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**Displacement to the camp vs Displacement to the city: A comparative study  
of Internally Displaced Persons' capabilities in Maiduguri, Borno State,  
Northeastern Nigeria.**

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
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## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that the thesis, presented to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Sheffield is solely my work, except for the work of others, which has been duly acknowledged.

No part of the work or in its entirety has been presented elsewhere for any other form of degree.

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April 2022

## **Abstract**

Forced displacement around the world is increasing. In the past decade, the numbers of forcibly displaced people has doubled from 40 million to over 80 million due to conflict, persecution, generalised violence, or human rights violations. Refugees are the most high-profile and highly researched category of forced migrants. This attention has been instrumental in documenting, understanding, protecting, and providing for their needs. However, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) globally, and particularly those in Africa, receive less attention. Therefore their complex needs, vulnerabilities, and experiences are less explored and less understood. Consequently, IDPs continue to experience distinct vulnerabilities with detrimental effects to their lives. Furthermore, conventional scholarship and policy on displacement still centres around the camp, despite the reality that 60% of all refugees and 80% of all IDPs now live in urban areas as self-settled inhabitants among host communities.

This study consequently compares the needs and experiences of camp IDPs to that of self-settled IDPs in Maiduguri, Borno State, Northeastern Nigeria. Maiduguri has become the hub for the displaced since the emergence of the Boko Haram conflict in 2009, and the city now hosts over one million IDPs. Using the Capability Approach as an analytical framework, this study investigates IDPs' wellbeing and capabilities. To explore these issues in-depth and empirically, 8 IDPs capabilities were created and examined as a threshold of what is considered decent for assessing individual IDP's wellbeing. The study also goes beyond individual wellbeing, by exploring the notion of group capabilities. In so doing, it examined what groups are instrumentally important in enlarging IDPs' capabilities. The research gathered rich in-depth qualitative data on camp versus self-settled IDPs' experiences. In total, 67 IDPs participated in individual semi-structured and focus group interviews. Researcher observations were also utilised where possible. In addition, individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 key informants in government, international organisations and NGOs, to understand if and how their support matches IDPs perception of their needs.

The study found that camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs differ in the way they realise capabilities. It found that in many cases, camp IDPs had more resources than their self-settled counterparts, but this did not mean they realised more capabilities. Camp IDPs had more negative personal, social, and environmental conversion factors to confront. It found that despite self-settled IDPs having fewer resources to cope with, their positive conversion factors allowed them to transform their modest resources into capabilities. Further, in some cases, in particular with primary capabilities, group affiliation is instrumental in promoting individual IDPs' capabilities. However, when associated with a group that has any form of notoriety, that can also hinder IDPs' capabilities.

The study concludes that the agency to lead their own lives coupled with freedom of movement – which are both missing for camp IDPs but evident for self-settled IDPs – greatly hinders or facilitates IDPs capabilities. It also concludes that capability expansion is possible and can be achieved when policy focus is shifted from just the provision of resources, towards individuals’ or groups’ capability to achieve the type of life they value by removing barriers for capability expansion. This ensures camp and self-settled IDPs are empowered, possess agency over their lives, freedom of movement, and equal opportunity; enabling them to become self-reliant.

## **Dedication**

*To my father, Architect Tijjani Mohammed, for your unending support, for always encouraging me to aspire for more, and for your love and sacrifices*

&

*To my mother, Mrs Hajara Mohammed, for your love, your kindness and the prayers that keep me going*

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## Table of content

Declaration.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgments.....	v
Table of content .....	vii
List of Tables .....	xi
List of Figures .....	xii
Acronyms.....	xiv
Chapter 1 .....	1
Introduction.....	1
1.1 General Introduction .....	1
1.2 Background and rationale .....	2
1.3 Aim of the study.....	4
1.4 Research Questions .....	4
1.5.1 Contribution to knowledge .....	6
1.6 Forced Migration .....	8
1.7 Theorising forced migration .....	11
1.8 Understanding the different categories of forced migrants.....	13
1.9 IDPs as a special category of concern.....	15
1.10 Thesis structure .....	16
Chapter 2.....	19
Camp IDPs vs Self-settled IDPs: A Capabilities Approach .....	19
2.1 Introduction.....	19
2.2 Encampment and camp IDPs .....	20
2.2.1 Theorizing camps from a socio spatial perspective .....	21
2.2.2 Theorizing camps in relation to urban spaces.....	24
2.2.3 Theorizing camps from a power perspective .....	24
2.2.4 Benefits vs Drawbacks of camps .....	26
2.3 Self-settlement and urban IDPs .....	26
2.4 The Capability Approach (CA).....	31
2.4.1 The core concepts: functionings and capabilities .....	32
2.4.2 Justification for the CA .....	35
2.4.3 Operationalising the CA .....	39
Chapter 3.....	47
Methodology .....	47



3.1 Introduction.....	47
3.1.1.....	47
3.1.2 Research questions.....	47
3.2 Methodological approaches.....	48
3.2.1 Case Study Method.....	50
3.2.2 Comparative Case Studies.....	51
3.3 The Preliminary Fieldwork.....	51
3.4 Data Collection Sites.....	53
3.4.1 Subunit 1: Camp IDPs.....	53
3.4.2 Access, gatekeepers, and the recruitment process for camp IDPs.....	55
3.4.3 Subunit 2: Self-settled IDPs.....	56
3.4.4 Access, gatekeepers and recruitment process for self-settled IDPs.....	57
3.4.5 Key informants.....	57
3.4.6 Access, gatekeepers and recruitment process for key informants.....	58
3.5 Grey Literature.....	59
3.6 Semi-structured Interviews.....	59
3.6.1 Semi-structured interviews with camp IDPs.....	60
3.6.2 Semi-structured interviews with self-settled IDPs.....	61
3.6.3 Semi-structured interviews with key informants.....	62
3.7 Focus Group Interviews (FGI).....	62
3.8 Observations.....	65
3.9 Ethics and ethical considerations.....	66
3.9.1 Consent.....	66
3.9.2 Potential harm to researcher and participants.....	67
3.9.3 Confidentiality and privacy of information.....	68
3.9.4 Data usage and storage.....	68
3.9.5 Positionality and reflexivity.....	68
3.10 Data analysis process.....	70
3.11 Limitations of the methods.....	70
3.12 Conclusion.....	71
Chapter 4.....	72
The Boko Haram insurgency as a driver for peoples’ displacement into Maiduguri.....	72
4.1 Introduction.....	72
4.2 Regional context and dynamics of Boko Haram.....	72
4.3 The advent of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria.....	76
4.4 Displacement effects of the Boko Haram insurgency.....	84
4.4.1 Mapping the displacement.....	84

4.4.2 The rationale behind camp settlement for Maiduguri IDPs.....	88
4.4.3 The specificities of the camps in Maiduguri.....	90
4.4.4 The rationale behind self-settlement for Maiduguri IDPs .....	100
4.4.5 The specificities of self-settled shelters in Maiduguri .....	103
4.5 Other effects of the conflict and displacement on IDPs, hosts and the city.....	106
4.6 Conclusion .....	115
Chapter 5.....	116
Key informants’ support for IDP’s capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs .....	116
5.1 Introduction.....	116
5.2 Classification of the agencies and their focus areas.....	116
5.3 Provision of registration and documentation services .....	120
5.4 Provision of food items, non-food items (NFIs), seeds, and other consumables.....	126
5.5 Provision of health and wellbeing services.....	129
5.6 Provision of Shelter.....	132
5.7 Provision of protection services i.e. legal aid, gender and religious advocacy, and so on.....	138
5.8 Provision of educational and livelihood services (including skills and economic incentives).....	142
5.9 Provision of public health services .....	145
5.10 Return and reintegration of displaced persons.....	146
5.11 Challenges in providing intervention for IDPs .....	148
5.12 Conclusion .....	151
Chapter 6.....	153
Realising primary capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs.....	153
6.1 Introduction.....	153
6.2 Life.....	154
6.3 Bodily and Mental health.....	156
6.4 Nourishment.....	164
6.5 Protection .....	172
6.6 Shelter .....	176
6.7 Conclusion .....	179
Chapter 7.....	181
Realising secondary capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs .....	181
7.1 Introduction.....	181
7.2 Public health.....	181
7.3 Education .....	187
7.4 Livelihood.....	194

7.5 Conclusion .....	204
Chapter 8.....	206
Conclusion .....	206
8.1 Introduction.....	206
8.2 Contribution of Thesis .....	208
8.3 IDPs post displacement and the role of aid providers and policymakers .....	210
8.4 Differences in achieving basic human capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs .....	212
8.5 Factors limiting potential for capability expansion .....	217
8.5.1 Role of policymakers in limiting potential for IDPs capability expansion.....	219
8.6 Final concluding comments: Role of capability expansion for IDPs .....	224
8.7 Future research.....	226
REFERENCES .....	228
APPENDICES .....	245
APPENDIX I: SEMA access letter.....	245
APPENDIX II: Interview guide for camp IDPs .....	246
APPENDIX III: Interview guide for self-settled IDPs .....	248
APPENDIX IV: Interview guide for policy makers .....	250
APPENDIX V: Participant Information Sheet .....	252
APPENDIX VI: Consent form.....	255
APPENDIX VII: Letter from IDPs to policymakers .....	256

## **List of Tables**

- Table 1: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
- Table 2: Basic language of the Capability Approach
- Table 3: Key Features of Basic Needs Approach and Capability Approach
- Table 4: Ten central human capabilities
- Table 5: 8 IDP capabilities
- Table 6: Linking research questions to sub-questions for CAIDP
- Table 7: Summary of camp IDP participants for semi-structured interviews
- Table 8: Summary of self-settled IDP participants for semi-structured interviews
- Table 9: Summary of Policymakers for semi-structured interviews
- Table 10: Summary of camp IDP participants for focus group interviews (FGI)
- Table 11: Summary of self-settled IDP participants for focus group interviews (FGI)
- Table 12: Sample of Boko Haram attacks across Northern Nigeria
- Table 13: IDPs LGA of origin with total number of IDPs and the total population of each LGA according to the 2006 census
- Table 14: Policymakers classification, description, function, focus and funding source
- Table 15: Summary of functions and targets of agencies
- Table 16: IDPs primary capabilities
- Table 17: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses towards access to food
- Table 18: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses towards the quantity and quality of the food they eat
- Table 19: IDPs secondary capabilities
- Table 20: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses regarding clean and sufficient water
- Table 21: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses to sanitary and hygiene
- Table 22: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses to access to education

## List of Figures

- Figure 1: Global forced displacement and total displaced (2010 – 2020)
- Figure 2: A simple analytical framework of the capability approach showing the relationship between resources, capabilities and functionings.
- Figure 3: The five concepts of the Capability Approach
- Figure 4: Capability Approach of IDPs (CAIDP)
- Figure 5: Map indicating Lake Chad Basin
- Figure 6: Risk Factors for conflict in the Lake Chad Region
- Figure 7: Boko Haram attacks and fatalities (2010-2021)
- Figure 8: Percentage of IDPs by reason of displacement
- Figure 9: IDP population from 2014 - 2021 by round of DTM assessment, Northeastern Nigeria
- Figure 10: Map showing causes of displacement and percentage of IDP population from 2014 – 2021 by state
- Figure 11: Increase in Number of IDPs from 2020 – 2021 by state
- Figure 12: Map of Borno state showing the LGAs that were displaced by the insurgency; especially during its peak period (2011 – 2014)
- Figure 13: Percentage of IDPs that are self-settled and in camps in Maiduguri
- Figure 14: Map of some formal and informal camps in Maiduguri in relation to the urban area
- Figure 15: Map of Bakassi IDP camp showing size and site
- Figure 16a: Existing houses of Bakassi housing estate which became Bakassi camp, Maiduguri
- Figure 16b: More of the existing houses in Bakassi camp, Maiduguri
- Figure 16c: Temporary tent structures in Bakassi camp, Maiduguri
- Figure 16d: Tents and houses in Bakassi camp Maiduguri
- Figure 16e: Tents of new IDP arrivals added to a school which is currently being used as an IDP camp
- Figure 17: Satellite images of Bakassi camp site over time from 2011- 2020
- Figure 18: Satellite view of Maiduguri from 2011-2018 showcasing the growth of the city and the growth of Bakassi camp over time
- Figure 19: Map showing Dikwa low-cost and the Shehu’s palace in relation to Maiduguri urban area
- Figure 20: Path leading to one of the houses that are rented and shared by several self-settled IDPs
- Figure 21a: Picture of a makeshift market which has emerged around Bakassi camp
- Figure 21b: Picture of a makeshift market which has emerged around Bakassi camp
- Figure 22: Picture of a newspaper showcasing how NGOs/ international organisations have boosted the economy of Maiduguri
- Figure 23: The Role of Social Connectedness in the Developmental Challenges Caused by BH insurgency
- Figure 24: Self-settled IDP children fetching water

Figure 25: Notepads donated to Bakassi camp IDPs

Figure 26a: Cap making in Bakassi camp

Figure 26b: Bag making in Bakassi camp

Figure 27: Summary of CAIDP for camp IDPs

Figure 28: Summary of CAIDP for self-settled IDPs

## Acronyms

IDP(s): Internally Displaced Person(s)

FM: Forced Migration

BH: Boko Haram

LGA: Local Government Area

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

SEMA: State Emergency Management Agency

NEMA: National Emergency Management Agency

DTM: Displacement Tracking Matrix

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

IOM: International Organization for Migration

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

FGI: Focus Group Interviews

EYN: Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria

CAN: Christian Association of Nigeria

JNI: Jama'atu Nasril Islam

WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

BSUPDB: Borno State Urban Planning and Development Board

RRR: Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

AAH: Action Against Hunger

GEPDC: Gender Equality and Peace Development Centre

GBV: Gender Based Violence

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 General Introduction

*“We need water, we need food, we need good medical care, we need to send our young ones to school. We have a lot of problems, we need help to rebuild our villages. Life is not possible without education and our kids are not going to school. We need to save them from poverty and lack of education. All of us have children to take care of yet we don't have enough food to give them. We are not even talking about what to wear, what we need is basic food and education.” – (Self-settled IDP, 2019).*

The quote above highlights some of the self-settled Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) underexplored needs. It begins to show that contrary to general assumptions, not all IDPs who are self-settled have all their needs met. However, it also shows how self-reliant they are because contrary to camp IDPs, self-settled IDPs do not have goods and services provided to them, so they must try and seek them out themselves. It additionally shows that camp IDPs are not the only group with complex needs. Some self-settled IDPs, particularly those who are not self-settling by choice, also have the same if not more needs than camp IDPs. The different and complex needs of IDPs, specifically self-settled IDPs, are understudied in much of the existent literature on displacement and forced migration. Academics, policymakers, and planners alike thus have a limited understanding of how similar or different their experiences are to camp IDPs. That is why this study sought to examine the needs and experiences of IDPs. More specifically, this study will compare the needs and experiences of IDPs in camps to the needs and experiences of IDPs who self-settle in urban areas in Maiduguri, Borno State, Northeastern Nigeria. This analysis and comparison of the needs and experiences of IDPs will help in understanding why and how the two categories of IDPs differ in how they achieve basic human capabilities. It will therefore be using the Capabilities Approach as a framework for analysing and conceptualising those experiences. Maiduguri, Borno State is an important place to study and analyse these IDP questions because the city has become the hub for the displaced since the advent of the Boko Haram conflict in 2009, hosting over a million IDPs (ReliefWeb, 2016). Additionally, forced migration in Africa has been scarcely studied and documented, especially when compared to other types of displacements globally.

This introductory chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part (1.2 - 1.5), I set the scene and provide the background and rationale of this thesis (1.2). Section (1.3) elaborates the aim of the study and the research questions (1.4). I also highlight the significance and timeliness of this study and also how it contributes to knowledge (1.5). In the second part of this chapter (1.6 – 1.10), I explore the literature



on the issues that contribute to and form the basis of the study on forced displacement, conflict induced displacement and Internally Displaced People. I also use this chapter to set out the broader context of the scale of internal displacement globally, using the existing literature and identifying relevant gaps that inform this study. I begin (1.6) by describing forced migration, examining the drivers of forced migration, and specifically conflict induced displacement. I bring attention to the sheer number of forced migrants around the globe today. In section (1.7) I review relevant theories of forced migration to place forced migration within wider theories of migration. In section (1.8) I identify the two most common types of forced migrants, refugees and IDPs, and analyse their differences to provide IDPs their own classifications. This leads into section (1.9) where I launch a discourse into IDPs as a special category of concern. I conclude with a final section (1.10) outlining the structure of the rest of the thesis.

## **1.2 Background and rationale**

The Boko Haram conflict in Borno State, Nigeria, which began in the early 2000's, is the main driver of displacement in Nigeria in recent times. The conflict has informed my research interest in IDPs within Nigeria due to my own connections to the region as a Northern Nigerian (more on my own positionality in Chapter 3 Section 3.9.5). It is the biggest humanitarian challenge I have witnessed in Nigeria which deserves exploration and examination academically. Additionally, I saw an underexplored area in studies of forced migration with regard to IDPs in general, but particularly with regard to camp and self-settled IDPs experiences in urban areas, which also warranted exploration.

Since 2009 till date, the conflict has taken approximately 350,000 lives and displaced more than 3 million people (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). Many of the displaced have fled their hometowns to other parts of Africa (particularly the West African region) as refugees, but the majority fled to neighbouring states and cities within Nigeria as IDPs. IDPs are a unique and understudied vulnerable group who go through a range of different yet interrelated economic and humanitarian crises. The consequence of unresolved IDP crises include a disruption in essential life support systems, worsened underdevelopment, and continued decline in already fragmented and fragile security structures (Adewale, 2016).

It is presumed that most IDPs live in camps (in this study they will be referred to as 'camp IDPs'), but increasingly IDPs are self-settling in towns and cities among host communities ('self-settled IDPs'). There is a gap in academic and policy knowledge about the general experiences of IDPs – especially when examining the experiences of those settled in urban areas. This examination is crucial toward understanding their different needs and for devising durable solutions. The 2018 World Refugee Council report demonstrated that 60% of all refugees and 80% of all IDPs now live in urban areas (Muggah and Erthal Abdenur, 2018). There is an even bigger gap in knowledge about the experiences of camp IDPs in comparison to self-settled IDPs. In this moment where self-settled IDPs now

outnumber camp IDPs, now is the time to address this gap (UNHCR, 2020), yet conventional thinking about displacement still centres around the camp. Further empirical research, analysis, and more nuanced theoretical understandings of camp vs self-settled IDPs experiences are needed.

To fill in this existing gap, my research examined the experiences of IDPs in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State and the hub for the displaced post Boko Haram conflict. Again, this city hosts close to one million IDPs (ReliefWeb, 2016). In particular, my study in Maiduguri compared the experiences of camp IDPs with that of self-settled IDPs, with the aim of understanding their different needs, distinctive vulnerabilities, and how they achieve basic human capabilities. This will benefit academic and policy understandings to better address the needs of different IDP communities and the support needed to overcome poverty and exclusion. Additionally, the study sheds light on whether it is better to ensure that all IDPs have access to camps, or whether self-settlement is a more durable option that provides more opportunities to IDPs.

There are two key terms central to this thesis. The first, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), is core to this study. IDPs are often defined as a homogenous group with other displaced populations, that is why it is necessary to give them their own definition at the onset. This will help in understanding their social, legal, and economic rights and also clarify how they differ from refugees. Although refugees like IDPs, are forced migrants, I provide a clear definition in this section to avoid mixing or interchanging the two groups, since they have many similarities but also many differences.

The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDPs as,

*“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.” (UNHCR, 2018).*

IDPs, being inside their home country, remain entitled to all the rights and guarantees as the citizens and other habitual residents. Like all human beings, IDPs should enjoy human rights that are articulated by international human rights law and customary law. The government and national state authorities where IDPs are found have the primary responsibility to prevent forced displacement as well as protect and assist IDPs (OHCHR, 2020). The international community’s role is complementary; it is welcome since it enhances the role the government plays but it is not compulsory.

IDPs are distinct from refugees or asylum seekers because they have not crossed an internationally recognised territorial border, so they do not require any special legal status (UNHCR, 2018). For the purpose of clarity, a ‘refugee’ according to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees is a person who,

*“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and if unable, or owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (UNHCR, 1951).*

There is a significant overlap in the concerns of IDPs and that of refugees, in that both populations might find themselves facing the same types of discrimination by both the government institutions and the citizens of the states or countries in which they reside. For example, both groups may face violence or persecution. Both groups may be marginalised in terms of the forms of social assistance they can access, the ability of their children to access public education, and access to health care services. Despite these similarities, IDPs also have distinct vulnerabilities. Although the focus of this study is IDPs and the aim is to use the Capability Approach in order to comprehend their needs and experiences, it will be impossible to do so without referencing refugees due to their similarities and the limited literature on IDPs. Moreover, many of the issues that will be discussed in this thesis will be relevant for the study of refugees as well as IDPs, especially when looking at the distinction between camp experiences and self-settled experiences.

### **1.3 Aim of the study**

This study aims to explore the needs and experiences of IDPs who have settled in camps, in comparison to IDPs who self-settled among host communities, and to explore the value of a Capabilities Approach as a framework for this analysis.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

1. What are the displacement effects of Boko Haram in and around Maiduguri and why do some IDPs end up in camps while others self-settle?

2. How do these two types of IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what do they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these?
3. What kind of group identities affect people's ability to achieve these capabilities and how does this differ between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs?
4. How are government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations supporting the capabilities of both camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs, and how well does this match IDPs' perception of their needs?

### **1.5 Significance and Timeliness of the study**

The gap in academic and policy knowledge of IDPs has become more evident in recent years. For one, I mentioned earlier that the challenges faced by IDPs are less academically anchored. The different intricate issues of IDPs have been studied as singular topics using particular frameworks, which Rajput (2013) categorises as the legal framework, the businesses framework, and the psychological framework. The legal framework by Cohen and Deng (1998) conceptualises the needs of the displaced providing constructive institutional arrangements at the national, regional, and international level. The framework amplified the abilities to address the protection, human rights and reintegration, and development needs of the displaced. The business framework by Zea (2010) examined how IDPs cope with living in a new urban environment after displacement. The psychological framework by Kagee and Del Soto (2003) assessed the prevalence of mental disorders in IDPs. These specific accounts of internal displacement successfully highlighted aspects of this multi-pronged phenomenon, though in a gradual manner and though not comprehensively (Rajput, 2013).

This lack of attention to IDPs can also be seen across many disciplines that have extensive studies on refugees but leave out issues of IDPs or attach them as a footnote when discussing refugees. Such studies can be found in the International Relations discipline where the causes, consequences and responses to refugees and other categories of forced migration are closely intertwined within world politics. Alexander Betts (2014) states that a gradual move towards theorising the international politics of forced migration; with a primary focus on theorising refugees and international relations, has been occurring since the late 1990s (Betts, 2014). Similarly, the study of refugees and forced migrants in anthropology and sociology is an important area which considers sociological studies of immigrant communities and anthropological studies of migration and settlement in urban areas (Colson, 2003). The same is true in Geography, where a considerable volume of literature on human mobility and refugees has been produced by prominent geographers such as John Rogge (Rogge, 1977) and Richard Black (Black, 1991, 1993, 1995). Literature in urban studies has also been very elaborate in

demonstrating that the design of human settlements and active involvement in place shaping is a potent tool of governance; nonetheless, urban studies has similarly focused on refugees and drawn on urban planning theories and migrant narratives (Stevenson and Sutton, 2011, Darling, 2016, Beier and Fritzsche, 2017). Even forced migration scholarship has often studied IDPs alongside refugees even though IDPs are neither as strongly anchored legally or institutionally and have their own unique experiences. The development of this scholarship has been far more ad hoc and isolated than that of refugees.

Furthermore, media coverage has brought the issues of IDPs to the fore, yet, mass displacements like the mixed migrations towards Europe have been much more extensively documented than other types of movements (such as those of IDPs) which, are either more recent or have received less media coverage (Fresia, 2014). UNHCR reported that the issues of urban IDPs and non-urban IDPs suffers from a lack of clear definition, clarification and understanding. They further stated that without such understanding, it is impossible to design and implement effective durable solutions (UNHCR, 2008). The director of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) was also reported to have said that despite the increase in the numbers of IDPs, their plight is being overshadowed by refugees and migrants and becoming difficult to place on the international agenda; in addition to saying that overlooking the issues of IDPs is one of their biggest regrets (Ghani, 2017).

### **1.5.1 Contribution to knowledge**

In this section, I discuss the need to widen our current knowledge of IDPs and their experiences for policy interventions, the importance and timeliness of the Capability Approach (CA) framework to analyse these experiences, and I connect this to the regional gap in existing research on displacement and forced migration.

First, IDPs are among the most vulnerable people in the world who go through an array of challenges either overtly or covertly, which have tremendous negative effects on them as well as on the development of the cities and countries they are displaced within. Yet, global attention to their plight – both academically and policy wise – has been inadequate. This lack of attention is problematic (Debarre, 2018), and needs to be addressed immediately (Cohen, 1999). Whether they are living in camps or self-settled, literature has been instrumental in showing us that the issues faced by IDPs is a huge humanitarian challenge. As mentioned earlier, the time to do so is now and my research will address several of those issues, in addition to narrowing the knowledge gap of IDPs experiences, in particular, the experiences of camp IDPs to that of self-settled IDPs. Comparing the two different groups of IDPs is in itself a timely contribution to knowledge as it presents a new perspective which has been overlooked in the existent literature. Although there are a few scholars such as Ulvesæter (2018), Brandt (2019), and Halais (2020) who have explored these issues, their work centres refugees, not IDPs, and

they acknowledge that while refugees living in towns and cities form the largest category, there is still very little knowledge about their experiences.

Second, the CA is a very suitable analytical approach for research on the IDP experience, but as yet this approach has not been adopted for the study of IDPs. The CA framework provides an analysis of what people are able to do and be – also understood as people’s real freedoms – and the opportunities available to them. The approach proposes that the freedom to achieve well-being is a matter of what people are able to do and be and thus the kind of life they are effectively able to lead (Robeyns, 2016). It is considered to be a flexible and multi-purpose framework. This will all be expatiated in Chapter 2. The terms ‘Capability Approach’ and ‘Capabilities Approach’ are both used interchangeably in the literature and in this thesis to refer to the same thing.

The main principle of the CA that is noteworthy and timely in a research of this kind is that “when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to do and be” (Berges, 2007:16). Although studies of migration and forced migration that adopt the CA are also gradually materializing from researchers such as de Haas (2021), Clarke (2014), Al-Husban and Adams (2016), Briones (2009), to the best of my knowledge none of these are with reference to IDPs. No study has empirically investigated the needs and experiences of IDPs particularly in relation to their wellbeing using the CA to examine what they are able to do and be, what they are able to achieve, and their real opportunities and freedoms. Moreover, no study has empirically adopted a nuanced conceptual lens to examine the difference in experiences and capabilities between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs in urban areas. This is a topic and study of wider importance because there is a close and underexplored relationship between displacement and human capabilities. This thesis will therefore significantly contribute to our understanding on how the experiences of IDPs in camps in comparison to the experiences of self-settled IDPs either enhances or hinders their human capabilities.

Lastly, in addition to the lack of research and literature, there is also a regional gap in the research area of forced migration and displacement in Nigeria. This can be seen in further chapters (e.g. Chapter 3) where I make references to inadequate data on the subject area. The regional gap is partly to do with the fact that relevant literature from some regions or specific countries are more prominent than others. As mentioned earlier, Fresia (2014) suggests that mixed migrations towards Europe are more extensively documented than other types of migration. Although there is some work on forced migration in Africa, these have regional concentration on East African countries and again, with more attention given to refugees. Therefore literature within the wider African region is insufficient. A significant amount of the literature on displacement in sub-Saharan Africa covers Somalia, Sudan, DRC, Ethiopia,

Rwanda and Burundi (Verwimp and Maystadt, 2015). Attention to Nigeria is only now intensifying with the advent of Boko Haram. Africa's diversity, dynamism and ever shifting political landscapes and spaces, policy formations and specificities of place creates a necessity to research how people, communities and states cope with the overwhelming challenges that forced migration produces (DeJesus, 2018). This thesis is a step in the right direction towards narrowing this regional gap.

Now that the first section of the introduction has set out the scene for the thesis, the next section will explore literature on the issues that contribute and form the basis of the thesis.

## **1.6 Forced Migration**

Forced migration, also typically referred to as forced displacement, is generally understood to mean the involuntary movement or displacement of refugees and IDPs. Forced migration can be distinguished from voluntary migration by the suddenness or violent circumstances of exit in the case of forced migrants, as opposed to the element of planning and preparation that is involved in the concept of voluntary migration (Agadjanian, 2013). It can either be disaster-induced, development-induced, or conflict-induced and these can sometimes be simultaneous or inter-related (Forced Migration, 2012). Debates indicate that it can be overly simplistic to ascribe one cause or driver to forced migration of any kind since people can be displaced for several reasons at a time or can be displaced more than ones at any given time for different reasons. In addition, the definition of 'forced' can be quite flexible and contested as shown in the next section when discussing theories of forced migration (Forced Migration, 2012).

Disaster or climate-induced displacement refers to communities whose lives and livelihoods are affected negatively by environmental stresses. This category of displacement reveals the effect of environmental issues (such as climate change), on mobility decisions. The category is increasingly being discussed in debates as environmental issues are estimated to displace up to 200 million people by the middle of the century. Such debates make an effort to acknowledge the importance of environmental change on why people are forced to migrate from their habitual locations. This is especially significant when the environmental conditions are extreme (Zetter and Morrissey, 2014).

The second driver, development-induced displacement, refers to "the displacement, resettlement, and relocation of populations as a result of state-defined development processes." (McDowell, 2014:2). Development projects such as urban developments, transport, and construction of dams render up to 10 million people displaced every year; it plays a key role in their resettlement. This category of displacement, just like any other category, tends to have a negative impact on the displaced. This is largely due to the fact the people who fall under these categories tend to be socially, economically and institutionally disrupted (De Wet, 2005).


The last category of the drivers of forced displacement, and the one this study is concerned with is conflict-induced displacement because it triggered and led to the rise of IDPs and the humanitarian crisis in Borno State, Nigeria. It has also been the major cause of contemporary forced migration around the globe and in African nations alike. The definition of conflict-induced displacement this study is employing refers to individuals whom due to an experience of armed conflict, generalised violence and limited protection from state authorities, have been forced to abandon and flee their homes (Lischer, 2007).

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an alarming increase in the volume and political significance of forced migration (Castles, 2003). Some of the events before and after the Cold War that heightened this increase include the two world wars, the colonial liberation wars, the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, a range of internal conflicts in Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq, state partitions and nationalist claims to territory in South Asia and the Middle East, authoritarian regimes, human rights violations, large-scale development projects, and environmental disasters resulting from hurricanes, tsunamis and climate change (Betts, 2009). These events have all contributed to people leaving their own communities in search of protection elsewhere. The most widely discussed have been refugees. An even greater number of people have been displaced from their homes but have remained within their country of origin as Internally Displaced People (Betts, 2009).

In the last 10 years, an incredible rise in the displacement of people – both within countries and across borders – has been recorded. This is often as a result of persecution, conflict, generalised violence or human rights violations. (UNHCR, 2020). This is shown in the graph in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Global forced displacement and total displaced (2010 – 2020).



Source: Author adapted from UNHCR, 2020.

Figure 1 shows that there were over 40 million forcibly displaced people in 2010, and that figure doubled going up to 80 million by the end of 2020. Of the 80 million displaced people, 48 million people were Internally Displaced People. The other 26.4 million were refugees, and 4.1 million were asylum seekers. These figures show that indeed, the clear majority of displaced people are individuals who have been displaced within the borders of their own countries. The drastic increase of forced displacement that occurred between 2010 and 2020 was concentrated between 2013 and 2018, mainly driven by the Syrian conflict. Conflicts in other areas also contributed to the rise, including in Venezuela Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, as well as the immense flow of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh at the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2020). Another UNHCR report also highlighted that 13.6 million people were forced to flee in 2018 alone. This included 2.8 million who sought protection as refugees or asylum seekers, and 10.8 million IDPs. Hence, on average, 37,000 people were newly displaced everyday of 2018 (UNHCR, 2018).

Sub-Saharan Africa saw the largest of this 2018 increase with 1.6 million Ethiopians; making up the largest newly displaced population during that year. 98% of the 1.6 million were displaced within the country, doubling their existing population of IDPs. Nigeria also had a high number of displaced people that year with 661,880 of which an estimated 581,800 were displaced within the country's borders (UNHCR 2018).

Forced migration comes with detrimental consequences for the migrants. First, forced migrants who flee in avoidance of civil wars or environmental issues suffer long-term physical or psychological trauma (often both). Second, forced migrants are prone to losing their assets and livelihoods due to destruction or as a result of hasty departure. Third, in most cases, forced migrants live in unsatisfactory

locations for a protracted period of time due to lack of choice and control over the displacement itself. Additionally, their political and economic status, as well as their expected time of finally settling down in their new place of residence maybe uncertain for a very long time. Lastly, forced migrants often have to deal with the realisation of the low-probability of returning back home (Becker and Ferrara, 2019).

### **1.7 Theorising forced migration**

Attempts at theorising forced migration have been scarce throughout history. They have also been a lot less developed than theories of, for example, voluntary migration. Piguet (2018) states that in the 27 papers selected by Robin Cohen for his impactful work titled *Theories of Migration* (1996), only five of them were concerned with forced migration or refugees; only three out of those make an attempt at theorising refugee movements. Forced migration still seems to be understudied and underrepresented in theoretical review books and papers over a decade later. There are still however two pioneering contributors of forced migration worth mentioning since they paved the way to theorising forced migration according to Piguet (2018). They are, Egon F. Kunz and Anthony H. Richmond.

Kunz's contributions in (Kunz 1973 and 1981) relied heavily on Lee's push and pull theories of migration. The theory suggests that there are push and pull factors within the country migrants move from and the country they move to (Lee, 1966). Piguet asserts that one of the central contributions of Kunz is the distinction he made between acute and anticipatory refugees. "The anticipatory refugee leaves his home country before the deterioration of the military or political situation prevents his orderly departure. He arrives in the country of settlement prepared" (Kunz, 1973:131) as seen in (Piguet, 2018). Acute refugee movements on the other hand "arise from great political changes or movements of armies. The refugees flee either in mass or, if their flight is obstructed, in bursts of individual or group escapes, and their primary purpose is to reach safety in a neighbouring or nearby country which will grant them asylum. The emphasis is on the escape." (Kunz, 1973:132) as seen in (Piguet, 2018). Johansson (1990) reiterates that anticipatory refugees are defined by pull factors since they have more time to plan allowing them to gather more information on the destination countries accessible to them and to have a better understanding of where they are moving to. Therefore, anticipatory refugees can be viewed as voluntary migrants. Acute refugees on the other hand should be more defined by push factors since their conditions compel them to immediately become refugees.

Anthony H. Richmond is a sociologist who takes a similar approach but relied more on Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. He claims that even when refugees are highly constrained by external conditions, they are still able to exercise a certain degree of human agency or choice. He adds that particular conditions impact their decision to move as they thoroughly deliberate all applicable information, alongside rationally calculating both material and symbolic reward before they decide to move. This perspective can be related to the ideas of voluntary or pull migration. On the contrary, he

states that extreme cases lead to a move influenced by the panic that arouses from crisis. This situation leaves the refugees with very constrained options for their escape (Richmond, 1988:17) also seen in (Piguet, 2018). This perspective relates more to the forced or push factors that influence migration.

Although Lee's push and pull debates as well as Kunz's contributions have been acknowledged as path breaking theories that explain migration and forced migration at various periods, they have also faced a lot of criticism. The push and pull debate has been critiqued by many who say it oversimplifies explanations of complex multifaceted processes (Skeldon, 1990; Giddens and Griffiths, 2008; de Haas, 2010 and 2011). Many of these scholars assert that there is a difficulty in determining which push or pull factors at both origin and destination are of higher significance to varying groups of people. Furthermore, the existence of interfering obstacles do not help with identifying the influence rate of factors, some could be minor, while others are major (Avasarkar, 2012). Consequently, Lee's theory offers little practical guidance that developing countries can apply on policy and decision-making issues of forced migration. As such, scholars such as Van Hear, Bakewell and Long modified existing explanations of migration and generated a newer more inclusive framework which they call push-pull plus. This new conceptual framework is used by analysts as a starting point to easily understand the complex flow of migration. It helps to easily "distinguish between predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating drivers. Combinations of such drivers shape the conditions, circumstances and environment within which people choose to move or stay put, or have that decision thrust upon them" (Van Hear, Bakewell and Long, 2017:927). This new framework speaks to my earlier point about the difficulty in isolating a distinct driver of forced migration (for example, development, disaster or conflict induced).

More recent attempts at theorising forced migration and refugee movements were consequently achieved based on the premise of the aforementioned theories. While there is no space to go into the broader theories of forced migration in depth, Giddens and Griffiths (2008), provide a useful categorisation of theoretical approaches in terms of macro-level, meso-level and micro-level processes. Macro-level factors refer to underlying issues such as the political situation in an area, the laws and regulations controlling migration and emigration, socio-economic, and environmental situations (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). The main theories at this level include dual labour market theory, neoclassical macro-migration theory, world systems theory and more (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Priore, 1979; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Wallerstein, 1974). Micro-level theories on the other hand focus on individual migration decisions. They refer to the resources, knowledge and understandings that the migrant populations acquire (Castelli, 2018). The main theories at this level include Lee's push and pull factors, neoclassical micro-migration theory, theory of social systems and others (Faist, 2000; Lee, 1966; Sjaastad, 1962). Lastly, meso-level theories, which focus on factors between the micro and macro level, tend to explain both causes and perpetuation of migration, for example, on the household or community

levels (Faist, 1997). Social capital theory, institutional theory, new economics of labour migration are examples of some debates that employ meso-level factors (Harbison, 1981; Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978). In the case of conflict induced forced displacement, macro factors are more presiding than micro and meso because analyses of refugee producing situations have found that there is a clear and obvious correspondence between displacement and the level of violence in the country of origin (Castelli, 2018).

These theories – although very limited – provide some insight into why and how people are forced to migrate. However, they do not help us theorise what happens to them after they do. They do not explain the lived experiences of forced migrants, where people end up, why they end up in those places, or how forced displacement affects the wellbeing and capabilities of these individuals or groups.

### **1.8 Understanding the different categories of forced migrants**

As mentioned earlier, the most high-profile and highly researched category of forced migrants is refugees. In the early stages, refugees were most frequently hosted in camps or settlements in the countries that they end up fleeing to, but this has changed over time. For instance, in 2019, up to 17.5 million refugees worldwide were self-settling in urban areas (Khan, 2019). Some of the largest and most noted refugee situations include Somalis in Kenya, Burundians in Tanzania, Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, Iraqis in Syria and Jordan, and Sudanese in Chad and Uganda. In addition, the Middle East region hosts an estimated 5 million Palestinian refugees (Betts, 2009). In contrast to other areas of forced migration, there is a clear response to refugees governed under the international regime. The 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugees establishes a definition of a refugee and the rights to which refugees are entitled. In addition to that, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the execution of the convention (UNHCR, 1951).

Similar to refugees, IDPs around the world are also displaced populations who have been forced to evacuate their homes and are potentially at risk (Cohen and Deng, 1998). However, unlike refugees, the recognition of internal displacement came much later and it was not until the 1990s that it became prominent on the international agenda. In the early years of its gradual development, no international agency dealt with the issue as the mandate of the UNHCR was both ad hoc and inconsistent. Ultimately, IDPs in certain situations were finally included in the redefined mandate of the UNHCR, in 1999 (UNHCR, 1999).

Until this time, the UN had no systematic approach to the data collection of IDPs, nor did they have adequate information on IDPs such as their numbers, causes of their displacement, their access to basic services and protection needs, the government's capacity and willingness to address the problems they faced and so on. Significant developments began to materialise after that. One of the developments was

setting up of the United Nation's IDP Unit in 2002. Another development was research and country missions by Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng, representatives of the Secretary General on IDPs, who were instrumental in raising awareness on the issue (FMR, 2008). In addition, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were consequently established (OCHA, 2004). The Principles and their definitions are summarised in Table 1.

*Table 1: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*

<b><i>Principles</i></b>	<b><i>Definitions</i></b>
<i>Principles 5-7</i>	<i>“Arbitrary displacement in the first place is prohibited” (p.4)</i>
<i>Principles 10-23</i>	<i>In the event where persons have in fact been displaced, “they retain a broad range of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, including the right to basic humanitarian assistance (such as food, medicine, shelter), the right to be protected from physical violence, the right to education, freedom of movement and residence, political rights such as the right to participate in public affairs and the right to participate in economic activities” (p.5)</i>
<i>Principles 28-30</i>	<i>“Displaced persons also have the right to assistance from competent authorities in voluntary, dignified and safe return, resettlement or local integration, including help in recovering lost property and possessions. When restitution is not possible, the Guiding Principles call for compensation or just reparation” (p.5)</i>

Source: OHCR, 2020.

The Principles were formulated from the international humanitarian and human rights laws with the intention to serve as an international standard to guide governments, international organisations and other applicable actors in providing assistance and protection to IDPs (George, 2013). The Principles provide protection against arbitrary displacement, offer basis for protection and assistance during displacement, and set out guidelines for safe return, resettlement and reintegration. However, aside from these Principles that have been mentioned, as well as the macro theories, which as mentioned earlier

have tried to theorise forced migration, there has been very limited scholarship, which specifically theorise IDPs or their movements.

Irrespective of these guidelines and Principles, there are reports often made by IDPs requesting special protection due to the inadequacy of the government responsible for them. This is often the case when the government is either the cause of their displacement or when the government is unwilling to provide the protection needed for IDPs (George, 2013). A report by the UN, for instance, found that in Liberia, while the refugees were provided with support from the UNHCR and had a national Resettlement Commission that managed their repatriation, “the internally displaced population was mostly left to fend for themselves.” (Cohen, 2000:2). As a result, IDPs similar to refugees, are often vulnerable to several physical and psychological sufferings. Their lives also have a high chance of being at risk, while their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain insufficient. They may for instance, be homeless with no sufficient basic means of survival, including food, clothing, adequate water, etc. Their economic freedom may be constrained as displacement often results in loss of employment, dispossession of land, and other means of obtaining a livelihood (George, 2013).

Despite the differences between the two forced migrant groups, the causes and experiences of being displaced are often similar to both IDPs and refugees. As a result there have been several debates on whether they should be grouped as a single category and issues pertaining to them handled by the same institution(s) (FMR, 1998 and 1999). Similar to refugees, IDPs may not feel welcomed in the cities or communities they eventually settle in, even though they have the host populations citizenship (George, 2013). All these categories of forced migrants have one thing in common. That is, as a result of an existential threat, they have been forced to flee their communities and have faced a substantial number of restrictions in their capacity to live ordinarily. Although IDPs are the central empirical focus of this study, it is necessary to still bring in refugees because academic and policy level interventions have largely focused on refugees making it impossible to have discussions on other groups without routing through discussions on refugees.

### **1.9 IDPs as a special category of concern**

One question within humanitarian and academic debates that continues to resurface is whether or not IDPs should be the subject of focused attention as a specific category of concern. One argument that has been made is that IDPs should simply be treated as victims of war rather than identifying as a specific group. However, this argument was disputed from the onset because it does not take into account other drivers of displacement. Meanwhile, others argue that singling out IDPs as a specific group will only benefit the displaced and lead to discrimination against others such as the non-displaced poor (Mooney, 2005).

Nevertheless, some scholars argue for the significance of identifying the internally displaced as a specific group in need of special attention (Brun, 2003; Cohen, 2006). Firstly, IDPs are often victims of a calculated policy that targets them for displacement and forced relocation, for example, in the case of development induced displacement. Minority groups are often vulnerable to such practices, which usually occur because of ethnic or religious reasons. In addition, internal displacement is in accordance with the violation of human rights. When it takes place, a set of conditions render the affected as highly vulnerable. For instance, it forces people to evacuate their homes with no source of shelter and basic protection. It cuts them off from the lands they recognised as home and livelihoods that influenced their lifestyles. Situations like these breaks up families, community support networks and cultural heritage, friendships, and a sense of belonging to a particular place. It has negative effects such as destitution, exclusion from health, welfare and education provision, social isolation, and lack of support structures. Women, children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to acts of violence and human rights violations including sexual assault. It is thus difficult to deny that IDPs have certain needs which require special attention (Mooney, 2005; Aloba and Obaji, 2016). As Cohen said “the fact of the matter is that internally displaced persons do have needs that make them different from others in the general population” (Cohen, 2000:3). The unique needs and heightened vulnerabilities from forced displacement makes IDPs distinct in their own right.

Having set out the research problems and theorised it with a discussion of general debates on the key focus of this study – Internally Displaced People – the final section of this chapter sets out the structure of the thesis to follow.

### **1.10 Thesis structure**

**Chapter 2 - Theoretical & Conceptual Framework** explores the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual framework of the study. It is divided into 3 main sections; encampment and camp IDPs, self-settlement and urban IDPs, and the Capability Approach. The first section introduces literature on encampment and camp IDPs and goes into the different ways camps have been theorised. It explores the theories of camps from a socio spatial perspective which relates to how the built environment of camps affects the camp experience. The works of pioneering academics such as Harrell-Bond, Kibreab, Black, and Diken are analysed and evaluated to explain this. It also theorises encampment in relation to urban spaces, seeing as how the camps and IDPs that are investigated in this thesis are all situated in the urban city of Maiduguri. A theorisation of camps from a power perspective is also formed here showing how power structures within camps can have an effect on IDPs experiences. The section then summarises the benefits vs drawbacks of camps in order to begin to draw a comparison between camp settlement and self-settlement. This goes into a section on self-settled IDPs. Here also, different theories of self-settlement are explored with particular reference to self-settlement in urban areas. It draws on some of the known reasons why more IDPs are self-settling as opposed to dwelling in camps. In this

section, the works of academics such as Karen Jacobsen, Davies, Hovil, and Beyani are assessed. The section also touches on the benefits vs drawbacks of self-settlement.

The chapter then focuses on how the different categories of IDPs can be analysed using the CA. In this section, the thesis defines and expounds on what the CA is with most of the explanations coming from Amartya Sen, the key pioneer of the concept and Martha Nussbaum who subsequently developed it. The section presents 8 IDPs capabilities which are subsequently used to analyse IDPs needs and experiences. The section on the CA brings together a range of ideas one of which is centered around the notion of individual human dignity. In this thesis, this notion of individual human dignity is taken a step further to explore the notion of group human dignity (referred to here as group capabilities), through the works of Stewart. The chapter later shows how the CA is going to be operationalised in this thesis to form an empirical analysis of IDPs experiences in Maiduguri.

**Chapter 3 - Methodology** presents the methodological approach that guided the data collection methods of the study. To answer the research questions of this study, an interpretivist approach, which is grounded in qualitative methodology was adopted. The chapter discusses employing a case study method with two subunit cases within that. The case study examined is the IDPs of Maiduguri and within that the subunits are; the camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs. The chapter provides a justification for the use of qualitative methods to investigate, interpret and describe the social realities of the IDPs. The methods for data collection that are used include grey literature, semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews and observations - all with the aim of collecting rich in-depth stories about IDPs experiences. In addition, semi-structured interviews were also conducted with policymakers who work to provide humanitarian aid and support to the IDPs. The chapter further discusses the processes and procedures of the preliminary fieldwork and the main fieldwork, which all took place in Maiduguri, Borno State. It also discusses the data analysis process which is carried out as an iterative process informed by the thematic aspects of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2. Finally the chapter highlights the ethics and ethical considerations that guided the study, as well as the limitations of the methods.

**Chapters 4 to 7 - Empirical Chapters** present the results and empirical analysis of the study. **Chapter 4** uses both secondary data and some primary data from the fieldwork of this study to answer Research Question 1 of the study. The chapter starts by presenting details of the regional context and the dynamics of Boko Haram. It also discusses the insurgency as the main driver for people's displacement into Maiduguri, while also revealing where the IDPs ended up settling and if they had a choice in their post displacement settlement.



**Chapter 5** presents findings from the fieldwork in response to Research Question 4. This question is being answered in this order to present a better empirical analysis of the second part of the question; how well does the support of the government, national NGOs, and international organisations match IDPs' perception of their needs? Research Question 6 and 7 will need to be answered to get the whole picture. In this Chapter 5, three categories of organisations were analysed; Government organisations, National NGOs (NGOs), and International organisations.

**Chapter 6 and 7** subsequently answer Research Questions 2 and 3. Both chapters will examine how the two different categories of IDPs (camp vs self-settled) differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these. Of the 8 IDPs capabilities described in 2, Chapter 6 will explore 5 of them. These are termed the 'primary capabilities'. Chapter 7 will then explore a further 3, which are termed the 'secondary capabilities'. The capabilities are grouped in this way because primary capabilities are more immediate and fundamental to any human being, whilst the secondary capabilities depend on them. This will also make the analysis more manageable. The two chapters also examine the kind of group identities that either positively or negatively affect people's ability to achieve capabilities and how this differs between camp and self-settled IDPs.

**Chapter 8 – Conclusion** explicitly showcases the key findings of the study in relation to the research questions. It presents the study's contributions of using the CA to analyse the needs and experiences of IDPs. It also discusses the implications of the research findings for broader debates in the fields of forced migration, internal displacement and the Capabilities Approach. In the end, the thesis concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the study and presents recommendations for future research on IDPs.

## Chapter 2

### Camp IDPs vs Self-settled IDPs: A Capabilities Approach

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual framework of the study. Specifically, the chapter will be elaborating on what the literature says about the experiences of IDPs in encampment vs those in self-settlement in order to really begin to understand those experiences and begin to see the difference between the two. The first section presents encampment and camp settlement by first discussing the characteristics of camps and camp life. It draws on discourse from an array of theoretical perspectives in different subheadings. This will start to show how IDPs deal with displacement while being confined to such spaces. It will also show how the camp experience has been conceptualised by different academics till date. Following that, the second section presents self-settlement in urban areas. This section discusses how self-settlement has been theorised and, what the other side of the coin looks like for IDPs; giving the reader a chance to compare the two forms of post displacement settlement. This will lead into the third section which discusses the Capability Approach. The section explores the framework that will be used in this study to conceptualise IDPs experiences. This third section also draws on other frameworks that have been used to conceptualise IDPs in order to make a convincing case for the use of the Capability Approach in analysing the needs and experiences of the different IDP groups in this study.

Millions of displaced people globally live in camps set up and run by a government, an international organisation and/or a non-governmental organisation (NGO) within or near a city (camp IDPs). However, millions more self-settle instead, in urban areas, towns or cities, in rented accommodations or with host communities and families (self-settled IDPs). Even though scholars tend to compare camps with “a form of human warehousing and ‘storage’ of displaced people” bringing to light the extremity of confinement (Jaji 2012: 227), self-settled displaced persons living in urban areas find that it presents them with a certain degree of anonymity and freedoms, e.g. of movement, but can also confront them with discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of formal employment (Koizumi and Hoffstaedter, 2015).

It is important to note that not all camps are situated within or near a city and not all self-settled IDPs live in cities or urban areas. A lot of displaced persons, whether in camps or self-settled, are also found in rural areas and there is some literature on this (IDMC, 2019; IOM, 2019). However, my study is specifically interested in camps and self-settled IDPs that are based in urban areas.

## **2.2 Encampment and camp IDPs**

When people think of where displaced people live, they stereotypically think of a camp (Bakewell, 2014). This stems from encampment being the most common approach to dealing with huge flows of displaced people. “Encampment refers to the policy which requires displaced people to live in a designated area set aside by the host country or state for the exclusive use of these displaced people.” (Bakewell, 2014:2). It then becomes the responsibility of the host states to safeguard their human rights which includes the rights to shelter, food, water, sanitation and health care, and education, although different states vary in the extent to which they do so (Bakewell, 2014). In this study also, camps refer to temporary purpose-built sites with the objective of providing shelter and assistance for needs (Deardorff, 2009).

The mass movement of displaced people forces governments and policymakers to consider many extremely important things. Among those things, for instance, are where protection and the provision of aid should be available. There are three reasons according to Bakewell (2014), why camps are commonly chosen by host governments and humanitarian aid donors as the best option. Firstly, concern arises with regards to incorporating a large number of displaced people within the society of the cities or countries they find themselves. This is particularly because displaced people (refugees or IDPs) are likely to come with an array of issues such as lack of shelter, poor physical and mental health, to name a few, and this will most likely present various social challenges for the society that is hosting them. There is also concern about the practicalities of providing them with emergency aid and immediate basic necessities. It is challenging to provide food, water, shelter, and medical assistance to thousands or millions of people at the same time without overwhelming the local services of the host state or country. Therefore, ensuring that the displaced are located in locations that are known and accessible can make the tasks easier to handle. Security is the third concern that is vital from the state’s perspective. States are normally concerned about the potential threats’ displaced people may be posing for their local population especially if it is large influxes of them who probably lack basic resources. They are also concerned about the hostilities their local population may pose as a defence mechanism (Bakewell, 2014).

The camp tradition was invented as the most efficient method of distributing aid. Likewise, the logic of displaced people’s camps is based on the fact that it is regarded as a temporary situation; it is assumed that the displacement will be temporary and so is the offer of aid and establishment of the space (camp) for the displaced. However, it is not unusual, particularly in recent times, to have displacement drag on for years (Sanyal, 2015). These conditions are no longer brief situations, they span over years or even decades as seen by the rise in number of protracted situations of displacement (Milner 2014). Turner (2016) also reaffirms this point, asserting that while camps are often described by their temporary nature, in practice this temporariness may become permanent. Thus, displacement no longer becomes

short-term and the inhabitants living in camps are segregated in these permanent-temporary spaces, which are provided to protect them long-term. As a result, displaced people in many countries, particularly those in camps experience a range of deprivations and distress (Sanyal, 2015). They can hardly join or engage in political activities. They are deprived of full participation in the economic activities of their host state despite International Human Rights requiring the states to yield such opportunities to the displaced. In cases where they are allowed to participate, they are faced with certain disadvantages such as difficulty accessing said opportunities or not being paid fairly due to their identity as refugees or IDPs (Sanyal, 2015). Education, aid and other facilities are provided but these can be highly controlled (Sanyal, 2015). Sanyal concludes that protracted displacement crises, coupled with the spatial incarceration of displaced people and ongoing dependence on aid, turns camps into spaces of “incomplete development, frozen in time” (Sanyal 2015:635).

Today, when we think of refugees and IDPs in camps, another stereotypical image we have is of people sheltered under blue or white plastic sheeting in close proximity to one another. That is because during the emergency phase of providing them with aid when a camp is first established, you are likely to find displaced people housed in unsuitable shelters, usually not much more than that piece of white and blue plastic sheeting stretched over some sticks. This blue or white plastic sheeting is often used when describing camp dwellings because of the UN’s presence and association with providing aid in a lot of situations of displacement; among that aid is the provision of camp shelters and facilities (Emergency.unhcr, 2020). “A camp consists of settlements, sectors, blocks, communities and families. A certain number of families in a camp make up a community, a certain number of communities make up a block, a few blocks make up a sector and a few sectors are called a settlement. Therefore, a large camp will likely consist of several settlements. Settlements, markets and certain facilities are often arranged according to nationalities, ethnicities, tribes and clans of their inhabitants” (UNHCR, 2022:3).

There are an array of different lenses, theories, and concepts which academics, sociologists, philosophers, planners and others have used to try and understand camps, camp like settlements and the experiences of those that inhabit these spaces. In the end, most debates seem to be in agreement that the encampment of displaced people is undesirable. The next section groups these debates into subsections and begin to explore them.

### **2.2.1 Theorizing camps from a socio spatial perspective**

A socio spatial perspective relates to how built infrastructure and society interact (Gottdiener and Budd, 2005). That is, for instance, how the built environment of camps affects the camp experience. This subsection, looks at the theories of academics who explore the experiences of IDPs using various lenses such as; space, walls, demarcation, exception, geography, confinement and so on, and how these all affect the social, political, and economic dimensions of the IDP experience. The term ‘socio spatial’ is

used here only as an umbrella for various lenses that relate to the sociological aspects of the urban spaces being discussed.

Harrell-Bond for example, has commonly written about refugees and other displaced people through a lens of confinement. Voutira and Harrell-Bond (1995), begin by proclaiming that for majority of displaced people, their residence in the camp is a result of coercion rather than choice. According to them, the camp is a distinctive enclave where refugees interact between themselves, while being forced to accept the humanitarian aid regime. They further discuss how the policies on assisting displaced people confines them in large numbers into these settlements of camps and also promotes their dependence on aid and relief. Moreover, considering how attracting money for their relief requires knowing their numbers, monitoring their movement, and representing them as helpless and dependent, they proclaim that this is a poor way of providing them with assistance and, in practice, breaching a lot of their human rights (Harrell-Bond *et al*, 1992). In essence, Harrell-Bond is arguing that humanitarian agencies favour confining displaced people to camps because it attracts and ensures a steady flow of resources to these organisations, which is more beneficial for them than the actual displaced people. Such views on the confinement of displaced people and its negative consequences are backed up by others like Kibreab (1989, 1991) who suggests that one of the biggest problems' humanitarians should be focused on is how to give aid in ways that are not debasing to the recipients of it.

The confinement of refugees and other displaced people to settlements and camps has a number of negative consequences that require exploration because they are some of the avenues used to theorise their experiences. Harrell-Bond writes that the confinement of camps affects the mental health of the camp inhabitants, who are already in a fragile and traumatised state. That is the reason why they tend to display emotions such as distress and helplessness at their long-term prospects. As a result of both confinement within the camp and dependency on the assistance, the inhabitants are inclined to abandon their social responsibilities (Harrell-Bond, 1998). A lot of literature cites Harrell-Bond in agreement with her. For scholars who are concerned with environmental issues, gathering refugees in camps strains local resources, including the environment, more than dispersed populations will (Black, 1994 and 1998). For Yousif (1998), it is the overcrowding of camps that constitutes the main problem. Van Damme agrees with Yousif, suggesting that it exposes the displaced people to diseases, which increases their health risks, and subsequently increases mortality rates in camps (Van Damme, 1995).

Other more recent literature has also widely discussed the concept of the camp and similar to Harrell-Bond and older literature, these scholars also theorise camps using the same lens of confinement, often referring to camps as a 'space of confinement' (Diken, 2004; Jacobsen, 2001; Bakewell, 2000; Hovil 2007). Looking at Bulent Diken's work, a philosopher and sociologist of urban planning, tells us that camps are typically situated on the outskirts of cities, in suburban or rural areas, and therefore they limit

individuals' access to the cultural facilities and amenities that are concentrated in cities (Diken, 2004). Throughout his work, he has always conceptualised camps from a socio-spatial perspective, trying to showcase camps as spaces of exception or 'non-places'. He refers to them as 'non-places' because according to him these camps or accommodation centres are often prison like-structures made to isolate people, and often the people who inhabit them are banned and excluded from society, sealed off by barbed wires and surveillance cameras. He adds that due to the difficulty the displaced experience to afford transport on their small support payments, it increases the likelihood of these people spending most of their time confined in camps. This means that they will have very little contact with the outer world rendering them in full seclusion from the public life. Coupled with the size of each shelter, Diken asserts that the camp environment is the underlying basis for the frustration and tension between the inhabitants and the existing local communities (Diken, 2004).

Diken further expounds that the four most essential characteristics of a camp and camp life are: "living on small amounts of support, which pushes the people living in camps out of the normal functioning of the economic system; inability to find paid work; living according to the governments choice of residency; and minimum geographical mobility" (Diken, 2004:92). A camp resident according to him is marked by extreme physical, socioeconomic and cultural isolation. As a result, they personify people who have been ostracized from various societal functionings thus reducing their lives to bare life.

Due to such characteristics, Diken subsequently finds a correlation between inhabitants of camps to those of prisons, slums, the favelas in Brazil or the African American ghettos in the US (Diken, 2004; Diken and Carsten, 2006). Similarly, Råghall (2015), elaborating on the same reasons notes that IDPs have often described their experiences in camps synonymously with being in prison.

The work of Diken as well as many others working on camps has been strongly influenced by the philosophy of Agamben who also refers to camps as 'spaces of exception' (Agamben, 2005;1998). In his initial work which opened up many debates on camps and the theory of 'bare life', titled 'Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life', Agamben's argument is in relation to sovereign power and what he attributes to 'exception' is the sovereign exception or ban. In other words, Agamben (1998) is denoting an individual whose existence has been reduced to a bare life, deprived of every right, denied of any legal status, dismissed from the political community and unconditionally made subject to the death threats. Additionally, this individual can only save himself in constant flight or in a foreign land. This production of bare life through the exception he argues has advanced increasingly and in parallel throughout modernity, reaching a peak in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as the system of concentration camps, where states first attempted the 'normal and collective' grouping of human life founded solely based on bare life. Agamben states that these historic concentration camps can be seen in examples such as the Nazi state, the Spanish in Cuba or the British in South Africa. He goes on to argue that it is this historic concentration camp, that has become a constant, generalised condition under modern liberal democracy.

Thus, he concludes that the camp, brought to existence through the representation of the state of exception, is distinctly the product of sovereign power (as seen initially with concentration camps). As such, the camp according to him is realised wherever bare life abandoned by law is produced, giving examples with spaces such as the Stadio della Vittoria in Bari where thousands of Albanian immigrants were confined in before being forcibly deported (Agamben, 1998). Agamben's analysis of the process is important today as it tackles the generalisation of the state of exception. It shows that we shouldn't limit our comprehension of the camp to historic or geographical instances. Rather, the camp, as a space of exception must continue to be understood in present conditions.

### **2.2.2 Theorizing camps in relation to urban spaces**

Various other authors have built on Agamben's work on camps to specifically explore the relationship between camps and urban spaces. For instance, Sanyal asserts that camps and similar settings of settlements are viewed as biopolitical spaces where the sovereign has the ability to reduce the subject to bare life. She adds that due to their geographical location and socio-spatial organisation, camps are often viewed as un-urban places or non-cities. Although many camps get bigger and improve over time, they grow into their own unique form of urbanism that is still un-urban, and that still makes them structurally invisible or absent to the cities and places they are located within (Sanyal, 2011). However, there is a growing debate over the urbanity of camps due to protracted crises of displaced people and it is now evident that the city is an important framework to examine when it comes to conversations on the spaces of displaced people.

She examines this further by claiming that camps are seen as exception and the city as norm, in contradiction with one another. However, camps are spaces that imitate city characteristics where a unique form of organisation of space, social life and systems of power is created that exists nowhere else. She also adds that although urbanity is a key role player in how camps located in cities are developed, the close proximity enables these camps to be part of the city. Despite that, the camps are segregated as enclosed spaces in what she has referred to as a 'state within a state' (Sanyal 2011:886). This argument directly links to the focus of this study on camps vs self-settled IDPs in urban areas because it reconfirms that as the world is rapidly urbanizing, so too is displacement. Therefore, more than ever, internal displacement is becoming an urban phenomenon.

### **2.2.3 Theorizing camps from a power perspective**

Power structures within camps can determine displaced people's access to fair and impartial shares of resources, decision making processes and their experiences in general. It is therefore imperative to give it its own spotlight since it plays a key role in their experiences and thus a key role in how they realise

their capabilities. McLean (1999), writes extensively on gender and power structures in refugee camps. I will hence be drawing on the power aspect of her work in this subsection.

Power structures in this study are understood from a sociological perspective where a person or an overall system has influence over any individual or group of people. McLean explains that power structures in camps can be seen as hierarchies of status, decision-making, rulemaking and enforcement, resource access and control, and gender relations. She further adds that that these power structures can happen between the refugees themselves although, the first experience of power hierarchies that displaced people may experience when arriving in a camp is the power of the states and the aid communities (McLean, 1999). Similarly, Zetter (1991) when addressing power hierarchies in refugees claims that labelling individuals as refugees has immediate power implications. The first implication means that the aid community has power over individuals when deciding their status, and the second means individuals with refugee status can become powerful because of their status. These two implications can also be applied to IDPs since even though their legal status is different, both groups go through comparable processes of identification and labelling. Zetter then suggests we pay attention to those with the power to label, and the lack of power of those who are labeled affirming that this will highlight the camp's power structure and the relationship between agencies and beneficiaries (Zetter, 1991).

Schmidt (2003) provides another theory for camps which also puts emphases on the power relations between agencies and beneficiaries. She suggests that camps should be characterised more in terms of containment and institution than shelter or relief. This is because refugees live based on filtered information and day-to-day routines such as queuing for food or medication, which are governed and controlled by institutions, implying that the bureaucracy and administration of encampment gives institutions power and control over aid recipients (Schmidt, 2003:6). These characterisations have similarly been applied when discussing refugees as well as camp IDPs (Debarre, 2018; Cohen, 2009).

Anecdotal evidence tells us that part of the reasons why some IDPs opt to self-settle is to avoid the power structures in camps, even though there are likely to be different ways in which IDPs who end up self-settling which will also be disadvantaged by power relations in urban areas (this will be expanded on in section 2.3 on self-settled IDPs). As explained previously, these power structures play a vital role in IDPs experiences and their potential to realise capabilities so I will be seeking to understand how. For example, what kind of power structures can we identify in IDP camps in Maiduguri and how do they differ for self-settled IDPs? Who benefits and who does not benefit from these power structures? Do these power structures help camp IDPs realise their capabilities or hinder them and how is this different relative to self-settled IDPs? These questions will be answered and discussed in the empirical chapters.



#### **2.2.4 Benefits vs Drawbacks of camps**

As seen so far from this section of the thesis, encampment has both positive and negative aspects when it comes to dealing with the needs of displaced people. The question of what is a benefit or drawback of a camp is a subjective one. Some of the positive arguments for encampment include the fact that as mentioned earlier, NGOs, aid donors and governments use encampment as a reasonable means to cater to the concerns of the displaced and provide security and material assistance. Camps also provide a means of easier access and supervision (Jacobsen, 2001; Kibreab, 1991; Smith, 2004). On the negative side, people living in camps find it difficult to utilise necessary economic and social services, and eventually even camps that were once self-sufficient end up becoming impoverished hence unable to cater to the needs of the displaced (Bailey, 1986).

Camps are best utilised during the emergency phase, but eventually, they deprive the displaced the freedoms they need to live productive lives, and that it is part of the reasons why some IDPs choose to self-settle (Jamal, 2003). Reports show that more attention is given to camp settings than self-settled areas by governments and humanitarian agencies due to factors such as their greater visibility and relative ease of accessing needs and providing services to clearly defined locations such as camps (UNHCR, 2010). Similar reports also suggest that assistance focuses typically on camps and where interventions reach IDPs outside camps, such interventions are often one-time and allocated during the initial phase of displacement. IDPs in camps therefore obtain more regular attention from governments and humanitarian agencies than IDPs outside camps. Irrespective of the aid and support, camps are the least favoured environment by most IDPs, and majority are choosing instead to find shelter, support and security outside camps (UNHCR, 2010). Emerging literature on urban IDPs reveals that with the world's urban population projected to increase to 66% by 2050, so too will the population of IDPs in urban areas (IOM | DTM, 2019). Consequently, more than 80% of the world's IDPs are increasingly living in urban areas (IOM | DTM, 2019, Park, 2016). This creates a new set of issues and problems around urban IDPs that have not been the focus of research in the past. One that is essential to anticipate, understand and plan for in preparation for their long-term settlement in urban areas (Crisp, Morris and Refstie, 2012). Nevertheless, most research, policy and practice relates back to the camp environment. Bakewell argues that this rather restricted policy focus on camps as opposed to self-settlement masks the diverse ways in which displaced people can live.

#### **2.3 Self-settlement and urban IDPs**

Humanitarian organisations, governments and other policymakers are steadily acknowledging that displaced populations, whether refugees or IDPs, frequently favour or rather, they have little other option, but to self-settle and reside with host communities or families as opposed to living in camps.

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of IDPs and refugees self-settling within host communities is still relatively unstudied when compared to how much is known about refugees and IDPs living in camps. So much so that it is rarely conceptually defined or theoretically grounded and even when it is, most of its literature focuses on refugees and not IDPs. Therefore, in this section I will try to bring together the little known on self-settlement drawing a lot of the literature from refugee studies, which should suffice in helping us begin to understand IDP self-settlement since the experiences of refugees and that of IDPs coincides in a lot of ways as highlighted previously. From this section we will also be able to make comparisons with IDPs in camps and set the groundwork for exploring it deeper in the upcoming chapters.

Karen Jacobsen outlines what is meant by self-settlement, stating that it occurs in cases where refugees disregard any form of aid and protection from the government and choose instead to live amid host communities allowing them the freedom to settle and work where they choose (Jacobsen, 2001). It is noted that Jacobsen's explanation of self-settlement suggests that refugees who self-settle choose to do so and even choose to ignore aid and protection from the government. But anecdotal evidence with IDPs is suggesting that while some of them choose it, others have no other option. My study will explore this in the context of Maiduguri.

There is little doubt that self-settlement can leave the displaced in a more vulnerable state, given that most assistance to IDPs tends to focus on camps (Bakewell, 2014). Irrespective of this, it was estimated that of the 14.7 million IDPs protected and assisted by UNHCR in 2010, 52% of the total live outside camps (Davies, 2012). This figure is different from the 80% figure above because the 80% is an estimate of total number of the worlds IDPs who reside in urban areas, whereas this 52% is the proportion of the IDPs that UNHCR supports. This suggests that around half the IDPs UNHCR protects and assists are actually outside camps which is interesting in itself. So why do many displaced people stay away from camps irrespective of the additional government and humanitarian aid provided in camps? Davies (2012) suggests that decisions made by displaced people to self-settle are influenced by a number of factors. They include the absence or overcrowding of camps in many situations of displacement, the opportunity to pursue local integration, as well as the observation made by the displaced on the greater economic opportunities that exist by living in towns and cities for work rather than camps; resulting in chances to support family members located elsewhere through allowances. Bakewell concurs with the point on economic opportunities and adds that the lack of freedom of movement, limited livelihood opportunities, lack of access to resources, and lack of ownership of assets are among the many reasons why refugees self-settle in areas where they can make a better living for themselves (Bakewell, 2014).

A UNHCR paper also stated that, refugees are increasingly flocking to cities after observing that those who self-settle enjoy economic inclusion, are more likely to meet their needs in a safe, sustainable and

dignified manner, they are able to be self-reliant and resilient while also avoiding aid-dependency and negative coping mechanisms. In addition, they tend to be more prepared for the future, whether they decide to integrate, return home or resettle in another state or country (UNHCR, 2020). Other reasons why displaced people may choose to self-settle include protection problems for some of them within camps which leads them to seek greater security outside a camp, in most cases where they will disguise or become invisible. The possibility of having relatives, friends, or social networks in hosting locations is another reason. The mixture of some or all of the above factors influences a split in options between family members whereby some may settle in a camp while a few of the members will choose to migrate to areas with greater work opportunities where they may have host-enabling networks (Davies, 2012).

Furthermore, reports by IDMC show that more than 50% of the 54 countries they monitor have insufficient or no camps for IDPs. Thus, IDPs are forced to opt for alternative coping mechanisms such as living with host families or communities, which in turn becomes the custom experienced by most IDPs in those countries. This report is already showing us that the assumption that IDPs always willingly choose to self-settle is not necessarily accurate since they have no choice in such countries. It is also often assumed that IDPs who choose to self-settle or live amongst hosts especially those located in urban areas are likely to be more affluent than IDPs in camps and consequently less vulnerable or in need of assistance (Davies, 2012). This assumption has been debated by theorists such as Hovil (2007), who are showing that more and more host families and communities are suffering the consequences of sharing already meagre resources with the displaced. As a result, humanitarian actors are increasingly advocating for more assistance to be provided to the displaced living outside camps and with host communities and/or families. This is a result of the recognition that if IDPs who live within camps are the ones receiving the most assistance, then over half of the global population of IDPs are being neglected since more of them live outside camps than within them. In these instances, it becomes necessary to apply Principle 14 of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which states that “every IDP has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence” (UNHCR, 2018:229). The human rights notion of providing aid and assistance to displaced populations without discrimination irrespective of their ethnic background, reasons for displacement, or where they might be living must also be applied.

Beyani uses the phrase ‘IDPs outside camps’ to refer to IDPs who reside in a range of different environments outside of camps. Some of them reside in urban areas where they own or rent houses, share a room, live with host families or occupy land that they do not own. While others live in rural areas or inhabit provisional slums and shelters (Beyani, 2013). This study focuses on those who end up self-settling in urban areas because Maiduguri is considered an urban area. Studies of this issue globally also show that over the years, the majority of IDPs who self-settle end up in urban areas as urban IDPs living alongside economic migrants or the urban poor (Beyani, 2013). Therefore throughout this study

we will refer to them as self-settled IDPs. I use the term ‘self-settled’ instead of ‘IDPs outside camps’ or ‘non-camp IDPs’ because the term IDPs outside camps is also used to refer to IDPs who settle in rural areas, and can also refer to IDPs whose place of residence and aid is provided, for instance, by their religious leaders or government representatives. I want to make it explicit that the self-settled IDPs in my study live in urban spaces among host communities and they fend for themselves both in terms of shelter and aid.

### **2.3.1 Benefits vs Drawbacks of self-settlement**

Similar to settling in camps, there are positives and negatives for IDPs who self-settle. Some of the positive aspects to self-settling include the fact that it is seen by displaced people as physically, emotionally and spiritually more secure. There is also the fact that urban areas offer opportunities for rebuilding lives including greater access to public services, work, business and livelihood, as well as education and socializing. Whereas those in camps may be confined to inactivity, dependency or an inability to adequately uphold one’s family, which may demoralise self-esteem. The existence of income generation or work opportunities in host communities can play a part in increasing the IDPs self-sufficiency and in turn raise their self-esteem (Davies, 2012). Kobia and Cranfield (2009) expand on this suggesting that numerous people leave camps for work purposes and send allowances back to family members as money in camps is often scarce. Even though refugees in urban centres are rarely offered assistance and when they do the distribution is often too uneven and insufficient to meet basic needs, they are still able to exercise a higher degree of self-sufficiency than those in camps. For these reasons, refugees self-settle to avoid depending on rations as well as to escape feelings of boredom, hopelessness, hardships, and restrictions that occur in camps. Additionally, the lifestyle of a refugee before displacement has an effect on where they decide to settle post displacement. It is presumed that refugees who formerly lived comfortable lifestyles or have no knowledge of farming do not cope well in camps and rural areas; they tend to do better in urban areas where they can put their education, skills and expertise to use (Kobia and Cranfield, 2009).

On the other hand, self-settlement also comes with specific challenges for displaced people who are attempting to navigate life in a different and intricate environment. Some of these challenges include inadequate housing or shelter and reduced access to services like WASH (water, sanitation and health) and education (Beyani, 2013). Davies develops that point, adding that there are some urban areas like Nairobi, Bogota, and Goma, where families who used to be IDPs themselves are now the hosts of new IDPs. Considering the fact that hosting is already very difficult, this will rapidly exhaust their already meagre resources and drive them from extreme to chronic poverty. In addition, adding more people to an already tightly packed neighborhood means other areas such as hygiene and sanitation will deteriorate further; leading to outbreaks of diseases which are communicable that can easily infect wealthier neighborhoods (Davies, 2012).

Similar to camp IDPs, there is also a challenge associated with power relations here. There are likely to be different ways in which displaced people who end up self-settling in urban areas will be disadvantaged by power relations. While IDPs in camps are highly visible and subject to closer surveillance and control, those in urban areas may be less constrained by camp rules and institutions but may also lack the ability to form a collective voice and may further be marginalised by local structures of power in the area where they live. Identity-based exclusion linked to ethnicity and religion might also pose challenges for urban IDPs.

An example of the issues that displaced communities have to weigh up when deciding where to settle can be seen in the urban refugees who ended up settling in Nairobi, Kenya. These refugees are progressively settling in Kenyan cities and towns despite the lack of assistance they receive outside their camps. Most of the refugees head straight to these urban areas to merge with family and other relatives already living there who help them with networks to find work and accommodation. Many of the refugees agree that even though the policies in place restrict their lives in urban areas, it is still a better option in terms of economic opportunities because these opportunities are lacking in camps (Pavanello *et al.*, 2010).

There are some analytical and practical issues that need to be overcome in studying the displaced in urban spaces, which Landau discusses in his chapter on Urban Refugees and IDPs. He argues that the most important is the need to address their problems in a more comprehensive manner, which relies heavily on categorisation and verification of these groups, specifically because urban refugees tend to blend in with the urban poor. Landau suggests that we rethink the role of planning in an era of diversity and mobility to understand better the unique problems of urban refugees and the factors working against their effective protection and forms of durable solutions (Landau, 2014).

It is often assumed that displaced populations – whether in camps or self-settled – will return home shortly after displacement. In fact, people are staying in camps and in host communities longer than they once did and the longer displaced people stay away from their state of origin, the harder it is to go back. This does not necessarily mean their situation is improving as IDPs continue to face protracted challenges, vulnerabilities, lack of access to amenities and worsening of unmet needs. It only means that cities and the institutions within them have to be more innovative in the way they address the challenges posed by forced displacement. There is insufficient knowledge about these challenges and how their experiences differ between camp and self-settled IDPs, and the different kinds of support they need to realise their basic human capabilities. The next section of this chapter will hence show how and why the capabilities approach is a suitable framework to understand the different challenges,

experiences, vulnerabilities, and opportunities of camp IDPs in comparison to self-settled IDPs and how the framework will help us to understand more about their different needs.

#### **2.4 The Capability Approach (CA)**

Up to this point it has been made clear that the aim of this study is to understand the well-being needs and experiences of IDPs in camps in comparison to self-settled IDPs, to help them escape poverty and exclusion, in order to aid development. In the Capability Approach, “poverty is understood as deprivation in the capability to live a good life, and development is understood as capability expansion” (Wells, 2020:1)

The Capability Approach has been described by Ingrid Robeyns as “a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society” (Robeyns, 2005:94). The approach, which was developed mainly by Sen (1979; 1980; 1982; 1985a; 1985b; 1988; 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1999) and subsequently by Nussbaum (1988; 1992; 1998 2000; 2003; 2006; 2011), aims to provide a framework for analysing what people are able to do and be – also understood as people’s real freedoms – and for analysing the opportunities that are available to them. Sen puts it simply as a way of understanding the capabilities that people have of successfully attaining the type of life they value (Sen, 1997). Sen’s argument in summary suggests that we think about the disadvantages of vulnerable groups more in terms of capability deprivations. An example of this can be seen in his famous work on poverty and famine where he highlighted that famine should not be limited to just a lack of food, but people lacking the capability to acquire food (Sen, 1981). A durable solution therefore should not be food relief but a real solution for the vulnerable populations, which will address capability failures such as providing employment in order to earn money to access food (Nussbaum, 2011). The approach can be used in a variety of fields ranging from welfare economics, development studies, social policy, and political philosophy. It can also be utilised for the evaluation of various characteristics of people’s wellbeing such as poverty, inequality, the well-being of an individual, or that of the members of a group (Robeyns, 2005).

Modern work on the CA dates from Sen 1979 and Nussbaum 1988, however Sen himself states that the CA echoes the works of variety of thinkers such as Aristotle, Karl Marx, and Adam Smith. He asserts that; “the most powerful conceptual connections would appear to be with the Aristotelian view of the human good. The Aristotelian account of the human good is explicitly linked with the necessity to ‘first ascertain the function of man’ and it then proceeds to explore life in the sense of activity.” (Sen, 1993:15). His views relate to Aristotle’s in a number of ways. One of those is Aristotle’s opinion on the importance of political planners to understand the requirements that need to be met in order for human beings to live a flourishing life. In his ethical writings about the flourishing human life, Aristotle makes

it clear that the intention is to guide the upcoming politicians of society in order for them to inherently create and achieve the conditions for flourishing lives (see Aristotle, 1984). He was specifically firm in his stance of how the pursuit of wealth was not a suitable comprehensive goal for any civilised society. He concludes that political planning should be driven by human values rather than wealth because wealth is a means and not an end (Conill, 2013).

Another view that Sen's CA draws on is that of choice. Choice was vital for Aristotle as he asserts that "no action counts as virtuous in any way, unless it is mediated by the person's own thought and selection" (Nussbaum, 2021:16). He urges politicians to aim at producing capabilities or opportunities rather than making everyone perform certain activities. Comparably in the CA, enhanced capabilities are what allow people to pursue and achieve their idea of what comprises the type of life he or she values. This idea of wellbeing recognises the importance of exercising choice to function, thereby creating personal values and ultimately wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2021). Aristotle urged governments to put in place the necessary conditions for human beings to flourish. In his view, government's needed to address vulnerability by considering issues like how pure the water supply is, how clean the air is, and the quality of education (Conill, 2013). Needless to say, Aristotle and Sen contextualised human vulnerability in a similar way.

Some aspects of Aristotle's views can also be recognised in Nussbaum's work on the CA. She states that the CA gave "the idea of human development an Aristotelian flavour and connected it to the language of capability and human flourishing" as a basis for individual and collective assessment of wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2003:1). She links the works of Aristotle, which focus on human dignity with the Capability Approach and also supports Aristotle's viewpoint that makes it possible to establish a list of functionings that encapsulates human good living. Although Sen is not completely against this, he asserts that he prefers the CA to stand in its 'incompleteness' without a definitive list thus allowing it to be a general framework of evaluation (Conill, 2013).

#### **2.4.1 The core concepts: functionings and capabilities**

Functionings and capabilities are the two key terms in this approach. Functionings refer to the activities and conditions that are valued by individuals which make up their wellbeing (Alkire, 2005). Examples of this can be a healthy body, an educated mind, a good job, being safe, calm and at peace, having a warm friendship, or social wellbeing, to name a few. Functionings therefore relate to resources and income but when they come together they describe what a person is able to do or be as a result. For instance, when people's basic need for food (a resource) is met, they enjoy the functioning of being well-nourished. Since functionings are characteristics of human fulfillment, some functionings may be very basic (being nourished, literate, clothed) and others might be quite complex (being able to play the piano). Alkire adds that functionings can also relate to different dimensions of wellbeing, from survival

to relationships to self-direction to arts and culture (Alkire, 2005). Table 2 demonstrates the basic language of the Capability Approach.

**Table 2: Basic Language of the Capability Approach**


<i>Functionings</i>	<i>“the various things a person may value doing or being” (p. 75)</i>
<i>Capability</i>	<p><i>“the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another... to choose from possible livings” (p. 40)</i></p> <p><i>“the freedom or opportunity to achieve various functionings”</i></p>
<i>Agency</i>	<p><i>is the ability for a person to be “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria” (p. 19)</i></p> <p><i>“a person’s ability to act on what they value and have reason to value.”</i></p>

Source: Sen, 1999b.

Capabilities are a combination of functionings that are feasible for a person to achieve. The idea of capabilities describes the real actual possibilities open to a person. “Capabilities are a kind of opportunity freedom. Just like a person with much money in her pocket can buy many different things, a person with many capabilities could enjoy many different activities, pursue different life paths” (Alkire 2005:2). Figure 2 consequently shows a summary of the central relationships in the Capability Approach.



Figure 2: A simple analytical framework of the capability approach showing the relationship between resources, capabilities and functionings.



Source: Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2020.

What the CA is really interested in is what a person is able to do or be – that is in their functionings. Alkire gives a great example of this, which should help in summarising the key points of functionings and capabilities:

*“A bicycle provides a good example of how these different concepts relate. A person may own or be able to use a bicycle (a resource). By riding the bicycle, the person moves around town and, let us presume, values this mobility (a functioning). If the person is unable to ride the bicycle (because, perhaps, she has no sense of balance), then having a bicycle would not create this functioning of mobility. But in our case, the access to the bicycle (resource) coupled with the person’s own characteristics (balance etc), creates the capability for the person to move around town when she or he wishes. Furthermore, let us suppose that the person enjoys having this capability to leap upon a bicycle and pedal over to a friend’s house for lunch – thus having this capability contributes to their happiness or utility.” (Alkire, 2005:4).*

When we fully understand the Capability Approach we see that its value comes from the fact that it reaches beyond the focus on income or resources compared to other approaches that suggest maximising income or commodities will increase people’s happiness. The problem with this line of thinking is that people need and use resources differently, and people also value other things outside of just increased income. To this effect Sen is famously and often quoted to have said “well-being is judged

in terms of certain valued functionings, or functionings a person has reason to value” (for example, Sen 2009: 231). In favour of this line of thinking, the CA tries to tackle some concerns Sen had about other approaches to evaluation of well-being. Firstly, like already mentioned, people vary significantly in the way they can convert the same resources into valuable functionings (‘beings’ and ‘doings’). This means evaluating well-being by focusing only on income is not sufficient. It is vital to reflect on what individuals can do with them. Secondly, it is also vital to examine the valuable options people have and whether or not they take up those options is secondary. Therefore evaluating people’s well-being must take into account both actual achievements (‘functionings’) and effective freedom (‘capability’). Thirdly, the evaluation of well-being should consider and reflect the different complexities of people’s reality rather than a standardised approach (Wells, 2020).

#### **2.4.2 Justification for the CA**

The CA has been used extensively in a range of disciplines and is now being utilised for the purpose of planning and design (Development Planning Unit, 2015), and in international policy like the formation of the UN Human Development Index. Its use in forced migration studies is limited though this is materialising (de Haas, 2021; Clarke, 2014; Al-Husban and Adams, 2016; Briones, 2009). Clarke explores the value of the CA as a substitute framework for understanding and conceptualizing the role of Refugee Community Organisations and other providers for groups that are commonly thought of as ‘hard to reach’. She draws her conclusions from 71 semi-structured interviews and offers it as a case study for how the CA can be conceptualized. Her study finds that the CA offers numerous useful arguments. It recognised the multi-dimensional nature of human wellbeing, as well as the significant role that individual diversity and human agency plays (Clarke, 2014).

Meanwhile, the Al-Husban and Adams (2016) paper uses the CA to debate that sustainable long-term solutions for refugees requires a reevaluation of the existing leading frameworks of containment and charity. Drawing upon understandings from a three and a half year study focused on a large refugee camp in Jordan, the paper showcases an appropriate framework that expands on the long-term abilities for the different stakeholder groups. It showed that the CA is useful for understanding refugees experiences, however, it does not actually analyse their individual capabilities. Rather it shows that the reason why this camp in particular is thriving is because it has invoked long-term, resilient solutions attributed to the human capital and capability of its residents. Hence, there is still a gap here in analysing the individual capabilities of displaced persons or migrants.

The CA possesses numerous qualities which make it suitable for research in this field while bridging a knowledge gap. The first significant quality of the approach is that it enables a focus on the complexities of human wellbeing and explores the notion that an individual’s ability to lead his or her most fulfilling life can be affected by any resource or activity (Clarke, 2014). This motivates an examination into a

range of resources, activities, options and opportunities that are provided to IDPs both in camps and those who self-settle. The second important attribute is that it captures the correlation between resources and an individual's potential to transform it into a capability. This is described as what Sen calls 'conversion factors', and uses the example of "a resource such as an English language class and an individual's ability to convert it into a capability such as the capability to speak English" (Clarke, 2014:63). Thus, access to obtaining benefits from resources can greatly be affected by an IDPs environment, social norms, policies and personal attributes. Consequently, the CA is best suited for this study because it recognises human diversity at its core through conversion factors, which other alternative approaches downplay despite it being very important. Those conversion factors are significant in this study because it is essential to recognise the detailed conditions and living circumstances of individuals to better understand how they use their resources. Conceptualising wellbeing in this way broadens our knowledge because it takes into account things that may be relevant to some people or groups but are not as important to others.

A further attractive feature of the approach is its ability to look beyond individual capabilities and explore the notion of group capabilities. Stewart (2005), makes great emphasis on this, asserting that groups are instrumentally important in enlarging individual capabilities. This is particularly vital when considering why some IDP groups or communities' function well and others do not. Stewart explains that in many cases, group association can improve a person's sense of well-being especially if that group or community is doing well. She further states that, vulnerable individuals experiencing different forms of inequality can overcome more adversity when part of a group, as individuals have limited power or assets to make significant changes on their own. Economic and political power increases with such collective action, enabling greater access to public and private resources whilst simultaneously impacting their status and self-respect (Stewart, 2005). In the context of IDPs in Northern Nigeria, anecdotal evidence suggests that religious identity like being Muslim or Christian, can make a difference to opportunities or access to resources. It may also be the case that other identities such as linguistic, or ethnic groups, or previous livelihood, may affect people's capabilities. This research will consequently use the idea of group capabilities to investigate which groups or group identities are significant for IDPs capabilities.

Finally, the capability approach is considered appropriate for examining IDPs experiences because it encapsulates many of the characteristics recognised in other approaches in one coherent analytical framework. Showing the distinction between the CA and these other approaches can help in providing a stronger case for the use of the CA. Sen argues that although other approaches have their particular strengths, there is none that offers a well-rounded exploration into well-being that can be utilised as a general concept. To him, their particular focus is on the 'wrong things' such as utility, liberty, commodities or goods. This narrow focus excludes many important aspects of well-being (Wells, 2020).

His criticism particularly of utilitarianism, as advocated by John Stuart Mill (see Mill and Isaiah, 1992), is a major contributor of his ideology (Wells, 2020). Sen disapproves of utilitarian models because in his view they rely solely on utility as their bases for evaluation. Since this view understands the quality of life in terms of pleasure, happiness or the satisfaction of desires, Sen states that it does not take into account other factors such as freedom or violation of rights which are intrinsically important (Sen, 199b). He also disapproves of other approaches that are income-based or resources-based theories. The CA differs from perspectives which evaluate well-being in terms of the possession of resources, income, wealth or what John Rawls (1972: 90–95) termed ‘primary social goods’ (or ‘primary goods’), which are all-purpose means. When assessing an individual’s welfare, both Sen and Nussbaum are quoted saying that “the appropriate ‘space’ is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that of the substantive freedoms — the capabilities — to choose a life one has reason to value.” (Sen, 2000:74).

The Basic Needs Approach (BNA) is another concept that is often compared to the CA. The BNA aims to fulfill the unmet basic needs of the poor. While it is commended for its ease of implementation and flexibility, it is also criticised for being paternalistic. The authority at the top is generally in charge of deciding what and how much people need assuming that all people have the same needs. This is exactly what the CA stands against. The two approaches are similar in their advancement of human well-being, except, the BNA falls short in that it focuses mainly on immediate basic needs like food, water, shelter and clothing and thus has been criticised for focusing on the possession of commodities. Compared to the BNA, the CA broadens beyond poverty and deprivation of basic needs and stretches into analyzing general wellbeing and fulfillment through the lens of deprivation of opportunities (Clark, 2005). This difference in perspective leads to very different policy initiatives. The relationship between policymakers and the individuals is also different in the two approaches. With the BNA, the policymakers would normally use their own understanding to determine what the individuals need. Whereas with the CA, policymakers would refrain from doing that and instead encourage participatory discussions providing opportunity for the individuals concerned to raise and discuss their concerns. Thus, the CA provides better attention to values and choices (Wong, 2012). Table 3 draws out more of these differences.

**Table 3: Key Features of Basic Needs Approach and Capability Approach**

<i>Feature</i>	<i>Basic Needs Approach</i>	<i>Capability Approach</i>
<i>Conceptual basis</i>	<i>People must have minimum sustenance</i>	<i>People should have equal freedom to choose their valued ways of life</i>
<i>Poverty definition</i>	<i>Deprivation of consumption</i>	<i>Deprivations of opportunities</i>

<b><i>Poverty reduction</i></b>	<i>Ensure adequate access to consumption</i>	<i>Ensure equal opportunities so that people can make choices about their lives</i>
<b><i>Policy objective</i></b>	<i>Sustenance</i>	<i>Empowerment</i>
<b><i>Power relationship</i></b>	<i>Paternalistic; little scope for voice of the poor</i>	<i>Deliberative; people share concerns and shape policies</i>
<b><i>Level of application</i></b>	<i>Generalised, but allows regional diversities</i>	<i>Multiple levels, with emphasis on context</i>

Source: Wong, 2012.

On the contrary, there are also theorists who have raised certain concerns with Sen's capabilities approach. One of those concerns has to do with under-theorisation. Concerns have been raised by some philosophers to suggest that as a theory of justice, the CA not a suitable framework. Sen does not provide a list of capabilities to be measured, neither does he indicate which capabilities matter the most, or even the way to distribute them. He leaves this decision up to the society itself. Those philosophers have argued that the lack of a list makes it difficult to measure the type of life people have reason to value. This also makes it difficult for societies to know what goal to aspire for, or to identify how well the society is doing, or even to identify where they fall short (Pogge, 2002). While this is a concern for some philosophers, it is a strength for others. Sen's lack of a definitive list of capabilities (which he emphasises is intentional), allows it to be a flexible framework which can be employed across many issues, societies, and disciplines. He proposes that personal judgment should inform the selection of capabilities depending on the nature and purpose of the issue one chooses to assess. This allows researchers the ability to apply it in many different ways (Clark, 2005). Additionally, Sen's emphasis of a 'no list of capabilities' has made room for Nussbaum's capability theory of justice, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.3. She provides a list of the central human capabilities that is motivated by a concept of human dignity.

Another issue that is often raised is on the individualism of the CA. It has been criticised for being too individualistic with theologians like Charles Gore, for example, arguing that when assessing the state of affairs and social arrangements, the approach only takes into account how good or bad they are from the perspective of individuals (Gore, 1997). However, as stated above some recent theorists have been exploring the notion of group or collective capabilities. For example, Stewart (2005), gives groups a more central role in the CA maintaining that they are an intrinsic part of human life. The quality of groups that an individual identifies with plays an influential role in the individual's choices, values and general well-being. Ibrahim (2006), also shares similar views. She states that by working together, individuals can expand and exercise new 'collective capabilities'.

Finally, the CA has been criticised for placing such little significance on power, even though power is central to almost every debate in social justice and philosophy. The significance of power relations comes through more clearly in Stewart’s work on group capabilities.

### 2.4.3 Operationalising the CA

A number of philosophers who are concerned with the CA have developed some theoretical and conceptual accounts that seek to elaborate the CA more comprehensively. Most of the accounts are primarily concerned with operationalising different dimensions of the CA because this is the part of the framework that is considered the hardest due to its vagueness and under-theorisation (although this is deliberate on Sen’s part). In response to Sen’s vagueness, Nussbaum subsequently developed a broad and effective capability theory of justice. She produced a theory of justice inspired by the notion of human dignity (in contrast to Sen who emphasises on freedom). In so doing, she produced a list of capabilities linking her argument to an Aristotelian perspective on the comprehensive requirements of the truly human life. She proposes her list as a neutral concept of the good life that can be utilised by many different groups in a society (Nussbaum, 2011).

**Table 4: Ten central human capabilities**

<i>Capability</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Life</i>	<i>“Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.”</i>
<i>Bodily health</i>	<i>“Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”</i>
<i>Bodily integrity</i>	<i>“Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.”</i>
<i>Sense, imagination and thought</i>	<i>“Being able to use the senses to imagine, think and reason, and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression and with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.”</i>
<i>Emotions</i>	<i>“Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves, to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety.”</i>

<i>Practical reason</i>	<i>“Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.”</i>
<i>Affiliation</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Being able to live with and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.”</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.”</i></li> </ol>
<i>Other species</i>	<i>“Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.”</i>
<i>Play</i>	<i>“Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.”</i>
<i>Control over one’s environment</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech association.”</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.”</i></li> </ol>

Source: Nussbaum, 2011:33-34

This approach by Nussbaum has received some criticism. One of those criticisms for example, is by Menon (2002), who argues that the list is oversimplifies and is over-optimistic about what structures and governments are like. Alkire also adds that not only is it missing some capabilities, it is also too specific and patriarchal, making it unsuitable for many purposes (Alkire 2005). Looking beyond Nussbaum’s list, Alkire, states that capabilities will have to be selected by a team, a community or a researcher. She suggests these questions which should be kept in mind when selecting the capabilities one wishes to examine. 1. Which capabilities do the people who will enjoy them value (and attach high priority to)? 2. Which capabilities are relevant to the policy, project or institution which may be affected directly or indirectly? (Alkire, 2005:35-45). I will similarly be using these questions as a guide when making my own list of IDPs capabilities.

Another conceptualisation of the CA is adapted through conversion factors. Both Sen and Robeyns highlight the concept of conversion factors when theorising the CA. Whether an individual has the capability to achieve a certain ‘doing or being’ depends on what Sen calls conversion factors (Sen, 2000). Conversion factors are what allow the CA to recognise human diversity because it takes into account factors that enable an individual to convert commodities (or resources) into valuable sets of functionings and capabilities. Conversion factors are the main reason why focus should be on capabilities and functionings rather than on goods and material resources, when it comes to studying development, justice and quality of life. Other than just the normative significance of focusing on ends


rather than on means, conversion factors are the key reason for focusing on functionings and capabilities. Through this, we are able to see how people vary in their capacity of transforming resources into capabilities and functionings. We can also see how individual capabilities can be amplified in other ways than just through the increase of the material resources the person possesses (Bonvi and Laruffa, 2017).

From this perspective, judging the well-being of an individual through knowing the material resources they possess or through their income is inadequate. Rather, what is most sufficient is to take into account features related to their personal, social, environmental, institutional, political or economic matters that are positive or negative and can change or create opportunities or barriers to expanding their capabilities (Goerne, 2010). Going back to the example of a bicycle, we have seen that a bicycle enables the functioning of mobility (to be able to move oneself freely and more rapidly than walking). The relation between the good (bicycle) and the achievement of certain beings and doings (functionings) is captured by conversion factors (what Alkire refers to in Figure 2 as personal utilisation function). For example, a person who is able bodied and has already learnt to ride a bicycle has a high conversion factor allowing him to move around efficiently. In comparison, a person who is not able bodied or has never learnt how to ride a bicycle has a very low conversion factor (Robeyns, 2020).

According to Robeyns (2020), there are numerous types of conversion factors which can all be categorised under three main groups. Every conversion factor plays a positive or negative role in how a person converts the resource into a functioning, however the sources of these factors can differ. While the examples above suggest positive conversion factors, it is important to note that there are also negative ones that actively prevent people from realising a functioning. The three main factors she details are, personal conversion factors, social conversion factors and environmental conversion factors. Factors related to a person's physical condition, sex, metabolism, intelligence, reading skills and so on, are considered to be personal conversion factors. The second is social conversion factors, which are factors related to the society in which one lives such as power relations associated with class, gender, race, or caste. Other societal factors include public policies, social norms, and practices that are unfair or discriminatory and many more. The last group is environmental conversion factors which materialise from the physical or built environment of where a person lives. Some can be geographical, while others are of the built environment like good roads, bridges and buildings, and transport and communication means (Robeyns, 2020). Therefore, to capture individual differences and human diversity, the CA must take different aspects of each of the three conversion factors. From this perspective, the five concepts that make up the CA: commodities, conversion factors, capabilities, agency/choices and functionings, are illustrated by Goerne (2010) in Figure 3.



Figure 3: The five concepts of the Capability Approach.



Source: Author adapted from Goerne, 2010.

Some authors such as Goerne use the term commodities, and others say resources. I will be using the latter as it better captures the things I want to look at. With this in mind, Robeyns (2006), has further narrowed down three ways in which she believes the CA can be used or operationalised as follows:

1. As a framework of thought for the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements
2. As a critique of other approaches to the evaluation of well-being and justice
3. As a formula or algorithm to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare or well-being.

### **A Capability Approach to examining IDPs (CAIDP)**

In order to place IDPs within the capabilities conversation and to operationalise the CA in this study by using it to examine their well-being and experiences, the study will take inspiration from different essential aspects of the theories discussed above.

First, I take Robeyn's suggestion by using it as a framework of thought for the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements, which is in line with the focus of this study (Robeyns, 2006). In doing so, the Capability Approach here will focus on the resources available to IDPs, how they cultivate those resources and convert them into various capabilities known as the capability set (I will be referring to this process as 'the conversion process'). I will then analyse the functionings that are achieved as a result (I will be referring to this as 'the outcome'). This means I will be making use of Sen and Robeyn's concept of conversion factors, which will act as barriers or enablers in 'the conversion process'. As well as agency/choice which will also act as barriers or enablers in 'the outcome'.

I will also be taking Nussbaum’s insights of using a list of 10 core capabilities as a threshold of what is considered decent for assessing human dignity. She uses this framework as a comparative tool to assess individuals’ quality of life by examining the resources and opportunities available to each person and measuring them against her list (Nussbaum, 2011). I will not however be taking all of Nussbaum’s suggested capabilities because even she does not claim that her list is definitive and unchanging, she merely advocates for outlining a list. Therefore, in coming up with my own list of IDPs capabilities, I adhered to Alkire’s guidelines on how to develop an appropriate list of capabilities, while also drawing on Nussbaum’s list. I propose to explore 8 basic and complex capabilities that I believe, through secondary research, anecdotal evidence, and preliminary fieldwork are central to IDPs wellbeing. These may be realised to different extents in camps relative to self-settled IDP communities and that is part of what I intend to find out. The capabilities I intend to examine and their description are outlined in Table 5.

**Table 5: 8 IDP capabilities**

<b><i>IDPs Capability</i></b>	<b><i>Description</i></b>
<i>Life</i>	<i>Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living; being able to live with one’s family; being able to make choices over one’s life; including planning one’s life.</i>
<i>Bodily and Mental health</i>	<i>Being able to have good health, including reproductive health, mental health; being able to access health services.</i>
<i>Nourishment</i>	<i>Having access to sufficient food, including non-food items that are needed for acquiring and making food; to be adequately nourished.</i>
<i>Protection</i>	<i>Being secure in camps and self-settled communities. Being able to move freely. Feeling secure against violent assault; including gender based violence.</i>
<i>Shelter</i>	<i>Being able to access camp shelters, including for camp settlements to be conducive; being able to have access to adequate housing for self-settled IDPs, including also for housing to be habitable.</i>
<i>Public health</i>	<i>Being able to access clean water; being in a sanitary environment; being able to practice hygiene, including having access to sanitary and hygienic products.</i>
<i>Education</i>	<i>Being able to access schools; to gain valuable education, including, but not limited to, the right to education irrespective of gender or educational history; being able to access professional or other forms of training.</i>
<i>Livelihood</i>	<i>Being able to work, access employment and engage in economic activities, including equal and fair working conditions; to be content with your livelihood.</i>


Source: Author, 2022.

Although in Table 5 I show 8 capabilities which I will be analysing in the empirical chapters, they are not the only capabilities that matter. There are two other capabilities ‘social wellbeing’ and ‘control

over one’s environment’, which could be conceptualised as capabilities relevant to IDPs, but these are beyond the scope of my project. They could however be potential areas for further research.

Figure 4 consequently shows my version of the capability approach framework, adopted from Robeyn’s framework, for exploring the wellbeing and experiences of IDPs.

Figure 4: Capability Approach of IDPs (CAIDP)



Source: Author, 2021.

So in essence, the resources will relate to the goods and services, and opportunities that are provided to and for IDPs. The conversion process refers to what they do with those resources and opportunities, how they utilise them and if they are content with them, including how the conversion factors enable or hinder them in doing so. The outcomes will therefore relate to how and to what extent those resources have enriched or hindered IDPs capability development. This dual focus on both processes and outcomes makes it practical to explore IDPs access to and outcomes from all the capabilities I wish to examine in this study, and also makes it easier to compare camp IDPs to self-settled IDPs.

Additionally, I will be combining the above focus to build on Stewart’s work on group capabilities. My study seeks to understand some of the ways in which membership of different kinds of groups affects IDPs achieved functionings, perhaps through access to or exclusion from certain resources, capability set, or choices. A comparison will also be made on how this differs in camp or self-settled communities and also to understand what kinds of groups matter and why. In summation, I will explore the idea that identifying as part of a group – such as a particular religious or ethnic group (or any other group that respondents identify as significant) – makes a difference to peoples’ ability to achieve the capabilities listed in Table 5. This will also enable me to investigate whether particular group identities have different effects in self-settled communities relative to camp contexts.

This will all be conceptualised through the framework with the use of semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews with IDP participants and policymakers. Table 6 shows how I gave my research questions their own sub-questions in order to further explain how I operationalise the capabilities approach of examining IDPs (CAIDP). It is these sub-questions that were further broken down into interview questions that enabled me to conduct the fieldwork and empirical analysis portion of this study.

**Table 6: Linking research questions to sub-questions for CAIDP**

<b>Research questions</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>
<i>2: How do camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what do they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which capabilities that IDPs have reason to value are enhanced and by how much?</li> <li>- Do IDPs have access to all their needs? Is this sufficient for capability expansion?</li> <li>- Are IDPs free to choose and decide for themselves what capabilities they value and how to live their lives?</li> </ul>
<i>3: What kind of group identities affect people's ability to achieve these capabilities and how do these differ between urban IDPs and camp IDPs?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What group identities (e.g. religious, ethnic or others) do IDPs ascribe to?</li> <li>- Are group identities important to individual IDPs? Why are they important?</li> <li>- Do they believe their group identities enable or hinder their capabilities? In what ways are these exhibited?</li> </ul>
<i>4: What are government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations doing to support the capabilities of both camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs, and how well does the support match IDPs' perception of their needs?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Are government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations aware of the capabilities that IDPs value?</li> <li>- In what ways do they support IDPs capabilities?</li> <li>- Are they aware of ways they may possibly be hindering IDPs capabilities?</li> </ul>

Source: Author, 2021.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has essentially drawn from different literatures, first in order to expound on encampment and camp IDPs as well as self-settlement and urban IDPs, with the aim of understanding their characteristics, consequences, differences, and similarities. In doing so, the chapter explored different theories and theorists which helped in effectively drawing out the benefits vs drawbacks of each of the post displacement settlements.

The chapter subsequently explained the Capability Approach giving its historical development and providing several justifications for its use in this study. It also explained how I operationalised the CA in this study by taking inspiration from different essential aspects of the theories that were discussed. I took into account Alkire's two key questions for researchers to consider when selecting capabilities. I then took Nussbaum's insight of 10 core capabilities and formulated 8 IDPs capabilities which I believe through research, anecdotal evidence, and preliminary fieldwork are central to IDPs wellbeing. Lastly, I took Sen and Roebyn's framework of encapsulating resources, conversion factors, capability set, agency/choice, and achieved functionings, into one analytical framework.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter outlines the details of how the research undertaken for this thesis was conducted. A credible and authentic research project should be based on solid rationales that explain and justify the methodologies used, as well as the processes involved in collecting and analysing data. In so doing, this chapter first examines the qualitative approach that was used for the study. Thereafter, it comments on the details of preliminary fieldwork conducted. It then proceeds to discuss the different data collection sites and methods of data collection including issues pertaining to access, gatekeepers and the recruitment process. Subsequently commenting on ethical considerations, the chapter concludes with comments upon the data analysis process used as well as the limitations of the methods.

Fieldwork in a war-torn state is an overwhelming experience, given that it involves researching individuals who are facing difficult times, who are vulnerable and probably living in poor and hostile conditions. In addition, being from Nigeria myself, I know the realities of conducting fieldwork in a country such as Nigeria is challenging given that systems and logistics do not run as smoothly as one would like, and facilitating access to research sites or subjects is a hard and time-consuming task. During the research process, a number of political factors and power dynamics forced the researcher to focus on particular camps, groups of people, and organisations over others. Within this chapter, how these choices influenced the research, the participants and the findings, are noted in the positionality and reflexivity section. The data collection process for the study was guided by the research aim and research questions which are restated below. The paragraph after elaborates the research questions showing how each question follows from the literature review.

#### **3.1.1**

This study aims to explore the needs and experiences of IDPs who have settled in camps, in comparison to IDPs who self-settled among host communities, and to explore the value of a Capabilities Approach as a framework for this analysis.

#### **3.1.2 Research questions**

1. What are the displacement effects of Boko Haram in and around Maiduguri and why do some IDPs end up in camps while others self-settle?
2. How do these two types of IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what do they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these?

3. What kind of group identities affect people's ability to achieve these capabilities and how does this differ between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs?
4. What are government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations doing to support the capabilities of both camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs, and how well does this match IDPs' perceptions of their needs?

Chapter 2 Section 2.2 revealed literature around the reasons for encampment and why some displaced people end up in camps. It also showed some characteristics of camps and how these characteristics affect the camp experience. Following that, section 2.3 does the same for self-settlement. Research question 1 thus follows on from this literature around camp settlement vs self-settlement to specifically show the characteristics of camps and of self-settlement in Maiduguri. It uses primary data collected from the fieldwork to show the reasons why some IDPs in Maiduguri end up in camps and the reasons why others self-settle. The literature in Chapter 2 also explored the concept of Capabilities Approach which showed an analytical way in which people's wellbeing can be evaluated. This provides answers to whether people, especially disadvantaged people, are achieving basic human capabilities and thus whether they are living a valuable life. After exploring why some IDPs ended up in camps while others self-settled, research question 2 follows on with primary data to explore how the different groups achieve basic human capabilities. It also tries to find out what the IDPs believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these capabilities as this matters for the type of support they receive from aid providers, in order for them to overcome poverty and exclusion.

The Capabilities Approach literature also touched on the notion of group capabilities, exploring how being a part of a group can either hinder or promote an individual's capabilities. Prior to going on fieldwork, anecdotal evidence suggested that groups such as ethnic and religious groups play an intrinsic role in IDPs experiences in Maiduguri. Research question 3 therefore set out to explore whether or not it is in fact the case that group identity can promote or hinder IDPs capabilities and if so, which groups matter in Maiduguri. Lastly, throughout the literature it has been evident that how aid providers and policymakers such as government organisations, international organisations, and NGOs support IDPs and provide them with aid can either enhance or hinder their capabilities. Research question 4 explores this further in order to highlight how IDPs are being supported, and whether this support matches IDPs perception of their needs. This ultimately lets us understand whether IDPs capabilities are being expanded and lets us see how strong of a chance they have of escaping poverty and exclusion.

### **3.2 Methodological approaches**

This research focuses on understanding the meaning that events have for the individuals or groups being studied and their experiences throughout those events. Many social scientists including Bhattacharjee

(2012), Ritchie *et al.* (2013), and Maggs-Rapport (2001) are of the opinion that for this kind of social research, a qualitative approach is the most appropriate.

To answer this thesis' research questions, an interpretivist approach grounded in qualitative methodology was needed. According to researchers such as Guba and Lincoln (1985), Merriam (1988), Bogdan and Biklen, (1992), Maxwell (2006), An interpretivist perspective sees interaction between people and with wider social systems, as well as how they construct, interpret, and experience the world. It maintains that people make their own sense of social realities (Tuli, 2010). Additionally, it suggests that the purpose of inquiry is not to generalise to a population, but rather to understand a particular phenomenon (Farzanfar, 2005). Researchers with this view often investigate, interpret, and describe social realities through the use of qualitative research methodologies (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). This line of thought is the reason why the use of qualitative research methods has increased significantly in the last decade especially in the fields of social science (Tuli, 2010). This informed the methodological approaches adopted in this study.

Qualitative research methods “are often regarded as providing rich data about real life people and situations and being more able to make sense of behaviour and to understand behaviour within its wider context” (Vaus, 2002:5). The method relies on researchers having personal contact with the group being studied over a certain period of time. Building a connection and trust with the participants of the study often leads to deeper insights; adding richness and depth to the data. The qualitative methodologies employed in this study are inductive. This means they focus on discovery and process, and have high validity. They emphasise less on generalisability, and more on the deeper understanding of the research problem in its unique context (Ulin, Robnson and Tolley, 2004). Researchers using qualitative methodology immerse themselves in their subject matter using various tools including: interviews with people that are crucial to the study, observing people and their interactions, taking life histories, constructing case studies, and analysing existing documents (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).

One positive characteristic of using qualitative methodologies is their ability to empower participants to openly voice their opinions; an experience they may not have had previously. During this study's fieldwork, some participants noted that previously no one had ever bothered to ask them about how they were feeling or coping, or their needs. They expressed that they were pleased that I cared enough about them to ask them such questions and, because of that, they were willing to give me all the information that the research required. A lot of the participants, especially camp IDPs, said that even if the study brought no immediate benefits to them, they were willing to participate because at least their stories and their concerns would be documented and made public for the world to see. One participant noted:



*“No one other than you has come to ask us anything and I will always tell the truth in case if someone like you comes to ask about our lives. I won’t hesitate to tell you everything.” – (Camp IDP 1, 2019).*

As Bauer and Gaskell (2007) stress, “the real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue.” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2007:41). Given this, this study employed comparative case study approach. More explicitly, the study will be comparing the two embedded cases within the main case study.

### **3.2.1 Case Study Method**

At the core of case studies is the exploration and investigation of real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a minimal number of events or conditions, and their relationships. Depending on what they are seeking, researchers can opt for either a single-case or multiple case approach (Zainal, 2007). This study adopts a single-case study approach. Researchers such as Yin, (2003); Baxter and Jack, (2008); and Creswell, (2013) argue that single case studies are better than multiple because they produce richer theory. The researcher also has more time and resources to really focus on the case using methods such as observation, which will enrich their findings. In addition, the researcher can choose to examine a single case study with subunits. Here, as Baxter and Jack (2008) note, the researcher analyses the data within the case analysis separately between the different subunits or across all the subunits. This approach is ideal for this study because the research comprises a single case of a city affected by conflict-driven displacement and multiple subunits within that.

A case study method can also make use of one of three categories of case study namely; descriptive, explanatory, or exploratory (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe, 2010). The first reveals patterns, sequences, and connections within a natural phenomenon in relation to theoretical constructs. In contrast, the second aims to explore and describe the phenomenon through answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions with the aim of explaining or forming a theory (Henry, 2012). The last category of case study is the exploratory case study; it seeks to answer the ‘what’ and ‘who’ questions (Christoph, 2012). The exploratory case study best fits the description of this research because it is concerned with probing a particular phenomenon in depth through qualitative work, informed by theory, but does not seek test a hypothesis. It is also inductive rather than deductive – which supports the use of an exploratory study.

The case study and real-life phenomenon examined in this thesis is the IDPs in Maiduguri; as a case study of the broader phenomenon of urban IDPs. Two subunits are also examined: first, IDPs who currently reside in camps (camp IDPs); secondly, those who are self-settled (self-settled IDPs). To answer the primary research questions of the thesis, a comparative method is adopted to enable examination of the differences and similarities in experience between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs..

The rationale for the case selection adopted in this research was two-fold. First, Maiduguri is the capital and largest city of Borno State, and it hosts the majority of the IDPs displaced by Boko Haram. Secondly, Maiduguri was the safest city in which to undertake research and, in addition, it was the only city in which I had family with whom I could live during the course of the fieldwork, as well as friends who gave me invaluable advice with regard to how to protect myself while on the field.

### **3.2.2 Comparative Case Studies**

Most comparative case studies imply comparing two or more different cases, I want to clarify that in this case this study will be comparing the two subunits within the case study as mentioned above. The goal of a comparative case study here is to compare and contrast two or more things with regards to a specific circumstance or environment in order to improve understanding of the diversity within the case (Lewis-Beck *et al.*, 2004). It is particularly useful here because it enables assessment of the generalisations that extend across the case or multiple cases being studied. For instance, IDPs are often generalised or put into one box as other forced migrants and the same is the case with different categories of IDPs, thus a comparison of the different categories is crucial in order to avoid generalising their experiences. A further benefit of comparative case study approach is that it highlights differences and similarities between migrant groups, geographical areas, organisations and more, rather than focusing on examining each individual (Bloemraad, 2013). This focus on groups rather than each individual is central to this thesis.

### **3.3 The Preliminary Fieldwork**

According to Cohen and Arieli (2011), one of the difficulties with research in conflict areas is related to accessing data. It was necessary for me to undertake preliminary fieldwork because there is only little information or data from Nigeria online. I needed more information about what was happening on ground in Maiduguri. Making contacts from Sheffield proved to be very difficult because Nigerians prefer face-to-face meetings rather than phone calls and emails. Using the snowballing method, I tested out the logistics of getting access to both camp and self-settled IDPs. Self-settled IDPs who were harder to locate because they lived in the city and were “mixed up” with the urban poor, whilst Camp IDPs were easier to locate with gatekeepers who would give permission to talk to residents (more on gatekeepers in section 3.4.2). For IDPs I had an idea of what camps I wanted to try and get access to based on information previously garnered online and I had a list of organisations and individuals who I wanted to meet. In contrast, I had no contacts as to how to engage with self-settled IDPs prior to the preliminary fieldwork.

There are other difficulties associated with research in conflict areas which my preliminary fieldwork helped me to understand and come to terms with. Moss, Uluğ and Acar (2018) provide a list of some

of those difficulties. They include: actual and perceived safety of researchers and participants, b) the complexities of getting research permits c) identities of the researcher, d) social and cultural obstacles and e) language barriers between researchers and participants. These issues are particularly significant and amplified in conflict areas. They suggest that researchers doing fieldwork in a conflict area should consider; a) getting informed consent, b) recording interviews, c) avoiding psychological harm to respondents, d) psychological demands for the researcher and e) giving back to the respondents (Moss, Uluğ and Acar, 2018). Every point in these two lists were considered prior the preliminary fieldwork.

The threat of physical danger can also impact on research processes. Though instances of attacks in Maiduguri had decreased prior to the fieldwork, I remained on edge and my mind was not at peace during either the preliminary fieldwork or the main fieldwork. This was because sporadic attacks still happened from time to time in neighbouring cities, as well as within Maiduguri itself. Even after my fieldwork there was an attack on IDPs very close to one of the camps I had been visiting. Ogora (2013), talks about this in detail in her chapter on *The Contested Fruits of Research in War-Torn Countries* and this helped me prepare further for such anxieties and emotional strain. One example of this can be seen when I was stopped, harassed, and searched coming out of Bakassi camp. The security personnel had been changed while I was inside the camp and the new personnel were not made aware of who I was. They had started searching me before I was able to show my letter of permission to visit the camp (further discussed in Section 3.4.2).

Another key challenge with research of this kind is managing uncertainty. Even though I was aware of this prior to embarking upon the preliminary fieldwork, it did not prepare me enough for how different things panned out in the field. Only the preliminary fieldwork prepared me for such abrupt changes in my plan. For example, such a change happened when I made plans to meet with a key informant of the study but he was called on an assignment a day before our meeting. I had to extend my trip to wait for his return; a decision that cost me a lot of money in flight and other changes.

Overall the preliminary fieldwork was a success. I met prominent staff of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and, through that, I was able to gather a lot of information regarding the BH insurgency, and the IDPs of Maiduguri. I was introduced to other NEMA staff and provided with a range of contacts. Subsequently, I interviewed the head of relief and rehabilitation at NEMA. I began to call those contacts to introduce myself and my study and ask for an introductory meeting. I was able to see the few that accepted my meeting proposal and I used that opportunity to ask for more specific contacts and gather more details. On this trip I successfully interviewed 12 people, 5 of which were key informants albeit they were mostly junior staff of a few NGOs, and 7 were heads of communities at different camps and camp-like settings. I visited camps and saw first-hand how they operated and who the gatekeepers were at the different camps. The head of the camps took me around the camps, while

telling me stories of how the IDPs arrived, and explaining the make-up of the camps, with some general information on the residents and organisations that are present in the camp. From this I was able to gather information on which NGOs and international organisations I would like to interview when I came back for the main fieldwork. It also gave me a clearer understanding of how camps operate, which then allowed me to further narrow down which camps exactly I was going to visit for the main fieldwork and what my sample criterion will be. I made many contacts of NGOs, international organisations, religious heads and more, and I was able to snowball from those contacts and ultimately reach everyone I had in mind for the research, including those I did not know I needed but were all very necessary.

As successful as it was, there were also a range of challenges. For instance, a lot of the senior policymaker contacts I made and the people with whom I wanted to speak were not available so I had to speak to junior staff and their assistants. Whilst this gave me background knowledge and provided me with needed contacts, it also meant that I had to spend time making those introductory meetings again after I came back for the main fieldwork. I learnt then that most of the senior key informants I intended on speaking to were often out of town, thus pinning them down for an interview was going to be very challenging. At this point, I also was not able to speak with any self-settled IDPs or anyone who could provide me with more information on them. Instead I was able to secure a contact who was going to safely guide me through that process during the main fieldwork. Lastly, I realised during the preliminary fieldwork that some of my methods were not practical in some places. For example, I learnt that it was going to be much harder to conduct interviews with self-settled IDPs, and near impossible to conduct focus group interviews (FGIs) with them. This meant that I had really prepare by making more contacts and ask for some help in order to conduct interviews and FGIs with self-settled IDPs for the main fieldwork. I even learnt some of the ‘do’s and don’ts’ of the culture in Maiduguri and of the IDPs when approaching as a researcher - particularly one that is not a local. All this would not have been possible without the preliminary fieldwork.

After returning from the preliminary fieldwork, arrangements were made for the main fieldwork. I narrowed down and finalised what camps I would visit and who I would interview. I also made adjustments to my data collection methods as detailed from section 3.5 onwards.

### **3.4 Data Collection Sites**

#### **3.4.1 Subunit 1: Camp IDPs**

Broadly speaking, there are 16 formal IDP camps in Maiduguri and many more informal camps (Reach-initiative, 2018). “Formal camps” refer to camp-like settings whose camp management and provision of aid are recognised and ensured by the government, whilst “informal camps” refer to camp-like settings whose management and aid is not recognised or ensured by the government (Reach-initiative,

2018). From the preliminary fieldwork I narrowed down my subunits to two formal camps: Bakassi IDP camp and Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria (EYN, the church of the Brethren in Nigeria) IDP camp. The decision to focus on formal camps was made because they have government recognition and NGO presence; this makes them more of a direct contrast to self-settled IDPs. The two camps were also chosen because of their different composition; most camps only house one particular group of people. Bakassi camp housed 98% Muslim IDPs, whilst EYN was established by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and, as a result, only housed Christian IDPs. Both perspectives were important for this study.

Bakassi camp was established on January 25<sup>th</sup> 2015, with a population of 4,763 IDPs. There has been an influx of IDPs since then and, as of August 2019, it had a population of 39,176. The camp houses IDPs who lived in one of 5 local government areas (LGA) prior to displacement: Marte, Monguno, Gwoza, Nganzai and Guzamala. Of the 39,176, 22% are men, 29% women, 23% boys and 26% girls; women and girls comprise 55% of the camp. The choice of Bakassi camp was informed by the following reasons: 1) it has a huge presence of NGOs and international organisations which facilitated the gathering of information and also meant that security was tighter; making it safer for research. 2) Location and access to the camp was not too difficult (access is discussed further in Section 3.4.2). 3) Contact has already been established with the gatekeepers of the camp. 4) A majority of resident IDPs (58.3%) speak and understood Hausa language (the researcher's mother tongue), whilst the remaining speak Kanuri (the main language in Borno State), English and other local languages (IOM, 2017).

EYN camp was established on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2014, at a time when the BH attack had increased to where a lot of Christian LGAs were now being attacked and destroyed. The camp was formed by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and is located not too far from the central area of the city of Maiduguri. It houses IDPs from 4 LGAs; Gwoza, Chibok, Michika and Madagali. In August 2019 it had a population of 3,365 IDPs. The choice of EYN camp was prompted by the following reasons: 1) as mentioned earlier, part of understanding IDPs experiences is by trying to understand both their individual and group capabilities. In order to do so, religious identity was going to be examined as a group that has the potential to either enlarge or diminish capabilities. Considering the fact that religion is a huge part of people's identity in Nigeria and particularly in Borno State, it was necessary to interview Christian IDPs as well as Muslims and the Christians are concentrated in EYN camp. 2) Studying one large camp (Bakassi camp) and one relatively small camp (EYNA camp) maximised case-study variation. 3) Access was easy, and gatekeepers bypassed through the Youth Federation for World Peace (YFWP) camp intervention I was a part of in EYN camp. This also maximised safety (see also Section 3.4.2). 4) IDPs at this camp also spoke up to 3 languages, Hausa, English and their local language so communication would not be a problem.

### **3.4.2 Access, gatekeepers, and the recruitment process for camp IDPs**

In order to get access to the chosen camps, I was advised during the preliminary fieldwork to write to the director of the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) giving details of the research and asking for permission to visit the camps and interview IDPs. The access letter (see Appendix I) summarises what I was going to be doing in camps and urged the camp leaders and managers to give me access to the IDPs and generally support the research.

Using the letter, I was able to visit and was allowed access into Bakassi camp on that same day to start recruiting IDPs for interviews. The camp manager was able to let his assistant move around the camp with me for ease of recruitment and movement. To keep the research detailed but manageable, I wanted to interview 40 IDPs in total, 20 camp IDPs and 20 self-settled IDPs. For the 20 camp IDPs, I started by recruiting 5 people from Bakassi camp. 5 men (all with families) were chosen; one from each of the LGAs. The reason for selecting men/fathers was so that the research might, thereafter, assess whether there were differences in the challenges faced between IDPs with families and those without. I subsequently interviewed those without families too.

In Bakassi camp, I used direct recruitment, purposive sampling, and the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM) to recruit participants. Direct recruitment refers to direct contact between the study team and potential subjects in person (Thomas *et al.*, 2007). I took considerable care with this method because I did not want any participants to feel forced to participate in the study. As a result, I made sure to provide a detailed explanation of the study as well as the participant information sheet. I made sure that potential participants were well informed as to issues of consent (consent is discussed further in Section 3.9.1). The second method of recruitment used was purposive sampling. This is a type of non-probability sampling where the characteristics of a population or the objective of the study are used as a basis for selecting the participants (Lavrakas, 2008). Lastly, SSM was used as a method for finding research subjects where one subject gives a researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). Snowballing techniques are often used when researching groups of forced migrants as they are often hard to reach, and their precise number and location may be either unknown or only estimated. It was an approach that also naturally lent itself to self-settled IDPs (Sulaiman-Hill and Thompson, 2011).

This study adopted the typical case method which is a type of purposive sampling. Researchers tend to adopt purposive sampling when they want to study a phenomenon based on what they consider to be typical or standard members of the effected group (Lavrakas, 2008). For this purpose, I told the camp manager's assistant who I wanted to talk to, for example, a man from Monguno who has a family. As for the direct recruitment, this approach was adopted when I visited the school at Bakassi camp and met the principal. Through him I was able to adopt the SSM where, for example, he put me in contact

with an IDP woman from his community who he said was trusted amongst other IDP women. Through her, I was able to interview a lot of women including two focus group interviews – one with youth men and another with youth women – which I set up with her and even executed in her tent. I continued to recruit other IDPs directly that I would meet in the camp market, mosque or at times when IDPs queued up for one thing or the other. All participants who consented to taking part in the study cooperated well and were keen to answer my questions. For ethical reasons, all interviews were conducted with just the researcher and the participant.

Access and recruitment process were entirely different with IDPs in EYN camp. During the preliminary fieldwork I was put in contact with the head of an NGO called the Youth Federation for World Peace in Maiduguri (YFWP). Through him I was able to snowball and obtained many contacts for other NGOs and international organisations. I was also able to volunteer and follow the organisation on a few of their field interventions for camp IDPs. They gave interventions in two camps over a two week period; one of the camps was EYN. Through volunteering on a real camp intervention, I was able to recruit and interview some IDPs at the camp. In this way, access to the camp was easy. In addition, during the briefing for the camp intervention, the head of YFWP told members of EYN camp about my research and asked for IDPs who were willing to partake in the study to cooperate with me. As a result, the recruitment process was also easier and more productive. I was consequently able to approach and select participants directly, having gone through the appropriate ethical procedures. The camp was much smaller than Bakassi so each participant would take me to their tent where I would interview them in their own comfort. There was no foreseeable risk to my own safety here because the tents were in plain sight where other people could see me. I was able to interview some IDPs using this direct method and was able to recruit some other women through the SSM for one of the focus group interviews. Details of the interviews will be discussed in section 3.6.

### **3.4.3 Subunit 2: Self-settled IDPs**

According to the most recent Displacement Tracking Matrix, approximately 60% of IDPs worldwide are self-settled or living with hosts, in comparison to the 40% of IDPs who live in camps or camp-like settings (DTM, 2019). To answer an aspect of the research question focused on why some IDPs end up in camps while others self-settle, I sought to understand why there are more self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs. During the preliminary fieldwork I was not able to access any self-settled IDPs for a number of reasons. First, I was not able to make contact from Sheffield; such a contact was only made during the last few days of the preliminary fieldwork. Second, the self-settled IDPs are spread all across the city. As they often live amongst host communities and may be disguised amongst the urban poor, this made them difficult to reach (Sulaiman-Hill and Thompson, 2011). Thirdly, safety was an issue because, for self-settled IDPs, there are no gatekeepers or security. As a result, safety is solely the responsibility of the researcher.

#### **3.4.4 Access, gatekeepers and recruitment process for self-settled IDPs**

Access, gatekeepers, and the recruitment process were entirely different for self-settled IDPs compared to camp IDPs. For access to self-settled IDPs, I was introduced to the leader of Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) during my preliminary fieldwork. He introduced me to one of the IDPs he trusted, and also explained to me the best ways to get interviews with these IDPs, as well as the best times to go to their communities, how to remain safe, and things to avoid. There were no gatekeepers between me – the researcher – and the IDPs, except in one case where I was first introduced to the Imam of a local mosque in one of their communities. The best method of recruitment in this case was through the SSM. So, I first interviewed the person that the JNI leader put me in contact with, who then put me in contact with other self-settled IDPs. I tried to keep the criteria selection for the self-settled IDPs as similar as possible to that of camp IDPs where I could, in order to make the study more manageable and to make comparison richer. However, due to the dispersed nature of self-settled IDPs and challenges in accessing people that met all my criteria, I had to do the best I could through snowball sampling to access a variety of interviewees. I could not find people who matched the exact categories I had found in camps, but did manage to access a diversity of self-settled IDPs in terms of relation and gender. Self-settled IDPs in general were very hard to reach, very hard to track down and especially hard to have interviews with. They easily became impatient since they had no incentive to stay and incentives were not a safe way to present oneself in these communities.

#### **3.4.5 Key informants**

Key informants were an integral part of the study because they have first-hand knowledge about IDPs thus they present a perspective that is vital to understanding their experiences. Amongst other duties, they provide aid and support to IDPs, they formulate policies and practices that pertain to them, and publish reports about the needs and experiences of IDPs. It was necessary to explore their roles in supporting different kinds of IDPs and to assess how well their support matches the IDPs' perception of their needs. Key members of 11 organisations were interviewed: 4 government organisations, 4 international organisations, and 3 NGOs.

In Nigeria, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) are the two most prominent and most involved government agencies in the affairs of IDPs. Therefore it is important to introduce them at the onset and clarify their roles and jurisdiction. NEMA operates at the National level while SEMA operates at the State level. As the apex disaster management body in the country, NEMA is responsible for formulating policies related to disaster management in the country, monitoring and ensuring the state of preparedness against disaster, and the provision of relief materials to disaster victims across the country. NEMA also guides and



educates against sudden disaster across the country; the agency trains and undertakes human capacity development, vulnerability mapping, develops joint humanitarian action plans with other relevant stakeholders, and delivers critical rescue equipment throughout the country (NEMA Nigeria, 2022), Some of these roles are echoed in different ways by the representative of NEMA later on in the thesis particularly in Chapter 5.

On the other hand, SEMA is the disaster management body of the individual states (all 36 states in Nigeria have their own SEMA organisation). Since SEMA works at the state level, their roles include responding to, and providing sustained intervention in any form of emergency or disaster, co-ordinating the activities of relevant agencies in prevention and management of disasters, providing relief materials and/or financial aid to the victims of various disasters, as well as responding promptly to any emergency at hand, all in the particular state (LASEMA, 2022). SEMA is essentially responsible for the day-day operations of disaster management in the state throughout the four phases of disaster management (the preparedness, the response, the recovery and the mitigation phase). SEMA is embedded within the local community, down to the grassroots level, so they work hand in hand with the local community and have access to even the most rural areas. These roles are similarly echoed by the representative of SEMA which can be seen in Chapter 6.

Essentially, NEMA is the national body for managing all kinds of disasters, while SEMA is at the state level thus SEMA is under NEMA. NEMA is the first point of contact and action for any type of disaster, while SEMA takes over at the state level handling the day-to-day support of victims. The Boko Haram crisis in Maiduguri is so vast and prolonged that both NEMA and SEMA are working together and are both responsible for the aid, support and management of IDPs. In contrast to smaller crises around the country where after initial contact, NEMA passes on the management of the crises to SEMA.

#### **3.4.6 Access, gatekeepers and recruitment process for key informants**

Access to key informants was challenging. This was for two primary reasons. First, they were often very busy which made them unavailable. Secondly, they needed a formal request which sometimes took weeks without response. Prior to the main fieldwork I already knew that I wanted to interview a mix of key informants who are involved in the plight of IDPs in different ways, at different stages, and to different extents. I ended up with informants of government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations (mostly UN bodies).

Recruiting key informants had to be done partly through direct recruitment but mostly through the SSM. Key informants such as SEMA and NEMA representatives were recruited directly because I went directly to their office and asked for meetings with their directors. I laid the groundwork for the interviews at these meeting and was able to come back on separate dates to interview them. There were

no gatekeepers between policymaker respondents and I because I did not have to go through anyone but the respondent to ask for an interview.

### **3.5 Grey Literature**

Firstly, I had to identify, study and be familiar with any grey literature, policy or data, which this research used a lot of. Grey literature comprises materials and documents that are not produced for the general public or are controlled by commercial publishers. Grey literature is often difficult to search for or collect but it may hold a lot of important knowledge and evidence (Adams *et al.*, 2016). It may include, amongst others, working papers, government documents, reports, conference proceedings (Luzi, 2000). Given that a lot of data from Nigeria regarding Boko Haram and especially regarding IDPs is not available on the internet, grey literature gathered during fieldwork was essential to help answer some of the research questions. Some examples include monthly annual SEMA and NEMA reports on IDPs, which were given to them by the people I interviewed there. Meeting minutes from NEMA Humanitarian Coordination Forum were also shared with me because I was present at the meeting.

### **3.6 Semi-structured Interviews**

In-depth semi-structured interviews were an essential element of data collection in this study because, as Patton (2009) notes, they enable an in-depth investigation of a real-life entity. Bauer and Gaskell (2007), assert that individual semi-structured interviews are the best option for a study that seeks to explore case studies or detailed individual experiences. They consist of questions that help to guide the researcher on the appropriate areas to be explored; whilst also allowing them to deviate so as to gather more detail about an idea or response (Gill *et al.*, 2008). It is also ideal to use interviews when the topic being researched concerns issues that are particularly sensitive (Bauer and Gaskell, 2007). Additionally, qualitative interviewing plays an important role when combined with other methods such as observations.

Designing the interview questions for all the subunits was guided by a series of principles which were both ethical and in line with the qualitative nature of this study. 1) There was both open ended and closed ended questions in the interview. The open ended questions allowed participants to answer freely while broadening the diversification in responses. 2) Questions were kept short and simple, so respondents do not get too tired or impatient. 3) Simple language was used to enable respondents to understand clearly what is being asked. 4) Potentially sensitive questions were not asked at the onset of the interviews, rather they were left till the middle or end to avoid making respondents too anxious too soon. In addition they were made aware they did not have to respond to said sensitive questions.

### 3.6.1 Semi-structured interviews with camp IDPs

A total of 20 camp IDPs were interviewed. The interviews were conducted in English for participants who understood English, and in Hausa for participants who did not. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour. A summary of some of the interview questions can be found in Appendix II. Table 7 provides a summary of the camp IDP respondents.

*Table 7: Summary of camp IDP participants for semi-structured interviews*

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Local Government Area</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Camp</i>
<i>Camp IDP 1</i>	<i>Marte</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 2</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 3</i>	<i>Monguno</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 4</i>	<i>Marte</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 5</i>	<i>Guzamala</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 6</i>	<i>Nganzai</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 7</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 8</i>	<i>Monguno</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 9</i>	<i>Marte</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 10</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 11</i>	<i>Michika</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 12</i>	<i>Michika</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 13</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>EYN</i>
<i>Camp IDP 14</i>	<i>Marte</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 15</i>	<i>Monguno</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 16</i>	<i>Monguno</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 17</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 18</i>	<i>Guzamala</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 19</i>	<i>Nganzai</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>Bakassi</i>
<i>Camp IDP 20</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>EYN</i>

Source: Author, 2019.

There is quite a limited age range (25-53) for the semi-structured interviews with camp IDPs as seen in Table 6. This is because most people I was finding who are above 55 (particularly in Bakassi camp) could only speak their native language. People younger than 25 were grouped together in a focus group interview, which is shown in Table 9.

### 3.6.2 Semi-structured interviews with self-settled IDPs

In-depth semi-structured interviews were the main source of primary data for self-settled IDPs. The interview questions were guided by the same standards used in devising the interview questions for camp IDPs. Although the background questions for both camp and self-settled IDPs were the same, other questions were altered for self-settled IDPs as a consequence of the different circumstances of the two groups; (for a summary of the interview questions see Appendix III). Only 13 individual interviews with self-settled IDPs were undertaken because of difficulties in accessing and recruiting participants. All interviews were conducted in Hausa as I did not come across any English speaking self-settled IDPs. Whilst the participants only spoke Hausa, they still represented different ethnicities and different religions; important criterion for this study. Interviews with self-settled IDPs lasted for between 25 and 40 minutes because most interviewees were either busy, in a rush, or reluctant to go into detail about their experiences. I had been warned beforehand that this would be the case because the interviewees did not gain any aid or incentive from participating. Table 8 provides a summary of the self-settled IDP respondents.

**Table 8: Summary of self-settled IDP participants for semi-structured interviews**

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Local Government Area</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 1</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 2</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 3</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 4</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 5</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 6</i>	<i>Gwoza</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 7</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 8</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 9</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 10</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>M</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 11</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 12</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Self-settled IDP 13</i>	<i>Dikwa</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>F</i>

Source: Author, 2019.

Even though I could not interview as many people as in camps, I was able to maximise diversity of age here, as well as good gender and ethnicity balance.

### 3.6.3 Semi-structured interviews with key informants

Semi-structured interviews were sufficient to gather the necessary data for this group. All interviews with key informants were conducted in Maiduguri. The interviews were administered in English and they lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour 45 minutes. The interview questions (see Appendix IV for summary) were different from the IDP interview questions; they comprised open ended and close ended questions. Table 9 provides a summary of the respondents. It should be noted that whilst all participants were key members of their respective organisations and permission was granted to name organisations, neither the names or specific job titles of individual participants are revealed so as to ensure anonymity. Instead, individual interviewees are referred to as ‘representative of (company name)’.

*Table 9: Summary of key informants for semi-structured interviews*

<i>Government</i>	<i>International Organisations</i>	<i>Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)</i>
<i>Borno State Urban Planning and Development Board (BSUPDB)</i>	<i>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)</i>	<i>Herwa Community Development Initiative</i>
<i>State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)</i>	<i>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</i>	<i>Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI)</i>
<i>National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)</i>	<i>Gender Equality, Peace and Development Centre (GEPDC)</i>
<i>Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (RRR)</i>	<i>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</i>	-

Source: Author, 2019.

### 3.7 Focus Group Interviews (FGI)

Focus group interviews are discussions on a given issue by a small group of people who are brought together by a trained moderator (in this case the researcher) to explore ideas, experiences, attitudes and feelings about an issue or a topic (Muhammad and Ijaz, 2013). Researchers such as Patton, (2009), and Morgan and Krueger, (1993) are of the opinion that focus group interviews are beneficial particularly when rich and detailed data is required, when a researcher is trying to find out people’s understanding or experiences about an issue, and when examining sensitive issues.

<sup>1</sup> In Nigeria, NEMA operates at the national level while SEMA operates at the state level.

Since my study is an explorative one which aims to collect different viewpoints from multiple parties, focus group interviews felt appropriate for this due to its strength to attain information from a diverse group of audience at the same time (Greenbaum, 1998). The decision to undertake focus group interviews came on the field when I realised that some IDPs did not want to keep waiting for their turn to be interviewed individually. I also observed that due to the sensitivity of the issues being discussed, some people were quite reserved in their response on their own but were more outspoken when around their peers. This was another reason why focus group interviews were beneficial in this case.

For camp IDPs, I recruited individuals through a direct method and snowball method which I discuss in detail later in this chapter. I organised the focus group interviews and held two of them in the tent of one of the women who was the head of the women in her community. The offer to use her tent proved to be helpful because it provided the women a safe space to have conversations with me and to feel relaxed and comfortable. Recruitment for the focus group interviews for self-settled IDPs was only possible through the snowball method. The interviews took place outside a private mosque where we placed a mat and sat in a circle. For both camp and self-settled IDPs, the interviews mostly took place with us sitting around each other often in a circle and on a mat on the floor. In a Northern Nigerian setting, this encourages trust and provides a relaxed atmosphere so it feels like we are simply just having a chat. In my opinion, this helps with the validity of the data being collected.

In a focus group interview, it helps to ensure that the composition of the group that is taking part is right therefore the members have attributes that are homogenous, but there should also be some degree of variation so that contrasting opinions can be derived (Krueger, 2002). In line with this, for both camp and self-settled IDPs, I made sure that the groups were mixed having people from different local government areas, different family compositions, and different jobs/lifestyles. This matters in the way they experience camp life. On the other hand, I kept the age range of each group quite small to improve the success of the interviews so that respondents can feel comfortable sharing information. I took into account the fact that in Nigeria, there are certain things someone of a younger age may not feel comfortable discussing in the presence of an older adult. I also did not mix genders for the same reason therefore allowing people to feel comfortable enough to speak freely. Although focus groups usually run for longer than an hour with breaks in between, these ran for 45 minutes to an hour without a break therefore keeping the time to a minimum in order to not lose the attention of the respondents. The small size of the groups (an average of 5 IDPs per group) was another factor that saw that the interviews ran shorter. Just like with the semi-structured interviews, the focus group interviews were also recorded with a piece of recording device and observations along with other notes were taken down in my field notes.

Focus group interviews are a great way of improving the validity and credibility of the study (Greenbaum, 1998). I observed that people were able to express their views more openly because they felt comfortable sharing certain information after others have shared too. I also paid attention and observed when people agreed or disagreed with the comments made by a respondent. For example someone might make a comment and another IDP will have a different experience or make a comment and majority will say that is not the case. This all played a key role in the triangulation of the data I collected. Table 10 provides a summary of camp IDP focus group respondents.

**Table 10: Summary of camp IDP participants for focus group interviews (FGI)**

<b><i>FGI + Location</i></b>	<b><i>Local Government Areas of participants</i></b>	<b><i>Age Group</i></b>	<b><i>Gender</i></b>	<b><i>Number of participants</i></b>
<i>FGI 1 Camp (Bakassi camp)</i>	<i>Marte, Nganzai, Guzamala, Monguno</i>	<i>18 - 25</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>FGI 2 Camp (Bakassi camp)</i>	<i>Gwoza, Marte, Monguno</i>	<i>20 - 30</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>FGI 3 Camp (EYN camp)</i>	<i>Gwoza, Marte, Monguno, Nganzai, Chibok</i>	<i>35 - 60</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>6</i>

Source: Author, 2019.

4 focus group interviews were undertaken with self-settled IDPs. Table 11 provides a summary of the respondents.

**Table 11: Summary of self-settled IDP participants for focus group interviews (FGI)**

<b><i>FGI + Location</i></b>	<b><i>Local Government Areas of participants</i></b>	<b><i>Age Group</i></b>	<b><i>Gender of group</i></b>	<b><i>Number of participants</i></b>
<i>FGI 1 Self-settled</i>	<i>Wulari, Gwoza, Marte, Baga</i>	<i>20 - 40</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>FGI 2 Self-settled</i>	<i>Bama, Mafa, Dikwa, Marte</i>	<i>21 - 35</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>FGI 3 Self-settled</i>	<i>Bama, Mafa, Dikwa Marte</i>	<i>40 - 55</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>FGI 4 Self-settled</i>	<i>Gwoza, Marte, Dikwa</i>	<i>30 - 40</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>4</i>

Source: Author, 2019.

In summary, for camp IDPs there were 20 semi-structured interviews and 3 focus group interviews with 16 people in total. For self-settled IDPs there were 13 semi-structured interviews and 4 focus group interviews with 18 people in total. In total, there were 36 camp IDP participants 31 self-settled IDP

participants. In addition there were 11 interviews with key informants. A grand total of 78 respondents participated in the fieldwork portion of this thesis.

### **3.8 Observations**

Observations are a way of “collecting data using one’s senses especially looking and listening in a systematic and meaningful way” (McKechnie, 2008:573 in Smit and Onwuegbuzie, 2018:1). Observations have been described by researchers such as Adler and Adler (1994), Patton (2009), and Kawulich (2005) as the foundation of all research methods. There were many ways in which observations were useful in this study. First, they complemented the interviews in the sense that they provided spontaneous, unplanned and unpredicted information. As the participants were in their normal environments, they behaved and reacted in more realistic ways which produced a greater range of behaviours. They also improved the validity of the information I was getting and helped to produce richer, more comprehensive data (Thomas, 2011).

While observations played a significant role in understanding and interacting with camp IDPs, it was largely impossible to employ observations for self-settled IDPs. This was because the self-settled IDPs did not all live together in a confined space. They all participated in different activities, went to different schools, engaged and related with each other differently, and were all guided by different circumstances. Most interviews with self-settled IDPs also happened in different casual places, for example, in a mosque, at a local store, in the courtyard of a house and so on. The interviews did not always occur in locations that required observing. In addition, unlike the camp IDPs, I did not spend any time with a majority of the self-settled IDPs beyond that which was required to undertake the interviews.

It is essential to note that participant and camp observations helped improve the validity of the data being collected and in triangulating sources. For example, one of the occasions I was fortunate to observe was the World Bank employing some janitors in Bakassi camp and simultaneously paying the current janitors their monthly wage. I was able to observe the role of the World Bank as well as the role of the camp managers in hiring janitors. I saw first-hand how some IDPs were pleading to be hired for the job while others were being selected based on favouritism. I witnessed complaints being filed with the camp manager regarding how some IDPs had previously done the work and thus should not be selected again this time. On the other hand, I also witnessed IDPs who were getting paid celebrating the salary they received. It gave me an opportunity to talk to one young IDP man who had received his salary, who said every time they get paid is a celebration in the camp. He further added that you will find parents and children smiling and celebrating on those days.

Another example of where observations were used to verify data was at EYN camp during the two week intervention by YFWP. During the course of the intervention, YFWP in collaboration with FAO



distributed food and financial aid to the members of EYN camp. I observed as each household was called to present the voucher that was previously given to them in order to collect their share of the food and cash. I witnessed as IDPs gleefully collected the aid materials with some even taking pictures on their camera phones with the distributors of the aid materials. The IDPs I spoke with during this period said they often do not get enough food and money to support them for the entire month, so this as an add-on means everyone in the camp is happy that month. Another lady who I observed did not receive any food or money said she was a self-settled IDP who came to the camp when she heard about the intervention in hopes that they will give her something out of it. She was however refused on the basis that she did not have a voucher because she did not reside in the camp and could not be given anything without a voucher.

Accordingly, observations allowed me to go beyond IDPs account and self-interpretation of camp activities, how some camp events are managed by the camp managers and aid agencies, and the different ways in which aid and support is offered and distributed in the different camps. It also allowed me to verify some IDPs account of the aid and support they get in camps, or for example, the favouritism they spoke about in their interviews (these accounts are discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7). The observations were mostly recorded in field notes with brief descriptions of what was being observed.

### **3.9 Ethics and ethical considerations**

There are many ethical issues a researcher of forced migration or displacement needs to consider before, during, and after data collection. The underlying considerations to take account of are the vulnerability of the participants and the sensitivity of the issue being studied. Displaced populations may have fled war, experienced traumatic events, and live under insecure conditions. Such hardships are, according to Krause (2017), often the focus of forced migration research including this one. He asserts that it is the responsibility of researchers conducting fieldwork to focus on methodological rigour when gathering data and to place ethical considerations at the centre of the process (Krause, 2017). The ethical concerns this study considered are discussed as follows.

#### **3.9.1 Consent**

After making myself familiar with the context of the study, the broad history of my respondents, and the extent of their vulnerability, I had to then make sure that I chose respondents based on equitable principles. First, I had to make sure that my choice of respondents was diverse in order to showcase different perspectives and avoid assumptions of a preference among IDPs. The forms of diversity included different ethnicities, different LGAs of origin, different religious groups, and a broad range of ages. Thereafter, I had to make sure that all chosen respondents were physically and mentally competent enough to give their voluntary and informed consent to participate in the study. These are the most

important guiding principles for research with people in situations of forced migration (Clark-Kazak, 2017). In addition, I made sure participants were aware of the purpose of the research and the type of questions they would be asked; this was facilitated through a participant information sheet (see Appendix V). I made sure that I gave each respondent enough time to understand the sheet and also gave them opportunities to ask me questions. The participant information sheet discussed their rights as participants, the potential risks and benefits of their participation, the anonymity of the study and their responses, the lack of pressure to participate, and their right to leave or end an interview at any time. Each participant was asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix VI). All participants of this study (except two) fully consented to taking part in the study by signing a consent form. The two exceptions did not want to sign a document, and instead opted for verbal consent. This was recorded and taken as sufficient. The consent form also asked participants for their approval for me to record them during the course of interviews; all participants consented.

### **3.9.2 Potential harm to researcher and participants**

The principle aim of ethics in social science research is to make sure that the participants of the research are safe from any harm that might come their way on account of their participation (Hugman, Pittaway and Bartolomei, 2011). For this study, no foreseeable physical harm was detected as a possibility for any of the respondents. However, there was the possibility of psychological distress due to individuals' vulnerability and the sensitivity of the topics being discussed. To try and mitigate any psychological distress I first had a conversation with camp managers and camp chairmen on how to best relate with IDPs, how to cause them minimal distress and what was acceptable or not in terms of how I relate with them. I also made sure I recruited each respondent ahead of time giving them the opportunity to familiarise themselves with me before we even sit for an interview. In order to reduce any chances of further harm to participants, no children under the age of 16 or anyone deemed unfit to give consent themselves were interviewed during this fieldwork (16 and above is the legal age for informed consent in Nigeria).

With regard to potential harm to the researcher, there was no way to absolutely foresee every possible potential harm; therefore extra measures were taken to try and mitigate them any unforeseeable harm. For example, I drove everywhere with a security personnel (alongside a driver), who was dressed casually to avoid drawing attention to myself. He always waited for me in the car while I conducted interviews because camps had their own security personnel's within them. I also made sure to be home early everyday as advised by the family I was staying with. Where the driver or security personnel were unavailable, I could not go out to conduct interviews on those days because I did not use any public transport for my own safety. I was encouraged by several people (including the family I stayed with) that my safety was assured because BH attacks had largely calmed down in Maiduguri. Nevertheless, I still had an open return flight ticket to leave Maiduguri immediately at the first thought of any unrest.

A detailed overview of potential harm to the researcher was provided for the risk assessment. All guidelines were followed, and risks were curbed during fieldwork. .

### **3.9.3 Confidentiality and privacy of information**

As researchers, it is our duty to protect the trust that participants put in us. In this study that meant ensuring the confidentiality of the information given and respecting individuals' privacy. IDP participants were informed that all interviews would be recorded, analysed and written anonymously so as to protect their privacy. Pseudonyms are used throughout the thesis. Photographs taken and used by me were all consented to by the camp managers as most of the pictures are taken from afar so no IDP is traceable in them. Photographs where an IDPs is clearly shown have been consented to by the IDP.

For key informants this was a bit different. Although I did not need personal information such as age and ethnic origin, taking organisation name and job or role descriptions within that organisation meant that there's a chance certain information could still be traced back to the informant. I made this clear to each of the participants so all who signed the informed consent were aware of this and were happy to proceed. All interviews were conducted with only the participant and the researcher present. No third parties were present during any interviews for additional privacy.

### **3.9.4 Data usage and storage**

All participants were made aware of where and how the information they provided was going to be used. It was made clear that all data would be used strictly for research only. All interviews were audio recorded using a piece of password secure recorder. After each day of interviewing, interviews were transferred from the recorder to my laptop into a folder, which was password secure and then the interview was deleted from the recorder. A duplicate copy of the interviews was stored in my iCloud. This was password secure and gave me the ability to delete all folders on my laptop in case of loss, theft or damage to the computer. Nobody other than the researcher had access to the recordings. Important fieldnotes that were taken by me were also inputted into word files in the computer making it possible to shred any identifiable personal data after they are done being used. Any further identifiable personal data will be destroyed once the project has ended (3 years after publication).

### **3.9.5 Positionality and reflexivity**

The participants in my study varied across different subunits. As a consequence, my positionality also varied between subunits and respondents. As the researcher, I was born and raised in Northern Nigeria, I am Muslim and I also speak and understand two out three of the major languages that are spoken in Maiduguri; Hausa and English. I also present myself in a similar fashion to the people of Maiduguri

and my respondents. This includes my body language, the way I dress, and my cultural and religious values. All of these factors played a significant role in my data collection process because I appeared to be an insider. However, there were also situations and moments that presented themselves that made me an outsider, as I explain below.

Upon arriving in Maiduguri I realised that I was immediately trusted by the people who aided me throughout the study because I spoke to them in their language and I presented myself as one of them. They were very willing to help me with anything I needed to progress my fieldwork and they often made comments about the ease of working with someone like me who understood their culture. They would also tell me stories about other researchers who lacked this understanding and, as a result, made them feel uncomfortable with the way they conducted their research ethics. This connection we had significantly aided me.

This was also evident with the first subunit; the camp IDPs. The older men and women took me like their daughter and often referred to me as ‘our daughter’. This is the language of someone who trusts and adores you in Northern Nigeria. In Bakassi camp, one of the women who was the head of the women in her community really emphasised this point. She would introduce me to other people in the camp as her daughter (not literally), who is here to do research; this alone gained me their trust. She let me conduct some interviews and focus group interviews in her tent where she would often offer me water and food in between interviews, and let me say my daily prayers. She would even buy cold water for the participants I was interviewing in her tent. It is extremely hot in Maiduguri, so these small gestures went a long way. This connection that formed a friendship made the information I was collecting feel very honest and authentic. I felt it also reduced the psychological distress that came with asking them certain questions. I was able to have many interesting and casual conversations with respondents after our interviews, which enriched my interview responses and helped me corroborate the information I had been collecting. All together this made my interviews in Bakassi camp both with men and women run very smoothly. The younger female respondents in Bakassi camp had the same inclination towards me. They were very open with me and spent a lot of time also telling me stories and basically hanging out with me. The younger male respondents on the other hand had their reservations. It was obvious to them that I was an outsider and being young and a woman made them very reserved towards me when it came to our interviews. Despite my efforts to make them feel comfortable around me, our interviews were a lot less casual and they only responded to the exact questions I was asking as a result. Not a lot of casual conversations outside of that took place.

In the second camp EYN, I initially thought I would be a complete outsider because I am not Christian. However, I was very surprised and pleased that this was not the case. I received an even greater trust and welcome than I did in Bakassi camp. Similar to Bakassi camp, a lot of the older participants referred

to me as their daughter and were very kind and helpful throughout the interview process. Once more, neither female nor male youths extended this type of welcome because I was a complete stranger and outsider to them. Interviews with them were very straightforward with no extra pleasantries involved.

With the self-settled IDPs however, I was a complete outsider. There were no welcome, no pleasantries, and no extra chats. The Self-settled IDPs reminded me whenever they could that I was not one of them, and that I was not an NGO either who had any aid for them. I was simply a researcher to them and not even a local to Maiduguri or Borno State. It was interesting to think about where the hostility came from. Perhaps it is because camp IDPs are more used to people like NGOs coming in that they welcomed me more warmly. Or perhaps it is because self-settled IDPs are not usually treated as they would like by outsiders and this makes them suspicious.

For a marginalised group of people, having their stories heard is very important. It follows, that it is equally as important for the researcher in such situations to remain ethical and also gather enough of those stories in order to convey the information they are trying to portray. I did my best to uphold ethical standards and remained consistent throughout the fieldwork. I felt that the study's participants were very kind and helpful and without that feeling of being an insider the fieldwork would have been an even greater challenge.

### **3.10 Data analysis process**

After data had been collected and transcribed or/and translated, it was analysed. The purpose of the analysis was to arrive at findings that would either confirm or disprove the hypotheses, or add new knowledge to existent understanding of the experiences of IDPs, and how these experiences differ between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs.

After transcribing and reading through all the data thoroughly, coding began. Coding allowed the researcher to group responses from the data into more digestible themes, ideas or categories; thereby making it easier to compare and contrast (Taylor and Gibbs, 2010). The coding categories for this study were derived from the research questions, the conceptual framework, and the data collected from fieldwork. It was organised and structured using Quirkos. Quirkos is a software package for qualitative analysis of text commonly used in social science. After that, the data was analysed by comparing and contrasting all the information that had been allocated to the same category of themes.

### **3.11 Limitations of the methods**

There were some limitations in this study and in the methodology that could be improved in future studies. The first weakness concerns the limited array of literature on this particular area. The study had

to rely on literature from refugee studies and a lot of grey literature. Secondly, there was limited information available on the internet regarding: the Boko Haram insurgency, IDPs, and Borno State. This meant that I had to conduct preliminary fieldwork in order to gather the information that I felt was needed and gauge the feasibility of the project and my methods. I had to go through an entire ethical procedure for the preliminary fieldwork and then fly to Maiduguri. This all took time and, in turn, reduced the time available for the my main fieldwork.

Time constraints were the biggest limitation for the data collection methods of this study. Other than the time spent during preliminary fieldwork, there was also the time it took to access and recruit participants. Camp IDPs were easier to recruit, but self-settled IDPs took longer to access, and key informants took a lot of time with up 3 weeks without any response from them. Another limitation is the sample size of the study. Although the study took a qualitative approach, which made use of in-depth and rich data, there are over a million IDPs in Borno State so a larger sample size would improve the results and analysis of future studies, although a larger sample size in this case was impossible for one researcher. Lastly, safety was a very delicate issue in Maiduguri, so I had to be cautious about undergoing fieldwork past a certain time of the day and also cautious about staying in the city too long. This further limited my efficiency. There is a need to increase sample size, time spent doing fieldwork and even resources including manpower in order to produce richer data and results for future studies.

### **3.12 Conclusion**

This chapter has effectively explained and justified the methodological approaches used in this study. An interpretivist approach allowed the researcher to investigate, interpret and understand the phenomenon rather than generalise social realities to a population. Qualitative methods used and focused upon in-depth semi-structured interviews coupled with focus group interviews and some observations. Semi-structured interviews were vital because they allowed the researcher to explore detailed individual experiences, while the focus group interviews enabled further enrichment and triangulation.

The chapter also explained the rationale for Maiduguri as the case selection. Similarly, the rationale for choosing the different subunits was discussed, along with why a comparative study was essential. Detail of each subunit was provided including discussions upon access, gatekeepers and recruitment process. Following that, ethical considerations were discussed. Lastly, issues of positionality were discussed along with weaknesses and limitations.

## Chapter 4

### The Boko Haram insurgency as a driver for peoples' displacement into Maiduguri

#### 4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents details of the regional context and the dynamics of Boko Haram. This will allow us to understand the features of the region where the group emerged, as well as some of the characteristics that lay at the foundation of the development of the group. It then narrows to a focus on the advent of the group in Borno State, which will showcase the group's leadership, membership, sponsors and ideology. This section further highlight one of the effects of the insurgency and the one that is at the fore of this study; the displacement of people. It highlights the rate of the displacement using some key figures and also map out the movement of the displaced people, showing where they came from and where they ended up. It will allow us to see if they had a choice in their post displacement settlement or if they were forced into these settlements. Lastly, the section highlights the different features of the two types of settlements and concludes the section by exploring the factors that lead to post displacement settlement.

The chapter concludes by exploring some other effects of the displacement. It particularly touches on economic effects, socio-cultural effects, effects on basic human needs and the effects on protection and security. This section also shows some other effects the insurgency and the displacement has had on the city of Maiduguri and the host communities as well (albeit in brief).

#### 4.2 Regional context and dynamics of Boko Haram

The biggest threat currently to global peace and stability is terrorism and it has especially been apparent within the African continent, including in Nigeria (Al Chukwuma and Philip, 2014:39). In 2013, Nigeria ranked the 7<sup>th</sup> most terrorised country in the world; making it the worst country affected by terrorism in Africa alongside Somalia, according to the latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI). This ordeal is not new for the country. Since returning to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has continued to confront serious security challenges. Some of these challenges are ethnic and religious conflicts, inter- and intra-communal clashes, and militancy in the Niger Delta region to name a few (Al Chukwuma and Philip, 2014).


Currently, the greatest security challenge Nigeria is dealing with has to do with the phenomenon of terrorism which materialised with the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency since 2002 (Akinola, 2015). The group is known globally as Boko Haram, however, they did not pick this name themselves; villagers who saw it fit picked the name given how often the group criticises western civilisation. The term Boko Haram is derived from a combination of the Hausa language word for 'book' *boko*, and the

Arabic word for ‘forbidden’ *haram*, when put together, Boko Haram is understood to mean ‘Western education is forbidden’. The group has been known to reject this name saying it favours the title ‘Western culture is forbidden’. The Islamic fundamentalist group actually refers to itself as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lid Da’wati Wal Jihad, meaning people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings (Agbiboa, 2013).

The Lake Chad Region – the border area between Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – has mostly been affected by the group’s activities. This includes predominantly the extreme North Region of Cameroon, the Lac Region of Chad, the Diffa Region of Niger, and the North East states of Nigeria (LCBC, 2021). The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), estimated that in 2014, 2.2 million people lived directly from the resources of Lake Chad on the shores and islands of the Lake itself, with nearly 50 million people living within the conventional basin. The conventional basin is the area shared by Cameroon (2.1%), Chad (44%), Niger (29%), and Nigeria (7.5%), expanding across over 427,500 km<sup>2</sup> (indicated in the map in Figure 5) (FAO, 1997). The Lake area provides a means of livelihood for a wide range of rural population through fishing, livestock herding, flood-recession agriculture, hunting and gathering. Moreover, the land surrounding the lake has a high agricultural potential. The combination of all the lake’s attributes makes it a net exporter of food and a source of jobs. Furthermore, 13 million people in the lake’s hinterlands benefit from its system. This includes regions of Borno in Nigeria, especially its capital and biggest city, Maiduguri (LCBC, 2021).



Figure 5: Map indicating Lake Chad Basin.



Source: Author adapted from Google Earth, 2021.

The region highlighted in Figure 6 has a large human and natural capital as it links the countries through a web of economic, trade, historical, political, cultural, ethnic and religious ties. The region has vast oil and other mineral reserves, and its routes are frequented by cattle herdsman and pastoralists. Additionally, it experiences a high migration rate for economic and religious reasons from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and beyond; mainly for the completion of education in Islamic learning centres that exist within Northern Nigeria. The accumulation of the migration occurring along the region has been the source for unification for a long time. Nonetheless, this trait also acts a contributor to the challenges that the region faces as well as the coping mechanism of its people (UNHCR, 2016).

Despite the lake's outstanding qualities, the bordering countries around it have extremely low development indicators in the global economy. "In the 2015 Human Development Index, Chad and Niger were among the bottom three countries ranking 185 and 188 out of 188 countries. Cameroon and Nigeria also received low rankings of 152 and 153 respectively, although this is relatively better. Furthermore, areas around the lake, including Niger's Diffa, North-East Nigeria, the Cameroonian Extreme North, and Chad's Lac region, are among the poorest regions of each country with visible gaps in socioeconomic indicators." Furthermore, the population of the region is expected to double in the next 20 years, making it one of the fastest population growth rates in the world (UNHCR, 2016).

Evidently, the features of the Lake Chad region make it prone to fragility and conflict; which are driven by a large degree of limited job opportunities, access to services and justice, and more. (World Bank, 2011). Figure 6 illustrates different factors that increase the risk of conflict in this region.

Figure 6: Risk Factors for conflict in the Lake Chad Region.



Source: Author adapted from World Bank, 2011.

### **4.3 The advent of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria**

Boko Haram had been in existence since the 1960s but only became evident in Nigeria in 2002. Since its advent in Nigeria in 2002, the group was largely calm between 2004-2009 and in this period it expanded from their base in Maiduguri, Borno State, into other states such as Niger, Bauchi and Yobe. Violence in this period was relatively small and the groups modus operandi at the time was the use of gunmen on motorbikes. Examples include sporadic attacks in Borno State, Bauchi, and Yobe, and attacks on police stations in numerous sites in Borno (Osumah, 2013).

Osumah (2013) tells us that “Mohammad Yusuf was its first leader while Alhaji Buji Foi, former commissioner of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the immediate past regime, was alleged by many reports to be its financier. Another prominent member of the group was Baa Mohammed, Yusuf’s father-in-law (Osumah, 2013:541). They were all captured by the Nigerian military and handed over to the police force who then executed them in a major anti-government revolution in July 2009, which originated in Bauchi State. It involved five northern Nigerian states causing approximately 800 fatalities and displacing thousands of people. The aftermath of this resulted in Boko Haram breaking apart, as their leader had now been killed, thousands of their members detained and several of their top leaders had fled across the border to seek refuge. The violence of July 2009 became the originator of the turmoil that engulfed Nigeria and its people for the next ten years. Abubakar Shekau subsequently emerged as the group’s new leader in 2010 with the group resorting to various sources to fund its operations. It is alleged to have robbed banks, and some prominent Northern politicians and traditional rulers have also been suspected of financing them (Osumah, 2013; Weeraratne, 2015; Oyewole, 2015; Amao, 2020). Other groups from countries across North Africa and the Middle East are also allegedly part of the financiers of BH (Tajudeen, 2011).

As mentioned earlier, the group rejects secularism and western education, particularly the type of western education that they believe is in conflict with the Qur’an; like Darwinian evolution, astronomy, genetic engineering, philosophy, and so. This belief is born from an animosity towards the way education in the country has developed towards Western lines. From the groups’ perspective, only the privileged acquire such education and the same people end up becoming politicians and leaders. As a result, they view the people who have acquired such knowledge as using their education to oppress the masses and make them experience hardship. The Boko Haram insurgency is thus a jihad (a holy war) against the people who acquire and use Western education (Anugwom, 2019; Anayochukwu, 2011).

Additionally, the group rejects democracy and believe what they are doing is fighting for social justice. The democratic government has been unsuccessful in meeting the needs and expectations of these people and that fuels their hatred for democracy (Ibrahim, 2011). Similar to other conflicts, it has complex and deep-rooted structural drivers. Some of the drivers include, poor performance on the

Human Development Index and Global Peace Index, and widespread corruption. Other structural issues include economic and political marginalisation, slow development, inadequate functional infrastructure, extreme poverty, poor governance; which exacerbates frustration and a sense of injustice among the population. In North-East Nigeria in particular, the youth are exceptionally vulnerable due to inadequate access and poor quality of education, and limited economic opportunities resulting in chronic unemployment and high levels of poverty (Osumah, 2013). In addition to all these challenges, there is also the issue of almajiri (children separated from their families for mendicant purposes). These children start off wanting to progress their future opportunities through Qur'anic education, but end up with scant options for sustenance resulting in them being even more vulnerable (Chiemerem, 2010). These issues have all been worsened by the state's limited presence thus promoting an increase of different non-state actors such as traditional, community, private and sometimes criminal actors in its stead. The non-state actors began to fill the governance voids in areas such as security, service provision, and justice. All of these social drivers that have been frustrating the people were further exacerbated by a chain of brief and often unexpected clashes that began to provoke violence in the region, the most noteworthy being the death of the then leader Mohammed Yusuf (Mercy Corps, 2016).

The group asserts that what they are doing is fighting for justice against the government for the sake of disadvantaged people whose rights have been neglected by the Nigerian constitution. These economically challenged people are mostly found in the Northern states of the country where Boko Haram is more prominent. As seen in a National Bureau of Statistics report dating from September 2018 – October 2019, up to 40% of Nigeria's population lived below the poverty line. That is 82.9 million people. The northwest region of the country showed the highest poverty levels; 87.7% of people live under the poverty line compared with 4.5% in the southwestern commercial hub, Lagos State (Aljazeera, 2020).

The then leader Mohammed Yusuf had established a religious hub, constituting a Mosque and an Islamic school. It was this religious hub that was used as a recruiting ground; many children from poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, and other neighbouring countries attended the school (IRIN, 2011; Anugwom, 2019). Sources told Higazi (2013) "...that Yusuf subsequently embarked on a massive campaign to recruit followers from all backgrounds. The wealthier members were encouraged to make generous donations to the cause, and the funds were used to acquire weapons and feed the members. Even those who were not wealthy were encouraged to take part in the "divine mission" by making symbolic contributions, in addition to engaging in fighting in the rising army to accomplish the group's goals." (Higazi 2013:148). Additionally, "On June 19, 2009, Muhammad Yusuf delivered a sermon on *jihad* and urged his followers on the need to acquire weapons of any size and type." (Higazi, 2013:152). In 2010, the group came out and made claims about training some of its fighters in Somalia as Jihadists. They also made claims of links to international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which reflects an ideological and political affinity. Most members of the group do not speak English so they essentially communicate in Hausa and Arabic (Higazi, 2013).

Thereafter, the insurgency began to ravage the country, particularly with the use of explosives and firearms leaving devastating and deadly consequences. Nigeria's ethnoreligious fault lines as well as national security forces were deliberately targeted in the group's attacks, which showed increased sophistication and coordination (Hassan, 2012; Oyetunji, 2011). Since its advent, the insurgency has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced over 3 million people (Global Conflict Tracker, 2022). Another estimated 2,000 – 7,000 people have gone missing, including abducted women and children. Most of the killings and displacement started from 2011, with 2014 being the deadliest year of the conflict to date (UNHCR, 2016). Boko Haram's tactics have reverted to irregular warfare, with frequent terrorist strikes still occurring across the region (Anugwom, 2019).

A significant consequence of the violence is the displacement and dire humanitarian crisis that has threatened human security in Nigeria. Other consequences include loss of life, loss of property, people severely injured, loss of livelihoods, family and life structures, loss of churches, mosques, hospitals, schools, government buildings, police stations, military barracks, markets, bus stations, gas stations and many more have all been attacked (Akinola, 2015). Table 12 presents a sample of a few out of many attacks attributed to Boko Haram throughout the Northern parts of Nigeria, and Figure 7 shows recorded BH attacks and fatalities from 2010 – 2021. As noted in Figure 8, the BH insurgency is the main reason for displacement in North-East Nigeria.

**Table 12: Sample of Boko Haram attacks across Northern Nigeria**


<i>S/N</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
<i>1.</i>	<i>January 2010</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>Killed 4 persons</i>
<i>2.</i>	<i>January 2010</i>	<i>Bauchi State</i>	<i>Prisons</i>	<i>Freed 700 inmates</i>
<i>3.</i>	<i>15 April 2010</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>INEC office</i>	<i>Killed several persons</i>
<i>4.</i>	<i>22 April 2010</i>	<i>Adamawa State</i>	<i>Prisons</i>	<i>Freed 14 inmates</i>
<i>5.</i>	<i>30 May 2010</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>Younger brother of the Shehu of Borno (traditional Emirate of Borno)</i>	<i>Killed 1 person</i>
<i>6.</i>	<i>October 2010</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>Former Vice Chairman, ANPP</i>	<i>Killed 1 person</i>
<i>7.</i>	<i>16 June 2011</i>	<i>Police Headquarters in Abuja</i>	<i>The Inspector General of Police</i>	<i>73 vehicles destroyed</i>
<i>8.</i>	<i>20 June 2011</i>	<i>Katsina State</i>	<i>Police station</i>	<i>Killed 5 police officers</i>
<i>9.</i>	<i>26 June 2011</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>Beer garden</i>	<i>Killed 25 persons</i>

10.	27 June 2011	Borno State	Officers of Nigerian Customs Service	Killed 2 and injured 3 persons
11.	03 July 2011	Borno State	Beer garden	Killed at least 20 persons
12.	09 July 2011	Borno State	Governor of Borno State	-
13.	26 August 2011	Abuja, Federal Capital Territory	UN office	Killed 18 persons
14.	28 August 2011	Bauchi State	Home of former Minister Yakubu Lame, bombed	-
15.	06 September 2011	Bauchi State	Bombing of a police station and a bank	Killed 6 policemen and 1 civilian
16.	24 November 2011	Yobe, Kaduna and Borno States	Bombings	Killed 150 persons
17.	08 December 2011	Kaduna State	Bombing of a market	Killed 15 persons
18.	16 December 2011	Kano State	Attacked Air Force Compressive Secondary School	Killed 6 persons
19.	24 December 2011	Yobe State	Clashed with police	Killed 50 persons
20.	24 December 2011	Borno State	Multiple bombings in Maiduguri	Killed 11 persons
21.	25 December 2011	Niger State	Christmas day bombing of five Churches	Killed 43 persons and 3 Boko Haram members
22.	05 January 2012	Gombe State	A Church	Killed 6 worshippers and 10 others wounded
23.	06 January 2012	Adamawa State	Christian mourners	Killed 17 persons
24.	20 January 2012	Kano State	Various points including: Police headquarters, immigration passport office, police station and others	Killed 185 persons
25.	14-15 April 2014	Borno State	Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok	276 girls kidnapped
26.	03 January 2015	Borno State	Seized Baga and the multinational joint task force military base	Western Media estimates death toll to be upwards of 2000 persons
27.	19 February 2018	Yobe State	Government Technical Girls College, Dapchi	110 girls kidnapped, 5 killed
28.	02 April 2018	Borno State	Attacked outskirts of Maiduguri	Killed 18 persons, 84 wounded

<b>29.</b>	<i>13 June 2020</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>Monguno and Nganzai massacres</i>	<i>Killed at least 20 soldiers in Monguno and at least 40 civilians in Nganzai</i>
<b>30.</b>	<i>23 February 2021</i>	<i>Borno State</i>	<i>Rocket-propelled grenades launched in Maiduguri</i>	<i>Killed 10 persons</i>


Source: Author adapted from Dike, 2011; Tajudeen, 2011; Ibrahim, 2011.

Figure 7: Boko Haram attacks and fatalities (2010-2021).



Source: Author adapted from Weeraratne *et al*, 2015; Dike, 2011; Tajudeen, 2011; Ibrahim, 2011; Osumah, 2013.

Figure 8: Percentage of IDPs by reason of displacement.



Source: Author adapted from DTM round 31 Reliefweb, 2020.

Weeraratne *et al*, explain the group's development and their approach to violence. They quoted; "the growing fragmentation of the movement, development of strategic ties with Al Qaeda affiliates, strong-armed counterterrorism operations that further radicalised the movement, and exploitation of the porous border area that separates Nigeria from its northern neighbours." (Weeraratne *et al*, 2015:610). They add that the group has grown in many dimensions. First, the frequency and intensity of attacks have each risen exponentially. Second, Boko Haram's attacks and operational base have expanded significantly across a larger geographic area such as Kano, Gombe, Kogi, Kaduna, and even Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (as evidenced in Table 12). In such regions, the religious extremists do not find it hard to radicalise and mobilise the impoverished to engage in the insurgency due to their levels of unemployment, poverty, and economic destitution. Third, Boko Haram's target selection has widened from a tight concentration on the security forces and different government institutions to include a much broader range of population (see Table 12). Fourth, the group's operating procedures have gotten worse since 2015 (Weeraratne *et al*, 2015). "Boko Haram adopts the modus operandi of the Niger Delta militants, which has been described as guerrilla warfare and propaganda" (Osumah, 2013:543). "They launch well-coordinated attacks on targets using sophisticated guns, homemade bombs, and electronically controlled explosives. This is reflected in the group's claims of responsibility for most of the recurrent, ruthless and vicious violent explosions in major cities in the North" (Osumah, 2013:545).

The North-Eastern geo-political zone of Nigeria has been most prone and most vulnerable to various scales of the group's attacks; with states like Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe as the epicentre (Al Chukwuma and Philip, 2014). The scale of the destruction in the areas affected by Boko Haram and military violence is far greater than is generally understood outside the region according to Higazi. He asserts that places that were under the control of the insurgents were not accessible to the outside world particularly during the peak of the insurgency from 2011 - 2014; neither the Nigerian armed forces nor government agencies, journalists, researchers or NGOs, had access to those places




while they were occupied by Boko Haram (Higazi, 2016). This is why the total number of casualties and even displacements are hard to calculate, and the reason why information about the displacement and its effects are quite scarce too. An example of the military violence Higazi alludes to can be seen in the January 2017 Rann bombing. A Nigerian Air Force jet mistakenly bombed an IDP camp in Rann, Borno State near the Cameroonian border. The incident left some 236 people dead including 6 Red Cross aid workers and injured many. The Nigerian Major General Leo Irabor said the incident was a 'grave mistake' and a result of wrong coordinates that were received by them, which indicated the presence of Boko Haram within the vicinity (Besheer, 2017).

To paint a more vivid picture of the scale of destruction caused by Boko Haram, Higazi tells us that there are some villages in Borno where nearly everyone perished in a deliberate attempt to wipe them out. For example, eyewitness accounts from Internally Displaced Persons in camps in Yola and Maiduguri tell of just three or four people surviving attacks on some of the villages of central Borno in 2014. Gamboru, Baga, Damboa, Gwoza, Marte and Monguno, are just some of the other towns that BH destroyed and where massacres occurred.


Of the millions of people displaced during the insurgency, some fled as refugees to neighbouring countries, but most became IDPs in Nigeria (Higazi, 2016). The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) round 36 assessment of the scope of internal displacement in Nigeria, which were carried out mid 2021 shows us that there has not been any positive change in the conflict affected Northeastern Nigerian states. Meaning people are still till date being displaced because repeated but unpredictable incidences of violence are still taking place. As per the assessment, 2,184,254 individuals were internally displaced by February 2021, an increase of 34,011 persons against the last assessment (round 35) conducted in December 2020, when 2,150,243 IDPs were recorded (DTM, 2021). In round 32 conducted in June 2020, 2,088,124 IDPs were recorded and in round 31, which was conducted in February 2020, 2,046,604 IDPs were recorded respectively. Figure 9 shows the total population of IDPs in Northeast Nigeria by round of the DTM assessment from December 2014 – February 2021. Figure 10 thereafter shows a map of the most affected states with the causes of displacement and percentage of IDP population by state.

Figure 9: IDP population from 2014 - 2021 by round of DTM assessment, Northeastern Nigeria.



Source: Author adapted from Displacement Tracking Matrix round 36 (DTM, 2021).

Figure 10: Map showing causes of displacement and percentage of IDP population from 2014 – 2021 by state.



Source: Author adapted from Displacement Tracking Matrix round 36 (DTM, 2021).

To expand on the map in Figure 10, Figure 11 shows the total number of IDPs by February 2021. The table additionally shows the difference in the number of IDPs from 2020 – 2021 in each of the state’s highlighted in the map in Figure 10. Particularly showcasing Borno having the highest number of IDPs and the highest increase by 2021.

Figure 11: Increase in Number of IDPs from 2020 – 2021 by state.

STATE	R35 (DECERMBER 2020) IDP POPULATION	R36 (FEBRUARY 2021) IDP POPULATION	STATUS	Population difference
Adamawa	209,252	208,334	Decrease	-918
Bauchi	66,062	65,595	Decrease	-467
Borno	1,603,044	1,630,284	Increase	27,240
Gombe	39,532	40,943	Increase	1,411
Taraba	88,594	82,661	Decrease	5,933
Yobe	143,759	156,437	Increase	12,678
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>2,150,243</b>	<b>2,184,254</b>	<b>Increase</b>	<b>34,011</b>

Source: Author adapted from Displacement Tracking Matrix round 36 (DTM, 2021).


#### 4.4 Displacement effects of the Boko Haram insurgency

The continuous insurgency has given rise to an array of issues that have affected many people and have also affected not only Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria but the Lake Chad region at large. This section will follow on to answer research Question 1; it seeks to understand the displacement effects of Boko Haram in and around Maiduguri and also why some IDPs end up in camps while others self-settle. The previous sections of this chapter have mostly used secondary data to give the necessary background information. This section onwards will mostly use data collected from the author’s fieldwork, which is integral to the story and to answering the research questions of this study. Except when it is clearly referenced otherwise, all pictures and quotes moving forward are from primary data.

##### 4.4.1 Mapping the displacement

In the map in Figure 12, displaced LGAs refers to LGAs where Boko Haram attacks as well as displacement occurred. Functional LGAs refers to any LGA where Boko Haram attacks did not occur, thus the LGAs infrastructures are still intact.

Figure 12: Map of Borno State showing the LGAs that were displaced by the insurgency; especially during its peak period (2011 – 2014).



Source: Author adapted from USAID, 2015; Borno State Return Strategy Report, 2018 (physical document); DTM round 36, 2021.

**Table 13: IDPs LGA of origin, population of each LGA, total number of displaced people from each LGA (mostly occurring between 2011-2014), and percentage of displacement.**

<b>LGA</b>	<b>Population of each LGA (2006 census)</b>	<b>Number of people displaced from each LGA</b>	<b>Percentage of people displaced in relation to total population of each LGA</b>
<i>Abadam</i>	<i>100,180</i>	<i>11,992</i>	<i>11.9%</i>
<i>Askira/Uba</i>	<i>143,313</i>	<i>12,534</i>	<i>8.7%</i>
<i>Bama</i>	<i>269,986</i>	<i>52,911</i>	<i>19.6%</i>
<i>Bayo</i>	<i>79,078</i>	<i>697</i>	<i>0.9%</i>

<i>Biu</i>	176,072	39,363	22%
<i>Chibok</i>	66,105	15,243	23%
<i>Damboa</i>	166,000	94,061	56.6%
<i>Dikwa</i>	105,909	72,426	68.4%
<i>Gubio</i>	152,778	4,734	3.1%
<i>Guzamala</i>	95,648	2,568	2.7%
<i>Gwoza</i>	388,600	102,451	26.4%
<i>Hawul</i>	120,733	25,669	21.3%
<i>Jere</i>	211,204	255,378	-
<i>Kaga</i>	90,015	19,843	22%
<i>Kala/Balge</i>	60,797	79,634	-
<i>Konduga</i>	13,400	134,259	-
<i>Kukawa</i>	203,864	12,803	6.3%
<i>Kwaya Kusar</i>	56,500	3,048	5.4%
<i>Mafa</i>	103,518	12,744	12.3%
<i>Magumeri</i>	140,231	26,532	19%
<i>Maiduguri</i>	1,907,600	249,622	13%
<i>Marte</i>	129,370	-	-
<i>Mobbar</i>	116,654	9,218	8%
<i>Monguno</i>	109,851	130,852	-
<i>Ngala</i>	236,498	57,122	24.2%
<i>Nganzai</i>	99,799	23,149	23.2%

Source: Author adapted from: Borno State Return Strategy Report, 2018 (physical document) and Wikipedia for 2006 census<sup>2</sup>.

Figures from the 2006 census should be taken with caution as they are reported to have been plagued by political interference from design through to implementation (Ibukun Akinyemi, 2020). Additionally, it should be noted that since the last census was 2006, populations must have increased before the insurgency hence why some LGAs show a higher number of IDPs than the total population.

The IDPs displaced by Boko Haram have faced great hardships both in and outside camps. Maiduguri, as the capital city of Borno, subsequently became the hub for the displaced hosting over a million IDPs. Although the LGAs of Borno are the origin site of Boko Haram, Maiduguri is both an epicentre of the Boko Haram movement and the biggest recipient of IDPs. According to the chairman of the Borno State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), there are a total of 32 camps in Borno, 17 of which are

<sup>2</sup> The total population of each LGA is added for the purpose of understanding the reach of the impacts of Boko Haram, and 2006 was the last census in Nigeria and the last census before Boko Haram insurgency began.

located in Maiduguri all housing IDPs from their different LGAs. The camps range in size and density ranging from 5,000 to 35,000 IDPs in a camp. Bakassi IDP camp (located in Bakassi housing estate) is one of the oldest camps in Maiduguri, hosting about 34,232 IDPs (ReliefWeb, 2020).

In the wake of forced displacement, governments usually set up camps to receive and offer assistance to those who have been displaced from their homes and these camps are widely accepted primarily because the displaced have very few alternatives. It is also generally easier to reach IDPs living in camps so state authorities are more likely to provide protection and assistance to the IDPs in camps in comparison to self-settled IDPs. This means that those who are self-settled will have to fend for themselves or depend on host communities for their survival (Mattieu, 2017 and Brun, 2010). The case is the same for IDPs in Maiduguri.

“Every IDP has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence” (Kalin, 2008:65), and under the Kampala Convention, it is the state’s primary responsibility to assist and protect IDPs within their territory without any discrimination irrespective of their choice of settlement. However, this is often not the case. IRC (2016), for example states that in Nigeria only 8% of the millions of IDPs were receiving support as at June 2016, and that is because the assistance is mostly only provided to camp IDPs. the remaining 92% have had no choice but to fend for themselves (IRC, 2016). The quotes below are accounts of two self-settled women who speak of this. While the qualitative data in Chapters 6 and 7 explore in depth the kinds of support that different groups of IDPs do and do not receive, the below quotes capture particularly well the sense that self-settled IDPs feel invisible and abandoned.


*“At first Action Against Hunger used to give us food even though we were not in camp, but now they don’t provide us with any food anymore. They said since we’re not in the camp they can’t continue providing us with food. If there was any NGO that is providing us with food or anything for that matter I would have told you. But there is none” – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“What i can say about why we're not receiving all this support is that in other camps, NGO's and the government knows about them unlike us. We're not sure whether the government knows of our existence.” – (Self-settled IDP 2:FG 3, male, age 41, 2019)*

Irrespective of that fact that host communities have been very helpful in supporting and assisting self-settled IDPs, their day-to-day struggles are rarely examined in much detail. Their issues are still relatively unexplored especially in comparison to how much is documented about IDPs in camps (Davies, 2012).

There are several factors linked to IDPs decisions and choice of residence post displacement, some of which were mentioned in Chapter 2 section 2.2. But it is important to note that for a lot of self-settled IDPs, that decision is a result of the absence of camps or the lack of available space in those camps (Davies, 2012). Despite the increase in the establishment of camps in Nigeria, they are still not sufficient for the capacity of IDPs, and there are still “no official IDP camps of long lasting nature in the country” (Olaitan, 2016:14; Tajudeen and Adebayo, 2013:5). Many IDPs thus have no choice but to self-settle. Figure 13 showcases latest IDP population by settlement type.

Figure 13: Percentage of IDPs that are self-settled and in camps in Maiduguri.



Source: DTM round 36, 2021.

Important to note that in this graph, camp like settings refers to informal self-made/makeshift shelters that constitute of 38%<sup>3</sup> of the 43%. Based on this, the proportion of formal camps in Maiduguri is only 5%.

#### 4.4.2 The rationale behind camp settlement for Maiduguri IDPs

Chapter 2 section 2.2.4 discussed the benefits vs drawbacks of camps and touched on some of the reasons why camps are potentially preferred over self-settlement; including the ease of access for governments and humanitarian agencies to provide aid, protection and assistance to camp IDPs. This is the reason why more attention is given to camp IDPs and why they are able to access more interventions.

<sup>3</sup> Informal camps which constitute self-made/makeshift shelters were explained in section 3.4.1.

This section will use insights from field research to look at the rationale behind camp settlement for Maiduguri IDPs.

Of the 36 camp IDPs interviewed for this study (of which 16 were part of focus group interviews), 90% indicated that they had no choice but to settle in camps after they arrived in Maiduguri. Being uprooted from your hometown and all of a sudden finding yourself in an unfamiliar city means your options of where to go are limited. Most of these IDPs had never been to Maiduguri prior to their displacement. Most of them indicated that they had no connections to anyone in Maiduguri that would help them with shelter and even if they did, they had no money and no support to make such choices. Even the ones that had some money were not familiar enough with the city to self-settle on their own. Up there with not having a choice, the need for aid and basic services is the biggest motivator for camp IDPs settling in camps.

Another appeal for settling in camps is to do with being recognised and registered as an IDP by the government and by NGOs and international organisations alike. State governments are fully responsible for IDPs and the IDPs know that and use it to their advantage. Some of the advantages this recognition and registration offers can be seen in the social and economic interventions that are put in place specifically to aid IDPs. In addition to other support such as medical and legal support. Furthermore, camp IDPs want to remain close to the people they got displaced with in the same way, when the time is right, they want to be returned home with them. The quotes below highlight all of these issues.

*“I cannot live in town because one, we are strangers here. Two, we have very little means so food will be difficult. We must live here because you are fully recognised as an IDPs here. If the government comes or any organisation comes and asks us about our needs and wants to help us, I will be able to tell them what our needs are. But in town nobody will do that for you because nobody will recognise you. They will assume we are all from this city and that is not the case because we are not. We know that we do not belong here, so it is safer to manage the little we can get from organisations than wandering about in town.” (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)*

*“Another problem with moving into town is that you leave the people you came with. You know I am not from here so I do not belong here. So even if someone sponsors you in town you will one day run out of money and still end up here. We have seen some people go through that. Your sponsor will not keep paying for the house bill every single time since nobody can tell when we will be leaving Maiduguri.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)*

*“There was a time my younger brother hired a place in town for me for 6 months and after that the landlord demanded for full 1 year payment of the house rent. Three of my kids are with him in Kano*



*so he rented one room for me in town. He told me that living in a government camp is not easy and should not be taken lightly so that is why he advised me to move to town. So after the 6 months had elapsed and they demanded annual payment, I felt heavy asking him to pay for the annual bill, hence I packed all my belongings and moved to this camp. I told him it was fine for me to live in the camp, after all my people are here in the camp, we suffered and escaped together so we continue to live together.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019)*

The above quote shows an example of how some IDPs tried living in town before realising that it was too hard/expensive so they ended up moving to a camp. Some IDPs stated that this was the case for many of their camp mates.

*“It is better to live in the camp because if you are self-settled in town you are to provide house rent for yourself and where is the money? You are not a government employee, you are not self-sufficient, there is no source of income and you also need to feed your family too. Some of the people living in town their children are not even in school because they cannot afford it. It is just not easy. You have to pay rent, water, firewood. You see with this money that Action Against Hunger gives us, we at least buy food, we have water in the camp, when your children are sick they help you. Who will help you in town?” – (EYN Camp IDP 7, male, age 48, 2019).*

Contrary to all this, there are IDPs in camps who would rather be self-settled but do not have the financial support to do so. 6% of the 36 camp IDPs interviewed alluded to this.

*“Being self-settled is better. If you are living in a rented house, as long as you did not carry yourself and go to someone or go somewhere for trouble then nothing will touch you. But here problems can come to you without you looking for them because everyone is in your business and nobody has anything better to do than to stir trouble.” – (EYN Camp IDP 12, female, age 28, 2019)*

*“You cannot even compare the two lives. Life as a self-settled IDP is better in my own view. Nobody will choose to live in this camp over the communities in town. Life as a self-settled IDP is easier. Even the issue of overcrowding in the camp is enough to make it easier. You will see people living together in a very small place in thousands. That is not good.” – (EYN Camp IDP 20, male, 2019).*


#### **4.4.3 The specificities of the camps in Maiduguri**

Not all camp settlements are the same, which also means not all camp structures are the same. There is nothing like a typical displacement experience in the same way there is no one typical type or style of displaced peoples' camps (Malkki, 1995). Bakewell tells of cases where shelter (in the form of a small allocated section per family) is originally offered to displaced people in dormitories. In most cases, if

the displaced people have to stay in the camp for a longer period of time, then we begin to see the temporary shelters take a more permanent form. You will find for example, grass roofs replacing plastic sheets and more permanent walls dividing shelters. In cases of long-term camp settlement, the structures within the camps may start to resemble the permanent structures of the local area. An example of this is seen in Buduburam refugee camp housing Liberian refugees on the edge of Accra, Ghana, which resembles a city suburb. Also in parts of Meheba refugee settlement in north-western Zambia, which resemble a collection of villages (as seen in Bakewell, 2014:2-3). In such instances we begin to see some similarities between camps and the urban areas they are located within, and we start to connect how Sanyal (2011), describes camps as having the ability to grow and develop over time by appropriating city characteristics to the extent where they become part of the urban fabric of those cities.

Similarly, in Maiduguri you will find many different types of camp settlements depending on the location and the year the IDPs arrived. Teachers Village camp, Bakassi camp, EYN camp, DCC Shwari camp, NYSC camp, Mogcolis camp, Farm Centre camp, and EL Miskin transit camp, are all examples of formal camps in Maiduguri. Each camp is named after the establishment that used to be in place on the site before it was given up to be a camp. Figure 14 shows a map of some formal and informal camps in Maiduguri in relation to the urban area.


Figure 14: Map of some formal and informal camps in Maiduguri in relation to the urban area.



Source: Author adapted from Google Earth, 2021 and REACH, 2017.

Bakassi camp is one of the earliest camps to open in Maiduguri (one of the ones I focus on in this study). It is a huge plot of land located in Bakassi Housing estate (size and site are shown on the map in Figure 15).

Figure 15: Map of Bakassi IDP camp showing size and site.



Source: Author adapted from Google Maps, 2021.

It was originally built as part of the Borno State housing project, which already had 200 relatively small-medium incomplete houses with 2-4 rooms in each of them (the houses are pictured in Figure 16a and 16b). The plot of land was then allocated to shelter IDPs during their first influx into the city of Maiduguri so you will find that the first displaced IDPs are settled in these incomplete houses. Figure 17 showcases different satellite images of the land area that houses the camp. From the map it could be seen that the housing estate was not erect in 2012, by 2014 the housing estate was in progress, which is why by January 2015 it was given as incomplete houses to be used as an IDP camp. The maps also show the growth of the camp over time as new displacements happened and more IDPs arrived at Bakassi.

Figure 17: Satellite images of Bakassi camp site over time from 2011- 2020.




Source: Author adapted from Google Earth, 2021.

The houses are made of modern materials like concrete walls and zinc roofs with nothing but windows and doors. On the same plot of land, you will also find temporary tent structures like the ones described before in section 2.2 – a piece of white and blue plastic sheeting stretched over some sticks – for the IDPs who arrived after the 200 concrete shelters had been occupied (pictured in Figure 16c and 16d). Considering there are close to 35,000 IDPs in Bakassi camp, a vast majority of the IDPs there thus live in these tents. A lot of camps in Maiduguri (EYN camp, Teachers’ Village IDP camp, Dolari IDP camp) are plots of land which have a mixture of these concrete buildings as well as tents because some of the plots are old primary schools, churches or even shopping complexes which are no longer in use in the city. The tents were added after as a result of the continues influx and increment of IDPs into the city, which was unexpected for the state (pictured in Figure 16e) These types of camps have a lot to offer to


the debate on the relationship between camps and urban spaces, similar to how Sanyal (2011) theorises camps in relation to urban spaces, which was discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. Some of them such as Bakassi, EYN, Mogcolis and NYSC camps even blend in with their urban poor surroundings; it is difficult to know particularly when one is within the camp space, yet it is obvious in other ways like the walls that demarcate them and sign posts of humanitarian aid agencies. This can be seen in the map in Figure 14 which showed some formal and informal camps in relation to the urban areas of Maiduguri. It allows us to see how a camp can begin to merge with its urban surroundings and even blend in with the urban poor. In Figure 18, the map shows us that as Bakassi camp kept growing and getting bigger, the city of Maiduguri also kept growing, thus highlighting the debate on the relationship between camps and urban spaces merging.




Figure 18: Satellite view of Maiduguri from 2011-2018 showcasing the growth of the city and the growth of Bakassi camp over time.




Satelite view of Maiduguri 2011



Satelite view of Maiduguri 2014



Satelite view of Maiduguri 2016



Satelite view of Maiduguri 2018

■ Maiduguri settlement    ■ Bakassi IDP camp

Source: Author adapted from Google Earth, 2021.

Figure 16a: Existing houses of Bakassi housing estate which became Bakassi camp, Maiduguri.



Source: UNHCR, 2017.

Figure 16b: More of the existing houses in Bakassi camp, Maiduguri.



Source: Author, 2019.



Figure 16c: Temporary tent structures in Bakassi camp, Maiduguri.



Source: Author, 2019.

Figure 16d: Tents and houses in Bakassi camp Maiduguri.



Source: Author, 2019.

Figure 16e: Tents of new IDP arrivals added to a school which is currently being used as an IDP camp. (Teachers village IDP camp, Maiduguri).



Source: Author, 2019.

Basic necessities such as food, water, sanitation and health are usually provided in camps. Primary and secondary level education is also provided to displaced people in camps particularly if they are there for a long period of time. University education is not typically provided in camps except, as seen in Bakewell (2014:3), in the case of Dabaab camp in northern Kenya where there are plans to open a campus of Nairobi University within the camp (Bakewell, 2014). Primary and secondary education in Maiduguri public schools are free. According to primary data, in the case of Maiduguri camps, only primary education is provided in a few camps like Bakassi camp. IDP children in other camps that do not have schools have to leave the camp to go into the city for their education. Secondary education is not provided in camps but it is also free in most public schools outside of camps. University education is not provided at all in Maiduguri camps and is not free outside of camps. Although public primary and secondary education is free meaning kids in camps that do not have schools in them can attend these schools for free, transportation to schools, food, and other school necessities are not free, and these have implications on IDPs' ability to achieve basic primary education (more on this in Chapter 6).

When they first arrive, camp inhabitants are provided regular food in the form of rations which they have to cook themselves. According to Bakewell (2014), some refugee camps in Macedonia that were established in 1999 for Kosovo Albanians took an exceptional approach where they provided individual ready meals for their residents, but this raised questions around the world about the rights of the refugees, coupled with the fact that it was an extremely expensive method of feeding them. This was also the initial approach in the beginning of the influx of IDPs into Maiduguri. NEMA was providing IDPs with cooked meals but this quickly turned into uncooked rations, which they take home to cook for themselves. Key informants from this study indicated that the reason for the change is because it was too expensive to continue and the IDPs of the camps (similar to the ones indicated by Bakewell above), also complained about their rights and dignity; feeling exposed especially when it came to adults and children queueing up in the same line for the same food. Camp IDPs in Maiduguri said they felt undignified this way. This already suggests that being able to cook one's food, in the way one wishes is important for dignity. Some IDPs in certain camps in Maiduguri are provided with the food items, while other camps are provided with money or vouchers to buy the food items. This all depends on who is providing the aid and different approaches have different consequences. For instance, camps where people receive food items directly from their aid donors have a different power structure of agency vs beneficiary hierarchy to camps who are provided with money to buy their own food items. Thus at a more theoretical level, we can begin to link the differences between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs and how they relate to different power structures within and between the IDPs, between IDPs and donors, as well as between IDPs and the wider city population (more on this will also be discussed in Chapter 6). Altogether, we can begin to see how receiving food in different ways can affect people's dignity and wellbeing.

The issue arises when camps are left in place for an extended period of time. It becomes too expensive to continue to provide food rations, coupled with the fact that the displaced become too dependent on aid thus making them less self-reliant. This is especially an issue with IDPs in Maiduguri as majority of the displaced people who came from around Borno State are farmers who are used to farming for their own food and fending for themselves. However, if rations are not provided, then IDPs have to have some other means of securing food by gaining access to either the labour market, or land and agricultural inputs to cultivate their own food. Here we can begin to see some of the reasons why some IDPs opt to self-settle so they may gain such access. However, according to Bakewell, states tend to control the economic opportunities of displaced people in camps so as to curb them from overwhelming local resources such as land, pasture, water, fuel, labour markets, and employment (Bakewell, 2014).

#### **4.4.4 The rationale behind self-settlement for Maiduguri IDPs**

Some of the IDPs that were interviewed for this study affirmed that they had no knowledge of camps to go to upon their arrival in Maiduguri post displacement. While others said that there were no official

camps available in the local communities in which they sought refuge. Some of the participants further stated that the few camps that existed were either difficult for them to access or they were informed were at full capacity upon their arrival. This is the same reason why some IDPs who prefer camp settlement reported not being able to also move from their self-settled residence to a camp. Additionally, a lack of identification to prove their IDP status left them with no choice but to self-settle.

*“We couldn’t secure a space at the camp, the place is overcrowded” – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“When I first came, the camp itself was not open. There was no camp at all. Then I went to stay with one of my relatives. After a while he advised me to go and find a place to rent and stay with my family. That’s why I am staying in this rented house” – (Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019)*

*“They get more support from NGOs so because of that I wish I lived in the camp, but there is no space” – (Self-settled IDP 3, female, age 20, 2019)*

*“The camp managers told us its filled up. Our place of living was paid by one generous man. If the time is due and we're unable to pay, the landlord will evict us. No body doesn't like to stay in camp, but even if you go there they will tell you there is no space. What can you do, where will go?” – (Self-settled IDP 3:FG1, female, age 29, 2019).*

On the other hand, there are equally many IDPs who were aware of camps but chose to self-settle regardless. OCHA (2015:6) reported that some IDPs preferred to self-settle within host communities for their own protection. Others reported that they preferred to self-settle so as to stay closer to family and friends because it made them more economically, socially, emotionally and physically secure. This in turn enables them to cope more easily with the challenges of the displacement. Self-settling within host communities additionally offers greater opportunities for work, education, food production, and socialisation (Davies, 2021) (more of this will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). Despite IDPs who are in camps in Maiduguri maintaining that they feel more secure than those who are self-settled, an ICRC study showed that the vast majority of self-settled IDPs in Borno prefer the option to self-settle as it provides them with more freedom, greater livelihood opportunities, and a greater access to public services (ICRC, 2016). The quotes below highlight this.

*“I drive people around in my car and they pay me, that’s how I feed my family. That’s why it is better for me that I am here. If I was in the camp I cannot work anytime I like. Whatever I earn, I save to support my children in school” – ( Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019)*

*“We have peace of mind here, that’s why I like it” – (Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019)*

*“We support ourselves from the small business that we’re running, we’re happy that we have a small business to support us, it might be small but it’s better than none” – (Self-settled IDP 13, female, age 30, 2019).*

The quotes above are beginning to showcase some key information in relation to some of the livelihood and mental health capabilities of self-settled IDPs especially when compared to that of camp IDPs. This will be explored in depth in Chapters 6 and 7.

Another factor that pushes some IDPs to opt for self-settlement is congestion and the unfavourable nature of the camps. Some self-settled IDPs report having a negative perception of camps as they identify it to be poorly-resourced, over-crowded, insecure, and unhealthy (Haver, 2008 and Rohwerder, 2013).

*“Our father pays the rent, although sometimes even he does not have the money. We prefer it because there is more freedom, you have your own room and your own toilet.” – (Self-settled IDP 5:FG 2, female, age 40, 2019).*

With all this in mind, it is clear that some of the factors that contribute to the majority of IDPs in Maiduguri opting or having no choice but to self-settle include, overcrowding in camps, poor functionality and services of camps, limited and regulated freedom of movement, limited access to education and livelihood opportunities for IDPs in camps.

A further observation that comes through from author interviews is the difference in the group of self-settled IDPs who prefer to self-settle in comparison to the group who had no choice but to self-settle. The group who preferred to self-settle from the inception consist of those who left their LGAs since the very beginning of the insurgency before it got out of control. This allowed them a chance to move in less of a haste, with a lot of their belongings and financial support. Some of them also had family and friends who advised them to move and supported them during and after the process. This group have been able to integrate into the communities with little stigmatisation (these IDPs fall under group i and ii which is discussed in the next section). They are also more likely to be Muslims of Kanuri, Hausa or Shuwa ethnicity, because they have more family and friends in Maiduguri as majority of the city consists of Muslims of the three mentioned ethnic groups. On the contrary, those who had no choice but to self-settle consist of IDPs who came to Maiduguri at a later stage. Some of them had been displaced as refugees outside of Nigeria and then displaced again as IDPs within Nigeria. Most of the IDPs in this group found already overcrowded camps or camps that had no one from their villages

within them. The lack of space in camps coupled with wanting to be closer to people they know left them with no choice but to self-settle.

#### **4.4.5 The specificities of self-settled shelters in Maiduguri**

The National Policy on IDPs in Nigeria recognises the communities that host self-settled IDPs as significant stakeholders in their protection and assistance. As we have seen from the rationale behind self-settlement for Maiduguri IDPs, these communities provide the IDPs with shelter, which the respondents of this study argue is better than camp shelters. They provide them with security and safety – either from being recognised as an IDP and experiencing discrimination as a result, or from Boko Haram attacks which sometimes are targeted towards camps. They also ideally allow IDPs access to the social services within those communities as well as promoting harmony and integration (National Policy on IDPs in Nigeria, 2013). It is also known through field insight that some of these communities were the first responders for IDPs since no camps had yet been established when IDPs first started arriving into Maiduguri. Irrespective of this, very little is known about self-settled IDPs or their challenges. Similarly, in comparison to camps, very little is known about the profiles of the communities that host these IDPs or the challenges they face in doing so. This is all due to the difficulty in accessing self-settled communities and the difficulty in differentiating between self-settled IDPs and the urban poor.

Hosting self-settled IDPs can be done in many different ways according to Caron (2017). Field research for this study has found three different ways in which self-settled IDPs are living/being hosted. Although information on self-settled IDPs and their communities is limited even in my own primary data due to difficult access, these three different groups and the communities I was able to access to collect data from are representative of the wider self-settled experiences.


- i. The first are those who are hosted by family or friends at a distance. This means a family member or a friend is supporting the IDP(s) with housing or land, monetary support, food support, and often livelihood support too but from a distance. Meaning they are not living together, and in most cases the host(s) lives in a completely different part of the town. Often times the hosts live in a different city altogether. Of the 31 interviews conducted with self-settled IDPs for this study (of which 18 were a part of focus group interviews), 10 respondents were in this category.
- ii. The second are self-settled IDPs who live in the same house as their family or friends while they simultaneously support them. Of the 31 interviews conducted with self-settled IDPs for this study (of which 18 were a part of focus group interviews), only 2 respondents was in this category.

iii. The third group from the sample of this study are the self-settled IDPs who have self-settled on their own without the help or support of family or friends. Some IDPs from this group often self-settle in an area which consists of other people from their LGA, while majority just move anywhere they can be safe and which they can afford. Either way this group are often found renting a private house, renting rooms in a private house or renting a private house collectively with other IDPs. Majority of the self-settled IDPs from this field research fall under this category. Of the 31 interviews conducted with self-settled IDPs for this study (of which 18 were a part of focus group interviews), 19 respondents were in this category.

Field insight and observations from the field have shown that the first two groups are the hardest to find as they are well integrated within the communities they are settled in. It was also observed that they live a more comfortable, well-adjusted life than the last group. To begin with, the people hosting them are often relatively wealthy so they can afford to give them more support, pay for their fees to go school, connect with them with other wealthy friends and family who also support them and develop their social connectedness, and also help provide them with a means of livelihood. The houses they live in are bigger, cleaner, have more rooms and bathrooms, better access to clean water and electricity, as well as access to good transport links, hospitals and other social amenities.

On the other hand, the last group although they often live in a cluster of other IDPs are often found in urban poor areas. To collect primary data from this group I visited the Dikwa low-cost community and another group of self-settled IDPs living in an urban poor community near the Shehu's Palace (Figure 19 shows Dikwa low-cost community and the Shehu's palace in respect to the Maiduguri urban area). IDPs living in Dikwa low-cost indicated that they settled there because a lot of other people from their LGA were already living in and around this area as it is only a 40 minute drive to their LGA of Dikwa. This helped them conduct businesses easily between Dikwa and Maiduguri before the insurgency.

Figure 19: Map showing Dikwa low-cost and the Shehu's palace in relation to Maiduguri urban area.



Source: Author adapted from Google Maps, 2021.

Self-settled IDPs from the third group may report being more comfortable in their rented houses than living in camps but the houses they occupy are generally low rent houses. The houses are not well maintained, with very few and small rooms so they report not getting the value of what they are paying for. These houses also mostly share bathrooms and kitchens, with self-settled IDPs complaining of very dirty overflowing toilets, poor sanitation and hygiene, too many squatters, constant lack of water, and a constant lack of electricity. Interviews with self-settled IDPs indicate that even in houses shared by as many as 24 people or 6 bedrooms, there is sometimes only one toilet and one bathroom. Coupled with the fact that competition for work and a means of livelihoods is high, access to schools are difficult because even the ones that are free come with other costs such as daily transport and lunch to school,



books, and uniforms. Moreover, part of the appeal for self-settlement is to put their children in private schools which are very expensive for them. Additionally, it is this third group that raises issues of tension between them and the host communities around them. These issues will all be explored in more details in Chapters 6 and 7.

Almost all the IDPs in this last group spoke of these poor and unhygienic living conditions. Figure 20 shows the path leading to one of these rented houses and just how uncollected rubbish accumulates there before these pathways get cleared which, is not very often. The detached zinc privy highlighted in red in the image is a cluster of toilets that some IDPs built because the toilets in their shared rented house are so badly out of use.

Figure 20: Path leading to one of the houses that are rented and shared by several self-settled IDPs. (Dikwa low-cost area).



Source: Author, 2019.

#### **4.5 Other effects of the conflict and displacement on IDPs, hosts and the city**

Conflict brings many other issues in addition to the displacement of people and a dire humanitarian crisis. Some of these issues are economic and socio-cultural. Others include effects on basic human needs, protection and safety, as well as effects on the people that are hosting the displaced. This section will touch on these issues in order to paint a more general picture of the effects of the conflict in and around Maiduguri.

**i. Economic effects:** Across the Lake Chad region, the BH violence has had a significant impact on trade, food production, and agricultural output. It has similarly impacted the economy of Maiduguri, Borno State, and surrounding areas. The insurgency, has prevented people from pursuing their traditional livelihoods and disrupted commerce and market operations. In Northeast Nigeria, a significant drop in daily wages is affecting low skilled workers and reducing overall incomes. Nearly 800,000 people have lost their jobs according to a DTM survey. The survey found that in 2015, N90 billion (approximately £154 million) was lost in income as a result of the displacement. The same survey found that if IDPs remain displaced and do not return to the places of habitual residence, the total cost of displacement from 2013 to 2022 will increase to N465 billion (approximately £794 million), even if there is a halt to additional displacement. It will take several years for a displaced person (at least 7 years post displacement) to be able to start earning an income similar to the one they had before displacement. The chance of earning some income is however 16% higher for self-settled IDPs rather than camp IDPs (DTM, 2016). The upcoming quote is from an IDP in camp who tried to sustain a farming livelihood from camp post displacement, but found that he could not due to the many challenges that come with being displaced.

*“What I basically did was trading goods, I also traded cows and sold groceries. Right now I can’t let my heart die of poverty so there is a town called Sufdubura, I went there and rented a farm. I took another one again in another place for 1 year. I grew 8 measures of beans in the farm and another 6 measures in the other farm with some ridi (sesame seeds). After all the labour I suffered with 2 of my children and also spent about N130,000 on the farm but I barely ended up getting 4 bags of Beans each containing 20 measures of beans. Meaning I got 80 measures of beans. As a result of that poor outcome, the entire farming spirit left me. I am just staying here now, idle” – (Camp IDP 1, 2019)*

In displacement-affected areas, price fluctuation for specific products, particularly food, water, and firewood has been seen, a trend that is particularly prominent in regions with significant populations of IDPs, such as Maiduguri. The hike in the prices of food, especially cereals, is disproportionately impacting the poor and reducing their nutritional levels. When these consequences are combined, an impoverished person will find it challenging to make ends meet with little chance of escaping poverty. Several IDPs reported such cases as noted below.

*“Like the N9000 that I am telling you we get for food now, if we calculate the food we buy from them it’s not worth more than N4000 because of the additional prices and there is nothing we can do about it” – (IDP, 2019)*

*“...the only problem with that is that the food vendors we buy food stuff from, some of the items have expired and the price is too high for an IDP. If a bag of rice is sold at N13,000, they sell it to us at about N19,000...” – (IDP, 2019)*

*“...they intentionally make the prices of food stuff from them higher than the market price because they know we are IDPs and we get free money and food.” – (IDP, 2019).*

However, the presence of displaced people has created business opportunities in some of the most disadvantaged places. Local markets have emerged in isolated areas and camps are often surrounded by small makeshift markets, which expand in size as more displaced people arrive (see Figures 21a and 21b). Field research has revealed that this has the potential to provide even more opportunities if the financial support were to be provided to IDPs for capital, as many of them are business minded with the skills to trade.

Figure 21a: Picture of a makeshift market which has emerged around Bakassi camp.



Source: Author, 2019.

Figure 21b: Picture of a makeshift market which has emerged around Bakassi camp.



Source: Author, 2019.

The presence of NGOs and international organisations has also boosted the economy in some ways. There is now significant literature from authors like Büscher and Vlassenroot (2010), and Büscher *et al*, (2018), on the humanitarian economy in conflict affected cities, which examine the relationship between humanitarian presence and urbanism and this appears to be echoed in Maiduguri. Some businesses in the city like accommodations, hotels, restaurants and even hospitals are benefiting from humanitarian presence. Other sectors like the transport sector are also a benefactor, as even flights to Maiduguri and other affected areas have doubled even tripled in frequency and cost. Figure 22 is of a newspaper that highlights this account. It also highlights the contradictory effects of NGOs and international organisations on the economy of the area; making life easy but difficult at the same time (as reflected in the title of the news article).



Figure 22: Picture of a newspaper showcasing how NGOs/ international organisations have boosted the economy of Maiduguri.



Source: Author, 2019.

Some extracts from the newspaper read as follows:

*“NGOs trooping into Maiduguri have been able to turn around life generally. They have made the city become more lively. This is because their presence has been very noticeable to almost every resident of the metropolis as they are always seen going up down at the city’s airport, motor parks, banks, hotels, restaurants, markets, grocery and shopping stores...”* *“One would even wish to work with them continuously because they do not mind how much they give to those who work with them.”*

*“The presence of NGOs in Maiduguri has been a blessing to me. They made my life better for me because they saved my job.”* *“Store fronts would have been shut months ago but the NGOs have increased sales by 70-75%”*

**ii. Socio-cultural effects:** The disruption of social bonds is arguably one of the biggest and most harmful effects of the Boko Haram insurgency. The rapid escalation and brutality of the violence,

together with failure to properly contain the situation, have heightened fear, suspicion, mistrust, and stigma, as well as amplified ethnic, religious, political, and geographical divisions. The general population have become especially fearful toward anyone who is known to have associated with BH at any capacity – even if that person was forced, kidnapped or abducted – or even someone who shares a certain identity with members of the group. Social division has continued to intensify which can be seen in day-to-day incidents. The consequence of which is heightened challenges for recovery, political leadership, and future development. The quote below highlights some of these fears, suspicion, mistrust and stigma.

*“There is an ongoing effort to integrate people who were once with Boko Haram to stay with us, eat and sleep together. People that kill us when we travel out are coming to live with us. Imagine how that is going to be. If you want to forgive each other, as Muslims or Christians, it is nothing, but the war should end before the thought about forgiving anyone who was once with Boko Haram is considered.” – (IDP, 2019)*

Loss of family members and the separation of households as a result of the conflict have additionally caused significant social and psychological effects. The sudden displacement has caused scattering of communities and households, which has increased the numbers of unaccompanied children and unconventional family structures. Subsequently, household and gender roles are transforming which is producing both positive and negative outcomes. The quote below showcases one IDP who spoke of this.

*“I have 8 children under me, including 2 orphans that have lost both parents... No husband, he was killed.” – (IDP, 2019).*

Some households have even scattered with some family members who are displaced within Maiduguri as IDPs, while other members of the family are displaced outside of Nigeria as refugees. These people have not seen members of their family in years and with no end in sight for the insurgency and displacement, the reunification of these families is unknown.

*“They live with their aunty. I couldn't bring them along to this camp because their uncle will not be happy to hear that I brought them into camp. It means I am not ready to give them a sound education. So, I decided to let them live with their aunty in the town, all 3 of them while I live here.” – (IDP, 2019).*

*“My kids have all spread across. Some of them are in Nasarawa, some in Abuja. They call me on the phone but even if they want to come here there is no space and they don’t have money to and I also don’t have it” – (IDP, 2019).*

*“My family is currently in Niger we only communicate sometimes. It is not possible for one to bring his family here given the condition. Nobody even thinks of doing so in the situation that we are as singles, we struggle so hard, let alone being with our wives and children. It would be load upon load. Sometimes there are people travelling to the country. If there is any package I have for the family, they help me deliver it to them but I have not seen them since 2015.” – ( IDP, 2019).*


Social connectedness is at the centre of recovery needs and long-term development when we consider the importance of social links and how it affects the resilience of the displaced. For instance, most IDPs report that when aid such as food, water, housing, livelihood assets, clothes and so on are distributed, those IDPs with social connections have an easier time accessing them and consequently find it easier to re-establish their livelihoods. On the other hand, those without such connections find it harder to access such assets and thus harder for them to re-establish themselves, as evidenced in the quotes below.

*“...for example, you say you want to bring aid now and I am a leader in this camp and I don’t have justice in my leadership so I will call my son and wife and cousins and other extended family. Not once, not twice they keep doing it continuously. If you have the right connections they show favouritism.” – (EYN Camp IDP 10, male, age 44, 2019).*

*“The duplication of efforts is sometimes an issue of camp management itself. If you tell them to bring a set of people to benefit from certain aid they will go and bring the same people that have been benefiting, their wives and sons, their friends their cousins, their in-laws and so on. You can find an IDP with three support funds. We have a ministry of social welfare that is in charge of such issues but even they have their own agendas. The department is the one directly in touch with the IDPs, so if any intervention comes they just continue enriching their families and favoring those families that they want to marry their daughters” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

Figure 23 consequently showcases the role of social connectedness in the developmental challenges caused by the displacement.

Figure 23: The Role of Social Connectedness in the Developmental Challenges Caused by BH insurgency.



Source: Author adapted from UNHCR, 2016.

Moreover, a report by the World Bank has shown that if IDPs social connections were not seriously hindered, they would have been able to actualise more coping mechanisms and have less dependency on short-term aid. The report also showed a clear difference in the living conditions of IDPs with such connections in comparison to those without. Those with more social connections are able to integrate more into host communities, living with extended family or friends, and move about more freely interacting on a day-to-day basis with members of the host communities. They are thus more able to access similar opportunities and services to their hosts. Those without social connections face a greater challenge integrating with host communities thus are often found in camps and camp-like settlements, are more restricted to movement and opportunities and often find themselves disconnected from the host community (World Bank, 2011).

*“You just sit there and hope. If you're lucky to have friends and family in town who can help support you, fine. If you're not, you'll just need to go and fold your hands and hope. That's how it is here.” –*  
*(Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019)*

**iii: Effects on Basic Human Needs including Protection and Safety:** Given that most of the IDPs displaced by BH ended up in towns and cities like Maiduguri, this resulted in unanticipated but massive increase on demand on basic human services such as health, education, and transport. It also changed the protection and safety trajectory of the IDPs, the host communities, and the city too. Maiduguri has all of a sudden doubled in population size and this is leading to an unexpected expansion of the city.



New security threats are emerging everyday further compromising the living conditions of IDPs and hosts. Boko Haram is abducting women and girls and coercing them into marriage, labour, religious conversion, and other physical, sexual and emotional abuses. These women are consequently falling victims to rape and exploitation, while rates of domestic violence and child marriage are rising. As a result, families and communities are rejecting victims due to the stigma of having been associated with the group (UNHCR, 2016).

The effects on basic human needs, protection and safety does not stop there. Both IDPs and hosts now find it near impossible to go to farms in search of food or work, including farms that are on the outskirts of the city of Maiduguri. Farmers have become easy target for Boko Haram to carry out violence and abductions (this will be discussed further in Chapter 6). A recent attack took place in a rice farm near Maiduguri killing at least 110 people with reports suggesting that some women may have also been kidnapped (The Guardian, 2020).

Additionally, a study that aimed at understanding the relationship between forced migration and tensions with host communities, found that in Nigeria, only 15% of the respondents in the host communities in Maiduguri were in favour of the presence of IDPs in their community. Of those opposed to the presence of IDPs, the study found that majority of them have never experienced conflict within their community and are consequently intimidated by the presence of IDPs and by the idea that their presence may present serious safety threats (Kamta, Schilling and Scheffran, 2021). They added that most experts including those interviewed at NEMA agree that members of host communities tend to feel uneasy at the prospect of IDPs living in their communities.

**iv: Effects on the hosts:** Most IDPs indicated that under the right conditions, they would want to return to their LGAs according to a UNHCR (2016), report; but many are likely going to end up settling in their location of displacement. For instance, widows and teenagers feel like they do not have much else left in their LGAs and with access to education, food security, and job opportunities, they may be better where they currently are. This is likely to create a burden on the host communities especially if successful and sustainable reintegration is not put in place. Considering most efforts by the state government are currently put towards return, little attention is given to reintegration thus the burden on host communities is likely to exacerbate. Demand for basic services will increase, overcrowding in schools and hospitals will remain, and competition over livelihood opportunities are all likely to cause even more tension between IDPs and hosts. Kamta, Schilling and Scheffran (2021), found that the rejection of IDPs expressed by majority of the host community members in their study is exacerbated by the pressure the IDPs are adding on the limited existing social infrastructure of the communities. Some evidence of these effects will be discussed in Chapter 7.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter enabled us to understand details of the regional context that is at the fore of this study. It enabled us to understand the wider Lake Chad Region and the extent to which it was a great source of food, livelihoods and other resources to the millions of people that benefited from the Basin. This has now all been affected by the Boko Haram insurgency causing millions of people from Cameroon, to Chad, to Niger and Nigeria to suffer as a result. The insurgency has displaced many of the people living in these areas and destroyed the web of economic, trade and cultural ties that bound them together.

The chapter gave an account of the advent of the Boko Haram group in Borno State North-East Nigeria in particular, which began in mid 2009. Since the crackdown of the group by the government in 2009, the group has retaliated in ways that have caused many casualties and ended the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Borno State, while displacing millions alike. The chapter subsequently gave details on the different effects of the insurgency that have been felt across Borno State and in particular Maiduguri. The biggest effect of the insurgency being the mass displacement of people from their different LGAs into Maiduguri the capital city of Borno State. Other effects discussed include economic effects, socio-cultural effects, effects on basic human needs including protection and safety, and a few of the effects the insurgency has had on the city and the people that are now hosting over a million IDPs. The chapter thus showed us where these IDPs got displaced from and to, allowing us to understand their post-displacement settlement choices; or lack thereof. In conclusion, the chapter showed that while it is clear that some self-settled IDPs see an appeal to living in camps and would much rather that option, some camp IDPs see the appeal for self-settlement and would rather have that option. Clearly, being displaced is not an easy experience for anyone whether self-settled or in camp, with each option having advantages and disadvantages.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Key informants' support for IDP's capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents findings in response to Question 4; it examines what key informants are doing to support the capabilities of both camp and self-settled IDPs, and how well this support matches IDPs' perceptions of their needs. Since the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency came to a head, quite a number of international agencies, and local non-profits as well as government agencies have set up interventions for the IDPs of Maiduguri and beyond. These interventions cut across provisions of aid in terms of shelter, food supplies, the provision of skills for the IDPs to recover some form of economic agency, the provision of legal services, and others. This chapter uses the findings from this study's fieldwork to show how a lot of effort has been put in by the government, national NGOs, and international organisations in making sure IDPs get the support they need, but it also shows some gaps with regards to how well their services accommodate the capabilities of IDPs. It also comments on and the level of synergy among them. Issues with regards to level of corruption are also noted within this chapter.

For the purpose of analysis, the key informants have been grouped into three distinct categories:

1. Government Organisations
2. International Organisations
3. National NGOs (NGOs)

Section 5.2 provides a summary table (14) which classifies the agencies based on data collected from the fieldwork. It demonstrates the focus area of individual agencies, as well as their functions and targets, and their sources of funding. Table 15 thereafter groups the agencies using wider themes of their functions and targets. This thematic grouping will be used in upcoming sections (5.2 – 5.9), to dive deeper into the interventions of the different organisations showcasing the impact of their interventions on the capabilities of camp IDPs vs those of self-settled IDPs. Each thematic group will form a section of its own and the organisations whose interventions fall under the group will be analysed to show the ways in which the different organisations provide services, coordinate with IDPs, and with other organisations. The sections will also show the success of their interventions, and the challenges in their approach. The chapter will conclude in section 5.10.

#### **5.2 Classification of the agencies and their focus areas**

There are a number of interventionist agencies and bodies that provide some form of succour to victims of the Boko Haram insurgency. Eleven organisations were interviewed; four government organisations,

four international organisations, two national non-governmental organisations and one religious organisation (which also operates as an NGO). Table 14 summarises them.

**Table 14: Key informants' classification, description, function, focus and funding source**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>Focus</i>	<i>Funding Source</i>
<i>Borno State Urban Planning and Development Board (BSUPDB)</i>	<i>State Government</i>	<i>To administer, execute and enforce urban and regional planning laws</i>	<i>Camp IDPs The City</i>	<i>State Government</i>
<i>State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)</i>	<i>State Government</i>	<i>Emergency management of IDPs, profiling, documentation and management of displaced persons</i>	<i>Camp IDPs</i>	<i>State Government</i>
<i>National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)</i>	<i>Federal Government</i>	<i>Management of displaced persons comprising selecting sites for erection of camps, management of camps and preparation for the closure of camps</i>	<i>Camp IDPs</i>	<i>Federal Government</i>
<i>Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (RRR)</i>	<i>State Government</i>	<i>Ensuring a secured and favourable conducive life for IDPs and returnee refugees for their return and resettlement</i>	<i>Camp IDPs</i>	<i>German Government, Development Agencies and State Government</i>
<i>Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)</i>	<i>International Organisation</i>	<i>Distribution of micro business materials, food vouchers, cash vouchers, cooking stoves, and farm materials</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>UN partners via voluntary contributions by member states</i>
<i>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</i>	<i>International Organisation</i>	<i>Provision of shelter and non-food items (NFI) kits for IDPs to start off with. Also help with registration, documentation and legal matters</i>	<i>Camp IDPs</i>	<i>The UN Humanitarian Actors</i>

<i>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)</i>	<i>International Organisation</i>	<i>Coordination of humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergency</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>The UN Partners</i>
<i>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</i>	<i>International Organisation</i>	<i>Organisation of mobility and management of migration through tracking</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>International Donors</i>
<i>Gender Equality and Peace Development Centre (GEPDC)</i>	<i>National NGO</i>	<i>Focuses on issues of gender equality, issues of policy and policy making</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>Government Agencies, International and Local Donors</i>
<i>Herwa Community Development Initiative</i>	<i>National NGO</i>	<i>Fostering quality education, health, gender issues that lead to conflict, and developing livelihood skills</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>National and International Donors and Prominent Individuals</i>
<i>Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI)</i>	<i>Religious National NGO</i>	<i>Responsible for transcending divisions among Muslims and Christians by preaching of peace towards the provocation of principles and values of Islam among the society</i>	<i>Camp IDPs Self-settled IDPs</i>	<i>Prominent Individuals</i>

Source Author generated from primary data, 2019.

Table 14 highlights that the overriding function of the organisations is around provision of shelter, food, and vocational skills to improve the livelihoods of IDPs. In some cases, there is a focus on peace and conflict resolution, providing legal aid, the re-integration of displaced persons, or upon providing justice for people in cases such as that of gender-based violence. The funding sources for the international organisations was mostly from the United Nations and its partner organisations including member states, while national NGOs relied on benevolent politicians and private donors or religious heads. Government organisations get their funding solely from the Borno State budget with the exception of the Ministry of RRR which also gets supplementary funding support from the German Government Development Agency, and NEMA, whose budget comes from the federal government. From Table 15 it is already evident that government agencies play little to no role in relation to self-settled IDPs; most of their interventions focus mainly on IDPs who are in formal camps, leaving the support for what constitutes the majority of IDPs up to international organisations and NGOs.

Table 15 further narrows down the functions of the organisations stated in Table 14 and the targets they aim to achieve based on their primary focus to the displaced communities.

*Table 15: Summary of functions and targets of organisations*

<i>Functions and Targets</i>	<i>Agencies</i>
<i>Provision of registration and documentation services</i>	<i>SEMA, NEMA, UNHCR, IOM, UNOCHA</i>
<i>Provision of food items, non-food items, seeds, consumables etc.</i>	<i>UNHCR, FAO, SEMA, NEMA</i>
<i>Provision of health and wellbeing services</i>	<i>NEMA, IOM, FAO</i>
<i>Provision of shelter</i>	<i>BSUPDB, SEMA, UNHCR,</i>
<i>Provision of protection services i.e. legal aid, gender advocacy etc.</i>	<i>UNHRC, GEPDC, Herwa, JNI</i>
<i>Provision of educational and livelihood services (including skills and economic incentives)</i>	<i>FAO, UNHCR, NEMA, Herwa</i>
<i>Provision of public health services</i>	<i>NEMA, IOM</i>
<i>Return and reintegration of displaced persons</i>	<i>Ministry of RRR, SEMA</i>

Source: Author generated from primary data, 2019.

Table 15 has grouped the functions and targets of the agencies into wider themes and presented organisations whose interventions focus on those themes. These are the themes that are to analyse the interventions of different organisations in the upcoming sections. The themes were not only generated from their responses, but also comprise many of the IDPs’ capabilities presented in Chapter 2 Table 5. The upcoming sections use these themes to reveal the impact that each organisation’s interventions have on the capabilities of camp IDPs vs self-settled IDPs. It will also start to highlight whether or not the interventions match IDPs’ perception of their needs. It is important to note however that in order to gauge the level of impact the interventions have on IDPs, both sides of the story will need to be examined. That is the side of the organisations and the side of the IDPs. Therefore, as much as this chapter will begin to uncover that impact, the subsequent chapters will allow us to see the full picture and then draw conclusions on the level of impact the interventions have on the capabilities of IDPs. The answer to Question 4 hence unfolds over several chapters.

The upcoming sections are thus structured around particular kinds of services. Within this the material is structured by the relevant key organisations and the roles they serve, with analysis showcasing how each organisation supports IDPs needs.

### 5.3 Provision of registration and documentation services

**SEMA:** is vested with the responsibility of registering IDPs and overseeing activities in the camps to make sure all is well in terms of their wellbeing and safety. It is also responsible for receiving and hosting new arrivals of IDPs. When new IDPs arrive into Maiduguri, it is first reported to SEMA, they take them to security and subject them through screening to ensure that they are not insurgents. They are then registered and taken to camp.

During the interview with SEMA it was confirmed that there are three classifications of IDPs in Maiduguri. First, those who live in formal camps; second, those who live in informal camps; third those who live by themselves with host communities. The SEMA representative is quoted below talking about the different types of camps and their role with each:

*“IDPs in formal camps are under our full control. We do everything for them. We provide security, food, shelter and health care for them. We have 100% control over them. Informal camps are the camps established by the IDPs themselves. They are not set up by government. When they find an open space, they make up their own shelter and settle there. We do not have control over them. They keep their families there and, in the morning, they go and run their businesses. Some of them do little jobs and get little earnings. As for those living with host communities, we do not have access to them unless they report themselves to us for some issue like lack of food. Otherwise, we do not have control over them.” “...the international organisations and NGOs come in here to offer some support. They complement what the government is doing in an attempt to bridge the gap. We have over two million IDPs so government alone cannot do everything for that big number. Government does its own part and the NGOs supplement the efforts of the government.” – (SEMA representative, 2019).*

The idea that SEMA has 100% control over camp IDPs is true and problematic in equal measure. Nothing happens to or for camp IDPs without SEMA’s approval. It represents the government and all queries and issues from other NGOs, international organisations, or any other organisation are meant to be taken to SEMA first. Access to camp IDPs is only granted through SEMA. Once a person receives a permission slip (from SEMA) to enter a camp the person has (for the period for which the slip is valid) unrestricted access to camp IDPs. This control over camp IDPs has many disadvantages according to the IDPs (as discussed in Chapter 6 and 7). Another gap in SEMA’s initiative lies in the fact that after attacks and displacements happen, it only focuses its efforts on IDPs living in formal camps, not IDPs in informal camps, or self-settled IDPs.

While discussing the registration and documentation of IDPs, the representative pointed out that, from their documentation, it is clear that many IDPs prefer to self-settle within host communities than stay in camps. This was attributed by the interviewee to the cultural context of Borno State. He stated that a

typical descendant of Borno dislikes being controlled by someone and will do anything to avoid it. He added that, in formal camps, the government tells you what to do, where to stay, gives you what to eat and does everything for you, and that being kept in a strict situation makes people feel like they are in prison. As a result, they prefer to stay on their own with their families where they can move about freely and engage in little jobs. That is why IDPs who are self-settled or living in informal camps outnumber IDPs in formal camps. The interviewee said *“it’s like choosing whether to stay in prison or stay on their own.”* This statement echoes the works of scholars such as Diken, Sanyal, Kibreab, and Harrell-Bond (discussed in Chapter 2), with regard to the negative effects of the confinement of displaced people in camps. It also appears from an observation of the casual demeanour in which the statement was relayed that SEMA and other organisations alike underestimate those negative effects of confinement and its effects on IDPs capabilities.

**NEMA:** carries out assessments for the selection of sites for the erection of camps, as well as preparation of the closure of camps. They carry out IDPs needs assessment, and the assessment and documentation of other sectors that cover IDPs needs. Lastly, they are involved with the coordination of all humanitarian actors. The NEMA representative noted that the sectoral approach to IDPs was newly introduced to them by the UN. He suggested that the approach had helped them document and organise their interventions, improved their response to IDPs, and reduced duplication of efforts. The sectors are divided into seven main groups; with some sectors having smaller sectors within them. The seven sectors which are coordinated and managed by NEMA include: water, sanitation and hygiene sector; chaired by ministry of water resources; co-chaired by UNICEF. Protection sector; chaired by ministry of women affairs and social development; co-chaired by UNHCR. Under protection sector they have food protection and livelihood protection, which are chaired by the ministry of agriculture; co-chaired by FAO. They also have a health sector, nutrition sector, education in emergency sector, and early recovery sector. The NEMA representative noted:

*“We have almost the same mandate as SEMA in the sense that we basically offer the same services to the IDPs, but ours is also to ensure that all stakeholders brought together are doing the right thing at the right time and to the right people. This is where our coordination comes in and this is a major part of our mandate.” – (NEMA representative, 2019).*

This quote is particularly intriguing because NEMA claims that it ensures that all stakeholders are doing the right thing, at the right time, and to the right people, but the interviews with representatives from Herwa and GEPDC suggested that there are concerns with regards to the effectiveness of NEMA’s coordination with other organisations. The GEPDC interviewee also indicated that whilst doing the right thing, to the right people should mean serving all IDPs not just camp IDPs, this is not the case since NEMA only offers intervention to camp IDPs. Additionally, NEMA’s mandate being so similar



to SEMA's raises concerns with regards to the overlap of interventions. Most of the organisations also carry out their own compilation and documentation of IDPs and this could be something that is reduced to specific organisations alone. Perhaps that is why reports on the documentation of IDPs often differs between different agencies.

The NEMA representative claimed that most of the needs of IDPs are fully being supported through different interventions, subsequent chapters will compare and contrast these claims with the actual experiences of IDPs. The interviewee said:

*“Yes I can say that all their needs are being met. I agree that everything cannot be done up to 100% but that is why we have other organisations complimenting the effort and making everything work well.” “Going by what the government is doing in terms of supporting the IDPs, improving the security situation and the reconstruction and reintegration initiative, I can say in the next eighteen to twenty-four months the camps will close and people will return to their communities empowered. Except the ones that decide to stay.” – (NEMA representative, 2019).*

During the interview, the representative failed to capture many of the gaps that still exist in providing interventions to IDPs despite being asked. These gaps cause barriers between intervention and implementation, exacerbate IDPs needs, and make it more difficult for them to foster their capabilities. It was at the NEMA Humanitarian Coordination Forum (NHCF), where each sector presented the progress and gaps of their interventions that those gaps became apparent and showcased many of the challenges that are pervading the aid industry. The gaps are identified throughout the chapter.

**UNHCR:** Registration and documentation are one of UNHCRs' biggest goals because lack of documentation brings many challenges. Most IDPs have lost proof of identification and without ID they cannot open bank accounts, enrol their children in schools, and so on. As a result, the UNHCR works with the National Population Commission to ensure children receive their birth certificate in order to reduce statelessness, whilst they work with the National Identity Management to document and produce new ID cards for adults. Although other organisations are involved with the documentation of IDPs, the UNHCR is unique in that it provides birth certificates and national IDs; both of these aspects are useful and play a huge role in how IDPs take care of their needs and improve their capabilities.

The representative made it clear that although the UNHCR tries to provide support to both camp and self-settled IDPs, their interventions mostly focus on camp IDPs because, at one point, the state government declared that humanitarian organisations were to focus their work in formal camps. During this period, the majority of their work – up to 80% – went to camps with only a small portion going to self-settled IDPs, though this is increasing slowly. She stated that the difficulty with working with self-

settled IDPs is that they are hard to reach due to the way they are scattered within host communities. The majority also move from one place to another so it can be difficult to (re) find them. Additionally, the reason why they stuck to formal camps is because IDPs spring up in informal camps overnight making it hard to tell if they are actually IDPs. This is something the military got involved with because of the security threat that not knowing whether these people are actually IDPs poses. After it was confirmed that the individuals were IDPs, UNHCR then started including them in the documentation process in order to be able to provide them with services.

**IOM:** The interview at IOM showed that they are highly involved with collecting data and the documentation of IDPs. The data they collect ranges from documenting the location of displacement, how many people are displaced, where they are coming from and so on, to information on the facilities that are available or not available for IDPs, in order to identify gaps. The data is subsequently used by the Nigerian government and other organisations for the intervention of IDPs. Without this data, it would be very difficult for governments' or organisations, or indeed for researchers and planners alike to plan for IDPs. IOM provides other interventions which will be discussed in subsequent sections, but one thing that stood out during the interview is that their interventions span across other states like Yola and Adamawa, not just Borno State. The interviewee alleged that this is why their funding for IDPs intervention is stretched and running low; also why there are many gaps in their interventions. He also noted that their interventions focus on both camp and self-settled IDPs, reiterating that there are more self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs:

*“There aren't even a lot of camps in Nigeria. The Northeast have very little number of camps but most importantly, IDPs prefer to live with people they know, who they are comfortable with and who can accommodate their needs as oppose to living in camps.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

This assumption by the IOM representative that IDPs prefer to be self-settled is an assumption shared by many, but it contradicts some of the findings of this research which show that although some IDPs do prefer to be self-settled, there is a high number of self-settled IDPs who had no choice but to do so. The issue of whether or not self-settled IDPs are there by choice was discussed in Chapter 4. It also begs the question of why the state government and other organisations focus majority of their interventions on camp IDPs if they are aware that their numbers are small compared to self-settled IDPs.

Through there documentation, the IOM is aware that there are many gaps in the interventions and services provided to IDPs but the representative was unable to determine whether or not that meant that IDPs' needs were not being met. He noted that;

*“There are gaps everywhere and it is very difficult to measure whether all their needs are being met...we tried to find out what is their greatest unmet need, and over 71% said food. But food is the most given humanitarian commodity above all. So looking at it from an outsider’s view you can easily get the wrong perception. They are getting food and they are saying it is not enough....we are not in the position to rate the response of how well their needs are being met, we can only say what the gaps are and what the needs are.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

What stands out from the above quote is the way that the IOM is unable to measure whether or not the needs of IDPs are being met despite it being the organisation that carries out and documents the needs analysis of IDPs. This suggests that no one is really mapping out whether the needs of IDPs are being met. Instead, what they are mapping are the services that are provided to them and the gaps that still exist. The reasons behind the gaps in intervention are also unclear to the IOM. When the representative was asked why there are gaps everywhere, he did not seem to know. Instead, he merely explained that IDPs speak more of their most pressing needs and often that is food. As he noted:

*“Obviously what tends to happen is when you ask the IDPs what their needs are and for example, I do not have a place to sleep and I am hungry, I want to eat before I sleep. It is only logical that they are saying food but really there are a lot of other gaps. 95% of the toilets in the camps are described as unhygienic which is enough of an issue in itself. And for self-settled IDPs that figure is even higher 98%. So of course what we try to do here is to get an explanation of what the conditions are in camps and what the conditions are for self-settled IDPs, then measure the pros and cons.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

There is a clear lack of knowledge about why the goods and services provided to IDPs are not enough, or meeting their needs. For example, despite the food provision the IOM representative speaks of, food still seems to be an issue. This research will fill this knowledge gap in Chapter 6.

**UNOCHA:** The organisation coordinates and documents the works of up to 60 humanitarian actors<sup>4</sup> in order to measure their impact and ensure that there is a coherent response to the emergency. They also ensure that there is a framework by which each actor contributes to the overall response efforts towards IDPs; thereby ensuring that all humanitarian needs are covered, and overlaps mitigated against. Though the organisation’s impact upon IDPs and their capabilities is mainly indirect, it is still a key actor especially with regard to the high rate of overlap of interventions among many organisations and the lack of clear framework among others. However, the coordination seems to focus on international

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<sup>4</sup> They co-ordinate and bring together government agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs. International organisations are other UN sister units such as WFP, FAO, UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA etc. National NGOs include MRC, DRC, INTERSOS etc. Government partners include NEMA, SEMA, PCNI, Victim Support Fund, Divine Ministries etc.

organisations, in particular UN sister organisations, not NGOs. Managing and coordinating 60 partners suggests that the organisation could provide an explanation for why there are gaps in interventions. The representative stated that the first reason is a consequence of the number of displaced persons. In addition to 2-3 million displaced persons, there are an additional 7 million people who have been affected by the insurgency who are also in need of support. The 60 partners do not have the capacity to tackle those numbers, and their funds are significantly stretched. Secondly, a lot of communities – and particularly those of self-settled IDPs – are hard to reach. Other communities are inaccessible due to security threats or decay in infrastructure; both factors make it impossible to travel to them. These are the main reasons why there are gaps in every sector.

However, at the time of data collection, there were still many overlaps in interventions, which most organisations spoke about. The representative asserted that he still considered the humanitarian aid and support of IDPs to be very good because a lot of progress had been made. For example, at the early stages of the insurgency in 2009, there was limited access to Borno due to the severity of security threat. Humanitarians had already started working in Adamawa and some parts of Gombe but there was no partners working in Borno. Instead, only a very small structure of the government, host communities and NGOs who were within Borno were supporting the state at the time. Subsequently though, a lot of progress has been made with regard to accessing Borno, and the many vulnerable LGAs within it. Since 2013, when the state of emergency was declared, UNOCHA has opened many camps where lifesaving support is being provided:

*“Personally I will say the situation has improved from 2013. From access to Maiduguri and now to most of the LGA headquarters and to some extent a few smaller towns too within the LGAs. A classic example is that now we are not only accessing Gwoza, but we have Pulka which is also a small town within the same LGA. I will not say that IDPs are getting everything they need especially because of the protection and security threat but I will say a lot has been put in place to save lives and they are getting most of the basic life support they need.”*

*– (UNOCHA representative, 2019).*

This section has already started to show that most intervention is targeted towards camp IDPs; thus showing that self-settled IDPs are really mostly left to fend for themselves. Even with the interventions mostly provided to camp IDPs, the section shows that there are many gaps which international organisations seem to acknowledge more than the two government agencies. From this section and observations during the data collection of the study, it seems that the documentation that government agencies carry out is mostly centered around the registration of the numbers of camp inhabitants. This also shows that the bulk of the very meaningful and crucial documentation and registration of IDPs is left for international organisations to do. This is interesting because it is sort of documentation that

greatly affects the citizens of the country, one would think the government will consequently be more involved in handling it. For example, some of UNHCR's documentation includes the provision of birth certificates and ID's; without which individuals can easily fall into statelessness or be unable to access certain services.

#### **5.4 Provision of food items, non-food items (NFIs), seeds, and other consumables**

**UNHCR:** At the height of the insurgency, people were fleeing their homes with nothing but the clothes on their bodies; upon arrival into Maiduguri they had nothing. The UNHCR began to provide them with immediate basic necessities; often referred to as NFI kits. These included thirteen items such as slippers, pots, soap, solar lanterns, blankets, mats, mattresses and so on. The UNHCR representative admitted that as a package, the NFIs looked sufficient but, when measured up against the needs of IDPs, they were insufficient. More could be done but the resources do not allow for this as new IDPs arrive every day. Many camp IDPs stated that whilst they initially received NFIs from various organisations, they are now left to buy their own items and that their limited funds are not able to cover all their needs. This has some implication on their capabilities which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

**FAO:** FAO's interventions include the distribution of micro business materials, food vouchers, cash vouchers, cooking stoves, and farm materials; particularly to the vulnerable. FAO's main goal and intervention is targeted towards safer alternatives for cooking through their Safe Access to Fair Energy initiative (SAFE). Currently, firewood and charcoal are the only means of cooking for IDPs. Not only is this the only way they know, it is also a means of livelihood for the people who chop the firewood and sell it. This style of cooking is unsafe for the people and the environment due to the hydrocarbons it emits which may lead to respiratory diseases. It is also unsafe for the women who have to go into the bushes or forest to fetch the firewood as they become vulnerable to Boko Haram and all types of sexual violence in these places. FAO also has a Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) initiative that targets farmers and teaches them about smart agriculture in a bid to get them to learn sustainable farming solutions for the future. It follows, that FAO's interventions do not only cater to IDP's immediate needs but also the sustainability of their livelihoods in the future. As a representative noted:

*“Most international organisations rendering services are only providing input. But you need energy (firewood) to cook the food provided, and if you look at the peculiarity of this desert area, the women are more vulnerable because they are the ones that go to the bush and get this energy. They could get raped or killed. So you can see the sensitivity in gender issues there. We are also advocating for energy efficiency and also climate change impact, in a state with adverse desertification where the natural resources (trees) are cut down to make firewood. The sale of the firewood and charcoal from it is like a traditional business in some families. So how do you ask these people to leave their profession and move to an alternative source of energy? This is why we're giving them access to*

*alternative fuel and energy to be able to cook. If UNDP or UNHCR come and give you food as an IDP, how do you cook it? And to get healthy food, you need to cook the food properly so we incorporate that project in the SAFE initiative.” – (FAO representative, 2019).*

FAO is unique in the nature of its interventions because it is the only organisation which focuses on women’s vulnerability with regards to firewood fetching. The representative stated that their support is particularly for self-settled IDPs as they do not get as much food and cash support as their camp mates and that camp IDPs get enough. The FAO representative also stated that they have so far reached 15,000 IDPs with their interventions, which they are very proud of. Of the 15,000 IDPs, 500 camp IDP households from Bakassi camp received nourishment intervention. However, 15,000 is a very small number especially when it is considered that there are more self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs. From this it becomes easy to see why IDPs claim that they are not getting sufficient nourishment support. It should be noted that food intervention is not FAO’s biggest or main intervention. Their main interventions are in areas of livelihood, and education in the form of training and protection; each is analysed in later sections.

**SEMA:** SEMA’s initial food support was provided through what they call ‘compound feeding’. It involves food being cooked in a central area in a camp with each IDP lining up and collecting their food, three times a day. Many IDPs had an issue with this as they complained about not being able to eat most of the food they were given because it was not the type of food they ate at home. Others complained that the process of queueing up to collect food rations made them feel undignified, like prisoners, and they also queried why the government should decide what they ate on a daily basis? SEMA subsequently changed this policy and began to give people raw food items so that they could make their meals themselves. The representative claimed that the IDPs are very content with this new policy. He stated:

*“It has been very successful. They are very happy because they can decide what to eat and they can eat to their own satisfaction.” – (SEMA representative, 2019).*

It is true from interviews with camp IDPs that the IDPs feel more comfortable deciding what they eat, but whether or not they can eat to their satisfaction is disputed by all the IDP respondents. Not one IDP in the course of this study stated they were eating to their satisfaction. All of the IDPs complained that either the rations were not enough or that the distribution of food was not timely. With particular reference to the camps where SEMA is the sole provider of nourishment support, a lot of IDPs complained that the monthly ration of food they receive is often not enough to feed their entire household for the whole month. Most times they have to use the little money they get or make to buy food from the market to supplement it. Those who do not have any money (the majority), often borrow

food or money from another family and use next month's ration to pay for it when it comes. The cycle continues over and over again. This will all be analysed in great detail in Chapter 6. It is not surprising to learn that the food items are not sufficient for most households because according to the representative of SEMA, by the world's standards, one household consists of a man, his wife, and five children. Though he says they use this formula at the basis of their distribution, they still take into account the size of the family and give them more based on that. He stated:

*“That’s the global standard. It was brought to us by the United States. They set one man, one wife and five children as the standard. Is that not the world’s standard? Whatever the standard is, we take it and increase it based on the number of their families. We calculate based on this.” – (SEMA representative, 2019).*

This formula has no basis in Nigeria where most families are larger. This is especially true in northern Nigeria where marrying more than one wife is a common practice grounded in Islam. One is more likely to find a camp IDP man (or a Borno man in general) with multiple wives than a man with just one wife. As a result, many families are very large with up to 18 children in some instances. Whether rationing is based on this formula or the size of each household, the amount of food provided is insufficient for a majority of IDPs. Some IDPs also complained that months can go by without food support. At the time of the fieldwork, all of the IDPs I spoke with in Bakassi camp said that it had been approximately 70 days or 2 months and 2 weeks since they last got food support. When asked, SEMA said this is not a regular occurrence and that they had, in this particular instance, experienced issues with regards to releasing funds and changing suppliers; both had delayed their efforts. The camp IDPs also added that when the new policy of giving them raw food started, SEMA also gave them some condiments or money to buy condiments to cook with. Now they only provide the food and IDPs have to buy their own condiments such as salt, and oil as well as other necessities like firewood. With little or no money at their disposal, this is a challenge. These issues will again be expatiated in later chapters, but they are important to bring here as they are starting to bring to the fore the issue of comparing provision with need.

**NEMA:** The interviewee from NEMA did not go into much detail with regards to food intervention. He simply proclaimed that the IDPs are supported with sufficient food and that they have no issues in this area. NEMA is not a major player in relation to food but since they oversee the food and nutrition sector, the representative was asked about the issue of malnutrition which came up during other interviews. He noted that:

*“There is no such issue of malnutrition. Two years ago there was a serious case of malnutrition but it has been addressed by humanitarian partners like MSF, WHO and UN. So you will hardly find any*

*cases of malnutrition now just maybe a few. Right now malnutrition is not a problem.” – (NEMA representative, 2019).*

At the NHCF however, the food and nutrition sector made claims to the contrary. The representative of the sector stated that malnutrition in children under five is extreme. The children’s ward in the hospital is overpopulated with malnourished children and that in general, the hospitals are in need of additional space. In the next seven months (from when this meeting held in July 2019), malnutrition is feared to increase to a state of emergency according to the nutrition sector.

From this section we can also see how similar to the previous section, the government agencies seem to think IDPs are content with the aid they are receiving. The representative of SEMA saying camp IDPs eat to their satisfaction is a serious overestimation when compared to IDPs responses regarding access to food (see Chapter 6). A government agency whose main responsibility it is to provide the intervention should know whether or not they are eating to their satisfaction. Despite NEMA not being a key actor in the provision of food, it was necessary to bring them up here to show how their responses regarding a lot of interventions (in this case food and malnutrition), often differ to what the different sectors and the IDPs say about those interventions. This is interesting because NEMA overlooks all those sectors; so where is the difference in opinion coming from? Perhaps the representative of NEMA was not aware of these issues before our interview. Or, perhaps there is some truth to the claims made by the representative of GEPDC that *‘the huge amount of money being sunk into camps and yet you can’t see any tangible aid for these people. It is like our government has no respect for human lives because they are not helping these people bounce back to their lives’* (See Section 6.6). Similarly again, in this section it appears that other important issues such as the provision of NFI kits, and the issues regarding firewood, women’s vulnerability around firewood fetching, and CSA are left in the hands of international organisations.

### **5.5 Provision of health and wellbeing services**

**NEMA:** In addition to food, the NEMA representative mentioned that they provide sufficient health and wellbeing services. However, the health sector at the NHCF mentioned a few gaps in this area too. For instance, they mentioned that mental health issues are not given enough attention and have only recently been seen as an emergency health issue after the IOM raised concerns about it and donated funds. They also mentioned that they have no means of transferring patients from camp health centres to secondary or tertiary sources of health; this has aggravated illnesses and even led to death in some cases. The WHO subsequently donated ambulances to major camps, although not all camps are covered, and this again excludes host communities where self-settled IDPs are. Outbreaks of cholera are also increasing due to insufficient Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services. Lastly, several attacks have been launched (up to 16) on health agencies, facilities and providers; such instances increase fear



amongst health providers. The provision of health services – or lack thereof – is an important one with many negative implications, which are discussed in Chapter 6.

With regards to the provision of health and wellbeing services, the protection sector also raised other issues around gender-based violence and drug abuse at the NHCF meeting. The representative of the sector stated at the meeting that a lot more support and protection services are required with regard to gender-based violence, as cases of rape remain high. In addition to that, the sector said it is also contending with high cases of drug abuse among youths. In fact, at the NHCF meeting, the sector mentioned that no organisation was working on drug abuse issues. There is a lack of rehabilitation centres for drug abusers, the government has no budget to support them, and it has done nothing with or for arrested or detained drug users.

The issue of drug abuse in IDPs is very common as confirmed by the representatives of Herwa, GEDPC, and by some of the IDPs themselves. A lot of interventions do not focus on young people and, there is also a lack of, livelihood and educational opportunities for older children, which leaves them idle thus more inclined to engage in drug use. The schools that are being built around Maiduguri as well as the schools within some camps do not go past secondary education. Only primary and secondary education are free in Nigeria, meaning university education will have to be paid for. However, the youth IDPs in this study said a lot of their pairs cannot afford to sit for university qualifying exams and that those who have passed the exams cannot afford to pay for university. The lack of livelihood and education, which leads to idleness and drug use is a major barrier for youths and other IDPs realising their capabilities (examined in more detail in Chapter 7). Some IDPs also made references to the situation of youths and drug abuse and claimed that these are the same factors that led many to join Boko Haram.

**IOM:** The representative of the IOM said that in addition to registration and documentation, there are four other components of the organisation. One of those components provides multidisciplinary Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) to IDPs in camps and self-settled communities. They offer a range of services including recreational activities for children and youth, informal education for adults, counselling, and support groups. Through sensitisation and focus group discussions, they engage with local communities to identify and address cross-cutting issues such as gender-based violence (GBV), security, and protection.

According to the IOM website, they reached 713,000 people by DATE across Adamawa, Yola, and Maiduguri (IOM, 2021). However, according to data obtained by this study, many IDPs in camps maintain that they neither receive mental health support, nor are asked about their mental health. This may be because these services had not reached the camps visited for this study at the time of fieldwork. However, as Bakassi camp is the biggest IDP camp with the most number of displaced people, it seems

rather unlikely that the services would not have reached that camp. Self-settled IDPs had little to no knowledge of the mental health services being provided to IDPs. There is a chance that the IDPs interviewed for this study were not aware of the services because they did not think that they needed them. There is an even higher chance that majority of the services are mainly offered in Adamawa and Yola. Moreover, the IOM website makes it clear that MHPSS services are extremely limited in many areas of the northeast, and that specialised psychiatric/mental health treatment services are only available in two hospitals (IOM, 2021). Such services have direct implications on IDPs capabilities considering the induced mental health and psychological problems that the insurgency has triggered in people, which we will see later on. Nonetheless, it was gathered during data collection that only 1 out of the 63 IDPs interviewed had used said services before (an IDP man spoke of his wife who needed psychiatric support and she was able to get that from one of the hospitals in Maiduguri). In contrast, another IDP woman spoke of a time when she desperately needed such support after losing her husband in the camp. She maintained that no one ever asked her if she needed any help or support.

**FAO:** In terms of health and wellbeing, the FAO representative indicated that they often visit communities to find out about the type of cooking energy they use and the vulnerability of the women who go out to the bushes to fetch firewood. These vulnerable women are the reason why FAO began its clean cooking energy initiative. This is also how the organisation found out that the current mode of cooking used by IDPs emits a kind of hydrocarbon that is linked to a type of respiratory organ disease that kills people.

The FAO representative was adamant that their interventions have been successful. When asked what makes them successful, he asserted that it was due to the fact that they do not apply a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Instead, they apply the UN policy which means they visit each community where they plan on intervening, carry out a needs analysis and find out precisely what that community needs. Whilst their interventions have not reached their preferred target because they are a fairly new organisation in the affairs of Borno State, their numbers are growing. Highlighting FAO’s approach, the interviewee noted:

*“When we were deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo, we noticed a lot of organisations were sent there to implement strategies or projects they had used in other cases in other countries, but it did not necessarily work for DRC. Implementation does not work like that. For example, if you know that a man needs something you still have to ask him before giving him that thing, that is the UN policy. So we work in concurrent with the needs of the people. That is why we visit the communities first to undergo a Training Needs Assessment to find out what their needs are. I think you need water but if I come and ask you about your needs, you may tell me shelter. They are most likely going to tell us what need is priority to them at that point in time. So there is a need to have that synergy between*

*their needs and what we offer. That is how we achieve successful results.” – (FAO representative, 2019).*

FAO’s approach of asking IDPs what their current needs are instead of just assuming what they need is both appropriate and evidently missing in the approaches adopted by other organisations. While examining other organisations, it was observed that, in most cases, organisations provide services to IDPs that they assume they need rather than the services which the IDPs themselves have asked for.

As seen from this section, there are many gaps in the provision of health and wellbeing services. Government organisations are also not part of the providers of these services and international organisations are overwhelmed from the services they do provide already, such as running camp clinics, that other key areas of IDPs capabilities such as their mental wellbeing are being overlooked. In such instances, the government could supplement the interventions of international organisations and tackle these gaps but that is not the case.

## **5.6 Provision of Shelter**

**BSUPDB:** A representative of BSUPDB stated that their job involves planning regulations and enforcing urban development codes in the city. These would generally be expected to lead the design and establishment of camp settlements. They are also meant to influence the distribution of self-settled IDPs in host communities to avoid communities deteriorating into slum conditions. The phrase ‘meant’ is used here because he stated that they are not often engaged by both the development partners, international organisations or camp authorities. According to him, when IDPs first arrived in Maiduguri there were no established camps and, as a result, they sheltered in schools and other open spaces. Subsequently, a few camps started to emerge particularly in the open spaces but a lot of the schools remained as camps; this is still the case today. According to him, these camps were not up to standard because they lacked many services including access to public infrastructure, and using schools as camps is not viable because it leads to the closure of the schools. As he noted:

*“When all these IDPs came there was no provision for them like refugee camps that is why they had to be taken to schools or any other open space. We even made a submission to his excellency about the establishment of proper camps so that eventually these institutions like the schools do not have to suffer. Not just for this insurgency but even against floods and other things that can lead to displacement. There is no proper provision of shelter for that, that is why they all end up using schools and other public spaces and in the same breath the law states that only IDPs in proper camps get proper support. Up till now, no consultation has been made with us regarding IDPs and their movement.”*

*– (BSUPDB representative, 2019).*

During the interview, he revealed that the submission that BSUPDB made to the governor proposed that proper, permanent camps should be established for IDPs. The proposal suggests site locations and layouts for new camps which will be bigger and better and have everything including access to public services and even police stations within them. Commenting further, he asserted that there is no cooperation between them and SEMA or NEMA despite the fact that cooperation is vital to current and future planning regulations for both IDPs and the city. What stands out as a gap from the onset is that BSUPDB is barely utilised by the state towards ensuring optimum planning for displaced persons especially with regards to the future. This will particularly become a problem if the insurgency does not completely end and their LGAs are still unsafe to return, or if IDPs decide to remain in Maiduguri instead of return. It is unclear what lies behind this lack of cooperation. However, the general atmosphere within organisations in Maiduguri suggests that some organisations like to take credit for doing more work than others.

BSUPDB was included in this study because it was assumed that the organisation played a key role in the city due to the fact that Maiduguri and Borno State are currently going through a lot of changes. These changes include: the destruction of infrastructure and public structures and services which will need to be redeveloped; the influx of IDPs which has forced the city to grow exponentially and caused resultant strain on the city's remaining infrastructure and resources. Given such factors it was to be expected that the planning and development board would need to be involved in implementing and improving frameworks and plans for the city that would cater for its growth as well as all the developmental projects that are springing up over the city. It was also assumed that BSUPDB would be involved in planning how to manage and accommodate both camps and IDPs who are settled within the city amongst the urban poor.

It was therefore both thought-provoking and shocking to find out that there is no aspect of planning for the future of the city and the IDPs in which BSUPDB is involved. Upon visiting the office, it seemed stagnant with very few staff and not a lot of work going on. The BSUPDB representative mentioned many times during the course of the interview that, in reality, no government agency or organisation is involving BSUPDB in developmental planning despite the organisation proposing projects to the effect. These statements were being corroborated by all the organisations including NEMA and SEMA. The UNHCR representative for example stated that:

*“What you said is true and a food for thought, we are not currently working with the planning department but I think it's the way the situation is. Maybe my colleagues in UNDP are engaging with them I am not sure. But you are right, if you are planning about humanitarian projects you should*

*start thinking about long term development and involving development planning partners. We have reached the point where we have to all work together.” – (UNHCR representative, 2019).*

In addition, the future of these schools that are currently occupied by IDPs is very much unknown. Key informants such as the representatives of Herwa and GEPDC admitted that they did not know what would happen to the schools should IDPs remain in them for the foreseeable future. They further suggested that this was a big problem, and that it was necessary to tackle it sooner rather than later. The representative of BSUPDB said their proposal suggests opening permanent camps, which would solve this issue. Such camps do not currently exist in Maiduguri or beyond; this might be because the government of Borno State and most other parties involved with IDPs favour return over integration. Currently, most plans are to this effect; perhaps they do not think they will need permanent camps. However, the decision to return or remain is up to each individual, and as literature on displacement indicates, the displaced usually remain in the country or city they find themselves in after displacement for a protracted period. As the representative stated, the earlier these permanent camps are created, the more secure the living conditions of IDPs would be, and the more secure the future of those occupied schools would be.

As noted, a lot of the plans for IDPs (such as the erection of camps or building of new homes and infrastructure in LGAs) have been approved by SEMA and NEMA. Other developmental projects around the city of Maiduguri have been approved directly by the government. The representative of BSUPDB stated that they were aware of all the new homes the government has built and is trying to build for IDPs so that they may return to their homes and towns. They also know that not all of them will choose to return or can even return considering the security threat. It follows, that most of them are likely to choose to stay in Maiduguri. Evidence from the IDPs indicates that without complete peace in their respective LGAs and their surrounding areas, they will not leave Maiduguri. The big question that arises from this, according to the BSUPDB representative, is ‘what are the provisions for those who are staying?’ Policymakers need to be aware that this is a big problem waiting to happen and they need to take the right steps to address it according to the representative. He added that, at the time of the interview; August 2019, the planning board was ready to give its support to any agency that wanted to cooperate with the planning board with regards to provision of layouts and services for IDPs, and how they can access more land. Additionally, he added that building new homes would not solve other issues that also require the planning board such as access to public infrastructure and transport, and electricity and water services. He noted that:

*“Certainly with all the new IDPs those services won’t be enough for the city, in fact right now as I am talking these services are facing shortages. They are not adequate for Maiduguri itself talk less of if*

*other people are here. Electricity, water and other services are not enough because there is not enough provision for them.” – (BSUPDB representative, 2019).*

With regard to the new developments all over the city of Maiduguri, many new schools and new hospitals were observed during the fieldwork undertaken for this study. It was understood that these schools are meant to replace the schools currently occupied by IDPs as camps. However, the schools are not yet in operation as they lack sufficient resources; including teachers. During the interviews, the representative of BSUPDB said they are also not involved in any of these projects. He stated that if the planning board were involved, then development of the schools would have taken a different approach. For example, they would not have recommended a site for the erection of a children’s school near a highway. He claimed that these new developments are simply political projects and not necessarily developmental or sustainable projects because the politicians do what they want mostly so these projects can easily be sighted. He further noted that:

*“We have a big problem with planning in our people. I don't know whether they consider engineers as planners. We will just see a project crop up one day and there is nothing we can do about it, this is the government’s decision. You can only turn a blind eye.” – (BSUPDB representative, 2019).*

From this and other interviews, it is clear that there is a power hierarchy at play between organisations and the government. SEMA is the main state organisation at the top of that power pyramid. The statement made by the representative of BSUPDB regarding the situation that ‘there is nothing we can do about it, this is the government’s decision. You can only turn a blind eye’, suggests that even when the organisation does not agree with certain projects or the way they are being executed, it is unable to challenge SEMA or the government at large.

**SEMA:** As described in Chapter 4, some of the shelters that SEMA has provided are open fields which are gated and fitted with tents. Others like Bakassi camp are housing estates with some incomplete houses in them and additional tents to shelter IDPs. A lot of them are, as noted, schools or other public spaces which are no longer in use because they have been turned into camps. These have also been fitted with additional tents. There is no one type of IDP camp. They take different forms and are located in different parts of the city or its outskirts. Although the representative of SEMA stated that it provides IDPs with shelter, it appears what it actually does is provide a space where shelters can be erected. Except in cases like Bakassi which possesses a few houses, and the schools that have a few classrooms within them, all other tents and structures within camps are actually provided by international organisations. In most camps, the UNHCR is the sole provider of tents. Other camp structures like schools, camp management offices, health centres, and privies are predominantly constructed by UNICEF. From observation, additional resources such as bore holes for water, and school supplies for

the educational centres are mostly provided by IOM. In some cases, such as EYN camp, the space (despite it being recognised as a formal camp) was not even provided by SEMA but by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and interventions in the camp are also mostly led by international organisations. Action Against Hunger is the sole provider of nourishment in EYN and other organisations like the IOM, the World Bank, and UNICEF provide additional support in the areas of WASH, livelihoods, and health.

**UNHCR:** Throughout Maiduguri, it is visibly evident that the UNHCR is the sole provider of new IDP shelters/tents. Almost every camp is equipped with tents made from poles and tarpaulin. As mentioned in Chapter 4, in Bakassi camp the state government provided the estate first, which had some 200 unfinished houses in it. The rest of the over 30,000 IDPs live in UNHCR tents. Similarly, in the teachers' village camp, the school, which is no longer in operation as a school, is occupied by IDPs as a formal camp. The classes have been demarcated into IDPs' rooms. However, the influx of IDPs means there are also UNHCR tents in the open fields where other IDPs are sheltered. The UNHCR representative admitted that this is a serious issue because education should be a priority for everyone and particularly for IDP children because, otherwise, their needs and vulnerabilities would be exacerbated. She stated that:

*“With the displacement, we see a lot of children and their priority is not education, which is a real need. For those who want to go to school the school might either be used as IDP accommodation or there are no teachers. Even if the children want to go to school because majority of the schools are currently being rebuilt by the state government and UNICEF - a very good case is Bama - but there are still no teachers. Ten schools were rebuilt by the state government but only two are working because there are no teachers.” – (UNHCR representative, 2019).*

During the interview, it was noted by the author that IDPs had, during their interviews, made a lot of complaints with regards to shelter (discussed in Chapter 7). The representative agreed that there were many gaps with regards to shelter. One of them is the influx of IDPs and the issue of squatting when new IDPs come to camps and squat in small tents that are already inhabited by others; thereby worsening overcrowding. The other is to do with the condition of the shelters. She stated that the tents have a lifespan of six months after which they start to erode. However, every IDP is expected to find ways of maintaining their tents in order for them to last longer. As she explained:

*“The tents which are made of tarpaulin have a lifespan of six months after which it may get worn out or the wood may get eaten up by termites. So of course they will say they need shelter. When giving them we told them to please take good care of these things because in most instances we do not have the capacity to come and repair them. Especially because of the new emergencies coming up, the*

*agency has to go and build new shelters for the newly displaced. I understand that the IDPs are not happy about that. And because of the condition they found themselves they expect everything to be done for them. When you are given kits you take ownership of it and you're expected to take good care of it.” – (UNHCR representative, 2019).*

She continued to make a point about another camp which is located in the outskirts of Maiduguri. She claimed that the camp ‘had almost been forgotten’. UNHCR used to operate at this camp but was called back due to insecurity and shrinkage in funding. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of this camp have managed to sustain themselves and reinforced their tents to protect them from adverse weather conditions. She noted:

*“After a long while we recently visited them and I was quite impressed. Even though most of the agencies have pulled out from there, they managed to sustain themselves. They've learnt that if the humanitarians can pull out then they are left to themselves. So they managed to sustain themselves, they reinforced the tents cleverly because the wind can blow it away. It has to be taken good care of.”*  
– (UNHCR representative, 2019).

This statement is particularly interesting because it speaks on the many issues being analysed in this research. Firstly, it speaks on the support provided by the government and other organisations. In this case it sounds as though they neglected the IDPs of this camp because of the difficult circumstances and challenges. Secondly, it speaks to the resilience of these displaced people and shows how capable they are of fostering their capabilities and becoming more self-reliant. Thirdly, it highlights some of the negative implications of dependency on aid provision; an issue which scholars such as Diken and Sanyal have alluded to. It also echoes the work of Al-Husban and Adams (2016), (also discussed in Chapter 2), who noted that a refugee camp in Jordan had “emerged as a functioning entity with a bustling economy.” (Al-Husban and Adams, 2016:9). This was due to the refugees actualizing their capabilities and being self-reliant. The UNHCR representative noted that, in her opinion, the reason why this camp had managed to sustain itself despite having no support is because the inhabitants had less restrictions in terms of their movement. They had more freedom to go out, work, and fend for themselves because they had no other option. She stated that, in contrast, Bakassi camp is located in the centre of town which means that residents have constant aid, often get visitors including wealthy people, and friends and family who often bring them aid. Besides the residents of Bakassi and EYN camp alike have restrictions to their movement, which acts as a barrier for them (more on this will be discussed in the upcoming chapters). This shows that restricting IDP’s movement in most camps is a disadvantage to their capabilities. Perhaps with this in mind, self-settled IDPs find it easier to actualise some of their capabilities compared to camp IDPs. It also speaks to the debate on the differences between camps



that are located within urban areas and those that are not. There remains concerns, however, as to whether or not these organisations recognise such issues as affecting IDP's capabilities.

### **5.7 Provision of protection services i.e. legal aid, gender and religious advocacy, and so on.**

**UNHCR:** Another essential intervention that the UNHCR offers is legal aid. The UNHCR ensures that people know their rights; a process that may require individuals to be educated as to their rights. This was interesting to learn because it suggests that the government does not educate its own IDPs on their rights. The UNHCR then tries to ensure that those rights are being provided. Thereafter, and since the destruction of civil structures such as courts during the insurgency, the UNHCR has established small courts in camps to which IDPs can take matters and receive legal support. They also follow up on IDPs cases to make sure that they are resolved. A lot of their cases revolve around women seeking justice or divorces from spouses who have run away. The UNHCR's main goals remain advocating for human rights, shelter, and documentation. Cases where IDPs have needed and made use of such legal aid will be seen in later chapters, particularly under protection capability.

**GEPDC:** GEPDC's main focus is issues of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. Their interventions span across any issues that IDP women and children in particular face including issues of policy and policy making that help to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, the full and inclusive participation of every person, and the removal of barriers to the same. They highly regard and encourage partnering and coordinating with other organisations – such as FOMWAN and CAN<sup>5</sup> - in order to achieve their goals. Some of their initiatives include supporting peace building, conflict resolution, and raising funds for vulnerable children. Other initiatives that are gender specific include a health and reproductive health rights initiative, a human security initiative for women, education in emergency initiative and relief and livelihood recovery initiative for women. The GEPDC representative stated:

*“We offer intervention in camps, we also get in contact with as many women living in host communities as possible, but they also often come to us by themselves. In 2014 - 2015, most concentration was in the camps. International organisations, NGOs and all interventionist organisations forgot that there are IDPs in the host communities. They assumed and still assume that anybody who goes to stay in town has one or two relatives not knowing that in some of these houses it is difficult for them to even find a blanket to cover themselves. So we started speaking up against concentration of aid in camps. We have sector meetings where we try to map out locations where women are in need of the most help and report the information back to the necessary organisations.*”

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<sup>5</sup> FOMWAN is the Federation Of Muslim Women's Association and CAN is the Christian Association of Nigeria. Both are faith-based organisations that also operate as NGOs.

*For example the number of women squatting that are in need of a house, or those that have lost their husbands and are in need of work to sustain themselves, or sometimes those are going through some form of abuse.” – (GEPDC representative, 2019).*

GEPDC’s interventions are very interesting because the organisation has clear and concise goals which makes it unique amongst the other organisations. Its interventions target all displaced people whether in camp or self-settled. It is also the only organisation that actively speaks up against the concentration of aid and support in camps alone. GEPDC speaks up against organisations whose interventions only cater to camp IDPs, and GEPDC also actively map out locations where vulnerable women are in need of support. The organisation shares that information with other organisations where it is appropriate and useful to do so. One thing that stood out in the quote from the representative is the suggestion that all interventionist organisations have either forgotten that there are self-settled IDPs or assume that self-settled IDPs have friends and family who support them. Though most people are aware that there are more self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs, the GEPDC representative was alluding to the idea that those organisations must have forgotten this fact and that their assumption is flawed since most aid and support still mostly goes towards camp IDPs. Another point that stood out from the interview is that although GEPDC strongly advocates for coordinating and partnering with other organisations, it does not partner or coordinate with the state government or any international organisation. It works independently as an NGO and the only partners mentioned in both interviews and on the organisation’s website are other NGOs.

**Herwa:** The representative of Herwa stated that the organisation particularly focuses on gender advocacy though it also addresses other issues such as fostering quality education, health, and developing livelihood skills. According to the representative, Herwa targets two main gaps. The first is its support for gender issues that lead to conflict among IDPs. Not a lot of interventions tackle those conflicts so their NGO took it upon themselves to do so.

The second is conflict resolution, which often occurs between families and communities particularly those whose members are Boko Haram survivors, been abducted by the group, or have had any past relations with the group. In these cases, Herwa first tries to reunite the victims with their families or communities, then it tries to reintegrate them, and finally it tries to build their resilience by providing them with livelihood support and other support that they may require. The word ‘try’ is used here because the representative stated that this is often a very difficult feat. The organisation tries to reintegrate people who have separated from their families and communities but in most cases people are afraid to live with the victims again. The assumption is that the victims have been brainwashed by Boko Haram; that they now know how to assemble and disassemble arms; and they know how to make bombs. As a result, everyone, including their families, are afraid of them. Herwa tries to join these

families and communities together and teach them how to live peacefully. The representative highlighted that in most cases this is easier to do in host communities than in camps especially for women who have had babies by a Boko Haram member, and who now want to live peacefully on their own. Such women prefer to self-settle in host communities because they can co-exist outside of the community of their LGA without anyone knowing their past. This is harder to do in camps because of the stigma that follows them which leads to isolation of the victim at best, and extreme discrimination at worst. As the representative noted:

*“There is high rate of stigma in IDP camps, we have many survivors of Boko Haram abduction that were released, they will return to the IDP camp and if unfortunately she was impregnated and comes back with a child, that stigma will not allow them to live freely or peacefully within the community. So they have to move to host communities where nobody knows them and you will just be living your life like an ordinary IDP. So, this is why some people feel so comfortable to live in host communities than camps.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

From this quote it can be seen that there are some other types of challenges that IDPs face; and particularly vulnerable women. It can also be seen that there are instances where an IDP will forsake camp settlement not necessarily because they want to, but because it is safer for them to do so. Such instances are not ones of ‘choice’ for the affected IDPs, and it also does not follow that their lives will be easier when self-settled. In most cases of this type, the IDPs need free aid and support, and can barely make (self-settled) ends meet on their own. The representative also stated that in addition to family support sessions and the reintegration of women affected by the conflict initiative, the organisation helps build victims’ resilience through its livelihood skills initiative. Promoting livelihood skills is particularly important as most of survivors who are self-settled have lost everything by the time they come to Maiduguri. Some of them thus require training first; after which they are then placed on apprenticeships. Others are provided with cash support if they already have established businesses and have the experience to carry out that business.

According to the representative, though Herwa’s livelihood support has been successful in many ways including, for instance, providing vulnerable women with a means to rebuild their lives, it has not been sufficient for two reasons. First, there are many such women hidden in self-settled communities which international organisations and the government do not cater for. As a result, there is a lot of burden and financial pressure on Herwa to do so. Secondly, when the initiative started they targeted specifically vulnerable women but men who have experienced similar situations started to request support too. As a result, Herwa had to split its initiative into 50% for men and 50% for women. Herwa has worked with six LGAs, selecting a 100 people from each LGA and enrolling them into the livelihood initiative.

The focus on gender in organisations like GEPDC and Herwa is very interesting and vital because in Chapters 6 and 7, many of the issues the two organisation's raised will also be raised by the IDPs. They will be analysed further in those chapters.

**JNI:** JNI is a faith-based organisation. Its mandate is targeted towards preaching and advocating for peace by reminding IDPs of the principles and values of Islam among the society. JNI preaches peace and tolerance among IDPs who have been traumatised as a result of the insurgency and who are also victims of sexual (or other) violence including those who have been neglected by others in society. Their representative said that JNI's main objective is to see that peace is maintained among both Muslims and non-Muslims so that both parties can tolerate each other. There has been high rates of intolerance within and between different communities due to the insurgency. Therefore, JNI - together with pastors in other Churches - have been preaching peace amongst IDPs, or between IDPs and hosts. The representative states that without their advocacy, this would not have been achieved. He also stated that the pastors play a big role in educating their followers and teaching them that the insurgency is an act of terrorism and not the fault of their Muslim counterparts. The representative claimed that altogether, there interventions have reduced the rate of intolerance in the community and improved the level of trust among citizens in different communities. He noted that;

*“At the start of the insurgency, the Muslims were blaming the Christians that they are the financiers of Boko Haram and the Christians were blaming the Muslims saying that Boko Haram is an act of Muslims therefore only the Muslims are financing it. But with the constant mobilisation and sensitisation of the community, both the Christians and the Muslims have now realised that, this insurgency is an act of terrorism, and terrorism has no boundary. Both the Muslims and Christians are being attacked” – (JNI representative, 2019).*

During the fieldwork, it was observed that most camps are segregated; hosting only Muslim or only Christian DPs. Only a few camps were mixed and even in those camps there was a very limited number of Christians. Though Islam is the dominant religion in Borno State, it was initially assumed by the author that this segregation was, perhaps, deliberate due to the intolerance of both parties. After speaking to the representative of JNI and the IDPs themselves, it became clear that the prevailing situation is neither deliberate nor a result of intolerance but rather people tend to cluster with others they perceive to be more like them and religion is an important part of that. The JNI representative confirmed that the clustering depends on when the IDPs arrive and where their community is settled. Some IDPs go to camps where the majority of people are from their LGA, whereas others are hosted in camps donated by specific churches. For example, the EYN camp was donated by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). As a result, it only hosts Christians. The respondent claimed that peaceful coexistence between followers of the two religions have been successful for some time now

with no apparent hostilities. This is confirmed in later chapters where IDPs agreed that they coexist peacefully between the two religions. Where issues of discrimination or lack of unity arise, these are often gender or ethnicity related. More of this will be discussed in later chapters particularly when analysing group capabilities.

The mission of JNI is an especially important one given that the Boko Haram insurgency was founded on religious beliefs and religious intolerance. This study's fieldwork and desk study of secondary data evidenced the religious passions and convictions that lay at the foundation of the people of Borno State. Whether Muslim or Christian, they are extremely religious people whose principles and daily lives are guided by their religious beliefs.

One thing that stands out with regard to the provision of protection services is that government agencies do not really provide any services tailored towards legal aid, gender advocacy, religious advocacy and so on. Interventions in these areas are also mostly provided by international organisations and NGOs with the result being again, that too much pressure is put on these organisations to provide such interventions; further depleting their resources/funding. At this point, it is starting to seem like the government agencies are left with considerably less services to offer, and yet, even those services do not span across all IDPs (neither are they sufficient for the camp IDPs they do target). Besides, as seen in Section 5.4 and will subsequently be seen in Section 6.4, the government does not offer interventions to formal camps like EYN camp.

### **5.8 Provision of educational and livelihood services (including skills and economic incentives)**

**FAO:** FAO provides IDPs with Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) training which is an open school in Maiduguri where they teach IDPs about farming, hygiene, and other matters related to their health and improved agriculture. The farmer's school is a great initiative by FAO especially considering the huge number of IDPs who are farmers. However, the majority of IDPs have not been able to farm for years and cannot continue to do so at this particular time or for the foreseeable future due to the insurgency and the unsafety that comes with going to farms. The IDPs who still farm do so around the peri-urban areas of Maiduguri as workers for the people who already own those farm lands. They get paid a very small stipend for doing so and even this is not necessarily safe. Therefore this seems to be training them for a livelihood they are not likely to use anytime soon, if at all should they remain in urban areas. It was noted during the interview with FAO that the CSA training is provided by expert facilitators and IDPs who are interested in it are asked to reach out to the facilitators. This presents a gap in the intervention because in the first instance, many IDPs are only worried about how to survive their current state so planning for the future seems like something that might take a back seat. Secondly, the representative noted that:

*“During the training needs assessment we found out that many people in the first place do not even know what climate change is let alone Climate Smart Agriculture.” – (FAO representative, 2019).*

Without being sure if and how FAO reaches out to IDPs to engage them in this training, it seems unlikely that majority of IDPs will make the extra effort of contacting expert facilitators in order to learn about the CSA when they do not even know what it is in the first place. These types of barriers and many others prevent IDPs from actualising their educational capabilities as we will be seeing in Chapter 7.

In terms of livelihood, FAO have also created three sustainable cooking stove production centres. These are located in the outskirts of Maiduguri. In order to promote IDPs to produce these stoves and own these centres, they have submitted a proposal to their funding partners to fund IDPs to open the centres by themselves, for themselves. They have also urged other organisations to patronise and buy stoves from these centres so that they can be self-sustaining. The gap in this initiative is that the functioning centres being on the outskirts of Maiduguri pose a challenge for camp IDPs with regard to the cost of transportation and camp restrictions. These are some of the reasons why such livelihood interventions are mostly targeted towards self-settled IDPs because it is easier for them to access them. Although camp IDPs still benefit from the more sustainable, healthier option of cooking stoves, they might not necessarily benefit from the livelihood opportunities that FAO provides due to the barriers in accessing the centres. Except of course if the new centres come to fruition and they within better access for camp IDPs. Though, should the funding for these centres fail to come through, IDPs are left with the ability to make cooking stoves but no capital or centre to materialise their training and actually turn it into a sustainable livelihood. This presents a major barrier to their livelihood capability. Such cases are common according to the IDPs, where organisations train them for a particular type of skill but the IDPs lack the capital to turn said skill into an actual means of livelihood. In other cases where IDPs are given both training and capital, they claim that the capital is often not enough to really allow the business to succeed due to other external factors. A case in point is with some camp IDPs who said at the time they received their livelihood income support they had to use the capital for more pressing issues like food when it was not provided at the camp. Other issues that make the capital insufficient have to do with the cost of renting a shop or the cost of daily transport into town to support their business. These are some of the barriers earlier referred to in the CAIDP framework as conversion factors that get in the way of IDPs actualising their capabilities and the gap between intervention and implementation. Such issues will be analysed in Chapter 7 section 7.4.

**UNHCR:** The UNHCR also provides livelihood interventions in the form of vocational training. It provides training especially to female headed households in areas such as knitting and tailoring, and then provides them with financial incentives to start businesses. The UNHCR create a type of co-

operative with ten people in each group so that the IDPs with training can teach others within their group. There are, however, some challenges associated with this intervention. First, some people end up moving which breaks the chain of the co-operative. Secondly, the initiative has also created tension between men and women in the communities because initially the livelihoods project only targeted female headed households. It was also discovered that women who were married were signing up for the project, which created tensions in their households. It created ‘a kind of acrimony’ because husbands are meant to be the heads of households. Some men also came forward to protest that they themselves were widowed and were being excluded. As a result, the vocational training was expanded to include men; they are taught cap making, tailoring, carpentry, metal bending, and shoe making. Youths who are IT literate are also included in a computer course.

The UNHCR’s intervention initially had such a narrow target and did not include other important groups of IDPs – men and youths – who equally need the training. Without the protests, they would not have realised this gap and would have continued with the narrow approach. The representative of UNHCR maintained however that, the livelihood interventions have been successful in many ways. For example, through the number of IDPs who have started successful businesses some can, as a result, survive on their own. Some have even been able to move out of the camps because they can provide for their basic needs without having to depend on others. This shows that with the right support, particularly in the areas of education and livelihood, IDPs have a real chance of becoming self-reliant, as demonstrated in Chapter 7. It echoes the reasoning behind the decision of many self-settled IDPs to remain in host communities where they can have a livelihood and be self-sufficient rather than camps where they have to depend on others for aid.

**NEMA:** The NEMA representative spoke of the many provisions that the government and other humanitarian actors have put in place to support IDPs education. The representative spoke of the schools in camps, the new schools that the government is building, and of self-settled IDPs having the ability to put their children in private schools to the point that the schools are over capacity. He also mentioned that most IDP children are in camp schools and those who have finished primary school are being supported by the state government to sit their qualifying exams for secondary school. However, self-settled IDPs do not get any support from the government so mentioning that they have the ability to put their children in private schools is not a measurement of the government’s success. Moreover, at the NHCF, a representative of the education sector stated that there are a lot of gaps in the provision of education which is largely a consequence of the lack of cooperation between NGOs, international organisations, and the government. There is also no coordination, cooperation or planning with the Ministry of Education. This is interesting as it shows a similarity to the lack of cooperation and planning between organisations and BSUPD (discussed in Section 5.6), which are all agencies within government.

The representative of the education sector also stated that where interventions are provided, there is often a duplication of efforts. Most of the camps that have schools operate in temporary learning systems. This statement was reinforced by the Headmaster of the school in Bakassi camp who said that there is no working system for the school, no curriculum, no books and no uniform. He claimed that the school was makeshift because it did not have classes or sufficient tables and chairs. Rather, it was comprised of just blocks supported by an aluminium roof which often gets blown away by strong winds. At the NHCF, the representative of the education sector reiterated that the schools in camps do not have sufficient books, uniforms, food, or school materials for the children. They also do not have sufficient teachers as a lot of them were lost due to the insurgency and the teachers that they do have are underpaid.

According to the education sector, there are over 11,000 primary school kids within self-settled IDPs who are in need of proper education. The schools in host communities are currently overcrowded with a ratio of 1 class: 200 pupils or more. In general, teaching is ineffective, and with over 1.2 million out of school children in Borno, a lot of attention needs to be given to the education sector. The many gaps in the education sector are alarming when the role of education in fostering capabilities is considered. Education is a key driver in reducing many vulnerabilities, promoting well-being, facilitating development, and also helping IDPs escape poverty and exclusion. The streets of Maiduguri are littered with out of school children who have resorted to begging; an issue prevalent in many Northern Nigerian states, which has increased insecurity within those states. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this issue of vulnerable children begging (almajiri) was a driving force for them joining Boko Haram. The consequences of poor education and its barriers to IDPs capabilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

### **5.9 Provision of public health services**

**IOM:** The organisation is highly involved with public health services particularly in camps in Borno. They have a WASH unit, which helps to ensure access to safe water facilities and services through the drilling, installation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of boreholes. The organisation works in camps and other communities to improve hygiene and sanitation outcomes through the construction, operation and maintenance of hygiene and sanitation facilities such as latrines, showers, and handwashing stations. On its website, the IOM states that they are leading the Nigeria WASH sector technical group. The website also states IOM is a sole WASH service providers in 25 camps in Borno state (IOM, 2021).

**NEMA:** Though such services like WASH have been praised by camp IDPs and the NEMA representative, the NHCF identified gaps in the sector. The NEMA representative had said that all WASH services are being provided to the highest standard including water, hygiene facilities, latrines and so on. He also said that it is the IDPs who do not take proper care of the facilities and are causing



interventions in the sector to deteriorate. At the NHCF, it was stated that the water being provided is not very clean and is leading to an outbreak of cholera. Waste in the water is a huge issue and it is worsened by heavy rain in the area. Camp management of water resources in most camps is also not adequate and there are some camps which lack the space to set up WASH facilities so IDPs are still struggling with a lack of water in those camps.

During data collection for this study, it was observed that UNICEF is another key actor that provides public health services to camp IDPs. All over camps – particularly Bakassi camp – water tanks and boreholes are marked with the UNICEF logo. Interviews with IDPs for this study showed that almost all camp IDPs are satisfied with WASH services, which adequately promotes their public health capability (demonstrated in Chapter 7). The capability of public health is a very important one because a lot of IDPs capabilities can either be hindered or facilitated from it. Some capabilities that could be affected include bodily health, protection, livelihood, nourishment, and education. These are discussed in later chapters/sections. The CA has been applied to the development of public health ethics by the likes of Dr Karen Lorimer, who asserts that such basic capabilities are valued by people because they determine how well and how comfortably they live Lorimer (2020). In contrast to camp IDPs, nearly all the self-settled IDPs in this study had serious complaints about their WASH services; as analysed in Chapters 7 section 7.2.

#### **5.10 Return and reintegration of displaced persons**

**Ministry of RRR:** As noted in Table 13 the mandate of the Ministry of RRR includes the physical reconstruction of the LGAs that displaced communities came from, ensuring the safe and conducive return of IDPs, and their rehabilitation. The representative stated that the process of return has been a very complex one. The Ministry has put together policy documents which details how the process will commence in accordance with the Kampala convention guidelines on the return of displaced people. Unlike the Ministry's previous attempt, this new policy engages other stakeholders like UNHCR and IOM in addition to NEMA and SEMA. Unlike before, the policy also now involves the IDPs themselves as major stakeholders in the process. It is no longer the government alone which preparing for the return but includes all the aforementioned parties to ensure there is an informed decision on any intervention. The return will also only be done upon the approval of the military after they have declared an area safe for return and rehabilitation. The representative stated that a lot of reconstruction has been taking place in many LGAs, which implies that the attention of the government and other organisations alike is now on return. However, camp IDPs have been the focus of the return. According to the representative, in order for an IDP to be eligible for return they need to have had their data captured and monitored by the government. This is also the case for those who are self-settled. It follows that only those self-settled IDPs who have presented themselves to the government and had their data captured are currently considered.

Of the 22 affected LGAs that have seen serious destruction, 3 are still inaccessible. The remaining 19 are under construction in preparation for the return of IDPs. Although, random attacks by Boko Haram are still occurring which is causing fear amongst people and slowing down the process of construction. What the representative failed to mention is that these random attacks are not only slowing down construction, but they are reigniting fear amongst IDPs who initially expressed an interest in the return. In their interviews for this study, many of the IDPs expressed that they are not willing to move from camps or their self-settled communities if their LGAs are not completely safe and free from Boko Haram attacks. This begs the question of why the Ministry of RRR and the government at large continue to put a lot of money towards the reconstruction and return of IDPs when the LGAs are not entirely safe to return to yet. As a result of the focus on return, the IDPs spoke of an incident where return was attempted but ended up failing and many IDPs got displaced again. The representative of the Ministry of RRR was asked about this. He said that the situation with Bama is not as it seems. First, the return attempt was made due to the IDP's desperation to return home. They even protested to this effect. In response, the government buckled and together with some partners tried to put a few things in order in preparation for their return. However, the number of returnees outweighed the available services and resources on the ground. In the end, the return attempt was unsuccessful with a majority of the IDPs who took part in the process being displaced back to Maiduguri again. The issues that came up from this attempt are all being reconsidered in the new returns policy according to the representative.

The representative also spoke of a new agenda which is presently being considered. The idea focuses on village groupings – whereby a number of villages that have been destroyed by Boko Haram will be merged together to form one big community. The idea was brought forward by the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), together with the Borno State government and could result in many advantages if successful. Other than the reduced burden on the government to rebuild every single LGA and the small villages within it, the village grouping initiative would provide a better opportunity for economic advancement, security, education, and so on. The representative stated:

*“The government through its wisdom is working on the idea. They are model villages that will help the government ease reconstruction but it has not come to fruition yet. This way, they will provide all public services to one big community instead of spending on every community to build boreholes, police stations and civil authorities. For example, Garwa community where an estimated 45 small villages are will come together to form one big village. It has been attempted in some part of Nigeria apparently I think in the South West. It has also been done in other countries of the world and has proven to be very successful. So we want to try it.” – (Ministry of RRR representative, 2019).*

**SEMA:** SEMA is also heavily involved with the return and reintegration processes and procedures for IDPs back to their LGAs. The representative said it is their main focus at the moment as they are praying the security situation will improve so that IDPs can back to their homes. He stated that they have already started attempting to return some IDPs. Bama, for example is one of those attempts. The LGA is safe now so they attempted to return the first 5000 people, although many have returned back to Maiduguri since then. He admits they received many complaints especially from international bodies that some of the standards for return were not met. They have since sat down with their development partners and created a better return strategy, which has been endorsed by the government and will be attempted soon. First he says, in the next return they will make sure to involve international organisations, NGOs, and the IDPs themselves as a major part of the process. The government will provide all the necessary facilities like they did previously and before they return they will make sure that all the basic services like health facilities are up to standard. They are avoiding the lapses they had in the first return, improving their strategy and making sure it is in line with global standards.

This section presents many thought-provoking issues. First, this idea of centralisation is interesting and potentially important as it could work for a whole range of regions and with regard to a series of different issues such as access to land, resources, opportunities and so on. It might also be easier and more cost effective for the government, but there is still a question of whether the proposal has been approved by members of Garwa community, and whether it would actually meet their needs. Moreover, these kinds of village clustering programmes have also been very problematic and controversial in other contexts where they have been tried before. The second issue is with regards to return. SEMA mentioned that their main focus at the moment is on the return of IDPs. This is interesting because many other organisations (particularly international organisations) stated that they are still in the emergency and recovery phase because new displacements are still happening. The IDPs interviewed for this study also mentioned that although they would want to return eventually, they are not willing to do so as of yet due to the continued insecurity in their LGAs. Furthermore, the representative of SEMA stating that the next return they are planning will involve international organisations, NGOs and the IDPs, lets us know the failed returns they had previously attempted did not include any of these key actors; this goes against the internationally recognised conditions that have to be fulfilled for a safe return.

### **5.11 Challenges in providing intervention for IDPs**

Providing intervention for IDPs comes with many challenges; this section will reflect on some of the ones that came up in this chapter. Some of those challenges have to do with organisations' implementations of their interventions, whilst others relate to the government and other organisations being barriers to providing certain interventions, while others pertain IDPs themselves. Four recurring challenges came up often during data collection; duplication of efforts, funding, the ongoing conflict itself, and cooperation between organisations and between organisations and IDPs.

**Duplication of efforts:** Duplication of efforts is seen in two different ways in this context. One way refers to different organisations having overlapping interventions that duplicate the same kinds of effort, which is inefficient. The second refers to IDPs attempts to extract resources from more than one organisation by exaggerating their community size, family size, or by exaggerating their problems.

The representative of FAO said that one of their biggest challenges has to do with duplication of efforts. This issue is one that is prevalent amongst most of the humanitarian organisations. During data collection it was observed that while these organisations tend to point fingers at the IDPs with regards to duplication of efforts, the IDPs themselves were pointing fingers back at the organisations in a bid to say that the corruption emanated from their own end; discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. The representative claimed that IDPs lie about their numbers by exaggerating the size of their families in order to obtain more support. He stated that in order to avoid this, the FAO does not use third parties to implement their interventions, even though this is the rule<sup>6</sup>. It is not clear from the data collection whether this is a hard rule that must be followed, but many of the organisations now bypass this stage of intervention due to claims of IDPs and even camp managers increasing the numbers of aid recipients or showing favouritism with regard to who receives said aid. The FAO representative stated;

*“We use the food voucher as a way to control fraud because people will just duplicate their family in order to get double ration. So it is just like a tracking method where we go ourselves and give each household not individuals. If we do not go ourselves or if we just ask them to tell us how many they need, that is when they usually spike the numbers..” – (FAO representative, 2019).*

**Funding:** Funding is another prevalent challenge that was brought up by most organisations. NGOs and international organisations mostly claim that funding is decreasing because the insurgency is still ongoing. The displacement has been prolonged, and each stage of the displacement receives its own separate funding. Most funds are now reserved for return and resettlement, however, the emergency stage is still ongoing with new displacements happening every day and there is no end in sight while, simultaneously, funds are depleting. Commenting further on this specific point, the IOM representative said;

*“Let me put it this way, there are competing emergencies in the world so there is need for funding accountability from our donors. We are at a point in time where there is crisis in Yemen which requires more funding than any other place you can think of, Afghanistan and Iraq are still ongoing.*

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<sup>6</sup> The rule is that all organisations are to provide their interventions through a third party. That is either SEMA or the managers of the given camp.

*South Sudan is another one that is protracted and the Lake Chad has its own issues, Mali is no different. The point is everybody requires funding and it is the same donors who are providing it. So although there is so much more that can be done, you can only use what funding you can get.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

Funding is an issue that the UNHCR is also contending with. The representative stated that there have been many instances where the organisation’s funds have been depleted and that this has caused its interventions to slow down significantly. For example, with regards to the issue of documentation, she stated that;

*“It all comes down to funding which is like a drop in the ocean. For example, the ID cards, UNHCR had invested a lot in buying equipment because they are centrally generated in Abuja. We try to generate the IDs in Maiduguri and initially we targeted a small number of people, a hundred thousand but now we are talking of two million. There is disparity and it’s like a drop in the ocean. And this is something that has really improved their lives.” – (UNHCR representative, 2019).*

Depleting funds are the main reason why shelters are becoming more and more unsuitable with no progress being made on making them more suitable. According to the representative of UNHCR, the plan was to provide these shelters until 2018 and from 2019 move into what they call the transitional year. During the transitional year, they are meant to move IDPs from emergency shelters to transitional shelters and then move them to more durable shelters. The transitional shelters are meant to be more durable as a consequence of their being cemented into the ground and their being constructed with iron roofs and tarpaulin bodies. However, the plan did not materialise because of fresh attacks from Boko Haram which resulted in additional IDPs. As a consequence, the funding earmarked for transitional shelters was used for new emergency shelters. The representative from UNHCR further added that some donors provide funds for specific purposes such as to build emergency shelters so irrespective of their plans, that donors’ wishes have to be respected. In 2017, the UNHCR had begun building permanent houses for IDPs to return to in LGAs such as Chibok and Mafa, however the project has not moved forward due the conflict situation, coupled with the fact that they are very expensive to build so a lot of funds are being spent there too.

The lack of funding is common across all the other organisations too. Government agency funds for IDPs are equally depleting because in addition to the IDPs, they have a lot of other issues that also require funding too. An example was stated earlier with regards to SEMA’s funds slowing down their food interventions to the point where camp IDPs were not provided any food for over two months. This will also be discussed in Chapter 6. Similarly, the representative of Herwa stated that the restrictions on their limited funding is what is causing their interventions to slow down.

**Ongoing conflict:** The ongoing conflict means that people will continue to rely on aid because they have little to no ability to support themselves. Areas of Borno State that were not accessible before due to the insurgency are now accessible, which require more funds to regulate and set right. Other areas which have been accessible where reconstruction efforts have begun are now being attacked and destroyed again by Boko Haram. This not only produces new challenges relating to security threats, but also challenges of new efforts in reconstruction and new displacements. It also leads to IDPs who have previously returned to these areas to be displaced again back into Maiduguri. The following quotes highlight these issues;

*“The second challenge is peace. Until there is peace and the people are able to go back to their lives, they will always need and so there will always be gaps. Even when there is so much to give because there are a lot of donors not just us, these people had their lives before now so they can never be satisfied that is why there will always be gaps somewhere. These are human beings who have dignities and want to be able to go back to living their lives as they were before. So how do you alleviate the gaps? Let there be peace, let the people go back to their lives, help them transition and give them something to start up with and they will be content. But until that happens, we will keep facing challenges and keep having gaps and there is nothing we can do about that.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

*“It also does not help matters that when we make progress we then have the issue of returnees. Returnees are people who went back to their place of habitual residence and then returned back again. You will be amazed that almost 1.9 million people have come back since we started collecting data. It means all interventions have to be reallocated to accommodate them.” – (IOM representative, 2019).*

## **5.12 Conclusion**

This chapter has used primary data collected during fieldwork to partly answer Research Question 4 of the study, which seeks to examine what government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations are doing to support the capabilities of both camp and self-settled IDPs, and how well this support matches IDPs’ perception of their needs. It is only partly answered because, as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, to fully explore how well various interventions match IDPs’ perception of their needs, it is imperative to have the perspective that Chapters 6 and 7 offer.

The chapter showed that different organisations target different communities of IDPs and that even when the efforts of different organisations are combined, there is still a significant number of displaced people who are unsupported and remain vulnerable. The chapter also showed that government agencies

only focus their interventions on camp IDPs, completely alienating self-settled IDPs from their interventions. It showed that there is lack of cooperation between some government agencies which presents a gap in planning for the IDPs and for the future of the city. Although the job of international organisations in Borno State is to compliment what government agencies are doing, it seems from the fieldwork that they actually carry a lot of the weight of IDPs' interventions both in camps and with self-settled IDPs.

In the case of international organisations, policy directions and initiatives are much more focused which is shown in the target, reach and success of their interventions. There is a clarity of intention and purpose associated with the functions of the agencies. While the reach and success of the initiatives are mostly dependent on local actors such as NEMA, SEMA, and even camp administrators, the international organisations have been seen to commit enough to ensuring that the IDPs are well catered for. NGOs in the state are seen to provide tailored interventions for IDPs, and appear to specifically target smaller issues that tend to be overshadowed by bigger issues. This could be attributed to their smaller capacity in terms of funding and manpower when compared to government agencies and international organisations. It could also be attributed to the fact that they have a closer view of the smaller issues that pervade their people as a consequence of their being nationals and locals of Borno. NGOs also cater to both camp and self-settled IDPs and try to make sure that self-settled IDPs are equally included in their interventions.

The chapter showed that different organisations have different mandates and targets, and also highlighted that their mandates often overlap. This raised issues of duplication as well as questions pertaining to why there are so many visible gaps in intervention when there is overlap. As a result of the present approaches adopted, some IDPs needs such as nourishment, livelihood, and shelter are prioritised over needs such as mental health, education, and protection. The latter which are equally important and play a huge role in IDPs actualising their capabilities. In the chapter, the issue of depleting funds was also raised by most organisations and is attributed to why many gaps exist in interventions. This is one issue that is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future.

Responses from the key informants coupled with interaction with the camp IDPs and those self-settled revealed that while a lot has been done and is being done by these organisations, the bulk of interventions are inadequate, substandard, and in some cases, unavailable. These concerns reflect the difference in the comments made by the key informants and the IDPs. These issues are hereafter analysed in the upcoming chapters from the perspective of both camp and self-settled IDPs.

## Chapter 6

### Realising primary capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs

#### 6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 explained that responses from key informants and IDPs have to be examined in order to fully understand the impact of the government and other relevant organisations' interventions on IDPs' capabilities, which we will begin to see in this chapter. This chapter thus addresses Research Question 2. In so doing, it examines how the two different categories of IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these.

Eight capabilities relevant to IDPs were presented in Chapter 2; adapted from the list of ten core capabilities which Nussbaum (2011) asserts are a threshold for assessing basic human dignity. Here, these capabilities are divided into 'primary capabilities', analysed in this chapter, and 'secondary capabilities' which are analysed in Chapter 7. They are grouped in this way because the primary capabilities are fundamental to any human being (failure to achieve them has immediate threat to life), whilst the secondary capabilities depend on them. Table 16 depicts the primary capabilities.

*Table 16: IDPs primary capabilities*

<i>IDPs Capability</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Life</i>	<i>Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living; being able to live with one's family; being able to make choices over one's life; including planning one's life.</i>
<i>Bodily and Mental health</i>	<i>Being able to have good health, including reproductive health, mental health; being able to access health services.</i>
<i>Nourishment</i>	<i>Having access to sufficient food, including non-food items that are needed for acquiring and making food; to be adequately nourished.</i>
<i>Protection</i>	<i>Being secure in camps and self-settled communities. Being able to move freely. Feeling secure against violent assault; including gender based violence.</i>
<i>Shelter</i>	<i>Being able to access camp shelters, including for camp settlements to be habitable; being able to have access to adequate housing for self-settled IDPs, including also for housing to be habitable.</i>

Source: Author, 2021.

The analysis of each capability follows the framework of the Capability Approach of IDPs (CAIDP) explained in Chapter 2. For each capability, this thesis' analysis begins by presenting the resources and opportunities that are provided to camp IDPs, and then comparing them to those of self-settled IDPs. Following that is 'the conversion process' which examined what each IDP group does with those



resources and opportunities, how they utilise them, and assesses whether or not they are content with them. This showcases the capability set allowing us to see the different functionings that are available for the two IDP groups to choose from and if they have equal opportunities to make choices. This chapter also examines whether the two groups are able to exercise agency in choosing from the different functionings and which achieved functionings develop as a result. From the achieved functionings we can begin to reason whether it is better to ensure that all IDPs have access to camps, or whether self-settlement is a more durable option that provides more opportunities for IDPs.

Where applicable, this chapter also touches on group capabilities in order to answer Research Question 3: What kind of group identities affect people's ability to achieve these capabilities and how does this differ between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs?

## 6.2 Life

To understand IDPs feelings towards the capability of life they were asked to describe their lives in their current state. Through their choice of words, the author, was able to deduce which group felt that their capability of life was significantly hindered. The data revealed that compared to their self-settled counterparts, camp IDPs were prone to feeling that their capability of life was diminishing. This analysis is rooted in the fact that the majority of them used words and phrases such as: 'useless', 'worthless', 'prisoner', 'unproductive', 'destroyed', 'critical condition', 'there is no life in camp', 'suffering' to describe their lives in their current state. They also often made references to life in their LGAs before displacement and asserted that 'it was better than life in Maiduguri.' They stated many reasons that have led them to feel this way including the fact that they were now living completely different lives to their lives before displacement. They have no real livelihoods and thus no income, they have lost family and friends to the insurgency, their mental health has been affected by the traumas of the insurgency, and some of them alluded to living idle lives in camps, doing nothing all day; they described themselves as feeling 'imprisoned'. As one 40 year IDP man who resides in Bakassi camp with his family noted:

*"If I were self-settled with capital or a job my life would have definitely improved more than this because I will not lose my sense of purpose over depending on NGOs to feed me and my family. There is no benefit to living in this camp. The people that were not afraid and went ahead to live in town, their relatives have helped them with capital and they have started a business. Some of them started with 1 million Naira and are now worth 2 to 3 million. While I am here sitting in this camp that has turned me into a useless person with no real value in life. So how can you tell me living in the camp has any benefit? Living in camp degrades your life it doesn't upgrade it." – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019).*

The fieldwork revealed that many IDPs with families, whether small or large, share the same sentiment as Camp IDP 2 above. Based on informal conversations and observations with IDPs, the responsibility of have to cater to a family makes life in camp all the more daunting particularly for the head of the families such as Camp IDP 2.

Self-settled IDPs also acknowledged the daily challenges that they experience as a consequence of being displaced. However, unlike camp IDPs they claimed that their lives were more manageable. When they were asked to describe their lives in their current state, many of them used phrases such ‘we are managing’, ‘we thank God’, ‘it was worse before but it is better now’. These phrases are used when one feels like their life could be worse so they are grateful for what they currently have. One IDP (68, male, self-settled) said,

*“Now I am good and better. After being in Boko Harams captivity I am now free. Life has changed for the better for most of us. Especially if you live happily in your house” – (Self-settled IDP 6, male, age 68, 2019).*

The data from this study shows that the freedom of movement that self-settled IDPs get, coupled with their being able to make choices over their lives and having the ability to plan their lives, are the biggest reasons why they feel that their lives are more manageable compared to camp IDPs. This analysis is further evidenced by the series of quotes that follow. The first quote is from a 30 year old female self-settled IDP, while the second is from a 25 year old man living in EYN camp.

*“Yes if you have a car you can go anywhere whenever you like. Even if you don’t have a car you can still move around freely, conduct your business, visit family and friends and so on. If you don’t have a car you just have to pay for transport fare. I finished my service and I was lucky to get a job without much delay so I drive to work every day with it and when I am not working I do taxi work for extra money.” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019).*

*“You also don’t have any freedom here. They close the gate by 8:00pm and that’s not good for people who want to work till late. Because of that they always fight at the gate. You see some of us go to farms that are far away from the camp so before you get back you are already worried they will close the gate. You can’t run any errands. Definitely our lives cannot progress if we are under such strict rules.” – (EYN Camp IDP 13, male, age 25,, 2019).*

Capability of life can also be achieved where one is able to live with one’s family because one is more likely to feel supported, to be able to plan life, and not feel that life is worthless. However, the contrary was recorded during the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis. The fieldwork showed instead that

although most camp IDPs live in a camp with their nuclear family and in the midst of other people from their LGAs, this does not significantly improve their achieved functioning of life. This is because they and their families are living a discontented life. In contrast, self-settled IDPs find that their lives are more manageable - even when they are not living with their nuclear family or in the midst of people from their LGAs – due to the support they get from relatives and friends in the city. This could either be monetary support, accommodation, food support, support with school fees or livelihood support. This kind of support not only helps the IDPs develop their social connectedness, but it also helps them achieve some form of normalcy in their new lives. This is the social connectedness that was discussed in Chapter 4 as being a key element of recovery needs, resilience, and the long-term development of IDPs. Moreover, a World Bank report showed that IDPs with such social connections are able to actualise more coping mechanisms and have less dependency on short-term aid (World Bank, 2011). This shows that while living with family is clearly important, the achieved functioning of life is not realised simply by that. What is more important is the support and social connections they get from their family. Cumulatively, these observations suggest that achieved functioning of life is better realised for self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs.

### **6.3 Bodily and Mental health**

The UK Academy of Medical Sciences and the Internal Displacement Research Programme<sup>7</sup> in a workshop concerning health and internal displacement raised some key issues with regards to the health of IDP populations, which they suggested were vital for governments, policymakers, and relevant organisations to pay attention to in order to safeguard the bodily health of IDPs. The issues are restated here for two reasons. First, they relate to all IDPs including the IDPs of Maiduguri. Secondly, the findings of this thesis echo those key issues, which will be deepened and analysed using the CAIDP throughout this section.

The first key issue is the need to consider the diversity of IDPs and the variety of contexts in which they live, including camp vs self-settled locations, and vulnerable stages in life such as childhood, older age or pregnancy. The second is the need to consider the full range of determinants of health rather than just specific health outcomes; this is especially important given that the conditions in which IDPs live are likely to expose them to multiple health conditions. Third, access to medical services must be assessed because IDPs face many barriers to accessing healthcare. Fourth, community dynamics and social structures should also be assessed because they can have positive or negative effects on health and wellbeing, but they can also contribute to social support and resilience to adversity if nurtured appropriately. The community dynamics in particular relates to group capabilities and can be seen more

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<sup>7</sup> The Internal Displacement Research Programme is a specialised independent research programme hosted at the Refugee Law Initiative of the School of Advanced Study, University of London.

clearly in the camp IDPs of this study who are always willing to join forces and help one another in medical emergencies. This leads to the last point which relates more closely to self-settled IDPs. It states that the value of considering and improving IDP and host population interactions can have a positive effect on health-seeking behaviours and outcomes (Acmedsci, 2021). This research addresses some of these concerns, not only by examining the outcomes between different types of IDPs but also by assessing the extent to which IDPs are able to turn the resources available to them into achieved health functionings.

In order to achieve the functioning of *bodily and mental health*, an IDP should be able to have good health, including the capabilities of reproductive health and mental health, and they should be able to access health services. Such services should also be of good quality and be affordable. A majority of the camp IDPs who were spoken to for this research stated that accessing health services is relatively easy for them compared to self-settled IDPs because clinics are available in camps. In addition, nearly all the camp IDPs stated that they were satisfied with the medical services. As one camp IDP man noted:

*“We are happy with the health centre to a large extent. They are trying their best. If there is any medication that they don't have, they will write a prescription for you to go and buy outside. But the clinic is well appreciated” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019).*

Most of the camp IDPs echoed the feelings of satisfaction expressed by interviewee Camp IDP 1 some, such as interviewee Camp IDP 2, had a different experience with the services available and felt different. Having visited the camp clinic at Bakassi camp myself, I saw first-hand how they took care of IDPs and responded to their complaints. The camp clinic was open every day on the days I was in Bakassi camp. However, camp IDP 2 mentioned several factors such as, having to go outside of camp to the general hospital for serious illnesses and having to pay for medical aid outside camp clinics as hindrances to bodily health. He further commented that:

*“I won't say the clinic is sufficient because if someone falls seriously sick, we must go outside the camp into town to help them. Earlier today before you got here, I was called by a friend whose wife delivered a baby and lost a lot of blood. They needed 3 bags of blood but no blood, and no money. He resulted to selling the food they had and I also gave him some money and together we got 4 youth volunteers to get tested. I have now sent all of them to the general hospital using the keke napep (auto-rickshaw) our senator gave us. Imagine if we had a good clinic here all this would have been*

*easier. Now if not for the longevity of life<sup>8</sup>, this lady would have easily passed away on her way to the hospital.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019).*

This quote is particularly interesting because many of the features of CAIDP can be analysed from it. It would appear that Camp IDP 2 understands, to an extent, conversion factors and how they can hinder one from achieving certain functionings. Access to health care is provided to camp IDPs as a service, but the process of converting that service to a capability set such as ‘being healthy’ or enjoying ‘good reproductive health’ is affected by many conversion factors. The first barrier to achieving bodily health to note is the fact that camp clinics have opening and closing times. This inevitably means that emergencies that occur outside of those hours have to be dealt with at a general hospital. Secondly, there are environmental conversion factors (such as transport) that make it harder for IDPs to access health services at the general hospital. Not all communities have a *keke napep* which they can use to transport sick patients and even when they do, they are often unfuelled due to lack of money; itself a barrier. Thirdly, and most importantly, medical services at the general hospital are not free, even for IDPs. This means the person requires additional funds to pay for all the services they receive at the hospital. Many Nigerians have lost their lives trying to avoid paying hospital bills or paying for a hospital bed even when it is clear they need it (Onwuzoo, 2020). The issue of not being able to afford medical care outside of camps and the need to find money by any means, including selling off portions of their food in order to convert the resources of healthcare centres into the actual functioning of bodily health was highlighted by a number of interviewees:

*“Yes you have to pay for the transportation and prescription yourself. Everything is on you. There is nothing you can do if you can’t afford it. You just sit there and hope. If you’re lucky to find someone who can help you, fine. If you’re not you’ll just go and fold your hands and hope.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019).*

*“When any member of the family falls ill, a portion of the food must be sold off for treatment.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 14, male, age 45, 2019).*

The interviewees also noted that there are some similarities and differences in experiences when it comes to accessing medical care between camp and self-settled IDPs. The main difference is that self-settled IDPs do not necessarily get free medical services such as the ones provided in camps. As a result, a few self-settled IDPs who live near EYN camp stated that they sometimes go to the camp clinic in

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<sup>8</sup> This phrase is commonly used among faith-based Nigerians especially Muslims who believe a person will only die when God has called them to. Therefore the longevity of life here refers to the idea that God has not yet called her.

EYN to ask for medical help, even though the camps may have limited medical supplies. As two interviewees noted:

*“No we don’t have easy access to clinic. When sickness comes we sometimes go to the camp to seek for medicine but in most cases you have to take yourself to the hospital.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019).*

*“Yes you have to pay your own medical bills and buy your own medicine just like everything else here. Even if you go to the relief centre in the camp it’s just paracetamol they give you there isn’t enough medicine in the place. If you want to get better it is better to just buy it by yourself than wasting your time going there.” – (Self-settled IDP 8, male, age 45, 2019).*

*“They only have painkillers like paracetamol and B-complex. Those are the only medicines available in camp clinic. You can’t even find paracetamol injection within the facility. It’s not right.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 17, male, age 45, 2019).*

As noted in Chapter 4 and 5, self-settled IDPs do not get the aid or services provided to camp IDPs, however, the comments by self-settled IDP 5 and self-settled IDP 8 suggest that they do use some camp services. Similarly, in Section 6.4 on nourishment, a couple of self-settled IDPs also mentioned getting food aid from one of the camps. This does not mean, however, that self-settled IDPs automatically get aid or services from camps. Rather, what happens in the case of the clinic is that the staff do not mind occasionally providing some minor medicines such as paracetamol to a few non-camp IDPs. In the case of nourishment, the self-settled IDPs who did get food from camps were getting it under the guise of being camp IDPs themselves. Initially, they would come to camps when food vouchers were being distributed and if they were lucky they would get a food voucher. From the fieldwork it was clear that such incidents only happened in EYN camp where security was limited (perhaps because the camp is located within the city). There are also fewer residents and only one or two international organisations operating at EYN camp which means the registration and identification of IDPs in the camp is not as strict. In contrast, the kind of disguise noted by which non-camp persons can use camp services does not happen in camps like Bakassi where the IDPs are under strict surveillance and only receive aid if they are fully registered residents. Moreover, even in EYN camp, the food vouchers are revoked from self-settled IDPs who are caught disguising as camp IDPs to collect food:

*“Action Against Hunger used to give us food before but ones they found out I am not from the camp they stopped. I work in town to get us food.” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019).*

Self-settled IDPs have a lot more conversion factors hindering them from converting resources to different bodily health capabilities. Where camp IDPs get free medical care in camps and only have to pay for services at the general hospital, the self-settled IDPs interviewed for this study stated that they did not get free medical care and often had to pay a lot of money towards achieving bodily health. Some even admitted that unless the illness was a matter of life and death, they would try to avoid going to the hospital, and would instead buy medicines more cheaply from a pharmacy. The fear of hospital bills has led many self-settled IDPs to avoid hospital even when they are in dire need of such assistance. A case in point is of a lady who could not afford to go to the hospital to deliver her baby and instead opted for a home delivery, a decision that cost her life and the baby's life due to complications. Self-settled IDP 9 stated that there are many such cases because people do not have a choice when they simply cannot afford to go to the hospital. Here, lack of resources (in this instance, money), hinders people from being able to make choices over their lives even when it is a matter of life and death. The following quotes are from self-settled IDPs who talked about barriers to achieving bodily health.

*“No one helps us with that, everyone is on their own. We take ourselves to hospital and we pay for everything. It is cheaper to just go to the pharmacy except if it is too serious for the pharmacy” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019).*

*“We don't have a clinic here so we have to go to the private hospital and we often don't have the means to go to the hospital. Nobody here will help you with that. If you are lucky relatives can give you something to manage but you have to work to pay the medical bills. Like the woman I was telling you about she didn't have a choice. No relatives to help them pay for hospital bed they didn't have a choice but to have the baby at home. It is not just them, many women are having their babies at home because of that. Some even if they can afford it they have it at home to save money” – (Self-settled IDP 9, male, age 43, 2019).*

The repeated references to 'nobody will help you with that' often came from IDPs who were self-settled on their own and did not benefit from much help or support from their relatives or friends. This group is referred to and explained in Chapter 4 as the third group of self-settled IDPs and they make up majority of the self-settled IDPs who were interviewed in this study. This group either lack the social networks and support that other self-settled IDPs get, or their friends and relatives support them in other ways. For example, a supporter may help them pay their yearly rent, or support them with a means of livelihood, or fees for their children's education, but they do not support them every day for every other need.

From the noted statements of both camp and self-settled IDPs regarding medical bills, the issue of group capabilities begins to present itself. In Chapter 2, the notion of group capabilities was explained and it

was suggested that groups are valuable in enlarging individual capabilities because individuals have a better chance of overcoming adversity when they are part of a group. This is because individuals have limited power or assets to make significant changes on their own. With regard to bodily health, group empowerment with camp IDPs can be seen when they come together to help a member of their ethnic community who is in need. As explained by Camp IDP 2, they did so by helping them out with money to pay their medical bills and by volunteering to donate their blood. Such cases are very common in camps: each community rallies behind its members to support them when a need arises. This is not the case with self-settled IDPs, with the data showing that a majority of the self-settled IDPs interviewed for this study prefer to live a more individualistic life. As a result, they do not benefit from the advantages of such group capabilities.

Physical and reproductive health are not the only areas of health that are hindered by some conversion factors, mental health may also be affected. Mental and physical health are not diagnosed in the same way; mental health is often harder to detect (Albee and Joffe, 2003). As a result, many IDPs struggle in silence with the effects of mental health. This thesis's data has shown that most of the Camp IDPs interviewed recognised and believed that their mental health issues had been further exacerbated by idleness and joblessness in the camps. In addition, a majority of them claimed that, since the displacement happened, no one had ever asked them about their mental health or how they were coping after the traumatic experiences they had endured. This is confirmed by the data in Chapter 5 which showcased that a majority of the organisations discussed within this work do not include mental health in their interventions. From this it can be concluded that it is likely that such issues were not given adequate attention or care, until IOM raised it as a matter of emergency and donated funds towards its support. Commenting further on such issues, a number of concerns were raised by camp residents in their interviews as follows:

*“Too many of us have experienced trauma because of the attacks and constant sound of gunshots so our minds are still not okay but nothing can be done about it. We just manage to be okay day by day.”*

*– (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019).*

*“Since the death of my husband no one has ever confronted me and talked to me or even asked how I was doing. No one. My mental health is now even affecting the way I take care of my children and I am not working, I am not doing anything so that is making matters worse. My husband used to do all the work.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 5, female, age 31, 2019).*

*“You will see many people around in the camp and you know that their mental health is not okay. When we first came here you will see people who can't sleep, can't talk, can't eat. Everyone is traumatised and worried about their business, their family, their property or their job. Now it is better*



*since we've been here people are more relaxed but still. There is no work, you don't know when next you will feed your family, your children are not going to school. How can your mental health be okay?" – (Bakassi Camp IDP 14, male, age 45, 2019).*

*"Another example is my wife. Boko Haram captured her briefly after she was released I spent more than 400,000 Naira (£700) on her medication because she wasn't herself anymore. She stopped eating, talking, even bathing herself. She just changed completely so we went to the hospital where they did a CT-scan and the doctor diagnosed her with some mental issue. She was prescribed medication and now she is almost 60% herself." – (Bakassi Camp IDP 19, male, age 40, 2019).*

From these comments it is clear that camp IDPs are aware of their traumas and the mental health issues that have arisen as a result. This, in turn, gives rise to the question as to why the government and other relevant organisations have not prioritised mental health in their interventions. Unlike with physical health, where there were some resources but conversion factors varied and caused some hindrances, in the case of mental health, there were hardly any resources in the first place to convert. The data produced for this study found that since very minimal external aid and support has been given to self-settled IDPs, mental health support is not a priority. Given this environment, the self-settled IDPs themselves do not prioritise mental health. They have all spoken about how their traumas have affected and continue to affect their mental health on a daily basis but what is more pressing for them is where their next meal or next pay will come from. It is also possible that self-settled IDPs suffer less mental health issues because the trauma is not compounded with idleness and a feeling of worthlessness/imprisonment.

*"I agree with what my sister said we are all not okay. Everyone is disturbed emotionally and we are struggling to cope but we can't go hungry and we have to pay our rent so we just have to get up every day and do something. One boy was recently arrested and detained for not paying his rent. Imagine what that will add to your mental health. And there are similar stories everywhere. So if you don't want that to be you next, you just have to be strong." – (Self-settled IDP 3:FG 1, 2019).*

*"How can one live peacefully without mental health issues amidst everything we have been through and amidst all the suffering and poverty? No one can have peace of mind like this, we have a lot to deal with and we don't have enough at our disposal to deal with it." – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40:FG 4, 2019).*

When IDPs' accounts of their mental health issues are taken together with key informants' accounts of the minimal mental health services being offered to IDPs (see Chapter 5), it is safe to presume that mental health has not been prioritised as a basic need for either camp or self-settled IDPs. Though both are under-served, camp IDPs have more awareness of these issues due to the fact that the very limited

mental health services which are available are primarily provided to them. When they do occasionally get support, camp IDPs are more likely to understand the importance of that support and treat it as such. In the CAIDP mental health is an important capability because mental health issues can continue to worsen and have long-term impacts on IDPs if left untreated. Such long-term effects can, in turn, make it harder or impossible for IDPs to realise their capabilities. Many studies such as those by Salah *et al.* (2012), Morina *et al.* (2018), and Sabhlok *et al.* (2020), have realised the importance of mental health among IDPs. These studies have examined the prevalence of disorders such as depression, generalised anxiety disorder, social phobia, and post-traumatic stress disorder to create more awareness of their long-term effects and to close the gap that stands between IDPs and mental health support. An expert opinion by IDMC has also stated that mental health is an issue that affects most IDPs and that whilst most of them consider it a priority few aid providers focus on it. The report emphasised that durable solutions to displacement must include mental health (Cazabat, 2019).

In Chapter 5 it was noted with regard to different interventionist organisations that many barriers to bodily health exist. This suggests that inadequate support by the government and relevant organisations is at the core of IDP's challenges when it comes to attaining bodily health. As noted in Section 5.5, no government organisation provides interventions that specifically targets mental health and the few international organisations and NGOs that do are overwhelmed by the many barriers that impact mental health support. A second problem relates to access to water for self-settled IDPs and access to clean water for both camp and self-settled IDPs (analysed in Chapter 7, section 7.2); both issues directly affect IDPs' general WASH services and can lead to outbreaks of cholera and other diseases. Another factor is overcrowding and unsanitary living environments for both camp and self-settled IDPs; they can become breeding grounds for diseases to spread. This not only increases their health risks but has also been linked to mortality rates in camps as noted by (Van Damme, 1995) in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1. Lastly, the lack of emergency services is a barrier to transporting IDPs from camp health centres to secondary sources of health; this may lead to aggravated illnesses and even death (as corroborated by the health sector at the NHCF meeting. See Chapter 5, Section 5.5).

With regard to the lack of emergency services and bodily health in general, an important evidence was acquired from EYN camp which also links to group capabilities. The IDPs of EYN camp came together in a form of group capacity to voice their concerns in hopes that it will lead to greater support from the government, aid providers, and relevant organisations. They put together a letter (see Appendix VII<sup>9</sup>), which explained all their needs and worries in the camp and elected one person to present the letter to several organisations. One of their main concerns in the letter was with regard to health where they

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<sup>9</sup> Permission to use the letter and add it to my thesis was obtained and granted from the person who discussed and gave me the letter. This is the same person who was elected to present it to the policymakers. In the appendix I have blurred out his name for the purpose of anonymity.

stated that they have many problems. One problem is with the poor response of emergency services during health crisis. Another is to do with the limited drug options at the camp clinic. The collective voice they used to seek out more support is a great example of what Stewart (2005) means by asserting that vulnerable individuals have limited power to make significant changes on their own. She adds that economic and political power increases with the type of collective action we are seeing here with EYN IDPs, enabling greater access to public and private resources whilst simultaneously impacting their status and self-respect (Stewart, 2005) (as seen in Chapter 2). More aspects of the letter will be discussed in subsequent relevant sections.

It is hard to determine which group of IDPs finds it easier to achieve the functioning of bodily and mental health because the barriers that affect the two groups are many and similar. Nevertheless, the free clinic in camps combined with the support they get from their community members in the same camp, means that camp IDPs are more able to confront those barriers than self-settled IDPs. Additionally, in terms of mental health, camp IDPs seem to have a higher awareness of their mental health issues; those issues seem to actually be worsened by being in camps.

#### 6.4 Nourishment

*Nourishment* is the most important and most talked about capability for both camp and self-settled IDPs. For the capability of nourishment to be achieved, IDPs must have access to sufficient food,<sup>10</sup> as well as those non-food items that are needed for acquiring and making food. This section thematically evaluates three themes. Namely; i: Access to food, ii: Quantity and quality of food. iii: Access to necessary non-food items (each theme is compared between camp and self-settled IDPs).

**i: Access to food:** Table 17 provides summaries of some camp and self-settled IDPs responses to how they access food. Through this it is possible to see who supplies IDPs with food and how this differs even between 2 camps.

*Table 17: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses towards access to food*

<i>Camp IDPs responses towards access to food</i>	<i>Self-settled IDPs responses towards access to food</i>
<i>“It has been three months and four days since they gave us food until day before yesterday. 94 days without food.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)</i>	<i>“No one provides us with food, we find food by ourselves” – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)</i>  <i>“There was a time the people in the community used to help us with food but not anymore. We have to work to find food. Like yesterday I worked on the farm and</i>

<sup>10</sup> Food here refers to staple carbohydrates as IDPs refer to other components of food such as vegetables and condiments as non-food items.

<p><i>“We are experiencing food insufficiency. There was no food for about 3 months.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 5, female, age 31, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Only Action Against Hunger gives us monthly food but sometimes when they have to renew their contract we don’t get food for a month or 2.” – (EYN Camp IDP 10, male, age 44, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Sometimes when they have to renew their contract, we don’t get food for a month or two or more. They even used to give us 13,000 Naira (£23) worth of food items for the past 2 years but since they renewed their contract they now give us 9,000 Naira (£15) worth of food. We have to supplement with some hard labour jobs those of us that can find any. Besides this we have no other means of living.” – (EYN Camp IDP 13, male, age 25, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We do get food free of charge which we are grateful for but we still require more. You know we are jobless, we solely rely on the food provided by government for survival.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 15, male, age 48, 2019).</i></p>	<p><i>made 700 Naira (£1.50) and used it to buy us food.” – (Self-settled IDP 2, male, age 32, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We go around looking for menial jobs every day that’s how we eat.” – (Self-settled IDP 3, female, age 20, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“I work as a driver that’s how I am able to support us with food and other stuff.” – (Self-settled IDP 8, male, age 45, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Yes I have a business. That is how we manage to feed our children.” – (Self-settled IDP 9, male, age 43, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Food is the biggest challenge every day you have to find it. That’s why I said I prefer the camp they get free food every day.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019).</i></p>
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Source: Author Interviews, 2019.

From the summaries in Table 17 it can be concluded that both the camp and self-settled IDPs who were interviewed for this study found access to food to be quite a challenge; either because it was not provided regularly, or because of the daily challenges of looking for food. There was a clear difference between how camp and self-settled IDPs access food; camp IDPs get it delivered to them in camps for free, whereas self-settled IDPs have to go out and buy it or look for it. Through Table 17 and Chapter 5 it can be seen that in Bakassi camp SEMA provides monthly raw food rations to each family or household and that it is the latter’s responsibility to cook what they want to eat. However, the IDPs pointed out that they face many issues with this arrangement such as the food not arriving on time or as regularly as they would like.

In EYN camp, monthly food vouchers are provided by Action Against Hunger (AAH); each IDP household gets 9,000 Naira worth of food and an extra 9,000 Naira cash for other necessities such as

non-food items. EYN is considered a formal camp so the IDPs should be supported by the state government as well as NGOs and international organisations. At the time of the author's data collection, only AAH was providing aid and support to EYN camp IDPs. The difference in the way the IDPs of Bakassi and EYN camps accessed food was unexpected. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. In both cases the disadvantages present a major barrier for camp IDPs to convert the food they get into different capabilities of nourishment. This makes it hard for any camp IDP to say they are adequately nourished. As can be seen from Table 17 similar to Bakassi IDPs, EYN IDPs also experience months in which they lack food from their sponsor often when AAH is in the middle of renewing its contract. The group IDP letter obtained from EYN camp corroborated that food is not given to them on a monthly basis, rather they get food every 40 days. It is hard to imagine what camp IDPs go through during such periods or how they managed to eat. Many said they borrowed food from one another, or exchanged some of their personal items for food, a form of bartering that has become a means of survival in camps according to a report by Aljazeera (2018). Others took some hard labour jobs, or in worst cases sent their children out to beg.

*“When there is no food you borrow money to feed your family. 500 Naira (£1) here, 1000 Naira (£2) there to use to buy food and you may not be able to pay back. So next time when they give food, you will use the little food you have been given to pay back. There are a lot of them here that's what they do to survive.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 6, male, age 42, 2019).*

*“The kids will go out on the streets and beg. Sometimes when they go out they run into rich people who help them with something. But begging is not safe, some even get hit by cars when they are out begging.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 16, female, age 50, 2019).*

The means of accessing food was completely different for self-settled IDPs; as evidenced in the data in Table 17. Food is not normally a free commodity for self-settled IDPs and their process for finding nourishment every day is a daunting one. The data collated for this study showed that the self-settled IDPs interviewed had fewer nourishment complaints than their camp counterparts. The following quote from the representative of Herwa (one of the NGOs analysed in Chapter 5), highlights some of the differences between camp and self-settled IDPs' access to nourishment; the interviewee insinuated that accessing food in self-settled communities was often easier even though camp IDPs get free food. The interviewee also highlighted the lengths that some camp IDPs have to go to in order to access food.

*“They are different in the sense that self-settled IDPs have the freedom to move around and work or beg. Begging to survive is really big now in Maiduguri you see them all around the corners and they get small money from it to feed their families. While for those living in camps they are only given food by the state government. So if you have 20 children and you're given one bag of rice, it's not going to*

*last you more than 15 days. Some of them have been forced into sexual hawking because of this issue. Selling themselves for sex to earn a living. A woman that has 10 -15 children in camp may not wait till the next time they get food while her children starve. She has to do everything at her disposal to feed them. This makes the women even more vulnerable in that aspect.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

The importance of the support of group capabilities for camp IDPs became even more evident with regards to nourishment; group affiliation is the reason why some camp IDPs are able to get through the hardship of lack of food. Camp IDPs also enjoy the benefits of group affiliation when it comes to the distribution of aid materials such as hygiene kits, and non-food items. Some IDPs suggests that there are people who get extra rations of food because of their ethnicity or because they are involved with or related to the chairman of their community. Group affiliation also comes through more in camp communities; some camp IDPs stated that they preferred camp settlement to self-settlement because in camps their counterparts are able to support them when they need it. As one camp IDP noted:

*“If you live in town who will help you? You get no help that’s the problem. But here even our fellow Christians help us with food and some items. In this camp when you have no food your neighbour will cook and call you to come and eat with them. That is how we live here by supporting each other and that is the importance of staying with your community I was telling you before. We help each other.”*  
*– (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019).*

This type of support is not common among self-settled IDPs because of the type of individualistic lives they live. Though family networks are important for self-settled IDPs, broader group affiliation such as those pertaining to religion or ethnicity are less useful to them. As they often mentioned, ‘nobody will help you around here’ and ‘all man for himself’. Though group affiliation has many advantages, the individuality within self-settled IDPs is what makes them self-reliant and gives them more agency over their lives.

**ii: Quantity and quality of food:** Table 18 depicts the responses of camp and self-settled IDPs regarding the quantity and quality of the food they receive and eat.

***Table 18: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses towards the quantity and quality of the food they eat***

<i>Camp IDPs responses to the quantity and quality of food they receive</i>	<i>Self-settled IDPs responses to quantity and quality of food they eat</i>
<i>“No it’s not enough. Whether you are young or an adult, whether it is for a month or 3 months, you will only get 3</i>	

<p><i>measures of grains per month. Back at home I used to feed my family with 2 bags a month.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We used to get 2 food tickets but now we only get 1. Us that have many kids sometimes it is not sufficient. When we really really manage it suffices for a month but most times it doesn’t.” – (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“No. Don’t even talk about food. Nobody has enough. The only food we get is from Action Against Hunger and that doesn’t go round because some families are large.” – (EYN Camp IDP 11, female, age 50, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Action Against Hunger were giving us 13,500 for food but they reduced it to 9,000. The food we buy does not reach a month as long as you eat two square meals.” – (EYN Camp IDP 12, female, age 28, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“The food being distributed by SEMA is not enough. They are using family size as a formula in sharing the food items and unfortunately it is not enough for most families.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 16, female, age 50, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“If possible they need to increase the quantity of the food. It is still insufficient. A person with six children for example, what they give you will not last longer than 13 days before it finishes.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 20, male, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Our biggest challenge is food which is a basic survival need. Even in food human beings require proteins and vegetables to keep his body healthy and effective.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 14, male, age 45, 2019).</i></p>	<p><i>“We don’t even eat enough food on a normal day how can we have peace of mind?” – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“It depends. When we work and get paid well you will see we eat very well. Vegetables, meat and everything. The problem is when we don’t work. Without work you cannot eat well.” – (Self-settled IDP 2, female, age 32, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We have food but we need more to improve our lives. That’s where the people in camp are doing better than us, at least they get free food. If we get enough food then everything will be good for us and our family.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 4, female, age 31, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We need the government to help us with food the way they help other IDPs. We also don’t have enough food.” – (Self-settled IDP 9, male, age 43, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We don’t have enough food because we don’t have a tangible business. The small money we make from hard labour is not enough for everyone to eat comfortably and eat well. We just manage.” – (Self-settled IDP 11, female, age 20, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Well, we do eat but nobody has enough around here. Some don’t even know what they will eat that day until they go out and find it and there is no certainty.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 3, male, age 48, 2019).</i></p>
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Source: Author Interviews, 2019.

From Table 18 it is clear that both camp and self-settled IDPs are not getting what they consider to be sufficient food to achieve the capability of nourishment. Nevertheless, some differences can still be seen in their responses with regard to how the two different groups feel towards this insufficiency, as well as with regard to the quality of the food they eat.

All the camp IDPs interviewed complained that the amount of food they get for the month does not cover a whole month due to the size of their families. As a result, they have had to borrow food from their neighbours and then pay them back via the following month's rations. The interviewed camp IDPs also stated that the situation is the same for almost every IDP across the entire camp. In one case, an IDP from Bakassi camp stated that whilst his family size had increased by two people there had not been a headcount by the camp authorities in a long time with the result that his family had insufficient food. Most of the interviewees stated that, in terms of food provisions, they got less than half of what they would normally eat at home. These IDPs not only had livelihoods at home that allowed them to adequately nourish their families, most of them also had farms where they grow and harvest their own food. This makes the food rationing condition they found themselves in within the camps even harder. The following statements highlight issues pertaining to inadequate food rationing.

*“Depending on the size of your family it’s 50kg rice and 50kg beans. Even the 50kg they now give us is not up to 50kg because a full 50kg will give you about 16 -17 kwanos (bowl measures of rice), but this time around, each bag hardly contains 10 kwanos. Some 12, some even 9 kwanos. If you complain they will tell you to go and put it in the toilet if you like. They will say it’s not their concern, if you like take it, if you like leave it. No seasoning, no salt, no oil, no vegetables. They only just gave us 8 cans of tin tomatoes together with the rice for every group of 12 people. One time they even brought soya beans and we don’t eat soya beans. We don’t even know how to prepare it.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019)*

*“When the food finishes we have to resort to family and friends for help and support. We also get support from those who used to live here with us but have found and moved to a better shelter in town. Sometimes if you’re lucky rich people who come here might help you.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019).*

While at Bakassi camp, some of the IDPs showed me the bags of rice and beans that were given to them by SEMA just a few days before my fieldwork began. Just like Camp IDP 1 said, I saw that the bags were not filled to capacity, despite many camp IDPs saying the bags used to come full. Although some had opened their bags and started to use it, others had not, and I was able to clearly see the reduced rations of the bags. Moreover, the response from Camp IDP 1 regarding getting soya beans sent to them is an interesting one because the camp IDPs stated they had never eaten soya beans prior to



displacement, neither do they know how to make it. This shows an issue of lack of attention or care to the IDPs cultural practices around food, from the aid providers. The statement by Camp IDP 4 that his family sometimes get support from IDPs who have moved out of camps into town as self-settled IDPs is also noteworthy because it suggests that self-settled IDPs have the capability to be so self-reliant that they even help out camp IDPs. No evidence was found of this happening in reverse. Furthermore, the issue of insufficient quantity of food was linked to corruption by some of the IDPs through anecdotal evidence. Similar claims have also been made in newspapers, with it being suggested that some officials take rations out of IDPs' food relief and either keep it for themselves or sell it for personal gain; *'Nigerian officials grow rich on the hunger of the poor'* (Malik, 2016). A news article reporting on a malnourished IDP child further stated that *"she found food hard to come by, not just because of the enormity of the feeding burden on the government but because of the inhumanity of emergency managers and camp officials who keep diverting IDP foodstuffs"* (Soyombo, 2016:3).

In addition to these comments, Camp IDP 3 from focus group 2 mentioned that there are women and girls who go as far as having affairs with men and end up with unwanted pregnancies all in an effort to be able to feed their families. This confirms the sexual exploitation issues noted by the representative of GEPDC (see Chapter 5 and Section 6.5). The comment also confirms how deprivation in one capability feeds into other capabilities.

With regards to the IDPs of EYN camp, It may seem like the voucher for food coupled with extra cash means that they are in a better position than Bakassi IDPs to buy additional condiments, non-food items, and vegetables to supplement their nourishment, but that is not the case. In reality, the amount they get often does not cover the needs of a whole family. For example, interviewees stated that the vendors who provide them with food intentionally increase the price of items because they know they are IDPs who have free vouchers to spend. In other cases, vendors sell them food that has already expired. Their complaints to AAH regarding this had not yielded any results. With regard to complaints about the quantity of the food and the size of their families, the IDPs stated that those with larger families used to get two food vouchers but as time went on this was reduced to one voucher per family. As some interviewees noted:

*"Like this 9000 that I am telling you for food now, if you calculate the food we buy from them it's not worth more than 4000 Naira because of the price hike. There is nothing we can say sometimes we feel like we are going to die because of these issues."* – (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019).

*"They intentionally make the prices of food stuff from them higher than the market price because they know we are IDPs and we get free money and food."* – (EYN Camp IDP 9, male, age 40, 2019).

Self-settled IDPs also experience barriers to their nourishment capability with regard to the quantity of food they eat on a daily basis. Although self-settled IDPs are unlikely to go days or months without buying or finding food, a lot of them stated that it would be beneficial if they had sufficient food so as to not require them to go out in search of it every single day. They further stated that having access to more food would also give them an opportunity to save money from their daily labour which they could then put towards other things such as school fees.

**iii: Access to necessary non-food items:** Insufficient food is not the only issue that hinders IDPs, and especially camp IDPs, from achieving nourishment. The camp IDPs interviewed for this study also raised an issue pertaining to them being provided with raw food materials to cook and how they were not also provided with the means by which to turn the materials into food; for instance, oil and seasoning, or charcoal and firewood for actual cooking. Without such non-food items the IDPs face major barriers in terms of converting food into the capability of nourishment. The following comments were made by some of the interviewees:

*“The food being provided by federal government is quite excellent but one must look for firewood or charcoal to prepare it even when the forest is inaccessible.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 17, male, age 45, 2019)*

*“Even if you have food but you don’t have money there is still a problem because you need to buy some other things like charcoal and vegetables.” – (Camp IDP 1: FG 1 male, age 25, 2019)*

*“SEMA used to give us some salt, can tomatoes, kuka, okro<sup>11</sup> and some vegetables but now honestly they don’t come as frequently. Sometimes they don’t even bring food<sup>12</sup> not to talk of vegetables. It has actually been up to a year now without vegetables, except in the last 2 months where a short supply was brought.” – (Camp IDP 2: FG 3, females, age 30, 2019).*

Without such condiments and non-food items being provided, IDPs have to either use their own money to buy them or eat meals that are not considered to provide a balanced diet; both scenarios hinder their nourishment capabilities. With reference to having to fetch their own firewood, it was mentioned in Chapter 5 that IDP women who go out to fetch firewood are often vulnerable to Boko Haram attacks and gender based violence as well as respiratory diseases from using firewood for cooking. Additionally, having little to no money means that most IDPs eliminate some important aspects of a balanced diet such as vegetables. As a result, many IDPs are at a high risk of being malnourished, which was a serious epidemic among them particularly around 2016, (Vittozzi, 2016; Kindra, 2016; Abdullahi, 2021). Though rates of malnutrition have reduced, malnutrition in children, as Chapter 5 noted, is still

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<sup>11</sup> Condiments used to make local Nigerian soups.

extreme and it is also feared that the level of malnutrition will increase to a state of emergency. The UNHCR emergency handbook (2021) notes that food security and nutrition interventions in camps need to improve the immediate food security and nutritional well-being of displaced people. It further notes that a person's nutritional status is highly influenced by his or her environment, WASH, access to health services, and shelter. Where these are inadequate, the risk of malnutrition increases (UNHCR, 2021). This echoes the point made earlier; when a major capability (such as nourishment) is being negatively affected, it trickles down onto other capabilities such as bodily health. The EYN letter also mentioned other non-food items they needed such as blankets, mats, soap, kitchen utensils, lanterns, buckets, and so on as the ones they were given upon arrival in camps have either finished or are worn out. With harmattan (cold season) approaching, the IDPs will face great hardships without these items.

The self-settled IDPs interviewed for this study did not speak much of the non-food items needed to make or compliment a balanced diet. This may be because the nature of their pursuit for food gives the people who can afford it more choices over what they eat and how they want to eat it. It may also be because making money daily affords them the option of buying street food. Buying street food daily is not as expensive in Nigeria (compared to other countries such as the UK). Such foods are popularly consumed on a daily basis among the poor to middle class because they are both a delicious delicacy and are inexpensive (Odiraa, 2021).

## 6.5 Protection

The following functionings are important for IDPs to achieve in order to fully feel *protected*: being secure in camps and self-settled communities, being able to move freely, and feeling secure against violent assault including gender based violence. For the most part, both camp and self-settled IDPs in Maiduguri feel secure in their communities owing to the fact that they moved from their LGAs or from their first place of displacement to Maiduguri because it is more secure from Boko Haram attacks than anywhere else in Borno.

A couple of the self-settled IDPs interviewed for this study however mentioned that they felt vulnerable in their community due to the hostility of the hosts. As one of them noted:

*“Sometimes they fight between IDPs and the hosts but if you don't look for trouble it won't come to you. It's just sometimes they stigmatise us, looking at us and calling us IDPs. It's not everybody but some of them look at us like we are slaves but I don't pay it any mind it's condition that made us so.”*  
– (Self-settled IDP 2, female, age 32, 2019).

Such feelings are often the case in displacement situations where host communities start to feel burdened by the presence of IDPs and their demands for basic services (see also Section 4.5). In cases

where IDPs do not feel secure due to previous violent assaults, this may be in situations that have to do with farming. As one interviewee noted:

*“If we can at least go to the farm without the fear of being killed our lives will be better...some people were killed when they went to the farms yesterday, more than 30 of them. Some are still missing and their relatives had gone out looking for their bodies. So you see I cannot go back to farming if there is no peace.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019).*

With regards to going to farms, camp IDPs who are also farmers and in need of a means of livelihood noted during their interviews that they would like to go and work on the farms as often as their self-settled counterparts, but that they had limited opportunities to do so. Camp IDP’s movement is, as noted in previous chapters, restricted by curfews; as a result it is harder for them to take on livelihood opportunities outside of camps. However, self-settled IDPs have to work to survive; they are often the ones who find work at the farms and are, therefore, at higher risk of violent assault.

While discussing issues of IDPs being secure in camp communities, the representatives of Herwa and GEPDC both mentioned the stigmatisation of certain people in camps and how this can make people feel insecure and uncomfortable and likely, as a result, to opt for self-settlement instead. The Herwa representative gave the examples of a girl who had, at some point, been captured by Boko Haram, and people who had previously been forced to join the group. After their respective releases, the stigma of having being associated with the group followed them to the camps and, as a result they moved to host communities where nobody knew them in order to feel secure. In interview, some IDPs mentioned that they no longer felt secure in their camp because the government had allowed some repentant Boko Haram fighters to come and live with them<sup>13</sup>.

Gender Based Violence (GBV) is another crucial aspect of protection due to the vulnerability of women and girls. Women and girls who have been through some form of gender based violence have a harder time realising any other capabilities and without proper measures this can affect their lives. It was difficult to gather data regarding GBV in both camp and self-settled communities and especially within the self-settled communities because the issue is rarely spoken about. However, the representatives of Herwa and GEPDC were both candid about it and stated that gender based violence was a serious issue

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<sup>13</sup> *“There is an ongoing effort to bring repentant members of Boko Haram to stay with us, eat and sleep in the same space with us. Imagine how unsafe that can makes us feel. Many IDPs protested against staying with repentant fighters.” – (Camp IDP 17, 2019).*

in both camp and self-settled communities particularly around 2016 when there was a huge influx of IDPs. The representative of Herwa noted that:

*“I think in 2016 the issue of sexual violence was at its peak but now it has significantly reduced. When new IDPs arrived around that time it took a while for them to be enrolled and without the enrolment you don’t get anything. So in that time what were they going to do to survive? They started trading themselves for money and aid and that started leading to some issues of gender based violence. It still happens occasionally between IDPs but there was also a serious case I remember regarding a soldier and a girl in camp when the human rights NGO came and took the girl from the pool of her blood. Human rights and sexual assault referral centre took care of that case properly.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

*“Some of the families don’t cooperate with us with regards to gender based violence because they are afraid if the case is exposed their daughter might not be able to marry in the future so they don’t follow up on the case for fear of shame. At that point there is nothing an actor can do but give up. If you try to fight for their rights or bring them documents to sign they won’t” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

The representative of GEPDC had more to say about gender exploitation and noted that:

*“Even to fetch water the man in charge of the pump will attempt to exploit the girls. You will see that once you are his girlfriend you don’t need to join any queues for water. It is the same for other relief and aid support. The camp management and the security that are meant to be protecting them are the ones exploiting them.” – (GEPDC representative, 2019).*

Here a clear example of where power structures are harmful to the vulnerable and could hinder IDPs from realising many of their capabilities can be seen. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this happens in both camp and self-settled settings. In the EYN group letter (see Appendix VII), IDPs noted that some security agents who are meant to be protecting them are the ones guilty of violating their rights. Accordingly, they were advocating for more legal support. The case is the same when they try to fetch firewood as confirmed by FAO. Other factors that lead to women and girls being exploited are transactional where, for instance, a woman is benefitting in some way from a man and does not therefore report GBV against her or her daughters for fear of no longer benefitting from the support. With proper and sufficient support from relevant organisations, such exploitative cases could reduce or stop completely. The quote below by the representative of GEPDC further highlights some geographical, environmental, and social conversion factors that exacerbate GBV particularly in camps. The quote highlights some key issues on the relationship between protection and a lack of voice.

*“Sometimes the issue of gender violence is caused by the way the camps have been structured. How can you build thousands of shelters and build the toilets at the edge of the camp? It will be difficult for women to go to at night. And sometimes you can’t differentiate between female and male toilets. It even became a meeting point for some people. Even if they don’t get raped it is easier to exploit them there. Another issue is the culture of silence. Some of them lost their husbands and had to remarry, now the husbands exploit their daughters and violate them. One woman in particular her husband started having affairs with her daughter and when she reported the mother told her they can’t go against him or he will throw them out and stop providing for them so she should keep quiet about it. A lot has been happening in the camp even when some parents send their children to beg for street hawking, they become targets there too.” – (GEPDC representative, 2019).*

From my observations of the camp structure, I also noticed the distance between the shelters and the toilets in camps. The toilets are clustered at the edge of the camp, so residents have to walk the distance from their tents to the toilets. In some camps such as EYN, the toilets are even located outside the camp structure itself (attached to the wall of the camp from the outside). Not only is this unsafe in terms of the distance, but as the IDPs noted, it is also often dark because of a lack of lighting around the toilets. Some people carry torchlights around for this reason. Even if they have light fixtures, they do not always have electricity supply.

One self-settled IDP mentioned that young girls in their community are often at risk of GBV especially when they go to fetch water or firewood:

*“Recently it even happened with a 7 year old in that compound (she points at the compound). Most of the time it’s because they send their kids in the night to fetch water or firewood because not everyone can afford to just buy it. It happens often times here actually with both young girls and adult females.” – (Self-settled IDP 2, female, age 32, 2019).*

The findings above support the results of Buscher and Makinson (2006), who found that GBV in refugee, IDP, and post conflict settings is often exacerbated by factors such as firewood collection. Issues such as firewood collection, the absence of opportunities for income generation, and early marriage either for economic gain or to reduce a family’s burden are major barriers to women and girls’ protection in humanitarian settings.

It was noted through this study’s data collection that similar to mental health, there is no governmental organisation whose interventions are targeted towards GBV. GBV issues are mostly supported by a few international organisations and NGOs and are not prioritised in humanitarian support and protection. It

was also understood from the data of this study that being part of a group can offer opportunities for extra protection particularly in camps because different ethnic groups tend to look out for each other. For instance, the ethnic community of Nganzia has a reputation in Bakassi camp for fighting with other IDPs on behalf of members of their community. Similarly, EYN IDPs advocating for more legal support to protect them is evidently another example of group voice/group capability. On the contrary, this section also shows a reverse of group capabilities. In this case, group stigma affects certain individuals and becomes an obstacle to them realising some capabilities. For instance, in the case of people who were once captured by Boko Haram, the stigma of having affiliated with the group in any capacity makes it near impossible for those people to reside in camps. Instead, they forgo the aid and support provided in camps and move to self-settled communities where they can disguise.

## **6.6 Shelter**

*Shelter* is another major issue for both camp and self-settled IDPs. For the functioning of shelter to be attained, IDPs have to realise the following capabilities; being able to access camp shelters, including for camp settlements to be habitable. Being able to have access to adequate housing for self-settled IDPs, (such housing must also be habitable).

As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, there is a general assumption that any IDP who wants to live in a camp can do so and that, accordingly, self-settling is a choice; this is not the case in Maiduguri. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are some self-settled IDPs who would prefer to live in camps but could not access camp shelters; this necessarily curtailed their capability of being able to access camp shelters. Self-settled IDP 1 noted that she was told that there was no available space for her family and, as a result, they found themselves homeless. Luckily, an NGO member found them in their homeless state and reported this to the organisation after which the NGO rented out an accommodation for them for 2 years with the hope that there would one day be space in the camp for the family. At the time of the interview the almost two years had elapsed and, with no money to continue paying the rent, they were going to try their luck again with camps. Another self-settled IDP who used to reside in Bakassi camp moved on the basis that the support offered in the camp was insufficient. As the interviewee noted:

*“I used to live in Bakassi before hunger drove us out. And the tents are too small they are not even proper shelters for decent people to live in.” – (Self-settled IDP 1: FG 2, female, age 30, 2019).*

The fact that many self-settled IDPs have been told camp shelters are too full and that, as a result, they could not reside there, coupled with the statement above from self-settled IDP 1: FG 2 raises certain concerns about how the Borno State government is handling displaced people. Chapter 5 noted that the government of Borno State has ruled that only IDPs in formal camps can get support from the government and major international organisations, yet when the same IDPs try to access formal camps

they are told to go somewhere else because the camps are at capacity. It was also noted in Chapter 5, via the evidence from BSUPDB that the government has not taken onboard plans to expand or refurbish the camps. The unsatisfactory state of camps are highlighted by some self-settled IDPs:

*“There are too many people in the camps so I decided to stay here in town. The government does not even care for the people in the camp not to talk of us and the reason why I say that is because the people in the camp are not fully supported by the government either.” – (Self-settled IDP 6, male, age 68, 2019)*

*“I used to live in camp but our family moved us here. We couldn’t stay anymore because the shelters are not good. It is too crowded and the tents are not in good condition. They leak and pour and you always get sick there.” – (Self-settled IDP 9, male, age 43, 2019)*

*“I heard life in camp is very terrible. I have never been there so I don’t know but I heard the rooms are very terrible. I don’t know how anyone can live like that because you hear many terrible things. I don’t think life is easy there.” – (Self-settled IDP 13, female, age 30, 2019).*

One can only conclude that the support that is given to IDPs in formal camps is insufficient owing to the statements regarding their nourishment and shelter. Particularly if even some self-settled IDPs have also referenced the poor government support in camps and unsatisfactory nature of camp shelters as the reason why they opted for self-settlement. This shows that not only is camp access restricted, even for camp IDPs, the achieved functioning of shelter is severely hindered.

The statements above about moving out of camp, coupled with the statement in Section 6.4 by camp IDP 4 regarding IDPs who used to live in camp now supporting IDPs who are still in camp, are making a strong point. The statements are indicating that life might just be easier to cope with and more favourable in general as a self-settled IDP than a camp IDP despite the challenges of both. Indeed, this finding is shedding light on whether it is better to ensure that all IDPs have access to camps or whether self-settlement is a more durable option.

When asked about their shelters most camp IDPs stated that they are congested and dirty and that living in a rented house is a better option even though one has to pay rent. Camp IDPs 13 and 14 respectively noted:

*“Life in town is definitely better. Even the issue of overcrowding in camp is enough to make it better. You will find a lot of people squatting in one single room because they don’t give us enough space.” – (EYN Camp IDP 13, male, age 25, 2019)*



*“During the raining and harmattan seasons, life proves to be more challenging here. For example, we are living in rooms where we are exposed to rain, cold and wind. There are no blankets in our possession to protect ourselves. We have no curtains or drapes to cover our doors and windows so the weather seriously affects us and our children by making us sick. Hot weather also comes with its consequences.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 14, male, age 45, 2019).*

Although blankets are initially provided as part of non-food items to camp IDPs, it became apparent during the data collection for this thesis that blankets are only given to IDPs at the start of their stay in camp. Anecdotal evidence from the camps further suggested that they are cheaply made blankets that wear out easily and that they hardly ever get replaced by aid providers.

The EYN group letter notes that they need more shelters as new IDPs are still arriving. It also notes that their shelters need renovation and reconstructing as some of them have been affected by termites. It is unclear whether the shelter reconstruction will be happening as the representative of UNHCR alluded in Chapter 5 that they are running out of funds for such issues and that it is the job of the IDPs to maintain their shelters; despite the shelters having a lifespan of six months according to her. Extreme weather conditions coupled with these unsatisfactory living conditions make camp life even harder. While in Bakassi camp during data collection, the temperature went up to 40 degrees Celsius and the heat was unbearable making it near impossible to be out during the day conducting fieldwork in that type of weather condition. It was hard to imagine how the IDPs work on farms or survive in tents made out of plastic sheets. In one of the tents the author observed that there were no beds, mattresses or covers. The owner of the tent stated that:

*“We don’t have a bed or mattress but right now we are just looking for what we can do to protect ourselves from the rain because raining seasoning is approaching. We can’t wait for them (aid providers) to come and fix it we will be sleeping in the rain by then so we just have to figure it out ourselves.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 18, male, age 47, 2019).*

Self-settled IDPs were also not satisfied with the houses that they live in, with most renting a room or two and sharing those rooms with their families. It is also often the case that individual families share kitchens, toilets and bathrooms, and communal areas with the other tenants within the same accommodation. Most self-settled IDPs who live in such rented accommodations stated that the shelters were unsatisfactory. Although they are not as crowded as camps, they are also habitually dirty, and they lack water and electricity which IDPs often have to buy themselves:

*“Over 30 tenants in this building and only one toilet that we all use. There is also no available water we have to go and fetch everyday by ourselves. You can understand how terrible that toilet is.” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019)*

*“We share 2 toilets between 20 people and no there is no water in the house we buy it almost every day.” – (Self-settled IDP 9, male, age 43, 2019)*

*“The whole house has 4 rooms and it is 12 of us sharing it. One toilet and it is already filled up they don’t come to clear the toilets. We also have to buy water.” – (Self-settled 4: FG 1, 2019).*

*“Ours is also filled up they haven’t cleared it since we came here and it is even 3 toilets.” – (Self-settled 2: FG 1, female, age 38, 2019).*

The representative of GEPDC commented on the living conditions of camp IDPs compared to those of self-settled IDPs. The representative stated that, in her opinion, no matter how bad it seemed for self-settled IDPs, they were still in better shelters than the camp IDPs. She stated that *“the living condition in camp is hell. The huge amount of money being sunk into camps and yet you can’t see any tangible aid for these people. It is like our government has no respect for human lives because they are not helping these people bounce back to their lives.”* This echoes the works of theorists such as Diken (2004), Jacobsen (2001), Bakewell (2000), and Hovil (2007), which was discussed in Chapter 2 and their theorisation of camps as ‘spaces of confinement’ and ‘non-places’ because of the restriction and poor living conditions that such places offer IDPs.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has presented data from the fieldwork in an effort to analyse how camp and self-settled IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic primary capabilities, and the conversion factors that get in the way of them achieving them. 5 out of 8 capabilities were analysed and each of them highlighted the resources and opportunities that IDPs have to contend with.

The chapter illustrated that for each capability there are a set of economic, environmental, or social negative conversion factors – or a combination of all – that hinder all IDPs from converting resources into certain functionings. This was more evident with camp IDPs who experience more issues which hinder them from converting resources, than self-settled IDPs. Most of the conversion factors hindering camp IDPs are either environmental or social, only a few of them so far have been personal. As discussed in Chapter 2, conversion factors can either be personal, social, or environmental. Personal conversion factors relate to a person’s physical condition, sex, intelligence, reading skills and so on. This suggests that for IDPs, and particularly camp IDPs, it is the environment along with the social structures that have been placed in that environment that act as their biggest barriers. Moreover, the fact

that self-settled IDPs are able to overcome more obstacles and attain more primary capabilities than camp IDPs suggests that self-settled IDPs have more agency and choices over their lives compared to camp IDPs.

One thing that remains very helpful for camp IDPs is their ability to attain more by virtue of group capabilities. The chapter showed that camp IDPs who find themselves in dire situations can rely on the help and support of other members of their communities to a greater extent than is the case for self-settled IDPs. It also showed the significance of group voice as IDPs coming together to complain and ask for specific support is more likely to get them the support they want. Group membership particularly with regards to the primary capabilities helps in all aspects of CAIDP. It is significant in ‘the conversion process’ because it helps camp IDPs access and acquire more resources. It helps them support one another in eliminating barriers, which can also be empowering for the IDPs. It is also significant in ‘the outcome’ particularly when IDPs who share a common goal come together to achieve that goal. This confirms Stewart’s (2005) assertions on group capabilities (as discussed in Chapter 2). Chapter 7 will subsequently address the secondary capabilities.

## Chapter 7

### Realising secondary capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs

#### 7.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 examined 5 fundamental capabilities, which were termed “primary capabilities”. This chapter explores a further 3 capabilities; termed “secondary capabilities”; as outlined in Table 19. The chapter follows the same structure as the previous chapter.

*Table 19: IDPs secondary capabilities*

<i>IDPs Capability</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Public health</i>	<i>Being able to access clean water; being in a sanitary environment; being able to practice hygiene, including having access to sanitary and hygienic products.</i>
<i>Education</i>	<i>Being able to access schools; to gain valuable education, including, but not limited to, the right to education irrespective of gender or educational history; being able to access professional or other forms of training.</i>
<i>Livelihood</i>	<i>Being able to work, access employment and engage in economic activities, including equal and fair working conditions; to be content with your livelihood.</i>

Source: Author, 2021.

#### 7.2 Public health

The UNHCR states that public health is an essential requirement for refugees and other displaced people to be able to rebuild their lives, particularly because years of forced displacement can significantly decrease individual health and wellbeing. The UNHCR also mentions the key areas of public health which the organisation focuses on and tries to improve. These include, but are not limited to; increased access to healthcare, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services, and the promotion of healthy living (UNHCR, 2021). Chapter 6 discussed healthcare under bodily health and also discussed nutrition as a separate key aspect of IDPs capability. In this section, the different functionings that make up public health echo the key areas of public health mentioned by the UNHCR as noted in Table 19.

The UNHCR (2021) also states that water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) are the cornerstones of all aspects of life. Without sufficient toilets, water sources for drinking and cooking can become contaminated. Without safe water, people in humanitarian settings become exposed to diseases and infections. Without soap and other hygiene products, including feminine hygiene products, viruses can spread in households and communities (UNHCR, 2021). Most of the camp IDPs interviewed for this study were quite satisfied with the WASH services they received, although some camp IDPs had negative experiences. In contrast, nearly all the self-settled IDPs reported dealing with unsatisfactory WASH services, water shortages, and in some cases unclean water. They also reported living in

unsanitary houses and environments, as well as having minimal access to sanitary and hygienic products. It seems from the data that camp IDPs have worse shelter but better WASH, and that self-settled IDPs have better physical structures to live in but worse WASH. A comparison of factors is provided in Table 20.

**Table 20: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses regarding clean and sufficient water**

<i>Camp IDPs responses regarding access to clean and sufficient water</i>	<i>Self-settled IDPs responses regarding access to clean and sufficient water</i>
<p><i>“We thank God, we honestly have no problem with water.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We have water there is no problem at all in that area.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 5, female, age 31, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We thank God, we have enough good water.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 6, male, age 42, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“UNICEF is providing us with water and one of our senators too, we are happy with water.” – (EYN Camp IDP 7, male, age 48, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Oh yes there is water, a lot of water.” – (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Yes we have an overhead tank, the issue is we use electricity to pump the water so if there is no power or if the engine is faulty we run the risk of going days without water. So honestly that means we don’t have enough water.” – (EYN Camp IDP 10, male, age 44, 2019).</i></p>	<p><i>“There are boreholes in the neighbourhood that you can go and fetch water from without paying anything.’ – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Well, people in that area (points at another street) have boreholes so whenever they are around we go there and fetch water.” – (Self-settled IDP 2, female, age 32, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Yes we have water but it is a well we fetch from.” – (Self-settled IDP 3, female, age 20, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“No we don’t get water here, we buy every day. The problem is the water they sell to us is not very clean and it can make someone ill.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Yes we get water sometimes but it’s a borehole so if there is no light we can’t get water and there is no steady light in this place so most of the time we have to buy water. Even today I had to buy water worth N150 (£0.25).” – (Self-settled IDP 8, male, age 45, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“No we don’t have water. We buy it. Sometimes it is clean, sometimes it is not, you just have to manage what you get.” – (Self-settled IDP 11, female, age 20, 2019).</i></p>

Source: Author Interviews, 2019.

As evidenced in Table 20, some camp IDPs could easily access water and were satisfied with the cleanliness and sufficiency of the water they got in the camp. In addition, all the camp IDPs interviewed at Bakassi camp stated that access to water was easy for them and agreed that it played a huge role in how sanitary the camp was, as well as their general hygiene, including being able to cook and do other things that require clean water efficiently. This was not the case in EYN camp where there was a tank which provides water to the entire camp but, as camp IDP 10 noted (see Table 20), without electricity water cannot be pumped from the tank. It is a well-known fact that power supplies are not consistent in either Nigeria as a whole or in Maiduguri specifically; it follows that the water supply is not consistent in places such as the EYN camp. This was confirmed by the representative of BSUPD who, as noted in Chapter 5 stated that services like water and electricity are not enough for the residents of Maiduguri, and certainly not for the residents and IDPs combined. It is also the case that in January 2021 Boko Haram insurgents attacked electricity towers in Maiduguri thereby cutting off power supplies to the entire city and neighbouring LGAs for over 100 days (Haruna, 2021). It is hard to imagine how the IDPs in EYN camp managed to access water during that period given that they cannot access water without electricity.

Whilst Bakassi IDPs boasted of having sufficient water, EYN IDPs had poor access to water on the frequent days when there was no electricity. In a like manner whilst there are only one or two active international organisations in EYN camp, there are over thirty in Bakassi camp. Such divergences and gaps in resources as well as social, structural, and environmental conversion factors make a real difference to how residents of the different camps achieve their capabilities. Being a Bakassi resident enables access to more aid, resources, support and services and thus empowers residents more readily to realise their capabilities. In general, I observed that aid, support, resources, and services differ tremendously between camps like Bakassi and EYN despite their both being formal camps. I saw first-hand the high presence of the government and international organisations in Bakassi camp. The organisations even have makeshift offices that they have built within the camp, and the camp managers office is full of their tools and flyers. IDPs all over Bakassi camp are aware of these organisations and what they can offer them. In comparison to EYN camp where there are no offices of international organisations. The presence of the government and international organisations is so scarce that the residents of the camp allude to not knowing them or not ever seeing them around. As Camp IDP 7 from EYN noted:

*“NEMA does not give us anything, SEMA does not give us anything too. The only organisation is Action Against Hunger who give us food and UNICEF who run the clinic and provide the water. So there is no intervention from the government.” – (EYN Camp IDP 7, male, age 48, 2019).*

Self-settled IDPs who have to look for their own resources, have to grapple with even more issues when it comes to accessing clean and sufficient water. 6 self-settled IDPs stated that they did not have access to water where they lived and that, as a result, they had to buy water every day. Access to water is a huge burden for self-settled IDPs; it is expensive and inconveniencing. From the data noted in previous chapters it can be recalled that a number of self-settled IDPs rely on hard labour jobs on farms for their day to day needs. This pays them 700 Naira (£1) per day, and water costs 150 Naira (£0.25) per day. This leaves them with 550 Naira (£0.75) per day to spend on other necessities. It is a sum that is not sufficient to pay for hospital bills, or to enable individuals to even consider creating savings. IDPs who live on this amount of money are merely surviving day to day .

Self-settled IDPs who get water for free from neighbouring streets are not exempt from burdens relating to water. Fetching water every day is a daunting task often given to children; this has been reported in many humanitarian settings as putting children in a vulnerable state. In addition, it is not uncommon to see children skip school in order to fetch water for their households. In Figure 4 the author was taken to an area where some self-settled IDPs tend to fetch water from; evidently, it was all children of school age who should have been in school at that time fetching the water. Lack of access to clean and sufficient water may cause water-borne diseases which can lead to children having to take time off school (UN.org, 2021). Lack of access to sufficient water for self-settled IDPs not only affects their public health capabilities but also their bodily health if they become ill. It can also affect their protection capability with regard to their children whilst the latter may have their educational capabilities limited.

Figure 24: Self-settled IDP children fetching water.



Source: Author, 2019.

Table 21 highlights the responses of camp and self-settled IDPs to other aspects of WASH such as being in a sanitary environment, practising hygiene, and access to sanitary and hygiene products.

**Table 21: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses to sanitary and hygiene**

<b>Camp IDPs responses to being in a sanitary environment, practising hygiene, and access to sanitary and hygiene products</b>	<b>Self-settled IDPs responses to being in a sanitary environment, practising hygiene, and access to sanitary and hygiene products</b>
<p><i>“The hygiene of the environment is also satisfactory. Thanks to World Bank who came and employed 2000 janitors from amongst us. They sweep and tidy up the place and at the end of the month get paid N7500 (£10). I was lucky enough to get the job and that’s what I use to support my family. Their intervention motivated us to keep the place tidy and everyone is happy and satisfied.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“When there is any issue with hygiene we complain to the WASH people that work under hygiene and they do something about it. They are really trying, I commend them. They give our wives soap and other hygiene items too.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“As for other things we need such as for our personal hygiene, in the past they used to give us promptly but due to the new people that arrived to the camp who were recently displaced by Boko Haram, they stopped giving us and focused on the new arrivals. The new arrivals need more help than us now and we understand that.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“That 1 toilet (1 communal toilet with 10 stalls and 1 communal shower with 10 stalls) is the only one we have here for everyone and it’s very faulty at the moment so we are left with few options.” – (EYN Camp IDP 10, male, age 44, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“There are problems with the toilets. We don’t have toilets near the rooms we live in, they are located</i></p>	<p><i>“The hygiene is very poor. We only have one toilet in our house, too many people are using and sharing it. We don’t always have water to take care of the toilets so it is not easy to maintain it.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 1, female, age 22, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“It’s the same for us. The lack of toilet and water is our biggest problem we need help with that.” – (Self-settled IDP 4:FG 1, female, age 36, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“No one provides us with any products. Soap, morning fresh, dettol or izal (all hygiene products commonly used in Nigeria for washing and cleaning). We have to buy everything by ourselves and not everyone can afford to buy, that is why the hygiene is poor – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>We told you earlier there is no water in taps so it’s the water we buy that we have to use to bathe, cook, wash, clean, and everything else. There is too much to do when you buy water and it is not cheap. The hygiene can be better but the lack of water makes it hard.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 4, female, age 31, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“We pay 60,000 Naira per year yet the environment is very bad. There is only 1 bathroom and 1toilet in this house and it is even too full, so we just go outside.” – (Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019)</i></p>



<p><i>outside and even there, we don't have enough of the toilets. You can see there are a lot of people but with few toilets for all of us. In the night or in case of an emergency you have to come out and walk all the way there to the toilet.” – (EYN Camp IDP 11, female, age 50, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“They (international organisations) come to enlighten women and create awareness about feminine hygiene and sometimes share soap, detergent and sanity products to the women.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 16, female, age 50, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“Like a month ago, members of IRC came and gave 600 women across 5 LGAs soap and morning fresh (a washing liquid) and other items too.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 16, female, age 50, 2019).</i></p>	<p><i>“It is hard as a young lady to get sanitary products here because you have to have money to buy it. Where will you get the money from? Who will give you money? Using hygiene products for some women here is a luxury. Some don't even know much about it.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 2, female, age 35, 2019)</i></p> <p><i>“The problem with the hygiene is there is no water and we all share 1 toilet in the house we are renting.” – (Self-settled IDP 4:FG 3, male, age 55, 2019).</i></p>
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Source: Author Interviews, 2019.

From the statements by camp IDPs in Table 21 it can be seen that there are differences in hygiene, how sanitary the environment is, and with regards to access to sanitary products between IDPs in Bakassi and EYN camps. As with other noted issues, IDPs in EYN camp are not getting the same level of aid and support as their counterparts. EYN IDPs stated that the hygiene in their camp is poor, some of their toilets do not function and they need sanitation equipment's in order to tidy up and keep the camp environment clean (see letter in Appendix VII). This not only shows the poor hygiene of their camp, it also shows that unlike Bakassi camp IDPs, EYN IDPs do not get paid by international organisations to clean and tidy their camps, neither do they get members of organisations such as IRC coming to enlighten them on hygiene or give them products such as soaps and sanitary products. During fieldwork, the author observed the clear difference in the level of hygiene between Bakassi camp and EYN camp. In fact, if not for the few resources such as free food and free shelter (albeit limited), one could almost deduce that EYN IDPs are surviving on their own in a similar way to self-settled IDPs. They are not getting the same support as members of other formal camps like Bakassi.

Self-settled IDPs also have to cater for themselves with regard to issues of hygiene. Since they live in host communities among the urban poor, they share the latter's hygiene conditions, and the nature of sanitation of slum areas. Nigeria is the third most regressive country in the world with regards to sanitation with up to 46 million people having no access to clean water and 118 million lacking access to safe and private toilets (WaterAid Global | Nigeria, 2021). The same report further notes that around

80,000 children under the age of five die every year from diseases caused by the country’s poor levels of access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene (WaterAid Global | Nigeria, 2021).

### 7.3 Education

Education is another fundamental issue in the lives of IDPs that most regard highly. It is a key factor in why many IDPs decide to self-settle. As is noted in Table 19, for the capability of education to be fully realised, IDPs must be able to access schools; to gain valuable education and to access professional or other forms of training. Table 22 compares camp and self-settled IDPs responses to access to education.

**Table 22: Camp vs self-settled IDPs responses to access to education**

<b><i>Camp IDPs responses to access to education</i></b>	<b><i>Self-settled IDPs responses to access to education</i></b>
<p>“Yes they go to school here in Bakassi. All the bigger ones go and the small ones will join them later” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019)</p> <p>“Yes all my children go to the school here. If not for what happened to us (the displacement), all my children were in private school.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)</p> <p>“Yes all my children go to school here.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)</p> <p>“We have many children in this Bakassi who do not go to school so they lack discipline. We even have young girls who are not going to school and the absence of that is not good for them. If a kid goes to school they will at least have an improved life rather than just remaining idle.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019)</p> <p>“They’re not in school anymore. When their dad was alive he took them to a private school in town everyday but since he died they don’t go anymore because I can’t pay the school fees and also pay for transport every day. But I am willing to put them back.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 5, female, age 31, 2019)</p>	<p>“Yes all my children are in school. The young ones are in public primary school and the older one is in the private school close to here.” – (Self-settled IDP 1, male, age 40, 2019)</p> <p>“I used to be a teacher myself and I even got promoted to head mistress before all this happened. Education is very important to me but I have not had a job since we got here and I cannot afford to pay for everything and also pay my children’s school fees. They have all been sent out of school because we can’t afford to pay. All 4 of them.” – (Self-settled IDP 2, female, age 32, 2019)</p> <p>“I finished my secondary school and passed well so I gained admission into higher institution but I cannot afford it and no one can support me to pay for everything.” – (Self-settled 3, female, age 20, 2019)</p> <p>“I have passed my exams I am just waiting to start higher education but we are still putting the money together. In our village my father used to farm to support our education. He would have supported me now but he was killed. He will feel bad if he knew I wasn’t in school.” – (Self-settled IDP 4, female, age 19, 2019)</p>

*“Yes the children go to police primary school which is walking distance from the camp but the problem is that we don’t only have children of primary school age, some are capable of going to polytechnic but they can’t afford to. Out of my 10 children some are 24, 25 but we don’t have money to send them to university or polytechnic.” – (EYN Camp IDP 7, male, age 48, 2019)*

*“Those who can afford it send their children to private schools. As for us we can only send our children to police primary school where you pay 1500 Naira (£2). But even that is hard to pay because we have a lot of children so we have to do hard labour to be able to pay. Not all my children are in school at the moment. The secondary school once lost their certificates during the insurgency in the same fire I told you that killed their brother so they cannot enrol. The certificate cannot be produced so they cannot be enrolled that is what has been holding them back.” – (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019)*

*“We have a big problem with education. For example, my oldest just gained admission to Ramat (a polytechnic in Maiduguri) after passing his exams but there is no money to pay the school fees.” – (EYN Camp IDP 9, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“I wrote my final paper here and passed but I haven’t started university because we can’t afford it. Education without money is not possible and there are no jobs. When I get a good paying job I will pay for myself to go.” – (EYN Camp IDP 13, male, age 25, 2019)*

*“In terms of school we are seeking help from the government. Our sons and daughters are not going to school because we can’t afford to pay for it.*

*“Yes all my children are in school. They don’t have a public school where we live so they are all in a private school.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019)*

*“Yes I am in school I go to the university<sup>14</sup>. One of my uncles was able to find me a scholarship after I passed my exams.” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019)*

*“They used to go to school when we were in our village but here there is no public school near us and we can’t afford private so they are not in school.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019)*

*“Yes they go to school. We don’t have the means to support them all so the older ones are in private school for now and when we get more money or when they finish the others will join them.” – (Self-settled IDP 8, male, age 45, 2019)*

*“We used to go to school when we first came here but due to the lack of funds we have now been expelled.” – (Self-settled IDP 12, female, age 21, 2019)*

*“Yes all my children are in school. Whatever I make from my job I save and support them with their education.” – (Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019)*

*“All our children are in the government school around here. We have two schools around here one private, and one public.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG1, female, age 40, 2019)*

*“Yes they all go to school.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 3, male, age 45, 2019)*

<sup>14</sup> Where IDPs use the word school in reference to university, it will be stated explicitly.

<p><i>Federal and state government know there is no way an IDP can afford to pay for higher education we don't have the means. We want the government to either pay for it or give them scholarships so they can further their education instead of letting them be idle.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 15, male, age 48, 2019).</i></p>	<p><i>“A lot of our kids finished their secondary school here, we paid for them to take their exams but the university education is too expensive so we can't afford that.” – (Self-settled IDP 3:FG 3, male, age 41, 2019).</i></p>
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Source: Author Interviews, 2019.

As is evidenced in Table 22, there are many conversion factors which hinder children and youths from accessing school or university and gaining a valuable education. These conversion factors again differed between IDPs in the two camps. Bakassi is much bigger and has two primary schools; EYN has no primary school within the camp, but does have a (public) police primary school within walking distance. As noted in Chapter 4 only primary and secondary public schools are free to attend in Nigeria. Despite primary schools being free, EYN IDPs have more conversion factors that hinder them from education than Bakassi IDPs because, even they still have to pay for uniforms, textbooks, exams and so on; as indicated by camp IDP 8 in Table 22. They do not get any extra funds or support to pay for these additions which often results in the children who cannot afford them being asked to leave school. Moreover, those who have more than one child (which is almost every IDP), cannot afford to pay for multiple children. This is not the case in Bakassi camp, where camp schools and school supplies are free because they are given by donors.

Funds and monetary support continue to be a major barrier in every aspect of IDPs educational capabilities. There are no secondary schools located in Bakassi camp or near EYN camp. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 4, secondary school children have to enrol in public secondary schools and leave their camps every day to travel to school. Most cannot afford the daily travel expenses which results in many children of secondary school age instead being sent off to work for wages, or being forced into early marriages (girls). A majority cannot afford university fees. The combination of these factors contributes to idleness among youths, promotes drug use, and leads to higher rates of crime; as noted in NHCF meeting discussed in Chapter 5. The noted factors may also contribute to young people joining Boko Haram forces. As Camp IDP 2 noted:

*“We have many sons and daughters who quit school and fled to other parts of the country to do God knows what. For someone who goes to Ramat polytechnic, getting his diploma and also owns a shop in town which he uses to support himself, if Boko Haram destroy his shop how do you expect this*

*person to afford to go to school again? I know up to 9 people who are my friends who had to quit school because they cannot afford it anymore.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019).*

Self-settled IDPs also face many barriers when it comes to access to education; the biggest of which is funding. The majority (if not all) of the self-settled IDPs interviewed for this study wanted their children to go to school, and thence onto higher education. This was a major difference between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs; not all camp IDPs actually cared if their children went to school whereas most self-settled IDPs wanted their children to go to private school. The latter were well aware that private schools provide better quality education and that children thus educated are more likely to progress academically. Some camp IDPs who cared about education were aware that private schools were better, they lacked the money to send their children to anywhere other than the camp schools (a scenario further reinforced by camp rules). The self-settled IDPs who chose to self-settle mentioned access to livelihoods and good schools as part of the reason why they made that decision. This says a lot about the agency and choice that self-settled IDPs enjoy over camp IDPs. A case in point can be seen with camp IDP 4. Although camp IDP 4 resides in Bakassi camp, she stated in her interview that her children’s uncle insisted the children do not also live in camp in order for them to get proper education.

There are many other conversion factors that affect both camp and self-settled IDP’s capability of education. The headmaster of the school in Bakassi camp stated that the number of children who are not in school in the camp outnumber those who are in school and he suggested that this was an indictment of the quality of the schools in the camp. He further noted that many parents of those who are not enrolled do not recognise the importance of education, (a situation made worse by education not being mandated by government), whilst conditions in camp mean that some parents decided that they had no choice but to send their children off to work. This further illustrates the key role of agency and choice; in this case, the consequence of a lack of agency or choice is keeping children out of school.

Another issue that presented as a serious barrier to the educational capabilities of camp IDPs was the size and capacity of the schools. The headmaster stated that each school had about 16 classes with over 100 pupils per class and that the schools were at capacity. This makes teaching and learning very difficult. Other barriers include a lack of school supplies, for instance school uniforms. Although UNICEF contributed some school uniforms, a majority of students did not possess a uniform. The headmaster specified that school uniforms are important to help the children feel that they are in a proper school and as a mechanism by which to differentiate between students and non-students. Whilst UNICEF together with the State Universal Basic Education Board and the military donated writing materials and school bags for students, it was in insufficient quantity. Since most parents are not willing to buy things like writing materials for their children, there is a lack of means by which the latter can undertake home learning activities such as homework. While in Bakassi camp on a school day, the

author observed the students in one of the schools and to the headmaster's points, majority of them did not wear uniforms, nor had school supplies such as school bags and writing materials. Text books were very scarce (almost non-existent), and the classes were so full that most children sat on mats on the floor; due to insufficient tables and chairs.

Furthermore, the headmaster at Bakassi school also noted issues with the curriculum. He opined that general curriculum drafted by the government is not efficient because some of the children had never been to school before, whilst others had lost months or years of school during displacement. It followed that they should not be using the curriculum of conventional schools. He also suggested that there were issues with teachers' salaries. He stated that the teachers get paid 11,000 Naira (£15) monthly and that this is often not enough especially for teachers who are self-settled and come from host communities. It was interesting to learn that a lot of the teachers that teach in the camp school come from self-settled communities. This shows an area where self-settled IDPs are again benefitting with livelihood opportunities above their camp counterparts. Nonetheless, according to the headmaster, the government is not paying enough attention to teachers and education; the effects of these oversights are likely to be very detrimental in the future. He stated:


*“What is happening is the teachers are sadly not being respected and the education is not taken seriously and this needs to be addressed by the relevant organisations. More has to be done in the education sector because our poor attitude towards education is what gave birth to our problems in this country. These children witnessed so much crises before coming here and if you continue to ignore them allowing them to be idle and ignorant they will be no better than Boko Haram who are constantly recruiting new members. They will start imitating what Boko Haram insurgents are doing. Before we came here, children had already started drawing arms on the walls all over the place which is already imitating Boko Haram. Government is fully aware that if IDPs are left to their fate, they would turn out to be worse than Boko Haram therefore, they need to pay more attention to educating them.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 19, male, age 40, 2019) [Headmaster Bakassi school]*

The lack of proper investment in education noted by the Headmaster will leave a lot of IDPs ignorant, uneducated, unemployable, and very likely poor. This is detrimental to every single capability in the CAIDP.

With regard to support from the government and aid providers, the headmaster noted that a lot of politicians come to the camp and ask questions relating to the school and the education provided. He suggested that little positive flows from such visits and he further noted that only the Norwegian Ambassador to Nigeria had kept his word in bringing some school uniforms, materials and tents, and promising jobs to young people. In contrast, other politicians – including the current vice president of

Nigeria – observe the poor environment and poor standard of the schools but do not do anything about it. He further added that where politicians do offer some support, it is often accompanied by a political motive. For example, one politician donated 200 blank writing notepads to the pupils but with over 6000 pupils the headmaster claimed that ‘such gestures are not even big enough to be a drop in the ocean.’ In other instances such donations have been timed to coincide with local elections; an example of the same being given in Figure 25.

Figure 25: Notepads donated to Bakassi camp IDPs.



Source: Author, 2019.

A further point made by the headmaster related to ‘feedings’. Similar to EYN IDPs, He noted that the IDPs do not get enough food (as we have seen in previous chapters), and that students cannot learn on an empty stomach. He is quoted below stating that the national feeding programme has not been provided to them:

*“They said there is a national feeding programme for school children that the federal government initiated but where is it? We have not seen it. How can children learn on an empty stomach? These children only eat from the food items given to their parents which is not enough that is why you will see the students always look hungry. Besides, once it’s lunch time and they go home to eat they don’t*

*come back to the school again. Most times their parents will start sending them on errands or to work. The girls to fetch firewood or water.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 19, male, age 40, 2019)*  
*[Headmaster Bakassi School].*

The quote illustrates, again, how barriers to one capability can also impact others. The lack of lunch in schools means children have to go home for lunch despite most families having insufficient food. It is also noteworthy that the new national feeding programme across public schools in Nigeria does not apply to camp schools. This may be because the state government feels that is already supplying free food to IDPs. Nonetheless, without adequate nourishment capability, most children end up leaving school; have no choice but to go and work or go to fetch firewood to support their family’s needs. There is an additional gendered element to this issue. Boys often get sent to work while girls get sent to fetch firewood and water, increasing their vulnerability as discussed by FAO in Chapter 5 and many other times in this study.

The children in EYN camp are not exempt from these other barriers. A lot of the parents already complained about the amount of money they have to spend on school supplies since the children go to a public primary school. Those who can afford it and keep their children in school still face hindrances with regard to the quality of teaching in these schools. Quality of teaching in public schools is also sub-standard (though still better than the teaching in camp schools). This is the same across majority of public schools in Nigeria, especially in the Northern states. Schools are overcrowded, dilapidated, and ill-equipped. Parents cannot afford school supplies. Teachers are often untrained and not paid enough. The education system in general needs to be prioritised and needs better investment (UNICEF, 2022; BBC, 2022) (see EYN group letter in Appendix VII). Despite these conditions, the public schools that EYN children go to are still better than the schools in Bakassi camp. It almost seems like Bakassi schools are not really considered by the government and aid providers to be vital because they simply do not prioritise them. Rather the schools act as a place for the children to go to while away time as some of the parents suggested in the interviews.

In the case of self-settled IDPs, the conversion factors that affect the quality of education received are less blatant. Due to the fact that self-settled IDPs are used to supporting themselves, the children in school are not left without food or supplies. The self-settled parents who take their children to private schools have no complaints regarding the quality of education their children receive. Self-settled IDP 1 from focus group 1 noted:

*“In public schools the teachers spend their time chatting under tree shades while the pupils will play and come back home. Your child will start and finish the whole primary school but will still be unable to write even his own name. They're not teaching them well at all. They only collect their salaries at*



*the end of the month and go. It's like they don't care about your child. That's why private is better they actually care.” – (Self-settled IDP 1: FG 1, female, age 20, 2019).*

It is evident from the fieldwork that the difference in the quality of teaching between public and private schools is down to incentives such as the higher salaries teachers receive in private schools and the minimal constraints that come with it. This is a common issue in other public and private schools across Nigeria.

Although it is clear that both camp and self-settled IDPs experience a lot of barriers which hinder their educational capabilities, self-settled IDPs have a better chance of realising that capability because they have agency. This agency is, again, one of the reasons why some of them chose to self-settle. The representative of Herwa confirmed this in her interview. She noted:

*“Education in host communities is definitely stronger than the one in camps. Camp IDPs are facing issues of food shortage, water shortage, and even the boreholes themselves suffer. Sometimes water tanks won't be on until 10 o'clock, which is when they will come and start calling their children from school to come out and fetch water for them while they are in class. You can just imagine. It's a very pathetic situation. However, if your child goes to private school you can't do that. You can't just come and call them out of class. You're paying a lot of money for the child to get good education and the money is not easy to find you won't take that for granted.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

#### **7.4 Livelihood**

*Livelihood* is one of the biggest challenges for IDPs in Maiduguri. It was the most talked about issue by both the camp and self-settled IDPs interviewed. Table 19 states the capabilities that need to be realised for the functioning of livelihood to be achieved. Like every other capability, IDPs experience a lot of negative conversion factors that act as barriers to them realising their livelihood capabilities. One major barrier is that most of the IDPs of Borno state are, as noted in other chapters, either farmers, tradesmen, or fishermen. Most no longer have a way of engaging in any livelihood activities because they live in an urban area where farming and fishing are not accessible. In the few cases where they can, the farms are located far away, it is unsafe to travel to them, and the pay is not good. The quotes which follow highlight a series of comments and issues raised by camp IDPs:

*“We don't have any work to do and if you try to go to outskirts of town for work Boko Haram will kill you.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 1, male, age 48, 2019)*

*“For me because I am used to farming where I grow crops, it is sincerely the only work I can do. I am not used to any other type of labour apart from the farming and the business I have of selling vegetables. That is all I see myself doing.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“There isn’t a single job for us to do here. Sometimes we get hard labour on a very big farm that is far from here and they pay 400-500 Naira. But because of suffering you have no choice but to take it.” – (EYN Camp IDP 8, female, age 53, 2019)*

*“You can see the situation for yourself. If we had jobs you won’t come and meet us here every day.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 15, male, age 48, 2019)*

*“There are no jobs available here we only do hard labour in farms when we can. Otherwise nobody dares go to the outskirts of town in search of a job for fear of being attacked. Boko Haram can hit at any time. They recently murdered one of us just two weeks ago so everyone is afraid.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 17, male, age 45, 2019).*

Other camp IDPs similar to camp IDP 1 who was also used as an example in Chapter 4 section 4.5 desperately tried to maintain a livelihood through farming by renting a farm in a nearby village. They found that running a farm from a camp that places movement restrictions on you, in addition to having limited financial support proved to be difficult and unsustainable. Another conversion factor which camp IDPs face is a lack of qualifications, skills, and expertise for city jobs. As a result they have no option but to rely on what the government and aid providers offer them in camps; for instance, those noted in Table 21. During the period of this fieldwork, the Red Cross also gave a financial support of N110,000 (£150) to 250 women in all of the five local governments in Bakassi camp to put towards boosting their businesses. Although there are certain resources available at varying times (for example, financial support for livelihoods), there are various conversion factors that make them insufficient and thus make it difficult to foster capabilities. These include:

i. Access to resources: As seen from the examples in Table 21, some camp IDPs – especially those in Bakassi camp – get some form of monetary or livelihood support, but this is not frequent or sufficient especially when compared to what they would normally make at home. Moreover, both the IDPs themselves and some key informants (such as the representative of Herwa) noted that the livelihood support they get does not go round to every IDP; fewer than 20% of camp IDPs interviewed got livelihood support, and they confirmed that very few people in the camp are lucky enough to get work or livelihood support in the camp. Besides, this is Bakassi camp where there is the presence of many humanitarian officials who often offer their support. In other camps like EYN, the livelihood support is

almost non-existent. Camp IDPs thus complained about the lack of livelihood support and how getting some monetary support (capital) can significantly improve their lives in camp:

*“A lot of people have nothing to do because the only thing they know is farming. But there are people in this camp that were taught skills so at least they can start something with it. Although they were taught skills with no income to use and turn the skill into a business.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 6, male, age 42, 2019)*

*“There is a big problem in this camp. People living in this camp are suffering. They don’t have any work to do, they don’t have farms to go to, no money to start or run a business, and they have not been employed by the government. How won’t we be suffering?.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 14, male, age 45, 2019)*

*“What will improve our lives here is jobs or capital. All of us are jobless. We need jobs because it will enable us to feed our family and put our kids in school so that they can also partake in fighting ignorance. A lot of our lives will improve with proper education and the solution to all our problems is simple, it is to give us jobs or give us capital to start businesses, start trading crops, vegetables and other things. We have lost everything yet they are not giving us anything.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 19, male, age 40, 2019)*

Due to the fact that not all camp IDPs get the financial or livelihood support provided, friction arises between different IDP groups and between men and the women too; particularly husbands and wives. The fact that women get more aid and support than men also provides another example of where group association provides some (in this case women), with a better chance of enhancing their capabilities. Cumulatively, these points were raised by a number of interviewees as follows:

*“Even if they give livelihood support you will see the chairman will give it to his relatives and his friends instead of sharing it justly. If you are not connected to them they will never give you a job. That’s why I did not even bother myself to try and get it because people are always fighting about it.” – (EYN Camp IDP 12, female, age 28, 2019)*

*“Yes it’s true they support the women more than they support us. I do not mind it because the women support the family but I know there are couples here who have a problem with it and are always complaining about it. It often leads to conflict between those couples.” – (Camp IDP 5:FG 1, 2019)*

*“Most of the organisations prefer to assist women, they rarely help men. Out of 100 interventions you will see 75 will be women. Is that fair? What is the man supposed to do just sit back and be useless?”*

*– (Bakassi Camp IDP 15, male, age 48, 2019)*

*“Yes there are gender conflicts. Sometimes you will bring an intervention and the criteria is women but at the end of the day you will find only men will come. When you complain they say it’s because the work is meant for men, women are not capable of doing it. Some women have restrictions in their households, some their husbands may not allow them to join the training because they believe they should be the ones getting work and taking care of the family. Even if you go to the camp chairman for help he will be reluctant to help because they say women cannot lead a household above their men. It all has to do with religious beliefs and cultural jurisdiction. They have this notion that women cannot lead while their men are not doing anything.”* – (Herwa representative, 2019)

The quotes also illustrate that there are cases where women’s agency is taken away from them; in this case because the men believe they are not supported equally by aid providers. It was observed during the data collection that IDP men in Bakassi camp feel differently towards their women being the majority aid receivers than EYN men. This suggests that there are differences in how Muslim men regard their women. The Christian men (EYN Camp) support their women receiving aid and do not feel undermined; the reverse is true of the Muslim men (Bakassi Camp). This feeling is rooted in the Islamic way of life where men are head of families and sole providers. The difference in thought and feeling can also be seen, therefore, as rooted in group (religious) identity. As an interviewee commented:

*“Actually here we usually allow and encourage our women to go and collect the aid materials or money when they are sharing it because she is the one that understands what the household needs and actually when she gets the support it reduces the burden on me. That’s how we normally do it here.”*

*– (EYN Camp IDP 9, male, age 40, 2019).*

ii. Resource limitation: In most cases, camp IDPs are taught some sort of vocational skills. In the case of the women this is often tailoring, cap making (see Figure 26a ), bag making (see Figure 26b ), or knitting. In the case of the men, it is often tailoring, welding, or mechanical work. They are then given a start-up kit (often by international organisations as seen in Chapter 5) to continue their businesses. According to the representative of Herwa, the money they get along with the start-up kit is not enough to grow sustainable businesses (see also EYN letter in Appendix VII). The representative of Herwa notes:

*“Say for example the start-up kit is 50,000 Naira (£70). 50,000 Naira is not enough to start a business. How do you expect someone to rent a shop, buy facilities and equipment, get support staff?”*

*All within 50,000 Naira. It is not feasible. It means you are already setting them up for meagre livelihoods that is if those are even possible. Of course if you give somebody 50,000 Naira they are just going to spend it on their immediate needs by providing for their family or paying school fees. It will be better if the organisations can give 100 people 500,000 Naira at once they will make a lot out of their lives because these people are very hardworking, than to give 1000 people 50,000 Naira.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

Figure 26a: Cap making in Bakassi camp.



Source: Author, 2019.

Figure 26b: Bag making in Bakassi camp.



Source: Author, 2019.

The comments by the representative of Herwa were confirmed and enlarged upon by camp IDPs as the following quotes illustrate. They also confirm the points made with regard to access to resources, that not all camp IDPs get the financial or livelihood support provided in camps.

*“Over 1250 women were helped by Red Cross. And rumour has it that they're going to be making these payments for three months but we are not sure. If a woman can get approximately 330,000 Naira within a certain period of time, she can definitely start a lucrative business and can also take care of the family when the husband is not around.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“If I had capital you won't even find me here. I am already a businessman, I will go and venture into a business that will help me feed my family. In fact, I have a little bit of money that I am using to run a business with at the moment but I am in dire need of more capital to invest into the business. In the past for a business to flourish we would invest 5 million in it without any problems because you will need crops, cars, and so on. We had a lot of money in the past but things have changed now.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)*

*“I already sew clothes and sell food like my own small restaurant. What we need now is more capital to improve our businesses. Like now for example, I need a new sewing machine and sometimes I don't have enough money to buy food items. If we have capital even when they don't bring food to the camp we would still be able to feed and support our families. Especially women like us that are single*

*mothers and running our households, how are we expected to cope with no livelihood? The children too will be able to hold something if we had good businesses. A child will not go to school without eating or come back hungry, tomorrow if you ask them to go again they won't go. But if we had capital and our businesses flourished they will joyfully run to school and come back with a smile on their faces just like the other kids.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 4, female, age 32, 2019)*

*“Capital. Capital. That's what we want. If I can get 500,000 Naira within 6 months I promise you I can turn it into 1 million Naira. In those 6 months I will feed myself and my family, put my kids in private school and take care of our needs because I know my ways, I have my ways. I am a business man I don't sit around and wait for someone to bring me food. As long as we have security, peace of mind and capital all of us in this camp will be better off.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 19, male, age 40, 2019).*

These quotes also illustrate that some IDPs are frustrated capitalists. What they really want is some capital in order to create their own incomes and they often have clear ideas about how to do this. Rather than being offered a job (often menial jobs), or being offered some sort of income, IDPs see themselves as businesspeople who want to generate their own money. This view is similar to that of Al-Husban and Adams (discussed in Chapter 2), who found that the refugees in their study preferred working towards being self-reliant and engaging fully within the community than just being the receivers of charity. In that study, promoting their capabilities helped them achieve that goal (Al-Husban and Adams, 2016).

iii. Lack of agency: Lack of agency and choice over what type of livelihood support they get is another issue camp IDPs have to contend with. Even those who have the necessary capabilities (resources and conversion factors), often do not manage to achieve the functioning of a decent livelihood due to a lack of agency. The lack of motivation that comes from feeling hopeless, or from feeling that lack of choice forces you to take on a job you do not necessarily like, increases this barrier. For example, an international organisation can come to the camp to recruit women to train them for a tailoring business, and the women who are desperate for work have no choice but to sign up for the training, whether or not it is something they want to do or are even interested in. The necessity for a livelihood opportunity outweighs their agency over what type of work they undertake.

Young people, and especially youths in camps, are not exempt from the lack of livelihood opportunities or the barriers that impede their ability at realising their livelihood capabilities. There are hardly any livelihood support programmes, empowerment programs, or monetary support provided to youths. Even based on the author's observations, youth is the least supported group in the camps. This is a form of reverse group capability where being a part of a particular group (youth) is an obstacle to the

individuals from that group realising their capabilities. As mentioned in Section 7.3 on education, idleness, coupled with lack of access to education or employment are all leading factors to youths being recruited by Boko Haram. As the representative of Herwa noted:

*“Honestly the issue with the youth is that there is no empowerment program. We have a lot of graduates and diploma holders that are now living without any livelihood, they are not employed even by the private sector. What do you expect from graduates who stay for ten years without a job? They will embrace whatever comes to them. That is why most of them are being recruited by Boko Haram simply because they have no means of livelihood and have not been employed by the government either. Out of frustration because the government cannot employ everyone, they are all falling victim to Boko Haram. That explains why most Boko Haram members are within the age bracket of 18 to 35. The youth don't have the capability to think twice for themselves, once you give them some dollars and tell them to work for you, they will fall for it. So these are some of the root issues we are dealing with.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

Some camp IDPs even expressed their desire to self-settle due to the livelihood opportunities they believed they would get if they lived in town. However, they chose to remain in camps due to the lack of social connectedness they also believe they need in order to get such livelihood opportunities in town. The quotes below by two camp IDPs highlights the significance of social connections in accessing livelihood opportunities as a self-settled IDP.

*“The only issue is they too don't have enough opportunities. And some when they do get the opportunity, they would rather share it with their relatives, family members, or friends.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 2, male, age 40, 2019)*

*“Well, for those who live in the town they say they have more chances of getting jobs but it is only when they have the necessary connection. But for us, we don't have that kind of privilege or opportunity therefore even if we go to town no one will help us there.” – (Bakassi Camp IDP 3, male, age 50, 2019)*

*“You can't compare living in town to camp. If you are living in town you have the opportunity to go out and look for work. You don't have to wait for anyone. But here you're always depending on someone for your daily bread. You can't even compare.” – (EYN Camp IDP 9, male, age 40, 2019).*

Self-settled IDPs have their own barriers to their livelihood capabilities that they also compete with. However, in this area especially, self-settled IDPs find it easier to access livelihood and economic opportunities that are also more sustainable and durable than their camp counterparts. One of the



positive conversion factors that enable self-settled IDPs to access more livelihood opportunities is mobility and freedom of movement. Freedom of movement allows self-settled IDPs to freely search for work, and to start and finish work when they want; allowing them to make more money if they so wish. Compared to their camp counterparts who have many movement restrictions, self-settled IDPs have better access to livelihood opportunities and are often given jobs in preference to camp IDPs because employers know that their movement is not restricted. This is a key finding because it shows that mobility and freedom of movement are key environmental conversion factors for IDPs; they can either promote or hinder their capabilities as suggested by Robeyns (2020); in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

A lot of the self-settled IDPs interviewed engaged in farm labour. They benefitted from the same freedom of movement advantages noted above. Commenting further on the difference that freedom of movement makes to livelihood capabilities the representative of Herwa noted:

*“The issue is in the camps your movement is restricted. You must seek for permission from the soldiers if you want to go out. And even if you do, you have to make sure you're back before six o'clock otherwise they will lock the gate. Self-settled IDPs have total freedom to move around at any time they wish so there is tendency to gain livelihood that. As a woman in host communities, there is always domestic jobs that they can do like washing, sweeping and the likes. But if you're living in camp you can't do that. Everybody is looking for a means of survival so who will give you job?” –*  
*(Herwa representative, 2019)*

Another positive conversion factor for self-settled IDPs is social connections. Chapter 4 illustrated that social connectedness is at the centre of IDPs' socio-economic development, and that IDPs with social connections have an easier time re-establishing their livelihoods. A lot of the self-settled IDPs interviewed demonstrated how social connectedness helped them access livelihood opportunities, and extended their range of opportunities to better livelihoods that they are fairly content with. This contentment is, in part, a consequence of the agency and choice they have over what type of work they do. The benefits of such social connections are noted by some self-settled IDPs:

*“My uncle<sup>15</sup> got me a place to stay where I am taking care of the family's animals. But because I used to be a mechanic people also bring me repairs work.” – (Self-settled IDP 5, male, age 30, 2019)*

*“At first I worked with the local government then one of my uncles helped me secure a scholarship to support my education so through that an organisation gave us appointments and that's where I work*

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<sup>15</sup> Uncle in this context could also mean some kind of relative, even if only distantly related.

*now. At first it was for 6 months but we have been there 2 years now. We hope they give us permanent offers.” – (Self-settled IDP 7, female, age 30, 2019)*

*“I worked as a welder before so one of my friends who knew me back then and knew I was a good driver recommended me to someone and now I am a driver for him.” – (Self-settled IDP 8, male, age 45, 2019)*

*“Other than driving people in my car for money, I also drive big trailers. When there is work my friends will call me to drive big trailers and I will make the money for that trip.” – (Self-settled IDP 10, male, age 38, 2019).*

Despite these positives, self-settled IDPs also have barriers to compete with. One of them is competition over livelihood opportunities, which is inevitable when millions of IDPs flock into a city. In Chapter 4 the effects of displacement on hosts were noted and, in particular, how an influx of IDPs increases demand for basic services. This has the capacity to increase tension between self-settled IDPs and hosts. This is particularly the case where self-settled IDPs disguise themselves amongst the urban poor – as evidenced throughout this study – and thus apply for the same jobs as the hosts. This is further evidenced by the following two quotes:

*“Yes there are some that complain that we are taking their jobs because they too work on the farms. Thankfully it is first-come, first serve so whoever gets there first gets the job.” – (Self-settled IDP 1:FG 1, female, age 22, 2019)*

*“When we had livelihood intervention for the host community we had to go through the traditional ruler because there is usually many issues with self-settled IDPs. The hosts get angry and complain that no one ever brought them intervention and now they are watching as others get help and they also need help. Then the IDPs themselves fight over who should get the intervention and if you put one person in charge of recruitment he will go and bring only members of his extended family. Intervention is very hard with self-settled IDPs because everyone is fighting for themselves.” – (Herwa representative, 2019).*

Another barrier is with regard to insecurity. As already noted, IDPs undertaking farm work face the daily threat of Boko Haram insurgents striking at any time. Self-settled IDPs, similar to camp IDPs, do not feel protected within farm work. However, the need to do farm labour outweighs the risks (Section 6.5); this impacts many of their other capabilities such as life, bodily health, protection, and of course livelihood. Although self-settled IDPs are the ones known (as this thesis has shown) to have more choice over the livelihoods they partake in, in this instance, that choice is seen to be taken away from them.

Firstly, if they had a lot of choices, they would not want to risk their own lives taking part in farm labour. Secondly, farm labour is plentiful due to the fact that not many people want to risk their lives doing it, and camp IDPs cannot spend too long on farms, coupled with the fact that it is seen as a means of quickly earning money (IDPs get paid after the day's work). Thus a lot of people who do partake in it are desperate and have no other choice but to do so. Many IDPs have unfortunately lost their lives to this ordeal due.

Other issues such as power structures and language barriers can also limit self-settled IDPs' livelihood capabilities. Similar to camp IDPs, there are also certain power structures that also play a role for self-settled IDPs. An example of the power structures can be seen when IDPs are paid less for certain jobs due to their identity. In such instances, IDPs tend to be hired for jobs and paid less because the employer is aware that they are IDPs and thus are desperate for the job and the money. This resonates with the beliefs of Sanyal (2015) (as seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.2), who asserted that displaced people do not get paid fairly due to their identity. Other power structures within self-settled communities are seen in exploitative situations where some women are made to sell themselves for sex to earn a living, or in order to get particular jobs. Language barriers also tend to affect self-settled IDPs' access to resources and livelihoods if they can only speak their mother tongue.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed 3 secondary capabilities. In so doing, it has drawn out the conversion factors that hinder IDPs from realising each capability, and questions of agency and choice which affect whether capabilities are realised have been discussed. Similar to the primary capabilities, economic, environmental, social, and personal conversion factors hinder both camp and self-settled IDPs' ability to convert resources into capability sets and, subsequently, achieved functionings.

In the case of public health, IDPs in Bakassi camp have no issues accessing clean and sufficient water. This is not the case for their counterparts in other formal camps such as EYN where access is hindered by factors such as a lack of electricity. This is particularly interesting in showcasing how different formal camps are not supported in the same way. Self-settled IDPs' access to water is also hindered by factors such as electricity and other conversion factors including a lack of pumps and boreholes in the houses or the areas that they live in. As a result, many of them have no choice but to buy water every day which is both costly and ineffective. Lack of access to clean and sufficient water is a major barrier to IDPs' capabilities because it affects other capabilities such as bodily health. In the same way, lack of access to sufficient water affects a lot of IDP children and in particular girls who are to fetch water. This can impact their educational capability and make them vulnerable to GBV; further affecting their protection and bodily health capabilities.

IDPs, especially camp IDPs, also face many barriers to their education capability. As this chapter has discussed, this includes lack of uniforms and school supplies for Bakassi camp students, a lack of a curriculum that suits their needs, and a lack of support for teachers which affects the quality of learning received. The situation was different in EYN camp as IDP children all go to public schools outside of the camp but, again, a lack of money to support their educational needs sees students are expelled and sent home. For camp IDPs, barriers to other capabilities such as nutrition coupled with a lack of in-school feeding by the government also negatively impacts children's educational capabilities. Educational capabilities are stronger in self-settled communities where IDPs work every day to support their children. For all IDPs, the barriers and challenges increase after secondary school as most young people cannot afford to pay for university or polytechnic education. Most IDP youth are, as a consequence of this, idle and jobless. This makes them vulnerable, and an easy target for Boko Haram recruitment.

This chapter has also discussed how livelihood capabilities have the potential to affect all other capabilities positively if a good livelihood is secured, or negatively for those who lack livelihoods. Camp IDPs especially lack the skills, qualifications, and social connections to secure proper jobs; those who are lucky are left with only camp jobs which also have their own hindrances. Others try to undertake farm labour but the restrictions on their movement and the lack of security on farms pose barriers. This echoes Diken's theories that camps are marked by extreme physical, socioeconomic and cultural isolation. As a result, camp IDPs are excluded from several functionings of society and their existences are reduced to bare life (Diken, 2004). Self-settled IDPs are in a better position to secure livelihood opportunities which help them to realise their capabilities. Notwithstanding this, all IDPs made it clear that their lives would feel more valuable and they would be able to lead the type of lives they would value if they had more financial support (capital) to pursue their livelihood capabilities.

Lastly, by analysing secondary capabilities this chapter showed that there is little room for group capabilities and group affiliations in promoting the capabilities of IDPs, especially when compared to primary capabilities. As noted in Chapter 6, a lot of IDPs – particularly camp IDPs – benefitted or even relied on the aid and support that group affiliation provides them, as it allows them to realise some capabilities better than they would be able to do so solely as individuals. A contrary position was presented in Chapter 7 whereby group affiliation did not really make much of a positive impact. In fact what made more of an impact – albeit a negative one – was reverse group affiliation where membership of a certain group (for instance, gender or youth) hindered some individuals capabilities. The next chapter, Chapter 8, presents the conclusion of this study's research.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Conclusion**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

This study has examined the needs and experiences of camp IDPs in comparison to that of self-settled IDPs in Maiduguri, Borno State, Northeastern Nigeria. This chapter provides the conclusion of the study. It recounts the main aim of the study including how the research questions were answered. The research questions are addressed in the subsequent sections providing the key findings of the study in relation to the questions. This further highlights the conceptual contributions drawn from evidence on the different experiences of IDPs. It also highlights the relevance of the findings from northern Nigeria to those displaced people in other contexts. In the final concluding comments, the chapter provides some suggestions also drawn from evidence with regards to the expansion of IDPs capabilities. Finally, it closes with areas for future research.

As seen from the literature of the study, forced displacement has become a major phenomenon of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries which has been increasing considerably over time. One of the major causes of forced displacement, and the one this study is concerned with, is conflict-induced displacement. The last 10 years in particular have seen an incredible rise of up to 50% in the numbers of forcibly displaced people both within countries (as refugees) and across borders (as IDPs); as a result of persecution, conflict or generalised violence. The number of forced migrants nearly doubled by 2020. In 2018, Sub-Saharan Africa saw the largest of this increase. Nigeria was among the countries that saw a high number of displaced people that year with 661,880 displaced people of which 581,800 were displaced within the country's borders (UNHCR, 2018). Today, Nigeria has the third highest number of conflict-induced IDPs in Africa with 2.7 million IDPs (Kamer, 2022).

The literature has revealed that the most high-profile and highly researched category of forcibly displaced people are refugees. Though there are similarities in the causes of displacement and consequently the concerns of both IDPs and refugees, the two groups have distinct needs, experiences and vulnerabilities. Yet, little is known about those experiences for IDPs especially when compared to how much we know about refugees. IDPs are a unique and understudied vulnerable group who go through a range of economic and humanitarian crises, which is essential to study in order to help them escape poverty and exclusion. The consequences of unresolved IDP crises include a disruption in essential life support systems, worsened underdevelopment, and continued decline in fragmented fragile security structures (Adewale, 2016).

While reviewing the small literature on IDPs, it quickly became apparent that even the little we know about them is still being studied through the lens of the camp. This is because historically, displaced people – both refugees and IDPs – were found in camps post displacement. This view is shifting as more refugees and IDPs are increasingly self-settling in towns and cities amongst host communities. This was further confirmed by the 2018 World Refugee Council report which showed that 60% of all refugees and 80% of all IDPs are now living in urban areas (Muggah and Erthal Abdenur, 2018). Therefore, not only is there a gap in our knowledge about the general needs and experiences of IDPs, there is an even bigger gap in our knowledge about the experiences of camp IDPs when compared to self-settled IDPs. It is for this reason that this research sought to examine the IDPs of Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State and the hub for the displaced post Boko Haram conflict, hosting over a million IDPs (ReliefWeb, 2020).

Specifically, the study compared the experiences of camp IDPs to that of self-settled IDPs in Maiduguri in order to understand their different needs, distinctive vulnerabilities and how they are able to achieve basic human capabilities. It also aimed to shed light on whether it is better to ensure that all IDPs have access to camps, or whether self-settlement is a more durable option that provides more opportunities for IDPs. The findings from this study have implications for the kinds of support that policymakers need to provide for IDPs and their communities. With this in mind, the research posed and addressed the following questions:

1. What are the displacement effects of Boko Haram in and around Maiduguri and why do some IDPs end up in camps while others self-settle?
2. How do these two types of IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities, and what do they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving these?
3. What kind of group identities affect people's ability to achieve these capabilities and how does this differ between camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs?
4. How are government organisations, national NGOs, and international organisations supporting the capabilities of both camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs, and how well does this match IDPs' perception of their needs?

Due to the nature of the study which wanted to investigate, interpret and understand different people's experiences rather than generalise social realities to a population, a qualitative approach was taken to achieve this. A qualitative approach allowed the author to obtain rich detailed narratives about the phenomenon. Therefore, it used in-depth semi-structured interviews for the purpose of rigour and flexibility, focus group interviews to further enrich and triangulate the data, and observations where possible to complement the interviews.

## **8.2 Contribution of Thesis**

The thesis makes four major contributions. The first relates to a wider knowledge of IDPs and their experiences in Nigeria, which is missing in most of the existent literature. In particular, this first contribution allowed us to examine the main driver of displacement in Nigeria, which is the Boko Haram insurgency. Unlike other types of displacement around the world which have been extensively documented, the drivers and consequences of displacement in Africa are less understood. Even in Africa however, other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have received more attention than Nigeria (see Fresia, 2014; Verwimp and Maystadt, 2015). Additionally, even when the displacements are studied and it became apparent that more displaced people are settling in towns and cities as opposed to camps, it was still mostly presumed that this was a choice by some IDPs. As a result of examining and understanding the Boko Haram conflict as a driver for people's displacement into Maiduguri, another major contribution was formed; self-settled IDPs do not always choose to forsake government aid and support and settle by themselves. A huge number of them actually do not have a choice but to self-settle. This study found that this is usually because the camps are over capacity or because the IDPs themselves were not aware of camps they could go to upon arrival to Maiduguri. The finding opened the door to an even deeper analysis of IDPs' capabilities regarding how this group of self-settled IDPs cope as the Nigerian government declared that only IDPs in formal camps get their full support, yet some of those IDPs are told to leave when they arrive at camps because there is no space for them.

The second contribution the thesis makes relates to the differences in needs and experiences between camp and self-settled IDPs. The contribution also showed how a study of their experiences through a capabilities approach lens is valuable for better understanding their different needs and opportunities in order to enhance policy solutions. It produced empirical evidence that calls governments, aid providers, and policymakers alike to shift their attention from generalising the needs and experiences of all IDPs, to focusing on the needs and experiences of specific individuals or groups. One effective way of ensuring this is by shifting their focus from immediate basic needs and the possession of commodities, to a focus on IDPs' capabilities. This way, policymakers focus on the complexities of human wellbeing and people's ability to lead a fulfilling life, which can be affected by any resource or activity. The empirical evidence showed that this is a valuable approach because it examines a range of resources, activities, options and opportunities that are provided to these IDPs. Not only that, it also examines how the environment, social norms, policies and personal attributes can affect how IDPs access or benefit from those resources. In order for an IDP to recover post displacement – and be able to escape poverty and exclusion and subsequently live the type of life they value – interventions must be holistic and exclusive to the individual or group, which can be examined and understood through the use of the capability approach. Additionally, another significant contribution that came from this is the notion of group capabilities. Group affiliation can be empowering and it is important in enlarging individual capabilities. The empirical evidence not only confirmed this and showed that it is another key area for

policymakers to focus on, but it also showed a reverse of group capabilities where associating as part of a group diminishes some IDPs capabilities making it harder for them to lead a valuable life.

The third contribution considered whether camp settlement or self-settlement is better for IDPs. In this regard, the empirical evidence found that IDPs in camps are better off with regards to some capabilities – particularly the primary capabilities – due to the fact that most of their aid and support is provided by the government and international organisations. Some of those resources and opportunities are thus easier for them to access, and access is a major conversion factor that either significantly aids or significantly hinders IDPs’ capabilities. This discovery however, showed that camp IDPs are in most cases not as self-reliant as their self-settled counterparts. It also revealed that governments and aid providers are potentially more focused on immediate basic needs and resources rather than overall wellbeing because most of the primary capabilities can be provided for through the delivery of resources. The complexity however is that in most cases simply delivering or providing resources is not enough, issues of conversion factors and agency need to equally be considered. Self-settled IDPs on the other hand who do not rely on free aid and support and have to go out every day to look for ways to fend for themselves, have proven to be able to realise more capabilities combined than camp IDPs. What this shows is that although there are many conversion factors also hindering self-settled IDPs, exercising agency and choice, coupled with freedom of movement, and their ability to be self-reliant, makes them more resilient and thus able to achieve more primary and secondary capabilities combined. This findings show on the one hand the integral role of agency as shown in the CAIDP framework, because self-settled IDPs being able to exercise their agency and make choices about their lives has allowed them to feel more empowered than their camp counterparts. On the other hand, it also shows that camps do not simply restrict, but they do also help secure some benefits for IDPs. Without such benefits, camp IDPs are more exposed to certain risks.

The fourth contribution provides details on the relevance of the findings of this study from northern Nigeria to displaced people in other contexts. Prior to collecting data for this study, the literature already showed that displacements such as the phenomenon of Borno State is not a new occurrence in Africa or the rest of the world. Countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Burundi have been dealing with the consequences of the displacement of people both as refugees and as IDPs. Similarly across the globe, many countries have experienced the same. The most recent example can be seen in Ukraine, the world’s largest human displacement in the world today with some 7 million IDPs displaced within the country. Just as is the case in Borno State, increasingly IDPs across the globe are being found in towns and cities among host communities rather than camps, and just as is the case in Borno State, these IDPs will want to feel settled at some point and begin to look for ways to regain some normalcy back into their lives. This study has shown that whether IDPs can in fact return to normalcy, regain their capabilities, and escape poverty, strongly depends on where they find themselves post displacement. It



depends on where they are residing, whether in camps or self-settled, and it also depends on their capabilities, and the conversion factors they have to contend with where they reside.

### **8.3 IDPs post displacement and the role of aid providers and policymakers**

This section details the key findings of the study in relation to Research Questions 1 and 4; further highlighting their empirical contribution. Chapter 4 focused on Question 1. It examined the displacement effects of Boko Haram and it mapped out the displacement showing where IDPs left from, and where they ended up post displacement. In so doing, it brought to light the extent of the destruction of the insurgency on life, property, infrastructure, family structures, community structures, livelihoods and many more, on the inhabitants of Borno State and beyond. It also showed the vast numbers of displaced people. It verified that while there are many IDPs in camps, the vast majority are self-settled among host communities. This emphasised the need for widening our limited academic and policy knowledge on IDPs and on displacements in Nigeria and the African nation alike.

One major finding from this chapter is with regard to the general assumption that IDPs who self-settle all have social connections that support them in doing so and thus are self-settling by choice. The chapter showed that the vast majority of the self-settled IDPs of this study do not actually have any social connections; therefore their needs and vulnerabilities remain high. It also verified that indeed, a lot (if not majority) of the self-settled IDPs did not have a choice but to do so. Many of them wanted to settle in camps so as to benefit from the support camp IDPs receive but were either not aware they existed, or were denied camp settlement for reasons discussed in the chapter.

Another major finding from the chapter is the huge disparity we began to see between two different formal camps (Bakassi camp and EYN camp). The disparity ranges from how they receive aid and support, to who provides them with the support, and the type of aid and support they receive. This has implications for how the IDPs of the different camps realise their capabilities, which we subsequently see in Chapters 6 and 7. This finding reiterates one of the initial points being made by this study. That is the importance of studying and understanding different individuals and different groups of IDPs rather than generalising them. Clearly, not all of them get resources and opportunities in the same way, thus not all of them use them in the same way. Generalising them risks failing to understand the distinct vulnerabilities of one group. The same goes for camp vs self-settled IDPs. This finding also made the study more robust. Though this was part of the rationale for selecting two different camps, the huge disparity was an unexpected yet important contribution.

Chapter 5 examined Question 4. It assessed what the government, national NGOs, and international organisations are doing to support the capabilities of both camp and self-settled IDPs and how well their support matches IDPs perception of their needs.

In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement specify that the government and national authorities of the state where IDPs are found have full responsibility of assisting them. The role of the international community is thus to supplement what the national or state government is already doing. However, one major finding from Chapter 5 revealed that in the case of Borno State, the international organisations seem to carry a lot of the weight of IDPs assistance. In particular, international organisations were seen to focus on really big issues such as providing IDPs with appropriate documentation which they require in order to access any type of intervention. They provide IDPs with legal aid, health and wellbeing services, livelihood support, and many more. It thus became apparent that the state government's focus is particularly on the provision of food and non-food items, and on return. Even in this small fraction of IDPs intervention, the state government seems to have a lot of gaps. Despite their ruling that only IDPs in formal camps are entitled to their support, the state government is still seen to neglect the IDPs of some formal camps like EYN camp. The chapter also revealed that some of the smaller issues that IDPs face are often neglected by both the state government and the international organisations, which is where NGOs come in. The study attributed this targeted focus by NGOs to the fact that they know and understand the context and the needs of their people more than anyone else.

A second key finding focuses on the second part of Question 5 regarding IDPs perception of their needs. The empirical chapters stated that Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will need to be analysed in order to be able to get the full picture that answers this question. What unfolded in the chapters showed that different IDP groups have different perception of their needs. For example, with regards nourishment, policymakers believe the food intervention they are supplying is satisfactory, camp IDPs have the perception that their needs are not being fulfilled particularly due to the quantity of food they receive, which is often not enough. Self-settled IDPs on the other hand, who look for their own food did not have such strong negative perceptions of their nourishment needs. They mostly stated that they just need to have access to better livelihoods which will allow them to continue to support their nourishment needs as they have been doing. This shows an example of a huge disparity between how well policymakers interventions match IDPs perception of their needs. In general however, most camp IDPs mentioned that a vast majority of their needs are not being met. One 'need' that all IDPs concur on is with regard to livelihood support. Whether in Bakassi camp, EYN camp, or self-settled, all the IDPs that were interviewed for this study mentioned needing better livelihood support. The IDPs seem to understand that many if not all of their capabilities depend on them being well nourished, being able to earn a living, being self-reliant, and putting their children in good schools; all of which rely on having a decent livelihood according to them. The need for better livelihood support in expanding IDPs capabilities is discussed further in Section 8.5.

#### **8.4 Differences in achieving basic human capabilities: camp vs self-settled IDPs**

This section highlights the key debates that emerged from the empirical analysis that answered research Questions 2 and 3. Question 2 examined how camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs differ in terms of their ability to achieve basic human capabilities and what they believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to achieving them. Question 3 examined the kind of group identities that affect people's ability to achieve capabilities and how it differs between camp and self-settled IDPs. Both questions were addressed in Chapters 6 and 7; Chapter 6 focused on the primary capabilities and Chapter 7 on the secondary capabilities.

##### **Primary Capabilities**

Looking first at the primary capabilities which consist of: *life, bodily health, nourishment, protection, and shelter*, the empirical evidence showed that agency and freedom are among the assets most valued by all IDPs. With regards to the capability of life for instance, many of the camp IDPs I interviewed alluded to the lack of freedom of movement as the biggest factor that is making them feel like their lives have less value. In addition to that, is their inability to make choices over their lives. These two factors led camp IDPs to describe their lives in camps as 'useless', 'prisoner', 'worthless', 'there is no life in camp', and so on. On the other hand, the ability for self-settled IDPs to make choices over their lives, and have the freedom to move around to actualise those choices, is why they described their lives as 'manageable'; alluding several times that their lives are better now compared to what they were in the beginning of the displacement. This showed that the achieved functioning of life is better realised for self-settled IDPs than camp IDPs.

In the case of bodily health, the empirical evidence showed that the combination of camp IDPs having access to free clinics in camps, as well as the group capabilities that allow them to help each other in times of sickness, together make it possible for camp IDPs to achieve more bodily health functionings than self-settled IDPs. This is irrespective of the fact that services provided by the camp clinics are often affected by some negative conversion factors that makes the clinics less purposeful at certain times. Still, not only do self-settled IDPs have no access to free medical care, they have to pay for any medical care they receive in the hospitals they go to. Self-settled IDPs also live a more individualistic life thus they are less likely to support one another with bodily health support. This is one of the capabilities where freedom of movement and agency does not add much value for self-settled IDPs.

Nourishment capability presented entirely different results compared to other capabilities such as bodily health. Here also, camp IDPs get free food brought to them presumably every month. Since access to food is one of the major conversion factors to achieving nourishment, it means camp IDPs should have a better chance at achieving the functioning of nourishment. However this is not the case. Camp IDPs have many negative conversion factors to contend with that hinder other capabilities of nourishment;

such as the quantity and quality of the food they get, power structures that pose many issues with accessing food, and most importantly, choice over what type of food they get. As a result, all camp IDPs reported not being satisfied with their nourishment support, not being able to achieve many nourishment capabilities, and thus not being able to achieve the functioning of nourishment. Although their self-settled counterparts also have negative conversion factors to contend with, their freedom of movement allows them to look for food or work for it whenever. It also allows them to always have access to food because they go out to look for it instead of waiting till someone brings it to them. Additionally, they have a choice over what type of food they buy or make. In Chapter 6 Section 6.4 for example, camp IDPs gave examples of the type of food they get from aid providers, and it is the same type of food every time. One camp IDP also spoke about a time when they got soya beans which they were not used to eating and could not even prepare. These are the reasons why despite the access to free food in camps, self-settled IDPs are able to realise more nourishment capabilities and achieve the functioning of nourishment over camp IDPs.

It is harder to judge which IDP group has achieved the functioning of protection over the other because both groups already feel more protected being in Maiduguri than they did in their LGAs. Thus both groups allude to being able to achieve different protection capabilities in whatever setting they find themselves. Camp IDPs feel protected due to the fact that they live in enclosed camps with constant security, where there is always the presence of government officials, international organisations and NGOs. Similarly, self-settled IDPs feel protected being in the midst of hosts where they can even disguise themselves to avoid being stigmatised or discriminated against; in particular the IDPs who once associated Boko Haram. Where IDPs do not feel protected, for instance, in the case of going out to work on farms outskirts of town, or in cases of gender based violence where there is limited intervention from policymakers, these issues affect both camp and self-settled IDPs almost equally.

From the empirical evidence, it can be seen that both IDP groups also have a lot of negative conversion factors getting in the way of them realising shelter capabilities. For example, camp IDPs deal with unsatisfactory shelters, lack of shelter necessities (such as mattresses, blankets, sheets and curtains) to protect them from the different and extreme Maiduguri weather conditions, overcrowding, lack of privacy, and so on. A lot of them mentioned preferring to self-settle because they believe the houses self-settled IDPs live in are better than camp shelters. Even some of the policymakers made references to the unsatisfactory nature of camp shelters. For self-settled IDPs, the negative conversion factors they contend with often have to do with the minimal space in their houses, which does not reflect the high amount of rent they pay. Additionally, they also contend with issues of infrastructure, water and sanitation in their shelters. As a whole, self-settled IDPs still have better shelter choices and the freedom to move from one shelter to another when they come across better shelters. They also have a chance of

their social connections in town helping with better accommodation. Evidently self-settled IDPs are able to achieve more shelter capabilities and realise the functioning of shelter as a result.

To conclude on the primary capabilities, the empirical evidence showed that although camp IDPs get a lot of aid and support delivered to them for free, it surprisingly does not reduce the negative conversion factors they have to contend with in order to realise capabilities from those resources and turn them into achieved functionings. Camp IDPs are ironically just met with more conversion factors to contend with. One prominent reason for this often has to do with the lack of agency, choice, and freedom of movement that they are limited to. Another reason has to do with the fact that they are not able to do much or achieve much on their own without the assistance of aid providers. For instance in the case of nourishment capability where they get free food from SEMA or AAH, when the agencies then have problems, it stops them from providing food for a period of time, and camp IDPs have no other proper means of acquiring food as a result. The evidence found that self-settled IDPs have a better chance at realising more primary capabilities than their camp counterparts because they are able to overcome the above-mentioned problems that camp IDPs contend with.

### **Secondary Capabilities**

Secondary capabilities which consist of *public health, education, and livelihood* also showcased some major contributions. First, that secondary capabilities are better realised when primary capabilities have effectively been realised. For example, Chapter 7 showed how the functioning of education is better achieved after IDPs achieve the functioning of nourishment. Similarly, the functioning of livelihood is better achieved when the functioning of protection is achieved.

In the case of public health, it quickly became apparent that Bakassi camp IDPs are able to realise their public health capabilities more comfortably than EYN camp IDPs and self-settled IDPs. This is one area where the majority of the Bakassi camp IDPs have no complaints or negative conversion factors with regards to their public health, and a key area that showed clearly the difference in intervention between two formal camps. In this instance, Bakassi camp IDPs have no negative conversion factors, but EYN camp IDPs have plenty. This raised some concerns over how the government is treating different IDPs including the IDPs of different formal camps who they claim are the only ones entitled to their support. Self-settled IDPs, similar to EYN IDPs, also have many negative conversion factors to compete with; public health is one area where they face great challenges. When these issues are taken into consideration, it becomes hard to state that camp IDPs achieve the functioning of public health over self-settled IDPs. It can only be said that Bakassi camp IDPs achieve better public health capabilities, thus they achieved the functioning of public health, than other IDPs.

Access to quality education (similar to livelihoods), is one of the main reasons why many of the self-settled IDPs who had a choice, chose to self-settle. This is because the evidence has shown that the quality of education in camps is not up to standard. Access to public and private schools from camps is hard and without a means of livelihood, camp IDPs cannot afford to support their children properly through education. Therefore, it is clear that self-settled IDPs despite a few of the negative conversion factors they have to compete with in this regard are better at realising their educational capabilities than camp IDPs, though at a significant cost given that schools are not free. Education is nonetheless a major capability for IDPs to live a fulfilled and valuable life because poor educational capability also feeds negatively into other capabilities. It feeds into poor livelihoods, and especially in the city, it feeds into protection because out of school children end up in vulnerable situations. It also leads youths into idleness and joblessness, which subsequently makes them easy target for Boko Haram recruitment. A lot of the IDPs are aware of the dire consequences of poor educational capabilities so those who can, try to avoid it by self-settling, while others who do not have a choice are placing their hopes on policymakers to provide quality education. This is why one of the major goals often mentioned by camp IDPs is to have a livelihood that will allow them to support their children's educational capabilities.

With regard to livelihood capabilities, it has already been established that freedom of movement is a key positive conversion factor for IDPs realising their livelihood capability, which self-settled IDPs have over camp IDPs. Camp IDPs get trained for some vocational skills, despite them not feeding through to sustainable livelihoods. Some also get some work in camp which they use to support themselves. However, very few camp IDPs get the vocational skills training or the camp jobs, which means the vast majority of them are still left with no livelihood capabilities. Additionally, Chapter 7 showed that those who do get the work have no choice over what type of work they get. This suggests that in terms of livelihoods for camp IDPs, not only are they challenged with lack of freedom of movement, and lack of agency, they also have very limited resources and opportunities to convert into livelihood capabilities. Self-settled IDPs on the other hand, are able to get jobs in the city no matter how menial. Some are able to get more than one job, and those with social connections are even able to get what they consider to be really good employment in the city. Despite the access to more livelihood opportunities in the city, both groups of IDPs equally deal with factors such as a lack of monetary support to fully realise their livelihood capability or to improve it. Irrespective of this, self-settled IDPs have better opportunities and fewer negative conversion factors that allow them to realise more livelihood capabilities. Self-settled IDPs thus have a better chance of achieving the functioning of livelihood. It is one of the main reasons why a lot of camp IDPs would rather be self-settled.

To sum up the section on primary and secondary capabilities, it has been evidenced that each IDP group has some capabilities that they are able to achieve over the other group, but ultimately, self-settled IDPs are able to realise more capabilities and thus achieve more functionings overall. Additionally, most of

the capabilities feed into one another, they are basically co-dependent. However, there are some capabilities, such as livelihood and protection, where resolving their conversion factors, can solve majority of the conversion factors getting in the way of IDPs achieving other capabilities. It should be noted however that although camp and self-settled IDPs face different kinds of barriers and choices in realising achieved functionings, self-settled IDPs show more opportunities for individual agency, but could possibly be exposed or ignored if their survival strategies break down. This puts self-settled IDPs at a slightly higher vulnerable state than camp IDPs. Albeit being more restricted, camp IDPs are assured safety against bigger risks/shocks.

### **Group Capabilities**

As seen in Chapter 2, group association is instrumental in enlarging individual capabilities. The empirical data showed that indeed it plays a vital role in how different IDPs achieve basic human capabilities. It is not all capabilities however where individuals can rely on group affiliation for support, but the capabilities where it is possible to do so feed into other capabilities which then helps in supporting individuals. For instance, the capabilities of bodily health and nourishment where groups come together to help each other can be seen to help IDPs not only realise more of those capabilities, but achieve others such as life, and livelihood. Group capability thus plays a key role in capability expansion.

Group capability is more evident in camp IDPs from the many examples shown throughout the empirical chapters. In camps, group affiliation has helped individuals in dire situations. The most noteworthy illustration of group capability that was gathered from the field is the members of EYN camp irrespective of culture coming together as one collective voice to confer their complaints. They summarised the complaints of nearly all the IDPs in the camp in a letter that they sent to several policymakers. Not only does this letter confirm and describe nearly all the issues discussed in this study under each of the capabilities, it also confirmed the important role of group affiliation and group capabilities. Their common identity as Christian IDPs of the same camp is the reason why they put this letter together therefore, it gives them this sense of group affiliation and empowerment. It is not common to see this kind collective engagement among self-settled IDPs, even those who share common identities. This is evidenced in how individualistic their lives are and their constant reference to ‘no one will help you around here’ and ‘all man for himself.’ Whenever self-settled IDPs used either of those phrases, they used it in the context of coming together as a group with a common goal or interest to achieve something. Their lack of collective engagement was also mentioned several times by the representative of Herwa, as well as many camp IDPs who said they could not self-settled because at least in camp, someone from your community will always look out for you. Camp IDPs stated that no one does that in self-settled communities.

We have seen that not a lot of support comes to self-settled IDPs in the form of group affiliation due to their individualistic way of living. Compared to camp IDPs, they do not self-organise themselves or rely on each other for support based on a common identity for a particular purpose. Instead they rely more on their individual social connections for support; either from a friend or a family member. This friend or family member does not have to share any common identity with them (social connections can sometimes be a friend of a friend, or the relative of a friend but in Nigeria people will still refer to such a connection as a relative<sup>16</sup>). What stood out the most from examining group capabilities is that group affiliation does not significantly alter self-settled IDPs ability to realise a lot of capabilities. In fact, if it has been argued so far that self-settled IDPs in general realise more capabilities than camp IDPs, then it means that the role of group capabilities albeit important, is not essential. It can improve the experiences of vulnerable people but escaping poverty and exclusion can be achieved with or without it. Rather, what is essential for all IDPs in order to achieve more capabilities is agency, freedom of movement, social networks, and self-reliance. This is particularly what self-settled IDPs rely on in expanding their capabilities more than camp IDPs.

What the author has found in the process of applying the Capabilities Approach in practice, is the interplay between individual and group capabilities. Individual capabilities are instrumental in helping vulnerable groups escape poverty and exclusion, and so are group capabilities. Thus it is important to give groups a more central role in the CA. This is because group affiliation has been seen to manifest itself and make a difference to individual IDPs in different cases. In Bakassi camp, it presented itself mostly through ethnic affiliation where IDPs of the same ethnicity or LGA often came together to support one another within their community. In EYN camp, it presented itself through religious affiliation and the affiliation of being an IDP in the camp. This goes to show that whether the group identity was previously formed, or newly formed due to the phenomenon they find themselves, group affiliation can have a direct contribution to individuals capabilities particularly when those groups are capable of influencing people's choices. What this finding contributes to the literature is that; while the Capability Approach is about the beings and doings of individuals, groups should be included and be given a more central role when analysing how the capabilities of individuals can be expanded because its role in capability expansion and human well-being is undervalued. Group affiliation can be empowering, and it can contribute to people's wellbeing.

### **8.5 Factors limiting potential for capability expansion**

This section focuses on some of the factors that are limiting the potential for IDPs capability expansion. In doing so, it further highlights what IDPs believe they need in order to overcome obstacles to

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<sup>16</sup> For example, in Nigeria you will often find people refer to their parents friends as their aunty or uncle.



achieving basic human capabilities and ultimately lead the types of life they value. Thus the section highlights some of the contributions of the second half of Research Question 2.

### **Camp IDPs**

For camp IDPs, one of the biggest factors limiting their potential for capability expansion as mentioned earlier is their limited freedom of movement. This conversion factor means that camp IDPs cannot leave the camp when they want and return when they want. This limits their chances of getting work outside of camp or engaging in more than one job. In fact, this study has shown that freedom of movement as a conversion factor has been so significant and has proven to be valuable that it should also be given a more central role and it should be considered an important capability by policymakers. Another factor is camp IDPs lack of knowledge, skill and qualifications for city jobs. Most IDPs were farmers, fishermen, and tradesmen in their LGAs before displacement. There is a need to therefore provide them with training for new skills and new jobs, particularly skills that can enable them to get jobs in the city. Their lack of freedom of movement also makes it harder for them to acquire such training on their own in town. This lack of qualification also presents itself in cases where IDP children or youth cannot be enrolled in school due to their lack of qualifications which they lost during the displacement. A third major factor limiting their potential for capability expansion is lack of livelihood support especially in terms of monetary support (capital). This hinders them from either starting a business, expanding the small-scale businesses some of them already have or to be able to sustain the vocational skills some of them receive in camps. Lastly, other factors that are limiting to camp IDPs include stigma and discrimination. IDPs sometimes do not get jobs because people find it hard to trust them. Other times they pay them less on account of them being IDPs or, in some cases IDPs are also discriminated on account of their cultural background.

### **Self-settled IDPs**

Self-settled IDPs share some similar factors with camp IDPs that also reduce their potential for capability expansion. Some of them are the lack of safety associated with farming and farm jobs, lack of qualifications, and stigma and discrimination. Unlike camp IDPs, they have more freedom to go after jobs in the city, learn and be trained for new skills in the city, and also keep more than one job. This has been a helpful system for them navigating employment. Some of the unique limitations self-settled IDPs face are to do with social connections, and competition in the city. Competition and overcapacity over the same houses, employment, and schools is very high in the city; thus tensions are equally as high. Additionally, those who self-settled on their own without such social connections find it very hard to get ahead, particularly in the job sector. They are also the group of self-settled IDPs that suffer the most discrimination in the job sector on account of their identity. Lastly, a major limitation self-settled IDPs face is the insufficient aid and support from policymakers, which cannot be compared to the support camp IDPs get despite both group of IDPs being entitled to the same aid and support.

### **8.5.1 Role of policymakers in limiting potential for IDPs capability expansion**

Due to the fact that IDPs are displaced within the borders of their home country, they remain entitled to all the rights and guarantees as the citizens and other habitual residents of the country. It is therefore the government's responsibility to cater to all their needs, provide them with immediate and long-term aid, and support them from the moment of displacement until they no longer have any needs associated with their displacement. Other agencies such as international organisations and NGOs assist in making sure this happens successfully. However, it is not uncommon for the government of a country to get overwhelmed with the responsibility of catering to IDPs, neither is it uncommon to see governments who fail to successfully do this. Since the IDPs of Maiduguri are still in the emergency stage of their displacement and new displacements are still happening, it is hard to clearly rule out whether the policymakers are successful at expanding IDPs' capabilities, or whether they have a role in limiting IDPs' capability expansion. The empirical evidence has so far provided information and shown some factors that point towards the latter. These factors are financial, political, and a lack of clear policy direction.

#### **Financial**

Throughout the empirical chapters, it could be seen from both the perspective of the policymakers themselves and from that of the IDPs, a clear lack of funds or situations of misused funds in handling the affairs of IDPs. The displacement has been ongoing since 2014; with its peak period being 2015. Since then till date, policymakers have exhausted a lot of funds in an attempt to control and contain the issue. This has resulted in a lot of money being provided by donors and then spent because the insurgency is still ongoing. Chapter 5 saw many policymakers allude to a lack of funds as the reason why they have not been able to expand, continue, or renew their interventions. On the other hand, a lot of funds have been misused so far also in attempts to control the phenomenon. In some cases a lack of clear policy direction has resulted in a duplication of efforts among policymakers, which has led to money being misused. Similarly, in cases where IDPs were not involved at any capacity in an intervention for them, often policymakers misjudge the needs of IDPs and in such cases end up misusing funds. This type of issue can be seen in Chapter 5 (as discussed by the representatives of SEMA and ministry of RRR), where a failed return was attempted that resulted in IDPs being displaced again. It can also be seen in Chapter 6 with regard to the case where Bakassi camp IDPs were provided with food they were not familiar with and so could not use it. The lack of funds – which is in part due to donors not being able to provide as much funds anymore, and in part due to the misuse of previous funds – clearly limits policymakers ability to provide sufficient aid and support to IDPs. This in turn limits IDPs potential for capability expansion.

#### **Policy direction/formulation**

A lack of clear policy direction and formulation has already been mentioned above as another factor limiting IDPs capability expansion. In Chapter 5 the empirical evidence showed that particularly in the beginning of the emergency efforts, organisations did not have a clear policy direction. This was one of the issues that led to a lot of duplication of efforts as every organisation was just doing what they thought was right or what their donors wanted. This resulted in some interventions or some groups of IDPs being over saturated while others were left unattended. It was not until years of this lack of policy direction being an issue before organisations started to appoint a head such as UNOCHA to oversee all affairs in order to ensure there is a framework that each organisation is following. However, today in Maiduguri you are still likely to find many cases of lack of clear policy direction by policymakers. This issue is also the reason why in Maiduguri you will find some organisations who believe they have gone past the emergency stage of the displacement and are now on to recovery, return and resettlement, while others believe they are still at the emergency stage and are focused on immediate needs alone as demonstrated in Chapter 5. The answers differ depending on which organisation you ask.

### **Political**

Political factors in this case refers to the decisions being made by the government regarding IDPs, which are motivated or influenced by politics or a political gain. The political factor limiting IDPs potential for capability expansion is arguably one of the biggest as it has many dire consequences. For example, it is the main reason why there is a difference in intervention between camp and self-settled IDPs thereby already limiting self-settled IDPs potential for capability expansion. It is the same reason why a political agenda is seen in the discussion with the representative of BSUPD regarding the building of new infrastructure in Maiduguri with the wrong motivation and poor planning. Similarly, the discussion with the headmaster of Bakassi school also brought up issues of political agenda that are at the detriment of IDP children's educational capabilities. The representative of Herwa also reiterates the political motive of some of the initiatives being provided to IDPs. She stated for example, that sometimes politicians or member elects come to camps to 'help' by bringing 50 bags of rice which is extremely insignificant for the 30,000 IDPs in that camp. She added that some of them particularly do this around elections period or after they have been elected so they can be seen on TV and all over newspapers making donations.


It could also be said that political agenda is the same reason why the government of Maiduguri are more focused on IDPs returning to their LGAs to the extent where some important immediate issues are overlooked. Corruption can also be tagged under political factors, which can be seen in cases of diversion of IDPs aid material by corrupt people who are in charge. Lastly, some IDPs have stated that some interventions for IDPs have been down to political gain alluding that some politicians come to ask them what their needs are, not necessarily to provide any suitable relief but simply so that they can be seen doing that for their own political gain as corroborated by the representative of Herwa.

Having noted everything this thesis has covered, including what this chapter has reviewed thus far, it is clear now that a Capabilities Approach has been useful for the study of IDPs. Using this approach has allowed for the study to explore not only IDPs immediate basic needs and resources, but a deeper investigation into the things that improve their welfare and leads them to their most fulfilling life. This matters for the study of IDPs because it offers a well-rounded exploration into their well-being thereby contributing towards policies and interventions that will not only benefit them in the moment, but also in the future – whether they choose to remain in camps, remain self-settled within host communities, or return to their LGAs. Without such well-rounded exploration, the evidence has shown that the chances of IDPs escaping poverty and exclusion remains small. It is this exploration that for example, highlighted freedom of movement and monetary support as the biggest hindrances to IDPs realising their capabilities.

Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that the CA is indeed usable in practice. It did so by first using it as a framework for the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements. Secondly, it considered which capabilities the IDPs value the most and attach high priority to, while also considering which capabilities are relevant to the policy, project, or institution which may be affected directly or indirectly. This is why in order to fully operationalise the CA in this study, both the perspective of the IDPs and the aid providers/policymakers had to be studied. In considering which capabilities mattered most for operationalising the CA, the researcher put forward a selection of 5 primary capabilities and 3 secondary capabilities some of which are basic and others complex but all central to IDPs wellbeing. Therefore, the study evaluated the resources available to IDPs, how they cultivate those resources and convert them into various capabilities, as well as the conversion factors that act as barriers or enablers in the process.

The diagrams below thus bring back the CAIDP from Chapter 2 to demonstrate how it was used in practise by summarising some of the resources the different groups of IDPs get, the different negative or positive conversion factors that hinder or enable their capability expansion, the different capability sets they realise as a result, and the achieved functionings. Figure 27 presents this information for camp IDPs and Figure 28 presents the same for self-settled IDPs. This visibly highlights the key contrasts between the two groups of IDPs.


Figure 27: Summary of CAIDP for camp IDPs



Source: Author, 2022.

From Figure 27 it can be seen that camp IDPs get many resources provided to them, but at the same time they have many negative conversion factors which affect how they convert those resources to a capability set. As a result, camp IDPs end up with very limited achieved functionings. One major factor helping some of them however is the group capability. Group membership is potentially effective at all levels of the CAIDP but it is most significant at ‘the conversion process’ point.

Figure 28: Summary of CAIDP for self-settled IDPs



Source: Author, 2022.

From Figure 28, the opposite of the case with camp IDPs is seen. Self-settled IDPs have limited resources and limited negative conversion factors. This in turn allows them to convert those limited resources into more capability sets and subsequently more achieved functionings. Again, unlike some camp IDPs who rely on group capability, self-settled IDPs rely on social connections and their freedom of movement. Social connections and freedom of movement are also effective at all levels of the CAIDP, but similar to group membership, they are also most significant at ‘the conversion process’ point.

The two figures above (figure 27 and 28) are a literal representation of the capabilities of camp IDPs vs self-settled IDPs in Maiduguri, but it does not stop there. In the literature chapters we have already seen academics such as Diken, Harrell-Bond, Black, and Kibreab describe the characteristics of camps and the camp experience. Others such as Karen Jacobsen, Beyani, and Hovil similarly describe the characteristics of self-settlement. These descriptions of camp settlement and self-settlement are not too dissimilar from the experiences of the IDPs of Borno State. Whether in Borno State or in Ukraine, the camp experience and the self-settled experience are very similar. This suggests that the findings of this study are also very likely going to be similar if repeated in other contexts, therefore making them relevant. Studies such as that of Al-Husban and Adams (2016), which was discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2 are already showing similar findings when they used the CA to try and understand refugee experiences in Jordan. The flexibility of the CA and its multi-dimensional nature in understanding human wellbeing means it can be applied to many different groups of vulnerable people and to different

contexts. It also means the scope of my CAIDP which was presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.4 and above in Figure 27 and 28 can be broadened. For example, when examining other settings, the capabilities in the CAIDP can be broadened and expanded to include more capabilities that are relevant to that particular group or setting. It can also be broadened to give freedom of movement and/or group capabilities its own central role within the CAIDP as these are factors that play an important role in every displacement setting.

### **8.6 Final concluding comments: Role of capability expansion for IDPs**

Capability expansion is achieved when the focus is shifted towards individuals' or groups' capability to achieve the type of life they value. It is arguably one of the surest ways to ensure both camp and self-settled IDPs are living the type of life they value and to help them escape poverty and exclusion. The empirical evidence itself has shown that the IDPs understand what they need in order for them to achieve more capability expansion. These six key words and phrases – freedom of movement, empowerment, self-reliance and resilience, equal opportunity, and durable solutions – were the most talked about in terms of capability expansion by all IDPs whether in camps or self-settled.

Several references have already been made above to IDPs' need for freedom of movement in order to achieve more capability expansion. With regard to empowerment, one of the ways IDPs mentioned being more empowered is through quality education for their children, and skills acquisition for the adults. This is both for children in camps, children who go to public schools, youths who need scholarships in order to enrol in university or polytechnic, and for the teachers themselves who need to be paid better and be provided with the necessary equipment to teach better. IDPs – especially camp IDPs – also made relentless references to how their life was before displacement, doing what they want, providing for themselves and their families. This was interpreted as self-reliance. Meanwhile, camp IDPs references and comparison to self-settled IDPs based on their belief that self-settled IDPs are doing better than them is what was interpreted as camp IDPs wanting to be as self-reliant and resilient as their self-settled counterparts. With regard to equal opportunity, it was evident through the empirical data that opportunities for IDPs are not equal and that self-settled IDPs believe they can expand their capabilities if they were given the same equal opportunity of aid and support as their camp counterparts. Opportunities vary between different camps, between camp and self-settled IDPs, and also between different IDP groups such as ethnic, religious, or gender groups.

All IDPs also believe their capabilities will greatly be expanded through solutions that are durable. A durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs as a result of their displacement. It was mentioned in previous chapters how a lot of the interventions provided for IDPs are such that they help in the moment by targeting their immediate basic needs but in the long term, these interventions are not always sustainable. The empirical evidence has shown that

some of the temporary measures in place at the moment are not enough to achieve durable solutions and IDPs themselves state that interventions need to work for them overtime not just in the interim. According to them, durable solutions can be achieved through durable livelihood solutions.

A major contributor to IDPs capability expansion is thus through the expansion of their livelihoods capabilities. Nearly all IDPs mentioned livelihoods support as their most important need because it will not only help every other capability, but they also recognise it as the thing that will make them more self-reliant and resilient. The livelihood capabilities of IDPs continues to be a major issue because livelihood support is often provided by international organisations and NGOs through small-scale projects. There is no national or strategic approach to livelihood support at any scale for IDPs. One of the ways IDPs livelihood capability can be improved is through providing them with the resources to pursue agricultural production. As seen in Chapter 5, only FAO has a focus on agricultural issues for IDPs and they do not have the capacity to reach every single IDP. Another way is through security and protection so IDPs can safely engage in farming and other labour. Giving camp IDPs the freedom of movement they desperately need is also vital. They cannot spend the required time needed working a job or on farms without this freedom of movement. IDPs can further be supported through delivering vocational training to improve human assets, knowledge, and skills. There is a need for vocational training to reach more IDPs both in camps and self-settled communities in order to improve their human assets, which will inevitably improve their chances of securing livelihood opportunities. In Chapter 7 it was seen that majority of IDPs do not have the skills, experience, or expertise to secure city jobs therefore they end up relying on meagre jobs. Providing them with the training will help them to be more diverse in knowledge and skill, therefore more employable.

An additional way to improve IDPs livelihood capabilities is through increasing access to financial assets by providing grants and loans. Throughout this thesis, it has been seen that both camp and self-settled IDPs have the potential to either start a business or a means of livelihood, or grow their existing businesses, but financial conversion factors continue to act as a major barrier in allowing them to do so. As evidenced in Chapter 7, majority of the camp IDPs stated clearly that with capital, they will be able to realise their livelihood capabilities which in turn will allow them to realise their nourishment capabilities, bodily health capabilities, educational capabilities, and other capabilities as well. This reiterates that primary capabilities can depend on secondary capabilities and vice versa. Furthermore, facilitating social, and physical assets through community mobilizing is also another way of helping IDPs to realise their livelihood capability therefore showing the vital role group affiliation can play. Again, Chapter 7 showed that one of the major differences between camp and self-settled IDPs ability to achieve livelihood capabilities had a lot to do with the different social and physical assets each group possesses. For self-settled IDPs, they are more privy to social assets such as social connections, the agency they have to choose what to do, when to do it or how to do it, and the freedom of movement to



do it. For camp IDPs, they possess some physical assets such as sewing machines from international organisations, but the limitations to their social assets makes it hard for them build their livelihoods. Different groups contend with different issues but with more effective support from policymakers, they can both improve their individual capabilities and improve their collective capabilities as IDPs.

## **8.7 Future research**

The overarching aim of this study has been to explore the needs and experiences of IDPs who have settled in camps in comparison to the IDPs who self-settled among host communities; using the capabilities approach as a framework for analysis. While recognising the limitations of the study, which were discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3), the overall aim itself has been achieved and the research questions have been answered revealing many important under-explored dynamics. Nevertheless, addressing these limitations will provide key issues for future research and researchers to consider which will improve the overall outcome and results of the study. These are addressed below.

1. The Capabilities Approach (CA) is fairly understudied in a context like this one. It has not been applied much in the area of displacement, forced migration, refugees and/or IDPs. It was indicated in Chapter 2 that operationalising the CA is challenging because of its vague and incomplete nature and also because it does not have a definitive list; thus it is difficult to measure the type of life people should value. Still, these same features of the CA are arguably what makes it suitable for a study of this kind because it allowed the author to define the capabilities that the IDPs value at the time based on both the literature and the empirical evidence. However, the specialised language of the CA especially when compared to the context of the study, meant that there was no shared understanding of what the CA meant between the people being interviewed and the author. This made it impossible to directly ask the IDPs to categorically identify what capabilities mattered most to them in order to lead a fulfilled life. A larger scale study would help in validating the findings of this study and making them more generalisable.

2. Due to the nature of the research context, the author's safety was not always guaranteed since the city still experiences sporadic Boko Haram attacks. This meant that the data could only be obtained with a lot of safety measures and further restrictions as described in Chapter 3. Additionally, due to the difficulty in accessing self-settled IDPs and the difficulty in getting them to participate in the study, interviews with them were not as easy to obtain or as detailed as camp IDPs. Although the aim of this study is not to generalise social realities to a population, but rather to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of individuals and to draw out a contrast in the experiences of those individuals, future studies on this issue could expand the scope of the respondents. For instance, they could visit more camps and interview more camp IDPs, similarly they could have a wider scope of self-settled IDPs from different areas. They could also compare between different cities/conflict zones in order to be able

to generalise the findings from this study about the difference in needs and experiences between camp and self-settled IDPs beyond Maiduguri.

3. This study's findings are that, freedom of movement and group affiliation are important determinants of IDPs' capabilities: as these have largely been overlooked in the literature thus far, follow-up work should explore their importance for IDPs' wellbeing elsewhere.



Fatima (the author) with her friend Hajiya (IDP) and her children.

Bakassi Camp, 2019.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I: SEMA access letter



Camp manager  
Camp commander  
Camp coordinator

BO/SEMA/50/1  
18<sup>th</sup> July, 2019

**FATIMA MOHAMMED**  
**PHD RESEARCH WORK**  
**UNIVERSITY OF SHEILFIED**

Reference to your letter dated on 18/7/2019 I am hereby directed to inform you that the agency have been satisfied with the purpose and grand access to the above mention name to conduct PHD research on displacement to the camp vs displacement to the city: comparative study of IDP capabilities in Bakassi Camp.

In view of the above all camp managers camps commander and camp coordinator to comply and render the any necessary recognition and assistance please.

**Ibrahim Usman Alkali**  
**PEO**  
**For: executive chairman**

website: [www.bosema.gov.ng](http://www.bosema.gov.ng)

## **APPENDIX II: Interview guide for camp IDPs**

- 1: When did you arrive at this camp?/ Where did you come from?
- 2: How long have you been displaced for? / Is this your first stop after displacement?
- 3: What was your previous employment before displacement? / Were you in school before displacement?
- 4: How would you describe life at camp? / How would you describe your day to day life/activities in camp?
- 5: Did you have an option whether to live here or with host communities? / What made you choose here? / How many people do you live with here? Family size and orientation? Head of family?
- 6: Do you feel protected in this camp? / Would you say you feel more protected here than back at home?
- 7: What kind of needs did you have in this camp when you first arrived?
- 8: Have all your needs been met, or do you still have them now? If yes, give me an example of a time when your needs were met in this camp? If no, what kind of needs do you still have?
- 9: Are you normally/often consulted about your needs and how to best meet them?
- 10: How do camp authorities consult you/provide you with information?
- 11: Are you normally able to participate in decisions about how to address your protection and assistance needs?
- 12: In what ways do you participate and how often?
- 13: What do you have to say about access to sufficient food?
- 14: How about access to other things like health facilities and medication? Water and hygiene?
- 15: Are you able to access work or school? If yes tell me what that is like and if you think it has helped your stay in camp. If no tell me why and how it affects your life and your stay in camp.
- 16: How about freedom of movement? Does that affect you in any way? How?
- 17: Do you face any form of discrimination in this camp? If yes, give me an example.
- 18: Do you sometimes feel like the men/women get better support than the men/women? Or get better treatment?
- 19: Do you sometimes feel like the members of other communities or religion get better support or treatment than you? Give me an example?
- 20: Do you think any group of IDPs prosper more than the other groups?
- 21: What else can you tell me about discrimination or unfair treatment that goes on in this camp?

- 22: Is there anything that is distressing or traumatising to you? / What would you say is most distressing or traumatizing to you?
- 23: Does it affect your daily life or your day to day activities? Explain how. Have you ever told the officials about this? What has been done about it?
- 24: How about peace in the camp and peace of mind. What can you tell me about that?
- 25: On a scale of 1-10 how satisfied are you in this camp? – Explain why you chose that number.
- 26: On a scale of 1-10 how satisfied are you with the way this camp is managed by officials? – Explain why you chose that number.
- 27: Do you think it is easier or better to be a camp IDP than a self-settled IDP? Why?
- 28: How do you think your experiences differ?
- 29: What are some difficulties you face here that you think you might not face if you lived outside of camp as a self-settled IDP?
- 30: Do you think you have opportunities for a better life in this camp?
- 31: If you were to picture a better life, what would it look like?
- 32: What do you think you need right now to achieve that?
- 33: What do you think the future holds for you?
- 34: When everything settles and is safe again, would you continue to live here or return back to your home?

### **APPENDIX III: Interview guide for self-settled IDPs**

- 1: When did you arrive here? / Where did you come from?
- 2: How long have you been displaced for? / Is this your first stop after displacement?
- 3: What was your previous employment before displacement? / Were you in school before displacement?
- 4: How would you describe life as an IDP living with hosts? / How would you describe your day to day life/activities here?
- 5: What made you choose to settle here instead of camps? Did you have a choice? Who do you live with? Family size and orientation? Head of family?
- 6: Do you feel protected living here? Do you feel more protected here than at home or in camps?
- 7: What kind of needs did you have when you first arrived? How do you meet those needs?
- 8: Have all your needs been met, or do you still have them now? If yes, give me an example of when those needs were met. If no, what kind of needs do you still have?
- 9: How do you support yourself/you and your family?
- 10: Do you live alone or with others? Do you live in a rented house/accommodation? Are you able to afford living here?
- 11: Do you receive any support/ assistance from agencies/NGO's/government or from the host community?
- 12: Would you say you have access to sufficient food, healthcare facilities and medication, public services, water and hygiene?
- 13: How about access to work and education? Do you work/are you in school? Was it difficult getting a job since you moved here? Are you content with the job? /the education you are receiving.
- 14: How about freedom of movement? Does it affect you in any way? How?
- 15: Do you feel safe being an IDP in this community or do you sometimes feel discriminated? Explain.
- 16: Do you sometimes feel like it is easier for others to prosper than it is for some? E.g. is it easier for men or women to prosper here? Is it easier for some ethnicities/religions to prosper here?
- 17: Do you feel like any group of IDPs prospers more than the other group?
- 18: What else can you tell me about discrimination or unfair treatment that goes on in your community?
- 19: Is there anything that is distressing or traumatising to you? What would you say is most distressing or traumatizing to you?
- 20: Does it affect your daily life or your day to day activities? Explain how. Have you ever told anyone like any officials about this? What has been done about it?

- 21: How about peace of mind. What can you tell me about that?
- 22: On a scale of 1-10 how satisfied are you living here? – Explain why you chose that number.
- 23: On a scale of 1-10 how welcoming were the host community?
- 24: Do you think it is easier or better to be a self-settled IDP than a camp IDP? Why?
- 25: What are some difficulties you face here that you think you might not face if you lived in camp?
- 26: How do you think agencies/NGO's/ government can support and make your life better you as a self-settled IDP?
- 27: If you were to picture a better life, what would it look like?
- 28: What do you need right now to achieve that?
- 29: What do you think the future holds for you?
- 30: When everything settles and is safe again, would you continue to live here or return back to your original home?



#### **APPENDIX IV: Interview guide for policy makers**

- 1: Can I start by asking you to describe your specific job role within this agency?
- 2: Do you work directly or indirectly with IDPs?
- 3: Can you please describe the role of your agency in the intervention of IDPs?
- 4: Roughly how many IDPs would you say your agency deals with? Are they all in camps?
- 5: How many camps does your agency work with? Can you name the particular camps?
- 6: Where are the other IDPs you support based? Roughly how many IDPs do you support there?
- 7: Would you say IDPs are comfortable/satisfied? If yes, why do you think they are comfortable/satisfied? If no, why do you think that?
- 8: Do you think the needs of IDPs are being met in camps or outside camps?
- 9: If yes, why do think their needs are being met? If no, why don't you think their needs are being met? Give me some examples of their needs that are being met.
- 10: Would you say IDPs are provided with sufficient food/healthcare services and medication/WASH?
- 11: Would you say that IDPs have access to work/education? Are they provided with public services that make work/education possible?
- 13: Would you say that IDPs are provided with sufficient resources and activities to live a fulfilling life? Or would you say they are deprived of resources and activities to live a fulfilling life?
- 14: Tell me about some of the policies or strategies your agency/organisation have created or tried to implement for the IDPs.
- 15: Was this for camp IDPs or other IDPs or for both?
- 16: Would you say some or any of those policies have been successful?
- 17: If yes, which have been successful and why? If no, what are some of those policies and why have they been unsuccessful?
- 18: How would you describe the government's level of involvement in your agency/organisation? I.e. has it been poor, average, satisfactory or great?
- 19: How have they been involved? Funding? Backing? Political influence or other? How would you describe other?
- 20: How would you describe the role of the president/Federal governments involvement in your organisation and in the plight of IDPs?
- 21: Have you had contributions or backings from private individuals? If so what kind?
- 24: Do you think IDPs or groups of IDPs go through any form or discrimination? E.g. gender, ethnic, religious, age, other?

23: Are there any groups of IDPs that prosper more than others? Which? Why?

24: How do you think your agency has improved the lives of IDPs? How do you think your agency can further enrich their lives?

25: What agencies have done or what support they have provided in all the areas of your capabilities: Food/Water Sanitation and Hygiene, education, public services, employment and health services, gender equality and social-wellbeing (i.e. feelings of inclusion, satisfaction and lack of discrimination).

Is this for camps or self-settled IDPs

26: Do you think it is better for IDPs to be in camps or self-settled?

27: What would you say are the consequences of having IDPs in camps for a very long time? And what are the consequences of having self-settled IDPs in host communities?

28: Where would you say government's / international organisations / NGO's have gone wrong in terms of response?

## APPENDIX V: Participant Information Sheet



The  
University  
Of  
Sheffield.

### Participant Information Sheet

#### Study title

Displacement to the camp vs Displacement to the city: a comparative study of Internally Displaced People's needs and experiences in Maiduguri, North Eastern Nigeria.

#### Invitation paragraph

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

#### What is the purpose of the study?

The purpose of the study is to examine the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) of Maiduguri, Borno State. My study seeks to compare the experiences of camp IDPs with that of self-settled urban IDPs in Maiduguri. The aim of doing this is to understand their different capabilities (this means to understand if/how IDPs are fulfilled in their lives) and also to understand their different vulnerabilities (this means to understand the things that are harmful to IDPs and the things that are stopping them from being fulfilled). This will benefit in understanding better ways of addressing the needs of different IDPs and help them to escape poverty and exclusion. To maximize the policy relevance of the study, it will explore the role of policymakers in supporting these different kinds of IDPs.

#### Why have I been invited to participate?

You have been invited to take part in this study because you fall under the category of an IDP, a policy maker or someone whose job includes supporting IDPs. I will also invite many other policy makers and IDPs to take part in the same way I have invited you.

#### Do I have to take part?

It is entirely your decision whether or not you want to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to give your permission to take part. This will either be by signing a consent form or by allowing me to record you saying you give permission. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time during the research without giving a reason by simply telling me, the researcher, that you no longer wish to participate. You can find my contact information in the last page of this document.

#### What will happen to me if I take part?

If you decide to take part and have signed the consent form, you will be given a one week notice to take part in a short interview. We will agree on a preferred location for you for the interview. It should last approximately 1 hour, and each respondent will only need to participate once. All interviews will only cover topics surrounding IDPs needs and experiences.

For policy makers, the interview aims to ask you some closed ended questions such as "do you work directly or indirectly with IDPs?" It will also ask some open-ended questions that will require in-depth discussion such as "tell me about some of the policies or strategies your organization have created or tried to implement for IDPs."

For IDPs, the interview will also contain some closed ended questions like “How long have you been living in this camp for?” and some open-ended questions like “How would you describe your day to day life at camp?”

The interview will refrain from making you feel uncomfortable in any way. The interviews will be recorded using a recorder so the researcher can refer back to the information. The recorder will have a password so all the information will be kept safe and secure. The audio recordings of your interviews made during this research will be transcribed into writing and will only be used for analysis in my thesis. When needed for conferences or lectures this will also be in written transcripts and not in audio recordings for the purpose of maintaining your anonymity. For further anonymity, one else other than me, the researcher, will have access to the audio recordings and no other use will be made of the transcripts without your consent.

#### **What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

Whilst there are a no immediate benefits for the people participating in the project, it is hoped that this research will benefit me in gathering information for my PhD study, which will ultimately advance our knowledge and understanding of the issues discussed. The answers you give could also aid in government policy formulations and appropriate responses regarding the issue.

#### **What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?**

There are only minimal disadvantages involved with taking part. One of them is the time that is required from you. The other is the distress that comes from answering questions around your displacement since this is a vulnerable situation which can be disheartening. As the interviewer, I will seek to be sensitive to any potential causes of distress and if necessary, allow you to take a break or even refrain from answering certain questions that may be too distressing for you.

#### **Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?**

All information collected from you will be kept confidential and will only be accessible in its early stages to my supervisors. Firstly, your name does not have to be mentioned, any information collected from you can be kept anonymous. This means your personal details such as name, phone number, address and email address will all be anonymous. Secondly, all interviews will be kept in a password-secure file. Lastly, all information collected is strictly for the use of research only (this is explained further below and again in the consent form).

#### **What should I do if I want to take part?**

If you want to take part in the study, please sign the consent form which is attached to this participant information sheet, take the participant information sheet out and keep it for your own discretion and return the consent form to the researcher. Alternatively, you can let me know and I can make note of your verbal consent. An interview date will be set with you in due time.

#### **What will happen to the results of the research?**

The results of the research will be used in my thesis for a doctorate degree. They may also be used in publications, reports, webpages and other research outputs with your permission. Due to the nature of the research, it is likely that other authorized researchers may want to use the information collected in publications or reports, but this will only happen with your consent for your data to be shared and it will still remain anonymized. You will not be named in any of these outputs unless you specifically request this. After the interviews, all physical evidence of identifiable personal information will be deleted or destroyed once it is clear that it is no longer needed for the research leaving only the anonymized translation of transcripts which will still be kept in a safe and secure manner.

#### **Who is the data controller?**

The University of Sheffield will act as the Data Controller for this study. This means that the University is responsible for looking after your information and using it properly.

#### **Who is organizing and funding the research?**

I am organizing, conducting and funding the research as a doctorate researcher of the department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Sheffield.

**Who has ethically reviewed the study?**

This project has been ethically approved via the University of Sheffield's Ethics Review Procedure, as administered by the department of urban studies and planning.

**What if something goes wrong and I wish to complain about the research?**

If you wish to complain about the research, you may contact me, the researcher. Alternatively, if your complain involves the way you were treated by the researcher or something serious occurring then you may contact the supervisors or the head of the department. All contact details are listed below.

**Contact**

For further information or questions please contact:

**The Researcher:**

Fatima Mohammed

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**The Supervisors:**

Dr. Tom Goodfellow

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**The Head of Department:**

Prof. Malcolm Tait

Urban Studies and Planning Department

Telephone: +44114 222 6919

Email: [m.tait@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:m.tait@sheffield.ac.uk)

**Thank you so much for taking the time to read this information sheet. Looking forward to hearing from you. 15<sup>th</sup> April 2019**

## APPENDIX VI: Consent form



### Consent form

#### **Displacement to the camp vs Displacement to the city: a comparative study of Internally Displaced People's needs and experiences in Maiduguri, North Eastern Nigeria.**

<i>Please tick the appropriate boxes</i>	Yes	No
<b>Taking Part in the Project</b>		
I have read and understood the project information sheet dated 15/04/2019 (If you will answer No to this question please do not proceed with this consent form until you are fully aware of what your participation in the project will mean.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I agree to take part in the project. I understand that taking part in the project will include a short interview which will be audio recorded and used for a doctorate research.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I can withdraw from the study at any time; I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part and there will be no adverse consequences if I choose to withdraw.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>How my information will be used during and after the project</b>		
I understand my personal details such as name, phone number, address and email address etc. will not be revealed to people outside the project.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand and agree that this is strictly for research only, but this means my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs. I understand that I will not be named in these outputs unless I specifically request this.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand and agree that other authorised researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand and agree that other authorised researchers may use my data in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I give permission for the interviews that I provide to be deposited in the University of Sheffield data repository so it can be used for future research and learning	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>So that the information you provide can be used legally by the researchers</b>		
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials generated as part of this project to The University of Sheffield.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Name of Participant

Signature

Date

Name of Researcher

Signature

Date

#### **Project contact details for further information:**

##### **Researcher:**

Fatima Mohammed: [fzmohammed1@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:fzmohammed1@sheffield.ac.uk)

##### **The Supervisors:**

Dr. Tom Goodfellow [t.goodfellow@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:t.goodfellow@sheffield.ac.uk)

Dr. Glyn Williams: [glyn.williams@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:glyn.williams@sheffield.ac.uk)

##### **The Head of Department:**

Prof. Malcolm Tait

Urban Studies and Planning Department

Telephone: +44114 222 6919

Email: [m.tait@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:m.tait@sheffield.ac.uk)

**APPENDIX VII: Letter from IDPs to policymakers**

15 December 2017

The UNHCR High Commissioner, Mr. Filippo Grandi;

The Zonal Director of the National Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Mohammed Kanar;

The Executive Chairman of the State Emergency Management Agency Engr. Ahmed Satomi;

The UNHCR Director for Africa Bureau, Mr. Valentin Tapsosa;

The UNHCR Regional Director, Ms. Liz Ahua;

The UNHCR Representative for Nigeria and ECOWAS, Ms. Angele Dikongue Atanagana;

The Head of Sub-Office Maiduguri, Mr. Cesar Tshilombo;

All Head of Departments of UNHCR Maiduguri;

All UNHCR partners in Maiduguri SAHEL, CCEPI, GICASSI, BAM-COPI

My fellow IDPs and all protocols observed.

It is a great pleasure and honour to stand before all of you here particularly our highly respected and amiable guest, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the person of Mr. Filippo Grandi who, with his tremendous effort, tight and busy schedules of work, is here with us to listen and share his precious time with us.

I must say that we are all wholeheartedly to have your presence amidst us. My Name is Ibrahim Kulkwa from CAN Centre IDP Camp and I am standing before you on behalf of all the IDP Camps and host communities here in Maiduguri.

Let me start by showing our gratitude and sincere appreciation to UNHCR who without them, me and my fellow IDPs will not be here standing before you. UNHCR gave us a meaningful life, they gave us a purpose and they restored and gave us hope when all we had is nothing. From giving us shelter, non-food items, livelihood support, water, sanitation and hygiene to mention but few, all we have to say is "May God bless all of you for your kind and sincere service to humanity and may God give you the ability to do more".

However, as IDPs, we all have problems one way or the other and below are some of the problems we are currently facing at our various locations of camps



### **FOOD ITEMS (FEEDING)**

The food being given to us by NEMA/SEMA and other organizations is not adequate enough to sustain us up to a month time, and mostly it has not been given to us a monthly basis as initially done, but rather 40 days time or so. We plead with UNHCR and other organizations to look into this plight and help us.

### **SHELTER**

I must commend UNHCR for providing us with shelter, without UNHCR majority of us would have been homeless. We are indeed grateful. But still, we need more shelters as some of the IDPs are still coming in; some shelters are affected by termites and are therefore need renovation and reconstruction.

### **NON-FOOD ITEMS (NFLs)**

As you are all aware, the cold season (harmattan) is here. We need more NFIs as the ones given to us upon our arrival at our various camps are old, worn out or out of use. NFIs like blankets, Mats, Vaseline, Slippers, Soap, Detergent, Kitchen sets, lanterns, buckets or jerrycans. We need UNHCR to look at this issue and come to our rescue.

### **PSYCHOSOCIAL**

As a result of the insurgency, many of us experienced the activities of the insurgents and have been affected one way or the other; from mental ill health diseases to trauma and various cases of psychosocial problems. Some of us need counselling, informal education for the adults, recreational activities for the children and sensitization on personal hygiene practices among others.

### **LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT**

Before we found ourselves here, many of us were doing business. Now we are displaced and have no access to livelihood support, UNHCR have supported us with livelihood like knitting manual and machine, tailoring, bag and shoe making, to mention but few. We are indeed very grateful. Some of us are ready and eligible to start some business but we have no capital or any means to start up the business we are pleading with UNHCR to do more of this because it cushion our hardship. Please help us to have livelihood support in every IDP camp and host community.



## HEALTH

When it comes to health, we are indeed facing real problems with the camp clinic and officials. One major problem we are facing regarding our health emergency response team/ambulance during the night time for emergency purpose. The drugs usually given to us are usually not prescribed very well. No syrup to the children, both children and adults are given tablets. We urge with UNHCR to look into that.

## WASH

Access to water, sanitation and hygiene in some of the camps is also not very good. The main problem regarding to WASH is maintenance. Some of the boreholes in our camps are solar powered, and now the cold season harmattern is here, so no adequate sunlight to power the borehole, some are under maintenance and others do not function well. Some are very far away from our tents, we have to trek far to fetch water. Some of our toilets are filled up and so we need new ones. Also we need sanitation equipments in order to tidy up and keep our environments clean at all times.

## EDUCATION

When it comes to education, we have several concerns. Among others are:

- ❖ Lack of teachers
- ❖ No qualified teachers
- ❖ No schools in the host communities
- ❖ No plan for secondary and tertiary education
- ❖ Need for solar energy in schools
- ❖ Need for school feeding
- ❖ Literacy for the adults

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Some security agents in camps supposed to protect IDPs tend to violate their right. There is a need for more legal support to IDPs.

### CONCLUSION

If we are to state our problems, time will not permit us but in conclusion Mr. High Commissioner, we are very grateful for your coming to Maiduguri. A million of thanks for your presence and discussions with us today, may God continue to bless you.