

Changing the Past to Build the Future
History Education in post-Mao China

Alisa Jones

Submitted in accordance with the regulations required for the degree of PhD

University of Leeds, Department of East Asian Studies

January 2007

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Department of East Asian Studies and the University of Leeds for being extraordinarily patient and enabling me to complete this study despite many delays. Special thanks are due in this regard to Professor Delia Davin and to Trevor Gorringe. I would also like to express my gratitude to the many history education professionals in China without whom this research would not have been possible: Wang Hongzhi, Ma Zhibin, Chen Qi and Bai Jie at the People's Education Press for helping me with materials and contacts; Yu Youxi, Ye Xiaobing and Zhao Yafu of Capital Normal University for sharing ideas and introducing me to current pedagogical research; Wang Duoquan (Shanghai), Li Zhiyong (Shanghai), Gong Qizhu (Sichuan), Ye Zhengshu (Guangdong) and Zhou Baiming (Zhejiang) for assistance with local curricula and teaching materials; Ma Huiying (Beijing) and Kong Fangang (Shanghai) for organising classroom observations; Zhang Jing (Beijing) for being an endless source of useful information, help and encouragement; and finally, all the teachers and students whose classes I observed and who discussed their thoughts and feelings with me.

Abstract

This study is concerned principally with the ways in which the school subject of History has developed over the past quarter century in the People's Republic of China. One of the key objectives of this research has been simply to redress previous neglect of a subject that seems, if public opinion is indicative of a topic's importance, to have some bearing on the ways in which states and societies try to shape young minds, values and identities, and thereby steer the course of future political, social and economic development. It accordingly traces the evolution of the History subject both through time and, more importantly, through the process of production, transmission and consumption, from central government organs, such as the Ministry of Education, down to the individual school History classroom. Specifically, it analyses various factors that have influenced thinking about the purposes and practice of history education, and how these have been reflected in the main vehicles for transmitting narratives of the past: national and local curricula, History textbooks and school lessons. Particular attention is paid throughout to the impact of the reform and opening policy on history education, highlighting tensions arising from often conflicting political and pedagogical objectives and evaluating the extent to which theoretical goals are attained in practice. The study argues that History is not simply an instrument of ideological control wielded by a totalitarian government seeking to sustain its own hegemony, but is a process in which many stakeholders participate, and in which learning outcomes cannot be guaranteed to correspond precisely to teaching objectives. Securing the future through controlling the past – even in an authoritarian society - is thus, the study concludes, considerably more complex and challenging than it might superficially appear.

Abbreviations of frequently cited works

- CE or CES *Chinese Education/Chinese Education and Society* (a journal of translations from Chinese sources. The journal changed its name to include ‘society’ in 1993)
- COCP *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: Curriculum (Teaching) Plans).
- COH *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: lishi juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: History).
- CSH *Chinese Studies in History* (journal of translations from Chinese sources)
- GMRB *Guangming ribao*
- HCS *Quanrizhi yiwu jiaoyu lishi kecheng biao zhun (shiyangao)* (Full-time compulsory education: History Curriculum Standards (trial edition)).
- JDC *Jiaoyu da cidian* (The Dictionary of Education)
- JYFQS *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa quanshu* (An Encyclopaedia of PRC Education Law).
- JYSD *Zhongguo jiaoyu shidian* (A Compendium of Events in Chinese Education)
- KJJ *Kecheng, jiaocai, jiaofa* (Curriculum, Teaching Materials and Teaching Methods)
- LSJX *Lishi jiaoxue* (History Education)
- LJW *Lishi jiaoxue wenti* (Issues in History Education)
- LSYJ *Lishi yanjiu* (Historical Research)
- RMRB *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily)
- SWDX *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (online edition)
- SWMZ *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*
- ZJB *Zhongguo jiaoyubao* (China Education Daily)
- ZQB *Zhongguo qingnianbao* (China Youth Daily)
- ZLJ *Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue* (Secondary School History Education)
- ZXLS *Zhongxue lishi: jiaoyu cankao* (History Teaching in Middle Schools: education reference (sic))

Other Frequently Used Abbreviations

- BEEd Basic Education Department
- ERU Education research unit
- MOE Ministry of Education (1905-1985, 1998-present)
- NCCT Basic Education Centre for Curriculum and Teaching Materials Development
- PEP People’s Education Press
- PMAR Province-self-governing municipality-autonomous region
- SEdC State Education Commission (1985-1998)
- SSEE Senior secondary entrance examination
- TMIC Teaching Materials Inspection and Approval Committee
- UEE University entrance examination

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements		ii.
Abstract		iii.
Abbreviations		iv.
Introduction	The Importance of History	1
PART ONE	The Making of the History Curriculum	
Chapter 1.	The Historical Context	39
Chapter 2.	The Political and Intellectual Context	69
Chapter 3.	The Institutional and Administrative Context	96
PART TWO	The Intended Curriculum	
Chapter 4.	History Teaching Outlines, 1978-2000	126
Chapter 5.	Local Curricula: Shanghai, Zhejiang , Beijing	154
PART THREE	The Implemented Curriculum	
Chapter 6.	Textbooks	173
Chapter 7.	Teaching and Learning History	219
Conclusion	Present Projects, Future Prospects	255
Bibliography		265
Appendix	PRC Textbooks	284

Introduction

The Importance of History

‘Who controls the past... controls the future; who controls the present controls the past’ is the Party mantra intoned and implemented with terrifying psychological brutality in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-four*.¹ Manipulating the past to legitimise the present and produce docile citizens who will adhere to prescribed social and ethical norms and sustain the polity into the future has been a common practice of totalitarian regimes depicted in fictional dystopias. In these brave new worlds, the past is to be commemorated principally as the ‘bad old days’, while the present is the fruit of ‘liberation’, the future a time when ‘things can only get better’. Officially authorised ‘traditions’, ‘culture’ and ‘narratives’ of the past which usefully serve present and future purposes, therefore, may be preserved; the rest must be consigned to the scrap heap of ‘incorrect’ thinking and customs, and quickly forgotten. Commemorating the discarded past and, more dangerously, invoking it to support the development of individual or collective identities outside state-decreed parameters is heresy, and ‘thought criminals’ must recant publicly and often submit to ‘re-education’ in the prevailing orthodoxy.

It is not, of course, only in fictional societies that the past is carefully edited or even completely rewritten to justify present political and social circumstances, limn an idyllic future, inculcate desirable values and legitimating ideologies, or foster loyalty to the state and support for its causes. Such uses of history have been particularly blatant in totalitarian societies, although it should not be forgotten that history has also been used in liberal democracies to further ideological goals; liberalism and democracy are, after all, current ideologies, not eternal verities. Totalitarian regimes, however, (especially those which derive their symbolic legitimacy from religious or utopian political ideologies) generally deploy a wider range of state resources in their efforts to regulate public commemoration and transmission of the past. This usually involves an amalgam of exhortatory and coercive measures: on the one hand, popularisation of ‘official’ versions of history; on the other, suppression of ‘unofficial’ or ‘counter-histories’ and legal/penal action against dissenting voices. The school subject of History, with its large, young and impressionable, and, above all, captive audience of citizens-in-the-making, is widely

¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-four*, p.34.

regarded as among the most powerful weapons in the exhortatory arsenal, presumably based on the assumption that inculcating official history at the earliest possible age will ultimately ensure homogeneity of historical memory in private as well as public spheres. Thus, while the state-supervised media and cultural arenas may provide valuable reinforcement of ‘correct’ historical viewpoints, universalising the fundamental ‘truths’ of official history and its core moral-ideological message is largely attempted through nationally standardised curricula, textbooks and examinations, teacher training and assessment mechanisms, and pedagogies which encourage acceptance of received ‘facts’ and interpretations.

It is often thought that in the People’s Republic of China ‘the Orwellian nightmare has already visited,’² with a malevolent Big Brother Communist Party and Ministry of Records-style propaganda apparatus tightly controlling the present and future through instilling in hapless masses state-authorized accounts of the past, resisted only sporadically and in vain by a handful of brave and selfless dissident intellectuals and oppressed minority peoples. Using or changing the past to serve present and future purposes, however, has been far from a novel brainwashing strategy devised by scheming Communists, and, in fact, has a pedigree as ancient as the Chinese state itself. From Qin destruction of the histories of all states other than its own, to the seventh-century establishment of a state History Bureau (*shiguan*) charged with producing official dynastic histories (*zhengshi*) and recording the present for posterity, to Qing purges of writers and historians suspected of calumniating the Manchu regime through historical allegory, China’s rulers and their acolytes have consistently employed both exhortatory and coercive mechanisms to ensure the primacy of the official version of the past. Education has long been an integral component of exhortatory efforts to circumscribe public historical discourse, and since the inception of a mass public education system in the early twentieth century, the ability of the state to propagate official accounts of the past among its citizens has rapidly increased. Under Communist rule, in particular, educational provision has dramatically expanded, and official histories disseminated through the centrally prescribed school curriculum have received unprecedented levels of reinforcement from state supervision of academia, the media and other forms of cultural (re)production. Increasingly strenuous efforts have also been made to create collective memories that can unite diverse communities to serve allegedly ‘national’

² Avery, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Zhang, *Half of Man is Woman*, p.xi

interests, and the state has thus largely appropriated local history and the histories of formerly subaltern groups (peasants, urban labourers, ethnic minorities), subsuming under the ‘national’ umbrella the foundations on which competing national or sub-national identities might be constructed or sustained. At the same time, although the heterodoxy proscribed under imperial law as ‘un-Confucian’ (*bujing*) or ‘against the natural order’ (*wudao*) has merely been re-branded in the PRC as ‘counter-revolutionary’ or ‘unpatriotic’, mechanisms for suppressing beliefs and activities that threaten state authority have become more sophisticated. To this extent, then, the ‘Orwellian nightmare’ conception of the PRC is not entirely baseless.

Yet, even during the most ideologically repressive periods, attempts to monopolise and standardise the past, and use it to justify the present and construct the future according to particular visions have frequently been resisted. Sometimes resistance has come from rival factions within the regime itself that seek to secure their own position and power, or to follow alternative paths to the future; sometimes from individuals and communities that feel official history neglects, denies or misrepresents crucial aspects of the past, or that the present policies and future prospects the official history aims to legitimise have little to offer. Needless to say, the authorities’ first response to resistance has frequently been harsh repression. Such repression, however, has usually been temporary; as all good students of Chinese history know - and China’s leaders almost invariably believe they are good students – repression has historically bred further resistance, leading eventually to dynastic downfall. Official clamp-downs, therefore, have often been followed shortly afterwards by leadership reshuffles and policy reforms, which in turn have required revision of the past to validate the new present and future goals. This has entailed not only changing the narratives constructed to represent the ‘correct’ course of history so that it leads smoothly and inevitably to the ‘correct’ policies of the present, but also demonstrating (however superficially) that the erroneous ways and thinking of the past have been reformed or abandoned, and the correct ones preserved.

The post-Cultural Revolution repudiation of the revolutionary and isolationist path to modernity, the adoption of the ‘reform and opening’ policy and the quest for restoration of national greatness have required precisely this kind of revision of ‘old thinking’ and old historical narratives. History education for school children has naturally been crucial to this undertaking, and not only have the goals and content of the History subject been repeatedly modified to harmonise with the changing nuances

of current ideological, political and economic imperatives, but the ways in which History has traditionally been taught and learnt have also been targeted for reform. This study asks how and why the school subject of History has (and has not) been adapted to accommodate diverse and sometimes conflicting present and future projects, and considers the impact of recent reforms on the Party-state's ability to ensure that historical orthodoxy is not distorted in the process of transmission from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to school classrooms. Although the scope of this project does not permit a thorough analysis of all the variables involved in the formation and expression of collective historical memories and identities, the final chapters advance some tentative conclusions concerning the relative influence of school History on definitions of 'the nation' and 'being Chinese', and assess the potential ramifications thereof for the Party-state's efforts to steer the course of the future.

Before embarking on this journey, however, it is worth discussing some of the general matters related to the purpose and practice of school History from various historical, political and cultural perspectives so as to provide the broader setting in which History education in China may be examined and evaluated. This is partly to avoid the cultural relativist pitfall of analysing the Chinese case in splendid isolation and ascribing the particular characteristics of History education in the PRC to an ineffable national-cultural 'essence' rather than to the changing ideas, processes and people that shape it. It is also, as the latter sections of this chapter will show, because the secondary literature on History education in China is minimal and offers no theoretical model upon which to build. Additionally, China's 'opening' in the post-Mao era has allowed History education professionals unprecedented access to international education research, upon which they have increasingly drawn to legitimise reforms and enhance their own practices.

The remainder of the chapter summarises the sources and methodologies used, focusing on issues and problems arising both from the nature of the topic and from the specific Chinese context. Finally, it outlines the structural parameters within which the findings of the present study are organised.

I. Global Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

The Purpose of History Education

Moral and Patriotic Exhortation

In recent years, there has been much research on the subject of ‘nationalism’ in its various ethnic, cultural and political incarnations, and on the related questions of how communal identities are formed.³ Perhaps most influential has been the work of scholars such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, who emphasise the ‘invented, ‘imagined’ or ‘constructed’ nature of the nation and the ways in which histories, traditions and rituals have been adapted or made anew to create attachment, identification and loyalty to the nation transcending that felt for other communal entities.⁴ They also note the role of language standardisation, print media, increased literacy and the expansion of educational provision as resources deployed (usually by the state) to enable hitherto isolated or autonomous communities to ‘think the nation.’ Furthermore, Anderson claims, the ‘blueprint’ for the nation-building model was exported from early nation-states to aspiring ones, engendering a universally similar (if not identical) pattern of construction, and subsequently the emergence of a global order in which only the nation-state was recognised as a legitimate and sovereign political unit.⁵ The literature on nationalism has since proliferated and become increasingly complex, incorporating the ideas both of postmodernists, such as Bhabha, Bruner and White who have highlighted the ways in which ‘narrative’ shapes past and present realities and identities, and of those, such as Smith and Connor, who have investigated racial and ethnic definitions of the nation.⁶ While this breadth of research supports views of ‘nationness’ ranging from the primordialist to the strictly constructivist, most historians reject cultural essentialism (in principle at least) in favour of evolutionary explanations of the ‘continuity and change’ variety. Recent case studies of nationalism and identity development in individual societies, therefore, have basically followed some version of the ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ nation thesis, emphasising how rituals and symbols are created or manipulated to represent, unify

³ Much of this work on collective identities proceeds from the ideas of Halbwachs outlined in *Collective Memory*. For a more recent elaboration of this thesis, see Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*.

⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Hobsbawm ‘Mass-producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914’.

⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. Duara notes, however, that the same resources have also allowed other groups to ‘imagine communities’ in opposition to the nation-state (*Rescuing History from the Nation*).

⁶ Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*; Bruner, ‘The Narrative Construction of Reality’; White, *Metahistory*; Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*; Connor, *Ethnonationalism*.

and bound the nation.⁷ The roles played by historical narratives and formal education are also commonly featured, and the school subject of History in particular is noted for its use in ‘mass-producing traditions,’ transmitting ‘national’ culture, and inculcating civic virtue, a sense of patriotic duty and especially the faith that *pro patria mori* is both *dulce* and *decorum*.⁸ Most importantly, History is thought to instil the message that ‘We’ are a primordial national people with sacred heritage and inviolable territory.

If allusions to history education as an element of the successful national consciousness-raising process are common, however, studies supported by more than a few cursory references to government proclamations and occasional quotes from historians, educators and textbooks of the day are rare except in works dealing specifically with education history.⁹ This is clearly, in part, because studies of nationalism must necessarily consider many factors other than the minutiae of school History, but it is also perhaps a product of constructivist models of national identity formation (implicit in the very term ‘nation-building’). That schooling in general and History in particular were (or still are) effectively used by Machiavellian states or elites to fashion hapless masses into dutiful national citizens thus tends to be assumed rather than demonstrated; even in histories of education, conclusions about elite instrumentalism are generally inferred from government macro-policy statements rather than from detailed analyses of school curricula, textbooks or education journals.¹⁰ This is not, of course, to deny that social and moral engineering and/or the reinforcement of authority have been the *intention* of many states and various power elites. La Chatolais’ 1763 ‘*Essai d’éducation nationale*’, for example, urged suppression of Jesuit schools because they were ‘promoting loyalty to Rome’ rather than to France; the 1806 Faucroy ‘*Rapport*’ called for teaching to have ‘one single

⁷ Cohen reminds us that a ‘boundary’ defining the limits of a nation (or any other community) not only ‘from without symbolises the public face of community’ but also ‘from within encloses difference’ (*The Symbolic Construction of Community*, p74). Duara makes a related point in challenging the hegemony of the ‘nation-space’ as the subject of history, arguing that not only may a nation contain many sub-national communities, but that the ‘nation-views’ of these communities ‘are not overridden by the nation, but actually define or constitute it’ (*Rescuing History from the Nation*, p10).

⁸ Hobsbawm ‘Mass-producing Traditions; Wilfrid Owen, ‘Dulce et decorum est’, c.1917. On dying for one’s country see especially Tamir, ‘Pro Patria Mori: Death and the State’.

⁹ For a comparative historical study of the relationship between education and the state, see Green, *Education and State Formation: The Rise of Education Systems in England, France and the USA* and ‘Education and State Formation in Europe and Asia’.

¹⁰ Notable exceptions include Powell, ‘Perceptions of the South Asian Past: Ideology, Nationalism and School Textbooks’; Lee, *Modern Education, Textbooks and the Image of the Nation*; Chancellor, *History for their Masters*; FitzGerald, *America Revised*; Bailey, *Reform the People*; Peake, *Education and Nationalism in Modern China*.

aim, that of forming characters virtuous from religious principle, useful to the State by their abilities and knowledge, attached to the government and devoted to its august leader in love and duty.’¹¹ Likewise, a proclamation issued by Reza Shah in 1921 stated that ‘It is essential for the character, the spiritual foundations and the feelings of our young people to be developed by means of a national-patriotic education so that our sons [will be] willing to sacrifice their lives for the motherland.’¹² History was to play a central role in this type of patriotic and moral education; as the nineteenth-century French ‘school-historian,’ Lavissee, wrote,

If the schoolboy does not carry away with him the living memory of our national glories, if he does not know that our ancestors have fought on countless battlefields for noble causes, if he has not learned how much blood ... it has taken to make the unity of our fatherland, the teacher will have wasted his time.¹³

Similarly, the American historian, W.T. Laprade, maintained that History should be the ‘inculcation of a species of patriotic religion,’¹⁴ and the British Board of Education in 1905 asserted that ‘no-one would dispute that our scholars should have examples put before them, whether for imitation or the reverse, of the great men and women that have lived in the past.’¹⁵

Two important qualifications of the ‘top-down’ instrumentalist paradigm should, however, be made, particularly as regards state-directed efforts to create or reinforce nationalist sentiment. First, during the time period with which most studies of nationalism are chiefly concerned (the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), few states exercised the kind of control over teacher training, curricula and textbooks characteristic of many later education systems. Even in highly authoritarian states such as Prussia, the USSR and Japan it was some years after the establishment of centralised bureaucracy that education was brought fully under government control and nationally standardised curricula and textbooks were adopted. How effectively education could be harnessed to serve state-centred nation-building programmes, let alone guarantee the desired outcomes, is therefore debatable. Second, not everyone believed education should inculcate uncritical patriotism, morality or obedience, but rather saw it as a means of delivering liberty, enlightenment and equality, and nurturing the individual mind, body and spirit. These goals were, it must be said, typically promoted by elites who believed that popular enlightenment and liberation

¹¹ Cit. in Hall, *Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France*, p21.

¹² Cit. in Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, pp94-95.

¹³ Cit. in Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past*, p64.

¹⁴ Cit. in Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p246.

from ignorance, superstition or ecclesiastical sway would enable intellectual, technological and social ‘modernisation’, thereby fortifying the nation against foreign competition or colonisation. Such ‘nationalist’ efforts were often, nonetheless, broadly anti-hegemonic/pro-democratic, and emerged from civic movements that sought to limit state power to the representation (rather than dominion) of society. For society to be empowered to guarantee such representation, in turn, required all (or at least most) individuals to understand the values, rights and duties of modern citizenship, a process which was to be effected through universal education. The focus on the schooling of the individual, however, was not only about the utilitarian manufacture of the necessary components to produce civil society; following developments in the new fields of sociology and psychology, there was also increasing concern among educators for the healthy mental, emotional and physical development of the child.¹⁶

Yet, in all but the most detailed studies of education history, these other objectives are typically ignored. Illustrating his claim that all school History has been essentially concerned with promoting ‘national fealty,’ Lowenthal, for example, cites criticisms made by the American Legion of 1920s textbooks for ‘placing before immature pupils the blunders, foibles, and frailties of prominent heroes and patriots.’¹⁷ But he fails to mention the other side of the coin; someone must have written those textbooks either to present a more ‘balanced’ account, or as counter-history challenging existing verdicts on said heroes and patriots. If it is remembered that professional historians (who were, in most industrialised societies, largely responsible for textbook production and teacher training until well into the twentieth century) were then pursuing ‘that noble dream’ of objectivity and attempting to discover an unadulterated past ‘exactly as it was’, it seems likely that the textbooks attacked by the American Legion were written in just such a spirit. Indeed, a US

¹⁵ From Sylvester, ‘Change and Continuity in History Teaching’ cit. in Vickers, *History as a School Subject in Hong Kong 1960s-2000*, p194.

¹⁶ Hall (*Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France*) argues that the ‘enlightenment’ view was prevalent among French revolutionaries, but was sidelined by the Napoleonic regime in favour of a state-serving education. The revolutionaries’ views, however, remained popular in Europe and America, and resonated in other parts of the world, such as Egypt and Iran, where education and modernisation were heavily promoted as a means of saving the nation from colonisation (Soliman, ‘Education in Egypt’; Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*). Likewise, in Meiji Japan, there was an early enthusiasm for child-centred ‘developmental education’, modelled on the latest Western pedagogical theories, which it was hoped would bring ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (*bunmei kaika*) to the populace and bring Japan into the modern age and parity with its European and American aggressors. (Lincicome, *Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform in Meiji Japan*).

¹⁷ From Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me*, cit. in Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past*, p132.

education conference held as early as 1892 witnessed many historians attempting to promote the new creed of objectivity in school History teaching.¹⁸ Similarly, in Meiji Japan, the Rankean views of professional historians and the promotion of child-centred ‘developmental education’ (*kaihatsu-shugi*) oriented to knowledge discovery and the maximisation of individual potential led many History curriculum developers and educators to reject Confucian moralising and traditional pedagogies involving the spoon-feeding (*chūnyū*) of correct viewpoints, and to attempt instead to focus on presenting the ‘facts’.¹⁹

Such efforts to promote objectivity in school History, however, were soon suppressed. In Japan, the developmental education project and the curriculum and textbook pluralism of the early Meiji period were swept aside as education was centralised, Confucian values were overtly restored to the curriculum and ‘emperor worship and love for the nation’ (*sonnō aikoku*) were promoted.²⁰ Thus, while professional historians could continue to study the facts of ‘pure history’ (*junshō shigaku*), schools, it was declared, should teach ‘applied history’ (*ōyō shigaku*), serving the needs of the state and society and perpetuating the ‘national polity’ (*kokutai*) and ‘national essence’ (*kokusui*) through nurturing obedient subjects (*komin*) and useful citizens (*kokumin*).²¹ History was effectively demoted in status and explicitly required to supplement the principles taught in Moral Education (*shushin*) with concrete examples.²² Likewise, in the USA, President Woodrow Wilson counselled historians against the promotion of objectivity and historical thinking skills in school History as young minds, he alleged, would be easily confused by dealing with doubt, criticism and evidence. In the interests of school pupils and for the future of the country, he insisted, it would be far better if History provided ‘moral and patriotic exhortation.’²³

With the widespread transition from private education for elites to compulsory public schooling for ‘the masses’, government administrative and financial authority over education increased. In most cases this meant that the moral and patriotic imperative of education was strengthened, not only through History and other

¹⁸ Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p71.

¹⁹ Lincicome, *Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform*; Mehl, *History and the State in Nineteenth Century Japan*, p54.

²⁰ On the restoration of Confucianism to the curriculum see the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (SJT.2, pp139-140).

²¹ Mehl, *History and the State*, p145.

²² Lincicome, *Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform*. For an analysis of Moral Education content, see Yamashita, ‘Confucianism and the Japanese State’.

humanities subjects, but also through the addition of Civics courses to many school curricula. In Prussia and Japan, for example, loyalty to the state and obedience to the ruler were placed centre-stage: discipline and conformity were emphasised, raising the national flag and singing the national anthem were incorporated into the school routine, and students underwent regular military training. A triumphalist history that demonstrated the purity and superiority of the 'national people' (*volksgemeinschaft, minzoku*) over all others was taught, and the state and the Kaiser/emperor were depicted as the embodiment of the people. While the state took a more *laissez-faire* approach in other societies with rapidly expanding education systems (such as Britain and the USA) it did not mean that those responsible for History curricula did not promote a triumphalist account of the national past. Indeed, flush with the success of colonial conquest, and supported by the social Darwinist pseudo-science of race espoused by the likes of Herbert Spencer and Lewis Morgan, commercial History textbook writers in many 'democratic' societies were often just as assiduous in lauding their countries' national and racial greatness as their counterparts employed by authoritarian states.

For reasons discussed in more detail below and in subsequent chapters, it is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain exactly how far school History influences national identity formation. The extent to which the nationalist and, more often than not, racist orientation of school History in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries contributed to widespread jingoism, the outbreak of World War I, the rise of European fascism and Japanese expansionism and the genocide attendant upon them is, therefore, questionable; certainly, this influence cannot be evaluated without reference to other vehicles for public exhortation, such as the mass media, assorted popular cultural activities and political campaigns. Clearly, however, it was widely believed by the end of World War II that education had been an important factor in bringing about and determining the outcome of global war. For the victors, their social and political systems and values were vindicated and national self-image reaffirmed. There was no pressing need, therefore, to reform the triumphalist national narrative promoted through the school curriculum. It was another matter, however, for twice-defeated Germany and Japan, and under Allied supervision, school textbooks

²³ Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p71.

were dramatically revised to repudiate the immediate past and ensure that future generations did not repeat the errors of their forefathers.²⁴

Under the newly established communist regimes in China, North Korea, Latin America and Eastern Europe, and in the postcolonial states which regained independence or formed following the demise of empires, meanwhile, History curricula and textbooks were also substantially overhauled as national histories were invented or re-imagined to create or strengthen national sentiment, to legitimise new political or social systems, and to unify the people in the drive for modernisation. In many of these societies, the new histories highlighted the struggle for independence from recent colonial oppression, tying it to a broader narrative of the people's resistance to tyranny and love of liberty, while in others ethno-cultural or religious ties were invoked as the basis for national unity.²⁵ In the communist states, history was restructured according to the historical materialist model of development from primitive to slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist society, with a strong focus on class unity and conflict as the basis for social cohesion and national purpose. Additionally, internationalism was - in theory at least - advocated in place of racial and cultural nationalisms. As we shall see in the case of China, as in other aspiring communist states, the internationalist ethos of utopian socialism proved short-lived, and History texts were soon openly promoting more traditional ethno-nationalist and moral-ideological concerns.

Skill-training and Critical Citizenship

History in most societies may have remained chiefly oriented to moral and patriotic exhortation for some time after 1945, but from the 1960s onwards, this gradually began to change as calls from educators for the teaching of 'transferable skills' in History gained momentum. 'New history', as it was originally known, sought principally to reject the positivist notion of history as a fixed body of facts waiting to be discovered or learnt, and to convey the idea that historians create history through selecting, analysing and interpreting data. Children should, therefore, practise the process of historical investigation, and instead of memorising 'acts and facts', should

²⁴ For an in-depth discussion of textbook revisions in the aftermath of WWII, see Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*.

²⁵ Ferro, *The Uses and Abuses of History*, provides a useful overview of post-war developments in History education in numerous societies. For more in-depth analyses of the various bases on which national histories for school children were constructed in particular postcolonial societies see, *inter alia*, Goh and Gopinathan, 'History Education and the Construction of National Identity in Singapore,

learn to examine ‘evidence’ and generate hypotheses and interpretations.²⁶ Despite some opposition from those of a Piagetian bent, who believed that children and young adolescents would not yet have attained a sufficient level of cognitive development to enable them to handle the complexity of evidence,²⁷ new history was widely accepted in Britain and the US by the 1970s, and in many other education systems thereafter.

While the initial promotion of skills may appear to have been ‘value-free’, it was, in fact, underpinned by various socio-political and ideological as well as pedagogical concerns. One important reason was the long declining status of History, since it was seen as increasingly meaningless, being merely about dead people and bygone events and, therefore, apparently irrelevant to modern life. Indeed, in many school systems History was downgraded to a component of the supposedly more ‘happening’ interdisciplinary subject of Social Studies. Viewed from this perspective, emphasising general, transferable skills was an attempt to inject contemporary ‘relevance’ into History and secure its place (and the place of History education professionals) in the curriculum.²⁸ At the same time, however, there appears to have been genuine belief that historical thinking skills would not only enhance students’ future ability to obtain lucrative employment, but would also enable them to evaluate more critically the relative merits of assorted political platforms and commercial spiels they would encounter outside the school. History education, in short, could prepare them to assume the rights and duties of adult citizenship and enable them to participate actively in democratic processes, since in this view ‘questioning and debating “received truth”..... is where citizenship really develops, not from the content of the national story passed down.’²⁹

Along with the emphasis on skills and democracy, traditional forms of moral and patriotic exhortation were increasingly resisted, especially in much of Europe where the two World Wars, the loss of empires, large-scale immigration from former colonies and European integration contributed to a rethinking of the meaning of ‘the nation’ and ‘citizenship’. Indeed, even the terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘morality’ are today often avoided by educationalists (if not politicians), for ‘patriotism’ is still associated with Hitler and holocaust, our shameful pasts of imperialist expansionism, and present

1945-2000’; Kazi, *Ethnicity and Education in Nation-building: The Case of Pakistan*; Wilson, Ford and Jones, ‘The History Text: Framing Ethno-cultural and Civic Nationalism in the Divided Koreas’.

²⁶ In Britain this took shape under the auspices of the Schools Council History Project.

²⁷ Husbands, *What is History Teaching?*, pp15-16.

²⁸ On competition for resources and status as a determining factor in curriculum development see Goodson, *The Making of Curriculum*.

instances of jingoism and racial intolerance; ‘morality’, meanwhile, is a ‘nanny-state’ imposing its values on society in an attempt to create obedient citizens, mindful of their proper social place and disinclined to challenge authority. History, like the rest of the school curriculum so this argument goes, has been complicit in advancing the cultural and ideological hegemony of the ruling classes and reproducing social inequalities for too long.³⁰ Subaltern voices should be heard, and tolerance, pluralism and multi-cultural identities, awareness and empathy should be nurtured. Opposing this reorientation, other historians and educationalists have bemoaned reforms as overweening political correctness, predicting that such goals will undermine national unity and leave students with no sense of identity, pride or loyalty to their country of citizenship.³¹ Somewhat ironically, both sides have criticised their opponents for violating the principles of impartial historical inquiry and distorting history to suit ideological purposes, while remaining blissfully unaware of their own blatant ideological leanings.³²

Unawareness of bias is precisely what those influenced by post-modern critiques have attacked, claiming that all history is inescapably freighted with values, that all ‘truths’ are relative, and that students should be taught to recognise that they are being confronted with ‘discourses’ or ‘texts’ and their sub-textual messages, not ‘facts’ or neutral judgements.³³ While post-modernist purists or hard-liners - whom Lowenthal bitingly calls the ‘solipsist fringe’³⁴ - argue that there is no basis at all for distinguishing fact from fiction, thereby apparently negating the value of historical study altogether, most post-modernist historians and educationalists see relativism in practice as a tool with which to heighten awareness of bias, and tend towards the democratic pluralist model. Whether nationalist, internationalist, liberal, conservative or post-modern, however, all approaches should be regarded as variations on a theme of civic exhortation. Which approach is adopted and what is taught merely reflect the

²⁹ Masalski, ‘Teaching Democracy, Teaching War’, p262.

³⁰ On the role of the school in perpetuating domination of one class or group over others, see for example, Althusser ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’; Giroux, *Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling*; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*; Dale et al, *Schooling and Capitalism*; Apple and Christian-Smith *The Politics of the Textbook*; Macedo, *What Americans are not Allowed to Know*.

³¹ Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America*; Hirsch, *Cultural Literacy*; see also debates over the National Curriculum in the British press c.1988, especially comments made by then-Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Baker.

³² Lowenthal on historians Arthur Schlesinger and Ronald Takaki, *Possessed by the Past*, p111.

³³ See, for example, Jenkins and Brickley, ‘Always Historicise: Unintended Opportunities in National Curriculum History’.

³⁴ Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past*, p118.

kind of society those who make and implement the curriculum wish to represent, reject or create.

How far such debates over the status of historical knowledge have permeated thinking about History education beyond the mainly North American-European-Antipodean academic axis is questionable, although proponents of ‘cultural imperialism’ and ‘globalisation’ theories have argued that ideas developed in ‘the West’ are invariably exported to everyone else as an instrument of continued domination in the post-colonial world.³⁵ What seems certain, however, is that, regardless of which theories of history are influential, training in transferable skills and encouragement of ‘creativity’ and ‘individuality’ have become mantras for education world-wide; in part, because such goals often appear at first glance culture- and value-free, but primarily because they are thought to have underpinned the continued ‘dynamism’ of ‘the West’.³⁶ As shown below and in subsequent chapters, however, pedagogical objectives such as ‘independent’ and ‘critical’ thinking skills may sit uncomfortably with equally if not more important aims of promoting patriotism and ‘correct historical viewpoints’.

The Practice of History Education

Content

Differing visions of History’s purposes are typically manifested in practice in how much centralised state control is exercised over syllabi, teacher training and textbooks, what topics are or are not taught, and what types of pedagogies and assessment methods are adopted. Whether History is used to promote patriotism, liberalism, inter-cultural understanding and tolerance, moral codes and model behaviour is usually reflected, therefore, in the balance maintained between local, national and global, political, social and economic history, famous persons, a collective ‘national people’, ethnic groups, social classes and so forth, as well as in the extent to which students are required to imbibe and regurgitate information and/or ‘correct’ interpretations, or to form their own opinions. As discussed above, moral-patriotic exhortation has long been the dominant model of History education, and unsurprisingly this has typically resulted in a focus on national rather than global

³⁵ See for example works by Altbach, ‘Education and Neo-colonialism’, Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*; Meyer et al, *School Knowledge for the Masses*.

³⁶ In Singapore for example, the government instituted a programme to enhance Singaporean students’ ‘creativity’ as they were regarded (like students elsewhere in East Asia) as diligent but dull (Buruma,

history, with strong emphasis on nation-defining events, on 'national' culture, and on the deeds of the great, the good and the dastardly. This, it is thought, will teach children who 'we' are, how 'we' got here and possibly where 'we' might be going, and will provide moral exemplars for them to emulate or spurn *en route* to the future. What constitutes the nation, 'its' history and 'its' culture, and by extension the sense of 'we-ness' knowledge of 'our' history and culture is supposed to create, is rarely, however, as straightforward as it might appear, even in countries such as China, Ethiopia and Japan, which have existed mostly as unified states within much of their present land mass for more than a thousand years and have a relatively high degree of ethno-cultural homogeneity. Since defining the nation and which territories, languages, peoples and culture are 'national' is an extremely complex topic discussed extensively elsewhere,³⁷ I will not attempt to analyse those arguments here. Instead, I will briefly examine some examples of problems or contradictions in the national-history-for-patriotism model, each of which will be discussed in the Chinese context in later chapters, and which, I will argue, may subvert or limit the success of intended didactic purposes.

Perhaps the most ostensibly simple and most widely used definition of national history is that which has occurred within the borders of the present sovereign state. This is relatively unproblematic if it recognised that all or parts of the present state have previously been components of other states or empires, that some areas were once independent states (and may still wish to be) or that ancestors may have arrived in waves of conquest or migration. Typically, however, the nation is depicted as 'as a self-same ancient entity evolving into the collective subject of the modern nation-state.'³⁸ Thus, Chinese historians vaunt five-thousand unbroken years of glorious history, France is exalted as 'the oldest of the mature European nations,' while 'we in England have maintained the threads between past and present, [and therefore] we do not, like some younger states, have to go hunting for our own personalities.'³⁹ Specific events, innovations and cultural achievements may bring long-lasting national glory, but only antiquity and continuity confer national sacredness and greatness for eternity. At the same time, however, many states also seek to emphasise

Bad Elements, pp136-137). The irony of the rigidly authoritarian government running this project to enforce 'creativity' should not be missed.

³⁷ See texts by Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm cited in n2.

³⁸ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, p229.

³⁹ From Burke, 'French historians and their cultural identities' and Butterfield, *The Englishman and his History*, cit. in Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past*, p176, p186.

the newness of political and social programmes as progress or even radical departure from a less enlightened past. Creating a coherent national narrative that captures ancient essences, which are perpetuated changed-yet-unchanged through inexorable progress towards the telos of modernity, is not easy, yet this is precisely what many History syllabi and textbooks attempt to do.

One of the most common ways the national narrative is given coherence is through imagining a 'national people' that may have been 'divided' between other states or suppressed by alien conquerors at various times, but survived intact to realise the modern nation-state. Germany, Italy and Greece, for example, may be relatively new countries, but Germans, Italians and Greeks are portrayed as 'ancient peoples'. The histories of former states such as Saxony, Verona and Sparta are thus demoted to mere *local* components of national history, while famous individual Bavarians, Venetians and Athenians are appropriated as *national* icons and ancestors. The origins of supposedly 'ancient peoples', however, are rarely discussed, and are depicted as hazily primordial, buttressed in some instances by myths of divine or semi-divine ancestry. Where the dominant ethnic group is clearly not indigenous, and has overrun indigenous peoples or earlier arrivals, the History curriculum typically side-steps such issues: American history in many US schools begins with Columbus' 'discovery'; Taiwanese History textbooks downplay the role of immigrants from China in driving aboriginal peoples into the mountains (although the latest editions do try to include indigenous peoples in the national narrative); and in Britain, Celts have featured so little that a Conservative Party MP could recently remark that 'our *homogenous Anglo-Saxon society* has been seriously undermined by massive immigration,' warning that the 'British' are in danger of 'becoming a mongrel race'!⁴⁰

It is not, of course, only ethnic groups that may be partially or wholly erased from the national narrative. Women, lower social classes, certain religious congregations and other 'sub-national' communities may also be excluded, since national history is 'the big picture', and the big picture is almost always drawn by Great Men with the proper ethnic, social and religious credentials. Yet, even if re-imagining the past to narrate an 'already-always nation-space'⁴¹ and/or an 'already-always' national people is accepted with few reservations, much history is still omitted, for - time constraints aside - the entirety may disrupt the smooth (and often triumphalist) grand narrative of

⁴⁰ Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me; Renshi Taiwan: lishi bian*; remarks made by John Townend, MP for Yorkshire East, March and April 2001 (*italics mine*).

⁴¹ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, p28.

progress from ancient times to the present. It may also project an undesirable ancestry of the modern nation-state, and certain episodes may therefore be avoided as too painful, too shameful, too alien or simply too dull to inspire patriotic fervour in the young. This is not to say that school History is always ‘happy’ or that ‘our nation’ always ‘wins’; histories of suffering, as Renan observed, tend to be equally important in promoting national bonding,⁴² and are commonly emphasised to exhort children to strive and serve so that ‘the bad bits’ of history will never repeat themselves. To these assorted ends, Italy’s World War II history has been recast as a tale of victimisation at the hands of fascist oppressors and evil German Nazis.⁴³ In Pakistan, pre-Islamic history and anything that does not demonstrate a trajectory leading inevitably to the Pakistan Movement is ignored, while in India, Mughal contributions to Indian cultures have been downplayed, and in some BJP-commissioned textbooks, have even been attributed to Hindu ancestors.⁴⁴ British school syllabi since the end of empire, meanwhile, have neglected imperial history as ‘embarrassing’, and in the US few schools cover the Korean ‘police action’ and still fewer the Vietnam War because they are ‘controversial’.⁴⁵

Yet, as educationalists such as Hahn argue, it is difficult or controversial topics that are best suited to teaching critical thinking skills, and it is through learning how cultures and societies have developed through migration, trade and cultural interaction that children can best understand that history is about ‘the phenomenon of change over time,’ not unchanging essences.⁴⁶ On the other hand, applying critical thinking to controversial, or indeed uncontroversial, issues may undermine authorised national narratives, and is not, therefore, always encouraged even where, as in China, cultivating ‘historical thinking skills’ is an official curricular objective. Such discouragement of critical thinking or avoidance of difficult topics lends weight to the arguments of scholars who maintain that school History rarely if ever teaches the analytical discipline of history and its concomitant concept of change. Instead, they argue, it seeks to define and bind the nation through promoting ‘collective memories,’

⁴² Renan, ‘What is a nation?’ [1882] reprinted in Bhaba *Narrating the Nation*.

⁴³ Rory Carroll, ‘Italy’s Bloody Secret’, *The Guardian* (online) 25/06/2001.

⁴⁴ Powell, ‘Perceptions of the South Asian Past’; *The Guardian* (online) 26/06/2004

⁴⁵ Cave, ‘Teaching the history of empire in Japan and England’; Loewen, ‘The Vietnam War in High School American History’. See also Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me*.

⁴⁶ Hahn, ‘Controversial Issues in History Instruction’; Stearns, ‘Goals in History Teaching’, p281.

‘myths’ or ‘heritage,’ which emphasise essentialist and exclusive notions of ‘nationness’ and are ‘impervious to rationalistic scrutiny.’⁴⁷

In the study of world history, ‘rationalistic scrutiny’ and evaluation of change are less likely to conflict with the patriotic education goals so prevalent in national history, although they may disrupt attempts to prove theories of ‘History’ (in the teleological, Hegelian sense) or challenge hoary stereotypes of ‘national characteristics’. This is not to say that attitudes to world history are disinterested or that world history cannot be harnessed to serve moral-patriotic education goals. As countless scholars since Said have emphasised, we define our ‘selves’, both past and present, in relation to our ‘Others’,⁴⁸ and the very purpose of world history, therefore, may be to locate or create suitable Others against which one’s own nation may be usefully (and usually profitably) compared. Indeed, how world history is narrated may reveal as much about national self-image as it does about those societies, peoples and cultures it seeks to portray. That world history is fundamentally ‘other’ is frequently confirmed by clear demarcations from national history, although perhaps only in Hong Kong are there two entirely separate subjects of Chinese History and History, the latter largely excluding China, but controversially including Hong Kong.⁴⁹ Elsewhere, national and world history are a single school subject, but often taught as separate courses, so that in the USA, for example, many schools will teach a year of American history, followed by a year of Western Civilisation, which does not include America except where relevant to international events. Few international topics other than wars are covered in most History curricula, however, and world history, like national history, normally takes existing nation-states and their self-defined national peoples as a given, focusing on what are perceived to be major nation-defining or world-impacting events and accomplishments.

World history may also serve patriotic and moral education goals through providing comparisons with one’s own ‘superior’ national achievements or greater antiquity and longevity, although it may also exhort students to strive to surpass certain desirable qualities of Others and *their* national heroes. Similarly, the suffering of Others may be downplayed if it appears greater than ‘ours’ and especially if there

⁴⁷ Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*; Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past*; Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, p99.

⁴⁸ Said, *Orientalism*.

⁴⁹ Yeung, talk given at International Conference on History Education, Shanghai, Nov. 2001. Yeung noted that recent efforts to integrate them as a single school subject have been bitterly opposed,

is extant tension between ‘us’ and ‘them’ over past or present conflicts. Thus, when new Palestinian History textbooks were drafted in 2000, it was decided to exclude the Holocaust as it ‘has been exaggerated in order to present the Jews as victims of a great crime, to justify [the claim] that Palestine is necessary as a homeland for them, and to give them the right to demand compensation.’⁵⁰ Recent Taiwanese History and Social Studies textbooks, meanwhile, have reduced formerly extensive coverage of the anti-Japanese War (Mainland Chinese suffering), while emphasising the ‘2.28’ massacre (Mainland Chinese inflicting suffering on Taiwanese), as well as acknowledging some of the positive aspects of Taiwan’s history as a Japanese colony.⁵¹

While omissions and additions of data or revisions of interpretation catalysed by changing identity politics and other contemporary imperatives are widespread in syllabi and textbooks, they attract attention only when particular communities - usually ‘sub-national’ - perceive their history, identity and/or contribution to the national whole to have been neglected or misrepresented. Occasionally, however, History is controversial enough to incite international indignation. Unsurprisingly, the changes in recent Taiwanese textbooks mentioned above, and especially the move away from the KMT-imposed China-at-the-centre narrative, have been vituperatively condemned by officials, the media, historians and educationalists in the PRC for ‘distorting history,’ ‘promoting separatism’ and ‘equating Han Chinese with foreign invaders.’⁵² (The PRC take on Taiwanese history is discussed in later chapters). In 2002, the German ambassador to the UK blamed an over-emphasis on Nazism in school History courses for racist attacks on two German teenagers, and called for curriculum revision to emphasise post-Third Reich democracy ‘to convey to young people that the Germans have learned their lesson and that they have changed.’⁵³ Most notoriously, bitter controversies erupt periodically between Japan and its East Asian neighbours over textbooks that ‘whitewash’ Japanese aggression and wartime atrocities.⁵⁴ In the most recent spat over a particularly euphemistic account, which failed to mention ‘comfort women’, glossed over the Nanjing Massacre and portrayed

especially by teachers of Chinese History. See also Vickers, *History as a School Subject*, on this topic and on debates over how and where to include Hong Kong history in the curriculum.

⁵⁰ Dr. Musa Al-Zu'but (chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council education committee) in Palestinian newspaper, Al-Risala, 13/04/2000, cit. in *The Guardian* (online), 18/12/2001

⁵¹ *Guomin zhongxue: lishi, Renshi Taiwan: lishi bian* and *Renshi Taiwan: shehui bian*.

⁵² See for example Liu, *Lishi jiaoxue yishu yu yanjiu*, p24.

⁵³ Vasagar, ‘History teaching in UK stokes xenophobia’, *The Guardian* (online), 9/12/2002.

⁵⁴ On Japanese textbook controversies see chapters by McCormack, Gerow, Nozaki and Inokuchi, and Kimijima in Hein and Selden eds., *Censoring History*. See also Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*.

Japanese invasions as wars of liberation from Western imperialism, South Korea even recalled its ambassador from Tokyo.⁵⁵ Although China did not take such drastic official action, the new textbook was roundly denounced for misleading Japanese youth about the ‘truth of history’. Reared on ‘lies’, it was asserted, Japanese youth would develop a mistaken conception of their national identity, and this in turn could be potentially damaging for future Sino-Japanese relations.⁵⁶

Whether History can really influence self-Other identity formation is impossible to gauge accurately, but to understand the ways in which it might contribute requires an understanding not only of *what* topics are included in or excluded from syllabi, textbooks and classroom teaching and which viewpoints are proffered as ‘correct’, but also of *how* data, concepts and values are organised, transmitted, received and interpreted. Clearly, the latter question is extremely complex, for the ways in which ideas and values are learnt and internalised inevitably vary from one individual or group to another, and there are, moreover, countless extracurricular influences on historical consciousness and identity formation. Before turning to the outcomes of History education, therefore, it is worth briefly considering some common characteristics of textbooks and teaching which might increase the likelihood of school History and the ideologies therein being accepted or rejected.

Teaching History

If national curricula set out the goals and general content of History, textbooks are, in most school systems, the primary vehicle for transmitting historical knowledge and ideas, and typically, the more concern the ruling regime has to ensure that a unitary official version of history is taught, the more tightly textbooks are controlled. In some instances national or local government bodies may authorise only a limited number of textbooks for school use (as in Japan and some US states), or even draft textbooks themselves (as in the former USSR, China, Taiwan and South Korea until very recently, and as continues to be the case in North Korea). Yet, even where schools or teachers can freely select textbooks, often only one is used. Furthermore, given that textbooks are frequently designed to meet the requirements of standard examinations, both teachers and students may rely heavily on them, rarely using supplementary

⁵⁵ Watts, ‘Koreans angry at Japan’s approval of book sanitising war history’, *The Guardian* (online), 10/4/2001.

⁵⁶ See ‘Negative Teaching Materials of History’ and ‘China can’t accept Japan’s revisions of History textbook’, 6/7/2001 and ‘Why Japan doesn’t earnestly inspect history’ 16/8/2001 in *RMRB* (online). As of 2004, only five schools (all of them private) had elected to use the controversial textbook.

materials. This reliance may be exacerbated if teachers themselves are not trained in history.⁵⁷ Encountering a single account of history, therefore, is one way in which its authority is increased, and this is especially so, Hein and Selden argue, if the single account bears the ‘imprimatur of the state’ through being government-authorized or produced.⁵⁸

It is not only limited use of supplementary teaching materials or state sanction which makes textbooks authoritative, but the ways in which their content is organised and presented. They are usually ‘written in a distant, magisterial tone,’ muting authorial voice and giving the impression of omniscience and neutrality, thereby ‘discouraging students from questioning any of their assertions.’⁵⁹ Although Loewen observes of many American History textbooks that ‘we need not even take a look inside’ to discern their ideological purpose since titles and covers may be extremely revealing,⁶⁰ students are far less likely to approach something so apparently innocuous as a book-jacket with a critical attitude. Unless guided by teachers to ‘deconstruct the textbook’ through examining titles, cover designs, proportions of ethnic minorities, women and the poor represented in visual images or text, dates of publication, authors’ gender, race, place of origin and so forth, students may well see the text as ‘objective fact’ and assume that more or less ‘the whole story’ is represented.⁶¹

The ‘magisterial tone’ is not simply a writing or presentation ‘style’, but inheres in the type of analysis and explanations woven into the narrative. While analysis is less important for younger primary school pupils who appear to respond principally to the internal logic of a ‘story’, by the time children reach secondary school - the stage with which the present study is chiefly concerned - they are usually beginning to develop some basic critical skills, and stories without supporting ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ are no longer sufficiently persuasive. As Project CHATA (Concepts of History and Teaching Approaches: [ages] 7-14) research into British schoolchildren’s historical understanding has found, there is a distinct progression in awareness that historical accounts are not necessarily complete, and that where younger children are more

⁵⁷ Professional training or tertiary education in a subject is not always or everywhere a necessary qualification for teaching it. In the USA, for example, a 1990 survey revealed that only 40% of teachers had a BA or MA in history or a degree with a significant history component; 13% had taken no college-level history courses at all (statistics cited by Loewen, ‘The Vietnam War in High School American History’, p150).

⁵⁸ Hein and Selden, ‘The Lessons of War, Global Power and Social Change’, p4, p8.

⁵⁹ Masalski, ‘Teaching Democracy, Teaching War’, p261.

⁶⁰ Loewen, ‘The Vietnam War in High School American History’, p151.

inclined to attribute omissions of data or differences in explanations to the writer's lack of knowledge or 'mistakes', older children may perceive authorial bias (intentional or unintentional). Furthermore, how children themselves deploy 'second-order structural concepts' such as causes and consequences of events also shows evidence of a progression in understanding. Younger children tend to emphasise 'important' individuals' personal qualities and desires, older children to recognise some external or 'situational' factors. They also appear to become gradually aware that people in the past did not have the benefit of our hindsight or share our values, and their decisions should not necessarily, therefore, be judged out of context.⁶² While the researchers note that these findings may be attributable to cultural and pedagogical conditions prevalent in British schools, researchers elsewhere have drawn similar conclusions.⁶³ Following this pattern of learning (and perhaps contributing to it), accounts targeted at secondary school children offer more 'structural explanations' of past events; that is, they explain causes and consequences in terms of abstract, macro-historical, political, social and economic forces rather than simply in 'intentional' terms of personal will or desire.⁶⁴ This gives texts a veneer of 'scientific objectivity' and emotional detachment, again increasing the probability that they will be accepted as credibly neutral statements of fact. Statistics, maps, charts and diagrams further enhance the 'objective' illusion, since these are items children regularly encounter in subjects, such as Mathematics, which at this level have ostensibly clear-cut, right-wrong/true-false answers. On the other hand, the impersonal and abstract nature of structural explanations may be dull and unappealing to student imaginations, causing them to lose interest in History. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find History texts the world over populated by Great Men and gripping tales of individual heroism, even if the 'Great Man theory' of historical progress has been philosophically rejected, and even if, as in China and the former Eastern bloc, historical materialism has supposedly recast the urban proletariat and peasantry as the principal subjects and agents of history.

⁶¹ Masalski, 'Teaching Democracy, Teaching War', pp261-262. Masalski, a former History and Social Studies teacher, used these questions and others to teach her students that history texts are not 'received truth,' but narratives constructed by particular persons who interpret selected evidence.

⁶² Lee, Dickinson and Ashby have reported extensively on CHATA in papers such as 'Researching Children's Ideas about History' and 'Children's Ideas about the Nature and Status of Historical Accounts'. They build here on their earlier work in volumes such as *History Teaching and Historical Understanding* and *Learning History*. See also Shemilt, *History 13-16 Evaluation Study*, on adolescents' historical understanding.

⁶³ See for example chapters by Hallden, Carretero, Voss, Leinhardt, Dominguez in *Learning and Reasoning in History*.

Not every textbook ignores alternative versions of the past, lauds Great Men, suppresses the subaltern, or seeks to promote ‘collective memories,’ ‘myths’ or ‘heritage’ over ‘history’; some may be specifically designed to provoke discussion and analysis, to teach skills rather than data or ideologies. More often, however, it is teachers who must ‘mediate’ or challenge ‘hegemonic’ texts if critical skills are to be nurtured. Whether they are willing or able to do so depends considerably on their professional training, their personal opinions, experiences and responses to textbook narratives, as well as on how much freedom to manoeuvre they are allowed by examination systems, schools, local education authorities or the state itself, and how much of that freedom they choose to exercise. Even discounting individual difference and extracurricular influences, students studying the same text with different teachers, therefore, may have quite varied learning outcomes.

Learning Outcomes

In discussing the effects of History education on individual or collective values and identities, it is important to maintain a distinction, as Wertsch has done, between ‘production’ of official history by states or their subsidiary agencies and its ‘consumption’ by target audiences.⁶⁵ History production can be restricted directly by government control mechanisms or indirectly by self-censorship on the part of historians, museum curators, History curriculum developers and textbook writers, but prescribing how official histories are consumed and suppressing all competing sources of historical memories are impossible tasks. No matter how authoritative a text or how authoritarian a state, citizens can only be forced to ‘know’ an official history, through having to memorise and regurgitate it in public performances (such as examinations) in order to succeed academically or professionally. There is no guarantee that official histories or indeed any government-decreed ideology taught in school and reinforced in other state-supervised arenas will be ‘believed,’ regardless of how often or how insistently they are reiterated.

As evidence now emerging from post-Soviet societies suggests, despite successfully monopolising education and cultural production, the Party-state was spectacularly *unsuccessful* at controlling what people actually believed about the past. Not only did counter-histories flourish both in *samizdat* literature and in private social

⁶⁴ Carretero et al, ‘Historical Knowledge: Cognitive and Instructional Implications’.

⁶⁵ Wertsch, ‘Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?’ and Wertsch and Rozin, ‘The Russian Revolution: Official and Unofficial Accounts’.

and familial settings, but the Party undermined its own efforts to dictate a univocal past by revising it to reflect the rise and fall of leading comrades or changing policies so frequently that it became risible; as the oft-quoted quip observed, ‘nothing in the USSR is as unpredictable as the past.’ Official histories were, in fact, often actively ‘resisted’ precisely *because* they were state-sponsored.⁶⁶ One Russian interviewed by Wertsch recalls being stunned as a primary school pupil in the 1930s when told to delete from the textbook portraits of former heroes who had been reclassified as ‘enemies of the people’, since new textbooks with ‘correct viewpoints’ had not yet been distributed.⁶⁷ Other interviewees reported similar instances at which their faith in official narratives was shaken, and many claimed eventually to have automatically believed the opposite of *any* official line, although most did not reach this stage of doubt until the upper years of secondary school or in adulthood. This by no means implies, however, that younger children are always passive, uncritical consumers, and they are especially prone to resist official histories if they belong to an ethnic or social group which is excluded from the national narrative, or if personal, family or community experiences conflict with the textbook account. As Ahonen has shown, ethnic Estonians under USSR rule rejected official Soviet histories *en masse* because they conflicted with their own family and community memories, and because USSR history was in reality a history of Mother Russia, albeit moulded to fit historical materialist theory and justify Soviet claims to non-Russian regions. Since independence, the situation has been reversed, and ethnic Russians living in Estonia (36% of Estonia’s population) reject current official histories because they narrate an ethno-nationalist Estonian history and portray Russians as the enemy.⁶⁸ In Taiwan during the mid-1990s, meanwhile, I found that many junior and senior secondary students and even some older primary school children thought KMT-dictated textbook claims to legitimate rulership of Mainland China (and Mongolia) were ridiculous, and few seemed to relish the idea of ‘reunification with the Motherland’. They all said, however, that ‘of course we go along with what is says in the textbook; we have to pass the tests.’

⁶⁶ On the failure of the state to control the past, see, for example, Tulviste and Wertsch, ‘Official and Unofficial Histories: The Case of Estonia’; Wertsch and Rozin, ‘The Russian Revolution’; Ahonen, *Clio sans Uniform*.

⁶⁷ Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*, pp126-127.

⁶⁸ Ahonen, ‘The Politics of Identity through the History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social Exclusion – or Inclusion?’.

‘Knowing’ one story and ‘believing’ another, or telling different stories in different circumstances - whether to pass examinations or avoid punishment for heresy - may lead to what Ahonen calls ‘double consciousness’ and Zinchenko ‘internal emigration.’⁶⁹ In this mental state, private ideological or value commitments are clearly distinguished from publicly iterated ones. This is more, however, than merely a boundary between the public and the private. Much as in some languages, such as Japanese, in which not only vocabulary, but grammar is adjusted according to power relations between speakers, the ability to switch from public to private register (or from official to unofficial history) according to circumstance is learnt from childhood and is accomplished subconsciously. Describing this psychological process in theoretical terms, Wertsch has argued that ‘known’ or ‘mastered’ official histories may be more than a politically correct account trotted out for public performances; the official history, in fact, may powerfully affect ‘cognitive functioning,’ and may be the basic ‘mediational means’ or ‘cultural tool’ called upon in *all* representations of the past. Many Estonians and Russians he interviewed in the early – mid-1990s, for example, insisted that the official account they had learnt in school was ‘false’, and that unofficial histories were ‘true’. Yet, when asked to talk about certain historical events, no-one was able to construct a coherent, reasoned narrative that did not rely almost entirely on refuting the official history with a ‘series of counter-claims’ constructed from the data, concepts, structure and language of the official version. It appeared that what they knew, they did not believe, and what they believed they did not really know. The official accounts, then, had been mastered as cultural tools, profoundly shaping cognitive functioning, but the target audience had not ‘appropriated’ or ‘internalised’ the truth claims, values and ideologies of the official history; that is, they had neither made them ‘their own’ nor ‘integrated them with a sense of self.’ Official histories thus failed to penetrate the ‘affective dimension.’⁷⁰

That official histories were so successful in determining cognitive functioning is hardly surprising in the Soviet context since by the mid-1930s all public historical discourse was state-supervised and voicing heterodox opinions could be extremely costly.⁷¹ Cognitive mastery of texts or other cultural tools, Wertsch argues however,

⁶⁹ Ahonen, *ibid* and *Clio sans Uniform*; Zinchenko ‘Vygotsky’s ideas about units of analysis for the analysis of mind’ cit. in Wertsch and Rozin, ‘The Russian Revolution’, p46.

⁷⁰ Wertsch and Rozin, ‘The Russian Revolution’; Wertsch, ‘Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?’

⁷¹ See Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* for a discussion of early Soviet historiography and history education. On History as a school subject, see especially Chapter 6.

is not enough if such tools are to serve as ‘identity resources.’ Mastery of official histories may enable citizens to ‘think the nation’ as defined by the political state, but only affective appropriation will lead them to feel emotional ‘attachment’ to such ‘inventions.’⁷² Proceeding from self-determination theory, Wertsch suggests, moreover, that the Soviet state failed to control collective identity formation or foster genuine loyalty to the Party because official histories and the values therein were experienced as coerced rather than ‘fully chosen’ and ‘autonomously undertaken.’ Like teenagers rebelling against their parents, the more force the state exerted in trying to engineer affective appropriation of official ideologies, the more resistance it tended to create. Indeed, the existence of a monolithic (even if ever-changing) narrative ‘provided a good target for opposition,’ and a model against which counter-histories and identities could be constructed.⁷³

If it is correct that enforced orthodoxy correlates closely to levels of resistance, this would certainly lend some credence to assertions that hegemonic narratives promoted in liberal-democratic societies are perhaps more insidiously powerful because they appear freely chosen.⁷⁴ This is partially borne out by Penuel and Wertsch, who found that US university students were strongly influenced both cognitively and affectively by a ‘master narrative’ of America’s ‘quest for freedom,’ even though they explicitly opposed many basic claims of the ‘official’ US history they had read in school textbooks.⁷⁵ Researchers have also found, however, that many North American schoolchildren master several competing narratives from both ‘vernacular’ and ‘official’ sources, but do not necessarily develop pronounced responses of appropriation or resistance to any of them, instead displaying ‘confusion,’ ‘indifference or agnosticism toward [all] historical narratives.’⁷⁶

There is, of course, no absolute, quantifiable correlation between the level of control a state exercises over the production of official history and the degree to which these narratives are affectively appropriated by their consumers in school

⁷² Wertsch, borrowing from Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, in ‘Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?’, p41.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p43-44, p47 Wertsch’s concept of appropriation is based on Grolnick, Deci and Ryan, ‘Internalisation within the family: The self-determination theory perspective’ and Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, cit. in ‘Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?’, pp40-44.

⁷⁴ Gramsci, Bourdieu, Macedo n21.

⁷⁵ Penuel and Wertsch, ‘Historical Representation as Mediated Action’.

⁷⁶ Seixas, ‘Historical Understanding among Adolescents in a Multicultural Setting’, Barton and Levstik, ‘‘It Wasn’t a Good Part of History’: National Identity and Students’ Explanations of Historical Significance’ cit. in Wertsch, ‘Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?’, pp46-47.

classrooms and beyond. Even if official histories serve as the primary mediational means of understanding and representing the past in both liberal-democratic and totalitarian societies, there are many possible outcomes for the formation of collective values and identities, determined not merely by the form of government, but by diverse historical experiences on multiple social and cultural levels. Nonetheless, the relationships between production and consumption of official histories analysed by Wertsch et al highlight a crucial distinction that must be made when discussing History education in any society. The production-consumption thesis also complements the distinction already drawn in this chapter between the purpose and practice of History, and has the added advantage of having been derived principally from the USSR experience, which in so many ways – although by no means all – has been paralleled in China, as well as in other ‘communist’ or ‘revolutionary’ states. It is used, however, with some modifications and caveats, not only to allow for different historical and cultural experiences in China, but because it omits the crucial stage of what I have termed ‘transmission’. This has much in common with the ‘practice’ model already discussed, and should be seen not merely as an interim stage lying between production and consumption, but as a major factor determining the extent to which official histories are consumed in the spirit in which they were originally produced. Caution regarding the production-consumption thesis is also applied because it was formulated on the basis only of respondents’ knowledge and beliefs concerning *recent* history; that is, those periods about which counter-discourses deriving from personal, family or community experience were still very much alive at the time of consumption. No interviewees were asked as to whether they had similarly resisted official accounts of the more distant past. Furthermore, no account appears to have been taken of interviewees’ ‘narrative performance’ for the researcher. Given that interviews were conducted after the dissolution of the USSR and the transition to democracy, it must be suspected that some respondents would ‘remember’ resisting a defunct and unpopular regime even if they had not. As we shall see below and in subsequent chapters, vocal criticism or claims to have resisted a policy after the event have also been common in China. Nonetheless, these flaws in the foundations of the production-consumption thesis are not regarded as fatal; on the contrary, they are embraced as specific issues to be addressed, which will help not only to deepen our understanding of the Chinese case, but may perhaps contribute to

the refinement of an important theoretical model for understanding the place of History in the process of identity formation in other societies.

II. Sources, Structure and Methodology

The State of the Field: Sources and Problems

Part of the widespread trend, the literature on Chinese nationalism and national identity has proliferated over the past decade or two, and has mostly emphasised its ‘invented’ nature, while also noting the ways in which much older ideas about culture, race and the state have been incorporated into the modern construct of the nation.⁷⁷ As in other studies of nationalism, both history and education have been highlighted as means by which elites have sought to deliver the nation unto modernity, whether to sustain their own domination or (for ostensibly more altruistic motives) to ‘save China’ from the combined evils of cultural stagnation, domestic oppression and foreign invasion. History (together with Civics and Social Studies) has been frequently cited as crucial to the moral-ideological aspect of the citizen-making and national consciousness-raising process. Yet, despite much academic interest in both Republican and Communist education and historiography, and in stark contrast to the international attention devoted to History in Japan, History education in China has been almost completely neglected by scholars outside the PRC. What little has been done, moreover, has tended to follow the Orwellian stereotype of an omnipotent Party-state operating a top-down system of ideological indoctrination, assuming that what is decreed by the centre correlates closely to what is taught and learnt in individual school classrooms.

Beyond passing references to government directives or the occasional textbook, to date, there has been only one book-length study undertaken in the early 1930s which analyses the content of History, Civics and Social Studies textbooks and evaluates the ways in which they were influenced by nationalist imperatives.⁷⁸ Nothing on the PRC was written until the 1960s when C.T. Hu, a Chinese émigré based at Columbia Teachers’ College, published two papers outlining the ideological bases and principles of History and its place in the PRC curriculum. Although works by Chen, Ridley et al and Martin in the 1970s examined the political and socialising role of education, with detailed reference to pre-Cultural Revolution school textbooks

⁷⁷ See, for example, Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*; Fitzgerald, ‘The Nationless State’.

⁷⁸ Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China*.

(mainly Chinese Language), it was not until after the Cultural Revolution that anything else focusing specifically on History was published.⁷⁹ Works published over the past two decades or so include a chapter in Ferro's comparative history education volume, *The Uses and Abuses of History*, which covers the period from 1949 to the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, drawing principally on textbooks to demonstrate how (per the book title) the Chinese government has manipulated the past to serve the present. The range of textbooks upon which Ferro has drawn, however, is extremely limited, relying, moreover, on translated excerpts rather than complete Chinese-language volumes.⁸⁰ Chau's overview of the nature and status of History in the PRC also covers the period since 1949, but goes further into the post-Mao era, and makes wider use of primary sources. The title – 'Continuity and Change: History Teaching in the PRC' – is, however, somewhat misleading as the central topic is not 'teaching', but government policy and national curriculum guidelines.⁸¹ As a specialist in PRC education, Lin would no doubt have been able to adopt a more comprehensive approach. Unfortunately, her discussion of socialisation through curriculum in a general work on reform-era education devotes only two pages to History, and the one (senior secondary) textbook examined is not in fact a History text, but a supplementary political education text on the history of social development produced and used only in Shanghai. Her analysis, nonetheless reflects a more nuanced understanding of education policy, recognising that not only are there discrepancies between government-prescribed educational objectives and actual learning outcomes, but that government policy itself is not simply a series of decrees from on high, and in fact frequently *responds* to rather than initiates social change.⁸²

One shortcoming of all the above-cited works is that none has anything to say about Chinese approaches to world history. This is not entirely surprising, since – as will be seen in subsequent chapters – Chinese history has clearly been central to state efforts to promote patriotism, prove the political legitimacy of the regime and nurture loyalty to the Party, and has consequently enjoyed a far higher proportion of class hours than world history. Even China's professional historians, as Croizier notes, have paid scant attention to world history, resulting in a low output of scholarly

⁷⁹ Hu, 'The Teaching of History in Communist China' and 'From Orthodoxy to Historicity'; Chen, *Chinese Education since 1949*; Ridley et al, *The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China*; Martin, 'The Socialisation of Children in China and Taiwan'.

⁸⁰ Ferro, 'A Note on the History of China'.

⁸¹ Chau, 'Change and Continuity: History Teaching in the PRC'.

⁸² Lin, *Education in post-Mao China*, pp10-11.

writing, few university courses in the field, and consequently little knowledge of the subject among History educators. Paltry though coverage has been, however, world history, as discussed above, may be an important vehicle for favourably comparing and contrasting one's own nation with its Others, and China has been no exception. Croizier's references to secondary school world history textbooks thus begin to fill some important lacunae in the literature.⁸³

Since I began this project, Chan and Scott have co-authored 'Teaching Chinese History in Junior High Schools in post-Mao China'. This is the most comprehensive piece yet written on the subject, although it does not discuss world history and, like Chau's chapter, bears a title unrelated to the article's content, since it focuses on the People's Education Press (PEP) textbooks from 1979-1990s with no references to 'teaching' or 'schools'. Chan and Scott cover in considerable detail modifications to textbook format (such as font, page size and colour, chapter length, paper quality), and concisely summarise general ideological trends, emphasising the familiar problem of correlating Chinese history to historical materialist theory, and noting a reorientation away from socialism towards patriotism. Chan reiterates the main points of this paper in her guest editor's introduction for a recent volume of *Chinese Education and Society* (henceforth *CES*) containing extracts from the 1992 junior secondary and 1996 senior secondary curriculum guidelines and several articles on History in the PRC translated from Chinese journals, which provide some useful insights not normally available to non-Chinese readers. Like most scholars, Chan contends that History education is principally 'expected to serve politics' and 'to foster support for the Chinese Communist Party's version of socialism and its one-party rule.' Leading cadres in curriculum development, she asserts, are 'usually Party members hand-picked by the Party,' and 'Party control over the teaching of history in schools is almost watertight.'⁸⁴ Thus, while she notes that some of the articles included in *CES* 'do not quite accord with the official views laid down in the Teaching Guidelines,' and both here and in her paper with Scott implies that, as historians, some curriculum developers and textbook writers may have professional reservations about following political directives, she moves only slightly beyond the Big-Brother-manipulates-hapless-masses model in a brief final admission that 'it is

⁸³ Croizier, 'World History in the PRC'.

⁸⁴ Chan, 'Introduction', pp3-4.

almost impossible to tell' whether and how History influences students' 'ideological and political commitments.'⁸⁵

History education in China may hitherto have been of little interest to those outside the PRC, but in China it is well-researched at academic and governmental institutions, and not only are there numerous education journals in which History-related issues may be discussed, but there are also several monthlies dedicated specifically to the field. These publish articles written by professionals ranging from curriculum developers to school History teachers, and cover every aspect of History from analyses of specific historical events or persons to discussions of curriculum and textbook production, teaching goals, model lesson plans, and examination questions. Although by the standards of most international academic journals, the majority of these articles appear somewhat methodologically and theoretically unsophisticated, and many (editorials in particular) are puff pieces broadcasting the current 'correct line', they provide some useful insight into mainstream thinking about history education, and occasionally also give print-space to more risqué pieces.

These journals, as well as specialist books on History education, have been among the most important secondary sources for the present study, supplying valuable background information to primary sources, such as government directives, curriculum guidelines, textbooks, teacher handbooks and classroom observations. A significant problem associated with having no sources outside the Chinese History education community, however, is that what is publicly iterated is already censored by the writers or speakers themselves, and may have undergone further revision in editorial hands. There is great emphasis on public consensus and unified viewpoints (*tongyi guandian*), and since the kind of records available to Vickers in his study of the Hong Kong History curriculum (minutes of meetings where curriculum content was debated for example)⁸⁶ either do not exist or are inaccessible in China, the extent of negotiation over History goals and content is impossible to assess accurately. Personal communications with History curriculum developers, textbook writer-editors and other research and teaching professionals, reading between the lines in published documents (usually made possible by acquaintance with the authors), or criticisms publicly voiced once a policy is no longer in effect have thus been invaluable supplements to contemporary publications and official policy statements. Clearly

⁸⁵ Chan, *ibid*, p7; Chan and Scott, 'Teaching Chinese History in Junior High Schools in post-Mao China', p118.

⁸⁶ Vickers, *History as a School Subject*.

there are methodological implications for this approach; as discussed in the preceding section, respondents' memories or opinions of past events may be shaped by present circumstances. In addition, 'double consciousness' remains a feature of everyday life in authoritarian China, and discussions with a foreign researcher are just as much of a 'narrative performance' as they are for assorted domestic audiences. I cannot be certain that my interviewees proffered genuine opinions, although the fear associated with the Maoist period has begun to dissipate, and talking to foreigners is no longer as perilous as it once was. Indeed, many people may even feel freer to express personal opinions to an outsider. At the same time, however, it appeared that people often told me whatever they thought 'I' - either as a generic 'Westerner' or as the person they felt they had come to know - wanted to hear. Similar problems of audience-oriented performance arose with classroom observations where teachers and students were forewarned of my visit and presented a 'model lesson' (although this was not always the case). Even anonymous surveys, as Chinese researchers have found, may be subject to this kind of self-censorship on the part of students and teachers, frequently eliciting what respondents suppose are 'correct' answers rather than encouraging critical expression.⁸⁷ As shown below, these difficulties, among others, have led me to avoid excessive reliance on informal communications and to focus this project primarily on those aspects of History which can be understood through analysing formal, written sources.

Objectives and Organisation of the Present Study

As far as I am aware, the works outlined above constitute all the literature specifically devoted to History education that is presently available in English,⁸⁸ and the most basic objective of this study, therefore, is to redress longstanding neglect of the subject. It focuses chiefly on the junior secondary History curriculum as primary

⁸⁷ Personal communications with education research unit staff who warned me of the limitations of their survey results. The difficulty of drawing valid conclusions from such surveys has been discussed by Chinese researchers in several journals (Paine, 'The Educational Policy Process').

⁸⁸ In endnotes to her *CES* 'Introduction', Chan misleadingly implies a broader literature in suggesting that readers who 'wish to consult Western scholars on history teaching in Chinese schools, can read, *among others*' the works by Croizier, Hu and her own paper with Scott cited above (*italics mine*). In addition to this handful of papers and those others mentioned above, I have recently read a Chinese translation of a German paper by Klaus Maeding (translated as 'Cong Deguo jingyan kan Zhongguo de lishi jiaokeshu' for a 1998 conference in Taiwan) on world history textbooks in the PRC, and also understand that a PhD comparing PRC History textbooks since 1949 with post-World War II French textbooks was being researched as of summer 2000. Since 2003, researchers at the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig and the University of Leipzig have also been engaged on a project analysing History textbooks in East Asia (including the PRC, Taiwan, Japan

History has recently been absorbed by a new Social Studies course and senior secondary education is neither compulsory nor universally accessible. Additionally, the junior secondary curriculum currently covers both Chinese and world history from ancient to contemporary periods and is thus probably the most systematic and comprehensive account of national and global history that most Chinese citizens will ever encounter. The basic narrative of Chinese and world history and its general moral-ideological thrust, moreover, is the same at all levels of the education system; it is merely the type or quality of analysis and quantity of material that change. Junior secondary History may therefore be regarded as largely representative of history education as a whole.

In part because of the difficulties associated with self-censorship and 'narrative performance' already described, I had originally intended to focus almost exclusively on the changing content of junior secondary History textbooks, and in particular to evaluate differences between the various editions published since compulsory education was legislated in 1986 and limited textbook pluralism was introduced. It soon became apparent, however, that regionally produced textbooks did not provide noticeably 'local' perspectives on national or global history, nor had a significant diversity of historical viewpoints or even narrative styles emerged. In fact, it seemed that an analysis of textbooks alone would indeed demonstrate little more than changing publication formats and the ways in which the vicissitudes of 'political lines' had been accommodated. This would not only duplicate existing research on the politics of reform-era historiography, but with textbooks being an end-product of history 'production' would tend to suggest either homogeneity or top-down imposition of views about History goals and content. It would thereby neglect the different views of history and schooling that shape subject content and its presentation, and would reveal almost nothing about what is actually taught and learnt, and still less about issues such as national identity formation. To gain a more complete understanding, therefore, I decided to make textbooks but one small part of a broader exploration of History education, analysing not only the changing political imperatives and curriculum guidelines which directly delineate the acceptable parameters of textbook content, but also examining curriculum development and textbook production processes, the personnel involved and their ideas concerning the goals and pedagogy of History, and the ways in which official guidelines and

and South Korea). Otherwise, I have so far been unable to locate any other work on this subject by

textbook content are mediated by teachers in History classrooms. Although a fascinating question, establishing how History affects student beliefs, values and collective identities is, as Chan noted, much more difficult, and would involve an analysis of an almost infinite web of extracurricular influences. This study focuses mainly, therefore, on the ‘production’ of official histories and their ‘transmission’ down through the hierarchy of the education system, offering only a preliminary analysis of their ‘consumption’ by students.

The structure of this study follows the theoretical model outlined in section I above, maintaining the already-noted distinctions between the purposes and practice of History, and the production, transmission and consumption of history texts. Part One explores the changing purposes of History education and the contexts and ideas that shape the ways in which the curriculum is designed and implemented. The first chapter considers the historical background, examining the purposes history has been expected to serve in China, particularly over the past century, and outlining the official narratives of Chinese and world history and the institutional framework for making and implementing History policies that were inherited by the post-Mao regime. Chapter 2 evaluates the ways in which this historical legacy and the current policy of reform and opening have influenced contemporary views concerning what purposes History should serve. This chapter focuses principally on central government attitudes to school History, analysing them in light of political and social change, general education reform and developments in professional historiography. It also draws attention to the changing perspectives of History education professionals, and highlights growing tensions arising from often conflicting pedagogical and ideological objectives. The way in which History education is administered from an organisational and procedural perspective is outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter details the systems and structures in place for the development of History curricula and textbooks, and for the dissemination and implementation both of official policies and practical pedagogy. Following Goodson, I analyse the professional relationships between institutional and individual curriculum ‘stakeholders’ and assess how power to determine the content of History syllabi, textbooks and teaching is distributed.⁸⁹

If Part One is concerned with *why* and *how* history is produced, Parts Two and Three focus on *what* emerges from the production process and how it reflects or distorts the stated purposes of history. Part Two consists of two chapters which

‘Western scholars’.

analyse the intended or ‘preactive’ (as opposed to the implemented or ‘interactive’) curriculum.⁹⁰ Chapter 4 examines national curricula, known as History Teaching Outlines (*lishi jiaoxue dagang*), which elucidate subject-specific teaching and learning goals, provide detailed syllabi and general ideological and pedagogical guidance, and are designated as the basis for textbook writing, teaching and assessment. It charts the ways in which the divergent views of History’s purposes, changing political circumstances and ‘official lines’ as well as developments in academia discussed in Chapter 2 have informed the changes made to the various Outlines produced between 1978-2000. Chapter 5 adopts a similar approach to the analysis of the local curriculum guidelines for History and Social Studies that were developed in Shanghai and Zhejiang respectively in the late 1980s as an experimental project in curricular devolution. It shows how curriculum developers attempted on the one hand to conform to national standards and goals, while on the other to develop something innovative and relevant to the conditions of their locale, and to set a modernising example for the rest of the country. This chapter concludes with a brief analysis of Beijing’s local curriculum for History, promulgated in 2001, which shows how the experiences of both national and local curriculum reforms over the past two decades have been assimilated, and points towards the direction in which History education is likely to proceed for the next several years.

Part Three explores the implemented curriculum, but in contrast to the generally chronological or – to use a more fashionable analytic term - diachronic approach adopted in Parts One and Two, these chapters primarily examine History education synchronically, that is History education in practice as of 2000-2001. Chapter 6 looks at History textbooks, focusing on the various editions that were first published in the late 1980s-1990s after limited textbook pluralism was legislated and that were still in use at the time of fieldwork. Although comparisons are made to earlier PEP textbook editions, the purpose here is not to chart the effect on content of changing ‘political lines’ as this would be to repeat unnecessarily much of Part Two; rather, it aims to shed light on the ways in which historical accounts encountered directly by school pupils over the past two decades have been constructed and to reveal some of the implicit and explicit messages and lessons embedded in the texts. Following the themes discussed above, it uses several examples to explore how important events and persons are represented, what types of data and which kinds of people are included or

⁸⁹ Goodson, *The Making of Curriculum*.

excluded from national and world history, how language is used to convey 'objectivity' and 'neutrality', and which salient characteristics of 'the national self' and its significant 'Others' emerge from textbook narratives.

Chapter 7 addresses History curriculum implementation at the school level. This chapter is the least well substantiated by comprehensive or representative research data and is consequently somewhat shorter and considerably more speculative than the preceding chapters. It examines how History is (or is supposed to be) taught in school classrooms, and is predominantly based on a combination of journal articles written by, for or about teachers, collections of model lesson plans, pre- and in-service teacher training materials, officially and commercially published teacher handbooks, discussions with teacher training professionals and teachers themselves, and classroom observations conducted in Beijing and Shanghai in 2000-2001. The final section follows Wertsch's theoretical model of 'mastery' and 'appropriation' outlined above, and draws again on classroom observations, on the findings of Chinese History education researchers and on various popular media in an effort to gauge whether and to what extent History influences values, ideologies and identities.

If 'Party control over the teaching of history in schools' has ever been 'watertight,' this research concludes that innumerable leaks have sprung, and that while the authoritarian regime retains ultimate power over the school curriculum, it has not (yet?) chosen to stem the flow. This is not to suggest that officially approved narratives of the past may be freely contested; as a cursory analysis of the pilot curriculum and textbooks currently on trial shows, changing the 'deep structures' of the past and its narrative representations is not easy. Nor is it to deny the profound influence of 'politics' on History curriculum development and implementation; on the contrary, politics is found to be among the principal considerations determining what should and should not be taught. Politics, however, is shown to be more complex than the interests of the 'Party-state' (which are themselves varied), and to encompass the often conflicting political, professional and personal objectives of stakeholders at all levels of the education system from the Ministry of Education (MOE), to local education authorities, schools, teachers, parents and even students. Rather than being simply a straightforward top-down process of ideological indoctrination, it is asserted that History curriculum development and implementation are somewhat more dynamic than has hitherto been suggested, and that much like the childhood game of

⁹⁰ Ibid.

'Chinese whispers', official messages may be consciously or unconsciously distorted in the process of transmission from government representatives to History education professionals to school pupils.

PART ONE

THE MAKING OF THE HISTORY CURRICULUM

Chapter 1

The Historical Context

玉不琢，不成器；人不學，不知道。是故，古之王者，建國君民，教學為先
 If jade is not carved, it cannot be a tool, if people do not study, they cannot know the
 Way. Thus, when state-building and ruling the people, the ancient kings began with
 education. (*Xueji*, verse 2).

以銅為鑒可整衣冠，以古為鑒可知興替
 Using bronze as a mirror, one may adjust one's attire; using the past as a mirror, one
 may predict the rise and fall [of empires]. (Emperor Tang Taizong, AD 597- 649)

If China's leaders have not always been able to shape the present or future quite as they would like, it has not been for want of efforts to control the past. Over the past two millennia, they have devoted much attention to the historical record, heavily investing state resources to institutionalise the production and transmission of official histories and suppressing unofficial histories where seditious intentions have been suspected. Such profound concern to control not only the content of history but to dictate the ways in which it has been produced and the purposes its telling should serve began, in part, because the past was widely viewed as a vital source of precedents upon which to draw directly or analogically to validate present beliefs and actions. It was also because the ancient past was considered a golden age in which sage kings had ruled with wisdom and benevolence (*ren*), and right (*yi*) had prevailed in all under heaven (*tianxia*). Through following the kingly ways (*jun zhi dao*) described in the Classics, learning the moral and practical lessons of previous experience, emulating the worthy and vilifying the ignoble, it was believed, this utopian society could eventually be recreated. Transmitting both past and present insights to future generations was regarded, therefore, as an almost sacred task. Additionally, among a largely agnostic secular elite, history was venerated and feared as the 'Last Judgement,' and China's rulers and their acolytes sometimes kept their less noble instincts in check, mindful of their posthumous reputations.¹ Perhaps most importantly, history 'proved' the chain of 'legitimate succession' (*zhengtong*) to the imperial throne through narrating the transfer of the ruling mandate (*tianming*) from one regime to the next. Although the ancient concept of legitimate succession began in simple genealogy, it soon came to be predicated on a Confucian moral mandate, which could be forfeited through degeneracy and misgovernment and inherited by morally 'superior' successors. Needless to say, since new dynasties wrote the

¹ Jenner, *The Tyranny of History*, p11.

histories of their predecessors, this simply proved the maxim ‘victors are kings, the vanquished are bandits’ (*chengzhe wei wang, baizhe wei kou*), overlaying ‘might’ with a veneer of ‘right’. Later, as the state supplanted the virtuous hegemon as the primary locus of loyalty, maintenance or restoration of political and territorial unity was also incorporated as a sufficient condition of legitimacy, thereby conveniently accounting for lengthy periods of rule by non-Confucian ‘barbarians’ such as the Mongols and Manchus.² Given the obvious possibilities for reinterpreting history to criticise government policy, challenge regime legitimacy or assert regional independence from the imperial centre, it is hardly surprising that China’s leaders sought to ensure that the official vision of the past and the Confucian ideology which underpinned it reigned supreme.

Education was the primary vehicle for universalising the values and *Weltanschauung* of the state, and with the seventh-century inauguration of the civil service examination system, which recruited ‘talented persons’ (*rencai*) to administrative office based on their knowledge of the Classics, a ‘national curriculum’ was effectively created. Although few could afford the intensive education required for probable examination success, the potential for social mobility through this meritocratic system engendered widespread belief in the value and status of classical learning and respect for those who possessed it. This curriculum was thus followed not only by the gentry with their individual tutors, in elite state schools or private academies, but by the sons (and occasionally the daughters) of families with more limited financial resources in local, clan-run or charitable schools. For those who required a rudimentary education, but had no examination aspirations, there were ‘miscellaneous wordbooks’ (*zazi*), designed to teach functional literacy as well as to affirm the Confucian virtues of filial piety and obedience to the ruler.³ The illiterate majority, meanwhile it was hoped, would eventually be weaned off their primitive ‘customs’ and superstitious beliefs and be ‘transformed’ (*huamin yisu*) into model subjects by emulating the superior example of those who ‘had culture’ (*you wenhua*); that is, who had received a classical education. Of course, the ‘trickle-down’ approach was hardly guaranteed to effect the desired social and ideological transformation, but for back-up there was always the penal code, which enshrined

² On traditional historiography and regime legitimation, see especially Beasley and Pulleyblank, *Historians of China and Japan*, and Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China*.

³ Miscellaneous wordbooks were typically funded by the local scholar-gentry, anxious to reinforce the ideology which legitimised their own status and ‘cultural hegemony’ (Woodside, ‘Real and Imagined Continuities in the Chinese Struggle for Literacy’, p32).

Confucianism as official orthodoxy, proscribed ‘heterodox’ writings and practices, and included convenient catch-all statutes to punish disobedience of Imperial orders and generally ‘doing what ought not’ – if one were a good Confucian subject – ‘to be done’ (*budang de wei*).⁴ Exhortatory reinforcement was provided through the *xiangyue* lecture system, which required that imperial homilies on proper thinking and behaviour be read out to ‘the masses’ at regular public gatherings.⁵ In this way, then, not only were a high culture and common values created among those who followed the classical curriculum, but even among those who did not a culture was encouraged in which education was valued, texts were authoritative and the state was the arbiter of public morality.

‘History’ (or pseudo-history) formed the substantive content of ideological education at all levels, from the Classics (which were believed to refer to real people and events),⁶ to the various language primers and potted histories that served as preparatory texts for the classical canon.⁷ Through ‘praising and blaming’ (*baobian*) Great Men whose deeds and misdeeds had determined the fates of their states and peoples, history taught morality and ideology ‘by examples,’⁸ and showed the way forward to the re-creation of the idealised past. The values taught through the historical lesson, in turn, provided the moral determinist rationale that underpinned the official narrative of history and guided readers towards ‘correct’ interpretations of the past. In short, history provided the veridical ‘evidence’ to support the very values

⁴ Hulsewe, *Remnants of Han Law*, p34. These catch-all statutes were included in every code from the Han dynasty to the Qing. For more detail on laws pertaining to religious and socio-ideological control, see especially de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*. Also, Johnson, *the Tang Code* and Boulais, *Manuel du Code Chinois*.

⁵ Hsiao, *Rural China*. At these gatherings the righteous in the community would be honoured, while those who had committed ‘wrongful’ (if not illegal) deeds would be denounced and publicly humiliated.

⁶ Although the Classics were deemed to be truthful records of the past, they were generally considered sacred and therefore exempt from conventional historical analysis. Some scholars, however, such as Wang Yangming and Zhang Xuecheng, did not regard classical exegesis (*jingxue*) as substantively different from historiography (*shixue*), viewing the Classics as ‘all history’ and thus subject to the same questions regarding their authenticity.

⁷ The most famous of the mnemonic primers were *Qianziwen* (written during the Southern Dynasties period) and *Sanzijing* (written during the Southern Song dynasty). Both were widely used until early Republican times. These and other primers are discussed in de Bary and Chaffee eds., *Neo-Confucian Education*, especially chapters by Lee, ‘Sung Education before Chu Hsi’, pp105-136; Kelleher, ‘Back to Basics: Chu Hsi’s *Elementary Learning*’, pp219-251; Wu, ‘Education of Children in the Sung’, pp307-324. Children’s history texts included: Huang Jishan, *Shixue tiyao* and Wang Ling, *Shiqishi mengqiu*, written during the northern Song dynasty (cit. respectively in Zhu, *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun*, p27 and Sun, *Lishi jiaoyu de yishu yu jiqiao*, p9); Hu Yan, *Xugu qianwen*, also written during the Northern Song dynasty, provided a one-thousand character outline of history from ‘ancient times to the Song’ (JDC, p1790); Chen Biao, *Lishi mengqiu* and Wu Chengquan, *Gangjian yizhi lu* (cit. in Bai, *Lishi jiaoxue wenti tantao*, p207).

which had circumscribed the selection and representation of that evidence in the first place.

While it would be erroneous to suggest that essential or immutable concepts of history and its presentist didactic functions have been transmitted *in toto* across the centuries, many of the ‘traditional’ values, concepts and practices outlined above have survived the transition to ‘modernity’, albeit modified by changing political, social and cultural forces. Thus, although the cyclical, dynasty-centred, Chinese past has been re-imagined over the past century as a ‘rational’, ‘scientific’ and ‘linear’ story of a primordial ‘Chinese nation’ marching through history towards the Enlightenment telos of modernity, this (variously defined) ‘nation’ as the subject of official history has consistently been imagined as coextensive with the constant ideal of the ‘unitary state,’ which must be preserved or restored for ‘China’ to remain intact and for the regime to attest its legitimacy.⁹ Moral determinism has also remained a core feature of the modern discourse of legitimate succession, despite the switch to ‘scientific’ evolutionary explanations of historical change. Thus, while historical materialist ‘laws’ prove the Communist party’s ‘inevitable’ rise to power ‘scientifically’, considerable effort has been made to demonstrate the moral superiority of the CPC over both the Kuomintang (KMT) and its republican and imperial predecessors.

This shift to a linear, progressive view of history has profoundly affected education over the past century, and goals have been decisively reoriented away from the restoration of a past utopia towards the construction of a better brighter future. In order to achieve this, formal education has undergone a transition from the artisan creation of political elites schooled in the ways of the ancient kings towards production-line manufacture of worker-citizens, equipped to serve the national modernisation project with literacy, numeracy and a grounding in science and technology. The switch from an emphasis on humanities to one on sciences has not meant, however, that moral-ideological education has been abandoned. Changing political systems, the development of nationalism and the modernisation project have required that imperial subjects become national citizens who are committed to revised social, economic and political goals and support the regime and its legitimating ideology. History and other subjects with morally or politically didactic functions,

⁸ This paraphrases Voltaire’s oft-quoted dictum, ‘history is philosophy teaching by examples,’ from *Essai sur les Moeurs et l’Esprit des Nations*.

⁹ See for example Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, and Fitzgerald, ‘The Nationless State’.

such as Politics, Civics and Geography, have accordingly retained an important place (diminished in size if not in symbolism) in the curriculum.

Clearly then, the Communist Party's attempted use of history education to sustain its political legitimacy and implement its vision for the future has hardly been an original strategy. It is not only the purpose of PRC history education, however, that owes much to its historical antecedents; in devising and implementing the school History subject, the Party has also drawn heavily on the experience, policies, administrative structures and even the narratives produced under previous regimes, especially those of its immediate predecessor, the Kuomintang (KMT). Thus, just as it would be misleading to dismiss global developments in history education as irrelevant to the Chinese experience, it would be inaccurate to see History in the PRC as a project begun from scratch in 1949 (despite what PRC commentators would have us believe). It would be equally mistaken to think that History in the post-Mao era has merely resumed where the Cultural Revolution left off and developed autonomously on a carefully cleaned slate. The previous chapter situated this study in its global historical context, identifying some of the general matters pertaining to the purpose and practice of History as a school subject over the past century or so; the purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the History subject in the recent *domestic* historical context, analysing some of the specific functions and objectives of official history and the ways in which education has been harnessed to disseminate them.

I. Developing a Modern Curriculum

History in Transition

Until the mid-nineteenth century incursions by foreign imperialist powers, the efficacy of Confucianism as a viable political, social and educational philosophy was never seriously challenged. Its superiority was, after all, 'proven' by history. Had not many neighbouring peoples adopted Confucian culture? Even the Northern barbarian conquerors of the Middle Kingdom had ultimately been assimilated by the glorious civilisation they found. And had not Western barbarians been coming to China to procure the fruits of this civilisation for centuries? Thus, when Europeans and Americans arrived en masse to 'open' China to international trade, they were rebuffed. The foreign traders did not simply slink away, however, but brought the might of their national navies to bear, forcing China into a succession of humiliating

‘unequal treaties’ which gave foreigners extraterritoriality and privileged trading rights. These humiliations, however, eventually persuaded some leading officials to advocate ‘using the techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians’ (*yi yi zhi yi*), eventually engineering the establishment of schools in which sciences, technology, foreign history, culture and languages could be taught as part of an overall military and industrial ‘self-strengthening’ (*zhiqiang*) effort. Despite court consent and tentative support, the new learning struggled to gain credibility, for the traditional examinations remained the main gateway to power. Moreover, even those who promoted the new schools maintained careful distinctions between the (superior) ‘essence’ (*ti*) transmitted through the Chinese Classics and the ‘practical application’ (*yong*) of foreign knowledge.¹⁰

Defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war precipitated more drastic reforms, and within ten years, the civil service examinations had been abolished, and a Ministry of Education (MOE) established to co-ordinate the transition to a modern school system based on the Japanese model, which had so evidently contributed to Japan’s national ‘enrichment and strengthening’ (*fukoku kyohei*).¹¹ The new system was to replace traditional examinations and degrees, teaching subjects such as mathematics and science deemed necessary for China’s modernisation.¹² Physical education was also emphasised to transform the stereotypical pale, frail literatus into a strong, healthy citizen who could defend his country. Traditional learning, however, remained the foundation of the national curriculum and in both the 1902 and 1904 regulations, 30-50% of total class hours were consistently allotted to ‘Confucian’ subjects: the Classics; Self-Cultivation (*xiushen*), a moral education class (deriving its name from the Japanese *shushin* subject) which aimed to teach children ‘filial piety, loyalty, rites, justice, honesty and shame, to venerate elders and respect teachers, to serve the ruler

¹⁰ Although the *ti-yong* approach is frequently used to describe attitudes and policies implemented from the 1860s onwards, the expression was not formulated until 1896 (by Zhang Zhidong in *Quanxuepian*). The concept, however, clearly permeated thinking about the foreign invaders, their ideas and technologies throughout the East Asian region, as similar slogans, such as ‘Eastern ethics, Western science’ (*toyō no dōtoku, seiyo no gakugei*) ‘Western implements, Eastern Way’ (*sōgi, tongdo*) were used in both Japan and Korea. It is interesting to note the Japanese and Korean use of ‘Eastern’ in these slogans, presumably implying a shared *regional* culture in which they actively participated, facing off against another regional (Western) culture. In China, by contrast, ‘Chinese’ was used rather than ‘Eastern’, since the Middle Kingdom was considered the fount of civilisation; Korea and Japan were regarded as mere beneficiaries, a view which is in many ways maintained today (see Chapters 6 and 7).

¹¹ Following Prussia’s 1871 victory over France, Japanese reformers determined that Prussian power derived not merely from having a corps of ‘talented persons’ (*jinzai*) in administration, but from the education of the general populace. A modern education system based on the Prussian model was accordingly introduced with the 1872 Education Code.

and love the country'¹³; and History, a survey of dynasties and Great Men from the legendary kings to the Qing. Further ideological reinforcement was provided in Chinese language courses.¹⁴ The complete dominance of moral-ideological subjects over ostensibly 'value-free', 'practical' subjects such as sciences and foreign languages gradually decreased as students progressed through the system, clearly suggesting that the *tiyong* (essence-application) principle permeated the new regulations, with young, impressionable children to be infused with Confucian learning, allowed access to things new and foreign only after a sound moral foundation had been established. Even in secondary school, however, the 'technical' or 'practical subject' (*shike*) stream remained inferior, deemed suitable for 'industrious' students intending to 'make a living' after graduation; 'wise' students, by contrast, favoured humanities, and were best qualified to 'rule the country and pacify the people.'¹⁵ These propensities were supposedly innate, implying none too subtly that scholars able to master the Classics were at the apex of the intelligence hierarchy, and that Chinese learning must, by extension, be the highest form of knowledge.

Although History was emphasised more heavily for humanities students, it was to be taught at all school stages with local history (*xiangtu lishi*) providing the entry point in primary school, focusing on familiar heroes and other worthies with whom it was expected children would readily identify. This would inspire them to strive for 'wisdom and virtue' and provide a basis on which 'the spirit of self-strengthening' and patriotic loyalty could be built.¹⁶ In secondary school, the syllabus moved slightly beyond dynastic rise and fall, adding some limited cultural, political and scientific history. This was presumably a tentative response to calls from those influenced by foreign, evolutionary models of history, such as Liang Qichao, who argued that dynastic history was increasingly irrelevant to modern citizens, and that social and economic development of the nation-state and its people should instead be emphasised.¹⁷ Foreign history was to comprise 50% of the secondary course, the first time non-Chinese history had ever been considered remotely relevant to a complete

¹² For a detailed study of late Qing/early Republican education reforms, see Bailey, *Reform the People*.

¹³ 'Qinding mengxuetang zhangcheng' [1902], COCP, p2.

¹⁴ The 1902 regulations also required schools to hold assemblies at which the *Sacred Edict* (*Shenglun guangxun*) would be read aloud, bringing the *xiangyue* lecture function into the classroom ('Qinding xiaoxuetang zhangcheng', 'Qinding zhongxuetang zhangcheng', COCP, p11, p18).

¹⁵ 'Xuebu zou bian tong zhongxuetang kecheng fen wei wenke shike zhe' [1909], COCP, p51.

¹⁶ 'Zouding chudeng xiaoxuetang zhangcheng' [1904], COCP, p23.

education. Its uses were entirely ‘pragmatic’, however, centring on China’s immediate neighbours, and heavily favouring recent history (especially the past century) over ancient history so as to illuminate the causes of China’s current plight, and alert students to the ‘danger all Eastern states are facing from Western invasion.’¹⁸ The new education system and the broader reform package implemented from 1902 onwards, however, were not enough to save the dynasty either from foreign encroachment or from its own revolutionaries, and despite a last compromise offer to move to a constitutional monarchy, the Qing and the political system were overthrown.

New Citizens, New History

After the 1911 Revolution, education reforms accelerated to serve the nationalist modernisation project and create loyalty to the new state, and in 1912-1913 new curricula were issued. These integrated humanities and science/technical streams, for their separation was thought to have hindered educational modernisation. As Cai Yuanpei (then-Minister of Education) observed, ‘every province is establishing humanities-only secondary schools, and there are few technical schools... [Consequently,] the number of qualified college students specialising in science, medicine, industry and agriculture is low.’ Humanities students meanwhile ‘have little scientific knowledge, and remain but traditional civil service examinees in modern guise, ill-adapted to the new age in which science is omnipotent.’¹⁹ The new curriculum was thus to expurgate *tiyong* influences and provide a more balanced education which would also serve those who did not continue their studies at higher levels. Most importantly, Classics classes were eliminated, for they were deemed not only inappropriate and overly taxing for children, but also to perpetuate ‘old’ thinking.²⁰ Concepts such as ‘loyalty to the ruler’ (*zhong jun*) and ‘respecting Confucius’ (*zun kong*), and the ‘backward’ ethics of the patriarchal social hierarchy

¹⁷ Liang Qichao *Xinshixue* [1902]. A survey of early twentieth century developments in Chinese historiography may be found in Wang, *Chinese Historians and the West*.

¹⁸ ‘Zouding zhongxuetang zhangcheng’ [1904], COCP, p42.

¹⁹ Quoted by Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi*, p109.

²⁰ The Classics were temporarily restored by Yuan Shikai in his bid for the monarchy (‘Guomin xuexiao ling’, ‘Gaodeng xiaoxuexiao ling’ [July 1915], ‘Guomin xuexiao shixing xize’, ‘Gaodeng xiaoxuexiao ling shixing xize’ [January 1916], COCP, pp77-101). These documents were revised in October 1916, after his death, and the Classics were permanently removed.

were thus to be replaced by the ‘bourgeois morality of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*,’²¹ more suitable for a republic with democratic aspirations.

In fact, ‘bourgeois moral education’ remained barely discernible from Confucian morality with primary Self-Cultivation to teach ‘the pristine virtues of filial piety, love, trustworthiness, righteousness and courage, respect, industry and frugality..... to stimulate students’ determination to fulfil their responsibilities to society and the country, and to nurture the spirit of altruism and patriotism.’²² In secondary school, however, a slight reorientation was evident. Students were to ‘develop moral thinking and sentiments, fulfil their duties to the country, society and their families,’²³ and then meet their responsibilities ‘to themselves, to humanity and to all things.’²⁴ That patriotic duty was listed first suggests an effort to establish the Republic as every citizen’s primary locus of loyalty, for although the state had long been paramount for scholar-officials, most people saw ‘duty’ chiefly as family-oriented. Indeed, Sun Yat-sen regarded family duty as an impediment to developing national sentiment and advocated selling patriotism to the people as an extension of clan (*jiazu*) loyalty.²⁵ Another departure from tradition was the notion of duty to oneself as an individual and to humanity as a whole, reflecting the growing influence of many Western theories of education, as well as a less Sinocentric/more outward-looking worldview.

Although in terms of class hours History was demoted to subsidiary subject status, it was, in tandem with Self-Cultivation, to play a significant role in Republican citizen-making and teaching new morality. A new history was accordingly needed to legitimise the new polity, provide accessible precedents and role models for the young, and thereby set the country en route to modernity. Throughout primary and during the first two years of secondary school, content focused solely on China, but the final two years of secondary schooling were devoted to East Asian and Western history, with emphasis on the latter, reversing the 1904 weighting. History was to convey concepts such as ‘the evolution of races (*minzu jinhua*), social change and the rise and fall of states (*bangguo*).’ ‘Particular attention,’ it was further noted ‘should be paid to the evolution of political systems and the origins of the Republic.’²⁶ History’s core purpose was thus to narrate the genealogy of the nation-state, create a strong

²¹ Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi*, p79.

²² ‘Xiaoxuexiao jiaoze ji kechengbiao’ [1912], COCP, p63; ‘Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize’ [1912], COCP, p69.

²³ ‘Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize’ [1912], COCP, p69.

²⁴ ‘Zhongxuexiao kecheng biao zhun’ [1913], COCP, p75.

²⁵ Stafford, ‘Good Sons and Virtuous Mothers’, p368.

identification between citizenship and membership of the ‘Chinese nation’ (*Zhonghua minzu*) and to situate China in the global multi-state system. What defined membership of the ‘nation’ and/or ‘citizenry’ was, however, uncertain, fluctuating between Confucian culture and civilisation, a ‘Han’ biological-racial unity, a multi-ethnic ‘national people’ of shared descent from the mythical Yellow Emperor (*Huangdi*) (by fortuitous coincidence, correlating almost exactly to those peoples occupying the territories of the Qing empire in its expansionist heyday, and now claimed if not controlled by the Republic), and a political community with proto-democratic aspirations.²⁷

New Culture, New History

By 1917, not only had Tibet and Mongolia declared independence, but the rest of the former Qing empire had split into de facto autonomous regions governed by military leaders. National policies were, therefore, selectively implemented and inconsistently funded. This did not mean, however, that they were not promulgated, presumably based on the assumption (or hope) that the state would imminently be reunified. In education, those active in the New Culture Movement, particularly the ‘Deweyan clique’ of American-trained scholars,²⁸ dominated both higher education institutions and ‘national’ education policy-making. They understood China’s current domestic and international problems as a product of cultural (and sometimes racial) *ennui* and debilitation, and argued that national salvation (*jiuguo*) lay in profound culture and value transformation (which education reforms had hitherto failed to achieve) as a prerequisite for scientific and social modernisation and the eventual transition to democracy.²⁹

The 1922 Decree on Reform of the Education System reflected the New Culture reformers’ views and the Deweyan, child- rather than text-centred, education-for-life approach. It also marked the transition from the Japanese to the American educational model. This was a twelve-year system of lower and higher primary, and

²⁶ ‘Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize’ [1912], COCP, p69.

²⁷ See Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* on racial definitions; Fitzgerald ‘The Nationless State’ on ‘statist’ definitions.

²⁸ This refers mainly to those who had studied in the USA at Columbia Teachers’ College under John Dewey, but may also include those influenced by Dewey’s education theories. For a full discussion of Dewey’s influence on Republican Chinese education see Keenan, *The Dewey Experiment in China*.

²⁹ On the New Culture movement and racial degeneration see Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race*, pp126-131. Some thinkers also advocated eugenics as a means of ‘saving the nation’ (*jiuguo*).

junior and senior secondary schooling (split 4-2-3-3), of which the lower primary stage was intended as compulsory. The stated goals of the new system were to

1. meet the needs of social progress
2. develop the spirit of education among the people
3. develop [the child's] personality
4. develop citizens' economic potential
5. emphasise 'life education'
6. facilitate the universalisation of education
7. allow regional flexibility.³⁰

To meet these new and disparate demands, the curriculum was substantially revised and expanded, and, for the first time, individual subject curricula (*kecheng gangyao*) were issued. These were drafted by experts in the field, and briefly outlined subject-specific teaching goals and provided detailed syllabi which were intended as the basis of teaching and textbooks.

Inspired by foreign theories adopted in professional historiography, the new field of archaeology, and a more internationalist ethos, History was to avoid traditional moralising and describe how 'human lives have changed over time, so as to nurture students' ability to adapt to their environment and subdue nature.' It was also to 'awaken their sympathy with all humanity in order to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual assistance,' and to help them 'discover the origins of things so they may understand the true nature of present issues.' Furthermore, it was to teach basic 'historical research methods and foster interest and familiarity with historical works.' To elucidate the 'common development of human society throughout the world,' and 'eradicate the narrow conception of dynasties as the basic historical unit,' Chinese and non-Chinese history were merged, with Chinese history simply to be 'described in added detail' within the 'framework of world history.'³¹ Junior secondary History outlined social and political development from ancient times to the present, concentrating on major civilisations (mainly European) and events, while Cultural History was taught compulsorily in senior secondary, covering the same time-frame, but focusing on topics such as scientific and economic developments, politics and international relations, religion, philosophy, art and literature. This was intended to emphasise the relationships of cause and effect between events, ideas and phenomena.³² This attempt to move away from moralising dynastic history towards a 'scientific' approach to global political, economic and cultural change closely

³⁰ 'Xuexiao xitong gaige ling' [1922], COCP, p105.

³¹ 'Chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng gangyao' [1923], COH, p14.

³² 'Chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng gangyao' [1923] and 'Gaoji zhongxue gonggong bixiu de wenhua shixue gangyao' [1923], COH, pp14-20.

reflected the New Culture reformers' preoccupations with science; indeed, following professional historians' rejection of China's earliest history as myth and fabrication, the sage-kings and the Xia and Shang dynasties were even eliminated from the curriculum.

Whether the new curricula were actually followed in school classrooms is questionable. Available History textbooks were predominantly translated or adapted from foreign (mainly Japanese) texts,³³ and although some were written locally after the establishment of the Republic, all were in classical Chinese and were becoming obsolete with the transition to the vernacular.³⁴ Following promulgation of the 1922 curriculum, however, textbook production began to develop rapidly, with commercial publishers espying a potentially lucrative market.³⁵ Although none appear to have adopted the curricular principle of integrating Chinese and world history, they generally followed state guidelines, for they required official approval to be commercially successful.³⁶ Even if the new textbooks produced by China's professional historians transmitted the new learning, however, many teachers were classically trained, had little knowledge of non-Chinese history and probably found it difficult to move towards the less text-centred, more interactive learning style advocated in the curriculum guidelines.³⁷ Additionally, the few teacher training colleges could not produce enough graduates willing to remain in the profession. The new curriculum, furthermore, was barely implemented beyond wealthy urban centres, primarily because local education bureaux did not usually have the funds or the political will to implement the costly new programme (especially at secondary level). It was also, however, because many people, particularly in rural areas, were still hostile to the new learning, which, as in the past, represented attempts by educated elites to 'transform the (common) people and change their (crude) customs'.

³³ Bai, *Lishi jiaoxue wenti tantao*, pp208-209. Among the (reputedly) more widely used of these adaptations was Chen Qingnian, *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu*, vols.1-2, originally published before the revolution in 1910, but revised and republished in 1913.

³⁴ See for example: *Zhonghua zhongxue lishi jiaokeshu*, vols.1-4 (Shen Wu ed., vols.1-3; Zhang Xiang, vol.4); *Xinzhì benguo shi jiaoben*, vols. 1-3 (Zhong Shulong ed.); *Gongheguo jiaokeshu benguo shi*, vols. 1-2 (Zhao Yusen ed.), published with an accompanying set of teacher reference materials; *Gongheguo jiaokeshu benguo shi cankaoshu*, vols.1-4. These textbooks were all reprinted several times until the early 1920s, suggesting that they were among the more popular editions.

³⁵ Gu Jiegang and Wang Zhonglin eds., *Xiandai chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: benguo shi*, vols.1-3. Other popular editions included Jin Yaozi, *Xin zhongxue jiaokeshu chuji benguo lishi* vols.1-2. Zhao Yusen, *Xinzhuo benguo shi*, vols.1-2 (this was a revision of his earlier text, *Gongheguo jiaokeshu benguo shi*).

³⁶ 'Guomin xuexiaoling shixing xize' [1916] required all textbooks to be officially approved, but by the 1920s it was merely an advantage for the publisher to have the *Daxueyuan* stamp.

Although individual educators outside the parameters of formal education and some local warlords tried to improve literacy and/or develop genuinely mass education,³⁸ most people remained illiterate, and many rural schools simply evaded the new regulations and continued to teach the Confucian canon from ancient character primers.

II. Nationalist History

The End of Liberalism

When the Kuomintang (KMT) gained control in 1927, they attempted to centralise the education system, and even planned to produce unified textbooks, but this idea was soon abandoned as impractical,³⁹ and they merely updated the existing inspection and approval system. A rigorous process of national curriculum development was also established under the auspices of the MOE Primary and Secondary School Curriculum Standards Committee, involving many academics and educationalists in the initial drafting and subsequent discussion processes, although final approval rested with the MOE.⁴⁰ The separation between an overarching curriculum (*kecheng biao zhun zong gang*), which outlined general principles and allocated class hours, and individual subject curricula (also known as *kecheng biao zhun*) tailored to specific disciplinary goals and content was maintained, although the new curricula also added lengthy instructions to guide teaching, study and homework. Teaching and learning goals were also far more clearly specified and content was substantially altered, particularly in arts and social sciences, for although both the 1922 Education Decree and 1925 draft constitution explicitly stated that education must be independent of politics, the KMT instated Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People (*sanminzhuyi*) as the guiding ideology of the state and its education system. Thus, it was directed that 'everything which violates the Three Principles should be excised

³⁷ At least two textbooks were required as the 'starting point of study,' on which other methods such as lectures and discussion could build ('Gaoji zhongxue gongong bixiu de wenhua shixue gangyao' [1923], COH, p17).

³⁸ Most notable among these educators are probably Tao Xingzhi, James Yen and Liang Shuming. Liang is particularly interesting, for he believed China's problem was not a lack of modernity and 'Western' knowledge and institutions, but was caused by their corrosive effect on traditional values. (Alitto, *The Last Confucian*). The warlords Yan Xishan and Chen Jiongming also invested in education in the areas under their control. By 1923, Yan's efforts had ensured that 60% of school-age boys and 11% of girls were enrolled in primary school in Shanxi (figs. cit. in Rozman ed. *The Modernization of China*, p408).

³⁹ Peake, *Education and Nationalism in Modern China*, p102.

⁴⁰ 'Xiaoxue kecheng zanxing biao zhun zong shuoming' [1929], COCP, p116 and 'Chuji zhongxue zanxing kecheng biao zhun shuoming' [1929], COCP, p119. Those involved in the 1929 draft History

from curriculum materials,' although, perhaps somewhat contradictorily, it was also stated that scientific methods and evidence were to be 'the basis, so as to reduce the errors of subjectivity.'⁴¹ It was clear, however, that politics was to have priority over 'science', and in addition to permeating the curriculum with the Three Principles of *minzu* (nationalism), *minquan* (People's Rights) and *minsheng* (People's Livelihood) and directly promoting the Nationalist agenda in Citizenship, significant class time (2-6%) was allocated to Party Principles, and students were to learn military drills in Party Cadet classes. The curriculum for these subjects, moreover, was not issued by the MOE but by the Party Central Office.⁴²

Although in primary schools History was integrated with Geography and Citizenship into a new Social Studies course, it retained an important place in the curriculum and was taught throughout junior and senior secondary school. In line with the nationalist ethos, Chinese and world history were separated, and approximately two-thirds of class hours focused on China alone. Moral didacticism, regarded as crucial to 'saving the nation', was restored as a central History objective, expected to 'nurture [students'] noble sentiments and the tireless spirit of serving the people (*renqun*).'⁴³ Chinese History was to follow the Three Principles, narrating the development of the nation, People's Rights and Livelihood, which had culminated (inevitably) in the 'Nationalist Revolution'. This required a combination of political, economic, social and cultural history, with an emphasis on recent history to demonstrate 'how the Chinese *minzu* has suffered foreign invasions... [in order to] stimulate students' *minzu* spirit and arouse consciousness of their responsibility to China's National Movement (*minzu yundong*).'⁴⁴ Indeed, the importance of this period to *minzu* consciousness-raising was such that teachers were explicitly warned to plan ahead to ensure sufficient class time for full coverage of China's humiliations.⁴⁵ *Minzu*, however, remained ill-defined, although the three principal themes highlighted as the core of Chinese history suggest efforts to create flexible boundaries which could be moved as necessary. These overlapping themes were 'the past glories of the Chinese *minzu*,' 'the relationship between history and present-day

curriculum included Gu Jiegang and He Bingsong (Jin, 'He Bingsong dui lishi jiaoyu de gongxian', p532).

⁴¹ 'Xiaoxue kecheng zanxing biao zhun zong shuoming' [1929], COCP, p117.

⁴² 'Chuji zhongxue zanxing kecheng biao zhun shuoming' [1929], COCP, p119.

⁴³ 'Chuji zhongxue lishi zanxing kecheng biao zhun' [1929], COH, p21.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p21.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p27.

life' and 'the extension of China's borders (*kuojiang*).'⁴⁶ History thus narrated how past cultural and/or military superiority had allowed the 'Han race' to assimilate (*tonghua*) or Sinify (*Hanhua*) both its neighbours and barbarian invaders, thus expanding national territory (*guotu*); how together as the 'Chinese national people' (*Zhonghua minzu*), they had resisted recent invaders; and how evolving political and civic consciousness had led to the establishment of the Nanjing government and its correct social and economic policies. Racial, cultural and political communities were thereby conflated in the rubric of both nation and state, KMT legitimate succession was successfully demonstrated and the present territorial claims of the Republic were justified.

World history, meanwhile, traced the origins of the present international balance of power, and required students to develop 'international knowledge' and 'a broad outlook.'⁴⁷ As in the 1923 Curriculum, international 'sympathy' and 'a spirit of fraternal co-operation, justice and tolerance'⁴⁸ were to be cultivated, but were now to be moderated to 'appropriate' levels to prevent students from developing 'excessively lofty ideals' which might lead them to 'neglect the necessity of revitalising and protecting the Chinese *minzu*.' Through examining the histories of other societies (predominantly European), students were to understand that

capitalist imperialism in recent history has led to the oppression of workers and weak *minzu*. Since the First World War, these weak *minzu* have risen up to oppose imperialism and demand independence ... China is an important member of this group. Thus when teaching foreign history in China, special attention must be paid to the development of imperialism and independence movements so as to inspire citizens with the courage and diligence to cast off the bonds of imperialism and achieve liberation.

The example of the imperialist powers, however, was to motivate the Chinese *minzu* to strive for similar greatness, although China would not, of course, 'imitate imperialist policies..... The post-war world is, nonetheless, one in which might prevails, and thus [China] must not be seduced by ideals of Universal Harmony (*datong shijie*).' Despite the emphasis on self-strengthening and resisting imperialism, students were not to become unequivocally anti-foreign; indeed History was to 'correct narrow, anti-foreign, *minzu* prejudice.' It was also to provide practical precedents, and in *tiyong* fashion, students were to recognise the cultural (primarily

⁴⁶ Ibid, p22.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p21.

⁴⁸ 'Gaoji zhongxue putongke waiguoshi zanzheng kecheng biao zhun' [1929], COH, p37.

recent scientific) achievements of Europe and the USA, and use them to supplement China's deficiencies.⁴⁹

That Nationalist curricula and textbooks could take such an anti-imperialist stance vis-à-vis Europe, while lauding Han military conquests of 'foreign peoples/races' (*waizu*, *yizu*) does not seem to have been regarded as a contradiction. A possible reason was the influence of USSR ideas on the KMT and of historical materialism, then making rapid inroads among historians. This posited imperialism as an advanced stage of capitalism. Since 'China' had been at the feudal or proto-capitalist stage during its expansions, by definition it could not be imperialist.⁵⁰ This, however, merely removed the opprobrious label of 'imperialism'; it did not account for the national glory derived from Han subjugation of 'weak *minzu*' or conquest of *their* 'national territory'. It is probable, therefore, that the resemblance to imperialism was unseen because China's culture and political system had long been regarded as benefiting 'barbaric' peoples, bringing them the light of civilisation where there was hitherto only ignorance. Indeed, most history textbooks clearly 'proved' that when uncivilised *waizu* invaded Han territories, they did so not simply to plunder, but because they 'craved' civilisation. Such a comparison could not be made with the European colonial project, not because it had no ideological justification, but because the European civilising mission was, in China's case, being brought to a society that regarded itself not merely as already civilised, but as 'civilisation itself.'⁵¹ As the twelfth-century historian, Zheng Qiao, had written, 'The myriad states have each their different ways, but all must join in the greater community which is China; only then may the outlying areas escape the ills of stagnation'⁵²

As Japanese exigencies intensified and the KMT felt increasingly threatened by the Communists, efforts were made to intensify moral-ideological education, most notably through the New Life Movement launched in 1934, which advocated adherence to Confucian virtues of decorum (*li*), righteousness (*yi*), integrity (*lian*) and a sense of shame (*chi*). This it was hoped would raise the 'cultural level' of the people, so that they could better resist enemies both without and within. Somewhat surprisingly, neither New Life nor the subsequent outbreak of war significantly

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Many History education professionals reiterated this view when I questioned them on China's 'imperialist' history.

⁵¹ This paraphrases Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, p7. The original quote reads, 'In the eyes of the emperor's subjects, the [Chinese] empire was not a country, but the country, not a culture, but culture itself.'

affected the History curriculum or textbooks, although curriculum goals became increasingly presentist and more dogmatically N/nationalist, placing ever greater weight on defending the *minzu* and the state, supporting the leadership and opposing imperialism. Presumably as a call to national unity, a slight redefinition of the formation of the *Zhonghua minzu* was also displayed, with the terms ‘assimilation’ (*tonghua*) and ‘Sinicisation’ (*Hanhua*), which implied Han superiority and, frequently, military conquest of other ethnic groups, abandoned in favour of the more egalitarian and peaceful process of ‘ethnic integration’ (*minzu ronghe*). In addition, class hours were adjusted to increase emphasis on Chinese history (see tables 1.1 & 1.2 below), and in fact by 1948, world history no longer warranted a separate course of study, but was to be inserted into the Chinese history course at appropriate junctures. As is evident from the 1948 revised syllabus, this was not intended in the internationalist spirit of the 1923 curriculum, but was because world history was considered inessential to the paramount objective of propagating

Abbreviations

I, II, III	first, second, third year of school	A	ancient history	Ch	Chinese history
i, ii	first, second semester	M	modern history	W	World history
x	class hours per week	C	contemporary history		

1929-1949

1.1 Junior Secondary

	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii	III.i	III.ii
1929*	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1932	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1936	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1940	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x
1948#	Ch(+W)/2x	Ch(+W)/2x	Ch(+W)/2x	Ch(+W)/2x	Ch(+W)/2x	Ch(+W)/2x

1.2 Senior Secondary

	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii	III.i	III.ii
1929*	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1932	Ch/4x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1936	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1940	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch/2x	W/2x	W/2x
1948##			Ch/2x	Ch/2x	Ch., W/2x	W/2x

* Suggested class hour distribution. Class hour allocation in the 1929 draft curriculum was not given; rather, a credit system was employed, 1 credit = 1 term of 1 class hour p/w. History for both junior and senior secondary was to consist of twelve credits over three years - 8 Chinese: 4 world for junior secondary, 6:6 in senior secondary.

Class hour distribution unspecified. Suggested only that world history be integrated with Chinese history

Precise class hour allocation unspecified, distribution specified as 60% Chinese, 40% world.

⁵² Quoted by Fincher, ‘China as a race, culture and nation’, p64.

patriotism and loyalty to the KMT.⁵³ Other than the changes noted above, however, syllabi and most textbooks were barely altered during the turbulent 1937-1949 period except to bring content up to the wartime present. What is astounding, however, is that amidst all China's troubles the KMT government found time and resources to revise the school curriculum at all. According to Li, this may be attributed to the 'study to save the nation' (*dushu jiuguo*) theory popular among many educationalists and the associated KMT policy of 'viewing wartime as peacetime,' maintaining a semblance of normality and stability within the surrounding chaos. The war, it was thought, was going to be a lengthy affair, and skilled personnel as well as soldiers would be needed both for the resistance and post-war reconstruction. Education was thus to continue as usual.⁵⁴

III. History for the Masses

New Regime, New System

The Nationalists were indeed correct that the war would be long and that skilled personnel would be needed for national reconstruction. By 1949, however, they were no longer on hand to supervise the reconstruction project, having been resoundingly defeated by the Communists, thence retreating to Taiwan to re-establish themselves as the government of Mainland China in absentia and plan the overthrow of the People's Republic. As the actual government of China, the Communists finally had the opportunity to implement the policies they had tested in the liberated areas (*jiefangqu*) under their control during the war years in the national arena. Once in power, however, the many policy experiments of the resistance years were abandoned in favour of a more traditional, centralised model, much along KMT lines, with significant borrowings from the USSR. Education was considered central to socialist transformation and modernisation, and with a 'new' cause and ideology, it was thought that the education system and curriculum and textbook content of the past would need to be substantially reformed as well as more closely controlled by the state. In 'value-free' sciences and foreign languages, reform was not urgent, but in ideology-laden History and other humanities subjects, it was deemed essential immediately to adopt 'Marxist-Leninist viewpoints and methods, and new democratic, scientific, mass, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture to replace the reactionary idealist,

⁵³ 'Xiuding chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng biao zhun' [1948], COH, pp97-99.

⁵⁴ Li Dingkai, *Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de jiaoyu*, pp2-6; 'Zhongxue kecheng biao zhun bianding zhi jingguo' [1940], COCP, p145.

mechanical materialist, feudal, comprador, fascist ideology and curriculum produced under reactionary Kuomintang rule.⁵⁵ To this end, it was decided that not only would the state continue to issue detailed national curricula, but it would also provide a public school system with a Party-supervised education administration at all levels of government from central to local and would take charge of textbook publication.⁵⁶ This could not, of course, be achieved overnight, but after a brief transitional phase, during which policy would be locally set and textbooks selected from Yan'an editions, abridged versions of professional (preferably Marxist) scholars' work, or those from the Nationalist era judged politically acceptable, China would adopt the USSR model, and all children would follow the same course, with the same textbook, at the same time.⁵⁷

The structure of the new education system was not, in fact, to be very different from that established by the KMT. Over the next few years, general Teaching Plans (*jiaoxue jihua*) and individual subject Teaching Outlines (*jiaoxue dagang*) replaced the Nationalists' Curriculum Standards (*kecheng biao zhun*), but the development process as well as the format and even much of the content of the new curricula were remarkably similar to their allegedly 'feudal' and 'fascist' incarnations produced by the Nationalists. The first Teaching Plans and Outlines were initially drafted by the MOE, while the task of producing unified textbooks was assigned to the People's Education Press (PEP), which had been established as an organ directly accountable to the MOE in December 1950. By the mid-late 1950s, however, PEP had acquired a virtual monopoly over subject curricula. Not only did PEP produce all school textbooks and accompanying sets of teacher handbooks, but it also assumed responsibility for Outline production, although comments and advice continued, in principle at least, to be sought from academic and pedagogical 'experts' before

⁵⁵ *RMRB*, 'Ren zhen shishi wenfa xueyuan de xin kecheng' 14/10/1949. This exhortation is frequently cited or adapted by writers on the history of education when arguing for the newness of CPC policies as distinct from those of the KMT. See, for example, Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai gaige shi*, p330; Yu, Ye and Zhao, *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue*, pp109-110. The *RMRB* exhortation is an elaboration of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Common Programme, which declared 'The cultural education work of the People's Government should raise the cultural level of the People, nurture talented persons for national construction, eradicate feudal, comprador and fascist thinking, and develop ideology which serves the People' (cit. in Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p119).

⁵⁶ Lu Dingyi (then CPC Propaganda chief), Xinhua shudian work conference [19/10/1949] cit. in Zhao, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue*, p92.

⁵⁷ The early years in the USSR had allowed relative freedom in education outside the few Party schools, but from the mid-1930s central control was increasingly asserted over the curriculum, textbooks and school time-tabling (Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*, pp123-145; see also Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*).

curricula and textbooks were promulgated.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, under state and Party supervision, an increasing number of education journals were published (several of them by PEP), various academic and professional associations were created, and individual subject ‘research groups’ (*yanjiuzu*) were established in secondary schools to find ways to improve both the ideological and academic ‘quality’ and uniformity of teaching.⁵⁹

The Purpose of History

Education in New China was to unite Marxist-Leninist theory and China’s revolutionary practice, as exemplified by Mao thought, and develop children’s intellectual, moral, physical and aesthetic abilities, preparing them to progress to the next level of schooling or to take up employment. Students were to learn to ‘love the motherland, the People (*renmin*), labour, and science, and develop civic morality and resolute courage to protect public property.’ They were also to be healthy, disciplined and to develop their creative abilities.⁶⁰ At the secondary level, emphasis was also placed on cultivating ‘self-awareness’ or ‘self-consciousness’ (*zijue*), so that students would internalise ideology, ethics and discipline rather than simply obey instructions. They were thus to be taught ‘good study habits and the skills of analysis, criticism and independent thinking to enable them to understand and use the knowledge learnt in each subject, and to verify and develop it through practical application.’⁶¹

In addition to developing science and technology for China’s economic modernisation, moral-ideological education was strongly emphasised as a means of creating new socialist citizens. With a clear Politics curriculum yet to be determined, History was selected as the principal conduit for inculcating new ideological precepts and ‘socialist morality’, and transmitting the revised narrative of legitimate succession, now ‘scientifically’ proven by historical materialist ‘laws’.⁶² Although no individual subject curriculum was issued for secondary History until 1956, its basic goals were made perfectly clear in both the Plans and the primary school History Outlines. Its chief purpose was to provide children with ‘an elementary

⁵⁸ It had been planned that PEP would assume Outline drafting duties by 1959, but the reins were actually handed to PEP in 1957 (‘Guanyu zhongxue lishi, dili, wuli, shengwu dengke jiaokeshu de jingjian banfa’ [1957], COH, p236).

⁵⁹ ‘Xiaoxue zanxing guicheng’, ‘Zhongxue zanxing guicheng’ [1952], COCP, pp200-212.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p200, 206.

⁶¹ ‘Zhongxue zanxing guicheng’ [1952], COCP, p209.

⁶² The first Politics Outline was not issued until 1959. In the interim various courses on socialist theory, revolutionary history and the PRC constitution were taught.

understanding of the laws of historical development: that the labouring people (*laodong renmin*) create history, and that class struggle drives history forward.’ This would gradually foster a ‘historical materialist viewpoint, the willpower for revolutionary struggle’ and an awareness of China’s ‘place and responsibilities in the endeavour to achieve world peace.’ At the same time, children would learn that the Chinese people (*Zhonghua minzu*) are ‘hardworking, brave and wise,’ that they have ‘made many great discoveries’ and ‘occupy an important position in Asian and world history.’ This would nurture patriotism.⁶³ Indeed, so important was History to moral-ideological training that in all Plans until 1957, it was consistently allocated approximately 10% of total class hours, behind only Chinese and Mathematics.

During the New Democracy phase, Chinese history was allocated two-thirds of class hours, as had been the case under the Nationalists. Both Chinese and world history were taught from ‘ancient times’ to the present, and junior secondary content was simply repeated at senior secondary level in more depth. By 1953, however, China was ‘leaning to one side’ and adopting USSR models, resulting in an equalised distribution of class hours between Chinese and world history. Moreover, world history was to precede Chinese, so as to situate the latter in a global context, while repetition at junior and senior secondary levels was avoided by arranging the curriculum in a continuous chronological narrative. Only ancient history was thus taught in junior secondary and only modern in senior secondary. Although this must have allowed greater depth of study, it seems that Chinese educators thoroughly disliked it, feeling that it devalued the importance and uniqueness of China’s past, as well as depriving the many students who did not progress to senior secondary of the historical knowledge necessary to understand the modern world and provide motivation to build China anew. It may have been an acceptable structuring of the syllabus in the USSR, one Chinese textbook editor has argued, but the Soviets had a ten-year compulsory system, ensuring that all students would complete the entire course. Furthermore, ‘the USSR is a European country and has from ancient times on always had a relatively close relationship with the world..... China’s national situation is different.... Ancient China’s links with the world were not close, but the Teaching Plans (1953-1955) blindly copied [the USSR].’⁶⁴

⁶³ ‘Xiaoxue zanxing guicheng’ [1952], COCP, p204.

⁶⁴ Zhao, ‘Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue shijian sishinian’, p3.

The Materialist Conception of History

By the time the first History Teaching Outline and accompanying set of PEP textbooks were issued in 1956-1957, a fairly coherent national and international historical narrative had been established, and despite some minor changes in the 1963 Outline and later textbook editions, and the rupture of the Cultural Revolution, this narrative has remained fundamentally intact in the post-Mao era. As discussed in the previous chapter, the new national and international narratives sought principally to define the nation-state, its national people and their unique characteristics, and to compare China favourably against its Others. It also, however, followed more 'traditional' Chinese themes of moral didacticism and incontrovertibly proving legitimate succession.

The theory of legitimate succession, however, had been revised, and the 'inevitability' of Communist Party (CPC) rule was now 'scientifically' proven by historical materialist 'laws', although Mao's oft-quoted dictum, 'Political power comes from the barrel of a gun,' also explicitly acknowledged the pivotal role of 'might'. Synthesising China's actual historical development with an evolutionary model derived from European history, and balancing ideological orthodoxy with patriotic and cultural-historical pride, however, was complex, as China's historians would attest, for they had laboured long and hard to correlate theory (*lun*) with historical data (*shi*).⁶⁵ This had largely resulted in 'Sinification' of the imported theory, particularly in school History where ongoing debates of the academic world were ignored or simplified to accommodate younger (and more impressionable) minds. Inexorable social evolution from primitive communist to slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist society was thus modified to de-emphasise the capitalist stage, since China had only developed the 'sprouts of capitalism' (*ziben zhuyi mengya*) before repeated foreign invasions 'reactionary', 'feudal' and 'fascist' thinking on the part of China's corrupt rulers obstructed progress, reducing the once great empire to a 'semi-feudal, semi-colonial' state.

Regime changes, meanwhile, were attributed primarily to class contradictions and struggle, and much attention focused on landholding patterns, taxation systems, and corresponding tensions between landlords and the peasantry which had culminated eventually in 'righteous peasant uprisings' (*nongmin qiye*). Although class relations and peasant uprisings were highlighted as history's 'motive force', Chinese history

⁶⁵ For a full discussion of pre-1949 communist historiography see Dirlik, *Revolution and History*.

actually traced the rise and fall of dynasties (Fig. 1.3), and tempered economic determinism with voluntarism, assigning individuals prominent, and frequently decisive, roles in historical events. Consequently, efforts to emphasise the peasantry's gradual transition from 'spontaneous' (*zifa*) resistance against oppression and exploitation towards class consciousness and 'self-aware' (*zijue*) revolutionary action were mostly superseded by tales of Great Men, which focused on 'praising' heroic rebel leaders and 'blaming' their reactionary ruling class opponents, despite the fact that innate 'class morality' had supposedly replaced acquired Confucian morality.

Whether it was because historical materialism (Sinified or otherwise) is at root a foreign theory, or simply that the cultural legacy retained a powerful grip on modern thinking, the CPC also sought to demonstrate legitimate succession in more strictly traditional terms of moral superiority over predecessors, and the defence, restoration and preservation of national unity. Accordingly, History Outlines and textbooks portrayed the CPC as the spearhead of the national restoration movement: organising

Fig. 1.3 Periodisation of Chinese History

Historical materialist stage of development	Era/Dynasty	Historical Period
Primitive Communism , 1.7m-2100BC	Primitive, tribal (matriarchal, patriarchal) society	Ancient History 1.7m BC – 1840
Slave Society , 2100-476BC	Xia, Shang, Zhou	
Feudal Society , 475BC-1840AD (Since this accounts for most of China's recorded history, the curriculum normally divides feudal society into the five stages shown opposite).	1. Warring States, Qin, Western Han, Eastern Han 2. Three Kingdoms, Western Jin, Eastern Jin, Northern and Southern dynasties 3. Sui, Tang 4. Five Dynasties, Liao, Song, Xi Xia, Jin, Yuan 5. Ming, Qing (to 1840).	
Semi-feudal, semi-colonial, Bureaucratic capitalist , 1840-1949	Qing (post-1840)	Modern History 1840-1919
	Republic of China 1911-1927 (Warlordism)	Contemporary History 1919 -
	Nanjing Government 1927-1949 (Nationalist Party)	
Socialist 1949 -	People's Republic of China	

strikes and boycotts to protest against foreign imperialist exigencies, and single-handedly leading the people in fighting the 'War of Resistance against Japan', while also improving rural conditions through land reform and education in CPC-held 'liberated areas'. Conversely, the Nationalists were shown to have been profoundly corrupt, to have brutally exploited the people, and capitulated to or collaborated with the enemy, while simultaneously attempting to exterminate the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek and his (bourgeois self-seeking) Nationalists thereby forfeited the ruling mandate to the morally 'superior' and more 'patriotic' CPC and the (virtuous,

disciplined and working class) People's Liberation Army (PLA). This allowed the CPC to establish the People's Republic, ending the period of disunity and the 'hundred years of humiliation' caused by foreign invasion, Qing conservatism, warlord rapacity and KMT perfidy.⁶⁶

As demonstrated above, history not only legitimised regimes, but also defined the parameters of the nation-state over which the regime presided, and to which entity citizens were expected to show loyalty. For symbolic reasons of national continuity, strategic concerns to maintain buffer zones between China and potential enemies, and pragmatic interests in exploiting natural resources to expedite modernisation, the PRC, like the Republic, claimed (most) territories formerly controlled by the Qing empire.⁶⁷ History thus charted the evolution of the nation-state in such a way as to demonstrate incontestable sovereignty over ethnic minority regions, Taiwan, and assorted oil- and mineral-rich atolls in the surrounding seas. A cornerstone of CPC ideology, however, was promoting egalitarianism and, like the Nationalists, opposing imperialism. Unlike the Nationalists, however, the Communists did appear to see problems with simultaneously opposing European imperialism and lauding Chinese expansionism. They thus sought to prove that minority territories were not, as traditionally regarded, simply Chinese imperial conquests or that ethnic minorities were the culturally and technologically 'inferior' objects of a Han civilising mission. Instead, non-Han or internationally contested territories were portrayed as 'indivisible parts of China from ancient times onwards' (*zigu yilai buke fenlie de lingtu*), and a primordial conception of the *Zhonghua minzu* was promoted, entwining both the majority Han and diverse minority nationalities in a common ancestry from Peking Man and a common destiny in a Communist utopia. Thus, what were once considered 'invasions' by 'barbarians' (the Xiongnu, Mongols, Manchus), bringing 'disaster' for the legitimate (ethnic Han) rulers (Han, Song, Ming), were recast as internal clashes erupting within eternal national borders, or were lauded as national unification movements, and the themes of integration and friendship between nationalities were emphasised. Such inter-ethnic confrontations were predominantly classified as 'class contradictions' to emphasise the dominant theme of integration, unity and friendship

⁶⁶ 'Chuji zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaoxue dagang' [1956], COH, pp146-152; PEP *Zhongguo lishi* [1956], Vol.4, Ding Xiaoguang, *Zhongguo jindai jianshi*.

⁶⁷ The Mongolian People's Republic and those parts of the USSR originally ceded by the Qing to Czarist Russia in 'unequal treaties' were not claimed, as they were now liberated from capitalism and imperialism and flew the flag of international socialism. After relations with the USSR deteriorated, however, these territories once again became 'lost' parts of China.

between nationalities. Meanwhile, uprisings against the dynasty, which were not led by the peasantry, or which asserted independence from the centre, were simply labelled as ‘treasonous rebellions’ (*fanpan, panluan*). Despite efforts to portray ethnic relations as harmonious and egalitarian, however, traditional prejudices persisted in historical materialist guise, with most minority cultures categorised as ‘feudal’ (backward), thus requiring the Socialist (advanced) Han to modernise them.⁶⁸

Integrating non-Chinese history and political ideology was relatively straightforward, mainly because there was far less at stake politically, but also because the deeply ingrained Sinocentric worldview meant that there was no long-standing tradition of studying the histories of other states or societies, a deficiency Soviet influence had failed to redress.⁶⁹ Furthermore, world history was primarily Eurocentric, sitting more easily, therefore, with a historical materialist interpretation. Proving the ‘objective laws’ of historical materialism appears to have been the principal purpose of world history, although it was also charged with inculcating ‘internationalism’ and further inspiring patriotism and commitment to the Chinese revolution. Major ancient ‘slave’ civilisations (Egypt, Greece, Rome) and the cultures of ‘feudal’ empires in Europe, Asia and the Arab world were thus surveyed both to demonstrate the relevant historical materialist stage and to prove China’s greater antiquity and longevity; as one text on patriotic education explained

Of the ancient civilisations which emerged on the stage of history at approximately the same time as China, some had long terminated their historical development, such as Ancient Greece and Babylon, while others had for long periods of time lagged far behind China in historical development, such as Egypt and India. Only when China had completed the great developmental phases of the Ch’un-ch-iu, the Warring States and the two Han periods, did the English of today begin to establish a number of small unintegrated states. As for the United States of America, it is hardly comparable to us, with its less than two hundred years of nation-making.⁷⁰

Most world history content, however, focused on the origins of capitalism, the evils of imperialism-colonialism, and their inevitable demise and displacement by communism. This involved great emphasis on changing modes of production, modern and contemporary European ‘revolutions’, and anti-colonial or independence movements in the oppressed, ‘proletarian nations’ of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

⁶⁸ For a full discussion of the ‘civilising’ project and PRC historiography of minority nationalities, see Stevan Harrell ed. *Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers*.

⁶⁹ On the dearth of research, publication and education in non-Chinese history see Croizier, ‘World history in the PRC’, pp151-169.

⁷⁰ Cit. in Hu, ‘The Teaching of History in Communist China’, pp8-9.

Political Change and the Place of History

From 1952-1956, History remained heavily influenced by Soviet models, and China both sent teachers to the USSR to learn from Soviet experiences and welcomed many Soviet education and history experts to recommend ways to improve Chinese practice.⁷¹ Unlike in science subjects where Soviet textbooks were simply translated and modified to suit the Chinese schooling system, History did not, as the above-quoted Zhao has claimed, ‘blindly copy’ the USSR; indeed, the CPC established two special committees in 1953 to oversee issues in History and Chinese language education (*lishi/yuwen jiaoxue wenti weiyuanhui*), and ensure that theoretical, ideological and pedagogical matters pertaining to these subjects were fully addressed in light of China’s particular needs and characteristics.⁷² As relations with the USSR deteriorated following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and China reverted to a more Sinocentric and isolationist stance, however, the old 2:1 Chinese: world history ratio and the repetition at junior and senior secondary levels was restored.⁷³ By the late 1950s, China had vowed no longer to borrow from its revisionist European neighbour - now viewed as just another European imperialist power masquerading as an international socialist one - but would find its own way to Communism and walk there on ‘two legs’, blazing a revolutionary path for other oppressed peoples to follow. In revolutionary China, the elite status, common sense and work ethic of the ‘red’ agricultural and urban proletarian classes were championed over effete, ‘bourgeois’ and potentially ‘counter-revolutionary’ academic learning. The three ‘cores of revisionism’ (textbook knowledge, classroom teaching and the teacher’s role) were criticised, and teachers and students were instructed to leave the classroom and engage in ‘situational education’ (*xianchang jiaoxue*).⁷⁴ Total class hours were cut, labour education was increased, and Politics supplanted History as the cornerstone of moral-ideological education.⁷⁵ World history was first to be excised from the junior secondary curriculum, as it was deemed unnecessary for basic moral-ideological training; ancient history was next, for the revolutionary ethos focused on

⁷¹ Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi*, p330.

⁷² These committees were established following Politburo discussions on educational work in May 1953. They were both overseen by Hu Qiaomu. (JYSD, p16; see also references to Committee work in ‘Guanyu zhongxue lishi, dili, wuli, shengwu deng ke jiaokeshu de jingjian banfa’ [1/8/1957], COH, pp236-237).

⁷³ ‘Chuji zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaoxue dagang’ [1956], ‘Chuji zhongxue shijie lishi jiaoxue dagang’ [1956], COH, pp135-181.

⁷⁴ Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi*, p332.

the present and the utopian future. Although after the Great Leap Forward, education was re-centralised and academic learning reinstated as part of the gradualist path to socialism, it was but temporary and by 1965, only one year of History was taught, and content was oriented primarily to the Chinese revolutionary tradition, with peasant rebellions and vitriolic attacks on historical 'class enemies' increasingly prominent.

Fig. 1.4 History class hour distribution 1950-1965

Abbreviations

I, II, III first, second, third year of school A ancient history Ch Chinese history
 i., ii. First, second semester M modern history W World history
 x class hours per week C contemporary history

	Junior Secondary						Senior secondary					
	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii	III.i	III.ii	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii	III.i	III.ii
1950	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	W 3x	W 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	W 3x	W 3x
1953	W A 3x	W A 3x	W A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x
1954	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	W A 3x	W A 3x	W A 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x
1955	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch M-C 3x	W A 3x	W A 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x
1956	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x	W 3x	W 3x	W M-C 3x	W M-C 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch A 3x	Ch M-C 3x	Ch M-C 3x
1958	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 2x	Ch 2x	W 2x	W 2x	W M-C 2x	W M-C 2x	Ch A 2x	Ch A 2x	Ch M-C 2x	Ch M-C 2x
1959	Ch 2x	Ch 2x	Ch 2x	Ch 2x	W 2x	W 2x	W M-C 2x	W M-C 2x	Ch A 2x	Ch A 2x	Ch M-C 2x	Ch M-C 2x
1963			Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x	Ch 3x					W 3x	W 3x
1964			Ch 4x	Ch 4x							W 3x	W 3x

When the Cultural Revolution was launched following the suspected allegorical criticism of Mao in historian Wu Han's play, *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office*, proletarian politics were put 'in command', and education through productive labour further increased. Schools and colleges, accused of being 'breeding grounds for bourgeois intellectuals,' run by 'traitors, spies and capitalist roaders,' were closed down or transformed into sites of political slogan-mongering,⁷⁶ while many education professionals were persecuted and dismissed from their posts. The entire education system was fragmented, and where classes were available, they were mainly staffed by under-qualified personnel teaching a piecemeal curriculum which prioritised Mao

⁷⁵ Lu Dingyi, 'Jiaoyu bixu yu shengchan laodong xiang jiehe', published in *Hongqi*, July 1957 (cit. in JYSD, p36); CPCCC and State Council directive, 'Guanyu jiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi' [1958] (cit. in JYSD, p37).

⁷⁶ JYSD, p53.

Thought and a correct political viewpoint above all else. Perhaps aggravated by the subversive *Hai Rui*, History was singled out as ‘a stew of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism’ (*feng, zi, xiu da zahui*), and the MOE Party Committee ordered printing, distribution and use of existing textbooks to cease. Politics and Chinese were to be integrated and History classes abolished altogether.⁷⁷ As one veteran PEP textbook editor has recalled, ‘the status and role of History were completely negated.’⁷⁸

Farewell to Revolution

By the early 1970s, it was decided that ‘stopping classes to make revolution’ (*tingke nao geming*) was obstructing China’s modernisation goals, and efforts were made to regularise education and re-establish a broad curriculum under the slogan ‘restore classes to make revolution’ (*fuke nao geming*).⁷⁹ Indeed, Zhou Enlai even questioned the wisdom of sending ‘educated youth’ to the countryside and recruiting university students based on their class background when he told a visiting foreign academic that he believed university students should be recruited directly from secondary school based on academic qualifications.⁸⁰ Although the April 1971 National Education Conference delivered the ‘Two Appraisals’, which asserted that during the entire 1949-1966 period the bourgeoisie had exercised dictatorship over the proletariat in education, and that the political outlook of all intellectuals remained fundamentally bourgeois, education restoration was tentatively begun. Central control was not, however, reasserted and administration remained at the provincial or local level, albeit supervised by the State Council Science and Education Committee, which had replaced the defunct MOE (and the National Science Commission) in 1970.⁸¹ History was reintroduced to the curriculum, and seven provincial-municipal education authorities were instructed to produce new curricula and textbooks, as the Two Appraisals rendered a return to pre-Cultural Revolution Outlines and textbooks unacceptable.

Both Chinese and world history textbooks (consisting of two volumes of the former, one of the latter) were drafted, apparently modelled on those produced by the

⁷⁷ ‘Guanyu 1966-1967 niandu zhongxue zhengzhi, yuwen, lishi jiaocai chuli yijian de qingshi baogao’ [13/6/1966], cit. in Tian and Zeng, *Zhongxiaoxue kecheng jiaocai gaige yu shiyan*, p334.

⁷⁸ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p243.

⁷⁹ This slogan had originally been used in 1967 for the same purpose, but had had little effect on revolution-minded students, especially in tertiary education institutions.

⁸⁰ Deng Xiaoping, ‘Setting Things Right in Education’ [19/9/1977] SWDX.

⁸¹ From 1973, the Committee was only responsible for education, as responsibility for scientific work was transferred to the Academy of Sciences.

Beijing Municipal Education Committee.⁸² It is difficult to know exactly what was taught, however, as no curricula were drafted and I was, unfortunately, unable to locate any Cultural Revolution textbooks. Indeed, when I expressed interest in Cultural Revolution textbooks to library staff, I was simply told that they had not been preserved being ‘worthless,’ ‘full of lies’ and ‘Gang of Four propaganda.’⁸³ Foreign researchers have not investigated this topic and reform-era Chinese writings on the matter have been brief, simply remarking on the extreme ‘leftist orientation’ and the heavy weighting towards modern-contemporary history (*houjin bogu*),⁸⁴ and noting how the history of ‘struggle’ – between Confucianism and Legalism, peasants and landlords, the ‘two lines’ within the Party, and the international proletariat and the ruling classes - replaced the systematic study of historical periods in Chinese and world history.⁸⁵ The majority of writers, however, have not even written this much, merely asserting that ‘during [the Cultural Revolution] period, there was no educational quality’ for ‘politics replaced history’ and ‘the masses of youth became ‘historically illiterate’. History courses reintroduced during the early 1970s are thus typically dismissed as ‘a disaster’ and ‘a travesty,’ in which History was ‘a small boat in a vast ocean, tossed violently by the unremitting waves of politics,’ with ‘the previous outline and textbooks repudiated and the ratio of ancient to modern, Chinese to world history thrown into chaos.’⁸⁶ It is interesting, however, that a number of these writers, although clearly fearful of the erratic Cultural Revolution regime, were far from languishing on the Mongolian steppes or in labour reform camps; rather, they were employed in textbook production at regional education institutions. Yet, none of these History textbook writer-editors (many of whom have remained in the profession in the reform era) have offered any substantial insight into History during the latter Cultural Revolution period. It seems that, like many of their contemporaries, their collaboration - however unwilling - in the Cultural Revolution administration is a part of history they prefer to forget.

The restoration of education begun in 1970 was temporarily interrupted by a last wave of revolutionary zeal, culminating in ‘the campaign to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius’, but it was clear that the majority of CPC leaders favoured re-centralisation and standardisation of education over the Gang of Four’s revolutionary

⁸² Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, pp14-15.

⁸³ Personal communications with staff at PEP and various universities in Beijing and Shanghai.

⁸⁴ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, pp14-15. See also Su, *Shibian shiyi*.

⁸⁵ Zhao, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue*, p113.

⁸⁶ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p240; Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoyu gaige shi*, p332.

model. PEP was re-established in 1972 and many former editors were reinstated, charged with drafting new textbooks for all primary and secondary school subjects. In January 1975 the MOE was re-established. Although in February 1976, Zhang Chunqiao instated a 'temporary leading group' at the MOE to ensure continued revolutionary guidance, its influence was short-lived. With Mao's death, MOE leading group chief Chi Qun and his colleagues were arrested along with their masters. The Cultural Revolution was officially over.

Chapter 2

The Political and Intellectual Context

After the Cultural Revolution, there was a brief period of hesitancy, during which Hua Guofeng followed the ‘Two Whatever’s’ policy of rigid adherence to all things Maoist.¹ It was soon acknowledged, however, that the ideological zealotry of the Cultural Revolution, which had exalted manual labour and derogated much intellectual endeavour as ‘bourgeois’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’, had not only failed to deliver the long-promised modernist utopia, but had also severely discredited the CPC and its legitimating ideology, bequeathed China with systemic chaos and a chronic shortage of skilled personnel, and excluded many individuals and groups from full membership in the ranks of the national People.

When Deng Xiaoping assumed leadership in December 1978, revolution and isolationism were repudiated, and a new era of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ announced, in which pragmatism would take precedence over ideology, and expertise over ‘redness’, famously summarised in his dictum, ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mouse.’ The ‘reform and opening’ policy was adopted to accelerate the Four Modernisations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, national defence) and the construction of ‘socialist material civilisation’, which aimed to deliver strength, prosperity and international prestige. Over the past two decades, this has entailed policy changes in many areas, including fiscal decentralisation, increased regional autonomy, development of a market economy, and re-establishment of normal relations with the outside world. Additionally, several government departments have been abolished, merged or enlarged in an attempt to rationalise tasks and responsibilities and maximise efficiency. Many ageing Party cadres have been retired, replaced by younger technocrats, and ostensible efforts have been made to increase extra-Party participation in policy-making.

While reforms have clearly facilitated economic development, ‘modernisation’ has not been a universally unqualified success. Administrative devolution and the

¹ The ‘Two Whatever’s’ refers to the statement, ‘We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave’. This statement was included in a joint editorial, ‘Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link’, published in *RMRB*, *Hongqi* and *Jiefangjun Bao* on 7/2/1977.

transition to a market economy have diffused interests and loyalties, and allowed official and commercial corruption to go unchecked; unemployment, regional and socio-economic disparities, rising crime rates and other social ills that have accompanied economic boom have led to popular discontent in both industrial and rural areas and catalysed ethnic minority unrest; 'opening', meanwhile, has permitted an influx of new ideas, culture and values which potentially challenge the political status quo. Official calls for construction of 'socialist spiritual civilisation' to promote ideological uniformity and prevent 'blind West worshipping' have been ineffectual, and consequently punctuated by sporadic campaigns to suppress dissent, 'bourgeois liberalism' and 'spiritual pollution', and by populist appeals to nationalist sentiment.

As the site of contest for the hearts and minds of the young, and thus the future, basic education (primary and secondary schooling) has been integral to the post-Cultural Revolution rehabilitation and modernisation process. It has accordingly been charged with aiding in the repudiation of past ideological 'errors' and renewing support for the Party, cultivating human resources for economic development, and combating modernisation-related problems. Such weighty responsibilities have required both structural and conceptual-ideological reforms in administration, curriculum development, textbook production, standard examinations, teacher training and recruitment, and classroom teaching. Many of these reforms remain theoretical, for although they are supported by legislation and a lively debate is ongoing in academic circles and in the media, implementation has faced tremendous obstacles, such as lack of investment and vast numbers of under-qualified teachers, as well as political concerns to promote ideological orthodoxy.² There have, nonetheless, been some noteworthy changes, including the introduction of compulsory education and limited textbook pluralism, and the recent restoration of central government subsidies for education in poorer areas. There has also been a concerted effort to downplay overt political dogmatism and to restore the primacy of subject knowledge over ideological correctness. This has resulted in a substantially modified Politics curriculum and the gradual reinstatement of History as a more 'subtle' vehicle for moral-ideological education, regime legitimation, discrediting old policies and

² The education budget still represents less than 3% of GNP, despite a stated goal of raising spending to 4% of GNP during the 9th five-year plan (figs. announced in a speech in Nov. 1995 by then-Minister of Education Zhu Kaixuan, translated in *CES*, 1997, no.3). Average education spending in other developing countries, by contrast, is 6% of GNP, in Asia, 5% (figs. cit. in Rong, 'Compulsory Education: a Chinese Dilemma').

promoting new ones. History's official status in the curriculum has thus been consolidated (see Chapter 4, Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

History's actual status, however, has not necessarily matched the attention it has received from central government, for it is not normally included in senior secondary entrance examination (SSEE) papers, and is often shunted aside to make room for extra classes in 'core' science subjects (*rangbu gei like*) which are.³ Members of the History education community have been constantly searching, therefore, for ways to defend their territory and resources in a school curriculum which is dominated both by examinations and by 'new' or 'more useful' subjects, such as IT and foreign languages. Many History education professionals in China, like their British and US counterparts in the 1970s, have highlighted the role History can play in skill-training, both to defend their subject's contemporary 'relevance' and to address genuine pedagogical concerns. That promotion of skills in Europe and North America originally arose in part also as a call to greater democratic participation, however, has not been widely discussed in China, for not only the government, but many educators themselves view History as a central component of moral-ideological education, even if their ideas of what exactly should constitute correct morality and ideology do not always accord with official dictates.

The following discussion examines views regarding the nature and purpose of History over the past two decades against the backdrop of political, social and economic change. It focuses principally on central government objectives, but also situates History in the changing intellectual climate with regard to new or resurrected debates in the field of education, where the concept of 'curriculum' and issues in pedagogy and child psychology have become major research areas, and in academic history, where both theory (*lun*) and data (*shi*), and the relationship between them have undergone considerable re-evaluation in recent years. As shown both here and in subsequent chapters, despite some significant developments, History lags behind many other school subjects in the pace and scope of tangible reform; in part, because the historical legacy weighs heavily on contemporary thinking, but primarily because History remains unavoidably implicated in regime legitimacy and current political concerns.

³ Senior secondary entrance examination requirements are determined by provincial-level education departments. In the post-Mao era, most regions examine Chinese, Mathematics, English, Physics, Chemistry and Politics. The implications of this system for History are discussed further in Chapter 7.

Although no formal divisions into temporal units or stages of development have been specified by the Ministry of Education or by History curriculum developers and educators, I have adopted a loose and informal periodisation, similar to that used by Ye.⁴ That the development phases to which I refer also roughly correspond to five-year plan cycles is not entirely coincidental, since economic decisions are often precursors for changes in other areas and have direct bearing on policy-making and implementation.

I. 'Bringing Order out of Chaos' (*boluan fanzheng*), 1976-1980

Regularisation of education began in earnest in the early 1970s and although briefly interrupted by the 'Struggle against Confucius and Lin Biao', by the time of Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, it was widely believed that Cultural Revolution education policies had hindered modernisation and that, at the very least, education should be returned to its pre-Cultural Revolution status and functions. Under Hua's leadership, education restoration was initially tentative, for 'Whateverism' prevented formal revocation of the 'Two Appraisals'. The intention to rehabilitate personnel dismissed from their posts during the Cultural Revolution and raise the status of academic learning, however, was soon clarified when the MOE Criticism Group announced that the Gang of Four had 'distorted' earlier assessments of intellectuals by labelling them all as bourgeois and in need of re-education, and thereby 'damaged the economic base of socialism.'⁵ These views were reiterated more strongly by Deng Xiaoping in May 1977 when he called for 'respect for knowledge and respect for talented persons.' If China were to modernise successfully, 'science and technology are the crux. [But] science and technology cannot be developed without first grasping education.' Comparing China to industrialised countries, he declared China twenty years behind, and called for the restoration of the elite 'key-school' system which would recruit the best students through rigorous examinations, thereby 'concentrating excellence.' Furthermore, it was to be acknowledged that those who labour with their minds are also workers, who

⁴ Ye describes ten stages of History curriculum development from the founding of the PRC to 1999: 1. 1950-1953; 2. 1953-1956; 3. 1956-1963; 4. 1963-1966; 5. 1966-1976; 6. 1976-1981; 7. 1981-1987; 8. 1987-1990; 9. 1990-1992; 10. 1992 - 1999 (Yu, Ye and Zhao, *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue*, pp109-115). Most Chinese scholars use a simpler periodisation: for example, Xiong (*Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi*, pp330-334) 1949-1957; 1958-1966; 1966-1976; 1976-1980; 1981-1990. See also Zhao, 'Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue shijian sishinian', pp2-7; Feng, 'Chuyi jianguo yilai zhongxue lishi jiaocai jianshe', pp30-34.

⁵ 'Dang de zhishi fenzi zhengce bu rong jianta', published in RMRB, 2/2/1977, (JYSD, pp56-57).

demonstrate ‘red’ ideological commitment through cultivation rather than derogation of expertise.⁶ By September, Deng was openly denouncing the Two Appraisals as absurd - if all other spheres of social and economic life had been liberated and the ‘red line’ had been basically dominant prior to 1966, how could education have been the only exception?⁷ – and in December, the Two Appraisals were branded ‘a counter-revolutionary crime.’⁸

Such pronouncements allowed the reinstatement of former ‘class enemies’, the reopening or reorganisation of schools and universities, and the reintroduction of university entrance examinations. After much debate over whether to adopt the ten-(5-3-2) or twelve-year (6-3-3, 5-4-3) system of primary, junior and senior secondary schooling, it was decided initially to restore the ten-year system to expedite production of skilled personnel. This was intended as a temporary measure, however, for, as Deng had observed, ‘opinions are still divided, and the question will have to be studied further.’ A far more pressing issue, he continued, ‘is the teaching materials we use. They must reflect the advanced levels of modern science and culture, while conforming to the actual conditions of our country.’⁹ Only through re-centralisation of curriculum development and textbook production, it was thought, could this be achieved. New curricula and textbooks were thus needed to replace the Cultural Revolution-era local policies and teaching materials which were still in use. Between autumn 1977-1978, the MOE accordingly drafted new Teaching Plans and education regulations, and commissioned teams of reinstated PEP writer-editors and academic subject experts to produce new Teaching Outlines and textbooks in time for the 1978-1979 academic year.¹⁰

In History, as shown in Chapter 4, this primarily involved reproducing the data and viewpoints of the 1963 Outline and textbooks, with a hefty dose of Mao Thought and anti-Gang of Four rhetoric, since central government had not issued a formal repudiation of Cultural Revolution historiography. Those historians who had thus far been rehabilitated had just begun tentative discussion of some questions pertaining to Cultural Revolution ideology, such as the ‘struggle between the Confucianists and

⁶ Deng Xiaoping, ‘On respecting knowledge and respecting talented persons’ (JYSD, p57).

⁷ Deng Xiaoping, ‘Setting things right in education’ [19/9/1977] SWDX, Vol.2.

⁸ Conference convened by Beijing CPC Municipal Committee, 10/12/1977 (JYSD, p59). This followed the MOE Criticism Committee’s repudiation of the Two Appraisals published in *RMRB* and other leading newspapers in November 1977.

⁹ ‘Some comments on work in science and education’ [8/8/1977] SWDX, Vol.2.

¹⁰ MOE, ‘Quanrizhi zhong(xiao)xue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli’ [22/9/1978] and ‘Quanrizhi shinianzhi zhongxiaoxue jiaoxue jihua shixing cao’an’ [1978], COCP, pp303-329.

Legalists' and the struggle between 'restoration and counter-restoration'.¹¹ These issues, however, were primarily related to ancient history, although during the Cultural Revolution more recent history had also been analysed in terms of these particular line struggles. With little willingness among historians to touch the more sensitive area of modern-contemporary history or to discuss much other than peasant rebellions (almost the only topic on which any research had been carried out during the Cultural Revolution itself),¹² History education professionals could do little other than wait before advancing any plans for reforming the content of their subject. Articles in those history education journals, such as *Lishi jiaoxue* and *Lishi jiaoxue wenti*, which had just been re-established after a ten-year suspension during the Cultural Revolution, thus primarily published 'safe' papers condemning Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and urging teachers to uphold Mao Thought, while avoiding any real discussion of historical events and issues, or what direction reforms in school History should take. Even after Deng assumed control in December 1978, neither professional history nor school History education began immediate reform, for Deng's leadership and the direction of reform were not yet confirmed, final verdicts on the Cultural Revolution and those who had participated in its excesses were not yet determined, and the closing of Democracy Wall indicated in no uncertain terms that the Party remained extremely sensitive to criticism.

II. Construction and Consolidation, 1980-1986

By the early 1980s Deng's leadership was more secure. Hua had been ousted and replaced by Deng's protégés: as Premier by Zhao Ziyang and as Party Chairman by Hu Yaobang. The official (if not exactly final) verdict on the pre-Cultural Revolution years had been delivered in the June 1981 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party,' and reform programmes had begun in earnest, albeit modified by continued emphasis (in principle at least) on conservative ideology, such as the Four Cardinal Principles, which affirmed the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership by the Party and the centrality of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.¹³

¹¹ Kaifeng shiyuan lishixi tongxunzu, 'Kaifeng shifan xueyuan lishixi juxing shixue taolunhui', *GMRB*, 19/1/1978, translated in *CE* Vol. 12, spring-summer 1979, pp127-132.

¹² See Harrison, *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions*.

¹³ Deng first spoke of the Four Cardinal Principles in 1978, but they were not published until 1981. They were subsequently included in the preamble to the 1982 constitution.

Having focused almost exclusively on restoring tertiary education to full functioning in the initial post-Cultural Revolution period, official attention now turned towards basic education, which under the ‘three-face’ (*sange mianxiang*) policy advocated by Deng was to ‘face modernisation, face the world and face the future’.¹⁴ This entailed reforming all areas of education from administration to textbooks to classroom teaching, expurgating old thinking and borrowing where appropriate from the examples and experiences of ‘advanced nations’. Particular attention was paid to the education programmes of countries such as Singapore and South Korea, not simply because they were Asian societies, but because they were politically authoritarian societies that had explicitly and successfully focused on education both for ‘developing human capital’ (*rencai kaifa*) to drive rapid economic growth and for strengthening moral and patriotic education.¹⁵ A similar approach in China, it was hoped, would expedite the development of a skilled workforce, able to adapt to new technologies to serve the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.¹⁶

Accordingly, from the early - mid-1980s, the twelve-year school system was incrementally restored, for graduates from ten-year schools were found to be ill-prepared for the challenge of university courses. Plans were also made to universalise nine-year compulsory education (primary and junior secondary, split 6-3 or 5-4). In 1985, in the ‘Decision on Reform of the Education System’ (hereafter the 1985 Reform) education administration was restructured to co-ordinate macro-planning, and to facilitate flexible implementation of reform in accordance with disparate regional needs and resources. This upgraded the MOE to the status of State Education Commission (SEdC, the title MOE was restored in a 1998 reshuffle), giving it increased powers of oversight and policy-making, and devolved micro-management to regional education bureaux and their subsidiary agencies.¹⁷

¹⁴ Deng formulated this dictum in an address to Jingshan School in Beijing 1/10/1983. It was later included in the 1985 Decision on Reforming the Education System, and is almost universally incorporated in most official directives and academic articles on education reform.

¹⁵ In Singapore, this began after the split from Malaysia in 1965 as it was realised that the land- and natural resource-poor city-state had only its people as ‘capital’. In South Korea, ‘developmental education’ (meaning education for economic development) was also begun in the 1960s under Syngman Rhee’s presidency, and was consolidated under the dictatorship of General Park during the 1970s. For more detail on the theory and practice of education for economic development in Singapore and South Korea, see Osman-Ghani, ‘Human Capital Development in Singapore’; Goh and Gopinathan, ‘History Education and the Construction of National Identity in Singapore’; Wilson, Ford and Jones, ‘The History Text’.

¹⁶ Hayhoe, *Education and Modernisation*, Lin, *Education in post-Mao China*. On current approaches to ‘human capital’ in China, see Yang et al ‘National Human Resource Development in the PRC’.

¹⁷ ‘Zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jue ding’ [27/5/1985], JYFQS, pp66-72.

Compulsory education was then legislated (1986), with implementation timelines staggered according to local conditions.¹⁸ Additionally, it was decided to extend participation in curriculum development to include more ‘expert’ advice from academics, teacher training personnel and senior teachers, and to introduce limited textbook pluralism, under the ‘one Outline, many editions (of textbooks)’ (*yigang duoben*) system. New Outlines and textbooks would henceforth be ratified by the recently created Teaching Materials Inspection Committee (TMIC), which aimed at independent adjudication and ‘objectivity’, although since committee members were to be MOE-appointed and supervised it is difficult to imagine how such goals could be attained. At the same time, it was also decided to grant the economically advanced regions of Shanghai and Zhejiang permission to design their own curricula as well as teaching materials as a pilot project in curricular devolution.

In an echo of Chiang Kai-shek’s New Life Movement and similar efforts in the early socialist transformation of China’s citizens, education reform was not only to be ‘practical’ or systemic, but from an ideological perspective was also intended to create ‘a generation of new people’ (*yidai xinren*), with a high level of ‘culture’, committed to the revised vision of socialist modernity and resistant to the pernicious influences of the ‘West’, already beginning to slip in through the open door. Although primary emphasis continued to be placed on subjects, such as sciences and foreign languages, which were perceived as ‘value-free’, and overt politicisation of curriculum content was gradually muted, it was still expected that all subjects, and humanities and social sciences in particular, would continue ‘to make the most of [their] role.....as hidden lessons in moral education.’¹⁹ History was thus gradually restored to a more prominent place in the curriculum, allocated 25% more class hours in the 1981 Teaching Plan.

Exactly what kind of morality and ideology History was expected to teach was not yet entirely clear. At the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1981, Zhao Ziyang delivered a report in which he called for the strengthening of History and Geography education in order to inculcate patriotism.²⁰ It was soon decided, however, that ‘patriotism’ needed more precise definition, and that the vague call to

¹⁸ ‘Yiwu jiaoyu fa’ [passed 12/4/1986, effective 1/7/1986], JYFQS, pp72-73.

¹⁹ Wang Shenghong, excerpts from ‘Speech at the Inaugural Conference of the Shanghai Primary and Secondary Curriculum and Teaching Materials Reform Committee’, pp55-56. The Three Lines are discussion of ideology, study of national and social situations (*guoqing*), civics; the ‘one face’ is the common aim of emphasising the moral and ethical content regarded as inherent in all subjects and activities.

love socialist China and uphold CPC leadership was not providing enough moral-ideological guidance to prevent China's youth from being swayed by the bourgeois, decadent ideas currently peddled by assorted 'Western-influenced', 'rightist' intellectuals. Informal discussions on ideological education and spiritual pollution held in autumn 1982 were leaked to the press, and over the following year numerous articles were published criticising writers who 'propagate sex and religion, distort the history of the revolution and deviate from the thinking of the Party.'²¹ Scholars who had begun to discuss Marx's humanism and had mooted the theory of alienation in socialist society were also denounced for equating socialism with capitalism and blindly following Western intellectual trends.²²

In this ideological climate, the Propaganda Ministry and the Research Department of the Party Secretariat issued an 'Opinion on strengthening patriotic education' in July 1983 as a buffer against the influence of the tiny minority who 'have lost faith in socialism, have weak sentiments towards the motherland, and have embarked on an evil path.'²³ This document acknowledged, nevertheless, that some people understandably

are confused about and lack confidence in the motherland's future... especially those comrades who grew up during the ten years of chaos, for they have not experienced the hardships of oppression, exploitation or enslavement which characterised the old society, and therefore lack emotional understanding of how diametrically opposed are the old and new societies. They have not been tested by the revolutionary struggle, and just when they most needed education [in these matters], they did not receive systematic schooling, and know little about the motherland's history, her past and present realities, the glorious tradition of the *Zhonghua minzu* or the basic principles of Marxism. Consequently, they are sometimes unable to analyse past and present problems scientifically, and may even reach the conclusion that socialism is not very good and that the motherland is not particularly loveable.²⁴

Such views were not to be punished, except in the case of unreconstructed rightists who deliberately manipulated the confusion of the ignorant, but were instead to be eradicated through all kinds of formal and informal education. The achievements of socialism were to be lauded, and the spirit of individual heroes and 'progressive groups' to be promoted by the press and in literature as role models. Television documentaries, books and photographs were to draw public attention to world renowned engineering projects such as the Great Wall and the Grand Canal, and to

²⁰ *RMRB* 14/3/1981.

²¹ *RMRB*, 31/10/1983, cit. in Ladany, *The Communist Party of China and Marxism*, p469.

²² Ladany, *ibid*, pp472-475. For more detailed analyses, see Dirlik and Meisner, *Marxism and the Chinese Experience*; Brugger and Kelly, *Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Era*.

²³ 'Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi guanyu jiaqiang aiguo zhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' [7/2/1983], *JYFQS*, p602.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p602.

areas of natural beauty and cultural heritage. This, it was hoped, would interest the public and simultaneously increase their historical knowledge and their love for the motherland and socialism. Special attention was to be paid to historical events and persons, and to the modern period (1840-1919) in particular, to stimulate awareness of past ignominy and recognition that ‘only socialism can save China.’ Minority contributions to the greatness of the national whole were also to be emphasised, and patriotic education propaganda work to be carried out especially diligently in areas where concentrations of ethnic minority populations were high. Patriotic education was to be promoted in all spheres of social and economic activity, from schools to the media to businesses, thereby raising patriotic consciousness and sentiment among all Chinese citizens, consolidating national unity and furthering the socialist modernisation enterprise.²⁵

The MOE responded promptly to the call, issuing, first, a ‘Notice on Improving and Strengthening History and Geography Education in Secondary Schools,’ then another on studying and implementing the Propaganda Ministry ‘Opinion.’ The first ‘Notice’ declared that History and Geography had hitherto been neglected, that schools had either reduced officially mandated class hours or cut the subjects altogether, that many trained History and Geography teachers were being transferred to teach other subjects while those actually teaching were the ‘teachers who are unable to teach anything at all.’ Education administration and research institutes responsible for in-service teacher training and support did not have people or departments assigned to History and Geography, and teacher quality could not therefore be improved. Moreover, the narrow focus on senior secondary and university entrance examinations which were weighted towards sciences (*like*) had a devastating impact on humanities (*wenke*), and not only did students lack knowledge of these important subjects and develop ‘one-sidedly,’ but such deficiency was impeding the development of their political-ideological consciousness (*sixiang zhengzhi juewu*), which would in turn affect ‘the establishment of a revolutionary outlook and belief in communism.’ Accordingly, education departments and schools were instructed to ensure that they followed the timetables provided in Teaching Plans, developed a corps of qualified teachers and added more variety to teaching methods, including, where possible, combining classroom learning with visits to museums and important historical sites, and using assorted audio-visual materials to

²⁵ Ibid, pp603-606.

stimulate students' interest.²⁶ These instructions were bolstered by the second 'Notice,' which reiterated the centrality of History and other humanities in patriotic education, and ordered education departments to organise publication and distribution of the July 'Opinion' to every school teacher. Study groups were then to be organised to discuss how to improve patriotic education. From the earliest possible age the concept of the motherland was to be 'engraved on children's minds,' and the motherland, the CPC and socialism were to be integrated as a single object of devotion.²⁷

While the official view of school History's purposes had been clarified, History education professionals had not yet articulated any new perspectives, presumably glad simply that their subject was finally being granted recognition as 'useful' and unwilling to jeopardise their improved position by calling for more substantial reform, if indeed, they even felt it necessary. Journal editorials at this time typically promoted MOE directives, and most articles focused on 'safe' topics, either reiterating official goals or discussing lesson plans and examination questions. Several PEP curriculum developers/textbook editors also published papers explaining the content of the 1980 Outline and the corresponding 1981-1982 textbook revisions, all basically repeating the official line, with frequent references to the 'higher authorities' of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Mao, however, was somewhat downplayed following the debunking of the personality cult and the 1981 'Resolution,' while appeals to ancient history to legitimise present decisions and to stress the longstanding importance attached to history in Chinese culture increased.²⁸ Following developments in education, which was becoming rapidly established as an autonomous academic discipline, and psychology, which had been recently rehabilitated as a legitimate field of research (having been suppressed in the Cultural Revolution as bourgeois, reactionary and unscientific), History educators also began to address pedagogical concerns, to explore theories and methods of enhancing the teaching and learning of history and to focus on the intellectual and personal development of the individual child. At the same time, they began to assimilate developments in professional historiography. The major trend in professional historiography away from 'using theory to lead historical

²⁶ 'Jiaoyubu guanyu gaijin jiaqiang zhongxue lishi he dili jiaoxue de tongzhi' [1/8/1983], JYFQS, pp666-667.

²⁷ 'Jiaoyubu guanyu xuexi guanche 'guanyu jiaqiang aiguo zhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' de tongzhi' [24/8/1983], JYFQS, pp607-608

data' (*yi lun dai shi*) - often cynically punned as 'using theory to *replace* data' - towards 'integrating theory and historical data' (*shilun jiehe*) was rapidly adopted, although the more radical notion of 'deriving theories from data' (*lun cong shi chu*) was rejected;²⁹ in part, because History educators could not incorporate the breadth of academic debate into their work, even had they wished to do so, for many discussions were far too abstruse for teachers, let alone students. It was also, however, because such ideas were not yet established as mainstream, and thus were unsuitable for young impressionable schoolchildren.

III. History in Flux 1986-1989

The mid-late 1980s were a period of rapid change as central government attempted to implement economic liberalisation without granting significant concessions in the direction of political reform. Intellectual freedom in academia and cultural production, however, was increasingly asserted, and criticism of corruption, cronyism, and the progress and scope of reform grew ever more vocal. Serious theoretical challenges to orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought were mounted, and China's political future was hotly debated in the 'salons' which had sprung up in more developed urban areas. In 1986, student demonstrations calling for 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'freedom' erupted across Chinese cities. This was not what the Party had envisaged as part of 'reform', and a crackdown against 'bourgeois liberalisation' ensued. As in the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign and the directives on patriotic education, the young were not held fully accountable for their erroneous notions, but were regarded largely as having been led astray by anti-Party, anti-socialist, bourgeois intellectuals. The campaign against bourgeois liberalisation culminated with the ousting of Hu Yaobang, who was perceived as too soft towards the students' demands, and the expulsion from the Party of prominent intellectuals Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang. The formal campaign dissipated shortly thereafter, but the demonstrations led to renewed official concern over moral-ideological education and the teaching of History in particular, which had yet again failed to immunise young minds against bourgeois diseases. Clearly, History, and especially the modern history of China's struggles and the history of the revolution

²⁸ See for example, Li, 'Tixi, jiegou, zhongxin' [*KJJ*, 1982, no.1], 'Jiaoliu, shentou, shidai tese' [*KJJ*, 1983, no.1], 'Fenxi, renshi, jiejian' [*KJJ*, 1984, no.3] all reprinted in Li, *Lishi wengao xuancun*, pp1-23.

²⁹ On *shi* and *lun* in Chinese historiography, see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 'On *shi* and *lun*: toward a typology of historiography in the PRC'.

(mostly synonymous with Party history), needed to be both further reformed and comprehensively reinforced; as one senior Party historian, Guo Xianxiu, wrote in 1987,

The students' movement at the end of last year cannot but lead us to critically contemplate our teaching of history, especially our teaching of revolutionary history. How come slogans calling for democracy, freedom and human rights which the CPC and progressive intellectuals were fighting for and using to mobilise the masses in their fight against imperialism and feudalism some sixty years ago are now used by a small group of people to attack the CPC? How come a small group of people pretending to 'reform ideas' can consider the political programme of establishing a bourgeois republic and the slogan of 'total Westernisation' as an ideal worth being worshipped and longed for although the programme has long ago already been declared bankrupt and been blown away by history? And furthermore, how come they can exert so much influence and stir up so many people? We do not have too many reasons to criticise the young misled students. After pondering cold and cheerlessly over the question and after disposing of the influence of bourgeois liberalism we will easily find that we have not disseminated enough knowledge on the history of the Chinese revolution among today's students. There is nothing to be astonished about if these specially enthusiastic young students are stirred up by the ideological trend of bourgeois liberalism and regard the garbage of history as the miraculous cure for all their problems.³⁰

The solution to this problem was not simply to transmit more information or insist more dogmatically on theoretical purity, but to convey a history of China's revolution which was less bound to the Party and abstract political principles and theories, and which instead narrated the history of the motherland and its struggle for national sovereignty and dignity. This would nurture concrete identification with the nation and patriotism, and would provide the young with a permanent locus of loyalty. Inculcating only loyalty to theory and revolutionary principles, on the other hand, would leave them with nothing solid in times of crisis, and even lead them to doubt the veracity or efficacy of ideology.³¹ Historical materialism was not, of course, to be abandoned entirely as the guiding theoretical principle, but standpoints (*lichang*), methodology (*fangfa*) and viewpoints (*guandian*) were not to be conflated, and history was not to be reduced to mathematical proofs of the correctness of theory. If a liberalising trend was apparent among Party historians, it was still more prevalent among other academic historians, who were not only integrating theory and data, but were also boldly re-appraising a number of hitherto sensitive issues, such as the role of the nineteenth century reformers (once vilified as the incarnation of all things evil) and the origins and development of capitalism in China. Furthermore, their conclusions were increasingly 'unorthodox', influenced in large part by the influx of

³⁰ Guo Xianxiu 'Zhongguo geming shiqi huafen ji zhongguo gemingshi jiaoxue zhuyi' in *Zhongguo xiandai shi* 1988, no.3, pp15-20 (first published in *Guangzhou shiyuan xuebao, shekeban* 1987, no.4, pp51-56), cit. in Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Party history or history of the Chinese revolution?', pp4-5.

foreign discourses on the philosophy and methods of historical research, many of which were now being translated into Chinese.³²

In the more lowbrow sphere, Chinese history was increasingly used as subject or setting for popular cultural production (some perhaps following the 1983 exhortation to make more history-based films and television programmes), many of them addressing the disruption caused by CPC-launched campaigns such as the anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution.³³ At the same time, journalists and writers were beginning a wave of historical investigative journalism (*lishi jishi*) and ‘problem literature’ (*wenti baogao wenxue*), which tackled difficult historical issues for the mass audience, and served as counter-narrative to the official history, indirectly and sometimes directly criticising past Party decisions.³⁴ The revisionist trend in history was perhaps most famously exemplified in the documentary series, *Heshang*, broadcast in 1988. *Heshang* went much further in its criticisms than other works, lambasting traditional ‘yellow’ (Chinese) culture, and ridiculing symbols of Chinese greatness as evidence of myopia, backwardness and ignorant isolationism. Furthermore, it implied that the CPC had wrought no improvements. Like the cultural iconoclasts of the New Culture Movement seventy years earlier, *Heshang* advocated reorientation towards the ‘blue’ (maritime) culture and outlook perceived as characteristic of ‘Western’ civilisation.³⁵

Although it did not launch another official campaign, the CPC responded to these challenges by banning various ‘bourgeois liberal’ works including *Heshang*. It then commissioned a rebuttal of *Heshang*, ‘On the Road: A Century of Marxism,’ a historical documentary which demonstrated how China’s travails since the mid-nineteenth century had finally, under Party leadership, ended with the establishment of the PRC.³⁶ The SEdC, meanwhile, issued a Moral Education Outline (*deyu dagang*) reiterating the need to encourage the young to dedicate themselves

³¹ Ibid, pp5-6. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik notes that this mirrored arguments advanced in the 1930s-1940s and the early 1960s in the Great Leap aftermath.

³² Foreign theorists translated during the 1980s include E.H. Carr (*What is History?*), Croce (*The Theory and Practice of History*), Collingwood (*The Idea of History*) and Popper (*The Poverty of Historicism*) (cit. in Qu, ‘Tashan zhi shi, he yi wei cuo’, *GMRB*, 19/10/1988 reprinted in Qu, *Shixue yu shixue pinglun*, pp311-315).

³³ See for example Xie Jin, *The Legend of Tianyun Mountain* (set in the late 1950s), *Hibiscus Town* (about the Cultural Revolution) and the television drama (also set in the Cultural Revolution) *Kewang* (Longing). Discussions of these and other works may be found in Zha Jianying, *China Pop* and Barmé, ‘History for the Masses’.

³⁴ Barmé, ‘History for the Masses’.

³⁵ The full text of *Heshang* is translated in Su, *Deathsong of a River*.

³⁶ This documentary is described by Barmé, ‘Small Screen, Small Minds’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct.25 1990, p32. It was not broadcast until August 1990.

wholeheartedly to modernisation for the sake of national pride and the commonweal. It also emphasised developing a sense of public morality and a concept of democracy and upholding the law, which ‘little emperors’ were thought to lack.³⁷ Presumably this did not press strongly enough the importance of counteracting the negative influences of Western bourgeois individualism and liberalism because, four months later, the Party issued its own ‘Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Moral Education Work in Primary and Secondary Schools.’ This document repeated much of what had been said in the 1983 Ministry of Propaganda directive on patriotic education about properly disseminating historical knowledge among the people, as well as reiterating the content of the Moral Education Outline, but it also stressed socialism more heavily and the need to strengthen Party leadership in ideological education work.³⁸

Despite crackdowns on cultural production, and various government and MOE directives attempting to persuade or coerce the unruly into model behaviour and correct attitudes, professional thinking about school History does not appear to have been profoundly affected, although numerous articles on using History to construct socialist spiritual civilisation and promote patriotism were duly published in early 1987 at the zenith of the campaign to eradicate bourgeois liberalism, and again in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre.³⁹ It must also be assumed that the widespread public debate over China’s past and future which followed the broadcasting of *Heshang* would have touched History educators on a personal if not also a professional level. In general, however, History educators seem to have avoided public discussion of specific political issues and academic historical debates at this time, and to have focused primarily on more general moral and pedagogical matters. Being in the spotlight as one of the primary resources for moral-ideological education may have bolstered the official status of History and the prestige of those who worked in the field, but it also made them far more vulnerable to accusations of ideological deviance. It is hardly surprising, then, that they chose simply to avoid either affirming or rejecting the official line with any degree of conviction.

³⁷ ‘Zhongxue deyu dagang’ [20/8/1988], JYFQS, pp596-601. For more discussion on this MOE directive and its implications, see Lan and Sun, *Zhongxue deyu dagang shiyan baogao xuan bian*.

³⁸ ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu gaige he jiaqiang zhongxiaoxue deyu gongzuo de tongzhi’ [25/12/1988], JYFQS, pp588-592.

³⁹ See for example, Bao, ‘Jianchi gaige, chongfen fahui lishi jiaoxue zai shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe zhong de teshu youshi’, pp10-11; Qian, ‘Peiyang xuesheng shehuizhuyi wenming shi lishi jiaoshi de guangrong shiming’, pp17-18; *LSJX* editorial, ‘Lishi jiaoxue yu jingshen wenming jianshe’, p2; Fan, ‘Aiguo zhuyi shi lishi jiaoxue de yongheng zhuti’.

IV. From Socialism to Nationalism 1989-1995

By the end of the 1980s, rampant nepotism and corruption had combined with spiralling inflation, wage stagnation and abolition of subsidies to cause increasingly widespread dissatisfaction with the Party. When students took to Tiananmen Square in April 1989 to lament reformist leader Hu Yaobang's death, protest against corruption and call for further reforms, therefore, they were soon joined by thousands of disgruntled workers. The subsequent suppression is well documented, and need not be discussed here, but the complete failure of calls for rejection of bourgeois liberalism and strengthening of morality, which had been adopted to avert the crisis, led the Party to reassert its *patriotic* credentials as China's past, present and future saviour, for had not even the Party's critics claimed to be seeking to save China? The Tiananmen students had also specifically demanded to be recognised as patriots as a condition of leaving the Square. Perhaps patriotism was a doctrine which could unite almost everyone; indeed the Party itself had admitted as much in acknowledging 'patriotic' contributions to China's recent history and development made by overseas Chinese, and reassessing many historical figures formerly labelled 'class enemies' as loyal patriots. The Party thus averred that having saved the nation from feudalism, imperialism, Japan, the KMT, the USSR and USA, it now had to protect it from China's youth, who had, it was believed, tasted only the sweet fruits of modernisation and not the hard years of bitter struggle, and were thus easily 'led astray' by the pernicious influences of 'decadent' Western culture. Unlike their 'ignorant' Cultural Revolution predecessors cited in the 1983 directives, this generation did not have the excuse of not having received a systematic education. Clearly then, what was being taught in schools was not accurately transmitting the official message, or was providing insufficient preparation to enable the young to resist the infiltration of subversive ideas sponsored by Western capitalist-imperialists.

Tiananmen thus prompted intensified focus on education, and especially on History, as a source of moral and ideological renewal and consolidation. In November 1989, the SEdC issued the 'Opinion on Strengthening Political-Ideological Education and Education in National Conditions (*guoqing*) through Primary and Secondary School Chinese, History and Geography' This was far more aggressive and pro-Party than previous directives, emphasising that China would never 'capitulate to foreign forces, nor completely Westernise (*quanpan xihua*), nor take the capitalist road' and that the Party is 'great, glorious ... and the correct long-term choice of the Chinese

people. Only under Party leadership will the Chinese *minzu* be able to stand up in the world of nations.’⁴⁰ In an apparently unprecedented move, the Teaching Plan and Outline provisions were overridden mid-academic year, and from the spring semester of the 1989-1990 school year, modern and contemporary Chinese history were to be added to the first year senior secondary curriculum, which since 1978 had taught only world history (two years of Chinese history were taught in junior secondary).⁴¹ Second year students (who had started senior secondary in 1988) were also to join this course, and from 1990, it was to be permanently integrated into the regular senior secondary curriculum. World history content, meanwhile, would be reduced, since as of 1986 it had been reintroduced to the junior secondary curriculum, albeit as a minor component.⁴² This was justified by an assertion that the current content of world history was too difficult for students, but it seems far more likely that it was simply necessitated by the greater emphasis to be placed on Chinese history as the vehicle for patriotic education.⁴³

In spring 1990, a further ‘Opinion’ was issued on strengthening moral education. Without mentioning Tiananmen by name, this document stated that great progress had been made ‘over the past year,’ but that much was still to be done to eradicate subversion at the roots. Party leadership was again highlighted, and Politics was also emphasised over History for the first time since before the Cultural Revolution. In an ominous tone, the 1990 Opinion advised education administrations and schools to ‘absorb deeply the lessons of calming that 1989 tidal wave, to rectify the guiding ideology of education, and to resist bourgeois liberalism.’⁴⁴ Similar guidelines on ideological education were also issued specifically for Tibetan students, amid fears that the intense Tibetan hostility towards central government which prevailed after the suppression of the 1987 demonstrations had been exacerbated by Tiananmen.⁴⁵ The most comprehensive education guidelines to emerge in response to the late 1980s

⁴⁰ ‘Guojia jiaowei guanyu zai zhongxiaoxue yuwen, lishi, dili deng xueke jiaoxue zhong jiaqiang sixiang zhengzhi he guoqing jiaoyu de yijian’ [8/11/1989], JYFQS, pp619-621.

⁴¹ For a complete break-down of class hour allocations for the 1978-2000 period, see Chapter 4 Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

⁴² This is discussed further in Chapter 4.

⁴³ ‘Guojia jiaowei guanyu zai zhongxiaoxue yuwen, lishi, dili deng xueke jiaoxue zhong jiaqiang sixiang zhengzhi he guoqing jiaoyu de yijian’ [8/11/1989], JYFQS, p621.

⁴⁴ ‘Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang zhongxiaoxue deyu gongzuo de jidian yijian’ [13/4/1990], JYFQS, pp592-596.

⁴⁵ ‘Guojia jiaowei bangongting guanyu jiaqiang neidi Xizangban zhengzhi sixiang jiaoyu gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi’ [14/6/1990], JYFQS, pp186-187. In Tibetan schools, this resulted in a half-day being set aside each week for patriotic education to the detriment of other subjects (Bass, *Education in Tibet*, p59).

crises, however, were not promulgated until 1991. In March then-Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had written a letter to SEdC leaders, Li Tieying and He Dongchang, calling for greater attention to be paid to modern-contemporary Chinese history and to education in China's national conditions (*guoqing jiaoyu*) as a means of inculcating right attitudes to socialist modernisation and due caution with regard to foreign ideas and culture.⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly, this letter was subsequently published and widely circulated, and immediately taken as a basis for new SEdC directives, which were issued in August.

The 'General Guideline on Strengthening Modern and Contemporary Chinese History and Education in National Conditions' used much more extremist language and was clearer in its targets of attack than earlier documents. The Guideline's stated objectives dwelled primarily on strengthening patriotism, faith in the Party, and cultural pride; on teaching the young that foreign ideas of 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'peaceful evolution' are the sugar-coated bullets of 'reactionary enemy forces' (capitalist and imperialist) conspiring to return China to a weak and easily exploited, semi-feudal, semi-colonial state; and on teaching the young to understand China's 'national conditions', which would give them patience and determination to strive for socialist modernisation, so that China would never again be humiliated. 'Western capitalism' was singled out for special attack, not only for its past imperialist transgressions against China, but as *innately* evil. This evil, exploitative *nature* was to be exposed through History and, in language reminiscent of the anti-Rightist and Cultural Revolution campaigns, 'a clear line' was to be drawn between socialism (China, good) and capitalism (the West, bad). Although the working people of Western countries were to be recognised as fellow sufferers exploited by the ruling classes, the distinction between political-economic systems and national character (*guomin jingshen*) was not made very clear, and the general tone certainly had more than a whiff of anti-foreignism about it. History was to be the core of this educational endeavour, and the guideline listed three key components: 'five-thousand years of glorious culture,' 'more than one hundred years of struggle to save the nation from humiliation and annihilation by invading enemy forces,' and forty years of 'world-beating transformation' and the establishment of 'glorious future prospects' under the leadership of the CPC. CPC 'errors,' meanwhile, were to be examined from a

⁴⁶ 'Jiang Zemin zongshuji zhi Li Tieying, He Dongchang qiangdiao jinxing Zhongguo jindaishi, xiandishi ji guoqing jiaoyu', written 3/1991, first published in *RMRB*, 1/6/1991, reprinted in COH, pp.607-608.

‘positive’ standpoint and narrating them was to result in ‘positive conclusions.’⁴⁷ An appropriate ‘syllabus’ was accordingly drawn up in the form of a ‘Guideline for Political-Ideological Education in Primary and Secondary School History.’ This in fact did not differ significantly from the existing Outline, and was merely a list of topics deemed relevant to conveying the Guideline’s core message. Education authorities, however, were to draw up more specific plans and ‘within two-three years should have integrated all the provisions of the guidelines into the curriculum of every school,’ although how this was to be done other than ‘to pay special attention to those subjects most important for this kind of education’ was not specified.⁴⁸

The 1991 directives thrust History further into the spotlight, and the new Teaching Plan for compulsory education raised its official status even higher by adding an extra weekly class hour in the second year of junior secondary to be devoted to modern-contemporary history. The reaction from History professionals, however, was less dramatic than the 1991 guidelines might suggest, although as always, numerous articles and books on *guoqing* education were published, as well as various children’s patriotic education books designed as supplementary reading since they could not legitimately be incorporated into the already crowded curriculum.⁴⁹ History education professionals, however, predominantly continued the trend towards pedagogical rather than ideological research; in part for safety reasons, but also because the crackdown and renewed vigilance against ‘poisonous (foreign) weeds’ had not been a total conservative victory, for socialist modernisation was still to be attained through reform and opening, as Deng made abundantly clear in his 1992 ‘Southern tour’. Foreign books and articles on education and psychology therefore continued to be translated, and increasing numbers of senior educationalists travelled abroad to study the ways in which other countries were carrying out History teaching. Much like the late nineteenth-early twentieth century reformers, Chinese educationalists saw foreign education and particularly the emphasis on skills and creativity as one of the bulwarks of economic success. If China wanted to compete successfully in the globalised knowledge economy, she would be foolish not to learn. As one History educator has described,

⁴⁷ ‘Guojia jiaowei guanyu lingfa ‘zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaishi ji guoqing jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)’ de tongzhi’, [1991], reprinted COH, pp609-610; ‘Zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaishi ji guoqing jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)’ [1991], pp.610-636.

⁴⁸ ‘Zhongxiaoxue lishi xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao’, [8/1991], reprinted COH, pp637-655.

⁴⁹ See for example Zhang and Wang, ‘Guoqing jiaoyu yu lishi jiaoxue chuyi’; Zhongguo jiaoyubao ed. *Zhongguo jinxiandai shi he guoqing jiaoyu duben*.

Times are changing, society is developing, the world economy and the scientific and technological spheres are ceaselessly advancing; creative consciousness and creative ability have already become important factors in overall national power and international competition. The capital with which to engage in international competition is thus the quality of the national people (*minzu suzhi*), and science and technology; that is to say, education and talented persons..... The times call for the emergence of wise and able persons such as a modern day Zhuge Liang, Nobel or Einstein, not for the merely knowledgeable, such as the likes of Zhao Kuo or Ma Su.⁵⁰

V. Quality Education 1996-?

Since 1991, central government has issued only one major decree on ideological education with the 1994 'Guideline for Implementing Patriotic Education' which was slightly more moderate in tone than its predecessors, although it reiterated many of their suggestions for promoting historical knowledge.⁵¹ It also pointedly emphasised national defence, guarding against 'splittism' and promoting *minzu* unity, and appears to have had wider ramifications for education policies in minority regions than in Han areas.⁵² Since the mid-1990s, however, reform and opening have accelerated dramatically and with economic prosperity for the educated elite, their vocal opposition to the government has been reduced to mere grumbles, although it is another matter in poverty-stricken rural areas and dismantled industrial complexes where official corruption, high unemployment and lack of welfare support regularly spark demonstrations and riots. Exposure to foreign ideas has also gathered pace through the burgeoning academic translation market and the growing numbers of both government cadres and private individuals who travel abroad for study or research, often returning to take up key positions as 'expert' participants in policy-making. This has certainly been the case in education, where great efforts have been expended to 'absorb the experiences of developed nations' and create an education system that is both modern and relevant to China's particular needs and circumstances. As always, reforming 'value-free' subjects has been most straightforward, but with little government guidance since the 1991 directives, History education researchers have been able to explore and even to publish almost anything they choose. This is certainly not the same as saying that there has been completely open discussion, free from editorial or self-censorship, let alone that 'new' ideas and practices have been widely implemented, but as argued below and in Chapter 3, the voices of reform-

⁵⁰ Ouyang, Banghua, 'Lishi ketang jiaoxue yu chuangzaoxing siwei', p18.

⁵¹ 'Aiguo zhuyi shishi gangyao' [23/8/1994], JYFQS, pp117-122.

⁵² Bass, *Education in Tibet*, pp54-60; Harrell and Bamo, 'Combining Ethnic Heritage and National Unity', p70. Harrell and Bamo do not refer specifically to these directives, but note that since 1995 control over production of Nuosu language textbooks has become more centralised and content has been significantly altered to emphasise the importance of national unity over local attachment.

minded History education professionals are increasingly driving the debate from the bottom (or at least the middle) up and influencing the decisions of senior policy-makers.

Over the past several years, the most important – indeed almost the only – topic of discussion in History education and education as whole has been ‘quality education’ (*suzhi jiaoyu*). There is much debate surrounding its precise definition and what it should entail, but the core of the argument revolves around the word *suzhi* which, as with the English term ‘quality’, has many cognates with various shades of meaning that must be largely inferred from the context in which it is used. Generally speaking, *suzhi* denotes: elements or attributes (*yaosu*) that together comprise a whole; the nature or character (*xingzhi*) of an entity; or its qualitative value (*pinzhi*).⁵³ Drawing somewhat unevenly on these overlapping meanings, the term *suzhi* until recently had widest currency in the fields of physiognomy and psychology, where it commonly refers to innate (*tiansheng*) physical, intellectual or psychological traits and abilities which, it is believed, may be - indeed, must be - nurtured through various forms of training if they are to be brought to fruition. Since the mid-1980s, however, *suzhi* has been appropriated (and some might say distorted) to serve various political, ideological and social purposes. The most significant of these has involved the drive to ‘improve population quality’ (*tigao renkou suzhi*). As Murphy has recently shown, the one-child policy is a cornerstone of this project, seen as a means by which parental and societal resources can be concentrated to produce ‘higher quality’ individuals, thereby raising the quality of the population as a whole and contributing to national development goals.⁵⁴ Barely distinguishable from population quality improvement is the idea of ‘raising the quality of the national people’ (*tigao minzu suzhi*); the two slogans have, it seems, even been used interchangeably, although in general ‘population quality’ can be seen as having slightly stronger eugenicist connotations, and is typically cited when referring to specific domestic matters, particularly rural issues and the one-child policy, while raising national quality is more commonly invoked in broad discussions on how to ‘arouse China’ (*zhenxing Zhonghua*) and engender ‘a revival of the great national people’ (*weida minzu fuxing*) who will then

⁵³ *Cihai*, p1479; *Xiandai Hanyu fenlei cidian*, p405, p1074.

⁵⁴ Murphy, ‘Turning Chinese Peasants into Modern Citizens’. As with many contemporary Chinese government policies, the concept of ‘population quality’ echoes Singaporean thinking; indeed, the Singaporean government’s policy of offering material incentives to highly educated couples to have larger families is much praised in China. As yet, this remains mostly implicit in public discussion on

triumph in economic and cultural competition against other national peoples. As indicated by another common slogan, ‘science and education for the rise of the country’ (*kejiao xingguo*), education is regarded as a key means of fostering quality, both for imparting the necessary scientific and technical know-how to compete in the global knowledge economy and for consolidating a moral-ideological foundation that will ensure wholehearted dedication to the motherland’s socialist modernisation cause. ‘Raising the quality of the national people’, along with ‘producing more talent’ (*duo chu rencai*) and ‘producing high quality talent’ (*chu hao rencai*), was accordingly adopted as an official objective of the 1985 Reform, and has featured prominently in all subsequent education directives.⁵⁵

It has, of course, been but a short step from ‘raising the quality of the national people’ through education to the emergence in the mid-1990s of a doctrine of ‘quality education’ – quality people cannot, after all be produced by an inferior education. It would be erroneous, however, to think that discussion of quality education has merely arisen in response to government calls to raise national quality, even if the language and many of the overall objectives of official and academic *suzhi* discourse frequently coincide. As already noted, educationalists have been talking about pedagogical reform and the need to make schooling more relevant to ‘real life’ for many years, especially in History and other humanities and social sciences where discussing content has frequently been off-limits and where there is a felt need to justify the existence of subjects with few obvious real world applications in an increasingly crowded curriculum. This has led them to focus on the role schooling plays in the development of ‘character’ (*renge*) and ‘skills’ (*nengli*) which, it is alleged, were direly neglected ‘during the era when class struggle set the parameters of educational research’ and ‘the demands of politics provided the criteria for educating people’: *renge* because it was regarded as ‘a bourgeois academic term bearing the toxic remnants of feudalism’, and skills because redness superseded expertise.⁵⁶ Even in the reform and opening era, it is thought that too much emphasis has been placed on creating a small elite that can meet the country’s scientific and technological demands and too little on the educational needs of majority. This, it is believed, has perpetuated an inflexible, narrowly academic, examination-centred curriculum which

the matter, although the idea of allowing urban residents who have access to superior ‘cultural and educational conditions’ and whose quality is higher to have more than one child has been mooted.

⁵⁵ ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jue ding’, JYFQS, p66-67.

⁵⁶ Zhao, *Lishi jiaoyuxue*, p39.

is over-reliant on spoon-feeding and rote-learning of data, thereby overloading students with work, stifling creativity, neglecting the psychological and social facets of the individual's child's development and completely failing to prepare them for life beyond the school. Quality education has thus emerged primarily as a potential solution for these many problems.

Needless to say, such grand objectives in combination with a pre-existing official *suzhi* discourse and the nature-nurture conundrum underlying physiognomic and psychological definitions of *suzhi* have meant that the meaning and substance of quality education have been matters of great debate.⁵⁷ Some adopt a view of *suzhi* as innate quality or qualities, assuming fundamental differences between each child and limitations to their potential; as Sun and Cheng have succinctly expressed it, 'quality may be developed, it cannot be taught.'⁵⁸ Some highlight the 'social component' (*shehui yinsu*) of *suzhi* and tend towards an emphasis on the educative process rather than the raw materials. Others focus on the finished product, the 'complete person', and see quality education in terms of goals which may be reached by assorted methods appropriate for the starting point of the individual child. Quality education in practice, or in the theory of practice, meanwhile, has been quite consistently set up in diametric opposition to traditional 'examination-oriented education' (*yingshi jiaoyu*), and although, as has more recently been argued, this binary thinking is too simplistic and implies that all education prior to the past few years has been 'anti-quality', repudiating examination-oriented education remains a core feature of quality education discourse.⁵⁹ If there is agreement on what quality education is opposing, there is also broad consensus on what it should achieve. Drawing on the work of contemporary foreign scholars, as well as the Deweyan pedagogical thinking of the 1920s and even ancient Confucian and Daoist approaches to teaching and learning, educationalists maintain that the fundamental objective of quality education should be, to quote Bruner, to 'cultivate excellence', to enable not only the best students, but the entire student body (*zhengti xuesheng*) to attain their maximum potential.⁶⁰ This requires the promotion of 'holistic' (*quanmian*) development through delivering a

⁵⁷ For a scholarly analysis of *suzhi* definitions and contradictions see Huang, 'Suzhi jiaoyu beilun'.

⁵⁸ Sun and Cheng, 'Quality, Development and Education'.

⁵⁹ Yang, 'Examinations, Coping with Examinations and the Relationship between Exam-oriented Education and Quality Education', p16.

⁶⁰ Bruner, *The Process of Education*, p9. This book (translated as *Jiaoyu guocheng*, Wenhua jiaoyu chubanshe, 1982) and others by the same author, such as *Jiaoxue lilun tantao* and ? REFS) are frequently cited by educationalists. (See for example, Zhu, *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun*, p8; Zhao, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue*, p399; Peng, 'Peiyang zhineng shi lishi jiaoxue gaige de hexin', p36.)

rounded moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic education (*de zhi ti mei*) to each child, nurturing individual strengths and improving areas of weakness, and ensuring psychological and social well-being. The holistic ethos is further reflected in an effort to integrate teaching and learning, preactive and active curricula, abstract knowledge and concrete practice.⁶¹ This, it is hoped, will foster a more democratic, participatory classroom environment, nurture creativity and independent thinking in students, and equip them with transferable skills.⁶² Although as shown in Chapter 7 this has yet to have significant effects on redirecting classroom practice away from teacher- and textbook-centrism and omnipresent examinations,⁶³ quality education has been unquestioningly accepted as the way forward for education; indeed, it was adopted as the official education policy mantra in 1999.⁶⁴

As is clear from the above discussion, most quality education goals are applicable across the school curriculum, and History has been no exception. As in other subjects, current thinking on History education has focused on formulating appropriate strategies for nurturing or optimising *suzhi*, especially what is often termed ‘cultural quality’ (*wenhua suzhi*) or ‘cultivation in the humanities’ (*renwen suyang*), and for developing intellectual skills. These are hardly new ideas, having been seriously discussed by specialists in History pedagogy since the late 1980s,⁶⁵ and the focus on cultural quality, of course, has an ancient pedigree, owing much to classical views of history and the arts. Thinking behind skill-training, however, is somewhat more recent, and follows the UK model developed in the 1970s, in particular the work of Lee, Dickinson and their colleagues discussed in the introduction, some of which has been translated into Chinese. For those with the requisite language skills, British influences are also available indirectly through the Hong Kong History curriculum, and directly through the UK national curriculum and GCSE examination papers which are widely circulated in Education and History

⁶¹ General works which define quality education and spell out some of its core objectives include: Lu and Wang eds., *Suzhi jiaoyu: jiaoyu lixiang yu mubiao*; Zhou, *Suzhi jiaoyu: lilun, caozuo, jingyan*; Yu, *Jichu jiaoyu xin gainian: suzhi jiaoyu*.

⁶² Zhang, *Suzhi jiaoyu de jiban*.

⁶³ Yu, *Jichu jiaoyu xin gainian: suzhi jiaoyu*, pp28-31.

⁶⁴ ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua jiaoyu gaige quanmian tuijin suzhi jiaoyu de jueding’ [13/6/1999] and ‘Shenhua jiaoyu gaige, quanmian tuijin suzhi jiaoyu, wei shixian Zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing er fendou’ [15/6/1999] in Beijing jiaoyu kexueyuan, *Jiaoyu wenxuanji*, pp45-78.

⁶⁵ See for example Ye, ‘Peiyang he fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de tansuo’ and ‘Peiyang he fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de jiaoxue shijian’. This theme was taken up by the *LSJX* editorial team the following year (1992) in its August editorial, ‘Yingdang kaizhan dui jiaocai nengli peiyang de yanjiu’.

departments at several Normal Universities. Japanese pedagogical research has similarly attracted the attention of many Chinese History education professionals, which given the ongoing controversy over textbooks between the two countries may seem somewhat surprising. It should be remembered, however, that many History educationalists in Japan are outspoken critics of atrocity-denying nationalists such as Fujioka Nobukatsu and his 'Liberal View of History' group (*Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai*) who seek to reverse what they see in the post-war period as a masochistic, self-denigrating national narrative.⁶⁶ Chinese educationalists can therefore study these 'leftist' Japanese scholars' work without compromising their patriotic integrity. Furthermore, as in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries, Japan is of particular interest because it is seen to have successfully adapted 'Western techniques' to 'Eastern essences'. Japanese textbooks, while despised for their whitewashing of the wartime past, are thus often admired for their contemporary pedagogical style and format.⁶⁷ History education in the US and Canada have also been studied, and cursory investigations have been made of the field in South Korea and assorted European countries.⁶⁸ A few writers, meanwhile, have looked into China's own past, examining ideas and experiments developed in the Republic;⁶⁹ Zhao has even gone back to the *Xueji* and concluded that holistic education - skills and critical thinking, as well as moral development - was exactly what was being promoted then.⁷⁰ The main outcome of this research has been an attempt to cultivate intellectual skills (*zhineng*) rather than simply force-feeding knowledge (*zhishi*); that is, to develop students' powers of 'historical thinking' (*lishi siwei*) and imagination (*xiangxiang*).⁷¹ It has also meant considerably less emphasis on positivism and immutable laws of development and greater emphasis on the individual mind and personality as an element of reconstructing history; as Ye has written, 'History is a subject through

⁶⁶ One prominent Japanese History pedagogy specialist and critic of nationalist history, Nitani Sadao, is widely known and often translated in the PRC [EGS]. For information on the Liberal View of History group, see, for example, chapters by McCormack and Gerow in Hein and Selden eds, *Censoring History*.

⁶⁷ Zhao, *Lishi jiaoyuxue* and *Riben xuexiao shehuike jiaoyu yanjiu*; Zhu, *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun*, pp267-274.

⁶⁸ Wang and Li, *Bijiao lishi jiaoyuxue*; Zhu, *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun*; Yu et al, *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue*.

⁶⁹ Jin, 'He Bingsong dui lishi jiaoyu de gongxian'. Dewey is also frequently referenced by contemporary writers.

⁷⁰ Zhao, '*Liji 'Xueji' jiaoyulun de xiandai yiyi*'.

⁷¹ Numerous articles on this subject have been published. Some representative examples include: Yao, 'Lun lishi xueke zai suzhi jiaoyuzhong de dute zuoyong ji qi shishi tujing'; Ouyang, 'Lishi ketang jiaoxue yu chuangzaoxing siwei'; Wu, Shouzhi. 'Lun lishi siwei'; Zhang, 'Dui lishi kecheng xianzhuang de fenxi'. One of the most sophisticated discussions of what quality education might entail

which one apprehends the historical process of human social development, and this historical recognition unavoidably brings subjectivity into selection and explanation [of historical data]'.⁷² This has led, in turn, to an increasing emphasis on 'independent thinking' (*duli sikao*) and on developing and expressing personal opinions. There are, of course, numerous contradictions inherent in on the one hand demanding the development of independent views, and on the other insisting that students arrive at 'correct' historical viewpoints and verdicts, something which continues to be advocated by many educationalists, reform-minded or otherwise; it is, after all, widely believed that ideological and moral education is not just a politically motivated add-on to History, but is integral to the subject, and that in light of 'little emperor' syndrome, building character (*renge*) and moral quality (*pinde*) has become more urgent than ever.⁷³ There are indications, nonetheless, that this contradiction is being acknowledged in some quarters, and while no viable solutions have yet been publicly advanced, the very notion of 'correct viewpoints' is beginning to be implicitly criticised in the new pedagogical goal of developing 'correct' historical approaches or conceptions of history (*zhengque de lishiguan*) – that is, critical thinking and analysis of evidence.⁷⁴

Another significant development is the trend towards following the path taken in primary education and integrating History into Social Studies at secondary level. Unsurprisingly, this has been staunchly opposed by many History educators who view it as a threat to their own status and job security, and thus continue to emphasise its traditional role in understanding the present and predicting the future as well as reiterating its place in moral-ideological education. While this may play well with conservative Party elders, however, it is the reformists who appear to be gaining the upper hand. Many of the more vocal critics of the History subject as it currently stands have become increasingly involved in curriculum development since they are at the forefront of research into skill-training. Their emphasis on the 'practical' applications of History and their tendency to look abroad for successful pedagogical models have been among the primary factors driving the integrationist campaign. As

for the History subject can be found in a series of articles by Zhao, 'Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin'.

⁷² Ye, 'Dui lishi jiaokeshu zuoyong de fansi', p43.

⁷³ Wang, *Lishi jiaoyuxue*, p45; Yu et al, *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue*, p87.

⁷⁴ Feng is among those who have publicly highlighted the individual opinion/correct viewpoint clash ('Lishi xueke chuangzaoxing siwei de kaocha yu peiyang'), although like most she does not offer a solution. In personal conversations with assorted History education researchers, I also found that many

in so many aspects of educational reform, Social Studies is not a wholly new or foreign idea, having been pioneered at the primary level in Republican times. Social Studies has in fact already replaced secondary level History, Geography and General Knowledge (*changshi*) in Zhejiang, introduced when the province developed its own curriculum in the late 1980s (see Chapter 5), and a similar course has also been on trial in Shanghai's Yangpu district. Although Zhejiang's curriculum and textbooks have been privately derided and did not pass the TMIC inspection (this does not prevent them being used in Zhejiang as shown in Chapter 3), the current interest in introducing Social Studies at secondary level has led to a sudden surge of interest in what Zhejiang has been doing. In the past few years, concrete action has been taken nationally in the shape of trial curricula for 'Social Studies' as well as for a compromise subject of 'History and Society', which is theoretically integrated, but prioritises the History component of the course.

Despite this explosion of liberal and experimental ideas, which are widely discussed by senior researchers and academics, and which have received at least token acceptance by the government in its ongoing public support for quality education, implementing avant-garde pedagogical practices in all but the most elite schools does not seem likely to happen in the immediate future, for as Zhou reminds us, the basic questions still have not been fully resolved.

Some people say that the contemporary history of educational development in China since 1949 is in fact a history of educational reform, a history of the search for socialist education with Chinese characteristics. In the process of development, this history has continually raised fundamental questions which demand answers: What is education? That is, what is the nature of education and its application/use? Which people does education serve? How does it serve? What are the aims of education? Who should lead education? Who should run schools - the state or the people? Should there be a unified system or multiple educational models? In regards to content, should theoretical (indirect) knowledge or practical (direct) knowledge be emphasised? With respect to goals, should we stress progressing to the next level [of education], or should we [prepare students] for employment? And then there is the related question, should we prioritise key schools or universal education? Regarding the speed of implementation, should stable, incremental development be promoted or great leaps forward? And in quality of *rencai*, should we emphasise the unity of politics and professionalism, redness and expertise or their diametric opposition?⁷⁵

had noted the problem, and some explicitly denounced the concept of correct viewpoints. Few, however, are prepared to express such radical minority views in writing.

⁷⁵ Zhou, *Suzhi jiaoyu: lilun, caozuo, jingyan*, Introduction, p2.

Chapter 3

The Institutional and Administrative Context

A note on terminology

Ministry of Education (MOE) is used in all general discussion of the PRC's highest education authority. It was named the MOE from 1949-1985, the State Education Commission (SEdC) from 1985-1998, and MOE again 1998-present. SEdC is used to refer to specific instances during the 1985-1998 period.

I. Public Policy and Education Administration

Most policy-makers no doubt long for an ideal world in which decisions are swiftly and unanimously agreed, smoothly implemented and produce the outcomes for which they were formulated. In the real world, even the most charismatic and brutal dictators typically seek their acolytes' advice and co-operation in setting policy, and however authoritarian the state, it is impossible to guarantee that what is ordered by senior officials is accurately performed by their minions, let alone that the desired policy outcomes obtain at grassroots level. How then do government bureaucracies (or any other large public organisations) operate to achieve policy consensus and to ensure that agreed-upon policies are maximally implemented? Economists, sociologists and political scientists have had much to say on these matters, and have devised or adapted from other disciplines (such as mathematics and psychology) a number of theories to explain, predict and/or improve the public policy-making and implementation process. Indeed, new hybrid academic disciplines, such as policy studies and public administration, have evolved specifically to address these concerns. While some theorists focus on institutions as the basic unit of analysis, arguing that the structure and function of organisations determine the decisions and actions of their members, others maintain that it is the goals and choices of individual rational actors that shape policy-making and implementation.¹ Needless to say, both approaches have been criticised: the former for overlooking the importance of individual motivation, the latter for aggregating individual choice to determine public choice, and both have been accused of neglecting the issue of power relations between individual and collective actors.² Few empirical studies of public policy apparatuses, however, adhere rigidly to a single theoretical approach, and most acknowledge the significance of both institutional and individual factors. Furthermore, it has been

¹ Coleman and Fararo eds., *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique*; Ashford ed., *History and Context in Comparative Public Policy*, especially chapters by Furniss, 'Functionalism and Public Policy', pp189-210, and Rothstein, 'Marxism and Institutional Analysis', pp85-116.

² Zey, *Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory*.

found that theories which appear adequately to describe policy processes in one area of administration do not always apply to another, even within the same society. Education, it has been argued, has been particularly difficult to squeeze into neat theoretical frameworks or compare to other policy areas, in part, because education systems are so diverse, ranging from the highly centralised (as in France) to the locally funded and operated (as in the USA). Education is also an extremely emotive issue because it typically consumes a high proportion of national and local budgets yet generates no tangible revenue, and because it is so palpably about the future of individuals, families and society as a whole. In education more than any other sphere, therefore, everyone thinks they should have a say: on how schools are run, how budgets are allocated, which textbooks are used and what is in them. In short, the implementation of macro-policies, especially at the local or school level, may be bitterly contested.³

Goodson examines precisely these issues of contestation and discrepancies between education policy-making and implementation in his seminal study of the school curriculum. School subjects, he argues, are not fixed categories of knowledge handed down fully formed from central governments or other education policy-making bodies; rather, they are 'made' over time through 'struggle' and 'negotiation' over 'territory,' 'resources' and 'status' between individual and collective 'curriculum stakeholders,' such as national and local government education agencies, textbook writers and publishers, education researchers, academic subject experts, schools and teachers. Proposed changes to existing curricula may also be hotly debated in the media and passionately fought for or opposed by parents and concerned citizens, sometimes forcing education policy-makers to reconsider. The intended or 'preactive' curriculum which emerges from this 'struggle' then undergoes further modification or distortion during implementation at subordinate levels, resulting in an 'interactive' school curriculum that often diverges significantly from what was originally planned or even officially mandated.⁴

Although most public policy theory has been formulated in and about institutions in liberal democracies (primarily in Western Europe and North America), and Goodson's curriculum thesis is derived almost solely from research conducted in the UK, and England in particular, it does not mean that these theories are irrelevant to the analysis or application of administrative practices in the rather different political

³ Coombs, 'Education Policy', p591.

and cultural setting of post-Mao China. Indeed, this has been acknowledged in the PRC itself where university courses in public administration, which were abolished in 1952 for being based on capitalist theories and systems and thus inapplicable to socialist government, have been re-established and dramatically expanded since 1982, drawing heavily on imported ideas in an effort to create a more efficient, expert cohort of administrators.⁵ Outside China, Hamrin, Zhao, Lampton, Lieberthal and their many Chinese and non-Chinese collaborators have also applied public policy theories to their analyses of PRC decision-making and implementation, and have found that policies are not simply determined through ideological or personal battles between elite rational actors within the Communist Party leadership, but are also negotiated between the Politburo, government ministries and public institutions. The resulting declarative policy, in turn, may be modified or subverted by regional and local authorities.⁶ This has led some commentators to characterise the PRC system as one of 'fragmented authoritarianism'; that is, while the regime and the political and administrative system remain largely authoritarian and central government continues to wield substantial coercive power, administrative structures and procedures necessitate both vertical and horizontal cross-department co-operation on many projects, resulting in far less command and far more bargaining and compromise than had previously been supposed.⁷

Needless to say, institutions in some policy areas have more leverage to pursue their objectives than those in others, even if they are of equivalent status; whether because their bosses are well connected to seats of legislative and coercive power, or because the institution itself is revenue-generating or plays a critical role in priority projects. In education, the 1985 Reform upgraded the MOE to the status of State Education Commission (SEdC, renamed MOE in 1998) making it administratively parallel rather than subordinate to the State Planning Commission, thereby unleashing education from its strict ties to economic planning which was primarily oriented to industrial and agricultural development. The leadership's commitment to education was further signalled by the appointment of then-vice premier Li Peng to serve

⁴ Goodson, *The Making of Curriculum*.

⁵ Zhang, 'Public Administration in China' pp9-10.

⁶ Hamrin and Zhao eds., *Decision-Making in Deng's China*; Lampton ed. *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*; Lieberthal and Lampton eds. *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-making in Post-Mao China*.

⁷ Lieberthal, 'Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations'. This model is derived principally from research into economic decision-making and institutions, the area to which


concurrently as SEdC head.⁸ The enhanced autonomy and power over macro-policy conferred on the SEdC were, as noted in the previous chapter, matched by devolution of central administrative control, and by increased flexibility to adapt national policies to local needs and resources and to carry out experimental projects. Over the past two decades, the MOE has thereby gained high official status, but its capacity to pursue many policy options remains limited, since as a ‘non-productive sector’ it has few tangible bargaining chips to deploy in negotiating for co-operation and support with other ministries and agencies.⁹ The MOE also struggles to assert its authority over policy implementation at lower levels because only rarely are education policies enacted as law. Instead, they are typically promulgated as ‘opinions’ (*yijian*), ‘guidelines’ (*gangyao*), ‘rules’ (*guize*) or ‘notices’ (*tongzhi*) which the MOE has limited power to enforce since subordinate education departments are directed by the MOE only in a professional capacity (*yewu guanli*); they are financially and administratively controlled (*xingzheng guanli*) by the corresponding level of People’s Government (see figure 3.1). Not only does the MOE have few legal recourses, but as Paine has shown, with approximately 90% of its budget tied to ongoing expenses such as salaries, it cannot offer material incentives to either local governments or education departments for compliance with national policies.¹⁰ Policies are further circumscribed to some extent by public opinion which, as elsewhere, can be very vocal on education. (Even in authoritarian China, public opinion is rarely ignored indefinitely). In order to implement its preferred policies, therefore, the MOE must rely chiefly on building consensus on macro-policy goals and values, sustaining commitment to education from the leadership and persuading other government organs to co-operate on cross-departmental issues.

Despite the relative powerlessness of the MOE to assure adherence to its directives, and vast disparities in the ways in which local governments choose to support, obstruct or simply neglect the efforts of their education departments to implement policy initiatives, various normative mechanisms have ensured that in many ways the education system remains highly centralised. Among the most

foreign researchers have had most unfettered access. As the contributors to the above-cited Lieberthal and Lampton edited volume show, the model is not always applicable to other policy areas.

⁸ Politburo members typically head national commissions (*weiyuanhui*), demonstrating the importance of these organs in the administrative hierarchy (Hamrin, ‘The Party Leadership System’, p96). Li served as head of the SEdC from 1985-1988. Subsequent SEdC/MOE leaders have been less illustrious, and none has held an equivalently high government or Party post outside the MOE whilst in MOE office, although several have gone on to become State Council or politburo members.

⁹ Paine, ‘The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China’, p181.

Fig. 3.1 The hierarchy of education administrationParallel control systems (*shuangchong guanli*)Left: Professional hierarchy (*yewu guanli*)Right and across: Administrative hierarchy (*xingzheng guanli*)

important of these mechanisms have been the national university entrance examinations, which tend to be the focal point of secondary education and to encourage a conformist approach to teaching and learning. In addition, barring periods of curricular devolution briefly in the late 1950s and again during the Cultural Revolution, from 1953 until 1986 only one set of textbooks was permitted to be used by all schools, and even with the introduction of textbook pluralism, differences between textbook sets have been minor. Likewise, the new, more flexible national curriculum piloted in 2001 and the many textbooks drafted to its specifications which are currently on trial in selected regions thus far appear fairly generic. This does not mean, however, that school subjects in the PRC have simply been dictated from on high and not 'made' through a process of struggle and negotiation between curriculum

¹⁰ Ibid.

stakeholders. As Au Yeung has shown, curricula – for the subject of Chinese at least - are not entirely ‘politically motivated and centrally initiated’ by the Party-state and transmitted unaltered to school pupils. In fact, ‘within the central government, the lack of co-operation and the competition between the various departments and curriculum agents results in a great deal of complexity, adaptation and confusion.’¹¹ Leung has found the same holds true for Geography, with rival academics involved in curriculum and textbook development bitterly contesting the parameters of curriculum content among themselves, and at the same time uniting to battle for improved subject status and increased class hours in the overall school curriculum.¹² Paine’s research on teachers and teacher training, meanwhile, reveals how decentralisation has resulted in policies increasingly being initiated at local levels where education experiments may be carried out relatively unimpeded. Successful models are then adopted or adapted elsewhere and may eventually be taken up as national policy.¹³ It would appear, therefore, that although central government attempts to monitor and standardise education through assorted exhortatory and regulatory mechanisms (such as advisory ‘guidelines’ and ‘notices’, national curricula, textbook inspection and approval systems), it exercises somewhat less top-down control than superficial markers of uniformity suggest.

Au Yeung, Leung and Paine conducted their research in the mid-late 1980s, and since then the devolutionary trend in administration and the expansion of expert participation in policy-making has accelerated. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the debate, negotiation ‘adaptation and confusion’ that have characterised the formulation of the Geography and Chinese subjects might also be evident in History; Geography and Chinese are, like History, clearly regarded by the leadership as important vehicles for moral, political and patriotic education, and indeed, as noted in preceding chapters, the three subjects have long been linked, often listed together in central directives on strengthening ideological orthodoxy. At the same time, however, neither Geography nor Chinese is as profoundly implicated in regime legitimation as History, the primary factor, presumably, which has convinced Chan that ‘Party control over the teaching of history in schools is almost watertight.’¹⁴

¹¹ AuYeung ‘Curriculum Dissemination in the People’s Republic of China’, p84.

¹² Leung, ‘Curriculum Development in the People’s Republic of China’.

¹³ Paine, ‘The Education Policy Process’, pp194-195.

¹⁴ Chan, ‘Introduction’, p4.

As discussed in Chapter 2, extreme political sensitivity has certainly limited the possibilities for vigorous and open debate over the purposes and content of History, leading most education professionals to concentrate on promoting ostensibly value-free skills and on reforming teaching, learning and assessment methods. This by no means implies, however, that the content of the History curriculum (both intended and implemented) has not been contested or undergone some reorientation of emphasis and interpretation, and while Chan is largely correct in asserting that such changes have been made ‘completely in line with shifts in official orthodoxy,’¹⁵ it is argued here that reforming curriculum content has not been an entirely one-way, top-down process. *What* has been reformed will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the institutional and procedural framework within which the History subject is ‘made’ and to clarify how power and responsibility are distributed among various individual and collective curriculum stakeholders. This will contribute to a better understanding of how, why, by whom and to what extent policies and practices are replicated, diluted, transformed or subverted (consciously or otherwise) in the process of transmission between the MOE and school History classrooms.

II. Macro-policy

The MOE has many responsibilities and pre-collegiate schooling is just one of them. Most MOE departments are concerned with various aspects of higher education policy and administering those tertiary institutions under its direct authority - mainly large prestigious ones such as Beijing, Fudan, Beijing Normal and Huadong Normal Universities – and managing other subsidiary agencies such as the People’s Education Press (PEP).¹⁶ In fact, only the Basic Education Department (*jichu jiaoyusi*; henceforth BEdD), which replaced the Common Education Department (*putong jiaoyuchu*) in the 1985 Reform, is directly involved with primary and secondary education. The BEdD is, in turn, subdivided into several sections and offices responsible for various aspects of pre-school, primary and secondary education, and for improving adult literacy. Its overarching purpose is to achieve nation-wide success in the ‘two basics’ (*liangji*) – that is, ‘basically to universalise nine-year compulsory education’ (*jiben puji jiunian yiwu jiaoyu*) and ‘basically to eradicate child and adult illiteracy’ (*jiben saochu qingzhuangnian wenmang*) - and its ongoing

¹⁵ Ibid, p6.

responsibilities include guiding basic education reform and drafting relevant policy documents, setting assessment standards and overseeing and approving curriculum and textbook development. In regard to this last task, the BEdD produces Teaching Plans (*jiaoxue jihua*), which set out the general objectives of primary and secondary schooling and allocate class hours to each subject. It also convenes committees to draft individual subject Teaching Outlines (*jiaoxue dagang*) and oversees other committees that evaluate and approve curricula and textbooks. New curricula and textbooks, however, are only drafted every few years, and most of the BEdD's day-to-day policy work is concerned with more fundamental matters such as raising standards of *putonghua*, promoting health and hygiene and reducing drop-out rates. With the exception of Teaching Outlines, therefore, very little attention is devoted to individual school subjects, and only rarely does the MOE issue additional subject-specific instructions.

As discussed in Chapter 2, however, several SEdC/MOE directives specifically concerning the History subject have been issued over the past two decades. I have been unable to ascertain precisely by whom these supplementary History policy documents were drafted and how much debate there was over them within the SEdC/MOE, since, as Lieberthal has noted, it is extraordinarily difficult to gain access to the highest decision-making levels in the PRC.¹⁷ It is clear, nonetheless, that these policies were not spontaneously initiated within the MOE, nor were they a result of upwards pressure from a History education community seeking to augment its own status *vis-à-vis* other school subjects. As shown in the previous chapter, these documents have in each instance blown with the prevailing political winds of campaigns such as those against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalisation and the Tiananmen crack-down, and have been drafted immediately following pronouncements on using history to promote patriotism and commitment to socialist modernisation issued by Party leaders, such as Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, or by the Propaganda Ministry. It cannot, of course, be inferred from this that the MOE has been in any way *opposed* to reiterating the moral and patriotic significance of History, or that the heavily ideological language and content of these supplementary guidelines have been designed merely to placate anxious Party leaders. Senior personnel at the MOE have, after all, been appointed partly because of their political affiliations, and

¹⁶ The MOEd lists all its departments and responsibilities at <http://www.moe.edu.cn/>

¹⁷ Lieberthal, 'Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations', p4. My own research access only went as high as the History TMIC, a sub-committee of the national TMIC.

evidently there has been a relatively high degree of consensus among the Party leadership on what purposes History should serve, with both ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ calling for its application to patriotic education. Yet, the fact that the MOE has not issued any unprompted directives on History education, does suggest that it has not normally been thought necessary to do more than incorporate ideology into Teaching Outlines. Indeed, the content of the 1991 ‘Guideline for Political-Ideological Education in Primary and Secondary School History’ was in essence a simplified listing of Teaching Outline topics prefaced with a formulaic political diatribe that was wholly devoid of concrete instructions on how local education authorities and History educators were to make their subject any more patriotic and moralising than it already was.¹⁸ Other supplementary MOE guidelines for History have been similarly unimaginative and vague, and apart from reinstating Chinese history to the senior secondary curriculum in 1990 and adding an extra weekly class hour in 1992 to the second year of junior secondary for modern and contemporary Chinese history (a class hour which was taken away in 1994), no serious commitment to changing or strengthening History’s place in the school curriculum has been indicated by the MOE.¹⁹ With this evident lack of focused MOE concern for History, coupled with its general inability to guarantee accurate replication of national policies at local levels, it is hardly surprising that local education authorities have not normally taken these guidelines very seriously, although numerous articles and editorials on properly implementing their provisions have appeared in education journals in the immediate aftermath of the guidelines’ publication. Similarly, the status boost given to History education professionals by these supplementary policies has been short-lived as the realities of the senior secondary and university entrance examination-oriented curriculum, in which History is eminently disposable, have set in. As we shall see below and in subsequent chapters, this has been an important (although by no means the only) cause of disillusionment and apathy among History educators.

¹⁸ ‘Zhongxiaoxue lishi xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao’, [8/1991], reprinted COH, pp637-655.

¹⁹ On the 1990 changes to the senior secondary curriculum, see Chapter 2. The extra class hour for junior secondary was introduced with the 1992 Teaching Plan (also see Chapter 2), but was cancelled by a 1994 directive concerning the reduction of the working week, which in turn led to a reduction of total class hours. The extra History class hour was an obvious choice for excision, especially in light of the desire to expand IT and foreign language provision (‘Guanyu yinfa ‘Shixing xin gongshizhi dui quanrizhi xiaoxue, chuji zhongxue kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua jinxing tiaozheng de yijian’ he ‘Shixing xin gongshizhi dui gaozhong jiaoxue jihua jinxing tiaozheng de yijian’ de tongzhi’ [5/7/1994], reprinted in COCP, pp385-392). A full break-down of class hour allocations from 1978-2000 is given in Chapter 4 (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

The direct impact on classroom practice of MOE History guidelines, including Teaching Outlines, should not, therefore, be overestimated.

III. Curriculum development

If MOE policies and central government exhortations on the importance of History have frequently met with widespread apathy from educators, it has been another matter when it comes to drafting Teaching Outlines. As noted in Chapter 1, the textbook writer-editors at PEP gained almost sole responsibility for Outline production in 1957, a monopoly they have only finally been forced to relinquish in the past few years. Answering directly to the MOE, PEP has unsurprisingly followed Party and MOE directives fairly diligently when drafting Outlines, incorporating much of the language and spirit of these directives. As shown in the following chapter, however, precisely where in the Outlines such language has been incorporated and how thoroughly the ideological tone has permeated the substance of the Outlines may be very revealing, indicating that in some cases History curriculum developers may simply be paying lip service to leadership pronouncements. The trend towards a more autonomous development process for school curricula, moreover, appears to be accelerating as increasing numbers of experts are invited to participate.

The curriculum development process is a long one, involving several stages and many personnel. First, the Teaching Plan must be drawn up, and the general trend desired for education over the next several years decided. At this stage, the timetable is determined and class hours allocated to each subject. As Leung has shown, there is considerable jockeying for position during this time as representatives of each subject lobby to enhance or protect their share of the timetable.²⁰ When the Teaching Plan has been decided, individual subject committees are appointed to draft Outlines. This stage of curriculum development is much longer than the drafting of Teaching Plans and involves far more lower level personnel; even at the height of PEP's monopoly, draft curricula were always sent out to local education departments and academics for comments and suggestions before they were promulgated nation-wide.

Since 1986, the BEdD has overseen the curriculum development (and textbook production) process through its Curriculum Development and Teaching Materials

²⁰ In 1987, Geography specialists attempted to have their subject reclassified as a science (*like*) in order to gain class hours. As a science, it would have been allocated between 6-9% of total class hours, as a

Administration Sections, and the MOE Basic Education Teaching Materials Inspection and Approval Office, which the BEdD directly supervises. Under the present system, the BEdD appoints a core group of curriculum developers who may invite other participants to provide additional expertise. For History, this core group has normally been drawn from the ranks of senior PEP editors, and key advisors have mostly been drawn from among university academic subject specialists and retired PEP editors. The 1988 draft Outline, for example was compiled by the History editorial department at PEP, Beijing Normal University professors, and a handful of senior teachers and education researchers, who were assisted by the Central Nationalities Institute, Shandong University and the Beijing Education Institute.²¹ In a major turnaround, however, the drafting of the 2001 curriculum - the name of which has been changed from History Teaching Outline to History Curriculum Standards (*lishi kecheng biao zhun*), the term used under Nationalist rule - was entrusted to a single academic from Beijing Normal University's History department, who then invited four experts to form the core group, and numerous others to advise on particular topics and issues. Only one of the core group members was a PEP editor, a source of considerable resentment at PEP where some editors feel that their many years of curriculum drafting experience are being discarded in favour of newfangled fads.²² Other core group members and supplementary advisors to the 2001 curriculum were recruited mainly from normal universities and education research units (see below), with experts in pedagogy favoured over academic subject specialists.²³

Despite major personnel changes, the process of curriculum development remains fundamentally unchanged. Once the curriculum developers have produced a complete draft Outline, it is submitted for preliminary approval to the History Teaching Materials Inspection and Approval Committee (History TMIC). This committee, which was established in 1986, serves under a multi-subject TMIC that includes representatives from all disciplines as well as pedagogical experts, each of whom is directly appointed by the MOE for a renewable period of three years.²⁴ The

humanities subject (*wenke*) only 4%. Their efforts failed and Geography has remained a lowly humanities subject (Leung, 'Curriculum development in the PRC', pp66-67).

²¹ Su, 'Tan tan dui 'jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chujing zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)' de jidian tihui', p2.

²² Criticisms made of HCS by PEP editors are discussed further in the conclusion.

²³ Personal communications with curriculum development group participants.

²⁴ 'Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui quanguo zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending weiyuanhui gongzuo zhangcheng' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1091-1093.

History TMIC is likewise appointed and consists of both subject and pedagogy specialists, the majority of whom are retirees from normal universities, education research institutes and PEP.²⁵ After the History TMIC has granted preliminary approval, the draft is sent out to education commissions (*jiaoyu weiyuanhui*) at the provincial level (provinces, self-governing municipalities and autonomous regions; henceforth, PMAR). The PMAR education commissions distribute it to selected regional and local education departments which convene committees of education department officials, academics from local colleges, education research unit personnel and school teachers to discuss the draft. Key criticisms and suggestions recorded by these committees are then sent back to the curriculum development group, which evaluates the comments and makes changes as it sees fit. The process may be repeated several times until a consensus has been reached. The final draft is re-submitted to the History TMIC for approval to begin the trial phase.

The trial curriculum (*shiyangao*) and their accompanying set(s) of trial textbooks (see below) are tested in a broad cross-section of regions in order to gauge their applicability to the country as a whole. The 2001 History Curriculum Standards (HCS), for example, went on trial in autumn 2001 in twenty-seven provinces and municipalities, in thirty-nine diverse areas. Some of the initial trial regions were entire cities, including large ones such as Liuzhou, Nanning, Guiyang and Dalian, but most were individual districts or counties under municipal jurisdiction such as Nanshan in Shenzhen, Chengguan in Lanzhou and Dagang in Tianjin. The trial region was expanded more than ten-fold in 2002-2003, and will continue to expand until the 2001 HCS formally replaces the current (2000) Outline.²⁶ During this phase each trial region conducts surveys, classroom observations and holds meetings to discuss their findings before reporting back to the curriculum development group.²⁷ These findings are incorporated into a revised draft of the curriculum, which after several years is re-submitted to the History TMIC. Some further changes may be required by the History TMIC, but once it has approved the final draft and has

²⁵ Additional members have included, *inter alia*, historians from the Party archives and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. A list of the then-members may be found at the front of the PEP History textbooks published during the 1990s. As of 2000, six of the seven original members were still serving on the expanded fourteen-member committee. I am grateful to Liu Zonghua (Beijing Jiaoyu Xueyuan, and History TMIC member since its inauguration) for giving me details of the members' backgrounds and discussing the committee's work during the curriculum development and textbook approval process.

²⁶ 'Jiaoyubu bushu quanguo jichujiaoyu xin kecheng gaige shiyan jiang tuiguang dao 500 duoge xianqushi' [4/4/2002], http://www.moe.edu.cn/news/2002_04/46.htm

received permission from the general TMIC, the new curriculum may be promulgated nation-wide. With the exceptions of Shanghai and Zhejiang which were permitted to develop their own curricula in the late 1980s (primary-senior secondary in Shanghai, primary and junior secondary in Zhejiang), and Beijing which followed suit in 2001, all regions were subject to Outline stipulations as of 2001, although they may be somewhat modified to suit local conditions and resources. Indeed, such modifications do not even require official permission, and must simply be reported to higher authorities ‘for the record’ (*bei’an*).²⁸ As Paine, has shown, this latitude is what allows regional and local education authorities both to evade regulations and to implement innovative practices.²⁹

IV. Textbook production

For much of PRC history, PEP has had a monopoly on drafting and publication of both Teaching Outlines and textbooks. With the introduction of the ‘one Outline, many textbooks’ (*yigang duoben*) system following the 1985 Reform, however, other agencies have also been permitted to produce textbooks. For History, this was at first limited to a few select groups, but textbook pluralism has since been greatly extended and, in theory, anyone can produce a textbook albeit subject to stringent regulations.³⁰

At PEP, full-time professional textbook writer-editors are grouped into individual subject teams responsible for producing textbooks for all school levels, as well as supplementary materials (such as exercise books) and teacher handbooks.³¹ Although all team members participate, History textbooks are by and large a collation of text sections drafted separately by editorial team members, each of whom is responsible for his or her area and historical period of specialisation. Specialisation in this instance is, of course, meant in a broad sense. PEP textbook writers are not normally recruited from among university department faculty, and few have postgraduate degrees in their subject. The majority are former teachers who have spent most of their careers working at PEP, and are specialist textbook writers, not academics. PEP

²⁷ Many of these reports are available online at the NCCT website (www.ncct.gov.cn) as is a full list of the original trial regions.

²⁸ ‘Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi xiaoxue, chuji zhongxue kecheng jihua (shixing)’ [6/8/1992], JYFQS, p727.

²⁹ Paine, ‘The Education Policy Process’.

³⁰ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, p1090.

More detailed instructions for prospective textbook writers and a plan for developing a more competitive textbook market were issued the following year (‘Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai bianxie guihua fang’an’ [21/8/1988], JYFQS, pp1093-1095). The most recent regulations were issued in 2001 ‘Zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianxie shending guanli zanzing banfa’ [7/6/2001].

cannot support a limitless staff either, and the areas and periods in which History editors specialise, therefore, are expansive, such as modern Chinese or ancient world history. To ensure accuracy and adherence to mainstream historical and pedagogical research, therefore, there is also some external input from university academics and retired PEP editors, the most important of which are normally acknowledged at the front of the textbook as advisors (*guwen*).

Elsewhere, textbook writing is not yet a full-time professional affair, and other History textbooks have mostly been produced under the auspices of PMAR education commissions, compiled by groups of academics and education researchers with some input from senior teachers, and published by the provincial education press. The first sets of non-PEP textbooks drafted after textbook pluralism was legislated were the ‘coastal edition’ (*yanhaiban*) produced in Guangzhou, the ‘inland edition’ (*neidiban*) produced in Sichuan, and another set aimed at four-year junior secondary schools drafted by Beijing Normal University. Shanghai also produced its own textbooks in accordance with its local curriculum, as did Zhejiang, although as already noted, Zhejiang replaced History (and Geography) with Social Studies at junior secondary as well as primary level. It was intended that these textbooks would meet differing needs in diverse regions. Thus, the Shanghai and Coastal editions were aimed at economically developed areas, the Inland edition at rural areas. In the late 1990s an additional set of History textbooks was drafted in Hunan, also directed at underdeveloped areas. It was, however, allegedly a plagiarised version of PEP’s textbooks, and although the matter did not make it to the courts, compensation was ordered paid to PEP in 2000.³² In autumn 2001, Beijing introduced its own textbooks in line with its new local curriculum, and numerous others have been produced in accordance with the 2001 HCS.

It is, of course, one thing to draft a textbook; it is quite another to get it adopted for use in schools and, in order to do so, textbooks must be officially approved. Once a draft is complete, it must be submitted to the PMAR-level teaching materials inspection committee, which operates along similar lines to the national TMIC. Adjustments may be required, but once these have been made and the textbook has

³¹ A summary of PEP’s responsibilities and a list of its publications may be found at www.pep.com.cn

³² Personal communication with PEP History editors, confirmed by Liu Zonghua. Given that all textbooks are remarkably similar and attitudes to intellectual property rights are fairly lax, this seems somewhat ironic, and it can only be surmised that the Hunan edition copied PEP texts verbatim. Unfortunately, however, I was unable to obtain copies of the Hunan textbooks to conduct my own comparisons.

passed PMAR inspection it may be used in schools within the province.³³ In order for a textbook to be eligible for use country-wide, however, it must undergo a trial period and pass the national History TMIC inspection. This process is similar to that required for Outlines, and involves testing the textbooks in various localities; the inland edition, for example, was piloted in rural areas of Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Hainan, while the coastal edition was tested in Guangdong and Fujian.³⁴ During this trial period comments and suggestions for areas of improvement are solicited before the editorial team revises and re-submits the textbooks to the History TMIC.³⁵ Each member of the History TMIC is supposed to study the complete set of textbooks and contribute to the decision-making process, although in practice the main contributions tend to be made by those with particular expertise in the relevant area.³⁶ The texts are evaluated for their ‘scientific’ (*kexuexing*) and ‘ideological’ (*sixiangxing*) suitability,³⁷ that is, on whether the ‘facts’ are accurate, whether the academic level is appropriate for the target audience, and whether the political orientation accords with current orthodoxy, or at least the orthodoxy held by the MOE and TMIC. This last concern has meant that the sensitive area of modern and especially contemporary Chinese history has typically received closest scrutiny. Many changes have frequently been required, and these volumes have usually been revised and re-inspected numerous times before they have been passed. By contrast, changes required for ancient Chinese and world history have been far fewer and texts have often passed after one round of minor revisions.³⁸ Some textbooks, however, have failed the TMIC inspection altogether despite numerous revisions, including Hunan’s plagiarised volumes and Zhejiang’s Social Studies textbooks.

Interestingly, despite regulations stipulating that textbooks must ‘comply with all the requirements stipulated by the Teaching Plans and Outlines’³⁹ in order to pass TMIC inspection, neither of the History TMIC inspectors with whom I spoke cited this as a factor they took into consideration during the inspection process. It is probable, of course, that were a textbook to diverge significantly from the Outline, it

³³ For an example of PMAR-level inspection processes, see regulations drafted by the Beijing Municipal Education Commission at <http://www.bjedu.gov.cn/zhinan/shenpi/sp5.htm>.

³⁴ Preface, Inland Edition, Chinese History, Vol.1; Preface, Coastal Edition, Chinese History, Vol.1.

³⁵ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, p1090.

³⁶ Interview with Liu Zonghua.

³⁷ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biao zhun’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090-91.

³⁸ Interview with Liu Zonghua.

³⁹ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biao zhun’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090-1091.

would meet neither scientific nor ideological criteria for approval, and for this reason it would not be worth the textbook writers' while to spend time and resources on something that has little chance of acceptance. Au Yeung has found, nevertheless, that some major discrepancies between Outlines and textbooks have still been permitted, either because they are undetected or disregarded during inspection. The PEP junior and senior secondary Chinese language and literature textbooks she examined in the 1980s, for example, in many cases omitted some items listed in the Outline and included others that were not, despite the fact that the writers of these textbooks were the very persons who had produced the Teaching Outline in the first place. This, she argues, is because Outlines have been written to satisfy the MOE and the Party leadership, textbooks to suit the requirements of examinations and examination-oriented teaching.⁴⁰ Textbooks have thus sometimes diverged from Outlines to reflect demands from PMAR education authorities, which set senior secondary entrance examinations, and from a teaching community that desires a single comprehensive set of textbooks to allow educators to achieve the highest promotion rates among their students in the most straightforward manner possible. The same has evidently been true for the subject of English. Indeed, in recent years, PEP has received a significant volume of direct, unsolicited complaints and requests for revisions to current textbooks from teachers and education researchers. No longer protected by a textbook monopoly, or perhaps simply in a genuine attempt to meet pedagogical needs, PEP has made serious attempts to respond to 'bottom-up' pressures.⁴¹

Such discrepancies between Outlines and textbooks and the degree of negotiation and accommodation between the higher and lower ends of the education hierarchy, however, have not been universal. History Teaching Outlines and textbooks, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, have been far more congruent than appears to be the case for Chinese and English. This is no doubt in part because of History's special ideological status in the curriculum and its corresponding sensitivity, but it is also a product of the education system itself in which History is not normally tested in senior secondary entrance examinations (unlike Chinese and English). Since History does not 'matter' in this context, educators just do not care as much about the content of

⁴⁰ Au Yeung, 'Curriculum Dissemination in the PRC', pp84-85.

⁴¹ Personal communication with Edward Vickers, who worked as a writer-editor of English textbooks at PEP from 2000-2001. See also references to Adamson, *English in China: The Junior Secondary School Curriculum, 1949-94* (Unpublished PhD. thesis, The University of Hong Kong, 1998) in Vickers, *History as a School Subject in Hong Kong 1960's-2000*, p80.

History textbooks. This is not to say that there have been no demands for change. As discussed in the previous chapter, desire to enhance the low status of History in the curriculum has certainly impelled education researchers, normal university History faculty and many school teachers to write extensively in education journals on the need for reform to make the subject more relevant and useful (and thus more appealing) to the student body. In response to these pleas as well as to the wider trend towards pedagogical reform, History textbooks have thus been partially overhauled in format and style and, to a lesser degree, in content.

Textbook pluralism and the new market it has theoretically created should also be an incentive for reform, as textbooks passed by the History TMIC are eligible for nation-wide use. Until recently, however, this market has hardly been competitive since PMAR authorities have simply mandated a single textbook for all schools under their jurisdiction. Furthermore, since until the past few years only Shanghai has had its own senior secondary textbooks and everyone else has had to use PEP, most areas have also chosen to use PEP History textbooks for junior secondary to ensure continuity. Additionally, many teachers may prefer to continue teaching what they already know, or feel reluctant to familiarise themselves with new textbooks without material incentives. The result of this has been continued nation-wide PEP dominance. Admittedly, in those areas where non-PEP textbooks have been produced, there has been some degree of local protectionism (*difang baohuzhuyi*) in an effort to make money for the provincial education press: coastal edition textbooks are the officially mandated texts in Guangdong, the inland edition in Sichuan and Shanghai textbooks in Shanghai. Yet, even with local protectionism, many schools, with the exception of those in Shanghai (because it has its own senior secondary textbooks and holds its own university entrance examinations) and Zhejiang (because History is no longer taught at junior secondary level) have actually been using PEP textbooks because, like their colleagues elsewhere, they prefer to maintain continuity between junior and senior secondary textbooks. It is not only textbook protectionism and teacher reluctance, however, that determine textbook selection. In one Guangzhou district, for example, local officials found that schools evaded education department instructions to enforce the use of the coastal edition by ordering both the coastal and PEP textbooks, and teaching the latter. Although this meant students had to pay for two sets, the practice was apparently a response to demands not from teachers, but from parents, who hoped that textbook continuity between junior and

senior secondary stages would ultimately give their precious only-child a better chance of success in the national university entrance examinations despite the fact that History is not even compulsorily examined.⁴²

Clearly then, there are many factors that determine precisely what is included in a textbook and whether it is adopted for classroom use. Whether the switch to the prescriptions of the 2001 History Curriculum Standards will permit the emergence of genuine pluralism and a more competitive, less PEP-dominated textbook market when the trial phase is complete, therefore, is debatable. Certainly, PEP editors have found it difficult to draft textbooks that conform to someone else's curriculum guideline, a guideline, moreover, that is far less detailed than its predecessors.⁴³ In addition, recent expansion of textbook pluralism in the senior secondary arena and the permission granted to several regions to develop their own curricula for basic education and to set all or part of the local university entrance examinations potentially removes the continuity condition, while the devolution of curriculum administration means that local education departments and even individual schools should eventually be free to select from any of the approved textbooks.⁴⁴ It may also be that PEP textbooks come to be seen as representing old-fashioned ways, even if they are keeping up with current trends towards cartoon-style formats and colloquial language which are thought to be more child-friendly. Nevertheless, as long as the polity remains illiberal, and texts continue to require official approval, it is unlikely that there will be any far-reaching substantive changes, or that textbooks will dramatically diverge from one another in the immediate future. And as long as History remains a peripheral subject in the school curriculum, it is unlikely that anyone will care.

V. Policy Dissemination

Teaching Outlines, MOE supplementary guidelines, textbooks and their accompanying teacher handbooks are the principal written forms in which macro-policies for History are concretely manifested, even if they are not always wholly consistent with one another. In order to ensure that the general intent and content of

⁴² Personal communication with local education department History subject officer.

⁴³ Personal communications with PEP editors. Further details of their criticisms of the 2001 HCS are given in the concluding chapter.

⁴⁴ Since 2002, Shanghai has been joined by ten other areas in setting university entrance examinations at the regional level, including Beijing, Guangdong, Liaoning and Tianjin. In March 2005, Shandong, Jiangxi and Anhui were added to this group. It is too early to know what effect this will ultimately have on education, but some of the possible implications will be discussed in the conclusion.

these texts are correctly interpreted and universally applied, therefore, the BEdD holds training sessions for PMAR education commission and research unit personnel whenever new guidelines or Outlines are published. These PMAR-level cadres are then expected to run similar training programmes for regional level cadres, who in turn hold them at the local level. Local education research unit (ERU) staff are responsible for liaising with schools and teachers and establishing and supervising ‘study groups’ to discuss issues pertaining to new guidelines and textbooks. Further instructions and explanations are offered through BEdD television broadcasts on the Education Channel (*Zhongguo jiaoyu dianshitai*)⁴⁵ and through numerous books, study guides and journal articles published by members of the History TMIC, the Outline drafting committee and textbook editors.⁴⁶

As discussed above, education, to quote Paine, is ‘a weak bureaucratic actor’;⁴⁷ that is, the MOE does not operate from a position of parity in its dealings with other ministries, nor does it exercise absolute authority over subordinate education departments. If it is difficult to ensure that there is 100% congruence between Party directives, History Teaching Outlines and textbooks, it is still harder to guarantee that lower level education authorities are actually carrying out the tasks with which they have been entrusted, and if they are, whether they are doing them diligently and correctly. Likewise, it is possible to pressurise local education departments, ERUs and schools into ordering copies of History education journals and guides for studying new regulations and guidelines, but it is not possible to ensure that education officials, researchers and teachers actually read them, let alone closely follow their recommendations. Indeed, I found that in the case of teachers at least, few of them had even a passing familiarity with the content of the current History Teaching Outline, and some freely admitted that the last time they had read an Outline was in teacher training college. Wang has similarly observed that schools frequently do not even bother to order copies of new Outlines, and that teachers focus solely on textbooks and teaching those topics with which they are familiar regardless of

⁴⁵ Programming information can be found at www.cetv.edu.cn

⁴⁶ These books and articles are too numerous to list here. Some representative examples, however, include: BEdD ed. *Lishi jiaoxue dagang (shiyong): xuexi zhidao*, a collection of articles written mainly by TMIC inspectors and textbook writer-editors past and present; Wang Hongzhi (NCCT, former PEP editor), ‘Tan tan guoduxing ‘quanrizhi zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang’ de xiuding’; Su Shoutong (TMIC and History TMIC, former PEP editor), ‘Tan tan dui ‘jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)’ de jidian tihui’; Gong Qizhu (Sichuan Education Institute, editor of Inland edition textbooks), ‘Tan tan jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang de tedian he sheng bian chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu’ and ‘Guanyu lishi jiaocai bianxie de jidian sikao’.

whether they are specified in the Outline.⁴⁸ There are, of course, assorted inspection mechanisms to ensure that policies are being thoroughly implemented. As in the UK, where schools are provided with advance notice of Ofsted inspections (and universities of Teaching Quality Assessments), however, schools in the PRC are forewarned of inspection visits giving teachers adequate time to prepare model lessons. Furthermore, although senior inspection staff occasionally conduct classroom observations, most school-level inspections are carried out by the same local ERU History subject officers who are responsible for organising the dissemination of official policy in the first place. Teachers' success or failure in policy implementation, therefore, reflects directly on the local ERU, making it more likely that they will be deemed compliant.

Macro-policy implementation is not the only function of the above-mentioned agencies and mechanisms; they are also involved in ongoing research and experiments, and devising and disseminating new policies and practices. Perhaps the most important agency involved in these projects is the ERU which exists at all levels of administration from the national Basic Education Centre for Curriculum and Teaching Materials Development (*jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiaocai fazhan zhongxin*; self-titled National Centre for School Curriculum and Textbook Development or NCCT), which answers directly to the MOE, down to those which are merely a handful of staff working at the local education department.

Operating at the national level, the NCCT has a broad remit. It consists of separate sections for curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation, all of which work closely with the relevant BEdD departments in organising curriculum development committees, drafting regulations for textbooks, liaising with TMIC, and overseeing inspection work. The NCCT also monitors experimental work, particularly the trial phase of curriculum and textbook implementation. In addition, it organises the writing and publication of teaching materials for Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwanese and other foreign readers that 'reflect the culture, history and geography of the Chinese national people,' presumably to ensure that the correct internal perspectives on these sensitive topics are represented externally.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Paine, 'The Education Policy Process', p181.

⁴⁸ Wang, 'Chaikai lishi jiaoxue xinde yiye', p33.

⁴⁹ 'Jiaoyubu jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiaocai fazhan zhongxin zhize renwu'. For more information on the various NCCT departments and their responsibilities see www.ncct.gov.cn/jgsz.html

At the PMAR and regional levels are ERUs that work within education departments and those that are affiliated education research institutes (*jiaoyu xueyuan*), which offer in-service teacher training courses as well as carrying out and reporting on research projects and making recommendations for policy adjustments. ERUs at this level usually have whole departments allocated to single subjects, with individual staff members responsible for research and development in particular aspects of the subject. Where History is concerned, PMAR ERUs have also been largely responsible for organising and drafting local curricula and/or teaching materials, such as those used in Shanghai, Guangdong and Beijing, as well as textbooks on local history, which as shown in Chapter 4, has been listed as a compulsory component of the curriculum in the Teaching Outlines since 1992, even if it has not always been enforced. More recently, many of their senior members have been called upon to advise on national curricula, as well as continuing their organisational and supervisory role in piloting trial Outlines and textbooks.

At the local level there may be one or more staff members responsible for a single subject in larger ERUs, but in smaller ones, especially in rural areas, a single officer will often take charge of several subjects. As already noted, these local ERUs (*jiaoyanshi*) are the frontline of interaction between education administration and teachers, policy and praxis. With the current emphasis on ‘raising the quality of teachers’ (*tigao jiaoshi suzhi*), which ties in to the broader goals of ‘raising the quality of the national people’ and promoting ‘quality education’, creating a fully qualified cohort of teachers has become increasingly important. Local ERU personnel, therefore, organise workshops and demonstration classes to disseminate new or existing thinking on ‘best practice’ to teachers. They also mentor new teachers to ensure that these novices complete the requisite number of in-service training credits within the allotted time-frame of their probationary period (normally one year). In addition to training workshops, they conduct classroom observations of all teachers to identify areas in which individuals or subject departments need particular improvement and to make appropriate recommendations. They also participate in teacher evaluations and help to determine teacher promotions and awards.

The principal focus of ERUs, then, is pedagogical research and teacher quality improvement, and for this reason, the majority of ERU History subject officers are themselves former History teachers, although many senior ERU staff, especially at the higher administrative levels are many years or even decades removed from everyday

classroom experience. Additional and often innovative pedagogical input comes from normal university History departments, where there are some prominent academics working in the field of subject-specific pedagogies as well as those in Education departments who work on more general pedagogical theories and practices. The majority of normal university history faculty members, however, are academic subject specialists like their counterparts in standard universities, and this is reflected in a continued emphasis in pre-service teacher training on acquiring historical knowledge rather than teaching skills, despite efforts to expand the pedagogical component of the curriculum. As shown in the final chapters, this has often made the work of reform-minded ERUs extremely difficult as History teachers are almost invariably inclined to place the textbook at the core (*yi keben wei zhu*) of their classroom practice. Much ERU experimental work, therefore, is oriented to going beyond the textbook, utilising supplementary materials and stimulating active student participation.

If ERU personnel and normal university academics are the chief innovators of pedagogical experiments, education journals provide the support or avenues for disseminating new ideas and practices. *Lishi jiaoxue* (History Education) and *Lishi jiaoxue wenti* (Issues in History Education) are the oldest and most prestigious of these journals and are run by a full-time professional editorial staff. In addition, several universities in conjunction with PMAR ERUs or professional associations also publish monthly or bi-monthly journals. *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu cankao* (translated by the publishers as Reference to Middle School History), based at Huazhong Normal University in Xi'an is probably the most widely circulated of these. Others include *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu tongxun* (History Teaching Research Journal), based in Shanghai, and *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu* (History Education Research) published by Huanan Normal University in Guangzhou. As noted in the introduction, these History education journal articles are not always platitudinous reiterations of official policies, and there are often reports on local teaching experiments, sample examination papers, model examination answers and lesson plans and even on History education outside the PRC, which teachers are far more inclined to read than editorials in praise of the latest MOE guidelines or articles explaining revisions of Outline content.

Another avenue for academic exchange is the History Education Association (*lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui*) which was established as the primary professional association for History educators in 1981 as a branch of the National Education Society (*Zhongguo jiaoyu xuehui*). This organisation hosts meetings at local levels and annually

convenes a large national conference, which somewhat misleadingly is termed ‘international’ since a handful of foreign – usually Japanese, Taiwanese or Hong Kong – delegates are often invited.⁵⁰ As elsewhere, this is typically a paid-for jaunt to a far-away city, available primarily to more senior educators. At the five-day ‘International Conference on History Education’ (*guoji lishi jiaoxue xueshu yantaohui*) that I attended in Shanghai in November 2000, for example, a couple of hours were devoted to the opening and closing ceremonies and speeches, one morning to ‘small group’ (about twenty people) discussions, and one afternoon to presenting the fruits of those discussions to the whole conference, a session which only one-third of the delegates attended. The remainder of the time was dedicated to sightseeing, banquets and socialising, with one token visit to an elite school where we were shown round the outstanding facilities and observed a model History class.

Although the 2000 conference apparently erred rather more than usual on the pleasure side,⁵¹ and many delegates clearly were far more interested in sightseeing and shopping than in discussing History education, it does not mean that these occasions are not sites at which ideas are exchanged. Self-censorship in conference discussion as in print is, of course, pervasive and the public forum is normally dominated by uninspired and uninspiring ‘politically correct’ speeches given by members of the History TMIC, NCCT, PEP and senior academics from prestigious universities, which may subsequently be published along with some of the conference papers in an edited volume.⁵² Even the small group discussion I attended was hardly discursive, involving primarily the reading out of prepared papers, and predictable – one might almost say ritualised - performances and exchanges between the participants that basically mirrored what had been iterated in the main conference forum. Perhaps the most striking example was the performance of Japanese and Chinese delegates for one another. At the opening ceremony, one of the History Education Association chairs gave a speech, a significant proportion of which was

⁵⁰ At the 2000 conference I attended in Shanghai, in addition to myself were one Korean and four Japanese. One Hong Konger and one Taiwanese were also present and were variously designated as ‘foreign’ and ‘compatriots’ as suited the hosts. As Yeung Sau-chu, the Hong Kong delegate, said to me, ‘They make it *very clear* here when I am Chinese and when I am not.’ The Taiwanese delegate Wang chong-fu, (a History professor at National Taiwan Normal University and of Mainland origin) and one of the Japanese professors, Natani Sadao, are regulars at the conference. Peter Lee and Alaric Dickinson whose work was discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 2 have been among previous attendees.

⁵¹ On the final day, the History Education Association chairman berated the poor attendance at general discussions and the over-emphasis given to ‘fun’ by the Shanghai organising committee.

⁵² See, for example, the proceedings of the 1993 conference, Zhongguo jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui and PEP eds., *Mianxiang 21 shiji lishi jiaocai he lishi jiaoxue*.

devoted to emphasising the importance of remembering past aggression against China, especially the atrocities committed by Japan. The most senior Japanese delegate then presented a paper on world history pedagogy in Japan, but spent much of his allotted time apologising for those textbooks that fail to acknowledge Japan's war crimes. Likewise, in the small group discussion, a Japanese delegate was supposedly speaking on pedagogical research in Japan, but followed his colleague at the opening ceremony and dedicated much of his time to denouncing textbooks that whitewash the war. The Chinese respondent then berated Japan for past atrocities and present denial, wholly ignoring the pedagogical issues that had been raised. As the small group chair later said to me, 'Every year it is the same. We denounce Japan for their textbook portrayals of the war, and the Japanese apologise for it. Similarly, all the Taiwanese delegates we invite are pro-unification. We should invite some Japanese militarists and supporters of Taiwanese independence – that would be much more interesting'. While rather less emotionally charged, much of the interaction between Chinese delegates is equally performative, since it is evidently governed by tacit rules of self-censorship and identikit phraseology showing deference to the achievements of History educators of the past and reiterating support for the current official goals of History education. Precisely for which 'audience' they put on this 'face theatre' (to borrow Gries' terminology) is not always clear;⁵³ what is certain is that the public performance normally changes only in very small increments as individual or group actors take calculated risks to move the parameters of legitimate discourse. The considerable time allowed for socialising at these conferences thus permits informal gatherings at which the real discussion and debate which lies behind such boundary-pushing takes place, at which new ideas, practices and plans may be shared and contacts and networks established and consolidated. As argued below and in the concluding chapters, it is these networks of reform-minded educators that are slowly beginning to reshape the History subject.

⁵³ Gries (*Face Nationalism*) uses the concept of 'face theatre' in the somewhat larger context of Chinese nationalism, in which he argues that 'Face theater involves elites on the political stage vying for legitimacy before audiences of popular opinion'. He proposes that in official dealings with Japan (and also the US), Chinese leaders' often belligerent stance is not merely about one-upmanship over a former (current?) enemy, but is a performance constructed to satisfy domestic nationalist sentiment. I would argue that similar dynamics apply in the much smaller context of both national and international academic exchange.

VI. Institutions, Individuals, Power and *guanxi*

The political and ideological, bureaucratic, systemic and procedural factors discussed above and in the previous chapter are clearly the major factors determining how the History curriculum is produced, what is in it and how it is disseminated to the various levels above the individual school classroom. As we have seen, there are ongoing tensions within the bureaucratic hierarchy as well as in the often conflicting pedagogical and ideological goals of the History subject. It should not be forgotten, however, that there are other tensions, perhaps more indirect, but by no means unimportant or less political, that affect History education. Before turning to the content of the school curriculum, both intended and implemented, therefore, it is worth briefly addressing some of these issues.

As McCormick has argued, the Chinese political and bureaucratic system is largely 'patrimonial' rather than 'legal-rational'. Although in the reform and opening era attempts have been made to codify and legislate rather than simply issue Party orders or instructions where bureaucratic structures and processes are concerned, and thereby to make politics and administration professional rather than 'charismatic', personalities, rivalries, patronage and *guanxi* networks continue to inform the ways in which policies are formulated and implemented.⁵⁴ As elsewhere, the functions and structures of organisations and networks may shape individual and group attitudes, choices and behaviours within institutional settings, but individual and group actors also contribute to the ways in which these systems, institutions and processes and the ideologies that underpin them evolve. Another important consideration is the growing power and independence of certain regions, such as Shanghai and Guangdong, which have been catalysed by decentralisation of budgetary control and the abolition of inter-provincial fiscal transfers. History education has not, of course, been able to escape these influences, and the development of the subject has thus been both constrained and enabled not only by the macro-politics of central government and its quest for legitimacy and by the politics of administrative systems and processes, but also by the politics of inter- and intra-institutional, regional and personal relationships.⁵⁵

Some examples of institutional and administrative obstacles to smooth implementation of central government objectives have already been cited, such as the

⁵⁴ McCormick, *Political Reform in Post-Mao China*.

⁵⁵ For an analysis of the place of personal and structural/systemic factors involved in policy-making, see Hamrin, Zhao et al, *Decision-making in Post-Mao China*.

lack of authority each level of education administration has over its subordinates owing to the two-tier administrative system. Inter-institutional rivalry was mentioned in the context of the reassignment of curriculum development responsibilities for the 2001 HCS from PEP to Beijing Normal University. Interdisciplinary competition was also remarked upon in the context of class hour allocation to individual school subjects. Almost nothing, however, has yet been said about regional rivalries or the effect of personal relationships on determining who has the power to do what in shaping the History curriculum or the agenda for its reform.

Regional rivalries and locale-based cliques are well known in China, and have been around for much longer than the PRC; indeed, most Chinese governments have gone to much trouble to prevent the development of local power. Although this has been as true in the PRC as it was in imperial times, members of leadership factions today often hail from the same area, and policy disagreements are commonly portrayed by outsiders as a Beijing-Shanghai (or Northern-Southern) contest. Friedman has even suggested that the very locus of national authenticity has been framed in competitive regional terms, moving with reform and opening from an inward-looking Northern-centred peasant/proletarian identity to an entrepreneurial, outward- and forward-looking Southern-centred one. Whether Friedman is correct in his claim that the South is shaping a new national identity is debatable, although it is certainly true that there have been some local attempts to move the national narrative away from the Yellow River and re-centre or disperse it elsewhere.⁵⁶ As shown in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, however, this has not yet had a profound effect on the national narrative currently purveyed by the History subject. Regional rivalry and contest, nonetheless, have pervaded History education. Regional tensions were palpable, for instance, at the 2000 History Education Association conference which was hosted by the Shanghai branch of the Association, but which was chaired primarily by more senior members from Beijing.⁵⁷ It would be difficult, however, to claim that such

⁵⁶ Friedman, 'Reconstructing China's National Identity', pp67-91. He elaborates further on these ideas in *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China*, especially Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6.

⁵⁷ The chairman's criticism of the over-emphasis on wining, dining and sightseeing the delegates at the Shanghai conference (see n52) was couched in such a way as to imply that the lack of professionalism on the part of the local association was a *Shanghai* problem, rather than a personal or institutional one. (The chair is from PEP, the Shanghai organising committee mainly from Huadong Normal University and the Shanghai Educational Research Institute). This tension had been evident from the outset, when the Shanghai committee asked me (and the other foreign delegates) to pay almost ten times more than the Chinese delegates for the hotel room. We had been invited to the conference by the Beijing branch committee, and the lower room price had been stated on the invitation letter. The Shanghai committee had booked several floors of the hotel for a bulk price, but stated that as 'all foreigners are rich' we should pay more. Despite the intervention of the Association's more senior Beijing members, the

tensions have resulted in a strikingly regional cast to the national History Outlines and textbooks drafted in Beijing, their local equivalents in Shanghai or Zhejiang, or the textbooks drafted in Guangdong and Sichuan. Yet, it is equally difficult to deny that the sense of regional separateness or distinctiveness that clearly exists throughout China (albeit to varying degrees) has encouraged History curriculum developers, textbook writers and educational researchers at least to try to stand out as exemplars of local excellence worthy of national emulation. As we shall see in Chapter 5, this has been quite pronounced in Shanghai and Zhejiang where History and Social Studies curriculum developers have attempted to move to the forefront of reform in the areas of pedagogical innovation and subject integration. Whether born out of genuine concern to improve educational provision in History, or whether it is a case of simply trying to be more ‘modern’ than Beijing/the rest of the nation, it has put the onus on the MOE and PEP to take more concrete, if sometimes somewhat reluctant, steps towards reform.

The promulgation of a local curriculum for Beijing in 2001 and the permission granted simultaneously to many other regions to develop their own curricula, meanwhile, have further accentuated the trend towards regionalisation. Beijing in particular, once regarded as synonymous with central government, has recently stepped up its local profile, no doubt in large part to dissociate itself from unpopular aspects of national policy, but also to free itself from the burden of association with the rest of the country, so much of which is considered ‘backward’, and thus to compete on an equal footing with buoyant Shanghai, and to a lesser extent Guangdong. In History education, Beijing ERU and university staff have been at pains to stress their reformist credentials; indeed, they have been among the most vocal and radical critics of the Teaching Outlines and traditional pedagogical practices, and have produced a curriculum that from a pedagogical standpoint goes much further towards introducing a genuinely skills-oriented approach than those introduced in Shanghai and Zhejiang a decade earlier. They have also sought to stress their Beijingness; the 2001 local curriculum opening statement claims to be designed specifically to provide a twenty-first century education suited to Beijing residents.⁵⁸ The selection of a Beijing Normal University professor to take over responsibility from PEP for production of the national History Curriculum Standards in 2001 has

Shanghai organisers refused to back down, it appeared, in large part, to show Beijing their independence (and, no doubt, also to pocket the extra cash).

⁵⁸ ‘Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige fang’an (zandinggao)’ [2000], p1.

also represented something of a coup for Beijing; even if the college is a national institution under direct MOE control, it is still regarded as local, while PEP, despite being Beijing-based and staffed by many Beijingers, is seen as a conservative central government organ. As already noted, PEP staff have unsurprisingly resented their unit's gradual marginalisation, especially in light of the monopoly it once enjoyed.

Regional rivalry, then, has obviously contributed to accelerating the pace and scope of reform in History education since it has led education authorities to grant considerable latitude to the tertiary institutions under their control and to their ERUs so that they can 'get ahead' of the competition. Co-operation, however, has also been a crucial element of reform, whether between different types of institutions, such as ERUs and normal universities, or between similar institutions in different regions. As already discussed, journals and professional associations have provided a public avenue for sharing ideas and experiences, but informal personal and professional *guanxi* networks, it was argued, have been more influential in driving change from behind the scenes. This is exacerbated by the nature of the administrative system itself in which participants in all aspects of policy-making, from TMIC to the local ERU, are not hired from a pool of job applicants, but are recruited from among one's protégés or recommended by close contacts, even if the procedures of the *Nomenklatura* appointments and promotion system are formally observed. Who gets to be involved in History curriculum development, textbook production and experimental projects, therefore, is typically determined by personal connections within and sometimes across institutions, and good personal contacts may allow voices that might otherwise not get aired to be heard; indeed, it seems that several of the more outspokenly radical reformers have sponsors in high places. At the same time, of course, personal relationships and institutional affiliations may hinder the free exchange of ideas, since the patrimonial nature of Chinese politics means that those who owe their success to the patronage of more senior figures, especially within their institution, may not wish to criticise their mentors or colleagues even if they disagree with them. The increasing professionalisation of curriculum development and educational research and the intensified focus on expertise, however, has meant that these patron-client ties based chiefly in institutional affiliations are being slowly weakened while those based in professional networks of like-minded thinkers are being consolidated. As more of these experts are brought on board by their patrons and friends to assist in curriculum development and textbook production, so the

curriculum is increasingly shaped by competing academic ideas from the 'middle-up' rather than by 'top-down' orders from the political centre.

PART TWO

THE INTENDED CURRICULUM

Chapter 4

History Teaching Outlines, 1978-2000

Many states produce national guidelines outlining general aims of the school curriculum as a whole and specifying teaching and learning objectives for individual subjects, but only in a few have curricula been as prescriptive as those issued in China. We have already seen some of the key political, ideological, institutional and administrative factors that have determined what precisely is included in the national History curriculum. The purpose of this chapter and Chapter 5, therefore, is to describe the ‘intended’ or ‘preactive’ curriculum that has emerged from these debates and struggles between curriculum stakeholders, and to show how the many influences outlined in Part One have affected curriculum goals and content.

As explained in Chapter 1, individual subject curricula for History (as for other subjects) were introduced after the 1922 Education Decree, and under the Nationalists became increasingly detailed. In the PRC, a similar curriculum format was adopted, although, presumably to emphasise difference, the name was changed from ‘Curriculum Standards’ (*kecheng biao zhun*) to ‘Teaching Outlines’ (*jiaoxue dagang*). Despite increased non-governmental, ‘expert’ participation in the drafting process over the past several years, this format was retained almost *in toto* up to the 2000 Outline in current use. Only in the 2001 curriculum, which is still at the experimental stage, has the format been significantly altered and the name changed back to ‘Curriculum Standards’.

Prior to 1978, the MOE had issued only two Outlines, in 1956 and 1963, although MOE Teaching Plans and other central government directives had led to revisions in class hour distribution and in the ratios of Chinese to world and ancient to modern-contemporary history (see Chapter 1, fig. 1.4). Since 1978, it may be said that two ‘sets’ of Outlines have been promulgated, with each Outline in a set being a revision of the previous version: the first, 1978, 1980, 1986, 1990; the second, 1988 (trial draft of Outline), 1992, 2000. Barring radical devolution of the school curriculum (a plan currently advocated by some educationalists) or a complete switch to the integrated subjects of History and Society or Social Studies discussed in Chapter 2, a third set of History curricula will probably derive from the 2001 History Curriculum Standards (HCS) after it has been used nation-wide for several years. (See conclusion for a discussion of the 2001 HCS).

Each Outline (abbreviated for reference purposes as ‘LJD’ with the date of promulgation in parentheses) contains five parts: 1. overall objectives; 2. basic principles determining the framework within which content is organised (this was excised in 2000, and a new section on assessment was added); 3. a brief note explaining class hour distribution; 4. general instructions on teaching methods; 5. the syllabus. The syllabus constitutes the bulk of the Outline and is divided into Chinese and world history, and subdivided into ancient, modern and contemporary sections. In each section a general outline of historical events during that period is summarised, followed by lengthy topic lists. In the first set of Outlines, these topics were arranged into major ‘parts’ (*bian*), often corresponding to a sub-stage in historical materialist development; each part was further divided into ‘chapters’ (*zhang*) (usually corresponding to a period of dynastic rise and fall) some of which were subdivided into ‘lessons’ (*jie*), under which numbered ‘points’ (*yaodian*) constituting the main content of that topic were listed. The second set of Outlines was designed for nine-year compulsory education and the ‘one Outline many textbooks’ system inaugurated by the 1985 Reform, and was supposed to be less prescriptive/more flexible to accommodate regional disparities and to allow textbook writers some freedom to arrange content. It accordingly dispensed with the *bian*, *zhang* and *jie* labels, replacing them with numbers in various fonts and sizes. This has, unsurprisingly, made almost no difference whatsoever to the structural arrangement of content, and has therefore offered little flexibility in the writing of textbooks since they must ‘comply with all the requirements stipulated by the Teaching Plans and Outlines’ in order to be approved by the Teaching Materials Inspection Committee (TMIC).¹ The initial switch to numbers, nonetheless, seems to have been hailed as an important innovation, although since many of those praising it were involved in the drafting process, and ideological reorientations are best left unsaid (even if they have been made, no-one wants to draw too much attention to them), it is hard to believe that this was seriously regarded as the major ‘breakthrough’ it was claimed to be.²

Ideological reorientation in Outlines may not always be highlighted by those commenting on it in the public forum, but as this chapter will demonstrate, it does not mean that there have been no changes in ‘viewpoints’ on historical events or persons,

¹ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biao zhun’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090-1091.

² See for example, Su, ‘Tan tan dui ‘jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chujing zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)’ de jidian tihui’; Sun, ‘Tan tan ‘jiunian yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chujing zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang’ de tedian’; Huang, ‘Xin dagang, xin jiaocai de tanxing’.

or even on theories of historical development itself. ‘Viewpoints’ are not always explicitly stated in the Outlines, although the first two parts on ‘objectives’ and ‘principles’ and the sub-sections giving event summaries make the general ideological tone fairly unambiguous. Some viewpoints, however, are conveyed in the topic lists themselves by the addition or removal of simple descriptors, such as ‘*national hero XXX*’ or ‘*XXX, a great XXX*’, and by the use of value-laden terminology, such as ‘righteous uprising’ (*qiyi*) or ‘treasonous rebellion’ (*panluan, fanpan*). Along with explicitly ideological statements and the relative allocation of space to particular topics or themes, therefore, it is such details on which I draw in this chapter (and also in Part Three) to evaluate the ways in which the intended curriculum has been revised to meet changing ideological imperatives, and to assess the shifting importance of these ideological objectives vis-à-vis often conflicting pedagogical goals and the academic professionalism of History curriculum developers.

As already noted, the official status of History has been raised since 1978, with class hours increased almost continuously until 1992. To avoid lengthy narrative descriptions of the exact ways in which class hours have been distributed between Chinese, world, ancient, modern and contemporary history, and at which stage of schooling they have been taught, the following tables are provided as reference.

Distribution of class hours for Chinese and world, ancient, modern and contemporary history.

Abbreviations

I, II, III	first, second, third year of school	A	ancient history	Ch	Chinese
i, ii	first, second semester	M	modern history	W	World
x	class hours per week	C	contemporary history		

Dates in **bold** font indicate a History Teaching Outline, other dates refer to Teaching Plans or other MOE/SEdC directives affecting class hours. # indicates a trial version of an Outline.

Table 4.1 Junior secondary

	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii	III.i	III.ii
1978			Ch/A/2x	Ch/A-M/2x	Ch/M-C/2x	Ch/C/2x
1980			Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/2x	Ch/C/2x
1981	Ch/A/3x	Ch/A-M/3x	Ch/M-C/2x	Ch/C/2x		
1986	Ch/A/3x	Ch/A-M/3x	Ch/C/2x	W/A-C/2x		
#1988*	Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/2x	Ch/C/2x	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x
1990	Ch/A/3x	Ch/A-M/3x	Ch/C/2x	W/A/2x		
1992	Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/3x	Ch/C/3x	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x
1994	Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/2x	Ch/C/2x	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x
2000	Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/2x	Ch/C/2x	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x
#2001	Ch/A/2x	Ch/A/2x	Ch/M/2x	Ch/C/2x	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x

*Class hours listed here are for the more common 6-3 (6-year primary, 3-year junior secondary) system. Where the trial Outline was tested in 5-4 system schools, however, History was taught in junior years I, II and IV, with 3 hours per week in the second year. When the 1988 draft was promulgated nation-wide as the 1992 Outline, it allotted equal hours to both systems, and moved History from year IV to year III in the 5-4 system.

Table 4.2 Senior secondary compulsory (*bixiu*) classes

	I.i	I.ii	II.i	II.ii
1978	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x		
1980	W/A-M/2x	W/M-C/2x		
1986	W/A-M/3x	W/M-C/3x		
1990	Ch/M-C/2x	W/A/2x	W/M/2x	W/M-C/2x
1996	Ch/M/3x	Ch/C/3x	W/M/2x	W/M-C/2x
2000	Ch/M/3x	Ch/C/3x		

I. 1978

Following Deng Xiaoping's exhortation to update teaching materials to 'reflect the advanced levels of modern science and culture, while conforming to the actual conditions of our country,'³ the MOE convened a conference of more than two hundred reinstated PEP editors and university academics at Xiangshan in September 1977 and organised them into individual subject editorial groups (*bianxiezu*) to plan production of a new curriculum and accompanying textbooks. After much discussion, the History editorial group, headed by long-time PEP editor Su Shoutong, submitted 'Preliminary opinions on handling issues and principles of History teaching outlines and textbooks' to the MOE Party Committee, which in turn referred it to the Standing Committee of the Politburo.⁴ Once approved, the History editorial group was able to begin work, and in spring 1978, the first draft of the History Teaching Outline and the first volume of the new textbook set were published.

The 1978 Outline was profoundly influenced by the uncertain political climate, departing minimally from the basic narrative described in Chapter 1, and closely following the 'Whateverist' political 'line' espoused by Hua Guofeng. There were several practical and political reasons for the lack of innovation. Firstly, time was limited; a central directive had instructed the editors to complete both Outline and textbooks in time for the 1978 autumn term, 'so that books arrive before classes begin and each child has his/her own copy.'⁵ Secondly, 'Whateverism' prevented formal revocation of the 'Two Appraisals' and although Deng Xiaoping had denounced the 'Appraisals',⁶ MOE leaders remained loath to initiate reform. It was unthinkable, therefore, that their subordinates would do so. Additionally, history had been heavily targeted during the Cultural Revolution with 'theoretical and factual issues severely

³ 'Some comments on work in science and education', 8/8/1977 (SWDX, Vol.2).

⁴ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p239. Su joined PEP in 1953 and was reinstated when PEP was re-established in 1972.

⁵ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p240.

⁶ 'Setting Things Right in Education,' 8/1977 speech (SWDX, Vol.2).

distorted by the Gang of Four' and 'the ideology of the academic world in chaos.'⁷ 'New' or 'reformed' interpretations of the past had not yet been agreed, and 'the most urgent priority was to erase the Gang of Four's pernicious influence on historiography.'⁸

Besides transmitting 'basic knowledge' of the past, teaching and learning objectives in the 1978 Outline were chiefly concerned with the longstanding purpose of using the past to explain the present and anticipate the future, although teachers were advised to avoid historical 'allegories and metaphors,' presumably as an oblique warning against using the past to critique the present.⁹ Adhering closely to Whateverism and the yet-to-be-debunked personality cult of Mao, Marx, Engels, Lenin and especially the Helmsman were cited extensively; indeed, the Outline's opening sentence proclaimed the importance and relevance to the present of History as a school subject with Mao's statement that 'for any political party leading a great revolutionary movement, victory is impossible without revolutionary theory and knowledge of history.' History was thus to continue teaching historical materialist laws, which would reinforce the 'inevitability' of CPC rule, and to convey the related 'two basic viewpoints': that the masses create history and that the forces and relations of production and class struggle are 'the motive force driving economic and social development.' It was to 'raise high and resolutely protect the banner of Chairman Mao, provide a full and accurate understanding of his theories and directives and use them as a guide.' In this way, students would arrive at the 'unity of [history's] revolutionary and scientific nature, and the unity of data and viewpoints.' Through following and applying these principles, 'correct' conclusions about historical events and persons would be reached. At the same time, 'all forms of historical idealism, of the kind espoused by Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four' were to be eradicated and 'the pernicious effect on history of using the past to serve the Gang corrected.'¹⁰

With principles and standpoints clarified, the Outline turned to data, stating that History was to provide education in the revolutionary tradition, patriotism and internationalism, teaching students to love the CPC, revolutionary proletarian exemplars, the masses and the motherland. 'Through studying the noble spirit of

⁷ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p240.

⁸ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, p389.

⁹ LJD[1978], COH, p330.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p327.

revolutionary heroes,' students would gain 'the confidence and determination to struggle for socialism and communism,' and 'raise their consciousness of class struggle, line struggle and ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.'¹¹ Despite the advocacy of internationalism, Chinese history remained the centre, world history the periphery, and following the 1963 Outline, only Chinese history was taught in junior secondary, with one year of world history in senior secondary (Table 4.2 above). The senior secondary course, however, was moved from year III to year I, both to ensure greater continuity with the junior secondary curriculum and to free up revision time in the final year of senior secondary for all-important university entrance examinations.

Teaching the centrality of historical materialist laws and the Chinese revolutionary tradition involved continued focus on changing forces and relations of production and many class hours were allotted to peasant uprisings, although the chapter headings remained tied to dynastic rise and fall. Correctly discerning the nature of uprisings was still an important concern, continuing the pre-Cultural Revolution debates over the extent to which such uprisings were spontaneous (*zifa*) responses to oppression and hardship, or whether they were also self-aware (*zijue*) class struggles against the forces of oppression. The nature of class contradictions and the social composition of rebel groups and those who opposed them were accordingly identified for each period of history. These differentiations became increasingly specific in the modern period (1840-1919), with the contradictions characterising each rebellion clearly noted, for it was then that the awakening of class consciousness was accelerating towards revolutionary overthrow of the class system.

To demonstrate legitimate succession in more traditional terms of the moral mandate and restoration of territorial unity, and also to promote patriotism, there was continued emphasis on the 'one hundred years of humiliation' (*bainian guochi*) China had suffered (beginning with the Opium War and ending with the establishment of the PRC) at the hands of first, European capitalist-imperialists, then the Japanese; indeed, modern-contemporary history was allocated 60% of total class hours (previous Outlines and Plans had normally maintained a 1:1 ratio for ancient to modern-contemporary Chinese history), since this was deemed most relevant to the formation of revolutionary and patriotic consciousness.¹² Establishing moral superiority primarily involved continuing the pre-Cultural Revolution practice of derogating the

¹¹ Ibid., pp327-328.

Qing dynasty and the Nationalists for feudal thinking, weakness, corruption and collaborating with foreign enemies, implying a degree of free will and moral choice in their actions which conflicted with the theory of innate class morality. The Nationalists were thus omitted completely from the Northern Expedition and portrayed in a wholly negative light in the War against Japan, while nothing was included about the period of Nanjing government. The Communists were thereby exalted as single-handedly leading the patriotic struggle for national unity and sovereignty.¹³

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of modern-contemporary history and the Outline as a whole was the obsequious treatment of Mao, who was revered as ‘the founder of the CPC, the PLA and the PRC,’ whose ‘revolutionary guidance’ both before and after 1949 had ‘led the whole Party, the whole army and the People of every race of the entire nation’ to glorious victory over enemies without and within. Surmounting such daunting challenges had been further complicated by the struggles within the Party itself: between Mao’s always ‘correct’ (even if inconsistent) ‘lines’ and the incorrect ‘rightist, capitulationist’ line of Chen Duxiu, the ‘rightist, opportunist’ line of Liu Shaoqi, the various leftist lines of Li Lisan, Qu Qiubai and Wang Ming, the splittist line of Zhang Guotao and the reactionary, counter-revolutionary plots of Liu Shaoqi (again), Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.¹⁴

Ethnic relations and national unity, meanwhile, featured more prominently in the 1978 than in previous Outlines, presumably to counteract secessionist and anti-Chinese/anti-Han sentiment in minority and border areas, which had been exacerbated by Cultural Revolution excesses. This entailed not only reiterating the primordial one-nation message and warning against the twin evils of ethnic (Han) ‘chauvinism’ and (minority) ‘localism’ (i.e. separatism), but also re-imagining periods of ‘disunity’ (*fenlie geju de jumian*) as characterised principally by integration or ‘ethnic melting’ (*minzu ronghe*). Such integration had been achieved through ‘class struggles’ and ‘the struggle for production,’ trade, cultural exchange and population movement. The dominant theme of integration (positive) which superseded political disunity (negative) thus inverted the 1963 Outline assessment in which ethnic integration was merely an unintentionally positive outcome from a negative state of affairs, and broke completely from the traditional view of barbarian tribes invading and vying for

¹² LJD[1978], COH, p329

¹³ Ibid., pp345-366.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp352-363.

control of the ‘civilised’ (Han) central plains (of which there were some vestiges in the 1956 Outline). Furthermore, the ‘rival states’ which had formed during these periods, were now reclassified as ‘rival centres of political power’ to emphasise the continuity of the national whole from ancient times to the present.¹⁵

The 1978 Outline moved beyond the scope of the 1963 chronology, which had ended with the founding of the PRC, and extended detailed syllabus coverage from 1949 to 1956, just prior to the Hundred Flowers and anti-Rightist movements, the period of CPC rule that was almost unanimously regarded as successful. This outlined the economic and political consolidation of CPC rule, covering topics such as land reform, suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, the Three and Five Antis campaigns, and the success of the first five-year plan. It also highlighted the ‘Resist America, Aid Korea’ movement, and the Soviet imperialist, revisionist betrayal of the revolution. The period from 1957 and the Great Leap Forward on was also covered, including the ‘great victory of the socialist construction general line’ (the Great Leap and the establishment of People’s communes), ‘victory over temporary economic difficulties’ (the Leap was not mentioned as a cause and Liu Shaoqi’s role in stabilising the economy was omitted), and finally, the Cultural Revolution victory of the proletariat (over ‘revisionism’ and ‘rightist deviations’).¹⁶ Broad-brush treatment of this period, however, was recommended, commensurate with the many issues awaiting formal address and resolution. In fact, the 1978-79 textbooks drafted on the basis of this Outline did not even venture into broad-brush treatment territory, ending their coverage in 1957 with a section on the publication of Mao’s ‘On handling contradictions among the people’.¹⁷ As Deng had advised the History Outline and textbook editorial committee, ‘it is best to say little about the living.’¹⁸

II. 1980

The February 1978 Outline was slightly modified that December, and more substantially in 1980, after Deng Xiaoping had assumed leadership and Whateverism and the Two Appraisals had been revoked. With Deng’s authority not yet fully consolidated and the direction and pace of reform undetermined, however, curriculum developers remained unsure of History’s (and, by extension, their own) future status. When reworking the Outline, therefore, they exercised extreme caution, avoiding

¹⁵ LJD[1978], COH, p331.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp362-363.

¹⁷ *Quanrizhi shinianzhi xuexiao chujing zhongxue keben: Zhongguo lishi*, vol.4 [1979]

sensitive issues, such as the role of Liu Shaoqi (whose posthumous rehabilitation was apparently contested among the leadership),¹⁹ and omitting post-1949 history altogether.

The 1980 revision retained basic narratives, viewpoints and aims of the 1978 Outline, but made some noteworthy alterations, in particular, removing some of the more revolutionary goals and language. History's indispensability to the revolution was thus replaced by an assertion of its 'certain place' in the school curriculum, while 'line struggle' and 'ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat' were eliminated, and students urged instead to 'devote themselves to the Four Modernisations.'²⁰ Class struggle was considerably muted, with the lengthy section detailing class contradictions at different stages of social evolution replaced by a brief exposition of contradictions between forces and relations of production, which 'are the basic motive force of social development,' and of their manifestation in class struggle which 'is the direct motive force driving historical development.' (The differences between 'basic' and 'direct' were not elucidated.) Downplaying of class struggle was also reflected in warnings against simplistically ascribing 'struggles between ethnic groups' to class contradictions, although the class viewpoint was nonetheless to be used to analyse such problems 'concretely.'²¹ Additionally, the exhortation to 'love the revolutionary proletarian exemplars' was deleted, since the Cultural Revolution over-emphasis on 'red' class background had been officially condemned. Teaching the laws of development remained paramount, but Mao's quote - 'Now we have reached the era in which capitalism is definitely dying, and socialism is flourishing'²² - was excised, since tentative 'opening' after two decades of isolationism had shown the Chinese people that despite a less than stellar economic performance in the 1970s capitalism was far from being extinguished, and that

¹⁸ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p240.

¹⁹ Liu's rehabilitation was decided at the February 1980 Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, although the memorial service formally announcing his rehabilitation was not held until May. Ladany (*The Communist Party and Marxism*, pp428-430) suggests this was because opinions on his rehabilitation were divided, with some among the leadership still regarding him as not having been a 'good communist' noting that both Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, then vice-chairmen of the Central Committee, absented themselves from the service. That a memorial service was held at all testifies to the authority of Deng, but that curriculum developers chose to straddle the fence and simply remove Liu completely from the Outline suggests that they were not certain that Deng and his acolytes would remain in control.

²⁰ LJD[1980], COH, p386.

²¹ LJD[1980], COH, p387.

²² LJD[1978], COH, p228.

socialism, especially of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution variety, was equally far from inevitable victory.

Although the syllabus was virtually unchanged, a 1:1 ratio for ancient and modern-contemporary history was restored. (The 1:3 ancient to modern-contemporary balance in the senior secondary world history course was not altered.) These additional ancient history class hours allowed curriculum developers to include marginally more cultural history, while the slightly more liberal climate permitted them to reinstate several ‘Great Men’ who had formerly been derogated as feudal oppressors or supplanted in the limited timetable by revolutionary peasant leaders. The most significant of these was Confucius, who, in 1978, had been portrayed as a reactionary ideologue and advocate of ‘restoring slave society,’²³ whose negative influence had shackled China in feudal darkness, obstructing social and economic development for almost two thousand years. In the 1980 Outline, he was tentatively rehabilitated as ‘a thinker’ and ‘educator,’ who had advocated adherence to the ‘rites’ prescribed in the *Liji* and believed that the ruler should exercise ‘benevolence’ towards his subjects.²⁴ Other thinkers, such as Sima Guang and Zhu Xi, were also added to ‘cultural history’ sections, while Wu Zetian, who had been included in the 1963 Outline but omitted in 1978, was restored to the section on Sui-Tang rule.²⁵

Class hours allocated to peasant uprisings were slightly reduced, while the Self-Strengthening movement, given short shrift in 1978 – and then mainly as a backdrop to the emergence of the proletariat - received more extensive coverage. Although Self-Strengthening ultimately failed to preserve China’s political and territorial integrity, its contribution to proto-capitalist development and the formation of a ‘national bourgeoisie’ was now acknowledged. Coverage of the 1898 Hundred Days Reforms was similarly extended, and the bourgeoisie who participated in the movement were credited with desiring ‘independence, strength and prosperity for China.’ Although the reform movement ‘could not defeat the conservative feudal forces, it opened the way for the development of capitalism.’²⁶ This reflected the gradual resurrection of the debate among professional historians over the ‘sprouts of capitalism’ in China’s past, as well as modest attempts to promote reform and

²³ LJD[1978], COH, p334.

²⁴ LJD[1980], COH, p392.

²⁵ In no writings on the rationale underpinning curriculum development have I found any reference to Empress Wu’s 1978 omission. It may perhaps be that the resemblance to Jiang Qing’s assumption of authority in Mao’s dotage was a little too close for comfort, and that there was a wish to avoid any possible positive comparison between the two.

downplay revolution. It was also an acknowledgement that all Chinese, regardless of class background, could be patriots. In a similar effort to embrace 'opening' and dispel isolationist xenophobia, the Boxer movement, formerly a heroic 'anti-imperialist struggle,' was criticised for its 'narrow and backward nature and generally anti-foreign methods.'²⁷

Reflecting leadership changes and the anti-personality cult ethos, flattering references to 'sagacious (former) Chairman Hua,' were conspicuously absent, and, more importantly, Mao's role was downplayed. The 1978 Outline's sycophantic ascription of all China's revolutionary 'successes' to Mao's genius was thus replaced with a relatively subdued emphasis on collective Party leadership, noting that 'the CPC led the Chinese people in overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, established the PRC, and achieved a great victory in the Chinese revolution.'²⁸ Nowhere was Mao's 'correct line' mentioned. As with the Liu Shaoqi issue, caution was paramount, and curriculum developers consequently chose both to credit other revolutionary leaders, many of whom were in senior government positions in 1980, and to dissociate themselves from the awkward task of dispensing 'praise and blame' where Mao and his 'correct' (and incorrect) 'lines' were concerned. As Su later noted, 'In the past, the influence of leftist ideology meant that many historical issues were regarded as political issues.... History curriculum developers and textbook writers did not dare to question matters in this regard.'²⁹

III. 1986

By the mid-1980s, 'historical issues' were still 'political issues', and although curriculum developers enjoyed greater latitude in revising traditional narratives, History remained extremely sensitive. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, education administration was undergoing a process of reconstruction at this time and it had been decided to introduce compulsory education, limited textbook pluralism and also to strengthen the role of 'experts' in curriculum development and textbook production. It would take some time, however, before drafting and comprehensive testing of new curricula and textbooks could be completed, and in the interim 'transitional' Outlines were commissioned, to be promulgated in 1986.

²⁶ LJD[1980], COH, p403.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, p411.

By 1986, History's official status in the curriculum had been strengthened. Firstly, the 1981 Teaching Plan had increased History class hours by 25%. It had also moved the History course from junior secondary years II and III, to years I and II, presumably to ensure that students actually completed the course, as History classes were frequently abandoned in the third year to allow additional revision time for the 'core subjects' tested in senior secondary entrance examinations. Secondly, then-Premier Zhao Ziyang's 1981 call to strengthen patriotism through History and Geography education and the somewhat later Propaganda Ministry 'Opinion' on promoting patriotic education had been formally adopted in two 1983 MOE directives, which emphasised the importance of History and Geography for understanding China's 'national conditions' (*guoqing*) and constructing 'socialist spiritual civilisation', and warned against arbitrarily curtailing time-tabled class hours.³⁰

Increased political stability and improved status partially freed History curriculum developers from their earlier caution, and although the SEdC had instructed them to 'take the current (1980) Outline and make few changes,'³¹ continued efforts to reduce 'leftism' and promote reform and modernisation were evident. To minimise 'the salience of 'struggle philosophy''³² - widely believed to be not only inappropriate in the post-Cultural Revolution era, but also tedious and difficult for students to comprehend - many peasant 'revolutionary struggles' were simply listed as unspecified 'wars' or 'uprisings,' or were omitted altogether; even coverage of the great nineteenth century rebellions, once regarded as essential to demonstrate the awakening of revolutionary consciousness, was curtailed, with only the Taiping and Boxer movements retained.³³ Conversely, to provide respite from dry political history and promote patriotic appreciation of China's traditional heritage, the previous practice of 'neglecting the (ancient) past, and emphasising the present' (*houjin bogu*) was reversed, and ancient history was allocated 60% of class hours.

²⁹ Su, *Shibian shiyi*, p256.

³⁰ 'Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi yu jiaqiang aiguo zhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' [2/7/1983] JYFQS, pp601-606; 'Jiaoyubu guanyu gaijin jiaqiang zhongxue lishi he dilike jiaoxue de tongzhi', [1/8/1983] JYFQS, pp666-668; 'Jiaoyubu guanyu xuexi guanche 'guanyu jiaqiang aiguo zhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' de tongzhi' [24/8/1983], JYFQS, pp607-608. These documents are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

³¹ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, p396.

³² Wang (ibid.) states that 'several comrades' have coined this phrase to describe the overarching theme of history as told over the preceding decades.

³³ LJD[1986], COH, pp452-464.

With the greater ancient history weighting, additional space was allotted to cultural and scientific developments of which the nation could be proud, and also to the Great Men who had contributed to (or detracted from) China's former pre-eminence. A token effort both to increase female representation and to counteract the hitherto predominantly negative portrayal of the few women who appeared (Bao Si, Yang Guifei, Cixi) was also made with the inclusion of the Song poet Li Qingzhao and the martyr to the 1911 Revolution, Qiu Jin. Moreover, in accounts of all historical figures, unequivocal distribution of praise and blame was repudiated. 'Negative' figures thus no longer needed to be 'exposed,' but were instead to be 'analysed' in their proper historical context, although they were still subsequently to be 'criticised.'³⁴ They were, however, to be evaluated in the spirit of 'seeking truth from facts,' rather than denigrated according to class background. While this may have been a simple repetition of the reform mantra, it also suggests a desired move away from overt politicisation of history towards attempts at balanced judgements and 'scientific objectivity'. Justifying this decision in the standard mode of appealing to a 'higher authority', Wang insisted that 'negating historical persons without analysis is not a Marxist attitude.' Instead, she argued, the actions of both positive and negative historical figures should be properly situated and examined in their own historical context.³⁵ Such a view clearly drew on the broader trend among academic historians towards 'integrating data and theory' (*shilun jiehe*) rather than 'using theory to lead data' (*yi lun dai shi*).

In a similar spirit of de-emphasising 'theory', and to minimise overlap with Politics (much of which also focused on the historical materialist stages of social and economic evolution), historical materialist laws were simplified and their role downplayed. The forces and relations of production were demoted to 'one of the motive forces of development,' and neither class struggle nor the masses were said to create history, although the socialist 'People' (*renmin*) remained the 'main actors.' Furthermore, the masses, like the 'revolutionary proletarian exemplars' in 1980, were omitted from the Outline's 'to love' list, suggesting clearly that in the entrepreneur-friendly, get-rich-quick climate of creating socialist material civilisation, the agricultural masses toiling in the fields and the proletariat clutching their iron rice bowls in lumbering state enterprises were no longer to be exalted as role models for the young. Instead, inspiration to strive for modernisation and the construction of

³⁴ LJD[1986], COH, p449.

socialist spiritual civilisation was to be sought in the achievements and noble spirit of ‘outstanding (*youxiu*) persons’ in Chinese history, most of whom, given the historiographical tradition, have, of course, been educated, ruling class males. Reflecting this reorientation, communism was pushed into the background and patriotism highlighted as a timeless, class- and ethnicity-transcending, unifying force. The motherland thus moved into first place on the ‘to love’ list, followed by the socialist modernisation enterprise, with the CPC dropping to third and last place.³⁶

The general portrayal of ethnic relations was unchanged, including the standard rhetoric of unity since time immemorial, the outstanding contributions of all ethnic groups to the development of the motherland (occasionally interrupted by ‘contradictions’ and ‘struggles’), and the shared love of the Chinese *minzu* for peace, equality and development. ‘Eradicating ethnic chauvinism and localism,’ however, was no longer listed as a curricular objective. No reason for this is immediately apparent, although Wang asserts that since 1949 ‘ethnic contradictions’ had steadily diminished, and by 1986 had disappeared completely, obviating the need for further mention. Moreover, she suggests that the concepts involved were ‘abstract and sweeping’, and that drawing attention to the issue may even have caused problems where none existed.³⁷ Ethnic problems, however, had not been eradicated and were tacitly acknowledged, for example, in the highlighted historical role and epithet ‘hero of the national people’ (*minzu yingxiong*) awarded to Great Men from minority nationalities who had contributed to the glory of ‘China’. Prominence was also given to ‘the peaceful liberation of Tibet.’ The former was presumably intended prophylactically, to demonstrate to wary minorities the inclusive nature of the Chinese nation, but the latter, which had not been mentioned in the 1978 Outline, was most probably a response to the growing pro-independence movement within Tibet. One interpretation of these changes, therefore, might be that ‘localism’, insofar as it involved resurgence of religious and cultural traditions and did not threaten territorial unity, was now to be tolerated. From a more cynical perspective, however, it could also be surmised that Han chauvinism was no longer regarded as a problem, but simply an ‘honest’ if implicit acknowledgement of Han ‘superiority’ over ‘backward’ minority peoples, many of whom were (are) widely believed to be ‘stuck’ at the feudal stage of development.

³⁵ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, pp392-393.

³⁶ LJD[1986], COH, p448.

³⁷ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, pp393-394.

Two major changes were made in modern-contemporary history. Firstly, the 1911-1949 period, which had previously amounted to little more than a ‘history of the Party and the revolution,’³⁸ was substantially revised to include a more positive portrayal of the Nanjing government and its active participation in the United Front, the Northern Expedition and the Anti-Japanese War.³⁹ While this change reflected curriculum developers’ professionalism in pursuing accuracy and their stated desire to move away from political dictates, they were, at the same time, obeying new ‘political’ demands, since the revised narrative fitted neatly with gradual détente between the PRC and Taiwan begun in the early 1980s. Secondly, with the official verdict on pre-Cultural Revolution history having been proclaimed in the 1981 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party,’ contemporary history coverage was extended up to the 1980s. Some issues remained sensitive, however, and references to factional struggles were omitted, so as to avoid discussing divisions within the Party, while the anti-Rightist campaign was portrayed simply as having ‘over-expanded,’ leading to ‘errors.’ By contrast, economic difficulties following the Great Leap were no longer euphemised as ‘temporary,’ but admitted to have been ‘serious,’ and the Cultural Revolution was roundly denounced as ‘ten years of domestic chaos,’ albeit resulting from an unintentional leadership ‘mistake’, exploited by the ‘counter-revolutionary cliques’ of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.⁴⁰

Perhaps the most important change in 1986 was the restoration of world history to the junior secondary curriculum, for it was recognised that the many students who did not progress to senior secondary level were receiving no instruction in non-Chinese history. In the context of ‘reform and opening in China and the consequent contact with many countries,’ this lack of knowledge was deplored,⁴¹ although it is debatable whether it was simple ignorance or a lack of state-authorised knowledge that the world history course aimed to redress. The world history syllabus was restricted to a sweeping one-semester survey from primitive times to the 1980s, and was actually an abridgement of the senior secondary course. Unlike Chinese history, world history had undergone little change during the reform era, maintaining a consistent emphasis on historical materialist laws, revolutions, imperialism and anti-colonialism, and a strong bias (at least 2:1) in favour of modern-contemporary history. This conservatism

³⁸ Ibid, p401.

³⁹ LJD[1986], COH, pp474-477.

⁴⁰ LJD[1986], COH, p481.

⁴¹ Wang, *Lishi jiaoyuxue*, pp68-69.

was reflected in the new junior secondary syllabus, which was even more heavily slanted towards the present, with ancient history constituting only 20% of class hours.

The addition of world history, however, was not unequivocally welcomed, and several academics, curriculum developers among them, can be found in assorted papers praising the inclusion of world history, but simultaneously complaining about the diminution of Chinese history and the consequent necessity of condensing a four-semester syllabus with extended chronological scope and four textbooks into three semesters and three volumes. In fact, total Chinese history class hours were simply returned to the amount stipulated in the 1980 Outline, and the textbooks were reorganised into three longer volumes. While these changes undoubtedly necessitated some reductions in various areas of Chinese history, it appears that the real grievance was that there had been no moves to increase total History class hours with the re-introduction of twelve-year schooling, and that Chinese history had not been added to the senior secondary curriculum. The combined class hour total for junior and senior secondary History was thus divided equally between Chinese and world history courses, which ‘given that China has such a long history, is not really appropriate.’⁴² (That world history is also ‘long’ does not seem to have had any bearing on the matter, nor does the fact that in primary school, a one-year History course, weighted 3:1 in favour of Chinese history, was also taught). Such sentiments manifestly echo the antipathy felt towards the equal distribution of Chinese and world history adopted briefly in the 1950s under USSR influence, and reinforce the impression that world history has continued to be considered as peripheral and relatively unimportant.

Although but a few words, the 1986 Outline included a significant addition to what in the 1978 and 1980 Outlines had been a brief section describing ‘the most basic teaching requirements and methods.’⁴³ This had simply reiterated the centrality of correct analysis and conclusions and cautioned against departing from textbook content, while somewhat contradictorily instructing teachers to ‘encourage students to think actively, and to oppose spoon-feeding.’⁴⁴ The 1986 Outline retained this section verbatim, but added that ‘attention must be paid to nurturing students’ ability to analyse, summarise, compare and generalise’ and that classroom teaching and extramural activities must be ‘fully integrated’ and ‘mutually reinforcing.’⁴⁵ This

⁴² Yu, Ye and Zhao, *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue*, pp113. Similar remarks are made by Su, *Shibian shiyi*, pp256-257.

⁴³ Wang, ‘Chaikai lishi xinde yiye’, p34.

⁴⁴ LJD[1978], LJD[1980], COH, p330, p388.

⁴⁵ LJD[1986], COH, p450.

reflected the growing influence of pedagogical theory, which was developing rapidly as an autonomous academic discipline. It also acknowledged that skills were desperately needed for economic development, and was an attempt to prove History's usefulness to the modernisation project in practical as well as ideological terms.

IV. 1988

The mid - late 1980s were a tumultuous period for China as reform and opening accelerated, bringing a potent mixture of economic growth, unemployment and social problems. Criticism of 'orthodox' Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and by extension, challenges to the Party itself, became increasingly vocal despite government-launched campaigns against 'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois liberalisation'. In the context of heightened anti-Party sentiment, increased regime sensitivity to allegorical criticism through history and renewed witch-hunts for political dissidents, curriculum developers followed their highly developed instinct for caution, attempting to balance a pro-modernisation, pro-opening ethos with a reassertion of 'traditional' values.

In 1987, the History editorial department of PEP and professors from Beijing Normal University (BNU), assisted by the Central Nationalities Institute, Shandong University and the Beijing Education Institute, began to draft a new curriculum for the compulsory education system.⁴⁶ Expanded 'expert' participation and a lengthy consultation process entailed greater negotiation over the content of the 1988 draft than had been the case with previous Outlines. Additionally, several older curriculum developers had retired, and their younger successors were typically more reform-minded and also directed more attention towards pedagogy. This was, in part, because 'opening' had allowed new (mostly foreign) ideas and theories to be studied, and it was felt that traditional pedagogies were inadequate for the modernisation task, but also because matters such as teaching methods were perceived as apolitical and value-free. The History TMIC approved the draft Outline in 1988, permitting implementation on a trial basis, with nation-wide promulgation slated for 1992-1993.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Su, 'Tan tan dui 'jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chujing zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)' de jidian tihui', p2.

⁴⁷ I have not been able to locate data detailing precisely which regions were involved. Both Gong ('Tan tan jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang de tedian he shengbian chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu') and Sun (*Lishi jiaoxue de yishu yu jiqiao*) name Chengdu, Chongqing and Wuhan, but it is likely that it was also tested elsewhere.

The 1987 provisional Teaching Plan further boosted History's status, extending the course from two to three years. (This restored it to parity with Politics, the first time History had been in such a position of strength since the mid-1950s.) With extra class hours, the 1988 Outline expanded the world history course to a full year, although it remained a simplified version of the senior secondary syllabus. The draft also stipulated class hours (approximately 5% of the total) for ethnic minority or local history, the teaching of which had hitherto been sporadic, since previous Outlines had designated it as 'supplementary,' allowing PMAR education departments to decide whether or not to include it 'after all the tasks required by the Outline have been completed.'⁴⁸ Furthermore, although the Outlines had instructed PMAR education departments to take responsibility for drafting relevant local history textbooks, there was, in fact, no organised publication of teaching materials, with some authorities taking an enthusiastic approach and others evading the task altogether.⁴⁹ It is unclear whether the inclusion of local history was a politically correct effort to celebrate, or at least display tolerance for ethnic and regional diversity, or a more cynical attempt to dictate the content of non-national histories and prevent assertion of separate identities and secessionist dreams. What is certain, however, is that it aimed to promote greater understanding of local conditions and love for one's hometown, and thereby inspire the young to strive for local development. By extension, it was thought, this would nurture patriotism and contribute to national modernisation goals.⁵⁰

Although the format was not changed from previous Outlines, there was considerable reorganisation of content, with the start-date of contemporary history moved from 1919 to 1949.⁵¹ Additionally, many points which had originally

⁴⁸ LJD[1978, 1980, 1986], COH, pp327-328, p388, p450.

⁴⁹ Ye, 'Guowai lishi jiaoxue zhuangkuang yu woguo zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de gaige he fazhan' p34

⁵⁰ Song, 'Dui jiaqiang xiangtushi jiaoxue de sandian renshi', pp38-39.

⁵¹ Chan and Scott assert that it was changed to 1927 and the establishment of the Nanjing government, but this is incorrect. They have probably made this error because in the PEP textbook set they examined, vols. 3 and 4 of *Chinese History* cover the modern-contemporary period, and vol.4 begins in 1927. They have thus assumed it to be the 'contemporary history' section. It states clearly in the contents page, however, that the 1927-1949 period is a continuation of modern history, as it does in the Outline. For contemporary history to begin in 1927 a dramatic re-conceptualisation of the past and the place of the Communist Party would have been necessary. The switch from 1919 to 1949, by contrast, is not without logic, since it ties the notion of 'contemporary' to the fresh start made in 'New' China (both for society and for the CPC). The change may also have been made because the extension of coverage up to the 1980s (initiated in the 1986 revised Outline) entailed an almost seventy-year (as compared to the previous thirty- forty-year) span for what was considered 'contemporary'. Perhaps this was considered too long a period for young minds to conceptualise as 'contemporary' because the start-date of contemporary history remained 1919 for professional historians. Since there was no periodisation debate regarding the modern-contemporary transition in the years leading up to this

appeared as ‘aims and requirements’ were moved to the lesser section on guiding principles. The importance of History education to the construction of socialist spiritual civilisation was reiterated, but where previously its relevance was unexplained, it was now elaborated as ‘an important means of realising [students’] complete moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic development and nurturing a new generation possessed of ideals, morals, culture and discipline.’⁵² History would thus play an ‘active role in raising the quality of the national people (*tigao minzu suzhi*), and strengthening national self-confidence.’⁵³ History was also claimed to be ‘beneficial to the study of other subjects,’ although how it was beneficial was not specified. The language employed in defining the objectives of this Outline reflected the growing influence of theories of child development and pedagogy, and was also, more importantly, an attempt to define a new ‘higher purpose’ for History, transcending simple knowledge transmission, to replace its former emphasis on revolution and historical materialist laws which were now increasingly downplayed.⁵⁴ Using the notion of a higher purpose to stake out a particular territory in the broader modernisation project and thereby guarantee History’s status in the curriculum seems to have been the major motivation here; as Wang remarked,

History education has hitherto not received the attention it deserves. Apart from the objective problem of staff shortages, from a subjective perspective, education departments at all levels and the leadership of some primary and secondary schools have neglected History education and this has affected the normal implementation of the History curriculum. This [Outline], therefore, is intended to remind education departments and schools at all levels to pay attention to History’s role and status.⁵⁵

Su insists that the draft remained essentially guided by Marxism and its (Chinese) derivative theories,⁵⁶ but he had already retired from curriculum drafting to the History TMIC, and his successors evidently decided that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought no longer required excessive mention, replacing it in most instances with the more ‘scientific’ terminology of ‘dialectical and historical materialism.’⁵⁷ The role of historical materialist theory, and its corollary of emphasising forces and relations of production, class struggle and peasant uprisings was, however, further

curriculum revision, it must be assumed that this was a decision taken by curriculum developers and TMIC on their own initiative. Unfortunately, however, I have been unable to find any explanation for this significant change in the secondary literature.

⁵² These are known as the ‘Four Haves’ (*siyou*).

⁵³ LJD[1988], COH, 510.

⁵⁴ Gong, ‘Tan tan ‘jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang’ de tedian he shengbian chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu’, p28.

⁵⁵ Wang, *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian*, pp406-407.

⁵⁶ Su, ‘Tan tan dui ‘jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chujing zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)’ de jidian tihui’, p3.

⁵⁷ LJD[1988], COH, p510.

downscaled, while space devoted to cultural history and Great Men was again expanded. This reflected continued repudiation of ‘revolution,’ and the promotion of patriotism and ‘national self-confidence’ through nurturing pride in China’s past glories. The demotion of ‘theory’ was also influenced by professional historical research, which increasingly attempted not only to integrate theory and data, but also to release Chinese history from its historical materialist straitjacket altogether, and ‘derive (new) theories from data’ (*lun cong shi chu*). Such an approach was not evident in world history, which remained principally concerned with providing illustrative examples of historical materialist theory and demonstrating past imperialist transgressions to alert the young to continued imperialist threats. Nonetheless, some cultural topics were added, and, in a nod to internationalism, students were required not only to strive for socialist modernisation in China, but also to develop ‘a sense of responsibility’ to strive for the ‘peace and progressive undertakings of humanity.’ International relations were thus portrayed as having been typified by peaceful trade and cultural exchange, albeit punctuated by occasional wars. This internationalist spirit was, however, somewhat undermined by Sinocentric arrogance, which asserted that China had made great ‘contributions’ (*gongxian*, purely positive) to humanity, while other cultures had ‘influenced’ (*yingxiang*) China (in both positive and negative senses).⁵⁸

One notable change of format was the separation of the ‘three great tasks’ of ‘knowledge transmission, ideological education and skill training’⁵⁹ in each section of the syllabus. ‘Basic knowledge’ (*jichu zhishi*) thus contained a narrative chronology of ‘major’ events for each separate period of Chinese and world history, while ‘ideological education’ (*sixiang jiaoyu*) reiterated in added detail the goals of patriotism, preserving national unity, teaching the laws of development, emulating the lofty morals and actions of outstanding persons, and upholding the Party’s ‘basic line’ at the preliminary stage of socialism.⁶⁰ Despite the clarification of the different task areas, neither basic knowledge nor ideological education differed significantly in content from the 1986 Outline. ‘Skill training’ sections, on the other hand, represented a serious attempt to emphasise both the need for improved pedagogy and the usefulness of History in terms of transferable skills. These sections were quite detailed, although also rather repetitive. Some general requirements were concretely

⁵⁸ LJD[1988], COH p510-511.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p512.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp515-516, 525, 532.

specified, including note-taking, summarising texts verbally and in writing, and locating past civilisations on modern maps. Other skills were more complex, such as applying dialectical and historical materialism to analysis of past events, and comparing historical events and persons across spatial and temporal divides.⁶¹ Little guidance on how to foster these skills was provided, however, other than to suggest using ‘lively teaching methods,’ to encourage students to relate classroom and textbook learning to other sources of historical information (novels, films, cultural artefacts), and to ‘research the skill and art of teaching, so as better to elicit students’ active thinking and learning.’⁶² Such vagueness indicates that a coherent understanding of how History related to skills, and how skills related to knowledge, and especially to ideology, had not yet been properly formulated by curriculum developers.

V. 1990

The 1986 revision had been intended to cover the transition to the new compulsory education curriculum, which was due to be implemented nation-wide in 1992-3. In the wake of Tiananmen, however, senior secondary class hours had been suddenly revised mid-school year to include a semester of modern-contemporary Chinese history (see Chapter 2), and in 1990, the SEdC issued ‘Opinions on the adjustment of the current Teaching Plan for senior secondary schools,’⁶³ formally incorporating the stipulations of the 1989 directive and also dividing the curriculum into compulsory and ‘elective’ courses (normally compulsory for students in the humanities stream). This required a revision of the Outline to reorganise the syllabus into the appropriate categories. It was decided at the same time to make some minor changes to the junior secondary section of the Outline to reflect the spirit of compulsory education and the 1987 provisional Teaching Plan. These were mainly concerned with the old theme of lightening students’ ‘learning burden,’ which had been a constant concern since the 1950s, and was thought to be particularly necessary in the case of rural students, who would struggle, it was thought, with ‘difficult or excessive content and overly high requirements.’⁶⁴

⁶¹ LJD[1988], COH, pp516, 525-526, 533.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p512.

⁶³ For the full text of this document and explanatory notes, see COCP, pp360-364. As with the 1981 Teaching Plan, the SEdC attached a notice indicating that regional education authorities may make adjustments in implementation according to local conditions (COCP, p359).

⁶⁴ LJD[1990], COH, p659.

It might be expected that the June 1989 events in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent crackdown would also have necessitated some significant modifications to History content, but in fact, the junior secondary curriculum remained almost identical to the 1986 Outline. One minor change was made in the opening section on 'Aims and Requirements' with 'providing education in upholding the Four Cardinal Principles' added to the existing list of revolutionary tradition, patriotism and internationalism, presumably as a post-Tiananmen response designed to remind the young (teachers and students alike) not to follow the erroneous path of bourgeois liberalisation.⁶⁵ The syllabus also remained virtually unchanged, but in an effort to distinguish between essential and supplementary knowledge, certain topics, or aspects thereof, were underlined to indicate that they were optional content only and should not be included in examinations. These optional topics were mostly related to systems of tenancy, taxation and administration, or were 'minor' peasant rebellions which had neither catalysed dynastic fall nor resulted in dramatic reforms. There was also a slight de-emphasis on individual battles, especially in the War against Japan, the War of Liberation and World War Two, and a reduction of coverage of the Cold War following the collapse of the European Communist bloc. In contrast, cultural history, which had been substantially expanded since 1978, was barely touched, suggesting a growing desire to move away from political and military history towards a more holistic history, which would also, it was hoped, be more appealing to students and provide them with a broader historical education. With the consequences of recent events still uncertain, curriculum developers were perhaps also attempting to stay away from the dangerous realm of politics, and thus followed Deng's earlier advice to 'say little.'

VI. 1992

If the uncertainty which characterised the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown had meant that few changes were made in the 1990 revised Outline, by the time the 1988 draft Outline for compulsory education had been fully tested and approved for promulgation in 1992, the official line had been clarified. Following Jiang Zemin's

⁶⁵ The Four Cardinal Principles are rarely mentioned in texts on History education. In the aftermath of the campaign against 'bourgeois liberalisation' in 1986-87 and the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, however, a spate of articles was published exhorting teachers to inculcate the Four Cardinal Principles as a prophylactic to ward off the 'influence of bourgeois liberals such as Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan' (*LSJX* editorial, 'Jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze de jiaoyu shi shenke de aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu', p2.)

letter to SEdC leaders Li Tieying and He Dongchang calling for renewed emphasis on modern-contemporary Chinese history,⁶⁶ the SEdC had issued several directives on strengthening education in modern-contemporary Chinese history and *guoqing* education, and had drafted special guidelines on political-ideological training for primary and secondary school History.⁶⁷ As described in Chapter 2, these directives were particularly vitriolic, although in terms of data they merely followed the Outlines in emphasising China's glorious (pre-modern) cultural history, and demonstrating how the twin evils of imperialism, and hopeless incompetence and ossified thinking on the part of China's feudal rulers had brought China to a nadir, from which the nation could never have recovered without the CPC. The language, however, was much more emotive than that mostly used in Outlines, and greater emphasis was also placed on the themes of historical materialism, the place of revolution, and the Party's leading role in bringing China out of feudal darkness into the light of socialist modernity.

The 1991 SEdC guidelines were explicitly stated to have been incorporated into the 1992 Outline, and according to one of the History TMIC inspectors, this resulted in 'significant progress [compared to the 1988 draft] in both political-ideological and scientific terms, as well as necessitating some adjustments in the structure of data.'⁶⁸ In the initial sections on aims and principles there were indeed several omissions, additions and changes in terminology which indicated a return to a more 'conservative' approach to History. The importance of understanding national conditions (*guoqing*), upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and opposing 'peaceful evolution plots,' for example, was stressed, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was reinserted into the section on guiding principles, although the forces and relations of production and the role of the masses in creating history were no more prominent than in 1988. There were, however, two additions which drew especially heavily on the spirit of the 1991 directives. Firstly, it was stated that

Western capitalism has developed through frenzied exploitation and extortion both at home and abroad. When capitalism entered the imperialist stage, it intensified its expansionist invasions. Oppression and plundering by imperialism and capitalism are the root cause of poverty and backwardness in undeveloped countries. History

⁶⁶ 'Jiang Zemin zongshuji zhi Li Tieying, He Dongchang qiangdiao jinxing Zhongguo jindaishi, xiandaiji guoqing jiaoyu', written 3/1991, first published in *RMRB*, 1/6/1991, reprinted in COH, pp.607-608.

⁶⁷ 'Guojia jiaowei guanyu lingfa 'zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaiji guoqing jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)' de tongzhi', [1991], reprinted COH, pp609-610; 'Zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaiji guoqing jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)' [1991], pp.610-636; 'Zhongxiaoxue lishi xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao', [8/1991], reprinted COH, pp637-655.

⁶⁸ Wang, 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong 'lishi jiaoxue dagang' shencha shuoming', pp14-15.

education must place emphasis on exposing the invasive nature and extortionist crimes of capitalism and imperialism.⁶⁹

This intensification of a strong anti-imperialist ethos appears to have been a warning against the much feared ‘blind West worshipping,’ particularly since Tiananmen had been largely blamed on the evil influences of degenerate ‘Western’ thinking. To reassert the innate malignancy of ‘Western’ capitalism was by association to denigrate domestic calls for greater democracy and human rights as just another strategy invented by imperialists to exploit China and destroy socialism through collusion with Chinese counter-revolutionaries or manipulation of naïve students.

While derogating the ways of the totalised ‘West’, it was also acknowledged that socialist China was not yet perfect, and an exhortation to patience was accordingly added immediately below the anti-imperialist principle.

In the history of the world, creating and consolidating any new [political] system has always involved a long period of struggle, during which there have been many twists, turns and switchbacks; feudalism was like that, capitalism is like that, and socialism is even more so. History education must demonstrate the laws of this phenomenon through historical facts, to make students understand that socialism will inevitably triumph the world over, but that the road to victory will be tortuous; it must also make them understand the imperialist countries’ ‘peaceful evolution’ strategy for defeating socialist countries and our counter-strategy.⁷⁰

Quite what the counter-strategy was to be was rather ambiguous, specifying little other than emphasising patriotism and strengthening of national ‘self-respect and pride’ as well as nurturing ‘national self-confidence’ as advocated in 1988.⁷¹ At the same time, however, China was not, as stated in the official policy advocated by Deng on his 1992 Southern Tour, to revert to isolationism, but was to continue the reform and opening process, while education was to continue Deng’s ‘three-face’ policy of ‘facing modernisation, the world and the future.’ Reflecting the continued reform and opening impetus, therefore, the Outline stated that ‘the closed door’ policies of late imperial times were to be criticised for having retarded China’s development.⁷²

While some of the vitriol of the 1991 directives was definitely present in the explanatory sections on objectives and guiding principles of the 1992 Outline, finding corresponding changes to the syllabus (and textbooks) is much like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. To the trained eye of a curriculum developer or TMIC member, however, even the most subtle nuances convey important messages, and the few changes in the phraseology of the syllabus cannot, therefore, be regarded

⁶⁹ LJD[1992], COH, p658

⁷⁰ LJD[1992], p658.

⁷¹ Ibid., p656.

⁷² LJD[1992], COH, p667.

as accidental. For example, in the ancient Chinese history 'basic knowledge section', Sui Yangdi's 'brutal rule' (*canbao tongzhi*), which in 1988 had 'made Sui a short-lived dynasty,' had, in 1992, 'incited peasant uprisings' following which 'the Sui dynasty had fallen.'⁷³ It does not take much imagination to see this as an allegory for the CPC and Tiananmen, and either a curriculum developer or a TMIC inspector doubtless decided that 'short-lived' was probably 'inappropriate' in the circumstances.

Another concession to Party sensibilities was the removal of the Rectification Movement from the Yan'an period, and its replacement by the Seventh Party Congress at which 'Mao Zedong Thought was affirmed as the guiding ideology of the entire Party.'⁷⁴ The most obvious change, however, was the attachment of 'socialist' to each mention of 'motherland,' and in the 'ideological education' section of modern-contemporary Chinese history, socialism was, furthermore, said not only to have 'saved' China, but to be the sole force which could 'develop' China, presumably implying that the CPC must remain in power for the foreseeable future.⁷⁵ Other changes mostly involved slightly extra emphasis on the evils of imperialism, and the weakness of China's feudal rulers in the modern period. The peasantry were also further demoted, with substantial cuts in space allocated to peasant rebellions. The failure of many rebellions, furthermore, was attributed not only to contradictions within their leadership, which had hitherto been among the principal causes cited, or to the peasantry's 'class limitations' (another common explanation), but to unspecified innate limitations of the peasants themselves. Finally, there was one minuscule change in a more liberal direction with an addition to the ancient Chinese history 'skill-training' section, which exhorted teachers to encourage students 'to express their own opinions about the historical events and persons they have studied.'⁷⁶ Clearly, having one's own opinions about modern, and especially, contemporary, history was rather less desirable.

VII. 2000

The 1992 Outline was implemented in schools nation-wide from autumn 1993, and over the following few years attention turned to the senior secondary curriculum and in particular to the need for university entrance examination reform. The junior

⁷³ LJD[1988], LJD[1992], COH, pp514, 660.

⁷⁴ LJD[1992], COHp670.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p671.

secondary Outline was thus untouched until the late 1990s. In the meantime, the pace of research on teaching methods, child psychology and curriculum theories accelerated dramatically, and the doctrine of ‘quality education’ was formulated. As has already been discussed, quality education is at best a vague philosophy, encompassing a broad range of concepts, theories and objectives, but the net result has been increasingly vocal criticism - chiefly from educationalists – of all aspects of education from national curricula to classroom teaching and examinations. History Teaching Outlines have primarily been criticised for restrictions they impose on production of teaching materials, lack of teaching, learning and assessment flexibility, over-emphasis on knowledge at the expense of skill-training, and even for being too ‘political’ yet simultaneously failing to provide adequate moral guidance and instruction.⁷⁷ Although the 1988 draft and 1992 Outline stated that History education goals not only include a grasp of ‘basic knowledge’ (*jichu zhishi*) but also training in practical skills and critical analysis,

only basic knowledge has been clearly prescribed, while [definitions of] viewpoints and skills have been vague and abstract.... [Furthermore], Outline content simply states what ‘must’ and ‘should’ be studied, lacking necessary analysis ...of the correlation between content and students’ level of psychological development.....[Required skills], such as ‘understanding’, ‘grasping’, ‘application’, ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ are not defined or explained, nor are examples provided. Thus, in textbook writing, teaching and assessment, interpretation is determined individually and subjectively.⁷⁸

Such critics represent a growing body of educators who increasingly view the goal of History as training in critical and creative thinking skills. Whether this is simply an attempt to defend History’s territory and status in the school curriculum, or derives from genuine concern to make History more ‘useful’ to the holistic development of both individual students and the student body as a whole, or is perhaps even a subversive promotion of critical thinking as the basis of informed citizenship is difficult to ascertain. Their critiques, however, have profoundly influenced thinking about the purposes and, in particular, the practice of History education, and have been reflected most dramatically in the new draft curriculum (HCS) on trial in selected regions since autumn 2001. As in the past, this experiment will continue for several years before the new curriculum is implemented nation-wide. In the meantime, the

⁷⁶ LJD[1992], COH, p662.

⁷⁷ See for example, Nie, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu lun*, pp19-23; Zhao, ‘Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin’; Ji, ‘Zhongxue lishi jiaocai gaige chuyi’, p93; Zhang, ‘Dui lishi kecheng xianzhuang de fenxi’, pp423-424.

⁷⁸ Nie, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyulun*, pp21-22. Nie has been arguing this point for a long time, and as early as 1989 was openly criticising the prescriptive and restrictive nature of Outlines (‘Zhongxue lishi xueke jiaoxue mudi de bianzhi ji qi zai xuexi pingjia de yingyong’, pp31-37).

1992 Outline has been revised, and was promulgated in 2000 and implemented in autumn the following year.

The 2000 Outline retained the basic 1992 format and syllabus, but goals and teaching methods were considerably revised to reflect the new priorities outlined above. History was no longer said to contribute to abstract ideological goals of constructing socialist material or spiritual civilisation, but to occupy an essential place in junior secondary education, necessary for understanding past and present (but not future) relationships between mankind, society and nature. Pedagogical goals, in particular, were highlighted, with 'teaching students to learn' as the most fundamental objective, to be accomplished through a variety of activities and methods which must be appropriate for students' 'level of cognitive development.' The Outline insisted that History also be used to develop skills and abilities, such as 'historical thinking,' 'creative consciousness,' 'independent study,' and 'co-operation with others,' as well as the more specific skills of note-taking, using maps and so forth, elaborated in the 1988 draft and 1992 Outline.⁷⁹ Although skills and abilities remained rather ill-defined, guidance on methods of fostering them became more detailed in response to criticisms of vagueness and a lack of concrete examples and explanations, such as those made by Nie. More suggestions for both group and individual classroom and extramural activities were thus advanced, including, among others, organising classroom discussions and debates, writing and performing historical plays, recreating historical artefacts, and gathering oral data in the community. Scope for the use of audio-visual aids, such as slides and videotapes, which had also been suggested in previous Outlines, was expanded by the latest technological advances, and teachers were exhorted to make 'creative use of multimedia and computer-assisted learning,' although this seems unrealistic, since few schools are likely to have these resources.⁸⁰

Focus on pedagogy by no means entailed the demise of ideology, although in keeping with the holistic imperative of quality education, it was reintegrated with knowledge and skill-training in each section of the syllabus. Nurturing love of the motherland (no longer prefixed by 'socialist'), and developing national self-respect and confidence remained central goals, although fostering 'national pride' was excised. The importance of education in 'patriotism, socialism, the revolutionary tradition, national conditions and ethnic unity' was also emphasised, while references to the Four Cardinal Principles and following the Party's 'basic line' were expunged.

⁷⁹ LJD[2000], COH, p715.

In fact, nowhere other than in the basic syllabus were Marxism or the CPC mentioned, and although dialectical and historical materialism were retained, this appears to have been merely a superficial concession to the legitimating ideology; indeed, 'integrating theory and data' and, more importantly, 'deriving theories from data' were explicitly stated to be the guiding theoretical principles which must be upheld.⁸¹ Moreover, the 'analysis and evaluation' of historical events and persons was no longer explicitly required to be 'correct', and students were to use 'imagination, association, comparison and generalisation' to develop their own opinions based on data from both the textbook and other sources. In an apparently more genuine internationalist spirit, History was also to be a means of 'enhancing understanding of the world..... leading students to respect the fruits of other countries' and peoples' civilisations,' although this did not result in substantial reform of the world history syllabus. Finally, personal development and public morality were highlighted, with History described as assisting students to develop a rounded personality, 'healthy aesthetic consciousness and interests' and the 'determination to strive for ideals, honesty, and goodness.'

Despite much talk of individuality and independent thinking, however, the morality and viewpoints even 'quality' History education is expected to inculcate remain fundamentally prescriptive, with 'correct' recurrently used to define desirable types of 'consciousness' and 'values.' Curriculum developers may thus increasingly reject the tenets of historical materialism and 'old' historical narratives, and they may scorn direct imposition of ideas and values, but they seem neither ready nor willing to challenge absolutist concepts of 'true' and 'false', 'right' and 'wrong' in discussions of either the past or the present.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp715-716.

⁸¹ LJD[2000], COH, p715.

Chapter 5

Local Curricula: Shanghai, Zhejiang, Beijing

When textbook pluralism was introduced following the 1985 Reform, Shanghai and Zhejiang were simultaneously granted permission to develop their own curricula, for they were regarded as having ‘special conditions’, being more economically and ‘culturally’ advanced than other regions. Indeed, so exceptional was Shanghai thought to be that it was also permitted to develop its own curriculum and teaching materials for senior secondary education, and to hold its own nationally recognised university entrance examinations separate from those taken by the rest of the country, a privilege, which as noted in Chapter 3, has only been extended elsewhere in the past two – three years. Zhejiang’s curriculum was limited to primary and junior secondary education, but provincial education authorities took reform in a new direction with experiments in subject integration at junior secondary as well as primary level. History was thus merged with Geography and ‘common knowledge’ (*changshi*) in a new Social Studies course, an experiment which was also attempted in Shanghai, albeit only in the single city district of Yangpu.

The Shanghai and Zhejiang experiments in curricular devolution have in many ways provided models for the rest of the country. Although Zhejiang’s Social Studies textbooks did not pass the national TMIC inspection and are thus ineligible for use outside the province, recent interest in developing integrated Social Studies courses for junior secondary schools elsewhere has led many educators and textbook writers to visit Zhejiang, study their textbooks and observe classes there. Shanghai’s History Curriculum Standards, meanwhile, appears to be a precursor of the national 2001 History Curriculum Standards currently on trial, and not merely in rejecting the title ‘Teaching Outline’ in favour of the Nationalist terminology. Although, as shown below, Shanghai’s curriculum shared many aspects of its format with the 1988 draft Outline, it also pioneered a more pedagogically oriented approach to the syllabus which has been adopted and developed in the 2001 national History Curriculum Standards.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly given its levels of wealth, education and economic development, Beijing has only recently developed its own curriculum, which was phased in city-wide beginning in autumn 2001. At this time, Shanghai and Zhejiang also revised their existing curricula, while permission to develop curricula at the local

level was further extended to many other regions of the country. None of these new curricula or textbooks were available at the time of fieldwork, however, and this chapter focuses principally, therefore, on the ‘first phase of curricular reform’ (*diyiqi kegai*) (up to 2001) for History in Shanghai which is the foundation of the Shanghai textbooks discussed in Part Three. Although Zhejiang’s curriculum has been for Social Studies rather than History, it is also discussed here, as is Beijing’s then-draft History curriculum, primarily because of their relevance to current developments in History and Social Studies education which are analysed further in the conclusion.

Shanghai

The Shanghai curriculum for basic education was first developed in the late 1980s with the ‘second phase of curricular reform’ (*erqi kegai*) coming into effect in 2001-2002. Neither the textbooks nor the curricula for the second-phase were available for analysis. Much like the national system, Shanghai has issued general ‘curriculum plans,’ which stipulate overarching teaching and learning objectives, and individual subject ‘curriculum standards’ (*kecheng biao zhun*), perhaps initially reverting to the Nationalist term to emphasise their local distinctiveness vis-à-vis national Outlines drafted in Beijing. As noted in Chapter 3, these curricula have been largely drafted by educationalists and subject experts from ERUs and normal universities – in this case, the Shanghai Education Institute, the national Huadong Normal University and the municipal Shanghai Normal University, working under the auspices of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission’s Committee for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curricula and Teaching Materials.

The first Shanghai History Curriculum Standards (henceforth, Shanghai HCS), as already noted, adopted a similar basic structure to the 1988 draft History Teaching Outline, including a preface, a summary of overall objectives, teaching and learning requirements and a summary of class hour distribution, which followed the national Teaching Plan in allocating two class hours per week for each of the three junior secondary years, with the first and second years to be devoted to Chinese history, and the third to world history. 5% of class hours were also allocated to the teaching of local history which could be taught either separately or integrated with Chinese history at the relevant junctures. In a departure from the national norm, however, Chinese and world history were integrated at senior secondary level.

The syllabus comprised the bulk of the Shanghai HCS for junior secondary schools and was divided into separate ancient and modern-contemporary Chinese

history sections and a single world history section. As in the 1988 Outline, these were subdivided into sections on basic knowledge, ideological education and skill training. The preamble and general objectives stayed on familiar ground, reiterating the importance of History for understanding the present and anticipating the future, raising the quality of the nation and fostering socialist spiritual civilisation through creating a generation of ‘new people’ in possession of the ‘four have’s’ (ideals, morality, culture, discipline). History was highlighted as a core subject in basic education, useful for teaching the young about national conditions (*guoqing jiaoyu*), socialism, patriotism and internationalism, promoting dedication to modernisation and world peace, and nurturing the historical materialist viewpoint which proves that communism is the highest stage of social development and will inevitably be reached through following the socialist road.¹ At the same time, however, the Shanghai HCS emphasised the importance of History as a social science that ‘encompasses all eras from ancient times to the present and touches on all aspects of human society.’² In addition, historical thinking skills, such as understanding relationships of cause and effect, comparing events and persons across related eras and societies, using maps and reference works and being able to describe historical events orally and in writing, were included in the basic objectives section. The section on teaching and learning requirements elaborated upon these skill-training tasks, indicating a somewhat greater commitment to - or at least more detailed exposition of - pedagogical goals than was evident in the national Outline. Basic knowledge (*jichu zhishi*) was to include historical data and historical theory, and two levels of understanding were to be nurtured: ‘knowing’ (*zhidao*), meaning ‘understanding basic content, memorising key points of information,’ and ‘requiring direct recall to complete [assigned] tasks’; and ‘understanding’ (*lijie*), meaning to ‘grasp the implications of [historical] knowledge’ and requiring students ‘to think (*sikao*) in order to complete [assigned] tasks.’ Skill-training (*nengli peiyang*) was similarly regarded as a two-stage process, involving first a preliminary grasp of skills, progressing to full, independent capability, although it was not specified exactly how this process was expected to unfold. Ideological education (*sixiang jiaoyu*) was also described as progressive, including the differentiated components of ‘interest, emotion, attitude and viewpoint,’ which were to be developed through ascending levels of cumulative understanding.³

¹ Shanghai HCS, p111.

² Ibid., p111.

³ Ibid, p112.

Following the division of each task area into levels of understanding, the syllabus was designed as a table consisting of columns for stages of social development (such as slave, feudal society), eras (such as the Warring States period and dynasties), general topics grouped under each era, and one column each for ‘knowing’ and ‘understanding’. Next to each topic a tick was placed in either the ‘knowing’ or the ‘understanding’ column to indicate the depth to which the topic was to be studied. These topics did not differ much from those listed in the Outline, and continued the broader trend in History education towards minimising coverage of peasant rebellions and class struggle and increasing topics on culture, economic development and national heroes. Presumably in recognition of the broad swathe of history the course was expected to cover and the difficulty of allocating adequate time for a peripheral subject such as History, however, the majority of topics were marked as requiring only the lower level of understanding. In ancient Chinese history (up to 1840), forty-six topics were to be ‘known’, nineteen to be ‘understood’; in modern and contemporary Chinese history the proportion of topics requiring higher understanding increased somewhat with fifty-nine ‘knowing’ and thirty ‘understanding’ topics, while in world history, the inequity between knowing and understanding was re-established with a respective allocation of one-hundred and eight and thirty-five topics. The topics selected for ‘knowing’ and ‘understanding,’ however, made the orientation and overarching goal of History clear. In ancient Chinese history, for example, eight of the nineteen ‘understanding’ topics concerned the laws of historical materialism, five related to national unity and the process of ethnic integration (*minzu ronghe*), four to the glories of ancient Chinese culture and its superiority over its contemporary civilisations, and three (overlapping with some of the other topics) to reforms carried out under various enlightened rulers.⁴ These key areas correlated directly and proportionally to the goals listed in the ideological education section immediately following the basic knowledge syllabus. The ideological purpose of ancient Chinese history was to instil patriotism and ‘national pride, national self-respect and national self-confidence’ – qualities also listed in the 1988 Outline – through emphasising that China has five thousand years of history and a glorious culture and for most of its history stood at the forefront of the world. It was also to reiterate the multi-ethnic nature of the PRC, and to reinforce the message that only with political stability and ethnic unity can socio-economic development be

⁴ Ibid., pp112-114.

achieved. The remainder of the instructions focused on historical materialism and its basic laws: that labour creates society, that ‘the broad masses of the people (*renmin qunzhong*) are the creators of history,’ and that individuals ‘can only take their place [in society] if they adapt to the tides of historical progress.’ Class struggle was also mentioned as one of the motive forces driving historical development, and students were to understand that progress from lower to higher socio-economic forms is inevitable and is thus a fundamental law.

In modern Chinese history, the emphasis of the ‘understanding’ topics changed to those related to China’s humiliations at imperialist enemy hands, patriotic resistance, and national self-strengthening and reform movements and the lessons to be learnt therefrom.⁵ The considerably shorter contemporary Chinese history section (which like the 1988 Outline moved the start-date of the period from 1919 to 1949),⁶ skipped quickly, meanwhile, from 1949 to the reform era. Two key ‘understanding’ topics related to the establishment of the PRC were listed, but only one was given for the difficult years between 1949-1978, on ‘the chief successes and lessons of socialist revolution and construction in the pre-Cultural Revolution period.’⁷ Attention then turned suddenly to the post-Mao era in which the historical significance of the eleventh plenum, and the consolidation of socialism and reform under the guidance of the Four Cardinal Principles were highlighted. The ideological education section for modern-contemporary Chinese history elaborated on the purpose of ‘understanding’ these topics, stressing education in national conditions and nurturing patriotic sentiment. Much as in the national Outline, children were to learn that corrupt feudal dynasties had led China to suffer one hundred years of foreign oppression and humiliation, but that the national people had resisted fiercely and given their lives to assure China’s independence and prosperity. Through studying the sacrifices and achievements of these national heroes, they would not only have role models to emulate and be inspired to defend the nation against capitalist-imperialist encroachment, but would also come to understand some key national qualities of the Chinese people, such as bravery, determination and love of truth and justice, which in turn would enhance their national pride and self-confidence. In this section, the Communist Party was also mentioned for the first time (other than in the topic tables), in a reiteration of the cliché ‘without the CPC, there would be no new China’ (*meiyou*

⁵ Ibid, pp115-116.

⁶ See Chapter 4, n51 for a more detailed discussion of this change.

⁷ Shanghai HCS, p118.

gongchandang jiu meiyou xin Zhongguo). From the history of New China, the young were to learn the superiority of the socialist road, and that despite some twists and turns along the way, ‘all who attempt to obstruct the progress of history will inevitably fail.’⁸ The contemporary period was also to reinforce the spirit of resistance as unspecified foreign powers had apparently attempted to invade China numerous times since 1949, presumably a somewhat distorted reference to border disputes with India and the USSR, and perhaps the 1979 war with Vietnam. Like the national Outlines, Shanghai’s HCS did not fully abandon revolution as a central concept and from the modern-contemporary period students were also to imbibe the ‘revolutionary tradition’ of their forefathers and diligently cultivate similarly high levels of personal and collective political virtue.⁹

In world history, the 3:1 ratio of ‘knowing’ to ‘understanding’ topics suggested clearly that world history was primarily about learning data, but as in Chinese history, ‘understanding’ topics also focused on broad ideological themes, the most dominant of which involved examples proving the historical materialist theory of social and economic development. In ancient history, topics to be ‘understood’ thus included Egyptian and Roman slave societies, the overthrow of slave society through rebellions and changes in ownership of the means of production, and the subsequent development of feudalism.¹⁰ Modern world history ‘understanding’ topics focused on ‘bourgeois revolutions’, such as the overthrow of the British monarchy in 1649, the US war of independence, the French Revolution and the Meiji Restoration, and the development of capitalism and imperialism and various cycles of reform. These were followed in the contemporary section by an emphasis on the evolution of socialism and the struggles for independence in European colonies, as well as the conflicts between capitalist-imperialist states, the eruption of global war and the beginning and end of the Cold War.¹¹ Other key ‘understanding’ topics included the place of Christianity (as the bastion of feudalism and, after the Reformation, as an impetus for the Renaissance and, indirectly, socio-economic progress), the development of science and technology, and the profound influence of ‘Eastern culture’ on the rest of the world, by which was evidently meant *Chinese* culture, since Japan’s status as a beneficiary thereof was also highlighted as a topic to be

⁸ Ibid., pp118-119.

⁹ Ibid, p119.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp119-120.

¹¹ Ibid., pp121-123.

‘understood.’ The final ‘understanding’ topic emphasised the rise of the Third World as the key force striving for global peace, a Third World of which China has, of course, sought to present itself as leader. The purpose of emphasising these topics as described in the ideological education section was principally to teach the laws of historical materialism and the place of class struggle therein, that ‘capitalism is built on cruel exploitation and oppression of the world’s working people, including the Chinese,’ that the Chinese people reject such evil ways, and that socialism will inevitably triumph. Indeed, forty years of socialism in China, it was stated, had achieved far more than one hundred years of capitalism, proving the former’s infinite superiority. Children were to understand the differences between capitalism and socialism, and also to adopt the ‘correct attitude to foreign cultures’; that is, to ‘absorb their outstanding successes, and reject the dross of capitalism and feudalism.’ In addition, world history was explicitly to serve the goals of nurturing patriotism, in part through the denigration of capitalism and understanding the superiority of socialism, but also through historical comparison and learning how Chinese culture has contributed to world civilisation. This would reinforce national self-confidence and provide a basis for ‘ideological awareness of international competition and exchange.’ Wholly out of context, a reference to global overpopulation as a longstanding historical problem was appended to this section, providing a convenient opportunity to reiterate the importance of the one-child policy. This was tied in to the laws of development in a statement emphasising that only through population control could economic progress be achieved, although quite why curriculum developers chose to include this in a History curriculum for junior secondary schools is something of a mystery.

Although the ‘understanding’ topics and the ideological sections clearly demonstrate that political, moral and patriotic education were among the core purposes of History, the three skill-training sections which followed each part of the syllabus and its ideological goals indicate that a serious effort to reform traditional pedagogies was being made, even if, as shown also in the national Outline, the concept of skill-training in History had not yet been fully developed. Attempts were made, nevertheless, to stipulate general and specific skills for each year of junior secondary, building on or reinforcing those previously learnt. By the end of the first year (during which ancient Chinese history would be studied), children were to have a basic grasp of chronology, an understanding of the relationship between centuries and

decades in the Christian and pre-Christian eras, and knowledge of where in this time-scale and in what order different dynasties fitted in. They were also to develop a basic ability to interpret illustrations and maps and to recognise the persons and events with which they were associated. In addition, they were expected to be able to draw up general chronologies, to locate pivotal events and persons and key points in written texts and to describe the trajectory of important historical events and the lives of major historical figures verbally and in writing. Rather more vaguely, they were to have a preliminary grasp of ‘all kinds of historical concepts,’ although what these concepts were was not identified.¹²

In the second year (modern-contemporary Chinese history), students were to build upon their first-year skills, learning the relationship between the traditional dynastic (*ganzhi*), Republican (*minguo*) and Christian dating systems. Maps, illustrations and photographs were now to be more thoroughly interpreted and students were expected to be able to outline the historical events associated with them rather than just recognise names and places. Their oral and written skills were to evolve considerably at this stage and they were to be able to provide a comprehensive description of persons and events. There were also to begin acquiring the skills of note-taking in class, to distinguish key from subsidiary points and to draft tables and chronologies from their notes. Additionally, they were to be encouraged to locate similarities and differences between events and persons, and to deploy some analytical and comparative skills in relating extra-curricular sources of historical knowledge, such as historical fiction, cinema, theatre and television, to the data they were learning in class.¹³

By the third year of junior secondary (world history), these skills were to have evolved substantially, and in addition to reinforcing geographical knowledge of the world’s countries and cities past and present, students were to have a thorough grasp of the relationships between different events, persons and eras world-wide and to be able to compare them with what they had already learnt about Chinese history. They were also to develop critical skills at this stage, integrating theory and data (*shilun jiehe*) to analyse and evaluate historical events and persons, to express their own opinions and to critique those of others. This, it was hoped, would prepare students

¹² Ibid, p115.

¹³ Ibid, p119.

for the rigours of senior secondary education and equip them with transferable skills.¹⁴

The final section of the Shanghai HCS was an instruction on the production of corresponding teaching materials. That it was included may have been because textbook pluralism within Shanghai was perhaps being considered, or because it was directed at the production of local history textbooks. Since the textbook market in Shanghai was not free, however, it seems more likely that it was added in imitation of the 1988 Outline, which included a similar section giving instructions for textbook writers, designed to meet the requirements of textbook pluralism. The instructions in the Shanghai HCS, nonetheless, revealed more clearly the commitment to improving pedagogical approaches to History. Previous (PEP) textbooks were thought to be dry and difficult, in part because they had closely followed the prescriptive rigidity of Outlines,¹⁵ and it was hoped that Shanghai's textbooks would raise the pedagogical bar. Much was accordingly made of both simplicity and flexibility. Textbooks were to use language and styles appropriate for their audience's level of intellectual and psychological development, incorporating plenty of images and tables to aid understanding and stimulate interest. They were to follow the Shanghai HCS closely, but were permitted to 'make appropriate adjustments,' such as rearranging the order of the topics, as long as they retained the 'logic' of the curriculum guideline and its historical chronology and ensured that the texts were conducive to accomplishing key ideological and skill-training objectives. They were also permitted, and even encouraged, to include supplementary materials not specified in the curriculum, such as recent historical research findings and established theories, although this was to be kept to a small proportion of the total text. Finally, the importance of maintaining horizontal connections to the subjects of Chinese, Politics and Geography was stressed as a means by which knowledge, skills and understanding in all four subjects could be deepened.¹⁶

If textbook pluralism within Shanghai was ever seriously considered, in practice only one set of History textbooks was actually used, a set drafted, moreover, by more or less the same group of ERU and normal university staff who had participated in writing the HCS. In this respect, Shanghai's History curriculum closely resembled its national counterpart, merely transplanting national systems and processes to the local

¹⁴ Ibid, p124.

¹⁵ Nie, 'Zhongxue lishi xueke jiaoxue mudi de bianzhi ji qi zai xuexi pingjia de yingyong', p35.

¹⁶ Shanghai HCS, p124.

level. Yet, as shown in Chapter 3 and in the following chapters, despite closely following national models of history production, and sharing much in common with the goals and content of national Outlines and PEP's textbooks, Shanghai's HCS and textbooks have represented a concerted effort to assert the city's difference from – and perhaps its superiority over – Beijing, and to set itself up as a centre of reform-oriented excellence.

Zhejiang

Zhejiang's Social Studies curriculum, as noted above, has also proven to be something of a pioneer in forging new directions for basic education, even if it was not initially very highly regarded by TMIC inspectors or History educators. This may have been in part because History education professionals clearly felt (and many still feel) threatened by a move towards subject integration. It is also because the integration of History, Geography and common knowledge in Zhejiang's 'Teaching Guideline for Full-time Compulsory Education Junior Secondary Social Studies' (*yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue shehui jiaoxue zhidao gangyao*, henceforth SSTG) and textbooks was in many ways somewhat superficial, consisting in practice of separate sections for each subject area. Nonetheless, it marked a clear attempt to increase the relevance of social science subjects to everyday life, and to give them a more solid place in the curriculum; indeed, Zhejiang has continued to demonstrate its commitment to Social Studies through including it in its senior secondary entrance examinations, unlike most provinces which no longer test either History or Geography.

Although at the time of drafting, there was no national Social Studies Teaching Outline for Zhejiang's curriculum developers to follow, they adopted the basic format of the History and Geography Outlines, including a preface, a brief statement of general teaching and learning objectives and principles, and a breakdown of class hours. In a departure from the Outlines, however, class hours and content were separated into compulsory and elective sections and extra-curricular activities, while a new section on implementation of the guideline and assessment of teaching and learning was added, something which was not included in national Teaching Outlines until 2000. As in the Outlines, the majority of the text was devoted to the syllabus, which was arranged by year of study, each subdivided into two sections: teaching and learning objectives and content.

The core purpose of Social Studies as stated in the guidelines was to teach children that everyone is part of society, so that they would be better able to take their part in it and contribute to social development – in this case, the socialist modernisation of China. The integrative nature of the subject was also emphasised as it was written that the ‘main thread [of the subject] is man’s relationship to society, and its primary content is the politics, culture, population, traditions and environment of both past and present, China and foreign countries. It also stresses education in local matters (*xiangtu jiaoxue*) and putting knowledge into practice.’¹⁷ Through Social Studies, children would come to understand the environment in which they and others live and the laws and progress of historical development. They would also acquire basic knowledge about all aspects of social life, and intellectual skills, such as ‘observation, analysis, generalisation and comparison,’ which would enable them to adapt to and participate in political, economic and cultural life. The other core purpose of Social Studies tied in more closely to the traditional objectives of History (and Geography and Politics), emphasising its relevance to nurturing patriotism through learning to love China’s natural and social environment and understanding its past. Children were to learn how China had suffered at the hands of foreign invaders, and to develop the spirit of patriotic resistance. Unlike in the Outlines and Shanghai’s HCS, this key section only exhorted students to develop national self-respect and self-confidence (*minzu zizunxin, zixinxin*), not national pride (*minzu zihaogan*), although the latter was included in the syllabus goals. They were, however, to learn to love not only socialism, but also the Communist Party, an instruction which had by then disappeared from the national Outlines and was never included in Shanghai’s HCS. They were also to acquire a basic grasp of historical materialist theory and learn to apply it to analyses of both past and present phenomena. In short, Social Studies was to teach children a sense of social and historical responsibility, to their locale and to the nation, and to prepare them for active civic participation.¹⁸

In order to do this, they were to spend the first year learning about China’s natural history and environment, its many peoples and general information about everyday life and institutions. In the second year, they would mostly study Chinese and world history up to the mid-twentieth century, and would continue their domestic and global historical studies and learn about current affairs and other national and international matters in the third and final year. The historical content of the syllabus closely

¹⁷ SSTG, p148.

followed that of the Outlines, but was somewhat truncated since the breadth and depth of the national curriculum could not feasibly be included in the reduced time-frame available for history. The usual main topics were included, however, with an emphasis on China's former glories, its contributions to world civilisation and its one hundred years of humiliation. World history trod similarly well-worn ground, covering principally those topics most relevant to proving the laws of historical materialism. What was significant about Zhejiang's history coverage, however, was that it attempted to integrate Chinese and world history during the second year of the Social Studies course.¹⁹ Thus, it began with the study of human evolution, and led on first to Egypt, Babylon and India, then to ancient China (up to the Spring and Autumn period) and Rome, Greece and the Americas.²⁰ Although the remainder was less well integrated - ancient Chinese history up to 1840, followed by world history up to World War I, then Chinese history up to the establishment of the PRC, and finally world history up to World War II - and the third year of contemporary history did not integrate Chinese and foreign history at all, it started (or perhaps resurrected given China's early Soviet-influenced History curricula)²¹ a trend towards a more holistic and integrative approach to history which is currently being pursued elsewhere.

Another notable feature of the Social Studies course was that it placed particular emphasis on local history, culture, politics, geography and so forth, which were allocated 10-15% of total class hours, the study of which it was hoped would encourage a love of Zhejiang and the determination to strive for its development. Other topics, such as population control, environmental protection, education in national defence (*guofang jiaoyu*) and basic philosophy, were recommended as optional subjects which could be incorporated should time and student interest permit. Textbook learning was to be reinforced through the use of audio-visual materials, and beyond the classroom through both organised and independent extra-curricular activities after school and in the holidays, with a particular focus on local issues. Setting a trend which has evidently been followed in the latest national and local curriculum guidelines, these activities were quite clearly specified, including not only the obvious visits to sites of natural beauty, man-made technological achievement, historical memorials and museums, but also reading historical fiction and travel

¹⁸ SSTG, pp148-149.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp164-190.

²⁰ Ibid, pp165-167.

²¹ See Chapter 1 for more detail on early Soviet influences on History education in the PRC.

literature, watching relevant television documentaries and films, interviewing local people about the recent past and finding out about the lives of famous historical figures from the area. On a more explicitly ideological note, extra-curricular learning was also to emphasise discovering how past capitalist-imperialist incursions had afflicted the area and how recent changes had benefited it, so as better to understand ‘the nature of capitalism,’ ‘the superiority of socialism and the correctness of reform and opening policies.’²² This ideological tone, which was rather more heavy-handed than that of the national and Shanghai curricula of the time, was further elaborated in the subsequent section on teaching principles, the most fundamental of which was to ‘uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping’s theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, instil dialectical and historical materialist viewpoints, and fully integrate ideology and science, viewpoints and data.’²³

Ideological goals were covered in still more depth in the teaching and learning objectives section of the syllabus, and made far more frequent mention of Communism and Marxism than either the national Outline or Shanghai’s HCS. Indeed, it was heavily emphasised that despite the then low ebb of international socialism (following *Perestroika* and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern bloc), this was merely preparation for the future high tide of the movement when Communism would inevitably triumph.²⁴ Yet, skill-training was also included in these sections of the syllabus, with considerable attention paid to practical activities and to the nature of assessment, which made it plain that skills as well as knowledge were to be tested and reinforced through examinations and other evaluative mechanisms.²⁵ Evidently, being ideologically correct was not the only central objective of Zhejiang’s curriculum, and one cannot help but wonder whether the more solidly conservative ideological line taken by the SSTG was perhaps an attempt to provide a nominal counterbalance to the heavy emphasis on education in Zhejiang history and geography, and to restate for those watching from above its primary commitment to national over local goals.

²² SSTG, pp150-151.

²³ Ibid., p151.

²⁴ Ibid., p165, p182.

²⁵ Ibid, p152.

Beijing

As has already been remarked, it is rather surprising that Beijing was so late in introducing its own curriculum for basic education, although this may perhaps have been because as the capital it was thought best that the city and its environs should be seen to represent national rather than local trends. By the new millennium, however, rapid development of major urban centres and the growing disparity between these international metropolises and the remainder of the country had become too great to ignore. It was decided, therefore, to draft a new, locally oriented curriculum which would nurture 'a generation of new people to allow twenty-first century Beijing to continue its development, and a Beijing education to nurture the needs of its new people.'²⁶ As in Shanghai and Zhejiang, the Beijing curriculum has been principally the work of ERUs with assistance from normal university History lecturers.²⁷ Beijing's History Curriculum Standards (henceforth Beijing HCS) has been designed as a single curriculum covering both junior and senior secondary schooling in anticipation of soon universalising the latter in the city. In many respects, it has been influenced both by the local curricula of Shanghai and Zhejiang, and by the concept of quality education and the latest developments in History pedagogy, which many of its writers have played key roles in developing.²⁸ The format of the Beijing HCS is not wholly dissimilar to earlier Outlines, and includes a preface and a lengthy section describing general objectives and the value of studying History, before launching into the syllabus, and concluding with two sections on, respectively, teaching and assessment methods. The new era and spirit in which it has been drafted, however, are clearly reflected in the wording and the focus on pedagogical objectives.

One of the key features of Beijing's HCS has been the switch to an 'integration-separation-integration' approach; that is, an integrated Chinese and world history curriculum at junior secondary level (grades 7-9), separate courses in Chinese and world history during the first and second years of senior secondary (grades 10-

²⁶ 'Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige fang'an (zandinggao)' [2000], p1.

²⁷ These included seven writers and four primary discussants drawn from the Beijing Institute of Educational Research, Beijing Normal and Capital Normal Universities, the Beijing Education Institute and the Central Institute of Educational Research.

²⁸ Zhang Jing (Beijing Institute of Educational Research) and Ye Xiaobing (Capital Normal University) have been very prominent in this field, publishing numerous articles on the subject. Some of these have already been cited in Chapter 2 (see n55 and n57). Other examples include: Zhang, 'Xuesheng lishi xuexi xintai yu jiaoxue celue de tantao'; Ye, 'Jiaoxue fangfa yu jiaoxue guannian'. Ye is head of Capital Normal University's History Department and part of a cohort of pedagogical specialists there, which includes the former head of department, Yu Youxi (now retired) and current associate professor Zhao Yafu. Zhang Jing is one of Ye's former graduate students.

11), and an integrated Chinese and world cultural history course in the final year.²⁹ This aims to overcome the longstanding ‘negative practice’ of excessive repetition at junior and senior secondary levels and to expand student imaginations and understanding through presenting them with a more holistic view of history,³⁰ much as the Zhejiang curriculum intended. Class hours in Beijing’s new curriculum have also departed from the national norm, reducing first year junior secondary History classes from two to one per week, and increasing senior secondary final year classes to three, retaining two per week for the four grades in between.

The stated overarching objective of Beijing’s HCS also follows Zhejiang in focusing on history as a science of human actions in society over time, rejecting the ‘academic- and knowledge-centred’ orientation of existing curricula in favour of a ‘human-centred approach’ that also places weight on putting knowledge and skills into practice. This is it thought, will better enable students to develop a ‘scientific world-view’ and a ‘correct view of humanity,’ equipping them to adapt to society and become useful contributors to its development.³¹ In order to achieve this, three key areas should be nurtured: attitudes and values (*taidu yu jiazhiguan*), skills (*nengli*), and knowledge (*zhishi*). Clearly, these have much in common with the basic knowledge, ideological education and skill-training components introduced in the 1988 draft Outline and Shanghai’s HCS. That knowledge has been moved from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, however, strongly reinforces the statement of commitment to moving away from what is thought to have been an overly academic, and by extension dull and taxing, curriculum, and to focus firmly, first, on using History to teach values and nurture cultured, humanitarian citizens (*renwen suyang*), and second, on teaching transferable intellectual skills. This does not, however, mean that traditional ideologies have been abandoned or that the informational content of the curriculum has been drastically curtailed. Students are still required to learn ‘the basic viewpoints of dialectical and historical materialism, correctly understand the objective laws of social development, and acquire scientific historical consciousness.’³² They are also to understand China’s place in the world past and present, to develop ‘a patriotic spirit,’ national pride, self-respect and self-confidence, ‘a sense of responsibility’ to the nation and fellow citizens, and to ‘learn the lessons of

²⁹ Beijing HCS, p341.

³⁰ Ibid, p342.

³¹ Beijing HCS, p341.

³² Ibid, p342.

the past,'³³ so that mistakes will never be repeated nor humiliations re-experienced. The syllabus, meanwhile, retains most of the same general topics that have been included in recent Outlines.

Yet, both the ideological and knowledge components of the curriculum also reveal some significant changes. While the six general 'values' points open with a focus on patriotism and historical materialism, they turn rapidly to promoting a view of History as a tool to teach the young not only about, but also a sense of responsibility for society and the outside world, which is clearly commensurate with the reformist attitude of Beijing's curriculum developers. Students are thus to learn to respect other national peoples and view them as equals, and to recognise the necessity of international unity and co-operation. They are also to study social problems past and present to develop a consciousness of human suffering and a sense of responsibility for social development. They are to understand concentric circles of individuals' relationships to one another, to the national people, the state, society as a whole and nature and thereby to develop civic consciousness and become better citizens. Finally they are to develop a 'healthy' morality and aesthetic sensibilities which will lead them to continue the great traditions of both the Chinese and other peoples and to build a better brighter future for everyone.³⁴ 'Values' are thus more broadly conceived than heretofore, no doubt in part to emphasise the value of History itself; indeed, a whole section discussing the value of the History curriculum has been included to highlight the subject's relevance to self and society.

The syllabus, of course, comprises a large part of the curriculum, although it has been summarised into far less detailed topic areas than the national Outlines. As already noted, Beijing's HCS integrates Chinese and world history throughout the junior secondary years. A somewhat better job of integration appears to have been done here than in the Zhejiang SSTG, with far more regular interspersions of periods of Chinese history with those of world history. As in the Shanghai HCS, differentiated levels of understanding are indicated by a tick in the relevant column. Three ascending levels of understanding are given in the Beijing HCS, and as in Shanghai's HCS, the majority are assigned to the lowest and middle levels, meaning that students are merely required to have a basic knowledge or a preliminary understanding of the topic. This is especially true for the first and second years of junior secondary, but as students progress, more topics are assigned to the middle and

³³ Ibid, p342, 345

highest levels of understanding. In Chinese history, the topics requiring the intermediate and more profound levels of understanding are mostly related to unification or reunification of the state and ethnic integration, with a more concentrated focus on reform movements and conflict with foreign powers in the modern and contemporary periods. In world history, only the history of the Roman empire is required to be understood at the intermediate level in the earlier period, with the remainder of intermediate and higher understanding topics chosen from the modern-contemporary period. Like Shanghai's HCS, these focus heavily on socio-economic forms, the industrial revolution, the development of capitalism, imperialism and communism, and conclude with topics on the dissolution of the USSR and the Eastern bloc and the emergence in the post-Cold War period of a 'multi-polar' (*duojixing*) world.³⁵

In common with Zhejiang's SSTG and more recent national History Teaching Outlines, Beijing's HCS makes several general suggestions for extra-curricular and classroom activities to stimulate student interest and reinforce understanding of textbook learning. In addition to visiting museums, famous historical sites and memorials, students should be encouraged to carry out their own historical research projects, gathering information from various sources, interviewing family members and local people about the recent past, collecting old stamps, coins and other small artefacts, and using these resources to write reports and make classroom presentations.³⁶ Somewhat greater detail, however, is given on what these supplementary activities and regular classroom teaching are intended to achieve. The teaching and assessment sections that complete the curriculum thus focus on broadening the practical application of History, emphasising the links between History and other school subjects, and how history touches on all aspects of daily life. The practical orientation is also mirrored in the precedence given to 'deriving theories from historical data' (*lun cong shi chu*), although 'unifying theory and data' (*shilun tongyi*) is also a stated teaching principle. Perhaps the most important aspect of the new curriculum, however, is the emphasis on students rather than on knowledge. Attention is to be paid to the psychological aspects of the educative process, with a focus on developing inter-personal, co-operative skills and creating interactive classroom learning opportunities which encourage student participation rather than

³⁴ Beijing HCS, pp342-343.

³⁵ Ibid, pp346-348.

³⁶ Beijing HCS, pp348-349.

passive silence. This is to be reflected in student assessments which should no longer be determined by single end-of-term or annual examinations, but through a variety of methods, including essay-writing, research projects and even in-class discussion, which seek to give all students a better chance to prove their capabilities.³⁷ Whether these high-minded, child- rather than text-centred pedagogical ideals or the more holistic, comparative teaching approach attempted through Chinese and world history integration herald a radical change in the way History is taught and learnt in Beijing's schools remains to be seen. There is little doubt, however, that many History education professionals throughout the country subscribe to the reforms advocated by these new curricula, and increasingly view child-centred holistic approaches as long-term goals which should be pursued, not only in History but in education as a whole.

³⁷ Ibid, pp358-359.

PART THREE

THE IMPLEMENTED CURRICULUM

Chapter 6

Textbooks

As discussed in the introduction, in almost all societies there is an official history that is disseminated through the school curriculum and especially through textbooks. In some societies, however, the state is heavily involved in the production of textbooks, whether directly, through supporting a state-run textbook-writing agency, or indirectly, through employing vetting mechanisms to ensure that commercial publishers do not transgress particular boundaries (be they ideological or pedagogical) of what is deemed appropriate content. State control over history production for schoolchildren has been fairly rigid in much of East Asia, and particularly in the PRC where there has mostly been a highly centralised system of curriculum development and textbook production in which both tasks have been carried out by the same institution or personnel. For these reasons, textbooks might legitimately be regarded as part of the intended or preactive curriculum. At the same time, however, the examination-centred curriculum has meant that textbooks are usually the most comprehensive vehicle for transmitting historical knowledge and viewpoints, and are frequently the dominant, and sometimes the exclusive, teaching and learning resource. Currently, textbook pluralism is also permitted, and although, as discussed in previous chapters and below, there are various guidelines that regulate how textbooks may be produced and distributed, and inspection and approval systems ensure that textbook content remains relatively standardised, textbooks nonetheless increasingly represent an interpretation rather than a replication of national guidelines, shaped by academics and education researchers seeking to fulfil the real or perceived needs of teachers and students. Furthermore, the effect of textbooks – their success or failure in accurately transmitting their explicit and implicit messages - can only be understood in light of their audience and the medium in which they are encountered. Textbooks are accordingly treated here as part of the implemented or interactive curriculum.

How the interaction between text and audience takes place in school classrooms when textbooks are the chief vehicle for implementing most teaching and learning practices is the subject of Chapter 7. This chapter examines the content of the textbooks with which teachers and students interact, evaluating the extent to which the textbooks faithfully follow the preactive curriculum guidelines on which they are

supposed to be based, and analysing the ways in which certain themes and topics are presented.

I. Textbooks: A Comparative Overview

The textbooks examined in this chapter are principally those drafted immediately following the introduction of limited textbook pluralism in the late 1980s, which were formally promulgated in 1992-1993 and which were still in use as of 2000-2001 when the fieldwork for the present study was conducted and classes in which some of these textbooks were taught could be observed. As described in Chapter 3, several sets of textbooks were produced during this time, mostly by academics and ERU personnel, with Shanghai and Zhejiang drafting their textbooks based on locally produced curricula, while the other sets of textbooks initially permitted under the ‘one Outline many textbooks system’ followed the national Teaching Outline. These included PEP, Beijing Normal University’s four-year junior secondary system textbooks, Guangdong’s ‘Coastal edition’ (*yanhaiban*) and Sichuan’s ‘Inland edition’ (*neidiban*), as well as a handful of minority-language texts.¹ The number of textbooks for History (as for other subjects) has expanded since the 2001 History Curriculum Standards went on trial, and several textbook sets currently have preliminary approval for use in trial areas from the History TMIC. With the exception of the first volume of PEP’s 2001 HCS-compliant textbooks, however, none of these were available at the time of fieldwork. The remainder of PEP’s textbooks have been made accessible online soon after they have appeared in print (one per semester) and I have acquired drafts or isolated copies of single volumes from other textbook sets, but since all are currently still on trial, these are not the focus of the current discussion, although they will be addressed briefly in the concluding chapter. This chapter, therefore, analyses the content of PEP, Shanghai, Coastal and Inland edition textbooks that were in use as of 2000-2001 with some comparisons to Zhejiang’s Social Studies textbooks where relevant, as well as to earlier (PEP) textbook editions, although the latter comparison is kept to a minimum to avoid duplicating the general outline of ideological,

¹ The 1984 Nationalities Autonomy Law reinstated many minority scripts that had been banned during the Cultural Revolution. Following the 1985 Reform, permission was granted to produce textbooks in these languages on condition that they properly ‘adhere to the Outline, relate to reality, and combine [textbook] writing with translation [of existing textbooks]’. (Harrell and Bamo, ‘Combining Ethnic Heritage with National Unity’, p63.)

pedagogical and historical data and viewpoint changes identified in Chapters 2 and 4.² Beijing Normal University's textbooks, unfortunately, are not considered here because I was unable to obtain a set.

While this chapter seeks to avoid a diachronic analysis that charts how textbooks drafted in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution have changed between then and now, its purpose is, nonetheless, comparative insofar as it compares the content of four contemporaneous textbook sets both to one another and to the national or local curriculum guidelines. As noted in Chapter 3, they were drafted with somewhat different audiences in mind – Shanghai and Coastal editions for developed areas, Inland for rural areas – and, with the exception of PEP's set, were not produced by professional textbook writers, but by local academics and education researchers. Yet, the differences between them are relatively minor, limited principally to presentation format. The PEP set, perhaps because facing potential competition from other publishers as well as being influenced by changing pedagogical ideas, is, in contrast to its previous volumes, large and weighty, with thick, high quality paper, coloured pages and numerous images,³ although a black and white edition was also produced to serve those who might not be able to afford the higher price tag attached to the colour version.⁴ Despite the many criticisms levelled at Zhejiang's Social Studies textbooks over the years, their authors actually went much further much faster than any of their counterparts in augmenting text with visuals, including numerous maps, charts, pictures depicting important events or persons, and photos of archaeological artefacts, the majority of which are in colour. The Shanghai and Coastal sets, by contrast, are flimsier and made of poorer quality materials (thereby keeping them to about half the price of PEP's textbooks), but equally have plenty of drawings, prints and diagrams, albeit in black and white with the exception of some colour-printed pages at the front of each volume. Only the Inland edition is a much

² Most of these textbooks underwent minor revisions in 2001 following the promulgation of the 2000 History Teaching Outline. As with the 2000 Outline, which was designated as an interim curriculum, these textbooks were intended to serve until new texts written in accordance with the 2001 History Curriculum Standards had been fully tested. It was originally expected that this process would be complete and the new curriculum in full operation by 2005, but various problems and disagreements caused the implementation date to be rescheduled for 2007. (Source: Beijing Normal University, History curriculum development committee member).

³ For a detailed description of the changing publication format of PEP textbooks between 1978-1993 see Chan and Scott, 'Teaching Chinese History in Junior Secondary Schools in post-Mao China', pp114-115.

⁴ The price difference was not substantial, in the mid-1990s averaging under 1 RMB, or between 10-20%. (Source: PEP textbook catalogues). Nevertheless, given the large number of textbooks a student is required to purchase, this difference may have been considered significant.

smaller (and cheaper) book with few images, much in same style formerly used by PEP, although like the other editions the first few pages of each volume are given to some colour photographs.⁵ The presentation of text is also very similar, although the chapters frequently have slightly different headings, and the PEP textbooks are divided into ‘lessons’ (*ke*), while the other editions retain the division into ‘chapters’ (*zhang*) and ‘lessons’ (*jie*) (meaning class hour) established by the earlier (pre-1988 draft) Outlines. All editions use a mixture of large and small type to distinguish core from peripheral information (although in the Coastal edition this is rather unclear), with PEP, Shanghai and the Coastal editions additionally using text boxes to incorporate or highlight supplementary data. PEP, however, stands out in having a far higher volume of images and supplementary information than the other sets, and at the back of each of its final two Chinese history volumes includes five readings (extracts from the writings of famous persons such as Lin Zexu, Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen, Mao and Zhou Enlai) for independent study. The volume of material is perhaps one additional reason why PEP has continued to be favoured as a superior edition used even in many areas where it is not the officially mandated textbook, especially in better performing schools.⁶ So much additional data is included, in fact, that almost every PEP volume is substantially longer than its equivalent in the other sets (Fig. 6.1).

Abbreviations

PEP	People’s Education Press
SH	Shanghai edition
YH	Coastal edition
ND	Inland edition

Fig. 6.1

No. of characters per volume (units of 1,000)

	Chinese history				World history	
	1	2	3	4	1	2
PEP	200	221	198	270	218	174
SH	139	131	143	121	146	145
YH	170	117	210	160	88	95
ND	90	100	104	168	120	108

The distribution of content between the four editions is also slightly different. Although in all cases four volumes are given to Chinese history and two to world, and the topics covered are the same, the cut-off or starting point in a given volume may vary somewhat from its equivalent in another set (Fig. 6.2). Given that each volume

⁵ Zhejiang’s Social Studies textbooks, from a visual standpoint, are the most ‘modern’ and appealing, being in full colour and including numerous photographs, colour prints, charts, graphs, maps and other images.

⁶ See Chapter 3, section IV, for a more detailed discussion of the factors involved in textbook selection.

Fig 6.2 Start and end-point of textbook coverage, by set and volume

Vol.		PEP	SH	YH	ND	
Chinese history	1	From	Primitive Man	Primitive Man	Primitive Man	Primitive Man
		To	Northern, Southern Dynasties	Sui-Tang	N, S dynasties	N, S dynasties
	2	From	Sui-Tang	5 Dynasties, Liao, N. Song, Xia, Jin	Sui-Tang	Sui-Tang
		To	End of Ming	Qing (pre-1840)	Qing (pre-1840)	Qing (pre-1840)
	3	From	Early Qing	Opium War	Opium War	Opium War
		To	Northern Expedition	Northern Expedition	Xi'an Incident, 2 nd United Front	Northern Expedition
	4	From	Establishment of GMD government	Establishment of GMD government	War with Japan (post-1937)	Establishment of GMD government
		To	1990s	1990s	1990s	1990s
World history	1	From	Ancient civilisations (Egypt, Babylon, India, Greece, Rome)	Ancient civilisations	Ancient civilisations	Ancient civilisations
		To	Italian and German unification	Italian, German unification	Meiji restoration	1 st International Paris Commune
	2	From	1 st International, Paris Commune	1 st International, Paris Commune	Italian, German unification	European and American imperialism, colonialism
		To	1990s	1990s	1990s	1990s

is to be covered in a single semester, this does suggest a minor variation in the prioritising of content, depending perhaps on the authors' own expertise or interpretation of the guidelines as well as the particular audience for which they were intended. It has been difficult, however, to ascertain the precise root of these and other differences from the authors' or their colleagues' own perspectives since few articles have been written comparing the various editions or outlining the thinking behind them, although there are many detailing the 'special characteristics' (*tedian*) of each regionally produced set, or volumes thereof.⁷ The few comparative discussions that have been attempted, moreover, are weak and preponderantly biased by the writer's affiliation with one or other of the editorial committees responsible for textbook drafting, or direct involvement in textbook production. They also tend only to compare PEP with the Shanghai and Coastal editions.⁸ In fact, I have as yet found no articles in which the Inland edition is compared to any of the others, perhaps because the 'quality' (*suzhi*) of its imagined audience is so low as to render the textbooks incommensurable with those produced by and for more developed areas. This suspicion was confirmed by several senior History educators who told me that the Inland edition is 'simpler' to suit its rural audience, while the PEP edition is characterised by its 'comprehensiveness', the Shanghai edition by its pedagogical

⁷ Gong, 'Guanyu lishi jiaocai bianxie de jidian sikao', pp7-12; Wang, Li and Zang, 'Chuzhong "Zhongguo lishi" (Renjiaoban), diyi, er, sance bianxie yuanze, tedian he shiyong shuoming', pp15-19; Yan, 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong "Shijie lishi" diyi, erce (Renjiaoban) de xin tese (shang, xia)'.

⁸ See, for example, Zhao, 'Tan renjiaoban, Shanghaiban, yanhaiban santao xin jiaocai', pp9-11. Zhao, formerly of PEP, latterly of the Beijing Educational Research Institute clearly favours PEP's textbooks.

innovation and attention to Sino-foreign interactions, and the Coastal edition by a strongly academic tenor.⁹ While, as shown below, I have been able to investigate some of these and other assertions made by writers on the topic, and have found that their claims are not entirely without merit, the impression formed through my own reading of the texts was that such categorisations were made primarily because it was thought necessary to distinguish each set from the other rather than because each is inherently distinctive. I found the differences to be generally rather minor, with the Inland edition perhaps being marginally more ‘conservative’ in the tone of its adherence to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought than the ‘modernising’ textbooks produced by PEP, Shanghai and Guangdong. Of course, if only those with high ‘cultural and scientific quality’ (*wenhua kexue suzhi*) - by which is normally meant well-heeled urbanites - are ready for ‘modernity’ in textbooks as in everyday life, and ‘conservatism’ is more appropriate for the ‘low quality’ people in the backward hinterland, it would then be logical to assume that the Inland edition was indeed pitched at a lower intellectual level than its counterparts. The Inland textbooks are, furthermore, considerably shorter and less detailed than PEP’s. As shown in Figure 6.1 above, however, they are *not* substantially shorter than either the Shanghai or Coastal editions, which are clearly directed at those with supposedly higher *suzhi*. Furthermore, if the developmental trajectory of children’s historical thinking outlined by scholars such as Lee, Egan and Carretero is correct, the historical materialist ‘structural explanations’ of change emphasised by the Inland edition are in fact more appropriate for an older or more intellectually sophisticated audience.¹⁰ It would appear, therefore, that the academic simplicity/complexity of a text, whether real or imagined, may ultimately be founded in little more than socio-biological determinist preconceptions about the ‘quality’ of the audience for which a given set of textbooks is designed. This is certainly not to suggest that there are no differences in the level of cognitive understanding certain language and concepts deployed in each set may require, but as a non-native speaker with little theoretical knowledge of cognitive development processes, it has been difficult for me to make valid comparisons on linguistic bases, and such an analysis must await further investigation by others more qualified.

⁹ Personal communications with TMIC inspectors and ERU personnel. The above-cited Zhao makes similar inferences.

¹⁰ Lee, Dickinson and Ashby ‘Researching Children’s Ideas about History’; Egan, ‘Accumulating History’; Carretero et al, ‘Historical Knowledge’.

There are other minor discrepancies between textbook sets, with, as already noted, writers of different sets giving somewhat more emphasis to certain topics or periods than to others. Some differences are also evident in the question or exercise sections that are included at the end of each chapter. These were included in earlier PEP textbook editions, but the section mostly consisted of two or three questions (*xiti*) that typically asked students to recall the information that had been covered and to describe its relevance to the historical materialist development process. By the late 1980s, such questions were deemed not only overly difficult, but also old-fashioned and dull. The new question sections in PEP and also in the Coastal edition (*lianxiti*) have accordingly employed much more basic techniques to get students to remember information, asking them to fill in the blanks, or simply asking general factual questions about the chapter, the answers to which are often listed in a short multiple choice exercise. The Inland edition, by contrast, has retained the older PEP style, not asking questions, but listing several points at the end of the chapter as ‘revision requirements’ (*fuxi yaoqiu*) which are divided under the instructional headings ‘remember’, ‘know about’, ‘understand’ and ‘generally describe’. The Shanghai edition, however, has earned its reputation for pedagogical innovation by heading its question section ‘think’, ‘try’ (*xiangyixiang, shiyishi*), asking its readers to answer short questions that occasionally require them to do more than regurgitate data, and sometimes to answer data-based questions from a selected supplementary passage, or to gather information on a topic from extra-curricular sources. As with the local curricula discussed in Chapter 5, however, it is difficult to detect a distinctly regional flavour to any of the sets.

In general, then, it may be said that the similarities between textbook sets vastly outweigh the differences. Given that each set of textbooks had to pass the TMIC inspection, this is hardly surprising, although whether this was because the revisions required by the History TMIC before granting approval brought each into line with the other or whether they were all virtually identical from the outset is difficult to determine since I did not have access to the initial textbook drafts. There are, of course, various regulations that stipulate what textbook writers can and must put in textbooks, and it is according to these that TMIC is supposed to judge those texts submitted to them for inspection and approval.¹¹ Although, as shown in Chapter 3,

¹¹ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, p1090-91; ‘Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai bianxie guihua fang’an’ [21/8/1988], JYFQS, pp1093-1095; ‘Zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianxie shending guanli zanxing banfa’ [7/6/2001].

these have not, in practice, always been absolutely binding and much has been left to the discretion of TMIC inspectors, it seems that most History textbook writers have followed the guidelines fairly closely. Another reason why the PEP, Coastal and Inland editions may well have differed little in their initial pre-inspection drafts is the prescriptive nature of Teaching Outlines which, together with the above-cited regulations, set the parameters of what must be included (or excluded) to ensure a reasonable expectation of passing inspection. Outlines, as we have seen, provide not only general ideological and pedagogical guidance, but also an extremely detailed syllabus in which long topic lists are given together with notes on the appropriate viewpoints that should be adopted. The curricula drafted in Shanghai and Zhejiang have also been very prescriptive and detailed, if marginally less so than the Outlines. The length and specificity of the syllabus in both the national and local curricula have thus left little to the imagination of textbook writers (who in many cases have anyway been the same persons who drafted the curriculum guidelines in the first place), and even if they wished to include additional topics, the limited time-frame available to cover the mandatory syllabus would preclude the incorporation of such material.

It is not, however, only these systemic and procedural factors that have circumscribed the form and content of textbooks, nor is it even a straightforward reflection of the political and ideological influences identified in previous chapters. Rather, it is in large part, I would argue, because the long-time dominance of PEP has established a tried and trusted template from which few, especially PEP itself, have been willing to deviate. Each 'new' edition of the PEP History textbook, for example, has closely resembled its immediate predecessor and, much like revised editions, has in essence taken the old one and added, removed, truncated or expanded some of the information, modified the distribution of praise and blame, and adjusted the ideological tone just as has been done in the Outlines. In the same way, the History textbooks produced by the different regions after the 1985 Reform not only follow the established national and global historical narrative, but at first glance appear to have taken the 1987 PEP textbooks and merely - to cite a common educational activity - 'put the text into their own words' and occasionally re-ordered the data.¹² Some of

¹² Redistribution of the data, however, was carried out in all sets, since prior to the 1988 draft/1992 Outlines, History was only taught for two years of junior secondary, with, according to the 1986 revised Outline provisions, three semesters for Chinese history and one for world (see Chapter 4 for further details), meaning that the 1987-1989 textbook set comprised three volumes of Chinese history and one of world. With the expansion of History classes into all three junior secondary years (i.e. six semesters), content was accordingly rearranged into four volumes of Chinese history and two of world.

the text and many of the photographs, images and diagrams are identical in all four textbook sets, with some having also appeared in the earlier PEP editions. It may be that this high degree of overlap is because there was close co-ordination between the various editorial teams or close supervision from higher authorities. It may also have been because non-PEP writers had little experience in the field on which to draw and thus borrowed directly from PEP.

Yet, such ‘borrowings’ may not have even been conscious or deliberate. Many of the local editorial teams included ERU staff and normal university academics, all of whom would have been very familiar with PEP’s textbooks through their day-to-day work of pre- and in-service teacher training, and, if then under the age of about forty-five (and not of the Cultural Revolution generation), would themselves have studied PEP’s earlier textbooks in secondary school. Moreover, the institutionalisation of textbook production in the PRC combined with the particular position history occupies in legitimising the polity has contributed greatly to the establishment and perpetuation of a dominant historical discourse which has certain narrative and linguistic structures and patterns at its core.¹³ Obviously this discourse has not, as we have seen in previous chapters, evolved in isolation from contemporaneous developments in politics, professional historiography or education, or from the history of the History subject itself, but while it should be regarded both as a product of a historical process of development over the *longue durée* and as a discursive field in ‘dialogue’ with related socio-cultural, political and academic discourses, History texts nonetheless constitute a distinctive ‘genre’ of their own.¹⁴

Those working in the field of History education would, if not from childhood, at least from the outset of their professional careers, have been socialised into, as Kress has put it, ‘recognising certain routinised kinds of texts’, and thereafter reproducing them. Through producing or reproducing these particular texts ‘in the one social place over a long period ...[they] come to make choices that have become habitual,

Other than bringing contemporary history content up to the post-Mao era for Chinese history and the post-WWII period for world history, however, there were no major changes. This redistribution of data is not therefore treated as significant here, although it is one to which writers on the subject have inevitably drawn attention, much as they did when claiming the switch from the division of the Outlines into parts, chapters and lessons (*bian, zhang, jie*) to numbers in various fonts and sizes was important (see Chapter 4).

¹³ Schoenhals (*Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*) makes a similar argument regarding political discourse, maintaining that a standardised ‘pan-national’ language deployed since 1949 has effectively restricted thought and consciousness to the language of the polity.

¹⁴ This concept of genre follows Fairclough’s definition (*Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp13-15). See also Kress, ‘The Social Production of Language’, pp120-121.

predictable, given'.¹⁵ And through these predictable choices – in this case, following the established textbook template – the ‘institution’ of textbook production (PEP and other textbook editorial teams and their parent organisations) which has produced these ‘linguistic and social subjects’ (textbook writers) in the first place thereby reproduces itself and ‘its characteristic institutional meanings’.¹⁶ This is not to say that there has been no ‘linguistic change’ at all. In times of ‘interactions of conflict and contestation’, as Kress’ argument continues, ‘individual [linguistic and social] subjects represent [as opposed to reproduce] their institution and its meanings and in the process produce significant linguistic change’.¹⁷ ‘Interactions of conflict and contestation’, as we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, have certainly characterised History education over the past several years with the recent expansion of textbook pluralism, growing pressure on History to appear more useful in the face of competition from new and existing school subjects, and the rapid development of pedagogical research which increasingly challenges old assumptions. Whether Kress’ ‘intertextual analysis’ accurately explains the dynamics of stability and change in History education in the Chinese context would require a far more profound analysis of its discourse than the scope of this study permits, but there is little doubt that the many changes taking place in the environment in which History texts are produced have catalysed some concrete movement in the presentation formats, language and meanings of History textbooks. Some common value-laden phrases or words that were once universally dominant have been replaced by or at least compete for space and usage with others: ‘*renmin*’ (the people in the proletarian sense), for example, has in many instances been supplanted by ‘*minzu*’ (the national people in a primordial ethno-cultural sense); ‘*guomin*’ (nationals in a political, territorial and civic sense, a term favoured by the KMT both on the Mainland and in Taiwan, and used in the early years of the PRC) has also made a comeback, and most recently ‘*gongmin*’ (citizens) has appeared with increasing frequency.¹⁸ The language of class struggle (*jieji douzheng*) and revolution (*geming*) in which slaves, peasants and workers featured (at least nominally) as the agents of historical change, meanwhile, has given way to an emphasis on economic, scientific and technological development (*fazhan*) catalysed by elite-led reform (*gaige*). Most recently, the quality education drive to make

¹⁵ Kress, ‘The Social Production of Language’, p119.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp139.

¹⁷ Kress, ‘The Social Production of Language’, p140.

¹⁸ On the changing meaning and naming of citizenship in the PRC see Yu, ‘Citizenship, Ideology and the PRC Constitution’, pp288-307.

learning more appealing and a lifelong pursuit has also begun to make inroads into the ways in which History textbooks present their information and the language that they use, with increasing numbers of cartoon figures shown engaged in dialogue and even debate (however simplistic) about historical events and persons, and efforts to write in a more accessible, child-friendly style. PEP is now in a position of trying to keep up with the latest trends being followed by the reformers in institutions such as Beijing Normal and Huadong Normal Universities (both of which have published 2001 HCS-compliant textbooks). Clearly, some of these changes suggest important shifts in the ways in which the nation, the people, society, the school, the teacher's role, and the learning process itself are conceived, or, as Fairclough, Kress and other like-minded discourse theorists might say, reconfigurations of the 'power relations' that History texts 'code'. It appears, nevertheless, that the History 'genre' and the key narratives, concepts and structures of which it is comprised have been preserved intact in all four sets of History textbooks discussed here.

The remainder of this chapter surveys the substantive content of History textbooks, analysing selected themes and topics that demonstrate the extent to which they faithfully reproduce the official narratives outlined in the intended curriculum and pursue the official objectives of teaching about the past. Specifically, this chapter asks whether the textbooks in question do in fact follow central government guidelines, Teaching Outlines or local curricula, and not only adhere to the syllabus mandated therein, but whether they effectively promote 'patriotism, internationalism, communist ideology, historical materialism and dialectical materialism'; whether they promote 'ethnic unity' (*minzu tuanjie*) and harmony; whether they are 'scientific', appropriate for China's 'national conditions' and 'reflect the spirit of the times'; whether they teach 'good morals, character and determination' and nurture 'four hases' students (with ideals, morals, culture and discipline); and whether they encourage an approach to education that nurtures students' intellectual, moral, physical and aesthetic capabilities and teaches them transferable skills.¹⁹ How fully these objectives are realised, needless to say, cannot be determined simply by reading the textbook, since no reader is a *tabula rasa*, and encounters the text in a particular medium (the school classroom), mediated by a particular person (the teacher) who has his or her own experiences and understanding of the past derived both from formal and informal education. Textbooks are analysed in this chapter, therefore, in terms

chiefly of *how* they reflect the formal objectives of History and whether they thereby promote the likelihood that these learning objectives will be attained.

As already discussed, the official objectives are not the only thing that textbooks convey; there is always a ‘hidden curriculum’ of one sort or another that – to borrow from the critical discourse analysts once more – might be said to encode power relations between social, economic, political, gender and ethnic subjects, and to reflect the desire of those with power to sustain their own hegemony. Although in the case of PRC History textbooks, I would argue that some of these curricular objectives are barely concealed, there are, nonetheless, implicit messages that sometimes contradict stated goals. A comprehensive discourse or content analysis of History textbooks, while clearly a fruitful area of research, is, however, more than the limitations of this study can accommodate. The themes and topics examined here are accordingly restricted to a few examples in each period of Chinese and world history that have been selected in part as representative examples of harmony or conflict between explicit and hidden goals and partly for their importance in shaping the national or global narrative. Some of them have also been chosen to coincide with lessons I was personally able to observe being taught in school classrooms and/or to discuss with teachers and students, and thereby to allow me to draw some tentative conclusions about how accurately messages are transmitted from the top to the bottom, and the centre to the periphery.

Fig. 6.3

Chinese History

PEP1, 2, 3, 4

SH1, 2, 3, 4

YH1, 2, 3, 4

ND1, 2, 3, 4

People’s Education Press, Vols. 1 - 4

Shanghai Edition, Vols.1-4

Coastal Edition, Vols.1-4

Inland Edition, Vols. 1-4

World History

PEPW1, 2

SHW1, 2

YHW1, 2

NDW1, 2

People’s Education Press, Vols.1-2

Shanghai Edition, Vols. 1-2

Coastal Edition Vols. 1-2

Inland Edition, Vols. 1-2

Social Studies

ZJ1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Zhejiang Social Studies, Vols. 1-6

The History textbooks discussed here – that is, those in use as of 2000 – are identified throughout this chapter and the following one by the already stated acronyms referring to the set, followed by a number indicating the volume (Fig. 6.3).

¹⁹ ‘Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biaoqun’ [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090-91; LJD[1988], COH, pp510-512.

A second number following the volume number indicates the chapter (*zhang*) or lesson (*ke*), and a third the lesson or class (*jie*); for example, YH2.3.1 refers to the Coastal edition, volume 2, chapter 3, lesson 1. Page numbers are indicated in the usual format. When citing earlier (PEP) editions I use the same format, but include the year of publication in parentheses. The titles of other textbooks cited here are given in full.²⁰

II. National History

'Metahistory'

The meaning and function of national history has already been analysed in the introduction, especially what was labelled the 'national-history-for-patriotism' model or History for 'moral and patriotic exhortation'. There is a great deal more that could be said in defining what constitutes national history and its social and political applications,²¹ but suffice it to reiterate for the moment that national history is understood here as denoting what – land, people, culture, ideas - is perceived as 'belonging' to the past of the present nation-state; to borrow from Kaviraj's remarks on nationalism, it is thus 'a relentless project of enumeration It counts, it appears, every conceivable quantifiable thing'.²² One of the core functions of national history in other words is to *quantify* the nation; that is, to ascertain who we are (who is included in 'Us?'), and what we have in tangible material and cultural terms (land, people, resources, cultural achievements, scientific discoveries). I would also suggest, however, that national history seeks to *qualify* the nation in intangible cultural or spiritual terms (national qualities, essences, or 'what is special about us?'). As shown below and in the final chapters, this is a complex project in which quantitative definitions of the nation may conflict with qualitative ones.

In addition to quantifying and qualifying the nation, national history also serves as a grand narrative conferring coherence on the current nation-state, and is commonly the story of an idea (or ideal) of a collective historical subject that moves changed-yet-unchanged through time.²³ As already argued, national history thus conceived may embody many problems and contradictions, since certain aspects of the past must almost invariably be excluded or dragooned into performing functions for which they

²⁰ The full publication details of all textbooks published between 1949-2000 are given in the appendix. The publication details of all other textbooks are included in the bibliography.

²¹ For a multi-perspectival analysis of national history in the context of an assortment of nation-states (and 'stateless nations' such as Catalunya), see Lönnroth et al eds., *Conceptions of National History*.

²² Sudipta Kaviraj, 'The Imaginary Institution of India,' in *Subaltern Studies VII: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, (New York: Oxford, 1992), pp. 30-31, cit. in Gries, *Face Nationalism*, p74.

may not be entirely suited in order to maintain continuity and the idea of the nation. 'Narrating' a nation, which in territorial or political terms may be somewhat historically discontinuous, is therefore often accomplished through imagining an ancient and/or 'pure' national people or national 'essence' which can provide continuity and a reason for national cohesion.²⁴

In all editions of the Chinese history textbooks, the national past is presented in just such a teleological fashion, with the modern nation-state projected backwards over time to demonstrate its antiquity and the continuity of its political and territorial existence 'from ancient times onwards' (*zigu yilai*); 'the China of today has developed from the China of yesterday' as all the texts, following the Outlines, are wont to declare. Continuity is also provided through the concept of a primordial national people, 'rooted in this land and soil' (*yi tusheng tuzhang wei genben*), albeit, in the spirit of multi-ethnic unity, having 'amalgamated into one (*rong wei yiti*) through ceaselessly receiving new blood'.²⁵ As shown in Chapters 1, 4, and 5, the grand narrative that tells this story of the nation and its people is hardly new, having remained fundamentally unchanged at least for several decades, and conceivably for much longer; indeed, a comparative survey of texts produced during the Nationalist era and those produced in Taiwan prior to the 'nativisation' (*bentuhua*) movement of the late 1990s reveals that the PRC interpretations of the past are considerably less revolutionary than their authors would care to admit, and follow a pattern that was already established long before the PRC.²⁶

This narrative is what I term 'the rise-and-fall (*xingti*) conception of history', and is, I maintain, the organising framework of all History textbook content. Although, as noted in Chapter 1, *xingti* traditionally referred to the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties, it has been adapted since the early twentieth century to fit a linear view of 'History' (in the Hegelian sense), and to refer to the fortunes of the nation rather than

²³ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, Chapter 1.

²⁴ The 'national essence' idea has enjoyed a great deal of support in China. Deriving from the late nineteenth –early twentieth century Japanese concept of *kokosui* (Chinese, *guocui*), it was adopted by many early twentieth century Chinese reformers, and has recently enjoyed something of a recrudescence among neo-conservatives (Schneider, 'Bridging the Gap', pp129-146. See also Xu, 'From Modernity to Chineseness'.)

²⁵ SH1, preface, p3.

²⁶ On the Nationalist period see Peake, *Nationalism and Education in China*; see also the discussion of pre-1949 curricula in Chapter 1, this volume. For Taiwanese textbooks, see Guoli bianyiguan, *Guomin zhongxue lishi: diyi, er, san, sice*. These volumes were initially produced in the mid-1980s and modified several times up to the mid-1990s. The overlap with Mainland textbooks in some instances is striking. On the nativisation movement and its impact on History education since 1997, see Corcuff, 'History Textbooks, Identity Politics and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan'.

those of its rulers. In its present historical materialist incarnation, which is of course the stated organising principle of all PRC historiography, *xingtì* describes the supplanting of one socio-economic form by another more ‘advanced’ one. Re-framed in these evolutionary terms the rise-and-fall conception of history might be seen as coextensive with ‘progressivism’ (*fazhanzhuyi*), but whereas progress is ‘inevitable’ (*biran*), determined by ‘scientific laws’ of historical development, rise-and-fall is determined by the will (*yizhi*) and moral character (*pinde*), or - to use a more recent term - the quality (*suzhi*) of its leaders and its people. Both ‘conceptions of history’ (*lishiguan*) are intrinsic to PRC narratives of the Chinese (and, in slightly different configurations, also the global) past; they have both, for example, been incorporated into the Communist narrative of legitimate succession, wherein CPC legitimacy is demonstrated by scientific laws on the one hand, and by moral superiority over its predecessors on the other.

Yet, despite the continued emphasis on understanding the laws of historical materialism as a core objective of History, I would argue that ultimately historical materialist progress tends to be subordinate to rise-and-fall. This is no doubt, in part, because the rise-and-fall model ties in to familiar narratives and deep-seated assumptions about the form and purpose of history. It is also because progress may be inevitable, but the *pace* of progress is predicated on the speed at which science and technology are developed since certain preconditions concerning the means of production (as well as the ownership thereof) must be met in order to catalyse the transition from one socio-economic form to the next. Thus, those whose national quality (*minzu suzhi*), especially their ‘scientific and cultural quality’ (*kexue wenhua suzhi*), is low will not be able to develop scientifically or technologically, and thus will not progress as fast as those whose national quality is high. The Chinese people, as history proves, have high national quality, having ‘stood at the forefront of the world’ for almost five thousand years. As we have seen in Chapter 2, however, quality requires training if potential is to be optimised. In a Darwinian struggle between nations, those who do not work ceaselessly to improve their quality and accelerate progress will fail to flourish (*xing*) and will sink into a state of stagnation or even decline (*ti*); ‘the backwards’, as the much repeated aphorism goes, ‘will be beaten’ (*luohou jiu yao aida*). This logic, bolstered by historical materialist laws, leads the narrative to the inevitable conclusion that since communism is the highest form of social development, the nation and the national people must follow the CPC

along the socialist road if they are to reach a state of perpetual rise (*xing*) and prevent another humiliating ‘beating’ or fall (*ti*).

The dominance of the rise-and-fall conception of history in PRC textbooks is not only because it has a long and glorious tradition in Chinese historiography, nor because, constructed in the way that it has been in past decades, it serves powerful moral and patriotic exhortatory functions and legitimises the Communist Party. As seen in Chapters 2 and 4, historical materialism has been gradually downplayed in the post-Mao era, in part because the socialist road (or the CPC) had clearly not delivered the rapid ‘world-beating transformation’ once promised, but also because it has been thought to be too theoretical, difficult and dull for younger students to comprehend. The rise-and-fall model, by contrast, offers what Bruner has called a ‘narrative’ rather than a ‘paradigmatic’ construction of the past, or in similar vein, what Carretero and his colleagues, have termed ‘intentional’ rather than ‘structural’ explanations.²⁷ As discussed in the introduction, this distinction is one that has been drawn between teaching history through ‘stories’ that focus on the role of individual heroes and their evil nemeses and so forth - or as Hayden White has put it ‘emplotting’ history in narrative forms such as tragedy, comedy, satire and romance²⁸ - and describing the past in abstract or conceptual terms of macro-social, political and economic forces. Bruner’s ‘narrative mode’, as researchers such as Lee, Dickinson and Ashby have found, is more appropriate for the cognitive psychology of younger children since narratives are ‘lifelike’ and thus more accessible and meaningful than paradigms or ‘arguments’ that attempt to persuade logically of their ‘truth’.²⁹ Although as students progress through schooling they develop their abilities to conceptualise more complex abstractions, the ‘narrative mode’ tends to remain, nonetheless, the foundation of History textbooks up until or even through senior secondary education.³⁰ From a pedagogical as well as a political-ideological standpoint, therefore, the rise-and-fall conception of history, with its story of the transition from five thousand years of greatness, to one-hundred years of humiliation (*bainian guochi*), followed by a glorious resurgence since 1949, is the more suitable framework into which to arrange Chinese history, while, in view of the emergent critical and conceptual faculties of

²⁷ Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*; Carretero et al ‘Historical Knowledge: Cognitive and Instructional Implications’.

²⁸ White, *Metahistory*.

²⁹ Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*; Lee et al ‘Researching Children’s Ideas about History’; Husbands, *What is History Teaching?*; Carretero et al ‘Historical Knowledge’.

junior secondary students, also providing supporting ‘scientific’ evidence through the structural explanations of historical materialist laws. The rise-and-fall and historical materialist or progressive conceptions of history, therefore, should be neither conflated nor seen as mutually exclusive, but should instead be regarded as different but closely related ways of representing the same story.

‘Why should we study Chinese history?’

The grand narratives of history are not normally identified as specific teaching and learning objectives in school curricula or textbooks, but PRC History Teaching Outlines do emphasise that students should have a basic understanding of the laws of historical materialism and should grasp the victor-victim-victor trajectory of Chinese history. Such objectives have normally had to be inferred from textbooks, but the late 1980s History textbooks examined in this chapter each includes a chapter or preface entitled ‘Why study Chinese history?’ (SH, YH, ND) or ‘What can history tell us?’ (PEP).³¹ This had never been included in earlier PEP editions, and appears to have reflected a felt need to reiterate the importance both of national history as an ideological construct and of History as a school subject declining in popularity and status. What is written in these sections, however, does not offer any substantially more persuasive reasons to study, let alone be enthusiastic about Chinese history than those offered in the Outlines, and certainly none that would likely appeal to a young audience, even if some of the language attempts to be more child-friendly. PEP, for example, opens this section by stating that

We are fortunate today to live in the socialist motherland. No doubt you all want to know how our socialist motherland came to be. How come our lives are so fortunate? Who are our ancestors? How did they live? What kinds of changes have there been between their time and ours? History can answer these questions.³²

It goes on to assert that ‘everyone has the great desire to contribute their energies to the socialist motherland’, and to tell students how this can be done through developing their moral and ideological qualities.³³

The other three editions offer similarly bland fare, and indeed appear to have followed the Outlines even more diligently than PEP in adhering to standard

³⁰ Egan, ‘Accumulating History’; Topolski, ‘The Structure of Historical Narratives and the Teaching of History’.

³¹ ZJ1 also includes a preface that similarly discusses, or rather states the importance of learning Social Studies. Note the lack of the modifier ‘Chinese’ in the PEP title. Answers given to this question in the opening chapter reveal that the question is not, in fact, ‘what can history tell us?’, but what can ‘*Chinese* history tell us?’, suggesting that history *is* Chinese history.

³² PEP1, p1.

³³ PEP1, p1

statements of how important Chinese history is for understanding national conditions, learning patriotism, national self-confidence, self-respect and pride, and emulating the worthy, learning from the wise and repudiating the bad.³⁴ Each of them also outlines the general rise-and-fall pattern that Chinese history has followed and that students will learn in more detail as they progress through the course: five thousand years of greatness, described as a ‘long history and glorious culture’ (*lishi youjiu, wenhua canlan*); one hundred years of humiliating imperialist incursions during which ‘massacres were perpetrated on the Chinese people, territory was lost, sovereignty trampled and wealth plundered’;³⁵ forty years of dramatic progress and the restoration of national integrity and pride from the victory of the CPC and the establishment of New China; and a future which can only come to fruition in the way that the nation - given its glorious past - deserves with the CPC at the helm.

Despite the familiar exhortatory tone and rhetoric and the verbatim repetition of many Outline provisions, the inclusion of such a section does seem also to represent an attempt to encourage students (and perhaps also teachers) to reflect at least somewhat critically on why and how they learn what they learn; indeed, the Inland edition specifically states in its first page text box that ‘the correct objective of study is to [develop] a strong motivation to learn; the scientific method of learning is the key to opening the treasure house of knowledge. In order to study Chinese history well, you must first clarify the objective of study and understand some learning methods’.³⁶ PEP, the Coastal and Shanghai editions also make a point of reminding students that there are numerous sources from which to learn about the past, although both PEP and the Coastal edition do emphasise that the point of entry is diligent reading and studying of the textbook without rigidly memorising it (*siji yingbei*).³⁷ In addition, PEP includes a short section in which it is remarked how evidence can change what we thought we knew about a subject, citing how the debate among historians over whether paper-making (one of China’s ‘four great inventions’) was discovered during the Western or Eastern Han was settled definitively in 1986 with the discovery in Gansu of a map dating from the Western Han period.³⁸ It also

³⁴ This may have been because their model was the 1986 revised Outline and its accompanying textbooks, whereas PEP was already engaged in writing the 1988 draft Outline and had already decided the direction in which changes were to be made. In this sense, PEP’s textbooks could be regarded as more ‘progressive’ than the other sets *at the time*.

³⁵ ND1, p2.

³⁶ ND1, p1.

³⁷ PEP1, p5; YH1, p2; SH1, preface, p7.

³⁸ PEP1, p4.

explains that there may be different viewpoints on historical figures and events, and that ‘some are even diametrically opposed’. This apparent introduction of a critical element, however, is undermined by the assertion that ‘only through using the Marxist viewpoint to analyse history can correct conclusions (*zhengque jielun*) be reached’. Thus, peasant uprisings, were ‘in ancient times seen by the ruling classes as violating the natural order and creating chaos (*zuoluan*)’, but ‘using a Marxist viewpoint to analyse them, we reach the conclusion that peasant rebellions were righteous movements’.³⁹ Such an effort to introduce students to critical thinking at the outset of their history studies, however, has clearly been deemed either too overwhelming or simply superfluous to requirements as the section has been excised from all the 2001 HCS-compliant textbooks.

Ancient Chinese History: The Essential Self

Five Thousand Years of Greatness

The first two volumes of each History textbook set (and the beginning of the third in PEP’s) are devoted to ‘ancient history’ (*gudaishi*), which covers from prehistoric man and a hazy antiquity in which the dawn of ‘Chinese civilisation’ is located, up to 1840 on the eve of the Opium War. Sticking closely to the Outline syllabus, the narrative follows dynastic rise and fall while simultaneously illustrating the laws of historical materialist development as China moves from primitive matriarchal and patriarchal societies, to slave and feudal societies, and finally to the sprouts of capitalism and the cusp of a sudden descent into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial abyss. This period, as not only the textbooks, but almost every political, media and literary text reminds its audience, is at the heart of promoting patriotism, national self-confidence, self-respect and pride, for China, as everyone knows or ought to know, ‘stood at the forefront of the world’ for five thousand years. A principal objective of these volumes, therefore, is to describe China’s past greatness. Another key theme is showing how the PRC’s present territory has ‘since time immemorial been an indivisible part of China’ (*zigu yilai buke fenlie de lingtu*), and how the ‘Chinese national people’ (*Zhonghua minzu*), composed of many ‘brother nationalities’ (*xiongdi minzu*) have come to be ‘one’. Through examples of outstanding persons (*youxiu renwu*) it also demonstrates the national characteristics of the Chinese people who are said to be intelligent (*congming*), brave (*yonggan*), diligent (*qinlao*) and full of creative spirit (*chuangzao*

³⁹ PEP1, p3. [This is not, of course, the case when it comes to ‘peasant movements’ of the post-Mao era which are evidently regarded by the present leadership not as ‘righteous uprisings’ (*qiyi*) against

jingshen). In other words, ancient history quantifies the nation in terms of what and whom it possesses, and qualifies it in terms of the virtues of the people that comprise the nation. In short, ancient history establishes what constitutes the ‘essential self’.

National People/National Territory

After the suppression of minority cultures during the Cultural Revolution, the post-Mao regime officially espoused cultural pluralism which, according to Harrell and Bamo, ‘is seen as a specific vaccine against the disease of separatism’. Needless to say, this has been a ‘balancing act’ because encouraging too much cultural autonomy and pride might promote the very separatism such policies have been designed to obviate.⁴⁰ Promoting ethnic and territorial unity is thus one of the core functions of History, and the first thing the textbook does to accomplish this is to create a ‘myth of descent’ in which the Chinese people or *Zhonghua minzu* - that is, the (ill-defined) ‘Han’ and the various minority groups that inhabit the PRC - are shown to have a common biological ancestry. Creation myths, needless to say, are dismissed and Darwinian evolution embraced as scientifically correct, although the ‘Out of Africa’ theory of human evolution espoused by most palaeontologists is comprehensively rejected in China, primarily, as Sautman has argued, for reasons of racial prejudice which projects the perceived backwardness of Africa (or the innate ‘inferiority’ of Africans) into antiquity.⁴¹ This problematic aspect of evolution, however, is side-stepped altogether in textbooks and the national narrative begins with primitive Yuanmou and Peking man in a chapter variously entitled ‘Prehistoric humans within the borders of the motherland’ (PEP), ‘Our country’s beginnings’ (SH), ‘Primitive society’ (YH) and ‘The peoples living in primitive society’ (ND).⁴² This descent story is developed in the following chapters with the ‘legends’ (*chuanshuo*) of Huangdi and the sage kings Yao and Shun, under whose rule the various tribes or clans (*shizu*) gradually amalgamated to form the *Huaxia* people, ‘the descendants of Yandi and Huangdi’ (*Yanhuang zisun*), more commonly known as the ‘Han’.⁴³ The legendary kings themselves also provide examples of persons of outstanding character, wisdom, benevolence and determination, who are shown through their

corrupt local officials but as riots.]

⁴⁰ Harrell and Bamo, ‘Combining Ethnic Heritage and National Unity’, p63.

⁴¹ Sautman, ‘Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities’. See also his articles ‘Racial Nationalism and China’s External Behaviour’ and ‘Anti-black nationalism in China’.

⁴² PEP1, pp7-12; SH1, pp1-4; YH1, pp1-7; ND1, pp6-10.

⁴³ PEP1.3; SH1.2; YH1.1.3; ND1.1.3.

leadership and achievements to embody the essential characteristics - intelligence, bravery, diligence and creativity - of the *Zhonghua minzu*.

It is significant, however, that although these stories are categorised as ‘legend’, they are written in such a way as to suggest they are fact, interspersed with supposedly ‘scientific’ data on the socio-economic forms of matriarchal and patriarchal society through which the nation evolved before arriving at ‘slave society’ with the ‘historical’ event of Yu’s establishment of the Xia dynasty. Nothing is said here about the doubt cast by historians on the existence of the Xia, let alone the authenticity of its founder, and there is no indication other than the single use of the word ‘*chuanshuo*’ in each text to suggest that these stories should be read any differently from the rest of the volume.⁴⁴ They are, furthermore, supported by photographs of the tombs of Yandi, Huangdi and Yu (in the Coastal edition) and by pictures of contemporary artefacts in all editions, further propagating an illusion of historical factuality.⁴⁵ Chinese nationalists, however, do not appear to view this as a cause for concern, as Lu has written, ‘There is no reason..... to object when antiquity draws no hard line between the human and the supernatural; it adds dignity to the past, and if any nation deserves the privilege of claiming a divine ancestry, that nation is our own.’⁴⁶

The next several chapters discuss the founding of the Shang and Zhou dynasties and the consolidation of China as a political entity, before turning to the Warring States period and the development of philosophical and political thought and culture, and restoring Confucius to a central position in the national narrative. It then describes the transition from ‘slave society’ to ‘feudal society’ under the Qin and Han. While clearly these periods are intended to demonstrate historical materialist laws through showing the transformation from one socio-economic form to the next, the reduction of coverage of peasant rebellions during this period suggests that another important purpose being served here is to instil national pride in the early establishment of feudal society (compared to the West where as shown in the world history textbooks, feudalism developed about a millennium later).⁴⁷ They also move

⁴⁴ Most doubters have unsurprisingly been foreign scholars, although in the 1920s many Chinese historians, notably Gu Jiegang, also questioned the veracity of China’s antiquity. In very early PRC textbooks, the Xia dynasty was listed as part of the ‘legend’ that included Huangdi, Yandi, Yao and Shun (PEP1[1952], p7), but subsequent volumes have integrated the Xia with Shang and Zhou.

⁴⁵ YH1 pp9-10. Huangdi’s tomb is also included in the (unnumbered) colour photograph section at the beginning of the PEP, Shanghai and Inland editions.

⁴⁶ Lu, ‘From Historicity to Fictionality’, p31.

⁴⁷ PEPW1.8.

away from the ethnic pluralism attempted in the descent story to focus almost exclusively on a culture and history that by most Chinese citizens (minority or Han) are regarded primarily as attributes or experiences of the Han. National pride is, thereby, conflated with Han pride. Only after the collapse of the two Han dynasties are minority groups again seriously discussed in any context other than the ‘internal contradictions’ – that is, wars - between the Xiongnu and the dynastic regimes of China proper.

Ethnic integration (*minzu ronghe*) is the chief subject of the remainder of the first volume (PEP, YH, ND),⁴⁸ which covers the long period of disunity (*fenlie geju de jumian*) that followed the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty and lasted until the establishment of the short-lived Sui and the glorious Tang dynasties. Despite the positive slant given to a period which had until the past few decades been viewed almost exclusively by historians as an aberration from the unified norm, the way in which reunification under the Sui and Tang is depicted nonetheless reinforces the view of unity as the natural tendency, the rule of even cooked barbarians as a temporary upset of the natural order, and the notion of Han (elite, advanced) culture and values as the key to regime stability. Thus, while some ‘national characteristics’ and Confucian virtues are attributed to various ethnic rulers of the different states, ultimately it is shown that it was their pursuit of Han culture and adoption of Han socio-political norms and structures that made them the ‘enlightened’ despots that they were. The fourth-fifth century Northern Wei Xianbei rulers who brought to an end the ‘Sixteen Kingdoms’ period, for example, are shown to have advanced not only the cause of ethnic integration, but also social development through adopting the civilised ways of the Han under their rule. Once nomadic, herding peoples, their move southwards and contact with the agricultural (Han) peoples of the Yellow River delta taught them a more ‘advanced’ way to live, and, eventually, following the Sinifying reforms (*gaige*) of the Emperor Xiaowen, they adopted Han names, Han clothes, Han customs and the ancient (Confucian) Han culture, and ‘immediately flourished’, developing a thriving modern city at Luoyang.⁴⁹ That the revolts which subsequently caused the demise of the Northern Wei may have been catalysed in part by resentment among the Xianbei at enforced Sinification is not mentioned, and the

⁴⁸ SH1 also covers the Sui and Tang dynasties, opening volume 2 with the Five Dynasties, Northern Song, Liao, Jin and Xia (fig. 6.2). This, in fact, follows the content distribution of the earlier 4-volume PEP textbook set (PEP1[1978]).

⁴⁹ ND1, pp130-133; PEP1.25, pp155-157.

fall of Northern Wei is simply described as an ‘uprising of the people of all nationalities’ against the brutal rule of Xiaowen’s successor.⁵⁰

The Sui-Tang period, together with the Yuan, Ming and early Qing periods are also key to enumerating China’s peoples and territories and thereby claiming their rightful place in (or under) the PRC state. It is during the Tang dynasty that Tibet’s place in the national fold is sealed through the granting of Tang princess Wencheng’s hand in marriage to the (Tibetan) Tubo king, Songtsen Gampo, who had long ‘envied Chinese culture and persistently requested an alliance’.⁵¹ This marriage strengthened relations, both cultural and economic, between the neighbours, and more importantly, through the diligence of Princess Wencheng and the willingness of her spouse to learn from her, began to ‘civilise’ Tibet. Then, with no prior or further explanation of Sino-Tibetan relations, Tibet disappears from the national narrative altogether until its reappearance in the seventeenth century as part of the Qing empire with the ‘strengthening of administrative control over Tibet’, and the conferral of the title ‘Dalai’ and ‘Panchen’ Lama on Tibet’s local rulers by the Qing emperor. As even some Chinese historians have pointed out, the title was originally conferred by the Mongolian Altan Khan in 1578, yet only the Shanghai edition makes the matter slightly ambiguous by saying that the title was ‘*formally*’ conferred by the Shunzhi Emperor.⁵² A similar approach is taken to Taiwan, which makes its first appearance in Volume 1, during the prehistoric period, where archaeological finds in Taiwan are grouped together with those in Guangdong and Fujian as part of ‘our country’s’ heritage.⁵³ Its history is otherwise ignored until the European colonists (*zhiminzhe*) arrive and ‘invade’ (*qinru*). ‘Brutal rule’ by the Dutch incited hatred among the oppressed locals who ‘longed to return to the motherland’s embrace’.⁵⁴ Thus, when Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)⁵⁵ fled the Mainland and the ‘entering’ Manchu forces,⁵⁶ and ‘regained’ (*shoufu*) Taiwan, the locals were delighted. His plan to establish a base of resistance against the Qing on Taiwan is, furthermore, conflated with one to

⁵⁰ PEP1.25, p157.

⁵¹ YH2, p19.

⁵² SH2, p92.

⁵³ YH1, p9. This section and earlier passages on southern primitive cultures provide a rare example of a local flavour to the textbook.

⁵⁴ ND2, p125.

⁵⁵ It is not mentioned that Koxinga himself was half-Japanese, although it is acknowledged that he was born in Japan and in the Shanghai edition also that he was once a pirate, only later submitting to the Ming authorities and taking up arms in their name (SH2, p87).

⁵⁶ Having been re-imagined as part of the ancestral Chinese people the Manchus can no longer be portrayed as ‘invaders’ and instead are said to have merely ‘entered the gates’ (*ruguan*) of the Great Wall. The Mongol conquest is similarly represented as ‘entering’ (*jinru*) the territory within the Wall.

‘kick out the Dutch’ and bring Taiwan back into the national fold.⁵⁷ When the forces of Koxinga’s descendants were finally defeated by the Qing armies in 1683, his plan was thus accomplished as the motherland and Taiwan were ‘reunited’.⁵⁸

Other territorial claims are made vicariously through the Mongols, who as part of the Chinese national family, expanded the territory controlled by China to unprecedented levels under the leadership of that ‘great hero of the Chinese national people’ (*weida minzu yongxiong*), Chinggis Khan, although like the Xianbei rulers, they too are shown to have succeeded largely through their co-optation of ‘talented persons’ and the existing Han administrative system.⁵⁹ The expansionist expeditions of the Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties, meanwhile, which in the past were seen as imperial conquests (of which the Chinese writers of the time were proud),⁶⁰ have in the PRC been depicted as ‘interactions with peoples on the borders’ (*bianjiang gezu de guanxi*) or as ‘consolidation’ (*gonggu*) of the multi-ethnic state. These interactions are portrayed as mostly peaceful, unfortunately punctuated from time to time by wars, either because of class (and occasionally ethnic) contradictions, because ethnic minority bandit elements were ‘harassing’ (*xirao*) ‘border regions’ (*bianjiang/jiangyu*),⁶¹ or because local peoples under traitorous ecclesiastical, aristocratic or foreign imperialist sway were attempting illegitimately to secede from the motherland.⁶² Furthermore, these interactions are depicted solely as domestic affairs, with the existence of Huihu and Gokturk empires, for example, wholly ignored. As shown in Chapters 1 and 4, such assertions serve to bolster the notion that current ‘minority’ groups have never had an autonomous existence beyond the confines of China, and that this China is a peaceable nation that has never fought an unjust war and under no circumstances could be considered imperialist. Wars have thus been fought only to protect what from unspecified ancient times onwards has been ‘rightfully ours’.

⁵⁷ ND2, p126-7; SH2, p87

⁵⁸ ND2, p131.

⁵⁹ SH2, p27.

⁶⁰ See, for example, textbooks from the early Republic and GMD eras, such as Jin, *Xin zhongxue jiaokeshu chuji benguo lishi* (1923); Zhao, *Xinzhuo benguo shi* (1922); Zhou, *Benguo shi* (1947).

⁶¹ For example, Tang expansion westwards into central Asia is portrayed as a necessary response to the trouble caused by marauding Gokturks, which ultimately resulted in the consolidation and development (*kaifa*) of the border region. Other Tang-‘minority’ relations are left largely unexplained, depicted vaguely as a harmonious coming together to form one (national) family (*hetong wei yijia*) (PEP2.4, pp22-24; YH2, p18.)

⁶² Examples include Jungar expansionism, portrayed as a collaboration between a territory-hungry Tsarist Russia and the ‘splittist’ Jungar leader, Galdan, and the Uyghur rebellions of the 18th century, stirred up by (again) ‘splittist’ clerics.

National Characteristics

Peace-loving is one of the many virtues that can be added to the core national qualities of intelligence, bravery, diligence and creativity. This peace-loving nature is definitively revealed in the expeditions of Zheng He in the early fifteenth century. Zheng He, as the texts tell us, travelled far and wide with no apparent aim other than to 'strengthen links and exchange' with foreign states.⁶³ Great emphasis is placed on the scale of his expeditions in which more than 27,000 people travelled on more than two hundred boats, the size of which was theretofore unknown, to more than thirty countries in seven voyages over twenty-eight years. This, as the texts note, was almost a century before the expeditions of Columbus and Magellan and vastly more ambitious in scale.⁶⁴ Zheng He and his envoys were allegedly welcomed in almost all the countries to which they travelled and China's links with the rest of Asia and also Africa were thereby strengthened.⁶⁵ This friendly exploration contrasts dramatically with the pre-1949 story of Zheng He as a bold conquistador, who set sail at the Emperor Chengzu's behest in order to bring the surrounding areas with which China traded into the tribute system. Zheng He, as one 1920s' text states

collected valuable goods and called upon all the states [with which he came into contact] to submit [to Ming authority]. When some did not obey this order, he sent his troops to invade and capture their kings, and held them hostage until they voluntarily capitulated. Thus, many kings accepted the Ming dynasty [as their overlord].⁶⁶

Even in the early 1950s, Zheng He's fellow travellers were still listed as 'armies' and his mission to 'proclaim the Ming Emperor's call for submission [to imperial authority] and demonstrate the might of China'.⁶⁷ Since the mid-1950s, however, 'troops' have become 'people', 'sailors' or 'craftsmen' and the missions friendly trading expeditions in keeping with China's stance as the leader of the victimised postcolonial third world and a seeker of peace.

The peace-loving theme is further developed in the following sections of the same chapters in which the large scale migration of southern Chinese to Southeast Asia is addressed. According to the textbooks, these migrants left China to 'make a living' (*mousheng*), bringing their advanced culture and skills to the local peoples. In Java, for example, Chinese families used developed irrigation techniques to transform

⁶³ SH2, p69; PEP2, p164.

⁶⁴ Only the Coastal edition, however, precisely quantifies the differences in time-scale and magnitude (YH2, p102, n1).

⁶⁵ PEP2, pp164-66; y2 101-3, SH 69-71

⁶⁶ *Xinxuezhilishi jiaokeshu*, vol.2, p13.

⁶⁷ PEP3[1953], p11.

sandy beaches into thriving agricultural land. Centres of trade also developed around Chinese communities and the Chinese people thus ‘expedited the economic and cultural development of Southeast Asia’.⁶⁸ This contrasts markedly with the nature of foreign peoples as demonstrated in the following two sections in which Japanese piracy and the arrival of the Jesuits on Chinese shores are discussed: the former causing great losses to the coastal Chinese peoples, but eventually being roundly defeated by the forces of Qi Jiguang, a good scholar and brave soldier;⁶⁹ the latter a story of scheming ‘colonists’ (*zhiminzhe*, a term *never* applied to Chinese migrants)⁷⁰ upon whose heels the missionaries followed. While the former seems to be solely concerned with demonstrating longstanding Japanese ambitions towards China, in the latter case, the missionaries’ acceptance of many aspects of Chinese culture which they subsequently transmitted to Europe, and the scientific knowledge they brought to the Chinese court is said ‘objectively’ to have accelerated East-West cultural exchange’.⁷¹ Otherwise, however, foreign contact is presented as largely negative, emphasising encroachment on Chinese territory by the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch, inflicting on China the first wounds in its battle with European colonialism.⁷²

Another key theme that clearly has contemporary resonance, albeit a less internationally competitive one, is the emphasis on the intelligence and forward-thinking of reform-minded leaders. The Tang Emperor Taizong is thus universally lauded for his ‘enlightened feudal rule’ (*qingming de fengjian tongzhi*); even if his ultimate goal was to consolidate his own power and that of the ruling feudal classes, he clearly embodied many of the desirable national qualities that are ‘inherent’ in the *Zhonghua minzu*. The Empress Wu Zetian, who as noted in Chapter 4, had been omitted from the 1978 Outline but restored in 1980, also receives fuller treatment in these late 1980s/1990s volumes as a strong and intelligent leader, one of the rare

⁶⁸ PEP2, p167.

⁶⁹ PEP2, p168.

⁷⁰ This term was, however, used in the past, both during the early Republic and the Nationalist period.

⁷¹ PEP2, p169.

⁷² SH2, p73. The way in which this is phrased in the Shanghai volume implies that Spanish occupation of Luzon (alongside Portuguese acquisition of Macau) was part of the colonialist invasion of China (*kaishile dui Zhongguo de qinlue*). Whether this is an attempt to depict Asia as part of China’s sphere of influence and thus off-limits to Europeans, or whether it is an indirect historical claim to the Philippines is not entirely clear. It seems more likely, however, to be the former as only when the Spanish conquer Taiwan is it explicitly stated to be Chinese territory (*woguo Taiwan*). Neither PEP2, ND2 nor YH2 discusses these Portuguese and Spanish intrusions here, and merely mention Macau briefly in a later chapter on the recovery of Taiwan from the Dutch and resistance to Tsarist Russia’s invasion of Heilongjiang (PEP3, p8, YH2, pp114-115, ND2, p125).

appearances of a female figure in the narrative.⁷³ Yet, unlike many of her male peers, she is shown to have had serious personal flaws, restoring military clans to greater power and building monasteries (and thereby sedating the people with the opium of religion).⁷⁴ Despite the less than subtle evaluation of these figures in the main body of the text, in the spirit of skill-training and encouraging students to develop their own opinions about historical figures and events recommended in the ancient history section of the Outline,⁷⁵ students are invited to evaluate Taizong and the Empress Wu Zetian in the question sections at the end of the relevant chapter, albeit with a more pronounced emphasis on Taizong. While the Shanghai volume leaves some room for formulating an ‘individual’ opinion, even if it is shaped by a selection of views offered on Taizong that the students are supposed to discuss, the PEP verdict is predetermined by the phraseology of the question ‘Why was Tang Taizong an outstanding politician?’⁷⁶ Whether intentional or not, language here as elsewhere thereby shapes or delimits the possibilities of what students are to think about the topic.

National qualities are not, of course, only embodied by emperors and explorers; even a peace-loving people such as the Chinese may excel in battle. Generals such as Cao Cao, Zhuge Liang and Yue Fei are accordingly lauded both for their intelligence and bravery, even if, as in Yue Fei’s case, their ‘patriotic’ efforts were hindering the cause of multi-ethnic national unity.⁷⁷ While the truly superior man (*junzi*) combines both *wu* (military) and *wen* (cultural) excellence, exemplars of national qualities are, nonetheless, to be found in the cultural sphere among those with no battlefield prowess. Several chapters at the end of most macro-periods (such as Sui-Tang, Ming-Qing) are allocated to ‘culture’ and to outstanding persons in various fields of intellectual and creative endeavour. As noted in Chapter 4, this has been an important

⁷³ Ma argues that under-representation of women in History textbooks (specifically senior secondary, but the same is true of junior secondary textbooks) has a negative impact on female students, undermining many of the qualities History aims to promote (‘A cursory analysis of the factors in senior secondary History courses that are disadvantageous for cultivating subjective awareness in female students’).

⁷⁴ PEP2, p11.

⁷⁵ LSD[1992], COH, p662.

⁷⁶ SH1, p100; PEP2, p10. ND merely requires students to memorise the topic (ND2, p29), while YH asks students to describe the period and the measures taken by Taizong to consolidate his authority (YH2, p13).

⁷⁷ It is worth noting that although the Liao, Jin, Xi Xia, Northern and Southern Song dynasties are all supposed to be contemporaneous ‘Chinese’ dynasties, with equal legitimacy, the language used clearly arrogates virtue and legitimacy to Song’s Yue Fei and his Righteous Army (*yijun*), who are shown as disciplined enough not to rape and pillage while determinedly resisting Jurchen ‘looting and massacre’

aspect of change to textbooks and has been designed to move History away from its former preoccupation with politics and the laws of development towards a broader picture of the national (and global) past that encompasses a diversity of topics and might thereby appeal to students. These extra chapters have largely been inserted at the expense of peasant rebellions and class conflict, and although this is not to suggest that these elements which remain vital to the Communist narrative of legitimate succession have been entirely obliterated, the focus has gradually shifted from one on class activism and consciousness which are manifest in rebellions, to an emphasis on more peaceful modes of economic development and progress, and on reform rather than revolution. Science and scientists accordingly play a prominent role in the culture sections. The Four Great Inventions (paper, gunpowder, printing and the compass) are much trumpeted in all editions, with an emphasis on their great contribution not only to China, but to the rest of the world. While there is a clear preference for science and technology, which ties in to current projects, many major literary figures are also included. Li Bai, Du Fu and Bai Juyi are all noted, both for their poems and for their desire to contribute to ‘national affairs’ (*guoshi*) (Li Bai) and to expose the ‘suffering of the people’ under corrupt and brutal rule (Du Fu, Bai Juyi).⁷⁸ Similarly, ‘progressive thinkers’ such as Gu Yanwu are lauded for their ‘sympathy with the people’ and their ‘opposition to imperial dictatorship’.⁷⁹

While some outstanding persons from minority groups are also cited (Zheng He and Kublai and Chinggis Khan, for example) in various sections of the text, in general, national characteristics are demonstrated chiefly by Han rulers and cultural figures. Minorities are typically said to be ‘good at’ (*shanyu/shanchang*) the martial arts (the Gokturks, Jurchen, Manchus, Mongols) or singing and dancing (Mongols, Tibetans, Uyghurs), rather than to be intelligent or creative. As Harrell has shown and the textbooks confirm, minorities are frequently infantilised or feminised, explicitly depicted as more backward than the Han and implicitly in need of civilising.⁸⁰ The current emphasis on scientific and economic progress and the move away from the historical materialist narrative have also meant that peasants and

(*lueduo tusha*) and attempting to recover (*shoufu* – the term used for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) Song territory. (PEP2, pp87-91. Similar language is used in SH2, YH2 and ND2.)

⁷⁸ YH2, pp34-35.

⁷⁹ YH2, p125.

⁸⁰ Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*, Introduction. One of the most common ways in which the textbooks identify minority groups as backwards is to emphasise that they were/are nomadic or matriarchal, and thus at lower stages of evolution according to the historical materialist paradigm.

workers who once epitomised ‘red’ national virtues are similarly depicted as somewhat backwards; national virtues are now the preserve mainly of the forward- and outward-looking bourgeoisie. Thus, while a quantitative, enumerative definition of the nation includes all the peoples presently living in the PRC, the nation defined qualitatively excludes or relegates to an inferior status those who do not possess the requisite Chinese national characteristics. Since these characteristics are innate, this suggests that despite all the talk of social equality and ethnic unity, History ultimately teaches that all PRC citizens are Chinese, but some are more Chinese than others.⁸¹

Modern Chinese History: From Victor to Victim to Victor

One Hundred Years of Humiliation

Modern history is the subject of volume 3, continuing into volume 4, and covers the ‘one hundred years of humiliation’ (*bainian guochi*) endured by the Chinese people from the Opium Wars until the establishment of the PRC. As discussed in Chapter 4, this end-date for the period represents a change from earlier textbooks in which the May Fourth Movement marked the beginning of contemporary history. Possible reasons for this shift were suggested, but it seems most likely that 1949 was selected for the new start-date of contemporary history principally to separate ‘new’ from old’ China, and to reduce the time-frame covered by contemporary history following the addition of the post-Cultural Revolution period to the syllabus. It also ties in with the emphasis on the rise-and-fall narrative in which the CPC is depicted, if not exactly as a new dynasty, as representative of a new social order and a fresh start for a beleaguered nation.

Another reason is that the focus on national humiliation has in recent years become particularly pronounced, perhaps in part because reform and opening have revealed just how ‘behind’ China had become during the early years of socialism. The scapegoat for this backwardness has long been capitalism-imperialism and the foreign incursions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the vitriol of recent directives on modern-contemporary history (see Chapter 2) indicates an increasing commitment to this view on the part of the leadership. Thus, just as ancient Chinese history is principally concerned with enumerating what belongs to the Chinese nation, so modern Chinese history has increasingly come to focus on quantifying what has been ‘lost’ or stolen and how much the Chinese people have suffered.⁸² As discussed

⁸¹ Paraphrased from Orwell, *Animal Farm*, p63.

⁸² Gries, *Face Nationalism*, pp71-72.

in the introduction, this focus on national suffering is by no means unusual; as Renan has observed, ‘suffering in common unifies more than joy does Where national memories are concerned griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties and require a common effort.’⁸³ Emphasising the hundred years of humiliation is thus part of an attempt to inspire Chinese people to strive for modernisation so that past ‘falls’ (*ti*) will never be repeated, and the nation will flourish (*xing*); the convenient (and memorable) round number of one hundred years also neatly takes China from the eve of its fall to the dawn of its glorious resurrection.

China’s losses begin with the Opium Wars and are swiftly followed by an endless succession of unequal treaties (*bupingdeng tiaoyue*), that rob China of its sovereignty and plunge the nation into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial abyss. Almost every chapter recounts a new humiliation as territories are surrendered, and the people are oppressed by their backward-looking feudal overlords, wicked foreign capitalist-imperialists and their toadying Chinese collaborators (*zougou*). The text here, perhaps more than in most other sections, is reinforced by images that enumerate precisely what was lost. PEP, for example, contains several tables which reiterate information already outlined in the main text, such as one showing Chinese territory stolen by Russia under the unequal treaties, listing treaty name, region ceded and amount of territory lost.⁸⁴ Another table shows which country wrested which treaty ports and spheres of influence from China in their efforts to divide the country between themselves, while another lists the names of banks established by foreign ‘countries’ as part of their economic imperialist strategy.⁸⁵ The Shanghai and Inland editions, by contrast, make extensive use of maps, again showing which countries occupied which parts of China, while the Coastal edition includes numerous prints (albeit in black and white and of rather poor quality) of paintings and photographs of the time, including images of British gunboats, opium smugglers and smokers, various battles and the signing of unequal treaties.⁸⁶ The end of chapter exercises, meanwhile, ask students to recall information such as which country first invaded China, how much territory was ceded to various powers and how many people died as a result of imperialist brutality.

While Britain, France and Russia are heavily criticised, it is the imperialist expansionism of Japan for which the greatest anger and opprobrium is,

⁸³ Ernest Renan, *What is a nation?*, quoted in Lowenthal, ‘Identity, Heritage and History’, p50.

⁸⁴ PEP3, p55.

⁸⁵ PEP3, p74, p73.

⁸⁶ SH3, ND3, YH3.

unsurprisingly, reserved.⁸⁷ Much attention is accordingly paid to the Sino-Japanese War, which is shown to be a war of aggression on the part of Japan, and on China's part as disinterested support for the Korean Choson monarchy overwhelmed by the Tonghak peasant rebellion. The ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki in which Taiwan was ceded marks the first steps in Japan's efforts to dominate China, and subsequent chapters go on to tabulate Japan's wrongdoing, with things reaching boiling point in the twentieth century with the infamous Twenty-one Demands, the Marco Polo Bridge incident and Japan's subsequent conquest of China. This narrative is of course so well known that it hardly needs repeating in great depth in History classes, but so central is this long War of Resistance against Japan (*kangri zhanzheng*) to the national story (and CPC legitimacy) that it overwhelmingly dominates the fourth volume.⁸⁸ These chapters in both volumes 3 and 4 persistently reiterate Japanese brutality and endlessly enumerate Chinese deaths and suffering. Words such as 'frenzied' (*fengkuang*), 'savage' (*yeman*) and 'evil' (*zuinie*) are used repeatedly to describe both Japanese actions and the Japanese themselves. They are shown also to be deceitful, seeking, for example to conceal their atrocities from worldwide public opinion.⁸⁹ The Chinese meanwhile are shown as innocent victims, with their homes looted and burnt, their women raped and their children murdered. Vast numbers of Chinese are said to have been killed in numerous massacres, with no mention of the longstanding debates among historians over the actual numbers of casualties.⁹⁰ Despite the litany of horror, as everyone knows, this is just a bitter interlude before the CPC and the Chinese people finally succeed in defeating their evil oppressors and after a relatively short struggle against the feeble KMT, establish New China.

⁸⁷ In an apparent backwards projection of tensions past and present, the USA, despite being a relatively minor imperial player in Qing China, is mostly lumped together in the same category as the then more aggressive imperial powers of Britain, France and Russia.

⁸⁸ In PEP4, *kangri* occupies 8/27 chapters; in SH4 7/25; YH4 appears somewhat more restrained in giving 5/30 lessons to the subject, but since the early years of the conflict are covered in the final chapters of YH3 (up to 1937), total coverage is roughly the same. ND4 also allocates only 3/27 chapters under the *kangri* topic heading, but like the Coastal edition takes this to mean post-1937. Earlier conflicts with Japan are included in the previous section which covers the early GMD years, establishment of revolutionary base areas and the Long March.

⁸⁹ The Port Arthur (*Lushunkou*) Massacre, for example, which allegedly took place during the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War is a subject of some controversy, with many contradictory contemporaneous reports, some of which substantiated, some rejected the very existence of the atrocity. The textbooks do not make any reference to these debates. Furthermore, PEP (PEP3, p71) asserts that the Japanese burnt all the corpses to hide the number of people they had killed and protect their reputation. YH3 makes no mention of concealment, but emphasises the moral incommensurability of the two sides in the war by showing it as a case of Japanese 'bandits' (*qiangdao*) attacking innocent 'Chinese people' (*Zhongguo renmin*).

⁹⁰ All texts, for example, cite the official Chinese figure of 300,000 deaths in the Nanjing Massacre, while the above-mentioned controversial Port Arthur Massacre is said to have claimed 18,000 lives.

Humiliation and Modernisation

Modern history may be a disaster for the nation in many ways, but it is considered crucial for understanding China's national conditions – that is, how China came to be as it is today. It is also central to the historical materialist narrative as it shows China's rapid transition from feudalism via the theoretically unorthodox stage of semi-feudalism, semi-colonialism, a brief foray into bureaucratic capitalism and onwards and upwards to socialism. Reform is a key component of the modern history narrative, with rather more attention paid here to the self-strengthening movement and 1898 reforms than in earlier textbook editions, which weighted discussion of this period more heavily towards the evolution of the proletariat.⁹¹ Perhaps most importantly, from the leadership's perspective, modern history relates the story of the Party and its role in leading China from feudal darkness to socialist light, although, as already noted, the laws of historical materialism and the heavy emphasis on the revolutionary tradition and the history of the Party have been somewhat downplayed in recent years. From a nationalist perspective, meanwhile, the period is naturally a source of shame, but it is also one of pride, for it demonstrates the outstanding resilience of the national people as they are subjected to one attack after another yet never capitulate. This period of history, therefore, is deemed essential for nurturing patriotism, learning from the examples of national heroes, teaching students that only socialism can 'save' (*jiu*) and 'develop' (*fazhan*) China, and that reform and opening are the way forward.

These objectives are pursued through, on the one hand, recounting the details of China's modern suffering outlined above, and quantifying China's losses, and on the other, demonstrating the determined resistance of the people and highlighting the outstanding qualities, especially the patriotism and bravery, of the *Zhonghua minzu*, qualities which as shown above are vividly contrasted to those of the foreign imperialists. In other words, although the nation is quantitatively assailed during the modern period, national qualities are tempered and shine through adversity and comparison with the national qualities of others.

With the move away from the peasant/proletarian-centred narrative, Chinese national characteristics have been increasingly demonstrated through the stories of Great Men who are deemed to have contributed to China's transition to modernity, although the Taiping and Boxer rebellions remain as part of the dwindling evidence of

⁹¹ PEP3.2.1[1979].

peasant patriotic activism. Some of these modernisers, such as Lin Zexu, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong and Ding Ruchang have enjoyed the status of loyal patriots and/or martyrs for many years, but others, particularly the self-strengthening 'Westernisation Movement' (*yangwu yundong*) reformers, have only been gradually rehabilitated since 1978. Where once men such as Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan and Zhang Zhidong who had crushed the Taiping, Nian and other peasant rebellions were depicted as feudal relics seeking to enhance their own power and that of the corrupt and ailing dynasty, now they have been re-imagined as fundamentally patriotic and their reforms hailed as important steps on the road to modernisation that provided some small measure of resistance to the oppressive demands of foreign imperialism.⁹² The reforms, however, were destined to fail, not only because the leaders of the movement were invested members of the ruling regime, and because the might of capitalism-imperialism was too great to overcome, but also because the feudal rulers of the 'conservative faction' were ignorant isolationists who blindly rejected all things foreign. The Empress Dowager, Cixi, is of course the prime culprit, and while it is not explicitly stated, one cannot help but wonder whether the fact that she was both a woman and a minority is not somehow a factor in the degree of blame attributed personally to her.

Moving into the twentieth century, national heroes become primarily those involved in the 1911 revolution, the development of the Communist Party and ongoing resistance against Japan. Sun Yat-sen, for example, who had earlier promoted reform along Western lines, soon realised that 'the weakness of the country was the result of Qing feudal rule', and turned from reform to revolution, determined to overthrow the despotic dynasty, establish a bourgeois republic and 'revive China' (*xingzhong*).⁹³ Chen Tianhua is lauded, like Ding Ruchang, for his 'patriotic' suicide, while Song Jiaoren is shown still to be thinking of the nation's future on his deathbed.⁹⁴ While the GMD era is given more attention in these volumes than in previous ones, heroes of this period are primarily Communist sympathisers or Party members. Mao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping accordingly enjoy prominent positions as national heroes, although, as already noted in Chapter 4, the post-1978

⁹² SH3, pp27-30; YH3, pp30-34. As shown in Fig. 6.1, volume 3 of the Coastal edition is considerably longer than the other volumes in the set, as well as being longer than the equivalent volumes in the PEP, Shanghai and Inland editions. Whether this is because the writers had particular expertise in this period is uncertain, but the extra focus on post-Opium War development, much of which took place in and around Guangdong, does suggest another rare instance of a local flavour to a textbook.

⁹³ ND3, pp82-83.

debunking of Mao's personality cult has led to somewhat reduced coverage of the Helmsman compared to the earlier volumes. As in ancient history, political and military figures are not the only outstanding persons held up as exemplars of national characteristics, but also include writers, such as Lu Xun, the historian Guo Moruo, and the educationalists Cai Yuanpei and Tao Xingzhi. Tao's maxims 'life is education', 'society is the school' and 'the unity of teaching, learning and doing' are also cited in the Coastal edition, perhaps in part as a reminder to students that classroom learning is only a part of their education.⁹⁵ In the Shanghai volume, particular attention is paid to the establishment of the League of Left-wing Writers which was founded in the city, another minor example of a local slant given to a textbook.⁹⁶ Despite a few minor differences, however, the Great Men cited in all four textbooks are mostly the same, and almost all of them are Han.

Contemporary Chinese History: China Stands Up

New China

Contemporary history, as noted above, has recently been rearranged to include only the post-1949 period and the story of New China's difficult path towards socialist modernity. If ancient history is principally about enumerating what the nation possesses, and modern history about what has been lost, contemporary history might be said to be concerned with narrating what China has regained, with counting the new victories of New China. This section of the textbooks is extremely short, however, leaving little space to count said victories, no doubt in part because many of the supposed victories have turned out to be less glorious than the great achievements they were once portrayed to be. The PEP edition, for example, contains only nine (of a total of twenty-seven) chapters in volume 4 on contemporary history; the Shanghai edition (which incidentally labels this period in its textbook contents page as 'socialist society' rather than 'contemporary history') nine out of twenty-five. Slightly more attention is paid to the contemporary period in the Coastal and Inland editions with seventeen out of thirty chapters devoted to it in the former and eleven out of twenty-seven in the latter, although there is no indication why this should be so.

The contemporary period is broken down into roughly three stages: the early years including the establishment of the PRC and the people's democratic dictatorship, and the achievements of socialist transformation; the 'tortuous path' of the Great Leap and

⁹⁴ PEP3, p97, p129.

⁹⁵ YH4.12.1, p54.

Cultural Revolution; and the return to the path of socialist modernisation in the post-Mao era. The first and last periods are the primary areas towards which attention is directed, with a rather cursory treatment of the intervening stage. Clearly one of the key goals here is to emphasise the importance of the CPC to China's progress towards modernity and to disown – or at least establish some distance from – its errors, and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that the History TMIC has typically required at least three to four revisions of the fourth volume of the Chinese history textbooks to ensure that they are scientifically and ideologically correct.⁹⁷ Restoring national pride which may have been severely dented by the disasters of the modern period is also an apparent objective of this section, and in the early period, great emphasis is placed on *China's* military 'victory' over the United States in Korea.⁹⁸ The importance of national unity is also reiterated here with a didactic account of the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet'. Much like the Muslim minorities during the Qing dynasty, the Tibetan people are not directly implicated in resistance to liberation, but are portrayed as ignorant victims of reactionary ecclesiastical deceit, manipulation and collaboration with foreign imperialists.⁹⁹ The majority of the early years, however, is devoted to narrating the rapidity of China's economic recovery during the first five-year plan, and to eradication of reactionary, counter-revolutionary forces.

The middle section covers the period from the mid-1950s to the end of the Cultural Revolution, including collectivisation and the establishment of communes, the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution, with the Coastal edition dedicating the most space to covering the topics.¹⁰⁰ Yet, even the Coastal edition includes only two paragraphs on the Anti-Rightist Movement, a movement which is merely said to have started with good intentions, but have been taken 'too far',¹⁰¹ a concession no doubt to the many CPC leaders who were involved in the campaign. The Cultural Revolution, by contrast, is given an entire chapter in each of the textbook sets and is, unsurprisingly, wholeheartedly denounced. It is presented, however, as something of a self-contained event, orchestrated by unpatriotic and anti-revolutionary megalomaniacs, the Gang of Four, with Mao mistakenly (as opposed to

⁹⁶ SH4, pp66-67.

⁹⁷ Even PEP has needed to revise its contemporary history sections numerous times despite the fact that it had drafted the Outlines upon which they were based. (Interview with Liu Zhonghua).

⁹⁸ ND4, pp147-151.

⁹⁹ PEP4, p139.

¹⁰⁰ YH4.4-5.

¹⁰¹ PEP4, p162; SH4, p86

consciously and deliberately) going along with it.¹⁰² The people, meanwhile, are exonerated of any blame and nothing is written of the mass participation in public denunciation sessions, although the sending of educated youth to the countryside is remarked. The Cultural Revolution is thus something that takes place among the upper echelons of power, but has profound ramifications for the country. In this narrative, history (order) is temporarily suspended by anti-history (chaos), and 1978 essentially picks up where 1966 left off, as Deng Xiaoping and his acolytes ‘restore order out of chaos’ (*boluan fanzheng*).

With the rapid success of the reform and opening policy, clearly there is a desire to proclaim the achievements of the past two decades and to exhort students to continue to strive for the nation’s further development and prosperity. The post-Mao period accordingly focuses on the outcomes of the eleventh plenum and adoption of the reform and opening policy. Economic development is pre-eminent in this section of the text, with a focus on rising industrial and agricultural output and the rapid growth of GDP.¹⁰³ Also mentioned are the ongoing efforts in ‘minority work’, that is, to bring all China’s peoples into the national fold and stifle any secessionist dreams. The ‘one country two systems’ policy is likewise discussed here, first, in the context of Taiwan where the idea is said to have been welcomed by the Taiwanese people and created the conditions for national reunification; and second, in the context of Hong Kong and Macao, then still languishing in imperialist hands.¹⁰⁴ Foreign relations, meanwhile, are shown to have developed rapidly and China’s international status to have grown. This generally rousing tale, however, omits any discussion of minority resistance in Tibet and Xinjiang (or resistance to reunification in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao) and glosses over the social problems and inequalities that have been exacerbated by the socialist market economy. And Tiananmen does not appear in any of the texts except obliquely in the Shanghai edition with one reference to 1989 ‘proving that the CPC is the Party in power’.¹⁰⁵ Barring an additional chapter on the cultural achievements of socialism (in which the detonation of China’s first atomic bomb takes pride of place), the reiteration of the CPC’s centrality to China’s future and the incontestably multi-ethnic, unified nature of the nation is where the national narrative ends.

¹⁰² YH4, pp81-87

¹⁰³ PEP4, pp24-25.

¹⁰⁴ PEP4, pp186-189.

¹⁰⁵ SH4, p104.

World History: Defining the Other

'Why Study World History?'

One of the principal stated goals of the Teaching Outlines is 'internationalism' (*guojizhuyi*), but although some discussion of Sino-foreign relations is attempted in the Chinese history textbooks, it comprises a minimal proportion of the national narrative, and it is left chiefly to world history to promote internationalism. Internationalism is not, of course, the only objective of teaching world history. As discussed in the introduction, world history may often reveal as much or more about our self-image as it does about those societies, peoples and cultures we seek to portray, and like national history may be harnessed to serve moral and patriotic ends. The objectives of studying world history in the Chinese context, however, are clearly stated in a chapter or preface at the beginning of each world history volume entitled, as in the Chinese history volumes, 'Why study world history?'. According to the PEP textbook, the reasons are as follows:

First, it is to understand the world better. No country or people on this earth can cut themselves off from the outside world. Human civilisation is increasingly developed, international exchange increasingly close. China does not exist all by itself; from ancient times onwards it has had all kinds of links with many countries and areas of the world. In modern-contemporary times, China's links with every country have become even closer, so we ought to understand the world and ought to understand world history.

Second, China is presently carrying out the construction of socialist modernisation, and should absorb and learn lessons from the achievements of all countries' and peoples' material and spiritual civilisations, taking the good and rejecting the bad to use for ourselves in order to speed up the construction of socialism. World history can furnish us with certain knowledge in this regard.

Thirdly, the ideological education we received through studying Chinese history can be broadened and deepened by studying world history on the foundation of Chinese history. Studying world history is beneficial to carrying out education in historical materialism and patriotism.¹⁰⁶

The other three texts offer similar reasons to study world history, but as in this section of the Chinese history textbooks, there is little that does not appear in the Outlines or that might appeal to students, and like its Chinese history equivalent, it has been dropped from the latest HCS-compliant textbooks.¹⁰⁷

While not an explicitly stated goal, the study of world history is also comparative in nature. As shown above, the nationalist narrative of Chinese history has centred on a victor-victim-victor transition, demonstrating that the innate and superior qualities

¹⁰⁶ PEPW1.1

¹⁰⁷ SHW1, preface; YHW1, preface; NDW1, preface.

of the Chinese *minzu* triumph *inevitably* over all adversity and all-comers.¹⁰⁸ This has necessitated much quantifying of Chinese glories and sufferings. The nationalist habit of quantifying, however, is meaningless if it is not also compared with the amount or frequency of victories and losses in other cultures, societies or countries. Another important focus of world history textbooks, therefore, is to demonstrate how China matches up in the international league table of achievement, pain and racial-cultural virtue.

Many of the goals may be the same in Chinese and world history, but the differences between the ways in which the narratives are constructed and the topics that are covered are in some ways so great that Chinese and world history might as well be two entirely separate subjects as they are in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, like Chinese history, world history follows a historical materialist organising framework that presents the global past as a gradual evolution through different forms of socio-economic organisation. It also tends to project present nation-states and peoples backwards into the past as if they were timeless and primordial entities. Thus, Italian and German unification in the nineteenth century is represented as a *reunification* of homogeneous peoples who had been long kept asunder.¹⁰⁹ In world history, however, the rise-and-fall conception of history is far less pronounced as the narrative skips from one society, culture, country or region to another, each an example of a parallel or following stage of historical materialist development. There is also some effort to be inclusive, and to cover areas of the world that are frequently ignored, such as Latin America and Africa. According to Zhu, this is a world-beating breakthrough for school History, for elsewhere global narratives have been stymied by Eurocentrism (*Ouzhou zhongxinlun*), and, in modern-contemporary history, also America-centrism.¹¹⁰ While Zhu's critique is not without foundation, it is somewhat ironic that Chinese approaches to global history should be portrayed as pioneering. As noted in the introduction, almost no research is carried out into world history in Chinese universities, a state of affairs that has persisted since the establishment of the PRC.¹¹¹ Even back in the 1960s, Soviet historians were taking their Chinese colleagues to task for their narrow view of world history and unwillingness to expand their intellectual

¹⁰⁸ Marks has made a similar assertion in the introductory chapter of his recent work, *The Origins of the Modern World*. Offering the metaphor of a painting on top of which another has been painted, Marks argues that the resurgence of China and India (and an Asia-centric world) may be inevitable; just as in the painting, with time, the overlay of paint wears off and the original image is once again revealed.

¹⁰⁹ YHW2, pp1-7.

¹¹⁰ Zhu, *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun*, p277

horizons far beyond their own borders.¹¹² Chinese approaches to world history, as shown below, are anyway extremely Eurocentric, as in fact is much of modern Chinese history, which focuses chiefly on the role of the foreign imperialists in bringing about China's decline, largely avoiding discussion of domestic contributory factors other than corrupt feudal rule.¹¹³ The chapters devoted to Africa, Asia and Latin America are thus extremely sketchy and focus almost solely on their anti-colonial, independence movements rather than the indigenous development of their own cultures and societies. This reflects the similar lack of research at the tertiary level, since mainstream developments in professional historiography tend, eventually, to filter down to the school level. The purpose served by including such 'obscure' topics, therefore, appears to be principally to reveal the evil nature of capitalism-imperialism, and by comparison to proclaim the virtues of socialism and those who espouse it.

Learning from outstanding foreign persons and their achievements is also an important stated objective of world history, and in recent years the culture sections of the textbooks have, like their Chinese history counterparts, been significantly expanded, and now include numerous examples of famous scientists, philosophers and some literary and artistic figures. Compared to their Chinese history textbook counterparts, individual political figures play a somewhat lesser role in the unfolding of historical events, perhaps, again, in part because lack of academic research means far less is known about them, but also because of the more strongly historical materialist slant in which individuals are minor actors subject to the laws of inexorable socio-economic progress.

Ancient World History

Ancient world history is a very small component of the world history course, comprising only the first few chapters of the first volume of the world history textbooks. It covers from the ancient civilisations of Egypt, Babylon, India, Greece and Rome through to the Renaissance, after which Europe enters the capitalist stage. Clearly, the basic objective of teaching about ancient cultures is simply to describe the development of human civilisation and to provide examples of 'slave society', but it is

¹¹¹ Croizier, 'World History in the PRC'

¹¹² Viatkin and Tikhvinskii, 'Some Questions of Historical Science in the Chinese People's Republic'. On approaches to world history in China, see also Martin, *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View*.

¹¹³ Cohen (*Discovering History in China*) makes a similar critique of 1960s 'Marxist' Sinologists in the US who, he argues, have closely followed the Chinese narrative in developing their own interpretations of the Chinese past.

also a comparative display of one-upmanship insofar as the ancient civilisations that developed contemporaneously with China have not enjoyed historical continuity or survived intact as China has allegedly done. A similar comparative purpose is explicitly served by the account of European feudal societies which reached this stage of socio-economic evolution more than one thousand years after China; indeed, it is reiterated here that China was the first country in the world to reach the feudal stage of development.¹¹⁴ China's superiority is further demonstrated in the development of feudal society in Korea and Japan, both of which are shown to have been profoundly influenced by their more advanced neighbour.¹¹⁵ Showing Chinese superiority is not, of course, the only goal of the chapters on feudal Europe, West and East Asia, and these chapters also seek to demonstrate the historical origins of modern nation-states.

Other key themes demonstrated by these early feudal societies include the role played by national unity in driving development and of reform programmes instituted by enlightened leaders. Silla's, and later Koryo's, unification of the Korean peninsula, for example, are said to be among the driving forces behind the development of Korean culture and economics.¹¹⁶ Japanese progress meanwhile is shown to have accelerated following national unification and the Emperor Kōtoku's Taika reforms in 646, which it is emphasised 'replicated China's Sui-Tang system', and in matters of 'education, religion, architecture, art, literature and so forth actively absorbed Chinese culture'.¹¹⁷ The development of Arab culture and power is similarly shown to be predicated on political and ethnic unity, and Arabs are also noted as important go-betweens facilitating cultural exchange between East and West.¹¹⁸ By contrast, the Ottoman empire, despite being a unified political entity, is depicted as savage, expansionist and obstructive of cultural exchange.¹¹⁹

National characteristics play a far lesser role in the global narrative than they do in Chinese history, no doubt in part because it is thought difficult to demonstrate national qualities when such limited time frames are covered for individual societies, and also because individualising other peoples beyond the macro-regions they inhabit is perhaps not seen as necessary. Although the focus here is predominantly, therefore,

¹¹⁴ YHW1, p35; PEPW1, p45.

¹¹⁵ NDW1, pp51-55; SHW1, pp42-47. Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean relations during this period are also discussed in brief in the Chinese history textbooks under the sections on Tang dynasty foreign relations. In both cases, China is shown implicitly or explicitly as munificently bestowing high culture on its less civilised neighbours.

¹¹⁶ PEPW1, pp58-59

¹¹⁷ PEPW1, p60-61.

¹¹⁸ PEPW1, pp53-57

on empires, states, societies and socio-economic development, important – or at least well known – individual cultural figures are included, to acquaint students both with key scientific and technological discoveries made outside China, and with dominant figures in (primarily) European history about whom any cultured global citizen ‘ought to know’. In the ancient period, these figures are mostly chosen from among the Greeks, and include various philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Socrates), historians (Herodotus, Livy) and literary figures (Homer, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Virgil). Bar a few references in the chapter on Arab empire to their translations of Greek writings and their introduction of numerals and algebra to Western Europe, no further cultural content appears until the end of the feudal period when the Renaissance is covered. All ‘advanced’ non-Sinic culture is thereby essentially conflated with European cultures; it is thus against a totalised Europe (West) that China must be measured.

Modern World History

The modern period in world history begins somewhat earlier than in Chinese history since capitalism is shown to have emerged following the Reformation, with the Renaissance and the flourishing of the Italian city-states, such as Venice.¹²⁰ The discovery of new shipping routes to Asia (and later the Americas) is shown to be among the core factors contributing to the sudden and rapid rise of a once backward Europe, as well as to have accelerated Sino-European cultural exchange.¹²¹ In stark contrast to the story of Zheng He, however, European explorers are portrayed chiefly as greedy colonialists seeking to plunder the wealth of others and to seize their land. Those migrants who followed in their footsteps are labelled ‘colonists’, who - unlike the ‘Overseas Chinese’ that ‘moved’ to Southeast Asia to ‘make a living’ and helped the local peoples develop - brought the ‘evils of colonialism’ to indigenous peoples.¹²² Nothing is said about the religious migrations from Europe and the ‘colonists’ are said to be composed chiefly of ‘vicious and powerful aristocrats and businessmen’ who imported slaves and oppressed the native peoples.¹²³

Although the Renaissance and the development of shipping routes may be considered to be the stage during which capitalism was developed and the seeds of imperialism sown, it is the ‘English bourgeois revolution’ (the Civil War) that

¹¹⁹ PEPW1, pp62-63.

¹²⁰ SHW1.5.1.

¹²¹ SHW1, pp53-55.

¹²² SHW1.5.2.

¹²³ PEPW1, p100.

officially kicks off the modern period. The establishment of a republic, albeit a short-lived one thanks to the dictatorial rule of Cromwell,¹²⁴ thus catalyses a series of political changes across Europe and North America. The following chapters accordingly detail the American war of independence, the French Revolution, and the wars of independence in Latin America.¹²⁵ These revolutions and wars are portrayed as progressive (*jinbu*) movements or ‘bourgeois revolutions’ that, together with the industrial revolution (which is allotted an entire chapter in each volume),¹²⁶ accelerated the development of capitalism and propelled the world forward towards a higher form of socio-economic organisation.

The following section opens with a more difficult, less narrative chapter on the evolution of ‘scientific socialism’, which briefly outlines the context in which Marx developed his philosophy, noting the lesser ‘utopian socialism’ (as Marx called it) of Saint-Simon, Robert Owen and Charles Fourier and several workers ‘uprisings’, including those among textile workers in Lyon and Silesia and the Chartist movement in Britain. According to the textbooks, the failure of these ideas and uprisings only highlighted the contradictions between the emergent proletariat and bourgeoisie, and indicated that a new theory was needed to guide the ongoing struggle. Marx and Engels, of course, were on hand to provide a solution and the remainder of the chapter in all four editions goes on to provide a short bibliography for each and to describe some of their key ideas, with particular emphasis on the laws of socio-economic evolution outlined in the ‘Communist Manifesto’.

With the communist ideology spelled out, the remainder of the modern history section covers topics that illustrate historical materialist laws of development as well as not-so-historical materialist preoccupations with the nation as the sole legitimate political entity. These chapters cover topics such as the 1848 European revolutions, the unification of Italy and Germany and the reforms undertaken in Russia under Peter the Great, and those introduced in Japan with the Meiji Restoration. While squeezed tightly into the historical materialist framework, other recurrent themes of revolution, reform and unity that are also emphasised in Chinese history are shown to be among the primary factors driving national development in each country examined. Japan and Russia thus are shown to have adapted the advanced technologies and military organisation of Western countries and thereby to have enriched and

¹²⁴ YHW1, p72.

¹²⁵ PEPW1.14, 1.16, 1.17-18, 1.19.

¹²⁶ PEPW1, pp131-137; SHW1, pp72-77.

strengthened their nations;¹²⁷ Italian and German unification meanwhile not only restores territorial completeness to the national people, but also hastens the growth of capitalism. This growth, however, leads to competition between the European powers, and thence to an escalation of imperialist expansion as new lands, resources and markets are sought to support capitalist development. As shown also in Chinese history, this intensifies the oppression of peoples across Asia and Africa, and culminates in the eruption of World War I.¹²⁸

Cultural topics are given somewhat more weight here, especially in the PEP edition which devotes a total of four chapters to the subject, although as is the case with the ancient history culture sections, the content here is almost exclusively Eurocentric.¹²⁹ Needless to say, intellectual developments in the modern period are deemed especially important since they catalysed rapid scientific and technological progress, and also gave rise to proletarian political activism and socialist thought. Accordingly, major figures in science and philosophy are highlighted both for their discoveries or ideas and as characters worthy of emulation; almost all of them are said, for example, to love studying. Although some figures are included in some editions but not in others, the most commonly cited are Descartes, Newton and Copernicus as well as contributors to the development of electromagnetism and atomic theory, Michael Faraday and John Dalton. Darwin receives considerable attention in all volumes, as does Einstein. In the artistic field, numerous authors are cited, including Moliere, Balzac, Dickens, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Goethe, Schiller and Twain, while in music Bach, Mozart and Beethoven are the most commonly noted. Only one female (Marie Curie) is included anywhere in the culture sections, and then only in the PEP edition, while no women writers are cited, and only in the PEP edition does any non-European writer appear. While the various editions perhaps here more than anywhere display some degree of individuality in their selection of 'representative' cultural figures, they all tend, nevertheless, to share a strong preference for writers whose works comment critically on 'capitalist society' and expose its ills. Art, in Europe as in revolutionary and – to a lesser extent – post-revolutionary China, is thus represented as somewhat utilitarian in nature, serving

¹²⁷ NDW1, pp138-142, 149-154.

¹²⁸ YHW2, pp46-51

¹²⁹ YHW2.17, NDW2.17 and SHW2.12 each title these chapters scientific and cultural developments in 'modern European and American history' although most of the discussion concerns European history. PEP does not do so, merely calling the chapters 'Modern culture' (PEPW1.27-29) and 'Culture in the late modern period' (PEPW2.7). The content, however, is almost wholly European centred.

social and political purposes, but doing so with the kind of creative aplomb that ensures the ideologies embedded therein are more likely to be successfully transmitted to and embraced by the people.¹³⁰

Contemporary World History

Unsurprisingly, the October Revolution provides the starting point for contemporary history. Far less attention, however, is devoted to this topic than in the earliest PRC textbooks, no doubt in large part because from the late 1950s China pursued its own path to socialism and no longer regarded the USSR as the leader of the international socialist movement, and also because since reform and opening the PRC has moved ever further away from its revolutionary platform. From a historical materialist perspective, nonetheless, it is absolutely essential to demonstrate the transition from capitalism to socialism, signifying also the transition to modernity, and by analogy to legitimise China's own revolution and regime. Failed communist uprisings are also noted in this section showing the far reach of the international movement even if it had not yet succeeded, and are linked, implicitly or explicitly, to anti-colonial independence movements that were fighting the same capitalist-imperialist enemies. The Great Depression further demonstrates the decline of capitalism and 'the suffering it brings strengthens the opposition of the people' to their exploitative capitalist rulers.¹³¹ Even Roosevelt's New Deal which 'alleviated the economic crisis' could not eradicate the root problems of capitalism, and was thus merely an 'important reform', not (as some neo-conservative Americans have alleged) a form of socialism.¹³²

The crisis of capitalism is shown to have underpinned the development of fascism and escalated the contradictions between the imperialist European powers. World War II is thus portrayed as having broken out principally over rivalry between Germany and Italy on the one side and Britain and France on the other. The Munich Conference sees the latter two capitulating to Germany, and even their subsequent declaration of war in 1939 is shown to be a sham as they strenuously avoid active conflict. Only after the entry of the USSR into the war in 1941, therefore, does the war cease to be an 'imperialist war' and become 'an all-out fight against fascism' (the

¹³⁰ See Mao's talks at the 1942 Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature for an elaboration of the role of art in disseminating political ideology and the revolutionary message.

¹³¹ SHW2, p73.

¹³² SHW2, p75.

USSR's earlier Non-Aggression Pact with Germany conveniently omitted).¹³³ The entry of the US into the war, by contrast, is depicted as far less momentous, merely a part of the wider Pacific war initiated by Japan. When Japan is finally defeated, therefore, this is not portrayed principally as an American victory, but as a result of China's long-standing resistance, the late involvement of the USSR and the rather more minor contributions of other allies.¹³⁴

Despite the unity bred in fighting fascism, it is shown that the contradictions of capitalist society had not been overcome, and in the aftermath of victory, therefore, Communist revolutions across Eastern Europe broke out, resulting in the establishment of new socialist societies. The hegemonic powers of the capitalist-imperialist USA and the socialist-imperialist USSR, however, plunged the world into the Cold War in their efforts to assert supremacy over one another and 'control the world'. In earlier texts when China was at loggerheads with the USSR, both the USA and USSR were assigned culpability in this. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, and China's intermittently frosty relations with the sole remaining superpower, the texts examined here downplay, although do not negate, the place of the USSR and highlight the hegemony of the USA. As in Chinese history, emphasis is accordingly given to the Korean War and China's role in defeating the imperialists. The Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War are also covered briefly and it is noted that more than a thousand Chinese sacrificed their lives to help the Vietnamese fight against the USA.¹³⁵ (China's own 1979 conflict with Vietnam is not mentioned here). Needless to say, this provides another opportunity to contrast Chinese goodwill towards neighbouring states and fearless desire to defend the weak and battle against injustice with the forces of world domination-seeking Western imperialists. Intentionally or not, it also implicitly points up China's importance in Asia as powerful, benevolent and perhaps even morally superior to its neighbours, having, both here and in the Chinese history textbooks, repeatedly and altruistically come to their aid throughout history.

The final chapters in world history cover contemporary culture, with a survey of scientific and technological developments in the twentieth century, including the atomic bomb, nuclear power stations, satellites and space missions and computers. As in modern history, the sections on art and literature again focus on those who used

¹³³ PEPW2, p99; NDW2, pp94-112.

¹³⁴ PEPW2, pp108-109.

¹³⁵ PEPW2, p125; SHW2, pp103-105.

their work to criticise capitalism, and in colonial/post-colonial countries to resist imperialism and feudalism. It is, however, the penultimate chapters that tackle perhaps the most interesting (and sensitive) topic, for they discuss the success of post-war capitalism in Western Europe, the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the USSR. Clearly, the analogies that could be drawn with China's own changes are manifold, and the text is accordingly careful not to imply that socialism is in any way a failed project, even if China has to all intents and purposes itself abandoned the socialist path in practice if not in rhetoric. Eastern Europe's abandonment of socialism is thus portrayed as a necessary 'reform' and 'transformation' that arose from the blind following of USSR models, over-centralisation and rigid economic planning which were unsuited to their own national conditions.¹³⁶ The break-up of the USSR, by contrast, is depicted as a result of Gorbachev's errors which brought ideological chaos to the Party and allowed 'anti-socialist forces' to deepen the 'political, economic and ethnic crises' besetting the country, and the Republics to declare independence.¹³⁷ While this is shown to have had a positive effect in fragmenting hegemonic power and creating a multi-polar world (*duojixing*) (in which China is an increasingly powerful player), the lessons to be learnt from these Soviet 'errors' barely need pointing out, since throughout both the Chinese and world history courses students repeatedly learn the importance of unity, not only for national strength, but for a nation's very existence.

¹³⁶ SHW2, pp115-116.

¹³⁷ Ibid, pp116-117.

Chapter 7

Teaching and Learning History

Had Vivian Preston not taught me East Asian history in secondary school, perhaps I would not have pursued tertiary studies in Chinese history. Had she not endlessly reiterated her favourite maxim, 'History is not a shopping list of facts but an interpretation of them,' and exhorted us to write multi-perspectival essays, I might never have developed an interest in historiography. And had we not watched countless documentaries about World Wars One and Two and written multiple projects on trench warfare and the Nazi Holocaust, I would probably not envisage Highland troops going 'over the top' to fall in their thousands each time I hear the wail of bagpipes, nor would I perceive visceral displays of flag-waving patriotism as a mere step away from book-burning and concentration camps. History does not, of course, supply the substance and power of all historical 'memories'. No-one arrives at school a *tabula rasa* on which ideas, opinions and emotions may be inscribed, nor can what is learnt in History lessons remain untouched by accounts of the past conveyed to us through family and other communities to which we belong, through local and national media, public sites and performances of collective commemoration, and all kinds of both elite and popular culture. Yet, as shown in previous chapters, what purposes History should serve and what should or should not be taught are issues which in most societies have received a level of attention from governments, educationalists, historians, the media and concerned citizens incommensurate with History's actual status as a proportion of the school curriculum. Evidently then, it is widely believed that school History lessons *do* influence the formation of historical memories, the values, opinions and identities we construct from them in the present, and our attitudes and actions in the future. In this penultimate chapter, an attempt is made to determine the extent to which such a conviction is warranted in the Chinese case, and if it is, whether learning outcomes correlate to curricular goals or, in Wertsch's terminology, whether official histories are cognitively mastered and affectively appropriated by their target audiences. Curricular goals, textbook narratives and the values and beliefs they attempt to inculcate, and the systems, institutions, ideas and ideologies that produce them have already been discussed. In order to understand their impact on learning outcomes, however, it is first necessary to examine the ways in which teachers transmit the curriculum and mediate the

textbooks in the school History classroom, and before examining the environment and methods by which they do so, first one must understand who History teachers are and how they themselves are produced.¹ This chapter accordingly looks, first, at teachers and teacher training; second, at how the curriculum is actually implemented on the ground in classrooms; and finally, it attempts a preliminary evaluation of how students consume, discard or recycle official narratives of the past.

I. Teachers and Teacher Training

Perhaps the first thing that should be said about teachers in China is that, as in so many countries, the vast majority of them did not choose their profession since there are few incentives that might attract students to the field. Teachers may have been frequently exalted in public rhetoric, but the reality has long been low salaries and status, incommensurate with the vulnerability of the profession to the vagaries of politics. The Cultural Revolution hit the profession particularly hard, targeting teachers as exemplars of bourgeois intellectualism, bequeathing post-Mao China with a legacy of suspicion and disillusionment and a severe shortage of qualified teachers.² Since reform and opening, there have been various campaigns and MOE regulations to enhance teacher status, as well as efforts to improve the level of teacher qualification. Salaries, however, remain low, and since authority over hiring and firing has been largely devolved to school principals, teaching is no longer an allocated job-for-life with a guaranteed pension in state-run schools. In better schools, therefore, teachers must compete for school posts, increasing numbers of which are contracted rather than tenured. In addition, the one child policy has meant that the number of school students is slowly beginning to decline and rather than simply allowing class sizes to be reduced from the current norm of forty students or more, classes and sometimes entire schools are simply merged or even closed down and teachers laid off. In rural areas, teaching is a considerably more precarious and even lower paid profession since many schools are locally run and financed, meaning

¹ This paraphrases Carr (*What is History?*), who famously wrote that before studying history, first one must study the historian, and before studying the historian, one must examine the contexts which produce the historian and in which he/she produces history.

² In 1985, the World Bank (*China: Issues and Prospects in Education*) reported that one-third of all teachers were fully qualified, one-third could become so with upgrading through training, and one-third were beyond redemption. In 1989, the State Statistics Bureau reported that 11% of college, 58.66% of senior high school, 64.39% of junior high school and 31.87% of primary school teachers were 'not adequately prepared for their teaching posts' (cit. in Lan et al, 'Education Reform in China since 1978', pp239-240).

that teachers do not always get paid when funds are wanted for other projects. Although as a whole teaching nevertheless remains a relatively stable occupation, the gradual erosion of the few attractions it might once have held makes it increasingly unlikely that senior secondary graduates will aspire to become teachers even if they acquire their tertiary education at a normal university.

If this lack of vocation is true for teachers in general, it is still more so for History teachers; only one of the dozens of History teachers and normal university students I asked said that he had chosen to study History at a normal university and had ‘always wanted to be a History teacher’.³ The rest had simply tested into a normal university History department in the university entrance examinations, and none were under any illusions about the status of History teachers. Despite the many directives issued by central government and the MOE on the importance of History, every History teacher is all too aware that Chan’s claims that the ‘perception of the special role the subject plays in political-ideological-moral education ... enhances the status of the subject and hence that of its teachers’ could not be further from the truth.⁴ The ideological importance of History and the consequent rise in History teachers official status has never been matched by a commensurate improvement in working conditions or History teachers’ status within the school. As repeatedly stated here, History is a subsidiary (*fuke*) not a core subject (*zhuke*), and although it *may* be somewhat more highly regarded than other subsidiary humanities subjects, humanities overall are widely perceived as inferior to sciences. This bias is reflected across the curriculum in a lower percentage of class hours for humanities, and come senior secondary or university entrance examination time History, along with Geography and other unimportant arts and humanities subjects, is typically dropped from the curriculum altogether to allow for extra revision classes in examinable subjects.⁵ It is, after all, success in entrance examinations that determines the status of the school, even if teachers are officially awarded merit pay based on graduation (*biye*) rather than promotion (*shengxue*) rates as a supposed disincentive to ‘teach to the top’ (*yousheng zhongxinhua*).⁶

³ Teacher at Beijing No.4 zhongxue, personal communication.

⁴ Chan, ‘Introduction’, p7.

⁵ When I conducted classroom observations in Beijing schools during spring-summer 2000, I was unable to observe any third year junior secondary History classes after early April as they had already been dropped from *all* the schools I visited.

⁶ Ross, ‘The Crisis in Chinese Secondary Schooling’, p73.

Given the low standing of the History subject, it is inconceivable that History teachers would 'have an edge over their colleagues in matters such as promotion and resource allocation'.⁷ On the contrary, if the higher administrative levels of the education system are anything to go by, History definitely does *not* provide a favourable foundation on which to build a career. All Ministers of Education in the past few decades have had educational backgrounds in sciences and engineering;⁸ as of 2001, no member of the Beijing or Shanghai Municipal Education Commission had a History background, and only a tiny minority had studied a humanities subject at tertiary level; and none of the senior administrators I met in the Beijing and Shanghai schools I visited were former History teachers. This is certainly not to suggest that History teachers never advance up the administrative ladder; one former History teacher from Jiang Zemin's senior secondary alma mater, not only made it to school principal, but was appointed to serve on the History TMIC. With few champions of the subject in high positions of actual authority over resource allocation (as opposed to the political or symbolic 'moral' authority over school subjects of the Party leadership), what limited resources are available to most schools are rarely invested in enhancing History education provision at the expense of other more 'important' subjects; even designating certain classrooms specifically for teaching History and housing subject resources (something for which several official directives have called), which would require little investment and might be thought relatively straightforward, has rarely been carried out.⁹ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that becoming a History teacher is not at the top of many senior secondary pupils' career choices, and that many History teachers, particularly the younger ones, would happily change their profession if the opportunity arose (Fig. 7.1).

Lack of enthusiasm for taking up or remaining in this low-status, low-paying profession may be partly to blame for the level of teacher qualification in the History subject, which as the 1983 'Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Education' and the subsequent MOE 'Notice on Improving and Strengthening History and Geography Education' lamented, is relatively low.¹⁰ This is not to deny that strenuous efforts

⁷ Chan, 'Introduction', p7.

⁸ Of the current ministers at the MOE, only one, Yuan Guiren (a vice-minister), even has a background in the humanities, having graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Beijing Normal University.

⁹ Only one school I visited had a 'History classroom'.

¹⁰ 'Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi guanyu jiaqiang aiguo zhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' [7/2/1983], JYFQS, p602-606; 'Jiaoyubu guanyu gajin jiaqiang zhongxue lishi he dili jiaoxue de tongzhi' [1/8/1983], JYFQS, pp666-667.

have been made to improve overall ‘teacher quality’ through recruiting more university graduates and through in-service training and part-time study for existing teachers, particularly those of the Cultural Revolution generation, to upgrade their qualifications to university level.¹¹ Enticing university graduates into entering or remaining in the teaching profession when, especially in developed urban areas, there are other more lucrative occupations available, however, is a challenging task, and many History teachers have only a junior college (*dazhuan*) education and may not even necessarily have specialised in History, or may be part-time teachers reassigned from other ‘related’ subjects such as Geography or Politics. This is true not only in less developed areas, but even in the major metropolises. As a recent survey of Shanghai’s level of History teacher qualification and specialisation revealed, only 78% of History teachers in the metropolitan area and 66% in the surrounding counties are full-time instructors in the subject, with the remainder dividing their time between teaching History, teaching other subjects, and/or fulfilling administrative responsibilities. The proportion of History teachers with a university-level education, moreover, is not very high, and is not much higher among the youngest teachers than among the oldest and even the Cultural Revolution generation (Fig. 7.2), despite the fact that ever-increasing numbers of students are obtaining a tertiary education. The distribution of university qualified History teachers, meanwhile, predictably shows that there are far fewer of them in Shanghai’s suburban districts than in the metropolitan area (Fig. 7.3), and far more of them in key schools than in regular junior secondary or ‘complete’ (combined junior and senior) secondary schools (*wanquan zhongxue*) (Fig. 7.4). Given that Shanghai has infinitely better educational provision than almost everywhere else in the country (with nine-year compulsory education already universalised and universalisation of senior secondary education anticipated within the next five years or so), it can only be surmised that the level of History teacher qualification in other cities and counties is considerably lower, although it is likely that the distribution of qualified teachers between different types of secondary schools is fairly similar everywhere.

The majority of those teachers that have a university-level education have, of course, studied in normal universities, with the remainder having studied in standard universities (*zonghe daxue*) or having obtained their qualifications through

¹¹ On the importance of teacher quality see, for example, Gong, ‘Chongfen renshi tigao lishi jiaoshi suzhi de zhongyaoxing’, pp22-25.

Figs, 7.1 – 7.4 History Teachers in Shanghai: Motivation and Qualification¹²

7.1 ‘What would you do if you could choose your career again?’

	Age Group			
	Under 30	30 – 40	40 – 50	Over 50
Teach History	34.77%	44.39%	59%	57.47%
Other work	47.97%	31.39%	18.64%	14.66%
Haven't thought about it	17.26%	24.22%	22.36%	27.87%

7.2* Secondary (junior and senior) school History teachers with university or postgraduate level education (by age group)

Under 30	30-40	40-50	Over 50	Total
59.35%	73.16%	46.47%	50%	55.77%

* These figures are for Shanghai Municipality which includes both the Shanghai metropolitan area and its surrounding counties.

7.3 Educational level of junior and senior secondary History teachers (by location)

	Shanghai Metro	Suburban Districts	Municipality Average
Senior secondary	2.6%	6.2%	4.5%
Junior college	31.8%	47.1%	40%
University	64.9%	46.2%	55%
Postgraduate	0.7%	0.4%	0.5%

7.4 Educational level of History teachers (by secondary school type)

	Junior secondary#	Complete secondary	Key school
Senior secondary	5.6%	3.38%	3.15%
Junior college	49.64%	30.5%	8.96%
University	44.24%	65.37%	88.34%
Postgraduate	0.5%	0.72%	0.89%

The junior secondary category here includes three-year junior secondary schools, and nine-year combined primary and junior secondary schools.

supplementary courses. Normal universities are generally considered to be of lower academic standing than standard universities, and thus, with a few notable exceptions such as Beijing and Huadong Normal Universities, usually have less stringent entrance requirements. Normal university History students, moreover, have in most cases not only failed to get into a standard university, but have also been unsuccessful in gaining a place to study another more prestigious subject. The perceived academic level of the student body, therefore, combines with deep-seated assumptions about what History teachers ought to know and teach to limit the way in which the normal university History curriculum is constructed, and to ensure that despite a relatively

¹² Statistical source: Shanghaishi jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui, ‘Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi xianzhuang diaoyan zhi baogao zhuanji’, pp2-8. In the study from which these statistics are taken, all Shanghai History teachers were supposedly surveyed. Whether all teachers replied to all questions in the survey, however, is not indicated.

high degree of autonomy in curriculum design within each college, curricula for prospective teachers are fairly homogeneous.

First and foremost, the curriculum is concerned with subject coverage, and while this is also true of standard universities, normal universities offer fewer opportunities to take elective courses and specialise in particular periods or regions. The core History curriculum in a typical normal university provides a more in-depth version of what students have studied in their junior and senior secondary textbooks, with numerous compulsory class hours devoted to outlining Chinese and world history from ancient times to the present. Other courses attempt to provide prospective teachers with an understanding of cultural, economic or political history, and a grounding in historical theory and methodology.¹³ Needless to say, the focus in the latter type of course tends to be on dialectical and historical materialism, which ties in to political education courses (also compulsory), but the burgeoning interest in foreign historiography and the increasing availability of translated works have ensured that normal university students are gradually being exposed to alternative theories of history through the introduction of courses such as Shanghai Normal University's 'History of Western historiography' (*xifang shixueshi*).¹⁴

Given that normal university students are supposed to be teachers in training, it might be expected that courses in pedagogy and practical teaching experience would feature as major components of the degree course. Even in colleges such as Capital and Shanghai Normal Universities where several professors are heavily involved in pedagogical research, however, pedagogy courses remain a small proportion of the curriculum, and pre-service classroom teaching practice is minimal.¹⁵ Teaching methods courses in China's normal universities are, furthermore, normally taught as entirely divorced from content, merely as a means by which to convey the substance of the History subject to school students, namely the necessary 'facts'.¹⁶ Only a few normal university History professors (if their writings are to be taken as representative

¹³ Source: History timetables from Shanghai and Capital Normal Universities 2000 and 2001.

¹⁴ Source: History timetable from Shanghai Normal University. The set text for this second-year course (also entitled *Xifang shixueshi*) covers Western historiography from Herodotus to Hegel and onwards into the twentieth century, including thinkers such as Toynbee and Collingwood, and even a handful of postmodernists such as Foucault. Since the course was only allocated one weekly session, however, it seems probable that only a few thinkers were covered in class with the remainder treated as supplemental reading.

¹⁵ Capital Normal University's Yu Youxi (now retired), Ye Xiaobing and Zhao Yafu and Shanghai Normal University's Wang Duoquan and Li Zhiyong have been very active in pedagogical research.

of their classroom teaching) have seriously attempted to analyse the relationship between method and content, and to encourage a critical approach to both.¹⁷

Lack of emphasis on pedagogy is no doubt in large part because few faculty members have much – if any – experience as classroom teachers in primary or secondary schools, and tend, like their counterparts in standard universities, to be academic subject specialists. It is also, however, because ‘coverage’, as Stearns has argued, is typically a pedagogical end in itself, not only as a reflection of ‘curricular routine-mindedness’, but as a product of profound beliefs that certain ‘historical facts’ are ‘an essential qualification for an educated person’. Such beliefs, he maintains, are not confined to cultural conservatives (in the mould of Hirsch with his ‘cultural literacy’ concept¹⁸), but extend to many postmodernists, postcolonialists and global historians, all of whom have ‘their own list of vital facts and events’, ethnic or social groups and regions, countries or cultures that they insist must be covered.¹⁹ Stearns’ critique derives from his studies of US historians and history educators, but the obsession with coverage is just as common in other societies and especially in China where, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2, it has long been believed by cultural conservatives and reformers alike that having a grasp of the outline of all five thousand years of Chinese history (and to a lesser extent world history) from one perspective or another is necessary to maintain or improve one’s ‘cultural quality’ or ‘cultivation’ (*wenhua suzhi/renwen suyang*). By the time History students graduate from normal university, therefore, they have sat through roughly four complete cycles of Chinese history from ancient times onwards and at least three of the same selected parts of world history, with the only significant difference between primary, secondary and tertiary levels of study being the gradually rising intensity of coverage. The methods by which they are commonly assessed and the learning style to which they have become habituated throughout their own education, furthermore, mean that rote-learning and regurgitating the contents and viewpoints of set texts are a virtually unquestioned norm. Most new teachers, however studious and enthusiastic, are consequently woefully ill equipped to do much more than teach the textbook when they begin their first job.

¹⁶ For a general discussion of the significance of the content-methods dichotomy, see Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, Chapter II.

¹⁷ See for example Zhao, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue* and ‘Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin’; Ji, *Lishi jiaoyuxue gailun*.

¹⁸ Hirsch, *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Should Know*.

II. Teaching History

Teaching Resources

As noted in Chapter 3, recognition of widespread teacher under-preparedness has meant that ERUs have increasingly taken on the role of providing models of best pedagogical practice, observing classes, offering advice and running local training workshops at which live or recorded teaching demonstrations may be given and information and ideas on best practice provided. Lack of pedagogical training in normal universities also means that first-year teachers are considered to be on probation and must take a requisite number of in-service training credits. During this period and sometimes for longer, they are, in theory at least, mentored both by the attending ERU History subject officer and senior teachers within the school. Access to such support in rural and less economically developed regions is considerably more limited than it is in affluent cities, and rural teachers must often take their required in-service training credits by correspondence or through short-term residential courses; indeed, many teachers in rural areas are not properly trained at all, and never obtain the level of qualifications mandated by central government.

ERUs are not of course the only source of teacher support, and there are many written materials available, offering guidance on both pedagogical theory and classroom practice, most of which are published by normal university or provincial education presses, with a few offered by unaffiliated education-oriented publishers. Some are lesson plans matched closely to textbook content, frequently compilations of model lessons written by senior teachers from well-known schools;²⁰ others are more theoretical or practical works on teaching methodology that may recommend particular teaching approaches or classroom activities.²¹ Numerous articles are also published in the main History education journals offering teaching suggestions and

¹⁹ Stearns, 'Goals in History Teaching', p284.

²⁰ See for example, the collaborative series published by PEP and Yanbian Education Press, *Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai (renjiaoban) jiao'an xilie congshu* which provides one volume to accompany each textbook. A similar set of handbooks was published by Beijing Normal University, *Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an*. Less comprehensive, but more detailed compilations of selected model lesson plans may be found in Zhang and Cui eds., *Lishi jiaoxue bilu jingxuan*; Yang ed., *Shanghai zhuming lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue sixianglu*; Wang ed., *Mingshi shoukelu: zhongxue lishi*.

²¹ Among the more academic works are Ji Bingxin, *Lishi jiaoyuxue gailun*, Zhao Yafu, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue*, and Yu Youxi, *Jichu jiaoyu xiandaihua jiaoxue jibengong: zhongxue lishi juan*. Recently, however, several educational publishing houses have issued more accessible guides that provide more concrete suggestions for classroom activities, for example, Xueyuan Press, *Zhongxue lishi chuanguang jiaofa*, a four volume series addressing different aspects of History pedagogy. Even these supposedly practical guides, however, devote the bulk of their text to restating the fundamentals of History education.

lesson plans, many of them written by ERU History subject officers or by practising teachers, and more recently, official websites run by institutions such as the NCCT and PEP have published online articles and established discussion forums both for general educational matters and for individual school subjects.²²

Judging from limited print-runs and conversations with school teachers, the more theoretical works do not constitute an important everyday teaching resource, although several have been used as set texts on teacher training pedagogy courses, providing prospective teachers with some basic exposure to up-to-date research.²³ The low popularity of these texts is no doubt in part because they tend towards more complex academic analyses of cognitive and affective development and their implications for History teaching and learning processes, and do not offer practical suggestions for classroom teaching; they also tend, like many of the newer, more practical teaching guides, to be fairly expensive. Individuals are consequently unlikely to buy them, and even many school History departments and libraries may find them to be inessential when finances are in most cases already overstretched and History is anyway not a priority subject. History education journals, by contrast, are more widely accessible, and many schools have subscriptions to one or more of them. As noted in Chapter 3, these contain many practical as well as ideological and theoretical articles, and frequently include lesson plans, suggestions on how to use both textbook and supplementary visual aids in class. It is difficult, however, to ascertain the extent to which they are actually used by teachers, although I found ERU staff, especially at the more senior levels, to be quite well acquainted with History journals. It is probable, therefore, that the import of some research articles is indirectly reaching even those teachers who do not read the journals themselves. The readership of internet articles is similarly hard to estimate, although on occasions the number of times a site has been visited is available, as well as the number of postings on a given forum discussion thread.²⁴ Active participants in online discussion forums are most likely to

²² PEP's history forum can be found at <http://bbs.pep.com.cn/forumdisplay.php?fid=15&page=1>. Articles are published in various locations on the www.pep.com.cn site. China Basic Education is an NCCT and Beijing Normal University backed private website providing online resources for nine-year compulsory education. They also host discussion forums, although these are not restricted to particular school subjects (see <http://bbs.cbe21.com>). Their History section main page can be found at <http://www.cbe21.com/subject/history/index.php>.

²³ The above-cited writers (Ji Bingxin, Zhao Yafu and Yu Youxi along with others) produced these texts in part to use them as core readings for their normal university History pedagogy courses. I do not know, however, how widely each text is used.

²⁴ Of course, many of the site hits and posts may be from repeat users. Not all the discussants, moreover, are History education professionals.

be members of a small but motivated and diligent minority of urban History teachers who are genuinely interested in teaching their subject, or are looking to improve their performance to gain promotions and pay-rises. What is written therein, therefore, cannot be assumed to be representative. Discussion forums are, moreover, censored to some degree, although even controversial posts typically remain available long enough for them to be copied and circulated elsewhere and some seem either to be tolerated or to escape the censors' notice altogether.²⁵

While resources offering both historical information and practical teaching tips are constantly expanding, suggesting that there is rising market demand for these items, the majority of History teachers seem to rely heavily, nevertheless, on the textbooks themselves and on their accompanying teacher handbooks (*jiaoxue cankaoshu/cankao ziliao, jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu*). The latter are produced by textbook publishers, and each textbook volume has a corresponding handbook; thus, there are currently four Chinese history and two world history teacher handbooks for each textbook set.²⁶ At the time of fieldwork, there were two additional teacher handbook sets in circulation, neither of which were directly affiliated with a particular textbook set, but both of which explicitly followed PEP's textbooks; in fact, one of the two was produced as a joint project between PEP and Yanbian Education Press, while the other was published by Beijing Normal University.²⁷ As with other supplementary texts, however, their print runs are dramatically lower than those of the standard handbooks, reinforcing the hypothesis that teachers prefer to stick with what they already know has a long track record as a staple pedagogical resource, tailored precisely to the particular text they are teaching.

Teacher handbooks are not, of course, a new phenomenon, having been first issued by textbook publishers in early Republican times, and accompanying almost every set of textbooks published thereafter.²⁸ The current crop, like the textbooks on

²⁵ See for example blogger 'Qianjiao maichu' (front foot forward) in which the writer criticises textbook editors for omitting important topics and distorting others in the HCS-compliant textbooks, thereby duping the children. ('Qing bianxie chuzhong lishi de zhuanjia huidao menggu tongzhi de shiqi') <http://club.cat898.com/newbbs/dispbbs.asp?BoardID=1&ID=1091399>.

²⁶ See Appendix for list of teacher handbooks.

²⁷ PEP and Yanbian Education Press, *Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai (renjiaoban) jiao'an xilie congshu* (Beijing Normal University, *Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an*. According to the preface of the BNU handbooks (Vol.1, p1), this set, produced by senior Beijing teachers and ERU researchers, was designed to follow the arrangement of PEP's textbooks, but was also, in principle at least, aimed at teachers of all textbook sets.

²⁸ See, for example, Zhao Yusen, *Benguoshi cankaoshu*, and Zhong Shulong, *Xintizhi benguo lishi cankaoshu* (both first published in 1915, reprinted until mid-1920s).

which they are based, has not departed significantly from earlier PRC models. Unfortunately, the only standard History handbooks I was able to obtain were the PEP and Shanghai editions, as well as the Zhejiang and Shanghai Social Studies teacher handbooks, Beijing Normal University's (BNU) independent History handbook set and a couple of volumes of the PEP-Yanbian Education Press collaborative texts. While it would have been useful to compare Coastal and Inland edition handbooks with PEP and Shanghai volumes, the high degree of similarity between textbook sets suggests that handbook differences are likely to be equally minor. Furthermore, since I was only able to observe classes in Beijing and Shanghai, it is these texts which are most relevant to the present study.

Each chapter of the handbooks mirrors a textbook chapter, and is structured in the same way throughout a given set. PEP handbooks, for example, divide each chapter into four main sections: 'teaching objectives', 'key points', 'teaching requirements and suggestions', and supplementary 'data and annotations'. They also include appendices which contain tips on suggested answers to the '*xiang yi xiang*' or 'thinking questions' (*sikaoti*) posed in the textbooks, namely, those questions which cannot be answered simply with data. The Shanghai handbooks follow a similar pattern with sections on 'teaching requirements' (which correspond to PEP's 'objectives'), 'key points and difficult points', 'teaching suggestions' and 'supplementary data'. They do not, however, provide model answers to open-ended '*xiang yi xiang*' questions, and in some chapters their 'supplementary data' section includes not only the standard items, such as brief biographies of key actors or details on the historical background of political movements, but also notes on recent historical research on the subject.²⁹ PEP's handbooks also recommend bringing some of the fruits of academic research into the school classroom, but they are far less specific and informative than Shanghai's. Both share, however, an avoidance of controversy. In the PEP chapter on Ming foreign relations, for example, it is emphatically stated that while historians disagree on the objectives of Zheng He's expeditions, 'teachers need only tell students what is written in the textbook and do

²⁹ For example, in vol. 3 of Shanghai's Chinese History handbook, a detailed explanation is given of historians' debates over the precise dates of the Hundred Days Reform and over whether Yuan Shikai's betrayal of the reformers was the immediate cause of Cixi's palace coup (pp98-100).

not need to add any supplementary opinions', while the Shanghai edition simply omits from this chapter the section giving conflicting academic opinions.³⁰

The BNU and PEP-Yanbian sets are similarly arranged, although the PEP-Yanbian set adopts a hybrid style, integrating the traditional handbook structure with samples of possible teacher-student dialogue, commonly seen in edited volumes of model lesson plans, which, given that these texts are a collation of chapters written by ERU researchers and senior teachers is hardly surprising.³¹ While PEP-Yanbian's model dialogues suggest a more concrete, pragmatic and less text-oriented approach to teaching, in almost every case, they do not move far away from the traditional teacher-centric methods advocated by other model lesson compilations. BNU's teaching methods section, meanwhile, almost invariably recommends 'lecturing' or 'narrating' (*jiangshu*) as the main method, only very occasionally adding an exhortation to use 'discussion' or 'audiovisuals'. The PEP-Yanbian set likewise in its model dialogues allots almost all the class-time to teacher explications of textbook content, punctuated only occasionally by question and answer interactions with students. Most of these suggested questions, moreover, merely require the students to respond with information that has been provided moments ago in the preceding section of the teacher's lecture. The much vaunted question and answer approach to teaching promoted by pedagogical reformers as a productive, 'holistic' and 'democratic' alternative to traditional teacher-centric lecturing,³² thus, in this model, simply evaluates whether students have been paying attention and have understood the topic, and attempts to reinforce data and viewpoints through simple repetition.

Clearly then, teacher handbooks greatly contribute to the likelihood that the implemented History curriculum will closely resemble the preactive curriculum, and although they are only intended as a basic teaching guideline which should be supplemented with 'lively', 'creative' and 'practical' learning activities, their dominance as a teaching resource reinforces the privileged position textbooks and teachers enjoy over all other sources of historical data and methods of learning about the past within the formal education system. Before turning to the implications this has for learning outcomes, it is necessary first to examine briefly the ways in which teachers actually conduct their lessons so as to ascertain the extent to which they

³⁰ PEP, *Zhongguo lishi dierce: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu*, p235; Shanghai, *Jiaoxue cankao ziliao*, vol.2, chapter 21, lesson 2.

³¹ See above-cited volumes edited by Zhang and Cui, Wang Duoquan, and Yang Xiangyang (n18).

follow the prescriptions and models provided by Teaching Outlines and teacher handbooks. Specifically, it is asked whether teachers omit some topics and supplement others (as Au Yeung maintains has occurred in the Chinese Language subject);³³ how they have integrated sometimes conflicting pedagogical innovations with political-ideological imperatives; and to what degree they adhere to or deviate from orthodox textbook interpretations of historical events and persons in their classes. The style in which they present their lessons – the teaching methods and language that they use - is also analysed in order to evaluate the ways and extent to which the textbooks and their explicit and implicit messages are reconfigured through teacher mediation. Evidently, the number of classes I was able to observe in Beijing and Shanghai furnished me with only a few snapshots of classroom teaching and thus provided a very tentative basis for generalisations about History teaching nationwide, while my Chinese language limitations, as noted in Chapter 6, have prevented me from fully comprehending all the linguistic nuances of teacher-student interactions.³⁴ My own observations are accordingly supplemented by evidence supplied by ERU researchers, teachers and other History education professionals, both in personal communications and in print.

Classroom Teaching

Teachers in the post-Mao era have been assailed from a number of directions, receiving frequently contradictory messages about what they should be doing and how they should be doing it. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are, on the one hand, periodic MOE directives which explicitly praise past and present efforts of History teachers, while implicitly reprimanding them through exhorting them to take the lead

³² See Chapter 2 for more discussion on post-1978 pedagogical thinking.

³³ Au Yeung, 'Curriculum Dissemination in the People's Republic of China', p85.

³⁴ In most instances, I was only able to observe one teacher's class on a given textbook chapter. While it would have been interesting to compare several different teachers' interpretations, it would have been logistically impossible since all teachers are trying to cover each textbook in a single semester, and are thus roughly on the same schedule in terms of when they cover which chapters. Furthermore, my school visits were almost wholly dependent on my ERU contacts, and I was unable, therefore, to pick and choose which schools and lessons to observe. My Shanghai visits, however, were concentrated in a much shorter period than those I made in Beijing, and purely by chance I was able to observe a couple of repeat classes. None of the classes I attended were recorded and I merely observed and took notes on the proceedings. Although I believe some additional information might have been gleaned had I been able to review the classes multiple times, the universal teenage grunt with which many students proffered their classroom contributions rendered some utterances completely unintelligible to my foreign ears. Such a detailed analysis of classroom practices would anyway have provided far more data than this study could accommodate.

in promoting patriotism, morality and a willingness to serve as if they have not yet adequately done so. Writings by senior members of organisations such as the NCCT, the History TMIC and PEP, and education journal editorials also repeatedly highlight these political-ideological functions of the History subject. On the other hand, there is a growing movement, primarily among university academics and senior ERU personnel, that explicitly advocates training students to think critically and to formulate their own opinions, and implicitly criticises using the past to legitimise the polity. Needless to say, there are many advocates of the history-for-moral-and-patriotic-education school who have embraced various aspects of skills-oriented pedagogy, while the critical thinking promoters are by no means necessarily opposed to incorporating moral and patriotic education into History classes. Nevertheless, in practice, the two goals frequently conflict, leaving teachers confused and frustrated by apparently contradictory instructions, such as helping students to form individual viewpoints, while also ensuring that they reach correct conclusions. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, teachers have also at times been victims of political persecution, while at other times they have been publicly exalted as the chosen vectors for transmitting ideological campaign messages. The volatility of their position has thus made many teachers understandably fearful of following unorthodox or suddenly fashionable paths. Add to this mix the fact that most History teachers did not select and do not have strong emotional attachments to their profession, that teacher training is often inadequate and that many History teachers are not even trained in the History subject, and it comes as no surprise to find that most simply follow the path of least resistance, modelling their lessons principally on the content of textbooks in the ways advised by the handbooks. Most of the classes I observed, therefore, whether in Beijing or Shanghai, in key schools or ‘bog-standard’ junior secondaries, were remarkably similar.

Unlike Gardner, who observed art and music classes in the early 1980s, I was not, in most instances, treated to a flawless performance of a pre-rehearsed lesson.³⁵ In some cases, I accompanied local ERU History subject officers on their regular school rounds, while in others I was simply assigned to audit one or more teachers’ lessons by the head of the History department or the school principal, and a few teachers

³⁵ In one instance, he was told that the regular music teacher had been suddenly taken ill, and an award-winning teacher was brought in as a ‘last-minute’ replacement, presenting a class which had clearly been painstakingly rehearsed by all involved (Gardner, *To Open Minds*, p260).

personally invited me to visit their classrooms. Many teachers had only a day's notice of my impending visit, and those that I observed with the ERU officers (of whose attendance the school had had ample warning) were correspondingly more prepared. Only in one school was the lesson clearly a well choreographed performance.³⁶

Lessons I observed were taught by both male and female teachers from various age groups, although younger women formed the majority, reflecting the widespread transition of normal university intakes and thus the History education profession from male- to female-dominated (figs. 7.5, 7.6). While there was obviously individual variation in teachers' performances, I did not witness any pronounced differences between genders, nor - more unexpectedly - between age groups, although it was certainly the case that the classes which diverged most from handbook formats were mainly given by younger teachers.³⁷ Unsurprisingly, novice teachers, especially those

Figs. 7.5 & 7.6 Gender and age distribution of Shanghai History teachers³⁸

7.5

Gender	% of workforce	Average age
Male	53.3	43.6
Female	46.7	34.5

7.6

Age group	% of workforce
Under 30	32.37
30 – 40	16.03*
40 – 50	24.09
50 and over	27.62

* Most teachers in this group were under 35.

with a background in a subject other than History, adhered most rigidly to the handbooks, textbooks and model lesson plans, while some older teachers had clearly

³⁶ This visit was organised as part of the 2000 conference of the national History Education Association held in Shanghai. Groups of approximately 15 delegates were each assigned to visit a local school and observe a History lesson. My group, which included all the foreign delegates, visited a first-year senior secondary class at Jincai Zhongxue in Pudong.

³⁷ I have tried in vain to rediscover and thus supply the reference for an article I once read by a Chinese sociology professor who claimed that the 'feminisation of the teaching profession' is an impediment to the development of creative teaching and learning practices as women are, by nature, diligent, but less intellectually creative and forward-thinking than men. His views, unfortunately, are not uncommon; indeed, the Chinese government itself has stated relatively recently that men are more suited to intellectual pursuits and women to nurturing (Ross, 'The Crisis in Chinese Secondary Schooling', p85). Many Chinese educational psychologists, meanwhile, maintain that although male and female intellectual capacities are roughly equal, boys have a broader intellectual range and are able to conceptualise more complex abstractions (Huang, 'Xue lishi yu di zhishang', p46).

³⁸ Source: Shanghaishi jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui, 'Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi xianzhuang diaoyan zhi baogao zhuanji'.

repeated the national and global narrative (albeit with various ideological permutations) so many times that they had virtually memorised the textbooks, and were able to digress more confidently and include supplementary data.

As numerous education articles as well as teacher handbooks and even the more recent curriculum guidelines repeatedly stress, it is deemed more important to cover some topics than others, and, since time is invariably constrained, teachers are advised to focus chiefly on the information contained in the ‘large character’ sections of the textbooks, reserving the ‘small character’ sections mainly for supplementary reading.³⁹ Following these instructions, the handbooks and common model lesson plans, most teachers accordingly spend the majority of the time talking, standing at the front of the class and relaying the salient points of the textbook narrative to largely passive (and, in several classes I attended, actually sleeping!) students.⁴⁰ Mirroring the model lessons, most classes I observed opened with a brief recap of topics and key points covered in the previous class, before introducing the current lesson. In line with recent efforts to develop a more participatory learning style and thus accomplish the stated central goal of ‘teaching students to learn’, teachers, in most instances, also asked the students questions about the content of both the previous and forthcoming lessons. In some cases, the students simply called out the answers individually or in unison, in others they raised their hands, and only in very few classes were respondents pre-selected by the teacher or required to stand up to answer the question. The following near-verbatim exchange from a class on the Boxers (which follows the textbook chapter on the 1898 reforms) is an illustrative example of such a question-and-answer revision and preview session. (Similar exchanges were witnessed in most of the classes I attended, regardless of the subject matter or which textbook - PEP or Shanghai - they were using.)

³⁹ See, for example, Wang, ‘Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaokeshu (Renjiaoban), di san, si ce neirong de zhongyaoxing he jiangshou jianyi’, p27. The local curriculum guidelines produced in Shanghai and Beijing have explicitly identified which areas are more important, and what level of understanding is required for various topics (see Chapter 5). In this vein, one Beijing ERU History officer I accompanied on school visits also distributed to the teachers in her district a detailed chart she had compiled herself showing which topics could be omitted and what level of understanding was required for each.

⁴⁰ It should be noted that the only sleeping students were at the back of the class where there they could not be easily seen, although in one class I attended, a boy was quietly snoring!

T= Teacher S= Student n= specific student

T. Why did the Wuxu reforms fail?

S1. Because of Cixi and the conservative faction's coup

S2. Because Yuan Shikai betrayed the reformers

T. Yes, Yuan was not yet able to realise his own imperial ambitions, and was still under Cixi's wing. Who were the Six Martyrs (*liu junzi*)?

S3. Tan Sitong, Liu Guangdi, Kang Guangren, Yang Shenxiu [pause]

T. Does anyone know?

S4. Lin Xu and Yang Rui.

T. Excellent. Now, open your books to page 54 and read out the last paragraph. [Students read aloud in unison a paragraph on the impact of the 1898 reforms]. What was the nature of the 1898 reforms? [No reply volunteered]. **Bourgeois reformism** (*zichan jieji gailiangzhuyi*). This kind of reform could not succeed in China because the imperialist influence was very strong.... Unequal treaties had given foreigners many powers in China.... From the unequal treaties, we can see that some of the provisions therein permitted foreign religious influences to infiltrate our country. Which treaties allowed foreigners to disseminate their religion in China?

S5. Treaty of Tianjin

S6. Treaty of Nanjing

S2. Treaty of Wangxia

T. Correct. After these unequal treaties were signed, the Chinese people unceasingly resisted foreign religious invasion. The Boxers were part of this patriotic struggle.⁴¹

Questioning students is not, in theory, intended to be solely a revision technique, and as advocated by both the handbooks and contemporary writings on teaching methods, questions should be used throughout the lesson to involve students actively in the learning process.⁴² In practice, however, they tend to focus almost exclusively on eliciting information that demonstrates mastery of the basic knowledge and viewpoints already covered in the set texts. In this particular class, the teacher posed several questions on previous topics during the course of the lesson, asking, for example, 'Which was the largest peasant uprising in modern history?' (Taiping), as well as asking for feedback demonstrating students had listened and understood the content of the present lesson; for example, basic questions about relevant dates, names and places, and more potentially complex ones, such as 'Why did the Eight Nation Alliance mount yet another foreign invasion of China?' Other teachers I observed also made pronounced efforts to use a question and answer format, opening a class on the consolidation of Han dynasty rule, for example, with factual revision questions on the aspects in which Qin unification had laid the groundwork for Han rule, and continuing

⁴¹ Second-year class, Weiyu zhongxue, Shanghai.

throughout the class to pose basic questions on the newly covered material.⁴³ In a class on the Three Kingdoms, meanwhile, opening questions were asked about what had caused disunity (a recap of the demise of Eastern Han), and subsequent ones on the content of the current lesson, such as why Cao Cao was able to unify the north, which of the three kingdoms was strongest and so forth.⁴⁴

Generally, I found rather more questions were asked in those classes I attended alongside the local ERU History officer than in those I observed alone. Whether this was because teachers were seeking to impress the ERU officer (whose assessment counts towards promotion) or was simply coincidental, I cannot be certain. It is clear, however, that even if teachers are exerting themselves to please ERU personnel, this format has anyway already been well integrated into everyday classroom practice. Only in a few classes did teachers talk virtually uninterruptedly or limit student participation mostly to reading aloud from the textbook. At the other end of the scale, a minority of teachers posed more challenging questions that required students to provide more lengthy answers and thus to occupy more of the available talk time. Some were common ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘either/or’ questions, that might be asked in any class, such as ‘What was the Renaissance?’, ‘Why did the Sino-Japanese War begin?’ and ‘Was bourgeois reformism regressive or progressive?’⁴⁵ In some classes, relatively simple answers may suffice (whether because the teacher expects nothing more, or merely wishes to elicit confirmation of basic mastery of the narrative, its basic data and key concepts). Appropriate answers of this type to the above questions might be, respectively, a short description of key ideas and/or a list of artistic achievements of the Renaissance period, a summary of events in Korea preceding the Sino-Japanese conflict or a litany of foreign, especially Japanese, designs on China’s territory, or simply one-word, ‘regressive/progressive’ responses. In others, however, teachers are more demanding, requiring students to go into greater depth to justify their responses. Indeed, students may even be asked to explain their own value judgements or verdicts on historical figures and their actions. For example, one teacher asked her class whether they thought the adoption of Confucianism as state

⁴² For example, Feng, ‘Bangzhu xuesheng tigao xuexi de fangfa’, pp48-49.

⁴³ First-year class, Humin Zhongxue, Shanghai.

⁴⁴ First-year class, Xinan Mofan Zhongxue, Shanghai. This particular teacher (young male with a normal university Politics degree) was extremely nervous as he had not been forewarned of my visit, and simply read from his notes for the first few minutes of the lesson. He was also being observed by the head of the History department and two other teachers.

orthodoxy in the Han period was a good or bad policy. In an apparent effort to stimulate thinking about the impact of a monolithic state ideology on individuals and society and elicit more than straight good/bad answers, she first asked by way of an example, 'If the only subjects examined in school were Mathematics, Chinese and English, would you bother to revise History?' (Given that History is currently not tested in the SSEs this might be seen as adding yet another layer of meaning to what was already a question which could be interpreted in multiple and potentially subversive ways.) Some students simply responded with a monosyllabic 'good' or 'bad', while others offered reasons for their verdict. For example, 'It was good because it concentrated political power and brought peace to the nation'; 'It was bad because it spread the poisonous influence of Confucianism, putting too much pressure on people to pass the civil service examinations, causing lots of people to commit suicide'; or, 'Bad, because people didn't study other subjects because they wanted to become officials, so science and technology couldn't develop'.⁴⁶ Clearly these responses suggest that students' grasp of textbook content and classroom lectures may not correspond exactly to anticipated learning outcomes, a matter which is discussed in more depth in the final parts of this chapter. Suffice it for the moment to say that some answers are usually deemed more 'correct' than others, although in this particular case, the teacher did not pass judgement on any student's opinion, and after about a quarter of the class had replied, moved on to introduce the next topic.

The lecturing and question and answer styles discussed above constitute the core of History teaching while textbooks provide the basic learning materials, but they are intermittently supplemented to varying degrees by other methods and materials, either for whole lessons or parts thereof. In better equipped schools, these might include showing television documentaries and dramas, audio-recordings, or slides and photographs which may be projected or handed around. In one class I observed, for example, half a lesson was spent watching a documentary on the German invasion of the USSR, in particular the Battle of Stalingrad, while in another excerpts from a documentary on the Boxers was shown.⁴⁷ Fairly widespread use was also made of overhead projectors to display images, such as detailed maps, famous paintings and historic buildings which are of poor quality in all textbooks except Zhejiang's Social

⁴⁵ These examples are taken from classes at, respectively, Xinan Mofan Zhongxue, Beijing No. 80 Zhongxue and Weiyu Zhongxue.

⁴⁶ First-year students, Weiyu Zhongxue, Shanghai.

Studies volumes; indeed, the images in the PEP textbooks are not even reproductions, but are illustrations provided by the in-house art department. In addition to these teaching aids, some schools have recently begun to use computers, although at the time of fieldwork this was in its infancy, available in only a handful of well funded schools. One class on the Renaissance, for example, projected images from a computer onto a large pull-down screen, although the effect was little different from an overhead or slide projector. I also had the opportunity on one occasion to attend a genuinely computer-based class, but this too was much like any other lesson. The only significant difference was that the students sat in front of individual computer screens instead of textbooks, while the teacher adopted the standard question and answer format and instructed students to go to a particular page/section of the programme instead of turn to a given page in the textbook.⁴⁸

Where question and answer sessions aim to encourage participatory learning and to reinforce knowledge and viewpoint acquisition through repetition, these audio-visual aids (as well as the images included in textbooks) are thought to help bring the subject to life, and provide students with a more tangible link to the past than they typically derive from text-based narratives. They also aim to ‘stimulate the senses and emotions’ and thereby assist the development of students’ affective skills and attachments.⁴⁹ Students, for example, should be inspired by the majesty of a building, angered by a photograph of Japanese soldiers raping and pillaging, and moved by a piece of music or a powerful public speech; they should also feel pride or shame when they see images of their own or others’ achievements, such as an atomic bomb detonating or mankind in space, emotions which may be enhanced by an accompanying explanatory oral or textual narrative. In one class which made considerable use of the overhead projector, for example, a map of Asia, the Indian Ocean and East Africa was displayed on a large screen. Numerous arrows criss-crossed the map showing the voyages made by Zheng He. Although only the lands then directly controlled by the Ming and/or currently held by the PRC were marked as ‘China’, both China thus conceived and its tributary states were all shaded in the same colour. The teacher pointed at the map as she talked, exclaiming ‘See how big China

⁴⁷ Second-year class, Weiyu Zhongxue; third-year class, Shoudu shifan daxue fushu zhongxue, Beijing.

⁴⁸ This was extremely new at the time, and was a major event, with the school (Beijing No. 80 Zhongxue) principal and many ERU personnel in attendance. A local Beijing newspaper had even sent a reporter and photographer to cover this breakthrough. (Whether the paper deemed this newsworthy or whether the school enticed them to attend, however, is unclear).

was/is', 'Look how far Zheng He travelled'. She also asked various questions such as, 'How many countries did Zheng He visit?', 'How many times/kilometres/for how long did he travel?' This was followed by a comparative table (borrowed from the PEP handbook) matching up the voyages of Zheng He against those of da Gama and Columbus.⁵⁰ It showed where the three had travelled, when, how many voyages, how many people and ships had been involved and compared the size of the ships. A final section of the table (not included in the handbook) outlined the motives for their explorations. The teacher then asked students to say something about Zheng He in each comparative regard, eliciting the predictable replies, 'he was earliest,' 'his expeditions/ships were biggest' and 'his motives [friendly trading] were good'. A little mental arithmetic practice was also incorporated as students were asked how much earlier and how many times larger his expeditions were, the magnitude of his superiority only compounded by his virtue in comparison to his colonialist European counterparts.⁵¹ While a few students appeared to be genuinely fired up by the lesson, the majority remained passive, offering up predictable responses when pressed, and the whole episode rather brought to mind a scene from the film 'Hope and Glory', where the teacher taps her cane across a world map, rapping out 'Pink, pink, pink, pink. And what are all the pink bits children?' The children fidget in their seats, trying not to catch her eye, but one small child is picked out, finally answering 'the British Empire.' 'Yes,' glows the teacher, '*three-quarters* of the world is pink.'⁵²

The above examples represent the mainstream of History teaching, and although some teachers digress somewhat from the textbook, or encourage student participation more than others, most of the classes I observed followed much the same format. Even those classes which seemed more lively with higher levels of student engagement ultimately made few significant breaks from the texts. A class on the Munich Conference, for example, was wonderfully entertaining as the teacher acted out an imaginary dialogue between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier. Leaping back and forth, putting on funny voices (Chamberlain and Daladier dithering and pleading with confident and bullish Hitler and Mussolini, but scheming and sneaky between themselves), the teacher had the students in fits of laughter. His performance was not just a piece of empty entertainment, and through this dialogue he

⁴⁹ Zhou, 'Chongfen fahui lishi ketang jiaoxue de feizhili yinsu'.

⁵⁰ PEP, *Zhongguo lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu*, vol.2, p239.

⁵¹ Second-year class, Nanzhong zhongxue, Beijing.

effectively conveyed the substance of the issues then at stake in Munich. He also conveyed value judgments both with his tone of voice and movements and with his dialogue, through showing Chamberlain and Daladier passively if slightly reluctantly and obsequiously agreeing to German demands. The conclusions to be drawn, as the subsequent question and answer section of the class revealed, were that Britain and France had become lazy capitalists (indeed, at one point in the ‘play’, Daladier had been portrayed, literally, as a fat squealing pig) and simply preferred to capitulate than to unite with their neighbours to defeat the evil forces of fascism while also harbouring secret hopes that Germany would take out the USSR and save them the trouble.⁵³ Thus, although this teacher’s presentation *style* was dramatically different from (and more appealing than) that of most of his peers, the substance of the lesson, in fact, was nothing more than a repackaging of textbook content and teacher lecture in more attractive wrapping.

This is not say that no student-centred classes are held at all, and attempts have increasingly been made to introduce more evidence- and discussion-based learning. I found that evidenced-based learning is rather undeveloped, with writers of journal articles and books on History pedagogy providing a theoretical foundation and some model practice examples, but I saw no deployment of these techniques in school classrooms. Many teachers and especially ERU History officers, nevertheless, were very familiar with the general principles involved and were especially interested in the kind of data-based questions used in UK examinations that require students to synthesise, compare and generalise about what they have learnt in order to analyse and draw conclusions from the evidence (such as pictures or historical documents) before them.⁵⁴ Certainly, ERU officers have been keen to include these in examinations, but at the junior secondary level History is only examined in end-of-year tests and graduation examinations, not in the all important SSEEs. Whether this interest will eventually translate into significantly altered classroom practices,

⁵² ‘Hope and Glory’ directed by John Boorman (Columbia Pictures, 1987).

⁵³ Beijing No.35 shiyan zhongxue.

⁵⁴ Many teachers assumed that since I was British and researching Chinese History education that I was well-acquainted with British schooling, and in every school I visited, a significant part of my after-class discussions with teachers involved talking about History education in the UK. Despite my explaining that my academic background was in Chinese Studies, and that my information on History in Britain was based mainly on my own secondary school experiences and thus not only unrepresentative but also extremely out of date, my opinions were nevertheless apparently highly valued as if merely being British was sufficient to provide me with an authoritative overview. By contrast, my foreignness rendered my opinions on Chinese history and History education virtually worthless.

therefore, remains to be seen. By contrast, class discussion has quickly become relatively popular, and suggested activities in textbooks and teacher handbooks include some recommendations to hold a group discussion at the end of certain macro-periods. Whole lessons given over to discussion still remain few and far between, since there is barely time to get through the textbook let alone add what is widely perceived as supplementary and therefore inessential material, but in several classes I attended, students were asked to discuss a topic briefly among themselves and report their conclusions to the class. In other classes, the teacher solicited opinions from a number of individual students, sometimes commenting and redirecting before allowing other students to contribute; at other times, leaving the 'discussion' (or at least statements of opinion) to flow freely between students with little or no interruption or guidance.

The introduction of a more discursive element is part of the same movement which has led to historical events and persons now being evaluated in more subtle shades of grey than in the past when analysis was supposed to result in black and white conclusions. One of the main outcomes of this trend has been that students are frequently asked to explain the 'subjective' (*zhuguan*) or 'objective' (*keguan*) view of an event or historical person that should be formed in light of all the evidence, or at least all the evidence the students have encountered in the textbooks and possibly in their extra-curricular learning activities. For example, colonisation of the Americas, Asia and Africa was 'subjectively bad because the people were exploited and oppressed by the imperialists', but 'objectively it accelerated progress and modernisation'.⁵⁵ Individuals are likewise examined in a more nuanced manner, and, in this same topic area, Christopher Columbus is evaluated as someone who both 'opened' (*kaifa*) and 'destroyed' (*pohuai*) new lands; thus, from an 'objective perspective' he should be praised for his spirit of adventure and his contributions to modernisation and global interaction, while from a subjective point of view he should be blamed for bringing disaster and destruction to native American peoples.

While this represents a significant development in History education, I am unconvinced that 'subjective' and 'objective' are appropriate terms to denote what is actually being done in these attempts at multifaceted analyses. Aside from the obvious questions surrounding the attainability of objectivity in historical analysis, in

⁵⁵ Third-year students, Xinan mofan zhongxue.

almost every instance I have observed in classrooms and in texts, ‘objective’ perspectives are concerned with outcomes such as scientific development, economic and social modernisation, and international exchange, all commonly brought together under the rubric of ‘progress’ (*fazhan*). In other words, ‘objective’ corresponds to long-term developmental outcomes, which are deemed good or bad in terms of whether they helped or hindered historical materialist evolution. ‘Subjective’ evaluations, meanwhile, are not asking for the personal views of students or for those of the participants in the events under consideration, but are either moral verdicts based on contemporary values (such as oppressors = bad, victims = good) or assessments of short-term outcomes that were incidental to or had no calculable impact on the grand narrative of historical materialist progress. In short, the subjective-objective assessment of the past is merely a by-product of what, in Chapter 6, I referred to as ‘progressivism’ and ‘the rise-and-fall conception of history’.

As the above discussion has shown, vigorous efforts to reform History education have in practice achieved relatively little. Teaching methods, the main ideological thrust and structure of historical narratives whether spoken or in print, and even the language used by most teachers are in general hard to differentiate clearly, and in many respects remain virtually unchanged from the days when History was universally examined for SSEEs and classes necessarily revolved around equipping students to succeed in the tests. For many pedagogical researchers, this is an endless source of dismay. As far as they are concerned, since junior secondary History is no longer normally examined for SSEEs, there is no logical reason for History classes to continue the old ‘examination-oriented’ style. They are constantly reading the latest theories on History pedagogy, especially those by foreign academics, and frequently recommend and sometimes translate whole volumes and articles or selected parts thereof for wider consumption;⁵⁶ they believe they have clearly and accurately communicated their ideas to their students; and they know they have published numerous articles not just on theory, but on how to harness theory to practice in journals widely read by ERU History officers and possibly also by teachers. Yet, as

⁵⁶ Well known American theorists of History pedagogy, Keith Barton and Linda Levstik and British researchers Peter Lee and Alaric Dickinson, for example, appear to be widely read among normal university and senior ERU researchers. Texts mentioned to me included Barton and Levstik, *Teaching History for the Common Good*; Levstik, *Doing History*; Dickinson, Lee and Rogers, *Learning History*. While more recent research has generally not been translated into Chinese, classic works on education, such as Benjamin Bloom’s *Taxonomy of Education Objectives* and Jerome Bruner’s *The Process of Education* have long been in circulation in Chinese.

the conversation reproduced below, between Capital Normal University's Zhao Yafu and two of his former students, illustrates, breaking old patterns is no easy task.

T = Teacher Z = Zhao (author) n = specific teacher

T1 Our efforts were in vain! Now all we can do is teach the textbook, and declaim the narrative. I teach the textbook and students memorise it; this is the reality of History classes, and you're doing well if you can just tell a story

Z. Aren't there X and X methods you can use?

T1 That's what you specialists think, but it's not what the students want. Who actually practises the teaching methods expounded in pedagogical science?

T2 Yes, those are just teaching models you learn in class....

Z. Haven't student-centred, participatory learning and class discussion etc been advocated?

T1. The more you reform a lesson, the more tasks there are, there are changes in form, but not in substance. Whatever method you use is only carried out under the teacher's strict control. A good class in terms of 'doing' is still the teacher leading, while the students remain passive recipients.

Z. But after many years of emphasising skill training, haven't there been any improvements?

T1 Yes, but they are all superficial.⁵⁷

Thus, despite much proselytising on the importance of teaching students how to learn and of placing learners rather than texts and teachers at the heart of the educative process, whether by omission or commission, students, in effect, continue to be sidelined by current majority teaching practices. What implications this has for student learning, their mastery and appropriation of historical concepts and narratives, is discussed below.

III. Learning Outcomes

If the first thing that should be said about History teachers is that most of them did not choose their profession, and many would pursue a different career path if they could have their time again, perhaps the first thing that should be said about learning outcomes is that most students dislike the History subject. Contrary to Chan and Scott's claims that History is among the most well liked of school subjects,⁵⁸ Chinese education journals have long been reporting History teachers' and ERU staff laments

⁵⁷ Zhao, 'Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji lishi jiaoxue de hexin', p12.

⁵⁸ Chan and Scott ('Teaching Chinese History', p118) state that History is among the more popular school subjects, but cite neither published sources nor even personal communications to support this claim of History's popularity. It can only be surmised that the assertion was made based on their own

over the unpopularity of History,⁵⁹ although Yu has argued that this dislike is a relatively recent phenomenon; indeed, he asserts that prior to 1991, more than 60% of students liked History, and while its popularity subsequently declined, it is still among the more popular subjects.⁶⁰ He cites no references, however, and other recorded student surveys, as well as teachers and ERU personnel, confirm the original claim that History is unpopular. In 1997, for example, an MOE survey of 2,107 Beijing students revealed that of fifteen subjects, History ranked third in subjects students least wanted to study, second of those they least enjoyed, and the fifth most ‘dry and boring’.⁶¹ Although the results of this and other surveys merely confirmed the existence of a longstanding problem, many people were apparently ‘shocked by these statistics’ showing just how much students dislike History.⁶² Such findings have resulted in much soul-searching within the History education profession, with the general consensus being that the problem is not that students find learning about the past boring, nor even that History as a school subject is a subsidiary part of the school curriculum and is invariably superseded by more important core courses, but that ‘classroom teaching methods are unsatisfactory and lack appeal’.⁶³ The desire to make History more popular, therefore – whether to enhance the status of the subject and those who work in the field, whether because it is believed that students need to understand the past and that disliking the subject will prevent them from doing so, or whether simply to provide learners with a holistic education – has been one of the primary factors driving History education researchers to investigate new teaching methods and persuading school History departments to carry out experimental projects. Only when teachers truly follow the tenets of quality education, it is believed, ‘will students respect History teachers, respect the History subject, and will History’s rightful place in secondary education be guaranteed’.⁶⁴

As shown above, however, the enormous volume of writing on History pedagogy that has been produced in recent years has not yet, in most instances, been reflected in

presumptions or that they were told this in private conversation with teachers who may have desired to project an image of their own importance and that of their subject.

⁵⁹ See for example Qi, ‘Lishi ketang jiaoxue de meili tanwei’, p31.

⁶⁰ Yu, *Jichu jiaoyu xiandaihua jiaoxue jibengong: zhongxue lishi juan*, p??

⁶¹ Zhang, ‘Xuesheng lishi xuexi xinli yu jiaoxue celue de tantao’, p4. (A full report of the implications of these survey findings may be found in another article by the same author, ‘Kecheng gaige xuesheng wenjuan de diaocha yu fenxi’).

⁶² Ibid., p4.

⁶³ Qi, ‘Lishi ketang jiaoxue de meili tanwei’, p31.

⁶⁴ Huang, ‘Xue lishi yu di zhishang’, p46.

a universally decisive reorientation of classroom practice away from teachers and textbooks towards a more learner-centred curriculum. Unsurprisingly, student attitudes to History have not really changed either; surveys have continued to find that History remains deeply unpopular, and is widely disdained as a subject requiring ‘low intellect’, an option (at university entrance examination level) for those who are unable to specialise in more complex and useful subjects such as Physics and Chemistry.⁶⁵ More in-depth surveys conducted by ERU personnel have attempted to discover what exactly it is that students dislike about History other than its low status *vis-à-vis* other subjects, and how it might be adjusted so as better to accommodate and develop student interest and skills. Although most of these surveys have been relatively small-scale and respondents are rarely anonymous, the range of responses as well as the frank criticisms made by some respondents indicate that the findings are meaningful even if they cannot be regarded as wholly free from self-censorship or be considered representative of student attitudes nation-wide.

One Beijing survey conducted in January 2001, for example, asked first-year senior secondary students to list the topics they had most liked and disliked in junior secondary History and to explain why. It also asked them to identify any areas or topics they had found difficult to comprehend, to state the topic they most wished to see eradicated from the course and to select which of the three sections of the History course - ancient Chinese history, modern-contemporary Chinese history and world history – they preferred, giving reasons for their answers in each case. Finally, they were asked how they thought the junior secondary textbook could be improved, and to give their opinions on testing and assessment methods. (See the appendix at the end of this chapter for a translation of the survey questions). The survey findings I was able to analyse⁶⁶ indicated clearly that students generally had little trouble understanding what they were learning, but found that some topics were rather convoluted and difficult to remember, especially those relating to periods of disunity

⁶⁵ Ibid., p46.

⁶⁶ This survey was carried out at several schools, but I only obtained copies of thirty-seven completed survey forms from Capital Normal University’s attached secondary school. The survey sample consisted of twenty-four females and eleven males, with two respondents not identifying their gender. I have numbered the survey response forms in no particular order, merely separating male from female. Hence, form nos. S1-S24 refer to female students, S25-S35 male, S36 and S37 to the unidentified respondents. It is worth noting that although the respondents’ prior education was not identified, it is likely that many of them had studied at the same school in their junior secondary years; others would have tested into the senior secondary section from other junior secondary schools through the SSEE. Their junior secondary History classes, therefore, should be assumed to have taken place with a variety of teachers, which may have influenced their responses to the textbooks.

when there were numerous dynasties controlling different parts of China, and to topics that focused particularly heavily on the laws of historical materialism and the changing means and relations of production. These relatively ‘difficult’ topics were, unsurprisingly, also among those listed as the most disliked, the reason being the aforementioned problems with remembering all the relevant data and chronologies which were widely criticised as ‘too chaotic’ (*tai luan*), as well as dull (*meiyisi*) and dry (*kuzao*). Other unpopular topics included wars, which particularly in the modern-contemporary period were said (in each case by female students) to go into too much detail about individual battles, and peasant rebellions, with the Taiping and Boxer rebellions specifically identified by several respondents (male and female) as ‘dry and repetitive’, while in world history, the 1848 European revolutions and ‘the development of scientific socialism’ chapters were written off as boring and difficult to follow.⁶⁷ Popular topics tended to include those from ancient history (both Chinese and world), especially cultural themes, although several students did state that they hated ‘all periods of cultural history’ for no apparent reason other than that cultural history is ‘boring’, even if, as one girl wrote, ‘we know it is very important.’⁶⁸

Although reasons for liking a given topic were, as those for disliking one, fairly mundane and generic, limited in the main to adjectives such as ‘interesting’, numerous students did specifically state that they enjoyed topics where stories were told or that gave them a ‘sense of mystery’ or ‘wonder’, as well as those that ‘opened one’s eyes’, ‘stimulated one’s imagination’ or ‘expanded one’s horizons’. For these same reasons, ancient Chinese history and world history scored highly on the question asking which section of the course students had most enjoyed, with only a handful stating a preference for modern-contemporary Chinese history.⁶⁹ Perhaps somewhat surprisingly given that this survey was not anonymous, only a few students wrote ‘politically correct’ answers that sounded as if they had been taken directly from the textbook sections on ‘Why study Chinese/world history?’. One girl wrote that her preference for ancient Chinese history was because as ‘a descendant of the Yellow emperor, one should have a knowledge of one’s own history and culture’,⁷⁰ while another stated a preference for world history for its use as an instructional resource.

⁶⁷ S2, S14, S29, S31.

⁶⁸ S7.

⁶⁹ Five students selected modern history.

⁷⁰ S10

Since China is undergoing socialist modernisation, we must learn from other countries material and spiritual civilisations, we must take the good things to supplement our deficiencies and accelerate socialist construction, and deepen our education in historical materialism and patriotism.⁷¹

Other students maintained the patriotic theme, but did not follow the patriotic education script as closely, with the few students who expressed a preference for modern-contemporary Chinese history stating that learning about China's recent humiliations could help revive (*xing*) the country.⁷² Similar reasons, however, were given by other students for disliking modern-contemporary Chinese history as 'the Chinese people suffered too much' and 'it is too humiliating and depressing to learn about it'.⁷³

Given the clear preference for story-telling and the rejection of all things dry and dull expressed by many students, recommended improvements to the textbook unsurprisingly included adding more images and stories and making the exercise and activity sections more 'lively'. Reducing the amount of data, while only specifically indicated as a suggested textbook improvement by a few students, was nevertheless apparently desirable since almost all of those who filled in the final section on assessment methods stated a preference for 'open book' tests to avoid having to memorise a great deal of information; as one student lamented, 'such and such a treaty, such and such a revolution, such and such a reform, such and such a movement There are so many of them and it is so boring to learn the names, dates, places and the historical significance of each one, and the teacher makes us memorise them all'.⁷⁴

While neither the students nor the above average Beijing school from which these survey results were obtained can be considered representative of secondary schools or students across the country, History teachers, academics, ERU personnel and students I interviewed in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and History education professionals from other parts of the country that I met at the 2000 Shanghai conference as well as journal articles and my own classroom observations confirmed the general thesis that, like their counterparts the world over, students throughout China are easily bored by the 'acts and facts' style of textbooks and many teachers, and confused by 'structural' explanations of the past, leading them to dislike what they are supposed to be learning. By contrast, they respond enthusiastically to story-

⁷¹ S12

⁷² For example, S9, S25.

⁷³ S27.

⁷⁴ S8

telling that focuses on ‘intentional’ explanations, and the personalities, thoughts and emotions of individual or group participants in events. Thus, teachers who tell lively stories about great men are almost invariably more popular than those who simply parrot the textbook or talk in terms of historical materialist laws, and their students more likely to enjoy History, which according to Chan and Scott may make them less resistant to believing what they read in textbooks and hear in classrooms, and to accepting the ideologies transmitted through these media.⁷⁵

Chan and Scott, as the evidence shows, were mistaken in their assumption that History is popular, but does disliking the History subject mean that students’ ‘mastery’ and ‘appropriation’ of historical narratives and the moral-ideological messages embedded therein are thereby impaired? Clearly, liking History might increase the probability that mastery and appropriation will be accomplished more easily or quickly, since preference for a particular subject may translate into better concentration within the classroom and greater diligence without, but there are many factors other than students’ interest in or enjoyment of the subject involved in determining the effect of texts on their users. In fact, if McLuhan is right and the medium is indeed the message, then it might be if not quite irrelevant at least inessential for students to like History at all in order for them to master and even appropriate what is learnt in the school.

There are, of course, as Bloom’s taxonomy (which is very popular among educationalists in China) different levels of mastery.⁷⁶ Being able to recite all the dynasties and their reign dates, for example, is undoubtedly one form, but it does not mean that one knows anything about them. Understanding something one has learnt, and being able to deploy the data to make sense of something else, or to support an argument is another level of mastery. Which levels students are expected to attain is, as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, specified in curriculum requirements in accordance with their stage of schooling, but the extent to which they succeed is debatable. It seems, nevertheless that whether or not they learn to manipulate and apply their knowledge, most students do have a relatively strong grasp of ‘the facts’ in the textbook, even if

⁷⁵ Chan and Scott, ‘Teaching Chinese History’, p118.

⁷⁶ Bloom, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*.

they are sometimes a little unclear about the relationship between them, or about concepts such as cause and effect.⁷⁷

Widespread attainment of this level of mastery, I would argue, has little relevance to whether students like the subject, but more to do with the teacher- and text-centric style of classroom learning (McLuhan's 'medium') which still predominates despite many efforts to the contrary. Furthermore, although History is no longer included in SSEEs, tests remain an important and regular fixture in the school calendar and student-learning is generally, as Chinese educationalists have long been complaining, 'examination-oriented'. There are, of course, fewer immediate negative consequences for poor grades when a subject is not SSEE-tested, but low grades mean lower expectations from teachers, and lower expectations are typically reflected in poorer overall performance. Given the pressure from parents and society to perform well academically - pressure which has intensified as the one-child policy gives parents only a single focus for their hopes - it is hardly surprising that many students continue to be fairly diligent about studying and homework, even if they do not always pay attention in class. Perhaps most importantly for cognitive mastery, is that students are exposed to this same account of history beginning in primary school and continuing most of the way through senior secondary. Furthermore, as in the former USSR, N Korea, Iran and other authoritarian and revolutionary states, the state has until recently at least also exercised a high degree of control over cultural (re)production, the media and other sources of public history. Given this context of intensive repetition and the dominance of government-authorised, if not government produced, historical narratives, and it seems almost impossible *not* to master the basic knowledge transmitted through the school History curriculum.

Knowing, as Wertsch and others have argued is not, however, the same as believing. As discussed at some length in the introductory chapter, in order for students to appropriate the values and ideologies inherent in a historical narrative, they cannot simply know an account of the past, but must believe it to be true.⁷⁸ Thus, just as with mastery being perhaps a smoother process if one enjoys the subject, liking History or a History teacher may predispose one towards believing what is heard, and thus more quickly to appropriate implicit or explicit ideological messages

⁷⁷ See the example in the previous section of student opinions on Han Wudi's expulsion of the '100 Scholars' and the instatement of Confucianism as the official state ideology.

⁷⁸ Wertsch, 'Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history?'

and concepts. There is, however, no direct correlation between liking History and either knowing or believing it.

The question that remains, therefore, is what do students actually believe and under what conditions are they likely to appropriate or reject what they are taught? Only when this is known can an attempt to answer the question of who controls the past be made. As to the latter part of the question, those who feel excluded from the national narrative and are not perceived to embody the national qualities of the *Zhonghua minzu* are undoubtedly the least likely to believe what they are taught. Ethnic minorities, for example, who are on the one hand included in contemporary national narratives as brother *minzu*, but on the other, consistently derogated by being shown to be at a lower stage of socio-economic development, only good at singing, hunting, horse-riding or archery and so forth, are far more likely to reject a narrative in which an important community to which they belong is treated as peripheral and incidental to the narrative, or plays a 'negative' role as splittist, barbaric or backwards. Indeed, one text of a model teacher-student dialogue has the teacher asking the student to say which minority figures (from the Sixteen Kingdoms and N and S Dynasties) are positive, which negative. The student replies that Shi Le is positive 'because he studied hard, respected the Han and Confucianism, and absorbed [their] advanced culture'.⁷⁹

Similarly women have few female role-models in the textbooks, and thus may also feel excluded from a gendered national narrative. This may perhaps be one reason why in the surveys cited above, female students displayed greater interest in foreign history, which tends to be more about events and cultures than individual (male) people, although in world history, the worthies students are encouraged to emulate are also almost invariably male. More recently, peasants and industrial workers, who were once at the narrative centre as the principal agents of historical change, have also been increasingly excluded as History has moved away from praising peasants and workers for their redness (once the highest national quality) to portraying them as backwards and ignorant. National qualities, as discussed in Chapter 6, are increasingly the preserve of the educated, male, Han elite.

If it is relatively easy to discern some of the factors that militate for or against the affective appropriation of values transmitted by historical narratives, it is

⁷⁹ Zhu, 'Tigao suzhi zuanyan jiaofa', p111.

extraordinarily difficult to ascertain what exactly people do believe, the precise reason for which this study has focused principally on the areas of history production and transmission rather than that of consumption. It is necessary, however, to attempt a preliminary and tentative explanation, or at least a hypothesis, in order to gain a complete picture of History education in the contemporary PRC. After all, if history had no bearing (real or imagined) on our values, beliefs and identities, it would not be as controversial as it is, nor would it be the object of intense public scrutiny, both domestic and international, that it so often is.

My impression has been that many Chinese students both master and appropriate what they learn in school and, in fact, may appropriate the values therein without ever attaining a high level of mastery in the subject. This is not, I would argue, because history education is simply an instrument of the Party-state, a vehicle for the top-down brainwashing of innocent minds. It is instead because History education in practice is remarkably homogeneous, with virtually the same language and concepts used by all textbooks and all teachers; indeed, in many other revolutionary and totalitarian states, school textbooks use astonishingly similar language to those used in the PRC.⁸⁰ While this homogeneity may originally have been designed, now, I would maintain, it is in large part simply because of inertia. Despite all the efforts to reform curricula, textbooks and teaching, thus far the changes have been extremely superficial. I do not believe this is because of a grand conspiracy to preserve the status quo on the part of the elite, for although homogeneity may perhaps be necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for hegemony, even if in practice it accomplishes the same thing. Hegemony implies, as Searle has put it, ‘collective intentionality’, that is, a collective will to power, to create or sustain domination, and while the CPC clearly wants to retain political power and there is evidently some concern among the leadership over what versions of history are taught to impressionable young children, the level of government control has, as discussed in Chapter 3, been dramatically reduced in recent years, and schools in practice have more autonomy than they do in theory. Homogeneity is, rather, a product of the current education system, the type of texts studied, teaching methods and, underlying it all, decades and even centuries and millennia of teacher- and text-centred education

⁸⁰ See, for example, North Korean texts cited in Wilson, Ford and Jones, ‘The History Text’; Iranian in Aloni, *Revolutionary Messages in Elementary School Textbooks in Iran*. This may be in large part

which have created an inert force of their own, independent of politics; as one teacher told Gardner, 'We have been doing this for so long that we just know it is right'.⁸¹

While homogeneity of texts and teaching may ensure that the same messages are being transmitted, it does not mean that they are necessarily appropriated in the ways curriculum developers and textbook writers might originally have had in mind. As Ye has put it, 'speaking clearly is not the same as hearing clearly' (*jiang mingbai bu dengyu ting mingbai*), 'teaching is not the same as learning' (*jiaoxue bu dengyu xuexi*).⁸² What goes in, in other words, may not be what comes out, and even if students appropriate the values and ideologies embedded in historical narratives, the values they are absorbing may not be in the form in which they were originally conceived, and even if they are, how they are subsequently deployed in social and political life may not be what was originally projected or intended. Under government direction, schools in post-World War II Ethiopia, for example, in an effort to construct a basis for 'modernisation',

cultivated scientific attitudes, taught about democratic institutions and transmitted egalitarian values for a society which remained pre-scientific, authoritarian and hierarchical. The school taught the opposite of what the society was and what the rulers wanted it to be. As a result the schools produced not merely cultural misfits, but also enemies of the social, economic and political order.⁸³

Perhaps to a lesser degree, History education in contemporary China is doing the same thing. As the language of historical grievance deployed by militant nationalists in today's China suggests, they have indeed mastered and appropriated much of what they learnt in their school History textbooks. Significantly, the most militant nationalists tend to be university students, that is, those who have had the greatest non-professional exposure to the authorised narratives of Chinese and world history. These educated nationalists are, of course, a small percentage of the population, albeit an influential one and the emotional component of their nationalism derives in no small part from their appropriation of historical narratives which teach them that China has always been generous and peace-loving and has been cruelly victimised by foreign capitalism-imperialism. While the curricula and textbooks attempt to use relatively moderate language, teachers frequently do not; indeed, in one volume aimed at school teachers, a TMIC member explicitly stated that the students should be

because many revolutionary Communist states have borrowed their textbook formats, or even simply translated, directly from USSR texts.

⁸¹ Gardner, *To Open Minds*, p271.

⁸² Ye, talk given at History education conference, Shanghai, Nov. 2000.

⁸³ Amare, 'Education in Ethiopia', pp94-95.

encouraged to hate China's enemies, because 'the more they hate our enemies, the more they will love China'.⁸⁴ Others, however, have denounced this as narrow and potentially harmful nationalism and believe History should seek to cultivate more globally minded citizens; as Yang has written

Dwelling only on 'glorious victories' and ignoring 'humiliating defeats' easily encourages arrogance and an unwillingness to learn from the strong points of other peoples.... While maintaining complete silence on China's own problems, the teaching of modern history on the other hand stresses the calamity brought about by the incursion of capitalism into China. This could easily create the impression that the main cause for the degradation of an advanced China into a backward position was the pillage and aggression perpetrated by capitalism and imperialism. Consequently, students are steered towards racial hatred and the rejection of other nations' advanced science and technology, thoughts and cultures.⁸⁵

While the state has certainly sought to harness this popular nationalism in real or imaginary battles against contemporary 'foreign imperialism', it has no doubt been in part to deflect attention from its domestic failures. These militant nationalists, however, potentially pose a threat to the regime, in part, because of their generally more privileged social background and their ability to vocalise and disseminate opinion, but primarily because the loyalty History teaches students to feel has been increasingly towards the Chinese *minzu* and to the lands that constitute a de facto or wished-for 'China' rather than to the CPC-led state. Thus to maintain its legitimacy, the government must be seen to be representing the honour and face of the *Zhonghua minzu* at all times, especially in the international arena, leading China into potentially dangerous confrontations. But this encouragement of nationalism is, for the regime, a potentially dangerous game, for the nation-centred narrative of history posits a primordial people and eternal motherland that transcend the transient historical category of the Communist state. It is this nation, descended from the yellow emperor, its cultural and ancestral lands - not the historically contingent regime and its political manoeuvring - with which History texts exhort the Chinese people to identify, and for the betterment of which they should strive. The state as Tang wryly observes 'will sooner or later become obsolete and end up in the museum, whereas the motherland will have as long a life as humankind itself'.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Bao, 'Lishi jiaoxue de renwu', p14.

⁸⁵ Yang, 'Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue jidai gaijin de neirong', p72.

⁸⁶ Tang, 'Rethinking the problem of patriotic education', p81.

Conclusion

Current Projects, Future Prospects

As we have seen, strenuous efforts have been made over the past few years to change the ways in which the curriculum is produced and transmitted, and to make History as a school subject both more appealing to students and more relevant to their everyday lives as members of a rapidly transforming society. While increased participation of experts in curriculum development and the introduction of limited textbook pluralism have clearly been major steps in the arduous process of reforming what has traditionally, because of its immense political sensitivity, been an extremely conservative school subject, in terms of format and content, neither the curricula nor the textbooks have been fundamentally altered. Classroom teaching, which reformers have long been trying to make more learner-centred, similarly lags in practice far behind the pace of theoretical developments. In classroom practice it is, of course, far harder to ensure that old habits and styles are being reformed than it is in the case of syllabi and textbooks, since as shown in Chapter 3, mandating changes has little correlation to their enactment, especially when there is apparently so little at stake for teachers. Accordingly, it was decided that a more radical overhaul of the curriculum and textbooks was necessary. If the teaching guidelines and materials were dramatically revised, it was reasoned, then teaching – even if it continued to adhere rigidly to the textbook – would automatically follow in the ‘correct’ direction. The fruits of these labours are yet to be determined, since the new national curriculum standards, Beijing’s new and Shanghai’s revised curricula and the array of textbooks that have been drafted in accordance with these several documents have only been on trial since 2001. It is worth offering, however, a preliminary analysis of these new materials in order to ascertain in a broad sense the extent to which the Party-state’s hold on the past has been maintained and to evaluate the implications for the future. More specifically, it evaluates whether reformist goals have actually been achieved in the new materials. The Beijing curriculum has already been discussed in Chapter 5; here we will survey only the content of the 2001 national History Curriculum Standards (HCS) and several textbooks that were drafted in accordance with it in addition to one of the textbooks drafted on the basis of Shanghai’s revised curriculum.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the 2001 HCS has been extremely controversial, beginning with the transfer of power over curriculum development from PEP to Beijing Normal University (BNU). Whether the BNU team has in part designed the curriculum with a key motive of displaying their difference from PEP, or whether they have simply followed sound pedagogical principles is difficult to ascertain, but the structural organisation of HCS is a major redirection from the old PEP format. The first section is a lengthy explanation of the nature of the curriculum, the basic conceptual aims to which it aspires and the thinking that informed the drafting of the document, although this last item is somewhat misleading as in fact, it merely summarises how it is organised, rather than explains why particular choices have been made. It implicitly and explicitly criticises the ways in which things have hitherto been done, while also reiterating its adherence to fundamental tenets of history, namely historical materialism, and to future pedagogical goals. More radically, it does not mention the Communist Party, socialism or even the reform and opening policy, let alone revolution and the proletariat, and generally tries to stay away from traditional platitudes about using the past as a mirror for the present and guide for the future, focusing instead on its role in moulding the values and outlooks of the next generation. It is worth quoting the opening statement at some length.

As mankind enters the twenty-first century, economic globalisation accelerates daily, all kinds of ideas and cultures influence one another, while the trend towards political multi-polarity continues to evolve. How to maintain and disseminate the traditions of the Chinese national people (*minzu*) and their culture and stimulate students' patriotic sentiment in this environment has become a problem from which History education cannot turn away. At the same time, the unceasing development of social science research has also highlighted new tasks in the basic education History curriculum. Since the establishment of New China more than fifty years ago, History education has had some astounding achievements, but there are still many areas in which it has not been able to adapt to the needs of the times and the quality education of the people (*guomin*). These curricular reforms use historical materialist viewpoints and scientific education theory as a guide, and through a selective syllabus, they create lively and varied teaching methods, encourage student interest in learning history, transform student learning from a state in which they have been passive, rote-learning recipients of teaching to one in which they have space to learn about and explore historical issues; they nurture a correct conception of history (*lishiguan*), teach students to observe and analyse both historical and current problems dialectically, deepen their love of the motherland and their understanding of the world, and teach students to derive wisdom from history, making them into modern civilised citizens equipped to face the challenges of the new century.¹

Subsequent sections reiterate many of the above points, and reinforce the principle of reforming both methods and content of teaching. It is asserted that the curriculum has hitherto been too specialised and adult, too focused on knowledge transmission

¹ HCS, p1.

and neglectful of skill-training, and overly preoccupied with presenting a systematic, comprehensive account of the past; all in all, a curriculum that is both unsuitable for young minds and unsuited to the times. The curriculum's ambition to provide a basis for teaching improvements is also noted here with a clear statement that 'history curriculum reform should help teachers to change their teaching methods, and instil the notion of students as the subjects of education'. This, in turn, will 'benefit the transformation of learning, promote students' positive and active participation in the educational process' and teach them analytical skills.² To this end, the second section on curricular objectives adds some general principles on striking the balance between knowledge and skills, on the process and methods of teaching and learning, and on affective development and values.

The remainder of the document consists of the syllabus and a section on implementation which covers teaching and assessment recommendations.³ Unlike the History Teaching Outlines, the new HCS does not provide lengthy introductions to historical periods and topics, nor does it offer guidance on the key themes, although it does contain short summaries of each historical period (ancient, modern contemporary) before listing the syllabus items. Here, the historical materialist stages of development are mentioned, but the narrative content focuses primarily on the key themes of unity and economic and scientific progress. None of this, of course, is particularly radical; the content of the 2000 revised Outline made many of the same departures from the language of revolution, emphasising reform and modernisation instead. What is a major change, however, is that the syllabus has been drastically curtailed. No longer is it ordered in such a way that textbook writers can merely take each topic heading and make it into a chapter, nor is it explicitly organised along historical materialist or dynastic lines. Instead, it attempts to pick out a key organising principle for each period and select relevant topics. Thus, for example, the Qin-Han period is labelled as 'the establishment of a unified state', the period between the fall of Eastern Han and the rise of Sui as 'the division of political power and the integration of the national people', and the pre-Opium War Qing period as 'the consolidation of the multi-ethnic state and social crisis'.⁴ Only very general topics are

² HCS, p2.

³ The syllabus comprises approximately 60% of the document (pp6-32), the final section on teaching and assessment almost 30%.

⁴ HCS, pp8-9.

listed, with an extremely brief explanation of the relevant key points and a classroom activity recommended at the end of each section.

While the ethos of simplicity is evident and clearly has a logical basis, there are nevertheless some rather odd omissions. In the modern history section, for example, the Taiping Rebellion has been omitted as a major rebellion targeting the ruling dynasty, but has instead been categorised rather awkwardly as part of the section on ‘Foreign invasion and the Chinese people’s struggle of resistance’. Since this section is all about foreign encroachment and resisting, the Taiping armies have accordingly been given some foreign enemies in the shape of the Ever Victorious Army. It is nowhere mentioned that the role of this foreign mercenary force was extremely minor and wholly ignores the main target of the uprising. This section has accordingly been much criticised. One PEP editor who was working on the HCS textbooks simply could not believe it, and struggled tremendously trying to fit the narrative to its revised function. ‘This is complete chaos’, he said, ‘I understand that History needs to be reformed, but this does not make any sense at all. How can I write a book about modern history without discussing the Taiping Rebellion?’⁵ Where rebellions (except for the patriotic Boxers) have largely disappeared from modern history, reform has taken their place and there is a section here (covering roughly the same time frame as the anti-imperialist section) on the origins of China’s modernisation.⁶

In the contemporary history section, meanwhile, the topics have also been cut, with key ones such as the establishment of the PRC, the peaceful liberation of Tibet, and the eradication of feudalism. The Great Leap and the communes are unambiguously denounced as an ‘serious error’ and the Cultural Revolution said to have ‘brought disaster to the country and the people’, but the Anti-rightist movement is omitted.⁷ Unsurprisingly, given the focus on reform and development for the twenty-first century, the post-Mao period is allotted a considerable portion of the syllabus, with an emphasis on economic growth, ethnic unity (reunification), national defence and achievements on the international stage.

World history, by contrast, has again undergone relatively few changes, although as in Chinese history a number of topics have been deleted. Focus remains on providing illustrative examples of different stages of historical materialist

⁵ PEP editor, personal communication.

⁶ HCS, p13.

⁷ HCS, p17.

development although the language has been somewhat revised to include currently fashionable terms such as ‘clash of civilisations’ (used to describe the conquests of Alexander the Great) as well as the more gentle ‘contact’ demonstrated by the travels of Marco Polo (or in Chinese history, Zheng He).⁸

While the narrative outlined in HCS does not suggest that significant revision of older textbook narratives is warranted, the ‘educational activity’ sections at the end of each topic and the lengthy final chapter on teaching and assessment do indicate a commitment to reform that is not evident from the syllabus. Suggested activities include reading various works of historical fiction, or classic works from the past, watching films that fictionalise the lives and times of various historical figures, organising class debates, ‘collecting and sharing stories of friendly inter-ethnic exchange’ and other story-telling activities, reciting classical poetry, visiting museums and historical buildings and other similar ‘cultural’ exercises. In the contemporary period there are also some suggestions that involve finding out from one’s family about the past, collecting the old coupons for grain, oil and other products, while in an effort to reinforce the ethnic unity message, it is also recommended that students each tell the class about a particular ethnic group, explaining their holidays, attire, customs and so on.⁹ Activities for world history, meanwhile, focus mainly on looking at historical maps and photographs, although there are a few recommendations to see films (such as ‘The Battle of Austerlitz’) and write essays or hold debates, such as one on friendly contacts and violent clashes between ancient (i.e. pre-seventeenth century) civilisations and another on whether World War II could have been avoided.¹⁰ There is also a potentially interesting activity suggesting a comparison between Chinese socialism and that of the USSR, although unfortunately the purpose of demonstrating China’s superiority and the correctness of its current path are explicitly noted in the question, thereby telling the students the conclusion they should reach.

The final sections on implementation do seem to be a useful addition to the curriculum. The first section is directed at textbook writers, and includes numerous examples of potential activities to incorporate at the end of each chapter or textbook section, while the latter seems to be more suited to ERUs since it is concerned

⁸ HCS, p22.

⁹ HCS, pp7-20.

¹⁰ HCS, pp22-27.

principally with assessment, and although teachers often set their own tests, they frequently do so with ERU input, and more important examinations, such as end of year and graduation examinations are always set by ERU officials.

As noted above, HCS has been viewed by PEP as something of an aberration, but having drafted curricula and written textbooks for many years, most of the editors were all too aware that they would need to comply with the guideline fairly closely in order to pass the TMIC inspection. What the TMIC inspectors actually thought of HCS I do not know as I interviewed them before HCS had been submitted for inspection. My suspicion, given that most of the TMIC members are rather elderly, and - if their writings are any basis on which to judge - are relatively conservative, is that they, like PEP, have found HCS to be somewhat piecemeal and insubstantial in comparison to the comprehensive narrative which has hitherto been in force. Since the BNU curriculum developers had been commissioned by the MOE to produce HCS however, and in the context of increasing pressure from central government to deliver on-time results in education, the TMIC inspectors would have had little choice but to recommend minor alterations or risk there being no curriculum to promulgate. Once HCS had been approved, therefore, the textbook writers would in turn have had no choice but to comply.

The new textbooks accordingly make an effort to follow the structure set by HCS. BNU's own press has published one set,¹¹ which since it was written and edited by many of the same scholars who drafted HCS, closely resembles what, presumably, the authors originally imagined would ensue from the guidelines.¹² The PEP editions, by contrast, organise their material under the broad headings suggested in HCS, but in their chapter titles indicate a reluctance to move away from the more traditional chronological approach that covers each of the 'major' topics. Nevertheless, in keeping with the spirit of HCS, PEP's volumes have drastically reduced their coverage in terms of plain text and greatly increased the number of images, while also adding more detail to their cultural sections.¹³ Huadong Normal University (HNU) Press, meanwhile, has published two sets of History textbooks, one compliant with HCS, the other with the revised Shanghai curriculum, which has compressed the

¹¹ BNU, *Lishi*, (6 vols.)

¹² Zhu Hanguo is the chief editor of the textbook set and was also the convener of the curriculum development committee.

¹³ PEP, *Zhongguo lishi* (4 vols.), *Shijie lishi* (2 vols.)

junior secondary History course into two years instead of three.¹⁴ Junior secondary students following the Shanghai curriculum, therefore, study Chinese History in their first year, and world history in the second, with the first volume of Chinese history covering from the dawn of Chinese civilisation up to the early Qing period, and the second from the Opium Wars to the present. The world history textbooks are unchanged in their coverage since there were only two volumes originally anyway.

The large time-span covered by the Shanghai Chinese history texts compared to the HCS-compliant ones means, needless to say, that they have had to excise considerably more material from the previous textbook set than has been the case for the other sets, even given the reduced coverage recommended in HCS. In this Shanghai set, the 1898 Reforms and the Boxers, for example, are merged into one chapter, as are the May 4th movement and the establishment of the CPC.¹⁵ On the other hand, the New Culture Movement, which in previous texts had been subsection of the May 4th chapter, is here given a chapter of its own, albeit a short one.¹⁶ Savings to offset this have been made in the *kangri* section of the text which was previously a substantial component of the modern history syllabus (and remains so in the HCS textbooks, albeit slightly reduced from those compliant with the Outlines). Now it has been reduced to only two (of twenty-eight) chapters. Like the HCS textbooks, the Shanghai texts here appear to be making an effort to focus on cultural history and reduce coverage of political and military history, which, as seen in the surveys cited in Chapter 7, are areas in which students appear to have little interest. As in HCS texts, there is also a downplaying of peasant uprisings and the theme of revolution, with the Taiping Rebellion reduced to a few paragraphs (although unlike the HCS textbooks this brief summary does pit them against the Qing, not the foreign imperialists). The Boxers, here, are represented as loyal patriots, but more is made of their anti-foreignism than in the equivalent sections in the HCS-compliant volumes.

From a presentation standpoint all the texts have changed quite significantly, but based on the one HCS-compliant Huadong Normal University (HNU) textbook I have seen, this is a dramatically more impressive volume than any of the others. Although both the BNU and PEP sets are in colour and have far better quality images than they did in the past, this HNU volume is superior in this regard. It appears to be following

¹⁴ Huadong shifan daxue, (HCS-compliant) *Zhongguo lishi* (4 vols.), *Shijie lishi* (2 vols.); (Shanghai HCS-compliant) *Zhongguo lishi* (2 vols.), *Shijie lishi* (2 vols.).

¹⁵ HNU (Shanghai) *Zhongguo lishi*, vol.2, pp33-37, pp65-69.

¹⁶ HNU (Shanghai), *Zhongguo lishi*, pp61-64.

the lead set by Zhejiang several years ago and also to be influenced considerably by foreign textbooks (especially Japanese textbooks which are well known among educationalists in China, not only, as noted in Chapter 2, for their sometimes controversial views on the war). It contains numerous high quality prints of photographs and paintings, as well as the usual items, such as maps and charts. In its layout, however, it appears rather more staid and traditional than the other two. Where BNU makes use of fluorescent colours and alternative fonts (somewhat reminiscent in fact of the kinds of fonts used in *manga* dialogues), and PEP includes numerous text boxes and even two little cartoon figures who have short dialogues in speech bubbles, the HNU edition simply lays out the text in muted colours, with no embellishments other than the aforementioned photographs and other images. It is uncertain why this volume is thus presented since the Shanghai curriculum-compliant textbook (also published by Huadong Normal University Press) is much more like BNU's and, like PEP, also has a cartoon character who appears regularly throughout the text. I can only surmise that the major differences are attributable, in part, to the fact that the HNU HCS edition I saw was the final volume of the world history textbooks, and thus aimed at slightly older readers, but perhaps also because the writer, Wang Side, is a respected scholar of foreign (mainly French) history, and accordingly produced a less superficially child-friendly work.

The presumption that underlies all these textbooks (except Wang's), of course, is that students will be more receptive to textbooks that contain groovy colours, crazy fonts and cartoon characters, thus making them more interested in the substance of what they are learning, more likely to acquire the desired skill-set History is thought to offer, and more open to the moral-ideological messages the texts convey. Perhaps because I am many years past my own secondary schooling and, anyway, never even had a textbook for the History subject, I find it hard to imagine that these more colourful volumes have any significant impact on student learning. While the coloured pages and cartoon figures may initially grab students' attention, I remain unconvinced that they will retain it. Furthermore, since teachers are often the key vehicle for transmitting the content of textbooks, giving classes which are frequently just an oral representation of the relevant chapter of the textbook, students frequently do not even need to read the textbook themselves except when required to do so for homework exercises, class preparation or revision for a test. Thus, if teachers continue their current practices and do not genuinely engage students in the learning

process, it is unlikely that the textbook will be powerful enough to do so alone. In short, nothing essentially will be changed in terms of student motivation, unless, as a phrase commonly used by educationalists goes, mindsets can be changed from 'Make me learn' (*yao wo xue*) to 'I want to learn' (*wo yao xue*).¹⁷

Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 7, being interested in, wanting to learn History, does not necessarily have much bearing on whether the learning outcomes desired by policy-makers, curriculum developers and educationalists will be attained by students. Furthermore, it was argued that while students may master and appropriate the history that they consume, the ways in which they recycle what they have learnt may actually be counter to what was originally intended. In this way, even if the state retains coercive, administrative or economic control over the production of history, and exerts considerable influence through vetting mechanisms over its transmission, it is still failing ultimately to control the past. If history education in recent years has in this way contributed to the rise of a militant popular nationalism that owes its loyalty to the Chinese *minzu* rather than to the rulers of the PRC state, what then are the likely outcomes for these latest reforms?

Since the last round of major reforms in the mid-1980s there have been few substantial changes in any areas of history education other than in pedagogical research; what changes have been made to textbooks and curricula have been superficial tweaking at best. With the pace and scope of change accelerating, the Chinese government has had to increase regional autonomy and open many areas of social, intellectual, cultural and economic life to market forces, and this has increasingly led History education personnel to demand and to implement more reforms. This latest round of reforms on the surface looks significant as many of the basic goals have been reoriented to focus increasingly on learning to learn, and on learning to acquire skills rather than on absorbing political-ideological theories. Great emphasis has also been placed on stimulating student interest in history, and as noted above, this has meant a considerable reorganisation of textbook materials. Additionally, the perception that Western success has been built on creativity has impelled reformers to focus on critical thinking and analytical skills. Although the texts remain largely unreformed in their general tone and the language and structures of the narratives remain more or less intact, the emphasis on activities such as

¹⁷ Ye Lan, paper given at history education conference, Shanghai 2000.

discussion and essay-writing and the conscious encouragement of debate, indicates that the potential to develop a more critically minded cohort of students is there. Critical thinking and debate, however, are likely to remain, for the moment at least limited within certain confines; as the article by Professor Yuan Weishi which recently got the magazine *Freezing Point* (*bingdian*) temporarily closed down has demonstrated, critical thinking can be a dangerous activity. Nevertheless, with the gradual relaxation of cultural and intellectual life and a rapid growth in mass media history which often reappraises hitherto orthodox verdicts on historical events and persons, it seems probable that although the state will retain considerable coercive powers to regulate academia, education and cultural production, and self-censorship will remain correspondingly widespread, reform will continue permitting a more polyphonic *Geschichtskultur* to evolve.

Bibliography

Most references to newspaper articles, government documents and websites are given in full in the footnotes and are not re-listed here. All PRC textbooks are separately listed in the appendix. This bibliography therefore includes textbooks from the pre-1949 era, those from other countries and all other books and journal articles cited throughout the text. Reference works and those of unknown authorship are listed by title.

Reference Works

Cihai (suoyinben). Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1999.

COH *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: Curriculum (Teaching) Plans). Beijing: PEP, 2001.

COCP *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: lishi juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: History). Beijing: PEP, 2001.

JDC *Jiaoyu da cidian* (Dictionary of Education). Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998.

JYFQS *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa quanshu* (An Encyclopaedia of PRC Education Law). Beijing: Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe, 1995.

JYSD *Zhongguo jiaoyu shidian* (A Compendium of Events in Chinese Education). Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994.

Xiandai Hanyu fenlei cidian. Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1998.

Ahonen, Sirkka. *Clio sans Uniform: A Study of the post-Marxist Transformation of the History Curricula in East Germany and Estonia 1986-1991*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1992.

Ahonen, Sirkka. 'The Politics of Identity through the History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social Exclusion - or Inclusion?' in *The Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 33, no. 2, March-April 2001, pp179-194.

Alitto, Guy. *The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity*. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1979

Aloni, Gil. *Revolutionary Messages in Elementary School Textbooks in Iran*. The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002.

Altbach, Philip. 'Education and Neo-colonialism' in Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin eds. *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, pp452-456. London; New York: Routledge, 1995.

Althusser, Louis. 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in Cosin ed. *Education, Structure and Society*, pp243-280. London: Penguin, 1972.

Amare, Germa. 'Education in Ethiopia' in Fafunwa and Aisiku eds., *Education in Africa*, pp62-97. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.

Apple, Michael and Christian-Smith, Linda. *The Politics of the Textbook*. London: Routledge, 1991.

Ashford, Douglas. *History and Context in Comparative Public Policy*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1992.

- Au Yeung Lai, W.Y.W.** 'Curriculum Dissemination in the People's Republic of China' in Marsh and Morris eds., *Curriculum Development in East Asia*, pp82-105. London: Falmer Press, 1991.
- Bai, Yueqiao.** *Lishi jiaoxue wenti tantao* (An Exploration of Issues in History Education). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1997.
- Bailey, Paul.** *Reform the People*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990.
Beijing jiaoyu kexue yanjiuyuan xinxi zhongxin, *Jiaoyu wenxuan zhuanji, diyiqi* (Selected educational documents, vol. 1). Beijing, Sept. 1999.
- Bao, Qi.** 'Jianchi gaige, chongfen fahui lishi jiaoxue zai shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe zhong de teshu youshi' in *LSJX*, 1990, pp10-11
- Bao, Qichang.** 'Lishi jiaoxue de renwu' (The task of History education) in Yang ed., *Shanghai zhuoming lishi jiaoshi: jiaoxue sixianglu*, pp1-47. Shanghai: Baijia chubanshe, 2000.
- Barmé, Geremie.** 'History for the Masses' in Unger ed. *Using the Past to Serve the Present*, pp260-286. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1993.
- Barmé, Geremie.** "Small Screen, Small Minds" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 25, 1990, p.32.
- Barton, Keith and Levstik, Linda.** *Teaching History for the Common Good*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004.
- Bary, Wm. Theodore de and Chaffee, John** eds. *Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage*. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc, 1989.
- Bary, Wm. Theodore de and Chan, Wing-tsit** eds. *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume II*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
- Bass, Catriona.** *Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950*. London and New York: Tibet Information Network, ZED, 1998.
- Beasley, W. and Pulleyblank, E.** eds. *Historians of China and Japan*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Bhabha, Homi.** *Nations and Narration*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Bloom, Benjamin.** *Taxonomy of Education Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals*. New York: Longmans Green, 1960.
- Boulais, Le P. Guy.** *Manuel du Code Chinois*. Chang-hai : Imp. de la Mission Catholique, 1924.
- Brandenberger, David.** *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Brown, Melissa.** ed. *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*. China Research Monograph 46. Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley, Centre for Chinese Studies, 1996.
- Brugger, Bill and Kelly, David** eds. *Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Bruner, Jerome.** *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Bruner, Jerome.** *The Culture of Education*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Bruner, Jerome.** 'The Narrative Construction of Reality' in *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.18, Autumn 1991, pp1-21.
- Bruner, Jerome.** *The Process of Education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961.

- Buruma, Ian.** *Bad Elements: Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing.* New York: Random House, 2001.
- Cai, J., Liu, S. et al.** 'Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi xianzhuang baogao' (Report on the current situation regarding Shanghai secondary school History teachers) in 'Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi xianzhuang diaoyan zhi baogao zhuanji' (Reports on surveys of the current situation Shanghai secondary school History teachers'), *Lishi jiaoyu yanjiu tongxun*, supplementary edition, 1998, issue 11, pp2-8.
- Cao, Songlin and Xiong, Weimin.** *Jianming zhongxue lishi xueke jiaoyuxue* (A Concise Pedagogy of Secondary School History). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin gong'an daxue chubanshe, 1997.
- Carretero, M., Jacott, L., Limon, M., Lopez-Manjon, A., and Leon, J.A.** 'Historical Knowledge: Cognitive and Instructional Implications' in Carretero and Voss eds., *Cognitive and Instructional Processes in History and the Social Sciences*, pp357-376. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994.
- Cave, Peter.** 'Teaching the history of empire in Japan and England' in *International Journal of Educational Research*, vol. 37, nos. 6-7, 2002, pp623-641.
- Chan, Hok-lam.** *Legitimation in Imperial China.* Seattle: Washington University Press, 1984.
- Chan, Sylvia and Scott, Paul.** 'Teaching Chinese History in Junior High Schools in post-Mao China' in *The Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 1998, pp107-118. Osaka: Intercultural Research Institute.
- Chan, Sylvia.** 'Guest editor's introduction', *CES*, vol. 32, no.6, Nov.– Dec, 1999, pp3-8.
- Chancellor, Valerie.** *History for their Masters: History in the School Textbook, 1800-1914.* London: Penguin, 1970.
- Chang, Yuan and Chou, Liang-Kai eds.** *Fangfalun: Lishi yishi yu lishi jiaokeshu de fenxi bianxie. Guoji xueshu yantao lunwenji* (Proceedings of the International Conference on Methodologies: Historical Consciousness and History-Textbook Research (sic)). Guoli Qinghua daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 1998.
- Chau, Manling.** 'Change and Continuity: History Teaching in the PRC' in Dickinson et al eds., *International Yearbook of History Education*, pp124-142. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1995.
- Chen, Qingnian.** *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu*, vols.1-2 (Chinese History Textbook). Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1910.
- Chen, Theodore.** *Chinese Education since 1949.* New York : Pergamon Press, 1981.
- Cleverley, John.** *The Schooling of China.* Sydney ; Boston : G. Allen & Unwin, 1985.
- Cohen, Anthony.** *The Symbolic Construction of Community.* London: Ellis Harwood and Tavistock Publications, 1985.
- Cohen, Paul.** *Discovering History in China.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Cohen, Paul and Schrecker, John eds.** *Reform in Nineteenth Century China.* Cambridge, MA.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Cohen, Paul.** *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Coleman, James and Fararo, Thomas eds.** *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique.* Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992.
- Connor, Walker.** *Ethnonationalism.* Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Coombs, Frank.** 'Education Policy' in Nagel ed., *An Encyclopaedia of Policy Studies*, pp587-616. New York: M. Dekker, 1994.
- Corcuff, Stephane.** 'History Textbooks, Identity Politics and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan', in Vickers and Jones eds., *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, pp133-170. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005.

- Croizier, Ralph.** 'World History in the People's Republic of China' in *The Journal of World History*, vol. 1, no.2, Fall 1990, pp151-170. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Dale, R., Esland G., and MacDonald, M.** *Schooling and Capitalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.
- Deng, Xiaoping.** *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vols. I-III* (online edition). <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn.dengxp>
- Deng, Yong and Wang, Fei-ling** eds. *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1999.
- Dickinson, A. and Lee, P.,** eds. *History Teaching and Historical Understanding*. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978.
- Dickinson, A., Lee, P. and Rogers, P.** eds. *Learning History*. London: Heinemann Books, 1984.
- Dikötter, Frank.** *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. London: Hurst and Company, 1992.
- Dirlik, Arif and Meisner, Maurice.** *Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1989.
- Dirlik, Arif.** *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978..
- Duara, Prasenjit.** *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Egan, K.** 'Accumulating History' in *History and Theory*, Vol. 22, no.4, 1993, pp66-80.
- Fafunwa, A. Babs and Asiku, J.U.** eds. *Education in Africa*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- Fairclough, Norman.** *Critical Discourse Analysis*. London and New York: Longman, 1995.
- Fairclough, Norman.** *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
- Fan, Yu.** 'Aiguo zhuyi shi lishi jiaoxue de yongzheng zhuti' in *LSJX* 1990, no.7, pp44-46.
- Feinberg, Walter.** *Common Schools/Uncommon Identities: National Unity and Cultural Difference*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Feng, Peilan.** 'Lishi xueke chuangzaoxing siwei de kaocha yu peiyang' (The investigation and training of creative thinking in History). Paper given at the International Conference on History Education, Shanghai, Nov. 2000.
- Feng, Yixia.** 'Tigao xuesheng xuexi lishi de fangfa' (Improve students' methods of learning history) in *LSJX*, 1986, no.11, pp48-49.
- Feng, Yixia.** 'Lishi jiaocai bianxie zhong deyu yaoqiu de tixian' (Realising the Requirements of Moral Education in the Writing of History Teaching Materials) in *Jiaoxue yu tansuo*, no.1, Aug. 1994, pp17-20.
- Feng, Yuren.** 'Chuyi jianguo yilai zhongxue lishi jiaocai jianshe' (A tentative discussion on the development of secondary school History teaching materials since the founding of the PRC) in *LSJX*, 1990, no. 1, pp30-34.
- Fentress, James and Wickham, Chris** *Social Memory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- Ferro, Marc.** *The Uses and Abuses of History: or How the Past is Taught*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
- Feuerwerker, Albert.** *History in Communist China*. Boston: MIT Press, 1968.
- Fincher, John.** 'China as a Race, Culture and Nation' in Buxbaum and Mote eds., *Transition and Permanence*, pp59-69. Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1972.
- FitzGerald, Frances.** *America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Fitzgerald, John.** 'The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism in Unger ed, *Chinese Nationalism*, pp56-85. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1996.

- Freire, Paolo.** *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, [1970] 1995.
- Friedman, Edward.** *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China.* Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1995.
- Friedman, Edward.** 'Reconstructing China's National Identity: A Southern Alternative to Mao-Era Anti-imperialist Nationalism' in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, Issue 1, February 1994, pp67-91.
- Gardner, Howard.** *To Open Minds.* Basic Books, 1989.
- Gellner, Ernest.** *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gillis, John.** *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Giroux, Henry.** *Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1981.
- Goh, Chor Boon and Gopinathan, Saravanan.** 'History Education and the Construction of National Identity in Singapore, 1945-2000' in Vickers and Jones eds. *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, pp203-226. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Gong, Qizhu.** 'Chongfen renshi tigao lishi jiaoshi suzhi de zhongyaoxing' (Fully recognise the importance of raising the quality of History teachers) in *LSJX*, 1987, no.1, p22-25.
- Gong, Qizhu.** 'Tan tan jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang de tedian he sheng bian chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu' (About the special characteristics of the junior secondary History Teaching Outline for nine-year compulsory education and the editorial objectives of junior secondary History textbooks drafted at the provincial level) in *LSJX*, 1990, no.2, pp27-33.
- Gong, Qizhu.** 'Guanyu lishi jiaocai bianxie de jidian sikao' (Some thoughts on the writing of History teaching materials) in *Jiaoxue yu tansuo*, no.1, Aug. 1994, pp7-12.
- Gong, Qizhu.** 'Zai jiunian yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai zhong shentou ai dang ai shehuizhuyi jiaoyu' (Imbuing nine-year compulsory education teaching materials with education in loving the Party and loving socialism) in *Jiaoxue yu tansuo*, no.1, Aug. 1994, pp37-43.
- Goodson, Ivor.** *The Making of Curriculum.* London, New York: Falmer, 1988.
- Gramsci, Antonio.** *Prison Notebooks.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
- Gries, Peter.** *Face Nationalism: Power and Passion in China's Foreign Relations.* PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1999.
- Gries, Peter.** 'Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing' draft manuscript, subsequently published in *The China Journal*, July 2001.
- Groot, J.J.M. de.** *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China.* Taipei: Chen Wen, 1970.
- Gu, Jiegang and Wang, Zhonglin** eds. *Xiandai chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: benguooshi* (Modern junior secondary textbook: Chinese History). Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1923.
- Guo, Jingyang and Mai, Qun.** 'Zhongguo dangdaishi de jiaocai he jiaofa' (Teaching materials and teaching methods for contemporary Chinese history) in *LSJX* 1991, no.5, pp41-44.
- Guo, Yingjie and He, Baogang.** 'Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The Zeng Guofan Phenomenon' in *Modern China*, vol. 25, no. 2, April 1999, pp142-170.
- Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui, jichu jiaoyusi.** *Lishi jiaoxue dagang (shiyong): xuexi zhidao* (The History Teaching Outline: A Study Guide). Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992.
- Guoli bianyiguan.** *Guomin zhongxue lishi: diyi, er, san, sice* (Secondary school History: vols. 1, 2, 3, 4). Taipei: Guoli bianyiguan, 1997.

- Hahn, Carole.** 'Controversial Issues in History Instruction' in Carretero and Voss eds., *Cognitive and Instructional Processes in History and the Social Sciences*, pp201-236. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
- Halbwachs, Maurice.** *Collective Memory*. New York : Harper & Row, 1980.
- Hall, W.D.** *Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France*. Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1976.
- Hallden, Ola.** 'On Reasoning in History' in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp272-279. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Hamrin, Carol Lee.** 'The Party Leadership System' in Lieberthal and Lampton eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-making in Post-Mao China*, pp95-124. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992.
- Hamrin, Carol Lee and Zhao, Suisheng eds.** *Decision-making in Deng's China*. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
- Hansen, Mette Halskov.** *Lessons in Being Chinese*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1999.
- Harrell, Stevan ed.** *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1995.
- Harrell, Stevan and Bamo Ayi.** 'Combining ethnic heritage and national unity: a paradox of Nuosu (Yi) language textbooks in China' in *The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 30, no.2, April-June 1998, pp62-71.
- Harrison, Henrietta.** *The Making of the Republican Citizen*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- He, Baogang and Guo, Yingjie.** *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
- He, Chenggang.** 'Wode jiaoyu guan: Li Xiaofeng laoshi de shijian yu tansuo' ('My views on education': Li Xiaofeng's practice and exploration) in *ZXLS* issue 176, 2000, no. 2, pp4-5.
- He, Zhaowu.** 'Kenengxing, xianshixing yu lishi goutu' (Possibility, reality and history) in *Shixue lilun*, 1988, no.1, reprinted in Yu ed. *Lishixue: shixue lilun juan*, pp423-432. Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 2000.
- Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark.** 'Learning Citizenship from the Past: Textbook Nationalism, Global Context and Social Change' in *The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 30, no.2, April-June 1998, pp3-15.
- Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark eds.** *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.
- Hirsch, E.D.** *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987
- Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence eds.** *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Hobsbawm, Eric.** *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hsiao, Kung-ch'uan.** *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967.
- Hu, C.T.** 'Orthodoxy over Historicity: The Teaching of History in Communist China' in *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 13, February 1969, pp2-19.
- Hu, C.T.** 'The Teaching of History in Communist China', China Quarterly-sponsored conference held in Oxford, 1964.
- Hu, Weiqing.** 'Jindai Zhongguo jiaoyu minzuzhuyi de jibian' (Nationalist Distortions of Chinese Education in the Modern Era) in *LSJX*, 2001, no.7, pp10-12.

- Huang, Fuquan.** 'Suzhi jiaoyu beilun' (Contradictions in Quality Education) in *Beijing shifan daxue xuebao (shehui kexueban)*, 1996, no.5, pp81-84.
- Huang, Haizhong.** 'Xue lishi yu di zhishang' (Low intellect and studying history) in *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu tongxun*, 1999, no.2, p46.
- Huang, Huazhao.** 'Xin dagang, xin jiaocai de tanxing' (The flexibility of the new Outline and new teaching materials) in Yang and Chen eds., *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu wencui (shang)*, pp10-11. Beijing: Beijing gongye daxue chubanshe, 1996
- Huang, Xiaoping.** 'Suzhi jiaoyu yu jiaoxue fangfa gaige chutan' (A Preliminary Discussion of Quality Education and Pedagogical Reform) in *Xibei shida xuebao (shehui kexueban)*, vol.35, no.4, July 1998, pp70-71.
- Hulsewe, A. F. P.** *Remnants of Han Law*. Leiden: EJ Brill, 1955.
- Husbands, Chris.** *What is History Teaching?* Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996.
- Jenkins, Keith and Brickley, Peter** 'Always Historicise: Unintended Opportunities in National Curriculum History' in *Teaching History*, January 1991.
- Ji, Bingxin.** *Lishi jiaoyuxue gailun* (General Theories of History Pedagogy). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1997.
- Ji, Bingxin.** 'Qianyi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi suzhi zhi tigao' (A brief discussion on raising the quality of secondary school History teachers), in *Xibei shiyuan xuebao*, 1994, no.3, pp93-95.
- Ji, Bingxin.** 'Zhongguo lishi jiaocai gaige chuyi' (Tentative suggestions on the reform of secondary school History teaching materials) in *Xibei shida xuebao (shehui kexueban)*, vol. 32, no.4, July 1995, pp93- 95.
- Jiaoyu da cidian* (Dictionary of Education). Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998.
- Jin, Xiangcheng.** 'He Bingsong dui lishi jiaoyu de gongxian' (He Bingsong's Contribution to History Education) in *Zhongguo jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiu hui* and PEP eds., pp531-537. Beijing: PEP, 1997 [1993].
- Jin, Zhaozi.** *Xin zhongxue jiaokeshu chuji benguo lishi* (New secondary school textbooks: junior-level Chinese History). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1923.
- Johnson, Henry.** *The Teaching of History in Elementary and Secondary Schools*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1915.
- Johnson, Wallace.** *The Tang Code*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Kaifeng shiyuan lishixi tongxunzu.** 'History conference held by the history department of Kaifeng Normal College', proceedings reported in *CE* Vol. 12, spring-summer 1979, pp127-132, originally published as 'Kaifeng shifan xueyuan lishixi juxing shixue taolunhui', *GMRB*, 19/1/1978.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta.** 'The Imaginary Institution of India', in *Subaltern Studies VII: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, 1992, pp1-39.
- Kazi, Aftab.** *Ethnicity and Education in Nation-Building: The Case of Pakistan*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1987.
- Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo eds.** *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiu 15 nian* (Fifteen Years of Research on Curriculum and Teaching Materials). Beijing: PEP, 1998.
- Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo eds.** *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: Curriculum (Teaching) Plans). Beijing: PEP, 2001.
- Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo eds.** *Ershi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biao zhun, jiaoxue dagang huibian: lishi juan* (Collected twentieth century standard curricula and teaching outlines for Chinese primary and secondary schools: History). Beijing: PEP, 2001.
- Keenan, Barry.** *The Dewey Experiment in China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Keyes, Charles. 'National Heroine or Local Spirit? The Struggle over Memory in the Case of Thao Suranari of Nakhon Ratchisima', in Tanabe and Keyes ed., *Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and Identity in Thailand and Laos*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

Khan, Almaz. 'Who are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity and the Politics of Representation in the PRC' in Brown, J. ed. *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, pp125-159, China Research Monograph 46. Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley, Centre for Chinese Studies, 1996.

Kress, Gunther. 'The Social Production of Language: History and Structures of Domination', in Fries and Gregory eds., *Discourse in Society: Systemic and Functional Perspectives*, pp115-140. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp, 1995.

Ladany, Laszlo. *The Communist Party of China and Marxism 1921-1985: A Self-Portrait*. London: Hurst, 1988.

Lampton, D. ed. *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987.

Lan, Peiyun and Sun, Xuece eds. *Zhongxue deyu dagang shiyan baogao xuan bian* (Selected Reports on Experiments with the Moral Education Teaching Outline). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1993.

Lan, W., Zhu, Y. and Lau, J. 'Education Reform in China since 1978' in Hu, Hong and Stavrou eds., *In Search of a Chinese Road towards Modernisation*, pp226-245. Edwin Mellen Press, 1996.

Lee, P. 'Children's Ideas about the Nature and Status of Historical Accounts' in Chang and Chou eds., *Fangfalun*, pp201-226. Guoli Qinghua daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 1998.

Lee, P., Dickinson, A. and Ashby, R. 'Researching Children's Ideas about History' in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp227-251. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.

Lee, Thomas H.C. 'Sung Schools and Education before Chu Hsi' in de Bary and Chaffee eds., *Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage*, pp105-138.

Lee, Yoonmi. *Modern Education, Textbooks and the Image of the Nation: The Politics of Modernisation and Nationalism in Korean Education, 1880-1910*. New York: Garland Press, s2000.

Leung, Julian Y.M. 'Curriculum Development in the People's Republic of China' in Marsh and Morris eds., *Curriculum Development in East Asia*, pp61-81. London: Falmer Press, 1991.

Levstik, Linda. *Doing History: Investigating with Children in Elementary and Middle Schools*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.

Li, Chunwu. *Lishi wengao xuancun* (Selected Essays on History). Beijing: PEP, 1997.

Li, Dingkai. *Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de jiaoyu* (Education in Chongqing during the Anti-Japanese War). Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1995.

Li, Gongming. *Lishi shi shenme?* (What is history?). Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997.

Li, Ji. *Zhongguo jiaoyubing* (China's Education Disease). Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999.

Lieberthal, K. and Lampton, D. eds. *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992.

Lieberthal, K. 'Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations' in Lieberthal and Lampton eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, pp1-30. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Lin, Defang and Yu, Yichuan. 'Kecheng linian he lishi jiaocai bianxuan de yuanze' (Understanding curriculum and principles of editing and selecting History teaching materials)

in *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu tongxun* (History teaching research journal), pp9-12, November 1999, no.2, issue 14. Shanghai: Shanghai History Education Research association and Huadong shifan daxue History department.

Lin, Jing. *Education in post-Mao China*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Lincicome, M. (1995). *Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform in Meiji Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Lishi kecheng biao zhun yanzhizu (History Curriculum Standards Research and Drafting Committee). 'Lishi kecheng biao zhun' (History Curriculum Standards) in Wen He ed. *Zou chuangxin zhi lu (shang)*, pp341-360. Beijing chubanshe, 2000.

Lisovskaya, Elena and Karpov, Vyacheslav. 'New Ideologies in Post-Communist Russian Textbooks' in *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 43, no.4, Nov.1999, pp522-543.

Liu, Xinwu. 'Zooming in on 1985' in *Black Walls and Other Stories*. Hong Kong: Renditions Paperbacks, The Research Centre for Translation, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990.

Liu, Zonghua. *Lishi jiaoxue yishu yu yanjiu* (The Art of History Teaching and History Education Research). Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000.

Loewen, James. *Lies My Teacher Told Me*. New York : New Press, 1995.

Loewen, James. 'The Vietnam War in High School American History' in Hein and Selden eds., *Censoring History*, pp150-172. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.

Lönnroth, E., Molin, K. and Björk, R. eds. *Conceptions of National History: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994.

Lowenthal, David. 'Identity, Heritage and History' in Gillis ed. *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, pp41-57. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Lowenthal, David. *Possessed by the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*. New York : Free Press , 1996.

LSJX editorial committee. 'Jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze de jiaoyu shi shenke de aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu' (Education in upholding the Four Cardinal Principles offers a profound education in patriotism) in *LSJX*, 1987, no.3, p2.

LSJX editorial committee. 'Yingdang kaizhan dui lishi jiaocai nengli peiyang de yanjiu' (We must develop our research into skill-training through History teaching materials), in *LSJX*, no.8, p26.

Lu, Bingyan and Wang, Jianpan eds. *Suzhi jiaoyu: jiaoyu lixiang yu mubiao* (Quality Education: Ideals and Goals of Education). Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999.

Luykx, Aurolyn. *The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999.

Ma, Jie. 'A cursory analysis of the factors in senior secondary History courses that are disadvantageous for cultivating subjective awareness in female students' in *CES*, vol. 34, no.1, Jan-Feb 2001, pp64-68, originally published as 'Jian xi zhongxue lishi keben zhong bu li yu peiyang nusheng zhuti yishi de yinsu' in *Yin xing shi jiao tanyan*, 1998.

Macedo, Donald. *Literacies of Power: What Americans are not Allowed to Know*. Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1994.

Maeding, Klaus. 'Cong Deguo jingyan kan Zhongguode lishi jiaokeshu' (Chinese History Textbook as Seen from the German Experience (sic)) in Chang and Chou eds. *Fangfalun*, pp103-112. Guoli Qinghua daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 1998.

Man, Qimin. 'Educational disrepair and quality education reform' in *CES*, vol. 30, no. 6, November/December, 1996, pp21-24, originally published as 'Jiaoyu huangfei yu suzhi jiaoyu gaige,' in *ZJB*, 30/4/1996, p.3.

Marks, Robert. *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

- Marsh, Christopher.** 'Learning from your comrades mistakes: the impact of the Soviet past on China's future' in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol.36, no.3, Sept. 2003, pp259-272.
- Martin, Dorothea.** *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People's Republic of China*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990.
- Martin, Roberta.** 'The Socialisation of Children in China and Taiwan' in *China Quarterly*, 1975.
- Marx, Karl.** *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: International Publishers, 1963.
- Masalski, Katherine Woods.** 'Teaching Democracy, Teaching War: American and Japanese Educators Teach the Pacific War' in Hein and Selden eds., *Censoring History*, pp258-287. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.
- McCormick, Barrett.** *Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Mehl, M.** (1998). *History and the State in Nineteenth Century Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Mei, Zhongsun and Wu, Yaqin.** *Zhongxiaoxue aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jingyan ziliao huicui* (Patriotic Education in Primary and Secondary Schools: Experience and Information). Dalian: Liaoning shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994.
- Menashri, David.** *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Meyer, J., Kamens, D. and Benavot, A.** eds. *School Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Primary Curricular Categories in the Twentieth Century*. London: Falmer Press, 1992.
- Ming, Qikun.** *Zhongxue lishi chuanguangxin jiaofa* (4vols.) Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 1999.
- Moloughney, Brian.** 'From Biographical History to Historical Biography: A Transformation in Chinese Historical Writing,' in *East Asian History*, December 1992, pp1-30.
- Murphy, Rachel.** 'Turning Chinese Peasants into Modern Citizens: 'Population Quality', Demographic Transition and Primary Schools' in *China Quarterly*, no. 177, pp1-20.
- Nie, Youli.** 'Zhongxue lishi xueke jiaoxue mudi de bianzhi ji qi zai xuexi pingjia de yingyong' (Setting teaching goals for secondary school History and their use in learning assessment) in *LSJX*, 1989, no.2, pp31-37.
- Nie, Youli.** *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu lun* (Theories of secondary school history teaching). Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1999.
- Novick, Peter.** *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Orwell, George.** *Nineteen Eighty-four*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954.
- Osman-Gani, Aahad.** 'Human Capital Development in Singapore: An Analysis of National Policy Perspectives' in *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, Vol.6, no.3, August 2004, pp276-287.
- Ouyang, Banghua.** 'Lishi ketang jiaoxue yu chuanguangxing siwei' (Classroom History Teaching and Creative Thinking) in *ZXLS*, issue 165, 1999, no.4, pp18-20.
- Pai, Hyung'il.** *Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography and Racial Myth in Korean State-formation Theories*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.
- Paine, Lynn.** 'The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China' in Lieberthal and Lampton eds. *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, pp181-215. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

- Paine, Lynn.** 'Reforming Teachers: The Organised Reproduction and Transformation of Teachers' in Epstein ed., *Chinese Education: Problems, Policies and Prospects*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1991.
- Peake, Cyrus.** *Nationalism and Education in Modern China*. New York, Columbia University Press, [1932], 1970.
- Penuel, William. and Wertsch, James.** 'Historical Representation as Mediated Action' in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp23-38. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Peng, Jinghua.** 'Peiyang zhineng shi lishi jiaoxue de hexin' (Fostering intellectual skills is the core of History education) in Yang and Chen eds, *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu wencui*, pp35-38. Beijing: Beijing gongye daxue chubanshe, 1996.
- Pepper, Suzanne.** *Radicalism and Education Reform in Twentieth Century China*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Postman, Neil and Weingartner, Charles.** *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*. New York: Delta, 1969.
- Powell, Avril.** 'Perceptions of the South Asian Past: Ideology, Nationalism and School Textbooks', in Nigel Cook ed., *The Transmission of Knowledge in South Asia: Essays on Education, Religion, History and Politics*, pp[PAGE NOS]. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Price, R.** *Education in Modern China*. London and Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, [1970], 1979.
- Pulleyblank, E.** 'Chinese Historical Criticism: Liu Chih-Ch'i and Ssu-ma Kuang,' in Beasley and Pulleyblank eds. *Historians of China and Japan*, pp136-157. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Purcell, V.** (1965). *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. London, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Qi, Jian.** 'Lishi ketang jiaoxue de meili' (The art of teaching history in the classroom) in *LSJX*, 1991, no.6, pp31-34.
- Qian.** 'Peiyang xuesheng shehuizhuyi wenming shi lishi jiaoshi de guangrong shiming' (Nurturing socialist civilisation among students is the glorious mission of History teachers), *LSJX*, p17-18.
- Qu, Lindong.** *Shixue yu shixue pinglun*. Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998.
- Ren, Qizuo.** 'Lishi shang jieji hezuo de tezheng ji zuoyong' (Historical Characteristics and Functions of Class Co-operation) in *Shixue lilun yanjiu*, 2001, no.2, pp47-56.
- Ridley, C., Godwin, P. and Doolin, D.** *The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.
- Rong, Jianxin ed.** *Beijing jiusuo mingxiao jinpai jieti: chuyi (chuer, chusan) lishi* (Nine famous Beijing schools discuss: junior secondary History, years 1, 2, 3). Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, zhishi chubanshe, 2001.
- Rong, Xuelan.** 'Compulsory Education: A Chinese Dilemma' in Hu, Hong and Stavrou, *In Search of a Chinese Road towards Modernisation*, pp246-270.
- Rosa, Albert.** 'What do people consume history for? (If they do): Learning history as a process of knowledge consumption and construction of meaning' in Carretero and Voss eds., *Cognitive and Instructional Processes in History and the Social Sciences*, pp221-233. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. Hillsdale, NJ: 1994.
- Rose, Caroline.** *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-making*. London, New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Ross, Heidi.** 'The Crisis in Chinese Secondary Schooling', in Epstein ed., *Chinese Education: Problems, Policies and Prospects*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1991.
- Rozman, Gilbert ed.** *The Modernization of China*. New York: Free Press, 1981.

- Said, Edward.** *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Sautman, Barry.** 'Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China' in *China Quarterly*, CHECK DATE pp. 413-437
- Sautman, Barry.** 'Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities' in Dikotter ed, *The Construction of Racial Identity in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, pp. 75-95. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997.
- Sautman, Barry.** 'Racial Nationalism and China's External Behaviour' in *World Affairs* 160.2, Fall 1997.
- Schlesinger, Arthur.** *The Disuniting of America*. New York: Norton, 1992.
- Schneider, Axel.** 'Bridging the Gap: Attempts at Constructing a "New" Historical-Cultural Identity in the People's Republic of China' in *East Asian History*, pp129-146.
- Schoenhals, Michael.** *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*. Berkeley, CA: Centre for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.
- Searle, John.** 'Collective intentions and actions' in Cohen, Cohen and Pollack eds., *Intentions in Communication*, pp401-416. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990
- Shanghai zhongxiaoxue kecheng jiaocai gaige weiyuanhui** (Shanghai Committee for the reform of the curriculum and teaching materials for primary and secondary schools), 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu lishi xueke kecheng biao zhun' (Nine-year compulsory education curriculum standards for History) in *Quanrizhi jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu kecheng biao zhun* (Curriculum standards for the full-time nine-year compulsory education system), pp111-124. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990.
- Shanghaishi jiaoyu xuehui, lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui** (Shanghai Education Committee, History Education Research Committee), 'Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi xianzhuang diaoyanzhi baogao zhuanji' in *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu tongxun* (History Education Research information), 1998, supplementary issue.
- Shemilt, Denis.** *History 13-16 Evaluation Study*. Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall, 1980.
- Shen, Shihan** ed. *Shiyong jiaoxue* (Practical Pedagogy). Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1991.
- Shen, Qiwei.** 'Nandao Zhongguo bushi waiguo qinlue de changqi shouhaizhe ma?' (Isn't China a long-standing victim of foreign invasion?) in *Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu tongxun*, 1999, no.2, pp44-45.
- Shen, Wu and Zhang, Xiang.** *Zhonghua zhongxue lishi jiaokeshu*, vols. 1-4. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1913.
- Shteppa, Konstantin.** *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1962.
- Smith, Anthony.** *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
- Soliman, Abdelaziz.** 'Education in Egypt' in Fafunwa and Aisiku eds., *Education in Africa*, pp49-62. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- Song, Enju.** 'Dui jiaqiang xiangtu shi jiaoxue de sandian renshi' (Three points on strengthening the teaching of local history) in *LSJX*, 1990, no.2, pp38-40.
- Stafford, Charles.** 'Good Sons and Virtuous Mothers: Kinship and Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan' in *Man*, no.27, June 1992, pp363-378.
- Stearns, Peter.** 'Goals in History Teaching' in Voss and Carretero eds. *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp281-293. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Stearns, P., Seixas, P., Wineburg, S.** eds. *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2000.
- Su, Shoutong.** *Shibian shiyi* (Supplementary amplifications on history writings). Beijing: PEP, 1995.

- Su, Shoutong.** 'Tan tan dui "jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)" de jidian tihui' (A few insights into "the junior secondary History Teaching Outline for full-time nine-year compulsory education (trial draft)), in *LSJX*, 1990, no.6 pp2-4.
- Su, Shoutong.** 'Woguo gudai de lishi jiaoyu he jiaocai' (History Education and Teaching Materials in Ancient China) in Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo eds., *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiu 15 nian*, pp436-454. Beijing: PEP, 1998.
- Su, Xiaokang.** *Deathsong of a River*. Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991.
- Sun, Gongxun.** *Lishi jiaoxue de yishu yu jiqiao* (The Art and Techniques of History Education). Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1995.
- Sun, Gongxun.** *Lishixue gaishuo* (An Introduction to Historiography). Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1995.
- Sun, Gongxun.** 'Tan tan "jiunian yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang" de tedian' (On the characteristics of the junior secondary History Teaching Outline for full-time nine-year compulsory education) in *LSJX*, 1992, no.8, pp16-21.
- Sun, Xiting.** 'Minzu suzhi yu jiaoyu' (Minzu quality and education) in *Beijing shifan daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban* (Beijing Normal University Journal: Social Sciences edition), 1997, no.6, pp10-17.
- Sun, Xiting and Cheng, Youxin.** 'Quality, development and education' in *CES*, vol. 30, no.6, Nov/Dec., 1997, pp12-14, originally published as 'Suzhi, fazhan yu jiaoyu' in *ZJB*, 20/1/1996.
- Tamir, Yael.** 'Pro Patria Mori: Death and the State' in McKim and McMahan eds., *The Morality of Nationalism*, pp227-244. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Tamir, Yael.** 'The Enigma of Nationalism' in *World Politics*, Vol. 3, April 1995, pp418-440.
- Tanaka, Stefan.** 'History – Consuming Pasts' in *The Journal of Narrative and Life History*, vol.4, no.4, 1994, pp257-274.
- Tang, Zhiyuan.** 'Rethinking the Problem of Patriotic Education in the Subject of History in High Schools' in *CES*, vol.32, no.6, Nov-Dec 1999, pp78-81, originally published as 'Dui lishi xueke aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu de zai renshi' in *LJW*, 1996, no.3, pp38-40.
- Thøgersen, Stig.** *Secondary Education in China after Mao: Reform and Social Conflict*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990.
- Tian, Huisheng and Zeng, Tianshan.** *Zhongxiaoxue kecheng jiaocai gaige yu shijian*. Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997.
- Tong, Enzheng.** 'Morgan's Model and the Study of Ancient Chinese Society' in *Social Sciences in China*, vol. 10, no.2, June 1989, pp182-205.
- Topolski, Jeretz.** 'The Structure of Historical Narratives and the Teaching of History' in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp9-22. London: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Tu, W.** ed. *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Tulviste, P. and Wertsch, J.,** 'Official and Unofficial Histories: The Case of Estonia' in *The Journal of Narrative and Life History*, 1994, no.4, pp311-329.
- Unger, Jonathan.** *Chinese Nationalism*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1996.
- Unger, Jonathan.** *Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1993.
- Viatkin, R.V. and Tikhvinskii, S.L.** 'Some Questions of Historical Science in the Chinese Peoples Republic'. China Quarterly-sponsored conference held in Oxford, 1964.
- Vickers, Edward.** *History as a School Subject in Hong Kong: 1960's – 2000*. PhD Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 2000.

- Vickers, Edward and Jones, Alisa** eds. *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Voss, James and Carretero, Mario** eds. *Learning and Reasoning in History*. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Voss, J., Wiley, J. and Kennet, J.** 'Student Perceptions of History and Historical Concepts' in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp307-330. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.
- Waldron, Arthur.** 'Representing China: The Great Wall and Cultural Nationalism in the Twentieth Century' in Befu ed., *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia*, pp36-60. Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Research Papers and Policy Studies, 1993.
- Wang, Baoyu.** 'Ye tan chuzhong lishi jiaocai de bianxie' (More on the writing of junior secondary school History teaching materials) in *LSJX*, 1990, no.5, pp34-35.
- Wang, Chong-fu.** 'Lishi rentong yu minzu rentong' (Historical identity and national identity) in *Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu*, vol. 25, autumn 1999. Beijing: Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu zazhi bianjibu.
- Wang, Chong-fu.** 'Lishi jiaoxue, lishi rentong yu minzu rentong' (history education, historical identity and national identity), paper given at the International Conference on History Education, Shanghai, Nov. 2000.
- Wang, Chunliang.** 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong "lishi jiaoxue dagang" shencha shuoming' (An explanation of the inspection process for the nine-year compulsory education junior secondary 'History Teaching Outline') in Guojia jiaowei, jichu jiaoyusi ed., *Lishi jiaoxue dagang (shiyong); xuexi zhidao*, pp14-23. Beijing: PEP, 1992.
- Wang, Dewei.** *Fictional Realism in Twentieth Century China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
- Wang, Duoquan and Li, Zhiyong.** *Bijiao lishi jiaoyuxue* (Comparative pedagogy of history). Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995.
- Wang, Duoquan.** *Lishi jiaoyuxue* (The Study of History Education). Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996.
- Wang, Duoquan.** *Mingshi shoukelu: zhongxue lishi* (Famous Teachers Teach: Secondary School History). Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993.
- Wang, Edward Qingjia.** *Chinese Historians and the West: The Origins of Modern Chinese Historiography*. (PhD Dissertation) Ann Arbor: UMI Thesis Publishing, 1992.
- Wang, Hongzhi.** 'Chaikai lishi xinde yiye' (Opening a new page in history) in Guojia jiaowei, jichu jiaoyusi ed., *Lishi jiaoxue dagang (shiyong); xuexi zhidao*, pp32-44. Beijing: PEP, 1992.
- Wang Hongzhi, Li Longqing, and Zang Rong.** 'Chuzhong "Zhongguo lishi"' (Renjiaoban) diyi, er, sance bianxie yuanze, tedian he shiyong shuoming' (An explanation of editorial principles, special characteristics and usage of junior secondary 'Chinese History' (PEP edition), volumes 1, 2, 3), in *LSJX*, 1992, no.6, pp15-19.
- Wang, Hongzhi.** 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaokeshu (renjiaoban) disan, sice neirong de zhongyaoxing he jiangshou jianyi' (The importance of and teaching suggestions for nine-year compulsory education junior secondary History textbooks (PEP), volumes three and four) in *LSJX*, 1991, no.7, pp24-27.
- Wang, Hongzhi.** 'Tan tan guoduxing 'quanrizhi zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang' de xiuding' (On the revision of the interim 'History Teaching Outline for full-time secondary schools'), in *LSJX*, 1987, no.2, pp2-9.
- Wang, Hongzhi.** *Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian* (The reform and achievements of History teaching materials). Beijing: PEP, 2000.
- Wang, Hongzhi.** *Lishi jiaoxue guoji yantaohui kaimuci* (Speech given at the opening ceremony of International Conference on History Education). Shanghai, November, 2000.

Wang, Shenghong. 'Excerpts from "Speech at the Inaugural Conference of the Shanghai Primary and Secondary Curriculum and Teaching Materials Reform Committee"' in *CES*, vol.27, no.1, January/February 1994, pp55-56.

Wang, Youcheng. 'Arduous struggle: an important lesson in quality education' in *CES*, vol. 30, no. 6, November/December 1997, pp18-20, originally published as 'Jianku fendou: suzhi jiaoyu de zhongyao keti' in *ZJB*, April 4 1996.

Wei, George C.X. and Liu, Xiaoyuan eds. *Exploring Nationalisms of China: Themes and Conflicts*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Wei, Jingsheng. 'A letter to Deng Xiaoping' in *CSH*, Vol. 30, no.3, Spring 1997, pp63-77.

Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. 'Party history or history of the Chinese revolution? On the political training of university students in the PRC', paper submitted to the conference, 'New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution', Holland, 1990.

Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. 'On *shi* and *lun*: Toward a Typology of Historiography in the PRC' in *History and Theory*, 1996, (theme issue), no. 35.

Wen, He ed. *Xianshi yu chaoyue: Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige beijing ziliao* (Reality and transcendence: Background data on the reform of the basic education curriculum in Beijing for the 21st century). Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000.

Wen, He ed. *Zou chuangxin zhi lu (shang/xia): Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige fang'an* (Taking the creative road, vols. 1 and 2: 21st century curriculum reform for basic education in Beijing). Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000.

Wertsch, James. 'Is It Possible to Teach Beliefs, as Well as Knowledge about History?' in Stearns, Seixas and Wineburg eds., *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2000.

Wertsch, James and Rozin, Mark. 'The Russian Revolution: Official and Unofficial Accounts', in Voss and Carretero eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History*, pp39-60. London and Portland, OR: Woburn Press, 1998.

Wertsch, James. *Voices of Collective Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

White, Hayden. *Metahistory*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Whiting, Allen S. 'Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng', *China Quarterly* no. 142, June 1995.

Wilson, C., Ford, D. and Jones, A. 'The History Text: Framing Ethno-cultural and Civic Nationalism in the Divided Koreas' in Vickers and Jones eds. *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, pp227-254. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Wilson, Richard. *Learning to Be Chinese*. Cambridge, MA and London: M.I.T. Press, 1970.

Woodside, Alexander. 'Real and Imagined Continuities in the Struggle for Literacy' in Hayhoe ed., *Education and Modernisation: The Chinese Experience*, pp23-46. New York: Pergamon Press, 1992.

World Bank. *China: Issues and Prospects in Education*. World Bank Country Study, 1985.

Wu, Han. 'Lun lishi renwu pingjia' (On the evaluation of historical figures) originally published in *RMRB* 23/3/1962, reprinted in Yu ed., *Lishi: shixue lilun juan*, pp339-348. Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 2000.

Wu, Shouzhi. 'Lun lishi siwei' (On historical thinking) in *Xibei shiyuan xuebao*, 1989, no.4, pp31-37.

Xinxue zhi lishi jiaokeshu (History textbook for the new schooling system). Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926.

Xiong, Ming'an. *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi* (A History of Education Reform in Modern and Contemporary China). Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1999.

- Xu, Ben.** 'From Modernity to Chineseness: The Rise of Nativist Cultural Theory in post-1989 China' in *Positions* 6:1, 1998, pp203-237.
- Xu, Yangqi** ed. *Zhongxue lishi weige jiaoxue jiaocheng* (Microteaching secondary school History). Kexue chubanshe, 2000.
- Yamashita, S.H.** 'Confucianism and the Japanese State', in Tu ed. *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*, pp.132-154. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Yan, Zhiliang.** 'Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong "Shijie Lishi" (Renjiaoban) de xin tese (shang, xia) (New characteristics of nine-year compulsory education, junior secondary "World History" (PEP edition) (parts 1 and 2)), in *LSJX*, 1992, no.8, pp22-25 and no.9, pp32-34.
- Yan, Zhiliang.** *Shijie lishi jiaocai de gaige yu tansuo* (Research and Investigation into World History Teaching Materials). Beijing: PEP, 2000.
- Yang Baiyin, Zhang De and Zhang Mian.** 'National Human Resource Development in the People's Republic of China' in *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, vol. 6, no.3, Aug. 2004, pp297-306.
- Yang, Gu and Chen, Feng eds.** *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu wencui (shang, xia)* (Collected Essays on Secondary School History Education, 2 vols.). Beijing: Beijing gongye daxue chubanshe, 1996.
- Yang, Lien-sheng.** 'The Origins of Chinese Official Historiography: Principles and Methods of *Cheng-shih*, T'ang – Ming' in Beasley and Pulleyblank eds., *Historians of China and Japan*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Yang, Rong.** 'The Content of History Teaching in High Schools that Requires Immediate Improvement' in *CES*, vol. 32, no.6, Nov-Dec 1999, pp71-77, originally published as 'Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue jidai gaijin de neirong' in *Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue cankao*, 1994, no.8-9, pp9-10.
- Yang, Xiangyang** ed. *Shanghai zhuming lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue sixianglu*. Shanghai: Baijia chubanshe, 2000.
- Yang, Zhifu.** 'Examinations, Coping with Examinations and the Relationship between Exam-oriented Education and Quality Education' in *CES*, vol. 30, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1997, pp15-17, originally published as 'Kaoshi, yingshi, yingshi jiaoyu yu suzhi jiaoyu de guanxi' in *ZJB*, Aug. 24, 1996.
- Yao, Jinxiang.** 'Lun lishi xueke zai suzhi jiaoyuzhong de dute zuoyong ji qi shishi tujing' (A Discussion on the Special Role of History in Quality Education and Means of Implementing it), in *Nanjing shida xuebao, shehui kexue ban* (Nanjing Normal University Journal, Social Sciences Edition), 1999, no.2, pp74-79.
- Ye, Xiaobing.** *Dui lishi jiaokeshu zuoyong de fansi* (Reflections on the Role of History Textbooks) in *Qinghua lishi jiaoxue* (Tsing-hua Journal for History Education), issue 8, September 86 (1997), pp40-44. Hsin-chu, Taiwan: National Tsing-hua University History Research Institute.
- Ye, Xiaobing.** 'Guowai lishi jiaoxue zhuangkuang yu woguo zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de gaige he fazhan' (The State of History Education in Foreign Countries and the Reform and Development of Secondary School History Education in China), Part 1 in *LSJX*, 1987 no.7, pp39-43, Part 2 in no.8, pp33-35.
- Ye, Xiaobing.** 'Jiaoxue fangfa yu jiaoxue guannian' (Teaching and Learning Methods and Concepts), paper given at the International Conference on History Education, Shanghai Nov. 2000.
- Ye, Xiaobing.** 'Peiyang he fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de tansuo' (Investigating fostering and developing students' historical thinking skills) in *LSJX*, 1991, no.6, pp26-30.
- Ye, Xiaobing.** 'Peiyang he fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de jiaoxue shijian' (Fostering and developing students' historical thinking skills in educational practice), in *LSJX*, no.7, pp32-34.

- Yu, Jianfu.** *Jichu jiaoyu xin gainian: suzhi jiaoyu* (New Concepts in Basic Education: Quality Education). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1999.
- Yu, Jingsong** ed. *Xuesheng kewai xuexi duwu: chuzhong lishi*. Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999.
- Yu, Pei** ed. *20 shiji Zhonghua xueshu jingdian wenku. Lishixue: shixue lilun juan* (20th century classic writings by Chinese scholars. History: the theory of historiography). Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 2000.
- Yu, Xingzhong.** 'Citizenship, Ideology and the PRC Constitution' in Goldman and Perry eds., *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China*, pp288-307. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2002.
- Yu, Youxi** ed. *Jichu jiaoyu xiandaihua jiaoxue jiben gong: zhongxue lishi juan* (Essential Teaching Skills for the Modernisation of Basic Education: Secondary School History). Beijing: Shoudu shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997.
- Yu, Youxi, Ye, Xiaobing, and Zhao, Yafu.** *Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue* (The Pedagogy of History). Beijing: Shoudu shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999.
- Zang, Rong.** *Lishi jiaocai zonghengtan* (A Broad Discussion of History Teaching Materials). Beijing: PEP, 1999.
- Zey, Mary.** *Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1998.
- Zha, Jianying.** *China Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids and Bestsellers are Transforming a Culture*. New York: New Press, 1995.
- Zhang, Cheng.** 'Public Administration in China' in Mills and Nagel eds., *Public Administration in China*, pp3-19. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
- Zhang, Guifang.** 'Lishi jiaoyu yu ren de fazhan' (History education and personal development) in *ZXLS*, Issue 168, 1999, no.6, pp7-11.
- Zhang, Jing.** 'Dui lishi kecheng xianzhuang de fenxi' (An Analysis of the Current State of the History Curriculum), in Wen ed., *Xianshi yu chaoyue*, vol. 2, pp423-430. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999
- Zhang, Jing.** 'Kecheng gaige xuesheng wenjuan de diaocha yu fenxi' (Curriculum Reform: A Survey and Analysis of Student Questionnaires) in Wen ed., *Xianshi yu chaoyue*, vol. 1, pp57-72. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999.
- Zhang, Jing.** 'Woguo bainian lai zhongxiaoxue kecheng shezhi ji qi gaige gaishu' (A General Outline of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum Design and Reform in China over the Past Hundred Years), in Wen ed., *Xianshi yu chaoyue*, vol.1, pp220-245.
- Zhang, Jing.** 'Xuesheng lishi xuexi xintai yu jiaoxue celue de tantao' (A Discussion of Student Attitudes to Learning History and Educational Strategies) in *Qinghua lishi jiaoxue*, no.10, Sept., 88 (1999), pp4-23. Hsin-chu, Taiwan: National Tsing-hua University History Research Institute.
- Zhang, Shuhua.** *Suzhi jiaoyu de jiban* (The Fetters of Quality Education). Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998.
- Zhang, Xiaguang and Wang, Lanzhen.** 'Guoqing jiaoyu yu lishi jiaoxue chuyi' (Suggestions for Education in National Conditions and History) in *Xibei shida xuebao (shehui kexueban)*, 1992, no. 3, pp85 - 87.
- Zhang, Yankai.** 'Woguo kechenglun yanjiu de lishi huigu: 1922-1997' (A Review of the History of Curriculum Theory Research in China 1922-1997) in Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo ed., *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiu 15 nian*, pp51-63. Beijing: PEP, July 1998.
- Zhang, Yunpeng and Cui, Can.** *Lishi jiaoxue bilu jingxuan* (Selected notes on history education). Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1996.
- Zhao, Henglie.** 'Tan renjiao ban, Shanghai ban, yanhai ban santao xin jiaocai' (On Three New Sets of Teaching Materials: PEP, Shanghai and Coastal Editions) in Yang and Chen eds.

Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu wencui (shang), pp11-14. Beijing: Beijing gongye daxue chubanshe, 1996.

Zhao, Henglie. ‘Xuanze de fangfa he chuangzaoxing siwei’ (Methods of selection and creative thinking) in *LSJX*, 1196, no.10, pp29-32.

Zhao, Henglie. ‘Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue shijian sishinian’ (Forty Years of Practising Secondary School History Education) in *LSJX*, 1989, no.9, pp2-7.

Zhao, Suisheng. *In Search of a Right Place? Chinese Nationalism in the Post-Cold War World.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997.

Zhao, Yafu. ‘Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin’ (Personality and Creativity: The Core of Secondary School History Education for the New Century), serialised in *ZXLS*, issues 171 – 176: 1999, no.9, pp4-6; 1999, no.10, pp4-7; 1999, no.11, pp5-9; 1999, no.12, pp9-11; 2000, no.1, pp7-10; 2000, no.2, pp10-13.

Zhao, Yafu. “‘Liji’ ‘Xueji’ jiaoyu lun de xiandai yiyi’ (The Modern Significance of Education Theories from *The Book of Learning* Chapter in *The Book of Rites*) in Sanchong University School of Education research papers, arts and social sciences issue no.46, March 1995, pp137-151.

Zhao, Yafu. *Riben xuexiao shehuike jiaoyu yanjiu* (Social Studies Education Research in Japanese Schools). Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001.

Zhao, Yafu. ‘XiZhou jiaoyu moshi chutan’ (A Preliminary Discussion of Education Models in the Western Zhou Era), in *Shoudu shifan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* (Capital Normal University Journal, social sciences edition), 1993, no. 1, pp81-89.

Zhao, Yafu. *Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue* (The Pedagogy of Secondary School History). Beijing: Zhongguo jiancai gongye chubanshe, 1997.

Zhao, Yusen. *Benguoshi cankaoshu* (Reference Book for Chinese History). Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1915.

Zhao, Yusen. *Gongheguo jiaokeshu benguo shi* (Republican Textbooks: Chinese History). Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1914.

Zhao, Yusen. *Xinzhuo benguo shi* (New Chinese History). Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1922.

Zhejiangsheng jiaoyu weiyuanhui (Zhejiang Provincial Education Commission). ‘Yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue shehui jiaoxue zhidao gangyao’ (Teaching Guideline for Full-time compulsory education junior secondary Social Studies) in *Yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue geke jiaoxue zhidao gangyao* (Teaching Guidelines for All Subjects in Full-time Compulsory Junior Secondary Education). Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997 (second edition).

Zheng, Yongnian. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International Relations.* Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Zhong, Shulong. *Xintizhi benguo shi jiaoben* (Chinese History Textbook for the New System). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1914.

Zhong, Shulong. *Xintizhi benguo shi lishi cankaoshu* (Chinese History Reference Book for the New System). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1915.

Zhongguo jiaoyubao ed. *Zhongguo jinxiandai shi he guoqing jiaoyu duben* (A Reader in Modern and Contemporary Chinese History and *guoqing* Education). Dalian: Liaoning shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994.

Zhongguo jiaoyu shidian (Compendium of events in Chinese education). Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994.

Zhongguo jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui and **PEP** eds. *Mianxiang 21 shiji lishi jiaocai he lishi jiaoxue* (Facing the 21st Century: History Teaching Materials and History Education). Beijing: PEP, 1997.

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyubu. *Quanrizhi yiwu jiaoyu lishi kecheng biao zhun (shiyangao)* (Full-time compulsory education: History Curriculum Standards (trial edition). Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001.

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa quanshu (An encyclopaedia of education law in the PRC), revised edition. Beijing: Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe. 1995.

Zhou, Baiming. 'Chongfen fahui lishi ketang jiaoxue de feizhili yinsu' (Fully develop the non-cognitive elements of History classroom learning), conference paper, International Conference on History Education, Shanghai Nov. 2000.

Zhou, Feng. *Suzhi jiaoyu: lilun, caozuo, jingyan* (Quality Education: Theory, Operation and Experience). Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1998.

Zhu, Yu. *Lishi jiaocaixue gailun* (Introduction to the study of history teaching materials). Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1999.

Zhu, Zhengyi. 'Tigao suzhi zuanyan jiaofa' in Yang, ed. *Shanghai zhuoming lishi jiaoshi sixianglu*, pp73-117. Shanghai: Baijia chubanshe, 2000.

Zhuang, Yunqin and Jin, Erwen. 'Bianxie chuzhong lishi jiaocai zhi wo jian' (Our Opinions on the Writing of Junior Secondary History Teaching Materials) in *LSJX*, 1990, no.1, pp41-42.

Appendix

Textbooks 1949 - 2000

Textbooks are listed by school level, subject, publisher and date respectively. A comprehensive list is given for junior secondary level History textbooks, a partial list for other relevant junior secondary subjects and for primary and senior secondary level textbooks. If known, the names of authors and editors of individual volumes and/or sets have also been included. These are listed after the title if only one writer/editor or group was responsible for all volumes in a set, and after the individual volume where there have been several contributors to a set. Dates of first and last editions and/or printings of textbooks have been included wherever possible to indicate the time period for which each set or volume was/is in use.

Junior Secondary History

Chinese History

Xinhua Shudian

Chuji zhongxue jindai lishi keben (Junior Secondary Modern History Textbook), Huabei University History Research Unit, revised by Xinhua Education Department Editorial Committee.

Vol. 1, Aug. 1949; three editions.

Chuji zhongxue shiyong zan dai keben, jin bainian shihua (Temporary junior secondary textbook: historical tales of the past hundred years), Huang Zuying ed.

1 Vol., Feb. 1950.

Chuji zhongxue benguo jindaishi keben (Junior secondary Modern Chinese History Textbook), Ding Xiaoguang ed.

Vol. 1, Aug. 1950; revised and reprinted by PEP until 1954.

Vol. 2, Feb. 1951; revised and reprinted by PEP until 1954.

Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, the People's Education Press (PEP)

Zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi geming shi: chugao (A History of the New Democratic Revolution in China: first draft). Hu Hua.

1 Vol., originally written Mar. 1950; revised and republished in Aug. 1955.

Zhongguo renmin jiefang zhanzheng jianshi (A Short History of the Chinese People's War of Liberation). Liao Gailong.

1 Vol., Jan. 1951; new edition Dec. 1952; final edition published with addition of "Five Years of New China", Sept. 1955.

Chuji zhongxue keben: lishi (Junior secondary school textbook: History). Li Gengxu and Wang Zhijiu eds.

Vol. 1, July 1952; revised Apr. 1953, final edition Feb. 1955.

Vol. 2, Jan. 1953; revised Oct. 1953, final edition July 1955.

Vol. 3, May 1953; revised Apr. 1954, final edition Sept. 1955.

Zhongguo jindai jianshi (A Short History of Modern China). Ding Xiaoguang

1 Vol., Oct. 1953; final printing Nov. 1955

Chuji zhongxue keben: Zhongguo lishi (Junior secondary school textbook: Chinese History).

Vol. 1, July 1955, final edition June 1965, Wang Jian ed.

Vol. 2, Dec. 1955, final edition/printing June 1965, Wang Jian and Chen Yasu eds..

Vol. 3, Apr. 1956, final printing Nov. 1964, Su Shoutong ed.

Vol. 4, Dec. 1956, final printing Nov. 1964, Yao Yonglin and Su Shoutong eds.

Jiunian yiguanzhi shiyong keben (quanrizhi): lishi (Textbook for the nine-year complete school system (full-time): History). Beijing shifan daxue lishixi putong jiaoyu gaige xiaozu (Beijing Normal University History Department, Committee for Reform of Ordinary [primary and secondary] Education) eds.

Vol. 1, Sept. 1960

Vol. 2, Sept. 1960

Vol. 3, Sept. 1960

Shi'ernianzhi xuexiao chuji zhongxue keben: Zhongguo lishi (Junior secondary school textbook for the twelve year school system: Chinese History). [Writer-editors not identified].

Vol. 1, 1962

Vol. 2, 1963

Vol. 3, 1963

Vol. 4, 1965

Quanrizhi shinianzhi xuexiao chuji zhongxue keben: Zhongguo lishi (Junior secondary textbook for the full-time ten-year school system: Chinese History). The Unified Primary and Secondary School Teaching Materials History Editorial Committee, eds.

Vol. 1, Mar. 1978, final printing March 1981.

Vol. 2, Aug. 1978, final printing Oct. 1981.

Vol. 3, Feb. 1979, final printing April 1981.

Vol. 4, July 1979, final printing April 1981.

Chuji zhongxue keben Zhongguo lishi (Junior secondary textbook for Chinese History).

Vol. 1, Nov. 1981, final printing May 1986, Chen Guangzhong and Zang Rong eds.

Vol. 2, June 1982, final printing Oct. 1986, Wang Jianying and Wang Hongzhi eds.

Vol. 3, Nov. 1981, final printing Mar. 1987, Hu Wenyan ed.

Vol. 4, June 1982, final printing June 1986, Li Longgeng ed.

Chuji zhongxue keben Zhongguo lishi (Junior secondary textbook for Chinese History).

Vol. 1, revised edition, Dec. 1986, final printing Apr. 1991, Zang Rong and Wang Hongzhi eds.

Vol. 2, revised edition, June 1987, final printing Aug. 1991, PEP History Editorial Department.

Vol. 3, revised edition, Dec. 1987, final printing Feb. 1992, PEP History Editorial Department.

Yiwu jiaoyu sannian zhi, sinianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: Zhongguo lishi (shiyan ben). (Textbook for the compulsory education three-year and four-year junior secondary school systems: Chinese History (trial edition)). PEP History Editorial Department.

Vol. 1, Oct. 1989, final printing May 1992.

Vol. 2, Apr. 1990, final printing Oct. 1992.

Vol. 3, Oct. 1990, final printing May 1993.

Vol. 4, Apr. 1991, final printing Sept. 1993.

Yiwu jiaoyu sannianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: Zhongguo lishi (Textbook for the compulsory education three-year junior secondary school systems: Chinese History). PEP History Editorial Department. This same textbook was published separately for the four-year system, although there are no differences in content, and both colour and black and white editions were printed. These textbooks are still in use, and were revised most recently in 2000 - 2001.

Vol. 1, Oct. 1992

Vol. 2, Apr. 1993

Vol. 3, Oct. 1993

Vol. 4, Apr. 1994

Yanhai ban (Coastal Edition)**Published by Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe (Guangdong Education Press)***Zhongguo lishi* (Chinese History), Nine-year compulsory education teaching materials (coastal region) editorial committee. [Still in use]Vol. 1, 1st edition July 1992; 2nd edition July 1993; 3rd edition July 1997Vol. 2, 1st edition 1991; 4th edition Dec. 1997Vol. 3, 1st edition July 1994; 2nd edition July 1998Vol. 4, 1st edition Dec. 1992; 4th edition Dec. 1999**Shanghai ban (Shanghai edition)****Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe (Shanghai Education Press)***Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben: lishi* (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: History), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum and Teaching Materials. [Still in use]Vol. 7/1, 1st edition June 1991; 2nd edition June 1994Vol. 7/2, 2nd edition Nov. 1992Vol. 8/1, 1st edition June 1992; 2nd edition June 1994Vol. 8/2, 1st edition Nov. 1992; 2nd edition, Nov. 1994**Neidi ban (Inland Edition)****Published by Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe (Sichuan Education Press)***Zhongguo lishi* (Chinese History), Neidiban History Teaching Materials Committee, Yang Guangyan, Gong Qizhu chief eds. [Still in use]Vol. 1, 1st edition 1992; 2nd edition, June 1994Vol. 2, 1st edition November 1993Vol. 3, 1st edition June 1994Vol. 4, 1st edition Nov. 1994***World History*****Xinhua shudian***Chuji zhongxue waiguo lishi keben (Junior secondary textbook: foreign history)*, Shen Changhong., revised by Xinhua Education Department History Editorial Committee.

1 Vol., Sept. 1949; further revised by Wang Zhijiu and subsequently divided into two volumes.

Vol. 1 (revised edition), July 1951; final printing May 1953

Vol. 2 (revised edition), Oct. 1951; final printing Sept. 1955

People's Education Press*Chuji zhongxue keben shijie gudai shi* (Junior secondary textbook: ancient world history), Wang Zhijiu.

Vol. 1, Sept. 1953

Vol. 2, Feb. 1954

Vol. 3, Aug. 1954

Chuji zhongxue keben shijie lishi (Junior secondary textbook: world history).

Vol. 1, Dec. 1955; final printing July 1965, Li Gengxu.

Vol. 2, Aug. 1956; final printing Sept. 1963, Wang Zhijiu

Chuji zhongxue keben shijie lishi (Junior secondary textbook: world history), PEP History Editorial Department.

1 vol., June 1988; final printing Oct. 1991.

Yiwu jiaoyu san, sinianzhi chujǐ zhongxue jiaokeshu: shijie lishi (shiyān bēn) (Junior secondary textbook for the three and four-year compulsory education system (trial edition)), PEP History Editorial Department.

Vol. 1, Oct. 1991; final printing Jan. 1993

Vol. 2, Apr. 1992; final printing Sept. 1993

Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu sannianzhi chujǐ zhongxue jiaokeshu: shijie lishi and *Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu sinianzhi chujǐ zhongxue jiaokeshu: shijie lishi* (nine-year compulsory education textbook for three(four)-year junior secondary schools: world history). PEP history editorial department eds.

Vol. 1, 1st edition Oct. 1994

Vol. 2, 1st edition April 1995

Yanhai ban

Published by Zhongguo ditu chubanshe (Chinese Cartographic Press)

Shijie lishi (World history). Nine-year compulsory education teaching materials (coastal region) editorial committee. [Still in use]

Vol. 1, 4th edition June 1999

Vol. 2, 3rd edition Dec. 1999

Shanghai ban

Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe.

Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben: lishi (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: History), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum and Teaching Materials. [Still in use]

Vol. 9/1, 3rd edition June 1996

Vol. 9/2, 3rd edition Nov. 1996

Neidi ban

Published by Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe

Shijie lishi. Neidiban History Teaching Materials Committee, Yang Guangyan, Gong Qizhu chief eds. [Still in use]

Vol. 1, 1st edition June 1994

Vol. 2, 1st edition Dec. 1994

Junior Secondary Social Studies

Zhejiang ban (Zhejiang edition)

Published by Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe (Zhejiang Education Press)

Yiwu jiaoyu chujǐ zhongxue keben: shehui (Compulsory education junior secondary textbook: Social Studies).

Vol. 1, 1st edition July 1991; 2nd edition May 1997

Vol. 2, 1st edition Nov. 1991; 2nd edition Nov. 1997

Vol. 3, 1st edition July 1993

Vol. 4, 1st edition Nov. 1993; 4th edition Nov. 1999

Vol. 5, 5th edition June 1999

Vol. 6, 4th edition Dec. 1999

Shanghai ban (Shanghai edition)

Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe

Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben: shehui (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: Social Studies), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum and Teaching Materials. [Still in use in trial district]

Vol. 7/1, 1st edition June 1991; 2nd edition June 1994

Vol. 7/2, 2nd edition Nov. 1994

Vol. 8/1, 2nd edition June 1995
 Vol. 8/2, 2nd edition Nov. 1995
 Vol. 9/1, 2nd edition June 1996
 Vol. 9/2, 2nd edition Nov. 1996

Trial textbooks¹

Beijing Normal University Press. *Lishi: qinianji shangce* (History, 7th Grade, vol.1). 2001.
Beijing Normal University Press. *Lishi: banianji shangce* (History: 8th Grade, vol.1). 2001.
Huadong Normal University Press. *Zhongguo lishi qinianji, di er xueqi (shiyanben)* (Chinese History, 7th Grade, 2nd Semester (trial edition). Shanghai, 2003.
Huadong Normal University Press. *Shijie lishi chuzhong san nianji (xia)* (World History, Third-year Junior Secondary, vol.2). 2004.
People's Education Press. *Zhongguo lishi, di yi/er/san/si ce* (Chinese History, vols.1-4). 2001-2003.

Teacher handbooks: Junior Secondary History²

People's Education Press

Zhongguo lishi: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu (Chinese History: Teacher Handbook)

Vol. 1, 1st edition, 1991

Vol. 2, 1st edition, 1992

Vol. 3, 1st edition, 1992

Vol. 4, 1st edition, 1993

Shijie lishi: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu (World History: Teacher Handbook)

Vol. 1, 1st edition, 1993

Vol. 2, 1st edition, 1994

Shanghai edition

Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben., Lishi: jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Textbooks for Nine-year Compulsory Education. History: Teaching Reference Materials)

Vol. 7/1, 1st edition, 1993

Vol. 7/2, 1st edition, 1994

Vol. 8/1, 2nd edition, 1997

Vol. 8/2, 2nd edition, 1996

Vol. 9/1, 1st edition, 1995

Vol. 9/2, 1st edition, 1996

Beijing Normal University Press

Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an: Zhongguo lishi (Teaching Plans for Nine-year Compulsory Education, Junior Secondary History: Chinese History)

Vol. 1, 1st edition, 1993

Vol. 2, 1st edition, 1994

Vol. 3, 1st edition, 1994

¹ This is not a complete list of all the textbooks currently on trial; it is merely a list of those texts I have seen and consulted.

² I was unable to obtain copies of the relevant teacher handbooks for the Inland and Coastal Edition textbooks.

Vol. 4, 1st edition, 1995

Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an: shijie lishi (Teaching Plans for Nine-year Compulsory Education, Junior Secondary History: World History)

Vol. 1, 1st edition, 1996

Vol. 2, 1st edition, 1997