Protest never goes out of style: the German Green Party and the gentrification of protest

Exploring the political style of the German Greens through an ethnography of party members in 2018/2019

Chantal Michaela Sullivan-Thomsett

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds

School of Languages, Cultures and Societies

School of Politics and International Studies

May 2022

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Chantal Michaela Sullivan-Thomsett to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Acknowledgements

Abstract

In many Western democracies, protest has become a normalised form of individual and collective political expression, even for political parties. Progressive political parties support, 'sponsor', and participate in street demonstrations and encourage and mobilise their party members to turn out. Yet, existing scholarly explanations for the interaction of institutional and extra-institutional politics often underplay the role protest plays for mainstream(ing) or established progressive political parties. Previous research focuses on conceptual frameworks which capture either party organisational types and structures, or party-internal ideological shifts. Indeed, such approaches underexplore the legacy of protest or social movement ancestry within a political party and ignore how this interaction of protest and party politics is experienced by individual party members. Using the contemporary German Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) as a case study, this thesis remedies this omission by analysing party and protest interactions as part of a broader political style I term 'gentrified protest'. I apply the analytical framework of gentrified protest to data generated through interpretative ethnographic methods to demonstrate the ways that the German Greens in 2018/2019 exhibited the political style of gentrified protest. As a result, this analysis shows how the everyday activism of Green Party members still involves interaction with protest. These are demonstrated through party participation at non-violent, tame street demonstrations or the performance of support online. Protest remains an authentic feature within the German Green brand, highlighted by the concerted effort to maintain links with the party's past during a rebrand of party principles. Party members, and their role as multi-level marketers performing personalised political communication in party and protest activism, legitimise and reproduce the party's participatory and democracy-focused political style. However, this aesthetic of participation and democracy is not always experienced in reality, reminding scholars to interrogate 'official' party understandings and conceptualisations of party image, processes, and activism.

Table of Contents

Table of Images

Table of Tables

Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
BLM	Black Lives Matter
BUND	German Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
EGPM	European Green Party members' survey
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FFF	Fridays for Future
G20	The Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
LGBTQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender plus other sexual identities
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PEGIDA	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party of Indonesia
R2G	Red-Red-Green or SPD-The Left-Green coalition
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SÖS	Social, Ecological, Stuttgart
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SSW	South Schleswig Voters' Association
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left - Progressive Alliance Greece
UN	United Nations
ZDF	Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen

Chapter 1 Introduction: Considering the role of protest for contemporary progressive political parties

1.1 Introduction

This introductory chapter outlines the context, research questions, findings and structure of this thesis in which I apply my original analytical framework of 'gentrified protest' to an interpretive ethnographic study on German Green Party membership between October 2018 and June 2019. There are three fronts of innovation presented in this thesis. Firstly, unlike the typical approach of membership surveys to study party members, the focus of my project was the individual lived experience of party membership. Using participant observation, semi-structured interviews and document analysis, I generated situated, contextual knowledge on the underexplored individual construction of party membership (Gauja, 2015). Secondly, the case selected for study, the German Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*), has recently been somewhat neglected in contemporary studies of German politics, particularly within English language publications. Therefore, my work here provides a necessary update to our academic knowledge on the contemporary German Greens, particularly during a period of unprecedented success.

The third and most significant contribution this thesis makes is to the conceptualisation and understanding of the interaction between institutional and extra-institutional politics. My original analytical framework of *gentrified protest* identifies and examines how protest is integrated into an embodied and aesthetic political style that is legitimised and reproduced by party members. Whilst the application of this framework in this thesis is solely on the German Greens, this framework and the findings of this thesis have a significant impact on our understanding of left and progressive politics and political activism.

This chapter first sets out the context in which I have undertaken this research and what this approach contributes to existing knowledge on party-movement interactions, party members and the German Greens. I then briefly outline my methodological approach and novel analytical framework and the reasons I chose these approaches. Thereafter, I introduce the main findings and the contribution the thesis makes to literature in political science and political sociology. I then close the chapter by summarising the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Research context and background

1.2.1 External context

When I began this thesis in October 2017, Brexit meant Brexit, and Article 50 had already been triggered earlier that year. The world was attempting to come to terms with Donald Trump sitting in the White House. These developments, amongst others, had led to an increased focus on populism in the media and scholarly work, including the discussions on a new cleavage of 'integration/demarcation' (Hutter, 2014). Most relevant to this thesis, Germany's federal election on 24th September 2017 was historic in multiple ways. The Christian democratic CDU/CSU and social democratic SPD obtained their worst results in a federal election, and the right-wing AfD entered the *Bundestag* for the first time as the third largest party. Yet, the German Greens, the party under study in this thesis, were the smallest opposition parliamentary party in Bundestag with 8.9 percent, a mere increase of 0.5 percent in their vote share than in 2013.[1] These results marked the start of my doctoral research.

---

[1] Within German politics, performance of parties in federal elections and many other elections is tracked via the *Zweitstimme* (second vote). This is the proportional, list vote of political parties and thus corresponds to vote share. This is interchangeably referred to throughout this thesis as either vote share, list vote or *Zweitstimme*.

However, as is evident from political and societal events over the last five years, a lot can change in two years. In May 2019, towards the end of my fieldwork research in Germany, the Greens were the second largest party in the European Elections in Germany with 20.5 percent, almost double their performance in 2014. In a serendipitous coincidence of conducting field research at the right-time, this thesis provides a snapshot of October 2018 - June 2019 in German politics. This phenomenon was considered by many as surprising, considering the substantial coverage in both domestic and international media outlets.

As I finish writing this thesis in early 2022, it is only more evident that a lot can change in two years. The UK, the state in which I am writing this thesis, has brexited and is moving from the global coronavirus pandemic to an endemic, and the Western, vaccinated world is beginning to cautiously return to a 'new normal'. As such, my research marks a pre-pandemic snapshot of physical grassroots political activism at a time when most people were unfamiliar with the video conferencing software Zoom and its Microsoft equivalent, Teams. German politics has undergone a considerable shift, too. This is not only evident in its approach to dealing with the pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also the end of the era of Angela Merkel, who stood down from politics in December 2021 following the 2021 *Bundestag* elections. She has been replaced by a so-called *Ampel* (or traffic light) coalition comprised of the SPD, Greens, and the fiscally liberal FDP and led by chancellor Olaf Scholz from the SPD. After 16 years, the Greens were finally back in federal government after a historically high vote share of 14.8% as well as increasing their previous one direct mandate to sixteen, one for every year they had been in federal opposition. However, this result was interpreted as a disappointing performance in their first election campaign competing for the top job in the Chancellery with their candidate Annalena Baerbock.

1.2.2 Research background

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, protest appears to feature more prominently in societies across the world. Occupy and the so-called Arab Spring were loosely organised, grassroots movements that had the potential to change the world, enhanced by their utilisation of technology. Anti-austerity movements in southern Europe were gaining seats in parliaments and governments. Police brutality against minorities in the US and revelations of serial sexual abusers spawned the global social justice movements of #MeToo, #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName. The seismic shocks of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have also unleashed a protest-heavy backlash from their opponents. Most recently, the Fridays for Future climate strikes have raised climate protection up the political agenda once again, and the restrictions and vast vaccination efforts during the pandemic have been protested against by a small, yet loud, minority. This increasing presence of protest often delivers a palpable feeling of a world in flux.

However, at the same time, a feeling of business-as-usual also prevails in society, despite protests to the contrary. After Greek voters in the referendum rejected the EU's bailout conditions in 2015, the SYRIZA-led government still accepted austerity measures. Despite continued mobilisations against them, the far-right AfD have entered local and national parliaments in Germany. There is a sense that protest is *normal*. In Germany, a country which proudly professes its 'peaceful revolution' of demonstrations which have been historicised as contributing to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, protest seems a conventional part of contemporary society (Rucht, 2003). German single-issue protests are often supported by one or more political parties, particularly on the left (Borbáth and Hutter, 2021a; 2021b). Unlike movement parties, Green and labour parties in various countries have tended to take part in less radical political action on the streets and have diversified party issues in order to broaden their appeal (della Porta et al., 2017; Peña,

2021). Green parties especially have diversified issues as their original innovative, ecological policy stances have been absorbed by their political competitors.

In the case of the German Greens, there have been several main threads of academic research since the early 2000s. Following their 2005 exit from federal government, their governing record and increasingly promiscuous stance towards coalition partners in state governments have been at the forefront of scholarly inquiry (Cooper, A., 2014; Hörisch and Wurster, 2017a; Hough et al., 2007; Jungjohann, 2016; Kronenberg, 2016; Lees, C., 2000; Steinert and Yordanova, 2016; Switek, 2017b; Weckenbrock, 2017). This sits alongside continued reporting and analytical debriefs on Green federal electoral performance and perceived success and failure (Bürgin and Oppermann, 2020; Lees, C., 2018; Probst, 2011; 2015; 2020; Rüdig, 2012; 2014; 2018; Schramme and Siller, 2006). Aside from elections and governing, research on the Green party organisation has continued to analyse their programmatic and ideological diversification (Güllner, 2012; Mende, 2012; Price-Thomas, 2016; Richter, 2016; Talshir, 2003), or lack thereof (Blühdorn, 2009; Richter, 2016; Jachnow, 2013; Richter, 2013). Additionally, as the Greens have surpassed their 30th and 40th anniversaries, there have been some notable retrospectives examining their contribution to German politics and society (Markovits and Klaver, 2015; Hager, 2019; Stifel, 2018). All of these strands of research, including the retrospectives which touch upon the Greens position in German political culture, do not sufficiently take into account their contemporary political style and the party's relationship to protest.

Furthermore, research which focuses on Green Party members is far more marginal within the literature. German Green Party members are generally studied in comparative cross-national studies either with Green Parties (Botetzagias and van Schuur, 2012; Kitschelt, 1989; Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020),

or comparative studies of different German political parties (Bukow, 2013; Nonnenmacher and Spier, 2014; Spier et al., 2011; Spier and Klein, 2015; Spier, 2019). These comparative studies tend to focus on identifying the social profiles of party members or analysing the incentives they had for joining (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002). In comparative Green studies, party member attitudes to traditional Green Party family values and organisational forms are investigated, such as how members value grassroots democracy (Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020).

In the few studies in which German Green members are the specific research focus, these have concentrated on either the party's use of digital tools (Gerl et al., 2016; Thuermer et al., 2018) or how German Green members in Baden-Wurttemberg believe their party should function when they are the coalition leader in state government (Dürr, 2018). There is thus a lack of research that highlights the lived experience of German party members, and of German Green party members in particular. Crucially, it is part of a wider lack within party membership studies of how individuals perceive and construct the concept of party membership, which are separate from the official party and legal constructions of party membership (Gauja, 2015). Gauja and van Haute have argued that ethnographic studies of party members could help to bridge this gap (Gauja, 2015; van Haute and Gauja, 2015). My study directly addresses this gap and provides both an original framework and fresh empirical data on the role and experience of party members in a party as a communicator of the political style of gentrified protest.

More significantly, existing approaches to analysing the overlap between extra-institutional protest politics and institutional party politics ignore the aesthetic and stylistic role protest can play for a progressive political party. Conceptual interaction of social movements and political parties has been focused on creating further ideal party types to account for their distinctive party organisational features or ideological goals; 'Social movement partyism'

(Almeida, 2010), 'movementisation' of 'hollow parties' (Cohen, 2019), 'party-driven movements' (Muldoon and Rye, 2020), 'movement factions' (Dennis, 2020), and 'militant' and 'activist' parties (Peña, 2021) are just some of the more recent attempts to explain party-movement interactions outside of the emergence of new parties. Parties which originate out of social movements or borrow their organisational form are instead captured by the established concept created by Herbert Kitschelt (2006): a 'movement party'.

In the specific context of the German Greens, this conceptual exclusion in movement-party interactions has only been intensified by a pre-2018 media and academic narrative of a professionalised Green party in crisis due to its detachment from its movement party roots (Stifel, 2018). This has precluded sustained examination of continued interaction between protest and the German Greens, with the notable exception of Steffen Blings' (2020) work on the programmatic alignment of movement and party politics. There is thus a conceptual and empirical gap in our understanding of the interaction of protest and party politics in established, institutionalised parties, such as the German Greens, how this manifests in member activity and perceptions, as well as the aesthetic role it plays for party identity.

Whilst these conceptual debates are important in understanding the interactions between institutional and extra-institutional politics, the aesthetic and experiential benefits to political parties of incorporating protest politics into their political style is hidden by these analytical approaches. Thus, gentrified protest's strength is in its ability to generate a diverse data set through ethnographic methods to capture this visual and experiential role of protest politics in a progressive party's political style. Furthermore, it clarifies the close links between progressive parties' desired branding and aesthetics of democracy, movement and participation with the functional use of party members as 'personal political communication' (Nielsen, 2012). In so doing, it can understand how the political style is communicated and reproduced in all

three party faces: the party in central office, the party in public office, and, most importantly for this political style, the party on the ground.

1.3 Research Questions, Aim and Objectives

This thesis presents the research project and findings of an interpretive ethnography of German Green Party membership between October 2018 and June 2019. The aim of this study is to apply my novel analytical framework of gentrified protest to explore the overlapping arenas of institutional and extra-institutional politics within a mainstream(ing) party, the German Greens, from the perspective of grassroots party members. Based on the gaps identified in the research context above, I have three concrete research questions that I answer in this thesis:

1. What role does protest play within the contemporary German Green Party?
2. How is protest and party activism experienced and conceived by grassroots party members?
3. How can the term 'gentrification' account for the interactions of contemporary progressive parties and protest?

Using an interpretive ethnographic approach consisting of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and document and media analysis, the first objective of this doctoral research project is to provide a rich, detailed, and qualitative analysis of Green Party membership that consists of strong voices from Greens at the grassroots, unlike the standard political science approach of party member surveys. In so doing, I explore the lived experience of Green Party members and their understanding and experiences of party activism and protest. I achieve this by using an interpretive epistemology concerned with creating knowledge of specified complexity in context. Such

an epistemology recognises that one cannot easily divide the world into categories and therefore stresses the importance of lived experience. This interpretive epistemology is best fulfilled by using the ethnographic methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, recruitment of interview participants from my interactions in fieldwork, as well as the analysis of party documents, social media and media articles. My approach is strongly influenced by the approach to interpretive social science of Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow (2012) and of the examples of political ethnography found in the works of Lauren Joseph et al. (2007), Edward Schatz (2009b), Myron Aronoff and Jan Kubik (2014) and Lisa Wedeen (2002; 2009; 2010).

The second objective seeks to clarify how protest and party interact within the contemporary German Greens at a local, regional, and national level using the ethnographic data collected. Not only is this objective concerned in understanding the context of the local in individual perspectives of Green Party interactions with protest, it deliberately explores how individual party members perceive and contextualise the movement ancestry, which is well documented in the scholarly literature, within contemporary German Green party activism. This objective was supported by my multi-sited approach to fieldwork, where ethnographies of three months were conducted in the following three cities:

- Berlin: 1st October 2018 – 21st December 2018
- Kiel: 6th January 2019 – 31st March 2019
- Stuttgart: 1st April 2019 – 30th June 2019

The third and most significant objective of this project is the construction and application of the concept of *gentrification* to analyse and test the interaction of institutional or party politics with protest by contemporary progressive parties and their party members. Thus, I constructed the concept and

framework of *gentrified protest*, a form of political style based on the work of Benjamin Moffitt (2016). The creation of a new conceptual framework to analyse political activism is, I argue, necessary to highlight the aesthetic qualities of contemporary politics and activism which is not only a centralised marketing strategy from the party in central and public office, but also a part of the embodied experience of the party on the ground and reproduced by grassroots party members.

I apply this analytical framework to the German Greens during a period of obvious rebranding and change that coincided with my fieldwork. This was not only the personnel change brought by the election of Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock as co-party leaders in January 2018. It was also marked by the redrafting of their *Grundsatzprogramm* or 'fundamental party principles', which was launched in April 2018. This redrafting process was structured as a deliberative process over two years, with both in-person and digital forms of participation, and the final version of the principles was adopted by party delegates of the digital conference in Berlin in November 2020 (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020b). Gayil Talshir (2003) has termed their previous *Grundsatzprogramm* an 'ideological document', and thus the process of redrafting an ideological document can be equated to a deliberate, ideological rebranding of the party. Therefore, not only does my application of a novel analytical framework help develop understanding on the aesthetic nature of protest in contemporary progressive activism, it also significantly contributes a much-needed update to English language knowledge of the German Greens, in particular their upward trajectory in the final two years of the 2010s, and how this aided their later entry into federal government in 2021.

1.4 Research Findings

My innovative concept and framework of *gentrified protest* presented in chapter three is applied to analyse the ethnographic data generated in chapters five and six. Based on Moffitt's (2016) understanding of political style, I define the political style of gentrified protest as follows:

a) Gentrified protest, and its analytical framework, identifies the *political style* of a *progressive political party* and how this *incorporates party members*.

b) Party members, as part of a gentrified protest style, *interact with and reproduce the rhetoric and aesthetic styles* used by the central party and politicians, particularly through *performances in digital spaces and on the streets at demonstrations*. In this way, party members are a form of 'personalised political communication' (Nielsen, 2012) in disseminating the party's political style.

c) The involvement of party members is crucial to *legitimise the participatory, embodied character* of a progressive gentrified protest style in *mediated performances*.

d) Gentrified protest performed by party members is thus an *integrated political style in everyday member activism.*

Furthermore, this political style is identified and characterised by four distinct yet interrelated facets which stem from attributes of gentrification:

1. *Sanitised* protest and *sanitising* politics
2. The *brand* of gentrified protest politics
3. The cachet of *authenticity* within gentrified protest politics
4. The *aesthetic* of gentrified protest politics

Whilst these facets may seem somewhat abstract, they are able to concretely be identified and analysed in the various forms of data generated from political ethnography methods of document collection, participant observation and semi-structured interviews. In the context of this thesis, the forms of data analysed include: interview transcripts, fieldwork diary entries and notes from participant observation, media articles, party documents, social media, and images and videos taken during participant observation in public spaces. At the general core of identifying the political style of gentrified protest is analysing party rhetoric and their aesthetic staging of events - such as party conferences, participatory processes, and participation in street demonstrations – and analysing party rhetoric and their aesthetic staging in relation to party communications. In this way, one can identify the curated and desired political style of the party in central office and public office. However, given the role party members play in the gentrified protest style, this must then be compared to the lived experience and feelings of party members in their activism to answer the following questions:

- How is protest incorporated into party activity and aesthetics?
- Does the lived experience match and reproduce this centralised style? Or is there a disconnect?

When it comes to identifying the four individual facets, the final section of chapter four outlines in more detail how these can be identified when applying gentrified protest to ethnographic data. For the purposes of this introductory chapter, I instead highlight the main findings of how each of these four facets manifested in the ethnographic data I generated on the German Greens.

The empirical evidence firstly demonstrates how sanitised protest within the German Greens is seen in the consistent valorisation of a canonised narrative of their radical history, but now in a 'sanitised' form. My use of the term

sanitised is purely analytical, to denote the boundary between 'radical' protest and politics and 'mainstream' protest and politics. In other words, 'sanitised' protest is that which is considered acceptable and normal in contemporary political culture, whereas 'radical' protest involves some kind of rule or law breaking as seen in strike action or occupations of private grounds. This is illustrated in the predominant support by Green party members and the central party of well-organised, non-violent street demonstrations, rather than more controversial occupations, such as those of *Ende Gelände*.

Furthermore, the Greens form a trustworthy protest bloc at demonstrations that passers-by feel comfortable in approaching. In this way, the party's interpretation of the term 'radical' within policy, communications, and reproduced by party members denotes a sanitised and electorally-motivated strategy. In relation to sanitising politics, the German Greens owed part of their success during this period to their emphatic opposition to the racist policy stances of the AfD. Yet, I identified a disconnect between their curated style of campaigning for racial justice and presence at large anti-racism demonstrations, and how party members and those external to the party critiqued the way the Greens engage with the issue of racial justice at a deeper, structural level in policy and values. For instance, journalist Ferda Ataman highlights that despite feminism being a running thread throughout the draft party principles document in 2019, racism appears just once (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019c). Such a disconnect between what is practiced and what is preached led to some party members perceiving people's activism within the Greens as a form of absolution, sanitising away their ecological or other political sins.

Secondly, the branding of the German Greens incorporates the canonised narrative of their party history and protest action. Visually, the symbols of the Greens are important in participating in street demonstrations, party communications, social media, and in party members' own self-branding.

Consequently, party members experienced a high level of recognition of their party's brand in their everyday lives. In particular, the aesthetic shorthand of the Greens in media articles as certain kinds of consumer goods, such as latte macchiato coffees or Tesla cars, creates an external perception of the German Greens as a lifestyle brand or 'feeling' into which party members can buy, participate, and belong. Furthermore, I see party members' willingness to display the party brand in their everyday lives positioning them as multi-level marketers: providing voluntary work and advertisement for the party without any guarantee of renumeration or even electoral success.

The third finding emphasises the importance of authenticity in the political style of the contemporary German Greens. During this period a lot of effort was exerted to integrate the party's sanitised protest narrative to create an 'experience of origins' (Zukin, 2010). This strategy was clear in the party's process of redrafting their party principles. In line with their ambitions to broaden their appeal and maintain a level of professionalism, the party made it palatable by conceiving themselves not as a catch-all *Volkspartei*, but as an 'alliance party' based on the past role and lineage of alliances with movements in West and East Germany. However, this experience of origins is also apparent among the younger generation of party members I interviewed, who clearly reproduce the sanitised protest narrative of the German Greens, despite not being born when the party was founded 40 years earlier. Their affective connection to a party history creates a party that feels, to them, authentic to their own individual values.

Finally, this thesis illustrates the aesthetic role protest plays in the style of a progressive political party. Unlike other approaches to party membership, the aesthetic quality of gentrified protest appeals to what is experienced affectively and at the level of sense (Rancière and Rockhill, 2013): the multi-modal visual and audio communications of the party and party members, as well as 'performances' that party members see and hear, performances with which

they interact, and performances in which they participate. It acknowledges that politics is inherently aesthetic (Simons, 2008). In the case of the German Greens, I identify their gentrified protest aesthetic via the performance of movement and how the party stages protests 'on the streets' and digitally. Party members have a clear affective relationship with the democracy aesthetic, perceiving their activism as a performance of support of liberal democracy. Lastly, the long-established party aesthetic of participation endures. However, as identified but not explored in other studies (Bukow, 2013; Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020; Spier, 2019), there is a contradiction between the rhetoric and staging of participatory processes as 'open' such as the party principles process and contributing to party policy and activity, versus the reality of participation experienced by grassroots party members.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is a general consensus amongst party and movement scholars that the Green Party has professionalised out of its protest and movement party roots, both organisationally and in terms of policy and ideology. Importantly, this thesis, with its research approach to garner insider perspectives, experiences and meanings, looks at how protest appears on the ground after this transition. The style of gentrified protest identified in my project calls into question the assumption that Joschka Fischer's aesthetic transformation from trainers to suits marked the final nail in the coffin of a protest sensibility for Green Party members, or the other two faces of the party. Indeed, it fleshes out, in terms of a political style, how the party's past, which is discarded as no longer relevant in other terms, maintains a relevance through its political style, albeit a sanitised one.

1.5 Research Contribution

My thesis contributes to the fields of political science and political sociology in several ways. Working with original data I generated in the field just three and

a half years ago, it provides a snapshot of a specific period in German politics; at this time the country was in the twilight of the era of Angela Merkel, with her official announcement that she would step down as leader of the CDU and would not run again for any political office taking place following the Hesse state elections in late October 2018 (Beitzer, 2018). This snapshot in time was also notable as it featured the initial rise of the Fridays for Future movement in Germany and globally, as well as occurring prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. The thesis thus enhances scholarly knowledge on the German Greens in the late 2010s. This is particularly important to provide the field with a nuanced understanding of how the German Greens' 'surprising' second place in the 2019 European elections came into being. Additionally, it provides much needed updated context on the party away from profiles and depictions of the Greens published in the early 2000s, which continue to be cited in recent political science publications. This is even more necessary following the Greens' entrance into federal office once again as part of the traffic light coalition in 2021.

Secondly, the existing knowledge on party members is notable in its methodological homogeneity derived from the standard use of survey questionnaires. Whilst surveys have the advantage of being a more time-efficient means of collecting a larger amount of data, they are intrinsically linked to 'official' and 'legal' definitions of what constitutes a party member by nation states and political parties (Gauja, 2015). Furthermore, they confine the parameters of data through pre-determined language and questions. As a result, studies that adopt this typical approach tend to focus on either the social characteristics of party members, their function within the party, or their incentives for party membership. These issues are discussed in more detail in in chapters two and four. This has led to requests for detailed ethnographic empirical material on the individual, lived experience of party membership in recent years to address this gap in academic understanding of the grassroots perspective. (Gauja, 2015; van Haute and Gauja, 2015).

My thesis is one response to this request and diverges from survey-based research to take an innovative, interpretive ethnographic approach to study party membership. This methodological approach is discussed in greater detail in chapter four. In addition, the use of ethnography during a period of rebranding and change within the German Greens represents a particularly exciting and distinct contribution to our knowledge on the party. As stated by Edison Trickett and Mary Oliveri (1997), ethnography is a methodological tool which is able to capture the dynamics of change in ways that snapshot surveys cannot. In the context of the time period under study, my ethnographic data can elucidate how the reproduction of the Greens' deliberate rebranding are observable in the daily lives of Green Party members. This enables my analysis to go beyond the mere changes in rhetoric, structures, and personnel to instead home in on the discussions and processes members experience as such change is introduced.

The final and most substantial significance of this research project for the field of political science is found in my new framework for analysing the political style of progressive politics and progressive political parties: **gentrified protest**. As explicated in the discussion on concepts of *social movement transformations and movement party interactions* in chapter two, these multiple concepts are insufficient when exploring the role and interaction of protest and party within an established, mainstream(ing) political party. Their focus on categorising overlaps and integration of movement and party politics through lenses of organisational or ideological party types ignores the aesthetic and stylistic elements involved. Instead, **gentrified protest** was a framework borne out of necessity to provide the field of political party research with an explicatory approach to protest as an aesthetic and embodied **political style** of progressive politics. This approach allows for the interrogation of individual perceptions of authenticity, the party 'brand', and to what extent is protest 'sanitised' in line with positive relationships to the state and democracy.

1.6 Outline of the thesis

In this chapter I have

- Provided the external context within which this research was approached and took place;
- Briefly outlined the research context and background literature on party membership, party-protest interaction, and the German Greens;
- Indicated what I set out to achieve in this study and how I approached this;
- Summarised the key findings and contributions of this study.

The thesis continues to the next chapter, a literature review which contextualises the research project in more detail with diverse strands on social movement studies, political parties, and Green parties and also incorporates a short scholarly history of the German Greens. Chapter three introduces the concept of *gentrified protest*. An extensive genealogy of the concept of gentrification in urban studies, LGBTQ+ activism, political theory, and society creates the basis for the development of my novel framework to analyse progressive political party activism and its place within political style. Chapter four details the research methodology and the methods used to generate data which met the objectives of this project. Chapters five and six each take two different qualities of gentrified protest distinguished in chapter three to analyse the ethnographic data gathered via the methodology of chapter four. Chapter five concentrates on the qualities of *sanitised protest and sanitising politics* as well as the *brand of gentrified protest politics*. Chapter six turns to the remaining two qualities of gentrified protest: *the cachet of authenticity* and *the aesthetic of gentrified protest politics.*

The seventh and final chapter concludes the thesis by bringing the discussion and findings in the analysis chapters into conversation with the previous chapters of the thesis. In doing so it emphasises the main findings and contribution of the thesis to our understanding of party members within the German Green Party. More significantly, the conclusion illustrates how my framework of gentrified protest can identify and highlight the underexplored aesthetic and participatory political style employed and co-created between all three faces of a progressive, power-seeking political party to create affective connections and communicate effectively in the intensely stylised nature of contemporary politics.

Chapter 2 Putting the *demo* in democracy – social movements, political parties, and a short scholarly history of the German Greens

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I critically survey literature on social movements, protests, political parties, and party members to demonstrate how existing conceptualisations of protest and social movement transformations cannot account for all relationships between institutional and extra-institutional politics. Crucially, I highlight how existing work on the interaction of protest and party politics underexplores the stylistic and strategic benefits for political parties, particularly at the level of party members. By outlining the existing explanations of interactions between political parties and protest and their focus on ideology and party structure, I highlight the significant omission that my framework of gentrified protest will rectify. I then consider political parties and their party members to underline the lack of qualitative research available on the experience and work performed by party members outside of election campaigns. The final sections of this chapter then address current knowledge on Green Parties and their position in predominantly western and European political systems, focusing on the German Greens as the subject of this study. In so doing, I argue that new material is required to understand how mainstream progressive parties strategically utilise party members and protest to exhibit a political style which is participatory, movement-aligned, and celebratory of liberal democracy.

2.2 Social movements and protest

2.2.1 Social movement studies

Research on social movements can be found across several disciplines, but sociology is the field that it tends to call home (Roggeband and Klandermans, 2017). A social movement encompasses a wide variety of extra-institutional, and sometimes institutional, political action. This may include protest, lobbying and petitioning. The German Greens, for example, evolved out of a variety of so-called New Social Movements, such as ecological, peace and women's movements (Kitschelt, 1989; Poguntke, 1993; Roth, R., 1991). Whilst my research focus is on protest supported by the contemporary German Green Party and its party members, many of the protest marches and rallies the Greens have supported are often aligned with social movement organisations. Therefore, the discussion of key concepts and debates within social movement literature are relevant to researching the social movement ancestry of and present associations with the German Greens.

The term *social movement* is both *social*, encompassing the collective nature of people coming together to make a change, and involves a conceptual physicality of *movement*, indicating the nature of action that is present both in the activity of a social movement, but also in the change or 'claim' the social movement is trying to enact (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). Whilst the concept of *social movement* is a more recent concept for longstanding practices of protest, resistance, and action for social change, its evolution as a discipline of study is well documented (Chesters and Welsh, 2010). Summative discussions in articles and book chapters trace the shifting focus of social movement research (Roggeband and Klandermans, 2010; Travaglino, 2014; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). They detail the journey from grievances and deprivation as motivations for participation and protest as a 'pathology'

(Travaglino, 2014, p.2), to that of the problem of collective goods and freeriding, as detailed in the theory of Mancur Olson (1965).

Two influential approaches to social movement scholarship then emerged in the late 1970s. The first was the *Resource Mobilisation* approach: an organisational and structural account of the social movement organisation, industry and sector, which was based on material resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The second was the *Political Opportunity Structure*: an approach which considers the ease or difficulty with which social movements can interact with the political context, and how the structure and culture of politics can shape the emergence and success of social movements in any given society (Kriesi, 2004; Tilly, 1978). Both the *Resource Mobilisation* and *Political Opportunity* approaches were critiqued for 'structural determinism', and led to a cultural turn within social movement research (Travaglino, 2014, p.6). This *Cultural* approach to studying social movements shifted the focus of studies to the level of the individual and small groups. *Cultural* approaches to the study of participation in social movements look at symbolic meanings carried in 'words, artefacts, artworks, rituals, events, individuals' that create 'shared worlds' (Jasper, 2010, p.60). This shift towards the individual lends itself well to social psychological studies of identifying emotions, motivations and social identity as elements of collective identity often required for collective action (Roggeband and Klandermans, 2010).

Yet, these approaches within the broader field of social movement studies are focused on either explaining the emergence and capability for social movements to fail or succeed in a particular environment, or what participating in social movements means to individual activists. Such approaches as those named above do not allow for considering more complicated relationships between social movements and political parties, nor the cultural legacy and stylistic impact social movements have on institutional politics. This is something which the concept of protest is more fruitful in providing.

2.2.2 Protest

Political protest has both *substantive* (the specific issue or cause) and *procedural* (the specific actions taken) dimensions (Mushaben, 1986, p.143). The dual-dimensions of protest are represented in the denotive meanings of the word protest, often applied as a noun for communicating a public demonstration of dissatisfaction towards a particular issue, but also as a verb which, when used, conveys objection or disapproval. There are several nouns in German used to denote a public demonstration of dissatisfaction: *Protest*, *Demonstration*, and *Kundgebung*. Protest can take different procedural forms; it can be silent or sung, peaceful or violent, spontaneous or organised, small or mass. In the literature therefore, a great deal of different movements and actions are included when discussing protest, and definitive conceptual clarity amongst scholars is lacking (Opp, 2009; Chesters and Welsh, 2010).

Protest is also often academically synonymous with social movements and subsumed under social movement scholarship. However, there are analytical differences. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper highlight this difference in their definition of a social movement:

> Social movements are conscious, concerted, and *sustained* efforts
> by *ordinary people* to change some aspect of their society by using
> *extra-institutional* means.
>
> (Goodwin and Jasper, 2015, p.3. Emphasis mine.)

They distinguish 'sustained' social movements from a 'single protest or riot' to analytically separate the two concepts. Simon Teune specifies this distinction further, stating that social movements make 'their message public through the staging of protest' (2008, p.529). Indeed, protest cultures are increasingly not just relevant within social movements, but are a feature of 'mainstream culture

in Western societies', illustrated by its aestheticisation and employment in the domains of fashion and advertising (Fahlenbrach et al., 2016, p.2; Maier, 2016). This analytical divide establishes the basis for this project utilising the concept of protest rather than social movement in its title, despite the frequent conflation of the two terms. This is why the framework presented in the following chapter is called 'gentrified protest' rather than 'gentrified social movement'. This is a conscious decision to allow for a broader application of the term to institutionalised political actors, such as parties or other organisations, including those who have not emerged from a social movement background. Furthermore, it also allows the style to draw from broader protest cultures within the cultural context under study and is therefore not reliant on explicit links to particular social movements.

The protest tradition associated with the German Greens arose out of New Left protest in the German Student Movement in 1968. As introduced in Ronald Inglehart's influential work *The Silent Revolution* (1977), increased economic security and wider prevalence of political skills combined to form a cultural shift, which he called post-materialism. This diminished concerns about material issues among the young, educated and affluent, who were instead more concerned about distant political issues, which were primarily a form of lifestyle politics. In particular, the focus within post-materialism on issues of 'participation', in forms more 'elite-challenging', such as protest, rather than 'elite-directed', such as voting, was exemplified across the student revolts of 1968 (Inglehart, 1977, p.3). Post-materialism is an often-cited explanation for the emergence and rise of the New Social Movements that would go on to form the German Greens (Kitschelt, 1989; Müller-Rommel, 1985). Public protests were deliberate tools used by the movements under the motto 'the private/personal is political', which was championed by the women's movement, but can also be traced back to Berlin communes around the time of 1968 (Kraushaar, 2008, p. 229). These shifting values towards public, elite-challenging behaviour illustrates the significance of the public sphere and

space within protest action and its significance in post-materialist parties like the Greens.

In the German context, middle-class, bourgeois protest has a link with 1968 and earlier. Kraushaar (2011) cites two studies, one from the Berlin Social Science Centre and another conducted at the Institute for Democracy Research in Göttingen, which both aimed to research who exactly was involved in the supposedly middle-class protests against the building of a new train station in Stuttgart, commonly referred to as Stuttgart 21. Instead, he asserts that *bürgerlicher Protest* (middle-class or bourgeois protest) is no new occurrence after 1968, and previously occurred in Germany in the 1950s with mass demonstrations against arming the Germany army with nuclear weapons in 1958 (Kraushaar, 2011). The term *bürgerlich* is used in German both to refer to the 'citizen' as applies to individuals with German nationality and the application of the law to them, but also as reference to the 'middle class', the 'bourgeois', and can be used in a pejorative way. What Kraushaar does in his article is to try and tease out this potentially pejorative accusation of *bürgerlicher Protest* in the context of the Stuttgart 21 demonstrations, by highlighting the paradoxical nature of *anti-bürgerlicher Protest* conducted by predominantly middle-class, *bürgerlich*, students of the student movement in 1968. After considering the two different studies on Stuttgart 21 protesters, Kraushaar rejects labelling it as either privileged or *bürgerlicher Protest* (2011). Whilst gentrified protest has class connotations, as I outline in chapter three, it is not used in the pejorative way that *bürgerlich* can be used in the German context.

This cultural shift to more participation and political protest has had a lasting impact on political culture in Germany and elsewhere. Both Alice Cooper (2004) and Dieter Rucht (2003) have noted the transformation of German political culture away from one with authoritarian characteristics to one with more democratic and participatory ideas. Cooper stresses that this

transformation is so deep-seated amongst the middle classes it 'has become simply another political resource, used with greater frequency by more diverse constituencies than in earlier decades' (2004, p. 216). Rucht compiled a detailed, longitudinal comparison of volumes of political protest, the number of protest participants, and protest type from accounts in national newspapers to illustrate the changing nature and role of protest in Germany (2003). This highlighted a long trend of left-libertarian protest and its contribution to democratisation of German political culture, alongside an increase in far-right, xenophobic protest, particularly in the eastern states (Rucht, 2003). Historian Philipp Gassert (2018) in his protest history of Germany since 1945 highlights the normalisation of protest in contemporary German political culture and how it belongs to liberal democracy. Such a trend is also visible in other European countries. Yet, despite an 'ideological normalisation' of protest in Europe on both left and right, the European left still participates more in protest (Torcal et al., 2016, p.328). Endre Borbáth and Theresa Gessler (2020) have recently added nuance to this argument with their analysis that the left is more likely to protest in Northwestern and Southern Europe, whereas in Eastern Europe, the right have more of a propensity to protest.

The predominance of protest on the left is, however, disputed in recent research on Germany. The diffusion and diversification of protest has led to the disassociation of protest with the left across Germany, with the normal assumptions of education or left-leaning political affiliation no longer a determining factor for most who protest (Bleckmann and Lahusen, 2017). As we saw from Cooper (2004), this normalisation of protest is usually attributed to the uptake and conventionalisation of protest by the middle classes, a view shared by Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave, who describe protest's evolution from 'disorganised outburst of the dissatisfied lower classes' to the 'domain of the politically active, well-educated middle class' (2001, p.462). Discussing the adoption of protest by the middle classes, Van Aelst and Walgrave cite and agree with the concerns of Frances Piven and Richard Cloward (1991, p.448) that the institutionalisation of protest cuts off ordinary

citizens from engaging in protest due to the resources required to organise an event to have some influence, thereby creating 'elitist' protest (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001, p.466). This post-materialist, lifestyle politics and ubiquity of protest, particularly among the middle classes, has, if Piven and Cloward and Van Aelst and Walgrave are right, *displaced* protest. Amongst this displacement, however, protest activity in Europe is actually related to historical and present lines of conflict within political cultures and systems (Borbáth and Gessler, 2020). This suggests that whilst class as a protest cleavage may be displaced to a certain degree, this is only because other conflicts have emerged to mobilise people to stage their dissatisfaction on the streets.

This section has focused on the role of protest in Germany, providing context for the case under study in this research. However, this contextual information on the normalisation of protest in society is crucial regardless of the country from which the political party hails. Furthermore, the literature reviewed here has demonstrated the need to consider existing class and other conflicts and/or social cleavages when analysing protest and its relation to liberal democracy. Gentrified protest, with its interpretive ethnographic methodological approach, is well-suited to generate data situated in context, which examines, in depth, the experience of party members and activists and the aesthetic elements of contemporary politics.

2.2.3 Categorising the transformations of social movements

Although the 'normalisation' of protest can be called a transformation, this is just one categorisation of a process of social movement transformation. This section deals with the transformation of movements from grassroots-organised phenomena into officially organised enterprises, a transformation that has been analysed considerably in the European context due to the

historical transformation of the German (and other) Greens' movement antecedents. Existing terminology relating to this evolution of social movements congregates around various '-isations': professionalisation, deradicalisation, institutionalisation and NGOisation. Almost fifty years ago, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, within the *Resource Mobilisation Approach*, used economic language to describe a *social movement sector* (1977). They had explicitly addressed the increasing professionalisation of social movements years earlier (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Professionalisation, within their model, accounted for the specialisation of tasks undertaken by staff, such as lobbying and fundraising, creating a professional class who pursued social movements as a vocation and could work in this specialised sector (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, pp.1233-1235). This kind of professionalised social movement is demonstrated in the notable study on Friends of the Earth, *The Protest Business* (Jordan and Maloney, 1997).

The specialised tasks of paid staff found in professionalisation are also found in NGOisation. This term describes the specific process of social movements becoming a professional, Non-Governmental Organisation and employing experts and staff to work on projects commensurate with the ethos of the NGO. This denotes a more specific transformation with regards to the type of organisation and is typically featured in literature on the transformation of women's social movements across the world (Alvarez, 1999; Lang, 1997). Srila Roy (2015) discusses the process of NGOisation in the context of the Indian women's movement and what Sadia Hodzic (2014) terms the 'NGOisation paradigm' of critique. This critique focuses on the neoliberal bureaucratisation of organisational structures that occurs when a movement becomes an NGO and becomes funder-driven and policy-oriented, and more concerned with good governance and employing experts (Roy, 2015, pp. 101-102). The more specific term of NGOisation demonstrates how a movement can morph into an industry in which well-remunerated 'volunteerism' can lead to activism as a vocation, and the creation of a highly specialised, middle-class elite of NGO professionals (Roy, 2015, pp. 106-107). The focus within

professionalisation and NGOisation on paid, competent, 'professionals' completing specialist work to meet the needs of a funder entails that these terms are not adequate for the relationship of party members and protest. Some party members may be 'professionals' in social movement organisations, NGOs, or indeed in the party organisation itself (Blings, 2020). This professional position would be an overlap of their networks of political activity but would isolate those party members for whom political activism and protest is a voluntary pursuit in their free time.

Institutionalisation is another term for a transformation of social movements, which is often applied to the social movements that transform into political parties. Whilst institutionalisation has some conceptual overlap with professionalisation and NGOisation, one of the most widely circulated ideas on why social movements formalise and create bureaucratic organisations is based on Robert Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy (1968). Based upon a study of political parties rather than social movements, the premise of 'Who says organisation, says oligarchy' is often applied to institutionalised social movements (Michels, 1968, p.365); in other words, once a social movement becomes institutionalised and formalised, it will be dominated by an elite leadership. Transformations of the women's movement towards institutionalisation and professionalisation, in particular, feature prominently in literature from various countries (Masson, 2015; Roy, 2015; Suh, 2011; 2014). Doowon Suh defines movement institutionalisation as

> a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement's goals.

> (Suh, 2011, p.443)

In Suh's understanding of institutionalisation, social movement activists take posts in government institutions and work to attain their movement goals. This results in issues becoming moderated and de-politicised and, by demonstrating professional competencies, radical or critical behaviour becomes obstructive and is therefore disregarded by the organisation and its institutionalised activists.

The 'social movement society' is a concept closely linked to ideas of social movement institutionalisation. Tentatively posited initially by Friedhelm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht (1993), the 1998 edited volume by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow brought it to prominence in the field (1998b), despite earlier incarnations of concepts such as Amitai Etzioni's 'Demonstration Democracy' and Harry Pross' 'Protest Society' (Etzioni, 1970; Pross, 1992). Each of these terms point towards an increasing diffusion of protest amongst society in general and the normalisation of unconventional, contentious political action. Meyer and Tarrow's 'social movement society' was based upon three hypotheses: (a) protest as a permanent fixture in modern life; (b) protest adopted by both a greater *quantity* of people and diverse constituencies (diffusion); and, (c) through professionalisation and institutionalisation of social movements into political parties and other organisations, protest becomes an instrument of mainstream politics (1998a, p.4). This is, ultimately, a very specific set of circumstances to measure and describe social movement institutionalisation in society and is contested by the work discussed in the previous section, which argues against an achieved normalisation of protest and a lack of diverse constituencies taking part (Torcal et al., 2016; Borbáth and Gessler, 2020). Yet some scholars still find the concept 'social movement society' relevant to examine, such as an edited volume testing the term's hypotheses within the Canadian context (Ramos and Rodgers, 2015).

The specific process of moderation and depoliticisation of a movement through institutionalisation has its own concept: deradicalisation.

Deradicalisation as a concept is used with relation to social movement transformations in two different contexts. The first context it can be applied to is for a social movement which sees violence as a means for bringing about political change. In this context, deradicalisation pertains to reducing the propensity for political violence of an organisation or social movement. Social movement literature has played a large role in the analysis of radicalisation and deradicalisation, despite the turn in recent years for it to be predominantly relevant within research on terrorism (della Porta and LaFree, 2012). Radicalisation along the left in the German context can be seen in the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), a radical, terrorist group offshoot of the German Student Movement that would also spawn many of the constitutive New Left social movements of the German Greens. As noted by Kraushaar, the actions of the RAF tarnished the left, which led the New Social Movements to play a significant rehabilitation role for the German left through their high esteem for non-violent methods (2011). The second context deradicalisation is applied to is when a movement institutionalises into a political party, where the party makes compromises to broaden out a movement issue's appeal to a constituency that the party is striving to reach (Rucht and Neidhardt, 2002, p.23). Here, deradicalisation is used as a dilution and depoliticisation of movement issues or claims much in the same way as institutionalisation.

Whilst processes of institutionalisation, professionalisation, and NGOisation point to a transformation which creates an elite group of specially-skilled individuals, they are all focused on the transformation of organisations or issues and do not allow for us to discuss the role of the participants on the ground. All five concepts – professionalisation, institutionalisation, NGOisation, social movement society, and de-radicalisation – account for the impact of funding on organisational motivations, organisational ideology, and the professionalisation of activists who are then able to pursue movements as a vocation. The structural, functional, and elite-based levels of analysis found within these terms do not help us to understand the grassroots perspective of continued protest action by institutionalised organisations, an analytical level

required for this project. Furthermore, these terms account for a process which is temporally-specific, in which the process is either currently undergoing or has just been completed.

The proposed theoretical framework in chapter three 'gentrified protest' analyses a 'political style' which is not solely a purview of elites, but is also a part of grassroots activity. Whilst it acknowledges a depoliticisation inherent in the four concepts discussed above, it also allows for the exploration of the long-term impact of these processes applied to a party which, as will be demonstrated in the final section of this chapter, has been analysed to have professionalised over two decades before my research took place. As such, gentrified protest is a necessary concept and analytical framework that allows one to contextualise the legacy of movement institutionalisation into a political party and how institutional politics interacts with other, extra-institutional politics. It can capture dynamics within the membership and elite figures of a political party, and the stylistic and cultural impact of protest, in a way that the structurally determinate concepts analysed in this section simply cannot.

2.2.4 Protest and politics

The interaction of social movements with the political sphere of government, parliaments, and political parties has been underexplored (Blings, 2020). Jack Goldstone outlines how a great deal of social movement literature has created an extra-institutional/institutional dichotomy between social movements and political parties and governments (2003). This is due to the main approach in social movement studies which considers institutional politics when analysing social movements: the *Political Process* approach, also known as *Political Opportunity Structures* (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978). Charles Tilly, the original proponent of this approach, identified and argued how the rise of social movements was

dependent on the evolution of national states, and the extent to which the state created opportunities for, or restrained challengers from, collective action against the government (1978). Tilly's work reinforced the idea of social movement activity, such as protest, as being predominantly external from political parties and the government, and led to much literature positing political parties as allies in the political process approach (Hutter et al., 2019). Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow (2010, p.529), along with Donatella della Porta et al. (2017, p.3), have noted this 'movement-centric' nature of social movement literature. In recent years, there has been increased attention on the relation between parties and movements (della Porta et al., 2017; Hutter et al., 2019; Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016; Hutter, 2014; Borbáth and Hutter, 2021b). The following section looks at the research which focuses on this interaction through the concept of the movement party and other related concepts, but here I concentrate on how social movement scholarship has dealt with the interaction between extra-institutional and institutional politics.

Researchers have addressed the porous lines between extra-institutional and institutional politics (Goldstone, 2003). Rucht and Neidhardt (2002) outlined the functional similarity of social movements and political parties as both forms of political mobilisation, but which each have different levels of resources and bureaucracy. Both parties and movements are democratic agents and represent citizens in society, although they may fulfil complementary roles in the institutional and extra-institutional arenas (Hutter et al., 2019). Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly created the term 'contentious politics' in their later work throughout the 1990s, as an attempt to broaden the scope of social movement research to include other organisations, including governments, as engaging in contentious, collective action 'in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties' (2015, p.7). Both 'contentious politics' and the concept of 'social movement societies' (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998a) argue that protest, social movements and, therefore, many elements of contention are becoming instruments of 'conventional politics', or institutional and electoral politics (Kriesi, 2014, pp.301-302). In many ways,

this appears to suggest what Goldstone termed the 'complementary' nature of protest and 'routine participation' within institutional politics: unlike the specified time period and simplified choices within elections, protests can occur at any time and be on any specific issue; and social movements can influence election outcomes (Goldstone, 2003, pp.8-9).

The blurred boundaries between social movements, politics, and protest have been apparent in academic research, particularly in Western Europe. In the often-cited work of Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (1995), they highlight the importance of left-wing parties in governments or in opposition for the efficacy and prominence of social movements and protest. Their research highlighted the ability of particular political moments to deliver protest and social movement action. Such moments can be seen around the peace movement in Germany in 1983, and in anti-austerity movements across Europe following the financial crisis of 2008. These developments point to the way in which institutional and extra-institutional politics respond to the development of new political cleavages (Hutter, 2014; Hutter et al., 2019; Reitz and Jörke, 2021).

One example of responding to new political cleavages can be seen in the increasing number of right-wing movements allying with or forming their own movement parties. In the recent German context, right-wing protest is found in contemporary German politics, with the rise of support for movements like PEGIDA and parties such as the AfD who either take part in, or do not condemn, anti-immigration protest, and which are faced with counter demonstrations in which the Greens take part and routinely support. Just as right-wing protest in Germany has appropriated left-wing symbolic action and protest forms (Wamper et al., 2010), so too has the right-wing, anti-establishment challenger party, the AfD, adopted many organisational and democratic structures from the German Greens, such as a gender-divided double leadership (von dem Berge and Poguntke, 2017). Despite right-wingers learning organisational forms and protest tactics from left-libertarians,

this new societal conflict is attributed to the cause for the political seismic shocks of the election of Donald Trump as US President and the UK's decision to leave the European Union. This has been referred to as a 'Silent Revolution in reverse' as anti-progressive sentiment against foreigners and globalisation manifest themselves in protest and electoral politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2017), or an integration/demarcation cleavage around immigration and globalisation (Hutter, 2014; Reitz and Jörke, 2021). In this way, Green and other progressive parties have responded to position themselves as the diametric opposites in these new cleavages, often utilising protest and its staging to emphasise their stances.

Furthermore, social movements and political parties can go further than just occupying overlapping political cleavages; indeed, they can be explicitly linked with one another. In their book on the recent emergence of anti-austerity parties in Spain, Greece and Italy, Della Porta et al. (2017) claim to link social movement research and political parties scholarship to demonstrate the linkages between the two forms of political participation. These close, albeit often complicated, ties can be found in party names, opening party participation to movement members, supporting movements' claims, sharing protest action and overlapping memberships (della Porta et al., 2017, p.5). In particular, the overlapping membership between movements and parties is a common linkage (Blings, 2020; Almeida, 2010). The close relationship of parties and movements is particularly pronounced on the left, as demonstrated by David Bailey in his argument that the left(s) have, in different historical periods, faced the crossroad of a path of marginality and integrity by remaining in a more movement-based form, or co-optation or moderating into an more institutionalised form as a party (2017).

All of these approaches to the interaction between movement and party or institutional politics are focused on elite level or strategic analyses. This is also the case with the term 'party-sponsored protest', although its less formalised

relationship is closest to what I am looking at (Rucht, 1998, p.41). Endre Borbáth and Swen Hutter build on this term and define it further in their comparative project to denote political parties which 'organise or co-organise, take part in, and/or call people to participate in a protest' (2021a, p.102). This term places the emphasis on the political party, as well as focusing on the action of protest rather than of a broader social movement. Yet, this does not address a political party's own use of protest staging and aesthetics in their own communications outside of interactions with movements. This is a feature opened up by the application of the analytical framework of gentrified protest.

2.3 Movement parties

The term 'movement party', as conceptualised by Herbert Kitschelt (2006), is a conceptual bridge between social movements and protest on one side, and political parties on the other. Several different kinds of political parties can be considered as movement parties: Green parties, Labour or Social Democratic parties, anti-austerity parties, or anti-immigration parties. Kitschelt explicates the differences between social movements and conventional political parties according to their differing institutional and functional features, through which collective action and social goals are pursued (2006). Social movements conduct action on the streets, have relatively little structure and resources, and tend to have a loose organisational structure; whereas political parties act by following procedure in legislative institutions, and are relatively hierarchical with a great deal more resources at their disposal (Kitschelt, 2006). Movement parties, therefore, exist in the middle ground as a 'hybrid party', adopting social movements' strategies and organisational practices and simultaneously operating in the arena of political parties (Kitschelt, 2006, p. 280). These hybrid movement parties are not known for possessing longevity in these true, hybrid forms. Instead, they must decide either to evolve into a political party to widen support and retain public office, where they could be better positioned to influence policy, but risk alienating traditional supporters, or stay true to

movement organisational roots and core issues but risk failure within the party system (Kitschelt, 2006).

According to movement party typology and the scholars who have engaged with it, there is consensus that the German Greens are a movement party which has institutionalised. This was already argued by Elizabeth Bomberg (1992), who discussed the extent to which the German Greens could be considered a movement party ten years after their founding. She highlighted that the Greens in the 1980s had undergone the perpetual dilemma of movement parties: considering whether to reform or remain radical, despite the fact that, ultimately, most movement parties will undergo parliamentarisation just as the German Greens did (Bomberg, 1992; Kitschelt, 2006). This pattern can be seen beyond Germany, as della Porta et al. (2017) argue many Green parties have increasingly loosened ties to social movements, professionalised and are therefore less integrated with social movements compared to the intertwined relationships of trade unions and labour parties. The lack of stamina of movement parties in their true form is acknowledged in their tendency to institutionalise and, therefore:

> the term 'movement parties' is not used […] as a clear-cut definition
> to designate a static phenomenon, but it enables us instead to shed
> light on […] complex and contingent dynamics developed when the
> field of party politics meets with protest politics
>
> (della Porta et al., 2017, p.24)

One such dynamic was following the 2008 financial crisis and the development of new anti-establishment, anti-austerity parties. In della Porta et al.'s work on anti-austerity movement parties, the contributors posit the following causes of movement parties: changes to political cleavage structures; conducive conditions in the electoral arena; 'delegitimation of bipolar party systems';

mobilisation around issues with no representation; and anti-establishment frames mobilising mass movements (2017, pp.7-12). They challenge the current assumption on the tendency for social movements to disassociate with political parties, as is normally asserted in the context of Green parties, with the example of anti-austerity parties SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement (della Porta et al., 2017). Indeed, SYRIZA successfully manipulated protest as part of a heresthetic electoral strategy between 2010 and 2015 (Tsakatika, 2016).

However, not all scholars think that a movement party is the conceptual term for the development of parties such as the Five Star Movement, with Kriesi calling them an 'anti-party'. Kriesi defines an 'anti-party' as a hybrid political organisation which 'mobilizes against the established party system as a whole by competing with the established parties in the electoral channel' or 'a protest movement which participates in elections in order to defeat the established parties with their own weapons' (2015, p.676). In the Latin American context, social movement and opposition party alliances and alignment against neo-liberal policies through street protest engagement is referred to as 'social movement partyism' (Almeida, 2010). Jean Cohen (2019) considers the 'movementisation' of 'hollow' political parties, particularly when exploited by populists, as a negative, undermining of democracy. Furthermore, new forms of conceptual gymnastics in the relations between movements and political parties have been conducted in the context of majoritarian, two-party systems which have high barriers for new parties to successfully enter. These have been focused on the organisations Momentum and the Labour Party in the UK, and Our Revolution and the Democratic Party in the US and conceptualised as either 'party-driven movements' (Muldoon and Rye, 2020) or 'movement factions' (Dennis, 2020). Both of these conceptions aim to account for the UK Labour Party adjacent organisation Momentum and their 'Janus strategy' to meet goals of both reforming the party itself as well as transforming society (Muldoon and Rye, 2020, p.495).

Alejandro Peña (2021, p.639) hones in on the hybridity of political parties engaging with extra-institutional logics to create a typology for the 'co-evolving and overlapping fields of action' of party and movement politics. His typology maps 'professional' and 'participatory' forms of political party resource mobilisation on one axis; whereas the other axis maps social-movement like repertoires of action between 'conventional/electoral' and 'non-conventional/contentious' (Peña, 2021, pp.644-647). According to Peña, parties which engage in unconventional and movement-like repertoires are either 'militant parties': participatory party organisations that deploy sustained engagement with movement repertoires, such as the Brazilian Workers' Party or Sinn Féin; or 'activist parties': professionally organised parties which deploy movement-like repertoires but which do not emanate from a base of supporters as is the case in the participatory 'militant parties'. The examples he gives of activist parties include the Eurosceptic Brexit Party in the UK, Emmanuel Macron's En Marche in France, Podemos in Spain, and the AfD in Germany following their development from niche eurosceptic party to national activist party by mirroring the PEGIDA movement (Peña, 2021).

Yet his own consideration of the German Greens within his typology ignores any continued deployment of movement-like repertoires that it sought out to address. Citing research from 1998, he uses the German Greens to exemplify how parties can travel from one quadrant of conventional/electoral repertoires of action to the other: according to Peña, the German Greens, once a 'niche party', with a 'committed and participatory alignment with their bases', moved into the quadrant of 'electoralist party' by 'sacrificing' alignment to the party base to broaden their appeal within the electorate (Peña, 2021, p.645-646). He does this despite citing works by Steffen Blings (2020) and Santiago Anria (2018) who both demonstrate that parties in government and parliaments still maintain programmatic alignment with their movement antecedents or movement-like qualities respectively. His omission of previous typology work

by Paul Lucardie and Benoît Lucardie (2008) and their concept of professional-activist for those institutionalised Green parties, which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter in more detail, make Peña's typology less convincing.

All these concepts on the interaction of social movements and political parties - movement party, anti-party, social movement partyism, movementisation, party-driven movements, movement factions, activist parties - highlight a dynamic relationship between a social movement and a political party. As Bomberg and Kitschelt argued that the German Greens had already undergone institutionalisation from their movement party form, this suggests the movement party concept cannot capture the German Greens in contemporary German politics. Similarly, Kriesi's concept of an 'anti-party', a term used by Greens themselves in their early years for their unconventional approach to being a political party, is now irrelevant to the contemporary party. The 'party-driven movement' and 'movement faction' concepts work well in the majoritarian contexts they are designed for, but their wider application with a Janus strategy of party democratisation and societal transformation is lost on a party with long-established participatory democratic processes, such as the German Greens.

Paul Almeida's social movement partyism showed slightly more promise in its focus on parties and movements engaging in street protest, a behaviour continued by the Greens despite their institutionalisation (Blings, 2020; Borbáth and Hutter, 2021a; Borbáth and Hutter, 2021b). However, its focus on the party in opposition poses issues in a federal, multi-level system in which the Greens have governing responsibilities at the state and municipal level. Social movement partyism's strength was where Peña's 'activist party' fell down in his conception for institutionalised parties with a continued propensity to engage in street protests, but a lack of connection to a participatory party base. All of these concepts do not broach the role such activity plays for party

members and how they experience it in their participation, as well as how street protest is incorporated into the party's stylistic self-depiction and engagement with mainstream and social media. The concept of gentrified protest and its framework of political style is able to account for the aesthetic quality that protest plays for progressive political parties and can interrogate the legacy of either movement party roots or wider protest culture for party members.

2.4 Political parties

As mentioned earlier, political parties are the institutional means through which political action is coordinated. Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1994) divide three distinct, but at times overlapping, organisational faces of political parties: the 'party in central office' (central party executives and boards responsible for organising party conferences and coordinating national election campaigns), the 'party in public office' (those in elected office as parliamentarians, and possibly members of the government), and the 'party on the ground' (party members and activists). The 'party on the ground' is of particular concern for this project, as my research examines the lived, actual experience of being involved in the German Green Party, and whether this reflects the 'official stories' of party organisation found in large, cross-national, comparative studies (Katz and Mair, 1992; Scarrow et al., 2017). However, all three party faces are involved in the production and communication of the political style of gentrified protest. Therefore, the following subsections consider the role of political parties, the nature of party organisation, and participation in political parties. Whilst the subsection on participation provides an introduction to scholarship on party membership, this is covered in more detail in chapter four.

2.4.1 Role of political parties

The role of political parties in society can be dependent on who is considering their role. In Germany, political parties are constitutionally enshrined within Article 21 of the *Grundgesetz* or Basic Law to be transparent, organise themselves democratically, and contribute to the political consciousness of German citizens. Von Alemann et al. suggest there are seven functions of political parties:

1. *participation*, by offering people a chance to participate outside of elections;
2. *transmission*, by converting societal interests into political action;
3. *selection*, by recruiting members of the public into political life;
4. *integration*, by integrating the previous three functions both within and across the party system;
5. *socialisation*, by bringing the learning of political issues into everyday life;
6. *self-regulation*, by regulating themselves as an organisation; and finally
7. *legitimation*, by undertaking all previous functions as political party, they legitimise the entire system themselves (2010, pp.216-221).

In this account, political parties are a crucial factor not only within the political system but have something to offer wider society. If political parties see themselves as benefiting the political consciousness of society, it is not absurd to conceive that political parties would engage with extra-institutional political action, such as protest.

Not all accounts of the political party are so positive, however. With their 'Cartel Party' thesis, Katz and Mair propose that political parties are colluding with one another to remain closer to the state as an existential, dominant strategy (1995). Mair furthers this thinking on the relationship between parties and democracy, stating that party elites are now ruling and dependent on the state to the extent that the citizenry have become spectators to political parties who

have eschewed popular democracy (Mair, 2006). This idea of the 'Cartel Party', along with data that suggests that people are disengaging with political parties due to processes of individualisation, has been internalised within political science scholarship to form a mutually understood position on the decline of political parties (Bardi et al., 2014; Whiteley, 2011). Though, increasingly this is being questioned due to the so-called 'renaissance' in grassroots political campaigning (Lees-Marshment and Pettitt, 2014) and the use of digital media 'renewing parties from the outside in' contributing to a reinvigoration of democratic engagement (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016). Scholarship along these lines challenges the idea that political parties are merely elite parties in public offices, sustaining themselves with money from the state, and bringing forth evidence of citizens and party members re-engaging with political parties, at levels intermediary from elites.

There are thus two discourses on the role and place of political parties. On the one hand, there is the intended positive role of political parties within society, which may be apparent in a re-invigoration of parties by party members. On the other hand, there is a negative conception of political parties as elite organisations, displacing the demos and its wants and needs, in order to profit from its financed, institutional position. Whilst the framework of gentrified protest does not directly address the role of political parties in society, this thesis presents an analysis of a political party during a period of increased membership and member participation, thereby adding to the literature which questions the narrative of the decline of political parties.

2.4.2 Party organisation

The way political parties are organised in Germany is, to a certain extent, enshrined in law. Alongside the Basic Law, the *Parteiengesetz* or party law stipulates how German political parties should be financed and organised. Due

to Germany's federalised system, political parties have to be complex, multi-level organisations in order to adequately organise and operate within the federal system. Municipal and state parties have their own autonomy across a horizontal relationship within a political party, but in order to mobilise together for national elections and create a coherent identity there is a vertical relationship from regional and state level up to the national parliamentary party and the central party office. If there is increased 'regional heterogeneity' and 'territorial diversity' in German political parties, thereby exacerbating the tensions of different party levels goals, as described by Klaus Detterbeck (2016), then it is not implausible that there could be conflict *and protest* between levels of the same political party. This is not a new discovery; Gerhard Lehmbruch (1975) described the Janus-faced nature of local political parties, keeping one eye on local politics and another on party politics as a whole. This trend appears to have been absorbed by the electorate more widely; state elections were once considered as second-order elections or, as Georg Fabritius termed it '*Bundesteilwahlen*' (part national elections) (1979), but Detterbeck shows an increasing trend of electoral asymmetry of German voters, which would suggest that regional and local issues are increasing in importance for voters and thereby changing the perception of sub-national elections and contributing to increasingly 'promiscuous' parties in regional coalitions (2016, pp. 268-279). This project therefore generates data from Green Party activity in three different cities to account for the 'regional heterogeneity' of German politics.

More broadly, theories of party organisation within the literature have expressed similar debates, and at times have been borrowed within social movement literature, such as Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy discussed earlier (1968). Other notable works looking at the organisation of political parties include Moisei Ostrogorski (1908) and Angelo Panebianco (1988). In Panebianco's work, the previously mentioned processes of institutionalisation and professionalisation within political parties play a central role in his model and discussions on the organisation of political parties. One basis of

Panebianco's theory is that political parties adapt to their environment after their formative years, which necessitates changes and for which he constructs a model (Panebianco, 1988). He postulates a new ideal-type of party, electoral-professional parties, which place professionals undertaking specialised tasks at the centre and concentrate on appealing to the electorate and not party members (Panebianco, 1988, p.264). This focus on the electorate is similar to Katz and Mair's concerns with the 'Cartel Party', in that the focus is more on the electorate in order to secure the party's position within the state (1995). Rather than the middle classes displacing others from the resources required for effective protest, the professionalisation of political parties displaces party members in order to profit from the votes of the wider electorate. Again, these arguments on the Cartel Party and electoral-professional parties suggest that party members and the electorate are losing importance in party political activity and participation, an argument that both poses a plausible explanation for the development of movement parties and party and protest interaction, but does not adequately explain the increasing numbers of members in some political parties.

Party members in the literature are often seen as another feature of the party organisation and used to justify party ideal types. This approach overlooks the work and role they play in campaigns and providing candidates, and their less researched everyday activism. By looking instead at the political style of a party through my conceptualisation of gentrified protest, I am able to emphasise the need for progressive parties to have member involvement to legitimise their aesthetic of participation. This aesthetic of participation is introduced in chapter three and empirically shown in the German Greens in chapter six.

2.4.3 Member participation in political parties

Member and activist participation is central to this project. Party members are often considered in political science literature in terms of their role for the central party organisation. Sue Granik's (2005) synthesis of models for party member roles highlights that, analytically, party members are seen for their three functions as 'supporters', 'funders', and 'workers'. Importantly, she highlights that Paul Whiteley (2002) and his concept of 'high-intensity participation', as well as the broader political science usage of the term 'activism' are problematic by not accounting that party-member activism is a form of voluntary 'work', in which party members pay the organisation for whom they work (Granik, 2005, pp.599-601).

Yet, analysis at the level of individual party members is often analysed using Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley's important 'general incentives model' (2002), which claims to account for the differing levels of activism by party grassroots according to their own individual motivations. For example, one study looked at how the party in central office can instrumentalise party member incentives to get the most out of grassroots activists in election campaigns (Lees-Marshment and Pettitt, 2014). In the German context, the incentives model has been applied in several studies that draw upon the German Party Membership studies of 2009 and 2017 on both joining a party and the level of party activism (Spier et al., 2011; Nonnenmacher and Spier, 2014; Hoffmann and Springer, 2019; Spier, 2019; Springer et al., 2021). However, the typical use of the general incentives models relies on survey responses to pre-determined incentive categories which does not account for the varied experience of party membership in increasingly digital societies. Scarrow addresses the various methods with which people in the 21st century engage with political parties through her multi-speed model of party affiliation (2015). This distinguishes the now-fluid nature of member categories in political

parties, in which one can dip into as much material, virtual or light-touch support and engagement at any given time (Scarrow, 2015, pp.13-35).

Increasing levels of engagement with political parties in the digital sphere has coincided with an apparent 'renaissance' in grassroots campaigning by party members and activists (Lees-Marshment and Pettitt, 2014, p. 250) Some even go further to suggest that, rather than political parties becoming obsolete for coordinating citizen participation, digital media may actually be renewing democracy and political parties from 'the outside in' with an interaction of 'grassroots-netroots' and establishing a 'party-as-movement mentality' (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016, pp. 285-288). The extent to whether this digital participation is real, and not just an appearance of democratisation is still open for debate. For example, after the Arab Spring of 2011, a culture of cyber utopianism around the potential of social media emerged (Morozov, 2011). Such scepticism to a digital renaissance of political participation should also be applied to the case of the German Greens. This party has long used and championed the use of online member forums through which to effectively crowdsource and review policy. However, the German Green members who are digitally active have been shown empirically to simply be the same members participating in offline environments (Gerl et al., 2018; Thuermer et al., 2018). The quantitative analysis of digital participation is not the purview of gentrified protest, instead focusing on analogue offline party activism and online party communication. It does so as the data generated is able to explicate the experience of participation and as party members more broadly, and thus recognises what Granik (2005) and I would consider as 'work' rather than merely activism.

Qualitative, ethnographic research on party membership has been called for by prominent party scholars Emilie van Haute and Anika Gauja. Qualitative data collection techniques, such as interviews, ethnography, social network analysis, and observation, can provide the field of party membership studies

with evidence and understanding of the changing nature of participation in political parties (van Haute and Gauja, 2015). Such qualitative and situated approaches also prevent data collection and analysis reliant on 'political party' and 'state' conceptions of party membership focused on political organisations' strategic priorities and the legal framework of party members (Gauja, 2015). Whereas survey-based research methodologies gather data based on 'official' membership data held by political parties, an ethnographic approach of observing and interviewing individual, grassroots party members can provide a means with which to identify the 'individual' conception of party members and the ways in which they currently experience party participation (Gauja, 2015).

For example, Susan Scarrow (2019) in her article on multi-speed party affiliation in Germany discusses the formal pathways of trial memberships in German political parties to attend meetings but not be able to vote in them for the space of a year in all parties but the Left Party.[2] In the case of the German Greens, Scarrow (2019, pp.171-172) identifies a further unlimited guest membership from their statutes known as '*freie Mitarbeiter*'. Yet, in the course of my field research, I observed non-members participate in party meetings and similar events, admittedly without voting rights but with no formal checks of status; I even interviewed one member who had been active in her local Green party branch for 11 years before she became an 'official' card-carrying member in 2011. No party employees, politicians, or members I spoke with made any reference to this status of *freie Mitarbeiter*. This example illustrates the important gap that needs to be filled in relation to party member research with a qualitative, individual approach to complement and push forward the extensive, organisationally-shaped party membership research. This is discussed in more detail in chapter four which addresses the methodological approach and methods I used.

---

[2] *The Left* or *the Left Party* are both English translations referring to the same political party in Germany: *Die Linke*.

2.5 Green parties

Green parties emerged from the 1970s and 1980s onwards and formed a new party family. Most Green parties, but not all, originated from social movements and were innovative at the time for their participatory organisations and structures, movement-influenced repertoire, and for their focus on unconventional policy areas compared to the established parties (Gahrton, 2015). Explaining Green parties often begins by adopting the terminology used to explain the emergence of New Social Movements in the 1970s. The emergence of Green parties in the West are either attributed to post-materialist value change (Inglehart, 1977), left-libertarian politics (Kitschelt, 1989), or New Politics (Poguntke, 1993). The Green party family of today is a broad church, consisting of parties who have been in national government, such as the German case, and those who continue to exist at the margins of an unfavourable political system, like the Green Party of England and Wales. Despite different levels of success, party organisational forms, and policy stances, the Green party family continues to endure (Dolezal, 2010; Rihoux, 2016; Price-Thomas, 2016; Carter, 2013). This is partly down to the transnational networks of Green parties: Green parties have come together in both European and global-level formal organisations: the *European Greens*, a network of European Green parties established in 2004, and the *Global Greens*, a global network of Green parties and Green movements established in 2001. Due to their success in placing environmental issues on political agendas, traditional Green issues have now been co-opted by established political parties, despite growing political backlash towards the issue of climate change (Reitz and Jörke, 2021; Spoon et al., 2014).

Green parties are often considered as an example of a niche party. Bonnie Meguid (2008, pp.3-4) defines niche parties as those that 'reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics' to 'politicize' issues previously irrelevant to party competition; they attract supporters across both traditional left/right 'lines

of political division' and concentrate on a limited set of issues rather than the 'comprehensive policy platforms' of mainstream catch-all parties. Greens are not the only type of niche party, with the concept applied to ethnoterritorial and radical right parties (Meguid, 2008), as well as pirate parties (Blings, 2020). Sebastian Bukow and Niko Switek (2017) argue that Green parties maintained their niche party status following the 2008 global financial crisis by maintaining a certain independence from external policy issues and using their core, environmental issues to find answers to the challenges from the crisis.

In more recent years, a perception has emerged of some Green Parties transforming into institutionalised and mainstream, rather than niche parties. For instance, the European Greens Party within the European parliament are said to be institutionalised despite internal tensions between their constituent Green parties of different levels of parliamentarisation (Switek and Weissenbach, 2020). Indeed, the efficacy of Meguid's framework of niche parties using party families has been criticised for not addressing parties' development over time; it struggles to categorise those parties that expand their policy platform over time to become mainstream parties, or those which remain only somewhat true to their roots to becoming 'niche-ish' parties (Bischof, 2017, p.224). I would agree with Bischof that the German Greens can no longer be considered as a niche party within contemporary German politics.

The degree of heterogeneity within the Green party family is often analysed in the literature using various categories. Firstly, demographic and attitudinal attributes of Green Parties and their voters are common lenses within comparative research on Green parties. This is often to evaluate the extent to which the concepts of 'New Politics', 'left-libertarianism' and post-materialism which explained them in their founding years continue to apply to Green parties. Martin Dolezal (2010) in his comparative analysis of Green voters in European Social Survey data collected between 2002 and 2007 argued that

Green parties continue to attract voters from groups which share the same social characteristics and attitudes to each other. These groups were also consistent with the 'new middle class' of Green voters identified in the early years of Green Parties in western Europe (Müller-Rommel, 1989). In addition, the concept of 'New Politics' is also applied to Green Party ideology and was introduced by Thomas Poguntke (1993). Gareth Price-Thomas (2016, p.293) concludes over twenty years later that British, French and German aggregate Green Party ideology has 'partially shifted away from the historical model of new politics' and the parties have 'lost some of their radical edge' and instead reflect the heterogeneity that now exists between Green parties. Whilst not fully committed, a partial link to New Politics and the new-middle-class social groups that subscribe to them is an attribute associated with the concept of gentrification, as outlined in the following chapter.

Another lens used to analyse Green parties is their relationship to civil society and social movements. This generally involves analysing the extent to which the Green party in question has either progressed away from its initial movement roots, or has lacked movement credibility as it was formed by a base other than social movements (Rihoux and Frankland, 2008). A Green party's relationship with relevant social movements is not static, either. Green parties that have made it into government, like in Germany and Italy, have had to maintain, repair or make new relationships with social movements whilst in government and post-incumbency (Poguntke, 2002). This can be due to dissatisfaction about institutionalisation and the centralisation processes that accompany it, or the damage the party causes itself by choosing seemingly obvious ministries such as environment, thus increasing the scope for disappointing the party's core supporters, voters and affiliated movements (Poguntke, 2002, pp.139-141). Yet, even for institutionalised Green Parties today who have no organisational connections with movements, programmatic connections with their movement roots must be maintained so that the party can raise the salience of their core issues, retain ownership of and credibility on these issues, as well as gain allies in civil society (Blings, 2020). As this

literature emphasises, evaluating Green party links with social movements are important in terms of tracing the degree of institutionalisation and impact of governing on the party in their electoral prospects. I go further, suggesting that these links also need to be examined in relation to the meaningful everyday activism of party members, as well as contributing to the ongoing political style of Green and other progressive parties in the aesthetic and mediatised nature of contemporary politics.

Perhaps the lens of analysis that most focuses on facets of professionalisation within Green parties is the extent to which party organisational changes limit the amount of grassroots democracy and participation. As mentioned earlier, Green parties were, or sometimes still are, considered to be movement parties (Bomberg, 1992; Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Kitschelt, 2006). Frankland et al. (2008) tackle organisational issues of Green parties in a comparative edited volume across 14 countries to identify an ideal type that satisfies this hybrid space of movement/party that Green parties seem to straddle. In one chapter, they argue that the professionalisation of Green parties leads to an organisational transformation from an amateur-activist party type (their preferred concept similar to a movement party), towards adopting more electoral-professional characteristics, during which activities are re-assigned from party activists to professionals, (Lucardie and Rihoux, 2008). They conclude that all Green parties sit in different places within this space between party and movement, and adopt hybrid characteristics from each of these ideal-types at different faces of the party to create a new ideal-type of professional-activist party (Rihoux and Frankland, 2008). This ideal-type is most prevalent within the German Greens, who adopt many electoral-professional characteristics within the party in central and public office, whilst the party on the ground still displays predominantly amateur-activist characteristics (Rihoux and Frankland, 2008). Similarly, data from the first European Green Party Member survey almost 20 years ago analysed in a recent article on party members' views on Green Party organisation and grassroots democracy, suggests a continuing influence of engagement with

protest politics on a party member's preference for grassroots democracy (Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020). The nuances within their analysis suggest that, at the time of the survey, there was a clear north/south Europe divide in membership support for grassroots democracy, and also within parties on the support from different levels of party membership (Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020, pp. 6-8).

These developments within most Green parties seem to illustrate that their attempts to avoid Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy have not been successful overall, as the Green Party of England and Wales' decision to drop a principle of collective leadership illustrated (Rüdig, 2008). However, in recent literature on the Green Party of England and Wales, a professionalisation did not prevent a 'Green Surge' of increasing membership prior to the 2015 general election, opening a 'possibility' of a new left-libertarian protest party, within which many insiders identified more with left populist movement parties, such as SYRIZA and Podemos, than with their family counterparts on the continent (Dennison, 2017, pp.138-139). This shows that, whilst Green parties have reorganised themselves in a way which displaces the activity of its members, their members still play a large role within the parties. This is supported by Blings' (2020) argument that this may be happening between movements and parties with overlapping memberships. Again, the approach to studying members of Green parties focuses on Green member preferences, social profiles, or the level of participation evident in the party organisation and structure. They omit the lived experience of Green party membership and how party members play a role in the communication and broader political style of the party. My original analytical framework and its application in this thesis is a useful remedy to this omission in the scholarly literature.

2.6 The German Green Party – a scholarly history

Founded under European law in 1979 for the European elections that year, and then under West German law in 1980, the German Greens first entered the *Bundestag* just three years later, in 1983. The German Greens during this period were often categorised as left-wing. Arguments and concepts explaining the German Greens differed slightly but included: the German Greens as a form of 'left-libertarian' political party (Kitschelt, 1989), the German Greens as a proponent of 'new politics' (Poguntke, 1993), the torch bearers of the West German student movement of 1968 (Kundnani, 2009), or as one of the 'Federal Republic's most authentic and quintessential creations' which emanated from progressive forces (Markovits and Gorski, 1993, p.275).

Yet, others argue that the Greens' diverse and heterogenous coalition at their founding created a fragile catch-all party that included different new social movements, as well as those from the left and right (Raschke, 1993; Milder, 2019). The broad coalition of the milieus which made up the 'founding Greens' is comprehensively explored by Silke Mende (2011). She outlines six 'founding networks' of the West German Greens:

1. the New Social Movements,
2. the conservative green 'preservationists',
3. the 'community thinkers' of the *Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher* who flirted with both left and right,
4. the 'anti-authoritarian anthroposophists',
5. the 'dogmatic' faction of the 'New Left', and
6. the 'undogmatic' faction of the 'New Left' (Mende, 2011, p.32).

The first decade of the western Greens was marred by intra-party strife which coalesced between the reformist '*Realos*' and the fundamentalist '*Fundis*'. These opposing factions have continued to be referred to in journalistic, and

some academic work, despite the resignation of the *Fundis* from the party in the early 1990s (Frankland, 2008).

The establishment of the Greens in the former East Germany was shaped by a different form of 'environmentalism' and different civil society movements (Hager, 2019). Environmental groups first emerged within the relatively autonomous space of the Protestant Church, and in November 1989 an East German Green Party was formed out of protest that called for technical expertise rather than authoritarian SED loyalty in approaches to environmental policy (Hager, 2019, p.4). This position differed from that of their Western peers, who wanted more participatory inputs of citizens in relation to environmental policy, rather than dominance by technocratic decision-making.

However, both Green parties were united in their indifference to German unification, with both Green parties standing separately in the first All-German elections of 1990, in which the West German Greens failed to obtain seats in the *Bundestag* (Poguntke, 1998). The East German Greens stood for the 1990 elections on a joint list with an alliance of East German citizen movements as 'Alliance 90/The Greens' and the East German Greens had two of the eight seats obtained by Alliance 90/The Greens (Poguntke, 1998, p.35). The two parties eventually merged in 1993 and retained the 'Alliance 90/The Greens' name of the East German party in a process of gradual fusion through negotiations which began in 1992 (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck, 1994; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2001). Despite negotiations underlined by commitments to equality of both organisations, the eastern party and eastern Germany became marginalised in the Greens not long after their fusion (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck, 1994; Poguntke, 1998; Hager, 2019). Whilst the Greens continue to perform weaker electorally in eastern German states, recent years have seen some uptake in support for the party there due to the increasing salience of climate change as well as the contemporary Greens' clear opposition to the AfD (Hager, 2019).

Following the Greens' entry into parliament and involvement in state level governing coalitions in the late 1980s and 1990s, much literature concentrated on the party's transition from anti-establishment movement party or 'anti-party party' to the reconciliation of social movement and political party through institutionalisation. This tension captured the imagination of many scholars for the titles of their work: *German Greens: Paradox Between Movement & Party* (Mayer and Ely, 1998), *Der lange Weg der Grünen: eine Partei zwischen Protest und Regierung* (Falter and Klein, 2003), and *Between power and protest: the Green Party in Germany* (Frankland and Schoonmaker, 1992). E. Gene Frankland and Donald Schoonmaker trace the change in scholarly debate on the German Green party, where early fears were focused on the party's endorsement of civil disobedience, and how this could threaten the relatively new and precious democracy in the then post-war West Germany (1992). Indeed, they report of fears the Greens were 'watermelons', disguising a red core of communists within a Green exterior (Frankland and Schoonmaker, 1992, p. 3). The German Greens were not the first Green party to enter parliament. However, they became a paradigmatic model for other Green parties due to their success in gaining widespread political legitimacy in West Germany in the 1980s (Frankland, 2008).

The focus of academic literature on the transformation of the Greens intensified further when they governed at the federal level with the SPD between 1998 and 2005 (Blühdorn, 2004; Jachnow, 2013; Lees, C., 2000; O'Neill, 2000; Rüdig, 2012). Since then, there is consensus that the Greens are an established and professional political party given their presence and experience of governing in most areas of German politics. Frankland interchangeably refers to the German Greens as having undergone the process of parliamentarisation, institutionalisation and professionalisation, though he qualifies that these have not been completely fulfilled with the little influence and power that is still located within grassroots democratic principles

retained by the party (2008, pp. 35-37). Such ideas about professionalisation are also seen in accounts of the evolution of the Greens with explicit reference to their past. Andreas Stifel traces a 'German Greens in crisis' narrative within scholarship, where the Greens' own anti-establishment history is used as a constant measure of their now professionalised electoral performance and policy choices (2018). Cooper speaks about how the institutionalisation the party has gone through has diminished the identity of the social movement aspect of the party: 'the German political system has penetrated the Greens as much as they have penetrated it' (2004, p. 214). The most unique term for this process, however, is '*Der Protest verbeamtete*' (the civil-servantisation of protest) (Walter, 2010, p. 77). In this concept, Franz Walter argues that as the 68ers and later 'radicals' involved with the Greens grew up, so too did their desire for a job. I do not challenge this consensus of a far more professional and institutionalised party than that founded in the early 1980s. What I do contest is that this wealth of literature lacks nuance and ignores ongoing collaboration and association with social movements and other non-institutional actors, and the important role this plays both for the party's political style and for Green Party members in contemporary politics.

This professionalisation of the German Greens has been examined from multiple angles. One additional angle is an ideological shift towards liberalism. Gayil Talshir (2003) identifies the German Greens' adoption of classical liberalism and focus on the private individual in their 2002 party principles programme, which she argues shifted the party away from eco-socialism and its emphasis on the collective present in the *Basic Programme* created in 1980 (Die Grünen, 1980). This ideological shift to a more liberal profile corresponds to how Walter groups the Greens together with the FDP as a *bürgerlich* party of the higher-earning middle class (2010). He sees this transformation as strategic, to enable the Greens to make themselves a '*Scharnierpartei*' or hinge-party that enables coalitions between both of the catch-all parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD (Walter, 2010, p. 111). This is only made possible by

widening their appeal to swing voters, without diluting their appeal to their core, established voter base.

The Greens' strategy for the 2017 and 2021 election campaigns were notable in their lack of a chosen, named coalition partner, either standing as an 'independent political power' in 2017, or posing Annalena Baerbock as their own chancellor candidate in 2021. The clear tension that comes from this office-seeking strategy is that pleasing both swing and core voters is needed, so the party must hold on to their 'different' and 'alternative' identity and not lose the 1980s perception of the Greens as dynamic, creative, and original (Walter, 2010, pp. 80-81). This idea that the Greens need to be both things at once to garner a suitable amount of votes from the electorate, chimes with Rihoux and Frankland's findings that, organisationally, professionalised Green parties are both electoral-professional and amateur-activists parties all-in-one (2008).[3] However, existing research has not managed to analyse in depth how the Greens, or other progressive parties, are able to maintain a particular party identity or aesthetic authentic to their movement roots through a political style. This capability is significantly addressed by my concept of 'gentrified protest'.

After the German Greens left federal government in 2005 and the Merkel era of German politics began, the Greens faced explicit critique of their interpretation of Green politics. German Green policy's apparent abandonment of their original principles is clear in more ideologically-driven analyses. Writing in the *New Left Review*, Joachim Jachnow lambasts the party for their complicity in sanctioning the controversial Agenda 2010 welfare policies and their part in sending German soldiers to the 1998/1999 NATO

---

[3] In their chapter, Rihoux and Frankland (2008) state that one of the reasons for the German Greens holding onto some amateur-activist characteristics was because they had not fully discarded the principle of separating office and mandate amongst Green politicians. However, in January 2018, delegates of the Greens voted in favour of changing the party statute and further diluting this separation of office and mandate to give the then new Green Party co-leader Robert Habeck a transition period of eight months between his existing position in the Schleswig-Holstein state government and assuming the role of co-party leader.

coordinated action in Kosovo (2013). Policy and party programmatic decisions, however, refer back to the Greens' positioning of themselves as either a *Programmpartei* (programmatic party) or *Funktionspartei* (functional party, there to help realise coalitions). Cooper (2014) sees the problem merging these two forms of party can cause at the local level in her analysis of the Hamburg state government CDU-Green coalition in 2010, where citizens used the referendum function that was a part of the Green programme in order to overrule another Green policy on education reform. Ingolfur Blühdorn was even more pessimistic in this period, commenting on the 'exhaustion' and failed 'reinvention' of Green politics (2009). His assessment was, however, before the federal election in September 2009, where the Greens achieved their highest amount of vote share in a national election prior to 2021 and prior to Winfried Kretschmann becoming the first Green Minister President of a German state in 2011.

Yet the literature on the Greens in the 2010s was not as pessimistic. Stifel (2018, p.3) and his important intervention challenged such 'scepticism' for the Green project, which many saw as fulfilled and aging out of German politics through its institutionalisation. Instead, Stifel implores scholars to acknowledge the Greens' 'successful failure of a movement' in its staying power and expansion of its voting base. Such acknowledgement is illustrated by the scholarly interest on the viability of CDU-Green coalitions led by the CDU at the federal level based on recent experience at city and state level (Kronenberg, 2016; Weckenbrock, 2017). The ascent of Kretschmann and the novel, Green-led coalitions in Baden-Wurttemberg have been the particularly dominant success of the German Greens in the 2010s and is thus reflected in the most recent academic literature. For example, Felix Hörisch and Stefan Wurster (2017a) in their edited volume bring together various theoretical and policy approaches to evaluate the first Green-SPD coalition between 2011 and 2016. On the other hand, Michael Dürr (2018) concentrates on the impact leading the government has had on party elites and party members on their normative expectations of how the party should behave. In his party-ideal

framework between a pragmatic, voter-oriented party ideal and a principled, member-oriented party ideal, his elite interviews and member survey demonstrate that all three party faces are not homogenous, but all generally want to see a mixture of both pragmatic and principled party ideals, with particular enthusiasm from all sides on intra-party participation (Dürr, 2018, pp. 182-183). One of his most interesting findings on party elites and how they view party members, is the elites' wish that party members could learn to defend their parliamentary party when in government, a new behaviour for a state Green party that had been in opposition for 30 years (Dürr, 2018, p.155).

Psephological studies on who votes for the German Greens have attempted to explain voters' responses to the transformation of party ideology and policy change. Wolfgang Rüdig and Lothar Probst have written extensively on Green federal election performance in recent years (Probst, 2011; Probst, 2015; Rüdig, 2012; Rüdig, 2014). Discussing the profile of those who voted Green in a federal election normally invokes a discussion on social cleavages and whether Green voters still match up with post-materialist values and demographics found in earlier studies (Rüdig, 2012, p. 121; Stifel, 2018). The social profile is not only found in its electorate, but also in the politicians and party members themselves (Switek, 2017a). However, Rüdig does establish trends within a pre-existing longitudinal electoral data set about a 'backbone of party support' from older party veterans, and the increasing importance of women as supporters of the German Greens, a trend also found in analysis around 2011 (Güllner, 2012; Rüdig, 2012).

Probst highlights, as one of several factors for the poor Green electoral performance in the 2013 federal election, the choice of a more 'left-wing' manifesto that contained a taxation policy that would negatively affect more of their own supporters, who are generally highly educated with decent salaries (2015). This would seem to illustrate the post-materialist, secured wealth milieu of contemporary Green supporters, but also confirm Walter's argument

about the position of the German Greens in the middle classes, or what Peter Lösche called the '*bürgerliche aufgeklärte Mittigkeit*' (enlightened bourgeois centre) (2010, p. 14). Yet, Saskia Richter disagreed with this assessment in an edited volume on the potential of Green-CDU coalitions, stating that the bourgeoisie is not limited to the middle class; instead, she argues that formerly bourgeois values are now anchored and accepted in all groups in society, to the extent that she understands the bourgeoisie as 'every group of people who actively participate and are engaged in society' (Richter, 2016, p.29). Here, Richter's assessment is not too dissimilar to the Greens' 2019 rebrand as a self-titled 'alliance party', who work in alliances with groups who want to change society for the better (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019c). This rebrand and how it demonstrates features of the gentrified protest political style is analysed in chapter six.

Finally, studies on attitudes towards, or the opinions of, Green Party members have highlighted a disconnect between the rhetoric of Green Party membership and reality. Bukow's (2013) work on the party in central office gathered interview and survey data from multiple central party office employees in Germany. It provides an insight into the view on party members from the central party offices of the FDP, SPD, The Left, and Greens. His results show that the Green central party office were the only party he analysed that ranked the party goal of assuming power higher than representing the interests of party members, and that they also ranked party members lowest in terms of advancing the party organisation (Bukow, 2013). Bukow does suggest that Green party employees' relatively low acceptance that growing membership numbers demonstrate an increasing legitimacy of the party is due to the Greens' 'party-cultural history' of a party open to participation of non-members (2013, p.226-227). Bukow's empirical research thus highlights a disconnect between central party employees' perceptions of the role of party members and the constant emphasis of an autonomous and grassroots member party structure. Such a disconnect between rhetoric and reality is possible in an interpretive ethnography approach, which can analyse

and compare both rhetoric and policies in official documents with the candid and lived experience shared in interviews with party members.

This disconnect is demonstrated differently in party membership survey studies. Firstly, in a comparative survey study of Green Party members conducted in 2002 and 2003, the German Green members themselves were the least likely in the northern Europe group of Green parties to support grassroots democracy (Rüdig and Sajuria, 2020). Secondly, Tim Spier's findings from the 2009 German Party Membership survey identified a similar disconnect in the Greens as the German party with the largest share of inactive members, which contradicts their 'image of an activist party with a lot of grassroots activities' (2019, p.295). This contrasts with the argument of Andrei Markovits and Joseph Klaver (2015, p.116) that the Greens' brand of ecology, feminism, peace and grassroots democracy has been normalised in German politics beyond the Green party as they have institutionalised, but to an extent in which they 'have become fully established without being fully the establishment'. The Greens have managed this by maintaining an image of what Stifel (2018, pp.290-292) calls both a 'double character of social movement and parliamentary party' or 'movement party' which benefits them in German political party competition. My doctoral thesis, with its use of an ethnographic approach, provides the opportunity to delve into the lived experience of the party on the ground and explore the extent to which this disconnect and double character is both perceived by party members themselves and incorporated into the party's political style and its branding of inclusion, progressiveness, participation, and movement politics.

Such existing studies as those listed above have highlighted their surprise findings at the differences between perceptions of the party and empirical opinions from interviews with party elites and survey data from party members. However, this surprise is not explored further. There is no interest in examining how this manifests in the lived everyday experience of active party members.

Furthermore, the interest in such information is limited to studying the Greens when in power or as a means of domestic or party family comparisons. The methods I utilise in this study are able to capture and provide concrete examples and cases of divergent rhetoric and reality in party member participation. Additionally, through the framework of gentrified protest these concrete discrepancies can help to analyse the extent to which the brand within the political style of the German Greens is actually experienced on the ground.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has critically surveyed diverse, interdisciplinary research to highlight the conceptual desert that exists in considering the role protest plays in the political style of progressive and Green parties. I have reiterated how the interaction between institutional and extra-institutional politics is divided along conceptual lines of protest as an extra-institutional phenomenon and based on an understanding of the political which is dominated by institutions. This has contributed to a long-term lack of communication between social movement studies and protest research and the study of political parties. Although this communication is slowly emerging by both party and movement scholars, it mostly focuses on either organisational typology or its impact on party campaigning and ideology. The past decade has seen a flurry of concepts proposed, yet none of these terms address the role and experience of party members nor how it contributes to the overall aesthetic of the party.

The concepts of a movement party, party-sponsored protest, activist party, or party-driven movements presented to account for the interaction of party and protest movements acknowledge the normalisation of protest in predominantly Western nations as just one of many tools available to institutional politics. Yet, these concepts fall short when applied to the case under examination in this

thesis: the German Green Party. The Greens were considered a movement party in their early years, before they institutionalised, which, according to Kitschelt (2006) marks the end of a movement party's existence. Party sponsored protest, on the other hand, can be applied to institutionalised parties in opposition and used in a comparative quantitative analysis. However, this makes it a reductive term for qualitative analysis. Party-driven movements seem to be a feature of majoritarian systems where the barriers of entry for new political parties are high, which is not the case in Germany and is a limitation the authors recognise themselves (Muldoon and Rye, 2020). Finally, the activist party concept by Peña (2021) specifically discounts the German Greens having any kind of relationship with movements. Peña himself states that he considers them to be a previously niche party who widened their electoral appeal to become an 'electoralist' party. His characterisation falls down because the party still aligns and works with social movements, as evidenced in both this thesis and Blings (2020). Furthermore, none of these terms provide helpful frameworks for the mediated and embodied experience of party members in party and protest interactions. This is exactly what my concept of 'gentrified protest', conceived as a type of political style and outlined in detail in the following chapter, can help elucidate. This may be applied in this work solely to the German Greens, but has significance for the analysis of the political style of progressive political parties more broadly.

Even social movement literature which analyses the transformation of social movements into political parties or other organisations such as NGOs proves fruitless for this project: NGOisation refers to a transformation into a non-governmental organisation and is thus irrelevant in this context. De-radicalisation, institutionalisation, and professionalisation all account for the moderation of movements. De-radicalisation in particular refers to de-escalating radical movement actions but is increasingly used in relation to terrorism. This leaves professionalisation, institutionalisation, and parliamentarisation which denote a movement accommodating to an institution, or specifically the institution of a parliament. Both processes involve

a development of professionals for whom politics becomes a paid vocation. All three of these processes also indicate a process that is specifically tied to institutions and for which, in the literature on the German Greens, is considered a process which has been completed. Once more, the legacy of a political party's non-institutional origin is completely erased through these conceptions, ignoring the memory and nuances that the party may have retained despite undergoing such processes.

This thesis applies my original analytical framework of 'gentrified protest', outlined in the following chapter, to present and examine how the political style of contemporary progressive parties, with its focus on movement/protest, democracy, and participation, incorporates party members in order to embody, legitimise and reproduce the party's rhetorical and aesthetic style, both on the 'streets' and its mediatised communications. This thus requires the study of local party activism and members or, in the words of Katz and Mair (1994), the party on the ground. As such, the role of political parties, the way in which parties are organised, and studies on party participation and party members were explored. The review of this literature made clear that very rarely is the lived experience of party members explored, and that our understanding of who and what a party member is, is shaped by legal and official constructions of party members (Gauja, 2015). When party members are the focus of research, they are often consulted only in quantitative surveys with responses often pre-determined by researchers, as was the case in Dürr's (2018) work on German Green Party members in Baden-Wurttemberg. Such approaches maintain a chasm which omits the lived reality of party activism. This project fills this gap with its interpretive ethnographic research approach, required to detect gentrified protest and discussed in chapter four, to present the lived, individual construction of party membership in the case of the German Greens in Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart.

My original framework of gentrified protest and the methods utilised to study party members and the political style also provide important insights to research on Green Parties. Existing research on Green parties is often concentrated on one of the following approaches: their ability to form a party family; their classification as a niche party; comparative studies exploring social profiles and cleavages of Green voters and members; or, most prominently, their party organisational forms. This is often in relation to their interaction with civil society and social movements and commitment to grassroots democracy. Whilst this study is not comparative across countries, the German Greens are one of the most researched Green parties (Blings, 2020), and considered the paradigmatic Green Party (Frankland, 2008). There is therefore both a great deal of secondary literature to consult, albeit nowhere near the amount in English since the 1990s and early 2000s. My study thus creates a corrective to this oversight and provides non-German speaking scholars with more current material on contemporary Green Parties and their members in Europe, specifically in Germany.

The thesis' contribution to academic understanding of the German Greens is also significant. I constructed a brief history of the German Greens as told by scholarly analysis. The scholarship on the party has shifted along with its rapid progress from anti-party parliamentary arm of social movements in the 1980s, through the reformist professionalisation of the 1990s, to the Green-SPD federal coalition between 1998 and 2005. Stifel (2018) encapsulated the contradiction of research on the German Greens since 2005 in both a narrative of the party in crisis being contrasted against its movement history, as well as obtaining increasing electoral successes at federal and state levels. A succession of grand coalitions between the CDU and SPD during the Merkel era of German politics alongside a Green Party with obvious office-seeking goals generated scholarship on new coalition formats and their potential at the federal level, such as CDU-Green coalitions. The position of the Greens as the antithesis to the AfD was also starting to be acknowledged in scholarship published during the period of my fieldwork (Hager, 2019). However, my data

and the corresponding analysis has the unique position of depicting how the German Greens were coping with another period of ascendance in the late 2010s. Through my frame of gentrified protest, I can highlight how the party was both rebranding and emphasising their origins to emphasise their political style of progressive politics. Unlike any of the terms and frameworks reviewed in this chapter, the comparison of rhetoric and style against the lived reality, particularly for party members, is particularly necessary to our understanding of participatory, progressive politics in the heavily mediatised political landscape of contemporary Western politics.

Chapter 3 Gentrified protest – an analytical framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to address the missing conceptual and analytical framework that can help us to understand the aesthetic and affective role that protest and progressive politics plays for contemporary political parties and their party members. Such a framework needs to be able to deliver insights that the structural, organisational, and ideological based analyses of institutional and extra-institutional politics do not address, as detailed in the previous chapter. My original concept and framework of 'gentrified protest', as laid out in extensive detail in this chapter, does just that and is particularly adept at addressing the legacy of past social movements within that organisation or political culture more generally, as well as the increasingly aesthetic role of protest in contemporary politics. In particular, gentrified protest is able to detect and capture the importance and interaction of protest and politics for party members and political activists, and the variety of and nuances within these interactions. In so doing, my concept and framework of gentrified protest is an innovative way in which to analyse how both central party machines, politicians, and party members all internalise and communicate a culture which includes protest as a part of their progressive politics.

Why gentrified protest? According to Schlichtman et al., we are living in an era of the 'gentrification of everything' (2017, pp.9-11). This chapter adds another, increasingly important form of gentrification to their list. The previous chapter concluded that terms for social movement transformation, such as institutionalisation, and various terms that capture hybrid movement parties are inadequate in capturing the current role political protest and activism play for many progressive political parties. Therefore, this chapter proposes, critically analyses, and discusses how the concept of gentrification helps to

identify this new function of protest within a mainstream(ing), progressive party. Following a thorough genealogy of the concept of gentrification in both scholarly and cultural contexts which highlights the associations and connotations the term conjures up in Anglo-Saxon and European contexts, I indicate how, as a *political style*, the meanings and qualities of gentrification can identify, and account for, the interactions and processes in contemporary 21st century progressive politics and protest that the terms in chapter one simply cannot. I do this by proposing *gentrified protest* as an analytical framework that not only establishes a strong theoretical foundation for this thesis, but which also structures the analysis of my research data on the German Greens in chapters five and six.

Given the concept gentrification has strong academic and cultural connotations and denotations, the first section of this chapter outlines the general academic utility of the term as it is currently conceived in social science. It briefly summarises the classic research on the predominant use of the term in relation to processes of change in urban spaces, but also highlights innovative research that has developed and stretched the use of the concept of gentrification outside this context. Following this interrogation of diverse uses of the concept, I argue that the theorisation of a gentrification of protest, can therefore work on the basis of the attributes and characteristics that seem core to its conceptualisation, regardless of the scholarly context in which it is used.

The second section looks at the broader cultural understanding of the term gentrification. As the German Greens are the political grouping that I use to test my framework later in the thesis, this section includes both German and English-speaking cultural contexts. Sections one and two thus create a genealogy of gentrification which illustrates the broad societal, semantic, and connotative properties of gentrification as a concept purely above urban regeneration and/or development. The similarities of different

conceptualisations of gentrification across both sections are united through the issues of: *class* and social group *displacement*, the process of *sanitising* or *institutionalising* radical politics, and the *aesthetic* and *stylistic* nature that these forms of transformation often take; broader societal connotations of *middle-class colonisation* through taste distinction, the role of *authenticity* and *consumption*, and how *culture is employed or appropriated* to deliver this authenticity. Based on this conceptual dissection and discussion, the bulk of the chapter and final section presents my original theoretical framework of *gentrified protest*.

This final section starts by highlighting the parameters of the concept of 'political style' as conceived by Benjamin Moffitt (2016). It deconstructs how gentrified protest as a political style highlights the temporal, spatial and semantic aspects of the term gentrification and asks how it can adequately capture aesthetic attributes and the quality and dynamic nature of authenticity within contemporary progressive political parties. Furthermore, in adapting Rasmus Kleis Nielsen's (2012) concept of 'personalised political communication', I demonstrate how gentrified protest is not just about the mediatised style of a political party or organisation, but rather how grassroots members contribute to, reproduce, and legitimise the style of gentrified protest. Through critical exploration of the term gentrification and my analytical use of it as *gentrified protest*, I address the complexity of protest when analysing contemporary left-liberal, centre-left, and ecological movements or political parties.

3.2 How is gentrification understood in academia?

3.2.1 Urban Sociology and Geography

In academic spaces as well as in common parlance, *Gentrification* is a word that conjures ideas and images of sleek neighbourhoods with inhabitants that have been called yuppies, hipsters, and the creative and cultural classes, but which often possesses an almost folklore-like history of downtrodden, derelict, and disastrous tales of urban planning and extreme poverty. Gentrification often relates specifically to the transformations of areas that were once the homes of marginalised migrant communities, or indeed citizens marginalised in their own country due to their race, class, religion, or sexuality. Gentrification is therefore a term used to describe the transformation of residential wealth and class; a sprucing up of a neighbourhood at the expense of its original residents, whilst retaining allusions and impressions of original ruggedness as part of its distinctive charm. Consequently, gentrification is often perceived as a negative process. This common understanding of gentrification is explored in all its complexity within human geographical and urban sociological scholarship.

It is not my intention, nor my area of expertise, to try and intervene in debates around the causes or explanations of gentrification as a process of urban renewal. But, in order to understand the attributes of gentrification that relate to political protest and activism, it is necessary to tease out the distinctive characteristics of the term in its dominant use in relation to urban spaces. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in subsequent sections of this chapter, the term gentrification is beginning to take on an extended life outside of its original scholarly home, and within its understanding in the public consciousness. For example, Geographer Chris Hamnett argues that gentrification has caught the imagination of human and urban geography because it represents a central

ideological and theoretical divide between 'liberal humanists' and an emphasis on consumption, culture and individual choice, on the one hand, and 'structural Marxists' and an emphasis on class, capital, and production, on the other (1991, p.174). This suggests that gentrification is not only a political and contested *process*, but a political and contested *term* which can be used to defend or argue a particular political ideology.

In this way, explaining the process of gentrification has been at the heart of ideological debates within human geography and urban sociology, and is inextricably tied up with issues of *class*, *capitalism*, *lifestyle*, *consumption*, *aesthetics*, *style*, *cultural symbols*, and *authenticity*. In chapter two I established how many of these issues are pertinent in the literature on Green parties and postmaterialist social movements. This section focuses on how these issues manifest in the gentrification literature and the parallels with the political subject matter of my original framework.

The term gentrification was originally coined by sociologist Ruth Glass (1964) to denote the displacement of working class residents in urban areas by the middle classes. It defines the regeneration of a previously deprived area, and was used to refer exclusively to residential dwellings in inner-city areas, but in recent years has been applied to include businesses, and gentrification of rural areas (Lees, L. et al., 2008). Class conflict exists within the etymology of the term, as *gent* refers to the landed *gentry* specific to class structures in the UK, despite the fact that the middle classes in no way represent or are considered as part of the 'gentry' in contemporary Britain. Gentrification is therefore a political as well as an analytical term. The UK-specific nature of the origins of the term gentrification, and the difficulties it poses when translated into other languages has raised calls for the conceptualisation of a more 'generic gentrification' that can be applied across different cultural and economic cultures (Clark, 2015). Considering such a broader context, gentrification refers to 'the commodification of space accompanying land use changes in

such a way that it produces indirect/direct/symbolic displacement of existing users and owners by more affluent groups' (Shin et al., 2016, p.458). *Commodification* and *consumption* are therefore an inherent part of the process and concept of gentrification, as much as *class* and the physical encroachment of a space. Furthermore, the post-war coining of the term by Glass and the challenges posed in translating the concept into other cultures and different economic structures underlines its similar associations with that of postmaterialist and Western political values.

Gentrification is also considered a 'chaotic' concept as the process of gentrification is complex and cannot be fully explained by a few factors (Rose, 1984). The debate about the 'chaotic' nature of gentrification emerged from the frustration with stagnant attempts to explain it through either production and structural conditions of profitability (Smith, N., 1979), or through consumption and the agency of so-called *gentrifiers* (Hamnett, 1991). Both of these approaches to explaining gentrification link it to the notion of capital: Ley (1994), inspired by Bell's (1974) thesis of the post-industrial society, discusses the link between the new middle classes, left-liberal politics and gentrification. Hamnett (1994) is one of the main proponents of a thesis of *professionalisation* for gentrification, which posits that as urban areas require more professional workers, more middle-class professionals move there. These theories imply that the rise of *post-materialist values of individualisation*, increased levels of higher education, and *concerns for distant political issues*, together with the *youth involved in counter-cultural movements and challenging the status-quo*, as seen within the transnational 1968 movement, made up the groups that we now call gentrifiers; in other words, the 1968 generation became professionals, or 'hippies became yuppies' (Ley, 1996).

These developments further highlight the (middle) class focus on the concept of gentrification as well as how gentrification is linked to wider post-war societal, cultural and political changes, such as the professionalisation of

these new, counter-cultural, middle classes. Issues such as these and the social profiles of post-materialism often apply to similar groups of people involved in urban, progressive politics. For example, the previous chapter already addressed how these values have been shown to be salient for Green party support (Dolezal, 2010). As such, this project aimed to test the utility of the concept in the political context to a political organisation, the German Greens, often associated with gentrification in the media, particularly internationally (Bennhold, 2018; McGuinness, 2018; Poschardt, 2018; Weise, 2018).

Despite the origins of gentrification relating to the British class system, the concept gentrification or *Gentrifizierung* is found within the German-language context to account for the same commodification of space and change in land-uses as discussed in the previous section. In marked contrast to American gentrification research, German research around gentrification prior to German unification had assumed that 'urban change [in Germany] would be slower, less dramatic, and less pronounced than in US cities', due to different urban cultures and urban planning traditions, more state intervention, less stark income inequalities, and the large amount of rental stock in Germany (Bernt and Holm, 2013, p.109). This changed in the 1990s after German reunification which drastically increased turnover in the German property market (Bernt and Holm, 2013). The Prenzlauer Berg district in Berlin has been linked to research and discourses of gentrification since the 1990s and early 2000s as a particular example of regeneration in former East Germany, despite its proximity to districts of former West Berlin strongly distinguishing it from other former East German cities such as Leipzig (Wiest and Zischner, 2006). Berlin is a particularly contentious area for gentrification in Germany, with urban sociologist Andrej Holm editing and managing the *Gentrification Blog* as an intermediary source between 'academic specialist debates and social movements in urban conflicts' and which predominantly focuses on the

issue within Berlin.[4] The port city of Hamburg is also a prominent source of gentrification research and resistance within Germany (Birke et al., 2015; Brunow, 2011).

Berlin has, however, become synonymous with gentrification since German unification, and is particularly prescient amongst communities of areas in Berlin such as Neukölln, Kreuzberg as well as the archetypal German site of gentrification: Prenzlauer Berg (Krajewski, 2015). Gentrification was an often-discussed topic at the Green party meetings I attended during my fieldwork in Berlin. Furthermore, in the Green-led district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, the city senate and district council have attempted to combat the increased gentrification and use of property to create wealth for investment companies through actions such as *Milieuschutz* (milieu conservation) and *Vorkaufsrecht* (right of first refusal) (Sarnow, 2019). Gentrification processes thus manifest differently in different countries and different regions, cities and districts within a country, illustrating once again the importance of *space*, *place* and the *historical traditions* of the economy and political policy in the development of gentrification. Such characteristics are thus relevant in other uses of the concept, as will be demonstrated in the rest of this chapter.

In this section the conceptualisation of gentrification within human geography and urban sociology has been explored, highlighting the concept's attributes of *place*, *class*, *commodification*, and *historical context*. The political nature of gentrification in this context descends into debate around the ideological arguments and explanations for the gentrification of areas. Whilst inherently political, such classic, student-textbook-appropriate ideological debates appear detached: firstly, from the emerging research that identifies the colonial aspects of gentrification (Kent-Stoll, 2020); secondly, from societal and cultural associations of gentrification; and lastly, from the visceral displacement felt by

---

[4] Holm's blog can be found at the following address:
https://gentrificationblog.wordpress.com/about/

citizens suffering because of gentrification processes on the ground. The following subsections interrogate scholarly conceptualisations of gentrification outside the land use context, and the ways in which the four aforementioned attributes, as well as others, continue to be present in the concept.

3.2.2 Stretching the concept of gentrification – Gentrification of LGBTQ+ Activism

Writer and activist Sarah Schulman (2013) places the concept of gentrification centrally within her 'personal intellectual memoir' on the afterlife and memory of the 1980s AIDS epidemic in America. For Schulman, gentrification is a term she uses for a process of an erasure of the true *history*, *experience*, and *consequences* of American AIDS activism in the 1980s. In her own words, gentrification is the concept that describes the process that

> *homogenizes* complexity, difference, dynamic dialogic action for change and *replaces* it with sameness […] a kind of institutionalisation of culture […] a lack of demand on the powers that be [and] containment
>
> (Schulman, 2013, p.14. Her emphasis).

In this sense, gentrification in Schulman's eyes is a *depoliticisation* of a radical civil rights movement into an *institutionalised cultural narrative*. She further distinguishes a 'literal experience of gentrification', of urban replacement as discussed above, and a 'spiritual gentrification', a gentrification that takes place in the mind of 'an internal replacement that alienated people from the concrete process of social and artistic change' (Schulman, 2013, p.14). Schulman's spiritual gentrification of the mind displaces the radical political nature of AIDS activism into this *approved, institutionalised, and sanitised*

history and experience better posed for broader societal consumption. Such a crafted historical narrative to fit in with a particular political style is an attribute to the concept of gentrification that will be discussed in far more detail in the third section of this chapter.

However, despite this explicit definition of gentrification at the outset of her book, Schulman uses the term gentrification throughout to account for any homogenising process, whether that be food, memory, neighbourhoods or 'institutionalised mourning':

> The disallowed grief of twenty years of AIDS deaths [81,542 New Yorkers] was replaced by ritualised and institutionalised mourning of the acceptable dead [2,752 New Yorkers died on 9/11]. In this way, 9/11 is the gentrification of AIDS. The replacement of deaths that don't matter with deaths that do
>
> (Schulman, 2013, p.46).

A provocative and controversial statement such as this, playing the acceptability of one group of deaths via another to exemplify what she considers another form of gentrification, is her least convincing use of the concept. I understand the point she is trying to convey, in that deaths used to justify a war on terror are more routinely acknowledged than of those from a marginalised community who were often refused healthcare. However, using the term gentrification here seems redundant and undermines her other often insightful uses of the concept. For example, I find how she describes 'gentrified thinking' as very plausible and an illuminative description of real processes in 21st century society. Such gentrified thinking, to Schulman is 'stupid', 'a dumbing down and smoothing over of what people are actually like', and:

a social position rooted in received wisdom, with aesthetics blindly selected from the pre-sorted offering of marketing and without information or awareness about the structures that create its own delusional sense of infallibility

(Schulman, 2013, p.51).

This description of gentrified thinking in my opinion is a cynical, though accurate, account of the rise and impact of slacktivism on social media platforms, particularly on Instagram. Her unpacking of the *aesthetic* and *stylistic* attributes of gentrification, outside the context of the aesthetics of an urban space in buildings and commercial outlets, further reinforce how integral aesthetics are to the concept, as is also the case within my proposed gentrification of protest.

Schulman's work is built upon by political scientist Daniel Conway (2021) in looking at the contemporary 'lifestylisation of LGBTQ+ identities' and the 'gentrification of activism' in South Africa. Conway takes Schulman's argument, that the oppressive and hard-fought battle for rights of the LGBTQ+ community in 1980s New York has been erased and replaced with a predominantly heteronormative sense of community, to illustrate the commercialisation and individualisation of the *Johannesburg Pride* event. *Johannesburg Pride* is located in a wealthy, majority White area of the city, articulates LGBTQ+ identities as 'lifestyles', and excludes and hides the participation and ongoing discrimination and human rights abuses still faced by poorer and marginalised LGBTQ+ citizens in South Africa:

This vision of Pride, as a lifestyle destination, evokes Schulman's (2013) characterisation of the tastes, politics and mindset of 'gentrified' white, urban, LGBTQ+ communities. For these individuals, *the history of queer activist struggles, LGBTQ+*

identities and Pride become more akin to commercial 'brands' that evoke emotional and cultural associations divorced from any troubling associations with poverty, oppression or marginalisation. […] Johannesburg Pride's gentrified version of Pride and its attendees, reflecting broader lifestyles of commercial consumption, excludes people who cannot access this 'lifestyle' and effectively erases them from not just Pride, but also broader LGBTQ+ politics and identity

(Conway, 2021, p.157. Emphasis mine).

Not only is *Johannesburg Pride* gentrified in its sense of exclusion of marginalised LGBTQ+ people and their struggle, it simultaneously associates itself with a *collective radical lineage* of anti-apartheid and LGBTQ+ liberation through language and evoking the history of the South African Liberation Struggle (Conway, 2021). Conway's use of the concept gentrification in relation to contemporary political activism thus highlights further attributes central to the concept. Firstly, that the *history* and *ancestry* of a political movement is used stylistically and aesthetically to the extent they are like *brands* in this new gentrified activism, as well as a means through which to cultivate a sense of *authenticity* as part of a wider cultural lineage of radical activism in a more sanitised present. In other words, the gentrified activism ignores the complex history and ancestry, or is *sanitised*, in order to be acceptable, palatable, and less problematic whilst also still 'political'. Secondly, it again touches upon the exclusionary displacement of marginalised groups, in this case on economic and racial grounds, outside of the residential context described in section one. Both Schulman and Conway's work have illustrated the utility of the concept of gentrification in relation to queer political activism, and therefore establish a precedent for it to be used in relation to political activism more broadly. I look to expand the scope further by using it in relation to progressive politics as outlined in the final section of this chapter.

3.2.3 Stretching the concept of gentrification – Gentrified politics in political theory

In my research on the expansion of its original definition, I have found gentrification as a concept used within political theory, albeit only in a few but nevertheless paradigm-changing publications. Slavoj Žižek's (2008) *For they know not what they do*, first published in 1991, uses the term gentrification, in his analysis of the term 'vanishing mediator' and Hegelian dialectics. Žižek argues that the mediator, which facilitates the transition from one epoch to another, vanishes after this facilitation in all but a gentrified form that is *acceptable* within the new epoch, or 'normality' (2008, pp. 194-196). In his article on iterations of populism, Benjamin Arditi (2003) borrows Žižek's interpretation of gentrification to illustrate Lefort's (1988) distinction between politics and the political. In Arditi's second iteration: 'populism as a symptom of democratic politics', he analyses how populism exists in the 'democratic imaginary of modern politics' (2003, pp.25-27). Similarly to Žižek's analysis of the double inscription of the political as both one of the social whole's subsystems and as the terrain where the fate of the whole is decided (2008, pp.193-194), populism as a symptom both belongs to democracy, but also disrupts the gentrified political order of liberal democracy (Arditi, 2003). Arditi asserts that gentrification represents the closed, elite and 'impersonal affair' of a liberal political system and that the gentrified nature of it conceals the inequality and 'shadier deals' required to sustain it (2003, pp.25-27). As populism disrupts the gentrified political system, bringing more democratic 'noise' and citizens into the institutions, it also threatens the normality of the gentrified political system and as such positions itself at the 'rougher edges' of democratic politics (Arditi, 2003, pp.25-27).

With parallels to Schulman, Žižek's use of gentrification accounts for *an acceptable political historicisation of an epoch-shifting mediator*, such as a political revolution, in a new 'normal'. Arditi, on the other hand, takes this

further with his use of gentrification as the *acceptable, elitist, mainstream liberal political system and politics* - in other words institutionalised - which stands in contrast to noisy, anti-establishment, ungentrified populist politics. These characteristics of professionalism and established mainstream politics within a conceptualisation of gentrification in Arditi and Žižek's work will influence an attribute that will be incorporated into gentrified protest in section three. In particular, the notion of a gentrified form of protest as containing what I term an *authentic yet sanitised* political ancestry.

These post-Marxist/postmodern analyses of the flaws of democratic systems and the political illustrate, together with the use of the term in relation to queer activism, that a narrow understanding of the concept of gentrification within scholarly work is not required. Indeed, outside of the stretching of the concept by Schulman, Conway, Žižek and Arditi, there is a broader understanding and connotative function of gentrification in contemporary society that highlights further important attributes of gentrification. On this basis, the next section outlines the ways in which gentrification as a concept is stretched in relation to different themes in the contemporary cultural domain, and how this is reflected in scholarly work.

3.3 How is gentrification understood more broadly?

3.3.1 Gentrification, class, consumption, and authenticity

Revisiting the assertion from the start of the chapter, that we are living in an era of the 'gentrification of everything' (Schlichtman et al., 2017, pp.9-11), what follows in section two aims to illustrate just how pliable the term gentrification has become in wider society, and not just within urban studies. Traditionally class, in particular the middle class, has been central to understanding who is

involved in the process of gentrification. In their reflective text, Schlichtman et al. declare that as well as being scholars of gentrification, they too are *gentrifiers*, and define this as such:

> we are middle-class people who moved into disinvested neighbourhoods in a period during which a critical mass of other middle-class people did the same, thereby exerting economic, political, and social pressures upon the existing community. […] [Gentrification is] when there are enough middle-class in-movers in a lower income neighborhood to prompt *social*, *cultural*, *political*, and *economic changes*
>
> (Schlichtman et al., 2017, p.4. Emphasis mine.)

Regardless of whether the area is a city or a rural part of a country, any processes of 'middle-class colonisation' of an area are denoted in the media as gentrification, because of the wide-spread recognition and political use of the concept and its class connotations (Lees, L. et al., 2008, p.156). Because gentrification can be used as a synonym for 'middle-class colonisation' or domination therefore entails that *class* is a central attribute of the concept. The class of gentrifiers is often named as one or more of the following: middle class or new middle class (Ley, 1996; Smith, N., 1987), bourgeois bohemians, often abbreviated to 'Bobos' (Brooks, 2000), professionals (Hamnett, 1991), the creative class (Florida, 2012; Florida, 2017), or the cultural new class (Ley, 1994). These gentrifying classes may not be homogenous, but the processes of *displacement* and *exclusion* of other classes and marginalised communities are consistent in whatever context the term is used in; whether in terms of urban redevelopment, LGBTQ+ history, individuals' identities and experiences, or even food and culture.

One way in which classes, and gentrifying classes in particular, can be identified is through specific *cultural* and *aesthetic tastes*. That tastes 'function as markers of class' is argued by Pierre Bourdieu in his influential work *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, (1984, pp.1-2). It is only those who are equipped with the cultural competence, who have learned a specific cultural code, who are able to decode the meaning of a work of art (Bourdieu, 1984). Furthermore, in the example of the work of art:

> an art which ever increasingly contains reference to its own history demands to be perceived historically; it asks to be referred not to an external referent, the represented or designated 'reality', but to the universe of past and present works of art

> (Bourdieu, 1984, p.3).

As such the aesthetic perception of art is therefore 'historical, inasmuch as it is differential, relational, attentive to the deviations […] which make styles' (Bourdieu, 1984, p.4). Such a coded style that references within its own territory and history in order to consider which similar works of art belong to the same 'style', results in exclusion not only at the level of being able to decipher the work, but also at the level of what works of art are part of this group, and which are excluded. Within my conceptualisation of a gentrification of protest, I argue that such as historically perceived and self-referential style is also apparent within political cultures and the legacy of protests and social movements.

What *Distinction* also explicates is how cultural codes also occur in distinguishing social groups. Individuals distinguish themselves and their class 'in the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar' and consequently in their *cultural consumption* (Bourdieu, 1984, p.6). The codes of such distinctions within society and social

groups lead to: 'Life-styles [as] the systematic products of habitus, which, […], become sign systems that are socially qualified (as 'distinguished', 'vulgar' etc.)' (Bourdieu, 1984, p.172). Even within the dominant class, consumption habits across food, culture and presentation differ (Bourdieu, 1984). These lifestyles signify to others the class or intra-class social grouping through the distinctions they make; those involved in the lifestyles are involved in determining the value judgements of distinguished and vulgar by participating in the sign system of distinction, as well as communicating to others their value judgements. These sign systems and the individual level of distinction, I argue, can also be found within political styles. Curating a political style is about distinguishing a party from others by reaching out to certain groups, individuals, voters, or activists. Indeed, as I conceptualise within gentrified protest, activists and party members wish to distinguish their political selves through their formal or otherwise support of a political party or political organisation.

Another example of a system of signs where one can fulfil their desire to distinguish their identity through consumption is described by Jean Baudrillard (1996) in an essay on advertising in *The System of Objects*. The essay highlights how a washing powder advertisement, in which a crowd waves white flags at an UN headquarters-size packet of Pax, elicits a consumer desire to purchase Pax so that they may see themself reflected in the 'collective' reality depicted; that of the social body campaigning for values of peace (Baudrillard, 1996, pp.178-179). Yet, this motivation for consumption is caught in a contradiction, where the desire for social solidarity motivates us to purchase a product to differentiate ourselves from others, but which also involves purchasing the same product to buy into the same idea as the collective purchasing it (Baudrillard, 1996). This example shows how consumerist signifiers and taste interact to communicate a *sanitised, acceptable culture*, which also distinguishes itself from others. To bring distinction, sign systems, and consumption back to my focus of gentrification, the use of gentrification as a concept to describe lifestyle trends highlights this

double level of meaning within the concept, focusing on the 'class signifiers instead of class itself', or the consumption habits of the gentrifying classes, rather than those involved in the purchasing and rent increases of gentrification (Staley, 2018). This further highlights the diversity that exists within a social group, and the diversity of consumption needs of gentrifiers due to the diverse nature of gentrifiers. Electorally motivated political parties often integrate diverse aspirational class signifiers into their political style, in an attempt to attract as broad support as possible, as well as numerous parties competing to attract similar social groups within the centre of society.

Aesthetics are another element in *Distinction*. It is through aesthetic choices, such as clothing or home decoration, where one can assert their social status, but not all social classes are willing to 'transform […] the basic dispositions of a life-style into a system of aesthetic principles, objective differences into elective distinctions' (Bourdieu, 1984, p.57). Such aestheticism defines itself through negation of the 'aesthetic' of other classes, such as the working classes' aesthetic. Conversely, this system of aesthetic distinction can also create a hierarchy of *authenticity* where people throw the accusation of being pretentious to indicate people being inauthentic and 'policing those suspected of trying to migrate from their social background' (Fox, 2016, p.129). For example, declaring drag ball culture within the LGBTQ+ community as mere pretension due to the participating drag kings and queens not being 'authentic' to their social circumstances, is to writer and musician Dan Fox a form of social control, where 'you not only deny the possibility of change, you remove a tool of social critique from the hands of communities that need them' (Fox, 2016, pp.61-62).

That these tastes, cultural preferences, and distinctions, can, according to Bourdieu, identify ourselves or someone else as belonging to a specific class or social group, have also been used to class or identify gentrifiers. Indeed, notable gentrification scholar Sharon Zukin argues that the desire to 'consume

authenticity' in gentrification creates displacement through the satiation of the 'taste for authenticity in the product mix, store design, and intangible ambiance of restaurants, boutiques, and gourmet stores' (2008, p.734). For Zukin, the exclusion does not happen through overt discourses of authenticity that refer to social class, income level or race, but instead refers to particular *tastes* and produces exclusionary consumption practices which cater to such tastes (2008). Geographer Miriam Stock (2013) in her study on falafel shops in Berlin looks at both taste as distinction and flavour. She is influenced by both Bourdieu's framework of taste as distinction, and Zukin's focus on the commercial aspect of gentrification and the gentrification of enterprises within an area. Stock (2013) argues that falafel shops are an example of what Zukin describes above: a marker of the gentrification and gentrified tastes of districts in Berlin and of gentrified consumption choices, to which restaurant entrepreneurs then cater by marketing themselves to the taste which craves consuming authenticity, in this case authentic, middle-eastern vegetarian food. As such, this work on gentrification, influenced by Bourdieu's conceptualisation and framework of taste as distinction, highlights the importance of *cultural markers in social class*, as well as the role of *aesthetics, authenticity, consumption, and commodification* within the conceptualisation of gentrification. Indeed, when authenticity is communicated through cultural markers and consumption, the initial salience of class within gentrification is minimised.

Often commodities themselves become symbolic and aesthetic shorthand for the concept of gentrification and class. Food and drink outlets, most prominently coffee shops, have become indicators, or bogeyman depending on your ideological stance, that an area is becoming, or is already, gentrified (Staley, 2018). Damaris Rose wrote in 1984 about which conspicuous consumption in particular had been considered in Marxist approaches to analysing and explaining gentrification, which included 'life-styles packaged in the "gentrification press"' and 'the conspicuous consumption of cappuccino and quiche' (1984, p.54). Of course, the cappuccino and quiche of the 1980s

'yuppies' have evolved into the flat white and vegan, dairy, and gluten-free cuisine of the late 2010s and early 2020s 'hipsters'. However, the symbolic relationship of these goods to gentrification, and more often the gentrifiers themselves, remains.

In 2018, McDonald's UK created an advert that satirised hipster cafés and how seriously they take coffee (McDonald's UK, 2018). These adverts were later shown dubbed in German (Theobald, 2020). The fact that an advert parodying hipster coffee shops could be used across linguistic contexts demonstrates the ubiquity of gentrification processes in the West. The *Flat White's* symbolism of gentrification also transcends the typical gentrification context. Luke John Davies' (2018) blog post for the Fabian Society on what he considers the gentrification of social democracy in the dominance of the middle class in social democratic votership, parliamentarians and party is playfully titled *From Flat Caps to Flat Whites*.

However, even within these commodities symbolic of gentrification, material and racial prejudice can remain. *New York Times* journalist Ginia Bellafante (2016) wrote about the attempted 'Columbusing' of a bodega sandwich: the chopped cheese. In her article, she highlighted the general hypocrisy of the wealthier urban classes through the gentrification of junk food stuffs, such as the chopped cheese: if you pay an extortionate price for an artisanal, heart-attack-inducing, minced beef and cheese sandwich at a refined restaurant, you are a 'foodie'; buy it at a more informal establishment such as a bodega at a low price and face class-based despair over its contribution to the rising rates of obesity among the less well off (Bellafante, 2016). The process of 'Columbusing' or discovering something which has existed but of which you were simply not aware, highlights the particularly disrespectful and cultural appropriative nature of commodification within gentrification, evoking gentrification's racist origins, as the next section outlines.

3.3.2 Gentrification, race, and cultural appropriation

Whilst this section has so far concentrated on the relationship of class to gentrification, and how displacement processes relate both to material/economic value and cultural distinction, gentrification is increasingly used in reference to the displacement and replacement not only of people of colour in their neighbourhoods, but also to refer to an appropriation, economic or otherwise, of their culture. The last part of this section will outline how race and culture intersects with the term gentrification in both scholarly and societal use and understanding, and why this aspect of gentrification is also relevant in my conception of the gentrification of protest.

The authenticity often searched for through the process of gentrification, is typically commodified by property developers. This is particularly the case in terms of *cultural authenticity*, significantly influenced by the culture of the people and the area in which they live. Typically during a period of gentrification this cultural authenticity is determined by the extent to which gentrifiers new to the area wish to create meaningful relationships with existing residents, or merely wish to live in proximity to them (Schlichtman et al., 2017, pp.35-36). The cultural authenticity of an area therefore feels threatened or compromised when marginalised communities see their cultural production, including food as I explored above, gentrified for a mainstream profit, whilst also being bastardised in its adaptation to a broader, dominant palate of gastronomic and social taste.

For marginalised communities and communities of colour, this *commodification of cultural authenticity* is particularly problematic. For example, property developers marketing properties in diverse, multi-ethnic neighbourhoods focus on 'authenticity', 'diversity', 'multi-culturalism' and 'the exotic' as selling points in this commodification (Zukin, 2008; Huse, 2014). In chasing material wealth in the profitable gentrified property market, these

neighbourhoods are packaged for those wealthy target markets in a way that they 'represent sanitised "otherness" made safe for mass-market consumption' (de Oliver, 2019, p.1498). The 'ethnic packaging of space' as 'multi-cultural' or representative of one culture in particular (for example the little Italy district in Toronto, Canada) can often create a setting where non-White inhabitants of an area are a part of the 'urban spectacle' for the affluent, White inhabitants (Huse, 2018, pp.191-195). Such commodification and sanitisation processes can further obfuscate the discrimination and experiences of marginalised communities to wealthy and dominant social classes of gentrifiers, particularly those whose desire for cultural authenticity is satisfied by living in proximity to different cultures, rather than engaging more thoughtfully with their 'multi-cultural' neighbours. This echoes the commodification of pride and LGBTQ+ lifestyles at *Johannesburg Pride*, which was devoid of the experiences of the more marginalised members of the community (Conway, 2021), and, as I will argue, can also be seen within political parties.

Derek Hyra (2017) provides one prominent example of the intrinsic role of race in the gentrification of Shaw/U Street in Washington DC. Hyra (2017) discusses the Black branding of this 'authentic' neighbourhood, but also notes how, as the area became gentrified with an influx of White residents, African Americans were also displaced from formal and informal political positions, and how long-standing Black cultural institutions also left the area, *performing a political and cultural form of displacement*. Gentrification is therefore not just a process of displacing long-standing residents out of a particular geographical area, but that it also involves a displacement of long-term residents out of local politics and a displacement of the existing culture to cater for the tastes and preferences of the wealthier, middle and upper-class gentrifiers.

In the context of mainstream progressive politics, over the last five years there has been an increased focus on long-ignored issues of racial injustice,

discrimination and prejudice, particularly spurred on by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Yet, politicians' lack of a deep understanding of the issues of racism is often unmasked. Consider the February 2022 remarks on a podcast from the deputy leader of the UK Labour Party. Angela Rayner's comments on police, suggesting they shoot suspected terrorists first and ask questions later, was criticised by a representative of the Labour Party internal group Momentum, Sonali Bhattacharyya, who was quoted in *The Guardian* saying 'You can't kneel for racial justice one day, then praise shoot-to-kill powers for the police the next' (Elgot, 2022). Such comments suggest a prospect of this increased attention on racism as possibly symbolic or a mere superficial commitment, rather than a commitment to tackling the systemic causes and issues of racism in contemporary society, such as institutionalised racism within the police, for fear of backlash from voters in the political centre.

The multiple forms of displacement which people of colour experience through gentrification has led to the use of the term as a pejorative description of racial disrespect and often cultural appropriation, outside of its urban theory context. Rather than expressing the harm of gentrification as that of displacement and unaffordable rents, the harm is a 'theft of pride' (Staley, 2018). As already mentioned, food is one subject where this use of the term is increasingly used, as well as popular culture. For Cooper, the gentrification of pop culture is how Black and other people of colour's lives fit into traditional White narratives, rather than the continuation of TV and films of the 1990s like *The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air* which focused on the Black experience:

> [I]t certainly is not progress. It's more like the gentrification of media, *being marketed to us as progress*. Under the logic of gentrification, both the physical kind and this new mediated kind, those of us who harken back to a prior moment when people of color could live and work and be represented on their own terms are seen as barriers to progress. Even though we are made to witness the systematic

removal of people of color from posts and property that they have labored for generations to have access to, we are supposed to be impressed when these new social and geographical formations allow token participation by people of color, who are viewed as having crossover appeal. To be clear, *crossing over means that despite your color, white people like you*.

(Cooper, B., 2014. Emphasis mine.)

This form of mediated gentrification mirrors the sense of sanitised otherness for the dominant, predominantly wealthy White audience and consumers argued by Schulman (2013) and de Oliver (2019) in their work with the concept. However, the use of gentrification in pop culture is also a shorthand for cultural appropriation. In his speech accepting the 2016 BET Humanitarian Award for work with the Black Lives Matter movement, actor Jesse Williams highlighted the continued exploitation of Black people in America:

We been floating this country on credit for centuries, yo. And we're done watching and waiting while this invention called 'Whiteness' uses and abuses us. Burying Black people out of sight and out of mind while extracting our culture, our dollars, our entertainment like oil. Black gold. Ghettoising and demeaning our creations then stealing them. Gentrifying our genius and then trying us on like costumes before discarding our bodies like rinds of strange fruit.

(BETNetworks, 2020)

For Williams, the cultural exploitation and appropriation of Blackness and Black culture is directly linked to the continued discrimination and brutality that Black people in America experience in the 21ˢᵗ century. The financial extraction through the gentrification of a community's genius reinforces the *inextricable relationship of culture and capital*, and how gentrification

processes, whether of culture, history, or property, commodifies for profit whilst simultaneously excluding or obfuscating discrimination and expulsion.

Systemic and structural racism in the West is not limited to just one area of society. Examples in this second section have detailed how gastronomy and food, culture, media, housing, and local politics all suffer from gentrification processes across different contexts. Progressive political parties in this moment of reckoning of the pervasive issue of racism are not excluded from these processes of gentrification. People of colour's experiences and the way racism is dealt with aesthetically and policy wise in contemporary progressive politics also requires interrogation. This is yet another reason why my conceptual framework of gentrified protest is required over the existing conceptualisations reviewed in chapter two. The following section details the finer structure and application of my analytical framework of the political style of gentrified protest, to illustrate its analytical prowess and abilities.

3.4 Proposing a gentrification of protest and politics: gentrified protest

3.4.1 Defining gentrified protest as a political style

I argue that the gentrification of protest, or *gentrified protest* as a form of *political style*, can be found in mainstream progressive, left-wing, or ecological parties in contemporary politics. Here, I am heavily influenced by Moffitt's definition of political style:

> [T]he repertoires of *embodied, symbolically mediated performance*
> made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields
> of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of
> government through to everyday life
>
> (Moffitt, 2016, p.38. Emphasis mine)

This broad definition of political style with its focus on a form of the political which goes beyond the institutions and government to everyday life reflects my own understanding of the political, as I outline in the discussion of political ethnography in the following chapter. Furthermore, the significance Moffitt places on the 'embodied' and 'mediated' performance of politics allows for the analytical capturing of aesthetic and cultural aspects that tend to be missing in existing analytical approaches on protest and institutional politics.

Moffitt then proposes and argues that the framework of political style allows for a more comprehensive analysis of populism in 'the heavily mediatised and 'stylised' milieu of contemporary politics' (Moffitt, 2016, p.28). My interest is less on the integration of political style into a framework to analyse populist politics but instead to concentrate on the term's ability to incorporate the rhetorical and aesthetic elements of politics, and how the staging of a political 'performance' recognises the *constructed* nature of how and what people do and perform in politics to their audiences (Moffitt, 2016). Indeed, Corner and Pels (2003, p.9) note that political style and aesthetics have never been restricted to the radical right, but are an 'inherent and inevitable feature' of mass democratic politics. As such, gentrified protest is my proposed framework of political style to analyse the political style of green, centre-left and other progressive political parties within contemporary Western politics.

The style and content of political performance are linked within Moffitt's conception of a political style, acknowledging that as a package deal, they

interrelate, elevate and can constitute one another. The rhetorical content is performed through rhetorical tools such as *oral and written language*, *argumentation*, and the delivery of rhetoric with its *tone*, *gestures* and *body language*; whereas the aesthetic style is performed through aesthetic tools such as *images*, *fashion*, *self-presentation* and the *staging of the political spectacle* (Moffitt, 2016). The importance of the political style approach is to analyse politics beyond the discursive features (content) to incorporate the 'aesthetic and performative elements that the discursive approach does not take into account' (Moffitt, 2016, pp.38-39). In this way, political style is related to political communication, as also indicated by Corner and Pels (2003).

Finally, it is worth noting that the use of performance within the conceptualisation of political style is not a pejorative 'inauthentic' value judgement of one performance compared against another, because 'performance is necessary in politics' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, p.389). In other words, it would be *inauthentic* to *not perform* in politics. Indeed, authenticity is delivered in the performance of politics through both its content and its style. This two-level nature of political performance captured by the concept of political style is a helpful place to start for the analysis of what I argue can be termed gentrified protest and politics. This allows for the analysis of the two-level sign systems of sign and signifier, as previously discussed in their nuances from Baudrillard (1996), and Bourdieu (1984), though in this case the two-level sign system is not considered deceptive. The levels of sign system in political style form the sign level of *what is said*, and the signifier level of how what is said is *staged* or *styled*.

However, rather than focusing on populism as Moffitt does, I take his conceptualisation of political style and demonstrate how political style manifests in the form of gentrified protest politics: a mainstream progressive political style. Yet, I must answer the question why Moffitt's conception of political style alone, broad as it is to be utilised in contexts outside of populism,

remains inadequate for the phenomena uncovered in the data collection of this research project.

Firstly, Moffitt's framework is used to analyse the political style of populist leaders, rather than movements or parties, despite his acknowledgement that political media actors also utilise this populist style, although they tend to be largely ignored in populism literature (2016). Whilst the political style of *gentrified protest* does take into account leading political figures, it goes further than that. In this way, it draws upon the role of political culture in political style identified by Corner and Pels (2003). Political culture to them is:

> [T]he realms of *political experience*, *imagination*, *values* and *dispositions* that provide the setting within which a political system operates, shaping the character of political processes and political behaviour […] elements of political culture that […] *interconnect the 'official' world of professional politics with the world of everyday experience* […].
>
> (Corner and Pels, 2003, p.3. Emphasis mine.)

Consequently, I argue that gentrified protest as a political style applies to far more than just political leaders.

a) Gentrified protest provides an analytical framework to identify the political style of a political party, its position in political culture, and *how the style incorporates supporters and party members.* Party members' *interaction and reproduction of rhetoric and aesthetic styles* similar to that of political leaders and central party and organisation communications, particularly in digital spaces and on the streets at demonstrations, *legitimises the participatory, embodied character of a progressive, gentrified protest style.* As such, these supporters may not

be political professionals, but *the political style of gentrified protest calls and relies upon the participation of citizens in its mediated performances,* integrating the political style into everyday political activism and wider political culture. Therefore, the political style of gentrified protest in a political party is integrated into *all three* of Katz and Mair's (1994) party faces.

Whilst the style of the populist calls to the 'people', those progressive parties who invoke democratic and participatory politics can only have these characteristics legitimised through the embodied participation of members and others in both online and offline spaces. This legitimisation is seen in how these parties celebrate increases in membership numbers and their employment of intra-party democracy where party members have a say in policy formation and/or candidate primaries. In this way, gentrified protest is a political style which incorporates the following five elements: *rhetoric*, *style*, *everyday activism*, *participation, politicians*, and the *party organisation*.

Secondly, I argue that gentrified protest is a politics one can buy into like one would buy into a particular neighbourhood that satisfies one's lifestyle tastes. By this, I mean that a party member or supporter's participation in a gentrified protest political style is not only dependent on what one says about a political leader or party, nor is it only dependent on participation within party organisational structures.

b) A gentrified protest political style of party members can be *performed through standing for election at local, regional, or national level,* but can also be *performed in extra-party politics* such as attending *demonstrations, events* on particular social and political issues, through one's *political performance on social media, visual presentations* of party identity, and *consumption choices.* By buying into the *lifestyle* or

brand of gentrified protest, party members and others can satisfy their individual desire for political satisfaction and self-actualisation.

However, unlike French and Smith (2009) I do not view party members as merely the 'consumers' of the 'trinity' of party, leader, and policy in the brand of a political party. As well as consuming the political style of gentrified protest, party members are also perceived as an additional fourth element of the party brand in this framework.

In this way, gentrified protest highlights the role party members play in communicating the party brand and the public staging of their political style. Borrowing Nielsen's (2012) term of 'personalised political communication' performed by party members and employees in the door-to-door and phone bank ground wars of US election campaigns, *party members' engagement in street demonstrations or sharing of online content produces and reproduces the participatory, embodied character of the progressive, gentrified protest style.* In some cases, active grassroots party members, as individual producers of personalised political communication, are self-aware of their role in the production of the party's cultural identity and can face criticism in public when they demonstrate their party affiliation in everyday life.

Up to this point, I have established how I define the political style of gentrified protest. The following final sections below detail how such a political style is characterised through its incorporation of four distinct, yet interrelated facets:

1. *Sanitised* protest and *sanitising* politics
2. The *brand* of gentrified protest politics
3. The *cachet of authenticity* within gentrified protest politics
4. The *aesthetic* of gentrified protest politics

The final sections below outline the how the facets incorporate attributes of the concept of gentrification explored in the first two sections of this chapter, and how these are identified.

3.4.2 'Sanitised' protest and 'sanitising' politics

The facet of sanitising within the political style of gentrified protest draws on the processes addressed in the conceptualisations of gentrification by Schulman (2013), Conway (2021), and Žižek (2008). Conway uses the term as the consequence of the gentrification of Pride producing 'sanitised presentations of LGBTQ+ rights, identities and diversity politics' (2021, p.162). Although Schulman and Žižek do not use the term sanitised, they similarly refer to this process of once radical stances or people being institutionalised into a cultural narrative (Schulman, 2013) or having their 'sting plucked out' (Žižek, 2008, p.196). My conceptualisation of gentrified protest politics incorporates this feature of a sanitised, institutionalised narrative of their once radical stances or organisational form. They do not eschew it, but instead it is depoliticised and integrated into the party (hi)story or myth because the original proponents have long been displaced. I use (hi)story written in this way to recognise the 'common root of stories and histories' (Bathrick, 2007, pp.3-4). This allows for the comprehension of multiple histories within a political party and the creation of institutionalised stories of a party history.

I consider sanitised a stronger concept to account for this characteristic, as other terms have connotations which are unhelpful: 'institutionalised' is too focused on the political arena of parliaments and precludes analysis of why grassroots individuals may prefer sanitised protest other than because their party is in a parliament; whereas 'approved' and 'acceptable' do not account for the possibility of intra-party and intra-organisation diversity in what is considered an acceptable form of protest. Whilst sanitised protest as part of a

gentrified protest political style does reflect a depoliticisation of radical pasts or ancestors, I do not believe sanitised protest is not political, and nor would supporters and party members. Therefore, sanitised as an analytical term retains the political nature of people's activism and the boundaries they and the party draw on protest action and policy, whilst acknowledging desires for votes and power as the ultimate goal. Therefore, sanitised is an analytical concept which is able to capture the ambivalence of thought on the issue of protest to be expected within a political party.

As the 'radical' elements of a party or politicians have often already undergone the process of gentrification, my use of the term 'sanitised' is not pejorative. I use it in line with its figurative definition which, as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, is 'to render more acceptable, clean up, as by the removal of undesirable, improper, or confidential material'.[5] In this context, I use 'sanitised' or 'sanitising' simply as an analytical term to denote the boundaries between radical and mainstream politics and protest, where the expressions of 'radical' policies, language, or behaviour are *sanitised* if what is 'radical' is also regarded as approved, institutionalised, and fitting within the existing system, instead of truly *radical*, and therefore controversial, anti-establishment and challenging the system. In drawing such a boundary, the style has a clear commitment to a liberal democratic system, even if it still considers some changes to be necessary.

Detecting this facet of gentrified protest is possible through the level of discourse and rhetoric employed by party, politicians, and members, as well as those utilised within party communications. Overall, this is identified in rhetoric and discourse where an opposition of *'moderate and respectful'* vs *'radical and disrespectful'* can be identified in both their politics and their relationship to protest. Examples include depictions of the party as

---

[5] Definition obtained from the online version of the dictionary, which can be accessed here: https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/170712?redirectedFrom=sanitise&

mainstream but with an 'alternative' edge, or thoughts and feelings on the importance of protest but distinguishing legitimate non-violent protest vs undemocratic violent protest. Furthermore, the party or organisation's visible and aesthetic presence at protests and demonstrations often highlights this facet of sanitised protest through a carefully cultivated image, a clear brand, and may be incorporated into (digital) party communications. Therefore, the detection of this facet of gentrified protest takes into account the rhetoric and discourse of party organisation and members, as well as the staging and stylistic presentation and framing of communications and physical party activity.

The *'sanitising' politics* element of this facet analyses a related but distinct issue of political style. Here I draw upon Arditi (2003) and how he sees the mainstream, gentrified liberal democratic system as closed-off and concealing inequality. Gentrified protest provides a style of institutional or extra-institutional politics that allows one to absolve oneself of any guilt for their role within structurally inequal societies, whilst also proselytising to others within a structurally flawed system. By this, I mean that a progressive political party may publicly be standing for an issue, such as racial equality, appealing to those who wish to feel they are taking some action on that issue, at the same time as operating and succeeding within a gentrified political system that is not effective at tackling this systemic issue.

In essence, sanitising politics within gentrified protest highlights the *contradiction* between their *communications and aesthetic* of their commitment to certain issues, such as racial justice or reaching out to new voters, and how the *practical experience* of supporters or members diverges from this image. The divergence creates an experience of adopting such strategies or policies to the extent where it forms an acceptable crossover, to borrow from Cooper, B. (2014), which absolves the party organisation from guilt but which does not concretely tackle the issue or follow through on the

image. The aim is targeting both what the party membership want and support, but in a way that makes it palatable for broad swathes of the electorate. Sanitising politics gentrifies causes for electoral gain. Therefore identifying this element of the sanitising facet of gentrified protest is about exposing these contradictions between desired image and aesthetic perceptions with that of experiences and counter perceptions of the party from internal and sympathetic voices which contrast this image and aesthetic.

3.4.3 The brand of gentrified protest politics

Both the discourses and styling of sanitised protest and sanitising politics can be incorporated in the second facet of the political style of gentrified protest: the *brand*. To identify the role branding plays within a gentrified protest style, I turn to certain aspects of political marketing literature. This is a small subset of literature on political branding, which applies marketing literature and theory in the political sphere (Marsh and Fawcett, 2011; Scammell, 2015; Smith, G. and French, 2009). Following Scammell's (2015) 'Political Image Model of Political Brand Distinctiveness', there are two elements to a political brand: the brand identity, or what image the marketers want to create in the brand's intended audience, and the brand image, or what consumers' perceptions of the brand are. This literature generally adopts voters as the consumers being 'sold' political brands at elections as the prime point of sale. In the case of party members or political supporters, as is the focus of this research, their role in political brands is more complicated. Whilst Pettitt (2012) sees party members as a form of internal market as the party on the ground, party members are also said to form part of a 'political brand community' (Smith, G. and French, 2009, p.215). Lower-ranking politicians have additionally been said to be either operating in franchise-franchisee relationships or as brand ambassadors for the party (Marland and Wagner, 2020). I would argue that such a position is also the case for grassroots party members for several reasons. Firstly, in multi-level political systems, there is often a level of

autonomy at lower party levels alongside coordination from the central party office, similar to how a franchise-franchisee business relationship functions.

Secondly, party members' role in relation to the party brand is complicated by their three-form role in a political party. As discussed in chapter two, party members perform three roles: 'supporter', 'funder', and 'worker' (Granik, 2005). Whilst Pettitt (2012) sees party members as a form of internal market as the party on the ground, I position active grassroots members within the gentrified protest style performing a role akin to participants in a multi-level marketing company. I use this analogy not in a pejorative way or to make a claim that party members are exploited in the same way as occurs in these multi-level marketing companies. In fact, this description of party members as multi-level marketers has been previously used to describe the member recruitment strategy of the Islamic PKS Party of Indonesia (Ahmad Ali, 2011). I use this term to highlight how party members, just like someone who enters a multi-level marketing scheme, pay their membership dues in exchange for a 'product' to sell to others, often in progressive parties a say in the party and voting rights either directly or through the opportunity to be a delegate. Additionally, those party members without a formal role provide work, particularly during campaigns and to help run other events, for little, if any, renumeration or guarantee of success, just like multi-level marketers. Finally, by visibly and vocally supporting the party they legitimise the party and, if they so wish, use this basis to recruit others to join them. As such, to reduce party members to just belonging to a 'political brand community' (Smith, G. and French, 2009, p.215), undermines the very real 'work' that such grassroots activists put in and their own stakes in the party.

Instead, party members *multi-level marketing* role in communicating the party *brand* highlights how the gentrified protest political style is integrated into all three party faces. In this respect, party members also play a role that Nielsen calls 'personalized political communication', which denotes practices that use

'*people* as media for political communication' (2012, p.7). Within the gentrified protest political style, party members performing personalised political communication are crucial to effectively communicate and depict the gentrified protest style and brand of a *participatory, democratic, and movement-aligned party*.

Identifying branding within gentrified protest politics involves a broader analysis than just that of party materials. As well as consulting party documents, communications, merchandise, symbols, and social media, and analysing how these are 'staged' or styled, often society's perception of brands is co-determined by coverage that is not created or determined by the party itself, such as in the media. Both internal and external attempts to brand the party often incorporate the sanitised, official narratives of the first facet of gentrified protest. Therefore, analysing media coverage and cultural depictions of the party, as well as the attacks they face from their competitors, is required to create a more nuanced picture of the party's political brand and illustrate exactly what party members both try to communicate to and face from the public when they are performing the role of personalised political communication.

Given the role party members play as multi-level marketers and legitimators of a participatory brand image, understanding their experiences, thoughts and feelings of their activism also helps to identify the brand of gentrified protest politics. Today, branding is a complex process which involves 'immaterial things – feelings and affects, personalities and values' as well as blurring the boundary between marketer and consumer by engaging consumers in the labour of building the brand (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p.7). The brand of a party with a gentrified protest style helps members and supporters *understand themselves, where they fit in society, and their role in contemporary, everyday political culture*. In addition to their own political articulation, they communicate the gentrified protest brand by reproducing the sanitised party (hi)story, and

interacting with the party or movement in online and offline spaces of party or movement participation. Again, party members are multi-level marketers, both consuming the participatory, gentrified protest brand as well as building it. They are the member-facing brand ambassadors and approachable frontline of the political party and its brand at the local level. The following two facets of gentrified protest feed into the brand as well as being facets in their own right.

3.4.4 The cachet of authenticity

Authenticity is a contested concept used in multiple scholarly disciplines, yet which struggles to attain a consensus definition. George Newman and Rosanna Smith (2016) bring together 'kinds of authenticity' to identify where these different typologies converge and construct their own typology. Their four types of authenticity are split evenly between those that apply to *objects*: 'historical authenticity' and 'categorical authenticity', and those that apply to *agents*: 'value authenticity' and 'self-authenticity' (Newman and Smith, 2016). Of interest to how authenticity is conceived within the political style of gentrified protest are the two types of authenticity which apply to agents: firstly, 'value authenticity', which is demonstrated in the extent to which an individual's behaviour 'embodies the values of a particular culture' (Newman and Smith, 2016, p.613); and secondly, 'self-authenticity', which relies on a personal, subjective evaluation of how authentic a particular behaviour is to oneself. This is the kind of authenticity identified in left-alternative milieus, such as those of West Germany in the 1970s and early 1980s, who secured a self-chosen identity of the 'authentic self' (Reichardt, 2014, p.57). In the case of the political style of gentrified protest, the facet of authenticity helps to analyse both the extent to which the content and style of party communications and activism are authentic to the party or organisation's values, and the extent to which party members and supporters see this reflected in their own self-authenticity.

Authenticity is a notion often linked to the process of branding. This is central to the argument of Banet-Weiser's (2012) *Authentic™: the politics of ambivalence in a brand culture*. She uses the term brand for 'the intersecting relationship between marketing, a product, and consumers', whereas the term 'brand cultures', which she uses frequently, accounts for the way 'these types of brand relationships have increasingly become cultural contexts for everyday living, individual identity, and affective relationships' (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p.4). This distinction emphasises her difference that brands are as much cultural as they are a product of economics. As a cultural phenomenon, individuals incorporate brands into their own 'stories', in which they are the 'central character', and in so doing the brand is more than just an object, but a perception: 'the series of images, themes, morals, values, feelings, and sense of authenticity conjured by the product itself' and captures the 'essence of what will be experienced' (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p.4). An authentic relationship with a brand is one with an *affective, authentic relationship* based on 'the accumulation of memories, emotions, personal narratives, and expectations' or, in other words, the 'experience' of the brand (Banet-Weiser, 2012, pp.8-9). Authenticity and brands are conceived through experience and individual (hi)stories, thus further emphasising the need for an ethnographic-based approach in order to collect data on the affective experiences of gentrified protest politics.

Whilst the concept of authenticity within political studies is often found within literature on political communication or political marketing, and more often on individual politicians and leaders, or their social media style (Luebke, 2021; Serazio, 2017; Whittle et al., 2021), it is also an important concept within gentrification research. Zukin is the most known for her work on authenticity in relation to cities. She claims that authenticity, in the context of cities such as New York, has 'little to do with origins and a lot to do with style' and has evolved from being 'a quality of people', to 'a quality of things', to 'a quality of experiences' (Zukin, 2010, p.3). Zukin sees cities as being considered authentic if they are able to create the '*experience* of origins' (emphasis hers)

by maintaining historic buildings, encouraging independent retail and hospitality, and 'branding neighbourhoods in terms of distinctive cultural identities' (2010, p.3). Based on Zukin's understanding, authenticity is not necessarily the demonstration of a commitment to a political organisation's values, but rather an intrinsic feature of its political style. For the political style of gentrified protest, the facet of authenticity strongly draws upon the facet of sanitised protest and its relation to (hi)story outlined earlier. This can produce an *experience of origins*, and additionally feeds into both the aforementioned facet of branding and the remaining aesthetic facet of gentrified protest politics.

Detecting the authentic facet of gentrified protest seeks to isolate how a party or political organisation, which has already undergone a process of professionalisation and is mainstream(ing), can deliver authenticity within its political style and values. As the authenticity of values within figures or policy is somewhat shakier ground, the cachet of authenticity in gentrified protest is instead concentrated in providing an affective 'experience' of authenticity in which party members can feel themselves as the central characters who see their own values reflected in the party or organisation. Thus, understanding whether and how party members see themselves within the established, sanitised party narrative and (hi)story, and how the central party organisation deals with the party's (hi)story are central to evaluating the perceived credibility of claims of authenticity. Such data can be obtained through methods which obtain discursive and individual data, such as open questions on surveys or interviews.

3.4.5 The aesthetic of gentrified protest politics

The final facet of the political style of gentrified protest is its aesthetic. As a complex and contested term, aesthetics requires some clarification as to how

I utilise it within the gentrified protest framework. Firstly, I do not conceive a political aesthetic as an irrational, deceptive practice, which places style over substance. Instead, along similar lines to Jon Simons (2008), I perceive politics to be inherently aesthetic with its use of symbols, images, and performances to create an affective response. This is also the understanding of political aesthetics as conceived by Jacques Rancière. With aesthetics determining the 'sense experience' of politics, he identified that politics is thereby limited to 'what is seen and what can be said about it' (Rancière and Rockhill, 2013, p.8). Following this broader foundation, I use the concept of aesthetic thus to refer to a mixture of *politics as performance* and the *use of visual images and social media* of politicians and adherents of political parties, and the *affective* responses they produce. These three constitutive elements of my conception of aesthetic relate to elements of contemporary politics that are visible and audible, the dramaturgical choices of what is said and done, and what it feels like to be involved in or co-creating this aesthetic.

My understanding of politics as performance is influenced by Erving Goffman's (1956) theory of dramaturgy in relation to social interaction in everyday life, which is often applied in social movement and political science research due to its introduction of the terms frontstage/backstage (Rucht, 2017). Whilst this theory is also pertinent because of the nature of the ethnographic fieldwork collected in this project, as I explicate in the following chapter, it also helps to understand the aesthetic facet of gentrified protest. In its relevance to the concept of gentrified protest, it is not isolated to the conventions of political party members on the public, frontstage of the party and its participation in the public stage of the street demonstrations. Rather, there is a blurred distinction between public (frontstage) and intimate (backstage) performances, which can, for example, increase the authenticity of a politician (Luebke, 2021). In the case of party sponsored protest demonstrations, the lines between frontstage/backstage are also blurred for party members; intimately either involved in planning party participation in the action or messaged privately by their local party branch to join in, they are too a part of the frontstage through

their embodied presence of the participatory party. Indeed, within gentrified protest, there is a more general blurring between institutional and extra-institutional politics through the interrelation of these two political arenas and their respective frontstages and backstages.

The final element of what I refer to with my use of the concept of aesthetic is that of the use of images and the visual appearance of movements, political parties, and politicians. The analysis of visuals used in political communication has repeatedly been declared underdeveloped (Barnhurst and Quinn, 2012; Bleiker, 2018; Nahema et al., 2021). Often such research concentrates on analysing the use of images during election campaigns, such as the study of politician and party Instagram accounts in the German 2017 federal elections (Haßler et al., 2021). Furthermore, the unease of political scientists to engage with digital and social media risks overlooking an everyday practice of those citizens engaged in politics, whether that participation occurs solely online or, more often, complements offline activism (Dean, 2019). Therefore, analysing the gentrified protest political style of a political party or movement must involve analysing the visual presentation of all types of party adherents, on social media or 'on the streets'. My conception of a political aesthetic is thus based on the *experience* and *affective dimensions* of party supporters, how the party *performs on the frontstages and backstages of the institutional and extra-institutional political arenas*, and lastly the *visual experience or performance of the party.*

The *aesthetic* facet of gentrified protest is closely interrelated with the previous three facets of *sanitised protest and politics*, *branding*, and *authenticity*, and therefore visual elements may be analysed when identifying any of these four facets of this political style. Through analysis of each facet's use of visual images and performance, as well as their affective consequences, it is possible to build a picture within political style of what is called the 'gentrification aesthetic' in urban studies. In a gentrified area, identifying the

gentrification aesthetic is expressed through the ways in which it 'has a certain "feel" to it, a certain look, a landscape of conspicuous consumption' (Lees, L. et al., 2008, p.113). In the political style of gentrified protest, this gentrification aesthetic is composed of a certain progressive 'feel' in its understanding of *democracy*, a certain 'look' in its emphasis of *participation*, and is 'conspicuous' in its imagery and member consumption of *street demonstrations and protest*. In terms of politics as performance and the use of visual imagery within gentrified protest, these three areas are analysed as part of the aesthetic element of the gentrified protest style.

This facet, like the other three, also goes beyond the analysis of the stylistic and aesthetic content of gentrified protest politics. This aesthetic facet provides the framework to interrogate how the lived sensory and affective experience of party members correspond to the aesthetic performance and brand image of gentrified protest politics already identified. This can be assessed by taking seriously party members' accounts of their activism. This can include their involvement in street protest, their experience of participating and being active within the party, or how they see their role in a party as reflecting wider democratic processes. Interviews with questions that seek to understand these factors help to identify the aesthetic facet of gentrified protest in terms of the affective consequences of the experience of party membership. This experiential data is analysed alongside observations of political performances and the visual, stylistic staging of politics in social media, documents, and at events to provide a thorough analysis of both the aesthetic stylings and affective nature of being a party member at a particular moment in time.

The strength in this double-pronged aesthetic facet is being able to consider both the consumption of the political style and aesthetic by party members through their experiences and how this is reported in the media, as well as the (attempted) production of such an aesthetic by the party, politicians and party

members. Thus, the aesthetic facet of gentrified protest highlights not only the stylistic and inherently aesthetic nature of contemporary progressive politics, but the inherently interlinked role party members play in the political style of gentrified protest as both co-producers and consumers - or multi-level marketers - of democratic, participatory, and protest-supporting politics.

These four interrelated facets of the political style of gentrified protest come together to allow one to analyse both the diachronic shifts in the (hi)story, aesthetic and brand of a progressive political movement or party, as well as the synchronic status of the aesthetic and brand, and what visual or dramaturgical tools are used within both to portray a perceived authenticity. Such a dynamic conceptual framework as gentrified protest allows one to capture the complex and nuanced emotions and experiences of political supporters across their experience of activism.

3.5 Conclusion

The political style framework of gentrified protest highlights how authenticity as well as electoral or societal support can simultaneously co-exist within progressive politics. The concept can help to explore not only the content and aesthetic style used to perform contemporary progressive politics, but also analyse the performance of authenticity and appropriation and sanitising of past and present radical politics through the gentrification of protest. To recap, gentrified protest is:

- an analytical framework to identify the political style of a progressive political party which integrates party organisation, politicians, and party members to produce and re-produce rhetorical and aesthetic styles.
- able to account for party members who perform the role of a multi-level marketer who consumes and co-creates the political style and

contributes 'work' as personal political communication for little or no renumeration or guarantee of success.

- reliant on party members to legitimise the participatory, embodied character of progressive politics through its participatory image and aesthetic on social media and at street demonstrations.

- focused on identifying and analysing how rhetoric and aesthetic style is incorporated into everyday activism and the party organisation.

- innovative in its approach to looking at the visual, rhetorical and staging qualities of political style and how these manifest in the affective experiences of party members, employees, and politicians.

- made up of four facets which help to identify this political style within a political party.

Identifying gentrified protest through its four facets involves invoking attributes of gentrification uncovered in the genealogy of the concept in the first two sections of this chapter:

1. *Sanitised protest*: This identifies patterns of action or rhetoric which suggested once radical or countercultural political positions or tactics of the political party are retained in an acceptable, institutionally suitable form for the masses. This may also involve the party drawing upon features from political culture more generally which was not relevant to the political party itself, but is part of a collective lineage with which they wish to be associated. This is closely related to the party's support of street demonstrations.

   Sanitising politics: similarly, the counterpart within this facet looks at how the aesthetic and styling of progressive parties deals with structural inequalities and societal issues such as racism, class, sexism or religious discrimination and the contradictions then apparent in the experience of individual politicians or party members. Again, this is focused on being palatable and acceptable to progressive voters who

wish to align themselves with this issue, but potentially only to the extent to absolve guilt rather than tackling structural issues.

2. *Branding*: this facet takes into account the marketing and communicative aspects of political style. In the case of gentrified protest politics, it highlights how party members are involved in delivering the brand of a participatory, democratic and movement-aligned political party. By focusing on how the brand is perceived by party members who are involved in reproducing it, this facet explores the feelings and affects, personalities and values which party members associate with the party brand. Furthermore, by collecting and analysing party external materials such as media coverage, the internal and external brand of the party and their similarities and differences can be compared.

3. *Authenticity*: this facet looks specifically at perceptions of authenticity amongst party members. On the one hand, it identifies how their party memberships are authentic to themselves in line with the affective and experiential character of this framework touched upon in other facets. However, more crucially to this facet of authenticity, the maintenance of an 'experience of origins', like that found in gentrified neighbourhoods, is analysed in party rhetoric and styling. Its analytical power exists in the extent to which it detects the connections and 'Easter eggs' kept in the contemporary party (hi)story and brand to create the experience of origins which portray a party authentic to its values.

4. *Aesthetic*: the final facet analyses the interrelation of party and protest politics through the features of politics as performance, the use of visual images and social media, and the sensory and affective responses these performances and imagery invoke. By incorporating backstage and frontstage performances in both protest and institutional arenas of politics, it underlines the involvement of party members within the political style of gentrified protest and their consumption and production of visual imagery and performance in contemporary, mainstream, progressive politics. The gentrification aesthetic in gentrified protest

politics has a certain 'feel' for democracy, a certain 'look' of participation, and conspicuous consumption and imagery of street demonstration and protest.

Unlike other concepts, gentrified protest incorporates features of party organisation, communication, member activism, and political style to create an integrated framework which identifies the interlinking nature of these elements. Whilst Moffitt in his understanding of political style focuses on the analysis of rhetoric, the staging of speeches, and performances by leading politicians, gentrified protest looks holistically at features from all three faces of the political party and broader societal and media perceptions that contribute to their political style. As detailed in the following chapter on the methods employed, an ethnographic data generation process which gathers interviews with grassroots party members, party employees, politicians, and party and media articles and documents, as well as observations of both party and protest events, is needed to establish the extent to which messages, staging and aesthetics, authenticity and the brand is produced and reproduced and thereby integrated into party participation to exhibit the gentrified protest political style.

Chapter 4 Activists, members and participation: detecting gentrified protest in the German Greens

As argued across chapter two, the stylistic and affective role that protest plays for political parties is understudied and theorised. Concepts such as professionalisation, parliamentarisation, institutionalisation, NGOisation and de-radicalisation, ignore sustained interaction with protest movements by political parties. Whilst those concepts that do - movement party, anti-party, social movement partyism, movementisation, party-driven movements, movement factions, or activist parties – are often focused solely on party organisation or ideological stances. Gentrified protest, my remedy to this lack of analytical power, incorporates attributes from the concept of gentrification to demonstrate how political style can account for a normalised party-protest relationship and its involvement of party members, and the aesthetic and affective influences and consequences it poses.

In this chapter, I demonstrate how an interpretive methodology and the corresponding epistemic and ontological basis from which I worked, is best suited to identify the aspects of gentrified protest. Interpretive methodologies are closely intertwined with the ethnographic methods I employed during my fieldwork, and consequently this chapter will firstly elucidate the existing understanding of ethnography and interpretive approaches to research within political science and political sociology. Secondly, I highlight how these methods can help to create new knowledge on the nature of party membership based on gaps identified within the existing literature on party members. I then demonstrate how this applies to existing knowledge on the specific political party under study in this thesis: the German Greens. Finally, I turn to the minutiae of my data generation in the field according to the evaluative criteria of interpretive research: exposure and intertextuality. This chapter thus addresses the methods used to generate data in which my analytical

framework could be identified to evaluate the extent to which the German Greens employed the political style of gentrified protest in 2018/2019.

4.1 Interpretive research and ethnography

Whilst the method of ethnography can be used as a tool by researchers with either an interpretive or neopositivist/naturalist epistemology (Rhodes, 2017; Schatz, 2009a), my understanding of interpretive research is influenced by Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow (2012). As such, I use ethnography as a 'qualitative-interpretive' method informed by 'constructivist-interpretivist presuppositions' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.6). In other words, my ontological stance of constructivism reflects my understanding that the world is socially constructed by humans (Kubik, 2009, p.38; Wedeen, 2009, p.80), whereas my epistemology is that of interpretivism. An interpretive epistemology, and the method of political ethnography, is steered by its aim for 'complex specificity in context' (Rhodes, 2017, p. 29), where the extended participant observation study of politics is considered as an 'aspect of social relations that needs to be studied in practice, *in statu nascendi*' (Kubik, 2009, p. 28). The complexity stems from the interpretivist presupposition that the world is made up of multiple 'perceived and/or experienced social "realities", rather than a singular "truth"' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.4). As one of the main research questions of this thesis is 'how is protest and party activism experienced and conceived by Green Party members?', the micro-level and experiential feature of an interpretive ethnography makes it the most appropriate research approach to answer this question.

These competing perceptions and experiences arise out of the interactions in events – where either the researcher or the research participant will interact from the position of an actor or as an interpreter – and the researcher requires several interpretations of a particular event in order to understand what was

meaningful to each participant (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Rasmus Kleis Nielsen identified this in his ethnography of the 'ground war' campaigns in US elections, and how he saw the 'worlds' rather one 'world' by recognising that the campaign meant 'different things to different people' (Nielsen, 2012, p.191). The value of such contextualised knowledge is not isolated to interpretive research or ethnographic research, as Bent Flyvbjerg's (2001) call for a phronetic approach to social science through cases and the power of examples also appeals for more contextualised knowledge.

Interpretive research and its relation to ethnography traces and assists researchers in the process of *meaning-making*. It is about identifying in the field what is meaningful to individuals, being able to recognise that the meaning will differ between individuals as 'knowledge' and 'knowers' are situated and contextual/local, and that meaning-making is based on experience and social practices (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, pp.42-43). The interpretive researcher does not enter the field from a state of *tabula rasa*; instead there is an *apriori* knowledge which from the perspective of interpretive research must be acknowledged explicitly; not merely because of its role in creating the research interest, but in how it can potentially shape the way in which the research is conducted (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.26). This *apriori* knowledge creates expectations for the researcher in what they understand they will see prior to being in the field, but which may appear very different in reality when they do get there.

One example where my own conceptual knowledge did not encapsulate the lived experience I was observing, was my understanding of 'party members' or 'party activists'. What I encountered 'on the ground' was in some ways different to my expectations that had developed out of my own personal experiences of political party members in the UK and from the existing concepts and themes I encountered in the scholarly literature prior to fieldwork. This phenomena has been referred to as 'slippage' between

concepts and reality (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p.245) or as the 'conversation' between lived experience and existing scholarly concepts (Wedeen, 2010, p.257). Here, the potential benefits for situated and contextual knowledge to elucidate the intricacies of concepts and knowledge by interpretive ethnographies was clear. Overcoming this 'slippage' required a certain flexibility in the field and the work of overlapping phases of fieldwork, 'deskwork' and 'textwork' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.7).

Flexibility or reassessing in the field is a key part of the logic of abductive reasoning of ethnography. Abductive reasoning starts with a situated puzzle for which the researcher works to find an explanation in a non-linear 'iterative-recursive' fashion. The researcher looks both at other field situations and relevant research literature in order to explain this puzzle. For example, in relation to the concept slippage of how to categorise party members, I found that work on the construction of party membership by Anika Gauja (2015) helped me to explain the puzzle with her conceptual insight that the legal definitions of party members by nation states, in addition to the official understanding of members held by political parties, may no longer line up with the desires and real-life engagement by individual members, supporters and similar. Gauja herself noted that the real-life perspective could be elucidated with an ethnographic approach (2015).

Within an interpretive epistemology, research participants are not seen as 'objects', but rather 'agents', highlighting the researcher's inability to control or force access of settings or individual people. I experienced this lack of control on the few occasions that I was denied access to a particular Green event, or when interview requests went unanswered or rejected due to illness or unavailability.

4.2 Political Ethnography

Ethnography as a method within political science and political sociology has been a marginalised research approach. This is immortalised in conference papers and articles using the words of Javier Auyero and Lauren Joseph and their categorisation of a '*double absence*' of politics in ethnography and ethnography in politics (2007, p.2). This claim remained nine years later, as political science is still yet to 'embrace […] wholeheartedly' ethnography or observation (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p.234). Edward Schatz explained his use of the term 'political ethnography' in this vein, to distinguish it from 'ethnography' alone, which he claims has become 'closely associated with the study of culture and society' (Schatz, 2009c, p.305). In British political studies, political ethnographies generally tend to be focused on 'studying up' to parliaments and political elites (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Boswell et al., 2019; Crewe, 2015; Miller, 2021; Rhodes, 2017), with the notable exception of the use of participant observation alongside other methods to explore membership fluctuations within the Green Party of England and Wales (Power and Dommett, 2020). Similarly in German language work, there is a focus on ethnography of parliaments and politicians (Brichzin, 2016; Schöne, 2010; Scheffer, 2014; Holly, 1990; Laube, 2018). This interpretive work is focused on politicians, political institutions, and the staff who work within them. This stands in stark contrast to the diverse levels of political ethnography in the edited volumes with contributors from North America and continental Europe (Schatz, 2009b; Joseph et al., 2007). In the German context, there are a few, but not many, examples of such grassroots levels of ethnography. This includes Anja Adler (2018) and her ethnography on Pirate Party members after the party's demise, Vandepitte et al. (2019) and their ethnographic study of the 'styles of civic action' of the German environmental protest movement *Ende Gelände*, and Jonathan Roth (2018) and his ethnography of a district SPD party branch in Mainz.

In British political science, R. A. W. Rhodes (2017) is a prominent scholar on the use of ethnography within political science with his conception of Interpretive Political Science as the use of ethnography. His conception is derived from his and Mark Bevir's influential work *Interpreting British Governance*, which calls for political scientists to approach the study of the Westminster political institution in the UK as a narrative that details 'how British government works with the beliefs and preferences of the relevant actors as the basic building blocks' (2003, p.25). I share Rhodes' enthusiasm to shift 'analysis away from institutions, functions, and roles to understand […] the beliefs, actions, and practices of actors' (2017, p.42). Such an approach decentres the 'institution' to illuminate the diversity that upholds institutions and practices and focus on the actors 'backstage' (Goffman, 1956). However, I am more critical of Rhodes' approach to political ethnography and its focus on 'who governs' as a concern for political scientists, and therefore the requirement for interpretive political ethnography to 'study up' and concentrate on governing elites rather than 'study down' on street-level bureaucrats (Rhodes, 2017, p. 45; Boswell et al., 2019, p.61). This narrow view of *the political* within Rhodes and his adherents approach to ethnography mirrors the focus within British political science on governance or an 'arena' definition of politics, rather than a broader 'process' definition of politics and its focus on the way power and politics are experienced in everyday life (Foster et al., 2013).

Correspondingly, I see political ethnography as a key tool to investigate this 'process' definition of politics. Schatz highlights the detailed evidence produced by ethnographic studies which can 'flesh out' or 'call into question' generalisations or meanings ascribed to central concepts of political science – such as justice, freedom, or democracy – by taking into account the lived experience of individuals and 'how they perceive these abstractions' (2009a, p.10). As such, my ethnographic work is influenced by the work of Schatz (2009a), Aronoff and Kubik (2014), Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012), and Wedeen (2010) and their explicit interpretive approach which is open to

exploring how power and politics are experienced in both political and non-political settings. Furthermore, these interpretive political ethnographies are often concerned with language and 'symbolic systems', also defined as culture or 'semiotic practices' (Wedeen, 2002; Aronoff and Kubik, 2014). As explicated in chapter three, language or rhetoric, and culture and semiotic practices, are the exact data that the framework of gentrified protest is able to explore, highlight and analyse. Therefore, such a methodology is well suited to generating data in which gentrified protest can be detected. I will come back to the issue of culture when discussing the approach to analysing my ethnographic data later in this chapter. Firstly, I must clarify the focus of my research data, Green Party members, and outline existing scholarly knowledge on members of Green parties in general.

4.3 Green Party members

Existing studies on members of the German Greens are almost exclusively survey-based investigations. Herbert Kitschelt's (1989) work on the emergence of ecological parties in West Germany and Belgium used both interviews and survey data, and was influential as one of the earliest studies that focused on Green Party members and trying to understand why people were joining these new, and radically differently organised parties. Membership studies on the German Green Party since have been compiled with the help from membership surveys, for example, the German survey collected as part of a larger comparative project: The European Green Party Members' survey (EGPM) conducted in 2002 and 2003.[6] A second EGPM survey led by Wolfgang Rüdig of the University of Strathclyde is planned for 2021/2022.[7] Survey data of the German Greens was also compiled in 2009 as

---

[6] The website accessed in 2018 is no longer available, but a snapshot of the site detailing the original 2002/2003 project is available via the Internet Archive 'Wayback Machine': https://www.egpm.eu/EGPMI/tabid/5321/Default.aspx

[7] As described on Wolfgang Rüdig's research profile at the University of Strathclyde: https://pureportal.strath.ac.uk/en/persons/wolfgang-rüdig.

part of the *Deutsche Parteimitglieder* survey of party members of all German political parties represented in the *Bundestag* at that time (Spier et al., 2011; Spier and Klein, 2015). Research publications are just starting to emerge from the 2017 round of the *Deutsche Parteimitglieder* survey (Springer et al., 2021). Most recently, German Green Party members specifically have been surveyed, and some interviewed, with relation to their use of online participation tools for intra-party democracy and policy building (Gerl et al., 2016; Thuermer et al., 2018). Whilst Florence Faucher (1999; 2005) has completed qualitative, anthropologically influenced work on Green Party members, she concentrates on the Greens in France and Britain. However, she rightly points out how survey and qualitative questions can entail that research participants construct an individualised account of their participation but often use a 'language' and a 'canvass of arguments' to assert 'group belonging' (Faucher, 2015, p.419).

Alongside existing studies on Green Party membership, the concept of party membership itself is contested. As indicated by Gauja, when one considers the 'contested and constructed' concept of party membership, the use of surveys to gather data on members also plays into a state-centred and official conception of what a party member is (2015, pp. 235-238). Whilst Gauja (2015) points out that the state is one actor which defines party members, both she and Susan Scarrow (2015) argue that what constitutes a party member today varies considerably, both within and across parties with different ideologies and traditions, and within and across countries according to different legislation and political systems. In the case of my project, Green Party members exist not only at the grassroots, but party employees, politicians, and functionaries (paid and voluntary) will also be paying members. However, limiting a conception of party members to those individuals who pay for membership is outdated; it ignores the multitude of different ways today that people support and engage with political parties, as modelled by Scarrow (2015) and her concept of multi-speed membership. Some members do still engage in more traditional ways, attending party meetings, standing for office,

and helping to provide resources at campaigns. But, new forms of purely cyber-based support, or the simple act of joining the party without any other form of involvement than financial support, can be enough for some party members today (Gauja, 2015).

For example, the German Greens have significantly more Facebook and Twitter followers of the official, national party accounts than the number of 'official' party members: the German Greens had (as of 1st August 2018) 192,792 Facebook followers and 426,510 Twitter followers; whilst the number of formal paid-up members of the German Greens (as of 31st December 2018) was 75,311 (Niedermayer, 2020).[8] To contextualise these 'official' membership numbers in German politics more broadly, the Greens have been the fourth largest German political party since 2015, overtaking The Left (Niedermayer, 2020). As of 31st December 2019, the top four parties in terms of membership numbers were as follows: SPD (419,340 members), CDU (405,816 members), CSU (139,130 members), and the Greens (96,487 members), demonstrating an increase of over 20,000 Green party members in the space of a year (Niedermayer, 2020).

Whilst these numbers indicate a surge of membership support for the Greens across 2019, they cannot detail how this increasing membership materialised within grassroots party activity. This can be remedied through the use of ethnography, which Trickett and Oliveri argue 'can capture the dynamic of change in ways that snapshot surveys using pre-established dimensions and response categories cannot' (1997, p.149). Therefore, Gauja's suggestion that an ethnographic approach to studying party members is not only a method with which to go beyond these numbers and uncover the individual's experience of being a member of a political party, but she argues could help scholars in 'reconceptualising and theorising the place and role of political

---

[8] Facebook and Twitter data are from my own fieldwork diary records at the time.

parties' in society (2015, p.244). The potential of ethnographic study of party members, particularly of the German Greens in a period of historic successes in elections and surging membership, has a lot to offer both research literature on the German Greens, as well as party membership more broadly.

The issue of political participation when dealt with within political science literature is more focused on the role party members play for a political party. Following her systematic review of conceptual models of party member roles, Sue Granik (2005) defined party members as performing three roles: supporters, funders, and workers. Incentive-based models in particular are effective in considering why one may join and participate in a political party (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002; Whiteley, 2002), and Alexandra Nonnenmacher and Tim Spier (2014) have considered the incentive model in relation to group size in the context of German political party participation. However, these approaches address neither the *everyday experience* of being a party member, nor do they capture members who engage outside of the 'official' or 'state' conceptions of party membership (Gauja, 2015). In particular, the academic tendency to study protest and institutional politics as part of disparate extra-institutional and institutional spheres respectively, do not address the phenomena identified elsewhere that street demonstration forms of protest are becoming increasingly normalised and legitimate forms of political engagement (Rucht, 2003; Kriesi, 2014).

My research focus on political style, party member participation in the German Green Party, and the interpretive ethnographic methods used to capture these focuses, thereby build on the understudied area of the intersection, interaction, and overlapping of institutional and extra-institutional protest identified in chapter two. It does so by digressing from existing party membership studies with its emphasis on members' feelings towards, experiences of, and opinions about protest, as well as party activity and participation. In addition to capturing the affective nature of party membership and protest action, such

observational methods are able to capture how members are involved and attached to the aesthetic and stylistic nature of protest and party activism. The data generated thus helps to identify and analyse the facets and characteristics of gentrified protest presented in chapter three. In this case, party members are not the 'objects of study', but instead meaning-making 'agents' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.6), or 'voices' who are 'members of (several) networks and participants in (several) flows, rather than as products and producers of clearly identifiable structures' (Kubik, 2009, pp.47-48), such as the structure of the German Green Party.

4.4 Sites of research

After outlining my epistemological and methodological approach of an interpretive ethnography, and the research agents and voices of Green Party members, in this section I map out the first element of research exposure, the geographical sites of research. The following subsections justify the three cities chosen, Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart, and outline the breadth of exposure these sites afford to different elements of the contemporary German Greens. Whilst the financial and temporal circumstances of doctoral research influenced the decision for nine months of fieldwork in total, with three months spent in each city, this was not the ultimate deciding factor for these three sites. In fact, Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart were chosen for their characteristics in relation to their relatively novel coalition formations at the state level. In each of these cities, the Greens were in governing coalitions which span the right-left political spectrum of German politics, with the exception of the far-right AfD. As such these sites were manifestations of maximum difference cases compared with academic literature which focuses on the model of governing Greens in SPD-Green (more often known as red-green) coalitions at the state level (Lees, C., 2000; Hough et al., 2007).

Federal State	State Capital	Coalition in State Parliament	Year coalition began
Baden-Württemberg	Stuttgart	Green-CDU (AKA Kiwi coalition)	2016
Berlin	Berlin	SPD-The Left-Green (AKA Red-Red-Green; R2G)	2016
Brandenburg	Potsdam	SPD-CDU-Green (AKA Kenya coalition – Red-Black-Green)	2019
Bremen	Bremen	SPD-Green-The Left (AKA Red-Red-Green; R2G)	2019
Hamburg	Hamburg	SPD-Green (AKA Red-Green)	2020
Hesse	Wiesbaden	CDU-Green	2018
Rhineland-Palatinate	Mainz	SPD-FDP-Green (AKA Traffic-light coalition – Red-Yellow-Green)	2016
Saxony	Dresden	CDU-Green-SPD (AKA Kenya coalition – Black-Green-Red)	2019
Saxony-Anhalt	Magdeburg	CDU-SPD-Green (AKA Kenya coalition – Black-Red-Green)	2016
Schleswig-Holstein	Kiel	CDU-Green-FDP (AKA Jamaica coalition – Black-Green-Yellow)	2017
Thuringia	Erfurt	The Left-SPD-Green (AKA Red-Red-Green; R2G)	2020 (early elections called for 2021)

Table 1 Current Green governing coalitions at state level (August 2020)

As illustrated by the table above, another reason Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart were chosen was because they are state capitals where their state parliament hosts a Green state party in government. All three sites are urban areas, and urban areas are traditionally more successful areas for the German Greens and Green Parties in general (Poguntke, 1993; Dolezal, 2010; Close and Delwit, 2016). This is due to how urban areas tend to represent secular and cosmopolitan societies which are often home to more of the service industry, and in the past were key strongholds of the 1970s and 1980s New Social Movements (Dolezal, 2010). Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart each have different regional economies, political traditions, and different proximity to other levels of German politics. This consequently affects the relationships within Green Parties in each site, as well as their interactions and opinions of different levels of their party and parliamentary parties.

The site selection has also aimed to achieve a breadth of geographical difference, within the obvious limitations of choosing three states of the total sixteen in Germany. In this case, the sites span north and south, and also, although to a lesser extent, east and west with the inclusion of Berlin and the idiosyncrasies it retains following its own division within the then East Germany. My main motivation for selecting these three sites was an intentional design for 'situated knowledges' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.111). Such a specific choice of case for such knowledge was also undertaken by Nielsen (2012) in his ethnography of 'Ground Wars' during election campaigns in the United States. In my research, I wanted to generate data related to Green party members in areas of relatively novel (at the time) state coalition governments: in Berlin, SPD-The Left-Green or R2G; in Kiel the so-called '*Jamaika*' coalition between CDU-FDP-Green; and in Stuttgart the so-called 'Kiwi' coalition of the Greens-CDU, with the Greens as the major coalition partner. When designing this research project, I wanted to see how these relatively new forms of Green governing coalitions affected Green Party involvement with, and responses to, local protest and whether this was also reflected in its presence in party events or promotion, and within the opinions and experiences of local party members and activists.

The following subsections thus address elements of Yanow's transparency of research design required in interpretive ethnographies to 'establish the trustworthiness of truth claims' (2009, p.282). This is in line with the choices that ethnographers are required to make prior to entering and during their time in the field (Yanow, 2009; Nielsen, 2012; Rhodes, 2017). In particular, these subsections address Yanow's elements of *place*, *exposure* and *access narratives*, as well as broader societal, economic, and political characteristics for my choices of Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart as research sites.

4.4.1 Berlin

Berlin is an obvious choice for studying protest action. It is the political capital of Germany: the federal parliament, the *Bundestag*, is based there and is therefore often the choice for national level demonstrations on national level issues. However, it also has its own thriving local politics and demonstrations. It has traditionally been a strong base of Green support, particularly within the electoral ward 'Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg – Prenzlauer Berg Ost', which was the first district in Germany to have repeatedly returned a directly elected Green politician to the *Bundestag*: Hans-Christian Ströbele between 2002 and 2017, after which Green politician Canan Bayram has successfully succeeded him twice. In the 2021 federal elections, Berlin obtained three direct mandates, where Bayram kept her direct mandate and was joined by Hanna Steinmüller and Stefan Gelbhaar who obtained direct mandates in Mitte and Pankow respectively (Burger and Soldt, 2021). Within the Berlin state parliament, the trajectory of the Greens can be classed as a 'success story', but one that has been accompanied by fractures, disaffection, injuries, and characterised by a high turnover of individual politicians (Lempp, 2007, p.124). This somewhat 'bumpy' success story can be seen in the Greens' performance in Berlin state elections in the table below:

Berlin State Parliament Elections (*Abgeordnetenhaus*)	Results (*Zweitstimme* in %)			
Party	**2021**	**2016**	**2011**	**2006**
Greens	18.9	15.2	17.6	13.1
CDU	18	17.6	23.3	21.3
SPD	21.4	21.6	28.3	30.8
AfD	8	14.2	N/A	N/A
FDP	7.1	6.7	1.8	7.6
The Left[9]	14.1	15.6	11.7	13.4

Table 2 Berlin State Parliament Elections 2006-2021[10]

In 2016, the Greens in the Berlin state parliament formed a left-wing coalition with the SPD and The Left, which is commonly referred to as a red-red-green coalition or R2G, and this one was the first at a state level to be led by the SPD.[11] Following the 2021 Berlin state elections, the SPD and Greens eventually negotiated another SPD-led R2G coalition with The Left. At the time of fieldwork, a R2G coalition was a relatively novel and often considered not impossible but unlikely at a federal level (Klapsa, 2018). Yet, Green Party support at all levels (district, state, and federal) differs between the various city districts of the Berlin. The variation of party support within Berlin corresponds to the local socio-economic status of residents in the area, and more entrenched social and cultural differences in regions due to its status as the only 'reunified state' in reunified Germany (Junge and Lempp, 2007, p.12). These differences still exist, as is shown in the table below depicting the different results in different districts in 2021 district council elections in Berlin:

---

[9] The Left results include the results achieved in 2006 by the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).

[10] Table shows results of parties represented in the *Bundestag*. Data is from https://download.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/3555792600ce736c/f8122ac6bd91/SB_B07-02-03_2021j05_BE.pdf and https://www.wahlen-berlin.de/historie/Wahlen/SB_B7-2-3-j05-11_BE.pdf

[11] A R2G coalition at the state level in the eastern state of Thüringen was formed in 2014, but was led by The Left.

Results in 2021 Berlin District Elections (*Bezirksverordnetenversammlung* or BVV) per District						
District	**Results (%) by Party**					
	Greens	**CDU**	**SPD**	**AfD**	**FDP**	**The Left**
Mitte	28.5	12.8	18.5	4.8	6.7	16.8
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg	34.6	7.8	14.8	3.1	4.7	21.6
Pankow	24.7	12.3	17.1	7.8	5.8	19.4
Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf	24.7	21.9	22	4.7	9.8	7.5
Spandau	11.9	27.2	27.7	10.2	7.5	5.4
Steglitz-Zehlendorf	22.4	27.2	21.7	5.1	9.5	5
Tempelhof-Schöneberg	23.6	20.8	23.5	5.8	7	8.8
Neukölln	17.6	16.9	28.7	7.1	4.9	15
Treptow-Köpenick	13.7	13.2	25.2	11.9	6.1	17.7
Marzahn-Hellersdorf	6.9	20.8	20.3	16.9	5.3	19.9
Lichtenberg	13	13.1	19.6	12	5.5	24.8
Reinickendorf	14.3	29	23.8	9.5	7.3	5.2

Table 3 Results of 2021 Berlin District Elections by District[12]

As you can see above, there is strong Green support in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, a district comprised of a former West and East Berlin area that previously had a tradition of anti-establishment squatters movements, the punk movement, and where a lot of 'guest workers' from southern Europe and Turkey settled as a result of West German migration policy in the 1960s. As such, this district is increasingly gentrified and now host to a different class of migrants that call themselves 'expatriates' from across the world, including students and those working in creative industries like tech, music and other artistic professions. As mentioned above these are consistent characteristics for strong Green support (Dolezal, 2010). In comparison, in Marzahn-Hellersdorf the Greens achieved less than the far-right AfD and were prevented from last place only by the fiscally-liberal FDP. These recent extremities are nothing new, as Jakob Lempp indicated in his description of

---

[12] Table shows results of parties represented in the *Bundestag*. Data from https://download.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/3555792600ce736c/f8122ac6bd91/SB_B07-02-03_2021j05_BE.pdf

the Greens as 'swaying between a neighbourhood (*Kiez*) mentality and federal politics' and 'between an ecologically-liberal party of the political centre and a socio-politically engaged party with a left-wing profile' (2007, p.123). As such, Berlin was a site which provided good examples of the Greens negotiating the split between state government and national opposition in close proximity, in terms of their characteristics of activity and style.

My prior knowledge of Berlin's diverse politics in a relatively small geographical location, and its position as a 'reunified state' amongst German states was a key factor in my decision to choose Berlin as one of my fieldwork sites. The city's proximity to and overlap with national politics and protest, as well as its relatively novel R2G state coalition was also a key factor in my choosing of Berlin alongside Kiel and Stuttgart. In line with my commitment to transparency, as well as my epistemological commitment to the impossibility of a researcher 'objectively' standing outside the object of study (Yanow, 2009), particularly in an ethnographic approach using participant observation, there were several reasons I chose Berlin and why I chose to go to Berlin first.

Firstly, my own experience of living and working in Berlin as an English Language Assistant in my early twenties had resulted in developing a friendship with a work colleague who was an active member of the Green Party branch in the district of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf. Correspondingly, I thus had prior working knowledge of the nature of the Berlin Green Party and a friend who was very generous to help me network and provide productive conversations with her about Berlin Green politics over many years. Furthermore, my familiarity with living in Berlin meant I had good geographical knowledge of the city, as well as ample experience with and knowledge of Berlin's public transport network. This familiarity therefore allowed me to give more attention and time to fieldwork, rather than navigating a new city, and to understand how I could replicate the fieldwork set-up when I moved on to the less familiar (to me) cities of Kiel and Stuttgart.

4.4.2 Kiel

The second city in which I conducted fieldwork was Kiel, the capital of the *Bundesland* Schleswig-Holstein. Unlike Berlin, I had not visited Kiel before my entry into the field, and I did not have party contacts to use before I arrived. Instead, I applied and was successfully awarded a grant to complete a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) short research stay at the University of Kiel. The contacts I made in my academic department of International Political Sociology greatly helped in making contacts with local Green politicians who had previously studied in the department. Of course, the discovery of this information was not something I could have planned, but rather an accidental and/or serendipitous discovery common to field research (Kapiszewski et al., 2015). Instead, my decision to choose Kiel as a site of research was based on prior researching of the history and cultural context of that city and its wider state of Schleswig-Holstein. The rest of this subsection elaborates on that context, as well as the nature of the Schleswig-Holstein Greens and their involvement in state government, as the factors which influenced this choice.

State capitals in comparison 2018: Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart							
	Categories of statistical comparison (2018)						
City	Population (Number)	City area (km2)	Proportion of foreign residents (%)	Unemployment (%)	GDP per resident (€)	Car ownership (total)	Number of tourist visitors (per 1000 residents)
Berlin	3,748,148	891.1	20	7.6	38,864	1,202,829	3,602
Kiel	248,792	118.7	12.3	7.4	47,019	110,156	1,550
Stuttgart	614,365	207.3	25.6	3.9	84,180	301,586	3,357

Table 4 State capitals in comparison 2018[13]

---

[13] Data in table abridged from the report *Die Landeshauptstädte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im statistischen Vergleich 2018* available from: https://www.potsdam.de/sites/default/files/documents/vergleich_landeshauptstaedte_2018_online_0_0.pdf

Compared to Berlin and Stuttgart, Kiel is a relatively small city, with less foreign residents. Furthermore, Kiel in 2018 had the smallest density of tourists of all the state capitals in Germany (Landeshauptstadt Potsdam Statistik und Wahlen, 2020). These tourism figures, together with its relatively low proportion of foreign residents, portray a more provincial state capital than Berlin or Stuttgart. Whilst Kiel's status as a smaller city provides a sense of exposure to how Green politics works in less metropolitan cities, this was not the only reason why I chose it. The wider state of Schleswig-Holstein, as well as its national border with Denmark and one of the few German states with a coastline, is also the state with the highest percentage (68 percent) of agricultural land use in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2021). Due to the rural character of the state of Schleswig-Holstein, a lot of the Green Party meetings and events I attended were state-level meetings and working groups hosted in Kiel, which brought together activists from villages and smaller towns and cities. This allowed me to interview activists who were based outside the state capital.

Research mentioned earlier established that Green voters are more likely to live in urban rather than rural areas (Close and Delwit, 2016; Dolezal, 2010; Poguntke, 1993). Therefore, it is unsurprising that whilst the Greens entered candidates for state level elections in Schleswig-Holstein from 1979-1992 on Green Lists, they were not represented in the state parliament of this rurally-influenced state until 1996. This Green entry took place much later than in all other western state parliaments, and only their entry into the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state parliament took place later (Linhart, 2019).

Schleswig-Holstein State Elections (*Landtag*)	Results (*Zweitstimme* in %)			
Party	**2017**	**2012**	**2009**	**2005**
Greens	12.9	13.2	12.4	6.2
CDU	32	30.8	31.5	40.2
SPD	27.3	30.4	25.4	38.7
AfD	5.9	N/A	N/A	N/A
FDP	11.5	8.2	14.9	6.6
The Left[14]	3.8	2.3	6	0.8
SSW	3.3	4.6	4.3	3.6

Table 5 Schleswig-Holstein State Election Results 2005-2017[15]

As the table above demonstrates, since 2009 the Greens have achieved third or fourth place with results between 12.4 – 12.9 percent. Furthermore, the Greens have been a part of two coalition governments in Schleswig-Holstein. This was firstly in a coalition with the SPD and SSW (South Schleswig Voters' Association) between 2012-2017, known as either the 'Danish traffic light', 'coastal' or 'Schleswig-Holstein' coalition because of the involvement of the SSW, a Schleswig-Holstein specific party for the Danish and Friesian minorities within the region. The second governing coalition with the Greens in Schleswig-Holstein was in power during my fieldwork. This was the so-called '*Jamaika*' coalition, because the mix of party colours corresponds to the colours of the Jamaican flag, and consisted of the CDU, the FDP, and the Greens. The *Jamaika* coalition was a relatively novel governing form for the Greens. It had been in place in the Saarland state parliament between 2009 and 2012 but collapsed due to issues within the FDP (Eubel, 2012). Yet, it was to Schleswig-Holstein the media turned when discussing the viability of a *Jamaika* coalition at the federal level ahead and after the 2017 federal elections (Eubel and Monath, 2017; Heidtmann, 2017). However, the *Jamaika* negotiations that took place following the 2017 federal elections collapsed

---

[14] The Left results include the results achieved in 2005 by PDS.

[15] Table shows results from parties represented in the Bundestag. Includes the Schleswig-Holstein region-specific SSW party for the Danish and Friesian minority, which is not subject to the five-percent-hurdle to enter the state parliament. Data from: www.statistik-nord.de

when Christian Lindner and the FDP pulled out, stating it was 'better to not govern, than to govern incorrectly' (Sigmund, 2017). These existing difficulties of governing and negotiating a Jamaica coalition convinced me that Kiel, as the only state capital of a Jamaica coalition, should be included as one of my research sites.

As well as the *Jamaika* coalition, another key factor in the decision to select Kiel as one of my research sites was because of Green Party politicians in the state. Firstly, the federal party co-leader at the time of fieldwork, Robert Habeck, a native of Schleswig-Holstein, had previously occupied the role of environment and agriculture minister and deputy Minister President in the *Jamaika* government in Schleswig-Holstein. Upon his election as co-leader of the party, he negotiated an amendment to party statutes to create a six-month transition period before giving up his post in the Schleswig-Holstein government to concentrate on the leadership of the central federal party. Secondly, the Schleswig-Holstein Greens in state parliament had three impressive and digitally visible, young politicians: Lasse Petersdotter (Hölter et al., 2018), Rasmus Andresen (politik&kommunikation, 2017), and Aminata Touré (Parbey, 2018). Therefore, I chose to conduct fieldwork in Kiel because of a potential different interaction with federal level politics through a connection of a party personality, as well as to explore a Green party with several, young, digitally astute politicians in a potentially volatile *Jamaika* coalition, and what influence this may have on party member participation and political style in both cases.

The final factor in choosing Kiel, in its role as the state capital of Schleswig-Holstein, was due to Schleswig-Holstein's history of environmental activism, specifically the anti-nuclear protests against the construction of the Brokdorf nuclear power plant in the 1970s and 1980s. The violent clashes between protesters and police at Brokdorf drew national media attention to the anti-nuclear movement and became a powerful symbol (Milder, 2019; Glaser, 2012). Following the successful prevention of a nuclear power plant being built

in Wyhl, similar protest tactics were transferred to Brokdorf, but did not have the same successful outcome (Mushaben, 1986). Yet, the events at Brokdorf helped to forge a link between nuclear energy and issues of authoritarianism, democracy, free speech, and radicalism, to the extent that Milder suggests nuclear energy 'became almost a cypher for politics as a whole in the Federal Republic' (Milder, 2019, p.141). This was partly due to the brutality of the police violence inflicted upon demonstrators, but also due to the perceived authoritarian character of the German state. For example, one demonstrator Maria Braig, cited in Michael Hughes (2015), when being charged in court for participating in the blockade at Brokdorf, compared 'truck drivers at the nuclear plant site and prosecutors and judges at trials of anti-nuclear-power demonstrators to those in the Third Reich who just did their duty in implementing that regime's evil policies' (2015, p.431).

Brokdorf has also had a lasting legacy on the policing of protest in Germany, due to Germany's constitutional court overturning a ban on a march in Brokdorf in 1981 (Braunthal, 1990). The 1985 Brokdorf resolution from the constitutional court 'obliges police to act in a friendly and cooperative manner towards peaceful protesters, even if "disturbers" are present in the protest' (Ullrich, 2020, fn. p.18). The historical context of protest within Schleswig-Holstein thus makes it a productive site for my fieldwork, particularly in relation to the continuum of violent and non-violent forms of protest. Furthermore, the empirical links between supporters of these anti-nuclear movements and the Greens at the time entail that the Greens in Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel have been influenced by and are supported by actors of these actions in that region (Müller-Rommel, 1985). Once again, the state governing coalition and the specific local historical context motivated me to choose Kiel and Schleswig-Holstein as my second research site.

4.4.3 Stuttgart

Stuttgart, the state capital of Baden-Wurttemberg was my third and final site of fieldwork. The three months I spent in Stuttgart coincided with European and municipal (*Kommunal*) campaigns and elections, which impacted the nature of Green Party activity I was observing. I will turn to this later in the following subsection. Compared with Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Wurttemberg is the economically strongest site of fieldwork, as table 4 above indicates. Baden-Wurttemberg had an unemployment rate just under half that in Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein in 2018, and a considerably higher GDP per resident at €84,180, which was more than twice that in Berlin (Landeshauptstadt Potsdam Statistik und Wahlen, 2020). These different economic aspects to society in Baden-Wurttemberg and Stuttgart, with its strong automobile industry as home to Mercedes Benz and the Daimler group, made it a convincing choice as a location to generate different situated knowledge of Green Party activism.

The major factor in choosing Stuttgart as a research site was for its position as the state capital of the only Green-majority-governed state. In 2011, Winfried Kretschmann became the first Green minister-president of a German state heading the first Green-led coalition with the SPD. Kretschmann was re-elected in 2016 and since then has been at the helm of a Green-led coalition with the CDU. This coalition is sometimes referred to as a 'Kiwi' coalition, because Green is the major coalition partner, and the CDU (black) is the minor coalition partner.

Baden-Wurttemberg State Elections (*Landtag*)	Results (in %)			
Party	2021	2016	2011	2006
Greens	32.6	30.3	24.2	11.7
CDU	24.1	27	39	44.2
SPD	11	12.7	23.1	25.2
AfD	9.7	15.1	N/A	N/A
FDP	10.5	8.3	5.3	10.7
The Left[16]	3.6	2.9	2.8	3.1

Table 6 Baden-Wurttemberg State Election Results 2006-2021[17]

The progress of the Greens in Baden-Württemberg has been followed closely by academics due to the novelty of both of the Green-led coalitions (Hörisch and Wurster, 2017a; Blumenberg and Blumenberg, 2017; Dürr, 2018). Felix Hörisch and Stefan Wurster's edited volume evaluates the impact of what they call the 'caesura' of politics and history in Baden-Wurttemberg following the Green-SPD government's historic defeat of the CDU-FDP coalition (Hörisch and Wurster, 2017b, p.2). Johannes Blumenberg and Manuela Blumenberg focus on Kretschmann as a candidate within the state electorate, whereas Michael Dürr concentrates on party organisation from both the view of Green party and parliamentary elites and the view of party members, thereby analysing political positions, member motivations, political socialisation and the perception of the party. Indeed, Dürr points out that the success of the Greens in seizing the minister-president leadership of Baden-Wurttemberg from the CDU, who had held the position from 1953 to 2011, had several different contributing factors: benefitting from the Fukushima disaster as a well-known anti-nuclear party, benefitting from the poor performance of the national CDU-FDP government at the time, and benefitting from being the

---

[16] The Left results include the results achieved in 2006 by the 'Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative' or WASG party before their merger with PDS to form The Left in 2007.

[17] Table shows the results of parties represented in the *Bundestag*. Unlike the voting process in the *Bundestag*, Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein elections, Baden-Wurttemberg state elections gives voters just one vote and the distribution of seats for parties is calculated from the state-wide aggregate of these votes. Data from https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/BWSerie_mods_00000906

party who stood opposed to the building of a new railway station, referred to as Stuttgart 21, which had been met with substantial and numerous protests by large numbers of citizens and heavy-handed policing (Dürr, 2018, pp. 27-29).

The Green-SPD state government put the issue of stopping Stuttgart 21 to a referendum (*Volksabstimmung*) in November 2011, where the majority voted against stopping its construction and put the Greens and Kretschmann in the position to say that they accepted the decision, although it ran counter to their own position on the issue (Dürr, 2018, p.32). However, the protests around Stuttgart 21 continue to go on almost a decade after they first started in 2010, albeit the support for these demonstrations has shrunk since the referendum. Those who continue to demonstrate are a specific group committed to stopping or changing the project and any negative environmental impact. This has created a splitter effect in local political organisations and parties at the city level, like *Sozial, Ökologisch, Stuttgart* or SÖS, the organisational arm within *Rathaus* politics of this anti-Stuttgart 21 movement. Within the continued protests against Stuttgart 21, they have the same 'Monday Demonstration' format most commonly associated with the protests of East Germans during the 'peaceful revolution' against the East German government in the late 1980s.[18] These protests and related events, some of which I attended during my fieldwork, now see a lot of 'Green-bashing' of local politicians involved with Stuttgart 21, such as Peter Pätzold, the city councillor for building and construction during my fieldwork, but also other actions by the Greens at the city and state level.

Alongside the novel Green position in the Baden-Wurttemberg state government and the state's economic prowess, it was the historical context of the Stuttgart 21 infrastructure project and the protests against it which also

---

[18] To see groups that are still organising and involved with continuing Monday Demonstrations against Stuttgart 21, see: https://www.bei-abriss-aufstand.de, http://www.parkschuetzer.de and http://www.kopfbahnhof-21.de

motivated my choice of Stuttgart as a field research site. Whilst some have disputed whether the Stuttgart 21 protests were 'protests of privilege', arguing instead that bourgeois protest (*Bürgerprotest*) was not new to Germany (Kraushaar, 2011), I believed prior to entering the field that this relatively recent sequence of events, and its influence on the Greens obtaining power, would have been a great influence on party members and both their party and protest activism. However, this was another example of abductive reasoning as outlined in section one. For those party members I spoke with, Stuttgart 21 was not a questionable issue. Some had attended the demonstrations prior to the referendum, whilst others were too young or did not live in Stuttgart at the time in question. All toed the party line in accepting the referendum result and saw the Green role instead in fixing the implementation. In particular, my interviewee Ulrike found those who continue to demonstrate against the project 'embarrassing' with their continued protest constantly present on badges on their rucksacks.[19] Indeed, with the Greens re-elected to the state parliament as the largest party in 2021, and locally in Stuttgart in the 2019 municipal elections, Stuttgart 21 is no longer a major influence on Green success in Baden-Wurttemberg, nor a cause of concern or particularly important for Green activists.

Finally, whilst I had never visited Stuttgart before, I did have a contact through a colleague who assisted me with accommodation and was active in the Stuttgart 21 Monday Demonstrations and the SÖS political organisation. This contact worked in a town outside Stuttgart, Plochingen, and put me in touch with two young Green Party members in that local area 19km from Stuttgart. Unlike Kiel, Stuttgart had a somewhat affordable and accessible public transport system, albeit naturally not as extensive in a large city like Berlin, and more smaller district Green Party branches. This enabled me to travel to far more Green Party events and meetings across the city, as these were not

---

[19] Ulrike, Stuttgart-East, p.10. Those involved in organising the Monday demonstrations often create badges to demarcate the number of demonstrations there have now been for supporters to illustrate their length of commitment to the cause.

as centralised as they were in Kiel. This included electoral campaign events. An overview of the campaign events to choose to observe was made possible early on in my fieldwork by one party member sharing an internal document of the registered election campaign events of all Stuttgart Green Party branches.

4.4.4 The electoral effect

In this thesis, elections are not my research focus. However, electoral activity had an impact on my research in each site despite the non-concurrent undertaking of field research. Whilst I was in Berlin, there were state elections in Bavaria and Hesse which influenced public discourse on the Greens nationally because of the historic electoral gains the party made in October 2018. In Hesse, the Greens went from 11.1 percent in 2013 to 19.8 percent in 2018. Whereas in Bavaria, the Greens went from 8.6 percent in 2013 to 17.6 percent in 2018. As an example of the serendipity of field research, I was invited to attend the Hesse state election campaign party at the central national party headquarters in Berlin after I lost access to the internet in my own accommodation. This offer came about after I made an appeal on Twitter that was amplified by Greens in the city.

When I moved to Kiel, I observed a party preparing for the upcoming European election campaign, and attempting to mobilise increasing numbers of new party members to help identify creative and participative campaign events. Finally, when I arrived in Stuttgart, I was witnessing a party in campaign-mode-proper, not only for the European election campaign, but also a fiercely contested and more prominent municipal election campaign in Stuttgart. This certainly shaped the data I was generating in Stuttgart, the kinds of events that I was observing, and the personal connections made and networking with party members. This surge of Green support across the nine months in various state-level elections and opinion polls, was not something I had necessarily

expected prior to entering the field, but which I had to reassess and adapt to as my research coincided with these outside influences.

The previous subsections on my research sites have particularly addressed my prior knowledge to entering the field, and explicitly how this prior knowledge motivated my choices of Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart as research sites. In doing so, it has addressed examples of the abductive logic of interpretive ethnographic research, and reassessing in the field. This has included the examples from this section of the role of Stuttgart 21 for Green Party members, coping with an internet outage, and reassessing the situated context in light of Green success. Another example of abductive reasoning was also discussed in section one in relation to my prior assumptions of active grassroots Green members. These three sites were chosen for their ability to elucidate potential nuances in the relationship of party and protest action in areas which are known to be successful territory for the Greens: urban and predominantly in the west. These sites were specifically chosen to isolate any differences and similarities within state-governing Green Party branches to illustrate just how broad contemporary Green members and activity differs, and what impact, if any, their role in state government has on party and member engagement with protest and movements, and thus the political style of gentrified protest.

In the final section of this chapter, I turn more to the detail of 'being there' in the field to provide a transparent map of the exposure and intertextuality of my research (Yanow, 2009). Section four has addressed my prior knowledge and the geographical 'place' of my research setting, but not necessarily the extent of 'spaces' within that place. In section five, I turn more specifically in turn to Yanow's elements of Place/Space, Time, Exposure, Positionality, and Access Narratives (2009, pp.282-289), which also fulfils Schwartz-Shea and Yanow's 'Mapping for Exposure and Intertextuality' (2012, pp.84-89). This section thus concludes the chapter with the detail of research design from the field which demonstrates the variety of relevant exposure to different perspectives on

Green Party members and Green Party involvement in protest, and how my analytical framework of gentrified protest can be applies to data generated in the field.

4.5 Research design – Being there and exposure

4.5.1 Positionality and reflexivity

The previous section detailed how my prior knowledge influenced my choices of research sites. However, it also influenced the way I positioned myself to my research whilst in the field. As a scholar with an area studies disciplinary affiliation and an educational background of German Studies, I conducted my data generation in a second language (German) within the confines of writing a project for an area studies and political studies audience in my mother tongue (English). This did have the advantage of ensuring that I already had the knowledge of the 'complexities of the context' - in other words the language, cultural assumptions, and history – well before I began planning this research project, let alone before I entered the field (Schatz, 2009c, p.309). This is not isolated to university study, but also was garnered through different periods of living and working in Germany: as a language assistant in a primary school, an internship at a mobile app start-up, and another internship in the functional offices of a medium-sized, high-precision manufacturer. These experiences were gained in Berlin and in a small town of less than 20,000 inhabitants in North-Rhine Westphalia and amounted to 18 months of living in Germany in total prior to conducting this fieldwork.

Despite my contextual knowledge, I did face what Wells et al. (2019) call 'inbetweenness' in the process of conducting my fieldwork as a Brit in Germany during Theresa May's attempts to negotiate a Brexit deal with the EU. As I was researching the German Greens who are a proudly European

party, not only was I translating my observations of the Greens for my own project whilst acting as an 'insider' in a state of contextual immersion, but I had to translate my 'outsider' status to the Greens I was immersed in. For example, on numerous occasions I was asked at party events about my own political activity and opinions on Brexit, such as the likelihood of a second referendum on Scottish independence. It also has the advantage that, particularly in interviews, assumptions from participants about a lack of knowledge that I may have as a British citizen and researcher, led in some contexts to richer data about the everyday minutiae of being in a political party that would perhaps be considered irrelevant for a German researcher, even if at times it crossed a boundary into more patronising language or tone. For example, in my interview with Vanessa in Stuttgart, she detailed her frustrations on the Green Youth mobilising to prevent her from obtaining a higher list place in the municipal elections in favour of a candidate they considered more left-wing and aligned with the values of the Stuttgart Green Youth, despite this chosen candidate's age (29 years) making her ineligible to be a Green Youth member, where the cut off is 28.

My own political views and beliefs do overlap or could be described as sympathetic to some of the policies and stances that are propagated by the German Greens. I have in the past campaigned and voted for the UK Labour Party in the UK. I have also campaigned for the cross-party *Stronger IN* campaign during the 2016 referendum in the UK on EU membership. Whilst most of this activism has been limited to specific campaigns or election cycles, I did once attend a Labour Students conference and have engaged with protest action in the past on a variety of issues; this includes anti-Brexit, anti-tuition fee rises, anti-Trump, anti-austerity, and also a few Pride Parades in my hometown of Brighton, albeit the protest nature of Pride in the 21st century is increasingly commodified (Conway, 2021). Most of these issues are UK-specific, and a few of them could be considered as political positions that sit quite further to the left than those held by many within the contemporary German Greens. This makes me a slight outsider to those who I observed

and/or interviewed. However, my own experiences could be seen by Green Party members as common ground where I understand the importance and desire to take part in demonstrations on issues that one cares about, and that I too have a clear idea about what it is to be a grassroots member of a party, albeit a knowledge based more around campaign and election time.

I also had to use abductive logic to understand what it entailed to be conducting an ethnography from 'within' the German Greens. I had to reconcile the experience of imbedding myself in the party over those months alongside expected, theoretical approaches to being 'within' a party. Ian Coates (1997) in his thesis on the worldview of English Green Party activists, for example, conducted his ethnographic data generation by becoming a formal party member. The first of these expectations I considered was joining the party, which I quickly rejected. Whilst becoming a formal member of the German Greens would 'officially' entail that I was a part of the party, this felt disingenuous to me, particularly given that I have my own party affiliation in the UK (at the time of fieldwork I was a member of the UK Labour Party). This would also require me to pick a state within which to have my party membership based and would therefore affect the communications I received from them. As my fieldwork was planned to work within three different cities, this also felt as though the area chosen with which to register my membership would be unfairly privileged over the other two areas. I learnt early on during some observation at the Berlin-Lichtenberg member meeting that it is not easy to change the place where your membership is registered, so there would be no guarantee that I could ensure a similar membership experience across all three cities. Furthermore, as Faucher (2015) interrogates the notion that mass membership provides legitimacy to a political party, by joining the party myself I would be playing a part in potentially involving myself in promoting or representing the party and giving it legitimacy, a position I also reflected on in my use of Twitter and Facebook during my fieldwork to network with Greens and gather information from it.

My largest impetus for deciding not to join the party, was very much of trying to engage with the party outside a non-official or state-defined way, as many people do these days. The German Greens have always prided themselves on the fact that you can be involved within the party without being a formal, paying member. Participation and grassroots democracy in action is a core principle of the German Greens, even in their less radical form, with an ability to take part in all things Green, albeit without any voting power or becoming a party delegate. Indeed, over the course of my fieldwork, multiple members I spoke to, and supporters I came into contact with, have been or are active within party structures for long swathes of time before making a decision to 'formally' join the party. This is on a sort of 'try before you buy' arrangement, made possible by the party's long-standing assertion that everyone can take part within the Greens, paid membership or not. Therefore, my approach illustrates the ability for an ethnographic method to find and identify such party members who would not fall under 'official' conceptions of membership (Gauja, 2015).

4.5.2 Place/Space

Following my decision to not be 'within' the party as a party member, I worked hard to approach various party and parliamentary levels of the Greens in Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart. Whilst these three cities constituted the places of my research, the different district branches or levels of the organisations were different spaces in which I undertook participant observation. Taking this approach, I achieved prolonged exposure to the Greens over different spaces (Yanow, 2009, p.285). This approach is particularly appropriate for political parties in Germany. German politics is a multi-level system with federal, state, and municipal levels of politics, which even within municipal level politics can be broken down further into districts and other such groupings. This multi-level

political system necessitates multi-level parties and parliamentary parties and, therefore, complex party structures.

	The Party	**Parliamentary Party (*Fraktion*)**	**Thematic Working Groups**
Federal level (*Bundesebene*)	Federal Party Organisation	Federal Parliamentary Party	Federal Working Groups
State level (*Landesebene*)	State Party Organisation	State Parliamentary Party	State Working Groups
Local/Municipal level (*Kommunalebene*)	District/Town/City Party Organisation	District/Town/City Party Representatives in local councils	District/Town/City Working Groups

Image 1 Simplified diagram of the Green multi-level party organisation

The above diagram is a visual map of the different levels I identified over the course of my field research. Other than the Federal Working Groups, I have observed and/or interviewed party activity or engagement with Green Party members at Federal, State and Municipal level. Appendix D details the full list of party events attended in all three cities, which includes categories such as public engagement work, members meetings, anniversary celebrations, social events, thematic events, working groups, and campaign events. The nature of events attended was shaped by the party structure in each site. Unless they were taking place at the weekend, party events took place in the evenings outside typical office working hours.

In Berlin, I attended district party meetings which always had thematic elements to them, instead of, or as well as, organisational aspects. I also attended public events marketed much wider than just to members, thematic working groups and associated events, and an election party at the party's central office. In Kiel, most of the events I attended were state-wide working groups which often met in Kiel, alongside a few campaigns and Green Youth events as well. But this also included social events such as a *Stammtisch* and

a reception for the Green representatives in the Kiel *Rathaus*. In Stuttgart, the European and municipal elections entailed that the events I attended were predominantly election campaign events, designed to reach out to voters, but which seemed to predominantly attract other Green members and activists. I did manage to attend some district party events, but due to the elections again, these were far more organisational in nature and focused on either campaign activity, or what needed to be done immediately following the elections.

Appendix E details the protests I attended, its cause, and whether the Greens had some visible representation as recorded from my fieldnotes. Whilst approaching choices on whether to observe protest demonstrations, I decided to attend all protests encouraged and advertised by Greens, as well as others that were not publicly endorsed by the party but were brought up by party members. However, I also attended demonstrations advertised which broadly were identified with left-wing politics, or in which there would be strong opposition to the Greens taking part, to ensure I had a broader exposure to protest action in each city. This is not to say that no visible Green presence means a deliberate omission by local Greens, as my interviewee Katharina told me you cannot be aware of all protest demonstrations, and nor do all demonstration organisers permit party flags.[20] The protest demonstrations I observed mostly took place on Friday evenings or Saturday mornings and/or afternoons, other than Fridays for Future which, as it suggests in the name, took place on Friday mornings so that children were able to strike from their school lessons.

At some times, I developed a strong feeling of a 'fear of missing out' given that the complex structures of the party often led to clashing events. This entailed that I had to make decisions, sometimes quite arbitrarily, to try and make sure I ended up at an event that would add more nuance to my data. Sometimes

---

[20] Katharina, Kiel Green Youth, pp.6-7.

my choices proved fruitful, and other times I passed up much better opportunities for events that, to be honest, I was mis-sold. For example, I decided against attending the state party conference in Berlin for what a party member suggested was a small, localised protest which turned out to be an information stand in a supermarket carpark.

By engaging in a multi-sited ethnographic method, both in terms of geography but also within the multi-level system, I ensured that the data captured different party voices. This is particularly important in order to detect the style of gentrified protest, which identifies how a political style is integrated and produced and reproduced by different party actors at different levels and in different contexts. As such, the method described here is adept at capturing the complexity and divergences from 'official' centralised communications and the party central office understanding of party membership.

4.5.3 Time: Timing and Duration

The situated knowledge I gathered and practices I observed were specific to the temporal context in which I was working. Clarification of the duration and timing of the fieldwork is particularly important considering the length of time I spent in the field and the multi-sited character of my field research. In total, I spent nine months conducting field research between 1st October 2018 and 30th June 2019. I spent three months in each of the three cities between the following dates:

- Berlin: 1st October 2018 – 21st December 2018
- Kiel: 5th January 2019 – 31st March 2019
- Stuttgart: 1st April 2019 – 30th June 2019

The prior conceptual knowledge I brought with me to the field concentrated on an importance of attending local party member meetings, as I believed they would provide insight into the issues and activities which are discussed by highly active, formal party members, and whether protest or demonstration action were mentioned at all. I did not have control over the content, scheduling, format, or attendance of party events. As I indicated in the previous section on place/space, my observations mostly occurred at weekends and evenings, outside of typical working hours. The timing of my observations reflects the same timing of political activism for those for whom it is not their primary vocation.

During the fieldwork itself, the events available to me varied considerably based on the location and the timing of my fieldwork stay in each area. This was also affected by my own timetable with personal and academic commitments throughout the nine months that required me to make visits back to the UK or elsewhere intermittently throughout fieldwork. For example, in Berlin it was very easy to access party member meetings in multiple Berlin districts with its extensive public transport network and was benefitted by the large amount of Green political activity in a relatively small geographical area. However, in Kiel, the local Kiel Green association was relatively small, and their only bi-monthly member meeting during my period in Kiel took place when I was in Finland for an academic conference. Otherwise, most party activity in Kiel was in state-wide working groups, so they formed the majority of my participant observation during my time there.

In Stuttgart, the events available for me to observe were heavily influenced by the municipal and European elections, which meant that most district parties in Stuttgart forewent their regular member meetings for the wealth of campaign events held across the city. Following the municipal and European elections on 26th May 2019, however, the Stuttgart Greens took a well-earned break from party activity and meetings, which then also were impacted by the

Pfingsten (Pentecost) holiday, when party activity also ground to a halt. Therefore, although conducting fieldwork across three different sites allows for comparisons and contrasts in party activity, direct comparisons are not meaningful within my interpretive approach which recognises the geographically and temporally specific situatedness of the data gathered. Instead, the close study of the German Greens and their members over an extended period of time allows for the detection of gentrified protest during both intense periods of activity, during the elections in Stuttgart, as well as quieter times, as was seen in Kiel.

4.5.4 Access Narratives

Considering the multi-level complexity of party spaces, and the decision to study across three different places, Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart, there were multiple attempts and points of access to Green Party organisations and Green Party members. Section 4.4 in this chapter detailed the instances in which personal contacts aided in establishing contact with Green Party members in each site. When attempting to gain access outside of personal contacts, I had to balance the ethical responsibilities of observational research and informed consent and notify party event organisers in advance so that I received explicit consent at the start of an event. This was strongly recommended by my university's ethics board, despite the clear shift this had on perceptions and attitudes towards me by Greens in that room at that time, and the way in which I was treated by others present: as a researcher; as a British white woman; and occasionally with scepticism of my motives for my choice of study because of my nationality or my own political affiliation that they sometimes requested from me.

I also had to consider what I conceived as a public or open Green event; when negotiating access to events, I received responses ranging from 'you do not

need to ask our permission to observe, as our meetings are open to anyone',
to 'it is good that you let us know in advance, and we are happy to help out
researchers' to 'on reflection we think your presence would disturb our
event'.[21] Some of these public events were not as public as advertised. Those
held in state parliaments required a form of prior registration and handing over
photo ID, as otherwise you could not get past security. There were also
occasions where I just turned up to events and observed, often at events that
were generally open to the public. However, in these cases I did not have the
invaluable opportunity to recruit interview participants that materialised when
introducing myself and my intentions to a group of party members who were
'being active' at that direct moment in time.

This resulted in a balancing act between trying to do what is best for the project
as a whole and raising my own visibility across the local party membership. By
introducing myself at events, attending protest demonstrations, and covering
events at different levels of the party and of different categories, I was able to
increase my visibility, which maintained my relationship with the party and
party members, as they could see I was committed to engagement during my
time there. This also led to my own surprise at just how many varied events
and subgroups the same members would engage with. I found that introducing
myself and my research project at party events, informal chats during lunch
breaks, or striking up conversations with party members at protests was the
most effective way of recruiting interview participants. Emails managed to get
me interviews with state level politicians and a central party office employee
but failed to get any grassroots party members on board. As such, negotiating
access to interview participants illustrated the lack of control that researchers
have over the 'agents' which are required to generate research data. For
example, the state politician I interviewed in Berlin was one offered to me when
my desired interview partner refused my request.

---

[21] My own translations from personal email communications with Green volunteers and paid
staff.

One constant feature I encountered was, despite approaching the party with the formal 'you' (*Sie*) to communicate my status as a researcher, I always received replies with the informal, or what the Greens would call less hierarchical, 'you' (*Du*). There was just one district in Berlin that maintained the formal *Sie*, Tempelhof-Schöneberg. In those interviews with state level politicians, I maintained the formal *Sie* and allowed them to shift it to the informal *Du* if they so wished. I only shifted to *Du* in one case, with a politician who was roughly the same age as me. The interview with the party central office employee was conducted with *Du*. This reflected the fact that we had met each other at a previous Green event earlier that year and followed each other on Twitter.

In the course of interviewing my research participants, I encountered 'slippage' between concepts and reality (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p.245) as I brought the concept of *active grassroots party members* into 'conversation' with the lived experience of my participants (Wedeen, 2010, p.257). According to my prior knowledge, I wanted to interview 'active grassroots members', but I soon found that the most forthcoming (and people I most often met at party events) were party members who held some kind of, often voluntary, role and responsibility, whether that was being a part of a tech team for events, or holding voluntary party roles in their local party, or representing the Greens on the local district council. Whilst I had multiple ad-hoc conversations with members at events or protests who considered themselves as less active, or observed them at party events, getting them to conduct interviews was challenging, and even when they said they were interested, a fair number pulled out. New members also do not tend to think of themselves as an 'active member', even if to all intents and purposes they had been at more than just an initial meeting within the early months of their membership.

I did enter the field with some concerns about my use of the term 'gentrification' on all my research documentation. This included information and consent sheets, but also the information available freely online, such as my staff profile at the university which contained my project title and its initial description. My concerns were rooted in the strongly negative connotations of the term 'gentrification', particularly among left-wing activists and in locations where urban change is happening. For example, gentrification in Berlin during my fieldwork was a contentious issue, with outrage expressed towards the attempted purchase of a block of flats on Karl-Marx-Allee by the large German real estate company Deutsche Wohnen (Loy, 2018). Gentrification and affordable housing were not just an issue in Berlin. Indeed, every city I visited as part of this fieldwork was having its own issues with rent levels and/or available housing. The first protest demonstration I observed in Stuttgart at the end of my first week there was a part of a nationwide campaign calling for fairer rents and an end to financial speculation with property prices.

However, interview participants were generally not as hostile about the use of the term as I had expected and were either indifferent or merely curious either pre-interview or during the interview itself. In one instance, where my call for participants had been circulated in advance of a party meeting that I attended in Berlin, I did face a question on my use of the term gentrification that I had to answer in front of a large member meeting. In this case, and others where I was questioned about my use of the term gentrification, I explained that the German Greens are often lumped together with this term in media reports and the ideas and symbols that are associated with it, which is why I am conducting this research to test out whether this is a fair, or indeed accurate, assessment of the actions and everyday life of contemporary Green Party members and their and the party's relationship with protest.

4.6 Data generation process and its intertextuality

Following the detailed map of the exposure my fieldwork garnered to the German Greens and their members, this section declares the more practical methods employed in the field. In compiling data from semi-structured interviews, participant observation, observation of social media accounts, as well as collecting press coverage, the data generated is varied and reflects my broad exposure to the German Greens and their party members. These multiple data 'texts' enable my analysis to achieve an 'intertextuality' which ensures that I am not solely reliant on one interviewee, nor on just my own interpretations.

4.6.1 Interviews

I aimed to conduct about 10-12 interviews in each area I visited. In actuality, I conducted 22 interviews in total: (Berlin, 10; Kiel, 6; Stuttgart, 6). With these series of semi-structured interviews, I generated two main areas of data from party members. The first area was an individual party member's experience of party membership. This included detailing the activities within the party that they engage with, where they and the party come into contact, their own motivations for their activism and membership within the party, what they think it means to be a Green Party member today, and their thoughts, feelings and experiences on party structures and participation within the party. The second area was an individual party member's relationship with protest, and their thoughts and experiences on the Green Party's relationship with protest. This has included discussing the relevance of the Greens' protest ancestry, the Party's contemporary association with protest movements such as those occupying Hambacher Forest to prevent brown coal mining in that region, individual party members' thoughts on other parties that take part in protest such as The Left and the AfD, the relationship of being in office or trying to

emulate the movement politics of Emmanuel Macron and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and any personal associations and involvement with other protest and social movements.[22]

These interviews and prompt questions were designed to generate as much situated knowledge of my research participants' lived experiences and own interpretations of their party and protest activity. As a result, the interviews generated data that reflected on the affective nature of being a party member and engaging in protest, a quality central to gentrified protest as discussed in the previous chapter. By using these same basic prompts in all three research sites, I was able to generate nuanced data both across and within each site. Furthermore, as the recruitment of party members often involved a shared experience of party or protest events prior to interview, the interviews allowed me to compare my interpretation of the shared event or protest with that of my research participant. As such, it developed the intertextuality 'sense-making' I strived for in this project, by 'reading across' various data sources on the 'experienced reality' of Green party membership and activism (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.86). Alongside participant interviews and my own interpretations from participant observation, I also collected media articles from a variety of publications during my time, as well as social media activity of Green Party and Green politician accounts to further broaden the intertextuality of my interpretations. This intertextuality is demonstrated throughout the following two analysis chapters.

As discussed above in the section on access narratives, identifying the conceptually 'pure' grassroots party members discussed prior to entering the field was not reflected in the reality of grassroots Green Party activism. This desire to interview 'pure' grassroots members was anchored in my motivation for this project to provide a voice to those Greens who one would often not

---

[22] See Appendix A for the interview prompts used during interviews.

find in the academic literature. Prior to entering the field, I was convinced such voices were for those who participated without taking on any formal or voluntary labour. However, in the first months of being in the field, it quickly became clear that a great deal of work and unpaid labour by local grassroots members goes in to running these party branches and working groups. As a researcher exploring the lived reality of grassroots Green Party membership and protest, additional voluntary responsibilities do not negate the status of grassroots members, and instead these responsibilities reflect how they are a part of multiple networks and flows within local, grassroots Green politics, or wider state or federal networks. Appendix B provides demographic information and details of any additional roles held by the party members interviewed. I had striven for a gender balance amongst interview participants, and obtaining a broad spectrum of age groups, but again this is something that I had to accept in my inability to control research agents. It was often affected by people dropping out of agreed interviews or due to a lack of interest. In Berlin, I had trouble finding young people, as my attempts at making connections with the Green Youth were quite challenging. However, in Stuttgart this balanced itself out somewhat with interviews with predominantly younger people.

I did obtain interviews with state level politicians and a federal party employee, to whom I tailored my interview prompts after conducting research on them in advance of the interview. However, I also asked them the same questions about their thoughts on protest, their initial membership journey, and how their membership had influenced their progression to their current position. Whilst these interview participants obviously had access and knowledge to broader and 'elite' party networks, reflected by their comments upon signing the consent sheet that they did not require the anonymity procedures I was putting in place, I ultimately decided to anonymise these 'elite' participants alongside their grassroots colleagues. The motivation in this project was to explore the voices of those often ignored in political science research in favour for studies of elite politicians or party employees at federal and state level. Yet these 'elites' are also party members and had to start somewhere. These 'elite'

voices increase the intertextuality of my analysis in being able to incorporate multiple perspectives on issues, but are not more 'valid' or 'insightful' than those of grassroots members. Indeed, my focus on the lived experience of membership is helping to address a gap in our understanding of party membership, as addressed earlier in this chapter.

The interview data, with its emphasis on an individual's feelings, thoughts, and experiences on protest and politics, are able to detect the sanitised and authenticity facets of gentrified protest. Within this interview data, language and discourses can be identified that either diverge from 'official', central party or politician rhetoric on protest action and policy, or reproduce it. Whilst such rhetoric may also be detected from statements made at events and which I recorded in my fieldnotes, the interviews have the advantage of being more extensive and separate from my own interpretations. These detailed accounts when compared with others and the other data generated from the sources below are crucial to detecting these two facets of gentrified protest.

4.6.2 Participant observation

Prior to heading to the field, I envisaged that I would be a passive observer and not participate in any significant way to discussions, given that I thought I was unlikely to be able to contribute anything insightful to local issues given the relatively short period of time that I spent in each area (circa three months). However, I left myself open to changing this approach when in the field if any specific opportunities arose. Of course, I was open to this whilst still trusting my judgement of what was appropriate in the context of the research project, and which still followed and met the expectations and limitations guided by my ethical approval. In the end, I was largely a passive participant at party meetings.

However, there were occasions where I did cross over into the more participant side of participant-observation. At a party meeting in Lichtenberg with an external speaker from the civil initiative *Ich bin hier*, a group of individuals intervening and liking positive comments on Facebook posts of news stories where the comments section has descended into hate-speech, I had a question on the subject that due to the process of *Quotieren*, the feminist discussion list tactic utilised by the Berlin Greens in many meetings and events, I, as one of the few women there, felt encouraged to participate. Another situation where a small level of participation in the discussion at party meetings took place, was when the conversation turned to Brexit. As a British citizen and therefore an 'expert' on Brexit in the eyes of Germans, occasionally I was asked to give my perspective on the issue, my experience, and any predictions that I had about what the potential outcome(s) could be, depending on the current status of the Brexit process at that time. Furthermore, at more social events, such as post-meeting drinks, *Stammtisch* socials and the Green Brunch I attended in Stuttgart, the lines between passive observer and participant became blurred. Overall, I used an abductive logic to determine what level of participation at these various events would generate data on the nature of local Green politics and membership.

One area that was, however, fairly consistent in all three areas I conducted fieldwork, was observing local protests and demonstrations. As public events, the issue with consent is not so complex as it is with party events. When attending protests, I made the decision to attend from its starting point, until the protest was officially ended by protest organisers. This was normally quite clearly expressed across a loudspeaker and required in line with the law of assembly.[23] This physical form of research at protest demonstrations faced all weathers: hot, cold, wet, sunny, or grey, and I often felt the physical impact of a long demonstration for a few days afterwards. However, my commitment to

---

[23] In Baden-Wurttemberg, this was governed by the federal law of assembly. Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin both have their own state law of assembly.

the duration of the protests meant that I had a perspective on how people start to dwindle, who starts to dwindle, and how these demonstrations can change over the course of a, for example, three-hour protest.

Whilst at demonstrations, I attempted, when possible, to strike up conversations with other demonstrators. I was particularly interested in doing this when observing the protest from the so-called 'Green bloc', referring to the party and not necessarily Green and environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and BUND. Due to the nature of these events, being present in your body at a protest indicates support of the cause, and without a clear hi-vis message of being an observer or researcher, my status was unknown by those around me within the protest and those observing the protest. I would sometimes take part in chants, if there were any, which helped in learning them, whilst at the same time keeping myself occupied sometimes on very long protest marches in less than suitable weather conditions.

During the nine months, I kept a fieldwork diary. Particularly towards the start of my fieldwork, this was a more reflexive endeavour, not only containing notes from observations in the field, but also reflections on my personal experiences in the field. Rather than a physical notebook diary, I found that an electronic form suited me better. It was less disturbing, particularly at demonstrations, to be taking notes on my phone rather than writing lots of observations down. I would then transfer these into the word document field diary for that area and refine my fieldnotes later that night or early the next morning. Additionally, I would take photos on my smartphone of observations when I thought it may be helpful. These were predominantly at protest demonstrations, but also at party events, particularly when the event was hosted in a Green-owned space such as state and federal party offices. A small selection of this photographic data is included in the following two chapters.

The data generated from participant observation is crucial in understanding the aesthetic styling and staging of protest and politics by a political party. As demonstrated in the nature of taking photos and detailed notes of what I could see, hear, feel, and sometimes even taste and smell, ensured I collected data that understood the sensory experience of the aesthetic of gentrified protest. The embodied research method of participant observation was also able to generate data on the embodiment of everyday member activism. In particular the visual data of observation of protests, party events, and party members own self-presentation helps to understand the branding of the party and how this is reproduced by party members.

4.6.3 The Role of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram

My observation of the German Greens did not just take place at party events or during demonstrations on the streets, it also took place online. Social media tools added to the richness of the data generated and helped me make the most of my time in the field. I followed party accounts on three major social media sites: Facebook, Twitter and Instagram using my own personal accounts. These included the online presence of local party associations, and, when applicable, individual member public accounts when they were often retweeted or mentioned by party accounts. Individual accounts were only followed on Instagram and Twitter when they were publicly available, whereas Facebook only included party pages and events, respecting people's privacy settings. Party social media was invaluable for my fieldwork for a number of different reasons.

Firstly, by following relevant accounts, such as the accounts for local Green Parties in that city, the state and federal level Green parties, as well as the accounts of prominent Green figures in federal and state politics prior to entering the field, I had a better grasp of key Greens in that area and the kind

of issues that were important to them and the kind of activity they engaged in. This increased the level of contextually specific knowledge, particularly in local politics and Green party branches before I left the UK for my field research. It also provided me with an insight into what could potentially be involved in my participant observation, how involved a particular party branch were in street protest, or how important it was to them to communicate it to their followers. Whilst in the field, this observation continued but then shifted to data generation to increase the number of 'texts' I could refer to for the events I had observed, and enhance the intertextuality of my interpretations.

Secondly, it gave me an idea of how professionalised or consistent the Green party was in regard to a social media presence. This digital observation provoked an understanding of which party branches or politicians curated a consistent presence on social media. By following a considerable number of Green Party accounts at state, city, or municipal level, including the accounts of state parties that were located outside my three research sites, I was able to develop an understanding of to what extent Green Party digital content diverged or conformed to the national party branding and messages, underlining the co-creation and reproduction evident in digital party branding. Social media was also an indicator of the kind of relationship the Green Youth in that area also had with its local party branch. This could be seen through interaction, or lack thereof, between these different but sisterly organs of the Greens. In fact, in Kiel interaction between certain accounts was not required, where the Greens in the city council shared social media accounts with the city party organisation, as indicated by different signoffs on social media posts: 'F' denotes posts by the Green representatives in the Kiel council house (*Rathausfraktion*), whereas 'KV' denotes the Kiel city party organisation (*Kreisverband*).

Thirdly, Facebook provided a source of local events that were posted after liking local party groups. This meant that I could click attending at an event,

keeping a record for myself on the events that took place during fieldwork, but which impacted the algorithms for pages and other events suggested to me on my personal Facebook account. I also tried to speed this process up by changing my location when I arrived in an area. What did tend to happen as I moved between fieldwork sites, was that my Facebook algorithms were not catching up as fast as I was changing locations, so the suggestions were not always in the right location. By clicking 'attending' for these events, it could be argued that I therefore became more of an active participant in a 'slacktivist' way, alerting my own personal Facebook friends that I was attending all these events, but for those Facebook friends who know me and the project I am working on, that was not so much of an issue.

Fourthly, on Twitter and, to a lesser extent, Facebook, I was able to keep abreast of not all but most of the major digital Green debates on social media. For instance, the incident where Robert Habeck insinuated that the eastern states having elections in 2019 were not democratic states (Grüne löschen Habeck-Video nach Shitstorm, 2019). Particularly on Twitter, a medium frequented by journalists, politicians, and other members of the commentariat, these debates were plentiful, and I was able to record them in a diary format with time stamps by retweeting them on my own twitter account. It also allowed me to bookmark or save content on these two platforms for a later date for those sources that I did not want to share myself. By doing so and occasionally participating myself in passing comment, albeit mostly in English, I too became a minor player in the commentariat context. This brought me new Green member followers, amongst others. This was how I was able to receive an invitation to watch the election results at the party central office, surrounded by press and prominent Green politicians.

4.7 Processing and analysing the data

In the following two chapters, I analyse some of the data I generated in the field. The length of time in the field and different sources of data outlined above resulted in me returning from the field with a considerable amount of material. This material needed to firstly be processed before it could be begun to be coded and analysed. This final section outlines the approaches I took to my data and how I applied the gentrified protest framework to my analysis.

4.7.1 Data processing

Much of the data processing was occurring concurrently whilst I was in the field. I kept physical documents together with labels which indicated which event it was from and the event date, which were then eventually grouped into box files according to research site. I also created digital albums to group together photos I had taken at different events. As I conducted interviews, I kept an interview log in a password protected Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. This allowed me to record the date of the interviews, create tables of demographic information of my interview participants, and to assign pseudonyms and keep a transcription change log before I began working with the interview data in a sustained way. Data storage was also arranged with folders for each of the three research sites, which then contained the fieldwork diary with my fieldnotes, as well as a folder of anonymised interview transcripts as I worked through the data. The fieldwork diary contained links and notes of prominent media coverage according to every date, as well as my fieldnotes I had transferred from my phone. I also collated an Excel spreadsheet of media coverage collected and labelled each article or video with keywords and brief descriptions of what issues and themes it covered.

4.7.2 Data analysis approaches

An intensive period of data processing occurred as I exited the field. This involved transcribing each of the interviews in full, in German, into a word document for an easily searchable text which was also true to our original conversation. It was from these interview transcripts that I began my approach to analysis. In the process of transcription by research site, it became clear that three themes were emanating from the data: the 'local', 'history', and 'perception'. It was at this point that I decided to use these three terms as initial codes for my data, rather than impose my own codes on the situated data I had generated. I thus went through each transcript and through my fieldwork diary to code it for these three concepts and grouped data that fell within these codes in word documents. It was at this grouping stage that I began to translate any German language quotations from the interview transcripts.[24] However, I retained the original transcription so that I could refer back to sense check my translation. Once I had grouped the interview data, I similarly coded and grouped media articles, videos, photos, blogs, and social media posts I had collected in addition to my fieldwork diary entries of observations.

It was these coded, grouped documents that I worked with when applying the theoretical framework of gentrified protest. The coded, grouped documents ensured that my analysis chapters maintained this rich, intertextual quality that had been central to the data generation, processing, and analysis stages.

4.7.3 Applying gentrified protest

I apply the political style of gentrified protest to analyse this broad and rich dataset through the four facets identified in chapter three:

---

[24] Examples of my translation quality are available in Appendix C.

1. *Sanitised protest* and *sanitising politics*
2. The *brand* of gentrified protest politics
3. The *cachet of authenticity* within gentrified protest politics
4. The *aesthetics* of gentrified protest politics

Both the concepts used in these four facets, as well as the phenomena they explore, such as democracy and participation, are quite abstract. As mentioned earlier, political ethnography is able to gather data on individual experience which allows one to present how such abstractions are perceived by those at the focus of the research, in this case Green Party members (Schatz, 2009a). This final section outlines how these somewhat abstract facets of gentrified protest can be concretely identified.

The first part of the first facet, *sanitised protest*, can be identified in interview data in several ways. Firstly, by analysing how individual party members perceive the role of party or wider protest (hi)story for their membership and party in contemporary politics. This can be compared with party documents and media coverage, and how they utilise and describe party (hi)story. Questions I used to guide my analysis included: Is it consistent? Did it suggest a canonised narrative? Is it contested by party members or different actors? Secondly, the interview data is able to provide an understanding of how individual party members conceive the boundaries between institutional party politics versus protest. This too can be found in other sources of data, such as media coverage, party reporting, or from data gathered from party employees or politicians to establish how this boundary manifests in different faces of the party. The final aspect required to identify sanitised protest within interview data is that of party member's perceptions of the concept 'radical' and how they perceive the state. This can be both a discursive analysis that may incorporate politician speeches and party documents which also use the term

'radical' or 'change', but may also involve an affective dimension amongst individual party members and data generated by them.

Detecting *sanitised protest* in the styling of party activity involves analysing the staging of protest by the party through the observation of protest events. In so doing, considering the following questions can help to ascertain the features of the staging: What kind of protest is this? Who has organised it? Is the party visibly present? What does this presence look like? Who is there? How long are they there for? What is said and what can be heard from the party's 'bloc' at a street demonstration? How does this staging differ or compare with other party 'blocs'? Is this a counterdemonstration? Whilst the notes, photographs and videos taken from observation are most helpful in this endeavour, any party or politician social media posts, media or party coverage of the event, or even interviews with party members who were present at this protest can ensure a more intertextual interpretation of whether this demonstration could be said to be coherent with the facet of sanitised protest.

The second part of the first facet, *sanitising politics*, can be identified according to two components. The first involves comparing the rhetoric and styling from party event observation and party documents, speeches, social media, and media interviews with the experience of party members gathered through interviews and observation of party events. The topics that this comparison should identify include, but are not limited to: class, racism, sexism, religion, and LGBTQ+ rights. In so doing, this facet is able to assess the appearance of the party's commitment to social justice issues and whether this is reflected in the reality of being involved in the party. This is also why the interviews ask interviewees to provide information on their education, background and profession. Similarly, this part of the facet can help to detect to what extent party critics' cries of 'wokeness' or 'political correctness', which one finds increasingly in the mediatised 'culture wars', are actually evident within party communications from central office or from party members.

To apply the second facet, *branding*, one must read across all forms of data generated from the ethnographic methods. Within the interview data, one can identify how individual party members perceive the party brand, their affective connection to it, and how they reproduce it in their everyday activism as multi-level marketers. This may also be observational data, for instance the extent to which party clothing and merchandise is consumed by party members and observed at a protest demonstration in a form of self-branding their political identity, or its presence in individual party members' social media accounts or business cards. Accordingly, the analysis of visual symbols in party material and the staging of protest demonstrations and campaign materials and events is also required to identify the coherence of branding between party central organisations and party members. Based on both these analyses, one can link branding with the facet of sanitised protest by examining the extent to which individual party member's experience of as well as the central party's utilisation of the party brand incorporates the party (hi)story and/or protest.

Furthermore, an additional discursive analysis is often required to identify the role of commodified goods in the branding of the party by either itself or external actors, such as the media or political competitors. Here, the analysis should be guided by two approaches; the first approach looks at ways in which the party may be distinguished via consumer goods such as food or cars to be associated with a certain kind of 'lifestyle'. This may be either as a form of praise or a form of critique. The second approach identifies when the association with consumer goods is more direct as an evaluation of their competence in politics. For example, consumption of meat products where the environment is a strong part of the brand, or evaluating how 'in touch with reality' politicians and parties are through their awareness of the cost of standard household items, such as bread. As such, this kind of discourse can be identified and analysed across media articles, interviews, politician statements and speeches, and social media.

In terms of identifying the facet of *authenticity*, this concentrates on two aspects. Firstly, at the micro-level of individual party members it is once again about evaluating the extent to which members' perceptions of the party find them to be credible and authentic (or not) to their own individual values and to the canonised party (hi)story and party values. As such, individual party members provide evidence of their 'experience of origin' of authenticity in this data. Authenticity is thus detected discursively through interview data and party documents, politician speeches, and social media posts. The second aspect that can be identified is the extent to which individual party members perceive the party as 'borrowing' authenticity through their own endorsements, associations or collaborations with non-institutional political actors, such as NGOs, social movements and charities. Again, this is something which can be ascertained from interview data, but should also include the analysis of party meetings or participation at street demonstrations.

The final facet used to detect gentrified protest is *aesthetics*. This involves analysing the visual performance and affective and sensory experience of three aesthetics: movement/protest, democracy, and participation. Furthermore, it also analyses the staging of gentrified protest politics and these three aesthetics within the digital space. In this way, this facet looks at all three party faces: central party, politicians and institutional party, and party members. As such, the aesthetics can be analysed in the communications of party, politicians and members – be that in party documents, media, social media, or audio-visual communications. This can incorporate the analysis of the use of brand symbols, or lack thereof, in such communications.

However, in order to understand the performance of the style of gentrified protest politics, the affective dimension of performing one of these three aesthetics should also be identified. For the movement/protest aesthetic this may be assessing the extent to which party members see a protest presence

as necessary for their party in order to feel like a satisfied member. For the democracy aesthetic, this is about establishing how party members see their everyday activism as contributing to democracy, and thus how they consume this aesthetic. In identifying the participation aesthetic, it is about determining the extent to which the aesthetic or appearance of participation as a value is experienced by party members in reality. As such, this provides data that goes beyond the participation believed possible as officially described by party structural and organisational documents. The affective connections and experiences of these aesthetics can be ascertained from the interview data with individual party members, but also from observational notes if this data arose in those observational contexts. The nature of the observational data can detail the performances which are seen and heard and how people are able to participate and interact with them. This can be on the frontstage of 'streets' as public spaces of political performance, as well as backstage at party organisational events. Lastly, these aesthetics and the overall performance of the style of gentrified protest in the digital space, as a predominantly visual medium, is analysed for evidence of the functional and everyday activism of party members and the staging of party activity.

4.8 Conclusion

The research approach, design, and the methodological underpinnings of an ethnography of Green Party members has been the focus of this chapter. As demonstrated in the first three sections, an interpretive ethnography is the most appropriate method to research and generate data on grassroots party member activism, as well as to garner an understanding of the lived experience and situated knowledge of Green Party activity and protest participation. In terms of existing approaches to studying party members, an ethnographic approach which focuses on the grassroots and on activity outside of political institutions is relatively underused within political science and political sociology, and has not been undertaken on German Green Party

members, with a focus instead on surveys. My method and data generated is thus a constitutive part of this thesis' original contribution to knowledge.

Sections four to six demonstrated in considerable detail my approach to 'being there' in the field. I have underlined the motivation of my three research sites with their relatively novel Green governing coalitions at state level, as well as the breadth of exposure to different party levels and thematic areas of district, city, and state levels within each research site. Together with the duration of three months in each site, and generating data through semi-structured interviews, participant observation in person at party events and protests, observation of social media activity, and collection of media articles and coverage, I ensure that the data generated, and my analysis of it through the application of the framework of gentrified protest, is rich and intertextual. In the following two chapters, the data generated from the approaches detailed in this chapter is analysed to assess how the political style of gentrified protest is embodied by the participation of German Green Party members and how party members contribute to the consolidation and reproduction of the gentrified protest style.

Chapter 5 German Green Protest: a sanitised brand for party members

5.1 Introduction

During data collection, I focused on understanding and observing the nature of German Green local party activity and engagement of grassroots Green members in local protest action. The unexpected development of the Greens in opinion and electoral polls also shaped the context in which my data was collected. As stated earlier in the thesis, the Greens had managed to go from around 8 percent at the 2017 federal election to polling in the late teens and early 20s by late 2018/early 2019. This was partly down to the party redrafting their fundamental party principles (*Grundsatzprogramm*), which was carried out by the central party office under the leadership of new co-leaders Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck, but also due to the weaknesses of the other parties within the political landscape and the changing political agenda at the time, in particular the rise of Fridays for Future and Greta Thunberg and the increasing salience of climate protection.

It is this context and time period in which this chapter and the following chapter analyses the extent to which the German Greens exhibited the political style of gentrified protest. It does so by concentrating on the following two facets of gentrified protest identified in chapter three:

- *Sanitised* protest and *sanitising* politics
- The *brand* of gentrified protest politics

In so doing, this chapter argues that the rhetoric and staging of German Green Party politics creates a palatable understanding of protest to gain electoral

support, but which displaces some of the party's more radical origins. Furthermore, sanitising politics in the German Greens can often be construed as proselyting, but is linked to an affective and rhetorical political style where both adherents and leaders believe and communicate that they are the 'good guys'. Lastly, the way in which German Green protest and politics is commodified, branded and then reproduced by party members is addressed through both visual aesthetics, but also party members' attachment to the brand. This analysis therefore demonstrates the complex and nuanced diversity found among Green Party members and the gentrified protest style.

5.2 Gentrified protest – acceptable and sanitised protest and politics

5.2.1 The German Greens as a party of the mainstream

It is not controversial to declare that the Greens of the 2010s and 2020s are an established political force in German politics. The erstwhile protest party had long before 2018 professionalised into a flexible coalition partner at all levels of government. This has involved making difficult compromises when in state level government, a few of which will be highlighted in this and the following chapter. The 2018/2019 Greens' desire to transition into the 'leading left-force' in German politics was also being curated and consolidated by the party itself during my fieldwork. Aside from the obvious rebranding as a serious political contender under new co-leaders Baerbock and Habeck during this period, there was also careful work being done within the party to integrate this new era of unity and respectability relatively seamlessly into the party ancestry to placate longstanding, ideologically diverse members of the party and appeal to new members and voters alike as a palatable and acceptable progressive party.

The acceptable and sanitised protest of the German Greens is linked to the perception that the Greens were a unique product of post-war (West) German politics. This perception and link for the liberal democratic tradition of the Bonn Republic has been solidified in the scholarly work by Andrei Markovits and Philip Gorski (1993), been argued by co-leader Habeck in an interview with the *Financial Times* (Buck, 2019), and is canonised through the party's presence in the permanent exhibition of the *Haus der Geschichte* museum.[25] Markovits and Joseph Klaver go even further to state the Greens' 'brand' of progressive politics has been mainstreamed into German political life (2015, p.114). This 'brand' will be considered separately in section three of this chapter. Yet, this simplified and sanitised story of the professionalisation of the German Greens is also being canonised within the party itself through the party's redrafting of their fundamental principles (*Grundsatzprogramm*). During an event I attended in the middle of this two and a half year redrafting process in March 2019, the party premiered a party-produced film marking the 40th anniversary of the German Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019a). The current (hi)story in this film was much the same as what is described in media reports and scholarly works: it narrates how an original protest party morphed into a professionalised and institutionalised party.

My interviews with Green Party members confirmed that this sanitised story of the professionalisation of the Greens had trickled down to be reproduced by the grassroots. Martin said the Greens were now 'on their way to becoming a *Volkspartei'* (catch-all party).[26] For Paula, this party evolution into a mainstream party was necessary, as she 'would not have joined a protest party'.[27] Unlike Paula, Franziska saw the party's development to 'socially acceptable and serious' as reflecting the party's successful ability to 'adapt to the times'.[28] This adaptation to the mainstream also reflects a Green chase for

---

[25] This can be seen in this entry of the exhibition audio guide available online: https://audio.hdg.de/hausdergeschichte/de/24.html
[26] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), p.12.
[27] Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.7.
[28] Franziska, Flensburg (SH), pp.7-8.

the political centre as the more politically viable option, even when such a strategy causes some to leave, as Vanessa reflected:

> We are now a party of the centre and would like to further our issues, which works better in the institutions. […] many [members] didn't find themselves [comfortable with the *Jamaika* coalition] so they may have left. But then lots more joined, so I think it seems that we are going in the right direction.[29]

Vanessa's statement is supported by the stark increases in membership of the Greens in recent years. Following the disintegration of the Jamaica coalition talks between CDU/CSU and FDP at the national level in late 2017, the Greens went from 65,065 members on 31st December 2017 to 96,487 members on 31st December 2019 (Niedermayer, 2020).[30] Sven, a Green politician in the Schleswig-Holstein state parliament noted how the Greens were very much a part of established, mainstream politics, though he considered the party had retained a certain individuality by sometimes seeming 'a bit more eccentric' and behaving 'a bit differently'.[31] The party member Oliver from the notoriously 'eccentric' and alternative Green Party branch of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg was not ready to fully embrace the label of 'established' and instead married original Green qualities of being 'leftist and idealistic, *and also* professional'.[32] Eva, an elderly, retired East German Green, took this further and was the only member to openly criticise the impact that professionalisation had had on the Greens, remarking that she thought 'a little more of a rebellious attitude would do the Greens good, to appear a little more strident', in response to the then

---

[29] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.13.

[30] This figure continued to rise, with the party reporting that 125,000 members were eligible to vote on the new *Ampel* or traffic light coalition in November/December 2021: https://www.gruene.de/artikel/urabstimmung-ueber-koalitionsvertrag

[31] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.13.

[32] Oliver, Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg pp.5-6.

federal party Secretary General Michael Kellner's performance on a political talk show the weekend prior to her interview. [33]

These statements may appear at first glance similar, but in fact display a nuanced understanding of the Greens' journey to the mainstream, whether celebrated, accepted or merely tolerated. As I have shown, this less strident, mainstream, and professional Green party has undergone a party and member-sanctioned evolution into the establishment from more radical roots. This demonstrates that the German Greens have sanitised and thereby displaced the radical origins of the party in order to maintain their place in contemporary German politics. However, they do not disavow their more radical party history, rather canonising and gentrifying large parts of it into their party (hi)story that makes it palatable to a broader audience, as well as displacing those parts which no longer fit in the contemporary, mainstream conception of the German Greens.

5.2.2 The boundaries of gentrified protest within the Greens

The Green boundary between protest movement and party has never been fixed; as early as 1986, just six years following the founding of the party under German electoral law, the *Standbein/Spielbein* relationship between the Green Party and its related movements had already changed amongst infighting between the *Fundi*, *Realo* and other factions of the early Greens (Siegert, 1986). The social movement core was known as the '*Standbein*' or weight-carrying leg of the party, and was to take precedence over the '*Spielbein*' or free leg, which denoted the party organisation and its involvement in political institutions. Given the sanitised and approved (hi)story of the Greens that appears to consign radical protest to the past, it was one of the main aims of this research to try to understand the role protest plays for

---

[33] Eva, Berlin-Lichtenberg, pp.19-21.

the contemporary party and its party members. In this section, I detail how the contemporary Greens' boundary between party and protest reflects the sanitised protest facet of gentrified protest.

5.2.2.1 Protest (is) past

Across the interview data collected from all three research sites, there was a consensus that the party's relationship with protest is a much different one than in the past. This opinion is uncontroversial and self-evident. If any members I spoke to refuted it, that would have been more controversial and particularly dislocated from the reality of the German Greens in contemporary German politics. As Katharina, a Green Youth member in Kiel, told me, Green participation in state governments means the party must now be 'more pragmatic' with protest.[34] Outside of the pragmatism needed to be an institutionalised party, a dichotomy of thought on the contemporary role of protest within the German Greens emerged from my fieldwork.

The first side of this dichotomy stressed that protest was relegated to the history of the Greens, explained by Vanessa from Stuttgart as 'no longer the task of the Greens'.[35] Occasionally this view was expressed to me in passing whilst conducting my fieldwork and attending Green Party events. When I would network with party members and explain my project to them, I would sometimes be met with firm resistance of studying protest in relation to the Greens. For example, at a State Working Group on Europe I attended in Kiel, a party member came over for an informal chat with me about my research once the event had come to an end. She asked me about my project and what I did or did not already know about the Greens. She did end up patronising me slightly, telling me that if I wanted to find the Greens who protest, I needed to

---

[34] Katharina, Kiel Green Youth, pp.7-8.
[35] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.13.

go to Hambacher Forest or the Lausitz, and that the Greens were only a protest party in the past under the *Standbein/Spielbein* understanding.[36]

This working group party member's conception that protest was consigned to the party's past was bolstered by citing one of the earliest organisational principles and boundaries between protest and party: the *Standbein* and *Spielbein*. As detailed earlier in this chapter, this original boundary was being contested even in the early years of the party. For this member from Kiel, *Standbein* protest is equated with what she conceives as 'radical', with the two examples she lists being sites of contentious occupations by protesters. The place of radical within German Green protest will be analysed later in this chapter. Yet, this example illustrates the gentrification of the past 'radical' protest of the party, with a party member citing party history like Žižek's conceptualisation of gentrification as a sanitised political historicisation of an epoch-shifting mediator. The *Standbein/Spielbein* at the time was a revolutionary form of democratisation of post-war West German politics, now consigned to the institutionalised (hi)story of the Greens.

5.2.2.2 Protest (is) present

The other side of this dichotomy acknowledged that protest was not the primary function of the contemporary Greens, but maintained that protest is still required to make progressive change in parliaments. Sven, a young Green state politician in Schleswig-Holstein, elaborated on how he saw the contemporary Green boundaries of protest and party:

> You don't exclude [protest] from your life. It is an important part of the party, absolutely. In my opinion, it needs to remain an important

---

[36] State Working Group on European, Peace and Foreign Policy, 20th Feb 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.42.

part, it is never [political] parties who bring really important ideas to the forefront. Rather the really good ideas always come out of movements. […] That was the original thought that needs to be the task of the Green Party today.[37]

Admittedly, the sanitised state and boundaries of Green protest in contemporary German politics reflects a greater normalised role for protest in general within the democratic process and political agenda in Germany (Gassert, 2018). Parties across the spectrum support or take part in protest action, as Franziska from Flensburg made clear, highlighting that the Greens were not the only political party that engaged with protest in contemporary German politics, but were, she thought, 'a party with many members who like to demonstrate'.[38] For those on this side of the protest dichotomy, the normalisation of protest did not preclude its perceived power to make a difference.

Whilst the extent of the interaction between protest and institutional politics to make concrete change in the present was acknowledged, it was defined in quite different parameters by different interviewees. The Berlin state politician Brigitte said that 'extra-parliamentary action is good', but that it is 'ultimately down to the resolutions in parliament and government to change things' for which social movements campaign.[39] Other interviewees stressed that protest is actually important to enact change in parliaments. Robert, despite not attending many protests himself, saw their importance so governments could address citizens' grievances, whereas Arpiar, a more enthusiastic attendee of protests went further, stressing protest was the only way to 'change the status-

---

[37] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.11.
[38] Franziska, Flensburg (SH), p.9.
[39] Brigitte, Berlin State Parliament, p.8.

quo'.[40] Jonas' phrasing of this interaction gave a concrete example of the interdependent relationship between protest and institutional politics:

> I'm a big fan of protest because I have noticed there is always an interaction between politics in parliaments and politics on the streets. If there is no pressure from the general public or from the streets, then nothing happens in parliament, either. The best example right now is the European elections. The Fridays For Future protests have significantly contributed to the fact that we have been discussing climate protest for the last six months, which I think is great.[41]

Although Nikolas agreed with Jonas in this interdependent interaction of political parties supporting protests as a good thing, he disagreed with how institutional politics had interacted with Fridays for Future: 'it is crap that we have to go on the streets at all and [politicians] still fail to do anything'.[42] Conversely, not all movements or protest organisations wish to interact with political parties. Often, the interaction can occur only out of instrumental reasons such as the party being able to provide financial or equipment-based support, or indeed interactions can be broken by changes in party policy, both examples explained to me by Green Party headquarters employee Lars of the central federal party's experience with protest alliances.[43]

On this basis, protest and demonstrations continue to play a role for the party and its members, contesting the boundary of those members who see protest as consigned to Green Party past. For those party members on the present side of the past/present dichotomy, interaction between protest and party

---

[40] Robert, Plochingen (BW), p.6. and Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.29-31.
[41] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, pp.7-8.
[42] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, pp.10-11.
[43] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.16.

politics is an acceptable feature of Green Party politics at local, institutional, and central party level. Such an acceptance denotes the gentrification of protest as a sanitised and acceptable tool of political expression for the institutionalised party, rather than a purely radical action.

5.2.2.3 When politicians protect protest

One benefit that can arise from the gentrification of the party's relationship with protest and their established institutional role is the protective role political parties and their politicians can perform for protests. Brigitte from the Berlin state parliament spoke about how the Greens can support protests informally, by publicly expressing solidarity or attending these events.[44] In some cases, institutional politicians can protect protests by taking on the more formal role of a parliamentary observer. During my fieldwork I heard of a few notable occasions when Green politicians had taken on this role. During the Stuttgart Green Youth meeting I attended, one of the committee members mentioned that the new member of the European Parliament, Micha Bloss, was a parliamentary observer at an *Ende Gelände* action following his European election win. Sven also informed me that *Ende Gelände* had explicitly asked him to observe one of their actions, and the police response to it, in 2017.[45]

The boundary of action by parliamentary observers of protest demonstrations was also an issue in Berlin as I arrived in autumn 2018. Newspapers were reporting that Green Berlin state politicians and *Bundestag* politician Canan Bayram faced prosecution from Berlin authorities for allegedly breaking the assembly law (*Versammlungsrecht*) by attending the counter demonstration to a far-right 'Women's march' (Litschko, 2018). Those being accused of this infraction declared to the press that they had been in attendance at the

---

[44] Brigitte, Berlin State Parliament, p.8.
[45] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.19.

demonstration as parliamentary observers (Gürgen and Schulte, 2018). The counterdemonstration attempted to block and prevent the 'Women's march' from progressing along its route. This became controversial, as the accusation that this was unconstitutional would result in such a protest to fall outside the contemporary boundary between protest and institutional politics, as an allegedly constitutionally 'radical' form of political expression. The opposition of radical and tame will be explored further later in this section, further defining the boundaries between 'acceptable', gentrified political acts and 'unacceptable' acts. However, the established practice within the Greens, and The Left party, to perform such protective roles at demonstrations further confirms that protest is a sanitised, acceptable tool of political expression in German political life.

5.2.2.4 Internal scepticism of protest

Even for those party members who would agree on the role protest plays for the contemporary Greens, the boundary between protest and politics for Green party members within this group is contested. Protests during my fieldwork which the party supported in either words or by a physical presence on the street, were often independent actions which involved groups or organisations that overlap with Green Party values and goals. This is often a strategy by movements to reduce their risk of being seen as co-opted or lumped together with long-standing critiques of institutional politics, as well as parties profiting electorally from such programmatic alignment (Blings, 2020). However, it does not mean that Green Party members do not privately express scepticism towards protest in opposition to the central party line. The emergence of Fridays for Future (FFF) during my fieldwork highlighted this complexity of thoughts on protest amongst party members. Nikolas, a Green Party and Green Youth member, was also heavily involved in the local Kiel and national organisation of FFF. In our interview, I asked him whether it was a conscious decision that many of the activists who spoke and were involved

did not reveal their own ties to the Green Youth despite the open support of the movement by the Green Youth and Green Party:

> We would like FFF to be and remain independent. […] it is deliberate, so that you distance yourself from the parties. Because otherwise in the media you can quickly become a target and then people simply talk about you as 'left-green filthy propaganda' [*linksgrün-versiffte Propaganda*] or whatever else is said when you work with a party.[46]

Less than two weeks after my interview with Nikolas, I had travelled from Kiel to Berlin for the Greens' event on their party principles. This event took place on the same day Greta Thunberg came to Berlin for that Friday's global climate strike on 29th March (Soltau, 2019). Just hours after the most prominent FFF activist in Germany, Luisa Neubauer, marched with Thunberg, Neubauer received a standing ovation from the crowd after her speech at the party principles event. Yet, a party member sat next to me in the audience had told me whilst we waited for it to begin that he was sceptical of the credibility of FFF demonstrations. He believed - similarly to a lot of media critique and critique from centre-right politicians - that the strike would be more credible if it were taking place outside of school hours. My interview participants Yvonne and Zoe in Stuttgart were similarly sceptical: both women did not know each other but both described FFF demonstrations as 'events', even though only Zoe had actually attended a FFF demonstration.[47] Even for Vanessa, who was not as sceptical of the credibility of FFF as Yvonne and Zoe, when I asked her if she had ever been to a FFF demonstration, said:

---

[46] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, pp.15-17.
[47] Yvonne, Stuttgart-Obere Neckarvororte, pp.6-7 and Zoe, Plochingen (BW), p.5.

> I've only been to them briefly, with the aim to be seen. I obviously completely support it, but I mostly work on Fridays.[48]

Her honesty took me by surprise given the more calculated, pragmatic reasoning that she needed to be *seen* at one of these demonstrations, that for her it was something she *ought* to attend, but not worth striking from her university work to do so, as many of the other school pupils and students were doing. This scepticism could be a sign of the more conservative and institutionalised nature of the Green Party within Baden-Wurttemberg, as all three of these women were members of the party there, reflecting the scepticism of the movement by the Green minister-president Kretschmann ("Das kann nicht ewig so weitergehen", 2019). As such, this scepticism further highlights the contested boundary between party and protest amidst gentrified protest. These critiques do not inherently criticise the cause of FFF, a cause that the party publicly shares, instead, the critique is focused on whether those involved are truly politically engaged in the cause and the format of action. Here, there is a sense of attempting to police what kind of protest can be seen as acceptable to support in line with the sanitised protest understanding of political style of the contemporary German Greens.

5.2.3 The Green Bloc

The existence of an easily identifiable Green bloc at a protest creates an awareness in public of the party's continued interaction and involvement with movements and civil society. However, it also determines perceptions and associations from those outside the Green bloc about an individual's political identity. I realised through observing the Greens at demonstrations from within the Green bloc that those who march in the Green bloc, in this case including myself, tacitly agree to be photographed and seen in such a bloc and therefore

---

[48] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.7.

be associated with the perceptions that other demonstrators or members of the public have of the Green Party. This can also attract negativity, as Sven had experienced at what he considered more 'radical-left' protests.[49]

Many of my interviewees explained what they felt as their obligation to 'show their political colours' (*Farbe bekennen*) by being a part of the Green bloc. For instance, Ulrike spoke of her desire to bolster her party publicly with her physical presence at a counterdemonstration against a so called "Demo for All" that objected to LGBTQ+ sexual education being taught in schools the previous year (Stuttgarter Zeitung & Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2018):

> I immediately looked where the Greens were, and I stood with them so that it was also visible how many Greens there were. Because I thought, if I walked somewhere else, then it would be said, depending on who was looking at it, who from the Greens were there. And then I thought that if I am there and Green and think it's nice, that I should also show my colours.[50]

This pre-empting of critique by Ulrike seemed to highlight a sensibility among party members for being seen at demonstrations and visible, something akin to Vanessa's understanding of being seen at a FFF demo as discussed above. Gisela similarly told me she always marched with the Green bloc as it was important for her to communicate her political allegiance to others.[51] Hendrik felt less obliged and instead preferred how the Green bloc gave him a sense of strength and solidarity, made him feel part of a 'We', and how much more fun he had protesting alongside like-minded people.[52]

---

[49] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.12.
[50] Ulrike, Stuttgart-East, p.12.
[51] Gisela, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.10-11.
[52] Hendrik, Berlin-Pankow, p.12.

For others, the presence of a Green bloc was less important. Oliver said that he showed his party identity by marching with a large Green Party flag, but that he preferred to see as much of the protest as possible and enjoyed leaving what he called 'the Green bubble'.[53] Whereas Daniel did not like blocs at all after his experience being a part of the antifa black bloc, and never marched with the Greens at demonstrations.[54] He did not elaborate further on his reasoning for this. Whilst the Green bloc's ability to give individual party members the feeling of being a part of a collective and meeting like-minded people is important at the individual level, this expression of the Green bloc as a means of clear visibility at public demonstrations can clearly start to feel like an obligation for some members. Indeed, as stressed by Ulrike, the bloc is an acceptable, sanitised, embodied collective in public, fulfilling the requirement of party members to publicly, through the use of their own bodies, legitimise and continue to produce/re-produce the political style of gentrified protest.

5.2.4 The gentrified boundary between tame and radical within the Greens

In observing and being a part of the so-called 'Green bloc' at the demonstrations I attended for my fieldwork, I witnessed the physical manifestation of sanitised, gentrified green protest. To a certain extent, the behaviour of the Green blocs I observed at demonstrations in all three cities highlighted a more reserved nature of participation in demonstrations compared to other groups and blocs. This is particularly highlighted in their participation in protest chants. Other than a few examples amongst the Green Youth at demonstrations, such as at the Stand up to Racism demo in Kiel, where the Kiel Green Youth participated in the *Hoch die internationale*

---

[53] Oliver, Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, pp.11-12.
[54] Daniel, Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, p.8.

Solidarität! chant (long live international solidarity!), the Green blocs I observed did not take part in any chants at all. The Greens are not a noisy, boisterous participant in public demonstrations, but a rather tame bloc. However, this 'tameness' and how it is contrasted with 'radicalness' goes far beyond the party's behaviour at protest demonstrations. In this section, I illustrate how this reflects the relationship between sister organisations and even within Green Party policy, as well as reflecting the sanitised facet of gentrified protest.

5.2.4.1 The Green understanding of 'radical'

During my fieldwork, the Green Youth possessed a perceptibly more left-wing profile than the Greens in both policy and engagement with civil society. In Kiel, the Green Youth were involved with local social movement alliances against racism and for LGBTQ+ issues, whereas the party itself seemed a little more distanced from such engagement on these issues. In Stuttgart, the Green Youth had their own candidates and campaign events for the municipal elections in Stuttgart and for Europe, complete with their own branded stickers and Instagram content. When I put an assessment to Jonas that the Green Youth in Stuttgart was the place for left-wing Greens, as I heard from a member of the Green University Group in Stuttgart, Jonas agreed:

> Yeah, I would confirm that. I see myself as a left-wing person. I want more than just a few cosmetic changes. I've worked actively so that the Green Youth continues to define itself as strongly left-wing and doesn't necessarily go along with this Kretschmann course, which is far more centrist.[55]

---

[55] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.3.

Jonas' desire for complete system changes rather than cosmetic changes is reflected in tone and language used by the Green Youth nationally the previous year (Grüne Jugend fordert mutige Visionen, 2018). The then leader of the Green Youth, Ricarda Lang, was speaking to the press about how the Green Youth wanted the Greens to have brave visions for the future in the new party principles.[56] Katharina, a Green Youth committee member in Kiel gave a concrete example for her claim that the Green Youth were not just more progressive, but more 'extreme' than the Green Party:

> In lots of areas, [the Green Youth] are still a bit more extreme than the Greens. […] A good example of that is within the Greens, the first place [on an electoral list] is always for a woman and the second place is an open place, so for men and women. The Green Youth have made the rule now that the first place is for women, intersex and trans people and the second place is still an open place. This was rejected [by the Green Party].[57]

The Green Youth occupy this left-wing space, which strives to influence policy direction and decisions within the party, whilst also maintaining a gulf of separation. This suggests that the boundary of 'radical', 'extreme' and left-wing policies and extra-institutional action sits more comfortably with the youth as a less sanitised and more extra-institutional arm of the Greens.

Despite a perception that the Green Youth are the 'radical' Greens, the sanitised Green Party has a complex interpretation of the concept 'radical' by attempting to maintain hold of it in a gentrified form. Throughout 2018 and 2019 the word 'radical' emerged from the mouths of prominent Greens in the

---

[56] Ricarda Lang was elected as co-party leader alongside Omid Nouripour in January 2022. Both Lang and Nouripour succeeded Baerbock and Habeck in line with the Green Party principle of office and mandate separation.
[57] Katharina, Kiel Green Youth, p.2.

party central office and the federal parliamentary party. As early as January 2018, Annalena Baerbock's speech for election as party leader talked of how she wanted the party to 'seize the opportunity' in the 'apparent contradiction between being radical and able to govern' (Höhne, 2018); Over 18 months later, even Daniel Cohn-Bendit of the old Green guard was putting his case forward for Robert Habeck as the future German chancellor and deconstructing what 'radical' means for the Greens (Hildebrandt, 2019). This Green notion of radical was consistently intertwined with the Greens' environmental policy approach: radical solutions are necessary for the radical problems of climate change. This was introduced upon the launch of the party principles redrafting process, as seen in press coverage around the time (Schulte, 2018). The Green federal Parliamentary Party also integrated the notion of radicality into their environmental policy as the title of their official magazine in December 2018 *Radical and Realistic* (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, 2018).

Image 2 Photo of magazine at Kiel Green Europe Campaign Planning meeting with members, 19th January 2019

The framing of 'radical' alongside 'realistic' in their environmental policy combines the fact that the radical problem of climate change realistically requires radical solutions to make realistic steps towards combatting the challenge ahead. This use of 'radical' as a value to describe the Greens had also been internalised by one of my interviewees, Franziska from Flensburg, as she told me when she considered what it meant to be a Green Party member:

It means that you contemplate the very large societal problems. That your thinking is very future-oriented. […]. Also, that we partly have radical approaches, you could say, so radical in the sense that we want to change the system. […] That you sometimes have to bring new ideas to the table, or that you have to think a bit radical, precisely because there are very pressing problems.[58]

Whilst this interpretation of radical had been absorbed by some party members with whom I spoke, the Greens' supposedly radical approach to climate protection was deemed by some FFF activists to not be radical enough. Whilst attending the Global Climate Strike for Climate in Stuttgart on 24th May 2019, the Friday before the European Elections took place, I was handed a leaflet by activists assessing the climate policies of the main German political parties:

---

[58] Franziska, Flensburg (SH), pp.2-3.

Image 3 Flyer from an anonymous group analysing how the manifestos of the six largest German parties correlate to the demands of Fridays for Future

Using a traffic light system, this group, who only identify themselves as a group of young teenagers and young adults, have assessed the extent to which the European election manifestos of the six largest parties in Germany support the climate demands of Fridays for Future. The party on this analysis which performs best is The Left, with the Greens very closely behind. What this visual representation of the analysis of climate protection does illustrate, is how this 'radical' environmental policy deemed realistic and necessary by the Greens in the year prior, is not considered as radical in the extra-institutionary space a year later at what was described as a 'climate election' by activists, pundits, and politicians.

5.2.4.2 The trustworthy nature of 'tame' Greens

The most vocal I saw Greens being at a demonstration was at the 9th November 2018 counterdemonstration against a far-right demonstration in Berlin. The Green bloc may not have started chants, but in this case, they did take part in the chanting, helping to elevate the loudness of this counterdemonstration. Yet, in other ways they remained more reserved than the other groups present. For example, the Greens were not at the front near the police cordon separating the two demonstrations. Their reservedness was particularly apparent when the demonstration moved inside the central train station building, as I reflected in my fieldwork diary:

> After hours of standing around in the cold and befriending some Green demonstrators representing the party by carrying flags that evening, we go into the central train station to try and warm up on this cold November night. As we go to enter, strings of police run ahead of us into the building. As we set foot in the station, you could suddenly hear the deafening echoes of chants from the anti-fascist and so-called 'black bloc' who have streamed into the central train station. They bellow at the top of their lungs 'Nazis out!' and 'Refugees are welcome here!'. The acoustics of the station make them seem much louder, and more intimidating, than earlier in the evening. Amongst this chaos, I am standing with this small group who are carrying Green flags who are then approached by three or four members of the public.[59]

---

[59] Counterdemonstration against a radical-right wing protest, Berlin Central Station, 9th November 2018, Berlin Fieldwork Diary, p.50.

One of the Greens I was stood with at this moment in time, Hendrik, reflected on why those members of the public approached us when I interviewed him some weeks later:

> They weren't Greens, they were simply just people who were curious. Perhaps it was down to the character, or that we were an established, united bloc that people know and know we aren't super extreme, so they trust us, or we are more approachable than an Antifa or black bloc.[60]

Here, amongst the chaos of what these passers-by saw as abnormal activity in a train station, the trustworthy group of people to approach was an 'established' Green bloc, representing a party who can be 'trusted' as part of the liberal democratic system and are more approachable in their sanitised protest style during a protest situation. A Green presence at such a confrontational protest as the example in Berlin may only be possible in specific locations. Considering Jonas from Stuttgart told me that he thought the Greens were only at 'tame protests' and 'not really at the real protests out of the left movement', it may be unlikely to witness something similar in more conservative cities.[61] The reluctance of the Baden-Wurttemberg Greens avoiding any potential associations with more radical movements whilst in coalition with the CDU, may be due to the same reasons that Stuttgart Greens felt free to criticise the Fridays for Future movement, as detailed above. However, with regards to the example from Berlin, not only is gentrified protest a political style that the Greens demonstrate in their behaviour at protests, but it also seems to be a political style that fulfils a role within the German protest ecosystem of other left-wing and participatory protest blocs.

---

[60] Hendrik, Berlin-Pankow, p.12.
[61] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.9.

5.2.4.3 'Tame' demos vs 'radical' demos = non-violent vs violent?

Whilst Jonas did not perceive the Greens as being a part of more 'radical' demonstrations, there continue to be external perceptions of the Greens as being friendly to, or involved with, violent demonstrations. Arpiar described to me the 'horror picture' created by certain media outlets when they associate the Greens with violent protest.[62] He further explained how these were used by right-wing media outlets like *Die Welt* when it seems like the Greens have a credible chance to be in power, who then depict the Greens as the 'bogeyman of the protest party' that will 'break everything'.[63] I was able to find examples of this Green trope in *Die Welt* online articles. In May 2018, there were squatters occupying houses in Berlin which allegedly garnered support from Greens in Berlin (Kuhn, 2018). However, on the same topic in the same publication, Habeck distanced himself from these squatters as they were 'breaking the law' (Kade and Poschardt, 2018). In practice, a *Die Welt* reader would have to read both articles to get a more comprehensive, nuanced view of the Greens' stance on this issue.

The very reality I witnessed throughout this fieldwork period of Green protest, however, fell on the tame and sanitised protest side of the tame/radical distinction: Greens were always visibly present at well-organised, tame, and peaceful demonstrations and protests far removed from the house occupations mentioned above. In fact, the nationally coordinated anti-coal demonstration I attended in Berlin in December 2018, was so sanitised and respectable that it was hosting several booths of different renewable energy companies advertising their services to attract new customers. This tame, sanitised protest is important for the party whilst they attempt to broaden their appeal, particularly into more conservative, middle-class milieus, whilst also remaining attractive to young and first-time voters enticed into politics through

---

[62] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.38-39.
[63] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.38-39.

movements and demonstrations. This balance of mainstreaming and maintaining a sense of being an 'alternative', as will be explored in more depth in chapter six, is therefore a deliberate choice for their political style to maximise their electoral chances.

Again, within a seemingly simple boundary, there were differentiated stances on whether the distinction between tame and radical protests equated to the same distinction between non-violent and violent protests. Sven went into a lot of detail about such a demarcation of tame and radical protest and how this impacted prominent Green figures. He told me that state party leaders, parliamentary party leaders and ministers who continue to take part in protest mostly stand at the front with the large banner at what he termed the 'family demonstration'; though he also noted that some Green state and national level politicians had taken part in more radical demonstrations, such as those who were a part of the counter-demonstration blocking the path of the right-wing 'Women's March' in Berlin mentioned earlier.[64] However, Sven stopped short of equating radical demonstrations with violence, stating that following the Joschka Fischer stone-throwing revelations when the Greens were first in national government, the party had:

> made a clean break and said violence is not a legitimate part of protest. I see it that way too. […] Violence is only legitimate against structural repression, so against a repressive state. We don't have that here. I believe that violence was legitimate against National Socialism. […] But we do not find ourselves in this situation.[65]

The example of a fascist state as a legitimate means for violent protest, is quite a clear line between violence and non-violence, though this does not map onto

---

[64] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, pp.15-16.
[65] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, pp.15-16.

the distinction of tame vs radical. The anti-coal power movement *Ende Gelände* is an area where the boundaries of tame and radical protest, non-violence and violence are far more contested by individual Green party members. Paula invoked her own personal connections in her classification of why *Ende Gelände*, in her eyes, is far from a 'tame' protest:

> I am not a friend of *Ende Gelände*. I find them quite horrendous. Admittedly, my dad works at a coal power plant and yes protesting is important, […] but you should keep in mind that you don't harm people through it or demean people who are just trying to do their jobs.[66]

Vanessa from Stuttgart agrees with Paula, stating that she wouldn't travel to Hambacher Forest for *Ende Gelände* protests as she thinks 'we have enough legitimate sources' to raise concerns and protest something, insinuating that the actions of *Ende Gelände* are illegitimate.[67] Yet not all Greens think this way. During the member meeting of the Green Youth in Stuttgart, one of the meeting attendees brought up a question about the validity of *Ende Gelände*'s radical protest action and their use of violence. A Green Youth member responded to this question by saying that such an aggressive form of action is needed because older Green Party figures' policy on climate protection is not *radical* enough, repeating almost word for word the Green Party's own environmental policy line analysed earlier. Indeed, Jonas from the Stuttgart Green Youth did not see *Ende Gelände* as a violent movement, instead calling it 'the most radical climate movement at the moment with peaceful means'.[68]

---

[66] Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.8.
[67] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.7.
[68] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.8.

With *Ende Gelände*'s activism which consists of actions which could be classed as criminal, distinction between violence and non-violence is divisive amongst Green members nationally, as Lars from party HQ informed me:

> I think that most in the party find [*Ende Gelände*] great, likable and worthy of support and somehow cool. However large parts of the party don't actually see themselves in the position to do that kind of protest. There is a dual point of view. That you no longer view that as a correct form of protest, but nevertheless think it's good, that young people do it and you want to support them to do something like that. And there are a handful of politicians who also take part […] or are there as a chaperone.[69]

Similarly to Sven, Lars qualifies the inadequacy of violence in protest as the party has 'too much of a positive understanding and a functioning state' to support violent protest like that seen with the Yellow Vests in France, who were in the news at the time of Lars' interview.[70] Because of this, Lars notes that the party does not encourage people to take part in *Ende Gelände*, as they have done for a less radical demonstration like the anti-racism march *#Unteilbar*. Nikolas, a Green Youth member and part of the organising team of FFF seemed more confused at the distinction of violence and non-violence in the case of *Ende Gelände* at Hambacher Forest, instead considering their action as a form of civil disobedience:

> you have to differentiate between violent and non-violent protest. If people are killed or are injured through it, then I don't think it's good. […] Good protest for me is that you are loud, you are standing for your own beliefs. […] Hambacher Forest […] absolutely has

---

[69] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.13.
[70] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.13.

something to do with civil disobedience. That is what FFF uses. We strike. Other people occupy diggers and brown coal mining sites. But I think that everyone needs to decide that for themselves. […] I would like to go one time and have a look at what happens, but I don't know if I would really occupy the mining site or a digger, […] as you get a bit of shit for it.[71]

Nikolas' thoughts on this issue of violent and non-violent protest, and whether he would cross the boundary of occupying a digger as a more stringent from of civil disobedience from the strikes used by FFF, highlight the conflicting and grey areas of drawing boundaries of violence and non-violence, and that of tame and radical protests for prominent Greens and grassroots party members. Whilst some find some more radical forms of political protest, such as *Ende Gelände* or blocking far-right demos, necessary to protect German democracy or the environment, others, along with the central party, will not take part or explicitly endorse what they consider to be unproportionate violence. Such a stance should be expected from a party that supports what Arditi (2003) calls the 'gentrified' state, as Lars alludes to above. The unclear boundaries between tame and radical, non-violence and violence in relation to protest amongst some party members indicate a level of regard for the original transgressive nature of protest that sometimes verge more into the category of violent than non-violent. This finding suggests that protest is not completely sanitised amongst individual Greens and their overlapping memberships with movements, but it is clear that the official party line is moving towards a sanitised relationship that respects the gentrified democratic state.

---

[71] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, pp.6-7.

5.3 Green Politics as a 'moral sanitiser'

5.3.1 The *Gutmensch* and *Verbotspartei* perceptions

Moving away from sanitised and acceptable protest and political acts, another feature of gentrified protest politics is its ability to sanitise and absolve its political adherents and proselytise its message to others. Such a proselytising perception of the German Greens was previously dominant and well documented in the scholarly literature and in critical media coverage of the party (Güllner, 2012; Walter, 2010). Such perceptions include the accusations of being a *Verbotspartei* (a party of prohibitions) full of *Gutmenschen* (a person who moralises and is perceived to be hyper politically correct). It is not too dissimilar to the discourse that surrounds 'wokeness', though *Gutmenschen* has been used in mainstream German discourse in relation to the Greens for over a decade. The 2013 Green federal election manifesto had a proposal for a 'Veggie Day', a proposal which encouraged people to reduce their meat consumption by ensuring all public canteens for one day a week only provided vegetarian and vegan dishes (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2013). This proposal may not seem particularly controversial in a society that is now increasingly embracing vegan diets. However, in 2013 the German media and their electoral competitors used 'Veggie Day' as a symbol of the Greens telling people how to live their lives and labelling them as a *Verbotspartei* (Rüdig, 2014). These perceptions, often held by those external to the party, can shape the experiences and perceptions of party members in their own party work. For example, I met an elderly woman member from Niedersachsen at the party principles event I attended on 30th March 2019. I recalled our conversation in my fieldwork diary:

> When I told her of my project, she spoke about how recent Green electoral performance had been shaped by 2013: 'veggie day', the paedophile scandal and a tax policy that affected the upper middle

class. […] She kept mentioning how the *Verbotspartei* branding of 'veggie day' meant that [the Greens] did not trust themselves to try and curb flying and how flying is one of the worst things you can do [for the environment]. She said someone she had spoken to on the party principles team had told her that the idea of a three flights a year budget, where you could sell flights if you didn't use them, was deemed too risqué, possibly due to this idea that Green voters and members are some of those who do fly so much.[72]

For this party member, she had a grudge against her own party because of the *Verbotspartei* image caused by the 'Veggie Day' gaffe of 2013, and the lasting impact this had on the party in proposing ideas for radical change. It seems that the party is now hesitant to play into these tropes that they have collected. This perception is something that the party has been working hard to overcome following the election of Habeck and Baerbock as party leaders. For example, in a video interview online for the *Berliner Morgenpost*, Habeck was confronted with three of the worst prejudices against his party (Rüdiger, 2018). The first one Habeck was confronted with was the Greens being seen as the senior teacher who 'wants to tell us how we should live our lives' (Rüdiger, 2018). In the interview, Habeck retorts by simply explaining that this is no longer the case but came out of the fact that the Greens started off as a citizens movement without a majority in society, so they had to believe in themselves that they had the truth, and because of that were a bit more presumptuous than others (Rüdiger, 2018). Habeck's justification that this 'senior teacher' role originated out of their protest and movement history demonstrates the instrumentalisation of sanitised party (hi)story to consign inconvenient perceptions to the past. Habeck's interview is a deliberate attempt to change the discourse around the party away from the moralising, know-it-all who proselytises to the electorate, something that they arguably

---

[72] Second Conference on the Green Party Principles Process, 30th Mar 2019 ARENA BERLIN. Kiel Fieldwork Diary, pp.72-73.

achieved during the time of this fieldwork.[73] Again, by shifting away from a discourse of moralising, they wished to move into a space of tolerance of differing opinions in line with their strategy to gentrify and appeal to broader, middle-class, milieus. Here, the instrumentalisation of party history serves to indicate a change has occurred, but also continues to reproduce the sanitised Green (hi)story discussed in the previous section.

5.3.2 Fighting for more diversity and inclusion… to a certain extent

It is possible that the party's new tolerant, broader image had not quite landed on a membership level given party members' frustrations I heard in my interviews and at party events. Despite increasing membership numbers in the period during my fieldwork, more often than not the people who turned up to meetings or events were the same Green faces. This was even the case at campaign events during the election campaigns in Stuttgart, as one of the Green Youth committee members lamented how they knew everyone in the audience, despite booking a drag queen to host their event to try to attract a more diverse crowd. The groupthink and lack of diversity that can emanate from the same people attending events can cause policy issues and problems later down the line. As Berlin state politician Brigitte reflected:

> I think with the Greens it is important that we are well anchored because lots of people who come to us are from the bourgeois spectrum, educated middle class and I think that social hardships

---

[73] This could be seen in the flurry of news coverage on the Greens following the Bavarian and Hesse state elections. For example, Wie grün wird Deutschland? 2018. *Focus Magazin*. [Online]. 19 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/politik-wie-gruen-wird-deutschland_id_9783249.html, Grün ist das neue Rot: Wie eine frühere Protestpartei an die Macht drängt. 2018. *Frankfurt Allgemeine Woche.* (43)..

do not necessarily belong to the experiential world of many Greens.[74]

This class-based ignorance was evidenced to me when I attended the party principles event in March 2019. On the Saturday morning of the event, party members in attendance were to be broken up into smaller groups to do workshops. The members themselves would name the workshops and announce these to the crowd to effectively advertise them in case anyone else wanted to attend it. One middle-aged man stepped forward to state his idea for a workshop and said: 'The Greens and the small man, sorry, and the small woman of course!'. Such language used here to refer to the working class or those who are not financially well off comes across as patronising and directly illustrates Brigitte's assessment that many current Greens do not understand the hardship experienced by those who are less wealthy or indeed living in working poverty. Such lack of understanding for those outside the typical gentrified, middle class of Green members even leads Greens to criticise their fellow members with similar levels of education for not reading materials in advance of an event.[75] This demonstrates a lack of understanding or empathy about the demands people face with stressful jobs and/or caring responsibilities that mean that people are not able to read all the detailed materials in advance of voluntary party meetings and events. But class ignorance and demands of productivity are not the only sanitising processes encountered by party members.

Race is another area where the party seems reluctant to fundamentally revolutionise the way people of colour are treated in German politics and society. The Greens are somewhat good on promoting politicians of colour including Muhterem Aras, Aminata Touré and current federal party co-leader

---

[74] Brigitte, Berlin State Parliament, p.17.
[75] Berlin Greens *Grundsatzprogrammprozess* event: 'Mobility of the future – how do we shape the Green transport transition?', 17th November 2018, Berlin Fieldwork Diary, p.55.

Omid Nouripour. One of the most prominent Greens of colour is Cem Özdemir, one of the first Germans with Turkish heritage to be elected to the *Bundestag,* alongside Leyla Onur of the SPD, in 1994. In 2008, Özdemir became the first party leader of colour in Germany as co-leader of the federal Green Party, and in 2021 he became the first German federal minister of Turkish descent when he became the federal Minister for Agriculture in the new *Ampel* coalition (von Bullion, 2021).[76] However, despite these achievements of Green politicians of colour, in 2018 and 2019 internal and external perceptions of the Greens classed them as a party predominantly for white people. Paula from Berlin-Lichtenberg was aware of the lack of heterogeneity within the party at the local level:

> We are completely open, but we are asking ourselves, because the people who are coming at the moment are like you and I: white, educated, young people. We're missing a relatively large section of people in this country that we somehow don't speak to, and we don't know why that is. […] At our new member meeting […] it's always people like you and me.[77]

I witnessed this sense of not speaking to certain sections of society at a member meeting of the Berlin Central (Mitte) District Green Party. The members present had a rather heated discussion on the defection of a Green of colour from the Central District Municipal Council Group to the SPD. Cüneyt Bülent Bilaloğlu had leaked his reasons for defection to the press before resigning from the party, just six months after Nedim Bayat, another Green in the same district council, had also defected to the SPD (Hofmann, 2018). The main reason both gave for their defection was the way that the party treated those with foreign heritage, particularly Germans with Turkish heritage. At the

---

[76] The selection of Özdemir as the Minister for Agriculture was beset by factional infighting and media speculation by those who wanted former parliamentary party leader Anton Hofreiter to be given the ministry in late November 2021.

[77] Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.6.

Berlin Central member meeting, the discussion focused on how to deal with it, stating there were false accusations but that also they would not be distributing the resignation letter for legal reasons. It also initiated a discussion about whether two similar defections within six months meant there could potentially be problems for people with 'migration backgrounds' being active within the Green Party.[78]

The lack of people of colour in the Greens is not just an issue at the municipal level but also a problem acknowledged at higher levels of the party. When I asked federal party HQ employee Lars how the central federal party were tackling this issue, he told me that many state Green parties had discussed the issue of increasing the participation of people of colour and those with diverse heritages, though he failed to tell me anything concrete:

> I find the term 'migrant quota' quite derogatory; I don't like it. But it is about people who identify as a People of Colour, […] the experience of racism, so that you grant a stronger voice through a quota for example or through other instruments. That is a controversial discussion.[79]

Lars here is referring in particular to the developments around some form of affirmative action to increase the voices and representation of people of colour within the state Berlin Greens, and not the federal party. However, he avoided any further answering of the question instead telling me about the broadening of gender categories within the Greens to include '*interdiverse*' as a third gender request option, alongside prefer not to say, although this would not

---

[78] I insert the term 'migration background' in inverted commas, as it is the literal translation from the German, but is a term that I find problematic, particularly in English translation.
[79] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.11.

apply to election lists, as Katharina later informed me the Green Youth had done.[80]

Such oversight on the issue of how the party can better reflect the diverse nature of contemporary German society, was also identified at the party principles event in March 2019. This event, highlighting the progress made on the interim draft of the new party principles, as well as the soft launch of the Green EU election campaign, invited journalist and activist Ferda Ataman, among others, to respond with her thoughts to the draft party principles. Whilst she praised the draft on how its running thread of feminism through all the policy areas, her 'core point of critique' of these draft party principles was that issues such as racism, discrimination, and societal diversity should also be a running thread through the principles, just like feminism (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b). She emphasised how important this was as Germans with a 'migration background' felt that their existence in Germany was increasingly questioned and they would therefore appreciate seeing the word racism appear more than just once in a Green Party principles document. The party's failure to address it as seriously as feminism entailed that this party principles document read to Ataman like one of a '*white party*', even though she stated that she knows the Greens are not a white party and have done a lot for diversity. However, she still did not feel that the Greens take people like her, a child of guest workers who immigrated to West Germany in the 50s and 60s, with them.

The document's pandering to discourse of taking seriously the concerns of those at risk of being radicalised by the Far Right was something she found particularly disappointing. She wished to see this replaced instead with more post-colonial language that critiques racism and which may help to bring people of colour like her along with the party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b). Here, the Habeck and Baerbock-led strategy to broaden and gentrify the

---

[80] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.11.

party's appeal into a middle-class milieu was playing into potentially racist discourses around so-called 'globalisation losers' and ignoring the lived experience of people of colour, thus contradicting the Greens' desired perception of emphatically standing against racism.

As a course of action to make meaningful changes in this direction outside of just the party principles document, the party hired racism-consultant Tupoka Ogette in August 2019 to help tackle the Greens' internal structural issues that disadvantage members of colour in the form of a Working Group on Diversity (Riese, 2019).[81] There was clearly progress to be made, when in May 2019 the Greens actually sent the first Black German to the European parliament: Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana. However, I only discovered this achievement in the days following the election through activist Facebook groups who were sharing a post from CDU municipal politician Sylvie Nantcha which stated this historical moment (Berlin Postkolonial, 2019). This reflected two possible situations: either it demonstrated a party unprepared for just how many MEP's they eventually gained in the 2019 EU elections, as Herzberger-Fofana was the 21st and last candidate on the list to obtain a seat, a place generally considered unrealistic in line with previous Green electoral performance. Or, it demonstrated the party's focus on the inner circle and most prominent Greens, a level already identified as problematic in its reflection of the diversity of German society above gender parity.

The Greens need to ensure the steps to address the issues of discrimination, racism, and diversity, such as the Working Group, amounts to more than simply 'wokewashing' and sanitising the party, where those members of colour are exploited in the exercise. This would involve fully taking on board the findings of the Diversity Working Group and making necessary changes so that the party is appealing, safe and provides spaces for people of colour to

---

[81] The findings of the working group were published in June 2020: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2020c. *Zusammenhalt in Vielfalt: Ergebnisse der AG Vielfalt.* [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.gruene.de/artikel/zusammenhalt-in-vielfalt-ergebnisse-der-ag-vielfalt

join them and work within their party structures. It remains to be seen whether the action they have taken thus far will make a fundamental, structural difference to the personnel, language and policies of the party to benefit people of colour. The recent and chaotic selection of Cem Özdemir as the only non-White cabinet minister of both the Greens and the wider *Ampel* coalition would suggest there is still plenty of room for improvement (von Bullion, 2021).

Should no substantial changes in this area occur, it would suggest that the Greens have indeed gentrified the cause to reinforce the self-assurance that they continue to be on the side of tolerance, where they balance the desire of party members who want to be part of an anti-racist party, whilst also gentrifying the party's appeal to more moderate, and much broader middle-class milieus. In this case, anti-racism becomes a commodifiable USP to sell the party to progressives, much like the idea of 'multiculturalism' is used to sell property in gentrified areas. Such aesthetic 'support', or arguably appropriation, of anti-racism without fundamentally changing the structurally racist nature of contemporary society can be a marker of a gentrified protest aesthetic, to be analysed further in the following chapter.

5.3.3 'One of the good ones'

Author, radio broadcaster, influencer, and SPD member Sophie Passmann released her second book in early 2019 which featured interviews and observations with several prominent 'old white men', including Green Party leader Habeck. She finishes her chapter on Habeck with the sentence 'he is one of the good ones' (Passmann, 2019, p.66). This sense of being on the right side of politics is one I found often in my interactions with party members. Internally and externally, there is a perception that this Green attitude of being 'one of the good ones' can also serve as a repentant for ecological sins, or indeed as a political sanitiser for the 'germs' of western, middle-class, resource-intensive consumption. When I asked Vanessa what she thought it

meant to be a Green Party member in 2019, she framed her answer in the context of the general political context of the time having a 'right' and 'wrong' side. Whilst she did not claim that the Greens were the only party who were a part of the 'right' side, she did conclude that being a member of the Greens today gives you a feeling that 'you are doing the right thing'.[82]

On the other hand, some party members I spoke to found this equating of the Greens as 'one of the good ones' or 'doing the right thing' problematic. Martin from Wankendorf had the impression that some people become Green Party members as a way to have a 'clearer conscience' and absolve themselves from their ecological sins, such as driving diesel-guzzling cars.[83] Arpiar, my only interviewee of colour and the most overtly critical of the party, thought that the Greens in late 2018 were 'a kind of sanitary product'. [84] He did not like that some of those within the Greens believed they had a 'moral blessing' because of a self-perceived 'altruism' or 'liberal attitude' that seemed to preclude them from accepting any criticism from others.[85] When I suggested to him that what he was describing was what a right-wing tabloid like *Bild* may term as *Gutmensch* he broke down what the accusation of being a *Gutmensch* meant to him:

> I find *Gutmensch* a sarcastic distortion. It isn't anything bad to be good. […] I wouldn't label myself as a *Gutmensch* or allow others to label me so. […] This *Gutmensch* accusation is not that you do good, but that [the accuser] ha[s] the negatives of it. You do something good at [the accuser's] expense.[86]

---

[82] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.2.
[83] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), p.10.
[84] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.16.
[85] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.16.
[86] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.17.

However, despite this very detailed analysis of how the label *Gutmensch* is a tool with which to try to write off a certain argument or policy, and therefore contradicts his earlier critique of the Greens as a sanitiser, Arpiar doubles down on his critique when he told me why he does not attend anti-AfD or anti-racism demonstrations:

> I don't take part in these *#Unteilbar* or anti-AfD demos due to personal, individual reasons. Because I know that they will not engage with the problem and people are just partying there. […] More or less, they are just against the AfD and find them stupid. But I can do that alone at home. I wouldn't be changing anything [at such a demonstration] and I demonstrate in order to change things.[87]

Once again, a Green Party member accuses his fellow members to be taking part in an event rather than a protest, as those from Stuttgart spoke about Fridays for Future earlier in this chapter. Unlike that example, Arpiar saw the participation of Greens in such anti-racism demonstrations as a way of 'pure self-assurance' for those who consider themselves an anti-racist.[88] As a person of colour within the Greens, Arpiar also has to face comments like 'oh given the way you look, you above all should be there' from his peers when he states that he does not attend such demonstrations.[89]

Based on his lived experiences as a Green and a person of colour, Arpiar links these performative, sanitised protest demonstrations to sanitising, moralising politics. By describing the motivation of taking part in these kinds of demonstrations as a self-assurance of being on the 'right side', the Greens in this logic become a sanitiser against the 'wrong side' of the AfD. When the

---

[87] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.38.
[88] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.15-16.
[89] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.15-16.

discussion becomes about moralising whether someone is attending a demonstration against racism, it displaces the causes of racism and those afflicted. Once again, the protest cause is gentrified in order to remain consistent with the party's political style of gentrified protest.

In the case of environmental protection, some party members think that people's private behaviour should also be held accountable to their political values. Martin was firm in his belief that a political membership should affect your private behaviour:

> I think that if you are a member of a Green party, then you have the obligation and the task, in my opinion, to […] at least demonstrate that a bit externally that they stand for what the Greens stand, and for me that is first and foremost the protection of nature and the environment.[90]

This effective demand from Martin that Green Party members should be putting their money where their mouth is, was also shared by a Green Youth member I observed speaking at a member meeting in Stuttgart. The young woman was answering a discussion question about how they perceived the European and Stuttgart election results of May 2019. Wearing a T-shirt with Van Gogh's sunflowers on, she responded to this request by saying that she is more interested in climate protection not merely as something discussed by parties, but something that private people contribute to by changing their private behaviour. She emphasises that people must not be left with the impression that simply voting Green is enough to protect the climate.[91] Therefore, even younger members see this potential for the Greens to be a political sanitiser.

---

[90] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), pp.5-6.
[91] Stuttgart Green Youth Member Meeting, 26th June 2019, Stuttgart Fieldwork Diary, p.47.

This demand for individual behaviour to protect the climate from young and old party activists alike demonstrates the successful infiltration of liberalist thought into German Green politics, since the ideological shift found in the 2002 fundamental party principles (Talshir, 2003). Both examples of sanitising politics in this section involve shifting debate on a structural problem onto the responsibility of private individuals. Such a displacement concentrates on making changes within the existing, gentrified liberal democratic system and not altering the status quo. This framing of politics creates the style of gentrified protest, creating the appearance that citizens are engaging and contributing to a political issue, whilst framing discussions within the party that ensure that the debate never fully deconstructs the gentrified system.

5.4 Branding the German Greens

The previous two sections have focused on sanitised and sanitising politics in rhetoric, affective dimensions, experience, and the staging of party participation in protest. The first section illustrated the completed gentrification of party history and of party members' approach to, and thoughts about, the boundaries between institutional and extra-institutional politics. The second section looked at the current process of gentrification occurring alongside the party rebrand to consciously aim towards a broader, middle-class audience and a way in which to become palatable. This section highlighted how these sanitising processes saw a potential for tokenism and performativity in relation to the party's work on anti-racism, and an increased focus on the use of Green Party membership to either absolve individuals of their own ecological sins, or provide a space to call for more engagement with private action to fight the climate crisis. This shift to the responsibility of the individual collapses the liberal boundary of public political activism into the realm of the private individual. In such a space, I demonstrated how Green Party members were

calling for more private action of individuals in German society, normally via a form of green or political consumption (Jacobsen, 2017). This final section touches upon consumption via the concept and process of branding. What follows it is the exploration of both the tangible and intangible aspects of branding practices of the Greens within the political style of gentrified protest.

5.4.1 Branding of Green Politics

5.4.1.1 Protest as a part of the Green 'brand'

Party protest history is frequently invoked by party members similarly to what Markovits and Klaver (2015) call the 'Green brand'. The Green Party members I interviewed do not refer to a brand, but rather use several different metaphors. Torsten, an older Schleswig-Holstein state politician talked about protest as 'embedded' in the party's 'DNA'.[92] Whereas Martin and Brigitte believe protest belongs to the 'culture' of the Greens.[93] This culture or DNA of the party is the strength of the Green Party and its brand.

The Green Party brand is reproduced by party members, particularly when it comes to the party's sanitised protest. Sven told me about a Kiel Green Party event held after the violent G20 protests in Hamburg on the theme of protest and violence. A member-only event, it included attendees there who were both protesters at Brokdorf, the controversial Nuclear Power Plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, and also a Green Party member who was working as a policeman at the Brokdorf protests in the 1980s. As he recalled the event, Sven highlighted the delicate balance protest plays in the contemporary Green brand:

---

[92] Torsten, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.14.
[93] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), p.23. and Brigitte, Berlin State Parliament, p.7.

> [T]hat is […] a strength that no other party can produce, that we have green policemen as well as green radical demonstrators. No other party could hold this meeting. And that is this tension, this balancing act somehow between protest and established party. It has its strengths; it can be an advantage.[94]

Nikolas from the Green Youth noted how the unconventional protest history of the Greens was for him a lasting brand image of the party:

> Especially how the Greens sprung up out of the 68er, through environmental protection in the 80s, with the reactor transports. Those are the images that I still [see] when I think of the Greens with protest. […] I would say that today it is still a bit the image of the party, the history.[95]

Both Sven and Nikolas here support the strong nature of the Green brand and its role in German political culture as argued by Markovits and Klaver (2015). Furthermore, Nikolas' chronology and its association with the Greens supports Cosgrove's (2011) assertion that a brand that is built over time is a stronger and more successful one, as long as the effort is made to maintain it.

Related to the protest image of the Greens, there remains a sense that even at 40 years old, the Greens are a young party. Both Nikolas and Martin stated declaratively that the Greens are a 'relatively young' party compared to other parties, in particular the CDU and SPD.[96] Martin expanded the youth to account for the party's status as being 'young-in-mind', which he qualified as

---

[94] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.15.
[95] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, p.5.
[96] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, p.6. and Martin, Wankendorf (SH) p.11.

'quick thinking' and 'open to other issues'.[97] Yvonne also mentioned the Greens as young, though she associated it to their history of being 'a bit non-conformist with trainers and such'.[98] Based on these assertions from party members, it is not simply the case that the party's history, with the most protest-oriented form of the Greens, is part of the Greens' DNA, culture and 'brand', but that party history is an integral element to convey a youthfulness of the party to its competitors and the electorate.

5.4.1.2 The symbols of the Green Brand

Brands can encompass intangible elements of how the party image is received by the electorate, but also tend to be comprised of a 'name, term, sign, symbol or design or a combination of these, that identifies the products or services of one seller or group of sellers and differentiates them from those of competitors' (Kotler and Armstrong, 2016, p.263). The Greens are represented by the colour Green and are often thought of as the paradigmatic Green party (Markovits and Klaver, 2015; Frankland, 2008). This branding was curated at the beginning of the Greens. At the party principles event I attended In Berlin in March 2019, they showed a video marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Greens in European Law (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019a). One aspect this film focused on was the initial branding of the Greens. It explained the decision for using a sunflower, how those early Greens learned about the colour green from artist Joseph Beuys, what message the colour conveyed about nature and the environment, and its relationship with people. This 12-minute-long video detailing the party's original branding and more was shown at an event alongside a conscious rebranding through a redrafting of party principles.

---

[97] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), p.11.
[98] Yvonne, Stuttgart-Obere Neckarvororte, p.6.

Although no one was explicitly referring to the party principles process as a rebrand, the fact they decided to devote a significant chunk of this video to this topic demonstrates the party's awareness of the strength of the brand it originally built, and a commitment to maintain some form of linkage with it. This awareness is particularly apparent considering the aesthetic rebrand for the European election campaign was premiered at the same event, later appearing on the Party's website sometime in early April 2019, and then seen on protest banners at the *Europe for All* demonstration that took place during the campaign period.[99] This aesthetic rebrand was underlining the conscious broadening and gentrifying of the party that has been discussed earlier in this chapter. Even at a meeting in Kiel where this new Green campaign branding was revealed, some had reservations that it did not look 'Green enough', as they always had a Green background with white text, and this branding was a clear change and inversion of branding as usual for the party.

---

[99] The aesthetic website update for www.gruene.de can be found on the internet archive Wayback Machine https://web.archive.org

Image 4 Photo of Green branding briefing for EU Elections. Taken at State Working Group on Europe, Kiel 20th Feb 2019

The strength of identification with the colour green and the Green brand could be seen in some individual party members during my fieldwork. Walter in Berlin came to his interview wearing a green-coloured watch, a Green Party sunflower emblem pin badge on his jacket and a light-green hat. Such items can be bought from both party-internal and external online shops. But just as Walter was only wearing one 'official' piece of Green branded items, members often locate their own, green-coloured clothing to turn the Green bloc at a protest literally green, as I saw at the Europe for All demonstration in Stuttgart, where people wore green-coloured jackets, tops, rucksacks and shoes. As shown in the image below, it may not be the case for absolutely every member, but for some members there is a strong personal commitment to the Green brand.

Image 5 Stuttgart Greens at the 'Europe for All' Demonstration 19th May 2019

The strength of the brand does pose risks for party members, particularly when they are alone or in non-party specific contexts. I had an impromptu fieldwork conversation when I travelled to a cinema in Berlin-Friedrichshagen, a district of Berlin that borders the state of Brandenburg, to see the documentary film *Following Habeck* (2018). It turned out that the Green branch of Schöneiche, located in Brandenburg but close to the border with Berlin, had planned this showing as part of their monthly *Stammtisch* meeting of their party branch (2018). One of the Schöneiche party members told me that by travelling with a party-branded bag on public transport, she clearly demarcates her party identity and affinity and that this has affected how people treat her. One time whilst out in public with her party-branded tote bag, she was called names such as *grüne Schlampe,* a 'green bitch', by complete strangers.[100] Gisela was so sensitive to people's responses to the Green sunflower symbol, that even in her role as a *Bürgerdeputierte* (citizen delegate) in a working group (*Ausschuss*) for the district council in Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, she has business cards with her @gruene-berlin.de email address that display a

---

[100] Schöneiche bei Berlin Green *Stammtisch*: ‚Following Habeck', 24th October 2018, Berlin Fieldwork Diary, pp.27-28.

hedgehog rather than the sunflower, a symbol of particular meaning for the Berlin Greens. I asked her about this in our interview. She clarified that the sunflower 'signals a certain attitude to many things' and how her avoidance of that symbol 'makes it easier for some people to speak out'.[101] She understands because she would behave similarly if she entered into a discussion with someone with an AfD logo. These experiences demonstrate the strength of the brand outside of the party member audience, but also notes how individual party members can suffer or change their reproduction of the party brand, sensitive to other brand images and perceptions held by audiences less sympathetic to the Greens.

This section on branding is deeply interrelated with the authenticity and aesthetic facets of gentrified protest that will be analysed in chapter six. In this section, we have illustrated how the party history and the continued engagement with sanitised protest are instrumentalised to form a core part of the Green brand and maintain hold of the party's position as a perceived, young, alternative party. This brand has been built and maintained over time, as is encouraged by marketers. The signs and symbols of the Greens and party members' individual engagement in their participation in protest and in everyday life and party work also demonstrates a clear understanding of the brand by these multi-level marketers, who perceive a sensitivity to how it is received by different audiences or markets within the German population. In so doing, this confirms Markovits and Klaver's claim that this Green brand is anchored in German political life, though, as with most aspects analysed in this thesis, the way it is reproduced and experienced at the level of grassroots members is nuanced.

---

[101] Gisela, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.8.

5.4.2 Green politics as a branded lifestyle

The previous subsection demonstrated party members' perceptions and reproduction of the Green brand and the visual symbols used to communicate it. However, for some members it is less about visuals and explicit branding and instead:

> Green is not just concrete politics in all possible policy areas, but an attitude.[102]

This what Oliver told me when I asked him what it means to be a Green Party member in 2018. This Green attitude, a branded *lifestyle* in other words, is not just a way of internally describing your habitus as a Green Party member but is also victim to becoming commodified via a shorthand criticism or joke made in the media. This can be satirical, as seen in a sketch on the *heute show* on the German Public Broadcaster ZDF prior to the Bavarian state elections in October 2018. During this skit, the host Oliver Welke joked that 'Green is more of a feeling' and then played an advert that looked like it was advertising the benefits of a spa break, with the voiceover stating in hushed tones that the Greens provide 'a democratic detox for a stressed world'. The 'advertisement' then comes to an end and the show returns to Welke behind his desk where he refers to the Greens as 'Alliance 90/The Wellness Party' (ZDF heute-show, 2018).

Such 'brandification' of a Green lifestyle can also be found in media commentary with analogies made with consumer products. For example, the right-wing publication *Focus* noted that the Greens have managed to turn their brand image from the 'sour-faced-30km/h-speed-limit party to a feelgood club'

---

[102] Oliver, Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, p.9.

and cite a advertising executive who calls the Greens the 'Tesla' of political parties, though this executive was not sure whether a Tesla is a car or a lifestyle product (Wie grün wird Deutschland?, 2018). Given the propensity for publications such as *Focus* to criticise the Greens in the past, the piece cited above was a more balanced profile than usually expected from them (Die Entzauberung der Grünen, 2013).

Consumable goods indicative of a certain metropolitan, and perceived Green, lifestyle are often used by their political opponents to critique the Greens and/or progressive left politics. This is the converse of the phenomenon of politicians proving their authenticity by consuming 'down to earth' foodstuffs, as is common in UK politics (Whittle et al., 2021). Such a form of critique was attempted during my fieldwork by the then federal leader of the CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, where she conflated a 'lifestyle' with progressive identity politics. At a performance during a carnival event in 2019, Kramp-Karrenbauer made a joke at the expense of non-binary individuals about gender-neutral toilets (Saarländischer Rundfunk, 2019). She referred to the SPD-Green-Left coalition in the Berlin state government as the 'Latte Macchiato delegation' who introduced toilets for the third gender, and that these toilets are for those men 'who do not know whether to stand or sit when they urinate' (Oltermann, 2019). Her controversial joke was later criticised in a blog post from Robert Habeck, as a form of punching down against minorities that made Habeck start to 'miss' Angela Merkel before she had even left office (Habeck, 2019b). I even heard this label of 'Latte Macchiato' later reclaimed by left-wing activists at the International Women's Day demonstration I attended in Kiel. This demonstration had a 'Women's bloc' or '*FLTI bloc*' which included cis-gendered straight women, lesbians, transgender women and intersex individuals. When it stopped for an in-between rally outside the office of the Kiel AfD, a speaker responded to Kramp-Karrenbauer's joke to rapturous

applause: 'if that makes us Latte Macchiato, then Kiel is Latte Macchiato because we want accessible toilets for all, no matter their gender identity'.[103]

Whilst Kramp-Karrenbauer was not exclusively referring to the Greens in this case, it is not the first time that her party, the CDU, have tried to distance themselves from the features of more metropolitan milieus, lifestyles and communities. In 2017, Jens Spahn of the CDU complained in a guest column in the weekly *Die Zeit* newspaper about German native speaker waiters and waitresses in Berlin conducting their job entirely in English. He considered this a dangerous trend perpetrated by hipsters which alienates Germans in their own capital, and could lead to a new parallel society of young people from all over the world who stick with their own (Spahn, 2017). Again, this was not a direct attack on the Greens specifically, but they responded in jest in English on social media:

Image 6 Screenshot from official Green Party twitter account criticising Jens Spahn, 24th August 2017[104]

---

[103] International Women's Day Demonstration, 8th March 2019, Kiel Central Train Station, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.52.
[104] Tweet available here: https://twitter.com/Die_Gruenen/status/900650028527702017

However, the rhetorical use of commodities and lifestyles as a mean of distinguishing one political brand against another is not just conducted by the centre-right CDU/CSU. The centre-left SPD has employed this strategy through the use of coffee as a symbol to demarcate class along the lines of Bourdieu's theory of distinction discussed in chapter three. In 2010 during a previous opinion poll high for the Greens, Sigmar Gabriel explicitly called the Greens the 'Latte Macchiato party' to emphasise his critique that the Greens did not cater for the working classes. Cem Özdemir, the Green federal party co-leader at the time, responded to this with the quip 'filter coffee isn't the solution either' (Phoenix, 2010). Jürgen Trittin, another prominent Green, mentioned Gabriel's 'Latte Macchiato' label when speaking to the paper *Die Zeit* a few years later in 2013. Trittin recounted how he had asked Gabriel when he was last in a McDonald's, explaining to him that you can now get a Latte Macchiato from McCafe, and how this was exemplary that a green, middle-class way of life was not exclusive, but one of solidarity (Lau, 2013). Empirical evidence suggests that Gabriel's commodification of 'working-class' to appeal to a white, male working class backfired; Social Democrats have not lost working class voters, but have failed to address the fact that the working class is smaller, younger, more educated, more female, and ethnically diverse (Abou-Chadi et al., 2021). Between October 2018 and June 2019, the SPD were experiencing crushing electoral defeats in EU and state elections. At the same time, the German Greens were being overwhelmed by the Green Wave of support, although that wave did subside later that year in eastern state elections.

This commodification of a Green lifestyle brand demonstrates the Greens' playful nature when they are faced with accusations of being out of touch, metropolitan, and/or pretentious hipsters. Indeed, such an association is welcomed by the party, as we saw in response to Jens Spahn, given how this closely aligns to the Green brand of being a bit 'alternative'. This was certainly

the case for the Green Youth in Stuttgart, who held an event titled *Spießerstadt Stuttgart? - Nicht mit uns!* (Bourgeois city Stuttgart? – Not with us!). The event was hosted by a local drag queen, Rachel Intervention, in a city centre bar and involved the Green Youth candidates for the city council and European elections presenting their visions in different policy areas in a PechaKucha format.[105] Being proud of being 'alternative', different, and even associated with lifestyles and signifiers of gentrification such as fancy coffees and hipsters is clearly both an external perception, but also one that the Greens do not mind reclaiming or playing on when it pays to exploit it in a social media or other context.

This last section on the Green lifestyle brand has demonstrated its importance to the political style of gentrified protest. It highlights an awareness by the party, its politicians, and its party members about the brand image that the party has within itself and the wider electorate. Progressive politics and protest are key to building and maintaining the Green brand, and are dealt with sensitively in the rebranding process of the fundamental party principles. Again, it is an element of gentrified protest that can only be legitimated by the participation of active grassroots members, and their work to reproduce the party brand is not overlooked in this analysis. Aspects from the brand facet of the political style of gentrified protest will be built upon in the following chapter in the discussion of the authentic and aesthetic facets of gentrified protest.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated and explicated two facets of the political style of gentrified protest of the German Greens in a period when they were in ascendence. The first facet of *sanitised* German Green protest relates to their

---

[105] Stuttgart Green Youth campaign event '*Spießerstadt Stuttgart? - Nicht mit uns!*', 16th May 2019, Club Zwanglos/Schocken, Stuttgart Fieldwork Diary, pp.22-25.

origins and party history out of the New Social Movements of 1970s and 1980s West Germany. It highlights the 'spiritual gentrification' that Schulman (2013) classes as a depoliticisation of activism that is now part of the canonised history of the German Greens.

Yet, the analysis of this sanitised protest past in the present Greens illuminates a still divided position on the role that protest plays for the contemporary party within a society where street protest is now a normalised part of the political culture. This is different from the political culture when the Greens were founded in West Germany 40 years ago, with their radical *Standbein/Spielbein* understanding of blurred boundaries between institutional and extra-institutional politics. For some, the interaction of institutional and extra-institutional political spheres is firmly consigned to the past; for others protest continues to be necessary in order to make progressive change in institutional politics. The contemporary relationship between these two spheres for the Green Party in Germany is complicated by a lack of consensus of what constitutes radical politics, what forms of protest fall under the category of violence, and the ideological variety of the Greens across a multi-level, federal political system.

The sanitised, acceptable protest past of the Greens and the party's role in a normalised eco-system of protest is a constitutive part of the Green *brand* as cultivated by the party themselves in a short film, as well as internalised by the party members I encountered during my fieldwork at party events and in interviews. Protest, however, is not the sole feature of the Green brand. The party's use of colour, symbols, and discourses which associate the party with a certain metropolitan lifestyle and the consumer goods associated with it are recognisable and employed by both supporters and opponents of the Greens. This underlines the strength of the brand identity of the party, which continues to be built upon by not only the central party office, but through everyday interactions and voluntary work of the grassroots multi-level marketers of the

party. Multiple examples in this chapter have illustrated that party members are perceptive when it comes to joining the Green bloc to prevent criticism of a lack of Green support for a cause, or how their fellow citizens may respond to the well-recognised Green symbols of the sunflower. Within a multi-level political system, the central party office is reliant on the party on the ground to appropriately reproduce the party brand on the political frontlines, online and offline.

Despite the strength of the Green brand and its incorporation of sanitised protest, there is a danger that the *sanitising* politics of absolving progressive guilt and some of the 'multi-level marketer' members' propensity for proselytising will cause common problems faced by progressive political parties more generally. A perception that the German Greens are a moralising, sanitising party who wish to tell people how to live their lives may be a perception that the party is actively attempting to shake off, but which continues to shape party members' experiences of Green Party activism. The high standards of those who consider themselves doing the 'right thing' and who demand ecological purity from their fellow party members and citizens could ultimately lead to disappointment, further criticism of the party more broadly, as well as gaffes in the media for the unrealistic expectations of a 100% environmentally friendly lifestyle in a system that is far from environmentally friendly.

Finally, the Greens' brand association as standing against racism and adopting the position of the direct opponent of the AfD since 2017 is more complicated than the brand image the central party and many white party members would like. During the period of fieldwork, which took place before the death of George Floyd in 2020 and the ensuing intensive discussions around racism in contemporary Western societies, the Greens still seemed to be having issues in reaching out to communities of colour. This was illustrated by defections to the SPD in Berlin Mitte, as well as the critique from journalist

Ferda Ataman of the draft party principles in March 2019. What the concept of gentrified protest has highlighted is that the gentrified protest style of the Greens, which is deliberately aiming to appeal to a broader, predominantly middle-class electorate as a palatable centre-left alternative, will end up compromising their positions in some areas, like racial equality, to appeal to others, like the use of language such as 'losers from globalisation'.

This chapter has thus demonstrated how a party deliberately striving for power has utilised the gentrified protest style to distinguish its progressive, democratic and participatory qualities in the stylised world of contemporary politics. It has retained on to a sanitised version of its party and protest (hi)story by maintaining a link to street demonstrations, utilising the bodies of party members through members' affective relationship to protest in their everyday activism, as well as their strategic perceptions on the importance of a visual and embodied Green performance at protests. The presence and organisation to attend such events are carried out by Green party officials, politicians, and party members and their contribution to this performance highlight how this political style is integrated into all three party faces.

Yet, the Greens face the struggles of the sanitising politics facet of gentrified protest. Like many progressive parties campaigning to alleviate the societal and/or economic disadvantages of those less well off in society, the Greens have a perception of proscribing how people should live their lives. This characteristic often results in critique, particularly in relation to individual environmental action. However, the Greens are caught in a paradox of minimising that perception to become more palatable to the wider electorate, at the same time as paying what some people of colour consider as mere performative allyship in street demonstrations and through members' personalised political communication, rather than tackling structural and party internal issues of racism. As such, this facet within the Greens' political style at the time under study allows people to buy into a party performing anti-racism

stances in their emphatic rhetorical and aesthetic street demonstration support, but possibly only as a form of moral absolution rather than concretely tackling such issues.

The branding of the gentrified protest style of the German Greens both maintains links to the sanitised protest (hi)story of the party as well as consciously rebranding as they diversify to a broader audience. The data analysed in this chapter has underlined the affective relationship that party members have with the party brand, and how they reproduce it themselves through visual presentation in their clothes and use of symbols, as well as through their embodied communication of the political style in their participation in street demonstrations. In this way, Green Party members perform a function of personalised political communication and a role akin to multi-level marketers to depict the participatory, democratic and movement-aligned German Green Party.

Chapter 6 The authentic and aesthetic nature of contemporary German Green politics

As argued in chapter three, the four facets that make up gentrified protest are distinct yet interlinked. The previous chapter established how the facets of sanitised protest, sanitising politics, as well as branding could be seen in the political style of the German Greens between October 2018 and June 2019. This chapter, whilst structurally separate, consolidates and expands on many ideas from chapter five in addressing the remaining two facets of gentrified protest:

- The *cachet of authenticity* within gentrified protest politics
- The *aesthetic* of gentrified protest politics

The previous chapter alluded to the role of authenticity in the work of maintaining the Green brand that relies heavily on its sanitised protest past and present. Furthermore, in analysing the strength of the Green brand, the visual and affective aesthetics of gentrified protest politics have already been introduced. This chapter thus builds on and consolidates the analysis from chapter five to demonstrate how party members contribute to and experience the political style of gentrified protest. This is explored through party members' experience and, often self-aware, perceptions of Green political activism, but also through the way the aesthetic of gentrified protest is perceived and interpreted by the central party, the media and others external to the party. In so doing, this chapter's analysis of authenticity and the aesthetic of gentrified protest in the German Greens cements the importance of the political style of gentrified protest for a contemporary progressive politics which is deeply entwined with contemporary media structures.

6.1 The cachet of authenticity

6.1.1 Party history as a guarantee of authenticity

The canonised, sanitised party (hi)story not only serves in gentrifying the party into a palatable contemporary force of the centre-left in German politics. As part of the Green brand, party (hi)story is a constitutive means of delivering authenticity to party members and the wider public. For example, Green (hi)story functions as a guarantee for some party members to identify with a perceived authenticity of the Greens, such as Oliver from Berlin:

> [History] is absolutely relevant for the party. Otherwise we would become arbitrary […]. The Greens stand up for democracy, […]. We stand up for ecology as our main issue. […]. The area of peace policy and civil rights […] The positions admittedly change a bit and the direction of the Greens too; but the fundamental attitude, that has remained.[106]

Ulrike in Stuttgart shared Oliver's view, but, rather than her own identification, stressed the instrumental nature that (hi)story plays within the electoral arena so that the Greens do not become 'like the CDU and SPD' who are 'no longer distinguishable'.[107] Two of my interviewees conceived the role of party (hi)story as *Folklore*, although they each had different interpretations of what a Green Party folklore entailed with regards to authenticity. Sven considered folklore a positively connotated concept which denotes the party's protest and movement (hi)story. After comparing what he considered the extensive folklore of the SPD with figures such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt and 150 years of social democracy, he concluded that Green folklore is 'not as present', is 'not mentioned in every speech', nor do the Greens have their own

---

[106] Oliver, Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, p.9.
[107] Ulrike, Stuttgart-East, p.7.

songs.[108] Instead Green folklore is that the party is 'a protest and movement party' that was founded by protest movements, and which still has many Greens travelling from all over to attend demonstrations on ecological protection and civil rights.[109] Arpiar, however, did not agree and instead saw Green (hi)story becoming folklore as something quite negative. He too makes a comparison with the SPD, suggesting that folklore is the packaging of (hi)story as something 'depoliticised' to the point it is largely irrelevant for the here and now.[110]

Arpiar and Sven may have different interpretations of what *Folklore* means for the Greens and their relationship with their protest past, but they are both making the same point as Ulrike and Oliver: that the party needs to hold on to its connection to its protest-influenced (hi)story as a means of remaining politically distinctive and competitive in the future. Any reinvention of the Greens that took them too far away from their (hi)story would not be advantageous in the eyes of these party members. It would erase the 'experience of origin' required for the party to be considered authentic (Zukin, 2010, p.3). The distinguishable, 'authentic' nature of the party as communicated through party (hi)story is therefore not only important to party members as a means of self-identification with the green 'brand' as outlined in the previous chapter, but also in the realm of voter perception and competition within the electoral field.

6.1.1.1 Which Green history? Whose Green history?

It was clear that Oliver and Ulrike's idea of party (hi)story was based on the canonised, sanitised Green (hi)story mentioned in the previous chapter. My interviewees were normally able to repeat the following story of (hi)story

---

[108] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.12.
[109] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.12.
[110] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.27.

presented in chapter two of this thesis: West German social movements and protests on various post-materialist issues entered state and federal parliaments with the aim of democratising West German politics and societies away from its authoritarian character after the Second World War. The party then went on its 'long march through the institutions' and professionalised, starting with Joschka Fischer and the trainers he wore as he became the first Green Minister for the Environment in the Hesse state parliament, and how he went from that position to being the first Green foreign minister deciding on the military deployment in Kosovo pursued by the SPD-Green federal government in the late 1990s. Following the peaceful revolution in East Germany, Alliance 90 successfully entered the Bundestag following the first all-German federal elections in 1990 and later merged with the Greens giving them their current name, Alliance 90/The Greens. That these events belong to the Green (hi)story is uncontroversial for those I spoke to both in interviews and more informally during my fieldwork.

However, at what point do certain events and milestones become relegated to party (hi)story? I attended a workshop on 'How to Tell the Green Story' at the Party Principles event on 30th March 2019 where a young male party member complained that he was sick of hearing about Petra Kelly and Joschka Fischer's trainers and wanted to know why Winfried Kretschmann's achievement of becoming the first Green state minister president and winning majorities was not a larger part of Green Party history.[111] For this member, this interpretation of the Green story did not mirror his feelings of what was *authentically* Green. This raises the interesting question of how and by whom is it decided what is a part of Green Party present and Green Party (hi)story? As mentioned in the previous chapter, whilst in Berlin I attended a screening of the film *Following Habeck* (Blockhaus, 2018). The film was exactly what the title suggests: a documentary that followed Robert Habeck as he

---

[111] Second Conference on the Green Party Principles Process, 30th Mar 2019, ARENA BERLIN. Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.72.

unsuccessfully campaigned to be one of the top candidates for the Greens at the 2017 federal elections. He narrowly lost out to Cem Özdemir. Is that series of events now part of the canonised Green Party (hi)story, or is that a part of the party's present, given Habeck's later success in assuming the co-leader position of the party at the federal level, and subsequently as vice-chancellor and the minister for the economy and climate? Or should personalities not really play such a central role in this Green story for an originally ideologically participatory party?

Therefore, it is not simple for events and milestones to be considered a part of Green Party (hi)story when they exist outside this canonised and neat narrative of the Greens as a democratising force of people power that made it into the German parliament. It is entirely plausible that there are multiple (hi)stories of the Green Party, particularly in such a federalised political system with a divided past between former states. Rather than the canonised and sanitised Green (hi)story guaranteeing party authenticity, as the Greens move into the position of a far more mainstreamed party and move into federal government as part of the traffic-light (*Ampel*) coalition with the SPD and the FDP, it would not be a surprise that the authentic nature of the party (hi)story could increasingly be called into question or need to be revised.

6.1.1.2 The 'alliance party': keeping historical authenticity in a 2020s rebrand

Recognising the importance of authenticity to the Green brand was evident in their process of redrafting their party principles (*Grundsatzprogrammprozess*), and how best to bring the Green brand into the 2020s. The process started in April 2018 and was ongoing throughout my fieldwork. The final draft of the principles was agreed at the party's first all-digital party conference in November 2020 (Grüne beschließen Grundsatzprogramm, 2020). The 2020

party principles *"…To Respect and to Protect…" Change creates stability* (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020b) replaced the 2002 party principles *The Future is Green* (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2002) which were agreed during the Greens' time in national government with the SPD.

Despite this process being focused on 'new answers' for 'new times' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2018), much of the framing of the process of drafting the document invoked the party's past. For example, the executive committee of the federal party created a discussion paper on the rationale and desired outcomes at the start of the project, that couched this process in a narrative that tied the almost 40 years of the Greens together in a neat metaphor of physical activity: the new principles were to herald what they call the 'fourth phase' of the Greens, moving past the three, self-defined, previous phases of the protest party of the 1980s, the Social Democrat-Green 'project party' through to 2005, and, since 2005, the 'doing the splits' phase, where they have governed in various coalition constellations at state level whilst simultaneously being in federal opposition (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2018). In comparison, the 'Greens 4.0' phase, they claim, will need to 'pose questions that could cause pain' to come out of these splits and 'run' forward (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2018).

This invocation of history continued throughout the process. At the party principles event I attended on the 29th and 30th March 2019, the party leadership launched a preliminary draft based on the contributions from the first year of the process and gave *some* party members the opportunity to take part and respond to this draft. Even prior to covid, such an in-person event could only accommodate a certain number of participants, and some party members at events I observed in Kiel were frustrated at how quickly this event had become full.[112] In line with the gentrified protest style, the staging of the

---

[112] State Working Group on Migration and Refuge, 28th January 2019. Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.24.

process of redrafting party values had to be embodied by party members and utilise a participatory aesthetic which I will analyse further later in this chapter.

The Secretary General of the federal party, Michael Kellner, opened this Party Principles event with a speech similar in content and tone to his contribution to a webinar held by German Green MEP Sven Giegold, on 22nd January 2019. During this webinar, Giegold called Kellner a 'Green History Philosopher' (Sven Giegold, 2019). In his speech at the party principles event, Kellner again took on the role of the 'Green History Philosopher'. He started off with the analogy of building a house, for which you need a foundation. It becomes clear that the party's (hi)story is the party's foundation. He then went on to reiterate what this included by mentioning notable figures in the West German history of the Greens, such as Petra Kelly and Roland Vogt, and how 2019 marked the 40th anniversary of the Greens forming under European law for the 1979 European elections. Kellner then turned to Alliance 90, the East German party that merged with the Greens following German re-unification, and for which 2019 marked the 30th anniversary of the peaceful revolution in East Germany. He emphasised the importance of Alliance 90's role in the party's history, stating that 'without them, the party today wouldn't exist' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b).

It is this evocation of the canonised party (hi)story that is used by Kellner to launch the party's rhetorical rebrand of themselves as an 'alliance party'. This term plays on their current name Alliance 90/The Greens (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*), which originates from the East German Party made up of an alliance of movements at the *Wende*, and the West German Greens' alliance of West German social movements. This rebrand therefore attempts to unite these two separate histories in the word 'alliance'. However, the central party office under the leadership of Baerbock and Habeck are attempting to broaden its meaning in a new context. For the Greens in 2019, an alliance is about coming together and working together across society to create majorities to make

change, and therefore reflect the broadening appeal of the Greens outside of its purely movement and protest-based roots and the post materialist milieus that still tend to support them (Rüdig, 2012). Kellner finished off his speech by explicitly opposing the term 'alliance party' from the term *Volkspartei* or catch-all party by contrasting what he considers the *Volkspartei*'s 'arbitrariness and sanding down of its edges', and instead highlighting the Green 'alliance party' as 'a party for anyone to work with who wants to push along progress' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b).

If we are to look at Green performance in terms of pure numbers in opinion and electoral polls, their second-place position close to the CDU around 20 percent, a level they hovered around nationally during my fieldwork, would indicate that the Greens were going through a period of broader if not broad appeal amongst the national electorate. However, regional performance of the party does not always follow these trends, as seen from the relatively modest electoral performance of the Greens in eastern state elections in autumn 2019. This perhaps gives a little more credence to the Greens' desire to distance themselves from the term of *Volkspartei*. Furthermore, previous Green opinion polling highs have not traditionally translated into actual electoral votes in federal elections, something which was seen again in the 2021 federal election, where they gained just 14.8 percent despite some opinion polls right before the election placing them on 17 percent.[113] In fact, similar media coverage and discourses about the Greens becoming a new *Volkspartei* circulated following Winfried Kretschmann's success in Baden-Wurttemberg state elections in 2011 but failed to materialise at the federal ballot box two years later (Löwenstein, 2011; Probst, 2011).

Considering this renewed overall electoral and opinion poll ascendance from autumn 2018 onwards, albeit patchy, the Greens still may have welcomed

---

[113] www.wahlrecht.de is the source I use for tracking multiple opinion polls for federal and state elections in Germany.

being considered a new *Volkspartei*. However, perhaps like an indie band signed to a major record label who do not want to admit that they have sold out, the Greens repeatedly refused and rejected the term like Kellner did. Such a move would not be 'on brand' and seem *inauthentic*. For that reason, in a *Der Spiegel* interview after the Thuringia election in October 2019, Jürgen Trittin, an established and prominent Green politician known for more left-wing positions, declared that the concept of the *Volkspartei* was dead, and that no one in the Greens was looking to become one (Fischer and Höhne, 2019). On the other hand, *Der Spiegel* Berlin editor Valerie Höhne earlier that month had written a critical opinion piece on the influence of postmodern sociological theory on the contemporary German Greens and outlined the theory and scholars that were involved (2019). The input of these scholars was influencing Green strategy moving forward in an attempt to capitalise on the growth in Green support. Höhne summed up by claiming that the new Green agenda is to broaden their appeal to become what one of these advisers, Daniel Ziblatt, might call a big-tent-party, but what in Germany would be called a *Volkspartei,* the term they vociferously reject (2019).

A process of reforming party principles naturally involves a process of rebranding. It is an ideological document and past reforms have demonstrated ideological reconfigurations (Talshir, 2003). It is a clear statement for what a party stands and should provide guidance and an indication of the kind of policy direction in which the party aspires to travel. However, the careful re-branding conducted with the new party principles is something offered as a placative to some of their membership and voters who would feel uncomfortable voting for a power-seeking, *Volkspartei*-aspiring party and would see that as a betrayal to its brand and authenticity. This determination to maintain historical authenticity can be seen in the language of the party principles interim draft which goes into great detail to define the 'alliance party' concept:

To work in an alliance means to recognise the differences of people
and their otherness, to put oneself again and again in the shoes of
others and nevertheless work together according to shared values
and goals. This outlines the task of political parties in the 21st
century. In order to pick up the threads of our own history in East
Germany, forty years since the founding of our party in West
Germany and 30 years after the peaceful revolution in the GDR, we
are pooling this strength for our tasks today: despite all our
differences to battle together for dignity and freedom. We want to
take this skill as a mission and use it in the future, rather than to just
remember it historically. We will require time and again the strength
and openness for new alliances for shared goals. That is the
remaining and ever-renewing task in a lively and constantly
changing society of the many.

(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019c, pp.6-7)[114]

The spirit of an alliance is thus not only a historical ancestry, but an
instrumental tool for future political work. These alliances also involve their
roots, (hi)story and progress over the last forty years:

As an alliance party the written core values unify and connect us.
They stand equally side by side. We have grown together out of
diverse roots. They lie in the ecological and anti-nuclear movement,
the women's and civil rights movement, the Lesbian movement, the
Gay movement, the one-world and peace movement as well as the
freedom movement of the peaceful revolution. And we have been
continuously developing for more than 40 years – new people, new
milieus as well as new perspectives and interests are added and
give strength to our values and goals. That applies for our

---

[114] Translations are my own, unless indicated otherwise.

members, for our voters, but also for many people who campaign for shared societal causes – out of initiatives and movements, associations and institutions, unions and companies. Diversity is an asset, and the diversity of our party is our strength.

(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019c, pp.12-13)

Alliances are therefore about working with civil society in different policy areas. One of the academics that Höhne's article cites is American politics scholar Daniel Ziblatt, who co-wrote the book *How Democracies Die* (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018), which focuses mostly on North and South America. He was interviewed by the Greens for their member magazine in mid-2018 where he talked about the need for political parties to form broad alliances in order to defeat increasingly anti-democratic forces (Günther, 2018). The passages above suggest the party have clearly adopted this thinking.

The final agreed draft of the party principles still maintains the Greens' self-definition as an 'alliance party', yet the references to 'alliance party' are fewer and less detailed. The focus on the alliance party as a broad base for politics is retained in the definition within the final draft of the party principles, cited here from the English-language version:

Our policies are for all people. We see ourselves as a party of alliance that, on the basis of shared convictions, is open to different experiences, ideas and approaches. It is not oriented toward the sum of individual interests or individual groups, but rather combines different interests into a common vision for a better future. This can be strenuous, because it also means raising questions about power and distribution, changing structures that have grown organically, overcoming resistance and struggling to find alternatives, but it is

the only way that something new can emerge from the many different experiences and ideas.

(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020a).

Here the party's history is only referred to implicitly through the idea of experiences out of which something new can emerge, but in the preamble they have retained the idea from the interim draft of this explicit connection between the party's diverse roots and history, which constitutes the diversity of the alliance party and its ability to reach out to make new alliances with civil society (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020a).

This intensive labouring of a branding of an alliance party demonstrates the importance that a *perceived and explicit historical authenticity* plays for the contemporary German Greens. This party leadership recognises the importance within the party of maintaining a connection of some sort to party (hi)story, even as it deliberately moves the Greens into more explicitly mainstream territory. Party members' feelings on this issue at the start of this section makes clear just how strongly they feel about the party's relationship to its (hi)story. This is exactly what role authenticity plays within the political style of gentrified protest. Without this retaining of a more radical and movement-related party (hi)story, the Greens would be unable to relate to sanitised protest as outlined in the previous chapter, which would weaken the Green brand. Even this renewed canonisation of Green Party (hi)story in the framing of the alliance party concept still highlights a commitment to the authentic conservation of the party's past.

6.1.1.3 Authenticity and professionalism in the contemporary Greens

The contemporary Greens' collaboration with and party members' overlapping activism between party and civil society, such as social movements and NGOs, creates a contemporary, tangible, and visible guarantee of authenticity. In the previous chapter and earlier in this section, I outlined how Green involvement with protest had clear links with their (hi)story, providing a sense of continuity that has been kept through local protest engagement and in the alliance party concept, despite the transformation the party has undergone since its early years. This continuity can manifest either in certain party personalities, such as Jürgen Trittin being interviewed by *Die Zeit* and asked to give young Fridays for Future demonstrators advice on his experience of protesting and legislating for climate protection (Pausch, 2019); the use of protest imagery with people standing with placards and behind banners asking for western party members to take campaigning holidays for the 2019 elections in eastern states at the 2018 federal party conference (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Thüringen, 2018); or Sven Giegold during one of his Europe Calling webinars remarking that those socialised within the Greens have been attending protests since they were in Kindergarten (Sven Giegold, 2019). These three examples use association with protest imagery and rhetoric to ensure their brand remains linked to protest. Daniel described being 'positively surprised' that the Greens still take part in forms of protest, like those he calls 'anti-Nazi' protest marches:

> Just to think, they were once in government, and now they take part in these things, but I find that good. I think of that as a thing of credibility of the Greens.[115]

---

[115] Daniel, Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, p.5.

The Greens' credibility with protest does, however, have limits. This was particularly the case for my interviewees who were members of the Green Youth. Katharina pointed out how the perceived authenticity of the Greens at a protest depends on the protest issue. For her, Green engagement for LGBTQ+ rights means that their presence at protests on Christopher Street Day (Pride in Germany) is 'still authentic'.[116] But Katharina qualifies this by stating that the authenticity of the Green Party is damaged if they were to support a protest against deportation centres, when the Schleswig-Holstein Greens were jointly responsible for a state coalition decision to build one in the town Glückstadt. Jonas explained his perception of the authenticity of Green protest by comparing them to other left parties in the German protest eco-system. He considered The Left Party as the most authentic 'because they pose the most radical opposition in the Bundestag' and the SPD as the least authentic because 'when you see SPD flags at a demonstration you say 'OK, but you could change it in government'.[117] In terms of the Greens, he poses the question 'to what extent is your party in government?' and 'can you protest against your own policies?'.[118] As highlighted in the previous chapter's analysis of the perception of radical, the Green Youth are positioned more to the left than the Green party. The Youth's status as a non-governing sister organisation leaves more space open for them to be publicly critical of the Greens' work and to operate as more 'authentically' themselves.

The Green Youth are not the only element within the Greens that see themselves as separate to the party. Their 16 years in federal opposition between 2005-2021 have been known as their 'doing the splits phase', as mentioned earlier, as they have been in various governments during these 16 years at the state level (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2018). This has created tensions between their professionalism in these state governing coalitions and perceptions of inauthenticity derived from compromises made in these state

---

[116] Katharina, Kiel Green Youth, p.8.
[117] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.10.
[118] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.10.

governments. These tensions were visible in my fieldwork from critiques I witnessed within State Working Groups and local district Green Party branches. The most prominent example I encountered was in Kiel, where the State Working Group on Migration and Refuge stated in their meeting that they could oppose the Glückstadt deportation centre proposed for Schleswig-Holstein as an internal party group, but that the Green state politician Aminata Touré who worked in this policy area could not, because the parliamentary Greens in coalition with the CDU and FDP had voted for it. Policy compromises to keep the peace within the coalition are a clear threat to the perceived authenticity of the party and the Green brand.

The main disadvantage of the emotional connection to the Green brand and the progressive politics associated to it, is the more they professionalise within the institutions, the higher risk to the brand and the party's perception of authenticity. Lars from party headquarters addressed this in relation to encouraging party members to attend and support demonstrations, and how it is a 'complicated interplay to find the right balance' between encouraging support in protests, movements and civil society whilst also being in 'X-Government' at the state level.[119] Jonas later referred to such an instance of what he felt was inauthenticity of Green ministers in the Baden-Wurttemberg government when asked about the role of (hi)story in the contemporary party:

> In Stuttgart you hear very little of the history of the party. So, people now are bringing attention to the lack of housing by occupying and squatting houses and then being prosecuted for it. Honestly, I would quite like to see [the squatters] handled differently, because we as the Green party and all the people who are now ministers, most of them earlier in their lives occupied trees or tracks, or prevented

---

[119] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.13.

castor transports, and I think they need to deal with movements on the streets today differently [than prosecuting them].[120]

This critique may seem idealistic because, as the leading governing party in the wealthy and staunchly conservative region of Baden-Wurttemberg, the state's Parliamentary Greens may feel that their hands are tied. However, this poses problems for the party's ability to maintain their political style of gentrified protest. Jonas feels that the action of ministers towards these squatters and, in his opinion, their hypocrisy, distorts his 'experience of origins' of the party, which leads him to question their authenticity. This would not be the case for those members who identified more with the 'Protest (is) past' side of the sanitised protest dichotomy as discussed in the previous chapter, who would not perceive this as hypocrisy or evidence of inauthenticity.

As I have argued, the cachet of authenticity is crucial both to the brand and to the aesthetic of Green Party politics. Therefore, increasing professionalisation and their record of governing threatens the perceived authenticity of the party. This threat to the Greens' 'authenticity' and credibility by being in government is unsurprising and quite likely to flare up in the coming years under the new federal *Ampel* coalition. Considering the rhetorical labour put into the party principles so as not to completely disjoin from the party ancestry and its associated brand, there is an acknowledgement that this could pose a considerable issue for the party. A shift to a perceived inauthenticity could particularly threaten the Greens' ability to utilise the political style of gentrified protest for their own electoral benefit.

---

[120] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.7.

6.2 The gentrified protest aesthetic

The final section of this chapter deals with the last facet of gentrified protest politics: the gentrified protest aesthetic. As outlined in chapter three, my use of the concept of aesthetic encompasses the fact that all politics is inherently aesthetic (Simons, 2008). Unlike authenticity which is perceived if an 'experience of origins' is created, the aesthetic quality of politics as I use it in this section refers to those elements of politics that are experienced on a sense level (Rancière and Rockhill, 2013); the multi-modal visual and audio communications of the party and party members, as well as 'performances' that party members see and hear, performances with which they interact, and performances in which they participate. This involves exploring social media of both 'official' Green accounts, and the relationship grassroots party members have with their own social media and those official accounts. Furthermore, the ethnographic data for this thesis has provided access to both the frontstage and backstage performances of Green politics (Goffman, 1956), illustrating how the boundaries between these two stages are often blurred, particularly for party members. Whilst this conception of aesthetic incorporates elements from the previous facets of gentrified protest analysed in this thesis, it is divided into four subsections which address different aesthetic and stylistic elements perceived by party members. This includes: the movement aesthetic, the democracy aesthetic, the participation aesthetic and the digital performance of gentrified protest politics.

6.2.1 A party on the move(ment)

Continued support from and links with progressive politics, either through the party's own work or public collaborations with social movements and other parts of civil society, are a necessary feature of a gentrified protest aesthetic. Steffen Blings (2020) has identified the importance of this interaction in terms

of programmatic alignment with movements. As established in earlier chapters in this thesis, the interaction of institutional and extra-institutional politics is normalised in German political culture more broadly and is considered intrinsic to many Green Party members' everyday political activism. The participation of members in contemporary protest is an embodied experience and performance of political activism and, when participating within the Green bloc or with recognisable symbols, legitimises the Green brand's continued association with protest and their position within the left-wing political party landscape. Additionally, the interaction of party and protest creates a movement aesthetic which must be curated and communicated in order to fulfil the political style of gentrified protest. In the case of the Greens, this is a deliberate strategy, as Lars, a party HQ employee, told me when I asked him whether the Green Party's support of protest was an opportunity for participation or just a tool for attracting publicity:

> I think people know that we go on the streets and fight for our causes. […] We are not a pure protest party. That is nonsense. Rather we want to be a party who shapes [policy] […] therefore we say, we want to be in government. That is the reason why we were willing to take part in *Jamaika* under the right conditions. […] And protest is a means to get there: to create societal majorities or to motivate people to vote for us. That is a goal we have. As such, protest on its own is not first and foremost the purpose, but rather is part of a group of measures we believe are right to do, in order to bring our ideas forward, cultivate trust, and to motivate people to vote for us.[121]

Whilst there is some sensibility at party HQ to the use of protest as a form of political expression, there is an important instrumental aspect to the party's

---

[121] Lars, Federal Party HQ, pp.14-15.

support of such action. It is a recruiting and trust-building exercise for party membership and electorally a means of getting into government, even in a more centre-right 'Jamaica' coalition with the CDU/CSU and FDP, which failed at the federal level during negotiations in 2017. Given the party's wish to authentically support civil society in line with their canonised party history and brand, but who also wish to win elections and be in government, maintaining an aesthetic of movement is a crucial component to maintaining this balancing act. During his initial campaign to become party co-leader, Habeck recognised the importance of this aesthetic for the party base; he was open with the press about his plans for transforming the German Greens. In December 2017 it was reported that he wanted to 'strengthen the left-liberal profile' of the Greens, turn it into an 'attractive movement party' and develop it into a 'thinktank of the republic' (Habeck will Grüne zur «attraktiven Bewegungspartei» machen, 2017).

As a reminder from what was discussed in chapter two, a movement party within the academic typology is categorised by Herbert Kitschelt (2006) according to its institutional and functional features as a hybrid party which adopts the strategies and organisational practices of social movements **and** operates within the arena of political parties. Typically these hybrid movement parties do not maintain their hybrid form, with their longevity as a political party dependent on wider electoral support and parliamentarisation (Bomberg, 1992; Kitschelt, 2006). Recognising that movement parties may not be in the hybrid format Kitschelt outlines, della Porta et al. and their conception of movement parties is broader, including political parties with particularly close relations to social movements, or parties that aim to integrate 'movement constituencies' into the party organisation (2017, p.7).

In December 2018, a year after Habeck's desire to turn the Greens into an 'attractive movement party', I interviewed Lars from the party central office. Lars brought up the redrafting process of the party principles process, as this

was being coordinated from the federal central party office. Lars, unprompted, mentioned that the party had recently started discussions on how the Greens understand themselves as a political party as part of this process:

> We don't think that this concept of the *Volkspartei* has a future because parties or political society has simply changed. That means, and here comes this modern concept of ours internally, or when Greens talk about the party, the concept of the *Bewegungspartei* (movement party). We are trying to combine what we do well with what others are doing successfully. [We] look to other countries: The Macron movement, the Corbyn campaign, the Obama campaign as the first that managed to do a lot of campaigning with many self-organised, voluntary structures and brought lots of discussion to the streets, to the people. Bernie Sanders is also a very good example or Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.[122]

Of course, as addressed in the previous section on authenticity, this was likely the initial discussions which resulted in the eventual concept of the 'alliance party'. With the exception of Macron and *En Marche!*, all of the examples Lars lists were campaigns for thoroughly institutionalised parties. This would preclude their consideration as a movement party according to Kitschelt's typology, and arguably even within the broader definition of della Porta et al. (2017) given the overwhelming electoral and campaign focus of these examples. Such differing relations of movement and party relations not being accounted for in the concept of movement party has led to the proliferation of concepts to address this, as already explicated in chapter two.

---

[122] Lars, Federal Party HQ, pp.2-3.

Despite state politician Sven from Kiel's assertion of the importance of being a part of a movement party was one of the reasons he initially became a party member of the Greens,[123] it is clear that the central party office's conception of a movement party or engaging with protest is electorally motivated. Considering the fact that political parties in Germany receive public funding according to the number of votes they achieve in state, federal and European elections, alongside funding from member subscriptions, private donations and contributions made by party politicians in office, this electoral focus is understandable as a financial motivator (Blings, 2020). With regards to a party movement aesthetic, I argue that the party, aware of the strength of the Green brand, use the concept of an 'alliance party' to continue to represent this sense of movement in the performance of constantly building alliances. It is this aesthetic of 'movement', then, that is the important aspect in this terminology, albeit in a form that is more flexible to the party's electoral and power-seeking goals. This aesthetic of movement within the German Greens is exactly what is expected from the style of gentrified protest, as is analysed in the following subsections.

6.2.1.1 The streets as a place for Green politics

Considering the importance of an aesthetic of movement within the political style of gentrified protest, the 'streets' are an important physical and metaphorical stage for gentrified protest politics. This was reflected in the language used by Green party members in relation to both party politics and protest activity. Members often invoked the importance of being present 'on the street'. During the period of election campaigning that was taking place when I was in Stuttgart, one physical presence of the Greens on the street was obvious: every inch of the city had electoral placards fixed on to every lamppost from all kinds of parties. Additionally, events such as the Stuttgart

---

[123] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.1.

City Hall open day provided an opportunity for a more transient physical presence of parties on the street, where all parties contesting in the municipal elections had their own information stands. At this event, the Greens were offering free organic ice cream, giving garden windmills to children, and distributing free plants and bags of seeds. Gisela, a long-serving Green member in the Berlin district council of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, stated the importance not just of the work she did in the council, but also the importance of this kind of work of going 'on the streets'.[124]

The frontstage of Green politics on the streets was not just expressed in terms of a physical presence in communities via information stands or during election campaigns. Franziska told me that when she is 'angry about an issue', she will go and protest in the street about it.[125] Paula saw it as her duty to be on the streets:

> Protest against the AfD, against anti-democrats, that is extremely important, and it is important to go to the streets. […] And not just as a party. I find it extremely important that civil society […] shows that. I don't understand why people in America aren't out on the streets more. I don't understand why people in the UK aren't out on the streets more. Everywhere, why don't people go out onto the streets?[126]

Here this idea of going to the streets is the frontstage of dissatisfaction, protest, and non-partisan politics. The streets are perceived as a place where the politics of dissent and the rejection of policy or opponents is performed. This re-emphasises the streets as a stage for democratic engagement of the politically active or of civil society. This thinking is closely intertwined with

---

[124] Gisela, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.7.
[125] Franziska, Flensburg (SH), p.8.
[126] Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.8.

Jürgen Habermas' (1999) argument on the creation of the bourgeois public sphere in 18th century public salons and coffee houses, as well as Charles Tilly's (2013; 1978) meticulous work tracing the emergence of social movements alongside the emergence of nation states and their democratisation. Only three of 22 interviewees told me they no longer took part in protest, and for two of those it was due to their age and physical ability to stand or walk for long periods of time, rather than viewing protest as an irrelevant form of action. Considering this alongside the continuous encouragement by federal, state and municipal party branches to engage with local and national demonstrations, this dual function of the streets for politics was a consistent Green opinion across all three locations. The physical and metaphorical streets are thus crucial to the Greens' political style of gentrified protest politics.

This visibility or invisibility of the Green Party on the frontstage of street demonstrations is often based on a delicate backstage negotiation between the demonstration organisers and party. Similarly, some party members do not always see such a visible presence at demonstrations as necessary. Ulrike from Stuttgart saw a danger in being too visible as a political party at a demonstration:

> If protest is broader and not so party-specific, because I notice that […] since I've been a member that that often puts people off. If it is NGOs or civil society associations, then it is more neutral. And party [involvement] is for many 'oh if it was just about the issue, I would protest alongside you, but not with the Greens'.[127]

---

[127] Ulrike, Stuttgart-East, p.11.

Vanessa, also from Stuttgart, mentioned how people prefer to be 'informed neutrally', in other words not by a political party, when it comes to protest.[128] These statements highlight how a close association with the party can be so toxic that it deters people from supporting a protest. Both of these statements are in relation to the 'independent' identity of Fridays for Future (FFF) as a movement that, in the eyes of FFF and many Green Party members, is a separate entity to the Greens. In this case, the party must negotiate its protest aesthetic to maintain the relationships with civil society that authenticate its gentrified protest political style, as well as respecting the separate protest aesthetic of the FFF movement. The backstage of FFF deliberately decided against any party involvement, as Nikolas told me from his experience as part of the organisation team at the start of FFF in Germany:

> We deliberately say that FFF is […], want[s] to be and remain[s] independent. […] That's why we have not permitted flags from organisations or parties at our rallies and marches. You can't ban it, […] [but] we have said that we do not wish [organisations or parties to bring flags with them].[129]

According to these conditions, the public support of the Greens for FFF must be delivered in a different visual style to still be incorporated into the party's gentrified protest aesthetic. At the Global Climate Strike I attended, I recognised one of the European Green candidates for Stuttgart, Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg.[130] She carried a homemade placard, as shown in the image below, thus keeping in line with the dominant, homemade style of placards at FFF demonstrations, without any reference to her party, and she told me she had given out a Green EU flag for a fellow party comrade to carry during the march, which you can see just behind her. During our conversation,

---

[128] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.13.
[129] Nikolas, Kiel Green Youth, pp.15-16.
[130] Fridays for Future Global Climate Strike Protest, 24th May 2019, Schloßplatz, Stuttgart. Stuttgart Fieldwork Diary, pp.34-35.

Deparnay-Grunenberg gave me permission to take her photo and for it to be used within my research.

Image 7 Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg, then Green candidate for EU elections and member of Stuttgart City Council at Global Strike for Climate, 24th May 2019

Her homemade placard says 'Politician for Future and Parents for Future', portraying her attendance at the demo both in a professional capacity, as this demonstration took place just two days prior to EU elections in Germany, and in a personal capacity as a parent. This demonstrated an example of respecting the movement's rule against visible party representation, but which also used the protest as an instrumental tool for an electoral campaign, albeit in an arguably covert position where the support blended the private and public identity of individual Green party members and politicians.

The digital space of social media, which I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, is another such medium used to retain the party's gentrified protest aesthetic. For example, consider this very supportive public post from the official federal Green Instagram account from the 15th March 2019:

Image 8 Screengrab from Green Party official Instagram account supporting Fridays for Future 15th March 2019

The story post shown here shows the party co-leaders and members from the party federal executive committee waving from the central party HQ balcony in Berlin, alongside someone in a polar bear costume, and holding a party-branded banner with the slogan 'There is no planet B!'. Those tagged in the post are co-leaders Baerbock and Habeck, executive committee member Jamila Schäfer, and the Fridays for Future Instagram account. Without being a part of the protest on the street, the party associate themselves here using the visual image of holding a party-branded banner, as they do when they attend a demonstration. However, there is also overlap with environmental protest more generally. 'There is no planet B' was often a chant and scrawled across homemade placards at the Fridays for Future demonstrations I attended, whereas polar bears have become icons and symbols of climate change at protests and in media publications more broadly (Born, 2019). The

aesthetic choices made in this Instagram post demonstrate a party commitment to the authentic, Green brand and its association with environmental protection and support of social movements.

Negotiating the visibility of the Green movement aesthetic can fail to satisfy Green Party members on the ground. This is particularly the case if other left-wing parties are visible at such demonstrations. The demonstration *#Wegmit219a* in Kiel protested against the federal legislation that limits women's access to medical information on abortion by prosecuting doctors who "advertise" this information.[131] At the start, I could see Green members that I recognised from party meetings I had been attending in the city and who I had seen at other demonstrations. I witnessed a Green Youth member and the communications employee for the Schleswig-Holstein Green Party turn up without any party paraphernalia like flags or placards, even though the local The Left party had an abundance of theirs with them. The communications employee then disappeared and missed the first ten minutes of speeches at the rally but came back with party flags in hand and then proceeded to photograph and document the Green and Green Youth attendance at this rally which later turned up on the Kiel Green Party's social media channels.[132] In such an instance where the Greens are one of the left-wing party ecosystem in attendance at a protest, the importance of documenting the Green participation and support is expected by fellow Green members, such as Gisela:

> 'If I see a news report from Hannover or somewhere else of a protest and haven't seen a Green symbol, I get suspicious. I have also called up [Greens] and asked 'where were you?' and those

---

[131] The *Ampel* coalition agreed to remove article 219a legislation in their 2021 coalition agreement.

[132] Demonstration against Article 219a, 26th January 2019, Asmus-Bremer-Platz, Kiel. Kiel Fieldwork Diary, pp.21-22.

Greens have told me they got there 15 mins late and by that time the TV people were gone! [laughs]'[133]

Every time one sees the Green Party visibly at a protest or demonstration, the demonstration organisers have normally permitted visible party identification. Yet, one cannot assume that because the Greens are not visibly at a demonstration that they do not support it, as such support can be publicly given via social media as demonstrated in the Fridays for Future example. These examples forcefully demonstrate both the embodied commitment to protest from party members and politicians, but also the importance that it maintains in the brand identity of the party and, thus, within the party's gentrified protest aesthetic, whether visibly present in person or otherwise. The streets are a performance frontstage for gentrified protest, and the visual opportunities they create allow the style of gentrified protest to be communicated on mainstream and social media. This is particularly important when the Greens exist alongside two other nationally represented, left-wing parties who also turn up on the same frontstages as them. The Green brand of a movement aesthetic, therefore, must be something recognisable and distinctive to them.

6.2.1.2 Critiquing the Green protest aesthetic

The recognisable and distinctive protest aesthetic of the Greens in their political style of gentrified protest is illuminated via its imitation by critics of the party. I saw two examples of such mimicry against Green action in state governments during my fieldwork. The first was in Stuttgart at the protest for affordable housing that the Greens attended alongside other organisations and parties. Here there was a group of house squatters who were protesting against the Greens at the starting rally of this demonstration. They were

---

[133] Gisela, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.12.

accusing the Greens of corruption, as the leading party in power at both the municipal level of Stuttgart and the state level of Baden-Wurttemberg, in terms of a perceived failure to commit to their promised housing policies. They demonstrated their dissent by creating placards using the party's own branding:

Image 9 Anti-Green placards of a squatters group at the affordable housing demonstration in Stuttgart 6th April 2019

Here the Greens are also accused as 'being like the SPD, but in trainers' and 'like the CDU but less honest'. Here, someone in this movement adept at using photoshop or another graphic design programme had taken care to use the exact party shade of Green, the logo (available open source), and found the party font in order to create these *almost* identical placards. The stylistic mimicry of these placards only furthered the incisive nature of their critique. Here the easily identifiable brand and its associated visual aesthetic in party documents and materials was used to critique what are perceived as broken promises and corruption on the part of the Greens in state power.

The second example comes from Kiel. Here tensions arose out of the burden of decisions taken by the state parliamentary Greens as a junior partner in the three-party *Jamaika* coalition with the FDP and CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. One of the most controversial *Jamaika* compromises for the Greens was the establishment of a deportation centre in Glückstadt. This was included in the coalition agreement between all three parties (CDU Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein et al., 2017). This issue repeatedly came up both internally and externally during my period in Kiel, as I have already alluded to earlier in this chapter. In one instance, a small silent protest was held outside the party HQ building in Kiel, targeting the meeting of the State Working Group on Migration and Refuge:

Image 10 Banners held by anti-deportation centre demonstrators outside Green state working group on migration and refuge 28th January 2019

Here the Green brand was utilised with one of the banners incorporating the widely recognisable sunflower logo of the Greens. This impromptu protest did not seem to faze those Green members present at the working group. One of the speakers at that session who worked for the state representative for refugees said to everyone as she arrived at the meeting '*Wie schön, dass wir werden demonstriert werden?* [sic]' or 'how lovely that we're being

demonstrated against?'.[134] This stems from the fact that internally, many Greens were not emphatic supporters of this policy decision. Sven, one of the Schleswig-Holstein state politicians I interviewed, attended and gave a report at the Green Youth meeting I observed in Kiel.[135] He provided the same explanation as to why the Greens were involved in implementing this policy that someone from the FDP gave to the local press: the use of deportation centres and the asylum process involved is stipulated at the federal level and, in that case, the state government is simply implementing federal law (Hiersemenzel, 2019). In this example, the compromises made in their junior role in the state coalition has left the party open to critique with mimicry of Green symbols within a movement aesthetic. Such a compromise is easier for the Schleswig-Holstein Greens to rationalise on the backstage of their Working Group meeting that evening. As I did not manage to gauge and observe the response to the squatters' critique in Stuttgart, it is hard to know how that critique, delivered through the protest aesthetic of the Greens, was received on the intimate, party backstage. However, both of these examples demonstrate the broad societal recognition of the Green movement aesthetic and brand, and how critics decide to utilise this aesthetic to elevate the visual aesthetic and incisiveness of their own protest.

6.2.2 The democracy aesthetic of gentrified protest

Alongside the public-facing movement aesthetic which requires a mass of party members and supporters in order to be realised, there is an aesthetic of democracy that I identified particularly when interviewing party members. This democracy aesthetic is found at the level of individual activists and members and the aesthetic that they emanate to others. It is an affective dimension of the aesthetic which conveys shared feelings among individuals of the larger,

---

[134] State Working Group on Migration and Refuge, 28th January 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.23.

[135] Kiel Green Youth Member Meeting, 7th February 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.33.

abstract idea of democracy. In this way, it is an aesthetic of the backstage. This was a common characteristic expressed either when stating what they think being a green member means, or their reasons for joining the party:

> I think [it] has a lot to do with an awakening and with a new era. […] What it means as a member is certainly firstly to be a part of the most modern politics, […], and that it progresses in a humanitarian way.[136]

Jonas' idealistic reasons for joining the Greens links to his desire for a modern and humanitarian politics and democracy. This was certainly the case for Daniel who told me quite simply that being a member of the Greens means that he does 'give a fuck' about the people and the world around him being able to lead a good life.[137] These statements display individual actors supporting a larger project that is part of institutions and representative democracy. It is an individual commitment to the democracy of the state via the Greens and demonstrates an affective connection to the Green brand and its perceived association with democracy. Many members in Berlin I interviewed saw their ultimate decision to join the Greens motivated by international and national political events:

---

[136] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, pp.5-6.
[137] Daniel, Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, p.7.

It was a long decision process for me, not considering whether to join the Greens specifically, but whether I would even actively enter politics, or at least become a bit more active. I observed the political happenings, and I was a bit agitated at the developments. And at some point, I got to the point where I wanted to be more than just a passive person in democracy. […] It was really last year [2017], the federal elections, and noticing the increasing right-wing populist tendencies.

Hendrik, Berlin-Pankow, p.1.

I considered it for a long time. The world developments were actually the reason. First there was Brexit. Then there was Donald Trump. And then the AfD got 13 percent of the votes at the federal elections [2017]. And every time I thought more 'OK, now I need to join a party'.

Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.1.

[I was always interested in politics, but] a more acute reason as to why I joined the Greens was firstly Trump and also the AfD in Germany. And that so many complained and said 'the evil Merkel' or 'Merkel out!' or 'Merkel must go!', and then everything that Trump does and then it occurred to me just how important or how great I find democracy.

Daniel, Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, p.2.

What unites these three members, other than them living in Berlin, is that they joined the party in late 2017, following the entry of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party into the federal parliament. This was a broader trend that Lars from the federal party headquarters also recognised:

>What we know from the more recent [members] joining, that it is seemingly so, that joining the Greens is for many people the first step out of their passive, unhappy role of the development of society to actively do something against it and take a stand.[138]

Therefore this impetus to protect democracy amid a perceived threat from the AfD has been a strong force in growing Green Party membership in recent years, as Germany engaged in a debate around how best to 'defend democracy' (Schmidt, 2018). Such a trigger for Green Party membership is not unique to the German Greens; Sam Power and Katharine Dommett (2020) in their article on the three streams of motivation, process, and triggers required to become a party member revealed how the aggregate membership data of the Green Party of England and Wales showed spikes of people joining following the election of Trump, the UK government's triggering of Article 50, and the Brexit Referendum. Together with my data, both of our cases highlight the perception that Green Parties stand for a progressive politics far broader than just environmental issues. For the German Greens, guaranteeing civil rights for the diversity of those resident in Germany and strengthening democracy are key elements of their gentrified protest style. The democracy aesthetic of individual party members enhances and is linked to the movement aesthetic of the broader party and is particularly meaningful at the level of the individual party member and activist.

Indeed, this democracy aesthetic within the Green style of gentrified protest could be satisfying the cravings of empowered postmodern consumer citizens for consumer counterculture (Smith, G. and French, 2009). The Green political brand of progressive politics helps members satisfy their need for political self-actualisation, as has been highlighted in examples throughout this and the previous chapter, by encouraging and creating outlets for collective

---

[138] Lars, Federal Party HQ, p.8.

democratic expression, such as at party meetings, protests, campaigns and other events. In this consumption of the Green brand through their aesthetic performance on the public frontstage and the intimate backstage, consumers, or party members, obtain cultural meaning, with a sense that they have consumed a contribution to progressive politics and democracy in contemporary Germany. Such consumption of the democracy aesthetic is particularly prevalent in the party's and members' use of social media as detailed later in this chapter.

6.2.3 The participation aesthetic in gentrified protest politics

The previous two sections on the aesthetic of gentrified protest have explored the movement and democracy aesthetics of the Greens' gentrified protest style. What links these two aesthetics is their participatory properties. Grassroots democracy and participation are fundamental values of the German Greens, part of their brand and aesthetic, as well as present in the everyday work of the party and their members. Brigitte, the Green state politician in Berlin told me how central participation was to the brand even under new leadership:

> Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock […] are people that reach
> other people somehow and encourage people to take part, so I
> think that is important that we always have people who are
> communicative and who value participation. I don't think we would
> vote for anyone who wasn't, because that is such an essence of
> our brand.[139]

---

[139] Brigitte, Berlin State Parliament, p.16.

Despite participation being core to the Green brand, and therefore also in the party's aesthetic in gentrified protest, central party office employee Lars noted the price paid for such 'high' levels of member participation:

> I fundamentally believe that this party is the one that has always ensured the most participation out of all the parties. You can see that in the fact that 20 members can propose a motion at a party conference, which I find completely mad for a party with 80,000 [at the time] members. We introduced this 20-member condition when the Greens had fewer than 20,000 members, […] but 20 members is nothing and it means that we pay the price of this participation with party conferences that are so jam-packed that often we can only have short debates on issues we want to discuss.[140]

Certainly, at the grassroots level of local Green Party roles and voluntary roles in district councils, I observed how members are often encouraged to get involved at meetings of local municipal Green party branches. The Green Youth in Kiel sarcastically framed this as members realising their 'wet dreams' by participating in party and youth organisation structures, encouraging members to not be shy and put forward amendments and motions for consideration at state party level conferences.[141] Statements like these at the local level correspond to the belief among Green grassroots activists that they have the ability to change the party from the bottom up. This is consolidated by the perception among those who have successfully done so, that these participatory structures and low barriers to participation foster the ability for a rapid rise into positions of public or party administration. This was a comment I heard in all three cities: from one of the committee members of the Stuttgart Green Party at the Green Brunch;[142] from the leader of the Green City Council

---

[140] Lars, Federal Party HQ, pp.8-9.
[141] Kiel Green Youth Member Meeting, 7th February 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, pp.36-37.
[142] Stuttgart Green Brunch, 2nd June 2019, Welt Café Stuttgart. Stuttgart Fieldwork Diary, p.38.

group in Kiel, who had only been a member for two years prior to taking her position;[143] and from Oliver in Berlin who contrasted the openness of the Greens with the CDU who make people 'jump through loads of party steps before you are allowed to open your mouth'.[144]

There was also an acceptance that it is acceptable to *not participate* and be a passive member. Whilst Lars talked about the importance of getting more members active in the party to fulfil voluntary roles in municipal politics due to the Green success in state elections in late 2018, he also acknowledged the important financial foundation passive members construct:

> For us a form of engagement is that a member is a member and is prepared to pay a not insignificant amount of their own income as a membership contribution. That shouldn't be underestimated.[145]

Robert, a member of just 18 years old in Plochingen also recognised this financial importance of passive members.[146] Passive members are still considered active through their financial donations and are captured in the democratic and movement aesthetic of the party, such as the 10-year-challenge of membership numbers on several party Instagram accounts detailed on the following page:

---

[143] Kiel City Council Green Party New Year Reception, 19th February 2019, Flandernbunker, Kiel. Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.40.
[144] Oliver, Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, p.5.
[145] Lars, Federal Party HQ, pp.1-2.
[146] Robert, Plochingen (BW), p.4.

Image 11 Screenshots of the #10yearchallenge from Instagram accounts of Green Parties in Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg, January 2019.[147]

---

[147] For privacy reasons, I have edited out any comments and account names in comments.

One reason that this aesthetic of participation does not always materialise in practice is due to the reality for grassroots party members attempting to engage in party structures. I encountered a fair amount of critique on how effectively participation is encouraged and incorporated within local parties. This was often based on members' own experiences of trying to engage with the party. Robert talked about the difficult shift from passive to active member and finding your place in the party.[148] This struggle to adequately activate your participation was a shared experienced of Yvonne's:

> It took a long time until … I wouldn't say that I have found my place, but on the one hand I have an understanding of how it functions and on the other hand I have found the places where my participation is meaningful. […] I didn't hear anything when I first joined other than from my local party branch and I didn't know what else there was. I didn't feel at home in the local branch because it was lots of older people, and it always was about cycle paths and I am not a cyclist – I live on a hill and need a car for my work. And after two or three times of going to these meetings I thought 'What am I doing here, is this right?'. But I didn't know where I could go otherwise.[149]

This lack of standardisation among branches is a strength in terms of a diverse offering to local members, but also a weakness in that it potentially leads to a lot of members feeling unable to meaningfully participate. This can lead to considerable disappointment for those party members who have bought into the aesthetic of participation and the Green brand and potentially alienate them away from the party not just in terms of membership, but also electorally. Yvonne's experience underlines that there is no consistent party strategy to try and match the lived reality with the aesthetic created by the party. To

---

[148] Robert, Plochingen (BW), p.1.
[149] Yvonne, Stuttgart-Obere Neckarvororte, pp.2-3.

successfully get individuals to participate in the party is entirely dependent on the nature of a particular party branch, as further emphasised by Jonas:

> [I]t is because of the initiative of individuals. People don't automatically get integrated, but rather you need good, engaged people who are open and strike up conversations with new people […]. Again and again in the Green Youth new people would come and then no one would really take care of them and then they wouldn't come anymore.[150]

Vanessa, who told me that she was responsible in her Stuttgart-South branch for looking after new members, was precisely one of these individuals that Jonas refers to here, who are volunteering their free time to help create a reality of better and broader participation in the party so that it matches up with the party aesthetic. This grew particularly important during the period of my fieldwork which coincided with a rapid rise in membership numbers within the party. In reality, it is local party branches who are the frontline of meeting and accommodating these new members, should they choose to engage and attempt to take part in party events. This reality was one I encountered both in passing when speaking to people at events, and was brought up in the course of multiple interviews. Because of the current autonomy of party branches, the extent to which one's experienced reality marries up with the curated participatory aesthetic is largely down to luck.

6.2.3.1 Not as easy to participate as it seems – The 'Expert Factor'

For those members who manage to figure out how they would like to participate in the Greens, there are still potential barriers and a steep learning

---

[150] Jonas, Stuttgart Green Youth, p.6.

curve in order to be involved. Part of this is the normal expectation similar to when you start at any organisation, that you have to acquire the jargon and learn the organisational structure. Accordingly, local party websites dedicate pages to help members navigate the party. The Schleswig-Holstein Green website is just one example of this, where they have a section called the 'Member Compass' to help you navigate the state party, including a glossary section to help bring 'light into the Green Jungle of abbreviations' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Schleswig-Holstein).

When observing a member meeting of the Tempelhof-Schöneberg branch in Berlin, I also observed the 'new member welcome meeting' that took place half an hour prior.[151] Here the chair responsible for welcoming new members informed these new members that sometimes the meetings can turn quite specialised and debating different forms of expertise around an issue, which they recognise can be a turn off for some members, so he also highlights the more 'relaxed' events they run, such as a games night. I interpreted this party branch's dual offering as either trying to ensure the district party offers something for everyone, for networking and socialising, and appreciates that not everyone will be interested in all policy areas up for discussion; or that their policy discussion meetings become so specialised and are so badly chaired and handled that they need to hold other events so as not to lose members. For instance, some members may not be as confident enough to challenge the dominant and known voices in the discussion to request that the meeting chairs clarify the party jargon being used in the discussion, as one newer Green Youth member in Kiel did at one of their meetings. This reality contrasts starkly with this aesthetic of open, easy, and welcoming participation in the party.

---

[151] Berlin Tempelhof-Schöneberg Greens New Member Meeting and Member Meeting, 11th December 2018, Tempelhof-Schöneberg Green Office. Berlin Fieldwork Diary, pp.75-76.

Despite this acknowledgment of a steep learning curve in order to participate within the Greens, and some measures in place to mitigate this, a few party members I spoke to both in interviews and in informal discussions at events highlighted the expert knowledge tacitly needed to engage with the Greens, and how this reduces the diversity of those within the party. Arpiar in particular was quite exasperated by the degree of expertise required:

> There are lots of experts or specialists at the Greens, who specifically know their way around one issue. Lots of them also have a formal, higher qualification, and that is a kind of, I don't want to say a requirement, but a kind of entry, in that it decides in how many issues you can or can't participate. So, if you don't have a formal qualification, for example, then only certain issues are possible. […] It's not that you can't participate, but that your word has no weight if you can't provide certain formal qualifications. The other way around, if you can prove that, then you can participate everywhere. That explains a bit [that] the members are not too diverse.[152]

Arpiar's claims around the level of expertise insinuate that whilst it is true that the barriers to participate in the party are low, in that you are able to just turn up to meetings and contribute if you want to, he highlights how the existing level of expertise and culture within the party means that only those with similar levels of expertise have their contributions taken seriously. Walter, a member of the leading committee of the Berlin-Central branch of the Greens spoke about how this lack of diversity is also present in participation in offline settings:

> I would love to bring in more members. In the committee [of the branch] I always come across problems. Every event that we put

---

[152] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.4-5.

on, it's almost always the same people who engage, who come to info stands and info evenings. It is always a small circle and the others, they watch what happens there and I would like it more if engagement in certain areas was reduced a little, but so that more members are involved.[153]

Here, Walter is referring to a different diversity than Arpiar. Whilst Arpiar was making an observation on the lack of a diversity that would reflect the heterogeneity of wider German society in party participation, Walter is simply wishing for more diversity in the sense of different party members being more involved in the party. Yet for Eva, it was not about the diversity of people taking part, but a perceived experience that those higher up in the party did not seem interested in utilising the experience and expertise of party volunteers at other levels:

They [paid politicians and employees] need to remember that there are people who do a lot voluntarily. […] We have a lot of knowledge, but our knowledge is not utilised. We know why some stuff doesn't work. […] Who appreciates all of these people? No one. […] This potential is under-used.[154]

In some regions there is also a geographical barrier to effectively participate within the party. This was particularly apparent during my time in Kiel, where I witnessed the choices of location for party meetings garnered an occasional criticism of a Kiel-centric state of mind within the Schleswig-Holstein Green Party. At the state working group on Migration and Refuge, attendees had travelled from all over Schleswig-Holstein, which was common at the other

---

[153] Walter, Berlin-Central, pp.4-5.
[154] Eva, Berlin-Lichtenberg, p.25.

state working group meetings I attended in Kiel.[155] One of the co-chairs of the working group was from Flensburg. They spent some time at this meeting discussing how to decentre Kiel as the meeting spot for the working group, acknowledging that Kiel was not always the most practical location for others, such as those from Flensburg at the northernmost point of Schleswig-Holstein. This conversation reminded me of a remark I had heard during the state working group on Secularism I had attended in Kiel, where one attendee raised the paradox that 'the longer you are in Green politics, the greater your carbon footprint becomes'.[156] This comment honed in on the problems of location, where many members resident in villages and smaller towns travel more in their own cars in order to be active within Green politics at a state level in Schleswig-Holstein, because of the Kiel-centric nature of events and the poor public transport infrastructure in Schleswig-Holstein.

These examples call into question the true reality of the 'alliance party' and the participatory aesthetic that the party claims to inhabit in its lack of diversity in those involved in participation, but also in its implicitly exclusionary practices on those attempting to actively participate within the party at the local level. This was particularly apparent in the process of redrafting the party principles (*Grundsatzprogrammprozess*), which has been referred to throughout this and the previous chapter. In some interviews, my interviewees brought this process up, normally as examples to illustrate the points they were making, and it would occasionally be mentioned during party meetings. Ulrike mentioned how much she liked the idea of grassroots members being able to participate in the process when she was describing her experience within the Greens.[157] Robert shared her view, but thought that the ability to take part in person was more restricted than he would have liked:

---

[155] State Working Group on Migration and Refuge, 28th January 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, pp.23-24.
[156] State Working Group on Secularism, 23rd January 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.15.
[157] Ulrike, Stuttgart-East, p.2.

with the *Grundsatzprogramm* it's a bit of a shame really, because you can take part online, that possibility is there for people to be involved but you can only be a part of it face-to-face if you go to Berlin for two or three days.[158]

I found some dissatisfaction with the way the process was being conducted in all three sites of fieldwork. At the state working group on Migration and Refuge I attended in Kiel, those members at the meeting were upset at the way that their state Green Party in Schleswig-Holstein was operating its part of this hierarchised process. These attendees worried that the Schleswig-Holstein Greens' lack of effort within this process was further reducing their influence despite already feeling like a marginalised state within the federal Green party.[159] This marginalisation felt particularly acute to these members as they pointed out that they often do not thematically agree with other states, often voting differently to Baden-Wurttemberg in the *Bundesrat*. Arpiar was similarly dissatisfied and deconstructed the party principles process to demonstrate what he considered its inherently defunct type of participation:

The party principles process is a bidding process. That means it is top down. […] But that means that the bidding process is obviously always conducted by those making the offer. […] you can only choose what is available to be chosen. […] That is a trick of the form, […] And this trick, this process of inputting and extracted results is transparent but the trick itself is opaque. Namely that those, who input the information only see the end result but do not see why their issue isn't included in the end result like they had perhaps assumed. But the host can always say 'Come on you were involved. You should have engaged more strongly. You should

---

[158] Robert, Plochingen (BW), p.4.
[159] State Working Group on Migration and Refuge, 28th January 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.24.

have inspired others more or maybe your idea didn't have enough support and so on.[160]

I was struck at how critical and sceptical Arpiar was on this issue, but yet was still happy to continue being a party member and engaging in a process that he considered to be gamed or skewed in a specific direction. It is worth noting that I cannot confirm or deny if the motivation or selection of this process has any truth to the reasoning that Arpiar speculated. Yet if this party principles participation is actually merely a performed gesture of participation as Arpiar believes, this would be another example of the party displacing the noisier, political participation within the lower ranks of the party, replacing it instead with an aesthetic performance of participation, which keeps it on brand, but with the outcome to create a more palatable middle-class politics that delivers a better chance at power. Thus, it would be an example of a curated gentrified protest aesthetic displacing the lived experience of party members.

6.2.4 The digital performance of the gentrified protest aesthetic

During my fieldwork, social media fulfilled a dual role. Firstly, I used it as a tool to assist me in identifying Green topics and events being discussed by national and local parties and Green activists, and also to quickly recognise familiar faces of and prominent digital actors within the local Green Party, as mentioned in chapter four. Secondly, social media and digital tools were also a part of the everyday activism of party members (Dean, 2019). Therefore, social media within my project was also another source of data to understand the Green Party member experience and to enhance the intertextuality of my analysis. With social media's inherently visual and performance aspects, it is

---

[160] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.9-11.

a format which contributes to the aesthetic facet of the style of gentrified protest.

The instrumental use of social media for a political party for publicity performs an obvious function. Occasionally, I observed some kind of strategically-led or copycat behaviour between Green Party social media accounts from different regions. For example, as shown in Image 11, many Green Party accounts at both state and city level took part in the '10-year-Challenge' that went viral on Instagram in January 2019. This created a picture of different state or city Green parties publicising their increases in membership numbers over the last decade, and potentially highlighted to those who were undecided that there were more Greens in their area than they may have originally thought. Such visual practices as this highlight this 'movement' aesthetic, of being part of a growing team.

To what extent social media performances like the '10-year-challenge' could be coordinated across the different local levels of the Greens was illuminated by Zoe's account of her branch's poorer showing on social media around the Stuttgart municipal elections:

> I think the Greens are quite well established in regard to social media […]. I think they do it really well on Instagram. I think with the municipal elections we [locally] could have done something a little earlier, so we could have used it, but I think it will become more and more important. […] It's always about 'how can I reach people on the internet? How do I reach them over Facebook?'.[161]

---

[161] Zoe, Plochingen (BW), p.2.

Zoe's critique of her local party not using it enough for municipal elections is not applicable to other party branches. One of the state politicians I interviewed in Kiel, Sven, went as far as to say 'I certainly would not have become an MP if I were not so active on social media'.[162] Even party members saw its value in campaigns, as Paula in Berlin thought about the necessity to use social media for the European elections seven months away at the time of our interview:

> I wish that social media wasn't so important, but it's extremely important. We're discussing it now in relation to our European election campaign. How much do we still need to campaign outside social media? But it is simply the case that Donald Trump, the AfD and Brexit campaigners […] the reason why they were so successful in my opinion is social media. […] Whilst the Greens do use it more, it does feel like parties like the AfD use it far more professionally.[163]

Other party members agreed with Paula on the importance of the use of social media in elections. Vanessa highlighted, like Zoe, that social media and the internet was important in elections in particular to receive the youth vote, but that also the Greens' use of social media and other digital tools, as well as their policies on digitalisation, also functioned as an attractive aspect of the party to those who may have previously considered voting for the Pirates.[164] This was borne out two years later, when the Greens and FDP campaigned for digitalisation of an outdated digital infrastructure in Germany during the 2021 federal election, which was listed as one of the reasons that the Greens and the FDP were so popular among voters under 30 (Betz and Lüring, 2021).

---

[162] Sven, Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament, p.7.
[163] Paula, Berlin-Lichtenberg, pp.4-5.
[164] Vanessa, Stuttgart-South, p.5.

This specific use of social media in attracting young people during an election campaign became apparent in the discussion of the European election campaign at the Stuttgart Green Youth meeting following the election in June. They discussed what they called a 'cute' Instagram exchange between the Instagram accounts of the CDU and the Greens. As can be seen in the screenshot below as it appeared on my own smartphone, the CDU posted on 23 May 2019 a post declaring that 'Everyone is talking about climate protection. We have been implementing it for 35 years', in an attempt to claim some ground in an election where the climate dominated the political and media agenda during the campaign period. The official Green account then replied in the comments with a singular 'lol', which made this CDU post and interaction go viral.

Image 12 A screenshot from the official CDU Instagram, highlighting the comment from the official Green Instagram account 23rd May 2019

These examples clearly show that, for the party and grassroots party members, the importance of social media is not ignored. Their curated digital visual aesthetic, as illustrated with the Instagram interaction above, clearly also had a desired impact of reaching young people when it was discussed at the Green Youth post-election meeting in Stuttgart. However, social media is not just a campaign tool, nor is it the sole preserve of the younger generation. For some Green Party branches, it is the main way in which local party members can be involved with the local party, and find out about what is going on. Alongside, social media sites like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, encrypted messaging services like WhatsApp also play a key role, with members like Gisela, who was over the age of 75, using emails and Whatsapp for party work.[165] Walter from the Berlin-Central district and in the 55-64 age bracket noted how social media and digital communications meant that party members could be informed about local events more quickly. These older Berlin party members felt included in this digital communication of their local party branches, but not everyone felt the same. Local parties' reliance on digital means of communication can exclude those not as digitally literate, such as construction worker Martin, who fell within the 45-54 age bracket. He spoke quite honestly about how he misses out on quite a lot of party events and meetings in his rather analogue life:

> I miss out on lots by not having a membership on Facebook and Instagram […]. I don't have Whatsapp. I have a telephone. I can telephone with them a lot but do not have many other opportunities for communication. I have an email address of course, but as I don't regularly check it, it can be the case that I don't look at it for 14 days and so I miss out on quite a lot.[166]

---

[165] Gisela, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, pp.6-7.
[166] Martin, Wankendorf (SH), p.11.

Martin is not aware of the digital, social media aesthetic of the Greens. Nor is he kept up to date with organisational information communicated via these digital channels. He is reliant on the information on the website being accurate and clear, which I also found was often not the case in organising my own fieldwork. Martin, either out of choice or perhaps due to the quality of his rural German broadband and phone data infrastructure, ends up being digitally excluded from a party that I was told on multiple occasions by younger people felt very 'analogue'. Other studies have also stressed that the digital participation of the Greens does not attract more or more diverse people to Green party activity (Thuermer et al., 2018). As my data gathering took place entirely prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the digital nature of party activity and that of party members is likely to be very different in the 2020s, but this is out of the purview of this project.

However, not all digitally literate party members I spoke with were as uncritically positive about the party's performance on social media. Social media was something with which both members and prominent politicians had a more complicated relationship. Daniel stated that he shared details of party events with his friends on Facebook as a 'private person', but was also concerned about his party district's styling in digital spaces:

> The topic there that gets on my nerves, LGBT and the fixation on gay and lesbian [issues]. […] I'm not against [a diverse society]. […] But I have the feeling that it's their main thing. […] Every Facebook post has a rainbow flag. I think [LGBT issues] are really important. But I think other issues are also important. […] And I would be lying to say that they don't do any other Green issues. But the way that they present themselves to outsiders on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, their posts, there are too many on just one issue.[167]

---

[167] Daniel, Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, pp.4-5.

Here, Daniel is concerned with the perception that his local party branch's social media gives to those external to the party, even though when I asked him about his own engagement, he cites the large amount of time dedicated to LGBTQ+ issues as one of the reasons that he engages with the party on a thematic basis within state working groups. Arpiar, on the other hand, is less concerned with the content of party social media, but rather its depoliticising effect because 'you cannot attempt to change fundamental structures with social media'.[168]

Arpiar told me this in our interview in late November 2018. Just over a month later in early January 2019, Habeck announced via his personal blog and Twitter his decision to leave Facebook and Twitter. He gave two reasons for his decision to do so (Habeck, 2019a). The first was due to the privacy breach he had experienced after being doxed, when his and his family's personal messages were being shared on Twitter. The second reason he gave echoed some of the criticism that Arpiar spoke about. Habeck had experienced a controversy for the second time after a video was shared on social media by the Thuringia state Green Party encouraging people to get involved with the Green election campaign there in autumn 2019 (Grüne löschen Habeck-Video nach Shitstorm, 2019). By doing so, Habeck insinuated people would be helping Thuringia '*become*' a more democratic state, implying that it was not already. His explanation of why this happened was that the polemic style and aggressive nature of Twitter had rubbed off on him in a communication so fast that there is no time to reflect on things (Habeck, 2019a).

His withdrawal from social media caused party members at more local levels of the party to reflect and discuss their own use of social media. In some instances, this was discussed as more of a tongue-in-cheek joke, as the co-

---

[168] Arpiar, Berlin-Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, p.18.

chair of the state working group on Europe in Schleswig-Holstein joked that he was the Robert Habeck of the group as he claimed he did not use social media.[169] For others this was a more serious deliberation of their local branch's use of social media, as Franziska in Flensburg told me:

> We had a discussion recently, because Robert Habeck has left Facebook, […] but naturally it is the case that lots of things are run over Facebook, in particular. […] We also use WhatsApp a lot in the party. Although we are considering that at the moment. In Flensburg there was a data leak scandal with the SPD where data was leaked from their WhatsApp conversations. That makes you think 'oh god'! […] But now we are saying 'it is simply too unsafe'. […] You could probably live without Facebook, but you use it a lot. It is very practical. […] we actually reach the most members through Facebook then we do through our website or Twitter.[170]

The security of social media and digital communications is not something that just the Greens in Flensburg have considered. Katharina and Nikolas both informed me that communications in the Kiel Green Youth run over the service Telegram, an open source end-to-end encrypted instant messaging service. At first glance these security issues would seem to distort the positive digital performance of Green gentrified protest; it is called into question by the security issues and potentially depoliticising effects of social media. In actual fact, this explicit rejection of social media as done so by Habeck is a complementary performance that will appeal to other party members and citizens like Arpiar who are distrustful of social media companies and the use of their digital data. Therefore, the performance in digital spaces of the gentrified protest aesthetic of the Greens between 2018 and 2019 was a mix

---

[169] State Working Group on European, Peace and Foreign Policy, 20th Feb 2019, Kiel Fieldwork Diary, p.47.
[170] Franziska, Flensburg (SH), pp.4-5.

between the progressive, digitally witty, and present party alongside a more sceptical take on the risks posed by social media. Such competing aesthetics more accurately reflect the reality of ambivalent positions on social media held by the Greens who have long been wary of the potentially excessive surveillance and data insecurity of the digital world. This was previously exemplified by former Green *Bundestag* MP Hans Christian Ströbele when he met with Edward Snowden in Moscow amidst the Snowden revelations that Merkel's mobile phone was subject to surveillance by the NSA (Schwarze, 2013).

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has elucidated the remaining two facets of gentrified protest politics. The first facet of the *cachet of authenticity* highlighted how the *sanitised history* is retained by party members and also deliberately referred to in the process of redrafting the party principles. As such, the sanitised protest history of the Greens serves as a *guarantee of authenticity* to create an authentic 'experience of origin' passed onto new generations of Green party members, gentrified from those original, radical protests (Zukin, 2010, p.3). Yet, the longevity of this sanitised party history was already starting to be called into question for those party members who did not see it in their contemporary experience of the Greens as the dominant political party in the state parliament of Baden-Wurttemberg since 2011.

The party rebrand in the form of the new party principles, and its conception of an 'alliance party' has been the means with which the Greens have sought to maintain the authentic party brand by bridging its sanitised protest history with this new era of palatable, broad electoral appeal. Such an approach was strategically smart in the period leading up to the federal election campaign. However, the inherent tensions between professionalism and authenticity are

not just found in policy, but also in the party brand and aesthetic. Particularly in a political culture with a normalised protest ecosystem, similar accusations of inauthenticity and critique, like those found in relation to housing policy in Stuttgart and the deportation centre in Schleswig-Holstein, may be more numerous due to Green involvement in the new federal government. This dynamic between authenticity of the aesthetic brand and supporters' disappointment in government policy is a factor faced by progressive parties and political movements more broadly. It remains to be seen how the party will use their rebrand and the alliance party concept to navigate this quagmire of authenticity as the *Ampel* coalition progresses over the coming years.

The *aesthetic* facet of Green gentrified protest politics was the final facet analysed in this chapter. Whilst the aesthetic facet has overlaps with the previous three facets of gentrified protest, four distinct aesthetic elements with their own either visual or performance aspects were identified. The *movement aesthetic* was highlighted as not fulfilling the academic typology of a movement party, despite prominent party figures using the term prior to the introduction of the 'alliance party'. For the Greens, then, being a 'movement party' involved developing their aesthetic as being a movement working to get a Green government elected, without explicitly stating it in those terms. Instead, the Greens cultivated this aesthetic by exploiting the normalised protest political culture in Germany and the Green understanding of the liberal democratic public sphere as being 'on the streets' to mobilise individual party members and thereby embody, perform, and reproduce this aesthetic on the frontstage of street demonstrations.

The second element of the gentrified protest aesthetic was the *democracy aesthetic*. Closely related to the movement aesthetic and its relation to liberal democracy, several German Green members I interviewed found what they perceived as threats to democracy, such as Trump, Brexit and the AfD, as 'triggers' to join the party (Power and Dommett, 2020). In this way, the

movement and aesthetic style of Green gentrified protest satisfied those who wanted to 'consume' politics (Smith, G. and French, 2009), and self-actualise through buying into the democracy aesthetic and the Green political brand.

As the section on the *digital performance* of the gentrified protest aesthetic illustrated, not only is social media a tool which the party and its members use as a functional medium to communicate party messages and organise party activity, but it is also a stylistic depiction of the Green gentrified protest aesthetic. This captures two opposing positions: digital-friendly and digital-sceptic, where the prominent example during my fieldwork period saw Habeck move from a digital-friendly to more of a digital-sceptic aesthetic.

The final section of this chapter dealt with the *participation aesthetic* of Green gentrified protest. With participation a core aspect of the Green brand, and an aspect that also requires embodied performance to realise, active grassroots members are crucial to this aesthetic. In the analysis, the everyday experiences of Green party members were illuminated. Despite the framework and beliefs held by members that it was easy to participate in the Greens, multiple party members I spoke with painted a picture of feeling either lost or overlooked because they did not have the right qualifications or were not in the right place. This was particularly the case for the participatory redrafting of the party principles. There seems to be a disconnect between an aesthetic of participation and the reality, as has been identified in other empirical studies on the German Greens discussed in chapter two. As such, the experience of participation for some does not reflect the aesthetic conjured by the rhetoric and staging of participation by the central party.

Across chapters five and six, I have analysed the data generated from my ethnographic methods to assess the extent to which the German Greens and their party members cultivated and displayed the political style of gentrified

protest. On the basis of this analysis, I would argue that the Greens do utilise the gentrified protest style through all three of their party faces. The diversity of the manifestations of the four facets of gentrified protest within the German Greens emphasise the rhetorical, affective, and aesthetic nature of political style, but also contemporary political activism. I reiterate the ways in which the German Greens display the facets of gentrified protest below.

Green gentrified protest is marked by the sanitised protest history as the depoliticisation of their once radical roots. This facet of gentrified protest appeals to those party members or politicians who seek a styled authenticity of values and an 'experience of protest origin' in the political party they support and/or represent. This is also demonstrated in the sanitising politics of gentrified protest. With the Greens, this is found in their ability to absolve people of their ecological sins and to provide members with a feeling of doing something personally for progressive causes, like anti-racism, without fundamentally changing behaviour or societal structures. These sanitised and sanitising facets feed into the Green brand, which is strongly recognised and recognisable for its policies, but also its visual and performance aesthetic.

I have also detailed and argued how the style of gentrified protest highlights the central party and Habeck and Baerbock's leadership as contributing to the strength of the Green brand. Both the central party and party co-leaders have maintained this movement aesthetic and attempted to retain their authenticity in the rebranding of the party principles (*Grundsatzprogramm*). This political style and maintaining these facets of gentrified protest in a rebrand, is, I argue, necessary to understand how electorally motivated political parties reach out to new audiences and maintain existing support in our aesthetic and mediatised everyday lives in which we crave authenticity; particularly in a world where our political activism is not just something we do, it is something we share and consume, online and offline. The following and concluding chapter of the thesis reiterates this argument and findings of these analysis

chapters more holistically to understand the contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of the ways in which extra-institutional and institutional progressive politics are interrelated through political style, as well as this new knowledge about the contemporary German Green Party. I also make recommendations on paths for future research and tangible recommendations for Green Party staff for member engagement.

Chapter 7 Conclusion: The gentrification of protest within the German Greens

7.1 Introduction

Over the previous six chapters, I have established that the field of political science was lacking a meaningful analytical framework and concept to identify and examine the stylistic and participatory use of protest by progressive political parties. To tackle this problem, I have defined and presented my novel framework of gentrified protest and its four constituent facets: sanitised protest and sanitising politics, branding, authenticity, and aesthetics. I have outlined the appropriate methodological approach to generate data that generates both data related to political communication, such as media articles and social media posts, as well as the lived experience of party members and party events through interviews and participant observation. I then applied this framework to the data I generated on the German Greens between October 2018 and June 2019 to evaluate the extent to which they displayed a political style of gentrified protest.

This conclusionary chapter summarises the key findings and discoveries of gentrified protest politics in the German Greens. It reiterates the significance of my framework of gentrified protest and the impact it has on how we consider the political activity and style of left-wing, Green, and other progressive parties. Moreover, it evaluates these findings in the changing context of contemporary German politics and identifies how future scholarly work should follow on from my contribution to research on political parties and party membership.

This chapter fulfils this task through the following structure. Firstly, I re-examine the research questions and objectives provided in the introduction by

highlighting the answers which have been provided by the main findings of my research. The second section emphasises how my thesis has produced an innovative contribution to the field of political science in terms of party membership studies, German politics, and movement party research. Thereafter, the final two sections of this chapter look forward by highlighting the main implications that this thesis will have on future research, as well as making a few recommendations for the German Green Party based on the empirical reality I discovered through my fieldwork.

7.2 Research questions and objectives

This project started off with an ambitious objective: to explore the interaction and overlapping arenas of institutional and extra-institutional politics within the German Greens from the perspective of grassroots party members. The literature reviewed in chapter two highlighted the considerable gaps in scholarly knowledge on this issue and established that concepts of social movement transformation or those which try to account for movement-party interactions are inadequate to capture the stylistic and continued interaction of protest and party in the contemporary German Greens. I thus formulated the following three research questions:

1. What role does protest play within the contemporary German Green Party?
2. How is protest and party activism experienced and conceived by grassroots party members?
3. How can the term 'gentrification' account for the interactions of contemporary progressive parties and protest?

When answering the first research question, it became clear that protest is a clear part of the German Green brand in their political style. This was evident

in the party's participation in protest marches and rallies in each of the three cities selected for research. However, this went further than just the staging of Green Party politics via visually branded banners and member and politician participation at street demonstrations. As seen at the party principles event, the canonised narrative of sanitised Green protest (hi)story was being deliberately worked into a strategic rebrand of the party. Through the lens of gentrified protest politics, I argue that this is to retain an 'experience of origins' to ensure despite the rebrand, party members – and voters – continue to find the party authentic.

Research question two necessitated an interpretative ethnographic research approach in order to collect data of situated knowledge based on the lived experience of party members. The nature of ethnographic data, which captures what R. A. W. Rhodes (2017) terms 'complex specificity in context', can shed light on the gaps in our existing knowledge based on desk-based, survey, or document-based analysis. For example, Susan Scarrow's (2019) analysis of multi-speed membership in Germany suggested that, outside of formal membership, the only option to participate in the German Greens was through the 'guest' membership known as '*freie Mitarbeiter*'. Yet my ethnographic methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and consultation of local party branch websites unveiled a far more diverse offering in reality. Indeed, Martin, a party member from rural Schleswig-Holstein, was participating in party events despite not being a member or possessing a guest membership for at least the three months that I was in Kiel, whereas Ulrike informed me she had participated in her local Green party branch for 11 years before she officially joined the party. Neither mentioned the words '*freie Mitarbeiter*'. This underlines the need for the ethnographic approaches to create knowledge in the field of party membership which reflects this 'individual' construction of party membership, especially when it contradicts the 'official party' and 'legal' construction of the concept with which academics tend to work (Gauja, 2015). This research question also required an approach that accounted for the nuances of local contexts for political

issues and nature of local and state level Green Parties. By designing a multi-sited ethnography which generated data from three different city Green Parties, my analysis is considerably sensitive to local nuances of party membership and interactions with extra-institutional politics.

My third research question was tied to the main research objective to build a conceptual framework based on gentrification that elucidated the interaction between protest and contemporary progressive political parties more generally. This question was created following my initial observations on how the process of gentrification, as discussed in academic literature, seemed to overlap with research on the German Greens. I found this not only in terms of the similarities in social characteristics between gentrifiers and Green and other left-wing, progressive voters, but also how both subject areas are argued as a consequence of Ronald Inglehart's (1977) widely cited thesis of post-materialism. More surprisingly, the term gentrification tended to be associated with the German Greens and other Green and left-wing parties in both German and English-language media coverage.

This signalled the need for a more substantial academic engagement with the concept of gentrification and to apply this to contemporary progressive party activism at a more sustained level. I approached this through a thorough genealogy of the concept of gentrification and its use in academic research beyond that of urban studies and within society and culture. This genealogy traced shared characteristics of class, commodification, authenticity, cultural appropriation, displacement, sanitisation, and aesthetics which all feature in the different interpretations and uses of the concept gentrification. The four main facets: *sanitisation, branding, authenticity* and *aesthetic* were then brought together in my concept of *gentrified protest*, a form of *political style* which follows the work of Benjamin Moffitt (2016). My concept of gentrified protest builds on Moffitt's framework that the rhetorical content and aesthetic style of politics which create a 'staged performance' are central to political

actors in our 'heavily mediatised and "stylised" milieu of contemporary politics' (2016, p.28).

However, I also build on and integrate aspects of Nielsen's (2012) concept of 'personalized political communication'. Nielsen gives this term to practices that use '*people* as media for political communication' through door-to-door canvassing and phone banking in American election campaigns (2012, p.7). Unlike Moffit's focus on elites, I argue that party members and activists are also proponents of the *gentrified protest political style*, which relies on aesthetics of participation and democracy in online and offline spaces. Thus, gentrified protest is a political style which identifies how the rhetoric and stylistic elements in party image and communication curated by the party central office is co-created and reproduced by the party on the ground. It does so by the staging of member participation processes. This provides both members with an affective connection to the party through their active performance of the party's participatory and democratic aesthetic, but also distinguishes them from their political competition. Party members' engagement in street demonstrations or sharing of online content thus legitimises the participatory, embodied character of the progressive, gentrified protest style and is an indirect form of personalised political communication that occurs during and outside of election campaigns. By employing ethnographic methods, the data generated uniquely highlights how Green politics are felt on the ground. In addition, it demonstrates gentrified protest's ability to incorporate the key aspects of branding and aesthetics and their intrinsic relationship to affect and sensory experience (Banet-Weiser, 2012; Rancière and Rockhill, 2013).

It is the application of this analytical framework of gentrified protest which helps to answer research question one: what role does protest play within the contemporary German Green Party? With rich ethnographic data that satisfied the criteria of exposure and intertextuality, chapters five and six establish the

role of protest and its interactions with the contemporary German Greens through the analytical lens of *gentrified protest*. The main empirical findings emerging from my analysis of German Green politics through the lens of gentrified protest are revisited and examined in the following sub sections.

7.3 Main findings: gentrified protest in the German Greens

7.3.1 Gentrification of the German Greens

My project does not repudiate the scholarly consensus that the German Greens underwent a process of professionalisation in the 1990s. It confirms that the gentrification of the German Greens took place during this process, when the original, radical Green project was professionalised and the *Fundis*, such as Jutta Ditfurth, left the party in the early 1990s. As this process has already been completed, the contemporary Greens possess a political style of gentrified protest; such a style is inextricably linked to the displacement of the original project through its sanitisation and approved party (hi)story and its role in the history and culture of German politics.

Franz Walter (2010) correctly observed that the Greens, through their professionalisation, were pivoting to become a hinge party open to forming coalitions with both the CDU as well as the SPD and were beginning to chase groups of the electorate other than their core voters. He predicted over a decade earlier the strategic need for what I determine is the political style of gentrified protest for the Greens; Walter saw the need for the party to maintain what he called their 'exclusivity' to please their core voters as they broadened their appeal to new social milieus (Walter, 2010, p.90). Other scholars also see this as key to the Greens' strategy, terming it either a 'double character of social movement and parliamentary party' (Stifel, 2018, p.290-292), or 'fully

established without being fully the establishment' (Markovits and Klaver, 2015, p.116). In the context of the later 2010s, this hybrid character of a professionalised, mainstream, power-seeking party that is maintaining links through a style of gentrified protest creates an appealing alternative to successive grand coalitions at the federal level.

7.3.2 The strength of the 'authentic' Green brand

When the party undertook a deliberate process of rebranding its party principles (*Grundsatzprogramm*), it was aware of the strength of its core 'brand' and the danger of completely disowning it. The brand and the sanitised party (hi)story are internalised reference points for the party members interviewed in all three cities. This helps to explain the party's, in my view, excessive effort to create the self-conception of the 'alliance party', stressing its relation to its movement past in both former East and West Germany, whilst also emphasising the party's intention to broaden its appeal, reach, and its willingness to work with diverse political partners. In so doing, it retains the 'experience of origins' that Sharon Zukin (2010) identifies in gentrified neighbourhoods that are branded with a specific cultural identity. In the case of the German Greens, this cultural identity is related to continued engagement with street demonstrations and protest movements, the sanitisation of party history, and aesthetics that provide party members with sensual and affective experience of participation, democracy and movement.

The authentic, Green brand is not just a product of centralised rebranding processes, such as the process of redrafting the *Grundsatzprogramm*. Active grassroots party members, as individual producers of personalised political communication, are aware of their role in the production of the Greens' cultural identity in extra-institutional arenas of politics, such as street demonstrations and information stands during election campaigns. They are also well aware

of the party's association with protest and the high regard others in the party have of it. This was highlighted firstly by Ulrike's awareness that if she did not join the Green bloc, judgements would be made about whether the Greens fully supported the cause of that particular protest, which was demonstrating for the inclusion of LGBTQ+ sex education in schools.

Conversely, Gisela was equally sensitive to the negative associations those external to the party have regarding party branding, and why she chose an alternative visual symbol of a hedgehog on her business cards, rather than the more prominent party sunflower logo. This highlights the risks posed to party members performing personalised political communication as multi-level marketers of the party brand. This can be particularly acute in areas with less Green support, as the member from Schöneiche in Brandenburg experienced when she was called a 'Green bitch' for simply carrying a branded tote bag on public transport. Some of this negative perception stems from an established external perception that the Greens are a moralising, proselytising political force that looks to sanitise politics through imposition of their ideas on society. Whilst Robert Habeck early on in his party leadership was actively campaigning to dispel such prejudices that had in many people's eyes been confirmed by the 2013 Veggie Day *Bundestag* election promise (Rüdiger, 2018), my interviewee Martin and a member of the Green Youth in Stuttgart were still committed to imploring individuals to change their personal behaviour to aid the process of climate protection. Once again, because these party members operate as multi-level marketers with little party oversight in their everyday lives, the central party has little control in eliminating such rhetoric within personalised political communication. This underlines how party members are co-creators in the communication of the gentrified protest style.

7.3.3 Green Party members and their ambivalence to protest

The boundaries of what counts as sanitised and appropriate interactions with social movements and protests highlights how some Green members are ambivalent to protest. In other words, members are unable to agree on whether radical movements, such as *Ende Gelände*, are examples of a peaceful climate movement or cross the line of violence. Chapter five explored this ambivalence in members' classification of violent and non-violent protest, the party's relationship with the concept of 'radical', as well as the critique by Zoe, Yvonne and Arpiar that they saw some protests merely as 'events' rather than a form of political engagement. Yet, both the party and its members are careful to avoid accusations of hypocrisy in their participation in demonstrations on issues that they are responsible for as part of a state level coalition, such as the deportation centre in Schleswig-Holstein. This example illustrates the danger of governing for the party's gentrified protest style amongst such ambivalence. Whilst for some party members the need to adapt their tradition of fighting for their causes on the street is a self-explanatory part of being in government, party elites in Baden-Wurttemberg interviewed by Michael Dürr (2018) wished that party members were more versed in how to defend the actions of their party in government.

7.3.4 The aesthetics of German Green gentrified protest

7.3.4.1 The performed aesthetic of movement

The aesthetics of gentrified protest politics analysed in chapter six demonstrate the way in which these rhetorical styles and personalised political communication are performed and experienced. Lars from the federal central party office highlighted the central party's view in this period that supporting protest not only maintains the longstanding association of the Greens with street demonstrations derived from their movement origins, but is also seen

as a way of mobilising people to join the party and vote for them. Whilst Steffen Blings (2020) highlights that many parties pursue a programmatic alignment with movements to increase the salience of a shared policy issue during an election campaign, my project has shown that an aesthetic of movement through association with extra-institutional politics is a fruitful way to enhance salience whilst also lending authenticity to the Green participatory and democratic brand. This can also occur outside of an election campaign. This aesthetic is then curated and performed either through a physical presence on the street, a supportive social media post, or borrowing the protest imagery of banners and placards for an appeal for election campaigners at a party conference.

The performance of party members in the movement aesthetic by participating in street demonstrations is also a means of legitimating the participation and democracy aesthetics. Applying the concept of Nielsen (2012) to the media and social media coverage of street demonstrations entails that participation by party members is also a form of personalised political communication which takes place outside the routine politics of elections. Protests can occur at any time on any issue, whereas elections take place over a specified time period and only allow individuals to make a decision from a pre-determined list with specific choices (Goldstone, 2003, p.8-9). This broader period for embodied personalised political communication highlights the mobilisation benefit of institutional and extra-institutional political interaction.

7.3.4.2 The affective aesthetic of democracy

The movement aesthetic of gentrified protest is clearly visible within the German Greens. The democracy and participation aesthetics of the party, however, are sensually experienced and accordingly have an affective dimension for party members. In the case of the democracy aesthetic, this was

demonstrated in chapter six through the democratically influenced 'triggers' to join the party for those members who joined in 2016 and 2017 (Power and Dommett, 2020). This included: the vote for Brexit in the UK referendum on European Union membership, the election of Donald Trump, and the rise of the AfD and their entry into the *Bundestag*. These triggers and the democracy aesthetic highlight the strong brand association of the Greens with liberal democracy that is often found in party rhetoric. The experience of these triggers had an affective dimension for party members, with Daniel summing up his membership as his way of showing that he 'gives a fuck' about people and the world around him. This affective relationship with an aesthetic of democracy is likely broader than the specific case of the German Greens, with similar 'triggers' identified for those deciding to join the Green Party of England and Wales (Power and Dommett, 2020).

7.3.4.3 Appearance vs reality: the aesthetic of participation

The participation aesthetic proved to be divergent from the lived experience of party members and their engagement and activism within the German Greens. In particular, it accounted for the stark difference between the appearance and reality of member participation. The nature of data collected highlights the gulf experienced between the signifier of a party associated with participatory features and an original connection to grassroots democracy for the party on the ground, as argued by E. Gene Frankland (2008), and that of the sign of participation: the reality and lived experience of grassroots member participation in the party and the barriers faced. Dürr (2018) and his data from party elite interviews and a party member survey demonstrate a shared desire by grassroots and elite Greens in Baden-Wurttemberg for intra-party participation. Yet, other studies by Sebastian Bukow (2013) and Tim Spier (2019) both identified disconnects between the aesthetic 'signifier' of the Greens that prides itself on its opportunities for grassroots member activism, against the reality of the 'sign': either a large number of inactive members

(Spier, 2019) or Green central party office employees who, compared to their equivalents in the FDP, SPD, and The Left, gave the lowest ranking for the statement of whether party members helped to advance the party organisation (Bukow, 2013, p.225).

Through my collection of data on the lived experience of grassroots party members, it is clear that there are barriers to participation in the party. These can be geographical barriers like those often mentioned at party meetings in Kiel, where 'the more you participate in Green politics, the larger your carbon footprint is'. More worryingly, the level of expertise and accessibility to the content of party events at the grassroots level was striking. The party branch in Berlin Tempelhof-Schöneberg implicitly acknowledged this by explaining the need for social party events to complement the thematic discussions which can become highly professionalised. This requirement of expertise was also identified by Arpiar, who believed it created an exclusionary culture for new entrants to the party, and who felt that unless he had a job or qualification in the area, his contribution to discussions carried no weight. The disconnect between the Greens' aesthetic of participation and the reality is thus also felt and experienced by those active party members on the ground.

7.3.4.4 The complicated digital performance of the gentrified protest aesthetic

Lastly, the digital performance of gentrified protest is somewhat complicated for the Greens. Digital media has an instrumental use for party participation, as well as for election campaigns, and is seen as a tool to reach out to young people. The example of the viral Instagram comment on the CDU European election post on climate protection and its mention at a Green Youth meeting in Stuttgart as a 'cute' digital exchange, shows its aesthetic as well as functional potential. These are performances of their branded political style of

being the slightly alternative, challenger party. Occasionally, these performances also utilise images from their radical past, such as when they criticised CDU politician Jens Spahn's hipster comments in 2017. The mediated and stylised nature of contemporary politics requires this for engagement with audiences, as well as to provide journalists with some content from time to time.

On the other hand, many Green members have a complicated relationship with technology. Most prominently during my period of field research, party co-leader Habeck left Twitter and Facebook after his personal communications were leaked online. He did not eschew digital communication entirely, deciding to keep his Instagram account and regularly post blog posts on his website that would be shared by the official federal party social media accounts. One of the other reasons he gave was that he found the fast-paced nature of Twitter created a culture of discussion that lacked nuance and reflection. This critique of the medium of social media was shared by two party members I interviewed for different reasons. Daniel did not appreciate his local Green Party branch's curation of their digital aesthetic because of its predominant focus on LGBTQ+ issues and constant use of rainbow emojis; whereas Arpiar saw social media as a tool which depoliticises issues rather than creating productive discussions or political action. Despite the complicated relationship that the German Greens and their members have to social media, it also fulfils an important functional role for party communications and is often very successful in performing the gentrified protest aesthetic. During the period under examination in this thesis, the Greens mostly benefited from such digital performances of their movement, participatory, and alternative political style.

7.4 Limitations of the study

No research study runs perfectly, and my doctoral project was no exception to this rule. I faced typical problems during my field research, like the recruitment of interview participants and the striving for gender and age balance. However, as is extensively discussed in chapter four, an interpretive methodological approach understands that the researcher does not have control over the agents of their data generation, in my case desired interview partners. Furthermore, the intensive personal cost of an ethnographic approach with just one sole researcher created tensions between maximising my time in the field, other professional commitments, such as conference papers that at the time were delivered in person, and my own need for personal free time and contact with friends and family. This entailed that decisions were made that were not driven by the research goals but instead by my own professional and personal needs. I lamented this during my time in Kiel, when I had to miss the only city party member meeting as I was presenting at a conference in Finland at the same time. Despite these challenges and limitations, I generated an astounding amount of rich data whilst in the field that more than suffices for this thesis.

7.5 Future directions

This study has several implications for future research in the field of political science. The novel conceptualisation of gentrified protest as a type of political style for progressive parties is dealt with in this project in a single case study. Projects with more resources than just one researcher may wish to compare political styles of different parties, albeit a form of comparison compatible with an interpretive epistemology. These could be between different progressive parties in the same country or within one party family across different nations. Applying the political style of gentrified protest in an interpretative approach

that considers multiple cases may find different aesthetic, authentic, branding, and sanitised characteristics in different contexts. It may also highlight different stagings and performances of the political style in both online and offline spaces.

The most pressing future project in my opinion should be to compare the political style of parties from opposite ends of the integration/demarcation cleavage. This could use gentrified protest to analyse the style of the party which falls under the integration cleavage and then use Moffitt's (2016) political style framework for populism for the 'demarcation' party. Interestingly, concepts such as 'authenticity' and appealing for more direct democracy are also found within parties which occupy the space within the demarcation cleavage. I would therefore also think that the concepts and facets included in gentrified protest would be fascinating to explore in these (radical) right-wing parties. Similarly, considering the increasing fragmentation of left-wing party politics, comparing the political style and relationship with protest from all parties situated on the left-wing, progressive spectrum in proportional political systems may help to understand the declining support for social democratic parties. Furthermore, such comparisons may help to revitalise their approaches to political style and integrating party members in the stylised, affective and individual nature of party activism in contemporary Western politics.

Another study must utilise the empirical evidence presented here on the period of party rebranding in the Greens. This knowledge can help scholars evaluate how successful this rebrand was in relation to the German Green performance in the 2021 *Bundestag* elections. Despite a positive start for the Greens when they named Annalena Baerbock as their chancellor candidate in April 2021, the campaign was dogged by embarrassing gaffes paired with an element of misogyny in press reporting as a left-wing female candidate who was also a mother of small children (Segler, 2021). Despite the Greens achieving their

highest result in a federal election with 14.8 percent, this was perceived as a disappointment for the party given their consistent opinion polling around 19-20 percent since autumn 2018. Yet, the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has created substantial shifts in German foreign policy. As the German foreign minister during this crisis, Baerbock thus far has been perceived as competent and received praise from a CDU politician and a *Die Welt* podcast, groups which often provide much Green critique (Krafft, 2022; Maksan, 2022).

Only time will tell what the legacy of the war in Ukraine will do to the Greens, but there has thus far been very little party internal criticism of this policy shift compared to the Greens' involvement in military action in Kosovo in 1998 (Joachim and Feld, 2022). This may further highlight the extent of gentrification the party has gone under, particularly in their new fundamental party principles which clearly states support for a foreign policy which is values-based and feminist (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020b). But as Sven, the state politician from Kiel who had grown up in united Germany, stated he saw violence as only legitimate as a force against structural repression, such as against National Socialism. This example evokes how Joschka Fischer justified German participation in Kosovo in the late 1990s, on the principle of 'Never Again Auschwitz'. The unprovoked aggression of the Russian invasion of Ukraine would permit a violent response in the paradigm put forward by Sven.

A similar interpretative study is needed urgently to illuminate the lived experience of people of colour within the German Greens. The critique from Ferda Ataman on the language used and lack of focus on the issue of racism in the interim party principles draft in March 2019 and the defections to the SPD by district councillors in Berlin highlighted a potential issue. The party recognised this in their employment of racism consultant Tupoka Ogette in August 2019 to help tackle internal structural issues that disadvantage members of colour in the form of a Working Group on Diversity (Riese, 2019). Furthermore, the final version of the new party principles took Ataman's

critique on board, mentioning racism more than the single occurrence in the interim draft (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020b). However, this progress did not prevent the farce that unfolded in relation to Cem Özdemir's federal cabinet nomination in 2021. Whilst the Greens ensured they met their requirement for gender parity in posts with three of the five cabinet posts going to women, a display of commitment to cultural diversity as the antithesis to the AfD was initially lacking. Prior to the official announcement of the Green cabinet ministers, there were publicised reports that internal party divisions on cabinet ministers between the leftist and realo factions had re-emerged after a relatively united four years.

Realo Özdemir was ultimately given the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, over the leftist biologist and former parliamentary party leader of the Greens in the *Bundestag*, Toni Hofreiter, to prevent a fully-White group of Green cabinet ministers, and a fully White traffic light government (von Bullion, 2021). The nomination of Özdemir marks the first German federal minister who is a descendant of Turkish guest workers. However, further progress needs to be made within the party and across German politics and societies more broadly to ensure that the Greens do not water down their commitment to cultural diversity to accommodate merely token participation of people of colour who have the 'crossover appeal' highlighted by Cooper, B. (2014), for the party's appeal to broader sections of German society.

7.6 Recommendations for research

This study has highlighted the benefits of integrating analysis of political style and the role party members play in political communication. Nielsen's (2012) concept of 'personalised political communication' is the concept I chose to highlight this role. This approach should not be ignored in the burgeoning literature analysing the interaction between institutional and extra-institutional

politics. Particularly, the use of this interaction by parties which curate an aesthetic of participation demonstrates its attractive use as a form of member engagement outside of election cycles. As such, it performs a necessary function for maintaining both member participation and the communication of this participatory party aesthetic.

7.7 Recommendations for the German Green Party

One aspect that was prominent in both my observational data generation and in interviews with grassroots party members, is the need for the German Greens to revisit how they incorporate the surge in numbers of party members. The past few years have seen rapid increases in Green Party membership across the whole of Germany (Niedermayer, 2020). Yet, Green Party structures, particularly at the local level, have not changed to accommodate this. Multiple interview participants with voluntary roles in their local party branches emphasised, like Katharina, that they feared that without an effective welcome and integration of these members, they may grow quickly disillusioned and lost both in terms of membership, but potentially also at the ballot box. Rather than leaving it as is, namely an adhoc process based on the initiative and goodwill of passionate individuals, Green Party branches need to assess and trial different ways to engage members at the grassroots. This requires a localised approach to integrate those who want to change something directly in their local area, versus those who wish to contribute their skills on a slightly bigger scale, like Yvonne in Stuttgart. Franziska mentioned an approach that focused on creative ideas for campaign and general party events that had been effective in maintaining the activity of party members in Flensburg. As Eva highlighted, there is experience and best practice in the party, but more needs to be done to share that knowledge across branches outside the existing, hierarchical party structures.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has concluded the thesis by reconsidering the original aim and objectives of the study. It has reiterated the main findings emanating from the thesis and how these relate to existing research in political science. Finally, it has made recommendations of particular future directions it highlights for research, and for academic researchers and employees of the German Greens. Overall, there are three main contributions that this thesis makes to the fields of party membership, party and protest interactions, as well as research on the German Greens. These are as follows:

1. I have produced the first interpretative ethnographic research study on German Green Party members with original ethnographic data.

2. My study on the German Greens illuminates the lived experience of a diachronic dynamic of rising success. Additionally, it analyses the process of a deliberate party rebrand in their strategy to become the 'leading force of the left-centre' in German politics through their own concept of the 'alliance party'.

3. Through this research project, I have conceived the novel analytical framework of *gentrified protest*. This is a framework that allows scholars to analyse the interaction of protest and party politics which, rather than focus solely on this interaction in the context of structural party organisation, is instead focused on how it is incorporated into a progressive *political style*. Furthermore, this framework allows for the elucidation of how this interaction is both experienced by party members, and the communicative and aesthetic role members play in reproducing this political style of gentrified protest. This framework is conceived in a way that allows it to be applied to other progressive, left-wing parties, as well as those considered mainstream(ing), to help the field understand the role of embodied performance and stylistic staging of the front and backstage of contemporary progressive politics.

Bibliography

Abou-Chadi, T., Mitteregger, R. and Mudde, C. 2021. Left behind by the working class? Social democracy's electoral crisis and the rise of the radical right. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Empirical social research.*

Adler, A. 2018. *Liquid Democracy in Deutschland: Zur Zukunft digitaler politischer Entscheidungsfindung nach dem Niedergang der Piratenpartei.* Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Ahmad Ali, N. 2011. PKS' Democratic Experiences in Recruiting Members and Leaders. *Majalah Al-jamiah.* **49**(2), pp.329-360.

Almeida, P. 2010. Social Movement Partyism: Collective Action and Oppositional Political Parties. In: Van Dyke, N. and McCammon, H.J. eds. *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.170-196.

Alvarez, S.E. 1999. Advocating feminism: the Latin American feminist NGO'boom'. *International feminist journal of politics.* **1**(2), pp.181-209.

Anria, S. 2018. *When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arditi, B. 2003. Populism, or, politics at the edges of democracy. *Contemporary politics.* **9**(1), pp.17-31.

Aronoff, M.J. and Kubik, J. 2014. *Anthropology and political science : a convergent approach.* New York: Berghahn Books.

Auyero, J. and Joseph, L. 2007. Introduction: Politics under the ethnographic microscope. In: Joseph, L., et al. eds. *New perspectives in political ethnography.* New York: Springer, pp.1-13.

Bailey, D.J. 2017. *Protest Movements and Parties of the Left: Affirming Disruption.* London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Banet-Weiser, S. 2012. *AuthenticTM: political possibilities in a brand culture.* New York, NY: New York University Press.

Bardi, L., Bartolini, S. and Trechsel, A.H. 2014. Responsive and responsible? The role of parties in twenty-first century politics. *West European Politics.* **37**(2), pp.235-252.

Barnhurst, K.G. and Quinn, K. 2012. Political visions: Visual studies in political communication. In: Semetko, H.A. and Scammell, M. eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication.* London: SAGE, pp.276-291.

Bathrick, D. 2007. Whose Hi/story Is It? The U.S. Reception of Downfall. *New German Critique.* **34**(3), pp.1-16.

Baudrillard, J. 1996. *The system of objects.* London: Verso.

Beitzer, H. 2018. Merkels Wagnis. *Süddeutsche Zeitung.* [Online]. 29 October. [Accessed 20 Feb 2022]. Available from: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/merkel-cdu-parteichefin-1.4190183

Bell, D. 1974. *The coming of post-industrial society : a venture in social forecasting.* London: Heinemann.

Bellafante, G. 2016. Gentrification and Junk Food: Chopped-Cheese Edition. *The New York Times.* 15 May [Accessed 15 May 2018]. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/nyregion/chopped-cheese-ginia-bellafante.html

Bennhold, K. 2018. Greens Thrive in Germany as the 'Alternative' to Far-Right Populism. *The New York Times.* [Online]. 27 Nov. [Accessed 25 Mar 2019]. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/27/world/europe/germany-greens-merkel-election.html

Berlin Postkolonial. 2019. Mit Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana haben wir die erste Afrodeutsche Politikerin im EU- Parlament! Gratulation! [Facebook]. 28 May 2019. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/berlinpostkolonial/posts/2305586642861477

Bernt, M. and Holm, A. 2013. Exploring the Substance and Style of Gentrification: Berlin's "Prenzlberg". In: Bernt, M., et al. eds. *The Berlin Reader: A Compendium on Urban Change and Activism.* Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp.107-126.

BETNetworks. 2020. *Jesse Williams Condemns Police Brutality in Moving Speech at 2016 BET Awards.* [Online] [Accessed 02 Sep 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7VPMJcXPGs&feature=youtu.be

Betz, S. and Lüring, L. 2021. Wunsch nach Wandel: Was grüne und liberale Jungwähler verbindet. *Bayerischer Rundfunk.* [Online]. 01 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from:

https://www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/was-junge-waehler-von-fdp-und-den-gruenen-verbindet,Skaiy4t

Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 2003. *Interpreting British Governance.* [Online]. London: Routledge. [Accessed 1 Aug 2018]. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leeds/detail.action?docID=180909

Birke, P., Hohenstatt, F. and Rinn, M. 2015. Gentrifizierung, Aktivismus und „Rollenspiele ". Erfahrungen am Hamburger Stadtrand. *Journal of Action Research.* **11**(1/2), pp.195-227.

Bischof, D. 2017. Towards a renewal of the niche party concept: Parties, market shares and condensed offers. *Party politics.* **23**(3), pp.220-235.

Bleckmann, L. and Lahusen, C. 2017. Unterschiedliche Protestkulturen? Eine vergleichende Analyse von Demonstrationsteilnahme in Ost-und Westdeutschland, 1990-2013. In: Daphi, P., et al. eds. *Protest in Bewegung?* Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft pp.225-254.

Bleiker, R. ed. 2018. *Visual global politics.* London: Routledge.

Blings, S. 2020. Niche Parties and Social Movements: Mechanisms of Programmatic Alignment and Party Success. *Government and opposition (London).* **55**(2), pp.220-240.

Following Habeck. 2018. [Film]. Blockhaus, M. dir. Germany: imFilm Verleih + Agentur.

Blühdorn, I. 2004. 'New Green' Pragmatism in Germany - Green Politics beyond the Social Democratic Embrace? *Government and Opposition.* **39**(4), pp.564-586.

Blühdorn, I. 2009. Reinventing green politics: on the strategic repositioning of the German Green Party. *German Politics.* **18**(1), pp.36-54.

Blumenberg, J.N. and Blumenberg, M.S. 2017. The Kretschmann Effect: Personalisation and the March 2016 Länder Elections. *German Politics.* pp.1-21.

Bomberg, E. 1992. The German greens and the European community: Dilemmas of a movement-party. *Environmental Politics.* **1**(4), pp.160-185.

Borbáth, E. and Gessler, T. 2020. Different worlds of contention? Protest in Northwestern, Southern and Eastern Europe. *European journal of political research.* **59**(4), pp.910-935.

Borbáth, E. and Hutter, S. 2021a. Politische Parteien als Protestakteure. In: Brichzin, J. and Siri, J. eds. *Soziologie der Parteien: Neue Zugänge zu einer alten Organisationsform des Politischen.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, pp.101-125.

Borbáth, E. and Hutter, S. 2021b. Protesting Parties in Europe: A comparative analysis. *Party politics.* **27**(5), pp.896-908.

Born, D. 2019. Bearing Witness? Polar Bears as Icons for Climate Change Communication in National Geographic. *Environmental communication.* **13**(5), pp.649-663.

Boswell, J., Corbett, J., Dommett, K., Jennings, W., Flinders, M., Rhodes, R.A.W. and Wood, M. 2019. State of the field: What can political ethnography tell us about anti-politics and democratic disaffection? *European Journal of Political Research.* **58**(1), pp.56-71.

Botetzagias, I. and van Schuur, W. 2012. Active greens: An analysis of the determinants of green party members' activism in environmental movements. *Environment and Behavior.* **44**(4), pp.509-544.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Braunthal, G. 1990. Political Demonstrations and Civil Liberties in West Germany. *German politics and society.* (19), pp.41-54.

Brichzin, J. 2016. Krise des politischen Alltags?: Eine ethnografische Parlamentsstudie zur gesellschaftlichen Entfremdung des Politischen. *ÖZS. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie.* **41**(Suppl 1), pp.191-212.

Brooks, D. 2000. *Bobos in paradise : the new upper class and how they got there.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Brunow, D. 2011. Soundscapes als akustisches Gedächtnis der Stadt: künstlerische Strategien gegen Gentrifizierung. In: Engelmann, J. ed. *Access denied: Ortsverschiebungen in der realen und virtuellen Gegenwart,.* Mainz: Ventil Verlag, pp.37-41.

Buck, T. 2019. Germany's Greens emerge from the fringe. *Financial Times.* [Online]. 27 Mar. [Accessed 28 Mar 2019]. Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/d226c922-4f04-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294

Bukow, S. 2013. *Die professionalisierte Mitgliederpartei: Politische Parteien zwischen institutionellen Erwartungen und organisationaler Wirklichkeit.* Wiesbaden: Springer.

Bukow, S. and Switek, N. 2017. Ökonomie sticht Ökologie? *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft.* **11**(1), pp.104-128.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2001. *Politische Grundsätze.* 2nd ed. Köln: kölnermedienfabrik kmf AG.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2002. *Die Zukunft ist grün: Grundsatzprogramm.* Berlin.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2013. *Zeit für den Grünen Wandel: Teilhaben. Einmischen. Zukunft schaffen.* Berlin.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2018. *Neue Zeiten. Neue Antworten. Impulspapier des Bundesvorstandes zum Startkonvent für die Grundsatzprogrammdebatte von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.* [Online]. Berlin. [Accessed 07 Apr 2018]. Available from: https://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Beschluesse_BuVo/20180406_Beschluss_Neue_Zeiten._Neue_Antworten..pdf

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2019a. *Am Anfang war Europa – 40 Jahre Sonstige Politische Vereinigung „Die Grünen".* [Online] [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zu6pPD8pSFw

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2019b. Grundsatzkonvent #grundsatz2020. [Facebook]. 29 Mar 2019. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/B90DieGruenen/videos/472246454512546/

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2019c. *Veränderung in Zuversicht: Zwischenbericht zum Grundsatzprogramm.* Berlin.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2020a. *"…to Respect and to Protect…" Change Creates Stability.* [Online]. Berlin: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/20210311_Grundsatzprogramm_EN.pdf

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2020b. *"…zu achten und zu schützen…" Veränderung schafft Halt.* [Online]. Berlin: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/20200125_Grundsatzprogramm.pdf

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 2020c. *Zusammenhalt in Vielfalt: Ergebnisse der AG Vielfalt.* [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.gruene.de/artikel/zusammenhalt-in-vielfalt-ergebnisse-der-ag-vielfalt

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion. 2018. *profil: GRÜN Radikal & Realistisch.* [Online]. Berlin: Dierichs Druck+Media. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/fileadmin/media/gruenebundestag_de/publikationen/zeitschrift/profil-12-2018.pdf

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Schleswig-Holstein. *Mitglieder-Kompass.* [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://sh-gruene.de/mitglieder-kompass/

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Schöneiche. 2018. *Stammtisch im Oktober: wir gehen ins Kino!* [Online]. [Accessed 02 Oct 2020]. Available from: https://gruene-schoeneiche.de/veranstaltung/stammtisch-im-oktober-wir-gehen-ins-kino/

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Thüringen. 2018. *BDK mit Fokus auf #Europa und #DerAndereOsten.* [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://gruene-thueringen.de/bdk-mit-fokus-auf-europa-und-derandereosten-20nov18/

Burger, R. and Soldt, R. 2021. Siegreich im grünen Kernmilieu. *Frankfurter Allgemeine.* [Online]. 27.09. [Accessed 12 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/bundestagswahl-die-gruenen-gewinnen-16-wahlkreise-direkt-17557790.html

Bürgin, A. and Oppermann, K. 2020. The party politics of learning from failure: the German Greens and the lessons drawn from the 2013 general election. *Environmental politics.* **29**(4), pp.609-627.

Carter, N. 2013. Greening the mainstream: party politics and the environment. *Environmental politics.* **22**(1), pp.73-94.

CDU Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein and FDP Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein. 2017. *Das Ziel verbindet: weltoffen, wirtschaftlich wie ökologisch stark, menschlich.* [Online]. [Accessed 08 Oct 2020]. Available from: https://www.schleswig-holstein.de/DE/Landesregierung/_documents/koalitionsvertrag2017_2022.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1

Chadwick, A. and Stromer-Galley, J. 2016. Digital media, power, and democracy in parties and election campaigns: Party decline or party renewal? *The International Journal of Press/Politics.* **21**(3), pp.283-293.

Chesters, G. and Welsh, I. 2010. *Social Movements: The Key Concepts.* London: Routledge.

Clark, E. 2015. Afterword: The Adventure of Generic Gentrification. In: Lees, L., et al. eds. *Global Gentrification: Uneven Development and Displacement.* Bristol: Policy Press, pp.453-456.

Close, C. and Delwit, P. 2016. Green parties and elections. In: Van Haute, E. ed. *Green parties in Europe.* London: Routledge, pp.241-264.

Coates, I. 1997. *Green ideology in theory and practice: an examination of theories of green politics in relation to a sociological investigation of the worldview of Green Party activists.* PhD thesis, University of Bristol.

Cohen, J.L. 2019. Hollow parties and their movement-ization: The populist conundrum. *Philosophy & social criticism.* **45**(9-10), pp.1084-1105.

Conway, D. 2021. Whose Lifestyle Matters at Johannesburg Pride? The Lifestylisation of LGBTQ+ Identities and the Gentrification of Activism. *Sociology.* **56**(1), pp.148-165.

Cooper, A. 2004. Social Movements in the Federal Republic. In: Sperling, J. ed. *Germany at fifty-five: Berlin ist nicht Bonn?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.206-226.

Cooper, A. 2014. Difficult Decisions: The GAL and "Schwarz-Grün" in Hamburg. *German Politics and Society.* **32**(4), pp.1-20.

Cooper, B. 2014. Hollywood's post-racial mirage: How pop culture got gentrified. *Salon.* [Online]. 25 Mar. [Accessed 15 May 2018]. Available from: https://www.salon.com/2014/03/25/hollywoods_post_racial_mirage_how_pop_culture_got_gentrified/

Corner, J. and Pels, D. 2003. The Re-styling of Politics. In: Corner, J. and Pels, D. eds. *Media and the restyling of politics: consumerism, celebrity and cynicism.* London: SAGE, pp.1-18.

Cosgrove, K.M. 2011. Political branding in the modern age: effective strategies, tools and techniques. In: Lees-Marshment, J. ed. *Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing.* London: Routledge, pp.122-138.

Crewe, E. 2015. *The House of Commons : an anthropology of MPs at work.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

"Das kann nicht ewig so weitergehen". 2019. *Stuttgarter Zeitung.* [Online]. 02 Apr. [Accessed 08 Oct 2020]. Available from: https://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.winfried-kretschmann-zu-klimastreiks-das-kann-nicht-ewig-so-weitergehen.157a4dff-0df4-4187-884b-2d68b664992d.html?fbclid=IwAR2Wf8K3Y3szbg9FHMS_53-4WbebTIIntQfjVGZaJjwfhyCTr_enp4bFPJI

Davies, L.J. 2018. From Flat Caps to Flat Whites. 15 May. *Fabian Society.* [Online]. [Accessed 17 Sep 2018]. Available from: https://fabians.org.uk/from-flat-caps-to-flat-whites/

de Oliver, M. 2019. Defending Gentrification as a Valid Collective Conception: Utilizing the Metanarrative of "Suburbia" as a Common Axis for the Diversity of Middle-Class Reurbanization Projects. *Urban affairs review (Thousand Oaks, Calif.).* **55**(5), pp.1487-1511.

Dean, J. 2019. Sorted for Memes and Gifs: Visual Media and Everyday Digital Politics. *Political studies review.* **17**(3), pp.255-266.

della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H. and Mosca, L. 2017. *Movement parties against austerity.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

della Porta, D. and LaFree, G. 2012. Guest editorial: Processes of radicalization and de-radicalization. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV).* **6**(1), pp.4-10.

Dennis, J. 2020. A party within a party posing as a movement? Momentum as a movement faction. *Journal of information technology & politics.* **17**(2), pp.97-113.

Dennison, J. 2017. *The Greens in British Politics: Protest, Anti-Austerity and the Divided Left.* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Detterbeck, K. 2016. Party Inertia amid Federal Change? Stability and Adaptation in German Parties. *German Politics.* **25**(2), pp.265-285.

Die Entzauberung der Grünen. 2013. *Focus Magazin.* [Online]. 13 Nov. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/die-entzauberung-der-gruenen-titel_id_2162935.html

Die Grünen. 1980. *Das Bundesprogramm.* [Online]. Saarbrücken. [Accessed 10 Jan 2018]. Available from: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/publikationen/1980_001_Grundsatzprogramm_Die_Gruenen.pdf

Dolezal, M. 2010. Exploring the stabilization of a political force: The social and attitudinal basis of green parties in the age of globalization. *West European Politics.* **33**(3), pp.534-552.

Dürr, M. 2018. *Die Grünen als führende Regierungspartei: Eine empirische Parteieliten- und Parteimitgliederstudie.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Elgot, J. 2022. Angela Rayner: police should 'shoot terrorists and ask questions second'. *The Guardian*. [Online]. 17 Feb. [Accessed 31 Mar 2022]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/17/angela-rayner-police-should-shoot-terrorists-and-ask-questions-second

Etzioni, A. 1970. *Demonstration democracy.* New York, NY: Gordon and Breach.

Eubel, C. 2012. Jamaika gescheitert, Schwarz-Grün nicht vom Tisch. *Der Tagesspiegel*. [Online]. 06 Jan. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/koalitions-aus-im-saarland-jamaika-gescheitert-schwarz-gruen-nicht-vom-tisch/6028882.html

Eubel, C. and Monath, H. 2017. "Schleswig-Holstein ist keine Blaupause für Jamaika im Bund". *Der Tagesspiegel*. [Online]. 26 Aug. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gruenen-politiker-habeck-schleswig-holstein-ist-keine-blaupause-fuer-jamaika-im-bund/20242430.html

Fabritius, G. 1979. Sind Landtagswahlen Bundesteilwahlen? *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.* **29**, pp.23-38.

Fahlenbrach, K., Klimke, M. and Scharloth, J. 2016. *Protest Cultures: A Companion.* 1 ed. New York: Berghahn Books.

Falter, J.W. and Klein, M. 2003. *Der lange Weg der Grünen: eine Partei zwischen Protest und Regierung*. München: C. H. Beck.

Faucher, F. 1999. Party organisation and democracy–A comparison of Les Verts and the British Green Party. *GeoJournal.* **47**(3), pp.487-496.

Faucher, F. 2015. New forms of political participation. Changing demands or changing opportunities to participate in political parties? *Comparative European Politics.* **13**(4), pp.405-429.

Faucher-King, F. 2005. *Changing parties: an anthropology of British political party conferences.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fischer, S. and Höhne, V. 2019. "Das Konzept Volkspartei ist tot". *Spiegel Online.* [Online]. 29.10.2019. [Accessed 15 Nov 2019]. Available from: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/juergen-trittin-das-konzept-volkspartei-ist-tot-a-1293841.html

Florida, R.L. 2012. *The rise of the creative class: revisited.* New York: Basic Books.

Florida, R.L. 2017. *The new urban crisis : how our cities are increasing inequality, deepening segregation, and failing the middle class-- and what we can do about it.* New York: Basic Books.

Flyvbjerg, B. 2001. *Making social science matter: why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foster, E., Kerr, P., Hopkins, A., Byrne, C. and Ahall, L. 2013. The Personal is Not Political: At Least in the UK's Top Politics and IR Departments. *British journal of politics & international relations.* **15**(4), pp.566-585.

Fox, D. 2016. *Pretentiousness : why it matters.* London: Fitzcarraldo Editions.

Frankland, E.G. 2008. The Evolution of the Greens in Germany: From Amateurism to Professionalism. In: Frankland, E.G., et al. eds. *Green parties in transition: the end of grass-roots democracy?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp.19-41.

Frankland, E.G., Lucardie, P. and Rihoux, B. eds. 2008. *Green parties in transition: the end of grass-roots democracy?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Frankland, E.G. and Schoonmaker, D. 1992. *Between protest and power: the Green Party in Germany.* Boulder, CO: Westview Pr.

Gahrton, P. 2015. *Green parties, green future: from local groups to the international stage.* London: Pluto Press.

Gassert, P. 2018. *Bewegte Gesellschaft: Deutsche Protestgeschichte seit 1945.* [Online]. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.

Gauja, A. 2015. The construction of party membership. *European Journal of Political Research.* **54**(2), pp.232-248.

Gerl, K., Marschall, S. and Wilker, N. 2016. Innerparteiliche Demokratie 2.0? Intra-Party Democracy 2.0? *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft.* **10**(2), pp.115-149.

Gerl, K., Marschall, S. and Wilker, N. 2018. Does the Internet Encourage Political Participation? Use of an Online Platform by Members of a German Political Party. *Policy & Internet.* **10**(1), pp.87-118.

Glaser, A. 2012. From Brokdorf to Fukushima: The long journey to nuclear phase-out. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists.* **68**(6), pp.10-21.

Glass, R.L. 1964. *London: aspects of change.* London: MacGibbon & Kee.

Goffman, E. 1956. *The presentation of self in everyday life.* Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Centre.

Goldstone, J.A. 2003. Bridging Institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics. In: Goldstone, J.A. ed. *States, parties, and social movements.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-24.

Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J.M. 2015. *The social movements reader: cases and concepts.* Third edition. ed. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley.

Granik, S. 2005. A Reconceptualisation of the Antecedents of Party Activism: A Multidisciplinary Approach. *Political studies.* **53**(3), pp.598-620.

Grün ist das neue Rot: Wie eine frühere Protestpartei an die Macht drängt. 2018. *Frankfurt Allgemeine Woche.* (43).

Grüne beschließen Grundsatzprogramm. 2020. *tagesschau.* [Online]. 22 Nov. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gruenen-parteitag-141.html

Grüne Jugend fordert mutige Visionen. 2018. *Neue Presse.* [Online]. 13 Apr. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.neuepresse.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Deutschland-Welt/Gruene-Jugend-fordert-mutige-Visionen

Grüne löschen Habeck-Video nach Shitstorm. 2019. *Der Spiegel*. [Online]. 06 Jan. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/robert-habeck-blamiert-sich-mit-wahlkampfvideo-zu-thueringen-a-1246688.html

Güllner, M. 2012. *Die Grünen: Höhenflug oder Absturz?* Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder GmbH.

Günther, G. 2018. "Es ist wichtig, neue Allianzen zu schmieden". *Das Magazin der Grünen: Kein wohin ohne woher - Schwerpunkt Haltung*. [Online]. pp.18-21. [Accessed 15 Nov 2019]. Available from: https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/2018-03_Magazin_Gruene.pdf

Gunther, R. and Diamond, L. 2003. Species of political parties: A new typology. *Party Politics*. **9**(2), pp.167-199.

Gürgen, M. and Schulte, U. 2018. Grüne stellen sich hinter Bayram. *taz*. [Online]. 10 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 21]. Available from: https://taz.de/Ermittlungen-wegen-Frauenmarsch/!5542264/

Habeck, R. 2019a. Bye bye, twitter und Facebook. 07 Jan. [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.robert-habeck.de/texte/blog/bye-bye-twitter-und-facebook/

Habeck, R. 2019b. Vom „Das-wird-man-doch-sagen-dürfen" oder: Warum Angela Merkel jetzt schon fehlt. 07 Mar. [Online]. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.robert-habeck.de/texte/blog/vom-das-wird-man-doch-sagen-duerfen/

Habeck will Grüne zur «attraktiven Bewegungspartei» machen. 2017. *Die Welt*. [Online]. 11 Dec. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/brennpunkte_nt/article171494299/Habeck-will-Gruene-zur-attraktiven-Bewegungspartei-machen.html

Habermas, J. 1999. *The structural transformation of the public sphere : an enquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Hager, C. 2019. Green Politics, Expertise, and Democratic Discourse in the Two Germanies, 1989–2019. *German politics and society*. **37**(4), pp.1-14.

Hamnett, C. 1991. The blind men and the elephant: the explanation of gentrification. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*. pp.173-189.

Hamnett, C. 1994. Socio-economic change in London: professionalization not polarization. *Built Environment* **20**(3), pp.192-203.

Haßler, J., Kümpel, A.S. and Keller, J. 2021. Instagram and political campaigning in the 2017 German federal election. A quantitative content analysis of German top politicians' and parliamentary parties' posts. *Information, communication & society.* pp.1-21.

Heidtmann, J. 2017. AfD drittstärkste Kraft im Bundestag, herbe Verluste für Union und SPD. *Süddeutsche Zeitung.* [Online]. 25 Sep. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundestagswahl-2017-historische-verluste-fuer-union-und-spd-afd-zweistellig-1.3681185

Hiersemenzel, C. 2019. Streit um neue Abschiebehaftanstalt. *Kieler Nachrichten.* [Online]. 31 Jan. [Accessed 07 Oct 2020]. Available from: https://www.kn-online.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Anhoerung-im-Ausschuss-Streit-um-neue-Abschiebehaftanstalt-Glueckstadt

Hildebrandt, T. 2019. "Habeck kann Kanzler werden". *Die Zeit.* [Online]. 07 Aug. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/2019/33/daniel-cohn-bendit-die-gruenen-robert-habeck-kanzler/komplettansicht

Hodzic, S. 2014. Feminist bastards: Toward a post-humanist critique of NGOization. In: Bernal, V. and Grewal, I. eds. *Theorizing NGOs: States, Feminisms, and Neoliberalism.* Durham: Duke University Press, pp.221-247.

Hoffmann, H. and Springer, F. 2019. The Individual-Level Determinants of German Party Membership. *German politics.* **28**(2), pp.242-261.

Hofmann, L. 2018. Grüne verlieren erneut Bezirkspolitiker an die SPD. *Der Tagesspiegel.* [Online]. 16 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/berlin-mitte-gruene-verlieren-erneut-bezirkspolitiker-an-die-spd/23192618.html

Höhne, V. 2018. Links, Mitte, ach egal. *Spiegel Online.* [Online]. 24 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-gruenen-vor-der-landtagswahl-in-hessen-sie-wollen-wachsen-a-1234904.html

Höhne, V. 2019. Hurra, die Welt geht unter. *Spiegel Online.* [Online]. 06.10. [Accessed 15.11.2019]. Available from: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-gruenen-im-aufschwung-eine-vision-fuer-die-zukunft-fehlt-a-1289731.html

Holly, W. 1990. *Politikersprache: Inszenierungen und Rollenkonflikte im informellen Sprachhandeln eines Bundestagsabgeordneten.* Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hölter, K., Röhlig, M. and Wadhawan, J. 2018. U30 und nicht ernst genommen: Was junge Menschen in der Politik erleben. *Spiegel Online*. [Online]. 23 Jan. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/lasse-petersdotter-moritz-heuberger-ria-schroeder-ronja-kemmer-u-30-politiker-wollen-ernst-genommen-werden-a-00000000-0003-0001-0000-000002039171

Hörisch, F. and Wurster, S. 2017a. *Das grün-rote Experiment in Baden-Württemberg: Eine Bilanz der Landesregierung Kretschmann 2011-2016.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

Hörisch, F. and Wurster, S. 2017b. Einleitung „Das grün-rote Experiment: Politikwechsel nach 57 Jahren CDU-Regierung?". In: Hörisch, F. and Wurster, S. eds. *Das grün-rote Experiment in Baden-Württemberg.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.1-13.

Hough, D., Koss, M. and Olsen, J. 2007. *The Left Party in contemporary German politics.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hughes, M.L. 2015. Rechtsstaat and Recht in West Germany's Nuclear Power Debate, 1975–1983. *Law and history review.* **33**(2), pp.411-434.

Huse, T. 2014. *Everyday life in the gentrifying city : on displacement, ethnic privileging and the right to stay put.* Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Huse, T. 2018. Gentrification and ethnicity. In: Lees, L. and Phillips, M. eds. *Handbook of gentrification studies.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.186-204.

Hutter, S. 2014. *Protesting culture and economics in Western Europe: New cleavages in left and right politics.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hutter, S., Kriesi, H. and Lorenzini, J. 2019. Social Movements in Interaction with Political Parties. In: Snow, D.A., et al. eds. *The Wlley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, pp.322-337.

Hutter, S. and Vliegenthart, R. 2016. Who responds to protest? Protest politics and party responsiveness in Western Europe. *Party Politics.* **24**(4), pp.358-369.

Hyra, D.S. 2017. *Race, class, and politics in the Cappuccino City.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Style among Western Publics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. 2017. Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse. *Perspectives on Politics.* **15**(2), pp.443-454.

Jachnow, J. 2013. What's Become of the German Greens? *New Left Review.* **81**, pp.94-117.

Jacobsen, E. 2017. Political consumption – citizenship and consumerism. In: Keller, M., et al. eds. *Routledge Handbook on Consumption.* 1 ed. London: Routledge, pp.181-190.

Jasper, J.M. 2010. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements. In: Klandermans, B. and Roggeband, C. eds. *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines.* New York, NY: Springer, pp.58-109.

Joachim, K. and Feld, C. 2022. Warum der Protest bei den Grünen ausbleibt. *Tagesschau.de.* [Online]. 03 Mar. [Accessed 03 Mar 2022]. Available from: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/gruene-krieg-101.html

Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. 1997. *The protest business? Mobilizing Campaign Groups.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Joseph, L.J., Mahler, M. and Auyero, J. 2007. *New perspectives in political ethnography.* New York, NY: Springer.

Junge, C. and Lempp, J. 2007. Einführung: Parteien in Berlin. In: Junge, C. and Lempp, J. eds. *Parteien in Berlin.* Berlin: be.bra wissenschaft verlag, pp.9-22.

Jungjohann, A. 2016. *Grün regieren: Eine Analyse der Regierungspraxis von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.* Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Kade, C. and Poschardt, U. 2018. „Dass das Rechtsbruch ist, ist klar wie Kloßbrühe". *Welt.* [Online]. 23 May. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article176606425/Robert-Habeck-Hausbesetzungen-in-Berlin-sind-Rechtsbruch.html?wtmc=socialmedia.twitter.shared.web

Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L.M. and Read, B.L. 2015. *Field research in political science: practices and principles.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. 1992. Introduction: The Cross-National Study of Party Organizations. In: Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. eds. *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-90.* London: Sage Publications, pp.1-20.

Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. 1994. The evolution of party organizations in Europe: the three faces of party organization. *American Review of Politics.* **14**, pp.593-617.

Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. 1995. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. *Party politics.* **1**(1), pp.5-28.

Kent-Stoll, P. 2020. The racial and colonial dimensions of gentrification. *Sociology Compass.* **14**(12), pp.1-17.

Kitschelt, H. 1986. Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. *British journal of political science.* **16**(1), pp.57-85.

Kitschelt, H. 1989. *The logics of party formation: Ecological politics in Belgium and West Germany.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kitschelt, H. 2006. Movement parties. In: Katz, R.S. and Crotty, W.J. eds. *Handbook of party politics.* London: Sage Publications, pp.278-290.

Klapsa, K. 2018. Wie Wagenknecht rot-rot-grüne Träume stört. *Welt.de*. [Online]. 04 Jul. [Accessed 20 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article178752292/Linkes-Buendnis-Wie-Sahra-Wagenknecht-rot-rot-gruene-Traeume-stoert.html

Kotler, P. and Armstrong, G. 2016. *Principles of marketing.* 16e, Global edition. ed. Boston: Pearson.

Krafft, E. 2022. Ukraine – Wie Baerbock ihre Kritiker eines Besseren belehrte. *Kick-Off Politik*. [Podcast]. [Accessed 10 Mar 2022]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/podcasts/kick-off/article237250723/Baerbock-zeigt-Kante-Von-der-umstrittenen-Kanzlerkandidatin-zur-Staatsfrau-Podcast.html

Krajewski, C. 2015. Arm, sexy und immer teurer: Wohnungsmarktentwicklung und Gentrification in Berlin. *Standort (Berlin, Germany).* **39**(2), pp.77-85.

Kraushaar, W. 2008. *Achtundsechzig: eine Bilanz.* Berlin: Propyläen-Verlag.

Kraushaar, W. 2011. Protest der Privilegierten? Oder: Was ist wirklich neu an den Demonstrationen gegen „Stuttgart 21 ". *Mittelweg.* **36**(20), pp.5-22.

Kriesi, H. 2004. Political Context and Opportunity. In: Snow, D.A., et al. eds. *The Blackwell companion to social movements.* Oxford: Blackwell, pp.pp. 67-90.

Kriesi, H. 2014. The Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis in Europe. In: Bartels, L. and Bermeo, N. eds. *Mass politics in tough times: Opinions, votes and protest in the great recession.* [Online]. Oxford Scholarship Online. [Accessed 16 Jan 2018]. Available from: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357505.001.0001/acprof-9780199357505-chapter-10

Kriesi, H. 2015. Party Systems, Electoral Systems, and Social Movements. In: Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J.W. and Giugni, M.G. 1995. *New social movements in Western Europe: A comparative analysis.* London: UCL Press.

Kronenberg, V. ed. 2016. *Schwarz-Grün: Erfahrungen und Perspektiven.* Wiesbaden: Springer.

Kubik, J. 2009. Ethnography of Politics: Foundations, Applications, Prospects. In: Schatz, E. ed. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.23-52.

Kuhn, P. 2018. So ungeniert feiern Grüne und Linke die Berliner Hausbesetzer. *Welt.* [Online]. 22 May. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article176587105/Rhetorischer-Haeuserkampf-Gruene-und-Linke-feiern-die-Hausbesetzer.html

Kundnani, H. 2009. *Utopia or Auschwitz : Germany's 1968 generation and the Holocaust.* London: Hurst.

Landeshauptstadt Potsdam Statistik und Wahlen. 2020. Die Landeshauptstädte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im statistischen Vergleich 2018. *Statistischer Informationsdienst* [Online]. **1**. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.potsdam.de/sites/default/files/documents/vergleich_landeshauptstaedte_2018_online_0_0.pdf

Lang, S. 1997. The NGOization of feminism. In: Scott, J.W., et al. eds. *Transitions, environments, translations : feminisms in international politics* London: Routledge, pp.101-117.

Lau, M. 2013. Die tot-grüne Koalition. *Die Zeit.* [Online]. 21 Mar. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/2013/13/Gruene-Sozialpolitik/komplettansicht

Laube, S. 2018. Unsichtbare Stützen des Politikbetriebs. In: Brichzin, J., et al. eds. *Soziologie der Parlamente: Neue Wege der politischen Institutionenforschung.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, pp.209-230.

Lees, C. 2000. *The Red-Green coalition in Germany: Politics, personalities and power.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Lees, C. 2018. The German Greens and the 2017 Federal Election: Between Strategic Calculation and Real-World Politics. *German politics.* **27**(1), pp.124-130.

Lees, L., Slater, T. and Wyly, E. 2008. *Gentrification.* London: Routledge.

Lees-Marshment, J. and Pettitt, R.T. 2014. Mobilising volunteer activists in political parties: the view from central office. *Contemporary Politics.* **20**(2), pp.246-260.

Lefort, C. 1988. *Democracy and political theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lehmbruch, G. 1975. Der Januskopf der Ortsparteien. *Der Bürger im Staat.* **25**(1).

Lempp, J. 2007. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Berlin. In: Junge, C. and Lempp, J. eds. *Parteien in Berlin.* Berlin: be.bra wissenschaft verlag, pp.123-139.

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. 2018. *How democracies die.* New York, NY: Crown.

Ley, D. 1994. Gentrification and the politics of the new middle class. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space.* **12**(1), pp.53-74.

Ley, D. 1996. *The new middle class and the remaking of the central city.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Linhart, E. 2019. Wahlsystem, Wahlen und Parteiensystem in Schleswig-Holstein. In: Knelangen, W. and Boyken, F. eds. *Politik und Regieren in Schleswig-Holstein: Grundlagen - politisches System - Politikfelder und Probleme.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.191-214.

Litschko, K. 2018. Grüne nach "Frauenmarsch" im Visier: Bayram soll Immunität verlieren. *taz.de*. [Online]. 09 Oct. [Accessed 06 Oct 2020]. Available from: https://taz.de/Gruene-nach-Frauenmarsch-im-Visier/!5538523/

Lösche, P. 2010. Ende der Volksparteien. *Sozialwissenschaftlicher Fachinformationsdienst soFid.* (Politische Soziologie 2010/1), pp.9-16.

Löwenstein, S. 2011. Die neue Volkspartei. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. [Online]. 30 Mar. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/wahl-in-baden-wuerttemberg/gruene-im-aufwind-die-neue-volkspartei-1611546.html

Loy, T. 2018. Deutsche Wohnen kauft 700 Wohnungen in der Karl-Marx-Allee. *Der Tagesspiegel*. [Online]. 06 Nov. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/berlin-friedrichshain-deutsche-wohnen-kauft-700-wohnungen-in-der-karl-marx-allee/23584888.html

Lucardie, P. and Rihoux, B. 2008. From Amateur-Activist to Professional-Electoral Parties? On the Organizational Transformation of Green Parties in Western Democracies. In: Frankland, E.G., et al. eds. *Green parties in transition: the end of grass-roots democracy?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp.3-16.

Luebke, S.M. 2021. Political Authenticity: Conceptualization of a Popular Term. *The international journal of press/politics.* **26**(3), pp.635-653.

Maier, R. 2016. Assimilation of Protest Codes: Advertisement and Mainstream Culture. In: Fahlenbrach, K., et al. eds. *Protest Cultures: A Companion.* New York: Berghahn Books, pp.479-487.

Mair, P. 2006. Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy. *New Left Review.* **42**, pp.25-51.

Maksan, O. 2022. Konflikt mit Russland: Deutschlands Sicherheit könnte in schlechteren Händen sein. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. [Online]. 08 Mar. [Accessed 08 Mar 2022]. Available from: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/der-andere-blick/krieg-in-der-ukraine-scholz-und-baerbock-souveraener-als-erwartet-ld.1673340?reduced=true

Markovits, A.S. and Gorski, P.S. 1993. *The German left: red, green and beyond.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Markovits, A.S. and Klaver, J. 2015. Alive and Well into the Fourth Decade of Their Bundestag Presence: A Tally of the Greens' Impact on the Federal Republic of Germany's Political Life and Public Culture. *German Politics and Society.* **33**(4), pp.112-140.

Marland, A. and Wagner, A. 2020. Scripted Messengers: How Party Discipline and Branding Turn Election Candidates and Legislators into Brand Ambassadors. *Journal of political marketing.* **19**(1-2), pp.54-73.

Marsh, D. and Fawcett, P. 2011. Branding, politics and democracy. *Policy studies.* **32**(5), pp.515-530.

Masson, D. 2015. Institutionalization, State Funding, and Advocacy in the Quebec Women's Movement. In: Ramos, H. and Rodgers, K. eds. *Protest and Politics: The Promise of Social Movement Societies.* Vancouver: UBC Press, pp.79-97.

Mayer, M. and Ely, J. eds. 1998. *The German Greens: Paradox between movement and party.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

McAdam, D. 1999. *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970.* 2nd ed. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. and Tarrow, S. 2010. Ballots and barricades: On the reciprocal relationship between elections and social movements. *Perspectives on Politics.* **8**(2), pp.529-542.

McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. 1973. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization.* Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation.

McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. 1977. Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American journal of sociology.* **82**(6), pp.1212-1241.

McDonald's UK. 2018. *McCafé - Flat What? .* [Online] [Accessed 23 Jul 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnyOHZXUzTI&ab_channel=McDonald%27sUK

McGuinness, D. 2018. Germany's Greens are older, wiser and doing well. *The Economist.* [Online]. 27 Sep. [Accessed 25 Mar 2019]. Available from: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/09/27/germanys-greens-are-older-wiser-and-doing-well

Meguid, B.M. 2008. *Party competition between unequals : strategies and electoral fortunes in Western Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mende, S. 2011. *"Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn": eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen.* München: Oldenbourg.

Mende, S. 2012. Von der «Anti-Parteien-Partei» zur «ökologischen Reformpartei». Die Grünen im Wandel des Politischen. *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte.* **52**, pp.273-315.

Meyer, D.S. and Tarrow, S. 1998a. A movement society: Contentious politics for a new century. *The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.1-28.

Meyer, D.S. and Tarrow, S. eds. 1998b. *The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Michels, R. 1968. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

Milder, S. 2019. *Greening democracy : the anti-nuclear movement and political environmentalism in West Germany and beyond, 1968-1983.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, C.M. 2021. *Gendering the everyday in the UK House of Commons : beneath the spectacle.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moffitt, B. 2016. *The global rise of populism : performance, political style, and representation.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. 2014. Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. *Political studies.* **62**(2), pp.381-397.

Morozov, E. 2011. *The net delusion: How not to liberate the world.* London: Penguin.

Muldoon, J. and Rye, D. 2020. Conceptualising party-driven movements. *British journal of politics & international relations.* **22**(3), pp.485-504.

Müller-Rommel, F. 1985. Social Movements and the Greens: New Internal Politics in Germany. *European journal of political research.* **13**(1), pp.53-67.

Müller-Rommel, F. 1989. *New politics in Western Europe: The rise and success of green parties and alternative lists.* London: Westview Press.

Mushaben, J.M. 1986. Grassroots and Gewaltfreie Aktionen: A Study of Mass Mobilization Strategies in the West German Peace Movement. *Journal of peace research.* **23**(2), pp.141-154.

Nahema, M., Lisa-Maria, N., Bence, K. and Philip, N.H. 2021. Investigating Visual Content Shared over Twitter during the 2019 EU Parliamentary Election Campaign. *Media and communication.* **9**(1), pp.158-170.

Neidhardt, F. and Rucht, D. 1993. Auf dem Weg in die „Bewegungsgesellschaft "? Über die Stabilisierbarkeit sozialer Bewegungen. *Soziale Welt.* **44**(3), pp.305-326.

Newman, G.E. and Smith, R.K. 2016. Kinds of Authenticity. *Philosophy compass.* **11**(10), pp.609-618.

Niedermayer, O. 2020. Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2020. *Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum.* **31**.

Nielsen, R.K. 2012. *Ground wars : personalized communication in political campaigns.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nonnenmacher, A. and Spier, T. 2014. Der Einfluss der Gruppengröße auf die Aktivität von Parteimitgliedern. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.* **66**(1), pp.369-393.

O'Neill, M. 2000. Preparing for power: the German Greens and the challenge of party politics. *Contemporary politics.* **6**(2), pp.165-184.

Olson, M. 1965. *Logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Oltermann, P. 2019. CDU leader sparks row with joke about gender-neutral bathrooms. *The Guardian*. [Online]. 04 Mar. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/04/cdu-leader-annegret-kramp-karrenbauer-gender-neutral-bathrooms-row

Opp, K.-D. 2009. *Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Ostrogorski, M. 1908. *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties Vol 1.* [Online]. 2nd ed. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company. [Accessed 11.05.2018]. Available from: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019981201;view=1up;seq=9

Panebianco, A. 1988. *Political parties: organization and power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parbey, C. 2018. „Mir wurden im Leben häufig Dinge nicht zugetraut, weil ich eine Frau und weil ich Schwarz bin". *Edition F*. [Online]. 16 Jan. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://editionf.com/interview-mit-aminata-toure/

Passmann, S. 2019. *Alte weisse Männer: ein Schlichtungsversuch.* Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.

Pausch, R. 2019. Protest braucht ein Gesicht. *Die Zeit*. [Online]. 03 Apr. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-04/juergen-trittin-protestbewegung-gruene-aktivismus

Peña, A.M. 2021. Activist Parties and Hybrid Party Behaviours: A Typological Reassessment of Partisan Mobilisation. *Political studies review.* **19**(4), pp.637-655.

Pettitt, R.T. 2012. Internal party political relationship marketing: encouraging activism amongst local party members. In: Lees-Marshment, J. ed. *Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing.* Oxford: Routledge, pp.151-164.

Phoenix. 2010. *19.11.2010, Teil 2, Parteitag Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (von 19.00 bis 20.00 Uhr).* [Online] [Accessed 31 Mar 2022]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6buHBsPQqUA

Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A. 1991. Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society.* **4**(4), pp.435-458.

Poguntke, T. 1993. *Alternative Politics: The German Green Party.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Poguntke, T. 1998. Alliance 90/The Greens in East Germany: From Vanguard to Insignificance? *Party Politics.* **4**(1), pp.33-55.

Poguntke, T. 2002. Green parties in national governments: From protest to acquiescence? *Environmental Politics.* **11**(1), pp.133-145.

Poguntke, T. and Schmitt-Beck, R. 1994. Still the same with a new name? Bündnis 90/Die Grünen after the fusion. *German Politics.* **3**(1), pp.91-113.

politik&kommunikation. 2017. Das sind die Rising Stars 2017! [Online]. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.politik-kommunikation.de/politik/das-sind-die-rising-stars-2017/

Poschardt, U. 2018. Keine Show sieht besser aus als die der Grünen. *Die Welt.* [Online]. 19 Oct. [Accessed 01 Apr 2022]. Available from: https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus182392654/Die-Gruenen-Keine-Show-sieht-besser-aus-als-die-der-Oeko-Partei.html

Power, S. and Dommett, K. 2020. From multi-speed to multi-stream? Recognising the motivations, processes and triggers behind party membership. *British journal of politics & international relations.* **22**(3), pp.505-522.

Price-Thomas, G. 2016. Green party ideology today: Divergences and continuities in Germany, France and Britain. In: Van Haute, E. ed. *Green Parties in Europe.* London: Routledge, pp.280-297.

Probst, L. 2011. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen auf dem Weg zur „Volkspartei "? Eine Analyse der Entwicklung der Grünen seit der Bundestagswahl 2005. *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2009.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp.131-156.

Probst, L. 2015. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Absturz nach dem Höhenflug. In: Niedermayer, O. ed. *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2013.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp.135-158.

Probst, L. 2020. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Grüne Erfolgswelle nach enttäuschendem Wahlergebnis. In: Jun, U. and Niedermayer, O. eds. *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2017: Aktuelle Entwicklungen des Parteienwettbewerbs in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.187-219.

Pross, H. 1992. *Protestgesellschaft: von der Wirksamkeit des Widerspruchs.* Munich: Artemis und Winkler.

Ramos, H. and Rodgers, K. eds. 2015. *Protest and Politics: The Promise of Social Movement Societies.* Vancouver: UBC Press.

Rancière, J. and Rockhill, G. 2013. *The politics of aesthetics.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Raschke, J. 1993. *Die Grünen : wie sie wurden, was sie sind.* Köln: Bund-Verlag.

Reichardt, S. 2014. *Authentizität und Gemeinschaft : linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren.* 1. Auflage. ed. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Reitz, T. and Jörke, D. 2021. The reshaping of political representation in post-growth capitalism: A paradigmatic analysis of green and right-wing populist parties. *Anthropological theory.* **21**(3), pp.287-314.

Rhodes, R.A.W. 2017. *Interpretive political science: selected essays. Volume II.* First ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richter, S. 2013. Paradoxie gesellschaftlicher Revolutionen. Wie Grüne und Piraten den Zeitgeist verloren *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.* **63**(48-49).

Richter, S. 2016. Die Grünen: Eine bürgerliche Partei? In: Kronenberg, V. ed. *Schwarz-Grün: Erfahrungen und Perspektiven.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.23-29.

Riese, D. 2019. Weg vom weißen Privileg. *Taz.* [Online]. 05 Sep. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://taz.de/Die-Gruenen-fuer-mehr-Repraesentanz/!5620899/

Rihoux, B. 2016. Green party organisations: The difficult path from amateur-activist to professional-electoral logics. In: Van Haute, E. ed. *Green Parties in Europe.* Oxford; New York: Routledge, pp.298-314.

Rihoux, B. and Frankland, E.G. 2008. The Metamorphosis of Amateur-Activist Newborns into Professional-Activist Centaurs. In: Frankland, E.G., et al. eds. *Green parties in transition: the end of grass-roots democracy?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp.259-287.

Roggeband, C. and Klandermans, B. 2010. Introduction. In: Klandermans, B. and Roggeband, C. eds. *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines.* New York, NY: Springer.

Roggeband, C. and Klandermans, B. eds. 2017. *Handbook of social movements across disciplines.* 2nd ed. Cham: Springer.

Rose, D. 1984. Rethinking gentrification: beyond the uneven development of Marxist urban theory. *Environment and planning D: Society and Space.* **2**(1), pp.47-74.

Roth, J. 2018. *An der Basis der Politik: ethnographische Erkundungen in einem lokalen Parteibezirk.* Münster: Waxmann Verlag.

Roth, R. 1991. Gegen Eliten oder Gegeneliten? Grüne und neue soziale Bewegungen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik. In: Klingemann, H.-D., et al. eds. *Politische Klasse und politische Institutionen: Probleme und Perspektiven der Elitenforschung.* Wiesbaden: Springer, pp.434-465.

Roy, S. 2015. The Indian women's movement: Within and beyond NGOization. *Journal of South Asian Development.* **10**(1), pp.96-117.

Rucht, D. 1998. The structure and culture of collective protest in Germany since 1950. In: Meyer, D.S. and Tarrow, S. eds. *The social movement society.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.29-58.

Rucht, D. 2003. The changing role of political protest movements. *West European Politics.* **26**(4), pp.153-176.

Rucht, D. 2017. Exploring the Backstage: Preparation and Implementation of Mass Protests in Germany. *The American behavioral scientist* **61**(13), pp.1678-1702.

Rucht, D. and Neidhardt, F. 2002. Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the possibilities of institutionalizing social movements. *Social Movement Studies.* **1**(1), pp.7-30.

Rüdig, W. 2008. Green Party Organization in Britain: Change and Continuity. In: Frankland, E.G., et al. eds. *Green parties in transition: the end of grass-roots democracy?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp.199-223.

Rüdig, W. 2012. The perennial success of the German Greens. *Environmental Politics.* **21**(1), pp.108-130.

Rüdig, W. 2014. The Greens in the German federal elections of 2013. *Environmental Politics.* **23**(1), pp.159-165.

Rüdig, W. 2018. The German Greens in the 2017 federal elections. *Environmental Politics.* **27**(5), pp.939-945.

Rüdig, W. and Sajuria, J. 2020. Green party members and grass-roots democracy:A comparative analysis. *Party Politics.* **26**(1), pp.21-31.

Rüdiger, J. 2018. "Gaga-Grüne": Parteichef Habeck über hartnäckige Vorurteile. *Berliner Morgenpost.* [Online]. 22 Jul. [Accessed 15 Jan 2019]. Available from: https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article214894803/Gaga-Gruene-Parteichef-Habeck-ueber-hartnaeckige-Vorurteile.html

Saarländischer Rundfunk. 2019. *Narrenschau 2019 – Putzfrau Gretel vom Landtag (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer).* [Online] [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzAUQqp3YPA

Sarnow, M. 2019. „Wir kaufen den Kiez zurück ": Milieuschutz und Vorkaufsrecht als Ansätze einer postneoliberalen Wohnraumversorgung in Berlin Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg? *sub\urban. zeitschrift für kritische stadtforschung.* **7**(1/2), pp.115-136.

Scammell, M. 2015. Politics and Image: The Conceptual Value of Branding. *Journal of political marketing.* **14**(1-2), pp.7-18.

Scarrow, S. 2015. *Beyond party members: changing approaches to partisan mobilization.* [Online]. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online [Accessed 17 Jan 2018]. Available from: http://0-www.oxfordscholarship.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661862.001.0001/acprof-9780199661862

Scarrow, S. 2019. Multi-Speed Parties and Representation: The Evolution of Party Affiliation in Germany. *German politics.* **28**(2), pp.162-182.

Scarrow, S., Webb, P.D. and Poguntke, T. eds. 2017. *Organizing Political Parties: Representation, Participation, and Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schatz, E. 2009a. Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics. In: Schatz, E. ed. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.1-22.

Schatz, E. ed. 2009b. *Political ethnography : what immersion contributes to the study of power.* Chicago, : University of Chicago Press.

Schatz, E. 2009c. What Kind(s) of Ethnography Does Political Science Need? In: Schatz, E. ed. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.303-318.

Scheffer, T. 2014. Die Arbeit an den Positionen - Zur Mikrofundierung von Politik in Abgeordnetenbüros des Deutschen Bundestages. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie.* **Sonderheft**, pp.369-389.

Schlichtman, J.J., Patch, J. and Hill, M.L. 2017. *Gentrifier.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Schmidt, T.E. 2018. Fortschrittlich gegen die da unten. *Die Zeit.* [Online]. 01 Aug. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/amp/2018/32/demokratie-postdemokratie-mittelschicht-modernisierungsverlierer?__twitter_impression=true

Schöne, H. 2010. *Alltag im Parlament: Parlamentskultur in Theorie und Empirie.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Schramme, T. and Siller, P. 2006. Leftovers as party-poopers: the performance of the German Greens in the federal election of september 2005 and the rise of the left party. *Environmental Politics.* **15**(3), pp.479-484.

Schulman, S. 2013. *The gentrification of the mind : witness to a lost imagination.* Berkeley ; Los Angeles: University Of California Press.

Schulte, U. 2018. „Eine neue Radikalität ist nötig". *taz.* [Online]. 03 Apr. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://taz.de/Gruener-zu-veraenderten-Zielen-der-Partei/!5495058/

Schwartz-Shea, P. and Yanow, D. 2012. *Interpretive research design : concepts and processes.* New York, N.Y.; London: Routledge.

Schwarze, T. 2013. Und dann kam Ströbele. *Zeit Online.* [Online]. 01 Nov. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-11/stroebele-snowden-brief-pressekonferenz/komplettansicht

Segler, D. 2021. ARD-Sommerinterview mit Annalena Baerbock: Unfaire Fragen und ständige Unterbrechungen. *Frankfurter Rundschau.* [Online]. 24 Aug. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.fr.de/kultur/tv-

kino/annalena-baerbock-ard-sommerinterview-gruene-bundestagswahl-interview-fragen-90935731.html

Serazio, M. 2017. Branding politics: Emotion, authenticity, and the marketing culture of American political communication. *Journal of consumer culture.* **17**(2), pp.225-241.

Seyd, P. and Whiteley, P. 2002. *New Labour's grassroots: The transformation of the Labour Party membership.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shin, H.B., Lees, L. and López-Morales, E. 2016. Introduction: Locating gentrification in the Global East. *Urban Studies.* **53**(3), pp.455-470.

Siegert, J. 1986. *Wenn das Spielbein dem Standbein ein Bein stellt.* Kassel: Weber, Zucht & Co.

Sigmund, T. 2017. „Es ist besser, nicht zu regieren, als falsch zu regieren". *Wirtschaftswoche.* [Online]. 20 Nov. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/fdp-chef-christian-lindner-es-ist-besser-nicht-zu-regieren-als-falsch-zu-regieren/20604956.html

Simons, J. 2008. Aestheticisation of Politics: From Fascism to Radical Democracy. *Journal for cultural research.* **12**(3), pp.207-229.

Smith, G. and French, A. 2009. The political brand: A consumer perspective. *Marketing theory.* **9**(2), pp.209-226.

Smith, N. 1979. Toward a theory of gentrification a back to the city movement by capital, not people. *Journal of the American Planning Association.* **45**(4), pp.538-548.

Smith, N. 1987. Gentrification and the Rent Gap. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers.* **77**(3), pp.462-465.

Soltau, H. 2019. Bei ihr sieht es einfach aus. *Zeit Online.* [Online]. 29 Mar. [Accessed 15 Nov 21]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2019-03/klimaprotest-berlin-greta-thunberg-fridays-for-future/komplettansicht

Spahn, J. 2017. Sprechen Sie doch deutsch! *Die Zeit.* [Online]. 23 Aug. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.zeit.de/2017/35/berlin-cafes-hipster-englisch-sprache-jens-spahn

Spier, T. 2019. Not Dead Yet? Explaining Party Member Activity in Germany. *German politics.* **28**(2), pp.282-303.

Spier, T. and Klein, M. 2015. Party membership in Germany: rather formal, therefore uncool? In: Van Haute, E. and Gauja, A. eds. *Party members and activists.* Abingdon: Routledge, pp.104-119.

Spier, T., Klein, M., Von Alemann, U., Hoffmann, H., Laux, A., Nonnenmacher, A. and Rohrbach, K. eds. 2011. *Parteimitglieder in Deutschland.* 1. Auflage. ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Spoon, J.-J., Hobolt, S.B. and de Vries, C.E. 2014. Going green: Explaining issue competition on the environment. *European journal of political research.* **53**(2), pp.363-380.

Springer, F., Klein, M., Lüdecke, Y., Becker, P., Czeczinski, L. and Schmidt, B. 2021. Getting in, moving up, dropping out. The threefold social selectivity of participation in political parties - an empirical analysis of party members, former party members and the general public in Germany in 2017. *European politics and society.* **22**(1), pp.121-139.

Staley, W. 2018. When 'Gentrification' Isn't About Housing. *The New York Times Magazine.* [Online]. 23 Jan. [Accessed 14 Sep 2018]. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/magazine/when-gentrification-isnt-about-housing.html

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2021. *Floor area according to types of use and Länder 31.12.2020.* [Online]. [Accessed 31 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economic-Sectors-Enterprises/Agriculture-Forestry-Fisheries/Land-Use/Tables/areas-laender.html

Steinert, C. and Yordanova, N. 2016. 'Alliance with the Enemy': Why the CDU and the Greens Formed Their First Coalition in a Large German Federal State. *German Politics.* **25**(1), pp.54-72.

Stifel, A. 2018. *Vom erfolgreichen Scheitern einer Bewegung: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen als politische Partei und soziokulturelles Phänomen.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Stock, M. 2013. *Der Geschmack der Gentrifizierung : Arabische Imbisse in Berlin.* Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Stuttgarter Zeitung & Stuttgarter Nachrichten. 2018. *Stuttgart: "Demo für alle" und Gegendemo "Gemeinsam Vielfalt leben".* [Online] [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1LLLrKMyKc

Suh, D. 2011. Institutionalizing Social Movements: The Dual Strategy of the Korean Women's Movement. *Sociological quarterly.* **52**(3), pp.442-471.

Suh, D. 2014. What happens to social movements after policy success? Framing the unintended consequences and changing dynamics of the Korean women's movement. *Social Science Information.* **53**(1), pp.3-34.

Sven Giegold. 2019. *Europe Calling 25: 1. Grüner Online Neujahrsempfang 'Starkes Europa oder Rechtes Europa'.* [Online] [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5d4b-HNcSQ

Switek, N. 2017a. Die Grünen. In: Wiesendahl, E. ed. *Parteien und soziale Ungleichheit.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.145-168.

Switek, N. 2017b. Grüne Farbenspiele. Neue Koalitionen von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen auf Länderebene. In: Bukow, S. and Jun, U. eds. *Parteien unter Wettbewerbsdruck.* Wiesbaden: Springer, pp.151-179.

Switek, N. and Weissenbach, K. 2020. An Ever-Closer Party? The Institutionalization of the European Green Party After the 2019 European Election. In: Kaeding, M., et al. eds. *Die Europawahl 2019: Ringen um die Zukunft Europas.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp.63-77.

Talshir, G. 2003. A threefold ideological analysis of Die Grünen: From ecologized socialism to political liberalism? *Journal of political ideologies.* **8**(2), pp.157-184.

Tarrow, S.G. 2011. *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics.* 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Teune, S. 2008. „Gibt es so etwas überhaupt noch?" Forschung zu Protest und sozialen Bewegungen. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift.* **49**(3), pp.528-547.

Theobald, T. 2020. So ästhetisch feiert McDonald's seine Kaffee-Expertise. *Horizont.* [Online]. 07 Jan. [Accessed 23 Jul 2021]. Available from: https://www.horizont.net/marketing/nachrichten/mccaf-so-aesthetisch-feiertmcdonalds-seine-kaffee-expertise-179960

Thuermer, G., Roth, S., O'Hara, K. and Staab, S. 2018. Everybody Thinks Online Participation is Great-for Somebody Else: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Perceptions and Expectations of Online Participation in the Green Party Germany. In: *Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science*: ACM, pp.287-296.

Tilly, C. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S.G. 2015. *Contentious politics.* 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C. and Wood, L.J. 2013. *Social movements, 1768-2012.* Third edition. ed. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Torcal, M., Rodon, T. and Hierro, M.J. 2016. Word on the street: The persistence of leftist-dominated protest in Europe. *West European Politics.* **39**(2), pp.326-350.

Travaglino, G.A. 2014. Social sciences and social movements: the theoretical context. *Contemporary Social Science.* **9**(1), pp.1-14.

Trickett, E.J. and Oliveri, M.E. 1997. Ethnography and Sociocultural Processes: Introductory Comments. *Ethos* **25**(2), pp.146-151.

Tsakatika, M. 2016. SYRIZA's Electoral Rise in Greece: Protest, Trust and the Art of Political Manipulation. *South European Society and Politics.* **21**(4), pp.519-540.

Ullrich, P. 2020. "Normal citizens" versus "rowdies": Police categorisations of protesters in Germany. *Sociologia.* **92**, pp.9-36.

Van Aelst, P. and Walgrave, S. 2001. Who is that (wo) man in the street? From the normalisation of protest to the normalisation of the protestor. *European Journal of Political Research.* **39**(4), pp.461-486.

van Haute, E. and Gauja, A. 2015. Conclusion: members and activists of political parties in comparative perspective. In: Van Haute, E. and Gauja, A. eds. *Party Members and Activists.* Oxford; New York: Routledge, pp.186-201.

Vandepitte, E., Vandermoere, F. and Hustinx, L. 2019. Civil Anarchizing for the Common Good: Culturally Patterned Politics of Legitimacy in the Climate Justice Movement. *Voluntas.* **30**(2), pp.327-341.

Von Alemann, U., Erbentraut, P. and Walther, J. 2010. *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* 4th ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

von Bullion, C. 2021. Willkommen im Jahr 2021, liebe Grüne. *Süddeutsche Zeitung.* [Online]. 26 Nov. [Accessed 02 Jan 2022]. Available from: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/meinung/gruene-cem-oezdemir-toni-hofreiter-minister-annalena-baerbock-robert-habeck-1.5474064

von dem Berge, B. and Poguntke, T. 2017. Varieties of Intra-Party Democracy. In: Scarrow, S.E., et al. eds. *Organizing Political Parties: Representation, Participation and Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walter, F. 2010. *Gelb oder Grün?: kleine Parteiengeschichte der besserverdienenden Mitte in Deutschland.* Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Wamper, R., Kellershohn, H. and Dietzsch, M. eds. 2010. *Rechte Diskurspiraterien : Strategien der Aneignung linker Codes, Symbole und Aktionsformen.* 1. Aufl. ed. Münster: Unrast.

Weckenbrock, C. 2017. *Schwarz-Grün für Deutschland? : Wie aus politischen Erzfeinden Bündnispartner wurden.* Bielefeld: transcript-Verlag.

Wedeen, L. 2002. Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science. *American Political Science Review.* **96**(4), pp.713-728.

Wedeen, L. 2009. Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise. In: Schatz, E. ed. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.75-94.

Wedeen, L. 2010. Reflections on ethnographic work in political science. *Annual Review of Political Science.* **13**, pp.255-272.

Weise, Z. 2018. Germany's new Green divide. *Politico.* [Online]. 23 Nov. [Accessed 25 Mar 2019]. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-green-party-haidhausen-munich-elections-social-democrats-spd-is-the-new-red/

Wells, N., Forsdick, C., Bradley, J., Burdett, C., Burns, J., Demossier, M., de Zárate, M.H., Huc-Hepher, S., Jordan, S. and Pitman, T. 2019. Ethnography and Modern Languages. *Modern Languages Open.* [Online]. (1), pp.1-16. [Accessed 07 Feb 2019]. Available from: http://doi.org/10.3828/mlo.v0i0.242

Whiteley, P. 2002. *High-intensity participation : the dynamics of party activism in Britain.* United States.

Whiteley, P. 2011. Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world. *Party Politics.* **17**(1), pp.21-44.

Whittle, A., Mueller, F. and Carter, C. 2021. Authenticity and political leadership. *IPPR progressive review.* **28**(2), pp.140-152.

Wie grün wird Deutschland? 2018. *Focus Magazin.* [Online]. 19 Oct. [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/politik-wie-gruen-wird-deutschland_id_9783249.html

Wiest, K. and Zischner, R. 2006. Upgrading old housing areas in East German inner cities–processes and development paths in Leipzig. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kommunalwissenschaften.* **45**(1).

Yanow, D. 2009. Dear Author, Dear Reader: The Third Hermeneutic in Writing and Reviewing Ethnography. In: Schatz, E. ed. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.275-302.

ZDF heute-show. 2018. *So machen AfD und Grüne Wahlkampf in Bayern I heute-show vom 12.10.2018.* [Online] [Accessed 15 Nov 2021]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6QYM9jOtzY

Žižek, S. 2008. *For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor.* 2nd ed. London: Verso.

Zukin, S. 2008. Consuming authenticity: From outposts of difference to means of exclusion. *Cultural studies.* **22**(5), pp.724-748.

Zukin, S. 2010. *Naked city: the death and life of authentic urban places.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix A Interview Questions and Prompts

German

Professionalisierter Protest? Die Gentrifizierung des Protests innerhalb Bündnis 90/Die Grünen[1]

Warum sind Sie ein Mitglied Bündnis 90/Die Grünen geworden?

Oder

Warum haben Sie Bündnis 90/Die Grünen als Mitglied beigetreten?

Wie würden Sie Ihre Erfahrung oder Ihre Zeit bei den Grünen beschreiben?

Was bedeutet es, in den 2010ern ein Mitglied von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zu sein?

Wie viel und in welcher Art engagieren Sie sich bei den Grünen?

Wie wichtig ist für Sie als Grüne die digitale Welt (zum Beispiel: das Internet, Blogs, Soziale Netzwerke usw.)?

Wie würden Sie Ihre Mitgliedschaft bei den Grünen beschreiben?

Oder

Wie würden Sie das Niveau Ihrer Aktivität bei den Grünen beschreiben?

Ob und in welchem Umfang denken Sie, dass die Grünen die Partizipation ihrer Mitglieder fördern? Denken Sie, dass solche Partizipation nötig ist?

Denken Sie, dass die Geschichte der Grünen relevant ist? Inwiefern?

---

[1] This was the working title of the thesis during field research.

Was halten Sie vom Protest?

Warum oder Warum nicht nehmen Sie in Protest teil?

Beschreiben Sie bitte Ihre Erfahrung mit sozialen Bewegungen und Protest. Ist Ihre Erfahrung mit der Grünen verbindet oder nicht? Wenn nicht, erklären Sie mehr und warum.

Was halten Sie von politischen Parteien, wie Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, die mit Protest und sozialen Bewegungen engagieren und unterstützen?

Assoziieren Sie Protest mit den deutschen Grünen? In welcher Art und Weise? Glauben Sie, dass Protest immer so verbindet war? Warum oder warum nicht?

<u>Schlussrunde</u>

Wann haben Sie die Grünen beigetreten?

Oder

Seit wann sind Sie aktiv bei den Grünen?

Seit wann sind Sie Grüne Parteimitglieder?

Wo sind Sie aufgewachsen?

Was ist Ihr Bildungsniveau?

Was machen Sie beruflich?

War Ihre Familie politisch? Wie hat Ihre Familie politisch engagiert?

Kennen Sie jemand, die interessiert sein könnte, auch in diesem Projekt teilzunehmen?

English

Professionalised Protest? The Gentrification of Protest within the contemporary German Green Party.

Why did you become a member of the German Green Party?

How would you describe your experience of the German Green Party?

What do you think it means to be a member of the German Greens in 2018/2019?

In what kind of ways do you engage with the party?

How important is the digital world (the internet, blogs, social media etc) to you as a Green Party member?

How would you describe your level of party activity?

To what extent do you think that Green Party members' participation in the party is encouraged? Do you think that such participation is necessary?

How relevant do you think Green Party history is within the contemporary German Green Party?

What do you think about protest?

Why do you/do you not participate in protest?

Describe your experience with social movements or protest action. Is it related to the Green Party or not? If not, explain why.

What do you think about political parties, such as the Greens, engaging in and supporting protest action and social movements?

In what ways, if any, do you associate protest with the German Greens? Do you think it has always been like this? Why yes or why not?

Closing quick-fire questions

When did you join the Green Party?

Where did you grow up?

What is your highest level of education?

What do you do for a living?

What was your family's political stances/were they political?

Do you know anyone else who would be interested in participating in the project?

Appendix B Interview Participants

	Name	Affiliation (if any)	Age	Gender	Locale	Date of Interview
			Interview Participants			
Berlin	Eva	Ex-District Councillor	65-74	Female	Lichtenberg	24.10.2018
	Walter	Party branch committee	55-64	Male	Mitte	05.11.2018
	Paula	Party branch committee	25-34	Female	Lichtenberg	07.11.2018
	Arpiar		35-44	Male	Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf	22.11.2018
	Daniel		35-44	Male	Tempelhof-Schöneberg	26.11.2018
	Gisela	District Councillor	75+	Female	Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf	29.11.2018
	Lars	Central Party Office Employee	35-44	Male	Central Party Office	05.12.2018
	Hendrik		35-44	Male	Pankow	07.12.2018
	Brigitte	Berlin State Politician	55-64	Female	Treptow-Köpenick	18.12.2018
	Oliver	Party branch committee	25-34	Male	Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg	18.12.2018
Kiel	Franziska	Party branch committee	35-44	Female	Flensburg	24.01.2019
	Sven	Schleswig-Holstein State Politician	25-34	Male	Kiel	30.01.2019

	Katharina	Green Youth committee	18-24	Female	Kiel	21.02.2019
	Martin	Unpaid member	45-54	Male	Wankendorf	12.03.2019
	Nikolas	Green Youth and Fridays for Future	18-24	Male	Kiel	18.03.2019
	Torsten	Schleswig-Holstein State Politician	65-74	Male	Kiel	18.03.2019
Stuttgart	Zoe	Local Electoral Candidates	18-24	Female	Plochingen	22.05.2019
	Robert	Local Electoral Candidates	18-24	Male	Plochingen	22.05.2019
	Vanessa	Local Electoral Candidates	18-24	Female	Stuttgart-Süd	29.05.2019
	Yvonne	Party branch committee	45-54	Female	Obere Neckarvororte	03.06.2019
	Jonas	Local Electoral Candidates and Green Youth	25-34	Male	Stuttgart	04.06.2019
	Ulrike		55-64	Female	Stuttgart-Ost	25.06.2019
		Female = 10				
		Male = 12				

Appendix C Interview Transcript Translation Sample

Here follows the original responses and translations from six interviews in response to the question:

'What do you think it means to be a member of the German Greens in the 2010s?'

Walter Original

Als ich damals zum Grünen ging, dann waren die Grünen noch so eine kleine Gruppierung. Die Sozialdemokraten haben auf uns ja runtergeguckt, und dachte wir sind in ein paar Jahren wieder weg und das ist sowie so nicht so wichtig, was wir da machen. Die haben uns nicht so richtig ernst genommen. Inzwischen kommt keine Mehr auf die Idee, die Grünen nicht ernst zu nehmen. Wir sind, selbst wenn wir noch immer kleiner sind in den Parlamenten als andere Gruppierungen, trotzdem nimmt man das ernst, was wir machen. Wir haben eine bessere Möglichkeit, mit unseren Themen auch durchzusetzen. Das ist glaub ich einfacher und das ist auch heute einfacher als Mitglied, ja offen sich als Mitglied zu bekennen. Vor zwanzig Jahren hat man noch überlegt ,kann ich überhaupt sagen, dass ich Mitglied bei den Grünen bin'. Und das ist heute anders. Heute also das haben die Grünen sicherlich auch miterreicht. Die Gesellschaft ist offene geworden. Auch für die Themen. Die Themen sind heute, die werden von vielen auch mit aufgegriffen und ja, man ist nicht mehr so eine kleine, so eine Underdog Gruppe irgendwo in der Ecke, sondern man gehört dazu.

Walter Translation

Back in the day when I went to the Greens, they were a small group. The social democrats used to look down at us, and thought we would be gone in a few years and what we [Greens] did was not that important. They didn't take us seriously. Nowadays no one thinks about not taking the Greens seriously. Even when we're still smaller than other groups in parliaments, people take us and what we do seriously. We are more able to push our issues through. It's also easier to say that you are a member of the Greens today than it used to be. Twenty years ago, you considered whether you could actually say that you were a member of the

Greens. That is different today. Today the Greens have certainly arrived. Society is more open. It's also more open to their issues. The issues are taken up by many today. And you're not the underdog group in the corner, but instead you belong [in politics].

Paula Original

Ich find es eigentlich wichtig. Also Ich habe früher gedacht, naja das sind halt die anderen, so. Also trifft mich an nicht. Aber eigentlich ist es total wichtig, halt wenn man da mit Farbe bekennt. Also und gerade in unserer Zeit jetzt, es ist halt schon also, ich werde schon sagen, dass die Demokratie in den westlichen Staaten ziemlich gefährdet ist, ich find es halt total wichtig in Parteien zu gehen. Also meiner Meinung nach, man muss nicht viel machen, aber es reicht halt schon in einer Partei einzutreten, und sein Beitrag zu zahlen, wie viel man sich auch leisten kann, um die demokratischen Parteien halt zu unterstützen und gerade die Grünen übrigens, weil die die einzigen sind, die zumindest in Deutschland eine klare Meinung dazu haben. Ja es ist einfach wichtig und viele Menschen haben ihre Meinung und wollen aber nicht Parteien beitreten. Ich find es momentan schwer direkt zu rechtfertigen, wenn man es halt nicht macht.

Paula Translation

I think it's very important. I used to think it didn't concern me, and that it was for other people. But it's actually really important to stand up and be counted. And especially in our time now, where I would say that democracy in western states is in danger, it is really important to go into [political] parties. In my opinion you don't have to do much, and it is enough to join and pay what you can afford to support democratic parties, especially the Greens because they are the only ones who, at least in Germany, have a clear opinion on that. It is important and many people have their own opinion but do not want to join parties. At the moment I find it hard to justify when someone doesn't [join a party].

Nikolas Original

Ja für mich bedeutet, dass persönlich erstmal ein Grüne Parteimitglied zu sein. Weil ich finde, dass wir momentan noch, wenn man jetzt in Deutschen Bundestag guckt, mit einer der noch nicht abgedrehtesten Parteien zu sein, die halt noch gucken so was ist wichtig. Wenn ich jetzt so auf die CDU, CSU und SPD denke, die jetzt gerade eher selber ihr eigenes Klima retten als das eigentliche, richtige Klima zu retten, so denke ich schon, dass die Grünen jetzt auch gerade mehr Zulauf bekommen, dadurch dass sie halt ja ihren Vorstand zum Beispiel ausgetauscht haben und jetzt halt ja massenanziehender geworden sind. So und für mich bedeutet das einfach, ja, so ein bisschen weiß ich nicht stolz, so dabei zu sein.

Nikolas Translation

For me personally, it means first of all to be a member of the Green Party. Because I think that at the moment if you look at the German *Bundestag*, with one of the most out of touch parties, and what they all look at as important. When I think about the CDU, CSU, SPD, who at the moment are more interested in saving their own climate than saving the actual climate, then I think that the Greens are becoming very popular because they have changed their leadership for example and are now more attractive to the masses. To me that means I am a bit proud to be a part of it.

Franziska Original

Ich würde sagen, es bedeutet, dass man sich tatsächlich um die ganz großen gesellschaftlichen Probleme Gedanken macht. Dass man sehr zukunftsorientiert denkt. Ich glaube, dass unterscheidet uns schon stark von anderen Parteien, dass wir halt versuchen nicht nur das Jetzt sozusagen zu gestalten oder teilweise auch sehr rückwärtsgewandt, die Verhältnisse so zu wahren, wie sie sind, also wie konservative Parteien das tun oder auch was ja jetzt glaube ich auch ein Problem der SPD ist, dass sie versucht in Strukturen weiterzuarbeiten, die einfach nicht mehr so richtig zeitgemäß sind. Und als Grüne finde ich schon, so ist mein Verständnis, dass wir versuchen, Zukunft zu gestalten. Und dass wir

auch teilweise auch radikale Ansätze haben, könnte man sagen, also radikal in dem Sinne, dass wir auch das System verändern wollen. Genau und ich glaube, dass jetzt durch unseren neuen Bundesvorsitzenden, der aus Flensburg kommt, (laughs) oder nicht aus Flensburg kommt ursprünglich aber dort wohnt, dass das jetzt auch ziemlich deutlich wird. Also, dass er das ganz gut vertritt zusammen mit unserer Vorsitzenden Annalena Baerbock. Dass man einfach auch manchmal dann ja ganz neu Ideen auf den Tisch bringen muss, oder dass man auch mal ein bisschen radikale denken muss, weil einfach ganz drängende Probleme jetzt auch da sind und ja europäisch Denken glaub ich ist ein ganz wichtige Aspekt, dass man nicht national, nur in nationalen Kategorien denkt, sondern dass man immer europäisch denkt. Das ist auch wieder in Schleswig-Holstein oder gerade bei uns in Flensburg auch irgendwie klar, weil wir sind in einer Grenzregion.

Franziska Translation

I would say it means that you actually contemplate the very large societal problems. That your thinking is very future-oriented. I this that differentiates us quite substantially from other parties, that we try to not just shape the present or are backward-looking in trying to preserve circumstances as they are, like conservative parties do, or what I think is the SPD's problem at the moment, that they attempt to continue to work in structures that are simply no longer suitable. As a Green I find that we try to shape the future. Also, that we have partly radical approaches, you could say, so radical in the sense that we want to change the system. And I think that through our new federal leader, who […] lives in Flensburg, that is quite obvious. He represents that very well, together with the other federal leader Annalena Baerbock. That you simply sometimes have to bring new ideas to the table, or that you have to think a bit radical, simply because there are very pressing problems. And that you have to think European and not just nationally is a very important aspect. That is clear in Flensburg, which is close to the Danish border.

Jonas Original

Ich glaube das hat viel mit Aufbruch zu tun und schon auch mit einer neuen, also am neuen Zeitalter, also jetzt mal ganz optimistisch gesprochen. Ich glaub nicht, dass die Konfliktlinien in den nächsten oder in diesem Jahrhundert sag ich mal, wo wir den Klimawandel besiegen müssen, noch die Gleichen sind wie im letzten Jahrhundert. Also ich glaube, die neuen Konfliktlinien sind viel globaler und internationaler. Was es als Mitglied bedeutet ist am Anfang bestimmt erstmal ein Teil der modernsten Politik zu sein, wenn man will, dass es menschenfreundlich vorankommt und ja. Also ich bin jetzt schon sehr lange Mitglied und deshalb bin ich jetzt weniger jemand, der noch mal reinschnuppern muss und sich die Grünen Partei neu anschaut, sondern ich würde mich dann eher als jemand sehen, der versucht die Partei intern in gewisse Richtungen weiter zu drücken und so.

Jonas Translation

I think it [what it means to be a member] has a lot to do with an awakening and with a new era. I don't think that the lines of conflict in the next or this century, where we need to conquer climate change, are the same as in the last century. I think that the new lines of conflict are much more global and international. What it means as a member is at the beginning certainly firstly to be a part of the most modern politics, if you will, and that it progresses in a humanitarian way. I have been a member for a long time and therefore I am less someone who needs to try it out and look at the Greens anew, but rather I would see myself as someone who attempts to push the party internally in certain directions.

Ulrike Original

Für mich ist es immer überraschend, dass die Partei jetzt doch so in der sogenannten Mitte der Gesellschaft angekommen ist und so etabliert ist und so anerkannt. Ich habe immer noch dieses Bild innerlich so einer Minderheit oder so eine Antipartei zu gehören und ja mich verteidigen zu müssen in vielen Zusammenhängen und so anerkannt zu sein. Für meine Kinder, die in ihrer 20ern sind, sind die Grünen oft nicht links genug. Wo ich denke, wenn ich jetzt jünger wäre, ginge es mir wahrscheinlich genauso, weil als sie die Grünen

kennengelernt haben, waren die ja schon ganz anders als jetzt zu meiner Zeit, wo sie natürlich, als ich jung war, gegründet haben. Aber irgendwie stimmt mich das ganz begeistert, weil ich hätte mir das vor 30 Jahren nicht vorstellen können, dass die Grünen sich so entwickeln. Ich habe gedacht, ist wahrscheinlich immer, wird zu einer idealistischen Minderheit bleiben, die nicht viele erreicht. Und jetzt hoffe ich natürlich, dass auch entsprechend mehr umgesetzt wird auch was Energiewende anbelangt, oder die ganz Mobilitätsgeschichte, und eben das Urthema der Grünen, das Klima, Umwelt, irgendwo jetzt so viele junge Menschen auf die Straße gehen, wo ich denke, das ist so ursprünglich grün. Ich bin auch skeptisch. Eben grad, weil es jetzt so etabliert sind und so viele sogenannte Sachzwänge, wie es dann eurer auch heißt, irgendwas dann nicht ermöglichen, ja Zugeständnisse an die Automobilindustrie gemacht werden und ja. Schwierig.

Ulrike Translation

It still surprises me that the party now has reached the so-called centre of society, and is so established and so accepted. I still have this mental picture of a minority or that I belong to an anti-party and that I have to defend myself in lots of contexts to be accepted. For my kids, who are in their twenties, the Greens are often not left-wing enough. That's where I think, if I was younger, it would probably be the same for me, because when they got to know the Greens, they were much different than they were in my time, when they founded themselves when I was young. But somehow that's exciting to me, because I couldn't have imagined 30 years ago that the Greens would develop like that. I thought that they would probably always remain an idealistic minority, who were unable to achieve much. Correspondingly, I now hope that more is implemented which concerns the energy transition or the whole mobility/transport stuff, and the original issue of the Greens, the climate, where now so many young people are going to the streets, where I think that is so originally Green. I'm also sceptical. Especially now, because they are so established and there are so many so-called constraints to not make something possible, and concessions made to the car manufacturing industry. It's difficult.

Appendix D Party events attended

Events attended (not including protests)				
	Date	**Event Hosts**	**Event Title**	**Location**
Berlin	01.10.2018	Green Bundestag Parliamentary Party	Day of German Unity Bundestag Outreach Work	Platz der Republik
	05.10.2018	Berlin State Green Party	Berlin Greens 40th Anniversary Party	Festsaal Kreuzberg
	11.10.2018	Berlin Lichtenberg Greens	Greens Lichtenberg Members Meeting	Green Lichtenberg Office: Münsterlandstraße 33
	23.10.2018	Berlin Mitte Greens	Greens Mitte Members Meeting	Rathaus Mitte
	24.10.2018	Brandenburg Schöneiche Greens	Greens Schöneiche *Stammtisch* and screening of the Film 'Following Habeck'	Kino Union: Bölschestraße 69
	28.10.2018	Federal Green Party	Hesse Election Party	Bundesgeschäfts-stelle (Federal Party HQ): Platz vor dem neuen Tor 1
	01.11.2018	Berlin Mitte Greens	Let's Talk About *Aufstehen*	Greens Mitte Office: Malplaquetstraße 7
	06.11.2018	Berlin Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf	Greens Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf Members Meeting	Rathaus Charlottenburg
	17.11.2018	Berlin State Working Group - Mobility	Mobility and Transport Transition Event (*Denkwerkstatt Grundsatzprogramm Prozess Mobilität*)	Forum Factory Besselstraße 13-14
	20.11.2018	Berlin State Green Party	The 68ers, an awakening that has lasted up to today (*Die 68er: Ein Aufbruch, der bis heute dauert!*)	Taz Kantine Friedrichstraße 21

	24.11.2018	Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf District Council	Day against Violence Towards Women	Outside Rewe Grunewald: Auerbachstraße 12
	26.11.2018	Berlin State Working Group - Europe	Topic - Brexit	Berlin State Party HQ: Kommandantenstraße 80
	27.11.2018	Berlin Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Greens	Greens Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Members Meeting	Falckensteinstraße 6
	03.12.2018	Berlin State Working Group - Democracy and Law	Topic - Public Assembly Act (*Versammlungs-gesetz*)	Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin
	10.12.2018	Berlin Green Youth	Green Youth Berlin Members Meeting in *Afrika Haus* about Decolonising Berlin	Afrika Haus: Bochumer Straße 25
	11.12.2018	Berlin Tempelhof-Schöneberg Greens	Greens Tempelhof-Schöneberg Members Meeting	Green Tempelhof-Schöneberg Office: Kolonnenstraße 53
Kiel	19.01.2019	Kiel Greens	EU Elections Campaign Event	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
	22.01.2019	Sven Giegold MEP	Europe Calling - a strong Europe or a right-wing Europe?	Webinar - Virtual event
	23.01.2019	Schleswig-Holstein State Working Group - Secularism	A Secular Europe?	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
	24.01.2019	Schleswig-Holstein State Working Group - Northstate	State Working Group *Nordstaat* Meeting	Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament

	28.01.2019	Schleswig-Holstein State Working Group - Migration and Refuge	State Working Group *Migration und Flucht*	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
	05.02.2019	Schleswig-Holstein State Working Group - Finance and Economy	State Working Group *Finanzen und Wirtschaft*	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
	07.02.2019	Green Youth Kiel	Green Youth Kiel Members Meeting	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
	19.02.2019	Kiel City Council Green Party	Kiel City Council Green Party New Year Reception	Flandern Bunker, Kiellinie 249, Kiel
	20.02.2019	Schleswig-Holstein State Working Group - Europe	State Working Group - *Europa*	Schleswig-Holstein Party HQ: Alter Markt 9, Kiel
Berlin	29-30.03.2019	Federal Green Party	Convention on Fundamental Party Principles (*Grundsatzprogramm konvent*)	Arena Berlin: Eichenstraße 4
Stuttgart	02.05.2019	Stuttgart City Green Party (KV Stuttgart)	Opening of the Europe Space	Galerie Kernweine, Cottastraße 4-6
	06.05.2019	Green University Group	Green University Group Members Meeting	University of Stuttgart, City Campus
	07.05.2019	Stuttgart North Greens	Greens Stuttgart Nord Members Meeting	Naturfreundehaus Steinbergle, Stresemannstraße 6
	10.05.2019	Stuttgart West Greens	Bicycle Tour in the West of the City	Stuttgart West
	11.05.2019	Stuttgart City Council	Stuttgart Day and *Rathaus* Open Day	Stuttgart Rathaus, Rathausplatz

	14.05.2019	Federal Green Party; State Green Party Baden-Württemberg; Stuttgart Green Party	Townhall in Stuttgart with federal Green co-leader Annalena Baerbock	Club Zwanglos/Schocken: Hirschstraße 36
	16.05.2019	Stuttgart Green Youth	Bourgeois Stuttgart? Not with us! Celebrate with us at our Election Campaign Party	Club Zwanglos/Schocken: Hirschstraße 36
	17.05.2019	Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt Greens	#Cemsession on Mobility with *Bundestag* politician Cem Özdemir	Bad Cannstatt Rathaus
	18.05.2019	Stuttgart Green Party (KV Stuttgart)	Eurovision Public Viewing	Bar White Noise, Eberhardstraße 37
	21.05.2019	Stuttgart East Greens	Greens Stuttgart Ost Members Meeting	Restaurant Theater Friedenau: Rotenbergstraße 127
	02.06.2019	Stuttgart City Green Party (KV Stuttgart)	Green Brunch	Café Welt: Charlottenplatz 17
	03.06.2019	Stuttgart Obere Neckarvororte Greens	Greens Stuttgart Obere Neckarvororte Members Meeting	SGU Gaststätte Delphi: Bruckwiesenweg 18A
	26.06.2019	Stuttgart Green Youth	Green Youth Stuttgart Members Meeting	Baden-Württemberg Party HQ: Königstraße 78

Appendix E Protests attended

Protests attended					
	Date	**Protest Title**	**Type of Cause**	**Location**	**Visible Greens?**[1]
Berlin	06.10.2018	*Hambi bleibt!* (Hambach Forest Stays!)	Environmental	Outside RWE offices on Friedrichstraße	No
	13.10.2018	*#Unteilbar* demonstration (#inseparable)	Anti-racism/anti-far-right	Alexanderplatz then march through Berlin Mitte	Yes
	18.10.2018	Anti-Rummelsburger Bucht Development	Anti-gentrification/development	Nöldnerplatz - Lichtenberg	No
	07.11.2018	Anti-Trump Migration Policy Solidarity Rally	Anti-racism/pro-migration	Brandenburg Gate	No
	09.11.2018	*Nazis Raus* Counter Demonstration	Anti-racism/anti-far-right	Berlin Central Train Station - then march in government district	Yes
	01.12.2018	Stop Coal! Climate Protection Now! (*Kohle Stoppen! Klimaschutz jetzt!*)	Environmental	Chancellery then march through Berlin Mitte	Yes
Kiel	18.01.2019	Fridays for Future Kiel	Environmental	State Parliament then march through the city centre	No
	18.01.2019	A district of Solidarity - Gaarden	Anti-racism/anti-far-right	Kiel - Gaarden	No
	26.01.2019	Demo against Article 219a	Women's Rights	Asmus-Bremer-Platz	Yes
	28.01.2019	Protest Against the Greens supporting a Deportation Centre	Anti-racism/pro-migration	Outside Schleswig-Holstein Green Party Headquarters	N/A[2]

---

[1] This is whether they were physically visible in the public space of the protest demonstration with party identification. This does not mean the party did not attend, nor that they did not promote it on their social media.

[2] Demonstrations where visible presence of the Greens is 'Not Applicable' (N/A) denotes protests that are against Green action or Green-involvement in policy decisions and thus they would not be present.

	Date	Event	Type	Location	
	20.02.2019	*Seebrücke* Demo	Anti-racism/pro-migration	Outside Italian Voluntary Consulate, Kiel.	No
	08.03.2019	International Women's Day	Women's Rights	Start Outside Kiel Central Train Station then march around the city	Yes
	15.03.2019	Fridays for Future Global Strike	Environmental	Start at Rathausplatz then march through the city centre	No
	16.03.2019	Stand up to Racism (*Aufstehen gegen Rassismus*)	Anti-racism/anti-far-right	Start at Europaplatz then march around the city centre	Yes
Berlin	29.03.2019	Berlin Fridays for Future with Greta Thunberg	Environmental	Invalidenpark, then march through Berlin Mitte and Finish at Brandenburg Gate	Yes
Stuttgart	06.04.2019	*Mietendemo*	Anti-gentrification/development	Schlossplatz then march through the city centre	Yes
	27.04.2019	Demo against Diesel Driving Ban	Pro-Car	Stuttgart Rathaus, Rathausplatz	N/A
	03.05.2019	Fridays for Future Stuttgart	Environmental	Stuttgart Rathaus, Rathausplatz, then march through the city	No
	11.05.2019	Fridays for Future and *Umstieg 21* Joint Demonstration - Stuttgart 21, a climate killer	Environmental	Stuttgart Central Train Station	N/A
	12.05.2019	23rd Pulse of Europe	Pro-EU	Karlsplatz, Stuttgart	No
	12.05.2019	Walk of Care	Worker's Rights	Schillerplatz then march through the city centre	No
	13.05.2019	460th Monday Demonstration *Umstieg 21*	Environmental	Schlossplatz	N/A

	19.05.2019	One Europe for All (*Ein Europa für Alle*)	Anti-racism/pro-Europe	Stuttgart Central Train Station then march through the city	Yes
	24.05.2019	Global Climate Strike	Environmental	Schlossplatz then march through the city centre	No
	24.05.2019	469th Monday Demonstration *Umstieg 21*	Environmental	Schlossplatz then march through the city centre	N/A
	29.06.2019	No to Baden-Wurttemberg AfD proposal for publicly funded cultural organisations to disclose number of foreign artists working there	Anti-racism/anti-far-right	Outside the Stuttgart Opera House	Yes