

Writing Jude: The Reader, the Text, and the Author

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Summary

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This thesis is about the application of modern literary criticism to the epistle of Jude. One of the major questions it asks is "What happens to a text (Jude) when a reader reads it using one of these literary theories?" Or to put it a different way, "What does this way of reading emphasise which may have been neglected, ignored, or treated as irrelevant by other forms of reading?" The answers to these questions have been constructed around three loci: the reader, the text, and the author. Within the chapters constructed around those foci, the issues of power and desire, knowledge and language are brought to the forefront by the methods used for reading Jude. These methods include ideas drawn from reader response criticism, feminism, psychoanalysis, intertextuality, the study of tropes, structuralism, and post-structuralism. These methods and the ideas which they highlight are drawn together to comment on the relationship between the reader, the text, and the author and to accent their access (or lack of it) to desire, power, knowledge, and language. The epistle of Jude becomes an epistle that is about power and desire just as much as it is an epistle about "false teachers" and about a community of people known by the name Beloved.

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In Order to Begin

In the beginning ...Genesis 1:1 and John 1:1

There is always a beginning before the beginning and an end after the end. As Stanley Fish says, "In Aristotelian terms, everything is middle, even where there are...all the formal signs of a beginning and an end".¹ And yet, readers, this must begin somewhere. It must, like a person timidly feeling the water of the North Sea with a toe, make a start. And it is a start in two directions at once, for it is a plunge into the textual sea, and it is the creation of a thesis. But while this thesis may have "all the formal signs of a beginning and an end", including a cover and binding, the place where the readers may test the textual waters with their interpretive toes is of their own choosing. The thesis is constructed of three main chapters. One is about the reader, one about the text, and another about the author. They can be read separately and/or in the order of the readers' choosing. But in another way, every chapter is about each of the subjects – the reader, the text, and the author; these items of discussion intermingle and inform each other.

Not only do the chapters and their topics intermingle, but so also do the ideas and methods and critical theories from which the chapters are composed and by which they are influenced. This thesis seeks to look at the text of Jude from a number of literary perspectives. In an effort to avoid a centred subject in which the author declares (and defines) *the* meaning of the text, or in which the text controls the reader in an effort to determine meaning, or in which the reader ignores any type of limitation by the text or the author or by her² own context, this thesis interacts with a variety of literary models developed for reading, structuring, understanding, and interpreting texts. As part of the process of decentering each of, what have been seen as, the three key

¹ Stanley Fish. *Is There a Text in This Class*. London: Harvard UP, 1980, p. 193.

² It should be noted from the beginning that I plan to refer to the reader as she or her, the author as he or him, and the text as it. This is partly for the sake of clarity but also due to the fact that I, this reader/author am a woman, and that the position of "author" (whether ancient or modern) has generally been held by more men than women. However, although I use this terminology myself, I do not change other people's words to fit it. Thus, there are other usages within the thesis. This is especially true in the section dealing with Michel Foucault since he makes extensive use of the word "man" to refer to everyone.

players (author, text, and reader) the thesis shifts in focus between the reader, the author, and the text. But despite this attempt to decentre the key players, one might still decide that the power goes to the reader by the end of the thesis, but that is your decision.

It is with this in mind that this thesis proceeds to explain and use ideas from structuralism, narratology, post-structuralism, reader response criticism, feminism, intertextuality, psychoanalysis, and the study of literary tropes. I try to explain each of these theories where they arise in the context of the discussion that is revolving around the reader, the text, and the author. The thesis does not claim to be a critical examination of any one and/or all of these theories; rather it is the goal of this thesis to give an explanation of each type of criticism (with some general notes as to what the theories do and do not do) and then to find out what happens when a reader (me) reads a text (Jude) using that type of criticism. It is the *use* of the theory and its relevance to reading and interpreting Jude which has been of the most importance. One of the leading questions in the research and writing of this thesis has been "Does reading Jude using this method tell us anything about Jude which we did not know before?" or "Does this method highlight an issue or discussion which was unnoticed or considered unimportant or irrelevant in the past?" And in general, it seems that ideas which arise out of readings informed by these various types of criticism and in answer to these questions relate new or different information than that received through the traditional forms of commentary, article, and monograph, and that new information can be most conveniently pinpointed in the ideas surrounding the reader, the text, and the author.

In general, commentators have written about Jude as an epistle which explicates the danger of false teachers and the need of the Christian community to fight against them.³ They have also used multiple reading strategies, although it is a rare occasion when a

³ For some examples see Barnett, *James, Peter, John, Jude, Revelation*. vol. 12. The Interpreters Bible. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957, p. 319; Bauckham, *Jude, 2 Peter*. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 50. Waco, Texas: Word Books Publisher, 1983, pp. 40-41; Calvin, *Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles*. Ed and Trans. John Owen. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1855, p. 427; Kelly, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and of Jude*. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1969, p. 228; Leaney, A. R. C. *The Letters of Peter and Jude: A Commentary on the First Letter of Peter, A Letter of Jude and the Second Letter of Peter*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1967, p. 82; Reicke, *The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, p. 192; Wand, *The General Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude*. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1934, p. 191.

commentator actually explains the reading strategy which he has employed. Jerome Neyrey's sociological commentary in the Anchor Bible series is an exception to this. He begins his commentary with an introductory section explaining the method and thinking behind a sociological reading.⁴ Like many commentators he makes use of multiple tools and reading strategies, but unlike others he comments on the tools of the interpretive trade. Traditionally, these items of the trade include training in languages, history (i.e. historical settings), and exegesis. But recently, readers are adding new equipment to their reading strategies, and these include sociology as well as the newer forms of literary criticism. Despite the new provisions, many articles continue to focus on single themes of either language or exegesis.⁵ In short, despite the brevity or length with which various authors have written on the short epistle of Jude, they have generally used an eclecticism of approaches even if it goes unrecognised, but this eclecticism has been used to determine and show a particular point about the epistle. In contrast, I bring a number of types of reading strategies to the book in the hope that there will be a plethora of meaning to be made and discovered in the text. I am not interested in discovering *the* meaning of the text. Instead, I want to see the text expand its meaning potential as it interacts (through me) with other texts in the textual sea.

One might think that it would only be fair to write a few words about the reader/author here at the beginning of the text, but it is not necessary in order to begin; so, that has been reserved for the conclusion. The views in this thesis about readers and authors are built up and created through reading, writing, thinking, and interacting with texts. This thesis does work with a particular reader in mind, but who that is can be left for discovery at the end. Then again, the reader can always choose to dip her toes in at the end in order to

⁴ Jerome H. Neyrey. *2 Peter, Jude*. The Anchor Bible. New York: Doubleday, 1993, pp. 1-9.

⁵ For articles that focus on the language of the epistle see N. H. Boobyer. "The Verbs in Jude 11." *New Testament Studies*. 5(1, 1958) 45-7; Marchant A. King. "Notes on the Bodmer Manuscript." *Bibliotheca Sacra*. 121(1964) 54-57; C. D. Osburn. "The Text of Jude 5." *Biblica*. 62 (1981) 107-115; W. Whallon. "Should we Keep, Omit, or Alter the *ol* in Jude 12?" *New Testament Studies*. 34 (1988) 156-59. For articles on more exegetical themes see A. M. Buono. "A Golden Letter." *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*. 89 (2, 1988) 59-62; I. H. Eybers. "Aspects of the Background of the Letter of Jude." *Neotestamentica*. 9 (1975) 113-23; W. J. Hassold. "Keep Yourselves in the Love of God: An Interpretation of Jude 20-21." *Concordia Theological Monthly*. 23 (1952) 884-94.

begin.

I have put forward these few short words in order to give us, readers, a place from which to begin – some kind of association before we go our separate ways along the beach and dabble our toes in the waters. But then, we are not so free as we might like to be, for a *viva* constrains us (and so many other traditions besides – known and unknown); but, enough of that for now – our ideologies will return to haunt us before the end, I'm sure. Now it is time to see what interpretations of Jude might be forthcoming in light of the various types of criticism utilised in this thesis. We can proceed together to read and write the chapters which follow.

The Reader: Who's who?

In the analysis of a reading experience, when does one come to the point? The answer is never, or no sooner than the pressure to do so becomes unbearable (psychologically). Coming to the point is the goal of a criticism that believes in content, in extractable meaning, in the utterance as a repository. Coming to the point fulfils a need that most literature deliberately frustrates...the need to simplify and close.

Stanley Fish

Who is "the reader"? That is a question that has been addressed by what now amounts to a large collection of books on the topic, and the answer depends on what is meant by those two words "the reader". Do those words refer to the real person or persons to whom the text was originally addressed or does it refer to a construct written into the text (an ideal or implied reader) or does it refer to the actual, real person reading the text now? All of these meanings have been accepted and used by scholars and critics alike.¹ So, does "the reader" refer to all of these? It can. But a clarification of the term and the theories that accompany it will be useful for this thesis. The focus of reader response criticism is, as the name implies, upon the reader and what the reader does. Old theories of reading explained the reader as a passive information gatherer. Elizabeth Freund defines the older understanding by saying that

a traditional, rigidly hierarchical, view of the text-reader relationship [enshrines t]he poem itself...as the prime mover...Subject to its dominion is the disinterested critic

¹ Some excellent studies of ancient readers have been recently produced in the field of biblical studies. This includes John Darr's *On Character Building: The Reader and the Rhetoric of Characterization in Luke-Acts*. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992; Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's *But She Said*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992; which (among other things) posits groups of ancient readers for the gospels. At the same time feminists and some reader response critics have demonstrated the role of the real reader. This has been demonstrated by people such as Sara Mills in *Feminist Readings/Feminists Reading*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989; and Stanley Fish in *Is There a Text in This Class?* Equally, theorists such as Umberto Eco in *The Role of the Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979; Wolfgang Iser in *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*. London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978; and Seymour Chatman in *Story and Discourse*. London: Cornell University Press, 1978; have demonstrated the use of the reader as a textual construct.

who...mediat[es] the textual properties....Last comes the lowly reader who benefits passively from the critic's work. Since response...is not a property of the reader at all but something inscribed in and controlled by 'the poem itself', the reader need only be taken for granted. Taken for granted, readers and reading become invisible.²

On the other hand, modern theories of reading not only make the reader visible but also give her much more power and control. The reader is an active participant in the creation of a text. Hélène Cixous in her book *Coming to Writing* asserts the need for an active reader when she says, "I [the author] gather words to make a great straw-yellow fire, but if you [the reader] don't put in your own flame, my fire won't take, my words won't burst into pale yellow sparks. My words will remain dead words".³ The text without a reader is a dead text. Reading is the act of creating meaning for a text in order to make a text live. Reading is "writing the ten thousand pages of every page, bringing them to light...".⁴ The reader actively creates meaning/s for the signs on a page. It is this process of making meaning for a text which defines the active reader. So, "Who is the reader?" The reader is the place, the location, in which the text is formed. The text exists in the reader and along with the text are all the constructs of the text. Ideal readers, ancient readers, a real author, or an implied author – these are all constructs formed in the mind of the reader. This chapter will describe and evaluate two of the main answers surrounding the question "who is the reader?" and then it will attempt to address the question, *how* do readers read? The praxis section of the chapter will look both at who the reader is and how she reads the epistle of Jude followed by some analysis of the difficulties one may unexpectedly encounter upon reading the epistle of Jude.

Who's who in reading: The ancestors

The discussion of original readers is not a new issue in the biblical studies discipline, and indeed most of the commentaries which I have read on the epistle of Jude (and many I have read on other books as

² Elizabeth Freund. *The Return of the Reader: Reader-Response Criticism*. London: Methuen, 1987, p. 4.

³ Hélène Cixous. *Coming to Writing and Other Essays*. Ed. Deborah Jenson. Trans. Sarah Cornell, Deborah Jenson, Ann Liddle, Susan Sellers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991, p. 107.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 24

well) posit a group of readers addressed by the author. One of four different identities is usually posited for the original readers of Jude by commentators on the epistle; however, as Bauckham notes, all attempts to determine the original destination and readership of the letter are largely guesswork.⁵ One destination that is often pointed to is Palestine. This is suggested in light of the authorship of the epistle by Jude a brother of James. It is usually assumed that Jude is one of Jesus' half brothers and thus, that he is a Palestinian Jew and will write to a church in the area with which he is familiar.⁶ A second view has suggested that the letter was sent to Antioch in Syria.⁷ A third view suggests that the epistle of Jude was written for Jewish Christians since it has so many references to Jewish literature.⁸ This view is supported by Walter Grundmann in his commentary, but he puts a little twist on the proposal by suggesting that the letter was written to a community consisting of both Jewish and Gentile Christians. The Gentiles were led astray by the false teachers and the letter was written to the strong Jewish Christians who were struggling for the faith.⁹ Others suggest that the epistle was written for Gentiles because of the argument against antinomianism. Bauckham proposes an effective mixing of these last two proposals by suggesting that the epistle was written for Jewish Christians who were residing in a predominantly Gentile society.¹⁰ A fifth reader (suggested by more devotional commentaries) is "all Christians".¹¹ Yet, when all the proposals by different

⁵ Richard J. Bauckham. p. 16.

⁶ See for example J. W. C. Wand. p. 193, as well as Montague James. *The Second General Epistle of Peter and the General Epistle of Jude*. Cambridge University Press, 1912, p. xxxviii (although James notes that there is no reason to confine one's self to Palestine and would also be happy with its readers being in Syrian Antioch) and Albert Barnett. p. 318.

⁷ Charles Bigg. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude*. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1901, p. 321 who derives his argument from Chase in *Hasting's Bible Dictionary*.

⁸ Bo Reicke. p. 191; Simon Kistemaker. *Peter and Jude*. Welwyn, Hertfordshire: Evangelical Press, 1987, p. 359.

⁹ Walter Grundmann. *Der Brief des Judas und der zweite Brief des Petrus*. Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1974. He writes, "Nehmen wir alle diese Züge zusammen, so ergibt sich: Gemeinden zwischen Jerusalem und Antiochia mit starker Judenchristenschaft sind die Empfänger dieses Sendschreibens" (p. 20).

¹⁰ 1983, p. 16.

¹¹ Alfred Plummer. *The General Epistles of St. James and St. Jude*. The Expositors Bible. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1891, p. 378. This reader is arrived at by understanding the words "the saints" as a reference to Christians. John Calvin. p. 429; Norman Hillyer. *New International Biblical Commentary: 1 and 2 Peter, Jude*. Ed. W. Ward Gasque. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1992, p. 238.

commentators are added up, there is no certainty about who the original readers were to whom this epistle may have been addressed. E. M. Sidebottom puts it well when he says,

The Epistle of Jude is a hortatory tract addressed to a Christian community or communities in some area which was in danger from subversive teaching and from subversive elements which had infiltrated into their own membership. The description of these elements is so vague as to make it difficult to tell whether a specific community is in view or not.¹²

Even if one could ascertain who the real, original readers of this epistle were, it would still be quite impossible to enter into their minds. This is both the delight and despair of books such as John Darr's *On Character Building: The Reader and the Rhetoric of Characterization in Luke-Acts*. John Darr has produced a major work that constructs through detailed research a very useful and believable reader for the Luke-Acts corpus (one who may even help the interpreter create new meaning for the work), but at the same time it must be recognised that Darr's reader is a useful construct – a creation – and not the real, original reader. This critique applies to the constructions of commentators as well. In the case of the epistle of Jude the search for the original readers has been hampered by the lack of available information, but even if real, original readers were to be found, they would be constructs of the commentator rather than real people into whose minds and responses one could enter.

Who's who in reading: The critics

However, constructed readers are not only made by biblical commentators. They are also made by reader response theorists. And unlike the proposals of biblical commentators who offer concrete suggestions as to the type and place of the constructed reader, the theorists offer abstractions about what a constructed reader should look like. And, it seems that theorists have christened the reader with their own unique name. Thus, under the constructed reader we have the

¹² E. M. Sidebottom. *James, Jude, and 2 Peter*. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1967, p. 70.

following proposals: "...the implied reader (Booth, Iser), the model reader (Eco), the super-reader (Riffaterre)...the narratee (Prince), the ideal reader (Culler)...the actual reader (Jauss), the informed reader or the interpretative community (Fish)".¹³ But even attempts to recover the readings of a "real" reader rely upon construction. The chapter on Reader-Response criticism written by The Bible and Culture Collective in *The Postmodern Bible* gives a taxonomy of readers who have been proposed within the range of reader-response criticism. This mapping includes the psychological or subjective model supported by the research of Norman Holland and David Bleich; the interactive or phenomenological model favoured by Wolfgang Iser and the early work of Stanley Fish; and the social or structural model put forward by critics such as Jonathan Culler, Gerald Prince, Seymour Chatman, and the later work of Stanley Fish.¹⁴ These constructs vary from each other, and some of them should be examined more fully before turning to the reading of Jude which follows.

Iser's implied reader

Wolfgang Iser begins by dividing readers into two categories. The first is the real reader and the second is the hypothetical reader.¹⁵ The second category has been further divided into the ideal reader and the contemporary reader. First, Iser speaks of the real reader. By this terminology he refers to the original reader or the reader in history.¹⁶ But, one needs documents which reflect the real reader's reaction to the works themselves; and, as Iser says, these documents become more sparse the further back in history one goes. But, when such documents are available, then the real reader can be reconstructed for the purpose of attempting to discover historical reactions to a text in light of the community and time in which those reactions took place. He notes that when documents become unavailable then reconstructions are often attempted from the work itself. But "[t]he problem here is whether such a reconstruction corresponds to the real reader of the time or simply represents the role which the author intended the

¹³ Elizabeth Freund, p. 7.

¹⁴ The Bible and Culture Collective. *The Postmodern Bible*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1995, pp. 26-27.

¹⁵ *The Act of Reading*, p. 27.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

reader to assume".¹⁷ Thus, Iser posits three kinds of "real" readers: one who might be known through historical documents, one who might be constructed from sociological and historical study, and one who might be constructed from the text itself. Yet while Iser recognises that these readers may be a valuable part of interpretation, it is not where his own interest lies.

He turns to the hypothetical category and problematises both the ideal and the contemporary reader by saying, "The first of these cannot be said to exist objectively, while the second, though undoubtedly there, is difficult to mould to the form of a generalisation".¹⁸ He turns to what he will call the implied reader, and he imparts to that reader this foundation:

He [the implied reader] embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise its effect – predispositions laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by the text itself. Consequently, the implied reader as a concept has his roots firmly planted in the structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be identified with any real reader.¹⁹

But while the implied reader is not to be identified with any real reader, the real reader is "offered a particular role to play" and that is the opportunity to participate in the textual structure including the structure of the implied reader.²⁰ In the process of playing that role, the reader formulates meaning for the text. The implied reader, in Iser's view, is a construct that is both written into the text and effected by the reader. Iser says that

the reader is situated in such a position that he can assemble the meaning toward which the perspectives of the text have guided him. But since this meaning is neither a given external reality nor a copy of an intended reader's own world, it is something that has to be ideated by the mind of the reader.²¹

Iser's implied reader is a mixture of a textual construct located within the text itself and the impulses and responses of the real reader. These

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

²¹ Ibid., p. 38.

two things together, in Iser's view, allow one to speak of the meaning of the text while realising its differences in various readers, times, places, and cultures.

Narratology's reader

Another view of the reader is proposed by narrative criticism. This criticism is even more restrained by the text and by its historic association with structuralism than Iser. In this view the reader has been seen as the narratee – the person to whom the text is written or addressed, the person to whom the story is told. This view has been put forward by both Gerald Prince and Seymour Chatman among others.²² In this view the reader is seen as a construct within the text that is separate from the real reader outside of the text. Chatman diagrams this by placing the narrator and the narratee in the centre of the diagram facing each other and standing behind them on either side are the implied reader and the implied author, the real reader and the real author.²³ The real reader and the real author are exterior to the text.²⁴

Psychology's reader

On the other hand, some views of the reader have tried to move away from the textual construct of the reader such as that proposed by Iser and narratology and towards a view of the real person who is reading. There are two theories which seem to correspond more closely to the real reader (the real person who picks up a text and reads it), but even these are constructs. The first is a psychoanalytic theory of reading, and it can be attributed to both Simon Lesser and Norman Holland. The second is Stanley Fish's informed reader. The psychoanalytic model as put forward by Holland places its emphasis on the response of the reader. He tries to demonstrate this approach in his book *5 Readers Reading*.²⁵ Here he analyses the responses of 5 different readers to particular works of literature, but even these real readers and their responses are constructed by his questions to them and how he

²² Seymour Chatman. *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*; Prince, Gerald. *Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative*. Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1982.

²³ Chatman, p. 151.

²⁴ For a diagram of this see the chapter on text in this thesis (p. 71) where this picture of the reader is discussed more fully in relationship to characters within the epistle.

²⁵ New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.

then edits their replies to put it in the book. They too are constructs.

Fish's informed reader

But it is perhaps Stanley Fish who proposes one of the most appealing constructed readers – the informed reader. Fish defines the informed reader as:

someone who (1) is a competent speaker of the language out of which the text is built up; (2) is in full possession of 'the semantic knowledge that a mature...listener brings to his task of comprehension,' including the knowledge (that is, the experience, both as a producer and comprehender) of lexical sets, collocation probabilities, idioms, professional and other dialects, and so on; and (3) has *literary* competence. That is, he is sufficiently experienced as a reader to have internalized the properties of literary discourses, including everything from the most local of devices (figures of speech, and so on) to whole genres. In this theory then the concerns of others schools of criticism... *become redefined in terms of potential and probable response...*²⁶

So, who exactly is this informed reader? Ah, here Stanley Fish says, "The reader of whose responses I speak, then, is this informed reader, neither an abstraction nor an actual living reader, but a hybrid – a real reader (me) who does everything within his power to make himself informed."²⁷ In Fish's later work he will bind this informed reader into the interpretative community, but in this early work first written in 1970 he posits an amalgamation of the real reader and the constructed reader. In his later essays, including his 1979 essay "Is There a Text in this Class?",²⁸ Fish makes clear the relationship of the reader to a reading community. This is especially prominent in his collection of essays *Doing What Comes Naturally*. In the very first essay, Fish remarks "that there is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a meaning that is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in the speaker's or hearer's mind, a meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can serve as a constraint on interpretation".²⁹ So, if there is no literal meaning

²⁶ Stanley Fish. "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics." *Is There a Text in This Class?* London: Harvard UP, 1980, pp. 48-49. His emphasis.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 303-321.

²⁹ "Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road." *Doing What Comes Naturally*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 4.

which constrains interpretation, does anything constrain it? Fish answers yes. Readers always read from a perspective. “[The reader] cannot distance himself [from his perspective] for a single second except to slip into another way of seeing, no less conventional, no less involuntary.”³⁰ The informed reader is actually bound by the very things by which he is informed. Is he a judge? His reading is constrained by his location in the judicial field. Is she a linguist? Her reading is constrained by her understanding of the discipline. Even a classroom can become a location which shapes and informs one’s reading and causes one to see in a particular perspective rather than another.³¹ As Nietzsche would say, “all seeing is perspective”.

What all of these theorists share is a constructed reader. Some, like Iser, try to restrain the power of the reader by constructing an implied reader who has some control over the text and yet who is created and manipulated by the textual structure. Others, like the narratologists who come out of a structural background present a reader whose construction appears even more textually based. Still others, such as the psychological models and Fish, attempt to give the real reader some power over the constructed reader – perhaps the power to define and create their own constructed reader. But even under the latter theorists the real reader must always construct a reader. In a sense, although there is a real reader, the real reader is effaced by her construct. And what she writes down as a response to the text she reads is itself a construct. When someone else reads that construct, they create a picture both of the reader who is described as well as of their own position as a reader.

These latter ideas about the reader and about the role which she plays in the text are reliant upon a theory of knowledge which emphasises the subjective way in which human beings know. It is a theory that is aware that everything is perceived and constructed from the person. David Bleich in his book *Subjective Criticism* writes that “[o]ne of the major reasons for the formulation of the subjective paradigm was the observation that subjectivity is an epistemological condition of every human being”.³² What humans know about the world, themselves, and even authors is a subjective matter. “[T]he

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

³¹ “Is There a Text in This Class?” *Is There a Text in This Class?* pp. 305-307.

³² David Bleich. *Subjective Criticism*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 264.

swerve to the reader assumes that our relationship to reality is not a positive knowledge but a hermeneutic construct, that all perception is already an act of interpretation."³³ And it is the reader with all of her presuppositions, her thoughts and ideas, her life and experience and reading who constructs the text she reads.

Reading: it used to be so simple

One difficulty of defining how one reads is that most people do not think about *how* they read; it is simply something they do. Another difficulty occurs because people do not all read in the same way. Even the same reader may read differently on different occasions. Roland Barthes describes these two ways of reading:

our very avidity for knowledge impels us to skim or to skip certain passages (anticipated as "boring") in order to get more quickly to the warmer parts of the anecdote...we boldly skip (no one is watching) descriptions, explanations, analyses conversations...Whence two systems of reading: one goes straight to the articulations of the anecdote, it considers the extent of the text, ignores the play of language...the other reading skips nothing; it weighs, it sticks to the text, it reads, so to speak, with application and transport, grasps at every point in the text...it is not (logical) extension that captivates it, the winnowing out of truths, but the layering of significance...³⁴

These two ways of reading might be described as reading for the plot or argument in the first instance and reading for the sheer pleasure of language in the second instance. Sections of this thesis include both reading for the "plot" and the kind of close reading and "layering of significance" which Barthes describes as the second of his two ways of reading. Reading for the bliss of the language can include reading the plot and argument of the text, but it is so much more besides. It is also the play of words in the readers' mind; the mingling of the text and its remembrance; the close consideration of words and phrases; the recognition of gaps, holes, and absences. But what is the actual process involved in reading, of either type? In other words, *how* does one read? This next section will examine the answers of Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish to that question.

³³ Freund, p. 5.

³⁴ *The Pleasure of the Text*. pp. 11-12.

Wolfgang Iser asserts the necessity of gaps. Without gaps the reader would be unnecessary. It is the gaps in the text which give the reader work to do. When there is a gap in the text, that gap, proposes Iser, is filled in by the reader's imagination. The reader "removes [the gaps] by a free play of meaning-projection and thus by himself repairs the unformulated connections between the particular views".³⁵ The gaps between sentences or clauses may be repaired by the reader, but this repair is then modified as she continues to read. Iser discusses this more fully in *The Act of Reading* where he writes, "throughout the reading process there is a continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed memories".³⁶ The reader may fill in the gap with a "meaning-projection" which is an expectation about what will come next in the text; then, as she reads, that expectation may be modified by new information which she encounters in the text. The modification of her expectation may also change her memory of what came before. She changes her memory of the text in order to make it consistent with her new expectations. This is a continual, ongoing process as she reads. But it is also a process which can take account of previous readings of the same text. "On a second reading familiar occurrences now tend to appear in a new light and seem to be at times corrected, at times enriched."³⁷ At this point, Iser argues, the reader is aware of both the gaps which will be encountered as well as the rest of the information to come, thus the reading experience is different the second time. And this reveals that "the reading process always involves viewing the text through a perspective that is continually on the move, linking up the different phases, and so constructing what we have called the virtual dimension".³⁸ This changing process which is reading "allows and, indeed, induces innovative reading".³⁹ For Iser, reading is a process. It is something that happens as readers attempt to make meaning for the text by filling in the gaps and spaces which are there (sometimes more evident in modern writing, but still there even in older writing), and yet at the same time reading is a process that is constrained by the text and its structure. This view of reading relies

³⁵ Wolfgang Iser. "Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response in Prose Fiction." *Aspects of Narrative*. Ed. J. Hillis Miller, New York: Columbia UP, 1971, p. 12.

³⁶ *The Act of Reading*, p. 111.

³⁷ Iser. "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach." *Contemporary Critical Theory*. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1989, p. 441.

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ *ibid.*

upon seeing *something* as determinate. There is meaning, and while the reader may contribute to it, she does not constitute it.

Fish's theory of reading also relies upon a close reading of the text. Like Roland Barthes' second type of reading, it is a reading which relies upon details, upon time and patience, and upon the reader. But the constraints on the Fishian reader are different from those binding Iser's reader. Iser's reader was bound by the text, but Fish's reader is bound by context and the understanding of language. When Fish describes the reading process he does not give a scientific analysis like that presented by Iser; instead, he tells stories about how various readers have been affected by their context in such a way that it causes them to read differently. This is one of the major themes in Fish's book *Doing What Comes Naturally*, but he had already begun to describe this point in *Is There a Text in This Class?* In *Doing What Comes Naturally* Fish relates an example of a reader reading in context, and it is quite appropriate for a thesis in biblical studies. It is a story about John Milton's attempt to read the text from Matthew 19:9 that says, "whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery". Fish relates how Milton interprets the text so that it applies only to the Pharisees in the text and not to people outside the text. Because of this the text cannot be used as a restraint against divorce for people who are not Pharisees. The point Fish draws from this story is not whether this is a logical, working argument but rather how Milton arrived at his interpretation. Fish writes:

It is an open question as to whether this argument works, but its success or failure is less important than the illustration it provides for the point I am making. Meanings that seem perspicuous and literal are rendered so by forceful interpretive acts and not by the properties of language. In the event Milton is persuasive, it is not because he has moved the words from their "normal" setting to the setting of a special intention, but because he has dislodged the words from one special setting (all intentional settings are special), where their meaning was obvious, and placed them in another where their meaning is also obvious, but different.⁴⁰

Milton interpreted the text of Matthew 19 in his own context, and that context included people who wanted to divorce for reasons other than

⁴⁰ "Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road." *Doing What Comes Naturally*. p. 9.

adultery. Readers are a context for the text, and different readers/contexts means that the text may have a different sense. The interpretation of Matthew 19 varies from one time period to the next and from one institution to another. The history of interpretation can illustrate how different people have read the same text at different times. Robert Herron has demonstrated this in his research on *Mark's Account of Peter's Denial of Jesus: A History of Its Interpretation*.⁴¹ There he demonstrates the changes in interpretation from the early church through medieval interpretation and on into the reformation. Readers interpreted this passage in light of their time and place.

But there is another key to the reading process as Fish understands it, for not only does one read from within a context, but reading also has an affect upon the reader. And this interactive process which creates an affect upon the reader will become the meaning of the text. For Fish, the response of the reader is one of the keys to a text's meaning. In his essay "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics" he asks the question "What does this sentence do?" What is the affect which the sentence has upon the reader as she reads? The sentence and the affect it has on the reader becomes an event, and that event generates meaning. It is the meaning says Stanley Fish.⁴² This sets up a criticism of Fish's method. At first it seemed that Fish gave readers more freedom by acknowledging their context, but still the text wields great power in Fish's theory. For the question is not "what does the reader do to the text or sentence" but rather "what does the sentence or group of words do to the reader?" The emphasis is, in a sense, upon the text, but when the reader is aware of what the text does then what the text does can be criticised. Fish often speaks in his early essays of how sentences encourage readers to read them in a certain way. And yet even this objection is done away with when Fish writes, "It is the experience of an utterance – *all* of it and not anything that could be said about it, including anything I could say – that is its meaning".⁴³ In Fish's early method meaning is bound up with the affect of a text and with one's experience of the text.⁴⁴ Thus for Fish the two keys to the

⁴¹ Robert W. Herron Jr. *Mark's Account of Peter's Denial of Jesus: A History of Its Interpretation*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1991.

⁴² *Is There a Text in This Class?* p. 25.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴⁴ Robert Fowler has commented on this in his book *Let the Reader Understand*. Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 1991. He writes, "Fish even went so far as to argue that all readers are textually directed in the way he describes. Some of them have just not

reading process are to be found in one's own response to reading and the way in which that response is formed by one's location in time and space.

Iser has been challenged by Stanley Fish. The challenge came because of differences in their view of metaphysics. While Iser thought *something* was determinate, Fish thought nothing was given. These two systems of thinking conflict with each other and can not be readily reconciled, for it is not just a matter of joining slightly contradictory theories but rather a matter of joining different ways of understanding the text, the reader, and the world in which they exist. Do things exist independently of their interpreters? Perhaps, but can that be known? Is it a reader's interaction with a determinate object which produces meaning or does the reader create meaning out of her own locality? "Either way it seems that the dispute...highlight[s]...the basically irreconcilable positions [in] which reader-response criticism moves, and which are frequently identified with the terms objectivity and subjectivity".⁴⁵ The argument can be thrown back and forth for decades. Both of these theorists have written critiques of each other. Fish asks, "How do you know the *something* that is given?" And Iser replies, "How can your interpretations be made available to a theorist who wants to study the process of reading?" Fish wrote in his essay "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" that

in the end [Iser's theory] falls apart, and it falls apart because the distinction on which it finally depends – the distinction between the determinate and the indeterminate – will not hold...Iser is able to maintain [his] position because he regards the texts as a *part of the world* (even though the process it sets in motion is not), and because he regards the world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than supplied.⁴⁶

In other words, Iser does not recognise Fish's point that whatever is seen is seen as it is precisely because of the location occupied by the person who sees. What is seen is not exactly what is in the world but rather the way in which the person seeing has constructed the world. While Fish has maintained that Iser's distinction between determinacy

realized that direction, not having paid attention to the ways texts control them" (p. 35).

⁴⁵ Freund, p. 151.

⁴⁶ *Doing What Comes Naturally*. pp. 74-75. his italics.

and indeterminacy is too weak, Iser has argued that Fish's theory is unscientific and unhelpful to the critical community. Iser gives the following critique of Fish: "This is the problem with Fish's concept – its [sic] starts out from the grammatical model, justifiably abandons the model at a particular juncture, but can then only invoke an experience which, though indisputable, remains inaccessible to the theorist".⁴⁷ So, Fish and Iser stand across a chasm tossing metaphysical arguments back and forth.

Iser offers interesting, and as Fish notes, uncontroversial constructs of the reader, but this thesis will pursue a more Fishian type of reading that will include analysis of the affect of the text on the reader. However, it seems that Iser still manages to slip in the back door, for the reader speaks not only of the affect upon herself but of how the structures of the text manipulate her reading. But, in the final chapter, a Fishian reading is more compatible with the theories of the text and of the author proposed by the rest of this thesis. For it is argued that the way in which the text and the author are viewed are constructs formulated in the mind of the reader in light of her locality in time and space.

These theories, along with feminist theories by such scholars as Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Mary Daly, and Judith Fetterley inform the reading of Jude which follows. Feminist scholars have been particularly aware of the role readers play in interpretation. Rosemary Ruether writes, "Human experience is both the starting point and the ending point of the circle of interpretation".⁴⁸ And Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza gives this reminder: "In short, understanding takes place in a circular manner: Interpretation and answer [are] to a certain extent determined by our presuppositions and prejudgements as well as by the questions we ask and how we ask them...".⁴⁹ This reader will ask of Jude a set of questions not usually asked of epistles. What do the sentences of this epistle do to the reader? How does the reader make meaning for the epistle of Jude? What is the process involved in a close reading of Jude?

⁴⁷ *The Act of Reading*. p. 32.

⁴⁸ Rosemary Ruether. "Feminist Interpretation: A Method of Correlation." *Feminist Interpretation of the Bible*. Ed. Letty M. Russell. 1985, p. 111.

⁴⁹ *Bread Not Stone*, p. 132.

A Reader Reading Jude

There are many different ways to begin a story. On some occasions there are narrative signals like, "Once upon a time..." or "And it came to pass..." and on other occasions there is a sudden plunge into a pool of words that may be unclarified and disorienting. And when the story is written down, it may have a beginning and a middle and an end as Aristotle said, and if he is right then "the end is the chief thing of all".⁵⁰ But, as was written in the introduction, there is always a beginning before the beginning and an end after the end. And somewhere in the middle of the infinite ending and beginning, the reader and the text meet in a great wrestling match for understanding.

The book of Jude does not begin "once upon a time", but instead it starts with a name, Jude.⁵¹ Jude, a servant of Jesus Christ and the brother of James.⁵² In seven Greek words Jude has given most of the explicit information about himself that he is going to give. He writes that he is a servant of Jesus Christ and the brother of James. Then, in the second half of the first sentence, he names the readers of his letter as "the called, those who are in God the father beloved and in Jesus Christ kept". What do these words do?⁵³ First, an author identifies himself and then his readers. He identifies himself as a servant, one in a position of being controlled and possessed by another, and he identifies himself as a relation of someone named James. The letter is addressed to readers that are named by words that give them aspirations (they are the called) and security (they are loved and kept). This address highlights the position of the readers in relationship to God and Jesus Christ. That position is one of love and security. The sentence ends with a wish that "mercy and peace and love may be multiplied" to this group of people. From the beginning the readers are located in the text as people who are already in a relationship of being called, loved, and kept although these readers do not know to what purpose they have been called. From the opening of the letter, the real reader is enticed into identifying with the reader implicit in the text, a reader who is in the position of being called, loved, and kept.

⁵⁰ "The Poetics." *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2316-2340.

⁵¹ For comments on the function of the name of the author in a text see the author section of this thesis (pp. 128-31).

⁵² This is my own translation of the Nestle-Aland Greek text (26th ed.) as are all the New Testament quotations in this thesis unless otherwise indicated.

⁵³ See Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader?" in *Is There A Text in This Class?* p. 27.

Beyond the relationship which these words set up between the readers (the addressees) and the narrator, what do these words do in the contemporary reader? This question cannot be answered without addressing the issue of context. Where has the reader found this text? This is particularly important in this case since the reader is aware that the epistle is part of the biblical canon; that it has a long history of interpretation; and that she does not respond to it in the same manner as she might respond to an unknown letter which she happened to find in a car park. But she is also aware that the beginning of this letter differs significantly from the beginnings of many other NT epistles. Besides Hebrews, 2 Peter, and 1 John, all the other biblical epistles are addressed to either a specific person or group of people.⁵⁴ Hebrews has no address at all although there is a subscript at the end of the letter in some manuscripts which says, "To the Hebrews". The epistles of 2 Peter and 1 John give broad addresses. The first reads, "To those who have obtained a faith of equal standing with ours in the righteousness of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ" (RSV, v. 1) and the second, "the life was made manifest, and we saw it, and testify to it, and proclaim to you the eternal life...so that you may have fellowship with us..." (RSV, vv. 3-4). These two introductions do something very different. The last address invites the reader to read in order to become a part of those who are telling the story. It is an invitation to the reader to join the community (the fellowship). It is an address which is open to anyone. The first address is more exclusive. It is to "those who have obtained a faith of equal standing" with the apostles. The reader must make a choice. Does she have a faith of equal standing? If she does, then this is a letter to her; but, if she does not, then she is reading this letter as an outsider. The words at the beginning of the epistle of Jude present the reader with a similar dilemma. When the reader reads, does she envisage herself as a person who is loved and kept and called by God

⁵⁴ Acts is addressed to Theophilus (v. 1); Romans to "God's beloved in Rome" (v. 7); 1 and 2 Corinthians are addressed to the church at Corinth (v. 1); Galatians is addressed to a group of churches in Galatia (v. 1); Ephesians is addressed to Ephesus (v. 1), but this is somewhat disputed as the address is missing in some manuscripts; however the textual evidence points to keeping the reference to Ephesus as part of the text. Philippians is addressed to the saints at Philippi (v. 1) and Colossians, similarly, to the saints at Colosse; 1 and 2 Thessalonians are addressed to the church of the Thessalonians; 1 and 2 Timothy are addressed to Timothy; Titus to Titus (v. 4); Philemon to Philemon (v. 1); James and 1 Peter to the "12 tribes" and "the exiles in dispersion" respectively - while these designations are broader, they are still specific. 2 and 3 John are also to specific people the elect lady and Gaius respectively.

and Jesus Christ? If she does, she will associate more closely with the letter than if she does not. In the process of reading, *how* does the reader read? Does the reader attempt to place herself in a position where she stands in an objective relationship to the text? In that case she would read the text as something exterior to herself. Or does she try to locate herself within the text by aligning herself with one of the characters in it? Might she identify with the reader addressed by the text? She may begin with what she thinks of as a benign position that she *is* one of the Beloved people addressed by the letter. This position may be confirmed or questioned as she continues to read. If it is questioned then she will have to rethink her position. Will she begin to identify with another character in the text, or will she finally objectify the text and move it outside of herself. If at the beginning, the real reader aligns herself with the addressees of the letter, what happens?

The text continues, "Beloved, while proceeding very zealously to write to you about our common salvation, I have necessity to write exhorting you to contend (ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι) for the faith that was once for all entrusted to the holy ones".⁵⁵ The reader continues in her secure position, for she is "beloved", and the reader feels secure in her identification. Jude explains that being zealous or diligent to write to them, he was going to write to them about something they had in common, their salvation – their security – but he has changed his mind. Apparently, he is not going to write about salvation. Instead, he writes that he wants the Beloved to fight for the faith. Is this what the reader is called to? To the reader, fighting does not sound so secure as being loved and kept. Nor does it have the peaceful and joyous flavour that accompanies the thought of a letter that comments on a common salvation rather than on fighting for the faith. And what is this "faith"⁵⁶ which was once entrusted to the holy ones? Who are the holy ones? The Beloved are the called and loved and kept, are they also the holy? Or was the faith delivered to some other set of people who were the holy? The reader's first vague feelings of uneasiness

⁵⁵ It is generally recognised that the Greek text can have at least two meanings. One meaning would indicate that Jude was already beginning to write when he changed his mind (as I have translated the phrase). The other meaning would indicate that Jude intended to write and before he began, he decided to write something different than he first intended. For fuller comment see Bauckham's commentary (pp. 29-30).

⁵⁶ For more on the role of the word faith in the text see section 2 of the thesis where faith is discussed in the section on metonymy.

may arise here as she becomes aware that this is going to be a letter about fighting for some faith (which she may or may not believe) delivered to some holy ones (of whom she may or may not be one).

The next words heighten those feelings of uneasiness. "For some men slipped in secretly (παρεισέδυσαν)." What have these men secretly slipped into? the faith? the Beloved? a church? It is not clear, but it is clear that Jude feels that he needs to write to the Beloved warning them to fight for the faith precisely because the Beloved have been infiltrated. They are no longer as "safe" or "secure" as the beginning of the letter may have implied. There are people all around them, perhaps within them, who may be the ones that they are supposed to fight against, but these people are stealthy, secret, hidden.

These secret people are "those, who long ago have been written into⁵⁷ this judgement, ungodly..." A long time ago (this sounds like the beginning of a story) these people were written about, and I am waiting to be told where the story is written down when I find that it is not written in a book or on a stone tablet at all. It simply exists. They were written "into this judgement". Whether the preposition εἰς should mean "for" or "into", it is difficult to know how these unspecified people came to be written into it. The only two commentators who comment on εἰς see it as evidence for predestination and the foreknowledge of God for both good and evil. The Puritan commentator Thomas Manton writes, "the next [point] is, That from all eternity some were decreed by their sins to come unto judgement or condemnation".⁵⁸ But what judgement is "this" judgement to which they have been long condemned?⁵⁹ And, if it was written long ago, where was it written? It is not clear what judgement

⁵⁷ Most commentators do not comment on the function of εἰς when considering this clause of v. 4. The only ones who do so are Calvin and Manton (*Jude*. 1658. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, reprint 1958) – one a 16th century reformer and the other a 17th century Puritan. The difficulty usually dealt with in this passage is the referent for τοῦτο (e.g.: Bauckham, Calvin, and Kelly). But English translations help show the possibilities. The RSV reads "for this condemnation". The KJV reads "ordained to this condemnation". The NIV translation glosses over the εἰς with "whose condemnation was written about". Plumptre paraphrases the text as "marked out as on their way to this condemnation" (p. 203). These translations show two possibilities: on one hand the εἰς shows purpose (i.e. they were, long ago, written beforehand "for" this judgement), but on the other hand, the εἰς could show movement "into" (i.e. long ago, they were written "into" this judgment).

⁵⁸ Manton, p. 28.

⁵⁹ Bauckham presents three options for interpreting "this" judgement. But none of them is fully satisfactory as Bauckham demonstrates. This is discussed in more depth in the chapter on text (pp. 93-94).

Jude is talking about.

These people who Jude says were written of long ago, "...have changed the grace of God into excess and they deny the only master and our lord Jesus Christ". Two direct accusations are placed against the infiltrators. They use God's grace for a licence and they deny Jesus Christ. For people who up until this time have gone undetected by the Beloved, the things the infiltrators stand accused of are not very secretive. But now the Beloved have been warned, so they can begin the "contest" Jude has called them to. With a tension established between the Beloved who are secure and those who are secretly among the Beloved denying the very thing (person) that gives them security, Jesus, Jude goes on.

Υπομνήσαι δὲ ὑμᾶς βούλομαι, "I want (or wish) you to remember."⁶⁰ With these words ("I want you to remember") the reader may begin a journey into a strange new land – the land of memory – and once there, the reader may be asked to look at many different things. But while a walk down "Memory Lane" might be a nice past-time for the person leading, it may have numerous hazards for the person following. These hazards may involve: inability to remember, different memories of the same event, and misunderstanding. However, just because there are difficulties does not mean that every

⁶⁰This is the beginning of the text to Jude 5. Jude 5 is not an easy verse to begin with and it is further complicated by a plethora of textual variants. C. D. Osborn, in a very helpful and clear article entitled "The Text of Jude 5", says:

Considerable disparity exists within the manuscript tradition concerning the text of Jude 5. Principal *variae lectiones* involve the subject of ἀπώλεσεν, the position and meaning of ἄπαξ, the reading πάντα, πάντας, or τοῦτο with εἰδότας, and to a lesser extent the presence or absence of ὑμᾶς after εἰδότας. Varying estimates of the data in recent scholarship are evidenced nowhere more clearly than in the shift from ἄπαξ πάντα, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς in the U.B.S. second edition to πάντα, ὅτι κύριος ἄπαξ in the third edition, albeit with extreme uncertainty denoted concerning that particular reading. This change is explained by observing that although the former reading has the best attestation among Greek and versional witnesses and that critical principles seem to require its adoption, most of the committee found it "difficult to the point of impossibility" (Metzger)...However, such bold dismissal of the strength of manuscript evidence would be justifiable only in an extreme circumstance. Yet there is good reason to suggest that both internal evidence and transcriptional probability cohere with the external data to favour the originality of this *lectio difficilior* after all, as Metzger and Wikgren maintained in the committee minority report (p. 724).

I am convinced that the more difficult reading is the better one to choose, and this will be evidenced throughout the section to follow.

person will fall into them, so someone may be able to remember as the leader wants without encountering any of these obstacles. Starting from v. 5 there is a multitude of references to specific people, places, and events that the author would like the readers to remember.

Between the little phrase, "I want you to remember", and all of the things which are pointed out, there are a few short words, εἰδότες [ὕμῃς]⁶¹ ἅπαξ πάντα, which can be translated as "you having known once for all all things".⁶² Those whom Jude wants to perform the task of remembering already know everything that he is going to tell them. This is already implied in the task of remembering, but Jude has made it explicit. This set of memories is just a reminder. In the active voice ὑπομιμνήσκω means to remind, and it means to remember in the middle/passive voice.⁶³ The readers go on to discover what it is that they know and are to remember. They encounter the phrase ὅτι Ἰησοῦς λαὸν ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου σώσας. You already know everything, and the first thing that you already know is that Jesus, while saving a people out of Egypt. . . . The unfortunate thing is that the reader does *not* already know this. She does not remember Jesus saving anyone from Egypt, and it is impossible for the reader to remember or be reminded of something which she simply does not know.⁶⁴ This event is not something which she remembers happening in her lifetime, and there is no story or cultural tradition that the reader can refer to (or be referred to) which will help her to remember this particular occasion. But the exercise in memory does not end with this first unknown. It

⁶¹ The word ὑμῶς is placed in brackets here to indicate that the evidence for its inclusion in the critical text is evenly split between the textual witnesses. For a fuller discussion of this point see C.D. Osborn's article "The Text of Jude 5".

⁶² I take the participle as modifying ὑμῶς in the previous clause. The AV translates it as "though ye once knew this", from the textual variant ἅπαξ τοῦτο which entered the textual tradition in the 9th century from Byzantine readings (Osborn). The NASB translates it as "though you know all things once for all". The RSV reads, "though you were once for all fully informed", and the NIV takes the less difficult Greek reading and translates it as "Though you already know all this".

⁶³ See Liddell and Scott *Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 9th ed. 1990; Bauer *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Trans. William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich. 2nd ed. 1959; and Abbott-Smith. *Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd., 3rd. ed., 1986.

⁶⁴ Of course, this difficult Greek reading, Ἰησοῦς, has given way to all kinds of readings which are more historically and theologically compatible with a similar story about a people saved out of Egypt by Moses and the Lord. This is evidenced by the substitution of κύριος and θεός in some of the manuscripts which we have today. Even the two most respected codices do not agree on the wording of this verse. Vaticanus reads Ἰησοῦς while Sinaiticus reads κυρίου.

proceeds with the next phrase, τὸ δεύτερον τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας ἀπώλεσεν. This can be translated as "the second time he destroyed those who did not believe". The reader is very hard pressed at this moment, for upon failing to remember the first incident, she is immediately thrust into a second event. It becomes apparent that Jesus saved a people out of Egypt not just once but twice. And the second time that he saved them, he destroyed them.⁶⁵ If there was a difficulty remembering the first time Jesus saved a people out of Egypt, it is even more difficult to remember it happening twice.

Having already failed to remember these incidents, the reader goes on to v. 6, the next clause of the sentence, where she is immediately greeted by ἀγγέλους, angels or messengers. These angels who did not keep their ἀρχή, principality or proper place of rulership, but abandoned their own habitation, these angels he has kept in darkness and eternal bonds for a great judgement day (Jude 6). Who keeps these angels in bonds? The only subject which corresponds with this verb is Jesus. But unfortunately for the reader, he or she doesn't remember Jesus doing that either. So far the reader has been unable to remember any of the incidents which she is supposed to know already.

Now, the next verse, Jude 7, which is still part of the sentence that began at v. 5, begins with the word ὡς which means "as, just as, even as". Abbott-Smith notes that ὡς is usually used with the word οὕτως either explicitly or implicitly. οὕτως means "in this way" and generally refers to the things which precede it. Thus, Jesus destroyed the unbelievers and kept the angels in eternal bonds and darkness even as Sodom and Gomorrah and the surrounding cities in the same manner as these gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh. At this point, the reader may remember an old story about Sodom and Gomorrah, sin, fire, and brimstone, but that this is like, or even close to, Jesus's keeping the angels in bonds and destroying a people saved from Egypt, well, the reader might seriously doubt that.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ English translations try to deal with this problem by translating the word δεύτερον as "subsequently", "later", or "afterwards" (NASB, NIV, and KJV respectively). But the usual meaning of the word is "a second time". This difficulty is noted in the ICC commentary by Bigg.

⁶⁶ A number of different explanations have been put forward by commentators to explain ὡς. Most, as Charles notes, take it to refer to "the type of sin which connects the angels to Sodom and Gomorrah" (p. 117). Thus Cranfield, Grundmann, Kelly, and Bauckham explain the ὡς this way, "As the angels fell because of their lust for women, so the Sodomites desired sexual relations with angels" (Bauckham, p. 54). Some commentators are less concrete than this and only say that the two examples are

Having failed to remember the first three references about the things that Jesus did and with only a short glimpse of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, the reader reads the end of the sentence: πρόκεινται δείγμα πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκην ὑπέχουσαι. Sodom and Gomorrah are set forth (by whom? Jesus?) as an example, suffering a punishment of eternal fire.

Before memory is left behind, there is a second reading situation to examine. One person trying to remember may fail to remember the occasion referred to, but another person remembering may remember occasions or stories that are similar even if they are not the same. So, from v. 5 again, "I want you to remember what you already know that Jesus saving a people out of Egypt..." The reader may follow along quite comfortably until she arrives at the word "Egypt" although the word "people" may already begin to open a gap in the reader's ability to make this phrase make sense.⁶⁷ ὅτι signals a content clause. It says what I want you to remember is going to be presented right now. And the thing that is to be remembered is Jesus. Which story about Jesus is going to be told? The reader goes on to find λαόν, a people. This information is not too difficult to add to the previous knowledge he or she holds in his or her memory. Jesus and a people do not have any problem being together since Jesus was quite clear that he came to a people, the Jews (Matt. 15:24). Then, ἐκ, "out", comes next. Jesus, a people out... The reader is compelled forward to discover more. Out of where? Egypt. In an effort to understand the reader may read the

parallel without describing how or why they are (Learney (p. 89) and Moffatt (p. 233)). Kistemaker remarks that ὡς can be "translated 'how' [and that] this adverb is equivalent to ὅτι (v. 5) and τε (v. 6). It introduces the third example that Jude lists" (p. 382). Bigg thinks that Jude made an error when he compared Sodom and the angels. This is implied in his comment on the passage in Jude which says, "St. Peter does not fall into the error of saying that the sin of Sodom was like that of the angels, for the fallen angels could not be said ἀπελθεῖν ὁπίσω σαρκὸς ἐτέρας" (p. 330). J. D. Charles argues against these positions in *Literary Strategy in the Epistle of Jude* when he writes, "The particle *hos*...should ... be seen as a link between two paradigms of fate. The 'same manner as these' speaks to the same *end* met by Israel and the angels which awaits the opponents of Jude" (p. 117). Charles carefully builds up a paradigm which shows each of the examples involved in some type of loss. He sees the ὡς as part of an ideological connection within this paradigm of loss. C. D. Osborn holds a similar view, "the subordinating particle ὡς introduces a simile that brings the rebelliousness and fate of the ancient cities of Sodom and Gomorrah into comparison with that of the angels in v. 6" ("Discourse Analysis," p. 297).

⁶⁷ Both Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish have shown us that reading is a temporal activity. Only one word can be read at a time, and each successive word takes up a different space in time. One of Fish's methods of interpretation is executed by "an analysis of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time" ("What is Stylistics?" p. 73).

words again, or, hoping to gain more information, the reader may go forward and encounter σωσας (having saved).⁶⁸ Now the reader has the whole clause to think about, but that clause is always modified by what has come before it. And in this text what has come before is a desire for someone, for "you", to remember what is already known. This leads back to the same problem that we saw in the first reader. This second reader may be able to remember a people out of Egypt being saved, but like the first reader, she does not remember them being saved by Jesus. If the reader remembers the Exodus story about the Israelites that were saved out of Egypt, the next clause will frustrate this attempt at understanding this story in Jude as a story based on the Exodus story, for in the Exodus account the people are only saved once, and in either case the hero of the story wasn't Jesus. If the reader remembers the stories in Jeremiah about Egypt, then the reader may remember threats of destruction for the people who disobeyed God and went to Egypt. But the reader does not remember any salvation or even hope for salvation for those who disobeyed and Jesus is not even hinted at in these stories.⁶⁹

Once again going on in the hope of finding a key to these riddles, the reader proceeds to v. 6 and encounters angels. What angels? Angels who do not keep their place of rule but abandon their own habitation. Who are these angels? If the reader is familiar with I Enoch, she may associate these angels in Jude with the "watchers" of the first chapters of the book of I Enoch. But the clues for such an association are very few. Like the "watchers", these angels do not stay in the place that they belong, but that is all that is known about them. The place they inhabited, what they did, when they left their place, and why they left is unknown. By remembering the story from I Enoch the reader may finally think that some of the answers to these riddles are solved, but the solution is only temporary. When the next part of the sentence is read, it is discovered that these angels are in judgement, in eternal bonds, and under darkness. These words may serve to affirm the first thought that these were indeed the ones described in I Enoch who came down out of heaven to have sex with human women and

⁶⁸ Fish notes this choice between going backwards and going forwards when reading a sentence that is difficult to understand ("Literature in the Reader", in *Is There a Text in This Class?*, p. 24).

⁶⁹ Sue Campbell reminded me of the stories in Jeremiah about Egypt and the children of God fleeing there.

who were subsequently punished. But as the reader arrives at the last word of the clause and finds that these angels are guarded or kept, the reader asks, who keeps them there? The answer is Jesus. Like the first reader, this reader does not remember Jesus doing such a thing. So, while this reader may remember a similar story, she is unable to reconcile the words of the text with what he or she knows.

The patient reader tries one more time and proceeds to v. 7. "As Sodom and Gomorrah..." Here are two names which the reader may recognise and which may conjure up for her the story of Lot and his daughters and strange visitors who come to their house. And if the story is remembered as it is told in Genesis with all the cities of the plain, then the cities surrounding Sodom and Gomorrah in the text of Jude 7 will be remembered as well. All of these cities "gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh."⁷⁰ However, what really happens in the Genesis story? Some "men" come to the city of Sodom, and Lot insists that they stay with him. While they are at his house, they are threatened by men from the city who want to have sex with them. This threat is never fulfilled because the "men", who are really angels, strike the men of the city who are at Lot's door with blindness. The threat of sexual attack is never brought to fulfilment in this story first because the angels strike all of the people outside the house with blindness and second because the angels leave and subsequently destroy the city. In other words, this is a story about attempted (but not perpetrated) rape. While the Genesis account says that Sodom was sinning in the sight of God (Genesis 13:13; 18:20-21; 19:13), it does not say what that sin was. The story is mainly description rather than judgement. Although the story is a judgement story in

⁷⁰ Although there have been occasional charges that the phrase *σαρκὸς ἑτέρας* refers to homosexuality (Hillyer, Kistemaker), this has been frequently challenged by scholars who argue that "other flesh" cannot refer to homosexuality because that is an attraction not toward a different flesh but towards the same flesh. Instead, these scholars argue that it refers to flesh of a different kind, and, in relation to v. 6, that kind must be angelic. Hence Cranfield, "as the fallen angels had sought intercourse with human beings, so the men of Sodom sought intercourse with angels" (p. 159). This view is supported by Bauckham, Kelly, and Neyrey. Yet, in response, commentators such as Kistemaker have argued that the men of Sodom were unaware that the men visiting Sodom were angels, and so what they were desiring were other men. In any case, this is an odd phrase that only occurs here in the NT; still, it seems more likely to refer to a different kind (perhaps angels) than the same kind (homosexuality). And, as Neyrey points out in his sociological commentary, "Sodom and Gomorrah violate the biblical purity code by going after 'other flesh'...Kashrut laws...emphatically insist on the separation of the sexes...in terms of sexual commerce, men may not have intercourse either with animals or men (Lev 18: 22; 20:13)" (p. 61).

which Sodom and Gomorrah are punished because of "sin", the language of the story is one of description. It tells what happened rather than instructing one what to think of the event. It is later stories that speak more definitively about the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah which was that they were "arrogant, overfed and unconcerned; they did not help the poor and needy" (Ezekiel 16:49, NIV). While the reader may remember different sins that were committed by these cities from the ones that Jude lists, she is inclined to agree that the cities did indeed suffer a punishment of fire which has been used as an example of judgement for a very long time. However, it was not, as Jude claims, an eternal fire. Ezekiel mentions that Sodom will be restored, and if it is to be restored then its destruction cannot be eternal (Ezek. 16: 53-55). So, while the reader may find this whole story a little easier to remember than the first three, the details she remembers still do not match up perfectly.

And these two readers, the one who may not remember the occasions referred to and the one who remembers a different version or versions, come to the next words in the text: ὁμοίως μέντοι καί. "Yet likewise also..." or "In the very same way..." (Jude 8, NIV). In the same way as what? What is the referent? The reader makes meaning for the word ὁμοίως by trying to make a comparison between what came before and what follows. The reader asks, "what is like what, or who is like what, or who is like whom?" The reader must decide how far back the referent for ὁμοίως lies. Should the reader return to the beginning of the previous sentence – to v. 5 and following – with all of its ambiguities and gaps and potential if not realised misunderstanding? Should the reader take ὁμοίως to mean that just as I wanted you to remember the things which you already know (v. 5) "in like manner..." what follows is similar? Or should the reader understand the reference in a narrower sense to refer only to the examples that immediately preceded "in the same way..." as those, what follows is similar? Or should the reader understand the reference in an even more specific manner to refer to the very last clause of the long and convoluted sentence which came before, so that "just as Sodom and Gomorrah...serve as an example by undergoing a punishment of eternal fire" (v. 7 b), so what follows will be a similar example? How does the reader decide how far back the referent is? The reader is already uncertain, tentative, because she did not

remember what she was expected to know. How does that unexpected ignorance effect the reader's understanding of v. 8? If a different version of the story is remembered from that which was related by the text, how does she read the next sentence which is so heavily dependent on the first?

"In like manner with" is followed by μέντοι, "yet".⁷¹ Suddenly the reader is cast into doubt. Is it the same or not? It is the same, but with hesitation. μέντοι connected with ὁμοίως causes the reader to feel ambivalence about just how "similar" the things are that are being compared. Ὅμοίως μέντοι καί ... "in the same manner, yet (and/also/as)." The reader must choose again. She is certain that καί does not have its connective sense "and" in this case since there is nothing to connect, but she is not sure whether the sense is "also" and complements μέντοι (thus, yet also) or whether it is "as" and complements Ὅμοίως (thus, in a similar manner as). Once again the reader reads on in the hope that more words will help her make sense out of those she has already read.

After this series of comparisons and connectives, the reader finally encounters οὗτοι "these", and for one of the first times since she was enjoined to remember, her memory functions to recall that the "these" have already been written of and identified earlier in the text. The reader is quite aware that the "these" can only be those who "slipped in secretly" in v. 4. But even though the subject of the sentence has now been found, the reader still does not know what is like what or who is like whom. Ὅμοίως is an adverb, but the reader has not yet found a verb to which the word can be attached. But with the next word ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι "dreaming" one referent can be supplied with certainty. "These who dream" are like (almost) what? Neither the reader nor the author, happily, is content to leave the sentence as it is. It must be expanded, so it finishes with a listing of what "these who dream" do. They defile flesh, deny lordship, and blaspheme glories. Now we have all the pieces (and would-be pieces) in one place. Something from vv. 5-7 is almost like v. 8. It only remains to decide what.⁷²

⁷¹ Those commentators on Jude who note μέντοι understand it in the sense of "in spite of" everything which proceeded (Bauckham, Cranfield, Kelly). Many commentators do not note the use of μέντοι.

⁷² Commentators always decide one way or another. And there have been a number of different answers. Bauckham suggests that the sins of v. 8 more or less correlate with the types given in vv. 5-7 (pp. 55-59). Grundmann also takes this position, and says that "Sie sündigen in gleicher Weise wie die Frevler der erwähnten Beispiele" (p. 35).

As can be seen from the note below, there have been several different solutions proposed for solving the difficulty of the reference of ὁμοίως, but I am not going to propose a new and original solution for the problem. Rather, I want to ask what effect the difficulty of reading this passage has on the reader. Since the reader could not remember what was supposed to be already known, she may find it hard to believe what Jude is telling her in v. 8. She may question the labels of v. 8 which are attached to “the men who slip in secretly” in v. 4. If the reader realises that there is more than one version of the story being presented, then the accusation of Jude that “these dreamers” are like those who were just described will not be as persuasive or trustworthy as it might have been if both the person leading and the person following had walked down “Memory Lane” without encountering any differences between them.

Verse 8 is a simile in which the “these” were compared, successfully or unsuccessfully, with what preceded, but is the simile supposed to be part of the task of memory? Or, has Jude turned from memory to something else? When is the reader supposed to stop remembering?⁷³

Bigg in the ICC commentary says that the comparison is between Sodom and the “False Teachers” (p. 330). Reicke barely comments on the comparison except to say that the Old Testament examples have shown the severe consequences “if fellowship with God is forsaken and one is caught by the enticements of heathenism” (p. 201). Like Reicke, Moffatt comments only very briefly on the comparisons, and his comments compare the listed sins of v. 8 with the sins of the Sodomites without considering the previous two verses (p. 234). Kelly, while having a longer comment, also compares the sins of v. 8 with the sins of the Sodomites (pp. 260-264). Schlatter makes only the loosest of connections before discussing the sins of which the “these” are accused (p. 86). Another solution to the equation is proposed by J. D. Charles in his recent book *Literary Strategy in the Epistle of Jude*. He writes:

Israel, the dispossessed angels, and Sodom and Gomorrah are all united in Jude’s polemic by their being divinely disenfranchised...These three paradigms together mirror the intention of Jude. Having despised normal life in the faith, the *houtoi* distort divine grace, deny Christ’s lordship, and scorn spiritual authority in general (p. 126).

⁷³ Jude does not explicitly tell his readers when they are to stop remembering, but the rest of the book up to v. 18 has passages in it that are similar to vv. 5-7 because they are an account or reference to something which happened outside this particular text. But the Greek tenses may be a clue about when Jude is talking about a story that should be remembered and when he is not. The reminiscences of vv. 5-7 are in the aorist and perfect tenses, but the comparison of v. 8 is in the present tense. All of the “stories” that Jude relates are told in the aorist tense, and all of the comparisons, whether similes or metaphors, which Jude makes are in the present tense. So, it may be that the things which the reader is to remember are written in the aorist tense, and the aorist tense is a clue to the reader that this is a thing which she should be able to remember. This idea was expanded further in a joint paper written by Jeff Reed and myself and entitled “Verbal Aspect, Discourse, Prominence, and the Letter of Jude.” It was presented to the Centre for Bible and Theology in Sheffield during the spring of 1995.

The memories continue in v. 9. In contrast to the "these" in v. 8, "Michael the archangel, ὅτε τῷ διαβόλῳ διακρινόμενος, when, disputing with the devil, he argued concerning the body of Moses, did not have the courage to pronounce a judgement of blasphemy, but he said, 'the Lord rebuke you.'" The story here seems to be more complete than any of the stories so far. Michael is arguing with Satan about Moses's body, and he does not judge Satan himself, but leaves him for God to deal with. But while the story seems straightforward, if it is still part of what is to be remembered, it is unknown to the reader. The ancient readers of the letter may have been able to remember a story about the archangel and the devil arguing about the body of Moses, for there are records of such a story existing (for full details see the excursus in Bauckham's commentary). But the story has been lost. For the modern reader, this is the only version of the story which has been preserved. There are similar stories, but not this story. A story which is lost and thus unknown cannot be remembered. Bauckham has shown, with the help of various extant texts from both this tradition about Moses' death and other traditions about his death, that a story may be reconstructed. But the reconstructed story is not the story which Jude wants the readers to remember. That story is missing.

While the story may at first glance seem to be straightforward, further reflection makes it less so. The story is full of gaps which the reader must supply with meaning in order for the story to make sense. This short story begins with a time when Michael the archangel was arguing with the devil about Moses' body. The reader has a lot of room to fill in the blanks. The time of the argument is unspecified and the reason for it is vague. Were they arguing about where the body was, what happened to it, who could have it? And how did an argument over a body end up in something for which Michael might consider charging the devil with blasphemy? If it did end up that way, why didn't Michael have the courage to pronounce judgement against the devil? What at first glanced seemed to be relatively straightforward appears at second glance to be just as intricate as the other citations for "memory".

In contrast (δέ, v. 10) to Michael who does not have the courage to issue a judgement of blasphemy against the devil, the "these" blaspheme what they do not know (οἴδασιν), and they understand

(ἐπίστανται) naturally like the irrational (ἄλογα) animals.⁷⁴ "In these things they are destroyed." What things destroy them? Does knowledge destroy them?

And then the language of prophets (v. 11), οὐαί – woe – "an expression of pain and anger"⁷⁵ – to these. Why? Because they have gone (ἐπορεύθησαν) the road/way (ὁδός) of Cain. What road is this? There are a number of roads and ways which come easily to mind that are associated with Cain. Among these are the roads or ways of exile, murder, and anger. The "road" of Cain which comes easily to mind is exile, but the "these" have not been exiled because they are described as being secretly present among the Beloved (v. 4). Perhaps this "road" refers to Cain's murder of his brother, but again this is not subtle enough for those who are a secret part of a larger group. So, perhaps it is the road of anger. The story,⁷⁶ as the reader remembers it, goes something like this. There were two brothers, Cain and Abel, with two different jobs, and each of the brothers brought a sacrifice to God from his work. God accepted one and did not accept the other. The brother who was rejected was angry. In his anger, he killed his brother. God punishes him by making him a wanderer on the earth. The "these" have gone the way of Cain. Have they too brought a sacrifice only for it to be rejected? Are they also angry that God has rejected them? Do they wonder why God has accepted some and rejected others? Is it wrong to be angered by unexplained rejection? Have these, like Cain, resorted to violence in their anger? The "these" may be angry, but they are still secret. Any violence that the "these" resort to must, like Cain's violence, be seen only by God.

The "these"...gave themselves up to (ἐξεχύθησαν) the error of Balaam's wages. This short saying makes it seem that the story⁷⁷ is clear and indisputable. But the reader remembers that the story goes something like this. There was a king who was afraid of the Israelites so he sent for Balaam to come and curse them. The king sent one group of people, and Balaam sent them back saying that he could not perform the service which the king wanted. Balaam sent them back because God told him to. The king wanted Balaam to come, so he sent another envoy and a message that the king would reward Balaam.

⁷⁴ Verse 10. like v. 8, changes tense from the aorist to the present.

⁷⁵ Liddell and Scott, p. 1268.

⁷⁶ The story can be found in Genesis 4.

⁷⁷ The story can be found in Numbers 22-24.

Balaam refused at first, but in the night God came to him and told him to go with these people but only to do what God said. So, Balaam went and God was angry that he went. So, God put all kinds of obstacles in his way. At the last of these obstacles, Balaam meets the angel of the Lord, and Balaam says that he will go back if the Lord wants him to. But the man says to go on and only to say what the Lord says. And Balaam goes to the king and looks out over Israel and blesses the people he was summoned to curse. In other words, this is a story about a man who does what God says and by doing so makes God angry. It is definitely not a clear and simple story. But Jude makes only one accusation against the "these" and that is that they "gave themselves up to the error of Balaam's wages". But what error is that? The story in Numbers does say that the king offered Balaam a reward, but the story never says that Balaam did what he did for money or reward. Rather, he turned away the first people because God told him to do so, and he went with the second group because God told him to do so. The "these" gave themselves up to the error of Balaam's wages, but what implies that the wages Balaam received were not the fair, agreed upon price for a job which he did not even complete to his employer's satisfaction?

As if this were not enough, the "these" are guilty of destroying themselves in the strife of Korah. This story⁷⁸ goes something like this. Moses and Aaron were the leaders of the people of Israel. Some honoured and respected people, a priest and 250 community leaders, challenged their leadership. They did not challenge the leadership with anger or abuse; rather, Korah challenged Moses and Aaron with the argument that the whole assembly were holy and knows the presence of the LORD, so one man, or small group of men, should not elevate themselves above the rest of the people. And there was a showdown, Moses and Aaron and the elders on one side and Korah and his followers on the other – God as the judge. Then the ground opened and swallowed up Korah and all who supported him. This is perhaps the clearest of the three illustrations in Jude 11. The "these" are likened to this man who dreamed of shared power and was destroyed. Did the "these" challenge the authority of their community only to find it dangerous? Would such a challenge be a move toward self-destruction? "They destroyed themselves in the strife of Korah."

⁷⁸The story can be found in Numbers 16.

Were the “these” challenging the leadership of their community?

The illustrations in v. 11 which relate the “these” to ancient characters are followed by metaphors in vv. 12- 13.⁷⁹ The “these” are hidden reefs or stains (σπιλάδες⁸⁰) who fearlessly feast with the Beloved at their love feast and shepherd themselves. They are waterless clouds, barren trees, wild waves, and wandering stars kept in eternal darkness. Each of these metaphors emphasises the worthlessness of the “these” and shows their potential to be destructive. What makes clouds beneficial? The rain that they bring. Clouds without any water are only oppressive hope raisers. Fruit trees are not usually planted for their wood but for their fruit. Barren trees provide no food or crop which can be sold and made profitable. Wild waves destroy coastal homes and lands and throw up debris on the sea shore. Wandering stars which are kept in darkness are doubly useless. They do not give any light, and even if they did give light, they cannot be used for navigation since they are wandering rather than fixed. In fact, stars kept in darkness cannot be seen just as the “these” are an invisible element in the Beloved. None of these things – waterless clouds, barren trees, wild waves, or wandering stars – is desired or worth keeping. The reader constructs the “these” as worthless, and this construction induces her to try to hold onto her chosen position as the “Beloved”.

Verses 14-15 are a prophecy about the “these”. The prophecy is spoken by Enoch, the seventh from Adam. Enoch says that “the LORD came (ἦλθεν) with myriads of holy ones to do (ποιῆσαι) judgement against all and to convict every soul concerning all their ungodly works which they did profanely and concerning all the violent things that the ungodly sinners said against him”. The reader stumbles a little bit over the second word of this prophecy, for, in general, the reader expects prophecies to be in the future or present tense (i.e. “the lord will come” or “the lord is coming”), but here it is the aorist tense. The

⁷⁹ The Greek of this verse has a number of difficulties. Some people have questioned what purpose the *of* serves (see for example W. Whallon), and there has been much discussion about the word ἀγάπαις and the variant reading ἀπάταις, deceit. The various manuscripts of Jude witness to insertions and changes in 8 places in the text. But the text constructed by Nestle-Aland seems to be the best supported by the manuscripts.

⁸⁰ Liddell and Scott give three separate entries for the word σπιλάς. They give the following definitions for the word: reef, storm, stain. For further comments on this word and the role it plays in this passage, see the section on metaphor in the chapter on text (pp. 115-16).

lord came. But then, the reader is aware that often the other citations have been cited in the aorist tense. Perhaps then the tense form does not tell her anything about when the prophecy either happened or will happen. Instead the tense serves to highlight its position as an example or something to be remembered.

The reader may not know when the prophecy takes place, but she can ask whom the Lord judges. It is the ungodly. Which ungodly? The ungodly of the story from which this quotation comes or the ungodly of Jude – the “these” – or both? The ungodly in the quoted text are obviously not the same people as the ungodly in Jude, but the reader has been told that this judgement was prophesied “to these” (τούτοις), the “these” who were first described in v. 4 and who have been specified in vv. 8, 10, 11, and 12 (οὔτοι or αὐτοῖς).

Οὔτοι εἰσιν, “these are”. The “these” are finally to be named directly. They are murmurers who complain and are carried away by their desires, and their mouth speaks excessively, and θαυμάζοντες πρόσωπα for the sake of profit. They do what? This is a difficult phrase. Bauckham only affirms this when he writes, “Neither the connection of this phrase with what precedes nor its precise meaning is easy to understand”.⁸¹ The phrase is usually translated as “they flatter others for their own advantage” (RSV, NIV, NASB, KJV), but this is a difficult translation since θαυμάζω does not mean “to flatter” but rather “to wonder” or “to marvel”.⁸² It does not make sense not only at a first reading but for many readings after the first. What is Jude talking about? These marvelling at people for the sake of profit? When the reader struggles to put words together into a form that she can give meaning to and finds herself frustrated, there comes a time when she stops trying to make sense of the words. She has read them and thought about them, and she has given up trying to know what they mean. The reader goes on to see what else the text has to offer, but the tension of an unresolved phrase still remains.

⁸¹ *Jude, 2 Peter.* p. 99.

⁸² Liddell and Scott, Bauer; Bauckham argues that sometimes the LXX renders a Hebrew idiom as θαυμάζειν πρόσωπον, but the idiom is not always rendered with the same Greek words. Bauckham notes that the Hebrew idiom מְבַרְכִים אֶת־פְּנֵי which BDB defines as sometimes meaning “to honour” and sometimes meaning “to show partiality” is only occasionally translated in the LXX as θαυμάζειν πρόσωπα, and that there is an alternative LXX translation (λαμβάνειν πρόσωπον) which seems more comparable with מְבַרְכִים. In either case, neither Liddell and Scott nor Bauer give any negative connotation to the Greek word θαυμάζω.

In stark contrast to the οὔτοι of v. 16 who have been characterised by such things as murmuring, v. 17 begins Ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀγαπητοί – but you – Beloved. By this time the frustration and uncertainty of the preceding text may cause the reader to wonder if she is beloved, if she belongs to the group called “Beloved”. And the Beloved are given the same command again – μνήσθητε, remember! The reader wonders, when she reads this command, whether it will be any easier to perform this time than it has been for the last verses. This time the reader is to remember the words previously proclaimed by the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hopefully, these words have been heard, so that they can be remembered. But, in case they were not, the words have been included here with ὅτι indicating indirect speech. “They said to you that, ‘In the last time there will be mockers following their own ungodly desires.’” And who are these mockers? Verse 19, Οὔτοι εἰσιν... “these are the ones who make divisions, physical, not having spirit”. The “these” are the unspiritual people in the midst of the Beloved who cause divisions among them. At this point the reader has drawn a gloomy picture of the “these” as people who are denying the faith, who are ignorant, who are complainers and murmurers, and who are more concerned about their own desires than about others. And with this picture, the reader may have developed an expectation that the “these” are the least desirable people to have among the Beloved.

In opposition (δέ) to the naturalness and unspirituality of the οὔτοι in v. 19, “you, the Beloved (v. 20) who are building (ἐποικοδομοῦντες) yourselves (ἑαυτούς)⁸³ up in your holy faith, praying (προσευχόμενοι) in the Holy Spirit, keep (τηρήσατε) yourselves in God's love, receiving (προσδεχόμενοι) the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ into eternal life”. The reader may read this sentence with mild surprise, especially if she was anticipating a strong command to excommunicate the “these”. And she may wonder whether these are instructions to be followed or a description of what is already happening in the Beloved. If it is something that Jude wants her to do, these instructions seem rather vague. What does it mean to build yourself up in the faith or to pray in the Holy Spirit? And then, finally, there is a finite verb rather than a participle, and unfortunately the reader must decide whether it is an

⁸³ This is generally considered to be the third person pronoun in Greek, but it does happen that the first and second person pronouns are contracted into the form of the third person pronoun (for fuller details see Bauer's article on ἑαυτός).

indicative verb or an imperative verb.⁸⁴ Is this a statement of fact? "You are keeping yourselves in God's love." Or is it a command? "Keep yourselves in God's love." In either case, the reader feels a vague uneasiness at this suggestion that she is the one responsible for keeping herself within God's love. And in this place of God's love that she is to keep herself, she receives the mercy of Jesus Christ. It seems a difficult task whether it is a command or a statement.

So, she reads on. Καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους, "And on some who are disputing/doubting be merciful (or, you are merciful)". Only on some? Why some and not others? And who are these some? And what are they doing? Doubting or disputing? And in the same manner as τηρήσατε, is this verb (ἐλεᾶτε) a statement or a command? οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες, "But some save (or, you save) by snatching [them]⁸⁵ out of fire". Again, she wonders. Why only some? And is this a command or a statement? οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε ἐν φόβῳ μισοῦντες καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐσπιλωμένον χιτῶνα. "But on some be merciful (or, you have mercy) in fear while hating also the clothes stained by the flesh." Again, why some? And is this a command or a statement? She is not sure. The text scans fairly easily upon first reading, but then she takes notice of the four markers which indicate textual variants, and when she looks at the textual apparatus on the bottom of the page, she wonders if she will ever be able to even decide which text to read.⁸⁶ There are, it seems, a great number of options, and to save herself time and trouble she consults an "expert" and looks at the three main options proposed. And she is especially intrigued by one change in particular. In her edition of the Greek New Testament (Nestle-Aland), vv. 22-23 has a clear three clause structure. Each separate clause begins with οὓς. And the commands are to have mercy, to save, and to have mercy. But p⁷², the oldest manuscript (something generally privileged in textual criticism) has only two clauses. It reads:

⁸⁴ The second person plural, first aorist active indicative verb form and the second person plural, first aorist active imperative verb form are identical.

⁸⁵ I have taken the participle here as still agreeing with the ἀγαπητοί of v. 20 and have inserted the word them for sense even though it is not found in the Greek text.

⁸⁶ This reader is not the only one to despair. C. D. Osburn in his article on these verses says, "The very ancient, widely diffused, and numerous alterations have caused many to despair of ever being able to ascertain the exact wording of these verses" ("The Text of Jude 22-23." *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*. 63 (1972) 139. And Bauckham comments, "It is probably impossible to reach an assured conclusion as to the original text of vv 22-23a" (p. 108).

οὓς μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάσατε
 διακρινομένους δὲ ἐλεεῖτε ἐν φόβῳ⁸⁷

This seems quite similar to her as that which has gone before. It reads something like, "On the one hand snatch some out of the fire, but on the other hand show mercy with fear on those who doubt or dispute." It is the variants which follow from this which are of particular interest to her. The order of the words and one of the verbs is changed in some variations on this shorter, two clause text. The manuscript of Codex C reads:

οὓς μὲ ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους
 οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες ἐν φόβῳ

This is a different reading from the first. Now it says something like "On the one hand, treat some with contempt or rebuke some who dispute or doubt, but on the other hand save some out of the fire in fear." Here the reader has found a text which does what she anticipated, it tells her that she should treat the "these" with contempt or with rebuke. But ἐλέγχετε is not the most common reading and can probably be seen as a misreading (misunderstanding). Yet, it is evidence that somewhere another reader saw the text as advocating a position of rebuke. And the texts hang in her mind waiting for some decision. The two clause text has the most historical and even internal support, and yet the three clause text has been favoured by both Nestle-Aland, UBS, and modern translations. So, she is unable to escape the influence of both readings which vie for her attentions. Thus, she reads on in the hope of finding more words to answer her questions, but she is aware that she is near the end of the page. Pretty soon, there will not be any more words remaining.

"But to the one being able to guard you without stumbling and to stand you before his glory faultless in exuberant joy, to the only God our saviour through Jesus Christ our Lord [be] glory, majesty, strength, and power before all the ages and now and into all the ages, amen." The book finishes with these words. They do not say that God will keep and guard the Beloved, but rather that God *is able* to guard them and stand them in His presence through Jesus. God is able, but will He? There are no more words to read. There is now only the experience of those words in the reader.

And what is that experience? It began comfortably enough with

⁸⁷ Osburn, "The Text of Jude 22-23." p. 139.

security and a call even if the call was to fight something that was hidden. But the experience continued on into the realm of impossibility when the reader became unable to follow the author along the path of memory he had drawn. The reader's inability to remember caused the reader to doubt. The reader was unable to draw the comparison between the second half of the simile asserted by v. 8 and the first half described in vv. 5-7. This caused her to wonder about the nature of the secret people described in v. 4. They too were constructs made by an author, and the lack of connection within the simile caused her to doubt the veracity of the author's construction (as she had constructed/understood it). The doubts raised by the difficulties of vv. 5-7 affected the reader's ability to interpret (make sense) out of the comparison drawn in v. 8. The reader's uncertainty is only accentuated by v. 9. She is not sure whether she should still be remembering, and if she is, then this story, like the others, is familiar but different. And v. 10 stands in contrast to v. 9. And as if there were not already enough tension, the comparisons drawn between the "these" and some characters from the Hebrew Bible in v. 11 are disturbingly unambiguous or judgmental to a reader who remembers a more complicated version of the original story. The similes of vv. 12-13 lead the reader toward a view of the "these" as valueless, and the prophecy of vv. 14-15 confirms an understanding of the "these" as ungodly people who have already been judged. With this rather clear portrait in the front of the mind (and the disturbingly ambiguous bits at the back), the reader is ready for a final judgement of the these. She encounters instead a phrase of such difficulty (v. 16) that it is finally skipped over because she is no longer consumed by a desire to make every word mean since her encounters with the previous text have been decidedly ambiguous in more than one place. And when she comes to another command to remember, she wonders about her capability to do so. Just when she thinks that the "these" are finally to be dealt with she encounters a series of words that can have more than one semantic function, and the ambiguity of the previous text makes her uncertain which function she should choose. When she reads on, she discovers that the text ends. And the ending is both positive (telling of God's abilities and character) and negative (because it offers no reassurance that the Beloved *will* be guarded by God).

In the uneasy tension felt in the reader because of the multiple

meanings, ambiguities, and misunderstandings in this text, she wonders who she is. When she began to read Jude, she read herself in it as the Beloved, as the called, as the kept. But the secrecy of the "these", and the attitude toward the "these" which ends with ambivalence instead of excommunication, leads the reader to wonder if she should have read herself in a different position rather than as one of the Beloved.

A short index of reading difficulties

In her reading of the epistle of Jude, this reader encountered a number of difficulties of varying types. She encountered textual, lexical, and semantic difficulties. In the area of the text, she met with the difficulty of deciding which form of the text should be read in passages which show varying amounts of textual tradition, variation, and emendation such as the texts of Jude 5, 13-14, and 22-23. The textual choices she had to make influenced her reading of the rest of the text. Textual criticism was the beginning of the process in which the reader wrote the text, for in her practice of textual criticism (playing one set of variations off against another) she creates the very text she will read and interpret. She also ran into lexical difficulties. There were words such as *σπιλάς* which had two or more meanings in the lexicon of which one was not an obvious choice above the other.⁸⁸ She also dealt with semantic difficulties. What did the phrase *θαυμάζοντες πρόσωπα* mean? Her inability to make sense out of that phrase and her ability to question the meaning of other constructs she read presented a barrier to easy understanding and interpretation of the text. She also considered the difficulty associated with her own location centuries away from the original text. This is part of the problem which she associated with lost texts that she was unable to remember or discover because they are not part of her knowledge. And she thought about the problem of her own association with the text and her ability or inability to locate herself within that text. The reader had thought that reading was a simple (innocent?) activity, but as she read, the difficulties she encountered (whether textual, lexical, or semantic – to mention a few) encouraged her to see reading as a much more powerful and definitely complex event than she has previously suspected.

⁸⁸ This is discussed further in the section on metaphor in the following chapter (pp. 124-25).

With this in mind, the reader takes her reading of Jude, and begins to consider some of the methods put forward for textual analysis of the epistle of Jude. She will take with her the methods of reader response criticism and begin to explore other methodologies.

The Text: A Reader's Playground

All seeing is essentially perspective

Friedrich Nietzsche

Making up the Rules

It is no use pretending, fortunately, that all readers read the same way, for they do not. And it is these differences among readers that provide such a variety of interpretations, not only in biblical studies but in all of the disciplines. Different readers bring new backgrounds and perceptions to their reading, and these influence the way they read, the way they view the text, and the method they use to think about it when they consider how they read. Modern literary theory portrays new understandings of readers and the role they have in interpreting and understanding – namely reading – a text. But what is this text which readers read?

It seems that there are two basic answers to this question. One answer is to view the text as an object, an external thing which exists without the help, interest or participation of the reader. It is an object separate and distinct from the reader. The other answer is to understand the text as a construct – something which the reader “creates” through the reading process. There are, of course, readers arguing for one position over the other, and the argument is bounced back and forth in the academic community much as children in a playground argue over both the rules of a childhood game and who has the power to make them.

The new critics and structuralists were early modern proponents for viewing the text as an object. They helped turn the interest of modern criticism from the author (who was he, what was his historical situation, and what did he intend) to the text. The American New Critics expounded a view that critical readings of texts should emphasize “the works of literature themselves”.¹ The French literary structuralists began working with Saussure’s linguistic understanding of language to create a system for studying the structure of texts.

The question for discussion, at the time of the new critics and structuralists (1940s, 50s, and early 60s), was “What is a text?” Several

¹ René Wellek and Austin Warren. *Theory of Literature*. London: Penguin Books, 1942, p. 139.

answers to this question were proposed by two important New Critics, Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, in their book *Theory of Literature*. It could be: an object, a verbal reading, the experience of the reader, a stratified system of norms, or "an object of knowledge...which has a special ontological status".² At the same time, French structuralists such as A. J. Greimas and Roland Barthes were proposing semiological systems which could be used to analyse whole systems of literature.³ The structuralist reader thinks of the written text as being composed of signs which can be analysed and compared. The reader may see this text as part of a much larger system of signs which sometimes makes up genres (like Propp's analysis of Russian fairy tales⁴) and at other times literature. The reader may use structuralist principles to try to obtain a systematic and scientific reading of a text whether it is a small epistle, the genre of epistles, or the whole of the New Testament or the Bible.

People playing on the opposite side have viewed the text as a construct rather than an object. Most notably this view has been formulated by the Reader Response critics discussed in the previous chapter. Viewing the text as a construct does not have to mean that there are no limits, or that absolutely any meaning can be applied to any given text. What it does mean, especially for Stanley Fish, is that communities and ways of reading, thinking, and seeing help determine how any particular reader understands any particular text. For two examples of this one can read his essays "Is There a Text in This Class?" and "How to Recognize a Poem When you see One".⁵

It was from the question "What is a text" that a more radical question arose: "Is there a text?" Both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, in different ways, rejected the idea that a text is an object that is formed or unified by its location on a page or by its author.⁶ Derrida says about the text that "When a text quotes and requotes, with or

² Ibid., pp. 142-56.

³ Roland Barthes. "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," *A Barthes Reader*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1982, pp. 251-295 and A. J. Greimas. *Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Model*. Trans. Danele McDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and Alan Velie. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.

⁴ Vladimir I. Propp. *Morphology of the Folktale*. London: University of Austin Press, 1968.

⁵ Fish, Stanley. *Is There a Text in This Class?* London: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 303-337.

⁶ Foucault's understanding of what he calls discourse will be examined under the discussion on the author in the following chapter.

without quotation marks, when it is written on the brink, you start, or indeed have already started, to lose your footing. You lose sight of any line of demarcation between a text and what is outside of it".⁷ It may be at the point of quotation that the "text" begins to lose its boundaries, but that is only the beginning. A few pages later Derrida goes on to say:

a "text"...is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits assigned to it so far...⁸

This suggestion that the text is boundless and has no limits is the most radical of the French proposals about the nature of the text.

But not everyone is happy with this lack of limits, and so other suggestions have been put forward as well. Umberto Eco tries to moderate a readerly approach with the recommendation that the text should be viewed as a limit for interpretation. Unlike others who appeal to authorial intention for a limit on interpretation (i.e. Hirsch), Eco appeals to the intention of the text and its "internal textual coherence" to control "the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader".⁹ Eco argues for a limit to interpretation, and from this perspective he argues against deconstruction because it is a limitless activity. Jonathan Culler defends deconstruction and, in a sense, the reader and the text, with the claim that "deconstruction...stresses that meaning is context bound – a function of relations within or between texts – but that context itself is boundless: there will always be new contextual possibilities to be adduced".¹⁰

In the same book, Richard Rorty also argues against the limitation of interpretation in an essay responding to Eco. Rorty returns to the question of whether the text is a creation or an object with these comments:

One of the things we say when we talk about rocks and quarks is that they antedate us, but we often say that about

⁷ "Living On." *Deconstruction and Criticism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 81-82.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 84.

⁹ Umberto Eco. *The Limits of Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 59.

¹⁰ Jonathan Culler. "In Defence of Overinterpretation." *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. Ed. Stefan Collini, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 120-121.

marks on paper as well. So 'making' is not the right word either for rocks or for marks, any more than is 'finding'. We don't exactly make them, nor do we exactly find them. What we do is to react to stimuli...[and build] up a potentially infinite labyrinthine encyclopedia of assertions.¹¹

Rorty goes on to argue that it is impossible to draw clear distinctions between not only making and finding but also such things as "nature and culture, language and fact".¹² Then he reminds the reader that when such distinctions are made, they are made "in aid of some particular purpose".¹³ There are no pure, innocent, objective readings of texts. No matter how much scholars may argue for the objective nature of the text, all readings are interpretations. And all readings are biased.

Rorty finds himself in agreement with proponents of Reader Response methodologies like Stanley Fish. Rorty points to Fish as another pragmatist who interprets texts in order to use them. Rorty goes on to say that perhaps a structuralist or deconstructionist knowledge may be helpful; it may help the reader to say something interesting about the text under consideration which they would not have been able to say otherwise. Then he makes a crucial point when he writes:

But it [reading Eco or Derrida] brings you no closer to what is *really* going on in the text than having read Marx, Freud, Matthew Arnold or F. R. Leavis. Each of these supplementary readings simply gives you one more context in which you can place the text – one more grid you can place on top of it or one more paradigm to which to juxtapose it. Neither piece of knowledge tells you anything about the nature of texts or the nature of reading. For neither has a nature.¹⁴

Rorty denies an essentialist meaning for texts, and, like Fish, he looks for a more useful way to understand texts. He supports a reading which is effected by other reading, other contexts, and one's own context. Peter Brooks says something similar about the encounter between texts in his book *Psychoanalysis and Storytelling*. He does not

¹¹ Richard Rorty. "The Pragmatist's Progress." *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. pp. 99-100.

¹² Ibid., p. 100.

¹³ Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 105.

want to see one text becoming a rigid grid of interpretation for another; instead, he hopes that the two texts may encounter each other in their interpreter, and cause both to be enlightened.¹⁵

If there is any idea that this thesis will answer the question "what is a text", let me put it quickly to rest. For the question I will ask is more in agreement with Rorty and Fish than with new critics or structuralists (although, I *use* the work of new critics and of others who treat the text more objectively than subjectively). It should also be recognised that it is possible to turn what appear to be objective theories into readerly theories, but often this is a task that accomplishes little, so instead I choose to *use* them and at the same time subvert them and the objective nature to which they lay claim. The question becomes "what is the text to the reader?" Some readers treat it as an object. This serves their purposes and gives them an approach to knowledge and understanding that suits their thinking and their community. Those meanings for the text may serve them well, or in Rorty's terms: they may find them useful. Others treat the text as something which they create; something that they write as they read. Perhaps Rorty is more correct than many acknowledge when he says that we do not exactly make, nor do we exactly find, texts. In some way, texts are both object and creation.

A reader can seek Eco's safe, moderate road of interpretation, but like Jonathan Culler she may think that "deep down in his [Eco's] hermeneutical soul...he too believes that overinterpretation is more interesting and intellectually valuable than 'sound', moderate interpretation".¹⁶ It is with this in mind, that this reader turns from the question "what is a text?" to other more traditional questions about who is in the text and what they do; to questions about the words, the structures, and the rhetoric in which the text is written. But while the questions may be typical literary questions which are asked of literary texts, the tools she will employ come from a wide variety of modern theorists.

These tools include the structuralists and new critics who are early predecessors to other textually based readings such as narrative criticism (Bal and Prince) and intertextuality (Kristeva and Landow).

¹⁵ p. 25.

¹⁶ *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 110.

Psychoanalysis¹⁷ (Freud, Lacan, and Peters) also offers another set of theories with which the reader may work toward an interpretation of the epistle of Jude. Nor will the reader ignore some textually based criticisms which have been around since the earliest times. This is especially so in the case of literary tropes like metaphor and metonymy which have been part of literary criticism at least since the times of the ancient Greeks. The reader melds old and new theories together to bring a fuller, richer, and broader interpretation to the epistle of Jude and the words from which it is formed. Each of these models or methods for reading texts and seeing what they are and do offers a new twist and/or answer to both the question "what is a text?" as well as "what is the text to the reader?" Different readers have constructed different methods by which to interpret a text, and those methods can be read and employed by this reader as she reads the book of Jude.

The questions in this chapter will centre around character, plot, and words. The first question to be explored is "What happens and who does it?" – or plot and characters. One way to answer this question is to turn to modern structuralist theory and the narrative criticism that has arisen from it. These particular literary methods have been most concerned with both the structure and the content of the text. They have seen the text as an object which can be charted and traced, limited and defined, and understood as part of a larger system either of language or writing or literature. The objectivism of structuralism and narrative criticism gives way to other more post-modern approaches and questions regarding plot and character including the use of psychoanalysis.

The second question to be addressed is "what role do the literary devices metonymy, metaphor, and repetition have in the text?" Like the first question, this one will also be examined with a variety of techniques. The literary understanding of these devices is utilised alongside reader response criticism, intertextuality, and psychoanalysis.

So, the reader, being more inclined to play the playground game in the text with Rorty's "rules" as well as others, turns to the first question and to structuralism for a beginning. At the same time, she is fully aware that the reader is reading, and the text does not stand at a great

¹⁷ Not all psychoanalytic readings are text based, but in this part of the study I will only be addressing those which are. Psychoanalytic readings which are more concerned with a psychoanalysis of the author than the text will be referred to in the chapter about the author.

distance but is interpreted through that very act of reading no matter how distanced that act may try to make the text appear either through its ideology or method. She knows that no reading of a text can be either objective or innocent.

What Happens and Who Does It?

When a reader begins to ask questions about who is in the text and what they do, the answer seems to involve a very simple task. All one has to do is read the text and make a list of the names it contains. Then, if one needs to, one can read the text again and make a note next to each name of what they do – simple enough. The task is done. Well, yes, the task is done, but does it tell us anything new or different about the text? Does it give us a new perspective – a new way of seeing? If someone has never thought about characters or about their role in an epistle before, it may, but otherwise it seems to be just a list of information. This is where a different perspective on characters and their function is useful.

The principles behind a structuralist understanding of language can be, and have been, applied to studies of characters and their functions in relationship to each other and within a text.¹⁸ Structuralists, as their name implies, spend a good deal of their time looking for structures – systems by which they can order and understand the object under study. When the object of study has been literature, the issue of concern has been both the structure of the text and its contents. As structuralists have studied literature, they have attempted to develop one system which would be applicable to all types of narrative and which would reveal its underlying organisation.¹⁹

The French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure emphasised several important concepts which have shaped and informed structuralist studies. The most important of these is his development of the arbitrary nature of language – the idea that words do not equal the things they represent. There is not any inherent reason why a tree is called a tree. The decision that a word has a particular referent is a historical/cultural decision made by the speakers of that language.

¹⁸ For examples of this within biblical studies see David Jobling. *The Sense of Biblical Narrative: Structural Analyses in the Hebrew Bible*. 2nd ed., vol. 1. Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986 and Daniel Patte. *Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics*. Ed. Dan O. Via, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990.

¹⁹ Ann Jefferson and David Robey, Eds. *Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction*. London: B. T. Batsford Ltd. 2nd ed., 1986, p.96.

This is evidenced by the fact that there are many languages.²⁰ If an object had an inherent connection to a particular word, then there would be only one language. The cultural nature of the decision can be illustrated by the change in meaning that some words undergo in a very short space of time. For example, the recent change in the referent of the word "gay". It has changed from its older reference to a carefree lifestyle to a newer reference to a homosexual person. The old reference is not gone since some English speakers still use it in its old sense, but that sense is dying out as more and more people use it to refer to homosexuals. This happens not because either a carefree lifestyle or a homosexual person have something in their essence or nature which demand the use of the word "gay" to refer to them; rather, a cultural change has occurred in the use and hence the general (but not fixed) meaning of the word "gay". Other cultural changes could easily occur in the future which could once again change the word's referent.

Out of these thoughts about the arbitrary nature of language came a second key concept: the distinction between *langue* and *parole*. *Langue* is the structure, the rules, of language which allow *parole*, the actual speech event, to take place and be understood.²¹ *Parole* always happens within the context of *langue*. Narratologists and others interested in poetics use this theory which makes distinctions between the rules of a language and its praxis, to justify making a distinction between the structure of a text and its content when analysing a text.²²

Thirdly, Saussure developed an understanding of opposites/binaries in his linguistic studies. This was later developed more fully by the linguist Roman Jakobson who looked at the way opposites related to each other. He wrote, "In an oppositional duality, if one of the terms is given then the other, though not present, is evoked in thought...Opposites are so intimately interconnected that the

²⁰ Ferdinand de Saussure. *Course in General Linguistics*. Trans. Wade Baskin. London: Peter Owen Ltd., 1959, pp. 67-8.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

²² Many different names have been applied to this distinction between the structure and the content. Some of the most prominent are Seymour Chatman's distinction between Story and Discourse which is based on Barthes work and Mieke Bal's terms Fabula, Story, and Text. But it is not the terminology which is so important in this chapter, rather it is necessary to see how structuralists use linguistics to make a two fold distinction when studying narrative.

appearance of one of them inevitably elicits the other".²³ This can be both positive and negative as Jonathan Culler notes when he says, "The advantage of binarism, but also its principal danger, lies in the fact that it permits one to classify anything. Given two items one can always find some respect in which they differ and hence place them in a relation of binary opposition".²⁴ While binary theory may have dangers, it shows the principle of relationships which structuralism uses to create meaning. Words are not essences. They are not complete unto themselves. Their meaning is arbitrary. Instead of a meaning based on the "nature" or "essence" of things, words invoke other words, both opposites and synonyms, which limit and define each other in relationship.²⁵ It is words interacting with one another which gives them meaning. Structuralists are not generally attempting to create a readerly criticism but rather a more scientific structure; so they do not readily acknowledge the role the reader plays in determining the relationships which words have with each other. Thus they do not speak a great deal about where these relationships are formed. They do not ask whether they are relationships between words on a page or whether they are formed in the reader. Instead they attempt to create a system which would serve as a "science" of interpretation. A readerly understanding of the way in which words enter into and interact with each other and how they limit and expand each others' meanings (rather than standing as limits built up through binary opposition) would only come later in a different type of interpretation – intertextuality.

The fourth important concept that Saussure discussed was synchronicity and diachronicity. He wrote:

Everywhere distinctions should be made... between (1) *the axis of simultaneities* (AB), which stands for the relations of coexisting things and from which the intervention of time is excluded; and (2) *the axis of successions* (CD), on which only one thing can be considered at a time but upon which are


²³ Roman Jakobson. *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning*. Trans. John Mepham. Hassocks: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978, p. 76.

²⁴ *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1975, p. 15.

²⁵ Greimas has developed an actantial model based on both the linguistic principles of the sentence as well as on an understanding of how binaries construct relationships. This model can help one understand the relationships of actors in a text (p. 18-31).

located all things on the first axis together with their changes.²⁶

The AB axis is synchronic and the CD axis is diachronic. They were diagrammed by Saussure in this manner:



This distinction was originally made by Saussure because he wanted linguists to be aware of the difference between “evolutionary” and “static” aspects of their linguistic study.²⁷ The synchronic axis excluded time. Instead, it stood for all of the things (words) that exist in a particular moment. On the other hand, the diachronic axis could include time, and so it was able to account for changes in the synchronic axis. One way to think about this concept is to use the idea of a paradigm. The elements of the paradigm all exist in relationship to each other on the synchronic axis. Changes in the paradigm that offer new possibilities take place on the diachronic axis. Saussure wanted to make a distinction between the development of a word over time and the range of meaning possibilities that it had in the present. The diachronic idea has been used in literary studies when analysing events, and the synchronic axis has been used in the examination of character and setting. But the idea of joining the diachronic and synchronic in literary study has not been explored as much as it could be.²⁸

²⁶ *Course*, p. 80.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁸In Biblical studies the terms synchronic and diachronic have been used differently from the sense they are given in linguistic studies. Adele Berlin talks about diachronic methods as the methods of reconstruction and development of the text while synchronic methods deal with the text in its current form without debating issues of reconstruction and development (p. 20). But in literary studies there has not been a distinction which places diachronic study with the pre-history of the text and synchronic study with the present form of the text. Instead, diachronic study is often applied to plot and changes

As the ideas of structuralism have been taken from the realm of linguistics to the study of literature, literary critics have proposed a number of different methods and models in their attempt to develop a narratology or poetics of literature from linguistic principles. Each one has its own intricacies, successes, and problems. But generally most narratologists would agree in some part – though often using different language – with the analysis Chatman gives when he writes, “...[s]tructuralist theory argues that each narrative has two parts: a story (*histoire*), [which includes] the content or chain of events (actions, happenings, [plot]), plus what may be called the existents (characters, items of setting); and a discourse (*discours*), that is, the expression, the means by which the content is communicated”.²⁹ This is another way to express Saussure’s distinctions between *langue* and *parole*. The story (*histoire*) is the content (*parole*) while what actually allows the discourse to take place is the structure (*langue*) that supports the story.

But Chatman’s model is based on narrative texts, and the assumption is that it is designed for narrative texts. So, in order to use this model, either *Jude* must be a narrative, or it must be demonstrated that Chatman’s model can work outside of the narrative world. Both Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss have shown how a reader can use structuralist models to “read” the surrounding world. Barthes demonstrated this in relationship to popular French culture, while Lévi-Strauss indicated its usefulness for anthropological field studies. It does not seem to be much of a difficulty to use these principles to structure other objects besides narratives if that is what a reader/viewer wishes to do. But while one can see ways in which the theory may be applied outside of the literary field, one may want to answer both sides of the question by asking whether or not *Jude* is a narrative. If one begins by trying to use a model on its own terms, then it can be noticed that Chatman’s model posits a narrative that consists of two parts: story and discourse. First, the story is made up of two parts – events and existents. The discourse is the way the story is told. It is the kind of structure it has. To help decide whether or not *Jude* can be referred to

in character while synchronic study addresses form and the relationships between words.

²⁹ Seymour Chatman. *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*. London: Cornell University Press, 1978, p. 19. I will use this definition repeatedly, and the theories which will be displayed here – although they belong to a number of different people who use different language – will be understood in the context of Chatman’s analysis of the structuralist approach to literature.

as a narrative, it can be asked whether Jude has events and existents, and if so what they are. This also takes us back to our first question about what happens in the text and who does it. If that question has a positive outcome, then one can posit a story for Jude and ask whether it does not also have a discourse. If it has both a story and a discourse of some sort then it can be referred to as a narrative.

So, does Jude have events and existents and if it does how many does one need before it becomes a narrative? Gerald Prince in his book *Narratology* writes that a narrative consists of at least two events.³⁰ So if it can be shown that Jude has two or more events, then it may be called a narrative. But, "What exactly is an event?" and "How do I know whether any particular piece of a text is an event?" are the questions. How does this reader decide if there are events in Jude; and, if there are, what they are?

Mieke Bal has proposed a way to determine functional events. Her method understands events as functions in the text. This idea comes from Barthes's work which indicates that events which open up possibility and choice in the story are functional. Others, such as Prince, have made it very easy to locate events in a text by asserting that all verbs can be events.³¹ But if this is the case, then every sentence would be an event. This criterion does not help to limit the text as other narratologists seek to do in order to structure it. Bal tries to limit the amount of events a narratologist has to consider by locating those which are "functional" in a text. She defines a functional event by the following three criteria: (1) Change – an event must be a process; it *cannot* be static.³² Bal remarks that this does not mean that every verb of action is an event but rather that it can lead to "a preliminary selection of events".³³ (2) Choice – an event opens up possibilities in the story. The occurrence of an event in a story may be a turning point or a hinge which allows new events or possibilities to develop or be introduced. This criterion assumes that some events have the ability to change the story while others simply follow up or expand on ideas that have already been introduced. Whether or not a verb or verbal clause indicates a choice is a subjective decision which the reader must

³⁰ Gerald Prince, p. 4.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-77.

³² Prince disagrees with Bal on this matter, as he says all verbs are indicative of an event whether they are or are not static.

³³ Mieke Bal. *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Trans. Christine van Boheemen, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 15.

make. Mieke Bal is aware of this subjective influence when she writes, "an intuitive decision is often necessary here".³⁴ But she turns to her third criterion in an effort to use "formal procedures" and to obtain results that are "less intuitive".³⁵ (3) The third criterion is Confrontation – an event must have an actor in both the subject and the object positions of the sentence.³⁶ An actor must do something to another actor. Mieke Bal writes explicitly about the position of actors in letters when she discusses her example sentence, "Liz writes a letter". She says that "writing a letter is an activity which presupposes an addressee. The letter is written to *someone*. Although the second actor is not specifically named in this sentence, his or her existence is implied".³⁷ This is not a difficulty in Jude since the addressee of the letter is named, but it does indicate that actors may be reasonably implied in linguistic instances where they are absent. So, the three criteria which Bal defines in her attempt to limit the amount of events in any given narrative are change, choice, and confrontation.

From these criteria three questions may be formulated which can be asked of the verbs in the epistle of Jude and of their context: (1) Does this indicate a process, a progression in the story – a change? (2) Does this open up new possibilities for the rest of the story; does it produce choice?³⁸ (3) Are two actors named, one in the subject position and one in the object position; is there confrontation? The following chart is an analysis of the verbs in the book of Jude. If a verb in the context of its sentence meets all three criteria, then we will view that verb as being indicative of an event. In the chart below, N indicates a negative response and U indicates a positive response.

| Verb | Change | Choice | Confrontation |
|----------------------|--------|--------|---------------|
| πληθυνθείη | N | N | N |
| ἔσχον γράψαι ὑμῖν | U | U | U |
| παρεισέδυσαν | N | U | N |
| Ἐπομνήσαι...βούλομαι | U | U | U |
| ἀπώλεσεν | U | N | U |
| τετήρηκεν | U | N | U |

³⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 14-16.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸ I am using Chatman's terminology of story in accordance with the definition for a narrative text proposed earlier. Bal would refer to the change occurring in the fabula.

| | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|
| πρόκεινται | N | N | N |
| μιαίνουσιν | N | N | N |
| ἀθετούσιν | N | N | N |
| βλασφημοῦσιν | N | N | N |
| διελέγετο | U | N | U |
| ἐτόλμησεν | N | U | N |
| εἶπεν | N | N | U |
| οἶδασιν | N | N | N |
| βλασφημοῦσιν | U | N | N |
| ἐπίστανται | U | N | U |
| φθείρονται | N | N | U |
| ἐπορεύθησαν | N | N | N |
| ἐξεχύθησαν | N | N | N |
| ἀπώλοντο | N | N | N |
| τετήρηται | N | N | N |
| Προεφήτευσεν | N | U | U |
| ἦλθεν | N | U | U |
| ἠσέβησαν | N | N | N |
| ἐλάλησαν | N | N | N |
| μνήσθητε | N | U | U |
| ἔλεγον | N | U | U |
| ἔσονται | N | N | N |
| εἰσιν | N | N | N |
| τηρήσατε ³⁹ | U | U | U |
| ἐλεᾶτε | U | U | U |
| σώζετε | U | U | U |
| ἐλεᾶτε | U | U | U |

From this analysis there are six functional events in the book of Jude. They are (1) the event of writing, (2) the event of remembering, (3) the event of keeping one's self in the love of God, (4) the event of showing mercy, (5) the event of saving, (6) the event of showing mercy. If there are six events in the book of Jude, then according to Prince's definition, Jude must be a narrative. These six events form half of what Chatman calls story; the other half is the characters or existents which will be examined below.

³⁹ Imperatives, by their form, imply two actors: one actor to give the command and one to receive the command. But it should be noted that the linguistic form of these verbs is uncertain as they could be either imperatives or indicatives.

Events are part of a narrative's story, and their order and arrangement is part of the plot. Sometimes it is assumed that a letter does not have a plot, but Petersen has shown that this is not the case in his study *Rediscovering Paul*.⁴⁰ In that book he spends a great deal of time showing what the plot of Philemon is and how that can be used in a literary study. Peter Brooks, in an essay entitled "Freud's Masterplot", proposes a psychoanalytic strategy for interpreting texts. He develops this method from Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and the study of narrative.⁴¹ Brooks's proposal is that Freud's account of the life process in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* can be used as a psychoanalytic reading strategy. Just as life has a beginning (birth), a middle (dominated by attempts to return to an earlier state) and an end (death), so a narrative has a beginning and a middle and an end,⁴² and these pieces of the narrative can be rethought in the light of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Peter Brooks's psychoanalytic proposals about plot which are based on Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* may help develop another understanding of the function of events in the book of Jude. Plot does not always have to be understood as the formal development of a story; it can also be viewed as movement. Writing has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Plot is the relationship which these have to each other. It is the way the story moves from the beginning to the end.

There has been a great deal of discussion about how the end relates to the beginning and how the beginning relates to the end, but what has been problematic has been the middle. In Peter Brooks' discussion of the issue, he writes, "If beginning is desire, and is ultimately desire for the end [both a literal literary end and the human end – death], between lies a process we feel to be necessary...but whose relation to originating desire and to end remains problematic".⁴³

The epistle begins with the zeal or diligence of a character – Jude – (v. 3) which compels him to write. It finishes with an end that portrays

⁴⁰ Norman R. Petersen. *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.

⁴¹ Brooks has a large debt to the school of structuralism out of which narratology eventually developed, but his specific interest in the movement of a text, especially its plot, led him to psychoanalysis.

⁴² Or, at least, a "good" narrative has a beginning, middle, and end. Cf. Aristotle who is also cited by Brooks.

⁴³ Peter Brooks. "Freud's Masterplot." *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*. Ed. Shoshana Felman. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1977, p. 284.

a God who has glory, majesty, strength, and authority and who is able to stand "you" in his presence (vv. 24-25). But how does the middle of the epistle relate to the beginning and the end? The middle is both a return to the beginning and an inevitable proceeding toward the end. In the epistle of Jude this is played out in a manner that has a sudden end (an unexpected end? – perhaps).

The early part of the book, particularly v. 4, but also earlier, begins with a number of metonyms: the Beloved, the ungodly, and the judgment are all metonymies.⁴⁴ The book proceeds to provide metaphorical understandings of these metonymies. By this, I mean that in the book there are references which the reader may use to help her formulate an understanding of the metonymies which she encounters. This use of language will be discussed more fully in the following section of this chapter. What is important here is that a paradigmatic understanding of the beginning of the book happens as the reader builds up a profile of the judgment encountered by the "these" and also as the reader develops a portrait of the Beloved. This is done by a continual return to the issues that began the epistle and an exploration of the path which leads to the completion of the epistle.

Verse 4 reads: "certain men slipped in secretly, those who were long ago written into this judgment, ungodly people, who change the grace of our God into licentiousness and deny the only master and our lord Jesus Christ". The rest of the epistle provides an expansion upon the nature of the "these" and of the judgment which they will encounter. The "these" change the grace of God into licentiousness and deny the only master and lord Jesus Christ (v. 4). They are dreamers who defile the flesh, reject authority, and blaspheme angels (v. 8). They blaspheme what they do not understand (v. 10). They shepherd themselves (v. 12) and are grumblers who find fault and follow after their own desires (v. 16). They cause division and do not have the spirit (v. 19). All of these things contribute over the course of the epistle to defining both the metonymical "these" and the "ungodly" which are linked in v. 4. Each time the word "these" appears in the text, the reader's memory is drawn back to the referent at the beginning of the epistle where the pronoun "these" can be connected to a group of people who slipped in secretly and who are called the ungodly (v. 4). In

⁴⁴ The use of metonymy and metaphor in the epistle of Jude will be discussed in depth in the next section of this chapter where the use of language will be examined.

a similar manner references to judgment also return the reader to v. 4 where a judgment was declared but not defined. The example of Sodom and Gomorrah (v. 7), the rebuke of the archangel (v. 9), the destruction of Cain, Balaam, and Korah (v. 11), and the conviction of all the ungodly (v. 15) remind the reader of v. 4 where the judgment of the ungodly was first declared.

Even in the short space which Jude occupies, the reader is consistently referred to the beginning of the letter by references and developments which reinforce the original themes. However, the relationship of the text to its end, its closure, is less clear. The ending it has is not easily predictable from its beginning. It is not that the end of a piece of writing must be predictable from the beginning (indeed it is the very unpredictability of a piece that often keeps the reader reading), but when the end has been reached the reader should be able to see how the beginning and the middle have led to that end, how they have been preparing for that end. The beginning of this epistle has prepared the reader for a description of the "these". It has prepared them for a declaration of judgment. The middle of the epistle reinforces the readers expectation that the end will bring doom. The commands and the doxology which constitute the end of this letter do not meet the reader's expectation of judgment. The ending does not seem to fit the middle of the letter even though it has some connection to the beginning.⁴⁵

The beginning of the epistle portrays the position of the "Beloved" as well as the "these". In the opening address the Beloved are described as the called who are loved by God the Father and kept by Jesus Christ. Right away the Beloved are placed into a secure position. The end of this epistle finishes with instructions to the Beloved who are told to "build yourselves up in your most holy faith; praying in the Holy Spirit; keep yourselves in the love of God; accepting the mercy of our lord Jesus Christ into eternal life" (vv. 20-21). Perhaps even more unexpected are the commands which follow these instructions. They are also to "show mercy to some who doubt and save some by

⁴⁵ This is popularly evidenced in some sermons (however rare) which are preached on the epistle. Vv. 1-3 are connected with vv. 24-25 with little or no consideration given to the intervening verses and the effect they have on understanding both the beginning and the end. For example 2 sermons preached by Steve Timmis at Christ Church Fulwood in July 1993.

snatching them out of the fire, and have mercy on some while also hating the tunic which has been defiled from the flesh" (vv. 22-23).

The tone of the final two verses of the epistle changes dramatically. It is no longer the language of command, but rather one of praise. Verse 24 begins τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ, "To the one who is able". These are words of praise not to one who *will* do something, but to one who has the ability to do something. If he chooses, he is able to do the things that follow in the rest of the sentence. He is able to keep you and to stand you without stumbling before his glory. He is able to place you in his presence in a state where you are without fault and full of exuberant joy. The sentence of praise finishes with a description: to the only God our saviour through Jesus Christ our lord [be] glory, greatness, power and honour in the past, the present, and the future. The epistle finishes with a great outburst of praise to the God who is able to save.

If one were to look only at the beginning and the end of Jude, one might think that the position of the "you" – the Beloved – was very similar from beginning to end. But the middle stands between and some significant changes take place in the construction of the Beloved between v. 3 and vv. 21-25.⁴⁶ The first change in the position of the Beloved is in v. 3 when they are called away from their security (perhaps complacency?) to contend for the faith. This change is intensified in v. 4 where they are informed that certain men have slipped into their group secretly. The threat moves from an exterior position (fighting the enemy without) to an interior position (rooting out or finding the enemy within). On the one hand, the Beloved may find it difficult to remember the things spoken of by the narrator, and they may find the description of the "these" difficult to agree with. They must locate those who change the grace of God into licentiousness. They must be on the look out for those who reject authority and blaspheme glories. But how are these things done secretly? On the other hand, it is possible that these people are hidden among them and may even be their leaders. They are people who join in the love feasts without fear and who shepherd themselves (v. 12). The question becomes more and more fraught with each description and each example given – who are the "these"? And, more

⁴⁶ These changes have been discussed in the chapter on Reader Response, but they will be briefly reviewed and expanded here for the sake of the argument regarding both plot and characterisation in the epistle of Jude.

importantly, who are the Beloved? Presumably the Beloved are those who listen to the words of the apostle which were spoken before (v. 17) And if they want to remain Beloved, then they should not cause divisions as the "these" do but should follow the list of commands which finishes the letter in vv. 20-23.

The main body of the epistle has been largely dedicated to pointing out the ungodly who have slipped in secretly and to describing them and their judgment. But the grand finale of the epistle is not more ungodliness and judgment, but mercy, rescue, and salvation. It is mercy, rescue, and salvation for the ungodly from the "you". The "you" are to rescue "some".⁴⁷ The Beloved are to have mercy on the doubting and to save others from the fire. Are the Beloved strong enough to carry out this command? Or does it narrow the definition of who is Beloved? Those who are Beloved must not doubt, but must be strong enough to save others, although, with fear (where fear may mean either terror or care). One way in which the Beloved can assert their position and disassociate themselves from the position of the "these" is by their actions. What they do separates them from the "these". The internal position of the "these" has threatened to undermine the Beloved's identity, but near the end of the epistle the addressees of the letter are given a way to prove their status as the Beloved ones.

⁴⁷ There are a lot of proposals about who exactly are the "some" referred to in this passage. Kelly refers to the "some" as the fallen members of the community (p. 287). Bauckham and Hillyer (*New International Biblical Commentary: 1 and 2 Peter, Jude*. Ed. W. Ward Gasque. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1992) both think "some" refers to church members. Moffatt and Leaney seem to think that "some" refers only to those who have been misled by the heretical leaders, but that the leaders themselves will be judged by God and it is not part of the community's responsibility to judge (or excommunicate) them (Moffatt, p. 244; Leaney, p. 99). Cranfield takes the "some" as referring to three groups of people each more seriously affected by the false teaching than the previous group (pp. 169-70; also de Boor, pp. 286-87). Schelkle takes the text as referring to two groups one of which is "gefährdete" (endangered) and another that is "schon verlorene" (already lost) (*Die Petrusbriefe Der Judasbrief*. Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament. Freiburg: Herder, 1964, pp. 170-71). Not all commentators agree that the reference to "some" is connected with the "these" of the rest of the letter. Bo Reicke writes, "Though it is often assumed that reference is made specifically to apostates, there is no evidence for this view" (p. 215). Instead, he sees it as referring to non-Christians generally. One important item to note about all of these commentators is that they do not use the words of the text to talk about who the "some" might be. They are referred to as church members, apostates, and non-Christians, but none of these commentators says that they are the "these" or part of the "these" – those people who first slipped secretly into the beloved in v. 4 of the epistle – nor do they say that the "some" are part of the "Beloved".

The last words of the epistle directed to the Beloved are, "to the one who is able to guard *you* without stumbling and to stand [*you*] before his glory faultless in exuberant joy, to the only God our saviour through Jesus Christ our lord [be] glory, majesty, strength and authority before all the ages and now and into all the ages, amen" (vv. 24-25). This letter began with the "you" in an assured position where they were "called, beloved of God, and kept by Jesus Christ". In the middle of the letter this position was called into question. Towards the end of the letter, they are instructed that they must work (build) in order to maintain (keep) the position they want in the "faith". And then in the last moments of the text, it is written that there is one who is able to keep them and to stand them in the divine presence. But there is *no* assurance given that this *will* be done. God is able, but will he rescue the Beloved?

The middle of this letter serves to move the "you" and the "these" from one position to another. The "these" who slipped in secretly are pointed out by the narrator, and it is asserted that at least some of the "these" and those affected by them can be rescued by the Beloved. The "you" are brought to a point where they can see that their position is not necessarily safe or secure, and they too could be part of the "these". They must recognize their need for actions (fighting, praying, building, receiving, saving, etc.) that develop and build up their faith. They are dependent upon a God who is able to save them, but they cannot rest complacently in that position, for the language of this letter does not give them that assurance. Thus, both the "you" and the "these" are changed and developed in this epistle. The "these" are pointed out to the community and brought to a point where they can be rescued, and are, in fact, dependent upon the "you" for their rescue while the "you" are brought from an assured position into a heightened awareness of their dependence on themselves and their own actions as well as on God. The movement of the letter brings us from the beginning, through the middle (which was both a return to the beginning and a proceeding toward the end) and to the end.

In this epistle the movement of the epistle centres around the actants rather than around the events. One could compare this to a novel or short story which develops a character and traces the changes in the character instead of comparing it to a work whose movement centres around plot. The process of change in a character is just as

much a type of plot as a more traditional movement in either time or location. Commonly the development of a character is associated with both time and movement. This has been the case since ancient times. Homer developed his character Ulysses with the help of a long journey home. But the development of characters in a short space and in the same location can be seen in short story writers, for example O. Henry's "The Last Leaf".

Now this chapter will turn from the discussion of plot back to the structuralist/narratological discussion of the beginning of the chapter. As noted above, story consists of two parts, events and existents. Earlier it was shown that there are six functional events in *Jude*. Now this analysis will proceed to ask, What are the existents in *Jude*? Existents refers to both characters⁴⁸ and setting.⁴⁹ When examining character, structuralist analyses usually focus on the relationship between actors and events, and because of this some have claimed that structuralism has not moved beyond the Aristotelian concept that the action is more important than the actor.⁵⁰ In a theory which is opposed to the idea that actors are "persons" or that actors are essences, how does one understand the role of actors in a text? To answer this question for the book of *Jude*, the identity of the actors must first be established, and then it can be asked how the actors might function within a structural analysis of *Jude*.

Mieke Bal gives a means by which one can determine who the functional actors are in any given narrative. She writes, "...it is necessary first to select which actors must be taken into consideration and which not. In some [stories]⁵¹ there are actors who have no

⁴⁸ Because characters do not have to be people, many theorists refer to them as actants or actors. Among these are Mieke Bal and A. J. Greimas. Others, like Propp, have referred to them more traditionally as *dramatis personae*. And some, such as Barthes and Chatman, have referred to them as characters. Whatever terminology is used to refer to characters, in narratology it is understood that these are the ones who either cause or undergo the events of the narrative.


⁴⁹ Gerald Prince and Seymour Chatman are the only narratologists to use the term "setting" (Prince, pp. 64-77; Chatman, p. 19). Chatman refers to setting in the same level that deals with actors, while Prince refers to setting when talking about events. Similar ideas to that of setting have been expressed by Roland Barthes's work with indices ("Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives", pp. 267-272), but he says indices apply to both events and actors.

⁵⁰ Chatman, p. 108.


⁵¹ I have changed Bal's terminology, *fabula*, to Chatman's, *story*. His definition of story is very similar to Bal's *fabula*, but Bal refers to the distinction Chatman has made between story and discourse with the words *fabula* and *story*, as was noted in footnote 29.

functional part in the structures of that [story] because they do not cause or undergo *functional* events. Actors of this type may be left out of consideration."⁵² Which actors in Jude undergo functional events? We have six functional events in the book of Jude. The first one, the event of writing is performed by the actor, Jude. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth events are all commands of some form given by Jude and expected to be performed by the Beloved. This indicates that there are only two functional actors in the book of Jude: the first is Jude; the second is the Beloved.

Having identified the functional actors, what role do they have in the text? A. J. Greimas's actantial model, as it has been modified by Mieke Bal,⁵³ may be helpful in answering this question. Greimas diagrams the model⁵⁴ as follows:



This model shows a variety of relationships between the actants in a narrative. The subject and the object seem to share the focus position in this model because they are both components which are acted upon twice. The object is acted upon by both the sender and the subject, while the subject is acted upon by both the helper and the opponent. But at the very centre is the subject's desire. Since Jude is a letter with a stated sender and receiver who are functional actors, they can be inserted into the model in the positions of sender and receiver. In the diagrams that follow, I have indicated the model itself in small capital letters while the actors and actants from Jude have been indicated in lower case letters above the model. Thus the first part of the model with its actors looks like this:




⁵² Bal, *Narratology*. p. 25.

⁵³ Greimas's actantial model has a number of difficulties because it is based on a forced combination of syntactic and semantic knowledge in relation to the sentence. Mieke Bal avoids this problem by referring to the sentence only as an analogy. However, neither theorist presents effective means to apply the given categories.

⁵⁴ Greimas, *Structural Semantics*. p. 207.

Jude is the sender. The Beloved is the receiver. After determining the sender and the receiver, the subject and object of a story may be determined by asking who desires what. Jude desires to communicate the object (a warning to contend for the faith) to the receiver, the Beloved.



Jude is the subject who wants to communicate the message to the Beloved. Thus, Jude occupies two places in the overall diagram. He is both the sender and the subject. The arrow pointing from the subject to the object is the axis of volition which indicates desire. There is a motivating factor behind the relationship between the subject and the object.⁵⁵ Jude, as the subject who is attempting to fulfil his desire, is helped by the vast assortment of historical and literary references to be found in vv. 4-19 in the letter. Greimas's model is similar to one Freud proposed almost half a century before in "Creative Writers and Day Dreaming". He wrote, "the... characters in the story are sharply divided into good and bad, in defiance of the variety of human characters that are to be observed in real life. The 'good' ones are the helpers, while the 'bad' ones are the enemies and rivals, of the ego which has become the hero of the story".⁵⁶ It is not a question of being helpful or unhelpful, but rather a more fundamental question about whether the character is good or bad as portrayed in the story. So, there is a central (main) character, an ego, at the centre, and there are helpers and opponents on either side. The diagram below shows "helpers" and "opponents" in the epistle of Jude.


⁵⁵ Desire will be more fully examined later in this chapter as well as in the next chapter on the author. There psychoanalysis will be brought into the discussion about the function of desire not only in the text but also in the reader and in the author.

⁵⁶ *Art and Literature*. Trans. James Strachey. Ed. Angela Richards. Vol. 14, The Penguin Freud Library. London: Penguin 1991, p. 138. Freud does say that he is "perfectly aware that very many imaginative writings are far removed from the model of the naïve day-dream; and yet I cannot suppress the suspicion that even the most extreme deviations from that model could be linked with it through an uninterrupted series of transitional cases" (p. 138).

| <u>Verse(s)</u> | <u>Helpers</u> | <u>Opponents</u> |
|------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| 1,4,14,17,21,25 | Jesus Christ | |
| 1,4,21,25 | God | |
| 2-3,5,17,20 | Beloved | |
| 3 | saints | |
| 4 | | the ungodly |
| 5 | | those not believing |
| 6 | | angels |
| 8,10,12,15-16,19 | | these [ungodly] |
| 9 | Michael | the devil |
| 11 | | Cain |
| 11 | | Balaam |
| 11 | | Korah |
| 14 | Enoch | |
| 17 | apostles | |

All of those listed here are helpers and opponents. While the clearest opponent is the "these", the clearest helper is not so obvious. At first glance, one might think that the Beloved are the clearest helpers; but, in a sense, they are the least clear. Unlike Jesus Christ and the apostles, the Beloved are not clearly good, nor are they completely bad like the representative inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah in v. 7. Instead they fall just to one side of the line. They are on the good side because they are kept by Jesus Christ and Beloved by God the father (v. 1), but they must be challenged to contend for the faith which was given to the saints and they must be encouraged to remember the words of the apostles. They face the possibility that they too could join in the error of the "these" or could fail to heed the warning provided by Sodom's judgment of eternal fire. But while the Beloved may not be the purest of the helpers, they are instrumental in offsetting the position of the "these", and they provide a comparison between the "these" and the Beloved which establishes the position of the narrator – Jude – in the centre. This narrative position from which the receiver, the helpers, and the opponents are described should be noted. They are written into the letter by the narrator, especially the helpers and opponents, and they have no autonomy of their own. They do not move or make their own decisions. They do not have a voice. The description of the helpers and opponents as well as of the receiver is controlled by the

narrator, the subject, Jude. However, the receiver still has some power, especially in light of the commanding language used, to disobey or ignore the message communicated by the sender. Greimas's full actantial model can now be diagrammed as follows:



This organisation of the actors shows that the story is structured around the desire to write. The sender and the receiver are the sender and receivers of the letter. The object which is exchanged is a warning contained in the letter, and the subject of the whole structure is motivated by an express desire to write to the receiver. The model places the actants in obvious relationships with each other. It shows how desire motivates the subject. It shows the way the helpers and opponents highlight the position of the subject. And it shows how the sender moves the object to the receiver. But, it does not reveal the actors. This model does not show them as people. This is not a model of characterisation which speaks of flat or round characters nor of developed or undeveloped characters; rather Greimas's structural analysis values characters for the actions they perform. Whenever Greimas's model is used, this will be the result because the model specifies actors in roles of action like sender/receiver, subject/desire/object, helper/opponent.⁵⁷ One of the benefits of the model is that it highlights the motive of the subject (Jude) which is desire. That desire may come in many forms, and, in the case of the epistle of Jude, it was the desire to write and to send a warning. But Greimas's model also shows the relationships between the different actors and the way in which they are affected by each other.

Psychoanalysis moves beyond the model presented by Greimas. It not only points to desire as a central organising principle but also to the constructing voice of one of the main actants, the narrator, a voice which wants to place itself in a heroic position. Jude seems to begin by

⁵⁷ In order to reveal an actor one must either use the circular intricacies of Barthes's indices, return to the theory of Prince that every sentence is indicative of an event, or leave structural analysis for another type of criticism.

establishing himself in a servant position. In v. 1 the narrator refers to himself as "Jude the servant of Jesus Christ". In that position he belongs to Jesus Christ, but he can also claim some of the authority which belongs to his master,⁵⁸ authority which he will be able to manipulate as the narrative voice in the epistle.

Jude is not content with this establishment of his character. The narrator goes on to point to a situation which apparently only he can see. He is responsible for pointing out to the all-knowing "you" a group of people who have slipped in secretly and whom they have not yet noticed. He is the hero who will announce to the "you" the threat of the "these". Not only does Jude procure for himself a "saviour" role by rescuing the "you" from their blindness, but he also takes on the role of judge as he points out the error of the "these". In the examples created in the text, it has been Jesus who destroyed those who did not believe and who kept the angels in darkness and who set forth Sodom and Gomorrah as an example (vv. 5-7). Michael left the rebuke of the devil to the Lord in v. 9. And in vv. 14-15 it is the Lord who will come to execute judgment and to convict the ungodly. But Jude in his position as servant takes on some of this power. When he writes "this judgment" in v. 4 (a phrase, I will later argue, that refers to the epistle as a whole),⁵⁹ he announces once again his authoritative position as Jesus's servant. He is the one who can see the error of the "these" and pass a judgment on them and call them "these ungodly". The author/narrator of Jude is the instigator of the book and its hero. Jude is a hero who sees what his omniscient readers have overlooked and who passes the judgment of the Lord (even if it is a judgment which is tinged with mercy in its finale). Whether the other characters are helpers or opponents, both groups serve to point to Jude as either a saviour or a judge, positions which he claims God and Jesus occupy (vv. 14-15, 24).

Referring to psychoanalysis can give the reader another perspective on the nature of the actant who narrates the epistle of Jude and on the way in which the narrator portrays both himself and the other characters who are part of the story. But returning to Greimas's model and structuralism, we are reminded that only two actors are functional – Jude and the Beloved – and six events have been identified in the

⁵⁸ This is more fully demonstrated in the discussion of metaphor in the next section of this chapter.

⁵⁹ This will be further developed in the section on metonymy which follows.

epistle. These actors and events are closely related to each other. An event is not an event unless it has two named actors, and an actor is not an actor unless it undergoes or causes one of the events of the story. An overview of the events and existents of Jude can now be posited as follows:

Jude writes to the Beloved

I⁶⁰ wish you⁶¹ to remember

Jude commands the Beloved to keep themselves in God's love

Jude commands you to show mercy

Jude commands you to save

Jude commands you to show mercy

This broad overview shows the functional events and actors in the story. In this overview, one can see the relationship of the subject/sender to the receiver. There is a tension which is implicit in the commanding language of the functional events. Jude, the sender and the subject, wishes to be obeyed; however, even though Jude issues the commands, it is the receiver, the Beloved, who holds power in a Greimasian sense. The power of the Beloved lies in their ability to choose obedience or disobedience to the commands received from the sender/subject, Jude. But because the epistle of Jude is a letter with no response or editorial remarks, the power of the Beloved remains latent and unused in the text. For now, let it suffice to say that this overview of events and existents gives us a broad picture of the relationships and the story in Jude. It does not give great detail concerning the content of the text or even the nature of the portrayal of the characters.

The story found in any given narrative text, as indicated earlier, can be said to be made up of its events and existents. Story is the "stuff" of a text, the content. Discourse is the "how" of a text. It is the way in which the story is told.⁶² Discourse in Chatman's definition is

⁶⁰ I is referent to Jude.

⁶¹ You is referent of the Beloved.

⁶² A number of different theorists have made this distinction between the "what" and the "how" of a text. Among them are Chatman, Bal, and Barthes. But each theorist uses this concept differently. Chatman refers to discourse as the difference between who tells the story (the narrator) and what the story actually is (pp. 146-147). Bal uses the term "text" (what Chatman calls discourse) to refer to the "how" of the text, and her meaning is very similar to Chatman's understanding of "discourse". But she uses the term "story" in a way which does not correspond to Chatman. When talking about story she is speaking specifically of the order in which a story is told. This order

specifically concerned with communication, the telling, of the story.⁶³ Chatman diagrams this "telling" as moving along a continuum as follows:

Real Author → Implied Author → (Narrator) → (Narratee) → Implied Reader → Real Reader⁶⁴

The story originates with the real author who writes, and that writing reflects an implied author who may or may not have a narrator who tells the story to the narratee (if there is one) and/or to the implied reader whom the real reader then reads. There are two things which should be noted about this paradigm. First, Chatman explains this diagram by writing, "...only the implied author and implied reader are immanent to a narrative, the narrator and the narratee are optional (parentheses). The real author and real reader are outside the narrative transaction as such, though, of course, indispensable to it in an ultimate practical sense".⁶⁵ Thus Chatman sees discourse as an event that occurs in the textual world and which is analysable in an objective fashion. Second, the above diagram is a telling illustration of the way in which Chatman retains a view of the text as something which is written by an author and eventually received by a real reader. This fails to take into account the fact that it must be constructed and analysed by a real reader who is constructing and positing both the implied author and the implied reader as textual constructs.⁶⁶ The diagram illustrates this by the direction of the arrows which Chatman has used in his book. The arrows all point away from the author and towards the reader, and this is a limit on the amount of construction for which the reader is responsible.

may be quite different from the order in which it was given in the fabula (what Chatman calls story) (pp. 49-53). She does not see any difference between the content of the fabula and the content of the story; rather there is a difference in the point of view which the critic uses to discuss the arrangement and contents of the text (p. 49). Barthes refers to narration ("Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives", pp. 259-260). His term "narration" is almost identical to Chatman's understanding of "discourse".

⁶³ The use of tropes in the telling and development of a story will be discussed in the next section.

⁶⁴ Chatman, p. 151.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Rather than arguing about the proper terms for referring to this phenomena (i.e. should the construct be called the implied reader (Chatman) or the ideal reader (Eco) or some other name), it would seem more profitable to ask "what purpose (or ideology) is served by insisting that the phenomenon is a textual construct rather than a readerly one?"

After developing these ideas about the "narrative-communication situation", Chatman shows how some stories may not have an explicit narrator or a narratee. He writes, "Of all the forms of literary narrative those...constituted by found letters and diaries least presuppose a narrator. If we insist upon an agent beyond the implied author, he can only be a mere collector or collator".⁶⁷ In the case of Jude, the voice of the narrator and the voice of the implied author are identical, so there is no need to posit a narrator distinct from the implied author of the story. Just as the narrator and the implied author of Jude match, so do the narratee and the implied reader. Chatman says, "The narratee of a letter is the addressed correspondent". So, the narratee in the epistle of Jude is the Beloved. The implied author and the implied reader of the discourse do not differ from the actors in the story as one often finds in other stories and as one might expect. When Chatman discusses discourse, he is more concerned with the act of communication between the implied author and implied reader. He relates this to different genres of writing such as the letter, but he does not deal with smaller units such as the structure of sentences or the use of tropes in discourse. Those will be examined later in this chapter.

The text presented to the implied reader (the "Beloved") by the implied author ("Jude") is a letter, and that letter is of a descriptive nature telling the Beloved about those people whom Jude wishes to warn them of. This is the obvious outcome of applying Chatman's model of discourse. At the same time, there are only a few instances which are events in the book and only a couple of actors. These are the results of working with limited models such as those proposed by Chatman, Bal, Greimas, and Prince. Because these models work only with events and actants, only a small portion of the epistle is relevant to the model. The greatest part of the letter in vv. 4-19 is material called up by Jude in order to fulfil his desire to communicate a warning about a particular group of people to the receiver/implied reader of his letter. This material is not easily examined using structural analysis or analysis centred around actants or characters. It needs to be examined by other methods and with different questions.

The epistle of Jude contains a very basic story about the narrator, Jude, who writes to some people, the Beloved, and issues them with certain commands which they may or may not carry out. This

⁶⁷ Chatman, p. 169.

psychoanalytic and structural analysis presents some information that is often overlooked in commentaries. First, commentaries seldom acknowledge that the people who are described in vv. 4-19 are simply that, a description that is part of the construct of another actor. The people "who have slipped in secretly" (v. 4) are not functional actors who either cause or undergo an event or events. Second, most analyses of the book of Jude do not focus on the functional actors who do cause or undergo the events of the narrative. The analyses are either focused around the general structure of the ancient letter⁶⁸ or posit a tension between the faithful and the ungodly.⁶⁹ A structural analysis has revealed that the tension is not in the conventions which form an ancient letter, nor is the tension some type of conflict between those who have crept into the love feasts and the Beloved. Rather the tension is between the power of the receiver and the desire of the subject. The subject attempts to attain and fulfil his desire. But the receiver is not without power over the subject, and in the epistle of Jude this power is very clear due to the commanding language used in the narrative. The receiver, the Beloved, has the power to refuse to fulfil the object of Jude's desire. The Beloved can refuse to heed Jude's warning or to obey his commands. In some texts it becomes clear how the receiver responds to the subject, but in the book of Jude there is no response because of the letter format in which the narrative is given without editorial comment. While this strengthens the position of Jude, in that there is neither opposition from opponents nor explicit opposition from the receiver, it leaves a vagueness in regard to the final outcome of the communication act. Did the Beloved satisfy Jude's desire?

It should be clear by now that there are some benefits to structural and psychoanalytic analysis. A structural psychoanalytic analysis can help pinpoint actors in a story. It can give us a list of events. It can show relationships between actors and events and reveal the workings of a text; in other words it can show how the pieces of narrative form a structure that is the text we read. Structuralism can make the reader acutely aware of the events and actors highlighted by its methods, and this may help the reader reflect on new ways of conceiving the text.

⁶⁸ For examples of such foci, see Bauckham, Kelly, and Moffatt.

⁶⁹ J.D. Charles claims that, "The fundamental dichotomy expressed in the epistle is the tension between the ungodly and the faithful" ("Those and These: The Use of the Old Testament in Jude." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament*. 38 (1990), p. 110).

"Analysis Terminable and Interminable"

Discourse can be understood in more specific terms than just who it is told by and how it moves from the author to the reader; it is also about the words that are used to tell the story. The use of metonymy and metaphor in the epistle of Jude forms an important part of its discourse that should not be ignored. Traditionally, tropes such as these have been examined using rhetorical strategies often based on Aristotle. This study will make use of literary strategies as well as different methods offered by psychoanalytic and intertextual criticisms. The study will begin by explaining some of the theories associated with psychoanalysis and intertextuality and will then produce a textual analysis based on them. It will conclude with an extended textual application that makes use of all of the methodologies in order to develop a broad picture of the possible usage and meaning of metaphors in the epistle of Jude.

Psychoanalytic Method: More Rules for the Playground

The psychoanalytic method is relatively new to biblical studies. A search of the religion index (ATLA) reveals that while there are over 900 references to psychoanalysis in the database only about 10 of them are references to psychoanalytic studies of individual texts while the overwhelming majority of the references deal with the study of religion rather than biblical studies or interpretation.⁷⁰ One of the first articles that used a psychoanalytic method to interpret a New Testament text was Mary Tolbert's analysis of the Prodigal Son published in *Semeia* in 1977.⁷¹ Several other short articles have followed. *A Walk in the Garden* edited by Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer contained a couple of essays that used psychoanalytic approaches to Genesis.⁷² Despite its rather recent appearance in the last twenty years among professional biblical scholars, psychoanalytic interpretation of biblical material has been practised by psychoanalysts

⁷⁰ Some of the texts that have been interpreted using psychoanalytic criticism include Genesis 1-4; Genesis 32; Job 3:25; Luke 24:13-35; the Prodigal Son; and Romans 7.

⁷¹ Earlier psychoanalytic articles have been published on the OT. For example Robert Katz wrote an article entitled "A Psychoanalytic Comment on Job 3:25" in the *Hebrew Union College Annual*. 29 (1958) 377-383.

⁷² Adrian Cunningham. "Type and Archetype in the Eden Story." *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*. Eds. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer. JSOT Supplement 136. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992, pp. 290-309 and Anna Piskorowski. "In Search of Her Father." pp. 310-318.

from its early times. Sigmund Freud wrote three essays on Moses and monotheism which addressed his understanding of who Moses was and how he came to be a "hero" for Jewish people and thus a significant factor in the psychology of the Jewish people. But Freud himself acknowledges that he was examining the character of Moses and not the biblical material itself. For he writes that by "bringing up [biblical tradition] to confirm my views when it suits me and unhesitatingly rejecting it when it contradicts me – I am exposing myself to serious methodological criticism and weakening the convincing force of my arguments".⁷³ In other words Freud was not offering a proper interpretation of the biblical material but was instead demonstrating a use to which that material could be put. Like other psychoanalysts who came after him, Freud was not so much interested in giving a systematic interpretation of the Bible (in part or in whole) as in creating a psychological system which accounted for the influence of biblical material upon the cultural situation of that period.

Carl Jung also offered interpretations of the Bible as part of his collection of archetypes. His main focus in these interpretations was upon either characters or objects as symbols. He too, like Freud, gave some extended interpretations of characters in the Bible – Job and Christ among others. In his book *Symbols of Transformation* he wrote, "Christ, as a hero and god-man, signifies psychologically the self; that is, he represents the projection of this most important and most central of archetypes. The archetype of the self has, functionally, the significance of a ruler of the inner world".⁷⁴ He also reflected upon theological issues such as the nature of God, the relationship of people to the divine, and the symbolic understanding of the church. Even more recent psychoanalysts have offered their thoughts on both biblical characters and the interpretation of the Bible. Julia Kristeva offers a clear example of this in several of her books, including *Tales of Love*. There she discusses her psychoanalytic understanding of the love of God saying, "The immediate love of God for his people, a love that demands neither merit nor justification but is based on preference and

⁷³ Sigmund Freud. "Moses and Monotheism." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Trans. James Strachey, v. 23, London: Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 27.

⁷⁴ C. J. Jung. *Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia*. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*. v. 5. Eds. Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 368.

choice, directly establishes the loved one (who is also loving) as a subject in the strong sense of the term".⁷⁵ Here she has taken a theological understanding of the relationship between God and his people and analysed its benefit in psychoanalytic terms. This is followed by a discussion of the apostle Paul's views about the love relationship between God and humanity. She notes that for Paul stress is placed upon the fact that the source of love comes mainly from God rather than from a reciprocal love relationship between God and people and because of this the wording of people's relationship to God is changed. She says, "For Paul, finally, it will no longer be (on the man's part) a matter of *agape* but of *pistis* – faith".⁷⁶ One of her latest books⁷⁷ has a whole section on the reading of the Bible. While psychoanalysts may have been some of the first people to use their ideas to interpret the Bible as well as other texts, biblical scholars are now joining other critics in hermeneutical disciplines who offer psychoanalytic readings of texts – a number that seems to be growing larger in the field of literary and feminist studies as well.

But what is the attraction of psychoanalytic criticism? Why are scholars using it to interpret texts and what exactly do they achieve when they have done so? Even more importantly, what are the criticisms which have been levelled against psychoanalysis in general and its interpretative system in particular, and what effect do those criticisms have upon the whole process and goal of psychoanalytic interpretation in biblical studies? And after these criticisms, can any or all of psychoanalytic interpretation be rescued and put to use in biblical studies?

The Law of the Father - Freud Writes the Rules

Until this point, I have been writing as if psychoanalysis were a unified theory which proposed a system of interpretation, but that is an inaccurate representation of psychoanalysis. There are many branches of psychoanalysis which have broken off from the "father" Freud, and each of those branches proposes a different system for understanding individuals and the culture in which they reside. They also make use

⁷⁵ Julia Kristeva. *Tales of Love*. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1987, p. 84.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁷⁷ Julia Kristeva. *New Maladies of the Soul*. Trans. Ross Guberman. New York: Columbia UP, 1995.

of different hermeneutical systems for analysis. It would be impossible for me to address all of the different types of psychoanalysis which are currently being written of and practised. Instead, I will limit myself to introducing and criticising two major psychoanalytic theorists – the founder, Sigmund Freud, and the person who has claimed to be his French re-interpreter, Jacques Lacan; but there will be reference to other psychoanalysts who have both built upon their theories and/or criticised them. These two have been chosen because the first embodies the basic principles from which all psychoanalysis eventually flows – principles that include comments on language, art, writing, and interpretation – while the second has made specific claims regarding the nature of language and psychoanalysis. Neither of these psychoanalysts has gone unchallenged with regard to their ideas about either language or interpretation. This chapter will show both the strengths of their ideas and the flaws (perhaps fatal?).

When Freud developed psychoanalysis, he did so for the purpose of helping patients who showed symptoms of hysteria, a mental disorder that is characterised by emotional outbursts and sometimes accompanied by paralysis. As he developed his new therapy, he began to build up and identify an encompassing theory of the human being and the relationship between mind and body. He redefined and popularised the now familiar idea of the unconscious, and he hypothesised that the unconscious could never be known directly but that it could be discovered if people (analysts in particular) knew how to recognize and interpret its manifestations in everyday life including its appearance in dreams, conversations, works of art, writing, and jokes.

In relationship to biblical studies, and I would say to the whole effort to understand and interpret texts, Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* is the most helpful in providing another framework for reading texts and understanding language. However, Peter Brooks, as it was demonstrated earlier in this chapter, has also used *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* as a central text to understand plot and movement in a narrative. In his book *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud made a distinction between the manifest content of a dream and its latent content.⁷⁸ The latent content of the dream, Freud

⁷⁸ Sigmund Freud. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Trans. James Strachey. Ed. Angela Richards. Vol. 4, The Penguin Freud Library. London: Penguin, 1991, p. 215.

argued, could be recovered by means of free association. This was a process in which the patient under analysis would first relate the manifest content of the dream. Then, for a beginner, the analyst would break the dream into small pieces and ask the patient to tell the analyst anything that came into his mind in connection with that small piece of the dream.⁷⁹ This gives the interpreter a great mass of information to manipulate and use to create a "meaning" for the manifest dream. At the same time, Freud explained different ways in which free association and dream symbols could be associated. Two of these categories of interpretation (categories that were later re-interpreted and expanded by Jacques Lacan) were condensation and displacement. Freud called displacement and condensation "the two governing factors to whose activity we may in essence ascribe the form assumed by dreams".⁸⁰

Freud noted that all dreams were much shorter than the dream thoughts which they produced in analysis,⁸¹ and he referred to this phenomenon as condensation. Each piece of a dream could represent a whole chain of thoughts, or it could be one small piece of a conversation, or it could trigger a number of different memories of either older or more recent origin.⁸² The subject or subjects of condensation would be discovered in the process of free association that sought to expand the condensed material of the manifest dream. But, in general, identifying the relationship between material drawn from free-association and the manifest dream content was just a matter of accumulating enough material through free-association and then weaving a web of interpretation around the signifiers.

Displacement, on the other hand, is not so easily identified. Its very nature seems to hide it. Freud explains the process of displacement in this manner, "It... seems plausible to suppose that in the dream-work a psychological force is operating which...strips the elements which have a high psychological value of their intensity and...creates from elements of low psychological value new values...If that is so, a *transference and displacement of psychological intensities* occurs..."⁸³ In this situation a piece of the dream was not just a symbol for some condensed memory

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 169-199.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 417.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 383.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 383-413.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 417, emphasis in the original.

or situation but rather a representation for material that was too intense to be openly manifested in the dream itself. James Walkup spoke of psychoanalytic interpretation in comparison with texts in this manner, "Whereas the interpretation of a text uses part/whole relations between passages and larger units (corpus, genre, etc.) to reconstruct its meaning, psychoanalytic interpretation must uncover meaning that is not only latent, but disguised".⁸⁴

These theories from *The Interpretation of Dreams* are part of Freud's understanding of the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious. The interpretation of dreams was a valuable tool in Freud's quest to discover the unconscious regions of a humanity which he described as controlled by its desires, drives, and instincts. These words have now become a common part of English vocabulary, but their relationship to biblical studies is still undefined. As I argued in the previous section of this chapter, desire becomes a central part of the structuralist construction of actantial character analysis. It is also part of Peter Brook's method for constructing plot. Freud brought the issue of desire into the forefront of consideration with his claim that all dreams are wish fulfilments.⁸⁵ The desire that is fulfilled by the wish-fulfilment dream may be an unconscious desire; however, Freud quite willingly admits that some dreams do not contain unconscious wishes but are simply wishes left over from the "residue of daytime". Still, in his analysis, Freud posited an unconscious that is full of chaos and instincts which drive and determine us.⁸⁶ At the same time the unconscious is a powerful "entrepreneur" that makes use of all available material to attempt to express the desires which are normally repressed by the conscious. These unconscious desires may be only dimly glimpsed in passing interpretation. This explanation of the conscious life of humanity places a heavy emphasis upon the unconscious and its hidden desires. Freud explicates it as follows in his *Outline of Psychoanalysis*, "The power of the id [the unconscious] expresses the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists in the satisfaction of its innate needs".⁸⁷ The forces that are

⁸⁴ James Walkup. "Narrative in Psychoanalysis: Truth? Consequence?" *Narrative Thought and Narrative Language*. Eds. Bruce K. Britton and Anthony D. Pellegrini. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990, p. 248.

⁸⁵ *Interpretation*, p. 163.

⁸⁶ Sigmund Freud. *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*. Trans. James Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1949, pp. 148-151.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

responsible for obtaining the needs of the id are the instincts. There are two basic instincts, Eros (or libido) and the destructive instinct (or death instinct).⁸⁸ The libido is a type of transferable desire that can be moved from object to object throughout life in order to satisfy the needs of the person. This conceptualisation of desire as a vital but unconscious and barely controlled instinct was first described by Freud. This too was to be re-interpreted by Lacan in his re-reading of Freud.

These are only some of the issues which Freud addressed in his considerations of language. There are many more, but these are the ones that I will make use of in modified form in the analysis which follows. However, I do not want to leave these suggestions (for they are theory and not fact) without acknowledging and agreeing with a number of criticisms that have been aptly directed towards Freudian psychoanalysis. I will begin with the criticisms that have been directed against Freud's epistemological position. Jane Flax, in a brilliant post-modern analysis of Freud, points out the tension between Freud's theories about the self, desire and language which are based on Enlightenment rationality and a postmodern view that discredits the Enlightenment. She writes, "Freud's work is paradoxical because it culminates and defends major tendencies within Enlightenment thinking, especially its individualism, empiricism, and rationalism. Yet at the same time his theories undermine the very epistemological and psychological aspects of Enlightenment thought he attempts to rescue".⁸⁹

Freud's concept of the mind anticipated and supported the post-modern critiques that were made of it, for he undermined some of the binary distinctions between mind and body and reason and unreason upon which the rationalist thinking of the Enlightenment is based. Yet, he could not abandon positivism and the idea that only science would be an adequate support for his new theory. Truth became knowledge of "what exists outside of us and independently of us...".⁹⁰ He could not posit an understanding of truth that was not based on science and which did not denigrate philosophy or religion. Thus, when his theory did come to the attention of continental philosophers

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Jane Flax. *Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p. 17.

⁹⁰ Ibid., quoting Freud "The Question of a Weltanschauung" in *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Trans. James Strachey NY: W. W. Norton, 1965, p. 65.

it was criticised. Phenomenologists “complained about its positivism... existentialists denounced its determinism...and critical theorists [...used it] as an index of the psychic price extracted by capitalism”.⁹¹

Alternatively, Freud could not decide exactly what kind of “truth” emerged in the analytic situation. Sometimes he called it a real truth and claimed that it corresponded to “what really happened” but at other times he called it a constructed truth.⁹² This ambivalence about the nature of the information gained through analysis is most evident in Freud’s dealings with (or failure to deal with) sexual abuse. Jeffrey Masson in a well documented and researched book *The Assault on Truth* has documented Freud’s change of opinion regarding the truth of stories about sexual abuse that he heard in his consulting room. Masson quotes Freud saying, “I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only fantasies which my patients had made up”.⁹³ In order to explain these “fantasies” of his patients Freud moved away from his seduction theory which had pointed to the reality of sexual abuse and began to work on the Oedipus complex – a complex which posited that children fantasised aggression towards their parents in an unconscious fashion. Any real acts of violence toward the patient in their childhood could now be classified as part of a childhood fantasy that is an inevitable part of the maturing process – the development and working through of the Oedipus complex. This complex was to become one of the foundations for later psychoanalysts. Anna Freud wrote a letter which detailed the effect that giving up the seduction theory (the acceptance that real violence was done toward children) would have upon psychoanalysis. She wrote that “keeping up the seduction theory would [have] meant to abandon the Oedipus complex, and with it the whole importance of fantasy life, conscious or unconscious...in fact, I think there would have been no psychoanalysis afterwards”.⁹⁴ Masson’s book brings serious allegations against Freud’s claims that his theories and the reconstructions of his patients in analysis correspond to empirical facts about what really happened. Masson argues that women are victimised a second time by Freudian psychoanalysts who

⁹¹ Walkup, p. 245.

⁹² Flax, p. 68.

⁹³ Jeffrey Masson. *The Assault on Truth: Freud and Child Sexual Abuse*. London: Fontana, 1992, p. 34 from Freud’s “An Autobiographical Study” 1925, Standard Edition, v. 20.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113, Masson quoting a personal letter from Anna Freud.

regard the stories women tell them about sexual abuse as a childhood fantasy rather than as real events. This is especially indicting in light of recent evidence which places the level of sexual abuse among girls before the age of 14 at least as high as 25%.⁹⁵ Freud's invention of the Oedipus complex could be seen as a self-protective move occasioned by his ostracization from the medical community in Vienna rather than as a move to understand the psychology of his patients.⁹⁶ This raises serious questions about the ethics of "playing" with language in such a way that *all* connections to reality are removed. Although all stories are constructs and language is in some way removed from reality, a complete disconnection harms people.

Besides the allegations that Freud could not escape the need to prove his theory by positivistic means nor face the reality of his patients memories there is a third allegation. Namely that his theory was to become an all encompassing, deterministic understanding of humanity – in some ways it was to become a type of religion. This criticism has come from a number of sources. It came early on from Carl Jung, who finally wrote in his autobiographical *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* that "Freud, who had always made much of his irreligiosity, had now constructed a dogma; or rather, in the place of a jealous God whom he had lost, he had substituted another compelling image, that of sexuality. It was no less insistent, exacting, domineering, threatening, and morally ambivalent than the original one".⁹⁷ The criticism was not to be limited to Freud's understanding of sexuality and in the 1960s the whole of psychoanalysis was criticised by Deleuze and Guattari in their book *Anti-Oedipus*. They wrote:

Doubtless, there are many other forces besides psychoanalysis for oedipalizing the unconscious, rendering it guilty, castrating it. But psychoanalysis reinforces the movement, it invents a last priest. Oedipal analysis imposes a transcendent use on all the syntheses of the unconscious, ensuring their *conversion*.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Diana E. H. Russell. "The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children." *Child Abuse & Neglect*. 7: 133-146, 1983.

⁹⁶ Masson, pp. 10-12.

⁹⁷ C. J. Jung. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. London: Collins, 1963, p. 174.

⁹⁸ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. London: The Athlone Press, 1983, p. 112. Emphasis in the original.

The Oedipus complex, claimed Deleuze and Guattari, became an overbearing hermeneutic which could be placed upon any manifestation of the unconscious in order to make it conform to the theoretical ideal. Not only that but psychoanalysis also "fills the following function: causing beliefs to survive even after repudiation; causing those who no longer believe in anything to continue believing; reconstituting a private territory for them, a private Urstaat, a private capital".⁹⁹ Freudian psychoanalysis can become a dogmatic view of a new reality, a new worldview for patient and analyst alike.

These are some of the criticisms levelled against Freudian psychoanalysis: undermining Enlightenment thinking while simultaneously building on ideas of the Enlightenment such as individualism and rationality which are called into question by post-modernism; a failure to distinguish adequately between reality and fantasy – a failure which led to ethical misjudgments that caused harm to patients; an attempt to become a new all encompassing doctrine of the human personality despite the recognition that such doctrines in the past had been harmful. So, can any of Freud's theories about language be rescued for some type of psychoanalytic interpretation? I do not think all is lost. The ideas presented in *The Interpretation of Dreams* were formulated in the period when Freud was still ambivalent regarding his division between reality and fantasy (a period which lasted until 1905 when Freud publicly repudiated his seduction theory,¹⁰⁰ while his book on dreams was published before this crucial date in 1903) and before he had completely solidified his ideas about psychoanalysis. The use that can be made of Freud's theories will be demonstrated in the discussion on Lacan which will follow shortly.

Psychoanalysis in Literature

Before turning to Lacan, the French psychoanalyst who associated the unconscious and language, there will be a general discussion of psychoanalytic literary interpretation. One of the problems that literary psychoanalytic criticism has encountered is the question of what exactly is being analysed. What is the object undergoing analysis with the use of this method? A variety of different literary objects have been proposed and analysed by different analysts and using different types

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

¹⁰⁰ See Masson, p. 12

and methods of psychoanalytic criticism. Elizabeth Wright gives a good introduction to these issues in her book *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice*.¹⁰¹ She describes classical Freudian analysis as applied to authors, characters, and culture. All too often analyses have focused on the author of the text or a character even though this presents some quite obvious difficulties. In reference to the author: When psychoanalysts read a text and claim to know from that text what an author "really" meant or "really" thought, there is an obvious basis for doubt on epistemological grounds. A post-modern and readerly oriented epistemology does not make claims to know the mind of the author and thus to give a "valid" interpretation by proclaiming to all who listen exactly what the author meant. But there is not only a difficulty in the application of psychoanalysis to authors, but also in attempted applications of psychoanalysis to characters. It is difficult to apply the psychoanalytic method of analysis to a character who has no unconscious, no means to free associate, and who is fictional. Yet, there are some psychoanalytic ideas that can be applied to text; these ideas require a subject. One of those concepts is the concept of desire. If one is to apply the psychoanalytic idea of desire in a literary fashion there are only three choices: it must either be applied to the reader, a character, or the author.

But psychoanalysis has not only been applied to authors and characters but also to language in general. This has happened most effectively through the archetypal interpretation of Jung and the structural interpretation of Lacan. Nor has psychoanalytic interpretation ignored the place of readers in interpretation. This has been most readily demonstrated in two books, one by Norman Holland entitled *5 Readers Reading*, which shows the specific responses of individual readers to a text in light of their psychological background, and the second by Simon O. Lesser, *Fiction and the Unconscious*. But it is also emphasised in the explorations of such post-modern writers as Roland Barthes and philosophers like Jacques Derrida.

While psychoanalysis and its practitioners have put forward a number of objects for analysis, I have chosen to limit myself to a psychoanalytic understanding of the role of both tropes and desire in interpreting a text. I do this partly so that I will not be guilty of the

¹⁰¹ Elizabeth Wright. *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice*. London: Routledge, 1984.

error of which Peter Brooks has accused many who undertake a psychoanalytic literary study when he writes, "The first problem...may be that psychoanalysis in literary study has over and over again mistaken the object of analysis, with the result that whatever insights it has produced tell us precious little about the structure and rhetoric of literary texts".¹⁰² Now it is finally time to turn to Lacan for some last theoretical explanations before beginning a textual analysis of *Jude* itself.

The Law Re-interpreted: Lacan Re-writes the Rules

Jacques Lacan took some of Freud's essential work on the unconscious and interpretation and re-interpreted it. Although he read and re-interpreted many of Freud's ideas, this chapter is concerned only with his understanding of language and desire and their role in psychoanalysis. Like Freud, Lacan also commented on specific works of art as well as literary works. One of his most famous applications of his psychoanalytic theory to a text was his seminar on Edgar Allan Poe's "The Purloined Letter". There he discussed the way that the text was structured by three glances (the glance of the minister, the glance of the Queen, and the glance of the detective) as well as discussing the way that readers are constructed by their own gaze and by the gazes of the text.¹⁰³ He also wrote an essay on "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in *Hamlet*"¹⁰⁴ that explicated his understanding of the function of desire in a text.

Lacan discussed language and its nature repeatedly during his career. One of his earliest works was on what he called "The Mirror Stage",¹⁰⁵ and it can be understood as an attempt to explain how the child moves from the pre-symbolic stage (the stage without language) to the symbolic stage (the place where the adult is located and determined by language). He went on to discuss the general topics of speech and language and the more specific topic of Freud's rhetoric in his essay "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in

¹⁰² Peter Brooks, p. 20.

¹⁰³ John P. Muller and William J. Richardson Eds. *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic Reading*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1988.

¹⁰⁴ Jacques Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in *Hamlet*." *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*. Ed. Shoshana Felman. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1977. pp. 11-52.

¹⁰⁵ "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience." *Ecrits*. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977, pp. 1-7.

Psychoanalysis".¹⁰⁶ But his most important work on language and its relationship to interpretation is probably his essay "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud".¹⁰⁷ Lacan makes this statement, "What the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the whole structure of language".¹⁰⁸ Directly following this statement he writes, "Thus from the outset I have alerted informed minds to the extent to which the notion that the unconscious is merely the seat of the instincts will have to be rethought".¹⁰⁹ In two sentences Lacan has set out the direction which the rest of the essay will pursue. He will try to explicate the unconscious and its relation to language especially in light of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and in doing that he will show that unlike its place in Freud's theory, the unconscious is much more than the location of a chaotic mass of instincts.

Soon after the introductory statements in his essay, Lacan turns to the structural linguists beginning with Saussure, but in the same way that Lacan re-interprets Freud, he also re-interprets Saussure. He begins his re-interpretation with Saussure's understanding of the sign. When Saussure labelled the relationship of the signified to the signifier he placed the signified on the top and the signifier on the bottom,¹¹⁰ but Lacan switches this around so that the signifier is on the top and the signified is on the bottom. He writes it this way:

$$\begin{array}{c} \underline{S} \\ s \end{array}$$

and says that it should be "read as: the signifier over the signified, 'over' corresponding to the bar separating the two stages".¹¹¹ Lacan, like Saussure, speaks of the arbitrary relationship between the signified and the signifier, but then he pushes the argument further. For he writes that it is an "illusion that the signifier answers to the function of representing the signified".¹¹² It is not a simple case of the word (sound) "tree" representing the concrete object or concept of a tree – which he implies is how Saussure understood the relationship. Rather, the signifier is much more slippery than that. What happens,

¹⁰⁶ *Ecrits*. pp. 30-113.

¹⁰⁷ *Ecrits*. pp. 146-178

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ See Saussure's *Course of General Linguistics*, pp. 66-7.

¹¹¹ Lacan. "Agency." *Ecrits*. p. 149.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

according to Lacan, is that the “signifier enters the signified”.¹¹³ The signified is actually shaped and defined by the word/s that are used to describe it, and the same object could have a multiple number of signifiers attached to it, each of which would enter into and redefine the signified. This is quite different from Saussure’s ideas about the sign, for he says that it “is never wholly arbitrary”¹¹⁴ and that what he means by the word arbitrary is that there is “no natural connection” between the signified and the signifier. Saussure does not see the signified/signifier relationship as a slippery one, and he concludes that “the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community”.¹¹⁵ In contrast, Lacan speaks of the “incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier”.¹¹⁶ The signified is continually changing and being rebuilt in light of the words that signify it and the context in which it resides. This sliding of the signified is enhanced through the building of signifying chains (a concept that is a familiar part of intertextual theories). In this process the signifier and the signified are both filled up with much more than a simple connection between a sound and an object. Lacan demonstrates this on the long familiar introductory example “tree” with these comments:

For even broken down into the double spectre of its vowels and consonants, it can still call up with the robur and the plane tree the significations it takes on, in the context of our flora, of strength and majesty. Drawing on all the symbolic contexts suggested in the Hebrew of the Bible, it erects on a barren hill the shadow of the cross. Then reduces to the capital Y, the sign of dichotomy which, except for the illustration used by heraldry, would owe nothing to the tree however genealogical we may think it. Circulatory tree, tree of life of the cerebellum, tree of Saturn, tree of Diana, crystals formed in a tree struck by lightning, is it your figure that traces our destiny for us in the tortoise-shell cracked by fire...¹¹⁷

This is a signifying chain – a chain of signifiers that modify and interact with each other and enter into the signified. And each element of the

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 151.

¹¹⁴ Saussure. *Course*, p. 68.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

¹¹⁶ “Agency”, p. 154.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

signifying chain (not just the word "tree") has attached to it "a whole articulation of relevant contexts suspended 'vertically', as it were, from that point" in the chain.¹¹⁸ According to Lacan the signifying chain discloses the possibility that people can use language "to signify *something quite other* than what it says".¹¹⁹

Signifying chains are attached to both the tropes of metonymy and metaphor. Lacan claims that metonymy is a word-to-word connection between signifiers and that metaphor happens when one signifier has taken the place of the other in a signifying chain while still remaining metonymically connected to the chain. At this point in the essay, Lacan turns to Freud's work and in particular to *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In this section he takes the linguistic discussion which he has conducted in the last 10 pages of his essay and applies it to psychoanalysis. In this fashion the sliding of the signifier becomes equal to Freud's 'distortion' – that necessary component of dreams. Lacan's discussion of metaphor now equals Freud's dreamwork 'condensation', and metonymy is made equal to the dreamwork 'displacement'. He then goes on to try to locate the subject in relationship to the language games he has been playing. Lacan implies that in the past people have seen themselves as the bar between the signifier and the signified. They have seen themselves as the determining factor in the creation of meaning, but Lacan calls this into question and asserts the supremacy of the signifier over the signified.¹²⁰ People are more defined by the language that they use than they are able to define the language they use. More radically than that, people are displaced by the signifier. In psychoanalysis people lose the ability to speak about themselves and can see the unconscious that speaks for them. In this way "the symptom is a metaphor...[and] desire is a metonymy".¹²¹

This gives a broad and very general outline to Lacan's thinking about language, but that thinking has not gone uncriticised. Some have heralded Lacan as the true French interpreter of Freud, but others have insisted that he takes all the errors of Freud and magnifies them in himself. He loses the ambiguity and uncertainty which is part of Freud's writing and thought in favour of a deterministic structuring of

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 155. Emphasis in the original.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 166.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 175.

the unconscious as language. Jane Flax says that "Lacan's work is a logical extension of certain concepts that Freud develops – an extension that requires and results in a denial and an obliteration of other aspects of his ideas".¹²² She also criticises Lacan's understanding of language in two respects. She forthrightly says, "Lacan's theory of language itself is also inaccurate".¹²³ Like Saussure she reasserts the relationship of the signifier to the signified and is unwilling to accept the idea that the signifier has more power or a higher place in the dual relationship. She writes that "Language is as much signified as signifier. It depends for its actual effects as much on the forms of life it reflects as on those it constitutes".¹²⁴ And unlike Lacan she refuses to accept a dehistoricised version of language. She argues that language is affected by history and by its changing usage within communities. In her second criticism, she accuses him of "displacing interrelational issues onto language"¹²⁵ instead of working with the relationship between mother and infant. The nature of language in Lacan's psychoanalysis sees humans as "essentially split and alienated precisely because needs must be articulated (in language)" to another,¹²⁶ and this split includes children who must also express their needs in language; so what "he wishes to deny [is] that splitting has anything to do with 'effects' of 'real dependency'".¹²⁷ Lacan sees the subject as determined by two things: the other (upon which one must depend) and language. Any arguments that might be made against his theory on the basis of gender or power structures or ideology are protected by his reliance upon language. For he has displaced "the focus of analysis from social relations and relations of power to the supposedly universal/ahistoric structure and effects of the logic of language".¹²⁸ And in the end, "The structure of Lacan's theory confirms the postmodernist claim that universalist concepts conceal acts of domination and that binary oppositions are inseparable from implicit or explicit hierarchies".¹²⁹

¹²² *Thinking Fragments*. p. 91.

¹²³ *Ibid*, p. 104.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 95.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 96.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 101.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*.

Metonymy in a Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Jude

In her book *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice*, Elizabeth Wright says, "The new psychoanalytic structural approach centres on the workings of the texts as psyche, based on the theory that the unconscious is structured like a language".¹³⁰ While there have been valid criticisms against this structuring of the unconscious, it may still be possible to use some of the principles which were explicated under this rubric. But this must involve an attempt to keep away from a totalizing deterministic structure. As this thesis should make obvious, psychoanalysis is not the "right" or "only" way to read a text. Rather it is one way that offers one set of insights regarding language, the way people understand it, and its relationships to itself and to the world. When the literary critic Peter Brooks constructed a psychoanalytic method for examining texts, he proposed several keys. These were metonymy, metaphor, and repetition. He chose metonymy for reasons that are closely related to both narrative theory (especially the theories of Tzvetan Todorov, Roland Barthes, and Roman Jakobson) and the French psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan.

Metonymy is the trope that relies on juxtaposition, on contiguity for its sense. It is part of the syntax of a text. A typical example of metonymy is often heard on the evening news in the form, "Downing Street said today..." Downing Street has been used metonymically to replace the Prime Minister or (at the time of this writing) John Major. In a section below I will discuss some of the metonymies found in the epistle of Jude. Metonymy is a literary trope, but when Jacques Lacan reinterpreted Freud, he associated the literary trope of metonymy with the psychoanalytic concepts of desire and displacement. Displacement was one of Freud's dream works; it happens when one piece of the dream content takes on more meaning than it would normally have by standing for something which has been censored out of the dream. A minor piece of dream material, a metonymy, may then become the key to interpreting the whole dream.

Metonymy is, in the first instance, a literary trope where one word is used in place of another rather than in comparison with another. It is, as Jacques Lacan called it, a word-to-word trope. The "Beloved", the "faith", the "ungodly," and "this judgment" are all metonymies in the epistle of Jude. The word "Beloved" is a term, a title, that stands in the

¹³⁰ Wright, p. 114.

place of the people addressed. "Beloved" is a metonymy because it replaces the addressees. Instead of the letter being addressed to a church, a group of people, or an individual, it is addressed to the Beloved (where Beloved stands in for the person/s addressed). In the same way "the Beloved" replace the people addressed. This metonymy characterises them not as people, not as saints, but as ones who are loved. Who loves them? V. 1 states that they are loved by God, but does this metonymy also imply that the narrator loves them since it is the narrator who describes them in this way?

Jude, the bond-slave of Jesus Christ and brother of James, has written to the Beloved to exhort them to contend for the faith which was once entrusted to the holy ones (v. 3). In this verse there are two examples of metonymy. "The faith" is a metonymy as are "the holy ones". The "faith" in this verse stands in for an undefined body of doctrines and beliefs which have been given to a group called "the holy ones". Who are these "holy ones"? Are they Christians in general as Bauckham¹³¹ and most commentators suggest or are they perhaps the apostles as Spitta¹³² recommends? Or do the words "the holy ones" refer to the Beloved? This is another example of a term, the holy ones, standing in place of a group of people. If this term was meant to refer to the Beloved, the ones who are loved of God, kept, and called, Jude could have used *ὑμῖν* or the title he had used previously – "Beloved". Rather than urging them to fight for something which had been given directly to "you", he asks them to fight for something given to "the holy ones", a category which the Beloved may or may not fit into. Here, the metonymy in the text leaves open the identity of the holy ones in such a manner that the metonymy distances the "you" from the description "holy ones". The holy ones may or may not be the reader of the text, the "you" of the text, the people who should be contending for the faith. But the "holy ones" is a metonymy for a group of people whether the Beloved belong to it or not.¹³³

The word "ungodly" in v. 4 is another example of metonymy. This is another word standing for a group of people. Who are these "ungodly?" The reader may make a metonymic connection between

¹³¹ *Jude*, p. 33.

¹³² *Judas*, pp. 309-400.

¹³³ As I noted in the chapter on reader response, the beloved are not referred to in the greeting as "holy ones", but as beloved, kept, and called. This is slightly noteworthy since a number epistles do begin with a greeting to the holy ones (Rom.; I and II Cor.; Eph.; Phil.; Col.;).

the ungodly and those who slipped in secretly, but the text will go on to add signifier to signifier and the reader will assimilate these and build up a metaphoric paradigm (Lacan's signifying chain) as part of an attempt to fill the signifier "ungodly" with meaning. This is a demonstration of the ways in which metaphor and metonymy are both similar and different and of how they bring meaning to each other. As a metonymy on its own, the word ungodly is simply a strong word to replace the long-winded word "those who slipped in secretly". It is through the metaphors that follow that the metonymy "ungodly" is given a broader sense. This first mention of the ungodly in v. 4 pushes the narrative forward toward a metaphoric, paradigmatic understanding of the ungodly. In order to understand who these "ungodly" are the reader must continue to read and accumulate signifiers through the comparisons made in the text.

As has been demonstrated, metonymy can be used of things as well as people. In v. 3 Jude asks the Beloved to contend for the "faith". The word – here faith – is standing for a set of doctrines or beliefs which is held by a community.¹³⁴ "The faith" does not define for the reader what those doctrines are, and it is only as the reader continues to read and add metaphors to this metonymy that some ideas regarding "the faith" emerge. Again, the metonymy pushes the reader forward in order to find more words which will help the reader make sense.

Jude writes to the Beloved to urge them to contend for the faith against certain men who have slipped in secretly. He describes them as "those who were long ago written into (publicly proclaimed in) *this judgment*, ungodly men who change the grace of our God into licentiousness and deny the only master and our lord Jesus Christ" (v. 4). What is "this judgment?" Bauckham presents the three most common options for interpreting "this" judgment. First, it has been suggested that τοῦτο refers back to an understood or implied judgment upon churches where false teachers have appeared. Second, it has been suggested that τοῦτο refers forward to the rest of v. 4, and is a statement

¹³⁴ It is not relevant how fully developed this set of concepts is. Some commentators have argued for a later date for the epistle based on the use of the word faith here (Sidebottom, Biggs) while others like Cranfield have wanted to make a clear distinction between "the faith" of the church and a later "wooden theological organisation" of the church. But these distinctions are not important at the moment. It is simply necessary to note that "the faith" is a metonymy standing for some larger body of undefined traditions which can probably be associated with the apostles in v. 20.

of the sin which the ungodly have committed – namely changing God's grace into licentiousness and denying Jesus Christ. Third, it has been suggested that τοῦτο refers forward to either all or part of vv. 5-15. But none of these suggestions is completely satisfactory, as Bauckham demonstrates. The first suggestion is “unnatural”. The second one is rather weak because although it takes into consideration κρίμα (explaining it as the charge against the ungodly) it fails on two other counts. It does not explain how the judgment leads to punishment, nor does it take into account the previous words – “long ago written into” (or “publicly proclaimed”). The third explanation is, perhaps, the most feasible; although, as Bauckham states, the referent for τοῦτο is a long way off.¹³⁵ The difficulty is that “this judgment”, into which the ungodly were written, is not written anywhere except here. What follows is not a (singular) judgment, but a conglomeration of accusations and judgments from a variety of sources. But there is another possibility. “This judgment” could be a metonymic reference to the epistle the narrator is writing. A reference which he supports by claiming that long ago they, the ungodly men, were written into (or publicly proclaimed in, cf. Gal. 3:1) this judgment. This judgment, this epistle, was fore-ordained. “This judgment” is the judgment of the epistle against the ungodly. If “this judgment” is a metonymy for the epistle, then the narrator is making a basic claim about his authority to pronounce an official judgment against these people. And the reader is again pushed forward to discover just exactly what “this judgment” is going to entail.

These last few paragraphs have demonstrated the literary use of metonymy by showing the way that a specific word stands for whole groups of people, sets of tradition, or even an epistle. Lacan, as was stated earlier, associates metonymy with desire. He says at the end of his essay “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud” that desire *is* a metonymy. Lacan asserts that desire is expressed in and structured by language. Metonymy is, in Lacan's terms, Freudian displacement; or, in Jakobson's terms, metonymy is the trope related to syntax – the trope of substitution and contiguity.¹³⁶ The

¹³⁵ *Jude*, pp. 36-37.

¹³⁶ Roman Jakobson. “The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles.” *Contemporary Critical Theory*. Ed. Dan Latimer. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. For a helpful comment on Lacan's understanding and use of Roman Jakobson see Anthony Wilden's essay “Lacan and the Discourse of the Other” (pp. 244-45).

question then becomes how is desire expressed in the language of the epistle of Jude, and what does Jude's desire displace? This may seem an innocent question, but desire itself in relationship to texts presents a particular problem. Texts or objects do not desire. Only subjects can desire. The epistle of Jude contains desire both explicitly expressed in the text and implicitly implied by the writing of the epistle. This leaves several possibilities; either the desire that is expressed in the text comes from the author who wrote it or it is inscribed in the narrator or it is posited by the reader. But it does not need to be an either/or choice. Different conceptualisations of desire are possible. Desire is not a monolithic concept, but rather one which has been redefined and reworked to suit different contexts. In an earlier section of this chapter, the desire of the narrator has already been discussed. Here that discussion will be furthered and explored in more depth. But the relationship of the author to desire will be explored in more depth in the chapter to come.

After the greeting, where the narrator identifies himself, he writes, *πάσαν σπουδὴν ποιούμενος γράφειν ὑμῖν περὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας ἀνάγκην ἔσχον γράψαι ὑμῖν παρακαλῶν...* There is some room for different translations of this phrase, as the English versions demonstrate,¹³⁷ but what is most noticeable is that whether Jude broke off something he had already begun, or whether he wrote on a different subject than he would have liked to have written, he writes out of necessity. He writes because he must. He is compelled, driven, to write, to tell, to enunciate a message. His desire becomes even more evident in v. 5 where he uses the verb *βούλομαι* – I wish, I will, I desire. What he desires is that “you” (the Beloved) be reminded or remember.

The narrator desires that “you” participate with him in his memories. In psychoanalytic terms this is the desire which the analysand has in the transference toward the analyst. The analysand wants the analyst to share his or her memories, speech, and feelings. The analysand wants the analyst to share and return his or her feelings

¹³⁷ Some translations take the participle as a temporal participle “While I was making every effort to write to you about our common salvation, I felt the necessity to write to you...” (NASB) and others translate it as a circumstantial participle “Although I was very eager to write to you about the salvation we share, I felt I had to write...” (NIV).

about the relationship between them.¹³⁸ But Lacan asserts that the very act of describing "I" in language forces the analysand to recognize "that this being [I] has never been anything more than his construct in the imaginary".¹³⁹ The subject is speaking in vain because it is impossible for "I" to become equal with the desire of the "I". Not only is it impossible for the subject's "I" to equal his own desire, but it is even more impossible for the "I" of the analyst to equal the desire of the analysand. Lacan asserts that this is impossible, but Freud only says that it is undesirable. In his essay on "Transference Love" Freud maintains that it is the duty of the analyst to remain neutral towards the analysand in order to facilitate the analysis.¹⁴⁰ The narrator of *Jude* trusts the "you" whom he posits as trustworthy by presenting them in a favourable light. They are beloved of God, guarded by Christ, and called (v. 1). The narrator wants this group of people to share his own view of the world, of the faith and salvation that they have in common, and particularly he wants them to share his ideas about the "these" and about the constructs he makes to judge the "these". Jude tries to enlist the help of the Beloved by arguing that they should contend for the faith (even as he is doing by writing to them). Jude's desire that the Beloved participate in the transference rather than remaining neutral or indifferent helps to drive the text forward. In Lacanian terms desire pushes the text forward because it is never satisfied. The narrator can only desire what he cannot have and by speaking of his own desire, he displaces and splits himself.

So, what does desire displace? If one desires something (an object, a person, etc.) it is because one does not have what one desires. Desire is "the revelation of a void".¹⁴¹ Jude desires to write. He says that it is

¹³⁸ Sigmund Freud. "The Dynamics of Transference." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. v. 12. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1958, pp. 103-4.

¹³⁹ "The Function and Field of Speech and Language." *Ecrits*. p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ "Dynamics." pp. 165-66.

¹⁴¹ Anthony Wilden. "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other." *Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*. Ed. Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968, p. 193. Deleuze and Guattari in their book *Anti-Oedipus*. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. London: Athlone Press, 1977, have made important objections to this understanding of desire. "In a word, when the theoretician reduces desiring-production to a production of fantasy, he is content to exploit to the fullest the idealist principle that defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production, of 'industrial' production" (p. 26). Deleuze and Guattari point out the manipulative nature of characterising desire as lack, but I am not convinced that the model of desiring production that they present as an alternative is helpful either. It seems to work

necessary for him to write. He felt compelled to do so. What void does this point to? His desire to write and his appeal for the Beloved ones to contend for the faith shows that the reality which he desires to be real (i.e. a strong, vibrant, unweakened faith) is not the reality which exists. He writes because his desire reveals the presence of a void, or as Lacan puts it: his desire "reveals the presence of an absence of a reality".¹⁴²

Jude desires more than simply to write. Jude also desires his readers to remember (v. 5). This desire that his readers remember fills another void – the void of forgetfulness. But here there are two tensions. He wants his readers to remember what they have forgotten, and he claims that they shouldn't have any trouble remembering. The RSV translation says of the readers, "you were once for all fully informed..." (v. 5). In my own translation, I have translated this passage as "you having known all things". This is the first tension: they already know, so they cannot have forgotten, thus Jude cannot remind them. He is creating a task for himself which does not need to be accomplished. There is a second tension: what he desires others to remember is his own construction. It is his memory. By creating and writing down his own memory which does not directly correspond to any other history or memory, he creates a situation in which the "all knowing" readers cannot remember what they have never known. In the end, Jude attempts to satisfy his own desire (a desire to make his memory the standard which has been disguised in language as a desire for the Beloved to remember), but he only succeeds in setting up a desire that is eternally displaced because his readers will never be able to remember his memory. His readers will never be able to meet the goal which Jude has set for them.¹⁴³ Because desire is a metonymy it has a contiguous relationship with the context. It needs context to make sense. Jude's desire to write and to encourage his readers to remember only becomes clear in the context of the letter where he points to the very void that he desires to change. He desires to change the void of weakened faith by salvation and mercy towards some (v. 23), but he succeeds only in sharing his desire for a reality that is not yet present.

within a particular political framework that may or may not be viable in any given location.

¹⁴² Wilden, p. 193.

¹⁴³ For a close reading of the text which explicates this point further, please see the earlier chapter on Reader Response.

Desire is a metonymy, and both desire as well as the examples of literary metonymy demand a context in order to make meaning. This demand for a context drives the text forward toward the next step in literary and psychoanalytic interpretation. The context metonymy finds itself in is not one of simple, unquestioned interpretation. Once a metonymy has been recognised, the next step is to locate metaphor. For metonymy and metaphor are two pieces of a spectrum and they do not make sense when they are separated from each other. They are distinct and yet intertwined in the process of interpretation. They share the same context and help to make sense of one another. Metonymy is understood as part of the syntax of a context, but metaphor is understood by its relationships of similarity and difference in a context. Together metonymy and metaphor help to create interpretation/s of words, phrases, and texts.

Metaphor in Psychoanalytic Interpretation

Metaphor relies on a comparison between two items, a comparison based on similarity.¹⁴⁴ The comparisons evoked by a metaphor help to set up a paradigm for understanding the subject referred to. When Lacan reinterpreted Freud's dreamwork condensation, he likened it to the literary trope of metaphor.¹⁴⁵ Because metaphor is a condensation, the interpretation of metaphor is dependent on expansion. Often, it will command evidence for its meaning from intertextual sources. In the psychoanalysis of a person, meaning would be acquired through the technique of free association, but lacking a person, intertextual threads of meaning will have to replace the technique of free association. Freud says about condensation in *The Interpretation of*

¹⁴⁴ Peter Brooks spends several pages talking about the purpose of metonymy in narrative, but he does not say much about metaphor once he has relegated it to the poetic genre. Jakobson, in discussing the disorder aphasia, splits metaphor and metonymy into binary oppositions. This split is often followed by later critics without considering how closely the tropes of metaphor and metonymy are related. While Jakobson sets them up as opposites, they are opposites on a pole. See Jakobson's book *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning*. trans. John Mepham. Hassocks: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978. They are opposing ends of a spectrum. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make a helpful distinction between metaphor and metonymy when they remark, "[m]etonymy serves some of the same purposes that metaphor does, and in somewhat the same way, but it allows us to focus more specifically on certain aspects of what is being referred to" (*Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 37) because it stands in place of the object rather than setting up a comparison. It is the substantive nature of metonymy which emphasises its relation to syntax and desire.

¹⁴⁵ Lacan, "Agency of the Letter", p. 160; Wilden, pp. 245-7.

Dreams, "As a rule one underestimates the amount of compression that has taken place...if the work of interpretation is carried further it may reveal still more thoughts concealed behind the dream".¹⁴⁶ The use of intertextuality in the psychoanalytic study of texts can replace the technique of free association which psychoanalysis so heavily depends upon in the analytical relationship. Lacan's ideas about the sliding of the signifier under the signified can be found in his article "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud", but his discussion of signifying chains and their intertextual use is very brief. I have supplemented his work with intertextual theories.¹⁴⁷ Julia Kristeva in her essay "Word, Dialogue, and Novel" discusses Mikhail Bakhtin's approach to texts. She describes the relationship as "each word (text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read...any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is an absorption and transformation of another".¹⁴⁸ George Landow moves the discussion into another area when he discusses "hypertext", a term associated with computers and particularly relevant to this study in which many (though not all) of the intertexts were located using computer software such as MacBible and AcCordance. He describes textuality using words like "link, node, network, [and] web" that describe the interaction of words instead of asserting a fixed definition.¹⁴⁹ Roland Barthes talks about this kind of text and the type of interpretation that it entails. He says, "To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what *plural* constitutes it".¹⁵⁰ This multiple, plural understanding of intertextual theory is useful for creating an intertextual expansion of the metaphors in Jude. What is condensed in the comparisons, the similes and metaphors of Jude?

Although the book is being driven forward by Jude's desire, it is at the same time forming a paradigm of comparisons based on simile and metaphor. The epistle of Jude has a large proportion of metaphors in

¹⁴⁶ p. 383.

¹⁴⁷ These are drawn from the works of Julia Kristeva, George Landow, Judith Still and Michael Worton, and Roland Barthes.

¹⁴⁸ Julia Kristeva. "Word, Dialogue, and Novel." *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. Ed. Leon S. Roudiez. Trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 66.

¹⁴⁹ George P. Landow. *Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, p. 3.

¹⁵⁰ Barthes, Roland. *S/Z*. Trans. Richard Miller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 5.

relationship to its brevity, but this is seldom noted in commentators' introductions. Commentators simply explain the metaphors and similes where they appear in the text without commenting on their metaphoric nature (i.e., the tension, the ambiguity and the openness which metaphors create), nor do they comment on the multiplicity of metaphors in this short text. Bauckham argues that the middle section of the letter (which he calls midrash) is simply a lead into the climactic point in vv. 20-23, but even he does not comment on the metaphoric nature of the text, especially at the most obvious points – vv. 5-7 and 11-13.¹⁵¹

The first sentence of Jude begins with a metaphor: "Jude, a bond-servant of Jesus Christ". This is a metaphor which, like all metaphors, opens up the range of meaning in the text. To begin with, Cranfield notes that a bond-servant "is the property of his master".¹⁵² This phrase denotes possession – Jesus Christ possesses Jude. In a tentative clause at the end of his comment, Cranfield adds that the phrase may also be a reference to Jude's "special office", whatever that office is. Bauckham goes further and notes in his commentary the similarity this phrase (which is used elsewhere in the New Testament) has with the Hebrew phrase "the servant of God" which is used in reference to patriarchs, kings, and prophets.¹⁵³ Bauckham then connects the Hebrew and Greek phrases (in what Lacan would call a signifying chain) in order to extract the meaning of authority, a kind of authority to which the addressees of the letter would listen. The metaphor, a bond-servant of Jesus Christ, is able to say and mean more than a literal statement because it draws on a broad context of signification and relates on multiple levels. The whole chain of signification and the attached contexts from both the New Testament and the Hebrew Bible are residual in the signifier "bond-servant" in the epistle of Jude. This includes connotations of possession, serving, and trusted authority.

¹⁵¹ All of the commentators note the similes and metaphors that arise in the text as is evidenced by their use of language such as "compared" (Reicke, pp. 206-207; Moffatt, p. 237) and "resemble" (Kelly, p. 266). Bauckham notes the four natural metaphors (p. 87) but then simply explains them without commenting on their function in the text. John Calvin (p. 440) also comments on the metaphoric nature of the text but only briefly. What should be noted is that commentators seek to explain metaphors rather than examine their function in a text. J. D. Charles has a very astute examination of the simile in vv. 5-7, and he shows how the whole simile revolves around the theme of judgement, but in the search for a single determining theme, he does not take into account the ambiguity of the text composed of metaphors.

¹⁵² p. 152.

¹⁵³ p. 23.

The very ability of metaphor to expand meaning and to mean in different ways and on different levels keeps a single definitive meaning from emerging. All of the meanings that are available must be considered.

After identifying himself as a servant, urging the Beloved to fight for the faith, and putting forth his judgment against the ungodly, Jude plunges straight into his desire for "you" to remember. At first, it seems that Jude is going to tell a story; but, instead of telling one coherent story, he jumps from one narrative to the next connecting them with similar words (variations of ἀπολείπω) or with comparative conjunctions (ὡς, ὅμοιον). What appears to be a story turns out to be a double simile. The sentence begins at v. 5 and ends at the end of v. 7. Verses 5 and 6 are related to v. 7 as a simile and vv. 5-7 are related to v. 8 as a simile.¹⁵⁴

What is compared? Sodom and Gomorrah are compared to the two stories which come before: first, Jesus saving a people out of Egypt, the second time destroyed those who did not believe; second, the angels who did not keep their principality but abandoned their own habitation, he kept in everlasting bonds under deep gloom for a great judgment day. The cities of Sodom and Gomorrah are likened to the examples which come before. This is demonstrated by the Greek comparative ὡς. The words which follow Sodom and Gomorrah also strengthen the comparative connection between v. 6 and v. 7. It reads...τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τούτοις, "in like manner to these". The "these" (τούτοις) is masculine and therefore cannot refer to the cities which come immediately before since the cities are feminine. The nearest masculine referent are the angels. Sodom and Gomorrah, like the angels, gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh, asserts Jude 7. The comparison gives us new information. We learn something about the angels that we did not know from v. 6 (namely, they gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh), and we learn something about Sodom and Gomorrah that we would not have known solely from v. 7 (namely, they are similar to the angels who did not keep their place and who are now kept in bonds and darkness).

¹⁵⁴ Simile is very closely related to metaphor. Just as synecdoche is part of the trope of metonymy, simile is part of the trope of metaphor. But simile is, obviously, more tentative than metaphor since the comparison is joined using comparatives (like or as) rather than equated using the verb "to be".

What does this simile mean? This has been the debate between commentators for a long time. Part of this debate has centred around how, or whether, the angels share with Sodom and Gomorrah the same accusations of giving themselves up to fornication and following after other flesh. Bauckham, along with Kelly and Cranfield, suggests that the angels and the people of Sodom and Gomorrah were the same because both groups went after "other flesh". The angels desired human females and the Sodomites desired angels. Thus, both groups were guilty of wanting to have sexual intercourse with beings outside of their own kind.¹⁵⁵ Some commentators have compared the verses and seen a likeness of judgments rather than of faults or errors¹⁵⁶ because, like Calvin, Reicke takes "in like manner to these" to refer to the cities around Sodom and Gomorrah instead of as a referent to the angels.¹⁵⁷ Other commentators are even more specific than the text about the nature of the crime committed by the Sodomites and the angels. Bigg implies that the error of Sodom was homosexuality but then can only point out that the sin of the angels cannot be the same.¹⁵⁸ Kistemaker says that the error of the angels and the error of Sodom cannot be equated as Bauckham has equated it because the men of Sodom were not desiring "other flesh" or "angels" but men, for, in Genesis 19, they said to Lot, "Where are the *men* who came to you tonight?" He then goes on to state that the error in Sodom was homosexuality, but he does not show how this is similar to the preceding verses.¹⁵⁹ All of these commentators try to decide what the simile in the text means (and what particular error was committed by both groups), but none of them go beyond commenting on the referent of "these" to talk about the metaphoric nature of the text. Once they have decided whether "these" refers either to the angels or to the cities around Sodom and Gomorrah, they continue on their interpretative way.

¹⁵⁵ Bauckham, p. 54.


¹⁵⁶ Reicke, p. 199 and Grundmann, p. 35, who sees only a loose connection between the judgment of the angels and Sodom and Gomorrah.

¹⁵⁷ As noted above this is a difficult way to interpret the passage because the referent "these" is masculine in the Greek and must refer to a masculine referent, but the cities are feminine in gender. Calvin gets around this difficulty by saying that "these" refers to the masculine inhabitants of the cities and not to the cities themselves. But this seems unnecessarily conjectural since there is a masculine referent in the earlier part of the sentence in v. 6 – angels.

¹⁵⁸ Bigg, pp. 329-30.

¹⁵⁹ Kistemaker, pp. 381-82.

The question has been, "What does this simile mean"; but perhaps a more helpful one would be, "What does this simile do?" To look at how similes work in psychoanalysis, especially in light of Lacan, one must also know Saussure's work on the signifier and the signified which was discussed earlier. Because the signifier is isolated from the signified by a barrier, the bar, this construct was supposed to "make possible an exact study of the connections proper to the signifier, and of the extent of their function in the genesis of the signified".¹⁶⁰ Finally a science of the sign would be possible. But Lacan has shown that the signifier and the signified are not as isolated from each other as the bar seems to imply. With the following diagram, he illustrates how the signifier enters into and changes the signified.



Having shown quite simply how the signifier (Ladies and Gentlemen) over the signified (two doors), changes the doors into a sign of public urinary segregation, Lacan goes on to say, "We are forced, then, to accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier".¹⁶¹ The signifier above the bar in this picture could have said "doors", but it says "ladies and gentlemen" and this constructs a different meaning from the signifier "doors". The signified is not a stable object as is sometimes supposed but rather changes in relationship to the signifier used to describe it. What do these Lacanian ideas have to do with the difficult similes of Jude 5 to 8? If this is the way that a "simple" signifier/signified relationship works, what happens to the signifier/signified when it is a simile or metaphor? What happens to the signifier/signified when it is not a simple signifier or two, but a whole chain of signifiers linked to and intertwined with another chain of signifiers? It is no longer the simple task, as people have interpreted it in the past, of finding the one meaning of this simile, because not only will the simile have multiple

¹⁶⁰ Lacan, "Agency", p. 149.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 154.

meanings, but the signifiers that make up the simile will have a variety of sliding meanings which contribute to the meanings of the similes.

Let us look once more at vv. 5-7. One of the first words Jude asks the readers to remember in v. 5 is "a people". That is the signifier, but what does it signify? The signifier "a people" is used in many different texts, and it brings with it from those texts a range of meanings from which a reader may choose. In Numbers 22 Balak's messengers say, "Behold, *a people* has come out of Egypt; they cover the face of the earth". A chapter later Balaam describes a people "as a lioness it rises up and as a lion it lifts itself; it does not lie down till it devours the prey, and drinks the blood of the slain". From a different perspective Deuteronomy 4:20 says, "But the LORD has taken you...out of Egypt, to be *a people* for his own possession". Yet again Psalm 95:10 says, "For forty years I loathed that generation and said, they are *a people* who err in heart, and they do not regard my ways". In these different passages "a people" are described as covering the earth, as a lioness, as a devourer, as a possession, and as errant. The signifier "a people" can contain all of these meanings in Jude. The words "a people" are not a single isolated construct but an amalgamation of how the signifier has been used in other contexts. When the reader asks what kind of people were saved out of the land of Egypt, these are some of the answers that may be remembered from other texts. Every signifier has this same ability to slide over its signified and redefine what may have appeared at first to be a simple word.

Jude 5 tells of a people saved out of "the land of Egypt". "The land of Egypt" is another signifier and like "a people" its meaning can shift. Lot describes the Jordan valley in Genesis 13:10 by comparing it favourably with Egypt. He says it is "well watered everywhere like the garden of the LORD, like *the land of Egypt*". And the land of Egypt is again favourably described in Deuteronomy 11:10, "For the land which you are entering to take possession of it is not like *the land of Egypt*, from which you have come, where you sowed your seed and watered it with your feet, like a garden of vegetables". But Egypt is also described as "the house of bondage" (Deut. 13:5; Jer. 34:13; Micah 6:4) and as a land that will be or was devastated by "great judgment" (Exod. 7:4), "plague" (Exod. 12: 13), "fire" (Jer. 43:12), "sword, famine, and pestilence" (Jer. 44: 13). The references create a tension in the mind of

the reader. What kind of land is Egypt? It is both a land of plenty and a place of bondage and judgments. The plurality of intertextual meaning/s becomes part of the interpretation of the text. Once again the signifier is sliding.

Verse 6 begins with angels – those messengers so often associated with the divine – but angels can also have different appearances. There are the angels of the Old and New Testaments, and there are the angels of the pseudepigraphical and apocalyptic literature. Even before the texts are brought to bear, there is an issue of translation which complicates the signifier/signified relationship. The word for angel in both the Greek and Hebrew languages can also have another meaning – messenger. This meaning does not necessarily imply any association with divinity. But in English the word “angel” is separated from the word messenger and generally carries separate connotations as well. If someone is called an angel in English, they are most likely being referred to as someone who brings good news or who is a kind person, but in Greek or Hebrew this same reference may simply mean that they are a bearer of a message whether that message be either good or bad, from God, from another person, or from another spiritual being. So, from the beginning the word “angels” in this text has the possibility of representing several different signifieds. They could be human messengers like those in Numbers 20:14 where Moses sent messengers (מלאכים) from Kadesh to the king of Edom, or they could be beings belonging to God as in Ps. 103:20, “Bless the LORD, O you his angels (מלאכיו)”. Angels can also be destroyers as in Ps. 78:49, “He let loose on them his fierce anger, wrath, indignation, and distress, a company of destroying angels (מלאכי רעים)”. New Testament angels are seen praising God in Luke 2:13 and are called heavenly hosts. The pseudepigrapha talks about angels extensively. There are bad angels who took human wives. In I Enoch 6:2-6 “...the *angels*...said to one another: “Come, let us choose us wives from among the children of men and beget us children...And they...descended in the days of Jared...” These angels were called the Watchers. Jubilees 4:15 says, “...for in his [Jared's] days the angels of the Lord descended to the earth, those who are named the Watchers, that they should instruct the children of men, and that they should do judgment and uprightness on the earth”. These Watchers were tormented, but not all of the

angels are watchers. II Baruch 56:10-16 tells yet another version of the story where the angels are distinguished from each other:

For he [the darkness of darkness] became a danger to his own soul: even to the angels became he a danger. For moreover, at that time when he was created, they enjoyed liberty. And some of them descended, and mingled with the women. And then those who did so were tormented in chains. But the rest of the multitude of the angels, of which there is (no) number, restrained themselves. And those who dwelt on the earth perished together (with them) through the waters of the deluge....

The word for angels has a range of meanings from human messengers to good or bad heavenly beings to destroyers.

Verse 7 is not a continuation of the story about angels but instead is a comparison between these angels and Sodom and Gomorrah – “Sodom and Gomorrah and those cities around in like manner to these gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh”. What is the signified of which Sodom and Gomorrah are the signifier? Do Sodom and Gomorrah signify destruction and desolation as they do in Deuteronomy 29:22? “All its land is brimstone and salt, a burning waste, unsown and unproductive, and no grass grows in it, like the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah.” Or are they proud proclaimers of their sin as in Isaiah 3:9? Or is it a reference to the poison and bitterness of Sodom and Gomorrah (Deut. 32:32)? Is the reader only to remember that the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah have been the stereotype for destruction in the Hebrew Bible, while they forget that the cities have also been promised restored fortunes by the prophet Ezekiel 16:53-55?¹⁶²

Here we have a small collection of sliding signifiers and signifieds. What “people”? Which “land of Egypt” or “angels”? What do Sodom and Gomorrah signify? I have not given overly extensive signifying chains for these signifiers. There are many more associations both from the Bible as well as from other literature ancient and modern. I limited myself to the Hebrew Bible for reasons of time and space and in light of the obvious relationship between Jude’s signifiers and Hebrew Bible signifiers. A more thorough use of intertextuality is made in the

¹⁶² Many of the thoughts in this paragraph have been influenced by the work Mark Love and I did together to prepare our joint paper “Green Texts: Recycling in Jude and Zechariah”. Presented in Budapest at International SBL, July 1995.

following section that addresses metaphor in the context of other literary theories including psychoanalysis. Although I have not created a giant signifying chain, the chains which I have constructed raise some questions in regard to simile. How are the pluralities of signification put together in a simile, especially one as extended as that which is being examined here? It can function on three levels. First, it shows that Jude's desire for the Beloved to remember will not be easily accomplished. Second, it calls into question the relationship between the two items compared. If the signifieds are not clear points of meaning as is often thought, then is their relationship to each other clear? Third, it can liberate the reader to create her own meaning/s for the similes in the text, or to make multiple meanings for the simile in the text.

"Jesus was saving a people (who were numerous, who had the attributes of a lioness, who were possessed and loathed by God) out of the Land of Egypt (which was both well watered and cursed), the second time he destroyed those who were not believing, and the angels (humans or destroyers or heavenly beings or watchers) not keeping their principality but abandoning their own habitation, he kept in everlasting bonds under gloom for a great judgment day as Sodom and Gomorrah (which was destroyed, which proclaimed its sin, which is poison and bitterness, which will be restored) and those cities around in like manner to these (the angels) gave themselves up to fornication and followed after other flesh, suffering by eternal fire was set forth as a just example."¹⁶³

This simile contributes to a psychoanalytic reading of Jude through its use of Freud's dreamwork of condensation. It is the expansion of the metaphor or simile which brings more meaning/s. Both psychoanalytic criticism and intertextual theory contribute to expanding the meaning which a simile or metaphor may have.

Must I tell you Again? Repetition in the Epistle of Jude

The third idea that Peter Brooks emphasised besides metonymy and metaphor was repetition. Brooks observes that Freud posited his theory "beyond the pleasure principle" on the basis of his observation that patients repeated and remembered unpleasant and painful events

¹⁶³ Obviously, I have not examined all of the signifiers which could slide because then I would have to look at each word, but this gives a flavour of what happens when the sliding of the signifier is recognised while reading a text.

and that "working through" those events meant treating them as though they were present events *even though they were painful and did not produce pleasure*. In other words, repetition and remembering were important for patients, and this observation in relationship to the psychoanalysis of texts means that one of the key items to look for in a psychoanalytic textual analysis is repetition. Brooks notes that repetition in literary texts is part of our experience. He writes:

rhyme, alliteration, assonance, meter, refrain, all the mnemonic elements of fictions and indeed most of its tropes are in some manner repetitions that take us back in the text, which allow the ear, the eye, the mind to make connections between different textual moments...¹⁶⁴

Jude has a great deal of repetition both of words and also, to some extent, of form. This is best seen in the repetition of the pronouns. *ὕμεις* and its derivatives are used eleven times; *ἡμεῖς* and its derivatives are used seven times; and *οὗτοι* is used six times. Other words are also repeated. Prominent among these is the repetition of *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* five times, *τηρέω* and its conjugations five times, *κύριος* and its derivatives seven times, and *ἀσθεῖς* and its derivatives four times. Other types of criticism also note repetition, but what makes it important for the psychoanalytic critic? In the essay "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through", Freud highlights the role of repeating in remembering. He writes, "As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering".¹⁶⁵ This repetition becomes the analyst's means of identifying the patients' symptoms along with their resistances to treatment, and it becomes the means by which the analyst can lead the patients to name the resistance and begin to "work-through" it to remembering and eventually changing. Repeating (or acting-out) is a basic form of memory which is attempting to remember while manoeuvring around the conflict between the conscious and the repressed.

So, texts, including Jude, may repeat, but what do they reveal when they do? One of the ways to assess this is to look at how each repetition changes. In a visual analogy, a textual repetition does not have to

¹⁶⁴ Brooks, "Freud's Masterplot", p. 287.

¹⁶⁵ Sigmund Freud. "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Trans. James Strachey. v. 12. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1958, p. 150.

come full circle; it may be a spiral that is going somewhere – working through some issue.¹⁶⁶ Because the repetition of pronouns in this text is so prominent, the study of repetition can begin there. The second and first person plural pronouns are introduced early in the book (vv. 2 and 3 respectively). The book begins by addressing those to whom it is directed. These people are loved in God the father and kept in Jesus Christ, and it is this “you” who are loved and kept whom Jude blesses by saying “may mercy and peace and love be multiplied to *you*” (v. 2). The text immediately goes on to further equate those who are loved with the “you”. Jude writes, “Beloved, while making all diligence to write to *you*...” (v. 3). Jude then goes on to identify himself with the *you* by the phrase “concerning *our* common salvation” (v. 3). After associating himself with the Beloved, he goes on to say, “I felt it was necessary to write exhorting *you* to contend for the faith given once for all to the saints” (v.3). In these first two verses where “you” and “we” appear, the emphasis is on the state in which they already are. They are Beloved (of God). They are kept. They hold a salvation in common with the writer. They are called to a common cause – a cause in which they will fight against people who change the grace of *our* God into licentiousness and who deny the one master and *our* lord Jesus Christ (v. 4). This is the “you” to whom Jude addresses his desire to remember. “But I want *you* to remember” (v. 5). And another characteristic is added to the “you”. The “you” are omniscient: “you having known all things” (v. 5). The “you” have every right to be confident since they are in God and all knowing, but already a tinge of uncertainty has been thrown into this picture of the you. Verse 4 begins “certain men slipped in secretly...” If the “you” were all knowing, then they would be aware of these men; they would not have been able to slip in without them noticing. The certain position of the “you” begins to be called into question by their failure to recognise these men who have slipped in secretly; later, their position is further jeopardised by their failure to remember the events which Jude goes on to describe in the body of the letter. The “you” are not omniscient; they

¹⁶⁶ Prof. Cheryl Exum gives an example of this in an essay “Who’s Afraid of ‘The Endangered Ancestress’?” in her book *Fragmented Women: Feminist (Sub)versions of Biblical Narratives*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993, pp. 148-169. Exum examines the repetition in Genesis of the stories of the ancestress in danger and shows how the final version is a resolution to some of the earlier tensions in the first two versions of the story. She writes, “There is a compulsive need to repeat the story until the conflict is resolved” (p. 169).

are human as well. When the letter opened the "you" were beloved by God the father and kept by Jesus Christ; but, when the letter closes, the "you" (the Beloved) are instructed to "keep themselves in the love of God while waiting for the mercy of our lord Jesus Christ into eternal life" (v. 21). What looked like a sure position in the beginning, turned out to be a position they must determine for themselves and keep themselves in. It is a position they must work to keep and maintain.

In contrast to the "you" are the "these". The "you" are to compare the "these" to the events remembered in the text. The "these" first occur in v. 8 with the words, "Yet in like manner also *these* dreamers defile the flesh, deny lordship and blaspheme glories". And there seems, at first, to be a very clear division between the "you" and the "these". For v. 10 continues "these blaspheme what they do not know..." But in v. 12 the "you" and the "these" come into closer contact. The "these" are stains (or rocks) in *your* love feasts (v. 12). After this verse the separation widens once again. The "these" are grumblers who find fault, following their own lusts (v. 16). The next paragraph, however, contains a mixture with a new element (new and improved pronouns). "You" occurs in vv. 17 and 18 in stark contrast to the "these" of v. 19 followed by another "you" in v. 20. But after v. 20 the "you" and the "these" die out and are replaced by "yourselves" (for you) and some (for others). Or even more noticeably the second person pronoun is dropped completely in favour of a second person verb form where the second person pronoun is understood. In order for the "you" to get the position they want, they must recognise some (at least a portion) of the "these" (the Other) and either have mercy upon them, save them, or both. The "these" also change, for they argue and doubt (v. 22) and may perhaps be saved. For this to happen, they can no longer be people who have slipped in secretly. In the penultimate paragraph, all of the pronouns must undergo some change which involves self-realisation in order to experience mercy and salvation. The protected "you" must lose some of their protection, and the self assured (v. 12) "these" must face doubt and fire. The repetition in the epistle is both repeating and working through the position which belongs to the "you" and to the "these".

The Playground Game Demonstrated with Metaphor

It is this way with all of us concerning language: we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.

Friedrich Nietzsche 167

It is difficult, these days, to answer the question “what is metaphor?” Aristotle only needed a few pages to explain that it was the process by which the name that belongs to one thing is given to another,¹⁶⁸ and in those few pages he articulated the substitution theory which is still prominent in most ideas of metaphor today. On the other hand, modern scholars have written whole monographs on the topic, and still have difficulty finding a rule or explanation that suits every situation.¹⁶⁹

One of the pronounced difficulties of interpreting metaphor is deciding what is literal and what is figurative. Many people who have studied metaphor have said that it works on two levels. It has a literal and a figurative level of meaning. But Mieke Bal writes, “Attempts to distinguish firmly between literal and figurative meanings of expressions have routinely been challenged by writers who could demonstrate the figurativity in the literal expression”.¹⁷⁰ And anyway what does it mean to say that something is literal? Owen Barfield erases any simplistic understanding of literalness when he writes, “...nouns ...do not in fact correspond with real and wholly material entities....In this factual sense there is indeed no such thing as

¹⁶⁷ “On Truth And Lies.” *Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870’s*. Ed. and Trans. Daniel Breazeale. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 82-3.

¹⁶⁸ *Poetics*, p. 2332.

¹⁶⁹ See Max Black. *Models and Metaphor*. Ithica: Cornell UP, 1962; Eva Kittay. *Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987; J. J. A. Mooij. *A Study of Metaphor: On the Nature of Metaphorical Expressions, with Special Reference to Their Reference*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976.

¹⁷⁰ Mieke Bal. “Metaphors He Lives By.” *Semeia* 61 (1993), p. 186.

literalness".¹⁷¹ We have only words, and words themselves are signs (symbols) as Saussure pointed out at the beginning of this century. Signs cannot correspond exactly with the things they represent. As Nietzsche said, "...we possess nothing but metaphors for things - metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities".¹⁷² Despite the difficulty which arises in the very definition and study of metaphor, people continue to ask what it is, how it is recognised, and how it is or can be interpreted.

But, it may be better to begin with other questions. Most people agree that metaphors occur in several kinds, either as nouns, adjectives, or verbs and that, generally, they involve a referential interaction in a context (whether the context is a sentence or a work). With this in mind, Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell suggest that the question should be shifted:

from what is a metaphor (how is one recognized?) to what does the metaphoric process do[? This] is to ask what the cognitive effects of metaphor are. The shift turns us from the writer of metaphor (Aristotle's concern), beyond the text (the meaning theorist's concern), to the reader. This shift, additionally, brings us into line with a modern posture of interpretation theory which affirms the role of the reader in the interpretive process. A reader-reception approach also requires metaphor to be more than a piece of text on a page; it requires a cognitive process view of metaphor.¹⁷³

Readers are essential in any theory of metaphor, but often they are left out in favour of a theory which only attempts to recover the intention of the author.¹⁷⁴ Like Gerhart and Russell, I am interested in asking what metaphors do. And to begin, I want to ask the question, "What do readers know about metaphors?" They know, first of all, that "there is no grammatical feature that distinguishes metaphorical attribution from literal attribution. For example, "grammar makes no distinction between Churchill's calling Mussolini 'That utensil!' and the use of the

¹⁷¹ Owen Barfield. "The Meaning of the Word 'Literal'." *Metaphor and Symbol*. Ed. L. C. Knights and Basil Cottle. London: Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1960, p. 57.

¹⁷² Nietzsche. *Philosophy and Truth*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁷³ Mary Gerhart & Allan Melvin Russell. "The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor." *Listening* 25 (1990), p. 115.

¹⁷⁴ Robert Fowler has put forward an attempt "to understand the encounter with metaphor in the experience of reading Mark's Gospel" (pp. 175-76).

same phrase in a frying-pan advertisement".¹⁷⁵ Secondly, readers know that metaphors are lies (what Nietzsche would call nonmoral or extramoral lies). Donald Davidson writes, "it is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor and start to hunt out the hidden implication".¹⁷⁶ Thirdly, readers should know, as the last quote noted, that not only are metaphors "lies", but also that the implication of metaphors must be searched out (whether this means found or created is still an open question). If one follows Davidson, as I will attempt to do further in this chapter, then discovering the *meaning* of a metaphor is not difficult, rather the difficult part of interpreting metaphors is the infinite implications which can be developed from their *meaning*. But whether metaphors have *meaning* or implication will be discovered further in this section. So how does one go about searching out *meaning* or implication?

Readers need a text to read. In some ways readers both read and write the text which they read. The task of balancing reader and text is not an easy one. Paul Ricoeur makes a good attempt in *The Rule of Metaphor*. There he indicates that the reader must work to create new meaning. He includes the reader as an essential part of the interpretation without ignoring the difficulties of deciding between literal and figurative interpretations; of knowing the reference for the metaphor; or of using a substitution type of theory.

Ricoeur defines metaphor as "a semantic event that takes place at the point where several semantic fields intersect".¹⁷⁷ Or, to explain more fully, when a reader reads a metaphor and creates a meaning for it, that process is a semantic event. The reader is essential to the semantic event. Without a reader no meaning would be created, and no event would occur. Without the event there would not be a metaphor. It is an event because several meanings are available which overlap and intersect one another. The semantic fields which are meeting each other need a reader to meet in and to create a meaning from them for the text being read.

What readers know about metaphor and Ricoeur's definition of metaphor can both be demonstrated with the following simple and

¹⁷⁵ Paul Ricoeur . *The Rule of Metaphor*. Trans. Robert Czerny. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 252.

¹⁷⁶ Donald Davidson. "What Metaphor Means." *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 258.

¹⁷⁷ *Rule*. p. 98.

common metaphor (if any metaphor can be simple). The lady is a lion. Unless the last sentence is found in a book on wild animals, readers have trouble making sense of this statement as it stands. It is regarded as false (they know the lady is *not* a lion), so they begin to search for meaning in a different manner. Northrop Frye says that the question becomes, "what is the point of saying that A is B when anyone can see that A is not B?".¹⁷⁸ Usually, this question is answered by looking for resemblances between A and B. Perhaps, in this case, "the lady is a lion" means she is courageous or brave, but there are other possibilities as well. It could mean, she has a lot of hair. Or it may mean she is a ruthless killer. It might mean that she stalks her prey silently but effectively, or it could mean that she is a loud, fierce adversary. Then again, it might mean that she roars at her colleagues and frightens them. These are some of the possibilities. It is the reader's responsibility to create meaning/s for the metaphor. This process of making meaning is what a reader does continually when they read words. What makes the process different in the case of metaphor? The way that the text and the reader interact makes it different because, in a unique way, the text asks the reader not to believe it, and this is the very opposite of what a text generally tries to do. In general, a text wants, in fact needs, its reader to accept its statements as true, but metaphor only works when a reader sees that a text is "lying". The task of interpretation can only be accomplished by the reader if the reader assumes that what the text says is not what it means. Rather the reader must create a meaning for the text. Metaphor happens when a multiplicity of meaning possibilities are turned into a meaning or meanings in a semantic event which the reader initiates and controls.

So, one set of questions has been dealt with, namely: what is a metaphor, and is it something found or created by the reader? But there is another set still to come: how do readers interpret metaphor and how are they affected by metaphor? In order to answer these questions, the metaphors of Jude vv. 12-13 will be examined.

These are those reefs/stains/storms feasting together in your love-feasts without fear, shepherding themselves, waterless clouds carried by the winds, barren autumn trees dying twice being plucked up by the roots, wild waves of the sea foaming

¹⁷⁸ Northrop Frye. "The Expanding World of Metaphor." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 53:4 (1985), p. 588.

up their shame, wandering stars for whom the deep gloom
has been kept into eternal darkness. Jude vv. 12-13.

There are at least six metaphors in this sentence: (1) These are stains/reefs...in your love feats. (2) These are shepherding themselves. (3) These are waterless clouds. (4) These are barren autumn trees. (5) These are wild waves of the sea. (6) These are wandering stars. The these are people. We know this from v. 4 which says "certain men slipped in secretly". People are not generally thought of as reefs/stains/storms, waterless clouds, etc. In order to understand this sentence, the reader must decide how to interpret the words in this text and make meaning from them. How does she do this?

If she follows Donald Davidson, as she was for so long tempted to do, the reader would say that metaphors should be interpreted literally. But what does that mean? In a binary system, it means that metaphors do not have a figurative meaning. Metaphors mean what they say they mean. They do not have a literal meaning at one level and then a figurative meaning at another level. They have only one meaning. The these *are* waterless clouds. Or, to use Davidson's example from Genesis, "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters" would mean that the water literally has a face.¹⁷⁹ The thesis of his paper "is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more".¹⁸⁰ But there is a difficulty with this theory. It relies on an "original" or fixed meaning for words (a literal meaning), and indeed Davidson recognises that this is the case; however, he does not seem to see the difficulty of such a claim. However, since Saussure, the majority of linguists have not argued that words have fixed or original meanings. Davidson's suggestions are attractive, but it is difficult to know the "literal", "fixed" or "original" meaning of a word, and this hampers any application of Davidson's theory. At first I thought that I might still be able to use some of his suggestions, but after some reflection, it became clear that much of what he writes depends heavily upon the idea that words have literal meanings. There are still two things which he helpfully pointed out, and which remain useful for this chapter. First, his thoughts on metaphors as lies were both helpful and concise, and

¹⁷⁹ Davidson, p. 248.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 245.

second his clarification of the infinitude of a metaphor's implication is important. Though, I will go on to say that it is really an infinitude of meaning rather than of implications.

On that note, the discussion can turn from Davidson back to Ricoeur with an attempt to discover the "meaning/s" of the metaphors in Jude. It can begin with the first metaphor from Jude 12, "these are reefs/stains/storms in your love feasts". This is a good metaphor to begin with because it contains a word that has multiple dictionary meanings. The Greek word *σπλάς* has several meanings and Liddell and Scott list the word in three separate entries. The first meaning is, "a rock over which the sea dashes" or, Abbot-Smith, "a reef". The second meaning is "a spot or stain". The third meaning is "a storm or squall".¹⁸¹ In some lexical situations, one meaning takes precedence over the others because it more easily fits the context. But here the reader can make all three meanings "make sense" if she so desires. The these are reefs in your love feasts. Or, the these are stains in your love feasts. Or, the these are storms in your love feasts. The reader does not seem to be able to make one of these make more sense than the others. It is not clearly evident that one meaning should be chosen and the others discarded. The lexical context does not provide a limit in this case.

It is at this point that it would be easiest to accept and use Davidson's thesis. Thus, the reader would simply say that the these *are* reefs/spots/storms and leave the meaning at that. The reader would not have to say what those things were and could claim that this whole phrase meant nothing beyond "what it said". It would then be the object of an interpreter to suggest some of the implications which might have been implied by the "meaning" of the metaphor. In this case an interpreter would have a plethora of possibilities simply because of the multiple meanings of the Greek word.

But this would do away with the definition of metaphor which was proposed at the beginning of this section. There it was suggested that a metaphor, as defined by Ricoeur, is a semantic event controlled by the reader that occurs at the place where several semantic fields intersect. It is an event precisely because there is a possibility that new meaning

¹⁸¹ Liddell and Scott suggest that the second meaning is to be taken for the passage in the epistle of Jude. This recommendation is based on the parallel passage is 2 Peter 2:13 and not on any lexical difference in the word itself which would set it apart from any of the other meanings which the word may have.

can be created every time the text is read. It is an event because it is possible for different meanings to happen in the same text. The metaphor is not limited to having only one meaning, a literal meaning, as Davidson says. Ricoeur's definition of metaphor allows for many possibilities. It allows for readers who read a text and see only one meaning for a metaphor, but it also allows for readers who can, and do, hold more than one meaning in mind at a time. So, what might be some of the meanings which a reader could create for this metaphor in Jude, and how does it happen?

One way that it can happen is that a reader simply pauses and asks herself, What does, "the these are..." mean? "The these are reefs in your love feasts." She recognises that the these are not really reefs, so she asks what it might mean to say that they are. This may actually be a very good metaphor for "the these" in light of what the reader knows about them from the rest of the text. Reefs are generally hidden under the sea or just barely poking out of the water; in a similar fashion, the reader knows that the these are hidden. They are people who slipped in secretly among the Beloved (v. 4). Reefs are dangerous places for sailors, and likewise the "these" are a danger to the Beloved as they try to undermine the faith of the Beloved by denying the very things for which they stand (v. 4). A reef or rock sticking out of the sea can be a barrier, and so too the these are described in v. 19 as those who cause divisions.

But *πιλάς* has another meaning. It also means stains, in which case the passage may read, "The these are stains in your love feasts." What could this mean? Again the reader thinks of possibilities. Unlike the reefs in the last paragraph, stains are not secret. Instead, they are generally obvious; they ruin the appearance of clothing or furniture or other things on which they appear, and they are unwanted. Many people try to get rid of stains, but the attempt is not always successful. Stains can remain even after the thing that has caused them has been removed. Will this happen in the case of the Beloved? The "these" can be an obvious stain or blemish in a group that is sharing a love feast together. The Beloved may sustain damage from their contact with people who cause stains. Should the Beloved attempt to remove the stains (and those who cause them) from among themselves? Will the Beloved be damaged or stained by their contact with the "these"?

Still, there is a third meaning for the word *σπιλάς* – “storm”. “The these are storms in your love feast.” Storms cause danger, upheaval, uncertainty, and destruction; they can be violent and unpredictable. This too is a meaning suitable to the epistle. It has been implied that the these are dangerous, for if they were not dangerous the Beloved would not be asked to contend against those who deny the lord and master in vv. 3-4. The presence of the “these” has created a situation of upheaval for the Beloved. No longer is it safe for the Beloved to continue in the love feasts without appraisal of the situation.

Within the context of the epistle of Jude, the reader may be influenced in her choice of meaning by the rest of the epistle. But even context is not always decisive. The first meaning considered was “reef”, and this might seem to work very well as the metaphorical meaning in light of the beginning of the epistle. There, the these were described as a people who slipped in secretly, and this secret or hidden nature might be seen to correspond to the reef metaphor in v. 12. But on further consideration, the third meaning – storm – has just as much claim to be chosen due to context as the meaning reef. For some of the metaphors that follow also conjure up pictures of a storm. The these are trees that are uprooted and they are wild waves of the sea tossed by the wind. These metaphors can be attached to the context of a storm, for violent storms can send trees crashing down and lash the shore with heavy waves. In a similar manner, the meaning stain or spot can also be affirmed in the context of the epistle as a whole. The “these” are committing acts which are described in a bad light. They grumble and find fault and cause divisions (vv. 16, 19). They are compared with the bad example established by Sodom and Gomorrah (vv. 7-8) and are easily described in a way commiserate with the description “stain”.

So, one way a reader can determine meaning is to stop and pause and ask, “what does ‘the these are...’ mean?” She may decide on one meaning. But whatever she decides, if she has considered more than one possibility, then all of those possibilities remain in her mind. Choosing one over the other may marginalise some, but it does not negate them or the possibility that another reader may choose that meaning or a meaning which this reader has not thought of. This is one way that a reader can go about creating meaning for a metaphor. It is a method that relies upon the experience of the reader to provide

meaning at a place in the text where there are a multitude of possibilities not only for the word but for the sentence in which that word is found.

Where does a reader get her experience from? She acquires it by reading texts. And that is another way a reader can create meaning for a metaphor: by intertextual association. By practising a version of this kind of interpretation, the readers who created Liddell and Scott were able to suggest that the best meaning for the word *πιλάς* in Jude is spot or stain. They did this by relating it to a similar word which happens in a similar passage in 2 Peter 2:13. This is the word *πιλός* which does have a denotation of spot or stain.¹⁸² But I am suggesting something more than comparing similar words and similar passages in a way that some dictionaries use to create denotations. What I want to suggest by intertextual association is a process by which the same words are identified in different contexts, and the meanings which the word has in those other contexts are brought by the reader to the text where the word is presently located. In this case, Jude. While it would be nice to use the word *πιλάς* which has been under consideration, that word is a hapaxlegomena. And it is not very frequent in Hellenistic literature either.¹⁸³

The second metaphor which was listed at the beginning of this section on Jude was, "these are shepherding themselves". How does intertextual association work as an interpretive method with this metaphor? Intertextuality relies upon a reader to make connections between the text that is being read and other texts which may have similarities to the text under consideration. In this study Jude will be referred to as the focused text and all other texts brought into the discussion will be referred to as intertexts. Intertextuality is an ahistorical theory which is based on literary relations between texts which are established through readers. The theory is not based on the availability of the intertexts to the author who constructed the focused text.

The word we are looking at occurs in Jude which is part of the New Testament corpus. This verb happens 9 times in the Greek New Testament. Those are 9 different contexts which may influence a reader's understanding of this verb. But the New Testament is not the

¹⁸² Liddell and Scott write, "*πιλάς* spot is prob[able] in view of 2 Ptr. 2:13" (p. 1628).

¹⁸³ TLG lists it as occurring only 117 times in all of its forms.

only, nor even necessarily the best, place to look for intertexts for the book of Jude. The epistle has drawn heavily on examples from the Hebrew Bible. Already in the first 11 verses there has been mention of Sodom and Gomorrah, Moses, Cain, Balaam, and Korah, and there has been a quotation from Zechariah (Jude v. 9).¹⁸⁴ The Hebrew Bible has been one of the major influences on this epistle, and it also provides intertexts for Jude.

This raises a problem. What happens when a reader works between languages? When a reader is working within the Greek New Testament the language is the same, but once the reader turns to the Old Testament different issues of language and translation arise. Which version of the Old Testament should be used? Should a reader try to maintain the use of the same language and so make use of one of the Greek translations of the Hebrew text, such as the LXX? But then the Greek text of Jude may reflect knowledge of both Hebrew and Greek versions of the Old Testament. This would seem to suggest that texts in both languages should be allowed to influence the reader's understanding of Jude. It allows the reader to acknowledge and be aware of both the original language and the language of translation. On one side, Jude is written in Greek and so is the LXX. But, on the other, it is very seldom that a translator always translates the same word in the same way. This is the case for the Greek word ποιμαίνω which was used in the LXX to translate the Hebrew words *העֵר* and *נָהַל*. Another consideration is that the LXX contains both additions and missing pieces in relationship to the Hebrew text.¹⁸⁵ So, it could be invaluable to consult the Hebrew text. This indicates more strongly the influence which both languages may have on the reader. In relationship to translation, I, this reader, am an English speaking person. I have been working from the Greek rather than a particular English translation because this allows me to work with nuances of the words which are hidden or disguised by their translation into English. For, in the end, a translator must pick one word or phrase which she thinks best and allow the other possibilities to remain unstated (an

¹⁸⁴ For more on this subject see the joint paper written by Ruth Anne Reese and Mark Love "Green Texts: Recycling in Jude and Zechariah".

¹⁸⁵ H. B. Swete gives some very interesting information regarding the relationship of the ancient Hebrew text to the ancient Greek versions including the LXX in his work *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*. Cambridge UP, 1902. He speaks of the work of various early translators and text critics who recognised the differences between the Hebrew text and the Greek translations.

exception to this is The Amplified Bible, but this translation is often awkward to read).¹⁸⁶ This coercion to pick a word or phrase with which to accomplish a translation is not limited to English, but also applies to Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible. Working with both Greek and Hebrew allows a reader to be aware of a variety of nuances which may not be available in the English.¹⁸⁷ And, ultimately, it is the reader who is aware of the relationships between words and languages and texts and who connects them to form some meaning for the focused text.

The reader may connect the word ποιμαίνω with a host of other references to shepherding which she remembers from various locations (the Hebrew Bible and the Greek New Testament among them), and those references may influence her understanding of the focused text. This particular word in its verbal form in both Hebrew and Greek is a commonly used metaphor. It happens metaphorically for the first time in Genesis 48:15-16, "Then he blessed Joseph and said, 'may the God before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac walked, the God who has been my shepherd all my life to this day...bless these boys'" (NIV). Just one chapter later this metaphorical usage is enforced. Genesis 49:24, "...his arms [Joseph's] were made agile by the hands of the Mighty One of Jacob (by the name of the Shepherd, the Rock of Israel)" (RSV). Over and over again in the Old Testament ones who shepherd (which is often a substantive participle from רָעָה) are seen caring for both animals¹⁸⁸ and people.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Each of the following English translations reflect one of the nuances of meaning which this word has, but each translation is limited to one word. The NIV translates it as "shepherds who feed only themselves". The NASB translates it as "caring for themselves". The NKJV reads "serving *only* themselves". And the RSV reads, "looking after themselves".

¹⁸⁷ It is probable that the English contains nuances and varieties of meaning which do not occur in the original languages.

¹⁸⁸ This is prominent in Genesis where the ones who shepherd pasture sheep, cattle, and flocks (4:2; 13:7,8; 26:20; 29:7,9; 30:31, 36; 36:24; 37:2, 12, 13, 16; 41:2, 18; 46:32, 34; 47:3) and it happens frequently in other places in the Old Testament. David was shepherding his father's sheep (I Samuel 16:11; 17:15, 34, 40). Job's servants were tending asses (Job 1:14), and in Isaiah "no shepherds will make their flocks lie down there" (RSV 13:20).

¹⁸⁹ There are examples of God as a shepherd of people in Genesis 48:15; Psalm 23:1; Isaiah 40:11 where "flock" is metaphorical for Jerusalem; Jeremiah 3:15; 23:2,4; 31:10 to mention a few; and there are examples of others shepherding people in such passages as Jeremiah 50:6; 2 Samuel 5:2 where the tribes ask David to be their shepherd; 2 Samuel 7:7 which speaks of "the judges of Israel, whom I commanded to shepherd my people Israel" (RSV). These are just some of the passages that speak of God or another person or group of people as ones who shepherd.

These metaphorical uses of the word happen in many different contexts, but the overwhelming similarity between these contexts is their focus either on destruction or restoration. This is especially true in the prophetic portions of the corpus. Some texts use shepherding to depict the kind of destruction that is envisioned. For example Isaiah 13:20 says of Babylon, "It will never be inhabited or dwelt in for all generations; no Arab will pitch his tent there, no shepherds will make their flocks lie down there." Other texts tell of the destruction which happens to either sheep or shepherd/s or both because of evil. This strand of thought runs through the rest of the prophets. Jeremiah 22 says, "The wind shall shepherd all your shepherds, and your lovers shall go into captivity; then you will be ashamed and confounded because of all your wickedness" (Jer. 22:22). Here the very ones who are supposed to be caring for and guiding others are left to be guided by the wind – an element which is changeable and unreliable. This curse is brought on by their wickedness. In the next chapter the following threat is uttered against evil shepherds, "Therefore thus says the LORD, the God of Israel, concerning the shepherds who care for my people: 'You have scattered my flock, and have driven them away, and you have not attended to them. Behold, I will attend to you for your evil doings, says the LORD'" (Jer. 23:2). More examples of the destruction which is personified through shepherds can be seen in Ezekiel 34, Amos 1:2, Nahum 3:18, and Zechariah 11.

But the other dominant context in which metaphorical shepherds are found is the context of restoration. The word restoration implies a certain starting point. It implies that at one time the person or thing that is to be restored held the position to which it is to be returned and then that position was lost for some reason. An example from the history of this country can serve to demonstrate the point. The restoration of Charles II to the English throne after the Civil War and the Regency was only possible because he had a prior recognised claim to the throne, but he didn't have the throne. If he had had the throne there would have been no need for a restoration. In order to be restored to his throne Charles II needed support and guidance from some of the people within his realm. So, restoration involves both the return to a position and the support and guidance needed for such a return. All of these things are seen in references to shepherding in the Hebrew Bible.

Jeremiah 50:19 states this theme of restoration clearly, "I will restore Israel to his pasture, and he shall feed on Carmel and in Bashan, and his desire shall be satisfied on the hills of E'phraim and in Gilead". This care for Israel and for Jerusalem is demonstrated over and over again using the metaphor of a shepherd. In the context of comfort in Isaiah 40, "He [the LORD] will feed his flock like a shepherd, he will gather the lambs in his arms, he will carry them in his bosom, and gently lead those that are with young" (v. 11). Other examples of shepherding in the context of restoration can be seen in Isaiah 49, Jeremiah 31:10-11, Ezekiel 34, and Amos 3:12.

In these contexts of destruction and restoration the most important passage to examine is Ezekiel 34, especially v. 2, since Richard Bauckham suggests that the metaphor in Jude 12 is an allusion to this passage.¹⁹⁰ Bauckham notes that this may be an originating source for the metaphor in Jude 12, but he makes no comment on the affect this might have on the reader. Ezekiel 34 is a strong chapter beginning with words of condemnation against shepherds who feed themselves rather than the sheep. The passage then describes exactly how the shepherds do this. They make their clothes from the wool of the sheep. They eat the fat ones, and they don't feed any of them. They do not care in any way for the sheep – they do not tend the ill or bring back the strays or seek the lost ones. The result was that the flock of sheep was scattered. The prophet says in v. 10 that this will not be allowed to continue; the Lord God will rescue his sheep from the shepherds. Verse 11 continues, "For thus says the Lord God: Behold, I, I myself will search for my sheep, and will seek them out...and I will feed them on the mountains of Israel, by the fountains, and in all the inhabited places of the country" (vv. 11, 13). And finally, after the Lord God has found all the sheep and brought them back to be his flock there will be a judgment. Not this time a judgment of the shepherds, but rather a judgment of the flock. God will judge between one sheep and another and in the end will make David, his prince, their shepherd. In the end the text says, "you are my sheep, the sheep of my pasture, and I am your God, says the Lord God" (v. 31). This is a chapter which moves from strong words of judgment to words of hope and restoration. It is a chapter which moves from shepherds "who have been feeding themselves" (v. 2) to the sheep who belong to God (v. 31).

¹⁹⁰ Bauckham, p. 87.

When a reader reads a text and sees an allusion to another text the whole of that other text (and not just the bit which connects the two) may influence her understanding of the text under consideration. When she reads "these are shepherding themselves" in Jude, she may remember this passage from Ezekiel. It is not that she simply says to herself, "isn't there something like that in Ezekiel", but rather she says, "hmm... weren't those who shepherded themselves in Ezekiel stopped from doing the evil they did? and what happened to the sheep? weren't they returned to a shepherd greater than those who did this evil? I wonder if this implies that those who shepherd themselves will be destroyed while the sheep will be cared for by the Lord, the Great Shepherd. I wonder if there will be a judgment among the sheep even after the bad shepherds have been dealt with?" She brings these thoughts with her to the passage she is interpreting and allows them to influence her understanding of the meaning.

All the texts that the reader has read which contain this word influence the meaning/s she finally chooses.¹⁹¹ She remembers other passages with the verb ποιμαίνω. Jesus said to Peter, ποιμαίνε my sheep (John 21:16). She may remember Matthew's quotation of Micah which says, "for out of you will come a ruler who will ποιμανεῖ my people Israel" (2:6). Or, more ominously, she may remember the passages from Revelation which says, "he will ποιμανεῖ them [the nations] with a staff of iron" (2:27, 12:5, 19:15). Any notion that the verb is solely a gentle, pastoral word is negated by these passages from Revelation which are a quotation of Psalm 2:9.

The verb is used with three objects in the New Testament: a flock (John 21: 16, Acts 20:28; I Cor. 9:7, I Ptr. 5:2); my people Israel (Matt. 2:6); and all the nations (Rev 2:27, 12:5, 19:15). Jude stands out from the rest because it is the only time the verb occurs with the pronoun "themselves" in either the New Testament or the LXX; although the object "themselves" is present in the Hebrew. In the LXX there is a greater variety of both subjects and objects than in the New Testament. The most common objects are flocks and people¹⁹² but there are some quite interesting and unusual ones as well. For example Psalm 49:14

¹⁹¹ This can be a conscious process like the one that is being followed, but it can equally well be an unconscious process whereby a reader collects meanings and changes meanings from one context to the next without consciously thinking about what has occurred.

¹⁹² This is the second most common object, but it only occurs 7 times. See II Sam 5:2; 7:7; I Chron. 11:2; 17:6; Ps. 28:9; Mic. 7:14; and Jer. 23:2, 4.

"θανατος ποιμινει αυτους" death shepherds them [the foolish], or Proverbs 22:11 χειλεσιν ποιμινει βασιλευς the lips tend a king. In general, whatever does the tending or caring does it for some object other than itself. But in Jude, the these are shepherding themselves. They tend themselves while the reader has not forgotten that elsewhere shepherds are governing, tending, caring for the sheep, people, and nations.

The reader's understanding of the interplay of intertexts mingles with her knowledge of the various meanings which the word has accumulated. In the case of ποιμαίω these meanings are not as disparate as those given for σπλάς, but they are still relevant. Liddell and Scott give these meanings for it: I. herd, tend, be shepherd, act as shepherd; II. cherish, guide, govern, soothe, beguile. When she reads *εαυτους ποιμαίνοντες*, she cannot forget that this word has accumulated meaning from its association with a large number of contexts. In these contexts it is not only a pastoral word about shepherding flocks and taking care of people; it is also a word about ruling firmly, about guarding a king, about being cared for by death. Perhaps those who shepherd themselves in the epistle of Jude will face the same fate as the bad shepherds in Ezekiel who failed to look after the flock properly.

This second metaphor in Jude 12 is an good example of the meeting of a number of semantic fields. It is relatively simple since it only makes use of two Greek words, but it is a good place to begin. There are several meanings which may be chosen, and the reader must choose one over the others in order to give the text sense. The process of making that choice actually causes the text to live at that moment for the reader and thus the metaphor remains alive. When there are no choices and the metaphor remains unconsidered, then the metaphor is "dead", no event occurs, and there is (literally) no metaphor.

The Author: The Missing Partner in a *ménage à trois*

"It is always well to divorce an artist from his work, and to take him less seriously than it. He is, after all, only a condition of the work, the soil from which it grows".

Friedrich Nietzsche¹

There were, once, three partners in the household of interpretation: reader, text, and author. But while two partners have recently been in the ascendant, the third has been in the descendant. In a 1968 essay Roland Barthes wrote that "the birth of the reader must be requited by the death of the Author",² and only one year later Michel Foucault produced an influential essay entitled "What is an Author?"³ There he claimed that "The work...possesses the right to kill, to be its author's murderer [...and that] the writer... must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing".⁴ Does assuming the role of the dead man imply voluntary suicide? One partner (or maybe the combined power of both) gained ascendancy and not only executed the author but forced him to will/want/desire his identification and participation as "the dead" partner.

But while some (Barthes and Foucault) have declared that the author is dead, others (Burke) have claimed that he has returned⁵ (to haunt the very ones that declared his death?), and still others (Hirsch) are sure that any death of the author was only a desire (wish-

¹ *The Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Francis Golffing. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1956.

² "The Death of the Author." *Contemporary Critical Theory*. Ed. Dan Latimer. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989, pp. 54-59.

³ There are two different versions of this paper; they were both written for conferences and both translated into English. The first version in which Foucault gives some reflections on the relationship of this essay to his monograph *The Order of Things* can be found in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 113-138 while the second, shorter version is available in *The Foucault Reader*. Ed. Paul Rabinow. London: Penguin, 1991, pp. 101-120.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵ Sean Burke. *The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1993.

fulfilment?) on the part of the critic and never a reality to be taken with any degree of seriousness (other than for the purposes of contesting it), since the author is not only the indispensable partner who is alive and well, but also the validating member of the syndicate in the enterprising household of interpretation.⁶ These contrary assertions bring with them a series of questions: Did the author die? And if so, was it death from natural causes or was it far more sinister? Was it murder for personal or political motivation? or accidental manslaughter? When death looms, thoughts of an afterlife are suddenly relevant. If the author died, could he return? Would that return be the haunting of a ghost or a full bodily resurrection? Or, might the author be relaxing in an easy chair in some long forgotten room waiting for the door to creak open, pushed by the reader? These questions frame more typical questions asked by commentators on specific books. They often want to know who the author was, when he lived, and why and what he wrote. In this chapter, all of these questions will be considered. But, there is another set to which I would like to draw attention. First, what advantage is served by claiming either the vitality or the death of the author? And second, what do these questions divulge in relationship to the epistle of Jude and its author?

Ascertaining the Time of Death

There are a number of coroners at the scene of death, and they all deliver different verdicts concerning the time of death, the cause of death, and the history of the deceased. Since Roland Barthes is the first to speak, his essay "The Death of the Author" can be given first consideration. The essay begins:

In his tale *Sarrasine*, Balzac, speaking of a castrato disguised as a woman, writes this sentence: "She was a Woman, with her sudden fears, her inexplicable whims, her instinctive fears, her meaningless bravado, her defiance, and her delicious delicacy of feeling." Who speaks in this way? Is it the hero...? Is it Balzac the man...? Is it Balzac the author...? Is it universal wisdom? Romantic psychology? We can never know, for the good reason that *writing is the destruction of every voice, every origin*. Writing is that

⁶ E. D. Hirsch. *Validity in Interpretation*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1967.

neuter, that composite, that obliquity into which our subject flees, the black-and-white where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes.⁷

Here Barthes displays the difficulty inherent in assigning one voice, the originating voice of the author, to a piece of text. He says that the very act of writing neutralises the voice. Not everyone has recognised the effect writing has on the voice (these are the misguided critics who search for meaning in biography⁸), but in the past some were aware of the problem. Among these Barthes comments on Mallarmé, Proust, and Surrealism.⁹ But, Barthes must still explain how texts come to be written, so he replaces the author with “the modern *scriptor*...he is not the subject of which his book would be the predicate; there is no time other than that of the speech-act, and every text is written eternally *here and now*.”¹⁰ The result of this is that the text does not deliver “a single ‘theological’ meaning” but is instead “a multi-dimensional space in which are married and contested several writings, none of which is original: *the text is a fabric of quotations, resulting from a thousand sources of culture*.”¹¹ How Barthes can tell that they are quotations from other texts given that writing destroys every voice is, of course, problematic. When the death (or distance) of the author has been ascertained (although, perhaps it is the ultimate irony to ascertain it by writing about it), it becomes futile to insist on one’s ability to decipher the clear meaning of the text. Instead, interpretation becomes a process of traversing writing – a process which is located in the reader. For, with the death of the author, the reader is liberated to seek not the one single meaning of the author, but the multiple meanings of the words as they are written upon herself.

So, Barthes passes his verdict. The author has always been dead, but this was not recognised until the 19th century.¹² The first people to

⁷ “The Death of the Author.” pp. 54-55, my emphasis. In this portion of the chapter, I am reviewing Barthes argument for the death of the author, but that death and hence “the destruction of every voice” will be called into question further on.

⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 55-57.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 57, emphasis in the original.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 57, my emphasis.

¹² See “The Death of the Author”.

come upon the dead body of the author did not mention his death as such, but his lack of movement seemed to make him unimportant. Barthes implies that he simply gave the final report on an obvious case in which the author paid his debt to the reader with a death that happened at the moment he began writing.

With the scene set thus, the second coroner takes the stand. He does not refute the evidence of the first coroner, but rather gives a more extended treatment of the results of traversing the sign "author". Michel Foucault's 1969 essay "What is an Author?" moved from Barthes declaration of death to a discussion of the function of the sign "author" within a language system. Like Barthes, Foucault also writes that "criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance—or death—of the author some time ago". Yet, he goes on to say, "But the consequences of their discovery of it [the author's death] have not been sufficiently examined".¹³ And he too agrees that Mallarmé is one of the significant turning points in the concept of the dead author. But the all encompassing importance of the author began to be limited even earlier than the 19th century by scientific discourses in the 17th or 18th century, for it was at this time, claims Foucault, that science began to accept reoccurring, redemonstrable truth as sufficient for validity rather than demanding the attachment of a name for that purpose.¹⁴ So, who wrote it was no longer the criteria for authority, instead the reproducibility of what was claimed took precedent. But for Foucault, as Barthes, ascertaining the time of death is only a parenthetical matter in a discussion which assumes both the author's death and the acceptance of that death (indeed, it seems any grieving should be well on its way to completion and the only remaining task is to fill up the space that remains).

Foucault prepares to occupy the space left in the wake of the author's death by exploring both the various meanings which may accumulate around the word "author" as well as the methods surrounding its construction – both historical and modern. Foucault begins to identify the issue by commenting on the difficulty surrounding the word "work". He says, "Is it [a work] not what an

¹³ p. 103.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

author has written?"¹⁵ And then he shows the difficulties inherent in this formulation. He chooses for his example the work of Nietzsche, and from what most people agree upon (i.e. that the work is constituted by both published and unpublished writings such as rough drafts, deleted passages, notes, and aphorisms) he proceeds to more problematic and ambiguous decisions about an author's writing (i.e. does a laundry list constitute part of an author's work?).¹⁶ Where and when does the collator of the work finish his collecting and declare the work complete, and when does one realise that it is impossible to collect all of the work of an author? Foucault raises the issue in this manner. And then he asserts, "we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers".¹⁷ Next, he sets out to clarify not the difficulties present in an author, but the difficulties present in the use of an author's name. At the end of the section, he confesses that "I have discussed the author only in the limited sense of a person to whom the production of a text, a book, or a work can be legitimately attributed".¹⁸ The first difficulty Foucault discusses is the difference between the author's name and other proper names.¹⁹ The key factor in the proper name of an author is its association with texts. In this it differs from other proper names which are identifiable with people. For example whether Shakespeare was born in a particular house in Stratford is irrelevant and does not change the nature of the sign Shakespeare; however, denying that the Shakespearean sonnets were written by Shakespeare would affect the function of the proper name Shakespeare.²⁰ The second difficulty is to be found in the nature of the author's name when it serves a classificatory function. This is the function which "permits one to

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 113. In the second large section of the essay, the author is discussed in a second function. For one can be the author not only of a book but also of a theory, tradition, or discipline. He gives as ancient examples Homer, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers, and he cites Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx as modern examples. See pp. 113-117.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 106.

²⁰ Ibid. For further comments on this example and for several other examples see pp. 105-107.

group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others".²¹ Thus, the author's name gives the writing an extra-ordinary sense and indicates that it must be received in such a mode and manner.²² The name of the author "characterise[s] the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society".²³ Despite these difficulties, Foucault gives a brief analysis of the "author function". He summarises those functions in the following four ways:

- (1) the author function is linked to the juridical and institutional system that encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourses;
- (2) it does not affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilisation;
- (3) it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but rather by a series of specific and complex operations;
- (4) it does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects – positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals.²⁴

A few concrete examples from the earlier portion of Foucault's essay may help to clarify Foucault's summary. The author function is linked to the institutional system through the issue of ownership (who owns the author's words?). Do they belong to an individual, a corporation, the community, etc.? This is a function of the name of the author which may vary from one time and culture to the next. In a similar manner, the second function also changes between time and place because some literature has entered into the literary sphere without the endorsement of an author; or, conversely, the name of the author is deliberately not attached to the real person who wrote the work. This can be demonstrated both with western texts such as those written by Kierkegaard, but also with texts closer to biblical studies such as the pseudepigrapha as well as other religious texts such as the Bhagavad

²¹ Ibid., p. 107.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., p. 108.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 113. This is a summary of the discussion Foucault lays out in pp. 108-113.

Gita. Foucault associates the third function with the way that readers attribute texts to authors. It is not self-evident how an author's name should be attached to and function in relationship to a document. Rather, this construct designed for the author is a reflection of what readers and editors do to the text itself. And lastly, the author is not simply a real individual (books are edited by many) partly because criticism posits an author who is a conceptual and theoretical coherence, a stylistic unity, and a historical figure standing at the crossroads of a series of historical events. This way of looking at an author (which Foucault claims to derive from St. Jerome) distances any relationship to reality which the author may once have had by insisting on a consistent, ideal standard of writing which may or may not be a reality for any particular author.²⁵

An author's name serves three purposes: it is a way for the text to receive status and recognition, it is a way to classify a text, and it may be a way to group together a number of texts which claim the same author's name.²⁶ Those purposes are served by a name, a sign, rather than by an individual. A name, a sign, is incapable of moving from "...the interior of a discourse to the real person outside who produced it..."²⁷ The author's name stands like a divide between the text and the outside.²⁸ And ultimately the author is the limit. He is the one which:

impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction...In saying this, I seem to call for a form of culture in which fiction would not be limited by the figure of the author...Although...I think that, as our society changes...the author function will disappear, and in such a manner that fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function

²⁵ This too is demonstrated in biblical studies, and it can be seen particularly in New Testament studies in the debates over which epistles are Pauline. The "author" "Paul" is constructed (by interpreters) as a consistent writer with an ideal standard vocabulary, and then judgements as to the authenticity of the authorship of various epistles are made on the basis of their consistency with the standard established. But those standards of validity are readerly constructs of the author, and not the author himself.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 107-8.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

according to another mode, but still with a system of constraint – one which will no longer be the author, but which will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced.²⁹

The coroner has given the verdict. The author is dead, society is changing, and there will be different limits as the old order capitulates to the new. Thus, both Barthes and Foucault talk of the author who is dead but was never really alive; his life was only an illusion.

Dead or Buried Alive?

The third witness stands up to testify in the debate, and he calls into question the evidence given by the first two coroners. Sean Burke in *The Death and Return of the Author* examines and challenges both Barthes and Foucault as well as Derrida. His book begins by highlighting the issues surrounding the poststructuralists and their “anti-authorial” stance by looking at the debate that has raged around Paul de Man since the discovery of his war time writings. He asserts that neither side (neither those who think the author never lived nor those who advocate his necessary vitality) have really entered into a truly academic discussion surrounding the issue. Instead, he contends that:

even within the most composed pro- and anti-authorial discourses, there is little or no compromise or cogent debate, neither side showing itself willing to argue and justify its root presuppositions. The problem of the author is thus sustained as a source of deep controversy, but does not surface as the site of common discussion, and the chimerical body of texts which constitutes the discourse of the death of the author is not rigorously analysed or interrogated either by its partisans or detractors.³⁰

He sets out to rectify the situation in his book. And he provides a thorough account of all three of the major “anti-authorial” critics and then deconstructs the “authors” themselves. He begins with the work of Roland Barthes.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 119.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

Barthes is acclaimed as the first coroner. But Burke wants to know just who this author was whom the coroner has proclaimed dead. Ah, the author who died is the "Author-God"³¹ – the authoritative author who generates, defines, and interprets the text. This is the unambiguous author. This is the author who only knows and generates one meaning.³² What results from the death of such an author? Liberation! Freedom! "But", the third coroner exclaims, "such an author doesn't exist in the twentieth century!" The one proclaimed dead is a creation, a construct put together to make the death more spectacular, more acceptable to the public, and more liberating. For Burke says, "we can, without contradiction, conceive of authors who do not issue 'single theological messages', who do not hold a univocal mastery over their texts".³³ So, on the first count, Barthes has been ascertaining the death of a fictional author who subsumes all author positions "under an essentially nineteenth-century theocentrism, a tactic which naturally lends to the death of the author a greater urgency".³⁴ Here is Burke's final edict on Barthes' position:

Roland Barthes in 'The Death of the Author' does not so much destroy the 'Author-God', but participates in its construction. He must create a king worthy of the killing ...What is happening in this procedure is that Barthes himself, in seeking to dethrone the author, is led to an apotheosis of authorship that vastly outpaces anything to be found in the critical history he takes arms against. Furthermore...Barthes's entire polemic is grounded in the false assumption that if a magisterial status is denied the author, then the very concept of the author itself becomes otiose.³⁵

After calling into question the identity of the "author", Burke goes on to point out that the predecessors whom Barthes claims, such as Mallarmé, do not envisage the death of the author but rather his

³¹ Barthes, "Death of the Author," p. 57; Burke, p. 23.

³² For Burke's discussion see pp. 23-25.

³³ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 26. See also p. 27 where Barthes's Author is described as "a metaphysical abstraction, a Platonic type, a fiction of the absolute".

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 26-7.

diminishment. And this distancing rather than death is a concept which Barthes will pick up and put to use in his own work when he allows the author to return. The author will not return as the Author-God but rather as a body which participates in the text. But if the author returns, then claims Burke, he must not have been dead. However, he is limited. "...if the author is to return he can only do so as the progeny of his text..."³⁶ He does not return as the timeless, omniscient Author but as a biographical author who is both transient and mortal.³⁷ This history following Mallarmé and the Surrealists is in contrast to what Burke sees as a more mundane (but relevant) history that traces its way through the New Critics and the Russian Formalists, both groups who bracketed or distanced the author in order to study the work itself. Yet these groups go unmentioned in Barthes' essay.

Burke also points out that the death of the author is related to Barthes's attempts to escape the referentiality of language. Barthes first attempted this through a scientific approach to language embodied in structuralism, and then later he pursued a post-structural alignment with the reader. Both of these methods were ways to move away from a representational view of language. In order to pursue the plurality of language, Barthes had to get rid of the kind of author who limited the reader to a single meaning. Thus, "the abolition of the author is the necessary and sufficient step to bring about the end of a representational view of language, for it is only through the function of the author as the possessor of meaning that textual language is made obeisant to an extratextual reality".³⁸ But once again Burke denies Barthes's pleasure by pointing out that representation does not have to be connected to the author but can also be understood as a readerly construct that views language as an instrument for conveying reality; if one were to abandon a representational view of language, then the death of the author would not be necessary.³⁹ To sum up, Burke attacks Barthes's views on three accounts: (1) the fictional nature of the

³⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

dead author, (2) the constructed history of the death of the author, (3) whether or not the death of the author is truly necessary for the anti-representational movement.

Next Burke turns from Barthes's to Foucault's view of the author. Rather than beginning with Foucault's essay "What is an Author?" Burke starts with his book *The Order of Things*. He starts with this book because in one of the versions of his essay "What is an Author?" Foucault introduces the essay as an attempt to answer some questions which were not answered or which were insufficiently answered in *The Order of Things*. Thus, understanding the basic argument of *The Order of Things* can help one see what direction is being pursued in the essay on the author, and it can point out both strengths and weaknesses in the argument of the essay. In this book, Foucault speaks of history as an object which has been formed not by individual thinkers or authors but rather by impersonal forces. To go even further, individuals and authors are determined by the history and context in which they live. In *The Order of Things* Foucault posits several historical time periods, and he sees them as completely separate from each other. This is significantly different from either a Marxist or Hegelian view because these two views assume that epochs of time contain the elements which will make up the suppression of one period of time and the introduction of the next. Unlike these approaches, Foucault insists that "epistemes" do not overlap, and they do not cause each other, nor do they contain the elements which will gain supremacy in the next episteme. In his portrayal of history, the notion of an author becomes absurd, for it is the totality of interwoven cultural forces rather than authors which determines history. But as Burke points out, Foucault is unable to annihilate the author that he claims is unnecessary.

First Burke points out that the epistemes (Foucault's name for his historical divisions) do indeed overlap, especially with reference to Descartes.⁴⁰ Foucault does not treat Descartes in the chronological episteme to which he belongs, but rather brackets the thinking subject out of both the Renaissance (1500-1660, Foucault's dates) and the epistemes which follow until the humanist time period, which he

⁴⁰ Ibid.; see pp. 66-77 for an in depth discussion of Foucault's analysis of Descartes and Foucault's anti-Cartesian emphasis.

dates as beginning around 1800. By doing this Foucault is able to declare the birth of the human subject during the recent humanist “episteme” at whose end we have almost arrived, and this leaves him the ability to declare that a new “order of things” is immanent and will result in the death of the subject, hence the death of both man⁴¹ and the author. However, Burke calls into question both Foucault’s analysis of history as well as his ability to remove Descartes from the picture and thus his ability to bracket the thinking subject (author) from the epistemic history.

Foucault’s analysis can only be accepted if one does not see anything of the human subject in Renaissance humanism, the *cogito*, or even in antiquity. With these comments, Burke begins to address Foucault’s essay on the author. He begins with the first version and its comments on *The Order of Things* and rapidly turns to Foucault’s discussion of the transdiscursive author – the author who has not only an *oeuvre* but is also a founder of a theory or discipline; an author to whom an – “ism” may be attached, for example Aristotelianism or Marxism. The problem with this proposal is that suddenly Foucault has reversed his deterministic view that authors are written by their own historical and cultural situations and instead he proposes that they create movements which are actually dependent upon the work of an individual author or founder. But they are not only founders, these authors are also limits; they are limits which their followers cannot transcend. In other words, these authors (and Burke speaks particularly of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud) no longer provide an opportunity for a plurality of meanings but rather set limits on meaning. Foucault’s writings oppose each other in a paradoxical, no-win situation.

The difficulties attached to the second coroner are not only in his writings but in his very attempt to write a discursive monograph on the edge of an authorless episteme. Because Foucault is himself an author, despite his longing to be defaced and erased by his writing, and because as an author *cum* archaeologist he stands outside of (and creates his own) discursive understanding of history, he is the object he

⁴¹ Here I am using “man” following Foucault – as happens again in the next several pages.

seeks to destroy.⁴² He writes this about the "I" of the *Archaeology of Knowledge*:

What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing – with a rather shaky hand – a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse...in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face.⁴³

He insists that he is not trying to proclaim the end of "man", but rather to think beyond the end, and it is to this end that he writes his archaeology. For Foucault, the change is already beginning to take place, and it is simply a matter of leaping forward into the next episteme. But while he attempts to deface himself as an author, the author continues to return, and after the death of the author, Foucault's writings and his understanding of the "author" have been haunted by the biographical works published on his life.⁴⁴ Burke makes the following critique of the author presented in Foucault's archaeology:

Archaeology...transgresses the limits of this era...in order to transgress...The *episteme* must be described from the point of

⁴² Foucault's archaeology is a descriptive tool oriented towards discourses, and it has the purpose of describing and ordering the knowledge both inside and outside the discourse. It is not the type of archaeology generally associated with excavations of physical objects. Rather it is an archaeology of texts and words and discourses which seeks to explain how certain texts came to exist at certain times in history. Most scholars agree that Foucault's early works differ significantly from his later works and that his early works are more archaeological than the later ones. His archaeological books would include *Madness and Civilisation*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things*. For more comments on the nature of archaeology, see pp. 27 and 49 of *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock Publications, 1972. Although, the whole of *Archaeology of Knowledge* is an attempt to explain the method which was used in the development of the three earlier books, ironically, once *Archaeology* was completed, Foucault never again made full use of the method he developed there. Instead he moved on to what he would describe as more genealogical analyses. This later method is more fully demonstrated and discussed in his volumes entitled *The History of Sexuality*.

⁴³ *Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Two biographies have been published. One by James Miller (*The Passion of Michel Foucault*. London: Flamingo, 1993) and another by Didier Eribon (*Michel Foucault*. Trans. Betsy Wing. London: Faber & Faber, 1989).

view of an ideal exteriority....Foucault is therefore always already in possession of the transcendence which he bestows upon Nietzsche for in the last analysis, it is still Foucault who purportedly has unique access to the true historical mission and significance of the Nietzschean discourse, he who has ultimate powers of appropriation within an archaeology of the human sciences which is all his own. His is the discourse of all discourses, the one site from which the rules of formation of four centuries of writing can be revealed. Foucault therefore cannot avoid becoming the author of his own text, and it is precisely the monumental and totalising nature of that text which conspires to make the authority of the archaeologist unconscionably problematic...The one subject he could never in principle dislodge is Michel Foucault.⁴⁵

And this criticism reveals that while the transcendental author can be killed off, it is much more difficult to get rid of an author who is limited by psychology and biography.⁴⁶ What is unclear is why the death of the transcendental author must be equated with the death of the ontological author. Or to pose the question differently, must the death of the author who stands outside the text and determines it be equated with the death of the author who is created in and by the text and with the author who writes the text?

Sean Burke, the third coroner, has declared that the dead man examined by the first two coroners was a creation of their own making – a body dug out of a 19th century graveyard. But this does not mean that he has no use for the death they have publicised in this manner. For while the body they examined may have been more rotten than that of a recent cadaver, it pointed out the absence of a transcendent author who could validate meaning. By propagating the death of the author, both Barthes and Foucault brought into question the use which had been made of the author by interpreters hunting the treasure of “true” meaning. They declared that these critics were seeking to close interpretation and to stop the proliferation of meaning.⁴⁷ That was the useful purpose of a fictional death.

⁴⁵ Burke, p. 97.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

Finally, the third coroner briefly attempts to locate the missing author who was mistakenly declared dead. But the ashes are scattered. Burke agrees that the fictional author set up by Barthes and Foucault should be left to rest in peace, but he does not agree with the resulting death of the biographical author. Burke maintains that "in texts which had somehow passed beyond the author, the death of the author would not be at issue".⁴⁸ Thus, if the author was really dead, then no one would need to write about it because it would be an unspoken rule of the cultural situation. Yet it is still an issue for Foucault and Barthes and this is a reflection of their deterministic argument which seeks

to promote authorial absence as an inherent property of discourse *rather than as merely one approach amongst others...*Much confusion...arises from...confounding the death of the author as a speculative experimental approach to discourse with authorial absence as the truth of writing itself.⁴⁹

Burke objects to this either/or stance. Examining a work of literature does not have to involve a choice between either the author as the determining centre of the work or the complete absence of the author – although, in a situation where complete control has been allocated to the author, a massive swing in the other direction is not unexpected.⁵⁰ Instead, "What is at issue...is rethinking the question of the subject outside the realm of a transcendental phenomenology, of seeing the subject actively engaged as one principle amongst others in the evolution of discourse".⁵¹ While Burke concludes his book with an ideal that sees the subject as one active part of the discourse, he also sees that "criticism can in practice read a text in terms of its tropes, aporias, rhetorics, words on the page, and also read in terms of biography, psychological dynamics, authorial inscription, and do so without obvious contradiction".⁵² But while this may be possible in theory it takes an awesome amount of imagination to conceive of as a

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 154.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 157. my emphasis.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 166.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 167.

⁵² Ibid., p. 173.

reality. Burke only gives a few pages at the end of the book to thinking of a model which might redress the misinterpretation of the anti-authorialists. Unfortunately, the third coroner has pointed to the fictional nature of the author's death without providing a living alternative as proof of life. For while he is willing to point out the inconsistencies in others' arguments regarding the author, he has put forward only an ideal dream and not a viable proposal concerning the nature of the relationship between author, text, and reader. He himself does not produce a theory which the reader might find helpful in her attempt to understand the text and the author.

Attending a Funeral for the Living

In a frontal attack against the anti-authorialists, Hirsch writes, "no logical necessity compels a critic to banish an author in order to analyse his text".⁵³ This is the beginning of a book which seeks to restore both the author to his position as lord of the house of interpretation and history to its rightful context. First Hirsch laments the lack of consensus which he feels results from no longer having authorial meaning, and he writes that "when critics deliberately banished the original author, they themselves usurped his place, and this led unerringly to some of our present-day theoretical confusions".⁵⁴ And he insists that "if a theorist wants to save the ideal of validity he has to save the author as well".⁵⁵ Unfortunately for Hirsch, not everyone is interested in rescuing the "ideal of validity". Feminists, Marxists, and psychoanalytic critics have all shown the kinds of oppression that can lie behind so called "valid" interpretations attributed to authorial intention, and they have moved away from a position which sees validity as the determining factor in the acceptance of an interpretation to a broader spectrum which sees such factors as personal interest, consistency (both textual and readerly), and topicality as more important factors in the process of interpretation.

Hirsch attempts to answer four arguments put forward by the anti-authorialists. These are (1) the meaning of the text changes – even for

⁵³ E. D. Hirsch. *Validity in Interpretation*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1967. p. 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

the author; (2) it does not matter what an author means – only what the text says; (3) the author's meaning is inaccessible; (4) the author often does not know what he means.⁵⁶ The most difficult part of his analysis is his reliance upon authorial intention to validate meaning. He argues that there is no "meaning" without the author. In place of meaning there is "significance" or even pragmatic use which may change over time. Yet when he arrives at the most serious argument against authorial intention, namely that it cannot be known, he says, "The most important argument to consider here is the one which states that the author's intended meaning cannot be *certainly* known. This argument cannot be successfully met because it is self-evidently true".⁵⁷ Thus, validity is still uncertain because the author's intention is unknown. However, he goes on, while one cannot know for certain what the author intended, one can have a relatively good idea of what was intended.⁵⁸ Burke responds to this assertion by showing that

[f]or Hirsch, the author is a normative principle which ensures the objectivity of meaning. [And Burke's critique is that] along a somewhat circular path, Hirsch argues that since verbal meaning is determinate and determinable, then the postulate of a determining will is necessarily required, for in the absence of any such will there would be no distinction between what is meant, and what might be meant by a word sequence...⁵⁹

One can speak of an author's intentions (and authors do have intentions), but this does not necessarily mean that one must know that intention in order to interpret the work or to discover *the* meaning of a text. Hirsch may be an authorial advocate, but he fails to effectively answer the arguments put forward by the anti-authorialists.

Reflections of The Coroner's Clerk

At the end of the day the coroners went to the pub and left their clerk to finish their work. And she knew that they were multiple, disunified, disagreeing voices and that they were only a few of the

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 6-23.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 16-17. His emphasis.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *The Death and Return of the Author.*, p. 109

many voices who spoke about the author – both dead and living. While it seemed quite obvious to her that the author killed off by Barthes and Foucault was a creation, just where the real one had got to wasn't entirely clear. It did not seem he was patiently awaiting discovery in some room labelled "authorial intention", or if he was, she found the room impossible to find. The search was called off, the pronouncements made, and the questions asked. Then a wind (breath?) blew in and swept the coroners' papers from her desk and threw them topsy-turvy on the floor. So that when she picked them up and sorted through them, she did not find the nicely organised conclusions belonging to her superiors but rather a new compound formed from the voices of both the papers from her desk and the leaves of books tumbled from her shelves.

So the big bad fictional author was dead, and in his place was not one, little biographical author but a plethora of little individual voices. For it seemed that in all the confusion most critics had forgotten that language was not invented and created and manipulated by the One Great Author but rather by all the individuals who use it and change it day after day – a fact which has been generally accepted, but is also noted by Saussure.⁶⁰ And so Bakhtin can say,

[T]he prose writer does not purge words of intentions and tones that are alien to him, he does not destroy the seeds of social heteroglossia embedded in words, he does not eliminate those language characterisations and speech mannerisms... glimmering behind the words and forms.⁶¹

The author is an individual who makes use of words – words which have never been and can never be pure or neutral or static. And the text which is created by the author is not only a echo of the author's voice but an echo of the many voices of those who use language. But does this bring us back to the nineteenth century when biographical criticism was all the rage? No, it doesn't, for the perspective has changed. Biographical materials such as journals, biographies, family anecdotes have sometimes been seen as events which determine the

⁶⁰ See Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*. pp. 71-78.

⁶¹ M. M. Bakhtin. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 298.

meaning of other texts. But another way to look at these texts is simply as intertexts – texts which may inform and influence the way interpreters understand texts in the same way that any text may inform and influence an author. They are not texts to be called upon for the purpose of defining the author or declaring what the author means, but in order to expand the meaning available to the text under consideration, and to control and “validate” the interpreters reading. It is not that biographical information about the author is irrelevant, rather it is two things: first, it is only one piece of the interpretative material, and second, it is just another text. Biography can never be about the author himself but only reflections of the author (or fragments?). It is impossible to put the whole “self” on paper whether it is one’s own or someone else’s, and so biography is always both a construct and a collection of fragments. That fragmented biographical construct can be used intertextually in the same manner as other texts. Thus, generally, texts contain the voice of the author as well as the voices attached to the words within the text by the readers.

The clerk knows that real authors write. She knows this partly because there are books and partly because she herself writes. Her pragmatism tells her that there are real authors, but it also tells her that what she wants is not to discover the meaning the text had for an author who is either long since dead or dying, but rather to put that text to use in a creative and imaginative manner that reflects her own use of language and her own voice. For while the authors’ intentions may not be easily accessed, their changing, chiming tones both ring out and mingle in the valley of reading. Different authors have different voices because they put together the words of authors in distinct sounds of their own – sounds which show their individuality but do not necessarily reveal their intentions or determine their meanings.

In the household of interpretation, the author and the reader are equally necessary members. In the chapter on the reader I quoted Hélène Cixous saying, “I [the author] gather words to make a great straw-yellow fire, but if you [the reader] don’t put in your own flame, my fire won’t take, my words won’t burst into pale yellow sparks. My

words will remain dead words.”⁶² In that chapter I emphasised the great power the reader has, but equally here the role of an author, a word gatherer, should be remembered.

However, while there is a real author who is a necessary part of the creation of a text, at the same time the author is also a construct of the reader – a readerly creation. This reader may not create a nineteenth century author, but the author she talks about is indeed a creation. She does not know the real author, and it is highly unlikely that she will meet him. Although, here it can be noted that it is often ironically funny when one does have the chance to meet an author of a favourite book/monograph/article, for far too many times the real author and the author constructed by the reader are quite dissimilar. And often one prefers one’s own creation to reality. In every text there are two authors – the real author who has gathered up the words and written them onto the page, and who has now been disassociated from his work, and the constructed author who is a product of the readers mind, imagination, and creativity. One is inaccessible, and it is useless to appeal to the authority of the other, for that is to appeal deceptively to one’s self.

One Author Awaits Dissection

This has been a brief overview of the ongoing debate in literary criticism about the nature and role of the author, but what does this discussion add to the study of the epistle of Jude? And where do the traditional questions which commentators ask fit into the discussion? The authorship of the epistle of Jude has been under discussion for a long time, and the answers arrived at have been far from determinate. The debate usually centres around two issues. First, is the letter authentic or is it pseudonymous? And second, if it really was written by a Jude, which Jude wrote it? Almost everyone agrees that “Jude the brother of James” (v. 1) refers to Jesus’s half-brother Jude and to James who was also a half-brother of Jesus and who was the first bishop of the church in Jerusalem. Moffatt suggests that the names may belong to an unknown Jude and an unknown James,⁶³ but very few seem to be

⁶² *Coming to Writing*. p. 107.

⁶³ Moffatt, pp. 224-5.

convinced by this proposal. Those who have written since Moffatt argue that it would be purposeless to put an unknown name on a letter because that would not serve to identify the writer; therefore, it must be the name of someone easily recognised solely by their name – i.e. an important person such as James. However, this response does not take into consideration the fact that the addressee of the letter is even more mysterious than its writer. Whom it was addressed to and where it was sent are completely unknown even though commentators have hazarded guesses on the topic. Thus, the letter may very well be written by someone who is unknown to modern readers. As to the authenticity of the letters, recent commentators are equally divided. Commentators who argue in favour of pseudonymous authorship include Barnett, Kelly, Reicke, and Sidebottom.⁶⁴ An equal number argue for authenticity, including Bauckham, Cranfield, Hillyer, and Wand.⁶⁵ The arguments over authenticity tend to centre around date and language with the presupposition being that the author was a brother of Jesus and thus a Galilean peasant who was one of Jesus's youngest brothers. So the question becomes, could the language of Jude which is good stylistic Greek really be written by a peasant? And could that peasant have lived long enough to give the book a fairly late date? For example could he have written at a date as late as 80 A.D.? If the answer to these questions is yes, then commentators usually come down on the side of authenticity, but if the answer is no then they choose the pseudonymous option. After giving a brief overview of the traditional answers posed to questions of date and authorship, Jerome Neyrey sums up his response to them with this phrase, "Until fresh evidence or new ways of framing the question are introduced, we can only surmise historical judgements in this regard".⁶⁶

But perhaps the ironic part of all these pages of argument and explanation around the issue of authorship is that they seldom really influence the rest of the commentary. And as one person has written, "conservative and liberal commentators alike have treated authorship

⁶⁴ Barnett, p. 317; Kelly, p. 234; Reicke, p. 191; Sidebottom, p. 79.

⁶⁵ Bauckham, pp. 14-16 and 21-23; Cranfield, p. 146; Hillyer, pp. 231-2; Wand, p. 187-88.

⁶⁶ Jerome Neyrey. *2 Peter, Jude*. The Anchor Bible. v. 37, New York: Doubleday, 1993.

as a matter of apologetics rather than interpretation".⁶⁷ In other words, whether or not the real author Jude really did or really did not write the epistle called by the name Jude does not effect the rest of their comments on the epistle.⁶⁸ But then, this is not surprising since nothing is known about the life of Jesus's brother named Jude. It is impossible to practice a biographical authorial criticism on the epistle of Jude due to the lack of material.

It is at this point that Foucault's analysis of the author as a function may be helpful in relationship to the epistle of Jude. Foucault asks some of the traditional questions such as "who speaks?" but they are posed with a twist. What Foucault wants to know when he asks that question is not just the name of the person who is speaking – Jude – but what it is that enables that person to speak. He wants to know what exterior forces determine the speech accorded to that person. Jude speaks both as the author and as one of the subjects of this book, but Foucault wants to move beyond this designation.⁶⁹ So, it can be asked, "...what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of [a statement]".⁷⁰ In other words, "Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language?"⁷¹ or "Who derives from [the language], his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true?"⁷²

⁶⁷ K. J. Vanhoozer. "The Hermeneutics of I-Witness Testimony: John 21:20-24 and the "Death" of the "Author"". *Understanding Poets and Prophets: Essays in Honour of George Wishart Anderson*. Ed. A. Graeme Auld. JSOTS, 152, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993, p. 367.

⁶⁸ The issue only becomes important in debates about canonicity which centre around authorship.

⁶⁹ The word subject is used here in the same way that Foucault uses it – to designate the subject of a statement. The structuralist analysis which was carried out in the last chapter, revealed that Jude is the only subject of this book because he is the one who initiates all of the events which form the structure of the book; however, a Foucauldian analysis leaves space for multiple subjects.

⁷⁰ *Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 96. At this point in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault is talking about the author and subject of statements. The author, as in his essay "What is an Author?" is a function of discourse, while the subject is a space which is occupied in a statement. That space may be filled by the author, but it does not have to be. One discourse can have many statements and many subjects. A discourse could have a different subject for every statement. The author may perform the function of a subject, but a subject cannot perform the function of an author.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁷² *Ibid.*

In the previous chapter there was an extensive discussion of the type of language used in Jude. This included an analysis of metaphor and observations about similes, quotations, and repetition. The extended simile from vv. 5-8 has already been discussed in the chapter on the reader, yet the last two verses are still a good example of simile in Jude. "Sodom and Gomorrah and the surrounding towns gave themselves up to sexual immorality and perversion....In the very same way, these dreamers pollute their own bodies, reject authority and slander celestial beings". The epistle also includes metaphors such as this one: "These men are blemishes at your love feasts, eating with you without the slightest qualm – shepherds who feed only themselves. They are clouds without rain, blown along by the wind; autumn trees, without fruit and uprooted – twice dead" (vv. 12-13). The usage of both simile and metaphor in abundance points to a highly figurative discourse. Besides using figurative language, the epistle of Jude also uses many allusions to Jewish literature. References are made to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt (v. 5), the eviction of wicked angels from heaven (v. 6), the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (v. 7), and Cain, Balaam, and Korah are mentioned briefly in v. 11. There is also a quotation from the pseudepigraphal book of "I Enoch" in vv. 14-15 as well as an allusion to a now lost pseudepigraphal work thought to be "The Testament of Moses" in v. 9. This kind of highly figurative language which is found in the book of Jude is unusual in the New Testament, especially in epistles. The only other books in the New Testament that use comparable language are parts of 2 Peter and Revelation. Of these, only 2 Peter is an epistle.

Figurative language is not unknown in the New Testament. In the gospels it can be found in the words of John the Baptist, in parables, and in other words of Jesus. There are also uses of figurative language in the epistles and in Revelation. However, the *way* that figurative language is used in Jude (and 2 Peter) is unique. There is no other New Testament book which devotes the vast majority of its words to a description of "people who have slipped in secretly" (v. 4) by building a consistently figurative and allusive picture of heretics within a group of believers. Of the 16 sentences which compose the book, 11 of them are descriptions of this group of people. "They are..." But in the end,

after a description in which they are named as godless, immoral (v. 4), dreamers, slanderers, rejectors of authority (v. 8), abusive speakers (v. 10), grumblers, faultfinders, boasters, flatterers (v. 16), causers of division, and Spiritless (v. 19), there is no command for denunciation or exclusion given in the discourse.

Description is more important than denunciation. So, who is given the right to speak in this manner? What does this use of language say about the author in this epistle and his function? Let it suffice to say that the people who used this kind of language – language which is more reminiscent of Old Testament prophets than of New Testament epistles – were guardians of a religious community. Both the Old Testament allusions and the brief instructions given to the Beloved in regard to their Christian practice point to this. Jude writes to them urging them to “contend for the faith” (v. 3) and he gives them commands to follow (vv. 20-21). He feels that it is “necessary” (v. 3) for him to write. Necessity can be the feeling of a guardian or leader; it is the feeling of someone who feels responsible. It is generally assumed that Jude speaks in his status as a guardian/leader because this is the type of position which would accord him the necessary status to deliver this message.⁷³ It is from this position that he can speak with a voice that sounds like the prophets. As an author whose function is to provide a name which will bring continuity, authority, and status to the discourse, this guardian/leader – acknowledged or unacknowledged – will bring authority and status to the discourse especially in the context of the early church.⁷⁴

⁷³ However, Mark Love pointed out to me that a feeling of necessity can also belong to an individual within a community who finally decides that “enough is enough” and then takes a stand on a particular issue. But he went on to say that this may lead to a situation where a group of people choose to agree or associate with that individual, and then, once again, we have a case of guardian/leader in relationship to the community.

⁷⁴ It is particularly interesting to note Foucault's concept of the function of the author when studying Jude because of the many questions about authorship which have arisen both in commentaries and in articles on Jude. Foucault never asks who the author is in reference to the real person who wrote; rather he wants to know what function the author plays in a discourse. One can also ask what function the text implied the author played in real life, i.e. one can ask about the function of the implied author as well. Some commentators have thought that Jude is a pseudepigraphal work, but they wondered why the name Jude, the brother of James, had been chosen as an author instead of someone more well known, such as one of the apostles. But Foucault's method

The role which the author performs as the writing subject can reveal more about both the function of the author and the inscription of the object. The author Jude (the subject) speaks to "the beloved" (object 1) about a group of people "who have slipped in secretly" (object 2). The subject of this discourse has a variety of relationships to the object(s) which are formed. Jude operates in a number of different relationships. He describes the object. This makes him the seeing subject. He inscribes the object, and so he is the defining subject. He reveals the object; in order to do this he must speak, so he is the speaking subject. As the subject, Jude holds three different relationships with the object(s) – seer, definer and speaker.

In this epistle the power to say what is and what should be is located in the subject. The other voices which are heard in the epistle, such as the voice of Enoch or echoes from the Hebrew Bible, are subsumed under the voice of the author which speaks authoritatively on the nature of the Beloved and of the "these" they must fight against. This power is reinforced by the descriptive and colourful language which describes the opponents and by the commanding language which is addressed to the beloved.

Foucault's question after "who speaks?" is where do they speak from? Or, from what institution or historical event does this discourse come? This question, like the first, is difficult to answer because of the shortness of the epistle. While it is relatively safe to assume that Jude holds some position of leadership in the Christian community (although this does not mean that one must automatically assume that he was Jesus's brother or one of the early bishops who bore the name of Jude) because the author function, especially in early Christian documents, demands an author who is qualified to speak, it is not, therefore, equally safe to assume that the place from which Jude is speaking is known – because the text does not specify what place he occupies.⁷⁵ There is no church or city or prison or even a dispersion,

points out that the author's essential role is to provide for the continuity, authority, and status of the discourse his or her name adorns. So, the name of Jude, no matter how obscure it seems now, provides the benefit of continuity, authority, and status for the epistle.

⁷⁵ Although the location has not been specified in the text, this is another issue which commentators continually address, as was noted earlier. But like the issue about

only a group of people called "the beloved" and another group who has slipped in secretly. These things do not tell us anything about the institutional location of the author/guardian.

That the author of the text is a function is not something new in biblical studies. This has been pointed out by people who argue for pseudonymous authorship, but even they have been unsure what to do with the name attached to this epistle. Repeatedly commentators note the paucity of information associated with the name Jude. But when the name (whether it belongs to Jesus's brother or not) is recognised to be not only a sign which has an exterior reference to a real object, but also a sign which has a particular function within the text, then the use of the name in the epistle becomes clearer. And commentators who put forward the case for authenticity also make claims about the function of the author. They claim that the name must belong to the author because it is the function of the author's name to provide an assurance of the document's authenticity.

At one time the name "Jude" was probably attached to a real person (whether it was the person who wrote this epistle or not is unknown), but now that real person is dead, and what remains is only a sign. That sign is the signifier for a construct which I, the reader, create. I can try to make my re-creation/construct a historical one by associating the name with the person known as Jude who was Jesus's brother and the brother of James and by collecting up what information I can discover about this person. Indeed, Bauckham gives a detailed discussion and critique of ancient sources which speak of the relatives of Jesus including Jesus's brother Jude.⁷⁶ Yet, he too must choose interpretations based not on certainty but on probability. Is it better to choose the Helvidian (sons of Joseph and Mary) or Epiphonian (sons of Joseph from a previous marriage) view of Jude's relationship to Jesus?⁷⁷ In the end, Bauckham gives an extended argument about who

authorship, this is simply information that is not given, and while arguments can be made from the nature of the epistle itself, these arguments are inconclusive, and, finally, unimportant when addressing the literary nature of the epistle.

⁷⁶ Richard Bauckham. *Jude and the Relatives of Jesus in the Early Church*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-26. At first this may not seem to make much difference, but for someone who is attempting a historical reconstruction of the date of the epistle and whether that date could coincide with the life of the real Jude this makes a significant

was related to Jesus and how. Yet that collection of information is a construct. The road of interpretation by which he reached his interpretation was full of forks, and there was not just one fork but many. And each time the interpreter comes to a fork in the path of interpretation, he must make a choice, and sometimes there is no directional marker which points out one way as any better than the other. Thus, historical reconstructions, although they deal with many helpful and interesting questions, are re-constructions – constructs. They are pictures of the sign, a painting, and a picture of the sign never equals the real thing itself. It might bear some resemblance to the real thing (but I will not be able to declare that with certainty), and it may give interesting and perhaps even convincing information about the nature of the sign “Jude”, but it does not determine the nature of the relationship between words, interpreters, and reality.

And so the question arises, if the author is a construct, where should the author be dissected? Does the author belong in a chapter on his own or should he be subsumed under the chapters that address the reader and the reader’s interpretation of the text? Probably, the author does indeed belong there (and in fact he is hidden away under the guise of a narrator in the text section of this thesis⁷⁸), but it has long been a tradition to treat the author separately. And this gives the interpreter a chance to discourse on the subject of the author, and the nature of his relationship to the text.

The author serves another function besides the one of being the sign where the forces of history are displayed in a speaking subject. The author functions as the voice for multiple voices.⁷⁹ This happens even when the narrative voice uses those other voices for his own ends; still they can often be heard whispering in the background. This function

difference. For, if Jude was a son of Joseph and Mary it can be assumed that he was a fair bit younger than Jesus (since Jesus was the first-born), and thus, Jude being younger, may have died many years after Jesus. If this were the case, he may have still been alive at the end of the first century to write the epistle of Jude. On the other hand if he was a step-brother from a previous marriage, then he would have been older, and he may not have lived so long after Jesus’s death. If this were the case, he may already have been deceased at the earliest dates usually given to the epistle .

⁷⁸ For a more complete discussion of the relationship between the author and the narrator in letters please refer to the text chapter of this thesis (p. 72).

⁷⁹ Bakhtin, p. 298.

of the author is quite evident in the epistle of Jude (and in this thesis). For not only does Jude speak in this odd, descriptive, denunciatory (yet not excommunicative) voice, but in the background the texts of others (and thus the voices of others – although they too may be as unknown as Jude) are discernible. These include the voices of Enoch, the voices of the prophets (in particular Amos and Zechariah),⁸⁰ and the voices of the patriarchal storytellers.⁸¹ While the author, and indeed the text, are constructs of the reader, those constructs contain textual traces. Greenblatt describes the desire to hear the author in this way:

I began with the desire to speak with the dead...If I never believed that the dead could hear me, and if I knew that the dead could not speak, I was nonetheless certain that I could re-create a conversation with them. Even when I came to understand that in my most intense moments of straining to listen all I could hear was my own voice, even then I did not abandon my desire. It was true that I could hear only my own voice, but my own voice was the voice of the dead, for the dead had contrived to leave textual traces of themselves.⁸²

In a way, the reader becomes the author. It is her voice which she will hear and not the voice of the author. I become the speaking voice – the voice of the dead. But at the same time Greenblatt holds out some hope to the person who really wants to speak with the dead. All is not lost because textual traces of the dead remain.

But Bernard Sharratt displays the problematic situation the reader finds herself in when she becomes the author. He writes:

We don't know who wrote the words – but they *present themselves* as written by somebody, so as we read them we '*repeat*' the style, tone, rhythm, of the way they're written... we repeat them in '*our own voice*'. Insofar as the words are directed at '*everybody*' as themselves...we read '*as ourselves*'. Yet we didn't write the paragraph, so in repeating it as

⁸⁰ Jude 9 has a quotation from Zechariah 4:3 "The Lord rebuke you" and allusions to both Zechariah and Amos in vv. 22-23 "snatch some from the fire, hating even the tunic defiled by the flesh".

⁸¹ This includes Genesis but also refers to much wider references which are reflected in the traditions that surround such allusions as Sodom and Gomorrah.

⁸² Stephen Greenblatt. *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 1.

ourselves we *receive* it simply as *given*, as originating from no other source than the page itself, and since it is in 'our own voice' that we '*hear*' it, we tend to *endorse* it as what we *already know*: We are telling ourselves something that seems curiously familiar, or at least innocuous. To recognise explicitly that someone else, someone specific, is telling us this would be to turn this deeply ideological paragraph from *anonymous information* into challengeable assertion...The peculiar *effectivity* of this mode of writing lies precisely in the *conflation* of the reader's own voice with that of the textual author...In that effect of 'overhearing' my 'own' comments lies the deepest *truth-effect*, the insidious credibility of the commentary, the unobtrusively acceptable 'knowledge' of the text...⁸³

The reader becomes the author, and the words of the author are no longer a separate voice, the voice of the Other but instead the voice is part of the reader. But this happens not only because the reader is constructing the author and the text but also because the text was originally manipulated/written in such a manner. For example, in the epistle of Jude there is a reader who has been written into the text by the author (the implied reader). That reader is the Beloved. Now, when a real reader picks up the text of Jude, they can choose to position themselves in line with that implied reader – "the Beloved". But, as was demonstrated in the second chapter that identification can become more and more problematic as the text goes on until at the end the reader reaches a point where she is no longer comfortable identifying herself as one of "the Beloved" – she is not the ideal or implied reader. In that chapter it was posited that she has a choice between positioning herself as one of the Beloved or taking up the position accorded to "the these". But there is a third option that belongs to the reader, and that option is to see herself as the author. She knows she is not the author, and yet she becomes the author. She writes the text both in a textual sense (i.e. determining the text from the textual evidence available in the textual apparatus) and in a semantic sense (creating meaning as she reads). But she can only be the author when she does textual violence

⁸³ Bernard Sharratt. *Reading Relations: Structures of Literary Production, a Dialectical Text/Book*. Brighton: Harvesters Press Ltd., 1982, p. 118. Emphasis in the original.

to the text by refusing to let it be Other than herself. And when she tries to listen to the haunting voice of the dead as their author, she only hears herself. Her reading as an author demonstrates resistance to the text itself. She represses the voice of the Other in order to smooth over the difficulties of the text and thus to hear the text in the unproblematic manner her own voice gives it. And locating these resistances can, in psychological terms, reveal the illness which afflicts her.

But when she wanted to hear the voice of the dead in her own voice, she made a mistake:

the mistake was to imagine that I would hear a single voice, the voice of the other. If I wanted to hear one, I had to hear the many voices of the dead. And if I wanted to hear the voice of the other, I had to hear my own voice. The speech of the dead, like my own speech, is not private property.⁸⁴

How does a reader hear the dead voices – not just one but many? She listens to and searches out not only the text which she is reading but also the many textual traces which it contains. Many of the phrases in *Jude* recall other texts. *Jude* demands his readers to remember them. Yet, at the same time, his work is monologic. The introduction says “*Jude, a servant of Jesus Christ, and brother of James, To...*” (v. 1). It is a first person narration, and the voice of the narrator subsumes all other voices. In fact, the readers are only privy to quotations from other works through the voice of *Jude*. The works that have been drawn from are only allowed to speak through the voices of the narrator.

This allusionary approach has the effect of pushing readers to accept a past, a history, which they may not remember, especially if they are not resisting readers. When a reader reads as an author they actually become less likely to be a resisting reader (i.e. someone who reads against the ideological grain of the text, someone who recognises the text as “other” than themselves) because the words they hear in their own voice seem incontestable. Yet, if they do not read as an author but as a reader, then the voice of *Jude* delimits the past and defines the memory of his readers. He tells them what they remember. *Jude* is

⁸⁴ Greenblatt, p. 20.

interpreting past texts: he is writing/re-writing history, not simply recalling it.⁸⁵ And he assumes his historical re-construction is the same as his readers' memory. The assumption is that readers who are familiar with the other texts will interpret them in the same way that Jude has done.

The texts that are alluded to possess a cultural force; these texts are a form of social energy. By alluding to these texts, Jude ties into the cultural force inherent in them and appropriates it for himself. Authors who use other texts (whether they are aware of it or not) acknowledge the regard society has for texts and assume that readers also have the same regard for them. When other texts are recognised by readers in the author's writing then the author's position as the source of authority is effaced so that the authority of the argument is drawn from the other text rather than from the author. In essence, when Jude alludes to or quotes another text he is saying, "it is not me saying this, but these great figures from the past". The author re-negotiates the social energy of the other text. The hope is that the audience will recognise the authority of the other text and grant to the focused text some of its social energy. In this case, Jude hopes that the reader will recognise and give authority to the voices of the prophets and storytellers who have spoken before him and will then accord some of that respect to his own authorial voice. Of course, at the same time, he takes the risk that either the reader will not accord such authority to the other texts or that she will not approve of his use of those texts. But that is a risk inherent in the use of other texts (whether it be an epistle or a thesis).

When the author of Jude has been dissected, one can say, "Unidentified, Jewish male" who served the purpose of creating, holding together, and unifying the text. He rests in peace, but his name lives on in the mind and creation of the reader.

The Author's Return to Power

It seems that the author is the maligned partner in the interpretational *ménage à trois*. Whatever small voice he may once

⁸⁵ This was demonstrated in the chapter on the reader in this thesis.

have had has been stolen away by his text and re-constructed by the reader. However, at the same time the author is often constructed by the reader as the one who holds power and against whom the reader must react. Thus, whether the author intended it or not (although I think he probably did) he finds himself in a position of power.

The reader constructs powerful lines which criss-cross the text and which she connects to the author. And in this way she can lay claim to her manipulation by the author. I demonstrated how a reader might resist the words of the author in the chapter addressed to the reader, but here, in this short section, I want to examine briefly some of the same verses that were looked at in other chapters and ask instead the question what kind of author was constructed by those readings.

I will begin with the chapter on readers. In that chapter I drew attention to the words the author calls himself – “brother” and “servant” (v. 1) and I constructed him as an author who was in a position where he was controlled by someone else and defined by his relationships with a sibling. His name alone was not sufficient identity. He also needed an association with his brother. In the discussion of v. 3, I went on to draw out both the zealous nature behind Jude’s desire to write as well as his indecision regarding what he did write. Then, in v. 5, I called attention to the first person narration of the communication which is particularly evidenced in the phrase “I want you to remember”. And an in depth discussion of the difficulties associated with that remembering was pursued. In the section which follows Jude is constructed as an accuser who points to “the these” in metaphorical and symbolic terms which the reader often fails to agree with. And, in the end, the role of the author fizzles out completely as the reader becomes more and more frustrated with the ambiguous nature of the text itself. In this chapter the author was constructed as a rather weak character who wanted his reader to respect him even though he had to rely on another person’s name for his authority. He used commanding language, but it only served to heighten the picture of him as someone who had to show his power by ordering people around, and then he was unable to bring a final condemnation against the people he opposed.

But is this the same construct as the author who appears in the next chapter of the thesis, or does the same reader create a different construct of the author when she uses different reading techniques? In this chapter the author "Jude" (who is there addressed as the character of the narrator) is spoken of in different language. The reader constructs for him a desire. She attempts to answer the question "what does Jude want?" And she points out that he wants to communicate a message, and he wants to be obeyed. And, in fact, the whole array of allusions and characters which the author brings to his aid are only helpers in the attempt to fulfil his desire to describe (and inscribe) both "the Beloved" and the "these". Jude is established as the central character in the letter. And there I claim that all of the other positions filled by the helpers and opponents are created and written into the epistle by the narrator in order to support his own position within the discourse. What I do not point out there is that this is my own construction of the author – not a set in stone fact but a construction arrived at through method and presupposition. And in the end the very motive which I give to the author is *his* desire (not my own).

And again, when I constructed the author in that chapter, I moved from the picture of him in the previous chapter as a weak person in the role of servant and sibling, to a person capable of obtaining power through the use of names which belong to his superiors. He obtains power by making himself the only person who is capable of seeing the real situation and then declaring what must be done so that the community can save itself from its precarious position. He is no longer the weak character of the previous chapter, but rather seer (prophet?), saviour, and judge.

Thus, the construct of the author is not static. One reading strategy can make him look weak and frustrating and can even do away with him altogether by replacing him with the text itself, while another reading strategy can posit him as a controlling figure who is quite capable of using manipulation and power for his own purposes in the textual game. Both of these strategies make use of the text, but they reveal different facets of the total construct one may wish to label "author". But, more damning, what this points to more conclusively is the devious strategies of a reader who wants to place the blame for

textual meaning (or indeterminacy) somewhere other than on herself. In the freedom which reader response gives her, she finds herself unwilling to take full responsibility for her frustration or inability to make sense of the text, and she pawns this off on her constructed author. But does the author bear no responsibility for the text in front of her? In a sense, he does. The author is the one who writes. And what he writes is not imaginary words on imaginary paper; but, when the reader uses reader response theory, so that she creates and constructs the author, then there comes a point at which she must also accept responsibility for a "senseless" text. Whether or not the real author wrote a sensible text, she is unsure, for now she hears the construction of the voices she has made – a construction which is influenced by the someone else's words and rhythm, but a construction which is nonetheless her own. What seemed to be the power of the author to control (or his lack) is also a construct.

Another Author in the Waiting Room

So, here I am, the author, awaiting my dissection and wondering what will remain of my voice when the autopsy is completed. But then, perhaps, when one is dead (or murdered) it is no longer relevant. I have written some words on paper, a temporary diversion through the twisting streets of authorial death and rebirth, and now I leave these words here – black marks on white paper – and wait for their chemical reaction in some other reader – a reaction I may never witness (but, what else is a *viva* for?), and which I do not influence. But then again, I shall come back to haunt you – a still, small voice whispering from an authorial mountain. And it is my own voice, a voice full of the influences of others in both the senses of Bloom and of Bakhtin. It is a voice full of traces both acknowledged and unrecognised. Yet, at the same time, reader, it is your voice constructing me, and you endow me with either weakness or power. This is the type of reader who is born through the haunting death of the author – the missing partner who always returns just when one thought he was dead.

At the End

Every real story is a Neverending Story...A lot of people read them without noticing. It all depends on who gets his hands on such a book.

—Michael Ende¹

There is always a beginning before the beginning and an end after the end. For us, readers, at the end of this reading, there will be a *viva*, and after that more writing and teaching. But the real end after the end can simply be called the future. This thesis has examined some of the types of criticism which have arisen during this century, and it has tried to see what shapes the reader, the text, and the author take on when they are read with such theories in mind. This thesis has put into practice some of the new ideas behind reading a text, and it has pointed out the results of such readings.

The reader is no longer the passive mind of past decades who accepts the "truth" of the written word. Instead, she begins to practice the injunction her mother continually reiterated: "Don't believe everything you hear – not even in writing." And as a resisting reader² she makes a conscious decision about *how* she is going to read the text. She chooses her location in the text. In the example given by the reading of Jude in the first chapter, the reader chose to place herself in the readerly position of the Beloved – a position that is very invitingly arranged for her by the author and the text. But the further she reads, the more she becomes aware of her distance from the text and from the position of the Beloved. By the end of the epistle, the reader finds it quite difficult to read the text "simply", and she can not see herself as one of the Beloved; thus, she feels compelled to assess her other options. At that point she is aware of two possibilities. She can read herself into the position of the Other, in this case the "these", or she can try to read the text objectively

¹ Michael Ende. *The Neverending Story*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. London: Penguin, 1979.

² Judith Fetterley's terminology.

as something outside of herself. The reader lacks the desire to read herself as the "these" and finds it difficult to read the text as an object since she strongly believes in the constructed nature of the text (i.e. she writes or constructs it).

So, like lego blocks, she constructs the text and tears it apart and then puts it together and repeats the process once again. She takes away with her the impressed image left by her reading and turns to other strategies, other theories, and other worldviews to help her build the text. She analyses the different characters in the epistle. She looks at the role played by Jude and by desire. His voice is the one constructing voice in the epistle. His voice draws the picture of the Beloved as those who are called to fight for the faith and of the "these" whom they oppose. He is the one who depicts the array of people who come to his aid as he performs his duty as the one who sees, the one who judges, and the one who saves (at least for those who listen). In the reader's analysis of the characters, she sees two issues which have generally been underplayed in the past: the first of these is desire (what does someone want?) and the second is power. She moves beyond the characters of the epistle to the language in which it is told. The metaphors, metonymies and repetitions are noted and using psychoanalysis and intertextuality these literary tropes and the effect they have on the text and the reader is explored. The book of Jude ceases to be only a commentary on the false teachers and the need of the Christian community to fight against them. It becomes instead a book which interacts with, influences and is influenced by other books in the New Testament, the pseudepigrapha, and the Hebrew Bible. It becomes an epistle that asks the reader to take notice of its tropes and to practise the work of an analyst upon it in order to delve further and further into the treasure of meaning.

The reader makes meaning for herself from her experience of the text as an event. It is not a meaning which she inherits or discovers or receives from some far distant author who determines and validates *the* meaning of the text. The author has not ceased to exist, for she realises that Barthes and Foucault could only succeed in killing off a constructed author – one of their own making – and not the real author. But the author has

ceased to be the validating factor in her interpretation. Even if biographical details from other texts might have influenced her reading of the epistle, this becomes irrelevant in a discussion of Jude. Generally, the discussion of biographical material is difficult in a situation like this one where the identity of the actual writer is contested and where the paucity of information surrounding individuals known by the name of Jude during the first century is uniformly acknowledged.³ But it is in the discussion surrounding the author, that another option is seized by the reader, and that is the option of seeing herself as the author – the one who writes the text, the one who constructs the text. And if she chooses this option she takes control and gives it away in the same act. For if she writes the epistle of Jude – its reader, its text, and its author – then, at the same time her readers can choose to write themselves, her thesis, and the author. But she is willing to exchange the experience of being the constructor for that of being constructed. And with that note, she withdraws her pen from the never-ending interpretation of Jude. It is not because she has nothing left to say but because time and space militate against her saying very much more now.

She has just these few words to add. I am the reader – the constructed reader. I am the reader who uses computers, the reader who has learned Greek and Hebrew, the reader who has been trained in two disciplines (English literature and biblical studies), the reader who gobbles up stories insatiably. It may seem that I have the power to construct myself, the text, and the author. But, as soon as I transfer that power to paper by building my constructions with pen and ink, I transfer that power away from myself and pass it on to my readers. And so, while the reader may seem to be the central controlling power in this thesis, it is only a construct which can be rewritten and torn apart and written again by other readers. Thus, the way in which the thesis began with the reader and proceeded on to the text and the author is only the beginning of a cycle, for in the end the

³ We have one story told by Eusebius about the grandsons of Jude. But beyond that we have only references to the other people who carry the name of Jude in the early Christian church.

reader becomes the author and the process begins again as the reader writes the text.

And yet, this reader/author hopes that readers will read the book of Jude differently. She hopes that it will no longer be seen as only a simple letter contesting heresy written to a group of people of long time ago. She hopes that her voice will come back with the voice of Jude and the voices of the texts to which he has alluded in order to haunt those who write her again. The text contains a scene of power and desire wrapped up with knowledge and language. I am not the only one to point this out. Neyrey's commentary and a short article by Joubert discuss the sociological issues which serve to enhance the power of the author over the status of the community.⁴ But it has been one of my goals to demonstrate that sociology is not the only methodology that shows relationships of power. This can also be played up by literary studies. It is this scene one may see when one ceases to exist as only a historical or assimilating reader (i.e. one of the Beloved who believe and assent to the mandates of the author, Jude) and begins to use one's own knowledge about power and desire, about knowledge and language.

⁴ S. J. Joubert. "Language, Ideology and the Social Context of the Letter of Jude," *Neotestamentica*. 24(2) 1990, 335-349 and Jerome Neyrey. *2 Peter, Jude*. The Anchor Bible. New York; Doubleday, 1993.

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