

**Fighting for the Habsburgs: Community,  
Patriotism and the kaiserlich-königliche Armee,  
1788-1816**

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# Abstract

This thesis explores the social and cultural impact of conscription, military honour, and wartime experience on the Habsburg Monarchy during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It illuminates the ways in which the Habsburg army's military culture, its processes of recruitment, and its institutional displays of dynastic loyalty created *Soldat Bürger* - military servants of the Habsburg state. These were men whose corporate identity was founded on regional allegiances and dynastic loyalty, which combined to link the various parts of the Monarchy together and tie these places' prosperity and security to the dynasty's triumph over Revolutionary and Imperial France.

As this work shows, military innovations established under Joseph II, and an accompanying military honour founded on patriotic service to the state, were integral to the Habsburg Monarchy's ability to confront French power. Equipped with the motivating ethos of state citizenship (*Staatsbürger*), officers and soldiers alike were driven to fight by duty, virtue, and the community awarded to them as *Soldat Bürger*. This was a corporate identity and act of citizenship resting on utilitarian ethics of state service and enlightened sensibility, binding officers and men together as the dynasty's military servants.

This thesis argues the wartime role and identity of regular soldiers became a focus for regional and dynastic patriotism, serving as an integral element in a narrative of the war and encouraging subjects to embrace and reaffirm their commitment to the Habsburg state and its pluralistic, organic hierarchies headed by Emperor Francis II (I). A central part of this narrative was the communication of the *Soldat Bürger's* virtue and ascetic commitment to the values of monarchism and the security this granted the emperor's subjects. These attributes of military service presented Habsburg dominion as essential, mobilising civilian populations in the fight against the political ideology of Republican and Imperial France.

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## *Author's Declaration*

*I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work, and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.*



# Introduction

## Wartime Experience, Community and Patriotism in the Habsburg Monarchy

“What sufferings the soldier must endure in war from a tender youth, as the military service of mine and my brother’s attest to.” These lines, written in 1840 by a veteran of the Habsburg army’s struggle against Revolutionary and Imperial France, concluded the memory of a joyous family reunion. In late July 1799, in the heat of the Italian sun, Lorenz Zagitzeck, a first lieutenant in the Bohemian, Habsburg infantry regiment *Oranien* Nr. 15, his veteran captain father and his fifteen-year-old brother all met for the first time as soldiers of emperor Francis II (I). Already Lorenz was an experienced infantry officer, having served under his father since he turned eighteen. Stationed on the Bohemian border with Prussia throughout the Austro-Ottoman War (1788-1791), he then fought in every campaign of the First Coalition (1792-1797). His brother, Karl, had just graduated from the *Ingenieurakademie* in Vienna (Technical Military Academy) and was now an imperial cadet in the Bohemian infantry regiment *Fürstenberg* Nr. 36.

After travelling with a military transport of replacement conscripts from the Kingdom of Bohemia, Karl met with Lorenz and their father near the recently captured French citadel of Alessandria in Piedmont.<sup>1</sup> His father, Johann Zagitzeck, was aged 56, and suffered from illness and fatigue, having served since the Seven Years’ War. At 15 Johann had been conscripted for the Habsburg army in 1758 by the Moravian Diet and by the war’s end he had risen to ensign.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ÖstA (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv), KA (Kriegsarchiv), NL (*Militär Nachlässe*), B/682 Zagitzeck von Kehlfield, Lorenz, fol., *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben, meiner Familie zum Andenken gewidmet*, Part 1, 52.

<sup>2</sup> ÖstA, KA, Pers (Personalunterlagen), MLST (Musterlisten und Standestabellen der k. k. Armee (1740-1820)), I (1820 noch bestehende Truppenkörper), Infanterieregimenter (Infanterie), IR (Infanterieregiment) 15 1105 Musterlisten (ML), (1791), fol., *Herrn Hauptman von Zagitzeck Compagnie*, Nr.1. The number indicates the position of Johann Zagitzeck in the company list and the accompanying career notes.

Now he commanded a company, carried the noble title of von Kehlfeld thanks to his bravery in battle, and had created a dynasty of imperial military servants ready to lay down their lives for the Monarchy.<sup>3</sup> Outside of Alessandria, surrounded by the detritus of battle, the three relatives met and embraced, pleased at being reunited as a family and as comrades eager to fight for “Emperor and Fatherland.”<sup>4</sup>

The retired Major Lorenz Zagitzeck von Kehlfeld’s memory of this reunion outside Alessandria encapsulates the Habsburg experience, perception, and narrative of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The small details Zagitzeck included in his retelling of the war, written down at the urging of his children, like the experience of battlefield violence; the educational history, military career and social mobility of Habsburg soldiers; their memory of war; the motives and emotions of those who fought; the military practice of conscription; what the Habsburg Monarchy was for subjects and soldiers; and the human cost of serving the emperor, are all present in these pages. These details illuminate the influence of this period on the Monarchy’s people and the state they inhabited. Taken together they answer the one overarching question posed by this thesis: what was the experience of fighting for the Habsburgs during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and how did this influence the political culture of the Monarchy?

Resolving what the experience of soldiers fighting for the Habsburgs between 1788 and 1816 is a significant part of this thesis. Yet this specific mode of enquiry serves to explore how

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<sup>3</sup> Karl was appointed general-major in 1845, was pensioned in 1847 and died in 1850. *Militärschematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthums* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1850), 691. Hermann Zagitzeck von Kehlfeld, son of Karl, was a first lieutenant in the regiment his father commanded in 1844. He was appointed major in 1850 and served as a *Flügeladjutant*. He was killed at Solferino in 1859, with the rank of a lieutenant-colonel of the First Grenzer Regiment. *Militärschematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthumes* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1859), 670. Guido Zagitzeck von Kehlfeld, son of Lorenz, served as a first lieutenant and adjutant in the same regiment of his father and grandfather, and by 1850 was a major and adjutant to the 13th Army Corps under Prince Franz Liechtenstein. He died in 1853 whilst stationed in Pest as the corps-adjutant to the First Cavalry Corps. *Militärschematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthums* (Vienna: Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1853), 950. In 1865, Carl von Kehlfeld, son of Hermann, was appointed cadet in the 58th infantry regiment. In 1883 he was made a captain in the 95th regiment. By 1909 he had retired from active service with the same rank and was on local assignment in Olmütz. *Schematismus für das k. u. k. Heer und für die k. u. k. Kriegsmarine 1909* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei 1909), 1103.

<sup>4</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, fol., *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 52.

the Habsburg Monarchy was able to mobilise its people and combat an enemy focused on radically altering the social, cultural, and political systems of Europe to the dynasty's detriment. The French Republic's desire to safeguard its new political order by disposing of monarchism and social distinctions and assert the right to equality before the law across Europe attacked the legitimacy of the Habsburg crown in all its provinces and kingdoms. As did the colonial expansion of France's imperial period under Napoleon Bonaparte (1805-1815).<sup>5</sup> It was the monarchs of Europe the citizen-soldiers of France were after, as demonstrated by the French Legislative Assembly's declaration of war on the emperor Francis as Head of the Habsburg Monarchy. Explaining how the Monarchy's subjects understood the war as an attack on them, and not just their paternal monarch, will be a key part of this work.

Before the 24-year-old emperor Francis II had heard of France's intent to end his reign, their armies invaded the Austrian Netherlands in April 1792. The regular forces of the emperor, trained professional soldiers, were soon defeated in November at Jemappes by an army of volunteers under the French Foreign Minister, General Charles-François Dumouriez. The Austrian Netherlands was quickly overrun, looted viciously and the province lost. Yet in March the following year, the forces of the Habsburg Monarchy, reinforced by veterans of the Austro-Ottoman War, defeated the volunteer soldiers of France at Neerwinden and reclaimed the province for the young emperor. Revolutionary France's first attempt to overthrow the oppressive tyrants of Europe, and seize their territories, had been repulsed by the determination of regular Habsburg soldiers.

The alternating outcomes of Jemappes and Neerwinden set up the recurring theme of war between the two enemies. The Habsburg army would be soundly defeated, humiliated in some instances (Fleurus, Rivoli, Messkirch, Hohenlinden, Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz), leading to the loss of territory, political influence and some of the Monarchy's population after the First,

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<sup>5</sup> Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2014); Philip G. Dwyer ed., *Napoleon and Europe* (London: Routledge, 2014). For a review of the historiography of the First French Empire before and after Broer's work see the second preface to *Europe under Napoleon* and Steven Englund, "Monstre Sacré: The Question of Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire," *The Historical Journal* 51, no. 1 (2008): 215-50.

Second, Third and Fifth Coalition Wars (1792-1809). In an effort to reverse the decline of its fortunes the Monarchy would return to war and inflict defeats of its own (Würzburg, Ostrach, Novi, Aspern-Essling, Leipzig, La Rothière, Arcis-sur-Aube) until it eventually triumphed as part of the Sixth Coalition (1813-1814).<sup>6</sup> As historians have noted, the Habsburg army was resilient if nothing else.<sup>7</sup> Identifying the reasons for the Habsburg soldier's resilience and the Habsburg populace's persistent support for the dynasty's war effort drives the arguments of this thesis. This work, however, is not a revisionist military history of the Habsburg army. Other works have already noted Habsburg victories outweighed French.<sup>8</sup> What it does seek to clarify is just how an army, a people and a state, consistently beaten and bloody, could muster the political will to unite and challenge the seemingly indomitably might of France.

By political, and politics, this thesis borrows the definition of another historian of the period, Keith Baker, who argued politics at its very heart is about "making claims" on who or what an individual or a group is. As Baker concluded, politics should be understood as "the activity through which individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon one another and upon the whole."<sup>9</sup> What this definition provides is a way in which to examine the changes war brought to the social and political institutions of the Monarchy. It allows for the meaning attached to being a part of the Habsburg Monarchy to be measured, as well as explore the social groups these "claims" made and how the identities of these groups motivated individuals to place their wartime experience within the Habsburg state. Specifically, this work argues soldiers and their identity, which will be shortly explained further, provided a widespread and accessible way in which people of the

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<sup>6</sup> The propagandist Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel, writing for the army commander in 1809, the archduke Charles, rebutted the claims of the French to military supremacy thanks to Marengo and Ulm with the Habsburg army's own victories in "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien. Zu gleicher Zeit erließen Hochstadieselden folgenden Armeebefehl," *Wiener Zeitung*, April 8, 1809, 1605-1606.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence, 1683-1797* (London, Routledge, 2003), 416-42.

<sup>8</sup> Gunther E. Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814* (Chalford Stroud: Spellmount, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> Keith M. Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-6, and esp. 32. The application of this term in this thesis leans heavily on Maureen Healy's use of Baker's definition in her study of Vienna and its people during the First World War in Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Habsburg Monarchy could actively use the language and narratives of the state to align their interests behind the dynasty. Thereby creating a tangible whole which motivated, chronologically and spatially in different ways, the people of the Monarchy to rally behind the dynasty's war efforts.

This thesis shows how the war with France and the massed mobilisation of the Habsburg populace forced, as well as provided, the many different peoples within the organic structures of the Monarchy to properly comprehend their connections, justify the inequalities and assert their participation and place within the dynasty's state. It is a study of how the people of the Habsburg Monarchy engaged with one another and negotiated, understood, related, discovered and embraced their shared similarities as part of the Habsburg whole through the experience, narratives, representation and reception of soldiers as protectors of the fatherlands.<sup>10</sup> It argues localised conscription tethered to specific regions gave hundreds of thousands of men the language to immediately understand themselves as members of the Habsburg Monarchy, and as the prolonged war intensified, the ever-present soldier in local societies enabled subjects, authorities, nobles, town citizens (*Bürger*), the emerging middle-class (*Bürgertum*), cities and provinces to locate themselves within the emperor Francis' domain. These different parts engaged with the whole of the Monarchy through patriotic wartime philanthropy that identified the soldier as a representation of their civic values, dynastic loyalty, and local allegiances. In doing so these places and people concurrently acknowledge their corporate importance and their valuable contribution to the Habsburg fighting effort.

## **The Habsburg Monarchy and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars**

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars played a pivotal part in how the Atlantic world understood war as a cultural phenomenon in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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<sup>10</sup> This was the description given to soldiers before they went to war against the French for the fourth time in April 1809. See "Inländische Begebenheiten," *WZ*, April 8, 1809, 1605.

Thanks to the decades of massed battles across Europe between France and its enemies which necessitated greater military exigencies, war was narrated and perceived as a struggle between values and beliefs.<sup>11</sup> The totality of these narratives mobilised by both sides provided the basis for national identities in the nineteenth century, influencing political decisions even to today.<sup>12</sup> Yet these narratives of war were also unevenly understood, hyperbolic and unoriginal.<sup>13</sup> As scholarship on this period stresses, it was a time of burgeoning nations, nascent citizenship, and the people's sovereignty. Yet it was also a period of reaction and resoluteness. Where people across Europe rallied around traditional rights and freedoms, long-established structures of religious faith, and the social and cultural institutions defended and maintained by the monarchies of Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Historians interested in the impact of war and violence on western culture and society have recently turned to the everyday experience of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to fully comprehend its relationship to the political identities of those who witnessed it, and the generations after who lived with its memory.<sup>15</sup> This scholarship has sought to

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<sup>11</sup> David A. Bell, *The First Total War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2007); Maïke Oergel, "Introduction," in *(Re-)Writing the Radical Enlightenment, Revolution and Cultural Transfer in 1790s Germany, Britain and France*, ed. Maïke Oergel (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2012), 1-8.

<sup>12</sup> Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Étienne François, eds., *War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>13</sup> Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. Alltag, Wahrnehmung, Deutung 1792-1841* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007).

<sup>14</sup> Leighton S. James, *Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). A microcosm of the debate on the totality of the conflict and the war narratives used, which pitted ways of life against each other in a struggle of annihilation, can be found in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). In response to Chickering and Stig and other authors of the collected edition see David A. Bell, "Reviewed Work: War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815 by Roger Chickering, Stig Förster," *The English Historical Review* 126, no. 523 (2011): 1546-48. For a rebuttal of Bell's thesis advanced in *Total War* see Michael Broers, "The Concept of 'Total War' in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period," *War in History* 15 (2008): 247-68. For work that suggests the wars with France and massed mobilisation were the results of decades of military processes evident in the Old Regime of Europe, and not a revolution of military affairs in 1792, see Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid and Harold D. Blanton eds., *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?* (Chicago: Routledge, 2008); Frederick C. Schneid ed., *Warfare in Europe 1792-1815* (London: Routledge, 2015).

<sup>15</sup> Katherine Aaslestad, and Karen Hagemann, "1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German Central European Historiography," *Central European History* 39 (2006): 547-79; Karen Hagemann, "Francophobia and Patriotism: Anti-French Images and Sentiment in Prussia and Northern Germany during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars," *French History* 18, no. 4 (2004): 404-425. Ute Planert, "From Collaboration to Resistance: Politics, Experience, and Memory of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany," *Central European History* 39 (2006): 676-705; Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson, eds, *Enlightened War: German Theories and Cultures of Warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz* (Camden House: Boydell & Brewer. 2011); Thomas Hippler, "Volunteers of the French

understand subaltern experiences in the military and the effects of what was harrowing and radically felt wartime events on the civilian populations.<sup>16</sup> It is because recent scholarship has removed the delineation between the front and home-front, focusing on the experience and perception of the war in both spheres, that we now see the period between 1792 and 1815 as a seminal moment for all those who witnessed it, influencing the ways in which populaces realised their place in Europe.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the experiences of subalterns during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has emphasised the extent to which radical ideas, concepts of gender, use of rhetoric, military service, meanings of citizenship and dynastic displays mobilised during this period, shaped local and national identities in support of state-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as the Atlantic world's social, political and cultural response to those deemed as "other" in the modern period.<sup>18</sup>

Specifically, an approach preferencing the experience of the war, instead of its operational history, has provided new avenues with which to understand the conflict's

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Revolutionary Wars: Myths and Reinterpretations," in *War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War*, eds., Christine Krüger and Sonja Levesen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23-39; George S. Williamson, "Retracing the Sattelzeit: Thoughts on the Historiography of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Eras," *Central European History* 51, Special Issue 1 (2018): 66-74.

<sup>16</sup> Mark Hewitson, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands, 1792-1820* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 125-58; Philip G. Dwyer, "Violence and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Massacre, Conquest and the Imperial Enterprise," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 15, no. 2 (2013): 117-31; Dwyer, "It Still Makes Me Shudder: Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," *War in History* 16, no. 4 (2009): 381-405.

<sup>17</sup> Ute Planert, ed., *Krieg und Umbruch in Mitteleuropa um 1800: Erfahrungsgeschichte(n) auf dem Weg in eine neue Zeit* (Paderborn: Brill, 2009); Jasper Heinzen, "A Negotiated Truce: The Battle of Waterloo in European Memory since the Second World War," *History & Memory* 26, no. 1 (2014): 39-74; Christopher Clark, "The Wars of Liberation in Prussian Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of War in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany," *The Journal of Modern History* 8, no. 3 (1996): 550-76; Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall, eds., *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perception of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For histories documenting France and its army which had dismantled much of the social histories of the late nineteenth century eulogising the *Levée en masse* see Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (London: Duke University Press, 1990); Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On Britain see Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: military and civilian experience in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Renaud Morieux, *The Society of Prisoners: Anglo-French Wars and Incarceration in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Simon Quinn, "British Military Orientalism: Cross-Cultural Contact with the Mamluks during the Egyptian Campaign, 1801," *War in History* 28, no. 2 (2021): 263-82

destabilising, and constructive, ramifications in Central Europe.<sup>19</sup> This has enabled scholars to dismantle the grand narrative of the 1813 “Wars of Liberation” (*Befreiungskriege*) and the effect of its nationalising myth on Prussia, Bavaria and the other states of what was the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) during the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>20</sup> Experiences, as history has shown, which were later adopted to promote political unity and stability during the Second German Empire, or completely neglected if they were deemed as challenging the central tenets of this newly founded state.<sup>21</sup> Collectively, these works reveal Germany was not an articulated ideal generated during the wars with France waiting for Prussia to realise it, but a place full of regional and local actors. People and communities divergent but with shared experiences of occupation and mobilisation and with only an inkling of what could connect them as a people (*Volk*).<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture, and Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Hagemann, “Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre”: *Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002); Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, trans. Andrew Boreham and Daniel Brückhenhaus (Oxford: Berg, 2004); Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson eds., *The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, Michael Rowe eds., *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Sam A. Mustafa, *The Long Ride of Major von Schill: A Journey Through German History and Memory* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). An early example of this focus can be found in Werner Blessing, “Umbruchkrise und ‘Verstörung’: Die ‘Napoleonische’ Erschütterung und ihre sozialpsychologische Bedeutung (Bayern als Beispiel),” *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 42 (1979): 75-106.

<sup>20</sup> Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. Alltag, Wahrnehmung, Deutung 1792-1841* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007); Karen Hagemann and John Breuilly, “The Response to Napoleon and German Nationalism,” in *The Bee and The Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire*, eds., Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 256-83; Michael Rowe, “France, Prussia or Germany? The Napoleonic Wars and Shifting Allegiances in the Rhineland,” *Central European History* 39 (2006): 611-40.

<sup>21</sup> Mark Hewitson, *The People's Wars: Histories of Violence in the German Lands, 1820-1888* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 23-37; Jasper Heinzen, “State-Building, Conquest, and Royal Sovereignty in Prussia, 1815-1871,” *The Historical Journal* 64, no. 5 (2021): 1281-310. See also, Mack Walker, *German Hometowns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871* (London: Cornell University Press, 1998); Yair Mintzker, *The Defortification of the German City, 1689-1866* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). On memory in German state-building see Ewald Frie and Ute Planert eds., *Revolution, Krieg und die Geburt von Staat und Nation* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016); Katherine Aaslestad, “Remembering and Forgetting: The Local and the Nation in Hamburg’s Commemorations of the Wars of Liberation,” *Central European History* 38, no. 7 (2005): 384-416; Heinzen, *Making Prussians, Raising Germans: A Cultural History of Prussian State-Building after Civil War, 1866-1935* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 114-39.

<sup>22</sup> On the Napoleonic wars as the beginning of Germany see Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Germany: C.H. Beck, 1983). For a synthesis of the recent literature nuancing Nipperdey’s point see Helmut Walser Smith, *Germany, A Nation in its Time: Before, During, and After nationalism, 1500-2000* (New York: Liveright, 2020), 150-190; Stefan Berger, *Germany: Inventing the Nation* (London: Arnold, 2004), 37; John J. Breuilly, “Napoleonic Germany and State-Formation,” in *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State-Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c.1800-1815*, ed., Michael Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 121-52; James Sheehan, “State and Nationality in



However, historians have still yet to agree whether or not the wars signalled a sharp break with the past and an end to the cultural and institutional edifices of Old Regime Europe.<sup>23</sup> Nor have they agreed, for Germany in particular, if regional experiences precluded supra-regional identities. But the monolithic modern national identities founded on ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, which earlier scholarship argued emerged from the period, have been recalibrated to show many different voices and localised experiences were still prevalent, and outweighed nationalistic rhetoric.<sup>24</sup> Yet history has far from fallen into a sequence of regional studies, dismissing new cultural and social innovations mobilised in response to continental spanning war.<sup>25</sup> The focus on how the demands of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars informed ways of formulating popular identities, patriotism, nationalism, gender, class, religious worship, regional allegiances and local societies, has instead elucidated more clearly how these forces which influenced emerging ideas of the modern nation drew upon the old edifices of estate based societies that made it easier for populations to imagine themselves within larger national communities.<sup>26</sup> In short, the wars with France, experienced as a permanent crisis, allowed for the imagining of modern nations, whilst also seeing regional identities strengthened by Old Regime social and cultural institutions organised in support of mass mobilisation for

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the Napoleonic Period,” in *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-State*, ed., John J. Breuilly (London: Longman, 1992), 47-59; Jörg Echternkamp, *Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus 1770-1840* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1998).

<sup>23</sup> Mark Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 72-124.

<sup>24</sup> For some of the literature see footnote 20 and 22.

<sup>25</sup> See how regional studies and the region as a methodological enquiry works to inform the history of state-building in Julian Wright and Christopher Clark, “Regionalism and the State in France and Prussia,” *European Review of History* 15, no. 3 (2008): 277-93.

<sup>26</sup> Mary Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers: Hamburg, 1712-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Lothar Gall, ed., *Vom Alten zum Neuen Bürgertum: Die mitteleuropäische Stadt im Umbruch 1780-1820* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1991); Otto W. Johnson, *The Myth of a Nation: Literature and Politics in Prussia Under Napoleon* (Camden East: Camden House, 1989); Otto Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1993), 36-57. Dann’s work, a study which has served as departure point for later works critiquing the idea of Germany existing as a nation in 1813, whilst emphasising the nation as the sovereign entity men were willing to die for, did recognise the importance of territorial allegiances and regional identities that worked in conjunction with ideas of the nation.

dynastic states.<sup>27</sup> The conflict did not birth the modern Europe, but it played an influential hand in shaping it.<sup>28</sup>

It is by focusing on the experience of continental wide mass mobilisation, famously attempted on the national scale in France from 1793 onwards, which placed unheard demands on every stratum of European society, that historians interested in the cultural and social impact of war on state-building have found fruitful avenues of research. The impetus for the move away from detailed discussions on operational warfare to the analysis of the social and cultural innovations and continuities used to mobilise population during the war, as well as their long-term importance, has been fuelled by two methodological leaps. Both approaches - “New Military History” and “War and Society” - are interrelated.<sup>29</sup> As Peter Karsten articulated of the discipline of “New Military History”, it is interested in:

recruitment, training and socialisation of personnel, combat motivation, the veteran, the internal dynamics of military institutions, inter-and intra-service tensions, civil-military relations, and the relationship between military systems and greater society.

It is this emphasis on war as a cultural and social contingency, and not just an educational domain for military professionals, which have allowed for new approaches to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See also Michael Broers, Peter Hicks and Agustín Guimerá eds., *The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Ute Planert, ed., *Napoleon's Empire: European Politics in Global Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Christopher Thomas Goodwin, “Surviving Crisis: The Napoleonic Upheavals and the ‘Time of the French’ as Cultural Trauma in Prussia, 1806-1812,” *War & Society* 41, no. 1 (2022): 1-20.

<sup>28</sup> T. C. W. Blanning, “The French Revolution and the Modernization of Germany,” *Central European History* 22, no. 2 (1989): 109-29.

<sup>29</sup> This “leap forward” in the historiography is also the result of an emphasis from historians on the cultural history of the period promulgated by demographic developments within university departments and changes to curricula. See Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?* (Malden: Polity, 2008); Suzanne Desan, Roger Chartier and Aletta Biersack, eds., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Victoria E. Bonnell, Lynn Avery Hunt and Richard Biernacki, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>30</sup> Peter Karsten, “The ‘New’ American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored,” *American Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (1984): 389-418, esp. 389; Peter Paret, “Hans Delbruck on Military Critics and Military Historians,” *Military Affairs* 30, no. 3 (1966): 148-52. For a critique of practitioners of the “New Military History” which seemingly forget the military part in their area of expertise see Peter Paret, “The New Military History,” *Parameters* 21, no. 1 (1991), 10-18. See also Thomas Kühne und Benjamin Ziemann, “Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung. Konjunktoren, Interpretationen, Konzepte” in *Was ist Militärgeschichte?*, eds., Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (Paderborn:

These new historical enquiries have been evaluated using the second methodological approach previously mentioned: “War and Society”. As Michael Neiberg has articulated, this is a method allowing for the analysis of “the iterative symbiotic relationship between social and cultural systems and how those systems experience war.”<sup>31</sup> Importantly, works of “War and Society” are bottom-up methodologies, allowing historians of the “Age of Revolutions” to probe at the line between state and locality, between community and nation and at each of their value systems. Practitioners have found the changes in the way governments mobilised their armies during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period meant civilians engaged with the state more frequently, and in ways which were unique but not necessarily new, allowing for negotiations, unequal to be sure, between rulers and the ruled over what the purpose of the war was, and its relationship to the greater centralisation of power in the early nineteenth century.<sup>32</sup>

For instance, studies have emphasised the centrality of religion and the church in Britain, Germany, Russia and Italy to the experience of war. This institution, despite the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, was still a pivotal functionary of the state and a vital way in which people found out about war they were nominally a part of.<sup>33</sup> And it was also the chief way in which rural communities were told of the reasons why their sons had to now don the uniform of their monarch.<sup>34</sup> Concurrently in the cities, emerging modes of the popular press, and new cultural leaders in the “public sphere” encouraged the urban and the urbane to fully commit their patriotic support to the state’s war, utilising language which hyperbolised at times the magnitude of the conflict.<sup>35</sup> Alongside many different classes and ranks of men,

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Ferdinand Schönningh 2000), 9-48; Joanna Bourke, “New Military History,” in *Palgrave Advances in New Military History*, eds., Matthew Hughes William J. Philpott (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 258-80.

<sup>31</sup> Michael S. Neiberg, “War and Society,” *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, eds., Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 42-60, esp. 42.

<sup>32</sup> Ute Planert, “From Collaboration to Resistance,” 688-94.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Broers, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy: The War Against God, 1801-1814* (London: Routledge, 2002); Paul E. Kerry, “Zusammenleben: Goethe’s Ideas on Community Building and Transforming Religious Festivals in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars,” *Global Intellectual History* 1, no. 1 (2020): 64-85; William Stafford, “Religion and the Doctrine of Nationalism in England at the Time of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars,” *Studies in Church History* 18 (1982): 381-95; Wright and Clark, “Regionalism and the State,” 285-86.

<sup>34</sup> Planert: *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg*, 139-47, 507-22.

<sup>35</sup> Planert, “From Collaboration to Resistance,” 681. For France see Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1992).

women too were mobilised as never before, serving as wartime philanthropists and donors in newly specified gendered roles cooperatively supporting new masculinities which had military service at their centre.<sup>36</sup> These gendered roles proved vital across much of Central Europe, allowing the ideals, symbols and practices of state-building to permeate local societies, co-opt communal patriotism, and link regional allegiances with the much larger state community.<sup>37</sup> Thereby fuelling, until exhaustion in some cases, massed warfare's insatiable demand for men and material.

If this review has felt breathless, it is intentionally so. The proliferation of work which answered the calls of Karen Hagemann and Katherine Aaslestad to "explore the experiences of the Napoleonic Wars in different regions in German central Europe and their consequences for regionally specific politics and patriotic-national mobilisation," if still incomplete, has been met with gusto. Except by historians of the Habsburg Monarchy. Aside from Ernst Zehetbauer's study on the cultural and social ramifications of popular mobilisation in 1809 on local societies and the military identity of regular soldiers, popular operational histories are still typical.<sup>38</sup> The reasons for this are, according to Andrea Pühringer, clear. In Austria, professional military history, particular the period up to and including the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, is still the domain of "military critics", or at least those employed by the Republic of Austria's military defence within the Museum of Military History (*Heeresgeschichtliches Museum*) in Vienna.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Katherine Aaslestad, "Republican Traditions: Patriotism, Gender, and War in Hamburg, 1770-1818," *European History Quarterly* 37 (2007): 582-602; Karin Baumgartner, "Valorous Masculinities and Patriotism in the Texts of Early Nineteenth-Century German Women Writers," *German Studies Review* 31, no. 2 (2008): 325-44.

<sup>37</sup> For example, see Jean Helen Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813-1916* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

<sup>38</sup> Ernst Zehetbauer, *Landwehr gegen Napoleon: Österreichs erste Miliz und der Nationalkrieg von 1809* (Vienna: Österreichische Bundesverlag, 1999).

<sup>39</sup> Andrea Pühringer, "Between Stagnation and Expansion. The Military and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century," in *The Military in the Early Modern World: A Comparative Approach*, eds., Markus Meumann and Andrea Pühringer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage, 2020), 45-66, esp., 46-47. See also Laurence Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 34-41. See also Michael Hochedlinger, "Bella gerant alii ...? On the State of Early Modern Military History in Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 30 (1999): 237-77. For military histories see Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, *Das Heer unter dem Doppeladler: Habsburgs Armeen 1718-1848* (Vienna: Bertelsmann, 1981); Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1999); Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*; Rothenberg, "The Shield of the Dynasty: Reflections on the Habsburg Army, 1649-1918," *Austrian History*

Contemporary debates over the validity of military history - whether new or otherwise - in the Austrian public sphere, the paucity of historians interested in the Monarchy's *Sattelzeit* period (1750-1850), as well as the impetus of scholars from the Monarchy's successor states to focus on pertinent questions for these new polities, have meant recent scholarship is thin.<sup>40</sup> The extensive history that is available focuses on operational histories of the Monarchy's campaigns, the intellectual underpinnings of its strategies, foreign and domestic policies and court politics, stemming from the work of earlier generations of Anglo-American scholars. These diplomatic and administrative histories are incredibly useful in understanding what decisions were made and the difficulties the Monarchy faced in its war effort, but contain little of the experience of war, or the consequences foreign policy and military decisions had on the culture, society, identity formation and thus the politics (remembering Baker's definition) of the Habsburg state.<sup>41</sup>

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*Yearbook* 32 (2001): 169-206; Lee W. Eysturlið, *The Formative Influences, Theories, and Campaigns of the Archduke Carl of Austria* (Greenwood: Praeger, 2000); John H. Gill, 1809, *Thunder on the Danube: Napoleon's Defeat of the Habsburgs*, 3 Vols (Barnsley: Frontline Book, 2010); Gill, *The Battle of Znam: Napoleon, the Habsburgs and the End of the War of 1809* (London: Greenhill Books, 2020); James R. Arnold, *Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna* (Westport: Napoleons Books, 2013); Richard Basset, *For God and Kaiser: The Imperial Austrian Army, 1619-1918* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); One of the most recent publications in German is Ernst Rainer Gramm, *Karl Mack von Leiberich. Ein General gegen Napoleon* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2012); For older accounts see Oskar Criste, *Erzherzog Carl von Österreich*, 3 Vols (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller 1912); Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl: Dynastie und Heerwesen in Österreich, 1796-1809* (Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1972).

<sup>40</sup> For exemptions to this see Ilya Berkovich and Michael Wenzel, "The Austrian Army," in *The Cambridge History of the Napoleonic Wars*, 3 Vols., gen. ed., Alan Forrest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), Vol. 2, Part 2, Chapter 28 [Forthcoming]; Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-1792," in *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State, c. 1648-1815: Contours and Perspectives*, eds. William Godsey and Petr Mat'á (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 298-321. I would like to thank Dr Berkovich and Michael Wenzel for graciously allowing me to consult their manuscripts before publication.

<sup>41</sup> For a small but significant selection of works on Habsburg reforms and foreign policy see Karl A. Roeder, *Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); James Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the Eighteenth-century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Franz A. J. Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753-1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Charles A. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Derek Beales, *Joseph II Vol 1. In the Shadow of Maria Theresa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Beales, *Joseph II Vol 2. Against the World, 1780-1790* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II* (London: Routledge, 1994); Michael Hochedlinger, "Who's Afraid of the French Revolution? Austrian Foreign Policy and the European Crisis 1787-1797," *German History* 21, no. 3 (2003): 293-318; John Deak, *Forging a Multination State* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 19-36; Simon Adler, *Political Economy in the Habsburg Monarchy 1750-1774: The Contribution of Ludwig Zinzendorf* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020); Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Maria Theresa: The Habsburg Empress in Her Time*, translated by Robert Savage (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022).

Recent work, however, has started to piece together the experience of war through the personal testimonies of Habsburg soldiers, shedding light on the continuity of military experience and state violence before, after and during the wars with France. This scholarship, chiefly authored by Leighton James, is limited to a few articles, or has been used as part of a general examination of the German speaking world, though recent dissertations have focused on the local contexts surrounding the experiences of Habsburg soldiers.<sup>42</sup> Other works have also focused on the Habsburg home front. These can be neatly placed under another “new” approach - a more detailed review of this “new” history will come later in this introduction - which challenges the grand narratives of the Habsburg state’s inevitable decline thanks to the centrifugal force of nationalism combined with bureaucratic stultification.<sup>43</sup> This scholarship has focused on the intellectual history of patriotism in the Monarchy during the eighteenth century and its promotion of Habsburg state loyalty, as well as the representation of “Austrian-ness” during events surrounding and after the Congress of Vienna.<sup>44</sup> Together they have revealed some of the Monarchy’s efforts in constructing a unified polity in order to defeat France,

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<sup>42</sup> Leighton James, “War, Experience and Memory: An Austrian Cavalry Officer Narrates the Napoleonic Wars,” in *War Memories. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture*, eds. Alan Forrest, Étienne François and Karen Hagemann (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 41-58; James “Die Koalitionskriege in der österreichischen Erinnerungskultur -am Beispiel der ‘Tagebücher’ ders Husarenoffiziers Michael Freiherr Pauliny von Kowelsdam,” in *Glanz – Gewalt – Gehorsam: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie (1800 bis 1918)*, eds., Laurence Cole, Christa Hämmerle and Martiz Scheutz (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2011), 221-42; James, “For the Fatherland? The Motivations of Austrian and Prussian Volunteers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,” in *War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War*, eds. Christine Krüger and Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 40-58; Nebiha Guiga, “‘Le champ couvert de morts sur qui tombait la nuit’. To be Wounded in Combat and Healed in Napoleonic Europe (1805-1813),” PhD diss., (The University of Heidelberg, 2021).

<sup>43</sup> Ernst Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials: Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979). This is still an important analysis of the Habsburg Homefront during the wars with France. Yet it overplays the importance of the Jacobin traitors within the Monarchy to the Habsburg narrative of the war.

<sup>44</sup> Franz Leander Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch: Staatsbildung, Wissenskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Zentraleuropa, 1750-1850* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2020); Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Martin P. Schennach, “‘We are Constituted as a Nation’; Austrian in the Era of Napoleon,” in *Napoleon’s Empire: European Politics in Global Perspective*, ed. Ute Planert (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 241-51; Nicholas Mathew, *Political Beethoven* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). This last work has articulated the important contribution music, theatre and opera in Vienna had on formulating a wartime identity in the Austrian lands; Alfred Kohler, “Österreich und die deutsche Nation- politische und kulturelle Distanz?,” *Die deutsche Nation im frühneuzeitlichen Europa: Politische Ordnung und kulturelle Identität?*, ed., Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2010), 3-14, esp. 11-12. As well as a greater centralised state, staffed with loyal administrators, Kohler uses the music of Haydn’s “Kaiserlied” to suggest the Monarchy articulated “one nation” under the House of Austria, which sat outside of the *Reich*, as worthy of defending in order to mobilise popular participation before 1806.

though – and this is not a criticism – these works do not consider the effects of prolonged wartime mobilisation on Habsburg identity formation.<sup>45</sup>

Building upon this Austrian focused scholarship, this thesis rejects John Breuille’s claim “state-wide identities in the conglomerate polities of Austria” used to mobilise popular support for war did not matter at a popular level. Instead, it argues the Habsburg Monarchy and its people together created a united political community with which to challenge and outlast the might of France and its allies using “regional and local, religious and royalist sentiments” that concurrently existed alongside a sense of “Austrian-ness” formulated by these combined localised allegiances.<sup>46</sup> As sources show, these identities did not exist, or were imagined by contemporaries, as separate. As part of this argument, this work asserts the Monarchy’s military institutions constructed before the war with France, and frontline experience of it understood through Old Regime military identities, were pivotal in this community’s creation.<sup>47</sup> This thesis builds upon diplomatic and administrative histories of the Habsburg Monarchy in the later eighteenth century to show how military systems created during the reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II were successfully utilised by the population and governments of their successors to defeat France, whilst also offering these groups the ability to imagine themselves within a Habsburg state without relegating regional loyalties.

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<sup>45</sup> This Austrian-ness is vastly different to the German national identity older histories argue was prevalent in the Austrian Hereditary Lands up until the end of the Napoleonic war, see Walter C. Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930). For a tempering of Langsam’s claims see Hugo Schmidt, “The Origin of The Austrian National Anthem and Austria’s Literary War Effort,” in *Austria in the Age of the French Revolution*, eds., Kinley Brauer and William E. Wright (Minneapolis: Centre for Austrian Studies, 1990), 163-85; Karen Hagemann, “Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!” Patriotism and Masculinity in Texts of the ‘Political Romantics’ Written during Austria’s Anti-Napoleonic Wars,’ *German Studies Review* 24 (2006): 41-62.

<sup>46</sup> John J. Breuille, “The Response to Napoleon,” 262. See also Mark Hewitson, “Belligerence, Patriotism and Nationalism in the German Public Sphere, 1792-1815,” *The English Historical Review* 128, no. 533 (2013): 839-76.

<sup>47</sup> For a detailed analysis on the use of regiments to promote and show local allegiances to the dynasty see Guy Thewes, Horst Carl, and William D. Godsey’s essays in William D. Godsey and Veronika Hyden-Hanscho eds. *Das Haus Arenberg und die Habsburgermonarchie: Eine transterritoriale Adelsfamilie zwischen Fürstendienst und Eigenständigkeit (16.-20. Jahrhundert)* (Regensburg: Schnell and Steiner, 2019). On the military experience of creating these local units see Michael Hochedlinger and Anton Tantner, *... der größte Teil der Untertanen lebt elend und mühselig: Der Berichte des Hofkriegsrates zur sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage der Habsburgermonarchie 1770-1771* (Vienna: Studien Verlag, 2005)

# Military Identities, Regional Allegiances and Dynastic

## Loyalties

In this thesis the most important Habsburg system of state-building, and their links of inclusivity, is the dynasty's massive standing army created after the Seven Years' War (1758-1763). The introduction of a localised conscription system between 1770 and 1781 (*Josephinian Konskriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme*) created a permanent force which made the requirements of sourcing soldiers a much more intimate relationship between the Habsburg state and its populace.<sup>48</sup> This new form of raising soldiers, directly overseen by local military administrative wings of the central government (*Kreishauptmannschaften*), whilst not a complete break with a previous system of mobilising troops, which relied upon cooperative agreements between the crown and local authorities, demanded specific areas of the Monarchy provide men for localised regiments every year during peace and war.<sup>49</sup> The counting of all the people across the Monarchy to determine the human resources available to the army, population books updated monthly by local villages and yearly inspections by military officials of these books, mapped the interior of the state and brought central government to the parochial manor. As Michael Hochedlinger has argued of the Habsburg's state in the years before the French Revolution, it was a "military monarchy".<sup>50</sup> How this military monarchy functioned, was understood, embraced or rejected by its populace during the dynasty's most prolonged conflict in its modern period will be explored in this work.

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<sup>48</sup> For a review of this process see Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 265-398; Hochedlinger, "Militarisierung und Staatsverdichtung. Das Beispiel der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit," in *Krieg und Akkulturation*, eds., Angela Schottenhammer, Thomas Kolnberger, Ilja Steffelbauer and Gerald Weigl (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), 106-29; Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy: From 'Military-Fiscal State' to 'Militarization'," in *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson* ed., Christopher Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 55-95.

<sup>49</sup> Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy," 303-307.

<sup>50</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, "Der gewaffnete Doppeladler. Ständische Landesdefension, Stehendes Heer und 'Staatsverdichtung' in der frühneuzeitlichen Habsburgermonarchie," in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740: Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas* eds., Petr Mata and Thomas Winkelbauer (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 217-50, esp. 217.



Whilst the Habsburg army was an imperial army, a specific part of its military culture, understood as “the values, norms and assumptions that encourage people to make certain choices in given circumstances”, was a regional expression of identity fostered within units by the way men were locally recruited.<sup>51</sup> Instead of transforming locals into Austrians, the military provided an identity which co-opted men to fight for the Monarchy without stripping away the pre-military connections they valued. Men often shared the same understanding of place, and these areas’ traditions and memories, and whilst in the military they remained in these regions. The localisation of these forces in an effort to create a “second home” may have been an approach to combating “nostalgia”, a form of neurosis brought about by military service and a longing for the familiar comforts of home that led men to desert.<sup>52</sup> Most soldiers possessed the same civilian occupation, religion, ethnicity, gender and low status, which a military culture founded on respect and reward exploited to present soldiering as an identity possessing opportunities.

Bernhard Schmitt’s analysis of this practice in the Monarchy’s new province of Habsburg Venetia after 1815 and up until 1866 has shown what could have been a problematic process to state-building, using the army as a tool for regional integration, actually provided little in the way of political tension.<sup>53</sup> Whilst conscription was not totally acclaimed by those subjected to it, the co-opted power of local authorities, the obedience of their people, sympathetic and nuanced policies, and an army that offered a community and some security, meant units were easily mustered from the dynasty’s new Italian speaking subjects. As Schmitt concludes of the army between 1815 and 1866, it was not a “melting pot of nations” or “the

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<sup>51</sup> Peter H. Wilson, “Military Culture in the Reich, c. 1680-1806,” in *Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century*, eds. Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 36-59, esp. 39.

<sup>52</sup> Christopher Duffy, *Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 93. On nostalgia during the Napoleonic period see Thomas Dodman, *What Nostalgia Was: War, Empire, and the Time of a Deadly Emotion* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 93-95; Philip Shaw, “Longing for Home: Robert Hamilton, Nostalgia and the Emotional Life of the Eighteenth-Century Soldier,” *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 39, no. 1 (2016): 25-40. The Austrian physician Leopold Auenbrugger, who treated soldiers during the Seven Years’ War, labelled nostalgia as “*Heimweh*” and a result of men conscripted into the army by force. See Leopold Auenbrugger, *Inventum Novum* (Vienna: Joannis Thomae Trattner, 1761), 43.

<sup>53</sup> Bernhard Schmitt, *Armee und Staatliche Integration: Preußen und die Habsburgermonarchie 1815-1866* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 82-86, 122-32.

school of the nation” but an institution where Italian speakers were instructed to simply be soldiers from the province of Lombardy-Venice who recognised the authority of the dynasty.<sup>54</sup>

The military communities who followed this message, as Laurence Cole has shown of veteran associations in the Habsburg’s later period, served as anchor points of loyalty that bound local societies to the dynasty and its wider polity up until the Monarchy’s dissolution in 1918.<sup>55</sup> In regional communities after 1866 and before, Cole demonstrates, imperial military identities resting on dynastic loyalty, informed by men’s military service, were integrated with the local society and its traditions through the actions, military displays and festivities of veteran associations. What Cole suggests is these men’s “emotional attachment” to the Austrian state as formulated by their time in the army, consolidated people’s pragmatic, sociological choice to seek protection and order from the dynasty by accepting its authority.<sup>56</sup> What these veterans provided their local communities, Cole’s work concludes, was a “language of loyalty” embodied with “meaning and symbolism” with which to imagine “vertical ties of loyalty to the imperial centre.”<sup>57</sup>

What this thesis suggests is the localised military identities found in communities across Austria, Moravia, Bohemia and Galicia which provided the anchor points of loyalty, discussed by Schmitt and Cole, were first utilised during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars by the Monarchy’s populace and government.<sup>58</sup> Whilst universal conscription introduced in 1867 may have meant military service was spread evenly across social strata, these localised military institutions during the wars with France turned fighting for the Habsburgs into an equal

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<sup>54</sup> Schmitt, *Armee und Staatliche Integration*, 118-26, 289-93.

<sup>54</sup> Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, 19-23.

<sup>55</sup> Cole, 126-127.

<sup>56</sup> Laurence Cole, “Military Veterans and Popular Patriotism in Imperial Austria, 1870-1914,” in *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy*, eds. Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 52; Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, 140-154. As another example of integrative state-building using military loyalty to make it “acceptable” for regional actors to identify with a supra-regional authority see Heinzen, *Making Prussians*, 65-84, esp. 83.

<sup>57</sup> Cole, “Military Veterans,” 55.

<sup>58</sup> Karin Baumgartner, “Staging the German Nation: Caroline Pichler’s Heinrich von Hohenstaufen and Ferdinand II,” *Modern Austrian Literature* 37, no. 1 (2004): 1-20; Hewitson, “Belligerence, Patriotism and Nationalism,” 855-66.

contribution made by its many local societies and one that the populace recognised was mutually beneficial.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, local and persistent conscription, military displays of regional allegiances, and a culture of military honour, created fighting forces tantamount with the dynasty, but also local military institutions linked to regional places. These military processes served as discursive practices which connected local power and identity to a supra-regional “Austrian” identity, providing populations the ability to claim, “there is something we cherish about being a part of the Habsburg state” and express the active dimension of loyalty by sacrificing resources (life, money, time) to establish a commitment to it.<sup>60</sup>

Rather than a set fixed of principles, this work understands the supra-regional “Austrian-ness” fostered by dynastic loyalty was seen by those who inhabited it as a range of possibilities, which stemmed from placing one’s individual identity and local social structures (manor, town, region, province) within the boundary of the Habsburg state. However, “Austrian” self-recognition underpinned by the soldier was not an immediate effect of military conscription introduced to the Austro-Bohemian lands in the 1780s. This only came with continual war with France as decades of conscripting local men meant the uniform identity of the regular soldier was placed across the different parts of the Habsburg state. This process of turning local subjects into Habsburg soldiers provided avenues for societies to “make claims” with each other over what the state was. As this work shows, this sense of belonging was predicated by the socialisation of the Habsburg military, and the symbiotic relationship between regional places and local dynastic military institutions which allowed for plural identities.

In this way, the army was not a centripetal force which rigidly extended Habsburg imperial power into all the dynasty’s domains, but an avenue in which the Monarchy’s different territories and nationalities could lay claim to being a part of the whole. It was an opportunity used by the Habsburg populace at all levels to exhibit the loyalty and patriotism the dynasty and

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<sup>59</sup> Schmitt, *Armee und Staatliche Integration*, 288-89.

<sup>60</sup> George P. Fletcher, *Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 62-63.

their people needed to outlast the destructive forces of France.<sup>61</sup> In the next part of this introduction, I will show just how this study integrates with current historiography exploring the Habsburg Monarchy as a “site of personal and political allegiance and even loyalty for much of the modern period”.<sup>62</sup>

## Community and Patriotism

What was the Habsburg Monarchy? This is a question which still provides distinct and contrasting answers. Was it an empire; a feudal entity barely clinging on in the modern period; a semi-federalised polity with a hobbled central government; or a centralising regime with little care for the particularisms of its people? Earlier historians, like C. A. Macartney and A. J. P. Taylor, enticed by the inevitability of liberalism and the centralised nations it created in the early twentieth century, argued from the beginnings of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period the Monarchy was always sliding towards oblivion. To these historians, the Monarchy was beset by administrative stultification promulgated by selfish and conservative provincial governments. It was ruled by a small-minded, easily swayed, young emperor in Francis. He was a monarch who misdirected his attention, failed to make decisions and was advised by men who were always looking back. At the end of the conflict with France, these histories suggested, the Monarchy was exhausted because of its inefficiencies, forever behind the other nations of Europe and unable to harness the potential of its people.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Michael K. Silber, “From Tolerated Aliens to Citizen Soldiers: Jewish Military Service in the Era of Joseph II,” in *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, eds., Pieter Judson and Marsha Rozenblit (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 19-37, esp. 30-31. For views on conscription held by leaders of the Bohemian Jewry see Marc Saperstein, “War and Patriotism in Sermons to Central European Jews: 1756–1815,” *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 18 (1993): 3-14.

<sup>62</sup> William Bowman, Gary B. Cohen, Pieter Judson, Michael Yonan and Tara Zahra, “An Imperial Dynamo? CEH Forum on Pieter Judson’s *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*,” *Central European History* 50, no. 2 (2017): 236-59, esp. 237.

<sup>63</sup> C. A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971); A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1990); Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 250. Jaszi lays the blame squarely at the Hungarian Magyar nobility whose agitation for independence, as he claims, from the Habsburg’s – a centrifugal force – was able to undermine the work of its centripetal forces: dynastic legitimacy, the army, the aristocracy, the Roman Catholic Church, centralised state administration, as well as the free-trade policies within the Monarchy which had encouraged social mobility.

One hundred years is a long time to be in decline and recent historians now tend to reject the histories of Macartney and Taylor's period. Scholars now agree that whilst the Monarchy was confronted with unique state-building conundrums, it was a vibrantly enduring political community. One where peoples' recognition of the dynasty's power provided avenues for possibility, and where the Monarchy's leaders answered the demands and ideas of civil society until the wartime military regime of 1914-1918 weakened integrative promises.<sup>64</sup> Before its dissolution, historians argue, the Monarchy's heterogeneous nature forced it to be a place of integration, mutual commitment and tolerance, despite the vocal agitation of nationalists in its last decades – many of whom still placed their ideal polities within the Habsburgs' broader state framework.<sup>65</sup> This revisionist scholarship asserts throughout the nineteenth century the Monarchy served as an integral way in which people viewed their place in the world, and the Habsburg state answered the competing claims they made over one another. Indeed, as this thesis suggest, this way of viewing the Habsburg Monarchy was first properly established and utilised by its people under Francis thanks to the exertion it made in defeating Imperial France.

It is now an important time to explain the nature of the Habsburg state in the years leading up to and during the wars with France. Until its end the Monarchy was a composite state made up of many provinces and kingdoms who all shared the same supreme authority – the Head of the House of Austria.<sup>66</sup> The term composite state, properly introduced to the scholarship by John Elliot, lends itself well to the description of the Habsburg Monarchy. According to Elliot, “composite monarchies were built on a mutual compact between the

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<sup>64</sup> Marco Bellabarba, *Das Habsburgerreich 1765-1918* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020); Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 386-367; Judson “Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe: Introduction,” in *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, eds., Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (New York: Berghahn Book, 2005), 1-18; Cole, *Military Culture*, 317-18; Healy, *Vienna*, 122-62.

<sup>65</sup> Gary B. Cohen, “Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy: New Narratives on Society and Government in Late Imperial Austria,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 29 (1998): 37-61; Ernst Bruckmüller, “Was There a ‘Habsburg Society’ in Austria-Hungary?,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006): 1-16; Jonathan Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1861-1895* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>66</sup> Karin Schneider, “The Austrian Empire as a Composite Monarchy after 1815,” in *A History of the European Restorations: Governments, States and Monarchy*, eds. Ambrogio A. Caiani, Michael Broers (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 147-58.

crown and the ruling class of their different provinces which gave even the most arbitrary and artificial of unions a certain stability and resilience,” where different conditions like religion, geography, memory, institutions or language “together helped constitute the collective sense of a province’s identity in relation to the wider community of the composite state and to the dominant territory within it.” As Elliot elucidates, a “strong loyalty to the home community - the sixteenth- century *patria* - was not inherently incompatible with the extension of loyalty to a wider community, so long as the advantages of political union could be considered, at least by influential groups in society, as outweighing the drawbacks.”<sup>67</sup> As historians of the Monarchy have demonstrated, this sense of community and patriotism lasted for much of its existence, even if it is hard to define.

Infamously, the Monarchy’s polycentric nature was the result of happenstance. The many provinces and kingdoms which made up the dynasty’s dominion had come to the Austrian Habsburgs through marriage in the early modern period. A series of unlikely incidents (the full inheritance of the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns in 1526 after the end of the Jagiellon dynasty) turned a few archduchies along the Danube into a strategically important conglomerate of unequal lands loosely held together by a “baroque façade”, as Charles Ingrao has articulated, resting upon a trypic of Counter-Reformation policies, a Catholic nobility allied to the dynasty, and a genuine fear of the Ottoman threat.<sup>68</sup> As inheritance had been the way in which these places had come to the House of Austria, especially the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, and not war, the traditions, particularisms and legislative peculiarities had to remain if the crown was to be assumed.

After Prussia chose to assert its primacy in Central Europe between 1740 and 1780, these myriads of lands underwent decades of top-down economic, political and social reform seeking to solidify the dynasty’s hold over these places’ domestic resources in order to defend its political autonomy. In various and different ways, and to varying success, the fiscal systems

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<sup>67</sup> John H. Elliot, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past & Present* 137 (1992): 48-71, esp. 57-58.

<sup>68</sup> Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 126; R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

and human resources of these provinces and kingdoms, particular the Austro-Bohemian lands, were streamlined or husbanded with the goal of improving the Habsburg's capacity to defend its emerging state. The need for a well administered army dictated approaches to education, tenancy rights, taxation and noble privileges, creating societies in the lands of Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, which were now linked to the dynasty because the changes enacted to them made the crown a visible and tangible presence for inhabitants.<sup>69</sup>

Specifically, top-down reform between 1750 and 1790 in response to Prussian aggression meant parochial communities, overseen by powerful local noble-landowners, ecclesiastic orders and insular town councils, could now comprehend a greater political community: the Habsburg state.<sup>70</sup> The state also provided avenues for these authorities to seize new opportunities, whether through administrative or military service, or new economic and fiscal chances created by state-building.<sup>71</sup> William Godsey's monograph on the contributions of the provincial authorities and their subjects in Lower Austria to Habsburg military power best exemplifies how the cooperative relationship between nobles and the crown worked together for their mutual benefit. This relationship, Godsey argues, from the middle of the seventeenth century until the end of Napoleonic Wars, built the solid edifice of the Habsburg state: the military. The provincial estate's political authority was not relegated by central power but continued to exist after these political bodies becoming "essentially a civilian support structure for a standing army" which was indispensable to Habsburg power and foreign policy.<sup>72</sup> Never

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<sup>69</sup> For the most detailed overview see P. G. M. Dickson, *Finance and Government Under Maria Theresa 1740-1780*, 2 Vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars*, 267-290; Hochedlinger and Tantner, "Auf dem Weg Zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht? Die Einführung des 'Konkriptions -und Werbbezirkssystems' in der Habsburgermonarchie," in ... *der größte Teil der Untertanen lebt elend und mühselig*, I - XVIII.

<sup>70</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Mat'a and Thomas Winkelbauer, eds., *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 2 Vols. (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2019); Franz A. J. Szabo, "Camaralism, Josephinism, and Enlightenment: The Dynamic of Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-92," *Austrian History Yearbook* 49 (2018): 1-14.

<sup>71</sup> William D. Godsey, *Nobles and Nation in Central Europe: Free Imperial Knights in the Age of Revolution, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On state building before the wars with France and their ability to integrate some communities see Petr Mat'a and Thomas Winkelbauer, "Einleitung: Das Absolutismuskonzept, die Neubewertung der frühneuzeitlichen Monarchie und der zusammengesetzte Staat der österreichischen Habsburger im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert," in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740: Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas*, eds., Petr Mat'a and Thomas Winkelbauer (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 7-62.

<sup>72</sup> William D. Godsey, *The Sineus of Habsburg Power: Lower Austria in a Fiscal-Military State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 152.

was this more clearer than during the wars with France, where years of credit and loan extensions from the provincial estates to the crown shored up their shared bulwark against liberty, fraternity and French imperial oppression – the army - even as the state declared bankruptcy in 1811.<sup>73</sup>

Something more than cooperation between authorities was needed if subjects of local landlords were to be connected to the state, and their resources and efforts harnessed. The enlightened discourse on what it meant to be patriotic, utilising contemporary understanding of the republican antiquities of Greece and Rome, provided government bureaucrats the tools to imagine peasant subjects as citizens who would seek to serve the whole Habsburg state, and not just their local landlords. One way in which the Habsburgs went about creating ideal state citizens (*Staatsbürger*) was interceding in peasant tenant-noble landlord relations in the Austro-Bohemian crownlands. Particular attention was paid to the judicial power the latter had over the former between 1775 and 1789, which sought to remove the supreme power regional and local authorities had over their subjects by providing equality before the law. In doing so it was imagined the central government would remove the “middlemen” separating the dynasty from its human resources.<sup>74</sup>

Along with edicts of religious toleration and stipulations on tenant contributions introduced in the 1780s, the goal of this state-wide judicial reform was to create members of a larger organic body, loyal to the Head of the House of Austria - the state -, than mere supplicants to local manors. Subjects would become loyal citizens, it was believed, because the laws handed down by the crown alleviating feudalistic burdens and removing prejudicial barriers guaranteed a person greater access to opportunity and therefore happiness.<sup>75</sup> Consequently, individuals would be naturally inclined to work, provide and sacrifice for the state’s existence. Some administrative centralisations, however, and the codification of some laws did not mean there existed an exclusive unified patriotic “Austrian” identity resting solely upon identification

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<sup>73</sup> Godsey, *The Sineus of Habsburg Power*, 360.

<sup>74</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 24-30, 255-90.

<sup>75</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 154-200.



with a nation-state thanks to land and law reforms.<sup>76</sup> The Habsburg state was able to function effectively, as recent scholars have argued, because its government recognised the importance of its many different parts and was not fanatically tethered to developing one supreme identity.<sup>77</sup> Instead, late eighteenth and early nineteenth century populaces were actively encouraged to inhabit *composite* identities, with state citizenship as paramount, as this allowed the organic nature of pre-modern society, founded on inter-dependence, to flourish and strengthen the whole.<sup>78</sup>

During the wars with France, territorial allegiances and regional identities within the Monarchy were co-opted by the dynasty to bind together its many peoples through the mutual obligations demanded of loyalty. Brian Vick has termed this process of identity formation within the Habsburg state as “step-wise” patriotism, where familial, professional, communal loyalties, and their place within local sub-regions combined to manifest regional identities reinforced by local jurisdictions, civic orders, faith, and shared traditions.<sup>79</sup> These regional identities formulated a “provincial consciousness” linked to the dynasty by intersecting layers of authority ending at the emperor, who by inhabiting all local apexes of power brought together the regional loyalties to make up Habsburg state patriotism.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 381-83; Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement, 1700-1800* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973). On what Austria was to contemporaries see Grete Klingenstein, “The Meanings of ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian’ in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 423-78.

<sup>77</sup> Laurence Cole, “Differentiation or Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy,” in *Nationhood from Below. Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* eds., Marnix Beyen and Maarten Van Ginderachter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 96-119; Reinhard Stauber, *Der Zentralstaat an seinen Grenzen. Administrative Integration, Herrschaftswechsel und Politische Kultur im Südlichen Alpenraum 1750-1820* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

<sup>78</sup> Hannelore Burger, “Die Staatsbürgerschaft,” in *Grenze und Staat Paßwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremden gesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750 - 1867*, eds., Waltraud Heindl und Edith Saurer (Vienna: Weimar Böhlau, 2000), 88-168; Olga Katsiardi-Hering and Ikaros Madouvalos, “The Tolerant Policy of the Habsburg Authorities towards the Orthodox People from South-Eastern Europe and the Formation of National Identities (18th-early 19th Century),” *Balkan Studies* 49 (2014): 4-34. Klingenstein, “The Meanings of ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian,’” 462-70; Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 374.

<sup>79</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 40-52, 250, 273-74.

<sup>80</sup> See the essays by Laurence Cole and Hans Heiss, as well as Ewald Hiebl in, *Different Paths to the Nation: Regional and National identities in Central Europe and Italy, 1830-70*, ed. Laurence Cole (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). The explanation of what “provincial consciousness” was and how this related to Austrian identification is taken from Hiebl, “German, Austrian or ‘Salzburger’? National identities in Salzburg c.1830-1870,” in *Different Paths to the Nation*, 100-21, esp. 103-07; Robert A. Kann, “The Dynasty and the Imperial Idea,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, (1967): 11-31, esp. 24-27; Peter Urbanitsch, “Pluralist Myth and National Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy - A Futile Experience in the Creation of Identity?,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 34 (2004): 101-41, esp. 104.

Laurence Cole's study of the province of Tyrol in the 1790s shows just how these regional identities were mobilised to support the Habsburg state through appeals to protect a particular "provincial consciousness". In Tyrol, as the army of General Bonaparte was approaching in late 1796, men were encouraged to fight to protect a cultural regionalism founded on counter-reformation Catholicism; resistance to secular government reforms; the celebration of shooting clubs as cultural institutions; and a commitment and admiration for political autonomy. And whilst this collection of traditions had been maintained by Tyrolean provincial estates agitating within the Habsburg state, it was made quickly apparent that all of this would be lost if the full power of the Monarchy was not behind it. Connection to Vienna, despite its centralising agenda in the eighteenth century, had been a good thing for Tyrol, and the threat of a French secular army saw the provincial estate affirm the area's relationship to the dynasty after 1797 by meeting increasing military necessities.<sup>81</sup>

As Cole has shown in Tyrol, being "Austrian" meant maintaining allegiances within local communities, whilst simultaneously acknowledging these existed thanks only to the protection offered by the House of Austria. Daniel Unowsky has revealed in the later imperial period and earlier these local loyalties could be easily narrated as part of a unified dynastic patriotism through top-down displays of Habsburg power expressing the imperial family's right to supreme rule (*Herrschaft*).<sup>82</sup> In turn the Habsburg family repaid their subject's loyalty in each place by maintaining the privileges and interests of these kingdoms and provinces by utilising the power of the whole. As Robert Kann has argued, "the Habsburg imperial idea was genuine tradition embracing lands, peoples, and dynasty. All in one and one in All."<sup>83</sup>

Pieter Judson, Brian Vick and Paula Fichtner have recently attempted to unravel how a sense of being "Austrian" was promulgated by the dynasty and all its people during the

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<sup>81</sup> Laurence Cole, "Nation, Anti-Enlightenment and Religious Revival in Austria: Tyrol in the 1792," *The Historical Journal* 43, no. 3 (2000): 475-97.

<sup>82</sup> Daniel L. Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (Purdue: Purdue University Press, 2005), 12; For an example of this during the Napoleonic Wars in Galicia see Iryna Vushko, *The Politics of Cultural Retreat: Imperial Bureaucracy in Austrian Galicia, 1772-1867* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 101-03.

<sup>83</sup> Robert A. Kann, "The Dynasty and the Imperial Idea," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, no. 1 (1967): 11-31, esp. 31.

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Like Cole, all underline the importance of people's regional pride, or *Landespatriotismus*, to the Monarchy's war effort. Paula Fichtner has argued the Monarchy's armies were motivated by a "territorial patriotism [which] identified the monarch as a supreme father of his people", and "identified regional interests with the dynasty's defence".<sup>84</sup> This regional pride was fostered through local state edifices, run by local authorities, which promoted specific region's contributions to the emperor.<sup>85</sup> According to Fichtner, the Habsburg state was localised through wartime rhetoric used to promote patriotic support along regional identities, as opposed to a unified Habsburg state identity.<sup>86</sup> Judson too, like Cole, emphasised regional pride as a motivating element, citing local militia (*Landwehr*) as *the* regional institution which encapsulated and promulgated territorial patriotism. Judson argues specifically that though these units were mobilised to protect the Habsburg state in 1809, they were made up of men heavily invested in the rights and freedoms which shaped their regional conditions. The *Landwehr*, as Judson contends, was a sign of a region's "mutual obligation, not an organic unity", yet it still helped locate these regions within the Habsburg's wider state.<sup>87</sup>

Conversely, Brian Vick suggests there was a desire from the Habsburgs to create an organic unified state out of its many parts stimulated by the creation of the Austrian Empire in 1806 (*Kaiserthum Oesterreich*). Vick contends a systematic attempt was made to construct an "Austrian" identity through the exposure of all to the many different places within the Austrian Empire using the popular press. Free of some of the censorship which had prevailed up until 1806, publications took great care to relate the many different parts of the Habsburg whole. Backed by central government, these periodicals and newspapers, usually edited by state officials, sought to create recognition and therefore links between local societies of the Monarchy.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Paula Sutter Fichtner, *The Habsburgs: Dynasty, Culture and Politics* (London: Reaktion Books, 2014), 156, 162.

<sup>85</sup> On the importance of pride in local state edifices to regional allegiances and state-building see Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm, eds., *Region and State in Nineteenth-century Europe: Nation-building, Regional Identities and Separatism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>86</sup> Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 162-63.

<sup>87</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 93-97.

<sup>88</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 42-43

As Vick insists:

the idea was not to construct an Austrian identity that superseded or suppressed regional or minority identities, particularly not a solely German-speaking one, but rather to encourage each language group or regional-provincial population to cultivate its own heritage, language, and identity in ways that would then redound to Austrian identity and power, as each group recognized the mutual support and protection of the parts for the whole and the whole for the parts.<sup>89</sup>

This thesis does not refute the detail of these claims. Instead, it moves the point of departure for much of this analysis away from the War of 1809, the creation of the Austrian Empire and the popular uprisings in Tyrol, to show how regional identities and a sense of “Austrian-ness” existed alongside one another and coalesced for the *whole* war around localised, dynastic regular military institutions. By doing so this project shows how “regional-provincial populations”, both soldiers and civilians alike, cultivated their own local wartime identity through the efforts of their regular fighting men, which also came to be understood as a way in which local societies could engage with the many other parts of the Habsburg state. This thesis shows localised societies imagined themselves as part of “Austria” using the local soldier’s vocabulary of state citizenship. A military ethos predating the founding of the Austrian Empire in 1806 of “mutual support and protection of the parts for the whole and the whole for the parts”, which motivated men to fight as state servants.

## **The *Soldat Bürger* as a Symbol of Dynastic Loyalty**

An important part of this thesis’ argument is Habsburg subjects understood the soldier as the symbol for a unifying Austrian identity which allowed room for regional allegiances to be acknowledge and expressed. This was a developing process, one that went through many phases, but was a constant presence throughout the war. The soldier was mostly a young, conscripted man, sometimes juvenile, forced to serve in the Habsburg army. He was poorly paid, at times inadequately fed and whose support for made up almost all the state budget and

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<sup>89</sup> Brian E. Vick, “The Vienna Congress as an Event in Austrian History: Civil Society and Politics in the Habsburg Empire at the End of the Wars against Napoleon,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 46 (2015): 109-33, esp. 127.

therefore the cause of the greatest financial strain placed on the Monarchy's populace. He was usually one of the most marginalised of society, but this did not make him uniquely repulsive to civilian populations as almost 50 percent of the male populace was a potential soldier in waiting.<sup>90</sup> Little seems to mark these men out as an expression of regional allegiances and dynastic loyalty. In particular, the Habsburg soldier lacks any of the credentials of the key development in military identities and national symbols stemming from this period: the citizen-soldier. Yet, as this thesis argues, the Habsburg soldier symbolised the community and the patriotism of all the dynasty's many societies because of a unique military identity constructed before the advent of the citizen-soldier: the *Soldat Bürger*.

Old Regime military identities of Europe have been marginalised in the historiography of the period, namely because they were seen to be inferior motivators to fight for the state than ideas of sovereign citizenship which first emerged during the "Age of Atlantic Revolutions" (1770-1815). Gunther Rothenberg's work on the Habsburg army, though noting its ability to endure, encapsulated this trend by romantically implying the elimination of a "people's army" after 1820 (*Landwehr*), and the continuation of its "pre-revolutionary" "military establishment" contributed to the Monarchy's geo-political shortcomings between 1792 and 1848. He argued the army, an eighteenth century one existing in a new and modern world, was a stultified force, made up of lazy, apathetic company officers, who bemoaned some of the more humanising approaches to leading their men, and advocated the use of the stick as the prime motivator for those under their charge. The enlisted men were "unfortunate", "misfits and criminals", who were subjected to pitiable and neglectful conditions and eager to desert. And when they did, these men formed bands of criminal gangs that preyed on the civilian population.<sup>91</sup> After learning of Rothenberg's post-war army, we are left asking: how could an institution which

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<sup>90</sup> Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 1: 45.

<sup>91</sup> Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 9-15; Rothenberg, *Napoleons' Great Adversary*, 30.

created this peace-time force so low on morale, discipline and cohesion provide an army that defeated Imperial France and its citizen-soldiers?<sup>92</sup>

The apparent superior motivating military identity of the citizen-soldier stemmed from the idea of state citizenship which permeated the “Age of Atlantic Revolutions”. One which implied the nation – its people, languages, laws and traditions – was the sovereign entity, and not the monarch.<sup>93</sup> Defending this sovereign entity through military service was then imagined as the social responsibility of men whose personal rights and self-determination rested on the continual existence of the nation.<sup>94</sup> This connection between citizenship and military service promulgated the idea that the right to active citizenship was expressed through participating in acts of state violence, allowing for the state in the modern period to mobilise unheard of numbers of men.<sup>95</sup>

Peter Wilson has shown between 1650 and 1800 an intellectual evolution to the idea of the fighting man, which coincided with centralised standing armies under the command of the monarch, eventually contributed to the manifestation of the citizen-soldier. To summarise, Wilson elucidates discussions in the eighteenth century on the soldier’s role “equated good soldiers with ideal subjects”. And the paternalistic military institutions of monarchies reinforced

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<sup>92</sup>Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars*, 441-42. Hochedlinger argues the tend to romanticise the citizen-soldier has impeded historian’s ability to create nuanced histories of the confrontation between France and the conservative powers of Europe

<sup>93</sup> T. C. W. Blanning. *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802* (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 119-21. Blanning convincingly historicizes the belief in the superior social and psychological motivating components of the citizen-soldier, with his elan and enthusiasm for the nation. Though more does need to be done to connect the ascendancy of romanticism in the European cultural sphere to the apparent superiority of the “feeling” citizen-soldier over the princes’ “automatons”.

<sup>94</sup> Ruth Seifert, “Identitat, Militar und Geschlecht: Zur indentitatspolitischen Bedeutung einer kulturellen Konstruktion,” in *Heimat - Front: Militar, Gewalt und Geschlechterverhältnisse im Zeitalter der Weltkriege*, eds., Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2002), 53-58; Katherine Aaslestad, “Krieg, Demobilisierung und Erinnerungskultur in den republikanischen Stadtstaaten Hamburg, Bremen und Lübeck, 1813-1830,” in *Kriegsenden, Nachkriegsordnungen, Folgekonflikte, Wege aus dem Krieg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed., Jörg Echternkamp (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2012), 53-74.

<sup>95</sup> Daniel Moran, “Introduction: The Legend of the *Levée en masse*,” in *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, eds., Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-7. On France specifically see Alan Forrest, “*La patrie en danger*: The French Revolution and the First *Levée en masse*,” in *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, eds., Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-32. See also Stefan Dudink and Karen Hagemann, “War and Gender: From the Thirty Years’ War and Colonial Conquest to the Wars of Revolution and Independence-an Overview,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds., Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, and Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 37-77 esp. 61.

“cultures of forbearance” to the sovereign. As the “Age of Revolutions” progressed, military identities discursively became a role that mandated men showcase their ability to be “ideal citizens with a more active political stake in society.” After 1792, when corporate and local identities were abolished for “liberty and efficiency” in France, soldiering became “a rite of male passage in most European countries” and were serving in the “nation assumed a prominent place in ideals of manliness.”<sup>96</sup>

Stefan Dudink has argued the change to western soldiers’ military identity can be pinpointed to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, arguing citizenship as a transatlantic trend was predicated on mass mobilisation in defence of one’s sovereignty, defined by the nation, which in turn provided a masculinity which shored up the exclusive processes of popular participation in the nineteenth century. Dudink argues historians of gender and war should:

think of the introduction of general conscription in France in 1793 and 1798 and in Prussia in 1813/14 as “a single transnational process”—an argument that can also be extended to Austria’s 1809 legislation to establish a *Landwehr* (militia). It was the encounter with the might of Napoleon’s Grande Armée with conscripts from France and the occupied and allied territories of the Napoleonic Empire (1804–14/15) that set Austria and Prussia on a course of reform in which Prussia in particular imported central elements of revolutionary France’s military innovations—albeit to its own political ends.”<sup>97</sup>

Though Dudink and others assert the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as a single transnational process, Karen Hagemann’s work on the resulting cultural meaning attributed to soldiering after Prussia’s military reform in the wake of defeat in 1806, has highlighted new military identities overlapped, but did not supersede, older forms of military ethos. Hagemann has defined the Prussian regular soldier “*Waffenmannes*” as a different form of “patriotic valorous manliness” to the French citizen-soldier, or the new model Prussian “*Webrmanns*”. *Waffenmänner*

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<sup>96</sup> Peter H. Wilson, “Wars, States and Gender in Early Modern European Warfare, 1600s-1780s,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds., Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, and Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 74-95, esp. 88-89. For a critical interpretation of this process see Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War,” *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000): 41-72.

<sup>97</sup> Stefan Dudink, “Citizenship, Mass Mobilization and Masculinity in a Transatlantic Perspective, 1770s-1870s,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds., Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, and Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 201-24, esp. 205.

were described in political rhetoric as honourable men, usually the regulars and the reserves, who protected the honour of the local fatherland, motivated by “love” for the territorial state, whilst the new *Wehrmänner* were motivated as “citizens of the state with a sense of responsibility towards the nation”.<sup>98</sup> The nation as was understood by these new soldiers, exemplified by the student volunteers, academics and poets of the Prussian Lützow Free Corps founded in 1813, was the people of Germany as defined vaguely by their shared linguistic and cultural traditions.<sup>99</sup>

Hagemann’s studies aptly elucidated in Prussia the citizen-soldier and his duty to defend his rights and the share of sovereignty in the nation was but one part of the discussion on contemporary soldierly models. There, even in 1813 during the outpouring of nationalistic rhetoric from the more educated of Germany, other models of military service co-existed. Yet because historians and military thinkers have viewed the changes to the way in which Prussia and France mobilised for war as ending the Old Regime in Europe, there had been a lack of research on how and if massed mobilisation predating 1792 was understood as social action.<sup>100</sup> Recently, William Ian Miller has even called into question the motivational difference between fighting for honour and for the nation, noting the two psychologies induced a form of shame inspired courage where men are stimulated to fight in the hopes of living up to the expectations of their comrades and immediate superiors. Fighting to maintain honour, or the nation, Miller concludes, still meant soldiers fought to protect the “*polis*”.<sup>101</sup> And it is only very recently older forms of mobilisation dependant on selective conscription, subject-authority relations, lifetime service and military cultures founded on honour, have been seen as expressing and making

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<sup>98</sup> Karen Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’: Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon,” *Central European History* 30, no. 2 (1997): 187-220, esp., 195, 215-16; Hagemann, “*Männlicher Muth und Deutsche Ehre*”: *Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 308-16. On a study of the organisation of the Prussian reformed army between 1809 and 1813 see William O. Shanahan, *Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1945). For work on the army before the war see Otto Büsch, *Military System and Social Life in Old-Regime Prussia, 1713-1807: The Beginnings of the Social Militarization of Prusso-German Society*, trans. John G. Gagliardo (Boston: Humanities Press, 1997).

<sup>99</sup> Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’,” 197.

<sup>100</sup> Smith, *Germany*, 1; Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789-1830* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 6-8; Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 93-108; Moran, “Introduction: The Legend of the Levée en masse,” 3-4; Peter Paret, *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 52.

<sup>101</sup> William Ian Miller, *The Mystery of Courage* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 178-79.



tangible the views, values and morality of monarchical states positively held by their inhabitants.<sup>102</sup>

This thesis argues the Habsburg Monarchy's Old Regime military service, devoid of the active political participation ethos of the citizen-soldier, was able to create soldiers who served as unifying links of loyalty and symbols of self-recognition for the Habsburg populace in ways which were vital to its war effort. Specifically, it articulates how "good soldiers" were pronounced as "ideal subjects" by the military culture of the Habsburg army and how officers and men internalised this message. It then examines how this ideal subject was narrated, perceived and understood by the Monarchy's wider populace during its wars with France as a representation of their dynastic loyalty. This military identity served to motivate individuals to fight on the battlefields of Europe for the Habsburg, but also promoted patriotic support for Francis' cause from his subjects by underscoring the viability and vitality of the dynasty's state to its peoples.

I have termed this Habsburg fighting identity *Soldat Bürger* for it encompasses two very important strains of Habsburg state building and popular patriotism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century: military service and state citizenship. The term *Soldat Bürger* is the descriptor Joseph von Sonnenfels used for his explanation of what exactly the patriotic fighting man should be in his work *Über die Liebe des Vaterlandes*. This was a collection of didactic writings published in 1771 defining the means in which the different members of Habsburg society would contribute as state citizens by directing the purpose of each individual's role in their local community to the betterment of the whole. According to Sonnenfels, a pivotal government official and force for state-building throughout the later part of eighteenth century, the *Soldat Bürger* was a man who derived satisfaction from serving the state as he was intended to

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<sup>102</sup> Sascha Möbius, *Mebr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind?: Eine mentalitätsgeschichtliche Studie zur preussischen Taktik im Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller e. K., 2007); Stefan Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006); Peter H. Wilson, "Imperial Defence. Integration Through Military Conscription?," in *Die deutsche Nation im frühneuzeitlichen Europa: Politische Ordnung und kulturelle Identität?*, ed., Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2010), 15-34.

– as a fighting man within the Habsburg Military Estate.<sup>103</sup> As part of this corporate body, the soldier was the guardian of the state’s laws, traditions, particularisms and people and the safety of its political system. He also understood his ability to contribute to the state and show love for it was a vital part of its existence. The *Soldat Bürger* did not act out of vain glory, violently asserting his right to rank and privilege within the military, but obtained honour, the social capital which recognised fighting men as state members, by only acting with the intent to protect the Monarchy’s public safety.<sup>104</sup> By meeting his obligation to the state through the embodiment of the martial masculinity stipulated by the Habsburg military code of honour, a man could lay claim to citizenship in it.

A pivotal point of Sonnenfels’ language of patriotism was a utilitarian view of state service, where patriots were inspired by the eudemonic benefits one could derive from working towards its security. The sense of contentment, or welfare one got from state service did not come exclusively from the pleasure derived from serving something bigger than oneself, but also from the privileges and opportunities the existence of the state derived for individuals.<sup>105</sup> It was the idea of self-gratification obtained from service, as well the specific patriotic displays Sonnenfels assigned to particular social classes, which permeated the three central tenets of the Habsburg soldier - honour, duty and obedience. The reward for patriotic service and exhibiting a dutiful and obedient desire to serve the state through military excellence was honour. This possession of honour provided a community to the once marginalised enlisted men and young ambitious officers where status in a hierarchical society could be obtained. Military honour was both social capital and a moral framework which formed a corporate community where members’ social identity was founded on serving the state in the right way.

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<sup>103</sup> Josef von Sonnenfels, *Sonnenfels gesammelte Schriften, Siebenter Band* (Vienna: Baumeisterischen Schriften, 1785), 218.

<sup>104</sup> Miller, *The Mystery of Courage*, 179.

<sup>105</sup> The historical context of Sonnenfels patriotism can be found in Echternkamp, *Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus*, 50-76.

It is important to pause now and define how the *Soldat Bürger* differed from the modern citizen-soldier identity which Robert A. Nye has argued shaped modern western masculinities, and as Thomas Hippler has suggested, was pivotal in “the integration of the individual into the sphere of the national state” in the two other great belligerents of the war - Prussia and France.<sup>106</sup> It is also important to summarise the uniqueness of this identity as a form of civic inclusion in the Habsburg state, as well as underscore its usefulness as an analytical tool of Habsburg frontline experience and its relationship to the forms of state-building examined in this study.

The citizen-soldier of France, as it was portrayed in its early Republican years and inspired by the American revolutionaries, was a virile man, full of deeply patriotic feelings motivated by the understanding his liberty and equality only came from the new democratic political order he now inhabited.<sup>107</sup> Yet this man was also aware that his political rights, as conferred by his citizenship in the nation, came with commitments to his fellow citizens, and these bonds which made up the nation always superseded pursuits of personal liberty.<sup>108</sup> It was this nexus between martial virtue and the rights of, and right to, political citizenship, which motivated men to make heroic sacrifices for the French nation.<sup>109</sup>

The understanding that political citizenship, as Dudink has explained, came with the inherent quality of patriotic selflessness entered French political culture after the war with the Habsburgs broke out in 1792.<sup>110</sup> Previously, acts of citizenship in Republican France, just as it was in the Habsburg Monarchy under Joseph II, had only meant patriotically serving “*La Patrie*” above all other bonds of loyalty and importance.<sup>111</sup> But with the armies of Prussia and Leopold

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<sup>106</sup> Robert A. Nye, “Western Masculinities in War and Peace,” *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 2 (2007): 417-38; Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies*, 8.

<sup>107</sup> Osman, *Citizen Soldiers*, 80-86.

<sup>108</sup> Brian Joseph Martin, *Napoleonic Friendship: Military Fraternity, Intimacy, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-century France* (Lebanon NH: University Press of New England, 2011), 19-28.

<sup>109</sup> Bell, *First Total War*, 138-142.

<sup>110</sup> Dudink, “Citizenship, Mass Mobilization and Masculinity,” 213-14.

<sup>111</sup> Jennifer Ngaire Heuer, *The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 44-46.

II massing on the French border, citizenship as it related to male suffrage came with the responsibility of fighting on the battlefield to protect these rights, and the popular sovereignty enjoyed by all. So effective in forming the massive volunteer French army of 1794, however brief these men stayed with the colours, the idea that the survival of a free society depended on citizens willing to die on behalf of democracy formed a “powerful ideological category” in the Atlantic world. This belief became entwined with emerging, modern understandings of masculinities, which identified one’s passage to manhood and right to political action was achieved through military service.<sup>112</sup>

Such was the persuasiveness of this ideology used for mass mobilisation, firmly established by French victories on the battlefield, that it dominated military reforms and debates across Europe after 1794 and into the twentieth century.<sup>113</sup> Specifically, these discussion that joined together mass mobilisation, gender and popular politics was felt keenly in Prussia after 1806, whose interpretation of the citizen-soldier model would inform liberal desires for universal male suffrage and political sovereignty in post-Napoleonic Central Europe.<sup>114</sup> As military theorist had argued during and after the wars with France, it was the patriotic selflessness of the citizen-soldier, who inhabited a nation which posited military duty as the crucible of masculine citizenship, which powered the successful territorial defence of the Republic, and provided the foundations for the French imperial army’s culture of equality.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Dudink, 209-13, esp., 213; Robert A. Nye, “War Mobilization, Gender, and Military Culture in Nineteenth-Century Western Societies,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds., Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 268-88; Joan Landes, “Republican Citizenship and Heterosexual Desire: Concepts of Masculinity in Revolutionary France,” in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, eds., Stefan Dudink, John Tosh and Karen Hagemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 96-115.

<sup>113</sup> Stefan Dudink, “In the Shadow of the Citizen-Soldier: Politics and Gender in Dutch Officers’ Careers, 1780–1815,” in *Gender, War and Politics. War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850*, eds, Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mettele and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 110-126. See as an example of the citizen-soldier model in twentieth century American and Israeli society, Shaul Mitelpunkt, *Israel in the American Mind: The Cultural Politics of US-Israeli Relations, 1958-1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 177-231.

<sup>114</sup> Karen Hagemann, “German Heroes: The Cult of the Death for the Fatherland in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, eds., Stefan Dudink, John Tosh and Karen Hagemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 116-34.

<sup>115</sup> On the military culture of the late French republican army, and then its new imperial army under Bonaparte, see respectively Jean Paul Bertaud, *The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-Soldiers to Instrument of Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 286-300; Michael J. Hughes, *Forging*

The citizen-soldier was then the ideological belief that, despite state coercion, men were highly motivated to undertake military duties to assert the primacy of their masculinity and ward off claims of effeminacy by protecting the citizenship rights and political privileges their gender entailed.<sup>116</sup>

In the Habsburg Monarchy, citizenship remained as the mark of a patriotic and loyal subject who contributed to the state. It never changed to mean the right to political sovereignty.<sup>117</sup> This meant the Monarchy had no need to adopt the citizen-soldier ideal to facilitate the mass mobilisation of men. As this work shows, the military processes and practices of the army were already entwined with unique ideas of patriotic military service and citizenship established during the years of enlightened absolutism between 1765 and 1790 under Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In the pre-war political culture of the Monarchy, citizenship was used as an aspirational term by the centralising Habsburgs to requisition domestic manpower from feudal authorities who ruled localised estate-based societies. These reformers did this by highlighting the identity of citizen (*Staatsbürger*) as the key to new forms of security, advancement, and prosperity.<sup>118</sup> For men deemed eligible for military service by rank, class and occupation, the army was positioned as their way in which they established their active citizenship and ability to obtain opportunities within new hierarchies made available through systems of state patronage distributed by the Habsburg dynasty.

To reiterate for the purposes of this study, the contemporary term *Soldat Bürger* is used here to highlight the Monarchy's own interpretation of enlightened civic virtue, duty and the

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*Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012).

<sup>116</sup> Stefan Dudink and Karen Hagemann, "War and Gender: From the Thirty Years' War and Colonial Conquest to the Wars of Revolution and Independence- an Overview," in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds., Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 36-73, esp., 61.

<sup>117</sup> Bürger, "Die Staatsbürgerschaft," 101. As Sonnenfels argued in 1798, "Bürger, ja Bürger. Dem warum soll in dem Missbrauche eingeräumt sein, den Sinn eines Wortes verdachung zu machen oder zu entstellen, das bis jetzt immer einen Menschen bezeichnet hat, der unter dem unmittelbaren Schutze der öffentlichen Verwaltung die Rechte der gesellschaftlichen Vereinigung genießt und nur Gesetzen und dem Organe der Gesetze, dem Oberhaupt des Staates, untertan ist."

<sup>118</sup> Bürger, 100.

common good which it used throughout the war with France to mobilise its own population for war. It underscores the Josephinian ideal of state participation, espoused by Sonnenfels in his work *Über die Liebe des Vaterlandes* and echoed in the political language of Francis' government, that narrated citizenship as a symbol of dynastic loyalty earned and expressed through deeds done to improve the prosperity and security of the state. It is a term the jurist Sonnenfels exclusively devised in his work to set out the ways the fighting man could align himself with the state and claim his rewards.<sup>119</sup> The soldier proved and earned his citizenship as a loyal servant of the dynasty, as opposed to mere subjects of local feudal landlords, by fighting to protect the wellbeing of the whole Monarchy. This psychology of state service, as this work shows, was inculcated within officers, conscripts, and volunteers alike by a military culture that equated honour, as a form of status, with an individual's exemplary demonstration of state service as dictated by the needs of the Habsburg army. This code of honour was made easier for men to adopt as it was founded on mutual respect, appreciation, compassion, and purpose made tangible by men in the army sharing the same experiences. The community that such displays of social behaviour created co-opted men to value military service for the material and psychological opportunities it could bring, motivating them on the battlefields of Europe.

Using an honour culture to co-opt men to serve the state in the standing armies of the eighteenth century was not exclusive to the Habsburg Monarchy. In response to the distress of the Seven Years' War contemporary discussions in France, Britain, Germany, and the Monarchy emphasised the links between honour, loyalty, fraternity, community, and military effectiveness.<sup>120</sup> Military intellectuals, inspired by enlightened discourses, engaged with a European "military public sphere" to realise a way in which their states' standing armies could maintain their effective fighting capabilities during future wars. In France, Christy Pichichero and Julia Osman have highlighted how new concepts of honour created after the Seven Years'

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<sup>119</sup> On the use of citizen and citizenship in enlightened absolutist rhetoric see Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 52-54.

<sup>120</sup> On the burgeoning "military public sphere" of the mid-eighteenth century see Matthew McCormack, *Embodying the Militia in Georgian England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Cornelis van der Haven, "Military Men of Feeling? Gender Boundaries and Military-Civil Encounters in Two German Soldier Plays (1760-1780)," *Journal for Eighteenth Century Studies* 41, no. 4 (2018): 511-25.

War also influenced the First Republic's treatment and representation of the *levee en masse*, and the motivations of subsequent armies used by Napoleon after universal conscription was introduced in 1798.<sup>121</sup> These two historians argue the French military reform period of the late eighteenth-century, and its approaches to military motivations, were reliant on the philosophical discourse of sentimentality to construct psychologies enabling men to withstand modern warfare. This intellectual approach to soldiering, found across Europe, has been termed the "Military Enlightenment". As part of this "regiment of letters" military philosophers drew on knowledge of ancient Greek and Roman republican warriors to suggest soldiers needed to be native-born. This would breed recognition between civilians and soldiers, they argued, and promote a relationship between the two spheres, motivating men to serve and their communities to support wartime mobilisation.<sup>122</sup>

At the apex of this enlightened discourse, Pichichero explains, was a change to the understanding of military honour fuelled by a moral sentiment founded on caring for others. War, these inspired military intellectuals imagined, could be "respectful, sociable, benevolent, and compassionate" instead of needlessly brutal. This meant honour, understood previously as the desire to avoid ignominy, was revised as something which evoked the natural capacity to be social and empathetic. This understanding was used to form moral codes for the soldier and officer to share. These honour codes cultivated "familiarity, camaraderie, community, respect and ... recognition" and these values would form "humane social bonds", allowing men to draw on a shared professional spirit to bolster their physical and physiological health.<sup>123</sup> Because the

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<sup>121</sup> Christy L. Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment: War and Culture in the French Empire from Louis XIV to Napoleon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 112; Osman, *Citizen Soldiers*. See also Marie-Cecile Thorat, *From Valmy to Waterloo: France at War, 1792-1815* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Valerie Mainz, *Days of Glory? Imaging Military Recruitment and the French Revolution* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016);

<sup>122</sup> David D. Bien, "The Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction and Revolution," *Past & Present*, no. 85 (1979): 68-98. Conversely David Bien argues these military intellectuals were interested in creating a military caste of military families rooted in the ethos of "talent" which separated men from the *polis* they defended. However, as Osman and Pichichero show, these French writers, believed a professionalism rooted on talent pursued fastidiously by native-born men, as opposed to mercenaries motivated by pay, would improve the image of the army to the point that it was celebrated as an institute of national pride. Osman, *Citizen Soldiers*, 58-62. For a study of military life as an escape from the banality of peasant life see David M. Hopkins, *Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766-1870* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002).

<sup>123</sup> Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment*, 8-10.

soldier shared a value system with his social betters - aristocratic officers and the king - it was believed the fighting man would also be better viewed by his non-combatant neighbours. An advantage of this, it was hoped, was increased retention rate and enlistment numbers.<sup>124</sup>

Yuval Noah Harari has demonstrated how after the Seven Years' War social and personal identities founded on compassion went some ways to secure loyalties. In the most part, Harari argues, common soldiers nurtured by officers, who viewed their own benevolence as integral to their social standing, committed to state service.<sup>125</sup> In greater detail Ilya Berkovich has revealed how these discussions influenced Old Regime military corporatism which used honour to promote soldiering as an acceptable way of life to marginalised men. Honour, Berkovich contends, socialised men to desire the respect of their peers, and the mutual nature of these relationships encouraged soldiers to stay with their units. This same desire for respect from peers and officers, unobtainable in civil society, also motivated soldiers to fight on the battlefield. Coercive techniques were still readily used, yet these punishments worked alongside honour to promote unit cohesion by assuring men their status and identities were meaningful.<sup>126</sup>

Katrin and Sascha Möbius' study of the writings of Prussian common soldiers during the Seven Years' War, and Stefan Kroll's use of military regulations and the ego document from soldiers of the Saxon army in the eighteenth century, reveal fraternal honour and benevolent paternalism created motivated military communities. These historians have shown how the exposure of soldiers to civilians through supplementary work and extensive systems of leave drew local communities to favourably view the dynastic state and the soldier. As the Möbius' demonstrate, civilians' need for the same royal acknowledgment as the combatants amongst them allowed Prussia to demand more from local places during war.<sup>127</sup> In Saxony, Kroll argues,

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<sup>124</sup> Osman 61-62. As Timothy Blanning has shown, none of this really matter when men could not be paid. T.C.W. Blanning. *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 27-28.

<sup>125</sup> Yuval Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelation and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 180-90.

<sup>126</sup> Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33, esp. 175-78; Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 188.

<sup>127</sup> Katrin Möbius and Sascha Möbius, *Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years' War: The Psychology of Honour* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 34. On the improved, but precariously balanced relationship between soldiers and urban subjects, see also Florian Schui, *Rebellious Prussians: Urban Political Culture Under Frederick the Great and His Successors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-34; For



local societies saw the soldier as representing their patriotic support for the Prince Elector, encouraging wartime philanthropy.<sup>128</sup>

An example of the “Military Enlightenment” successfully playing out can also be found in what was previously seen as the bastion of Old Regime military servitude: Russia. In Russia, during the reign of Catherine II, Eugene Miakinkov has stressed the various means in which men could leave the military if unhappy meant coercive techniques were understood as almost ineffectual. Instead, Miakinkov argues the enlightenment provided military frameworks where “layers of belonging, identity, and commitment” coalesced to show peasant recruits the possibilities “open to them as soldiers”. Opportunities, his work argues, which encouraged the once dubious peasant serf to remain with his regiment. For these men, a life where “slave had to kneel before his master” was gone and replaced by respectful interaction between trained professionals based upon systems of honour nurturing respect. In Russia’s army, up until and throughout the Napoleonic wars, Miakinkov concludes, it was the healthy relationships between officers and men, the paternal care shown by military authorities, and the moderate punishment they meted out, which motivated men to see soldiering as vastly better than serfdom.<sup>129</sup>

What a review of this recent scholarship shows is European states, long before massed mobilisations in France, co-opted intellectual strains of the enlightenment to provide meaningful communities for their military servants.<sup>130</sup> Through processes of socialisation these communities created disciplined, obedient and willing soldiers who would fight and die in order to protect their reputation, their regiments’ and their monarchs’. In doing so they protected the

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another work that argues canton soldiers were viewed with pride by their local community see Jörg Muth, *Flucht aus dem militärischen Alltag: Ursachen und individuelle Ausprägung der Desertion in der Armee Friedrichs des Grossen: mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Infanterie-Regimenter der Potsdamer Garnison* (Freiburg: Rombach, 2003).

<sup>128</sup> Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert*, 370-35. Kroll’s work makes some similar arguments on local societies identifying with their regiments during the wars with France in his analysis of the Saxon army before 1796.

<sup>129</sup> Eugene Miakinkov, *War and Enlightenment in Russia: Military Culture in the Age of Catherine II* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 130-35, esp. 135.

<sup>130</sup> Ludolf Pelizaeus, “Die zentraleuropäische Entwicklung der Begriffe Ehre Disziplin und Pflicht im Spiegel von Militärschriftstellern und Reglements 1500–1808,” in *Ehre und Pflichterfüllung als Codes militärischer Tugenden*, eds., Ulrike Ludwig, Markus Pöhlmann and John Zimmerman (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2014) 29-45, esp. 43-44.

state and maintained a military honour that provide them with a corporate society and the possibility of privilege.<sup>131</sup> In the Monarchy, the *Soldat Bürger* was Sonnenfels' expression of the perfect Habsburg soldier, and because of his dedication to protecting the state, articulated by his desire to fight for "Emperor and Fatherland", this thesis argues, he was also recognised during the wars with France as the population's symbol of dynastic loyalty.

In this work, the *Soldat Bürger* serves as a crucial lens to examine the political will of the Habsburg populace precisely because it relates directly to intellectual strains of state-building and military processes relied upon in the Habsburg Monarchy, enabling us to examine its wartime state using the language of its subjects. As this thesis argues, soldiers' connections to their communities and the dynasty, the enlightened state identity they assumed as *Soldat Bürger* where honour was a display of their patriotism, and the views this afforded them of the world, meant the Habsburg populace chose to use these men as symbols and conduits of loyalty and unity.<sup>132</sup>

## The Structure of this Study

As each segment of this introduction has suggested, this thesis seeks to contribute original knowledge to three areas of historical study: the everyday experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the Habsburg Monarchy; the Monarchy's state-building and imperial project in its later period; the "Military Enlightenment's" effect on war as a cultural practice in the western world. In this work Vienna serves as the nexus to chart the relationship between military culture and popular patriotism, between the "Military Enlightenment" and wartime experience. By limiting the investigation of military practices to infantry regiments in Upper and Lower Austria, I am best able to detail the Habsburg war effort and its effects on the socio-cultural milieu in the space allowed. It is these specific regions where French occupation

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<sup>131</sup> Möbius, *Prussian Army Soldiers*, 78; Miakinkov, *War and Enlightenment in Russia*, 130-31.

<sup>132</sup> Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert*, 374-75. Kroll again makes a similar argument in his work, suggesting the military enlightenment of the eighteenth century, its intellectual public sphere and the way in which the military honour of soldiers promoted dynastic loyalty in local societies may have been prevalent phenomenon in Central Europe.

was fiercest, soldiers and resources were constantly mobilised and where Vienna, the cultural, social, and political hub of the dynasty, was located. This does not mean the study does not try to consider the Monarchy's other regions. The experiential sources used are from Habsburg soldiers who came from across the Monarchy, and the conscription practices found in Austria also cover Bohemia and Galicia where most Habsburg soldiers were from.<sup>133</sup> The date range of this study begins in 1788 with the commencement of the Austro-Ottoman War and ends in 1816 when the wartime Habsburg army was demobilised. As this study explains, the last war with the Ottoman Empire is vital to understanding the Monarchy and its people's response to the political culture and military power of France.

The work comprises six chapters answering what was it was like to serve in the Monarchy's army, and what effect this experience had on the ways in which inhabitants engaged with the Habsburg state. The first chapter examines the economic situation of the peasant classes to appreciate the oppressive experience of pre-military life. By comprehending the isolating precarity of young men, we can grasp why the military communities created by the *Soldat Bürger* were motivating for soldiers. This chapter then explores the intellectual and functional reasons for why the Habsburg standing army preferred native-born conscripts over migrant volunteer professionals. These choices stemmed from debates beginning in the 1760s over the army's links to wider society and contextualise the army's military identity. The last section assesses the interplay between burgeoning concepts of state citizenship from the 1770s and the normative values of the army. It concludes the characteristics attributed to the *Soldat Bürger* by Sonnenfels were exhibited in military regulations through the forms of honour used to motivate soldiers fighting France.

The second chapter articulates how this identity was disseminated across the Austro-Bohemian lands through mass conscription, beginning in the 1780s and continuing until 1816.

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<sup>133</sup> I do, however, understand this generalisation leaves this work open to criticism for too much emphasis on Vienna. As an example of a history of the Monarchy's period which could have been written with a very Bohemian focus see David S. Luft, "Austrian Intellectual History and Bohemia," *Austrian History Yearbook* 38 (2007): 108-21; Hugh LeCaine Agnew, *The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2004).

It focuses on the conscription of Habsburg subjects in local regiments from Upper and Lower Austria to show how this process realised the commitment of the many layered territorial authorities within the Monarchy and the communities they represented to the dynasty. The chapter concludes localised conscription served to deliver the soldier's language of state service to these places, providing the most consistent way people engaged with and understood the Monarchy's war effort.

The third chapter is devoted to analysing the official norms of the *Soldat Bürger* and the experience in which company practices, social connections and military rituals instilled these values within officers and men. It also focuses on how regiments were places of discourse between region, province and the state through the semiotic language of the Habsburg army's material culture. It argues the flags of regiments and the bodies of soldiers were sights used to communicate and affirm the importance of the *Soldat Bürger* to the fighter, his community and the state, as well as the dynasty's legitimacy to the rest of Europe.

The fourth chapter continues the focus on the normative values of the *Soldat Bürger* by examining how they affected and gave meaning, through individual reflections, to the violent scenes of battle witnessed by Habsburg soldiers. The experience of battle, as Marian Füßel and Michael Sikora claim, is "culturally conditioned" and reliant on the perception of its participants to reconstruct its reality. The *Soldat Bürger's* honour – his ability claim respect and maintain reputation within military communities thanks to his state service– was the key part of soldiers' perception of violence.<sup>134</sup> As this section argues, the *Soldat Bürger's* desire to maintain his honour meant wartime violence was seen as an important test of character which needed to be repeatedly overcome. This "culture of battle" provided men of all ranks a way to mediate war's debilitating physical and psychological effects.

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<sup>134</sup> Marian Füßel and Michael Sikora, "Schlachtengeschichte als Kulturgeschichte," in *Kulturgeschichte der Schlacht*, eds., Marian Füßel and Michael Sikora (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2014), 11-26, esp. 22.

Chapters five and six focus on how the soldier was represented to the Habsburg populace and their reception of it as a symbol of “Austrian” identity, the dynasty’s legitimacy and the structures of state they were purported to protect. Together these chapters show how the image of the soldier was constantly used between 1788 and 1815 to obtain popular engagement with the military effort on the Monarchy’s home front from its establishing, and previously untapped bourgeoisie society. Chapter five charts how the image of the soldier was used in popular plays, poems, militaria, sermons and newspapers to elucidate the primacy and legitimacy of the Habsburg state to its people by articulating the traits of the *Soldat Bürger* as exhibiting the values of the most loyal subject. Characteristics and principles, this rhetoric asserted, which proved the dynasty and the social hierarchy it assured was the sole purpose for the comfort and security enjoyed by its people.

Chapter six argues this message was positively accepted and the soldier was used by local societies, as evidenced by communities providing substantial patriotic donations and care to “their” local regiment, to assert their place within the Habsburg state. The wartime philanthropy offered by the Habsburg populace to the men of their local military institution was acknowledged as the patriotic role non-combatants were afforded in their fight for the Habsburgs. Whilst women of various social levels were expected to organise these contributions, this chapter argues patriotic gifts were not exclusively the domain of women which cooperatively worked with the gendered male soldier. Instead, wartime giving was seen as a way in which those exempt from military service could make meaningful contributions to the state mirroring the service of the *Soldat Bürger*. This chapter concludes by examining the soldier’s role in post-war celebrations, and suggest his position was used to affirm the supremacy of the Monarchy’s political system and celebrate the contribution of the state’s many places to Habsburg victory.

Taken together these chapters show how the *Soldat Bürger* as an expression of state service motivated men to fight, was embraced by the Monarchy’s many communities as the tangible representative of its inhabitants’ values and served as the means with which different

peoples located themselves within the dynasty's war effort and its state-building project between 1788 and 1816.

## Chapter One

### “Usable for other State Necessities”: State-building and the *Soldat Bürger*

In December 1792, two months after the Battle of Valmy, infantry regiment *Deutschmeister's* recruiting officers were provided with 191 new conscripts from the rural villages making up some of the manorial estates (*Dominien*) south of Vienna.<sup>1</sup> The conscripts had been identified in the most recent “survey of souls” (*Seelenskonskription*), undertaken by local military officials with the support of their administrative counterparts on manor estates, as men “usable for other state necessities” (*zu anderen staatsnotdürften anwendbar*).<sup>2</sup> Recruited between late December and early January, the lack of seasonal agricultural work, the winter weather and the precise known location of these men destined for “state necessities”, made it possible for the military authorities to gather these souls and begin a transformation that would turn subjects of the local manors into *Soldat Bürger* of the Habsburg state.<sup>3</sup>

The regular soldiers who took on the power of Revolutionary and Imperial France were men whose motivations and experiences of war were influenced by state reforms introduced in the later part of the eighteenth-century by Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II. Habsburg state-building from 1740s up until the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars were social, cultural and intellectual movements which transformed the expectations Habsburg rulers had of their

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<sup>1</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 368 ML, (1792), fol., *Assentliste, December 1792*. I have used the spelling giving to local manors (*Domänen*) found in the Habsburg army administrative documents of the period

<sup>2</sup> Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 1: 45. This was the term given to those identified in the census of the Habsburg population started in the 1770s who were economically invaluable to the local economies controlled by landowners and therefore collateral for the Monarchy's wars.

<sup>3</sup> IR 4 368 ML, (1792), fol., *Assentliste, December 1792*.

subjects, and the expectations these rulers saw themselves owing the people under their dominion.<sup>4</sup> Influenced by the philosophy of Renee Descartes, and the work of the Vienna based cameralist professor Johan Heinrich Gottlob Justi and jurist Joseph von Sonnenfels, the Habsburgs understood themselves as the “head” and “mind” of the state body-politic. According to Justi, lecturing during the reign of Maria Theresa (1740-1780), the state was a “well-made machine”, which could be attuned and directed by the regent to achieve its “ultimate purpose”, the “strength and felicity of the state”. Absolute power in the state had to lay in the hands of the regent - “the artificer” - as only they could be relied upon to make sure every component of the machine worked towards serving the state’s “ultimate purpose”. It was the monarch, Justi argued, who was the chief servant of the state as they could wield supreme power in maintaining its efficiency and deciding its “felicity”. As part of this pursuit of happiness, Justi contended, the monarch was responsible for exercising those “deep rooted prejudices” of early-modern society which barred the contentment of the modern body politic.<sup>5</sup>

Maria Theresa’s son and successor, Joseph II (1780-1790), saw himself as a “servant of the state” responsible for husbanding the wealth, welfare, and prosperity of those he ruled. Those who he ruled were now accountable for “working for the general good according to their wealth, their strength, and their capacity to be useful.”<sup>6</sup> Explaining what the “state” was, or the “general good” meant, or how one could be “useful” was one of the key goals of Habsburg state-building. For Maria Theresa and Joseph, the “general good” meant the dynasty safe from foreign aggressors as it was their tradition of rule which guaranteed subjects’ safety and happiness. Those destined for *Deutschmeister* in 1792 were the tangible reality of what “working for the general good...according to their capacity to be useful” was. These men were domestic resources whose value to the state was realised as its military servants.

This chapter examines the specifics of peasant society, reforms to peasant tenant-noble landlord relations and the economies of local manors in Austria during the latter half of the

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<sup>4</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 258-73; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 54-58.

<sup>5</sup> Stollberg-Rilinger, *Maria Theresa*, 189-90.

<sup>6</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 51.



eighteenth century. It does this to understand the position and prospects of those men who were marked out for conscription, which can also be used to describe the situation of volunteers, providing context to the life and opportunities all common soldiers were presented on joining the Habsburg army.<sup>7</sup> The chapter then goes on to consider why the Habsburg Monarchy's military intellectuals specifically chose to focus on mobilising domestic human resources for its army. Finally, it examines the discourse of enlightened state-building which informed the construction of the *Soldat Bürger* as a co-opting identity. It argues conscripts, volunteers and officers alike were provided a corporate identity founded on a culture of honour which provided possibilities unattainable in pre-military life, turning military service into a utilitarian choice. For conscripts and volunteers, the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* afforded chances hitherto unseen: security, community, social mobility.<sup>8</sup> For officers who were eager for

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<sup>7</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, II, LIR 50 Stain 10.507 ST (*Standestabellen*, (1797), fol. *Assentliste, July 1797, Bischoff*. To put a name to these volunteer men and provide a general experience of their life before enlistment, as well as the authorities and systems which controlled them, the *Assentliste* of the 22-year-old Joseph Bischoff provides a neat summary. Bischoff was from the village of Löffelstelze in Franconia (*Franken*). He was man without a profession or family, and who had never served in the military. On July 20, 1797, he was paid 15 fl. to volunteer for six years in the *Stain* infantry regiment. This was a unit based in Linz. At 182 cm (5 *Fuß*, 7 *Zoll*), he provided the perfect physique for the regiment's grenadiers. He arrived in Linz on July 29 to begin his training in *Stain's* reserve division. Most of the soldiers in the regiment recruited during this period were around 170-175cm. Stain was able to recruit from Bischoff's village as it sat under the dominion of Francis' uncle, Maximilian Francis, who in his capacity as Grand Master of the Teutonic Order had authority over the people there. The villages around Bad Mergentheim, like Löffelstelze, were part of the Grand Master's estates, which the emperor Francis, as head of the Holy Roman Empire, had been given recruiting rights to. See Peter H. Wilson, "The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The English Historical Review* 117, no. 472 (2002): 536-68, esp. 541.

<sup>8</sup> To attest to the army's ability to provide a "well to do life" the conscripts and volunteers whose ego-documents are found in the bibliography all achieved the rank of sergeant, or senior gunner, after living lives of economic precarity before enlistment. Some men did live a life of security before joining the army and this was because their fathers also served. Some fathers went from migrant volunteers to sergeants and then went on to obtain secure work in local military administrations as clerks after being discharged: ÖStA, KA, NL, B/1396 *Schernerer, Johann*. Others rose from conscript to officer before receiving ennoblement, positions which helped their son's careers: NL, B/682 *Zagitzeck*. Some *Reich* volunteers were able to achieve security for themselves and their families after obtaining commissions, which also opened officer positions for their sons: Herbert Wolderstorfer, "Schatten des Krieges: Napoleons armee Soldaten," *Österreichische Heimatblätter* 53, no. 3 (1999): 257-67; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 59 K5017 ML, (1806), fol., *Nachtigall Compagnie, Nr. 4*. Nachtigall. Franz Nachtigall was born in Stein, Upper Austria and served as a second lieutenant in infantry regiment Nr. 59. He is listed as, "*Ein Officiers Sohn vom Regiment*". His father, Heinrich Nachtigall was a *Reich* who having originally volunteered in 1777 had risen from enlisted soldier to second captain; See also Michael Pauliny von Kowelsdam, "Bruchstücke aus dem Tagebuche eines alten Huszaren," *Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ)*, no. 6 (1848): 292-312; *Streffleurs Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 3 (1863): 139-140 and 326-28; *Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift* no. 4 (1867): 85-88. Pauliny von Kowelsdam went from volunteer hussar to lieutenant-colonel and retired after 36 years of service as director of the *Filial-Invalidenhaus* in Vienna with the rank of a Baron and the Prädicate *von Kowelsdam* for his bravery at Kowel (Kovel, Ukraine) during the 1809 campaign. See also, ÖStA, KA, NL, B/932, *Reinhard, Friedrich*. Reinhard was born in Ober-Esslingen, Württemberg in 1764 before joining Infantry Regiment Nr 8 as a volunteer in 1782. Promoted to senior

social advancement: networks, prestige and patronage.<sup>9</sup> These opportunities inspired men to serve the state's interest, presenting system of meaning which motivated the Monarchy's soldiers throughout the wars with France, eventually providing avenues for the state's populace to display their dynastic loyalty.

## State-building and the Manor Estate

In order to understand the myriad of different social contexts conscripts were subjected to before entering military service, it is essential to describe the institutions of power that wielded almost supreme authority over their lives. Officers too would also have been bound by social constraints, different to be sure, but no less limiting.<sup>10</sup> These institutions of power in the

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private in 1785, corporal in 1786 and sergeant-major in 1789. He became an officer in 1794 before being appointed captain in the *Freikorps Ignaz Graf Gyulai* in 1798; ÖStA, KA, NL B/1390 *Lenk von Wolfsberg, Jakob Freiherr*. Lenk was born in Platz, Bohemia. He was enrolled into the school for soldiers' son of *Artillerie Regiment Nr. 3* in 1780 at 13. He was awarded the "Silver Medallion for Bravery" in 1796 (*Silberne Tapferkeits-Medaille als Feuerwerker*). Then commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1809 and awarded the Military Order of Maria Theresa (*Militär-Maria Theresien Orden*) for his performance at the Battle of Ebelsberg (Altötting).

<sup>9</sup> For an example of this in practice see William D. Godsey "Überlebens- und Erfolgsstrategien in einer Zeit revolutionärer Umbrüche Das Haus Arenberg und die Habsburgermonarchie 1780-1820," in *Das Haus Arenberg und die Habsburgermonarchie*, eds., William D. Godsey and Veronika Hyden-Hanscho (Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner 2019), 325-74. For more examples see ÖStA, KA, NL, B/647 *Hochenegg von, Friedrich Reichsgraf*. Hochenege was born in 1770 in Franconia and assigned to Infantry Regiment Nr. 23 as an ensign in 1788. Rose to the rank of major in 1804 before being appointed head of the Recruitment Department in the *Hofkriegsrat (Leiter Hofkriegsrätlicher Referent des Rekrutierungs-Departements)* in 1806. He commanded Infantry Regiment Nr. 15 by the end of the war; ÖStA, KA, NL, B/905 *Innerhofer von Innhof, Johann Edler*. Innerhofer was born in Vienna in 1780. He left the Theresian Military academy in 1797 and was assigned to Infantry Regiment Nr 1. He was transferred to Infantry Regiment Nr. 62 with the rank of first lieutenant in 1805. He served as a regimental staff officer in 1809, before being appointed Professor of War Sciences at the Theresian Academy in 1813; ÖStA, KA, NL, B/1143:2 *Hibler von Alpenheim, Marcus Edler*. Marcus Hibler who went from volunteer soldier to lieutenant-colonel and was ennobled in 1836; See also ÖStA, KA, NL, B/864 *Frisch, Ignaz Friedrich*, fol. 4, *Bellegarde* (Vienna, 9 June 1821); *Frimont* (Naples, 20 July 1821); *Militärschematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthums* (Vienna: k. k. Hof- und Staats-Druckerey, 1822), 208. Ignaz Friedrich Frisch was a first lieutenant in a Galician regiment in 1821, who used his friendship with the wife of a dead comrade, Colonel (*Oberst*) Franz Bruschi von Neuberger who was killed in 1809, to petition the President of the *Hofkriegsrat*, Count Heinrich von Bellegarde, for a promotion. Frisch was made captain by 1822. This was an advancement he received from the Habsburg general Frimont, whose aide was Franz Bruschi in 1809. Frisch was a lieutenant-colonel and aide to Radetzky in Milan in 1846. More on the military as an avenue for social mobility, respect and security is found in chapter three.

<sup>10</sup> For recent work on the Habsburg officer corps, their motivations, desires and ways of seeing their place in the world see Michael Hochedlinger, "Adlige Abstinenz und bürgerlicher Aufstiegswille. Zum Sozial- und Herkunftsprofil von Generalität und Offizierskorps der kaiserlichen und k. k. Armee im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," in *Soziale Mobilität in der Vormoderne Historische Perspektiven auf ein zeitloses Thema*, eds. Gustav Pfeifer and Kurt Andermann (Innsbruck: Wagner Verlag, 2020), 270-349; Markus Fochler, "Zwischen Korpsgeist und Konkurrenz. Regimentskultur und Offiziershabitus im Infanterieregiment Hoch- und Deutschmeister. 1696–1792," PhD diss., (University of Vienna, 2021); Tobias Uwe Roeder,

Monarchy's provinces were anchored at one end by the *Hausvater* and at the other by the prince. And as the peasant was the foundation for the Austrian Hereditary Land's economy specifically, he and his household also served as the basic unit of a well-structured and governed society.<sup>11</sup> Unlike today with the apparent separation of the public and private sectors, between public authority and private life, the organisation of society was maintained by a collection of corporate institutions, customs and privileges that imbued individuals with superior powers and magisterial authority over those who did not possess the same character to rule.<sup>12</sup>

This concept of regulating social norms and boundaries was known as *Herrschaft* and referred to not just the manorial estates governing the majority of the population, but also a concept of legitimate rule believed by those who were ruled to be a prerequisite for public good and their own personal safety.<sup>13</sup> Households, guilds, towns and manorial estates were governed in a hierarchical system of paternal authority, overlapping and contributing to a system of control where the rulers demanded obedience through their "powers of definition and disposition over the ruled".<sup>14</sup> From the mightiest prince to the smallest peasant holding the recognised power of the *Herr*, who not only controlled the economic resources of his domain but also the authority to enforce his will through violence, was used to maintain the social contract between communities and institutions that bound together a *Land*.

In the late eighteenth century, the basic territorial unit in the German speaking parts of Europe was the *Land*.<sup>15</sup> A *Land* was defined by its rurality, traditions and particularisms with

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"Professional Identity of Army Officers in Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy 1740-1790," PhD diss., (University of Cambridge, 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland Vol. 1: Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft 1600-1800* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017), 82, 341.

<sup>12</sup> James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 25.

<sup>13</sup> Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 68. A contemporary understanding is as follows: "*Herrschaft, in dem allerwertesten Verstanden ist diejenige Verhältnis derer Dinge gegeneinander, da die Abrichtung derer Kräfte des einen von dem Willen des anderen abhängt. So wohl die Abrichtung derer Kräfte als der Wille geben zu verstehen, das eine von diesen beiden Dingen ein mit Vernunft und Willen begabtes Wesen sein muss.*" This quote was taken from Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosse vollständige Universal Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Vol. 12 (H – He) (Halle und Leipzig: Zedler, 1735), 1799.

<sup>14</sup> David M. Luebke, "Symbols, Serfdom and Peasant Factions: A Response to Hermann Rebel," *Central European History* 34, no. 3 (2001): 357-82, esp. 362.

<sup>15</sup> John G. Gagliardo, *From Pariah to Patriot: The Changing Image of the German Peasant 1770-1840* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 3; Luebke, "Symbols, Serfdom and Peasant Factions," 362.

cities and towns sitting within these places but with socio-cultural customs that defined them as separate entities.<sup>16</sup> Authority in the province of Lower Austria, where the men of *Deutschmeister* came from, was shared by a series of semi-autonomous bodies; institutions whose collective laws and customs created a distinct multi-layered socio-political identity that linked noble landowners, monasteries and bishoprics with wealthy burghers and guild masters.<sup>17</sup> These authorities were the *Obrigkeiten*, the dominant half of “the oldest social division in the Austrian Empire”.<sup>18</sup> Authorities were those who were a part of territorial corporations that gave them the legislative, judiciary and economic privileges over those underneath the power of said corporate institution. Subjects were those without corporate status, obedient to the authority of one or several of the institutions who exercised political and economic power over them.

At the apex of Austrian rural society, authority was in the hands of landlords and their loyal officials thanks to almost two centuries of oppression inflicted on the peasantry by an alliance between crown and nobility.<sup>19</sup> By the beginning of the French Revolution this dominion of power was accepted by the peasant class as legitimate, though there were a few sporadic revolts in Bohemia, Transylvania and parts of Austria in opposition to top-down reform.<sup>20</sup> In the rural Austrian lands, the duties demanded of the subject by those who had authority over him usually meant labour service on the demesne land of the lord. Demesne land was cultivated fields directly owned by the nobility and therefore free from taxation by the central government. In the last decades of the seventeenth century demesne land increased as noble landlords forcefully evicted peasants from land they had the right to farm, claiming it as their own.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Mintzker, *The Defortification of the German City*, 80-82; Maarten Prak, “Moral Order in the World of Work: Social Control and the Guilds in Europe,” in *Social Control in Europe: Volume 1, 1500-1800*, eds., Herman Roodenburg and Peter Spierenburg (Columbus OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2004), 176-99.

Daniele Andreozzi and Luca Mocarrelli, eds., *The Empress Cities: Urban Centres, Societies and Economies in the Age of Maria Theresia von Habsburg* (Trieste: University Press Italiana, 2017).

<sup>17</sup> Sheehan, *German History*, 25.

<sup>18</sup> Hermann Rebel, “Peasants under the Austrian Empire,” in *The Peasantries of Europe: From the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries*, ed., Tim Scott (Harlow: Longman, 1998), 191-227, esp. 194.

<sup>19</sup> R. Po-chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750* (London: Routledge, 1992). Winfried Schulze, “Gerhard Oestreichs Begriff ‘Sozialdisziplinierung’ in der Frühen Neuzeit,” *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 14, no. 3 (1987): 265-302; As an example, see Peter Thaler, “Peasants and Swedes: The Making of a Habsburg Nightmare in Early Modern Austria,” *Social History* 42, no. 2 (2017): 205-32.

<sup>20</sup> Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 68-69.

<sup>21</sup> Léonore Loft, “The Transylvanian Peasant Uprising of 1784, Brissot and the Right to Revolt: A Research Note,” *French Historical Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 209-18.

The consequence of forceful evictions was the decrease in the Habsburg government's tax revenue and a greater burden shifting on to the peasantry who now possessed a smaller portion of workable land and who were also required to work more for their noble landlord.<sup>22</sup> Labour services (*Robot*) consisted of many tasks that alleviated the burden on the noble from hiring and paying staff to work his land. Men would drive coaches, work in the fields, hunt and fish; women would spin and serve as part of the household staff; children would run errands and assist the adults in the field. In return peasants completing their service were provided with a mid-day meal and could use the common pasture, claim building supplies and rely on manorial relief during poor harvests. The amount of time a tenant had to provide his lord varied and depended on the customs of each manor, with most noble landlords claiming unlimited service.<sup>23</sup>

The unrestricted and unregulated nature of *Robot* in the Austrian Hereditary Lands at the beginning of the eighteenth century led to an economic system which necessitated the hoarding of labour amongst peasant tenants. This manifested itself in the increasing use of day labourers who were put forth as substitutes for the peasant tenant. It also saw the creation of familial communities within villages where adult children and landless relatives were controlled by peasant tenants so they could meet their *Robot* obligations.<sup>24</sup> These extended members of the family lived in cottages with small gardens amongst the larger tenant properties. In most instances the noble landlord would reside in the larger urban centres of the Monarchy. In their place were a plethora of domain officials, mostly minor nobility, who were given the authority of the noble landlord and governed the subjects of the estate using provincial constitutions as a guideline, all of which gave the landlord almost unlimited power.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Jerome Blum, *Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria, 1815-1848: A Study in the Origins of the Peasant Emancipation of 1848* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1948), 46.

<sup>23</sup> Edith Murr Link, *The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant, 1740-1798* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 17.

<sup>24</sup> Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 218.

<sup>25</sup> Link, *Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant*, 15

By the beginning Revolutionary Wars, the lord still provided an important judicial function, ruling on all legal matters concerning those peasants who lived on his manor.<sup>26</sup> However, any abuse of power was constrained by the *Strafpatent* of 1781, introduced by Joseph II, which limited the amount of punishment the lord could mete out to those he sentenced. Included in the *Strafpatent* was the right for the peasant to raise complaints against his lord, which he could do through a centrally appointed advocate known as the “Subjects’ advocate” (*Untertansadvocat*).<sup>27</sup> Some peasants even used visiting military officials to air their grievances.<sup>28</sup> Despite the state intervening to protect the peasantry in a series of judicial and agrarian reforms enacted to promote the creation of a class of peasants with a greater ability to contribute to the central government’s treasury, the noble landlord and his officials dictated the social, judicial and economic fortunes of their subjects up until 1848. Indeed, even after the introduction of the General Civil Code (*Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*) in 1811, which gave some civic rights to manor subjects, the subaltern house servant, day labourer, cottar and any attached children were still left under the private law of the *Hausvater*.<sup>29</sup>

The General Civil Code was but one culmination of almost seventy years of university teaching and government policy that aimed, in the words of Justi, “to preserve and increase the general capacity of the state’s internal health, and to make it even more useful for the promotion of communal happiness.”<sup>30</sup> Justi was one of the most influential writers in a field of state-theory and public policy that powered government initiatives in Central Europe aimed at

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<sup>26</sup> Blum, *Noble Landowners*, 66.

<sup>27</sup> Link, 119-20.

<sup>28</sup> Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 90.

<sup>29</sup> Sheehan, *German History*, 281, Written under the guidance of Franz Edler von Zeiller, a defender of aristocratic privilege, he argued that “inequalities of rank and function had to remain” in order to maintain the social relations of the Monarchy under attack from the ideals of the French Revolution. This understanding of “rank” as important to society will be examined further in chapter five.

<sup>30</sup> Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, 380. Original quotation provided by Stolleis on paged 380 reads, “das allgemeine Vermögen des Staats in seiner innerlichen Verfassung zu erhalten und zu vermehren und dasselbe zu Beförderung der gemeinschaftlichen Glückseligkeit immer dienlicher und brauchbarer zu machen.” See also Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 257. Raeff contends that policy makers in the German states, and the Habsburg Monarchy, were interested in maintaining, or lifting, social order and stimulating economic and political change i.e. the dismantling of archaic social structures. On the evolution of judicial and educational policies affected by the enlightenment in the Austro-Bohemian lands see Szabo, *Kaunitz* 180-97.

stimulating productivity and the fiscal yield of a society to serve the needs of territorial princes.<sup>31</sup> Along with Justi, authors in the early part of the eighteenth century developed theories on how a prince could balance the state and its society broadly labelled by contemporaries as *Polizey*.<sup>32</sup>

It was widely argued by writers such as Justi, the philosopher Christian Wolff and the jurist Joseph von Sonnenfels, that in order to maintain the sovereignty of a territory in a political climate of pragmatic aggression domestic political action was needed. What this meant was a rationalisation of the many corporate institutions preventing the state from accessing its domestic resources. Justi and Sonnenfels played a pivotal role in developing theories on the centralisation of domestic authority in the Austrian Hereditary Lands, with both occupying chairs at tertiary institutions in Vienna.<sup>33</sup> Justi advocated the deconstruction of the internal barriers, namely the corporate rights of guilds, cities, and the noble landowner, preventing the prince's access to the fiscal yield of his territory. He argued the removal of these barriers was for the good of the whole state and thus for the good of its subjects.<sup>34</sup> For Justi, as Michael Stolleis has argued, there was no difference between the goals of government and the corporations of the state, as centrally organised state management was for the "common happiness" of the whole.<sup>35</sup> The improvement of the country, cities, agricultural production, trade, industry, welfare, health and sanitation would increase the strength and prosperity of those living under the rule of the prince, which by extension would not only provide the government with a greater fiscal yield but a population able to bear the stresses of military service.

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<sup>31</sup> John G. Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime, 1600-1790* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 124.

<sup>32</sup> Johann Heinrich Zedler, *GULWK*, Vol 28 (Pi – Pq, 1741) (Halle and Leipzig: Zedler, 1741), 1503. Zedler's lexicon describes it as: "*Policy or Polizey, ist entweder so viel, als das gemeine Wesen, Republik, Regiments Former, oder auch de Gesesse, Anstalten und Verordnungen, so einer Stadt oder lande gegeben und vorgeschrieben, dass jedermann im Handel und Wandel sich danach achten, mithin alles ordentlich und friedlich zu geben, und die menschliche Gesellschaft erhalten werden möge.*"; See also, Roland Axtmann, "Police and the Formation of the Modern State, Legal and Ideological Assumptions on the State Capacity in the Austrian Lands of the Habsburg Empire, 1500-1800," *German History* 10, no. 1 (1992): 40-63.

<sup>33</sup> Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, 376-83. Justi taught at the Theresianum Academy in Vienna between 1750 and 1753. The *Theresianum* was a school set up by Maria Theresa in 1746 to train civil servants in effective state administration. From 1763 Sonnenfels was professor of police and cameral science at the University of Vienna. Other schools with chairs in *Policeywissenschaft* were Prague (1763), Freiburg (1768), Innsbruck (1768) and Klagenfurt (1768).

<sup>34</sup> Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, 380.

<sup>35</sup> Stolleis, 380.

Influenced by the writings of Justi, Maria Theresa and her advisors began imposing uniformity across the realm to better protect her dominion from the encroaching power of Prussia under Frederick II. From 1749, under the direction of Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz, a progressive reformist and advocate of Justi's principles, the central government changed the nature of provincial estates' territorial authority in Austria and Bohemia by circumventing their semi-autonomous fiscal and military power through a centralised bureaucracy. The role of this central body (*Directorium in publicis et cameralibus*) was to implement economic policies and systems of fiscal collection that would support a rapidly growing standing army to be used in a future war of revenge against Prussia after the loss of Silesia in 1748.<sup>36</sup>

Intervention in the lord-peasant relationship did not truly begin until a series of population surveys undertaken by the Habsburg military in 1770 and 1771 revealed the horrific conditions of the peasant under the dominion of the noble landlord.<sup>37</sup> Historians have debated the motivations of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II's approach to the lord-peasant relationship.<sup>38</sup> Unrest in Bohemia in 1775 over *Robot* dues certainly provided an impetus to interfere in the centuries old system of manorial sovereignty, but the reforms which had been coming thick and fast since the 1740s would have eventually turned towards the peasant tenant's ability to provide revenue and recruits.<sup>39</sup> Through a series of decrees aiming to limit the amount of service subjects had to give their lord, the central government under Maria Theresa from 1770, and then her son Joseph II from 1780, attempted to create a cash-tribute class of peasants free from having to work the demesne land of the privileged landowner. The cash-tribute peasant would instead have the time to work his own land, strengthening its economic output, and allow the peasant to save enough capital to improve his economic position.

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<sup>36</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 267-86.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Hochedlinger and Anton Tantner, ... *der größte Teil der Untertanen lebt elend und mühselig*. For a thorough and insightful introductory essay, which places into context the foundations and motivations for the Josephinian reform movement see Hochedlinger and Tantner's introduction to the cited work "Einleitung: Auf dem Weg Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht? Die Einführung des 'Konskription und Werbbezirkssystems' in der Habsburgermonarchie," I-LXXIV.

<sup>38</sup> For a review of the literature, and for conclusions still apt today, see Charles Ingrao, "The Problems of 'Enlightened Absolutism' and the German States," *The Journal of Modern History* 58, (1986): 161-80; Beales, *Joseph II: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa*, 347-58.

<sup>39</sup> Agnew, *The Czechs*, 84-98.



Importantly, by strengthening his own economic position the government would have access to far more fiscal revenue.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, by reducing the need to provide labour-tribute, peasants tasked with providing *Robot* did not need to hoard labour, leaving the military with a greater pool of recruits to draw from without damaging local economies.<sup>41</sup>

## Peasant Cultures, Economic Privileges and Social Exclusion

The life of an economically desperate and socially excluded young cottar, servant and day labourer was one of anxieties stimulated by different social demands an individual would have been subjected to before entering the military. Peasant culture, feudal corporate identities, manor economies and government reform constricted the agency of young men, forcing families to evict them from their homes, stymying their ability to follow avenues of economic potential, restricting them to a life of subsistence, neglect, and violence. This position was faced by almost half of the men born in the Austrian Hereditary Lands in the late eighteenth century, made more uncertain by successive government policies that were hopeful of creating a class of military recruits.<sup>42</sup>

Contemporary images of the recruit in Old Regime armies, and the reflections of intellectuals and high society, depict the life of the common soldier as one of permanent servitude, restriction and abuse brought about by military service. These interpretations do not consider the dominion of violent and oppressive manor officials and peasant employers these

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<sup>40</sup> Derek Beales, *Joseph II*, 1: 183-91. Beale's still provides the most insightful breakdown of the ideas held by Joseph on "the assimilation of civil and military, soldiers and peasants" in the Austro-Bohemian Lands. A task he and the presidents of the *Hofkriegsrat*, Lacy and Duan, worked extensively on during the emperor's co-regency.

<sup>41</sup> Taken from Table 3.3 "Peasants, cottars, and industrial workers, excluding Hungarian lands (1785 census) in Dickson, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresa 1740-1780*, 1: 46. In the new system of military recruitment, which will be discussed later, the Austro-Bohemian lands provided the most conscripts for the army. The *Werbbezirkssystem* implemented in 1781 drew on those classified in the *Seelensskription* as available for military service. Of those deemed available, 420,503 came from Austria, which amounted to 48% of the surveyed male population in these places. For a discussion on the two types of tribute in the Austro-Bohemian lands, cash and labour, see Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 224.

<sup>42</sup> For a detailed analysis of how peasant cultures created "system necessary" victims for the Hessian state's military export subsidy system that has parallels with the Monarchy see Peter K. Taylor, *Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State, 1688-1815* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 113-200.

recruits would have lived under before conscription. Of course, these central actors could not conceive of the world these men had inhabited, as the journalists, writers and poets of the age were as far removed from the experience of the enlisted man as they were from battle. Nor do the subsequent histories on the Habsburg army's involvement in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars attempt to understand the make-up and experience of pre-military life for those who fought in the armies of the Monarchy.<sup>43</sup> As Habsburg common soldiers attest, military life was viewed by some as a place where they could belong, a duty that enabled them to transcend the terrible oppression of pre-modern rural life and provide for their family.<sup>44</sup>

For the new soldiers of *Deutschmeister*, service in the army of the Monarchy had been preordained almost from birth, the military census counting them when they were children as subjects deemed dispensable to local economies.<sup>45</sup> By 1792 military service for many of the male rural inhabitants of Lower Austria between 17 and 40 was a distinct possibility, and as we shall see in the next chapter, almost an inevitability by the end of the Second Coalition in 1801. Yet for these conscripts, mandatory enlistment in the infantry regiments of the Habsburg Monarchy was only one of the many coercive and restrictive institutions they had to negotiate. From the time they could work in the fields of their father's tenant property, or assist as a servant in a peasant's household, these men were subjected to tasks and communal living that was harsh, oppressive and constricting, so as to maintain the wealth and prosperity of any number of public and private institutions who claimed sovereignty over them.

The manorial estate from whence most Habsburg soldiers came from was far from homogenous, and the distribution of peasant wealth and power skewed. As was the social

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<sup>43</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*; Basset, *For God and Kaiser*; Gramm, *Karl Mack von Leiberich*. This last work provides an insightful analysis of rural life and the make-up of Habsburg regiments in its first chapter, where it details the familial connections found in Mack's first regiment.

<sup>44</sup> Franz Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran. Franz Bersling's Leben, Reisen und Kriegsfahrten in allen fünf Weltteilen* (Schweidnitz: F. D. Franke, 1840), 8-10; Johann Friedrich Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant. Leben des Schlesiens Johann Friedrich Löffler. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Zeitgenossen* (Breslau: Barth and Comp. 1836), 29-23; Friederich A. Brander, *Aus dem Tagebuch eines österreichischen Soldaten im Jahr 1809 (Lobau)*; J. Breyer, 1852), 1; Georg Grüll, "Aus dem Tagebuch eines Ewigen Soldaten," *Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs* 9 (1968): 291-97.

<sup>45</sup> Anton Tantner, *Ordnung der Hauser, Beschreibung der Seelen: Hausnummerierung und Seelenkonskription in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna: Studienverlag, 2007), 69-77.

standing of those who owed dues and obligations to the lord of the manor.<sup>46</sup> The core of the economy, indeed the foundation of the Habsburg government's taxable revenue, was the Peasant (*Bauer*) who was designated in civil and public law as the ruler of all who lived under his roof.<sup>47</sup> The peasant was defined in population census as a man who owned or farmed enough land to support a household, as well as create enough surplus to be given to the lord whose estate he was on, pay taxes to the central government and provide lodging, food and services to the army. There was vast difference in property size, and what actually made a man worthy of peasant tenancy, with established communal rights and privileges, was his recognised role as the "sovereign chief of the private law domain".<sup>48</sup> These rights marked the head of the household out as a neighbour (*Nachbar*), a man to trust and someone who could be relied upon to maintain his household.<sup>49</sup> He was free to exercise his rights in whatever way he deemed fit, however tenuous or small his tenancy was, so long as he maintained the wellbeing of his house and those within it.<sup>50</sup>

Governing this "inward-looking" collective was the *Hausvater*, whose role was the maintenance of the "house peace" (*Hausfrieden*), a duty the male peasant owed to his lord and all who lived under his roof.<sup>51</sup> In the late eighteenth century the head of the household was relied upon by both the local noble landlord and the increasingly centralised government to maintain social order within his private domain.<sup>52</sup> The doctrine of the house, and the place for those within it was prescribed by one sixteenth century commentator as such:

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<sup>46</sup> Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 1: 122. Karl Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Auflassung des gutherrlich-bäuerlichen verhältnisse in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humbolt, 1894), 50-87.

<sup>47</sup> Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 196.

<sup>48</sup> Dickson, *Government and Finance*, 1: 44.

<sup>49</sup> Lutz K. Berkner, "The Stem Family and the Development Cycle of the Peasant Household: An Eighteenth-Century Austrian Example," *The American History Review* 72, no. 2 (1972): 398-418, esp. 400.

<sup>50</sup> Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 197.

<sup>51</sup> Hermann Rebel, *Peasant Classes: The Bureaucratization of Property and Family Relations under Early Habsburg Absolutism, 1511-1636* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 44.

<sup>52</sup> Horst Günther, "Herrschaft: 5. Drei Themen. langfristiger Auseinandersetzung," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. 3, ed., Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 39-63, esp. 42-43.

One commands and rules, as the householder: the other is obedient, as the wife: the third is the charming assistant of the family and the household, the child: the fourth are submissive, as servant and maid.<sup>53</sup>

And though the eighteenth-century enlightened thinkers such as Justi were discomfited by the idea of unrestricted domestic power, it was difficult for them to implement a more bureaucratic and civilising way of controlling the population without the private power of the *Hausvater*. In short, by the time of the French Revolution the *Hausvater* enjoyed dominion over those legally under his authority in the same way a corporate lord held political, social and economic power over those subjects he ruled.<sup>54</sup>

In the peasant household there existed a true subaltern class of servant men, women and children who worked for, lived with, were disciplined by, and relied upon the central male figure of the peasant farm.<sup>55</sup> These were usually unmarried sons and daughters of other families who did not possess property, or were adults unable to inherit land and who had entered a household for the security of lodgings, corporate protection and regular wages. These servants were taken on by peasant households to increase the yield of the land when children of the family were too young to work in the fields, or the parents too old.<sup>56</sup> Despite the security of work, the pay was meagre, paid at the end of every year of service, sometimes with deductions for clothing, healthcare and any other payment a *Hausvater* could think to demand.<sup>57</sup> Men were overworked and beaten, women rarely paid and often sexually exploited, and both were subjected to verbal abuse from both the *Hausvater* and his wife, who ruled their domain fuelled by petty jealous or the anxiety that there was never enough to go around.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Günther, "Herrschaft," 43. "*Eins gebietet und herrscher, als der Hausvater: dass ander gehorsamer, als das Weib: das dritt ist ein anmutige Gehilfe des Geschlechts und des Hausgesinds, als die Kind: das vierte ist untertänig, als Knecht und Magd.*"

<sup>54</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 137-52.

<sup>55</sup> Hermann Rebel, "'Right-Sizing' in Oftring Parish: Labor Hoarding Peasant Farms in Austria, 1700-1850," *Central European History* 46, no. 23 (2013): 469-94.

<sup>56</sup> Rebel, "'Right-Sizing,'" 485.

<sup>57</sup> Rebel, "'Right-Sizing,'" 486.

<sup>58</sup> Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 196; For an account of this similarly private rule in Prussia see William W. Hagen, *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 399-421.

Those peasant with tenancy rights also employed day labourers (*Tagelöhner*), men who lived in small holdings rented from the wealthier peasant or the local landlord. These lodgings and land were only large enough to support one single family. Men would work on daily contracts which were agreed on at the start of every day as part of localised villages or single tenant corporations. Contracts varied and were unreliable, forcing the labourers to travel further afield, which could mean a dearth of able bodies for some villages in the seasons to come. In order to hoard labour to meet obligations to landlords, richer peasants would specifically tie down day labourers by hiring married workers, whose desire to fix his immediate family's security would bring him to reside on the peasant's property as a lodger (*Inleute*). Even so, these workers were only an injury, illness or family death away from poverty and eviction.<sup>59</sup> Whilst also securing the labourer's ongoing service, a lodging family gave the peasant the ability to recoup the wages he paid the man by using his wife and any of their children as unwaged servants, which was the right of the *Hausvater*.<sup>60</sup>

To reduce the stifling conditions brought about by labour-tribute, the first reform of labour services in Lower Austria in 1772 decreed those on the largest tenancies (*Ganzbauer*) were only required to perform 104 days of servile duty (*Robot*). He was also required to provide a team of four animals. The cottar, who possessed little land and usually no work animals, had to provide 52 days of *Handrobot* which could take the form of spinning, road work, land clearing or construction.<sup>61</sup> In the other provinces of Austria, the obligations varied based upon the strength of the local estates negotiating positions and the will of the central government in forcing their decrees through the provincial estates. Joseph II's emancipation patent introduced into the Bohemian lands in 1781 abolished a servile status that prohibited all peasants to move, marry and acquire a trade without permission. This patent was later introduced into the Austrian

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<sup>59</sup> Rebel, "Peasantries under the Austrian Empire," 218.

<sup>60</sup> Rebel, "Right-Sizing," 491.

<sup>61</sup> Link, *Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant*, 49; Blum, *Noble Landowners*, 72. For a more updated discussion on the transformation of the agrarian sector during the reign of Maria Theresa see Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 155-180.

Hereditary Lands in the summer of the next year, with some resistance coming from the Estates of Styria and Carniola.<sup>62</sup>

Over the course of the 1780s unlimited labour services in the lord-peasant relationship was further dismantled by Joseph II through a series of decrees which radically promoted a cash-tribute system at the expense of labour-services. It was believed a cash-tribute agreement that stipulated the amount a peasant owed to his lord based upon the size of his property would compensate the noble landlords for their loss of peasant service, allowing lords to hire agricultural labourers instead. In 1785 peasants were given improved tenancy rights in the Austro-Bohemian lands. The patent provided lifelong rights to the peasant over his tenant property, and he could not be evicted except for definite offences.<sup>63</sup> It was hoped that this patent would give the peasant secure possession of the land he cultivated. This was a central tenant to both Justi and Sonnenfels' theories on increasing peasant wealth and security, and the central government's ability to secure tax revenue from its territories.<sup>64</sup>

As we have seen here, men conscripted into the regiments of the Monarchy were not exclusively outcasts unwilling to work effectively or live within society. Boys and young men destined for the Habsburg army inhabited the very lowest rungs of the manor because of the social structures surrounding them. They were subjected to forms of control that were wielded by senior peasant men and their families who relied upon the subaltern status of the landless son and the desperate agricultural labourer to stave off eviction, poverty, despair and misery. These were men beholden to the systemic constraining conditions of rural life under the rule of local nobility, and the corporate nature of the old *Land* where authorities relied upon exacting tribute from obedient, vulnerable and desperate subjects to prosper and could violently enforce their will to do so, despite central decrees that attempted to limit such power.<sup>65</sup> That peasants

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<sup>62</sup> Link, *Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant*, 109.

<sup>63</sup> Blum, *Noble Landowners*, 54.

<sup>64</sup> Link, *Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant*, 103-106; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 276.

<sup>65</sup> Martin Scheutz, "...mit dem soldatenleben gezüchtigt worden?: Gewaltsame Rekrutierung als form der Disziplinierung am Beispiel niederösterreichischer Land- und Markgerichtsprotokolle des 18. Jahrhundert," in *Alltag und Kriminalität: Disziplinierungsversuche im steirisch-österreichischen Grenzgebiet im 18. Jahrhundert*, *MIÖG Ergänzungsband 38*, ed., Martin Scheutz (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2001), 315-73. The records of some Upper Austrian district courts also attest to this. For example, see Oberösterreich

accepted this system of order was because they themselves benefited from it, able to coerce those under them to serve and maintain their existence.<sup>66</sup>

Thanks largely to a significant increase in population in the latter half of the eighteenth century and the acquisition of Galicia after the first partition of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, the size of the cottars, servants and day labourers available to the Monarchy's army was 1,635,497 by 1785. It is possible, as some accounts attest, that when the recruiting captain came calling for these men deemed eligible, the promise of protection, regulated justice, food, clothing and companionship eased the coercive nature of entering the military. Instead of a second "serfdom", military service could have been viewed as a relief to the economically stagnant and marginalised cottar – a calling to be answered and an emancipatory avenue to pursue.<sup>67</sup>

## Building the Military System

The ability of the Habsburg Monarchy to defeat France and remain a central power in Europe into the middle of the nineteenth century relied upon its massive standing army, comprising almost wholly of the lowest of male subjects, built in response to the rise of Prussia and its aggression in the middle of the eighteenth century. The human cost and the drain placed upon the Habsburg economy by three wars with Prussia, culminating with the loss of Silesia, one of its richest provinces, led to a debate on the role of the army and its position in Habsburg

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Landesarchiv (OÖLA), Landesgerichtsarchiv - Akten: (Archivverzeichnis D 1, LGA-Akten), Schachtel 2570: B I Donautal Landgericht 1763 - 1780, Nr. 143 "*Gutachtlicher Bericht des Landrichters Simon Rupert Aichingers an die Landesbauptmannschaft den Michael Fabrenberger, Bauer auf dem Roither Gut zu Pöchling und der Herrschaft Weydenholz Untertan und dessen Söhne Sebastian, Johann und Johann Georg Fabrenberger betreffend. (1765) (Strafe: Johann Fabrenberger dem k.k. Militär als Rekrut ohne Kapitulation zu Gunsten seiner Herrschaft Weidenholz abgegeben, im Falle seiner Untauglichkeit durch ein ganzes Jahr zur öffentlichen Arbeit in Eisen angehalten werden solle; Sebastian Fabrenberger und Johann Georg Fabrenberger über den ausgestandenen Arrest auch noch durch 6 Wochen zur öffentlichen Arbeit in Eisen angehalten werden sollen; Michael Fabrenberger über den ausgestandenen Arrest mit scharfer Warnung desselben zu entlassen, jedoch für private Satisfaktion insgesamt 7 Dukaten und 6 Gulden zu zahlen hat).*" The above passage was transcribed by Klaus Richter as part of the *Projekt zur Aufarbeitung der Rechtsaltertümer Oberösterreichs*, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> Luebke, "Symbols, Serfdom and Peasant Factions," 362; Sheilagh Ogilvie, "So That Every Subject Knows How to Behave': Social Disciplining in Early Modern Bohemia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 48, no. 1 (2006): 38-78.

<sup>67</sup> Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy," 94.

state and society between 1761 and 1769, influencing reform programmes up until 1790.<sup>68</sup> The traditional *Landrekrutenstellung*, where provincial estates were expected to fulfil a quota of soldiers provided by the central government, had failed to meet the needs of the army in its war with Prussia. One which suffered 300,000 casualties between 1756 and 1763.<sup>69</sup> The brutal nature with which local authorities rounded up the most marginalised men under their dominion, putting them in irons along with cartloads of Prussia prisoners and delivering them to the army as part of the quota, no doubt lessened the quality of the army.<sup>70</sup> This sporadic and variable system of recruitment, one which relied on unaccountable intermediaries to place the interest of the state above their own, stimulated the desire within parts of the Habsburg government to reform conscription practices in the hopes of creating a motivated and massive standing army integrated wholly into society.<sup>71</sup> Other ministers rejected such proposals, wanting to strengthen the separation of the military from the civil realm, with the hopes of minimising the effects of war on the health, wealth and integrity of the state's producers.

In the decade after the Seven Years' War, reconciling these two opposing stances on the army became one of the chief issues for the central government.<sup>72</sup> The proponents of a new system to replace an unreliable military apparatus relying on the cooperation of secondary authorities came from within the military. Field marshal Leopold Joseph von Daun, along with his subordinate Franz Moritz von Lacy, were the first to champion the reorganisation of the Habsburg military system in 1761. Daun was the supreme commander of the Habsburg army during the latter part of its war with Prussia and was appointed the head of the *Hofkriegsrat* in

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<sup>68</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 267.

<sup>69</sup> Hochedlinger, 292.

<sup>70</sup> Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 2: 139; Christopher Duffy, *Instrument of War: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years War*, Vol. 1 (Rosemont, IL: The Emperor's Press, 2000), 46, 193, 201-02. For a wider discussion on the implementation of the conscription system in the 1770s see Ilya Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740–1792," 300. Berkovich reveals the war with Prussia was so bloody that provincial estates had to provide married men and farm owners to meet military requirements.

<sup>71</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy," 86-87; Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740–1792," 300-01.

<sup>72</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*: 278-95; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 292-93. Hochedlinger, "Das Stehende Heer," in *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit, Band 2, Hof und Dynastie, Kaiser und Reich, Zentralverwaltungen, Kriegswesen und landesfürstliches Finanzwesen*, eds., Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Mat'a and Thomas Winkelbauer (Vienna: Böhlau, 2019), 655-766, esp. 731-34.



1762. The *Hofkriegsrat* was an administrative body that dealt with, among other things, military justice, logistics, ordnance, recruitment, spending and regulations and under Daun it was reorganised to better fulfil the requirements of an army engaged in the field.<sup>73</sup> Along with these improvements Daun proposed copying the “canton model” of recruitment believed to be a primary contributor to Prussia’s resilience in its wars with the Monarchy.

Together with Lacy, Daun’s main ally was the young emperor Joseph, whose chief role in the central government in the early 1760s was military affairs.<sup>74</sup> They argued for the introduction of cantonal conscription across the Austro-Bohemian crownlands (*Konskriptions- und Werbbezirkssystem*) and a change in the way the Monarchy’s subjects were seen in relation to military service.<sup>75</sup> In a series of memorandum addressed to Maria Theresa, Daun and Joseph championed a system that relied on native-born men as a military resource and one where the army had direct access to the subjects. Joseph’s interest in increasing the size, strength and primacy of the army in society had already been displayed in 1761 when he argued against a plan to reduce the army in order to minimise state expenditure.<sup>76</sup> After Daun died in 1766, Joseph continued to zealously campaign as head of the army for conscription’s introduction, with the continual support of Lacy as the new president of the *Hofkriegsrat*.<sup>77</sup>

The thrust of the military party’s plan and argument used to persuade Maria Theresa centred on the belief that native-born men drawn from regions affiliated with one locally based regiment would create a motivated and highly efficient force easily rebuilt after each campaign season.<sup>78</sup> Each canton would be responsible for recruiting men for the regiment and supplying it with all the necessary materials to sustain it during peace and war, allowing for the creation of a streamlined logistical process and the formation of an *esprit de corps* along regional loyalties that would make sourcing adequate men for the army easier.<sup>79</sup> Importantly Joseph believed that men

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<sup>73</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 23-5.

<sup>74</sup> For an analysis of Joseph’s approach to military affairs in the first years of the co-regency see Beales, *Joseph II*, 1: 183-91.

<sup>75</sup> Beales, 1: 186.

<sup>76</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 283.

<sup>77</sup> Szabo, 284.

<sup>78</sup> Hochedlinger, “Das Stehende Heer,” 733.

<sup>79</sup> For a quick discussion on regional and regimental loyalties see Berkovich, *Motivation in War*, 189-190.

born within the domain of their emperor and king would, thanks to their status as subjects, be more dedicated to the cause than foreign soldiers who were “bad mercenaries, loafers and vagabonds”.<sup>80</sup> He argued that the canton system of recruitment would dispense with the need to source these foreigners who were “good for being killed in war in preference to subjects, but they are a heavy burden on the latter in peacetime” and money spent on paying the bounty to volunteers could be saved by:

establishing cantons to form all subjects into as many soldiers ready to defend the country well in time of war, who in time of peace...would form an equally useful army of cultivators and artisans.<sup>81</sup>

The idea of native-born men who could serve a dual role as subject and soldier was one of Joseph’s favourite schemes, and integral to his idea of the military within Habsburg society. An idea that continued into his decade of sole rule between 1780 and 1790. The emperor believed that in times of peace these soldiers would live and work within their local community, be allowed to marry and their children would be educated by the state, with the sons of soldiers used to form the regiment’s next generation of non-commissioned officers.<sup>82</sup> As Derek Beales has found, the emperor thought of the soldier as a twofold contributor to the state:

The military army is composed of many thousands of men disciplined and trained for the service of the state. The modest pay that they receive they spend in the place where they are stationed. With few exceptions, everything that the state furnishes them in kind is produced in the region. From this standpoint they are consumers. But they also, during their periods of leave, supply many workers to agriculture and industry, which, together with the permission they have to marry, places them among the class of producers.<sup>83</sup>

Men who were both soldiers and subjects would normalise the concept of soldiering, wearing the uniform on Sunday whilst on leave, and contribute fiscally to the very same community expected to meet the needs of the army.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, their role as contributing members of

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<sup>80</sup> As quoted from Joseph’s “General picture” found in Beales, *Joseph II*, 1: 188.

<sup>81</sup> Beales, *Joseph II*, 1: 188.

<sup>82</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 314.

<sup>83</sup> Beales, *Joseph II*, 2: 348.

<sup>84</sup> Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 87.

society would combat the prejudice people held of the army, which was most often understood at this time as an institution of delinquents and vagabonds.

For those deemed eligible for military service, soldiering would serve as an extension of one's assigned role in committing to the prosperity of the state. The emperor Joseph summarised as much when wrote in response to one of the rebuttals to his military plan "the duties of a citizen and a soldier have never appeared and still do not appear to me incompatible".<sup>85</sup> This idea was not exclusive to the young emperor, but part of a wider European military enlightenment that followed in the wake of the Seven Years' War couched, as Matthew McCormack has argued, "in the language of sensibility" prevalent from the 1750s onwards "to suggest that the citizen-soldier would be motivated to fight his adversaries by natural feelings of protectiveness".<sup>86</sup> More will be said on what citizen meant to Joseph in the next section, but it is enough to say the young emperor's preference was for the native soldier, a person who lived with the population he protected and who was optimistically hoped to possess the virile needs to protect his community. This, coupled with a subservient devotion to the emperor, would create a potent patriotic desire to serve.<sup>87</sup>

Opponents to the introduction of conscription, and a military system that maintained a massive standing army during peacetime, were predominantly noble landowning government officials who, like the military men, had a vested interest in the army's position in society. Their leader, Foreign Minister Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, advocated for an increased use of volunteers from outside the crownlands to prevent a slowing of domestic growth and reform. The foreign minister's objections were based on his desire to limit state violence and a system he termed "Prussian slavery", which would cripple both the peasantry and the economy. Kaunitz position was clearly made to Maria Theresa in subsequent rebuttals of Daun, Lacy and

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<sup>85</sup> As quoted in Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 286.

<sup>86</sup> Matthew McCormack, *Embodying the Militia*, 187.

<sup>87</sup> Teodora Shek Brnardić, "The Enlightened Officer at Word: The Educational Projects of the Bohemian Count Franz Joseph Kinsky(1739-1805)" PhD diss., (Central European University, 2004), 167-69; See also Ritchie Robertson, "Joseph Rohrer and the Bureaucratic Enlightenment," in *The Austrian Enlightenment and its Aftermath*, eds., Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1991), 2-42.

Joseph's schemes shared with him by the empress during the 1760s. The foreign minister believed exposing rural Habsburg subjects to gruelling, belittling and destructive military service dependent on capital punishment and viscous beatings would destroy the private wealth and happiness of men and their immediate communities needed to power an agrarian economy directly taxed by the government.<sup>88</sup> Above all, Kaunitz argued, the army could not expand exponentially, monopolising tax revenue for its needs. It had to operate within the fiscal means of the Monarchy where "security concerns had to be solved with political measures."<sup>89</sup>

By 1769 the empress had come around to her son and Lacy's way of thinking, prompted by the president of the *Hofkriegsrat's* rigorous and detailed response to Kaunitz's objections, as well as his ability to compromise and create a system of military service that circumvented what the foreign minister continually asserted as "Prussian slavery". Lacy's suggestions included placing conscripts on leave for 46 weeks of the year, which would, he argued, alleviate the fiscal demand armed men placed on the state, as well as the isolating experience military service may have brought for those enlisted.<sup>90</sup> He also introduced guidelines setting out the expectations for all members of the army, listing in detail a more humane and sympathetic treatment of the common soldier inspired by moral concepts of sensibility.<sup>91</sup> After a series of debates in the Council of State in Spring and Summer of 1769, a conscription system was ratified and then subsequently passed by the respective provincial estates after varying arguments by these representative bodies over local particulars.<sup>92</sup>

The conscription system devised by Lacy and supported by Joseph was introduced at a legislative level in the different provinces of the Monarchy, except in Hungary, the Military Border and Tyrol, between February and October 1770. Infantry regiments were each given a region where recruiting parties would select unmarried men between the ages of 17 and 40 for

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<sup>88</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 279-80

<sup>89</sup> Szabo, 282, esp. 289.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 289.

<sup>91</sup> Tobias Roeder, "Professionalism and Training of Army Officers in Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-90," *MCU Journal* 1, no. 9 (2018): 74-96. esp., 77-79. This point will be discussed in chapter two.

<sup>92</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 289. Hochedlinger and Tantner, ... *der größte Teil der Untertanen lebt elend und mühselig*, XVII.

soldiering.<sup>93</sup> Before it could properly function, however, the central government and its military representatives had to find out the true extent of the population within its domain.<sup>94</sup> In Lower Austria a census of the Habsburg populace had taken place in 1695 with a further survey, examining the other kingdoms of the Monarchy, occurring in 1753 before some reforms to the process was implemented in 1762. The 1753 census was undertaken by local manor civil servants, working on behalf landowners, with the intended purpose of tabling the available manpower for the army in preparation for renewed hostilities with Prussia. This census, however, was rife with questionable data, which hid the true numbers of able-bodied men from the government with some landowners desiring to keep agrarian workers within manor economies. The conscription patent, which was introduced in 1770, sought to remedy these issues introducing military commissioners who worked in conjunction with manor estate officials.<sup>95</sup>

As part of the new census - “the counting of souls” (*Seelenskonskription*) - house numbers were introduced to the Austro-Bohemian lands, except for Tyrol, where the inhabitants of each numbered house were surveyed and evaluated for their military potential. The rubric every official had to work with accounted for the subject’s name, age at the time of registration, birth place and eventual location, their position in the household, as well as their profession and potential for military service.<sup>96</sup> It registered boys as young as nine, reserving data for the potential needs of conflicts far off into the future.<sup>97</sup> The census was predominantly a military survey, but women and Jewish peoples were also registered as part of the more general survey Kaunitz had called for during the conscription debate. Oxen and horses were also accounted for with the last divided into categories based upon their breeding potential and military effectiveness.<sup>98</sup> The census used the parish boundaries as a guide to rationalise the

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<sup>93</sup> *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme. Für die kaiserl. königl. deutschen Erbländer in Friedens- und Kriegszeiten* (Klagenfurt: Kleinmayr, 1781), 24.

<sup>94</sup> Anton Tantner, “Volkszählung,” in *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit, Band 1, Hof und Dynastie, Kaiser und Reich, Zentralverwaltungen, Kriegswesen und landesfürstliches Finanzwesen*, eds., Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Mat’ a and Thomas Winkelbauer (Wien: Böhlau, 2019), 73-81, esp. 76.

<sup>95</sup> Tantner, “Volkszählung,” 76.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>97</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, fol., *Manuskript: Bruckstücke aus meinen leben, 13 Bogen, verfasst nach März 1857*, 1.

<sup>98</sup> Tantner, 76.

convoluted borders that marked out the domains of the manorial estates, and surveyed the towns, markets and villages of each area. The completed census was finally delivered to the *Hofkriegsrat* in 1772. In the report were countless testaments to the crippling social and economic existence almost all who had been surveyed lived.

These “political comments” (*Politischen Anmerkungen*) were written down by officers whose general enlightened outlook led them to lay the blame for such suffering directly on the noble and ecclesiastical landowners.<sup>99</sup> Some of the findings no doubt inspired the reforms Maria Theresa, Kauntiz and Joseph enacted in the 1770s to stimulate the agrarian economy in the Austro-Bohemian lands, as well as police peasant-noble relations.<sup>100</sup> However, its main purpose was to categorically account for the human and logistical resources needed to build and maintain the Monarchy’s standing army, which it did in detail never before achieved. The “counting of souls” and the numbering of houses revealed the interior of the Monarchy to the government and its army, paving the way for the final implementation of the new conscription system in 1781. A system which mandated the ways in which men chosen for the army would serve the state.

The introduction of this new conscription system enabled the Monarchy to maintain a standing force of 220,000 during the 1780s, rising to almost 500,000 in the months preceding the First Coalition. These numbers, though only a paper strength, reveals the initial success of the system when compared to the army during the Seven Years’ War, where it had reached a peak of 201,311 men between 1760-1761, with the Monarchy unable to sustain that level for long.<sup>101</sup> More will be said on how this system operated during the wars with France, but first an examination of who these men were to be as servants of the state will prove useful.

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<sup>99</sup> Hochedlinger and Tantner, ... *der größte Teil der Untertanen lebt elend und mühselig*, LVI – LXXIV; Anton Tantner, “Vienna at the Time of Maria Theresa. The Panorama of the Political Comments’ from 1770/1771,” in *The Empress Cities: Urban Centres, Societies and Economies in the Age of Maria Theresia von Habsburg*, eds., Daniele Andreozzi and Luca Mocarelli (Trieste: University Press Italiane, 2017), 77-99. Tantner also recognises the bourgeoisie sentiments of the officers may also have clashed with the *lebenswelt* of the “plebian class”.

<sup>100</sup> Tantner, “Volkszählung,” 77.

<sup>101</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 299.

## Imagining the *Soldat Bürger*

The *Soldat Bürger*, wrote the jurist, professor and enlightened philosopher, Joseph Sonnenfels, once a common soldier of *Deutschmeister* and intellectual confidant of Joseph, was a man who committed his whole being to the prosperity and protection of the state and its society through service in the army. To do so marked a man out as possessing the soldier's honour. This was a system of meaning introduced to the Habsburg army in the 1760s setting out the prescribed way in which conscripts and volunteers could participate in the Austrian state and become true patriots. The *Soldat Bürger's* quest for honour was understood as an exhibition of loyalty expressed through virtuous martial acts done for the common good. It was a code of behaviours and system of values which was built upon Sonnenfels' ideals of state citizenship.<sup>102</sup>

Sonnenfels' Austrian civic identity coincided with Maria Theresa and her son's centralising reforms. Citizenship, he envisaged, was a legal status which could be used to unite the inhabitants of the many different societies of the Monarchy as one central state behind the dynasty.<sup>103</sup> As part of Habsburg state-building, Sonnenfels reasoned the emancipatory nature of universal legal citizenship, as part of a wider corporate state justly ruled and administered by the emperor, as opposed to the status of subjecthood bound to local corporate bodies, would promote patriotic service for the betterment of all society. As Hannelore Burger has argued, the Austrian citizen was a fighting term that evoked progression and an anticipation of things to come, which Josephinian elites could use to attack "estates and all their particularism, priests, members of foreign orders, secret societies, beggars and vagrants" who prevented the quest for a good and happy state.<sup>104</sup> In short, the inhabitants of the Monarchy were imagined as citizens of one political body, and not just subjects or authorities based upon their place of residence, gender and status. They would be people, as Franz Fillafer has articulated, who supported the

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<sup>102</sup> Sonnenfels, *Sonnenfels gesammelte Schriften*, 218.

<sup>103</sup> Burger, "Die Staatsbürgerschaft," 101.

<sup>104</sup> Burger, 100.

Monarchy's collective wellbeing as a moral responsibility and for the utilitarian benefits they could derive from a rationalised state.<sup>105</sup>

It was not equality before the law that specifically earned a subject the status of citizen, this was a tool with which to relegate the powers of local landowning elite over the human resources of the Monarchy, but one's commitment to the collective prosperity of the state.<sup>106</sup> What this meant was a subject "who participates in the state", as Joseph and Maria Theresa stipulated, became citizens by "working for the general good according to their wealth, their strength, and their capacity to be useful."<sup>107</sup> Such patriotic work realised an individual's citizenship, and though this did not confer specific rights, serving the state in such a way was a just reward. The reward, as could only be the case in a monarchical system where the state and the emperor were one and the same, was the maintenance of the security and prosperity one needed for a good life - that is living without fear - which could only remain with the Habsburgs in power, who because of their intervention in the corporate hierarchy of society at every level were increasingly "understood primarily as the giver, protector, and implementer of laws".<sup>108</sup> As Harm Kluefing has elucidated, a patriotic citizen in the Josephinian sense was a being with the "love of the service to the fatherland".<sup>109</sup> This love of service, Kluefing and others have explained, was best found in the emerging central bureaucracy, where the obedient performance of one's prescribed duty in administrating the state, and not working purely for one's corporate or social position, was the indicator of a patriotic citizen.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Burger, 107; Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 29.

<sup>106</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 180-181.

<sup>107</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 51.

<sup>108</sup> Judson, 53; László Kontler, "Polizey and Patriotism: Joseph von Sonnenfels and the Legitimacy of Enlightened Monarchy in the Gaze of Eighteenth-Century State Sciences," in *Monarchism and Absolutism in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Cesare Cuttica and Glenn Burgess (London: Routledge, 2012), 75-90, esp. 81-83.

<sup>109</sup> Harm Kluefing, "Bürokratischer Patriotismus," *Aspekte des Patriotismus im Theresianisch-Josephinischen Österreich*, in *Patriotismus* ed., Günter Birtsch, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1991), 37-52, esp. 50. For discussion on differing modes of patriotism in the Habsburg Monarchy see Teodora Shek Brnardić, "Modalities Of Enlightened Monarchical Patriotism in The Mid-Eighteenth Century Habsburg Monarchy," in *Whose Love of Which Country?: Composite States, National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe*, eds., Balázs Trencsenyi and Márton Zászkaliczky (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 629-61, esp., 640-49.

<sup>110</sup> Waltraud Heindl, "Bureaucracy, Officials, and the State in the Austrian Monarchy: Stages of Change since the Eighteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006): 35-57; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 58-62; Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 152.



The Josephinian idea of citizenship and patriotism as state service continued throughout the reign of Francis. One echoed in a patent issued in February 1797 entitled “West Galician Civil Law Code” (*Westgalizisches bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*). It stipulated “every citizen, regardless of rank, status or sex, is obliged to assist in the general welfare of the state by strictly observing the laws as much as possible.” By relegating the other demands corporate society placed on one’s rank, status, and sex, the identity of the citizen, the patent indicated, was the most important role in the Monarchy. The state was thus *the* corporate entity which sat above all other corporations, expecting its members to do good – follow the law – and place its wellbeing above all else.<sup>111</sup> Serving the state was the form of patriotism that permeated the army, underpinning the motivations of many common born men who secured employment and status through their performance as soldiers during the wars against France. What the law meant for the conscripted man, the volunteer and their officer was to accept and embody the martial virtue and duty of the *Soldat Bürger* by following the principles of honour governing his service.

Beginning in the 1760s, Habsburg military intellectuals led by Joseph II, and later followed by the emperor’s nephew, Archduke Charles, set out military honour as the foundations of a *Soldat Bürger’s* state service in the hope that this psychological system, and the communities and identities it created, would sustain the army through the rigours of war. At its foundation military honour was an exclusive set of moral virtues that promoted soldiers to judge their actions and those of their comrades by their usefulness to the state. Men referred to these moral virtues as the “soldier’s honour” (*Militärischen Ehre or Soldatenehre*), “*point d’honneur*”, the “principles of honour” (*Grundsätzen der Ehre*), or simply as “honour” (*Ehre*).<sup>112</sup> It was a code of integrity and a mark of status shared by all in the army but was known to demand more and reward more the higher one rose through the ranks. It was most definitely a badge of merit, as

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<sup>111</sup> Burger, “Die Staatsbürgerschaft,” 98.

<sup>112</sup> Johann Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen für Soldaten und ihre Freunde im österreichischen Kaiserstaate* (Vienna: Anton Strauss, 1817), 75-76; *Das Österreichische Militär betreffende Schriften: Das Neueste Reglement für die Sämmentlich-kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie* (Frankfurt: L. S. Casius, 1786), 158 and 159 (to be referred to as *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement* for the rest of the study); NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 11. NL, B/682 Zagitzcek, fol., *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 19; Part 2, 11. These terms, and the collected virtues they were applied to, have all been translated as honour for this work.

one soldier understood it, but it also created the “exhibition of dignity” (äußere Würde) and “symbol of unity” that manufactured the “noble notion” of service.<sup>113</sup> If a man continually met the demands of the soldier’s honour by embodying its traits as a dedicated military servant, he and his community could recognise him as a citizen of the state and deserving of respect.<sup>114</sup>

The principles of honour introduced into the Habsburg army after the Seven Year’s War was a process that turned obedient military service into a moral imperative and a condition of privilege.<sup>115</sup> A soldier who carried out their military service by placing the safety of the state at the apex of his considerations was awarded with access to a more immediate corporate body which would secure his welfare (*Wohlfahrt*).<sup>116</sup> This body was the “Military Estate”, where through his loyalty and virtue a man could secure his own individual prosperity within its social hierarchy. For ennobled officers this may have meant a career which provided access to larger social networks offering patronage and prestige. For volunteers, conscripts and the “middling-sort” of officer, military service gave men social mobility – potentially ennoblement - as well as security. Citizenship (*Staatsbürger*) obtained through military service was thus dualistic, where the ability to claim the safety and security of old regime citizenship (*Bürger*), understood by contemporaries as the “special and privileged status of membership in a socially esteemed category”, came from a desire to selflessly serve the state.<sup>117</sup>

The intellectual underpinning of the soldier’s honour, and the key to his citizenship, rested on the pillars of utilitarian patriotism, the concept of the state, and one’s service to it as described by Sonnenfels’ 1771 work “On the Love of the Fatherland” (*Über die Liebe des Vaterlandes*). In it Sonnenfels documented the patriotic acts, models of virtue and the state service each member of the different corporate estates and rungs of hierarchy within the Monarchy were to undertake to showcase their love of the fatherland and therefore their

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<sup>113</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär*, 127.

<sup>114</sup> Norma Thompson, *What Is Honor? A Question of Moral Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3-5.

<sup>115</sup> Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed., J. G. Peristiany (Chicago, IL: Midway Reprint, 1974), 19-78, esp. 21-27.

<sup>116</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 158-159.

<sup>117</sup> Jean L. Cohen, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos,” *International Sociology* 14, no. 3 (1999): 245-68, esp., 254; Klingenstein, “The Meanings of ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian’”, 450.

citizenship. After setting out what the fatherland was, Sonnenfels listed the ways in which the king, nobility, bureaucrat, soldier, scholar (*Gelehrte*), artist, and head of the household could demonstrate their virtuous love for it.

In the second edition published in 1785, Sonnenfels labelled the patriotic soldier a “*Soldat Bürger*”, a man who actively participated in his community by “fighting against armed enemies, sparing the defenceless, protecting [his] fellow citizens,” and who committed to soldiering without the thought for material gains. Originally, the term *Soldat Bürger* was absent in the 1771 publication. Yet later, as a sign of the newly militarised state he now resided in, Sonnenfels added two lines to the end of his chapter on the “Patriotic Soldier” arguing that:

*Under a just king every citizen is a soldier (Bürger Soldat). Turn it around and say: Under a just king every soldier is a citizen (Soldat Bürger).*<sup>118</sup>

Sonnenfels’ last lines echoed the thinking of German-Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, who in a review of Thomas Abbt’s “On Death for the Fatherland” wrote “in a warring monarchy, all are citizens”. Abbt’s work argued fighting and dying for the fatherland in a just war, as Helmut Walser-Smith concludes, “transformed servile subjects into active, participating citizens.”<sup>119</sup> Now under the rule of Joseph, who modelled his reign on what he desired from an enlightened and patriotic servant of the state, fighting for the Habsburgs was a clear way in which men could show dutiful obedience to the monarch by exercising their political agency as appointed citizens entrusted with securing the traditions and particularisms of the fatherland that gave them a community to belong to.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Sonnenfels, *Sonnenfels gesammelte Schriften*, 218. “Man kann die Denkungsart eines patriotischen Befehlshabers ber der Armee mit keinem treffenden und edleren Zugezeichnen und vollenden, als Livius dem Tribune Herennius in Mund gelegt: Ein Befehlshaber, dem mehr, wirklich zu siegen, als das Kommando zu führen am Herzen Liegt. Was Justinus von Epaminondas sagt, kann zum Gegenstücke von diesem Zuge aufgestellt werden: Er strebte, die Herrschaft nicht sich, sondern dem Vaterlande zu erwerben. Ein Heer, das die Vaterlandsliede beselet kämpft gegen die bewaffneten Feinde, schonen des Wehrlosen, schützen seine Mitbürger, halt nicht, wie die Legionen des Caesar, sich durch den Namen Quiriten entehret, und ruft, wie diese: Wir sind Soldaten! Saadi in dem Apologe der Tyrant sagt: Unter einem gerechten Konige ist jeder Bürger Soldat. Man wende es um, und sage: Unter einem gerechten Konige ist jeder Soldat Bürger.”; Sonnenfels, *Über die Liebe des Vaterlandes* (Vienna: Joseph Kurzböck, 1771), 126.

<sup>119</sup> Smith, *Germany*, 105-06. The quote from Mendelssohn is from his review of Abbt, which can be found on p. 106.

<sup>120</sup> Teodora Shek Brnardić, “The Enlightened Officer at Work,” 167-69.

The fatherland for these military servants was understood by Sonnenfels and most of his intellectual contemporaries, including Abbt, as encompassing a man's family, "a land in which he has made his permanent abode", where he enjoyed security and protection along with his fellows inhabitants, and those who enjoyed the same rights as he.<sup>121</sup> The state for the soldier was thus his local community, where regionally based recruiting districts, drawing upon close knit groups of men from rural communities, served to underscore the regiment he was a part of as an extension of the fatherland. Foreign volunteers could also lay claim to these places as their fatherland after making the choice to take up employment in the emperor's service and moving to the regimental districts. Soldiering was then a civic act done on behalf of the locale, one full of political agency, which placed these local societies within the greater Habsburg state through the military service of its adult men. Their military service and a love of duty, Sonnenfels concluded, echoing Abbt, was the defining aspect of the fighting man's virtue and citizenship.<sup>122</sup>

Such acts had rewards. As Sonnenfels explained of citizenship in a monarchy: to be patriotic, virtuous and have a love for duty was to have self-worth, to have self-worth was to have honour, and to have honour was to have social value in a society founded on rank and privilege. The idea of respect and reward obtained through virtue was, as Franz Szabo has indicated, a distinctly Josephinian concept, informed directly by Sonnenfels' work which built on contemporary concepts of civic republicanism, rational and rationalised society and the rule of law.<sup>123</sup> These strains of the enlightenment, however, had to sit within the confines of the monarchical political system of the Monarchy where self-serving desires still reigned supreme.<sup>124</sup> This was a system of rule which the French political philosopher Montesquieu wrote as one that did not contain virtue as a fundamental motivator for loyalty. Instead, as the philosopher had summarised in a work read by the young emperor, honour as status motivated citizens to

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<sup>121</sup> Brnardić, "The Enlightened Officer at Work," 167. The Court Secretary (*Hofsekretär*) and later director and president of the faculty of law at the University of Vienna, Franz Ferdinand von Schrotter (1736-1780), understood his "fatherland" as all the "states which are subject to the glorious Austrian sceptre", which as Grete Klingenstein summarises meant, "the whole of the Monarchy." Klingenstein, "The Meanings of 'Austrian' and 'Austrian'," 461.

<sup>122</sup> Sonnenfels, *Sonnenfels gesammelte Schriften*, 217-18.

<sup>123</sup> Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 2-7

<sup>124</sup> Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in 18th-Century Europe* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2005), 43-53.

support a monarchy, fear chained men to a despotic state, and selfless virtue inspired positive participation in a republic. Yet, as Szabo has summarised, Joseph introduced “virtue as fundamental principle of a monarchy”, putting into practice the writings of Abbt, Mendelssohn and Sonnenfels in the construction of his army and the bureaucracy with the hopes of maximising the domestic potential of his people, and thereby the prosperity of his state.<sup>125</sup> In short, Joseph’s state needed the positive participation of its inhabitants to improve, and the honour of citizenship and respect derived from good deeds done in service of the monarch became the motivating reward.

In the soldier’s case, their active participation in the state through their military service was imagined by Joseph and his military advisors, like Lacy and the director of the Theresian Military Academy, Count Franz Joseph Kinsky, as a way in which disenfranchised men could claim both corporate and state citizenship, both rank and privilege. A community, status and reward which would motivate men to serve and die on the battlefield. Through a series of military regulations that set out the roles for soldiers to inhabit, Joseph, his military advisors, acolytes and descendants, from the 1760s onwards and throughout the wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, developed, asserted and then reconditioned obedience, resilience and loyalty as values which together formed an honourable and virtuous military identity. The behaviour and mental methods of military honour men demonstrated, to borrow from Julian Pitt-Rivers, determined “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society”.<sup>126</sup> It was this sense of value and community within the army, Lacy, Kinsky and Joseph believed, which would inspire men to outlast the psychological costs of military service and serve the state .

Honour then was a system of meaning that promoted soldiering as an act of citizenship as defined by actions that assisted in the general welfare of the state. These actions, soldiers were instructed, would eventually serve a man’s own self-interests as the honour that came from

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<sup>125</sup> Franz A. J. Szabo, “Innere Staatsbildung und soziale Modernisierung: Überschreitung von Grenzen?,” *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts* 13 (1999): 251-62, esp. 261.

<sup>126</sup> Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” 21.

-serving the state was a form of currency awarded with security and promotion within the army. It was men's individual desire to maintain the respect and the satisfaction honour provided to them which military intellectuals believed would foster the *esprit de corps* units needed to win the Monarchy's future wars.

The language of honour used in the regulations from the 1760s right up until 1848 carried the hallmarks of a military intellectual sphere influenced by the patriotism of Sonnenfels and his definition of citizen. Though never directly referenced in the regulations of the Josephinian army, or those written by the archduke Charles, Sonnenfels' work permeated the soldier's stipulated identity as a loyal, selfless servant of the state which embodied correctly secured honour as a sign of respect and status. The revised infantry regulations written in 1786, echoing almost exactly those produced under the guidance of Lacy in 1769, informed common conscripts and volunteers alike, "he must think of nothing but his duty and observe it as an honourable and righteous soldier to the best of his ability", and their officers reminded at all times, whether convincing men to join the army or stand their ground on the battlefield, they were "obliged to do everything within their power which is in the best interest of the service".<sup>127</sup>

This language of honour was also a social framework introduced to create military communities of respect that would sustain soldiers during combat and allow them to overcome the fear of random death on the battlefield and the desires to escape the drudgery and difficulty of military life.<sup>128</sup> The military regulations for the standing army, first written in 1769, laid out the principles of honour and state service for each rank, which together created the communities that influenced men to view soldiering as a duty they owed the fatherland, each other, God and their monarch. These communities will be analysed further in chapter three, but

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<sup>127</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 15. See also verbatim texts or texts marginally changed for stylistic reasons on the soldier's honour in *Reglement für die sämmentlich-kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie* (Vienna: Johann Thomas Edlen von Trattner, 1769); *Das Österreichische Militär betreffende Schriften* (Frankfurt/Leipzig: Klimbt, 1794) This edition was a reissue of the 1786 regulations, with stylistic changes. *Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie*, Vol. 1-4 (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1807); *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1808). The *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement* was the first section of volume 1 of the *Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie* published in 1807.

<sup>128</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 160-161.

it is enough to say for now that it was at the company level where the love of state service was to be fostered in a man. A process resting on the love and respect of his immediate superiors, the brotherly care of the *Cameradschaft*, and the ambitious, but controlled, desire to maintain one's honour as a mark of esteem, military proficiency, and selflessness.<sup>129</sup>

Together men honourably serving in company communities and shaming those who did not would form the foundation of a regiment's *point d'honneur*, or *esprit de corps*, motivating units to serve the state fervently with a "fierce confidence".<sup>130</sup> Conscripts and volunteers were told on enlisting by their company commanders, whose own honour rested on husbanding self-respect and the desire to be valued within their men, that "the role of the soldier is to protect the public safety... it is the sublime purpose of his existence" and through performing the skills of their service, "obedience, faithfulness, vigilance and steadfastness", a man could obtain a "well to do life" (*ein gesitteter Lebenswandel*). It was the "the desire for honour" in service to the emperor which enabled a man to "set out his claims for respect and reward."<sup>131</sup> As the regulations published in 1769, updated in 1786 and then again in 1807 stated, these were "the laws of the soldier".<sup>132</sup>

All the regulations published during the wars with France stipulated honour was a mark of selfless, stoic service undertaken for the good of the state. These were the same hallmarks of the *Soldat Bürger* as imagined by Sonnenfels. To create soldiers invested in the state, the 1769 *Reglement* and its successor works strictly forbade practices attributed to the common people like public drunkenness, falling into debt, money lending and the smoking of tobacco outside of camp. These actions were indicators of a man whose commitment was not to a higher collective purpose. Instead, the common soldier (*Gemeine*) was to "live in harmony and unity with his

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<sup>129</sup> The spelling of the German word *Kameradschaft* is presented here in its original eighteenth century form found in all the military regulations.

<sup>130</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 161.

<sup>131</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 1-2.

<sup>132</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 1-4. This same message is echoed in *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 91-104. Page 104 contains the oath soldiers were to swear on enlistment, which closely resembles the oath set out in 1807. See *Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserliche königliche Infanterie*, Vol. 2 (Vienna: K.k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1807), 2.

comrades”, speak with words that exhibited “reason and honesty” and was to watch out for the physical well-being of his fellow soldiers.<sup>133</sup>

In the 1807 *Reglement*, written when Charles’ was at the head of the army and the *Hofkriegsrat*, sentences were almost quoted verbatim from the older 1769 copy, reinforcing the Habsburg army’s commitment to a military professionalism based upon honour as a system of sociability and service that encouraged mutual respect. The common soldier was to show “decency”, an accepted model of behaviour that “distinguished the educated soldier from the crude farmer.”<sup>134</sup> In order to keep strong, healthy, and ready to serve the monarch who cared for him and the state that he protected, the common soldier was ordered to look after his hygiene and abstain from sexual intercourse. This new regulation dictated the soldier’s “reputation must be free and easy, his demeanour sensible and modest,” and that if he was without food, pay or clothing he was to “bear the hardship of military service, privileged that it is for the good of the state.”<sup>135</sup> Above all the soldier was to remain faithful and always obey and respect his sovereign who commanded the duty and dedication of all those who served. This, the opening paragraph written in 1769 and addressed to the soldier stated, was “the whole foundation of service” (*die Grundfeste des ganzen Dienstes ist*).<sup>136</sup>

The reception of the principles of the *Soldat Bürger*, his honour and “foundation of service” are articulated by Johann Nuce, a military intellectual and essayist who was an officer in the *Deutschmeister* between 1795 and 1815. He described the honour of the Habsburg military community as specifically “the honour of soldiers” in an 1817 treatise entitled “Essays on Military Moral: Point d’honneur – Esprit de corps” (*Militärisch-moralische Aufsätze: Point d’honneur – Esprit de corps*). A soldier’s honour, for both the enlisted man and officer, Nuce explained, was like “the honour of an estate, civil servant, artist and citizen”, but different in that, as with all

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<sup>133</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 5.

<sup>134</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 12-13; *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 5-6. The 1786 edition of the *Reglement* specifically asserted the common soldier (*Gemeine*) must carefully avoid crude behaviour, so he was not mistaken for a peasant farmer dressed in soldier’s clothes. “. . . und das ungeschliffene Wesen auf das sorgfältigste zu vermeiden, um nicht ein in Soldatenkleidern verüllter Bauer zu hyn.”

<sup>135</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 4.

<sup>136</sup> *Reglement für die sämmentlich-kaiserlich-königliche Infanterie*, 7. The 1807 *Reglement* echoed these sentiments in the oath of loyalty all men were to swear. See, *Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserliche königliche Infanterie*, 2: 2.



professional honours, it could not be classified as the same and nor could it be equated with the honour of mere craftsmen.<sup>137</sup>The reason why the soldier's honour was vastly different, indeed superior, was because he was expected to lay down his life for the good of the state.<sup>138</sup>

This honour, Nuce initially explained, quoting a number of writers, including words from Johann Michael von Loen's *Der Soldat oder Abhandlung vom Kriegsstand*, "was both a consequence and a reward of virtue...which is attached to our deeds alone".<sup>139</sup> It was not an honour of happenchance or popular sentiment, but a "true honour" which took its value from the "good conscience", "true merit" and a "reputation which arises from...a brilliant capacity for action, based on a sense of duty to religion and society."<sup>140</sup> Selfless service was the hallmarks of the soldier's honour, Nuce articulated, quoting another contemporary. This was a quality that could only truly belong to his estate, whose members strove to "protect all others, to defend the state against unjust violence, to support justice, to help maintain good order and police, and thus to ensure the peace and security of the commonwealth."<sup>141</sup>

What honour was specifically to the Habsburg soldier, as Nuce had learned through his years of fighting the French, rested on three pillars which together provided "special greatness" (*besondere Größe*). To Nuce, the soldier's honour came from the selfless desire "to fight, to win, and to die". These were the fundamental purposes of the soldier, and each action could separately bring honour, as could following all the "preparations, instructions, measures and teachings," which were the "in-dispensable sources for the accomplishment of the fight." All of this, Nuce summarised, is "most easily understood by the word service." What service meant to the retired captain, echoing the *Reglement* of 1807, was to "endure happiness with moderation, adversity with steadfastness, and finally the constant and heartfelt urge to never be less than good and useful."<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 76.

<sup>138</sup> Nuce, 95.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*, 79.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid*, 79-80. The last quote was attributed by Nuce to a French writer called Basaque from his work *Histoire de duel*, 17.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 83-84, Nuce again quoted from Basaque's *Histoire de duel*, 17-19.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, 85-86. Nuce now writes in his own words.

As Ernst Zehetbauer has shown in his study of the friction between Austrian militia units and regular soldiers in 1808, the soldiers' honour was seen by professionals as mark of one who had faced the fire enemy with steadfastness, exhibiting the desire to do well whilst under stress and strain. Honour for fighting men was not just a mark of exclusivity in a corporate institution, or the sign of expert professionalism, it attested to men's demonstrated courage and their selfless sacrifice made for the good of the state. As the regular officers who petitioned the emperor Francis wanted to make clear, expressing their disgruntlement at militia officers wearing *portepées* on their swords, the soldier's honour was superior to other estate-based honour because it demanded resoluteness in front of the enemy, and the ability to endure the fear of, and proximity to, death.<sup>143</sup> This is what made a fighting man honourable and, as Nuce suggested, were "together the praiseworthy qualities that the name zealous servant (*Diensteifer*) denotes."<sup>144</sup>

Specifically, Nuce articulated that military honour, and the feeling it gave, was essential in motivating men to treat death with contempt and "to die on the field of honour for the sake of one's dear fatherland and one's duty".<sup>145</sup> This ability to deny one's inner instinct for self-preservation and to become acquainted with death at such a young age, Nuce explained, was a testament to "human greatness and the strength of its soul" (*menschliche Größe und Stärke der Seele*) and nowhere could the human spirit be shown more than on the battlefield.<sup>146</sup> Such commitment to victory and accepting death as part of this process, just like the "Holy Son", was one of the hallmarks of a man who possessed a "zeal for service" (*Diensteifer*).<sup>147</sup>

This zeal to serve was, as previously mentioned, essential to the soldiers' honour, and if followed correctly prevented men from using the military for petty-vain glory and material vice. Men who did this were "honour-seekers" (*der Ehrsüchtige*), whose unbridled ambition led them to view the possession of honour as something to hoard and jealously guard. Whilst human

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<sup>143</sup> Zehetbauer, *Landwehr gegen Napoleon*, 99-102

<sup>144</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 85-86.

<sup>145</sup> Nuce, 86.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, 88.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*, 86.

ambition was something that needed to be cultivated as it empowered men, Nuce recognised, it could not become despotism or tyranny in any of its guises. How the correct type of soldiers' honour could be kindled within a man, Nuce explained, depended on the paternal instruction of his superiors and comrades. What was paramount, however, was the soldier's quest for honour had to be pursued for the state's common good at the expense of his own selfish desires.<sup>148</sup>

Nuce's description of the soldiers' honour he had imbued – “since the first happy hour that called me to be a member of our army” – reflected precisely the demands Sonnenfels placed on the *Soldat Bürger*.<sup>149</sup> The mark of a good soldier and honourable soldier was to fight and maintain composure on the battlefield for the good of the state. An end which required men to accept the possibility of death, exhibiting a form of prescribed patriotism that put the love of the fatherland, and the love of serving, above one's own life. Yet the honour which co-opted men to serve the state also offered a utilitarian reason, a key element Sonnenfels believed was needed to inspire service. The soldier's honour, as Nuce had understood it, was not just the key to a special military community, but also one that rewarded the correct amount of ambition and drive. Fighting gave rank to a man and identified him as *Soldat Bürger* (or *Diensteifer* as Nuce has labelled the virtuous soldier). This provided privilege, for the soldier's position announced him as one who deserved “veneration” and praise “above all others” because he was willing to die for his fatherland.<sup>150</sup>

The desire for rank and privilege, the retired *Deutschmeister* captain knew after two decades of fighting the French, was just as essential part of the soldier's honour in motivating men to serve, as was the feeling of moral virtue, camaraderie, and the fear of shame and punishment.<sup>151</sup> This was the combination of selfless devotion and selfish desire the Josephinian state required from its military servants. Indeed, the patriotic soldier, as Sonnenfels wrote, had to mirror the ancient Thebian general Epaminondas, the greatest soldier of his age, who

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<sup>148</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 93.

<sup>149</sup> Nuce, 76.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid*, 97-98.

modelled the stoic, ascetic virtue desired of Habsburg soldiers. This was the moral standard honour had inspired Nuce to uphold throughout his time in the *Deutschemeister*.<sup>152</sup>

Let us now pause to define what honour was for Habsburg soldiers and clarify the use of this term for the rest of this work. As has been discussed, the Josephinian military culture of the army constructed honour as a multifaceted psychology whose purpose was to create a culture of state service, motivating individuals to judge their behaviour, actions and relationships on their contribution to the overall felicity of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was also mark of status, and therefor security, offered to those who possessed a goodness of character and state commitment as exhibited by the types of military proficiency, comradery and compassion assigned to their rank. In its implementation through socialisation, Habsburg military honour comprised of three layers of modifiers– behavioural, social and cognitive – which altered pre-military values, leading men to internalise their usefulness to the state and obedience to their superiors as an imperative for their own personal happiness. Each layer of honour interacted with the other to instil within individuals the self-discipline required to function in their military role, and police the service of others, driven by the utilitarian desire to “protect the public safety from enemies within and without.”<sup>153</sup>

As the analysis of Nuce’s work has shown, a treatise which was subscribed to by the emperor and military members of the Habsburg family, men within Francis’ army understood the traits of Sonnenfels’ patriotic *Soldat Bürger* as it was imagined by the Josephinian army’s honour culture. The military identity honour realised, and the mode of state participation it encouraged, provided generals with the means to motivate their soldiers to fight without the need to borrow from the French Republic’s exhibition of the enlightenment. As this work will show, honour as manifested in the Habsburg army made tangible Sonnenfels’ *Soldat Bürger* by linking men’s personal welfare and esteem to their protection of the dynasty’s state.

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<sup>152</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 87-88.

<sup>153</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 2: 3.

## Conclusion

Let us conclude my summarising who and what the *Soldat Bürger* was in the minds of Habsburg military intellectuals. The soldier, as a citizen and servant of the state, was a man who had sworn an oath of loyalty, homage and submission directly to the emperor. He was now no longer under the sole authority of his local noble landlord. The conscript, the volunteer and the officer of the Josephinian army were to serve a goal beyond selfish comforts and corporatist interests: the defence of the dynasty and therefore the “public safety” of the state. In doing so soldiers would serve themselves by becoming citizens of the state, using their status to obtain rank and privilege in a monarchical society above what was afforded to them otherwise.<sup>154</sup>

In time, thanks to this new ability to obtain status, the role of the soldier would be understood as a man who protected the welfare of his community. As a local man he would help these places accept soldiering and conscription as a normal part of rural life and the way in which local societies fulfilled their loyalty to the dynasty.<sup>155</sup> A role, which thanks to the respect afforded to it, made it easier for men to accept. A commitment made infinitely easier as it was rewarded with an exclusive and superior corporate honour to those available to non-combatants because it was only open to those who served the state. The maintenance of this honour was men’s key to the military estate and the privileges that came with it.

The *Soldat Bürger*, as we shall see, was not merely an intellectual musing, but a lived identity for hundreds of thousands of men. One that rested upon the understanding of the state as the supreme corporate body amongst many, which demanded, as Laurence Cole has articulated, a “loyalty relationship above and beyond all other social bonds”. A relationship that was shared between a soldier and his monarch, between the Monarchy’s local societies and the dynasty’s “imperial project”.<sup>156</sup> These links of loyalty were only truly realised and effectively

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<sup>154</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 2: 3.

<sup>155</sup> Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 88.

<sup>156</sup> Cole, *Popular Patriotism*, 22; Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 4.

utilised through the Monarchy's own form of mass mobilisation, and the central government's relationship with the territorial authorities who enabled it, during the wars with France.

## Chapter Two

# Conscription in the Austro-Bohemian Lands, 1781-1817

Amongst the 191 men drafted into the *Deutschmeister* in 1792 was Philip Bauer, a sixteen-year-old from Lower Austria, who became a soldier of the regiment in the last days of December as it was stationed in the garrison town of Wiener Neustadt. There Bauer's sole existence as a subject of his local landlord was ended when he swore his oath of service to the emperor and was given the uniform of the regiment. The *Assentliste* table containing Bauer covered a period of two months, from December to January 1793. It is a document that collated the details of all new recruits, listing the boy as a catholic from the valley village of Schwarzenbach in Lower Austria and of middling height at 5 *fuss*, 1 *zoll* (1.64cm-170.3cm).<sup>1</sup> On joining *Deutschmeister* Bauer was paid the obligatory bounty given to conscripts of 3 *florins* (*fl.*), which amounted to roughly 36 days' pay.<sup>2</sup> Propertyless and without a recognised profession, the only remarkable point distinguishing Bauer from the other men on the regiment's *Assentliste* is his age. At sixteen he was the youngest to be conscribed during the winter months of 1792, and officially he should not have been made a soldier until seventeen. Enrolled in the regiment on the same date was the forty-year-old Anton Zschsinger, a man whose age placed him at the very limit of those available for active service. He too was from Lower Austria, from the village of Zillingsdorf, where the thirty-one-year-old shoemaker Max Lackner had also called home. Lackner was one of the few men recognised in the *Assentliste* as a man with a trade.

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<sup>1</sup> ÖstA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 368 ST, (1792), fol., *Assentliste: December 1792*.

<sup>2</sup> *Reglement für die Sämmentlich-kaierlich-koniglich Infanterie*, 66

These three men are outliers in 1792, making them remarkable. Their presence as part of the *Deutschmeister's* conscription drive at the very beginning of the Revolutionary Wars hint at the already substantial pervasiveness of the localised military in Habsburg society, its desperations for men and its ability to provide a reference point for individuals to understand their experiences of the war with Revolutionary and Imperial France. The rest were, like most of the European population, propertyless, working poor whose existence relied on the vagaries of a rural economy. In their late teens and early twenties these men had no trade or status to protect them from military service. Their experience of war and for their communities, as it would be for the next 23 years, was tied to service in local infantry regiments. A process so ubiquitous in local societies, as we shall see in later chapters, it dictated the ways in which those exempt from military service, by their social privilege or gender, engaged loyally with the dynasty.

This chapter focuses on the implementation, wartime use of, and evolutionary reforms to, the Josephinian conscription system in the Austro-Bohemian Lands, with a specific emphasis on its predominance in the communities of Upper and Lower Austria. These two provinces have been chosen as they provide direct context and access to the milieu that used the role and symbol of the soldier to unite behind the dynasty examined later.<sup>3</sup> The regiment *Deutschmeister*, made up of men predominantly from in and around Vienna, serves as a thread to narrate the changes and tangible impact of conscription that, along with summaries of other units, can be used to make general statements about the Monarchy's war with France, and the consequences of mandated military service on local societies. This chapter shows that as the war with France progressed, frontline service and military life became an almost universal experience, turning the abstract ideals of the *Soldat Bürger* into tangible, lived expressions of state service and local societies' dynastic loyalty.

Ilya Berkovich and Michael Wenzel have both revealed, tabulating the conscription of men across the army before 1792 and up until 1814, how the Monarchy established its own

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<sup>3</sup> Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 162-63.



effective means to create an “Empire-in-arms”. A system of military recruitment before war that bound places to regiments, creating a cultural core within these units that served to identify them as “Bohemian”, “Upper Austria” or “Moravian”, which foreign volunteers were assimilated into through the longevity of their service.<sup>4</sup> What these two scholars prove is the Monarchy did not borrow from the French, but pursued its own unique mass mobilisation process that was older than the systems Napoleon relied upon to power his wars. Yet, as this chapter describes, it was only through war with France that the regiment truly became the anchor point for the dynasty in local regions, serving as avenues for different societies to engage in the Monarchy’s collective war effort.

This chapter takes a more focused approach to conscription than Berkovich and Wenzel, emphasising from the bottom up the impact of recruitment on local societies, and these places’ role in it. This method reveals something very different to the “Nation-in-arms” found in France, but also a military process more intimate than Berkovich and Wenzel’s “Empire-in-arms”. Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy during the wars with France created, to introduce a further nomenclature, *territories at war*. A process where the loyalties of these place, and the political identities individual’s inhabited aligned behind the Habsburg state, was generated by meeting military exigencies.<sup>5</sup> Whereas before wartime mobilisation the life of a soldier had originally been reserved for foreign volunteers and marginalised local young men, the repeated gathering of conscripts, and the reforms to the Habsburg military system which facilitated this, drew the soldier from the periphery of society and cemented it at the very centre of every suburb, village, manor and town through the constant recruitment of their male population into local regiments. Through this process territorial loyalties centred on military institutions were fostered, and state service was introduced to every manor of the crownlands.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ilya Berkovich and Michael Wenzel, “The Austrian Army”; Berkovich, “Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-1792”.

<sup>5</sup> Cole, “Differentiation or Indifference?,” 110.

<sup>6</sup> For a summary of the Habsburg conscription system during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period see Arthur Mark Boerke, “Conscription in the Habsburg Empire to 1815,” in *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?*, eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid and Harold D. Blanton (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 66-83; Alphons Freiherr von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht: Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols (Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1898), 1: 100-08; Oskar Teuber and Rudolf von Ottenfeld, *Die österreichische*

The primary sources employed in this chapter are the *Musterlisten* and *Standestabellen* of Habsburg infantry regiments stationed in the Austro-Bohemian Lands from 1781 to 1817. The units selected here compliment the experiential sources used in later chapters written by men who served in their ranks. Cavalry recruiters picked the best conscripts from the infantry, and this military process allows us to generalise the experience of almost all combatants and their communities without the need to examine other branches of the army.<sup>7</sup> The *Musterlisten* are military records that detail by company the men who were present with the regiment on the specific date a roll call took place. Each company list follows a distinct pattern which reflects the hierarchy of the unit, descending in order from the company commander to usually the most recently enlisted common soldier. Accompanying the name of each soldier is a list of information recorded on a table beginning with rank, name, place of birth, age, religious denomination, profession before enlistment - most men were listed as “without” (*ohne*), indicating they had not learned a profession - marital status, number of children, and height. Notes were also included detailing the soldier’s length of service, the bounty he received, any important incidents like desertion, capture and punishment, as well as promotions and any raised concerns. A synopsis of each company was recorded by the regimental clerks on a *Muster Tabella*, which gathered data on the changes to the regiment in the periods between roll calls, as well as a summary of demographics.<sup>8</sup>

These lists allow us to simultaneously measure the effects of the Habsburg military institution on local communities and individual historical agents. Importantly, they offer concrete numbers of the many men and places affected by the unique way the Habsburgs transposed a neoclassical view of the military virtuous male polity onto a hierarchical social

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*Armee, 1700-1867* (Vienna: Emil Berte, 1895), 286-473. For the most recent military history of the period that relies on Wrede see Bassett, *For God and Kaiser*, 185-290.

<sup>7</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 295; Anton Hoffman, *Geschichte des ersten und ältesten österreichischen Veteranen-Vereines zu Reichenberg in Böhmen* (Reichenberg: Selbst Verlage des Vereines, 1901), 5-6. See for example the story of Joseph Müller, who was conscripted into the infantry in 1803 before being almost immediately transferred to the cuirassiers thanks to his height of “5 *Schub*, 9 *Zoll*, 3 *Strich hoch*”.

<sup>8</sup> Berkovich, “Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-1792,” 303-04.

system that relied on subservience, deference and patrimonialism.<sup>9</sup> These are not just military sources, however, documenting an individual's loyalty to the crown. *Musterlisten* are examples of territorial authorities cooperatively engaging with the Habsburg government; agreements between crown and estates that show how the Monarchy, and its many parts collectively negotiated the turmoil of France. They are both the histories of individuals becoming *Soldat Bürger*, as well as landowners proving their loyalty by providing their subjects as the raw material for the state to make citizens. These underutilised sources reveal the local effect of the war with France, the repeated and wearing burden placed upon communities and the ubiquitous nature of military service in local regiments. In short, these sources provide examples of how widespread Josephinian state-building, as introduced by its military institution, was.<sup>10</sup> Together they reveal how, as the war with France continued, and the demand for native born men increased, the intentional symbiotic relationship between the army and society, between crown and local landlord, and the dual role of the loyal subject and the disciplined soldier was leveraged with every conscription drive.

## **“...von seiner Grundschaft gestellt”: Conscription and the Manor, 1780-1792**

From 1770 until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Habsburg army was the largest, most pervasive and constant dynastic institution in the Austro-Bohemian lands.<sup>11</sup> The power of the army to impact the culture, society and politics of the dynasty and transform the lives of millions of men came from a system of conscription that symbiotically relied upon the rigid structures of rural life, and the ability of military agents to work within the political parameters of the dynasty's many societies. Just as the relationship between each Estate and Diet across the Monarchy required different approaches from the dynasty, the same level of cooperation was

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<sup>9</sup> Harald Heppner and Sabine Jesner, “Aufklärung mittels ‘Aufklärung’: Die Rolle des habsburgischen Militärs im Donau-Karpatenraum im 18. Jahrhundert,” *Journal für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa*, no. 1 (2020): 197-212.

<sup>10</sup> Matthew McCormack makes a similar argument in his work, *Embodying the Militia*, 77-92.

<sup>11</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 291-97.

required of the army in its manifold response to local societies. It was the regional, social and cultural ties between regimental officers and local authorities that permitted the Monarchy to build and sustain a massive standing army. A process that brought the state into the manor, co-opting the powers of local officials who directly governed the lives of the dynasty's subjects to fuel the Monarchy's war.<sup>12</sup> The eventual use of military officers from 1804 to greater facilitate conscription at a manor and village level did not undermine this relationship, but only served to strengthen the power the local authorities, the army and the dynasty had over the conscripted class.<sup>13</sup>

Conscription for men in the Habsburg crownlands was different in many ways to the systems of recruitment that dominated the lives of those who would fight for France.<sup>14</sup> It was only applicable to the unmarried rural and urban poor, and exemptions were extensive, whilst still maintaining a pool of conscripts recruits just over 1,500,000 in the 1790s.<sup>15</sup> Some historians have queried the conscription systems effectiveness in meeting the demands of the Habsburg army and the effects such coercive practices would have had on the motivation and morale of the soldiers of the Monarchy, especially during a time of such apparent rapid change in the wartime culture of Europe.<sup>16</sup> Many of the Habsburg generals too decried a system of military conscription they thought failed to provide the number of troops the war with France demanded, and some military intellectuals went so far as criticise the government's opposition to popular participation.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Josef Löffler, "Grundherrschaftliche Verwaltung, Staat und Raum in den böhmischen und österreichischen Ländern der Habsburgermonarchie vom ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert bis 1848," *Administrativ* 2, no.1 (2017): 112-39; Löffler, "Die Auswirkungen der theresianisch-josephinischen Reformen auf die Stellung der Grundherrschaften," *Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs* 10, no. 2 (2020): 194-202.

<sup>13</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 94.

<sup>14</sup> Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies*; Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution*, 58-89.

<sup>15</sup> Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy," 88. As the war progressed the regimental sources used in this chapter show the exempted peasantry were utilised in greater numbers than has been thought, though much more needs to be done to crystallise this finding.

<sup>16</sup> Mark Hewitson, "'Princes' Wars,"; Rauchensteiner, *Kaiser Franz*; Eysturliid, *The Formative Influences*.

<sup>17</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 66-67.

These opinions reflect a malaise at the top of the Habsburg army.<sup>18</sup> Regimental officers were able to maintain the strength of their units in the field, thanks largely to a system their superiors blamed in order to mitigate their failures as leaders. Fundamentally, a transformation in military conscription demanding popular participation and relating it to active citizenship could never have taken place. The many cooperative periphery bodies of authority the dynasty relied upon to extend its power across its kingdoms, the corporate nature of eighteenth-century society, and the power the authorities expected from the emperor for their loyalty, prevented any radical change. The conscription system, as it was established in 1781, was part of the cooperative relationship between the crown and the provincial estates that served as the foundation of Habsburg rule in regional places.<sup>19</sup> Its unravelling could only have led to critiques of the dynasty's political structures it may not have survived. Yet in response to assessments of the Habsburg military system, which did acutely observe some of its failures, small incremental changes were introduced to keep up with the intensification of the conflict and the escalating numbers of men required to challenge French domination. Even so the fundamental practices of the Habsburg military system, imagined by Joseph, remained the same until its victory, providing the Monarchy the successful means to wage absolute war in its own way.<sup>20</sup>

In 1781, after extensive surveys of the Habsburg crownlands and its populations provided the Monarchy with a reliable source of information on the interior of its domain, a patent entitled *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme. Für die kaiserl.[iche] königl.[ich] deutschen Erbländer in Friedens- und Kriegzeiten* was issued under the governance of Joseph II.<sup>21</sup> The patent

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<sup>18</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 438-42.

<sup>19</sup> Petr Mat'a, "Der Adel in der Habsburgermonarchie: Standeserhebungen und adelsrechtliche Regelungen," in *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit I: Hof und Dynastie, Kaiser und Reich, Zentralverwaltungen, Kriegswesen und landesfürstliches Finanzwesen*, 2 Volumes, eds., Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Mat'a und Thomas Winkelbauer (Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsband 62/1-2) (Vienna: Böhlau, 2019), 1: 117-48; On the cooperation between monarchs and nobles across Europe see Julia Swann "Politics and the State in Eighteenth Century Europe," in *The Eighteenth Century: Europe 1688-1815*, ed., T. C. W. Blanning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11-51, esp., 47-51.

<sup>20</sup> Ilya Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy,"; Rothenberg, "The Shield of the Dynasty," 180-184. On the efforts to contain the impact of war see Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 169-84; Walter C. Langsam, *Francis the Good. The Education of an Emperor, 1768-1793* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1949).

<sup>21</sup> *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme. Für die kaiserl.[iche] königl.[ich] deutschen Erbländer in Friedens- und Kriegzeiten* (Klagenfurt: Kleinmayer, 1781).

laid out how each infantry regiment stationed in Austria and Bohemia was to be given a region (*Kreise*) where, guided by the most recent census, military recruiting parties would rely upon local authorities to select unmarried men for soldiering.<sup>22</sup> Each of the allocated conscription and recruiting districts given to regiments, most with historical links since at least since the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), were supposed to make these units homogenous, developing a particular *esprit de corps* that drew upon the established, pre-military relationships men had with those they served with. Each company in a peacetime regiment was to be comprised of 100 local men, and 60 foreign volunteers, with a further 40 men identified from the recruiting department who would serve during war, acting, as Michael Hochedlinger has described, as “a kind of permanent reserve, a pool of able-bodied men who continued to live as civilians in their homes before being actually drafted”.<sup>23</sup> As one general said of the Josephinian military system, men conscripted into the ranks of the local regiment would, it was hoped, view the regiment as their “second home and family”.<sup>24</sup>

The success of the new system at a local level rested on the extensive cooperation from all ranks of power in the provinces and kingdoms of the Monarchy.<sup>25</sup> Instead of a contractor system, where the army had its conscripts independently sourced by the provincial estates, who themselves relied upon sub-contractors at a manorial level, and *sub*-sub-contractors and councils at a village level to find the men required, specific regiments now had direct involvement and oversight in the quality of human material made available.<sup>26</sup> Even with the introduction of the

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<sup>22</sup> In Lower Austria these regions were: “Viertel unter dem Manhartsberg”, “Viertel ober dem Manhartsberg”, “Viertel unter dem Wienerwald”, and “Viertel ober dem Wienerwald”. The circle of Salzburg was briefly held by the Monarchy between 1803 and 1809, where IR 59 *Jordis* and IR 50 *Stain* were stationed. In Upper Austria these districts were called “Hausruckviertel”, “Traunviertel”, “Mühlviertel” and “Innviertel”, which was later lost to Bavaria in 1809.

<sup>23</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 299-300; Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht*, 102.

<sup>24</sup> Duffy, *Military Experience*, 93. Quoted from Duffy's transcription of General Creutz's report for the *Nostitz-Rieneck Hofkommission*, held from 1791-1796.

<sup>25</sup> For an analysis on how the Monarchy worked with periphery authorities in Lower Austria to secure funding for war see William D. Godsey, *The Sineews of Habsburg Power*, 362-92. See also Stefan Brakensiek, “Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900,” in *Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900*, eds., Wim Blockmans, André Holenstein and Jon Mathieu (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 149-62.

<sup>26</sup> On sub-contractors working for the Estates in Lower Austria see Heinrich Rauscher, “Rekrutierung und Soldatenwerbungen in Stein an der Donau,” *Das Waldviertel* 3 (1954): 1-7; On conscription in Styria during the Seven Years' War see Manfred Straka, “Die Rekrutierung für den Siebenjährigen Krieg aus der Steiermark,” *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 56 (1965): 43-61; On how local manors and district courts used military service as a punishment in Upper Austria again see Scheutz, “...mit dem

military into local regions, the implementation of the conscription system was not a centralised project that relegated the noble landowners and their magistrates. It was accomplished through mutual agreement between the central government and those authorities who had an intimate understanding of the localities which the army wished to utilise.

These messages of cooperation were in the *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme* patent. The officers from each company of a local regiment were provided with a set number of villages which they were to account for and where they worked with the magistrates to annually update the census, with the directive to finalise the new list by April for the year just past. The regiment was to undertake this task during times of peace as well as in war, with the company officers of the garrison battalion accounting for the population and livestock in their recruiting department.<sup>27</sup> In the period between each update, the manor officials were to take note of all those who had moved from and entered the area, whilst at the most fundamental level of society the family father was instructed to “make an oral report to the individual who oversees the population book”.<sup>28</sup> Those heads of family who failed to report a new birth were to be arrested, or fined 30 kreuzers (*kr.*).<sup>29</sup> Thus, at the most fundamental level, the effectiveness of the conscription system to account for replacements and the regiment’s ability to source them relied upon the rigid structures of the rural village. Above that it counted on the power local authorities had over their direct subjects to police subversive behaviour. At a regional level, Joseph and his government knew they relied on the noble landowners good will to effectively reach the subjects of their domain and, like with the company officer and the local magistrate, it was essential cordial relationships existed between the dynasty and those territorial powers.

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soldatenleben gezüchtigt worden”; For a brief, specific description of how recruiters sourced soldiers, and the less than stringent checks made to potential recruits see Karl von Duckner, “Eine Amazone beim k.k. Infanterie-Regimente Hagenbach,” *Streffleurs Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no.3 (1893): 231-34; See also, Christoph Hatschek, “Von der ‘wehrhaften’ Frau zum weiblichen Rekruten - Entwicklungshistorische Perspektiven der österreichischen Soldatinnen,” PhD diss., (The University of Vienna, 2009), 30-33.

<sup>27</sup> *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme*, 36.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>29</sup> This seems to be the equivalent of 2-4 days wage for unskilled work in Vienna. There is no reliable information on rural wages. For information on wages for the urban poor see Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 1:131.

In order to fully implement the new system, noble landowners and richest members of each province had their fears of militarism and despotism assuaged by explicit statements promoting the new military system as a scheme that would not impede upon the collective economic output of each province. In this sense the *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme* was a military process born from the decade long debate between Kaunitz and Joseph. According to the 1781 patent the goal of conscription, as it related to the military, was a system to be used “from time to time for the regiment to be supplied with the necessary complement of domestic men, clothes and horses during war and when the army is in the field without harm to the provinces or oppression of its inhabitants”.<sup>30</sup> This last point was reiterated by the government on a number of occasions throughout the patent, written as part of an outline on the purpose of conscription. Moreover, the central government described the new system as one created to maintain the Monarchy’s political and military means in the easiest way possible, “without destroying the agricultural industry, guilds, food and fodder production, mining and salt works” of each province.<sup>31</sup>

Joseph’s conscription system had a myriad of exemptions put in place to reinforce the strict social hierarchy of old regime Europe and the ability of provincial authorities to extract wealth from the land and their subjects. Those deemed too important for rural economies and exempted from military service were property owners and tax paying peasant tenants. As were their heirs and the master apprentices to most skilled workers within guilds. Iron workers, miners of salt and saltpetre, of which the last was essential in the creation of gunpowder, were also exempt, as were those in shipping and assorted manufacturing. Men wishing to work in these trades had to seek permission from the local magistrate before being allowed to take up a position.<sup>32</sup> Those who were part of guilds and lived in the towns of the crownlands as free citizens were also spared military service. Of course, the clergy, nobility, officials and dignitaries were not subjected to forced military service and nor were their sons.<sup>33</sup> By providing such a

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<sup>30</sup> *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme*, 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

<sup>32</sup> *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme*, 17.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*. See also Hochedlinger, “Das Stehende Heer,” 732.



detailed list of exemptions that maintained the economic and social privileges of the nobility, the clergy and their manor officials, the central government was able to position the new system as an extension of the already existing rural structures.

By 1784, 30, 504 men were garrisoned in towns across Upper and Lower Austria, and in 1786 when an army wide muster took place, the canton system had been operating for almost six years, drafting men for the infantry regiments, *Carl Ludwig* Nr. 3, *Deutschrmeister* Nr. 4 and *Graf Pellegrini* Nr. 49 in Lower Austria and *Tillier* Nr. 14, *Stain* Nr. 50 and *Langlois* Nr 59 in Upper Austria.<sup>34</sup> However, the system and regiments still relied heavily on an already established model of military service positioned as a professional avenue for men from across the *Reich* to pursue. The official number of 100 local conscripted men per company were rarely achieved in the 1780s and the complete reliance on native-born men, with their theoretical devotion to home, hearth and monarch supplemented by volunteers had not eventuated. However, the numbers of subject from within Habsburg Monarchy did reach 100 in each company thanks to the extensive use of Galicians from each regiment's supplementary recruiting departments (*Aushilfsbezirke*). These were areas in the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria assigned to each of the crownland regiments. They functioned as a valve release, reducing the economic and social pressures of sourcing men on the Austrian and Bohemian Estates by utilising the massive amounts of human resources made available to the Monarchy after the first partition of Poland in 1772. And though the use of Galicians introduced another demographic with their languages and traditions that had to be navigated, the foundations of the Josephinian conscription system within the crownlands and the reliance on the Monarchy's inhabitants for war had been set. Conscription, as Berkovich argues, was legitimatised and normalised in the crownlands during the peacetime years of the 1780s as more men were drawn into the regiments of the Monarchy each year. As the decade rolled on, regiments collected the basis of a cultural core, establishing direct links to

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<sup>34</sup> *Graf Pellegrini* would be renamed *Kerpen* in 1797, after its new *Inhaber*, Wilhelm Lothar Maria von Kerpen (1741-1823). *Tillier* would become *Klebeck* in 1788 and *Langlois* became *Jordis* in 1790. The numbers of garrisoned men come from Dickson, *Finance and Government*, Vol. 2, Table (iv) "Distribution of the entire army for 1784," 357. This number does not consider the numbers of men who had been in regiments between musters but were now no longer with them.

the villages and towns they billeted in, and whose male population they were ready to use during wartime.<sup>35</sup> The *Soldat Bürger*, as we will see, was now a part every community across the crownlands.

Between August 2 and 12, 1786, on the military exercise fields at Mikendorf in Lower Austria and near the garrison town of Wiener Neustadt, the *Deutschmeister* infantry regiment, a unit which drew its conscripts from departments around Vienna and St. Pölten, assembled by company to be counted. Five years after the implementation of the *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirksysteme*, the regiment comprised three distinct groups of common soldiers: older foreign volunteers, conscripted men in their mid to late twenties from Lower Austria and a growing number of conscripts from Galicia and Lodomeria. Each company was commanded by a cosmopolitan group of ennobled career officers whose progression up the ranks had been stultified by two decades of peace.<sup>36</sup> Volunteer foreigners (*Ausländer*) made up 1, 279 men of the 2, 718 common soldiers of the *Deutschmeister*.<sup>37</sup> These troops served as the backbone of the regiment, forming a cadre of professionals who were entrusted with husbanding the new conscripts. They generally were men who had already been in the army for a six-year term of service and who had agreed to continue for another term.

We can get a greater sense of who these men were, and the lives they led, by looking at one fusilier company whose demographic breakdown is indicative of the rest of the regiment. In the company of Baron Franz Kottulinsky, a 39-year-old graduate from the “*Neustadt Military Academy*” born in *Brünn, Moravia*, his immediate officer colleagues, first lieutenants Baron Carl Terzi and Joseph de Schonfeld, were men between their late twenties and late thirties who,

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<sup>35</sup> Berkovich, “Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy,” 312-18. It is also important to note that even with the prominent use of Austrians and Bohemians in their local regiments many of the Corporals and *Gefreyter* responsible for the socialisation of recruits in the regimental lists utilised in this chapter were Galician born. Their language, experience at transitioning from a subject at the fringes of the Monarchy to central pillar of company life would have helped many recruits from Galicia.

<sup>36</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML, (1786). I examined the service records of all those listed on the Staff company, the two Grenadier and 16 Fusilier companies’ *Prima Plana*. This is the first page of each roll call, which lists the officers of the company: *Hauptmann* (or *Kapitainleute*), *Oberleutnant*, *Unterleutnant* and *Fähnrich*.

<sup>37</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML, (1786), fol., *Mustertabella*.

without war, had in 1786 most probably reached the peak of their military careers.<sup>38</sup> The lack of combat in the preceding years had prevented any opportunity for their advancement, and all would have expected to remain company officers long into their fifties, reliant on family wealth to sustain the officer's lifestyle if peace remained.<sup>39</sup> The company's youngest non-commissioned officer was Franz Reikinger, a 21-year-old volunteer from Lower Austria who was promoted to senior private (*Gefreyter*) after four years of military service.<sup>40</sup> However, most of the company's corporals and sergeants were from parts of the *Reich* in their late 30s, 40s and early 50s who had willingly volunteered. One man, senior private Markus Seitschick, had joined the regiment as a volunteer in January 1763 in the last weeks of the Seven Years' War.

After the non-commission officers, the *Musterliste* of Kottulinsky's company was set out according to regulations, listing the common soldiers in descending order by their length of service. Of the 171 common soldiers, including non-commission officers in the company, 73 were foreigners who had moved to Lower Austria to live and work as professional soldiers, 52 were native-born conscripts from Lower Austria provided by their manor authorities, and the remaining were 32 Ruthenian serfs from the regiment's supplementary district in Galicia. Those soldiers from Lower Austria who had been conscripted during the late 1770s had been on leave between 1780 until 1784, living and working in their home communities as subjects and soldiers.<sup>41</sup> These were some of the men who benefited from a system of furlough implemented by Joseph that sought to ease the burden placed upon the government by having a large

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<sup>38</sup> ÖStA, KA Pers MLST I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML, (1786), fol., *Hauptmann Baron Kottulinsky Compagnie*. These men are listed from 1-3 on the company list. Kottulinsky was married, and after borrowing 6000 fl. from the regiment to pay the mandatory *Heiratsbewilligungen* (Marriage Permit) was faced with servicing the debt and caring for his family on stagnant wages which failed to meet inflation.

<sup>39</sup> Friedrich Franz Georg Baron (*Freiherr*) Kottulinsky von Kottulin would retire in 1809 after reaching the rank of Feldmarschalluetnant and becoming the proprietor of infantry regiment Nr. 41 in 1808. In 1797 he was appointed colonel of infantry regiment *Klebeck* Nr. 14. He later commanded a division in 1809, comprising of the Lower Austrian regiments *Kerpen* and *Deutschmeister*, and the Upper Austria regiments *Jordis* and *Klebeck*. War enabled him to ascend the regimental ranks relatively quickly, whereas peace had seen him remain as a company commander eight years prior to 1786. See Wrede, *Geschichte*, 1: 210, 409.

<sup>40</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML, (1786), fol., *Kottulinsky*. Reikinger was listed as number 21.

<sup>41</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML, (1786), fol., *Kottulinsky*. The note indicating men had been on leave was, "*Auf Dom(inien) von 1780 bis 1784 restlichen*". See for example Nr. 45, Georg Soldat, aged 33 from Wismath (Wiesmath, Lower Austria); Nr. 46, Franz Fuchsteiner, aged 28 from Kirchberg (Kirchberg am Wechsel, Lower Austria); Nr. 46, Georg Schlager, aged 34 from Soss (Sooß, Lower Austria); Nr. 47, Matthias Dinsker, aged 30 from Pitten, Lower Austria.

standing army. In 1782 alone there were almost 62,000 troops living amongst the civilian population across the Monarchy.<sup>42</sup> By 1786 most of the locals were now in their late twenties and early thirties, some with wives and children. The Galician conscripts were on the whole men who had been marched across the Monarchy to Lower Austria in 1778 in preparation for the War of the Bavarian Succession, and they too had spent much of the 1780s on leave back home.

The *Deutschmeister* regiment of 1786 encapsulates the demography and nature of military service in the Habsburg army in the decades before the French Revolution.<sup>43</sup> Soldiers were either volunteers who had been with the colours for an extended period, usually opting out of gruelling civilian life in the *Reich* for the security of the military in their emperor's army, or conscripts with little battle experience existing as Joseph intended: a trained cadre of soldiers who tilled the land, bolstered the local economy, and relied on rural work for income instead of draining the state's treasury. The regiment *Tillier* Nr. 14, from Upper Austria, mirrored *Deutschmeister* in 1786, with 1,047 foreign soldiers, 1,158 locally sourced men (*Unconscriptirte* and *Conscriptirte*) and 538 Galician recruits (*Galizier*).<sup>44</sup> The same numbers can be found in regiments from the Kingdom of Bohemia as indicated by the Moravian regiment *Laudon* Nr. 29, which in 1788 was comprised of 1,242 foreign volunteers, 1,428 Moravians and 126 Galicians. In almost every one of *Laudon's* 18 companies, Moravian locals outnumbered foreign volunteers, acting as the dynasty's anchor to the area, and the region of Brünn's (Brno) "locus of loyalty".<sup>45</sup> Their shared language, memories of home, traditions, religion and knowledge of the villages, brooks, fields, forests and farms around the Moravian city linked them together as fictive kin, like their fellow *Soldat Bürger* in Austria. And whilst Joseph's recruitment system had not taken full effect, with the peacetime regiment still reliant on foreign volunteers, the length of time many of these

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<sup>42</sup> Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy," 87-88.

<sup>43</sup> Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Society, 1648-1806* (Bristol: UCL Press, 1998), 339.

<sup>44</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 14 993 ML, (1786), fol., *Muster Tabella*

<sup>45</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 29 2514 ML, (1786), fol., *Muster Tabella*. Cole, *Popular Patriotism and Military Culture*, 19-23. "Locus of Loyalty" as articulated by Cole, describes a region's tangible fixed point of loyalty to the dynasty as represented by the men who made up its local dynastic military institutions, or "military sphere", "who combined a personalized bond of loyalty [to the monarch] with the duty to defend the 'fatherland'".

men had spent with the regiment, 20 years in some cases, meant connections to the local area and its people through marriage and proximity had been established. Indeed, according to Joseph, espousing the “Sonnenfelian population principle” of turning foreigners into inhabitants, these men were already locals for they had resided in the Monarchy for ten years or more.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the lack of immediate transformation, the system cannot be described as a “dead letter”, as Ute Planert and others have agreed, because of its vast exemptions.<sup>47</sup> The “permanent reserve” in the 1780s had not been called up to increase the regiment to its wartime service, leveraging the Monarchy’s population as intended to increase infantry regiments from 3, 176 to 4, 575 men.<sup>48</sup> In the *Deutschmeister*, Lower Austrian conscripts had only been required to replace the sick and the invalid, which they did in increasing numbers, leaving the majority to work in and support the manor and town economies as required. The system was thus a “slow burner” operating as needed. Robust enough that it was able to sustain a massive standing army, supply men in the field for what were successful military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire in 1789 and 1790, and then rebuild the regiments every year until the end of the First French Empire. In the process, the almost monthly conscription of those deemed eligible for military service, like the Lower Austrians Bauer, Zaschsinger and Lackner, asserted the local regiment’s prominence in the lives of almost everyone in the Habsburg crownlands, establishing an “ethnic composition” within the army that mirrored the Monarchy’s total population long before the introduction of universal conscription in 1867.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Burger, “Die Staatsbürgerschaft,” 98. The quote attributed to Joseph is “*Jene Ausländer, welche durch volle 10 Jahre sich hier befinden, sind für Inländer zu halten*”.

<sup>47</sup> Hewitson, ‘Princes’ Wars,’ 479. Hewitson incorrectly states cantonal recruitment was introduced in 1786. Here Hewitson quotes Ute Planert’s exclusive analysis of Anterior Austria where conscription was introduced there in 1786 with the already existing exemptions found in the other Austro-Bohemian territories from 1781. See Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg*, 388-90.

<sup>48</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 300.

<sup>49</sup> Alfred J. Rieber, “Nationalising Imperial Armies: A Comparative and Transnational Study of Three Empires,” in *Nationalizing Empires*, eds., Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 593-628, esp. 618.

## “Landstandische Recrouten, Reichs Recrouten, Galizianer”:

### The Militarisation of Society, 1788-1804

By 1788, and even without wartime conscription, the cooperation between military agents of the Josephinian conscription system and the manor authorities of the Hereditary Lands meant that the army and its needs had already assumed a central position in society. The military census, the population book, the yearly visits of company officers to assigned villages and the magistrate’s role in policing, categorising and observing the population for the army, indicates a breaking down of the barriers between the military and society in ways in which influenced localities and historical actors far more than has been understood, or can be covered here. It was war with the Ottoman Empire, however, the culmination of all of Joseph’s enlightened reforms, that truly tested his military monarchy, paving the way for the processes and practices of the Habsburg army during its war with France.

In the lead up to the Austro-Ottoman War the conscription system was able to mobilise nearly 315,000 men for the regular regiments of the Habsburg army.<sup>50</sup> During the course of the war the fighting effectiveness of these regiments were maintained whilst they were in the field.<sup>51</sup> The first use of this system revealed to local communities the extent to which regiments could utilise the male population in the villages that surrounded its garrison town and the effect this could have on their way of life. Friedrich Löffler, a young foreign volunteer who was recruited in Vienna in 1788 and fought during the war as a soldier in the *Deutschmeister*, records how the processes of conscription and mobilisation affected multiple groups of people. Garrisoned in the Lower Austrian town of Bruck with a section of the reserve division, Löffler and the soldiers there were ordered to Wiener Neustadt as the regiment mobilised for war. On hearing that the news that war was to be fought against the “Turks,” Löffler remarks:

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<sup>50</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 298.

<sup>51</sup> The following numbers are sourced from Table 12, “Strength of the Habsburg Army in absolute numbers 1741-1792” in Hochedlinger, *Austria’s War*, 300.

At the beginning the name “Turk” was shattering, marked by their proven cruelty against the wounded and prisoners from the earlier wars, that acquaintances and friends complained to us that few would return from this war.<sup>52</sup>

Upon reaching the barracks at Wiener Neustadt, the twenty five soldiers from Bruck were transferred into the company of first captain Johann Baptista de Prevost, a 46 year-old career officer who had been with the regiment since 1758.<sup>53</sup> De Prevost’s company was part of the third battalion and Löffler reflects, with some disdain, that the company contained “the most useless people, most of them newly recruited foreigners”.<sup>54</sup> What Löffler means by foreigners is hard to deduce, but he is most probably referring to the hundreds of Galician serfs that were drawn from the *Deutschmeister’s* supplementary recruiting district who were used, on the main, to bring the third battalion up to its effective wartime strength.

In Vienna, where the whole regiment mustered, Löffler recounts the interactions of the *Deutschmeister’s* local-born men with the inhabitants of the city. On the banks of the Danube where the regiment gathered Löffler stated “the most touching farewells of friends, spouses, children, and lovers could be observed. When a ship pushed off from the shore, the assembled crowd called out to the men, wishing them a happy victory and a speedy return”.<sup>55</sup> Here Löffler reveals the extent to which the mobilisation of the regiment impacted multiple layers of Lower Austrian society: from the small village of Bruck where soldiers developed intimate relationships with those they lived with, to the town of Wiener Neustadt where the local economy depended on the presence of soldiers and where its citizens were confronted with foreigners from afar, and finally in the city of Vienna where whole suburbs and villages were affected by the departure of young relatives for war.

At the conclusion of Austro-Ottoman war in 1791 the Habsburg Monarchy’s army had been transformed, existing as an institution with only a superficial resemblance to the peacetime

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<sup>52</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 33

<sup>53</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 344 ML (1786), fol., *Deutschmeister 1st Grenadier Compagnie*.

<sup>54</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 33-34.

<sup>55</sup> Löffler, 34. “An den Ufern war wohl der dritte Theil von Wien’s Bevölkerung versammelt, wo die rührendsten Abschiede von Freunden, Gatten, Kindern und Geliebten beobachtet werden konnten. Stieß ein Schiff vom Strande, so rief die versammelte Volksmenge den Einbarkirten glücklichen Sieg und baldige Wiederkunft zu.”

army of 1786. Before the regiment had assembled in Wiener Neustadt, *Deutschmeister* reflected the heterogeneous makeup of many of the fighting forces of Old Regime Europe. Professional soldiers and long-time conscripts in their late-twenties or mid-thirties, proficient in drill and military exercise, led by sons of lesser nobles who used military service to assert their family's right to social privilege. After the war it was a force with varied training and younger officers, with a reliance on young native-born men to maintain the fighting ability of the regiment.<sup>56</sup> What it did possess, however, was a cadre of conscripts in their early to mid-twenties who had already been mobilised and deployed against an enemy that invoked within the population a remembered terror that the subsequent wars with France lacked. A war, Löffler recounted, which turned foreign volunteers into friends and neighbours of local places, instead of being seen as a mere "hireling" (*Mielling*), thanks to the experiences they shared with the many "friends, fathers and loved ones [who] could not be found in the thinned ranks of the regiment".<sup>57</sup>

The soldiers the sixteen-year-old Bauer would have met in the *Deutschmeister* in 1792, eighteen months after it returned to Vienna, were still divided into three distinct groups: *Reich* volunteers, native-born conscripts who were the single largest majority, and Galicians. Yet, even with the pre-war similarities, a significant difference had emerged in the way the regiment approached each group. The foreign volunteers who had served as the professional core before the war, were now supplementary, attached to the battle-hardened conscripts who replaced the men of '86. Volunteers from the *Reich* and other parts of Europe, like Löffler, were still readily accepted because they alleviated the pressures war applied to Lower Austria, extending the native-born resources for both the military and the economy. They were not, however, relied upon by the regiment to maintain its military effectiveness. This had change between the years 1788 and 1791 as the recruiting parties of the *Deutschmeister* scoured the villages and towns in the parishes around Vienna to replace the losses the regiment incurred during the war.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 346 ML, (1791), fol., *Hauptmann Baron Andlau Compagnie*.

<sup>57</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 77-78.

<sup>58</sup> Mayer, "The Price for Austria's Security: Part 1," 296-98.



We can see how this process played out in roll calls of the *Deutschmeister* in June 1791. The sources are incomplete, but by analysing Baron Andlau's fusilier company, it is possible to chart the number of men used during the last eighteen months of the war and the impact this had on the nature of the regiment. From January 1790 until June 1791, 338 men had been in the company. At the end of the Ottoman conflict, 186 officers and men were with the regiment, a full third of them Lower Austrian recruits conscripted between June 1787 and September 1790. Of the 152 no longer with the unit, 45 had been transferred to other companies in the regiment, or to another one altogether. Six had deserted, 22 were reported as unaccounted for, and 60 confirmed dead. Of the 135 replacements used from January 1790 onwards, 75 had come from other regiments or directly from the reserve division stationed in Wiener Neustadt. Along with these men, 60 had come from the supplementary reserve in Galicia, who joined over the summer months of 1790.<sup>59</sup> The turnover in Andlau's company indicate the regiment had been completely rebuilt whilst still deployed.

In June 1791, when the company undertook its roll call, the number of foreign volunteers with the company was 40. Along with them were the 64 conscripts from Lower Austria, and a further 52 Galicians. The numbers of local born men had remained consistent throughout the war, Galicians had increased, and foreign volunteers dwindled.<sup>60</sup> What the war had created was a system, which continued up until 1804, that maintained a regiment's links to its area through regional conscription but utilised the supplementary districts of Galicia to replace dead volunteers. A cadre of men who became increasingly difficult and costly to source thanks to the stipulated job requirements of wartime regiments. From these numbers in Andlau's company we can see the conscription system of Joseph II created an army he and

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<sup>59</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 346 ML, (1791), fol., *Hauptmann Baron Andlau Compagnie, Docirung*. Ilya Berkovich explains the *Docirung* - a term derived from the Latin *doceo*, "to inform" - was a section at the back of a company or division's *Musterlisten* that summarised "reporting in two tables on listing intake (*Zunachs*) and removal (*Abgang*) of individual soldiers that had occurred since the previous muster." Berkovich, "Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy," 304. The *Deutschmeister's Muster Tabella* for 1791 is missing.

<sup>60</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 346, ML (1791), fol., *Hauptmann Baron Andlau Compagnie, Docirung*. The table page of the *Docirung* had the heading "Enclosed herewith" (*Darun der befinden sich*). It provided a snapshot of the company by rank, location, assignment, and type of recruit (*Außländer, Inländer Unconscribirte, Inländer Conscribirte, Galizjaner*).

Kaunitz both desired. One that was sustained by the native-born population, but also took the opportunity to conserve it by openly accepting foreign volunteers and utilising serfs from the periphery.

The war with the Ottoman Empire was militarily successful. The storming of Belgrade in July 1789 provided the Monarchy with a stronger buffer zone between its central lands and the frontier. The army had been able to secure this advantage under the leadership of field marshal Ernst Gideon von Laudon, thanks to its ability to replenish the losses it had incurred in the first campaign seasons, and then had gone on to stabilise the Monarchy by reconquering the Austrian Netherlands and ending the Brabant Revolt in September 1790.<sup>61</sup> Where the military had succeeded, the diplomats failed, and after war the borders with the Ottoman Empire were restored *status quo ante bellum*. Almost immediately after the ending of hostilities the son of the new emperor Leopold II, the archduke Francis, was tasked with gathering proposals from military officials and authorities with the hope of reforming the army's strength, recruitment, peacetime disposition, equipment, military education institutes, weapons and uniforms for the wars to come. One of the key issues that had arisen from the war, despite the numbers of conscripts fielded from the crownlands, was the effectiveness of the conscription system, the use of the recruiting departments, the length of service for conscripts, the impact of extended leave on military practice and the ratio of native-born men to foreigners in the regiment.<sup>62</sup> These critiques do not reflect, as some have claimed, an army in worse state than before Joseph ascended the Habsburg throne, but of a command structure unable to comprehend the difficulties of cordon warfare.<sup>63</sup>

It is clear to see, however, by returning to Andlau's company that problems did exist with the Josephinian system, as regiments relied too heavily on a complicated process which brought Slavic soldiers from the very far reaches of the Monarchy's territory to either the

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<sup>61</sup> Matthew Z. Mayer "The Price for Austria's Security: Part II, the Prussian Threat, and the Peace of Sistova, 1790-1791," *The International History Review* 26, no. 3 (2004): 473-514, esp. 507-10.

<sup>62</sup> *Wiener Zeitschrift*, Volume 2, 1792, 239.

<sup>63</sup> Basset, *For God and Kaiser*, 198.

frontline battalions or the reserve depots. This practice was so efficient in getting bodies into uniforms however, that it stalled the effective mobilisation of regiment's local resources in the crownlands, creating processes which impeded the quick replacement of losses because of the distances to and from Galicia. Yet this issue, which was both a help and a hindrance, would remain a vital part of the army's conscription system as the Monarchy took to the field against France. Francis was unable to continue chairing the commission which sought to remedy this matter among many, as the death of his father in March 1792 meant the archduke was now the young emperor. The commission was taken over by the field marshal and president of the *Hofkriegsrat*, Friedrich von Nostitz-Rieneck, who oversaw it until he died in 1796. Little was achieved in the meantime, and many of the questions originally posed by Francis on behalf of the last war's leaders were left unaddressed until the end of the Second Coalition. Even so, as regimental *Musterlisten* from the Austro-Bohemian lands attest, canton recruiting continued to impact thousands of communities across the Monarchy, enabling it to wage a decade long war with Revolutionary France.

By the time the *Nostitz-Rieneck* commission had concluded in 1796, frontline military service was an embedded part of life for the rural and urban poor, thanks to the monthly use of the conscription system to replace losses in the Austrian Netherlands and Italy. The experience of this is best exemplified by the reflections of Johann Schnerer on his time as a soldier.<sup>64</sup> A man who first served in the Moravian infantry regiment *Olivier Wallis* Nr. 29, his account illuminates the impact the military had on Monarchy's society and documents the interactions native-born men had with the Josephinian conscription system. Born in Kanitz (now Dolní Kounice), Moravia, in 1778 to a volunteer soldier from Bavaria and a local woman, Schnerer was marked by manor officials and regimental authorities for service when he was a nine-year-old boy. Before being conscripted in 1795, Schnerer attended a school run by the regiment where he learnt to read and write in German. Schnerer's military education was not unique, though, with regimental schools taking in the sons of respected non-commissioned officers with

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<sup>64</sup> NL, B/1396 Johann Schnerer, *Manuskript: Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 1.

the goal of creating the next generation of exemplary soldiers. Writing fifty years later, Schnerer tells us that “all the young boys available for conscription were taken as the regiment was in the field” in early 1795.<sup>65</sup> At 18 he was part of a new wave of men paid the usual bounty of 3 *fl.* who would replace the losses *Wallis* sustained along the Rhine. From 1796 to 1798, Schnerer spent two years in *Wallis*’ reserve division escorting newly raised Moravian and Galician conscripts, and *Reich* volunteers from Thuringia to the regiment’s depot. His education, familiarity with the regiment and position as the son of a sergeant made him the perfect candidate to fulfil the vital work of the recruiting parties.<sup>66</sup>

The muster rolls and the monthly transfer lists of *Olivier Wallis* from 1792 to 1802 elucidate the frequent regularity the reserve division sourced men from the local manors surrounding Brünn, trained them and then sent them to the battalions fighting in Italy. We can see in early March 1797 that the reserve division had 827 common soldiers listed as part of the unit, with 556 of those men identified as locals.<sup>67</sup> Of the full list of common soldiers, 644 had yet to be classed as effective as they were still in training. In the preceding 15 months beginning in January 1796, a total of 1, 233 men had been conscripted from Moravia and Galicia with 907 sent to the two field battalions in a monthly stream to replace the sick, the dead and those who had deserted. During the same period in Upper and Lower Austria, the numbers of locally born men were drafted with the same regularity. Across the seven regiments stationed in Upper and Lower Austria between 1791 and 1798, nearly half of the companies were still made up of men conscripted from the villages and towns in each allocated district, maintaining the same numbers of Austrians in the regiments as was seen before the Austro-Ottoman War.<sup>68</sup> A

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<sup>65</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 1. “Als gezielt junge knabe zu Conscription, in dem das Regiment, in Felde war, genommen daß worden.”

<sup>66</sup> Ibid; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 29 2517 *Revisionslisten* (RL), (1795-1797), fol., *Revision Tabella: Olivier Wallis Infanterie Regiments 2 Feldbattailons et Grenadier Division*. The field battalions were in Mainz where they mustered in February 1796 and counted 276 dead and 140 missing since the same time the year before. The third battalion’s *Revision Tabella*, which includes the reserve division, places them in Krakow in May 1796. They list 138 dead, but it is not clear if these are men sent to the field battalions who died, or if they died in Galicia.

<sup>67</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 29 2517 RL, (1795-1797), fol., *Reserve Division: Revisions Liste, März 1797*.

<sup>68</sup> These were *Carl Ludwig* Nr. 3, *Deutschmeister* Nr 4, *Klebeck* Nr. 14, *De Vaux*, Nr, 45, *Pellegrini* (then *Kerpen*) Nr. 49, *Stain* Nr. 50, and *Jordis* Nr. 59.

practice which retained each regiment's strong anchoring point to the local districts, despite the increasing use of Galician recruit.<sup>69</sup>

During the First Coalition the conscription of native-born men remained consistent - despite illegal migration, the purchasing of replacements and exemptions - and “*Reich Recrouten*” were still sourced regularly, even if their presence in the ranks decreased. However, it was the increasing use of Galicians after 1797 that allowed the Monarchy to challenge France and prevent the escalating use of Austrian subjects.<sup>70</sup> This method of sourcing men was an inevitable part of both the conscription debate in the 1760s, and the *quid pro quo* military arrangements made between the central government and the provincial estates of the Austrian Hereditary Lands. One which rested upon the colonisation of Galicia in the 1770s and the exploitation of its Slavic peasantry class to preserve the resources of crownland nobles closest to the central government.<sup>71</sup> This accordance was a give and take which coincided with the multi-layered effort of the Habsburg dynasty to husband the goodwill and economic contributions of the provincial estates, working with legislation that strengthened the noble-landlord's power over his subjects, and the removal of some of the more liberal patents issued by Joseph II.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 49 4171 RL, (1795-1797), *Assentliste: Pelegrini, September 1795*; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, vor 1820 aufgelöste Truppenkörper (II), Infanterie, LIR 50 Stain 10.481 RL, (1798), fol., *Reserve Division, 30 July 1798*. In July 1798, the Reserve Division of *Stain*, stationed in Linz, had 148 Foreign recruits, 181 Galicians and 171 conscripts from Upper Austria.

<sup>70</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten, Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 1, 1797, 318. The municipality of Rotherdorf, located in the recruiting district of *Deutschmeister (Viertel unter dem Wienerwald)* was directly advertising for foreign recruits in the *Wiener Zeitung*. This was highlighted as a patriotic donation put forth by the community. These volunteers (*Ausländer-Recrouten*) were promised a bounty (*Handgeld*) of 27 *gulden* and 21 *kreuzers*, with a daily pension of 5 *kreuzers* if a man was rendered unfit for service whilst with the army. That the community were willing to give so much in the hopes of fulfilling their requirement to the regiment without the need to use the locally born men, and the fact this was published in the areas largest paper, shows the prevalence of the sub-contractors, and *sub*-sub-contractors common before the introduction of the Josephinian conscription system, and one it sought to eradicate, were still in use. Though, as a sign of the standardised conscription system's efficiency in sourcing the best recruits, the use of vagabonds and prisoners, which had been prevalent in the Seven Years' War, was almost totally absent from regimental *Musterlisten*.

<sup>71</sup> A process which, as the correspondence of the emperor Francis shows, left many dead even before they reached the reserve divisions. See Friedrich W. Schembor, “Kaiser Franz II. (I) und die Uniformen,” *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 3 (2014): 14-24. Francis' note transcribed by Schembor which reads, “*Der Dienst, den sie einst dem Vaterlande zu leisten haben und die Menschlichkeit selbst gebieten eine wohlthätigere Behandlung dieser jungen Leute und ihre möglichste Schonung*”, can be found on page 15.

<sup>72</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, II, Infanterie, LIR 50 Stain 10.507 ST, (1797). In April 1797, the recruiting captains of the regiment *Stain* were paying a 13 fl. bounty for recruits who promised 3 years of service. This was the amount paid to Franz Greig, a 17-year-old from Herdorf in the Rhineland-Palatinate. Others, like the 22-year-old Heinrich Lanoy from Argentan in Normandy, were offered 4 *Dukaten* as *Handgelb* for six years of service in February 1797.

Indeed, one reason for the use of Galicians was the military inefficiencies stemming from compromising with the layers of authorities within Austria and Bohemia still separating subject from state. Even as late as 1797, regimental administrative records classified local born Austrian conscripts as *Landstandische Recrouten*.<sup>73</sup> What this term indicates is the responsibility for sourcing recruits still predominantly sat with the authorities from manor estates. And even though regimental authorities had greater oversight than before, which allowed for the regular use of Austrian subjects, cooperation, and compromise with landlords played a key part in the military system. In this context Galicians were cheaper than Austrians politically, despite the logistical hassle in sourcing them. Austrian based regiments could utilise subjects in the Habsburg's newest province with far less impediment because of the central government's agreement with the Polish nobility. An agreement which gave the army direct access to the subjects. In return the local lords had complete authority over their land holdings and subjects and were free from outside interference and direct taxation.<sup>74</sup> The tangible effects of these agreements between territorial power and the Monarchy's government in both Austrian and Galicia can be seen in the regiments *Klebeck* Nr. 14 and *Kerpen* Nr. 49, stationed in Linz and St. Pölten respectively.

As the Second Coalition began in earnest in the early months of 1799, *Klebeck* should have been predominantly made up of men from cantons in Upper Austria. Yet, as the *Revisionlisten* of three companies taken from that year show, it was Galician conscripts that made up many of the common soldiers, suggesting that as the army mobilised for war authorities spared as much of the Austrian male population as they could.<sup>75</sup> In January 1799, the company *von Pikashausen* contained 57 Galicians out of a full strength of 117 men. In the same regiment, *Portenone* contained 69 Galicians, and the fusilier company *Chandler*, 51. In Lower Austria, after the disastrous campaigns in Germany and Italy and the end of the Second Coalition in 1801,

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<sup>73</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, II, Infanterie, LIR 50 Stain 10.507 ST, (1797), fol., *Stain Infanterie Reserve Division: Monat Tabella pro Octobri 1797*. See the headings under "Zuwach".

<sup>74</sup> Larry Wolff. *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012), 13-63.

<sup>75</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 14 1000 RL, (1799), fol., *Hauptmann von Pikashausen Compagnie; Portenone; Chandler*. The numbers were taken from each of these company's *Docirung*.

*Kerpen* undertook its first muster in 13 years. On the regimental roll call, completed in September 1802, the regiment had 1,926 Galicians out of a total of 2,798 common soldiers. Of the remainder: 645 men were native conscripts and 215 were foreign volunteers.<sup>76</sup> The regiment *Stain* had a similar spread, though they did have more locally born men with the regiment as can be seen in Figure 1. For the Habsburg government it seems, spending the lives of Galicians was a worthwhile concession for the money needed from the provincial estates of Bohemia and Austria which was, as William Godsey has shown, vital to the continuation of the war against France.<sup>77</sup>

This heavy use of the Galician underclass during the Second Coalition did not mean that war and the military was a periphery concern for the poorer rural and suburban communities of the crownlands. It was just that the full effects of war, and the increased use of the Habsburg state's human resources in the Austro-Bohemian lands, had been mitigated for a while by the exploitation of its Slavic peasantry. And only for a short while at that. As can be seen in regiments in Moravia, Bohemia, Upper and Lower Austria, these units still maintained a cultural core of locally born men from the fatherlands these military institutions defined. A trend had developed, however, one which provided a value system to the human resources available to both the Monarchy and its composite authorities. Austrian subjects, thanks to the proximity and interconnectedness of the Austrian provincial estates in Vienna with the central government there, were more valuable out of uniform. Bohemian and Moravians were less so as they were more readily conscripted into their local regiments than men in Austria. At the bottom of this hierarchy were Galician serfs, providing an almost bottomless resource for the generals of the Monarchy.

Despite these findings, the *Soldat Bürger* as a sign of a region's loyalty and as a localised lived identity was still on the rise in territories across the Monarchy. Space does not allow for a yearly detailed breakdown of the influx (*Zuwachs*) of conscripts into regiments up until the end

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<sup>76</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 49 4173 ML (Part 1), (1802), fol., *Muster Tabella*.

<sup>77</sup> Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, 367-74.

of the Revolutionary Wars, but what is clear is that monthly conscription drives placed more men in uniform than ever before, and even if these men did not remain with their units to be counted during the grand regimental roll calls that took place in 1802 and 1804, they were exposed to the culture of the Habsburg army and its model of state service during their time in uniform. Whilst the use of Galicians to conserve the lives of Austrian and Bohemian men was prevalent, communities in the crownlands still provided thousands of men each year to their respective regiments. A service which only increased as the conflict with France entered its second decade, solidifying the Monarchy's military institutions as local societies' display of Habsburg loyalty.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 349 ML (Part 1), (1806), fol., *Muster Tabella*. Between the musters of 1803 and 1806, the *Deutschmeister* had 9,701 men who had once been in its ranks, the majority coming from Lower Austria. Of those who were listed as “outgoings” (*Abgang*) in 1806, 911 were reported as dead, 943 missing (*Unwissend Verlohren*) and 629 were known to have deserted. 445 men had been discharged in that time. The effective strength of the regiment in 1806 was 2,953.



| <b>Table 1:</b> Social Composition of Common Soldiers in Crownland infantry regiments, 1786-1804 |           |                          |                        |            |        |
|--|-----------|--------------------------|------------------------|------------|--------|
| <i>Mustertabellan</i>  | Außländer | Inländer<br>Unconscripte | Inländer<br>Conscripte | Galizianer | Total  |
| <i>Tillier</i> (later <i>Klebeck</i> ) Nr. 14, 1786.<br><br>Upper Austrian                       | 1, 047    | 49                       | 1, 109                 | 538        | 2, 743 |
| <i>Deutschmeister</i> Nr. 4, 1786.<br><br>Lower Austrian   | 1, 249    | 70                       | 929                    | 640        | 2, 688 |
| <i>Landon</i> (later <i>Graf Wallis</i> ) Nr. 29, 1786.<br><br>Moravian                          | 1, 242    | N/A                      | 1, 428                 | 126        | 2, 769 |
| Field Battalions of <i>Graf Wallis</i> , Nr. 29, 1796 (Mainz)<br><br>Moravian                    | 56        | 1                        | 919                    | 939        | 1, 915 |
| <i>Graf D'Alton</i> (later <i>Zach</i> ) Nr. 15, 1802.<br><br>Bohemian                           | 533       | 5                        | 1, 250                 | 541        | 2, 431 |
| <i>Graf Wallis</i> , Nr. 29, 1802.<br><br>Moravian   | 90        | 10                       | 2, 193                 | 504        | 2, 797 |
| <i>Kerpen</i> Nr. 49, 1802.<br><br>Lower Austrian  | 215       | 12                       | 645                    | 1,926      | 2, 743 |
| <i>Stain</i> Nr. 50, 1804.<br><br>Upper Austrian   | 524       | 28                       | 992                    | 1,234      | 2, 778 |

## **“*Hat zu stellen*”: The Socialisation of the Army, 1804-1817**

After defeat and the occupation of Austria by the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1797, 1800 and 1805, efforts to readdress failings in the army and its recruiting system took place, leading to the use of the male population in the crownlands in unprecedented numbers. These reforms finally completed the Josephinian militarisation of society and cemented the symbiotic relationship between specific rural regions and their local regiments. Led predominantly by Archduke Charles, the military reforms introduced between 1804 and 1808 sought to regulate more closely, but not completely remove, the role of local authorities in the conscription selection process. As a result, the regiments of the Habsburg crownlands were homogenised – finally building a body of troops like those envisioned by the emperor Joseph in the 1760s - and a reserve system created to better meet the demands of campaign. These reforms were not a break with the Josephinian military system and copied from France, but part of a 70-year trend started by the empress Maria Theresa in 1740s that made soldiers of the state from subjects of the noble-land owners (*Dominien*) who were tasked with “providing them” (*Hat zu stellen*).<sup>79</sup>

Charles, brother to the emperor Francis, focused some of his first reforms in 1804 on eradicating draft evasion, believing any reduction to it would husband local resources.<sup>80</sup> Now each company district within a regiment’s recruiting department was to be overseen by one of its lieutenants, or a pensioned officer, who was made specifically responsible for its administration.<sup>81</sup> Each regiment was also required to maintain a recruiting office staffed with military bureaucrats (*Conscriptions-Revisor*) entrusted with liaising with local officials to maintain the flow of conscripts from each district’s villages.<sup>82</sup> This recruiting office would report to the

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<sup>79</sup> Berkovich, “Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy,” 317-318; Berkovich and Wenzel, “The Austrian Army”.

Berkovich argues the same way of Habsburg conscription, with modifications, can be traced from the 1740s right up until 1820. In these pages here we can see the specific details of this organic evolution. “*Hat zu stellen*” was the term given to conscripts provided by local manors after 1806.

<sup>80</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 93-98.

<sup>81</sup> Wrede, *Geschichte*, 1: 100-04.

<sup>82</sup> Wrede, 1: 104.

General-Command, which was a province's central military administration, where a "Conscription-Director" would coordinate the whole operation for each of the regiments stationed there. The introduction of these administrative wings of the regiment streamlined the recruiting process, but also localised the connection between military service and society even further, leading to companies in regiments that reflected social networks at a village level.<sup>83</sup>

These new administrative arms of each of the regiments in the crownlands, headed by the staff of their *Conscriptions-Revisor*, were seen by military reformers as vital to tightening the inefficient and careless manor processes in each department, which led to the wastage of resources through absence, local corruption, or arbitrary manor exemptions. Indeed, even as early as April 1789 the Habsburg government had been confronted with portions of the surveyed population designated as potential conscripts deserting their villages before the company recruiting parties came calling. The *Provinzial Nachrichten*, which reported on the "statistics, economics, action, arts and sciences of the Imperial crownlands", published a central decree promising a punishment of eight days confinement and two days on bread and water for any peasant caught harbouring a man without a passport. Those who harboured a fugitive but held a special social honour gained from their profession were instead to be fined 50 fl.<sup>84</sup>

Over the course of the first two Napoleonic campaigns 27,000 men had been identified as fleeing their villages, providing a consistent problem for regimental staff.<sup>85</sup> This is not a debilitating number when spread out across 60 recruiting districts, and ten years, but the absence of these men at critical stages of the war did promote pressure points. In some instances, evasion became an existential problem for local authorities, and in the lead up to the Monarchy's involvement in the Third Coalition many areas reported they were unable to fulfil

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<sup>83</sup> For a breakdown of how regiments approached the categorisation of villages by company see, *Deutschmeister Infanterie. Conscriptions-Bezirks-Nro. 4. Alphabetische Ortschafts-Tabelle Über alle in dem hier benannten Conscriptions-Bezirke enthaltenen Ortschaften* (Vienna: 1805).

<sup>84</sup> *Provinzial Nachrichten aus bei Kaiserlich Königlich Staaten über Statistik, Oekonomie, Handlung, Künste und Wissenschaften*, May 2, 1789, 147: For a discussion on urban social hierarchies in German speaking territories see Max Weber, "Economy and Society," in *Democracy: A Reader*, ed., Ricardo Blaug (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 247-52, esp. 249.

<sup>85</sup> The following can be found Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 93. Much of this echoes Teuber and Ottenfeld, *Die österreichische Armee, 1700-1867*, 339-44.

their military obligations as men confused by reforms to the conscription system in 1804, introduced by Charles, were “marrying, without regard for the supply of food, with the sole intention of evading the military.” In order to combat this rise in irresponsible marriages the *Wiener Zeitung* published a decree on behalf of the Lower Austrian Provincial Estate reading “His Majesty’s intention was never to exempt from military duty those people who are specially earmarked as fit for purpose when they marry or are already married”.<sup>86</sup>

The archduke also identified a fear of lifelong service genuinely motivated desertion and draft evasion. In a letter to his brother he argued this archaic system of military service created “an army which at the outbreak of war is already superannuated, consisting of decrepit soldiers who either will be invalided out after a few months campaigning, or who are disaffected and ready to desert or even enlist with the enemy when captured.”<sup>87</sup> Though an untrue reflection of the Habsburg army – the average age of soldiers had decreased – Charles’s letter to his brother paved the way for a reduction in the length of military service for common soldiers. From 1802 the infantryman was expected to serve for fourteen years, with demobilisation staggered to prevent the destabilisation of rural society or potential revolt a sudden influx of battle-hardened troops could bring.<sup>88</sup> The archduke’s hope was that by transforming the reality of life in the army it would no longer be thought of as “serfdom”, but as a limited period of dutiful service, eliminating the motivation to flee the recruiting captain.<sup>89</sup>

It was not just administrative reforms that cemented the links between local societies and their regiments. Those regiments who had lost their recruiting districts in the Austrian

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<sup>86</sup> “Circularre von der k. a. k. Landesregierung im Erzherzogthums Oesterreich unter der Enns. Weheirathete Leute sind von Stellung Feueryewöhr nicht ausgenommen,” *Wiener Zeitung*, July 24, 1805, 3431. The proclamation issued by Count Joseph Karl von Dietrichstein, the Lower Austrian Estate President, notified the people of his province that selection for soldiering in the new system introduced in 1804 still followed those stipulated categories in section 7 (Qualification) of the old conscription patent of 1781. See *Conscriptions- und Werbbezirkssysteme*, 58-60. “...Seiner Majestät’s Absicht nie dahin gegangen ist, die zum Webrstande tauglichen und dazu eigens vorgemerkten Leute, wenn sie sich verheirathen, oder schon verheirathet sind, von der Militärpflicht zu befreien, sonder fest entschlossen sind, hierin falls von der Vorschrift des section 7 des alten Rekrutierungssystem nicht im geringsten abzugeben; so wird diese allerhöchste Schlussfassung hiermit allgemein bekannt gemacht.”

<sup>87</sup> As quoted in Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 93.

<sup>88</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 94.

<sup>89</sup> Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 95.

Netherlands, Italy and in parts of Austria thanks to the Peace of Lunéville and Pressburg, signed respectively in 1802 and 1805, were transferred to Galicia. Conscripts from this kingdom were now to be exclusively assigned to local regiments there and no longer used to supplement the losses of other units in the Austro-Bohemian lands. A further impact to the army's ability to source soldiers was the end of the *Reich* and new alliances between many of the German princes and France. This meant that the Monarchy could no longer rely on the imperial right of the Holy Roman Emperor to source volunteers from amongst his *Reich* subjects.<sup>90</sup> In response, an even greater demand had to be placed on the native population within the crownlands designated for conscription.

The regiments *Deutschmeister* and *Jordis*, mustered in 1806, allow for an examination of what type of army Charles was starting to build in expectation of future war. The *Mustertabellen* of both these regiments, one from Lower Austria, the other from Upper Austria, reveal a homogenisation of demographics, and units with little battle experience. The numbers of Galicians present after the Second Coalition had dwindled. Now they were either dead or transferred to regiments being mustered in Galicia. After the Third Coalition it was a slow trickle of foreigner volunteers and a massive increase in local born men which had rebuilt these units since 1805. The relationships and demographics of the local areas in these two provinces, particularly the villages surrounding Enns and Wiener Neustadt respectively, were now being mirrored in each of the regiment's companies, with at least a full third of the men, on average 60 soldiers, being very new soldiers from these places. In the *Deutschmeister*, only a third of the regiment had served more than six years prior to 1806, with nearly 2, 522 soldiers "raised from the [Lower Austrian] Dominions for 3 florins" (*von Dominien a 3 fl. ausgehoben*) in the last three

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<sup>90</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 294. The army still tried to utilise foreign recruits by accepting migrant workers who crossed the border to volunteer. This form of recruitment was called "Confinenwerbung". The minimal effects of which can be seen in Jordis' Assentliste in 1809. ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 59 5076 Assentlisten (AL), Transferierungslisten (TL), (1809), fol., *Assentliste: September*.

years. Many of these men became casualties in 1805.<sup>91</sup> In *Jordis*, a regiment which suffered comparatively few losses in 1805, only 51% of the men had served more than four years.<sup>92</sup>

In 1807, the number of local born men across all the regiments again increased after the staggered demobilisation of army veterans, many of them foreigners, in the preceding year.<sup>93</sup> The correspondence and demands sent by the Conscription Director of the *Viertel unter dem Manhartsberg* to the manor domain of Mühlbach, west of Korneuburg, between 1807 and 1809 provides glimpses at the ways in which these new soldiers were found, as well as the pervasiveness of conscription in Austria and Bohemia. In February 1807, an instruction entitled “On Conscription” (*Weg dem Rekrutierung*) setting out the new processes for replacing the “the veterans of 1805” was received by the Mühlbach manor. The decree mandated authorities from manors in each of the company conscription districts of the Lower Austrian regiment *Erzherzog Carl*/Nr. 3 were to report to their allocated recruiting station on a specified date at 9 in the morning. Along with these authorities, every man classed in the local population book as “Category number 8” and “Category number 9” were to accompany them “without question” (*ohne Unterschied*).<sup>94</sup> These two categories encompassed men deemed available for military service in local population books. Those in category eight were men born in the area, whilst those in

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<sup>91</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 349 ML, (Part 1) (1806), fol., *Muster Tabella*. See footnote 334 for a breakdown of the *Deutsche Meister* casualties suffered in 1805. Some of those missing were accounted for in the regiment’s “*Consignation*” file, which listed 630 deserters between September 1804 and December 1806, of which 233 were returned.

<sup>92</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 5017 ML, (Part 1) (1806), fol., *Muster Tabella*. In *Jordis*, 1, 469 *Inländer* conscripts had more than 9 years left with the army. 194 *Außländer* were listed as having 4 more years still left on their contracts. There were a further 60 volunteers who had recently signed a new bounty, whilst 430 veterans from within the Monarchy had already agreed to remain with the regiment after their allocated service had ended. The total number of common soldiers with the regiment in December 1806 was 3, 139, with 2, 359 of them “raised from the Dominions for a payment of 3 florins” (*Von Dominien 3 fl. Handgeld ausgehoben*). Between 1804 and 1806, 769 men had gone missing, 504 were dead and 526 were known deserters. The regiment kept a folder on all those that had gone missing (*Abgang gebracht*) which grouped men by company. This file listed their last known whereabouts and was updated until 1807 if confirmation of the missing was found. The source shows many Galicians either fled the transport companies before reaching Upper Austria or died of exposure. New recruits were especially prone to dying of sickness as their deaths in military hospitals only a few months after recruitment attest. On campaign the wounded were left in villages never to be recovered, whilst in peace men took the opportunity to flee the regiment whilst on home leave.

<sup>93</sup> In Upper Austria 617 men were released from the regiment *Jordis* between 1804 and 1806, and in Lower Austria 445 men were “farewelled” from *Deutsche Meister* (*Mit Abschied*) during the same period.

<sup>94</sup> *Nieder Österreichische Landesarchiv* (NÖLA) Herrschaft Archiv (HA) Mühlbach-D-IVa-06, fol., *Nr. 32: Circulare vom k. k. Kreisamte de V.U.M.B, Wegen der Rekrutierung*, 30 February 1807.

category nine had migrated, but were from another recruiting district within the crownlands.<sup>95</sup> Accompanying these men, and the manor officials, were local community leaders who were to give details on the character of the men from their village to the awaiting officers. Once all these men had appeared at the recruiting station on their specified time and date, the officers from *Erzherzog Carl* would conscribe those who met the requirements. The regiment wanted men specifically between the ages of 26 and 30 who could withstand the rigours of campaign and particular attention was to be paid to the physique (*Körperbau*) of the potential soldier.<sup>96</sup> As the instructions concluded, all authorities were expected to comply, “as so often had been proven”, for the recruitment had to be completed by March.

By 1807, even if a man was not originally called up during the massive recruitment drives of that year, the demand for him from the local regiments never slackened. We can see this in the repeated demands sent to Mühlbach up until April 1809. In January 1809, Mühlbach was required to send two men for the cavalry, and two men for the reserve of *Erzherzog Carl*. A month later the manor was expected to provide one baker, 2 artillery handlers, 12 wagon drivers and 24 horses. On April 13, the manor was instructed by the conscription director at Korneuburg to send 13 men to the garrison town of Sierndorf for *Erzherzog Carl*'s reserve. Accompanying them was also two prospective medical orderlies for the army hospital in Steyr. All were to be presented to the recruiting officers on April 26.<sup>97</sup>

With each group summoned to the recruiting station came their manor authorities. These men carried with them a meticulous breakdown (*Widmungs-roll*) of who each conscript was as taken from their village's population book. This was a list which provided all the basic physical and social details, and the economic usefulness of the conscript to the manor. On April 27, a day after the men of Mühlbach were taken to Sierndorf, the manor authorities from the

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<sup>95</sup> *Conscriptions- und Rekrutierungs System* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1804), 41-42.

<sup>96</sup> NÖLA, HA Mühlbach-D-IVa-06, Nro. 32, “*Bey der Wahl der Rekruten ist nach dem hohen Regierungsdekrete mehr auf den Körperbau als auf das Alter zu sehen; man ist dabey angewiesen, bey der Rekrutierung nicht bloss die jüngsten Leute, sonder vorzüglich von 26 bis 30 Jahren aus der Zahl der Anwendbaren zu heben*”.

<sup>97</sup> NÖLA, HA Mühlbach-D-IVa-06, Nro. 37, *Wegen Ausschreibung einer Rekrutierung zur Ergänzung der Regimenter*, 2 January 1809. “*...und dabey in Durchschnitte das Mass von 5 Schuh 4, und mindestens 3 Zoll erreicht haben müssen, und derek Starkere und gesünderer Körperbau sie zu dem beschwerlichen Dienste der Cavallerie*”.

Lower Austrian manor of Asparn an der Zaya arrived at the small village. With them came 25 men for the *Erzherzog Carl*. From this list we can see the regiment was now being supplied with men of dubious quality, with the best resources dead or in the army retreating from Bavaria.<sup>98</sup> Some of the men were migrants from Bohemia and Moravia without migration passes, or migrants from Tyrol. At this stage of the war, only two weeks before Vienna was occupied, Asparn now relied upon drifters to alleviate the burden *Erzherzog Carl* placed upon it. All were single (*ledig*), some were artisans (*Schuhmacher, Tischler*), though only a few were above 165cm. The smallest men were rejected by the military officials at Sierndorf, a few were made orderlies, and the most robust were placed with the regiment's reserve battalion.<sup>99</sup> The reality of war is stark here, there were just not enough local young men to meet the demands of an army who now needed more bodies than ever before.

The list, however, was not just a roll of men, but an inventory of both Asparn's subjects and the state's citizens whose authority over was shared by both. It shows that even in 1809 the effective recruitment of the local population still relied on cooperation between the manor and military officials, between provincial estates and the crown. The list was also a contract between the state, as represented by the regiment *Erzherzog Carl*, and the manor of Asparn. A point made by three signatures left at the bottom of the last page of the *Widmungs-roll*. One from the accompanying manor official, agreeing to the regiment's decisions to take Asparn's subjects, and two others from the military commissioners tasked with delivering the new conscripts to their unit. Here we see military service was not an exclusively social contract the state entered in to with its citizens. Though these subjects became citizens through their military service as *Soldat Bürger*, such a process was the outcome of agreements between authorities, and the exchange of these men was still part of the obligations local elite owed the dynasty.

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<sup>98</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 3 285 ST, (1809), fol., *Monats Tabella*: April. By the end of April, the field battalions had suffered 1,506 casualties. 526 men conscripted before April had been sent from the reserve battalion to the field battalions to replace these losses. In the same month the reserve battalion was replenished with 623 new recruits, some which were the men from Mühlbach and Asparn.

<sup>99</sup> NÖLA, HA Aspang-Schöfmann K5-063, fol., *Widmungsprotokolle: Von der Herrschaft Asparn an der Zaya für das löbte Regiment E. H Carl*, April 27, 1809.



In 1809, men not already with the regiment had been marked explicitly as both a soldier in waiting and subject of the manor through state designations that singled them out as reservists for their local units.<sup>100</sup> On the frontline these small changes to the conscription system and category status allowed the regiments to replace nearly all the losses they sustained in the first weeks of the Franco-Austrian war of 1809, where the main army in Bavaria was defeated and forced on the defensive after a series of battles north-east of Munich. In mid-April the *Deutschmeister's* reserve battalion sent 338 conscripts drafted in late March from Vienna to the regiment near Altötting in Bavaria. These men were first wave of reserves used to replace the 1,790 casualties it had suffered in the first weeks of the war. As those men left for the regiment some 983 men were drafted into the reserve battalion still stationed in Vienna from the surrounding area, called up in preparation for further casualties.<sup>101</sup> By the end of April 1809, 6,001 men had either fought in the ranks of the *Deutschmeister*, trained in the reserve battalion before being sent on to the field battalions, or had been conscribed on mass.<sup>102</sup> By the end of July a ceasefire had been signed, and after disease which killed many in late summer, the survivors returned to Vienna in October, greeted by relieved family.<sup>103</sup>

In the years after the loss of the Franco-Austrian war in 1809 the Habsburg Monarchy was forced to alter its foreign policy. Under the guidance of their new foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, the dynasty aligned itself behind the French Empire with the intention of maintaining its position in Europe. The Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed in December 1809, demanded the Monarchy cede 83,000 square kilometres of territory and approximately 3.5 million subjects to France and her allies.<sup>104</sup> Some of the Austrian Hereditary Lands were handed to Bavaria and the Kingdom of Italy; Croatia also went to France and became the Illyrian

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<sup>100</sup> Wrede, *Geschichte*, 1: 104-05. See also Franz Müller, and Emanuel von Mensdorff-Pouilly, *Die kaiserl. königl. österreichische Armee seit Errichtung der stehenden Kriegsheere bis auf die neueste Zeit: Nebst einer Beigabe: Notizen über die bewaffneten Bürger-Corps der größeren Städte der Monarchie*, Vol. 1 (Prague: Gottlieb Haase Söhne, 1845), 347-48.

<sup>101</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 398, ST (1809.01-1809.06), fol., *April*.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>103</sup> For sick and dead see ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 389 ST, (1806.06-1806.12), *Monats Tabella*. July-October; Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 25-26. Schnierer, recovering from sickness in the back of a wagon, remarked the throngs of people who lined the streets of Vienna were jubilant at seeing the returning *Deutschmeister*.

<sup>104</sup> John Gill, *1809: Thunder on the Danube*, Vol. 3 (Haverton: Casemate, 2010), 311.

Provinces, with some Grenzer regiments transferred to French service. The loss of the recruiting districts in Galicia, Carinthia and Carnolia led to the disbandment of eight-line regiments, placing a greater focus on the Austro-Bohemian lands to provide the men for the regiments of the Monarchy. The army was to be reduced to 150,000 and the Monarchy agreed to pay France war indemnities.

By 1811, after the reduction of the army in 1810, the common soldier was primarily locally born, with most living in the garrison towns or in the surrounding villages of their birth. The majority were aged in their twenties, having been conscripted between 1807 and February 1809. Foreigners were still part of the regiment, with veteran soldiers responsible for the orientation of recruits, but they now barely made an eighth of the units, as opposed to a third in 1792. Those Galicians who remained with the army, conscripted from districts ceded to Russia and the Duchy of Warsaw, had nowhere else to go. They opted for service in the Habsburg army where many were now senior non-commissioned officers instead of facing an unknowable future under the indirect rule of Bonaparte. The officer class was predominantly either regimental private cadets, who had come from the poorest members of the local nobility and followed a family tradition of military service or were common men who had been promoted. The imperial cadets, boys who represented some of the most powerful noble families serving the dynasty were still with the army, but their numbers could not meet the attrition rates, leaving the regiment to promote from within and rely on their connections with their locale to source aspiring professional officers.<sup>105</sup>

In the regiment *Kerpen*, stationed in St. Pölten and Herzogenburg, foreign volunteers made up only 387 of the 1, 946 common soldiers present. The largest portion of troops were the 1, 396 native-born conscripts, many recruited in the last four years from Lower Austrian

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<sup>105</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 59 5076 AL and TL, (1809), fol., *Transferirungs Liste: K.k. Militär Kadetenbäus zu Wiener Neustadt zum Löbl K.k. Jordis IR Nr. 59*. The transfer lists of *Jordis* from May 1809 list cadets between 18 and 15 being placed in the regiment's fusilier companies, indicating a "scraping of the barrel". One of them, Carl Mainone from Upper Austria, was a 15-year-old boy transferred to *Jordis*' 10th Fusilier company in May, after 8 years boarding at the "Wiener Neustadt" military academy. Mainone, Ludwig Pfanzetler and Vicomte August de Pillers were immediately made ensigns (*Fähnrich*) as instructed by General Military Directions dated 5 May 1809.

villages scattered between the towns of Tulln, Melk and St. Pölten, which sat within the regiments recruiting district of *Viertel ober dem Wienerwald*.<sup>106</sup> Almost a quarter of those foreigners with *Kerpen* were in the regiment's two grenadier companies. These elite companies required the experience of the volunteers, and most had been with the regiment for over ten years. In contrast, the rest of the fusilier companies were comprised of local men, almost all with only two years' experience. This trend is best represented in the regiment's tenth company, under the command of First Captain Karl von Bourneville, one of only a few officers who had been with the army since 1791. Of the 167 common soldiers with the company, 132 of them were Lower Austrians drafted into the regiment in the months before the war of 1809. In 1811, many of them had been placed on furlough to reduce the costs of the army. *Kerpen* represents a wider demographic trend present in the other Habsburg regiments in the Austro-Bohemian lands. These units now comprised mostly of local common soldiers in their early to mid-twenties. They were largely homogenised and reliant almost exclusively on the native population. A reality reflected in the materiality of the regiment's *Musterlisten*, which had been updated to reflect the new administrative processes implemented by the archduke Charles. They now no longer considered the recruiting circles in the defunct *Reich*.

It was these local born soldiers which tipped the balance in favour of the allied powers of Europe in the Sixth Coalition, contributing most to the "Wars of Liberation" in 1813 and 1814.<sup>107</sup> The speed in which the Habsburg government, still reliant on loans given to them by provincial estates, could mobilise the Army of Bohemia in 1813 was down to the Josephinian conscription system rejuvenated by Charles, and his integration of regimental administration with manor bureaucracy.<sup>108</sup> In the process of raising the second largest army on the continent,

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<sup>106</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 49 4181 ML, (1811), fol., *Muster Tabella*.

<sup>107</sup> For analysis on the Monarchy's contribution to the Sixth Coalition see Alan Sked, "Austria, Prussia, and the Wars of Liberation, 1813–1814," *Austrian History Yearbook* 45 (2014): 89-114.

<sup>108</sup> NÖLA, HA Muhlbach-D-IVa-18, fol., P. Z. 7687/6, Kreisamt Kornneuburg, September 21, 1813; P. Z. 7885, 8072, 8325, 8329, 8353/6, Kreisamt Kornneuburg, October 23, 1813; P. Z. 8841/6, Kreisamt Kornneuburg, November 8, 1813; P. Z. 8916/6, Kreisamt Kornneuburg, November 12, 1813. This last directive specifically requests the "Dominien" of Mühlbach "provide" four recruits (*Zahl der zu stellenden Rekruten*) to replace the losses *Erzherzog Carl* sustained at Leipzig. Directives arrived at Mühlbach bi-monthly until the end of the war in 1814. On discussions pertaining to the demands placed upon the estates in Lower Austria in 1813 see Godsey, *The Sineas of Habsburg Power*, 391.

the dynasty had turned the rural lands of the Monarchy into a perpetual barrack. It can be assumed without access to an army wide review of every regiment, that each unit from Austria, Moravia and Bohemia in Saxony was comprised almost exclusively of subjects from the crownlands of the emperor, whose local societies would replace these unit's wartime losses, just as the emperor Joseph had envisioned in his memorandum of 1761.<sup>109</sup>

Following the triumphs of the Sixth and Seventh Coalitions the first muster of the *Deutschmeister* since 1811 took place in 1817. Through thirty years of wartime conscription the regiment was now firmly linked with the city of Vienna - the cultural, social and political capital of the German speaking lands. Before 1792 the *Deutschmeister* had always acted as a symbol, representing the dynasty's Catholicism and role as benevolent defenders of the *Reich*, achieved through a system of military patronage, with each Grand Master of the Teutonic Order named as the regiment's proprietor since its founding 1696. It was only now in 1817, however, that the regiment could truly be considered a mirror of the area, and a symbol of the city's military virtue. Demographic uniformity seen across the Monarchy in 1811 had continued in the *Deutschmeister*, cementing the unit's affiliation with the city for a century to come. Of the 3, 161 common soldiers in the regiment, 2, 882 were men from the villages and suburbs that lay to the east and south of Vienna. Of these native-born conscripts 2, 654 had joined in the last two years of the war, entering a regiment that had loomed over their lives since the moment their births were recorded in company population books. All of them would have never known a time when the soldiers of the *Deutschmeister*, and of the emperor Francis, were not made from the sons and brothers of their village.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> The *Musterlisten* for this analysis, with a spread across Upper and Lower Austria, as well as Bohemia and Moravia, can be found in Table 2.

<sup>110</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 353 ML (Part 1), (1817), fol., *Muster Tabella*.

**Table 2:** Social Composition of Common Soldiers in Crownland infantry regiments, 1806-1817<sup>III</sup>

| <i>Mustertabellan</i>  | Außländer | Inländer<br>Unconscirbirte | Inländer<br>Conscirbirte | Galizianer | Total |
|--|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------|-------|
| <i>Deutsche Meister</i> Nr 4,<br>1806.<br>Lower Austria                          | 470       | 42                         | 933                      | 902        | 2,344 |
| <i>Kerpen</i> Nr. 49,<br>1811.<br>Lower Austria                                  | 387       | 20                         | 1,376                    | 143        | 1,946 |
| <i>Klebeck</i> Nr. 14,<br>1811.<br>Upper Austria                                 | 250       | 12                         | 945                      | 216        | 1,466 |
| <i>Erzherzog Ludwig</i><br>Nr. 8,<br>1811.<br>Moravia                            | 210       | 9                          | 1,905                    | 558        | 2,682 |
| <i>Zach</i> Nr. 15,<br>1811.<br>Bohemia  | 148       | 15                         | 1,969                    | 629        | 2,757 |
| <i>Deutsche Meister</i> ,<br>Nr. 4, 1817.<br>Lower Austria                       | 207       | 28                         | 2,882                    | 44         | 3,161 |
| <i>Großherzog Baden</i><br>Nr. 59 (ex- <i>Jordis</i> )<br>1817.<br>Upper Austria | 91        | 1                          | 3,628                    | 51         | 3,771 |

## Conclusion

The wars with the Ottoman Empire and France exposed nearly all those men who occupied an insecure position within their community, identified by their lack of assets and professional inadequacies in manor communities, to military service. These men lived a transient life which oscillated between pre-military service, active military service, furlough and demobilisation. As we have seen in these pages, war in Central Europe, Italy and Austria required the constant renewal of the professional army and successive conscription drives ingrained within the communities of the Hereditary Lands, and the rest of the Monarchy, the legitimacy of military service. Taking the *Deutschmeister* as a microcosm of the wider army, its processes and practices linked the sixteen-year-old Philip Bauer and seventeen-year-old Martin Guthmann conscripted in 1792 to the barber's son Johann Schnierer in 1809 and the conscript Sebastien Bradl in 1817. This last man at 21, from the village of Hundsturm in the Viennese suburb of Margareten, represented the last wave of men to fight the French. He, like all local men who had served, had been paid 3 *fl.* on enlistment in 1813. Bradl went on to fight in Italy before he was placed on furlough with much of his company, living as a subject in his community (*Geburtsort*) no doubt wondering what the last 11 years of his soldiering life would bring.<sup>112</sup>

As this chapter has shown the Habsburg army was one of the largest and most pervasive state institution in rural society, and the Monarchy's most widespread social movement. The militarisation of Habsburg society and its considerable reorganisation in the latter half of the eighteenth-century enabled the foundations for war, the act of soldiering and the identity of the soldier to be cemented at the centre of rural communities before the conflict with France demanded mass armies. The stability of this system, despite its inherent flaws, was

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<sup>111</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 349 ML (Part 1), (1806), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 49 4181 ML (1811), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 14 1005 ML, (1811), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 8 544 ML, (1811), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 15 1119 ML, (1811), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 4 353 ML (Part 1), (1817), fol., *Muster Tabella*; IR 59 5022 ML, (1817), fol., *Muster Tabella*.

<sup>112</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 353 ML (Part 1), (1817), fol., *4th Fusilier Compagnie*.

provided by the bureaucratic totality of manors in the Austro-Bohemian lands, whose local power legitimised enforced military service.

Conscription in the Habsburg Monarchy was not just a contract of dutiful obligation between the emperor's subjects and himself but a commitment of and engagement by the many layered territorial authorities within the Monarchy to the Habsburg state. If the old *Landrekrutenstellung* agreement used during the Seven Years' War had been a mark of loyalty between the Monarchy and its provincial estates, then the Josephinian *Konskriptions- und Werbbezirksystem* made that commitment even more intimate, demanding local manors prove their loyalty by providing their subjects to specific units. The mass conscription drives demanded by these units turned military spheres into a reflection of each of the individual local societies within the Monarchy. War with France socialised the military and realised the emperor Joseph's desire for the *Soldat Bürger*, subjects who became citizens through their state service in the emperor's army. Men whose service also affirmed their local community's loyalty to the dynasty.

As we shall see in later chapters, the social change brought about by conscription spread the ethos of the *Soldat Bürger*, providing hundreds of thousands of men and their families a direct link to the dynasty through service in local regiments, a military culture with which to understand their place in the European wide war and a social identity that was both regional and dynastic. This martial identity rested on distinctly old regime concepts of honour, duty, courage, and stoic bravery, which coupled with localised recruitment and military displays, turned these institutions and their soldiers into an expression of regional patriotism and dynastic loyalty. This process of transforming subjects into soldiers was a vital part of positioning the dynasty as integral to their subject's security. As this thesis argues, making *Soldat Bürger* out of manor subjects allowed individuals and their communities to realise, experience and narrate their Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as part of the Habsburg state.

## Chapter Three: Making the *Soldat Bürger*

This chapter examines the *Soldat Bürger* identity hundreds of thousands Habsburg conscripts, volunteers and officers were presented with on joining the army, and how it was lived. It charts how the actions of soldiers, guided by company military regulations, produced men who internalised the role of the *Soldat Bürger* through socialisation within the immediate military community of the company. In doing so it reveals how men were motivated to serve the Habsburg state as soldiers. It first examines the role of the enlightenment and the influence of sensibility on the didactic material used to formulate military communities and their culture of state service in the latter half of the eighteenth century. It then considers the impact of the company regulations, specifically the 1786 edition, on the conduct of officers and men separately. This part first investigates the role of the officer in creating an effective military unit. It then highlights the soldier's desire to obey, and gain honour for himself and his immediate community on the battlefield, was thanks to the care shown to him by superiors, and the fraternal bonds of honour created amongst his peers.<sup>1</sup> Read alongside regulations, ego-documents provide evidence of proscribed military behaviours being carried out in practice, the agency of men in the Habsburg army, the active internalisation of the soldier's role by officers and commoners alike, and the way in which these roles were inhabited and witnessed by those within the social structure of the company. Lastly this chapter will consider the ways in which the material culture of the army and its culture of display reinforced the messages of

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<sup>1</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 3-65. The messaging of the 1786 regulations served as the foundation for the Habsburg army's military culture all throughout the war. The edition was an almost verbatim copy of the one issued by Lacy in 1769 and the content was heavily utilised in the 1807 *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*. The forward to the 1786 publication noted that as the original published in 1769 was a well written text, only stylistic edits had been made. The 1807 articles of war distilled the 49 articles published in the 1786 regulation down to one page, whilst still retaining the overall message of "loyalty and obedience" (*Treue und der Gehorsam*) found in the earlier edition on page 91. The duty and characteristics for each of the ranks also remained similar in content. It is therefore used in this chapter as the primary representation of the army's culture of service and a source that best describes how the role of the *Soldat Bürger* was conveyed, and this role of internalized by officers and men.



“obedience, faithfulness, vigilance and steadfastness” underpinning the soldier’s whole culture of service.<sup>2</sup> These sources reveal how symbols of honour created communities that represented a soldier’s fraternity, his local fatherland and the legitimacy of the dynasty in these places, motivating men to fight.

## The Military Enlightenment

In the years after the Seven Years’ War a pan-European “military public sphere”, devising ways in which to motivate men for future wars, had opened avenues of thought reshaping the way the state, society and the army approached soldiering and the soldier in the modern period.<sup>3</sup> The enlightenment, specifically the emergence of the concept of sensibility, accentuated the moral good in understanding the experiences and emotions of others. Sensibility was an intellectual movement known “...as a deep and untaught capacity to feel emotion, to perceive beauty, and especially to sympathise with others’ sufferings.”<sup>4</sup> For individuals to express and possess the emotional and ethical qualities of sensibility was to achieve a natural goodness that came from “caring for that which society does not value,” and by believing in the morality and virtue of others.<sup>5</sup> This understanding of the other, specifically the enlisted man, fuelled a movement in military thought that believed in a more humane approach to motivating, caring for and leading soldiers. One that was dependent on the sociability of officers and men which would create bonds encouraging “humanity, friendship, benevolence, and collective spirit that could promote...community, a masculine martial identity, and ultimately victory”.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Stephanie Downes, Sally Holloway and Sarah Randles, “A Feeling for Things, Past and Present,” in *Feeling Things: Objects and Emotions Through History*, eds., Stephanie Downes, Sally Holloway and Sarah Randles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 8-26.

<sup>3</sup> van der Haven, “Military Men of Feeling?”; Hamish M. Scott, “The Seven Years War and Europe’s ‘Ancien Régime’,” *War in History* 18, no. 4 (2011): 419-55,

<sup>4</sup> Inger Sigrun Brodey, “Making Sense of Sensibility,” *Persuasions* 37 (2015): 62-80, esp. 63.

<sup>5</sup> Susan Manning, “Sensibility,” in *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature, 1740-1830*, eds., Thomas Keymer and Jon Mee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80-99; Paul Goring, *The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>6</sup> Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment*, 67.

As part of this change in approach to the common soldier, officers were taught that instead of immediately beating the soldier, as had been prevalent in the Habsburg army before the 1740s, it was better to gently coax him with care, attention and with a role he could assume which gave him a community that respected him and access to avenues of advancement he could not find outside of the army.<sup>7</sup> Military theorists, soldiers and intellectuals wrote of a “Soldier Estate” to encapsulate this idea.<sup>8</sup> This was a particular estate within the hierarchy of eighteenth-century Central Europe only available to men, and their relatives, who had or would experience battle. The ongoing membership of this estate was the defence of one’s own honour, and the honour of a soldier’s unit, fatherland and community.<sup>9</sup>

By providing the new conscript with his own corporation which gave him a degree of power and self-worth it was hoped men would remain with the army, internalising military service as something beneficial.<sup>10</sup> It was these ideas, integrated into the creation of the Habsburg standing army in the 1760s, promoted and manifested by interactions within the company, which led men to assume the role of the *Soldat Bürger*. The way this culture of service was created depended on the willingness of officers to coax and co-opt the common man. This was an experience and process many witnesses attest to. These social connections between combatants and the psychology governing their behaviours were, as we shall see in this chapter,

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<sup>7</sup> Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 180-90.

<sup>8</sup> For works that examine the ways in which ideas of sensibility influenced the relationships fostered within the *Soldatstand*, the treatment of the common soldier and the moral standing of the officer in Old Regime society see Daniel Hohrath, “Spätbarocke Kriegspraxis und Aufgeklärte Kriegswissenschaften: Neue Forschungen und Perspektiven zu Krieg und Militär im ‘Zeitalter Der Aufklärung,’” *Aufklärung* 12, no. 1 (2000): 5-47; Christiane Büchel, “Der Offizier Im Gesellschaftsbild Der Frühaufklärung: Die Soldatenschriften Des Johann Michael von Loen,” *Aufklärung* 11, no. 2 (1999): 5-23; Michael Sikora, “‘Ueber Die Veredlung Des Soldaten’; Positionsbestimmungen Zwischen Militär Und Aufklärung,” *Aufklärung* 11, no. 2 (1999): 25-50. For contemporary discussions on how officers could husband the respect of common soldiers and improve the retention of recruits through the promotion of a positive culture within the *Soldatstand* see Gotthard Christoph Müller, *Militärische Encyclopädie; oder systematischer und gemeinnütziger Vortrag der sämtlichen alten und neuen Kriegswissenschaften*. (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1796); Johann Jacob Gebauer, *Der Soldat, oder Compendiöse Bibliothek alles Wissenswürdigen über Militärische Gegenstände*, Issue 1 (Halle: Gebauer, 1795); Jacob Heinrich Wild, *Gesetze für die k.k. Armee in Auszug nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Gegenstände eingerichtet* (Vienna: Schönfeld, 1784); Anon, *Dienst-Pflichten und Verhaltung für den Militärstand* (Bonn: Schriften der typographischen Gesellschaft, 1787). The last two works listed here were written by Habsburg officers. Wild was a first lieutenant and auditor in the *Joseph Colloredo* infantry regiment, and the anonymous author of *Dienst-Pflichten* identified himself a regimental staff officer in the *K.k. Armee*.

<sup>9</sup> Wilfried Wilms, “Dismantling the Bourgeois Family: J.M.R. Lenz’s ‘Soldatenfamilie,’” *Monatshefte* 100, no. 3 (2008): 337-50.

<sup>10</sup> Osman, *Citizen Soldiers*, 55-79.

prevalent in units of the Monarchy throughout the war with France, working together to generate honour as a normative motivator and system of meaning for both officers and common soldiers

The articles of war in the Monarchy's military regulations defined the duties and purpose of the *Soldat Bürger* and set out the codes of behaviour and marks of esteem that encompassed his honour. These have been examined in chapter one, but it bears repeating here. A soldier proved his state citizenship by his commitment "to protect the public safety from enemies within and without". This, as the articles of war from 1807 stated, mirroring those from 1786, was the "sublime purpose of his [the soldier's] existence." To confirm his position within the military estate, a soldier was to be "devoted to his position with true attachment...wholly committed to fulfilling his destiny in its entirety." And he should consider "it an honour" to teach men the dangers of war "with love and serenity for the service". The recruit and the veteran were reminded monthly in German as well as the regiment's main language, "all who are under the authority of his monarch must avert all that is disadvantageous to him," and "should avoid anything that could lead to a disadvantage." The fighting man was to apply "his abilities...for the benefit of the service" and follow the "laws of the soldier", whose "solemn oath has promised his homage and submission." As the regulations of 1807 concluded, it was honour gained from the love of service that provided men "respect and reward".<sup>11</sup> These were the foundations of the *Soldat Bürger*, and the Sonnenfelian state citizenship explored in chapter one, which powered the Monarchy's institutions during the war with France.

In this chapter the autobiographical writings of common soldiers and company officers are used to examine how the articles of war, as instructions for state service, were realised by men embodying the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* as it was defined by the principles of the army's honour.<sup>12</sup> Together these accounts show how the honour culture of the Habsburg army, as it was informed by the "Military Enlightenment", prepared men to serve the state in war. This

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<sup>11</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 2: 2-4.

<sup>12</sup> See Table 3: The Social Background of Military Authors, 330.

ability to motivate men to fight used honour to promote obedience by giving men a sense of self-worth and recognition only found in the exclusive communities it created. As military writers suggest, these communities successfully changed the behaviours of men, and what they valued, by providing esteem to those who correctly inhabited the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* and ostracising those who did not. Men, these authors write, maintained their sense of worth by contributing towards the security of the Habsburg state through their military excellence. As the 1807 regulations stated, this is what it meant to be “a man of honour”.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the limited number of military writings used here, the roll calls of authors’ regiments show these motivating communities of respect and self-esteem were large and widespread. These administrative documents allow the sociocultural context surrounding the authors to be easily identified. The names of the comrades, corporals and officers many authors listed in their accounts as important to their war narrative have been identified in these sources. Along with these names, is the exact detail of the author’s military milieu, which for this work has been identified as the company. These details provide the social backgrounds, religious denominations, familial life and histories of military careers that made up the communities of honour that defined and influenced author’s perceptions and experiences of war. Whilst these authors are limited in number, their accounts leave behind the whispers of thousands of men, mostly the rural labouring poor, found in regimental rolls calls and who, despite differences in place, language, hierarchy, and religion, contributed to authors’ understanding of the Habsburg’s war, and its influence on their inner life, by fighting as *Soldat Bürger*.

The underlying motivations of the authors used here are varied. Volunteer soldiers wrote of the security the military could bring. Others desired to see the world, whilst some saw soldiering as means for social mobility. Conscripts wrote specifically of enjoying the community and comradeship that honour as an alternative values system promoted which could not be found in civilian life. Some officer authors came from military families or military educational institutions, taught from a young age to cherish the duty the army provided. Whilst others were driven by a desire for recognition.

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<sup>13</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 2: 2

Most of the company commander authors used here were from the German speaking bourgeoisie (*Bürgertum*), whose civilian education had instilled within them the need to promote and exhibit discipline, hard-work, professional excellence, and self-improvement. The habitus of this group will be explored further in chapter five, but it is enough to say here that this understanding of the world supported the army's ability to create state servants from these men.<sup>14</sup>

Regardless of the motivations and social backgrounds, the resources these military authors provided the army – their ability “to fight, to win, and to die” - were conditioned by a system of honour which governed this capacity, and which also rewarded exemplary military service. It did this by giving a soldier self-value, a community who valued him and a hierarchy to ascend if he did everything for the benefit of the state. This community was then maintained by its members, starting with company officers, who fostered a culture of state service through systems of sociability underpinned by empathy, compassion, and respect and who also policed deviants to a standard deemed fair and humane. As this chapter shows, this was a general experience, reflecting how honour as code of service and mark of esteem created affective communities across different provinces and branches of the army that motivated men to fight.

Soldiers' experience of how the Habsburg army's psychology of honour created the *Soldat Bürger* and the effective fighting forces which they comprised is the subject of this chapter. To first understand how men used the articles of war and their prescribed role within their communities to foster unit cohesion, we now turn to the company officers of Habsburg infantry regiments. These were leaders of the soldier's immediate military community who were entrusted with nurturing a culture of respect and state service utilising the tenets of the Habsburg army's honour.

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<sup>14</sup> See Tables 3 and 4 for a greater analysis of the social backgrounds and career histories of military authors used in this study.

## Setting an Example: Company Officers

The health of the interpersonal relationships between officers and common soldiers, the two parts of the military estate, and within each of these groups, was as relevant to Habsburg military intellectuals as the state's ability to conscript men. There was no point to the extensive systems of conscription investigated in the last chapter if the local born population was frittered away by complacent officers and draconian punishment.<sup>15</sup> Therefore the officer's dignity and compassion exhibited in the treatment of the common soldier, and an ability to see the best in the most marginalised of society, was as important as his battlefield courage. It was the company commander who was to specifically exhibit such traits and foster it within his men. In doing so he would create the bonds of loyalty that would link his company together and provide the foundations for a capable fighting force.<sup>16</sup> This did not mean corporal and capital punishment was discarded for compassion. These were still administered in the Habsburg army, reflecting the nature of an Austrian society that relied on coercive violence to maintain order.<sup>17</sup> This type of social disciplining, however, was tempered by military justice administered by benevolent officers, which made punishment more humane, regulated, and theoretically utilised as a last resort.<sup>18</sup>

To care was the duty of an officer, and the memoirs and letters left by soldiers used in this chapter show officers carried out their prescribed role. As Markus Fochler has demonstrated by examining the habitus of the *Deutschemeister* regiment officer corps before 1792, the professionalism demanded of officers, and the honour they could gain in recompense, "defined and influenced their actions".<sup>19</sup> Acting the part of the dutiful officer, as Fochler explains, where committing to "service, devotion to duty and honour [was] expected" as a sign of an individual's social superiority, dictated how officers approached their men.<sup>20</sup> Tobias

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<sup>15</sup> See the chapter entitled "Von der Erhaltung des Mannes" in *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 162.

<sup>16</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 47-67; *Dienst-Reglement*, 2; 32-38.

<sup>17</sup> John H. Gill, *Thunder on the Danube: Napoleon's Defeat of the Habsburg*, Vol. 1 (London: Frontline Books, 2012), 60-62; Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 30.

<sup>18</sup> Rebel, "Peasants under the Austrian Empire," 196.

<sup>19</sup> Fochler, "Zwischen Korpsgeist und Konkurrenz," 119.

<sup>20</sup> Fochler, "Zwischen Korpsgeist und Konkurrenz," 119-20.

Roeder's study of the Habsburg officer corps has also shown the structures of service and the behaviours required of individuals established through systems of peer learning and mentorships created compassionate leaders.<sup>21</sup> The war with France did not alter this approach to leadership at the tactical level, but increased it. As accounts show, Habsburg officers, many of them common born and without their nobility to suggest a superiority, worked together to exhibit their dutifulness by carefully nurturing the human resources under their supervision. They did this knowing their actions achieved honour for their unit and proprietor, and "the opportunities to gain and maintain social recognition and social prestige" for themselves in a society where hierarchy was paramount.<sup>22</sup>

A central element to an officer's display of his professionalism, which contemporaries labelled his *point d'honneur*, was by fostering a community which instilled within men a desire to be held in esteem. This was done by nurturing the self-worth of common soldiers. Company commanders, their soldiers tell us, referred to them as "sons" (*Söhne*) in battle, used the informal pronoun "Du", took the time to converse with their men, spent their own money to provide reading materials, food and alcohol, and used corporal punishments sparingly, and only as warning with which to reinforce the importance of honour as a set of values to the communities it created.<sup>23</sup>

The retired *Deutschmeister* captain Johann Nuce, a veteran of the wars with France, argued the common man only truly internalised the desire to serve through the "philanthropic" tendencies of his company superior. "To bring out the man (*Menschen*)" Nuce wrote, "requires [a superior] who gives himself to [the task] completely and gladly...if good treatment, good examples and good instructions are introduced to the recruit [then one will] end with the veteran." This approach had served the essayist well, as he argued "if every superior in his sphere of activity is happy to deal often and much with the common man; then the problem of good soldiering can, will and must solve itself; all the more so, as everything then lifts the man

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<sup>21</sup> Tobias Uwe Roeder, "Professional Identity of Army Officers," 109-36.

<sup>22</sup> Fochler, 22-23, 110-13, esp. 110, 279.

<sup>23</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 42; James, "For the Fatherland?," 45.

only to do good.” Indeed, as Nuce reflected, a soldier was made from a man and not a boy to be educated.<sup>24</sup> This process started with a “spark of honour”, which could be found in “the less cultivated of raw material: the common man...if only one knows how to seek it out.” By lighting the desire to be valued within men, Nuce articulated, a superior would harness the myriads of people, characters and disposition of those under his control and create a unit ready to serve.<sup>25</sup> Even those neglected, browbeaten, and mistreated in the past would be inspired by a “kind word”. And with this word a soldier could be made.<sup>26</sup>

Nuce’s 1817 essays on the ways in which company officers, from cadet to first captain, could inspire obedience, faithfulness, vigilance and steadfastness in their men reflects an officer who modelled his military identity, and intellectual thought, on the didactic writings of the Habsburg infantry regulations. In the regulations, published in three separate editions between 1769 and 1808, company commanders were instructed to care for their men and infuse within them a desire to serve, exhibiting the same paternalistic nature expected by society of its authorities. He was to know every man’s birthplace, character and the length of service. Though this was an instruction stipulated to make the apprehension of deserters easier, it did also promote an affinity between an officer and the men under his command and vice-versa.<sup>27</sup>

This sort of behaviour was not only expected of company officers, but of all superiors. The account of Lorenz Zagitzcek, a Bohemian officer in the infantry regiment *D’Alton*, of his intimate meeting with the Walloon Habsburg general Johann Peter Beaulieu, demonstrates the sincerity officers had in creating a force where the consideration for others, and an acknowledgment of their efforts, fostered a committed community from ethnically and socially different men. After defeat at Arlon in the Austrian Netherlands on April 17, 1794, Zagitzcek remembered several of his regiment’s officers toasted the health of their commander in a beer

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<sup>24</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 99.

<sup>25</sup> Nuce, 97-98.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 98.

<sup>27</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 63, 162-63.



house near his headquarters. Soon afterwards they were joined by Beaulieu, who went over to the table and:

emptied a glass to our health as well and thanked us for the good order that had been observed carefully by all the troops during the retreat, which became a model for the brave behaviour of all the officers, whose example served the men at every opportunity. He considered himself lucky to command such troops and hoped to lead us again to victories soon.<sup>28</sup>

Beaulieu exemplified to his company officers the importance good ones placed upon their behaviour, and their behaviour's relationship to the creation of military spheres where honour as a symbol of paternal love and integrity motivated men to serve despite the hardships of war. He not only commended Zagitzek and his comrades for their actions as company officers after defeat but offered to them a compassionate and good-natured leader to emulate in future battles.

As the regulations for all ranks of the company made clear, this unit was the fundamental basis on which a battalion and then a regiment built its fighting capabilities on.<sup>29</sup> Social cohesion within companies, and the fellowship between officers and men, played an important role in maintaining soldier's motivation during campaign, and therefore an army's ability to overcome the enemy.<sup>30</sup> Officers were instructed to promote dignity and respect and were explicitly directed to slowly introduce new recruits to the life of the soldier.<sup>31</sup> This developed the loyalty required of soldiers for their officers, subsequently used to maintain the cohesion of the company in battle. Officers understood this. The *Deutschmeister* fusilier Johann Löffler remembered he could bear the gruelling first stages of military training in 1788 thanks to the words of his company commander. In the village of Bruck, Löffler described how captain Lindberg, a man recognised by the regiment as an officer whose skill was in husbanding new

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<sup>28</sup> NL, B/682, Zagitzek, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Lebens*, Part 1, 9.

<sup>29</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 518-96. Beginning with chapter thirty-six of the fourth section entitled "*Schwenkungen*", the *Exerzierreglement* stepped out the movements a company needed to make as part of a regiment, and by extension, a brigade. The preceding third section of the exercise regulations, "*Chargirungen*", provided all the details needed for officers to instruct their men on how to fire by platoon and company either stationary, advancing, or retreating. See pages 441-517.

<sup>30</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 3-5.

<sup>31</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 55.

recruits, cautioned his drill sergeant (*Corporal*) to be patient with the young volunteer whilst he struggled with the early stages of military training. The corporal heeded the words of “the worthy captain” (*biedere Hauptmann*), and soon Löffler was able to successfully perform the drill of a Habsburg soldier.<sup>32</sup>

The care and attention paid to Löffler did not begin with Lindberg. It was exhibited by all the officers the recruit met in his first week as a soldier. After being paid 45 *fl.* for volunteering to join the *Deutschmeister* for six years, Löffler, who was recovering from a debilitating fever, was met by the regiment’s colonel, Baron von Rosenberg. Löffler recounted how the colonel, who he described as a “very generous and benevolent man” (*einen sehr menschenfreundlichen Mann*), came with the new recruit’s company commander and one of the regiment’s tailors to inspect him. On seeing Löffler in the uniform of the *Deutschmeister*, Rosenberg remarked that he looked like a “strong, well-heeled man, to whom the uniform looked very nice”. He then addressed the captain and said loudly: “I hope that he will become a good grenadier”. Rosenberg, Löffler explained, then took the young man aside and told him because of his weak state he would send him to Bruck where Lindberg, described by the colonel as “a very considerate captain” (*einen sehr nachsichtigen Hauptmann*), would make him “a capable soldier” (*ein tüchtiger Soldat*).<sup>33</sup> The approach of these men is telling, as is the memory Löffler had of them and the glowing adjectives he chose to describe his initial encounter with Habsburg officers, revealing *Deutschmeister* officers were intimately acquainted with their role in fostering a paternal culture which co-opted the soldier to serve.

This approach to the common man continued throughout Löffler’s service and during other Habsburg soldiers’ war with France. In the early campaigns with the Ottoman Empire, Löffler was provided with money by his captain whilst in hospital in Agram (*Zagreb*) as a reward and thanks for helping the company’s wounded first lieutenant.<sup>34</sup> After recovering, Löffler met the army commander, Baron Ernst Gideon von Laudon, who thanked his “children” for

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<sup>32</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 31-32.

<sup>33</sup> Löffler, 32.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 43-45.

sharing their mouldy bread with him on at a picquet opposite Dubica (*Dubincz*).<sup>35</sup> These bonds of paternal comradeship were also experienced by the Moravian conscript Johann Schnerer, from the infantry regiment *Wallis* Nr. 29, who recalled the joyful friendship shared between the officers and men of his company in the days after the battle of Stockach in 1799. In a memoir he wrote for his children nearly fifty years later, the veteran remembered whilst stationed in the small town of Bodman, on the shores of Lake Constance, he spent a “friendly” day climbing to the ruins of Altbodman with a rope team (*Seilschaft*) made up of all ranks in the company. So striking and influential was the experience for Schnerer, he chose to linger on it in his memoir, delighting in its retelling. In early Spring, officers, corporals and common conscripts alike set about hiking up to the old castle, taking in the air, the beautiful surroundings and the companionship of each other. On reaching the summit the men admired the view, an event that must have lightened the emotional toll of the first bloody days of the campaign and brought officers and men closer together.<sup>36</sup>

As some accounts attest, these familial interactions inspired a devotion for officers from their men that created a sense of belonging and community. Johann Grueber, then a young gentleman trooper in the cuirassier regiment *Herzog Albert* Nr. 3, wrote of his love for his first company commander. A man who had cared and nurtured him as a father after Grueber volunteered for the unit as an eighteen-year-old. Such was the affection he had for his leader Grueber recalls openly weeping as the man was buried near the town of Tuncchod (*Tuněchody*, *Czech Republic*) after dying of a short illness in 1807.<sup>37</sup> In the account of his military service, Nuce wrote of a remarkable scene he witnessed at Rivoli in 1797 to underline the commitment officers made to instil a love for them, and a devotion to service, within their men. At the battle Nuce recounted how an assault made by the infantry regiment *Colloredo* Nr. 57 was immediately stalled after the lead battalion’s commander, lieutenant-colonel Bessele von Mayer, was killed

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<sup>35</sup> *Der alte Sergeant*, 47.

<sup>36</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, fol., *Bruckstücke aus meinen Leben*, 3. “Das Regiment Bodman (Bodman-Ludwigshafen) in die Cantionirungs station zur liegt worden, unter welchen Zeit ich die Berge und die Burg ruinen bei schaute, und offiziers mit Comaraden, mit meine Seilschaft auf die See, freundlich war.”

<sup>37</sup> Karl Johann Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen Eines Reiteroffiziers vor Hundert Jahren* (Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1906), 55.

from a shot to the head. Stunned by his death, the charge broke into a confused stumble and then a sudden rush to Mayer's body from men who dearly loved their leader. Their touching devotion, Nuce reported, was replicated two years later as the dead man's regiment gathered around his grave to pay their respects as it marched through Italy during the opening weeks of the Second Coalition.<sup>38</sup>

The care shown by officers to the common man continued throughout the struggle against France. In the lead up to the war of 1809 the *Vaterländischen Blätter* printed a tribute from the officers of the Moravian regiment *Erzherzog Ludwig* Nr. 8. The piece attested to the patriotism of a first captain shown by the efforts he made in educating, caring and maintaining the well-being of his soldiers. Whilst a prisoner of war in 1798, the readers of the paper were told Carl Würth paid for the food and wine of his imprisoned soldiers, and during the twenty years of his service collected a vast library that he made available to his soldiers, encouraging them to use books from his collection. Würth, who retired from the army due to ill health, left his library to the regiment and was celebrated by his fellow officers in the paper publicly as "...a brave warrior, a true friend and worthy comrade".<sup>39</sup> His actions, no doubt motivated by the European shift towards empathy and ideals of sensibility, was also a result of a military culture that encouraged company commanders to maintain the military estate by ensuring the physical and emotional welfare of their soldiers.

During the war of 1809 Habsburg officers used compassion and good-natured paternalism to lead and cajole their men on campaign even after gruelling losses. Johann Schnierer, a conscript in the *Deutschmeister*, recounted how his first experience of battle ended with a public performance from the company captain which rewarded the courage of the eighteen-year-old soldier. The *Deutschmeister* had been engaged in heavy fighting with a Bavarian division at Neumarkt-Sankt Veit on April 24, 1809, and there it forced the enemy back after an

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<sup>38</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 159-61.

<sup>39</sup> "Charakterzüge Österreichischer Patrioten. (Aus der Periode der Errichtung der Landwehre und ihres Ausmarsches)," *Vaterländische Blätter*, April 11, 1809, 196. "...braven Krieger, dem treuen Freunde, dem würdigen Kameraden".

attack through woods had led to an extended exchange of volleys. After the battle, Captain Georg Mehlführer addressed his company as it stood to attention, and a man who had shirked his duty was put on the spot:

It had happened that a man in our company had used a shallow excuse to unmanly pull himself out of line and back from enemy fire. While I, with a nose blooded from my fired musket, staining my white uniform, had stayed in the line. Nevertheless, the next day in front of the whole company the other man, with his quick feet, received a less than flattering lesson on bravery from Captain Mehlführer. But for me, my captain struck me very agreeably on the arm, told the other man that I was a very different example of sinfulness, and turned to me with the words: “Bravo, my son, you have done your duty!”<sup>40</sup>

The quick footed shirker had failed to do his duty and instead of disciplining the soldier with the cane, Mehlführer chose to shame him, stripping the man of his dignity - his right to be valued by those around him. In a culture of honour this, the captain believed, was a scathing punishment, one where the soldier's self-revulsion would spur him onto greater feats in the battles to come. A feeling no doubt reinforced in the man by the public recognition of his actions, which would now be policed by the rest of the company. At the other end of the scale Schnierer's public recognition as a “son” who had “done his duty” in front of those who he lived and fought with served a threefold purpose. First, it rewarded the actions of Schnierer in a culture where recognition of duty courageously carried out on the battlefield was a precondition for obtaining honour as a mark of respect. Second, the public spectacle reasserted the expectations of the emperor, the army and the company had of each individual soldier. And lastly, Schnierer's position as a new member had valiantly represented to the veterans of the severely depleted *Deutschmeister* that the new influx of reservists belonged, and they could and were expected to contribute as valued soldiers.

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<sup>40</sup> Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 14; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 398 ST, (1809.1-1809.6), fol., *Muster Tabella April 1809, Mehlführer compagnie* The April *Deutschmeister Standestabellen* lists 18 men assigned from the reserve division to Mehlführer's Second Fusilier Company in April 1809. A Johann Schreier was one of them. In April the company had 96 men captured and two killed. A total of 75 men were killed and 1,654 captured from the regiment in April. Many of the casualties were suffered at Landshut on April 21, Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht*, 1: 144.

Whilst Würth's comrades in 1809 had paid tribute to the behaviours of an enlightened man able to appreciate the importance of education, the approach of Mehlführer and his commitment to honour outside of Neumarkt-Sankt Veit rested on knowledge unique to a man of his military experience. Originally a volunteer from the city of Würzburg, Georg Mehlführer joined the *Deutschemeister* in 1780 as a twenty-year-old for a six-year period. He agreed to a further six years after being made a senior private in 1783 and was appointed sergeant-major in April 1789. Over the course of the First, Second and Third Coalitions, Mehlführer rose further through the ranks, first by becoming a second lieutenant in March 1794, then a first lieutenant in August 1797, before advancing to the rank of second captain in September 1805 and finally first captain after 1806.<sup>41</sup> Mehlführer was thus a career soldier, but not a career officer. He was a man who had experienced the two different strata of the military estate: the officers and the other ranks. He knew what it was to confront the horrors of the battlefield, where the ability to perform the part of the soldier and behave with “vigilance and steadfastness” decided the continued possession of personal and regimental honour. And he was aware of the importance of honour as a normative motivator for common soldiers because of the length of his service and its varied nature.

Mehlführer's social mobility and military experience was not unique. As the war progressed the move from common soldier to officer became more prominent in the Habsburg army.<sup>42</sup> Promotion from men in the ranks increased as attrition saw a decrease in the amount of available replacement officers from the pool of “Imperial Academy Cadets” (*K. k. Akademie cadets*) and “Regimental Ordinary Cadets” (*K. k. ordinaire cadets*). To facilitate speedy replacements cadets as young as 14 were made ensigns on immediately entering their regiments, and the newly promoted common soldier was provided with the equipment fee (*Montourgeld*) required to purchase the accoutrement and uniform of an officer. The career history of the colonel of the infantry regiment *Jordis* Nr. 59 in 1806, Christoph Adler, provides a glimpse at the background

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<sup>41</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 349 ML (Part 1), (1806), fol., *5th Fusilier Compagnie: Mehlführer*.

<sup>42</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, “Adlige Abstinenz und bürgerlicher Aufstiegs-wille,” 339-44; Roeder, “Professional Identity of Army Officers,” 59-61.

of these common born officers. Adler was a catholic volunteer from Thuringia, who had served in the last months of the Seven Years' War. He would later command a brigade in 1809 and obtain the noble particle "von" from the emperor as a reward for his service.<sup>43</sup> In 1806 he commanded an officer corps where 73 of the 90 men were common born, with 33 of the men having once served as common soldiers, and a further 23 as gentleman volunteer soldiers who joined with the intention of becoming officers.<sup>44</sup> The increased number of common soldier officers in the regiment *Jordis* served to close the social gap between officers and men prevalent before the war with the Ottoman Empire. Importantly, this new cadre of professional officers provided the common soldier with superiors who had an intimate understanding of their experience, which served to strengthen company morale and military effectiveness.

Soldiers who were not directly commanded by a man who had once been one of them were led by officers from two different backgrounds. The most senior of company commanders were Imperial Academy Cadets. These men were a product of the social organisation of the officer corps during the reign of Maria Theresa, where the honour of the noble families and their position in the system of Habsburg court patronage, local jurisdictions and wider society were tied to the service of their sons in the army.<sup>45</sup> For many of these ennobled boys the beginning of their military service began with a gruelling education in one of the Military Academies of the Monarchy. These were schools which had been established, or professionalised and their curriculum updated, by Maria Theresa and Joseph II after the Seven Years' War. The intention was to transform the sons of the Habsburg nobility into a social class of warriors who would lead the native-born troops of the Monarchy.<sup>46</sup> The Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt provided the best cadets, with a portion of the boys educated there the sons of

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<sup>43</sup> *Militär-Almanach. Nr. 20* (Vienna: Graeffner und Comp., 1810), 43. Christoph von Adler, was listed as an "unemployed (*Unangestellte*) General Major" in 1810.

<sup>44</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, IR 59 5017 ML, (1806). I tabulated the service records of all those listed on the Staff company, the two Grenadier and 16 Fusilier companies' *Prima Plana*. This is the first page of each roll call, a Latin term meaning "the first folio", which lists the officers of the company: Captain (or Second Captain), First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant and Ensign.

<sup>45</sup> Michael Hochedlinger, "Mars Ennobled the Ascent of the Military and the Creation of a Military Nobility in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Austria," *German History* 17, 2 (1999), 141-76, esp. 150-52

<sup>46</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 305-08.

experienced common soldiers.<sup>47</sup> After being filled with love for service and the fatherland through an education which promoted patriotic state service, cadets were assigned to regiments and were usually the first to be promoted to full regimental officers.<sup>48</sup> This process reflected the position of the nobility in wider society, but was also part of the scheme that promoted military service as an attractive proposition to a group which before had shown very little interest in war.<sup>49</sup>

The less senior of the cadet ranks, and the most prevalent, were Regimental Cadets. These were young men who through various social connections to the regiment and its proprietor were given positions in fusilier and grenadier companies. As part of a company, they would learn the profession of the officer, providing they or their family could afford the equipment fee. These young boys would then be promoted in good time to higher ranks.<sup>50</sup> Regimental cadets also promoted unit cohesion through familial connections as many had once been “officers’ sons”. These young boys were appointed into the regiment at the behest of the regimental proprietor, and their presence served to further tie the unit to locale, helping create units that reflected the social networks surrounding the garrison.

The number of men who left their testimonies of the war, attest to the widespread use of family ties in the Habsburg officer corps to strengthen unit professionalism and cohesiveness. For example, Marcus Hibler, an ensign in infantry regiment *Stain* Nr. 50 in 1797, was the younger brother to a captain in one of the regiment’s grenadier battalions.<sup>51</sup> In 1806, Hibler’s officer colleagues in the regiment *Jordis*, Heinrich Nachtigall and Johann Justus Eggert, were like their commander, Adler, recruits from the *Reich* who had risen in the ranks. Both these men had sons who in 1806 were lieutenants in the regiment.<sup>52</sup> When Lorenz Zagitzeck was

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<sup>47</sup> Fochler, “Zwischen Korpsgeist und Konkurrenz,” 98-110. István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 78-81.

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion on the curricula see Fochler, “Zwischen Korpsgeist und Konkurrenz,” 106-10; *Brnadić*, “The Enlightened Officer at Work,” 265-89.

<sup>49</sup> Hochedlinger, “Mars Ennobled,” 174-76.

<sup>50</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 28.

<sup>51</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Georg Gröll, “Aus dem Tagebuch eines Ewigen Soldaten,” 291-97; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, IR 59 5017 ML, (1806), fols., *5te Fusilier Compagnie von Drob, Nr. 5, 13te Fusilier Captainlieut Nachtigall Compagnie, Nr. 1*.



made a regimental cadet in 1790 at the age 18, he was appointed to a company in *D'Alton* Nr. 15 commanded by his father.<sup>53</sup> These same paternal and familial connections were also present within the *Deutschmeister* regiment in 1809. The son of Georg Mehlführer, Carl, was a 19-year-old second lieutenant in the same unit by 1810.<sup>54</sup> These regimental cadets usually made good officers. Their regimental pride, and the professionalism this instilled, coupled with their familial networks, created a committed officer class with strong social connections to the regiment and an understanding of its culture of dutiful service.<sup>55</sup>

When the power of France was broken at Leipzig by the Allies in 1813, the Habsburg army triumphed with an experienced officer corps, many of whom had served in the ranks as soldiers, or who had learnt to become company commanders during wartime. After the reduction of the army after the Treaty of Schönbrunn in 1810, these same officers had been kept even if they had no men to command, ready to lead new conscripts once war resumed. Marcus Hibler, who had served with the army since 1796 was listed as the *third* captain in the regiment *Zach's* second fusilier company. His immediate superior was Lorenz Zagitzeck. He had been with the regiment since 1790. Hibler and Zagitzeck were established wartime officers at the resumption war in 1813. Their ability to command troops coming from their repeated exposure to battle. By the end of the war, Hibler commanded *Zach's* second grenadier company, leading it as part of the main Austrian assault on the French positions west of Lyon at the Battle of Limonest in 1814. This was the last of the 30 battles he took part in during the wars with France.<sup>56</sup> Zagitzeck finished the war also as a grenadier company commander. He would later become a major in *Zach's* first battalion in 1823. This was an honour, he recorded in his memoir to his family, only made possible by his 14 campaigns against the French and his superior's "satisfaction" in his abilities (*mit Zufriedenheit meiner Vorgesetzten ausgezeichnet gedient*).<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> NL, B/682, Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 53.

<sup>54</sup> *Militär-Almanach. Nr. 20: Schematismus der Kais. Kongl. Armee, auf das Jahr 1810* (Vienna: C. Graeffner & Comp. 1810), 105; ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, IR 4 349 ML (Part 1), (1806), fol., *5te Fusil Capitlent Mehlführer*. In 1806 Carl was listed as a 15-year-old dependent in the *Masterlisten* of his father's company

<sup>55</sup> Roeder, "Professionalism and Training."

<sup>56</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 58.

<sup>57</sup> Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Lebens*, Part 2, 79.

For Zagitzcek the regiment was his community he never wanted to leave. One where his father had served:

in the Seven Years' War, the Bavarian War of Succession, in Turkey and until 1801 during the Wars of the French Revolution. The regiment was the fatherland I was born into, and where my son was enrolled as a cadet.<sup>58</sup>

This commitment and connection led Zagitzcek and his other brother officers to play their role as compassionate, courageous leaders. A role which was first stipulated in the regulations devised by the field marshal Lacy in 1769, and later reasserted by Charles in 1808. The actions of these men, and the instructions which guided them, served to co-opt the common soldier, motivating them to pursue honour on the battlefield, as well as in everything they did as servants of the emperor and his state. This desire for respect and recognition from leaders they were devoted to produced motivated troops that contributed to the culture of the regiment in their own way, fostering fraternal relationships within companies the army repeatedly drew upon to sustain itself against France.

## Comradery in the Ranks

In a culture of honour where respect and reward were earned through martial virtue, the opinion of the common soldier's equals was pivotal in the maintenance of his personal soldierly identity and the group identity of his immediate peers which placed service to the state at its core.<sup>59</sup> Many of the common soldier authors who attested to the importance of peer evaluation in creating a culture of honour that maintained and rewarded state service all became non-commissioned officers. Their writings and career experience show the identity of the *Soldat Bürger*, the code of honour used to create it, and the communities this produced, motivated men to commit to a life of soldiering. These men reveal that for common soldiers it was not the

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<sup>58</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzcek, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Lebens*, Part 2, 79.

<sup>59</sup> Berkovich, *Motivations in War*, 175. *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 160-62. See the sections "Von der Harmonie oder Einigkeit" and "Von Esprit de Corps". See also page 36 "So oft Recruten zur Compagnie kommen, soll einem jeden derselben ein guter, alter Gemeiner oder ein Unterofficier, der mit ihm reden kann, beygeben werden; wenn diese nicht zureichen, so müssen die Officiers, und endlich auch der Hauptmann selbst die erste Abrihtung übernehmen."

stick, but respect earned through the shared love of service, and of each other, which motivated them to fight for the Habsburgs.

It was those men who the soldier billeted with, shared campfires with, ate with and foraged with, who helped him overcome the fear of impending battle, the separation from family and drudgery of military life. Together their shared experiences, fatherland, and set of defined behaviours, created a peer group that emphasised the exceptionality of the military estate and the value it offered men. This group of soldiers, known as the *Cameradschaft*, was the smallest social unit of the regiment, providing the common soldier with a group of men with similar pre-military values, which replicated the links of loyalty found at home.<sup>60</sup> It was made up of eight to ten men and was overseen by a senior private - the *Gefreyte*. Each company consisted of usually thirteen of these senior privates, whose exemplary service and literacy skills had seen them promoted.<sup>61</sup> These small groups made war a collective experience, encouraging the common soldier to value not just the lives of those around him, but also their beliefs and opinions. Such an approach is evident in the account left by the Moravian soldier, Johann Schnerer, who explicitly mentioned almost forty years later the names of three boyhood friends whom he served alongside with.<sup>62</sup> Brian Martin's suggestion this type of informal "supportive, lateral relationships with one another as an antidote to the hardships and miseries of combat" was found exclusively in the army of France, inspired by fraternal oaths made by French Revolutionary soldiers to each other as citizens of the nation, is wrong. As the accounts of Habsburg soldiers attest, oaths of loyalty to the Monarchy were just as imbuing, providing the same psychological, and emotional intimacy shared by officers and men claimed to be found in the armies of France and its allies.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Berkovich, *Motivations in War*, 153 and 218; *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 16-19.

<sup>61</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 19-20.

<sup>62</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen leben*, 1. The *Assentliste* of the regiment *Kerpen* in April 1809 highlights the localised nature of recruiting for some manors. The monks from the Cistercian abbey of Heiligenkreuz in Lower Austria provided eight of the nine men they gave to the unit from Gaaden. This was a village directly under their control. The Augustinian monks in Klosterneuburg sent eight from Neulerchenfeld. These were a collection of homesteads under the rule of the abbey just outside of Vienna. ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST I, IR 49 4242 AL and TL, (1809.4-1809.12), fol., *April 1809*.

<sup>63</sup> Martin, *Napoleonic Friendship*, 19-20, 68-100, esp. 89. On the transformative effects of oath giving for Habsburg soldiers see Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 6.

It was the codes of behaviour within the articles of war which men assumed on joining the army and the marks of esteem one could be rewarded for following them correctly which provided men with a sense of fellowship that unit cohesion could be built upon. The foundation for this group solidarity was the *Cameradschaft's*, which internalised within men the normative behaviours of a soldier by encouraging conformity through socialisation – and in practice this did take place. If we return to Mehlführer's admonishment of the man who fled the line, it is possible to see how officers drew on the contempt and disdain men had for their tent mates who failed to muster the discipline and steadfastness needed to stand before the enemy. Mehlführer's performance in front of his company rested on his understanding of the common soldier, learnt in the ranks, that men took it upon themselves to police deviants. Through his public shaming of the shirker, the captain's actions reinforced the use of informal sanctions such as peer ostracism and ridicule. A process of self-regulation that was so strong that even after the first few gruelling weeks of the war with France in 1809, the officers of *Deutschmeister* still relied on ridicule, praise, reprimand and approval within *Cameradschaften* to maintain the effectiveness of their unit, circumventing the morale sapping punishments and direct, violent confrontations official regulations could demand when reinforcing unit cohesion.<sup>64</sup>

The *Cameradschaft* sat within the organisation of a *Corporalschaft*, which a company had four of. This unit always operated in the same position in a company's battle line, indicating that men of a particular *Cameradschaft* fought side by side in battle, and that individuals faced death with their tent mates.<sup>65</sup> Mehlführer's shaming of the soldier notified the rest of the company, but particularly his immediate comrades, it was necessary for each of them to participate in the regulation of the soldier's behaviour through verbal - if not physical - expressions of displeasure. Not only was the shirker shamed into conforming by Mehlführer, but he also called into question the honour of his tent mates, revealing to the whole company the importance of the

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<sup>64</sup> Jeffrey M. Horton, "In Service of the State: Desertion, Discipline, and Army Life in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1753-1781," PhD diss., (The Pennsylvania State University, 2016), 86. Horton points out that as early as the 1750s "giving the soldier a verbal dressing-down in front of the unit" was seen by officers as a viable way in which to recondition men to commit to the tenets of soldiering.

<sup>65</sup> Horton, "In Service of the State," 60-61; *Dienst-Reglement für die kaiserliche königliche Infanterie*, Vol. 3 (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staats-Druckerei, 1807), 38-39.

soldier's own informal sanctions, as well as the formal power of the captain, in maintaining the company's battlefield effectiveness, or *esprit de corps*.<sup>66</sup>

The interplay between company authorities and the peer pressure of those under their command in creating an environment where military duty was internalised can also be found in the ways in which the personal relationships of the *Cameradschaft* were drawn upon before and during battle. These customs and rituals of comradeship essentially stayed the same throughout the period and were predicated on the same philosophies of the French citizen army: collective solidarity, self-interest, alcohol.<sup>67</sup> This collection of motivating factors and opportunities shaped the fraternity of honour men could access by defending the Monarchy. As the accounts of Habsburg soldiers attest, drink and the mutual anxiety of battle specifically emphasised these motivating factors and brought men closer together.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, Habsburg officers encouraged drink, knowing full well its powers as a social lubricant and the army accepted all that was donated to them throughout the war. In 1788, Löffler remembers joining his new company on the eve of the Austro-Ottoman war in Wiener Neustadt where his captain opened a keg of beer for his men to share aware of its powers to foster company cohesion.<sup>69</sup> Soon after Löffler's first engagement, storytelling, alcohol and food played a role in bolstering the morale of the regiment, which had only recently suffered three hundred dead during its assault on the Ottoman occupied town of Dubica in the Autumn months of 1788. After the young man's return from hospital for treatment to a wound sustained in the assault, his presence was greeted with surprise as many of his company thought the fusilier had died in the attack. On reporting to the company officer of his return he was cajoled by his sergeant to recount the tale of his near capture and his brave rescue of the company's young lieutenant to all those present in the camp.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Marshall B. Clinard and Robert F. Meir, *Sociology of Deviant Behaviour* (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 28-32, esp. 30.

<sup>67</sup> Thoral, *From Valmy to Waterloo*, 102-107; Martin, *Napoleonic Friendship*, 67. See Pichichero for a rebuttal of histories founded on ideas of "radical ruptures", *The Military Enlightenment*, 192-229.

<sup>68</sup> Thoral, *From Valmy to Waterloo*, 117.

<sup>69</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 33.

<sup>70</sup> Löffler, 51.

In the same year Löffler recited the importance of the regiment's winter quarters in reviving spirits and creating common bonds. Billeted in a local church at Petrinia (*Petrinja*), the men feasted on roasted meat, drank, socialised, and learnt Croatian from those they stationed with, which they later used on local sweethearts. The break in fighting between 1788 and 1789, and a shared experience where Löffler remembers "often we soldiers hardly knew what we should do with all the wine we were supplied" restored the *esprit de corps* of the *Deutschmeister*, allowing its members to establish a camaraderie that carried it through the brutal storming of Belgrade.<sup>71</sup> In the following year, during the siege of Czettin, the survivors of Belgrade and the new replacements in the company built a cabin out of chestnut trees which was large enough the whole unit could lounge about, socialising over "tasty" chestnut soup as the artillery reduced the fortress.<sup>72</sup> Such was the bonds forged on campaign, Löffler remembered there was much sadness at the end of the war when comrades decided to leave the army instead of signing on for another term.<sup>73</sup>

The power of socialising, conversation and leisure built military communities of respect that psychologically equipped men for battle throughout the war with France. Franz Bersling, a gunner in an artillery battery, remembered the night before his first battle against the French in the Austrian Netherlands in 1794 where he asked one of his comrades, a veteran of the Austro-Ottoman war, what was to come. The veteran assured the youngster not to be afraid, and as the young soldier profusely declared he was not a coward it was his comrade, sensing the young Bersling was scared, who played an important part in instilling within him the courage to fight. The veteran gathered his section around a campfire where they ate, drank and joked fatalistically about the battle. These men then were then led by the senior soldier who played a superstitious game which guaranteed the gunner 78 years of life. This informal ceremony inducted Bersling fully into the section, and by being assured of his worth he assumed an aura of invincibility others remarked upon throughout his military career.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 51.

<sup>72</sup> Löffler, 64.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 72.

<sup>74</sup> Bersling, *Der Bohmische Veteran*, 43.

Fraternal relationships also cajoled men to commit themselves to battle in order to maintain these bonds of respect. In 1809, the *Deutschmeister* conscript Johann Schnierer, from the Viennese suburb of Wieden, spent the first weeks in uniform singing and drinking in the guesthouses of his home suburb with other new reservists. When he was not on sentry duty near the *Getreidemarkt* barracks outside the walls of the inner city, Schnierer remembers being supported by his mother and father's money, "which made the hours of free time in the evenings joyful, as youthful blood and good camaraderie always seem to bring in these situations".<sup>75</sup> It was this sense of camaraderie, which socialised men to view and experience military life positively, that motivated the young conscript to forsake the safety of the reserve battalion, where he worked as a clerk for his sergeant-major, and asked to join the field battalions. It was Schnierer's desire to not only "see what a soldier sees", but also avoid being viewed by his returning comrades as a coward and "a man who sat it out by the fire", that encouraged him to be a "field-soldier" and join the *Deutschmeister* battalions in Bavaria.

Indeed, the soldier's initial interactions and socialisation with his comrades in Vienna transformed a man, who at first begrudged serving alongside rural labourers, into a soldier who desired the validation of his peers, risking death in battle to claim it. Soon after joining the field battalions, the advice and support of senior soldiers and the bond of the *Cameradschaft* also helped the young Schnierer before battle, as it had Bersling and Löffler almost twenty years previously. In the minutes before *Deutschmeister* assaulted the Bavarian right flank at Neumarkt-Sankt Veit, it was the older soldiers in the ranks which made sure the recruits had their muskets loaded and cocked after hearing the order to prepare to engage. Their demeanour, which Schnierer tells us transformed from one of joviality to stoic deliberation, prepared the recruit's "soul" for what was to come.<sup>76</sup>

The bonds of shared experience between young soldiers, and the fraternal care of the veteran, were also used to maintain units during and after battle, as the reflections of Friedrich

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<sup>75</sup> Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 10.

<sup>76</sup> Schnierer, 8-10.

Brandner, a German volunteer soldier in the Bohemian regiment *Nepomuk* make clear. In 1809, as Schnierer was fighting in southern Bavaria, Brandner and the men of his *Cameradschaft* had been separated from their regiment during its retreat from Regensburg. It was their friendship, Brandner recalls, that allowed the men to work together to source food from the population of the Bohemia Forest, navigate its perils, avoid the pursuing French and make it back to their regiment near Wagram.<sup>77</sup> On the eve of Aspern in May 1809, the army celebrated Pentecost with wine, meat and bread, where men were allowed three days off to cook, and lounge in the late Spring sun.<sup>78</sup> The fellowship this fostered was recognised and memorialised when, as Brandner recounts, the next day the surviving men of his unit gathered round a watchfire, surrounded by the slain from the day, to reminisce about those comrades who had died.<sup>79</sup> All were committed to their monarch and officers through the values of honour and this allowed for the creation of friendships, which sustained Habsburg soldiers through the harshest fighting.

Those common soldiers who provided the glue which bound together the *Cameradschaft*, the senior private and the corporal were indispensable to company life. These men modelled what loyalty, honour and the professionalism of the military estate was to those they oversaw every day. In some instances, men were promoted because of their superior intellect, language skills and administrative ability, like the German volunteer Brandner and Moravian conscript Schnierer, or were given promotions because of their display of behaviour as fighting men and congeniality like the Prussia-Silesian volunteer Löffler and Viennese conscript Schnierer.<sup>80</sup> As the regulations made clear, much of the responsibility of binding the two halves of the estate together rested on these men's shoulders.<sup>81</sup>

The experiences and actions of those appointed to senior positions marked them out as exemplars for common soldiers to follow, and as the leader of a *Cameradschaft* they had a moral

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<sup>77</sup> Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 44-51. The same experience can be found in the army's southern retreat in Schnierer, 13.

<sup>78</sup> Brandner, 54-55.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, 65.

<sup>80</sup> Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 2; NL, B/1396 Schnierer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen leben*, 1; Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 44-45, 64-65; Schnierer, 12-13.

<sup>81</sup> *Dienst Reglement*, 3: 37-39, 49-51.



and professional obligation for the care and success of the small group of men they mentored.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, the senior private was one of the most essential elements of the company's culture, used to set and display the values of comradeship and fortitude.<sup>83</sup> Company commanders knew this intimately, with the Moravian Johann Schnierer, and the Austrian Johann Schnierer, both conscripted men, transferred from one regiment to another, and then promoted to sergeant-major, after requests were made by their captains for these common soldier paradigms to join them.<sup>84</sup>

It is important to note the brotherly care of the non-commissioned officer worked with the violence these men used to coerce common soldiers. The purported penchant of the sergeant and corporal for striking their men with yard sticks mirrored the private right of the *Hausvater* to discipline those who lived on his property. Newly recruited conscripts were men who would have been subjected to the authority of their fathers, employers and master tradesman, long before they were confronted with the sergeant's stick. And unlike the beatings administered by peasants, the sergeant's violence was regulated. It was not to be exercised wantonly but existed as part of the reality of late eighteenth century social disciplining, education and "supervision on morals" (*Polizeywissenschaft*) which combined in policy to create a populace that contributed to the "happiness of the state". In the army, just like its state, the bodily punishment meted out by non-commissioned officers punished "vice", whilst their ability to embody the perfect soldier, along with the actions of empathy displayed by company and regimental officers, encouraged the "virtue" the Habsburg state needed to succeed.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-14; *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 17-18.

<sup>83</sup> *Dienst Reglement*, 3: 18. The 1808 regulations, written by archduke Charles, and which is said to have introduced a more humane system of co-opting men into serving the state, quotes almost verbatim paragraphs on how the *Corporal* should treat the men under his command from the 1786 *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 27-28.

<sup>84</sup> NL B/1396 Schnierer, *Bruckstucke aus meinen leben*, 8; Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 28-30.

<sup>85</sup> Stollberg-Rilinger, *Maria Theresa*, 288-89.

## Military Justice and Military Community

If the kind words and worthy temperament of officers, and the shared experiences of comrades, were not enough to maintain the behaviour of the common man, then the stick and the noose were used to shame delinquents (*Delinquenten*).<sup>86</sup> The public disgrace which came from punishment was a part of honour's motivational system, used to disgrace those who failed to meet the standards expected of a soldier. Common soldiers, perpetrators and officers knew this, and all took great care to make sure the carrying out of punishment was done correctly, underscoring its legitimacy.<sup>87</sup> Such actions were necessary, Nuce articulated, for "as long as people will be people, reward is the idol, and the fear of punishment is the bridle".<sup>88</sup> Indeed, "discord destroys great things", Nuce argued and as the 1786 regulations made clear, corporal and capital punishment were not just the final judgement of a man, used to browbeat others into submission out of fear, but an indication all men served something greater. This was exactly what regimental majors were instructed to tell the assembled men after the executions of their comrades.<sup>89</sup>

The power of officers to send a man to his death for his transgressions was but one part of the systems of punishment authorities used to regulate behaviour and recommit men to a regiment's culture of honour. Officer's interventions in the punishments non-commissioned officers administered to their men was also an ongoing practice in developing of this culture within a company. In the company of each infantry regiment sergeants and corporals were equipped with a yardstick, which they were reported to have utilised judiciously on the men under their command.<sup>90</sup> Excessive punishment, however, was frowned upon by regimental bureaucracy. In the 1807 regimental infantry regulations, mirroring the stipulations set out in 1786, the captain was presented with several alternatives beside the rod for his men to be

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<sup>86</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 186-87.

<sup>87</sup> Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 17-18.

<sup>88</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 97.

<sup>89</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 187.

<sup>90</sup> Gill, *Thunder on the Danube*, 1: 62.

disciplined with. Sergeants were to be spared “vicious beatings” (*niederträchtige Prügeln*) and common soldiers were not to be “disciplined with the rod straightaway”.<sup>91</sup> First time offenders were to be punished with “rebukes, arrest and the carrying of muskets” and it was only in the case of “ongoing and coarser” crimes that the rod was to be administered. Even then, the regulations advised the captain, the punishment should “never amount to more than 20, at the most 25 strikes.”<sup>92</sup> If beatings were understood to be excessive, men had avenues to raise the grievances they had with their immediate common soldier with superiors. Johann Höcel, a common soldier from the *Deutschmeister* who deserted in September 1804, was provided the opportunity to give “the alleged reason for deserting” (*angebliche Ursache der Desertion*) when he was re-enrolled after being returned to the regiment by civilian authorities. Only gone from the ranks for 12 days, Höcel advised the regimental staff that he had left his unit “due to mistreatment from Corporal Rücksteiner”.<sup>93</sup>

The intended goal of documenting the reason for desertion was to act upon the “feedback” provided by the deserter and mitigate against ongoing attrition. As Ilya Berkovich and Jeffrey M. Horton have shown in the Habsburg army, desertion was more than a man fleeing the colours. It was his opportunity to participate in the ongoing construction of a company’s culture. Desertion can then be read as an act that men undertook to highlight what was impacting unit cohesion, and what needed to change to provide environments that encouraged men to stay.<sup>94</sup> In the case of Höcel, his company commander, first captain Baron Bretton, would have been made aware of the allegations, and then been tasked with regulating the behaviour of Rücksteiner. The bureaucratic approach of the army and the leniency it showed deserters, the majority of which were returned to the colours to serve again, allowed for officers, senior non-commissioned officers and the common soldier to establish the boundaries

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<sup>91</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 50.

<sup>92</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 3: 32-33.

<sup>93</sup> ÖstA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, Infanterie, IR 4 349 ML (1. Teil), 1806, fol., *Consignation, 31 Decembre 1806*. The regimental *Fourier* (clerk) recorded Höcel’s testimony briefly as “*Übrigen zu Schlechten Behandlung das Corporale Rücksteiner*”.

<sup>94</sup> Berkovich, *Motivation in War*, 55-94; Horton, “In Service of the State,” 93-121.

of service in their company and the creation of a social unit where individuals were compelled to remain.<sup>95</sup>

Moreover, corporal and capital punishment, and the way in which judgements was carried out, reflected the inclusive function of military justice. Common soldiers participated in the administering of military law to underline the importance of honour and the communities it created. The recount of Löffler of one particularly display of military justice handed down to non-commissioned men of his regiment as the *Deutschmeister* was stationed in France in 1793 highlights this practice. His experience shows that some regiments governed their paternal communities through martial law that allowed psychological, and emotional intimacy to be felt horizontally and vertically. Löffler's experience of capital punishment underlines the brutality of military law, but also the ways in which officers and men negotiated its more draconian measures through its application.

On Christmas eve 1793, Löffler was blackmailed by the youngest member of his *Cameradschaft*, along with the oldest sergeant in the company, into helping them and six other men of *Deutschmeister* desert as it was garrisoned in the Belgian town of Thuin. Apprehended shortly later by hussars, the shame of being captured and then paraded in front of his comrades in chains was punishment enough for Löffler, who remembered using the dishonour to spur him to clear his name, laying the charges of blackmail at the feet of those he was caught with. Löffler, along with his accomplices, were sentenced to death by hanging, despite the clear and confident way in which he addressed the military court and set out his predicament. Two days

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<sup>95</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exercierreglement*, 5-6 “Wenn er etwas zu bitten, sich worüber zu beschweren, wegen seiner Zurückkunft zu melden, oder sonst etwas, wie es immer Nahmen haben mag, anzubringen hat, so geht er zu seinem Corporal der Corporalschaft, und wenn er wohin geht, oder zurück kommt, auch zu dein Corporal vom Aufpassen. Giengen aber seine Beschwerden über einen Corporal, so wendet er sich an den Feldwebel, und alsdann an den Fähndrich. Trafen aber seine Klagen einen Officier oder den Hauptmann selbst, an diese und so weiter, wenn er die Genugthuung stufenweise nachgesucht und nicht erhalten hat, mit der fernern Beobachtung, daß derselbe einem jeden Hobern vom Corporal an aufwärts durch Sie benennen müste.” Royal pardons were also issued regularly throughout the war to deserters, particularly after a period of retreat or strategic set back. These pardons, sometime covering eight months, acknowledge desertion as a crime, but one which was committed by reasonable and rational men who were pushed beyond their limits, but were still seen as soldiers who could once again proudly serve the state. “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, December 21, 1796, 3634-635, esp. 3634. “...alle Bestrafung, Abndung, oder Nachtheil ihre Ehre und ihres guten Leumunds allergnädigst vergeben, nachgesehen und aufgehoben”. On the approach of the Habsburg military to general pardons see Horton, “In Service of the State,” 87.

after Christmas, on the morning of a night where the most experienced ringleader assured that all would be spared, as he had seen this type of charade before, the deserters were led to the gallows by a detachment of Löffler's closest comrades. On either side of their journey from cell to the hanging rope, the men of *Deutschmeister* were arranged at attention, with the regimental staff sat resplendently on their horses, watching the doomed. After the last rights were administered, the roll of the regiment's drums rose to a crescendo, the watching men were brought to attention, and the execution party prepared the guilty.

As Löffler recounted, the ringleader thought he would be spared right up until a sack was placed over his head, a noose tied around his neck and his punishment delivered. The ringleader swung, his feet jerking in the air for all to see. A death, Löffler believed, which was the most shameful way a soldier could die.<sup>96</sup> It was then, as the sergeant's body hung in the wind, the regimental commander raised his hand and pronounced the emperor and the local bishop had spared the lives of Löffler and his young tent mate. Instead, they would be forced to run the gauntlet. Such was the joy at seeing their comrades spared, the surrounding soldiers began to jubilantly mob the men, shouting "long live the Kaiser". Then, with a wicked glee, three hundred men formed the gauntlet and proceeded to take just as much joy from lashing out at Löffler, as they had in hearing of his survival. Now, as participants in the punishment, they could obtain some sort of satisfaction for the shame Löffler had brought them.<sup>97</sup>

Here we see punishment was a communal performance used to shape and police the regiment's military honour, the fraternal relationships this honour created, as well as the paternal and hierarchical communities it was designed to reinforce.<sup>98</sup> The display of leniency by the emperor Francis, which was no doubt a ruse used by the regimental commanders to spare the lives of less guilty parties, asserted the power of authorities, and the paternal care they used to

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<sup>96</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 105-06.

<sup>97</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 107.

<sup>98</sup> On the theatre of execution and its effect on eighteenth century audiences see Simon Devereaux, "Recasting the Theatre of Execution: The Abolition of the Tyburn Ritual," *Past & Present*, no. 202 (2009): 127-74; Vic A. C. Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

harness their men. Yet the participation of the common man in both capital and corporal punishments affirmed this community was as much theirs as it was the regimental officers who dictated the laws. By participating in the gauntlet, soldiers were actively defining the culture of their community, taking it upon themselves to show Löffler how much they disapproved of his deviant actions, whilst at the same time celebrating his pardon. Their ability to administer blows as part of the gauntlet exhibited a level of agency that bound these men closer together, forming the ties that would motivate them in war. Military law allowed them to participate in their communities, unlike the law of the manor, and it was as much a symbol of these men's exclusive estate as it was used to reinforce what it meant to be a servant of the state.

Like the performance on the execution field at Thuin did for the men of *Deutschmeister*, soldiers' reflections on their time as fighting men highlighted the importance of patrimonialism, comradeship, and the desire for honour as a sign of value and self-worth to their process of internalising selfless service as the principal part of obtaining "respect and reward".<sup>99</sup> Together these accounts show how the intention of Habsburg military intellectuals to create exclusive communities seen as better than pre-modern agrarian life, a soldier's *reward*, was manifested by men who fought for the Habsburgs. The socialisation of soldiers through the *Cameradschaft*, the behaviour of their leaders and a culture that championed resilience and valour on the battlefield, promoted the military spheres these men inhabited as their own. One which, as we will see in later chapters, they valued and believed was worth facing death on the battlefield to maintain.

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<sup>99</sup> The opportunity for social mobility and prosperity made obtainable through state service may have been a contradictory motivational ethos, with many officers still noble born and casualty rates high, especially during the bloody campaigns of 1805-1814, but this ideal helped build a cohesive military experience made tangible by the presence of sergeants and officers in each company who rose from humble beginnings. For example, many of the company second officers and sergeants in infantry regiment *Grossherzog von Baden* Nr 59 in 1817 had either been conscripts or volunteer common soldiers. One of these men, Anton Nowey, was the first lieutenant from the regiment's first fusilier company, who was born in Vöcklabruck in the unit's canton department of Hausruckviertel. Nowey had risen from regimental drummer in 1794 to his current rank in 1813 whilst also fathering and supporting six children! ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, IR 59 5022 ML, (1817), fol., *Muster-Lister 1ten Fusilier Capit-Lieut Wenzel Richter Compagnie*, Nr. 2. Anton Nowey. The conscript Johann Schnerer even used his discharge payment in 1810 to purchase the rank of *Expropriis - Gemeine* (a gentleman or volunteer bourgeoisie soldier who was the first to be considered for promotion in the ranks) and return to the military in 1811.

<sup>99</sup> *Dienst-Reglement für die K.k. Infanterie*, 2: 2-4.

## Symbols of Honour, Links of Loyalty

The protection of a military community's honour through battlefield service was not just understood by soldiers as the sole purpose of their role. As the 1808 articles of war made clear, the purpose of the soldier and his honour was to defend the state and the "public safety" of the Monarchy.<sup>100</sup> They were men, as Francis' proclamation of peace given to the army in October 1809 asserted, who served as "the pillar of my throne, [and on which] the protection of the future peace of my subject's rest", whose "loyalty and devotion weave more firmly and intimately the bond that binds the prince to a good people." As Francis' assured these men, "the spirit of discipline, of love of the country and of unity with the citizens...that has inspired you [with] the justly acquired feeling of your worth will not be extinguished". Francis' words in 1809 underlined an explicit part of Habsburg military culture, which used honour to link the social environments of the regiment to soldiers' locale and then outward again to create virtuous fighters who served the whole state. As the emperor concluded in his proclamation, he relied, and would rely on again, these links to "maintain the spirit and order of the inner [state's] constitution and to secure lasting peace and respect from our neighbours."<sup>101</sup>

It is the material culture of the Habsburg army, the banners, medals, headwear and distinct body shaping uniforms worn by officers and men, which reveal the ways in which sacred and profane symbols of military honour communicated to soldiers and civilians the *Soldat Bürger's* role as vital in defending the fatherlands.<sup>102</sup> This sections argues military displays, uniforms and regimental rituals were used to reinforce a unit's culture of honour, as well as promote military service as the protection of a soldier's fatherland, his emperor and the whole of the Monarchy. These demonstrations asserted the dynasty's authority in local areas, but also

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<sup>100</sup> *Dienst-Reglement*, 2: 2.

<sup>101</sup> "Armeebefehl, 16 October 1809," in Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 107-08.

<sup>102</sup> See chapter five. On the methodology of reading military material culture and display see Ralf Pröve, Carmen Winkel eds., *Übergänge schaffen: Ritual und Performanz in der frühneuzeitlichen Militärgesellschaft* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012).

manifested self-recognition between soldiers and civilians and the connection regiments needed to legitimise their place in local society.

The regimental flags for each battalion were the most prominent object of military honour, and symbol of the communities it created, as well as a representation of a regiment's locale. These banners were the white *Leibfabne* exclusively assigned to the first battalion (*Leib*) and the yellow *Ordinärfabne* carried by a regiment's other two battalions. The design of the *Leibfabne* and *Ordinärfabne* changed during the conflict with France, representing the different policies of political unity pursued by each succeeding monarch beginning with Joseph II. At all times they characterised the multi-layered communities the soldier inhabited – the regiment, his fatherland, the state – and demonstrated men received and maintained honour by protecting the welfare of the whole Monarchy.<sup>103</sup>

The flags carried by the infantry regiments during the First and Second Coalitions were designed by Joseph in 1780. Regimental banners were altered in 1804, and then again in 1806 to coincide with the founding of the Austrian Empire.<sup>104</sup> The design of the *Leibfabne* remained the most consistent throughout, portraying two of the most important symbols of the Habsburg dynasty's political legitimacy. The front of the banner depicted Madonna and Child. Across all three of the designs Mary is dressed in blue, imitating the most common depiction of her in the post-tridentine catholic faith.<sup>105</sup> Mary stands on a globe as a sign of her bodily ascension and position as the Queen of Heaven, and all the Earth (*Regina Caeli*).<sup>106</sup> Under her heel is a crushed snake, a symbol of victory, and the Virgin Mary's continual triumph over the devil and Original Sin.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> ÖStA, KA, Feldakten (FA), Kriegswissenschaftliche Memoires (Mem), XXVIII, Militärische Miszellen, Nr. 1401/1 fol., *K. und k. Kriegsarchiv, Nr. 844, Die Fahnen und Standarten des k. und k. Heeres*, 21.

<sup>104</sup> Militärische Miszellen, Nr. 1401/1 fol., *K. und k. Kriegsarchiv, Nr. 844, Die Fahnen und Standarten des k. und k. Heeres*, 13-17.

<sup>105</sup> Militärische Miszellen, Nr. 1401/1, fol., *K. und k. Kriegsarchiv, Nr. 844, Die Fahnen und Standarten des k. und k. Heeres*, 4-5.

<sup>106</sup> John Otto, ed., *Dictionary of Mary* (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co, 1985), 283.

<sup>107</sup> See figures 16 and 17 in the appendices for contemporary sketches of the 1806 infantry flags.



These two motifs were part of the veneration of Mary known as the “Immaculate Conception”, whereby Mary was free from Sin at birth as she was conceived, like Jesus, without “seed”.<sup>108</sup> Dressed in the colour blue, thanks to its vividity and rarity, Mary’s prominence and sexual purity was further highlighted and celebrated as part of catholic doctrine’s response to the dogmas of Protestantism. In the 1780 and 1804 versions of the flag, both Mother and Child are framed by a halo made up of bands of golden thread. The 1806 *Leibfabne* had Mary in the same pose with a background of sky blue surrounding her and her child, representing her ascension to Heaven.<sup>109</sup> As Robert Evans has shown, the baroque catholic faith of the late eighteenth century was one of the fundamental tools with which the early modern Habsburg monarch was able to cement his authority over the myriad of contradictory and convoluted systems of power that made up each kingdom and duchy.<sup>110</sup> Since the Thirty Years’ War the *Leibfabne* flying at the centre of the regiment, depicting Madonna and her Child in such a powerful pose, represented the purity of the Habsburg cause to its soldiers and its right to divine victory.<sup>111</sup> This symbol of faith on the battlefield was not only chosen to inspire men and assure them of victory, it also placated their fears of death, allowing men to confront their mortality and reinforce their belief in God by reliving Mary’s ascension.

The reverse of the 1780 pattern *Leibfabne*, like the *Ordinärfabne*, displayed the arms of the House of Habsburg carried by a black double headed eagle (*Doppeladler*). On each of the wings of the eagle, a sign of the dynasty’s imperial prestige earned through the possession of the *Reichskrone*, were the initials of the emperor Joseph. These initials were later changed when Francis II became the emperor. The letter J receiving a bar that converted it to an F. The shield

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<sup>108</sup> Rosilie Hernández, *Immaculate Conceptions: The Power of the Religious Imagination in Early Modern Spain* (London: University of Toronto Press, 2019); Robert Fastiggi, “Mariology in the Counter Reformation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Mary*, ed. Chris Maunder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 442-53; Carol Engelhardt Herringer, “Mary as Cultural Symbol in the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Mary*, ed. Chris Maunder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 503-15.

<sup>109</sup> Friedhelm Mennekes, “Two Realms of Light: Peter Paul Ruben’s ‘Assumption of Mary’ (1626) and Gregory Schneider’s ‘End’ (2008),” *Religion and the Arts* (2011): 263-76.

<sup>110</sup> Robert J. W. Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Central Europe c.1683-1867* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 18; Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 169; Harm Kluetting, “The Catholic Enlightenment in Austria or the Habsburg Lands,” in *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe*, eds., Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael O’Neil (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 127-65.

<sup>111</sup> Anna Coreth, *Pietas Austriaca*, trans. William D. Bowman and Anna Maria Leitgeb (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press), 45-80.

bearing the Habsburg arms displayed the kingdoms and duchies under the dynasty's dominion, as well as those the dynasty had claim on, or who had once held, and this sat at the very epicentre of the banner, superseding the imperial symbol of the *Doppeladler*.

The many quarters displaying the arms of these territories emphasised the power of the Monarchy now lay outside the Holy Roman Empire, reflecting the emperor Joseph's turn away from the prestige of the *Reich* towards the domestic potential of the vast domain he had hereditary claim over. The chain of the Order of Saint Stephen of Hungary ran around the edge of the Habsburg shield. This order was a concession, a mark of thanks and royal reward founded by the empress Maria Theresa after the Seven Years' War, only accessible to selected members of the Hungarian nobility. Dominating all, however, was the Imperial Crown of Austria, which rested above the *Doppeladler*. This was the private crown of the dynasty, separate from the *Reichskrone*, and one that did not need the approval of provincial estates or diets to wear. It was the symbol of autonomous power that linked all the estates, territories and kingdoms of the Monarchy together as part of the House of Austria's dominion.<sup>112</sup>

The 1806 *Ordinärfabne* pattern was introduced to highlight the autonomous power of the Monarchy and the emperor Francis' pre-eminent position in the European pantheon of monarchs. After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the creation of the Austrian Empire - at first a symbolic decision that placed Francis ahead of Napoleon - the new pattern represented the power and majesty of the newly created *Kaisertum*.<sup>113</sup> The *Doppeladler* remained on a yellow background but this time it represented the new Austrian Empire and only the shields of Hungary, Galicia and Lodomeria, Styria, Siebenbürgen, Moravia, Bohemia, Lower Austria, Tyrol, Würzburg, Upper Austria and Carinthia were included, relegated to the sides of the flag in a horseshoe shape that surrounded a central shield containing the arms of Austria, Lorraine and the House of Habsburg. Framing this central design was the chain of the Order of

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<sup>112</sup> Militärische Miscellen, Nr. 1401/1 fol., *K. und k. Kriegsarchiv, Nr. 844, Die Fahnen und Standarten des k. und. Heeres*, 11-13.

<sup>113</sup> Peter H. Wilson, "Bolstering the Prestige of the Habsburgs: The End of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806," *The International History Review* 28, no. 4 (2006): 709-36

Saint Stephen and in the background was the *Deutschmeister* Cross, an order the dynasty had been affiliated with since the end of the seventeenth century and a symbol hinting at their long-standing supremacy in Central Europe as Holy Roman Emperors.<sup>114</sup>

Moreover, the design of the *Ordinärflagge* served to project the soldier's polity beyond the locale. It recognised Bohemians were still ruled by the King of Bohemia and Austrians by the Archduke of Austria for example, but by including the diverse motifs of each state and kingdom under the Habsburgs rule, represented first by placing them inside the body of the *Doppeladler* and then under the crown of Austria after 1806, it mirrored how early modern people in the Monarchy, and their laws, viewed the Habsburg composite state.<sup>115</sup> To many early modern and eighteenth-century Europeans, the analogy between a social collective and the human body was widely understood as best describing the way in which states, made up of many corporations, functioned. Each *Land* was its own corporation and was thus an individual organism that joined with other polities to make up the body of the greater collective. In this way the particularisms of locales in the Monarchy could be recognised but could also be bound to a larger political body where each member served the whole. As Yair Mintzker has shown, cities and towns in the Holy Roman Empire saw themselves as both a body made up of many member citizens, and an organism - a hand for instance - which "was of vital importance to the existence and overall health or constitution of the body politic" overseen at its "head" by the emperor.<sup>116</sup> In much the same way as this analogy was depicted in motif form in the *Reich* from the middle ages to its dissolution in 1806, so it was replicated on the flags of the Habsburg army.<sup>117</sup> The flag, which was a symbol of the regiment's honour, also positioned the unit as an individual organism of the *Land* it was raised in, as well as the physical manifestation of the province's contribution to the larger political body that was the Habsburg Monarchy.

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<sup>114</sup> Mem, XXVIII: Militärische Miszellen, Nr. 1401/1 fol., *K. und k. Kriegsarchiv, Nr. 844, Die Fahnen und Standarten des k. und. Heeres*, 19-22.

<sup>115</sup> Schneider, "The Austrian Empire as a Composite Monarchy after 1815," 148-53. Schneider argues this composite understanding lasted throughout the war and was a central tenet of the Metternich period.

<sup>116</sup> Mintzker, *The Defortification of the German City*, 22-25.

<sup>117</sup> Wilson, "Bolstering the Prestige of the Habsburgs," 734.

The daybook of the officer Marcus Hibler documented the importance of regimental flags in representing the connection his unit *Stain* had to the region of Upper Austria, and the area's loyalty to the House of Austria. A relationship that was affirmed in a public baptism of the third battalion's *Ordinärfabne* in October 1797. The banner's godparents, Countess Althann (Althaim), a noblewoman of Linz, and the regiment's second in command, lieutenant-colonel Caraccioli, witnessed the flag as it was:

brought to a tent pitched in the square of the town for the sacred ritual, where nails were hammered [attaching the banner to the pole] in accordance with the order and regulations. Each staff officer nailed in three, the remaining officers one each, as did a sergeant-major and three common soldiers. After this, the flags of the *Oberstwachmeister* (major of the garrison) von Schönthall were accompanied by the banner with a short form of address, then handed to the Auditor before the officer corps escorted the priest to the tent where the blessing was given.<sup>118</sup>

The presence of the countess, a woman whose paternal family holding in Upper and Lower Austria were significant, displayed the regiment's affiliation with the local authorities and its central position in the society and culture of Linz and Upper Austria. The countess as a godparent to the *Ordinärfabne*, representing the battalion, was to advocate for the regiment amongst the authorities of the area. Furthermore, Countess Althann was to legitimise to their subjects that military service in the regiment was legitimate. The solemn ceremony, which combined public displays of military culture, baroque Catholicism and local symbols of authority demonstrated the power of the dynasty, linked local particularisms to it, and asserted the importance of the army in the region.. For the countess, her honoured position in a display of the dynasty's military presence highlighted the nobility's pre-eminence in the structure of Upper Austrian society.

The inclusion of all ranks in the ceremony also underlined the dual nature of the baptism. A ceremony which bound the locale to the body of the Monarchy, as well as joining -

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<sup>118</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 25. The Althaim (Althann) countess is most likely Maria Franziska Eleonore von Thürheim whose family seat was Schloss Hagenberg, a *Herrschaft* in the Mühlviertel that passed to the Althann family after she married Count Michael Max Althann. Their four children were all born in Linz between 1798 and 1808, indicating her presence in the city at this time. The Thürheim family were one of the oldest lines in Upper Austria, with fifteen estates in the province.

symbolically at least - the two parts of the regiment's military estate together as one. The attachment of the banner to its pole, with each rank provided with the requisite number of nails that signified their status, showed to all that each individual organism contributed to the body.<sup>119</sup> As a rite in catholic, reformed and orthodox Christianity, baptism was also a process of admitting and adopting individuals into a larger community, where those baptised were allowed to start anew. It also signalled the creation of a community, one which had been renewed by the introduction of new members. In this way the public baptism of a new flag, most probably introduced after the loss of one on the battlefield, showed to all who witnessed shame had been erased and that each military member had now been welcomed into a renewed community.

The recollections of the twenty-four-year-old Prussian student turned Habsburg infantry officer, Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, details the significant importance of the *Ordinärfabne* in symbolising a regiment's collective honour, as well as each man's individual honour, and its effect on the emotional response of fighting men. At the battle of Wagram in 1809, Varnhagen was with the Bohemian infantry regiment *Vogelsang* Nr. 47, which spent the morning of July 5 just south of the village Wagram in cover. Wounded in the late evening, during an attack by French and Saxon forces that pushed *Vogelsang* back, Varnhagen witnessed something that stuck with him into his old age:

The Archduke Generalissimo, accompanied by his aides Generals Count von Grüne and Baron von Wimpffen, hastened to order the [retreating] troops. He rallied them and turned them to meet the enemy. The Corps commander, Count Bellegarde showed the same zeal. Colonel Count zu Bentheim, commander of *Vogelsang*, seized the flag of the regiment, encouraged the troops by his character and example, leading them to quickly storm and recover the lost ground.<sup>120</sup>

This scene of duty and zeal witnessed Bohemian common soldiers, who Varnhagen believed shared little in common with their Austrian officers, hold the centre of the Habsburg battle line. Under the direct gaze of the Habsburg dynasty's military representative, the men of *Vogelsang* followed their commander into battle, whose position as colonel made it necessary for

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<sup>119</sup> *Das Neueste Dienst und Exerzierreglement*, 176-79.

<sup>120</sup> Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, *Denkwürdigkeiten des eignen Lebens*, Vol. 2 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1843), 115.

him to inspire his men from the front. By grasping one of the *Ordinärfabne*, Bentheim openly challenged his men to fulfil their oath to the emperor, to protect his realms and follow their commander's courageous example. At another level, consciously or not, Bentheim was shaming his men into action by placing the banner in danger. In this small but pivotal part of the two-day battle, officers appealed to the common soldier's sense of self-worth through an object that policed behaviours and emotions and urged the Bohemians to not only fight for their emperor, but also their soldierly, corporate identity which had been internalised using various objects of honour since the moment of their recruitment.

Honour as a behavioural modifier was immediately presented to the common soldier on his recruitment by the uniform he wore. Once the man volunteered, or was conscripted, he was issued with a rudimentary uniform of an undershirt, breeches, stocking and sometimes forage cap, which replaced his civilian clothes.<sup>121</sup> Often in the case of poorer rural recruits this was the first full set of new clothes the man had possessed. The basic uniform represented to the soldier the adoption of a new identity, one which provided him with an ability to transcend the hierarchy of civilian life. This ability, like the uniform, was provided by the Habsburg monarch and as the full uniform of the army recruiters wore attested - adorned with the initials and symbols of the emperor's power - the soldier was his servant and representative. Soldiers, like Löffler, remarked on the white uniform's transformative effect and the ability it gave men to refashion their perception of themselves and their body. Even after 14 days sick, the young volunteer felt his strength returning after donning the coat of the *Deutschmeister*.<sup>122</sup> In 1809 the Viennese conscript Schnierer remembered, after swearing the oath of loyalty to the emperor with other reservists, he was immediately presented with the *Deutschmeister* jacket bearing its distinct sky-blue collar and cuffs. This public and communal display of commitment made

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<sup>121</sup> ÖStA, KA, Pers, MLST, I, IR 59 5076 AL & TL, (1809). The *Assentliste* of various volunteers indicated the items of uniform which were issued on enlistment. These included, *Roqueler* (Roquelaure: Tunic with regimental facings), *Rokel* (Rock: Great Coat), *Leibl* (Waistcoat), *Tuchosen* (Breeches), *Paar Gattien* (Stockings), *Zwang Hemder* (Undershirt), *Zwang Kamaschen* (Gaiters), *Paar Schube*, (above ankle boots), *Halsbindl* (*Halsbinde*: a necktie, like a cravat used to stop the collars of the *Roqueler* from fraying), *Holzmissen* (A forage cap without a peak, usually in the facing colours of the regiment), *Faustlinge* (Mittens).

<sup>122</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 31.

before the depot battalion's *Ordinärfabne* represented the transition from mere subject to *Soldat Bürger*.<sup>123</sup> One which was made tangible by the wearing of the uniform of the emperor.

By 1809 the uniform of the infantry from Austria, Moravia and Bohemia had been designed in such a way that its manipulation of the soldier's body through cut, shape and design created an allegorical representation of the ancient world and symbol of the dynasty's political legitimacy. The cultural and political struggle raging across Europe over the validity of monarchical rule and the hierarchy of European powers was now played out across the body of the soldier in such a way that it accentuated the primacy of the House of Austria and its dominion over its subjects. Not only was the uniform a symbol of Monarchianism but it also provided the soldier with a physical and metaphorical prompt that evoked the performative identity of the *Soldat Bürger*.

The study of bodily cultivation in the military sphere has been influenced most by Michel Foucault, whose exploration of modern disciplinary techniques and its evolution from the end of the seventeenth century included military drill. Repetitive drill and constricting uniforms contributed to the creation of the "docile body" needed in the ordered infantry regiments of the eighteenth century. According to Foucault, individual selves were morphed into "subordinated cogs of a machine" through repetitive drill, turning the peasant conscript into an extension of his musket. The drill and uniform were one of the tools which altered the individual body, social-body and body-politic into one that was obedient and pliable, enabling the authorities of emerging centralised states to fashion permanently coerced societies. Foucault described the military as the initial testing grounds for this new disciplinary society, later manifesting total institutions, like prisons and the factory, that punished, disciplined and coercively manipulated the civilian body.<sup>124</sup> This reading, however, has recently been challenged by scholars who accentuate drill, the tight uniform and their effects on the body as fundamental

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<sup>123</sup> Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 6.

<sup>124</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 135-41.

in constructing positively held group solidarity, soldierly identity and the emotional control that psychologically assisted men in their military service.<sup>125</sup>

Body cultivation and material culture was an essential element in revitalising the *Soldat Bürger* after the losses to France in the first decade of the conflict. After the end of the First Coalition in 1797, the generals of the Habsburg army were ordered by the emperor Francis to oversee “the rebirth, reorganisation, and perfection of the troops of my army.”<sup>126</sup> Led by General József Alvinzci, one of the responses of the *Hofkommission* charged with this task was a dramatic change to the uniform of the army.<sup>127</sup> Completely made anew in response to military defeat and the diplomatic reverses of the Treaty of Campo Formio, the new uniform of the Habsburg soldier was charged with elements of co-optive motivators, producing the regulated behaviour of the *Soldat Bürger*. The uniform carried the least strategic and tactical sense and was exorbitant in cost, but it was seen as a tool with which to improve morale, reconditioning men to accept their roles as the Monarchy’s defenders and inspire a greater level of martial virtue and dutiful service.

In the creation of the new Habsburg uniform the *Hofkommission* drew extensively on the “true-style”, a pivot in eighteenth century western culture and design that mirrored the form and features of Greek and Roman antiquity. These were civilisations which late eighteenth-century thinkers believed as unrivalled on earth.<sup>128</sup> Whilst the Grecian style was ubiquitous with French political fashion after Thermidor, the emulation of imperial Rome in Austria had been pivotal in the dynastic representation of the Monarchy since Maria Theresa. The connections to the Rome of Augustus, over Brutus’ republic, made through the uniform and other symbols of

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<sup>125</sup> Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment*, 113-19; Philip Smith, “Meaning and Military Power: Moving on from Foucault,” *Journal of Power* 1, no. 3 (2008): 275-93; Matthew McCormack, “Dance and Drill: Polite Accomplishments and Military Masculinities in Georgian Britain,” *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 315-30; Barbara Ehrenreich, *Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 24-25; William H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), 2.

<sup>126</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversary*, 51.

<sup>127</sup> Rothenberg, 52-54.

<sup>128</sup> For a sense of the contemporary analysis on the ancient male body and its representation of the purity, virility and nobility of the classical polity see Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Reflections on the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks: with Instructions for the Connoisseur, and an Essay on Grace in Works of Art*, trans. Henry Fusseli (London: A. Millar, 1765), 6-19.



dynastic authority legitimised Monarchianism and circumvented parallels that exposed the dynasty to critique.<sup>129</sup> Already by the end of the 1770s the palace grounds of Schönbrunn had become the site of the Monarchy's first attempts to draw parallels with antiquity and celebrate the dynasty's connection to ancient imperial Rome. It was Joseph who first connected the military power of the dynasty with the formidable armies of Roman Empire by overseeing the design and constructions of the Gloriette in the Palace grounds of Schönbrunn. Erected in 1775 as a symbol of the Monarchy's struggle against Prussian aggression, and its rightful place above the kingdom, the Gloriette championed the sacrifice of the army in a "Just War". Sculpted by Benedikt Henrici and Johann Baptist Hagenauer, the design contained symbols of Rome and its army, which served to link the power of the contemporary dynasty to the most pre-eminent of ancient civilisation.<sup>130</sup>

The head of the commission, Alvinzci, alongside other notable dons of the Josephinian army, took the conscious decision to modernise the uniform and evoke Imperial Rome and reassert the values of the *Soldat Bürger* through a succession of memoranda written in the summer and autumn months of 1798.<sup>131</sup> In these minutes the decided uniform changes for all arms of the army, and for each rank, are documented in exacting detail. However, the archival holdings leave very little of what was enacted and when. Yet, we do know what the modern army of the Monarchy was meant to look like after 1798 thanks to the proliferation of war time

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<sup>129</sup> On the ideas of republican civic virtue and its effects on clothing and fashion in revolutionary France see E. Claire Cage, "The Sartorial Self: Neoclassical Fashion and Gender Identity in France, 1797-1804," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 42, no. 2 (2009): 193-215; Jennifer Heuer, "Hats on for the Nation! Women, Servants, Soldiers and the 'Sign of the French,'" *French History* 16, no. 1 (2002), 28-52; Cissie Fairchilds, "Fashion and Freedom in the French Revolution," *Continuity and Change* 15, no. 3 (2000): 419-33, For Britain see Matthew McCormack, *The Independent Man: Citizenship and Gender Politics in Georgian England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 140-61.

<sup>130</sup> Beatrix Hajós, *Schönbrunner Statuen, 1773-1780: Ein Neues Rom in Wien* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 129-30. For Kaunitz's role in sponsoring artists dedicated to the neo-classical style see Szabo, *Kaunitz*, 199-200; Ernst Wangermann, "Maria Theresa: A Reforming Monarchy," in *The Courts of Europe: Politics, Patronage and Royalty, 1400-1800*, ed. A. G. Dickens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 127-40. For Maria Theresa's use of classical allegory in representing her power and ability to rule see Michael Elia Yonan, *Empress Maria Theresa and the Politics of Habsburg Imperial Art* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 168-89.

<sup>131</sup> The men charged with re-energising the Monarchy's army were Generals Rudolf von Otto, Heinrich Graf Bellegarde, Leopold von Unterberger, Johann Graf Sporck, Anton von Liphay und Generaladjutant Oberst Baron Vincent. Unterberger was identified in the minutes as responsible for the uniform decisions. The minutes of these meetings can be found in ÖStA, KA, FA, Mem, XXVIII: Militärische Miscellen, Nr. 1401/2.

art. Providing the most accurate representation of both the soldier and his new aesthetic is the *Abbildung der Neuen Adjustirung der k. k. Armee* printed by the publishing house owned by Tranquillo Mollo and illustrated by Joseph Georg Mansfield, after engravings made by Vincenz G. Kininger. These were men who all worked extensively with the Habsburg army during the period. The work was dedicated to the younger brother of the emperor Francis, the Hereditary Prince Ferdinand Karl Joseph, and was the official catalogue of the new changes commissioned by the *Hofkriegsrat*.<sup>132</sup>

Accompanying the *Adjustirung* was a preface. Written in December 1798 by the field marshal Joseph Maria von Colloredo-Mels und Wallsee, the Director General of Artillery, the *Vorschrift* chastised the company officers of the Habsburg army for failing to wear the uniform according to regulations. By adorning their uniform to the tastes of the season, they had undermined the military spirit it was designed to foster. This practice was, the order announced, “one of the root causes” for the low morale of the army. “Not only did this result in the loss of all spirit in the service”, the introduction to the new uniform continued, “but also means the regulations based on military principles are no longer observed at all and thus the state itself is often exposed to the greatest disadvantage and the worst consequences.” Younger officers, it was claimed, allowed to wear what they liked, were now ridiculing their superiors for failing to embrace modern dress. And so, the introduction stipulated, all leaders of men were to modestly adhere to the new regulations. In doing so they would bring to the army “a composed attitude, subordination and honour”.<sup>133</sup> These change to the uniform were not superficial, as the introduction made clear, but one of the essential ways in which money could be saved, the ethos of service that imbued the *Soldat Bürger* reenergised, the wellbeing of the state secured and a feeling of his own “nation’s worth” evoked in the wearer.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Vincenz G. Kininger, Georg Mansfeld, *Abbildung der Neuen Adjustirung der K.K. Armee*, ed. Tranquillo Mollo (Vienna: Mollo, 1798), accessed 23/12/2021, <http://uniformenportal.de/index.php?/category/92>.

<sup>133</sup> This section of the *Vorschrift* was taken from Schembor, “Kaiser Franz II. (I.) und die Uniformen,” 15-23.

<sup>134</sup> *Militärische Miscellen*, Nr. 1401/1, fol., *Adjustirungs-Vorschrift für die k.k. Armee*, 13 Dec 1798, 4-5. Even as late as 1808, the archduke Charles was admonishing officers who copied foreign fashions and failing to wear the proper uniform as it showcased a “self-contempt” for the soldier, as well as disloyalty to monarch and “nation” the soldier protected. *Dienst-Reglement*, 3: 45.

The prints of Tranquillo Mollo show just how the Alvinzci *Hofkommission* in 1798 shaped the common soldier's body into a masculine form that celebrated imperial glory through the cut of the uniform. This new image was a political statement reasserting the Monarchy's right to rule. The body was tucked and sculpted by a shorter jacket, tighter breeches and lower gaiters, emulating the male figures of the ancient world (Appendices, Figure 3). The removal of the sword belt accentuated the genitalia, jackets with stitching along the shoulder blade pulled the man's shoulders back, emphasising the chest, and the tightening of pants around the thighs gave the impression of long-leggedness and the masculine virility to determine the fate of one's polity (Appendices, Figure 4). These men were now not just soldiers of the Monarchy, but the embodiment of the greatest masculine form copied from the artefacts of antiquity. Taken together this alteration to the body was to evoke the virile, vigour and virtue of the classical man and reinforce to all those who witnessed the uniform, or put it on, that the strength, courage, self-sacrifice and self-discipline found in the ancient world was embodied by the Habsburg soldier. These were the traits understood by contemporaries to have been long ago established as possessed by those who served the common good.<sup>135</sup>

The most striking depiction of the "true-style" and the most significant change in the uniform, was the helmet (*Helm*).<sup>136</sup> The leather helm was embossed in brass and topped with a woollen comb in the imperial colours of the *Reich* - black and yellow.<sup>137</sup> As part of an old tradition, troops were also ordered to fix sprigs of oak leaves, a universal sign of victory and war, to the side of their helm. This helmet was worn by all troops, except for those in the Border regiments, and marked the most overt symbol used by the *Hofkommission* to turn their fighters into the allegorical representation of soldiers from ancient Imperial Rome. If Rome had

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<sup>135</sup> On the neoclassical male body as a cultural representation of political legitimacy see Abigail Solomon-Godeau, "Male Trouble: A Crisis in Representation," *Art History* 16, no. 2 (1993): 286-312; Carol Duncan, "Fallen Fathers: Images of Authority in Pre-Revolutionary French Art," *Art History* 4 (1981): 186-202; Lynn Hunt, "The Imagery of Radicalism," in *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution*, ed., Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), 87-119; Alex Potts, "Images of Ideal Manhood in the French Revolution," *History Workshop Journal*, no. 30 (1990): 1-22.

<sup>136</sup> Bassett, *For God and Kaiser*, 208-10. Whilst Bassett also identifies the *Helm* as visually important, he argues only that it was the pinnacle of Josephinian standardization, which is a superficial reading of its materiality and one that fails to consider the spirit of Joseph's penchant for uniformity: cost-savings.

<sup>137</sup> These imperial colours were later adopted by the Austrian Empire in 1806 as part of the many symbols used to underscore the Habsburg dynasty's lengthy history as one of the supreme authorities in Europe.

been the pinnacle of civilisation, it was reckoned by contemporaries, then surely their armies were just as magnificent. Moreover, the imperial armies of Francis, as Holy Roman Emperor, were the direct descendants of these ancient soldiers, and symbolising this literally through the helmet announced to all the legitimacy of his claim to rule and the Monarchy's supremacy over their republican enemies.

The number of testaments from Habsburg soldiers documenting the change in the design indicates the new clothes did have an impact on how men viewed themselves. In a letter written to his brother in August 1798, Jacob Friedrich Reinhard, a captain the light infantry battalion *Carl von Greth*, described in detail the “costly” new uniform he was issued, labelling the helm a “*Romanische Pickelhaube*”.<sup>138</sup> In choosing this term Reinhard reveals that he was aware of the allegory behind the new uniform, and it seems so was his brother, who the captain believed would have immediately been able to visualise his sibling and place the materiality of the design within the philosophical and political context of late eighteenth century European intellectual discourse. The introduction of the uniform was also remarked upon by the Moravian Schnerer who was able to recollect its issue over forty years later, writing in his memoir that his company received it as it wintered in Edling, near Wasserburg am Inn in January 1799.<sup>139</sup> It is not hard to imagine the monotony of winter garrisoning being broken up by the excitement of new kit given to men anxiously awaiting the renewal of hostilities, or the allegory of the helm being teased out for the common soldier by some of their more enlightened officers. Men like Zagitzeck who recounted, almost fifty years later, that he was tasked with travelling to Vienna with a convoy to pick up the new accoutrement for his regiment.<sup>140</sup>

The mounting costs of war saw the infantry regiments discard the helm in 1810, its cost of 40 *fl.* amounting to just under half of the equipment costs for a fusilier.<sup>141</sup> Yet, with victory

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<sup>138</sup> ÖStA, KA, NL, B/932 Reinhard, fol., *Johann Christoph Reinhard* (Schorndorf, August 3, 1798). Jacob's brother, Johann, according to the title on the letters sent to him, was a first lieutenant (*Oberleutnant*) in the Duchy of Württemberg's army; *Militärische Miscellen*, Nr. 1401/2, fol., *Adjustierungen 1798, Summarilich Recapitulation*. According to one table, the total cost of the uniforms for all arms was 4,635,742 *fl.* with the cost to fit out the light infantry units amounting to 245,006 *fl.*

<sup>139</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 3.

<sup>140</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 50-51.

<sup>141</sup> *Militärische Miscellen*, Nr. 1401/2, fol. 1, *Adjustierungen 1798*.

finally achieved in 1814, money could once again be spent on symbols of Habsburg legitimacy and authority in Europe. The army's loyalty to the monarch had been at the heart of Francis' power and in peace, as Scott Hughes Myerly has argued of Britain's military spectacles throughout the nineteenth century, the Habsburg soldier now displayed an idealised version of the Monarchy, setting out for the state's populace the models of loyalty with which to emulate.<sup>142</sup> In March 1814 the Austrian Army Cross (*Kanonenkreuz*) was introduced and awarded to the men who made victory possible, an emblem that vindicated the approach of the army to the motivations of its soldiers and the connection these men had with their community. The Austrian Army Cross was first and foremost a recognition of the soldier's contribution to the defeat of France, bearing the inscription "*Grati princeps et Patria*" (With gratitude from the Emperor and the Fatherland).

As Gunther Rothenberg concluded in his work on the Habsburg army, the cross was a symbol that represented "the Habsburgs' faith in the traditional military system".<sup>143</sup> Throughout the war with France the soldier of the Habsburg army was provided with a corporate identity which gave purpose, social mobility and inclusivity, resting on the protection of his fatherland and a love of service to the emperor and state as exhibited by the possession of honour. This corporate identity provided men a set of norms that created obedient, dutiful soldiers but also traits - from conscription to battle and demobilisation - that gave meaning and way to place their experiences within a narrative framework which provided self-worth and social connections. The Army Cross made sure every man knew his service to the state, and the ways he had embodied it, had meant the security of the Monarchy and its people in their lifetime.

## Conclusion

As we have seen in chapter one, the *Soldat Bürger* was a fighting identity which promoted service to the state through the protection of the dynasty and therefore its subjects by

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<sup>142</sup> Scott Hughes Myerly, *British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Crimea* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 12. This point will be examined in chapter six in more detail.

<sup>143</sup> Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 243.

positioning respect and reward as a prime motivator. It was an identity which used the psychology of honour to persuade men to exhibited military excellence. As part of their dedication to military service, officers were encouraged to treat the common man with care and attention. This ethos created an environment encouraging men to serve thanks to the paternal and genial community they inhabited as soldiers. The company was men's immediate military community, and it was here where duty, honour, courage, valour and faithfulness - the hallmarks of the *Soldat Bürger* - were negotiated and made tangible by the interactions between officers and men.

As this chapter has shown, regimental officers took their role as *Soldat Bürger* seriously, fostering an environment where conscripts and volunteers alike were co-opted into the army through care and respect. In some instances, these company officers had either once been conscripts or volunteers themselves or were from military families. These men viewed the regiment as their fatherland thanks to generational connections and its ability to provide personal security. Their commitment to military service and the communities it created saw them carry out their role as paternal carers even if they did not possess the responsibility of nobility and notions of its superiority. These officers still utilised corporal and capital punishment. However, it was viewed as a last resort, and a tool to remind men of the importance of honour, and the communities it maintained extending outwards to the dynasty. By reminding soldiers of their responsibility to the monarch, their officers and their peers through acts that shamed deviants and allowed their comrades to participate in public physical punishments, men again internalised honour as a behavioural modifier.

In most instances it was the soldier's immediate superiors and social group that made up the *Cameradschaft* who decided on the required behaviour honour dictated. These small groups of men mirrored the communal, working relationships within pre-industrial agricultural societies soldiers had been conscripted from. Some officers relied on this social group as a form of control and shame in motivating men to fight. It was the soldier's *Cameradschaft*, as accounts attest, the experiences he shared with his tent mates and their collective pursuit of honour as a

signifier of military excellence that promoted resilience on the battlefield and conditioned men to embody the *Soldat Bürger*.

Aspects of display were also used to socialise men into assuming the identity of the *Soldat Bürger*. Regimental flags, the soldier's uniform and physique were symbols of military honour positioned as objects of unity, linking men with their officers and units with the locality they were garrisoned in and raised from. These same objects of honour - indicating men were devoted to their "position with true attachment...wholly committed to fulfilling [their] destiny in its entirety" - also served as connectors that bound local areas to the dynasty through their loyal soldiers.<sup>144</sup> As the war with France continued, and a system of military motivation built upon loyalty and social hierarchy was challenged by republican practices, the Habsburg army redoubled its commitment to the soldierly values of obedience and steadfastness. It did this by reaffirming the role of *Soldat Bürger* in protecting the Monarchy's security through changes to the army's material culture, which highlighted its superiority over soldierly depictions emanating from France. These changes, as we shall see in greater detail in chapter five, played a part in cementing the image of the soldier as a representation of local societies loyalty to the dynasty and the Monarchy's legitimacy. As this chapter has shown, the rejuvenating qualities and eventual triumph of the Habsburg army owed much to its pre-revolutionary military culture and the values it instilled within its men. These were principles of military service that affected and dictated their experience of combat and campaign.

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<sup>144</sup> *Compagnie-Dienst-Reglement*, 1.

## Chapter Four

### Experiencing and Narrating Battlefield

#### Violence

This chapter investigates the ways in which military honour was used by men, sometimes fatalistically, to provide the physical, mental and spiritual endurance needed to process the violence they witnessed and committed, allowing men to repeatedly and effectively fight for the Habsburgs on the battlefield. As this chapter shows, fighting on the battlefield was understood to have brought privilege, maintained rank, and gained the respect of comrades and leaders alike, and viewing death through the prism of honour provided soldiers with a narrative of continually fulfilling the role of the *Soldat Bürger*. Glorious death on the battlefield, however, did not equate to fame.<sup>1</sup> This was a specific contradiction to the honour of the *Soldat Bürger* which undermined unit integrity and duty.<sup>2</sup> Instead, the Habsburg soldier's moral frameworks held death to be an inevitable part of service, a big and confronting part, but something to expect. Honour as a value system was a way to regulate the psychological reaction to death and prepare men for combat. By confronting battlefield violence and carrying out the function of a soldier, men showed they possessed the ability to serve the state and therefore maintain their standing in the honour-based culture of the Habsburg army.<sup>3</sup>

Writing about the experience of battlefield violence as witnessed by a Habsburg soldier was an analysis of the self, relying on what men expected of the *Soldat Bürger*. An identity

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<sup>1</sup> For an example of this see Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 200-07.

<sup>2</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 93; *Reglement für die Sämmentlich-kaierlich-koniglich Infanterie*, 91, 101-102; Sonnenfels, *Ueber die Liebe*, 218

<sup>3</sup> Miller, *The Mystery of Courage*, 179.



instructed by the military culture of the Habsburg army, which allowed them to overcome the anxiety battle induced by embodying the behaviours of a man who loved the service. The testaments of these men of the brutality of the war with France sits within a corpus of autobiographical texts created by other German speaking soldiers Leighton James has argued coupled a new and emerging “introspection and an increasing concentration...on the individual” with older forms of narratives where self-fashioning was still susceptible to corporate identities.<sup>4</sup> Most of the unpublished manuscripts used here begin as the works of amateur ethnographers, or as march diaries. Quickly, however, usually after a few entries or pages, they turn to the self, recounting the violent transformative events Habsburg soldiers were subjected to. Each entry is a repetitive meditation used by individuals to manage themselves as soldiers by reflecting on the violence of their war - the battlefield killing and dying - using what was deemed by their military culture as a suitable and therefore an honourable reaction to it.<sup>5</sup>

Before examining the affective nature of the violence these men witnessed and experienced, this chapter explores how military authors narrated and perceived their war as a journey towards moral maturity. It argues the understanding these men had of the scenes of death and suffering they encountered were informed by *Bildungsroman* novels of the late eighteenth century, which positioned young life as a journey towards the moral completion found in adulthood. These works often placed protagonists on a physical and psychological journey where the events they experienced were *the* significant part in shaping them as adults.<sup>6</sup> As this first part explains, the values of the *Soldat Bürger's* military honour was used in men's

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<sup>4</sup> James, *Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic War*, 45-47. See also Frederic S. Steussy, *Eighteenth-Century German Autobiography: The Emergence of Individuality* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1996), 1-32; Natalie Zemon Davis, “Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France,” in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, eds., Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna and David E. Wellbery, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 53-63. On autobiographical text as self-narratives that shed light on communitarian influences see Kaspar von Greyerz, “Ego-Documents: The Last Word?,” *German History* 28, no. 3 (2010): 273-82.

<sup>5</sup> Mark Hewitson, “‘I Witnesses’: Soldiers, Selfhood and Testimony in Modern Wars,” *German History* 28, no. 3 (2010): 310-32.

<sup>6</sup> Hewitson, “‘I Witnesses,’” 316.

writings to organise war and make the suffering they witnessed meaningful, contributing to their maturity as effective servants to society, and lessons that others could learn from.<sup>7</sup>

The second section of this chapter highlights the viciousness of war these men were trying to convey. A consequence that came from the marginalisation of their voices in post-war society, and their efforts to properly comprehend what they had experienced and how it affected them as individuals.<sup>8</sup> As frontline infantrymen, artillerymen, light and heavy cavalrymen who had been repeatedly committed to the mass battles of the period, their war with France, these men explained, was ferocious and unrelenting, terrifying and murderous. This had to be conveyed to those who were not there, and to themselves, as many authors stressed, if the transformative effects of war could be truly understood.<sup>9</sup>

The last part of this chapter examines how the components of a man's behaviour that indicated he possessed soldierly honour - "steadfastness, resolution and courage" - mediated how men felt about what they saw on the battlefield. It examines how these principles that constituted the Habsburg army's honour served to form connections between past violent experiences and a man's understanding of himself in the present. It does this by examining the ways in which men described their feelings towards fighting and its consequences. It argues these events were experienced as trials to be bested in a soldier's continual desire to embody the values of a *Soldat Bürger* which men maintained by following the values of service the psychology of honour instilled within men. This was a personal and social identity, accounts reveal, that men cherished as encompassing who they were as young fighting men, and as elderly veterans reflecting on how they became honourable servants of the state through their experience of battlefield violence.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> James, *Witnessing War*, 48-52; Yuval Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 145-50. See also Tobias Boes, *Formative Fictions: Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Bildungsroman* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 43-70; Petru Golban, *A History of the Bildungsroman: From Ancient Beginnings to Romanticism* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2017), 288-309.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Hewitson, *The People's Wars: Histories of Violence in the German Lands, 1820-1888* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 23-37.

<sup>9</sup> Yuval Noah Harari, "Scholars, Eyewitnesses, and Flesh-Witnesses of War: A Tense Relationship," *Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas* 7, no. 2 (2009): 213-228; Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 231-40.

<sup>10</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 1.

## Military Honour as a Narrative of Moral Progression

What military authors used to mediate the fear of death and take meaning from its randomness was the desire to possess the honour that marked a man out as a worthy member of the military estate.<sup>11</sup> What acting honourably in battle and on campaign was, and showing how one belonged to this estate, can be best represented by the proclamation the archduke Charles used to address his troops in Vienna before the invasion of the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1809. Written by Friedrich Schlegel, working as the army's chief propagandist, but approved by the *Generalissimo*, the proclamation underlined for soldiers who they were to be whilst on campaign. Soldiers were to embody "unconditional obedience, strict discipline, courage, unwavering steadfastness", and act with "modesty, compassion, and humanity". These were the principles of honour that characterised the identity soldiers were to exemplify as part of the "cooperation of the whole" and "unity of will" needed to defeat France. A self which created soldiers who through their correct commitment to the state could obtain social standing, security, advancement and respect.<sup>12</sup>

An important part of honour for these men was self-control dictated by the nature of eighteenth and early nineteenth century warfare. At the end of the seventeenth century, technological advances in firearms changed the way in which men were to understand their role on the battlefield and their relationship to death. Instead of facing the enemy in a hyper-stimulating, personal and active confrontation where the skill with a hand weapon decided who lived or died, men were now to passively accept the incomprehensible random nature of death delivered from afar. As the efficiency of guns increased, the way in which courage was understood changed. Soldiers of the eighteenth century were now expected to possess a stoic courage, which demanded resilience and the ability to regulate one's own

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<sup>11</sup> For further discussion on this approach to battlefield motivation see Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Vintage, 1994), 197; Miller, *The Mystery of Courage*, 178-231.

<sup>12</sup> Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 159-203.

behaviours and emotions for the good of the collective.<sup>13</sup> The ability to accept death and still operate as soldiers was of paramount importance to the experience of war for Habsburg fighting men, and the way in which they narrated their time in the army.

The psychology of honour was not only used by author soldiers to endure the fear of death on the battlefield, but also to link the random and disturbing scenes they witnessed into one coherent journey, serving as a barometer of moral progression from the naivety of youth to the moral awareness of an adult. Their writings exhibit a moral judgement on the authors' role in the war, one which reflects the desire for honour and goodness as exhibited by the traits of the *Soldat Bürger*. These responses were placed within narratives of war which documented the self, and the experiences which composed it, influenced by the literary genre of *Bildungsroman*. This was a type of novel and narrative that ran concurrently with the war with France, which emphasised through the adventuring, travelling tale of a central character "the development of a young person towards a fully developed personality".<sup>14</sup>

Narrating how a man virtuously inhabited the characteristics summarised by the archduke Charles in 1809 - the traits of the *Soldat Bürger* - was a key part of Habsburg war experience. A Habsburg soldier's honour was predicated by his display of obedience, discipline, courage and steadfastness. Unlike other more intellectually inclined volunteer soldier authors from Prussia, whose fascination with the sublime and the "authentic" experience of battle shaped their understanding of it, honour remained the keyway in which regular soldiers of the Habsburg Monarchy understood their place in the dynasty's war effort.<sup>15</sup> Habsburg soldiers did not view themselves as Picaresque characters, rogues

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<sup>13</sup> Robert L. O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (New York: Oxford University Press 1989), 154-55; Ilya Berkovich, "Fear, Honour and Emotional Control on the Eighteenth-Century Battlefield," in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*, eds., Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 93-110, esp. 94-95; Alan James, "Warfare and the Rise of the State," in *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, eds., Matthew Hughes and William Philpott (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 23-44.

<sup>14</sup> Liisa Steinby, "Temporality, Subjectivity and the Representation of Characters in the Eighteenth-Century Novel: From Defoe's Moll Flanders to Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre," in *Narrative Concepts in the Study of Eighteenth-Century Literature*, eds., Liisa Steinby and Aino Mäkikalli (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 135-60, esp. 145.

<sup>15</sup> James, *Witnessing War*, 8-9; Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 183-87; Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 152.

enjoying the sensations of the world “inured to the hardships and sufferings of war”, as Mark Hewitson argues.<sup>16</sup> But men who through repeated exposure to battle, experienced through the self-narration of honour, were able to psychologically accept the effects of battlefield violence in ways that stoically negotiated death and bloodshed’s impact. The development of these men, as characters in their ego-documents, was towards the ideal Habsburg soldier. A man who through courage, perseverance, fortitude and valour was able to operate as a servant of the state, and as a member of his unit’s community. This fortitude was never set and had to be demonstrated every time a man took to the battlefield. This was the task of the *Soldat Bürger*.<sup>17</sup>

Officers reflected on their own experience of battlefield violence learnt from contemporary reading movements, engaged with through either regimental reading groups, or classes at university and cadet schools.<sup>18</sup> Influenced by the rise of the sentimental novel in the German speaking world, these men took great care to ape the characters they read in these works, tending towards, “frequent expression and analysis of emotion as a means of exercising and demonstrating virtue” whilst they documented their lives as soldiers.<sup>19</sup> The emotions they analysed, and the virtue they demonstrated were influenced by their roles assigned to them by the regulations as officers who commanded men on the battlefield.

Common soldiers also described the violence they witnessed in relation to the social status (respect, honour, mark of competence) men gained by being a part of a unit that performed its function on the battlefield. Most of these men were able to communicate their experiences within the ranks thanks to state and regimental schooling that opened modes of

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<sup>16</sup> Hewitson, “I Witness,” 215-316. See also Harari, *The Ultimate Experience*, 190-93.

<sup>17</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 44-45; Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (Novato: New World Library, 2008), 17-18, 23.

<sup>18</sup> Such as the one captain Carl Würth of the *Erzherzog Ludwig* Nr. 8 introduced to his company as seen in the last chapter. Moreover, the officers Lorenz Zagitzcek, Marcus Hibler and their lieutenant-colonel Baron Friederich Hochenegg, whose memoirs can be found in the *Kriegsarchiv*, were all part of the infantry regiment *Zach* Nr. 15 between 1810 and 1811. Hibler kept a diary during his years as a soldier, whilst Hochenegg and Zagitzcek wrote family memoirs later in life. The connections indicate the possibility of a milieu of military memoirist in each regiment informed by social networks and literary reading circles.

<sup>19</sup> Anna Richards, “The Era of Sensibility and the Novel of Self-Fashioning,” in *German Literature of the Eighteenth Century: The Enlightenment and Sensibility*, ed., Barbara Becker-Cantarino (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2005) 223-43, esp. 223.

expression closed off to previous generations.<sup>20</sup> Specifically, it was the need for competent non-commission officers who could contribute to, and enable, the bureaucratisation of the state under Joseph II and his successors, that provided avenues for the common man to record his experience. The need for literate soldiers tasked with administration introduced thousands of common people to the documentation of experiences in linear fashion, either through regimental diaries, or the notes of soldier's military careers in *Musterlisten*.<sup>21</sup> Their accounts, just like the administrative documents of their regiment, placed the individual amongst the collective, whilst still recognising the importance of personal experience to the whole.<sup>22</sup>

The sources describing the battle and campaign experiences of these individuals can be divided into four categories. Letters, diaries, marching journals, and memoirs. Each one of these groups is not mutually exclusive, all containing a little of the other. All exhibit the sensibility and self-reflection of *Bildungsroman* literature: the desire to communicate transformative events that influenced who the writer was at the time of recording. Letters written for family members contain some of the immediate visceral feelings of soldiers who had experienced the brutality of combat, providing a snapshot of men attempting to comprehend what they barely understood. Yet these letters are also couched in language that separates the recipient from the reality of war, edited by the sender to communicate very little of the distressing aspects of the soldier's life.<sup>23</sup> Soldiers sometimes address family grievances in one sentence before recounting a battle in

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<sup>20</sup> James Van Horn Melton, "From Image to Word: Cultural Reform and the Rise of Literate Culture in Eighteenth-Century Austria," *The Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 1 (1986): 95-124, esp. 96. Melton suggests that elementary schooling was the most robust and well attended in the Austro-Bohemian lands in the 1770s and 1780s, places where many of the authors used in this chapter were raised.

<sup>21</sup> As previously stated in the last chapter, the common soldier accounts used here were created by men who were tasked with book-keeping. Mary Hamilton and David Barton, *Local Literacies: Reading and Writing in One Community* (London: Routledge, 1998) 9-11. Barton and Hamilton argue that different domains of literacy exist in every day reading and writing, with each domain's activity influencing the ways in which people write. Domains "are structured, patterned contexts within which literacy is used and learned." These domains, however, are not clear cut and professional forms of writing, or institutions that inform literacy practices lead to "leakages, and movement between boundaries", influencing modes of literacy within the "discourse communities" of these domains. In the case of Habsburg soldiers, it is clear to see that their literacy practices in the home (writing memoirs for family) were regulated by the conventions and practices of the Habsburg military institution.

<sup>23</sup> Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 21-53. The letters I have found written by Habsburg soldiers share much literary commonality with the those studied by Alan Forrest. His methodology has proved useful in understanding the letters of Habsburg soldiers.

another. These documents are also interspersed with news gleaned from comrades, army gazettes and the mundanity of life, which further distanced the recipient from what combat soldiers witnessed, making it harder to ascertain the writer's immediate recollection and experience of battle.

Diaries provide the historian with a more immediate, coherent and purposeful reflection by men on the disturbing experiences of the Coalition Wars. Again, they are unreliable narratives of "what really happened", containing reflections on certain events entered long after the war had finished, leaving them susceptible to the pitfalls of human memory. Sometimes battlefield experiences understood by the author as important are only recognised as such decades later, with testimonies of violence interspersed with published histories, newspaper reports, or regimental accounts that greatly influence the significance of an event than in its immediate aftermath. Yet by linking the specific experience of the individual to the universal of wider narratives, men located their lives within a broader framework. This provided writers with a greater clarity of thought, sharpening their reflections on how influential past events were to their identity as worthy soldiers, bringing recollections to the fore that would otherwise bypass the letter writer.<sup>24</sup> Marching journals, sources that list the date, the journey taken, the hours travelled, and the miles crossed, had interspersed detailed discussions of towns, reflections on the war from an operational level, interesting notes on people seen, as well as celebrations individuals participated in. Most of which was entered later, as men went back and reflected on their time in the army. Though providing very little self-narratives (*Selbstzeugnisse*), these works, sometimes later curated, share much in common with diarists who recorded what had happened at the end of every day.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> This form of narrative writing is best explained in Philip G. Dwyer, "War Stories: French Veteran Narratives and the 'Experience of War' in the Nineteenth Century," *European History Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (October 2011): 561-85.

<sup>25</sup> Isolde Moser, "*Bruder, komm zum Militär*": *Aus den Tagebuchnotizen des k.k. Artilleristen Josef Sechterberger in der Zeit der Napoleonischen Kriege* (Klagenfurt: Hermagor, 2019). This work is the most recent publication of a Habsburg soldier's marching journal. The tension between early nineteenth century autobiographies written by "ordinary people" characterised by their pragmatic concerns, and a modern reading culture's desire for narratives of experience that shaped identity, i.e., the "ego-document", is best exemplified in the minute detail the author adds to each of the sparse entries originally written by the soldier. See for example page 51, and Josef Sechterberger's notes on the Battle of Leipzig which read "16. Oktober 1813 - Leipzig - große Schlacht". For a better example of a marching journal as both a diary and memoir which

The episodic memoirs used in this chapter were the recollections of what was experienced, following a formulaic travelling narrative with typical images and structures, emphasising the educational nature of men's early lives as soldiers at war. These narratives were intentionally fashioned, maybe even fictionalised, into lessons to be shared with future generations.<sup>26</sup> In these works, reality was created through the writing of it down, in a way that allowed men to show how they grew as individuals. The experiences of battle and tribulations of war permitting them to become better selves, or at least better soldiers. Simultaneously, memoirs published decades after the conflict, many as centenary editions, served to highlight "what it was actually like" to fight the power of France and be part of a conflict that affected the culture of Europe up until the early part of the twentieth century.<sup>27</sup> These works, based upon manuscripts found in archives by editors, or antiquarians, were sometimes verbatim publications. Otherwise, they were edited in such a way as to communicate the importance of these experiences on individuals, and the ways in which together they collectively shaped a generation.<sup>28</sup>

Alan Forrest has argued military memoirs lack the spontaneity of letters. This form of writing, Forrest positioned, can better communicate immediate responses to events, and the wartime identities and perceptions they shaped more concretely because the author lacks the "complex layers of memory" informed by images of nostalgia.<sup>29</sup> Nostalgia which clouds the general experience and outlook of soldiers between 1791 and 1814. Of course this is hard to

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constantly evolves with each remembered entry see ÖStA, KA, NL, B/719, Carl von Amon, Ignaz, fol. 2, *Tagesereignisse von den Feldzügen 1813/1814*, fol. 3, *Tage-Ereignisse von dem Feldzuge 1815*. The first folio of the Amon collection, fol., 1, *Journal von unglücklich Feldzug im Jahre 1809*, is a diary, though again it contains only some self-narratives. On "ordinary writings" and the problems for the catch all term "ego-document" for subaltern autobiographies, see Martyn Lyons, "Do Peasant Write Ego-Documents? The 'ordinary exception' of Luigi Daldossos in the First World War," *Quaerendo* 47, no. 1 (2017): 38-60.

<sup>26</sup> Steven E. Kagle and Lorenza Gramagna, "Rewriting Her Life: Fictionalization and the Use of Fictional Models in Early American Women's Diaries," in *Inscribing the Daily: Critical Essays on Women's Diaries*, eds., Suzanne L. Bunkers and Cynthia A. Huff, eds. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 38-55; Sarah C. Maza, "Stories in History: Cultural Narratives in Recent Works in European History," *American Historical Review* 101 (1996): 1493-515.

<sup>27</sup> Alan Forrest, Étienne François and Karen Hagemann, "Introduction: Memoires of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture," in *War Memories. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture*, eds., Alan Forrest, Étienne François and Karen Hagemann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-37.

<sup>28</sup> Leighton S. James, "War, Experience and Memory," 41-58; Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, 126-27.

<sup>29</sup> Forrest, *Napoleon's Men*, 32-33.



argue with, yet the ways in which these layers of memory, institutional writing practices and nostalgia informed the writing of memoirs is why they are so useful. As Joan Scott elucidated, “experience is a subject’s history” and the construction of the experience by a writer is the closest we can get if we consider “the analysis of the production of that knowledge itself”.<sup>30</sup> This production of past experience is what this chapter considers by examining how the principles of the Habsburg army’s honour were used to produce soldiers’ history of their war.

In *War Stories: The War Memoir in History and Literature*, Philip Dwyer argues memoirs are “a personal perspective of what has been witnessed, experienced and suffered.”<sup>31</sup> Taken together, and using this definition, the different modes of autobiographical writings left by Habsburg soldiers can only be defined as memoir. Most of the diaries and march logs used here were finalised long after the war. Men added to them to elucidate the past in ways that conveyed a perspective of self-progression mirroring the *Bildung* novels of the period, or they placed themselves amongst what was later defined by the collective memory of the war as pivotal moments. The author’s intent was to show the reader (the author or relatives) these events’ effects on the veteran, clarified by years of remembering. Letters which contained almost immediate reflections on the experience of battle are written by soldiers in much the same way as memoirs, with authors narrating war to their relatives to convey battle’s reinvigorating effect on men’s commitment to the fight.

For historians of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, these war narratives are wholly unique to the period. They represent a group of men tasked with defending the legitimacy of monarchism as part of a protracted and escalating conflict that demanded the most from those Europeans under the dominion of the Habsburgs. Sources left by military authors from Germany usually fought in one or two campaigns (1809-1814) and emphasise the

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<sup>30</sup> Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (1991): 773-97.

<sup>31</sup> Philip Dwyer, “Making Sense of the Muddle: War Memoirs and the Culture of Remembering,” in *War Stories: The War Memoir in History and Literature*, ed., Philip G. Dwyer (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018), 1-26, esp. 4.

disaster of 1812 as a pivotal moment.<sup>32</sup> This was a not an experienced shared by Habsburg soldiers. British soldiers spent most of their time in Spain where the fighting was less frequent, or only fought at Waterloo where the violence was extreme but no more notable than the Habsburg experience over two decades.<sup>33</sup> The works here, however, are the lived experience of the war's increasing intensity, of its longevity, of its attrition, and the endurance it demanded. They reflect a crystallisation of thought held by Habsburg veterans on their individual experiences which placed service to a monarchical state at the centre of their war and as a key motivator. Whilst these works do not specifically celebrate the sanctity of the state, at the heart of soldiers' experiences of war is the psychological frameworks of honour which made tangible the identity of the *Soldat Bürger*. This was a militarised ideal of citizenship that led men to perceive everything they did in war through a prism of obedient state service. This, as this chapter argues, made wartime suffering easier to narrate and therefore infused with meaning with which to better understand its consequences.

These stoic and purposeful narratives of war, which were mainly written for military families, elucidate why these works were gathered in the *Kriegsarchiv*, or published as centenary editions. They reflect a milieu of military thinking, handed down through dynasties of military servants from the 1760s until end of the First World War, that provided a Habsburg militarised ideal of state citizenship, or what Christa Hämmerle has explained as the genesis for a “whole man”.<sup>34</sup> This “whole man” learnt to be a worthy citizen through his education in the army, a place where he was taught to “obey” and place the interests of the state before his own, and above the influences of his meso-communities. For the military authors used here their time soldiering provided the perfect qualities for sons to copy in their own military careers as loyal

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<sup>32</sup> Leighton James, “Travel Writing and Encounters with National ‘Others’ in the Napoleonic Wars,” *History Compass* 7, no. 4 (2009), 1246-258. See also the chapters by Leighton James and Catriona Kennedy in Joseph Clarke and John Horne, eds., *Militarized Cultural Encounters in the Long Nineteenth Century: Making War, Mapping Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

<sup>33</sup> Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack, eds., *Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850: Men of Arms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>34</sup> Christa Hämmerle, “Zur Relevanz des Connell’schen Konzepts hegemonialer Männlichkeit für ‘Militär und Männlichkeit/en in der Habsburgermonarchie (1868-1914/1918),” in *Männer - Macht - Körper. Hegemoniale Männlichkeiten vom Mittelalter bis Heute*, ed., Martin Dinges (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2005), 103-21, esp. 109-112.

state servants. Wider still these qualities of the “whole man” were especially important for military intellectuals wanting to provide the conscripts of the common army after 1868 with models of military virtue to emulate.<sup>35</sup> What makes these works so important as a form of communicative memory for this study is that these men’s experiences had made tangible for them, and had subsequently provided the foundations for, a lexicon of military thought on a masculine martial identity unique to the social and political context of the Monarchy.<sup>36</sup> These memoirs are lived experiences of soldiers exhibiting, or who had exhibited, their citizenship within the Habsburg state by fighting as *Soldat Bürger*. As these men show, this military identity and act of citizenship had proven to be an effective wartime motivator for the Monarchy’s soldiers.

As these men had used the principles of honour and the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* to, in most cases, ascend the hierarchy of the army, it was also an essential element to their narrative of self-realisation, and then self-definition. Some men went from poor conscript to respected company officer and with this ascension came a narrative of a successful life which the military identity of the soldier purported to only provide. How these authors constructed their narratives, as has been explained, relied upon a literary writing in the German speaking world which framed life as journey of self-improvement. It was this idea of individual improvement, coupled with an interest in defining who they were at the time of writing, which led men to the use of honour’s principles to frame their reaction to violence and the self-realisation this had led them to.

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<sup>35</sup> Inspired by the principles of the *Soldat Bürger* many acts of heroism from the Wars of the Coalition were shared in the mid-nineteenth century Habsburg army’s educational journal. See for example, “Zuge von Heldenmuth aus den Letzten Kriegen der Oestreicher *Streffleus militärische Zeitschrift* (1847): 296-318.

<sup>36</sup> Harald Welzer, “Communicative Memory,” in *Cultural Memory Studies An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook.*, eds., Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (New York: De Gruyter, 2008), 285-298, esp., 285-286. I understand communicative memory as the remembering of an event that is only available to those who witnessed it. As Welzer valuably articulates, “Communicative Memory’...denotes a wilful agreement of the members of a group as to what they consider their own past to be, in interplay with the identity-specific grand narrative of the we-group, and what meaning they ascribe to this past.”

The rest of this chapter is a reflection on how “memoirs transmit a particular view of war”, as well as how veterans shaped their memory of war using the principles of military honour to convey its experience.<sup>37</sup> These soldiers chose to transmit their war, of what to include and to omit, by using codes of behaviour laid out in military regulations and internalised by soldiers to ward off the psychological effects of battle. The process of writing a memoir, this chapter argues, reflected the ways in which battlefield soldiers processed the violence they witnessed as their honour demanded. It was the controlled reaction to violence, nonchalantly expressed, which enabled the tactical demands placed on soldiers to be met. As the battlefield was a place where honour - a person’s value to his community - was expressed by stoically accepting the effects of modern weaponry, young men writing on campaign, and elderly veterans at their desk, chose to frame their experience of battlefield violence by expressing how they continued to fight despite what were acknowledged as harrowing scenes. Together this biographical corpus shows the way in which soldiers organised, perceived, and narrated their place in the Monarchy’s

bloody war effort. All use the principles of honour that defined the *Soldat Bürger*, revealing how important the community and ideas of service it created were to these fighting men.<sup>38</sup>

## Witnessing Battlefield Violence

The sites of death and battlefield violence Habsburg soldiers depicted in their accounts were included with the intention of conveying to the reader the life altering extraordinariness of the Coalition Wars. Scenes laid out by authors to reveal how bloody and brutal it was to be a Habsburg soldier during the defining era of their lives. Those who left their own accounts of the war wrote of deadly and awe-inspiring cannon fire, the apathetic treatment of the dead, the suffering of the wounded, as well as crippling marches in all conditions. If accounts conveyed the soldier's acceptance of death, they also laid bare the incomprehensible way in which men killed each other. Murderous (*moerderische*) is a recurring word found in multiple soldiers' accounts, used to emphasise the active nature of the violence. Battle was a series of decisions made by individuals motivated by various reasons to end the life of another. The effects of which were both terrifying and numbing, leaving most fearful. Friederich Brandner, a corporal in the Bohemian infantry regiment *Nepomuk* during the 1809 campaign, asserted his right as a "flesh-witness" to dismiss the eulogising of the heroic soldier in the decades after Napoleon's defeat. For Brandner and the others he served with, the constant confrontation with death did not foster fearless sacrificial behaviour, as the German dramatist August Friedrich Ferdinand von Kotzebue had insisted, but instead led soldiers to "cut the most desperate faces when the bullets hissed and whistled, and by no means did they prove themselves as heroes."<sup>39</sup> The fact

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<sup>37</sup> Dwyer, "Making Sense of the Muddle," 5.

<sup>38</sup> Dwyer, "War Stories," 562-563. On memoir as a dialectic between memory and imagination, see David Carlson, "Autobiography," in *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*, eds., Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (London: Routledge, 2008), 175-92.

<sup>39</sup> Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 33. On flesh-witnessing see Harari, "Scholars, Eyewitnesses, and Flesh," 217-19. In Brander's account of war, he is specifically laying claim to what Harari labels the "novel authority, that of flesh-witnessing, which is based not on observations of facts but on having undergone personal experience."

they stayed to fight out of duty despite their fear, Brandner asserted, is what made them courageous.

Before France, the struggle with the Ottomans exposed to men the grotesque nature of state violence, and the role of the soldier in it, providing those who survived an understanding of modern war's consequences before the rest of Europe. Prisoners were butchered on both sides, corpses defaced by vengeful soldiers in retaliatory actions abhorrent to enlightened officers, heavy artillery rendered individual bravery obsolete, horrifying death was ever present and its effects wearing. At the outset of the war a feeling of fear permeated many within the ranks. All believed if they were wounded and left on the battlefield or captured by the "hereditary enemy" then death would surely follow. Officers asked their men to rescue them if they fell wounded, fearful of decapitation and mutilation at the hands of Ottoman soldiers, and it was widely reported during the war that the corpses of the Habsburg dead were desecrated if the field of battle remained in the hands of the enemy.<sup>40</sup>

Captain John Bellow, an Irish émigré serving with the cuirassier regiment *Zeschwitz* Nr. 10, wrote to his family back in Ireland how it was a "shocking inhumane prospect...to see a field covered with dead bodies, without heads" taken by an enemy with "no manner of humanity" who "as soon as one of our soldiers [is taken] prisoner, they immediately cut off their heads and left their bodies behind."<sup>41</sup> No stranger to combat after having intimately killed a peasant who tried to scythe him during a local uprising in northern Hungary in 1786, war with the Ottoman Empire meant Bellow was confronted with random death from afar and the lack of agency it allowed him, a fact he documented to his brother in an account of the siege of Belgrade in 1789.<sup>42</sup> On the morning of September 30, 1789, Bellow recounted "the regiment turned out in order to cover the infantry, then came a cannon ball and the man and horse that stood before

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<sup>40</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 45-46; Balázs Lázár, "Turkish Captives in Hungary during Austria's Last Turkish War (1788-91)," *Hungarian Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (2015): 418-44.

<sup>41</sup> National Library of Ireland (NLI), Collection List (CL) no. 33, Bellow of Mount Bellow Papers (MBP), Ms. 27, 118, Letters from John Bellow (Bellow), *Dublin* (December 10, 1788).

<sup>42</sup> NLI, CL no. 33, MBP, Ms. 27, 188, Bellow, *Dublin* (May 7, 1787).

me [and] the man and horse stood behind me [were killed] and I and my horse remained untouched, which surprised the whole regiment.”<sup>43</sup>

The violent nature of the war for infantrymen oscillated between the terrible butchery of close combat and death dealt by artillery. Johann Friedrich Löffler, a new volunteer in the infantry regiment *Deutschmeister*, remembered that such was the ferocity of the fighting, “every strip of the land we took had to be stubbornly fought over”, costing “much effort and blood”.<sup>44</sup> The assaults on the Ottoman fortresses along the Danubian Basin, at times beginning with bombardments lasting two days, gave Löffler and his comrades the knowledge of how “gruesome” mass death on the battlefield could be, leading veteran soldiers from the Seven Years’ War to reflect that everything they had encountered before was “child’s play” (*Kinderspiel*).<sup>45</sup> A fact that was ably demonstrated for Löffler at the Ottoman fortress of Dubica in April 1788, where under the cover of darkness, the *Deutschmeister* attempted to scale the escarpments surrounding the town in an assault which proved disastrous, thanks in part to the accidental discharge of a soldier’s musket. Then, recalled Löffler, sudden confusion erupted in the ranks as Ottoman cavalry rushed his company, encumbered by ladders, which was quickly overcome with “turmoil, confusion and terror”. The constant cries of Allah from the defenders, the disorientating hand to hand combat in the dark, with men dismembered as they attempted to scale the walls under a barrage of rocks, pitch, and boiling water, broke Löffler’s company. Their captain was left wounded in the ditch pleading to be saved, and as his men fled the wall, Löffler recounts that the regiment’s lieutenant-colonel was badly wounded. The attack was repulsed at dawn, leaving behind three hundred dead, their “bodies cut open, their arms and legs chopped off...most with their heads split or cut off”.<sup>46</sup>

According to Löffler, artillery provided a different, more unearthly quality to killing. At Belgrade in 1789, such was the ferocity of the bombardment from 18 and 24 pounder cannon

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<sup>43</sup> NLI, CL no. 33, MBP, Ms. 27, 188, Bellew, *Dublin* (November 20, 1789).

<sup>44</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 60.

<sup>45</sup> Löffler, 56.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, 37.

as well as mortars that fired shrapnel shells “high into the air with a terrible roar”, Löffler believed it was something that could never be conveyed properly as the “impression of such a cannonade is beyond all imagination, and those who have not seen and heard it for themselves will always struggle to understand.”<sup>47</sup> The effects of this awe inspiring power on individuals was also laid bare to the soldiers, with Löffler remarking especially on the tragedy of the mangled corpse of a young and “beautiful” woman who lay amongst the bodies of the Ottoman camp followers killed by artillery as they fled the fortress of Czettin in 1790 (*Cettin, Croatia*).<sup>48</sup> Amongst soldiers the total bodily destruction these weapons dealt were at times laughed off in shows of bravado that involved the waving of genitalia at the enemy.<sup>49</sup> These actions, however, intentionally masked the tacit acknowledgement shared by the men of modern war’s horror. A point vividly expressed in the last frantic words of a Croatian soldier who screamed “Fire! Fire!” as surgeons attempted to sooth him after his sleeping hut was hit by a mortar bomb.<sup>50</sup>

The three years of bloody conflict with the Ottoman Empire transformed a peacetime standing army into a force cognisant of what violence between states entailed. The infantry had been confronted with unrelenting manual labour, disease and long marches interspersed with frantic, awe-inspiring violent and random death. Whilst the cavalry had been subjected to close quarter fighting where the wounded were beheaded by the enemy. Eventually war ended, and such was the shared misery both sides understood a little more of the other.<sup>51</sup> This recognition

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<sup>47</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 56.

<sup>48</sup> Löffler, 69.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, 63.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 66.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 70. As peace approached in 1791 the relations between the two forces warmed. Löffler tells of falling into the hands of an Ottoman rear-guard force after the fall of Czettin. The small patrol he was a part of were surrounded by the enemy and after a brief skirmish they were told to lay down their arms. This the men did fearfully. However, on reaching the Ottoman camp Löffler remembers that “...we enjoyed the greatest freedom in the short time of our imprisonment. I was allowed to walk around the camp and had plenty to eat and drink.” The men were soon exchanged and returned to the Habsburg army, where their comrades eagerly asked after their time captured by the “hereditary enemy”. To what must have been bewildering to their comrades the returned prisoners, “...could do nothing but praise the Turks.” Löffler also talks about men who guarded captured Ottomans were introduced to coffee by their prisoners, marvelling at the intricacies of its production, and enjoying the offered drink. The comparatively humane way these captured men were treated by an “enlightened” army was, as Balázs Lázár has revealed, markedly different from the interactions the Ottomans and Russians had with their prisoners. Lázár, “Turkish Captives in Hungary,” 424-26.



of modern war's suffering meant those who fought in the wars of the First Coalition harboured little of the youthful yearning for combat found in the accounts of French soldiers.

For veterans, the mobilisation in 1792 for war with France was so sudden, and what was to come familiar, that the news that regiments were leaving for the Austrian Netherlands was greeted with little apprehension.<sup>52</sup> Yet for those who had not fought in the bloody battles in the Banat, the war with France signalled the beginning of a new life. For the young cadet Lorenz Zagitzeck, who had spent the first two years of his time in the infantry regiment *D'Alton* stationed along the border with Prussia during the Ottoman war, the conflict represented the end of his childhood. Now he was a combat officer in his father's company. A time that he acknowledged changed the course of his life and gave him and his family opportunities as one of the last "still living officers who participated in the whole revolutionary war".<sup>53</sup> The artilleryman Franz Bersling, who had once hoped the life of a soldier would free him from working his father's trade, remembers embracing the news as it meant the world awaited.<sup>54</sup>

Habsburg soldiers initially imagined the French to be an easier enemy than the Ottomans. Veteran soldiers were confident in victory as they were led by the victorious generals of the previous war. Military success against the Ottoman Empire also meant many new recruits were sure of the Monarchy's victory over France.<sup>55</sup> Bersling, remembering the pride he had when serving as an artilleryman, recounted how the regiment he joined had proven themselves elite in the previous war.<sup>56</sup> The confidence he had as a new soldier came from the respected veteran officer who led his company, as well as the experience his comrades gained in the Banat. The professionalism displayed by his unit eased Bersling into his role, as the initial sieges of the French held cities in the Rhineland-Palatinate mirrored the Monarchy's last war. His part in all

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<sup>52</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 82-83. Löffler remembers that in late 1792 the *Deutschmeister* regiment was refitted with new equipment so efficiently that it was if the enemy was the gates of Vienna.

<sup>53</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, 1.

<sup>54</sup> Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran*, 11, 17.

<sup>55</sup> Löffler, 87-88.

<sup>56</sup> Bersling, 17.

of it, however, was not as glorious as Bersling had expected, writing that he and his gun team reflected with sadness they were reducing beautiful cities to rubble.<sup>57</sup>

The war with France introduced another mode of random death, the exchange of close ranged volleys, a mode of fight which many of the veterans of the Ottoman War had yet to encounter, but one Habsburg soldiers would continually remark upon as particularly vivid throughout the war.<sup>58</sup> In March 1793, an initial exchange of volleys between the *Deutsche Meister* and a unit of French infantry near Aachen in the middle of the night confirmed to the regiment that a new “murder had begun”. Löffler recalled how, “several of my comrades sank to the ground” as musket fire and cannon shot poured into the regiment as it closed ranks and forced the French to flee using the “butts of our rifles and the bayonet”. The skirmish had been a “bloody hand” with the French leaving many dead.<sup>59</sup> Pitched battles between the French armies and the forces of the Habsburg Monarchy became commonplace as the war progressed, and the scenes of death and destruction intensified in the campaign months of 1794. This led soldiers to comment on the scale of the violence, whilst reflecting on its banality, during a time where artillery and musket fire created mounded lines of the dead.<sup>60</sup>

Heightening the tension of pitched battles for those under their command, Habsburg generals told their soldiers that “every step must cost the French blood” in speeches that urged their men to confront and overcome the scenes of death they witnessed, communicating the finality of their way of life if they did not.<sup>61</sup> In the skirmishes before the Battle of Arlon in April 1794, after hearing from his commanders death was not deter him, Zagitzeck wrote that the bloody fight to capture the village of Messancy was not “insignificant”, costing the regiment *D’Alton* “one dead and several wounded officers”. And even the death of “...my best comrade and friend, lieutenant Thill, killed by a cannonball”, did not deter Zagitzeck from his mission,

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<sup>57</sup> Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran*, 17-20.

<sup>58</sup> Varnhagen von Ense, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 96-99; Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 9.

<sup>59</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 88-89.

<sup>60</sup> Bersling, 18-19.

<sup>61</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 7. “*Jeder Schritt muss den Franzosen Blut kosten! und er hielt Wort!*” This rhetoric reflected the sermons delivered from the pulpit back in the Habsburg Monarchy, which will be briefly examined in the next chapter

who remembered the ferocity of the French fire was matched by the deadly fire of Habsburg artillery on the ranks of the advancing columns.<sup>62</sup> The gunner Bersling also internalised the speeches delivered by his officers, which echoed the preachers at home, contemptuously declaring “the French were driven by a peculiar thirst to conquer, cloaked by a dubious claim for freedom for themselves and others.” This understanding of the enemy motivated soldiers to endure stoically the battle of Tournay on the 22nd of May 1794, which went from 6 in the morning until 9 in the evening, where “the last man and the last drop of blood was given to claim the young monarch’s first victory”.<sup>63</sup> Such was the ferocity of the battle veterans who had fought the Prussians in the 1760s, and more recently the Ottomans, agreed that nothing could rival the intense combat they experienced whilst repulsing the repeated attacks of the French.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, such was the exchange of musketry and cannon fire Bersling recalled the whole battlefield was cloaked in smoke, and the amount of bodies left outside Tournay and along the banks of the River Scheldt must have exceeded the official reports.<sup>65</sup>

The initial battles fought during the early stages of the Second Coalition were as incessant as the fighting experienced in the first years of the war with France. The seesawing nature of the campaigns in Southern Germany, Italy, and Switzerland in 1799 meant some narratives focused on the triumph of Habsburg forces, whilst others reflect men coming to terms with the murky, and often bitter, realities of war. As the campaign in Switzerland began in earnest Marcus Hibler, an ensign in the infantry regiment *Stain* Nr. 50, wrote on March 7, 1799, his company were eager to hold the key positions defending the village of Chur against advancing French troops during the first battle of Feldkirch. But after the assault on a day of such heavy rain where much of the fighting was done with the bayonet, the company was reduced to 45 men with all the officers except Hibler killed or wounded, leaving the twenty-year-old ensign with no choice but to surrender when the survivors ran out of ammunition. The vicious fighting, and the eventual defeat, led Hibler to write in his daybook that “our victory

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<sup>62</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzack, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, 8-9.

<sup>63</sup> Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran*, 29.

<sup>64</sup> Löffler, *Der alte Sergeant*, 111.

<sup>65</sup> Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran*, 30.

does not come from heat alone, which I had to experience again today with such unlucky success.”<sup>66</sup> Heat, was understood as an emotional response to violence - an uncontrollable desire to do harm and win - that honour was to mediate. It undermined soldiers training, the rational and logically steps required to deploy into line, modulate the fear of death, endure a volley of fire and stoically outlast the enemy as a controllable unit. The lesson at Feldkirch tempered Hible’s youthful exuberance, moulding him into the stoic, pragmatic and emotionally guarded soldier he would become.

In southern Italy, Zagitzeck wrote evocatively of the violence he and his men were subjected to, detailing how his officer comrades and men were killed and wounded around him. As part of the retelling, and throughout Zagitzeck’s account, he remembered the fallen of his company, listing the names and injuries of the casualties, as well as the wounds he received, articulating the shared nature of combat and its psychological effects. During one of the skirmishes before the battle of Fossano (*Genola*) the regiment *D’Alton* was caught in a column by a line of French infantry where Zagitzeck remembered, “the first three companies, especially the lieutenant-colonel’s company under my command, immediately had several dead and wounded.” The subsequent bayonet attack of the regiment ended the chaos, but not before the “murderous moment” had left many strewn across the road running outside Fossano.<sup>67</sup> A few weeks later, as the armies of Michael von Melas and Jean Étienne Championnet clashed around the town of Genola in early November, Zagitzeck wrote of a committed assault on his regiment’s position, where his company suffered many dead and wounded as they defended a small chapel.<sup>68</sup> The captain was soon ordered to lead half his company and two battalion guns to push the enemy back from the regiment’s position, leading to a struggle where the battlefield was so littered with casualties it appeared to Zagitzeck like a “field hospital”<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>66</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hible, *Journal*, Part 1, 12.

<sup>67</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 62.

<sup>68</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 1, 64.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, Part 1, 66.

Hibler, fighting as part of the army in Southern Germany the next year, wrote in his diary of the “bitterness” and “vividness” of the second battle of Stockach fought on May 3, setting down in words his shock at the apparent ease Jean Victor Marie Moreau, “the master of battles”, had humbled those under the command of Baron Paul Kray.<sup>70</sup> At Stockach Hibler recounted fighting started in the early morning with the sound of “small-arms” fire rippling around the village of Engen, before a sudden and unexpected bayonet attack from a French demi-brigade launched through the woods forced his regiment to retreat. As Hibler related, the battle raged until ten in the evening with both sides fighting bitterly over Engen, which changed hands repeatedly before the Habsburg army left the field beaten. As an epitaph to the battle, one in which the ensign wrote “was the bloodiest of the war”, he remembered the 19 fellow company officers who were either killed or wounded, as well as three of the regiment’s staff officers and “between 3 or 4, 000 dead, that many captured” from the army. Only a few days later Hibler was part of the battle of Messkirch (*Möskirch*), where the French renewed their push into southern Germany, defeating the Habsburg army on May 5. As part of *Stain*, the ensign was in the middle of the fighting for twenty-four hours, his job to encourage the troops and help maintain their morale from the rear of his company. Hibler once again listed the officers killed, wounded, and missing, adding that the survivors of *Stain* had heard, “we should have had up to 4, 000 men killed and wounded in this battle.”<sup>71</sup>

Cavalry were also exposed to shot and shell, rendering them impotent, especially in terrain that restricted their visibility and ability to accelerate. At Hohenlinden, in the last stages of the Second Coalition, the young gentleman soldier Johann Grueber, from the cuirassier regiment *Herzog Albert* Nr. 3, was treated to a vicious surprise in the forest east of the southern German town. The French attack which crippled the Habsburg forces fell heavily on *Herzog Albert* and Grueber’s account evocatively depicts the sudden and panic-inducing volleys of fire that raked the regiment as it moved at a trot through the woods. Forced to “run the gauntlet” at

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<sup>70</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 22-23.

<sup>71</sup> Hibler, Part 1, 23. “Das Regiment hatte 4 Blessierte und 1 gefangen Offizier. Wie man hört sollten wir bei dieser Schlacht bis 4000 Man Todte und Verwundete gehabt haben.”

a gallop, Grueber remembers “many cuirassiers and horses remained, lying in the forest” later to be buried in a mass grave by the victorious French. As the cavalry regathered their blown mounts behind the lines of a grenadier division, some of the men were also hit from the musketry that flew over the heads of the infantry.<sup>72</sup>

As the armies of Europe increased in size to mitigate the effects of battle casualties on operational effectiveness during the Napoleonic Wars (1805-1815), the intensity of the fighting increased. Whilst military technology and tactics remained consistent throughout, the scale of battle subjected veterans and recruits alike to levels of killing that was wholly new to those who experienced it. For veterans, the beginning of a new campaign also meant confronting the anxieties of the previous struggles as demonstrated by Hibler’s first confrontation with the enemy in Tyrol in 1809. As a jäger captain in an advance guard, he recounted how he had to repeatedly press the commanding major to launch an assault on an isolated Bavarian outpost. Yet, according to Hibler’s journal, “...thousands of reasons, informed by too much anxiety, were put forth as excuses”, by the major.<sup>73</sup> This despite, as Hibler points out in a detailed list: the enemy were retiring, in a position that was isolated, outnumbered, and the Habsburg advance guard was guided by locals with extensive knowledge of the area.

For recruits, which comprised almost 60% of some infantry regiments, the scale of war during 1809 meant men were introduced to war by the first mass deployment of artillery on both sides.<sup>74</sup> The effects of which were constantly noted. At the battle of Abensberg in April 1809, the corporal Brandner wrote that his battalion was positioned far behind the first line, but

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<sup>72</sup> Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 17-20. Grueber mentions an interesting incident in 1803 that describes how the bodies of the Austrian soldiers were treated after the French victory. In his memoir he recounts how one of his fellow officers, presumed killed at Hohenlinden, was presented to the regiment by Duke Albert – its proprietor – as a symbol of his fatherly protection during a muster in 1803. The lieutenant, wounded during the engagement, was almost buried alive in a mass grave before French soldiers discovered he was breathing. The man, suffering a head injury, was treated for two years at Mühlendorf, Strasburg and Dijon before he remembered his identity and was soon exchanged. According to Grueber, the man rose to become major in the regiment before dying as a result of his head wound in 1815. His widower had remarried, and finding that her lost husband was alive, apparently died of shame two years later.

<sup>73</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 3, 15. “Tausend, von allzu großer Ängstlichkeit herrührende Ursachen wurden vorgeschützt”.

<sup>74</sup> Gunter E. Rothenberg, *The Emperor’s Last Victory: Wagram 1809* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004).

just to the rear of a heavy artillery battery. The French shots that missed their targets would finally come to a stop amongst the ranks of his regiment, where men attempted to evade the last rolls of the ricocheting cannonballs by jumping. Brandner recalled this rarely worked, leaving many to ask of their comrades “where have your feet gone”?<sup>75</sup> The troop captain (*Rittmeister*) Michael Pauliny, from the hussar regiment *Kaiser Franz*, also wrote of the effects of artillery fire on mounted horsemen, recounting how five men were felled as a shot passed through their ranks just outside Warsaw in late April.<sup>76</sup>

The ferocity of the fire these men were subjected to underlined battle as a test of endurance and composure. Johann Schnerer, then a sergeant-major in the infantry regiment *De Ligne* Nr. 30, related his experience of the first engagement at Raszyn in Poland, attesting to the exhausting and fraying atmosphere of battle by writing that he stood “from nine in the morning as widespread tirailleur fire and cannon fire all along the line continued into the evening”.<sup>77</sup> The captain Alois Pfersmann, from the Hungarian infantry regiment *Sztarry* Nr. 33, recorded in his memoir of the effectiveness of the French guns on the mass of infantrymen under his command. Present on the first day of the Battle of Aspern-Essling, the captain remembered that as the mist cleared on the morning of May 21 “the French cannons fired on us from several positions, and we lost a number of officers and men”. During the cannonade, Pfersmann

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<sup>75</sup> Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 32.

<sup>76</sup> Kowelsdam, “Bruchstücke aus dem Tagebuche eines alten Huszaren,” *ÖMZ*, no. 3 (1863), 326. On Pauliny’s rank: Laurence Cole identifies him as a first lieutenant (*Oberleutnant*) at the time of his active service retirement in 1825. Pauliny was actually a major by then in the hussar regiment *Kaiser Franz* Nr. 1. See,

*Militärschematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthums* (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1825) 82, 301. Nine years later he was made a lieutenant-colonel (*Oberstleutnant*) and the head of the *Militär-Filial-Invalidenhaus* before he retired in 1835 after joining the army as a volunteer common soldier in 1788. Joining the army was initially an economic decision, as Pauliny was an eighteen-year-old “*mittellose Student*” and used the opportunity of war to ascend the ranks to squadron leader (*Rittmeister*) by 1809. See Jaromir Hirtenfeld, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden und seine Mitglieder: Nach authent. Quellen bearb. Zur ersten Säcularfeier 1857*, Vol. 2 (Vienna: k. k. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1857), 1081-084. The error of rank does not detract from Cole’s central analysis but elucidates more clearly his examination of the rapid rise of non-nobles to the position of privilege in the Habsburg army during the war with France, as well as the army’s ability to provide economic security. See Cole, *Military Culture and Popular*, 32. For a detailed analysis of Pauliny’s experience, changing perception of the war and subsequent life afterwards see James, “Die Koalitionskriege in der österreichischen,” 221-41.

<sup>77</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 9. ”

recounted that, “the regiment regretted the loss of its colonel, Count Anton Weissenwolff, who died a few days later of his wounds”.<sup>78</sup>

Zagitzeck’s account of the second day at Essling vividly communicates the bloody experiences of a prolonged firefight with modern weapons:

When the enemy tirailleurs came upon us we opened fire and drove them back to their main front. As the enemy line was approaching us in considerable numbers, the battery fire from both sides intensified, several more men were killed and wounded, and it was not possible to maintain strict order because of the gunpowder. Since war, where human blood flows, is not a parade ground, it is easy to understand that in the moment of danger, where honour and life are at stake, order can only be maintained in general, but not for each individual, especially when the infantry is in disarray, or musketry fire turns into a full line exchange.<sup>79</sup>

A month later, the *Deutschmeister* conscript Johann Schnierer witnessed the devastation artillery could inflict on the massed squares of his regiment at the battle of Wagram. Ranked up in a *division massée* near the village of Markgrafneusiedl on the army’s left flank, Schnierer remembered one shot ploughing through the ranks and killing 21 men, their bodies left tangled together on the ground in a straight line.<sup>80</sup> It was only after the fighting that Schnierer realised how close he had come to being killed, writing that the heavy coat he wore during the two-day battle was riddled with bullet holes. The end of the battle also gave Brandner the opportunity to marvel at his own survival. After retreating from the village of Wagram and a raging grass fire started by flaming cartridge paper, he gathered with his comrades along the sunken road of the Brünner Strasse, west of the battlefield. As the roll call was taken, the corporal remembered his company counted only one officer and 26 men. Whilst he had survived, Brandner himself was still wounded, having suffered a gash to his left hip the day before from a Saxon bayonet during the struggle in the village of Aderklaa<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>78</sup> ÖStA, KA, NL, B/101, Pfersmann von Eichthal, Alois, fol. 1, *Tagebuch*, 39.

<sup>79</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 20.

<sup>80</sup> This was a solid square made up of two companies used to repel cavalry, which was also used to maneuverer raw recruits with no experience of fighting in line.

<sup>81</sup> Brandner *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 99.



Whilst face to face killing was rare for the infantry, it dominated Grueber's account of the war, with heavy cavalry increasingly used to deliver almost suicidal counter charges to protect retreating infantry. In the last stages of the battle of Eckmühl in 1809, his cavalry division fought a bloody engagement to cover the lines of broken infantry. On the road leading to Ratisbon, Grueber recalled a short, yet intense and claustrophobic engagement fought in the dying sunlight where:

A French heavy cavalryman (grenadier à cheval) thrust at my chest with his sabre in such a way that it went between my neck stock and cuirass, and I started to bleed from my nose and mouth. I did not notice this at the time but stabbed the grenadier from his horse. I received another sabre blow, probably from one of his men, on my right hand, which was not very deep, as the thick glove prevented any penetration. It was too dark to see anything more than my opponent falling from the horse, and the enemy riders took flight.<sup>82</sup>

At the battle of Teugen-Hausen, a few days earlier, Brandner witnessed a struggle between two cavalry forces as the French attempted to exploit a gap in the Habsburg line. A sight Brandner labelled as terrible, recalling:

In the colourful flurry of activity one can only see the curved sabres toppling riders from their horses. Only the clang of weapons and the continuous rumbling of the horse's hoof steps can be heard. Luckily the struggle lasted no longer than five minutes. The ground was littered with the fallen, many of whom tried to rise, only to fall back down again.<sup>83</sup>

The battles of 1809 were at a scale never seen. Yet these were quickly surpassed in 1813 by the largest battle of the whole conflict at Leipzig. Soldiers of the Habsburg army remarked on the magnitude of the violence they experienced there with awe, later stating that it felt to them unparalleled, both in ferociousness and importance. During the afternoon of October 16, on the first day of the Battle of Leipzig, Zagitzek recalls how the first battalion's major from the regiment *Zach* gathered the company commanders together near the hamlet of Seifertshain to prepare them for the day's fighting. There he impressed upon them their responsibilities as officers as the French could be seen preparing an attack. Shortly afterwards an infantry attack

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<sup>82</sup> Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 65.

<sup>83</sup> Brandner *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 25.

on the regiment's position in the ditches and woods west of the hamlet was launched that carried on late into the night. Hibler, from the regiment's third battalion, wrote in his diary that twice the enemy seized the village and twice the bayonets of his soldiers drove the enemy from it.<sup>84</sup> Musket fire from *Zach* eventually broke the attacking French, and the retreating infantry ran past the front of Zagitzeck's company stationed to the left of the village. Revealing the officer's pragmatic approach to soldiering, Zagitzeck ordered his soldiers to fire on the enemy, knowing personally of how difficult it was, "to bring the fleeing men to a halt in the event of an unsuccessful attack". The effects of his men's fire, he wrote, were laid bare to him when on patrol that night he came across many dead and wounded men, the latter, "already struggling with death, asked us for water to quench their burning thirst, which was not possible at first sight, but could only be done later, when many had already passed away."<sup>85</sup>

Hibler took note of the regiment's losses at the end of each day, marvelled at the number of cannons present and guessed, "at least 180, 000 canon shots must have been fired by all the armies together."<sup>86</sup> Zagitzeck recounted the magnitude of the artillery fire directed at *Zach's* attack on the villages Holzhausen and Stotteritz on October 18 by writing:

We left our village and moved off in battalion masses. Often, we held our ground, and not infrequently we had to endure the fire of 30 enemy guns. The cannonade from both sides was terrible. Whole batteries lost their crews covering our advance. Powder shot flew one after the other into the air and the earth shook with thunder.<sup>87</sup>

Hibler wrote of the same attack on Stotteritz, detailing how the enemy waited for them before opening fire from 100 paces. Such was the intensity of the fighting, the captain wrote, he had to assume command of the third battalion after both the regiment's lieutenant-colonel and the battalion's major were wounded. In the devastating volley and the artillery fire before it, Hibler wrote the regiment lost 4 officers and 87 men before retreating.

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<sup>84</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 4, 48.

<sup>85</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 45.

<sup>86</sup> Hibler, Part 4, 49.

<sup>87</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 2, 45.

The following year soldiers of the Monarchy were part of the invasion of France, travelling through many of the villages in Switzerland, Bavaria, and northern France they had once fought the Republican armies over. The veterans who had participated in these earlier campaigns immediately drew comparisons, leading some to narrate their march into France listing the engagements they had previously fought in the area.<sup>88</sup> These new battles were no less bloody, leading the survivors to repeatedly comment on the ferocity of the French defence. Hibler, now a grenadier company commander, was part of the allied corps under Prince Frederick of Hessen-Homburg, which marched through Geneva and on into the Rhône River basin. His account of the invasion is littered with descriptions of French inhabitants surprised to see Habsburg regiments trooping through their towns and villages to the sound of triumphant music. Simultaneously, Hibler's daybook documents the difficulties of occupation, recounting ambushes peasants attempted to spring on advancing columns.<sup>89</sup>

The regular French forces under Marshal Pierre Augereau also proved to be challenging opponents, taking up positions in difficult terrain that could only be secured through frontal assaults. Hibler's account of the battle of Limonest on March 20 described how successive attacks were repulsed, explaining that "in his fortified position the French fought with the greatest bitterness (*größter Erbitterung*) late into the night." The French withdrew from the hills west of Lyon during the night, leaving the city open to the allied forces. The battle, the last of Hibler's war, had been costly with the captain writing, "the loss this day on our side was far greater than that of the enemy."<sup>90</sup> Schnerer, now a first lieutenant in the infantry regiment *Czartoryski*, recounting the very same battle wrote, "the battalion had Captain Hayden and Dychene dead, Lieutenant Lonrenz, Lieutenant Muhr and Lieutenant Manner wounded, and 230 men dead, and wounded, from sergeant downwards."<sup>91</sup> Even during the last days of the French Empire, ending it proved costly.

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<sup>88</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 11.

<sup>89</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 4, 58.

<sup>90</sup> Hibler.

<sup>91</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 11. "Das Batallion hatte an Toten Hauptmann Hayden und Dychene, Oberlieutenant und Lieutenant Lonrenz an Blessirten Oberlieutenant Muhr, und Lieutenant Manner, und bei 230 Mann Tode, und Blessirte, von Feldwebel Abwärts."

## Honour as a Mediator for Violent Experiences

The effects of the violence these men encountered and meted out, and the increasing levels of death they witnessed whilst fighting, were experienced and mediated by the frameworks of military honour. Honour, as these men's writings express, was a recompense for these experiences, turning the battlefield into a place where courage and bravery was shown, and a shared comradeship developed. Honour was also the behaviours men exhibited in response to violence, marking them out as worthy soldiers of the emperor.

To understand this dual process on the psychology of fighting men, Victor Turner's concept of "social drama" provides a theoretical approach that enables a better grasp of how honour as a narrative tool was used by Habsburg soldiers to mediate violent experiences. Indeed, what is battle but a social drama, a term used by Turner to describe "units of aharmonic or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations."<sup>92</sup> Social dramas are divided by Turner in four phases, breach, crisis, redress, and a final settlement which resolves the tension in communities' belief structure. The first, breach - a rupture in "norm governed social relations" - creates a social drama, a conflict hindering the constructive relationships people have with each other and the ways in which they view themselves and the world. In the case of Habsburg soldiers, it is the act of killing and witnessing violence which constitutes a "breach", challenging the Judaeo-Christian moral imperative "thou shall not kill", and the automatic physiological reaction that is fight - or - flight. The experience of which leads to the second stage of Turner's social drama: crisis. A term he uses to describe anything upsetting a society and its accompanying beliefs, demanding members redress the changes a breach has made. It is in this stage of the "social drama" that a soldier's motivations, combat effectiveness and ability to carry on as fighting men is challenged by the brutality witnessed.

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<sup>92</sup> Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (London: Cornell University Press, 2018), 37.

It is after the breach that the debilitating affective nature of war on men's psychology must be circumvented by "redressive action". This is the third stage of a social drama where psychological "mechanisms" are used by leaders of social structures to alleviate disorder for the wider social group. These mechanisms, either informal or formal, institutionalised or ad hoc, are used to create cultural narratives with which to define or redefine the beliefs of a community to ward of the ensuing crisis from totalling enveloping an individual, group or society. In the case of Habsburg soldiers, it is honour which serves as the redressive "mechanism" in their narrative of events, internalised by company and regimental relationships. It is used to "limit the spread of crisis" within individuals and their wider community and reach a settlement where the drama is no longer affective.

As the oath of loyalty and articles of war instructed, a soldier maintained his honour by his ability "in every place, and at all times to bravely and manfully fight" with "resilience and valour before the enemy". The identity these words created provided resolutory narratives with which to ward of the "crisis" of battle, offering descriptions for men to navigate the effects of battlefield violence, legitimising the transformative change it brought to the self.<sup>93</sup> As shall be shown here, it was these forms of military virtue attached to the *Soldat Bürger* that became the focal point of men's lives during war and in its retelling. The honour they exhibited, as they judged it, allowed them to redress the "social drama" of violent battlefield death on their psychology, leading to a final settlement and the means to muster the fortitude required to confront it again.

For soldiers of the emperor Francis, facing the fire of the enemy and following the will of their monarch, despite potential death, was a sign of loyalty and duty soldiers guarded fiercely, taking great pains to narrate their actions, and responses to violence in ways that indicated their duty was carried out, and honour was sought and obtained.<sup>94</sup> As part of a

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<sup>93</sup> Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*, 36-42; Turner, "Social Dramas and Stories about Them," *Critical Inquiry* 7, no. 1 (1980): 141-68.

<sup>94</sup> The conscript Johann Schnierer labelled his first engagement in 1809 as a place where he had met his obligation see Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 10. "Ob ich in diesem meinem ersten Kampfe meine Schuldigkeit wohl auch getan habe, lasse ich, wie folgt, meinen Hauptmann selbst aussprechen"; Zehetbauer, *Landwehr gegen Napoleon*,

counter-offensive in April 1794, Zagitzeck described how *D'Alton* was tasked with clearing the French defensive positions east of the Austrian Netherland city of Arlon in a frontal assault at dawn. In his account Zagitzeck remembered how the three battalions of *D'Alton* were urged on by Beaulieu, the “Old Hero” (*alte Held*), whose presence meant the unit could increase its honour by performing under his guidance. Inspired by Beaulieu, the regiment pushed aside a screen of skirmishes before storming the redoubts and capturing six cannons and 150 prisoners. The losses, however, “were not insignificant”. As Zagitzeck wrote:

Lieutenant Pachta and ensign Gering were killed by the enemy battery, Lieutenant Brummel was shot through the left foot by canister fire, Captain O'Fallon was wounded and, I believe, 100 men from sergeant-major down were killed or wounded.”<sup>95</sup>

In Zagitzeck’s account the experience of witnessing the effects of modern weaponry was alleviated by the honour the regiment had gained through its performance on the battlefield. Importantly, the courage shown by its commander under the direct guidance of Beaulieu, and his performance as both a soldier and a loyal “*Niederländer*” reflected well on those who were part of the regiment.<sup>96</sup>

Honour could also be gained from the actions of those on the battlefield from the same branch of the army or local region through a unit’s association. In the preceding engagement around Arlon on April 17, Zagitzeck highlighted the importance of infantry regiment *Kinsky* Nr. 47’s performance in holding the right flank as the army was forced to retreat. Despite the losses the regiment sustained, it had fought against an enveloping French brigade with “courage” and as “brave Bohemians”. According to the ensign, their performance won them “much honour”, not only for the regiment but for other Bohemian units like *D'Alton*, whose men could take pride in the prestige won by their fellow countrymen even in defeat.<sup>97</sup>

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99-102. Zehetbauer documents the jealousy regular soldiers exhibited on hearing the *Landwebr* could adorn their uniforms with the same marks of honour they did without having to face the enemy on the battlefield. Similar psychologies of honour can be found in the Prussian army of the Seven Years’ War and the Imperial army of France see, Katrin Möbius and Sascha Möbius, *Prussian Army*, 129-35; Michael J Hughes, *Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée*, chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>95</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 1, 13.

<sup>96</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 1, 11.

<sup>97</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 1, 9.

Victory also brought honour, pacifying the horror of witnessing death and of one's own. Johann Nuce's account of the Battle of Rivoli, detailed the death of a sergeant wounded in the stomach during the storming of a French battery. In agony the sergeant begged the cadet to end his life with the butt of his musket. The look of pain in the man's eyes forced Nuce to grip the dying man around the neck, but he could not bring himself to end a "Christian" life in such a way. The pain of both men was soothed, however, when the cries of victory from their unit could be heard from the next French battery. The assault had been successful, honour had been won, the man's death was not in vain. Recognition of this, Nuce remembered, sparked in the dying man's eyes, who on hearing the cries of his comrades died with a smile on his face. Death, the cadet believed, was accepted by the soldier as worthy, now that their unit had collectively achieved the honour of victory.<sup>98</sup>

The honour gained from fighting as part of a collective and stoically enduring the full force of the enemy was a key part of Johann Schnerer's, then a corporal from the Bohemian infantry regiment *Wallis*, first experience of combat at Ostrach on March 21, 1799. An experience illustrating the communal nature of military service for common soldiers, and how the honour and standing of a regiment secured on the battlefield was worth the effects of war on individuals. In his memoir Schnerer recounted that from 10 in the morning the three battalions of *Wallis* were exposed to musket and artillery fire as they advanced a mile to the French positions east of the Bavarian town of Ostrach. After reaching the outskirts of the town, the regiment engaged in a firefight with the enemy from 100 paces. A few days later, on the March 25, *Wallis* was part of the Battle of Stockach where it fought in heavy woods. Schnerer described that at 8 in the morning, "fire from the skirmishes erupted all along the battle line on both sides until the evening, before the enemy retreated on the 26th and 27th through the Black Forest and on into Switzerland." The losses suffered by the army, though small in comparison to battles in the later stages of the war, lingered with Schnerer who concluded, "the two engagements had given the army many dead and wounded. These included (Prince)

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<sup>98</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen* 88-89.

Fürstenberg, and the *Kaiser* infantry regiment's colonel, Prince Anhalt, who were also among the dead.”<sup>99</sup>

Whilst Schnerer documented the time, place, and brief snippets of what occurred during these engagements, he recounted very little of how he felt. However, the conduct and actions of *Wallis* was enough for Schnerer to neatly explain his experience, communicating for his family, many who were also soldiers, the effects marching against a mass of men with the intent to kill had on oneself. His actual involvement in the assault at Ostrach and Stockach left him with very little to say, as it was experienced as part of a larger body of men, performing collectively the intricate manoeuvres of a regiment deployed into line.<sup>100</sup> What he could relate, however, was the honour achieved by the Monarchy's most prominent military figures, whose actions encompassed the motivations and experiences of all present. Schnerer wrote proudly of the archduke Charles' assault on the French centre at Stockach at the front of a column of grenadiers - the actions of the imperial family member encapsulating the behaviour he and the army exhibited on the battlefield.

In retelling his involvement in the First Battle of Zurich in 1799, Schnerer conveyed the courage, virtue and valour shown by his regiment's proprietor, Oliver Wallis, killed as he led an assault of grenadiers, intent on depicting the same devotion and enduring abilities the men of his regiment had shown during the engagement. The veteran soldier did this by first describing how men of the first and second battalion of *Wallis* were subjected to “canon and cartouche until the afternoon” remaining in position during the “bloody battle” until its end, before camping amongst the bodies of “3 officers, and 109 men from sergeant-major down,” who had been killed, along with the “7 officers and 187 men” wounded. After detailing the determination of his regiment, Schnerer's narrative immediately turned to Wallis's honourable death. A scene which in its reciting was depicted as part of the regiment and Schnerer's experience of the battle. The proprietor's death provided Schnerer a narrative and a face with which to highlight

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<sup>99</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 3.

<sup>100</sup> Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, 74.



the ability of the men within his regiment to collectively endure the battle's violence, overcome its debilitating effect and contribute to victory. By retelling his own war in this way, Schnerer used the Monarchy's most prominent military figures, whose actions and courage to face death brought honour, to symbolise the motivations and experiences of all present.<sup>101</sup>

The desire for honour, sometimes promoted the want for battle. Hussar troop leader Pauliny recalled in his diary that honour won in battle drove him and the hussars he commanded to seek out ways to face the enemy. Yet, as he recollected, the initiative demanded of light cavalry, and the honour this fostered within their units, could turn into impetuosity, leading men to their deaths. Near Kamionek, just outside Warsaw in 1809, Pauliny recounted how his section was so eager to come to grips with the enemy they recklessly pursued a cavalry screen until the Polish reached the safety of an infantry line. Such was their desire to defeat the enemy and gain honour, many ignored Pauliny as he dismounted and "implored them to curb their belligerence and follow me with prudence and calm." None of his ideas, he remarked, were able to restrain the pugnacity of his men, who had taken umbrage at the jeering of the Polish infantry, forcing Pauliny to follow them as the "daring crowd rushed forward". They were met with levelled muskets and bayonets, leaving some dead and those who survived promising never to "anticipate" their commander again.<sup>102</sup>

Four years later, during the army of Bohemia's campaign in Saxony in 1813, officers and men used the narrative frameworks provided by their military honour, highlighting the professional performances of themselves and their units on the battlefield even after loss. Hibler and Zagitzeck, both captains in the regiment *Zach*, participated in the Battle of Dresden. Their corps, commanded by Johann von Klenau, disintegrated as heavy rain flooded the River Weißeritz, leaving the infantry vulnerable to the massed cavalry charges of French cuirassiers.

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<sup>101</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruchstücke aus meinem Leben*, 4; See also Ian Germani, "Mediated Battlefields of the French Revolution and Emotives at Work," in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*, eds., Erika Kuijpers, and Cornelis van der Haven (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 173-94, esp., 174. Germani argues that under Napoleon French soldiers' writings also mediated the effects of battle using the virtue and honour of their leaders, whose actions encompassed the details of soldiers' stories.

<sup>102</sup> Kowelsdam, "Bruchstücke aus dem Tagebuche," *ÖMZ*, no. 3 (1863), 326-27.

Hibler's account of the battle is dry, echoing in parts the regimental diaries that were kept by each unit's adjutant. He communicated the general strength of the French cannonade, how the heavy rain had made it impossible for the men to fire their muskets, and the tactical inflexibility of *division massée* when defending villages. Previously, defeat had reduced Hibler to despondency, his writing communicating his own disappointment in his performance as a soldier, as well as the army at large. Yet after Dresden, the captain's reflection covered none of his own inner reactions, nor did he dwell upon defeat. Instead, he drew upon the army's culture of honour to emphasise the dutiful performance of the soldiers, summarising the vicious battle by praising the army, which had "shown a degree of steadfastness, resoluteness and courage worthy of its glory even in the most unfavourable situation."<sup>103</sup>

Zagitzeck's account of Dresden was also brief. Instead, he lingered on the skirmishes his company took part in as the rear guard of the army in the days after the battle, writing with pride of the small victories he won as its commander. In his memoir, Zagitzeck detailed the prisoners his men captured in these engagements, two of which, he made sure to point out, were the French marshal Murat's aide-de-camps. Later he wrote of his company's actions in alerting his corps to a combined attack by the French near Großwaltersdorf, 15 kilometres south of Freiberg in Saxony. In the engagement between probing French skirmishes and Zagitzeck's picket, the enemy were compelled to retreat thanks to the "brave resistance of Lieutenant Merliczek...who thwarted the enemy's plans", forcing them to leave five dead in the village's churchyard. An indication, he wrote with professional satisfaction, that his company had left the enemy with many more wounded. Of note was the performance of Zagitzeck's cadet who was wounded, but "behaved very well", suffering his wound with the calm and grace expected of an infantry officer.<sup>104</sup>

The captain Ignaz Berndt, from the Bohemian infantry regiment *Prinz Reuss*, also saw the battlefield as a place where regimental honour could be won, and personal success achieved.

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<sup>103</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 44.

<sup>104</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 39.

His narrative of the war located his own experience as central to its retelling. This not only shrunk the battle to what he could see, but also to what he wanted from it. At the second Battle of Kulm on September 17, 1813, Berndt recounts how his regiment, standing in a *division massée*, was assaulted by a combined attack of French cavalry, artillery, and infantry, which he remembered left many dead and wounded men.<sup>105</sup> Yet the ferocity of the assault, Berndt wrote, provided him with an opportunity to excel. In his memoir he recounts how part of his battalion under the direct guidance of the Habsburg corps commander, Count Hieronymus Karl Colloredo-Mansfeld, was ordered to storm the village of Arbesau (*Varvažov, Czech Republic*). A moment in which Berndt later described as a “favourable opportunity”. Seizing it, the captain wrote, he led two companies into the village without concern for his own safety. A point he made by detailing the mass of fire directed at him and the three bullet holes he found in the overcoat, which he had worn rolled up and hung slung sash-style over the shoulder. He also noted he was wounded in his left foot. Many others under his command were killed, and when the assault was repulsed, Berndt highlighted the intensity of the fight by remarking his men were forced to leave their bodies behind. Soon the village was once again recaptured by a combined effort by soldiers from *Prinz Reuss*’ two battalions.

Emphasising the importance of battlefield achievements and the honour it could bring as a motivator in war; Berndt wrote that the day after the battle a “debate” had broken out between officers in his battalion and officers from the regiment’s second. The exchange was over who had secured the village of Arbesau, the details of which would be included in the regimental commander’s report to army command. Berndt, his company’s second in command, as well as a fellow captain from the first battalion, stated that it was their men who secured the village and captured a French cannon, long before the intervention of half the second battalion under Captain Mende. To resolve the issue and soothe the tension between the two parties

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<sup>105</sup> ÖStA, KA, NL, B/683, Bern(d)t, Ignaz, fol. *Bemerkungen aus dem Leben eines Pensionierten Stabsoffiziers der österreichischen Armee*, 242-43.

within his regiment, the colonel Joseph Söldner mentioned all the men involved in the attack, sharing the honour evenly.<sup>106</sup>

Johann Schnierer, previously a conscript in the *Deutschmeister* regiment, and now an experienced corporal in a jäger battalion, remembered the invasion of France in 1814 as, “a happier campaign”. Soldiers were now, “setting foot on the enemy’s soil, following the double eagle, well dressed and shod and no longer bent over by the oppressive feeling of defeat, but striding forward on victorious wings.”<sup>107</sup> As a specialised skirmisher Schnierer’s war was different to his experiences in the regular infantry. Instead of trading volleys with the enemy in massed ranks, he now fought as part of a small group, independent from the control of company officers. He was expected to use his initiative, a point made to him when he was transferred into the jäger battalion in 1813, an honour which motivated those who fought as “pale-grey warriors”.<sup>108</sup>

The honour these men had been given after being assigned one of the specialist roles in the army meant they were expected to exceed the performances of the line infantry. A point Schnierer highlighted in his recount of the Battle of La Rothière, which was fought on February 1, 1814. There the sergeant and his battalion began the battle in a dry ditch, lying low on their stomachs as they engaged with a line of French skirmishes. Soon the French dispersed and behind them came a column of infantry with fixed bayonets, urged on, as Schnierer remembers, by the constant shout of “Advance”. The jäger recounted how his company retreated before the advancing infantry, but before the line broke out into a disordered run, the division commander, *major general* Count Anton Leonhard von Hargegg, shouted over the noise, ‘Shame on you, Jägers! Advance!’. This, Schnierer remembers, spurred him on and:

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<sup>106</sup> ÖStA, KA, NL, B/683 Berndt (Bernt), Ignaz, *aus dem Leben eines Pensionierten Stabsoffiziers der österreichischen Armee*, 244-45.

<sup>107</sup> Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 43.

<sup>108</sup> Schnierer, 29.

without thinking of rank...and like a good Jäger, I raised my rifle (*Stützen*) and with all the power of my voice let out an 'Advance!' that drowned out all the whizzing shots before yelling, '*Stützen-Jäger*, follow me! Follow me, *Stützen-Jäger*! Advance! Advance!<sup>109</sup>

The use of *Stützen-Jäger* as a rallying cry, Schnierer recounted, was especially important as these were soldiers singled out in the battalion for their expert marksmanship, and their honour demanded they turn and fight. According to Schnierer, although only a select few bore this rank, the whole battalion turned with fixed bayonets to engage the French who in response levelled their muskets and fired. Despite the volley, which killed several Habsburg soldiers, the French were forced to retreat, leaving the jägers with the ditch and their honour intact.<sup>110</sup>

Despite honour's ability to motivate men to fight and positively interpret their battlefield experiences, the reality of the unburied dead, charred corpses, the sights and smells of wounded bodies and moments of mortality could not be forgotten, or at times these affective sights negotiated without the help of comrades. The cavalymen Grueber's account of Hohenlinden, his first taste of massed action, reveals how bravado and comradeship were used to draw on honour's ability to negotiate the debilitating effects of war on men's psychology after he experienced an extreme moment of violence. After a succession of volleys had driven back his cuirassier regiment, and a mad dash through the snow to safety, Grueber remembered the young soldier's troop commander turning to him, and after seeing the look of strained pain on his face as the battle intensified, declared "it seems my dear cadet, that you have canon fever".<sup>111</sup> The cadet did not have to fend off what was a good-natured accusation used to relieve the tension of the moment, as one of his comrades pointed out that Grueber's left foot was badly wounded, allowing him to retire to the regiment's field hospital.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Schnierer, *Aus der Franzosenzeit*, 47.

<sup>110</sup> Schnierer, 54. The bloody fighting had given Schnierer an opportunity to put himself forward and further his own standing within the regiment. An act acknowledged by his captain who, "on his own initiative", presented Schnierer to the Battalion commander after the battle. On hearing the tale, the colonel ordered the actions of Schnierer mentioned in dispatches, a sign of honour that reflected well on the corporal, the regiment, and on the officers, who had effectively husbanded such commitment in their men. Field marshal Count von Wrede awarded "*Oberjäger* Schnierer" the gold Bavarian medal for bravery, along with a silver to "*Unterjäger* Kramer and *Gemeiner* Ferkel". See page 61.

<sup>111</sup> Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 19. "*Wie es scheint ... haben sie, mein lieber Kadett, das Kanonenfieber?*"

<sup>112</sup> Grueber, 20-21.

The remark uttered by Grueber's commander, however jovial, highlights an effect of battle on men which, whilst less identifiable than the physical wounds received in action, could render them just as useless as soldiers as shot and shell. Canon fever was understood by contemporaries as an uncontrollable fear that came after an engagement and exposure to battlefield violence. Something that, as its names suggests, was a form of sickness which deprived men of their fortitude and ability to modulate their emotions and fight again. As Grueber's commander's remarks to his young cadet make clear, canon fever namely affected recruits, or those who had little experience of violent death. These men, thanks to the shock at what they had witnessed, were psychologically overcome and unable to commit again to battle.<sup>113</sup>

In this moment at Hohenlinden, Grueber's company commander, aware of the debilitating effects of battle on men's psychology, is, relating back to Turner's model of "social drama", reminding the young man of his "star group" - his military community - the one who he cherishes the most. By jovially, and antagonistically, teasing Grueber about his reaction to battlefield violence, the "breach" in the young man's life is closed, psychological crisis averted (Canon fever), and his fear placated by the desire to be seen as part of the group.<sup>114</sup> To put it another way, the commitment honour manifested in Grueber's company served, using Turner's words, as the "implicit social process" to reconcile the "overt drama" of battle and "manifest performances" within soldiers.<sup>115</sup> For Grueber, honour - his commitment, fortitude, courage, comradery - was evoked in order to give meaning to the violence, a "redressive phase", providing an "appearance of sense and order to the events leading up to and constituting [his] crisis" at Hohenlinden.

At times, however, honour failed to alleviate the moroseness of defeat within men and across entire armies, as Hibler's accounts of the end of the Second Coalition reveal, when the

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<sup>113</sup> Marian Füssel, "Emotions in the Making: The Transformation of Battlefield Experiences during the Seven Years' War (1756– 1763)," in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*, eds., Erika Kuijpers, and Cornelis van der Haven (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 149-72, esp. 154.

<sup>114</sup> Turner, "Social Dramas and Stories about Them," 150-52.

<sup>115</sup> Turner, 154.

military communities it constructed broke down. Writing during the terrible weather of the days that followed Hohenlinden, which saw the Habsburg army wearily retreat to the Austrian town of St. Pölten, the young officer expressed his utter despondency at the way in which the war had gone, as well as the misery he and those he commanded were subjected to. What was the point of honour, he demanded, if none of his superiors carried out their duties in accordance with the demands it placed on them? The army, he wrote, was “far weaker in numbers than the enemy” and “the moral effect of so many victories on the one hand and so many misfortunes on the other had made the disparity between the two sides even greater.”<sup>116</sup> A fact later compounded by a desperate winter which left Hibler angrily lamenting the conditions of the army as it gathered at St. Pölten in February 1801. There he wrote:

our bodies only wrapped in rags, with covered faces, bare feet, numb senses, behind us the traces of our own devastation. In the hearts of all the curses of our fate. During one and a half terrible winter months [where there was] not a single day of rest under the protection of a roof, and where there were twenty-three winter days of uninterrupted marches on the most miserable paths, where usually 10, 12, or 15 hours were spent. Deprivation of sleep, terrible lack of food and clothing. No example, no encouragement from above, therefore no more trust, no love, no obedience from below. What progress, what decisive things could one rightly expect from this army?<sup>117</sup>

As Hibler’s lament emphasised, battle had to be viewed as a place where honour and recognition was preserved and won in front of invested peers if it was to condition men to accept death and exemplify the “resilience and valour before the enemy” needed of a *Soldat Bürger*.<sup>118</sup> A process which created professionals who were skilful and rational, able to perform collectively under pressure, and no longer disturbed by the immediacy of violence. Underscoring this view of war for Habsburg soldiers as a collective investment, John Bellew who fought the Ottoman Empire, chose to accept the death of his cousin Pat on the battlefield as the way in which his relative’s honour was restored, and his military integrity saved. In a letter from December 1788, Bellew wrote of his cousin’s death, beheaded after he was captured fighting as part of the rear guard during the armies retreat near Mehadia (Romania), as an end

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<sup>116</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 34.

<sup>117</sup>Hibler, Part 1, 35.

<sup>118</sup> *Dienst-Reglement für die K.k. Infanterie*, 2: 2-4.

the family should cherish. It meant the dead officer could lay claim to some honour to restore his tarnished image. A drunk, detested by his fellow officers and men and labelled a “bad character” by John, Pat’s fate, Bellew wrote to his brother in Dublin, meant he would be respected in death by his comrades for he had finally exhibited the prescribed behaviours of a Habsburg officer.<sup>119</sup>

This continued understanding of battle as place where honour was earned and maintained because of violence collectively endured was still held by soldiers in the last year of the war with France.<sup>120</sup> The veteran Zagitzek, who fought the French in 1792, was in France during the last weeks of the war in 1814 where the fighting was as fierce as he had experienced. The enemy fought ruthlessly and desperately, the inhabitants of villages aggressively assisted their countrymen in uniform, and the laws of war had been forgotten, leading to prisoner’s executions. Yet Zagitzek, a veteran whose honour had always been used to moderate his experience of violence, recounted in his last battle, one which was a “murderous and decisive moment” as his regiment defended the bridge at Montereau in the middle of February 1814, as worth experiencing as it allowed his unit to show considerable fortitude and resilience, and obtain honour.

At Montereau the regiment *Zach* was confronted by the veterans of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard; whose attack threatened to pierce the allied centre. It was at this moment, Zagitzek remembered, “the battle took on a serious character on all sides.” As the assault began, and indicating the gravity of the situation, the regiment’s *Leibfahne* was assigned to Zagitzek’s company. It was believed safe in the village of Surville whilst “Napoleon, who wanted to master the position by nightfall, stormed with all the troops at his command”. Soon the guard smashed through the Württemberg regiments stationed in the centre of the allied line,

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<sup>119</sup> NLI, CL no. 33, MBP, Ms. 27, 188, Bellew, *Dublin* (7 May 1787).

<sup>120</sup> Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 99-100. For example, whilst acting as an adjutant in Russia for Schwarzenberg’s corps, Grueber forgot to deliver a message from the corps commander to a division leader on the eve of a battle. The shame this brought Grueber hindered any advancement and led to his ostracisation in the corps’ upper hierarchy. This he tried to alleviate by displays of fanatical, and suicidal displays on the battlefield. After 1812, Grueber left the Habsburg army and took a commission in the Bavarian force with the hopes of securing more lasting patronage.



exposing the Habsburg units in reserve. The only indication Zagitzcek had of this was from the allied commander, Friedrich Wilhelm Karl, Crown Prince of Württemberg, who as he galloped past the captain's company yelled "hold as fast as possible", before he headed for the bridge and safety. Following quickly behind the crown prince were a group of hussars thought to be his escort, and it was only after Zagitzcek's corporal pointed out they were French did the company open fire, stalling the cavalry's pursuit. The French infantry followed behind the cavalry and in the streets of Surville hand to hand combat broke out between *Zach* and the oncoming enemy.

In the ensuing engagement Zagitzcek was wounded in the shoulder by a hussar's sabre, had his shako knocked off his head by a second Frenchman's weapon, and he suffered a blow to his arm lucky to have come from the flat of a sword. All the while, he recounted, the French screamed at the Habsburg soldiers "*contra les Marie Louis*" (*you are fighting the Marie Louises*) as they cut them down. Zagitzcek wrote that as he stood in "the middle of the slaughter, expecting death," he looked around to see:

Major Kollar on the ground covered with wounds, First Lieutenant Endemann was wounded by a stab in the face, Lieutenant Morwitz was dead, the sergeant at my side, hit by a bullet, fell dead at my feet. What remained was captured [after which] several of the men, and a few of the officers were murdered by some of the townspeople.<sup>121</sup>

The retaliatory killing of prisoners was stopped by some of the French soldiers, but only after the inhabitants of Montereau and the hussars pilfered the captured, demanding money, clothing and watches from their prisoners. One Frenchman threatened to shoot Zagitzcek if he did not hand over his wedding ring, but his murder was prevented by an Imperial Guard soldier who "reached for the pistol, took it from his hand and told him, "That is no way to treat a defenceless prisoner." The humiliation of "the most disgraceful of mistreatment" at the hands of the French after being taken prisoner, and the bloody cost of the loss in the last days of the war, was alleviated by a victory of sorts for Zagitzcek.<sup>122</sup> The stand of the regiment *Zach* had, according to Zagitzcek, "prevented the enemy's rapid advance to the bridge, thus giving the Hereditary Prince time to escape capture." For the old soldier, the honour he earned through dutifully serving his superiors and preventing France's total victory

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<sup>121</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzcek, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 51.

<sup>122</sup> Zagitzcek, Part 2, 50-53.

was solace in his defeat, enabling him to take meaning from the bloody murder of his comrades and the violence and cruelty he witnessed during his very last battle of the war.

Maintaining honour had given Zagitzeck purpose, and a community, which he fought throughout the war for and clung to until he was forced to retire in 1838. As an old man, despite palsy in his feet, a condition he attributed to 14 campaigns and thousands of traversed miles, Zagitzeck still hoped to remain with his regiment, devoted to the military honour he could only possess by protecting “with my sword, the sacred person of His Majesty, as well as the exalted imperial family, wherever it might be necessary, even with the last drop of blood.”<sup>123</sup> Fighting for the Habsburgs, and the honour this gave him, had made him the man he was in his old age. A fact, the foreword to his memoir stated, he wanted his children to know.<sup>124</sup>

## Conclusion

The campaigns of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, immediately following the Austro-Ottoman War, were experienced by soldiers of the Habsburg army as conflicts of incessant violence. Battles and skirmishes were regularly fought during protracted and arduous campaigns that continually demanded regiments commit exhausted soldiers. Some men vividly described the deaths they witnessed, the wounds they suffered, and the scale of modern weaponry to convey the brutal reality of their war. Others, without the ability to eloquently convey their memories, or writing for an audience with an understanding of war, simply listed the actions of their regiments and generals, knowing this was enough to convey their “inner experience”. As this chapter has shown, honour, as interpreted through the military culture of the Habsburg army, played a central part in mediating the trauma of violence and the suffering of battle, allowing men to understand their frontline experiences in ways which enabled them to continue to take on the citizen-soldiers of Revolutionary France, and the glory seeking men of Napoleon’s army. Honour was a set of traits - courage, compassion, discipline, obedience, fortitude - a man embodied in battle and campaign, which marked him out as a *Soldat Bürger*, an identity used by individuals to modulate their emotional reaction to and anticipation of battlefield violence.

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<sup>123</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Leben*, Part 2, 81.

<sup>124</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 1, 1.

The reaction to witnessing violence was constantly judged by soldiers according to their principles as fighting men, allowing them to evaluate war in ways that showed the moral progression and worthiness needed to be part of the Habsburg Military Estate. As soldiers were confronted repeatedly with the effects of battlefield violence, it was the social and personal pressure brought about by military honour that motivated men to accept the violent reality of war, teaching them to fatalistically accept its consequences. Honour specifically provided soldiers with a narrative to take meaning from the death and suffering they witnessed and the violence they committed, relating battle as a test where men used their identities as soldiers to evaluate their ability to endure and overcome the fear it induced in them. By passing the test of the battlefield men knew they acquired the respect of their comrades and leaders and the possibility of prestige.

As this chapter has explained, honour was a defined set of traits as well as a reward acquired by those who correctly maintained the character and virtue of a military servant of the state. This was a sense of meaning, as accounts have attested, which allowed soldiers to consistently defend the dynasty's way of life from the power of France despite decades of death and defeat. How much the narratives of these men and their violent experiences of war were understood, witnessed, or engaged with by subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy will be the topic of the next chapter.

## Chapter Five

### War Narratives: the *Soldat Bürger* and Dynastic

### Legitimacy

This chapter charts the representation of the Habsburg soldier during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, placing it within the Monarchy's rhetoric of popular wartime patriotism. It argues, along with the next chapter, the relationship between soldiers and civilians, between military service and political engagement within the Habsburg Monarchy was defined by the ideals of the *Soldat Bürger* and support for him. This was a professional identity and Old Regime model of military service thought by contemporaries to be undermined by the victories of Republican France's soldiers inspired by their new identity as citizens. Yet, as previous chapters have shown, the conflict with France did not necessitate, or even demand, a sharp break with the Monarchy's previous ways of facilitating war. Instead, it reaffirmed the systems of conscription, motivation, military service and the loyal links between individuals, the state and their local societies already established. As this chapter argues, the *Soldat Bürger* was retained as the model of the fighting man within the Monarchy as it could be positioned within the government's narrative of the war as embodying local societies' loyal engagement with the dynasty, strengthening support for local war efforts. Simultaneously, the *Soldat Bürger* highlighted to the dynasty's subjects the emperor Francis' legitimate authority and commitment to defend the "happiness" and "justice" of his people from the tyranny of France. Importantly, in a war demanding more than ever, the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* asserted the cultural values of an

establishing bourgeoisie untouched by military exigencies, linking these characteristics to Habsburg legitimacy and mobilising the people who held them for the dynasty's struggle.<sup>1</sup>

## Fighting Tyranny

For subjects of the emperor Francis, the declaration of war from France on his personage was not, as the French intended, understood as an assault on the primacy and absolute power of monarchs, but an attack on the traditions and peoples of his domain. People, traditions and social orders the emperor was duty bound and entrusted by God to maintain, and whose loyal subjects looked to for protection.<sup>2</sup> From the beginning, the Habsburg war effort was narrated by its leaders as one which guarded the “happiness” of the Monarchy's people from invaders who wished to change Europe and enslave its inhabitants for their own benefit, using the false pretence of universal rights to mask their nefarious goals. The “enlightened philosophers of France”, as one official proclamation sneeringly labelled them, used liberty, fraternity and equality to entice good and honest people away from the safety of hierarchy before entrapping them as slaves for France's goal of destruction.<sup>3</sup> This was, as Viktor Bibl labelled, the “Swindle Myth”.<sup>4</sup>

The Habsburg narrative of France's egocentric focus on European destruction continued until the war's very end.<sup>5</sup> Initially the armies of France were believed to be the vanguard for a political ideology, and then for a despot, who would violently dismantle and

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<sup>1</sup> Ulrike Docker, “Bürgerlichkeit und Kultur- Bürgerlichkeit als Kultur. Eine Einführung,” and Docker, “Jeder Mensch gilt in dieser Welt nur so viel, als wozu er sich selbst macht'-Adolph Freiherr von Knigge und die bürgerliche Höflichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert,” in *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*, eds., Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, Ilona Sármany-Parsons, Péter Hanák and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1990), 95-104, 115-25.

<sup>2</sup> Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 162-163.

<sup>3</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, May 16, 1792, 1355-356, esp. 1355. This proclamation was issued by the Governor-generals of the Austrian Netherlands, Maria Christina and Albert Casimir of Teschen assuring the wider Habsburg populace the people of the recently rebellious province would reject the republicanism of France.

<sup>4</sup> Viktor Bibl, *Die Wiener Polizei: Eine kulturhistorische Studie* (Vienna: Stein-Verlag, 1927), 262-67. Donald E. Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police: Security and Subversion in the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1815-1830* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 11-36, esp. 22-23.

<sup>5</sup> “Manifest,” *Wiener Zeitung*, April 15, 1809, 1717-729. Who France was as an enemy of peace changed from its republican representatives between 1792-1801 to the emperor Napoleon from 1805-1815.

remove the purpose, position and safety of the emperor Francis' subjects.<sup>6</sup> The proclamations, publications and sermons communicated this message routinely and summarised the emperor as the head of the gracious and caring Habsburg dynasty whose members were devoted to the continuation of their subject's fatherlands.<sup>7</sup> France, its armies and then its emperor did not want to give Francis' people liberty, equality, or indeed fraternity, but death inspired by the despotism of the enlightenment's nihilism. In the first decade of the conflict, the Habsburg struggle was a religious war in defence of God from the Deism of the French. Against Imperial France, the Habsburg war effort was a crusade called by God against the scourge of the world answered by the Monarchy's people.<sup>8</sup> This was the reality of the Habsburg's war as related to its peoples.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, May 12, 1792, 1313-316. A proclamation issued by the governor-general of the Austrian Netherlands on April 29 by Archduchess Maria Christina and her husband Prince Albert Casimir, Duke of Teschen summarised the initial and then ongoing response of the Monarchy towards the French Republic. "...und wer konnte dommach söblind und unsinnig seyn, auch .nur das geringste Vertrauen den hinterlistigen Versprechungen und Versicherungen zu schenken, welche diese Tyrannen dem Volke machen, das sie zu unterjochen suchen, daß sie nämlich ihr Eigentum, ihre Religion, ihre Rechte, ihre Privilegien, ihre Landesverfassung in Ehren halten wollten, sie, die, seit dem sie in Frankreich das öffentliche Ansehen und alle Gewalt an sich gerissen haben, mit einer bis heutzutage unerhörten Schamlosigkeit und Vermessenheit, alle öffentlichen und die feyerlichsten Verträge, alle göttlichen und menschlichen Rechte...Nicht gegen die Fürsten der Erde, sondern gegen die Religion unserer Väter die bürgerliche Ordnung und gegen das Glück und den Trost, den diese und jene gewahrt, ziehen sie zu Felde, nachdem sie durch den Erfolg ihrer ungereimten Systemem, ihr eigenes Vaterland in alles Unheil der Anarchie versenkt haben."

<sup>7</sup> Joseph Schneller, *Predigt am vierten Sonntage nach Pfingsten, als der löbliche Stadtmagistrat, und die Bürgerschaft Wiens wegen der glücklichen Zurückkunft Seiner Majestat des Kaisers aus dem Feldzug dem Allerhöchsten in der hohen Metropolitankirche Feierlich dankte* (Vienna: Grund, 1794).

<sup>8</sup> Joseph Schneller, *Predigt Bey Gelegenheit Des Dreytägigen Kriegsgebethes Am Zweyten Sonntage in der Fasten: Gehalten in der Metropolitankirche Zu Wien* (Vienna: Mathias Andreas Schmidt, 1794), 4, 7-8. "Wie weit kommt man doch, wenn man den Zaum vollends ausschlägt, welchen der wahre Glaube, und die christliche Sittenlehre unserer verderbten Natur angelegt hatte? Eine Nation, welche sich für die feinste unter allen Nationen Europas hielt, deren Gebräuche und Moden nachzuahmen sich andere Völker beinahe zum allgemeinen Gesetze machten, geben wir nun in dem Abgründe eines namenlosen Elends, und einer ungläublichen Sittenlosigkeit liegen; sie will von Menschenrechten reden, und zeigt uns von allen Seiten zahllose Beispiele der grausamsten Unmenschlichkeit: sie will Freiheit einführen, und unterjocht das ganze Volk unter die Botmäßigkeit einiger nach ihrer Willkür raffenden Tyrannen: sie will das Reich der Vernunft erweitern, errichtet Tempel der Vernunft, widmet der Vernunft gottesdienstliche Ceremonien, und begehrt zugleich Thorheiten, derer sich barbarische Völker schämen würden. sie will die Menschen glücklich machen, und läßt in dem Eingeweide ihres eigenen Landes Ströme vom Menschenblute stießen, opfert ganze Haufen der Mitbürger wegen feichter Argwöhnt, wegen eines schuldlosen Reichthums, wegen anderer ungegründeten Ursachen der eigentlich zur Menschenschlachtung erfundenen Mordmaschine."; Karl Hartmann, *Predigt Zur Zeit Des Französischen Krieges* (Prague: Johann Diesbach, 1796); Karl Cleymann, *Der Krieg vor dem Richterstuhle der Vernunft und Religion: Eine Predigt* (Vienna: Gerold, 1813); Jacob Rudolph Khünl, *Predigt über Vaterlandsliebe* (Vienna: Mausberger, 1813). A discussion on the reception of these messages in Tyrol can be found in Cole, "Nation, Anti-Enlightenment, and Religious Revival," 487. Cole has demonstrated the success of this message and its reception in Tyrol, however across the Monarchy and with its mass of tenant farmers, cottars, labourers, craftsman and house servants it is harder to measure in the space allowed, but the memoir of the Bohemian artilleryman Franz Bersling offers an insight into what the common soldier understood of the war in the 1790s, reflecting the sermons of the Monarchy's religious leaders. See Bersling, *Der Böhmisches Veteran*, 35.

<sup>9</sup> KA, Flugschriften-, Plakat- und Zeitungsausschnittsammlung (FPZAS), Flugschriften- und Plakatsammlung (1600(ca.)-) (FPS), Flugschriftensammlung (-1812), fol., "Volker Oesterreichs!," April 8, 1809. For a discussion on how this narrative was maintained through censorship see Norbert Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur in Österreich von 1751 bis 1848* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2017), 93-121.

The representation of the soldier during the conflict with Revolutionary France and its reception by Habsburg subjects sat within this interpretation of the Coalition Wars. A message continually delivered in the Monarchy's "political public spheres" to combat the radical political culture emanating from Paris, detailing who had the right to power and authority in Europe.<sup>10</sup> Was it the people of a nation, and then an emperor elected by the people for life, as the French model demonstrated, or as Francis' government claimed, a divinely appointed ruler whose God had mandated was responsible for his subjects' lives? As seen in chapter three, the Habsburg soldier became part of the European intellectual discussions that sought to reconcile the tensions that came with the Republic's new, violent and triumphant political order after the victories of Revolutionary France in 1797. These military victories in Italy and the Austrian Netherlands were regarded as making a mockery of the power wielded by monarchs and the order their armies guaranteed. As Ute Planert, Ute Frevert, Karin Baumgartner and others have shown in their work on military masculinities and soldierly identities in the German speaking world, the depiction of the soldier mattered as it represented the very best of a people, its political ideology, and the way it governed itself.<sup>11</sup> Standing armies raised by princes, commentators argued, filled by soldiers motivated only by self-serving honour were no match for citizen-soldier who courageously sacrificed themselves for a community that empowered them, supported them, and who they loved.<sup>12</sup> Their victories indicated a new dawn was rising,

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<sup>10</sup> Jürgen Habermas, Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article (1964)," *New German Critique*, no. 3 (1974): 49-55.

<sup>11</sup> Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg*, 386-408; Ute Planert and Ewald Frie, "Revolution, Krieg, Nation - ein Universelles Muster der Staatsbildung in der Moderne?," in *Revolution, Krieg und die Geburt von Staat und Nation: Staatsbildung in Europa und den Amerikas 1770-1930*, eds., Ewald Frie and Ute Planert (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 1-20; Ute Frevert, "Citizen-Soldiers: General Conscription in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Enlightened War: German Theories and Cultures of Warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz*, eds., Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), 219-38; Baumgartner, "Valorous Masculinities and Patriotism. See also Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon*, 75-172. See also Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and Mischa Honeck, "War and Gender: Nineteenth-Century Wars of Nations and Empires-an Overview," in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 228-72.

<sup>12</sup> Gebauer, *Der Soldat*, 29- 30. Gebauer, writing on the moral qualities of a soldier and arguing for greater attention to the pursuit of "moral goodness" amongst officers and men in the Habsburg army, noted that fighting for and pursuing the wrong type of honour made men cold and detached. It created men who were purely dedicated to advancing their own interests through the killing of humans, the mistreatment of their subordinates with an eagerness to duel over any slight ("Wie soll Moralität sich äußern, solange es noch verzeiblicher scheint einen Menschen zu morden, als ein oft aus Übereilungen ungeschlüpftes Wort zu vergeben."). This created armies, he argued, like in Russia, where men were seen as animals and civilians were looked down upon with contempt and treated disdainfully. This widened the gap between the two *Stände*, he insisted,

the feudal power of the princes was over, and a new type of man was required. A citizen, not a subject.<sup>13</sup>

This narrative was pervasive, if not universally accepted, at a time when war was seen by enlightened intellectuals as a test of a people's character, and their right to popular political participation as demonstrated by the male inhabitants of a state.<sup>14</sup> The military masculinities provided by republican civic virtue, evoking the idealised and powerful ancient Greek and Roman citizen-soldier, was thought to have given men in France symbols of the perfect male citizen to copy long before they took to the field as soldiers, indicating republics were far better at providing successful and motivated fighters for the crucible of war, and thereby proving its superiority as a political regime.<sup>15</sup> It was better to have soldiers inspired by virtue, commentators agreed, than men devoted to corporate honour as a means of self-advancement, possessing a base form of "shame-driven courage".<sup>16</sup>

Yet even after successive defeats, as the next pages will show, the Monarchy continually reaffirmed the foundations of military service and its connections to the state as set out by Joseph II. It projected the model of the *Soldat Bürger* to urge its many different communities to continually commit to war and the social orders the dynasty protected. These men were servants of the state, this rhetoric highlighted, who derived their honour from serving the communities they came from and who exhibited these places' loyalty to the dynasty. It was the patriot's duty

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making conscription a process that was feared and reviled. For contemporary intellectual discussions on Prussian military motivations before 1806 see Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies*, 131-39.

<sup>13</sup> Stefan Dudink, "Citizenship, Mass Mobilization," 201-218. Baumgartner, "Valorous Masculinities," 329.

<sup>14</sup> Famously the archduke Charles, and his intellectual milieu within the Habsburg army, saw war as an evil that had to be contained. See *Grundsätze der höhern Kriegskunst und Beyspiele ihrer zweckmässigen Anwendung* (Vienna, k. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerey, 1808), 1-2. Conversely Schneller, the *Stephansdom* preacher, emphasised the productive qualities of war, enabling Austria to remove its own godless people and their "softness, costly attainments and sensuality" (*eurer Weichlichkeit, euren kostspieligen Ersetzungen, eurer Sinnlichkeit*). See Schneller, *Predigt Bey Gelegenheit Des Dreytägigen Kriegsgebethes*, 15. On war as seen across Europe as crucible for a state's strength and the virility of its men in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries see Bell, *The First Total War*, 58-62; Stephen Moore, "A Nation of Harlequins? Politics and Masculinity in Mid-Eighteenth Century England," *Journal of British Studies* 49, no. 3 (2010): 514-39; Susan Kingsley Kent, *Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990* (London: Routledge, 1999), 80-81; Nye, "Western Masculinities in War and Peace"..

<sup>15</sup> Landes, "Republican Citizenship and Heterosocial Desire," 98-99.

<sup>16</sup> Miller, *The Mystery of Courage*, 178-84. Miller argues that shame-driven courage was as prevalent in the military culture of citizen-armies, albeit it was not just one's comrades' men were fearful of letting down, but also the "fatherland". This, as we shall see, was also prevalent motivator in the Habsburg army.



to care and billet these men and support them with cash and kind. Moreover, monarchism was legitimate, the images of the *Soldat Bürger* exclaimed, and inspired the levels of martial virtue within men required to obtain peace and prosperity for the Monarchy's people. The acceptance of this military model by the establishing bourgeoisie of the Monarchy, as this chapter and the next argues, brought soldiers and civilians closer together, galvanising the systems and structures of military might in local areas and the loyalty of Francis' subjects needed for victory. The identity of the *Soldat Bürger* asserted the cultural values of these people, linked them to Habsburg legitimacy and made the dynasty's war effort their own.

## The Soldier of the Revolutionary Wars

The first attempts to engender a positive relationship between soldiers and subjects and stoke within the Habsburg populace a patriotic commitment to the dynasty's wars was undertaken during the conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Though the war has been highlighted as an unpopular one in the rural spaces of the Monarchy, the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire generated an outpouring of patriotic sentiment from the middling Viennese and the artistically gifted of the city who, thanks to the relatively light censorship laws under Joseph, celebrated the devotion, sacrifice and loyalty of the soldier.<sup>17</sup> During a time when military logistics and medical care relied on the civilian population, these were communities needed to care for, support and garrison men if the Monarchy's army was to operate effectively.<sup>18</sup> It was Joseph's initial light touch to public opinion and censorship which allowed for these connection between the cultural, social and political life of the Monarchy to develop. One, as Derek Beales has argued, utilised in ways that supported the emperor's alignment with Russia in its quest to win territory from the Ottomans in Moldavia. Using Mozart's *Beim Auszug in das Feld*, Beales has shown there was a clear example of war influencing the insular artistic culture of Vienna, the wider Monarchy, and the patriotic sentiments of Joseph's subjects.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, as Timothy

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<sup>17</sup> Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 27-35.

<sup>18</sup> See for example NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 28; Varnhagen von Ense, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 146-61; Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 21-26.

<sup>19</sup> Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform*, 103-04.

Blanning and Beales both articulate, the scenes of jubilation in Vienna after the capture of Belgrade in 1789 do not paint the picture of a war weary populace, but a defiantly expectant one fuelled by the political culture of the city.<sup>20</sup>

Beales analysis of the composer's time in Vienna firmly underlined a culture, which far from being averse to war, was happy to embrace it as something that nourished patriotic love and excised effeminacy.<sup>21</sup> Mozart too was not a man removed from the politics of the Monarchy, expressing his own sentiments when he wrote music to accompany these lines from *Beim Auszug in das Feld*:

So, brave warriors, fight with courage  
For your crowns of Honour!  
God himself will recompense  
Your Heroes blood at his throne!  
Your descendants will bless you too  
With warm and fervent thanks  
For every well aimed blow  
That once helped secure their happiness.  
For we're recording all your names,  
As if in the Book of Life,  
So that they can show you their love and gratitude,  
Your heroes, let it not be in vain!<sup>22</sup>

The collection of *Oesterreichische und türkische Kriegeslieder* released by Joseph Hraschanky in 1788, of which Mozart was a subscriber, celebrated the soldier as a symbol of loyalty in much the same way as *Beim Auszug in das Feld. Die Kriegesfurie*, the opening lyrics of the collection, likened war to a fire-breathing 'black monster' emerging from the east. A "gleeful" harpy who desired to darken the skies "to the horrors of faithful men". Yet all would be well, the song proclaimed, if the people of Joseph stood by him as their first soldier and hero, whose "arm fights the embers that threatens your doom". He was a warrior, the work concluded, who thanks to the courageous prayers of his people would return on "the victor's chariot."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform*, 104-06.

<sup>21</sup> Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform*, 103; Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 37-41.

<sup>22</sup> The above are stanzas 16-18, which have been translated by Derek Beales and Professor H.B. Nisbett and are found in Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform*, 107-10.

<sup>23</sup> *Oesterreichische und türkische Kriegeslieder* (Vienna: Joseph Hraschanky, 1788), 1-7.

The collection did not just exalt the emperor Joseph as the most courageous of soldiers. It also underlined the bravery and determination of common soldiers in *Der Kleine Karl und Seine Mutter. Ein Gespräch*.<sup>24</sup> This was a duet, placed in the final third of the collection, celebrating the sacrifices of the fighting man. It also urged the Monarchy's women to contribute to the war effort by relinquishing their sorrows and encourage their men to go and protect them from the "Turk". In this work Karl asks his mother why she cries and comforts her by claiming the janissary is no match for his father. Besides, the boy explains, father had "promised" he would return. The mother responds by explaining to the child her husband has not written, and news has come that "in a distant land, struck down by an enemy's hand, many German heroes lay". Far from sad, Karl promises that once grown he will pick up his father's sword, avenge him, and leave the enemies once "proud head to grow cold". The last stanza sung by the mother, cheered by her son's words "worthy of your Father", brings her child to her chest, safe in the knowledge there will be a new generation of heroes to come. This was the role of women in Joseph's wartime Monarchy: to tell their men to go, to stoically accept their death, and take solace in the fact their sons, made available for conscription by their local lords, would be brave warriors like their fathers.<sup>25</sup>

It was not just on the stage and in the lyrical omnibuses that the soldier was championed. In the papers of the Monarchy the soldier's experience of fighting the "Turks" was placed at the centre of reports detailing the efficiency and ability of the fighting man. These accounts in the *Wiener Zeitung* came from daily reports of the campaign provided by the army's headquarters located in Siebenbürgen (Transylvania) which encouraged the educated reading public to commit to the emperor's war with the same fervour as his troops.<sup>26</sup> Already in February 1788 the beginning of the conflict was reported extensively in the *Wiener Zeitung* with the preparations for war in late 1787 having been closely followed.<sup>27</sup> The early clashes between

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<sup>24</sup> *Oesterreichische und türkische Kriegeslieder*, 102-07

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, 107.

<sup>26</sup> See for example "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 9, 1788, 309-10.

<sup>27</sup> The first report documenting the movement of troops from Lombardy to Hungary can be found in "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, January 26, 1788, 171.

the army and the Ottoman garrisons along the Danubian basin were provided as part of almost daily accounts of the army's movements. Many of the first few pages of the newspaper's editions from February until late Summer 1788 included march timetables, allowing interested individuals the chance to see passing troops or follow their movements from the comfort of home. Military appointments were publicised, administrative reforms in the *Hofkriegsrat* were reviewed with the appropriate praise assigned to the emperor Joseph for his industry.<sup>28</sup>

By April, a special supplementary in the *Wiener Zeitung* entitled *Kriegsvorfälle* (War events) had been published twice weekly since February 16, summarising the events of each day based upon accounts sent by the army command.<sup>29</sup> These reports listed by name the officers killed and wounded in battle and the number of dead soldiers from each regiment. In most instances readers of the paper could experience the skirmishes and battles these men had fallen in by reading the *Kriegsvorfälle*, which took great care to evocatively highlight the commendable actions of the emperor's soldiers in the face of overwhelming odds.

These eye-witness reports, though supplying broad information, still evoked a little of what the soldiers along the Danube were experiencing. Described in ways that accentuated the valiant behaviour of soldiers fighting an enemy who launched repeated and ferocious attacks. The "Turks" were presented as stereotypes, tapping into the historical memory of Austria which had narrated the Ottoman Empire as the existential threat to European Christianity. The enemy was brutal, uncaring, savage, and warlike. The Habsburg soldier: brave, stoic, and loyal. A bastion against what must have seemed to the readers of *Wiener Zeitung* as a numberless horde, easily able to replace daily losses of 400 men. A report of the defence of castle Raman (*Tvrđava Ram, Serbia*) at Uj-Planka (*Banatska Palanka, Serbia*) by Lieutenant Baron Lo Presti and 23 men from the Further Austrian infantry regiment *Belgiojoso*, which was included in the first few pages of the *Wiener Zeitung* published on July 9, 1788, illustrates the typical way in which this narrative

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<sup>28</sup> "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 27, 1788, 469. This edition carried news of the emperor's streamlined reform to pension pay-outs for the widows of officers killed in battle. A task he apparently oversaw within the *Hofkriegsrat* after he was petitioned by men about to be deployed.

<sup>29</sup> "Erste besondere Beylage zu Wiener-Zeitung: Kriegsvorfälle, Nro. 14," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 16, 1788.

was conveyed by the paper.<sup>30</sup> On June 28, and faced with 3 or 4, 000 enemy soldiers, Lo Presti apparently urged his men to remain at their position and fight for the “honour of the Fatherland” until their “last drop of blood” rather than “stain the glory of the Austrian army with cowardly surrender”.<sup>31</sup> The “brave” lieutenant and his men fought with a fierce “spirit” and “heartiness” (*Herzhaftigkeit*) that seemingly astonished an enemy who were killed by every musket shot and sabre blow, leaving 400 of the Turks dead and a 100 wounded. The strength of the enemy was too much, however, and as the report details, Lo Presti and his command died at their posts.<sup>32</sup>

Their sacrifice was not in vain, the readers of the *Zeitung* were told, as the enemy failed to occupy the fort, leaving it open for the Habsburg forces to retake. Conveying the brutality of the enemy and their savagery, the report ended by noting the state of the soldiers’ corpses found in the citadel. All had been hacked to pieces with bladed weapons and repeatedly shot by the enemy. Some had even been dismembered, their limbs strewn across the ground, and what remained of their bodies thrown into the Danube. As befitting his rank, Lo Presti was buried in Uj-Planka with full military honours. His body, the report conveyed, bore the signs of his honour and duty, and attested to the barbarity of the enemy. His right arm was cut into three pieces, his left hand into two, a spear had been left in his body and he had two musket ball wounds.<sup>33</sup> These last details left the emperor’s subjects with no doubt as to what type of enemy his armies were facing, eliciting, it was hoped, greater support for a war widely known to be fought on behalf of the Russian Tsarina, Catherine II.

The emphasis on communicating the loyalty and dutiful conduct of the Habsburg soldier was present in the *Kriegsvorfälle* throughout the war with the Ottoman Empire. A narrative exemplified by the report carried in the *Wiener Zeitung* on October 10, 1789, covering

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<sup>30</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, July 9, 1788, 1688-689.

<sup>31</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” 1688.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 1689.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*.

the capture of Belgrade.<sup>34</sup> It was the army's most decisive victory, which to contemporaries rivalled the triumph of Eugene Savoy in 1717. It was also a military performance marking the zenith of Joseph's governance, achieved thanks to the dramatic reforms he introduced during his reign, and as the *Wiener Zeitung* pointed out, "His Majesty's troops' immense courage and cold-blooded determination".<sup>35</sup> The five-page report detailed the final assault that breached the outer walls of the city on September 29, recounting the bravery of the volunteers tasked with clearing the breaches made by the artillery. The language chosen to describe the actions of the men, and convey the behaviour of their officers, emphasised the qualities expected of a Habsburg soldier and the exemplary deeds these attributes induced. This narration of the assault, written as if General Laudon had provided the dictation, portrayed the ferocity of the fighting and its intensity. Men were cut down as they fought with bayonets and swords over the palisades and through the houses of Belgrade's suburbs.

The extremes the Habsburg soldiers had to go to as they fought the "Turks" was stressed in ways that conveyed how much the soldier excelled during the assault. The commendations provided by the report were listed in the descending order by rank as befitting a society divided between authorities and their subjects. The leaders of each attack column were praised for their "zeal", "well known zeal for duty" "efficacy", and ability to adapt to the demands placed upon them by the stresses of assault.<sup>36</sup> Regimental officers were praised for their tactical thinking and company officers for their courageous displays. The common soldiers were commended for "fearlessly" capturing the city's outer suburbs with "calm courage" and "determination" in the face of the enemy's "stubborn resistance".<sup>37</sup> These were the traits of the *Soldat Bürger* eagerly proclaimed to Joseph's subjects.

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<sup>34</sup> "Sieben und dreyssigste besondere Beylage zur Wiener-Zeitung: Kriegsvorfälle, Nro. 81," *Wiener Zeitung*, October 10, 1789. No page number was originally provided but I have assigned the supplement page numbers one to 37 for reference in the subsequent footnotes.

<sup>35</sup> "Sieben und dreyssigste besondere Beylage," 2. "Der kommandirende General, Feldmarschall Baron v. Laudon, äussert sich, daß er den ungemeinen Muth und die kaltblütige Entschloßsenheit, womit die Truppen, und ihre anführenden Generäle, Stabs und Oberoffiziere, diesen Sturm unternehmen und ausführen, Sr. Maj nicht genügsam rühmen könne, und es für seine Pflicht halte, diejenigen namentlich anzuführen, welche sich dabey ganz vorzüglich ausgezeichnet haben."

<sup>36</sup> "Sieben und dreyssigste besondere Beylage," 2. It is important to note *Diensteifer* was a term echoed by Johann Nuce in 1818 when he described a trait of the most honourable soldier, indicating its primacy in Habsburg military language.

<sup>37</sup> "Sieben und dreyssigste besondere Beylage," 3-5.

The heroic deaths of officers were a regular occurrence in the account of the siege, just as they had been in past reports. As Alan McNairn has explained of the artistic and literary depictions of the British General James Wolfe's death at Quebec, these men's last actions were narrated because despite their deaths, and apparent defeat, they had provided victory. They were, as McNairn writes of Wolfe, "heroic achievers" whose performance as soldiers before they were killed transformed their sorrowful death into something that could be joyously celebrated.<sup>38</sup> To have the reasons for one's demise recorded in the Monarchy's most widely read paper was to be immortalised and deemed honourable, providing soldiers with figures to emulate and a tangible study of what duty entailed. Moreover, the deaths of these men also served to expose the readers of the *Zeitung* to the lived experience of this war, albeit one narrated by military professionals whose culture of service minimised the effect of violent death. Even so, these *Kriegsvorfälle* were transparent enough for subjects of the Monarchy to relate to a little of the soldier's war, closing some of the distance in wartime experience between the military and civilian spheres.

The role of the *Wiener Zeitung* as a memorial to the deeds of the Monarchy's heroes diminished during the first decade of the war with France. This change informed by the introduction of press censorship and an altogether different approach to narrating war.<sup>39</sup> War was now the extension of dynastic policies, where knowing the plight of the soldier would somehow undermine the sanctity of the Habsburg throne, instead of strengthening it as Joseph had assumed. It was a view shared by most monarchs who believed war was not something that needed to concern the wider population.<sup>40</sup> The depiction of the soldier in civilian circles during the early campaigns with France was brief, relying on the memory of the fighting man imagined during the war with the Ottoman Empire. Peace with the Ottoman Empire and the financial costs of war had led to the demobilisation of the army, placing the soldier again at the periphery

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<sup>38</sup> Alan McNairn, *Behold the Hero: General Wolfe and the Arts in the Eighteenth Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 234.

<sup>39</sup> The most detailed explanation of how the censorship laws were applied can be found in W. E. Yates, *Theatre in Vienna: A Critical History, 1776-1995* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25-42. See also Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 168-74; Schmidt, "The Origin of 'The Austrian National Anthem'"; Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 151-61; Sheehan, *German History*, 283-86.

<sup>40</sup> Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 86.

of the Monarchy's culture as his importance to it dwindled.<sup>41</sup> The warriors lauded in the pages of the Monarchy's press were now quickly forgotten under the new emperor Leopold II and his son Francis.

It was because the war with France was fought on the fringes of the Monarchy in its first few years, with an enemy who did not threaten its very heart or appeared as terrifying as the Ottomans, and with those in government unflustered about the course of the struggle, that the soldier and his plight remained a distant concern for most of the urban population, even if, once again, the rural subjects of the new emperor Francis were increasingly meeting the cost of his war with their meagre wealth, their sons and brothers.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, it was not until the emperor took to the field in 1794 to win his first battle after the disasters of 1793, that the war and the soldier were ushered back into public discourse. In response to defeat the emperor Francis' government, military and the pulpit orators of the Monarchy's many faiths continually stressed that the systems of motivation and education found within the Habsburg army created valorous and patriotic subjects who could defend the dynasty's people from the barbarity of the French. These authors, religious preachers and government propogandists, attempted to accentuate the beneficial features of a system of soldiering that created "princes' armies", with the hope of bringing the civilian closer to the soldier, strengthening the processes and practices of the military that relied on the structures of old regime society.<sup>43</sup>

At the same time, the contemporary understanding that the Habsburg soldier served out of obligation and necessity, and the patriotic citizen out of love and devotion, created a dangerous idea that conscripts of the conservative armies were lesser fighters than the citizen-soldiers of the French.<sup>44</sup> Men who, in their bourgeois citizen-soldier identity, reflected more the ideals of the urbane in Vienna, Prague, Brünn and Pressburg than the conscripted soldiers of

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<sup>41</sup> Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 407.

<sup>42</sup> Hochedlinger, "Who's Afraid of the French Revolution?," 311-316; Roeder, *Baron Thugut and Austria's Response*, 81-139.

<sup>43</sup> For example see Schneller, *Predigt am vierten Sonntage nach Pfingsten*, 9-10, 19-20. Schneller likened the emperor on campaign and his brave warriors to the Israelite David who slew the Philistine giant Goliath. The proceeds taken from the sale of this printed sermon were, as the cover explained, "*Zum Besten der Wittwen und Waisen der in diesem Kriege vor dem Feinde gebliebenen Soldaten.*"

<sup>44</sup> Baumgartner, "Valorous Masculinities," 329.



the Monarchy they defeated. The disparate and weary lines of retreating soldiers, laden with the wounded, destroyed equipment and pitiful looks of resignation, seen outside of Linz in 1797 and then again in 1801, leaving the locals to fend for themselves, must have led some to question the motivations of those who served as their protectors.<sup>45</sup> And if this question were to follow to its logical conclusion, the victory of the French citizen-soldiers may also have justified a new world order. For if the armies of France defeated those of the emperor Francis, did that not mean their republican cause was just? Such thinking could not take root in the Habsburg psyche.

Along with stricter censorship, defeat in 1797 also meant the image of the soldier had to be rehabilitated by the government if these thoughts over political legitimacy were to be suppressed, wholesale support for further war generated and the effects harnessed.<sup>46</sup> In chapter three we have already examined how the military culture of the Monarchy's army was revitalised by a change to its material culture in 1798. At the same time efforts to garner a more popular perception of the soldier were also made in the Habsburg's public sphere by the government through the proliferation of printed material. In 1800, as the armies of Austria were campaigning in Germany and Italy, there appeared a series of 12 prints depicting the heroic achievements of the Habsburg soldiers in the first war against France (1792-1797). A little larger than a Royal Quarto (36.7cm x 28.7cm), they were drawn by the Vienna-based artist Vinzenz Georg Kinninger, who in addition to being a portrait and miniature painter was also a skilled copper engraver and lithographer.<sup>47</sup> Kinninger's mentor in Vienna was the vice-director of the Academy of Fine Arts, Friedrich Heinrich Füger, who in 1801 was appointed court painter by Francis, and it is through him that he most likely acquired the commission to initially produce

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<sup>45</sup> Anneliese Schweiger, "Die Stadt Linz in den Napoleonischen Kriegen," *Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz* (1981): 109-99; Herbert Wolderstorfer, "Schatten des Krieges: Napoleons armee Soldaten."

<sup>46</sup> For the uneven application of censorship across the Monarchy see Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur in Österreich*, 94-96, 203-11.

<sup>47</sup> Constantin von Wurzbach, "Kinninger, Vincenz Georg," in *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, Vol. 11. (Vienna: k. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1864), 271-73. Accessed August 18, 2021: <https://tinyurl.com/3e3hm4ue>

these 12 drawings, as well as the opportunity to capture the new uniforms introduced in 1798 and provide some of the frontispieces for the Habsburg army's annual military almanacs.<sup>48</sup>

These 12 scenes, later engraved by Adam Bartsch, depicted freezes from some of the most pivotal moments of the Habsburg Monarchy's war with Revolutionary France. Entitled "Heroic deeds of soldiers of the Imperial and Royal Army during the campaigns against the French between the years 1792-1799", these engravings portrayed common soldiers of the Habsburg army reversing the tides of battle or bravely carrying out their duty.<sup>49</sup> In most cases the common soldier is seen courageously killing troops of the French Republic and rescuing wounded or captured officers. Underneath each of the printed battle scenes, both German and French are used to describe the events. In the short paragraph there is a description of the battle and the date, and the heroic deed said to have taken place. Specifically, the rank, regiment and name of the soldier represented in the print is given. None of the men praised as heroic have a rank above sergeant, most are the lowliest of soldiers performing their duty. They are either maintaining the honour of the immediate superior, risking their life to alter the course of a battle or sacrificing their safety for the integrity of the regiment. These deeds are the reflection of the common soldier's selfless commitment to the common good.<sup>50</sup>

In one print, Johann Kleineden, a corporal in the infantry regiment *Huf*Nr. 51, is pictured carrying his wounded captain and section commander, Baron von Keseritz, as the regiment retreats to safety. We are told the corporal made sure Keseritz remained out of the hands of the pursuing French by carrying him until he commandeered a cart in the village of Bundenthal. The cart is placed to the right of the picture, hinting the ordeal for Keseritz is nearly over. In this print the viewer is shown, by the actions of Kleineden, the duty of the common soldier is best exemplified by service to his superiors, as much as his actions on the

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<sup>48</sup> Constantin von Wurzbach, "Füger, Friedrich Heinrich," in *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, Vol. 5. (Vienna: L. C. Zamarski & C. Dittmarsch, 1859), 1-3. Accessed August 18, 2021: <https://tinyurl.com/35vzxj6b>

<sup>49</sup> Vincent Georg Kininger and Anton Bartsch, *Kininger und Bartsch - Züge der Tapferkeit k. k. Soldaten* (Vienna: Tranquillo Mollo, 1800). Engravings, 36.7cm x 28.7cm, *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Accessed August 18, 2021: <https://tinyurl.com/km4uumc>

<sup>50</sup> See figures 1, and 5-15 in the appendices.

battlefield.<sup>51</sup> As viewers we are told adherence to the social orders and commitment to duty, created by hierarchy the French sought to dispose of, did not preclude virtue. The fundamental basis of a good and just society was only found in the monarchies of Europe where happiness and justice was maintained by obedience and the steady hand of authority. This, as previously established, was an important message championed by both the emperor Francis and the counterrevolutionaries of German speaking Europe.

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<sup>51</sup> Vincent Georg Kininger and Anton Bartsch, "Johann Kleineiden, Corporal des k.k. Infanterie-Regiments Huf," in *Kininger und Bartsch - Züge der Tapferkeit K.K. Soldaten* (Vienna: Tranquillo Mollo, 1800), figure 4. Engravings, 36.7cmx 28.7cm, *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Accessed August 20, 2021: <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243241>. The German script for figure 1 reads, "Johann Kleineiden, Corporal des k.k. Infanterie-Regiments Huf. Dieser wackere Mann rettete den 14 Sept. 1792, bey dem Rückzuge, während des grössten Feuers, als der Feind das Regiment verfolgte, den im Fusse verwundeten Hauptmann und Divisions-Commandanten, Baron von Koseritz, welcher ohne dessen Hülfe ganz gewiss in Feindes Hände gerathen wäre; er trug ihn fast allein über den Berg nach Bundenthal herab, und legte ihn in diesem Dorfe auf einen Karren, der sich eben flüchten wollte."



**Figure 1.** Johann Kleinsiden, Corporal des k. k. Infanterie-Regiments *Huf*. © Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection.

As the use of French and German in the accompanying text highlights, these images engaged with similarly educated cultured people who lived in both the cities and rural places of the Monarchy. The same people who news of the campaigns in the dry, pragmatic and detached army reports published in the *Wiener Zeitung* targeted.<sup>52</sup> However, these prints were a more vivid

<sup>52</sup> In Britain, military prints were for the petty bourgeoisie of the British consumer class, whilst in France prints were intended for the rural poor. See Jocelyn Anderson, “Views of Political Geography in the Seven Years’ War: Military Artists’ Prints and British Consumers,” *Oxford Art Journal* 41, no. 1 (2018): 19-38; David M. Hopkin, “Military Marauders in Nineteenth-Century French Popular Culture,” *War in History* 9, no. 3 (2002): 251-78.

portrayal of the valour and bravery of the soldier than found in city papers, containing rhetoric to galvanise the reading public's allegiances to the Monarchy and the social orders it protected. It did this by bringing soldiers and civilians closer together in an image of self-recognition that underscored the legitimacy of the viewer's society with the dynasty at its head.

Those being asked to see the soldier as one of them was a wide and establishing swathe of people, removed from and below the intellectual elite of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, whose understanding of the world and their moral frameworks was influenced by Weimar Classical and Jena Romantic literature from the 1770s onwards. Inspired by a popular enlightenment that sought to improve the intellectual and economic horizons of all, these corpuses provided an emerging bourgeois sentiment (*Bürgertugend*) shared by the wealthier rural peasant tenants and urban professional class (*Bürgertum*).<sup>53</sup> These were the men and women whose personal wealth and assets meant they did not have to fight, but which local regiments relied on for the billeting of soldiers and care for the sick and wounded.<sup>54</sup>

The *Bürgertum* were united less by their economic means than by a value system founded on diligence, industriousness, reflective awareness, emotional control, discipline and decency which were shared and discussed in new communal places like masonic lodges, casinos, salons, art, philanthropic and social societies.<sup>55</sup> These men and women inhabited a self-identity more closely aligned, intellectually and initially at least, with the revolutionaries of France as followers believed knowledge was gained through experience rather than being innate and

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<sup>53</sup> Jürgen Kocka, "Bürgertum und bürgerliche Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert: europäische Entwicklungen und deutsche Eigenarten," in *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich*, Vol. 1, ed., Jürgen Kocka (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 11-76.

<sup>54</sup> "Bürgertugend," *Carinthia. Zeitschrift für Vaterlandskunde, Belehrung und Unterhaltung*, September 25, 1813, 1-3. See for example the words of one soldier who mobilised this shared sentiment held by both soldier and civilian to support the army's needs in the days before the invasion of Italy in 1813

<sup>55</sup> Hans-Werner Hahn and Dieter Hein, "Bürgerliche Werte um 1800. Zur Einführung," in *Bürgerliche Werte um 1800: Entwurf, Vermittlung, Rezeption*, eds., Hans-Werner Hahn and Dieter Hein (Cologne: Bohlau, 2005), 11-27, esp. 22-23; Margaret Eleanor Menninger, "The Serious Matter of True Joy: Music and Cultural Philanthropy in Leipzig, 1781-1933," in *Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America*, ed., Thomas Adam (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 121-37; Pauls Daija, *Literary History and Popular Enlightenment in Latvian Culture* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 91-102. On Salon culture in Vienna and the sociability of the nobility *Bildungsbürgertum* and wealthier bourgeoisie see James Van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 215-23.

defined by status. Yet this group was more socially aligned with the arch conservatives of the Monarchy's political elite and had determined already by 1800 the eradication of social distinction was an "unimaginable utopia".<sup>56</sup> Horrified by the violent excess found in France before Thermidor, these people were mostly reform-minded conservatives, believing in the justice provided by the social orders of monarchism.<sup>57</sup>

In the Monarchy these people saw the values they cherished reflected by the emperor Francis, whose projected image from within the government was as an "honest defender of the rights of the people and of his cause", "truth and justice" and the "common welfare of Europe", who worked tirelessly to care for those at the very bottom of society.<sup>58</sup> Unlike the French who were said to care little for those they sought to rule, the emperor was believed to be a man of "fatherly kindness" (*väterliche Güte*) "merciful love" (*erbarmungslose Liebe*) and "compassion", which was the chief inspiration for "loyalty and devotion under the Emperor".<sup>59</sup> It was Francis' commitment to justice before the law, as well as the leniency he promoted through his office, which promulgated the idea that fairness was found all through society,

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<sup>56</sup> Wolfgang Ruppert, "Volksaufklärung im späten 18 Jahrhundert," in *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution: 1680-1789*, ed., Rolf Grimminger (Munich: Hanser, 1980), 341-361. Esp. 346-47; Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police*, 26-28.

<sup>57</sup> Sheehan, *German History*, 211-18; Smith, *Germany: A Nation in its Time*, 154-60; Karin Baumgartner, "Staging the German nation: Caroline Pichler's Heinrich von Hohenstaufen and Ferdinand II," *Modern Austrian Literature* 37, 1 (2004): 1-20; Birgit Eriksson, "Revolution, Modernity, and the Potential of Narratives: Self-Determination and History in Goethe's Works of the 1790s," *German Life and Letters* 66, no. 4 (2013): 368-87. For the response of many of these intellectuals to Napoleon see Elisabeth Krimmer, "Genius and Bloodsucker: Napoleon, Goethe, and Caroline De La Motte Fouqué," *Goethe Yearbook* 28 (2021): 243-62. Indeed, it was this same group of people who were viewed with the most suspicion by the government of Francis in the early years of the war, as in 1794 a ring of purported Jacobin imitators, made up of academics, ex-officials of Joseph's government, naïve youths, thespians and artists and a military officer, had been tried for treason after insinuating their world would be better off if they imitated France. See Walter Consuelo Langsam, "Emperor Francis II and the Austrian 'Jacobins,' 1792-1796," *The American Historical Review* 50, no. 2 (1945): 471-90.

<sup>58</sup> "Manifesto," *Wiener Zeitung*, 15 April 1809, 1718; Stollberg-Rilinger, *Maria Theresa*, 221-22; Derek Beales, "Joseph II, Petitions and the Public Sphere," in *Culture of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century*, eds., Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 249-68, esp. 252-54; Anna Fabiankowitsch, "Striking Images: The Public Image of Maria Theresa of Austria in Coins and Medals (1740-1780)," in *Empresses and Queens in the Courtly Public Sphere from the 17th to the 20th Century*, ed., Marion Romberg (Boston: Brill, 2021), 120-56. Francis's display of justice and sensibility was not specific to his reign. Rather it was a display that made the power of the monarch interpersonal, a persona adopted by many of the enlightened rulers of the late eighteenth-century. A process of governance which had permeated the dynasty's rule for as long as Francis's subjects could remember, and one that sought to control the image of the monarch in the public sphere.

<sup>59</sup> Schneller, *Predigt am vierten Sonntage nach Pfingsten*, 13.

despite its disparities.<sup>60</sup> This promoted loyalty within his subjects, but also made capital and corporal punishment more impactful, as those who were not granted clemency were understood to have broken their relationship with the emperor himself. This “personal government” founded on decency helped subjects connect with their wartime ruler, and if the ideals of the emperor Francis wielding firm but fair justice was far from obtained – his secret police were notorious in their handling of suspected deviants - the alternative rule as provided by the French was understood as an enslaving foreign, violent and impersonal tyranny.<sup>61</sup>

As part of the rhetoric aligning the emerging bourgeoisie of the Monarchy behind the emperor’s war, these prints argued the ideals of the perfect contributing member of society – from emperor to *Hausvater* - was also exhibited by the state’s defenders. Diligence, industriousness, discipline and obedience was possessed by the Habsburg soldier as demonstrated by their performance on the battlefield. Men whose military honour shared similar civic-moral values with the developing bourgeoisie social class these soldiers fought to protect.<sup>62</sup> The reception of the Monarchy’s representation of the soldier, and proof of audience, is provided by the publications of Heinrich August Ottokar Reichard, an extreme counter-revolutionary, who used the prints of Kleineden and five others in the 1801 edition of the *Revolutions-Almanach* in a chapter entitled “Explanations of Engravings from an Old Publisher: Six Examples of German Nobleness and Bravery” (*Erläuterung der Kupfer Vom Alten Herausgeber: Sechs Züge deutscher Edelmutb und Tapferkeit*).<sup>63</sup> Edited and published by Reichard in Saxony at the request of the Elector there, the *Revolutions-Almanach* was a journal that communicated at the

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<sup>60</sup> Langsam, *Francis the Good*, 149.

<sup>61</sup> Langsam, 150-51; Selma Krasa-Florian, *Die Allegorie der Austria: Die Entstehung des Gesamtstaatsgedankens in der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und die bildende Kunst* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), 45-54.

<sup>62</sup> Dieter Hein, “Arbeit, Fleiss und Ordnung,” in *Bürgerliche Werte um 1800: Entwurf, Vermittlung, Rezeption*, eds., Hans-Werner Hahn und Dieter Hein (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005) 239-52. Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, 30-37.

<sup>63</sup> Heinrich August Ottokar Reichard ed., *Revolutions Almanach, 1801* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1801), 208-11. The print in the *Almanach* (see figure 2) was a copy which appeared differently to the original, most probably to save space. The description for this print was one of eight, with some prints chosen left out but their accompanying text included. Kleineden’s story was also different to the original text but maintained the same flavour. It read “*Johann Kleineden, Corporal des k.k. Infanterie-Regiments Huf. Dieser mackere Mann rettete den 14 Sept. 1792, bey dem Rückzug, aus dem grössten Feuers, und vom Feind verfolgt, dem am Fuss verwundeten Hauptmann und Divisions-Commandanten, Baron Koserz, der sonst geniss in die Gefangenschaft gerathen ware. Er trug ihn fast allein über einen Berg nach Bundenthal hinaus, und legte ihm im Dorf auf einen, oben abfabrenden, Wagen.*”

popular level but, as Robert Palmer has explained, aimed to capture the sophisticated audiences who consumed the popular culture inspired by the Weimar-Jena movement<sup>64</sup> To Reichard the “Heroic deeds of soldiers” showcased the Habsburg army’s devotion to the cause of the reactionaries in the *Reich*, and their bravery highlighted the fallacy of the French Revolution and its extreme enlightened ideals.

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<sup>64</sup> Hahn and Hein, “Bürgerliche Werte um 1800. Zur Einführung,” 12-13; Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 706-08; Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 495-96; Norbert Oellers, “Literatur für die Mehrheit? Notizen über Heinrich August Ottokar Reichard und seinen ‘Revolutions-Almanach’,” *Aufklärung* 1, no. 2, *Französische Revolution und deutsche Literatur* (1986): 25-41, esp. 33; For a recent analysis of German interpretations of the enlightenment as it was applied in France see Amir Minsky, “The Men Who Stare at Cathedrals: Aesthetic Education, Moral Sentiment, and the German Critique of French Revolutionary Violence, 1793–1794,” *Central European History* 53 (2020): 23-47.





Ein Korporal trägt seinen blessirten Hauptmann  
aus des Feindes Mitte.

**Figure 2.** “Ein Korporal trägt seinen blessirten Hauptmann aus des Feindes Mitte,” *Revolutions Almanach*, 1801. © Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.

What these prints provided to the reader specifically, the explanatory note stated, were examples of the “bravery” (*Tapferkeit*), “noble courage” (*Edelmuth*) and “selflessness” (*Großherzigkeit*) found in the “well behaved” Habsburg army. Behaviour that was also present in the armies of the German princes and readers of the *Almanach*. The unfortunate thing was, the introduction went on to explain, Germans did not have the Habsburg tradition of capturing “deeds in a bright light and explaining it to the world through words”. Before showcasing the copies, the preamble concluded it hoped these pictures would motivate “patriots” to “organise similar collections for Germans to hang in their rooms that inspire imitation and honour!” The armies of Germany and the Habsburg Monarchy, as these examples proved, had a “La Tour d’Auvergne of their own”.<sup>65</sup>

These prints were then examples of the superiority of social hierarchy, serving for Reichard as rejoinders to the images of Théophile Corret de la Tour d’Auvergne, a French grenadier captain, who had been an ennobled officer from the Royal army. A man whose courageous dedication to the Republican cause and selflessness was championed by the government and army of the French Consulate as a paragon of citizen-soldier sensibilities which could only have been unearthed through fierce devotion to the nation and people’s participation in its governance. After La Tour d’Auvergne’s death at Neuburg in July 1800, he provided France with a symbol with which to rally its soldiers around, and project to the world the masculine qualities of a republic. He became a part of France’s pantheon, a symbol which explained the greatness and superiority of its new order founded on liberty.<sup>66</sup> The bravery and courageousness of its soldiers as symbolised by La Tour d’Auvergne was evidence of this enough.<sup>67</sup>

Yet the prints from the publishing house of Tranquillo Mollo proved abstract “universal” freedom did not amount to cultural or political superiority as exhibited by a state’s

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<sup>65</sup> Reichard ed., *Revolutions-Almanach*, 208.

<sup>66</sup> Eveline G. Bouwers, *Public Pantheons in Revolutionary Europe: Comparing Cultures of Remembrance, c. 1790-1840* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 91-130, esp. 93-102.

<sup>67</sup> Valerio S. Severino “Reconfiguring Nationalism: The Roll Call of the Fallen Soldiers (1800–2001),” *Journal of Religion in Europe* 10 (2017): 16-43.

armed forces. The scenes of heroic sacrifice in service to a higher authority by soldiers of the Habsburg Monarchy, depictions of scenes from the war that would hang up in bourgeois drawing rooms found within the realms of kings, exhibited the tangible fact that the soldiers of an emperor were just as brave, just as loyal, and just as courageous as those of a republican nation. The bravery of Habsburg soldiers of course was not a new message. Reports of the battles in both the Ottoman and French wars had always labelled the Habsburg soldier as “brave” and “courageous”, with his actions on the battlefield never publicly depicted as costing the Monarchy.<sup>68</sup> However, the continual reversal of fortunes at the hands of the French, and the constant and amplified cult of military glory emanating out of France celebrating the patriotic sacrifice of its citizen-soldiers, drowned out the subtle nods to the common soldier’s bravery in newspapers’ war reports, forcing the Monarchy to overtly extoll the virtues of the *Soldat Bürger* and the community he protected.

As David Bell has shown, the French government knew full well the power of mobilising symbols of cultural power in support of its political ideology, and the bodies and lives of its soldiers could be effectively deployed even in death to further the cause of the Republic.<sup>69</sup> The Habsburg Monarchy and its allies were, as the 1801 *Revolutions-Almanach*

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<sup>68</sup> For example, see, “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, January 18, 1797, 158, for reports on Kehl; “Zweyte besondere Beylage zur Wiener Zeitung Nr. 4: Kapitulation von der Festung Kehl,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 14, Jan, for the articles stipulating Kehl's surrender; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, January 28, 1797, 275-277, for the engagement at Rivoli; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 15, 1797, 469, for the articles setting out Mantua’s surrender; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 18, 1797, 502, for more news of Mantua; “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 22, 1797, 537, on the appointment of Charles to the army of Italy; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 25, 1797, 578, for another blow-by-blow account of the storming of Kehl; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 4, 1797, 655, even more blow-by-blow accounts of Kehl; “Kriegsbegebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 29, 1797, 953-955, news is published of Charles’ retreat. In these reports the loss at Rivoli in January 1797, the fall of Mantua the following month, and the destruction of the Habsburg army in Italy were given far less column inches than the special supplement and the 24-page report, spread across eleven editions, which detailed the capture of the Rhenish fortress at Kehl in late December 1796. Rivoli was reported as a draw, or very near victory, prevented only by the “weariness” of the Habsburg troops. The loss of Mantua was covered by the publication of the articles of the capitulation, but it was not given the same attention the capture of Kehl had been provided. The retreat of the army into Austria in early Spring 1797 was completely ignored. In its place throughout all of March the *Wiener Zeitung* provided edition after edition detailing the “patriotic donations” of the Habsburg subjects. Reports from the army under the archduke Charles was finally published in late March and followed the distinctive pattern of all *Kriegsbegebenheiten* between 1792 and 1805: the enemy’s success was down to its superior strength, even though the army had fought bravely, and the generals led competently. In the end strategic imperatives necessitated further retreat.

<sup>69</sup> Bell, *The First Total War*, 100-101. See also Mainz, *Days of Glory?*, 143-76.

explained, a little outmoded for it had many noble warriors “that no decree or newspaper names, and if they fall, we do not bury them with laurels made from sprigs of oak”.<sup>70</sup> The prints of Mollo, made by a publishing house and artists who had worked for the army previously, were an attempt to rectify this and, as the reading of the prints provided by the *Revolutions-Almanach* shows, prove to the Habsburg bourgeoisie public that its soldiers were as noble and pure as the enemy were purportedly to be. Courage and sacrifice, the prints proclaimed, are also found within the army of the emperor Francis. These masculine qualities derived from military honour - diligence, virtuous obedience, loyalty, sentimentality - are inherited from the world his soldiers seek to defend. Republicanism, as Mollo’s works cried, did not have the sole claim to these epitomes of a virtuous civilization as the French proclaimed. Monarchism, and the soldier who protected it, also expressed the same civic-bourgeois identity cherished by a growing number of Francis’ subjects.<sup>71</sup>

## The Soldier of the Napoleonic Wars

Defeat in the first two decades of the conflict had undermined the representations of the common soldier as a model of unifying Habsburg patriotism and epitome of the very best of society. This image, produced by institutions closely aligned with the Habsburg dynasty was unable to convincingly convey the importance of military service and the demands the army brought on society when the outcome was the French in Vienna.<sup>72</sup> As Leighton James’ work on demobilisation in the German lands has shown, some veteran officers, even ones who had once

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<sup>70</sup> Reichard ed., *Revolutions-Almanach*, 208.

<sup>71</sup> Khünl, *Predigt über Vaterlandsliebe*, 14-15. “Ein Volk guter Christen war ein ordnungsliebendes, nüchternes, lenksames und dennoch rustiges Volk. Seine Helden gross und menschlich, weise und mutbig, unternehmens und treu.”

<sup>72</sup> Schweiger, “Die Stadt Linz in den Napoleonischen Kriegen,” 114, 135-45. Schweiger’s work on Linz documents the strenuous strain reparation and requisition payments had on the citizens of the city, leaving many unable to meet the cost of living. Food shortages after 1800 and 1805, thanks to the destruction of fields and crops by the French, meant starvation on top of government taxes. Previously in 1797 the town was forced to raise its citizen militia after witnessing the defeated regulars with their wagons full of wounded trundle past on their retreat from Italy. For the violence meted out to the populace by French extortionists between 1801 and 1809 see Benedikt Pillwein, ed., *Linz, Einst und Jetzt*, Vol. 2 (Linz: J. Schmid, 1846), 1-19. For details of the violent occupation in Lower Austria in 1809 and the resentment held by some for the army after occupation see Anton Kerschbaumer, “Niederösterreichische Kulturbilder aus der Kriegsepisode 1809,” *Blätter des Vereines für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich* 11 (1877): 48-59.

been common soldiers, believed the men they had commanded in 1805 at Austerlitz were little more than convicts and murderers. Yet by 1813 and 1814, soldiers were seen as true patriots, inspired by their love of the nation to lay down their lives for victory.<sup>73</sup> These alternating views held by Michael Pauliny von Kowelsdam were widespread throughout the Monarchy. Even in 1806 after a decade of rhetoric, Old Regime soldiers were seen as slaves, browbeaten, and without honour because they were pressed into service and did not possess the desire to serve the nation. It was determined by the government something needed to be done to rectify this perception of the soldier if the Monarchy's war was to continue into its second decade and the people's political will bolstered.<sup>74</sup> Thanks to the ensuing efforts made by the government, soldiers were viewed by large segments of the population with pride at the war's end. Whilst military practices and the soldier's motivating identity had barely changed, rhetoric had successfully conveyed the soldier's honour was earned through service to nation and in defence of the traditions, laws and order it represented, thereby sustaining domestic support for the war with France until its end.

If we return to the remarks of Pauliny in his memoirs made in 1817, a man who believed the soldier of the last years of the war were of better quality, and more willing to lay down their lives than the Habsburg soldiers of the French Revolutionary Wars because they fought for the nation, we can suggest a reason for why this was true, without resorting to distilling men's motivations down to a desire to protect their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness proffered by linguistic superiority.<sup>75</sup> Instead of understanding the analysis by Pauliny as one

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<sup>73</sup> Leighton S. James, "The Experience of Demobilization: War Veterans in the Central European Armies and Societies after 1815," in *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions*, eds., Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, Michael Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 68-83, esp., 76-77

<sup>74</sup> "Stimmen des Auslandes über den österreichischen Kaiserstaat (Auszug aus einem Schreiben aus dem Österreichischen)," *Vaterländische Blätter*, February 17, 1809, 83. The common soldier, this article highlights, had once been "a useless lodger, over whose feeding one laments" and only fought for honour; Baumgartner, "Valorous Masculinities and Patriotism," 329-30. Baumgartner highlighted some women intellectuals believed Old Regime soldiers possessed no honour as they did not serve the nation. Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversary*, 153. Rothenberg argues the changes made by the archduke Charles in 1807 attempted to redress these concerns, but as we have seen in chapter three, he only reiterated the army's already established commitment to creating soldiers who viewed their honour as intrinsically linked to their service to the state.

<sup>75</sup> Bellabarba, *Das Habsburgerreich 1765-1918*, 43-49; Fillafer, *Aufklärung habsburgisch*, 39-49, esp 40-42. Godsey, *The Sins of Habsburg Power*, 323-58. This thinking was barely articulated in the Habsburg lands,

shaped by the nationalistic rhetoric of 1813 and the “Wars of Liberation”, we can interpret his remarks by considering the soldier’s position in the wartime culture of the Habsburg army and its part in representing, as well as linking together, the composite regions of the Monarchy. The nation, as this section argues, was understood by the regular soldiers and the populace they defended as the home, hearths, traditions and people of each of the regiment’s local societies they were linked to through conscription. A point greatly reinforced by the social, cultural and spatial homogenisation of regiments between 1805 and 1813 as revealed in chapter two, as well as by its re-energised military culture as seen in chapter three, and the rhetoric of the wars’ later period discussed below.<sup>76</sup> The soldier’s role, this oratory announced, was to demonstrate his communities’ dynastic loyalty by serving in local units for the whole Habsburg state. In doing this, soldiers fulfilled and maintained their honour as *Soldat Bürger*. This was the representation of military service and the soldier’s role that dominated the wars with Napoleon.

In response to defeat in 1805 the Monarchy chose not to upend the traditional role of the soldier as a stipulated task for a segment of the male population and introduce mandatory service.<sup>77</sup> Instead, army and government chose to rectify the flagging respect for soldiers and make palatable further mobilisation in its towns and villages by seeking to profit from all available rhetorical contingencies. This was by accident rather than design. A result of two opposing ideas on the soldier in society and his forms of patriotic military virtue. Between the Old Regime *Soldat Bürger* who was communicated as the local fatherland’s contribution to the dynasty’s protection of the whole, as well as the filial love of the emperor Francis’ subjects, and

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only really introduced by Joseph Hormayr in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and then received by a small group of regionalised nobles eager to assert their exclusiveness in the Habsburg centralising administrative and judiciary state. Godsey argues nobles were also able to assert their autonomy through military contributions that strengthened provincial nobilities’ power even if some enlightened reforms had curtailed their political sovereignty. See the introduction which explains that love for the traditions, language and culture of one’s region was articulated as love for the dynasty that safeguarded them. See also, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. Reginald F. Jones and George H. Turnbull (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1922), 52-71. Accessed 14/01/2022: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Addresses\\_to\\_the\\_German\\_Nation](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Addresses_to_the_German_Nation)

<sup>76</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien. Zu gleicher Zeit erließen Hochstudieselden folgenden Armeebefehl,” *Wiener Zeitung*, April 8, 1809, 1606; Brandner, *Aus dem Tagebuch*, 9-10. In 1809 regular soldiers were told their courage, discipline, compassion and kindness which made up their honour would “enable peace, satisfying their monarch, [gain] the applause of the world, and the blessings of their fellow citizens.”

<sup>77</sup> Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers, and National Armies*, 168-89.

the modern citizen-soldier who represented people's determination to participate and exercise a right to protect themselves. These models of the soldier co-existed uneasily in the Habsburg military institution up until 1810. Both provided widely differing views of patriotic citizenship thanks to the relaxation of censorship laws in 1806, until popular participation was discarded for a total commitment to what had been the dominating values of the *Soldat Bürger*.<sup>78</sup>

These competing identities were introduced when a new foreign minister was appointed to head the Monarchy's war effort after Vienna's occupation in 1805.<sup>79</sup> And with this appointment came new ideas, prejudices, and desires. It was the new minister, Count Johann Philipp Stadion, now an ex-imperial Knight from Swabia after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, who along with the archduke John believed the fight to safeguard the sanctity and order of Habsburg society meant popular participation had to be encouraged, or at least insinuated. This new fervour for soldiering could then be harnessed in the newly establishing militia units (*Landwebr*), which would help curtail the power of Imperial France and, importantly for Stadion, reinstate the rights and privileges of the newly defunct *Reich*.<sup>80</sup>

Yet if the soldier and military service was to be seen as an agent of patriotic sentiment and loyalty for the urban professional and well-off peasant tenant now expected to fight in the *Landwebr*, the censorship of the print media and cultural productions in the Habsburg lands had to be relaxed if fervent commitment to Monarchy's cause was to be generated. Wartime censorship had been introduced in the first years of Francis' rule and then finalised in 1795 after he and his government became increasingly alarmed at the regularity of the most common subjects discussing the spirit of the French Revolution. Specifically, the new censorship laws

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<sup>78</sup> Zehetbauer, *Landwebr gegen Napoleon*, 99-106. Zehetbauer documents the symbolic struggle professional soldiers had in reasserting their status over the militia, and the resentment the militia had for regulars who had failed in their one job – defeat Napoleon. The co-existence between two modes of masculine valour was also present in Prussia between 1813 and 1815, reconciled through different ways of articulating military virtue, as explained in Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre*, 305-316

<sup>79</sup> The ministry's last leader, Ludwig von Cobenzl was dismissed in 1806. See Karl A. Roeder, "The Habsburg Foreign Ministry and Political Reform, 1801–1805," *Central European History* 22, no. 2 (1989): 160-82.

<sup>80</sup> James A. Vann, "Habsburg Policy and the Austrian War of 1809," *Central European History* 7, no. 4 (1974): 291-310; Enno E. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy, Volume I: The Contest with Napoleon, 1799-1814* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015), 58-81; Kraehe, "Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1800-1867," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, no. 3 (1967): 3-36.

policed news of the outside world and restricted commentary. It was thought that if the new ideologies from France were not made known to the people of the Monarchy, and musings on it prohibited, the dynasty would avoid the chaos that ended the Bourbons and their regime.<sup>81</sup> As Walter Langsam revealed, Francis believed that the role of newspapers was to “narrate” and not to “discuss”, with the narration, of course, suiting the prevailing agenda of Monarchy’s government.<sup>82</sup> Censorship was incredibly strict, with educated commentators understanding Francis’ wartime government as an administration determined to “govern according to the fashion of a hundred years ago”.<sup>83</sup> Before the relaxation of the censorship laws in 1808, the war as reported in the newspapers was a sterilised version of the conflict. Indeed, thanks to the censor’s narrow interpretation of the censorship laws, which preferred morality, monarchism and apathy, the depiction of the war was not seen at all on the stage.<sup>84</sup>

With the *Landwehr* patent introduced in 1808, and censorship reduced, Stadion promoted a new narrative of military service to persuade the emperor’s subjects to freely give to the state as soldiers.<sup>85</sup> Almost immediately after the new military institutes introduction, and without the constraints of eagle-eyed censors, an army of writers, editors, artists, musicians, and performers, supported by Stadion, sought to encourage popular participation in the war effort. Part of their role was to assist in the rehabilitation of the soldier’s image. Not only to ease the demands for more men and material for the army from an already burdened society, but also to

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<sup>81</sup> Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 168-83.

<sup>82</sup> Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars*, 29; Hugo Schmidt, “The Origin of The Austrian National Anthem,” 176-80.

<sup>83</sup> The quote is taken from Gustav Wilhelm ed., “*Briefe des Dichters Johann Baptist von Alxinger*,” in *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, CXL/2, (Vienna: Carl Gerold’s Sohn, 1898), 70, as found in Carolyn Kirk, “The Viennese Vogue for Opera-Comique 1790-1819,” PhD diss., (University of St Andrews, 1985), 64-65. “*Sie möchten gern so regieren wie vor hundert Jahren Mode war, schelten alles Jakobiner, was die alte Mode missbilligt und sind entschlossen es auf ihre Art durchzusetzen es kost, was es wolle. Pressefreyheit und Publicat sind höchst verhasst und wer ihnen je das Wort geredet hat, der ist sich nie gefordert zu werden. Die Censur ist strenger als je und Josephs grosser Geist ganz von uns gewichen.*”; See also, Franz Leander Fillafer “Rivalisierende Aufklärungen Die Kontinuität und Historisierung des josephinischen Reformabsolutismus in der Habsburgermonarchie,” in *Die Aufklärung und ihre Weltwirkung*, ed., Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 123-68, esp., 132-48.

<sup>84</sup> Yates, *Theatre in Vienna*, 25-33, esp. 26. The words “liberty” and “equality” were not to be mentioned on stage, let alone “Enlightenment?”. See also Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Print vs. Speech: Censoring the Stage in Eighteenth-Century Vienna,” in *Freedom of Speech: The History of an Idea*, ed., Elizabeth Powers (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2011), 81-98.

<sup>85</sup> Karen Hagemann, “Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!,” 41-62.



encourage men and families previously untouched by military service, and who held a view of the soldier as an uncouth, rural, indolent conscript, to commit themselves to compulsory service in the newly established *Landwehr*.<sup>86</sup> The fighting man was now narrated as the central pillar of Habsburg wartime identity, and a local societies' loyal contribution to the dynasty's war effort. As part of the new, modern approach to championing military service as a patriotic virtue of the Habsburg bourgeoisie now mandated to fight, the actions and contributions of the individual had to be acknowledged, especially the commitment of the common soldier.<sup>87</sup> After 1808 popular participation in the armed forces was advanced, the stakes of the war made more personal, and the importance of military service to the continuation of the happiness the emperor Francis protected made known to those previously ignorant of the culture of the army.<sup>88</sup>

However, thanks to the competing agendas and institutional cultures found within the foreign ministry, the *Hofkriegsrat* and the Josephinian army, the rehabilitation of military service within the Habsburg public sphere was not monolithic. Two competing models of the soldier ran in parallel to each other. One strain of thought extolled the benefits of a people's war, and the triumphant will of the patriot in protecting his nation. The soldier was now "a warrior who fights for more than just honour but for the nation of which he belongs. It is that which encourages him."<sup>89</sup> This was the Monarchy's experiment with the citizen-soldier. The other, emphasised the importance of the military virtue found within the regular army, its relationship with dynastic and regional loyalty, as well as the guild-like nature of military service, where soldiers' professional pride and group cohesion enabled generals to ably utilise the units under their command. Honour was the motivator paramount, with soldiers reminded that on campaign:

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<sup>86</sup> Zehetbauer, *Landwehr gegen Napoleon*, 99-137; Hagemann, "Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria," 42-45; Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars*, 57-93.

<sup>87</sup> The rationale for the Landwehr's introduction, can be found in, "K. K. Patent die Errichtung von Reserve-Bataillonen betreffend," *Vaterländische Blätter für den Österreichischen Kaiserstaat (Vaterländische Blätter)*, May 20, 1808, 1

<sup>88</sup> Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars*. 53.

<sup>89</sup> "Stimmen des Auslandes", 83.

unconditional obedience, strict discipline, perseverance of courage and unwavering steadfastness in the face of danger are the tenets of true skill... Outside the battlefield, against the defenceless citizen and peasant, he [the soldier] is modest, compassionate, and humane. He knows the sufferings of war and seeks to alleviate them.<sup>90</sup>

These were the *Soldat Bürger*. The model of military services founded by Joseph II and carried on by the archduke Charles.

Karen Hagemann's analysis of the poetry produced in the lead up to the Franco-Austrian War of 1809 has provided a close, gendered reading of the culture of war in the circles closely aligned with Stadion and the motifs they used to inspire every man to view himself as a soldier. These writers were a group of people whose strategic goals were mirrored by the Habsburg Monarchy's foreign ministry: the end of French power in lands of the defunct *Reich*. How this new German speaking polity would look, though, varied significantly.<sup>91</sup> The émigrés wished for the reinstatement of their privileges and collective identity that had served the once powerful authorities now exiled in Vienna.<sup>92</sup> The poets wished for a homogenous Germany united by language, culture, and mythical tradition, instead of the stifling laws and layers of authority that had once bound the *Reich* together. The émigré and local "political-romantic" writers like Friedrich Schlegel, Joseph Fridolin Lehne, and Friedrich von Gentz chose to narrate military service as an act a husband would take to protect his wife. The wife, for these men, as espoused in their personal writing, was an abstract ideal - the Nation of Germany - allowing greater agency on behalf of the husband, whose dominant and protective role as the head of the relationship encouraged greater participation in politics in whatever guise, and a hatred of those

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<sup>90</sup> Erzherzog Carl, "Inländische Begebenheiten: Armeebefehl (Wien am 6. April)," *Wiener Zeitung*, April 8, 1809, 1605-606, esp., 1606. These words were written by Schlegel, working as the army's chief propagandist, but approved by the *Generalissimo*. A sample of which reads, "*Wir wollen unserm theuern Vaterlande einen dauerhaften Frieden erkämpfen: aber wir können das hohe Ziel nur durch grosse Tugenden erreichen: - Unbedingte Folgsamkeit, strenge Disziplin, ausharren der Muth und unerschütterliche Standhaftigkeit in der Gefahr, sind die Begleiter der wahren Tapferkeit Nur Einheit des Willen, zusammenwirken des Ganzen, führen zum Sieg... Der wahre Soldat ist nur dem bewaffneten Feinde furchtbar, ihm dürfen die bürgerlichen Tugenden nicht fremd seyn. Ausser dem Schlachtfelde, gegen den wehrlosen Bürger und Landmann ist er bescheiden, mitleidig und menschlich. Er kennt die Leiden des Krieges, und sucht sie zu mildern... Nicht Ruhmredigkeit, sondern mannliche Thaten ehren den Krieger. Durch Reinheit vor dem Feinde musst Ihre zeigen; dass Ihr die ersten Soldaten seyd.*"

<sup>91</sup> Vann, "Habsburg Policy," 299-304; Hagemann "Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria," 44.

<sup>92</sup> Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, 79-81.

who sought to destroy the one he loved. Together they attempted to foster an environment, as Hagemann has shown, where a “patriotic-valorous masculinity” explicitly linked with military service was to be the defining characteristic that dominated male identities and motivated men to take up arms.<sup>93</sup>

These writers may not have shared the same political interests as the exiled imperial knights and *Reich* nobility gathered around Stadion, but their dreams of a linguistically unified state with common traditions, cultures and ways of life could be easily utilised to serve the purpose of the disenfranchised nobility. Linking the cause of the émigrés to the newly established *Landwehr* was the prime role of Schlegel and his peers in Vienna. Yet, as Hagemann states, their husband-wife metaphor, which described the newly established relationship between the middle-class *Landwehr* and the German Nation, was little understood, or widely circulated outside of Vienna.<sup>94</sup> Instead of a German nation, or a “people’s war”, the cultural outputs that seemed to resonate the most with the people of the Austro-Bohemian lands stressed the links between honour, shared comradery in the military sphere and the soldiers as the embodiment of a local community’s loyalty to the emperor Francis.

Those works which extolled the *Soldat Bürger* and his military virtues of honour, local community, duty, and commitment to the dynasty were written chiefly by two men employed within the Habsburg central government, Ignaz Franz Castelli and Heinrich Joseph von Collin. Both men were at the fringes of the “political-romantic” network in Vienna that extolled a unified German people.<sup>95</sup> Castelli and Collin, however, were dramatists and poets whose intellectual inspiration and financial security as state servants came from articulating the importance of filial loyalty and martial duty to the dynasty in their war poetry, plays and songs. This did not mean their works were exclusively provincial as it could be used to extrapolate

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<sup>93</sup> Hagemann, “Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria,” 44.

<sup>94</sup> Hagemann, 51; Varnhagen von Ense, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 97-99. According to Varnhagen it seems most officers and soldiers of the Habsburg army had little knowledge of the propaganda consumed in Vienna that espoused fighting for a German nation.

<sup>95</sup> Pichler, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 57, 125, 187; Ignaz Franz Castelli, *Memoiren meines Lebens: Gefundenes und Empfundenes, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes* (Vienna: Kober & Markgraf, 1861), 152-53; See also, Ignaz Franz Castelli, *Aus dem Leben eines Wiener Phäaken 1781-1862. Die Memoiren des I. F. Castelli*, ed., Adolf Saager (Stuttgart: Robert Lutz, 1912), 102-81., esp., 158-59.

local loyalties in Austrian communities to links with a wider German nation through allusion and analogy, as was common in contemporary discussion on the German nation.<sup>96</sup> Yet these links in the works of Collin, Castelli and others were subtle, requiring an intelligent understanding that would limit the range of their poetry intended for mass consumption. There was, however, an overwhelming and distinct provincial focus used to unsubtly mobilise regional allegiances in defence of the whole Habsburg state. Provincial in that they limited themselves to exploring a “provincial consciousness” through cultural, social, and institutional frameworks found within the Monarchy which were intentionally interchangeable to meet the needs of Francis’ composite state.

By looking beyond Vienna and setting aside an approach that sets the Monarchy within an overarching German narrative, we can find representations and narrations of the experiential connections between local identities, military service, and dynastic loyalty more clearly. The Hungarian historian Arthur Weber, responding to the collection of poems compiled by Robert F. Arnold and Karl Wagner on the 100-year anniversary of Aspern in 1909, described the outpouring of poetry in Hungary as specifically stoking “the political interest of the people” through “words to the Nation” that evoked commitment to the emperor and fatherland through a Hungarian lens. The Hungarian people’s specific “political interest” was the local mobilisation of the population for its ancient feudal levy, which was reinstated in 1808 and represented the autonomy of the Kingdom *and* its contribution to the whole Habsburg state.<sup>97</sup> What Weber’s archival work shows is how one of the many regional identities within the Monarchy was specifically mobilised, connected to military service, and then stepped out to show the soldier was an act of local loyalty that joined the dynasty’s many peoples together as one.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Hagemann, “Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria,” 48; Laurence Cole, “Differentiation or Indifference,” 107-11.

<sup>97</sup> Arthur Weber, “Zur Politischen Lyrik des Kriegsjahres 1808,” in *Ungarische Rundschau für Historische und Soziale Wissenschaften*, ed., Gustav Heinrich (Altenberg: Stephan Geibel & Co, 1912), 218-46; Robert F. Arnold and Karl Wagner eds., *Achtzehnhundertneun, die Politische Lyrik des Kriegsjahres* (Vienna: Verlag des Literarischen Vereins, 1909).

<sup>98</sup> Weber, “Zur Politischen Lyrik des Kriegsjahres 1808,” 219-20

As Brian Vick has shown of the nation, it was a nebulous idea in Austrian wartime rhetoric, which could be used to relate concepts of unity from provinces to kingdoms, to a supra-state identity that encapsulated many different regions and peoples.<sup>99</sup> It could be deployed in many ways, but in the context of the Hungarian poets, it was employed to mean all the people of the Kingdom of Hungary ruled by Francis and his wife. The filial love these subjects had for the ruling family served as the most important function in narrating military service as an act of duty. In the work of Gregor Alois Dankovsky, whose poems is but one example of the localised patriotism deployed in 1808, Maria Ludovika was lauded and addressed as the Queen of Hungary whose “motherly love in Hungary’s heart flows bright and pure.” As a symbol of dedication and loyalty for Hungarians she was a local one, far removed from the German identity her literary supporters were trying to promulgate in Austria.<sup>100</sup>

For other poets, the many crowns Maria Ludovika wore represented her Hungarian subject’s ability to live alongside, defend and love the peoples of her other nations. The poet Simon Peter Weber narrated Maria as an imperial ruler, protecting the traditions of all her people. Yet for him and his audience she was foremost the Queen of Hungary who guarded and honoured the kingdom’s constitutions. Indeed, Hungary exemplified the best of her people for it was a region where its inhabitants loved the throne the most, and whose happiness increased because of it. Hungary was also a place, the reader was told, where all religions and confessions were held in the highest esteem and defended by soldiers who were the most loyal in all the Monarchy. Yet, as Simon Peter Weber reminded his readers, this “calm, happy, joyful” existence was only secured by “Austria’s mighty eagle” where “under this eagle’s wings of blessing,

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<sup>99</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 41-46; Vick, “The Vienna Congress as an Event.”

<sup>100</sup> Weber, “Zur Politischen Lyrik des Kriegsjahres 1808,” 222. The poem in question is entitled *Bey der Krönung Ihrer Majestät der Kaiserin von Oesterreich Maria Ludovika zur Königin von Ungarn*.

The last stanza reads:

*Ein Engel in der schönsten Hülle,  
 Maria, wird Ungarns Königin;  
 Dieß Glück empfind't in seiner Fülle  
 Nur Ungarns edler Kindessinn;  
 Denn nur dem unverdorbnen Triebe  
 Entkeimt die Kraft für Mutterliebe  
 In Ungarns Herzen fließt es hell,  
 Und rein wie in dem Felsenquell.*

everything will succeed.” It was to support the greater Habsburg cause, as well as to protect a Hungarian king and his youthful, virtuous queen, that the people of the kingdom promised to “raise sons” who “will not flee the danger of war or death/ If it be for king, for fatherland.” Here we can see that Simon Peter Weber identified Francis and his wife as the king and queen of Hungary, and the fatherland as Hungary. This acknowledged the importance of the local allegiances Hungarian subjects and soldiers held, and communities they inhabited and defended, whilst also underscoring their existence was only safeguarded by the defence of the whole Monarchy. A task Hungarians also had to commit to, Simon Peter Weber reminded his readers, thereby showcasing their loyalty to the king of Hungary, as head of their region, and his greater Monarchy. In 1808, military service was narrated by these political poets as a duty owed by Hungarians to a pluralistic community aroused through appeals to local loyalties.<sup>101</sup>

Across the Monarchy, like in Hungary, local loyalties were efficient at mobilising populaces because they were part of Habsburg subject’s tangible, lived experiences which could be “stepped-out” to include the greater Habsburg state by linking individual loyalties to local communities, then upwards to the emperor Francis and then outwards to his people.<sup>102</sup> These regional allegiances were mobilised specifically to introduce the *Landwebrmann* to the values of the Habsburg army’s military culture and the *Soldat Bürger* identities it instructed by inferring martial duty subjects owed to the emperor and his state were part local provincial loyalties. Collin’s lyrical poem “Mein” best encapsulated this idea by articulating the farm owner, the vigneron, the merchant, and the citizen were coming together to protect the fields, vineyards, goods, and towns of their forefathers by serving in the militia. Yet as Collin’s poem explained,

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<sup>101</sup> Weber, “Zur Politischen Lyrik des Kriegsjahres 1808,” 224-24. Simon Peter Weber’s poem is entitled *Die Freude Pressburgs am Tage der Krönung Ihrer Kaiserlich Königlichen Majestät Maria Ludowika*.

The third stanza reads:

*Einst, o vergesst es, lieben Brüder! -*

*Nein, diese Zeiten kehren nicht mehr wieder -*

*Da war es auch bey uns nicht so.*

*Doch kaum schwang Oestreichs mächtger Adler*

*Die Schwingen über uns, da schwand der*

*Tadler,*

*Und alles wurde ruhig, glücklich, froh.*

*Ja, unter dieses Adlers Segenschwingen*

*Wird alles alles wohl gelingen,*

<sup>102</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 250, 273-74.

the foundation of a soldier's "regional-patriotism" (*Vaterlandsliebe*) was not just the love for what was palpably "mine", but the possession of honour that came from defending the whole state. A sense of love and commitment to the emperor and his domain, as well as other soldiers, which motivated men to serve found within the regular army. Soldiers would rather possess "courage", the poem stated, than all the goods in the world, if it allowed them to defend all their brothers from the enemy at the very border of the Monarchy where, the French were told, "soon thy grave shall be".<sup>103</sup>

The soldier's honour stemmed from state service, Collin's "*Österreichs Landwehr*" explained, and was found within all the armed forces of the Monarchy – especially the new militia. The lyrical poem championed "bravery" (*Tapfer*), the ubiquitous trait of the Austrian soldier in all the army's literature, as the defining quality that linked the military men of the imperial family with the professional soldiers of the army, and now with the new bourgeoisie *Landwehr*. To be honourable and possess bravery meant to gladly serve the throne at the very "tip of the nation's spear", just like the brothers of the emperor. Bravery was to stoically accept the fate of the battlefield, knowing death served a worthy cause. And by actively marching out to confront the enemy, the men of Austria's militia were told, soldiers were heroes, who proudly wore their wounds, happy in finding a community whose collective strength would defeat the tyranny of France and protect all.<sup>104</sup>

Collin's work did not deal only with the ideals of virtuous state service. It also introduced men to the comradeship of the soldier's life, and the models of masculinity this socialising was to create. "*Trinklied*", a song written specifically to extoll the importance of alcohol in forming the brotherly bonds of the soldier, highlighted the military virtues of the professional for the new militia. Overlooked by scholars who have used Collin's work to investigate the existence of national sentiment during the wars with France, "*Trinklied*" focused specifically on the *Cameradschaft*, the smallest collective group soldiers were a part of. In

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<sup>103</sup> Heinrich Joseph von Collin, *Heinrich J. von Collin's Sämtlich Werke*, Vol. 4 (Vienna: Anton Strauss, 1813), 280-83.

<sup>104</sup> Collin, *Sämtlich Werke*, 265-67.

*Trinklied*, which is written as a song performed in a “call and response” style, the lead singer is identified by the lyrics as the senior soldier (a corporal in this instance) of the *Cameradschaft*. Wine, the leader sings in the first two stanzas, is earned after a hard day’s work. It lessens the load of the musket and “improves the aim”. Yet, as the song continues, it also allows for the conversations, cajoling and socialising found within homosocial groups that cement what it means to be a fighting man. A man in the army, the leader outlines, is one who stoically overcomes the fear of death, and holds the enemy back motivated by “Throne and State”. He is one who stands in the breach, “where only danger shows”. His victory is always assured as only “death can bend him”. The repeated refrain at the end of each stanza sung by the senior soldier demands the troop to “call to me” they will embody the honourable soldier. “I am a Man”, the troop sings, to which the leader replies sceptically “all of you?” As the song continues, he precedes to outline the escalating demands one must meet to prove this sentiment, heightening the fervour amongst his men, their commitment to each other, the throne, and the state.<sup>105</sup>

Collin’s poems were intended for consumption by men subjected to enforced military service in the *Landwehr*. Works that conveyed what it was like, what it meant, and how to embody the role of the soldier. Yet his words alone were not alone in inspiring the emperor’s middling subjects to serve as soldiers. Whilst newspapers and pamphlets were consumed in the coffee houses of Vienna, Prague, Budapest and Brünn by the emerging bourgeoisie, it was the theatres in the Monarchy’s capital, feared by Francis’ government, which were seen as the best way to promote within all classes the knowledge that dynastic loyalty, and therefore one’s regional patriotism, was only truly communicated through military service.<sup>106</sup> Never had this medium been properly harnessed for the purpose of supporting the Monarchy’s war effort with France, and as Hugo Schmidt documented, it was used by the government to an incredible effect, providing the people of Vienna with months of political messaging that fostered a desire

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<sup>105</sup> Collin, 284-86.

<sup>106</sup> Fichtner, “Print vs. Speech,” 94-96.



to best the power of France and excise the shame of defeat.<sup>107</sup> The use of the theatre in this way was a dramatic and fleeting turn only allowed by the leniency of Stadion's policies. At the beginning of the conflict the stage was seen as the most insidious place where allegories presented could challenge and subverted the power of the dynasty.<sup>108</sup> Now after 1808 Stadion sought to harness such a medium, and across all the city's theatres, plays about soldiers and soldiering were projected to the audience educating them on the culture, expectations, and values of the fighting man.

It was not just the militia man who took centre stage, but also the professional soldier who was now the embodiment of love for the fatherland. These were soldiers to be embraced, respected, and lauded as inspiring guides, men who all males wanted to be, and all women wanted to be seen on the arms of. As the play, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe* made sure to highlight, this had not always been so. Premiering at the Theatre an der Wien on the evening of April 15, 1809, the day war was made public in the morning papers, it was the perfect place for such a performance as it was the largest in Vienna and the most modern, holding over 2,000 guests.<sup>109</sup> *Biedersinn* was a play that had all the hallmarks of a Viennese comedy of the period: a believable setting, as opposed to a fantastical world; a focus on the moral, economic and insular concerns of the emerging German bourgeoisie, dialogue and character interaction over stage theatrics and musical accompaniment. Its central character was Peter Brunner, a respected farmer with holdings near the small village of Blumenthal, his birthplace and site of the gatherings of the area's militia.

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<sup>107</sup> Schmidt, "The Origin of The Austrian National Anthem," 177-79.

<sup>108</sup> Yates, *Theatre in Vienna*, 25. The emperor Francis' chief censor in the Monarchy up until 1804, Franz Karl Hagelin, wrote in a 1795 memorandum detailing the new censorship laws for colleagues in Hungary that: "It is beyond question that censorship of the theatre must be much stricter than the normal censorship of printed reading matter, even if the latter may consist of dramatic works...The impression made by the former (theatre) is infinitely more powerful than that of the latter (printed literature and pamphlets) because the former engages the eyes and ears and is intended even to penetrate the will of the spectator in order to attain the emotional effects intended; this is something that reading alone does not achieve. Censorship of books can restrict their circulation and make them accessible to a certain kind of reader, whereas the playhouse by contrast is open to the entire public, which consists of every class, every walk of life, and every age."

<sup>109</sup> W. E. Yates, *Theatre in Vienna*, 22, 49-50.

The plot of *Biedersinn* revolved around Brunner, the audience's surrogate, a respected farmer. The scenes of his daily life and the decisions he had to make as the father of the house play out amidst the slow, but regular process of turning citizens into soldiers. Unrequited love, missing and presumed dead lovers, miraculous reveals, anti-Semitism quashed by the shared love for the fatherland, missing treasure, cunning love games, and songs of victory, the play reflected ongoing life for the people of Vienna, resting upon the shared physical, but rewarding experience of the exercise field to communicate soldiering was now the most important part of the *Bürgertum* community. A role which dictated one's responses to all of lives petty challenges.<sup>110</sup>

After the play introduced the young members of its love-triangle, it returned to Brunner drinking at home with another wealthy member of his community, where he proclaimed the *Landwehr* "our obligation" (*Schuldigkeit*). "When Young and Old", he said as he sipped his beer, "great and small, noble and low, join. When a wall is built around the throne of our father, who can harm him?" Such a sense of commitment made Brunner "so merry and so happy today, and so thankful to God".<sup>111</sup> Brunner's happiness at being part of a collective effort also gave him pause to reflect on the changing and now prominent position of the soldier in Habsburg society and exclaim "it should have been like that a long time ago". Whereas before Brunner remembered flowing wine had been needed to dampen the fear of young men when shown a weapon, now they "whoop and holler with joy when they see one." Drink also had eased the tension when men in uniform were near, "as the peasant was afraid of the soldier, and the town citizen (*Bürgersmann*) avoided them." This thinking was in the past though, as all were united with "one heart and one purpose" (*jetzt ist allen eine Herz, ein Sinn*). Indeed, as Brunner

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<sup>110</sup> Johann Gottlieb Schildbach, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe. Ländliches Lustspiel in 4 Auf* (Vienna: Johann Baptist Wallishausser, 1809). The *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon* labels Schildbach "a typical representation of the time". He was a journeyman who made his money publishing on trend plays, for the government at least, that celebrated "patriarchal relationships in family and society," and "love of one's country" (*Vaterlandsliebe*). See, *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950*, Vol. 10 (Saviňek Slavko–Schobert Ernst) (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), 131. Accessed January 13, 2022: [https://www.biographien.ac.at/oeb1/oeb1\\_S/Schildbach\\_Johann-Gottlieb\\_1765\\_1820.xml](https://www.biographien.ac.at/oeb1/oeb1_S/Schildbach_Johann-Gottlieb_1765_1820.xml)

<sup>111</sup> Schildbach, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe*, 21-23. "Brunn: Ist's nicht unsere Schuldigkeit? Ist's denn nicht unser eigener Mühsen? Wenn sich so al und jung, gross und klein, vornehm und gering - aneinander anschliesst, wenn eine dreyfache Männer um den Thron unseres Landesvaters steht, wer kann Ihm was anhaben? - Nun, wir reden heute bey Tische schon mehr davon, Ich bin heute so lustig und so froh, und so dankbar gegen den lieben Gott! Wenn nur mein Franzel schon gross genug wäre, um mit dem jungen Volke aufmarschieren; Er soll ihn nur sehen, wie der kleine Spitzbube mit dem Gewehr umgeben kann."

admitted, without wine “no girl would even look at a soldier”, but thanks to the cultural capital a man in uniform brought “they soon look at no one who is not at least a soldier.” A point, Brunner’s friend remarked ruefully, is why “if I did not have a wife or children, I would be learning the drill too”.<sup>112</sup>

The play inserted its most overt political messaging in the final two scenes, where it extolled the patriotism of the military servant as an exemplar all must strive for. The introduction of three professional soldiers, *jägers*, is jarring and comes after the central storyline is resolved, indicating potential re-writes that made the play palatable for a popular culture influencing and feeding off a desire for war. The *jägers* sit in a tavern discussing their new status in society before they set out to drill Blumenthal’s militia. A position where the local count has promised a tract of land and a small cottage for any soldier who returns from the field with gold medal for bravery. The three men marvel at the possibility, before one breaks out into a song, the first of the play, to demonstrate the soldier’s fervent commitment to God, the emperor, and the fatherland. “To arms brothers”, the *Jäger* sings, “firmly united by new bonds, now citizen and soldier, rich and poor wielding arms for the state.” Yet, as the song continued, military service did not just unite the different orders of the Monarchy, it also united “people of different tongues” who through “this brotherly bond is indissolubly entwined, as a castle for the fatherland.” Military service, as *Biedersinn* announced on the eve of war with France, was now a duty that created one single political community united behind the dynasty.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Schildbach, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe*, 21-22.

“*Schmidt*: Ach bleibe, die Wehrmänner sind ja schon lange eingerückte. Aber Gevatter! brav machen sie's schon, das muss wahr seyn - es ist eine Freude, ihnen zuzusehn.

*Brunn*: Recht ist's, so hatt's schon längst seyn sollen, so hatten, wie manchen Eimer Wein mehr im Keller - Sonst haben die Bauernbursche gebeute, wenn man ihnen nur von weisen ein Gewehr gezeigt hat, und jetzt - Sapperment! Jetzt jauchzen und schreyen sie vor Freude, wenn sie einen sehn. Sonst hat sich der Bauer vor den Soldaten gefürchtet, der Bürgersmann ist ihnen ausge weiche; jetzt is alles ein Herz, ein Sinn.

*Schmidt*: Das muss wahr seyn.

*Brunn*: Sonst hat kein Mädcl sich getraut mit einem Soldaten zu reden - jetzt schau sie schon bald keinen mehr an, der nicht wenigstens ein Wehrmann ist, und so ist's recht. Ich bin gewiss, jetzt wird's, jetzt muss es anders geben. Jetzt wissen wir erst, was wir im Stande sind.

*Schmidt*: Das muss wahr seyn. Wenn ich nicht Weib und Kinder hatter, ich lernte selber noch exerzieren.”

<sup>113</sup> Schildbach, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe*, 98-99.

Zu den Waff'n, wahre Bruder!

Sammelt euch; die Trommel ruft:

Ordnet euch n Reih'n und Glieden

This was not news to the regular soldier. The singing jäger had always known this, firmly ensconced within a military culture founded on the communitarian effects of honour. To him military service had always brought the many tongues and places of the Monarchy together to protect the emperor and his domain. Therefore, the play *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe* positioned him as the leader and role model of patriotic love, reflecting the reality on the training ground for many of the men in the audience, and now also in the wartime culture of the Monarchy. The soldier was now truly the embodiment of dutiful and patriotic service, his bravery, loyalty, and honour representing the very best of Habsburg subjects, a fact reflected in the symbolic act of Brunner's daughter, who after being reunited with her long-lost love, handed him a musket and championed his choice to march with the professionals to take on the might of France.<sup>114</sup> Now on April 15, this was what was expected of all in the audience, who were told in the last lines of play, sang as the cast marched across the stage behind the regular jägers, to "hold their ground" as they, the fatherland's defenders, live.<sup>115</sup>

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*Fort in Gottes freye Luft!  
 Übt euch im Schnell Bewegen,  
 Schnell zerstreut, schnell sammelt euch!  
 Rucket im Sturm dem Feind entgegen,  
 Einer Wetterwolke gleich.  
 Fest vereint durch neue Bande  
 Ist nun Bürger und Soldat,  
 Vom und reich, von jedem Stande,  
 Schwingt die Waffen für den Staat,  
 Wolke Von verschieden Zungen  
 Stehen, durch dieses Bruderband  
 Unauflöslich fest verschlungen,  
 Eing Burg und Vaterland.  
 Am dem Festen unsrer Treue  
 Breche sich der Wogen Wuth:  
 Und in eillen Schaun zerstreue  
 Sich der Feinde Uebermuth!  
 Wir sind Deutsch, wir verachten  
 Jedes fremde Macht Geboth:  
 Fort zum Kampf, zu neuen Schlachten!  
 Sieg mit uns! dem Feinde Tod!  
 Alle (stimmen am Ende mit ein.)*

<sup>114</sup> Schildbach, *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsliebe*, 100.

<sup>115</sup> Schildbach, 102-04.

The last stanza of the song read:

*Hoch Vaterland!  
 Und Haben wie den Sieg errungen,  
 Wird einst ein Kankfest abgefungen,  
 Tont's durch das Land:  
 Sie Hielten Stand.*

And as the cast marches off stage, they shout:

For the regular professionals, the officers and men who knew what it was like to face the power of Napoleon's armies, something more than the novel experience of patriotic service found in *Biedersinn und Vaterlandsiebe* was needed to convey the qualities and importance of the military spheres they inhabited and which, as Hibler's account attests of the retreat after Hohenlinden in 1801, had repeatedly been destabilised by the victories of France. Archduke Charles, who had heavily invested in the revitalisation of the culture of honour which had informed these communities since the time of his grandmother, Maria Theresa, sought to reenergise the role of the *Soldat Bürger*, thereby encouraging his professionals to redouble their efforts in the war to come. The soldier was to fight for honour in service to the state, displaying his obedience, discipline, courage and emotional fortitude, as well as caring for each other and inhabitants of other lands. These were the principles of honour he was to imbue on campaign.<sup>116</sup> And whilst the archduke had agreed to the founding of the *Landwehr*, he was still firmly committed to the *Soldat Bürger* as the model of military service. Charles, however, did engage with the popular patriotism of the time to obtain the recommitment he needed from his weary regulars. Men whose expertise and experience were vital in motivating the tens of thousands new conscripts filling the regiment of the army.<sup>117</sup>

The archduke turned to Castelli, a government bureaucrat, playwright, journal editor, and ex-militia man who had served in the Vienna volunteer battalions in 1797, for a song that would inspire his men to embody the traits of the *Soldat Bürger* and topple the French.<sup>118</sup> *Kriegslied für die österreichische Armee* was penned by Castelli in early 1809 and was chosen by Charles as the song his army would sing as they marched into Bavaria.<sup>119</sup> Printed in its hundreds of thousands, after it proved a success earlier in the year with a popular audience, it was distributed to the regulars in April, and was widely read by the men, or at least engaged with, as

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*Pivat! Hoch Vaterland! Es leben seine Vertheidiger!*

<sup>116</sup> Erzherzog Carl, "Inländische Begebenheiten: Armeebefehl," 1606.

<sup>117</sup> NL, B/683 Berndt, *Bemerkungen*, 130-33, esp. 133. After his rapid rise through Prince Joseph von Lobkowitz's Bohemian landwehr battalion to second lieutenant, Berndt wrote he learnt everything in the first few months about soldiering, and company organisation from an old sergeant charged with his education. Berndt's company commander was a retired officer, First Lieutenant Schneider, from the Bohemian infantry regiment *Kollonrat* Nr. 36.

<sup>118</sup> Castelli, *Memoiren meines Lebens*, 70-80.

<sup>119</sup> Ignaz Franz Castelli, *Kriegslied für die österreichische Armee* (Vienna, Anton Strauss, 1809).

the reports from the French of finding the lyrics on captured and dead Habsburg soldiers attest to.<sup>120</sup> Castelli's work resonated with Charles because it echoed the professional virtues of the regular soldier instilled within him as a young man. Virtues dictated by Joseph and fostered in the army of the 1790s by his acolytes. Honour, duty, courage and loyalty, the hallmark of the professional, were the main themes of *Kriegslied für die österreichische Armee*, which linked common soldiers with their officers, and the army with the imperial family.

At its heart, the *Kriegslied* communicated to regular soldiers their time was now. The time to strike back at an arrogant enemy, to defeat them and restore their own professional pride. A pride, which all acknowledge had been hurt, but never shamed. Castelli's lyrics evoked a desire to end the Monarchy's burden of war, the need to address the devastation, cruelty and "wantonness" (*Übermuth*) of the enemy, and it set out the arena where this could be achieved. As the first lines of the war song made clear, it was the battlefield – the "field of honour" (*Feld der Ehre*) – where the soldiers of the Monarchy were to march on "with joyful courage" to "conquer or to sink". This was the soldier's responsibility and duty: to follow where "Francis commands" as "avengers". His courage was to embrace "burden" and "hardship", and to meet the enemy's condescension "with our lead". And it was the soldier's loyalty to the emperor, and his fatherland, which served as "one link in the chain" that through the gentle hand of Francis' "blessing entwines us, so we are brothers". This is what it meant to be a *Soldat Bürger*: a wall that surrounded the emperor and the link that bound his domain together. And now as professionals under the guidance of Charles, Castelli wrote, they would take to the field of honour "to show the world, that we deserve [honour] too" motivated by the desire to restore happiness to Europe.<sup>121</sup>

The Bohemian infantry captain Lorenz Zagitzek's account of the campaigns in 1809 shows us that many men believed this as true and viewed themselves as honourable and dutiful

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<sup>120</sup> Castelli, *Memoiren meines Lebens*, 153. Castelli writes he was sent a report from the French paper "*Le Moniteur*" by his friend, the court secretary and editor of the *Vaterländische Blätter*, Johann Michael Armbruster, which indicated he and Castelli, would be subjected to a military tribunal if found.

<sup>121</sup> Castelli, *Kriegslied für die österreichische Armee*.

soldiers who represented the very best of their local societies, and these places commitment to the dynasty's cause. At Regensburg in 1809, the captain recalled in his memoir a speech given by one of the regiment's company commanders to a division of fusiliers waiting within the city to repulse any breaches made by the French.<sup>122</sup> As the men mustered in an open space ready to repel advancing French grenadiers, Zagitzeck recalled how the leader of the division, an educated man from a military family called Joachim Baierwek, spoke to the Bohemian soldiers in Czech, instead of the German used to give orders. There he reminded his men to fight like the ancient heroes of Bohemia, ready to die as "heroes, as the good Bohemian always has."<sup>123</sup> As the French looked to have secured an irreversible victory, Baierwek used the native language of his soldiers to mobilise them as Bohemians and reminded them their honour also marked out the loyalty of their communities to the Habsburg cause.

Four years later, just before the Army of Bohemia took to the field in 1813, Karl Philipp, Prince of Schwarzenberg and commander of the Monarchy's contribution to the Sixth Coalition, similarly underscored the relationship between a soldier's battlefield performance and the dynastic loyalty of his region. The proclamation announced "a great day has come. Brave warriors! Your fatherland depends on you" and urged them to fight for the "safety and welfare of our descendants". These men, as Schwarzenberg declared, were not just fighting for their own fatherland, but also the whole of Europe, placing the soldier and his local region within a greater unified polity. One that was directed "in a common purpose, to a well-founded, lasting state of peace, an equitable distribution of power and the independence of each individual state." It was not a war against France, but a war against French supremacy outside its borders, one fought - as the war had always been - to reinstate the natural order of the world. It would be achieved, as had always been the case, by the *Soldat Bürger*.

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<sup>122</sup> NL, B/682 Zagitzeck, *Das Bemerkenswerte meines Lebens*, Part 2, 13-14; Baierwek was the son of the chief military official (*Kreiskommissar*) from the Leitmeritzer recruiting district in northern Bohemia. Zagitzeck remembers Baierwek's father (spelt Bayerwek) as a *Stadtgärtenadministrator*. For details see, *Schematismus des Königreichs Böhmen: auf der Jahr 1805* (Prague: Gottlieb Haase, 1805), 118.

<sup>123</sup> Zagitzeck, Part 2, 14.

In such a sacred war, we must preserve more than ever the virtue by which our army has shone in so many previous wars. Unfailing readiness to sacrifice everything for the monarch and the fatherland, high degree of steadfastness in good and bad days, determination and perseverance on the battlefield, moderation and care for the defenceless, these must be natural to us everywhere.<sup>124</sup>

## Conclusion

Conscription and mass mobilisation meant the soldier was constantly present in local societies, and in order to meet military exigencies he was posited by the Habsburg government as the most public display of territorial patriotism and love for the Habsburg dynasty. The soldier and the military virtues that made up his honour, became a central tenant in the wartime culture of the Monarchy, especially so during the wars against Napoleon. War with France meant the soldier was to no longer be viewed as a pariah, a man isolated and removed from the community he defended. He was positioned as the leading model of a dutiful subject for a wartime population to emulate.

In the first decades of the conflict, the soldier was a symbol used by the dynasty to counter the political enlightenment of the French Republic, the erosion of their legitimacy and align the Monarchy's public behind them. In the war's last decade, the *Soldat Bürger* was a form of loyalty and identity making the war personal for its inhabitants and their communities without any need to truly appeal to a universal identity that would undermine the Monarchy's composite nature. In defeat representations of the soldier rang hollow, requiring rehabilitation before war would renew. During war and victory, however, the soldier was universally accepted as a symbol of community, patriotism and cherished values of monarchism. How this message resonated and was received by the people of the Monarchy can be best charted by consulting the patriotic donations of the emperor's subjects, made by people within local societies to care, protect, and honour the fighting men of their communities. It is with these sources, used in the next chapter, that we can better understand the reception of the *Soldat Bürger* as an accepted

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<sup>124</sup> "Armee-Befehl, Gegeben am 17. August 1813," *Wiener Zeitung*, August 21, 1813, 415.



symbol of regional patriotism, dynastic loyalty and avenue for popular participation in the Habsburg wartime state.

## Chapter Six

### “Our Cause is Just”: The Cult of the *Soldat*

#### *Bürger*

This last chapter will show how the identity of *Soldat Bürger*, understood by subjects of the Monarchy as protectors of the fatherland, and guardians of its traditions, were utilised as a means with which civilians could engage with the dynasty’s war effort and demonstrate an individual’s desire to exist as part of a monarchical state under the Habsburgs. This chapter not only suggests the image of the *Soldat Bürger* was received by people as a representation of the Habsburg’s right to rule, and the values of its subjects, but it also argues the regular soldier was understood as *the* way in which local societies patriotically engaged with the Monarchy and embraced their position within the state.

To begin, this chapter articulates how patriotic donations from local compatriots to specific regional units were used as expressions of a place’s commitment to the dynasty. The *Soldat Bürger* was used by people as a symbol of a supra-national Habsburg patriotism, and as a representation of regional loyalties. As this chapter shows, providing goods and alms which honoured local soldiers’ service to the Monarchy bound the Habsburg state’s many territories together, allowing it to forge a singular wartime cohesiveness in the face of rapid political and cultural change. Charitable donations also closed the gap between soldier and subject, providing people the agency and means to reject the vocabulary of citizenship and modernisation emanating from France and serve the Habsburg’s “great glorious edifice of states” (*große herrliche Staatsgebäude*).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cleymann, *Der Krieg vor dem Richterstuhle*, 45.

Importantly this chapter underlines the primacy of *Soldat Bürger* as a focus for regional and dynastic patriotism throughout the whole war, as a means for bourgeoisie self-recognition, and its role as an integral element in the Habsburg government's narrative of the conflict.

Recently Pieter Judson has identified the *Landwehrmann* in 1809 as:

Symbolizing the universal mobilization of all Austrians and their commitment to an interregional defense... [demonstrating] that the war was not waged on behalf of far-away rulers and that it instead involved the "Austrian people"- all classes, all generations, sometimes even both genders - sacrificing to defend their common interest,

And whilst this dissertation does not contest this view of 1809, this chapter clarifies the regular soldier was attributed the same "emblematic significance as an interregional all - Austrian patriotic institution" as Judson describes of the *Landwehr* throughout the whole war. As this work has argued, the local regiment and its soldiers were used most often as an identity and local institute for places to show support for and belief in the emperor Francis' right to rule. To borrow Judson's words on the *Landwehr*, it was the identity of the regular *Soldat Bürger*, as will be shown here, who served primarily "as the embodiment of the Austrian people's sacrifice and of their enthusiasm for the common cause" from the war's beginning until its end.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter will conclude by explaining how the Habsburg military displays, which were a part of the Congress of Vienna held between 1813 and 1814 - summarised by Brian Vick as new cultural demonstrations of Habsburg supremacy and unity which demanded the subject identity with the soldier - needs to be read as the culmination of the Monarchy's rhetoric on the soldier's connection to the state and a subject's devotion to the dynasty.<sup>3</sup> A narrative of the *Soldat Bürger* and his values which had existed throughout the war, connecting soldiers and civilians together in service to the Habsburg state and the traditions and privileges it guaranteed. As this chapter's first section explains, this representation of the soldier and his identity, promulgated by both conscription within local communities and government rhetoric, was

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<sup>2</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 93.

<sup>3</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 27-28.

accepted by the people of the Monarchy as evidenced by patriotic gifts given to support those fighting for the Habsburgs.

## Charitable donations

Fighting for the Habsburg was, as we have seen in chapter two, the duty and obligation of those subjects who were deemed economically inactive. There was, however, as the preachers of the Monarchy continually pointed out in their sermons, a way for people with status, wealth and some economic importance to “contribute to the service of the state”.<sup>4</sup> This line was the bureaucratic nomenclature initially used by the *Hofkriegsrat* for voluntary donations made by subjects of the Monarchy to the Habsburg war effort, but also one that neatly summarised how non-combatants could exhibit their dynastic loyalty and regional identity without undermining their place in society.<sup>5</sup> Francis was the first to take it upon himself as the wealthiest of inhabitant of the Monarchy to contribute to state service with his money in 1792, making it known he was to charitably support the war effort and his wounded soldiers with his own private funds for two years.<sup>6</sup> Almost immediately after the publication of this symbolic gesture in the *Wiener Zeitung*, thousands of his subjects eagerly followed, giving over their own wealth to care for those whose lives had been altered by the effects of war, thereby participating as patriotic

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<sup>4</sup>“Inländische Begebenheiten: An patriotischen Beytragen haben Sr. K. k. Maj. neurdings unterthanigst dargebracht,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 20, 1793, 449-53, esp. 452 and 453. “*Von dem thatigen Eifer, womit auch die Einwohner und getreuen Unterthanen des Landes ob der Ens, durch Bererentwilligkeit zum Dienste des Staates mitzuwirken, sich auszeichnen, ist schon mehrmals in diesen Blättern Erwähnung gemacht worden.*”

<sup>5</sup> Khünl, *Predigt über Vaterlandsliebe*, 13. “*Doch man kann sagen: von mir hängt das Heil des Staates nicht bin: ich bin nicht Feldherr, ich bin nicht Minister, ich bin nicht reich, kann also dem Vaterland keine bedeutenden Opfer bringen, keine wichtigen Einrichtungen machen! Zugegeben dieses alles, so hat doch jeder Bürger des Staates tausend Gelegenheiten seine Vaterlandsliebe durch Handlungen an Tag zu legen. Es sind ja nicht immer die ausserordentlichen, und schreienden Handlungen, die den Flor des Vaterlandes behörden, die stille, ordentliche aber standhafte Erfüllung der gesamten Bürgerpflichten ist es, welche allezeit heil und Segen bringt. Unter diesen ganz ordentlichen und stillen Handlungen der Bürgerpflicht steht die Erfüllung des Standes oder Berufes haben an. Sey nur ein jeden an seinem Plass ganz, was er dort seyn kann und soll! Erfülle er nur seinem Beruf mit redlicher Rücksicht auf das allgemeine Beste! Sey der Landmann arbeitsam, geduldig und genügsam! Sey auch der Burger emsig und einfach liesere er gute und dauerhafte Arbeiten? Hute sich nur der Beamte vor Bestechung und Trägheit? Verschmace nur der Hobe und Grofse niedere Geschäfte und niedere Freuden, und diese Tugenden der verschiedenen Stände werden für das allgemeine Glück den schönsten Wohlklang bilden.*”

<sup>6</sup> Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 159.

citizens (*Staatsbürger*) who held the happiness of the Monarchy as paramount. Their reward was to be honoured in the papers of the Monarchy for their community to see.<sup>7</sup>

The patriotic gifts made to support wounded soldiers, widows and orphans were not just Habsburg subjects affirming their commitment to the dynasty. They were also, as this section will show, parochial patriotic gestures that represented one's loyalty to the local community, or estate he or she was a member of. These were acts which allowed all peoples to contribute to dynasty in a way which did not undermine the composite nature and regional differences of the Monarchy, or its organic body polity, but still recognise the Habsburg state as the supreme political community. At the same time, wartime philanthropy provided the noble elite avenues with which to reassert their authority through the giving and organising of enormous bequests, whilst also offering lesser subjects an opportunity to actively engage in the Monarchy's war effort, obtain social recognition through willing state service and assert their commitment to legal rights and the traditions of their local societies seen to be protected by the dynasty.<sup>8</sup> In short charitable acts were gestures which captured the enlightened, utilitarian patriotism of civic virtue and service to the Habsburg state espoused under Joseph II, as well as the all-encompassing dynastic loyalty facilitated by the government of Francis used to reject the political culture of France.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> "Beylage: Als Beweis des patriotischen ruhmvollsten Eifers, und der billigsten Verabscheuung der verdammlichen Jakobiten sind folgende freywillige Beytrage bey dem k. k. Kreis und Oberamte eingekommen," *Bregenzer Wochenblatt*, March 15, 1793, 5. This is the number I have assigned the page in this edition; "Amtsblatt zur Oesterreichisch-Kaiserlichen privilegirten Wiener-Zeitung: Kundmachung," *Wiener Zeitung*, September 30, 1813, 333.

<sup>8</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 39.

<sup>9</sup> For the patriotic language of Joseph's period used to describe patriotic donations see "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, January 12, 1793, 97. "Als einen neuen Beweis von den patriotischen Gesinnungen, welche die Unterthanen Sr. K. k. Majest. für aller höchstero Person und den Staat, in Rücksicht auf die gegenwärtigen Kriegsumstande und die dadurch vermehrten Staatsbedürfnisse beleben, können wir neuerdings dem Publikum bekannt machen, das ein erhabener Staatsbürger, von hohem Adel und Range, der abe ungenannt zu bleiben sich erbat Sr. K. k. Maj. einen freywillige Beysteuer von 20.000 Gulden dargebracht hat. Ingleichen haben wieder andere gutgesinnte Staatsbürger, nämlich die bürgerlichen Schneidermeister allhier, 3001 Gulden 20 Kruezer, Herr Regierungsrath von Königsburg, 13500 Gulden, Herr Johann Georg Hamer, ungarischer Weinbändler, 225 Gulden in barem Gelde, und Hr. Georg Adam Edler von Neuberg, 2000 Gulden in Bankozetteln übergeben. Sr. Majest. haben hierüber dem obersten Directorial-Minister, Grafen von Kollowrath, in einem Kabinettschreiben von 11. d. M. Ihre landesvaterliche Dankgefühl zu bezugen gerührt." For words that summarised the ways in which the *Wiener Zeitung* espoused the commitment of each local region's commitment, specifically the communities of Lower Austria, the inhabitants of Vienna, and the emperor's subjects in Upper Austria, see, "Inländische Begebenheiten," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 20, 1793, 452-53. The concluding remarks to the first major table of donations

As Sandra Cavallo has demonstrated of philanthropy in the late early modern period, “people often engaged in charity as a result of concerns other than those generated by thoughts of the poor”, summarising “involvement in charity was sought partly out of concern for individuals’ own position in power or status...motivated by aims which were secular and which involved personal rewards.”<sup>10</sup> Benefactors, of course were not entirely motivated by an internal pragmatic logic, but were influenced by “rhetoric and passwords...which donors adhered to on the wave of emotional stimuli.” Giving is a historically contextualised action, Cavallo concludes, a political act not just used by the rich to maintain their supremacy over the poor, but by peoples to maintain their identities and “hierarchies of values” challenged by “social conflicts”.<sup>11</sup> Specifically, as Thomas Adam’s has shown in the immediate aftermath of war with France in Germany, cultural philanthropy was an expression of political unity used by the bourgeoisie and the nobility to cement their attachment to, and legitimise a past and society, which had been ruptured by the conflict. This culture of charity was founded during the Napoleonic Wars where money was given for the wounded and the widowed in ways that bound together social classes behind a political ideology. It was not just an expression of concern for the wartime affected, but a response to threats made to the values of people wedded to the Old Regime hierarchies of Europe and a rejection of France’s imperial project.<sup>12</sup>

In the context of the German speaking world during the war years, Jean Helen Quataert has identified philanthropy being used as “a site for the production of definitions of community memberships and state identities,” beginning precisely at a time when German local

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published in the paper was, “*Mit gleichem Erfolge mehren sich die patriotischen Beytrage in allen K. k. Erblanden, und werden dieselben zu seiner Zeit, zum Ruhme der Gesinnungen, welche die beglückten Unterthanen Sr. K. k. Maj. beleben, umständlich angezeigt werden.*”; “Beylage,” *Bregenzer Wochenblatt*, March 29, 1793, 5. The local paper *Bregenzer Wochenblatt* announced “*wo nicht die biederer treuen Bewohner Vorarlbergs die freywilligen Kriegsbeyträge fortsetzen...zur Verteidigung und Rettung des Vaterlands mitzuwirken sich bestrebt.*”

<sup>10</sup> Sandra Cavallo, “The Motivations of Benefactors: An Overview of Approaches to The Study of Charity,” in *Medicine and Charity Before the Welfare State*, eds., Jonathan Barry and Colin Jones (London: Routledge, 1994) 46-62, esp., 51-52.

<sup>11</sup> Cavallo, “The Motivations of Benefactors,” 54-56.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Adam, *Philanthropy, Civil Society, and the State in German History, 1815-1989* (Camden House: Rochester, 2016), 17-27.

communities were trying to shake off the yoke of French supremacy in 1813. “Dynastic philanthropy practices”, argues Quataert, enabled courts to remake their sovereign “royal authority” devoid of Imperial French connections and which “intertwined the soldier and the civilian volunteer in an elaborate system of honours and rewards, feasts and festivals that bound them to the state.”<sup>13</sup> Moreover, this practice of giving by the subjects of Germany’s princes was a system of “institutions and organisations” establishing common bonds “between distinct localities”, allowing for the mobilisation of resources to defeat the might of Imperial France.

Importantly for Quataert, aristocratic and royal women were represented as “caring” *Landesmutter* who formed the perfect relationship with the militarised and valorous *Landesvater* of their husbands and male relatives, creating a “public sphere” where women and non-combatants patriotically contributed to dynastic wars that complimented the efforts of the mobilised “citizen-soldiers” of the state.<sup>14</sup> The “duty of love” shown by women was seen as garnering just as much as honour as gained on the battlefield.<sup>15</sup> It was through the act of giving, Quataert argues, that “notions of the state” were created by civilian volunteers, most often privileged women, in local communities. Charity also created regional identities through tangible networks formed by the processes of giving, asserting the legitimacy of the monarchism in these places, as well as underscoring local societies’ contribution to and recognition of the dynastic state-building needed to end French hegemony.<sup>16</sup>

The work of Katherine Aaslestad has also shown how charitable donations made in Hamburg during and just after the war of 1813 was a way in which inhabitants asserted their

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<sup>13</sup> Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy*, 4-6.

<sup>14</sup> Quataert, 5, esp. 29-30. See also Karen Hagemann, “Tod für das Vaterland: Der patriotisch-nationale Heldenkult zur Zeit der Freiheitskriege,” *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 60, no. 2 (2001): 307-42; Hagemann, “Female Patriots: Women, War and the Nation in the Period of the Prussian-German Anti-Napoleonic Wars,” *Gender & History* 16, no.2 (2004): 397-424; Hagemann, “Männlicher Muth und Deutsche Ehre”, 383-94. For a study of state and local responsibility to fight men in Britain see Patricia Y. C. E. Lin, “Caring for the Nation’s Families: British Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families and the State, 1793–1815,” in *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians*, eds., Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, Jane Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 99-117.

<sup>15</sup> Quataert, 23.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

identity free of French oppression and celebrated the values they placed on the traditions and particularisms of their area.<sup>17</sup> Aaslestad's exploration of Hanseatic and Saxon cities in the later part of the war found a new desire to help the soldier, his family and those stricken by war. And it was in these urban environments where inhabitants, motivated by patriotic rhetoric and a sympathy for the suffering brought about by a conflict which was now intimate and personal, took it upon themselves to support a state's war effort by aiding those exposed to its hardships. Cities were "sites of political activism" and places where the rich gave money, linking neatly with the contributions of state's rural areas, which gave men and material. Both Quataert and Aaslestad point towards this coming together of the military sphere and a separate "public sphere" inhabited by non-combatants occurring in 1813, placing this cultural and social movement within the context of German state-building and questions over what type of nation the people of the German speaking lands wished to inhabit. Questions which stemmed from the "Wars of Liberation" in 1813. The Habsburg Monarchy is absent from the discussions of these historians.<sup>18</sup>

The widespread civic engagement by those affected by violence in Hamburg, Leipzig and Prussia was also extensive and enduring in the Monarchy. The population's active participation in supporting "local and state armies, patriotic wartime mobilization, humanitarian relief and post war commemorative practices and rituals" began, however, long before 1813.<sup>19</sup> The desire to give and care as a means to show dynastic loyalty and regional allegiances, existed in the Monarchy twenty years before, beginning with the first patriotic donation arranged by Francis in 1793 for the widows and orphans of his soldiers, which quickly became a patriotic act

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<sup>17</sup> Katherine Aaslestad, "Cities and War: Modern Military Urbanism in Hamburg and Leipzig during the Napoleonic Era," *German History* 35, 3 (2017): 381-402, esp. 382; Aaslestad "Identifying a Postwar Period: Case Studies from the Hanseatic Cities following the Napoleonic Wars," in *Decades of Reconstruction: Postwar Societies, State-Building, and International Relations from the Seven Years' War to the Cold War*, eds., Ute Planert and James Retallack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 158-76.

<sup>18</sup> Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy*, 39. Aaslestad, "Cities and War: Modern Military Urbanism," 386. It is pedantic to lay this criticism at Aaslestad's door since her work is located within the Hanseatic states, but the point remains – 1813 does not provide a novel start point for this type of public participation. On the memory of 1813 in the political culture of the Monarchy see, Christian Forster, "Die österreichischen Denkmale um Leipzig zum Gedenken an die Völkerschlacht," in *Das Jahr 1813, Ostmitteleuropa und Leipzig*, eds. Marina Dmitrieva and Lars Karl (Leipzig: Verlag des GWZO, 2016), 178-204.

<sup>19</sup> Aaslestad, 383-90, esp. 383.



in the Habsburg state performed by subject's exempt from combat.<sup>20</sup> Powerful women were still expected to lead these donations as *Landesmutter*, but these contributions were not specifically gendered.<sup>21</sup>

In the Monarchy, where a different form of massed conscription than in France and the rest of Germany existed, patriotic donation was the keyway in which those not called to fight in the conscripted armies of the Monarchy - the economically important bourgeoisie in the city and country of the Monarchy - could show their loyalty as citizens of the state.<sup>22</sup> Whilst Pauline Sutter Fichtner has identified patriotic donations continuing from 1793 up until 1809, charitable contributions continued right up until the end of struggle with France, reaching a crescendo during the “emotional stimuli” that swept across Austria after victory at Leipzig in 1813.<sup>23</sup> These cultural performance charged with meaning which, as Quataert argues of philanthropic giving in Prussia and Germany after 1813, was a type of “power that constituted relationships, ties of loyalty, and bonds of solidarity”, using the *Soldat Bürger* to assert a collective Habsburg identity.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy*, 38. Quataert, using the biographies of the Prussian queen Luise Auguste Wilhelmine Amalie in 1810 and 1814, suggests the participation of Frederick William III and his wife Luise in public philanthropy, as *Landesmutter* and *Landesvater*, in the Prussian sphere served as the genesis for “Dynastic philanthropy practices” that other German states copied post 1812. *Landesmutter*, however, was used to highlight the actions of Francis’ second wife, Maria Theresa of Naples and Sicily, who visited the military hospital in Vienna to attend to the wounded on Christmas eve, 1793. “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, December 25, 1793, 3686.

The term was also used to describe empress Maria Ludovika in the lead up to the war of 1809, reflecting the cultural power of the word in Europe influenced its use in Prussia, and not vice-versa. See Maria Ludovika’s involvement as the *Landesmutter* in the presentation of regimental banners to the Archduke Charles Legion in Prague can be found in “Rede bey erfolgter Uebergabe der Fahnen,” *Vaterländische Blätter*, April 11, 1809, 199; Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars*, 34.

<sup>21</sup> “Bürgertugend,” *Carinthia. Zeitschrift für Vaterlandskunde, Belehrung und Unterhaltung*, September 25, 1813, 2-3. This does not mean women were not acknowledged in popular press as caring for the wounded with the qualities of a courageous mother. For example, see the report from Klagenfurt of “*Die Gattin des bürgl. Handelsmanns Millsteiger nahm den Verwundeten [ensign Baranyay] mit herzlichster Innigkeit auf, pflegte ihn selbst mit rastloser Muthe und eine mütterlichen Sorgfalt, und als er am 1. Sept. starb, weinte sie, wie über den Verlust einen geliebten Sohnes, schmückte den Leichnam mit Blumen, und ließ ihn auf eigene Kosten mit vielem Aufwände beerdigen. Das Offiziers-Korps [from the Hungarian infantry regiment Duka Nr. 39] stattet dieser braven Frau hiermit öffentlich den verbindlichsten Dank ab.*”

<sup>22</sup> On the political engagement of the *Bürgertum* through social organisations see Peter Urbanitsch, “Bürgertum und Politik in der Habsburgermonarchie. Eine Einführung,” in *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*, eds., Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, Ilona Sármány-Parsons, Péter Hanák and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1990), 165-175, esp. 166-167.

<sup>23</sup> Fichtner, *The Habsburgs*, 159; Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy*, 54.

<sup>24</sup> Quataert, 10-11.

Initially wartime donations were received by the emperor as filial love for him from his subject.<sup>25</sup> A sign of devotion that marked them out as *Staatsbürger* because of the contribution they made to the wider Habsburg state through their love for the monarch.<sup>26</sup> Over time, as will be explained, these bonds and signs of loyalty coalesced around the regional identities and local communities created by the military processes of the Habsburg army, stimulated by the representation of the soldier as a key figure of dynastic loyalty, regional identity, and the monarchical bourgeois values identified in the last chapter. Thanks to the way in which charity for soldiers and their family was distributed, acts of giving was recognised by all as patriotic performance which strengthened the bonds between Habsburg regiments and the communities they drew their men from, between soldiers and subjects of these places, and between local societies and the dynasty. Such patriotic deeds underscored the positive reception of the soldier's representation analysed in the previous pages, the political engagement of the *Bürgertum* with the dynasty's war, and a collective desire for monarchism to endure.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, January 26, 1793, 226. The standard letter written on behalf of the emperor by the "Directorial-Minister" Count Leopold Kollowrat to those who made contributions published in the *Wiener Zeitung* read "Danken Sie dein würdigen Staatsbürgern, so schließen Se. Maj. höchstero Schreiben, in Meinem Nahmen, und versichern Sie dieselben, dass Ich das Vergnügen, geliebt zu werden, in seinem ganzen Umfange empfinde."

<sup>26</sup> "Beylage," *Bregenzer Wochenblatt*, March 29, 1793, 6. The motto of giving published by the *Bregenzer Wochenblatt* for its locals encapsulated this idea, "Wir kleinen Kinder weihn hier diese kleine Gabel Dem vielgeliebten, dem besten Vater Franz/ Das er gekrönt mit Ruhm und Sieges Glanz/ Daran von uns ein Pfand der Liebe habe.;" "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, January 12, 1793, 97-98; Highlighting wartime philanthropy as state service to the readers of the paper, an editorial decision made by the *Wiener Zeitung* linked the re-appointment of Count Johann Anton von Pergen to the role of Minister of Police, described in a personal letter written by as "a service to the state and the protection of my subjects," directly with the voluntary contributions of the emperor's people. Both acts of state service were described using the language of dutiful sacrifice. "Lieber Graf Pergen! Wenn Ich Ihre ehrenvolle Ruhe nach so vielen dem Staate, und Meinem seligen Obeime geleisteten Diensten unterbrech, wenn Ich Sie zum Dienste-des Staates, zu Vorsichts für das allgemeine Wohl, für die Sicherheit Meiner Mir so ergebenen Unterthanen, nach so grossen unternommenen wichtigen Arbeiten auf das neue wieder zur Wachsamkeit, zur Arbeit, zur Sorge für das allgemeine Wohl aussorder[.]" ... "Se. K. K. Maj haben von dem Eifer und der Ergebenheit Ihrer getreuen Unterthanen, und von derselben Bereitwilligkeit durch freywillige Aufopferungen den Staat bey dem gegenwärtigen gerechten Kriege zu unterstützen, neue Beweise erhalten."

<sup>27</sup> "Theater," *Carinthia. Zeitschrift für Vaterlandskunde, Belehrung und Unterhaltung*, November 20, 1813, 1-3. These are the page numbers I have attached to this edition. For an example of this change in who the money was for, see the last stanza of a poem delivered by a member of the Carinthian *Gesellschaft dramatischer Kunstfreunde*, which was the opening to three plays put on by the society at the Klagenfurt State Theatre to gather charitable funds for the soldiers of the area. The *Carinthia* reports 763 *Gulden* were taken on the night and presented to city's Mayor for the sick and wounded soldiers, and the widows and orphans of the dead. The paper also reported similar performances for local Border regiments in Marburg (*Maribor, Croatia*) and Hermannstadt (*Sibiu, Romania*). The prologue, read by Dr. L. von Fest, ended with the lines:

*Die aber zogen in dem Heiligen Krieg,  
Sie waren nicht allein am heimischen Heerd,*

Whereas before the crippled soldier was a man to ignore, and the widows of the dead seen as potential criminals, the enlightened thinking of the eighteenth century, and evolving rhetoric on the soldier during the war with France in the Habsburg Monarchy, positioned these unfortunates as people whose communities should not only care for but honour because of the service they gave the state.<sup>28</sup> In the rural areas of the Monarchy the desire to participate was informed by decades of conscription which coalesced with local communities, forcing people to engage with a conflict that took their friends, families and kin long before the armies of France arrived. In the city it was the intensifying rhetoric which championed the fighting man as a representation of the dynasty's legitimacy, the traditions, privileges and opportunities it protected, the cultural values of the establishing bourgeoisie – decent, honest, respectable, brave - and the desire for those with rank to assert their dominion in Habsburg wartime culture which promoted charitable acts.<sup>29</sup>

Those in the cities contributed incredible amounts of wealth, involving themselves on mass for the first time in war. City funds went to the wives and children of local regiments, or

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*Denn Jeder ist gebunden an ein Herz,  
Des Weibes Thron fließt, dir Sehnsucht wacht,  
Die mit den Wolken zu den Gatten zieht;  
Des Kinder Frage um den Vater reißt  
Ihr immer tiefer ihres Busens Wunden.  
Ihn selber wecke die Trommel auf dem Traumen,  
Wo er sein Liebstes erst in Schoos gewiegt  
Es is an uns der Seinigen zu denken,  
Lasst uns durch Dank des Heerbanns Siege feiern.  
Kehrt er zurück im Schmucke grüner Zweige,  
Den Frieden bringend auf entrollter Fahne,  
Begrüßt sein nasses Augen die heimischen Fluten,  
Und alles strömt bewegt dem Zug entgegen-  
So sind er auch am Thor nur blühende Gestalten,  
Und am bekannten Heerd des Bruders Dankes Walten.*

On philanthropy as a means to forge relationships between the “giver” and “receiver”, as well as define “social distinction and class” see Thomas Adam, “Introduction,” in *Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America*, ed., Thomas Adam, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 1-14, esp. 4-5.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Scheutz, “...mit dem soldatenleben gezüchtigt worden?”: Scheutz, “Demand and Charitable Supply: Poverty and Poor Relief in Austria in 18th and 19th Centuries,” 74-75; Peter Feldbauer and Hannes Stekl, “Wiens Armenwesen in Vormarz,” in *Wien im Vormarz*, ed., Renate Banik Schweitzer (Vienna: Verein für Geschichte der Stadt Wien Kommissionsverlag Jugend und Volk, 1980), 175-201.

<sup>29</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 30-51.

during particularly troubling times with the enemy advancing into the interior of the Monarchy, to volunteer units raised from the citizen population of these urban places.<sup>30</sup> Most individual donations, however, came from the communities the regular regiments drew their men from, which were organised at a parish or manorial level by religious leaders or patriotic local authorities. These were patriotic gifts given to the families of the dead and captured, and those men wounded in battle from the locally raised regiments by neighbours. Donations which affirmed the patriotism of local societies to the emperor through the care of his soldiers, whilst reflecting these places' communal care and goodwill to its own.<sup>31</sup>

Indeed, whilst the rural population of the Monarchy may not have had the means to match the wartime philanthropy of its suburban and urban compatriots, they did comprise most of the donors. Their donations, from the communities and villages found across the whole of the Monarchy, were published in the *Wiener Zeitung* alongside contributions made by those in the cities, joining the two demographics together. This linking of the different organised bodies which made up the Habsburg state was a theme of the Monarchy's wartime philanthropy, exhibited by the way in which it was recognised, with lists in the paper showing readers the myriad communities, orders, estates, and provinces of the Habsburg state unified as one behind the dynasty's efforts against France through the act of freely giving.

The first published lists of voluntary patriotic contributions was in the 1793 February 20 edition of the *Wiener Zeitung*.<sup>32</sup> The amounts given and who donated were taken from an

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<sup>30</sup> "Anhang zur Wiener-Zeitung, 1796. Nro, 74: Allerhöchste Entschliebung," *Wiener Zeitung*, September 14, 1796, 2653-655; "Beylage zur Wiener-Zeitung Nro 75. 1796: Siebentes Verzeichniß: derjenigen Patrioten, welche zu dem von Sr. Majestat genehmigten, hier zu errichtenden Korps von Freywilligen, ihre persönlichen Dienste, oder Geldbeträge angeboten haben," *Wiener Zeitung*, September 1796, 2683-688.

<sup>31</sup> Scheutz, "Demand and Charitable Supply," 74-76.

<sup>32</sup> Previously donations were listed in paragraph form in each edition through December 1792 to February 1793. See for example, "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 6, 1793, 321-22, esp, 322. On hearing of the Mayor of Vienna attempting to coercively organise a collection from the inhabitants of the city out of "excessive zeal", the emperor requested this be stopped as he demanded nothing come between him and the love freely given by his subjects. Soon, however, as this chapter argues later, collections organised by authorities became the norm as it was utilised as means to assert their power during a time of political destabilisation. "*Lieber Graf Kollowrat! So angemessen auch der Beytrag, welcher von so vielen würdigen Staatsgliedern geliehet wir, den Unstranden ist, in welchen der Staat sich befindet, so ist Mir*

account provided by the *Hofkriegsrat*, located in Vienna, who extended the “most heartfelt emotion and most grateful thanks” on behalf of the emperor to those whose names were for all to see.<sup>33</sup> As the war progressed some lists would cover eight pages, sometimes inserted as appendixes covering specific regions of the Monarchy which ran concurrently with other lists documenting specifically local donations given from Upper and Lower Austria as well as Vienna. These lists record the names of individual tenant farmers who had made one-off donation, to local guilds and magistrates who promised yearly or monthly contributions for as long as the war continued. The priests who donated their collections could be seen with the nobility who gave amounts that dwarfed the rest. Where collections from whole manors were tallied, these were attributed to the subjects of the area (*Unterthanen*), just the same as takings from the staff at imperial officers were listed as contributions from their affiliated departments.<sup>34</sup>

The list of voluntary donations in the *Wiener Zeitung* was one of the few spaces where Habsburg society was flat. Tailors and shoemakers living in rural communities could be read alongside the highest of nobility. Peasants who gifted kind, such as the subjects of Zbirow who in 1793 gave 1000 bundles of hay, were gratefully thanked at the same time as the family members of Francis, like the Archduchess Maria Elisabeth, aunt to the emperor, who gave 10,000 *fl.* Not all who provided their own money did so publicly, some were listed by their profession, house number or referred to simply as “an anonymous young woman” (*Ein ungenanntes Fräulein*).<sup>35</sup> Though some wished to remain anonymous, the named promotion of

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*doch der Gedanke noch weit willkommener, dass die persönliche Lieber Meiner Unterthanen für Mich der Hauptbeweggrund dieser freyer Gaben ist. Diese Lieber Meiner Unterthanen ist Mein Stolz, eine Glückseligkeit, nach der Ich durch Meine ganze Lebenszeit trachten werde, und für welche Ich so ausschließend angenommen bin, dass Ich auch die größten Gaben für nichts achten würde, wenn sie nicht aus diesen Beweggründe, wenn sie nicht mit ganzer Freyheit dargereicht wurden. Der Magistrat der Stadt Wien hat aus übertriebenem Eifer sich zwischen Mir, und Meinem Unterthanen zum Mittler eigenmächtig aufgeworfen, da er die Haus-Eigenthümer hat vorladen lassen, und sie zu einer Gabe, samt ihren Einwohnern, sog mit Bestimmung einem Terminus, hat bereden wollen.”*

<sup>33</sup> “Anhang zur Wiener-Zeitung 1793. Nr. 79,” *Wiener Zeitung*, October 2, 1793, 2895.

<sup>34</sup> “Anhang zur Wiener-Zeitung 1793. Nr. 86: Freywillige Kriegsbeyrage der Gitschner-Bezirks Beamten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, October 26, 1793, 3145.

<sup>35</sup> “Fortsetzung der Verzeichnisses der Sr. Maj. unterthanigst dargebrachten freywilligen Beytragen,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 2, 546-49.

those who gave was not only a recognition of their charity, but also an incentive for others to give.

The naming of those who gave indicates charitable donations were a form of performative patriotism, tasks with elements of ritual and spectacle allowing patriots to be seen, but rather fortunately not be killed, and the bi-weekly lists of charitable donations in the *Wiener Zeitung* provided those who made contributions something for their efforts. For subjects of the Monarchy the act of giving was, like Cavallo has explained of charity in early modern Italy, as important as the giving itself, enabling actors to claim recognition from their emperor, as well as social and cultural currency with which to show others they loyally loved the fatherland.<sup>36</sup> Individuals could lay claim this honour, or obtain patriotic virtue through professional guilds, whose combined donations made on behalf of its members strengthened the honour of both the organisation and every one of its members whatever their contribution. The search for corporate honour earned through acts of patriotism can be found in the guild of Shoemakers in Ravelsbach who donated 15 *fl.* in March 1793, or the cotton weavers working in the factory of the Laurenz Monastery who gave 400.<sup>37</sup> By contributing through estates, guilds, parishes, towns and community collectives, a shoemaker, a peasant, clerk, student philosopher or manor servant could feel proud and patriotic if their guild, order or manor was listed and they contributed. These lists of patriotic donations were published right up until 1815, enabling men and women to see the fruits of their patriotic labour.<sup>38</sup> They created links of loyalty that

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<sup>36</sup> Cavallo, "The Motivations of Benefactors," 54-56.

<sup>37</sup> "Fortsetzung der Verzeichnisses," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 2, 1793, 546.

<sup>38</sup> For an early way in which corporate bodies were recognised see "Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 13, 1793, 385-86. Here the "das Gremium der privilegierten Handelsleute zu Graz, 4500 G.; Franz Jos. Reither, burgerl. Baubolzhandler, 100; die hiesigen griechischen Handelsleute, 8185; das Personale der Staatsraths-Kanzley und des Centrale, 805; Maria Anna und Elisabeth Gartner, 105 G. 40 kr.; die drey burgerlich. Handelsleute zu Waidhofen an der Taya, 300; der Unterthanen von Höflein an der Donau, 54; das Collegium der Advocaten zu Graz, 1498 G. 30 kr.; das burgerlich. Jägerkorps zu Laybach 675 G.; Maria Theresia Rbunost, ein neunjähriges Mädchen, 54; der Markt Schwechat, 645 G. 20 kr.; die neuen jüdischen Großhändler zu Praag, 2430 G.; das Dorf Unter-Dobling, 108; eine ungenannte Wittwe, 50; die Vorstadt-Gemeinde Oberneustift ober Schottenfeld, 1799 G.; Jos. Edler v. Weinbrenner, 200; die Horer des zweyten Jahrganges der Philosophie, an der hiesigen Universität 225; Klara Unfriedinn, Dienstmagd zu Nürnberg, 4 G. 328 kr., und das Josephinische Gymnasium, 108 Gulden", could all be seen together, representing both the sum of the Habsburg state's parts and its collective whole.

highlighted the whole of the Monarchy's wartime efforts, and coaxed subjects to honour the emperor by supporting his brave and courageous troops.<sup>39</sup>

It would be disingenuous, however, to view charitable donations and the lists of those who contributed as a form of egalitarianism that removed the power of authority, and instead only recognised patriotism and loyalty as *the* form of status. As Franz Fillafer has argued of patriotism during the Revolutionary period, the nobility used wartime philanthropy to assert their privileges within the greater Monarchy and cement their rank over others during a time when equality and liberty - and centralisation - threatened their position.<sup>40</sup> Donations, especially given by those from manors, guilds, officers or orders, were organised by the same authoritative power which governed the lives of the majority under the emperor Francis. The municipal corporations (*Gemeinde*), noble landowners, their magistrates and officials, priests, guild leaders, heads of imperial departments and retired military officials who organised these contributions all served to benefit from persuading those under their power to pledge voluntary, patriotic donations. These were acts of philanthropy which would save their own pockets and gain them honour and rank through the martialling of the human resources under their dominion. Indeed, it was their name which appeared on the paperwork of the *Hofkriegsrat* and filtered out to the newspapers of the Monarchy.

But one example of the power of authorities can be found in a report on the archduchess Maria Anna of Austria, sister to the emperor Francis and abbess of the Theresian

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<sup>39</sup> "Amtsblatt zur Oesterreichisch-Kaiserlichen privilegirten Wiener-Zeitung: Kundmachung," *Wiener Zeitung*, September 30, 1813, 333. This exact point was made in an 1813 proclamation from the highest provincial authority in Lower Austria, the *Statthalter*, Count Franz von Saurau which asked for voluntary donations of alcohol for the troops fighting in Saxony in 1813. "Während die tapfere kais. österreichische Armee in dem gegenwärtigen verhängnisvollen Zeitpunkte für das Höchste Interesse des Staates den Kampf baumvoll besteht; forberg Gemeinsinn und Vaterlandsiebe alle übrigen Stande, welche an den Gefahren und Beschwerden des Krieger ihre Mitbruder zu erleichtern... und zu diesem Ende eine Freiwillige Sammlung an Wein und Branntwein in allen Provinzen veranstaltet werde...Die Regierung wird es sich zur Pflicht machen, dem Namen der patriotischen Geber zu allgemeiner Nacheiferung die Ehre der öffentlichen Bekanntmachung widerfahren zu lassen.;" "Amtsblatt: Kundmachung," *Wiener Zeitung*, October 12, 1813, 561. Such was the response to this request the local authorities issued a statement announcing they would not be taking donations after October 17, 1813; "Amtsblatt: Freywillige Beytrage," *Wiener Zeitung*, October 19, 1813, 622. Those who provided wine and brandy were "honoured" in a list on October 19.

<sup>40</sup> Fillafer, *Aufklärung Habsburgisch*, 39.

Institution of Noble Ladies in Prague, who was acclaimed in the *Wiener Zeitung* as a paragon of those who “imbued with the deepest feelings offer everything to ease the fate of warriors who are struggling with so many difficulties.”<sup>41</sup> The archduchess offered “everything” by organising a collection of knitted socks from the inhabitants of Prague which was then sent onto the soldiers reportedly experiencing a difficult winter. It is not reported on who purchased the wool. Of course, the archduchess’s patriotism inspired imitators. One of these was the countess Siskowitz who in early 1794 had begun a collection for the wives of soldiers in Prague who were fighting or had died on campaign. Again, how much of her own funds she contributed was not disclosed, but her initiative, shown by someone who could only do so because they possessed authority, was hailed as an exemplar of patriotism in Bohemia to readers in Vienna.<sup>42</sup>

How did these funds get to those they were intended for? How were these voluntary contributions handled? And how did they provide links between a locale and its soldiers, and therefore between a society and the dynasty? To answer the first question: During the first years of the war the *Hofkriegsrat* reported quarterly in the *Wiener Zeitung* on the amount of money that had been distributed to those Viennese in need. From these reports readers could find out the amount of money bequeathed, the daily allowance of those who received it, and the number of recipients present in the local area. These were snapshots of charitable donations starkly revealing, somewhat naively, the growing cost of war. In the first quarter of 1794 a report from the *Hofkriegsrat* stated between January and March 8, 023 daily payments were made to those eligible, each consisting of between 2 and 16 *kreuzers* (*kr.*), whilst others in need were employed by the military in ancillary roles.<sup>43</sup> Most of these women, orphans and invalids initially went to

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<sup>41</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 1, 1794, 311. “*Aus Prag vom 24. Januar: Auch unser Vaterland ist so glücklich, wie so viele andere Länder, Beyspiele von höchsten Personen aufzuweisen, die von dem innigsten Gefühle durchdrungen alles aufbieten, um den mit so vielen Beschwerlichkeiten kämpfenden Kriegern ihr Schicksal zu erleichtern Ihre. K. Hoh. die Erzherzogin und Abtissin des biesigen Kongl. Damenstifts gaben dazu selbst das Beyspiel und die Ermunterung. Höchstdieselbe veranstaltete unter dem heftigen Adel eine Sammlung von gestrickten Fussesackeln für die im Winter streitenden Soldaten bey der Armee, und diese iel so ansehnlich aus, dass schon dieser Tage ein Transport davon zur Armee abgeben wird. Dieses aufmunternde Beyspiel hat bereits Nachahmer erwecken. Die Grafinn von Siskowiss, hat nämlich eine Sammlung für die hier befindlichen Soldatenweiber veranstaltet, deren manne im Kriege sind, ober or dem Feinde ihr Leben gelassen haben.*”

<sup>42</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *WZ*, February 1, 1794, 311.

<sup>43</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, May 7, 1794, 1353.



the alms houses and local councils in their area, continuing the traditions of “face-to-face” charity found within small local communities. This seems to have been an ineffective system, for soon charitable distributions evolved into a system by the end of the war where funds were administered by the *Hofkriegsrat* and distributed out to the many regiments across the Monarchy through each recruiting districts military administration office (*General-Commando*).<sup>44</sup>

Women recipients were provided with an amount of money according to a rubric of need, which corresponded to the number of children the widow, or husbandless wife, had to care for. An important eligibility for receiving donations was the regiment in which the woman’s man had served in, as money from specific conscription departments were only made available to the relatives of dead soldiers who had come from or lived in the area. As part of the process of caring for these people, regiments would submit the list of wives who were in need to the War Payments Office (*k. k. Universal-Kriegszahlamt*) in the *Hofkriegsrat*. This was a department which oversaw and administered the local charitable funds, as well as pensions and pay, for the army to each recruiting district.<sup>45</sup> By 1796 reports from the *Wiener Zeitung* show a process of administering patriotic funds had been established where eligible women were divided into three classes as designated by each regiment. In December of that year women whose men had served in the Lower Austrian regiments surrounding the city, but had died or been captured since the April 10, shared in the 2, 316 *fl.* recently provided to the *Hofkriegsrat* by the mayor of Vienna on behalf of the city’s inhabitants. Those ranked in the “First Class” were given 20 *fl.* These were

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<sup>44</sup> Much more needs to be done to establish the exact ways in which funds were administered but here I have attempted to sketch out a system with the sources at hand. Franz Hübler, *Militär-Oekonomie-System der kaiserlichen königlichen österreichischen Armee*, Vol. 16 (Vienna: Geistinger, 1822), 14-21; *Ibid*, *Militär-Oekonomie-System der kaiserlichen königlichen österreichischen Armee*, Vol. 1 (Vienna: Geistinger, 1820), 19-20. These works were compiled by a “*kais. k. Ober-Kriegs-Commissar und ökonomischen Referenten des niederösterreichischen General - Commando*,” who wrote “*eines vollständigen Handbuchs über das Militär-Oekonomie-System für die österreichischen Staaten*,” with the desire to create, “*ein umfassendes Handbuch über das Militär-Oekonomie-System zu besitzen, haben mich bestimmt, mit einer jahrelangen Anstrengung, die seit dem Jahre 1523 bis einschliessig zum Jahre 1819, mithin durch einen Zeitraum von 296 Jahren, für alle Zweige jener Verwaltung ergangenen Vorschriften, Normen und Grundgesetze, in so weit sie gegenwärtig noch in Wirksamkeit stehen, zu sammeln, sie systematisch zu ordnen, und solche zur practischen Anwendung für das Ganze, und als Leitfaden für den Einzelnen vorzulegen.*”

<sup>45</sup> *Kaiserlich- Königlicher Schematismus des Erzherzogthums Oesterr. ob der Enns. auf das Jahr 1823*, Vol. 1 (Linz: Johann Christoph Quandt, 1823), 132.

women who had no children. The “Second Class”, women with one child, was given 27 *fl.*, and wives with two or more children were provided with 33 *fl.* and 25 *kr.*<sup>46</sup>

The year before, money collected from a February Thanksgiving mass at St. Stephen in Vienna was distributed to four separate classes of wives and orphans of soldiers from the regiments raised in Lower Austria. Then the amount provided was substantially more than what was offered to those in 1796. For example, orphans whose fathers had been killed, the “Fourth Class”, were given 35 *fl.* and 7 *kr.* Women with multiple children received 53 *fl.* and 8 *kr.* The majority of those who received some form of payment from the cathedral’s collection were the wives and children of the men from the *Deutschmeister* who had been captured the year before at Landrecies.<sup>47</sup> In both 1795 and 1796, the names of these women’s dead or captured husbands were printed in the *Wiener Zeitung*, alongside the amount their dependents were given, and a report that each woman had been handed the cash from the cathedral’s parishioners by the city’s mayor, who also offered the thanks of the city.<sup>48</sup> Across the Monarchy, like in Vienna, the links between regiments and their locales were strengthened by these acts of giving right up until the end of the conflict.<sup>49</sup> Communities, as an evangelical parish priest had urged his parishioners on the eve of war in 1813, took care of their own soldiers, along with their wives and children who lived as neighbours, as a sign of their love for the fatherland and the emperor<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, December 21, 1796, 363-64 The recipients were women whose partners were from the Austrian raised infantry regiments *Deutschmeister*, *Großberzog Toscana*, *Erzberzog Karl*, *Preiß* and *Pellegrini*.

<sup>47</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten: Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 7, 1795, 349-348.

<sup>48</sup> “Inländische Begebenheiten,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 11, 1795, 381-382. These orphans and wives had men from the Bombardier-Korps and the 2nd Artillery Regiment garrisoned in Vienna, the infantry regiments *Deutschmeister*, *Erzberzog Karl*, *Preiß* and *Pellegrini*.

<sup>49</sup> “Notizen,” *Der Sammler*, April 22, 1809, 192.

<sup>50</sup> Cleymann, *Der Krieg vor dem Richterstuhle*, 48-50. “Hat nicht ohne dem der Krieg der unverschuldete, Leiden genug für sie? Wollt ihr sie noch vergrößern? Aber, auch wir, meine Freunde, denen nicht das Loos gefallen ist für das Vaterland zu kämpfen, die wir ruhig in unseren friedlichen Wohnungen leben, und das Ungemach des Krieges zum Theil nur aus Beschreibungen kennen; auch wir wollen bei dieser großen Angelegenheit des Vaterlandes nicht untätig sein...Nehmt euch, ihr Begüterten, der hinterbliebenen Familien unserer braven Landwehrmänner an; laßt Weib und Kinder derselben nicht darben.”

It was between the victory at Leipzig in October 1813 and the news of the occupation of Paris in May 1814 where the model of the *Soldat Bürger* was clearly utilised by the Habsburg populace to exemplify regional allegiances and express dynastic loyalty.<sup>51</sup> It was also during this time that the most overt assertion of the coming together of local communities and the soldiers who fought in their regiments was made through wartime philanthropy. On March 10, 1814, the *Wiener Zeitung*, as part of the official announcements published on behalf of the government, printed a letter sent from the regimental commander of the Lower Austrian infantry regiment *Kerpen* stationed on the border with France. In the published letter the regimental commander, Baron Johann O' Brien, expressed his "warmest thanks and indelible gratitude to those patriotic communities and individuals who have so generously shown their respect for the military, and in particular their benevolent disposition towards the regiment under my command."<sup>52</sup>

Those patriotic communities who had so benevolently supported the regiment *Kerpen* were villages and parishes around the town of St. Pölten in the recruiting district of *Viertel ober dem Wienerwald (Mostviertel)*. This was the region where by 1814 almost all the men of *Kerpen*, as we have seen in chapter two, were from. As O'Brien noted, the parish of Ollersbach, east of St. Pölten, gave 27 *fl.*; the parish of Mautern, north of the city and along the Danube, gave 46 *fl.*; the ecclesiastic manor of Lilianfeld, a group of villages in the south, provided almost 300 *fl.* The inhabitants of St. Pölten gave coats and shoes, which were greatly appreciated by the soldiers of *Kerpen* when they arrived in early February, and the people of the town Ybbs, in the west of the province, provided 44 shirts. Along with almost 450 *fl.* given to the Lower Austrian General Command, an administrative wing of the army responsible for the regiments stationed there,

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<sup>51</sup> "Amtsblatt: Verzeichniß," *Wiener Zeitung*, November 2, 1813, 742. The official report from the Habsburg government indicates 56,750 Gulden were provided by the people of Vienna for the "*k.k. Oesterreichischen Heere*" in the week after victory at Leipzig was announced.

"Amtsblatt: Patriotische Beytrage. Bey den fur das k. k. Oest. Militar eingeleiteten Sammlungen sind im V.(iertel) U.(nter). M. (anharts) B.(erg). eingekommen, wie folgt," *Wiener Zeitung*, December 13, 1813, 1140; "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 1, 1814, 127. This edition's first page contained news that officials from the k. k. Landrechte in Lemberg donated to the wounded of the Habsburg Cuirassier Corps at Leipzig, attesting to the widespread act of giving in the later part of the war.

<sup>52</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Geschenke," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 10, 1814, 281.

*Kerpen* received one florin and 43 *kr.* from the parish of Schebs (*Scheibs*) in the foothills of the Türnitzer Alps.

All these gifts, along with a 5,000 *fl.* organised by the Bishopric of St. Pölten between December 1813 and March 1814 for the soldiers of *Kerpen*, were given by locals who identified soldiers from their villages as worthy of recognition, and the charitable giving brought the civilian and military estates together, turning the war into a collective effort for the people of the region.<sup>53</sup> These estates, as O'Brien's words attest, were now one community, who through mass mobilisation, mass giving and the recognition of each other's war time contribution, affirmed the loyalty of the inhabitants around St. Pölten to the emperor Francis. In some instances, individual soldiers and their families were named in the official announcements of patriotic donations, with the money given to them acknowledged as coming from the communities they were born, raised and conscripted from.<sup>54</sup> For the subjects in the recruiting district of *Viertel ober dem Wiener Wald*, the members of the regiment *Kerpen* served as the focal point for this display of wartime patriotism. First through the sons and brothers conscripted to fight for the dynasty, and then through the *florins* and *kreuzers* dutifully provided by their families and communities used to alleviate the burden of war for the emperor's military servants.

The same levels of patriotic giving around St. Pölten, used as an avenue by the territory defined by the regiment to engage in the dynasty's war effort, was seen right across the Hereditary Lands, Hungary and in Galicia. The official proclamations accompanying O'Brien's letter in the *Wiener Zeitung* came with a full page of charitable donations with the requests of

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<sup>53</sup> "Amtsblatt, Patriotische freywillige Gaben. Für die verwundeten Krieger haben bey der k. k. Stadthauptmannschaft erlegt," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 3, 1814, 251.

<sup>54</sup> "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, October 24, 1813, 663. "Der Oberbeamte der Herrschaften Karlstetten und Wasserbug, had in dem Konskriptions-Bezirk diers Herrschaften eine Subskription zur Unterstützung der vor dem Feinde dienenden Militär-Mannschaft veranstaltet. Der Erfolg war, das sich mehrere Gemeindeglieder beeyliessen, für die Dauer des gegenwärtigen Krieges, jährliche Beytrage, welche sie in vierteljährigen Raten bezahlen wollen, festsetzen, deren Gesamtbetrag, mit den Leistungen des Herrschaftlichen Amts-personale, jährlich die Summe von 258 Gulden, 12 1/2 Kr. ausmacht. Da die Herrschaft Karlstetten den Wunsch geäußert hat, das von diesem Beytrage folgende im Regimente Kerpen dienende Mannschaft namentlich die Gemeinen, Franz Eichinger und Michael Birgmayer, von Flinzbach; Lorenz Gruner, von Niedling, und Franz Giesler, von Karlstetten geburtig mit taglichen 8 Kreuzen, dann die Landwehr-Gemeinen, Ferdinand Gassner und Franz Losteiner, von Neidling, und Franz Brand, von Flinzbach geburtig, mit taglichen 4 Kreuzern bestellt werden."

guilds, parishes, professional groups and individuals to assign their donations to the men and families of their local area.<sup>55</sup> A trend which was seen in almost every edition during the Sixth Coalition.<sup>56</sup> Together, these charitable donations clearly articulated to the paper's readers that local areas everywhere were engaging in the dynasty's war effort through support for their virtuous and valorous local soldier. Acts of patriotism that linked the Monarchy's regions and social orders together and reflected Francis' subjects' belief their dutiful military institutions, and the men who comprised them, represented the strength of monarchical power and the justice and happiness it provided. Inspired by the bravery of his local soldiers, one landlord from the Viennese suburb of Leopoldstadt gave 200 *fl.* in July 1814. Half of which he directed was to be divided between the regular soldiers wounded in the last campaign and the other half to the families of the suburb's dead *Landwebr.* In the same month, communities across Upper Austria provided almost 3, 500 *fl.* to be shared out to the wounded, sick and surviving soldiers of the province's two infantry regiments, *Jordis* Nr. 59 and *Erzherzog Rudolph* Nr. 14.<sup>57</sup>

Soldiers were not passive bystanders in the mobilisation of civilians for their war effort. Some members of regimental staffs sent appeals to local press, drawing upon the shared civic values wartime rhetoric had positioned as being held within both the civilian and military spheres of the Habsburg state to generate support for their men. In September 1813, just as the army of Inner Austria were marching into northern Italy and Illyria, Constantin Wunsch, captain and auditor from the infantry regiment *Duka*, wrote to the *Carinthia Zeitung*, extolling the links between the *Soldat Bürger* and German bourgeoisie in Austria, whose decent, honest, respectable, morally upright actions would together push back the power of France, bring good governance to Europe and secure the "the sanctuary of the home regions".<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> "Amtsblatt," *WZ*, March 10, 1814, 281. This edition of the patriotic donations in the *Wiener Zeitung* listed communities from Galicia who had donated between September and December 1813.

<sup>56</sup> "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, February 26, 1814, 229.

<sup>57</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Beytrage," *Wiener Zeitung*, July 18, 1814, 794.

<sup>58</sup> "Bürgertugend," *Carinthia. Zeitschrift für Vaterlandskunde, Belebrung und Unterhaltung*, September 25, 1813, 1; *Militär-Almanach*, Vol. 23 (Vienna: C. Graeffner und Comp., 1813), 144. Constantin Wuns[c]h is listed as regiment *Duka's* Auditor in the army's official schematics. His younger brother, Franz, is a second lieutenant in the regiment.

It was soldiers who had been given the “honourable task”, Wunsch articulated, to fight for “ancient rights (*Heides Rechte*), monarch and fatherlands,” and they took great solace knowing their fellow citizens loved and thanked them for it. To support the fighting man the “good-natured people” of Austria had to channel their own dignity, their love for peace, tranquillity and justice. This would enable them to mobilise their noble “Samaritan trait of philanthropy” and align their hopes and actions behind the soldier in his quest to reinstate “the old prosperity” of Germany and the House of Austria in Illyria. If the compassion of both the soldier and his “fellow citizen” (*Mitbürger*) was united in “mutual effort, in honest, strong, persevering work,” then, as Wurth concluded, “civic virtue would triumph over the enemy’s sacrilegious power!” (*Über des Feindes frevelnde Macht - Triumph der Bürgertugend!*).<sup>59</sup>

Wunsch had drawn on the rhetoric surrounding the Habsburg soldier, which had described his identity as containing the same civic virtues valued by the bourgeoisie reading public in the city and country of the Habsburg state, to urge these communities to support the army, care for the wounded and meet local military exigencies. Specifically, the captain mobilised the men and women deemed too economically and intellectually valuable to serve on the battlefield, but who were as valuable to local war efforts through their economic and political support as mobilised conscripts, by positioning the struggle with France as one between a world both soldier and civilian valued, comprising of dignity, compassion, benevolent authority and “mild government”, against destructive, tyrannical and oppressive power.<sup>60</sup>

Such rhetoric, echoing the narrative of the war from central government in the Monarchy’s newspapers and pulpits, mobilised communities to continue to support their

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<sup>59</sup> “Bürgertugend,” *Carinthia*, September 25, 1813, 3.

<sup>60</sup> “Bürgertugend,” *Carinthia*, September 25, 1813, 2. Wunsch describes a scene where the village of Lambrecht in Illyria is destroyed during a skirmish between soldiers of France and the Monarchy to reiterate the difference between the two sides. One of the residents, with all his worldly possessions gone and house aflame, tells Wunsch “if this sacrifice could serve to buy peace and bring us back under Austria’s mild government, then I would be happy living as a beggar.” “*Auch Gott! (erwiderte mir da Einer aus dem Jammer Zirkel) wenn dies Opfer dazu dienen konnte, den Frieden zu erkaufen, und uns wieder unter Oesterreichs milde Regierung zu bringen, so würde ich mich an dem Fablen Bettelstabe glücklich schagen.*”

soldiers, despite defeat and local economic hardships.<sup>61</sup> And as the war continued into the early spring of 1814, local parishes across the Monarchy, containing civilian populations eager to see a Europe of justice, security, honesty and diligence, continued to give to those regiments who recruited from their villages and towns. These places utilised their donations to express their commitment to the Habsburg cause and identify with their soldiers who fought to restore the safe and steady hand of monarchism they so valued.

Just before the Allied armies entered France in February 1814, the *Wiener Zeitung* reported donations from areas to the soldiers of their local regiments in Upper, Lower and Inner Austria, listing parishes and the amount they gave under the banner of each unit. Specific detail was given on the donations provided to *Deutschmeister* and *Jordis*, recruited from the communities adjoining the city of Vienna and in Upper Austria respectively.<sup>62</sup> The villages in Illyria, Inner Austria and the town of Fiume gave money to care for the sick and ill soldiers at the military hospital in Laibach, as well as the local regimental communities of *Chasteller* and *Hohenlobe Bartenstein*.<sup>63</sup> Those parishes in Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia reportedly gave to their infantry regiments *Joseph Colloredo* and *Froon*, using donations to affirm their loyalty and express their joy at the victory at Leipzig won by their local men.<sup>64</sup> The new and emerging private patriotic associations, which united and allowed the wealthy and the patriotically eager to support the Monarchy, also featured heavily. One donation came from the recruiting district of the infantry regiment *Wenzel Colloredo* in Bohemia whose patriotic association donated 1, 211 *fl.* which was only to be given the wives of those from that unit killed in the fighting.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> On the cost of war on Upper Austrian communities, and their determination to never again be under the yoke of Napoleon see *Schweiger*, “Die Stadt Linz in den Napoleonischen Kriegen,” 195-97, esp. 196.

<sup>62</sup> “Amtsblatt: Freywillige Patriotische Gaben, dargebracht an den kaiserl. konigl. Hofkriegsrath,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 19, 1814, 202; “Amtsblatt: Freywillige Patriotische Gaben,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 3, 1814, 251; “Amtsblatt: Freywillige Beytrage,” *Wiener Zeitung*, February 7, 1814, 153; “Amtsblatt: Freywillige Patriotische Gaben,” *Wiener Zeitung*, March 22, 1814, 329; “Amtsblatt: Freywillige Patriotische Gaben,” *Wiener Zeitung*, April 3, 1814, 377.

<sup>63</sup> “Amtsblatt: *WZ*, February 19, 1814, 203.

<sup>64</sup> “Amtsblatt,” 203.

<sup>65</sup> “Amtsblatt: Beytrage,” *WZ*, July 18, 1814, 794; “Amtsblatt,” *WZ*, February 7, 1814, 153.

The utilisation of the local regiment to express dynastic loyalty and to highlight the contributions of different societies to the Habsburg state was also found in the Monarchy's eastern provinces. One official report published in the months after Leipzig announced the "nobles, citizens (*Bürgerschaft*) and inhabitants (*Einwohner*)" of Pressburg had, instead of paying to light the city at night, contributed almost 3, 500 *fl.* collectively to those wounded, orphaned and widowed as a result of the victory at Leipzig. The money was given to the area's local military communities, where the soldiers and women of the regiment *Hiller* received two-thirds of the donations, and those from *Württemberg* a third. Another 400 *fl.* were donated to the local military hospital caring for these regiment's wounded in the city.<sup>66</sup> A patriotic society from the Silesian town of Fulnek donated 80 *fl.* to the soldiers of the infantry regiment *Joseph Colloredo* Nr. 57.<sup>67</sup> In the towns of Buda and Pest, government officials, clergy and citizens of the city collected 1, 857 *fl.*, dedicating the money "to the wounded men of the [Hungarian] infantry regiment *Hieronimus Colloredo*."<sup>68</sup> The citizens of Oedenburg (*Sopron, Hungary*) gave 1, 551 *kr.* to widows and orphans of the dead from the infantry regiment *Simbschen* Nr. 43, as well as 1 *Dukaten* in Gold for those wounded at Leipzig.<sup>69</sup> The Greek orthodox community in Agram (Zagreb, Croatia) provided 10 pales (*Eimer*) of wine for the wounded of the preeminent Hungarian infantry regiment *Erzherzog Franz* Nr. 1.<sup>70</sup>

Further evidence of the integrative effects of patriotic donations between periphery communities and the rest of the Monarchy can also be found in a report stipulating the Jewish

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<sup>66</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Beytrage," *Wiener Zeitung*, December 13, 1813, 1139.

"Der Adel, de Bürgerschaft und die übrigen Einwohner zu Pressburg, haben wegen des bey Leipzig errungen Sieges statt einer allgemeinen Beleuchtung der Stadt, eine Sammlung für verwundete Krieger unter sich eingeleitet, und den eingegangenen Beytrag von 3442 *fl.* *W. (itve) W. (ajfes)*, 54 *fl.* 12 *kr.* in Gold, und 101 *fl.* in Silber Münze mit zwey Drittheile für die Verwundeten des Infanterieregiments *Hiller*, und mit einem Drittheile für Verwundete des Infanterieregiments *Württemberg* gewidmet, 400 *fl.* aber sogleich an das dortige Militairspital zur Verwendung abgegeben."

<sup>67</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Gaben," *Wiener Zeitung*, August 15, 1814, 905. For similar links between local regiments and their communities in Bohemia and Moravia see, "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Gaben," *Wiener Zeitung*, April 23, 1814, 456.

<sup>68</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Beytrage," 1139. "Von mehreren Beamten, Geistlichen und Privat-Personen zu Ofen und Pest vermittelt einer zu diesen Zwecke veranstalteten Sammlung 1857 *fl.*, und darunter 1 *Dukaten* in Gold, wie auch 3 *fl.* in Silber, welche letztere insbesondere für einen Verwundeten des Infanterie-Regiments *Hieronimus Colloredo* gewidmet wurden."

<sup>69</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Freywillige Gaben," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 7, 1814, 270.

<sup>70</sup> "Amtsblatt: Patriotische Beytrage," *Wiener Zeitung*, July 29, 1814, 838.



community in the old town of Ofen had freely donated 320 *fl.* to the sick and wounded of the Hungarian infantry regiment *Esterházy* Nr. 32 and the *Palatinal* Hungarian hussar regiment.<sup>71</sup> The proprietors of these two regiments, one the brother to the emperor Francis, the other the head of one of the dynasty's most loyal Hungarian noble families, represented the twin authorities of the region. The *Esterházy* regiment symbolised the loyal Magyar nobility, whilst the *Palatine* (*vice-regent*), a title carried by Archduke Joseph, evoked the supreme power in the kingdom: the Habsburg dynasty. The Jewish people's donation was an act of assimilation and a positive engagement in their wider community's political sphere, one identifying them as part of the collective Habsburg war effort and as contributing inhabitants of Hungary.<sup>72</sup>

As this section has shown, charitable donations were patriotic acts used by non-combatants as a symbol of subject's regional allegiances, dynastic loyalty and recognition of the Monarchy's legitimate edifices of state valued by all levels of society.<sup>73</sup> Contributing to the state, and fighting for the fatherland through these performative gestures, strengthened a political identity firmly aligned with monarchism and the paternalism of social orders sustained by the love of one's region. These voluntary gifts in support of the soldier served to bind local communities to the dynasty and close the distance between groups in an estate-based society.

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<sup>71</sup> "Patriotische Freywillige Gaben, dargebracht an den Kais. konig. Hofkriegsrath," *Wiener Zeitung*, March 7, 1814, 270.

<sup>72</sup> See also a report in the *Wiener Zeitung* which specifically dedicated an announcement honouring donations made by the "Israelitischen Einwohnern veranstalteten Sammlung für verwundeter Krieger, der deren Witwen und Waisen" in "Amtsblatt: Namens-Verzeichniß," *Wiener Zeitung*, December 5, 1813, 1054.

<sup>73</sup> "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, June 18, 1814, 676. One report, taken from the *Prag Zeitung*, detailed the widow of an artillery captain who was patriotically inspired to travel to the front in 1813 and assist in the field hospitals after the Battle of Kulm. As this report indicated the widow died of Typhoid but only after her "Effort and activity" (*Anstrengung und Thatigkeit*) given to the soldiers. Such was her dedication and virtue 200 *fl.*, and an improved pension was transferred from the widow to her only daughter as a sign of the emperor's gratitude; "Inländische Nachrichten: Patriotische Handlungen," *Lemberger Zeitung*, November 1, 1813, 665. A report from Lemberg (*Lviv*) of a particular zealous subject of the Monarchy advised that a local magistrate from the *Herrschaft* of Brody had paid for his son to take up a position in the Uhlan regiment raised in the area. "Der Grundrichter des Dorfes Folwarki Wielke, in der Herrschaft Brody, Joseph Lang, hat am 4. Oktober, als am hohen Namensfeste Sr. Majestät unseres allergnädigsten Kaisers, aus reinem patriotischen Eifer der Erklärung überreicht, seinen erwachsenen Sohn Joseph, freiwillig auf die Dauer des Krieges, mit einer Zulage von täglich 6 Kreuzer und Bestreitung aller Kosten für Monturs- und Rüstungs-Sorten samt Pferd zum Militär stellen zu wollen. In dessen Folge hat derselbe auch am 11 Okt d. (ieser) J. (abre) diesen seinen Sohn ganz ausgerüstet und betrieben zu E. H. Karl Uhlanen auf die kriegsdauer gestellt, und für selben 60 Gulden als Zulage für ein halbes Jahr an das Werbbezirks - Kommando des besagten Regiments im voraus erlegt. Möge dieses rühmliche Beispiel großberziger Vaterlandsliebe und treuer Anhänglichkeit an den besen der Fürsten, viele Nachahmer finden!"

Patriotic contributions also served as the foundation of local political identities built upon easing the burden of war on the military communities of local areas.

Through wartime victualling, military conscription, the culture of the army and the rhetoric surrounding the soldier, regiments were solidified as an area's "locus of loyalty" during the Napoleonic Wars. The culture of charity embraced by the Habsburg populace created an identity which reflected and rested upon subjects of the emperor Francis adopting fighting men as the embodiment of their commitment to him and their way of seeing the world. An identity which utilised already established regional allegiances, the loyalty these places owed to the monarch through centuries of fealty, as well as the desire of individuals for patriotic capital acquired through the act of being seen donating. As units became exclusively made up of native-born men, the decades of rhetoric on his virtue became more impactful, for the virtuous and brave soldier now had a recognisable, even familial face, making it easier to identify him as a symbol of belonging and state citizenship. The Habsburg regular soldier was a wartime message of inclusivity which reached its zenith in victory in 1814, culminating in the military displays held during the Congress of Vienna. These were celebrations acknowledging the virtuous service of the soldier from the Monarchy's many regions as key to its triumph over France and a future of honest peace.

## Victory

In the early Autumn of 1813, the triumph over French tyranny was achieved at Leipzig.<sup>74</sup> The battle, fought between October 16 and 19, was the culmination of the Habsburg war effort and saw the supreme power of Napoleon irreversibly ended.<sup>75</sup> Such a victory provided, it seemed to the people of the Monarchy, an end to decades of wartime living and the

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<sup>74</sup> Michael V. Leggiere, *The Fall of Napoleon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael V. Leggiere, *Napoleon and the struggle for Germany: The Franco-Prussian War of 1813* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

<sup>75</sup> Alan Sked, *Radetzky: Imperial Victor and Military Genius* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 35-50; Sked, "Austria, Prussia, and the Wars of Liberation."

fear of French extortion which had been constantly held over them. Achieved during the largest European land battle to date, victory at Leipzig saw an outpouring of patriotic support from the subjects of the emperor in the form of charitable contributions, poetry, prose, theatre, music and religious celebrations championing the efforts of the soldier.<sup>76</sup> Scenes of victory which had not been seen since the storming of Belgrade in 1789.

Habsburg patriotic displays held during the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815, a coming together of all the superpowers of Europe to celebrate the culmination of the allies' efforts over Imperial France, embraced the idea of the soldier as the representation and defender of the just and legitimate values of the dynasty's state. Maintaining the position of the emperor at the head Monarchy's polity had been his governments wartime goal and thanks to the sacrifices of the *Soldat Bürger*, representing the contributions of Francis' people, the emperor's position was secure, and with it his people's happiness. As the proclamations in Vienna trumpeted through the late Autumn of 1813, joyous jubilation abound. The *Soldat Bürger* was at very centre of these scenes.<sup>77</sup>

The work of Brian Vick has shown how during the Congress of Vienna, where diplomatic negotiations rested upon and coalesced with cultural and public displays of political power, overt symbolism and "speech acts" involved the Habsburg army as an "illocutionary force".<sup>78</sup> Soldiers were used to impress upon allies and subjects alike the loyalty found within the Monarchy, and the power this gave the Habsburgs in a new Europe. As Vick has argued of the military displays during the Congress, veneration of the army created a political identity shared "between populace and soldier", which created a "recognition of self and an acclamation of dynasty and of nation alike."<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> "Inländische Nachrichten," *Österreichischer Beobachter*, December 11, 1813, 1784. See for example the politically motivated premieres of Beethoven's Symphony No. 7 in A major, Op. 92 and "Wellington's Victory" on December 8, 1813, at the University of Vienna in support for those killed and wounded at the Battle of Hanau.

<sup>77</sup> "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, October 26, 1813, 679; "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, June 17, 1814, 667-68.

<sup>78</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 27.

<sup>79</sup> Vick, 27.

Yet as this chapter has shown, the Congress did not mark a point where the gap between soldier and subject, and “a recognition of self” as symbolised by the fighting man - the *Soldat Bürger* - was first displayed. Rather, it was the culmination and high point of decades of patriotic displays of the soldier as an “acclamation of dynasty” and the fatherland, which as we have seen in chapter five, first began during the war with the Ottoman Empire. As chapter two showed, this recognition was amplified by years of local conscription that made *Soldat Bürger* out of subjects from every community across the Monarchy. This was a military process enabling people to identify with the soldier and accept him as a signifier of their regional allegiances and use as an avenue to express dynastic loyalty during wartime.

The lists of charitable donations we have seen in this chapter attest to the ways in which the populace used support for the soldier to express a political identity aligned with the Habsburg dynasty’s war time goals. In this way the army as an illocutionary act, as Vick argues, was not an empty utterance to the powers of Europe whilst planning for a new order, but a reflection, as this thesis argues, of what had developed over the course of the war.<sup>80</sup> A key reason, no doubt, for the Habsburgs’ ability to assume a dominant position in the post-war hierarchy of European power.<sup>81</sup>

Despite the decades of rhetoric championing the soldier, it was in victory that that reception of the army and the soldier as exemplars of virtue, local patriotism, duty, commitment and martial valour could properly ring loud, providing vivid and easily identifiable motifs of the *Soldat Bürger* embraced by the Habsburg people. The festivities in Vienna had the fighting efforts of the regular soldier and the role of the army in society at their centre. As Vick has shown, the celebration of military might was a key feature of the Congress, serving as spaces where class, gender, estate and profession were set aside to venerate the Habsburg soldier as a symbol of a

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<sup>80</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 29.

<sup>81</sup> Beatrice de Graaf, *Fighting Terror after Napoleon: How Europe Became Secure after 1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 93-137.

collective identity.<sup>82</sup> However, and again, this was not a novel idea, but a tangible reflection of the charitable donations made throughout the war, where all, regardless of status, could be seen to be patriotically supporting the soldiers of the emperor, and thus his cause. Acts which allowed individuals to assert their political identity as subjects of the Monarchy, and devotees of the fatherlands the emperor and his soldiers protected. These men were not distant outsiders, the *Te Deums*, parades, parties and feasts of the Congress showed its attendees and spectators, but the very best of what the Monarchy had to offer.

The importance of the *Soldat Bürger* to victory was first theatrically displayed with the news of the triumph at the Leipzig reaching Vienna in late October 1813 by the symbolic delivery of the army's report of the battle to the empress Maria Ludovika.<sup>83</sup> The courier, the Habsburg general and ambassador to the Swedish king, Count Adam Albert von Neipperg, brought the news to the *Hofburg* through a highly ritualised and public route, which passed through the "most popular streets of the city". Followed by a military procession and preceded by six post-officers sitting in carriages drawn by 36 postilions, Neipperg first delivered a handwritten note to the empress from her husband, then he went from the *Hofburg* to the *Hofkriegsrat*, which sat on *Am Hof* plaza's Bognergasse corner and delivered the news of the battle to the war council's president, Count Heinrich von Bellegarde.<sup>84</sup>

In victory it was the professional army, most of them now native-born conscripts from the recruiting districts of Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, who had "covered themselves with glory".<sup>85</sup> It was their efforts, along with the actions of the Monarchy's allies, which had led to celebrations in the city streets after Neipperg's arrival. Scenes which were so jubilant that the *Wiener Zeitung* reported people were "drunk with joy" as they took in the news of the "victory of

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<sup>82</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 36-37.

<sup>83</sup> "Kriegsschauplaß," *Oesterreichischer Beobachter*, October 22, 1813, 1495-497; "Wien," *WZ*, October 26, 1813, 679.

<sup>84</sup> "Wien," *WZ*, October 26, 1813, 679.

<sup>85</sup> "Wien," *WZ*, October 26, 1813, 679.

the good and just cause”.<sup>86</sup> The festivals, events and acts of patriotism following the news of victory, which culminated in the coming together of all of Europe in Vienna in 1814, recognised this and continued to place the soldiers of the emperor’s army at its very centre.

The soldiers that participated in the public displays of Habsburg power during the late summer months of 1814 were veterans of Leipzig and of the invasion of France and had marched directly from the battlefields surrounding Paris.<sup>87</sup> Marcus Hibler, who had fought in the infantry regiments of the Monarchy since 1796, played a part in most of the patriotic displays involving the army in 1814, recounting in his diary the perlocutionary effects they had on the jubilant Habsburg subjects of Vienna. The first of Hibler’s acts as a symbol of Habsburg patriotism was as his battalion from the regiment *Zach* approached Vienna on the last day of May. Stopping at Nussdorf, one hour north of the city, the men attended to their uniforms, arranged into order and, instead of wearily trudging into the city, stepped off as part of a grand parade that carried on into the suburb of Wieden.<sup>88</sup> The troops were then garrisoned in the suburb of Neubau at the barracks on Mariahilferstrasse, and the officers roomed in quarters just north of the barracks in the parish of St. Ulrich. From there, the soldiers of *Zach*’s first battalion served as members of the town watch, policing the gates of the inner city, interacting with its inhabitants and serving as honour guards as foreign rulers arrived. On September 22 the veterans of *Zach* who participated in campaigns in Saxony and France were awarded their Austrian Army Crosses (*Kanoneneruz*). This was a sign of thanks from a grateful monarch and his people that bore the inscription “*Grati et princeps et patri*” (A grateful prince and country).<sup>89</sup> Three days later the Tsar of Russia and King of Prussia arrived in the city. The Congress of Vienna was now in session.

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<sup>86</sup> “Wien,” *WZ*, October 26, 1813, 679.

<sup>87</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 60-61.

<sup>88</sup> Hibler, Part 2, 61.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

The largest and most well attended public event of the Congress, one that sat outside the official programme, was the “Great Military Prater Festival” held in the public park in Leopoldstadt, once the hunting grounds of the Habsburg monarchs, to commemorate the sacrifice of the Habsburg army at Leipzig. It was an event organised by the army commander Prince Karl Philipp von Schwarzenberg to honour the regular soldier who had contributed the most to the victory in Saxony. More accurately, it was an event organised by Schwarzenberg’s wife and one that was later co-opted by the emperor Francis.<sup>90</sup> As Vick has argued, Francis’ interest in a Leipzig celebration could have been manifold: the emperor himself wished to honour his army; wanted to put on a display of patriotic fervour to impress upon his allies the power of the Monarchy; or hoped to supersede the many other events around Germany that championed Prussia’s efforts the previous year. Indeed, the festival in the Prater did all three, and marked the zenith of the Habsburg soldier’s presence in the popular patriotism and culture of the Monarchy, serving as a culmination of the rhetoric which championed his dutiful service as the epitome of dynastic loyalty and regional patriotism.<sup>91</sup>

Hibler’s experience of the Prater Festival was at its centre, surrounded by the bountiful gratitude of the urbane, and mostly wealthy civilians. Something that his account of the war shows was in short supply during the bitter months of fighting in the first years of his service.<sup>92</sup> Despite the rhetoric, and the charitable donations, individual soldiers had always sat on the periphery of the bourgeoisie’s favour. Feeding, billeting and clothing them had been a burden many resented.<sup>93</sup> The continual mobilisation of troops meant the disruption to business, and the

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<sup>90</sup> Almost immediately Schwarzenberg wished to commemorate and memorialise the efforts and sacrifice of the men he commanded, writing to his wife Marianne, “*Ich bin entschlossen, irgendwo [in Worlik] eine einfache, aber niedliche Capelle erbauen zu lassen, zu dem Andenken der großen Ereignisse bei Leipzig; es müßte eine anmuthige Pflanzung angelegt werden; am 18. October müßte alle Jahre ein Tedeum abgehalten, dann ein ländliches Fest gefeiert werden, bei welchem alle Invaliden der Herrschaft gespeiset und beschenkt würden. Den Tag darauf würden Messen für die an diesen Tagen verbliebenen Krieger abgelesen.*” This quote is from Forster, “Die österreichischen Denkmale um Leipzig,” 184.

<sup>91</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 31-33.

<sup>92</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 1, 28.

<sup>93</sup> “Stimmen des Auslandes über den österreichischen Kaiserstaat (Auszug aus einem Schreiben aus dem Österreichischen.),” *Vaterländische Blätter*, February 17, 1809, 83; “K. K. Patent die Errichtung von Reserve-Bataillonen betreffend,” *Vaterländische Blätter für den Österreichischen Kaiserstaat (Vaterländische Blätter)*, May 20, 1808, 25-26.

Viennese bakery riots in March 1805 had even required the army to repeatedly charge a gathering of the populace in the suburb of Mariahilf.<sup>94</sup> Sermons from the Monarchy's priests had constantly sought to communicate the importance to the populace in accepting the burdens of supporting the military, smoothing the tensions that existed after decades of demands.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, even if soldiers served as symbols of dynastic loyalty and whose professional status as servants of the dynasty had risen in people's perceptions, interacting with individual soldiers still drew prejudices from civilians. Yet, as Hibler attests of his experience on the Prater, the unsympathetic aloofness of the people he mingled with, was, at least for a time, completely suppressed or replaced by the knowledge that the war was over, and the soldiers had finally achieved the victory their contributions had paid for.<sup>96</sup>

For the civilians who attended the festival it gave them a chance to encounter the soldiers who had fought for them, and who had been praised as the very best of the emperor's subjects. Vick's analysis of civilian accounts of the service for the dead before the festivities, reverently participated in by the soldiers who attended, shows that many were moved to express some sort of recognition of the soldier's wartime experience, which had left so many killed, wounded, or suffering from loss. This opening religious display softened civilian's perception of the common soldier, allowing them to sympathise with his plight, easing the divide between the two before the celebrations began.<sup>97</sup> These were encounters which needed to reflect the rhetoric of the soldier in the Monarchy's wartime culture, hence the free food and drink for the military to make any man good natured and willing to socialise with the curious crowd. Every enlisted soldier was provided with a florin to buy a pound of meat, and 13 *kr.* to purchase pork, veal and

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<sup>94</sup> Grueber, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 37-38.

<sup>95</sup> Khünl, *Predigt über Vaterlandsliebe*, 7-8. "Aber gesetzt, wir wollen auf das immer währende Vorwärtsschreiten Verzicht thun, so können wir doch nicht wollen, daß sich unser Zustand verschlimmere, daß unser Vaterland sinke und zu Grunde gehe. Um auch nur dieses zu verhüten, müssen schon von Zeit zu Zeit neue, bisher unübliche Maßregeln ergriffen werden, und wenn eine blinde Anhänglichkeit an das, was da ist, uns beherrscht, so werden wir die weiten Anstalten unseres Fürsten weder zu billigen, noch zu befördern wissen...O, theure Zuhörer, selbst ein fejes Gebäude erhält sich nur dann, wenn der Eigentümer jedes Jahr dasjenige aus heffern läßt, was die verschiedenen Witterungen und Zufälle des Jahres daran beschädigt haben. Wird an dem Gebäude nichts gebessert, nichts wieder hergestellt, dann wird es vor der Zeit zusammenfinden und seine Bewohner erschlagen, besonders wenn Erdbeben, Überschwemmungen und Stürme gegen dasselbe ankämpfen."

<sup>96</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 65-66.

<sup>97</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 33-34



the accompanying sauces, salt, breads and dumplings. Officers were given 10 *fl.* to do with what they wished. Men were then able to pick and choose from the vendors scattered across the Prater, intermingling with the highest of the nobility, the commanders of the army and the wealthy of Vienna. For the soldier, as Hibler recounted, everything was “executed with appropriateness, neatness and taste.”<sup>98</sup>

The Prater was not only a meeting place for soldiers and civilians, and cross-estate sociability, but also a site of cultural exchange that allowed the various levels of local, regional, religious and linguistic identities found within the Monarchy to meet, acknowledge its myriad parts and coalesce to realise, or at least present, the foundations of an overarching Habsburg or “Austrian” identity. An identity that could co-opt and work alongside the distinctions, traditions and particularism found within each province and kingdom of the Monarchy. Whilst this may not have been the intention of Schwarzenberg, or his emperor, the soldiers themselves acted as the conduit for the idea of a unified Habsburg identity, realised through the links of loyalty to the emperor that were manifested at a local level. The soldiers invited to take part were men from the city’s garrison, relieved of their duties for the day by the city’s militia. This was another thanks from a grateful population. The men who took part were Northern Hungarians from the infantry regiments *Colloredo Mansfeld* and *Hiller*; Bohemians from the cuirassier regiment *Constantin*; Grenadiers in 8 battalions from 24 different recruiting districts; and men from across the Monarchy in the bombardier and artillery units garrisoning Vienna.<sup>99</sup>

Each group represented the commitment and patriotic activity of local societies directed to the Habsburg effort, which had been highlighted as such by thousands of wartime donations. The presence of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious soldiers united in their loyalty and commitment to the emperor, and supported by their local communities through patriotic donations, as reported on constantly by newspapers, was tangible evidence, which

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<sup>98</sup> Hibler, Part 2, 65-66.

<sup>99</sup> Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 65-66.

reinforced to those present, of an “Austrian” identity founded on love for the dynasty and the fatherlands they protected. One that overlapped and existed alongside the identities of local societies sponsored and recognised by central government as integral to its ability to defeat France. The Hungarian troops, in their distinct light blue, tight *gatyá* pants, adorned with warrior-knots synonymous with romanticised Slavic traditional dress, would have highlighted the distinct “otherness” of some of these soldiers. Yet their presence celebrated by the Viennese on the Prater also accentuated the proven ability, as shown by the army through decades of war, of different peoples within the Monarchy to unite behind the dynasty, whilst still maintaining the parochialism of regional communities. Many of the other celebrations during the Congress also accentuated and symbolised the ideal federal nature of the Monarchy, providing the message war had bonded the subjects of emperor Francis together as a composite people now united through their defeat of France.<sup>100</sup> In peace, the Prater, other events surrounding the Congress and after made clear, it was now up to civilians to continue their part in the dynasty’s unifying imperial polity.<sup>101</sup>

These events celebrating victory, however, did not just assert the veneration of the soldier in popular patriotism as a link between regions, peoples and the dynasty. They also championed the social orders as the very core of what made the Habsburg Monarchy a just and happy place. It was the *Soldat Bürger* who had been used throughout the war to exhibit the legitimacy of the power and authority held by emperor Francis as the true reason for his subject’s happiness. The continuation of the social orders, the right for one to hold rank, privilege and dominion over another, and for all to know their position in an organic society had been highlighted as the fundamental motivation behind the Monarchy’s bloodshed. As the reports, spectacles and proclamations made clear, it was the dynasty’s continual existence,

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<sup>100</sup> Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 40-47

<sup>101</sup> Karin Schneider, “King Rudolf I in Austrian Literature around 1820: Historical Reversion and Legitimization of Rule,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 51 (2020): 134-51.

secured by its soldiers, which underpinned a system of government that delivered the emperor's subject's joy.<sup>102</sup>

The return of the emperor Francis to Vienna in June 1814, after his journey to France and time away with the army, marked the beginning of official festivities in the city.<sup>103</sup> It also marked the use of the victorious soldier as a symbol for the primacy and legitimacy of the Monarchy's political community. Francis' procession through the streets of Vienna on June 17 contained all the trappings of rank, privilege, imperial legitimacy and the army's hand in its existing supremacy in European politics.<sup>104</sup> It was a parade at its heart which showcased the right of authorities, and of the emperor, to oversee those under his dominion. The type of imperial pageantry which would dominate the projection of Habsburg power during the reign of Franz Josef forty years later.<sup>105</sup>

Hibler attended the procession with his grenadier company, serving as barrier between the jubilant crowds from its participants, and he later used the *Wiener Zeitung's* report of the event to detail the procession and those in it, remarking a window along Kartnerstrasse and Spitalgasse, those surrounding the Neumarkt, down Klostergasse, around the Spitalplatz, either side of the Augustinergasse, Josephsplatz, Braunerstasse and the Graben, as well as near the Kohlmarkt next to the *Hofburg* cost 50 *fl.* to peer out of, with a room coming in at 100 *fl.* for the day.<sup>106</sup> Such prices - a room would have cost the veteran Hibler an eighth of his yearly wage - reveal the patriotic commitment of the emperor's subjects.<sup>107</sup> These men and women were ready to be moved by the event, eager to see and hear from their leader.

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<sup>102</sup> "Manifesto," *Wiener Zeitung*, April 15, 1809, 1717-729. The summary for the reason why France was an enemy of the Habsburg state thanks to its despotism, tyranny, threats to the social order which provided Habsburg "happiness: and the rejection of European harmony, was never more clearly defined than in a thirteen-page Manifesto published on April 15, 1809, announcing a new war against France.

<sup>103</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 97.

<sup>104</sup> "Wien," *Wiener Zeitung*, June 16, 1814, 663.

<sup>105</sup> Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism*, 41, 97-100.

<sup>106</sup> NL, B/1443:2 Hibler, *Journal*, Part 2, 61-62.

<sup>107</sup> Hochedlinger, "Adlige Abstinenz und bürgerlicher," 293.

Watching on from these windows, or between the shoulders of the guards lining the route, the populace witnessed the parade beginning with a squadron of the city's citizen cavalry and a whole regiment of regular heavy horses. Following them came attendees of the imperial court in full regalia, the noble members of the Lower Austrian provincial government, and officials of the chancellery. The city of Vienna was represented by its council members on horseback, whilst Albert of Saxe-Teschen and the many archduchesses made up the imperial family's part of the procession. Behind them rode the emperor in the campaign uniform of a field marshal, along with his wife, eldest son, and brothers. The latter were men whose military role championed the dynasty's links with its army and its service to the state.<sup>108</sup> The emperor rode at the head of his personal security, the *Trabanten* lifeguards, in their red and yellow uniforms. After the emperor rode the chief imperial court officer, the captain of the Guard, the emperor's adjutant, members of the *Arvieren* Guard, another company of the emperor's lifeguard, as well as the royal Hungarian noble lifeguard and the Bohemian noble guard. The procession had finally passed the spectator once another whole regiment of cavalry passed, followed by the final group of the city's citizen cavalry.<sup>109</sup>

Those participating in the emperor's returning parade were chosen as they commanded respect and subservience from all who watched. Present as part of the spectacle was each layer of authority the subjects in Vienna were under, representing not only the pre-eminence of each group's position in society, but also the many different identities the emperor commanded, and his subjects inhabited. Everything, the *Wiener Zeitung* proclaimed of the parade, "spoke of the glory and power of the Imperial state" and heralded the "new prosperity and the blessings of peace" headed by a ruler who was "universally respected among the foreign peoples, even those whom his mighty army fought and conquered."<sup>110</sup> The procession began and ended with the city's citizen cavalry recognising the power, if only symbolically, of Vienna and its position as custodians of the imperial family. The two regiments of heavy cavalry, elite warriors in their

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<sup>108</sup> Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, 38-39.

<sup>109</sup> "Wien," *WZ*, June 16, 1814, 663.

<sup>110</sup> "Wien," *WZ*, June 17, 1814, 667.

black cuirassiers and high plumed helmets, projected the sovereign authority of the emperor and the superiority of his victorious troops. The noise of the men's harness and the reverberation of shod hooves on cobblestone would have impressed upon the viewer the terrible killing power of these units. The presence of the Lower Austrian provincial estate marked the federal authorities in the city's surrounding region, partners in the emperor's war and representatives of the intimate power overseeing the day to day lives of his subjects.<sup>111</sup> The councillors again provided a more localised authority, whose power guaranteed the traditions and legal jurisdiction of the city that gave some of its inhabitant's freedom, security and privilege. Sitting at the head of these different orders was the imperial family and the emperor. A man in his military uniform which identified him as part of the regular army who had guaranteed the security of the Habsburg state.

This was the point of the parade. A spectacle showing the inhabitants of Vienna it was the benevolent service of their imperial authorities and the soldiers they commanded who had defeated France, ending forever the tyrannical rule of despots and libertines. The mayor of the city summarised as much when he addressed the emperor on a stage outside the *Kärntnertor*, the city's main gate:

Your Highness had the sacred purpose of bringing to Europe and the world the peace it has so long desired. Hail to your Majesty! That purpose is accomplished. Your Majesty returns to us as the victor and saviour of the capital, amidst the loudest of cheers and the greatest and most joyous blessings of the inhabitants, whose expressions of heartfelt gratitude, admiration and deepest reverence I have received. I kiss your Majesty and your Magistrates and assure you of the steadfast loyalty and filial obedience of the citizens and inhabitants of the capital city.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Godsey, *The Sineus of Habsburg Power*, 359-92.

<sup>112</sup> "Wien," *WZ*, June 17, 1814, 667. "Eure Majestät! Als Eure Majestät im verstossenen Ihre diese Haupt und Residenzstadt verliessen, hatten Allerhöchstdiesehren den erhabenen, heiligen Zweck, Europa und der Welt den so lange, so sehnlich gewünschten Frieden zu verschaffen. Heil Eurer Majestat! Dieser Zweck ist erreicht. Eure Majestat kehren, mit unversöhnlich Lorbeer, als Sieger und Retter in Allerhöchster Hauptstadt zurück, unter dem lauten Jubel und den heissen Segnungen der freudetrunkenen Bürger und Bewohner, deren Äußerungen des innigsten, unbegrenzten Dankgefuhle, der höchsten Bewunderung und tiefsten Ehrfurcht, ich das Glück habe, Eurer Majestät zu Füßen zu legen, und den Magistrat, so wie die Bürger und Bewohner dieser Hauptstadt Allerhöchsten Gnade, mit der heiligsten Versicherung einer stets unverbrüchlichen Treue und eines kindlichen Gehorsams, aller untertänigst anzuempfehlen."

The emperor replied to the mayor and his people, thanking them for their love, whilst also affirming his sovereignty:

My dear Viennese have given me proof of their love and loyalty at all times, in misfortune as well as in happiness. I am always glad to return to their bosom. I am most pleased today, now that I have made peace, which gives me the just hope, as I have always wished, of permanently fortifying the prosperity of my faithful people and my dear capital city. I count on the effective support of the magistrates, and trust you, Mayor, to assure the citizens and inhabitants of Vienna of my love.<sup>113</sup>

These “fatherly words”, the report in the *Wiener Zeitung* concluded, “filled all bystanders with heartfelt emotion”, and their loud cheers resounded throughout the city in jubilation, joyful in the knowledge the emperor Francis had protected the people of the city and the Monarchy by giving back to Europe “the independence of all the states ... their rights and their crowns...[their] possessions, ranks and dignities... [with] every source of prosperity, peace and tranquillity assured.”<sup>114</sup>

Across the Monarchy, as Pieter Judson has revealed, very similar celebrations were taking place after hearing of the emperor’s return to Vienna. These festive communities, many of them comprising of the *bourgeoise* class of the Monarchy, utilising symbols of classical antiquity which had been used to communicate the dynasty’s legitimacy, were linked together by a common political language provided by the rhetoric of the Habsburg wartime government, but also through the support they had shown throughout the war by caring for the emperor’s soldiers.<sup>115</sup> Men who represented to these places their contribution to a European peace provided by the Habsburgs.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> “Wien,” *WZ*, June 17, 1814, 667.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 668. “*Meine lieben Wiener haben mir zu allen Zeiten, im Unglücke wie im Glücke, Beweise ihrer Liebe und Treue gegeben. Immer war ich froh in derselben Schoß zurückzukommen. Am meisten erfreut es mich heute, nachdem ich einen Frieden geschlossen habe, der mir die gerechte Hoffnung gewahrt, wie ich immer gewünscht habe, den Wohlstand meiner getreuen Volker und meiner lieven Hauptstadt dauerhaft zu befestigen. Ich rechne dabei auf dem wirksamen Beistand des Magistrats, und traurige Ihnen, Herr Bürgermeister auf die Bürger und Einwohner von Wien meiner Lieber zu versichern.*”

<sup>115</sup> Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 99-100.

<sup>116</sup> On the Monarchy’s role in providing Europe’s security see Vick, “The Vienna Congress as an Event in Austrian History,” 123.

The emperor, with the help of his military servants - as events surrounding the Congress of Vienna confirmed - had affirmed the right of princes to rule, as well as the social orders which provided Europe security, establishing the prosperity his people so desperately wanted for twenty-three years. The soldiers of his army, whose commitment to “religion, humanity and duty” as the military author Johann Nuce later reflected on in a work subscribed to by the emperor and his brothers, had proven themselves as “the purest of all mortals” (*schönsten vor allen Sterblichen zu beweisen*) evident by their actions in “the last tremendous battles of the most just war”.<sup>117</sup> This was a point the emperor Francis made whilst standing in front of the *Lusthaus* on the afternoon of the Great Military Festival at the Prater, surrounded by all the dignitaries of Europe, its monarchs and “a surging, crowd which filled the air with jubilation”. There in the afternoon sun he thanked “my brave army and its leaders” for providing “lasting peace”.<sup>118</sup>

## Conclusion

In this thesis I have focused on the ways in which Habsburg subjects and foreign volunteers were transformed into military servants of the Monarchy - *Soldat Bürger* – and how the ways in which this identity was communicated to the dynasty’s population as being integral to the traditions and privileges of their communities. First this work explored how this identity was set out in military regulations, informed by the visions of state citizenship theorised by Josef von Sonnenfels. It then examined how it was made a lived reality through the decades of mass conscription during the wars with France. This dissertation moved onto how conscripts, volunteers, officers and common soldiers alike assumed the role of the *Soldat Bürger* by focusing on the process and experience of socialisation within infantry companies, as well the ways in

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<sup>117</sup> Nuce, *Nützliche und interessante Militär-Skizzen*, 38-39.

<sup>118</sup> “Wien,” *Wiener Zeitung*, October 19, 1814, 1164. “*Während des Mittagmahls brachten Se. Majestat der Kaiser folgende Gesundheiten aus:*

- 1) *Auf die Gesundheit meiner hier anwesenden hohen Gäste und Freunde!*
- 2) *Dank meiner braven Armee und ihren Anführern!*
- 3) *Dank den tapfern verbündeten Heeren!*
- 4) *der achtzehn Oktober! Möge die Erinnerung an diesen glorreichen Tag, in einem dauerhaften Frieden, auf die Späternachwelt übergeben!*”

which the violent experiences of battle were mediated by the moral frameworks of this personal and social identity. I then turned to the representation of regular soldiers as provided to the people of the Monarchy, arguing the *Soldat Bürger* was communicated to Habsburg subjects as embodying the legitimacy of the dynasty's state during its war with Republic and Imperial France. This was a war which sermons, plays, poems, print and material culture narrated as undermining the foundations of a secure and prosperous way of life, which only existed thanks to the commitment of the emperor Francis and his military servants. These were men, as chapter five explored of the rhetoric provided by the Habsburg government, whose actions exemplified the Monarchy's moral authority.

This chapter has highlighted the successful reception of the *Soldat Bürger* by the many local societies with the Habsburg Monarchy as a symbol of dynastic loyalty and regional identity. It also argued support for the soldier was utilised by the emperor's subjects as means for them to recognise the dynasty's legitimacy during a time of political turmoil and violent war. It showed how support for the Habsburg regular soldier became the most consistent way in which Francis' subjects expressed their patriotism, whilst also giving an avenue for local societies to positively engage with the dynasty and express the desire to be part of its state. It has argued non-combatants used the model of the *Soldat Bürger* above all else to reject the values of Revolutionary and Imperial France through charitable donations to local men who fought in the armies of emperor Francis.<sup>119</sup> In much the same way chapter two showed how conscription was used as an avenue for communities to showcase their commitment to the dynasty through contributions of fit fighting men to local regiments, this chapter has revealed non-combatants of these same places used wartime philanthropy in support of local military institutions to further exhibit their desire to serve and place themselves within the Habsburg state.

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<sup>119</sup> On the revolutionaries as rejected oppressors see Charles A. Ingrao, and John E. Fahey, "The Habsburg Empire in 1763 and 1815: Reconstruction and Repose," in *Decades of Reconstruction: Postwar Societies, State-Building, and International Relations from the Seven Years' War to the Cold War*, eds., Ute Planert and James Retallack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 105-122, esp. 122.



As the last part of this chapter has suggested, this link between soldiers, subjects, state citizens and the dynasty reached an evocative crescendo during the Congress of Vienna, where the dynasty and its people used the image of the soldier to assert their collective efforts in navigating the turmoil and terror of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The *Soldat Bürger*, these events proclaimed, had served as the guardians of the state, and were received by its people as a symbol of the Monarchy's legitimacy and power in Europe. These men had played their prescribed part as the fighting eudemonic state citizens Sonnenfels had articulated, Joseph II had realised, the emperor Francis had needed for victory, and his populace had embraced as a shared culture image to represent their own unique place in the Habsburg state.

# Conclusion

## “Fragments from my Life”

On February 13, 1846, Johann Schnerer celebrated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his conscription into the *Olivier Wallis* infantry regiment. One of the last surviving soldiers of his generation, the 68-year-old veteran was the guest of honour at a lunch held by company officers from the 49<sup>th</sup> line infantry regiment stationed near his home in Herzogenburg, Lower Austria. A toast was made thanking Schnerer for his service and the veteran was held up as an exemplar to the Lower Austrian regiment. It is possible the toaster noted the guest of honour had served in four separate infantry regiments, rising from conscript soldier to second captain. He many even have mentioned that after the demobilisation of the Habsburg wartime army in 1816, Schnerer had spent the last eighteen years of his military career as an officer in Galicia, Lombardy and Lower Austria, conscripting for the Monarchy’s peace time force. Indeed, the officers present at Schnerer’s jubilee may have all learned a great deal from the veteran who settled in their garrison town on retirement.<sup>1</sup>

Schnerer was originally a coerced conscript in 1796, but at his retirement, he had served as a willing agent of the Habsburg state for more than forty years. He was initially discharged in 1810 with the reduction of the army after the War of 1809, and without a profession, a community outside of the military or family, used his discharge payment to purchase the equipment of a common soldier and voluntary enlisted in a Galician regiment in 1811 as an *Expropriis Gemeine* (gentleman, volunteer soldier).<sup>2</sup> After 1816, and ascending to second lieutenant, he spent seven years integrating the

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<sup>1</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstucke aus meinen leben*, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Schnerer, *Bruckstucke aus meinen leben*, 10.

newly acquired territory of Venetia-Lombardy into the Monarchy through the conscription of its native-born men. Later, in Lower Austria, he worked for 13 years finding, training and psychologically equipping men for service in the Habsburg army. In 1834, married to his late brother's wife, Schnerer had his time in the Habsburg army ended whilst serving as a second captain.<sup>3</sup> He remained at Herzogenburg where he made the last of his memoir's entries in 1857.

At the centre of Schnerer's retired life, supported by an emerging welfare state, and local endowments administered by his last regiment, was the Habsburg military institution he had valiantly served.<sup>4</sup> In between entries on family marriages, deaths, family trees, pension budgets, and recipes for bacon soup, Schnerer studiously noted changes to regimental structures, new conscription patents, deployment orders and demographics of the units in his area.<sup>5</sup> He engaged critically with Radetzky's campaign in Italy in 1848 and enthusiastically consumed the popular patriotism of Franz Joseph's early period laced with the values of the army's military culture.<sup>6</sup>

Schnerer cared for the sanctity of the Habsburg state in the years after 1848, and its near dissolution, because of the military identity he had assumed in 1796. It was something in his later life he celebrated and cherished. The son of a *Reich* volunteer from Bavaria and a local woman from Brünn, Schnerer saw himself as a member of the whole Habsburg state thanks to the language of service and community the values of the *Soldat Bürger* had provided him. These values had given him opportunities, even if they were originally offered to maintain his compliance on

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<sup>3</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen leben*, 16. Schnerer's wife, Anna, was a refugee from the Austrian Netherlands who fled to Prague. She was born in 1788 and married Johann's brother, Anton, who was a "Bürgerliche Schneider Meister" before his death in 1816. Anna died in Herzogenburg in 1839.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 12-13, esp., 43. In 1853 Schnerer received 200 fl. from his state pension, 89 fl. 4 kr. from the 49th Infantry Regiment's "Major Rogersche Stiftung" and 40 fl. from the "Fürst Schwarzenburgische Stiftung"; Herbert Obinger, "Conscription, the Military, and Welfare State Development: An Introduction," *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 45, no. 2 (2020): 7-26.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 23-33. Page 33 has Schnerer's potted history of the Austro-Turkish War.

<sup>6</sup> Cole, *Military Culture*, 42-44.

conscripted, which supplied him with the “well to do life” the army regulations promised. A life, in stereotypically saccharine Biedermeier fashion, which saw him spend time with his adopted daughters strolling along the tree line paths of the Vienna glacis and visiting the public gardens of *Schönbrunn* where he spent money from his military pension.<sup>7</sup>

What Schnerer understood of the *Soldat Bürger* and its role in the Habsburg state was expressed through the military songs he copied into his notebook. The themes of which conveyed the values of Habsburg community and patriotism held by generations of fighting men and their communities the *Soldat Bürger*'s identity has revealed in this study. *Die Schildwache*, written by Adolf Ritter von Tschabuschnigg and published in 1833, was recited by Schnerer as it described to him both the rewarding, and at times isolating, experience that came from serving the state as a soldier.<sup>8</sup> In the song, the sentry Franz marches up and back in the moonlight with a small fire to warm him. He peers out across the land to see the lights of a village twinkling in the night, their distant brightness suggesting the warmth of domesticity and childlike bliss. The soldier then casts his thoughts to his beloved, imagining the joy of holding her in his arms. He wonders if she thinks of him as he does her, concluding his military life means he is alone. Franz, verging on tears, admonishes himself. “Let go”, he cries, “you’re not alone/There, a rifle/what more does an old guy (*Kerl*) need?”. The last stanza of the song introduces Franz’s community, his comrades and companions who comfort him and meet his emotional needs. The sentry is not alone, the last passages

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<sup>7</sup> Schnerer, 16. Some of Schnerer’s descendants were officers in the Habsburg army, medical doctors or central government bureaucrats. The social mobility provided by the army for Schnerer family was striking, as his father, Franz and mother, Agnes had been born in the middle of the eighteenth century to the rural cotter class with very little. By the middle of the nineteenth century their families were now firmly part of the established German speaking bourgeoisie in Austria and Bohemia.

<sup>8</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen Leben*, 18; Adolph von Tschabuschnigg, *Gedichte* (Braunschweig: Franz Wieweg & Sohn, 1833) 96-101; For a discussion on Tschabuschnigg influence on political culture before and after 1848 see, Primus Heinz Kucher, ed., *Adolf Ritter von Tschabuschnigg (1809-1877): Literatur und Politik zwischen Vormärz und Neoabsolutismus* (Vienna: Bohlau, 2006). Tschabuschnigg was neither a liberal or a neo-conservative, though he was invested in the social change and as a jurist and politician was involved in provincial reform in Carinthia after the 1848 Revolution.

reveal, for the corporal and his men approach. This is his family. “Stand to!” the last line exclaims. It is now the time to be a soldier.

*Die Schildwache* laid out for Schnerer one of his experiences as a *Soldat Bürger*. He, like Franz, had been charged with protecting the communities of the Habsburg state and this had meant he was separated from kin, never close to his brother, removed from his mother and absent when his father died. Yet as the song acknowledged for Schnerer, and this thesis revealed for soldiers of the Habsburg army, he had a community whom he loved and who loved him. A community which provided Schnerer with a sense of belonging in three separate provinces and across six different infantry regiments. Its members inhabiting military identities which presented self-value and opportunities replicated throughout the Monarchy by the framework of honour and the duty and obedience it promoted in serving the state.<sup>9</sup>

As Schnerer’s accounts of the war testified, the community he valued was forged and nourished by its understanding of battle as a place where its member’s proved their zeal for state service. A place where individuals and their collective promoted their worth. Schnerer’s transcription of *Kriegslied, auf die 789 bei Fokschan, in den Moldau, durch Prinz Coburg, gewonnen Schlacht*, elucidated his view of the battlefield as a place of honour, where a man’s desire to serve was properly revealed in the foreground of thundering guns and the rumble of cavalry charges. *Kriegslied* detailed the capture of Fokschan (Focsani, Romania) by the combined Austro-Russian forces in August 1789. In the song the steady hand of the fatherly Coburg, his rigorous approach to battle, the stoic way in which his men endured the ferociousness of the janissary, and the enthusiasm each of the prince’s regiments exhibited are all celebrated. The song’s conclusion proudly boasted the enemies of the Monarchy,

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<sup>9</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstucke aus meinen leben*, 17-18.

Selim III and his Vizier, had been humbled by the fortitude displayed on the field of Fokschan by the Habsburg soldier.<sup>10</sup>

Schnerer also understood his conviction on the battlefield connected the local community which surrounded his regiment to the monarch and the rest of the Habsburg state. The language which expressed Schnerer's understandings of the soldier's honour as a link which bound all the emperor's subjects to him was neatly encapsulated by the lyrics to the war song, *Die Feldflasche*. This song commemorated a chance meeting between the emperor and one of his soldiers at Leipzig. It articulated honour and battlefield service not only joined soldiers together as men worthy of respect, but it also joined them to the dynasty, marking them out as chief servants of the state and as symbols of a local society's place in it. This link was made tangible by a field canteen positioned as the literal representation of loyalty shared between subject and emperor, between local societies and the Habsburg state.

*Die Feldflasche*, written by the Bohemian catholic preacher Johann Emanuel Veith, begins with a wounded man asking his comrades to help him off a wagon. The soldier implores his friends to be careful of his field canteen. If broken, he exclaims, his happiness is gone as the emperor had drunk from it at Leipzig. There the emperor had passed the soldier's file as the bullets flew, and like his men, was unperturbed by the imminence of death. Sensing his emperor's thirst, and taking courage from the shared experience of battle, the soldier gave his canteen to the emperor who drunk from it and then thanked him for the kindness shown. As *Die Feldflasche* made clear, the canteen is the soldier's zeal for service freely given. It is his direct link with the emperor, a man who personally recognised the soldier's sense of duty. As the song continues, the canteen becomes to be understood by the old veteran's community as its link to the dynasty. For in the veteran's old home sits the flask from which the

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<sup>10</sup> Schnerer, 18. The song was also published in Friedrich Karl Freiherrn von Erlach, ed., *Die Volkslieder der Deutschen* (Mannheim: Heinrich Hoff, 1834), 501-503. This publication replaces *kaiser* with *könig*.

emperor drunk, a symbol of his presence, as well his subject's loyalty and service. A connection between soldier and monarch which displayed the old soldier's local society's place within the Monarchy. As the song concludes, the bottle would remain with his community for all time, as its site of loyalty, buried with their own veteran in the grounds of the church.<sup>11</sup>

These songs written down by Schnerer articulated for him his understanding of military service and its connection to the communities and popular patriotism in the Monarchy, providing the language to express what fighting for the Habsburgs meant for the old soldier. Schnerer's identification with these three songs, all celebrating loyalty to the emperor as expressed through military service, were shaped by the perceptions and experience provided to him by the identity of the *Soldat Bürger*. This was a military identity long embodied by the conscripted Schnerer, whose framework of service had also provided subjects of the Monarchy the language to place themselves within the narrative of the Habsburg state. As this thesis has argued, this identity was founded on compassion, fortitude, selflessness, valour, faithfulness, and obedience which entailed the possibility of social mobility. This framework of honour did not just align native-born conscripts, foreign volunteers, and officers' personal desires with the continuation of the Monarchy, but also provided avenues in which their local communities – the places these soldiers had live and resided in – could show they too were loyal to the Habsburg state and valued what it protected.

## **The Finding of this Study**

This thesis has contributed to three fields of enquiry: the impact of the “Military Enlightenment” on the motivations of soldiers who fought for and against France; the experience of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe; the conflict's influence on the Habsburg state's political community. In chapter one, this

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<sup>11</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen leben*, 19.

thesis provided the first discussion on the intellectual spirit behind the creation of the Habsburg standing army in the late eighteenth century and its links to the enlightened state-building reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. It did this by examining the creation of the *Soldat Bürger* as an identity which promoted military service as an active engagement by subjects in the protection of the Habsburg state's common good. In chapter two, this work then documented how widespread this military identity was by examining how local societies were linked to the dynasty and its many parts through cantonal conscription. This was a military practice established before the war with France which overtime symbiotically linked regional social structures and military service to promote conscription as a mark of dynastic loyalty for these places.

In chapter three this work moved onto the experience of the Habsburg military sphere, revealing how the soldier's military honour used to maintain state loyalty was founded on the compassion, application and zeal exhibited and policed by men in their military communities. These virtues formulated the desire to serve as a mark of honour, and the communities these principles created, this thesis revealed, was enough to motivate men to internalise military service as an avenue for utilitarian fulfilment. As chapter three has pointed out, life within the emperor's army did not necessarily mean the soldier was subjected to cruel and dispiriting violence overseen by brutalizing non-commissioned officers and uncaring officers. As the testimonies of soldiers and officers make clear, men created their own communities with the ability to transcend the precariat life of pre-modern society by inhabiting the role of the *Soldat Bürger*. This was seen as an opportunity only soldiers of the emperor had the ability to hold and with it came possibilities of advancement, security, and companionship. These chances were earned by possessing honour, which meant exhibiting "camaraderie, resilience, discipline, fortitude and bravery" in service to the state. These were the traits of the *Soldat Bürger* which created the military communities



of belonging used to connect local societies to the dynasty and psychologically prepare men to fight.<sup>12</sup>

As chapter four argued, utilising the accounts of war left by Habsburg soldiers, honour served as a set of internal standards which regulated a soldier's experience of and reaction to the physical and psychological effects of battlefield violence. Honour was also a determinant of respect which was never a fixed resource. It was something a man maintained, and the Monarchy's military culture determined the battlefield was the place where honour was shown by demonstrating the traits of the *Soldat Bürger*. As combatant's ego-documents demonstrate, men understood their individual honour reflected the collective honour of their units, and therefore the honour of their proprietor, their local community, and the monarch. By fighting to maintain each overlapping demand for honour on the battlefield soldiers fulfilled their duty to the state. As chapter four concluded, men saw battle as a place where embodying the traits of the honourable soldier meant they could lay claim to respect and systems of patronage and career progression that provided a life few could obtain outside the army.

Despite a culture championing the battlefield as a place of personal opportunity, the *Soldat Bürger* was not an identity which promoted nihilistic, self-service through killing. Instead, it was a concept of patriotic utilitarianism, promoted by Joseph von Sonnenfels and applied by the army, which advocated the structures of the Habsburg state and service to it as the best form of acquiring the greatest happiness. As part of the Monarchy's narrative of war, chapter five explained, the soldier was represented as embodying the best of the Habsburg state and its legitimate traditions, civic orders, religions, and social hierarchy which together guaranteed

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<sup>12</sup> NL, B/1396 Schnerer, *Bruckstücke aus meinen leben*, 40. In a proclamation from 4 April 1857, directed to the veterans of 1848, Radetzky thanked his soldiers for the "Camaraderie, Resilience, Discipline, Fortitude and Bravery" they had shown. These sentiments, resonated with Schnerer's experience as a soldier who fought France. The last "fragment" of his life he recorded was Radetzky's words of thanks to the troops of 1848/49.

security. Initially the soldier's honour, and the traits it promoted, was used to instill within the dynasty's subjects a revulsion for the politics emanating from Paris during the Revolutionary period. As the war moved into its second phase, soldiering was positioned as a loyal action by individuals and their communities used to demand more from the Habsburg populace to defeat Napoleon.

Importantly for the war effort, soldiers were identified as defending and sharing the values and expectations of the Monarchy's urban and rural political and economic middle class. Whilst these people were not responsible for fighting for the Habsburgs, their political opinion and wealth mattered for it facilitated military exigencies during a time when logistics and medical care were the responsibility of civilian authorities. By espousing the similarities between the *Soldat Bürger Soldat Bürger* and the *Bürgertum* the government made it easier to mobilise this group of people for the war effort. A key part of both representations was images, songs, plays and poems communicating the traits which made up the Habsburg soldier's honour were also the characteristics of the most loyal of Habsburg subjects. As chapter five concluded, the soldier's image became a wartime symbol of Habsburg loyalty and popular patriotism linking military and civilian spheres through the shared values of justice, dignity, order, and diligence embraced by Habsburg monarchism under Francis.

Finally, chapter six articulated how the representation of the Habsburg soldier as the positive embodiment of monarchism, the loyalty of its many local societies, and the commitment each of these places had to the continuation of the whole state, was positively received by the dynasty's subjects. This was a population which aligned their interests behind the war effort, and who committed to the tenets of Francis's rule and culture of the German bourgeoisie he embodied by cherishing the service of the soldier. As chapter six showed, non-combatants contributed to the Habsburg war effort by choosing to provide voluntary donations to the regiments made up of men from their communities. This was a decision made by people to be part of the

Habsburg state by supporting the emperor's soldiers. However, as this chapter stressed, wartime philanthropy was not just recognition of the whole Monarchy and one's desire to be a part of it. Voluntary contributions were also a celebration by regional and local actors of their place *in* the Habsburg state. Charitable donations to the soldier were dual processes where territories, defined by localised conscription, proclaimed the importance of their specific efforts to the whole through the contributions they made to local soldiers. At the war's conclusion, the Habsburg soldier's position in victory celebrations represented and was received as a concurrent symbol of dynastic loyalty, Habsburg legitimacy and a regional distinctiveness which had coalesced to create a particularly "Austrian" wartime identity used to maintain the political will to outlast France.

What this thesis has shown was the Habsburg Monarchy's own military processes and practices, established during the period of the "Military Enlightenment" from the 1760s to the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars, gave the state and its people the tools to create a wartime community utilising the values of the Habsburg military culture. A community which allowed for expressions of regional allegiances and dynastic unity. Whilst the Monarchy never descended into a culture of militarism that plagued later nineteenth century nation-states, the pervasive nature of the Habsburg military during war altered existing social structures and created an environment where the soldier was openly depicted by elites and accepted by the population as servants of the state, a man of the community and a worthy subject whose duty safeguarded a way of life. As more and more of the Monarchy's population were exposed to this culture of service through conscription, popular symbols of military dynastic loyalty, and emerging avenues of performative patriotism, the *Soldat Bürger* was employed and received as a means with which to identify with the dynasty and assert local societies loyalty to it. It was an identity which constructed robust military communities, as well as the nexus between territorial loyalties, cultural values and dynastic patriotism needed to mobilise the Monarchy's composite people.

By the closing stages of the war, the soldier was seen by the Habsburg populace as a valuable and contributing state citizen, serving as the constant element in the construction of a unifying wartime Habsburg identity. This did not last. Communities in the post war Monarchy withdraw into themselves, weary from war and eager to embrace a promised peace.<sup>13</sup> The demobilisation of the Habsburg army in 1816, through the reduction of infantry regiments from 4 battalions to two with a reduced third, also meant men were left to their own devices in communities they had no affiliation with, and without the military connections that had formed their social lives. More research needs to be done on the social and economic effects of the disbandment of regiments into war weary unaffiliated communities, but it is clear the soldier reverted to being seen as a miscreant and outsider. In some instances, as Christoph Tepperberg has suggested, the mass demobilisation of soldiers, and the undesirable nature of peace time service for ten percent of “the uneducated and economically disadvantaged” meant they congregated in criminal gangs. However, this rather dim view of the “lower classes” and their motives bears much more analysis before such generalisations can be truly determined.<sup>14</sup>

Another factor contributing to the decline of the unifying symbolism of the *Soldat Bürger* can be assigned to the garrisoning of infantry regiments away from the communities they recruited from between the 1820s and the 1860s. Though the Habsburg army’s role as a pacifying occupation force, with Italian regiments stationed in Hungary, Austrians in Bohemia, Hungarians in Austria, is overstated, the stationing of regular regiments on the periphery of the Monarchy, particularly in Galicia, meant

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<sup>13</sup> Steven Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1815-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 25-53.

<sup>14</sup> Christoph Tepperberg, “Rechtsnormen zum “Verbrechen der Desertion” in der K.k Armee, vornehmlich für die Zeit des Vormärz,” *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 43 (1993): 94-113; Tepperberg, “Räuber, Mörder, Deserteure: Fahnenflucht und Bandenkriminalität im Vormärz, dargestellt am Beispiel zweier Verbrechergruppen,” *Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich* 59 (1993): 197-224. For an analysis of desertion in Galicia and the Birder regions during period of the common army see Serhiy Choliy, “Military Desertion as a Counter-Modernization Response in Austro-Hungarian Society, 1868-1914,” *Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar* 9. no. 18 (2020): 269-89.

regular soldiers were no longer visible to local societies, and nor was the local regiment intimately connected to the areas they raised their men from.<sup>15</sup> These peace time practices may have initiated the divergence, as Gunther Rothenberg explained, between the military and the Habsburg populace during Vormärz. This, however, was a problem of military practices after Napoleon, and not as Rothenberg identified, a result of alienating Old Regime military processes contributing to civil unrest and the revolution of 1848.<sup>16</sup> As this study has shown, the military communities of the Monarchy during the war with France were not motivated and controlled by brutal punishment which separated soldier from civilian, but rather by systems of honour that championed compassion and the mutually beneficial relationship of loyalty shared between state and inhabitant. It was not until universal conscription was introduced in 1867, and the common army formed, that dynastic loyalty promulgated by shared intimacy between local societies and their regiments could once again be established through, amongst other things, the veteran associations identified by Laurence Cole.

History is a series of arguments, and due to the constraints of this work there are avenues not explored which would have strengthened the claims of this thesis. For one, work on the very local experience of war in the Habsburg Monarchy, where the connection between regiment and its local society can be measured have not been included. Questions focusing on the economic developments of local communities associated with garrisons would have provided further evidence on the links between local societies, their soldiers and the wider Monarchy. Specifically, understanding the place of soldier workers (*Nebenarbeiten*) in local economies would have revealed the type of social networks conscription and resource mobilisation created within regions.

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<sup>15</sup> Schmitt, *Armee und Staatliche Integration*, 166-68, esp. 173-77. As Schmitt's study of Veneto-Lombardy proves, units were rarely moved as far and as readily as some literature as suggested. It simply is a long way to walk from Italy to Galicia, and the wastage of men on the march was not an insignificant cost to have xenophobic soldiers ready to fire on the rebellious locals. For the specific literature Schmitt challenges see *Armee und Staatliche Integration*, 32-33.

<sup>16</sup> Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 11-15.

More needs to be done also on the types of military communities which existed outside of battle.<sup>17</sup> Wives and children were included in regiment's numbers, and they were seen by authorities and their local area as part of the military sphere. Yet little is known of these women and children. Regimental parish indexes within the *Kriegsarchiv* contain much information on the social make up of military families and the communities they created, as well as qualitative data of women relating to, subverting and negotiating the systems of military service put in place by the Habsburg Monarchy. Pension claims made by widows to local military administrative offices (*Militär-Ökonomie-Commissionen*) required women to detail their relationship with deceased officers and soldiers and provide documents validating these claims. By exploring the language, narratives and women's personal interactions with soldiers used to evidence their relationships would shine further light on the connections between local society and the military, between the Habsburg army and its members.

As the introduction to this work noted, the Monarchy's army was a polycentric force, and how the home front was narrated, experienced and perceived in the other urban nodes of the Habsburg provinces and their adjoining rural regions would better elucidate the *Soldat Bürger* as a link of loyalty and as a sense of "Austrian" belonging. Further to this, studies of the local charitable organisations aligned with local regiments would provide a more detailed understanding of civil-military relationships across the Monarchy. Research on their motives, structure, administration, members and meetings can elucidate more clearly what people wanted to get out of serving the state in this way during war. In addition, a more detailed examination of how the *Hofkriegsrat* administered funds provided by local charities would offer an understanding of how military officials viewed patriotic donations. Moreover, the experience of occupation, the effects of the French armies "living off the land", and the need to meet further mounting wartime fiscal demands is absent

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<sup>17</sup> Christa Hämmerle, *Heimat/Front: Geschlechtergeschichte/n des Ersten Weltkriegs in Österreich-Ungarn* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2004). This work provides a template to emulate.

here. As were the ways in which the war, and its many setbacks, was described to the populace. Space did not allow for an in-depth analysis of these events or narratives.

The answers may have revealed more on the importance of the soldier's representation in Habsburg political culture and its reception by local societies.

Despite these lacunas, dictated by the nature of this project, this thesis set out to answer one overarching question: what was the experience of fighting for the Habsburgs during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and how did this influence the political culture of the Monarchy? For those voices present in this study, it was a brutal, bloody, incessant and at times isolating war. Yet this experience, promoted by the army's military culture and patriotic rhetoric as the necessary duty of the Habsburg state's military citizens, created identities and communities which gave individuals and local territories throughout the Monarchy the language to reject France. Not only did the *Soldat Bürger* provide avenues for people to embrace the opportunities of the Old Regime through military service, but this identity also served as a vessel for different classes of people and their communities to actively align behind the emperor Francis and the values of his state through popular patriotic displays. These displays, resting on positively acclaiming the identity of the *Soldat Bürger* as an expression and manifestation of the Habsburg people's collective will, solidified the Monarchy and its purpose for participants, reinforcing a wartime narrative which positioned justice, stability and happiness as only guaranteed by the supreme sovereignty of the dynasty.





## Appendices



**Figure 3.** “*Deutsche Linieninfanterie - Mannschaften.*” Mansfeld, Joseph Georg. *Abbildung der Neuen Adjustirung der k. k. Armee, 1798.* Vienna: Tranquillo Mollo & Comp., 1798.



*Deutschmeister. deutsch. Inf. Reg.  
1780. N. 4.*

**Figure 4.** “Mannschaften. Deutschmeister. Deutsch Inf. Reg. 1788, N. 4.” Grimm, Max. *Schema aller Uniform der Kaiser. König. Kriegsvölkern aus dem Jahre 1793.* Vienna: Artaria & Comp. and Tranquillo Mollo, 1793.




**Figure 5.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Gregor Toth, Gemeiner vom k.k. Infanterie-Regiment Giulay. Dieser eilte den 21 August 1793 bey Verfolgung des Feindes, in der Gegend von Werth, dem bereits verwundeten und gefangenen Korporalen Karnezki zu Hilfe, erlegte mit dem Gewehrkolben zwey Franzosen, welche ihn führten, und

brachte ihn wieder zurück.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.  
<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243245/>



**Figure 6.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Georg Horne, Gemeiner vom k.k. Infanterie-Regimente Terzy. Als dieser brave Soldat sah, daß sein Kammerad Pickel, welcher eben im Begriffe war, einen Kammeraden zu tödlen, und ihn über Füssen fortzuschleppen wollten, ging er mit dem Regimente auf ihn los, vertrieb alle, und trug ihn Verwundeten auf seinen Schultern in Sicherheit. Den 12. Sept. 1792.”


retten, verwundet zur Erde fiel, und ihn vier Franzosen fortschleppen wollten, ging er mit dem Bayonnete auf sie los, vertrieb alle, und trug den Verwundeten auf seinen Schulter in Sicherheit. Den 12 Sept. 1792.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243239/>



**Figure 7.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “George Toth, Gemeiner vom k.k. Husaren-Regiment Erdödy, gibt seinem vom Pferde gefallenen Rittmeister das eigene Pferd,

und erretet ihn dadurch aus der Gefahr, in feindliche Gefangenschaft zu gerathen. Im Jahr 1793.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.

<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243247/>



**Figure 8.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Jacob Fleischer, Corporal vom leichten Bataillon Rubenitz No. 12 brachte am 20 März 1799 einen Zug Uhlanen der von einer

mehr als viermal stärkeren Feindlichen Cavallerie angegriffen war, dadurch aus der Verlegenheit, daß er, aus eigenem Antriebe, mit einigen Freywilligen eine Waldspitze besetzte und dadurch dem Feinde die Flanke, und, bey weiterem Vordringen, den Rücken bedrohte.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.

<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243303/>



**Figure 9.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Der Gefreyte Bucher von Manfredini trägt seinen Major, den Grafen Magawly, welcher nächst Hechsheim am rechten Beine mit einer Kugel durchschossen wurde, bey 40 Schritte zurück, legt ihn hinter einen kleinen Erdhügel und verläßt ihn mit diesen Worten: lieber Herr Oberst-Wachtmeister ich bliebe gern bey Ihnen, aber meine Pflicht ist ins Feuer zurück zu gehen. Den 29 October 1795.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.  
<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243249/>





**Figure 10.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, and Bartsch, Adam, “Christoph Hirschel, Corporal, und Carl Klösch, Gemeiner vom zweyten Garnisons Regiment. Diese zwey braven Männer haben mit Aussetzung ihres Lebens, den tödlich verwundeten Oberlieutenant Wilhelm unter dem heftigsten Feuer weggetragen, und aus des Feindes Händen gerettet. Den 12 Junius, 1793.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243243/>



**Figure 11.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, and Bartsch, Adam, “Der Feldwäbel Michael Csulich vom leichten Infanterie-Bataillon Munkatsy ermunterte den 15 März 1799 bey Martinsbruck, einige Mannschaft den Feind mit dem Bajonette anzugreifen, er warf

denselben, und behauptete diese Position, und rettete noch dabey seinen Hauptmann aus der Gefangenschaft.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.

<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243298/>




**Figure 12.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Der Corporal Georg Zuchtrigl von Levenehr Dragoner vertheidigte am 11ten Juny 1799 bey Fenestrelle, auf einem schon tödtlich verwundeten Pferde zwey seiner Cammeraden, deren Pferde erschossen waren, gegen die Gefahr des Todes oder der Gefangenschaft so lang bis sie durch einen herbey

gesprengten Soutien gerettet wurden” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:244967/>



**Figure 13.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Daniel Lukatsy und Barothi, k.k. Soldaten vom Husaren-Regiment Erzherzog Leopold. Diese zwey Männer haben ihrem braven Obersten Ott, welcher vom Feinde schon gänzlich umrungen war, bey Bellheim das Leben gerettet, indem sie die Feinde, welche ihn tödten wollten, niedersäbelten. Den 17 May 1792.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military*



**Figure 14.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Ein Zug von Mészáros Husaren, unter der persönlichen Ausführung des Obristen von Mészery, befreyet bey Andelfingen den Generalen Piaczeck, welcher nach mehreren erhaltenen Wunden in die feindliche Gefangenschaft gerathen war, den 25ten May 1799.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243251/>



**Figure 15.** Kininger, Vincenz Georg, “Der Feldwäbel Wenzel Wessely vom 5ten Bannater-Bataillon drang den 28ten April bey Verderio mit vier Freywilligen in den Feind ein, um zwey verlorene Kanonen wieder zu gewinnen, stieß mehrere der Feinde mit dem Bajonette nieder und befreyte so die Geschüz wieder.” (1800). *Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection*. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.

<https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:243300/>





Leibfahne für die Infanterie, 1806 Aus den so genannten “Schmider-Blättern” von Anton Schmieder (1768-?). *Uniformen, Rüstsorten, Waffen und Ausrüstungsgegenstände der k.k. Armee im Zeitraum von 1772 bis 1840, 1815-1848.*



Ordinäre Fahne für Infanterie, 1803/06 Aus den so genannten "Schmider-Blättern" von Anton Schmieder (1768-?). *Uniformen, Rüstsorten, Waffen und Ausrüstungsgegenstände der k.k. Armee im Zeitraum von 1772 bis 1840, 1815-1848.*



**Table 3: The Social Background of major Military Authors used in this Study**

| Company Officers  |  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
|---|--|-------|---|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Name  | Ego-document   | Birth | Province                                | Wartime Regiment   | Initial Rank                                   | Retired Rank                     |
| Marcus Hibler<br>(*awarded<br>predicate von<br>Alpenheim) | Unpublished<br>diary (1796-<br>1839)   | 1778  | Tyrol                                   | <i>Tiroler Scharfschützencorps (1796)</i><br>Infantry Regiment (IR) <i>Stain</i><br>Nr. 50 (1797)<br><i>Tyrol Territorial Miliz</i> (1803-<br>1805)<br>IR <i>Jordis</i> Nr. 59 (1806-1809)<br>IR <i>Zach</i> Nr. 15 (1810- | Volunteer common<br>soldier                    | Colonel<br>(1837)                |
| Social Background   | Hibler was a Philosophy student at Innsbruck University. His father was a magistrate in Sillian, and his brother was a regular army officer in <i>Stain</i> . He was ennobled in 1836 after forty years of service.  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Lorenz Zagitzeck<br>(*von Kehlfeld)                       | Unpublished<br>Memoir (1840)   | 1777  | Bohemia                                 | IR <i>Zach</i> Nr. 15 (1790)   | Regimental Cadet                               | Major (1828)                     |
|   | Zagitzeck was born in Galicia whilst his father was working as the Bohemian regiment <i>Zach's</i> recruiting captain in the regiment's <i>Aushilfsbezirk</i> . His mother was a Bohemian, and his father was a common born conscript from Moravia. As the son of an officer, he was allowed to join the regiment <i>Zach</i> as a private cadet. Like his father and brother, Zagitzeck was ennobled. Though he did not officially reach forty years of service, the military governor of Galicia sponsored Zagitzeck's application to the Habsburg court for his noble patent.                                 |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Karl Gruber (von<br>Grueber)                              | Published work<br>(1906) and<br>unpublished<br>memoir (1849)   | 1783  | Bavaria<br>( <i>Reich</i><br>Volunteer) | Cuirassier Regiment (CR)<br><i>Herzog Albert</i> Nr. 2 (1799-1812)   | <i>Expropriis Gemeine</i>                      | Regimental<br>Adjutant<br>(1820) |
|   | Gruber was the son of a Bavarian magistrate ( <i>Rentbeamter</i> ) who had been ennobled for his service as a local official. His love for the military as a child motivated him to volunteer for the Habsburg infantry as a young man. His family wealth and connections enabled him to join the cuirassier regiment <i>Herzog Albert</i> as an <i>Expropriis Gemeine</i> . After failing in his duties during the 1812 campaign, Grueber joined the Bavarian army to seek fresh opportunities. He then re-entered the Habsburg army after 1819 before retiring in 1820 to work as a petty bureaucrat in Tyrol. |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Alois Pfersmann<br>(*von Eichtal)                         | Unpublished<br>memoir (1854)   | 1781  | Carinthia                               | Grenz Regiment<br><i>Brooder</i> Nr. 7 (1796)<br>IR <i>Starray</i> Nr. 33  | Regimental Cadet                               | Major General                    |
|   | Pfersmann joined the <i>Brooder</i> regiment as a regimental cadet in 1796. He was the son of a minor secretary working for the Imperial tobacco board ( <i>K.k. Tabak</i> ) in Klagenfurt. He retired as the commander of the <i>Siebenbürgen</i> military district.  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Michael Pauliny<br>(*von Kowelsdam)                       | Published<br>excerpt (1863)  | 1770  | Hungary                                 | Hussar Regiment <i>Kaiser Franz</i><br>(1788)  | Trooper  | Lieutenant-<br>colonel<br>(1836) |
|   | Michael Pauliny joined the Habsburg army after he was unable to meet his university course fees due to altered family circumstances. The army provided significantly more opportunity than university as he retired as the head of the <i>Militär-Filial-Invalidenhaus</i> in Vienna.  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Ignaz Berndt<br>(Bernt)                                   | Unpublished<br>memoir (1839)   | 1773  | Bohemia                                 | Saatzter-Landwehr Battalion<br>(1809)<br>IR <i>Prinz Reuss</i> Nr. 17<br>(1809)  | Landwehr<br>Lieutenant                         | Major<br>(1829)                  |
|   | Worked as a manor bureaucrat in Bohemia, the last of his employers was the noble Lobkowitz family, until he was appointed to administer the <i>Saatzter</i> Landwehr battalion at 36. He quickly rose to command a company within the unit before he was then transferred to the regular army on the eve of the 1809 war.  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Ignaz Carl von<br>Amon                                    | Unpublished<br>march diary<br>(1809-1815)  | 1785  | Upper Austria                           | Traunviertel Landwehr (1809)<br>IR <i>Kerpen</i> Nr. 49 (1813)   | Landwehr<br>Cadet                              | Major<br>(1839)                  |
|   | At the beginning of the 1809 campaign Carl von Amon was a 24-year-old cadet in a Traunviertel Landwehr battalion. In 1813, he was a first lieutenant in <i>Kerpen's</i> 3rd battalion as part of the Habsburg's observation corps along the Danube.  |       |   |  |  |                                  |
| Jacob Friedrich<br>Reinhard                               | Family letters<br>(1796)   | 1764  | Duchy of<br>Württemberg                 | IR <i>Pallavicini</i> Nr.8<br>(1783-1795)<br>Ignaz Gray Gyulai<br>Freikorps (1796-1798)<br>LIR <i>Gretb</i> Nr. 6 (1798)   | Volunteer Common<br>soldier<br>(Reich Recruit) | Captain (killed<br>in 1799)      |
|   | Reinhard joined the Habsburg army in 1783 as a foreign volunteer on a six-year contract. He rose to first lieutenant by 1795. He was transferred to the Ignaz Graf Gyulai Freikorps in 1796 and made captain. In   |       |   |  |  |                                  |

|                          |                            |  |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------|--|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                          |                            | 1798, Reinhard was appointed to the newly formed <i>Gretb</i> light infantry battalion and was killed at Mattarello (Italy) in April 1799. It seems that Reinhard came from an educated military family as the letters he wrote to his brother, who served in the Duchy of Württemberg's army, covered political events in detail and enlightened concepts, which drew on the language of sensibility to convey experience.  |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| John Bellew              | Family letters (1778-1790) | Unknown  | Ireland         | CR <i>Zeschwitz</i> Nr. 10 (1777)  | Imperial Cadet                     | First Lieutenant (1792)               |
|                          |                            | Coming from the landed Irish catholic gentry, Bellew joined the Habsburg army in 1777, utilising the connections of the Irish émigré community within the upper echelons of the army to secure a lieutenancy in a cuirassier regiment. Bellew recommend this plan for his own cousin, advising him to attend the Imperial cadet school, and then use the Irish connections with General D'Alton to be placed in a suitable regiment (he suggested, however, the infantry as they bore the least financial cost). He served in the Bavarian War of Succession, put down revolts during the Josephinian land survey in Hungary and fought during the Austro-Ottoman war along with many of his Bellew relatives. It is unknown when his service ended.   |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| Johann Nuce              | Published memoir (1817)    | Unknown  | Lower Austria   | IR <i>Deutschmeister</i> Nr. 4 (1796 – 1816)   | Imperial Cadet                     | First Captain (1816)                  |
|                          |                            | Nuce was an Imperial cadet in the regiment <i>Deutschmeister</i> in 1796 before becoming a second lieutenant in 1801. He would go on to write works after the war extolling the virtues of military honour for the children of the civilian “honorati who wanted to be cadets” and pursue their passion for soldiering.  |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| <b>Common Soldiers</b>   |                            |  |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| Johann Friedrich Löffler |                            | 1768   | Prussia-Silesia | IR <i>Deutschmeister</i> Nr. 4 (1788-1794)   | Common Soldier (Foreign Volunteer) | Sergeant (Private) (captured in 1794) |
|                          | Published memoir (1836)    | Löffler was a migrant day labourer from a poor, widowed family in Prussia-Silesia who was working in Hungary when he fell ill and lost his employment. Whilst recuperating in Vienna he was contracted into the <i>Deutschmeister</i> in 1788. During the Austro-Ottoman war he rose to the rank of sergeant. He was demoted to private in 1793 after being caught up in desertion ring whilst fighting in France. Later he was captured at Landrecies in 1794 after the surrender of the citadel to the French. The treatment of the prisoners meant the first two <i>Deutschmeister</i> battalions dissolved completely (most dying of malnutrition and mistreatment), forcing Löffler to escape to the Dutch Republic. There he was “kidnapped” by military contractors and served the rest of the war in the British forces. |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| Franz Bersling           | Published memoir (1840)    | 1775   | Bohemia         | 2 <sup>nd</sup> Artillery Regiment (1791)  | Gunner (Conscript)                 | Corporal (deserted in 1796)           |
|                          |                            | The son of a tailor from his father's first marriage, Bersling was conscripted into the Habsburg army in the months after the Austro-Ottoman War. Qualified in his father's trade, Bersling worked as a tailor in Prague whilst as a soldier before the war with France began. He fought in the Flanders campaigns, during the Siege of Kehl and the German campaign of 1796. The death of one of his friends, killed by a howitzer at Kehl, pushed Bersling to consider deserting the army. He did this in 1797 but almost immediately joined military contractors looking for men in Switzerland after fearing capture. He subsequently served the rest of the war in the British forces.  |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| Johann Schnerer          | Unpublished memoir (1853)  | 1778   | Moravia         | IR <i>Laudon (Wallis)</i> Nr. 29 (1795-1802)<br>IR <i>EH Ludwig</i> Nr. 8 (1802-<br>IR <i>De Ligne</i> Nr. 30<br>IR <i>Czartoryski</i> Nr. 9 | Common Soldier (Conscript)         | Adjutant, Second Captain (1834)       |
|                          |                            | Johann Schnerer was the son of a Reich volunteer and Bohemian women who was educated in a regimental school before he was conscripted in 1795. He rose to the rank of corporal in a Moravian regiment by 1801. In 1802 he was transferred to a Bohemian regiment to work with a former captain as his sergeant. He was demobilised in 1810 after reaching his “capitulation” length. In 1811 he purchased the position of an <i>Expropriis Gemeine</i> in a Galician regiment and ascended to first lieutenant and battalion adjutant by the wars end.   |                 |  |                                    |                                       |
| Johann Schnierer         | Published memoir (1914)    | 1791   | Lower Austria   | IR <i>Deutschmeister</i> (1809-1813)<br>3 <sup>rd</sup> Jager battalion (1813-1816)  | Common soldier (Conscript)         | Sergeant (1816)                       |
|                          |                            | Conscripted in 1809 as part of the new reserves for the <i>Deutschmeister</i> , Johann Schnierer was the son of a barber in the suburb of Wieden. It seems he was well cultivated, suiting the status of his family, as he was made a company clerk in the reserve division and was a stage performer in Vienna whilst on furlough between 1810 and 1813. Schnierer fought in France in 1814 and was stationed in Scharding in 1816 where he married and remained until death. It is unknown when his service ended.   |                 |  |                                    |                                       |

|                     |                         |   |                      |  |                                |                  |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---|----------------------|--|--------------------------------|------------------|
| Friederich Brandner | Published memoir (1852) | Unknown   | German Confederation | IR <i>Erzherzog Johann Nepomuk</i> (1807-1810) | <i>Confinenwerbung</i> Recruit | Corporal in 1809 |
|                     |                         | In Prague, Brander took the decision, “half voluntarily, half enforced”, to enlist in the Habsburg army in 1807. There is no evidence of his life before his time in the army, but his strong command of written German, which lead him to be immediately appointed to the regimental staff, indicates a man with a <i>Bürgertum</i> education. He fought as a company sergeant in Bavaria and at Essling and Wagram. It is unknown when his service ended. |                      |  |                                |                  |

**Table 4: The Careers of minor Military Authors used in this Study**

|        | Archive information   | Name                                   | Life      |
|--------|---|--|-----------|
|        | OeSTA/KA NL B/38  | Franz Edler Schluderer von Traunbruck  | 1777-1844 |
| Career | Born in Parma, served in Infantry Regiment (IR) Nr 15 as an ensign and was an officer in the 4 <sup>th</sup> Vienna Volunteer Battalion in 1809.  |  |           |
|        | NL B/165  | Franz Freiherr Dahlen von Orlaburg     | 1779-1859 |
|        | Born in <i>Siebenbürgen</i> (Transylvania) and served as an ensign in IR Nr. 40.  |  |           |
|        | NL B/286  | Maximilian Freiherr Stietka von Wachau | 1777-1833 |
|        | Born in <i>Brünn</i> (Brno) and served as a captain in Dragoon Regiment Nr 6.   |  |           |
|        | NL B/287  | Wenzel von Stransky 1792-1873.09.09.   | 1792-1873 |
|        | Born in <i>Gitschin</i> (Jičín) and served as a cadet in IR Nr 17 from 1808, rising to first lieutenant by 1813.  |  |           |
|        | NL B/340  | Karl Freiherr von Spangen              | 1762-1824 |
|        | Born in Mons in 1763 and joined IR Nr 9 (Walloon) in 1783 as a second lieutenant. He was a prisoner of war from November 1789 to December 1790 (Austro-Turkish War). He had attained the rank of major by the time of First Coalition and colonel by 1799. He was pensioned in December 1806, most probably as a result of Archduke Charles's military reforms. |  |           |
|        | NL B/341  | Johann Hermann von Hermannsdorf        | 1781-1809 |
|        | Born in Prague in 1781 and was assigned to the Engineer Corps in 1799 after training at the Academy in Vienna. Killed in 1809 commanding the Predil blockhouse.   |  |           |
|        | NL B/349  | Konstantin d'Aspre                     | 1789-1850 |
|        | Born in Brussels in 1789, attended the military school in Wiener Neustadt before he was assigned to IR Nr 24 as an ensign in 1805 (Polish recruiting territory). Served as second captain in IR Nr. 18 during the 1809 war. Fought in Russia (1812), Italy (1813) and against Murat in 1815 (Naples).   |  |           |

|  |   |           |
|--|---|-----------|
| NL B/351   | August Stwrtnik   | 1790-1869 |
| Born in Prague in 1790 he served as a loader ( <i>Unterkanonier</i> ) in Artillery Regiment Nr. 2 in the 1809 campaigns.   |   |           |
| NL B/356   | Wilhelm von Grueber                                     | 1779-1877 |
| Born in Lemberg (Lviv) in 1779 before serving as an ensign in IR Nr. 33 from 1794. He served twelve years in the regiment then he was promoted to captain before transferring to a Grenzer Regiment in 1806 and then assigned to the newly raised Hungarian insurrection in 1809 as major.   |   |           |
| NL B/389   | Werner Freiherr von Trapp                               | 1773-1842 |
| Born in 1773 in Lauterbach (Duchy of Hesse). From 1791 he was an ensign in the Hessian contingent assigned to General Wurmser's army. Before transferring to Austrian service in 1797, he took part in the major campaigns of the First Coalition. By 1809 he was a colonel and in 1814 was part of the quarter-master general staff.  |   |           |
| NL B/539   | Viktor Chevalier de Chaudelot                           | 1766-1843 |
| Born in Nancy and after three years as part of Louis XVI lifeguard joined IR Nr. 55 as a cadet in 1788. Fought in the First Coalition and Second Coalition before being transferred to IR Nr. 21 as a major. Fought in Bavaria and at Aspern and Wagram in 1809, before being transferred back to Nr. 55. He was then transferred back to Nr. 21 in 1813, where he fought in Bohemia and Saxony and was appointed Colonel in December 1813. Ended the war with his regiment fighting in Italy in 1814. |   |           |
| NL B/630   | Andreas Freiherr von Neu                                | 1778-1840 |
| Born in Lower Austria, attended the academy at Wiener Neustadt before serving as an ensign in IR 45. Fought in IR Nr. 25 from 1800 to 1815 in all major campaigns.   |   |           |
| NL B/647   | Friedrich Reichsgraf von Hochenegg                      | 1770-1848 |
| Born in 1770 in Franconia and assigned to IR Nr. 23 as an ensign in 1788. Rose to the rank of Major in 1804 before being appointed Head of the Recruitment Department in the <i>Hofkriegsrat (Leiter Hofkriegsräthlicher Referent des Rekrutierungs-Departements)</i> in 1806. Later commanded IR. 15 in 1813.   |   |           |
| NL B/720   | Dietrich von Hermannsthal, Michael,                     | 1783-1836 |
| Born in Hermannstadt (Sibiu, Transylvania). In 1801 was assigned to IR Nr. 31 as a cadet before transferring to the Grenzer Regiment Wallachisch-Illyrischen Nr. 2. Fought in 1805 and 1809.   |   |           |
| NL B/864   | Frisch, Ignaz Friedrich,                                | 1785-1858 |
| Born in Vienna, before joining IR Nr. 7 as a cadet in 1801. Moved to IR Nr. 58 and served as a second captain for the rest of the war.   |   |           |
| NL B/884   | Culoz von, Karl Freiherr,                               | 1785-1862 |
| Born in Hartberg in 1785. Served from the rank of cadet to captain in IR Nr. 27 during the war.  |   |           |
| NL B/897   | Franz Heinrich Graf Schlick zu Bassano und Weisskirchen |           |

|   |                                      |                 |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <p>Born in Prague in 1789. Served as a company commander in a Landwehr Battalion in 1808 before joining the Herzog Albert von Sachsen Cuirassier regiment for the 1809 campaign. Served as captain from 1813 to the end of the war in the same regiment.</p>  |                                      |                 |
| NL B/905  | Innerhofer von Innhof, Johann Edler, | 1780.02.28-1850 |
| <p>Born in Vienna in 1780. Left the Military academy in 1797 and was assigned to IR Nr 1. He was transferred to IR Nr. 62 with the rank of first lieutenant in 1805. Served as a regimental staff officer in 1809, before being appointed Professor of War Sciences at the Academy in 1813.</p>   |                                      |                 |
| NL B/937  | Baron Arnold Leeuwen                 | 1773-(?)        |
| <p>Born near Brünn in 1773 before serving as a cadet in IR Nr. 1 from 1790. Rose to the rank of captain before being pensioned in April of 1809 (possibly unfit for active service).</p>  |                                      |                 |
| NL B/963  | Leonhard Graf Rothkirch von Panthen  | 1773-1842       |
| <p>Born in Parndorf. He was appointed second lieutenant in IR Nr. 59 in 1794. Served as a second captain from 1795 to 1798 and then as a captain of a Pioneer company in 1800. Joined IR Nr 4. in 1801 and was a commander of a Grenadier company until 1806. After that he served as a staff officer until the end of the war.</p>                                   |                                      |                 |
| NL B/988  | Wilhelm Müller von Mühlwerth         | 1787-1846       |
| <p>Born in Graz in 1787. Ascended from cadet to lieutenant in the engineering corps from 1806 until 1809. He was made a second captain in IR Nr. 31 in 1813 before being made captain in 1814.</p>  |                                      |                 |
| NL B/1045   | Ferdinand Goetzen                    | 1784-(?)        |
| <p>Born in Dresden in 1784. He was transferred from the Cuirassier Regiment Diensten to IR Nr. 4 in 1805 before moving to the Uhlan Regiment <i>Erzherzog</i> as captain in 1806. Served until 1814 before being pensioned.</p>   |                                      |                 |
| NL B/1262   | Joseph Wirker-Wackerfeld             | 1775-(?).       |
| <p>Born in Wüitingau, Bohemia in 1775. Served as an artilleryman in the Artillery Regiment Nr. 2, in the quarter-master staff and pioneer corps. Served from 1793 to 1799, then again in 1800, 1801, 1805 and 1813 to 1815.</p>   |                                      |                 |
| NL B/1372   | Philipp Du Rieux de Feyau            | 1788-1860       |
| <p>Born in Mechelen, Belgium in 1789. Was made an ensign in IR Nr. 2. He was appointed second captain in Feldjäger-Bataillon 7 and then captain.</p>  |                                      |                 |
| NL B/1390   | Jakob Freiherr Lenk von Wolfsberg    | 1767-1837       |
| <p>Born in Platz, Bohemia. He was conscripted into Artillery Regiment Nr. 3 in 1780. Awarded the Silver Medallion for bravery in 1796 (<i>Silberne Tapferkeits-Medaille</i>). Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1809 and awarded the Military Order of Maria Theresia (<i>Militär-Maria Theresien Orden</i>) for his performance at the Battle of Ebelsberg.</p> |                                      |                 |



# Glossary

Below is a table containing the equivalent ranks of the Habsburg army between 1788 and 1816 found in the modern British army. The British ranks have been used in this thesis to maintain the style of the prose. I have attempted to align the ranks based upon their role within both armies. Where the equivalency does not exist, I have provided the translation used in this thesis and placed them alongside the NATO Rank chart.

| <b>k. k. <i>Armee</i>, 1788-1816</b>            | <b>British Army, 2022</b>  | <b>NATO Code</b> |
|---|----------------------------|------------------|
| <b>Staff, Corps, Division and Brigade Ranks</b> |                            |                  |
| Feldmarschall                                   | Field marshal              | OF-10            |
| Feldzeugmeister                                 | General                    | OF-9             |
| Feldmarschall-Lieutenant                        | Lieutenant-general         | OF-8             |
| General-Major                                   | Major-general              | OF-7             |
| General   | Brigadier                  | OF-6             |
| <b>Regimental Ranks</b>                         |                            |                  |
| Oberster (Obrist)                               | Regimental colonel         | OF-4/5           |
| Oberstlieutenant<br>(Obristleutnant)            | Lieutenant Colonel         | OF-4             |
| Oberstwachmeister<br>(Obristwachmeister)        | Major (Garrison commander) | OF-3/4           |
| Major   | Major                      | OF-3             |
| Hauptmann (Hauptleute)                          | Captain                    | OF-2             |
| Capitaine-Lieutenant                            | Second Captain             | OF-2             |
| Rittmeister                                     | Cavalry Captain            | OF-2             |
| Oberlieutenant                                  | First Lieutenant           | OF-1             |
| Unterlieutenant                                 | Second Lieutenant          | OF-1             |
| Fähnrich  | Ensign                     | OF(D)            |
| Feldwebel                                       | Sergeant-major             | OR-6             |
| Corporal  | Corporal                   | OR-4/5           |
| Gefreyte  | Senior private             | OR-3             |
| Gemeine   | First Private              | OR-1/2           |

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NL, B/101 Pfersmann von Eichtal, Alois.

NL, B/165 Dahlen von Orlaburg, Franz Freiherr.

NL, B/286 Stietka von Wachau, Maximilian Freiherr.

NL, B/287 Stransky von, Wenzel.

NL, B/340 Spangen von, Karl Freiherr.

NL, B/341 Hermann von Hermannsdorf, Johann.

NL, B/349 d'Aspre, Konstantin.

NL B/351 Stvrtnik (Swrtnik), August II.

NL B/356 Grueber von, Wilhelm.

NL, B/389 Trapp von, Werner Freiherr.



NL, B/539 Chaudelot de, Viktor Chevalier.

NL, B/618 Grueber von, Johann Nepomuk Ritter.

NL, B/630 Neu von, Andreas II. Freiherr.

NL, B/647 Hochenegg von, Friedrich Reichsgraf.

NL, B/664 Hess von, Heinrich Freiherr.

NL, B/682 Zagitzeck von Kehlfeld (Zagitzek), Lorenz.

NL, B/683 Berndt (Bernt), Ignaz.

NL B/719 Amon, Ignaz Carl.

NL, B/720 Dietrich von Hermannsthal, Michael.

NL, B/864 Frisch, Ignaz Friedrich.

NL B/884 Culoz von, Karl Freiherr.

NL, B/987 Schlick zu Bassano und Weisskirchen, Franz Heinrich Graf.

NL, B/905 Innerhofer von Innhof, Johann Edler.

NL, B/932 Reinhard, Friedrich.

NL, B/937 Leeuwen, Arnold Baron.

NL, B/963 Rothkirch von Panthen, Leonhard Graf.

NL, B/1045 Goetzen von, Ferdinand Graf.

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