

'Nossos Índios: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Jair Bolsonaro's Social Media Discourse Regarding the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil'

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1. Abstract

In the era of social media, and as populism continues to thrive off the politics of intolerance, Jair Bolsonaro's unprecedented use of this communication form represents a new approach to political discourse; one that is increasingly being used to target the indigenous peoples of Brazil. There is little doubt that throughout the colonial period and right up to the modern day, the indigenous peoples of Brazil have been systematically victimised. This dissertation investigates how the rise of Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency of Brazil in January 2019, and his use of social media, has influenced the ongoing struggle for the fundamental rights of indigenous Brazilians.

The present study has gathered the Tweets and Facebook live transcripts from Bolsonaro's social media feeds between 1 January 2019 and April 2020 to analyse the ways in which Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse to victimise the indigenous communities of Brazil. To do this, this dissertation uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the principal method of investigation. Through utilising Norman Fairclough's (1992, 1993) three-dimensional model of CDA, the nuanced ways in which Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse to undermine and threaten the indigenous communities of Brazil is uncovered. At the core of CDA lies the relationship between language and power and it is an appropriate method of investigation as it allows for micro and macro levels of analysis. The CDA reveals that Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse to create a sense of 'othering', to repeatedly attack indigenous land rights and to undermine the federal agencies and international alliances fighting for indigenous rights. This dissertation concludes that Jair Bolsonaro's social media discourse represents a form of symbolic violence. Furthermore, this symbolic violence is the catalyst for other forms of violence: structural and direct.

Above all, this dissertation contributes to the growing understanding of populism's communicative dimensions and reveals that the social media discourse of Jair Bolsonaro represents a willful disregard of his administration's constitutional responsibility and a clear threat to Brazil's indigenous peoples.

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2. Introduction

Across the world, social media platforms have acted as a catalyst for the rise in populism, fuelled by the politics of intolerance. Along with other world leaders, Brazil's President, Jair Bolsonaro, has used social media networks for the purposes of a new form of political discourse. This dissertation investigates how Bolsonaro uses his social media feeds to target the indigenous peoples of Brazil; a field of research all the more significant given the fact that Bolsonaro's ascension to the Presidency relied heavily upon his effective use of social media and the ability to use these social networks to influence and disseminate discourse. This investigation focuses on the Tweets and Facebook livestreams of Bolsonaro that relate to Brazil's indigenous communities.

This dissertation will be structured as follows: In chapter one, some important historical and contextual themes will be discussed; these include examining Brazil's political system, the rise of Bolsonaro and 'Bolsonarismo', an overview of the indigenous peoples of Brazil and lastly, the role of social media and populism in Brazil, examining how the digital architectures of social media permit the dissemination of hate. These themes are fundamental to this dissertation: they will underpin large parts of the discussion and analysis. In chapter two, the methodology relating to this research will be discussed, examining Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and its relevance and application in the digital age. The inclusion of contemporary news articles, investigations and reports relating to the environmental and physical threats facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil also serve as a key source of analysis and discussion throughout this thesis. Furthermore, the field of Digital Humanities (DH) will be introduced, exploring the textual analysis tools that permit the quantitative analysis of qualitative data gathered from Twitter and Facebook. In CDA, the research to date has tended to focus on more traditional forms of political discourse, such as political speeches (Sipra, 2013) and traditional news media (Amer, 2017). However, the widespread use and adoption of social media platforms has changed the way political leaders and the elite communicate with the electorate (Thurlow, 2011; Paulussen & Harder, 2014). Principally, social media has changed the way in which information, knowledge and ideas are exchanged in society. Thus, there has been a clear need for CDA to engage with discourse in this new digital context (Bouvier, 2015; KhosraviNik and Unger, 2015). Ultimately, whilst this creates new theoretical and methodological challenges for the field of CDA, this dissertation challenges this outlook by furthering the understanding that social media also provides plenty of opportunities for CDA and, "one consequence for CDA is that we can

simply no longer be able to start from the text as a point of analysis. Rather, we may have to position texts based on what users do with them” (Bouvier and Machin, 2018: 184). The key challenge for CDA, therefore, is to examine how to carry out this critical language analysis in an ever-changing producer-receiver landscape.

The third chapter focuses on the analysis and discussion. The analysis will address a series of sub-questions including:

- (i) How are indigenous people addressed in Bolsonaro’s statements?
- (ii) To what extent is the image of the indigenous as the ‘other’ reinforced through the statements of Jair Bolsonaro?
- (iii) What policies has Bolsonaro implemented regarding indigenous people / indigenous lands?
- (iv) What are the consequences of his discourse?

Lastly, this dissertation attempts to consolidate the research findings into a chapter titled ‘Guardians of the forest under threat’, which seeks to make the connections between the discourse disseminated via Bolsonaro’s tweets and Facebook livestreams and the physical policies being introduced by his administration which directly and indirectly impact the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The inspiration behind this chapter are the ‘Guardians of the Forest’, who are a group of 120 indigenous Guajajara who risk their lives fighting illegal logging activities. This chapter examines the three types of violence: symbolic, structural and direct, and draws on a range of contemporary resources, reports and investigations into the threats facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil to ascertain the connection between words and actions. Ultimately, exploring whether the symbolic violence in Bolsonaro’s social media posts can translate into structural and physical violence too.

Above all, this dissertation contributes to the growing understanding of populism’s communicative dimensions and reveals that the social media discourse of Jair Bolsonaro represents a willful disregard of his administration’s constitutional responsibility and is a clear threat to Brazil’s indigenous peoples.

3. Literature review

3.1 Discourse

It is important to establish what is meant by the term 'discourse'. Indeed, the exact definition of discourse has been part of an ongoing academic debate; Professor Ruth Wodak, who has been studying discursive practices throughout her academic career, defines discourse as "a set of relationships between discursive events" (Wodak, 2006: 8). With regard to this dissertation, the 'discursive events' would refer to the social media posts of Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro. Whilst the multi-faceted understanding of discourse has been open to debate, Widdowson (1995: 158) suggests that the variety of definitions can be problematic and means that discourse becomes both "in vogue and vague". For the purpose of clarity, this dissertation opts to use the simplified definition of the term offered by Blommaert (2005: 2) who argues that discourse at its simplest is "language in action". Ultimately, this dissertation advances towards the understanding that Bolsonaro's social media discourse not only represents a way of maintaining power through 'othering', and at times attacking, the indigenous peoples of Brazil, but also represents a new form of political discourse, one that is becoming increasingly popular alongside the rise in populism across the globe.

3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

This dissertation will engage extensively with the concept of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth referred to as CDA) as the primary method of investigating Bolsonaro's discourse regarding the indigenous peoples of Brazil. CDA is a rapidly developing area of language study. As Van Dijk (1993) persuasively acknowledged, CDA offers an excellent opportunity to examine and analyse the manipulation that goes on within texts. At its very core, it views discourse as a "form of social practice" (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258) and allows for micro and macro analysis of discursive events. Importantly, CDA expands on Michel Foucault's (1971) dialectical understanding of discourse, acknowledging that language is both socially shaped and socially shaping. Indeed, Titscher et. a (2000: 146) provide an explanation of the dialectical relationship between society and language:

“Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse: society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse. Every single instance of language use reproduces or transforms society and culture, including power relations.”

Importantly, the critique in the word ‘critical’ in CDA is with regard to those who hold the tools of power in society and who use language to maintain and exercise power. Within this context, ‘power’ can be understood as not only meaning the ability to coerce through military or penal means, but also where there is power and control over the ideas and values used to create and shape societies (Bouvier and Machin, forthcoming). Above all, the tendency of CDA studies has been to expose how language is used to benefit the user’s (e.g., Jair Bolsonaro) own interest, often at the expense of others (the indigenous peoples of Brazil). Put simply, the underlying assumption in CDA is that those in power disseminate discourses (Foucault, 1972) that solely serve their own personal interests.

Whilst CDA has been the focus of recent academic attention, it is worth noting that this discursive area of research has been at the centre of academic debate for a long time (Fairclough, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2010; Van Dijk, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001; Wodak, 1996, 2001; Meyer, 2001; Gee, 2005). It is equally important to consider that the approaches to studying and analysing CDA differ, with some seeking to focus more on the linguistic analysis of text (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak, 1996), whilst other methods are more interested in the social and cultural contexts behind language (Van Dijk, 1997; Gee, 2005). Despite their obvious differences in approach and methodology, CDA scholars share the understanding that at the core of CDA lies the relationship between language and power and ultimately, their work addresses social problems and seeks to advocate for those being oppressed, which is why this is especially relevant with regard to the plight of the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

This dissertation mobilises Norman Fairclough’s (1992, 1993) three dimensional CDA model as the principal method of investigation. This approach holds particular relevance as it provides a clear way of connecting language use and social practice (Fairclough, 2010). The three dimensional model allows for micro and macro analysis to examine how these unequal power relations manifest themselves and is an important framework as it seeks to engage with the context surrounding the discourse; how the texts are produced, read and consumed (Fairclough, 1993; Livingstone, 2004). Without these added layers of context, CDA becomes a

too simplistic level of analysis that overlooks many of the hidden complexities within discourse (Philo, 2007). It is worth noting that CDA analysts accept that some unequal power relations remain institutionalized and thus, remain unquestioned. Fairclough's (2001) research is useful in this regard, illustrating this understanding with regard to doctor-patient interactions in which no one questions the hierarchical position of the doctor above the patient due to the doctor possessing the relevant knowledge. Indeed, this obvious imbalance of power is of great benefit to the patient as it potentially represents life-saving advice and knowledge. This is what Fairclough calls "common-sense assumptions" (ibid, 2001: 1). However, CDA holds real value with regard to instances in which the imbalance of power is not justified.

Past studies have used CDA to reveal how discursive practices have included negative lexical choices towards the 'other', both within the context of Brexit (Thommessen, 2017) as well as Donald Trump's presidency (Cullen, 2017; Rachman et al, 2017; Bustan et al, 2020). The recent works on both the EU referendum and the Presidency of Donald Trump are important contributions to the study of political discourse using CDA, especially under the context surrounding the rise of populism. Furthermore, the works on Donald Trump and CDA are particularly relevant to the nature of this dissertation focusing on Bolsonaro given his nickname of 'Trump of the tropics' (The Guardian, 2018).

3.3 CDA as a social movement

One of the principal contributions of the field of CDA lies in its ability to uncover unequal power relations. Importantly, Freeden et al (2013) suggests that CDA is much more than just a method of analysis, and should also be considered a social movement. This sentiment is shared by Van Dijk (1998: 352) who suggests that "critical discourse analysts take an explicit stance and, thus, want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality". This is arguably, the primary reason why CDA is especially relevant to analysing Bolsonaro's social media discourse regarding the indigenous people of Brazil, as it helps to uncover these unequal power relations and examine in what ways they manifest themselves.

3.4 Criticisms of CDA

The widespread use and relevance of CDA within academic research has been obvious and CDA has even been considered “an established paradigm in linguistics” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 4). Furthermore, it is said to have “become one of the most influential and visible branches of discourse analysis” (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 447). However, this does not negate the fact that this strand of discourse studies has faced criticism. One of the main criticisms stems from the understanding that CDA is restricted to small-scale studies (Stubbs, 1997). Others have suggested that CDA scholars are ‘cherry picking’ texts that best prove their argument (Widdowson, 2000; Koller and Mauntner, 2004). Indeed, Widdowson (2005) expands on this critique, suggesting that CDA can be biased and maintains some ideological commitments and thus, certain texts can be chosen to support the preferred interpretation. This is a valid criticism, however Fairclough (1996) addressed this very question, highlighting that CDA has always been explicit about its ideological commitments. Importantly, the underlying truth is that CDA does not claim to be politically neutral, but must be seen as a “critical approach which is politically committed to social change” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2009: 64).

Additionally, this dissertation seeks to challenge the criticism regarding small-scale studies by examining multiple social media accounts belonging Bolsonaro. Furthermore, these criticisms are further challenged by pointing to the value that CDA provides in acting as an investigation into how language sustains and creates unequal power relations (Gil-Bonilla, 2020). Importantly, this dissertation furthers the understanding that CDA is especially relevant in the digital era of the twenty-first century, where social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are becoming host to new forms of political discourse. Lastly, the discipline of CDA has embraced the field of Digital Humanities (DH) and corpus linguistics as a way of addressing the credibility gap (Baker, 2006; Mauntner, 2009; Berry, 2012).

3.5 Digital Humanities

The field of Digital Humanities (DH) has over the years developed a range of effective tools for analyzing and detecting patterns in large text samples. Importantly, Baker (2006:17) suggests that digital corpora tools provide four main benefits for discourse analysis. One of the most important benefits is that it is easy to combine with other methods of analysis to achieve

'triangulation'. Significantly, research triangulation within CDA challenges the principal criticism that "critical discourse analysts could intentionally select (possibly atypical) data or linguistic features for analysis to prove a preconceived point" (Baker and Levon, 2015: 222).

One of the principal benefits of embedding DH within CDA studies is with regard to the textual analysis. This dissertation will be using the digital text mining tool 'Voyant' as its primary method of corpus analysis. Voyant Tools is appropriate for this particular study as it offers five visualisation tools for text mining and analysis. Furthermore, a detailed examination of Voyant Tools by Miller (2018) titled *Text Mining Digital Humanities Projects: Assessing Content Analysis Capabilities of Voyant Tools* found that "an extremely valuable feature of *Voyant Tools* is the interactive and relational aspects of each tool. This means that the tools can interact with each other simultaneously" (ibid, 2018: 175). Whilst it remains a relatively new tool used in the field of DH, Voyant Tools has been used as a qualitative linguistic analysis tool in several studies (Steiner et al, 2014; Clouder and King, 2015; Zahedzadeh, 2017; Miller, 2018). Importantly, this dissertation demonstrates how the use of digital tools such as Voyant Tools can be used to quantitatively analyse qualitative data (Hetenyi et al, 2019).

3.6 Populism and social media

Populism is at the heart of contemporary debates in political science (Chadwick, 2013; Postill, 2018) and plays a central role in understanding the current socio-political context of Brazil. Populism can be defined as "a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent 'the people's' direct rule" (Palinka, 2013: 3). At its very core, populism has been characterised by largescale popular mobilisation coupled with anti-elite rhetoric. Indeed, populist discourse "claims that the people have been betrayed by the elites in charge who are abusing their positions of power" (Ernst et al, 2019: 2). Significantly, the arrival of social media platforms has taken this mass popular mobilisation to the digital sphere. Modern strands of populism aim to create disillusionment, and even anger, towards the status quo and seek for a radical change, one that truly attempts to represent 'the people'. For decades, populism had remained on the fringes of society. However, there has been a recent shift in global politics and with the rise of populism there has been a growth in the politics of intolerance. Put simply, populism has become 'trendy' (Kaltwasser et al, 2017: 1). Studies in populism have principally sought to examine who constitutes 'the people' - who counts and how must they be addressed (Laclau,

2005; Higgins, 2009). For the purpose of this dissertation, these approaches hold particular relevance and this dissertation expands on this to also consider the construction of the 'other'. The process of othering can be defined as the process by which individuals use language to "narrowly define who qualifies as a full member of society" (Powell, 2017). The construction of 'the people' and the 'other' highlights that populist discourse lies in the construction of dichotomies. At its core, populism can be understood as an antagonistic phenomenon (Laclau, 2007).

Importantly, populism is significant when considered within the wider context of how it is performed, and how that performance is able to recognise power (Moffitt, 2016). It is this technological performance of populism, and the consequences this can lead to, that this dissertation is concerned with. This understanding of the technological performance of populism is corroborated by Van Leeuwen (2015) who argues that there has been an 'aestheticization' of communication with the arrival of social media. Recent academic research has begun to investigate the relationship between populism and social media (Nguyen, 2014; Engesser et al, 2016; Arias-Maldonado, 2017; Curtis, 2019; Cesarino, 2020). Importantly, there has been a growth in the number of studies examining how politicians use populist language on social media platforms, especially Twitter (Gerbaudo, 2016; Abramson, 2017; Enli, 2017), Facebook (Milner, 2013) and even Instagram (Mendonça and Caetano, 2020). This dissertation expands on these studies that investigate the communicative dimensions of populism through social media, by applying it to a very contemporary issue in Brazilian politics: the growing persecution, and attacks towards, the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

Above all, this dissertation's theoretical intervention is to not only investigate how digital tools such as social media platforms provide new ways to demonstrate the technological performance of populism, but ultimately to reveal that they represent a new form of political discourse; one that is increasingly being used to target the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

4. Background

4.1 Brazil's Political system

Brazil's political system has undergone radical changes over the past century. Whilst Brazil's political system does not lie at the core of this research project, there is a clear benefit in providing an overview of how the Brazilian political body functions. Additionally, by delving into the mechanisms and decision-making powers granted to the President, it will become evident why there is an inherent danger attached to the language used by Jair Bolsonaro and how this can translate into policy implementations that can directly affect the indigenous people of Brazil.

Brazil has a federal system comprised of 26 independent states. There are three levels of government: federal, state and municipal, and each level is divided into three independent branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary (Brazilian Report, 2017). The Brazilian Congress comprises two chambers: the House and the Senate; the House of Representatives has 513 members whilst the Senate has 81 members. The Constitution of Brazil grants the President wide reaching powers, so much so that the Brazilian President is considered to be one of the strongest of any nation on paper (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2001). Between 1988 and 2007, around 85.6% of laws approved by Congress were initiated in the executive branch, and 71% of all bills submitted by the President to Congress were approved within his or her mandate (Limongi, 2007: 256).

How are laws passed in Brazil?

A bill is initiated by being approved by one chamber of Congress and consequently passed onto the other chamber to be discussed and voted on. If the bill is approved by the reviewing chamber, the bill will be sent to the President for final approval or the President may exercise the veto. The President is granted veto powers over any bill submitted to Congress.

Furthermore, the President is also given a broad power to govern by decrees, or provisional measures. It is important to note that there are certain checks and balances placed on this power, as Congress has the power to pass, amend or outright reject these decrees prior to becoming law. However, as Katz (2018: 84) persuasively notes: "these [provisional measures] are a powerful tool for the sheer reason that they can clog up Congress' agenda, as, if not voted

on within 45 days, can skip to the head of the queue, superseding all other legislative deliberations”.

The Constitution of Brazil places the President as head of all federal agencies; this is significant as it means that the President wields the power to not only fill many senior federal positions with allies, but also to abolish or fire those in federal positions that he disagrees with or that represent a threat to his Presidency. In total, an enormous 48,000 federal positions can be filled by the President (Brazil Constitution, Article 84, XV and XXV). This particular issue will be discussed in the proceeding chapters, especially with regards to examining how key federal environmental positions have been filled by allies of both Bolsonaro and the Agribusiness interests, whilst presenting increased threats to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Furthermore, the firing of key figures from Brazil’s environmental agency (IBAMA) largely stems from these powers granted to the President of Brazil.

Despite these powers granted to the President, Brazil’s political system is highly fragmented. Indeed, a ‘coalition Presidency’, as is the case in Brazil, requires the President to negotiate with other parties. In Brazil, the success or failure of the President relies heavily upon long-lasting coalitions. In a political environment such as the legislature of Brazil, where there is scope for political gain to be achieved through working coalitions, there is also room for corruption to manifest itself. Indeed, Brazil’s legislature can become a “cesspit of venality and opportunism” (Anderson, 2011:143).

It has been clear to see that Brazil’s federal Presidential system does grant the President with far-reaching control over the tools of power with very few checks and balances. Thus, ‘presidentialism’ (see Rose-Ackerman et al, 2011) prevails, whereby the President is able to exercise considerable control and exercise their agenda with little constraint. The combination of the ‘hyper-presidentialism of Brazil’ alongside anti-indigenous rhetoric, “would reinforce the expectation that policy should follow Presidential vision in Brazil” (Hochstetler, 2017: 4). This overall understanding of the inherent dangers of Bolsonaro wielding the tools of power and its likely impacts upon the indigenous of Brazil, very much underpins this dissertation and will become apparent throughout.

4.2 The rise of Jair Bolsonaro & 'Bolsonarismo'

On January 1st 2019, Jair Bolsonaro became the 38th President of Brazil. On paper, Bolsonaro's background as a former army captain, followed by a twenty seven year tenure in Brazil's national Congress, suggests that Bolsonaro was a very accomplished and apt candidate to become the next President of Brazil. However, in Chagas-Bastos' (2019) review of the first 100 days of Bolsonaro's Presidency, titled *Political Realignment in Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro and the Right turn*, there is a scathing critique to such a view; "he is a captain who was forced into retirement in 1988 after he threatened to bomb army barracks to obtain salary increases...In twenty seven years in Congress, he religiously collected the substantial benefits paid to Brazilian Congressmen in exchange for producing absolutely nothing besides controversial and dangerous rhetoric" (ibid, 2019: 95). Whilst this does represent an emotive attack on Jair Bolsonaro, it is worth noting that in twenty seven years in Congress, Bolsonaro presented 150 bills, of which only one was ever approved in 1996.¹

It is important to take a closer look at exactly what were the factors that led to Jair Bolsonaro's victory in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential elections with 57 million votes. It should be stressed that the rise of Jair Bolsonaro from the fringes of Congress to assuming the Presidency of Brazil cannot be attributed to one factor alone. Indeed, a combination of factors have led to this moment in Brazilian history and these include: a desire for political change, the growing violence and crime across Brazil and the effective use of social media.

Firstly, it is crucial to understand that the Brazilian electorate was desperate for political change. This had largely stemmed from a fatigue of political corruption. The national *Lava Jato* investigation had revealed the widespread corruption by Brazil's elite that had permeated all facets of Brazil's branches of power. After over a decade of rule from the Partido dos Trabalhadores, followed by continued accusations of wrongdoing and corruption under Michel Temer's short tenure, there seemed to be a palpable desire for change. The growing levels of crime across Brazil were a second reason as to why Bolsonaro was able to pave his way to victory. Bolsonaro's rhetoric and campaign message promised to be tough on crime and was clearly a very appealing message in a nation with 19 of the world's 50 most dangerous cities (See Americas Quarterly, 2018). Lastly, the rise of Bolsonaro must be examined in conjunction

¹ Of these 150 bills presented to Congress, over one fifth related to the military, whilst only one concerned education (see Marini, 2018)

with his effective use of social media. Jair Bolsonaro was able to use his mass following on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to spread campaign messages that were able to reach millions across Brazil. Indeed, “twitter...has been pinpointed as the fastest and most critical campaign tool for reaching and mobilising people, for gathering data and responding to public reactions” (Bouvier, 2015: 158). The benefits of using social media for his campaign were two-fold: firstly, by opting to livestream his speeches on social media platforms such as Facebook, Bolsonaro was able to deliver his key campaign messages, whilst at the same time avoiding scrutiny by declining to participate in the more traditional TV debates. Secondly, the use of social media was particularly effective because key policies, rhetoric and political attacks could be shared in bite-size posts, which would then be shared and disseminated by users all over Brazil. Indeed, social media posts “tend to be highly multimodal, carrying not so much larger bodies of running text, but text formed of shorter chunks and integrated with images, lists and graphics” (Bouvier and Machin, 2018: 184). These small bodies of text can be repeatedly posted in different formats in ways that Damien Pfister (2011) has described as ‘flooding the zone’; this term argues that the continuous production of discourse through posting similar or repeated content is “one communicative strategy than can focus the public attention in a networked media environment” (ibid, 2011: 158). The added benefit of ‘flooding the zone’ with bite-sized messages of misinformation and fake news is that they can be tailored to different classes of society; a multi-pronged message can spread fear and hope to the economically anxious and prosperous alike, in a targeted manner. At the core of these bite-sized social media posts, lies the effective use of political ‘memes’² by the Bolsonaro campaign. The use of political memes is especially effective as they act as a way to synthesize the core message whilst also being able to attack his political rivals. Additionally, “internet memes enable and encourage non-traditional actors to ‘speak back’ to political authorities in surprising, and surprisingly eloquent ways” (Howley, 2016: 171).

Bolsonaro’s closest challenger in the polls, Fernando Haddad, from the left wing PT party, had 650,000 likes on Facebook in the run up to the election. However, this number was dwarfed by Bolsonaro who boasted over 6.5 million likes (see BBC Monitoring, 2018). In a country where social media has been fused into the fabric of everyday life and with 60% of Brazilians claiming that they use social media as a news source (see Digital News Report, 2018), it is clear to see how Bolsonaro was able to ‘weaponize’ social media for the benefit of his campaign.

² Coleman (2012: 109) defines internet memes as “viral images, videos and catchphrases under constant modification by users, and with a propensity to travel as fast as the internet can move them”.

Furthermore, “while other candidates were unable to respond to misinformation campaigns [on social media]....Bolsonaro’s campaign remained on the offensive, and he never came under pressure to defend his ideas” (Chagas-Bastos, 2019: 96).

Overall, it has been clear to see why the political, social and economic conditions in Brazil provided the perfect background for Bolsonaro’s ascension to the Presidency in October 2018. The topic of social media and its influence on politics in Brazil will be discussed in depth in a separate chapter.

4.3 The Indigenous Communities of Brazil

“Although indigenous peoples only own, occupy and use 25% of the world’s surface area, they safeguard 80% of the world’s remaining biodiversity”
(Sobrevila, 2008: 11)

It is important to examine exactly who are the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Establishing the ‘identity’ of the indigenous has become a widely researched topic for anthropological and sociological scholars (see Pereira et al 2009; Bolaños, 2010). Discussion surrounding the identity of the indigenous of Brazil is vital, and as Weaver (2001: 243) persuasively acknowledges: “identity is shaped, in part, by recognition, absence of recognition, or misrecognition by others”. An examination across academic literature, fictional books, films and TV documentaries has revealed terms varying from ‘Indians’, ‘indigenous’, ‘tribal’, ‘traditional people’ and ‘natives’; “and yet, artificial and generic as they were at the time of their creation, these labels have been ‘inhabited’ by flesh and blood people” (Carneiro da Cunha and Alameida, 2000: 316). Furthermore, Carneiro da Cunha and Alameida (2000: 243) suggest that “the use of the term ‘traditional people’ is intentionally encompassing”. This is an important observation as, arguably, an encompassing term such as this offers one of the most logical options considering that Brazil is home to more than 900,000 indigenous people³, gathered in 225 societies and speaking 274 indigenous languages (FUNAI, 2020).

In her important work titled *Reconstructing Indigenous Ethnicities*, which involved conducting in-depth interviews with many of Brazil’s indigenous communities, Omaira Bolaños (2010) came to the conclusion that whilst the construction of indigenous identity is a complex and dynamic process, there were a collection of themes that could encompass all the different indigenous people, including: a sense of rootedness (attachment to land), historical memory (family memories; authenticity), consciousness (restrictive knowledge; acquiring knowledge), historical transformation (enforced assimilation) and social exclusion (stigma; discrimination) (ibid, 2010: 64).

³ Figures surrounding exact population size vary substantially; in the 2000 national census, 700,000 people reportedly identified themselves as indigenous people (see Kenedy and Perez, 2000; Ramos, 2003).

	Brasil		Amazônia	
	Número	Superfície (ha)	Número	Superfície (ha) (% Amazônia / Brasil)
Em estudo ³	118	-	43	-
Delimitadas	43	2 243 541	11	1 662 477 (74%)
Declaradas	74	7 602 655	32	6 982 470 (92%)
Homologadas	13	1 497 048	332	105 615 658 (98,5%)
Regularizadas	473	105 714 670		
Interditadas	6	1 080 740	6	1 080 740 (100 %)
TOTAL	603	117 057 916	424	115 341 345

Figure 2. Indigenous lands of the Amazon and Brazil (Le Torneau, 2019: 4)

The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is the Brazilian government body responsible for overseeing policies relating to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Importantly, FUNAI plays a fundamental role in the processes of demarcation of indigenous lands. The process of ‘demarcation’ refers to the lengthy administrative process that leads to the official recognition of indigenous territorial rights.

An examination into the history of the indigenous peoples of Brazil reveals that they have experienced persecution throughout many decades. The military dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985) was a particularly difficult period. During the two decades of dictatorship, the government was wary of the Amazon region and its indigenous populations to the extent that it envisioned intervening in the Amazon and integrating the territory in Brazil through heavy construction projects. Such an ideology stemmed from underlying fears regarding national security; “the military government argued that a thinly populated Amazon might create avenues for foreign powers to invade Brazilian territory” (The Intercept, 2019). The results of these efforts to intervene and construct in the Amazon were catastrophic for the local indigenous populations. The invasive construction projects, including around 10,000 miles of roads being built in seven years (Andreas, 2007) caused immense distress for the indigenous populations living in the area. Furthermore, the Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade (National Truth

Commission) estimates that at least 8,350 indigenous were killed by the military dictatorship (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 2014).

Indigenous and the 1988 Constitution

Following years of military dictatorship in Brazil, the new Constitution of 1988 aimed to elevate the issues of human rights and the protection of the environment; “nicknamed the Citizen Constitution, it expressed hope for a regime of justice and democracy” (Carneiro da Cunha et al, 2017: 404). The 1988 Constitution asserts that the Indigenous rights are ‘originary’ and, importantly, it marked the first time that indigenous policies reflected genuine interests and demands of the indigenous peoples, rather than those of the State. Furthermore, Article 232 of the Constitution goes as far as encouraging the creation of indigenous peoples’ organizations, both at the local and regional levels. As Rodrigues (2002: 501) asserts “the constitution created a new arena where indigenous peoples could autonomously articulate their interests and act on their own behalf”. Put simply, the indigenous peoples of Brazil had been granted agency for the first time in their history following years of *apagamento* (erasure). The understanding of the term *apagamento* within the context of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, this term refers to the understanding that the indigenous peoples of Brazil have been erased from the narratives surrounding the construction of Brazilian society. Indeed, it was only in 1991 that the category “indigenous” was included in the national census. Secondly, the term refers to the notion of erasure being a physical process; the indigenous peoples of Brazil face the loss of their physical lands and culture through the dangerous discourse and policy implementations of the Bolsonaro administration.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

A second way in which the rights of the indigenous peoples were further improved, was through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was adopted in 2007 and represented the most progressive effort to establish an international norm surrounding the protection of indigenous rights. Indeed, “one of the main innovations of the declaration is the recognition of the legal personality of indigenous peoples, and the respective entitlement of collective and individual rights, as well as the rights of self-determination” (Godinho, 2008: 248). There was a large consensus behind the document with 143 votes in favour, 4 votes against and 11 abstentions. Most notably, Brazil was a signatory whilst other

nations with sizeable indigenous populations, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States, voted against the declaration. At the core of the declaration lies the issue of 'self-determination'. Conversely, the document also makes it clear that it does not seek to place the indigenous communities in a position of isolation and detachment. Indeed, as well as being granted the right to self-determination, indigenous peoples are equally entitled to participate in "the political, economic, social and cultural life of the state" (see UNDRIP, 2007: article 5). It is important to note, however, that the declaration is non-binding, and as this dissertation will go on to reveal, the actions and interventions of Jair Bolsonaro regarding the indigenous of Brazil are in stark violation of the declaration that Brazil signed up to in 2007.

Overall, despite the advances in the human rights and greater political participation of Brazil's indigenous communities, there is little evidence to suggest that *de jure* legal changes have translated into *de facto* improvements for the indigenous communities in Brazil.

The importance of indigenous lands

The demarcation and protection of indigenous lands are crucial for the indigenous communities of Brazil to maintain their culture and way of life. However, the importance of these indigenous lands stretches beyond this. Indeed, a vast body of academic research (see Ferreira et al, 2005; Nolte et al, 2013; Nepstad et al, 2006; Adeny et al, 2009) has shown the capacity of indigenous lands in preventing damaging agricultural practices and wildfires, and consequently, they play a vital role in the global fight against anthropogenic climate change. Significantly, the Amazon rainforest represents one of the 10 global 'tipping points' which refer to "critical thresholds in a system that, when exceeded, can lead to a significant change in the state of the system, often with an understanding that the change is irreversible" (See IPCC, 2019). Furthermore, these protected indigenous lands, predominantly concentrated in the Amazon, help defend against agribusiness advancements in the Amazon rainforest. A clear example of this can be seen in figure 3 which shows a 'green island' of forest in the state of Rondônia which is an indigenous territory, surrounded by areas of deforestation. This argument is corroborated by Cristosomo et al, (2015) who have shown that deforestation in 2014 was much lower in indigenous land (2%) in comparison with the rest of the Amazon (19%).



Figure 3. Indigenous land in Rondônia surrounded by deforestation (Le Torneau, 2019: 6)

It has been clear to see that the indigenous of Brazil face a variety of threats from the present administration of Brazil. In many ways, the discourse of Bolsonaro acts as a threat multiplier, not only guiding future policy relating to the indigenous peoples, but also emboldening those who seek to exploit their lands, often with life threatening consequences. It is important to remember that “environmental degradation has a marked and disproportionate effect on the indigenous peoples, whose physical existence and lifestyles depend on the forest, the land and the rivers in material, social and symbolic terms” (CADHu and ARNS Commission, 2019: 4).

4.4 Social media and politics in Brazil

“If we don’t have the capacity to distinguish what’s true from what’s false, then by definition the marketplace of ideas doesn’t work. And by definition our democracy doesn’t work. We are entering into an epistemological crisis”
(Barack Obama in conversation with The Atlantic)

This section represents an important examination of the two main subject matters relating to this dissertation: social media and populist communication. The increasing digitisation of electoral campaigns means that these two issues can no longer be considered as separate entities. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2016 and the political victories of Brexit and Donald Trump, the ascension of Viktor Orban in Hungary and finally, Bolsonaro’s meteoric rise in 2018, there has been a sustained focus of attention on how social media has helped to sustain the rise of populist politics. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, the rise and growth of social media platforms in Brazil will be examined. Secondly, the use of social media by the indigenous peoples of Brazil will be considered, focusing on how these digital platforms allow the indigenous peoples to not only showcase the growing threats they are facing but also in helping to mobilise support and create broader alliances. Thirdly, some of the core features of these social media networks, and how they enabled Bolosnaro’s electoral success, will be examined. Lastly, the relationship between social media and populism is uncovered, ultimately revealing how social media affords populist politics in Brazil. Above all, by examining social media and its relationship with populism, this dissertation seeks to uncover the communicative and visual dimensions of populism in the digital age of the twenty-first century.

4.4.1 The rise of social media in Brazil

The use of social media has become increasingly widespread among citizens and politicians in Brazil. This comes as no surprise in a country where there are over 139 million smartphone users (Statista, 2019). Facebook registered the domain ‘facebook.com.br’ in 2007 and officially began operating in 2008. From the outset, Facebook gathered a very rapid expansion from just 4 million users as of mid 2009 to 92 million users in 2014, representing about 45% of the total population of the country. Significantly, out of the 92 million users, 77 million accessed via mobile internet (Bessone et al, 2020: 8). However, it isn’t just Brazilian society who have

subscribed to these digital platforms, but also Brazilian politicians. Indeed, most political actors maintain a strong presence across the different social media networks as the Brazilian political debate is increasingly being shaped online. Leading the way in shaping the online political landscape lies the current Commander-in-chief, Jair Bolsonaro, who ran virtually his entire 2018 Presidential campaign across different digital media. According to the World Leader social media monitoring observatory, Twiplomacy (2021), Jair Bolsonaro's social media presence ranks very highly compared to other Politicians across the world. Some of the findings regarding Bolsonaro by Twiplomacy include:

- 6 million Twitter followers
- 10 million page likes on Facebook
- 17 million followers on Instagram
- #2/50 in the top 50 World Leaders with most interactions on Instagram
- #4/50 in the top 50 most followed World Leaders on Instagram
- #2/50 in 50 World Leaders with most interactions on Facebook
- #6/50 in the 50 most followed World Leaders on Facebook
- #17/50 in the 50 most followed World Leaders on Twitter

(Twiplomacy, 2021)

The evidence gathered by Twiplomacy is particularly relevant to this dissertation as it not only highlights Bolsonaro's popular presence across the different social media channels, as seen through his large followings, but also hints at high levels of 'interactions' with other users and followers. This latter point regarding 'interactions' is especially important when considering the effectiveness and reach of his discourse regarding the indigenous peoples of Brazil. It is equally significant under the 'discursive practice' layer of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) model which considers how the text is produced, distributed, and consumed, and what changes occur within this process (Fairclough, 2012: 192). Lastly, the notion of 'interaction' between leader and the electorate is a key tenet of populism, which will be discussed further in the proceeding section.

It is worth noting that Bolsonaro's decision to transition his political campaign to the digital sphere was partly influenced by the *modus operandi* of Brazilian Presidential campaign procedures. The reason for this is two-fold: firstly, it is important to understand that political campaigns in Brazil are publicly funded and that there is no private financing involved. Significantly, the public funding is distributed according to the number of seats the candidate's party has in Congress. Thus, Bolsonaro and his fringe-dwelling party received little funding for

his candidacy. It is worth considering that Bolsonaro's party, the Social Liberal Party (PSL), could only muster enough votes to elect one federal deputy in 2010 and 2014 elections. Secondly, Presidential candidates in Brazil are given free air time (TV and radio) to broadcast their political manifesto. However, and in a similar manner to the public funding, this free broadcast time is allocated as a proportion of the number of seats the party has in Congress. Consequently, Bolsonaro lacked the two most important assets needed to run a political campaign: financing and traditional media coverage. Therefore, in many ways it is not surprising that his Presidential campaign needed to pivot to social media platforms which could afford him what he needed most: low cost campaign and an unlimited reach to prospective voters.

4.4.2 Social media & the indigenous peoples of Brazil

It has been clear to see that Bolsonaro has used social media platforms to further his agenda and attack political rivals with great success. However, it is important to consider the ways in which Brazil's indigenous communities have also utilised the availability of these digital networks. Indeed, and contrary to popular belief, even the smallest towns and villages in Brazilian Amazonia now have access to high speed internet connections and an increasing number of indigenous villages in forest areas also have satellite or antenna internet connections (Virtanen, 2015: 350). As such, and in an attempt to raise visibility and awareness of the ongoing struggles, Brazil's indigenous communities are increasingly turning to social media platforms as an important tool to post videos and messages to tell their side of the story and bolster support for their threatened cultures (Benassatto, 2020) and there are various opportunities that social media platforms have provided Brazil's indigenous communities. Indeed, in her pivotal paper titled *Indigenous Social Media Practices in Southwestern Amazonia*, Pirjo Virtanen (2015) having gathered ethnographic data over a number of fieldwork trips since 2003 and followed indigenous Facebook users since 2009 identified five reasons why social media acts as a powerful tool for Brazil's indigenous peoples:

- (1) For (re)producing relationships
 - (2) For discussing one's personal life
 - (3) For expressing political opinions related to indigenous politics
 - (4) For organising meetings
 - (5) Enabling new contacts
- (Virtanen, 2015: 354)

The third point addressed by Virtanen is one of the most significant ones. Indeed, the ability to disseminate political opinions relating to indigenous politics enables the indigenous communities of Brazil to exercise more agency over matters that will directly impact them. Furthermore, key examples of this can be seen in social media campaigns against dam construction (e.g. Belo Monte) as well as other dangerous extractive activities which have rapidly connected and furthered support from people all over the world. The Brazilian government is constructing the Belo Monte mega-dam on the Xingu River in the Amazon; the sheer size of these projects threatens to harm or destroy vast areas of land belonging to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. More recently, the online outrage against the proposed bill PL490 which seeks to bar the recognition of indigenous lands not occupied by October 1988 has centred around the Twitter hashtag '#PL490NÃO'. Indeed, Carina Pensa, a researcher at the Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar) who focuses on Environmental conservation and social media, analysed the online debate surrounding #PL490NÃO and produced a data visualisation map highlighting the principal individuals involved (see figure 4).




Figure 4. Twitter.com, 2021

Significantly, this data produced by Pensa highlights not only the impact that a ‘#’ campaign can have in debating an environmental policy that directly impacts the indigenous peoples of Brazil on a social media platform but, crucially, highlights the role that indigenous activists play in shaping the online debate; this can be seen by the prevalence of social media accounts such as ‘Sonia Guajajara’ and ‘Joenia Wapichana’. Furthermore, and in a similar manner to Bolsonaro’s use of social media during his electoral campaign, the indigenous communities of Brazil also use social media as an easier and more efficient way for mass mobilisation than face-to-face meetings, which normally require lots of space, travel and time (Juris, 2012). This was seen in the organisation of protests in Brasilia against the PL490 bill. Significantly, the indigenous protests in Brazil’s capital were met with physical violence from the federal police, who used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the indigenous activists. However, as a result of social media, indigenous communities were able to broadcast this violence via videos, photos and texts posted on social media platforms such as Twitter (see figure 5), thereby gathering further support for their cause and raising international condemnation towards Bolsonaro’s administration.

Figure 5.



(Twitter.com, 2021)

Whilst social media platforms offer an excellent opportunity for individual indigenous activists to enter the political debate, it is also worth noting that there are plenty of indigenous organisations who also use social media as their principal method of communication. Indeed, the 'Mídia Índia' and 'ABIP' (Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil) are examples of this. The Mídia Índia is a network that considers itself to be the voice of Indigenous Peoples and regularly posts news across Instagram, Facebook and Twitter, as well as producing podcasts on Spotify. Indeed, Erik Terena, a member of the Terena indigenous tribe and one of the organisers of Mídia Índia, stresses the importance of using social media platforms as a counter-discourse to Bolsonaro: "we are living under a government that uses fake news and lies to harm the indigenous populations...we are having to fight back against a new colonization by resorting to ethno-media to tell the truth about us" (Erik Terena quoted in Benassatto, 2020). This observation by Terena is significant for two reasons: firstly, it acknowledges that the transition to the digital age represents a new threat in the form of a digital colonization. Secondly, the very tools being used to attack the indigenous peoples of Brazil can be used by them as a way to fight back, be heard and reveal the government's willful disregard of its constitutional responsibility. Ultimately, revealing the social media affords both many challenges and opportunities to Brazil's indigenous communities. Above all, it is evident that social media platforms grant the indigenous peoples of Brazil with a powerful instrument for self-representation as well as being vital in resisting the growing political, economic and environmental threats. Put simply, they afford the indigenous communities of Brazil with a sense of visibility, having experienced decades of '*apagamento*' (erasure).

4.4.3 Key features of social media platforms

Having covered a brief overview of the rise of social media platforms in Brazil, it is important to look at the key features that these online platforms possess and what the benefits, and risks, they bring to politics in Brazil. There are many reasons why social media platforms were the perfect way for Bolsonaro to disseminate his policies and attack political rivals. Firstly, social media platforms allow users to deliver content in a variety of formats, these include: images, text, 'memes', videos and sound bites. This is effective as not only can they be tailored to the target audience but can also successfully reach users from different demographics. Secondly, these different types of content can be rapidly shared via the 'retweet', 'share', 'forward' and 'copy' functions built into these social networks. Significantly, Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign was effective in producing content that could be rapidly shared and thus, "users received a flood of

supposedly spontaneous political memes, audio messages, and videos featuring ordinary folks from peers and private groups of family, friends, neighbors, and other personal relations” (Cesarino, 2020a: 12). Crucially, during Bolsonaro’s campaign, all of this information sharing occurred at a time when WhatsApp had not yet introduced its “forwarded” symbol on message chains, thereby further obscuring the ability to discern between original and shared content. Across social media platforms, memes and other political campaign messages circulate quickly with little to no indication to the original source; indeed, ambiguity is a key part of its performative efficacy and thus, campaigns of mis/dis-information can be very successful.

There is little doubt that the rise of social media and its influence on Brazilian politics has brought various advantages in increasing the availability of information, especially to large proportions of the population who are otherwise neglected and out of reach. However, it has also allowed new ways of manipulating it to emerge. As Marres (2018: 435) notes, social media networks are “truthless public spheres by design” and consequently, this has profound impacts on politics and the spread of ideas. The key issue for politics in Brazil as a result of the transition into the digital sphere is that it is becoming rife with mis/disinformation campaigns, or the spread of ‘fake news’. The concept of mis/disinformation is increasingly linked to social media and poses serious challenges to not only politics, but the spread of ideas as a whole. Indeed, misinformation can be understood as the sharing of false information that the individual believed to be true. However, disinformation differs from this as it relates to the spread of false information that an individual shares despite the knowledge that it is not true. The significant challenge for social media platform moderation and fact-checking is that it is very difficult to sometimes prove whether the individual(s) intentionally knew the information was false or not. Thus, as Ingram et al, (2016: 74) persuasively note, the inability to distinguish between irony and sincerity, a joke or a serious statement, fact or fiction, direct quote or paraphrase, provides leader such as Bolsonaro wide scope for deniability, tactical reversals and withdrawals of statements with little chance of repercussion. However, whilst this is a clear benefit for politicians like Bolsonaro, the inability to distinguish truth from fiction represents a significant threat to democracy in Brazil and, as the epigraph of this chapter notes, it also leads to an epistemological crisis. Significantly, recent research published in Brazil revealed that 67% of Brazilian teenagers can’t distinguish fact from opinion (Oliveira, 2021), above all highlighting one of the principal reasons why memes and other forms of social media content can flourish and have such powerful effects on political success.

It has been evident that social media platforms offer an array of tools that can be utilised to benefit political campaigns. However, it has been equally clear to see that these tools can be used to impact politics in a manner that circumvents mainstream media and any sense of accountability or fact-checking. Put simply, social media platforms such as Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook afford an impressive efficacy in spreading ideas and mobilizing political support, with little regard for the truth.

4.4.4 Populism & social media

The myriad of recent studies on populism points to the concept's ability to speak to the current political environment. Indeed, what was once a fringe-dweller in the political landscape has now become 'trendy' (Kaltwasser et al, 2017: 1). Furthermore, and as already noted, the emergence of social media within the field of politics and political discourse has also centred populism within this field. According to Baldwin-Philippi (2019: 377), populism can be understood as a 'performance' and digital technologies such as social media platforms allow for and encourage particular performances of populism.

The affinity between social media and populism is clear and as this relationship has grown over the past decade. The growth in recent literature on this new form of populism has led to it being called 'digital populism' or 'populism 2.0'. Indeed, Engesser et al (2017: 1123) reveal how social media is particularly well suited for populist communication, granting political leaders the platform and freedom "for the use of strong language when attacking the elites and ostracizing others". This notion of social media platforms being well suited for populist communication is shared by Leticia Cesarino (2020b) who, in her research paper titled *How Social Media Affords Populist Politics*, attempts to examine the structural features of social media which may be helping to co-produce populist politics in Brazil. Indeed, her research identifies two factors leading to the rise of populist leaders on social media platforms: firstly, they occur and manifest within a wider context of dissatisfaction. Secondly, it requires a charismatic leader claiming to speak from outside the system (ibid, 2020b: 6). The first point regarding populist politics and social media being fuelled by a broader context of dissatisfaction is particularly relevant to Bolsonaro's electoral success as he rose to prominence in the midst of an antagonistic political environment in which many 'elite' politicians were identified in the Operation Car Wash (*Lava Jato*), whilst the everyday citizens were struggling with socio-economic issues including high

crime rates and poor economic prospects and therefore had huge dissatisfaction with the status quo. Operation Car Wash was an investigation that uncovered an unprecedented web of corruption permeating both the public and private sector of Brazil; directors at the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras, funneled billions of dollars between themselves and the political elite. Significantly, Cesarino (2020b: 410) suggests that the unfolding sense of crisis and anger may have also been reinforced by social media itself: “social media spread a sense of epistemic and moral crisis and disorganisation, while at the same time offering a reductionist, populist style solution for remaking a corrupt society anew by the hands of an all-powerful, untainted anti-establishment outsider”. This interpretation is persuasive and reveals that social media platforms in Brazil acted not only in exacerbating the extent of the issues but also providing a sense of solution, which ties in with the second factor mentioned above regarding requiring a charismatic leader claiming to speak from outside the system.

It is worth considering that there is an additional feature that social media platforms provide in affording one of the core features of populism: direct access to the leader. Indeed, one aspect that has already been mentioned relating to this is the ‘interaction’ that occurs between the electorate and the elected; social media platforms promote the kind of interactive communication often praised in populist rhetoric and grants everyday Brazilians the opportunity to send direct messages to the President via short tweets or interacting with Facebook live streams in the comment section. Furthermore, across the different social media platforms, Bolsonaro was able to portray himself as the true embodiment of the everyday Brazilian (*cidadãos do bem*) and consequently breaking down the barriers and differences between leader and followers - a key tenet of populism. This idea of presenting himself as a true embodiment of the everyday Brazilian is explored in depth by Mendonça and Caetano (2021) whose important research explores the visual dimensions of populism through Bolsonaro’s instagram posts and how he uses his social media posts to act as a “mirror of the people” (ibid, 2021: 210). Mendonça and Caetano gather a series of images from his personal Instagram account showing Bolsonaro at large gatherings with voters, wearing the national football team jersey, holding an assault rifle and even in hospital following a knife attack, which not only removed him from the election campaign debates but importantly, revealed a human, weaker side to him. Cumulatively,

“these images reinforce the theme of distancing from the institutions of government that Bolsonaro seeks to control. In a double move, Bolsonaro concurrently distances himself from the

traditional structures and trappings of power while bringing ordinariness to their very heart. By presenting himself in close proximity to established power but not as a constituent element of it, he ends up achieving distance: from the people, as an exceptional figure, and from political institutions, as a noninstitutional performer” (ibid, 2021: 228).

Significantly, Mendonça and Caetano’s (2021) research reveals how Bolsonaro’s instagram posts emphasise his ordinariness and distances himself from the political status quo whilst attempting to bridge himself closer to the everyday Brazilian citizen.

Whilst the relationship between social media and populism may seem linear, it is worth adding a note of caution. Indeed, Waisbord and Amado’s (2017) investigation into Presidential Twitter use in Latin America concluded that social media use did not tend to alter the forms of communication already practiced there and that the populist style of interaction in fact was similar to that of non-populist leaders in Latin America. Despite this, one of their principal conclusions is especially relevant to this dissertation:

“Rather than engaging with citizens to exchange views and listen to their ideas, populists have used Twitter to harass critical journalists, social media users and citizens. Just like legacy media, Twitter has been a megaphone for Presidential attacks on the press and citizens. It has provided a ready-made, always available platforms to lash out at critics, conduct personal battles, and get media attention” (Ibid, 2017: 1330).

Significantly, whilst Waisbord and Amado (2017) cast doubt on the supposed link between social media and populism, they note that these social media platforms afford populist leaders with the tools to attack and undermine citizens, evidence of which will become clear in the proceeding chapters. A more cautious interpretation of the relationship between social media and populism is shared by Van Dijck et al, (2018) who view social media as platforms through which many symbolic processes that are essential to politics take place. Indeed, as this chapter has already discussed, social media platforms are particularly well suited to populism as they offer a flattened communication structure whereby voters can ‘interact’ with leaders, which lies in stark contrast to the top-down structure of traditional legacy media.

This chapter has sought to identify the rise of social media platforms in Brazil and examine how Brazilian politicians like Bolsonaro are using them to promote and further their own political agenda, whilst at the same time seeking to delegitimise and attack political rivals, traditional media and even Brazilian citizens such as the indigenous communities of Brazil. Furthermore, it

has been clear to see that there is a growing relationship between social media and populism and how the built-in features of digital platforms are affording populist politics, especially through granting direct access to the leader. Above all, electoral successes such as Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 suggest that history is won by whoever can control the narrative, the viral video, the meme; this ability to control discourse and public opinion through social media, regardless of whether it is truth or fiction, ultimately has dangerous consequences for Brazil's indigenous communities.

5. Methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis

This dissertation will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the principal method to examine the social media posts of Jair Bolsonaro regarding the indigenous people of Brazil. CDA expands on Michel Foucault's (1971) dialectical understanding of discourse, suggesting that discourse is both socially shaped and socially shaping. Furthermore, CDA is an appropriate method of investigation as it allows for micro and macro levels of analysis. At the core of CDA lies the relationship between language and power; as Van Dijk highlights in his critical work *'Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis'* (1993), discourse permits the ideological dominance of some groups over others, through the "positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the other" (ibid, 1993: 249), and this is precisely why it is an effective method of investigation into the discourse and rhetoric of Jair Bolsonaro. This interpretation is also acknowledged by Norman Fairclough (1993: 135) who suggests that CDA focuses on the "linkages between discourse, ideology and power". This is significant as discourse allows political actors such as Bolsonaro to justify, establish legitimacy and normalise their intentions and actions.

Many scholars have presented the core principles of CDA in their own terms (Fairclough, 1992, 1993; Van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 1996, 2001). Whilst some approaches focus more on linguistic analysis of texts (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak, 1996), other methods are more interested in the social and cultural contexts behind language use (Van Dijk, 1997; Gee, 2005). Despite these differences, it is also apparent that there are common grounds of agreement between them and this is best summarised by Luke (2002: 100): "CDA involves a principled and transparent

shunting back and forth between the microanalysis of texts using varied tools of linguistics, semiotic, and literary analysis and the macroanalysis of social formations, institutions, and power relations that these texts index and construct". Furthermore, the most widely accepted interpretation is Fairclough and Wodak's (1997) eight principles of CDA. The first principle is that CDA is used to address social problems; CDA goes beyond just language and also examines the processes behind it. The second principle is that power relations are discursive and as such, CDA seeks to explain how relations of power are exercised and maintained. The third principle is that discourse constitutes society and structure. Fourthly, discourse does ideological work. Put simply, ideologies are produced through discourse. The fifth principle states that discourse is historical; only by examining the wider historical contexts and narratives, can the true meanings of discourse be fully understood. The sixth principle suggests that the relationship between text and society is mediated. The seventh principle is that CDA is both interpretive and explanatory; CDA goes beyond just textual analysis. The eighth and final principle states that discourse is a form of social action; at the core of CDA lies an attempt to uncover power relations (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).

Norman Fairclough's CDA model

In order to achieve a level of analysis that goes beyond simply the textual analysis, this thesis will use Norman Fairclough's (1992, 1993) three dimensional CDA model (see figure 6) as the primary method of investigation, which provides a clear way of connecting language use and social practice (see Fairclough, 2010). In the three dimensional model, each of the three layers represents a separate part of analysis. Firstly, there is a linguistic analysis of the text; according to Fairclough (1993: 138), the text refers to "the written or spoken language produced in a discursive event". Secondly, there is an analysis of discursive practices surrounding the text. The discursive practice considers how the text is produced, distributed, and consumed, and what changes occur within this process (Fairclough, 2012: 192). Lastly, there is an analysis of the social practices surrounding the text; Fairclough (1992: 86) notes that it is the "social practice that determines the macro-processes of discursive practice, and it is the micro-processes that shape the text".



Figure 6. Norman Fairclough's three dimensional CDA model (Fairclough, 1992: 73)

Digital Humanities

Despite the clear applicability of CDA, it has also been clear to see that the CDA approach has come under criticism; this largely stems from “the lack of objective and reliable empirical evidence it produces for the sweeping claims it makes about the relationship between language and social structures” (Lee, 2018: 82). In response to such criticism, the discipline has embraced the field of Digital Humanities (DH) and corpus linguistics as a way of addressing the credibility gap (Baker, 2006; Mauntner, 2009; Berry, 2012). The field of DH has over the years developed a range of effective tools for analyzing and detecting patterns in large text samples. Indeed, Baker (2006:17) suggests that digital corpora tools provide four main benefits for discourse analysis; firstly, it is effective in reducing researcher bias. Secondly, it provides a ‘cumulative effect’ of repeated patterns in a corpora as evidence of a particular hegemonic discourse. Thirdly, it makes it easier to find counter-examples or ‘resistant discourse’ to reveal a fuller range of discourse positions. Lastly, it is easy to combine with other methods of analysis

to achieve 'triangulation'. This final point is especially significant as the incorporation of a software text mining tool alongside close qualitative reading of the texts is effective in achieving 'research triangulation' (Cicourel, 1969); research triangulation involves using two or more different approaches as a means of checking results or a specific hypothesis. Importantly, research triangulation within CDA challenges the principal criticism that "critical discourse analysts could 'cherry-pick' or intentionally select (possibly atypical) data or linguistic features for analysis to prove a preconceived point" (Baker and Levon, 2015: 222).

The meanings and parameters of digital humanities remain contested (see Jones, 2013). However, the concept of Digital humanities emerged in the spotlight between 2004-2008, branded as a "humanities 2.0" (The New York Times, 2010). As Berry (2012: 2) explains in *Understanding the Digital Humanities*: "the digital humanities also try to take account of the plasticity of digital forms and the way in which they point towards a new way of working with representation and mediation, what might be called the digital 'folding' of memory and archives, whereby one is able to approach culture in a radically new way." It is important to note that the study of discourse and digital practices takes both a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach. Furthermore, discourse analysis in the digital age provides both challenges and opportunities, especially with regards to social media. This understanding is addressed by Jones et al (2015) in their book *Discourse and Digital Practices: Doing Discourse Analysis in the digital age*, who note that traditional discourse analyst tools can be modified and adapted to analyze new communication practices within different digital media platforms.

Lastly, a key contribution of this dissertation is that through centering the topic of race and indigenous identity within the field of digital humanities, it challenges the assertion highlighted by McPherson (2013) as to '*why are the digital humanities so white?*'. Indeed, Gallon (2016) articulates this understanding further by suggesting that there is a need for a 'technology of recovery'; this notion of recovery within digital humanities is an attempt to recover those who have been excluded and whose histories have been largely ignored or remain hidden. Above all, there is great value in challenging "those involved in digital humanities to shift our epistemology in order to generate new questions about the relationship between the racialization of humanity and the digital spaces" (FSU Digital Humanities, 2018).

Voyant Tools

An important part of CDA involves textual analysis. This process involves deriving information from texts, or in the case of this thesis, from the tweets and Facebook live broadcasts of Jair Bolsonaro. The process of textual analysis involves detecting patterns between words; this can be through the frequency in the use of particular words or the associative link between them. Above all, it can combine both a qualitative and quantitative approach to research.

This thesis will be using the digital text mining tool '*Voyant*' as its primary method of corpus analysis. *Voyant Tools*, developed by Stefan Sinclair (McGill University) and Geoffrey Rockwell (University of Alberta), is an open-source web-based reading environment. It consists of a simple landing page and a selection of five primary tools used for analysis:

- (1) Cirrus - word cloud showing the most frequent terms
- (2) Reader - a view of the text corpus that can gather segments of the text as you scroll
- (3) Trends - distribution graph showing trends across the corpus
- (4) Summary - Provides a simple overview of the corpus
- (5) Contexts - Provides context about the occurrence of a key word

Whilst *Voyant Tools* offers these five primary tools for text mining (see figure 7), it is important to note that it is not restricted to these alone. Indeed, the user can benefit from up to 20 different tools for carrying out their analysis. Furthermore, "an extremely valuable feature of *Voyant Tools* is the interactive and relational aspects of each tool. This means that the tools can interact with each other simultaneously" (Miller, 2018: 175).




Figure 7. Primary features of Voyant tools (Voyant Tools, 2020)

Each of the selected tweets and Facebook live transcripts were extracted from Jair Bolsonaro's personal Facebook and Twitter accounts and inserted into a Microsoft (MS) Word file. This represents one of the most important stages in the process of text analysis as it ensures that the data (Tweets) can be cleaned to remove any special characters or tags (see Maceli, 2015). The finished Word document can then be directly uploaded to Voyant Tools to begin the process of analysis. A total of 27 tweets have been scraped from Jair Bolsonaro's Twitter profile, whilst a total of 36 Facebook live streams have been gathered and transcribed. The shortest live stream is only 12 minutes in length and the longest live stream is 58 minutes in length. Of these 36 live streams that have been published within the research time frame (March 2019 - April 2020), 14 relate directly to the indigenous people of Brazil and will be used for the purpose of this dissertation (see Appendix 2).

Twitter & Facebook

Twitter was launched in 2006 and currently has over 320 million monthly users; it is completely free to use and allows users to post 'Tweets' containing up to 280 characters. Brazil is the fourth highest country in terms of active Twitter users (16.65 million) (Statista, 2020). The brevity of this form of communication, in which tweets are limited to 280 characters, is well suited to the political discourses of the twenty-first century due to the 24/7 nature of news media consumption. Jair Bolsonaro's Twitter account has 6.6 million followers (Twitter, 2021). It is worth noting that it is not just 6.6 million followers who have access to Bolsonaro's Twitter feed.

Indeed, because Bolsonaro's Twitter account is public, any individual can access the account without requiring the need to follow the account in the first place. Furthermore, the various Twitter features including the retweet button ensures that tweets can be disseminated to much larger audiences as well as frequently being featured within more traditional news reports too.

Facebook was launched in 2004 and has over 2.7 billion users; like Twitter, Facebook is completely free and allows users to interact with one another through sending messages, sharing photos and posting content. Jair Bolsonaro's Facebook account has 10.8 million likes and 13.8 million followers, making him the most widely followed Brazilian politician on social media (Statista, 2020). One form of user interaction is through Facebook live streams and this dissertation will be focusing on the discursive strategies employed by Jair Bolsonaro in his weekly Facebook live broadcasts, known colloquially as 'lives'⁴. These weekly broadcasts involve Jair Bolsonaro discussing the key events, policy implementations and trends occurring in Brazil; he is regularly joined by senior cabinet members or other guests to discuss such news.

Twitter data collection

One of the primary data sets for this thesis has been collected from the Twitter profile of Jair Bolsonaro (@jairbolsonaro). A range of tweets have been gathered from the start of January 2017 up until April 2020. This precise time frame has been chosen for this thesis for the following reasons: firstly, by selecting the start point as being January 2017 onwards, this thesis will assess the tweets regarding the indigenous people of Brazil in the run up to the general election, which was held in October 2018. Secondly, the end date of April 2020 is significant as it marks the onset of the covid-19 pandemic in Brazil, and significantly, the first covid-related death being recorded within an indigenous community in Brazil (Folha de S. Paulo, 2020). The use of Twitter's 'advanced search' was utilised in order to gather the Tweets needed for this CDA. This particular scraping tool provides "an easy interface to make very specific queries, like only searching for tweets from or to specific accounts, during certain time periods, or containing particular types of content like videos or links" (First Draft, 2019: 19). The following words were used as parameters for gathering the necessary tweets from Jair Bolsonaro's Twitter and Facebook accounts:

⁴ The weekly Facebook 'lives' are often referred to as the 'live de quinta-feira', 'live semanal' or 'live da semana'

“Indígena”	“Indígenas”	“Demarcação”
“Indígeno”	“Indígenos”	“desmatamento”
“Índio”	“Índia”	“FUNAI”
“CIMI”	“marco temporal”	“originário”
“ocupação”	“integração”	“IBAMA”
“retomadas”	“caboclos”	“Incêndio”
“Amazonas”	“garimpo”	“mineração”

Table 1. Key word searches

The selection of these words represents an attempt to cover a broad range of lexical choices relating to the indigenous peoples of Brazil; some words relate directly to the indigenous people of Brazil whilst others such as the inclusion of ‘FUNAI’ and ‘IBAMA’ are significant as they are some of the government bodies solely responsible for indigenous affairs and their living environment. The selection of the words ‘demarcação’ and ‘marco temporal’ are also significant as they represent contentious issues within Brazilian politics and are directly related to the land rights of the indigenous people of Brazil.

Facebook data collection

The second source of primary data collection was gathered from Jair Bolsonaro’s Facebook profile. The weekly live broadcasts were transcribed directly from his official Facebook page by using the ‘voice typing’ tool available from Google Drive. Using the aforementioned word parameters (see figure 3), the transcriptions were filtered to gather discourse relating to the indigenous people of Brazil. The first regular Facebook live was broadcast on March 7th 2019 and the final live stream to be transcribed and analysed was broadcast on 23rd April 2020.

Twitter & Facebook limitations

There is no doubt that social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook offer plenty of opportunities for reliable data collection. Despite this, there are a number of methodological challenges that need to be addressed. One of the principal limitations of this thesis is due to the limited sample size. Indeed, the decision to focus on the Tweets between January 2017 to April 2020 meant that many tweets referencing the indigenous people of Brazil will have been ignored; Bolsonaro's Twitter profile states that he created an account in April 2010. Thus, a lengthier time scale regarding tweet publication dates could yield very different results and reveal additional evidence which may have not been considered within the present study. Significantly, a lengthier consideration of tweet publication dates could also provide important insight into whether Bolsonaro's stance regarding the indigenous people of Brazil has changed much over time.

The parameters of this thesis meant that further analysis into the discursive and social practices was limited. Conversely, further research into this area of study could consider how users across Brazil interact with each tweet and Facebook broadcast; by broadening the analysis to include the consideration of the shares, comments, quote tweets, retweets and likes attached to each tweet and video from Bolsonaro's account, it could provide significant insight into how individuals respond to such discourse. Additionally, a more in-depth analysis could consider exactly what type of users are interacting the most with these tweets; for example, are they predominantly private individual accounts or corporate businesses? Indeed, as Boyd and Crawford (2012: 669) persuasively note "some users have multiple accounts, while some accounts are used by multiple people". Lastly, further analysis could assess whether there is any evidence of 'Twitter bots'⁵ influencing discourse on social media platforms in Brazil.

The use of Twitter's 'advanced search' was very effective in gathering the required Tweets within the established time scale. However, by restricting the search to a limited number of keywords, the present study may have missed some significant Tweets which may have referenced, or alluded to, the indigenous people of Brazil without mentioning these specific words. Lastly, Twitter's advanced search does not include any tweets which may have been deleted by the @jairbolsonaro account; a lengthier study could seek to examine if there were

⁵ Twitter bots, also known as social bots, or simply bots, are pieces of software that are programmed to automatically create, share and like content on the platform (Caldarelli et al, 2019)

any tweets regarding the indigenous people of Brazil which have been deleted, or banned, from the Twitter.com platform, by using some Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools to gather such evidence. OSINT refers to any information that can legally be gathered from free, public sources about an individual or organization.

In order to transcribe the Facebook broadcasts, the built-in 'transcribe' feature was used in Google docs; whilst this does an effective job, there is a risk that outside noise or interference could impact the quality of the transcription and thus, some key messages could be missed. The process of transcription is very lengthy and future research projects could examine ways of streamlining this process to make it more effective.

Ethical considerations

With regards to the ethical considerations related to this thesis, the present study does not highlight any ethical concerns. All of the data is open-source and has been legally gathered from Twitter and Facebook. Conversely, it is worth noting that "it is problematic for researchers to justify their actions as ethical simply because the data are public. The process of evaluating the research ethics cannot be ignored simply because the data are seemingly public" (Boyd and Crawford 2012: 672). However, upon creating an account on Twitter.com, all users agree to the terms and conditions of the platform and have the option to select a 'private' or 'public' account. Furthermore, the severity, and contemporary nature, of the issue being investigated legitimises the use of Bolsonaro's tweets and Facebook live streams for the purpose of research.

Lastly, no individuals or third parties have come to any harm throughout the entire research process of this thesis.

6. Analysis & discussion

The dataset retrieved from Twitter consists of a corpus of 27 Tweets, between the date range of January 2017 and April 2020. Of these 27 Tweets, 23 explicitly mention the indigenous people of Brazil, representing an average of one Tweet every 1.7 months. The other four Tweets mention issues directly and indirectly related to the indigenous people of Brazil, such as the federal agencies tasked with protecting them or their living environment, including the Amazon rainforest. With regard to the Facebook live transcripts, a total of 36 Facebook broadcasts have been transcribed between the date range of March 2019 and April 2020. Of these 36 transcriptions, 14 explicitly mentioned, or were related to, the indigenous people of Brazil, representing over 38% of the transcripts analysed.

Through analysing the discourse of Jair Bolsonaro's personal Tweets and Facebook live broadcasts regarding the indigenous people of Brazil, there are some clear themes and discursive practices that emerge. This analysis and discussion will proceed as follows: first, this dissertation will address one of the key research questions and will examine how the indigenous people of Brazil are described in Bolsonaro's social media feeds. Secondly, the extent to which the indigenous people of Brazil are presented as the 'other' will be assessed. Thirdly, the repeated attacks on indigenous land rights and demarcation laws will be analysed. Lastly, this analysis will examine how Bolsonaro uses his social media feeds to attack Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and Federal agencies; by attacking the very NGOs and federal agencies tasked with protecting the indigenous people of Brazil and their surrounding environment, Bolsonaro is indirectly impacting the safety and long-term survival of Brazil's indigenous communities.

6.1 How are the Indigenous People of Brazil described in Bolsonaro's social media posts?

“É no trato com os índios que o Brasil se revela”
(It is in the treatment of the indigenous population that Brazilian society is revealed)
 Vincent Carelli in Martirio, 2016

It is important for the analysis and discussion of this CDA to begin with the basic research question: how are the indigenous people of Brazil described in linguistic terms within the social media posts of Jair Bolsonaro? Furthermore, as the quote from the epigraph of this chapter suggests, the way in which the indigenous people are treated and described within the social media posts of Jair Bolsonaro will directly and indirectly pave the way for how they are perceived within Brazilian society as a whole. Not only does the Brazilian President have a strong influence over the electorate through his social media channels, but he ultimately also possesses the tools of power to implement changes that can determine the way in which the indigenous communities in Brazil are treated.

One of the principal ways in which Jair Bolsonaro describes and addresses the indigenous people of Brazil is through the lexeme: ‘índio(s)’ (see table 2). It is important to note that the misnomer ‘Indian’, used to denote a person of indigenous descent, is no longer used in the English Language. However, the equivalent term ‘índio’ remains widely used in contemporary Brazilian Portuguese. It is worth considering, however, that the widespread use and circulation of the term ‘índio’ in Brazilian Portuguese does not necessarily imply that it is the most appropriate term to describe the indigenous people of Brazil. Indeed, the indigenous author Daniel Munduruku, who has a post-doctorate in Linguistics from the Universidade Federal de São Carlos, suggests that such a term is both outdated and full of preconceptions:

“a palavra índio perdeu o seu sentido. É uma palavra que só desqualifica, remonta a preconceitos. É uma palavra genérica. Esse generalismo esconde toda a diversidade, riqueza, humanidade dos povos indígenas.....A palavra índio está quase sempre ligada a preguiça, selvageria, atraso tecnológico, a uma visão de que o índio tem muita terra e não sabe o que fazer com ela. A ideia de que o índio acabou virando um empecilho para o desenvolvimento brasileiro.”
 (Rossi, 2019 *BBC News Brasil*)

“A palavra indígena diz muito mais a nosso respeito do que a palavra índio. A palavra índio gera uma imagem distorcida. Já indígena quer dizer originário, aquele que está ali antes dos outros.”

Importantly, Munduruku argues that the use of the word ‘indigenous’ is important as it has much more ‘respect’ for the history and culture of the indigenous people of Brazil. Indeed, this argument is corroborated by examining the etymology of the word indigenous; this term derives from the Latin noun *indigena*, meaning ‘native’. Thus, it could be argued that the failure to use and consider the term ‘*indígenas*’ is a failure to recognise that they were the first inhabitants of Brazil.

The repeated use of the word ‘índio’ not only suggests a lack of agency attributed to the indigenous people of Brazil, but it is also used by Bolsonaro in remarks when he suggests that they remain under the possession, or the property of, the Brazilian State. The title of this dissertation was taken from this tweet: “nossos índios” (appendix 1, tweet n. 7). This notion of Bolsonaro and Brazil having a sense of ownership over ‘our indigenous’ is further emphasised by his Facebook livestream comment: “*eu fui lá pra baixo taquari ver como estão os índios*” (Appendix 2, transcript 9). Bolsonaro’s remark implies that the indigenous people of Brazil are an object or animal that must be checked up on to see ‘how they are getting on’. It is worth noting that this hidden reference to the indigenous communities of Brazil as being subhuman is a regular theme within the discourse of Bolsonaro. Indeed, the most racially harmful comment made by President Bolsonaro occurred during his Facebook livestream on the 23rd January 2020, in which he claimed that “*com toda a certeza, o índio mudou, tá evoluindo. Cada vez mais o índio é um ser humano igual a nós*” (Appendix 2, transcript 12). This alarming remark sets a dangerous precedent as it presents a discourse of dehumanisation. Furthermore, this particular danger was acknowledged within the ICC referral of Jair Bolsonaro, which was filed in November 2019 by the Comissão Arns and the Coletivo de Advocacia em Direitos Humanos (CADHu), who noted in their report that “the statements of President Jair Bolsonaro should prompt deep concern, as genocide is unlikely to occur without being preceded by a discourse of dehumanisation” (CADHu and ARNS Commission, 2019: 33). Above all, this critique suggests that the process of dehumanisation within language can be an initial step that can lead to a much more dangerous future; an understanding that symbolic violence could lead to more direct forms of violence too.

It has been clear to see that the use of the word 'índio' has been the preferred choice of language to describe the indigenous people of Brazil. However, the application of the word 'índio' has also been used within Bolsonaro's social media posts as an opportunity to draw attention and attack political rivals. This has been particularly evident with regard to his dislike of Bolivian President, Evo Morales. Indeed, in describing Morales, who is an indigenous leader, Bolsonaro states: "é o índio né" (Appendix 2, transcript 4). It is worth noting that the negative association between Bolivia and indigenous people has been implied by other Bolsonaro allies. In an interview with Brazilian news network 'O Globo' in January 2019, congressman Rodrigo Amorim suggested: "Quem gosta de índio, vá para a Bolívia" - '*whoever likes the indigenous, go to Bolivia*' (O Globo, 2019). Above all, it has been clear to see that the word 'índio' can be used to create not only internal borders between Bolsonaro's Brazil and "nossos índios", but also external borders, as seen through the designation of Bolivia as a country of 'índios'.

Whilst the lexeme 'índio' is the most common and preferred word choice present in the social media posts of Bolsonaro, there is one instance where he chooses to use the word 'caboclo' (Appendix 2, transcript 7) when suggesting that he is not a 'caboclo' who sets fire to the forest. The Portuguese term 'caboclo' was originally used to describe a person of mixed indigenous and European ancestry. However, such a term is classed as derogatory. Indeed, Richard Pace (1997) carried out an investigation into this term in his work '*The Amazon Caboclo: What's in a name?*' and came to the conclusion that "calling a person a caboclo indicates that they occupy an inferior social status. In most cases people do not use the word to directly address another unless it is done in anger or to belittle someone" (ibid, 1997: 82). This is further evidence that through the focus on the etymology and word choice within the social media posts of Jair Bolsonaro, there is ample evidence to suggest that the indigenous people of Brazil are being represented in harmful and derogatory ways. Despite this being a common theme, there is also evidence of Bolsonaro attempting to downplay his racially insensitive remarks by noting "o índio é um ser humano igual a nós, já falei muito sobre isso" (Appendix 2, transcript 8). This juxtaposition was also addressed in his Facebook live from August 2019 in which he mentions how "o índio tão brasileiro...é tão inteligente como nós...se pegar um filho dele e um de nós...aqui vamos votar...ele vai crescer igual...o filho dessa pessoa legítimo biológico não tem diferença" (Appendix 2, transcript 6).

It could be argued that the extensive debate and analysis over the correct use of the term 'indigenous' is unnecessary and that the concern for political correctness emphasises

appearance over reality. Indeed, as John Truddell (1997) famously acknowledged: “they change our name and treat us the same”. However, this dissertation challenges this outlook by furthering the understanding that the choice of words is important as it provokes a critical awareness of history and culture. Above all, it is important to note that terms such as ‘índio’ and ‘caboclo’ are seldom used for self-identification by the indigenous people of Brazil. Thus, a failure to accept this ultimately renders the indigenous people of Brazil as a homogenous group without agency.

Table 2.

Theme / Trend	Evidence (Tweets)	Evidence (Facebook live)
1. Lack of agency / generic use of term ‘índios’	<p>“ao lado de índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 2)</p> <p>“sobre índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 5)</p> <p>“Nossos índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 7)</p> <p>“os índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 9)</p> <p>“Breve encontro com índios em Manaus” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 14)</p> <p>“O Brasil integrando seus povos: 5 comunidades indígenas no Amazonas tiveram seu plano de visitação aprovado pela Funai” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 23)</p> <p>“incorporou os índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 25)</p> <p>“A independência dos Índios no Brasil” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 26)</p>	<p>Describing Bolivian President Evo Morales: “é o índio né” (Appendix 2, transcript 4)</p> <p>“o índio tão brasileiro é tão inteligente como nós se pegar um filho dele e um de nós aqui vamos votar ele vai crescer igual o filho dessa pessoa legítimo biológico não tem diferença” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“o branco que estava lá casado com uma índia” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“Caboclo” (Appendix 2, transcript 7)</p> <p>“o índio é um ser humano igual nós, já falei muito sobre isso” (Appendix 2, transcript 8)</p> <p>“eu fui lá para baixo ver como estão os índios” (Appendix 2, transcript 9)</p> <p>“Então você conhece, teve contato com os índios. Já passaram praticamente 13, 14 anos. Com toda a certeza, o índio mudou, tá evoluindo. Cada vez mais o índio é um ser humano igual a nós” (Appendix 2, transcript 12)</p>

A second way in which Jair Bolsonaro describes the indigenous people of Brazil in his social media posts is through suggesting that they are both confined and isolated (see table 3). According to Bolsonaro, this notion of the indigenous people of Brazil being isolated and confined presents itself in two ways: firstly, he suggests that this sense of isolation is sub-human and that they are being treated like animals. Secondly, he suggests that they lack basic services and are longing for access to new technologies and healthcare.

The principal way in which Bolsonaro seeks to epitomise the indigenous people's sense of isolation is by describing them as being like 'animals in a zoo': "Chega de tratar nossos irmãos como animais de zoológico" (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 11). This description of the indigenous people of Brazil is problematic and ties in with the aforementioned discussion that Bolsonaro's descriptions of the indigenous people in Brazil focuses on a discourse of dehumanisation. Furthermore, "by comparing 'índios' living on their own lands to animals kept in zoos, Bolsonaro clearly expresses his intentions of belittling them, while building up grassroots support for a policy designed to shrink indigenous lands that have already been demarcated" (CADHu and ARNS Commission, 2019: 33). This latter point regarding Bolsonaro's attacks and intentions on shrinking indigenous land rights will be addressed at length in the third section of this discussion, but the irony surrounding this discourse of comparing the indigenous people to animals in zoos is that it implies that they are confined and trapped in small pockets of land which is how animals in zoos are often described. However, what the third chapter of this discussion section will reveal is that Bolsonaro repeatedly uses his social media posts to attack the size of indigenous reservations, complaining that they are too big for too few people. Ultimately, this description of being trapped like animals in a zoo lies in stark contrast to his complaints regarding the large areas of land demarcated as indigenous reserves.

In an attempt to suggest that the indigenous people of Brazil are lacking many services, Bolsonaro repeatedly uses the access to healthcare, and dentists in particular, as a key example. Indeed, across both Twitter and Facebook, Bolsonaro suggests that "eles querem dentista" (Appendix 2, transcript 6). He attempts to emphasise his point further in one Facebook livestream in August 2019 by suggesting that his own Environmental Minister, Ricardo Salles, does not have to worry about this kind of issue as he is always within a short walk from the dentist: "se tiver dor de dente, o Salles só tem um caminho para procurar um dentista" (Appendix 2, transcript 6). The repeated focus on a lack of technology and healthcare allows

Bolsonaro to portray the indigenous people of Brazil as miserable. In one example during a Facebook livestream, Bolsonaro compares life expectancy between non-indigenous and indigenous Brazilians as a way to emphasise the inequality gap: “eu não sei com a expectativa de vida de um índio dentro de uma reserva se a nossa está na casa dos 72, 73, eu acho que a dele só tá baixo de 50...eu acho...não tenho certeza mas é muito mais abaixo que é nossa” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). This is an example of the clear dangers of official Heads of State using their social media platforms to produce and distribute discourse that does not hold any concrete evidence, but is merely used to suit their personal political agenda. Bolsonaro acknowledges that he does not have precise figures to back up his statements and yet feels comfortable sharing this information across his social media platforms, reaching millions of Brazilians across the country. Furthermore, as Santos et al (2020: 4) note, “although there is evidence from various parts of the world that mortality rates are higher for Indigenous than for non-Indigenous populations, there remains a lack of demographic and epidemiological data that effectively characterizes such inequities”. Above all, the lack of transparency and truth is a clear danger with the social media discourse of Jair Bolsonaro.

Table 3.

<p>2.. Confined and isolated</p>	<p>“exploradas e manipuladas por ONGs.” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 4)</p> <p>“Reintegrar os índios à sociedade levando até a estas condições para que possam se sentir brasileiros” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 8)</p> <p>“Chega de tratar nossos irmãos como animais de zoológico” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 11)</p> <p>““O Brasil integrando seus povos: 5 comunidades indígenas no Amazonas tiveram seu plano de visitação aprovado pela Funai” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 20)</p> <p>“Não foi o índio que se integrou à nossa cultura, mas a cultura ocidental europeia, como a Belga, que incorporou os índios, só que hoje os condenam à miséria;” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 25)</p>	<p>“porque os índios querem se entregar à sociedade, os índios querem deixar se escravizar por homens” (Appendix 2, transcript 1)</p> <p>“aquela historinha que a esquerda sempre pegava né que o índio tem que viver como se fosse um ser pré Histórico” (Appendix 2, transcript 1)</p> <p>“o índio é o nosso irmão eles querem dentista” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“eu não sei com a expectativa de vida de um índio dentro de uma reserva se a nossa está na casa dos 72, 73 eu acho que a dele só tá baixo de 50 eu acho tenho certeza mas é muito mais abaixo que é nossa” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“nós vamos fazer tudo para integrá los à sociedade” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“eles querem a tecnologia que nós temos é justo nós negamos isso a seres humanos” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“é o índio o que ele quer a vida semelhante a nós.... ele quer um dentista” (Appendix 2, transcript 7)</p> <p>“aqui o índio não é tratado como um ser humano não é tratado como um objeto que tem que ser escravizado e confinado dentro da sua reserva” (Appendix 2, transcript 13)</p>
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6.2 To what extent are the indigenous people of Brazil presented as the 'other'?

It has been clear to see in this initial linguistic analysis of Bolsonaro's social media posts that he seeks to portray the indigenous people of Brazil as a homogenous group without agency. Furthermore, Bolsonaro seeks to create an image of the indigenous people of Brazil as being miserable by suggesting that they are confined and lack basic services. However, a deeper examination into the social media discourse of Bolsonaro suggests that he is also using his social media posts to create divisions in Brazilian society between non-indigenous and indigenous Brazilians. Indeed, this dissertation proposes that Bolsonaro uses a range of discursive measures that are employed to construct the 'other'. This can be seen through the use of inclusive and exclusive pronouns that are utilised to emphasise the supposed biological differences, as well as technological differences.

It is important to consider that a key characteristic of populist discourse lies in the construction of dichotomies. Thus, populism can be understood as a factional phenomenon. Indeed, Ernesto Laclau (2007: 83) expands on this notion of populism as a factional and antagonistic phenomenon, suggesting:

“Populism requires the dichotomic division of society into two camps - on presenting itself as a part which claims to be the whole; that this dichotomy involves the antagonistic divisions of the social field; and that the popular camp presupposes, as a condition of its constitution, the construction of a global identity, out of equivalence of a plurality of social demands”

This statement by Laclau is significant as it suggests that ultimately, Bolsonaro necessitates this splitting of society in order for his populist agenda to succeed. In other words, populism feeds off the politics of intolerance. This process of dichotomization highlighted by Laclau refers to the positive self-representation and the negative representation of the 'other'. In the context of Bolsonaro's social media posts, the positive self refers to Brazilian society as a whole, whereas the negative 'other' refers to the indigenous people of Brazil. This process of creating an “us” versus “them” is known as 'othering'. John Powell (2017: 32) describes 'othering' as the process by which individuals use language to “narrowly define who qualifies as a full member of society”. This idea of becoming a 'full member of society' is significant with regard to Bolsonaro's social media discourse as he repeatedly suggests that only by reintegrating the indigenous people of

Brazil can they become members of Brazilian society: “reintegrar os índios à sociedade levando até a estas condições para que possam se sentir brasileiros” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 8). Above all, suggesting that the integration of the indigenous people of Brazil is the ultimate test as to whether they may be considered as a Brazilian national or not. The topic of nationalism also became evident during a Facebook livestream from August 2019 in which Bolsonaro remarked: “imagine o nosso Brasil com...um pouco abaixo do sudeste e sul demarcado como terra indígena, tudo estaria inviabilizada no Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 7). Through clearly stating ‘o nosso Brasil’, Bolsonaro is suggesting that the indigenous people of Brazil are not a part of this group, despite representing around 900,000 different people. Furthermore, this is additional evidence of Bolsonaro using discourse to aid the creation of internal borders by ostracizing certain parts of Brazilian society.

Through his selective use of words Bolsonaro uses language to define the boundaries of the in-group and the out-group, the “us” versus “them”. One of the principal ways in which he portrays the indigenous people of Brazil as the ‘other’ is through the use of inclusive and exclusive pronouns. This has been most evident through the repeated use of ‘nós’ to represent Brazilian society as a whole, in contrast with ‘eles’ and “nossos índios” (Appendix 1, Tweet n. 7) as a way of describing the indigenous ‘other’. Whilst there is a need to acknowledge that the word “nossos” is by its very nature an inclusive word, it is important to highlight that it is used in the context of possession and a sense of ownership over the indigenous peoples of Brazil and therefore does create a sense of othering. Within Bolsonaro’s social media posts, these inclusive and exclusive pronouns have manifested themselves in two separate ways: by being used to reveal biological differences and through revealing technological differences between non-indigenous Brazilians and indigenous Brazilians (see table 4).

Table 4.

Biological 'othering'	<p>“se pegar um filho dele e um de nós” (Appendix 2, tweet n. 6)</p> <p>“o índio é um ser humano igual nós, já falei muito sobre isso” (Appendix 2, transcript 8)</p> <p>“aqui o índio não é tratado como um ser humano” (Appendix 2, transcript 13)</p> <p>“Cada vez mais o índio é um ser humano igual a nós” (Appendix 2, transcript 12)</p>
Technological 'othering'	<p>“é o índio o que ele quer a vida semelhante a nós” (Appendix 2, transcript 7)</p> <p>“eles querem a tecnologia que nós temos” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p>

Despite these clear attempts by Bolsonaro to portray the indigenous people of Brazil as the 'other', as seen through their supposed biological differences, their lack of services and through their lack of land rights, there is also evidence of Bolsonaro contradicting himself. Indeed, as table 5 reveals, there are rare cases of Bolsonaro seeking to suggest a united Brazil, one that recognises and accepts the differences within society.

A second consideration regarding Bolsonaro's discursive mechanism of constructing the positive 'self' and negative 'other', is that this has also extended to some international leaders who have campaigned for better protection of one of the main areas of protected indigenous land: the Amazon rainforest. Upon receiving criticism over his handling of the Amazon wildfires from leaders of the G-20, including the French President Emmanuel Macron, Bolsonaro appealed to the populist message of sovereignty and nationalism: “O Presidente Macron....me acusou de mentiroso... ele colocou em jogo a nossa soberania sobre a amazônia” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). This sentiment was echoed in his Tweet: “após o G-20, caso tivesse demarcado mais algumas dezenas de Áreas Indígenas e orientado pesadas multas nos produtores rurais, o mundo não estaria me acusando, falsamente, de destruir a Amazônia. Soberania da região e suas riquezas é o que, verdadeiramente, está em jogo” (Appendix 1, tweet 17), in which

Bolsonaro jokes that he would have to demarcate more indigenous land to avoid international criticism. Bolsonaro carefully pits Brazil and its rural agricultural workers against the International Community and its attempts to protect the indigenous people, as well as fuelling the populist and nationalist message by suggesting that Brazil's sovereignty is what is at stake.

The present study has revealed how the populist communications of Jair Bolsonaro attempt to create polarization between different actors. This has been evident in not only the dehumanisation and portrayal of the indigenous people as the 'other', but also with regard to international actors, such as the leaders of the G-20, who have expressed concern over the handling of Brazil's protected lands, many of which belongs to the indigenous communities of Brazil. Ultimately, the construction of 'others' through language eventually leads to dangerous policy implications affecting the lives of the indigenous people of Brazil.

6.3 Attacks on Indigenous Land Rights and Demarcation Laws

“Pode ter certeza que se eu chegar lá (Presidência da República)...não vai ter um centímetro demarcado para reserva indígena ou para quilombola.”
(Jair Bolsonaro quoted in Estadão, 2017)

In the previous discussion, it has been clear to see that Bolsonaro has used his social media discourse to attack the indigenous peoples of Brazil through a process of ‘othering’. However, one of the other principal targets of Bolsonaro’s discourse towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil has been with regard to their own living environment: their land rights. It is worth addressing that Bolsonaro has never sought to hide his distaste towards the process of demarcation and the recognition of indigenous lands in Brazil. Indeed, he makes this point very clear in one of his first Facebook lives in early 2019: “obviamente não sou de marcar grande quantidade de terras indígenas” (Appendix 2, transcript 2). Furthermore, prior to his presidency, and in an interview in 2015, Bolsonaro made it very clear that he was never interested in defending indigenous land rights: “não tem terra indígena onde não têm minerais. Ouro, estanho e magnésio estão nessas terras, especialmente na Amazônia, a área mais rica do mundo. Não entro nessa balela de defender terra pra índio” (Campo Grande News, 2015). Likewise, and as the epigraph of this chapter reveals, Bolsonaro has sought to eliminate all efforts and intentions to demarcate future indigenous lands. Interviews such as these have always presented clear evidence that Bolsonaro never had the interests of the indigenous peoples of Brazil and their land rights as a priority. In the analysis that follows, this dissertation investigates how Bolsonaro continues to use his social media posts to attack and undermine indigenous land rights in three separate ways: first, through criticizing the physical size of indigenous lands. Secondly, Bolsonaro seeks to portray the indigenous peoples of Brazil and their lands as an obstacle to agribusiness and mining. Thirdly, Bolsonaro uses his social media posts as a platform to deny and downplay the severity of the Amazon forest fires, whilst removing himself from the blame. Whilst the focus on the Amazon fires may seem detached from the plight facing the indigenous people of Brazil, it is worth remembering that the vast majority of indigenous lands are found in the Amazon rainforest, covering over 23% of the Amazon and representing over 98% of all indigenous territories in Brazil (socioambiental, 2018).

For the purpose of clarity, it is worth unpacking what is meant by the process of demarcation. Indeed, demarcation, or ‘marking out’, of indigenous lands refers to the administrative process

in Brazil which culminates in the official recognition of the territorial rights of indigenous populations. Importantly, “demarcation consists of a four-step process involving 1) an anthropological study to identify the physical boundaries of the territory, 2) the approval of FUNAI, 3) the approval of the Minister of Justice, and 4) the homologation by presidential decree and registration in the national land registry.” (Baragwanath and Bayi, 2020: 3).

Indigenous Land Rights & Demarcation Laws

The first aspect worth examining in further detail with regard to Bolsonaro’s social media discourse about indigenous lands is how he attacks and complains about the physical size of the indigenous lands in Brazil. At the core of this argument, Bolsonaro implies that there is too much land for too few people: “menos de um milhão de pessoas vivem nestes lugares isolados” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 4). The manner in which Bolsonaro seeks to convey his argument is two fold: firstly, by repeatedly highlighting that indigenous lands represent over 14% of national territory (see table 1) and secondly, by comparing the size of indigenous territories to the size of major Brazilian states such as Rio de Janeiro (see table 5).

Table 5.

<p>Criticizing the size of Indigenous Lands (over 14% of national territory)</p>	<p>“Mais de 15% do território nacional é demarcado como terra indígena e quilombolas. Menos de um milhão de pessoas vivem nestes lugares isolados” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 4)</p> <p>“Após o G-20, caso tivesse demarcado mais algumas dezenas de Áreas Indígenas e orientado pesadas multas nos produtores rurais, o mundo não estaria me acusando, falsamente, de destruir a Amazônia. Soberania da região e suas riquezas é o que, verdadeiramente, está em jogo.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 17)</p> <p>“ou seja hoje em dia 14% do território nacional já está a demarcação como terra</p>
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	<p>indígena, se eu marcar todas abertas passa para 20%...imagina 20% simplesmente da agricultura pecuária foi inviabilizada no Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“eu não vou usar a minha caneta a não ser que seja obrigado a demarcar mais áreas...como disse 14%...já equivale no Brasil uma área maior que os estados de São Paulo e imagina São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro e do Paraná também” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p>
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Importantly, not only does Bolsonaro use his social media discourse to attack existing demarcated indigenous lands, but he also uses his platforms to claim that some demarcations have been fraudulently authorised in the pursuit of profits:

“elas merecem ser todas revistas uma vez que há provas de dentro da própria Funai, denúncias de demarcações fraudulentas....demarcações que foram muito aumentadas na sua extensão por gente interessada em lucrar com isso” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)

Within the same Facebook live from August 2019, Bolsonaro continues:

“então todas as demarcações tem que ser objeto de revisão para verificar o que realmente corresponde à verdade, nessas terras precisam ser devidamente demarcada de acordo com a realidade e a partir daí vamos pensar se vale a pena....são latifúndios que se nós não dermos ao indígena” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)

The repeated discourse casting doubt on the demarcation process is a recurring theme within Bolsonaro’s tweets and Facebook lives. Indeed, in one broadcast Bolsonaro complains that indigenous reservations are demarcated randomly: “é à toa que essas reservas cada vez mais aparecem aqui no Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 3). However, such a claim fails to take into account the rigorous four-step demarcation process that is required in the first place. The multiple attacks by Bolsonaro towards the constitutional process of demarcation is problematic. Indeed, according to the 2018 UN ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples’, the lack of guarantees of land rights is one of the main causes of violations of the

rights of indigenous peoples, revealing that ultimately, by seeking to deny, undermine and obstruct the process of demarcation, Bolsonaro is also indirectly threatening the human rights of the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Furthermore, the claim made by Bolsonaro that all demarcations must be revised is very dangerous and goes against the 1988 Brazilian Constitution as well as the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Importantly, as Article 8 of UNDRIP states:

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
- (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(UNDRIP, 2007)

Furthermore, in these examples not only is Bolsonaro using his own government agency (FUNAI) as a scapegoat to promote conspiracy theories, but the great irony of accusing certain individuals and government agencies of wanting to profit (*lucrar*) with the process of demarcation is that the very reason Bolsonaro is against demarcation laws is that they prevent his political agenda from permitting the agribusiness and mining corporations from entering in to these protected lands in order to “lucrar” from the riches of the land. Bolsonaro’s pro-mining and agribusiness discourse and interests will be analysed and discussed in the proceeding section but it is important to consider that such discourse is intertwined with his attacks on demarcations.

In many instances across his social media platforms, Bolsonaro not only mocks the physical size of indigenous lands, but also ridicules their important role in forest conservation and climate change mitigation. Indeed, upon returning from international UN talks in Osaka, Bolsonaro mocked the idea of demarcating more indigenous lands during a facebook live, implying that if he did, then the Amazon forest fires would end: “que eu voltasse para casa e marcasse mais duas dúzias de 60 indígenas com mais 30 ou 40 quilombolas ampliase parques ambientais... o incêndio acaba imediatamente na região amazônica” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). Indeed, Bolsonaro echoed this exact sentiment in a tweet: “Após o G-20, caso tivesse demarcado mais algumas dezenas de Áreas Indígenas e orientado pesadas multas nos produtores rurais, o mundo não estaria me acusando, falsamente, de destruir a Amazônia.” Whilst the argument that increasing demarcations would end Amazon forest fires is difficult to prove with complete accuracy, there is some underlying truth to such a claim. Indeed, Dourado et al’s (2015) pivotal

research paper, *Indigenous Lands in the Brazilian Amazon: from budgeting to climate change mitigation*, is useful in this regard, articulating:

“In the Brazilian Amazon, indigenous peoples hold a significant portion of the local forest. Their Lands as a whole cover approximately 110 million hectares and contain about 30% of forest carbon in the region, which corresponds to something around 13 billion tons of carbon. This is equivalent to about a year of global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). These territories play a key role in stopping the encroachment of deforestation in the region. Therefore, they play an extremely important role in the conservation of biodiversity and to achieve the GHG emissions reduction targets undertaken by Brazil” (ibid, 2015: 5).

Furthermore, Baragwanath and Bayi (2020: 1) corroborate this argument and persuasively acknowledge that indigenous territories, when granted full property rights, will be effective at curbing deforestation:

“First, obtaining full property rights is crucial to recognize indigenous peoples’ original right to land and protect their territories from illegal deforestation. Second, when implemented, indigenous property rights reduce deforestation inside indigenous territories in the Amazon rainforest, and could provide an important positive externality for Brazil and the rest of the world in terms of climate change mitigation” (ibid, 2020:1)

It is worth noting that despite clear scientific evidence contradicting such claims, Bolsonaro has continued with this discourse. During an interview in November 2020, Bolsonaro stated: “no passado quando qualquer presidente viajava, quando voltava na semana seguinte tinha um diário oficial da união extra, tudo quanto é demarcação de terras indígenas, ampliação de parques e reservas e cada vez mais inviabilizando a nossa agricultura” (Roraima, 2020). Bolsonaro’s remarks reveal that he only associates the need, or pressure, to demarcate indigenous lands due to international pressure, implying that demarcation has acted only to please international partners and avoid scrutiny as opposed to having the interests of the indigenous peoples, or the fight against anthropogenic climate in mind. Above all, there is clear evidence that Indigenous peoples and their lands play a key role in forest conservation (Walker et al., 2020) and thus, the continued desire to obstruct demarcation also poses long-term risks to the Amazon rainforest, representing a clear threat not only to the indigenous peoples of Brazil, but also the international community as a whole.

As evidenced in table 6, the other principal way in which Bolsonaro seeks to cause resentment and irritation towards the demarcation of indigenous lands is through comparing these areas of protected land with the size of Brazil’s major states, principally Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

These comparisons can be repeatedly seen in both his tweets and facebook lives. Amongst various examples, Bolsonaro highlights the Yanomami as a clear example of this in two separate Facebook live streams: “foi demarcada uma área duas vezes o tamanho do estado do Rio de Janeiro para aproximadamente 9 mil índios” (Appendix 2, transcript 1) and “em ‘92 foi assinada a demarcação da reserva Yanomami...uma área duas vezes o tamanho do estado do Rio de Janeiro” (appendix 2, transcript 6). Significantly, and as mentioned in chapter 1 of this analysis, Bolsonaro has very rarely addressed an indigenous community by their own name (Yanomami), and yet in this single example of Bolsonaro choosing to do so, he references the Yanomami indigenous within the context of accusing them of inhabiting too much land; a discourse which ties in with his overarching political message of ‘muita terra para pouco índio’

Table 6.

<p>Comparing indigenous territories to the size of other Brazilian states</p>	<p>“foi demarcada uma área duas vezes o tamanho do estado do Rio de Janeiro para aproximadamente 9 mil índios” (Appendix 2, transcript 1)</p> <p>“Uma área maior que a região Sudeste (SP/MG/RJ/ES) já está demarcada no Brasil como TI. Sob essas áreas uma completa "Tabela Periódica." (Appendix 1, tweet n. 23)</p> <p>“você pega uma reserva yanomâmi.....duas vezes o tamanho do Rio de Janeiro” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>"Só de reserva indígena de hoje em dia temos uma área equivalente a região sudeste - o estado de Minas, São Paulo, Rio, Espírito Santo. Com mais esse incremento de 6% teremos mais uma área de aproximadamente da região sul” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“Dá para imaginar o tamanho região sudeste o Rio, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais e São paulo que é o equivalente a terra indígena demarcada no Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 13)</p>
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	<p>“em ‘92 foi assinada a demarcação da reserva Yanomami...uma área duas vezes o tamanho do estado do Rio de Janeiro” (appendix 2, transcript 6)</p>
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Mining and agribusiness in indigenous lands

A detailed examination of Bolsonaro’s social media discourse regarding indigenous land rights in Brazil has revealed his discontent towards the demarcated areas of land allocated to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. However, the analysis that follows will reveal that Bolsonaro’s anger towards the demarcation process is not simply because of the physical size of the reservations per se, but also because these areas of protected land prevent other forms of economic activity from taking place, principally, the mining and agribusiness sectors.

One discursive example of how Bolosnaro attempts to promote the opening up of indigenous lands to the mining and agribusiness sectors is by suggesting that this is in fact what the indigenous peoples of Brazil actually want (see table 7). Indeed, by suggesting that the indigenous peoples of Brazil want mining: “no Brasil há quase 600 comunidades indígenas e muitas delas querem a mineração.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 21), not only is Bolsonaro attempting to speak on their behalf, but he is also positioning himself as someone who is wanting to do them a favour, implying that previous administrations have been holding them back and not having their best economic interests at heart. This notion of speaking on their behalf is reflected in another of Bolsonaro’s tweets: “O Ministro fará exposições p/ outros embaixadores, p/ mostrar-lhes o quão será bom para os índios, o Brasil e o mundo a mineração em TI” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 23).

Table 7.

<p>Claiming Indigenous Peoples want mining</p>	<p>“O Ministro das Minas e Energia recebeu o embaixador da Bélgica e apresentou-lhe alguns motivos pelos quais o Governo Jair Bolsonaro pretende regulamentar a mineração em Terra Indígena:</p> <p>No Brasil há quase 600 comunidades indígenas e muitas delas querem a mineração.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 21)</p> <p>“As riquezas minerais não estão onde queremos, mas onde a natureza as colocou: no Norte do Brasil onde, "curiosamente", governos anteriores demarcaram enormes áreas indígenas.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 22)</p> <p>“Uma área maior que a região Sudeste (SP/MG/RJ/ES) já está demarcada no Brasil como TI. Sob essas áreas uma completa "Tabela Periódica."</p> <p>O Ministro fará exposições p/ outros embaixadores, p/ mostrar-lhes o quão será bom para os índios, o Brasil e o mundo a mineração em TI” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 23)</p> <p>“Os governos FHC e Dilma também propuseram, sem sucesso, regulamentar a mineração em TI.</p> <p>Mineração em área indígena exige a prévia oitiva dos índios, autorização do Congresso e indenização aos índios (art. 231 da Constituição);</p> <p>Nenhum país do mundo tem essas exigências;” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 24)</p>
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Upon analysing Bolsonaro’s tweets and facebook lives, it is clear to see that he uses his platforms as an opportunity to promote the need to open up gold mining (‘garimpo’) in

indigenous lands. Indeed, Bolsonaro frequently uses his social media discourse to fuel the debate surrounding this issue:

“quando se fala em legalizar o garimpo tem muita gente que é contra então vamos começar a discutir esse assunto pra você até ter números e dados de como você melhor decidir se você acha que devemos ou não abrir o garimpo legal aqui no Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 6).

In this example, it is clear to see that Bolsonaro recognises that legal mining in indigenous lands is a disputed topic. However, Bolsonaro attempts to use his platforms to suggest that those who are against mining are simply lacking the key “números e dados” to make an informed decision and realise that it is a good idea. It is worth acknowledging that this notion of needing to convince, or justify, the need for legal mining can be seen in various examples across Bolsonaro’s social media feeds. Indeed, in these tweets from December 2019, Bolsonaro describes how the Brazilian Minister for Energy and Mining would attempt to persuade foreign ambassadors on the need to legalise mining:

“O Ministro das Minas e Energia recebeu o embaixador da Bélgica e apresentou-lhe alguns motivos pelos quais o Governo Jair Bolsonaro pretende regulamentar a mineração em Terra Indígena” (Appendix 1, tweet n.21).

“O Ministro fará exposições p/ outros embaixadores, p/ mostrar-lhes o quão será bom para os índios, o Brasil e o mundo a mineração em TI” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 23).

The repeated attempts to justify the need to open up the legal Amazon and indigenous lands to mining and other agribusiness activities can be seen in Bolsonaro’s choice of words, opting for phrases such as “apresentou-lhe alguns motivos” (*presented some motives*) and “mostrar-lhes” (*will show them*) the many reasons why his administration should proceed with such measures. One of the main ways in which Bolsonaro justifies the need to explore these protected indigenous lands is due to their perceived abundance of energy and minerals: “você encontra no subsolo ali uma tabela periódica riquíssima” (Appendix 2, transcript 1). Furthermore, Bolsonaro suggests that the exploration of these rich lands is for the benefit of everyone:

“nós queremos garantir que a amazônia é nossa e acredita que aquela riqueza que existe lá, não só minerais como a biodiversidade...que elas sejam exploradas de forma racional para o bem estar dos nossos povos” (Appendix 2, transcript 1).

Bolsonaro attempts to justify the need for these economic activities by suggesting that they would be of great benefit to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The aforementioned quote was from a livestream in April 2019, but Bolsonaro echoed this sentiment one year later in Spring 2020 suggesting that the opening up of indigenous lands for hydro-electricity would be good for the indigenous peoples of Brazil: “e com os rios ali na reserva ...teria condições de fazer algumas hidrelétrica ali e de fornecer energia elétrica para o estado todo...e o índio né? A comunidade indígena ganharia” (Appendix 2, transcript 14). However, it is important to note that Bolsonaro’s suggestion that these economic activities could be carried out in a manner that respects and benefits “nossos povos” not only fails to explain how this could be achieved in the first place; i.e how the indigenous communities could benefit (*ganhar*) from such measures, but also lies in stark contrast to his general discourse regarding environmental safeguarding and protection. Indeed, upon a closer examination of Bolsonaro’s tweets and Facebook lives, it is clear to see that the environmental standards which are put in place to protect the land and the indigenous peoples that live there are viewed as a nuisance. In one example, Bolsonaro suggests that Brazil stands alone in having such strict environmental measures in place: “nenhum país do mundo tem essas exigências” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 24). This sentiment was echoed in his Facebook live from July 2019 in which Bolsonaro complained about environmental licences: “já temos alguns problemas em alguns trechos com licenciamento ambiental” (Appendix 2, transcript 5). In summary, there is ample evidence from Bolsonaro’s social media discourse that presents the protected indigenous lands in Brazil as an unfortunate obstacle preventing his administration from pursuing economic activities that would greatly damage the living environment belonging to Brazil’s indigenous communities.

Playing with Fire: Bolsonaro’s denial of the Amazon forest fires

The third way in which Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse to undermine and threaten the indigenous peoples of Brazil and their protected lands is through the denial and downplaying of the severity of the Amazon forest fires. For context, the Amazon rainforest experiences forest fires every year and this is a well documented phenomenon (Silvério et al., 2013; Brando et al, 2020). However, within the first two years of Bolsonaro’s Presidency, the Amazon rainforest has experienced its worst fires in decades. Indeed, in 2020 the fires in Brazil’s Amazon increased 13% in the first nine months of the year compared with the previous year. Furthermore, satellites in September 2020 recorded 32,017 hotspots in the world’s largest rainforest, representing a 61% rise from the same month in 2019 (The Guardian, 2020). The danger posed

by Bolsonaro, however, is that as the President of Brazil, and therefore able to command Brazil's air and defense forces to combat such threats, not only is he failing to act in the first place, but he is using his social media feeds to downplay the severity of the fires, which greatly affect the protected territories of the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The manner in which Bolsonaro uses his discourse regarding the Amazon fires is two-fold: first, by denying that the existence and severity of the fires and secondly, by using the Amazon fires as an opportunity to attack other political rivals including the press, the international community and the indigenous peoples of Brazil and even suggesting that they play a role in causing the fires in the first place.

The first and arguably, most dangerous way in which Bolsonaro undermines the Amazon fires is by denying the severity and existence of the fires. Indeed, as table 8 shows, Bolsonaro uses his tweets and Facebook live broadcasts as an opportunity to suggest that the Amazon 'does not catch fire' (Appendix 2, transcript 6), imply that the Amazon fires are a common event and therefore not serious (Appendix 2, transcript 6), suggest that the forest fires are a 'big lie' (Appendix 2, transcript 10) and that the recent fires in the Amazon are below average compared to recent years (Appendix 2, transcript 10). The failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem with the Amazon forest fires and to even promote a discourse that portrays the issue as a lie is of significant risk to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Indeed, through failing to address a critical issue facing indigenous lands, Bolsonaro is threatening the long-term future of many indigenous communities in Brazil. The full extent of the consequences of such discourse will be addressed in a chapter titled 'Guardians of the forest under threat', which will analyse the many reasons why this discourse is dangerous and will expand on the recent technical report published by the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) in March 2021 titled *Amazon on Fire: Deforestation and Fire in Indigenous Lands*.

Table 8.

<p>Denying the severity or existence of the Amazon fires</p>	<p>“o conhecimento que eu tenho que a selva não pega fogo...ainda não têm representação rasteiro mas é impossível pegar fogo na floresta então o que chegou lá fora que a floresta estava em chamas” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“fico triste pelos Brasileiros me atacando por queimadas na amazônia quando se isso nunca tivessem e nunca fosse deixar de existir” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“porque me interessa divulgar a cultura da Amazônia...e mostra para quem vem de fora que a Amazônia não pegou fogo nem tá pegando fogo...é uma grande mentira” (Appendix 2, transcript 10)</p> <p>[Discussing forest fires]: “no Brasil no passado, além de ser abaixo das médias nos últimos anos, nem se compara ao que aconteceu na austrália” (Appendix 2, transcript 10)</p>
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It is worth acknowledging that the great irony of Bolsonaro using his discourse to deny the existence and severity of the Amazon fires is that he publicly tweeted in August 2019, thanking the Israeli President, Benjamin Netanyahu for the assistance that the Israeli special forces provided in combating the flames in the Amazon forest:

“Em contato telefônico com o Primeiro-Ministro Benjamin Netanyahu, este reconhece os esforços do Brasil no combate aos focos de incêndio na Amazônia. Aceitamos o envio, por parte de Israel, de aeronave com apoio especializado para colaborar conosco nessa operação” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 19)

This tweet from Bolsonaro is significant for two reasons. Firstly, he is acknowledging that the Amazon fires do in fact exist and therefore represent a threat to the Amazon rainforest. Such a

remark lies in stark contrast to his previous claims that the forest fires are “uma grande mentira” (Appendix 2, transcript 10). Furthermore, the need to accept the support of international partners such as Israel, not only highlights that the forest fires exist, but that they are of such a severity to necessitate international assistance. Above all, suggesting that the threat from the forest fires is beyond the capabilities of the Brazilian armed forces. Put simply, Bolsonaro’s tweet are clear evidence that the Amazon fires not only exist, but that they are a very dangerous threat not only to the indigenous peoples of Brazil, but the whole international community.

The second way in which Bolsonaro’s discourse regarding the Amazon fires is problematic is that he uses it as an opportunity to attack his political rivals, the Brazilian press and even the indigenous peoples of Brazil. One of the primary targets of his attacks is French President, Emmanuel Macron: “o presidente Macron...o Presidente da França aproveitou e fez um escarcéu, me acusou de mentiroso” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). In these facebook live streams, Bolsonaro makes it explicitly clear that his concern does not rest with dealing with the forest fires, but rather with how others are judging him. This interpretation can be seen with his approach to the press too, accusing the national news outlets of spreading lies: “a imprensa Brasileira alimentou esse fogo” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). One slightly subtle linguistic practice deployed by Bolsonaro with regard to his lexical choices surrounds the use of the word ‘fogo’ (*fire*) within different contexts and purposes. In one Facebook live stream from August 2019, Bolsonaro accuses the Brazilian press of spreading lies regarding their reporting on the forest fires. In this example, Bolsonaro uses the term ‘fogo’ with regard to spreading lies like ‘stoking a fire’: “a imprensa Brasileira alimentou esse fogo” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). In a similar instance, Bolsonaro seeks to link the international criticism with the populist message regarding the threats to Brazil’s sovereignty: “O fogo que mais arde é o da nossa soberania sobre a Amazônia. Assista, comente e COMPARTILHE.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 18). There is great irony in using the sentence ‘the fire that burns the hardest is our sovereignty’ at a time when Brazil has been experiencing its worst forest fires in history.

The most alarming approach taken by Bolsonaro occurred during his United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) speech in September 2020, one month after the livestream from August 2020 (transcript 6) in which Bolsonaro had attacked the Brazilian press and Emmanuel Macron. In this speech at the UNGA Bolsonaro accused the indigenous peoples of Brazil of being responsible for the Amazon fires, stating: “the fires practically occur in the same places, on the east side of the forest, where peasants and Indians burn their fields in already deforested

areas,” (Reuters, 2020). This rhetoric was alarming for a variety of reasons. Firstly, whilst it is true that certain indigenous populations do use fire as a method to manage their productions, hunting and natural resources (Falleiro, 2011; Welch et al., 2013; Falleiro et al, 2016), this is carried out on a very small scale and “it is false, therefore, that it is the Indigenous peoples who are responsible for the increase in fire observed throughout the Amazon region in 2019 and 2020” (IPAM, 2021: 1). Secondly, by placing the blame on the indigenous peoples of Brazil, Bolsonaro attempts to distance himself from any form of responsibility despite being the Commander in chief of the Brazilian armed forces and able to authorise the necessary interventions to tackle the Amazon fires. In summary, there is clear evidence to show that Bolsonaro has used his rhetoric to not only downplay the severity of the Amazon fires, but to also accuse other actors of causing them in the first place. Cumulatively, these actions greatly threaten the living environment of the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

6.4 Attacks towards pro-indigenous agencies and alliances

“Se eleito eu vou dar uma foçada na FUNAI, mas uma foçada no pescoço. Não tem outro caminho. Não serve mais” - Jair Bolsonaro, 2018
(Survival International, 2021)

To date, the analysis and discussion has revealed how Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, has deployed a range of discursive practices across his social media accounts in an attempt to threaten and undermine the indigenous peoples of Brazil. There has been clear evidence that Bolsonaro has used his tweets and Facebook lives to attribute a lack of agency towards the indigenous communities of Brazil, as well as pursuing a process of ‘othering’. Furthermore, Bolsonaro has sought to use his discourse to attack and criticise indigenous land rights and the legal process of demarcation. In the final chapter of analysis, this dissertation will uncover how Bolsonaro also uses his social media posts to harm and discredit the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI), international alliances and the NGO’s tasked with protecting and promoting the rights of indigenous peoples and their living environment. To achieve this, this dissertation will split the analysis in two: first, by assessing how Bolsonaro attempts to undermine FUNAI. Secondly, by examining his repeated attacks towards the international efforts to protect the Amazon and the indigenous communities that live there. This latter analysis will particularly focus on Bolsonaro’s efforts to undermine the Amazon fund as well as his criticism towards some of the European G7 nations, including French President, Emmanuel Macron, who has become an outspoken critic of Bolsonaro’s environmental policies and rhetoric.

FUNAI

One of the most serious ways in which Bolsonaro has used his social media discourse to indirectly endanger the indigenous peoples of Brazil is by seeking to threaten and undermine FUNAI. For context, FUNAI is the Brazilian government body that establishes and enforces policies relating to indigenous peoples in Brazil. Thus, the repeated criticism and destabilizing of the sole body responsible for indigenous affairs represents a key threat to Brazil’s indigenous communities. The various examples of how Bolsonaro has sought to undermine FUNAI across his Twitter and Facebook accounts can be seen in table 9. Significantly, in his tweet from March

2019 (see appendix 1, tweet n. 10) Bolsonaro states: “para uso da FUNAI (índios)”. The need to add the word “índios” in brackets after mentioning the word FUNAI is troubling as he attempts to associate his dislike towards a large demographic of Brazilian society, the indigenous peoples, with a key federal agency. It is worth noting that FUNAI is not some vague unknown government agency that Brazilian society would be unaware of; indeed, FUNAI was created in 1967 and represents a key federal agency within Brazil’s political system. Therefore, there is no obvious reason for Bolsonaro to need to inform Brazilian society and purely represents Bolsonaro’s attempts to disseminate his anger towards Brazil’s indigenous populations by tying it to the key federal body responsible for managing indigenous policies and affairs.

Table 9.

<p>Attempts to undermine FUNAI</p>	<p>“A FUNAI, como regra, "cuidava" de tudo, menos do índio. Cada ninho de ratos que toco fogo, mais inimigos coleciono. Acredito no Brasil porque confio em você, cidadão de bem. - com @DamaresAlves” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 13)</p> <p>“A Ministra da Mulher, da Família e dos Direitos Humanos, @DamaresAlves cancelou envio de cerca de R\$42 mi para compra de bitcoins para uso da FUNAI (índios) e a UFF” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 10)</p> <p>“Com poucos dias de governo, não só a caixa preta do BNDES, mas de outros órgãos estão sendo levantados e serão divulgados. Muitos contratos foram desfeitos e serão expostos, como o de R\$ 44 milhões para criar criptomoeda indígena que foi barrado pela Ministra Damares e outros.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 6)</p> <p>[demarcations] “elas merecem ser todas revistas uma vez que há provas de dentro da própria Funai, denúncias de demarcações fraudulentas” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p>
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A second way in which Bolsonaro attempts to undermine the vital work carried out by FUNAI is by suggesting that they do not have the interests of the indigenous peoples of Brazil at heart. Indeed, such an interpretation can be seen in his tweet from July 2019: “a FUNAI, como regra,

"cuidava" de tudo, menos do índio" (Appendix 1, tweet n. 13). In this example, Bolsonaro implies that the indigenous federal agency 'took care of everything, minus the indigenous', implying that FUNAI is poorly managed and has other potential vested interests and motivations. By contrast, and as already mentioned, Bolsonaro uses his discourse to suggest that he himself is the sole person interested in elevating their status in society: "vamos juntos integrar estes cidadãos e valorizar a todos os Brasileiros" (Appendix 1, tweet n. 4). It is worth highlighting that the irony of Bolsonaro using his large social media platforms to suggest that FUNAI do not care and do not look after the indigenous peoples of Brazil is that his very actions and discourse in undermining and threatening FUNAI in the first place are causing such a statement to slowly become a reality. Indeed, Bolsonaro's policies regarding FUNAI will be addressed at length in a later chapter, titled 'Guardians of the forest under threat', which will explore how funding cuts and personnel changes within FUNAI are presenting a grave threat to Brazil's indigenous communities, but the key takeaway is that Bolsonaro's discourse and consequent policy implementations are meaning that FUNAI is becoming less and less able to fully look after ('cuidar') the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

In an attempt to discredit FUNAI, Bolsonaro suggests that some of the work carried out by this federal agency is fraudulent. For example, when discussing his anger towards Brazil's process of demarcation, Bolsonaro implies that FUNAI has sought to benefit from it: "elas merecem ser todas revistas uma vez que há provas de dentro da própria Funai, denúncias de demarcações fraudulentas" (Appendix 2, transcript 6). Whilst there is little to no evidence to back up such a claim, Bolsonaro is able to disseminate such a message to his millions of followers, ultimately highlighting this producer-receiver social media environment in which discourse is able to avoid any form of accountability and scrutiny and in doing so, also undermining a key federal agency tasked with protecting indigenous affairs and policies. Bolsonaro is also able to promote this notion of FUNAI being engaged in potentially fraudulent activity with regard to a project co-led by FUNAI that sought to promote the creation of a cryptocurrency for indigenous people to use. Indeed, in these tweets from January and March 2019, Bolsonaro attacked this cryptocurrency proposal that was ultimately blocked by the Minister of Women, Family and Human Rights, Damara Alves:

"Com poucos dias de governo, não só a caixa preta do BNDES, mas de outros órgãos estão

sendo levantados e serão divulgados. Muitos contratos foram desfeitos e serão expostos, como o de R\$ 44 milhões para criar criptomoeda indígena que foi barrado pela Ministra Damares e outros.” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 6)

“A Ministra da Mulher, da Família e dos Direitos Humanos, @DamaresAlves cancelou envio de cerca de R\$42 mi para compra de bitcoins para uso da FUNAI (índios) e a UFF” (Appendix 1, tweet n. 10)

For context, the cryptocurrency project that Bolsonaro is referencing involved a partnership between FUNAI and the Federal Fluminense University (UFF) that had the objective of wanting to help introduce cryptocurrencies for indigenous peoples to use⁶. Interestingly, in their paper titled *Decolonization in a Digital Age: Cryptocurrencies and Indigenous Self-Determination in Canada*, Alcantara and Dick (2017) examined the extent to which digital currencies could be used to facilitate Indigenous self-determination, political autonomy, and economic prosperity and found that “cryptocurrencies demonstrate some potential for advancing these goals” (ibid, 2017: 1). However, the reason why Bolsonaro’s repeated need to draw attention to this issue is significant is that it lies in stark contrast to his previous discourse regarding the desire to integrate the indigenous peoples of Brazil and provide them with the technology that he believes they want: “eles querem a tecnologia que nós temos é justo nós negamos isso a seres humanos?” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). Indeed, Bolsonaro has claimed to want to provide and give technology and the access of services to the indigenous peoples of Brazil and yet in these two tweets it is clear to see that he is proud of his Minister of Women, Family and Human Rights, Damares Alves, for having blocked the proposed project. Overall, it is evident that Bolsonaro has used his social media accounts to promote and disseminate a discourse that sought to not only discredit the vital work carried out by FUNAI but also accuse the federal agency of being involved with fraudulent activities. Lastly, as the epigraph of this chapter highlights, Bolsonaro’s stance regarding FUNAI prior to assuming the Presidency of Brazil was very clear, and what this analysis has uncovered is that such discourse has continued to filter and disseminate across his social media accounts since becoming the Head of State.

⁶ For further information on this cryptocurrency project for Brazil's indigenous peoples: <https://brazilian.report/society/2019/01/04/indigenous-cryptocurrency-brazil/>

International Alliances & the Amazon fund

Having examined how Bolsonaro has used his social media discourse to discredit and undermine the efforts led by FUNAI in promoting and protecting indigenous rights, it is important to examine how Bolsonaro also attempts to attack the international alliances who have sought to protect and promote indigenous rights and their living environment, the Amazon rainforest. The key focus of this section will be on how Bolsonaro has attempted to damage the Amazon fund. According to the official government website “the Amazon Fund is a reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) mechanism created to raise donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor and combat deforestation, as well as to promote the preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon.” (Amazon fund, 2021). The Amazon fund has represented one of the principal international efforts to curb deforestation and as highlighted by the annual data reports, has been influential in supporting the indigenous peoples of Brazil in the Amazon:

- 65% of the area of indigenous lands in the Amazon supported
- 59,000 indigenous peoples directly benefited
- 190 protected areas supported

(Amazon fund, 2021)

It is important to consider that from the outset of his Presidency, Bolsonaro has had issues with the Brazilian government’s Amazon fund. Indeed, as table 10 reveals, there is clear evidence that Bolsonaro has used his tweets and Facebook lives as an opportunity to disseminate his distrust towards the Brazilian government’s Amazon fund. Upon closer examination, it is evident that Bolsonaro associates the international efforts to protect the Amazon rainforest as a clear threat to Brazil’s sovereignty. Importantly, Bolsonaro makes this viewpoint clear in the very first Facebook livestream from March 2019: “nós queremos garantir que a amazônia é nossa” (Appendix 2, transcript 1). In a statement such as this one, there is no indication from Bolsonaro that his administration would seek to protect the Amazon itself, the sole interest is in preventing international actors from having any influence in the region. It is worth noting that Bolsonaro has a long track record of expressing anger and distrust towards such international interventions and has suggested that countries investing in Brazil for environmental preservation are buying Brazil in instalments: “alguns países europeus estão comprando Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). Furthermore, Bolsonaro’s view regarding this issue is nothing new in Brazilian society.

Indeed, there is a perception, one that is particularly strong amongst Brazil’s armed forces, that environmentalism is a Trojan horse meant to undermine Brazil’s sovereignty (Americas Quarterly, 2021). It is worth noting that Bolsonaro’s discourse and failure to implement the required policies to continue curbing deforestation in the Amazon rainforest led to the suspension of payments towards the Amazon fund from Norway and Germany (The Guardian, 2019).

Table 10.

<p>Criticising international alliances & undermining the Amazon fund</p>	<p>“nós queremos garantir que a amazônia é nossa” (Appendix 2, transcript 1)</p> <p>“Alguns países Europeus estão comprando Brasil” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“o Presidente Macron...o presidente da França aproveitou e fez um escarcéu me acusou de mentiroso e depois duas coisas graves né ele colocou em jogo a nossa soberania sobre a Amazônia” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“com essa historinha de dinheiro do fundo amazônia estão comprando a nossa amazônia” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p> <p>“aquele dinheiro daquela escola oferecida pelo Macron...o Brasil vale muito mais que 20 milhões de dólares” (Appendix 2, transcript 6)</p>
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Amongst the variety of international actors attempting to assist with the need to curb deforestation and protect the living environment for the indigenous peoples of Brazil, Bolsonaro focuses particular attention on the French President, Emmanuel Macron. In Bolsonaro’s livestream from August 2019, he accuses Macron of wanting to purchase Brazil: “aquele dinheiro daquela escola oferecida pelo Macron...o Brasil vale muito mais que 20 milhões de dólares” (Appendix 2, transcript 6). In this example, Bolsonaro is referring to the \$20 million pledge offered by the G7 leaders in an attempt to help fight the Amazon fires. Interestingly, Bolsonaro chooses to single out the French President, despite the pledge coming from a variety of European nations. Furthermore, Bolsonaro again seeks to associate the financial pledge with

the notion of international actors wanting to 'purchase' Brazil. This discourse is problematic as Bolsonaro attempts to suggest that the financial pledge offered by France and other G7 nations is an attempt to purchase, whereas the sole reason for the payment is to assist with efforts in curbing the severe levels of deforestation and forest fires. By using this form of discourse, Bolsonaro is not only choosing to avoid the key reason for the financial pledge, the Amazon forest fires, but he is also attempting to rile up his populist base and attack his political rivals.

Whilst the parameters of this dissertation have focused on Bolsonaro's discourse up until the beginning of the first wave of covid-19 in April 2020, it is worth considering this discourse that has been analysed within the context of the current bilateral talks being held between Brazil and the United States over the future of the Amazon rainforest and the potential pledging of \$20 billion by the US government to support deforestation efforts (Reuters, 2021). Indeed, since February 2021, representatives from US President Joe Biden's administration have been holding high level talks with Brazil's Environment Minister, Ricardo Salles, with the talks culminating in a high-profile meeting with Bolsonaro to be held during the US Earth Summit on 22nd April. Significantly, on April 16th, more than a dozen US senators wrote an open letter to US President, Joe Biden, urging him to condition any future support for Amazon preservation on significant progress reducing deforestation. Indeed, the letter states:

"President Bolsonaro's **rhetoric** and policies have effectively given a green light to the dangerous criminals operating in the Amazon, allowing them to dramatically expand their activities....[U.S.-Brazil partnership] can only be possible if the Bolsonaro administration begins to take Brazil's climate commitments seriously — and only if it protects, supports, and engages meaningfully with the many Brazilians who can help the country fulfill them," (AP News, 2021)

This open letter is particularly relevant to this dissertation and its analysis as it specifically identifies Bolsonaro's 'rhetoric' as a key factor in undermining efforts to protect the Amazon rainforest. Furthermore, by seeking to establish conditions for the provision of these funds, it identifies Bolsonaro's discourse of international actors seeking to 'buy' Brazil as a myth as there is a sense of reluctance and hesitation on behalf of the US in wanting to send funds in the first place. Indeed, there is no evidence from this letter to support the view that international actors, such as the US, are seeking to purchase Brazil. A second significant aspect of this letter is with regard to the need to 'engage meaningfully' with those individuals and agencies who can fulfill such demands. This is important as this chapter has revealed clear evidence that Bolsonaro has sought to do the exact opposite: to undermine, discredit and threaten the very federal agencies

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(FUNAI) and alliances tasked with protecting the indigenous peoples and their living environment in the first place.

Above all, the evidence from Bolsonaro's social media discourse suggests that not only does he fail to protect the indigenous peoples of Brazil himself, but he also uses his discourse to discredit the national and international agencies and alliances that attempt to support the indigenous communities of Brazil and their living environment.

7. Guardians of the forest under threat: an analysis of Bolsonaro's structural, direct and symbolic violence towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil

"All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations"
(Brazilian Constitution, Chapter VI: article 225)

This chapter will draw on the evidence gathered from the CDA from the previous three chapters and uncover how Bolsonaro's social media discourse not only reinforces, but also promotes the violence facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil. This dissertation has been clear in advancing towards the understanding that the ascension of Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency in January 2019 has begun a critical phase in the struggle for fundamental rights of indigenous Brazilians. Indeed, this chapter will uncover how Bolsonaro and his administration (January 2019 - ongoing) has used symbolic violence through his discourse to promote and encourage structural and direct violence towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil, as well as assessing what the consequences of these different strands of violence have been.

This chapter will proceed as follows: first, it is important to assess what is meant by these different types of violence; this will involve examining the definition of structural, direct and symbolic violence. Secondly, the ways in which Bolsonaro has promoted and enabled structural violence against the indigenous peoples of Brazil will be examined. This predominantly analyses how the Bolsonaro administration has sought to dismantle the environmental protections, law and enforcement mechanisms and governance entities in Brazil which consequently have had severe direct and indirect consequences for Brazil's indigenous communities. Thirdly, the impacts of Bolsonaro's direct violence towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil will be assessed. Significantly, each of these two sections of analysis will uncover how Bolsonaro's use of symbolic violence (social media discourses) is influential in not only enabling, but also promoting these two aforementioned forms of violence. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how the symbolic, structural and direct violence of the current Brazilian administration towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil are interlinked. Indeed, the premise of this dissertation is that the discourse (symbolic violence) of Jair Bolsonaro has severe consequences (direct and structural violence) for Brazil's indigenous communities. Simply put, symbolic violence is at the root of the other types of violence. Furthermore, as Castilho (2018:

701) acknowledges: “racist discourses are not disconnected from an effective action against the rural populations. They keep happening, in the voices of diverse parliamentarians, throughout the recent political history of the country”. Above all, corroborating the notion that these different strands of violence are impacted by one another. Whilst Castilho’s acknowledgement of ‘racist discourses’ may seem strong in nature, it is worth noting that the CDA analysis identified instances in which Bolsonaro repeatedly compared indigenous peoples to animals in a zoo and in his Facebook livestream from January 2020 stated that: “the indigenous are undoubtedly changing....they are increasingly becoming human beings just like us”.

7.1 Structural, direct and symbolic violence

This dissertation advances towards the understanding that Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse as a form of symbolic violence towards Brazil’s indigenous peoples. Furthermore, this form of symbolic violence is used to promote, reinforce and legitimise forms of structural and direct violence too. Structural violence, also referred to as institutional violence, is a more subtle form of oppression; it is often not the responsibility of any particular person or institution but is the result of abstract laws and rules that govern social life in Brazil. Above all, it is often seen in cases where the executive branch has failed or lagged behind with its administrative duties and procedures. Direct violence is a form of violence that is carried out by an individual or range of stakeholders. This dissertation will examine the direct violence carried out by miners, loggers, land grabbers and the current administration against the indigenous peoples of Brazil. In many instances, these forms of direct violence have occurred because the oppressors have felt emboldened by the discourses of the President. Indeed, as Carvalho et al (2021: 261) persuasively note: “the persistent attacking of indigenous peoples legitimises specific forms of direct violence”. Lastly, and the central focus of this thesis, symbolic violence refers to the persistent attacking of indigenous peoples seen within the speeches and rhetoric of Jair Bolsonaro. With regard to this dissertation, the symbolic violence has manifested itself within the Tweets and Facebook live posts of Jair Bolsonaro. Furthermore, as Recuero (2015: 1) highlights: “social media is violent because it is a medium of discourse and discourse is strongly related to another type of violence, the symbolic violence” (ibid, 2015: 1). Significantly, violence disseminated by social media is not the most identifiable. But, by using Fairclough’s three dimensional CDA model, the nuanced ways in which Bolsonaro’s symbolic violence has reinforced structural violence, as well as promoted direct violence, has been uncovered. Above

all, it is a form of violence “transmitted in the racist speeches of Bolsonaro negating the otherness of indigenous communities” (Carvalho et al, 2021: 263). For others, such as Bourdieu (2001: 5), symbolic violence is “exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling”. Above all, symbolic violence is present within the day-to-day discourses of Bolsonaro and has the ability to not only reinforce the structural violence facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil but also in enabling and influencing the direct violence too. Žižek (2008) explains symbolic violence as an objective type of violence, which happens through language. Indeed, “while objective violence is easily perceived against a background of “normality,” it is precisely in this background that symbolic violence stands, sustaining, through language, the current status quo” (Recuero, 2015: 1).

Up until now there has been a clear need for a nuanced exploration of whether the violence directed at Indigenous peoples correlates with the political leanings of governments. The important research by Carvalho et al (2021) titled *‘Politics and Indigenous Victimization: The Case of Brazil’* has filled this gap by carrying out a comparative study of the four most recent administrations in Brazil: those led by Lula, Dilma, Temer and Bolsonaro—covering the period January 2003 to December 2019. Importantly, one of the main conclusions of this research paper was that “while leftist governments primarily target Indigenous peoples through structural– institutional violence, right-wing governments, in addition, also employ symbolic and direct violence” (ibid, 2021: 252). Indeed, Carvalho et al (2021: 259) suggest that the structural violence from leftist governments towards the indigenous populations of Brazil can be seen in two areas: “(1) governmental agencies responsible for establishing the boundaries of Indigenous territories and their protection from intrusions lagged in their duties and (2) militarized structures inherited from previous dictatorships were not transformed into human rights institutions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of Indigenous communities, as promised.”. Furthermore, the right-wing administrations maintained this indigenous victimization through structural violence, but also deployed direct and symbolic violence too. Above all, the findings of this dissertation reinforce this understanding that the right-wing government of Jair Bolsonaro employs a range of symbolic, structural and direct violence targeting Brazil’s indigenous communities.

In summary, the central premise of this dissertation has been to examine the mechanisms through which Bolsonaro’s social media discourse reinforces and promotes violence towards

the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The following section seeks to join the dots between the evidence gathered from the CDA alongside the range of structural and direct violence implemented by the Bolsonaro administration.

7.2 Structural violence: the dismantling of Brazil's environmental protections and governance entities

The proceeding section will delve into the various ways in which the Bolsonaro administration has pursued a path of structural violence towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil; the outlined policies and measures are reported below and will testify to the weakening of environmental institutions, the attacks and persecution of public officials, the changes of personnel within key environmental positions and the increase in deforestation in the Amazon region.

7.2.1 The weakening of environmental institutions & personnel changes

Within the first year of Bolsonaro's presidency, his administration sought to implement a range of structural and personnel changes within the various environmental institutions and agencies in Brazil. One of the major developments was the decision to move FUNAI, the national agency for the protection of indigenous peoples, from the Ministry of Justice and place it under the Ministry of Human Rights, led by Damares Alves. Significantly, Damares Alves is under investigation from the Public Prosecutor's Office in Brazil (MPF) for evidence of racial hatred towards indigenous peoples. It is also worth noting that within the CDA analysis of Bolsonaro's tweets, there were multiple references to Damares Alves, as seen in the following word cloud:

example of how such discourse promotes and enables the structural violence facing Brazil's indigenous communities. In a significant development in June 2021, Ricardo Salles resigned from his position as minister of the Environment amid a criminal investigation into whether he obstructed a police enquiry into illegal logging in the Amazon rainforest. This investigation was initially reported by the Folha de S. Paulo back in April, in which the head of the Amazon federal police force, Alexandre Saraiva, accused Salles of actively obstructing the fight against deforestation and suggesting that it is the first time he has seen a Minister of the Environment going against any operation that seeks to protect the Amazon rainforest (Folha de S. Paulo, 2021). Above all, this development represents further evidence of the structural violence that has faced Brazil's indigenous communities and highlights the fact that Bolsonaro's ministerial picks point towards his disregard for the environment and indigenous rights.

It is important to note that personnel changes have occurred at all levels across the Ministry of Environment, Ibama and ICMBio. Furthermore, at these agencies, lifelong civil servants and skilled environmentalists have been replaced by members of the armed forces, who are now occupying senior positions of command. At Ibama, "12 strategic positions are now occupied by members of the military police and armed forces, whilst at the Ministry of the Environment, at least five members of the armed forces occupy strategic positions" (Observatório do Clima, 2019: 8). These changes are significant as it is well known that members of Brazil's armed forces have always been skeptical of Brazil's indigenous peoples and the lands that they occupy. Therefore, the promotion of such members of the armed forces into strategic environmental posts creates very obvious sources of tension for Brazil's indigenous communities. There have been many structural changes within Brazil's environmental sector that are particularly troublesome. Firstly, the transfer of the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) to the Ministry of Agriculture. Secondly, in May 2019 Bolsonaro signed a decree that reduced by 76% the members of the National Environment Council (Conama). Conama has been in existence since the 1980's with the primary purpose of drafting environmental rules and has approved over 500 different resolutions since its creation. An important report produced by the Observatório do Clima in 2019, outlined why these changes were problematic:

"One of the most important features of Conama was the diversity of the representatives, which included 96 members spanning the federal government, states, municipalities and civil society. This number has been drastically reduced to 23, and turnover rules have been put in place. With this measure, the number of representatives of civil society fell from 22 to just 4 members" (Observatório do Clima, 2019: 4).

Whilst on the surface such measures may not seem drastic, the changes to the membership structures at Conama means that there is a loss of representation for the indigenous and traditional populations and at the same time facilitates the approval of more flexible rules that benefit the agribusiness and mining sectors in Brazil.

It is important to note that the changes at Conama are not the only way environmental rules and licensing have been impacted. Indeed, one of the principal ways in which the Bolsonaro administration is indirectly impacting the indigenous peoples of Brazil is through the attempts to remove environmental licensing from future infrastructure projects. Indeed, on May 12th and with 300 votes in favor and 122 against, Brazil's Lower House passed the draft of a bill (PL 3.729/2004) that withdraws environmental impact assessments and licensing for development projects, ranging from construction of roads to agriculture (Mongabay, 2021). Such a measure has been a long-term goal of Bolsonaro, as well as the conservative agribusiness lobbyists: the Bancada Ruralista. Indeed, as seen in the previous chapters, a close linguistic analysis of Bolsonaro's social media had uncovered how he repeatedly complained about the environmental measures that exist in Brazil, claiming: "nenhum país do mundo tem essas exigências" (*no other country has these measures*) (Appendix 1, tweet n. 24).

7.2.2 The dismantling of environmental governance

So far, there has been clear evidence of how Bolsonaro and his administration have sought to disassemble various bodies, councils and groups tasked with protecting environmental matters, including the protection and representation of Brazil's indigenous communities. The crucial 2019 report by Observatório do Clima, titled '*The worst is yet to come: a year of environmental havoc under Brazil's far right President*', has outlined some of the environmental governance bodies which have been eliminated during the first year of Bolsonaro's Presidency, including:


- The National REDD+ Commission, which implemented actions to promote payment in exchange for deforestation reduction results
- The Executive Committees that dealt with deforestation prevention and control plans in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes
- The steering committee of the National Policy for Territorial and Environmental Management of Indigenous Lands, which addressed environmental issues in indigenous lands

- The National Council of Traditional Peoples and Communities, whose goal was to promote the sustainable development of traditional peoples and communities, recognising, strengthening and ensuring their rights

(Observatório do Clima, 2019: 6)

The second way in which environmental governance in Brazil has been weakened under Bolsonaro's Presidency is through the dramatic reduction in budget for environmental matters. This is most evident with regard to the budget allocation for the Environment Ministry. Indeed, as figure 9 clearly shows, the budget for the Environment Ministry experienced a drastic reduction between 2018-19. Whilst the following data deals with Bolsonaro's budget allocation for the first year of his Presidency (2019), it is important to note that such cuts in funding allocation have continued to the present day. Indeed, on 24th April 2021 Bolsonaro approved a 24% cut to the Environment Ministry budget. The decision was all the more significant given the fact that Bolsonaro was speaking on Thursday 23rd April at the summit organised by US President Joe Biden, Bolsonaro pledged to double the budget for environmental enforcement and end illegal deforestation by 2030 (The Guardian, 2021).

Figure 10.




(Observatório do Clima, 2019: 6)

7.2.3 The weakening of environmental law enforcement

One of the most significant actions taken by Bolsonaro and his administration is with regard to the weakening of environmental law enforcement. The consequences of this course of action

are very severe for Brazil's indigenous communities who, as a result, end up facing many threats from land grabbers, loggers and illegal miners who face impunity for their actions. Significantly, as figure 11 shows, under Bolsonaro's Presidency, IBAMA has applied the lowest number of environmental fines in the last 15 years.

Figure 11.



(Observatório do Clima, 2019: 11)

The reason why the reduction in environmental law enforcement is so significant is because it represents one of the main instruments for punishing illegal deforestation in the Amazon. Indeed, shortly after assuming office, Bolsonaro's administration passed a Presidential decree (9.760) which allowed individuals and businesses accused of environmental crimes to be entitled to "reconciliation hearings" that could reduce or even cancel fines. Furthermore, recent reporting by Reuters has revealed that this decree has led to environmental fine collections grinding to a halt:

“a backlog of more than 17,000 fines has piled up, going uncollected as they await hearings, according to internal documents seen by Reuters and confirmed by two sources at the main federal environmental agencies Ibama and ICMBio, both of whom requested anonymity as the information is not publicly available. So far about 500 reconciliation hearings have been held, according to a statement from environmental agency Ibama and data obtained by Reuters under Brazil's public information laws in mid-June - less than 3% of the backlog.” (Reuters, 2021)

It is worth noting that Bolsonaro has repeatedly cast doubt on Brazil's environmental agencies⁷, as seen in chapter 3 of the CDA analysis. Furthermore, in June 2019, in a speech in front of the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), Bolsonaro took the opportunity to celebrate the reduction in law enforcement carried out by IBAMA, claiming: “vamos acabar com esta indústria da multa no campo” (let's end this business of fining) (OECD, 2019). The lack of environmental law enforcement represents a severe threat to Brazil's indigenous communities as it ultimately emboldens and encourages the illegal activities to occur within Brazil's protected lands. Indeed, “the dismissal of IBAMA's inspection coordinators sends a message that organised crime is liberated in the Amazon and punishes those who work to combat illegal activities” (interview with Ricardo Abad, see *The Conversation*, 2020). In June 2021, the national newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* ran a detailed piece about a group of land invaders in the Floresta Nacional de Jacunda in Rondonia. The purpose of the article was to detail the extent to which these environmental crimes are occurring without federal repercussion. Indeed, the land occupiers were so relaxed that they even promoted their own Youtube channel encouraging others to join them in their illegal activities. The leader of the group, Humberto Ferraira, is quoted in the video featured in the article, stating: “Você quer ganhar uma terrinha também? Me chama aqui no privado, vou deixar meu contato. Aqui, nós ajudamos você a fazer a tua barraquinha. É por ordem de chegada” (‘Do you wish to also own a piece of land? Private message me, I'll leave my contact below. Here, we can help you create your piece of land. It is first come, first served’) (See *Folha de S, Paulo*, 2021).

⁷ Bolsonaro has had a personal vendetta against Ibama and its environmental inspectors dating back to 2012. Indeed, in January 2012 Jair Bolsonaro was caught illegally fishing inside the Tamoios Ecological Station, a federal marine reserve off the Rio de Janeiro State shore. Bolsonaro was subsequently fined (\$2,500). In retaliation, in 2013 Bolsonaro introduced a bill to forbid Ibama's agents to carry guns. In a final act of revenge, the Ibama inspector who had issued the fine, José Olímpio Augusto Morelli, was mysteriously fired from his role in March 2019. Ibama discharged him without explanation from his Brasília position as the head of Ibama's Air Operations Center. Morelli had a key role in coordinating airborne raids on illegal mining and forestry in the Amazon (Climate Change News, 2019)

Significantly, the increased impunity for loggers has resulted in a severe jump in deforestation in the Amazon. Whilst 2019 levels of deforestation were record-breaking, researchers from the Instituto Socioambiental have found that deforestation rates in 2020 have overtaken those of 2019. Tragically, the deforestation hotspots are also occurring within indigenous territories (see figure 11). Indeed, the indigenous lands of Trincheira-Bacajá, Kayapó and Munduruku, located in the state of Pará, have all seen deforestation rates increase by 827%, 420% and 238% respectively between the months of March and July (see Instituto Socioambiental, 2020).




Figure 12. Deforestation hotspots located within indigenous territories (Instituto Socioambiental, 2020).

The cumulative result of these reduced budgets and law enforcement powers for Brazil's environmental agencies has also contributed towards the severe increase in forest fires within the Amazon region. The Amazon fires of 2019 have led to the greatest loss of forest in a decade, with almost 10,000 sq.km lost in the year to August (see The Guardian, 2019). There

was extensive evidence from the discourse analysis revealing how Bolsonaro has used his social media posts to undermine, and even question the existence of these forest fires.

Overall, it has been clear to see that collectively, the militarization of the Ministry of the Environment, the gutting of Federal budgets for environmental concerns and the dismantling of environmental governance and regulation represents some of the obvious ways in which Bolsonaro's administration is targeting the indigenous communities of Brazil through structural violence. It is equally evident that Bolsonaro's discourse (symbolic violence) has served at times to justify, promote and influence the aforementioned policies and actions.

7.2.4 PL 490 and the attempts to end indigenous land demarcation

As already addressed throughout this dissertation and evidenced in the CDA analysis, Bolsonaro makes no attempt to hide his dislike towards Brazil's indigenous land demarcation laws. Indeed, Bolsonaro's right-wing administration, backed by a powerful farm lobby have long argued that the demarcation and protection of indigenous lands acts as a barrier to economic development and, as such, have sought to change this. In June 2021, Bolsonaro's administration came one step closer to achieving this policy goal. The proposed bill PL 490 has cleared the Constitutional affairs Committee and advanced through Congress to the lower house plenary. The PL 490 bill represents a critical threat to Brazil's indigenous communities as it bars the recognition of indigenous lands not occupied by October 1988, a measure that also favours farmers in several ongoing land disputes (Reuters, 2021). If passed into law, indigenous leaders have highlighted that this would represent the biggest setback since their land rights were guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution:

"This is the worst moment since 1988 for the rights that indigenous people gained....There will be war because indigenous people will not allow their territories to be taken at any cost" (Almir Surui, Chieftain of the Paiter Surui, interviewed by Reuters, 2021)

This quote from the leader of the Paiter Surui is significant for two reasons. First, he identifies that Bolsonaro's administration is pursuing the most aggressive policy against the indigenous peoples of Brazil since their rights were guaranteed in 1988. Secondly, he specifically suggests that this form of structural violence will lead to other forms of violence: direct violence. It is worth noting that this proposed PL 490 bill comes as no surprise. Indeed, the detailed CDA analysis in

chapter 6 specifically identifies Bolsonaro's motivations towards ending indigenous land demarcation (figure 13). Furthermore, an analysis of the area of indigenous lands demarcated by each administration reveals that Bolsonaro's government has demarcated the least amount of land across the last five governments (see figure 14). Above all, it is clear evidence of how Bolsonaro uses his social media discourse (symbolic violence) to influence, promote and encourage structural and direct forms of violence.

Figure 13.




Figure 14.

- Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 2002) 145 approvals
- Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 2010) 79 approvals
- Dilma Rousseff (January 2011 August 2016) 21 approvals
- Michel Temer (August 2016 December 2016) 0 approvals
- Jair Bolsonaro (January 2019 -) 0 approvals

(Funai, 2021)

7.3 Direct Violence under the Bolsonaro administration

Having examined the multiple ways in which Bolsonaro has inflicted structural violence on Brazil's indigenous peoples, it is necessary to also consider the various ways in which Bolsonaro has imposed and promoted direct violence. The previous section detailed the

weakening and dismantling of environmental and indigenous policies, as well as the reduction and loss of environmental inspection and law enforcement. The consequences of these measures are that they stimulate land invasions, deforestation and other illegal activities including mining. The increase in trespassing within these indigenous lands led to direct contact with Brazil's indigenous communities and in extreme cases, such contact has resulted in direct violence. The harmful consequence of increased trespassing and land grabbing combined with reduced law and order is that it results in greater cases of conflict and violence. The Cartografia dos Ataques Contra Indígenas (Caci)⁸ was launched by CIMI as a form of conflict monitoring observatory and the data regarding attacks against indigenous communities paints a bleak picture. The data reveals that in 2019, the first year of the Bolsonaro administration, there were 188 indigenous assassinations across all Brazilian states (see figure 14). One particular case of murder occurred in November 2019 in which the indigenous leader Paulo Guajajara was assassinated in a logging ambush (Globo, 2019). Paulo Guajajara was a member of the 'Guardians of the forest group', a collective created by indigenous peoples to protect their lands and also the inspiration behind the title of this chapter.

⁸ The term 'Caci' means 'hurt'/'pain' in the native language of Guarani



Figure 14. 188 indigenous assassinations across Brazil in 2019 (see CACI, 2020)

It is important to note that the social media discourse (symbolic violence) of Jair Bolsonaro had a direct impact on these land invasions and consequent violence. A technical report published by Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) in March 2021 made this precise connection between rhetoric and violent consequences: “the **publicised intention** of the federal government to no longer approve indigenous lands encouraged illegal activities and occupations” (IPAM, 2021: 12). Evidence of Bolsonaro’s anger towards the size of demarcated indigenous lands and his desire to end all future demarcation was addressed at length in chapter 3 of the CDA. This statement made by a Brazilian non-profit research institute is significant as it makes a clear observation that Bolsonaro’s discourse has had significant impacts upon Brazil’s indigenous communities. By stating the words ‘publicised intention’, IPAM makes it very clear that discourse has consequences and that Bolsonaro’s symbolic violence is leading to direct violence. Indeed, there is precise evidence of exactly this phenomenon from the outset of Bolsonaro’s Presidency when in January 2019 armed squatters who invaded indigenous lands in Rondônia declared: “agora Bolsonaro é presidente” (*‘now Bolsonaro is President’*) as a form of justification for their actions (Noticias ao minuto, 2019).

One of the major sources of direct violence has occurred due to the increase in illegal mining in indigenous reserves. The rise of illegal mining is a direct result of Bolsonaro’s discourse emboldening miners to enter these protected lands. A report was published in March 2021 by the Instituto Socioambiental titled ‘Cicatrices na Floresta’ (*Scars in the Forest*) which highlights

the extent of the problem. According to this recent report, the Yanomami indigenous reserve has seen illegal mining increase by 30% in 2020, losing the equivalent of 500 football pitches or 2.4 thousand hectares of indigenous territory. Furthermore, there are over 20,000 miners operating within the Yanomami territory (Instituto Socioambiental, 2020). Importantly, this report was published in March but the situation within the Yanomami territory has escalated further and since 10th May 2021, there has been daily conflict between illegal miners and the Yanomami community with videos circulating on social media channels showing miners firing bullets from their boats (Globo, 2021). As Carvalho et al (2021: 261) persuasively note: “the persistent attacking of indigenous peoples legitimises specific forms of direct violence” and the ongoing clashes between illegal miners and the Yanomami is further evidence of how Bolsonaro’s symbolic violence contributes towards the direct violence being carried out by a range of stakeholders in indigenous territories.

Significantly, it is worth noting that the severe increase in land invasions and direct conflict threatens the health and safety of the indigenous peoples of Brazil by bringing diseases into the region (Fellows et al, forthcoming). This is especially applicable with regard to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, a detailed investigation by Laudares (2020) assessed whether deforestation was spreading COVID-19 to the indigenous peoples. The published paper documented a “positive and statistically significant relationship between deforestation and the transmission of COVID-19 in indigenous communities” (ibid, 2020: 54). Importantly, Laudares found that a one unit increase in deforestation per 100km² is associated, on average, with the confirmation of 2.4 to 5.5 new daily cases of COVID-19 in indigenous people 14 days after the deforestation warnings” (ibid, 2020: 33). In summary, this is further evidence that by enabling the land invasions, Bolsonaro is not only leading to increased direct violence towards the indigenous peoples of Brazil, but also inflicting additional suffering and death through the increased transmission of diseases such as the coronavirus pandemic.

In the previous section, the recent Congressional bill PL 490 was examined as clear evidence of the structural violence facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil. It is worth highlighting that the passage and debate of this bill through Congress led to large protests from indigenous communities in the Brazilian capital, Brasilia, throughout June 2021. During these peaceful demonstrations, riot police fired rubber bullets and teargas towards indigenous activists, including children and elderly, protesting outside Brazil’s Congress (The Guardian, 2021). Above all, not only is this clear evidence of direct violence by the Bolsonaro administration but it

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is also a clear indication of how Bolsonaro's symbolic violence is the root cause of other types of violence. Indeed, Bolsonaro's repeated social media discourse has promoted and encouraged structural violence (PL 490 bill) which in turn has resulted in direct violence (confrontation between riot police and indigenous activists).

8. Conclusion

Discourse has consequences. This has been the precise premise, and investigation, of this dissertation. Through a detailed CDA of Bolsonaro's social media discourse in chapters one, two and three, as well as an analysis of the dismantling of Brazil's environmental protections and governance entities, there is clear evidence to suggest that the persistent attacking and undermining of indigenous peoples via his social media feeds legitimises other forms of violence, namely structural and direct violence. Having engaged extensively with the work of Carvalho et al (2021) throughout the previous chapter, it is worth considering this conclusion to their paper: "Brazil went from unfulfilled promises under leftist governments to a landscape of fulfilled promises of violence under right-wing governments" (ibid, 2021: 262).

The inclusion of contemporary news articles, investigations and reports, many of which have been published as this dissertation was being written, are testament to the fact that these forms of structural, direct and symbolic violence continue to permeate Brazilian environmental politics to the present day and therefore represent a grave threat to Brazil's indigenous communities. Throughout this analysis, the pivotal reports published by IPAM, Instituto Socioambiental, CIMI, Caci, Observatório do Clima and the ARNS Commission have been vital in providing clear evidence of the threats facing Brazil's indigenous communities. Crucially, in each individual report, there has always been a clear indication that discourse plays a vital role as a catalyst for the violence. Whilst some reports have mentioned discourse directly: "President Bolsonaro's discourse..." (Observatório do Clima, 2019: 23), others have opted for describing the "government rhetoric", "publicised intention" (IPAM, 2021: 12) and even "statements by President Bolsonaro" (ARNS and CADHu, 2019: 9). Despite the differences in wording, one common theme unites them all: language has the power to influence, and acts as a catalyst for more dangerous forms of violence and hate.

As already addressed in the methodology section of this dissertation, the investigation of Bolsonaro's discourse using CDA has sought to act as a social movement with the intention of uncovering the unequal power relations in Brazil. As such, this dissertation has advanced towards the understanding that CDA should be seen and used as a "critical approach which is politically committed to social change" (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2009: 64). Indeed, the previous chapter sought to reveal that discourse (symbolic violence) has the power to influence, encourage, direct other forms of violence towards the indigenous people of Brazil. It is worth

noting that the exact extent to which symbolic violence is driving the direct and structural violence facing the indigenous communities of Brazil is hard to quantify and would necessitate more detailed empirical studies. Above all, this dissertation has uncovered that there is a positive and significant trend, and this must not be ignored.

It has been evident that the study of discourse in the digital age has provided both opportunities and challenges. One of the clear opportunities has arisen through the opportunity to also include indigenous 'voices' that are equally as active and engaging on social media platforms, thereby not only challenging Bolsonaro's assertions that Brazil's indigenous lack technology but also providing clear evidence of counter-discourse. Significantly, the inclusion of indigenous voices and their presence across social media platforms feeds into what Gallon (2016) has termed the 'technology of recovery'; recovery as understood in the sense of attempting to recover those who have been largely excluded and whose histories have been largely ignored.

As this dissertation comes to a conclusion, there are a couple of additional considerations worth noting. First, as Brazil heads towards 2022 and the prospect of another presidential election, there is hope for Brazil's indigenous communities that Bolsonaro's slumping ratings could signify the end of his tenure. However, it is worth noting that a change of Presidency does not necessarily represent immediate relief for the indigenous peoples of Brazil. On March 10th 2021, former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made his highly anticipated speech in which he would position himself as the leading candidate for the 2022 general election. His speech sought to present himself as the complete opposite of everything that Bolsonaro represents, and he took every opportunity to criticise Bolsonaro's tenure. However, and very significantly, during his 90-minute speech, the left wing candidate did not once mention climate change, Amazon fires and deforestation, the loss of the Pantanal wetlands or the plight of the indigenous peoples. Indeed, "considering Bolsonaro's anti-environmental stance is one of the major reasons for Brazil's growing diplomatic isolation — and with it, potentially serious consequences for the economy — it was a remarkable omission" (Americas Quarterly, 2021) and is a clear signal that the (potential) departure of Bolsonaro in 2022 does not necessarily represent an immediate sense of relief for the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

Secondly, it is worth noting that the latter half of Bolsonaro's Presidency has seen Brazil experience one of the worst public handlings of Covid-19 across the globe. Furthermore, María Neira, the Director of Public Health at the World Health Organisation (WHO) has warned that

70% of the last global pandemics began with deforestation. This statement acts as a stark reminder that humanity's growing encroachment on the living environment, as seen through the structural and direct violence occurring in Brazil's Amazon rainforest, could continue to trigger future pandemics; pandemics that not only impact humanity as a whole, but disproportionately impact Brazil's indigenous communities. As Bolsonaro continues to push his agenda and encourage the 'opening' of the Amazon through increased mining, logging and other extractive activities, there is an increased risk that the growing interaction between humans and animals can increase the chances of a contagious virus triggering the next global pandemic. Through inadequate healthcare, targeted misinformation regarding vaccine hesitancy and a President who does not believe in science, Brazil's indigenous suffered immensely during this COVID-19 pandemic. As João Paulo Lima Barreto, environmental activist and member of the Tukano indigenous people, persuasively notes: "It is very easy for us 'to blame the bat, to blame the monkey, to blame the pig' when a new disease emerges. But in fact, humans are causing this, in the relationship that we build with the owners of the space" (Eco business, 2020).

Lastly, it is worth considering the various ways in which the present study could be expanded further. Indeed, one key consideration regarding social media CDA would be to expand the focus beyond just 'text'. The focus on the textual (tweets and Facebook transcripts) side of social media discourse has led to an obvious blind spot; as social media platforms are increasingly becoming host to more visual forms of communication, including photos, videos and even gifs, future research should also consider these as crucial ways of distributing discourse. Put simply, attempts to monitor social media discourse as merely text, will miss large quantities of evidence hidden within images and videos. Therefore, in order to fully understand and analyse the digital architectures of social media and how they influence discourse, future research in this field should expand to include all forms of verbal and non-verbal communication.

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Appendix 1: Tweet sampling

Tweet number:	Date posted:	Original Tweet (Portuguese version)	Translated version (English)
1	03/09/17	<p>“BOLSONARO, A AMAZÔNIA E OS ÍNDIOS: A VERDADE QUE DISTORCEM PROPOSITAMENTE!”</p> <p>(video attached)</p>	<p>“BOLSONARO, THE AMAZON AND THE INDIGENOUS: THE TRUTH THAT THEY PURPOSEFULLY DISTORT!”</p>
2	01/09/18	<p>“Em Rio Branco/AC, ao lado de índios, um pronunciamento de união de todos brasileiros.”</p> <p>(video attached)</p>	<p>“In Rio Branco/AC, alongside indigenous, a symbol of the union between all Brazilians”</p>
3	26/10/18	<p>“Índia da Tribo Xingu visita Jair Bolsonaro e conhece suas reais propostas, sem as mentiras do PT. O Brasil é de todos nós!”</p> <p>(video attached)</p>	<p>“Indigenous from the Xingu tribe meets Jair Bolsonaro and understands his real policies, without PT lies. Brazil belongs to us all!”</p>
4	02/01/19	<p>“Mais de 15% do território nacional é demarcado como terra indígena e quilombolas. Menos de um milhão de pessoas vivem nestes lugares isolados do Brasil de verdade, exploradas e manipuladas por ONGs. Vamos juntos integrar estes cidadãos e valorizar a todos os brasileiros.”</p>	<p>“More than 15% of the national territory is demarcated as indigenous and quilombola land. Less than a million people live in these truly isolated places in Brazil, exploited and manipulated by NGOs. Together, we will integrate these citizens and value all Brazilians”</p>
5	03/01/19	<p>“Com vivência no tema, General Heleno fala o que a grande parte da imprensa omite sobre índios”</p> <p>(video attached)</p>	<p>“With experience on the subject, General Heleno covers what a lot of the press omit about the indigenous”</p>

6	07/01/19	“Com poucos dias de governo, não só a caixa preta do BNDES, mas de outros órgãos estão sendo levantados e serão divulgados. Muitos contratos foram desfeitos e serão expostos, como o de R\$ 44 milhões para criar criptomoeda indígena que foi barrado pela Ministra Damares e outros.”	“With a few days of government, not only the black box of the BNDES, but of other agencies are being raised and will be disclosed. Many contracts have been broken and will be exposed, such as the R \$ 44 million to create indigenous cryptocurrency that was blocked by Minister Damares and others”
7	21/01/19	“A Caixa Econômica Federal em Roraima. Nossos índios se integrando à sociedade. A CEF é de todos.” (video attached)	“The Caixa Econômica Federal in Roraima. Our indigenous integrating themselves into society. The CEF belongs to everyone.”
8	16/02/19	“Reintegrar os índios à sociedade levando até a estas condições para que possam se sentir brasileiros e não apenas serem tratados como massa de manobra e divisão do povo para contemplar planos de poder. Temos o povo mais miscigenado do mundo e somos todos iguais!”	“To reintegrate the indigenous into society, providing the conditions so that they can feel Brazilian and not just be treated as pawns and division of the people to contemplate plans of power. We have the most mixed people in the world and we are all the same!”
9	10/03/19	“Em prática o que dito em nossa campanha, a Ministra <u>@DamaresAlves</u> está empenhada em desfazer os malfeitos de gestões anteriores, prezando por respeito e responsabilidade com o brasileiro. A integração dos índios em nossa sociedade faz parte desse processo.”	“In practice what was said in our campaign, the Minister <u>@DamaresAlves</u> is committed to undoing the misdeeds of previous administrations, seeking the respect and responsibility of the Brazilians. The integration of Indians in our society is part of this process.”
10	26/03/19	“A Ministra da Mulher, da Família e dos Direitos Humanos, <u>@DamaresAlves</u> cancelou envio de cerca de	“The Minister for Women, Family and Human Rights, <u>@DamaresAlves</u> canceled sending approximately R \$ 42 million to buy bitcoins for use by

		R\$42 mi para compra de bitcoins para uso da FUNAI (índios) e a UFF. Agora, outra “ estranheza ” na #ComissãoDaAnistia : compra de HD por R\$7milhões. #CaixaPretadaAnistia	FUNAI (Indians) and UFF. Now, another “strangeness” in #ComissãoDaAnistia : purchase of HD for R \$ 7 million. #CaixaPretadaAnistia ”
11	13/04/19	“A Embrapa, em parceria com a Funai e outros órgãos de governos participam da inserção social indígena e a comunidade inteira ganha com isso. Chega de tratar nossos irmãos como animais de zoológico ou como massa de manobra política. Vamos adiante. Via Ministra @DamaresAlves ” (video attached)	“Embrapa, in partnership with Funai and other government agencies, participates in indigenous social insertion and the entire community gains from it. No more treating our brothers like zoo animals or as a mass of political maneuver. Let's go ahead. Via Minister @DamaresAlves ”
12	28/04/19	“A @policiafederal , com apoio do MPF, deflagrou a Operação Arquimedes contra um esquema de corrupção na extração ilegal de madeira na floresta amazônica. A PF prendeu 26 suspeitos, entre eles o ex-superintendente do Ibama no Amazonas.”	“The @policiafederal , with support from the MPF, triggered Operation Archimedes against a corruption scheme in illegal logging in the Amazon rainforest. The PF arrested 26 suspects, including the former Ibama superintendent in Amazonas.”
13	08/07/19	“A FUNAI, como regra, “cuidava” de tudo, menos do índio. Cada ninho de ratos que toco fogo, mais inimigos coleciono. Acredito no Brasil porque confio em você, cidadão de bem. - com @DamaresAlves ”	FUNAI, as a rule, “took care” of everything, except the Indian. Every nest of rats that I burn, the more enemies I collect. I believe in Brazil because I trust you, a good citizen. - with @DamaresAlves
14	25/07/19	“Breve encontro com índios em Manaus/AM.”	“Brief encounter with the indigenous in Manaus/AM”

		(video attached)	
15	29/04/19	“O público-alvo são as populações que vivem nas capitais dos nove estados que compõem a região Amazônica (AC, AM, AP, PA, MT, RR, RO, TO e MA), além de regiões de mata, assentamentos rurais, periferias e áreas indígenas.”	“The target audience is the populations living in the capitals of the nine states that make up the Amazon region (AC, AM, AP, PA, MT, RR, RO, TO and MA), in addition to forest regions, rural settlements, peripheries and indigenous areas.”
16	05/06/19	“O Ministério do Meio Ambiente deverá priorizar destinação de recursos da conversão de multas ambientais do IBAMA até o montante de R\$ 100 milhões para o projeto. Estamos mostrando que desenvolvimento econômico e preservação do meio ambiente podem andar lado a lado”	“The Ministry of the Environment should prioritize the allocation of resources from the conversion of IBAMA's environmental fines up to the amount of R \$ 100 million for the project. We are showing that economic development and preservation of the environment can go hand in hand”
17	15/08/19	“Após o G-20, caso tivesse demarcado mais algumas dezenas de Áreas Indígenas e orientado pesadas multas nos produtores rurais, o mundo não estaria me acusando, falsamente, de destruir a Amazônia. Soberania da região e suas riquezas é o que, verdadeiramente, está em jogo.”	“After the G-20, if I had demarcated a few more dozen Indigenous Areas and directed heavy fines on rural producers, the world would not be accusing me, falsely, of destroying the Amazon. The region's sovereignty and its wealth is what is really at stake”
18	23/08/19	“O fogo que mais arde é o da nossa soberania sobre a Amazônia. Assista, comente e COMPARTILHE.”	“The fire that burns most is that of our sovereignty over the Amazon. Watch, comment and SHARE.”
19	25/08/19	“Em contato telefônico com o Primeiro-Ministro Benjamin Netanyahu, este reconhece os esforços do Brasil no combate aos focos de incêndio na	“In telephone contact with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he recognizes Brazil's efforts to combat outbreaks of fire in the Amazon. We accept the shipment by Israel of an

		Amazônia. Aceitamos o envio, por parte de Israel, de aeronave com apoio especializado para colaborar conosco nessa operação.”	aircraft with specialized support to collaborate with us in this operation.”
20	20/10/19	“O Brasil integrando seus povos: 5 comunidades indígenas no Amazonas tiveram seu plano de visitação aprovado pela Funai. O Projeto turístico resgata a cultura, gera renda para os indígenas e desenvolve consciência de preservação dos turistas! Muitas outras virão!”	“Brazil integrating its peoples: 5 indigenous communities in Amazonas had their visitation plan approved by Funai. The tourism project rescues culture, generates income for indigenous people and develops awareness of the preservation of tourists! Many more will come!”
21	31/12/19	“O Ministro das Minas e Energia recebeu o embaixador da Bélgica e apresentou-lhe alguns motivos pelos quais o Governo Jair Bolsonaro pretende regulamentar a mineração em Terra Indígena: 1- No Brasil há quase 600 comunidades indígenas e muitas delas querem a mineração.”	“The Mining and Energy Minister received the ambassador from Belgium and presented some reasons why the Jair Bolsonaro government intends to regulate mining in Indigenous Territory: 1- In Brazil there are almost 600 indigenous communities and many of them want mining.”
22	31/12/19	“As riquezas minerais não estão onde queremos, mas onde a natureza as colocou: no Norte do Brasil onde, "curiosamente", governos anteriores demarcaram enormes áreas indígenas.”	“Mineral wealth is not where we want it, but where nature has placed it: in northern Brazil where, "curiously", previous governments have demarcated huge indigenous areas”
23	31/12/19	“Uma área maior que a região Sudeste (SP/MG/RJ/ES) já está demarcada no Brasil como TI. Sob essas áreas uma completa "Tabela Periódica.”	“An area larger than the Southeast region (SP / MG / RJ / ES) is already demarcated in Brazil as IL. Under these areas a complete "periodic table.”

		O Ministro fará exposições p/ outros embaixadores, p/ mostrar-lhes o quão será bom para os índios, o Brasil e o mundo a mineração em TI”	The Minister will make presentations to other ambassadors, to show them how good I mining will be for the Indians, Brazil and the world.”
24	31/12/19	<p>“2- Os governos FHC e Dilma também propuseram, sem sucesso, regulamentar a mineração em TI.</p> <p>3- Mineração em área indígena exige a prévia oitiva dos índios, autorização do Congresso e indenização aos índios (art. 231 da Constituição);</p> <p>4- Nenhum país do mundo tem essas exigências;”</p>	<p>“2- The governments FHC and Dilma also proposed, without success, to regulate mining in IT.</p> <p>3- Mining in an indigenous area requires the prior hearing of the Indians, authorization from Congress and indemnification to the Indians (Article 231 of the Constitution);</p> <p>4- No country in the world has these requirements;”</p>
25	31/12/19	<p>“5- A França faz mineração na Guiana e sequer reconhece, nesse seu território, o que seja uma comunidade indígena;</p> <p>6- Não foi o índio que se integrou à nossa cultura, mas a cultura ocidental europeia, como a Belga, que incorporou os índios, só que hoje os condenam à miséria;”</p>	<p>“5- France does mining in Guyana and does not even recognize, in its territory, what an indigenous community is;</p> <p>6- It was not the Indian who integrated himself into our culture, but Western European culture, like the Belgian one, which incorporated the Indians, only today they condemn them to misery;”</p>
26	19/02/20	<p>“A independência dos Índios no Brasil”</p> <p>(video attached)</p>	“The independence of the indigenous in Brazil”
27	27/02/20	“Live de quinta-feira: tacógrafos, táxis, bilhões gastos com a imprensa, MPs perdem validade, projetos em prol do Brasil parados, índios, carteira de motorista, dólar, corona vírus e derivações econômicas	“Thursday's livestream: tachographs, taxis, billions spent on the press, MPs lose validity, projects in favor of Brazil stalled, Indigenous, driver's license, dollar, corona virus and world economic derivations, tuning between powers ...”

		mundiais, afinação entre os poderes...”	
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Appendix 2: Facebook Livestream transcriptions

Transcript 1 - 19/04/19

Source: Facebook.com

06:03

direito trabalhei contra a forma como

06:06

foi demarcada reserve humano uma área

06:09

duas vezes o tamanho do estado do rio de

06:11

janeiro para aproximadamente 9 mil

06:14

índios

06:15

é um pequeno espaço interno é você pode

06:18

chamar pequeno duas vezes o tamanho de

06:20

janeiro duas vezes o tamanho do estado

06:22

de israel onde você encontra no subsolo

06:25

ali uma toda uma tabela periódica na

06:27

riquíssima e fica confinada por questão

06:29

de gerir esta questão ambiental já

06:32

buscam solução país porque os índios

06:34

querem se entregar à sociedade

06:36

os índios querem deixar se escravizar

06:38

por homens e por alguma melhoria de

06:41

político em despertar milhões aqui no

06:43

brasil há muitas portas contato direto

06:45

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comigo o que eu puder fazer por decreto

06:47

farei não sendo possível demanda um

06:51

projeto de lei para campos afastados ou

06:53

mandar uma proposta de emenda à

06:54

constituição o que é quase um consenso

06:57

entre nós que aquela historinha que a

07:00

esquerda sempre pegava né que o índio

07:03

tem que viver como se fosse um ser pré

07:07

histórico desde a sua reserva não cola

07:10

mais barato quanto a isso desde 2010 92

07:15

07:53

o primeiro momento obviamente não sou de

07:55

marcar grande quantidade de terras

07:57

indígenas

07:57

o objetivo é uma onda vem trabalhando há

08:00

algum tempo pela autodeterminação escola

08:04

de retornar

08:05

essas grandes áreas novos países

08:08

sendo os países e vão fazer relações

08:10

comerciais com os países que obviamente

08:13

a questão mineral está em primeiro lugar

08:15

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então mudamos eu acho que conseguimos um

08:18

ponto de inflexão para tudo isso não

08:20

podemos cruzar alguns países na mais

08:24

desenvolvido que nós que nós queremos

08:26

destruir a amazônia nós queremos

08:28

garantir que a amazônia é nossa e

08:31

acredita que elas riqueza que existe lá

08:33

não só minerais com biodiversidade elas

08:37

sejam exploradas de forma racional para

08:39

o bem estar de nossos povos e em

08:41

especial para os povos dias

08:43

Transcript 2 - 07/06/19
Source: Facebook.com

para é o início das obras do linhão de
13:45
tucuruí de manaus até boa vista está
13:49
cumprindo fielmente estabelecendo
13:51
esperamos ter a licença de instalação
13:54
até o final de julho eo início de agosto
13:57
final de agosto estaremos nesse
14:00
iniciando as obras do leão e 2021 vai
14:04
ser um ano que nós não só teremos nova
14:07
fonte de energia em roraima mas também
14:10
finalmente o leão provendo energia para
14:14
a questão é mesmo já conhecendo as minas
14:18
e energia também é a zona de baixo da
14:21
terra
14:22
em uma das passagens via pulando disse
14:25
uma verdade a figura de linguagem
14:27
se eu fosse reeleito de roraima com o
14:30
tecnologia e 20 anos teremos economia
14:33
próxima do japão com quatro grand corp
14:36
tem muito presidente eu acho que essas

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14:39

ações todas de políticas públicas

14:41

voltadas para o estado de roraima vão

14:44

permitir que esse estado seja exatamente

14:47

aquilo que o senhor já falou várias

14:49

vezes é um estado riquíssimo e vai

14:52

contribuir muito para o desenvolvimento

14:54

do país

14:56

iii pessoa quando nós temos que fazer o

14:59

casamento de meio ambiente

15:01

o progresso roraima tem estado quase

15:06

inviabilizada com o outro do brasil

15:08

rondônia desse problema até e

15:09

rapidamente esse problema há uma placa

15:12

o povo procurou bastante mata no sul do

15:15

brasil todo

15:16

com essas reservas é nobre indígenas

15:19

quilombolas e proteção ambiental parques

15:22

nacionais parques estaduais é uma

15:25

absurda sair o erro meu cachorro é

15:27

reconhecer o decreto que demarcou a

15:30

estação ecológica foi na condição de

15:32

chutar errado mas olha pra mim é um

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15:34

absurdo você tem marca por exemplo foi

15:37

constatado por decreto nos últimos anos

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Transcript 3 - 20/06/19
Source: Facebook.com

depois de ronaldo foi para miracatu bem
17:56
antes de o dourado sobre vamos ali na
18:00
região na região da barra do taquari uma
18:02
reserva indígena
18:03
dídio do paraguai o viu e índios do
18:07
paraguai diz a carta mental genetically
18:11
esmeralda e outros
18:13
outro outros minerais então não é à toa
18:16
que essas reservas
18:17
cada vez mais aparecem aqui no brasil e
18:20
aparece agora com essa riqueza na região
18:22
chamada vale do ribeira e que na verdade
18:25
é tido como era mais pobres são paulo
18:27

Transcript 4 - 18/07/19
Source: Facebook.com

vou ouvir a entrar em contato com o
09:59
ministério das relações exteriores de
10:01
ver se existe essa cobrança é lá e cá se
10:04
existia um tal como acordado o time
10:07
derrotou o chile já tem quem estava
10:10
muito faceiro hoje na reunião lá e não é
10:12
no mercosul disse a brincar ou evo
10:14
morales estava lá o nosso é o índio né
10:17
uma década fez um trabalho de relações
10:23
temos muito bom pediu algumas coisas pra
10:26
mim foi possível a gente vai atender tá
10:28
e falei no início estava com saudades
10:31
dele porque ele esteve na minha posse

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Transcript 5 - 25/07/19
Source: Facebook.com

04:55
porto velho rondônia a nossa região
04:58
amazonas o estado do mar do Amazonas ale
05:01
tem mais 70 e seria uma reivindicação
05:04
antiga porque esse asfalto com o tempo
05:07
já foi embora não existe mais uma
05:09
estrada praticamente intransitável e
05:12
através do nosso ministro aí o Tarciso
05:15
da e futura ele já reservou recursos
05:17
para ainda no corrente ano começou
05:20
asfaltamento da mesa mas já temos alguns
05:22
problemas em alguns trechos com
05:24
licenciamento ambiental que o nosso
05:26
menino ficar o site conduzindo a
05:29
contento essa essa essa questão
05:33
tenho certeza que todos nós ganharemos
05:36
com a implementação dessas dessas obras
05:40
aí lá na região amazônica aproveitar uma
05:45
jogada do lado aqui ele teve uma
05:46
importante reunião hoje às autoridades
05:53
polícia militar de todo o Brasil

Transcript 6 - 08/08/19
Source: Facebook.com

01:11
conseguir os números finais à questão
01:13
daqueles o que lhe roubou de 700 quilos
01:15
de ouro são paulo
01:16
então chegamos a um número aproximado
01:17
não é o real ainda de quanto gente manda
01:21
de ouro oficialmente para fora do brasil
01:23
enquanto fica aqui e falar um pouquinho
01:24
daquela proposta me legalizar o garimpo
01:28
empresas vêm aqui levam pra fora e
01:32
toneladas e toneladas de ouro uma parte
01:35
aí próximo de 10 por cento um pouco
01:37
abaixo de 10% fica a título de imposto e
01:41
quando se fala em legalizar o garimpo
01:44
tem muita gente que é contra então vamos
01:47
começar a discutir esse assunto pra você
01:50
até ter ter números e dados de como você
01:55
você melhor decidir se você acha que
01:57
devemos não é é abrir o garimpo legal
02:01
aqui no brasil temos três jovens índios
02:05

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aqui da reserva indígena raposa serra do
02:08
sol vão falar alguma coisa no tocante à
02:10
galinho também ontem foi comemorado aqui
02:14
o 165º aniversário da santa casa de juiz

33:54
quando se fala em riquezas o que vai
33:57
embora
33:59
agora que a gente fala em legalizar o
34:02
garimpo que legalizaria o projeto
34:04
conhecendo o legislativo pode ser nosso
34:06
executivo que vai pra cama passa no
34:07
senado de modo a que se crie regras
34:11
o pobre garimpeiro que está talvez muito
34:15
assistindo especial do pará a terra
34:17
riquíssima ele possa então ser
34:22
garimpeiro e ter dignidade que ele possa
34:27
é também com algumas informações é
34:30
preservar o meio ambiente não usar
34:33
mercúrio o mundo cair na minha cabeça
34:35
especial a pensar onde é grande né
34:38
até que preserve o meio ambiente uma das
34:41
meninas que tirou daqui eu não sei se
34:44

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essa aqui é paracatu minas gerais seria
34:52
complicado mas o pessoal pode ver na
34:53
internet no google e como é que fica a
34:56
região lá então ao certo ataque betti a
35:01
controlar 70 e que havia um compromisso
35:03
de reflorestamento depois agora porque

35:46
mundo aqui nós quer uma solução para
35:49
esse caso o mirante bento que a ministra
35:51
das minas e energia está trabalhando
35:53
nesse projeto de lei liga
35:55
usando o garimpo não só na sua fazenda
35:58
bem como em terras indígenas pronta
36:01
agora comprei o problema com o mundo
36:02
todo é a galáxia vai entrar em briga
36:06
comigo agora que estão se exige do hiv
36:10
senhor de uma fuga que chegou perto de
36:13
uma furada nele aqui ó
36:14
ele vai sentir a mesma furada querer os
36:17
alas
36:18
se tiver dor de dente o salles e ele só
36:22
tem um caminho procurar um dentista ano
36:24

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passado procurava um tal de percy geral
36:26
do bolsonaro que era dentista prático
36:29
dessa sorriso perto de estivesse tocando
36:31
e arrancava com alicate nobel taboco que
36:34
o índio é o nosso irmão
36:36
eles querem dentista que era um médico
36:38
que cara de cobra
36:41
geralmente morre não deu para salvar
36:42
picada de cobra
36:45
relamente mal ricardo gomes é outra
36:48
coisa como vocês verem irmãos vocês
36:50
jovens morrendo por doença comum
36:53
como não vamos falar de saúde de ouro
36:55
branco não vamos falar da fundaj não é
36:57
na vida normal
36:59
o estado da sua reserva ele tem problema
37:01
eu não sei com a expectativa de vida de
37:04
um índio dentro de uma reserva
37:06
se a nossa está na casa dos 72 73
37:10
eu acho que a dele só tá baixo de 50 eu
37:13
acho tenho certeza mas é muito mais
37:15
abaixo que é nossa o que lhes falta o
37:17

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que eles querem

37:18

nessa terra você pega uma reserva

37:21

ianomâmi que não só no amazonas

37:24

no momento duas vezes o tamanho do rio

37:27

de janeiro

37:27

imaginou você pega a lei de ponta a

37:30

ponta e tatiana campos não há não sei

37:33

quantos km são aí não não e anormal e

37:40

duas vezes o tamanho do rio de janeiro o

37:44

sol é o texto mais ou menos bem menor

37:47

raposa serra do sol é bem menor do que o

37:49

hatch fundiário ele quer plantar a sua

37:52

até a plataforma

37:54

sim ela quer plantar nossa terra se é

37:57

factível aquela paulo

37:59

eles querem a vida dele

38:02

preciso de gente do estado para buscar

38:06

cuidar da vida deles querem cuidar da

38:08

própria vida desde é como temos índios e

38:09

39:31

unicom ano o que valem mas a brasileira

39:37

vocês são tão brasileiro quanto nós

39:40

povos originários desta américa

39:45

quero a mensagem do coração mais puro do

39:48

que essa tem nossos irmãos aqui o

39:51

peçoal que usa o índice como massa de

39:54

manobra

39:55

ademar cada vez mais terra para deixar

39:59

isolado como se fosse 11 será eu uni

40:03

abertaw essa não é uma turma nem

40:06

pergunta pra ele o que eles querem

40:07

não perguntei conversa com eles têm

40:11

muito a galera lá na raposa serra do sol

40:15

a jornada tem bastante camuflado né tem

40:18

mais jogo na amazônia do que no sertão

40:20

nordestino muito mais nós vamos fazer

40:27

tudo para integrá los à sociedade

40:30

se ele passar com certeza quer criar

40:33

robôs com certeza é mais é que a energia

40:38

elétrica na propriedade vocês queremos

40:41

sim lá tem aquela fala de casa de

40:43

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farinha como é que é movimentar a casa

40:44

de farinha hoje em dia é manualmente

40:46

mesmo você pega paleta que chama mexer

40:50

na farinha

40:51

então olha energia elétrica motora o

40:54

motor do lado ali faz a farinha pra eles

40:58

eles querem a tecnologia que nós temos é

41:00

justo

41:01

nós negamos isso a seres humanos como

41:04

esse estão do nosso lado que o que nós

41:07

temos de melhor do que aquele pessoal

41:08

que eles confinado não quero o bem dele

41:11

geralmente eu só queria dinheiro de ong

41:13

para mantê los dentro de sua propriedade

41:17

confinar se ele não quer isso

41:19

o índia tão brasileiro é tão inteligente

41:22

como nós

41:24

se pegar um filho dele e um de nós aqui

41:27

vamos votar

41:28

ele vai crescer igual o filho dessa

41:30

pessoa legítimo biológico não tem

41:32

diferença

41:33

e cada vez mais escondem o índio não
41:37
defende o índio
41:38
nós estamos acompanhando aqui é buscando
41:41
construir o linhão de energia elétrica
41:44
de manaus a boa vista em roraima até 16
41:50
anos
41:51
estamos é o brasil tá tentando e não
41:53
consegue é problema ambiental que
41:56
praticamente resolveram se casar agora
41:58
tem problema indigenista espertalhões
42:01
fica usando o ios índia para dificultar
42:04
isso aí ea gente gasta por ano como
42:07
energia de lá agora grande quase
42:10
totalidade agora d or e mané é de óleo
42:14
diesel está gastando com o que fazer
42:17
botando na conta dos demais brasileiros
42:19
por um bilhão e duzentos
42:21
de reais não acho o prejuízo ambiental
42:24
de quem olha para gerar melhor mas aí o
42:26
pessoal ecochato não fala nisso não toca
42:29
nesse assunto não fala que lá
42:32
essa usina termelétrica de idade são só
42:35

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algumas de roraima gera energia carisma

42:37

e poluir o meio ambiente não falo porque

42:39

é interesse e não desenvolver o estado

42:41

de roraima

42:42

o estado tem um subsolo riquíssimo e

42:45

tenho a certeza que gostaria que eles já

42:47

falaram aqui gostaria de explorar as

42:49

riquezas que existe lá você pega o mapa

42:51

metal genético né

42:53

todas as cores têm ali mais ao norte de

42:55

rolando que engloba raposa serra do sol

42:58

e também reserva ianomâmi a área mais

43:00

rica do mundo do planeta outra bastante

43:03

rica o vale do ribeira em são paulo

43:05

muita coisa também por isso começar

43:07

atraente do paraguai já os 10 anos

43:09

aproximadamente e jogar e miracatu

43:12

a linha do lado paulista por

43:13

coincidência é a terra onde eu cresci

43:16

então tem tudo ali essas já têm tudo eu

43:19

tenho dito que toda vez que fui a roma

43:20

no sentido figurado falar se eu fosse

43:23

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rei de roma é com tecnologia e 20 anos
43:26
teria tema economia próxima do japon
43:29
isso é verdade e é justo nós condenamos
43:33
as pessoas desta terra
43:35
sabemos temos a oi ter pela frente
43:38
burocracia parlamento logo ele não fala
43:41
a nossa língua como é conseguir um carro
43:43
não foi para defendê los
43:46
não foi pra dar pra defender ele está
43:48
certo para defender interesses
43:50
internacionais que têm na região
43:51
policiais interessa números ano abusivos
43:57
sobre a região amazônica
43:59
por que cada vez mais nós enfraquecemos
44:01
cada vez menos não podemos falar que a
44:05
amazônia é nossa
44:06
alguma coisa maluca foi atrair o
44:09
presidente é o motivo da nossa visita
44:11
aqui na capital federal primeiramente é
44:14
uma honra muito grande
44:16
sábado participando dessa transmissão ao
44:19
vivo
44:20

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o motivo da nossa vida que é justamente
44:22
é tudo e um pouco mais daquilo que vossa
44:25
excelência mencionou
44:27
nós vivemos numa terra riquíssima falará
44:30
cultivo de grãos onde antes
44:33
os rizicultores plantavam hoje todas
44:36
elas ministro
44:37
todas elas estão embargadas e nós
44:40
estamos proibidos de produzir uma área
44:43
que já é consolidado e que não há nenhum
44:46
tipo de desmatamento não há nenhum tipo
44:48
de punição
44:49
nada nós temos áreas de lavrado com uma
44:54
conhecida em moema e nós não podemos
44:56
produzir porque se produzir em grande
44:59
escala seremos mudados teremos nossa
45:01
produção embargados mas não é isso que
45:04
nós queremos nós nós povos indígenas
45:07
nós vivemos um novo estilo de vida nós

45:33
hoje as demandas são outras hoje as
45:36
nossas necessidades são outras

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45:38

então nós precisamos sim de oportunidade

45:42

de crescer e desenvolver nossas

45:44

comunidades indígenas participar da

45:46

economia do nosso estado participar do

45:49

crescimento e desenvolvimento do nosso

45:50

país

47:20

região conseguir o título da terra

47:22

depois vêm os governos do pt especial

47:25

mas começou lá atrás com collor fhc foi

47:27

uma desgraça

47:28

fernando henrique cardoso uma desgraça

47:30

para o brasil nessa questão também de

47:33

reservas indígenas e foi demarcada então

47:37

no governo lula seu amigão foi

47:39

consolidada da marcação e eles fiquem

47:43

por exemplo brasil o branco que estava

47:45

lá

47:46

casado com uma índia ele teve que sair

47:49

com seus filhos se você não podia ficar

47:51

48:10
média arrebetaram família só minha foi
48:12
para longe da periferia de boa vista
48:15
índios favelados o que nós queremos dar
48:22
o direito além de explorar a terra
48:24
poderá expor o turismo à terra por que
48:27
possam por eles por exemplo para o
48:29
turismo
48:30
a riqueza é maravilhosa né cachoeiras
48:34
lagos matas nativas à cultura diz que
48:38
não pode fazer isso aí quando alguém
48:41
fala do outro lado da linha fala que eu
48:44
estou falando querendo demais o índio
48:46
lembra de uma coisa na bolívia
48:48
quem é o pai da bolívia ó 100% na
48:54
bolívia depois
48:54
o presidente da república aqui ele tem
48:56
que ser um ser pré histórico dentro da
48:59
tua terra isso não é justo e desumano e
49:02
isso é covardia é criminoso e em grande
49:04
parte dessas reservas o que existe de
49:07
forma clandestina
49:08

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o garimpo de ouro e diamante como não

49:12

temos informações da reserva russell

49:14

honoré de amanhã

49:15

50:00

assunto sou rondinelli escolhida na

50:02

região da raposa serra do sol em roraima

50:05

eu queria dizer nem sempre nessa linha

50:07

da conversa informal que hoje as ong a

50:10

igreja católica é tão covarde com a

50:13

gente que os padres que estão lá na

50:16

terra indígena raposa serra do sol pode

50:18

ser um desafio à imprensa e lá filmar

50:21

vez tem um índio quase tudo da áfrica do

50:25

sul tudo de fora que não falei mal fala

50:27

português

50:28

então isso é ruim para nós a gente não

50:31

consegue mandar na própria terra que nós

50:34

consideramos que é o brasil é nosso é é

50:37

nessa linha e presidente é muito triste

50:40

para quem vive lá o que as une que é um

50:43

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homem que sempre quiseram ver aquele
50:45
parente é pior casa que têm eles
50:47
filmaram e tiraram fotos e pedir
50:49
dinheiro lá fora e com isso têm mais
50:52
facilidade veio a Brasília da gestão
50:55
disse
50:55
o dodô pt que vinha toda a semana
50:58
reivindicado 0 incluindo estava bem
51:00
estava
51:01
estava aquilo e hoje nós sofremos muitos
51:04
desfrutaram querendo a demarcação já se
51:08
foram mas nós que ficamos aqui nós
51:11
estamos nós estamos sofrendo nós estamos
51:14
sofrendo tanto financeiro que nós longe
51:17
de nossa terra no Roraima está cheio de
51:21
Venezuelanos e nós não conseguimos
51:24
emprego onde é que nós vamos correr pra
51:27
até quando nós vamos sofrer e tendo a
51:29
riqueza a gente não pode explorar a
51:31
gente não pode explorar o minério league
51:33
pode cobrar nada

53:51

precisam ter que mostrar a você que tá

53:54

que vive na área urbana a quem são os

53:58

índios que eles querem e a grande farsa

54:00

a grande mentira de de ongs e de

54:05

entidades religiosas no caso é católica

54:09

se me fazem contra contra essas pessoas

54:14

diferentemente do evangelho quando vejo

54:17

realmente fazer um bom trabalho nesse

54:19

meio é lamentavelmente uma parte da

54:22

igreja católica tatá voltada para

54:24

mantê-los no estado em que se encontra

54:26

não estão preocupadas com o

54:27

desenvolvimento deles não tão preocupado

54:29

e tratá los como seres humanos no tempo

54:32

buscar uma solução para isso o primeiro

54:33

passo

54:34

vencemos a guerra aqui dá da comunicação

54:37

com vocês

55:45

exército da marinha chegou então o

55:48

senhor presidente nós queremos junto com

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55:51

o senhor

55:52

o nosso brasil o povo indígena em

55:56

roraima está esperando uma solução que o

56:02

presidente mostre e faça e tenha uma

56:07

solução para atender o nosso povo

56:10

indígena

56:12

nós estamos não podemos produzir em

56:19

grande escala

56:20

não podemos produzir e agora

56:31

recentemente o ibama foi montar um

56:38

onze empresários que estão produzindo

56:40

mais morar na terra indígena na terra

56:46

indígena

56:46

mas o imã foi na foi curto

56:50

eu quero levar isso ao conhecimento do

56:52

negócio a cedência para poder sair e

57:00

tomar providências

57:02

quero o presidente de todos esses

57:08

assuntos no brasil tem lei e um país que

57:11

tem lei devido processo legal

57:14

oportunidade de ampla defesa isso é

57:16

muito importante

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57:17

o brasil é um país que tem segue a sua

57:19

constituição tem um marco legal que nós

57:22

vamos fazer valer as leis respeitar as

57:24

leis e quando for o caso se precisar

57:27

muda se a lei é assim que funciona num

57:29

país que segue devido processo legal e

57:32

ao brasil um exemplo disso é importante

57:34

que a gente possa deixar bem claro aqui

57:36

eu não tenho nenhuma versão a a

57:38

estrangeiro

57:39

é o que eu não quero é estrangeiro de

57:41

forma ilegal no meu próprio brasil

57:44

quem não está aqui na forma da lei no

Transcript 7 - 29/08/19
Source: Facebook.com

bem em frente a semana foi bastante
06:19
agitada e não a questão de a questão da
06:23
queimada na amazônia não só passou por
06:25
lá
06:25
o conhecimento que eu tenho que a selva
06:27
não pega fogo ainda não têm
06:32
representação rasteiro mas é impossível
06:35
pegar pegar fogo na floresta então o que
06:38
chegou lá fora que a floresta estava em
06:40
chamas disse susana
06:42
quem não é verdade está o ensejo decian
06:47
está abaixo da média dos últimos anos
06:50
lógica ele não tivesse incêndio mas é
06:52
uma realidade não vai conseguir ficar
06:54
livre sair mas a imprensa brasileira
06:55
alimentou esse fogo e foi para fora
06:58
tínhamos uma reunião tinha uma novela
06:59
não fazendo faxina no dia certo
07:01
o g7 fez uma reunião em paris e omar com
07:06
o presidente da macron o presidente da

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07:10

frança aproveitou e fez um escarcéu me

07:13

acusou de mentiroso e depois duas coisas

07:16

graves né

07:17

ele colocou em jogo a nossa soberania

07:20

sobre a amazônia dizer que estava em

07:22

aberto sendo bem entrou em contato com

07:25

vários chefes de estado o primeiro na

07:28

retina

07:30

o dado da espanha que foi como convidado

07:32

o dia 7 conversei com tantos e tantos

07:35

outros né com os presidentes aqui na

07:38

américa do sul em especial na região

07:39

amazônica e isso fosse com o passar do

07:44

tempo foi desfeito sair foi feito mais

07:47

uma imagem do brasil que não se combinam

07:50

é fácil você limpar uma imagem num país

07:52

né acusado de negligência no tocantins é

07:56

que falta à imprensa brasileira eu sei

07:58

que não foi à imprensa e tocou fogo ar

08:01

naquela aqui nossa serviço público é

08:04

verdade porque a verdade não tem

08:06

problema a gente que busca a solução

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08:09

o exército às suas amadas e diz

08:11

prontamente tomou as providências

08:13

agora a região a região amazônica é modo

08:17

que é modo que europa toda

08:20

doação de dizer que a floresta em chamas

08:22

e que inclusive foi o objeto de manchete

08:26

permanente e uma emissora de televisão

08:29

isso é uma incoerência total e só

08:31

acontece na cabeça de pessoas que

08:34

desconhecem a floresta amazônica é a

08:37

própria zona é a ocidental inteira cabe

08:42

dentro da amazônia imaginem toda a

08:45

europa ocidental e chama a bola passa

08:48

isso na cabeça de alguém então o que

08:50

acontece na amazônia numa determinada

08:51

época do ano há fogo e sem não é

08:54

amazônia chan

08:56

isso é um exagero que não é não é nem

08:59

nem aceitável na cabeça de pessoas

09:02

inteligentes é uma grande bobagem

09:04

é um som pontos da floresta onde surgem

09:07

os núcleos de 100 e nós temos duas

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09:10

coisas a comemorar a semana presidente

09:12

primeiro a ação das forças armadas

09:14

imediate pronta resposta altamente

09:18

competente trabalhando em cima desses

09:21

focos de incêndio e debelando a maioria

09:23

deles isso aí também não quer dizer que

09:25

não vá acontecer um recrudescimento de

09:28

alguns ponte mas a ação da força armada

09:30

foi absolutamente eficiente muito é

09:35

imediate isso mostra a capacidade das

09:38

forças armadas têm de cumprir qualquer

09:39

missão com a seleção não é uma missão

09:41

fácil que amazônia gigantesca e os

09:44

pontos de incêndio ficou longe um do

09:46

outro

10:48

plano de fora aí para que nós vemos a

10:53

usufruir dos bens da região amazônica

10:55

preservando o meio ambiente se

10:57

preocupando com a nossa soberania está

10:59

ameaçada de hoje é verdade

11:01

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nós tivemos um encontro nesta terça

11:02

feira os governadores da região

11:05

amazônica e ali só um falou em dinheiro

11:10

aquele dinheiro daquela escola oferecida

11:11

pelo macron o brasil vale muito mais que

11:14

20 milhões de dólares pela noite dentro

11:16

havia dito há poucas semanas que alguns

11:19

países é europeu estão comprando brasil

11:22

a prestação já gastaram mais de anton

11:25

mais de 1 bilhão de dólares para cá

11:27

ao longo de 2010 12 anos que dera ter

11:30

dinheiro

11:31

me aponte um hectare replantado uma ação

12:02

governador foi excepcional e levei para

12:05

ele os números é que eles não sabiam

12:07

eu perguntei você sabe quantas áreas

12:09

indígenas

12:11

sou tão pronta pra usar uma caneta e

12:13

sendo marcada a próxima na próxima de

12:16

fogo mais 200 áreas indígenas mais novas

12:19

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200 vila kosmos quilombolas do brasil

12:22

está na bica para ser bacana 900

12:25

quilombolas

12:27

quantas a proteção ambiental parques

12:29

nacionais estações ecológicas e criado

12:32

ou aumentado ou seja hoje em dia 14 por

12:35

cento do território nacional já está a

12:38

demarcação como terra indígena

12:39

se eu marcar todas abertas e passa para

12:41

20%

12:43

imagens 20% simplesmente o agricultura

12:49

pecuária mas foi inviabilizada no brasil

12:51

e os governadores obviamente não querem

12:54

mais é um exemplo do zico nunca parece

12:57

um daqueles que resolve falar que quer

13:00

demarcar terra mesmo naquele momento

13:02

ninguém aceitou falar eu quero que o

13:04

estado seja de macau que está sendo

13:07

proposto né de governos anteriores não

13:09

fizer eu não vou usar a minha caneta a

13:12

não ser que seja obrigado a demarcar

13:14

mais áreas como disse 14% já não

13:18

equivale no brasil uma área maior que os
13:20
estados de são paulo e imaginou são
13:23
paulo minas gerais rio de janeiro e do
13:27
paraná também no pará
13:29
é muita coisa e mais essas demarcações
13:31
elas merecem ser todas revistas uma vez
13:36
que há provas de dentro da própria funai
13:39
denúncias de demarcações fraudulentas
13:42
para 10 indígenas são demarcações que
13:45
foram forjadas muito aumentadas na sua
13:49
na sua extensão por gente interessada em
13:53
lucrar com isso
13:54
então isso ia ser muito bem estudado o
13:57
próprio laudo de raposa serra do sol foi
13:59
colocada em dúvida e foi praticamente
14:02
comprovado que foi o álbum fraudulenta
14:04
então essas todas as demarcações tem que
14:07
ser objeto de revisão para verificar o
14:09
que realmente corresponde à verdade
14:11
nessas terras precisam ser devidamente
14:14
demarcada de acordo com a realidade
14:16
e a partir daí vamos pensar se vale a
14:19

pena são latifúndios que se nós não
14:22
dermos ao indígena
14:24
o tratamento que eles merecem com a
14:26
possibilidade de se integrar na aal
14:30
conjunto de de importa do povo
14:33
brasileiro isso não promove de maneira
14:36
nenhuma o engrandecimento da etnia
14:39
ao contrário elas são sufocados pela
14:41
cidade a chegada de estranhos
14:43
fico cada vez mais pobres e não tem
14:46
resolvido o problema no índio condá
14:48
sendo recebido indignada palavras ou
14:50
mesmo receber wind pedindo paz para
14:52
serem integrados à sociedade para
14:55
estudar pra terem possibilidade de
14:57
frequentar a faculdade sem cotas em na
15:00
escola indígena que possa preparados
15:03
márcia cidadãos brasileiros estarão
15:06
sempre apenas cidadãos indígena são
15:08
cidadão indígenas brasileiros isso é
15:11
muito importante e vai voltar com cães
15:13
assunto a semana que vem é muito
15:14

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importante de 90 eo crochê na cama

15:17

trabalho quanto a isso

15:18

em 92 foi assinada a portaria pelo menos

15:22

a justiça da demarcação da reserva

15:23

yanomami uma área duas vezes o tamanho

15:26

do estado do rio de janeiro

15:28

ninguém sabe quantos interlagos chuta

15:31

chuta chuta 8000 9000

15:33

vamos porque seja devil imagine uma área

15:35

duas vezes o tamanho do gênero fazem

15:37

agora a riqueza de tela baixo se você

15:40

pega o mapa mental genérico vai ver é

15:42

uma coisa absurda mais rica do brasil

15:46

subsolo de marcar como teses sobre solos

15:50

são são rick terra a bancada de mato

15:53

grosso do mato grossense como escolhido

15:55

hoje o governador presente também

15:57

preocupado com isso buscando alternativa

16:00

para nós na fita fazer com que o índio

16:03

trabalho

16:04

os índios querem trabalhar e vamos agora

16:06

segundo eles propuseram vai reduzir nem

16:08

razão que a 81 69 e diz que só pode
16:13
fazer na terra indígena depois de ouvir
16:15
emídio nós queremos agora do passado
16:19
não é tão desconhecido como é hoje então
16:22
seria tinha como ouvindo se eu não trago
16:24
autor vai pegar o tradutor do furo
16:25
antigamente a brincadeira né
16:27
sabe falar o que aconteceu aqui é só
16:29
mentira ou como regra era mentira então
16:32
agora como ele fala a nossa língua taxa
16:35
integrando vamos ouvi lo para que essas
16:37
áreas realmente possam ser usada por
16:40
eles né não só no tocante à pecuária
16:42
agricultura e por que não também caiu

Transcript 8 - 20/09/19
Source: Facebook.com

mas é uma coisa que a gente vai a nós há
04:12
uma semana que vem é para nova york em
04:16
um ano a onu a fazer um pronunciamento
04:20
lá tá na cara que você cobrar é porque o
04:23
grande parte alguns países me atacam de
04:26
forma bastante violenta é que eu sou
04:28
responsável as queimadas
04:31
aí pelo brasil nós sabemos que há dados
04:33
oficiais é que quem manda tem todo ano
04:37
infelizmente a inflação que tem até uma
04:39
questão de tradição não sou caboclo toca
04:42
fogo no ano passado ele a plantar uma
04:45
coisa tocantins o índio faz a mesma
04:48
coisa
04:49
tem aqueles que falam de forma criminosa
04:52
também agora como combater tudo isso sem
04:55
meios né
04:56
uma na região amazônica que pega se não
05:00
me engano acho que deve ser ajudar a
05:01

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estação de gum que modo que há um
05:05
porcentual é complicado sair não faço
05:08
agora a gente faz o possível porque
05:13
alguns países da europa batia na gente
05:16
duramente o que eles queriam quando eu
05:19
voltasse dessas desse grande diferença
05:21
como já tive azar em osaka time da rua
05:25
que eu voltasse para casa marcassem mais
05:28
duas dúzias de 60 indígenas com mais 30
05:31
ou 40 quilombolas ampliasse parques
05:34
ambientais se eu resolver amanhã
05:36
negative a todos lá como aqui em todo o
05:39
planeta com parte do novo mas mas sim na
05:44
de craft de marcar e 20 reservas
05:47
indígenas que 50 quilombola o incêndio
05:50
acaba imediatamente na região amazônica
05:53
e que alguns países lado a nota estava
05:55
fazendo
05:57
com essa historinha de dinheiro do fundo
06:01
amazônia estão comprando a nossa
06:03
amazônia
06:04
é o índio o que ele quer a vida
06:09

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semelhante a nós uma vez de ter um
06:11
acesso ali contato com o novo ele quer
06:15
um dentista carregado dentro o topo na
06:17
boca o médico para apurá lo de alguma
06:20
coisa ele quer energia elétrica quando
06:23
com essa internet se maravilha né
06:25
nós temos maravilhados há pouco tempo
06:27
quando conhecemos ele quer e que é o que
06:30
nós queremos sim nós temos alguns fãs do
06:34
governo quer mantê los de forma
06:36
primitiva como se fosse homens
06:38
pré-históricos quer se casar no futuro
06:40
dessa escolar e que os caras que é de
06:43
olho
06:44
a riqueza que tem embaixo da terra então
06:47
fala alguma coisa pra gente aqui o meu
06:49

fico triste pelos brasileiros me
09:16
atacando por queimadas na amazônia
09:18
quando se isso nunca tivessem e nunca
09:22
fosse deixar de existir e o que está

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09:24

existindo tá é a parte da média dos

09:26

últimos 15 anos mas o pessoal vai a

09:30

primeiro lá atrás e depois de acusado

09:34

nero também tocando fogo tudo por aí eu

09:37

sou nos aproximar se o que estava

09:40

previsto com essa época os países de

09:42

fora do brasil previsto para agosto está

09:44

no brasil até domingo 22 é que o futuro

09:47

quem fosse eleger presidente em 2018

09:50

demarcasse mais aproximadamente 400

09:54

reservas indígenas novas e mais

09:56

aproximadamente 900 quilombolas além de

10:00

ampliação de parques nacionais

10:05

tal só de reserva indígena de hoje em

10:08

dia temos uma área equivalente a região

10:10

sudeste é porque o estado de minas são

10:14

paulo rio espírito santo

10:16

com mais esse incremento de 6% teremos

10:19

mais uma área de aproximadamente né

10:21

região sul paraná santa catarina e no

10:24

sul

10:24

imagine o nosso brasil com o mar

201005208

10:28

equivalentes é um pouco abaixo do

10:30

sudeste e sul

10:31

demarcado como terra indígena tudo

10:34

estaria inviabilizada no brasil se ao

10:37

agronegócio homem do campo

11:37

se deus quiser vou estar em nova york na

11:39

próxima terça feira

11:42

estou preparando um discurso uma

11:45

bastante objetivo diferente de outros

11:49

presidentes que me antecederam ninguém

11:51

vai brigar com ninguém lá pode ficar

11:52

tranquilo vou apanhar da mídia qualquer

11:54

maneira essa vida sempre tem o que

11:56

reclamar né

11:58

mas eu vou falar como o brasil

12:02

são eles têm número 5 verídicos observa

12:05

que interessa desgasta a imagem do

12:07

brasil gastar porque pra ver se crie um

12:11

caos aqui pra quem se dá bem de saúde e

12:14

fora também da nossa cultura cair é bom

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12:17

para o país que vivem diz outros que

12:19

vivem disso acaba vendendo mais contra

12:22

certeza mais caro nós aqui que cansou

12:25

bastante complicado

12:27

Transcript 9 - 07/11/19
Source: Facebook.com

18:51

shiita a correção dos índios eles querem

18:55

cada vez mais se incorporar à sociedade

18:58

estamos trabalhando sentido eu dependo

19:00

de mim é um livro vai fazer da terra que

19:03

um fazendeiro foi de 10 outra terra ali

19:05

do lado que o índio é um ser humano

19:07

igual nós já falei muito sobre isso

32:22

de todos é que essa é a de de óleo são

32:27

até amanhã é que você pode ver um

32:29

problemas indígenas estamos buscando uma

32:33

maneira de começar construir no corrente

32:35

ano o leão e tucuruí até o leão que vai

32:41

do de manaus até pela vida porque nós

32:44

vamos pagar este ano mais de 1 bilhão de

32:47

reais todo mundo vai pagar para que

32:49

chegue essa energia em roraima ou seja

32:53

produzida dessa forma o encerramento do

32:56

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jogo

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Transcript 9 - 28/11/19
Source: Facebook.com

02:46

fenomenal não é nominal fenomenal

02:48

eu tenho uma caverna do diabo é

02:50

inesquecível é um turismo de jet ski o

02:53

time do jec com que o museu lado temos

02:55

três quatro semanas

02:57

eu fui lá pra baixo taquari ver como

03:00

estão os índios do pará agora só e isso

03:02

paraguai álvaro ribeiro

03:03

pelo amor de deus não adianta que não

03:05

vai ter pra vocês não vai ser nada é

03:07

mercado não tá certo vem da copa aqui no

03:10

brasil que não vai dar certo isso aí mas

Transcript 10 - 02/01/20

Source: Facebook.com

17:01
manaus essa essa estratégia e porque me
17:04
interessa divulgar a cultura da amazônia
17:05
é bem-vindo além de trazer recursos para
17:09
nós e mostra para quem vem de fora que a
17:12
amazônia não pegou fogo nem tá pegando
17:14
fogo é uma grande mentira
17:16
eu queria saber agora tá pegando fogo
17:18
praia né sei que é uma cor falou uma
17:20
coisa sagrada
17:21
falou e colocar em dúvida a soberania na
17:24
austrália não aquela menina também
17:26
naquela pequena ela falou uma coisa bem
17:28
na hora e no brasil que nem se compara o
17:33
que aconteceu que acontece todo o brasil
17:37
que é um pouco cultural é difícil mudar
17:40
a cabeça das pessoas
17:41
a questão de tocar fogo no roçado
17:44
difícilmente vai acabar com isso aí
17:47
mas o que há com somatório que aconteceu
17:49
no brasil no passado além de ser abaixo

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17:52

da das médias nos últimos anos nem se

17:56

compara ao que aconteceu na austrália

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Transcript 11 - 16/01/20

Source: Facebook.com

hoje teve um grande empresário
28:23
auxiliando conversando comigo é da área
28:26
da mineração
28:28
ele está querendo explorar vanádio no
28:32
piauí
28:33
o piauí é o estado mais pobre do brasil
28:36
né tá o penúltimo é o maranhão acho que
28:39
é o mais pobre sim está há três anos no
28:42
entanto uma licença ambiental do estado
28:43
e não consegue
28:45
o governador é o curador que indica o
28:47
resultado
28:48
em meio ambiente né agora uma visão
28:51
dessas pessoas nesta campanha tá é numa
28:55
o método que ele fala de explorar o
28:57
vanádio não tem qualquer agressão ao
29:00
meio ambiente mas o secretário de meio
29:02
ambiente do governador não concede essa
29:06
licença ambiental e ele está a ponto de
29:08
um desistido do empreendimento aqui
29:11

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afinal de contas estado está governando

29:13

por petistas quanto mais informado foi o

29:16

povo com quanto menor for o poder

Transcript 12 - 23/01/20

Source: Facebook.com

for criamos no dia de ontem né o
11:35
conselho da amazônia sem qualquer gustta
11:38
custo aproveitando o gabinete do
11:41
vice-presidente aí eu o antônio mourão
11:44
tá ele vai ser o nosso grande é de
11:47
lado aqui está na frente desse conselho
11:49
da amazônia vai tratar-lhe da proteção
11:51
da defesa é prevenção desenvolvimento
11:55
sustentável logicamente vai ter sua
11:57
participação no tocante às reservas
11:59
indígenas tarciso você você vê mato
12:02
grosso qual estado não teve o região
12:04
norte é gostado serviço segundo amazonas
12:07
na cidade de manaus mas na outra você
12:09
conhece contato com índio né com toda a
12:12
certeza o índio do tempo que vocês que
12:14
não foi brasil revelar de 2002 2007 2007
12:19
só passaram-se praticamente 13 14 anos
12:21
mudou o índio mudou tá e vou cada vez
12:24
mais o índio é um ser humano igual a nós
12:27

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e fazer com que o índio cada ano e se
12:29
entrega a saudade seja realmente dono da
12:33
sua terra indígena diz que nós queremos

Transcript 13 - 27/02/20

Source: Facebook.com

22:33

e o índio passado a ser tratado como

22:36

cidadão brasileiro estados unidos existe

22:39

há seis anos mais ou menos para ver que

22:41

eu não fiz isso o índio é é gente né

22:43

aqui não aqui o índio não é tratado como

22:46

um ser humano não é tratado como um

22:49

objeto que tem que ser escravizado e

22:52

confinado dentro da sua reserva agora

22:56

não vem me cobrar que eu fiscalize uma

23:00

área do tamanho da região sudeste dá

23:02

para imaginar o tamanho região sudeste

23:05

o rio espírito santo minas gerais e são

23:08

paulo que é o equivalente a terra

23:10

indígena demarcada no brasil

23:14

eu possa fiscalizar roubo de madeira

23:18

o contrabando de pedras preciosas roubo

23:23

de biodiversidade não tenho como fazer

23:24

isso aí agora a gente conseguir aprovar

23:26

esse projeto nossa que meu projeto visa

23:29

regulamentar o artigo 231 da

201005208

23:31

constituição trabalhado projeto lá com o

23:34

mirante dentro que o nosso ministro das

23:37

minas e energia né com a sua assessoria

23:39

um projeto maravilhoso permitindo o

23:42

índio aí a explorar a bateria se ele

23:46

quisera fascar ouro com jogo de peneira

23:49

buscar diamante tá se ele pode plantar

23:54

lá fazendo a gente não pode plantar na

23:55

terra no céu se ele quiser arrendar a

23:58

terra também não pode tá ou melhor já tá

24:01

vendo alguma coisa nesse sentido mas e

24:03

algumas poucas reservas indígenas tá e

24:05

com problemas quer vender o pessoal do

24:08

parecis mato grosso tem problema for

24:10

montar só dois anos 120 milhões de reais

24:12

estão plantando transgênicos lá na

24:14

região também tem que ter essa liberdade

24:16

se quiser isso

24:18

oi para o turismo na sua reserva onde

24:20

pode fazer isso aí ruim Jesus exatamente

24:22

igualzinho nós não tem diferença nenhuma

24:24

a gente tem curso superior mas alguns

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24:28

ambientalistas ainda a gente da funai

24:31

ainda porque tem muita gente concursada

24:32

lá acerto remo exatamente o contrário

24:36

dentro do parlamento a esquerda é contra

24:39

isso a esquisito que eles terminar ainda

24:41

tá mandando regulamentando o artigo 231

24:44

da condição então sabemos dos problemas

24:47

tá certo

24:49

a e vão tocar o barco lamento gostaria

24:52

de fazer muita coisa muito mais pelo

24:54

brasil mas tem um problema eu tô há seis

24:55

meses as suas seis meses com o projeto

24:58

de lei da câmara para que a validade da

25:00

carteira de motorista faz de cinco para

25:01

dez anos e não vai para frente projeto

25:03

eu tô também as seis meses com o projeto

Transcript 14 - 05/03/20

Source: Facebook.com

11:43
candidato a nada né o governo defende
11:46
vamos tratar do linhão de tucuruí
11:48
operação acolhida reservas indígenas
11:52
galeria reservas de garimpo em terras
11:55
indígenas entre outras coisas essa
11:56
intenção de nós tratarmos com esse
11:58
pressionar os deputados federais
11:59
senadores governadores estão convidados
12:01
mas que não vai abrir a palavra porque
12:03
na verdade vai ser uma hora e meia vai
12:05
ser 50 minutos onde estão indo os meus
12:07
de alguns ministros ainda comigo a expor
12:09
para a população e para todo mundo o que
12:12
nós vamos fazer um tocante a isso então
12:13
e convida-os para metais as autoridades
12:16
locais mais por favor não posso dar
12:18
palavra senão vocês vão falar e não vão
12:21
poder falar nada que não teremos tempo
12:22
para falar vendo tempo fala mas
12:24
difícilmente haverá esse tempo eu

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12:26
agradeço antecipadamente aí ops
12:29
e o denilson que tá organizando esse
12:31
esse encontro nosso online na boa vista
12:36
e detalhe não tem nada de colher
12:37
assinatura de ficha não existe isso tá
12:39
certo esse encontro não vai ser político
12:42
vai ser o encontro de prestação de
12:44
contas o nosso trabalho e que nós
12:45
estamos fazendo para fazer que o ro lema
12:48
deixe de ser uma área isolada no brasil
12:51
por falta de energia que ele tem e tem
12:55
rios ali na reserva não eu não conheço o
12:57
vale do rio cotingo me falar não tenho
12:59
certeza que o vaso rio contigo teria
13:01
condições de fazer algumas hidrelétrica
13:03
ali e da fornecer energia elétrica por o
13:06
estado todo em região e o índio né a
13:08
comunidade indígena ganharia royce em
13:10
cima disso todo mundo daria feliz você
13:13
quer enganar quem não de maneira que o
13:14
senhor tá falando de miami pessoal a
13:17
nossa tilápia agora ele tá tão famosa

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13:20

que tá agora vai ser uma tilápia

13:22

americana lembrando que ainda não é fez

13:24

vamos acompanhar o presidente lá nos

13:27

estados unidos e vai ter um evento lá

13:28

Com

Appendix 3: Key words

Indígena/o(s) / Índio(a) – Portuguese for “indigenous”; the principal focus of this thesis

Demarcação – Portuguese for “demarcation”; process of the legal recognition of indigenous lands

Desmatamento – Portuguese for “deforestation”; a key issue related to the indigenous peoples of Brazil and the threats facing their lands

FUNAI - Fundação Nacional do Índio; Brazilian federal agency tasked with establishing and carrying out policies related to the indigenous peoples of Brazil

CIMI - Conselho Indigenista Missionário; produce annual reports on the threats and types of violence facing the indigenous peoples of Brazil

marco temporal – Portuguese for “time limit”; a key term in contemporary debates relating to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The marco temporal framework postulates that Indigenous peoples are only entitled to the lands they occupied on the date of the promulgation of the Brazilian Federal Constitution – i.e. October 5th, 1988

originário – another term that is present within many contemporary debates surrounding indigenous culture. The term originário relates to the understanding that the rights of the indigenous peoples of Brazil were established and defined prior to the creation of the modern nation State. I was personally challenged by my two professors to explore this term and the relevance it has in contemporary indigenous debates.

Ocupação – Portuguese for “occupation/invasion”; this term is very relevant to many of the issues explored in this thesis, particularly with regard to the ongoing presence of logging, mining and other extractive activities within indigenous lands

Integração – Portuguese for integration; an important word featured repeatedly within Jair Bolsonaro’s social media discourse. One of Bolsonaro’s main aims was to ‘integrate’ the indigenous peoples of Brazil into his own definitions of Brazilian society.

IBAMA – The Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources; a key federal agency and one that Bolsonaro sought to undermine in his social media discourse. IBAMA carries out inspections, undertakes actions linked to the preservation of the environment, undertakes federal environmental licensing and oversees the use of natural resources.

Retomadas – refers to the ‘taking back’ [of control] of indigenous lands

Caboclos – a contentious term that can have a variety of meanings; the term can be understood as a person of mixed Indigenous Brazilian and European ancestry; often used in a negative/demeaning manner

Incêndio – Portuguese for [forest] fire; important topic within the wider context of the Amazon rainforest and the destruction caused to indigenous lands by the wildfires

Amazonas – Geographic location; key term linked to the indigenous peoples of Brazil and the wider environmental debates in Brazilian society

Garimpo – Portuguese for wildcat mines; small-scale mining; often illegal and carried out within indigenous lands

Mineração – Portuguese for “mining”; a key issue for indigenous lands; see also ‘garimpo’; Bolsonaro has repeatedly called for the opening up of indigenous lands for mining and other economic activities