ORGANISED LABOUR AND NATIONALISM IN THE LONG 1970s: CLASS, DEMOCRACY AND THE SUB-STATE NATIONS OF SCOTLAND AND GALICIA.

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Abstract

A major feature of the political development of Western European multinational democracies since the 1970s is the growth of sub-state national communities seeking self-determination, with sub-state nationalist parties moving away from niche core-periphery political frameworks in favour of more inclusive, catch-all political narratives and social democratic programmes. Examining the cases of Scotland (UK) and Galicia (Spain), this thesis approaches the questions of how and why such a 'civic' form of sub-state nationalism was articulated within Western European multinational democracies during the 'long 1970s'. Offering a broad historical, transnational comparative approach, it rests on four interwoven thematic strands: economic restructuring, devolutionary politics, democracy and socialism. Considering the current reassessment of class identities and politics in the 1970s, this thesis examines the under-researched relationship between 'class' and (sub-state) 'nation', understood here as linguistic constructions, using qualitative discourse analysis. More specifically, it examines the evolving narratives of the regional workers' organisations in Scotland and Galicia arguing that, within these institutions, workers' representatives played a central role in the articulation of regional 'socialist democratic' narratives merging class and (sub-state) national interests as a response to the global socioeconomic and political challenges of the 'long 1970s'. Pursuing different aims, these narratives were co-opted both by left-wing regional and nationalist political parties, arguably driving the sustained electoral growth of sub-state nationalism in Scotland and Galicia in the 1990s. Thus, this thesis analyses the rise of a 'civic' form of sub-state nationalism since the 1970s using a bottom-up approach.

A mis abuelos

Carmen y Vicente, que no la han visto

Paciano, que se quedó a las puertas, y Teresa, que aún tiene mucho por ver.

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Abbreviations

AES	Alternative Economic Strategy
ASTMS	Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs
AUEW	Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CLP	Constituency Labour Parties
CCOO	Workers Commissions
CCOO-G	Workers Commissions National Syndicate of Galicia
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
CSG	Galician Trade Union
CSA	Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
CTG	Galician Workers Union
CXTG-I	General Confederation of Galician Workers
DLO	Direct Labour Organisations
EEC	European Economic Community
GC	General Council (STUC)
GS	Socialist Galicia
HBD	Highlands and Development Board
HIDB	Highlands and Islands Development Board
ING	National Galician Intersyndical confederation
INTG	National Confederation of Galician Workers
NALGO	National and Local Government Officers' Association
NEB	National Enterprise Board
NEC	National Executive Committee
NUM `	National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA	National Union of Mineworkers Scottish Area
NUPE	National Union of Public Employees
PCE	Communist Party of Spain (*Partido Comunista de España*)
PCG	Galician Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Galicia*)
PLP	Parliamentary Labour Party
PSG	Galician Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Galego*)
PTE	Spain's Work Party (*Partido del Trabajo de España*)
SCLP	Scottish Council of the Labour Party
SDA	Scottish Development Authority
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SNP	Scottish Nationalist Party
SOG	Galician Workers' Syndicate (*Sindicato Obreiro Galego*)

STUC	Scottish Trade Union Congress
TSSA	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association
TGWU	Transport and General Workers’ Union
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UCS	Upper Clyde Shipbuilders
UCATT	Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians
UPG	Union of the Galician People (*Unión do Povo Galego*)
USDAW	Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers
USO	Workers’ Union (*Unión Sindical Obrera*)

Archival and source abbreviations

AHF10M	Arquivo Histórico Fundación 10 de Marzo
FESGA	Fundación Moncho Reboiras
FTT	Fundación Terra e Tempo
FV	Faro de Vigo
GH	Glasgow Herald
LMAD	Legado Manuel Amor Deus
LSCB	Legado Santos Costa Barroso
LVG	La Voz de Galicia

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Introduction

A major feature of the political development of Western multinational democracies since the late 1960s is the growth of sub-state national communities striving for greater self-determination. In the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain, sub-state movements such as those in the regions of Scotland and Galicia deeply influenced the regional and, to a different extent, the national (state) political agendas. Since the 1980s, in both regions, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) progressively moved away from their initial niche core-periphery political framework. Deploying more inclusive, catch-all, 'citizenist' political narratives, social democratic programmes and broad 'issue packages', both parties performed increasingly well at elections during the 1990s.[1] In 1996, the BNG obtained its first two seats in the Spanish Parliament, and in the 1997 regional elections, the party attained its best electoral results with just over 25 per cent of the vote.[2] Meanwhile, the SNP consistently grew under Alex Salmond's leadership, obtaining in the 1997 general elections its most successful results since 1974.[3] Parallel to these developments, left-wing national (state)

[1] The concept of a 'citizenist' frame, as opposed to a 'workerist' frame, has been deployed by Oriol Barranco and Oscar Molina, 'Continuity and Change in Trade Union Frames: Evidence from General Strikes in Spain', *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 42.4 (2019), pp. 1232-53. Sonia Alonso, Laura Cabeza and Braulio Gómez, 'Disentangling Peripheral Parties' Issue Packages in Subnational Elections', *Comparative European Politics* 15.2 (2017), pp. 240-63.

[2] Closely followed by the 2020 regional elections (just over 23 per cent). The Galician nationalists briefly accessed the regional government in coalition with the PSdG-PSOE between 2005-9. Ramón Máiz and Cristina Ares, 'The Shifting Framing Strategies and Policy Positions of the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 24.2 (2018), pp. 181-200;

[3] The party has been governing Scotland uninterruptedly since 2007. Andrew Mycock, 'SNP, Identity and Citizenship: Re-imagining State and Nation', *National Identities*, 14.1 (2012), pp. 53-69; Matt Garnett and Martin Steven, 'Rhetoric and the Rise of the Scottish National Party' in Judy Atkins and John Gaffney (eds), *Voices of the UK Left: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Performance of Politics* (2017), [e-book], pp. 171-88.

parties – particularly their regional branches – added political decentralisation onto their agenda.

Political scientists and sociologists have long investigated the complexities of growing demands for self-government. Nicola McEwen introduced the concept of 'state welfare nationalism', exploring the relationship between rising sub-state nationalism and the retrenchment of the welfare state.[4] She and others have convincingly argued that the welfare state's partial retrenchment facilitated the growth for self-government.[5] Linking welfare state development with sub-state nationalism has its merits; however, it gives only a partial explanation of the articulation and significant rise of a 'civic' form of sub-state-nationalism within multinational democracies in Western Europe since the 1970s.[6] My thesis offers a broader historical comparative approach in response to the wider challenges to European post-war liberal (social) democracy as they unravelled in the 'long 1970s'.[7] This approach sees the nation as an 'imagined community' and nationalism as a 'discursive formation', 'a cluster of

[4] Drawing on Michael Keating's empirical work on state and nation-building and on Louis Balthazar's research on public policy and Quebecois nationalism, Nicola McEwen 'State Welfare Nationalism: The Territorial Impact of Welfare State Development in Scotland', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 12.1 (2002), pp. 66-90; Nicola McEwen, *Nationalism and the State. Welfare and Identity in Scotland and Quebec* (Germany, 2006). In her work, McEwen nuances the assertion of scholars of liberal nationalism that argue the feeling of belonging to a common national identity was a pre-requisite for shared solidarity, pivotal to sustaining a state welfare system. David Miller was a leading exponent of this view. See also Richard Johnston *et al.*, 'National Identity and Support for the Welfare State', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 43.2 (2010) pp. 347-377.

[5] McEwen, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 15; Nicola McEwen and Luis Moreno, *The Territorial Politics of Welfare* (London, 2005); Daniel Béland and Andre Lecours, 'The Politics of Territorial Solidarity. Nationalism and Social Policy Reform in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, *Comparative Political Studies* 38.6 (2005) pp. 676-703. Daniel Béland and André Lecours, *Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity* (Oxford, 2008).

[6] The concept of 'civic' nationalism opposes that of 'ethnic' nationalism and generally has a more positive connotation, being usually characterised as democratic, liberal and inclusive. The categories of 'civic' vs 'ethnic' nationalism are ideal types, and in practice most nationalist movements draw from both. As Michael Keating states, 'what matters is the balance between the two'. See Michael Keating, 'Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System', *Nations and Nationalism*, 3.4 (2004), pp. 689-717. For other assessments of the concept, Azar Gat and Alexander Yakobson, *Nations. The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 328-79; Yael Tamir, 'Not so Civic: Is there a Difference between Ethnic and Civic Nationalism?', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22 (2019), pp. 419-34.

[7] Increasingly, historians have been using the term 'long 1970s' to speak of the decade as one of transition, usually encompassing the late 1960s and lasting at least until the early mid-1980s. This is specially the case among international and global historians. For a recent and succinct historiographical review of the 'New International History' of the 1970s see Michele Di Donato, 'Landslides, Shocks, and New Global Rules: The US and Western Europe in the New International History of the 1970s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 55.1 (2020), pp. 182-205.

rhetoric and reference that enables people to articulate positions which are not settled and to take stands in opposition to each other on basic issues in society and culture'.[8]

The (re)emergence of sub-state nationalism in Western Europe from the late 1960s alongside the rise of new social movements inaugurated a period of 'identity politics'.[9] Finding evidence of 'class dealignment' in traditional voting patterns, scholars in the social sciences and humanities argued that traditional structures, such as family or social classes, were losing their power and influence in shaping political behaviour within increasingly affluent societies.[10] Further scholarship nuanced these arguments, claiming that what the 1970s witnessed was a 'decline in deference'.[11] Mazower locates its origins in the 1960s, when a 'younger, more urban Europe, became conscious of the vast social changes which had taken place since the war, and demanded that politics and the law catch up'.[12] Others argue that the decline of deference facilitated the growth of a polyvalent popular individualism, manifesting 'anger with the "establishment" for withholding it' and making class identities more complex and suspect.[13] Considering the reassessment of class identities and politics in the 1970s, this thesis bridges a gap in the literature by examining the under-researched relationship between

[8] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (revised edn., London, 1983); Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy', *Public culture*, 19.1 (2007), footnote 1, p. 1515.

[9] The term 'identity politics' can refer to a myriad of phenomena. For an overview on how the term has been used and approached in social science and humanities research, see Mary Bernstein, 'Identity Politics', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 31 (2005), pp. 47-74.

[10] Bo Särlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s* (Cambridge, 1983); Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *Voters Begin to Choose: From Closed-Class to Open Elections in Britain* (London, 1986); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Class Dealigment and the Regional Polarization of Voting Patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987', *Political Geography*, 11.1 (1992), pp. 73-86; Jan Pakulski and Malcom Water, *The Death of Class* (London 1996); Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Are Social Classes Dying?', *International Sociology*, 6 (1991), pp. 397-410. See also Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in Late Modern Age* (Cambridge, 1991); Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (New Jersey, 1977).

[11] Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London, 1999); Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, *Class, Politics and the Decline of Deference in England, 1968-2000* (2018) [e-book]. Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton also argue that class remained salient in 1970s Britain, see 'Introduction' in Lawrence Black, Hugh Pemberton and Pat Thane (eds), *Reassessing 1970s Britain* (Manchester, 2013).

[12] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 291 and pp. 326-32.

[13] Emily Robinson, *et al.* 'Telling Stories about Post-war Britain': Popular Individualism and the "Crisis" of the 1970s.' *Twentieth Century British History*, 28.2 (2017), p. 268.

'class' and (sub-state) 'nation' from a historical transnational comparative perspective.[14] To do so, it treats 'class' in a similar manner to 'nation': as a discursive construct, a 'language'.[15] Moreover, it places the Scottish and Galician regional workers' organisations at the epicentre of the research since organised labour was a pivotal socioeconomic actor in Western Europe but also deeply affected by the societal, economic and political transformations of the long 1970s. With a chronological focus on the period roughly between 1972 and 1986, this thesis analyses the institutional narratives that emerged from internal discussions within the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) in Scotland, and the Workers' Commissions (CCOO-G) and emerging nationalist workers' organisations in Galicia. The overarching argument is that, within these institutions, workers' representatives played a central role in the articulation of what I call regional socialist democratic narratives merging class and national interests as a response to the socioeconomic and political challenges of the period. Pursuing different aims, these narratives were co-opted both by left-wing regional and nationalist political parties, driving the sustained electoral growth of sub-state nationalism in Scotland and Galicia in the 1990s.

Transformations of western European democracy and the economy in the 'Long 1970s'.

Viewing the 1970s as a watershed in western European history is commonplace among scholars. After all, the decade witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, two oil

[14] Another attempt to bridge this gap in a transnational comparative perspective is political scientist Michael Keating, 'Class, Sector and Nation. Support for Minority Nationalism among Peak Interest Groups in Four Western European Countries', *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 2.3 (2014), pp. 322-37. See also, John Coakley (ed.), *The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements. The Contemporary West European Experience* (Surrey, 1992). After Brexit, some social scientists have analysed the role of class in national identities in England, Scotland and Wales with a more contemporary focus but also in connection to welfare state retrenchment. Robin Mann and Steve Fenton, *Nation, Class and Resentment. The Politics of National Identity in England, Scotland and Wales* (Basingstoke, 2017).

[15] Inspired by Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, *Class, Politics and the Decline of Deference*.

shocks and 'stagflation'.[16] In the whole of Western Europe, inflation rose from averaging 3.7 per cent in 1961-9 and 6.4 per cent between 1969-73 to 10.9 per cent in 1973-9. However, national experiences varied, with the UK and Spain averaging 16 per cent per annum in the 1970s.[17] Accompanying the stagflation phenomenon, Western Europe's economy also faced relative low productivity and deindustrialisation. Nevertheless, historians have recently argued that we should look at the 'long 1970s' not as a time of 'crisis' but of transition – as 'difficulties coexisted with creative solutions and political debates about the future of Europe'.[18] As alternative democratic models emerged in the new decolonised states of the global South, the 1960s witnessed the questioning and negotiation of western European post-war democracy at different political, geographical and social levels.[19] Issues of representation, social justice and subsidiarity started to arise and, across the 1970s, the reassessment of the post-war democratic model was in full swing.[20]

The crisis of democracy seemed to go hand in hand with the gradual shift in macroeconomic management from Keynesianism to monetarism and the free-market – favouring flexible specialisation, market-led growth and increasingly decentralised collective bargaining.[21] By the early 1980s, these economic policies were common practice. Breaking

[16] The term 'stagflation' refers to the combination of rising inflation and the slowdown of growth rates which followed from the shock of the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. Worldwide, the real per capita gross domestic product and average annual growth fell from a +3.5 per cent in 1960/70 to a +1.8 per cent in 1970/80. Niall Ferguson, 'Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global' in Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (eds), *The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 1-21.
[17] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 307.
[18] Umberto Tulli, 'The Search for a European Identity in the Long 1970s: External Relations and Institutional Evolution in the European Community.' *Contemporary European History* 25.3 (2016), p. 541. Global accounts include Ferguson, Maier, Manela and Sargent, *The Shock of the Global*; Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Human Rights to Economic Inequality* (New Jersey, 2012); Philippe Chassaigne, *Les anneés 1970: Fin d'un Monde et Origine de Notre Modernité* (Paris 2012). European accounts include Tulli, 'The Search for a European Identity', pp. 537-50; Black, Pemberton and Thane, *Reassessing 1970s Britain*; Mazower, *Dark Continent*; Tom Buchanan, *Europe's Troubled Peace: 1945 to the Present* (2nd edn., Chichester, 2012); Ian Kershaw, *Roller-coaster: Europe, 1950-2017* (London, 2018).
[19] Martin Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age: 1945-1968* (Oxford, 2020).
[20] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 291-8. The principle of subsidiarity within the EEC was very contested within the competing visions of Europe during the transition to the EU. Broadly described, subsidiarity is a co-operative approach to management. See Patrizio Bianchi, 'Subsidiarity and Its Significance', in Pat J. Devine *et. al.* (eds), *Competitiveness, Subsidiarity and Industrial Policy* (London, 1996), pp. 43-58.
[21] As identified by Kerstin Hamann, 'Spanish Unions: Institutional Legacy and Responsiveness to Economic and Industrial Change', *ILR Review*, 51.3 (1998) pp. 424-44.

away from the post-war 'social contract' which rested 'upon the twin achievements of full employment and growth', governments of different political colours in the late 1970s and early 1980s proceeded to restructure their national economies effecting deindustrialisation in 'traditional', male-dominated, sectors such as shipbuilding or steel.[22] Thus, the 'long 1970s' witnessed a political shift to the Right. Despite rising social and regional inequality, left-wing parties were either failing to win elections at the national level and/or abandoning radical socialist aims in favour of 'progressive' politics.[23] Accompanied by the relative decline of class-based industrial militancy in favour of more fragmented forms of identity politics, western European political commentators in the 1980s spoke of the decline of the Left.[24] Additionally, an increasingly competitive global market and further supranational integration within the European Economic Community (EEC) put the traditional nation-state formula in question.[25] Against this background, the thesis reassesses the 'death' of class identities and the 'crisis' of the Left in the long 1970s by exploring the articulation of a 'civic' sub-state nationalism and its relation to democracy within regional workers' organisations.

Scholars of Southern European or post-1989 Eastern European transitions to democracy have stated the importance of looking at the role of 'civil society' in democratisation processes,

[22] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 305 and 311-4. This led to post-modern sociological interpretations and talks of 'the post-industrial' society; Christiane Lemke and Gary Marks (eds), *The Crisis of Socialism in Europe* (Durham, 1992), pp. 136-70; Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World* (Oxford, 1995).

[23] This thesis will comment further on the specific cases of the Labour Party in the UK and the Spanish PSOE and PCE in the following 4 chapters.

[24] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 326. This idea of left-wing crisis or decline became more acute post-1989, with right-wing scholars celebrating the 'end of history' and the demise of Marxism, for example Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London, 1992). In Britain, Hobsbawm put his classic argument forward with a series of essays in the magazine *Marxist Today*, starting with the influential 'The Forward March of Labour Halted?', *Marxism Today*, 22.9 (1978), pp. 279-86. See also the work of Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal. Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left* (London, 1988).

[25] Simon Sweeney, *Europe, the State and Globalisation* (London, 2014); Michael Keating and John McGarry (eds), *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order* (Oxford, 2001) [e-book]; Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 332-5. Interestingly, sociologists in the 1980s and early 1990s had predicted that the social salience of the localities and regions would diminish at least in the developed world because of globalisation. See John Agnew, 'From the Political Economy of Regions to Regional Political Economy', *Progress in Human Geography*, 24, (2000), pp. 101-10.

highlighting the influence of nationalism as an 'underwritten dimension of democracy'.[26] The central role of 'civil society' in articulating sub-state nationalism has also been asserted in relation to Scottish nationalism.[27] For instance, examining the nation-building process within Catalonia, Québec and Scotland since the 1960s, Michael Keating identifies three possible responses to the national challenges described above. These answers are a retreat to 'hyper-individualism' *à la* Thatcher, an emphasis on 'identity politics', or the construction of new forms of collective identity and action to build a 'territorial' civil society.[28] Yet, scholars of sub-state nationalism have often neglected the study of grassroots movements and their role in the development of 'civic' nationalist narratives, focusing instead on political parties.[29] There

[26] Pamela Radcliff referred to legal voluntary associations in late-Francoist Spain as 'schools for democracy' because they fostered new habits of democratic participation – concurrently encouraging the development of horizontal connections and reviewing the vertical ties between society and the state. Pamela B. Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78* (Basingstoke, 2011). Other scholars looking into the role of civil society in the transition process in Spain include Víctor Pérez Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: the Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge, 1993); Álvaro Soto Carmona, 'Sociedad Civil *versus* Elites. Las Transiciones a la Democracia en España y Chile', *Les Cahiers de Framespa*, 27 (2018), pp. 1-15 [Web]; Inbal Ofer, *Claiming the City and Contesting the State: Squatting, Community Democratisation in Spain (1955-1986)* (London, 2017); Xavier Domènech Sampere, *Cambio Político y Movimiento Obrero bajo el Franquismo: Lucha de Clases, Dictadura y Democracia* (Barcelona, 2011); José M. Marín, Carme Molinero and Pere Ysàs, *Historia Política de España: 1939-2000* (Madrid, 2001); Álvaro Soto Carmona, *Transición y Cambio en España, 1975-1996* (Madrid, 2005); Robert Fishman, 'How Civil Society Matters in Democratisation: Setting the Boundaries of Post-Transition Political Inclusion', *Comparative Politics*, 49.3 (April 2017) pp. 391-409; Robert Fishman 'The Labor Movement in Spain: From Authoritarianism to Democracy.' *Comparative Politics* 14.3 (1982), pp. 281-305; Robert Fishman, *Organización Obrera y Retorno a la Democracia en España* (Madrid, 1996). Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-determination', *International Sociology*, 8.4. (1993), pp. 387-411; Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy'. In these two final articles, which draw from his book *Nationalism* (Minneapolis, 1997), Calhoun argues that 'nationalist rhetoric provides the modern era with a constitutive framework for the identification of collective subjects, both the protagonists of historical struggles and those who experience history and by whose experience it can be judged good or bad, progress or regress or stagnation', ft.1, p. 151.

[27] The scholarly use of the term 'civil society' increased in the 1990s in connection to a notion of 'civic' politics 'standing outside and opposite state power, or at least, the status quo of established political parties'. See Jonathan S. Hearn, 'Scottish Nationalism and the Civil Society Concept: Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot?', *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 20.1 (1997), pp. 32-9. The Scottish focus on civil society as key to nationalist growth arguably responds to the fact that social scientists led the study of Scottish national identities in the 1990s and early 2000s. These scholars emphasised the existence of a distinctive institutional framework including education, legal, press or financial systems, as well other collective organisations. Lindsay Paterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1994); David McCrone, *et al*., 'Who are we? Problematising National Identity', *The Sociological Review*, 46.4 (1998), pp. 629-52; David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland. The Sociology of a Nation* (2nd edn, London, 2001).

[28] Keating, 'Stateless Nation-Building', p. 692, pp. 703-5.

[29] There are some shorter considerations in the field of political geography, such as Martin Jones, 'Social Justice and the Region: Grassroots Regional Movements and the English Question', *Space and Polity*, 8.2 (2004), pp. 157-189. More recently, Moreno Luzón edited a special issue on 'The Nation from the Grassroots: Perspectives on Spanish National Identity in the 20th Century' for *European History Quaterly*, 50.2 (2020).

is value, however, in looking at decentralised grassroots organisations such as regional workers' organisations which, this thesis shows, demonstrated the benefits of power diffusion. Workers' organisations in Scotland and Galicia provided a space for collective discussion whilst articulating specific national (regional) narratives and democratic projects. In so doing, they were key to the re-territorialisation of political debate around the region. Considering not only the wider western European context but also the Spanish and British framework, this thesis examines how left-wing regional workers' organisations in Scotland and Galicia linked together democracy, devolution and socioeconomic development in response to the societal, economic and political transformations and intensifying institutional challenges of the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the thesis rests on four interwoven thematic strands: economic restructuring, devolutionary politics, democracy and socialism. To encompass both the revolutionary and progressive Left – that which accepted a stepping-stones approach to socialism – socialism is broadly understood here in opposition to monetarism and the free-market.

History and historiography

An in-depth, extended transnational comparison of Scotland and Galicia is unique.[30] Social scientists have generally preferred to compare Scotland with Catalonia, while Galicia is usually relegated to national comparative studies or, occasionally, compared to Wales.[31] This shows how the scholarly focus on sub-state nationalism has rested on electoral developments, under which set of conditions does sub-state nationalism become successful. Yet, Scotland and Galicia are comparable case studies. In Scotland, the failure of the British government to bridge

[30] There are some shorter considerations, though these are also rare. For example, Antonio Carlos Pereira Menaut, 'Scotland and Galicia: Devolution versus *Autonomía*', *Scottish Affairs*, 4.1 (2002), pp. 1-33.
[31] Michael Keating, 'Rethinking the Region: Culture, Institutions and Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8.3 (2001), pp. 217–234; Sidney Van Morgan, 'Language Politics and Regional Nationalist Mobilization in Galicia and Wales', *Ethnicities*, 6.4 (2006), pp. 451-475.

the increasing unemployment gap (see tables 1.2 and 1.3) along with the shift in industrial ownership from small indigenous firms to overseas or British companies made the Scottish economy increasingly liable to fluctuations in the world economy.[32] First, the export market for heavy, labour-intensive manual industry became more competitive in the increasingly globalised economy. Second, branch-plant operations were more likely to close down in the face of an economic recession. Similarly, Galicia diverged rather than converged with the rest of the country during the significant growth of the *desarrollista* period of 1959-75, remaining a predominately agrarian society.[33] In the industrial and socioeconomic sphere, this meant that both regions were over-reliant on extractive and manufacturing industries, and thus characterised by unemployment and emigration levels above the national average.[34]

Unemployment is often used as an index of welfare, being both a cause and marker of deprivation 'highly correlated with other indices of social deprivation such as incomes, the quality of jobs available, the proportion of lone-parent families, health and housing conditions'.[35] Since the 1960s, a narrative of regional 'relative deprivation' took centre stage in Scotland. Luis Moreno describes how Scots collectively believed that the English, particularly those in the Southeast – the centre of the polity – were in a more advantageous socioeconomic situation.[36] This perception of inequality, Moreno continues, created 'a

[32] C.H. Lee, *Scotland and the United Kingdom. The Economy and the Union in the Twentieth Century* (Manchester, 1995); Peter, L. Payne, 'The Economy' in T.M. Devine and Richard J. Finlay (eds), *Scotland in the 20th Century* (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 14-45.

[33] Xoán Carmona Badía and Ángel Fernández González, 'La Economía Gallega en el Período Franquista (1939-1975)' in Jesús de Juana and Julio Prada (Coords), *Historia Contemporánea de Galicia* (Barcelona, 2005) pp. 261-94. For the Spanish context, see Soto Carmona, *Transición y Cambio*, p. 331; Townson, '"Spain is Different"? The Franco Dictatorship' in Nigel Townson, *Is Spain Different?: A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Sussex, 2015) pp. 141-58.

[34] Scotland was particularly over-reliant on coal, shipbuilding and steel, while Galicia was very dependent on the maritime complex, agriculture-inputs industries, but also shipbuilding and steel – including small automotive branches. Additionally, industries were concentrated in West Central Scotland and in the coastal 'Atlantic axis' linking Ferrol and Vigo.

[35] Peter Scott, 'Regional Development and Policy' in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, vol. 3 (Manchester, 2004), p. 333.

[36] Luís Moreno, *Escocia. Nación y Razón* (Madrid, 1995), pp. 164-169. See also Dominic Abrams, *Political Identity: Relative Deprivation, Social Identity and the case of Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1989).

psychosocial attitude' which was fertile ground for nationalist claims but also had the potential to encourage social and political mobilisation for change.

In Galicia, after the Francoist repression, sub-state nationalism survived both in exile and domestically with both forms pursuing increasingly different strategies and objectives. Adapting to the authoritarian and constrictive context of Francoism, domestic leader Ramón Piñeiro developed a cultural 'Galicianism' (*Piñeirismo*) that renounced self-determination advocating instead for the 'galeguisation' of all political parties and organisations acting in the region. He defined the Galician nation through its language and the ethno-cultural complex surrounding it.[37] Political nationalism re-emerged in the 1960s mainly amongst university students, leading to the creation of two radical, albeit minuscule, left-wing parties: the Galician Socialist Party (PSG) and the Union of the Galician People (UPG). The PSG (1963), under the influence of *piñeirismo*, initially favoured a democratic, Marxist-inspired socialism adapted to the specific problems of Galicia, defending until 1967 the slogan 'federalism, socialism and democracy'.[38] The UPG, formed in July 1964, looked up to the national liberation movements of the decolonised countries in the Third World.[39] Galician historians differentiate between two clear stages in its evolution under Francoism. [40] During its first stage (1964-70), the UPG strategized to organise 'mass' fronts for political struggle. In this period, the UPG was particularly active among students and in the countryside – for instance participating in rural struggles against the expropriation of land for the construction of dams.[41] In its second stage (1971-5), as we will see in chapter 3, the party put an end to its ideological vagueness, firmly

[37] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'Orígenes y mutaciones del nacionalismo gallego (1840-1982)', in Francisco Campuzano Carvajal (coord.) *Les nationalismes en Espagne. De l'État Libéral à l'État des autonomies (1876-1978)* (Montpellier, 2002) pp. 331-365.
[38] Quoted in Judith Carbajo Fernández, *El Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) y el discurso de los derechos del Franquismo a la Transición democrática* (Salamanca, 2016), pp. 197-202.
[39] Núñez Seixas, 'Orígenes y Mutaciones'.
[40] This differentiation of the UPG's various stages was first made by Alberto Romasanta Armesto, 'El Nacionalismo Radical Gallego en el Ocaso de la Dictadura y los Inicios de la Transición Democrática (1974-1977): Organización, Estrategia e Ideología', Dissertation (UNED, Madrid, 1991).
[41] Justo G. Beramendi, *De Provincia a Nación: Historia do Galeguismo Político* (Vigo, 2007), pp. 1084-8.

adopting Marxism-Leninism and the idea of a 'vanguard' party and taking on board Xosé M. Beiras' definition of Galicia as a doubly exploited 'internal' colony.[42] Defining Galicia as a colony of the Spanish state, the UPG proposed self-determination to promote socioeconomic development through a socialist system based on the nationalisation of big companies and farming cooperatives. Thus, a narrative of relative deprivation was also developed in Galicia. These narratives of regional deprivation and underdevelopment, this thesis demonstrates, underpinned the articulation of regional socialist democratic narratives within the workers' organisations.

Historical studies of Scottish devolutionary politics have linked this process to the longer history of industrial change, with Jim Phillips placing industrial politics as central to the devolutionary shift of the 1960s and 1970.[43] More specifically, he argues that the problems of declining heavy industry and the difficulty of establishing new industries, such as car manufacturing, 'conjoined with the management by successive UK governments of perceived [economic] decline, industrial militancy and "the Scottish question"' to promote the growing demand for self-government. Building on Phillips' work, Tomlinson and Gibbs expand the chronological framework to the 1930s.[44] To attract inward investment and solve structural economic problems, British governments from the 1930s onwards resorted to regional policies, creating 'special areas' across the UK based on high unemployment levels. Scotland was one of them, and the implementation of regional economic policies led to a perception of the Scottish economic structure as distinctive, creating the 'regional problem' that would continue

[42] Xosé M. Beiras, *O Atraso Económico de Galicia* (Vigo, 1973). The UPG used to speak of Galicia as a colony more broadly within Europe, Beramendi, *De Provincia a Nación*, p. 1088, pp. 1091-4.
[43] Jim Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s*. (Manchester, 2008). He is indebted to the earlier works of Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London, 1975); Henry Drucker and Gordon Brown, *The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution* (London, 1980); Christopher Harvie, *No Gods and Precious Few Heroes* (Edinburgh, 1993); John Foster, 'The Twentieth Century, 1914-1979' in R. A. Houston and W.W. Knox, *The New Penguin History of Scotland* (London, 2001), pp. 417-93; and Paul Ward, *Unionism in the United Kingdom, 1918-1974* (Basingstoke, 2005).
[44] Jim Tomlinson and Ewan Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation: Scotland 1931 to 1979', *Contemporary British History*, 30.4 (2016).

to inform British economic policy during the 1970s. As the Scottish Office expanded its powers and responsibilities, there grew a sense that the distinctive problems of the Scottish economy – overdependence on the heavy industries, the underdevelopment of its service sector, a high level of unemployment and emigration – should be addressed with an equally distinctive Scottish approach. This fostered a new 'economic unionist-nationalism' which envisioned the diversification and 'rationalization' of Scottish industry within the framework of the British state, combining both a commitment to maintaining the Union with a recognition of the need for a specifically Scottish approach to economic policy issues.[45] In this manner, by making the regions aware of their distinctive economic structure and offering a regional 'non-class' solution to the problems caused by economic restructuring in the form of a limited economic devolution, regional policy unintentionally enhanced the idea of political decentralisation as a solution to economic decline and social problems.

Unlike Scotland, Galicia remains relatively under-discussed, receiving much less scholarly attention beyond its own borders. To some extent, the linguistic barrier can explain this. One can study Scotland regardless of one's knowledge of Gaelic, but knowledge of Galician is necessary to study Galicia. Additionally, the asymmetric development of regional institutions in Spain also helps explain why academic interest in Galicia has lagged behind regions such as Catalonia. By contrast with Scottish historiography, historical studies of Galician sub-state nationalism remain either syntheses of broader periods – analysing the ideological evolution of the region from 'a province' to 'a nation' within political nationalism from the nineteenth century – or are excessively focused on the ideological transformations of

[45] Phillips highlights that the initial drive for administrative decentralisation originated among Scottish industrialists, Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, pp.13-78. More recently, David Torrance used this concept in his study of the Scottish Unionist Party and Scottish nationalism. See David Torrance, '"Standing up for Scotland": The Scottish Unionist Party and «Nationalist Unionism», 1912-68', *Scottish Affairs*, 27.2 (2018), pp. 169-88.

pre-war nationalism during the 1950s.[46] There also studies focused on the emergence of the new, radical, left-wing political parties in the 1960s.[47] Shifting the focus from the political parties to the workers' organisations in Galicia and focusing on the 'long 1970s', this thesis therefore approaches the historical analysis of the 'new' Galician nationalism in a completely new light.

Aware of the continuities with the late 1960s, this thesis takes 1972 as a starting point. It does so because of its significance for the regional workers organisations in Scotland and Galicia in relation to sub-state nationalism. As chapter one shows, from 1971-2 the STUC progressively spearheaded the Home Rule movement in Scotland with trade union delegates articulating an image of the region as a left-wing nation.[48] Meanwhile, chapter three argues that 1972 witnessed the transformation of the workers' movement in Galicia to a *Galician* workers' movement – following the industrial struggle that inspired the UPG to set up a specifically nationalist workers' organisation.[49] The closing date for this study is more open. Viewing the 1970s as a transitional period in western European democratic history and considering the different regional and national contexts of Scotland/UK and Galicia/Spain, this thesis includes the early to mid-1980s. In the case of Scotland, the examination ends in 1983, following Margaret Thatcher's second electoral victory. This can perhaps be viewed as unorthodox because, usually, in British and Scottish studies of the 1970s, the stories of devolution and the

[46] Beramendi, *De Provincia a Nación*. See also Justo G. Beramendi and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, *O Nacionalismo Galego* (Vigo, 1996); Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'De Breogán a Pardo de Cela, Pasando por América: Notas sobre la Imaginación del Nacionalismo Gallego', *Historia Social*, 40 (2001), pp. 53-78; Núñez Seixas, 'Orígenes y Mutaciones del Nacionalismo Gallego'. These syntheses also exist for Scotland, having emerged as the Scottish Parliament was being born. W.W.J. Knox, *The Industrial Nation. Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present* (Edinburgh, 1999); T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000* (London, 1999).

[47] Manuel Anxo Fernández Baz, *A Formación do Nacionalismo Galego Contemporáneo (1963-1984)* (Santiago de Compostela, 2003); Carbajo Fernández, *El Partido Socialista Galego*.

[48] The central role of the STUC in the 1970s as leader of the devolutionary cause is commonplace in the work of Scottish historians, e.g. Harvie, *No Gods*; Foster, 'The Twentieth Century'.

[49] Because of the nature of the political system in Spain, workers' organisations in the country including Galicia, were not officially institutionalised until 1978. Until its institutionalisation, CCOO used to refer to its structures as a 'new socio-political movement'.

end of the 'high tide of trade unionism' stop in 1979.[50] However, considering that transformations are not abrupt, this thesis includes the first Thatcher government (1979-83) in its analysis. Examining this period, chapter two evaluates how trade union delegates to the STUC annual congress and the organisation's General Council made sense and responded to the Thatcherite challenge. In analysing the impact of Thatcherite rhetoric and policy on the STUC's rhetoric and strategy, chapter two demonstrates that it was by facing Thatcher's Britain that this organisation defined a Scottish Labour constituency through the articulation of a socialist democratic narrative that built on their previous portrayal of Scotland as a 'radical' left-wing nation.[51] This facilitated the progressive redefinition of *Scottishness* in egalitarian terms, linked to a national preference for left-wing policies. In Galicia, the focus continues until c. 1986 to account for the intra and inter-organisational conflicts between CCOO-G and the nationalist workers' organisations as they strived to become the proxy of opinion for Galician workers while adapting to the new democratic framework. The constitutional framework, established in 1978, included the setting-up of the institutional regional framework in 1981, which was dominated by the conservative Popular Alliance (AP). This periodization also differs from historical studies on the political transition to democracy in Spain, which end either in 1978 or, more often, in 1982 – following the victory of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) in the general elections.[52] Thus, including the period 1982-6, Chapter four examines the

[50] John McIlroy, Nina Fishman and Alan Campbell, *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics. The High Tide of Trade Unionism 1964-1979*, vol. 2 (Hants, 1999). This was due to the 'corporate bias' of the British state as established between 1964 and 1979 with the the development of bipartite and tripartite structures – such as the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) or the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) – in which government, capital and unions shared responsibility for many aspects of the state's economic management.

[51] There is in Scotland a public narrative of Thatcher and Thatcherism that differs from that of British imagery presenting her 'as an "Iron Lady" on a crusade to overcome British decline by humbling militant trade unionism, modernising the economy and revitalising British-American relations'. The social costs of her policies in this British account are portrayed as 'necessary sacrifices'. By contrast, the Scottish narrative on Thatcher presents her as 'an undemocratic, English nationalist, antagonistic towards Scotland's distinctive collectivist nature'. David Stewart, *The Path to Devolution and Change. A Political History of Scotland under Margaret Thatcher* (London, 2009), p. 1. Stewart's work challenges this narrative and argues instead that Thatcherism was a 'post-imperial mission to restore British greatness by removing the preconditions for socialism throughout Britain'.

[52] The victory of a 'Socialist' party following 40 years of dictatorship which othered left-wing actors is widely interpreted as the consolidation of the transition process. This periodization is starting to be challenged, see Joan Gimeno I Igual, *Lucha de Clases en Tiempos de Cambio. Comisiones Obreras (1982-91)* (Madrid, 2021).

political and institutional challenges derived from competition on both the regional and left-right axes, arguing that this context led to the articulation of multiple national socialist democratic narratives within the Galician workers' organisations and to the prioritisation of pragmatism over ideology as they struggled to find their space. The final chapter compares the findings of both case studies. Unlike the previous chapters, which follow a chronological structure, the comparative chapter is thematically structured, interpreting the regional evidence in the wider western European framework.

The Scottish and Galician workers' organisations in the 'long 1970s'

Writing about post-war Britain, historian Jim Tomlinson makes the compelling argument that there were concrete governmental efforts to manage people's understanding of economic issues for their own policy objectives.[53] However, other bodies also shaped public economic understanding. Chapters one to four demonstrate that, in the period under study, both national and regional workers' organisations fiercely opposed the 'neo-liberal' narrative that sought to curtail (or, in the Spanish case, limit the consolidation of) their power.[54] After all, the 1970s reassessment of post-war social democracy included the questioning of the corporatist system of interest mediation that characterised industrial, economic and social policymaking.[55]

[53] Jim Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy, Managing the People* (Oxford, 2017). 'Declinism' as a narrative was central to the socio-political transformations of Scotland within the British context in the 'long 1970s'. This narrative was ingrained in public discourse in 1970s Britain, and scholars contributed to its long-lasting authority well into the 1990s. See David Edgerton, 'The Decline of Declinism', *The Business History Review*, 71.2 (1997), pp. 201-6.

[54] The concept of 'neo-liberalism' is very contested and evolving. See Ben Jackson, 'Currents of Neo-liberalism: British Political Ideologies and the New Right, c.1955–79', *English Historical Review*, 131 (2016), pp. 823-50. In fact, a new historical study reassessing the conceptualisation of Britain since the 1970s has just been published: Aled Davies, Ben Jackson, and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite (eds), *The Neoliberal Age? Britain since the 1970s* (2021) [e-book]. Here, by neo-liberalism I mean a language that constructs and expresses a vision of economics, politics and everyday life characterised by individualism, competition, free markets and privatisation.

[55] Until then, European workers' organisations participated in the state's economic management either through concertation or social pacts; which usually entailed a moderation of wage claims by the unions in exchange for for a social wage. For a review on the vast literature on corporatism, see Oscar Molina and Martin Rhodes, 'Corporatism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5 (2002), pp. 305-31.

Since the 1980s, workers' organisations in western Europe have struggled to redefine their role in the midst of economic and industrial restructuring as well as decreasing membership and political marginalisation.[56] Jim Phillips has analysed the agency of Scottish workers, especially with reference to miners and steel and shipbuilding workers, and most recent Scottish historiography focuses on how deindustrialisation affected skilled worker's identities.[57] In fact, Scottish historiography has long identified a relationship between class and nation in Scotland, arguably drawing from Foster and Woolfson's study of the 1971-2 Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' conflict and building on W.W.J. Knox's categorisation of Scotland as 'an industrial nation'.[58] These Scottish historians look at the dynamic interplay between popular agency and elite policy since the 1960s, with an overwhelming focus on the male-dominated unions. Chapters one and two build on this burgeoning scholarship. My chapters on Scotland complement the existing historiography, shedding light on how the workers' representatives of these declining sectors interacted, framed and negotiated their occasionally contradictory interests with representatives of workers in other industries within the umbrella STUC. Popular pressure for devolution arose with workers (STUC) and employers (the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, SCDI) acting 'as a proxy for popular opinion'.[59] The role of the STUC as a champion for devolution is well known and asserted in Scotland but, perhaps for this reason, in-depth work on the organisation is limited. In 1986, historian Angela Tuckett wrote a well-documented institutional history of the organisation.[60] However, limited by its own periodization, the book barely considered the issue of devolution. To commemorate its

[56] Hamann, 'Spanish Unions', p. 424.
[57] Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*. Jim Phillips, Valerie Wright and Jim Tomlinson, 'Deindustrialization, the Linwood Car Plant and Scotland's Political Divergence from England in the 1960s and 1970s', *Twentieth Century British History*, 30.3 (2019), pp. 399-423; Jim Phillips, Valerie Wright and Jim Tomlinson, 'Being a "Clydesider" in the age of Deindustrialisation: Skilled Male Identity and Economic Restructuring in the West of Scotland since the 1960s', *Labor History*, 61.2 (2020), pp. 151-69.
[58] John Foster and Charles Woolfson, *The Politics of the UCS Work-In: Class Alliances and the Right to Work* (1986); Knox, *The Industrial Nation*; Tomlinson and Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation'.
[59] Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, p. 3.
[60]Angela Tuckett, *The Scottish Trades Union Congress. The First 80 Years 1897-1977* (Edinburgh, 1986).

centenary in 1997, the STUC commissioned a 'story' of the STUC to journalist Keith Aitken.[61] Tracing Scottish history until 1997 from the STUC's perspective, Aitken efficiently chronicles the different phases of the organisation and engages with many aspects of Scottish politics, including devolution. To this day, Aitkens' book constitutes the most relevant work on the organisation's history across the twentieth century. Although my research does not intend to be a comprehensive synthesis of the STUC as an institution, it does include some institutional analysis to contextualise its rhetorical and strategic transformations.

In the case of Galicia, study of the regional workers' organisations is uneven and focused on their individual institutional articulation.[62] In contrast with the CCOO-G, academics have practically disregarded nationalist organisations.[63] This disparity in research has different explanations, ranging from the centrality of the CCOO in the anti-Francoist struggle – highlighted in chapter three – to the complexity and relative scarcity of the sources available. Studies of the CCOO-G are devoid of historical analysis of the sub-state national dimension. This thesis remedies these shortcomings, exploring the rhetorical transformations and tensions within the CCOO-G, examining the institutional rhetoric and strategy of nationalist workers' organisations and how they influenced each other. In this manner, this thesis constitutes a major contribution to the history of the Galician worker's movement, to Galician historiography on sub-state nationalism and to Spanish historiography on the processes of democratic transition and consolidation with a regional perspective.

[61] He clearly establishes a difference between his own journalistic work and historical research through the use of the word 'story'. Keith Aitken, *The Bairns O' Adam. The Story of the STUC* (Edinburgh, 1997).
[62] Often commissioned by the organisations themselves.
[63] José Gómez Alén and Víctor Santidrián, *Historia de Comisións Obreiras de Galicia nos seus Documentos* (Sada, 1996) pp. 46-7. José Gómez Alén *As CC.OO. de Galicia e a conflictividade laboral durante o franquismo* (Vigo, 1995); Pedro Lago Peñas, *La Construcción del Movimiento Sindical en Sistemas Políticas Autoritarios* (Madrid, 2011) pp.122-51. Scholarly work on the nationalist workers' organisations include Carla A. Gutiérrez Ramos, 'A Articulación do Sindicalismo Nacionalista Galego ata 1982', MA Disertation (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2014); Xosé Marcelino Bastión, 'O Sindicalismo Nacionalista Galego e súa evolución comparada co Sindicalismo Estatista', minor thesis, (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1985).

Methodology and Sources

Approaching the 'nation' and 'class' as linguistic constructions, the methodology of the thesis revolves around qualitative discourse analysis.[64] This sociological approach draws on Foucault's interpretation that particular discourses 'systematically construct versions of the social world'.[65] Goffman first defined frames as models of interpretation helping individuals 'to locate, identify and label' occurrences.[66] Building on his work, social movement scholars differentiate between broad, flexible and inclusive 'master frames' and 'collective action frames', or the sets of beliefs or meanings legitimising and guiding collective action.[67] Framing processes, understood as the 'construction of meaning', result from the continuous negotiation of the shared meanings within an organisation, which implies agency.[68] Because there may be contradictions between new and established frames, the process, albeit contentious, can generate new political opportunities. In his study of trade union identities in Sweden, Dimitris Tsahouras surveys the three core tasks leading to the establishment of shared meanings for frames, differentiating between diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, emphasising that frames usually result from new challenges and strategic purposes.[69] It is through the articulation of new frames that members of a social movement or organisation 'articulate otherwise disconnected events to form a coherent, compelling whole and amplify reality to

[64] See Barbara Johnstone, *Discourse Analysis* (3rd Ed., New Jersey 2018).
[65] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York, 1972); Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience* (New York, 1974); David Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization', *American Sociological Review*, 1 (1988), pp. 197-217; Sidney Tarrow, 'Mentalities, Political Cultures and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings through Action' in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McGlurg Mueller, (eds), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, 1992), pp. 93-108; Mario Diani, 'Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: Insights from Regional Populism in Italy', *American Sociological Review*, 61.6 (1996), pp. 1053-69.
[66] Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, p. 21.
[67] Snow and Benford, 'Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization'.
[68] Robert Benford and David Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000), p. 614.
[69] Dimitri Tsarouhas, 'Frame Extension, Trade Union Identities, and Wage Politics: Evidence from Sweden', *Social Politics*, 18.3 (2011), pp. 419-40

highlight those events and occurrences deemed more significant'.[70] Analysing how the Swedish Trade Union Confederation responded to the rise of feminism within its ranks, Tsahouras argues that the organisation resorted to 'frame extension' enlarging 'the master frame of (class) solidarity' towards a more inclusive frame which saw female union members as 'doubly disadvantaged by class and gender'.[71] This approach arguably bridges John Kelly's 'fusion' thesis with 'post-modern' theories which argue for the end of class as a useful concept, supporting Kelly's argument that multiple identities can overlap, leading both 'old' and 'new' movements to undergo some organisational and strategic renewal during 'cycles of protest'.[72] Using comparable internal reports, meeting minutes and official publications of the STUC, CCOO-G and the untapped sources of different Galician nationalist workers' organisations– complemented by the use of institutional publications and regional and national newspapers – this thesis analyses the language used by workers' representatives within its historical and social context. My analysis of their *use* of language constitutes a way of accessing both the collective 'world view' of their industrial membership and their changing constituencies.

The STUC was an established socioeconomic actor by the 1970s.[73] Founded in 1897 over a disagreement within the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) as regards the role of the trade councils, the STUC was independent from the TUC, although the dual membership of some unions facilitated some British representation in the STUC annual congress.[74] The purpose of this annual congress was to coordinate, develop and articulate 'the views and policies of the trade union movement in Scotland'.[75] During the 1970s, as trade unionism in

[70] Benford and Snow, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization', pp. 623-5.
[71] Tsarouhas, 'Frame Extension', p. 420.
[72] John E. Kelly, *Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves* (London, 1998), pp. 108-25.
[73] Encompassing Scottish trade councils and unions which could be constituted both at a Scottish and UK-level. Tucket, *The Scottish Trades Union Congress*.
[74] Trades councils were local councils where smaller unions could be informed of industrial events and stay connected both among themselves and with the TUC. In 1897, the Select Committee of the TUC came up with Standing orders which aimed to exclude Socialists and Trades Councils. This was seen as going against the grassroots and was particularly detrimental to small and distant Scottish unions.
[75] STUC, 'Constitution', *78th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1975).

Britain peaked in terms of affiliation and power, the annual congress also provided a public forum for debate.[76] STUC members directly affected the organisation's agenda and decision-making process through the submission of motions and resolutions to be publicly discussed and voted on by the mandated delegates sent by the affiliated unions.[77] To reduce the number of motions dealing with similar issues, many were 'composited' ahead of the congress, meaning that the delegates occasionally voted on slightly different motions from those discussed within their union meetings, prompting interesting arguments during the congress. In addition to setting out policy, at the annual congress trade union and trade council delegates also elected the organisation's General Council (GC), who implemented said policy in between congresses and appointed a General Secretary to lead the movement and serve as the organisation's main public representative. The members of the different industrial sections within the STUC elected the GC on a proportional basis. By contrast, as chapters three and four illustrate, the 'long 1970s' in Galicia witnessed the articulation of the Galician *centrales sindicales* (or syndical confederations): the different nationalist organisations and the CCOO-G. Following a pyramidal structure, these were structured around sector and territorial branches, rather than around professional trade unions.[78]

The institutional and contextual differences between 1970s Scotland and Galicia are reflected in the sources that have been utilised. For Scotland, this thesis relies on the *Annual Reports* published by the STUC. These include a thorough report of the General Council's activities in between congresses, including reports of meetings with other organisations and members of government. In these publications, the GC's 'Report of Activities' is followed by the minutes of that year's annual congress; a summary of all the carried, rejected or remitted

[76] As the organisation affirms in its website https://stuc.org.uk/about-the-stuc [last accessed 25/03/2022]. Between 1972/73 and 1978/79 the STUC saw a large increase in its membership, a variation of almost +20 per cent which reached over 1,045,000 members in April 1979. Data comes from my analysis of the STUC's *Annual Reports* 1972-1979.
[77] Unions sent 1 delegate each plus 1 every 500 members.
[78] See figures 3.1., 3.2., and 3.3. in Chapter 4.

motions; and a list of the membership by trade union and sector. In Galicia, neither the CCOO-G nor the nationalist organisations published an *Annual Report*. This relates to the oppressive nature of the political system and the 'clandestine' nature of the workers' movement until 1978, but also to the context of institutional competition for resources and political influence that marked their institutionalisation. To achieve a comparable body of source for this region, this thesis relies on a complex variety of sources. In the absence of minutes of the biannual congresses, this thesis examines internal reports and unpublished *Actas* (or minutes) of their general councils but also provincial and local level meetings within each organisation. Additionally, it looks at reports of inter-organisational meetings and institutional publications – particularly as relates to Galician nationalist organisations, for whom the sources are more scattered. The relative 'newness' of the nationalist organisations and their rather limited economic resources partly explain why their depositories remain only partially catalogued.[79] By contrast, the holdings of CCOO-G are more accessible and organised.[80] The CCOO-G matches particularly well with the STUC, both being left-wing, non-nationalist organisations that, as argued in the following chapters, turned pragmatically to the region to safeguard not just the interests of their membership, but their institutional needs. The inclusion of nationalist worker's organisations in the study helps to understand the regionalisation of CCOO-G and enriches the interpretations derived from the comparison of the CCOO-G and STUC – with whom they share an institutional autonomy (being exclusively regional organisations).

The close reading of newspapers, and in particular how significant regional industrial, economic and political events were portrayed, complements institutional sources. This allows

[79] Key programmatic and constitutional documents, all the *Eixo*s, some pamphlets and other interesting but limited material are available through the FESGA's digital archive's website, Arquivo en Liña - Fundación Moncho Reboiras (fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal) [last accessed 27 November, 2021]. The Arquivo Histórico do Nacionalismo of the Fundación Terra e Tempo linked to the UPG is also in the process of digitising some sources, which periodically become available in Proxecto - Presentación - FBA (bautistaalvarez.gal) [last accessed 27 November 2021].

[80] As recently as 2019, the holdings of its main collection have become digitally accessible via Galiciana. Arquivo Dixital de Galicia > Datos de registro [last accessed 27 November 2021].

the rhetoric of the workers' organisations to be contextualised and provides interpretations with greater nuance, while giving a sense of the centrality of industrial affairs in the public sphere in the period under examination. Because they are easily accessible, both available online, but also particularly informative for this topic, this thesis has relied on the Galician newspaper *La Voz de Galicia* (*LVG*) and the Scottish *Glasgow Herald (GH)*.[81] For a national context, and for similar motives, this thesis also uses *El País* and *The Times.*

Due to the nature of the Galician workers' organisations, this thesis uses UPG and PCG publications to complement the sources of the workers' organisations, particularly for the early 1970s.[82] When necessary, for Galicia, I have also used the sources of the various nationalist political parties which emerged and transformed during the period under study, held in the CCOO-G's Arquivo Histórico da Fundación 10 de Marzo. Because of the comprehensive nature of the STUC's *Annual Reports* and due to being able to draw on the existing historiography, this was not necessary for the Scottish case. However, to contextualise the STUC rhetoric, specific British Parliamentary Debates around budgets and devolution, and some of Margaret Thatcher's speeches and statements have been consulted.[83]

[81] Últimas noticias sobre Hemeroteca. La Voz de Galicia; *Glasgow Herald* available via Google News Archive Search.
[82] In the region, as chapter 3 demonstrates, workers' organisations emerged clandestinely and with significant overlapping with the political parties. Some of these sources are digitally accessible https://upg.gal/terra-e-tempo/
[83] Archive | Margaret Thatcher Foundation

Chapter 1: Articulating a socialist nation (1972-8)

The 1970s were a watershed decade for economic policy in Britain. The economic recession that followed the 1973 oil crisis (OPEC1) brought about rising inflation, unemployment, and the slowdown of growth rates across the industrialised West. 'Stagflation' encouraged the questioning of Keynesian political economy, and partly contributed to the breakdown of the post-war consensus on full employment and welfare state provision. Edward Heath's Conservative government (1970-4) was the first to challenge this consensus openly, and was elected on a platform that opposed the state's 'interference' in the economy.[1] Conservative proposals to reverse what they termed 'Labour stagnation' included tax reductions, reducing government spending, and putting a stop to the nationalisation of industries in favour of the expansion of free enterprise.[2] The subsequent Labour governments led by Harold Wilson (1974-6) and James Callaghan (1976-9) also implemented unpopular prices and incomes policies. Despite these efforts, economic hardship carried on through the decade, with inflation rising to 26.9 per cent in 1975 and unemployment doubling between 1976-7, forcing the Callaghan Government to apply for a $3,6 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976, in exchange for profound expenditure cuts.[3]

[1]Conservative Party Manifesto, *A Better Tomorrow*, 1970. [http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1970/1970-conservative-manifesto.shtml Accessed 12/07/2017]; Noel Thompson, *Political Economy and the Labour Party* (London, 1996) pp.197-198; Martin Holmes, *The Failure of the Heath Government* (Basingstoke, 1997) pp. 6-9.
[2] Conservative Party, *A Better Tomorrow*.
[3] Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, 'Introduction. The Benighted Decade? Reassessing the 1970s' in Black, Pemberton and Thane, *Reassessing 1970s Britain*, p. 4.

At the same time, in the aftermath of the 1973 publication of the *Kilbrandon Report*, the constitutional debate regarding the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, was at the forefront of the agenda.[4] This chapter examines how accelerating deindustrialisation, combined with the (failed) devolutionary process framed the STUC narrative and debates until 1978. These debates revealed a conscious merger of class and regional interests from 1971/2, promoted by the National Union of Mineworkers Scottish Area (NUMSA). Presenting a motion for devolution in the 1968 annual congress, Michael McGahey, the Communist leader of the Scottish Miners, urged the Wilson government (1966-70) to introduce a Scottish Parliament stressing that Scotland was 'a nation in its own right'.[5] Moreover, McGahey closed his statement arguing that 'socialism meant decentralisation of power…to involve the people of a country in the operation of power at every possible level'.[6] This was debated alongside another motion against devolution presented by the Foundry Workers, which was rejected by a margin of seven-to-one for running against 'the trend of opinion in Scotland'.[7] Meanwhile, the NUMSA motion was remitted to the GC for being 'vague'. The STUC finally adopted devolution as a policy in 1969, approving the GC's interim report in favour of legislative devolution without a vote.[8] However, there was a loss of momentum until the 1973 publication of the *Kilbrandon Report*.

McGahey's argument in favour of political decentralisation was indebted to the ideas of the Scottish New Left, particularly political scientist Tom Nairn.[9] Following the 1967

[4] This report was issued by the Crowther (later Kilbrandon) Commission, set up by Harold Wilson in response to the increasing demands for political autonomy and following the SNP's 1968 victory at the Hamilton by-election. Formerly a Labour stronghold, the victory shocked contemporaries. *The Times* portrayed it as a 'humiliating' blow for the Labour government, warning both the Labour and Conservative parties against dismissing the result as 'a freak' pointing to the wider nationalist upsurge, David Wood, 'Nationalists Win at Hamilton: Tories Take Leicester.' *Times* (London, 3 Nov. 1967). See also, I.G.C. Hutchison, *Scottish Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke, 2001) p. 99.
[5] Tuckett, *The Scottish Trades Union Congress*, p. 383.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 384.
[7] Aitken, *The Bairns O'Adam*, pp. 216-9.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[9] There is an expanding bibliography on the Scottish New Left and Scottish nationalism. See Rory Scothorne, 'The "Radical Current": Nationalism and the Radical Left in Scotland, 1967-1979', *H-Net: Humanities & Social*

victory of the SNP at the Hamilton by-election, Nairn published his influential essay 'The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism'.[10] In the article, he linked the rise of modern Scottish nationalism to uneven regional development and challenged the contemporary depiction of the movement as inherently left wing. Instead, he conceptualised nationalism as an instrument for the elites (aristocracy and bourgeoisie) to control the masses in defence of their *status quo*.[11] Nairn argued that the nature of Scotland's incorporation into the union had led to a repressed national identity manifested in 'different cultural neuroses rather than as a political struggle for independence', and suggested Scottish socialists should follow the example of post-colonial nations to rid themselves of the imperial system which had kept them underdeveloped.[12] He encouraged the articulation of a new socialist nationalism to oppose the SNP's bourgeois nationalism, supporting increased political autonomy to fight British imperialism because such autonomy represented a transfer of power to the people. In this manner, Tom Nairn's work, influenced by Gramsci, informed the rhetoric that flourished in the 1970s which presented devolution as an opportunity to promote socioeconomic and democratic change at all levels.[13]

Concerned about the industrial future of Scotland and about the future of (male) skilled workers, who still comprised the majority of trade union members, trade union delegates in Scotland gave sectoral and local issues a regional dimension. This allowed them to present the

Sciences Online, H-Nationalism (May 2018) [Accessed 20 September 2018]; Rory Scothorne and Ewan Gibbs, 'Origins of the Present Crisis? The Emergence of "Left-Wing" Scottish Nationalism 1956-81', in Evan Smith and Mathew Worley, *Waiting for the Revolution: The British Far Left from 1956* (Manchester, 2017) pp. 163-81; Ben Jackson, 'The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism', *The Political Quarterly*, 85.1 (2014) pp. 50-56; W. Mathews, *The New Left, National Identity and the Break-up of Britain* (Leiden, 2013).

[10] Tom Nairn, 'The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism', *New Left Review* 1.49 (May-June 1968), pp. 3-18. https://newleftreview.org/issues/i49/articles/tom-nairn-the-three-dreams-of-scottish-nationalism [last accessed 28 february 2021].

[11] As political commentator Claud Cockburn had argued in the *New Statesman*, quoted in *ibid.*

[12] Nairn, 'The Three Dreams'; see also Scothorne, 'The "Radical Current"'.

[13] The 'Nairn-Anderson Thesis', that combined his work with Perry Anderson's, was very influential in contemporary Scottish nationalism. In this account, the unreformed British state remained an imperial state and thus would be inadequate to achieve socialism. Meanwhile, the British labour movement predated Marxism and so it was exceptionally conservative, blindly accepting British parliamentary traditions and preferring gradual reforms to radical social change The New Left referred to this conservative form of working-class politics as 'Labourism'. Ross Mckibbin, 'Why Was There No Marxism in Great Britain?', *The English Historical Review*, 99.391 (1984), pp. 297-331.

regional workers' organisation as a proxy for the Scottish Assembly and, thus, the Scottish people. Progressively, as governments favoured a monetarist approach to the 1970s economic crisis, a majority of trade union delegates attending the STUC's annual congresses and the leadership of the regional organisation framed devolution as a political opportunity to implement the 'radical' economic policies necessary to solve Scotland's socioeconomic deprivation. In so doing, they characterised Scotland not just as an 'industrial' but as a left-wing nation.[14]

The 1971/2 Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) work-in: framing a regional issue

The industrial policies of the Heath government (1970-4) antagonised the trade union movement, further promoting a militant mood.[15] Trade union militancy had been increasing since 1965, when the Wilson governments resorted to a deflationary programme, followed by cuts in public expenditure and statutory six-month incomes freeze. In 1968, the Labour administration linked wage increases to productivity and proposed a voluntary pay freeze that was rejected by the STUC, in contrast to the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). In a failed attempt to rein in the growth of unofficial strikes, Labour presented the 1969 White Paper *In Place of Strife*.[16] Similarly, Heath promoted the 1971 Industrial Relations bill, the industrial

[14] Knox, *The Industrial Nation.*

[15] High levels of trade union militancy have been well established in British and Scottish historiography. The years 1970-4 witnessed the highest average of strikes per annum, 2,885, and working days lost through the strikes since 1939. See William Brown 'Industrial Relations and the Economy' in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 403. For an overview of the unions-Tory relationship, see Andrew Taylor, 'The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions' in McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell, *The High Tide of Trade Unionism*, pp. 151-86; Peter Dorey, *The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions* (London, 1995). For a review of the industrial legislation see Chris Wrigley, *British Trade Unions since 1933* (Cambridge, 2002); Keith Laybourn, *A History of British Trade Unionism c. 1770-1990* (Stroud, 1992), pp. 139-198.

[16] Tuckett, *The Scottish Trades Union Congress*, pp. 380-2. For an exhaustive study of the Labour movement and the links between the trade unions and the party, see the seminal study Lewis Minkin, *The Contentious Alliance. Trade Unions and the Labour Party* (Edinburgh, 1992). For a more recent and briefer overview, see Andrew Thorpe, 'The Labour Party and the Trade Unions' in McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell, *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics*, pp. 133-50. The TUC only accepted the wage restraint after much debate hoping to prevent legislation, yet the leadership could not ensure how the membership of their individual affiliated unions would follow their recommendations. In fact, a 1968 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations

framework that informed the relationship between the Conservative Government and the unions. The bill aimed to offset the traditional 'voluntary' character of the British system, 'reasserting the authority of the official movement' with the provision of a comprehensive legal framework to curb shop floor bargaining.[17] This piece of legislation envisioned the setting-up of a National Industrial Relations Court with jurisdiction over most industrial disputes, making collective agreements legally binding and limiting the right to strike.[18] The STUC opposed the bill in its 74th Congress (1971) with a resolution pledging to 'fight to retain the democratic rights of trade unionists and the independence of trade unions from state interferences'.[19] The Industrial Relations Act received royal assent in 1972, and delegates participating in the STUC's 75th Congress unequivocally declared the Tory government and its policy 'anti-working class'.[20] The presidential address delivered by R. MacDonald, Regional Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), set the tone for what followed. MacDonald equated the government's industrial legislation with 'warfare', referring to 'Tory guns' and portraying the Conservatives as a 'hard-faced' and 'ruthless' 'crew' dedicated to 'crushing the unions… [and] the workers' to preserve 'their class system'.[21]

This portrayal of the Conservative party as aggressively antagonistic towards workers was further reinforced by Heath's attempted departure from the Keynesian model of economic management. In regional policy, this translated into prioritising areas of potential growth over

highlighted this duality of the British industrial relations system; with both a 'formal system', represented by official institutions, and an 'informal system created by the actual behaviour' of employers' associations, managers and shop stewards and workers. Minkin, *The Contentious Alliance,* pp. 113-4.

[17] John Foster and Charles Woolfson, 'How Workers on the Clyde Gained the Capacity for Class Struggle: The Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Work-In, 1971-72' in McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell, *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics*, p. 301.

[18] Brown, 'Industrial Relations and the Economy', pp. 399-423.

[19] STUC, *75th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1972), pp. 72-3. STUC delegates also decided against registration under the future Act denying affiliation to registered unions. The TUC responded in a similar fashion at a Special Congress in March 1971. Taylor, 'The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions', p.157.

[20] This epithet titled the section of the GC annual reports covering its activities regarding industrial policies.

[21] STUC, *75th Report*, p. 202.

more deprived areas, as measured by their unemployment levels.[22] Unemployment in the UK rose abruptly, peaking at 929,000 people in January 1972. In contrast to the 5 per cent British average, unemployment reached 10.5 per cent in West Central Scotland.[23] Contrary to public declarations, governmental policies had failed to bridge the increasing unemployment gap between the more deprived regions, including Scotland, and the rest of the UK – particularly the South East of England (see tables 1.2 and 1.3).[24] In this context, the announcement made by the Heath administration in June 1971 that it would stop subsidising the semi-public Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS), condemning it to bankruptcy and threatening 8,500 jobs, inevitably caused a big industrial uproar.[25] Ending the subsidies to the UCS was the Conservative government's way of showing its determination to end state support for the industry's 'lame ducks'. Considering the composition of the STUC membership (see table 1.1), criticism of the government's acceptance of increasing (skilled) unemployment as a necessary trade-off to improve British comparative economic growth was not surprising and fostered the Tories' image as an 'anti-worker' party. In July of that year, the first redundancies took place with

[22] The 1970 White Paper *Investment Incentives* aligned with the recommendations of the *Toothill Report* (1961), which encouraged the direction of Government grants and financial concessions to private companies concentrated on 'growth points' rather than on the existing 'development districts' based on unemployment levels'. See Tomlinson and Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation', pp. 584-606.

[23] As shown by a 1971 Interim Report, reproduced in STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 40-4. UK number in Thorpe, 'The Labour Party and the Trade Unions', p. 166.

[24] Other significantly deprived regions included the North of England, Northern Ireland and Wales. Deprivation is usually measured by a specific region's GDP per head and/or unemployment rate as compared to the UK national average. However, it should be noted that the Southeast of England has an extraordinarily strong influence in the national average, as C.H. Lee shows, distorting it with its relative affluence. There were significant differences within Scotland, as economic restructuring affected regions differently. For example between 1921-71, unemployment increased in all regions except Lothian, Central and Fife. During the 1970s and 1980s, employment decline affected all regions – specially Strathclyde – except for Grampian and the Highland. See Lee, *Scotland and the United Kingdom*, pp. 64-6.

[25] See Foster and Woolfson, *The Politics of the UCS Work-in*. The authors have summarised their central argument in pp. 297-325. See also John Foster 'Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 1971–2 and Edward Heath's U-turn: How a United Workforce Defeated a Divided Government', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 102.1 (2016) pp. 34-48. For a wider background to the UCS closure and work-in see Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, pp. 79-116. For a detailed background on shipbuilding see Lewis Johnman and Hugh Murphy, *British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918* (Exeter, 2002).

workers responding with a new form of class struggle: the work-in.[26] That month, 200,000 workers in Clydeside observed the one-day strike in solidarity.[27]

Table 1.1 Proportion of STUC affiliation by sections (%)

Sector	***1972/73***	***1975/76***	***1978/79***	***1981/82***
*Mining**	8.24	6.27	6.5	6.24
Transport	17.97	16.34	15.83	15.83
Shipbuilding and Engineering	20.84	19.37	16.96	15.96
Building	5.32	4.67	4.45	3.66
Printing and Paper	3.43	3.23	2.79	2.65
Textile and Pottery	4.68	3.86	3.54	2.70
Food, Drink Tobacco and Distributive	6.98	6.38	6.49	5.83
Non-Manual Workers	4.85	6.58	Est. 6.50	7.18
Local Government	21.20	23.32	27.24	24.73
Civil and Public Servants	6.47	9.97	9.89	10.41
*Education***	-	-	-	4.87

Sources: STUC Annual Reports, 1973-82.
* Mining became Fuel and Power from 1977.
** Education became a section of its own in 1980, being previously integrated in Local Government Employees before.
Health workers (COHSE) were integrated in the Civil and Public Servants section

The UCS conflict confirmed the centrality of the STUC in Scottish labour politics. The General Council (GC) provided support to UCS shop stewards and union officials from the get-go. Willie Hutchison, a regional Officer of the Engineers (AUEW) and a GC member, became a central figure in the struggle. The GC arranged a visit to London with shop stewards and union officials to lobby Scottish Labour MPs and the government, arguing that UCS was a viable company but lacking working capital.[28] They also issued a press statement asserting that the government's decision showed 'complete disregard for the working population'.[29] The

[26] The idea behind this campaign was that 'the Liquidator could not remove ships, materials or machinery'. Tucket, *The Scottish Trades Union Congress*. p. 395.
[27] Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, p. 80.
[28] STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 29-30.
[29] *Ibid.*

Council remained in session throughout the struggle, meeting shop stewards and union officials as well as the government. At these meetings, GC members depicted the UCS closure as paradigmatic of the continued loss of skilled jobs in Scotland. In the region, unemployment stood at 117,000 and hit Glasgow especially hard, with male unemployment at 9.6 per cent, above the Northern Ireland figures – the most deprived UK region.[30]

Table 1.2 Unemployment rate by region

Regions	***Average unemployment rate (per cent) 1970-1979***
South East	2.24
East Anglia	2.76
South West	3.45
East Midlands	2.79
West Midlands	3.10
York-Humber	3.39
North West	4.12
Northern	5.12
Wales	4.44
Scotland	**4.93**
Northern Ireland	6.26
UK total	**3.15**

Source: Data from Department of Employment and NOMIS.[31]

Table 1.3 Unemployment rate in Scotland.

Year	***Scotland %***	***Great Britain %***	***Scotland/Great Britain (GB = 100)***
1938	16.3	12.6	129
1946	4.6	2.4	192
1950	3.1	5	207
1960	3.6	1.6	225
1964	3.6	1.6	225
1970	4.2	2.6	162
1975	5.2	4.1	127
1979	8.0	5.8	138
1980	10.0	7.3	137

Source: Luis Moreno, *Escocia. Nación y Razón* (Madrid, 1995) p. 166.

The conflict with the government gradually showed to the STUC, and the left in Scotland more broadly, the benefits of marshalling collective mobilisation by framing an industrial and sectional issue as a local and regional grievance. This was first demonstrated at

[30] Minutes of the meeting between the GC and the Prime Minister on 21 June 1971 in *ibid.*, p. 31.
[31] Included in Michelle Baddeley, Ron Martin and Peter Tyler, 'Transitory shock or structural shift? The impact of the early 1980s recession on British regional unemployment', *Applied Economics*, 30 (1998) p.24

the yard. Blaming poor management for the 'sorry state' the 'shipbuilding and upper reaches of the Clyde' were in, shop steward and CPGB member Jimmy Reid articulated the work-in as a 'class' and 'community' struggle, 'an industry fighting for its community'.[32] The STUC embedded the conflict in the wider regional frame, deciding at a special congress on 16 August 1971 to set up a committee of enquiry to 'consider and report upon the wider social and economic consequences' of closing UCS.[33] The 400 delegates in attendance demanded a reversal of government policy. For them, any proposed policy should meet 'social needs' through housing schemes, improving hospitals, and building nurseries whilst alleviating the crisis of the construction industry. They insisted that the government should 'provide the basis for economic expansion' by creating regional development boards.[34] These would prioritise balancing the region's industrial structure through the attraction of new industries, which were to provide 'the necessary number of male [skilled] jobs'. The GC also floated the idea of a Scottish Development Authority (SDA) similar to the Highlands and Development Board (HDB), 'an appointed body' with the power 'to purchase equity in firms', assist them or initiate them. The collective framework deployed during the UCS work-in was highly effective in encouraging support at the local and regional levels. Inserting the specific industrial issue into the wider context of the Upper Clyde and West Central Scotland and making it a communitarian problem encouraged the involvement of local authorities – including the Conservative/Progressive Glasgow Council – which, alongside the STUC and the 700 UCS creditor firms, expressed support for the work-in and exercised pressure on the government.[35]

[32] The analysis of Reid's discourse in this paragraph draws from Foster and Woolfson, 'How Workers on the Clyde Gained the Capacity for Class Struggle', pp. 304-12. Trotskyist voices were, however, critical of this framing because it de-emphasised the ties with the rest of the British working class while collaborating with non-class allies. See Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, p. 82.
[33] STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 35-6.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.* p.307. To that end, the STUC organised various meetings to coordinate actions, STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 33-4. The Progressive Party operated exclusively in local governments in various Scottish cities across the twentieth century, co-operating with other political parties against the Labour Party.

The British TUC had been involved in the conflict and was critical of the government's policy. Nevertheless, it attempted to broker a pact following the proposals of the government's Advisory Committee to establish a two-yard successor company in Govan.[36] While this offer cut redundancies, these would still affect c.5,000 workers. Additional government conditions included lowering wages and rearranging shifts. Ultimately, the effective leadership of the shop stewards prevented workers' support for the agreement and precipitated the government's U-turn in 1972 – combining an interventionist industrial policy with a statutory incomes policy which lead to a brief expansionary period known as the 'Barber Boom'. By contrast, the STUC Committee of Enquiry produced an Interim Report in September 1971 on the socioeconomic consequences of closing the UCS, justifying the GC's support of the proposals by shop stewards to maintaining all four yards. The *coup d'effect* was delivered by Jimmy Reid, who produced private and confidential notes to the Ridley memorandum (1969). This had emerged from the visit of Conservative politician Nicholas Ridley to Clyde to brief then Trade spokesman Keith Joseph, and had caused an uproar in Scotland, not least due to the fact that the notes contained the instruction to 'put in a government butcher to cut up the UCS'.[37] The Committee's Report argued that West Central Scotland was a problem area with unemployment double the UK average, high relative poverty and deprivation. Here the regional effects of UK's 'national decline' were magnified.[38] Finally, the report warned that closing the yards would cost more than subsidising them, as government and local authority spending

[36] Shop stewards were also victorious at the TUC September Congress, defeating attempts to secure union compliance with the upcoming Industrial Relations Act. See Foster, 'Upper Clyde Shipbuilders', pp. 37, 41-2. Foster argues that this condition had been included by Heath to prevent attacks 'by Lithgow, Yarrow and their allies'. A fear that the conflict would lead to division between the workers of the Upper and Lower Clyde also existed within the STUC, as reported in the Committee of Enquiry's Interim Report. On his part, Jim Phillips nuances that the victory was ambiguous at best, as it ultimately did not solve the problem, Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, pp. 80-3.

[37] Memorandum and notes reproduced in STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 47-9. Nicholas Ridley came from a family who had dominated Tyneside building for generations. After meeting with Sir William Lithgow, and Sir Yarrow , both Scottish shipbuilding owners, Ridley reported back calling UCS a 'cancer'. He called into question its profitability due to the wages and favourable conditions of its workers, which he argued would only be fixed by splitting the company and selling it to others. Foster and Wolfson, *The Politics of the UCS Work-In*.

[38] Interim Report in STUC, *75th Report* pp. 40-4.

would increase due to expanding social security benefits and falling revenues from rates. In this manner, the STUC framed the closure as paradigmatic of how deindustrialisation was a Scottish problem requiring Scottish solutions, despite it actually being a process that affected other UK regions.

Expanding its activities, the GC launched the first Scottish Assembly on unemployment in Edinburgh on 14 February 1972, attended by over 1,500 delegates representing 57 churches, 39 MPs, five political parties, trade unions and trades councils, local authorities, the CBO and other employers' organisations. The main line of thinking was that the Scottish economy 'in its present state of development' was particularly prone to recession because of its dependence on multinational branches and traditional decaying industries. Indeed, industrial ownership in Scotland had shifted hands with the growth of new sectors though both relocation within the UK but also multinational investment, with many US firms establishing branch plants. This shift from small indigenous firms to British or overseas companies fitted within the global trend of corporate amalgamations and, 'by 1975, only 41 per cent of manufacturing employment in Scotland was controlled from within the [region]'.[39] Moreover, in the early 1970s, 21.3 per cent of the total employment in manufacturing relied on 124 US-owned companies.[40] This, combined with the region's overdependence on decaying industries, made the Scottish economy increasingly liable to fluctuations in the world economy.[41] Ultimately, participants in the Scottish Assembly agreed that the best way for the government to resolve these issues was through regional policies *and institutions.*[42] Such initiatives further recognised the STUC as a

[39] P. Smith and M. Bums, 'The Scottish Economy Decline and Response', in D. McCrone and A. Brown (eds), *The Scottish Government Yearbook* (Edinburgh, 1988), p 262
[40] Economic Department of Congress, 'Paper on International Companies' in STUC, *76th Annual Report* (1973), p. 205.
[41] See this thesis' 'Introduction'.
[42] STUC, *75th Report*, p. 48-54. The following year, a Second Assembly took place, organised by the Standing Commission, not by the STUC. Trade unions and trades councils' delegates at the 1973 congress expressed their concerns then that the SNP had attempted to co-opt the assembly.

key Scottish social and economic actor but, more importantly, they marked a turning point which encouraged the STUC to spearhead the cause of devolution.[43]

The STUC and socialism, a 'radical' organisation?

The GC's continued support for the UCS workers and the shop stewards highlighted the STUC's marked leftism and belligerence as compared to the TUC leadership, who had proved to be more willing to negotiate and accept redundancies. The speeches at the 1972 Dunoon Congress suggest that a majority of STUC delegates strongly supported radical left-wing policies, which aligns with Phillips' argument that shop floor militancy had resulted in increasing support for the CPGB and organisations to the left of Labour.[44] Inspired both by the success of the united UCS workers in promoting policy change, and by the miners' and railwaymen's struggles taking place in 1972, solidarity amongst different sections of the workers was encouraged.[45] In this respect, a composite motion on the Scottish economy was approved which asked individual unions to pursue policies such as the shortening of the working week, early retirement and increasing holiday entitlement to aid in the maintenance of full employment.[46] Moreover, contributions to the economic debate were full of claims that Socialist 'policies', 'ideas', or a Socialist 'programme' or 'government' were central to turning around the economic situation. Moving the aforementioned composite motion on behalf of the GC, A. Day defended the need for individual unions to not be 'ashamed' to express to their members that while 'a capitalist society' existed, 'there will be no solution whatsoever to the

[43] 'Standing Commission of the Scottish Assembly' in STUC, *76th Report*, p. 36.
[44] Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, p. 96.
[45] For more on the miners' conflict in Scotland see Jim Phillips. 'The 1972 Miners' Strike: Popular Agency and Industrial Politics in Britain', *Contemporary British History*, 20 (2006), pp. 187-207.
[46] Measures approved at the Scottish Assembly. Emphasis on these solidary measures remained central as the economy struggled, as did the awareness that inserting local industry into a wider framework was key. For example, steel industry trade union representatives participating at a conference attended by the GC of the STUC argued that, while local demonstrations were important, it was 'of much greater importance' to achieve the unity of the trade unions and community support to 'compel the Government to accept our demands', which included lobbying the government to establish an integrated steel facility in Hunterston. 'GC report of Activities' in STUC, *76th Report*, p. 45.

problem of unemployment, because [it] is an inherent and essential part of the capitalist economic system'.[47] Additionally, he asserted that Tories were 'the political expression' of the 'capitalist philosophy' and, as such, the Conservative government was 'relentless in its pursuit of inequality'. In his presidential address, R. MacDonald called for socialist policies to be implemented as opposed to the 'consensus' policies which had 'brought Labour electoral defeat'.[48] The word consensus here likely refers to the power balance between British capital and labour. A. Henderson, for the Clydebank and District Trades Council, moved another motion calling the GC to fight for a Labour administration committed to socialist 'principles', namely full employment – to ensure the maintenance of 'the community' and people's living standards.[49] UCS workers had succeeded in framing their struggle as a fight for the greater good, as opposed to a sectionalist struggle 'for higher benefits', and a majority of delegates supported this tactical framing. Henderson argued that by garnering 'the full support of all sections of the community' they were preparing 'the common people' for authentic 'socialist advance' and W. Niven, of the Engineers' Technical and Supervisory Section (AUEW-TASS), linked the solution of Scottish economic problems to 'Socialist planning'.[50] Before passing these motions – either unanimously or by a majority - STUC's General Secretary, James Jack, referred to the 'persistent, noticeable view expressed that Socialism was the only hope', noticing that 'it was some time since they had [that] kind of discussion'.[51]

A composite motion on the Scottish economy along these lines was also approved at the 1973 congress, with Betty McIntyre – that year's chair and only the second woman to hold the post in 77 years – insisting that 'the only true solutions for the economic problems of Scotland and indeed Britain' implied 'a change in the nature of society'.[52] Proposing a similar

[47] STUC, *75th Report*, pp. 258-9.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 270-86.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 283.
[52] STUC, *76th Report*, p. 267.

motion, A. Dorrens, of the Patternmakers, stated that Tory 'mis-rule' had not only 'failed to improve Scotland's economic position' but also brought 'unemployment and escalating price increases'.[53] He called on the next Labour government to implement '*more radical* economic policies', including the setting-up of a state holding company.[54] In this manner, following the UCS struggle but, arguably, also the struggles of the late 1960s, the Scottish delegates positioned themselves to the left of the British labour movement (including both the party and the unions). Yet, what Scottish delegates meant by 'socialist' or 'socialism' was extremely vague. J. Jack noted in 1972 that the word meant 'different things to different people in different parties', but analysis of the contributions to the debate and the wording of the resolutions indicates some common elements. A 'radical' policy involved the government's handling of the economy through regional policies and planning (although to what extent was a matter of debate), an increase in public ownership and, unequivocally, maintaining the Keynesian aim of full employment. Finally, the implementation of a socialist policy was linked to the demise of the Conservative government, the arrival of a Labour government and to the establishment of an SDA 'with cash and power…to steer Scotland to lasting economic prosperity…within the framework of the UK' based on its potential 'to apply Socialist ideas to the solution of our problems'.[55]

The different understandings of socialism within the STUC reflected the contemporary political divide within the left, which also affected the Labour Party. The 'new' issues in the UK during the 1960s, including race, immigration, gender, youth and contentious areas of foreign policy including nuclear disarmament and EEC integration, had posed moral and political dilemmas for the labour movement that remained unsolved in 1970.[56] In 1972, a

[53] 'Scottish Economy – Economic policy' motion in STUC, *76th Report*, p. 281.
[54] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
[55] 'Presidential Address', STUC, *75th Report*, p. 204.
[56] Paragraph draws from Thorpe, 'The Labour Party and the Trade Unions'. For the period between 1964-70 see pp.145-65; for 1970-9 see pp. 166-87. See also chapter 14 in Thompson, *Political Economy*, pp.197-249; and Minkin *The Contentious Alliance*, pp.116-26.

Liaison Committee was set up between the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the TUC, marking a rapprochement of both wings of the British Labour Movement and a renewed degree of consultation and co-operation.[57] The Committee produced two policy documents between 1972-3, which set the basis for *Labour's Programme 1973*, committing the party to price controls, extending public ownership, increasing pensions, restoring free collective bargaining by repealing the 1972 Industrial Relations Act, and renegotiating the terms of European Economic Community (EEC) entry. They encompassed the *Alternative Economic Strategy* (AES) proposed by British economists Stuart Holland and Michael Barrat Brown, linked to the Labour Party and the British New Left respectively. They also set the basis for the Labour government's (1974-9) Social Contract, a deal whereby trade unions committed to a voluntary wage restraint in exchange for wealth redistribution through social services and taxation.[58]

In Scotland, relations between the STUC and the Scottish Council of the Labour Party (SCLP) had been 'cool' during those years, with trade union delegates doubting how far left the Labour Party would actually go.[59] This coolness arose in part due to Wilson's previous attempts to regulate industrial relations and in part from a new left-wing leadership in the STUC, facilitated to an extent by changes in trade union membership and amalgamation that had also encouraged the left-wing realignment in four of the five largest British unions between 1967-9.[60] The STUC strongly rejected 'incomes policy', with McGahey winning unanimous

[57] While the PLP was in hands of the centre-right revisionists, the Left had made important advances in the NEC since 1967. Thorpe, 'The Labour Party and the Trade Unions', p. 168. For the mechanics of the Labour Party Conference (until 1970) see Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Conference* (Manchester, 1980).
[58] These documents were the *Statement on Industrial Relations* (1972) and *Economic Policy and the Cost of Living* (1973).
[59] As SCLP Secretary Peter Allison acknowledged in his fraternal address at the 1972 Dunoon congress, STUC, *75th Report*, p. 216.
[60] Although only the change within the AUEW represented a decisive shift, with Hugh Scanlon replacing Bill Carron. The new Jack Jones' leadership in the TGWU represented a consolidation of the tendency, while the rise of Richard Seabrook in the Shopworkers and of Lawrence Daly in the NUM were 'significant' but 'balanced by senior officials to the Right'. This new leadership shared a support for rank-and-file militancy, a defence of industrial democracy and a commitment to extending public ownership. Minkin, *The Contentious Alliance*, pp. 116, 161-72.

support for a motion opposing it.[61] The motion called on 'the next Labour Government to drastically redistribute the nation's wealth in favour of the wage earners, pensioners and the underprivileged', contrary to the Tory government. Yet the debate on 'Relations with the Labour Party' illustrates both the wariness towards the party leadership and the tension between different professional sections.[62] While delegates of the Shop Workers and the Electricians defended the motion and the need for the Labour Movement to come together to design a common policy, a delegate of the Falkirk trades council reluctantly supported the motion nuancing that 'it did not go as far' as he would have liked.[63] He stressed that the Labour leadership had moved away from socialism and was now committed to the mixed economy, which explained the party's contradictory behaviour in government and opposition. Finally, he called on trade unionists to hold the party accountable if elected. Two delegates of the Engineers argued against the motion, insisting that by calling the party and unions to 'hammer out a common policy covering inflation, *wages*…' the STUC would be contradicting itself, giving a 'blank check [sic] for an Incomes Policy'.[64] D. McKay (AUEW-TASS) accused the party leadership of creating the division between the two wings of the movement, for often 'breach[ing]' agreements. In the 1973 Congress, the Shop Workers moved a motion in support of a voluntary wages policy to reduce the differentials between the poorer and higher paid workers in solidarity with workers such as nurses.[65] Ultimately, the motion lost the vote, which shows the strength of male skilled workers within the STUC.

Delegates were still debating whether Labour's economic policy was radical enough to deal with Scotland's complicated economic situation by 1974, with J. Dollan proposing a

[61] Following the miners' success in a seven-week strike to break the informal wage restraint that Heath had attempted to implement. For more on the strike and the Government's reaction, see Rosaleen Anne Hughes, '"Governing in Hard Times": The Heath Government and Civil Emergencies: The 1972 and the 1974 Miners Strikes', PhD Thesis (Queen Mary University of London, 2012).
[62] As represented by Raymond MacDonald in his 1972 president address, STUC, *75th Report*, p. 204.
[63] STUC, *75th Report*, pp.315-6.
[64] *Ibid.* p. 317. Emphasis added.
[65] STUC, *76th Report*, p. 430.

composite motion criticising the inefficiency of the previous regional policies which had merely '[slowed] down the process of economic decline' in Scotland.[66] Instead, he urged the Labour Government to enforce the 'Socialist policies' upon which the party had been elected. Supporting the notion, T. Finn of the Aberdeen trades council provided nuance, stating that both the motion and Labour's economic policy was 'reformist… not socialist'. Nevertheless, most delegates accepted gradual – or progressive – change, with W. Niven of the AUEW arguing that 'there could be no instant socialism'. More importantly, considering the SDA as an essential instrument of their (Socialist) economic policy, administrative decentralisation was embedded in the socialist reform.

A regional 'socialist' response to an international 'monopoly capitalist' crisis (1973-5)

The demands for legislative decentralisation within the STUC from 1974 emanated from the two major political events that took place the previous year: Britain's entry to the EEC and the publication of the *Kilbrandon Report* on 31 October. Support for EEC integration following two failed attempts in 1961 and 1967 remained split on all fronts: amongst Britons (see table 1.4) and across the political field, including within political parties.[67] Key themes around the debate on EEC integration in the 1960s and until the 1975 referendum were national sovereignty and Britain's global role in the post-imperial world, but also how to stop the nation's perceived long-term decline.[68] The pro-membership side argued that some transfer of

[66] This and the following quotes in STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 339-48
[67] Both applications were blocked by Charles de Gaulle. For the first application see Piers N. Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC* (Cambridge, 1997). For the second, Helen Parr, *Britain's Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's World role, 1964-1967* (London, 2006). See also Lindsay Aqui, *The First Referendum. Reassessing Britain's Entry to Europe, 1973-75* (Manchester, 2020); Robert Saunders, *Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain* (Cambridge, 2018); Justin Gibbins, *Britain, Europe and National Identity: Self and Other in International Relations* (Basingstoke, 2014); Brian Harrison, *Finding a Role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990* (Oxford, 2010) pp.7-38. See also the work of British diplomat Michael Butler, *Europe: More Than a Continent* (London, 1986).
[68] 'Declinism' is further examined in chapter 2. Edgerton, 'The Decline of Declinism', pp. 201-6.

power was beneficial to the UK in exchange for becoming an influential force within the Community and that it was unrealistic to expect absolute national sovereignty within an increasingly interdependent world.[69] They also argued for the EEC as a defence tool facing Communism and as a solution to economic decline – providing a larger market for exports.[70] The issue of EEC membership deeply divided the Labour Party. Figures such as Roy Jenkins and John Mackintosh defended EEC membership in terms of the internationalist principles of Socialism. Others voted in favour as they considered EEC membership to be inevitable. Conversely, the Left repudiated the Common Market for its restrictive liberal concept of 'Europe', considering it essentially 'a capitalist device', believing it would increase prices and effect unemployment. This was the STUC position in the early 1970s. It criticised the negotiations in 1971 because the Government had 'surrender[ed]' to harmful EEC demands such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and predicted that the transitionary period would affect the balance of payments deficit and lead to more job losses.[71] As the process moved forward and the international and national context worsened following OPEC1 and the demise of the Bretton Woods system, EEC integration featured prominently in STUC debates on the national economy and regional policy. More specifically, delegates forecasted that membership would raise the cost of living and encourage price increases and wage freezes.[72] Ultimately, the STUC's opposition to membership was linked to the organisation's demands for 'radical' left-wing economic policies 'with a regional component' to be implemented by regional bodies whose workers would have 'a far better idea of the needs of that region'.[73] Arguably, Heath and later Wilson noticed these complaints and tried to renegotiate the terms

[69]Aqui, *The First Referendum*, pp. 24-47.
[70] For instance, responding to a STUC resolution on economic policy, approved in the 1972 congress and which did not mention the EEC, the Minister for Industrial Development Christopher Chataway, asserted that 'Britain's entry into the [EEC] will provide a wealthy and expanding market', a fact that encouraged government to 'launch a major new drive to expand and modernise British industry'. STUC, *76th Report*, p. 3.
[71] STUC, *75th Report*, p. 67
[72] Examples include the 1972 resolution on 'Price Increases' or the debate on the 'Economy Policy' motion in 1973, both in STUC, *76th Report*, p.94, pp. 308-12.
[73] E. McIntyre, proposing a composite motion on the Scottish Economy, STUC, *76th Report*, p. 279.

of the CAP and the setting up of the European Regional Development Fund, which was not established until 1975.[74]

Table 1.4. Approval of EEC entry across political party voters in April 1972

	% Voting			
	All	**Con.**	**Lab.**	**Lib.**
Approve	42 (44)	64 (64)	25 (28)	43 (40)
Dissapprove	43 (44)	22 (23)	62 (60)	40 (42)
Don't know	15 (14)	14 (13)	13 (13)	17 (18)

Source: NOP April 11-16, 1972, in Dov S. Zakheim, 'Britain and the EEC Opinion Poll Data 1970-72', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 11.3 (1973) pp. 191-233.

Framed by this national division around EEC membership and its effects on British sovereignty, the *Kilbrandon Report* (1973) showed that a broad section of the Scottish public opinion supported administrative decentralisation, with 49 per cent of Scots doubtful as to whether the central government could assimilate Scotland's needs.[75] In no other region was this perception as high, with the next highest being 40 per cent of respondents in the North and the Southwest of England. This higher proportion suggests that a large proportion of Scots were convinced by the narrative which presented deindustrialisation as a pressing Scottish problem in need of a Scottish solution, and was likely linked to the UCS struggle. Considering that EEC membership 'would certainly make Scotland a peripheral area' it was imperative, Betty McIntyre argued, for the government to implement STUC's economic policy immediately.[76] The second Scottish Assembly on unemployment (1973) shared the same concern and included in its Second Charter of Proposals a petition that EEC negotiations should 'ensure that discussion [centred] around the establishment of a community regional policy' to deal with 'the problem areas such as Scotland' that required assistance.[77] Underpinning the STUC's argument that the EEC was a device of international capitalism, a resolution was approved in 1973

[74] Although Wilson also resorted to renegotiation, to solve the Party's division on the issue promising a Referendum. See Aqui, *The First Referendum*, Chapters 2-4.
[75] This linked with opinion polls conducted in 1970 regarding the level of centralisation within the British state. In Scotland, 65 per cent of the respondents believed it was too centralised facing 45 per cent of respondents in Northern England and 38 per cent in Wales. See Moreno, *Escocia*. p. 173.
[76] McIntyre, STUC, *76th Report*, p. 278.
[77] 'Second Charter of Proposals' in *ibid.*, pp. 37-9.

affirming that 'the thought behind entry to the EEC [was] to strengthen [multinational] companies'.[78] Both multinational companies and the Common Market challenged the nation-state by further centralising the decision-making process. Arguably, this shift in power affected the regions with an over-representation of branch-plants such as Scotland. Considering that the STUC articulated a decentralised, regional socialist solution to Scotland's deindustrialisation and unemployment problems, opposition to EEC membership for being a supranational capitalist device is not surprising. However, their critique also hinted at an aspect that would later become central to the argument for devolution: that of a 'democratic deficit' in the increasingly globalised world.[79]

The second day of proceedings in the Rothesay Congress (1974) saw a heated strategic debate. In the context of Labour's renegotiation of the UK's entry terms, the day opened with delegates unanimously approving a motion demanding a referendum on EEC membership, framed as a 'threat' to Britain's 'democratic institutions'.[80] Recycling the argument in support of administrative decentralisation, the mover of the motion warned against the power shift in decision-making from elected representatives in Britain to 'faceless men' in Brussels. Accountability, however, remained secondary to the issue of the economy. Following this discussion, a National and Local Government Officers' Association (NALGO) delegate moved a motion calling the GC to seek representation for the STUC in the Community's Economic and Social Committee arguing that, while they opposed membership, this was now a reality and Scottish trade unionists should seek representation to defend their members' interests. Another NALGO delegate seconded the motion, supported by delegates of the Shop and Distributive workers and the Builders, because these links contributed to the STUC's

[78] Resolution in STUC, *77th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1974) p. 139. In 1972, the presidential address accused the Tories of being 'hell bent on this European suicide mission… to protect the bastions of capitalism', STUC, *76th Report*, p. 205.
[79] See Chapter 2.
[80] R. Garland of the Engineers-Foundry Section STUC, *77th Report*, p. 319.

commitment to promote peace.[81] Conversely, the Miners and the Engineers, alongside the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) and the Glasgow Trades Council directly opposed the motion. As with the 1972 Industrial Relations Act, C. Thomas of the AUEW-TASS argued that neither the STUC nor the unions should engage with the EEC's anti-worker framework.[82] Their resistance to participation in any European institution clearly relates to the economic context. The energy crisis and stagflation particularly hurt shipbuilding and steel – concentrated in West Central Scotland and the Glasgow conurbation – and further affected mining, which had been declining since the 1950s.[83] The motion was defeated by a 2:1 ratio, but this discussion is indicative of the growing cleavages within the STUC related to the change in affiliation, as the shrinking number of traditional male skilled workers began losing their ground facing the increasing white-collar membership (table 1.1).[84]

North Sea oil and devolution: a political opportunity

North Sea oil had featured in the STUC economic discourse since its discovery in 1969, with delegates favouring nationalisation but settling for the 'Norwegian approach': that the state shared in the profit through royalties.[85] Some of the organisation's concerns, as expressed by the GC at various meetings with the SCLP across 1973, involved the rate of exploitation. The GC feared that it was too fast, that the environmental impact was too high, and that Scotland and other deprived regions might not profit economically as they should.[86] The final of these concerns arose from the worry that multinationals would exploit the resource.

[81] J. Finnegan in STUC, *77th Report*, p. 327.
[82] STUC, *77th Report*, p. 325.
[83] Employment in coal mining fell from 86,000 in 1957 to 36,000 in 1967. Phillips, Wright and Tomlinson, 'Deindustrialization', p. 404.
[84] The motion received 589 votes for and 1044 against.
[85] As argued by the GC at meeting with the Scottish Parliamentary Labour Group on 11 May 1973, STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 101-3. For a contemporary assessment of the impact of oil discovery and exploitation in both countries see, Susan M. Squires, 'The Impact of North Sea Oil in Norway and Scotland.', *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift* 29.3 (1975) pp. 133-40. For more on Scotland see Phillips, *The Industrial Politics of Devolution*, pp. 146-77.
[86] Meetings recorded in the STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 101-5.

Considering that Scotland under Heath 'had never had it so bad', it was fair for a government to take 'positive action' as regards North Sea oil.[87] Taking this narrative one step further in the context of a global energy crisis, the SNP campaigned for the October 1974 general election around the slogan *It´s Scotland's Oil!*, arguing that the solution to Scottish structural problems lay with North Sea oil revenues. As oil reserves were in Scottish waters, nationalists argued that exploitation profits should fund the turnaround of the Scottish economy, restructuring the nation´s industrial base. In February, the party obtained a 21.9 per cent share of votes (an increment of 10.5 per cent as compared to the 1970 election).[88] Journalists attributed the rise of the nationalist party to a combination of protest vote — giving voice to those who complained that Scots had 'too long' been 'neglected by England' amid a 'mood… of frustration and disillusionment with the two main political parties'— and the fact that 'oil [had] for the first time made a Scottish government seem a viable economic proposition'.[89] The official position of the STUC contested the SNP's claim to oil, arguing instead that profit arising from oil exploitation should be directed to funding the turnaround of the whole British economy 'through the encouragement of self-generating industries' in all the deprived areas of the UK to improve the situation of the British working-class.[90] Regardless, some delegates to the 1974 STUC congress, such as A. Kitson, praised the SNP's ability to appropriate the nationalisation campaign, drawing upon the discontent of the Scottish people with how the oil operation was being mounted in 'disregard for the nation's needs'.[91]

[87] O'Hanlon from the Electricians argued while moving a motion on Economic Policy, STUC, *77th Report.*, p. 308.
[88] A result that increased in the following October 1974 general election to 30.4 per cent share of the vote and eleven MPs; Jonathan Hopkin, 'Party Matters. Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain', *Party Politics*, 15.2 (2009) pp. 179-198.
[89]Diana Geddes, 'Oil Boom Has Yet to Become a Vote Winner', *Times*, 18 Feb. 1974; and Diana Geddes, 'Colourful Campaigner with a Romantic Rallying Cry', *Times*, 23 Feb. 1974.
[90] Resolution on North Sea oil in STUC, *77th Report*, p. 98.
[91] While prosposing an unanimously carried motion for the nationalisation of the oil industry at the 1974 Congress, STUC, *77th Report*, p. 364.

It was in this context of economic hardship, EEC membership and oil exploitation that the STUC debated 'devolution' in 1974. Delegates to the 77th congress voted to support the GC's stance in favour of devolution not just because 'the Scottish people desired and required it', but because 'it could improve the quality of Scottish Government' and further democracy.[92] Yet, support for devolution was not unanimous. Right before the relevant motions were debated, A. Kitson addressed the congress as a member of the GC. He asked delegates to reject a motion on the agenda moved by the GMWU which opposed the *Kilbrandon Report*, and to support the amendment to said motion proposed by the AUEW and Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA) instead.[93] He framed his argument by stating that 'the real need for devolution… [was] for greater control and scrutiny over the already devolved administrative machinery', arguing that the assembly should have 'definite legislative powers' to tackle Scotland´s socioeconomic problems.[94]

The GMWU opposed the report for proposing an 'administrative and superficial' structural solution lacking 'the real decision-making powers necessary to advance the [socioeconomic] condition of the Scottish people'.[95] Because the main issue of the 1970s was 'how to control multinationals before they controlled people', the only solution to Scotland's economic problem within the increasingly 'large, monopolistic and centralist' world structure lay within the UK framework through a 'strong, independent Scottish voice in the [British] Cabinet'. Devolution was but 'a dangerous illusion' suggesting that a 'fairer, more just, egalitarian society' could be achieved by decentralisation, when that aim was only possible within a British socialist economic framework. Only the Journalists' union supported the terms of this motion. On behalf of the AUEW, Niven proposed an amendment to the motion specifying that the STUC welcomed the majority report but rejected any reduction in

[92] STUC, *77th Report*, p. 385-7.
[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 386-94.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 386.
[95] Motion and argument in STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 387-9.

Scotland's MPs in Westminster. He framed the debate as a disagreement between the Right and the Left (of the movement).[96] Asserting that there was 'no contradiction' between devolution and belief in a strong, united British working class, Niven criticised 'right-wing[ers]' who defended EEC membership despite the sovereignty loss it entailed while simultaneously criticising decentralisation for the same reason. His differentiation between 'reactionary nationalism' and 'progressive devolution', framed as 'a useful tool to break the capitalist power structure', highlights the influence of Nairn's thought. Facing the democratic deficit deriving from 'centralisation under monopoly capitalism', devolution was the best solution to liberate 'the working people' and advance towards socialism. Other speakers in support of the amendment also pressed this point, with A. Adam of the Clerical and Computer Staff asserting that a devolved Scotland could be 'a catalyst for the rest of Britain'.[97] Also a Labour Party member, Adam called on the STUC to urge the Party to 'make up' its mind and support democratisation through devolution, which differed from the SNP's 'narrow, almost "master race" concept of Scotland'.[98] In this manner, the STUC bridged the contradiction between class internationalism and regionalism by framing devolution as a progressive and democratic step towards Socialism. This opposed the bourgeois 'reactionary nationalism' of the SNP, who framed devolution as a stepping-stone to independence.

Before the October 1974 general election, the Labour Party jumped on the devolution bandwagon. Yet, the SCLP was split on the issue and the Scottish executive was reluctant to support it.[99] The Scottish executive met on 23 June to vote on the Government's proposals but, with only 11 out of the 29 members present, 6 voted to reject all the alternatives in the

[96] STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 390-1.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 393.
[98] He also argued that the majority of Scots rejected the SNP's framing, an interpretation supported by contemporary opinion polls proving that 'only a small minority' of those who… supported the party in elections' supported Scottish independence. See, Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 578.
[99] For a political analysis of the Labour Party and its stance on Scottish Home Rule/devolution see Michael Keating and David Bleiman, *Labour and Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1979). A specific account of how the party came to support devolution in 1974 in pp. 164-75.

discussion paper.[100] Following Wilson's and the NEC's intervention, the SCLP met again in Glasgow with the unions and the constituency delegates – both pro-devolution. The national party conference supported a compromise decision incorporating both the demands of the devolutionist and unionist factions: this centred on the setting-up of a directly elected Assembly with legislative powers within the UK framework, maintaining the figure of Secretary of State and the current 71 MP representation in Westminster.[101] This change of party policy was not just a reaction to the SNP's spectacular electoral results. The block vote of the unions at the Conference provided a bare majority, arguably demonstrating that devolution was becoming central to their socialist project.[102] However, the party remained divided on this issue through the decade, as evidenced by MPs' participation in the 'Labour Vote No' and 'Scotland is British' campaigns, as well as by Cunningham's amendment to repeal the 1978 Scotland Act unless a 40 per cent of the eligible electorate voted 'Yes' in the 1979 Referendum.[103]

A proxy for Scotland

The return of a (slim) majority Labour administration to office in October 1974 imbued the STUC with hope, at least until the April 1975 Budget. The whole of the Labour Movement approached the campaign focusing on the achievements of Wilson's minority administration, presenting his government as determined and trustworthy. Inheriting a large balance of payments deficit, a sharp rise in inflation, a rising budget deficit, and knowing that a second election would soon be necessary, Wilson's short-term electoral concerns shaped the Government's economic and industrial policy. To position themselves against the Conservatives, who had endured important protests in the winter of 1973, Wilson's

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 166.
[101] *Ibid.* 167.
[102] 183 out of the 354 delegates. *Ibid.* p. 171.
[103] Cunningham was a Labour Party backbencher.

administration was committed to ensuring industrial peace.[104] In November 1973, the miners went on strike to protest Stage III of Heath's prices and incomes policy. The policy included a wages freeze designed to fight the rising inflation. [105] Other unions joined in this protest. The electricity power workers started a work-to-rule and the railway union banned overtime, Sunday and rest-time working.[106] In January 1974, electricity was only supplied to industries three days a week, television broadcasting stopped at 10.30 pm and there were blackouts, which fuelled the pessimistic atmosphere of the time and served as visual markers of the crisis.[107] In the seven months between the elections, through the Social Contract, Wilson pursued policies favourable to the trade unions in exchange for wage moderation. His administration also passed legislation granting more rights to the unions and workers, such as the Employment Protection Act and the Equal Pay and Sexual Discrimination Act. Thus, the Labour Party could argue in its manifesto that

> [f]rom the day we took office… We increased pensions… We froze rents… We repealed the divisive Industrial Relations Act and we replaced confrontation by conciliation. We restrained the rise in the cost of living by our subsidies on essential foods and price controls. We gave loans to the building societies… We allocated more money to local councils to build or buy homes.[108]

The STUC was actively involved in the campaign, publicly backing the Labour party and contributing two leaflets: *Scotland Will Only Win With Labour* and *Labour's Promises Were Kept – Let Them Carry Through Their Programme*.[109] Both documents insisted that the solution to Scotland's problems lay in a Labour administration pursuing a left-wing agenda

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[104] Public deficit was then labelled 'public sector borrowing requirement' (PSBR), Max Crook, 'The Labour Governments 1974–1979: Social Democracy Abandoned?', *British Politics* 14.1 (2019), p. 92. Lewis Baston, 'The Age of Wilson 1955-79' in Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan (eds), *The Labour Party. A Centenary History* (London, 2000), p. 94.
[105] S. Brittan and P. Lilley, *The Delusion of Incomes Policy* (Temple Smith, 1977) pp. 170-171 as referenced in Holmes, *The Failure of the Heath Government*, p.105.
[106] Eric Hopkins, *English Working Classes 1918-1990* (London, 1991) Pp.134-138.
[107] In 2007, the BBC News gathered a series of testimonies and photographs of people commenting on their individual memories of different decades. For the 1970s, electricity shortage and blackouts as well as union action, particularly strikes, are what people considered most characteristic of the period. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6734123.stm [Accessed 01 June 2017].
[108] Labour Party, *Britain Will Win with Labour* (1974) in http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab74oct.htm [Accessed 26 June 2017].
[109] STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 24-25.

with a regional focus. To this end, the GC continued to pressure Wilson's administration to set up the SDA and a Scottish State Holding Company.[110] The GC had also floated the idea for a separate West Central Scotland agency, especially following a Report on the area published on 29 April 1974 by the West Central Scotland Planning Team.[111] Scoring high in all the deprivation markers, the area was often referred to by delegates as the most 'derelict…in the whole of the UK' but central to Scotland's economic future.[112] Although the SDA started functioning in December 1975, a separate West Central Scotland Authority was discarded. The SDA had three main functions: to invest in industry; to provide publicly owned factories; and to recover the environment by clearing derelict land.[113]

Wilson's fourth government also revamped the old 'merger-promoting, state-funded body' known as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation. Renamed National Enterprise Board (NEB), this body functioned between 1967-71 promoting the competitiveness of British industry. The NEB implemented 'planning agreements' with private industry on a sector-by-sector basis with the participation of the trade unions.[114] While the STUC welcomed the idea of a state holding company, the organisation lamented both the lack of 'a regional component' to co-ordinate and administer the affairs of firms operating in Scotland, and, considering the upturn in North Sea oil activity, to initiate developments.[115] A GMWU delegate argued in 1975 that while the oil industry by itself would not solve Scotland's problems, including urban dereliction, an 'independent' SDA, '[not] subservient or subordinated to the NEB', would facilitate 'the kind of radical, publicly accountable and publicly owned development which the

[110] For example, a paper submission to the Secretary of State for Industry, Tony Benn, ahead of a meeting dated for 24 May 1974 in STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 141-53. At every meeting with him, but also with the Secretary of State for Scotland the GC made clear demands.
[111]The GC wrote a paper in response. STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 70-3.
[112] For example, James Dollan affirmed in his presidential address that the 'regeneration' of the 'recession-hit West Central Belt' was 'essential for the economic and social wellbeing of Scotland', STUC, *78th Report.* p. 399. This showcases again how local problems were given a regional dimension.
[113] Peter L. Payne, Michael Lynch (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Scottish History* (Oxford, 2005), p. 575.
[114] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* p. 295.
[115] 'Submission to the Secretary of State for Industry', in STUC, *78th Report*, p. 141.

trade union movement had traditionally called for'.[116] It is interesting to note the apparently contradictory stance of this union: while deeply supporting economic administrative devolution, it nevertheless had rejected Kilbrandon's majority report two years earlier. This, however, fits with Tomlinson and Gibbs' identification of an 'economic unionist-nationalism'.[117] Bruce Millan also played a vital role in agitating for economic security in Scotland, lobbying the Government as Minister of State at the Scottish Office between 1974-6. From 1974, 'Labour's economic and industrial management became more popular in Scotland than in England'.[118] Popular measures included the Plan for Coal, which 'stabilized employment among miners, with extensive investment across the Lothians and Fife', and the nationalization of the shipbuilding industry in 1977 with the creation of British Shipbuilders, preserving many jobs on the Clyde.[119]

Following EEC membership renegotiation, Wilson called a referendum in June 1975. In Scotland, the debate revolved around issues of sovereignty, self-government and national identity, themes which benefitted the SNP.[120] Opinion polls forecast a Scotland decidedly more negative towards membership than England. If this translated into a negative vote, the nationalists hoped that this could reinforce the political cleavage between the nations. A composite covering seven motions was approved at that year's STUC congress criticising Labour's renegotiation of terms.[121] Jack Jones moved the composite, claiming that 'there was no issue more important in this Congress than to make the strongest call to the people of Scotland to vote 'No'.[122] He mobilised the democratic deficit framework, equating remaining with 'surrender[ing] our rights as citizens' and presenting membership as an obstacle to the

[116] STUC, *78th Report*, p. 417.
[117] Tomlinson and Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation' in this thesis' 'Introduction'.
[118] Phillips, Wright and Tomlinson, 'Deindustrialisation', p. 408.
[119] Johnman and Murphy, *British Shipbuilding*, pp. 208–10 quoted in *ibid.*
[120] Saunders, *Yes to Europe*, p. 347. For an analysis of the campaign at the British level see Aqui, *The First Referendum*, pp. 201-37.
[121] STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 471-82. A motion on the referendum was also discussed, pp. 482-5.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 472-3.

implementation of Congress' desired radical economic policy, including 'socialist or national planning'. Viewing the EEC as 'imperialist, anti-working class and anti-socialist' – existing alongside NATO 'to prolong antagonistic attitudes' between the Western and Eastern blocs – the majority position within the STUC opposed membership, regardless of the renegotiated terms, articulating it as a 'class' (and peace) issue.[123] The GMWU represented the minority position, supporting membership under Labour's renegotiation of terms and thus asking congress to oppose the composite.[124] The TSSA delegation abstained, denouncing that supporters of membership within the Labour Party were 'denigrate[d]' and 'identify[ed]' with Tory supporters, and arguing that 'there were many ways to socialism' not limited to 'Parliamentary democracy' – a jab at devolution.[125] EEC membership continued to be articulated as a regional issue when problems within the traditional declining industries were discussed, such as steel in 1975. Here, rejection was strongly linked to the EEC-imposed 'rationalisation' of the industry. The referendum took place on 5 June 1975, with a majority of 67.7 per cent of the votes at the UK-wide level in favour of membership. Regionally, Scotland gave the Common Market noticeably less support, with 58.4 of the votes; this was, though, still a favourable vote.[126]

Pragmatically deployed, particularly by male skilled workers threatened by unemployment, the issue of devolution had come a long way within the STUC since 1968. Arguably, it was useful for the regional workers' organisation to present itself as a proxy for a broad section of Scottish opinion. In his 1975 presidential address, J. Dorran of the Journalists, argued that measures taken by Wilson's third government (February-October 1974) owed much to STUC lobbying, asserting that representing '900,000 workers and their families' the

[123] As stated by A. Matson of the AUEW-Technical section, *Ibid.*, p. 476.
[124] STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 478-9.
[125] This delegate opposed membership and the referendum. Leadership should not 'seek a consensus opinion', *Ibid.*, pp. 479-80.
[126] See Saunders, *Yes to Europe!*; Robert Saunders, '"An Auction of Fear": The Scotland in Europe Referendum, 1975', *Renewal* 22.1/2 (2014), pp. 87-95 .

STUC was 'the most representative body at least until the establishment of the… Scottish Assembly'.[127] Linking (workers) class and (Clyde) local interests with those of the Scottish nation, and presenting the STUC as an example of devolution, trade union delegates arguably sought to portray the STUC as a champion, not just of Scottish workers, but of Scottish people. Noting their 'appreciation' of the extent to which the Labour Government had listened to their suggestions to boost ever-declining employment, STUC delegates insisted on making 'our proposals go further towards redressing regional imbalances'.[128] Expressing doubts that the Labour Cabinet would follow through their desired socialist agenda, particularly extending public ownership, the STUC sub-committee on devolution added the demand for the Scottish Assembly to have 'some' tax-raising power as well as 'some power in the economic field'.[129] In this manner, by 1975, devolution was clearly central to the STUC's socialist project against social and regional deprivation.[130]

Nevertheless, there was not complete unanimity. On 27 November the controversial White Paper *Devolution to Scotland and Wales: Our Changing Democracy* was published, proposing a milder devolution than the majority *Kilbrandon Report* had suggested, in part by deducting the Assembly's full responsibility over the SDA, agriculture, forestry or fisheries. The distinctively Scottish legal system would also remain a UK responsibility.[131] Discontent with the document arose from all fronts. Within Labour's own ranks, the proposal of a weaker Assembly led to the breakaway of the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) under Jim Sillars' leadership on 18 January 1976.[132] The SNP, who after much internal debate had accepted devolution as a stepping-stone for independence in May 1975, received backlash from those who had

[127] STUC, *78th Report*, p. 397. A view apparently shared by Wilson, Dorran said, as proven by the STUC continued dialogue with government.
[128] As stated by A. Forman for the GC, while discussing a composite motion on the Scottish economy, STUC, *78th Report.* p. 412.
[129] Sub-committee on Devolution, 'Devolution: Scottish Assembly' in STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 161-6.
[130] Composite motion 'Scottish Assembly' in STUC, *78th Report*, pp. 694-697.
[131] Aitken, *The Bairns O' Adam*, p. 246.
[132] H.M. Drucker, *Breakaway: The Scottish Labour Party* (Edinburgh, 1976).

adamantly opposed the devolutionary road.[133] Abiding by the 1975 congress' devolution resolution, the GC of the STUC expressed disappointment, issuing a statement claiming that the Government's proposals had fallen short of the objectives set by the organisation and 'could lead to frustration and confrontation'.[134] The Council also opened its *79th Annual Report* arguing that 'only *meaningful*... devolution create[d] a basis for the maintenance of the unity of the United Kingdom'.[135] Moving a composite covering eight motions during the 1976 congress, A. Kitson fell short of calling Scotland a nation, asserting that it was 'not just another region of the [UK]', having a distinctive 'history', 'tradition' and 'culture'.[136]

The GC's increasing and assertive engagement with devolution arguably contributed to intensifying the defensiveness of the trade union delegates opposed to greater Scottish autonomy. G. Smith, the Scottish General Secretary of the British Construction union (UCATT), moved a motion asking for a referendum, fearful that devolution could effectively lead to separatism.[137] He argued that the underlying cause for 'political unrest' in Scotland was 'economic' and so the solution to its problems lay not in the creation of a new level of government but in the implementation of 'a radical change in economic policy'. Furthermore, he blamed 'alienation and frustration towards Government' not on geography but on the feeling that the government was 'unable or unwilling' to manage the economy – thus referencing the 'decline of deference' towards post-war democratic institutions (e.g. political parties) and practices.[138] Smith did not deny Scotland's deprivation, but he put it in perspective taking the unemployment figure of 6.8 per cent, shared with the North-West of England, and comparing it with the 7.1 per cent of Northern England and 7.4 per cent in Wales.[139] Ultimately, he argued,

[133] James Mitchell, 'From Breakthrough to Mainstream: the Politics of Potential and Blackmail' in Gerry Hassan, *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power* (Edinburgh, 2009), pp. 31-41.
[134] Statement in STUC, *79th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1976) p. 200-1
[135] 'Introduction' in STUC, *79th Report*, pp. XIV-XV. Emphasis added.
[136] STUC, *79th Report*, p. 468-71.
[137] Motion and debate in STUC, *79th Report*, pp. 472-5
[138] Chapter 2 will further discuss this idea as well as the changing expectations that people had in the Government's ability to manage the economy.
[139] STUC, *79th Report*, p. 474.

nationalism would lose in a referendum – allowing the Labour Movement 'to get back to the real struggle': improving the living standards of the Scottish working class'. The motion was seconded by a Clackmannanshire Trades Council delegate, but lost to an overwhelming majority who viewed the referendum as an unnecessary delaying technique.[140] After all, when Scots voted Labour they had voted for a 'progressive' Assembly vs the 'narrow' (self-sufficiency) nationalistic argument of the SNP that 'ignore[d] the class issue'.[141] A delegate of the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) clarified that his union's support for devolution was limited to the Scottish Division, as the state-wide union lacked a specific policy, and used the occasion to encourage the STUC to explain the benefits of devolution to the English workers so they could fight for their own regions.

Rejecting monetarism: Scotland as a working-class, Left-wing nation

The contemporary public impression was that the Communist Party had an extraordinary influence on the trade union movement in Scotland. In April 1975, anticipating the upcoming election of James (Jimmy) Milne as General Secretary of the STUC at the 78th congress, journalist Ian Nimrie argued that the STUC was 'a vehicle for the Left'.[142] Presenting his argument, Nimrie went on to argue that

> [T]he Communists have for seven years exerted a growing influence on the STUC. Five… of the 20 members of the GC are of that party and most of the others could be described as being to the Left of the Labour Party on most issues. About one sixth of the delegates are communists, while only a small handful are linked with the SNP, who have about 33 per cent of the Scottish vote. Some might argue that the STUC is, therefore not representative of the views of the Scottish people… [However] The worker who would vote for a Communist to be a shop steward would normally back Labour in a Parliamentary election. […] Trade unionism is regarded in a different light. Communism is now respectable and even the Labour Party in Scotland have made peace with the STUC and recently agreed to continue joint, regular discussions.

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 485.
[141] As argued by a NUM delegate, STUC, *79th Report*, p. 480.
[142] Ian Nimrie, 'By the Left... Communists strengthen their position in the unions', *Glasgow Herald*, 14 April 1975, p. 7.

Years later, Mick McGahey supported this analysis in an interview for the *Scottish Trade Union Review* in 1987.[143] Defining the CPGB as being part of the 'broad Scottish people's movement', McGahey argued that this characteristic allowed it to have an influence in Scottish society and the trade union movement. Yet, he denied that the CPGB 'dominated' the STUC, claiming that it was the 'unity of purpose' with those to the left of the Labour Party that had allowed the CPGB in Scotland to provide influence and leadership. The good relations between the STUC and the SCLP during the general secretariat (1976-86) of communist Jimmy Milne supports McGahey's statements. However, the commonplace perception that the STUC was located to the left of its British counterpart and of the British Labour Movement more broadly is significant in the context of its growing membership.[144] Depicting itself as a radical organisation and a proxy for the Scottish people, and articulating a regional socialist project which centred devolution in the struggle against deindustrialisation, deprivation and, gradually, as key to democratisation, the STUC was articulating Scotland as a nation to the left of the UK.

In April 1975, the budget presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey, announced a £901 million cut in public expenditure for the year 1976-7 to bring down the rate of inflation.[145] Some of the projected cuts included the reduction of subsidies to nationalised industries and housing, as well as an increase in taxation. Being deflationary at a time of rising unemployment, this budget was a turning point for British economic policy, marking the Government's departure from the Social Contract, and *de facto* implementing cuts in social services and hence in wealth redistribution. Yet, the Labour administration still intended to regulate wage increases. Starting with the 1975 implementation of a £6 wage rise limit and a zero increase on or over the £8,500 threshold, Healey argued that it was preferable to have

[143] Bill Speirs and Malcolm Burns, 'An interview with Mick McGahey', *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 34 (1987), pp. 4-8.
[144] The STUC reached its peak membership in 1980 at 1,090,839. See chapter 2.
[145] Martin Holmes, *The Labour Government, 1974-79. Political Aims and Economic Reality* (London, 1985), p. 21.

more people working for lower wages than more people on the dole.[146] In this manner, the Labour Party leadership contributed to the increasingly popular conservative narrative that 'excessive' wage increases caused inflation and, indirectly, unemployment.[147] In turn, this narrative allowed both the Labour and the Conservative governments to deflect economic responsibilities and manage voters' expectations.[148] Adding fuel to the fire, the 1976 Budget, which followed the publication of the White Paper *The Attack on Inflation*, announced further cuts to public spending. By this time, Jim Callaghan had taken over Britain´s premiership and the Labour Party's leadership, after Wilson´s resignation on 16 March 1976 due to the onset of Alzheimer's Disease. The 1976 and 1977 Budgets anticipated what would later become key components of the Thatcherite programme: 'cash limits' to government spending, pursuing a medium-term economic strategy or publishing money-supply targets from July.[149] This, combined with Callaghan's speech to the Party Conference on 28 September 1976 calling for budgetary prudence, has often been interpreted as the first signs of retreat from Keynesianism.[150] However, in contrast to Thatcherism after 1979, Harrison offers a nuanced analysis that the mild monetarist policies implemented between 1976-9 were out of necessity rather than conviction.[151]

The STUC reacted to this narrative, opposing incomes policy as a substitute for broad economic policies to fight inflation and criticising the cuts in public sector spending due to worries about their impact on people's living standards and unemployment. Implemented by a Labour Government, these policies felt harsher. Although no one within the trade union movement had expected the 1974 manifesto to be 'a blueprint for a socialist society in Britain',

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[146] *Ibid*. p. 24.
[147] Denis Healey as quoted in Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, *Government and Trade Unions: The British Experience (1964-1979*) (London, 1980) p. 202. Conservative Party, *Putting Britain First* (October 1974) available in http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1974/Oct/october-1974-conservative-manifesto.shtml [last accessed 23 February 2022].
[148] As argued by Tomlinson in *Managing the Economy*, which will be further discussed in chapter 2.
[149] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* p. 298.
[150] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[151] Drawing from Callaghan's biography and Healey's interviews. *Ibid.*, 297-8.

D. M. Purves' (East Kilbride Trades Council), expressed his disappointment that the Labour government had not even come close to shifting 'the balance of wealth and power in favour of workpeople and their families'.[152] While this opinion was shared by the majority of members during the 1976 annual congress, some understood opposition to the Social Contract as opposition to the Labour Government. For them, the biggest fear was that criticising Labour's economic policy would facilitate the rise of a conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, a firm believer in monetarism.[153] This was the case for the AEUW and the TGWU, whose General Secretary and chief economic spokesperson for the British TUC, Jack Jones, had been one the main architects of the £6 pay policy. Jones himself spoke against an extremely critical motion on unemployment, asking Scottish delegates to support instead a composite which did not directly condemn Labour but which insisted on a radical agenda. Ultimately, a milder-worded motion was carried but the STUC's rejection of incomes policy in 1976 marked 'a fundamental division between Scotland [STUC] and the rest of the United Kingdom [TUC]'.[154]

The harsher public expenditure cuts linked to the 1976 IMF loan reinforced the narrative of the 1977 annual congress that Scotland was being deprived. Consequently, Callaghan's emphasis on reducing public spending strengthened the STUC's argument for devolution, justified by the GC as stemming from the desire to maintain the unity of the UK.[155] Macroeconomic indicators for the years 1972-4 suggested that Scotland had been 'less badly affected by the current crisis than the UK as a whole' thanks to the cushioning of the oil and subsidiary construction industries. The GC noted that this was an abnormality. Since 1976, the

[152] STUC, *79th Report*, p. 382.
[153] The possibility of such an alternative was quite possible, as at the time the Labour administration had lost its overall majority as a result of different by-elections.
[154] As T.H. Plant, representative of the British TUC at the 1976 STUC Congress emphasised. STUC, *79th Report*, pp. 357-360.
[155] The GC discussed it in those terms with Callaghan at a meeting in August 1976. Discussion paper and meeting report in STUC, *80th Annual Report* (1977), pp. 47-67.

GC insisted, the crisis had been affecting Scotland 'in the traditional manner', meaning 'more deeply' than the rest of the UK, a view widely shared within the participants on the Congress.[156] In the same meeting, the GC also pointed out that Scotland had greater social deprivation across large areas than 'virtually anywhere else in the EEC' and a high rate of emigration. Furthermore, at a meeting with Dennis Healey, the GC insisted that the projected cuts in public expenditure – namely in the rate support grant for local authorities – would likely have 'a more serious effect in Scotland compared to England and Wales'.[157] This was justified on the basis that Scotland had '97 per cent of the worst 1 per cent of areas of deprivation' in the UK (concentrated in the Strathclyde region) and Scottish local authorities had not been able to retain balances until the implementation of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. In practice, this translated into authorities being in a much weaker position to offset the Rate Support Grant (RSG) reduction in Scotland than in England or Wales.[158] Healey, who stated that the region had traditionally 'fared better than England and Wales' in public expenditure per head, also admitted Scotland's greater dependence on public spending. Indeed, public expenditure per head between 1974 and 1978 averaged £866 in Scotland, above the £708 of the UK average.[159] Hutchison has explained the region's higher dependence on public expenditure as intrinsic to Scotland´s socio-economic structure.[160] The higher unemployment rates and lower per capita income encouraged more reliance on the social security and health systems, and, during a construction industry crisis, housing became central to the STUC's argument for increased public investment.

[156] In a December 1976 meeting with the Prime Minister regarding Regional Policy, reported in STUC, *80th Report*, pp. 77-8.
[157] STUC, 'Report of Meeting with the RT. Hon. D. Healy, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer' in STUC, *80th Report*, pp. 107-110.
[158] *Ibid*.
[159] Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 578.
[160] Iain G.C. Hutchison, 'Government' in Devine and Finlay, *Scotland in the 20th Century*, pp.46-63.

The issue of housing had regularly featured in the STUC's agenda across the 1970s and was a key marker of Scotland's socioeconomic deprivation. Heath's government reform of the Housing (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act in 1972 was strongly opposed within the 1973 Annual Congress and by the local authorities which were under Labour control.[161] The Act meant an end to subsidised rents. Considering that 54 per cent of Scottish housing was within the public sector in 1974, as opposed to 29 per cent in England, this reform would have a particularly devastating effect for Scotland.[162] Accordingly, in 1974 the STUC called on the GC to campaign against the Act and against the idea of private house building as a solution for slums. Instead, Congress demanded the building of 50,000 houses per annum (a request that dated back to the 1960s), making loans at minimum rates available to local authorities, and getting the Government to finance local authority housing programmes directly.[163] Overall, the decrease in new house building and the government's (insufficient in the eyes of the STUC) shift towards improving existing stock was heavily criticised all through the 1970s at the annual congresses because there 'still [was] a serious housing shortage'.[164] In 1977, ahead of an October meeting with the undersecretary of state, the GC submitted a paper emphasising that housing shortage was a major problem in some areas of Scotland, where the density of people per room figure was up to 'four times the figure for England'.[165] In this manner, the STUC consistently highlighted that Scotland had 'the worst housing situation in Europe'.[166] This use of a European framework arguably emphasised the relative deprivation narrative, adapting it

[161] Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 584.
[162] Even in 1981, council housing represented up to 70 per cent of the housing stock in this region. Richard Rodger, 'Urbanisation in Twentieth Century Scotland' in Devine and Finlay, *Scotland in the 20th Century*, p. 146. See also chapter 2.
[163] STUC, *77th Report*, pp. 213-222.
[164] STUC, *79th Report*, p. 537.
[165] 'The Housing Programme Scotland. GC Submission' in STUC, *80th Report* p. 389.
[166] The idea of having 'the worst' housing situation of Europe is expressed on different occasions in the STUC, *79th Annual Report*. The specific reference alludes to the discussion of Housing's 'composite Q' pp. 537-542. To relieve overcrowding and redevelop outworn and war-damaged housing in the UK, the Government committed in 1946 to the development of new towns under the New Towns Act. Five New Towns were built in Scotland after the Act: East Kilbride (1947), Glenrothes (1948), Cumbernauld (1955), Livingston (1962) and Irvine (1966), Rodger, 'Urbanisation', pp. 122-152.

to the context of EEC membership. Even within the UK's general poor housing context, slums still existed and many families lived in 'overcrowded, sub-let conditions' in Scotland, a situation which STUC delegates argued had deteriorated between January 1971 and January 1976.

At the 79th Annual Congress (1976), some STUC delegates noticed the rhetorical potential that poor housing had for the advancement of the nationalist cause. G. Gould of the UCATT warned the Labour Party that this issue allowed the SNP to argue that Scotland´s regional economic underdevelopment and relative social deprivation within the UK was a result of Westminster-dictated policy, happening both under Tory and Labour governments.[167] A motion moved by the Clydebank and District Trades Council's delegate also established the similarity between Tory and Labour housing policy, with reference to rents.[168] Arguably, that Labour had also lacked solutions to the housing issue in Scotland in the past weakened the STUC's regional project. Contrary to the SNP's national project, which accepted devolution as stepping-stone to independence, the STUC argued for 'progressive devolution' under a Labour government as a stepping-stone to democratic socialism. Another issue was that the crisis in the construction sector deepened at the same time, with an unemployment figure more than double the general unemployment UK figure (15 per cent facing c. 6 per cent).[169] Thus, these resolutions partly related to the decrease in building jobs. Therefore, housing became another industrial issue that the STUC framed as a national problem, adding weight to the relative deprivation argument.[170] The ineffective economic policies carried out by the current and previous governments had left Scotland as an underdeveloped region within the UK, evidenced by the region´s outdated industrial structure. Furthermore, this economic underdevelopment

[167] STUC, *79th Report*, pp. 537-542.
[168] *Ibid.*, pp. 542-3.
[169] As recorded by the GC ahead of a meeting with the Under-Secretary of State responsible for Housing, Hugh Brown. STUC, *80th Report*, p. 394.
[170] Beyond the STUC, the issue was also framed as a regional problem by the Scottish press, namely the *Glasgow Herald* and *The Scotsman*.

meant that the Scots were also socially more deprived than the inhabitants of most other regions of the UK. In turn, this explained Scotland´s greater dependence on the state for welfare, clearly exemplified by its reliance on public sector housing. Now, the Labour government´s decision to cut public spending was portrayed as disregarding the specific needs of the Scottish economic and social needs.

In February 1977, the guillotine motion aimed at separating the Scotland and Wales Bill was defeated, partly because 22 Labour MPs abstained. Their abstention was severely criticised at STUC's 81st Annual Congress (1978).[171] The Bill was then withdrawn and, from that moment on, the STUC argued that two separate Bills for Wales and Scotland should be introduced. The Scotland Bill finally passed its second reading in November 1977 yet on 25 January 1978 George Cunningham, a Scottish Labour MP, moved an amendment to include that at least 40 per cent of the Scottish electorate (not just the turnout) were required to vote in favour of the Assembly at the upcoming referendum for the legislation to be implemented. [172] The STUC strongly opposed this requirement, with delegates wondering why it had not applied to the referendum on EEC entry. Yet, a degree of confrontation remained within the regional workers' organisation. At the 1978 congress, Alex Kitson moved a motion on behalf of the GC calling trade unions to express their rejection of the Referendum and, admitting its inevitability, defend that the consultation should exclude the question on independence.[173] It also called STUC members to campaign for a 'Yes' vote and to condemn Labour MPs who had tried to boycott the passage of the Bill. Interestingly, despite the centrality of housing for the STUC's argument, UCATT opposed the motion because it conflicted with its ideal of class internationalism.[174] During his intervention, R. Thompson of the Cambuslang and Rutherglen

[171] Paper and record of GC meeting with Michael Foot, the Minister in charge for devolution in STUC, *81st Annual Report* (1978) Pp. 243-247.
[172] Aitken, *The Bairns o' Adam*, pp.256-257 and STUC, *81st Report*, p. 619.
[173] STUC, *81st Report*, p. 618.
[174] *Ibid.*, p. 621.

Trades Council focused on reproaching the attitude of those within the Labour Movement who had betrayed the 1974 Manifesto.[175] The NUMSA representative, W. Clarke, believed that opposition to devolution derived from the 'great confusion' on its meaning. Similar to the Scottish New Left, his address eloquently analysed the reason behind the growing popular support for the Scottish Assembly within the STUC but also across Scotland, making the case for a socialist democratic devolutionary project opposing the SNP's:

> 'There [was] a failure to understand that Scotland has been a nation…
> There has always existed a national pride in Scotland, but it has found the expression in the [SNP], who pretend and show themselves as the custodians of Scottish National spirit, and that is totally wrong.
> The problems of Scotland stems from policies of repeated right-wing and Tory Government, who have slowed down the economy, and its effects on the British economy have been both negative and severe…
> It can be quoted that the North-east of England is a similar comparison but what is forgotten is that Scotland is a nation, and it involves the social fabric of that nation. This along with the erosion of democracy due to monopoly capitalism has shown itself… in the emergence of the [SNP]…
> In conclusion… we are for more control of our affairs, we are against separatism'[176]

Clarke's statement signposts the pragmatic rhetorical deployment of Scotland's nationhood within the STUC. We have seen that in identifying the Scottish markers of deprivation, Scottish delegates often acknowledged that these problems were shared with other deprived British regions. In their speeches, delegates did not refer to Scotland as a nation but as a region. However, this narrative shifted progressively. If A. Kitson had hinted at Scotland's national identity to justify devolution in the 1976 congress, W. Clarke did so openly in 1977. Furthermore, Clarke also specified that 'it [was] not just economic details of priorities that the Scottish desired when they supported devolution' but '[m]ore importantly… the fact that the establishment of a Scottish Assembly would give them the ability to have a specific say in decisions made by Government on their behalf'. He argued that democratic accountability to the Scottish people would mean a stop to undesired policies, such as the proposed cuts in social services and education. In this respect, he referred to the teacher-training college cuts, which

[175] *Ibid.*, p. 619.
[176] *Ibid.*, pp. 620-21.

in his words completely miscalculated 'the very strong feelings of the Scottish people when education is being threatened with a run-down'.[177] Seconding the motion, Jimmy Milne made the following statement, which condenses the rhetorical shift analysed here which will be explored further in the next chapter:

> The setting up of a Scottish Assembly would be an extension of democracy for Scotland. The mood of the Scottish people is clearly for a de-centralisation of power...
> The setting up of a Scottish Assembly would be one of accumulation of victories in the working-class struggle… No country could go through a state of economic depression and recession without encountering major constitutional problems. Against the tight control of central Government [including attempts to control the unions] we must fight and win the battle for devolution.[178]

The Referendum took place on 1 March 1979. While the vote was in favour of devolution by 52 percent to 48 percent with a 63.6 per cent turnout, this meant that only 32.9 per cent of Scots had actually voted for devolution.[179] Falling short of the 40 per cent threshold, this effectively meant that the Scotland Bill was repealed in April.

Conclusion

The UCS conflict highlighted the advantages of framing a local industrial struggle as a wider communitarian and regional problem. The issues of deindustrialisation and unemployment were particularly acute in West Central Scotland, affecting the male skilled workers who still composed the majority of STUC membership. The attitudes of the British and Scottish TUC leadership during the conflict indicated slightly different policy preferences, to be understood in the scope of their territorial representation. This contributed to a perception that the STUC was on the left of its British counterpart. The success of the UCS shop stewards in changing government policy by gradually involving the wider Clyde and, with the help of the STUC's GC, the regional community arguably had twofold effects. From a strategic point

[177] All quotes from the discussion around Motion 93 and amendment in STUC, *80th Annual Report* (1977) p. 796.
[178] *Ibid.*, p. 797.
[179] Results in Scottish Referendums (bbc.co.uk) [last accessed 10 December 2021].

of view, expanding the collective frame to include other sections of workers and society, Scottish trade unionists could defend the interests of their (skilled) industrial membership more effectively. Derived from this, and in relation to the decentralisation process that for decades had accompanied British regional policies, STUC members included increased *administrative* devolution in their prognosis to regional deprivation. Inspired by delegates from traditional unions representing skilled workers from declining sectors such as mining, shipbuilding and steel – themselves inspired by the Scottish New Left, delegates to the STUC congress and the regional leadership articulated in the early 1970s a regional socialist programme linking socialism with administrative decentralisation.

Entry into the EEC and accelerated deindustrialisation went hand in hand with the publication of the *Kilbrandon Report* and the production of North Sea oil. In this context, *legislative* devolution strongly entered the STUC's agenda from 1974, with delegates progressively adding democratic accountability to their socialist programme. Specifically, delegates argued that *meaningful* decentralisation required public accountability. Fear of the effects of Common Market membership on the already declining manufacturing sector underpinned the argument. Framing the recession as a global 'monopoly capitalist' crisis, the STUC viewed the EEC as a monopoly capitalist institution. Opposing the EEC's liberal social democratic framework for being inherently contrary to the interests of the working class, especially in Scotland, which could only benefit from radical socialist policies, delegates from the traditional industries emphasised the democratic deficit of the supranational institution. Namely, they criticised that the decision-making power was moving away from the Scottish workers affected by the policies, shifting from Scottish MPs elected by the (working) people to 'faceless men' in Brussels defending the interests of multinational companies.

Outlining a devolutionary road to Socialism, portraying alternatives as contrary to the interests of the *Scottish* workers and their families, showcased the cleavages within the British

Labour Movement on the left/right axis. For instance, the STUC's 1972 refusal to accept any closures or redundancies and the organisation's opposition to incomes policy following the public expenditure cuts in 1976 before the TUC allowed the Scottish organisation to present itself as more 'radical' (left-wing) or belligerent than the Labour Party and the TUC. With membership growing across the 1970s, particularly among white-collar workers, the STUC depicted itself as a proxy for a Scottish Assembly and, as such, for the Scottish people, that is 'Scottish workers and their families'. In so doing, the STUC articulated Scotland as an industrial left-wing nation. However, the debate around the STUC's socialist democratic project that centred on devolution also highlighted the internal cleavages facing Scottish workers' in the nationalist axis. The majority position, represented particularly by skilled workers in traditional industries, supported devolution as a stepping-stone to a democratic socialism. However, some voices arose opposing this proposition for contradicting the international principles of class solidarity. These internal differences and narratives are further explored in the following chapter.

Chapter 2: Othering Thatcherism, articulating a regional socialist citizenry (1979-83)

The May 1979 general election campaign was the highpoint of the battle between two widely different set of values: Thatcher's advocacy for state retrenchment, the free-market and individualism versus Labour's 'traditional values of cooperation, social justice and fairness'.[1] The election would prove to be a watershed for Scotland. The regional voting pattern sharply diverged from the rest of the UK, confirming the longer-term trend of conservatism's electoral decline and Labour dominance in Scotland.[2] While the Conservatives won a 43.9 per cent share of the vote in the UK as a whole, the party managed just a 31.4 per cent share in Scotland.[3] Meanwhile, the Labour party won 41.5 per cent of the vote in Scotland in contrast to 36.9 per cent in the UK and, for the first time, it doubled the number of Conservative seats in the region.[4] This added a new dimension to the Scottish nation-building process: the introduction of different electoral preferences as a marker of national identity.[5]

[1] Labour Party Manifesto, *The Labour Way is the Better Way* (1979) http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab79.htm [last accessed 15 June 2018].
[2] A trend initiated in 1959 and confirmed in subsequent electoral results, see Hutchison, *Scottish Politics*, pp. 98-138 and https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results/scotland.
[3] Although this was a higher share of the vote than the party had achieved in Scotland in October 1974. Sam Pilling and Richard Cracknell, *UK Statistics: 1918-2021: A Century of Elections* (18 August 2021), pp. 17 and 24. Available in CBP-7529.pdf (parliament.uk) [last accessed 30 November 2021].
[4] 44 facing 22 Conservative seats in *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[5] A view reproduced in many academic accounts of Thatcherism in Scotland. E.g. James Mitchell, *Conservatives and the Union* (Edinburgh, 1990); Christopher Harvie, 'Scotland after 1978: from Referendum to Millennium' in R.A. Houston and W.W. Knox (eds), *The New Penguin History of Scotland* (London, 2002), pp. 494-531; or Richard Finlay, 'Unionism and the Dependency Culture: Politics and State Intervention in Scotland: 1918-1997' in Catriona M. MacDonald (ed.), *Unionist Scotland 1800-1997* (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 100-116.

Margaret Thatcher had promised to radically transform Britain.[6] In contrast to the post-war social democratic settlement, the Conservatives proposed a 'property-owning democracy'. Coined by Scottish Conservative Noel Skelton in 1923 as a viable political alternative to public ownership and nationalisation, its meaning changed across the twentieth century in parallel with the shifting understandings of 'property' and 'democracy'.[7] Originally, the idea was confined to the industrial sphere, with co-partnership and profit-sharing as a means to achieve property ownership. Yet, as the issue of housing came to dominate the post-1945 agenda, there was a growing trend within the party in favour of extending private home ownership.[8] In the mid-1970s, both themes conflated and, under Thatcher's leadership, the party committed to giving tenants a 'Right to Buy' to favour the 'spread of wealth and ownership' and reduce the appeal of the socialist cure to economic hardship and national decline.[9]

The notion of a 'property-owning democracy' was frontally opposed to the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) espoused by the STUC. The years 1979-82 were hit by economic recession in the wake of the second oil crisis (OPEC2) and the Iranian revolution. During that period, Scotland lost 10 per cent of its industrial output and saw a 20 per cent increase in unemployment in the traditional (unionised) industries.[10] A phase of economic restructuring followed after March 1982 when Thatcher implemented her policies in full, accelerating her privatisation programme and effectively reducing regional spending, thus sharpening the

[6] There is an extensive body of literature as regards the Thatcher years. In addition to the PM's memories, Margaret Thatcher's *The Downing Street Years* (London, 1995), there are over 25 biographies such as Brenda Maddox, *Maggie* (London, 2003). Relevant scholarly work includes Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge, 2012); Harrison's *Finding a Role?*; John Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher, Volume Two: The Iron* Lady, (London, 2008), Dennis Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics* (Oxford, 1990).
[7] For an analysis of these changes see Matthew Francis, '"A Crusade to Enfranchise the Many": Thatcherism and the "Property-Owning Democracy"', *Twentieth Century British History*, 23.2 (2012), pp. 275-97.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 279.
[9] Michael Heseltine quoted in *ibid.*, p. 284.
[10] Meanwhile, the UK as a whole lost 14 per cent of the output, with the Midlands being the most affected region. Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, p. 52.

economic North/South divide.[11] Alongside these changes in macroeconomic policy, came a strong rhetoric on monetarism which historians argue allowed her administration to downgrade the public's expectations on what the government could be expected to do.[12] This enabled the new Conservative executive to implement other elements of the monetarist agenda, namely reducing public borrowing and spending but also carrying out labour market, tax and benefits reforms. Considering the growing socioeconomic and political challenges posed to Scottish (and British) trade unionists in the context of accelerated deindustrialisation, economic restructuring and a hostile government, this chapter examines the articulation of a regional socialist democratic narrative, project and constituency within the STUC opposing Thatcherism.

The STUC in the late 1970s: facing new challenges

Labour's failure to win the 1979 general election has been linked to the 'Winter of Discontent'.[13] The term refers to the successive public sector strikes in protest at the 5 per cent wage increase limit imposed by Callaghan's government in July 1978.[14] By then, while the

[11] A term which refers to the differences, real and perceived, between Southeast England and the rest of Great Britain. See David Smith, *North and South: Britain's Economic, Social and Political Divide* (London, 1989) p. 98. See also Ron Martin, 'Thatcherism and Britain's Industrial Landscape', in Ron Martin and Bob Rowthorn (eds), *The Geography of De-industrialisation* (London, 1986), pp. 238-90; Ron Martin, 'Remapping British Regional Policy: The End of the North-South Divide?', *Regional Studies* 27.8 (1993) pp. 797-805; Jim Lewis and Alan Townsend (eds) *The North-South Divide. Regional Change in Britain in the 1980s* (London, 1989).
[12] Roger Middleton, *The British Economy since 1945* (Basingstoke, 2000) p.96; M.J. Oliver, 'Whatever Happened to Monetarism? A Review of British Exchange Rate Policy in the 1980s', *Twentieth Century British History* 8.1 (1997), pp. 49-73; Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, pp. 63-86.
[13] Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, 'Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism' in Jackson and Saunders, *Making Thatcher's Britain*, p. 5. The term was coined by the *Sun* editor Larry Lamb.
[14] For an examination of the events see Tara Martín López, *The Winter of Discontent: Myth, Memory and History* (Liverpool, 2014). Martín draws from Colin Hay to challenge the narrative, entrenched in British public discourse, depicting the Winter of Discontent as a 'crisis of an overloaded state held to ransom by the trade unions and brought to this condition by its reliance on moribund Keynesian techniques'. Hay's work suggests that the death of Keynesianism in Britain in the 1980s was precipitated by this industrial conflict, in the sense that the events were constructed – primarily by the New Right – to symbolise Keynesian decay and helped fracture the British post-war consensus. Colin Hay, 'Chronicles of a Death Foretold: the Winter of Discontent and the Construction of the Crisis of British Keynesianism', *Parliamentary Affairs* 63.3 (2010) pp. 450-451. See also James Thomas, '"Bound in by History": The Winter of Discontent in British Politics, 1979-2004', *Media, Culture & Society* 29.2 (2007) pp. 263-83. Meanwhile, Jim Tomlinson nuances that while the 1970s and 1980s did indeed witness a temporary eclipse of Keynesian policies, Keynesianism was not dead – as proven by its comeback in the 1990s

STUC and the TUC had agreed to Wilson´s 1974 Social Contract, this pact was in disarray. Union members, particularly within the public sector, had suffered a loss of over 13 per cent in real wages between 1975 and 1978.[15] In addition, the Labour governments of both Wilson and Callaghan had progressively imposed cash limits on public spending thus breaching the party's commitment to rising living standards.[16] However, while living standards did suffer a substantial drop between 1975-7 – with average household disposable income dropping by 0.8 per cent in 1976 and 2.4 per cent in 1977, by 1978 they were rising again.[17] Minkin convincingly links the events of the Winter of Discontent with the rising expectations of trade unionists who, in the 1978 context of limited economic recovery, believed they deserved a reward for their sacrifice.[18] In fact, following the Government's announcement of the cash limits imposed for 1978/9 and ahead of the TUC September Conference, the leadership of the main British unions encouraged Callaghan to hold an autumn election predicting industrial strife during the winter.[19] Industrial unrest to overcome wage restraint started with the Ford workers, who got a 17 per cent increase.[20] By the end of January 1979, water workers, ambulance drivers, nurses and sewerage staff amongst others were involved in state-wide co-ordinated industrial action.[21]

The prolonged pay constraint had generated cleavages between public and private sector workers but also within those sectors, between the lower paid, unskilled workers and the

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and 2000s. Jim Tomlinson, 'Tale of a Death Exaggerated: How Keynesian Politics Survived the 1970s', *Contemporary British History*, 21 (2007), pp. 429-48.

[15] Peter Gourevitch *et al*., *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden* (London, 1984) p. 56; Robert Taylor, 'The Trade Union "Problem" in British Politics', in Ben Pimlott and Christopher Cook (eds), *Trade Unions in British Politics*, (London, 1982) p. 207. For a study on the relationship between the trade unions and the party see Andrew Taylor, *The Trade Unions and the Labour Party* (London, 1987).

[16] A view often expressed within the STUC when discussing economic-related issues since 1976. See chapter 1.

[17] CSO, *Social Trends*, 18 (1988) p. 84 quoted in Minkin *The Contentious Alliance*, p. 151, footnote 48 and p. 152 footnote 55.

[18] Minkin, *The Contentious Alliance*, p. 126.

[19] Geoffrey Goodman, *From Bevan to Blair: Fifty Years Reporting from the Political Frontline* (London, 2003) pp. 226–227.

[20] Ken Coates and Tony Topham, *Trade Unions and Politics* (Oxford, 1986), p. 198.

[21] López Martín, *The Winter of Discontent*, p. 1.

rest. The limits imposed by the Labour government were easily infringed for workers in the private sector or nationalised industries, whereas it was more complicated for workers in the public service sector. This was a source of conflict and some ambivalence within the STUC, which seemed more inclined to support free collective bargaining than the TUC – possibly due to lower regional salaries. While the British unions voted to support the £6 limit by a 2:1 majority at the 1975 TUC congress, that same year the STUC congress backed, with little debate, two motions against wage restraint but supported a softer line in 1976.[22] The debate was exceptionally intense at the 1977 congress.[23] The day before the vote, Ian Imrie, industrial editor of the *Glasgow Herald*, predicted that the STUC would vote 'against pay policy' passing a composite motion moved by the Scottish Miners (NUMSA) and supported by the General Council (GC) demanding a return to free collective bargaining.[24] He remarked on the 'surprise decision' of the Scottish Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) delegation to go against the national leader's wishes, noting that while this rejection would be 'virtually meaningless in the national [British] context' the rejection of the Social Contract 'by such a representative gathering will encourage the Left even more'.[25] At all three congresses it was M. McGahey, the Communist Regional Secretary of the NUM, who moved the motions prompting the end of wage restraint. Meanwhile, the general secretaries of the main British unions advocated alignment with TUC policy, which vaguely defended an 'orderly return' to free collective bargaining.[26] Those calling for an end to the Social Contract pointed out that supporting a third round of pay restraint would be 'inconsistent' with the STUC's criticism of

[22] *The Times*, 4 September 1975, frontpage; STUC, *78th Report* pp. 600-4; STUC, *79th Report*, pp. 504-11; *The Times*, 20 April 1976, frontpage. More detailed analysis on the STUC reaction to incomes policy in chapter 1.
[23] STUC, *80th Report*, pp. 678-94.
[24] *The Glasgow Herald (GH)*, 20 April 1977, frontpage.
[25] Jack Jones had been an architect of the Social Contract. Telling of the rank-and-file desire to return to free collective bargaining is the 1978 change in the TGWU union leadership, with Moss Evans moving away from his predecessor's policy.
[26] Such was the argument made by A. Spanswick, General Secretary of COHSE and member since 1977 of the TUC's GC, and A. Donnet, national chairman of the GMWU and also member of the TUC's GC, STUC, *80th Report*, p. 682 and 684.

the government's economic policy.[27] Ultimately, the STUC barely defeated the composited motion with a majority of 50 (1,017 against and 967 for).[28] By 1978, the rejection of incomes policy by the rank-and-file across Britain including Scotland evidently affected the STUC and TUC's refusal to reach a formal agreement with the Labour government.[29]

Rejection of Callaghan's latest pay policy was partly linked to the profile change in trade union membership. As table 2.1 shows, between 1973 and 1979 membership within the STUC increased significantly among public sector workers such as civil and public servants, which integrated health workers, and Local Government Employees, integrating education employees until 1980 (see table 1.3). The unions with the largest increase during the 1970s were the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), and the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU), all involved in the 1978 industrial unrest. Accompanying this shift was the steady influx of women into the trade union movement, reflecting their entry into the expanding public sector.[30] By the end of the decade, women comprised almost 30 per cent of trade unionists – a 73 per cent increase from 1966 – concentrated in low-paid, unskilled jobs, and represented 92.8 per cent of part-time workers in Britain.[31] In 1979, the General Secretary of the STUC, Jimmy Milne, told Congress that affiliation returns showed that 276,063 affiliates out of the 1,054,000 total were

[27] Such as P. Talbot of the ASTMS, STUC, *80th Report*, p. 683.
[28] 'Scottish TUC Rebuffs Militant Miners', *The Times*, 21 April 1977, frontpage.
[29] As stated by David Basnett, leader of the GMWU quoted in Marsh, *The New Politics*, pp. 51-52 and 59-64. STUC, *81st Report*, pp. 521-528.
[30] Chris Wrigley, 'Women in the Labour Market and in the Unions,' in McIlroy, Fishman, and Campbell, *The High Tide of Trade Unionism*, p. 44. The influx of women and the rise of Second Wave Feminism effected some formal change on the STUC's agenda across the 1970s, bringing forward the issue of Equal Opportunities – in education but also in the labour market, calling for equal pay, for universal nursery care, etc). In the UK, the Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975. The year 1975 was declared International Women's Year by the United Nations, which also established 1976-85 as International Women's Decade. See also Tara Martín, 'The Beginning Labor's End? Britain's "Winter of Discontent" and Working-Class Women's Activism', *International Labor and Working-Class History* 75 (2009), pp. 49-67. For analyses on the role of women in the movement Linda McDowell, Anitha Sundari, and Ruth Pearson, 'Striking Narratives: Class, Gender and Ethnicity in the "Great Grunwick Strike", London, UK, 1976-1978.' *Women's History Review* 23.4 (2014) pp. 595-619; Dolly Smith Wilson, 'A New Look at the Affluent Worker: The Good Working Mother in Post-War Britain,' *Twentieth Century British History* 17.2 (2006) pp. 216–217.
[31] Wrigley, 'Women in the Labour Market', pp. 44-5.

women nuancing that, as some unions did not differentiate by gender, the number was likely to be higher.[32] In the same speech, he lamented the low number of female delegates for being unrepresentative of their weight within the movement.[33] In his presidential address, C. Drury (NALGO) raised the concern that 'woman trade unionists in Scotland [were] without a voice of their own in the inner cabinet of this movement' and called on delegates to 'reflect whether equality of opportunity' required 'a helping hand'.[34] Still, in 1980 only 38 out of 580 trade union delegates were women and by 1982/3, just three women sat in the STUC's GC, out of 26 members.

Table 2.1. Industrial sections and changes in affiliation.

	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	% VARIATION
Mining (Fuel and Power)	71,985	29,470	28,916	59,967	56,556	69,420	67,902	- 5.67
Transport and Docks	156,842	155,833	156,855	156,628	166,136	165,533	165,470	+ 5.5
Shipbuilding, Engineering, etc	181,841	189,987	198,138	185,657	177,440	178,417	177,289	- 2.5
Building	46,441	45,649	41,666	44,719	46,859	46,471	Est. 46,471	+ 0.06
Printing and Paper	29,985	29,726	30,102	30,963	30,560	30,750	c. 29,142	+
Textile and Pottery	c. 40,878	41,054	c.40,203	c. 37,088	37,132	38,898	Est. 37,000	- 9.49
Food, Drink, Tobacco and Distributive	60,882	59,384	61,667	c. 61,198	62,433	63,549	c.67,788	+ 11.34
Non-Manual Workers	42,354	44,787	c. 44,482	63,097	65,723	70,865	Est. 68,000	+60.55
Civil and Public Servants	56,434	78,395	c. 81,682	c. 95,533	108,223	105,031	103,350	+ 83.13
Local Government Employees	185,061	196,364	202,577	223,485	c. 249,051	267,624	284,722	+ 53.85
STUC TOTAL	c.872,703	870,649	c.886,288	958,335	1,000,113	1,036,558	c.1,045,134	+ 19.76

Sources: STUC, *Annual Reports*, 1973-1979.

Following the Winter of Discontent, and the disappointing results of the 1979 devolution referendum, the campaign for the general election in Scotland focused on economic issues.[35] While Thatcher framed the election as a choice between socialism/decline and modernisation/freedom; Labour set the tone of the campaign in Scotland, framing the election as a choice between 'partnership' and 'participation' versus a 'selfish and destructive free-for-all' – highlighting the reduction of inflation from over 20 per cent to around 10 per cent with the help of the unions.[36] Launching his Scottish election campaign in Glasgow on 9 April,

[32] 'Report of Proceedings' in STUC, *82nd Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1979), p. 342.
[33] In its 82 years, only two women chaired the GC of the STUC.
[34] While thanking Betty McIntyre as she retired from the GC, STUC, *82nd Report*, p. 379.
[35] *GH*, 17 April, 1979, frontpage. In fact, the *GH* published a System Three opinion poll before the election showing that only a 3 per cent of the population thought of devolution as a main issue.
[36] http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/great-britain/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-great-britain.aspx [last accessed 15 January 2018]. Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, p. 189. Callaghan's speech in Glasgow on 9

Callaghan centred on the negative effects a Tory government would have on unemployment, Scotland's greater marker of relative deprivation.[37] The Labour Party proposed to keep fighting for low unemployment and increased living standards maintaining the tripartite pact involving the state, industrial management and the unions.[38] However, despite the theme of co-operation, Callaghan also argued for industrial reform. During a speech in Leicester, he called for a national agreement on pay bargaining and industrial relations, encouraging unions to reform themselves instead of imposing legislation.[39] Arguably inspired by the experience of the February 1974 general election, Callaghan deeply believed that a 'pledge' to moderation by the British unions would help him win. Known as the Concordat, provisions included strikes to be a last resort, suggesting arbitration instead and calling for more secret ballots.[40]

While a large majority of STUC delegates supported the motion defending free collective bargaining in 1979, differences of opinion remained.[41] On behalf of the TGWU, R. Macdonald argued that free collective bargaining was the only mechanism workers had to protect their living standards and eradicate low pay within a mixed economy. Additionally, collective bargaining could be used to create employment negotiating working conditions such as the 35-hour week. The motion rejected 'Government intervention in wage bargaining… *formal* incomes policies or cash limits in the public services'. However, McDonald defended the TUC/Labour government 'agreement' as part of the AES. Reiterating that trade unions were 'part of a community of interests', he spoke of 'responsible' free collective bargaining,

April, quoted in *GH*, 10 April 1979, p. 5. In the *Scotsman* newspaper, assistant editor Chris Baur also summarised the two main parties' key points as follows. Labour stood for 'social justice' defending 'need, not greed', 'people before profit' and 'caring and sharing' as opposed to Tory emphasis on the self: 'self-reliance', 'self-confidence', 'self-help'. *The Scotsman*, 14 April 1979, p. 4. Peter Hetherington, 'The 1979 General Election Campaign in Scotland' in *The Scottish Government Yearbook* (1980), p. 95.

[37] 'Callaghan sees Tory threat to Scots Jobs' in *GH*, 10 April 1979, p.5. See Chapter 1.

[38] See the Labour Party's manifesto *The Labour Way is the Better Way* in http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1979/1979-labour-manifesto.shtml [last accessed 18 December 2017].

[39] Quoted in *GH*, 17 April, 1979, p. 5.

[40] *GH*, 17 April, 1979, p. 5.

[41] The following quotes come from the discussion on free collective bargaining in STUC, *82nd Report*, pp. 480-9.

accepting 'guidance' but not legislation. For the Civil Servants, J. Prior supported the composite motion 'with a word of warning against the Concordat'. By contrast, delegates of the National and Local Government Officers' Association (NALGO), whose British general secretary G. Drain participated in the creation of the Concordat, were vocal against 'the fallacy of free collective bargaining'. Drain argued that the majority position within the STUC contradicted the parallel claims for government control 'of everything conceivable under the sun'. On his part, NALGO's Scottish District Organization officer, C. Drury, argued that Scottish trade unionists should present free collective bargaining as 'a feature' of the mixed economy system rather than 'a tenet of our faith'. There was also criticism of the STUC's commitment to end low wages, a commitment defined by a delegate from the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA) as somewhat hypocritical, considering the 'established relationships between the skilled and unskilled' in reference to the wage differentials within unions.

Maintaining a critical stance towards the 'Concordat', the STUC pledged to fight for the return of a Labour government conflating trade union and regional needs. Labour's electoral pledge clearly opposed the vague Conservative promise to '[concentrate] welfare services on the effective support of the old, the sick, the disabled and those who are in real need'.[42] Moving an emergency motion on the General election, Jimmy Milne, STUC General Secretary and CPGB member, stressed that 'we sincerely believe that [Labour] are good for the national interest' and they had 'generally' been 'attentive to the needs of trade unionists'. He also asserted that '[Labour's] commitment to maintaining the essential fabric of the health and social services, comprehensive education, labour employment legislation and health and safety at work' warranted STUC support. Moreover, he carried on the rhetoric that presented

[42] Delegates quotes in this paragraph are from the discussion on an emergency motion on the general election. STUC, *82nd Report*, pp. 457-62. See also Conservative Party, *A New Beginning* (1979) https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110858 [last accessed 8 May 2021].

the organisation as a proxy for Scottish opinion, defending the STUC's criticism of Callaghan's government in connection with Scotland's distinctive electoral behaviour stating (for the first time) that

> This Congress is often accused of being hyper-critical of Labour government policies, and I think there is a grain of truth… But, on the other hand, please look at Scottish electoral performance. I would suggest that had other parts of the country voted as we have done in Scotland since the early sixties, we would never had had a Tory government during that period…

Speaking on behalf of the Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), P. Hunter supported the motion, justifying the disappointing performance of the Callaghan government on its slim majority. While also supporting the motion, M. McGahey (NUMSA) showed his scepticism repeating that 'what we require is a Labour government committed to the policies of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement that will take us… to a Socialist Britain where industrial democracy will truly express itself'. Finally, the nationalisation of key industries such as shipbuilding was also highlighted to mobilise support for the Labour party. [43]

McGahey's statement also constitutes a preview of the crisis over policy and power that would affect Labour after the 1979 elections, which until 1983 was expressed as a left-wing backlash.[44] Between 1979 and 1981, delegates repeatedly called to 'democratise' the Labour Party – diffusing the power from the top and making the leadership accountable by 'extending voting rights in leadership elections to trade unionists and constituency Labour parties (CLPs)'.[45] Finally, Michael Foot was elected leader in a special conference in Wembley in January 1981, facing Dennis Healey – who stayed on as deputy leader, and attending delegates agreed that the votes within that college would be split between MPs, CLPs and the trade unions on a 30-30-40 proportion. In exchange, the party tightened nomination rules including a 5 per

[43] For example, a delegate of the GMWU emphasised the creation of the British Shipbuilders despite Conservative and SNP's opposition, while a delegate of the Boilermakers ominously stated that 'the destiny of the shipbuilding industry relies on the establishment of a Labour government'. STUC, *82nd Report*, p. 423.
[44] For brief accounts of Labour's crisis see Eric Shaw, 'The Wilderness Years 1979-1994' in Brivati and Heffernan (eds) *The Labour Party*, pp. 112-42; and chapter 10 of Andrew Thorpe, *A History of the British Labour Party* (2nd edn, Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 188-212.
[45] Tom Quinn, 'From the Wembley Conference to the "McDonnell Amendment": Labour's Leadership Nomination Rules', *The Political Quaterly*, 89.3 (2018), p. 476.

cent MP support threshold.[46] Also at that conference, the Labour party committed to unilateral disarmament and withdrawal from the EEC.[47] The advance of the left intensified the internal divide existing within the party at least since the 1950s, between left-wing Bevanites and the revisionist Gaitskellites. Finally, it was resolved with the defection of politicians such as Roy Jenkins and the creation of the splinter party Social Democratic Party (SDP).[48] Soon after, Tony Benn challenged Healey for the deputy leadership but narrowly lost by 49.6 per cent to 50.4 per cent in September 1981.[49]

In 1979, despite criticism and disenchantment at the record of Callaghan's government, the motion calling on the STUC membership to campaign for Labour was unanimously carried. However, rather than unconditionally supporting Labour, the unions were coming together against a common enemy. Emphasising that a Conservative victory was very much against the interests of workers (and thus Scotland) because a Thatcher-led government would abandon the pursuit of equality through wealth redistribution to prioritise 'wealth creation', they were partly responding to the Conservative leader's disdain for the unions and the new challenges to industrial mobilisation.[50]

The Thatcherite cure to the 'British disease'

The debates about incomes policies evidence the increasing division among workers that accompanied the membership shift from the declining traditional unionised industries to public sector and service workers, but was also apparent between skilled and unskilled workers

[46] *Ibid.*
[47] James E. Cronin, *New Labour's Pasts: The Labour Party and its Discontents* (2004), p. 204.
[48] Jonathan Davis and Rohan McWilliam, 'Introduction: New Histories of Labour and the Left in the 1980s' in Jonathan Davis and Rohan McWilliam (eds), *Labour and the Left in the 1980s* (2017), pp.9-10.
[49] Shaw, 'The Wilderness Years', p. 115.
[50] As argued by H. Wyper, communist Scottish Secretary of the TGWU, who quoted Thatcher on this while moving a composite motion in unemployment, see STUC, *82nd Report*, p. 439. Thatcher had consistently argued that redistribution was a constraint to economic growth at least since 1975, e.g. in a Speech to the Institute of Socioeconomic Studies on 15 September available in https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102769 [accessed 12 May 2021].

across the 1970s. Growing internal division undermined class solidarity to some extent, which is seen in the contributions of public sector union delegates to the STUC congresses from 1979. For instance, in 1980, C. Gallacher (NALGO) stated that 'we in the public sector union must convince our friends in the private sector that our fight is their fight'.[51] The TGWU delegate echoed this sentiment, defining the working people as everyone but the wealthy, 'those who work by hand or brain, the elderly, the sick and the young'.[52] Trade union delegates blamed the increasing difficulties in mobilising workers on the 'assault' on the trade union movement. After the Winter of Discontent, workers' representatives from private sector and traditional industries expressed concern at the growing popularity of what they unanimously called 'the journalists' myth' or 'the Tory lie': the linkage of wage increases with higher inflation and rising prices.[53] However, this was not the only challenge to class solidarity and mobilisation that Scottish and British trade unionists would have to face from the late 1970s. Militancy also came heavily under attack.

Militant trade unionism along with rising inflation, accelerating deindustrialisation and growing unemployment contributed to the emergence in the 1970s of a '*right-wing* version' of the declinist rhetoric first developed by the Labour Party in the late 1950s.[54] Declinism, or 'the explanation of relative decline', emerged as a left-wing nationalist critique of the British elite arising from the perception that the British economy was growing at relatively lower rates than the rest of the world economy as a whole.[55] This left-wing rhetoric blamed the empire and British internationalist capitalism for the national decline. The former cushioned the realities of the increasingly competitive global market through protected markets and for drawing the

[51] STUC, *83rd Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1980), p. 515.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 528.
[53] R. Macdonald (TGWU) and J. Smith (AUEW-TASS) supporting it, STUC, *82nd Report*, pp. 480 and 486.
[54] Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, p. 64; Jim Tomlison, 'The politics of declinism' in Black, Pemberton and Thane, *Reassessing 1970s Britain*, pp.41-60; David Edgerton, *The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: a Twentieth-Century History* (UK, 2018) [e-book], pp. 291-307.
[55] Edgerton, *The Rise and Fall.*, p. 298. Edgerton suggests that is useful to partly think of declinism as part of the anti-deferential mood of the 1960s.

elite away from industry, while the latter undermined the national economy via imports. The press amplified this narrative across the 1960s, diagnosing 'the country's perceived economic struggle as a kind of 'British disease'.[56] In this manner, declinism 'was never merely descriptive… [but] primarily prescriptive'.[57] It was to overcome 'decline' that 'modernisation' narratives emerged in the UK in the 1960s.[58] Following from the technocratic critique of the British elite – old-fashioned, improperly trained and with wrong attitudes – Wilson prescribed technological advancement and central planning. By contrast, Thatcher framed 'modernisation' as 'rolling back the state'.[59]

Margaret Thatcher succeeded Edward Heath as leader of the Conservative Party on 11 February 1975, becoming the first woman to lead a British political party.[60] Although she served in Heath's cabinet (1970-4) as Minister for Education, Thatcher represented a different political current within the party. She summarised the economic and political views that would come to be known as Thatcherism in the press conference immediately after her election as party leader. There, she defended 'a free society with power well distributed amongst the citizens and not concentrated in the hands of the state… supported by a wide distribution of private property amongst citizens and subjects'.[61] She aimed to advance a monetarist agenda of free markets, restraint of government spending in favour of privatisation and deep tax cuts in order to transform modes of local and national governance.

The British New Right drew from the monetarism of Milton Friedman and Friedich von Hayek. Claiming that inflation was the consequence of money supply exceeding GDP growth,

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[56] Lucy Bell, 'From Cooperation to Confrontation? Trade Unionism, British Politics and the Media, 1945-1979', (University of Sheffield, 2018), p. 105. See John McIlroy and Alan Campbell, 'The High Tide of Trade Unionism: Mapping Industrial Politics 1964-79', in McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell, *The High Tide of Trade Unionism*, p. 109.
[57] Edgerton, *The Rise and Fall*, p. 301.
[58] See chapter 2 in Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, pp. 41-62.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[60] Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, p. 6.
[61] The transcript of the Press Conference can be consulted at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation digital archive [https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102487 [Consulted 16/11/2017].

mainly resulting from the state's intervention in the economy, Friedman proposed the control of money supply as the chief method of stabilising the economy.[62] On his part, Hayek focused his attack on collectivism and government planning, while also blaming the unions for distorting the labour market with their wage demands and their refusal to accept 'natural' (market-dictated) employment levels.[63] Thatcher was introduced to this strand of political and economic thinking by fellow Tory Keith Joseph, and Thatcherism owed much to the work of the right-wing think-tank Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). The CPS was established by Joseph in 1974 to expand monetarist views and attitudes with the aim of turning the political centre away from the left where it had been situated since the post-war settlement.[64]

Economic hardship in the second half of the 1970s helped popularise Thatcher's beliefs first within her party and later across British society. However, the principles of the post-war consensus were hard to shake.[65] Between 1975-7, Thatcher focused on winning the battle of ideas within her party.[66] Utilising Cold War language, she consciously linked the politics of consensus with socialism. The Conservative paper *The Right Approach to the Economy* (1977), which set out Thatcher's economic strategy, justified the need to move on from the 'socialist policies of massive spending and borrowing, high taxation, controls and over-detailed planning' on the basis that it had weakened Britain's 'national strength'.[67] The Conservative Party fought the 1979 elections on the platform of anti-statism, emphasising the dangers of the rising inflation to the socioeconomic and political stability and blaming post-war institutions

[62] Sarwat Jahan and Chris Papageorgiou, 'What Is Monetarism?' *Finance and Development*, Vol. 51.1 (2014), pp. 38-9. Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago, 1953).
[63] Von Hayek as summarised by David Stewart in *The Path to Devolution.*, p. 6.
[64] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* Pp. 314-20. Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, pp. 5-13. Thatcher served as Vice-Chairman in the CPS, see ´Margaret Thatcher and the Centre for Political Studies', *Margaret Thatcher Foundation* https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/CPS2.asp [accessed 10 November/2017].
[65] Stewart, *The Path of Devolution,* p. 7.
[66] Jim Tomlinson, 'Thatcher, Monetarism and the Politics of Inflation', in Jackson and Saunders, *Making Thatcher's Britain*, pp. 62-77.
[67] Geoffrey Howe, Keith Joseph, James Prior and David Howell, *The Right Approach to the Economy. Outline of an Economic Strategy for the next Conservative Government* (London, 1977), https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/112551 [accessed 14 December 2017].

and policies for having enlarged the state to the point of limiting individual freedom and 'crippling' private enterprise.[68]

At the epicentre of Thatcher's declinist narrative were the Labour governments but, also, the trade unions. Speaking in Cardiff, Callaghan's constituency, Thatcher accused the current Labour movement – as opposed to Attlee's and Gaitskell's Labour – of being 'a world away' from its voters.[69] She claimed that Labour voters rejected trade union militancy and the 'ugly [corporate] apparatus which has been strapped like a harness on our people' – in reference to the post-war consensus on industrial relations. Post-war corporatism entailed trade unions and business representatives participating in the management of the economy via national agreements. It was based on free collective bargaining, voluntary union regulation and clearly entailed some interventionism.[70] Framing militant trade unionism as a central component of British decline, powerful enough to 'potentially bring the country to its knees' and 'strangle' the economy, meant that breaking-up the industrial corporatist consensus was vital.[71] Proposals in the 1979 Conservative party manifesto included banning secondary picketing, which allowed a strike to spread in related businesses and turn into a national strike without a national ballot; limiting the right to strike and the closed shop; expanding the use of secret ballots within the unions; and returning to free collective bargaining.[72] As opposed to the socialist and corporatist policies of consensus leading to events such as the Winter of Discontent, Thatcher inaugurated her premiership 'offering harmony for discord, truth for error, faith for doubt and

[68] *Conservative Party General Election Manifesto* (1979), https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110858 [accessed 14 December 2017].
[69] Thatcher quoted on *GH*, 17 April 1979, p. 5.
[70] Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, p. 87. For an overview of the crisis of British corporatism see Harrison, *Finding a Role?*, pp. 288-306.
[71] As stated in the Conservative Party Manifesto. The idea that curbing trade union power was a pre-requisite for economic recovery and reconstruction and to restore managerial authority in the workplace was discussed in the late 1970s by senior Conservatives, political supporters and industrialists such as Sir John Hoskins, who came together to develop the strategy known as 'Stepping Stones'. See Peter Dorey, 'Weakening the Trade Unions, One Step at a Time: The Thatcher Governments' Strategy for the Reform of Trade-Union Law, 1979–1984', *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations*, 37 (2016) pp. 169-200.
[72] Conservative Party, *Putting Britain First*; Harrison, *Finding a Role?*, p. 153.

hope instead of despair'.[73] Not only was her project a novel solution to British decline but an opportunity for radical change.

In the 1980 congress, STUC delegates lamented the predominance of 'new trade union attitudes' characterised by decreasing militancy, with more workers choosing to take redundancy payments instead of campaigning to keep their jobs, linking them to the negative characterisation of the movement by the press.[74] However, the preceding Labour government and the TUC leadership also facilitated to an extent the union-blaming narrative.[75] Seeking to shape public opinion in favour of the Social Contract and to get trade unionists to adhere to it, the Wilson government created the Counter-Inflation Publicity Unit (CIPU) in 1975 and consciously publicised a causal link between wages and inflation, leading the public to perceive inflation as 'caused by greed'. By October 1975, 80 per cent of survey respondents asserted that they preferred 'lower wage rises and more security' to 'bigger wage rises and take a risk'.[76] As seen within the STUC debate on free collective bargaining, the TUC leadership (e.g. James Jack in 1974 and G. Drain in 1979) echoed this narrative seeking rank-and-file compliance with the Social Contract and Concordat. An inadvertent consequence of this was that any breach of the wage limits imposed by the government could potentially be construed as a sign of irresponsibility and disregard for the national needs. In this manner, self-moderation arguably contributed to further erode class solidarity ties and militancy, and Thatcher's anti-union rhetoric profited from this.

[73] Geoffrey Parkhouse, William Russell, Roy Rogers and Ian Imrie, 'Thatcher spells out her hopes – and then to work', *GH*, 5 May 1979, p. 1. David Cannadine, 'Apocalypse When? British Politicians and British "decline" in the Twentieth Century', in Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock (eds) *Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic Performance,* (Cambridge, 1997) pp. 261-84; Robert Saunders, '"Crisis? What Crisis?" Thatcherism and the Seventies' in Jackson and Saunders, *Making Thatcher's Britain*, pp. 25-42.
[74] 'Introduction' to the GC Report in STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 1.
[75] For the analysis of the Labour party's role in this process, this paragraph draws on Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, pp. 187-205.
[76] Quoted in Tomlinson, *Managing the Economy*, p. 200.

Table 2.2 The Power of Trade Unions for British Public Opinion

Date	*'Unions too powerful' (% in agreement)*
Aug. 1974	61
Aug. 1975	71
Aug. 1976	65
Aug. 1977	75
Aug. 1978	69
Aug. 1979	84
Aug. 1980	70
Aug. 1981	60
Aug. 1982	63
Aug. 1983	59

Source: Gallup Opinion Poll data quoted in David Marsh, 'Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Mrs Thatcher', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 28.1 (1990), p.60.

Disagreement within the STUC on the collective bargaining issue reflected how far Thatcherite rhetoric on the excessive power of the trade unions resonated with the British public. Trade unions reached the lowest net popularity in July 1979 (15 per cent compared to 31 per cent in August 1980).[77] Concurrently, 67 per cent of respondents to the MORI poll agreed that 'extremists and militants' controlled the unions.[78] Furthermore, the Gallup Opinion Poll data showed that the public perception of the unions as politically too powerful peaked at 84 per cent in August 1979 (see table 2.2). Nevertheless, this had been the perception of a majority of the British population at least since 1974 and the majority of the public still believed that trade unions were overall necessary and 'a good thing'.[79] In this manner, the data shows that public perception was not negative towards the existence of the trade unions *per se* but suggests that their popularity was affected by their perceived belligerence in times of economic hardship.[80] Even a 69 per cent of trade union members agreed in September 1979 that unions

[77] Marsh, 'Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Mrs Thatcher', p. 59. Net popularity was measured by the author as the percentage of respondents saying unions were a good thing minus the percentage saying they were a bad thing.
[78] https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/attitudes-trade-unions-1975-2014 [Accessed 20/01/2018]
[79] According to the Gallup respondents for the period 1954-85, as referenced by P.K. Edwards and George Sayers Bain, 'Why are Trade Unions Becoming More Popular? Unions and Public Opinion in Britain', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 26.3 (1988), p. 313.
[80] *Ibid*.; Marsh, 'Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Mrs Thatcher', p.59; Harrison, *Finding a Role?* p. 158.

had ‘too much power in Britain today’ and had agreed with that statement since 1975.[81] After the first Thatcherite mandate, this perception dropped below 60 per cent.

Thatcher’s ‘anti-social’ monetarist experiment (1979-81): framing the enemy

Chancellor Geoffrey Howe introduced his first Budget in June 1979. To incentivise entrepreneurship, the Government provided significant income tax cuts for those at the top of the income distribution (from 83 to 60 per cent) while reducing the standard rate from 33 to 30 and increasing VAT from 8 to 15 per cent.[82] Interest rates were also raised to lower inflation.[83] Concurrently, the Government cut off demand from the state as the budget announced a £1,500 million reduction in public spending, with most Whitehall departments seeing their money allocation drastically cut except for defence, where spending went up by £100 million.[84] To attract foreign investment and encourage British investment abroad, the 1979 budget relaxed foreign exchange controls – which in turn contributed to boost the already high value of sterling, lowering the competitiveness of British exports, affecting unemployment and ultimately increasing the social security bill.[85] Further cuts were announced in the first White Paper on public expenditure in November 1979.[86] Facing ‘uncertainty’ in the international economy, John Biffen – Chief Secretary to the Treasury – justified in the House of Commons the reduction of nearly £3,500 million to the Labour government’s projected spending for the year 1980/1 on economic ‘stability’.[87] Yet, the results of Howe’s 1979 deflationary budget

[81] https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/attitudes-trade-unions-1975-2014. Also, Harrison quotes a Gallup poll in January 1977 showing that 54 per cent of the public ascribed more power to Jack Jones than to the Prime Minister. Harrison, *Finding a Role*, p. 294.
[82] Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, p. 49. For a detailed catalogue of key policy changes see Fran Bennet, ‘The Conservative’s Diary. Policies Affecting Poor Families: June 1979-August 1996’ in Alan Walker and Carol Walker, *Britain Divided. The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s* (London, 1997), pp. 289-308.
[83] Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, pp. 50-51. The 1979 budget can be consulted at https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109497 [last accessed 1 September 2018].
[84] As reported on the *GH* on 13 June 1979, frontpage.
[85] Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, pp.48-53.
[86] *Public Expenditure White Paper*, Cmnd. 7746 (London, 1979).
[87] Biffen at the HC Debate 05 December 1979 vol. 975 cc443-574.

were dismal: inflation peaked in May 1980 at 22 per cent, prices increased, deindustrialisation accelerated, unemployment soared (rising from 1.3 in 1979 to 2.8 million at the end of 1980) and government borrowing rose.[88] The negative results impelled the introduction of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in the 1980 Budget, intending to reduce public spending and monetary growth through targets that could be readjusted over the course of several years – but once again, was unable to meet its goals.[89] In this manner, the budgetary cuts translated into three-fold economic policies: a reduction in regional spending, the imposition of tight cash limits, and privatisation – limited at this stage to selling the more profitable ancillary parts of the nationalised industries.[90]

National union leaders such as D. Basnett (GMWU), G. Drain, (NALGO) and A. Fisher (NUPE) condemned the 1979 budget accusing the government of 'attacking' the quality of life in Britain and benefiting the 'well off' at the expense of the more vulnerable sections of society.[91] Similarly, the GC of the STUC defined it as 'an ideologically motivated attack on the public sector in manufacturing industry'.[92] Jim Morrell emphasised this idea in the 1980 annual congress as he moved a composite on economic policy covering 11 submitted motions arguing that

> there is nothing God-given or immutable about mass unemployment; there is nothing ordained in tablets of stone that requires pensioners to die from hypothermia, it is not inevitable that many working class children receive their education in cramped and inadequate schools from overworked and underpaid teachers…it is a matter of political *choice*.[93]

Morrell affirmed that this legislation responded to the Government living 'in cloud cuckoo land' and pointed out the increase of charities and their eligibility for tax exemptions claiming

[88] Historic CPI inflation figures available in https://www.inflation.eu [17 May 2021]; Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, pp.52 and 78.
[89] Jim Tomlinson, 'Mrs Thatcher's Macroeconomic Adventurism, 1979-1981, and its Political Consequences', *British Politics*, 2.1 (2007), pp. 3-19. The 1980 budget can be consulted in https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109498. Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, pp. 50-58.
[90] Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, p. 95.
[91] *GH*, 13 June 1979, p. 6.
[92] STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 551-2.
[93] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

that the government was 'abandoning left, right and centre the state's responsibilities towards its citizens'. Delegates adhered to this narrative, emphasising the regional framework calling the government to reverse its policy and increase regional assistance using 'a portion' of oil taxes as specified by an amendment.[94]

Indeed, historians have demonstrated that the Thatcherite rhetoric and the MTFS were intended to transform the public's expectations on macroeconomic management. More specifically that 'real economic variables' such as economic growth and unemployment – as opposed to 'financial variables' such as the inflation rate – were out of the Government's scope.[95] Anticipating a rise in unemployment in the aftermath of the new policies, the Conservative government was pressed to change the public's expectations to win 'the battle for political argument hegemony'.[96] They built on the 'Labour isn't working' discourse that had emerged during the elections to deflect their responsibility for growing unemployment to militant trade unionists, including those involved in collective bargaining. The Steelworkers dispute over a pay rise, starting in January 1980 and dragging on for several months, was a good example.[97] It was the first major industrial dispute under Thatcher's rule. The British Steel Corporation (BSC) announced in November 1979 that it planned to close several plants, shedding one third of its workers. Although the strike had the potential to further damage other debilitated industries, Joseph refused to intervene as Secretary of State for Industry and Thatcher blamed the potential loss of jobs on the strikers, defending her government's position that an industry should not depend on subsidies. Ultimately, the strike was resolved via an inquiry headed by Labour's Harold Lever, who recommended a settlement 'of around 16 per cent, including productivity deals', and a promise by Joseph that the industry would remain

[94] Debate on different motions regarding economic policy in *ibid.*, pp. 450-71.
[95] Tomlinson, 'Macroeconomic Adventurism', p. 8. See also Jim Bulpitt, 'The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher's domestic statecraft', *Political Studies* 34.1 (1986), pp. 19-39. Drawing from these historians, chapter 1 of this thesis suggests that the Labour governments of 1974-9 initiated this trend.
[96] Bulpitt, 'Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statescraft', p. 38.
[97] For this discussion I draw from Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher,* pp. 98-100.

subsidised for another year.[98] While the steelworkers negotiated a pay rise well above the initial 2 per cent offer, Thatcher did make her point against government intervention in industrial disputes and closures were accepted.

She continued with a rhetoric that saw militancy primarily as an economic problem. Blaming 'communists and militants' in spearheading the trade union made it possible for her to proceed with the industrial relations reform, in particular with James Prior's Employment Act in 1980.[99] The Act limited the definition of lawful picketing to those workers in dispute with their employer and in their place of work, making secondary picketing illegal, and denying the right to claim for unfair dismissal to workers of new companies.[100] A requirement of an 80 per cent majority ballot for a closed shop was also introduced, with public funds being made available to finance postal ballots for workers to participate in key union decisions.[101] Despite all her rhetoric and her resolve to end the industrial consensus, Thatcher's cabinet proceeded with caution in the years between 1979-1983.[102] It was not until her second term, following a landslide victory in the 1983 general elections, that Thatcher went full force, passing legislation to deal directly with the trade union's political activity.[103]

STUC delegates fiercely opposed the 1980 Act, arguing that it was confusing, confrontational and of a discriminatory nature.[104] A composite motion was unanimously passed opposing the (then) Bill on the grounds that it 'hit' at the most vulnerable sections of workers – women and the low paid, purposefully undermining trade union organisations. D. MacGregor of the TGWU criticised the government's tactic of expanding 'old myths and slogans about the excesses of trade union power'. He insinuated that unions only had 'negative power', the power

[98] *Ibid.* p. 99.
[99] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, pp.97-108.
[100] The 1980 Employment Act is available online on the website www.legislation.gov.uk, as are other Acts; Stewart, *The Path to Devolution.*, p. 90.
[101] Laybourn, *A History of British Trade Unionism*, pp. 203-214; Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 40.
[102] Jackson and Saunders, 'Introduction', p. 5.
[103] Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, pp. 87-94.
[104] Quotes in this paragraph drawn from these debates in STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 613-21.

‘to stop things and stop the worst excesses’, in contrast with the positive power of industrial democracy. He called all unions to act against the bill and the GC to coordinate it. R. Todd, also from the TGWU, argued that the Bill was an attack on the traditional statutory protections established by Parliament, and that the Tory proposals had been birthed by employers – born at the Grand Council of the CBI. A. McDonald described the bill as ‘unfair’, ‘unnecessary’ – because workers had already been ‘muzzled’ – and ‘dangerous’ because it would provoke ‘frustration and anger’ encouraging increased militancy and extremism. G. Orr of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) made the point that the Bill was restricting maternity and women rights while under a woman prime minister. Meanwhile, R. West of the Edinburgh trades council linked the attack on women’s rights to unemployment and benefits: married women were less likely to register as unemployed and hence get unemployment benefits. Finally, West suggested that the consequences for picketing of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill in combination with the Employment Act was a threat to civil liberties with ‘a Scottish dimension’, and asserted

> ‘Suppose we had a Scottish Assembly now and suppose that Assembly was responsible for Scottish legislation. Is it conceivable that the people of Scotland and their elected representatives would inflict this legislation upon themselves? ... No. I think that is a very good practical argument why we ought to have had a Scottish Assembly at the time of the Referendum, and why we need one now.

Once again, Scottish workers were conflated with Scottish people and the need for political devolution was justified by vaguely reintroducing the notion of accountability. This notion had first come to the fore as an argument against EEC integration, viewing the Common Market as a tool that defended the interests of multinational corporations. Facing Thatcherism and the objective growth of social and regional inequality from 1979, political accountability became central to the argument for devolution in the STUC rhetoric. But now, the national (regional) ‘other’ was re-scaled.

Thatcherism and inequality

The 1979 budget reduction in public spending included unemployment, sickness and invalidity benefits as well as maternity allowances.[105] Additionally, the budget included a further £900 million cut in social services and the NHS, encouraging privatisation. The restructuring of the health service began in 1980 with the Health Services Act, which abolished the Health Services Board, allowed for the reintroduction of pay-beds into the Scottish Health Service and forced health boards to adhere to their allocated budget, as the Scottish Office was no longer required to finance their expenditure.[106] Other measures to boost privatisation in the NHS later included tax exemptions and encouraging the uptake of private insurance schemes in 1982. Additionally, there were frequent rises in prescription and dental charges. Meanwhile, the Social Security Act 1980 ended the earnings-related supplement, linked pensions to price rises estimates, cut the uprating of benefits, eliminated benefits for those in strike as well as their families, and eliminated the local education authorities' compulsion to provide nursery education or school meals to other than the children of families on benefits among other measures.[107]

[105] Francis McGlone, 'Away from the Dependency Culture? Social Security Policy' in Stephen Savage and Lyndon Robins (eds) *Public Policy under Thatcher* (London, 1990) pp. 161-162 quoted in Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, p. 118.
[106] Because of this policy, surgical waiting lists in the NHS rose from 65,000 in 1981 to 88,000 in 1983. Claire Donnelly, 'Private Health care in Scotland', *Scottish Government Yearbook 1986* (1986) p. 183.
[107] The UK Government, *1980 Social Security Act* can be consulted in https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/30/contents [Last accessed 9 July 2021].

Fig. 2.1 % of population below 60 per cent median income



Sources: Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

As poverty levels rose, social inequality became of growing concern to British and Scottish trade unionists (see figure 2.1). T. Dougan of the Boilermakers underlined the increase in inequality in his 1980 Presidential address. Evaluating Thatcher's first year, he characterised the UK as 'a class-ridden society' where the 5 per cent received 60 per cent of tax rebates while the government denied index-link pensions, social security or unemployment benefit.[108] He accused the government of bias against the poor, the sick and the unemployed, focused on fighting social security abuses instead of tax evasion and prioritising defence spending. The uneven social impact of the cuts overtook the Congress' proceedings on its third day, with delegates discussing a composite covering 10 motions in addition to eight single motions on different aspects of the cuts. C. Gallacher (NALGO) moved the composite rejecting public expenditure cuts because they represented a return to a 'society based on private affluence for the fortunate minority and public squalor for the majority' that could 'only be seen as a deliberate attack on the Welfare State and the living standards of the working people and their families'. The motion argued that the cuts would have grave consequences for employment and for social and welfare services, key to the makeup of the 'social wage'.

Outraged by these policies, delegates used harsh disqualifying words. A. Graham from the Civil Servants – involved in industrial action following the Government's refusal to

[108] STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 418-22.

implement the pay increase they were due – compared Thatcher to a 'female Dracula' thirsty for the elimination of jobs.[109] The GC also encouraged this narrative, moving the emergency motion on the budget and the economy during the 1980 congress insisting that

> The vicious increase in prescription charges, the paltry alteration to Child Benefit Allowance [increase lower than the level of inflation], and other such measures, make it clear that the Government want the worst impact of its policies to fall on those least able to bear it.' [110]

In this manner, delegates at the 83rd congress framed Thatcherism as unfair and uncaring, highlighting the agency of Thatcher's Government in promoting inequality.[111] They justified their calls for an early general election by questioning the legitimacy of the Thatcherite agenda, defining the government as 'undemocratic' for being 'anti-social'.[112] Jim Morell, in his presidential address of the STUC in 1981 defined the Thatcher government as 'the most calculatedly anti-human collection of individuals who have ruled this country since we first started to win the battle for British democracy'.[113]

As the Thatcher government powered its agenda, a plethora of academic works came out focusing on the 'politics of poverty' – particularly on the evolution of social security legislation and public images of welfare.[114] The later rose as an issue because the most popular

[109] *Ibid.*, pp. 517-39.
[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 550-1.
[111] This choice of adjectives and the emphasis delegate made on the irony that female working conditions would worsen under a woman PM points to a gendered depiction of her premiership. With the focus of this thesis being on class and regional identities, this aspect of the STUC discourse is beyond the scope of this research. Discourse analysis, however, returns other sexist remarks, such as H. Wyper of the TGWU claiming that trade unionists needed to convince people that the cuts in public spending represented 'good housekeeping'. STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 528. Historiography looking at the role of gender in depictions of Thatcher and her premierships include, Yves Golder, 'From Parodies of the Iron Lady to Margaret Thatcher's Political Image', *Polysèmes*, 23 (2020) [online]; Douglas M. Ponton, 'The Female Political Leader. A Study of Gender-Identity in the Case of Margaret Thatcher', *Journal of Language and Politics*, 9.2 (2010), pp. 195-218; Anneke Ribberink, 'Gender Politics with Margaret Thatcher: Vulnerability and Toughness', *Gender Forum*, 30.1 (2010). For a more general study on gender and politics, see Susan Kingsley Kent, *Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990* (London, 1999).
[112] STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 520.
[113] STUC, *84th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1981) p. 363.
[114] Examples include David Donnison, *The Politics of Poverty* (Oxford, 1982); Frank Field, *Poverty and Politics: the Inside Story of the CPAG Campaigns in the 1970s* (London, 1982). The charity Children Poverty Action Group was particularly active, publishing works such as David Bull and Paul Wilding, *Thatcherism and the Poor* (London, 1983); Alan Walker and Carol Walker, *The Growing Divide* (London, 1987).

newspapers in Britain increasingly reproduced stories about 'scroungers'.[115] Analysing local and national press reports of the time, Golding and Middleton found that 1 out of 8 issues related to welfare, social security and social services were reporting abuse. This discourse promoted the ideal of individual self-sufficiency which inspired Thatcher's approach to the welfare state.[116] By contrast, in Scotland, the *Scotsman* – whose daily circulation was 98,934 in 1981 – often accused Thatcher and her government of 'playing the poverty game', depicting Thatcherism as being 'against families' – particularly as the cuts affected housing and social services, but also in relation to industrial policy.[117] The *Scotsman*'s editorial at the time sympathised with Labour, which explains its contempt towards Thatcher's policy priorities, ironically claiming that cuts were made to help 'people suffering in the private sector'.[118] On its part, the *Glasgow Herald* – with a daily circulation of 116,161 in 1981 – was also critical of the cuts in public spending and reported on increasing poverty with concern. Nevertheless, the Glasgow-based newspaper – sympathetic to the newly established SDP-Liberal Alliance – was not as aggressive towards the Government.[119]

Portraying the Thatcherite government as an ally of 'the rich' who kept 'getting richer', designing policies to 'perpetuate that class' – the top 5 per cent – was arguably STUC's response to Thatcher's 'middle-class' rhetoric.[120] To overcome the 'divisive' socialist model of class and create 'a completely new popular constituency', Thatcher blurred the lines between 'working' and 'middle' class by using a language 'of "ordinariness", hard-working

[115] Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, *Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty* (Oxford, Robertson, 1982).
[116] Walker and Walker, *Britain Divided.*, pp. 5-6.
[117] Such as in February 1980 after the coal prices went up. *Scotsman*, 15 and 16 February 1980.
[118] *Scotsman*, 16 February 1980.
[119] For an intensive study of the SDP, a breakaway party formed by right-wing elements of the Labour Party, see Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, *SDP: the Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party* (Oxford, 1995). For an account of the Alliance, see Jeremy Josephs, *Inside the Alliance: an Inside Account of the Development and Prospects of the Liberal-SDP Alliance* (London, 1983).
[120] 'Editorial', *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 13 (April-June 1981), p. 3. References to her economic policies as a vicious onslaught are constant and can be found in the editorials of almost every number of the periodical, see for example Barry Sherman, 'Tory Economic Policy' in *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 11, (1980), pp. 20-1.

respectability and family-centred individualism'.[121] Believing in the Victorian division between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, Thatcher argued that by neglecting to make such a distinction the modern welfare state had created a dependency culture in the UK.[122] She insisted that her government's tight targets and policies were necessary and inevitable for Britain to recover and that they were in line with 'every other' (Western) country's monetary and fiscal policies.[123] At a time when the occupational structure in the UK had shifted and the labour force was more evenly divided between professional and managerial work, intermediate occupations and manual work, she linked these values to the middle-class assuming them as her own. This allowed her to cast her project onto a majority, which combined with the reference to their historical roots in the Victorian age contributed to give her values a national dimension. Conversely, the STUC sought to defend and expand its own constituency and that of a left-wing Labour Party. The regional framework provided the Scottish workers' organisation with an opportunity not afforded to the TUC. The rise of inequality made a compelling case for devolution based on democratic accountability, particularly considering electoral divergence.

Taking the relative deprivation framework a step further, articulating regional grievance through an anti-Scottish, undemocratic portrayal of the Thatcherite government, Scottish trade union delegates further othered Thatcherism. Because Scotland was very dependent on state investment, Thatcherite economic and social policies were easily portrayed

[121] Lawrence and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 'Margaret Thatcher and the Decline of Class Politics', p. 134. This paragraph draws heavily on their analysis of Thatcher's 'new' constituency. According to the authors, Thatcher used the terms 'ordinary people' or 'ordinary working people' at 175 public events between 1975 and 1990. Thatcher, *The Downing Years*, p. 625. Another interesting analysis on the rise of the middle-class rhetoric in British politics and the decline of class politics during the Thatcher years includes Harrison, *Finding a Role?* pp.141-50.

[122] Thatcher supported Novak's conception of 'democratic capitalism' as a moral and social as well as an economic system. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, pp. 626-7; Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, pp.178-84.

[123] TINA – 'There is No Alternative' – quickly became associated with her persona. Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher*, p. 87.

as especially harmful for the region.[124] In a paper submitted ahead of a meeting with Younger, Secretary of State for Scoland, on 17 September 1979, the GC rejected selling off profitable state industrial assets, opposing the loss of public accountability in the increasingly competitive global market. Driven by profit, private multinational companies had 'no allegiance to the welfare of peoples or states'. This justified the need 'for some democratic [public] control through the State' or nationalisation.[125] Additionally, the loss of British sovereignty because of EEC membership made 'more difficult the adoption of alternative [social and economic] policies that meet the needs of the British people', specifically controlling manufacturing imports and capital exports – another key economic claim.[126] STUC delegates and the GC blamed increased competition, the 'outflow of investment capital' and the rise in prices within the Common Market for many closures. For example, the decision of the harvester manufacturer Massey-Ferguson in Kilmarnock to move production to France and the closure of the pig slaughtering Lawsons of Dyce due to the difficulties in adapting to EEC regulations, were framed as examples 'of the deleterious effects…particularly on the Scottish economy, of Common Market membership'.[127]

Accelerated deindustrialisation added an extra layer to the inequality narrative in a region characteristically reliant on the public purse. In addition to shipbuilding and steel, closures were affecting Scottish branches of multinational companies that had come to Scotland in the 1960s. These developments validated the STUC's narrative against the cuts and its call for state interventionism, a central element in the AES. A composite was unanimously adopted at the 1980 congress insisting on the need for the government to '[recognise] its role

[124] See chapter 1. The regional effects on Thatcherite policies in Scotland was a point consistently made by the GC to government ministers at various meetings, such as at meetings with Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland and Joseph as Secretary of State for Industry across 1979-80, STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 93-126.
[125] Paper quoted in STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 104-14.
[126] As stated in a 1979 resolution against the Common Market and in the discussion of a composite covering 3 motions on import and export controls. STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 201 and pp. 453-7.
[127] GC meeting with Younger in May 1979, STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 96.

as an economic agent' in an interdependent world.[128] Amid the global recession, the GC argued that the government needed to support struggling industries against 'unfair competition' and help them adapt to EEC regulations.[129] Moving the motion on economic policy in the 1981 annual congress, J.D. Pollock of the Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS), confirmed that while 'not all the problems of Scottish industry can be placed at the door of No. 10 Downing Street… almost every existing problem has been aggravated, and new ones have been created' by Thatcherism.[130] He focused on unemployment, which continued to decline 'at a faster rate than in the UK' particularly in manufacturing, which in Scotland was falling 'at a rate of 3.5 percent compared with the 2.5 per cent national figure'. Similarly, D. Kane of the Cumbernauld trades council stated that while there were 'many reasons for our economic decline' the most important was government policy.[131] Government intervention in the economy 'to offset any international competition' remained central to STUC's economic policy in 1982-3.[132] Within an economically interdependent world and in the EEC, Thatcherism was but another instrument serving unregulated, monopoly capitalism. Seeking wealth creation over wealth redistribution, the monetarist policies pursued by the government inherently hurt the interests not only of workers but of the poorer regions and their communities. Because the Conservative Party lost both the general and the 1980 local elections in the region, Scottish trade unionists soon suggested that the Conservatives were not only the party of 'the wealthy' class but of the richer part of England:

> 'whichever way Tory economic policy is viewed, from the social misery of youngsters being unemployed to the physical misery of the deprived or the sick unable to get adequate treatment, it is absurd, self-defeating and at many points wicked. In the short term it can only work if unemployment rises… and not too much of it will be in the Tory South East'.[133]

[128] STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 453-4.
[129] GC meeting with Younger in May 1979, STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 96
[130] STUC, *84th Report*, p. 384.
[131] *Ibid.*, p. 467.
[132] STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 383-406; STUC, *85th Report*, pp. 368-76.
[133] Barry Sherman (ASTMS), 'Tory Economic Policy', *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 11, (1980) p. 21.

In this manner, the regional socialist narrative developed within the STUC in previous years that depicted Scotland as a working-class, left-wing region, now allowed trade union delegates and the organisation to depict Thatcher as class and regional enemy. From 1980, the bundling of the themes of inequality and democratic accountability became more acute. This is connected to the sunset of traditional trade unionism in Scotland.

Devolved *socialist* democracy and the articulation of regional citizenry

STUC membership peaked in 1980 at 1,090,839 but began a steady decline the following year with a loss of 18,803 members.[134] Commenting on the reduced numbers, James Milne blamed closures and redundancies while Jim Morrell (GMWU) highlighted the added difficulty of the new industrial relations legal framework. In his presidential address at the 84th Congress, Morrell described 1980/1 as 'one of the worst in the history of the Trade Union Movement in Scotland'.[135] With the trade union movement (successfully) under attack and dealing with a contracting membership framed by rapid deindustrialisation, outsourcing and job casualization, the public sector-led GC defended the need to seek a broader consensus, collaborating with non-union organisations in Scotland. 'To build the broadest possible basis of support for the [GC]'s position on unemployment and the problems of the Scottish economy… [and] to put the maximum possible pressure on the Government for a change of policies', the GC organised an Unemployment and Public Expenditure Cuts Conference on 25 January 1980.[136]

Participants included local authority representatives as well as trade union delegates; but there were also observers from different regional bodies such as the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Scottish Council of the CBI,

[134] 'Introduction', STUC, *85th Annual Report*, (Glasgow, 1982), p. 1.
[135] STUC, *84th Report*, p. 362.
[136] STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 145-59.

the New Town Development Corporations, the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB), and parliamentary political parties. On 8 December, the GC organised an even broader gathering drawing from the experience of the 1972 Assembly on Unemployment. The Scottish Convention on Unemployment included representatives from Health Boards, Universities, Youth and Women's Organisations, Tenants and Pensioners' organisations and Scottish MPs, and the GC of the STUC presented a paper promoting its economic strategy.[137] The paper identified growing unemployment since the 1960s at a 'higher level than in the UK' and low *per capita* investment in domestic manufacturing as the key Scottish issues – even if the discovery of the North Sea oil had reduced the gap to some extent.[138] Over 800 delegates attended, but there were such differences of opinion that Ian Imrie of the *Glasgow Herald* called the Convention 'a brave fiasco'.[139]

Two interconnected elements of discord divided trade unionists (and delegates to the Convention) around strategy: whether to take industrial action for political purposes and whether to work together with other organisations.[140] These two positions had been brought forward in the 1980 annual congress. Generally, trade union leaders at the local level or representing local government workers advocated for a broad campaign against government policies. G. Massie moved a motion for the Cambuslang and Rutherglen trades council calling on the GC to escalate the campaign against the cuts involving not only workers but tenants, pensioners, etc.[141] Similarly telling was N. McIntosh of the Hamilton and District trades council's motion calling on the GC to support trade union branches to affiliate to the trades councils. For him, these local branches of the STUC were key in fighting the main issues of workers' organisations, namely 'class issues requiring solidarity and unity'.[142] Specifically,

[137] *Ibid.*, pp. 119- 35.
[138] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[139] *GH*, 9 December 1980, p. 3.
[140] *GH*, 9 December 1980, p. 3.
[141] STUC, *83rd Report*, pp. 518-521
[142] *Ibid.*, p. 511.

McIntosh brought forward the trades councils' role 'watching over' the interests both of trade unionists and the public, scrutinising, criticising and pressuring local governments – just as the STUC did at the regional level. Yet, R. Curran, speaking on behalf of NUPE (a UK-wide union) expressed 'reservations' over the call to build a broad movement, supporting the motion to escalate the campaign but arguing that a mass movement already existed in the form of the Labour Movement.[143] While 'appreciat[ing]' local and social organisations, Curran argued that the priority of the STUC was to mobilise its own army of workers. Yet, moving the emergency motion dealing with the 1980 budget on behalf of the GC, Jim Morrell (GMWU) insisted on a broad campaign.[144] Ultimately, a Standing Commission was set up after the Convention to hammer out a common approach asking for the reflation of the economy along the lines of the AES. In 1981, trades councils delegates reiterated the need to build a broader campaign, with S. Waterfield arguing that trade unions in Motherwell had 'definitely lo[st] face' and that numbers in the trades council were 'dwindling…because they feel that the [STUC]… are not successfully combatting Government's policies.[145] D. Kane also spoke of the 'demoralisation' among shop floor workers in Cumbernauld, who believed that cuts, closures and redundancies were 'inevitable'.[146] The calls to reach a broader social base were to convince people that 'it is not Britain in crisis' but 'the economic system' and the solution lay neither in Thatcherism nor in the 'consensus policies of the fifties and sixties' but in the socialist AES.[147] In March 1980, the STUC participated in the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) – an all-party campaign first launched after the failure of the 1979 referendum that also framed devolution as an extension of democracy. [148] Finally, Thatcher's 'Right to Buy' policy brought local authorities and the STUC together.

[143] *Ibid.*, pp. 535-6.
[144] *Ibid.*, p. 552.
[145] STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 392-3.
[146] *Ibid.*, p. 467.
[147] STUC, *84th Report*, p. 393; STUC, *85th Report*, pp. 368-9.
[148] Neal Ascherson, 'After Devolution', *The Bulletin of Scottish Politics*, 1 (1980), pp. 1-6.

As the PM promoted her ideal of a 'property-owning democracy', the markedly different pattern of tenure in Scotland as compared to the rest of the UK took centre stage in the regional argument against Thatcherism, characterised as undemocratic both as a policy and as a government. Collaboration between the STUC and the Scottish local authorities was not completely novel.[149] Yet, the conflict between the Labour-dominated Scottish local authorities and the Thatcherite government over the cuts in public spending enhanced their collaboration on the basis that they were the two segments of the public 'most affected' by government policy.[150] The Prime Minister legislated to encourage the 'Right to Buy' amongst council house tenants through the 1980 Tenants' Rights etc. (Scotland) Act.[151] The Act forced local authorities to sell council housing at two-thirds of its market value to their current occupiers if they so wished. It also subsidised them.

Many Scottish, Labour-dominated, local authorities opposed the sale of council houses and the house rent increases from the beginning and, as late as January 1983, the Scottish Officer minister wrote to several councils accusing them of failing 'to give sufficient priority to meeting the wishes of tenants to buy their council houses'.[152] To justify the cuts, the government claimed there was a housing 'surplus' in Scotland. However, the LPSC and the STUC strongly contested this, maintaining that housing provision in the region was inadequate to the people's needs. John Maxton – Labour MP for Glasgow – argued that there were 'acute local shortages' with 8 per cent of all Scottish households living in overcrowded conditions, up to 70,000 houses in Scotland in 1980 lacking basic commodities – such as toilet or sink, or

[149] The STUC had established a local government sub-committee in July 1976 and there were routine tripartite talks between STUC's sub-committee, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) to discuss the implications of the Rate Support Grant (RSG) limits for service delivery and its impact to the workforce.
[150] As noted in a paper created for the Unemployment Conference in January 1980, 'Government Policy and the Scottish Economy' in STUC, *83rd Report*, pp.145-59.
[151] Stewart, *The Path to Devolution*, pp. 161-172.
[152] Quoted in Gerry Hassan and Eric Shaw, *The Strange Death of Labour Scotland* (Edinburgh, 2012), p. 25.

that there was a shortage of sheltered housing for the elderly.[153] The STUC agreed with the diagnosis of the LPSC and, having previously criticised Labour's 1977 Green Paper on Housing endorsing home ownership, once again opposed privatisation.[154] Against the government's assertion that the problems with Scottish housing lay in the 'ownership mix', the GC argued that difficulties originated 'in the nature and distribution' of the stock, justifying that housing should be under community control. The STUC was concerned local authorities would sell their stock of high amenity housing, denying many families the opportunity to transfer. The organisation also rejected the provision that authorities could not buy houses back and was critical that, as opposed to England, there were no provisions in the Scottish Bill to ensure tenant participation in management – key to their definition of democracy, understanding that power diffusion would lead to the implementation of kinder, more favourable and fair measures. Finally, the GC asked the Government to remove the 'Right to Buy' from the legislation.

Table 2.3 Pattern of housing tenure in the UK in 1981 (%)

	Owner Occupied	Privately Rented	Housing Assoc.	Local Authority
England	57.7	11.4	2.3	28.6
Scotland	35.6	10.1	1.7	52.6
Wales	61.8	9.7	1.0	27.5
N. Ireland	53.1	7.9	0.4	38.6
UK	55.7	11	2.1	31.2

Source: Gavin McCrone, 'Scottish Housing in a European Perspective', *Urban Studies*, 32, 8 (1995) p. 1266.

The STUC encouraged the continued boycott of the local authorities to the cuts, supporting a resolution to this respect in the 1981 Congress.[155] To some extent, STUC support arguably linked to the potential impact of the cuts on Direct Labour Organisations (DLO),

[153] John Maxton, 'Problems and Prospects for Housing in Scotland', *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 17 (May-Aug. 1982) pp. 2-3.
[154] A fact brought up by Jimmy Milne at a meeting held on 10 March 1980 with the Minister for Home Affairs at the Scottish Office, Malcolm Rifkind, to deny that the STUC position could be seen as partisan, STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 287-93.
[155] STUC, *84th Report*, p. 463.

which the Government rejected in the name of 'efficiency' to promote competitive tendering.[156] The STUC argued that DLOs not only 'satisfied a vital social need', helping local authorities to meet their housing needs, but were 'a backbone for the construction industry' being a source of 'safe' and 'stable' employment in an otherwise casualized sector.[157] In turn, COSLA also supported the STUC resolutions in regards to DLOs, and asserted in a memorandum that the Government proposals were 'an intrusion into the freedom of local authorities to carry out their statutory responsibilities in accordance with the assessment of the needs of their localities'.[158] By contrast with previous Labour legislation, the STUC framed the increasing central government control over local authority spending as an attack on local democracy.[159]

Moving a unanimously carried composite resolution on local government finance asserting that Thatcher's local reform entailed 'a serious reversal of local democracy', D. Macgregor of the GMWU argued that all local democratic control was 'gone'.[160] C. Gallacher (NALGO) insisted that the government was threatening democracy. By giving the *appointed* Secretary of State power to intervene in local government spending and planning, the Thatcherite administration deprived *elected* authorities of that power and forced them to carry on cuts in expenditure and services regardless of the needs and wishes of the electorate.[161] The contradiction – or 'hypocrisy' in Gallacher's words – of the Thatcherite aim to 'roll back the state' in the economic sphere while implementing more political control was not lost on STUC delegates, reinforcing their characterisation of the Thatcherite government as 'undemocratic'. J. Morrell put it eloquently in his 1981 president's address, affirming 'we hear a great deal

[156] As stated in a letter sent by the Scottish Development Department to the GC in 1980 quoted in STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 243.
[157] As stated in a composite resolution adopted in 1979. STUC, *83rd Report*, p. 243.
[158] Quoted in the COSLA response the GC, STUC, *83rd Report*, p.244.
[159] Although the Labour government considered the introduction of a needs-based central grant following the 1976 IMF loan, local authorities in Scotland ultimately retained certain autonomy 'to decide their own priorities'. Hugh Brown, under-secretary of state in charge of housing, at a meeting with the GC in October 1976. STUC, *80th Annual Report* (Glasgow, 1977) p. 393.
[160] STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 595-6.
[161] Emphasis mine, 'The Cuts and Local Authority Services in Scotland', *Scottish Trade Union Review*, 16 (Feb.-Apr. 1982) pp. 7-9.

from this Government about democracy…telling us that trade unions' structures need changing and that our [socialist, militant] views are not representative of our members', but 'it is they who are unrepresentative and undemocratic'. Having 'torn up their election pledges' and launching an attack on the rights of local, democratically elected councillors to carry out their mandates from the people, the Thatcherite government was no longer aligned with the electorate.[162] He went on to define the unanimous view within the STUC that

> democracy means giving the people a voice at every level in our society. That is why we supported, and continue to support, the idea of a Scottish Assembly… we continue to insist that the people of Scotland should have a voice in those affairs which are a directly Scottish interest.

Building on their critique of EEC membership, namely how it made it difficult to implement the AES, the GC and trade union delegates feared that centralisation would widen existing local and regional differences within the UK. Ultimately, framing the conflict over public spending and service provision as matter of political choice and accountability reinforced the STUC's argument for political devolution, specifically as a firewall to Thatcherism. R. Gillespie, of the Graphical trade union, moved a composite motion on the Scottish Assembly at the 1981 congress defending an Assembly 'with teeth', with 'effective' economic and fiscal powers 'to protect and advance Scottish interests' – including powers over the SDA, HIDB, collaborating with the National Economic Planning Council and a NEB, ensuring 'industrial re-generation' using North Sea revenues. Moreover, he asserted that, had Scotland constituted the Assembly after 1978,

> we would have a natural labour majority in Scotland. As the unanimous progressive policies that you have been adopting reflect the Trade Union Movement it also reflects what a Scottish Assembly would have to reflect, the progressive views of the Scottish people and their special needs and requirements.

[162] STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 365-6. By the end of the year, Thatcher's popularity hit rock bottom, making her 'The Most Unpopular Prime Minister since Polls Began' as Ivor Crewe affirmed for *The Times*, 9 October 1981, p. 11. While careful to acknowledge that it was not uncommon for governments to suffer a slump in vote intention mid-term and noting that the public still preferred Thatcher over Foot as leader; Crewe warned that 'it would be wildly premature' to assume that she would be re-elected.

Gillespie supported his argument with the specific case of the 'Right to Buy' policy. He emphasised that Scotland had 'more council houses than any other part of the [UK]' because it was 'a deprived nation' and suggested that '[i]f we had been able to have an Assembly, because the majority of the Scottish people who voted in the referendum voted for it, we would not have to worry about selling council houses'. He argued that the Scottish Assembly should 'be empowered to determine priorities in education' – key to rebuild the Scottish economy – and take responsibility over 'health, social welfare, housing and law'. E. J. MacKenzie, of the Falkirk trades council, praised the Labour Party's commitment to devolution under new leader Michael Foot, whose case for decentralisation was 'a democratic and socialist one' – progressive, unlike the SNP's. She argued that devolution was 'part of the wider process of bringing power closer to the people' and 'within the context of an advance to socialism'.

The composite, which understood the Assembly as a 'democratic advantage for Scotland' was carried by a very substantial majority. Nevertheless, some English delegates rejected giving a Scottish dimension to problems widely affecting the British working class. D. Crawford (UCATT), who was himself from the north-east of England, recalled that back in 1968 he had claimed 'going to the STUC was like taking a course in LSD: we go into cloud cuckoo, at least some of us do, for a particular week, but fortunately the revolution stops at 1 o'clock tomorrow' returning to 'the real [class] fight'. In 1981, he insisted via a decontextualized quote by famous Scottish biographer James Boswell, that 'patriotism is the refuge of the scoundrel'.[163] The argument against devolution within the STUC remained linked to class internationalism. In 1982, H. Wyper asserted on behalf of the GC that the future Labour government should prioritise the setting-up of the Assembly to create 'a wider and more open democracy'. The resolution affirmed that 'an Elected Assembly for Scotland' would fulfil Scottish aspirations 'to bring decision taking and decision making nearer to the people of

[163] Debate on the Scottish Assembly motion in STUC, *84th Report*, pp. 538-41.

Scotland' in dealing with the industrial and economic circumstances – a U-turn to the 'steady progression of decision-making to outside, totally undemocratic organisations right from the EEC to the multi-national conglomerates' to NATO.[164] Moreover, considering the electoral divergence, a Scottish Assembly 'could have acted against the worst attacks of the Tory Government' to service provision and local democracy because it would have had control of these areas.[165]

The GC's 'Report of Activities' for the year 1982/3 shows that the leadership of the organisation worked closely with the LPSC and the Scottish Parliamentary Labour Group to agree on a comprehensive devolution policy. Finally, they agreed on increased economic powers such as transferring the responsibility for selective assistance to industry – then held by the Secretary of State, control over a proposed 'UK special Oil Fund to be allocated regionally and used specifically for industrial [re]generation', control of the SDA and responsibility for the training work of the Manpower Services Commission in Scotland. There was also agreement that the Assembly should have the power to raise tax and to reorganise local government. Contrary to the CSA advocacy of proportional representation, the STUC and Scottish Labour's Working Party preferred to maintain the 'first past the post' system.[166]

Ahead of the 1983 general election, the inhumanity and lack of accountability of Thatcher's government came to the fore. A. Barr, of the Railwaymen, but also a member of the Scottish Labour Party executive until March 1983, described his 1982/3 presidency as a 'tough' succession of industrial 'disaster[s]' in Scotland under a government displaying 'an incongruous combination of utter prejudice against workers and their organisations together with utter indifference to the ravages of their policies on the working class'. Barr framed the announcement of further closures such as that of Scott Lithgow in Greenock or Govan

[164] J. McCafferty of the Scottish Miners, STUC, *85th Report*, pp. 424-5.
[165] As argued by A. Kitson and H. Wyper (TGWU) and J. McCafferty (Scottish NUM).
[166] STUC, *86th Report*, pp. 269-70.

Shipbuilders as another example of Thatcher's disdain for compromise. He accused her of not 'caring' for the working-class people of Scotland because '[a]fter all, they didn't vote for a Tory Government in 1979'.[167] In this manner, the lack of electoral appeal of the Thatcherite government in Scotland offered an opportune step for the STUC to fortify its offensive and demand further devolution. Scots' electoral preference meant that the government's policies were the 'imposition of an alien political programme funded on the extremism of a right-wing alien political philosophy' as stated by D. Henderson of the General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union while moving a composite in support of the assembly.[168]

As the popularity of the Thatcher government recovered following the Falklands' War (1982), it was natural that delegates attending the 1983 STUC congress reiterated their concern at the possibility of another Tory victory and their support for the Labour party.[169] On her fraternal address on behalf of the LPSC, Helen Liddell claimed that the upcoming election would be 'a stark choice', opposing Thatcher's Victorian 'values of the poor house, of child exploitation and exploitation of workers generally' to the Welfare State. A Labour government would carry an expansionary economic policy 'spending money on good things' as opposed to Thatcherite spending on unemployment benefits and the Falklands' War. Labour pledged to cut unemployment to under one million in five years to 'give back self-respect and dignity and freedom' to the working class.[170] Moving the motion calling for the return of a Labour government, E. Clarke (NUMSA) asserted that 'we want to invest in people, not property, and that is what we would be doing in supporting the return of a Labour Government'. In seconding the motion, R. Gillespie of the SOCAT asserted that a Labour government defined by its

[167] *Ibid.*, pp. 328-9.
[168] STUC, *86th Report,* p. 496. This union resulted from the amalgamation of the GMWU and the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers. In 1985, it was absorbed by the Amalgamated Textile Workers' Union.
[169] Ivor Crewe, Anthony D. Fox and Neil Day, *The British Electorate 1963-1987: A Compendium Data from the British Election Studies* (Cambridge, 1991) p. 311.
[170] This and the following quotes in STUC, *86th Report,* pp. 337-42.

comparison to Thatcherism would be 'a humanitarian government'. Delegates agreed that only the Labour policies embodied in its programme *New Hope for Britain* – including support for a powerful Scottish Assembly with revenue-raising powers, for unilateral disarmament, a non-nuclear defence policy, the AES, and a commitment to withdraw from the EEC – would benefit the working class and Scotland. Yet, they acknowledged that support for such a left-wing programme 'would not be automatic' after four years of Thatcherism firmly displaced the political centre to the right.[171]

Indeed, although Margaret Thatcher's first term was marked by an increase in unemployment accompanied by changes in housing, conflict with local authorities and cuts in the social services, the Conservative Party won the 1983 general elections in England with an extremely comfortable 46 per cent share of the vote. In stark contrast, there was in Scotland a slight decline in the vote of the two major parties and the SNP, explained by the strong rise of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, from a 9 per cent share of the vote in 1979 to 24.5 per cent in 1983.[172] The rise of the Alliance confirmed the fears that trade union delegates had expressed in the 1982 annual congress that the separation of 'people who have previously been bound together by their commitment…to the achievement of social justice' into different parties, would create social division.[173] The Labour Party and the STUC emphasised that Labour had won the elections in Scotland, even if 60 per cent of the votes concentrated in the central belt of Scotland and mostly Strathclyde.[174] Also, from this moment on, Scottish politicians showcased the different regional electoral pattern. In this sense, Bruce Millan, Labour's shadow secretary of

[171] Quote from R. Mennie of the Dundee Trades Council. The discussion of the motion in STUC, *86th Report*, pp. 491-5. This Manifesto would later come to be coined by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman as 'the longest suicide note in history'.
[172] J.M. Bochel and D.T. Denver, 'The 1983 General Election in Scotland', *Scottish Government Yearbook 1984* (1984) p. 8.
[173] J.D.Pollock (EIS) in his presidential address. At the time, he hoped political division would not translate into the trade union movement and believed that the 'accession of non-politically affiliated' unions such as his own to the GC was very positive for the STUC, both in this sense and to give the organisation 'authority to speak for a broader cross-section of the Scottish population' than any other organisation. STUC, *85th Report*, p. 354.
[174] Bochel and Denver, 'The 1983 General Election'.

state for Scotland, declared on 10 June that 'we cannot tolerate this situation indefinitely', while other members of the party spoke of industrial action, parliamentary disruption and local government strikes.[175] From the SNP, which had lost some of its share of the vote, public statements also focused on the fact that Thatcher had been defeated *again* in Scotland and thus 'had no mandate', warning other opposition parties to unite so that they could 'prevent anti-Scottish measures attempted by "what is effectively the Government of another country"'.[176] Political commentators such as Geoffrey Parkhouse warned Thatcher to think twice before taking her economic policy more to the Right in light of the Scottish results, and predicted that Labour MPs in Scotland would be pressing for more autonomy 'exploiting a North/South divide'. [177] The Scottish distinctive electoral performance therefore sparked a political discourse that revolved around two issues: the fact that Scotland rejected Thatcherism as a solution to the economic crisis, and that the Prime Minister lacked the necessary mandate to implement her policy in Scotland.

Conclusion

Based on survey evidence and the electoral preferences of the Scottish electorate, there is scholarly consensus that Scottish national identity came to be reassessed in terms of a collective preference for egalitarianism and collectivism particularly during the 1980s.[178] Scholars such as Nicola McEwen affirm that the opposition parties nurtured this identity, yet the findings in this chapter indicate that this narrative drew from the rhetoric developed by the STUC across the 'long 1970s'. This is not to say that Scottish organised labour followed a specific blueprint. The progressive articulation of a differentiated, class-based regional identity

[175] As quoted in William Clark, 'Scotland Produces a Little for Everyone', *GH*, 10 June 1983.
[176] *Ibid*.
[177] *GH*, 10 June 1983, frontpage.
[178] McEwen, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 126.

arose as a response to the tectonic changes occurring in the UK and across western European liberal democracies. In the earlier 1970s, facing deindustrialisation and the first challenges to post-war Keynesianism, STUC delegates began shaping their own socialist democratic project. As unemployment increased, politicians deflected responsibility, projecting blame onto free collective bargaining. Reacting to this attack, trade union representatives depicted the regional workers' organisation as a proxy for the Scottish Assembly – a devolved left-wing institution working within the UK framework for socialism. In so doing, they were articulating Scotland as a 'progressive' workers' nation. Moreover, they were also identifying nationalisation, decentralisation and wealth redistribution as vital to overcome the limitations of post-war (liberal) democracy. This allowed them to insinuate that any response to the economic recession that rejected those ingredients was undemocratic, a line of thinking that was first mobilised against EEC integration. The 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher displayed the long-term transformations of the British society, including the rise of individualism and the challenges to class identities.[179] The evidence in this chapter shows how class solidarity declined across the 1970s. This ran parallel to the changes in trade union and STUC membership that partly account for the hybridisation of class identities. The attacks on industrial militancy also hindered class-based mobilisation. After the Winter of Discontent, delegates to the STUC raised concerns over the negative perception of industrial struggle and changing trade union attitudes. Facing unprecedented governmental hostility, Scottish trade union delegates expanded the classic 'workerist' frames, for instance to be more inclusive of the growing female membership.

As trade union leaders struggled more and more to mobilise workers, the regional framework developed in the early 1970s provided an effective collective frame for the STUC

[179] As analysed in Sutcliffe-Braithwait, *Class and the Decline of Deference* and Robinson *et al.*, 'Telling Stories about Post-War Britain'.

to oppose Thatcherism. Thatcherite monetarist policies and politically centralising tendencies, designed to promote the Conservative government's 'property-owning' democratic project, radically opposed the AES and the STUC's socialist democratic project. Although the deployment of a regional framework served the agenda of the STUC and Scottish unionised workers, the ideas put forward within the regional organisation arguably captured the wider Scottish public mood rejecting Thatcherism. The diverging electoral behaviour helped STUC delegates articulate a Scottish socialist democratic constituency that opposed Thatcher's Britain. Briefly mentioned in 1979, but more so following the 1980 local elections, this rhetoric progressively brought the issue of public accountability to the fore. As Thatcher's monetarist socio-economic policies of 1979-81 left a trail of growing social and regional inequality, Scottish trade union representatives othered her government as both a class and a regional enemy. Depicting Thatcherism as cruel and undemocratic because of its political choices and for its declining regional electoral support, devolution in the form of a Scottish Assembly with significant legislative powers re-emerged in 1981 as a firewall against Thatcherism.

Co-operation with other organisations in these years, although far from constituting a 'mass movement', had a wide political reach and arguably contributed to create the pervasive national political narrative of Scotland as socially progressive and egalitarian, particularly following the 1983 general election.[180] In this manner, the rise of a 'civic' nationalism in the region and the subsequent redefinition of Scottishness as a set of policy preferences can be linked to the transformative nature of the 'long 1970s' as a regional, workerist response to the socioeconomic and political challenges of the decade.

[180] Within the SNP, the *79 Group* grew closer to the trade union movement, participating for instance in the STUC-organised unemployment demonstration in Glasgow on 21 February 1981, attended by 50,000 people. STUC, *84th Report*, p. 363. This group within the SNP believed that the SNP needed a sharper left-wing image, and in 1981 some members took over the NEC. There is a recent well-informed online article that focuses on the salience of 1981 for re-igniting the devolution campaign. https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2021/10/21/1981-the-year-scotland-re-wove-its-campaign-to-secure-a-parliament/ [last accessed on 10 December 2021]. Also interesting is M. McLaughlin, 'Interview: The 79 Group – SNP Young Rebels who Became the Party Mainstream', *Holyrood* (16 October 2018) retrieved from https://www.proquest.com/magazines/interview-79-group-snp-young-rebels-who-became/docview/2117498399/se-2?accountid=13828.

Chapter 3: Articulating democracy and a *Galician* working class (1972-8)

The 1970s transformed Spain. If the economic recession and a shift in macroeconomic management marked these years in Scotland and the UK, in Galicia and Spain political imperatives led to a downplaying of economic issues until after the 1977 general elections, the first to be held in Spain since 1936. After nearly four decades of dictatorship, in the early 1970s, several elements finally pointed to the feasibility of a democratic rupture with the Francoist regime. These included the murder of Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco, President of the government, on December 1973 by the Basque nationalist terrorist group ETA, as well as high levels of social mobilisation spearheaded by the (re)emerging, clandestine, workers' movement.[1] As in Scotland, industrial mobilisation remained at high levels across the decade, peaking in the months after the death of Francisco Franco in November 1975. However, workers in Galicia were stuck with a narrow institutional framework until the passing of the Constitution in 1978.

Since 1940, the state had monopolised all decision-making over industrial relations. Seeking to guarantee social peace and reinforce a broader Spanish identity, the Francoist

[1] Manuel Redero San Román and Tomás Pérez Delgado, 'Sindicalismo y Transición Política en España', *Ayer*, 15 (1994) pp. 189-222; Álvaro Soto Carmona, 'Conflictividad Social y Transición Sindical' in Javier Tusell and Álvaro Soto (eds) *Historia de la Transición 1975-1986*, (Madrid, 1996) pp. 236-51; Fishman, *Organización Obrera*; Holm-Detlev Köhler, *El Movimiento Sindical en España: Transición Democrática, Regionalismo, Modernización Económica* (Madrid, 2001).

regime mandated affiliation to the Spanish Syndical Organisation (OSE) to both workers and employers.[2] As such, this vertical syndicate aimed to dilute class-based identity markers.

Industrial conflict within the authoritarian framework re-emerged parallel to Spain's 'economic miracle'.[3] This term has often been deployed to characterise the economic growth and modernisation that accompanied late-Francoist *desarrollista*, or developmental, policy whereby the state intensified its interventionist role in the direction of the economy. The Francoist government had initiated liberalisation policies through the implementation of the National Plan of Economic Stabilisation (1959), breaking with the previous years of autarchy, international isolation and strong economic nationalism. Committed to promote productivity and external competitiveness, the government subsidised many companies through the state holding company, the National Institute of Industry (INI). Spain set up a new industrial and service-based productive model that grounded its expansion on the absorption of large quantities of (low-skilled) labour and allowed for the progressive emergence of a mass consumption society.

Between 1959 and until 1975, Spain's annual growth rate reached almost 7 per cent and wages grew at a pace of 8.8 per cent per year – having started from an exceptionally low point.[4] Yet, dependence on foreign investment, tourism and the influx of remittances from Spanish emigrants hampered Spain's economic progress, making it extremely contingent on the international economic context.[5] Other shortcomings of Francoist economic policy included

[2] Álvaro Soto Carmona, 'No Todo Fue Igual. Cambios en las Relaciones Laborales, Trabajo y Nivel de Vida de los Españoles: 1958-1975', *Pasado y Memoria. RHC*, 5 (2006) pp. 15-43; Glicerio Sánchez Recio, 'El Sindicato Vertical como Instrumento Político y Económico del Régimen Franquista', *Pasado y Memoria. RHC*, 1 (2002), pp. 19-32.

[3] Townson, '"Spain is Different"? The Franco Dictatorship' in Nigel Townson, *Is Spain Different?: A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Sussex, 2015), pp. 141-58; Álvaro Soto, *Transición y Cambio en España, 1975-1996* (Madrid, 2005) p. 331.

[4] Luis Cardenas and Rafael Fernandez, 'Revisiting Francoist Developmentalism: The Influence of Wages in the Spanish Growth Model', *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 52, 260 (2020), p. 262; Álvaro Soto, *Transición y Cambio*, p. 331.

[5] With as many as 1,5 million emigrants between 1960-72, Nigel Townson states remittances covered 'up to 50 per cent of the foreign debt'. Townson, '"Spain is Different"?', p. 141-2.

the unevenness of industrial growth, the limitations of the modernisation process and the energetic substitution of coal in favour of petrol and electricity, which made Spain more reliant on imports.[6] As the economy modernised, living standards rose along with the Spaniards' welfare expectations, particularly in the urban centres. Yet social inequalities remained. Averaging 7 per cent GDP growth rate in 1960-74, similar to other western European countries such as France, the percentage dedicated to social spending in Spain was almost four times less (8.6 per cent of GDP as compared to 23 per cent).[7] The dictatorship never developed a comparable welfare state, opting instead for a system of 'social assistance' that included a paternalistic Social Security system funded through regressive and indirect taxation, where social benefits were linked to income (the principle of 'income maintenance').[8] These welfare shortcomings were 'strains' of modernisation that promoted the mobilisation of some sectors of society in defence of their interests, facilitating the emergence of new social movements, including that of the workers, from the 1960s.[9]

While Galicia was not an exception, also experiencing significant growth during the *desarrollista* period, the region diverged rather than converged with the rest of the country.[10] In the early 1970s, Galicia remained one of the poorest and most underdeveloped Spanish regions, retaining a marked rural character. The developmental policies promoted a 10 per cent

[6] For a detailed analysis of the consequences of Francoist interventionist policies see José M. Serrano Sanz and Antón Costas Comesaña, 'La Reforma del Marco Institucional' in José Luis García Delgado (Dir.), *La Economía Española de la Transición y la Democracia* (Madrid, 1990), pp. 511-2. Enrique Fuentes Quintana, 'La Crisis Económica Española', *Papeles de Economía Española*, 1 (1980), pp. 84-136.

[7] Fernando Wilhelmi, *Romper el Consenso: la Izquierda Radical en la Transición (1975-82)* (Madrid, 2016), pp. 23-4.

[8] However, this principle was systematically ignored, with different groups benefitting from 'extraordinary', privileged, regimes. Illustrative of this is that in 1977, 66.5 per cent of contributors (mostly from the industrial and service sectors) funded with their salaries 87 per cent of the total contributions. See Luis Moreno and Sebastià Sarasa, *Génesis y Desarrollo del Estado de Bienestar en España*, Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados Documento de Trabajo 92-13, pp. 9-19. Available in http://www.ub.edu/ciudadania/hipertexto/evolucion/introduccion/G%E9nesis%20y%20Estado%20del%20Bienestar%20en%20Espa%F1a.pdf [Last accessed 20 August 2019].

[9] Townson, '"Spain is Different"?, pp. 143-4.

[10] The following economic discussion draws from the work of Xoán Carmona Badía and Ángel Fernández González, 'La Economía Gallega en el Período Franquista (1939-1975)' in Jesús de Juana and Julio Prada (Coords), *Historia Contemporánea de Galicia* (Barcelona, 2005) pp. 261-94.

growth in industrial value and added a (very) limited diversification of its industrial structure. As in Scotland, Galicia's industrial structure was over-dependent on steel and shipbuilding and industrialisation concentrated in certain areas: the coastal cities of Vigo, A Coruña and Ferrol and their *comarcas*.[11] Characteristically, 39 per cent of the region's active employed population still worked in agriculture by 1975 (see table 3.1). This challenged further the development of the industrial workers' movement in the region. Yet, Galicia also witnessed growing levels of industrial conflict, which exploded in 1972.

Table 3.1 Labour force structure in Galicia (proportional) between 1960-75

	1960	**1975**
Agriculture	61.7	39
Fishing	4.2	3.9
Industry	11	15.2
Construction	4.8	11.9
Services	15.4	28.6

Source: Carmona Badía and Fernández González, 'La Economía Gallega en el Período Franquista (1939-1975)', p. 277.

This chapter examines the narrative of the emerging regional workers' organisations during the later years of Francoism and the beginning of the democratic transition, until the end of the Constitutional process in 1978. Specifically, it focuses on the Workers' Commissions (CCOO), union bodies strongly linked to the Communist Party (PCE/PCG), and the various workers' organisations emerging in the orbit of the new left-wing Galician nationalism. Identifying a common enemy in Franco's authoritarian, 'oligarchic' and centralist state until the dictator's death in 1975, these parties and their sister workers' organisations linked democracy with class, othering Francoism and building a constituency of workers. Moreover, particularly from 1972, the region featured prominently in their democratic narratives through a rhetoric of regional underdevelopment and socioeconomic dependence,

[11] *Comarca* is an administrative district. By 1974, most salaried workers in companies of over 100 workers concentrated in the *comarcas* of Vigo and Ferrol. José María Cardesín Díaz, 'La Sociedad Gallega en el Franquismo' in Jesús de Juana and Julio Prada (coords), *Historia Contemporánea de Galicia* (Barcelona, Ariel, 2005) p.302. *Comarca* is an administrative district.

articulating a *Galician* working class. However, this rhetorical combination of class and regional frameworks sought different socio-political outcomes. Ideological differences within the anti-Francoist Left in Galicia including the workers' movement heightened as the democratisation process advanced and the new legal and institutional framework emerged. From 1976, the debate on political reform and decentralisation rendered the nationalist cleavage an unsurmountable obstacle for the unity of the Left in Galicia. Defending different regional socialist democratic projects, a struggle then began to represent the new constituency of Galician workers.

Class, democracy and the region in the final years of Francoism.

While Franco's corporate state rejected any idea of trade unions as free organisations that workers joined to protect their own interests, the 1958 enactment of a law for trade union collective agreements introduced some degree of labour and market flexibility into the state-run system of 'vertical' syndicates.[12] Collective agreements became the main mechanism to define workers' conditions, particularly following the recognition and decriminalisation of economic strikes in 1962.[13] Spontaneous and informal workers' commissions appeared in the factories whenever a conflict arose, gathering the workers' requests, presenting them to the employer and his delegates and dissolving when the conflict was over.[14] In Galicia, most of the promoters of the first CCOO cells were workers within the steel and shipbuilding sectors active

[12] Some scholarly works on the role of the Spanish Labour movement during the transition include Fishman 'The Labor Movement in Spain', pp. 281-305; Redero San Román and Pérez Delgado, 'Sindicalismo y Transición'; Álvaro Soto Carmona, 'No Todo Fue Igual.'; Fishman *Organización Obrera*; Jon Amsden, *Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict in Spain* (London, 1972); Holm-Detlev Köhler, 'Industrial Relations in Spain – Strong Conflicts, Weak Actors and Fragmented Institutions', *Employee Relations*, 40.4 (2018), pp. 725-43.

[13] 'Decreto sobre Procedimientos de Formalización, Conciliación y Arbitraje en las Relaciones Colectivas de Trabajo', 24 September 1962. Studies on the CCOO in Spain include David Ruíz González, 'Las Comisiones Obreras, Movimiento Sociopolítico (1958-1976)' in Manuel Ortíz Heras, David Ruíz González, Isidro Sánchez Sánchez (coords), *Movimientos Sociales y Estado en la España Contemporánea* (Cuenca, 2001) pp. 405-424. For Galicia see for example Gómez Alén, *As CCOO de Galicia*.

[14] The first one in Galicia was set up in Bazán, Ferrol, in 1963. Gómez Alén and Santidrián, *Historia de Comisións Obreiras de Galicia*, pp. 46-7. Gómez Alén *As CC.OO. de Galicia.*

in the illegal Spanish Communist Party (PCE), who saw the potential to challenge Francoism from within.[15] In 1962, ahead of the party's guidelines at the state level, these militant workers set out 'to begin structuring the social fabric' of the region through 'a new type of organisation'.[16] The first stable *Comisións Obreiras* in the region appeared after the 1966 workplace elections – when workers chose shop stewards and representatives to serve on the workers' council within a company (*jurados de empresa*).[17] Organisationally, the elections were a turning point. Participating meant that CCOO infiltrated the OSE, a strategy known as *entrismo*. *Entrismo* allowed CCOO leaders to progressively establish broader social networks, recruiting members through factory commission coordinators.

Emerging as a trade union despite the legal constraints of the dictatorship, the CCOO progressively turned the workplace into a unique democratic forum. At workshop and factory assemblies, commissions and conferences, factory workers discussed and agreed upon industrial action and demands. In so doing, they exercised some form of democratic practice against the wishes of the Francoist authorities.[18] Moreover, because assemblies and clandestine meetings centred on industrial grievances, 'a network of identification and matching of problems [was] weaved together' using a rhetoric of class.[19] In the 1966 manifesto, CCOO

[15] Lago Peñas, *La Construcción del Movimiento Sindical*, pp. 67-72.
[16] Carlos Núñez interviewed by Lago Peñas on 16 June 1993, quoted in *ibid.* footnote 14, p. 108. Between 1966 and 1975, the promoters managed to set up stable commissions across 14 productive branches in 60 factories concentrated in A Coruña (26.6 per cent), Vigo (18.3 per cent) and Ferrol (10 per cent). Mostly in companies of over 500 workers (27), but also between 101-500 workers (25) and in eight small companies. Lago Peñas, *La Construcción del Movimiento Sindical,* pp. 67-8.
[17] The first commissions appeared in the shipbuilding towns of Vigo and Ferrol. Arquivo Histórico Fundación 10 de Marzo [herafter AHF10M], Fondo Manuel Amor Deus [hereafter FMAD], Sindicato Nacional de CCOO de Galicia [hereafter CCOO-G], Informes, notas e estudos de Manuel Amor Deus, 'Esquema da historia das Comisións Obreiras de Galicia' (no date). The elections took place every four years and the number of workers' representatives in each 'company's committee' was determined by the total number of employees, see Fishman, *Organización Obrera,* pp. 102-109. Other overviews on trade union representation in Spain include Pere Jódar, Ramón Alós, Pere Beneyto and Sergi Vidal, 'Trade Union Representation in Spain: Coverage and Limits', *Cuaderno de Relaciones Laborales,* 36.1 (2018), pp. 15-34. Holm-Detlev Köhler, *El Movimiento Sindical*.
[18] And thus, borrowing Pamela B. Radcliff's concept for neighbourhood associations, they acted as 'schools for democracy' see this thesis' Introduction.
[19] Francisco González, 'Paco Balón'. AHF10M, Legado Francisco González, 'También Ferrol Contribuyó a la Lucha por la Libertad y la Democracia' in Lago Peñas, *La Construcción del Movimiento Sindical*, p. 119, footnote 67.

defended wage rises and the improvement of working conditions, but also integrated political and social demands.[20] These ranged from logistical appeals such as the readmission of co-workers fired for political reasons to the development of a welfare and social system, all of which served to point out the broader need for a class-based organisation. Both the OSE and the Francoist state that set it up were at the service of the 'financial oligarchy', as proven by the prices and incomes policies that lowered the purchase power of the workers and increased the cost of living.[21] Therefore, as CCOO leaders insisted at assemblies, dismantling the authoritarian regime was central to achieve higher salaries and a better quality of life. In this manner, the leadership of the CCOO articulated industrial (class) grievances as demands for democracy, asserting that 'without independent class associations, without democratic rights… [workers were] always at the mercy of the arbitrariness [and] the repression of companies and "authorities"'. Othering Francoism in these terms, these militants justified the existence of the CCOO concurrently articulating a constituency of democratic workers. This narrative permeated published communications of both the CCOO and the PCE in Galicia, but also across Spain.

Despite Communist dominance, the commissions brought together workers with different ideological backgrounds and political and trade union cultures, including those who were either involved with or sympathetic to Galician nationalism. Although the PSG and UPG had emerged in the early 1960s, both parties remained organisationally dormant until the early 1970s, also relying on a very small but very active militant section.[22] In the meantime, nationalist political activity centred around cultural associations.[23] In the words of Camilo

[20] AHF10M, FMAD, Recortes de Prensa, 'Las Plataformas Reivindicativas de la Clase Obrera Gallega', *Nova Galicia*, 1 (October 1966).
[21] Indeed, prices and income policy became an axis of the technocratic government (1958-75), particularly from the implementation of different decrees establishing wage ceilings. For instance, the Decree-Law 22/1969 of 9 December established a ceiling of 8 per cent on collective agreements lasting 2 years and of 6,6 per cent for shorter ones.
[22] Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, *O Nacionalismo Galego*, p. 213.
[23] As stated by different nationalist militants quoted in Suso de Toro, *Camilo Nogueira e Outras Voces. Unha Memoria da Esquerda Nacionalista* (Vigo, 1991). This work chronicles the evolution of the nationalist Galician

Nogueira, one of the most significant figures of modern Galician nationalism, associations such as the Vigo Cultural Association were created for the 'normalisation of the Galician culture' but also to open up the discussion about the nation through 'talks about the economy, politics, culture, Galician classes and other type of activities'.[24] Many of those who participated in the association would eventually be involved not only in nationalist party politics, but also in the clandestine workers' movement. Nogueira himself, at the time an engineer working in Citroën, co-organised in 1968 a *político-sindical* group (with both political and trade union goals) with other workers from Vigo's automotive sector. They also had contacts with workers in different shipbuilding companies, where CCOO was stronger.[25] As salaried workers, the members of this grouping strived to theorise a nationalism centred on industrial labour, intending to actively combine in Galicia 'for the first time' the 'nationalist concerns with those of Socialist workers'.[26] In this sense, they challenged the core tenet that connected pre-war and 'new' Galician nationalism: identifying peasant farmers and fishermen as the essence of the Galician nation. Accordingly, the grouping called itself Socialist Galicia (GS). To promote the national issue among their co-workers, GS members gave many training workshops where, engineer and GS member Xoán López Facal details, they 'explained Marxism, economics, [and] the history of Galicia'.[27] In the spring of 1968, GS joined forces with CCOO. Yet, López Facal acknowledges that in the factories '[t]here was a competition between those who politicised for nationalism and those who politicised for the [PCG]'.

The PCG emerged as a Galician section of the PCE in 1968 under the leadership of Santiago Álvarez, who remained a member of the PCE's central committee and was in exile

left from the 1960s and until 1990 through interviews with protagonists from across the Galician left-wing nationalist spectrum. This chapter draws on these interviews to complement the archival sources available for the period before 1975.

[24] de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p. 37.

[25] Nogueira interviewed by de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p.40; Xaquín López Facal, quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p.67. 45 per cent of the small but active militancy belonged to companies within this sector.

[26] Nogueira quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p. 44. See also this thesis' Introduction.

[27] Xoán López Facal interviewed by de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, 69.

until 1976.[28] In 1970, the PCE/PCG problematized (sub-state) national issues across Spain mostly in terms of cultural 'oppression' and 'repression' with reference to Franco's linguistic policy.[29] The Galician working classes shared with the rest of the Spanish working class their lack of democratic liberties. However, the ban on speaking their own language implied they were doubly deprived of freedom. Thus, Álvarez explained, sub-state nationalisms in Spain had emerged as a reaction to Francoist oppressive 'bureaucratic centralism', which also affected the regional economy.[30] Inspired by France's indicative planning with growth poles, the 'technocrats' in government designed the 1959 and subsequent development plans to foster 'the growth of the Spanish economy using a sectoral approach' in part seeking to smooth regional inequalities.[31] However, because the very existence of differentiated regions was politically unacceptable from the Francoist centralist perspective, *desarrollista* policy was implemented by the central administration, with some involvement of the province and/or local authorities. As a result, and unlike in the UK, regional policy in Spain did not lead to regional administrative decentralisation.

Álvarez had first explained the (re)emergence of the national struggle in Galicia as 'another' expression of the growing anti-Francoist sentiment among the various 'antimonopolist' classes in 1964.[32] In 1970, drawing from Lenin and in the global context of decolonisation, he differentiated between the nationalism of the oppressive and the oppressed

[28] Álvarez suggested the creation of a Galician section of the PCE in 1965, the same year that the Catalonian PSUC celebrated its second congress committing to the consecution of democracy in Spain and autonomy for Catalonia. Álvarez was re-elected leader in 1973 and remained in that position until 1979.
[29] Examples include 'Un Aspecto del Problema Nacional (I)', *Mundo Obrero*, 1 (January, 1970), p. 6; 'Un Aspecto del Problema Nacional (II)', *Mundo Obrero*, 3 (February 1970), p. 5.
[30] AHF10M, Legado Santiago Álvarez [hereafter LSA], Caixa 16, carpeta 5, Santiago Álvarez, 'La Cuestión Nacional y los Comienzos del Movimiento Nacional en Galicia' [Draft manuscript, No date].
[31] For a better understanding on how regional policy developed between 1964-75, see Juan R. Cuadrado-Roura, 'Regional Economy and Policy in Spain (1960-1975) in Cuadrado-Roura (ed.), *Regional Policy, Economic Growth and Convergence. Lessons from the Spanish Case* (Berlin, 2010) pp. 19-51. For Galicia, see Marta Fernández Redondo and Jesús Mirás Araujo, 'Política Regional y Localizacion Industrial en Galicia', in Joseba de La Torre Campo and Mario García Zúñiga (Coords.) *Entre El Mercado y El Estado: Los Planes de Desarrollo Durante El Franquismo*, (Navarra, 2009) pp. 209–32.
[32] AHF10M, LSA, Caixa 44, Carpeta 5, Santiago Álvarez, 'La Acción de Masas y el Resurgir del Sentimiento Nacional en Galicia', [no publication name], 4 (February 1964), p. 6.

nations. Because internationalism should seek 'formal equality between nations', some positive discrimination was required to enable 'small' nations to make up for their socioeconomic structural inequalities as a stepping-stone to the international socialist revolution.[33] Framed in this way, he was suggesting that the (sub-state) national struggle in Spain was but a sectional expression of the broader class struggle, which in the country should start with the fight for democracy.[34]

Table 3.2. Evolution of the Galician population and GDP share in the Spanish total (%)

	Population	*GDP*
1940	9.59	7.28
1950	9.26	6.82
1960	8.51	5.95
1975	7.66	5.61

Source: Carmona Badía and Fernández González, 'La Economía Gallega en el Período Franquista (1939-1975)', p. 262.

Following their first regional ('national') general meeting in September 1970, the CCOO, now integrating GS, deployed a regional framework of socioeconomic deprivation and grievance in its anti-Francoist narrative, producing a document calling for industrial action asserting

> The manifest incapacity of the regime (government) in the economic field is once again evidenced in Galicia with the resounding failure of its development poles, which have solved nothing... not even diminishing the bleeding wound of emigration... nor have they been able to provide a solution to the continual plundering to which our farmers and stockbreeders are subjected... nor our fishermen... nor in general the entire population, making Galicia an oppressed and exploited nationality to the point that today its consumption [level] is, compared to the Spanish average, far below half [of what it should be based on] its population.[35]

Indeed, under Franco, Galicia's growth rates remained below the state average and the region kept losing relative weight within the Spanish economy (see table 3.2). This criticism of the

[33] Santiago Álvarez, 'La Cuestión Nacional'. Lenin first expressed his ideas about national self-determination in 1916, understanding that supporting anti-colonialism was key to undermine the capitalist-imperialist world order.
[34] Because Galician scholars of nationalism have focused their studies on the sub-state nationalist parties, the UPG has broadly been seen as the architect behind the redefinition of nationalism as a specific form of class struggle, namely with reference to UPG member Ramón López Suevos, *Do Capitalismo Colonial* (Santiago, 1979), see for example Judith Carbajo, 'Fortalezas e Debilidades dos Discursos Ideolóxicos', *Revista Jurídica Portucalense*, 15 (2012), pp. 132-48.
[35] AHF10M, Legado Santos Costa Barroso [hereafter LSCB], Organizacións Sindicais, 'I Xuntanza Xeral das Comisións Obreiras de Galicia' (September 1970).

dictatorship attempted to discredit the official narrative of 'economic miracle' and 'modernisation', underlining the regime's failure to address Galicia's underdevelopment. Drawing from Álvarez's analysis linking regional discontent and growing social strife with the dictatorship's centralising and homogenising ways, these workers decided to strategically deploy the framework of regional underdevelopment and grievance characteristic of Galician nationalism as a collective mobilisation frame. In this manner, militant workers in Galicia deployed the regional component in their critique of the Francoist dictatorship, articulating industrial and regional grievances as demands, first and foremost, for democracy. The 1972 industrial struggles in Galicia showed how successful the CCOO's strategy was. *Entryism* allowed *elected* union officers to become 'drivers and organisers of the struggle' while the organisation of workplace assemblies introduced workers to the workings and programme of the CCOO, promoting discussions that deployed class and regional collective frames while arguing for democracy.[36]

1972 and the emergence of a *Galician* labour movement

Around 1970, Xosé M. Beiras, who in 1971 joined the PSG's secretariat, Xosé M. Méndez Ferrín, UPG leader, and Camilo Nogueira produced the *Joint paper on Galicia. UPG and PSG. For a Free and Socialist Galicia*.[37] This was the first political document blaming Galicia's 'centuries-old' underdevelopment on internal colonialism, situating the origins of its 'exploitation' in the creation of the 'Modern Unitarian State' of the Catholic Monarchs, and referring to the nation as being in the periphery of Western Europe.[38] Breaking with past

[36] As explained by the General Council of the Galician CCOO after their IV assembly in May 1974. AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Resumen del Informe del Secretariado' (1974).
[37] Recollections vary. Beiras locates it vaguely in the late 1960s. Carbajo, 'Fortalezas e Debilidades', p. 142. Nogueira locates it in 1971, see de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p. 46.
[38] It does so in its first sentence, framing the rest of the document. *Texto Conxunto encol de Galicia. UPG e PSG. Por Unha Galicia Ceibe e Socialista* (1973), p. 1. Accessible in https://en.calameo.com/read/000471136d101b042aa2a [Last accessed on 17 March 2022].

interpretations, adapting to Galicia's new socioeconomic reality, there was a broader cross-class definition of the nation.[39] The exploited classes were no longer limited to the peasantry and fishermen, whom the document argued were 'proletarianising', but other salaried workers including those in the services and commerce sectors – which had absorbed much of the agricultural labour surplus (see table 3.1), intellectuals and lower middle classes (who theorised for the parties) and, of course, industrial workers.[40] Sharing a desire to form a regional, nationalist workers' union, this collaboration encouraged GS to split from CCOO and join the UPG in 1971. Although the militant workers of CCOO and GS approached the national question slightly different, Manolo Lima states that disagreement between both groupings fundamentally stemmed from the organisational debate, that is the desired level of autonomy for the CCOO in Galicia regarding both the state CCOO and the PCG.[41]

The joint document was not published until 1973, yet the colonial framework it contained permeated CCOO discourse after 1971. This showcases the importance of the workplace as a democratic forum, allowing close contact and collaboration amongst workers of different political sensibilities. The PCG also began to characterise Galicia's relationship with the dictatorship (rather than the state) as colonial, speaking of the region's 'decades-long' struggle.[42] After the GS split, and in preparation for their second regional assembly, the leadership of CCOO reasserted the importance of the movement's 'platforms of demands' – the basic documents for discussion at the workers factory assemblies during collective bargaining.[43] Seeking to mobilise as many workers as possible in destabilising the dictatorship, CCOO representatives defended the inclusion 'not only those general aspects common to the

[39] Nogueira explains that Ferrín wrote the cultural part and him and Xan Facal, both from GS, wrote the socioeconomic aspect and the historical background to ground it. de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p. 46.
[40] *Texto Conxunto encol de Galicia*, pp. 14-5.
[41] Manolo Lima, quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, pp.64-5.
[42] Seen in various PCG statements from 1971-onwards. AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Políticas, Comunicados e Informes do PCG, PCG, [untitled] (September 1971). Later work by Santiago Álvarez, however, assumes the longer framework of internal colonialism.
[43] AHF10M, LSCB, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Documento Preparatorio de la II Asamblea Nacional de Comisiones Obreras de Galicia' (1971).

working class of Spain, but also those... that outline Galicia as a nationality'. Galicia's specific problems were 'emigration, inferiority of salaries, low cultural level, real and hidden unemployment [and] work casualisation'. As such, the 'working class' was 'the most interested' in solving Galicia's problems 'to improve its standard of living and social emancipation', although 'the vast majority of the Galician people' was also invested in finding a solution. In the discussion document, the leadership of the CCOO stressed the need to involve non-militant workers further in collective bargaining so that militant shop stewards could insert the specific industrial and regional struggle to the need for democratisation. To make their claims representative, workplace assemblies had to be the 'supreme decision-making organ'.

In 1972, the Bazán shipbuilding company failed to renew the collective agreement for its three factories located in Ferrol, Cádiz and Cartagena, triggering a rather intense conflict. The key issue was that the Galician factory refused to negotiate at the company/interprovincial level, insisting only on factory-level negotiations.[44] Publicly, workers' representatives in Bazán justified a factory-level agreement because there was 'no contact' with the factories of Cartagena and Cádiz, claiming that they were unfamiliar with those workers' needs because of their 'different standard of living, the climate itself and the needs it poses'.[45] In reality, the key difference was that the CCOO decidedly led the workers' movement in Ferrol. Despite being officially outlawed since 1967, numerous members of CCOO were elected to the workers' council of Bazán in the 1971 workplace elections, tabling proposals that exceeded the OSE's claims and showcasing how unrepresentative of the workers' interests the state organisation had become. It was particularly so for workers in Galicia, shop stewards could argue during this conflict, because their demands were higher and their salaries lower. The proposals were refused, leading to CCOO-led stoppages during February and early March, when workers met

[44] Enrique Barrera Beitía, *La Transición en Ferrol* (Ferrol, 2001), p.94 in Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', pp. 122-4.
[45] *Diario de Ferrol*, February 1972 reproduced in the document series FESGA, *1972: Organización de Clase e Construcción Nacional. 45 Aniversario* (Galicia, 2017).

in factory assemblies to discuss the events and the platform of demands. These assemblies gradually grew from 500 to 1,200 participants.[46] On 8 March, the workers' assembly rejected an agreement signed in Madrid by representatives from other factories and the conflict began. The following day, the company suspended four shop stewards and two workers' representatives, the police attempted to disperse the workers protesting in front of the factory and the confrontation turned violent. The workers took to the streets of Ferrol and overpowered the police – arguably aided by a concurrent issue at the University of Santiago de Compostela dividing the forces between both cities. The following day, around 3,000 workers concentrated in front of the closed factory. Some of them prompted the nearly 6,000 workers in ASTANO, another shipbuilding company, to join in another demonstration in solidarity. In the resulting confrontation, two workers died by gunshot and 50 people were injured.[47]

The killings of Amador Rey and Daniel Niebla turned them into symbols of the Francoist opposition in Galicia and their assassination by the police sparked broader social unrest. Pickets paralysed Ferrol, and the governmental response created a non-official state of emergency, with the police, the army and minesweepers deployed.[48] Adding insult to injury, in August 1972, the son of Manuel Amor Deus – who became the General Secretary of CCOO-G in 1978 and who was amongst those imprisoned – was killed by a car and the Francoist authorities refused to notify the father until the day after his burial. The act further highlighted the regime's cruelty and 'inhumanity'.[49] By contrast, the official narrative attempted to minimise the issue, not referring to workers but to 'subversive groups' who had violently challenged the public forces thus 'forc[ing them] to shoot against a demonstration formed by

[46] Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', p. 124; José Gómez Alén, 'O conflicto laboral na Bazán de Ferrol en 1972', *Dez-Eme*, 3 (2001), pp. 65-73. Both works offer thorough accounts of the events.
[47] *La Voz de Galicia* (*LVG*), 11 March 1972, p. 14; María Rosa Martínez Cal, *Informes Diversos de los sucesos de Ferrol, 10 de Marzo de 1972* (Madrid, 2015).
[48] Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', p. 131.
[49] AHF10M, LSCB, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Declaración das CCOO' (August, 1972).

some thousands of people'.[50] The repression of Ferrol fuelled a spontaneous wave of solidarity across Galicia, Spain and even internationally – a common pattern across Spain during the crisis of the regime.[51] However, the spread of protest became possible due to different coordinating structures across cities and factories. For example, Camilo Nogueira recalls that it was Paco Lores, of GS, who organised the stoppage in Citroën through his contacts in the different workshops, following a phone call from a Vulcano worker affiliated to the PCG informing him of the two killings.[52] Framed as a fascist repression of a working-class struggle, the Bazán conflict engendered broader social networks and solidarity. Nationalist workers and the UPG leadership actively supported the struggle echoing CCOO's anti-Francoist rhetoric. A special issue of the party's press organ *Terra e Tempo*, emphasised how 'the very fair claims of the workers of Ferrol and other places', in reference to previous industrial struggles taking place across Galicia, had been met by the 'fascist' power with 'murders, gunshot injured, torture' and 'imprisonment'.[53] Over the following months, all clandestine organisations kept supporting the families of the imprisoned leaders of CCOO with money collected from all over the region.[54]

Seizing the opportunity to mobilise broader sections of the Galician society, the Communists in Galicia presented the issue as a regional one, although they continued othering the Francoist regime primarily in class terms. The PCG and CCOO called for general strikes across Galicia in solidarity with Ferrol and its workers, part of the Galician working-class. On 14 March, the PCG claimed in the front page of its press organ *A Voz do Pobo* 'Galicia stands

[50] 'Tras Violencia y Daños, Grupos Subversivos se enfrentaron con la Fuerza Pública', *ABC*, 11 March 1972.
[51] For an examination on how the British press and government addressed the issue see Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', pp.136-40. Also, different organisations from the European left signed the document 'A Bas la Dictadure de la Terreur et du crime: Solidarité avec la Class Ouvrière et les Peuples d'Espagne' (March 1972), reproduced in the documental compilation FESGA, *1972 : Organización de Clase e Construcción Nacional*, p.31.
[52] Nogueira and Paco Lores quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria,* p.83 and p.95.
[53] UPG, *Terra e Tempo* (TT onwards), special number (April 1972).
[54] UPG, *TT*, May 1972; AHF10M, LSCB, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'No al Consejo de Guerra de El Ferrol!' (August, 1972).

up to the crime! National strike in Ferrol'.[55] Situating the region at the same level than other (industrialised) 'vanguard' areas of Spain – e.g. Madrid, Granada or Barcelona, the PCG emphasised that the struggle was nothing short of 'a legitimate workers' fight for their children's bread' as well as for their rights, 'overridden by the [OSE] imposed agreement'.[56] This wording showcases that CCOO viewed the struggle as a turning point for the region in regards to the development of an (industrial) class identity.[57]

On 9 September 1972, another industrial conflict within the factories in Vigo, spread to the city and its surrounding area, mobilising people around economic and socio-political claims. This began with a partial stoppage in Citroën initiated by CCOO leaders demanding the establishment of a 44-hour-week. The conflict quickly expanded and by 15 September it affected 24 companies across Vigo, with 'over 10,000 workers' participating in stoppages, demonstrations and riots.[58] The industrial uproar lasted two weeks and until 27 September the situation was considered far from 'normal'. By then, only 304 of the 3,000 workers of Citroën were still striking. 111 people were fired across the different companies and disciplinary action was taken against 119 union shop stewards.[59] Years later, some GS members claimed that this struggle in Vigo responded to an attempt by CCOO to overtake the nationalist group, very active in the factory via their elected representatives in the workers' council.[60] However, this action is coherent with the strategy of CCOO and their interpretation of the March struggles. The accusation of the nationalist GS members is perhaps intended to undermine the historic image of the CCOO, in Galicia and elsewhere in Spain, both as a proxy for democracy and embodiment of the working class – in their role of organisers of the democratic workplace

[55] PCG, *A Voz do Pobo* (14 March 1972).
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] An assessment broadly shared by Galician historians, see for example Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', but also José Gómez Alén, 'O Conflicto Laboral na Bazán de Ferrol en 1972'. *Dez-Eme*, 3, pp. 65-73.
[58] *LVG*, 15 September 1972, p. 13.
[59] *LVG*, 30 September 1972, p. 14.
[60] Paco Lores and Manolo Lima quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria.*, pp. 95 and 97.

assemblies within the authoritarian framework.[61] The repression and imprisonment of many of CCOO's leaders reinforced this image, but came at a price, temporarily setting-back the CCOO and leaving a vacuum in the factories that the nationalists encroached upon.[62]

The UPG shared CCOO's interpretation of 1972 as a regional turning point that provided a political opportunity.[63] In fact, this conflict encouraged the nationalists to decidedly opt for mass action. The UPG had first formulated the need to create different 'fronts' amongst university students and industrial workers in 1971.[64] The new centrality of the workers within the UPG's theoretical framing was linked to the new leadership of workers Xosé González (1971-1976) and Xosé Ramón 'Moncho' Reboiras, who negotiated with Camilo Nogueira the integration of GS in the organisation.[65] They viewed the assembly-based organisation of the CCOO as effective for discussing ideas and organising action, particularly during collective bargaining, and thus to the development of class awareness. However, as part of the wider Spanish workers' movement, CCOO was not *specifically* Galician and therefore did not and would not attend to the nation's specificity. Ultimately, the nationalists co-opted the CCOO's argument that workers needed a 'true syndicate' to defend their interests but applied it to the (sub-state) national framework, theorising that Galician workers needed a distinctly 'Galician' trade union to foment first the 'national-popular' and then a socialist revolution to fight against the perceived oppression and exploitation of the Galician people.[66] In May, the UPG chronicled

[61] AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Documento Preparatorio de la II Asamblea Nacional de Comisiones Obreras de Galicia' (Agosto 1972). This image of CCOO at the state level is recognised by historians such as Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*. p. 19.
[62] Although the UPG was also affected, with leaders such as Nogueira having been held and tortured and moving to Santiago because no company hired him in Vigo anymore, the party used the following years to create the Workers' Front. For an overview of CCOO's period of 'crisis and recovery' (1973-5) see José Gómez Alén, *As CCOO de Galicia e a Conflictividade Laboral durante o Franquismo* (Vigo, 1995), pp. 188-241.
[63] As transpires in UPG, *TT* (May, 1972).
[64] As part of its original intention to promote a national liberation front, Beramendi, *De Provincia a Nación*, p. 1084.
[65] Camilo Nogueira in de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, pp. 92-3. Moncho Reboiras, militant of the UPG, was a worker in the Company Hijos de J. Barreras in Vigo. He established links with the OO and GS through his active participation in the events of 1972. His death at the hands of the police in 1975 – during a police raid against the short-lived armed front of the UPG that he was involved with – turned him into a nationalist martyr.
[66] UPG, *TT*, (March 1972), p. 6.

the events initiated in the Barreras company (Vigo) in *Terra e Tempo*, arguing that a 'real' class-based – as opposed to the OSE – and national – as opposed to CCOO – union needed to be formed to organise these somewhat 'spontaneous' socio-economic protests, providing them with a political underpinning.[67] In July, the UPG elaborated on that statement asserting that

> Both in Ferrol and Vigo the starting point was a localised conflict at a company… [around] a collective agreement. Immediately, all the working-class…followed by other "popular" sectors… showed solidarity…
> …There was an exceptional level of conflict, unknown since before the war of 36, and new forms to organise the fight…
> From everything that happened, we have to draw the conclusion that the demands (the same across Spain) of the CCOO and the non-unionised approach of the UPG… have been overcome by new fighting ways.[68]

Arguing that the Galician working classes were ready to fight together against both class and national injustice, the UPG created a Workers' Front (FO, 1973). By 1974, the FO had a small but very active membership (between 30 and 50 militants) in key Galician factories.[69] In line with the internal colonialism theory, the UPG insisted that the people involved in the 'national-popular movement' were 'anti-imperialists, democrats and anti-fascists'.[70] Framed in this manner, Galician 'patriots' were intrinsically revolutionaries.

The struggles and their aftermath in the industrial and socio-political spheres convinced the PCG and the CCOO that their mobilising strategy, including the deployment of the regional framework in their struggle for democracy, was the right one. This was because, they argued, March 1972 demonstrated the increased class *and national* awareness of the 'Galician people'.[71] From this, it followed that 'the [elements] of class and nation… must interrelate within the action' to encourage broad social participation 'in the common struggle against the dictatorship'. In June, CCOO-Vigo – city were the UPG and GS had more representation in the factories – asserted that workers fought 'for a dignified life... Jobs for everyone! Especially

[67] UPG, 'Editorial', *TT* (May, 1972), p. 1.
[68] UPG, 'Editorial', *TT* (July, 1972), p. 1.
[69] Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, *O Nacionalismo Galego*, p. 222.
[70] This was likely a legacy of 1968, see Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'De Breogán a Pardo de Cela', p. 68.
[71] AHF10M, LSA, Caixa 44, 'Comunicado do PCG' (April 1972).

in our GALICIA, plundered and exploited by the centralist regime and big capital'.[72] In December, the CCOO presented a fighting programme draft that emphasised the region's 'double exploitation', economic and cultural, by the 'Francoist state'– along the lines established by the PCG.[73] In January 1973, the CCOO approved a document in their third regional assembly stating that 'the pride of being Galician' had been 'present in our spirit' during the struggle, a struggle '[which cornered the] image of a Galicia that cries, that asks, that resigns itself, to replace it with that of a Galicia that fights'.[74]

It should be noted that 1973 also witnessed the publication of both the joint UPG/PSG/GS document, and Xosé M. Beiras' theory articulating the region's backwardness and underdevelopment as markers of the Galician nation.[75] Drawing on the findings of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Robert Lafont's regional approach and 'internal colonialism' theory, Beiras further theorised Galicia and Spain's colonial relationship speaking of the nationality's 'double' exploitation – economic and political whereby the Spanish state exploited Galicia's rich natural resources.[76] Under Beiras, the PSG launched a stage of ideological re-definition culminating in the party's 1974 *Principles Declaration*. From a social democrat federalist formulation, the PSG evolved into a nationalist party forcefully defending the revolutionary road to socialism and self-determination.[77] Encouraged by the developments in the nationalist sphere, CCOO committed

[72] CCOO-Vigo, 'Por qué Luchamos los Obreros?', *Vigo Obreiro*, 1 (June 1972).
[73] AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Programa de Lucha de la Clase Obrera Gallega. Proyecto' (December 1972).
[74] AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'III Asamblea Obrera de Galicia. Resolución' (1973) and 'Declaración de la III Asamblea de CCOO de Galicia. Este fue el año de la Clase Obrera Gallega' (Ferrol, 1973); CCOO-Vigo, *Vigo Obreiro*, 7 (March 1973); CCOO-Ferrol, *10 de Marzo* (March 1973).
[75] Beiras, *O Atraso*; Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'De Breogán a Pardo de Cela, Pasando por América: Notas sobre la Imaginación del Nacionalismo Gallego', *Historia Social*, 40 (2001), pp. 53-78.
[76] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'Nuevos y Viejos Nacionalistas', p. 77.
[77] Carbajo, 'Fortalezas e Debilidades', pp. 144-6. This evolution – which Beiras insists on describing as an 'accomodation' to Galicia's reality – originated internal disagreements between those who understood nationalism along *piñeirista* lines (promoting the galeguisation of Spanish-wide parties) and those who wanted specifically Galician parties and organisations. See Introduction.

in its IV Assembly in 1974 to defending the recognition of the Galician language as co-official and to fight for an autonomous government, referring to Galicia as a 'historic nationality'.[78]

In this manner, becoming a symbol for both the CCOO/PCG and sub-state nationalism in the region, the events of 1972 turned the whole of the workers' movement *in Galicia* into a *Galician* workers' movement.[79] The date, 10 March, has been celebrated ever since as Galician Labour Day. Moreover, as recent Galician historiography has showcased, the date was a massive blow against the dictatorship in the region. Depicting March 1972 as a 'full stop' for the dictatorship, Galician historian Grandío Seoane unearthed reports from the church authorities in Ferrol that claimed 'It is no longer a small vanguard that wants to commit itself permanently. It is a huge mass of the people who are aware of and discover the need to take action [for democracy]'.[80] After all, democracy had become a way of addressing grievances – whether socioeconomic or regional – promising a forum in which these could be addressed.

Democratic transition and diverging positions (1975-6)

As democracy seemed within reach, the different political underpinnings of the anti-Francoist Left became more evident in their different democratic projects. As Galician branches of the broader Spanish Communist movement, the strategy of the CCOO and the PCG was strongly influenced by the PCE. This partly explains why, although the CCOO and the PCG framed the March 1972 struggle as a regional one, they still inserted it into the broader Spanish framework. In addition to interpreting the Bazán conflict and the subsequent solidarity strikes as confirming that Galician workers had become class-aware, the Communists presented the struggle as a stepping-stone to the 'general [state-wide] strike' that would bring

[78] AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia 'Comunicado de la IV Asamblea Nacional de CCOO de Galicia al Pueblo Gallego' (June 1974); CCOO, 'Comunicado de la IV Asamblea de CCOO', *Vigo Obreiro*, 15 (June 1974), pp. 7-8.
[79] I first pondered this idea in Gutiérrez Ramos, 'A Articulación do Sindicalismo Nacionalista Galego ata 1982'.
[80] Quoted in Grandío Seoane, 'Bazán, Marzo 1972', p. 144.

about democracy.[81] The effects of the economic recession following the 1973 OPEC crisis, which was beginning to hit Spain badly, served the CCOO and the PCG's purposes well. In 1973, the government had put a cap on salary increases and, although salaries both in 1974 and 1975 increased above the quality-of-life index, the 2.9 per cent real salary increase barely translated into an improved purchasing power.[82] The effects of the economic recession contributed to social discontent, which was further instrumentalised by CCOO to encourage defection against the regime.[83]

By 1974, the dictatorship was crumbling. Franco's was the last dictatorship in Western Europe after democracy returned to Portugal and Greece. Following ETA's murder of Carrero Blanco, there was increasing political confrontation between Francoist elites regarding whether to introduce limited political reforms.[84] Building on the linkage between working class/socialism and democracy, the general coordinator of the Galician CCOO published a report in January 1975 claiming that 'the regime [intended] to make *us* pay the consequences of *its* political bankruptcy'.[85] Thus framed, it was clear that the workers would be suffering, carrying the weight of an economic crisis brought upon by the regime's, thus the oligarchy, mismanagement and wrongdoing. A general strike was justified

> because dictatorship means galloping inflation with the consequent accelerated rise in prices; it means crisis and the threat of layoffs, it means the denial of improved living conditions, the denial of rights and freedoms…

Although Santiago Álvarez wrote prolifically in name of the PCG about the multinational quality of the Spanish state, the PCE did not recognise the nations' right for self-

[81] AHF10M, LSCB, Documentación do Sindicato Nacional de CCOO en Galicia, 'Declaración del Partido Comunista de Galicia' (June, 1972).
[82] Jesús Montesinos *et al*, *Anuario de las Relaciones Laborales en España 1975*, (Madrid, 1976) p. 247.
[83] At every opportunity, both to entice social protest and mobilisation but also in connection to it, CCOO insisted that a general strike was vital to achieve democratisation. E.g. '[Thanks to the struggle of the workers] With their effort and example... a level of the struggle has made possible that the dictatorship shows cracks that are too big for it to sustain itself for long', CCOO Ferrol, *10 de Marzo*, 14 (October 1974).
[84] Contreras Casado and Cebrián Zazurca, 'La Ley para la Reforma Política, p.80; Carme Molinero and Pere Ysàs, 'Un Proceso Policéntrico. La Transición de la Dictadura a la Democracia, en España', *Avances del Cesor*, 12.12, (2015), pp. 189-207.
[85] CCOO-Vigo, *Vigo Obreiro* (January 1975). Emphasis added.

determination until its 1975 Manifesto-Programme.[86] Political scientist de Blas Guerrero argues that the Spanish left assumed some maximalist sub-state nationalist postulates in 1975 conditioned by the circumstances, which also explains why the Spanish left 'does not have a coherent national policy...because the issue has always been one of political opportunism'.[87] The PCE advocated decentralisation, but the defence of self-determination and the autonomy of the regions was intended to strengthen the unity of Spain.[88] Understanding the state as the 'community' where all regions and nations *convivían* (coexisted), the Communists, and the Spanish left more broadly, argued that a strong union could only be voluntary.[89] As seen above, they blamed oppressive and antidemocratic unity personified in Franco's bureaucratic centralism, which disregarded national and regional peculiarities seeking standardisation, for the increasing claims for separatism in Catalonia and the Basque Country and, to a much lesser extent, Galicia. Indeed, by 1975 the Spanish identity was in crisis because the nationalism espoused by the dictatorship was both devoid of any liberal or democratic components and lacked the will to become more inclusive.[90]

To force a clear break with the past, advocating a provisional government that would then begin a constituent process, the Francoist opposition in Spain came together on 26 March 1976 in the platform Democratic Coordination – known as *Platajunta*.[91] Previously, perceiving the change in the opportunity structure to pressure for democratisation more effectively, the

[86] Gustavo Hervella García and Prudencio Viveiro Mogo, 'A UPG e o PCG perante a Transición á Democracia, 1975-82', *Murguía, Revista Galega de Historia*, 11 (2006), pp. 81-103, p. 90.
[87] Andrés De Blas Guerrero, 'El Problema Nacional-Regional Español en los Programas del PSOE y PCE', *Revista de Estudios* Políticos, 4 (1978) pp. 155-170. From the same author see also 'Los Nacionalismos Españoles ante el Estado Autonómico Español' in Ramón Máiz, Justo Beramendi, Xose Manuel Núñez (eds), *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present* (Santiago de Compostela, 1994) pp. 39-52.
[88] de Blas Guerrero, 'El Problema Nacional-Regional', p.160.
[89] L. Ribas, 'Coordinación Democrática y la Problemática Nacional y Regional', *Mundo Obrero* (June 1976) p. 8-9; Santiago Carrillo, *PCE* (Barcelona, 1976) p. 100, quoted in Hervella García and Viveiro Mogo, 'A UPG e o PCG', p. 91.
[90] José Álvarez Junco, 'La Nación Posimperial. España y su Laberinto Identitario', *Historia Mexicana* 53.2 (2003) pp. 461-4.
[91] Formed by the Democratic Board and the Platform of Democratic Convergence. *Manifiesto de Coordinación Democrática* (1976) in X.M. Núñez Seixas (coord), *España en Democracia 1975-2011*, Vol.10, *Historia de España* (Barcelona, 2017) pp. 709-12.

PCE had sought unity in the Democratic Board (1974). The party was joined by CCOO, representatives of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), businessmen or liberals.[92] Echoing what was happening in the political sphere, all labour organisations across Spain called for unity and tried to pursue it by converging in different platforms. At the Spanish level, UGT (General Workers' Union, PSOE's sister union), CCOO and USO came together in September 1976, signing a programme document committing to work together to ensure a democratic break with the Francoist regime, agreeing to respect their autonomy of organisation and action and to elaborate a platform of common demands.[93] Yet, in Galicia, calls for unity both across the political and the industrial spheres were unsuccessful. The divide between regional and state-wide organisations continued and was reflected in the workers' movement.

The Galician Workers' Union (SOG) was born in May 1975. The organisation emerged as an evolution of the FO as the first 'national' workers' organisation to fulfil the 'immediate need' of the Galician (industrial) workers' to fight against Spanish imperialism.[94] Aiming to 'educate and sensitise' the Galician workers about the national issue, SOG publications introduced the pivotal concepts of modern Galician nationalism such as (Spanish) 'imperialism', 'colonialism' or 'oligarchy'.[95] The later term referred to the 'Spanish' or 'imperialist' bourgeoisie or 'capitalists' who were considered the ultimate class and national enemy.[96] In contrast, the meagre Galician bourgeoisie was defined as an ally of the Galician working class, both 'very important sectors' that shared the 'very distressing [economic] situation'.[97] In this manner, the SOG assumed an ambivalent cross-class nationalist position,

[92] The PSOE would join forces with the Christian-democrats and social-democrats in 1975 under the Platform of Democratic Convergence.
[93] 'Presentación Pública de la COS', *El País*, 12 September 1976; AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Sindicais, Manifestos Conxuntos CCOO, UPG, PSOE, UGT, PTE, 'Bases de Acuerdo para la Constitución de Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sindicales' (1976), pp. 1-3.
[94] SOG, *Eixo*, 1 (May, 1975), p.2.
[95] For instance, all *Eixo* numbers, the SOG's publication, inserted issues in Galicia's colonial framework.
[96] SOG, *Eixo*, 1 (May 1975), p. 4.
[97] SOG, *Eixo*, 2 (November 1975), p. 1.

which made sense considering the prevalence of smaller companies and small landowners in the region. Consequence of uneven and insufficient development, by 1975 the nation still had a numerically weak working class: 19 per cent of its population as against 48 per cent of farmers and peasants (which contrasted to 38 and 23 respectively per cent in the Spanish state).[98]

The extremely close links between the SOG and the UPG as part of the 'national-popular movement' were evident in their rhetoric. López Suevos – economics Professor at the University of Santiago and UPG member – developed a theory criticising the dual approach that informed Beiras' analysis. Instead, Suevos argued that Galicia was 'superexploited' under the dictatorship, suffering a *triple* colonisation: economic, cultural and political. Thus, his most relevant contribution was the introduction of a third dimension in the study of underdevelopment: the 'sociological aspect of the dual phenomenon'.[99] The SOG adopted this framework to justify both its own existence and strategy.[100] Economically, industrialisation levels were low and most of the industries promoted by the government were extractive rather than transformative, such as hydroelectric or nuclear plants, mining, cellulose, etc. Not only did enclave industries failed to generate enough jobs, but they also destroyed traditional employment in agriculture as land was expropriated, or fishing, due to contamination. Salaries below the Spanish average (5,500 compared to 7,200 pesetas per month) were also blamed on Spanish colonialism. As a result, Galicia maintained emigration levels above the average levels of the Spanish state: 320 out of every 10,000 Galicians emigrated in contrast with 77 in the rest

[98] Which also contributes to explain that historiographical interest in the region revolves around the rural world, including studies of the democratisation process. Alba Díaz-Geada, 'De Memoria, Revuelta y Conciencia. El Sindicalismo Campesino Democrático en la Galicia de la Dictadura y el Proceso de Cambio de Régimen Político' in Julio Prada Rodríguez (dir), *Galicia en Transición*, pp. 193-223; Alba Díaz-Geada and Daniel Lanero Táboas, 'Dinámicas Políticas de la Sociedad Rural Gallega: Entre la Agonía de la Dictadura y la Implantación de la Democracia (1970-1978)', *Historia del Presente*, 2.21 (2013), pp. 123-44; Daniel Lanero Táboas, *Por Surcos y Calles. Movilización Social e Identidades en Galicia y País Vasco (1968-1980)* (Madrid, 2013).

[99] Ramón López-Suevos, *Cara Unha Visión Crítica da Economía Galega* (1975), pp. 49-87. Ramón López-Suevos, 'Las Tesis Dualistas del Subdesarrollo Económico', *Boletim de Ciencias Economicas*, 24, (1981), pp. 173-216.

[100] SOG, 'Conclusións da Primeira Asamblea Xeral do SOG' (April, 1976), pp. 2-6 available in https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/app/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/files/arquivo/documentos/1976_08_SOG_1_asemblea_maio1976.pdf [last accessed 1 April 2022].

of the state as a whole.[101] Having been subjected to continuous population movement for over a century, emigration had become emblematic of Galician national deprivation and helped to explain the nation's historical and cultural peculiarity (see table 3.2).[102] It was the ultimate consequence of economic dependence on the Spanish state and its colonial exploitation: migrants left in search for a better life, to escape the misery and exploitation of 'Spanish capitalism'. Conversely, Galicia's migratory drain benefited Spanish capitalism/oligarchy, providing cheap labour and commodities as well as remittances, which were not invested in the region. This turned Galicians into 'second-class citizens' both inside their region and in the rest of Spain (or Europe), where they undertook the least socially-valued jobs. This treatment, alongside Galicia's cultural oppression linked to the imposition of a Spanish language and culture encouraged *diglossia*, creating an inferiority syndrome of feeling ashamed of their national personality.[103]

Galician and Spanish workers shared the problems derived from the state's economic management, which opposed the interests of the workers promoting a high cost of living and a restrictive and repressive industrial relations framework. However, the political and cultural 'superexploitation' of Galician workers justified the existence of *Galician* class-based organisations.[104] This explains the UPG's aversion to the PCG, although it was also partly

[101] FO, *Eixo*, 3 (March 1975), p. 10. This publication, *Eixo*, would remain the official publication of all nationalist workers organisations' linked to the UPG. Every time a new one was created, the numbering would restart.
[102] In fact, the issue of emigration both in the nineteenth and twentieth century has attracted much scholarly interest in Galicia, particularly the transoceanic flow to Argentina. See Pilar Cagiao Vila and Vicente Peña Saavedra, *Nós Mesmos. Asociacionismo Galego na Emigración* (Santiago de Compostela, 2008); Xosé M. Núñex Seixas (ed.), *La Galicia Austral. La Immigración Gallega en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 2001); Anxo Lugilde, *A Participación Política dos Emigrantes Galegos (1905-2011)* (Santiago de Compostela, 2011); Pilar Cagiao Vila, *Muller e Emigración* (Santiago de Compostela, 1997).
[103] SOG, 'Conclusións da Primeira Asamblea'. This discourse was also consistent across the SOG's *Eixo* 1-4. *Diglossia* occurs when the use of the native language is confined to a familiar use while the state language is used in social or public gatherings. Diglossia 'may encourage an inferiority complex and deprive the region of the language and culture as a mobilising factor in competitive development'. Keating, 'Rethinking the Region', p. 220.
[104] FO, *Eixo*, 1 (June 1974) and *Eixo*, 2 (July 1974). The traditional syndicates, marginal forces at this time: the Socialist UGT and the anarchist National Confederation of Work (CNT), also advocated for the complete boycott of the Vertical.

linked to their being in direct competition for members and ideological position.[105] The region could not overcome its underdevelopment relying on institutions and organisations 'alien' to the Galician 'proletariat' who served fascist and colonial interests. They were referring primarily to the OSE/Francoism but, by implication, also to the CCOO/PCG. Considering the vertical syndicates to be a farce, the SOG opposed the *entryist* strategy, refusing to recognise any union representatives within the OSE as legitimate.[106] Nevertheless, the SOG did adopt CCOO's pyramidal assembly-based structure and encouraged its members to be continually active at the factory level fighting to improve working conditions, salaries and other factory-level goals while inserting the conflicts in the wider national struggle.

In 1975, the UPG promoted a coordinated non-partisan body including other nationalist parties and workers organisations: the National-Popular Galician Assembly (AN-PG). The aim was to achieve nationalist unity to mobilise society in favour of a democratic rupture that would lead to 'the full exercise of Galician national rights', or self-determination.[107] Differentiating itself from the Communist-led Democratic Board, the AN-PG and all organisations involved defined democracy as a drastic change, which should include the establishment of a Provisional Galician Government. The programme incorporated other democratic demands, calling for general amnesty and the suppression of the 'repressive [Francoist] institutions'. Additionally, it demanded economic measures 'to eliminate the conditions for emigration', including the promotion of a 'rational' industrialisation process, fishing and agrarian reforms; and there was a fierce claim to normalise the Galician language to fight *diglossia*.[108] These claims were non-

[105] Examples of this criticism to the PCG include UPG, 'Editorial: pola Unidade Antifeixista e Antimonopolista en Galicia', TT, 33 (January 1976), p. 1; UPG, 'O Consello. Alternativa Galega para a ruptura', *TT*, 34 (February 1976), pp. 6-7; UPG, 'Posición da UPG encol de "Coordinación Democrática"', *TT*, 36 (April 1976), p.7.
[106] FESGA, uncatalogued, FO, 'Informe no 3' (April, 1975); FTT, Caixa 101, SOG, 'Programa I Estatutos Provisorios do Sindicato Obreiro Galego' (1975).
[107] 'Alternativa da AN-PG de cara á Ruptura', *Ceibe!*, 6 (Oct. 1976) p. 5.
[108] A decree regulating the use of the 'regional languages' had been implemented at the end 1975.

negotiable. Galicia needed to catch up with the other nations of the state to establish with them an '*equal* relationship… in the *common* struggle for democracy'.[109]

In 1976, unity between Communists and Socialists in the *Platajunta* translated into the Galician Democratic Table; with nationalist forces converging in the Council of Galician Political Forces (CFPG). The Table supported the establishment of a Galician provisional government according to the 1936 Statute of Autonomy and prioritised the construction of the democratic framework in Spain.[110] Meanwhile, as a *Galician* 'rupturist' (or revolutionary) alternative, the CFPG defended the *Constitutional Bases for the Participation of the Galician Nation in a Federal Pact.* The *Bases* demanded the recognition of the (sub-state) nations' right for self-determination as a pre-requisite for the achievement of a confederal state.[111] The UPG provided the following definition of 'self-determination' in May, clarifying that

> This is not a metaphysical right... It is about the political, economic, social and cultural right of a people to:
> 1. Govern themselves
> 2. Owning their wealth and means of production
> 3. Making politics work for the popular classes, the only ones capable of defending self-determination
> 4. Having a normally developed language and culture of a scientific, popular and democratic nature.[112]

The *Bases* established that 'a Galician government' should 'assume the representation and exercise of political power in the territory' until 'the definitive political institutions are

[109] 'Alternativa da AN-PG', p.6. Emphasis added.
[110] The Table included CCOO, UGT, PCG, FSG-PSOE, the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers (ORT), the Socialist Party of the Galician People (PSPG) and the Party of Work (PT). Executive Committee of the PCG, 'Por un Pacto de Unidad Gallego', *Mundo Obrero*, 23 (June, 1976); 'Comunicado da Táboa Democrática de Galicia', *LVG*, 23 July 1976, p. 32.
[111] Hervella García and Viveiro Mogo, 'A UPG e o PCG', p. 85. For an in depth study of modern Galician nationalist parties, specially the UPG see Fernández Baz, *A Formación do Nacionalismo.* During the early stages of the political transition there were three main projects for democratisation. In addition to the 'rupturists' there were the 'continuists', who wanted Francoism to survive virtually unchanged. Supporters of this project were mostly confined to the military and some figures of the old political elites, and their strategy was to speak of a revolutionary threat; and the 'pseudo-reformists' or supporters of a 'continuist reformism', as advocated by the Francoist elites and by Arias Navarro's government (December 1973-July 1975). Santos Juliá, 'En Torno a los Proyectos de Transición y sus Imprevistos Resultados', in Carme Molinero (ed.), *La Transición, Treinta Años Después* (Barcelona, 2006), pp. 59-79. An essential study of the radical Spanish left during the transition is Wilhelmi, *Romper el Consenso.*
[112] UPG, *TT*, (May 1976), p.7.

established in the corresponding constituent process'.[113] The *Bases* also established the principle of equality amongst nations in the negotiation and signing of the federal pact, and reserved for the central power the competences of defence, foreign relations, monetary and tariff policy, coordination of economic and fiscal policy, legal regime of the federal administration, criminal legislation and administration of justice in some matters. In this manner, although all the parties of the Galician Left advocated for political decentralisation as a stepping-stone to socialism and a solution to socioeconomic dependence, underdevelopment and exploitation. However, decentralisation was envisioned in two ways: *autonomía* (devolution) vs self-determination.

First steps in the institutionalisation of the workers' movement.

Following Franco's death, and with many collective agreements due for renegotiation, Spain experienced a large wave of social unrest in 1976.[114] The UPG promoted sector unions in the fields of education, banking and fishing, all of which would come together with the SOG to create in 1977 the ING, a first step towards the unity of Galician workers inside a Single Galician Syndical Confederation.[115] Within the ING, activity guidelines were broadly defined in biannual congresses where representatives of all sector unions met on a proportionality basis, electing some of the members of the national plenary (fig. 2.1). Other members of the national plenary, who defined the strategy and action according to congress guidelines, included elected representatives of all sector unions affiliated to the ING. The national plenary met at least once every three months and elected a permanent commission to take over its executive duties in

[113] Quoted in Beramendi and Seixas, *O Nacionalismo Galego*, p. 244.
[114] Wilhelmi, *Romper el Consenso*, p. 25; Soto Carmona, 'Conflictividad Social', pp. 363-408; Redero San Román and Pérez Delgado, 'Sindicalismo y Transición'.
[115] These were the Union of Galician Education Workers (UTEG), Union of Galician Banking Workers (UTBG) and the Galician Syndicate of Sea Workers (SGTM). Their original programmes, which shared the principles of 'democracy, independence, unity and internationalism' are available at the online archive of the FESGA: https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/arquivo-en-linha.html. The SOG worked on this unification since January 1977, introducing the acronym ING progressively in its publications and documentation. ING, *Eixo*, 13 (November 1977); FTT, Caixa 164, ING, *Estatutos da Intersindical Nacional Galega* (October, 1977).

between meetings. The zone and local plenaries took place once a month and fortnightly, and their job was to coordinate the activities at their respective level.

Fig. 3.1. Representative and governing bodies of the ING



Examples of unity within the industrial sphere, were limited to key dates and issues. In Galicia, the labour movement notably came together on 1 May, when all organisations operating at the time, USO, CCOO, SOG and UGT called the Galician workers to fight for their 'most urgent' demands: the creation of work in the region to stop the 'forced' emigration, the end of the wage freeze and price suppression, trade union freedom, the rejection of 'any type of imposed reform' and the creation of a class-based 'Galician, unitary, democratic, independent from political parties and confederated at the state level' workers' organisation.[116] Also on 21 July, a demonstration for total amnesty in Vigo drew 25,000 people asking for the anti-terrorist decree to be abolished.

That month, the Galician CCOO debated in its fifth national assembly whether to support the transformation of the 'movement' into a classic confederate class-based organisation at the upcoming state-level assembly in Barcelona. Although the majority opted for its transformation into a traditional workers' organisation with affiliates, *de facto* accepting the inevitability of a plural trade union system in the future democracy; a significant minority argued that the CCOO should carry on as a socio-political, assembly-based movement in line

[116] CCOO, USO, UGT and SOG 'Cara a Coordinadora Sindical Galega' in *Eixo*, 5 (May 1976), p. 8.

with the nationalist thesis previously espoused by GS.[117] To placate the tensions and avoid splits, CCOO adopted the demand to constitute a provisional autonomous government through a Galician constituent process, calling free elections for a Galician assembly. The organisation also espoused the 1936 Statute of Autonomy as a stepping-stone to Galicia's self-determination, demanding that total amnesty and freedom of association were guaranteed before the political reform referendum.[118] Nevertheless, the decision to unionise prevailed. Created in 1978 as an 'autonomous' territorial federation of the CCOO confederation, the 'Galician National Syndicate of CCOO' (CCOO-G) was divided into branch or sector 'syndicates' (*sindicatos de rama*) and territorial 'unions'. The local, *comarcal* and provincial unions grouped the different sector syndicates, coordinating their action to achieve the socio-political goals of the national union. The structure of the syndicate was pyramidal, starting with 'syndical sections' at the factory/company level which were then grouped at the local, *comarcal*, provincial and, finally, 'national' levels. The lower-level unions implemented the policy decided by the corresponding national syndicate. The national congress, which met biannually, was the main deliberative and decision-making body of the Galician union. In between congresses, the highest governing and representative body was the national council, which included members of the executive committee, the general secretaries of all syndicates and unions, 35 members representing the syndicates and another 35 members representing the unions. This representation was in proportion to affiliation.[119]

[117] 'Disensiones Internas', *El País*, 30 May 1976; AHF10M, Legado Amador Rey, 'Resolución da V Asamblea Nacional de CCOO de Galicia', (June 1976).
[118] 'Resolución da V Asamblea Nacional'; *LVG*, 22 June 1976. Ultimately, the CCOO-G advocated a unitarian, class, vindicatory, democratic, independent and socio-political trade union confederation at the state level; maintaining the workers' commissions and assembly-style structure and thus becoming a 'new-type' syndicate. CCOO-Vigo, 'Anteproyecto de Manifiesto de la Unidad Sindical', *Vigo Obreiro*, Extraord. Ed. (January 1976).
[119] AHCCOO-G, Caixa da Federación do Metal [hereafter CFM], 'Proxecto de Ponencias ao I Congreso do S.N. de CCOO de Galicia. Estatutos, Programa, Estrutura do S.N. de CCOO, Finanzas e Administración, Reglamento de Finanzas e Administración' (1978).

Fig.3.2. Structure of the CCOO-G



Figure 3.3. Representative and Governing bodies of the CCOO-G



Framing the constitutional process: different regional socialist democratic narratives (1977-8)

The appointment of Adolfo Suárez as President of the Government by the king Juan Carlos de Borbón in July 1976 marked the beginning of a clear process of reform, with the implementation of the Trade Union Act, the Amnesty Act and the legalisation of the PCE in April 1977 leading to the Law of Political Reform referendum in December and subsequent general elections in June 1977. As the process of reform advanced, both the leadership of the

PSOE and PCE abandoned their commitment to rupturism opting instead for a 'negotiated reform'.[120] In the PSOE, this sudden change exemplifies the flexibility – opportunism even – of its leader, Felipe González, and his close circle. The party had just adopted Marxism in a December 1976 Congress, relegating social democracy as a 'corrector' of the gross inequalities created by capitalism and embracing instead the principles of self-managing socialism.[121] At this time, the party also argued for the constitution of a federal republic, self-determination for the regions and the nationalisation of large banks and companies.[122] However, ahead of the 1977 elections González softened his critique of capitalism and committed his party to the negotiation of the democratisation process.[123] The rapid transformation of the PSOE into a liberal, social democratic party between 1977-82 has elicited interest amongst scholars who have described it either in terms of 're-founding', equating this change with the creation of a new party under a historic acronym, or of ideological 'transition'.[124] The latter meant that the PSOE was not historically a radical party but that it only assumed a Marxist rhetoric at its 27th Congress (1976) in the context of the political transition in order to rebuild the party, regain its political hegemony in the left and eventually ascend to power.[125] Concurrently, the PCE also stopped referencing the word self-determination or the achievement of a federal state in its programme, a position that the PCG maintained in some documents.[126]

[120] Juan Andrade Blanco, 'El PSOE y el PCE en la Transición', *Ayer*, 89.1 (2013) p. 169. For more on the ideological evolution of the PCE see Juan Andrade Blanco, *El PCE y el PSOE en Transición. La Evolución Ideológica De La Izquierda Durante El Proceso De Cambio Político*. (Madrid, 2012); Miguel Ángel Perfecto García and Javier García Martín, '"Nuestra Bandera". La Transición Doctrinal del Comunismo Español y el Eurocomunismo 1975-1979' in Tusell and Soto *Historia de la Transición*, pp. 227-52.
[121] W. Rand Smith, *The Left's Dirty Job: The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in France and Spain* (Pittsburgh, 1998), p. 55; Sergio Gálvez Biesca, 'Del Socialismo a la Modernización: los Fundamentos de la "Misión Histórica" del PSOE en la Transición', *Historia del Presente*, 8 (2006) pp. 199-218.
[122] *Ibid.*
[123] Abdón Mateos López, 'La Transición del PSOE durante los Años Setenta' in Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze, *Historia de la Transición en España* (Madrid, 2007) pp. 285-99, p. 287.
[124] Santos Julià or Méndez Lago speak of 're-founding' in contrast with Donald Share or Abdón Mateos López.
[125] Donald Share, 'Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left', *West European Politics* 8.1 (1985) pp. 82-103.
[126] Hervella García and Viveiro Mogo, 'A UPG e o PCG', p. 95.

These strategic changes make sense when considering public opinion. Opinion polls from 1977 showed that 'four out every five Spaniards described themselves as belonging in an area between right and left of centre' with a 49.5 per cent of the respondents identifying with centre politics, 25.7 per cent with the left and a 24,8 per cent with the right or far right. A majority of the population still placed great value on the Francoist notions of 'social peace' and 'order'.[127] In fact, a majority of Spaniards preferred order to freedom. Additionally, data from the Centre for Sociological Research, showed that almost half of the population preferred Suárez's reform in contrast to a fifth that supported a clean break.[128] Thus, public support for the 'negotiated reform' – manifested through a 94 per cent of affirmative votes in the referendum – legitimised the process and influenced the ideological and discursive moderation of PSOE but also PCE.[129]

The extremely disappointing results in the 1977 general election forced the Communists to adopt 'Eurocomunism' as a doctrine.[130] The PCE strove to get rid of their historical pro-Soviet authoritarian image and renounce Lenin.[131] Similarly, the PCG in Galicia fully embraced the model of 'progressive' Galician nationalism. Maintaining the language of self-determination and of a federal state, the party was committed to the national reconstruction of Galicia and its self-government under a statutory framework.[132] As a result of this process, the PCG distanced itself further from the UPG, referring to the nationalists hereafter as an

[127] According to a FOESSA report published in 1981 quoted in Núñez Seixas, *España en Democracia*, pp. 83-4. Additionally, both concepts remained highly mentioned in the press and by politicians of all political backgrounds.
[128] Núñez Seixas, *España en Democracia*, pp. 83-4.
[129] Referendum result in *ibid.*, pp. 66-76.
[130] Electoral results in *ibid.*, p. 112.
[131] Image constructed through years of negative propaganda. Andrade Blanco, 'El PSOE y el PCE', pp. 170-3.
[132] Statutes of the PCG following the Third Congress in 1977 quoted in Hervella García and Viveiro Mogo, 'A UPG e o PCG', p. 98. Examples of the PCG's new moderate line marked by its leaders from 1977 includes Santiago Álvarez's document to explain the party's political argument facing the 1978 constitutional referendum, AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Políticas, 'Notas sobre la Constitución con Vistas a la Campaña del Referéndum en Galicia'. See also Víctor M. Santidrián Arias, 'PSOE, PCE, UGT y CCOO durante la Transición en Galicia (1975-1981)', *Historia del Presente*, 25 (2015), pp. 63-79.

'elitist independentist group'.[133] The official rhetoric of the CCOO-G mimicked that of the PCG, and the close connection was reflected in the make-up of the first executive committee, with 27 out of the 33 members belonging to the party.[134] The 'exceptionality' and 'instability' of the economic and socio-political context warranted moderation. For the CCOO-G, this included dropping all references to colonial theory.[135]

The UPG moved in the exact opposite direction. Following 'democratic centralism', the party set a new hierarchical and disciplined structure.[136] This included a network of cells connected in the first instance with a local committee which in turn was linked to a zone committee. All zone committees had to respect the decisions made by the central committee. Ideologically, the UPG promoted a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and proletarian internationalism. Facing competition from the PCG and PSG, the UPG sought historical legitimacy in reinterpreting key figures of pre-war nationalism, such as Castelao, and assuming the 'revolutionary potential' of the Galician peasantry. The party stopped short of developing how to construct socialism in the region, focusing on what it would be the first 'popular-democratic' stage. As for the issue of nationhood, the UPG stated in May 1976: 'The nation is the popular classes because the nation acquires revolutionary status against bourgeois power, the nation *is not all classes, but those who assume the struggle* for national liberation'.[137] Thus, whilst including a voluntarist element to nationhood, only those who identified with the party's ideology would be truly Galician. In this manner, within the emerging plural and competitive context, the UPG transitioned towards sectionalism.

[133] Statement of the Central Committee of the PCG, 'Conciencia Nacional Gallega', *Mundo Obrero*, (October 1976), p. 9; Santiago Álvarez *Ensaio encol do Problema Nacional Galego* (Madrid, 1976).
[134] CCOO-G, *I Congreso do Sindicato de CCOO de Galicia. Edición Facsimilar* (Santiago de Compostela, 2008).
[135] This view and argument would remain so at least until after the 1979 general elections.
[136] Beramendi and Seixas, *O Nacionalismo Galego*, p. 225.
[137] UPG, *TT*, (May 1976) quoted in *ibid.*, p. 226. Emphasis added.

With an uncompromising commitment to maximalist objectives, the party articulated an exclusive frame around the dichotomy Nationalist (Galician)/*españolistas* (Spanishist).[138] Under this framework, every party or workers' organisation willing to participate in the *consenso*, negotiating with the government appointed by the Spanish king – himself appointed by Franco as his heir – was identified as *españolista*. Following from the party's rupturist, regional democratic project established in the *Constitutional Bases*, this term intended to undermine the 'illegitima[te]' progressive 'bourgeois' democratic project. Thus, the UPG and its sister workers' organisations, the SOG and the ING, were articulating Galicianness as a revolutionary socialist cross-class coalition, inherently opposed to a bourgeois, monopolistic Spain. Yet, within the UPG, a minority argued against the division of nationalism/*españolismo* and proposed a 'possibilist' (*posibilista*) – pragmatic – strategy instead. The minority comprised many of the old members of GS led by Camilo Nogueira, who left the UPG quietly ahead of the 1977 general elections. The meagre electoral support of the nationalist block BN-PG (UPG and AN-PG) seemed to back the minority's argument that the UPG was out of touch with the Galician reality and the desires of its people. Soon after, Nogueira created the Galician Workers Party (POG). In short, 'possibilists' (pragmatists) and maximalists shared the same goal: self-determination and self-government. However, they disagreed on the process. While the majority UPG position discarded reform over rupture, the POG accepted the new 'autonomic regime' as a stepping-stone, asserting that the context demanded nationalists to participate in the process of reform to represent Galicia.

Consensus and 'autonomy': devolution vs self-determination

Consensus politics unfolded with the signing of the Moncloa Pacts on 25 October 1977 by the leaders of all parliamentary parties. These pacts were the first real attempt to tackle the

[138] For an analysis of the evolving framing strategies of the UPG/BNG see Máiz and Ares, 'The Shifting Framing Strategies and Policy Positions of the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*'.

economic recession.[139] By June 1977 inflation was running at 30 per cent, there were very sharp increases in prices and the balance of payments deficit, with unemployment running high.[140] The Moncloa 'Agreement on the Economic Reform and Recovery Programme' outlined the pivotal goals of reducing inflation and the $5,000m deficit through an adjustment policy based on wage and monetary restraint in exchange for implementing public social policies around housing, social security and education to be funded through a progressive tax reform.[141] Basically, in return for restraint in the industrial sphere, with wage increases to be capped at 22 per cent, the government committed to wealth redistribution and developing a modern welfare state. It should be noted here that, unlike the UK, what was achieved was not a *social* but a *political* pact, as neither the workers' nor the employers' unions were directly involved in the process. While most academic works in the fields of history and political sciences describe the Spanish policy process starting in 1977 as 'neo-corporatist', Paul Heywood convincingly argues that while the pacts provided the legislative framework for Spanish industrial relations and economic policy, they were 'used [by the government] as an implementation mechanism to achieve, sometimes legitimise, specific short term policy objectives' rather than constituting a genuine negotiation with the social actors involved.[142]

The absence of the trade unions as signatories was criticised as unrepresentative of the workers, who were most affected by the measures. On 26 October, CCOO and UGT requested to meet with the government and the employers' organisation (CEOE) to negotiate issues

[139] Almudena Mozo Gayo, 'Constitución y Trabajo: el Debate Sindical' in Tusell and Soto *Historia de la Transición*, pp. 355-68.
[140] José María Marín Arce, 'Crisis Industrial y Primeras Medidas de Reestructuración durante la Transición (1976-82)' in Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze, *Historia de la Transición*, pp. 121-35, p. 122; José Luís García Delgado and José María Serrano Sanz, 'De la Primera Crisis Energética a las Elecciones del 77: Tiempo de Incertidumbre' in García Delgado (Dir), *La Economía Española de la Transición*, pp. 3-21.
[141] Manuel Redero San Román, 'Los Sindicatos en la Democracia: de la Movilización a la Gestión', *Historia y Política*, 20 (2008) pp. 129-58, pp. 136-7. The agreements also had a political component, and they included the reform of previous political and judicial institutions; the dismantling of the Francoist corporative institutions and the incorporation of mechanisms for parliamentary control in the creation and implementation of the economic policy; and they dealt with some issues regarding the functioning of the provisional autonomous institutions.
[142] Paul Heywood, 'Power Diffusion or Concentration? In Search of the Spanish Policy Process' in Paul Heywood (ed.), *Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different?* (London, 1999), p. 107.

pivotal to industrial relations such as union action in factories, the division of workers' organisations' historical assets, collective bargaining and the right to strike. Criticism of the agreements, first of their retroactivity and then of the government's unilaterality in their application, demonstrated that the consensus had some limitations. Showing the close links between party and syndicate, the UGT criticised the Pacts harshly until the PSOE subscribed to them. Although with some reservations initially, the CCOO supported the pacts arguing like the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), party in government, and PCE their importance for both the economy *and* the consolidation of democracy.[143] Asserting that the workers were willing to pay a price for democracy and to overcome the critical situation of the economy, the Council of the CCOO-G defined its position as 'responsible' at its first meeting on 30 October 1977.[144]

The decision of CCOO to support the pact brought to the fore the issue of organisational 'autonomy' – meaning independence from political parties. Admittedly, the decision to support the Pacts had been far from unanimous within the organisation. An internal document circulated for debate taking stock of the agreements summed up the arguments of the critical sectors, which opposed the process of political *reform* and coincided in their unwavering defence of 'class interests' with the ING.[145] Critics claimed that the proposed economic measures were a 'tough stabilisation plan' that would aggravate the crisis, bring more unemployment and lower the purchasing power of the workers. Under the pretence that the crisis should be 'equally distributed', the agreements favoured employers at the expense of the workers. Additionally, for these critics, the trade-offs were either deceptive or ambiguous, a demagogic way of achieving social support for the unpopular economic sacrifices asked for by the workers. Ultimately, they argued that the pacts would pave the way for the setting-up of a

[143] ING,'Comunicado de CCOO de Lugo', *Eixo* (1978).
[144] AHF10M, FMAD, CCOO-G, Consello Nacional, 'Xuntanza do Consello do Sindicato Nacional das Comisións Obreiras de Galicia' (30 October 1977).
[145] AHF10M, CFM, 'Circular ante el Congreso de las CCOO' (April 1978).

state with curtailed liberties. In Galicia, this critical sector would eventually split and create a new nationalist trade union in November 1978, closer to the postulates of the PSG and the POG: the Galician Workers Union (CTG).[146] Its members supported a progressive socialist democratic project around both organisational and regional autonomy and self-determination, rejecting interference from political parties and the policy of state agreements preferring a Galician framework of industrial relations.[147] Considering the 1979 Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) 'thermometer of feelings', which revealed a strong rejection of 'political parties' and 'bureaucracy' in Galicia (only surpassed by 'revolutionary groups'), this position seems to have been majoritarian among workers.[148]

Meanwhile, the ING defined the economic agreement reached in Madrid by the political elites as anti-Galician and anti-working class, maintaining in a public statement that the agreement was 'doubly grave' for Galician workers. The Pact allowed the Spanish dominant class to keep exploiting the region, maintaining 'the lowest salaries of the State, the greatest number of unemployed (emigration) [and] the lowest number of job vacancies'. Thus, the Moncloa Pacts retained the nation's colonial function within the state. Also, because the pact proposed a homogeneous solution for Spain as a whole, disregarding Galicia's different needs, the ING argued it would 'accentuate' the nation's difference – underdevelopment and deprivation – within the state.[149] In line with its radical, revolutionary approach, the ING criticised the acceptance of the pacts by CCOO and UGT on the basis that it *de facto* consolidated 'social pact[ism]' in Spain with a government that represented the interests of the 'Imperialist Spanish Capital'.[150] Moreover, challenging a statement made by Santiago Carrillo

[146] For an overview of this union see Bastión, 'O Sindicalismo Nacionalista Galego', pp. 92-102.
[147] CTG, 'Estatutos do I Congreso da CTG' (November 1978) quoted in *ibid.*, p. 100.
[148] CIS study published as Manuel García Ferrando, *Regionalismo y Autonomía en España 1976-1979*, (Madrid, 1982), pp. 307-43.
[149] AHF10M, CFM, 'Manifesto da Intersindical Nacional Galega (SOG, UTEG, UTBG, UTSG, SGTM) encol do "Pacto da Moncloa"' (c. January 1978); ING, *Eixo*, 15 (1978).
[150] FTT, Caixa 166, ING, 'Manifesto da Intersindical Nacional Galega (SOG, UTEG, TUBG, UTSG, SGTM) Encol do "Pacto da Moncloa"' (November 1977).

that CCOO and UGT 'and by extension workers' had *de facto* been represented by the PCE and the PSOE, the ING accused the Spanish Communists of plotting to 'cheat' workers to keep the social peace. In this manner, as the common political enemy vanished and Spain began the construction of its democratic apparatus, the nationalists became more antagonistic towards the Communists. Pluralism and competition partly determined the aggressiveness of the discourse. In January 1977, *Eixo*'s editorial stated

> At this time, when "illegal" unions are already starting to negotiate with employers directly in many companies... When we begin to see clearly a senseless competition between...unions... that only leads to creating division... it is more urgent than ever to study the experiences of our class... to prevent this "freedom of association" of the government, which imposes pluralism and division on us, from setting us against each other...
> [We] commit ourselves publicly to openly denounce any activity (wherever it comes from) that is against the interests of the workers.[151]

However, the aim was to gather public support both for the construction of specifically *Galician* – nationalist – institutions, including a nationalist trade union, and for economic decentralisation. In other words, the ING was campaigning for the UPG's 'national-popular' socialist democratic project.

The writing of the Constitution began in August 1977 with a commission integrating MPs from the different parliamentary parties and the text was presented to parliament in December 1977, receiving over 3,000 amendments.[152] Positions regarding the territorial question were polarised. Some conservative MPs argued that the definition of Spain as a nation composed of nationalities implied a veiled acknowledgment of the country's multi-nationality opening the door to its future disintegration.[153] On the other hand, from the (sub-state) nationalist perspective, the Constitution and devolution fell short from self-determination. Although no nationalist party in Galicia supported the 'Spanish' Constitution, there were some

[151] SOG, *Eixo*, 7 (January 1977), p. 2.
[152] Núñez Seixas, *España en Democracia*, pp. 128-34.
[153] *Ibid*. Ultimately, the unrest amongst the most reactionary groups against the democratisation and the decentralisation process led to Lieutenant-Coronel Tejero's attempt at a coup on 23 February 1981, during the inauguration of Calvo-Sotelo's presidency after Suárez's resignation.

nuances. The PSG advocated for abstention opposing article 93, which enshrined a liberal free-market economy, viewing administrative decentralisation as a chance to develop national consciousness and as a first step towards self-government.[154] Similarly, the POG defended a blank ballot to actively express disconformity with a text that denied 'Galicia's national rights' and the possibility of 'a social transformation within the Spanish state' as article 93 'put it in the hands of multinational companies'.[155]

By contrast, the UPG and ING advocated a negative vote denying that the future constitutional framework provided new ways to achieve self-government. They insisted that the constitutional text ensured the continued colonial exploitation of Galicia by the Spanish oligarchy under a democratic façade. The transition process had but reformed the fascist, centralist and colonial state trying to equate it to the other European liberal democracies. Ultimately, it was a text 'done and thought from Madrid… for the Spanish imperial capital', assuming liberalism and setting up a free-market economy.[156] As such it was anti-Galician and anti-working class. This revolutionary framing inevitably rendered the constitution anti-democratic. Another element to consider when asking the Galician people to oppose the text was that any autonomy that could be *granted* by such a state would clearly not suffice to solve the socioeconomic problems affecting Galicia. Accordingly, the autonomous process that followed was interpreted as a reform that sought to appease national claims to allow the continued exploitation of Galicia. In this manner, these revolutionary nationalists redefined the relationship between the new 'pseudo-democratic' state and Galicia as 'neo-colonialism'.[157] The political autonomy offered by the new democratic state maintained the triple exploitation

[154] Carbajo Vázquez, *El Partido Socialista Galego*, p. 323
[155] *Galicia Socialista* (September 1978) p. 1; Camilo Nogueira quoted in de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, p. 149.
[156] 'Contra o Pacto Social, NON á Constitución Española', in *Eixo*, 21 (November 1978).
[157] UPG, *TT* most numbers between 1978-80; ING, *Eixo*, 30 (January 1980). FESGA, uncatalogued, ING, 'Situación Sindical e Alternativas pro Sindicalismo Patriótico e Anticolonial' (1979); 'Acordo de unificación ING-CTG' (September 1980) available in https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/nova/acordo-unificacion-ing-ctg-1980.html [last accessed 7 April 2022].

of Galicia and its derived socioeconomic problems. As such, ahead of the celebration of Galicia's Day on 25 July 1978, the ING argued that 'if autonomy is going to be today the vehicle through which the colossal oppression is exercised, the fight against it takes a preferential importance'.[158] In this manner, and following from the UPG's equating Galician 'patriots' to revolutionaries/rupturists; the majority sector of the ING hinted that the contradiction between nationalism-*españolismo* and, from 1978, 'pseudonationalism' was the political expression of the class struggle in Galicia.

The leadership of the PCG and CCOO-G campaigned for a favourable vote in the 1978 referendum.[159] These organisations counter-argued the UPG's framing of the text as undemocratic, anti-working class and anti-Galician stating that the text emanated from a parliament elected by universal suffrage, considering its plural political make up, and guaranteed autonomy for the nationalities and regions within unity in the Spanish state. The PCG and the CCOO-G justified the socio-political consensus initiated with the Moncloa Pacts and culminating in the Constitution because it suppressed 'the two Spains' of the Civil War and avoided a constitutional draft elaborated by a conservative majority (UCD-AP). The Spanish communists believed that although the constitution established a bourgeois free-market economy, it also determined that the country's wealth would be subordinated to the general interest. Furthermore, the Constitution was but a minimum legal framework from which future legislation would emanate to model the country. Thus, when and if the parliament had a left-wing majority, the social and welfare aspects could be further developed. Finally, the PCG and CCOO-G criticised the maximalist position of the UPG and ING stressing that autonomism was an opportunity for Galicia; allowing it to 'self-administer' and self-govern within limits that could be increased in the future.

[158] That date has been institutionalised as the day of Galicia, St James Day (whose remains are supposedly buried in the cathedral of the region's capital, Santiago (St James) de Compostela. ING, *Eixo*, 20 (July 1978), p. 3.
[159] AHF10M, LSCB, Organizacións Políticas, 'Notas Sobre la Constitución con Vistas a la Campaña del Referéndum en Galicia' (Santiago de Compostela, 31 October 1978).

On 6 December, the Constitution was approved with 88,54 per cent of the votes across Spain. In Galicia, the constitution obtained 90,06 per cent of affirmative votes, but only a 50,2 per cent of the registered voters exercised their right (against the Spanish average of 67,11 per cent).[160] Galicia's largest newspaper, *La Voz de Galicia* highlighted the region's higher levels of abstention, blank and null ballots but also positive votes compared to the Spanish average.[161] The same year, Spain held the first democratic workplace elections.[162] CCOO maintained its position as the main trade union confederation both at the state and regional levels (37 and 24.88 per cent respectively). The UGT obtained 17.29 and 31 per cent of the vote in Galicia and Spain respectively. Meanwhile, the ING obtained 9.51 per cent of the vote, with exceptional results in sectors such as health (where it was the most representative union with a 23.53 per cent). In fact, nationalist trade unionism achieved a more than respectable 13 per cent of the total when we add up the results of the CTG. The leadership of the ING interpreted the results as a success derived from their confrontational strategy, defined in its electoral programme as 'an uncompromising defence of the interest of the Galician workers' contrary to the Spanish CCOO and UGT.[163] Similarly, the CCOO-G reflected on its own position regarding both the national question and its relationship to the PCG.

CCOO had set itself up as an 'autonomous' organisation in its first Congress (1978). Autonomy, as defined by the leadership of the confederation, '[did] not mean apathy or indifference to institutional dynamics' but 'the capacity to express and respond to workers' problems with its own initiatives, supported by mobilisation'.[164] At a meeting of the PCG on 23 March 1978, Amor Deus acknowledged that the union had lost some support amongst

[160] Official data can be consulted at the Ministerio del Interior website http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/
[161] *LVG*, 7 December 1978.
[162] Data quoted in Gutiérrez Ramos, 'A Articulación do Sindicalismo Nacionalista Galego'; *A Nosa Terra*, 6 (17 February 1978) p. 3.
[163] *Eixo*, 21 (November 1978), p. 3.
[164] Marcelino Camacho, 'Informe General' in *Primer Congreso de CCOO* (Madrid, 1978), pp. 31-6. For a comparative with UGT see Araya Gómez, Rodrigo, 'Desenredar lo Bien Atado. Propuestas Sindicales Ante la Crisis Económica del Postfranquismo', *Historia, Trabajo y Sociedad*, 1 (2010), pp. 53-78.

industrial workers, which he partially blamed on the political vacuum that CCOO-G had left on the Left and 'others' (ING, CTG) had used. In the view of the general secretary, the Communist union 'needed' to have a stronger 'national image', to be built by presenting specific alternatives to the Galician problems.[165] From this it followed that CCOO-G should be more independent from the CCOO but also from the PCG, because 'communist' was a negative tag and not representative of the organisation's diverse grassroots. Ultimately, the programme that arose from the first congress of the CCOO-G, specifically its chapter on prospective 'socioeconomic aims and measures' recovered the narrative of underdevelopment and regional deprivation, arguing that the industrialisation of Galicia should be planned and promoted by regional institutions.[166] Nevertheless, the majority of the 730 delegates attending the first CCOO-G congress taking place in June 1978 opted to support the CCOO's strategy, seeking unity of action with the UGT, rather than the ING. This decision and CCOO-G's subscription of consensus politics, showcased its 'branch' or dependent status in the eyes of the nationalists, who clung to the nationalist/Spanishist frame.

Conclusion

Capitalising on the increasing weakness of the dictatorship, the democratic opposition to the Francoist regime in both Spain and Galicia, particularly the Communists, established a clear dichotomy between working class/democracy and oligarchy/Francoist dictatorship until 1975. Militant workers in Galicia, and elsewhere in Spain, deployed a rhetoric linking class interests with democracy, justifying the (re)emergence of the labour movement and the setting up of the CCOO. In using a language of class and setting up opportunities to exercise democracy in the workplace, the CCOO (re)constructed the constituency of workers that the

[165] AHF10M, LMAD, PCG, Comité Executivo, 'Minutes of Executive Committee meetings of the PCG between 1978-82'.
[166] AHF10M, CFM, 'Proxecto de Ponencias ao 1º Congreso do S.N. de CCOO de Galicia' (1978).

regime had tried to crush and presented itself as a proxy for democracy and embodiment of the Spanish working class. Adapting to the region's socioeconomic (rural) character and political (nationalism) reality, the language of Galicia's national dependence, underdevelopment and 'exploitation' permeated the narrative of the regional CCOO at least since 1968. Yet, the grouping did not pragmatically deploy the nationalist framework to encourage broader class mobilisation against the dictatorship until after 1971. The CCOO's adoption of the 'internal colonialism' framework developed by the UPG, GS and PSG leaders c. 1970 speaks to the importance of the workplace as a democratic forum. CCOO blamed the socioeconomic backwardness and 'exploitation' of Galicia primarily on the dictatorship's management of the economy. To some extent, Galician workers shared this problem with the rest of the Spanish working class; but the regime's homogenising tendencies meant they were doubly oppressed, economically and culturally. This framework was emphasised after the 1972 industrial protests of Ferrol and Vigo, which the anti-Francoist opposition in Galicia including sub-state nationalism viewed as a regional turning point. The struggles demonstrated that industrial issues could be politicised to mobilise the broader population and that Galician workers had finally gained class consciousness. This aspect encouraged the UPG to develop a 'Galician' alternative to the CCOO, seeking promote its 'national-popular' democratic project. Conversely, the broad regional solidarity – manifested with an explosion of industrial conflicts in solidarity – convinced the CCOO leadership that the region was also witnessing a rise in national awareness. In this manner, from 1972, the regional framework became entrenched in the narrative and strategy of class-based organisations and the workers movement *in Galicia* turned into a *Galician* workers' movement.

Before 1975, CCOO and the nationalist groupings identified a common enemy: the fascist Francoist state which serviced the interests of the oligarchy. After all, under a democratic framework both class and regional grievances could be addressed. Yet, as the

regime crumbled and disappeared, with the country transitioning towards democracy via 'reform', the Left in Galicia became divided, defending alternative socialist democratic projects, and the broad issue of 'autonomy' gained ground – with both political and organisational connotations. Although the causes of division were manifold, two interrelated elements stand out. First, the progressive moderation of the main state-wide parties in the left, their regional federations in Galicia and their sister syndicates. Second, the issue of political decentralisation, with the issue of devolution vs self-determination becoming central to the political debate in Spain until the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. The extremely close links between parties and the workers' movement at this time meant that political cleavages both affected and were affected by the regional organisations. The nationalists of the UPG/ING fiercely maintained their commitment to the radical democratic project enshrined in the *Constitutional Bases*. As such, and in an increasingly plural and competitive context, they reformulated Galicianness according to the 'triple exploitation' framework. In this manner, the identity discourse of the BN-PG and the ING became increasingly excluding, developing a complex dichotomy that distinguished between Galician 'patriots', *españolistas* and 'pseudo-nationalists'. According to this framework, only those who advocated for a 'national-popular' socialist democracy, where Galicia could negotiate a federal solution in a position of equality with the other nations, could speak for Galicia, its workers and population. The next chapter explores the continuities and transformations of these institutional narratives as the different organisations competed for socio-political influence and representation.

Chapter 4: Devolution, plurality, and competition (1978-86): (Re)defining the Other

The years 1978-86 in Galicia witnessed the consolidation of both this new model of industrial relations and the new constitutional framework of asymmetric devolution (the *autonomías*). The *transición sindical* set up, by contrast with Scotland, a plural and competitive system in a society with low affiliation levels and moderate political preferences. In this system, workers' organisations received a significant portion of their income from the state based on their performance at the workplace elections. This structure truly impacted industrial and labour relations across both Spain and Galicia.[1] In Galicia, the setting up of the 1981 regional institutional framework added a layer for competition. Considering the extremely close links between the political parties and the workers' organisations at this time, the new regional sphere exacerbated existing ideological and strategic disagreements over the emergent democratic model. With the passing of the 1978 Constitution, CCOO-G, which up until 1975 had embodied Galician (and Spanish) workers and functioned as a proxy for democracy, faced new challenges. Not only was the organisation competing with the more moderate General Workers' Union (UGT), sister of the PSOE but, parallel to the process of *reconversión industrial* that deeply affected the steel and shipbuilding sectors, the radical nationalist organisations gained ground in the factories.

[1] Fishman, *Organización Obrera*, p. 221-onwards. José M. Marín Arce, *Los Sindicatos y la Reconversión Industrial durante la Transición* (Madrid, 1997), p. 97. Affiliation levels decreased from 57 per cent in 1978 to 33 per cent in 1980 and 23 per cent in 1984. Pérez Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society*, p. 221.

The Spanish government led by Adolfo Suárez (1977-9 and 1979-82) issued a decree to downsize the shipbuilding sector in October 1977, planning to close almost half of Spain's 54 shipyards and forcing out two thirds of their 60,000 strong workforce.[2] The political delay in tackling the economic crisis meant that, by 1982, the recession in Spain was steep. GDP growth was virtually stagnant, there was a sharp decline in investment and the public deficit had increased to 5.4 per cent of GDP from 1.8 per cent in 1978.[3] That year, the PSOE won the October general election with a landslide victory, under Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra.[4] With a comfortable parliamentary majority, the PSOE government pushed forward with the *reconversión industrial*. This process deeply affected Galicia – with an already narrow industrial base.[5] In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Galician shipbuilding represented 40 per cent of the national workforce in the sector jobs at the state level.[6] Regionally, shipbuilding represented 11.5 per cent of direct industrial employment and generated 2.8 indirect jobs in ancillary companies for every shipyard job.[7] The *comarcas* of Vigo and Ferrol were particularly over-dependent on the sector. To give an idea of the local importance of shipbuilding, in 1979 deliveries from the Vigo shipyards represented 43 per cent of the state total.[8] In part, this overdependence related to a corporate policy encouraged since the 1960s aimed at the creation of 'integrated industries'. This meant that all materials and parts used to

[2] David Florido del Corral, José Luís Gutiérrez Molina, Beltrán Roca Martínez, *El Pueblo en la Calle, Reconversión naval, Sindicalismo y Protesta Popular en el Astillero de Puerto Real* (Sevilla, 2009) p. 42.
[3] Julio Segura, 'Del Primer Gobierno Socialista a la Integración en la CEE: 1983-1985' in José Luis García Delgado (Dir.), *La Economía Española de la Transición*, pp. 59-77, p. 59.
[4] Felipe González led the PSOE to three consecutive electoral victories between 1982-96. For a close look at the first term of the PSOE, which frames the present chapter, see number 8 of the history journal *Historia del Presente* (2013) edited by Álvaro Soto and available in http://historiadelpresente.es/revista/historia-presente/20062 [last accessed 28 June 2020].
[5] Diego Gómez-Aller Andrés, 'La Otra Transición: Reconversión Naval y Movilización Social' in Julio Prada Rodríguez (Dir), *Galicia en Transición* (Madrid, 2019), pp. 149-92. See also chapter 3.
[6] Manuel Guisado Tato, Mercedes Vila Alonso and Carlos Ferrer Soto, 'Estado de la Cuestión de la Construcción Naval Gallega. Los Nuevos Factores de Competitividad', *Revista Galega de Economía*, 1 (2002), p. 10.
[7] *Ibid.*; Eugenio Vela Sastre and Luis Gutiérrez de Soto, *El Sector de la Construcción Naval ante el Ingreso de España en la CEE* (Madrid, 1985), p. 13.
[8] Guisado Tato, Vila Alonso and Ferrer Soto, 'Estado de la Cuestión de la Construcción Naval Gallega', p.9.

build a specific ship were manufactured within the same shipyard. Between 1978 and 1987, Galicia lost just over half of the jobs in the companies affected by the *reconversión*.[9]

Also in 1982, the workplace elections brought significant changes to the industrial relations sphere in Galicia. United within the *Intersindical*, the nationalist workers' organisation reached the coveted 'most representative' union status for the first time while CCOO-G lost its first place to the UGT.[10] The nationalists had been framing the industrial issue as a matter of regional grievance from the get-go and, in 1984, the CCOO-G joined in these efforts. As the STUC had done in Scotland, both organisations involved broader sections of society in their struggle. However, unity of action did not translate into organic unity. This chapter centres on the changing strategies and discourse of the CCOO-G within this context of (liberal) democratic consolidation that combined political decentralisation with economic centralisation. To reinstate itself as a proxy for Galician (and Spanish) workers and public opinion, this organisation struggled between pragmatism and ideology. Additionally, this chapter analyses the relative success of the left-wing workers' organisations in Galicia considering their rhetoric and strategy, comparing the results of nationalism and Communism in the regional industrial and political spheres. The lack of a unified *regional* – as opposed to nationalist – workers' umbrella organisation challenged the short-term development of a unified regional socialist democratic political narrative. Yet, in the industrial sphere, pragmatism often won over ideology as the unions faced many institutional challenges in the new democratic setting. Attaining better electoral results in the industrial sphere than in the political sphere, co-operating against the PSOE's state-managed deindustrialisation process

[9] From 11,820 jobs to 4,397. José Luís Outes Ruso, *La Crisis del Sector Naval y su Repercusión en Galicia* (Vigo, 1990), p. 131.

[10] In Spain, the concept of 'most representative' union acts as an instrument of selection, as a comparative assessment between workers' organisations justifying prerogatives in institutional matters *vis-à-vis* the State and companies, as well as with regard to collective bargaining. This status was achieved by getting a 10 per cent of delegates in the workplace elections at the state level, or a 15 per cent at the autonomic level. Pierre-Henri Cialti, 'La Mayor Representatividad Sindical en España', *Justicia*, 30 (2016), pp. 17-31.

and facing a conservative regional government, this chapter argues that socialist workers' organisations in Galicia advanced the transition of Galician political nationalism from maximalist (revolutionary) to more pragmatic (progressive), inclusive positions from 1985.

The *transición sindical*: institutionalising a multi-level, plural, competitive stage.

In the emerging democratic context, collective bargaining remained at the heart of trade union strategy and the workplace retained its role as a democratic forum. Leading a factory-level negotiation process gave workers' representatives the chance to show their management skills, political stance and commitment to the workers, while providing exposure. In the case of the bigger steel and shipbuilding companies, workers' assemblies usually took place in public places such as municipal stadiums where workers from other local companies or sectors sometimes joined in solidarity. [11] As successive governments accompanied political decentralisation with economic centralisation in their efforts to fight the recession and converge with the EEC, workplace negotiations provided both a challenge and an opportunity. In the new democratic framework, successful conflict management could lead to majority union status in the company or sector. In turn, this made it possible for unions to participate in the state-wide negotiations leading to the legislative agreements that framed industrial relations in democratic Spain (*Acuerdos Marco*, table 4.1). CCOO and UGT dominated these state-wide negotiations, the former because of its social capital for its role in bringing down the dictatorship and the latter favoured by the national government and the employers' association (CEOE), who conceptualised the dominance of the Communist CCOO as the 'syndical problem'.

[11] As seen for example during the conflict of the ASTANO ancillary companies taking place in April 1977. *LVG*, 7 April 1977, p. 31.

Table 4.1 Democratic legislative framework for industrial relations in Spain.

Year	Agreement	Signatories	Contents	Aims/Outcomes
1977	**Moncloa Pacts**	Government and political parties with parliamentary representation (with the notable exception of AP)	Control of inflation and unemployment Collective bargaining Structural Reforms	Consolidate democracy Introduced flexibility in the labour market and trade union rights
1979	**ABI** (Basic Inter-confederal Agreement)	CEOE and UGT	Regulate collective bargaining, trade union rights in the workplace and the System of Work/Industrial relations	Ended the arbitrating role of the state
1980	**AMI** (Frame Inter-confederal Agreement)	CEOE and UGT USO adhered later	Collective bargaining, employment, inflation control. Trade union rights Unemployment protection	Fight unemployment Liberalised the labour market
1981	**ANE** (National Employment Agreement)	Government (UCD), CEOE, UGT and CCOO	Trade unions to participate in public institutions Distribution of trade union assets Employment Wages	Consolidated the trade unions as institutionalised social agents Increased flexibility of the labour market and imposition of a wage ceiling below CPI increase
1983	**AI** (Inter-confederal agreement)	CEOE, CEPYME, UGT and CCOO	Trade union rights Established criteria for the reduction of working hours and collective bargaining Regulated the role of the trade unions in public institutions Employment policy and unemployment benefits	Liberalisation of the labour market
1984 (for the year 1985)	**AES** (Social and Economic Agreement)	Government (PSOE), CEOE and UGT	Trade union participation in INI companies Historical trade union assets Employment and Fiscal policy	Liberalisation of the labour market

Sources: Antonio Herrera González de Molina and Francisco Acosta, 'Sindicalismo y Socialización Política en la Transición' in Quirosa-Cheyrouze, *Historia de la Transición*, p. 185; Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla and Francisco Pérez Amoros, 'El Acuerdo Económico y Social', *Revista de Política Social*, 145, (1985) pp. 55-78; José Babiano Mora, 'El Sindicalismo Español en el Último Cuarto del Siglo XX' in Heras, Ruíz González, Sánchez Sánchez (coords.), *Movimientos Sociales y Estado*, p. 441.

The governments of Adolfo Suárez had begun the regulation of industrial relations with the Moncloa Pacts in 1977. Successive decrees and agreements slowly established a model of

indirect representation as opposed to the direct assembly-style.[12] This sparked debate between unions. On one hand, CCOO, USO and the ING defended organisational unity – albeit at different territorial levels – and horizontal workplace representation through workplace committees (*comités de empresa*).[13] On its part, the UGT defended plurality and a vertical representational model based on union sections at the workplace (*secciones sindicales*).[14] The first democratic workplace elections extended through 1978. The Royal Decree 3149/1977 of 6 December regulated them, imposing proportional criteria for small and medium-sized companies and closed lists for larger ones, as well as the division into two polling stations (blue vs white collar staff). The decree was heavily criticised by both the ING and the CCOO-G. The nationalists argued that regulations were detrimental to them and favourable to the CCOO, most representative in the bigger companies, and the UGT, with more support amongst white collar workers.[15] Instead, the ING wanted the elections to take place at the regional ('national'), not factory, level, believing that Spanish unions would then be penalised for their moderation. Crucially, the ING had a superior presence in smaller companies where there would be no elections. CCOO-G criticised the imposition of a closed-list system preferred by the UGT, which in turn opposed the assembly-based system encouraged by the CCOO.[16] Arguably, the UGT feared that the more established CCOO would otherwise occupy most positions.[17] It

[12] Much scholarship has looked at this legislative process. See for example, Agustín Morán, 'Auge y Crisis de los Grandes Acuerdos Sociales de los 80', *Relaciones Laborales*, 9 (1996), pp. 13-55. For a recent overview of the *transición sindical* that values its collective nature see Pere J. Beneyto Calatayud, 'La Transición Sindical. Reivindicación de una Obra Colectiva', *Debats*, 132.1 (2018), pp. 103–122.
[13] CCOO-Vigo, 'Anteproyecto de Manifiesto de la Unidad Sindical', *Vigo Obreiro*, special issue (January 1976); ING, 'Puntos Fundamentais que Recollemos no Noso Programa Electoral', *Eixo*, 14 (December 1977) p. 8.
[14] Nicolás Redondo expressed the views of the Socialist union in a statement published in *El País*, 29 April 1978. The 'sections' were formed by the members of the different trade unions in the workplace, each union having its section. Then each section would designate a delegate to liaise between the union and the company. On the other hand, the committees were elected by all workers in the company, thus were organs of collective representation.
[15] ING, *Eixo*, 15 (special issue, 1978) p. 3; ING, *Eixo*, 17 (March 1978) p. 4; *A Nosa Terra* [weekly newspaper of nationalist views born in 1977], 3 (10-16 February 1978), p. 4.
[16] AHF10M, FMAD, CCOO-G, Consello Nacional, 'Algunhas Consideracións sobe a Situación Actual' (5 March 1978).
[17] Rubén Vega García, *La Reconstrucción del Sindicalismo en Democracia, 1976-1994. Historia de la UGT*, Vol 6, (Madrid, 2011), pp. 1-13.

probably also wanted to maximize its links to the PSOE, framing the elections as a first step towards the future Socialist (PSOE) government, imposing the Communist label on the CCOO.

As this system was set up, the ING focused its collective bargaining efforts at the workplace level in the hope of gaining strength and being included in the negotiations. This strategy also reflected a rejection of the state-wide framework and an ambition to sensitize workers to nationalist issues. As in previous years, the process of collective bargaining was useful to disseminate political ideas. For nationalist workers, this meant articulating local, industrial issues as specific manifestations of the key national (regional) problem: internal colonialism, whose solution required both political and economic decentralisation. The ASCON conflict that took place in Vigo between 2 February and 7 October 1978 provides an excellent example of this. As explained by Benito Santos, leader of the majority union in the company at the time (USO), the dispute was linked to the ownership change in the company from a local family to a Santander group following the death of the owner Davila. Santos confirms that the new owners brought an Argentinian, Slinin, to reduce the number of staff 'which at the time was 2,450 workers (including workers from ancillary companies).[18] The tension within the company led to the 'longest strike that a Spanish company has ever known [following the dismissal of an employee]'. The competition between organisations for members and influence underpinned the interventions of all the trade union delegates represented in the company committee at the large assemblies. The delegates of the Spanish unions highlighted their connections to the political parties at the state level to attract workers and convince them of their aptitude for problem solving. By contrast, ING delegates highlighted the role of the workers themselves, advocating a regional ('national') general strike and mobilising their argument for Galician (nationalist) organisations and institutions. Following negotiations in Madrid in which the UGT and CCOO settled the bases for a future

[18] Benito Santos González interviewed by *Faro de Vigo* (*FV* hereafter) on 27 April 2009 [online version].

agreement, there was an assembly on 23 May that gathered 1,500 ASCON workers to discuss how to proceed. The pre-agreement defended by UGT and CCOO accepted the dismissal of six workers and was so unanimously rejected *a viva voce* that voting was not necessary. In the assembly, Manuel Mera, who became general secretary of the National Confederation of Galician Workers (INTG) in 1987, used his intervention (as leader of the local branch) against the pre-agreement to accuse Spanish workers' and political organisations of only 'thinking of Galicia' to use its resources. Thus, he suggested they participated in what the UPG/ING defined as colonial plundering as opposed to 'solv[ing] our problems'.[19]

The way events unfolded supported Mera's argument. In September, the ASCON workers considered three proposals to end the conflict, finally opting for the arbitration proposed by USO. However, as the locally elected USO delegates prepared to proceed, they discovered that their union was already negotiating at the state level, accepting compensation in return for dismissals. After some back and forth between the company, the workers' committee and the Work Ministry, the conflict was resolved with the dismissal of five workers (including Santos).[20] The conflict paved the way for the split of USO-Vigo, whose members created the Galician Syndical Confederation (CSG) in 1980. In its foundational manifesto, the CSG denounced the concentration of power at the top of the unions to the detriment of the grassroots and the subordination of the unions to their sister political parties (both at the state and regional level). In its first congress, the organisation subscribed to the internal colonialism theory.[21]

[19] *Eixo*, 19 (June 1978) pp.12-13; *LVG*, 24 May 1978, p. 19.
[20] While the company reopened, it would eventually cease production and close on 1 March 1984, with 1,640 workers losing their job most of which carried on their struggle demanding relocation in other companies until 1989. *FV*, 27 April 2009 [online version].
[21] CSG, 'I Congreso da Confederación Sindical Galega. Estatutos' (Vigo, 1980) in https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/app/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/files/arquivo/documentos/1980_09_CSG_1congreso_estatutos.pdf [last accessed 25 February 2022].

The devolution of the historic trade union assets – those seized by the Franco regime – and the division of the wealth accumulated by the OSE aided the nationalists with their account. Reporting on the several different conflicts that were taking place across 1978-9, the ING stressed the demobilising role of the CCOO-G, whom they now identified as their 'main enemy'. Wanting to be involved in the political process, the ING argued, CCOO-G discouraged strong action and refused to involve larger sections of society. Thus, the ING framed the reformist 'pactism' of the CCOO and UGT in terms of partisan interest. The Spanish unions sought 'the favour of the government' for their own institutional and economic benefit, demonstrated by their 'excessive share' of trade union assets.[22] Because workers' contributions to the OSE had been mandatory during Francoism, the ING argued that all organisations with workplace representation should be entitled to a proportionate amount, believing their own share to be too small. In this manner, as collective bargaining became a more centralised process in hands of state-wide moderate unions, the nationalists emphasised their difference and encouraged some Galician workers to look inwards, at the emerging regional framework, to deal with socioeconomic issues.

Seeking their space in the new multi-level plural system, the different trade unions diverged with their eyes set on different territorial spheres, according to their democratic projects. Competing both at the state and regional levels, the leadership of CCOO argued that the division between historic and accumulated trade union assets benefitted the UGT, which received the largest share of the total wealth despite its understated role in the struggle against Francoism.[23] While CCOO-G agreed that broad agreements at the state-level should frame

[22] Sources quoted in this paragraph are Fernando Rúa Acuña (trade unionist and member of the UPG), 'O Patrimonio Sindical', *A Nosa Terra*, 6 (17 February 1978); 'O "reparto" do patrimonio sindical', *Terra e Tempo*, 66 pp. 6-7; 'O Patrimonio Sindical é dos Traballadores', *Eixo*, 18 (May 1978) p. 5.
[23] Minutes of meeting on 14 September 1979 in 'Minutes of Executive Committee meetings of the PCG between 1978-82'. Ultimately, in 1986 the UGT received 4.144 mil. *Pesetas* as compensation for its historic assets on the same week that the 1986 workplace elections began, provoking the outcry of all other unions. On its part, the anarchist CNT received 248 mil., *LVG*, 25 September 1986, p. 51.

collective bargaining at the sector and workplace levels, the federation criticised the contents of the ABI and shared the ING's position that moderation (in this case exclusively of the UGT) was rewarded by the government.[24] The leaders of CCOO feared that the UGT would overtake them as spearhead of the labour movement after their efforts in favour of democratisation. If they did, based on the results of the UGT's negotiations, the CCOO's redistributive proposals to overcome the recession could be overlooked. After all, the UGT signed all the agreements, which promoted a liberal framework, lowering the workers' demands arguing that negotiation was 'transcendent' to the context.[25]

In 1979, the Government presented its Economic Programme (PEG). The PEG established limits to wage increases and proposed a more flexible job market, facilitating redundancies and curtailing trade union rights. In effect, it changed the hitherto inclusive (assembly-based) trade union practices and contributed to internal class divisions. Additionally, the government also established limits to public spending and limited the role of the state in the economy – benefitting the larger companies in crisis hoping that they would eventually reinvest their cumulative wealth to generate employment via a trickle-down effect.[26] These liberal policies were consistent with other national western European responses to the economic recession after OPEC1, including the UK.[27] Unlike the UGT, CCOO-G harshly criticised the government's economic policy for responding to the interests of the monopolies, maintaining and improving profit rates instead of proposing solutions to the crisis and its inherent social problems. In the speech that opened the first 'Conference of the Workers'

[24] The defence of a pyramidal collective negotiation model (state-sector-company) in AHF10M, CFM, 'Primer Congreso. La Acción Sindical de la Confederación Sindical de las CCOO'. While criticism to the UGT regularly featured in the meetings of the CCOO-G's executive commission AHF10M, FMAD, SNCOO-G, Comisión Executiva, 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva 1979'.

[25] And it still is the official narrative as seen in the commemorative volume of UGT-Galicia 25th anniversary written by Roxelio Pérez Poza and Emilio Garrido Moreira, *Comprometidos co Presente e Sementando o Futuro 1979-2004* (Santiago de Compostela, 2004), pp. 46-51.

[26] An analysis of the Spanish economy between 1979-82 in Luís M. Linde, 'La Profundización de la Crisis Económica: 1979-82' in García Delgado (dir.), *La Economía Española*, pp.35-57.

[27] As seen in chapters 1 and 2 and the more general overview in the Introduction.

Movement in the Historical Nationalities', organized by the local union of CCOO-G Ferrol on September 1979, Julián Ariza – one of CCOO's leaders – summarised the position of the confederation facing the government's proposal.[28] With a slogan calling for democracy 'to reach companies', CCOO advocated a 'National Solidarity Plan' whereby unemployment and wealth redistribution should become the progressive government's main tools to bring about social *transformation* (along Eurocommunist lines abandoning talk of revolution). [29] Accordingly, CCOO favoured a negotiated over a 'savage' restructuring of the sectors in crisis and vaguely proposed that companies should be co-managed by the workers.

In Galicia, as in Spain, this led the CCOO-G to pragmatically re-emphasise a workerist collective frame to the detriment of the regional framework in order to retain its position as proxy of the Spanish (including Galician) working class. The Executive Commission defined its organisation as the true 'progressive' union, arguing that the singling out of UGT by the government and the employers' organisation (CEOE) through negotiation was an attempt 'to isolate CCOO' and divide the labour movement to impose 'regressive' legislation – contrary to the interests of the working class.[30] Regional leaders depicted UGT as a 'domesticated' union motivated by its 'economic bankruptcy' to compromise the interests of the workers. Yet, the national leadership of CCOO still sought unity of action with the Socialist organisation. The Executive Commission of the CCOO-G backed this state-level strategy, although the minutes of its 1979 meetings highlight existing concern that the proposed *rapprochement* with the socialist union might be criticised by the grassroots, based on the 'outrage' provoked by

[28] The speeches of the conference were compiled in M. Tuñón de Lara (dir.), *Primeras Jornadas del Movimiento Obrero en las Nacionalidades Históricas* (Vigo, 1979). Here p. 19.
[29] This plan was first approved at the CCOO's foundational Congress in 1978. Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*, pp. 22-3.
[30] AHF10M, LMAD, CCOO-G, Comisión Executiva, 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva 1979', 29 December 1979.

the UGT's actions.[31] To appease these protests, they claimed they were trying to bring the Socialist confederation (linked to the PSOE) back to defending class positions.

Competing to represent Galician workers, the ING continued to depict the position of CCOO-G as ambiguous and demagogic. Nationalist leaders claimed that the strategic change of the 'Spanishist' confederation, from negotiation to a combination of bargaining and limited confrontation, did not respond to ideological conviction but had rather been forced by the state-wide competitive political and industrial relations context. The strategic change, nationalists insisted, was first a partisan tactic to include the PCE in political negotiations, as the party's role had diminished following the lack of electoral success in the 1979 general elections.[32] Second, change responded to the narrowing gap between the Communist and the Socialist unions in Spain, and between the latter and the nationalists in Galicia. Finally, the nationalists criticised that 'the Eurocommunist confederation', a jab to the progressive socialist project of the CCOO-G and a way to explicitly connect the union to the PCE/PCG, was legitimising the emerging *neo-colonial* economic, political and institutional framework. As a 'Spanish alternative', defending the framework of the Spanish capitalist state and 'seeking' to stabilise a bourgeois democracy proposing a 'European-style socialism' (*socialismo a la europea* or liberal social democracy), the CCOO's proposals did not offer a plausible solution to class and national problems in Galicia. For the ING, neither tackling unemployment and economic restructuring nor building a more 'national', 'rational' and 'democratic' society was possible when ignoring the intrinsic injustice upon which the Spanish society was based: 'the [capitalist] exploitation of workers, [and] the colonial [political and cultural] oppression of nations such

[31] This paragraph is based on 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva 1979' and on public statements issued by the organisation available in AHF10M, LMAD, CCOO-G, Circulares. Although UGT campaigned hard to destabilise the UCD following the presentation of the PEG and during the discussion of the Workers' Statute Bill (1980), ultimately, the statute included the terms for collective bargaining agreed in the ABI and the UGT did not oppose it.

[32] FTT, Caixa 163, ING, 'Os Estatutos Españois e o Marco Galego de Relacións Laborais' (October 1979); ING, *Eixo*, 28 (October 1979), p. 3. In this regard, they were building on their narrative portraying both UGT and CCOO as mere 'transmission belts' to their sister parties. ING, *Eixo*, 16 (Februrary 1978), p. 3.

as Galicia'.[33] The Constitution not only recognised a free-market economy but also committed public authorities to defend the 'productivity' of private companies.[34] Accordingly, the nationalists accused all parties participating in the constitutional consensus of consciously linking the interests of private companies to the social welfare of the country, pushing through legislation that would curtail trade union rights benefitting the interests of the employers. Examples included the Royal Law-Decree 17/1977 (4 March), which attempted to use the defence of productivity as a precept to restrict strike action, and the Basic Employment Law (October 1980), which forced the unemployed to perform jobs 'of social interest' to receive unemployment benefits and encouraged 'the geographical mobility of workers' – raising fears of emigration, Galicia's historical deprivation marker.[35] This legislation framed the ING's argument for a Galician framework of industrial relations. 'A legal articulation that considers our socioeconomic reality' was needed because, within the 'neo-colonial' Spanish constitutional framework, the working class in general but especially in Galicia would only be abused.[36]

Political opportunity or challenge? Nationalism, devolution and the consolidation of regional institutions (1978-81).

Although the ING leadership attacked CCOO-G for its dependency both on the PCG and CCOO, its framing highlights the close ties the nationalist union itself retained with the UPG – its parent party. For the first time in over forty years, the political context was widely

[33] ING, 'Editorial', *Eixo*, 28 (October 1979), p. 3.
[34] In its article 38. The Constitution can be consulted online on the website of the Spanish Congress https://app.congreso.es/consti/ [last accessed 18 March, 2022].
[35] As the Basic Employment Law came out, the limitations of the right to strike were severely criticised by judge Aurelio Desdentado Bonete in 'Huelga y Constitución' *El País* 14 October 1980.
[36] FTT, Caixa 166, ING, 'Primeiro Encontro Nacional de Negociación Colectiva' (November 1979); FTT, Caixa 166, General Secretariat ING, 'A Lei Básica de Emprego. A Lei de Folga' (June 1980); ING, *Eixo*, 33 (July 1980) p. 7

open to plural visions of democracy. This provided a unique opportunity to push for the implementation of socialist policies and political decentralisation, both of which could take either a revolutionary or progressive (stepping-stones approach) route. It was in this context that workers' organisations across the board at times subordinated their interests to those of the political parties, campaigning for their political socialist democratic projects. After the approval of the Constitution in December 1978, asymmetric devolution moved forward in Spain with two different paths: one designed for the 'historic nationalities' and a more limited one reserved to other regions.[37] Galicia struggled to receive the same status and competences as Catalonia and the Basque Country as a historic region. At the beginning of 1979, a commission drafted a Statute, which was approved by the pre-autonomous Galician Assembly of Parliamentarians on 25 June and sent to the Spanish government.[38] Following substantial cuts to the level of devolution, on 22 November the UCD government passed a Statute granting minimal powers to the autonomous Galician government – aiming to set the example for the future Statutes of Autonomy (*Estatutos de Autonomía*) that would regulate the powers of the emerging Spanish regions and their relationship with the state apparatus. Ultimately, social and political pressure paralysed the process for nine months helping Galicia to achieve a Statute similar to its Catalan and Basque counterparts in September 1980, through the Hostal Agreement.

Indeed, the Government's proposal sparked a big political and social outcry in the region. All the Galician political parties who accepted the constitutional framework and the

[37] As opposed to a sovereign political 'nation', the 'nationalities' were defined as cultural nations. 'Nationality' was the compromise term that would be used in the constitution to refer to the three regions who had approved via referendum a statute of autonomy during Spain's Second Republic (1931-6): Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. In 1978, the Suárez government established a 'pre-autonomic' government for these regions including the Galician *Xunta* under the presidency of Antonio Rosón, member of the UCD. For more on the autonomic process see Eliseo Aja, *El Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales* (Madrid, 1999); Luís Moreno, *La Federalización de España: Poder Político y territorio* (Madrid, 2008).

[38] Jesús de Juana López and Julio Prada Rodríguez, 'La Dinámica Política de la Galicia Post-Autonómica', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 28 (2006) pp. 323-342, 324; Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas (coord.), Lina Gálvez Muñoz and Javier Muñoz Soro, *España en democracia, 1975-2011*, Vol. 10, in Josep Fontana and Ramón Villares (dirs) *Historia de España* (Barcelona, 2017) pp. 148-9.

creation of the autonomous regions, along with the Galician press, declared that Galicia had been 'humiliated' and described 'the Statute of the UCD' as an 'affront' (*aldraxe*).[39] Opposition included sectors of the UCD in Galicia – such as the pre-autonomy president Antonio Rosón – and the conservative AP. The latter had opposed asymmetric devolution during the Constitutional negotiations. Yet, at this time, AP representatives insisted that the statute should reach the 'maximum ceiling' allowed by the constitutional framework, even if it would not solve Galicia's problems.[40] Arguably, the conservative party's particularly good electoral results in Galicia as compared to the rest of Spain informed its position, aware that the emerging autonomous framework broadened its opportunities to access new levels of power.[41] Autonomist parties and workers' organisations carefully linked *aldraxe* to the UCD government, contrasting the text to the original 'Statute of the 16', defined as 'progressive' and 'representative' having been approved by the Galician Assembly.[42] Together, they organised a day of struggle for 'the national dignity of Galicia' on the day the 'Statute of the UCD' was approved, with a march that gathered between 85,000-100,000 people on 4 December 1979.[43] By contrast, retaining the project of the *Constitutional Bases* (1976), the nationalist bloc of the BN-PG argued that while the 'Statute of the 16' improved that of the UCD, no Statute that emanated from the 1978 'colonial' constitution could ever be 'progressive'. After all, the competences of any Autonomous Community would always be limited to the 'pre-established

[39] The POG, PG and PCG also sent a statement to the newspaper *El País*, who never published it. The Spanish newspaper had an editorial line against a maximalist statute, denying the condition of Galicia as a historic nationality and arguing that those defending it only wanted to keep reproducing the *cacique* structure. On 17 November, the newspaper *El Ideal Gallego* replied that such an affirmation was an insult to Galicia's historical autonomic vindication. *LVG* also covered the issue extensively all through November and December 1979 sharing in the narrative of grievance.

[40] *LVG*, 22 November 1979. For an análisis of the regionalisation of the Spanish right during the transition see Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'El Nacionalismo Español Regionalizado y la Reinvención de Identidades Territoriales 1960-1977', *Historia del presente*, 13.1 (2009, II época) pp. 55-70.

[41] Leading the Democratic Coalition (CD), the party had attained 14,19 per cent of the vote in Galicia facing 6.05 per cent in Spain in the March 1979 general elections. Official data on every electoral process in Spain can be consulted at the Ministerio del Interior website http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/

[42] The PCG's 'script' around the referendum

[43] *LVG*, 21-23 November and 5 December 1979.

framework of a free-market economy… [and] inviolability of the unity of the state'.[44] To them, autonomy was but the mere regionalisation of a liberal democratic state they rejected, a proposal that undermined their 'popular-national' democratic project.

Bridging maximalist and progressive positions was the POG, the nationalist party led by Camilo Nogueira who pragmatically deployed the idea of 'progressive self-government'. By contrast with the UPG's characterisation of Galicia as a superexploited colony, the POG offered a more nuanced interpretation, rejecting the comparison of Galicia's oppression to that suffered by 'a colony in the Third World'. After all, these colonies suffered military occupation as well as completely alien 'laws and… administrative-bureaucratic apparatus'.[45] The party was ideologically close to Eurocommunism, advocating a 'democratic', or progressive, way to socialism and accepting the autonomic framework not as a 'colonial imposition' but as a stepping-stone to self-government which they conceived 'within the European context'. Yet, the POG's project also differed from that of the PCG. As seen in the previous chapter, and as identified by Nogueira, the communists intended 'to redefine the Spanish nation' as a 'new' nation, integrating a degree of self-government for the nationalities but without challenging the unity of the state. In turn, the PCG differed from the PSOE in that the latter wanted to simply 'reinterpret [the Spanish nation]... with a unifying, uniform character and with a centralist power'.[46] Advocating party plurality and opposing the Nationalist/Spanishist frame, the POG prioritised the right/left cleavage and rejected equating state-wide socialist parties, who sincerely supported devolution – namely the PCG with its strong 'acting presence through CCOO-G', with those of the right – AP and UCD. Indeed, the leadership of the POG actively sought collaboration with other parties, encouraging electoral alliances, such as Galician Unity (UG, 1979). In the 1979 general elections, UG, which included the PSG and the PG, attained

[44] ING, *Eixo*, 30 (January 1980).
[45] The following quotes are from Camilo Nogueira interviewed de Toro, *Unha Memoria*, pp. 204-10.
[46] *Ibid.* p.241.

better results than both PCG and BN-PG in most cities (table 4.2). In the local elections, UG obtained 18 per cent of the vote in Santiago and A Coruña, 22 per cent in Pontevedra or 14 per cent in Vigo in 1979.[47]

Table 4.2 % of vote General Election 1979 in the seven Galician cities

	UCD	**CD**	**PSOE**	**PCE/PCG**	**UG (POG-PG-PSG)**	**BN-PG**
A Coruña	36.99	16.17	20.92	4.39	9.03	5.32
Santiago	43.3	16.89	11.65	2.89	9.07	7.18
Ferrol	32.44	12.17	20.44	14.55	8.82	3.75
Pontevedra	40.54	14.24	18.61	3.9	10.3	5.93
Vigo	36.65	17.21	19.23	8.65	9,57	7.03
Ourense	40.5	20.66	23.32	3.58	3.36	5.61
Lugo	39.06	21.49	25.28	2.78	2.69	5.34
Galicia	**48.18**	**14.19**	**17.32**	**4.16**	**5.43**	**5.95**

Source: Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España

The persistence of small nationalist political parties at this time, then, must be linked to the excluding framework employed by the UPG, which was coherent with its maximalist aims and revolutionary strategy, and to the party's refusal to bend or adapt its ideological principles. The exclusive triple *españolistas*/nationalists/'pseudonationalists' framework had also affected the evolution of the nationalist workers' movement. The extremely close links of the ING and the UPG, which conceived the union as a workers' 'front' within its wider 'popular-national' project, hindered at times the convergence of the small unions within a nationalist umbrella workers' organisation. However, the constitutional arrangements and the legal set-up of the regional framework, encouraged nationalist unity. In the political sphere this was limited. Ahead of the 1981 regional elections, the UPG and the PSG presented a united candidacy for the first time, under the acronym BNPG-PSG. This process led to the September 1982 creation of the nationalist bloc BNG. On its part, the POG encouraged a broader coalition, Galician Left (EG), co-opting sectors from the PCG. After the election, the three elected BNPG-PSG representatives to the Galician Parliament were expelled for refusing to pledge the Constitution,

[47] Source: Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España in Consulta de resultados electorales. Ministerio del Interior (mir.es) [last accessed 16 December 2021].

and thus excluded from participating in the first regional term. This ideologically coherent but intransigent position undermined their political consolidation in the medium term (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). By contrast, nationalist participation in the industrial sphere facilitated their sustained growth at the factory, which in turn led to their progressive integration in state-wide negotiations.

Following the joint negotiation of a regional collective agreement for the construction sector in 1980, the ING and CTG co-organized the commemoration of Labour Day based on the coincidence of their political and strategic approaches, 'defending collective bargaining in Galicia and the Galician framework of labour relations'.[48] In September, ING-CTG ratified their merger creating the INTG in 1981.[49] Whilst consistently opposing the Spanish frame agreements for 'perpetuat[ing] our discrimination', the INTG pragmatically discarded non-participation on the basis that only nationalist participation could protect the Galician working people in the inevitable state negotiations.[50] Here, the influence of those workers ideologically close to the 'pseudo-nationalists' of the POG is clear. However, is also possible that the leadership of the INTG also realised that participating in state-wide politics came with institutional benefits. The electoral success of the UGT demonstrated it. That year, the organisation surpassed CCOO as the most representative workers' organisation in Spain, although not in Galicia. In the region, the 1980 workplace elections confirmed the significant growth of the nationalist workers' organisation, as ING and CTG obtained a combined 18 per cent of delegates, facing 24 per cent UGT and 27 per cent CCOO-G.[51] To become the hegemonic regional workers' organisation it aimed to be, it needed to participate in the new democratic institutions and be present in negotiations putting forward their alternative

[48] ING, *Eixo*, 33 (July 1980), p.9; ING, *Eixo*, 34 (September 1980), p. 3 [dedicated to the merger].
[49] Gutiérrez Ramos, 'A Articulación do Sindicalismo Nacionalista, p. 65.
[50] Quote in ING, 'Negociación Colectiva no Ano 1980' *Eixo*, 30 (January 1980) p. 3.
[51] Pérez Poza and Garrido Moreira, *Comprometidos co Presente*, p. 55.

nationalist project. Finally, nationalist unity was attained in the industrial sphere in 1982, as the INTG and CSG merged within the *Intersindical*.

If the CCOO in the state and the region had begun to consider the need to be independent from the PCE/PCG after the 1977 general elections, the nationalists did so after 1981. The questioning of these connections partly responded to the emergent correlation of political forces. In its 'programmatic declaration', the *Intersindical* argued that the 'conscious self-organisation' of the Galician workers was particularly important in light of the political electoral results.[52] Based on this, they argued, such a 'tool' for liberation – one of many considering the *frontist* strategy – should be independent from political parties and economic forces. In part, however, this decision must be connected to public opinion surveys unearthing the social *desencanto* (disenchantment) and the decline of deference as regards top-down consensus politics and traditional power structures.[53] Both in 1976 and 1979, the CIS showed that Galicia was the Spanish region with the strongest sense of its own regional identity – identifying primarily as Galician whether living in Galicia, abroad or in another region of Spain. Sociologists found it particularly striking that 41 per cent of Galician emigrants identified themselves as Galicians, compared to the national average of 19 per cent.[54] Yet, this may be linked to emigration being a national identity marker. If 66 per cent of *galegos* had considered themselves to be highly regionalist in 1976, this proportion increased to 73 per cent in 1979. In light of these results, one might have expected for nationalist parties to achieve significant results. Yet, polls showed that Galicians' political conception of regionalism had become increasingly moderate since 1976. For instance, the proportion of Galicians

[52]'Declaración Programática', *1 Congreso INTG Unificación INTG-CSG* (September 1982), p. 9. Available online at https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/arquivo-en-linha/tag/Congreso.html [consulted 24 September 2020].
[53] For more on *desencanto* see Santos Juliá, 'De Transición Modelo a Transición Régimen', *Bulletin d'Histoire Contemporaine de l'Espagne*, 52 (2017), pp. 83-95. Santos Juliá also has an interesting titled 'Ah, ¿pero esto es democracia? Sobre el Desencanto y los Descontentos de la Transición' (2006) available in Orígenes intelectuales de la democracia en España (VII): Ah, pero ¿es esto la democracia? Sobre el desencanto y los descontentos de la transición (march.es) [last accessed 21 December 2021].
[54] García Ferrando, *Regionalismo y Autonomía*, pp. 307-43.

understanding regionalism as a means to defend the region fell from 38 to 22 per cent and support for separatism decreased from 5 to 2 per cent. Conversely, a passive conception of regionalism as 'feeling pride' rose from 2 to 37 per cent. Political moderation was also evident in their preferred means for defending the region, favouring signing petitions, participating in peaceful demonstrations or collecting signatures to more forceful protests. This is consistent with 72 per cent of respondents prioritising 'order' over 'freedom' and a 56 per cent preferring 'private property' to 'socialism'. Regardless, more respondents valued 'equality' over 'freedom' (47 per cent). These preferences, which arguably reflected the agrarian, parochial and conservative character of the Galician society, help better understand the nationalist (and communist) efforts to 'educate' and sensitise Galician workers and the wider population to national and class struggles.

Poll results suggested that their strategies were achieving limited results. For instance, in 1979 a higher percentage of Galicians approved of striking as a means to defend regional interests (53 vs 45 per cent in 1976) and the image of Galicia as a victim to the development of other regions increased from 56 to 63 per cent. Still, only 2 per cent of Galician respondents identified themselves with 'revolution' and 'Marxism' in 1979, and the police and the military ranked higher than regionalist movements and workers' organisations.

These public preferences constrained the growth of political nationalism. CIS researchers concluded that Galicians had a rather pragmatic and realistic view of the possibilities of autonomous governments. They believed they would bring politics 'closer to the man in the street', politicising the population, and improve some public services. However, they did not think that political decentralisation would substantially alter regional imbalances and the political structure of Spain. The pre-autonomy experience of 1976-9 reinforced this perception.[55] When, after nine months of discontent and protests, the referendum for Galician

[55] *Ibid.*, p.332.

autonomy took place in December 1980, only 28.28 per cent Galicians voted, resulting in a 73.5 per cent affirmative vote. Galician historians have explained the high electoral demobilisation on the long-drawn-out autonomous process, the half-hearted campaign orchestrated by the main political parties for the statute and the negative and abstentionist campaigns run by the BN-PG and PSG.[56] The worsening of the economy may also have affected the decline of deference in the region and the 'disenchantment' with the democratic transition.[57]

Table 4.3 Electoral results election to the Galician Parliament 1981

	UCD	**AP**	**PSG-PSOE**	**PCG**	**EG**	**BNPG-PSG**
A Coruña	19.50	32.66	23.96	3.43	3.34	6.70
Pontevedra	28.19	28.61	17.19	3.38	5.90	5.47
Ourense	42.71	28.01	16.39	2.01	0.52	5.16
Lugo	35.03	31.35	16.08	1.47	0.91	8.03
Galicia	**27.80**	**30.52**	**19.62**	**2.93**	**3.40**	**6.27**

Source: Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España

The 1981 regional elections, seemingly confirmed the preference of Galician voters for the centre-right, despite the debacle of the UCD, who experienced a sharp decrease in its share of the vote from 48.18 per cent in 1979 to 27.80.[58] Within the governing party, there was a high

[56] Núñez Seixas, *España en Transición*, p. 149. It also aligns with the traditionally high abstention trend in Galicia. Until the mid-1980s, the region consistently averaged the highest abstention rates in the state and in Europe. From the mid-1980s, however, it has tended towards convergence with the other Spanish regions. Abstention levels have generally been highest in the autonomic elections, with Galicians mobilising much more in local and general elections. From 1985, however, abstention in the regional polls has significantly reduced. Abstention was highest in the rural provinces of Lugo and Ourense, although the situation has reverted in the 1990s. There are many scholarly approaches to this question, mostly focused on the parochial political culture and the region's underdevelopment; but Míguez González highlights as well the role of emigration and the shortcomings in the electoral censuses. Many municipalities inflated their census to receive more funding. In 1980, the Ministry of the Interior acknowledged that many municipalities inflated their census by c.40 per cent. This was corrected in 1981 and new censuses were used from 1982-onwards. For an analysis of Galicia's electoral transformation see Santiago Míguez González, 'De la Apatía a la Participación. La Evolución de la Abstención en las Elecciones Autonómicas de Galicia (1981-1997)', *Sociológica. Revista de Pensamiento Social*, 3 (1998), pp. 39-68.

[57] Examples of contemporary disenchantment and criticism to the process include José Luis López Aranguren, 'Oposición, contestación y filosofía como subversión', *El País*, 12 May 1978; Juan Luis Cebrián, 'El país que tenemos', *El País*, 22 July 1979 and *La España que Bosteza. Apuntes para una Historia Crítica de la Transición*, (Madrid, 1980); José Vidal Beneyto, 'Claves para un contubernio', *El País*, 15 November 1980, and *Diario de una ocasión perdida* (Barcelona, 1981).

[58] Silvia Alonso-Castrillo, *La Apuesta del Centro. Historia de UCD* (Madrid, 1996). For an overview of the UCD in Galicia see Emilio Grandío Seoane, 'La Maquinaria de la Transición. Estado y Democracia: la UCD en Galicia', *Historia del Presente*, 24 (2014, II Época) pp. 24-41. It should be noted, however, that electoral results at this time owed much to the parties'.

degree of internal conflict and instability, which Hopkin links to ideological diffusion. [59] Rather than being a single party, the UCD encompassed different sectors of the Madrid political and economic elite. These sectors remained grouped in different parties, each with a different programme and ideology, and had only been brought together by their support to Suárez's presidential candidacy. In 1981, Suárez resigned and the UCD, having failed to establish itself as an independent political party, disbanded in 1982. Benefiting from the UCD struggles, the conservative AP, precursor of today's Popular Party (PP), became the ruling party in Galicia amid exceptionally high abstention levels.

Founded in 1976 by Manuel Fraga, a Galician politician who had been Minister of Information and Tourism (1961-9) and Minister of Home Affairs (1975-6) under Franco, AP was a political coalition. It was 'formed by ministers or civil governors who had represented different political positions' within the later years of the dictatorship, all of whom shared, however, 'the idea of limited political reform'.[60] Partly because of the ideological origins of its leadership and partly because the UCD occupied the political centre, the AP had maintained a hard-right line in 1979. For this reason, at least half of the Spanish electorate rejected it.[61] The unsatisfactory electoral results (with less than 10 per cent of the votes) led Fraga to reshape the party's position adapting its conservatism to the new democratic context, a process recently analysed by Maestu Fonseca. Between 1978-82,

> Fraga updated the political doctrine of the democratic right…combining the core principles of pre-Francoist conservatism, adding elements of Margaret Thatcher's "moral economy", an inspired inclusion of Carl Schimtt's political philosophy regarding "tacticism within the state", and…incorporated traditional core symbols, such as the monarchy, the unity of the nation, the Spanish flag and the defence of Christian and conservative moral values...binding the concepts of state and nation to the need for broad economic modernisation [along neo-liberal lines].[62]

[59] Jonathan Hopkin, 'La Desintegración de la Unión de Centro Democrático. Una Interpretación Organizativa', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 81 (1993), pp. 185-210.
[60] Enrique Maestu Fonseca, 'Spanish conservatives at the Early Stages of Spanish Democracy: Reshaping the Concepts of State and Community in the Thought of Manuel Fraga', *Genealogy (Basel)* 4.22 (2020) p.2.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Although Fraga defended the unity and centralism of the state, as a 'Father of the Constitution' he respected the autonomies and urged party leaders to do the same. He developed a sociological narrative with the potential to redefine *Spanishness* in conservative terms, pragmatically focusing on the 'composite character of Spanish society'. Like Thatcher, he spoke of a 'natural majority' defined as those Spaniards who believed in 'the creation of political majorities' and wanted 'peace, law, jobs, social services at a reasonable price… by democratic means'.[63] In this manner, as opposed to Francoist sectarianism, anyone who defended liberal economic modernisation and political moderation within the autonomic democratic framework could identify as Spanish. Despite the lack of support in the provincial congresses celebrated in October 1980, the Galician branch of the party decided to openly support the constitutional arrangements at the November Regional Congress, instigated by X. L. Barreiro.[64] AP did not have a specific regional project that would lead to Galicia's economic development and modernisation. Instead, the party eventually espoused a traditionalist neo-regionalism based on folklore, merely assuming the native language and cultural heritage – similar to historic figures of Galician nationalism such as Piñeiro. In 1981, AP won the elections campaigning as an uninhibitedly Galician party led by a 'Galician like you'.[65]

The conservative victory aligns with the persistence of a dual identity (Spanish/Galician) – reflected in the support for the constitutional arrangements in 1979 and 1990 – and the public preferences for centrist positions explained above.[66] This duality and a rejection of radical positions challenged Galician nationalists, who responded by seeking unity

[63] Quoted in *ibid*.. p. 12.
[64] Julio Prada Rodríguez, 'De Dónde Venimos y hacia Dónde Vamos… La Derecha Gallega entre la Transición y la Consolidación de la Democracia', *Historia del Presente*, 2.25 (2015) p. 17; Keating, 'Rethinking the Region', p. 228.
[65] The creative director of the campaign, Antonio Aguilar, explains that he chose it among many others because it allowed the party to vaguely defend the notion of Galicianness without compromising Fraga's strategy at the state level. '"Galego Coma Ti", Un Lema que Aún No Fue Superado', *LVG*, 11 September 2016 [electronic versión].
[66] 1979 and 1990 CIS results published in García Ferrando, *Regionalismo y Autonomía* and Manuel García Ferrando, Eduardo López Aranguren and Miguel Beltrán, *La Conciencia Nacional y Regional en la España de las Autonomías* (Madrid, 1994) respectively.

and successfully created the umbrella *Galician* workers' organisation in 1982. Although the *Intersindical* maintained the INTG acronym, the anti-Spanish frame and the commitment to fight for a Galician framework of industrial relations, this was to be done '*using* the autonomic (constitutional) framework'.[67] This line of action, approved by a majority of the c.375 workers' delegates, however insisted on discrediting state-level negotiation for responding to monopolistic interests favouring integration into the Common Market. They argued that pacts undermined the workers' and nationalist movements via demobilisation and fuelling class fragmentation. [68]

At the 1982 workplace elections, UGT-G strengthened its position, overtaking CCOO-G by 3.31 per cent of the votes. The UGT and the PSOE shared closed fraternal ties and their membership overlapped to an extent, with most members in the trade union's executive committee affiliated to the party and over three quarters of UGT members supporting PSOE.[69] On its part, the *Intersindical* became 'most representative' union with c.19 per cent of the vote, which guaranteed nationalist representation in the relevant institutional organisms for the first-time. The sustained electoral growth of nationalism in the industrial sphere contrasted with the political strength of nationalism, who remained a marginal force (see table 4.3). Being in touch with workers, this demonstrates that the nationalist industrial leadership was more pragmatic and open to negotiation, understanding better the socio-political and economic reality of Galicia. Understanding the new challenges as opposed to the 'vanguard' of the movement, the UPG, their response posed a new challenge for CCOO-G.

[67] 'Declaración Programática', *1 Congreso* pp. 9-11. Emphasis added.
[68] 'Ponencia de Acción Sindical', *1 Congreso INTG*, p. 17. Number of delegates from *A Nosa Terra*, 174 (28 January 1982) p. 5.
[69] Rand Smith, *The Left's Dirty Job*, p. 50. This overlapping was partially due to a stipulation in the PSOE statutes that party members should also join that union. Víctor Pérez Díaz, *Clase Obrera, Partidos y Sindicatos* (Madrid, 1980), p. 76.

CCOO-G, in-between lands (1982-6).

In 1981, the CCOO-G had adapted the Confederation's proposals to the new regional framework, synthetised in the 'National [state] Solidarity Plan against Unemployment in Galicia'.[70] The plan centred on solidarity, which 'require[d] collective effort, the convergence of all of Galicia's institutional and social sectors to lay the foundations of a just development model *in keeping with our reality*'.[71] Because the 'sectorial policies' favoured by the UCD government ignored the territorial impact of the crisis, existing regional inequalities had increased. From this it followed that administrative decentralisation was key and CCOO-G argued for a quick 'regionalisation' of the state – accelerating the transfer of powers so the new regional government could encourage industrial development. Actions that the *Xunta* could take on included having a share in the saving banks (*cajas de ahorro*) and creating regional agencies such as a Galician Institute for Public Enterprise. This emphasis on the region aligned with the regional organisation's commitment to the 'national reconstruction of Galicia', re-emphasised in its second Congress (1981) as necessary to recover its position (as proxy of the Galician workers). Again, the Executive Commission argued that CCOO-G should 'increasingly be and look like a national syndicate' defending both class and national (regional) interests within a regional, but not independent, framework of industrial relations.[72] The Statute was viewed as the tool to develop the region's 'national personality', and delegates to the congress approved that their organisation should merge class and national interests within a 'supra-Galician' framework. In 1983, regional secretary Manuel Amor Deus referred to the regional institutions as 'internal developmental instruments', arguing that Galicia's economy

[70] AHF10M, LMAD, CCOO-G, Informes, 'Plan de Solidariedade Nacional Contra o Paro en Galicia' (May 1981).
[71] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
[72] AHF10M, LMAD, CCOO-G, Informes, Notas e Estudos de Manuel Amor Deus, 'Informe Balance da Xestión da Comisión Executiva do S.N. de CC.OO. de Galicia. Resolucións do II Congreso do S.N. de CC.OO. de Galicia' (1981).

was ‘subordinated’ to a ‘backwards’ state – dependent on ‘the economic decision-making centres’ in Spain.[73]

Concurrently losing ground to the UGT and the *Intersindical*, the CCOO-G faced increasing institutional constraints in its quest for the representation of Galician workers, necessary to press for the implementation of its progressive redistributive plan. Beyond the declining male skilled workforce, political developments at the state-level added to the challenge. CCOO-G identified the crisis in Galicia as ‘a crisis of a whole economic model’: free-market capitalism.[74] In an increasingly global world, the crisis in western Europe related to the lack of competitiveness. National responses centred growing salaries in their narrative of malaise, and thus workers were being burdened with the weight of the crisis. In Spain, the PSOE also followed this path, presenting itself as a ‘scapegoat’ looking at the 1982 elections and blaming the right for not having assumed its historic role.[75] Committed to democracy and modernisation, the party had sacrificed its socialist project in favour of the necessary ‘bourgeois revolution’. The party presented its project ‘for change’ as the culmination of its ‘historic mission’ and, by becoming the party of modernisation, the PSOE became a cross-class party.

In 1982, the PSOE won the general elections with a landslide. The party’s victory relied on an ‘expansionist-oriented’ programme that promised to create 800,000 new jobs.[76] Once in government, however, Felipe González and his cabinet embraced the free-market principles of productivity, privatisation and structural reorganisation looking towards ‘“Europe” [as] a symbol of progress… democracy and economic growth’.[77] The electoral victory of the PSOE was *a priori* cautiously well received by the leadership of the CCOO. Writing in *El País*,

[73] AHF10M, LMAD, Informes, Notas e Estudos de Manuel Amor Deus, ‘Situación Laboral e Clase Obreira Galega’ (3 March 1983).
[74] CCOO-G, ‘Plan de Solidariedade Nacional’.
[75] Gálvez Biesca, ‘Del Socialismo a la Modernización’, p. 217.
[76] Segura, ‘Del Primer Gobierno Socialista a la Integración en la CEE’, pp. 59-60.
[77] Rand Smith, *The Left's Dirty Job*, pp. 116-8.

Marcelino Camacho, CCOO's General Secretary, welcomed the results, which demonstrated popular support 'for democracy and change'.[78] Yet, he warned against the pressures that the 'moderate left' now in power would be facing, urging the PSOE to resist them so that Spain could achieve the '*necessary* change' (the 'National Solidarity Plan') as opposed to the '*possible* change'.[79] Also acknowledging that the victory raised 'high expectations of change' among broad sectors of society, the secretariat of the *Intersindical* remained even more sceptical as regards the change offered by the PSOE. The nationalists believed that the PSOE would continue with the UCD's liberal economic policies, reinforcing and stabilising the 'bourgeois democracy' to adhere to the Common Market.[80] After all, both parties represented 'capital': the UCD defending the interests of Spanish capital, and the PSOE those of 'European' capital.[81] This was the framing that justified maintaining a confrontational strategy against a left-wing party overwhelmingly voted in by Spanish workers.

Following the guidelines of the Confederation, CCOO-G decided on a strategy of 'critical support' – combining once again 'responsibility and commitment' or, in other words, preferring negotiation to confrontation in the name of national solidarity.[82] This strategy would, however, be quite contested at various levels. At the state level and within sector syndicates, criticism came from members with close ties to the PCE's historic leader Santiago Carrillo, who resigned after the disappointing electoral results and proposed returning to more confrontational positions.[83] In Galicia, opposition to the signing of state-wide sector agreements mostly arose from the territorial unions, particularly local unions. Across all levels, this was the position of the steel and shipbuilding confederation.

[78] Marcelino Camacho, 'El Cambio Posible y El Cambio Necesario' *El País,* 17 November 1982 [electronic version].
[79] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
[80] FTT, Caixa 105, 'Documento para a aprobación da Dirección Nacional da Intersindical' (9 December 1982).
[81] FTT, Caixa 103, 'Historia do Movimento Obreiro Galego' (c.1977).
[82] Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*, p.46.
[83] These intestine debates have been thoroughly examined in Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*, particularly in pp. 54-81 and. 96-122.

Internal resistance to negotiation within CCOO had much to do with the liberal turn of the PSOE as regards industrial relations from 1983. Ultimately, neither the CCOO-G nor the nationalists had been wrong to cautiously welcome the PSOE government. Centring the fight against inflation (of c.15 per cent), from 1983 the Socialists pursued an economic adjustment plan facilitating the liberalisation of the labour market. The Government set out the guidelines for its economic policy in the Medium-Term Economic Programme (1983-6).[84] In addition to the delay in tackling economic and industrial restructuring, the increasing public deficit or the high international interest rates, the PSOE identified the rapid growth of industrial wages as a key problem of the Spanish economy. As such, incomes moderation eventually became a cornerstone of its policies. Additionally, Ministers of Industry and Energy Carlos Solchaga and of Economics, Finance and Commerce Miguel Boyer prioritised the reform of the state holding company INI, whose losses accounted for about 1.5 per cent of GDP and nearly half of the government's net borrowing.[85] Their goal was to 'rationalise', or reduce, the public sector. In June 1983, Solchaga introduced the White Paper on Reindustrialistion embodied in the RLD 8/1983 of 30 November and, ultimately, in the Reconversion Law 17/1984 of 26 July. This legislation, unilaterally imposed by the government, differed from previous *Ucedista* policy in that it emphasised retraining and re-entry into the labour market and the promotion of new industries.[86] Regardless, the legal framework accounted for a significant reduction in staff.[87]

CCOO centred its criticism not on the process of economic restructuring itself, but on the anti-democratic *ethos* of the PSOE's management and policies. The Confederation aspired to participate in the management of the Spanish economy through a corporate system, similar

[84] Segura, 'Del Primer Gobierno Socialista a la Integración en la CEE', pp. 62-3.
[85] OECD, *Economic Surveys: Spain* (Paris, 1984) quoted in Rand Smith, *The Left's Dirty Job*, footnote 9, p. 263. By the 1970s, it was a refuge for lame ducks and, by the early 1980s, the seventy firms it held employed over 215,000 workers. See also Jesús María Valdaliso Gago, 'Crisis y Reconversión de la Industria de Construcción Naval en el País Vasco.' *Ekonomiaz: Revista Vasca De Economía*, 54 (2003), pp. 52-67
[86] Previous policies include the RD 643/1982 of 26 February published in *BOE*, 78, 1 April 1982, specific to shipbuilding, declaring the beginning of this sector's restructuring distinguishing between large shipyards on the one hand, and small and medium-sized ones on the other. Gómez-Aller Andrés, 'La Otra Transición', pp. 160-3.
[87] *El País*, 8 June 1983.

to the one existing in pre-Thatcher Britain. In Galicia, this would translate into a Galician Socio-economic Platform.[88] The Government, however, refused to negotiate with the labour movement, only consulting with the unions and accelerating the process via royal decrees. Trade union participation was further limited as the government decreed that only those unions involved in the legislative consultation process would be allowed participate in the monitoring committee.[89] Thus, at all levels, CCOO denounced the lack of negotiation and the poor articulation of democratic mechanisms to ensure trade union participation.[90]

Their position hardened in the face of a loss of purchasing power and growing unemployment. By the third trimester of 1984, wages' share in national income had declined by 5 points while unemployment exceeded 20 per cent.[91] Considering that CCOO had linked democracy to redistribution and 'solidarity', the PSOE's liberal policies were, by contrast, undemocratic. To undermine this discourse, the Socialists in power would eventually try to co-opt the term 'solidarity' to further undermine declining militancy.[92] Here is where the notion of collective 'responsibility' developed by the Communists to justify the Eurocommunist turn after Franco's death came back at play. Now, it was deployed by the UGT and the PSOE but also by the general press. It happened, for instance, during the 1983 negotiation of the AI (table 4.1). As the negotiations seemed to reach a standby, the editorial of *El País* argued that

> under these delicate circumstances only the negotiating parties can be held accountable... [hoping that] the awareness of one's own limits and the ability to put oneself in the place of the opponent w[ould] overcome doctrinaire maximalism ... Because no one should forget...that practical solidarity with the two million or so unemployed Spaniards and the defence of existing jobs constitute, at this moment, the main social problem of our democratic coexistence…[93]

[88] CCOO-G 'Plan de Solidariedade'.
[89] 'Acuerdo alcanzado en la Primera fase de la Reconversión Naval' quoted in Gómez-Aller Andrés, 'La Otra Transición', p. 162.
[90] Jorge Aragón y Tomás Parra, 'Reflexiones sobre el "Libro Blanco de la Reindustrialización"', *Economía Industrial*, 232 (1983), pp. 89-97.
[91] Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*, p. 33.
[92] A process that underlies part of Gimeno i Igual's analysis of the transformations experienced by CCOO between 1982-91.
[93] 'Un Acuerdo Necesario', *El País*, 28 January 1983. The ghosts of the threats to the new democratic system thus reappeared, understandable considering the attempted coup on 23 February 1981 and the growth of ETA's terrorist attacks.

Effectively, this narrative depicted mobilisation (to maintain purchasing power) not just as a destabilising force for democracy but also as unsupportive of the growing ranks of unemployed. This opened the door for further attacks to the trade unions. Facing the growing fragmentation of the workforce, the more combative workers' organisations were increasingly accused of selfishly defending the 'corporatist' interests of the few (male skilled workers) regardless of all other workers and unemployed they were hurting in the process.[94]

CCOO-G further criticised the PSOE's course of action arguing that the government's policies would encourage deindustrialisation rather than reindustrialisation.[95] The RD 1271/1984 of 13 June dealt with the shipbuilding sector and it established lay-offs through early retirement and through the creation of Employment Promotion Funds (FPE).[96] Another decree established in 1985 the creation of Areas of Urgent Reindustrialisation (ZUR) in linkage with the FPE, seeking to promote industrialisation by offering direct subsidies, such as a tax benefits, to companies relocating in critical areas. CCOO-G argued that, contrary to the National Solidarity Plan, the PSOE's plans were only conducive to diverting employment towards these areas encouraged by the subsidies.[97] Particularly upsetting was Felipe González's linkage between modernisation and the implementation of monetarist and free-market policies, rejecting *dirigisme* as a Francoist policy.[98] Writing in 1984, Andrés Gómez, a leader of CCOO, stated 'the government and its apologists seek to present any challenge to its industrial policy...as opposition to modernisation...[but] The dilemma... is not between restructuring yes or no, it is in how to do [it]'.[99]

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[94] Gimeno i Igual, *Lucha de Clases*, p. 86.
[95] CCOO-G, 'Plan de Solidariedade'; AHF10M, LMAD, Comisión Executiva, 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva' (1983).
[96] José Marín Arce, 'La Fase Dura de la Reconversión' Industrial: 1983-1986', *Historia del Presente*, 8 (2006), pp. 61-101.
[97] AHF10M, CFM, Caixa A.448, 'Alternativa Xeral para a Negociación do Sector da Construcción Naval' *Boletín Informativo de la Federación de Metal de CCOO*, 14 (18 March 1983).
[98] Gálvez Biesca, 'Del Socialismo a la Modernización, p. 217. The change in macroeconomic management to favour monetarism and the free-market is comparable to the British connection between declinism and modernisation seen in chapter 2.
[99] Andrés Gómez, 'A Vueltas con la Reconversión', *Ahora*, 1 (July 1984), pp. 52-3.

In Galicia, growing resistance to negotiation within CCOO-G also related to the actions of the *Intersindical*. In 1982, the leadership of the nationalist organisation had taken note of the new context. Giving the PSOE a chance, the CCOO-G discarded the organisation of general mobilisations of workers based on 'global' or 'political' demands in favour of supporting 'specific' or immediate claims.[100] This opened a window of opportunity for the *Intersindical* to lead broader protests giving 'all working class struggles' a nationalist underpinning; using them to promote collective bargaining at the regional level by making conflicts converge through the merger of industrial and socio-political claims. The leadership encouraged its cadres to 'systematically [insist], even via "marketing" techniques' in the idea that Galician workers needed a nationalist, class-based, combative but also 'responsible' and 'efficient' trade unionism.

At their second congress, in 1983, the nationalists insisted in presenting the PSOE as 'a mere continuator' of the previous policies to emphasise that, under the current constitutional arrangements, 'the great problems of Galicia remained unfixed'.[101] The nationalists rejected any restructuring plan that might cost jobs and reduce Galicia's share of the Spanish and European markets. Instead, they presented their alternative 'Galician Employment Plan'.[102] Arguing that the economic global recession had exacerbated and highlighted the fundamental problems of Galicia's colonised economy, the INTG once again centred its solution on political sovereignty. The 'dismantling' of the Galician shipbuilding complex showed the 'complete disregard' for the socioeconomic consequences for the nation. The continuities in Spanish economic policies under UCD and PSOE demonstrated that the central government serviced Spanish monopolistic interests seeking EEC integration.[103] In this manner, the continuity of the

[100] FTT, Caixa 163, 'Documento para a Aprobación da Dirección Nacional da Intersindical' (9 December 1982).
[101] Lois Ríos, General Secretary of the *Intersindical*, in *Eixo*, 39 (October 1983), p. 2.
[102] *Intersindical* (INTG-CSG), *Plan Galego de Emprego* (1983) in https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/app/pdf/web/viewer.html?file= [last accessed 31 March 2022].
[103] INTG, *A Administración Central co Apoio da UGT polo Peche de ASTANO en Dúas Fases* (14 November, 1984) p. 1.

colonial nationalist/Spanishist framework within the *Intersindical* is clear: neither the national problems of the unsovereign nation nor its workers 'matter[ed] in Madrid to the Spanish parties'.[104]

'National' mobilisation facing the *Reconversión* towards EEC integration

In 1983, the German presidency of the EEC unblocked the negotiation process. From then on, the negative effects that Spain's adhesion to the Common Market would have on Galicia became a central feature in the nationalist discourse.[105] Joining the EEC had been a Spanish ambition at least since 1962, when Franco's government first approached the Community seeking an association agreement to no avail. Adolfo Suárez applied for membership in 1977, but the negotiations only formally began in 1979 as Spain joined the Council of Europe.[106] Between 1979-85, the Spanish held arduous negotiations with the EEC over entry terms.[107] The impending negotiations affected industrial restructuring, with Spain accepting production quotas from a position of disadvantage, with scant bargaining power and little of the financial aid or other financial transfers enjoyed by current EEC member states.[108] Nevertheless, the Spanish road to EEC membership enjoyed broad support across parliamentary parties and in the country at large. The majority of citizens accepted its value for the country's economic modernisation and democratisation.[109]

[104] INTG, 'Reconversión Industrial', *Eixo*, 1, Segunda Etapa (January 1984).
[105] The UPG made opposition to EEC integration a pivotal axis of its political strategy in its 1982 congress.
[106] Carlos Closa and Paul M. Heywood, *Spain and the European Union* (London, 2004), pp. 13-30.
[107] Donato Fernández Navarrete and Gustavo Matías 'Ajuste Estructural de la Economía Española y negociaciones con las Comunidades Europeas durante el Primer Gobierno Socialista (1982-1985)', *Historia del Presente*, 8 (2006), p.54.
[108] José Marín Arce, 'La Fase Dura de la Reconversión', p. 61.
[109] The symbolic significance of European integration during Spain's democratisation process has been succinctly analysed in Carlos López Gómez, 'Europe as a Symbol: the Struggle for Democracy and the Meaning of European Integration in Post-Franco Spain', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 10.1 (2014) pp.74-89. See also Juan Avilés, 'España y la Integración Europea: Partidos y Opinión Pública, 1977-2004', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Revista de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia/Serie 5, Historia Contemporánea*, 16 (2004) pp. 409-23; Mary Vincent, *Spain, 1833-2002: People and State* (Oxford, 2007) pp. 225-38.

The EEC's rejection of Franco's application for an association agreement in the 1960s and the Community's track record with the other two southern European dictatorships in the 1970s, had demonstrated a strong link between Europeanism and democracy.[110] This symbolism explains the PCE/PCG and CCOO's support of the integration process from 1972, unlike British and Scottish Communists, arguing that Spain's future incorporation into the EEC would be in the nation's best interest for economic reasons. The PCE contended that accepting this tendency towards market integration opened a way to socialism in the long-term, as integration would reveal the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.[111] By contrast, Francisco Rodriguez, leader of the UPG, clarified in 1983 that 'when we talk about Western Europe... we are referring... to a monopolistic economic system'.[112] Accordingly, the leadership of the Intersindical put forward a protectionist argument. Specifically, it argued that EEC entry only benefitted the interests of monopolies and big businesses, as proven by the process of industrial restructuring and the labour legislation concurrently introduced.[113] By contrast, smaller companies – the majority in Galicia – and workers would struggle. Joining the EEC entailed opening the Spanish borders to fierce competition from more developed economies in the traditional steel and shipbuilding industries, which were already in crisis. In this sense, the *Intersindical* affirmed that European integration 'will not solve our problems because it is a market already in crisis and because our industrial backwardness...will not allow us to face an integration of this kind in competitive conditions'.[114] Ultimately, they said, 'Galicia [was] being *sacrificed* once again'.

[110] Concurrently, Spain's application in 1961 led to the EEC introducing the requisite of 'democracy' for accession and, thus, affected the construction of a European identity with 'democracy' as a tenet. Emma De Angelis and Eirini Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961-1978', *Contemporary European History* 25.3 (2016) pp. 439–58.
[111] Salvador Forner and Heidy-Cristina Senante 'La Política Europea del PCE (1972-1999): del Viraje Europeísta al Euroescepticismo', *Historia y Política*, 41 (2019) pp. 335-66.
[112] *A Nosa Terra*, 225 (June 1983), p. 13.
[113] This narrative was reproduced in their addresses at different demonstrations, press statements and publications.
[114] INTG, *Eixo*, 1, 2 Etapa (January 1984) p.6. Emphasis in the following quote added.

Industrial restructuring showed that Galician shipyards were suffering the greatest loss of employment: '50 per cent of the total' reductions announced in the Reconversion RD, with ASTANO losing up to 62 per cent of its workforce.[115] Joining the EEC also meant that Spain committed to strict production quotas in the fishing, agriculture and dairy sectors. In Galicia, structural disadvantages in this field included the size of farms, the advanced age of the farmers and the lack of qualified and effective institutional support. Particularly grim were the predicted effects on the production of dairy products and meat.[116] These concerns were justified in that a large amount of the population still relied on farming as a complementary economic activity. It did not help that Antonio Giolitti, Head of Regional Policy of the EEC, confirmed in 1985 that the agricultural policy of the common market might favour regional imbalances.[117] For fishing, the reduction of licences and the increase of imports would disadvantage the Galician fleet, which represented 40.64 per cent of the state fleet.[118] Ultimately, the *Intersindical* argued, the problem was the region's lack of 'political ability to defend itself', hence the lack of sovereignty. In this regard, the nationalist weekly *A Nosa Terra* had seconded in 1980 the claim that 'our lack of sovereignty to negotiate leaves in foreign hands the right to speculate with our vital interests, making us a sacrificial offering in the interest of protecting the subsistence of other economic sectors favoured by the Spanish state'.[119] That same year, the nationalists would occasionally frame the industrial state agreements as an imposition of the EEC, stating that they were 'an offensive [by employers]' to 'adapt companies and productive sectors to the

[115] Such as AESA, as acknowledged by the ASTANO's directive. INTG, *Eixo*, 3, (July 1984), p. 4; Caixa Galicia, *A Economía Galega. Informe 1986* quoted in FESGA, *A Reconversión Naval de 1984 na Galiza* (no date), p.23.
[116] Carlos Carreira Pérez (of the agricultural unión CCLL-SLG), 'A Desfeita do Campo Galego coa Entrada na CEE' in INTG, *Eixo*, 4, (November 1984), p.7.
[117] Antonio Gialotti in *LVG*, 24 September 1985, p.30.
[118] Concerns for the fishing sector became more acute with the establishment in 1982 of new international legislation limiting national fleets to fish at a maximum distance of 200 miles from the coast and grew stronger as the negotiations with Europe advanced. The common fishing policies also determined fishing methods the size of species, aiming at rationalising fishing exploitation. Julio Hernández Borge, 'La Población del Sector Pesquero en Galicia' in Sicilia Gutiérrez Ronco and Juan José Sanz Donaire (coords.), *Homenaje al Profesor José Manuel Casas Torres* (Madrid, 2007), pp. 210-11.
[119] Quoted in Anwen Elias, *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study*, (London, 2009), p. 84.

demands of the [EEC]', in a process where Galicia had 'nothing to gain but much to lose'.[120] After all, European integration would enhance the peripheral role and slight political weight of Galicia within the Spanish state and destroy the productive fabric of Galicia, turning the region into an industrial desert.[121] Instead, the BNG and INTG favoured sovereign bilateral negotiations with Third World countries who shared Galicia's economic priorities (as defined by them).[122] Finally, they refused to establish any positive linkage with the Europe of the Regions project, a notion they 'dismissed as a [pragmatic] construct of clandestine nationalism during the Franco regime'.[123]

With no state agreements framing collective bargaining in 1984, the *Intersindical* determined in its second Congress (1983) the priority of organising a general strike at the Galician level, predicting a favourable context for social mobilisation.[124] The first 'national' general strike was called on 14 February 1984 against the policies of the PSOE and for 'national liberation'. They argued that it was in the PSOE's best political interest to burden Galicia as opposed to Andalusia, where the Socialist governed, or the Basque Country, given certain government agreements between the PSOE and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). This fragment of the nationalist narrative of regional victimisation, critical of the ruling party rather than the system would prove to be a successful mobilisation slogan.[125] Also positive for mobilisation was the pragmatic attitude change towards CCOO-G, acknowledged in the Congress. The leadership of the *Intersindical* confirmed that there had been a 'substantial'

[120] ING, 'Adiante a Loita contra os Plans dos Monopolios', *Eixo*, 31 (March 1980), p.3.
[121] INTG, *Eixo*, 4, 2 Etapa (November 1984) p. 9. Also by the agrarian workers' unions, who organised several protests, *tractoradas*, since 1984 especially against the milk quotas.
[122] *Ibid.* For an examination of the international references of the UPG see Prudencio Vivero Mogo, 'As Referencias Internacionais da UPG (1964-80)', in Xesús Balboa López and Herminia Pernas Oroza (coords), *Entre Nós* (Santiago de Compostela, 2001), pp. 1023-36.
[123] Elias, *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration*, p. 89. The Europe of the Regions project arguably was much too similar to the banal regionalism promoted by Francoism. See Núñez Seixas, 'El Nacionalismo Español Regionalizado'.
[124] FTT, Caixa 166, *Intersindical*, 'II Congreso' (October 1983).
[125] Posters for the strike also highlighted that the strike was 'against the economic policy of the Spanish [PSOE's logo] Government' and for the industrialisation of the region. See for example, https://www.fundacionmonchoreboiras.gal/arquivo/id-1984-02-14-intg-folga-xeral-cartaz-intg.html.

transformation in this regard, and that the organisation was 'acting without any kind of sectarianism'.[126]

The struggle had limited geographical impact but forced a shift within CCOO-G.[127] The minutes of the CCOO-G executive commission meetings across 1983 show scattered views.[128] Generally, the leaders from the sector or branch syndicates rejected framing the shipbuilding and steel crisis as a Galician issue, preferring to remain closer to the UGT and find a state-wide solution. This was the position of the Confederation at the state level. Meanwhile, support for the unity of action with the *Intersindical* came from the territorial unions at the local levels. Officially, CCOO-G opposed the general strike of 14 February on the grounds that it was a 'political' move against a left-wing party, and so could be counterproductive in working towards a progressive government.[129] Nevertheless, some members of the Vigo union such as Waldino Varela – Regional (local) Secretary General – participated in the demonstration seeking a policy U-turn. Representing his union at a meeting of the CCOO-G Executive Commission on February 1984, Varela suggested that CCOO-G should take a page from the nationalists' book, creating the conditions for a successful general strike in Galicia by reframing the issue of shipbuilding into a territorial issue. Following the relative success of the protest and grassroots pressure at the local level, the national leadership of the CCOO-G begrudgingly opted to work more closely with the *Intersindical*. On 12 July, they successfully co-organised a second general 'national' strike against the economic policy of the Socialist Spanish government and for 'a Galician Employment Plan'.[130]

Across 1984, leaders of the CCOO-G, the press and other socio-political actors in Galicia echoed the idea that the region was an injured party in the EEC talks and disadvantaged

[126] *Intersindical*, 'II Congreso', p. 11.
[127] Focused mainly in Ourense and around Vigo, where a demonstration involved 300,000 people according to the press *FV*, 15 February 1984 pp. 1-28; *LVG*, 15 February 1984, p. 1 and Special.
[128] AHF10M, LAD, CCOO-G, Federacións Nacionais, 'Actas da Comisión Executiva 1983.'
[129] *FV*, 15 February 1984, p. 12.
[130] Broadly supported across Galicia, according to the *Xunta* as quoted in *LVG*, 13 July 1984, frontpage.

by the PSOE's economic policy. This shared sentiment facilitated the creation of other organisations at the local and regional level. Political Commissions, also called Citizens' Commissions or Anti-crisis Commissions, emerged in Vigo and around Ferrol promoted by the local authorities. At the regional level, a Platform for the Defence of the Galician Shipbuilding Sector emerged in August 1984 integrating all political parties and regional workers' organisations with institutional representation, except for PSdeG-PSOE and UGT.[131] The Platform aimed to encompass all the economic, cultural and social institutions of Galicia to make the Galician people aware of the need to save the shipyards.[132] Created as a pressure group to find alternatives to the restructuring project coming from Madrid, the Platform assumed the *Intersindical*'s Employment Plan and the White Paper presented by the *Xunta* in January 1984. Both documents emphasised Galicia's relative deprivation, and so proposed increased political decentralisation as the best solution to the economic crisis.[133] In its foundational document, the Platform established eight basic goals aligning with nationalist claims. Participants looked to maintain the Spanish state's share in the global demand for ships and for Galicia to retain its c.30 per cent share in the Spanish production. Other claims included keeping ASTANO's naval division and the nationalisation of struggling shipyards such as VULCANO and ASCON in Vigo. The Platform also called for the repeal of the restructuring decree, prompting AP's *Xunta* to 'take action' and find specific solutions. In addition, the Platform demanded the creation of jobs to absorb the high level of unemployment and 'the creation of a Galician Public Sector' to fight the crisis'.[134] These eight foundational points were adopted and polished at the technical conferences (*Xornadas Técnicas*) organised in October.

[131] Gómez-Aller Andrés, 'La Otra Transición', pp. 170-1.
[132] *El Ideal Gallego*, 14 August 1984; *LVG*, 14 August 1984 p.43.
[133] *LVG*, 22 January 1984, p. 24; *A Nosa Terra*, 238, 28 January 1984, pp. 12-3.
[134] AHF10M, FMAD, CCOO-G, Sector Naval, Plataforma para o sector naval, Foundational document. Untitled, (13 August 1984).

The conclusions of the conference included heavy criticism towards the Spanish government, whose policy was depicted as 'aggressive' towards the Galician workers and the nation.[135]

The extent to which this nationalist rhetoric permeated the Platform is further demonstrated in a proposal sent for discussion and approval to all the mayors of Galicia ahead of the third and last Galician national strike of the year – called for 29 November by both the *Intersindical* and CCOO-G. Stating that Galicia was 'a country rich in raw materials… representing over 11 per cent of the state [production] while our population is below 7.5 per cent', the international crisis hit the region harder than the Spanish state because of its economic underdevelopment.[136] This was 'fruit of its secular marginalization', whereby its economic structure was too dependent on shipbuilding and fishing – the sectors most affected by the current crisis. Unemployment was Galicia's main problem, growing since 1978 at a higher rate compared to the Spanish average – 369 per cent in Galicia as against 270 per cent in the state – while being the second region of the state most affected by redundancies. Adding insult to injury, unemployed *galegos* were, alongside Canarians, the least protected by the state (22 per cent as against 26 per cent), with 'only one in five' receiving unemployment benefits.[137] The document expressed concern about the predicted outcome of EEC integration in agriculture, farming and fishing, calling both for protective measures and to improve its structural shortcomings concluding that

> …the real cause of the fall of shipbuilding in the Spanish state is to be found in the **disastrous industrial policy...aggravated by the prospect of entry into the EEC**...
> The policy **of the Central Government is aggressive against the interests of the economy of the workers** of the whole State and **particularly of Galicians**, and denies in fact the extraordinary importance [of shipbuilding] within the Galician economy, as one of the foundations of the industrial fabric of our Nation.

[135] The conclusions of the conference are also included in *ibid.*; and in the INTG, *Eixo*, 4 (November 1984), pp. 4-5.
[136]AHF10M, LAD, CCOO-G, Sector Naval, 'Plataforma para a Defensa da Construcción Naval de Galicia á Asamblea de Alcades dos Concellos Galegos' (Compostela, 31 October 1984).
[137] This linked to the fact that unemployment in the region was 'submerged', disguised by the familiar character of Galicia's agriculture. This disguise hampered the development of class consciousness. López Suevos argued that Galicia had a peculiar working class, born around shipbuilding particularly in Ferrol. He defined this class as 'symbiotic proletariat' – farmers who transformed into industrial workers 8 hours a day. Ramón López Suevos, *Dialéctica do Desenvolvimento: Naçom, Língua, Classes Sociais* (Santiago de Compostela, 1983).

> **The Government's policy aims to blindly condemn Galicia's industrial future**, without offering any alternative for industrial reindustrialisation and diversification
> Shipbuilding has...a future...if the right political and management conditions are created…
> …GALICIA STANDS, SHOUTING TOGETHER
> • FOR THE SALVATION OF OUR ECONOMY AND OUR INDUSTRY
> • FOR THE SALVATION OF THE SHIPBUILDING SECTOR
> • FOR A RATIONAL FISHERIES AND TRADE POLICY
> • FOR AN AGRICULTURAL POLICY THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF GALICIA
> • AGAINST SURRENDERING POLICIES
> • FOR A REAL REINDUSTRIALIZATION
> FOR A GALICIA WITHOUT UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMIGRATION.[138]

In this manner, it is evident that the nationalists were able to capitalise on the CCOO-G's critically supportive stance towards the PSOE. Additionally, that all parties involved in the Platform pragmatically subscribed the nationalist framework of regional grievance demonstrates its value for collective mobilisation.

Nevertheless, despite collaboration within the Platform on a shared narrative of national grievance, the nuanced differences between nationalist organisations and the other participants in their criticism of the EEC and the PSOE's economic policy eventually affected unity. Only the BNG and the INTG rejected integration altogether. Other parties, including AP, criticised the PSOE's handling of the negotiations and lack of political will to help Galicia. For the conservatives, this was clearly a partisan attack directed to undermine its competitor at both the state and regional levels. Meanwhile, the PCG and CCOO-G complemented their criticism of the PSOE's policy and attitude with a condemnation of AP's lack of policy in the region. Lacking 'programme or will', the conservative regional government had been completely ineffective in opposing the damaging plans of the central government.[139] Thus, CCOO-G narrowed its criticism not to the constitutional arrangements but to the political actors in charge, opposing their action/inaction to their ideal 'progressive' government.

[138] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
[139] AHF10M, FMAD, CCOO-G, Informes, Notas e Estudos de Manuel Deus, 'Informe Balance de Xestión da Comisión Executiva' (1984).

CCOO-G doubted the suitability of AP's involvement in the Platform from the get-go.[140] It did not come as a shock, then, when the ruling party was expelled from the organisation in December 1984 for holding an 'ambiguous' and 'contradictory' stance.[141] This stance was evidenced by AP's Restructuring Plan for Small and Medium-sized Shipyards and the breaking-up of the negotiations to elaborate a plan for the big shipyards (mostly state owned) in September, which the Platform criticised in a plenary session on 13 September would lead to 'a drastic reduction in Galician naval production and employment in the sector'.[142] The *Intersindical* asserted that 'AP's *Xunta*' suffered 'political schizophrenia' being a Spanish right-wing party playing a role, 'verbally opposing' the Spanish government's restructuring plans ahead of the upcoming autonomic elections while actually supporting them.[143] Contrary to the CCOO-G and retaining the colonial frame, criticism of the *Xunta* coming from the *Intersindical* and the BNG, whilst also including AP as a liberal (centre)-right Spanish party, was primarily a critique of the constitutional provisions. As the regional elections drew nearer, however, this discourse, or rather the strategy behind it, was challenged again in 1985.

Pragmatism vs Ideology

The first months of the year showed a significant reduction of collective action compared to 1983-4.[144] Undoubtedly, following 15 months of continuous struggle with no substantial policy alterations, weariness was a factor. The official line of the *Intersindical* combined both maximalist and 'possibilist' nationalist positions, advocating a return to the

[140] Hinting at the 'fragility of the commitment of some forces present' as stated by Julio Pérez de la Fuente, 'Galicia en la Encrucijada. El Impacto de una Huelga General', *Ahora*, 2 (October 1984) p. 56, quoted in Diego Gómez-Aller, 'Acción Colectiva e Reconversión Naval', MA Dissertation (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2012) p. 59.
[141] *LVG*, 19 December 1984, p. 51; *FV*, 19 December 1984, p. 30.
[142] AHF10M, FMAD, CCOO-G, Sector Naval, Untitled document [summary of the meeting] (13 September 1984).
[143] INTG, *Eixo*, 4 (II Etapa, November 1984) p. 3.
[144] Gómez-Aller Andrés, 'La Otra Transición', p. 182.

radicalisation of the struggle, with the 1984 strikes as benchmark, and to 'debureaucratise' the union finding a balance between serving the workers' immediate needs in combination with the organisation's long-term objective of 'strengthening nationalism'.[145] Yet, the leadership linked to the UPG was genuinely concerned that collaboration with CCOO-G would obscure the work and identity of the nationalist trade union and turn the focus from the Galician framework to the state. As such, regional leaders warned that cooperation should be aimed at bringing the 'Spanish' union to nationalist positions, with the *Intersindical* imposing its agenda and not the other way around. This explains why the *Intersindical* refused to participate in actions organised by CCOO-G in 1985 such as a march to Madrid, criticising the 'small *Intersindical* sector with shipbuilding representation' who joined them.[146] The Secretariat acknowledged a 'lack of coordination' between the grassroots leadership at the factory and local levels, which limited the promotion of actions and campaigns at the regional level. However, this 'lack of coordination' stemmed from the internal struggle between pragmatism and ideology parallel to the realignment of the nationalist fractions in the political sphere. In 1984, a section of the PSG joined forces with Camilo Nogueira's party (now rebranded Galician Left, EG) forming the coalition PSG-EG. Following the *Intersindical*'s second congress in January 1984, an internal document surfaced criticising the weight of the UPG in the organisation and rejecting its 'sectarianism…wanting to obstruct a plural society, [using] absolute "truths" as a weapon... against dissenters… described as enemies because they understand life differently'.[147] The *críticos* argued for the autonomy of the sector unions while those in the regional unions defended democratic centralism – thus the decisions made by the *Internsidical's* governing bodies. In May, these critics, created the Nationalist Syndical Convergence (CSN) as a 'current of opinion' within the organisation. They had the majority in

[145] Manuel Mera in *Eixo*, 5, 2 Etapa (February 1985).
[146] *Ibid.*
[147] FTT, Caixa 166, Report of the General Secretary in *II Congreso da Intersindical* (October 1983). FTT, Caixa 164, 'Documento dos Críticos' (January 1984).

Santiago, Vigo and Lugo. The UPG strongly criticised this development, accusing the CSN and EG of 'undermining [the organisation's] internal cohesion' and promoting a campaign of 'ideological intoxication'.[148] The CSN advocated keeping the focus on industrial matters and socioeconomic problems, demanding more independence from the BNG.

The first public disagreements surfaced after the celebration of the Galician Labour Day on 10 March 1985. In light of reports that some participants in the Santiago demonstration had spontaneously showed support for the Basque terrorist group ETA and its nationalist armed struggle, the Lugo and Vigo zone directives and the national secretary for transport and communications sent press statements criticising those acts.[149] They argued that the slogans did not represent a majority of the *Intersindical* affiliates, but 'some sectors' of the BNG (the UPG) who 'used' industrial acts to advocate their ideas.[150] They also publicly lamented that the Secretariat refused to celebrate the date alongside CCOO-G. The *Intersindical*'s general secretary, Xan Carballo, called them *españolistas*.[151] At a meeting on 20 April 1985, the National directive of the *Intersindical* decided to expel both zone secretaries and a member of the National directive for disobeying the organisation's policy.[152] This conflict led to the breakaway of the *críticos* and the emergence of yet another nationalist union: the General Confederation of Galician Workers – National Intersyndical (CXTG-IN). The CXTG-IN adopted a pragmatic strategy with a catch-all discourse, accepting the autonomous framework as a stepping-stone, demanding the Galician government increased its powers and pushing –

[148] *LVG*, 2 May 1984, p. 52.
[149] *LVG*, 11 March 1985, p. 30; *LVG*, 14 March 1985, p.52.
[150] Statement by Lois Burgos (transport national secretary) to *LVG*, 13 March 1985, p. 38.
[151] Carballo belonged to a Communist group known as '22 March' that emerged within the UPG as the party slowly began to moderate its strategy in its Fifth Congress to achieve more electoral support, following its poor performance in the 1985 autonomic elections. The group would eventually emerge yet as another anti-system party: the Communist Party of National Liberation (PCLN). *LVG*, 27 July 1986, p. 23.
[152] Extracts of the minutes published in *Eixo*, 7, 2 Etapa (June 1985) p. 2. In the case of the Lugo leadership, because they had publicly criticised the national directive and the general secretary seeking to 'factionalise' the organisation and agreeing to organise the Labour Day celebrations alongside CCOO amongst other things. Vigo's leader had obtained a large subsidy from the *Xunta* and the National Direction thought it should revert in different areas.

similarly to CCOO-G – for the constitution of regional institutions such as an Economic and Social Galician Council. The CXTG-IN pursued unity in the fight against the PSOE's anti-worker and anti-Galician economic policies, especially in light of EEC integration, and for a fair class and regional solution to the economic crisis.[153] This strategy, encouraged by the successful turnout in the 1984 protests and the experience of the Platform, led to the understanding and collaboration between the CXTG-IN and CCOO-G between 1985 and early 1987.

The leadership of CCOO-G remained convinced that mass actions were 'the only response' against the Government's policy, which for 1985 included a proposal for the reform of the Social Security system (SS).[154] Coherent with the overall economic strategy of macroeconomic discipline, the PSOE government accompanied its industrial policy with increasing taxation and a reduction in public expenditure as a percentage of GDP in social services. While total public spending increased from 35.8 to 42.1 per cent of GDP between 1981-7, public spending in social services decreased from 25.1 to 23.7 per cent namely in unemployment benefits and pensions.[155] As the pressure over the pension system increased, partially in connection with the numerous workers pre-retired during the industrial restructuring process, the PSOE government announced in 1985 a reform which effectively restricted the pension access and reduced the amount of the lowest allowances – enlarging the minimum contributory period and adding more salaried years in the calculations.[156] Although

[153] Sources for this paragraph include several articles in *LVG* and the report of the National Secretariat of the CXTG-IN ahead of its Second Congress (1988), FTT, Box 103, 'Informe do Segredariado Nacional', parags 01-11.
[154] AHF10M, LAD, CCOO-G, Comisión Executiva 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva 1984' and 'Actas e Resolucións da Comisión Executiva 1985'.
[155] In fact, the increase in public spending was directed to pay for the interest on public debt. Luis Moreno and Sebastià Sarasa, *Génesis y Desarrollo del Estado de Bienestar en España*, Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados Documento de Trabajo 92-13, p. 20, Available in http://www.ub.edu/ciudadania/hipertexto/evolucion/introduccion/G%E9nesis%20y%20Estado%20del%20Bienestar%20en%20Espa%F1a.pdf [accessed on 21 May 2020].
[156] Ana Guillén, Santiago Álvarez and Pedro Adão E Silva, 'Redesigning the Spanish and Portuguese Welfare States: The Impact of Accession into the European Union', *South European Society & Politics* 8.1-2 (2003), p. 247.

separated by their positions on self-determination, CXTG-IN shared with CCOO-G a conviction that only a left-oriented 'progressive' economic policy that combined class and national interests could help Galicia.

On 20 June 1985, CCOO called the first general strike of the new democratic era arguing that the PSOE government had to review its spending priorities, reducing the expenses in defence and investing that money into SS instead. The CXTG-IN decided to support it, calling for the effective transfer of power to the Galician authorities.[157] Meanwhile, the *Intersindical* called a regional ('national') demonstration on 13 June to highlight the specific effects of the SS reform on Galicia.[158] The *Intersindical* also demanded returning the management of the Social Security to the regional government, with the necessary financial resources. While CCOO-G was careful to state that the strike did not intend to overthrow the Socialist government, the *Intersindical* was far more aggressive towards the PSOE. Accusing the government of lying in its justification for the reform (justified by the ageing population), the *Intersindical* stated that the causes of the Social Security deficit included the lowering of employers' contributions, their debts (one and a half billion pesetas) and the overall policy framed by Spain's accession to the EEC.[159] Progressively, the PSOE's 'counter-reform' became a pivotal issue for CCOO, the CXTG-IN and the *Intersindical* in addition to the ever-increasing unemployment.[160] CCOO-G and the CXTG-IN came together to defend a common platform of demands in 1986, advocating collective bargaining at the Galician level to fight the economic crisis, which had been exacerbated by the PSOE whose policy was now defined as 'anti-social', a more inclusive framework than anti-union/workers or anti-Galician.[161]

[157] *LVG* (Pontevedra edition), 12 June 1985, p. 37.
[158] *LVG*, 13 June 1985, p. 30.
[159] *Ibid.*; INTG, *Eixo* numbers 5 and 7 (February and June 1985 respectively).
[160] Which grew in Spain from 15.6 per cent in 1982 to 21.1 per cent in 1985, see Rand Smith, *The Left's Dirty Job*, p. 93.
[161] AHF10M, LAD, CCOO-G, Acordos, 'Acordo CCOO-CXTG-IN para a Negociación Colectiva de 1986' (February 1986).

Outlined by the nationalist/Spanishist/pseudonationalist framework, the division within the nationalist workers' organisations lasted well into 1987. However, the autonomous regional elections of November 1985 saw a change in strategy within the BNG, probably affected by the nationalist experience in the industrial arena. That year, three nationalist parties run for the Galician government: BNG, the PSG-EG and in the centre-right of the political spectrum Galician Coalition (CG). The latter obtained a spectacular 13 per cent of the votes, while PSG-EG obtained 5.7 per cent and the BNG 4.2 per cent, bringing the total vote of nationalism over the 20 per cent threshold for the first time.[162] Realising that having an institutional presence would only benefit the party, the BNG performed a U-turn with respect to 1981 deciding to abide by the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy.[163] Moreover, following the split, the *Intersindical* lost its 'majority union' status at the 1986 workplace elections. So too did the CXTG-IN, although this union obtained marginally a few more delegates than the *Intersindical* despite facing vicious attacks by the latter and having little time to campaign. Arguably, their relative political and institutional marginalisation led the leadership of the BNG and *Intersindical* to reconsider their maximalist strategy. In February 1987, the later joined CCOO-G and the CXTG-IN signing an agreement which criticised both the PSOE and AP's governments. The agreement demanded the establishment of the Galician framework of labour relations 'in certain sectors', according to their needs and to unify work conditions and salaries, and for a Galician employment plan. Finally, the argument for increased political decentralisation involved criticism to the lack of interest of the ruling conservative party to expand the powers of the regional government.

[162] Justo G. Beramendi, *El Nacionalismo Gallego* (Madrid, 1997), p.73.
[163] *LVG*, 22 March 1986, front page; FTT, UPG, 'V Congreso. Os Comunistas Galegos pola Liberación Nacional' (March 1986).

Conclusion

The consolidation of a multi-level, plural, liberal democratic framework posed various challenges to the young workers' organisations in Galicia, whose relationship with the political parties remained close. It may be argued that it was this relationship that undermined the emergence of a unified regional umbrella organisation for workers in the first place. Facing the opportunity to build the new democracy from scratch, each left-wing party and workers' organisation had a specific vision for the establishment of a socialist democracy. This led to partisan division and the subordination of immediate workerist claims to the broader political needs of the country. CCOO, who had embodied both democracy and the working class in 1970s Spain, was the first to frame the moderation of class aims in terms of democratic responsibility, justifying the strategic subordination of mobilisation to negotiation seeking to ensure the inclusion of the PCE in the constitutional negotiations. In this context, and as the economy deteriorated, the CCOO proposed a 'National Solidarity Plan' to consolidate democracy and overcome the recession. Redistribution was the backbone of this plan, which explains the emphasis on solidarity. As the constitutional framework developed, establishing a competitive industrial relations framework, a decentralised political system and centralised economic management, the moderate left, represented by the PSOE and UGT, progressively co-opted this narrative. Following the Socialist victory in the 1982 general elections, the UGT at the state and regional levels discarded mobilising skilled workers against the PSOE government, framing militancy as radical, irresponsible and selfish. The UGT had a larger white-collar membership as opposed to the CCOO. As a regional branch of the Spanish CCOO Confederation, this state-wide context framed and constrained the actions of the CCOO-G. Seeking unity of action with the UGT to encourage a return of the Socialist union to class positions and a better defence of the workers' interests, the CCOO-G temporarily de-emphasised the regional political frame in favour of workerist frameworks. Yet, the concurrent

growth of nationalism in the industrial sphere, which reached the condition of 'most representative' union in 1982, and the liberal turn of the PSOE facilitated the CCOO-G's return to the deployment of some nationalist propositions.

The constitutional arrangements posed both an opportunity and a challenge to Galician nationalism. It was an opportunity because it facilitated the argument for economic decentralisation and the establishment of a regional system of industrial relations. It was also an opportunity for those in the political sphere who defended a progressive, stepping-stones approach to self-determination. Maintaining a confrontational stance that contrasted with those of the 'Spanish' unions, the *Intersindical* could argue more forcefully that only independent Galician organisations had the interests of Galician workers, their families and the region at heart. Politically, nationalism retained the exclusive framework derived from its diagnosis of the Galician problem: internal colonialism and superexploitation. The lack of political will to bend its maximalist ideological aims and renounce its revolutionary strategy, led to animosity towards the 'pseudonationalists' who had merely settled for the 'imposed' bourgeois, liberal democracy, which retained Galicia in a dependent position under the 'neo-colonial' autonomic framework. Rejecting participation in the new regional framework, which opposed its 'national-popular' project, the BNG effectively undermined its position, presenting itself as a radical and uncompromising party to a Galician society characterised by its dual identity and a preference for moderate policies and social 'order'. In contrast, acting as nationalist umbrella organisation, the *Intersindical* pragmatically discarded non-participation in the regional framework, and from 1983 softened its position towards CCOO-G, accepting unity of action to defend the interests of its membership and to draw the 'Spanish' organisation to nationalist positions.

The shipbuilding restructuring process managed by the PSOE amid negotiations towards EEC integration further encouraged the pragmatic convergence of *Intersindical* and

CCOO-G. Meanwhile, the UGT had clearly emerged as the organisation authorities and employers' organisations favoured, demonstrated for instance in their disproportionate share of resources. The *reconversion industrial* highlighted the anti-democratic *ethos* of the PSOE for various reasons. First, because it was implemented through royal decrees rather than through tripartite negotiations – as proposed by CCOO. Second, because its policies resulted in the rapid growth of unemployment, which in 1985 was at 20 per cent.[164] Prioritising the fight to reduce inflation and the reduction in public spending hoping that growth in the private sector would have a trickle-down effect, the PSOE's position converged with the strategies followed by other western European countries. Yet, these policies were the opposite of CCOO's 'National Solidarity Plan' and thus also undemocratic. Finally, the PSOE's policies were undemocratic as regards the redistribution of regional wealth defended by the CCOO-G. For this union, the problem of regional inequality could only be solved through the development of regional tripartite negotiations which, by contrast with the nationalist proposals, would remain articulated in the state framework. The *Intersindical* argued that sovereignty was the only way to protect Galicia's share of the industrial, agricultural and fishing market, arguing that the PSOE Spanish government sacrificed Galicia because politically it did not feel as accountable to this region as it did, for instance, to Andalusia. To promote unity and broad social mobilisation, the nationalists prioritised this part of their argument on February 1984, blaming the PSOE over the system. As the protests acquired a broader regional character, nationalist arguments permeated public discourse as seen within the Platform for the Defence of the Galician Shipbuilding Sector. Nevertheless, as the AP presented regional proposals that aligned with the PSOE's policies and the 1985 regional elections grew closer, the nationalist/Spanishist divide came back to the fore.

[164] According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) accessible in https://datosmacro.expansion.com/paro-epa/espana?anio=1985 [last accessed 04 April 2022]. This represented 2,731,500 people, 127,312 people. In 1984, unemployment had increased in 261,884 people. 'El Paro Registrado a Finales de 1985 Alcanzó a 2.731.505 Personas', *El País*, 17 January 1986 [electronic versión].

Within the *Intersindical*, the sector linked to the UPG rejected collaboration with the CCOO-G fearing it would undermine its proposals for an independent Galician framework. This led to the rupture of the progressive sector, which rejected party interference in industrial affairs and sectarianism. This sector was particularly well established in the shipbuilding sector, as was the CCOO-G sector that favoured unity of action with the nationalists. As in Scotland, facing the fragmentation of the workforce – including the decline of male skilled workers, the growth of female employment and the shift towards a service economy, workers' organisations in Galicia strongly represented in declining sectors such as shipbuilding, locally contained in the coastal areas around Ferrol and Vigo, encouraged the use of broader collective mobilisation frames.[165] The appeal of this more inclusive approach, demonstrated during the 1984 protests against the *reconversion* and in the electoral strength of the CXTG-IN in 1986, together with the loss that the organisational split of the *Intersindical* meant in terms of nationalism losing its 'most representative' status, encouraged the INTG's abandonment of the exclusivist framework and a return to unity of action in 1987. Remaining industrially strong and surpassed in 1987 by a nationalist conservative coalition, in 1993, the BNG also adopted a more inclusive political framework with a progressive 'common project' defending 'more self-government and welfare'.[166]

[165] Between 1978-88, the gap between the percentage of women and men in industry and the tertiary sector in Galicia was reduced by 9 points. Enya Antelo Alvite, 'Usos Políticos de la Mujer Gallega en la Transición a la Democracia', in Prada Rodríguez, *Galicia en Transición*, p. 338.
[166] A schematic analysis of the BNG's changing political frameworks can be found in Máiz and Ares, 'The Shifting Framing Strategies', p. 188.

Regional socialist democracy in the 'long 1970s'

The focus of this thesis has been the Scottish and Galician regional workers' organisations and their response to the socioeconomic and political challenges of the 'Long 1970s', defined here as the years between 1972 and c.1986. These challenges are significant in understanding how the notion of democracy was negotiated and formulated in the period under examination. Inspired by Martin Conway's work on Western Europe's post-war democracy between 1945 and 1968/73, the thesis takes an inclusive approach to the topic, understanding 'democracy as a way of life' rather than just a political system.[1] Conway has showcased the limitations of using a national historical framework to study the evolution of post-war democracy, justifying a transnational approach given the porous nature of national frontiers after 1945.[2] While his research focuses on a period marked by 'uniformity and stability', this thesis has focused on the transformative and unstable decade of the 1970s, using a comparative focus to transcend the 'the northern and western bias' in European historiography.[3]

Taking 1972 as a turning point has allowed me to consider the interplay between the ongoing socioeconomic transformations and the political dynamics following the 1973 OPEC crisis. Although discontent with the liberal social democratic model began in the 1960s, leading

[1] Conway has used both ending points in *Western Europe's Democratic Age* and Martin Conway, 'The rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945-1973', *Contemporary European History*, 13.1 (2004), pp. 67-88; Till van Rahden, 'Clumsy Democrats: Moral Passions in the Federal Republic', *German History*, 29 (2011), p. 489 quoted in Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, p. 23. Key historiography on the broader post-war Western European and global context also includes Paul Betts, *Ruin and Renewal: Civilizing Europe after World War II* (London, 2020); Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Oxford, 2007) and Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 268-304.
[2] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, p. 21.
[3] A bias also present, but acknowledged, in Conway's work, 'The Rise and Fall', p. 71.

to the protests of 1968, its impact was most notable in the 1970s.[4] Beyond the structures of government, criticism of post-war democracy targeted post-war Keynesian corporatism and economic management, facilitating the overhaul of the liberal social democratic model in the 1980s. Thus, the 'Long 1970s' in Western Europe were transformative in all spheres – political, economic and social. Furthermore, they were also transformative at all territorial levels – supranational, national and regional. The economic recession unveiled how deep global economic interdependency was, reflected for instance in the socioeconomic and political impact of multinational corporations. These developments challenged the nation-state framework, already affected by the deepening and widening of the process of European integration.

The previous chapters have brought into focus how these broader western European dynamics played out in two different regions, Scotland and Galicia. Both regions underwent a revitalisation of sub-state nationalism and hosted politically active, regional workers' organisations. In the period under study, changes in macroeconomic management leading to the abandonment of the corporatist consensus in favour of free-market monetarist policies unleashed the processes of deindustrialisation and economic restructuring that deeply affected the workers' organisations' *raison d'être*.[5] Trying to make sense of and adapt to these supranational and national changes, regional workers' organisations expanded their traditional 'workerist' frames. They deployed the regional framework to defend their members, but also to safeguard – or in the case of Galicia institutionalise – their corporatist role. Comparing both cases, this concluding chapter points to the contribution of local, bottom-up articulations of

[4] In Conway, 'The Rise and Fall', p. 70; Kristin Ross, *May '68 and its Afterlives* (Chicago, 2002); Carole Fink and Philipp Gassert (eds), *1968: The World Transformed* (Cambridge, 1998).
[5] Corporatism refers to the socio-political organisation of society into interest groups, such as business and labour. Here, corporatist consensus refers to the negotiation between these interest, or 'corporatist', groups and the state in the co-management of the economy. See Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great 'ism'* (NY, 1997).

regional *socialist* democratic, or progressive, narratives in the 'long 1970s', as they adapted to the transformations of the decade.[6]

Negotiating democracy and class. Regional workers' organisations and identity.

The 1960s witnessed the emergence of alternative forms of democracy around the globe, particularly amid decolonising states across the global South. New forms of economic power and state development accompanied the rise of mass movements and direct local democracy.[7] In the midst of these global transformations, western Europe witnessed the emergence of a New Left, which drew from the anti-imperialist liberation movements emerging in Africa, Asia and South America, and a much more individualistic form of liberalism espoused by what would become the New Right. This polarisation clearly brought to an end the consensus over 'the end of ideology'.[8] The democratic model that emerged after the war was originally designed by political leaders, administrators and specific intellectual communities seeking to ensure stable parliamentarism and effective government.[9] Because post-war democracies revolved around 'institutions of an orderly and inclusive liberty', symbolised by the political centralism of the main parties, the model lacked plurality.[10] The top-down democratic order that emerged limited the 'popular control of rulers' and the opportunities to express political dissent, while granting more freedom to state officials.[11] In other words, the model lacked accountability. Dissenters from the liberal social democratic

[6] Umberto Tulli, 'The Search for a European Identity in the Long 1970s: External Relations and Institutional Evolution in the European Community.' *Contemporary European History* 25.3 (2016), pp. 537-50.
[7] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, p. 257.
[8] As stated by Daniel Bell in his book *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, 1960) and was assumed by other privileged and middle class, white, anti-communist intellectuals such as French philosopher Raymond Aron, whose thesis on post-war democratic stabilisation Conway tests in his book.
[9] This section draws from Conway's Introduction, pp. 1-27, and chapter 5 'Contesting Democracy: the Democratic Critique of Democracy', pp. 255-93.
[10] *Ibid.* p. 17.
[11] *Ibid.* p. 8.

post-war settlement started 'questioning whether the vertical hierarchies of representation […] were the best means of achieving the goals of individual freedom, social justice, and a participatory democratic culture'.[12] In Galicia, similar narratives were concurrently deployed when faced with the oppressive verticality of the Francoist dictatorship. The claims for a more participative and decentralised democratic model, Conway asserts, reflected a social desire for increased individual autonomy as a solution to the perceived democratic deficit. In the context of authoritarian Spain, politicised shop workers in Galicia fighting against the regime, nationalists familiar with the works of Gramsci and members of the PCE, all coexisting within CCOO, formulated similar claims in the late 1960s. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, these claims facilitated the articulation of regional socialist democratic narratives.

Facing increasing global economic competition and deindustrialisation, requests for the decentralisation of economic management as a political solution to the problem of regional relative socioeconomic deprivation emerged in some regions. In Galicia, the Marxist-Leninist UPG linked Galicia's socioeconomic backwardness and the prevalence of 'pre-capitalist' modes of production to its peripheral position both within Spain and Europe. Centralism was equated to imperialism and the party vaguely proposed self-determination to fight for the 'national liberation' of Galicia as early as 1965, without discarding a federal association with the other peoples of the Peninsula.[13] In 1968, the PCG appeared as a specific regional section of the Spanish PCE. Its leader, Santiago Álvarez, had linked the emergence of sub-state nationalism in Spain to the oppressive nature of the Francoist regime in 1965, conceptualising it as part of the broader anti-Francoist struggle, specifically in connection to Franco's oppressive 'bureaucratic centralism' in the name of standardisation. Also in 1968, a nationalist

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[13] UPG, 'Dez Principios Mínimos', *Terra e Tempo*, 5 (Santiago de Compostela, 1965), p.2.

workers organisation emerged in the factories of Vigo, intending to reframe Galician nationalism from a socialist perspective. This group, GS, worked closely – and clandestinely – with other militant workers within the CCOO, yet both groupings politicised with different priorities in mind: nationalism and communism. From c.1970, Galician nationalists argued that the Francoist regime was an 'oligarchic', 'fascist' dictatorship that was exercising 'internal colonialism' through its centralised vertical structure to the detriment of Galicia's socioeconomic development. Moreover, they began to argue that, historically, Spanish governments had relegated the region's economy to a colonial extractive status. If the root of regional underdevelopment was political, then a political solution was required. As opposed to a remote and authoritarian central government, Galician nationalists advocated political decentralisation within a Spanish federal state (PSG) or, more vaguely, 'self-determination' (UPG). The PCG also accepted the region's socioeconomic and cultural – but not political – exploitation and proposed devolution as the political solution. In accepting the colonial framework, the leadership of the PCG was influenced by the close contact between the small nationalist militancy and sympathisers within the Workers Commissions (CCOO) movement. Conversely, GS learned within CCOO the political importance of the workers' assemblies and collective bargaining, while also influenced the PSG and UPG. Thus, in Galicia, the workplace was the democratic forum where militant workers discussed political ideas and regional socialist democratic narratives emerged. In Scotland, the argument for administrative decentralisation related to the development of regional policy, and had been led by Scottish businessmen and the Scottish Unionist Party in the 1960s.[14] Concurrently, while modern sub-state nationalism was politically represented by the SNP and pushed for the nation's

[14] Jim Phillips, '"Oceanspan": Deindustrialisation and Devolution in Scotland, C. 1960-1974.' *Scottish Historical Review* 84.217 (2005) pp. 63-84; Jim Tomlinson and Ewan Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation: Scotland 1931 to 1979', *Contemporary British History*, 30.4 (2016), pp. 584-60.

independence, New Left Scottish thinker Tom Nairn was introducing a new perspective.[15] Nairn, whose thought nourishes twenty-first century Scottish nationalism, shared with Camilo Nogueira – engineer and shop steward linked to GS, UPG and later leader of the POG and EG – a Gramscian analysis of Scottish and Galician politics that contributed to framing political devolution as a stepping-stone to socialism and further democratisation. Thus, criticism of liberal social democracy began in 1960s Western Europe as a response to the perception of relative economic and political decline following decolonisation and the emerging threat of the 'Asian Tigers'.[16]

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the articulation of alternative national projects was in full swing. Relative decline led to the questioning of the welfare state and Keynesian economic management – both central to post-war western European democracy. Following the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the 1973 and 1979 OPEC crises, successive European governments favoured monetarist and free-market solutions to the economic recession, and progressively gave central bankers control over economic policy.[17] Politically, transformative voices arose from across the national political spectrum aiming to modernise the economy and reinforce national pride. Representing the radical liberal right, Thatcher and her supporters in the UK envisioned a 'property-owning democracy' as opposed to what they viewed as an outdated and inefficient British post-war settlement. Drawing on Thatcher's project, Fraga, who held various political posts under Franco and then became leader of AP, developed a conservative sociological narrative identifying Spanish democracy with economic free-market liberalism and the constitutional autonomous framework set up during the

[15] Scholars have highlighted that, at this stage, the SNP was not engaged in nation-building. Mark Garnett and Martin Steven, 'Rhetoric and the Rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party' in Atkins and Gaffney, *Voices of the UK*, pp. 171-88. See Introduction and chapter 1.
[16] Ŭn-mi, Kim, *The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy* (London, 1998).
[17] See for example Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani (eds), *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World* (Brussels and New York, 2011); De Angelis and Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity'.

transition to democracy. On the British left, the Labour Party became increasingly divided over the best way to economically modernise the country. In Spain, as opposed to Franco's 'developmentalism', the PSOE came up with a project 'for change' based on 'Europeanisation', implementing free-market solutions and industrial restructuring, while the PCE assumed the progressive 'Eurocommunist' project, discarding the revolutionary road to socialism. Ultimately, however, the *Transición* set up a liberal social democratic model that aligned with the western European post-war model. At the regional level, criticism of the hegemonic liberal democratic model revolved around a wide range of issues. However, most political actors articulated their narratives and alternative democratic projects as an issue of 'devolution', or diffusion of power. For the right, the issue was market 'freedom' from state control, granting the individual 'freedom' of choice. For rising sub-state nationalism and the socialist left, devolution was linked to the notion of subsidiarity, meaning political and administrative decentralisation or self-government to ensure equitable wealth redistribution. While their project also entailed a devolution of power from the state, the beneficiary would be the regional or national (state) community rather than the individual.

The focus on the Scottish and Galician regional workers' organisations illustrates the ways in which socialist and nationalist democratic projects converged from the late 1960s. It was within the trade unions that the interests of the regional socialist left met those of sub-state nationalism and industrial workers in relatively deprived regions, especially from 1972. These workers had not completely reaped the benefits of liberal democracy. The expansion of welfare provision, or paternalistic protection in the case of Francoist Spain, had addressed some of the most outrageous causes of poverty but class and regional inequalities remained, with wages 'lagg[ing] behind increases in productivity' both in Spain and the United Kingdom, but more

so in Scotland and Galicia.[18] For this reason, workers were highly mobilised in the early 1970s, facilitating militant collective action. It should, however, be noted that criticism of Francoism was much more extensive. Under Franco, Spain was a police state where there were clear violations of human rights legislation, including the use of torture against political opponents.[19] Because of the scope of this thesis and the comparison with democratic Scotland, these have not been explored here although they underpinned, for example, the PCG's characterisation of the regime as oppressive. Returning to our topic, bottom-up criticism of the liberal democratic model and, understandably, of Francoism focused on the lack of plurality and accountability and on the verticality of post-war corporatism. Eventually workers' organisations were also challenged by this discourse. After all, they were vertical structures of representation defending the interests of their membership, a membership that was steadily declining and becoming more heterogeneous. In the face of deep socioeconomic recession and industrial restructuring, workers representatives had the difficult task of making sense of the present and redefining their role and that of their institutions for the future. In this manner, contemporary concerns around political and administrative devolution had manifold effects on the regional workers' organisations in Scotland and Galicia.

From a purely organisational standpoint, criticism of a vertical hierarchy of representation was especially notable in Galicia. There were several reasons for this. First, we need to consider the context in which the 'new' 'socio-political movement' of the Workers' Commissions (CCOO) first appeared, opposing the clearly unrepresentative and repressive vertical structures of Franco's corporate state – which were evidently different both in function and purpose from the representative vertical structures of post-war democracy. In the early 1970s, *democratisation* was the central aim of the Francoist opposition in Galicia (and Spain),

[18] Institutionalised through income-related pensions, subsidies and economic protectionism. Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, p. 25. See also chapters 1 and 3.
[19] Mary Vincent, *Spain, 1833-2002*, pp. 199-203.

acting as a unifying force and promoting social mobilisation. Yet, once the political transition began in 1975, the wide range of visions regarding how the process should take place, what it would entail and what the new democratic Spain should look like, translated into ideological and institutional division. In Galicia, political division took place both across the left and nationalist axes (PSdeG vs PCG vs UPG vs PSG and POG/EG). Among workers' organisations, there were also numerous organisational splits. The setting-up of a fragmented and competitive system of industrial relations, linking workplace representation at the national level with economic funding and determining socio-political influence, was the framework and main source of regional inter-organisational conflicts. However, the issue of devolution also underlay most intra-organisational disputes – with sections arguing for a diffusion of power from the top of the organisations to the grassroots, loosening their ties with the parties. Socialist Galicia (GS) split from CCOO in 1971 for this reason; CCOO-G emerged in 1978 as independent from the party – although it retained close links through its leadership; the Galician Syndical Confederation (CSG) was born out of this critique, splintering from the USO in 1980 and from the *Intersindical* in 1985 leading to the constitution of the Confederation of Galician Workers – National Intersyndical (CXTG-IN).

Devolution also underpinned opposition to the Spanish industrial relations framework. Under Franco, shop stewards in the factories easily highlighted the obvious undemocratic nature of the regime, politicising local industrial issues in order to mobilise large sectors of society against the dictatorship. Collective bargaining provided the ideal framework, as the discussion of collective claims in workplace and local assemblies allowed the unions to politicise their co-workers. First, shop stewards linked to the CCOO framed specific factory struggles as representing shared workers' struggles, deploying the traditional 'workerist' ideas that drew from Marxism to articulate issues through concepts such as 'exploitation' or 'class

interests'.[20] These appealed to the identity of the 'workers' as opposed to the 'capitalists' or the 'oligarchy' and, in this way, sought to mobilise other wage-earners in class solidarity. At the same time, shop stewards included socio-political claims in the negotiations, demanding for instance the freedom of workers to associate within 'free' trade unions – independent from the state and separate from the employers. Ultimately, both positions articulated a basic narrative defining democracy primarily in terms of class and autonomy – as opposed to the authoritarian regime catering to the 'oligarchy'. Evidencing the polyvalence of conflating class and national interests, from 1972, the UPG took up this mobilising rhetoric and strategy, creating a 'Workers' Front' (FO) to promote its 'national-popular' ideology. The nationalist party interpreted the events as proof that the Galician working people had finally become a class 'for itself', providing the political opportunity for them to lead the 'national-popular' revolution that Galicia needed to rid itself of its colonial status *before* taking on the socialist revolution. As the path towards democratisation was cleared, from 1976, the nationalists of the UPG pointed out that self-determination required native organisations and established a dichotomy between 'Spanishist' and 'nationalists'. With regional autonomy embedded in the 1978 Constitution, the UPG's framework evolved. Refusing to bend their ideological aims, the leadership of the party reframed Galicia's relationship with democratic Spain as 'neo-colonial' and characterised the region as being 'superexploited'. In turn, this exclusive reframing led to further division. The UPG now not only differentiated between Spanishist and nationalists, but between nationalists (revolutionaries) and 'pseudonationalists', those who accepted the 'possible' or progressive stepping-stones approach to self-determination. In any case, in both nationalist narratives, regional and class equality appeared as pre-condition to national (Spain) and international socialism.

[20] This definition of 'workerist' frames draws from Oriol Barranco and Oscar Molina, 'Continuity and Change in Trade Union Frames: Evidence from General Strikes in Spain', *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, (2019).

Similarly, devolution underpinned STUC discussions over industrial affairs. Its organisational impact here was much more subdued, with no splits. The STUC acted as an umbrella organisation for all Scottish workers' and was a well-established key regional interest group. This gave the STUC a socio-political standing that the various young Galician unions lacked, first as a proxy for Scottish workers and their families and, facing Thatcher, as a representative of all Scots. This was possible because the STUC effectively linked regional and class interests from 1972, characterising the region as an industrial, socialist nation by turning industrial issues into broader local and regional problems – particularly unemployment – and comparing the actions of its leadership to that of the TUC. In contrast with the STUC, the British workers' organisation was less confrontational. In 1972, it had been willing to accept redundancies while between 1975-8 it had more willingly accepted wage moderation. In the context of growing unemployment in a region that saw itself as relatively deprived, the TUC's actions were short of what Scottish workers needed. Furthermore, as central governments of different signs implemented policies that favoured the reduction of inflation over the Keynesian goal of full employment, the STUC argued that said policies opposed the interests of the industrial Scottish nation. In contrast, only the AES would solve the region's socioeconomic deprivation. Between 1976-9, in the context of an economic recession marked by cuts in public spending and deindustrialisation, legislative devolution was being discussed. Having framed Scotland as an industrial nation, the STUC progressively presented itself as a proxy of regional democracy. Finally, devolution in Scotland also underlay the clashes with the successive Labour (1964-70 and 1974-9) and Conservative (1970-4 and 1979-83) governments. Confrontation was provoked by their attempts to legislate in the sphere of industrial relations in the face of the voluntarism that had previously characterised them. The implementation of a legal framework to curb shop floor power was often framed as an 'attack' on democracy, not

only because this undermined the corporatist post-war consensus on industrial relations but also because it threatened the 'independence' of the trade unions.

Regional 'workerist' responses to the challenges of the long 1970s.

Although in both Scotland and Galicia shop stewards linked to the communist left, working in decaying industries such as shipbuilding, and members of the regional workers' organisations, had begun merging class and regional interests in the late 1960s, 1972 was a turning point both for the articulation of *regional* 'workerist' frames and, strategically, for the regional workers' organisations. In Scotland, the implementation of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) under Heath's government (1970-4) provided the context for the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) work-in. The coincidence of both events reinforced the pragmatic deployment of 'workerist' frames by shop stewards and the STUC leadership to emphasise the paradigmatic 'anti-worker' character of the Conservative party. Additionally, following in the footsteps of the NUMSA, shop stewards supported by the regional leadership of the STUC depicted the closure of the shipyards as paradigmatic of a shared regional problem: deindustrialisation and the failure of the central administration to encourage industrial regeneration.[21] For this reason, the STUC made administrative decentralisation central to its socialist project. They argued that central economic management was flawed because the 'faceless men' governing in London followed liberal precepts and were unaware and indifferent to the pressing needs of Scotland and its industrial workers. Similarly, the shop floor leaders of the clandestine workers' movement working in Francoist Galicia encouraged the insertion of specific industrial demands into the wider regional arguments, e.g. justifying the demands for salary increases in a specific factory as a step to end the relative deprivation shared

[21] The role of the Scottish miners as spearheads of devolution within the STUC and in Scotland has been well proven in Scottish scholarship. See for example the works of Angela Tucket or Jim Phillips referenced in chapter 1.

by all Galician workers. To make their point, leaders of the CCOO at the regional, local and factory levels, in contact with nationalist workers and sympathisers, resorted to the colonialist frame developed in a joint nationalist document by Xosé M. Beiras (PSG), Camilo Nogueira (GS) and Méndez Ferrín (UPG) c.1970. This framework was later further theorised by Beiras to showcase the nation's 'socioeconomic and cultural exploitation'. The articulation of a narrative linking class and regional interests allowed workers' representatives to delegitimise the Francoist dictatorship with a three-fold argument, redefining the democratic project of the Galician socialist left. First, by highlighting the underdevelopment of the region, they undermined the Francoist developmentalist narrative of an 'economic miracle'. Second, demanding representative workers' institutions as opposed to the OSE, and denouncing the brutal repression of workers' struggles and protesting wage ceilings, CCOO activists highlighted the authoritarian and the anti-worker character of the regime. Finally, as opposed to the authoritarian policies implemented since 1939 and drawing from the Republican experience and the pre-war 1936 Statute, the socialist left in Galicia – both nationalist and non-nationalist – favoured political decentralisation as a solution to regional socioeconomic backwardness. In this manner, in the late-Francoist context, the socialist left in Galicia converging in the CCOO based its modern socialist democratic project in the pillar of 'autonomy'.

The wave of industrial, local and regional cross-class solidarity and support for the UCS and Bazán struggles seemingly demonstrated that combining traditional 'workerist' or class narratives with issues of regional inequality, and portraying industrial issues as paradigmatic of local and regional structural socioeconomic problems, was a powerful mobilisation 'resource'.[22] Such a tactic allowed the leadership of the regional workers' movement in

[22] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 'Introduction' in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge, 1996), p.3-4.

Scotland and Galicia to appeal to industrial workers but also to the people of Galicia and Scotland. Ultimately, the mobilisations stimulated the continuity of a militant undercurrent, encouraged by Heath's policy U-turn and the wave of solidarity across Galicia against Franco's authoritarian regime in 1972. In this manner, the initial deployment of nationalist core-periphery political frameworks by the regional leadership of the CCOO and STUC was pragmatic. For the non-nationalist, socialist leaders of the struggles in the early 1970s, regional interests remained subservient to class and partisan interests: the aim of the STUC and CCOO was attaining *socialism* (wealth redistribution) and *democracy* (encompassing devolution) following the guidance of a Labour and PCE government respectively. Conversely, the UPG's decision to set up a nationalist workers' organisation was also pragmatic. The aim of the socialist revolution was contingent on self-determination and, for this to be achieved, the Galician 'workers' – an ample category including wage earners, farmers, fishermen and the small and weak native bourgeoisie – needed to be aware of the national question. After 1972, the party was convinced that the best way to 'educate' the Galician 'popular' class was to use the framework of industrial collective bargaining and the assembly strategy of CCOO.

Facing central governments of a different political persuasion, the clearly articulated and pragmatically deployed *regional* workerist frameworks of inequality in the early 1970s emanated from the agenda of politicised local shop stewards and trade union organisations. This happened in a favourable political context were workers' organisations saw themselves as having relative socio-political strength. This was more evident in Scotland and the UK, where trade unions in the first half of the 1970s were seen as having 'too much power', even as causing the fall of the Heath government in 1974. But it also occurred in Galicia and Spain, where Francoism was in crisis. These regional workerist narratives changed, however, as the economic recession deepened and national responses leaned on free-market liberalism to face it, shifting the blame for growing unemployment to militant workers who 'selfishly' claimed

higher salaries (to maintain their purchase power). From the late-1970s, organisations went on the defensive and, progressively, the framework of inequality was merged with that of grievance.

While controlling inflation had been a fluctuating concern among post-war European governments for some time, it was not until the 1970s that lowering the level of inflation took priority over unemployment as a policy driver.[23] As demand management on its own did not seem to put a stop to the inflationary tendencies, many western European governments decided to combine this strategy with prices and incomes policies to enforce restraint on employers and the unions.[24] In Britain, the implementation of incomes policy to prevent wage increases over the inflation rate encouraged militancy at the shop-floor level across the 1970s, peaking in 1978/9. From 1976, the British government moved farther away from Keynesian economic management, implementing cuts in public spending which included limiting industrial subsidies. In Spain, industrial and social mobilisation had peaked in 1976 to encourage a radical break with Francoism, declining in 1977 and 1978 as the process of democratic reform advanced in favour of the consensus politics engineered by the UCD, PSOE and PCE. Ultimately, Spain set up a democratic system along the lines of the western European liberal social democratic model, adopting free-market policies from 1977 with the Moncloa Pacts and enshrining them in the 1978 Constitution. This legislative framework opened the door to further confrontation.

To reduce opposition to the implementation of monetarist policies and deflect responsibility for growing unemployment, governments of different political affiliation from the mid-1970s-onwards increasingly blamed industrial militancy for economic decline, categorising it as 'irresponsible'. Ongoing attempts to legislate the industrial relations field in

[23] Whereas during the 1950s and 1960s they had been willing 'to accept a degree of inflation in return for prosperity'. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 277.
[24] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 305-35.

the UK had begun in 1969, when Barbara Castle, Labour's Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, questioned the 'voluntarism' that characterised British industrial relations in the white paper *In Place of Strife*. The first legislation to this effect was the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, which was followed up by Thatcher's 1980 Act. By contrast, a narrow authoritarian legal framework regulated the Spanish system of industrial relations until 1978, and the changes established afterwards did not leave workers' organisations much leeway. Workplace elections remained key to determining the political role and funding of the regional workers' organisations and contributed to the fragmentation in the industrial sphere. The prioritisation of collective bargaining at the state level, the acceptance of political pacts and the transformation of the CCOO into a traditional class-based organisation from 1977 institutionalised vertical, albeit now democratic, hierarchies of representation.

The moderation of CCOO in Spain from 1977 and its acceptance of liberal social democratic reform responded to contemporary public opinion polls showing a broad popular preference for centre-politics in Spain, which was further evidenced by the political support given to political parties at the centre of the political spectrum and the marginalisation of the PCE in favour of the PSOE. Accepting the inevitable set-up of a plural, competitive system and facing the (re)consolidation of UGT, CCOO intended to cater to the broad constituency of Spanish workers who favoured an orderly return to democracy rejecting radical socioeconomic propositions. In the politically unstable context of the transition, the Spanish unions legitimised the political discourse framing consensus and ideological restraint as responsible vs irresponsible 'radical' socialist (and nationalist) militancy. Similarly, although in a different political context, the leadership of the TUC and the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan between 1975-8 framed voluntary wage restraint as a responsible attitude in the context of growing inflation and unemployment. Thus, moderation in Britain also responded to partisan (Labour) interests. Workers' organisations in both the UK and Spain accepted

moderation in exchange for broader social protection and wealth redistribution but were later disappointed. In hindsight, this strategy may have contributed to discredit industrial militancy and to popular disenchantment with the political system, posing yet another challenge to organised labour and left-wing political parties, particularly at the state level.

The emphasis on social peace as a condition for national economic and political stability run parallel to the deterioration of the British and Spanish economies from 1976-onwards. Furthermore, it followed the lines of the demagogic 'law-and-order' agenda that facilitated the neo-liberal turn of the early 1980s in Western Europe (and North America). Neoliberalism as a body of thought has multiple 'philosophical strands, normative interpretations and policy applications' all of which, however, share a common vision of a 'weak' state in terms of economic influence, and understand democracy as reversing 'the traditional liberal relationship between polity and economy by insisting that economic freedom is a prerequisite for political freedom'.[25] Yet, while neo-liberal principles require a limited state, neo-liberal practice needs a strong one.[26] Framing industrial militancy and social protest as irresponsible and their national projects of regeneration or modernisation as inevitable, allowed the governments of Thatcher (1979-83), Suárez (1979-82) and González (1982-6) to concentrate political power in the state, for instance policing collective mobilisation. Additionally, it allowed them to push free-market policies accelerating the restructuring of the national economy while deflecting responsibility for rapidly rising unemployment.[27] Within this national context, the rhetoric of regional and class deprivation and underdevelopment nursed in Scotland and Galicia a

[25] This definition draws from Vivien A. Schmidt, 'The Roots of Neo-Liberal Resilience: Explaining Continuity and Change in Background Ideas in Europe's Political Economy', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 18.2 (2016), pp. 318-34. See also Jackson, 'Currents of Neo-liberalism'; Stuart Hall *et al.*, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (London 1978); Anthony M. Platt, 'The Politics of Law and Order', *Social Justice*, 21.3 (1994), pp. 3-13; Colin Hay, Stephen Farrall and Naomi Burke, 'Revisiting Margaret Thatcher's Law and Order Agenda: The Slow-burning Fuse of Punitiveness', *British Politics*, 11.2 (2016), pp. 205-23.

[26] This contradiction has led to the implementation of a 'liberal neo-statism'. Schmidt, 'The Roots of Neo-Liberal Resilience', p. 321.

[27] Yet, their policies did not lead to a reduction in public spending, facing the growing demand in unemployment benefits and, in the Spanish case from 1988, an expanding welfare state.

narrative of political grievance. Considering that, historically, wages were comparatively lower than the national average in both Galicia and Scotland and that both regions suffered from unemployment and emigration levels above the national average, the STUC and the nationalists (now under the umbrella *Intersindical*) suggested a regional bias in the policies implemented by Thatcher and González.[28]

These narratives were framed and enhanced by the process of European integration and growing global economic competition. Contrary to contemporary economic liberal thinking, regional inequalities not only did not sort themselves out within the free-market economy but also, as globalisation advanced, these economic disparities strengthened.[29] Global economic integration facilitated and promoted the movement of capital, goods, services and labour, as multinational corporations gave more authority to the market to the detriment of the nation-state. Scholars such as Michael Keating explain that, by eroding 'the state framework for economic activity', economic globalisation made it harder for the nation-states to manage their domestic economies within the international trading order.[30] Political integration into the EEC further intensified the challenge to the nation-state. Alongside the growing regional economic competition within the global market, an increasing number of political decisions on economic matters ultimately affecting regions and localities were negotiated and taken at the European level. Scholars of nationalism assert that European integration presented sub-state nationalism with a political opportunity to make their case for independence *within* Europe.[31] But this occurred in the long-term. In its immediate aftermath, the combination of supranational and

[28] Additionally, they shared a narrow industrial base, over-reliant on decaying heavy industries such as shipbuilding and steel – in addition to the contracting mining sector in Scotland and enclave and maritime industries in Galicia.

[29] Consequently, academic interest in the region and on its economic performance has increased since the late 1990s. Conversely, sociologists in the 1980s and early 1990s had predicted that the social salience of the localities and regions would diminish at least in the developed world because of globalisation. John Agnew, 'From the Political Economy of Regions to Regional Political Economy', *Progress in Human Geography*, 24, (2000).

[30] Michael Keating and John McGarry (eds), *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order* (Oxford, 2001), p. 3.

[31] Michael Keating, 'European Integration and the Nationalities Question', *Politics & Society*, 31.1 (2004), pp. 1-22.

sub-national challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state coupled with the implementation of monetarist, free-market policies at the national level encouraged the socialist left in Scotland and Galicia to demand *meaningful* political devolution. This framework rejected political decentralisation understood merely as a sort of administrative decentralisation whereby regional powers acted as branches of the central government, managing the region. Instead, drawing from nationalist demands, meaningful devolution required a regional government with the power to plan and promote the industrial development of the region. By contrast with nationalist demands, however, this autonomous regional framework should remain articulated within the broader national (state) framework. After all, the intention was to progressively take steps towards international socialism.

In Galicia, CCOO-G was the organisation which defended devolution in these terms, accepting the constitutional arrangements. CCOO-G advocated for tripartite organisations to be established at the regional level and to give the *Xunta* powers to use regional resources to promote reindustrialisation in its 1981 'National Solidarity Plan against Unemployment in Galicia'. In Scotland, the STUC first referred to it after the publication of the Kilbrandon Report which rejected, for instance, that the future Scottish Assembly should have any tax-rising powers (to be used for funding the turn-around of the regional economy). More importantly, framed by EEC integration and accelerating deindustrialisation, meaningful devolution came to encompass public accountability. Articulating its criticism of EEC membership by defining the Common Market as 'a capitalist device', the STUC emphasised that the concentration of power at the top, with the decision-making process moving further away from the region and their elected representatives, directly contradicted Scottish interests. This critique of EEC membership, originating in the early 1970s, was mainly voiced by delegates of the trade unions representing workers in the sectors most threatened by European integration and competition – mining, shipbuilding and steel. These sectors were

overrepresented in Scotland, and they suffered most from the European competition. Similarly, the leadership of the *Intersindical* and the UPG problematized EEC integration because it would accentuate Galicia's peripheral position. By contrast, the PCE and CCOO did not oppose integration because the democratic symbolism of the EEC in Spain translated into wider popular support for the process.[32]

In the Galician case, EEC integration was framed by asymmetric devolution, with the 1981 emergence and later consolidation of the autonomous regional framework. Political decentralisation was, however, not accompanied by economic decentralisation. Instead, the government of Suárez (1979-82) prioritised the centralisation of collective bargaining and political agreements at the state level. The PSOE government that came into power in 1982 continued this trend. Although the arrival of the 'moderate left' to power initially imbued CCOO with hopes that it was a first step towards the implementation of its National Solidarity Plan, the Spanish union was soon disappointed. Looking at converging with the EEC, the PSOE promoted industrial policies which aligned with the general trend that rejected the post-war corporatist industrial consensus – refusing to negotiate with the workers' organisations and limiting their role to consultation. As the party opted for a rapid process of industrial 'restructuring' that saw a drastic reduction of skilled jobs, particularly in shipbuilding and steel, the nationalist framework for self-determination gained centre stage from 1983. The nationalists framed the *reconversión industrial* as a problem derived from the lack of sovereignty within the 'neo-colonial' and 'pseudo'-democratic liberal autonomous framework. Within this framework, Galicia remained a 'sacrificial lamb'. The region's economic and industrial backwardness put Galicia in a specially disadvantaged position against not only other Spanish regions but also western European markets. Because EEC integration only benefitted

[32] Juan Avilés, 'España y la Integración Europea: Partidos y Opinión Pública, 1977-2004', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Revista de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia/Serie 5, Historia Contemporánea*, 16 (2004) pp. 409-23.

the Spanish 'oligarchy', which gained access to the markets, and the European and multinational companies, which gained access to cheaper labour, the nationalists argued that the Spanish governments of the UCD (until 1982) and the PSOE (1982-6) served the Spanish and European capital. Furthermore, they accused the PSOE of favouring the Basque and Andalusian regions over Galicia for partisan reasons. Although the CCOO opted to criticised *how* the negotiations were carried out, in Galicia, the CCOO-G coincided to an extent with the *Intersindical*, reaching contextual agreements. Most notably, the regional leadership of the CCOO-G begrudgingly agreed to co-organise with the *Intersindical* two regional strikes in 1984, deploying the nationalist mobilisation frames of regional grievance. Collaboration at the regional level culminated in the setting up of various civic society organisations encompassing a wide range of representation, the most important of which was the Platform for the Defence of the Galician Shipbuilding Sector.

This collaboration, encouraged from the bottom by representatives of shipbuilding workers and local unions, facilitated the othering of the PSOE and its liberal policies as contrary to both class and regional interests. The PSOE's lack of negotiation neither with the trade unions nor with other political parties as regards the restructuring process brought CCOO-G and the *Intersindical* together. While is true that Spain never truly implemented social pacts during the transition, the workers' organisations were included in the consultations due to the close links of the political and industrial leadership. With a majority government, González and his technocratic government insisted on legislating via decree-laws and even denied workers' organisations participation in the consultation process unless they first accepted the government's terms. This allowed the CCOO-G and the *Intersindical* to frame González and his governmental style, if not 'authoritarian' because of the immediate Francoist precedent, but 'undemocratic'. The contextual understanding between the *Intersindical* and the CCOO-G across 1984 is illustrative of the pragmatism of the regional leaders. After all, they were

competing in a multi-level, plural industrial relations framework to represent an already small and declining membership. Representation mattered to be politically influential and lobby for the implementation of socialist, redistributive policies. This competitive context was particularly difficult for CCOO, which was in-between lands. This context partly explains why CCOO-G joined forces with the nationalists as a response to the PSOE's bias in favour of the UGT, demonstrated by the Socialist organisation benefitting excessively from the distribution of historic trade union assets.

In Scotland, where competition between regional class-based organisations was not an issue, the othering of Thatcherism as a class and regional enemy was much more straightforward. The STUC's vitriolic portrayal of the Thatcher's governments as 'anti-human' related to her lack of political flexibility, refusing to alter or even negotiate her agenda despite the acute rise in unemployment and inequality. It was also the organisation's response to her hostility towards the trade unions. However, the concurrent issue between the central and local authorities in relation to the aim of reducing public spending, allowed trade union delegates and the STUC to equate Thatcherism with authoritarianism. Framing Thatcher's imposition of public expenditure cuts as an attack on local democracy and working closely with local authorities to mobilise a broader base of support, the STUC strived to delegitimise the Conservative PM's 'property-owning' democratic project. The argument was two-fold. First, it displayed the irony of the Thatcherite aim of rolling back the state and her defence of 'freedom of choice' while simultaneously imposing policies and interfering with local authorities' freedom. Second, the overwhelming Labour victory in the 1980 local elections allowed them to stress that the imposition of the cuts was clearly against the preferences of the Scottish electorate. In this manner, following from the articulation of regional 'workerist' narratives and at the same time reinforcing them, Galician and Scottish workers' organisations

in the early 1980s encouraged militancy in the regions – contrary to the moderation promoted by organised labour at the state-level.

In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, with industrial membership declining and within more restrictive national frameworks of industrial relations, the ability to mobilise people and other organisations in defence of regional interests gave workers' organisations a salience in regional politics beyond that which could be expected. Thus, portraying the restructuring of industrial policies and the economy as regional problems and appealing to the region's population responded to the interests of unionised workers particularly at the institutional level. Within the regional sphere, autonomous and devolved workers' organisations supporting local industrial conflicts demonstrated their ability to supply 'national' leadership within the Scottish and Galician communities. In Scotland, the STUC's belligerence as compared to the TUC exemplified that regional devolution facilitated the struggle for alternative socialist policies. Indeed, from 1978, the Scottish umbrella workers' organisation stood as a proxy for devolution and for the Scottish nation. In Galicia, regional confrontation presented ING/INTG with the opportunity to argue the nationalist case for an independent *Galician* trade union organisation and industrial relations framework. By contrast with the BNG, the *Intersindical* pragmatically decided to use the existing regional framework to advance its institutional aim of getting the nationalist message across to workers.[33] While CCOO and UGT struggled to become the most representative workers' organisations at the state level, the leadership of the ING/INTG/*Intersindical* attempted to portray the organisation as a proxy of the Galician nation – exemplifying what self-governed or independent regional institutions could do. Its sustained growth in the factory elections between 1978 and 1982, particularly among shipbuilding workers in Vigo and in other sectors such as health or

[33] It is important to remember that, at this point, the three elected BNG representatives to the Galician Parliament had been expelled for refusing to pledge the Constitution in 1981 to avoid legitimising it.

education, arguably encouraged the return of CCOO-G (institutionalised in 1978) to a more confrontational position in the new competitive regional context.[34] After all, the CCOO-G favoured the consolidation of a 'progressive front' at the state level to implement a 'National Solidarity Plan' – a clear left-of-centre social democratic project, focused on national (state) redistribution and defending a progressive road to socialism which contrasted with the UPG and INTG's maximalist, revolutionary programme.

Articulating regional citizenship: pragmatism over ideology

The articulation of regional, progressive, socialist democratic narratives by workers' representatives in Scotland within the STUC, particularly those linked to the CPGB, and by local and provincial leaders linked to POG and PCG in Galicia, could be interpreted as being both an indicator of and a contributor to the erosion of class solidarity and the dwindling centrality of 'class' in popular identities in 1970s UK/Scotland and Spain/Galicia. However, building on Sutcliffe-Braithwaite's findings for Britain, based on individual narratives, this thesis agrees that class identities were increasingly complex. From 1979, when the STUC and trade union delegates deployed the term Scottish 'working people', this referred to not just industrial workers but to 'the weakest sections of society'. Considering the rapid and later sustained increase in social and regional inequality from 1979, 'the weakest sections of society' effectively encompassed an ever-expanding majority of the Scottish population. Dogged by declining membership numbers, deindustrialisation, job casualization and economic restructuring – and arguably opposing Thatcher's construction of a British 'constituency' of 'ordinary people' – the STUC attempted to broaden the scope of its own (and, by extension,

[34] The nationalists had also succeeded in doing so among farmers through the Farmers Committees (*Comisións Labregas*).

Labour's) 'constituency' to include a majority of the Scottish society.[35] One factor confounding individual and collective class identity in UK/Scotland related to the changes in trade union membership, including the rapid growth of public-sector workers – which however was insufficient to offset declining industrial affiliation. Another relevant factor muddling class identities was that the 'working class' was implicitly a gendered (and racialised) category.[36] This became increasingly problematic in the context of the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, it was not until the end of this decade that the leadership of the STUC moved the issue higher up the political agenda.[37]

Trade union delegates to the annual congresses between 1979 and 1983 often expressed their outrage at how the cuts in public spending affected women more, and seemed keen to point out the irony that these were being carried out by a woman PM. This deployment of gendered frames was lacking for example in 1976/7, indicating to an extent the pragmatism guiding it. In any case, as inequality and unemployment soared, and parallel to the transformations in trade union membership, the STUC made a conscious effort to shift from regional 'workerist' to regional 'citizenist' frames. The socioeconomic impact of EEC integration on Scotland emphasised its peripheral position in the UK, and the divergent electoral results showcased the importance of decentralisation as a political 'firewall' against Thatcher's economic and social policies on the basis of regional accountability. From 1979, but especially after the 1983 elections, diverging electoral results were presented as a regional rejection of Thatcherism. In turn, as discussed in chapter 2, this arguably allowed for the

[35] 'New political historians' in the 1980s claimed that electoral constituencies were constructed through political discourse. Jon Lawrence, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914* (Cambridge, 2002); Steven Fielding, 'Looking for the "New Political History"', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 42 (2007), pp. 515–24; Jon Lawrence and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 'Margaret Thatcher and the decline of class politics' in Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders' *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge, CAU, 2012) pp. 132-47.

[36] Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, *Class, Politics and the Decline of Deference*, p. 6; Phillips, Wright and Tomlinson, 'Being a "Clydesider"', 151-169.

[37] Chapter 2 illustrates that from 1979 the STUC leadership publicly declared concern at the lack of representativeness of the growing female membership in positions of responsibility.

progressive redefinition of the Scottish *ethos* in egalitarian terms as opposed to the Thatcherite policies that promoted inequality and the British electorate seemed to favour.

The articulation of competing regional 'citizenist' narratives in Galicia can also be interpreted as a decline of deference.[38] The *Intersindical* and CCOO-G increasingly appealed to Galician 'workers' inclusively defined to integrate all wage-earners but also the unemployed, the underprivileged, pensioners, etc. However, competing for resources at the state level and for popular representation at the regional level, multiple rhetorical frames were deployed here. Those within the *Intersindical* linked to the UPG insisted on deploying the divisive Spanishist/nationalist/pseudo-nationalist frame to serve the political aim of self-determination. Meanwhile, the CSN tendency linked to the PSG-EG, whose views were comparable to those of the Scottish New Left, insisted that the *Intersindical* should avoid following into the 'sectarian' steps of the UPG, prioritising socioeconomic issues and deploying a catch-all frame. Eventually, the splinter organisation CXTG-IN appeared, deploying a strategy of collaboration with the CCOO-G based on their belief on a 'progressive' alliance, accepting political autonomy as a stepping-stone to self-determination, highlighting its limitations and demanding in 1985 an 'effective transfer of power'. CCOO-G and CXTG-IN also shared their belief in the 'progressive' road to socialism. The shared interest and efforts of the Galician regional workers' organisations to appeal to a broader public are observable in their opposition to the PSOE's announced overhaul of the pension system. At the state level, it was then that the UGT, the PSOE's sister workers' organisation, departed from its non-confrontational strategy. Finally, the belligerence of the STUC and the *Intersindical* illustrated that meaningful devolution and self-determination was useful to defend both individual (e.g. worker) and collective (e.g. regional) democratic socialist rights.

[38] Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 291.

The pragmatic deployment of regional identity to encourage collective action highlights the increasing challenges to the articulation of a hegemonic left-wing political narrative at the state and European level. The concept 'identity deployment' refers to the strategic processes whereby 'activists alternately emphasize similarities to or differences from the norm because of the interactions among social movement organizations, state actors, and opposing movements' to implement change.[39] Although the leadership of the STUC and CCOO-G directly engaged with the politics of national identity, internal differences and debate existed within the regional workers' organisations when it came to support the centrality of political decentralisation in their agenda. This is evident, for example, during the STUC's debates on devolution or in the internal disagreements within the CCOO-G surrounding the 'national' strike of February 1984. Internal disagreements and declining militancy evidence further how the 'decline of deference' and the interlinked questioning of the shortcoming of vertical hierarchies of democratic representation and authority challenged workers' organisations. The most illustrative example in Scotland concerns the opposing views within the STUC as regards the extent to which the organisation should collaborate with other regional and local organisations to encourage mass collective action against Thatcherism. In Galicia, the example of CCOO-G mentioned above was mirrored within the *Intersindical*, with regional leaders fearing losing both their nationalist identity and spearhead position through collaboration with the 'Spanish' union. In this sense, the leadership of the CCOO-G seemed keener to listen to local demands to both join forces with the *Intersindical* against economic restructuring.

Division within the progressive, socialist democratic *Galician* labour movement lasted until 1987. The autonomous regional elections of November 1985 contributed to a change in strategy within the UPG. That year, three nationalist parties run for the Galician government:

[39] Mary Bernstein, 'Identity Politics', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 31.1 (2005), pp. 61-2. This article provides an extensive and thorough literature review on 'identity politics'.

BNG, the PSG-EG and in the centre-right of the political spectrum CG. The latter obtained spectacular results. Realising that having institutional presence would only benefit the party, the BNG performed a U-turn. This U-turn must be connected with the better electoral results achieved by the *Intersindical* in the industrial sphere. The workers' organisation had pragmatically discarded non-participation in the new framework to be able to defend its members and strengthen its institutional position. In 1986, following their split, the *Intersindical* and the CXTG-IN lost the 'majority union' status at the workplace elections. Arguably, their relative political and institutional marginalisation led the leadership of the *Intersindical* to reconsider the maximalist nationalist strategy. In February 1987, the INTG joined CCOO-G and the CXTG-IN in signing an agreement criticising the Spanish PSOE and Galician AP's governments, demanding the establishment of a Galician framework of labour relations – 'in certain sectors', according to their needs and looking to unify work conditions and salaries – and a Galician employment plan. Finally, the argument was made for increased political decentralisation, criticising the lack of interest of the ruling conservative party to expand the powers of the regional government. The BNG would follow suit and, in 1993 adopted the inclusive 'common project'.

This evolution of Galician nationalism and the fact that, politically, Galicia seemingly favoured conservative options amid extremely high levels of abstention are strong indicators of the growing political popular apathy or disenchantment. The high abstention levels in the region and their fluctuation across the different level elections have long been an object of debate.[40] Scholarly explanations range from the dispersion of its population to its orographic and climatic conditions, to a lack of political 'tradition' or 'culture' amongst the Galician people – acting as another marker of underdevelopment. Galician scholarship also portrays

[40] de Juana López and Prada Rodríguez, 'La Dinámica Política de la Galicia Post-autonómica', footnote 6, p. 325.

abstentionism either as a tool to fight patronage or related to parochialism in the rural areas, which would explain the highest participation rates in local elections.[41] Additionally, political apathy in Galicia may be linked with the lack of a hegemonic regional democratic narrative and disenchantment with the limitations of the autonomous framework. The process leading to the setting-up of the *Xunta* in 1981, encouraged the 'Galicianisation' of 'Spanish' regional parties, a process that Ramón Máiz and Antón Losada have called 'institutionally induced nationalism'.[42] This process, which drew from *Piñeirismo* and thus emphasised the linguistic and ethno-cultural elements of the nation, effectively meant that the regional branches of the PSOE and AP deployed a regional emphasis and co-opted 'banal' nationalist symbols to emphasise their dual identity – echoing the Galician electorate.[43]

The contextual acceptance of political decentralisation helps to understand the asymmetric nature of Spain's decentralisation process.[44] The different priorities established by each socio-political actor in Galicia prevented them from effectively lobby for increased decentralisation in the 1970s and 1980s and, in turn, this partially explains Galician's centralist nature. It did not necessarily mean that Galicians trusted the central government, but rather that they were sceptical of political decentralisation as a solution to deindustrialisation and underdevelopment.[45] Indeed, the shipbuilding crisis arguably reinforced this view.[46] None of the governments prevented the loss of employment and industries, so in that sense both were ineffective. From this we can conclude that the INTG and CCOO-G were right to an extent in

[41] All electoral results for Spain since 1979 can be consulted in the Spanish *Ministerio del Interior* (Home Office) website http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/ [last accessed 23 October 2021].
[42] Ramón Máiz and Antón Losada, 'Institutions, Policies and Nation Building: the Galician Case', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 10.1 (2000). pp. 62-91.
[43] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* [electronic Resource] (London, 1995). See also Introduction and chapter 4. An analysis of the evolution of Galicia's national and regional conscience, see Miguel Beltrán Villalva, Manuel García Frrando and Eduardo Lóperz-Aranguren, *La Conciencia Nacional y Regional en la España de las Autonomías* (España, 1994).
[44] While communities such as Catalonia, Basque Country or Andalusia received for instance their healthcare competences during the 1980s, Galicia had to wait until the beginning of the 1990s.
[45] This perception was evident in the responses to two CIS studies in 1976 and 1979, referenced in chapter 4.
[46] Another CIS study in 1985 confirmed that Galician respondents gave a negative assessment of the *Xunta*'s ability to deal with Galicia's problems. See chapter 4.

accusing AP of devaluating the regional government. The regional socialist democratic narratives deployed by the 'radical' left and sub-state nationalism in 1980s Galicia were also arguably undermined by the specific development of the Galician autonomous framework. That governments of a different political sign, led by a social democratic party in Madrid and a conservative government in the region, implemented similar economic policies, defending similar democratic projects undermined the 'socialist' proposals. However, the failure of the Galician nationalist and non-nationalist left to make their project hegemonic also links to their division. In this manner, the later redefinition of Scottishness in terms of egalitarianism or inclusion was greatly facilitated by the institutional muscle of the STUC and the absence of competing regional democratic projects.

Scholars of sub-state nationalism focusing on Western multinational liberal social democracies have established a causal link between the rise of sub-state nationalism and welfare state retrenchment. The scholarly focus usually lays on heavily industrialised regions where the electoral marker is central to the nation-building process, for instance comparing Scotland with Catalonia or Québec. This narrow focus – characteristic in the methodology of the social sciences, seeking to identify causal patterns and generate analytical models – on the welfare state and its specific interaction with nationalism, gives a partial and decontextualized response to the wider question of why a civic form of sub-state-nationalism emerged in the 'long 1970s' in Western multinational democracies. By contrast, my research shows that the historical path towards political devolution was neither linear nor inevitable, demonstrating the importance of a bottom-up, transnational comparative approach. The welfare state is only one component of the western European social democratic post-war settlement, which was renegotiated and transformed during the long 1970s, and it was this wider process that framed national and regional political and socioeconomic transformations. Additionally, my research suggests that initial high levels of industrialisation were arguably less important for the

comparison as the regional impact of deindustrialisation. Galicia was not heavily industrialised and yet regional workers' organisations developed strikingly similar narratives and mobilising political frameworks to those developed by the STUC in Scotland. The existence of an electoral marker of identity significantly facilitates the nation-building process, but it also requires the successful articulation of a hegemonic political narrative. The leading role of the Galician and Scottish workers in the articulation of regional socialist democratic narratives in the 1970s and early 1980s highlights the political opportunities afforded to the declining class-based social movements and political parties by the regional socio-political sphere in the context of western European reassessment of post-war democracy.

The centrality of the issues of representation and devolution in the wider debate on democracy, the rise of 'new' social movements and of political apathy – expressed in growing electoral abstention and class dealignment – and governmental efforts to weaken grassroots and social movements deeply affected workers' organisations. Struggling to retain their political influence, local shop floor and regional leaders blended the preoccupations of their shrinking traditional working-class constituencies with popular concerns about devolution of power. Facing the intensification of economic globalisation and political integration within the EEC, the region provided workers' organisations with a new political opportunity to implement a redistributive agenda as a first step towards socialism. In this manner, my analysis of the organised workers' movement in Scotland and Galicia links the development of a more 'civic' form of sub-state nationalism to the European reformulation of democracy and demonstrates the central role of the trade union, local and regional leadership linked to the socialist left in the process.

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Arquivo Histórico da Fundación 10 de Marzo

Federación do Metal

Caixa A 448

Legado Amador Rey

Legado Santiago Álvarez

Caixa 15, Escritos sobre Política Española de 1960-1975 – Transición y post 1968

Caixa 16, Escritos Santiago Álvarez sobre Nacionalidades (I)

Caixa 17, Escritos Santiago Álvarez sobre Nacionalidades (II)

Caixa 18, Escritos Santiago Álvarez sobre Nacionalidades (III)

Caixa 19, Escritos Santiago Álvarez sobre Nacionalidades (IV)

Caixa 20, Escritos sobre Datos PCE & IU 1978 (I)

Caixa 21, Escritos sobre Datos PCE & IU 1978 (II)

Caixa 22, Escritos sobre Datos PCE & IU 1978 (III)

Caixa 23, Escritos sobre Datos PCE & IU 1978 (IV)

Caixa 44, Dictadura & Antifranquismo. Transición 1975-1977 (I)

Caixa 45, Dictadura & Antifranquismo. Transición 1975-1977 (II)

Caixa 46, Galicia Vida Política: Posterior a 1977 (I)

Caixa 47, Galicia Vida Política: Posterior a 1977 (II)

Caixa 48, Galicia Vida Política: Posterior a 1977 (III)

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Legado Manuel Amor Deus (1941-2007)

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Acordos (1982/1987)

Administración e finanzas (1977/1989)

Circulares (1977/1997)

Comisión executiva (1978/1989)

Conferencias (1982/1983)

Congresos nacionais (1981/1987)

Consello nacional (1977/1989)

Eleccións sindicais (1977/1990)

Federacións nacionais (1977/1988)

Folgas e manifestacións (1978/1988)

Informes

Informes, notas e estudos de Manuel Amor Deus

Manifestos e discursos

Negociación Colectiva

Notas de prensa e comunicados

Recortes de prensa

Sector Naval

Partido Comunista de Galicia (PCG) – 1977-1988

Comité Central (1977/1988)

Comité Executivo (1977/1985)

Congresos (1979/1985)

Outras Organizacións políticas (1974/1989)

Esquerda Galega- EG

Partido Socialista Galego- PSG

Partido Socialista Galego-Esquerda Galega (PSG-EG)

Unión do Povo Galego (UPG)

Documentos Persoais

Fondo Carlos Dafonte

Fondo Santos Costa Barroso

Organizacións Sindicais

Organizacións Políticas

Organizacións Sociais

Prensa

ABC

Ahora

El Ideal Gallego

Fundación Terra e Tempo

In process of cataloguing at the time of research:

Caixa 101 ‘Sindicalismo’

Caixa 103 ‘Sindicalismo’

Caixa 105 ‘Sindicalismo’

Caixa 161, ‘Panfletos Sindicalismo’

Caixa 163, ‘Sindicalismo’

Caixa 164 ‘Documentos Sindicalismo’

Caixa 166, ‘Documentos Sindicalismo’

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