Building Peace Economies? The Politics of 'Patronage Peacebuilding' in the Ilicit Informal Economies of Bayelsa State and Rivers State, Nigeria

Ramya Nanpon Sheni

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds

School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS)

September 2021

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Ramya Nanpon Sheni to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Acknowledgements

I give all the glory to God for the successful completion of this study.

I owe a special thanks to my supervisors, Prof. Anna Mdee and Prof. Edward Newman. Anna provided sound advice not just on all matters PhD, but to take time out to relax and "enjoy the process"; I would like to thank her for her extreme patience in constantly reading over my long and over chunky chapters that I thought were best. She taught me to remember the picture and to always "look at how the branches made up the trees", a vital lesson I will carry throughout life. I remain grateful for her unwavering support. I have also benefited enormously from Edward's input, and his constant reminder to keep my work theme focused, a truly challenging concept for me. He also encouraged me to think outside the box, guided me on where I needed more theory, and on which areas I should focus more of my time on. They are a truly remarkable and hardworking duo and I am blessed to have been moulded by two influential minds in academia.

Numerous organisations were also responsible for facilitating my PhD fieldwork. During this PhD, I spent six months between Abuja, Rivers and Bayelsa with various peacebuilding agencies. I would like to thank the staff at Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation programme (NSRP), the Ministry of Defence, the War College, the University of Port Harcourt and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. They opened their doors, willingly answered all my questions, and assisted in providing more contacts for interview, which helped in enriching this thesis. They also kept an eye on me after my fieldwork, checking up on how the writing stage was going. I would also like to thank Dr Tarila M. Ebiede, who went out of his way to ensure that I was able to access recent literature on the Bayelsa state and River state by posting vital materials to me during the COVID pandemic. His generous gift went a long way in contributing to my background analysis.

I would also like to thank my aunty Becky, who opened her home to me during my time in Rivers State. Not only did she worry about my safety with calls and texts during my interviews, but she also always had encouraging words for me when I got home – as well as the best remedy to a long day of interviews: an Indian series on Zee World.

Furthermore, my 'interesting' experience in the Leeds POLIS PhD Suite: although cut short by the COVID pandemic. This experience was shaped by the long and excessive lunch breaks enjoyed by Nicole, Ruth, Nabaa and I, discussing everything but our PhDs. It also served as a haven for rants, sports and

Abstract

Although there seems to be a consensus on the importance of the informal economy in conflict, the role of the informal economy remains ambiguous with regard to the political economy of peacebuilding. There are, therefore, important questions concerning the informal economy in terms of its role in establishing or undermining sustainable peace, which is the focus of this thesis. This thesis draws on an extensive range of literature on the informal economy and peacebuilding and presents original empirical data. Six months of fieldwork – which involved in-depth interviews and document analysis – was carried out in the Bayelsa state and Rivers state. The analysis focuses on the peacebuilding activities of three main stakeholders, namely The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NRSP), the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) and the Nigerian government. The thesis argues that peacebuilding initiatives are not only failing to build peace, but also are potentially continuing the cycle of neopatrimonialism that is closely linked to the ongoing illicit informal economy. It highlights three contrasting perspectives on the peacebuilding agenda. Firstly, donor-based initiatives are donor centric leading to the reliance on foreign aid and donor regulations that are not regulated by the state. It also observed that state-led peacebuilding has reproduced the socio-economic hierarchical systems that existed in the conflict, creating an atmosphere for 'patronage peacebuilding'. Secondly, state-led peacebuilding initiatives has resulted in marginalisation of various local stakeholders, providing incentives for joining parallel and sometimes illicit power structures and activities within the informal economy leading to "positioning" for aid in the informal economy, "performance of militancy". Thus, the relationship between donor-based, state-led peacebuilding and the informal economy in Bayelsa state and Rivers state rather functions as a vehicle that keeps the wheel of neopatrimonial bargaining and power-sharing spinning. These findings raise important conceptual challenges not just for the political economy of peacebuilding but also for the evolution of the informal economy.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Maps

Cases

Chapter 1: Introduction

The term 'informal economy' does not have a precise definition in existing scholarship and some aspects of its nature and significance are debated (ILO, 2013; Chen, 2015; Meagher, 2016). Nevertheless, several themes are closely associated with the concept, and there is sufficient agreement of its meaning within academic and policy debates (Dreher and Schneider, 2009; Karunakaran and Balasubrama, 2012; Chen et al., 2018) for it to be used as a key concept in this research. The informal economy refers to activities undertaken outside state control, and beyond the reach of tax authorities, at various levels and by different actors, aimed at generating profit, meeting personal or household welfare needs, circumventing state control and taxation, or facilitating advantages in business and politics (ILO, 2013). It includes a wide range of practices from small-scale, local practices – such as casual labour – to organised criminal activities which generate very significant revenues (ILO, 2013). In neopatrimonial regimes, the informal economy facilitates corruption and clientelist relationships especially at the interface between politics and business in many contexts can be a source of violence, as exemplified in the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo amongst many others. Some argue that this is a form of 'neopatrimonialism' and this thesis will engage with this concept as a way of understanding.

The informal economy is present in every society; however, it differs greatly in size and scope. There are several factors that shape its nature, such as recession, drought, famine, history, culture, governance, institutions and development, as well as many other factors, including those most closely related to this thesis – conflict and peacebuilding (Meagher, 2016; Young, 2020). Extensive previous research has shown that low-level conflict in developing countries which have weak state institutions is no longer about one side winning; rather, it has taken a more self-financing dimension (Wells, 1989; Goodhand, 1999; International Peace Academy, 2002; Goodhand, 2003; Wennmann, 2005; Spear, 2006; Newman and Keller, 2007; Goodhand, 2008; Le Billon, 2008; Newman, 2010; Distler, Stavrevska and Vogel, 2018 **).** Thus, in these types of conflicts, the parties involved are often more concerned with economic gain than achieving victory (Keen, 2012). Therefore, the self-financing nature of conflict – alongside socio-economic factors, economic inequalities and the presence of natural resources – provides further space for illicit activities to occur within the informal economy (Keen, 2012; Danielsson, 2015). With activities in the informal economy ranging from trade and the hawking of goods to more acute expressions such as organised crime. The 'informal economy' can provide a space for illicit and illegal economic activities that are not captured by the state. Such activities may be associated with situations of armed conflict and as a part of the 'legacy' of conflict, within post-conflict environments, but it is also a phenomenon that is inherent, in varying degrees, in most countries and

especially in those with weak institutional capacity in the Global South. This thesis focuses on the more acute expressions of the informal economy namely the illicit informal economy– including organised crime, large-scale corruption, and activities at the interface between criminality and insurgency – as something that has a close relationship with instability and conflict, including fragile 'post-conflict' settings. The intensity of these types of activities in the informal economy depends on interactions with the factors stated above, within a post-conflict society, and can be influenced by interventions such as peacebuilding initiatives.

Whether as a response to survival or welfare needs, or as a demonstration of illicit aggrandisement, the illicit informal economy can be a key dynamic – or even a driver – of conflict, which continues to operate and have consequences once open conflict has ended. With the problem not only of prolonging and intensifying conflict, but, further, of posing a barrier to the consolidation of peace, especially in post-conflict societies, the illicit informal economy is often viewed as a significant problem in many societies. This is because it not only disrupts the other dimensions of the informal economy – those that provide welfare and security to the population, thus serving as a way of life – but also the illicit economy becomes an incubator of conflict that thrives during the peace process and may hinder peacebuilding. Furthermore, as ordinary people are forced to work within the illicit informal economy as a coping mechanism, formal state institutions are ultimately weakened, thus crippling the state's revenue. Likewise, the illicit informal economy opens the door for actors to operate outside the law, which further leads to hampering the establishment of public institutions that produce development and establish positive peace. Thus, there is the need to fully understand the scope, nature and dynamics of the illicit informal economy not just empirically but also the ways in which this illicit informal economy is shaped by various factors in society.

Beyond the challenge of the illicit informal economy the relationship between the formal and informal economy is far more dynamic than is generally understood (Meagher, 2010; Valodia and Devey, 2011; Guha-Khasnobis, Ostrom and Kanbur, 2012). The formal economy continues to be used by ruling elites as part of the structuring and legitimation of power in the region being analysed in this thesis. At the surface informal patronage networks, corruption and personal leadership seem to supersede and pervade formal institutions; however, the relationship between the two is one of dependence. Thus, interactivity between the formal and informal economy complicates the assumed simplified dichotomy as the distinction between the two is not always clear (Meagher, 2010; Valodia and Devey, 2011; Guha-Khasnobis, Ostrom and Kanbur, 2012). Clan politics, informal networks and personalist leadership become barriers to the consolidation of formal institutions that provide the basis of democracy and

peacebuilding (Meagher, 2010). It is, therefore, analytically challenging to recognise where the informal begins and the formal ends. The extent to which the formal and informal economies pervade one another has therefore obscured our understanding of the importance of the informal economy and the ways in which it supports neopatrimonial authority beyond conflict. Therefore, much can be achieved by utilising insights and scholar approaches that examine the nexus between the informal economy and neopatrimonial authority within a development trajectory.

In understating this trajectory research suggests that rather than breaking the clientele networks that exist during conflict, peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict economies have sometimes reinforced these relationships, especially between political competitors and their economic supporters (Goodhand, 2003; Spear, 2006; Newman and Keller, 2007; Raeymaekers, 2013; Iwilade, 2017; Distler, Stavrevska and Vogel, 2018). Hence, the political economy of post-conflict society offers lucrative dividends to various globalised elite networks in different forms, such as in the participation of government decisions, security sector reforms, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' (DDR) programmes, political favours, election rigging and so on. Thus, paradoxically, peacebuilding initiatives seem to be leading to the accumulation (in post-conflict society) of networks that thrived within the conflict (Chandler, 2013). These networks touch upon links to administrative corruption such as aid bunkering and organised crime, which may be problematic as they can fuel the self-financing dynamics of conflict and undermine state reconstruction and development. This implies a paradoxical nexus between peacebuilding initiatives and the illicit informal economy, a nexus which is rooted in a tight association of political protection, clientele networks and economic capital between the various networks and agents within the state (Chandler, 2013; Iwilade, 2017). Although it is assumed that peacebuilding initiatives are based on liberal-democratic conceptions, at the interface between the informal economy and peacebuilding the informal economy becomes anti-democratic. As noted by Paul Jackson although talking about security reforms and aids, he, however, raised important questions (Jackson, 2012). He recognised the need to examine what and who development is really serving (Jackson, 2012) Thus, working within this logic this thesis aims to examine who peacebuilding really serves in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. Whether as Jackson as ask, it is to maintain the status quo of the existing governance or rather it is aimed at the people (Jackson, 2012).It, therefore, becomes important to explore how peacebuilding initiatives shape the informal economy and what this means for the overall peacebuilding agenda. Thus, this thesis suggests is that the illicit informal economy should take a central, rather than a peripheral, role within the peacebuilding agenda and in the analysis of this topic.

Drawing upon the perspectives of political economy and peacebuilding studies, this thesis examines two crucial points. Firstly, it explores the type of peacebuilding being promoted in Bayelsa state and Rivers state, focusing on the two main stakeholders – the state, and donor-based organisations. Secondly, it analyses how the peacebuilding agenda shapes the illicit informal economy by these stakeholders. Hence, this thesis aims to consider how and to what extent state-led and donor-based peacebuilding activities are potentially continuing the neopatrimonial cycle that existed in the conflict and the effect of this on the peacebuilding agenda. It also aims to deepen our understanding of the way these donor-based and stated-led peacebuilding initiatives shape the informal economy, with a focus on the illicit informal economy. Consequently, this thesis will contribute to the debates on the political economy of peacebuilding, recognising that there is an incomplete understanding of the socio-economic aspects of peacebuilding and how they relate to the informal economy. This gap creates a vacuum in our understanding not only of peace, and especially sustainable peacebuilding but also of the formation of constructive post-conflict economies. To this end, this thesis engages with debates about the informal economy, the illicit , its formation and the practices which shape them, and the way different networks shape, adapt and alter such economies, as well as their relationship to the realities and experiences of peacebuilding. In turn, the thesis finds that a focus on peacebuilding initiatives, informal institutional structures, and discourses of power, aids our comprehension of peacebuilding and development in Bayelsa state and Rivers state and contributes to broader understanding.

Research Questions

This thesis examines various interconnected themes (and, by extension, underlying conceptualisations) to fully understand the peacebuilding dynamics in Bayelsa and Rivers states. It follows a case-study design, with in-depth analysis of both the informal economy and donor-based and state-led peacebuilding in these states. The high levels of unemployment, environmental degradation and political marginalisation coupled with the years of intensive conflicts and militarisation have resulted in a thriving informal economy of illicit activity within the Bayelsa state and River state, such as illegal oil exploitation, election rigging and thuggery to survive. Examples of thuggery can range from the use of thugs by various politicians to intimidate citizens of opposing parties to evading the National Senate (Vanguard, 2018). The various peacebuilding initiatives implemented by the government have been seen rather as in the words of Idemudia (2012 p. 190), to have "become a tool of patronage to the determent of oil communities". The peacebuilding initiatives implemented in the last ten years have incorporated many new elites into the neopatrimonialism system, increased the destructive political culture of elites and their supporters, as well as led to a contentious, tenuous economic base, and flawed political systems (Iwilade, 2017). This raise concerns as to how this shapes the informal economy

as well as the illicit informal economy. How are peacebuilding initiatives influencing the dynamics of the informal economy and what does that mean for the broader peacebuilding agenda? To explore this, this thesis uses a template thematic analysis, a tool which analyses the data into a coding structure called a template as a theoretical framework. This allows for the data to be analysed in various hierarchies, thus painting an interactive picture of how different elements shape the overall narrative. The fieldwork for this approach encompasses in-depth interviews and thematic analysis. The fieldwork and analysis will be undertaken in accordance with the following research questions:

1. How and to what extent are state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives shaped by neopatrimonialism?

   a. How has the influence of neopatrimonialism on state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives challenged the construction of peace in post-conflict Bayelsa and Rivers?

2. How have state-led and donor-funded peacebuilding initiatives shaped the informal economy?

   b. Does this influence the illicit informal economy? If so, in what way(s)?
   c. How does this challenge the construction of peace and the peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict Bayelsa State and Rivers State?

Contributions

This thesis contributes to political economy and peacebuilding scholarship by exploring how peacebuilding initiatives interact with the informal economy and what this means for the overall peacebuilding agenda (Jones et al., 2006; Meagher, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2017; Danielson, 2016). It will build on three notable contributions to political economy literature. Firstly, it contributes to scholarship about the neopatrimonial relationships which underpin states and legitimise regimes and examines the forms of authority and political relations that previous studies on the Bayelsa state and River state have focused on. This scholarship emerged as the central conceptual label by which scholars understood politics and conflict within the Niger Delta region. The study of post-conflict Bayelsa state and River state have been underpinned by the social-scientific dichotomy of greed and grievances. Specifically, these dichotomies have been operationalised mostly through the concept of neopatrimonialism. Thus, studies on the region have come to be ubiquitously about neopatrimonialism – a concept used to describe the complex interplay between the regime and elites specifically with regards to conflict. Recent studies have begun to expand on neopatrimonialism as a theme within studies of governance and development issues beyond conflict, thus this thesis aims to expand on this area. It shifts the analytical focus from neopatrimonialauthority in the context of conflict to neopatrimonial authority in

the context of peace and explores how peacebuilding is shaped by neopatrimonial authority. It expands on neopatrimonial authority by focusing on discourses of power, taking into consideration the reception and audiences of power, and thus this thesis unpacks the symbolic and discursive mechanisms which aid the legitimation of neopatrimonial authority within the peacebuilding agenda.

Secondly, the peacebuilding strategies implemented over the last ten years in the Rivers and Bayelsa states have incorporated many new elites – such as the heads of numerous militant organisations – into the neopatrimonial system; the strategies have fallen short in addressing not only the conflict in the region but also the dynamics of the illicit informal economy which can reproduce conflict. Placing the patron-client relations at the centre of its analysis the thesis explores how there is a fluid relation to the informal economy to further understand how the informal economy is shaped in post-conflict societies. Rather than utilising the usual conceptualisation of these relationships – that the clients are being exploited by the patrons – as previous studies on Nigeria have done (BISINA, 2001; Eberlein, 2006; Omeje, 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2008; Bagia, 2009; Mähler, 2010; Obi, 2010; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Iwilade, 2014; Ebiede, 2016), or focusing on the boundaries between the informal, formal as well and illicit informal economy, this thesis explores how these patronage networks have led to the criminalisation of peace leading to the "positioning" in the informal economy, "performance of militancy" in the illicit informal economy consequently leading to the marginalisation of population.

Thirdly, the focus on the neopatrimonial nature of peacebuilding contributes to the thematic analysis of the political economy of peacebuilding and how the political economy of conflict can be detrimental to the overall peacebuilding agenda. This focus brings into question the transformation from conflict economies to peace economies as well as the reality vs theory of liberal peacebuilding in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. It does so by exploring the dimensions of donor-based and state-led narrative of the peacebuilding agenda and how this brings about the establishment of positive peace, which allows for a better understanding of the formation of peace economies. This builds on previous studies that conceptualised the transformation of war/conflict economies (Carbonnier, 2003; Festic and Rausche, 2004; Nitzschke and Studdard, 2005; Brown, 2006; Pugh, 2006; Spear, 2006; Turner and Pugh, 2006; Newman and Keller, 2007; Broodryk and Solomon, 2011; Distler et al., 2018; Bhatia, 2021; Wennmann, 2021).

Significance

This thesis is significant in three major ways. Firstly, it brings the integrated strategies of post-conflict peacebuilding by both state- and donor-based initiatives into focus, and places attention on

neopatrimonial relations and power structures to enable positive peace. Secondly, it provides a reminder of the multifaceted, heterogeneous and simultaneously stubborn and deeply rooted nature of the illicit informal economy specifically in post-conflict societies. This illicit informal economy shapes the rules and institutions of the formal economy, further incentivising corruption, reconstructing neopatrimonial power dynamics and marginalising agency, which also undermines the informal economy and peacebuilding initiatives as well. Thus, understanding the nexus between the informal economy, the illicit informal economy and peacebuilding will ensure that designs for economic and social policy responses to the reality of power dynamics. Thirdly, this study highlights the importance of understanding and having a clear perspective of the reality and theory of liberal peacebuilding especially in Africa. This, therefore, questions the narrative of liberal peacebuilding.

Background to Rivers State and Bayelsa State

Bayelsa and Rivers are two of the nine states that make up the Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. The Niger Delta is an oil-rich and environmentally fragile region that is home to approximately 30 million people hailing from 20 different ethnic groups (Ekeh, 2007). Within the area of the longest rivers emptying into the Atlantic Ocean between Benin and Biafra, occupations within the region are mainly those of farmers and fishermen; however, the oil industry over the last decade has not only threatened the livelihoods and survival of the inhabitants but has, further, led to the expansion of the informal economy.

Since becoming the heart of the Nigerian economy in the 1970s, oil has contributed about 80 per cent of all federal revenue (Ekeh, 2007). Despite the existence of oil, both Rivers state and Bayelsa state remain among some of the poorest and most underdeveloped states within the country. This is due the mismanagement of the oil refineries, stunted growth of core institutions, poor governance, and rising participation in the informal structures of power and the informal economy has placed these states at the centre of many studies and analysis. This has ultimately led to political competition which has been centred around obtaining power to control the massive revenue (Wapmuk, 2012; Oyewo, 2016; Iwilade, 2017). With little or no trickle-down effect from the billions of dollars generated from oil exploration, aid bunkering, the emergence or growth of theft, corruption by political elites, environment degradation, political exclusion, ethnic divides, youth mobilisation, and unemployment, the dynamics of these states have been complex and cannot be painted on the canvas of a single cause (Wapmuk, 2012; Oyewo, 2016; Iwilade, 2017).

Furthermore, extensive research has shown that political, social, environmental and economic marginalisation has created a situation in which violent movements thrive, and, consequently, lead to militarisation (Wapmuk, 2012; Oyewo, 2016; Iwilade, 2017).. From the Ogoni crisis of 1995 to the large-scale conflict in 2003–2006 and then in 2009, various responses by the Nigerian government failed to pave the way for the only initiative that could work, an amnesty programme. In 2009, the late president Umaru Yar'Adua, announced a 60-day amnesty programme within the whole Niger Delta. The amnesty programme formally addressed the conflict by de-militarising the militant groups; it failed, however, to resolve many underlying sources of conflict that are once again taking centre stage, such as the sharing of oil resources, political and ethnic marginalisation, poverty, environmental degradation, and so on. Generally, the post-conflict Bayelsa state and Rives state is marked by intermeshing crimes committed during and since the conflict that overlap with the peacebuilding process, informal economy and the illicit informal economy (Ugor, 2013). The post-conflict Bayelsa and Rivers is a case that exemplifies the importance of the power dynamics, the resilience of the illcit informal economy and the ways in which both economies intertwine, feeding into each other.

Beyond the militarisation of these states over the last decade history has interwoven into a complex story of social mobilisation, violence and marginalisation that has been inextricably sewn into the very fabric of these states. At its very heart is the thriving informal economy that has been dominated by the oil economy, youth violence and economic elites, aid bunkering and criminality, and which has over the years been incentivised by marginalisation, injustice, disempowerment and environmental degradation (Obi, 2014; Oyewo, 2016; Obi and Oriola, 2018). The informal economy is further shaped by the overlapping territorial claims to land by various ethnic groups. This is especially fuelled by oil multinationals and state officials who generate disputes and foment ethnic divides based on historical memory, land disputes, and even disputes over oil wells (Oyewo, 2016; Obi and Oriola, 2018). Thus, the development of core governance institutions has resulted in the emphasis laid upon the formation of informal networks to obtain power.

Thus, Bayelsa and Rivers states serve as an interesting case for the literature on the informal economy and post-conflict building initiatives. Previous literature on the Niger Delta has created a critical space in which the politics of the rentier states have especially been studied (Omeje, 2006; Sandbakken, 2006; Orogun, 2009; Asumah, 2010; Fragiskatos, 2010; Idemudia, 2010; Losman, 2010; Nzeadibe et al., 2015; Osunmuyiwa et al., 2017). This theme has, however, limited our understanding in integrating a broader debate about neopatrimonialism and the political economy in Nigeria. It ignores the links that connect the region with the rest of the country, the role of elites, and understanding of the overall impact for

peacebuilding. Furthermore, the literature has focused on the notion of actors operating from a fixed point that is framed based on conflict and ignores the role of 'peace' within the post-conflict society. What kind of peace is established? How has the establishment of peace been shaped by the interconnection of the formal and informal structures of power? What does this then mean for peace? These are the questions that both Rivers state and Bayelsa state as case studies allow us to explore and contribute to the scholarship of peacebuilding and political economy.

Methodology

This thesis uses qualitative methods to provide a more locally grounded perspective. All the components and foundations within the qualitative research contribute to contextualising and understanding the research questions within this study. A qualitative approach will foster a better understanding of the peacebuilding within Bayelsa and Rivers, the ways in which it is shaped by neopatrimonialism, and, overall, how it influences or is influenced by the informal economy. The use of rich and critical descriptive interviews provided in-depth accounts of participants' experiences which feeds into this research. The sheer complexity of the informal economy entails that there can be no single approach to understanding the phenomenon's articulations. Thus, the qualitative research methods proposed for use in this study include case study and semi-structured interviews through snowball sampling to ensure systemic and concurrent data collection and data analysis.

This research is aligned to 'critical' approaches, used by Frankfurt School theoreticians such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Max Horkhiemer, (Jay, 1973; Hughes, 1975; Agger, 1979; Habermas, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1981a,b, 1984, 1987a,b;, Connerton, 1980; Kellner, 1989b) Critical theory moves beyond the obvious to uncover the effects of political structures and power relations. It questions the conceptual and theoretical bases of knowledge, and acknowledges the role of social and power positions in various phenomena (Griffiths, 2009). The current discourses in society are laid bare and analysed in terms of the systems in which they operate, focusing on disclosing the power relationships within these systems (iNtgrty, 2021), as well as how they are structured, in order to reveal the oppressive nature of the structures. This theory assumes that reality is attainable and shaped by political, cultural, economic, social, and gendered-based forces (Griffiths, 2009). Thus, this philosophy fits the dynamic of this thesis as it questions the power relations that sustain dominant realities (Calás and Smircich, 1997). Critical theory perspectives strive to bring to light what has been excluded by power relations through the deconstruction of what counts as reality, as one would dismantle the bricks and mortar that make up an old building (Calás and Smircich, 1997).Thus, critical theory challenges existing ways of thinking and knowledge, and is relevant to the challenges this research raises to current

modes of thinking about peacebuilding initiatives, the informal economy, and the formation of peace economies. Within the philosophical framework, concepts and theories serve as challenges in order to demonstrate alternative perspectives and realities that were previously excluded or silent, as well as observing the interests they serve. As shown in the conceptual framework diagram below.

Conceptual Framework

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework

Positionality of Researcher

As in all research, it is helpful to understand our positionality and, therefore, our lens on the data as such this section captures my positionality as a researcher whilst undertaking the research as part of

my PhD candidature. Predominantly it depicts the milieu that influenced the choices and decisions made and how negated through issues that arose. It starts by firstly locating myself in relation to the subject, i.e., acknowledging personal positions that have the potential to influence the research. Secondly, locating myself in relation to the participants, i.e., researchers individually considering how they view themselves, as well as how others view them.

In terms of personal positions that had the potential to influence this research various familial connections i.e., connection to the former Permanent Secretary of Defence and a former Naval Air Vice Marshall open some door. Due to these familial connections, I was able to gain quick access to staff in the Ministry of Defence and the College of War. However, while these familial connections had a lot of benefits, it did have a disadvantage. While engaging in an interview with a member of state-led my positionality was question. During the conversation, the participant asked where my father's political loyalties laid. These statements made by highlights issues to address in considering my positionality. This situation was mitigated by listening to the participants, ensuring they felt heard but also highlighting how that was a question not for me but my father, and steering him back to the interview question. As a result, Issues of positionality remained active throughout the data collection process.

It is key to note, for this research, I was both insider and outsider. As Nigerian concerned with issue of peace, I became an insider with both state and donor-based organisations, as my research interest is their lived experience. But on the flip side, indigens from the Niger Delta with whom I interacted with strong ethnic ties, were unable to relate to me. As I sought to engage participants in frank conversations about their understanding and perceptions state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives' in Bayelsa state and Rivers state I expected that my position as a Nigerian woman would aid me in connecting especially well with researchers in peacebuilding organisations. At first, the similarity in national identity created a sense of belonging, building the spontaneous relationship – with the participants I was interviewing. To further foster this, in conversations with both members of state-led and donor-based organisations from the Niger Delta, as I introduced myself, drawing on my insider status more so than when I interacted with people who were not from the Niger Delta region. It might have been that I was seeking to compensate for my outsider status of being a "from the North' collecting data from people from the Niger Delta region, many of whom were men.

In reflecting on the research experience, I noticed that my position as an insider- a Nigerian was not enough to always convince participants to engage in the research Participants, especially those from Niger Delta region perceived me as an outsider. They assumed as an outsider did not have a detailed

awareness of Deltans struggles. I was able to mitigate this by showing I have a vested interested in the Niger delta region. As I was posted to Rivers state in 2014 for my National Youth Service. In addition to this my background in peace and conflict and as well as experiencing first head the various conflicts in Jos, allowed me to identify and sympathise with the effects, impacts of conflict within the region beyond a lay man.

Furthermore, it crucial to note that while interacting with middle to low level security forces, I made special efforts to make to connect with them. As works Cabrera & Nora, (1994); Chang, (2002) Fries-Britt & Turner, (2002) suggest people tend to gravitate toward those with whom they share some level of commonality. These included speaking pidgin English, conducting interviews at their duty posts which were mostly outside rather than offices. Also, rather disclosing links to higher rank officers, I mostly used mid-level officers to gain access to foot soldiers in Bayelsa state. As such, mid and low-level security forces were much more open to discussing issues with me.

As with any research project, as I moved through the research process, I continually thought about issues pertaining to positionality. I realize that my positionality is not a limitation. My positionality meets the positionality of participants, and they do not rest in juxtaposition to each other. The research in which I engage is shaped by who I am, and if I remain reflective throughout the process, I will be shaped by it, and by those with whom I interact. Highlighting 2 points to consider when carrying research of this nature. Firstly, the need to address positionality with all participants of qualitative studies beyond physical attributes. As I noted previously, I engaged differently with people from the Niger Delta and people who were not from the Niger Delta even though there all have similar physical attributes as me. Secondly, when collecting data in the field to be clear not only with their participants but also myself concerning the motivations of the study and collecting data. Are there motives (true or assumed) that relate to my positionality? Addressing questions of motivation with participants has the potential to foster greater openness between participants and myself.

Challenges in the Field

There were several challenges I faced during my fieldwork. Firstly, due to the security challenges in Bayelsa state and Rivers state I was concerned about my general safety in the field. This was especially true in Bayelsa due to the political atmosphere as the gubernatorial elections were just about to take place during my research. Apart from this there was the constant risk associated with being in proximity of the constant crimes, robbery, kidnapping, human trafficking and piracy that are endemic to the region. As a result of the environment I was only able to visit Bayelsa once, while in Port Harcourt my movement was restricted to the major offices in the city centre and I was unable to visit any villages.

Secondly, another interesting and unexpected challenge was the lack of trust and high level of suspicion from both government and aid-funded agencies. Some agencies suspected that I was a spy from the Nigerian government and insisted I sign a declaration with their legal department, which I did after getting permission from both my supervisors.

Case Selection

To examine how and to what extent peacebuilding are shaped by neopatrimonialism. I chose two state in the southern Nigeria, Bayelsa and River state. I used a case-study design because it is an intensive study and it is important to get as complete a picture as possible in order to fully answer the questions and realise the purpose of the study; case-study design also offers fine detail, and allows for appreciation of the importance of local context, nuance and dynamics (Tellis, 1997; Meyer, 2001; Corcoran et al., 2004; Held, 2009: Widdowson, 2011; Njie and Asimiran, 2014; Snyder, 2015; Yin, 2018). It is also a means of examining roleplay between parties, and in that way, of gaining understanding and describing their actions (Sedgwick, 2014). Rivers states and Bayelsa states were purposively selected based on economic status, current peacebuilding initiatives and the Nigerian government's current interest in the informal economy in that region. In addition, the collection of data in these states was facilitated by the region's current relative political stability and safety.

Furthermore, the selection of Bayelsa state and Rivers states as a case study for this research provides an opportunity to understand different manifestations of the link between the informal economy and peace building initiatives within the region. The Nigerian government proposes to legalise some of the informal oil refineries with the aim of using the market as a means by which resources will be allocated, in order to provide jobs. Thus, the informal economy is already an agenda in which the Nigerian government is interested; this study functions as one step towards the direction of economic recovery and growth by concentrating on the understanding of the informal economy through peacebuilding, an aspect that is not included in the recovery plan of the Nigerian government. In addition to this, in 2011, the UNEP report on Ogoniland recognises the importance of cleaning up the Delta as well as of sustainable development within the region (United Nations, 2011). That report led to the creation of the Clean Up Project which commenced work in 2019. Additionally, President Buhari's Strategic Implementation Plan for Budget Change and its 2017–2020 Economic Recovery and Growth Plan highlight the informal economy within the Niger Delta and recognise its continuation based on "leaks of public resources, corruption and inefficient spending" (The State House, Abuja, 2020; Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017, p. 21; (UNEP, 2017)). Hence, these parts of the informal economy in particular in the Niger Delta region are a current focus of the Nigerian government.

Likewise, the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), in conjunction with the British Council, in its 2017 Economic and Natural Resources report recognises the role of the patronage system in continuing economic grievances, stating that "Nigeria's system of patrimonial politics where political affiliations, ethnicity and religious identities are primary factors determining the allocation of resources, including state benefit" (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2017, p. 2). The NSRP report further emphasised the role of the socio-economic and political marginalisation of youth as major conflict drivers which feed into the informal economy. Thus, the importance of the informal economy cannot be overemphasised, and the focus on Rivers and Bayelsa not only falls in line with current efforts towards development and peacebuilding within the region, but also offers a means by which to understand the informal economy and peacebuilding initiatives in general.

Data Collection

The methodology used for this study involved the integration of primary data and secondary data. Interviews formed the primary data and further data was obtained using secondary sources. Official reports and statements were also gathered. Secondary data was drawn from extensive research of sources on databases such as Web of Science, Research Channel Africa, Sage Premier Online, Africa Portal, EBSCO host Research Platform, and World Newspaper Archive, collation of newspapers, Nigerian government publications, peacebuilding reports, conference material and presentations. The use of both primary and secondary data provided a pool of relevant sources that enabled the description and classification of themes within the data and the structure of various hierarchies to summarise the findings.

All the primary data gathered during this research was recorded using a recording device that enabled me to store the date, time, and 'name' of participants. This also made transferring the interviews onto my computer easier. Furthermore, I made use of an interview protocol for the interviews, This was useful as it ensured that key themes consistently guided interviews. It also allowed me to record emerging questions, those raised by participants that were not initially included in the questions I constructed.

Interviews

This research makes use of in-depth interviews for the collection of data in Rivers State, Bayelsa State, and Abuja. In-depth interviews were essential as they allow for the identification of the participant's opinions, emotions and feelings, and their perceptions around a particular subject. The inclusion criteria for this study were individuals who had relevant knowledge and/or experience in peacebuilding

initiatives in Bayelsa state and River state either through work, association and so on for a minimum of three years. Interviews were semi-structured as this allowed for flexibility in terms of how the interview was conducted, which in turn created room for the generation of conclusions that would have not been foreseen if the research had been restricted using closed-ended questions (Gubrium, 2012; Silverman, 2017). Furthermore, written consent was received from all participants, and they were all informed of the voluntary nature of involvement with this thesis and were given the option to withdraw from the study before the start of data analysis.

The empirical material underpinning this thesis is based upon six months' fieldwork in Bayelsa, Rivers and Abuja from June 2019 to November 2019. A total of 29 interviews were conducted cutting across Abuja, Rivers and Bayelsa, with key informants as mentioned below. The interview venues were chosen according to participants' convenience and willingness. Each interview lasted between 40 and 80 minutes, with the aim of going through eight open-ended questions, with the aid of an interview guide. Due to the nature of this research, a field journal was also kept to document observations as well as any additional remarks that may have occurred during the fieldwork.

Furthermore, with the range of data being used, it is imperative to converge data sources, a process known as data triangulation. Data triangulation is a method of ensuring comprehensive results in the research which not only reflect the participants' knowledge accurately, but also have foundations within the other sources used (Yin, 2017). Yin and Stake (2009, 2010, 2017) both concurred that data triangulation is a crucial element in case-study research. As such, with the intended scope of understanding how peacebuilding initiatives interact and shape the informal economy as well as how this is shaped by clientelism, this research used data triangulation.

	Data Collection for each Question			
Research Question	**Primary Data**	**Secondary Data**	**Data Analysis**	**Purpose**
1. How and to what extent are state-led and donor-funded peacebuilding initiatives shaped by neopatrimonialism–clientelism and political patronage? a. How has the influence of neopatrimonialism–clientelism and political patronage on state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives challenged the construction of peace economies in post-conflict Bayelsa and Rivers?	Interviews with peacebuilding, development agencies, interviews from scholarly experts from local universities in the Niger Delta eg. The University of Port Harcourt.	Books, journals and publications from the University of Port Harcourt	Thematic Analysis	Interviews with peacebuilding agenices will facilitate in providing insights about the patrimonial system in the Bayelsa state and Rivers state a and how it shapes peacebuilding initiatives. Interviews with acadmic scholars will provide insights on the patrimonial system that is not captured within textbooks or provided by developmental agencies.
2. How have state-led and donor-funded peacebuilding initiatives shaped the informal economy? a. Does this influence the illicit informal economy? If so, in what ways? b. How does this challenge the construction of positive peace and the peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict Bayelsa State and Rivers State?	Interviews with peacebuilding and development agencies, interviews with peacbeuilding scholars. Interviews with local police forces		Thematic content anlyais ai	Interviews with peacebuilding and development agencies will provide practical identification of observable interactions and behaviors between the informal economy and peacebuilding initiatives, practical knowledge on collaborative peacebuilding initiatives engaged in with the state and how this relates to the informal economy. Interviews with peacebuilding experts within the University of Port Harcourt will provide a further understanding of how peacebuilding shapes the informal economy from an academic perspective. these sources of data will complement each other to answer this research question.

Sampling

Purposive sampling was used to select the participants for this research. Purposive sampling refers to "a selection strategy in which particular settings, persons or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can't be gotten as well from other choices" (Maxwell, 2005, p. 88). In addition to purposive sampling, a snowball sampling method was also used. In this method participants or informants:

> with whom contact has already been made use their social networks to refer the researcher to other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study. Snowball sampling is often used to find and recruit hidden populations, that is, groups not easily accessible to researchers (Heckathorn, 2002, p. 12).

Thus, the sample group grows like a rolling snowball. As the sample builds up, enough data is gathered for the researcher's needs. Snowball sampling is a useful tool for building networks and increasing the number of participants. Snowball sampling method was applied to prevent the data from being skewed; as such, participants were not only from the NSRP and PIND but also included some of their partners and government agencies. This helped to further ensure that participants were best situated to meet the purpose of the study (Bartlett and Vavrus, 2017).

As stated above, participants were firstly selected from the peacebuilding initiatives examined, the NSRP and PIND. Secondly, using the snowball sampling technique participants were selected based on their work with both initiatives. Finally, the snowball sample ensured that participants with knowledge and experience of peacebuilding initiatives and an understanding of the informal economy in the Bayelsa and Rivers states were included. Thus, participants were selected from the following:

1. Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) (in Abuja – in conjunction with the British Council)
2. Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) (located in Abuja and Port Harcourt)
3. Institute of Peace (Abuja)
4. Ministry of Defence (Abuja)
5. Local police offices (Rivers)
6. College of War (Abuja)
7. University lecturers (experts in peace studies in the Niger Delta)

8. Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)

	Type of Respondents	Interviewees
1.	Staff from the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme	3
2.	Staff from the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND, located in Abuja and Port Harcourt)	6
3.	Staff from the Institute of Peace	4
4.	Staff from the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)	2
5.	Nigerian military/security forces	4
6.	Staff from the Ministry of Defence	2
7.	Staff from the College of War	2
8.	Academics	6
	Total Number of Respondents	29

Table 1 Number and Types of Respondents Interviewed

It is curial to note that while this method of convenience sampling is an affordable way to gather data and provides a wealth of qualitative information it does have some limitations as seen in this project. However, this sampling has various limitations, it does not provide a representative result and there are issues of under-representation with convenience sampling. The issue of under-representation can be seen in the inability to talk directly to people within the informal economy. This was due to security concerns in both Bayelsa and Rivers states as well as lack of access to members of clientelist networks. As such the data in the research are from the perspectives of state-led and donor-based organisations alone.

Positionality of the Respondents.

Donor-based Organisations.

As in all research, it is helpful to understand our positionality and, therefore, our lens on the data. For this research being my positionality, it was also critical to reflex on the positionality of various participants interviews. The participants in the donor-based organisation were mainly middle-class men who were originally from states within the Niger Delta and had lived in that area for a long people of the time. They often referred to themselves as "sons of the soil". This showed their deep-rooted ethnic ties and as a result, led them to question the motivations behind my research. Most of them perceived me to be an outsider, "from the north" and referred to me as such. As discussed above, I mitigated this by trying to appeal to their sense of nationality, which work with most participants but not all. In addition to this, this strong bond to ethnicity shaped how their stance on issues in Bayelsa state and Rivers state- with many of them identifying and speaking from places of anger, grief, and pain. This allowed me to truly understand the lay of the land as depicting importance to ethnicity and traditions in the Niger Delta- an element not previously considered. Furthermore, they had various educational qualifications ranging from bachelor's degrees to doctorate degrees. This impacted how they responded to questions, as they were highly informed about the theory of peacebuilding as in academia.

State-led Organizations

Again, most of the participants I interviewed were men, however, their ethnicity cut across the Niger Delta, the north, a middle belt of Nigeria. Participants from the middle and the north were mostly middle to low-level men within security forces- who were not concerned with my motivation for the study. However, they were more concerned with my gender although this did not impact their willingness to speak to me. Furthermore, I am unsure of the sense of national identity but participants from the north and middle belt of Nigeria also identified with grievances in the Niger Delta. Also speaking from a place of pain and anger. In addition, their educational background ranged from school leavers to bachelor's degrees. Majorly the school leavers preferred to speak pidgin (broken English)

It is crucial to note that across both state-led and donor-based organisations that were still a consensus of the multi-layered nature of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and River state.

Data Analysis

Thematic template analysis, as developed by King, is used as the means of analysing the data gathered (2004b; King and Brooks, 2016; Walters, 2016; Nowell et al., 2017; Braun and Clarke, 2019; Lochmiller, 2021). This is a method of analysis in which data is framed within a template which serves as the coding structure. This is a process where data is categorised into themes and subthemes in order to be comparable. The main advantage in using thematic template analysis is that the data collected becomes refined and simplified (King and Brooks, 2016). This will ensure that the end results can be measured using qualitative techniques. In addition, content analysis would permit structure of the data in a manner that will ensure the research objectives are accomplished (Krippendorff and Bock, 2009). Within thematic analysis, major themes emerging from the participants' responses will be integrated within the arguments of this research in verbatim format. The template is updated from time to time until the full picture of the research has been captured and the research questions answered (King and Horrocks, 2010).

The codes within this initial template of the research were based on topics based on both the literature review and previous knowledge. However, as the interviews progressed, and the data analysis was completed the codes fell within three main categories:

1. topics based on the literature review and previous knowledge
2. codes that address a larger theoretical perspective in the research
3. codes that were surprising and were not anticipated at the start of the research

The organisation of codes in a hierarchical manner is a prominent feature of template thematic analysis. This is done by grouping similar codes together to allow the research to properly analyse the data at different levels of specificity (King, 2004b). The 'highest-order' codes – or the highest category of codes – represent the initial themes to be analysed. These are usually broader and frequently form the basis of the discussion. The codes are then subdivided into any of levels one, two or three lower-level codes, depending on the depth of analysis of the research. Thus, for this research the levels are labelled as: level one, which are the broader themes and the highest level of hierarchy; level two, which are subcategories of level one; and level three, which are subcategories of level two, and so on, thus, forming the hierarchy described by King.

The first stage of the data analysis involved creating the initial template or code which was a representation of the undefined data. This occurred because some of the themes were a priori – that is, themes identified in advance. However, these themes changed and were reshaped as I engaged with interviews and more texts, as displayed below. The relationship between the themes showed how themes were revised because of the way data was organised within the template. It is key to note that a prominent feature is the arrangement of the template in a hierarchical manner (King, 2004b). This is achieved by grouping similar themes together to form 'higher-order codes' (King, 2004b, p. 258), thus enabling the researcher to analyse the data at various levels of specificity. Thus, within this research, to determine the initial template, interview guide questions and previous literature were used. This enabled me to analyse the most important content, and data was sorted into categories. Firstly, the data was organised based on the date and time that interviews were conducted; this eased the transcribing of the interviews and ensured no interview was skipped. Secondly, I adopted an immersion approach which entailed listening to the recordings numerous times. This process allowed me to gain a better insight into the research questions and allowed me to adapt subsequent interviews based on emerging themes that I otherwise did not consider: for example, the role of traditional leaders in peacebuilding. Thirdly, I was able to generate emerging themes which enabled the next stage of the process, which was coding the data into the different themes based on the perception of participants; these related to the state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives, the informal economy, as well as various incentives and institutions associated with peacebuilding, for example, partners of the peacebuilding initiatives, and so on. After the data was categorised into various themes I then analysed and interpreted it by structuring it into a template for better analysis. This enabled me to analyse how the various themes differed and the interplay among them, providing a broad interpretation of the coded data. Furthermore, after deducing the data, I then looked for multiple sources and perceptions in order to draw conclusions about peacebuilding and the informal economy. The final stage was writing up the report of the case study, which contributes to the interest, incentives and institutions within peacebuilding and the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers states.

Initial Template (Before Fieldwork)

Level 1 – Peacebuilding initiatives and neopatrimonialism

   Level 2 – Separate reality (theory and language of the NSRP and PIND)

      Level 3 – Clientelism

         Level 4 – Corruption

Level 1 – Initiatives and the informal economy

Level 2 – Limitations of initiatives

Level 2 (i) – Lack of suitability of programmes

(ii) – Lack of measurement of success

Level 3 – Loss of livelihoods

Level 4 – Alternative sources of livelihoods

Level 5 – Crime

Level 6 – Ungoverned and government spaces

Level 1 – Peacebuilding, informal economy and development

Level 2 – Community development

Level 3 – Lack of development

(i) – Lack of basic infrastructure

The themes for discussion were identified after the construction of the initial template, and as the research progressed the template was revised on numerous occasions. These included new codes at various levels, deleting some codes as they no longer reflected the aim of the thesis, and redefining some of the codes. Furthermore, some of the codes were also re-ordered within the hierarchy structure in order to reflect their importance within this thesis. All this resulted in a final template being constructed after the interviews had been transcribed, thus ensuring that none of the data was left out. Additionally, the thematic analysis successfully answered the research questions, because it showed the development from prior themes to the finalised themes.Also, as suggested by King and Horrocks (King, 2004), to prevent the data becoming descriptive it is important to interpret and link the coded template to the research questions. Thus, within this research the themes were analysed based on their level of prominence within the transcripts, and then linked to the research questions. In order to execute this properly the themes were firstly linked back to the literature, then expanded on using quotes and the perspectives of participants. The template below represents the moving themes within the research that have been examined in the analysis chapters – themes such as neopatrimonialism, 'patronage peacebuilding' and 'performing militancy', for example, which aim to identify and analyse: firstly, how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are being shaped by neopatrimonialism; secondly, how peacebuilding initiatives shape the informal economy. The restructured themes based on the analysed data are detailed below (compare Initial Template (Before Fieldwork):

Finalised Template (After Fieldwork)

Level 1 – Definition vs reality of peacebuilding in Rivers and Bayelsa

   Level 2 – Separate reality (theory and language of the NSRP and PIND)

      Level 3 – Patronage peacebuilding

         Level 4 – Clientelism

            4 (i) – Struggle for power

              (ii) – Corruption

            Level 5 –Effective of Patronage Peacebuilding on the peacebuilding agenda

               5 (i)Tolerance of patronage peacebuilding

                 (ii) – Blame game

                 (iii) Reliance on NGOs by the population

Level 1 – Donor-Based Initiatives (PIND and the NSRP) and the informal economy

    Level 2 – State-led Initiatives and the informal economy

       Level 3- Criminalisation of Peace

          3 (i) Positioning

          3 (ii) – Performing Militancy

          3 (iii)- Marginalisation of Population

Ethical Considerations

I am aware of the various ethical considerations relevant to conducting this research. To ensure that this research was carried out in line with the University of Leeds ethics and data safeguarding guidelines, approval was sought from the university's ethics committee, and from the relevant agencies in Abuja, Rivers and Bayelsa. I was also aware of the university's resources on ethics for further consultation.

In line with the University of Leeds' guidelines, I made particular effort to guarantee the participants' anonymity. This was carried out through the process of pseudonymisation, where artificial identifiers were ascribed to each participant. These artificial identifiers created the opportunity to carry out follow-up interviews, when necessary, while still protecting the identities of the participants. Also, in the context of this research it was necessary to understand the perspectives representative of the stakeholders in order to understand the overall narratives and views of how state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy

and post-conflict setting. The artificial identifiers used in this research were based on the organisation each interview came from with donor-based interviewees identified respectively as DB1, DB2 and so on, depending on the number of interviews. State-based representatives were identified as SB, and academics were represented by AD The table below depicts the identification markers used in this research:

	Type of Respondents	Identity Marker
	Staff from the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)	DB
	Staff from the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND, located in Abuja and Port Harcourt)	DB
	Staff from the Institute of Peace	SB
	Staff from the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)	SB
	Nigerian military/security forces	SB
	Staff of the Ministry of Défense	SB
	Staff from the College of War	SB
	Academics	AD

Table 2 Identity Marker of Respondents

Chapter Structure

This thesis proceeds in two main parts. The first consists of a literature review and the background to the case study. The literature review (Chapter 2) contextualises the thesis within existing theories and studies, in order to provide a fundamental understanding of the key concepts of peacebuilding, the informal economy and neopatrimonialism. This chapter is divided into four subsections, which provide analysis of each concept respectively. The first subsection focuses on explaining and understanding the concept of the informal economy, and analyses the main theories which explain the origin of the informal economy, namely: dualist, structuralist, legalist, voluntarist, illegalist and realist theories. This subsection also brings out the various meanings and understandings of the informal economy through the lens of peacebuilding, highlighting the informal economy as a social source of welfare, security and resistance, as discussed in the literature. It expand on previous work to explore the acute dimension of the informal economy – that is, the illicit informal economy, including corruption, organised crime and criminality, and linking this to peacebuilding, thereby establishing the problems explored by this research. The second subsection discusses the existing literature on liberal peacebuilding and highlights the political economy of peacebuilding. It assess a wide range of perspectives and theories which attempt to explain the causes and motivations of liberal peacebuilding initiatives. It also focuses on key themes developed around peacebuilding studies, highlighting the gaps within the literature. The third subsection analyses neopatrimonialism, taking into consideration the neopatrimonial paradigm and highlighting the distinction between the various 'big' men (political patrons, godfathers and political entrepreneurs). The fourth subsection links the three conceptual terms – the informal economy, peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism – together to highlight the niche for this study. Most importantly, this chapter contributes to the overall structure of this thesis by framing and reviewing the relevant theoretical and empirical debates in the literature on political economy related to peacebuilding, the informal economy and neopatrimonialism. This presentation of information exposes the gaps in the currently available research.

The background to the case study (Chapter 3) builds on these key concepts, introducing the case study of Bayelsa and Rivers states. It explores the origins and dynamics of the conflict in these states. The first subsection provides a brief history of the conflict, integrating a large body of writings on the conflict and laying out a historical timeline of the conflict, concentrating on different key dimensions of overlapping causes and motivations from the political, ideological, economic and strategic interests at its heart. This section touches on factors such as the discovery of oil, the role of both nationalism and ethnicity, the emergence of insurgent groups, and the ways in which these have influenced and escalated the conflict from political violence to militarisation, as well as the role that traditional leaders

have played in shaping and responding to the conflict. The second section also explores the transition to peace and discusses the different government responses used to manage the conflict. The empirical literature indicates that in conceptualising the peacebuilding, the Nigerian government adopted a minimalist approach. This approach focused on addressing insecurity and instability, instead of taking a maximalist approach, which encompasses the latter, as well as enhancing development opportunities in order to address the root causes of the conflict. Backed by the literature, the second section revealed that peacebuilding efforts in Bayelsa state and Rivers states have been a mix of neoliberal and neopatrimonial peacebuilding approaches. The third subsection of this chapter analyses the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers states, analysing it not just as a way of life but also exploring its acute dimension with regard to corruption, organised crime and criminality, which then paves the way for this thesis to focus on peacebuilding and the informal economy. The size of the informal economy and, additionally, the relationship between the informal economy and macroeconomic variables in Bayelsa and Rivers is also analysed. The four subsection provides an overview of peacebuilding initiatives: the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) and Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) are examined. This chapter aims to contribute to the thesis by providing background knowledge of the case studies to be examined, highlighting the road from conflict to peace, and setting the scene in order to understand the elements of the informal economy and peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers.

The second part of the thesis presents the empirical findings and the outcome of the qualitative analysis. Chapter 4 focuses on answering the first research question: how and to what extent are state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives shaped by neopatrimonialism? The first section takes a critical look at donor-based peacebuilding (the NSRP and PIND), while the second section examines state-led peacebuilding initiatives. This section then goes on to explore the understanding of the concept of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers and the difference between the theory of peacebuilding and its reality. This gives rise to the concept of 'patronage peacebuilding'. The section then moves to focus on examining the neopatrimonial nature of peacebuilding and its relationship with power. This leads to a discussion of how the actors that control these states, the state-led initiatives and donor-based initiatives tend to manipulate the institutions that are available to reinforce, support, safeguard or protect their interests. It captures the contested interests of actors and various groups (the government, elites, traditional leaders, ex-militant leaders, ex-militants and communities) and how they come together to form networks of patronage and tactical alliances, as well as to defect or break alliances in order to pursue their agendas. This exploration leads to discussion of how the competition of interests over resources has incentivised decisions and strategies within the peacebuilding agenda,

examining the patronage pyramid that exists in both Bayelsa and Rivers states. Thus, in examining the interaction of these various actors, the chapter gives a vivid portrayal of the character of these institutions and the ways in which this has affected the outcome of peacebuilding efforts in Bayelsa and Rivers. It also examines the overlap between patronage peacebuilding and the NRSP and PIND, focusing on the three consequences, the tolerance of patronage peacebuilding, the reliance on NGOs by the population and the blame game.

Chapter 5 focuses on answering the second research question, which centres on examining the nexus between peacebuilding initiatives and the informal economy. It explores how and to what extent the informal economy has shaped peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Specifically, the chapter investigates how both state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives have created ways led to the in which opportunities and resources are manipulated leading to criminalisation of peace leading to the "positioning" for aid in the informal economy, "performance of militancy" in the illicit informal economy thus consequently leading to the marginalization of the population.

Chapter 6 concludes the this research and shows how it has been able to answer the main research questions. Providing a summary of the research discussions, the study brings together the discussion in the previous chapters. In addition to exploring the research findings and their implications, the limitations and areas for future research, the chapter also describes the theoretical contributions of the research as well as exposing the gaps in the research and pointing out possible areas for further study on the Niger Delta.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Assessing and Contextualising the Informal Economy, Peacebuilding and Neopatrimonialism

Introduction

To analyse how peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy in Bayelsa state and Rivers state, this chapter focuses on providing an extensive literature review on the key concepts. An overview of key academic definitions of the informal economy, peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism are provided, examining the understanding (or lack of understanding) of the informal economy through the lens of peacebuilding. Due to the complex and interrelated nature of these concepts this chapter emphasises the importance of a clear and coherent understanding of the key terminology, especially in the case of the informal economy since there is no universally accepted definition of the term.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the informal economy, providing a foundational understanding of the informal economy and its relationship with peacebuilding activities. This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection engages with debates surrounding the contested conceptualisation of the informal economy, particularly focusing on definitions by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This is essential as it gives a better understanding of what is referred to as the informal economy. Having determined what the informal economy is, the second subsection turns to discussion on relevant theories, specifically geared to understanding the interaction between the informal and the formal economy. This is important as it serves to provide an extensive analysis of the formal–informal dimension, measuring the informal economy and its interaction with the state's institutions, as well as providing information on previous empirical studies of the informal economy, which illustrates the gaps in the existing literature and highlights the significance of this research. The third subsection discusses the nature of the informal economy, cutting across various dimensions of welfare, security and survival, and focusing specifically on 'inclusion', within the state framework.

The second section of this chapter examines the liberal peace theory highlighting its definition and understanding, which also explores the gaps within the literature of peacebuilding and how these fit within the narrative of the informal economy. This section also links the political economy of conflict to the political economy of peacebuilding, highlight the gaps and failure of liberal peace theory especially within Africa, in order to show how this study fits within the political economy.

The third subsection examines neopatrimonialism; it briefly sheds some light on the general knowledge of neopatrimonialism, discussing its links to patronage, clientelism and corruption, and explores how the literature treats the possible links between the three. Within clientelism, the notion of the 'big man' and godfatherism are discussed in order to understand the relationship between neopatrimonialism and power structure of conflict and how they feed into each other, as well as the cycle of conflict. The main objective of this section is to assess how previous literature on neopatrimonialism has accounted for the obstacles surrounding conflict economies and their overall influence on the peacebuilding agenda.

The final section links these key terms together, examining how these concepts are linked to form the conceptual framework of this thesis, with the aim of highlighting the niche for this study.

Definition of the Informal Economy

The usefulness of the informal economy as a concept has been called into question, with various researchers as well as policymakers employing different definitions, some of which are quite divergent (Moser, 1978; Crow, 1989, Scott 1991; Rakowski, 1994; Roberts, 1994). Ideas such as the clandestine economy, hidden economy, subterranean economy, unreported economy, black economy, second economy, shadow economy, irregular economy and/or cash economy are used interchangeably to describe it (Ferman and Ferman, 1973; Gutmann, 1977, 1980; Cassel and Cichy, 1986; Feige, 1989; OECD, 2002; Gerxhani, 2004; Henry and Stillls, 2006; Vuletin, 2008). For the purpose of this literature review and thesis, the term 'informal economy' is used.The concept of the informal economy was introduced by the ILO in its 1972 report on Kenya and later in 1973 by Keith Hart's research on the urban populace in Ghana (Hart, 1973). The idea has, over time, been refined and amended to include an array of firms within various fields (Hart, 1973). Over the years there has been no universally accepted definition; however. Two semi-official definitions have also been made, based on the literature on the informal economy, one by the OECD and the other by the ILO. Each will be explored below.

International Labour Organization Definition

One of the most widely used and recognised definitions of the informal economy was made by the ILO, traced back to the Decent Work initiative (ILO, 1972).. This report recognised the concept of the 'informal sector' from the 1970s, referring mainly to the economic enterprises and employment that occurred outside the regulatory structure of a state, rather than focus on the characterisation of people

involved in the jobs (ILO, 1972). It denoted the survival activities engaged in by the peripheral or marginal populations of the economy (ILO, 1972).. The ILO characterised the informal sector as: "ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, small-scale operations, labour intensive and technology, skills acquired outside of the formal sector and unregulated and competitive markets." (ILO, 1972, p. 2)

This definition was furthered reshaped by the International Labour Conference fifteenth report, in 1993, which adopted an enterprise approach; thus, the informal sector was:

> all jobs in informal sector enterprise or all persons who, during a given reference period, were employed in at least one informal sector enterprise, irrespective of their status in employment and whether it was their main or a secondary job. (ILO, 1993)

This definition recognised that the informal economy comprised small-scale units of distribution and the production of goods and services by independent, self-employed producers in the urban settings of developing countries (ILO, 1993). Mostly operating with no or very little capital, thus resulting in a low level of productivity (ILO, 1993). As such this resulted to low and irregular incomes as well as unstable employment for those who worked in the informal sector. This definition was criticised for its inability to capture different aspects of the increasing informalisation of employment, such as households that employed domestic workers within the informal sector.

In 2002 the ILO proposed to broaden the term 'informal sector' to 'informal economy', identifying the need to include a diversity of enterprises and workers to ensure the concept was not confined to a particular sector of economic activity. As such, it adopted the term 'informal economy', to cut across various sectors (ILO, 2002, p. 53). This resulted in the term informal economy referring to:

> activities are not included in the law, which means that they are operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which means that although they are operating within the formal reach of the law, the law is not applied or not enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or imposes excessive costs. (ILO, 2002, p. 53)

This definition was further harmonised by the seventeenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, which defined informal employment relating it to different aspects of the 'informalisation'

of employment as well as different targets for policy-making (ILO, 2002). It saw the concept of the informal economy expanding to include not just the informal sector, which referred to the observation units as the productions units, but also informal employment, which saw jobs as the observation units. Samson (2004) identified that the concept of the informal economy amplified the notion of informality to include enterprises as well as employment relations, which resulted in capturing the heterogeneity and the totality of the informal economy. This is important, as the informal economy is made up different economic activities. However, the definition of the infromal economy was expanded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Definition (OECD).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Definition (OECD)

Noticing the absence of a strict definition of the informal economy as well as the various approaches to defining its subject matter, the OECD proposed a more integrated definition. This definition would address the way the two terms 'undeclared work' and the 'informal economy' coexisted (OECD, 2002). Apart from these observations the OECD further acknowledged the need to broaden the definition of the informal economy to include more activities – such as VAT fraud, pilfering, extortion, social security fraud and illegal production – that were not covered in the national accounts (OECD, 2002). This resulted in the convergence of two spheres of interest for the informal economy. The first description, recognised as the 'core' definition (OECD, 2002) consisted of:

1. Undeclared work (these included employment statutes that were concealed).

2. Under-declared work – these involved employee's statutes that were declared; however, part of the earnings were concealed with collusion from the employer.

3. Black-market work – this referred to secondary jobs earnings that were concealed in collusion with the purchaser.

4. Informal employment – this referred to a situation where there was no concealment because there was no requirement to declare earnings or even employment.

Expanding the 'core' definition of the informal economy, the second and broader definition included the following within its scope (OECD, 2002):

1. Tax evasion – ranging from activities where earnings are concealed from the authorities, to self-employment – but without collusion with the purchaser.

2. Employment within illegal production – this refers to concealed production, sales as well as consumption, whether by the self-employed or an employee.

3. Employment within the production of goods and services for self-use that are not included in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

4. VAT fraud, theft, social security fraud and extortion.

Therefore, because of this amended definition of the informal economy, Chen (2012) was able to provide a more precise terminology. The amendment included informal workers and firms of unregistered or unprotected labour working within the formal sector, which was not originally covered within the definition of the previously used term 'informal sector'. Thus, within this terminology the ILO and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) (Chen, 2013, 2016; ILO, 2013; International Labour Office, 2018) view the informal economy within three central concepts, namely:

• The informal sector – this refers to production and employment within unregistered enterprises.
• Informal employment – this focuses on employment that is outside labour protection regulations of a given state, whether that falls within formal or informal enterprises.
• The informal economy – this refers to all workers and firms that operate outside the legal regulatory framework of a given state, as well as the output being generated.

In the same vein, the OECD handbook offered three categories of the non-observed economy. The first category is the underground economy, which refers to all activities that are productive and legal that can be concealed deliberately to avoid paying tax, meeting the legal standards set by the state, as well as complying with administrative producers (OECD, 2002). The second category refers to the illegal economy, which encompasses economic production that is prohibited by law. The third category refers to the informal sector, which involves the production of goods and services at a low level where actors finance their own risk, such as in the household or the employment of family, which is not declared to the government (OECD, 2002). A variety of activities within this third category can be legal and not deliberately kept secret or undeclared to the government because of factors such as weak tax laws, the state being practically absent, and so on. Consequently, production in the informal economy can be legal but it can also be illegal. Pedersen (2003) in his study on Germany, *The Shadow Economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia*, identified the link between the two as the OECD handbook does not recognise this. He acknowledges that the informal economy does consist of activities outside the state's regulatory framework, known as the 'shadow economy'. Within this shadow economy is a 'black economy', which involves undeclared productions that are illegal. Pedersen further notes that the categories might overlap in practice (Pedersen, 2003). Thus, within the scope of Pedersen's work, the informal economy not only refers to non-observed activities but also to the shadow and black economy, which are illegal as shown by the image below.

Figure 2 Formal and Informal Economy (adapted from Pedersen, 2003)

Pavlovskaya (2004) expanded the OECD definition to include 'spheres of dichotomies', which refer to components of the informal economy that are divided into four sectors, namely: the state, private, monetised and non-monetised sectors. Here the state referred to the second economy, price subsidies in various stores, bribes, wages and profits engaged in, while the non-monetised sector included activities such as various privileges and perks afforded to the state, barter exchange between various companies, networks of political and economic elites, and so on. The private monetised sector referred to help with money, rent, profits or investments, buying goods and services. The private non-monetarised sector referred to a network of family and friends and help with various forms of labour. This expansion offered by Pavlovskaya allowed for the distinguishing of favours, taking in to account the non-monetary exchange that occurs within the informal economy based on interpersonal connections.

Schneider further attempted to define the informal economy (1997, 2002, 2005), and his work was complemented by Sepulveda and Syrett's definition which recognises both legal and illegal activities based on monetary and non-monetary activities within the scope of the informal economy (Sepulveda and Syrett, 2007). This sought to further expand both on the broad definition offered by the OECD and on Lippert and Walker's work in 1997 (Lippert and Walker, 1997). This definition of the informal economy recognises the need to distinguish between goods and services, illegal employment, social fraud and illicit work such as moonlighting, as well as criminal economic activities (Sepulveda and Syrett,

2007). The legal activities include salaries and assets that were unreported, unreported legal services and goods, wages and neighbour help. The illegal activities include drug-dealing, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, trade in stolen goods, the production of drugs and theft a shown below. Thus, the illicit informal economy referred to in this thesis refers to some of the activities in the table.

Table 2.1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities[1]

Type of Activity	Monetary Transactions		Non Monetary Transactions	
Illegal Activities	Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing and manufacturing; prostitution; gambling; smuggling; fraud; etc.		Barter of drugs, stolen goods, smuggling etc. Produce or growing drugs for own use. Theft for own use.	
	Tax Evasion	**Tax Avoidance**	**Tax Evasion**	**Tax Avoidance**
Legal Activities	Unreported income from self-employment; Wages, salaries and assets from unreported work related to legal services and goods	Employee discounts, fringe benefits	Barter of legal services and goods	All do-it-yourself work and neighbor help

[1] Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks.

Figure 3 Taxonomy of Types of Illegal Informal Activities

Similarly, Williams and Renooy (2009) adopted the OECD definition, defining the informal economy as the production of legal activities that are deliberately concealed from the authorities to avoid payment of taxes, complying to various administrative procedures such as forms or statistical questionnaires, and meeting legal requirements such as minimum wage, safety and health standards.

Thus far, this work has highlighted the changing nature not just of the term 'informal economy' but also of its definitions overtime. However, despite these continuous debates surrounding the definition of the 'informal economy'. This thesis is aware of similar characteristics by which the informal economy is understood:

a) It refers to economic activities that are not recorded (Schneider, 2002). (

b)   These activities are not captured by the state's national or statistics accounts (Castells and Portes, 1989; De Soto, 1989; Harding and Jenkins, 1989; Fiege, 1990; ILO, 2013).

c)   They are invisible to policy formulation (ILO, 2013).

d)   Actors employed within the informal economy are excluded from labour standards such as safety, health, minimum wage, working hours (ILO, 2013).

Nature of the Informal Economy

Having provided an overview of the contested definition of the informal economy, this section discusses its nature. The informal economy is an increasing phenomenon that some claimed would be formalised: that is to say, become integrated with the formal economy because of economic growth or democracy (Tokeman, 1978). However, as noted by Chen (2007, p. 7), "the informal economy is here to stay". It exists in all countries and varies in size, sometimes even exceeding the formal global economy. The presence of the informal economy means that activities, industries and employment are outside the framework of the state, thus implying the lack of proper conceptualisation and understanding of it Castells and Portes, 1989; De Soto, 1989; Harding and Jenkins, 1989; Fiege, 1990; ILO, 2013). This can lead governments to miss relevant data concerning its citizens – which could influence taxes levied, the state budget and so on – hampering good governance as well as state building.

Often the informal economy is perceived as a marginal economy that enables survival and is only capable of catering to subsistence levels of economic activity and income (Bluncj et al., 2001; Meagher, 1995). This view promoted the early theorising of the informal economy as a transient economic phenomenon that occurs in less developed economies. The ILO (2013) recognised that the informal economy creates an environment in which poverty, discrimination, low productivity, exclusion, poor quality jobs, vulnerability and insecurity thrive in the labour market. It further acknowledges that its effects go beyond the dimension of the actors involved but further affects state revenues, the development of adequate policies and institutions and enterprises (ILO, 2013).This has resulted in a problematic understanding of the informal economy that focused on a macro-level perspective, thus limiting recognition of other significant drivers and decisions that impact the size of and participation in the informal economy (ILO, 2013). However, the informal economy is not just a marginal economy; rather, it is recognised as a means of economic development, as discussed below.

The first element to be examined within nature of the informal economy is whether it is taxed as this is a highly contested issue within the literature. Previous studies on informal economy have centred on taxation within the informal economy, ranging from communal levies and extortion by public officials

(Prud'homme, 1992; Olken and Singhal, 2011; Meagher, 2013; Pimhibzai and Fox, 2013).Although the informal economy is viewed as being untaxed, there is a wider range of literature especially focused on Africa that supports the notion that actors within the informal economy contribute to the revenue of both formal and informal taxes (Meagher, 2016). This challenges the view that the informal economy is not taxed. In many countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, the infromal economy is more about being unregistered, lacking the essential licences, or otherwise falling below the fiscal threshold required by the government, than about taxation (Meagher, 1990). Firms that operate within the informal economy contribute to revenue through local government level licences, fees and market dues, as well as other gazetted levies (Caroll, 2011; Meagher, 2013; Pimhizai and Foz, 2013). For example, Kate Meagher found that firms operating within the informal economy in Uganda paid a formal tax of 7 per cent of their income, and a segment of poorer actors contributed up to 23 per cent of their income to revenue (Meagher, 1990, 2016). Futher continuing this school Prud'homme argues that within the continent of Africa, informal taxes exceeded the amount of formal taxes, which results in further burdening the poor (Prud'homme, 1992; Guyer, 1994; Juul, 2006, Olken and Sighal, 2011). Further contributing to this school of thought, Olken and Singhal note that "estimates of formal taxes may underestimate the true tax burden faced by households. In particular, the conventional wisdom that poor households and households in rural areas do not generally pay taxes other than VAT may be misleading" (Olken and Singhal, 2011, p. 27). Based on these ideas, Lough et al. (2013) suggested dividing the category of informal taxes into two: informal communal self-help; and corrupt payments to officials.Thus, the notion of whether the informal economy is taxed is also contested; however, from whichever side one looks at it, these considerations help us to understand the nature of the informal economy (Meagher, 2016).

Taxation in the informal economy focuses on the bribery and 'taxes' paid to corrupt officials, further highlighting the significant role these levies play on the taxes applied within the informal economy. For example, in an analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Titeca and Kimanuka (2012) recognised the "moral economy" of corruption, where illicit payments were more accommodating than formal taxation. Oxfam (2012) further recognises that these illicit taxes have been implemented by various actors such as soldiers, militias and local chiefs, which constitutes a threat to the livelihoods of those that work in the informal sector. Consequently, it can be argued that whether viewed as formal taxes or informal taxes, the informal economy is indeed taxed.

Another interesting element of the nature of the informal economy within the literature the informal economy has been recognised as a social valve, exemplified by three somewhat interrelated factors

(Danielsson, 2015). The first factor identifies the informal economy as a welfare provider. The informal economy emerges as a result of weak institutions, a lack of state control, administrative barriers, high taxes and porous borders within the state (Danielsson, 2015). These issues illustrate the inability of the state to provide sufficient welfare for its population, thus stimulating the increase in activity within the informal economy in post-conflict societies, as people provide a parallel system by which to survive (Keen, 2012). As noted by Wennmann (2005, 2010), the informal economy functions in "sustaining welfare in the post-conflict situation when the state is so dysfunctional that our citizens must rely on the parallel economy to survive". The informal economy has widely become a pillar of survival among the general population, who do not view their activities as informal but, rather, a way of life. Examples of the informal economy acting as welfare provider were seen in the economic crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, as it grew through the implementation of structural adjustment policies (Tokman 1992). Another example can be seen in Asia in the 1990s, when the informal economy was the haven in which people created jobs after losing their formal positions (Lee 1998). Furthermore, according to the ILO, between 2007 and 2009, 27 million people across the world lost their jobs in the formal economy, thus leading them to seek safety in the informal economy (ILO, 2012c; Benson et al., 2014). Consequently, the informal economy offers inclusion to various vulnerable groups; without the presence of the informal economy, circumstances may very well be worse for members of the general population. Thus, the informal economy as a welfare providers depicts the informal economy as enhancing development for marginalised populations.

However Graner (2005) recognised that although the informal economy hampers state building and development there does, however, exist a caveat in countries where justice, policies and the monopoly of violence are controlled by both political and economic elites, where the informal economy is rather a haven in which the poor and weak operate. Thus, the 'informal' might be the result of political connotation rather than deliberating hiding one's economic activities. Furthermore, participating within the informal economy has been for some groups a response to the inefficacies of the formal institutions, institutional ambiguity and institutional inconvenience (Gifici et al., 2013; Webb et al. 2013). In 2004 a study conducted by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency showed that members of the informal economy make cost–benefit analysis decisions regarding formalisation and choose to remain or operate within the informal economy (Becker, 2004). Furthermore, a business survey conducted in South Africa reported that "[w]when asked whether they were thinking about the possibility of registration, the responses were evenly balanced with 45 percent saying they were and 43 percent saying they were not" (USAID, 2005, p. 4). Thus, bringing to light the relevance of the informal economy (Benson et al., 2014). Similarly, De Catro, Khavual and Burton's

(2014) work on the Dominican Republic found that street vendors would rather operate within the informal economy, not in order to avoid regulations but because they did not see any tangible benefit in the formal economy. There has been the development of evidence which suggests that more technologically and organised economic activities take place within the informal economy, which are far from marginal (Jones et al., 2006; Kar and Markit, 2009).

Additionally, the informal economy is seen on the one hand to present a dilemma for policymakers as it is largely associated with the violation of human rights, poverty and an unknown number of people, while on the other hand serving as a thriving, resilient and innovative system that provides services, jobs and opportunities for marginalised people (Benson et al., 2014). For example, the events that led to the Arab Spring bring to light the links between economic inclusion, social cohesion and the informal economy. The outrage of a street vendor in Tunisia setting himself on fire because his fruit cart was seized and he was unable to provide for his family highlights the weakness in socio-economic structures; this built on an already fragile system of political exclusion, abuse of human rights, and much more, resulting in full-scale violence and destruction (Benson et al., 2014). Thus, the importance of understanding the informal economy can never be over-emphasised (Benson et al., 2014). It is crucial not to downplay the role the informal economy plays in any given situation, and in order to promote sustainable development within developing countries, governments need to commit to improving and understanding the informal economy – an objective this thesis wishes to fulfil.

It is key to note that the informal economy has its own way of organising capital and its own distribution which makes it a 'community economy'. As Kinyanjui (2010) notes, it is not just an economy; rather, it includes a sociocultural dynamic involving the production and transfer of cultural products such as foodstuffs and creative industries; this is often disregarded when solely economic and entrepreneurial models are used for analysis. Some groups have developed national and even regional networks based on culture and kinship and have succeeded through a series of economic and social organisational arrangements to control big shares of markets (Kinyanjui, 2010). The informal economy thus serves as the unifying umbrella under which ethnic, class and lines of marginalisation are blurred, thus becoming the expression of marginalised groups (del Pozo-Vergnes, 2013; Benson et al., 2014). According to Tandon, the informal economy tends to be "more alert to the opportunities and threats posed by environmental or political change than their formal counterparts" (Tandon, 2012, p. 4). It is crucial to note that the informal economy is not shielded from various factors such as, for example, the political economy and climate conflict; rather, it is shaped by it and sometimes seeks alternative means to cope, survive, thrive and deal with these factors (Benson et al., 2014).

A different light has been cast more recently on the notion of the informal economy; although it remains crucial to understand the dangers and, some many even say, drawbacks of the informal economy, it also remains imperative to note how it serves as a source of livelihoods, opportunity and even income, not just for marginalised groups such as the poor and vulnerable but also for well-educated individuals as well who recognise its benefit. It has been found that the informal economy is more innovative in generating wealth and scarcity solutions than the formal economy in most parts of the globe (Tandon, 2012). This indicates the power that the informal economy possesses, and shows the need to understand and explore in more detail the influence of this (Benson et al., 2014). However, to ensure this, it is crucial to understand how the informal economy is shaped and influenced by numerous factors, one of which is peacebuilding and the political economy.

The second factor, which is especially prominent within the literature, is that the informal economy emerges as a force of resistance against both the state and the neoliberal governance pushed by the international community (Danielsson, 2015). Exemplified by analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pugh identified that the informal economy resulted from factors lacking in the social contract on which the Yugoslav welfare system relied (Danielsson, 2015). This resulted in an increase in reliance on the informal economy and meant that the informal economy functioned as a measure for social cohesion, enabling resistance and allowing for the possibility of obtaining goods and welfare outside the formal structure ((Pugh, 2004; Danielsson, 2015). A strong example of resistance was seen in the Arab Spring, where resistance emerged because of the "politics of disappointment" experienced in the informal economy (Allam, 2017). Further, as Greenberg (2014) notes, this resulted in resistance, triggering a "survival strategy" and engagement in the informal economy.

The third dominant factor within the literature on the informal economy views the informal economy as a security maker (Danielsson, 2015). This notion relates to the state's capacity to provide security within post-conflict societies. Kostovicova and Glasius (2012) state that the informal economy thrives because of the multidirectional security market, which restricts people's security while also being able to support circumstances in which everyday insecurities are managed. However, the informal economy undermines the ability of the state and public to provide welfare and services, thereby reducing the security of the local population in the long run (Danielsson, 2015). On the other hand, the informal economy may enhance the security of the local population, by allowing unemployed individuals to work within a weak state.

Taken together, it is crucial to note the informal economy is no longer seen simply as an indicator of underdevelopment; rather, the informal economy is viewed as an asset or even a solution to poverty and as contributing significant economic activities (Rakowski, 1994). Neoliberal theories recognise the informal economy as an incubator of entrepreneurship, possessing the potential to contribute to long-term economic development. This occurs because of small indigenous enterprises cutting the cost of over-regulation, such as corporate tax, business registrations, social security contributions, and so on (De Seto, 1989, 2001; Packard, 2007; Biles, 2009). Indeed, there are elements of the informal economy that are taxed and it does serve as a welfare provider, security marker and a means of resistance. The next section examines the theories that link the informal economy and the formal economy, which will provide an understanding to the theories that shaped the conceptual framework of this thesis.

Theorisation of the Informal Economy

Moving beyond the sphere of defining the informal economy and its nature, is the question of the informal economy's interactions or links with the formal economy, which this section examines. Studies have suggested that the formal and informal economy represent a continuum, with no clear boundaries or definitional consensus of where one ends and the other starts (Leonard, 2000; Valodia and Devey, 2011). Understanding the informal economy as a continuum, where actors do not all act the same way or comply with the same rules, further contributes to its contested nature (Leonard, 2000; Valodia and Devey, 2011). This, therefore, has led to the development of various classifications of the interaction between the formal and informal economy which have been discussed below. Williams and Round (2008) distinguish four different theories of the informal economy with the formal economy: the dualistic approach, structuralist approach, complementary theory, and alternative to the formal economy, while Chen (2007) collates corresponding schools: dualism, structuralism and legalism. Williams further identifies two generally opposing perspectives: the modernisation and globalisation thesis. These theories will be discussed below, starting with dualist theory, which was mostly popular in the 1900s.The objective of this section is to deepen our conceptual and theoretical understanding of the informal economy and its relationship with the formal economy, and how these two elements coexist within a nation. Understanding the relationship between the formal economy and the informal economy creates an avenue to understanding the competition between official and unofficial firms as well as economic competition within economies. This will provide a framework for understanding factors that influence the informal economy, such as the growth of employment, income, poverty and

inequality, which will provide a better overview of the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers and how this is shaped by the peacebuilding agenda.

The dualist approach saw the informal economy as being distinct from the formal (Chen et al., 2004). The main argument within this approach is that economic activities are made up of small firms that are based on family labour as well as low levels of productivity (Chen, 2004), while, in contrast, the formal economy is capital intensive and has high levels of productivity. The major criticism of this school is the continuous use of the informal versus formal conceptualisation. As noted by Weber:

> The concept of a second economy is a metaphor that should not be taken literally to mean that there are two geographically separated economies. Instead, the notion of a second economy is best seen as a form of shorthand to describe the deeply segmented nature of an extremely unequal economy. (Weber, Benya et al., 2008, p. 7)

The dualist approach assumes that the informal economy would disappear when economic advancement occurs, and views the informal economy as a leftover by-product of previous production and consumption (Chen et al., 2004). Corresponding with Derrida's theory of binary opposition (1970), which views two elements as having a hierarchical relationship with one another, within this relationship, one is considered superordinate while the other is subordinate. The informal economy is considered to be subordinate and negative (Chen et al., 2004). The dualist approach saw the informal economy as being related to underdevelopment, while the formal superordinate economy is related to progress.

Although once accepted, this theory received heavy criticism since, as noted by Williams and Round (2008), the informal economy is neither weak nor disappearing. Rather, the informal economy is growing and has remained persistent within the global economy. Chen et al. (2012) further criticised the dualist approach based on the notion that the informal economy emerged and grew in unexpected places and was not a residue and summarised the main differences between the old and new concepts of the informal economy within a table, as shown below highlighting the weakness in the dualist approach.

The Old View	The New View

The informal sector is the traditional economy that will wither away and die with modern, industrial growth.	The informal economy is 'here to stay' and expanding with modern, industrial growth.
It is only marginally productive.	It is a major provider of employment, goods and services for lower-income groups. It contributes a significant share of GDP.
It exists separately from the formal economy.	It is linked to the formal economy—it produces for, trades with, distributes for and provides services to the formal economy.
It represents a reserve pool of surplus labour.	Much of the recent rise in informal employment is due to the decline in formal employment or to the informalisation of previously formal employment relationships.
It is comprised mostly of street traders and very small-scale producers.	It is made up of a wide range of informal occupations—both 'resilient old forms' such as casual day labour in construction and agriculture as well as 'emerging new ones' such as temporary and part-time jobs plus homework for high tech industries.
Most of those in the sector are entrepreneurs who run illegal and unregistered enterprises in order to avoid regulation and taxation.	It is made up of non-standard wage workers as well as entrepreneurs and self-employed persons producing legal goods and services, albeit through irregular or unregulated means. Most entrepreneurs and the self-employed are amenable to, and would welcome, efforts to reduce barriers to registration and related transaction costs and to increase benefits from regulation; and most informal wage workers

	would welcome more stable jobs and workers' rights.
Work in the informal economy is comprised mostly of survival activities and thus is not a subject for economic policy.	Informal enterprises include not only survival activities but also stable enterprises and dynamic growing businesses, and informal employment includes not only self-employment but also wage employment. All forms of informal employment are affected by most (if not all) economic policies.

Table 3 Old and New Views of the Informal Economy

Source: (Chen, 2007)

The second approach is the structuralist approach, according to which the formal and informal economy are linked internally. The structuralist approach sought to rectify the disconnect found in the dualist approach. This theory, like the dualist, viewed the informal economy negatively (Moser, 1978; Henry, 1987, Castells and Portes, 1989). Within the structuralist school, the informal economy comprised economic units subordinated by larger firms seeking ways to cut the cost of labour and input. The structuralist approach acknowledged that the formal and informal economy coexisted, but in contrast to the dualist theory saw the informal economy as being an integral part of the formal economy, and, further, noted that the relationship is one of interdependence among different forms of production (Moser, 1978; Henry, 1987, Castells and Portes, 1989). The informal economy is seen as emerging from an increasingly deregulated global economy and late capitalism that results in labour standards being low, thereby leading to the population accepting exploitative work as a 'survival strategy' (Moser, 1978; Henry, 1987, Castells and Portes, 1989). This could range from workers working without benefits, to employees of informal enterprises, and so on. Within this theory Smith and Stenning (2006) considered the informal economy as being "constitutive outside" of neoliberalism (Smith and Stenning, 2006). They noted that the informal economy was a response to social benefits being reduced, as well as being the way that marginalised households sustain their livelihoods. Thus, recourse to the informal economy was an attempt at providing an additional source of income (Smith and Stenning, 2006).

Third is the legalist approach, in which there exist relationships between informal enterprises and the bureaucratic formal economy. The legalist approach, spearheaded by De Seto, argued that the expensive nature of operating within the formal economy was the main reason why enterprise engaged with the informal economy. Through her study on Peru, De Seto (1987) focused on the process of registering formally within various operations, such as public transport and trading. Despite considering the bureaucratic relationship between the formal and informal enterprises, this school has been criticised for not fully recognising the complex nature of the informal property regime (De Seto,1987). In addition to this, it did not take into consideration how formalising the informal economy could be a disadvantage to informal traders, especially the poor and marginalised groups (Cousin et al., 2005), as informal actors could potentially have more to lose when formalised or included into the formal economy.

The fourth approach, which is slightly related to the legalist approach, is the microenterprise development approach. This approach has mostly been promoted by non-governmental agencies, development agencies, international donors and private businesses whose aim is to work in poverty alleviation (Williams et al., 2016).. This approach recognises "microenterprises as synonymous with informality, poverty, and entrepreneurship" (Williams et al., 2016). Also, like the legalist approach, it sees the procedures for formal registering as being cumbersome. This approach believes in levelling the playing field in order to expand jobs and productivity. This can be achieved through unveiling credit facilities, as well as by providing training for the poor in management and accounting (Williams et al., 2016).

The fifth approach which was popularised by neoliberal and neo-classical theorists is the 'illegal' theory. This theory is based upon the argument that within the informal economy there is a conscious and intentional motive by actors to avoid regulations and taxes, as well as to engage in criminal activities (Maloney, 2004). This school invokes the notion that there is a vibrant and operational illegal underground economy (Maloney, 2004). The sixth approach is termed complementary theory. According to this view, both the formal and informal economy are growing and declining in tandem rather than as a by-product (Williams and Rounds, 2008). Both economies are seen as being intertwined, where economic development involves the development of both the informal and formal economy (Williams and Rounds, 2008). The informal economy, through mutual aid and reciprocity, ensures social cohesion, the provision of goods and services to those in need, the development of social networks of material support, as well as the extension of various opportunities to individuals and families in order to enable them to cope in situations of deprivation.

Williams (2010) recognises a seventh theory: the "globalisation thesis", which further emphasised that the informal economy is growing universally. Further advocating this point of view, Schneider and Enste analysed the size of the informal economy, finding that over the past two decades the size of the informal economy has risen dramatically; they linked the causes of the increase to the tax burden, social welfare systems and labour costs.

Furthermore an eighth theory in understanding the formal–informal relationship was proposed by Williams and Round (2008), who noted that all theories of the informal economy talk about different forms of informal employment, and, although evidence does exist to support each of them, no one theory depicts the informal economy. Therefore, they came up with a scheme that showed the relationship between the formal and informal economy. Williams and Round's theory could be described as a post-structuralist approach to understanding the formal and informal relationship. It recognises the economic plurality and diversity within the economy as well as acknowledging that the informal economy seeks plurality.

Furthermore, It is crucial to understand that the last two decades has resulted in the formal–informal relationship evolving and becoming more complex. With empirical realities like globalisation and market reforms, the growing informal economy due to production and consumption, and the global crisis of the formal economy are all factors altering the development and relationship between the formal and informal economy (ILO, 2013). In the context of globalisation, the formal economy depends on the informal economy through trade, distribution and services that are provided in the formal economy. Globalisation has led to an expansion of the geographical scope of the link, new actors being involved as well as an altering of the power balances between both economies. New theoretical approaches have appeared in terms of analysing the formal–informal economy relations, such as network analysis, legal pluralism, new intentional economics and global commodity/value chains (Chen, 2012; ILO, 2013). These developments have resulted in new questions, which focus not just on the relationship between the two and the patterns that emerge, but also on whether this relationship is beneficial, for whom, and how this impacts the regulatory formal structures, as well as the informal economy. However, evidence also suggests that the informal economy can develop and thrive on its own without contact with the formal economy (Benson et al., 2014). This makes it more difficult to decipher the links and effects of the formal and informal economy, and there are various qualitative and quantitative studies on the size and increased role of the informal economy within global

production and reproduction (ILO, 2013). This leads to a blurred rather than a clarified distinction between the formal–informal, resulting in normalisation rather than an analysis of the two.

As shown from the discussion above, there are several theories explaining the formal–informal relationship, there has been a call for the integration of the different schools in order to fully understand the informal economy (WIEGO, 2006). The aim would be to show how different elements – dualist, structuralist, legalist and illegal, for example – provide an understanding of the different segments of activities and employment (WIEGO, 2006). Modernisation theories primarily attribute the informal economy because of survival and marginal activities, while neoliberal and legalist schools are based upon state regulation as an explanation. Meanwhile, structuralist theories attribute the informal economy to the nature of modern capitalism (WIEGO, 2006). Though these schools are most often studied in isolation the reality is that the complex nature of the informal economy is best understood by drawing from and interacting with all the theories in a complementary fashion as this thesis does. (ILO, 2013).

Therefore, to examine how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers, this thesis integrates the work of three different schools to fully capture the dynamics of the informal economy. As suggested by WIEGO (2006), the integration of different theories of the informal economy allows full consideration of the varying elements, activities, types of employment and actors involved. Hence, this thesis integrates the globalisation thesis, complementary theory and the 'illegal' school. The integration of these three schools enables us to see that the informal economy is growing universally, and that it is intertwined with the formal economy, rather than a separate entity. This view recognises that because of the growing nature of the informal economy, social networks within it are formed which provide goods and services to those in need. Economic development affects both the informal and formal economy as both are integrated. Finally, within the scope of the illegal school, this integrated view notes that there is indeed an underground economy that thrives and interacts with both the formal economy and the illegal informal economy. Understanding the informal economy and the formal–informal relationship through this lens allows us to fully capture and explore the multi-layered nature of the informal economy (i.e., the informal economy and the illegal economy) in Bayelsa and Rivers states and to explore how it is shaped and influenced by peacebuilding initiatives.

Gaps in the Informal Economy Literature

So far, this chapter has focused on the definition of the informal economy, its nature and the theories explaining the formal–informal relation and the theories this thesis embraced. This section will discuss

previous empirical studies on the informal economy, highlighting the gaps within the literature that have shaped the conceptual framework of this thesis. Subscribing to even the narrowest definition of the informal economy the evidence still shows how the informal economy plays a vital role in the national economy of a state as well as taking a closer look at the informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa, it contributes 92 per cent of the labour force (Medina et al., 2017; WIEGO, 2017).

Studies of the informal economy has altered in perspective over the years. Between the 1970s and 1980s the focus was on poverty and marginality; this then shifted, in the 1990s, to consideration of the informal economy as a seedbed for entrepreneurship. There has been a renewed interest in both developed and developing countries resulting in an increased number of empirical studies, in which the heterogeneous nature of the informal economy has been revealed (Jones et al., 2006; Devey et al., 2008). However, the lack of a clear definition of what the informal economy consists of has led to the determination of its size being somewhat difficult (Schneider,2004;2012). Thus, making understanding the informal economy challenging.

As the informal economy develops and is understood in different ways, within some contexts it is viewed as a locally embedded, dynamic system that promotes constructive development. Within another context it is viewed as fostering development as well as intensifying economic exclusion, poverty and vulnerability (Meagher, 2014). Kate Meagher (2014) argues that a gap existed in understanding the differing nature of the informal economy because of the shift from a blanket representation of the informal economy to other narrower representations. Focusing on the informal economy in Africa, she has highlighted how previous work on the informal economy has rather been focused on the conventional differences between north and sub-Saharan Africa, rather than on understanding the differences in specific states and/or cities (Meagher, 2014). Meagher has, further, identified a blind spot within the studies, particularly pertaining to areas such as class, gender, ethnicity, region, age and occupation. Significantly emphasising the need to shift from a monolithic view of the informal economy, in order to improve the theoretical understanding of the informal economy, as well as perspectives on governance with regards to taxing, she carried out a study on the informal economy and explored the potential problems and limitations of taxation on building a social contract, particularly focusing on Northern Nigeria (Meagher, 2016). Her work centred on how gender, history, wealth and ethnic-religious identities influenced how the informal economy was taxed and shaped governance (Meagher, 2016). She found that an adverse relationship existed between political voice and the informal economy, revealing that imposing taxes on the informal economy will result in exaggerated social divisions rather than building up the social contract. Thus, shaping this thesis.

This thesis is also shaped by Meagher's (2014) work on the informal economy in Northern Nigeria in two ways. Firstly, expanding on her identification of the need to shift from a blanket representation of the informal economy to focusing on specific states and cities, this work focuses on the informal economy in the states of Bayelsa and Rivers as a gateway to understanding the broader picture in the Niger Delta. Thus, this will provide an understanding of these states' informal economy while also expanding on a regional understanding of the informal economy. Secondly, Meagher (2014) identified the need to explore how the informal is shaped by governance with regard to history, gender and so on. While this analysis shows evidence that is closely related to the proximate causes of the informal economy, there is a lack of information on underlying factors that influence how state institutions and economic development agenda interact and influence the development (and size) of the informal economy .As such, this work expands on this notion by exploring how the informal economy is shaped by peacebuilding initiatives, although this research is not focused on gender, wealth and ethnic-religious identities and how these influence the informal economy. It is, however, concerned with the notions of neopatrimonialism and power, as these are key elements not just within peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states but also influencing the conflict within these states.

Also, Meagher futher argues that although studies of the informal economy analyse the determinants of its size, there seemed to be a gap, however, when it came to evaluating various local informal institutions and how they create additional variations not just in the size of the informal economy but within the informal economy itself (Meagher, 2014). In reviewing the literature, I found that very little was found regarding the question of the size of the informal economy, as formed through internal conditions marked by various inequalities, hierarchies, neopatrimonialism and commonsensical understandings, as observed by Danielsson (2015). Both Danielsson and Meagher recognised the need to better understand the informal economy beyond its scope and size to include the implications it holds for economic change, especially within local institutions in Africa (Meagher, 2014; Danielsson, 2015). To shift to inclusion of economic change in local institutions to question whose interests were being met and who was being included. The focus on inclusion was, however, disguised as a more interventionist goal, in which the pool of workers, as well as institutions within the informal economy, were regarded as useful for reducing cost and facilitating access to the informal market. This resulted in an inclusive engagement that was highly selectively (Meagher, 2016). The outcome was that a part of the informal economy became marginalised, while other actors within the informal economy were 'included' (Meagher, 2016). Thus, inclusive engagement with the informal became an exercise that rather fell in line with the agendas of governance. Techniques of governance became more involved

with working, classifying, managing and restructuring the informal economy in order to build inclusive markets that were synonymous with global businesses (Meagher, 2016). The outcome was a lowering of the cost of operations for the formal economy through the advantage of low cost employment (Meagher, 2016). Hence, the informal economy is viewed more as a workforce to be harnessed than as a system that needs to be transformed; especially within the continent of Africa, the view of the informal economy is based upon those who are useful to global capital and those who are not. Meagher acknowledged the need for questions to be raised towards informal economic inclusion, with regard to the actors and their interests (Meagher, 2016). She recognised the need for the states' roles in the development agendas of informal economic inclusion to be examined closely. As Meagher states:

> It matters whether informal economies of entrepreneurship, vulnerable employment or unfree labour are being embedded in the formal economy and whether these informal arrangements are being harnessed in the interest of global, political expediency or local economic transformation. (Meagher, 2015, p. 5–6)

Consequently, Meagher's (2016) work on inclusion and the interest of actors is instrumental to this research analysis. Building on the work of Meagher (2014), Johnson et al. (1998), and Danielsson (2015) mentioned earlier, this research examines the interest of actors within peacebuilding initiatives that shape the informal economy, and explores whom these interests serve, thus, filling the gap identified by Meagher. In analysing how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy (see Research Questions), this thesis examines the role of actors both of state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives. Likewise as observed by Keith Hart: "We need to know...what social forms have emerged to organise the informal economy as well as examine the institutional particulars sustaining whatever takes place beyond the law." (2006, p. 33). As such, this research sits within the niche of examining the informal economy and the political economy as previously stated, while focusing not on the size of the informal economy, but rather on the characteristics of various factors (such as neopatrimonialism, power hierarchies and corruption, for example), which, as Hart points out, sustains the informal economy, and specifically the illicit informal economy (Hart, 2006).

Although some studies on the informal economy literature pay particular attention to the interconnections between the informal economy and crime within the political economy of conflict, they it fall short of exploring this within the political economy of peacebuilding, a gap this research aims to fill. Previously, work on the informal economy has examined the political culture of elites and their

supporters, a contentious area, noting a tenuous economic base and flawed political systems, which possess the potential to produce and reproduce the link between the informal economy and crimes (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018). Mostly explained through a rational-choice approach to conflict, these studies focus on highlighting the role of greed and grievance, the resource curse, the productivity of illicit goods, and the emergence of warlords, as well as the challenges posed by the monopoly of power through violence by various drivers of conflict (Freedman et al., 2006; Peterson, 2010; Valodia and Devey, 2011; Elbahnasawy et al., 2016; van der Molen, 2018; Young, 2020). These studies do note that individuals that enjoy various privileged positions and access to resources otherwise operate within the informal economy in such a manner that unfair competition is created, making the less privileged also begin to feel the need to operate within the informal economy (Peterson, 2010; Valodia and Devey, 2011; Elbahnasawy et al., 2016; van der Molen, 2018; Young, 2020).. Thus, the relationship between the informal economy and crime is characterised by inequalities, hierarchies, privilege differences, neopatrimonialism and clientelism, which encourage activities within the informal to survive while promoting the informal economy. Consequently, Abdixhiku (2011, p. 119) notes that the informal economy becomes a "parallel system built into the grey economy", in which the lines are blurred with regard to how these different power relations shape the interaction of actors within the informal economy. Although Abdixhiku research is influential, especially with relevance to the political economy of conflict, it has, however, created the need to examine the same notions – such as the influence of these power relations, access to resources, and operations within the informal economy – within the political economy of peace. Exploring this is crucial because it will examine whether the narrative that occurs in the conflict setting is also found within the dimension of peacebuilding, and, if so, what this means not only for the promotion of peace but also for the peacebuilding agenda and power structures. If indeed the relationship between peacebuilding and the informal economy is re-institutionalising inequalities, hierarchies, privilege differences and neopatrimonialism, it becomes essential to examine the implications of this for the state, cities and population in which it occurs. Sookram (Sookram and Watson, 2008) the characteristics, role, scope and size of the informal economy are empirical questions that should be explored within a particular economy as well as the various cities. Most studies that focus on the Niger Delta are centred on oil production and the amnesty programme. Although this research does touch on both dimensions, as it is impossible to talk about the Niger Delta without their inclusion, this thesis aims to shift away from the narrative of oil. It seeks to explore and provide an alternative understanding of infromal economy within the region by examining the relationship between peacebuilding and the informal economy. Thus, this current empirical study seeks to close a gap that exists in the literature. An exploration of these very issues is the aim of this research.

Moreover, evidence suggests a strong relationship between poverty and informality: in countries where informality is decreasing, the number of working poor is also decreasing, and vice versa (AfDB, 2012). This relationship creates an endless cycle that is continued over years depending on the factors. A lot of activities in the informal economy are dependent upon natural resources – as such, impacts on climate and the environment in turn affect these activities, therefore exacerbating the poverty cycle. This was acknowledged by the OECD when it stated: "growing informal employment might substantially increase poverty levels, making it impossible for many countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015" (OECD, 2009). The diffuse and unorganised nature of the informal economy makes it hard and expensive for governments to track and enforce regulations, thus reinforcing the poverty cycle (Benson et al., 2014). At the heart of the poverty cycle is the absence of social protection and rights; those within the informal economy operate without secure benefits, thus serving as the gateway through which they are taken advantage of, and the poverty cycle continues (ILO, 2012). This highlights the link between the informal economy and poverty, and shows a gap that needs to be filled with research, on a case-by-case basis.

Additionally, in a study to examine the relationship between the informal economy, regulation, the tax burden, the rule of law and corruption, Johnson et al. (1998) carried out an analysis of 49 countries within three regions of the world. The study involved measuring the regulatory discretion, tax burden, bureaucratic quality and corruption, based on a proposition that the tax burden, regulatory system and corruption were all positively correlated with the informal economy. One of the key findings of their study was the role of the political environment in determining the size of the informal economy. Further analysis found that political instability and polarisation are directly related to the informal economy (Johnson et al. 1998). Their results supported the proposition, noting that bureaucratic discretion and regulatory discretion were key determinants for the informal economy. Their analysis further revealed that due to the weak rule of law, tax regulations officials decided to view individual cases without effective supervision, thus giving rise to conditions that were ripe for corruption (Johnson et al.1998). Consequently, under such circumstances many firms chose to operate underground. Elements of this study also provided insights into the conceptual framework and structure of this research. Expanding from Meagher's study on specific cities and the role of governance on the informal economy, my research also adopts Johnson et al.'s (1998) analysis of corruption and the influence of the political economy. While this research does not focus on the size of the informal economy, Johnson et al.'s (1998) analysis opens the way to examining the role of the political economy in shaping the informal economy. As such, this work combines elements of Meagher's (2014) and Johnson et al.'s (1998)

analysis in order to examine how the informal economy is shaped by the politics of the economy of peacebuilding and how this influences the overall peacebuilding agenda.

Much of the available literature on the informal economy deals with the question of its determinants (Krakoski, 2005; Sepulveda and Syrett, 2007; Vuletin, 2008). A study based upon two suggested determinants of the informal economy – high tax rates and corruption, and a weak legal system – identified a positive correlation between the informal economy and poor institutions (Krakoski, 2005; Sepulveda and Syrett, 2007; Vuletin, 2008). However, it fell short of answering the question of which came first: do poor institutions result in high levels of activity in the informal economy; or, rather, do high levels of activity in the informal economy undermine basic institutions? To address this dilemma, Freidman et al., (2000) employed instrumental variables, developed by La Porat et al. (2008), in order to measure linguistic fractionalisation, religious composition of the population and the geographic location. Their findings noted a correlated relationship between the informal economy and institutions, thus suggesting a causal link between a large informal economy and weak institutions. This finding advances our understanding of the informal economy and opens doors for more crucial questions on what this relationship means, not just for the informal economy but also for weak institutions.

Thandika Mkandawire (2010) drew attention not only to the size but also to the role the state plays in influencing the informal economy in Africa. Mkandawire's analysis used history to explain why countries like Kenya, South Africa, and other East African countries possess smaller informal economies compared to those found in West African countries. He traced these differences to the economic objectives of the colonial state (Mkandawire, 2010). Hence, his analysis recognised that the informal economy is not a phenomenon that just occurs outside the operation of the state; rather, the state is linked to the informal economy, and plays a role in shaping it. Consequently, the role, scope and relationship between the informal economy and the state became of interest to organisations, governments and decision-makers who wanted to better understand it (Mkandawire, 2010). For example, the Indian government recognised the urgent need to assess the informal population in order to improve its policy design in 2012; Nigeria finally acknowledged the informal economy in the Niger Delta and the 'need' to formalise illegal oil refineries, although this process has been slow and is yet to begin. However, such moves serve as a starting point for the inclusion of the informal economy in the agenda of the government (Benson et al., 2014).

Likewise, as interest in the informal economy grew so did studies on the regulatory framework of institutions within it. This led to light being shone on the modes of organisations within the informal

economy (Meagher, 2016). As such, political scientists and economists, such as Kate Meagher, took a closer look at the regulatory framework of the informal economy, which revived the notion that the informal economy is not 'unorganised' or just criminal; rather, it involves a cornucopia of trade networks, institutions, credit systems and is even a way of life that operates outside the regulatory framework of the state (Meagher, 2016). This led to research grounded within the 'bottom of the pyramid' approach, which was focused on penetrating the institutional organisation of the informal economy. Meagher's study yielded the need for making the informal space and activities 'legible' to the state by deciphering their inner working, rather than rationalising or even formalising it. Thus, international development thinking shifted to a more "inclusive turn", where economic growth was promoted by engaging with informal actors (Meagher, 2016). This analysis shapes the understanding of the informal economy within this thesis. Although part of this thesis does examine how the illicit informal economy is shaped by peacebuilding, it does not, however, state that the informal economy itself is criminal. Indeed, the informal economy is a way of life (sometimes people's only way of life) that has existed for decades, not just in Bayelsa and Rivers states but also in other parts of Africa and the Western world too. In addition to this, Meagher's analysis is again useful to this thesis because it recognises that the informal economy is made up of a network of relationships some of which overlap with neopatrimonialism and peacebuilding; thus, this thesis examines these relationships within the lens of peacebuilding initiatives and how it shapes the informal economy. The reason for this is that the actors operating in the informal economy and peacebuilding are the same, thus, rather than focusing on formalising the informal economy or elements of it, this research examines these relationships and creates the potential for further research.

The emerging body of literature on the political economy of peacebuilding makes few, if any references to informal economies, although they are dominant in every society. According to the ILO, in developing countries the informal economy makes up half to three-quarters of non-agricultural employment (ILO, 2013). In the case of examples such as South Africa and India that have experienced rapid economic growth, the informal economy within these states seems to be still increasing. As has been already stated, numerous factors affect the growth and development of the informal economy, for example, the 2008 and Eurozone crisis served to rapidly increase the informal economy in developing countries (Benson et al., 2014). From waste networks in India to food-sellers on the streets of Ghana, and miners in Peru and Kenya, the informal economy functions as a network where poor people live, produce, trade and work (Benson et al., 2014).

Certain governments have recognised the importance of the informal economy through the establishment of various policies. An example of this is the Kenyan government, which since 2000 has adopted a new approach by working directly with local enterprises and informal economies to produce sustainable charcoal (Benson et al., 2014). The government recognised the need for flexibility in dealing with the informal economy; they also began to include it in the budget, planning and governing in order to bring about social and environmental benefits (Benson et al., 2014). It is, however, imperative to understand that the informal economy is not a phase of underdevelopment; rather, it is an economy that responds to the fluctuations of various conditions and in times of recession can be a "cushion" (Benson et al., 2014). Thus, previous peacebuilding policies have made little if any reference to informal economies, which as research shows have been expanding in all parts of the world because of changes occurring in the formal economies (Benson et al., 2014). Critical questions are raised due to the unaccountable nature of the informal economy in policy approaches, analysis and modelling, some of which are: do policy approaches necessitate the formalisation of the informal economy? Do informal economies prove to be detrimental to the environment? Or to the formal sector? Also, how have efforts led by governments, authorities, or even international institutions impacted informal markets in the past, currently and in the future? (Benson et al., 2014). Hence, the usefulness of a comprehensive study that streamlines the contributions and influences of the informal economy and developmental polices within specific environments gives this study overwhelming justification.

In addition to the above-mentioned, recent findings about the informal economy have failed to view the informal economy as a system, as noted by Meagher (Meagher, 2017). Failing to do so has thus limited analysis on the differences within history, colonial states, government, the nature of engagement within the global economy, and how all these factors shape the informal economy differently (Meagher, 2017). What makes an informal economy thrive in one area and not in another? Should policies on the variation of the informal be adapted to respond to these factors? Meagher (2017) has thus emphasised the need to view the informal economy, especially within Africa, as a system, one that is shaped by its interactions with the state as well as institutional, economic, historical factors and as well as the differences between the formal global economy and the informal economy. This notion has influenced adoption of the selected theories in this thesis: the globalisation thesis, complementary theory, and the illegal school (see

Theorisation of the Informal Economy). The informal economy is a system that is intertwined with the formal economy and occurs not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. Within the informal economy are various networks that expand into an illicit dimension that makes up the illicit informal economy (Meagher, 2017). As Meagher notes, it is crucial to examine how complex networks

are created, and to understand how the state relates to the informal economy in different contexts (Meagher, 2017). Where, for example, informality is based upon a strong entrepreneurial system, support from the state may be constructive. Similarly, in a setting where the informal economy is based upon vulnerable networks of labour, a different kind of support will be needed that expands inclusion. Also, where the informal economy is based upon a high degree of criminality, corruption and coercion, a system of economic support will seem ill-advised as the process of 'inclusion' becomes questionable. This research recognises these points and incorporates them within its analysis, examining the network that exists within state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives and how this shapes the informal economy, and exploring whether the networks of peacebuilding based upon corruption, criminality and so on affect the informal economy and, if so, in what way. To examine this, the next section of this chapter examines the concept of peacebuilding, exploring the gaps within the literature and how this links to the informal economy, as previously discussed.

Liberal Peacebuilding

So far, this chapter has discussed the definition of the informal economy, its scope and nature, and has highlighted various theories within the literature that are applicable to this thesis. It has also shown how the works of Meagher (2014, 2015, 2017), Johnson et al. (1998) and Danielsson (2015) have shaped the conceptual framework and structure of this research. In order to further contribution to the conceptual framework this section provides a foundational understanding to the concept of 'peacebuilding', what is meant by peacebuilding and how this fits within the narrative of the informal economy. Mainly referring to democratic states, the idea of liberal peacebuilding has antecedents dating back to the eighteenth century, drawing upon Kantian thought, with the end of the Cold War strengthening its basis (Kant, 1971). Finding its foundation on the basis that democratic states are unlikely to engage in physical warfare among each other but would much rather enforce development, stability and peace (Kant, 1975), it is a framework or discourse in which a liberal epistemology of peace is formed, aiming at projecting a form of government that is reliant upon its viability and legitimacy with its recipients, operating at both the state and social level (Richmond and Franks, 2009). The conceptualisation of peacebuilding has been surrounded by certain key aspects which are: the rule of law, democratisation, free and globalised markets, neoliberal development and the development of human rights (Richmond and Franks, 2009). this theory concerns the principle that democracies will not go to war with one another if they have institutional constraints that would make it difficult. War is less likely between countries that are economically interdependent, because going to war can interrupt trade. It has been said that liberal peace is the corollary of democratic peace theory (Parmar, 2013). It is not based upon coercion but, rather, upon the belief that liberalism is the best way for states to relate

to one another. Driven by interdependence as well as democracy, liberal peace theory holds a central place within liberalism theory (Carlsnaes, 2013). According to liberalism the conditions for cooperation between international governments is fostered by economic interdependence; because states function as rational actors who have mutual economic and political problems, as such, an environment of cooperation thus becomes necessary for their common good (Carlsnaes, 2013). Also, within liberalism, since states must act transparently and be accountable to those who voted them into power, for this reason, democracy, therefore, functions as the basis for peace. It follows that it becomes unlikely for them to engage in secret policies, war, or even geopolitical deception (Howard, 2008)Thus, for this type of peace to be obtained, the democracy must be stable, stability here referring not only to military or even economic means but rather a long-term peace that is based on the functioning of democratic values as well as justice (Kant, 1975).

Within liberal peacebuilding, there are two strands or approaches, namely the Wilsonian and hegemonic neoliberal approaches. Based on the promotion of free-market economies and democracy, the Wilsonian approach is the classical model of liberalism that exists between states (Plant and Plant, 2009; Roberts, 2013). This approach embraces the notion that democracies are more stable and are more likely to enjoy human rights and accountable governments (Plant and Plant, 2009; Roberts, 2013). It is based upon the premise that democratic states will not engage in conflict or war with one another because of the trade they enjoy and because the states are accountable to the people. Although hegemonic neoliberal peacebuilding embraces the similar notion of political and economic liberalism it, however, differs from the Wilsonian approach (Debiel et al., 2016). It promotes based on the interest of international actors; as such, it tends to avoid disruptions that will affect the global market actors rather than focusing on the problems or conflicts of the individual. This is what makes it neoliberal in orientation. Within this approach open political discourse is not really promoted.

Beyond the strands of liberal peacebuilding is the actual definition or understanding or peacebuilding. Peacebuilding can also be seen as having two dimensions: broadly speaking, the narrow perspective or the wide perspective. The narrow view is geared towards the end of armed violence within a given period, as well as maintaining a ceasefire, as exemplified by Downs and Stedman (Stedman et al., 2003). This definition has been embraced by many scholars as they believe it allows for more feasible and realistic expectations of peacebuilding (Stedman et al., 2003). Further work within the definition of peacebuilding has focused on the distinction of indicators in evaluating peacebuilding, with more positivist scholars embracing, for example, the number of refugees resettled, economic development, employment rates and so on. These benchmarks allow for clear identifications for measuring or

assessing peacebuilding. Nevertheless, non-tangible narrow benchmarks – for example, reconciliation – are harder to measure.

Within liberal peace, free-market economies and democracy make countries more peaceful. With the foundation on governance and development, liberal peace is premised upon the notion that states will resolve disputes peacefully (Newman et al., 2009). Newman identified that although in theory peacebuilding is viewed as 'liberal' in nature, it, however, tends to be more geared towards repressing or curbing conflict based on the interests of international peace or "particular hegemonic strategic interests" that fall in line with the security agenda (Newman et al., 2009, p. 16). This implies that rather than falling in line with Wilson or Kant's views on peacebuilding, it rather reflects more the notion put forward by Hobbes (Hobbes et al., 1998; Hobbes and Tuck, 2011).

Political Economy of Conflict and Peacebuilding in Africa: Gaps in the Literature of Liberal Peacebuilding

In previous studies on liberal peacebuilding, different variables have been found to be related to its interpretation within African countries; although nurtured around respect for human and civil rights, free markets have failed especially in Africa to, in Salih's opinion, "deliver tangible developmental or economic benefits." (Salih,2017, p. 133). The reality of liberal peace is that it has resulted in various manifestations in different countries, leading to varying forms of democratic experience, which has further led to the negative social effects of neoliberalism. Salih notes that within most African countries democracy has been treated as a synonym for development (Salih, 2017). Citing examples of 12 African countries, he argues that development through peacebuilding is contingent upon the outcome of the political economy of peace rather than the imposition of liberal peace within these societies, noting that the interest of citizens within these societies is in democracy and development, to which the precursor is its linkage to peace and development. (Salih, 2017). As Fischer states:

> This conflation may seem insignificant since both theorists and practitioners refer to the liberal kind of democracy that has come to prevail in the West. Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate the significant differences between the democratic and the liberal aspects of these regimes in order to grasp the peace that prevails among them. (Fischer, 2000, p. 2)

Salih contends that the notion that liberal peace ensures that nations live in peace refers specifically to various types of states (Salih, 2017). These states have over a long period of time developed liberal traditions that extend beyond the mere existence of polyarchy and democratic institutions (Salih, 2017). It follows that if liberal peace is indeed about the promotion of liberalism it will undergo various challenges within African countries, as they are not yet fully liberal. These states are, however, seen as being states at various stages of democracy (Salih, 2017).

In addition, the promotion of liberal peace has led to a disconnect within the political economy in various African states, thus leading to further problems (Richmond and Franks, 2009). This happens where the allocation, as well as the control of resources, can be defined as the site of power, which also becomes the site of domination within post-conflict societies (Richmond and Franks, 2009). This understanding provides insight into the analysis in this thesis, as it examines how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism. The empirical data revealed that there is indeed a disconnect between the reality of peacebuilding and the theory, which shapes how it is influenced by neopatrimonialism (see Theory of Peacebuilding vs the Reality of State-Led Peacebuilding Initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers State). Furthermore, this view is supported by Jones, who highlights three criticisms of liberal peace. Firstly, he argues that liberal peace does not consider the 'old' and 'new' democracies; it is, rather, focused on exporting from the old into the new without any consideration for the people, especially the poor (Brown et al., 2001). Agreeing with Salih, Barnett contends that,

> (b)ecause liberal states have these desirable dispositions, peacebuilding has attempted to transplant and nurture these attributes. Exhibiting their own brand of shock therapy, international peacebuilders attempt to transform nearly all features of the state society, accomplishing in a matter of months what took decades in the West. (Barnett, 2006, p. 6)

Salih's second criticism of liberal peace is the assumption that African states are ready to integrate as their preferred paradigm the core values of liberalism on development, peace and state building (Salih, 2017). Salih's logic is that if these values have been questioned within the Western democracies, why then should they be uncritically integrated into African countries? Another element that has shaped the framework of this thesis.

Salih's third criticism of liberal peace is that it does not take into consideration the historic tension between liberalism and democracy. He notes that although liberalism is in favour of free markets and property rights it tends to lean more towards the private sector and civil society (Salih, 2017). The issue

with this is that it leads to a formula of empowering and creating opportunities for criminalised elites who were part of the war/conflict economy. Through the manipulation of external and internal programmes of privatisation, these elites exploit liberal peace and consolidate their power, which therefore leads to the extension of the war/conflict economy (Salih, 2017). Thus, elected leaders, especially within African countries, have continued the abuse of human rights towards their populations, which not only undermines but also betrays liberal peace.

Salih notes that, within Africa countries, the notion of liberal peace seems to have neglected the social conditions of the people in comparison to the Western countries (Salih, 2017). He further observes that 50 per cent of people in African countries live below the poverty line, thus liberal values such as individual rights, free speech, equality and so on do not, on their own, translate to peace and development (Salih, 2017). As important for state building and development as the core ethos of liberal peace is, it does not, however, provide an avenue through which the poor in African countries can realise the benefits of free trade in which their personal, global and national share is negligible. Thus, Salih contends that liberal peace which is conditional on economic liberalisation has, so far, not yielded results, because of the lack of evidence pointing to how the free market has led to the reduction of poverty or even contributed to equality. Furthering this point, Cooper states:

> …the global level, neoliberalism has fostered a particular kind of globalization that in simultaneously weakening states and fostering the free movement of goods, has created conditions under which local conflict entrepreneurs have been able to utilize flexible worldwide trading networks to generate global revenues from local predation. (Cooper, 2005, p. 468)

Furthermore, existing research recognises the critical role played by liberal peace theory in increasing the number of democratic states. However, one major theoretical issue emerging is that neoliberal economies – especially within post-conflict states – have, among the poor, exacerbated economic marginalisation, increased social injustice, fomented grievance and, to some extent, increased poverty. In other words, liberal peace has begun to undermine social peace and could quite possibly lead to a relapse into violent conflict. attempting to answer this Christian Morrison's work focused on answering the question of whether the IMF humanitarian emergency programmes caused conflict (Morrisson, 2000). He begins by distinguishing between 'soft' and 'hard' repression: soft repression refers to responses to demonstrations and strikes; while hard repression refers to major contributions to violent conflict. He concludes that the IMF programmes may indeed cause soft repression and not hard

repression, noting that soft repression should be anticipated when implementing liberal programmes (Morrisson, 2000). Similarly, Salih asserts two propositions from Morrison's analysis. The first is that most humanitarian programmes are carried out on a short-term basis, and do not consider the social injustice that emanates from the conflict when implementing or forming policies (Salih, 2017).The second proposition is that because of being ill-prepared to manage long-term safety nets, most countries coming out of conflict do not alter the conflict situation of social problems that were responsible for the conflict in the first place (Salih, 2017). Thus, it can be deduced that these humanitarian emergency programmes have not been successful, because not only are they seen as being short-lived remedies designed to curb political tensions, but also, the problems are exacerbated by economic liberalisation and lead to a relapse into conflict.

Thus, it can be observed that economic liberalisation policies that have been implemented through the concept of liberal peace have resulted in the supervision of the market, leading to exploitation by the state and various warlords (Turner and Pugh, 2006; Vandeginste, 2012; Mohamed, 2017). This has led to warlords becoming commercial cartels, who are often protected by the economic reforms of 'liberal peace', as seen in Afghanistan (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mehran, 2018). It is now well established that the dividend of the liberal peace theory benefits the criminal entrepreneur who also benefited from the political economy of conflict. However, the influence of this situation has remained unclear with regard to the political economy of peacebuilding and the implications of this for on the overall peacebuilding agenda.

Hence, African nations have been seen to adopt the neoliberal paradigm with regard to economic and public policy. This has resulted in these state institutions adhering to a broad free-market paradigm because of the influence of international organisations. Examples can be seen in nations such as Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola, where there has been a failure to ensure the equal spread of the peace dividend, which in some cases has undermined peace itself (Mohamed, 2017; Jackson and Allouche, 2018). This has led to the further marginalisation and suffering of the people who had previously endured hardship during the time of the conflict. This situation has, in some instances, resulted in peace 'rewarding' those who engaged with the criminal economy (Mohamed, 2017). Likewise, these peacebuilding initiatives are top-down. The top-down approaches are based upon realist exercises that are geared at establishing security and stability through negotiations with the local top-level power holders. These power holders thus play leading roles in peacebuilding: the rationale here is that in order to sustain and maintain peace there must be cooperation among the elites. On the flip side, bottom-up approaches entail resolving the conflict between the conflicting parties in order to

facilitate accommodation. This is described by Kaldor as a "cosmopolitan" approach, one that "embraces tolerance, multiculturalism, civility, and democracy" (Kaldor, 1999, p. 116). Thus, bottom-up approaches are community-based and entail engaging with civil societies.

A prime example of this can be seen in Sierra Leone another country plagued by conflict, more specifically due to the resource curse. Rich in natural resources such as diamonds, fertile land and timber, the conflict that plagued the country from 1992 to 2002 not only destroyed properties and led to the displacement of people, but also disrupted government, schools and health facilities (Jackson and Albrecht, 2014; Jackson and Allouche, 2018). However, the country was able to successfully re-establish itself, holding two elections in 2002 and in 2007 and returning many displaced individuals; with scholars like Michael Chege calling it: "the state that came back from the dead" (Chege, 2002, p. 148). However, despite this turn in Sierra Leone, Thomson notes that the country remains at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), stating that there would need to be a re-establishing of certain areas of government in order to sustain recent improvements. He notes, however, that "re-establishing institutions carry with it the risk that old abuses will return" (Thomson, 2007, p. 34). This raises the question of how best to establish and implement liberal peace within society, while also avoiding the re-institution of warlords and criminals that thrived in the political economy of conflict. This has therefore led to mixed reviews with regard to interventions in Sierra Leone (Thomson, 2007). It has also been noted that attempts through the judiciary process aimed at attacking corruption have had little or no impact (Thomson, 2007; Bindi and Tufekci, 2018). Also, the rivalry that exists between various chiefdoms makes it hard to evaluate and promote citizen participation to deliver better services to the country (Bindi and Tufekci, 2018). Furthermore, it can be noted that the establishment of executive checks has been unsuccessful, thus continuing the thriving patronage network system that exists in Sierra Leone, with old patterns emerging again.

Moreover, the political economy of African conflicts has determined how resources are allocated in various states, the notions of losers and gainers, rent-seeking, and social and political factors. These factors are mostly based upon greed or grievance, as noted by Collier: reliance on resources like oil (more accurately termed the "resource curse"), diamonds and opportunities lead to rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).Thus, it can be deduced that conflicts within Africa arise from poverty and want, and are attempts to address the government's failure to provide security (human and physical), as power has been captured by elites for private gain (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).

It is crucial to note the conflict in the Niger Delta like many others serves as another example of a nation affected by multiple factors. Factors such as corruption, greed, environmental degradation, the oil revenue distribution allocation, the destruction, and mismanagement of resources. Another dimension of the conflict is the pining of various ethnic minorities groups against the ethnic majority, which is then used as an instrument of manipulation by the elites and various groups such as MOSOP. Thus, adding an ethnic–political dimension to an already complex-natured conflict. Likewise, warring parties within the conflict depended on the exploration and trade of resources, thus encouraging criminality and corruption to thrive. This results in a political economy centred on securing resources and maintaining the flow of arms and equipment, which in turn leads to a fierce and unrelenting political economy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005) While these factors and more are discussed in more detail in... it is crucial to note that their multi-layer dimensions make it difficult to pinpoint the main cause of conflict in the Bayelsa and Rivers. However, it is key to note that pinpointing one major cause of conflict is not always important, or beneficial to the peacebuilding process. What conflicts like that of the Niger Delta highlight, are the diverse, complex, and intricate nature of conflicts, which should, in turn, should be met with peacebuilding methods that address their complex nature.

Within the political economy of African conflict, it is crucial to note the different multiple, and sometimes contradictory, interests of various groups. These groups can include private businesses, armed forces, state operators, citizens, political parties, victims, spoilers, disputants' religious entities, regional and international stakeholders such as NGOs, peace activists, humanitarian agencies, and so on. It is also important to note the national and global governance policies that directly or indirectly perpetuate the political economy of conflict. The Human Development Index (HDI) shows that despite many African post-conflict societies achieving economic growth, most of these societies remain poor, with over 50 per cent living below $1 a day (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2019). It has been noted that Africa is the only region to have witnessed an increase both in the incidence of poverty and in the absolute number of poor, with some 300 million people – almost half the regional population – living on less than $1 a day (UNDP, 2019).The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which became the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) (formerly the Department for International Development – DFID), notes that in Mozambique, for example, among the rural poor economic growth and political achievement have been low while inequalities remain high. For example, where talking to Mozambique, Gastrow notes: criminal actors "...rely on the 'purchase of impunity' through bribery and corruption in order to operate without too much state interference. They cultivate connections at the highest levels of the state hierarchy or of the ruling party and seek their protection in exchange for money." (Gastrow, 2002, p. 18). Thus, can this be said for all societies of 'liberal peace',

or is this specific to Mozambique, and, if so, why? Does the implementation of liberal peace play a role in this and, if so, what is that role? And how does this affect the general peacebuilding agenda in Mozambique, Sierra Leone or any other country? Thus, as a means of testing these considerations, this research examines the liberal nature of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states. To do this, it analyses how neopatrimonialism influences peacebuilding and affects the overall peacebuilding agenda.

Furthermore, the literature recognises that the political economy of liberal peace has fallen short of addressing development problems such as poverty, social justice, exclusion and human insecurity (Philipsen, 2014; Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016), noting that this can be attributed to the tension that exists between democracy and liberalism that leads to contradictions within political and economic liberalisation. As a result, there tends to be an increase in social conflicts as well as in violent conflicts, thus resulting in development and peace being undermined or destroyed in the long run. Especially within Africa, these economies are rushed into a 'liberal peace paradigm' under the neoliberal policies of economic liberalisation through privatisation and free markets (Philipsen, 2014; Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). However, the long-term outcome is the failure in the sustainability of this peacebuilding and a questionable economy. Thus, the problem within post-conflict societies with regard to the informal economy is not connecting or disconnecting the informal economy from the formal economy within the nation, but, rather, changing the nature of the interactions between the two in order not to undermine the transition of conflict to peace, as well as building up the broad base of development and recovery.

Thus, taken together this raises the question of why this is happening and whether this sort of liberal peace is then acceptable? Is this variation of liberal peace more likely to be embraced by the African countries, as seems to be the norm? If so, what does this mean for peacebuilding in those specific countries and in Africa? Emphasis through the liberal peace paradigm on civil liberties and democracy alone, while failing to incorporate the social dimension, will continue to fuel tensions between socio-economic conditions and liberal peace. Thus, there exists a mismatch between the economic liberalisation and the political within the notion of liberal peace that has been dominated by neoliberal policies; this mismatch can lead to a relapse in conflict. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the cause of this mismatch, and whether and how it needs to be addressed? Or does this represent an accepted version of liberal peace? Which to an extent this thesis aims to address.

Neopatrimonialism

This section briefly sheds some light on the general understanding of neopatrimonialism, discussing its links to patronage, clientelism and corruption, and exploring how the literature treats the possible links between neopatrimonialism, conflict, the informal economy and peacebuilding challenges. This section aims at assessing how the current literature has addressed the relationship between conflict economies and neopatrimonialism and what are the implications of this in post-conflict or peacebuilding settings; the main component of this work is to assess how previous literature on neopatrimonialism has accounted for the obstacles surrounding conflict and their overall influence on the peacebuilding agenda. Also, within neopatrimonialism, the notion of clientelism will be explored, distinguishing between 'big man', political clientelism, political entrepreneur and godfatherism in order to understand the relationship between neopatrimonialism and conflict, and how they feed into each other as well as into the cycle of conflict.

The prefix 'neo' is added to patrimonialism to distinguish it as a modern variant of Weber's work on the typology of authority. Imposed by colonialism, this veneer of rational-legal authority takes on a personalistic nature that becomes characterised by patronage, clientelism and corruption (Pitcher et al., 2009). According to Blundo and Medard, neopatrimonialism can be seen as a prolongation of the notion of traditional patrimonial domination developed by Max Weber, which is based upon the idea of the confusion of the public and private in the context of traditional legitimacy (Médard, 2002). The recourse to the prefix 'neo' is intended to emphasise that we are no longer in the traditional context. The neopatrimonial state is understood as a state that is structurally and formally differentiated from society, while in the way it functions the public and private spheres informally tend to get mixed up (Médard, 2002). In a sense, the state is privatised for their benefit by those who hold a position of authority, first at the summit of the state, but also at all levels of the state pyramid. The political leader behaves like a patrimonial chieftain, that is, like the true owner of his realm (Médard, 2002).

The term neopatrimonialism was first applied in research on the traditional patterns of authority within various parties in West Africa by Zolberg in 1966; it has since been applied elsewhere, especially in African states, but also in Latin America, Asia and Europe (Zolberg, 1985). Studies into neopatrimonialism sought to explain it as a result of continued premodern cultural norms or as one of the effects of colonial rule. Likewise, many studies on neopatrimonialism have used it as a means for explaining economic stagnation, underdevelopment, poor leadership and other factors. In addition to this, recent works have also examined and explained the concept and closely related terms as labels for identifying regimes, leaders and systems (von Soest, 2006; Bach, 2011; Kelsall, 2011; Pitcher et al.,

2013; **Degila, 2014; Hopper,** 2017; Sigman and Lindberg, 2017; Ugur-Cinar, 2017; Khan, 2018; Kimani et al., 2021). This work, however, is concerned with examining how the concept of neopatrimonialism and its related concepts such as clientelism, corruption and patronage influence peacebuilding and shape the informal economy and post-conflict society.

In neopatrimonialism, it can be noted that a distinction exists between the public and private, at least formally. According to Erdmann and Engel, neopatrimonialism is a "mixture of two, partly interwoven types of domination that co-exist namely, patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. (…) elements of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination penetrate each other." (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 18). Similarly, according to Jean-Francois Medard, neopatrimonialism represents a confusion between the public and private spaces as well as a lack of differentiation between the office holder and his office (Medard, 1982). According to him, juridical norms as instructions are masked by the illusion of a functioning legal bureaucratic system. The distinction between public and private is rather "negated and voided of its contents" (Medard, 1979, p. 68). Kohli notes that it is the lack of an "effective public arena" able to differentiate between private and public interests that leads to the functioning of neopatrimonialism within the state (Kohli, 2012). He also highlights, giving the example of Nigeria, that elites are consumed with the hunger for power, stating that elites are focused "on maintaining power and on privatising public resources for personal gain or gain by [their] ethnic communities."(Kohli, 2012).

Thus, taken together, neopatrimonialism can be seen to be the overlap between public and private, the political and the economic, the individual and the collective (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Sindzingre, 2012). It is where there has been a blurring of the public and private domains, which therefore leads to the privatisation of state resources as individuals treat them as their private property. It consists of the centralisation of political power, the private use of state resources, and the redistribution of personal favours as well as state resources (Bach, 2011; Kelsall, 2011; Sindzingre, 2012). State resources, natural resources (diamonds, oil, etc.) and state-owned enterprises are some of the resources which are accumulated (Sindzingre, 2012).

According to the literature, neopatrimonialism refers to the simultaneous operation of two Weberian ideals: the rational-legal and the patrimonial (von Soest, 2006; Bach, 2011; gur-Cinar, 2017; Kimani et al., 2021). Patrimonial here denotes the relationship between a patron and client in the social and political order, in which the patron awards gifts from his own resources as a mean of securing the loyalty and support of the clients (von Soest, 2006; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Bach, 2011; Kelsall, 2011). These

gifts could refer to protection or material resources. These patrons are usually office holders who misuse both or either public funds or the office they hold as a means of securing support from their followers (von Soest, 2006; Bach, 2011; Kelsall, 2011). An example of this within the state tax collection agency could be the placement of unqualified officers by patrons to fill top and middle-level positions in order to influence the system (von Soest, 2006). Such an act would weaken the tax administration as strategies would be serving political agendas and the private interest of the patron rather than the state's agenda (von Soest, 2006). Examples of influencing the system could be the prevention of lawsuits of patron-owned businesses, the inhibition of controls at border posts, or – the most prominent feature in African states – the harassment of the patron's opponents.

As further noted by Erdmann and Engel:

> All the attempts to define neopatrimonialism (or modern patrimonialism) deal with and try to tackle one and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other, i.e. a very hybrid phenomenon (…) the term clearly is a post-Weberian invention and, as such, a creative mix of two Weber types of domination: of a tradition subtype, patrimonial domination, and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 17)

Neopatrimonialism is often contrasted with rational-legal authority where the latter is characterised by impersonal logic, law and reason which form the bonding agent for the legitimacy of authority (Pitcher et al., 2009). Emphasis on the coexistence between patrimonialism and the legal-rational structures within neopatrimonialism, therefore, raises questions pertaining to the forms of interactions and outcomes between one another (Bach, 2012). This raises questions concerning the neopatrimonial state's capacity or lack of capacity to produce policies that serve the public. Attempting to explore this rationale further, Daniel Bourmaud (1997, p. 62) defines neopatrimonialism as a "dualistic situation, in which the state is characterised by rationalisation, as well as by bureaucratisation."

Medard notes that neopatrimonialism has two foundations. Firstly, that neopatrimonialism is anti-democratic, meaning that it is based upon various mechanisms that ensured the stability of authoritarian regimes, thus undermining competition and political participation (Medard, 1991). Secondly, neopatrimonialism plays a central role in Africa's economic crisis as it prevents capitalist accumulation (Medard, 1991). As such, its removal became a wide obsession with the study of African politics for both economic growth and transformation (Oarhe, 2013). Neopatrimonialism has also become a universal concept used for understanding the political weakness and economic crisis in Africa

(von Soest, 2006), with scholars like Bratton and Van de Walle basing this upon ascribing that neopatrimonialism is a situation in which informal particularistic politics of the leaders and elites are placed above formal state institutions with blurred lines between the separation of the 'private' and the 'public' realm (von Soest, 2006; Van de Walle, 2012). Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle state that:

> While neopatrimonialism practice can be found in all politics, it is the core feature of politics in Africa…[P]ersonal relationships are the factors of margins of all bureaucratic systems, but in Africa, they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions. The interaction between the 'big man' and his extended retinue defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly. (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 459)

Furthermore, according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), the elements of neopatrimonialism were manifested through the redistribution of state resources, a systematic return to clientelism, as well as the use of presidential offices for the concentration of power to benefit an individual. In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law; with neopatrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system and the leader occupies bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favours, both within the state…and in society (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).

Likewise, serving as a multidimensional concept within the political sphere with economic outcomes as well as social norms interaction, neopatrimonialism is usually understood more simply, especially in economics and when looking at conflict economies, which therefore overlooks its complexity and possible involvement in conflict economies. Furthermore, the dual-track system of accumulation of both wealth and power by patrons can also be adjusted to fit into and function within economic policies established by foreign donors as well as global economic markets (Compagnon, 2012). Markets are transformed by neopatrimonialism into private membership groups that function based upon allegations and collusion, which thereby results in the erosion of the public sector, as personal interest is pursued above public development. For example, in Zimbabwe, programmes were used by the

government to enrich the family of the president. As such, economic contexts inform neopatrimonialism and neopatrimonialism informs the economic context (Sindzingre, 2012).Futhemore, relationships between neopatrimonialism and economic development, or the lack thereof, can be traced in various works, one of which is Theobald (1982). According to Theobald, a public patrimonial administration came about because of antidevelopment. Working within Weber's logic, Theobald states that individuals within bureaucracies rely upon public office in order to secure private gain as a result of a lack of institutional arrangements by the states which consist of revenue provided to the state (Theobald, 1982). This, therefore, leads to a failure in creating credible professional apparatus, as stable revenue cannot be provided by the state, leading to the reliance on personal networks for funds, power and connections by officials. This reliance upon personal networks therefore erodes the formal institutions and can be seen as a hinderance to development.

Previous studies into neopatrimonialism and development have focused more keenly on corruption, such as the literature by the International Financial Institution (IFI) and policymaking literature, which has led to the blame being ascribed to 'weak institutions' or even 'poor governance' rather than focusing on neopatrimonialism as a problem of the legacies of conflict economies or even underdevelopment (Sindzingre, 2012). Linking conflict economies to neopatrimonialism, William Reno's research on the civil work in Sierra Leone expressed how the institutional arrangements of power and the personal wealth accumulation by elites had led to the creation of the "shadow state" (Reno, 1997). The "shadow state" therefore formed a narrative for understanding how a state was meant to function and how it actually did (Reno, 1997). Reno thus links neopatrimonialism with the rise of violence and the asymmetrical pattern of distribution of resources, with the prevalence of gangs and criminal networks, and the intervention of warlords (Reno, 1997). The functioning of neopatrimonialism within the state, therefore, led to the risk of a "parallel power network, matching existing state hierarchies" according to Ilkhamov (2007, p. 71).

The concept of neopatrimonialism has been applied in various ways within the literature, and the following four descriptions represent its broadest illustrations: 1) At the state or community level, as social relations of personal loyalty solidified through bonds of dependence and subordination; 2) as rent-seeking behaviours and authority that is characterised by personal patterns, mainly practised by African rulers and elites; 3) the continued blurring of public services and personal gain which leads to economic development; 4) to characterise a type of regime, especially the one-party system in Africa (von Soest, 2006; Pitcher et al., 2009; Degila, 2014; Hopper, 2017; Sigman and Lindberg, 2017; Khan, 2018). This work, however, recognises the vast coverage of neopatrimonialism within the literature and, although it will briefly explain each broad area, it will be primarily focused on points two and three

to examine the current literature of neopatrimonialism and its role in understanding the post-conflict environment and the formation of positive peace.

Thus, analytically neopatrimonialism consists of three components, which are: the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and the misuse of state resources (Erdmann and Engel, 2006; von Soest, 2006; Ilkhamov, 2007; Bach, 2011; Guliyev, 2011; Kelsall, 2011; von Soest et al., 2011). The concentration of political power refers to a situation in which a single individual dominates the decision-making process by either delegating or making the decisions themselves. It is characterised by the formal and informal rules resting on one man – the president; this is known as presidentialism (Ilkhamov, 2007; Van de Walle, 2012; von Soest et al., 2011). This brings into play the 'big man' dimension of politics in which the patron or leader stays in power over a long period of time and sometimes even till he is dead (von Soest, 2006). This individual is seen as being largely above the law and, as such, is not subjected to the checks and balances that are otherwise present in mature democracies. Alternatively, there could be a rotation of power between political elites of the same party to prevent the opposing party from taking over, developing their own dominance, and extending their clientelist network (von Soest, 2006; von Soest et al., 2011; Ilkhamov, 2007). As such, for a concentration of power, there needs to be a simultaneous failure of both aspects, which could be represented by the short tenures of key members of the state and the long tenure of the president (von Soest, 2006; von Soest et al., 2011; Ilkhamov, 2007. The centralisation of power further finds expression in the short tenure and conscious change of key officials like ministers. For example, in Zambia, the average tenure of ministers is 2.4 years, so members are only operating for half of the legislative period (von Soest, 2006). This results in a situation of 'elite circulation', which is a prominent feature of multi-party systems. What this means for neopatrimonialism is that the network of client–patron relationships continues to branch and include more individuals at various levels.

The second component of neopatrimonialism – the award of personal favours – refers not only to the circulation of favours but also to personal favours being awarded as a means of serving power. For example, the status quo is maintained by a system of clientelism branching down from the president to his immediate followers and into a network of other links that even reach down to the everyday man and local village chiefs (Van de Walle, 2012). There is a high level of corruption here can be a key indicator for the misuse of state resources, with reference to the corruption perception index and the World Bank governance index (von Soest, 2006). Thirdly, fiscal resources are relied upon for their redistribution through clientless logic, meaning the misuse of state resources (Van de Walle, 2012). As

such, thiese componmnets shapes the conceptual framework of this thesis and moulds the narrative of this thesis to analyse what happens to political clients post-peacebuilding, and whether and how these relationships are influenced by the post-conflict environment and the formation of peace economies, which is one of the central aims of this thesis (see Conceptual Framework and Research Questions).

Beresford on the rise of gatekeeper politics in South Africa (Beresford, 2015). Beresford recognized the need to **understand the "African" political system he noted t**hat previous works have especially focused and linked it to neopatrimonialism however there is a need to understand the patronage politics from a broader spectrum-gatekeeper politics. He noted that **gatekeeper politics"is how political leaders in** positions of authority within the ruling party or in public office control access to resources and **opportunities to forward their own political and economic ends."** (Beresford, 2015p 3) Which is closely associated with neopatrimonialism but not laid within its traditional framework. So, whether refer to as clientelism, prebendalism, neopatrimonialism, or gatekeeper politics, there is a need to understand this parallel system of governance and resource control that exists as this work does especially through the framing of patronage peacebuilding (Beresford, 2015).

Concept within Neopatrimonialism

The foundation of the political economy of neopatrimonialism was laid by Richard Sandbrook, who examined the "private appropriation of states powers" within African states with regard to underdevelopment (Sandbrook, 1986). Sandbrook identified that in some African states a representation of "economic objectives [is subordinated] to the short-run exigences of political survival" for the elites (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 97). Peter Evans further expressed the link between neopatrimonialism and underdevelopment, stating: "the preoccupation of the political class with rent seeking has turned the rest of society into prey", further explaining that "it is not the bureaucracy that impedes development so much as the lack of capacity to behave like a bureaucracy" (Evans, 1987, p. 570).Neopatrimonialism can be combined with patterns of stable production of various public policies and embedded in a state's informal structure operating within criminal networks. For example, according to Fithen and Richards' work, "the [Revolutionary United Front] RUF represents a paradox. It claimed to have an ambition for a more just society, and yet ended up a random and arbitrary killing machine" seeking, where possible, profits (Boas and Jennings, 2005, p123). Similarly as stated by Medard, "Unlike the patrimonial regime, the neopatrimonial regime hides behind a façade which is complex and differentiated" (Medard, 1982, p181).

Thus, the neopatrimonial paradigm is known by a variety of names such as 'big man politics', 'personal rule', 'politics of the belly', and is based upon the understanding that affairs of the state were being run by informal institutions (Medard, 1991). Using the examples of child soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the concept of neopatrimonialism has been used to explore social relations. In his work, William Murphy explained youth clientelism in the service of violence through neopatrimonialism and patrimonialism (Murphy, 2003). He argued that 'big man' logic within these shadow states and in Liberia and Sierra Leone characterised the regimes during the periods of conflict. Both politicians and military leaders were known as the 'big men', taking advantage of youths and controlling natural resources, dispensing a patronage system to youths for their role in the violence in return for loyalty, protection, administration roles and even arms (Murphy, 2003). These patron–client relationships trickle down through the command structure into the civilian population where rebel groups then exercise control (Murphy, 2003). This creates a situation in which rebel groups are perpetuating violence over space and time because of the relations of dependency upon their patronage system. Murphy's work in Sierra Leone also forms the basis for part of the conceptual framework of this thesis; his work analysing the trickle-down effect of the patronage network while also considering the 'big men' (patrons and godfathers) in conflict situations, is applied in this research; however, rather than focusing on conflict this thesis advances Murphy's thinking by substituting conflict with peacebuilding. This, then forms the basis of the first research question, which aims to examine how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this influences the peacebuilding agenda (see Research Questions number one).

While Murphy's (2003) work concentrated on examining the micro-level relationships between a commander and his troops, others, such as Medard, have examined the predominance of personal relationships within African politics (Medard, 1982). They note that African societies were historically organised according to a patron–client structure, which has now become embedded within the political infrastructure. With reference to Rwanda and Burundi as "traditional clientelist states", Medard argues that the relationship between the patron and client forms the underlying basis of the state, from the king down to the local peasant (Medard, 1982). As with Medard, Hyden also emphasised that this personal rule can be seen in all areas of the world and "a lineage orientation" of various kinds and other "primary reciprocity" further governed African communities (Hyden, 1997). Thus, according to Hyden, this explains why informal rather than formal rules have had greater salience in Africa.

Less is said within the literature concerning the behaviours and actions of non-state groups within conflict and how they change over time: why is it that movements that start as a social rebellion against

the state change into a mirror-image of the state they set out to fight against? (Boas and Jennings, 2005) One explanation previously discussed is Keen's notion of greed and the need for self-enrichment. Although this explains why groups change their dynamic, Boas and Jennings take this a step forward with a dual analysis of why groups forsake their political agenda to become more profit-seeking, profit-making based groups (Boas and Jennings, 2012). They analysed both where the state and the state's structures placed these groups, and the place of profit-seeking, looking at Central and West Africa. They analysed how local, national and international responses affect the dimensions of conflict, considering that the RUF were never treated as being other than thugs and greedy bandits, which is what they eventually became, with the same being seen in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, where armed youths putting forth real social issues were treated as bandits that could be crushed by force. Boas and Jennings argue that neopatrimonialism has assumed a machine-like character, occurring in many insurgencies fuelled by resource extraction (Boas and Jennings, 2005).

Similarly, as Clapham stated, neopatrimonialism cannot just be seen as a limited pattern; rather, it is a systematic institutional structure that is characterised by the informal themes of presidentialism, clientelism and the use of state resources to maintain legitimacy (Clapham, 1985). As such, the next subsection discusses the role of political clientelism, breaking the concept down into discussions of the political entrepreneur, the middleman and godfatherism, in order to understand neopatrimonialism and its relation to the legacy of conflict economies, and post-conflict societies.

The 'Big Man'

Within the dynamic of neopatrimonialism, the literature has highlighted a factor which concentrates on the patterns and behaviours of various leaders post-independence. In these studies, the focus is laid on the rule of the 'big man', or 'personal rule', in which power is retained by leaders in order to accumulate wealth through reliance on their neopatrimonial networks (Pitcher et al., 2009). Examples of such studies are Callahy's work on Zaire, Joseph's work on Nigeria, and Reno's work on the warlord states of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In all these works, the key features highlighted are the recognition of patron–client ties for professional and political advancement, and the misuse of state resources for the loyalty of patronage networks by leaders, especially with regard to natural resources (Pitcher et al., 2009). Economic enrichment is sought by both the patrons and the clients, and this pursuit trumps public advancement. This can, therefore, be linked back to David Keen's work on how conflict becomes a pursuit of economies by other means and stops being about one side winning. Rather, interested parties can be seen to have a vested interest and benefit from the continuance of conflict (Keen, 2012). Although these studies remain influential in identifying the role

neopatrimonialism plays in the overall economic stagnation of a community, they fall short of assessing how neopatrimonialism sustains the functioning of the informal markets in which the clients operate, and what this means for African communities. This gap is filled by the second research question in this thesis, which examines how neopatrimonialism shapes the informal economy (see Research Questions). Moving back to the notion of the "The Big Man" this is express through political clenteslim and godfathers discussed below.

Political Clientelism

Noting the embedded nature of clientelism in society, the following few paragraphs will engage with the literature on the question of what determines the existence of clientelism. According to anthropologists, there is a two-pronged answer to this. The existence of clientelism is linked partially to environmental conditions, which contribute to material insecurity, and is also a result of situational factors. For example, the initial client of political clientelism has been said to be a refugee or a kinless man who sought out a protector (Mair, 1961,). Another perspective with regard to what determines clientelism can be explained by Lucy Mair, who notes that the need for a patron does not reflect the "necessity for survival" but is more to "advance one's economy and social status", thus reinforcing Keen's work with regard to the idea that conflicts shift to becoming more about vested interests and economic agendas (Mair, 1961, p. 325; Keen, 2012). Furthermore, as highlighted by J.J. Maquet's work, clientelism could not have developed without: a) the favouring of economic conditions to produce consumer goods; and, b) the means by the patron to control economic surplus (Maquet, 1961). There are various types of clientelism such as tribute clientelism, political clientelism, mass clientelism and so on. While this research will highlight each type, it is primarily concerned with political clientelism, which will be explored in detail below. Tribute clientelism refers to the exchange of gifts more typically within the traditional kingdoms based upon the client and patronage bonds of reciprocity and trust (Van de Walle, 2012). Within the scope of the 'big man' paradigm, patrons, for example in African society, adopt the cultural repertories of traditional forms of tribute as a means of legitimising the pursuit of client relationships. Mass clientelism refers to the allocation and provision of state resources and public offices to the mass of clients through party organisations and electoral politics (Van de Walle, 2012). Elite clients, on the other hand, refer to those who are narrowly associated with the political elite, based upon the characteristics of prebendalism, granting personal favours to state resources and even the strategic allocation of political public offices to elites (Van de Walle, 2012).

As identified by Nicolas van de Walle, political clientelism is "a ubiquitous feature"; thus, it will not disappear (Van de Walle, 2012). It is, therefore, essential to study and understand how this feature is

embedded within society, as well as how it involves and influences the very structure of the political economy. As this is a complex and large topic, this section aims to examine empirical and theoretical observations within the literature of neopatrimonialism in order to expose the gaps which suggest the need for further work to be carried out. This section examines and distinguishes between various types of political clientelism, further branching into political entrepreneurism and godfatherism. Also this will help in understanding the poltical power structure in Bayelsa state and Rivers state discussed in chapter 4.

Political clientelism can be defined as a reciprocal and personal relationship between a superior and an inferior, with the command of unequal resources, and the norms of rationality, universalism and anonymity being absent from the relationship nexus (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972; Van de Walle, 2012). It serves as a binding adhesive in which the patron is bound to the client and vice versa. As such political clientelism is a personal reciprocal relationship between actors involving mutually beneficial transactions and the control of unequal resources that could possibly have political ramifications beyond the dynamic of that relationship (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). The scope of political clientelism, therefore, allows for the recognition of three vital components: 1) the asymmetric relationship discernible in the patron–client relationship; 2) the durability and locus of the relationship; 3) the dimension of the character of the transaction within the relationships (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). Within studies of clientelism, especially with regard to the region of Africa, it is viewed as being a leftover effect of pre-existing traditional cultures (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). However, this notion has been contested by Van de Walle, whose argument against it was based on two points. Firstly, that this atavistic view cannot be correct as clientelism is a feature that is not present within Africa alone but is also found embedded in different societies, such as Latin America and Europe; although it is at different levels, it is still present (Van de Walle, 2012). Secondly, clients exist in modern states on the condition that political actors allocate resources by preferential discretion for what they deem will result in a political advantage (Van de Walle, 2012). As such, it can be deduced that political clientelism exists in all modern states, at various levels and, as will be shown within this section, political clientelism plays a function within the economic structure of a society.

Political clientelism differs from the dynamics of mere common friendship in that it involves to a greater extent the conditional nature of personal loyalties (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972).. This characteristic, therefore, acts as a means through which discrepancies in status and power are reflected, thus both uniting and separating the patrons and clients (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). According to Scott, the patron–client relationship can be seen as:

a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. (Scott, 1972, p. 92)

The asymmetrical dimension of this relationship is highlighted by Eric Wolf's phrase "lopsided friendship", expressing the differential control that the patrons have over resources and the nature of the obligation, not just from the clients but the patrons too (Wolf and Silverman, 2001). The dynamic can manifest as a client owing tribute to his chief, and the chief owing him political privileges and rights, or a peasant owing a local politician a vote and the politician owing to the peasant material needs (Wolf and Silverman, 2001). Thus, these relationships are based on a complementary role that is rooted in reciprocal rights and obligations.

With the above concept in mind, we can, therefore, recognise the availability of "middlemen" or "social brokers" as highlighted by Jeremy Boissevain's work in Sicily, where the middleman functions as the broker between the two parties and forms the bridge through which communication is made (Blok, 1969; Boissevain, 1969), serving as a means of bridging the gap of not only communication but also groups, cultures and other factors. This brings into discussion the role of the broker within neopatrimonial relations (Boissevain, 1969). As such, it is crucial to note that, as neopatrimonialism expands within the state and other bureaucratic institutions, so also do the functions of the broker. Furthermore, as new political institutions are formed, the linkages through the brokers tend to increase through channels such as kinship, family ties, ethnicity and so on (Boissevain, 1969). Thus, as state functions shift and evolve over time to become more and more vested in individual interests, brokerage functions also tend to expand beyond the initial starting point into national institutions, pressure groups, parties and so on (Boissevain, 1969). This gives us a picture of the neopatrimonial network and how it can branch out beyond the simple linear client–patron dynamic.

Furthermore, it also becomes necessary that within each relationship type the transactions in the client–patron relationship are examined, as they vary. The term 'transactions' refers to a mutual exchange of beneficial obligations between the patron and client, with the transaction depending on the needs of the client as well as the overall influence of the patron. In some instances, these transactions can be completely linear at the local level, while at other times they might flow into the

hierarchy of a government through various persons of influence, thus resulting in a situation in which "the organization of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies" (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, p. 155).

In addition to this, clientelism is intimately linked to poverty and inequality, of which it is probably both a cause and a consequence (Clara, 2010). Also, as noted by Hopkin (2006a), clientelism and corruption are interlinked, as clientelism incites corruption and vice versa. It is crucial to note that despite notions that clientelism would disappear because of democratisation, it is, however, persisting in both developing and developed countries, irrespective of democracy (Clara, 2010).

Just as the variables of clientelism are subject to political change and development, so also is the type of clientelist relationship. For example, factors such as technological or economic changes can reinforce the patron's position, with the possibility of their clients changing but their positions remaining the same (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). As such, when patrons give way to the emergence of new patrons, the displaced persons are alternatively converted into "brokers" or "middlemen" (Boissevain, 1969; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). Although the type of resources available for use changes, this does not change how resources are used. However, in the new situation, brokers may use state resources in the form of policy outputs for their desired goal (Boissevain, 1969; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972).This has, therefore, taken the locally centred nexus of exchanges of either prebends or tributes to the broader dimension of a network of formed relationships that involves political balancing, and a wider network (Boissevain, 1969). As such, efforts towards intervention within the socio-economic milieu may alter the original position of the patron to that of a broker, but, overall, it may have little effect on clientelism itself (Boissevain, 1969).

Furthermore, in accordance with Mushtaq Khan's work, which critiques the excessive focus on the adverse effects of clientelism as well as rent-seeking, this thesis does not seek to list or merely identify the effects of clientelism and rent-seeking (Khan, 2005). Rather, just like Khan, it acknowledges the inevitable nature of political clientelism and rent-seeking in all societies, especially where markets are imperfect (Khan, 2005). As such, the focus of studies should not be on where and to what degree these exist in societies, but should shift to a more effective analysis as to whether these two phenomena lead to the creation or capture of rents, and what this means for the societies in which they occur (Khan, 2005). This would give way to an understanding of how rents could lead to the stabilisation of the political process, the growth of the markets and, where conflict occurs, a shift into the formal market structure. Consequently, it becomes clear that clientelism cannot be meaningfully studied outside the

setting in which it occurs, because its nature and dimensions depend on the structure of the society within which it occurs, as well as the political structure of that society. There also needs to be a distinction made between patterns that encompass the whole state and neopatrimonialism patterns within the state as this study shows in chapter 4.

Also as recognised above relationships change also within the patron–client relationship, there exist what are known as 'role-sets', which are seen as paired relationships that link the patron to the client and vice versa, while a clientele network is an aggregate of role-sets linked to each other in such a manner that the patron also occupies a client position to a superior of his own, who in turn is his patron (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972). The reason for this identification is to note that client and patron can replicate themselves within various intergroups, or even institutional levels. As such the simple, straightforward relationship observed between a client and patron may be a little more complex and could possibly extend across a segment of society or the whole society itself.

Thus, it can be deduced that the wealth of the economy and the resources available to the state influence the scope of clientelism regardless of the political regime. Where there is a lack of resources, clientelism is more likely to occur within the distribution of public offices by elites. The everyday average citizen does not receive adequate funds to sustain themselves and, as such, even the smallest political benefit because of clientelism would be valuable (Van de Walle, 2012). Both factors can be identified in neopatrimonial systems and form a gateway into the operations of informal institutions, opening up the means for doing whatever is needed to survive, including as well for personal enrichment. This brings into discussion the link between conflict, peace economies and neopatrimonialism.

Political Entrepreneur

Branching off from political clientelism, we move into the dimension of political entrepreneurship. Political entrepreneurship involves similar features of conquest and the preservation of power by political actors, establishing a link between the two within a neopatrimonial system. Referring to political entrepreneurs, Compagnon viewed them as a group of individuals who live off politicians as a source of income (Compagnon, 2012). Constantly in the pursuit of resources, positions of power as such are not necessarily their interest, but are, rather, a means by which prebends may be obtained for themselves or their clients, all of which contributes to the preservation of power. It is within this context that Weber views corruption as an "irregular and formally illegal variant" of the entrepreneur's income (Weber, 1959, p. 127). It can be identified that the loyalty of followers can be traced to symbolic

elements such as kinship, religion, witchcraft, charisma and so on, which is exploited by the entrepreneurs (Weber, 1959).

Using the example of a boss within twentieth century American politics, Weber describes how the political entrepreneur invests his own finances and controls some votes, which he then delivers to a particular candidate in exchange for some sort of influence over decisions within the state as a return on his investment (Weber, 1959). The political entrepreneur is supported by a team and aspires to power through the guaranteed supply of material and rewards for his clients. Similarly noted by Bailey, to be a successful leader, one must, therefore, collect "more resources than one opponent and use them more effectively. Attacking an opponent means trying to destroy his resources or preventing him from acquiring some or using them efficiently" (Bailey, 1971, p. 37). Building up and maintaining efficient support is the foundational basis of political entrepreneurship. In the pursuit of clients, there exists competition among various patrons; the struggle is about how one can outbid another patron through the combination of resources and the mobilisation of clients. This is a promoment theme that is explore by emanating the struggle of power in Bayelsa state and Rivers state in chapter 4

Godfatherism

Godfatherism is another concept embedded within neopatrimonialism that explores relationships between patron and client which can be linked to conflict and peacebuilding as this thesis shows. Godfatherism refers to a situation in which individuals can dominate various public institutions by manoeuvring into elected offices as well as manipulating other sufficient offices for their protégés (Albin-Lackey, 2012). These godfathers are not merely financial supporters, but rather possess the ability to mobilise individuals into violence, and work through corruption to hobble any competitors (Albin-Lackey, 2012). According to Daniel Bach, these godfathers represent the 'strong men' who can challenge the 'big man', further stating:

> While the big man combines economic power with key political functions as a broker in a
> neopatrimonial setting; the strongman does so through his ability to control illicit forms of
> violence, if need be through the manipulation of public means of coercion. The strong man
> may be a warlord or the boss of a gang; he may also be observed in Nigeria under the
> fourth republic, a rogue politician, or his "godfather". (Bach, 2005, p. 67)

Godfatherism is the process in which links are established between an individual and the institutional hierarchy in order to receive favoured treatment and support. As stated by Joseph, it is the process where:

An individual seeks the support and protection of an oga or a godfather while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods – loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, promotion – and the main resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece of the state. (Joseph, 1991, p. 207)

Furthermore, according to Albert (2005), godfathers serve as political gatekeepers, who influence politics and manipulate society by surrounding themselves with an array of loyalists. They determine who participates in politics and when (Albert, 2005),. As noted in the HRW (2007) report, godfathers are more than just political campaign financiers: their power stems not just from their abundant wealth but also from the ability to influence and deploy violence and corruption that manipulates the local, state and national political system in order to support the politicians of their choice.

Godfatherism has characterised the political, religious, social and commercial networks of Nigerian since the colonial times. Several studies on Nigeria have featured the role of political godfathers and their godsons within the scope of fraudulent elections, and intra-party and political conflicts – a political interaction that promotes corruption, thus resulting in the stifling of democracy (Albert, 2006; Nnamani, 2006; Onwuzuruigbo, 2006; HRW, 2007). Both the godfather and the godson become critical factors (roles) in the development agenda by raising a network of individuals in religious, commercial and political arenas. In an atmosphere where political patrons thrive and seek office godfathers are beneficial. Godfathers can include current and retired military generals and past presidents. Politics around the godfathers is centred around enjoying a portion of the 'national cake', as well as personalised control over it (Albin-Lackey, 2012). Within godfatherism, the interest of the godfather lies not in occupying political office, but, rather, in dominating and controlling these offices by filling them with their protégés, who would not be able to obtain political office without the help of the godfathers (Albin-Lackey, 2012). Government offices are therefore viewed by godfathers as investments which, when in their control, could yield greater rewards of wealth and power.

In practical terms, the godfather serves as a benefactor and mentor who trains their political godson to achieve success, and supports him not just with their wealth but most importantly their network of connections. They shield their mentee from politics and plans that are likely to negatively influence them. The godson thus reciprocates, firstly by remaining loyal, and then by serving the demands of the godfather through the promise of control and power when successfully elected to office (Albin-Lackey, 2012). Furthermore, the godson expresses his support through symbolical gifts, and occasionally hosting lavish parties in honour of the godfather. As noted by Komter, "mutual loyalty, often supported

by gifts, connects those involved in collective hostilities towards third parties as well as those who maintain collective friendships." (2007, p. 94). Two very public godfathers in Nigeria who were interested in the illicit economy and who furthered the criminalisation of politics, were Chief Lamidi Adeidibu and Chris Uba (Albin-Lackey, 2012). Through corruption and violence, they influenced the governments of their states.

It is crucial to note, corruption features prominently when talking about godfatherism (Aderonke and Awosika, 2013; Martini, 2014; Adeosun et al., 2016). Godfatherism has created a functioning system in which formal and informal institutions limits access to public goods. Thus demanding regular 'returns' from their protégés. These rewards range from contracts to stolen government funds, as well as the ability to appoint various positions within the government (Albin-Lackey, 2012). Godfathers derive their authority from effective proficiency in criminal activities, ranging from financing thugs to rigging elections, and when necessary bribing various officials who either stand in the way of their selected protégés taking over, or would assist in making this a reality (Albin-Lackey, 2012). As such, politicians that have been helped are in debt to the godfathers. In reality, the entire country is reliant on a rent-collection system, which not only dictates the electorate process but also the power structure. Elections in Nigeria are characterised by multiple voting, intimidation of voters, hijacking of ballot boxes, vote buying, violence and the stealing of ballot boxes (Idada and Uhunmwuangho, 2012; Martini, 2014). The inability to conduct credible elections since 1999 has been attributed to the existence of godfathers, especially within Anambra, Oyo, Enugu and Rivers states, due to the intense political tensions within these states (HRW, 2007). For example, the results of the 2019 general elections were said to be dictated by former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan, Senator Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso, former Lagos state governor Bola Tinubu, and current president Muhammadu Buhari, who were all regarded as godfathers (Shakirudeen, 2017).

Godfathers are seen to have transcended the political realm and entered into other areas of societal life, such as religion, commerce and even child-rearing, thus influencing the advancement and growth of a society. Although the empirical data for this thesis did not reveal much detail about the notion of godfathers, a minority of participants did agree that they sit at the top of the power structures of the political realm. AD1, an interviewee, notes that the godfathers mostly hide in the shadows and can really be linked to any crimes; however, they control everything that goes on, beyond the state level to the entire federal government. He argues that godfathers are the financial muscle behind most patrons, and that any examination of power dynamics is incomplete without mentioning godfathers. Thus,

although the notion of godfatherism is a minor theme within this research, it opens avenues for future studies to examine the role and impact of godfatherism within the political economy of peacebuilding.

Link between the Informal Economy, Peacebuilding, and Neopatrimonialism

As studies have previously shown, testing and ascertaining the link between the informal economy, peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism can be difficult; however, there does exist clear evidence of an affinity between them. Thus, taking all these relationships together, neopatrimonialism extends far beyond political domination; it is also embedded within the social and economic relations that together shape the state. It facilitates the solidification and growth of power structures in situations of conflict and post-conflict settings. These power structures are simply replaced by the incoming political elites whose interest is in receiving their 'cut' or, as it is widely known, their share of the "national cake" (Van de Walle, 2012). This situation creates a legacy of neopatrimonialism that can lead to the build-up of corruption as it grows and evolves. Hence, with the central objective being the relationship between conflict and neopatrimonialism, current literature on neopatrimonialism does recognise the legacies of neopatrimonialism and its continuous cycle, but falls short of assessing the effect of these legacies and how they relate to other dimensions of the state, such as its economic, social and even political spheres. This reveals a need for the legacies of both neopatrimonialism and conflict connectiveness to be analysed, whether within a given state, region or even globally. Also, as identified by Wolf, it becomes necessary to recognise the location and cooperative ramifications of these clientele ties within the community in the areas, as he puts it, "where the patron is incorporated into the lineage to form solid patron-client blocs", or "the institutional framework is extensive and the ties between multiple sponsors and multiple clients are diffuse and cross-cutting" (Wolf and Silverman, 2001, p. 204). As such, it also becomes necessary to examine how these various dimensions affect the political economy of a country as both one aspect and various interrelated structures of the country. In addition to this, a study based upon the actors within the political economy of peacebuilding will, therefore, contribute to an understanding of the reproduction of neopatrimonialism in relation to the legacies of conflict and peacebuilding.

Work on African democracies and market economies continues to refer to their informal, personality- and patronage-based nature, which is heavily based upon a neopatrimonial infrastructure, as opposed to the formal institutions such as the rule of law or free and fair regular elections, which are some of the foundations of democracy (Pitcher et al., 2009). According to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, this is:

Very fruitful - but only insofar as the term "patrimonial" is used to designate not a level of "development" or differentiation of political regimes, but rather a specific way of coping with the major problems of political life which may cut across different levels of "development" or structural complexity. (Eisenstadt, 1973, p.9)

In addition to this, the impact of neoliberal policies on the social welfare of the general population is also an area of interest when examining the link between peacebuilding and neoliberalism, the question here pertaining to the effect these economic policies have on the social welfare of society. This is an issue raised by Dzelilovic but not covered in her work. She notes that the creation of social security and stability influence political participation as well as participation in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies, thus having the potential to influence the implementation of liberal peace (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2015). The lack of social security can lead to a reliance, for survival, not only on patronage networks but also on the informal economy.

Thus, from the examples cited it can be concluded that work on the political economy of conflict and the neoliberal solutions suggested as addressing it have not given sufficient attention to socio-economic improvements and development of the informal economy, which constitutes a source of support for most of the population. As noted by Salih (2017), in its zeal to promote human rights and democracy, liberal peace theory, both in practice and principles, falls short by not taking into consideration the fact that post-conflict economies have been crippled by debt, poverty, diseases and so on, and may not be able to comply with the ethos of liberal peace just yet. Hence, it could conceivably be hypothesised that liberal peacebuilding in practice is promoting relationships of clientelism within certain areas of states. Thus, this thesis tests this hypothesis by examining how and to what extent peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy, as well as how this influences post-conflict society and the overall peacebuilding agenda.

Futhermore, examination of the implementation of the liberal peace agenda by neoliberal policies reveals that these policies have fallen short of addressing individual impacts or shaping poverty reduction in terms of employment creation. Poverty and unemployment rates not only affect the formal economy but also impact the informal economy, as noted above. Over time there has been an immense interest within this area of peacebuilding studies, circling around poverty reduction and placing focus on the need for employment creation to secure economic recovery and reduce poverty, which could positively affect the formal economy within any given society. Thus, it can be deduced that economic policies or reforms that increase employment opportunities will foster poverty reduction and

subsequently lead to the establishment of economic security, promoting political participation and fostering peace. However, despite knowledge of this, there remains a gap in the systematic adoption of such policies within the peacebuilding agenda. Rather, efforts have been centred on macroeconomic policies that are in tune with monetary and fiscal policies, while institutional reforms that shape employment creation and lead to poverty reduction in order to foster peace receive less attention. This affects not only the scope and dimension of the formal economy but also the informal economy. The most probable reason for this in post-conflict societies is that institutional reforms seem to be more political in nature and take a longer period to bring about. They could also involve the difficulty of relocating a country's resources as well as the structural realignment of the economy, which, as previously stated, runs the risk of corrupt elites or politicians using these reforms not only to secure a position of power and control but also to use it as a way of obtaining wealth as showed by Salih work. Thus, there is a complex web of issues that need careful consideration when assessing the role of neoliberal policies on poverty, as well as examining the link between peacebuilding, neopatrimonialism and the informal economy.

Within the peacebuilding literature a sensitive issue that has also been explored is the trade-off that sometimes occurs at the end of a conflict, while trying to transition into the post-conflict stage. Despite the opinions of many scholars, may peacebuilding operations have either officially or unofficially engaged in compromise with warlords or criminal elites to foster peace. This ranges from including warring factions in power-sharing agreements, arranging amnesties for past crimes, to the toleration of illegal economic activities; a glaring example of the foregoing is the warlords in parliament in Afghanistan. This raises the question of stability and whether it should be pursued at all costs if that involves engagement with war/conflict criminals, and to what extent should the state be willing to compromise? Should activities that existed within the conflict economy continue to thrive within the post-conflict stage in order to facilitate support and foster peace? How much negotiation will be deemed as buying peace, and is buying peace wrong? Does it in any way jeopardise the peacebuilding agenda? Also, should conflict criminals be recognised in peacebuilding forums for development? Should the state adopt an exclusive or inclusive approach to conflict entrepreneurs? Hence, part of this thesis in chapter 4 examines the buying of peace adopted by the state and the implications of this.

Furthermore, the notion of legality differs across the various types of clientelism. Patronage, as previously stated, is perfectly legal though it constitutes favouritism, which is a 'grey area' that is frowned upon. There is nothing illegal about the use of the patronage system within a state and it remains a practice in even the most mature democracies (Van de Walle, 2012). As such, the question

then arises as to what the point is of studying a patronage system and its relationship to peacebuilding. The patron–client relationship comes into question when the intentions of the patron are fuelled by greed, as previously highlighted by Collier's work and subsequently David Keen's work (Collier, 2004; Keen, 2012). The relationship begins to operate within prebendalism, where the rule of law is subverted for personal gain, thus spreading within society. Therefore, the methods for attaining these resources by both the patrons who need it and the clients who set out to obtain it for their patrons for personal enrichment become illegal (Van de Walle, 2012). Although this thesis is not centred on the notion of whether a society is democratised or not, it is, however, essential to note that, according to Van de Walle's work, clientelism is influenced by the nature of democratisation of a society (Van de Walle, 2012). He argues that the public would benefit more from clientelism in a society that is more democratised than in a society that is less democratic. His notion is that the less democratic society would favour the elites through clientelism, while the rule of law would be subverted, and various rights undermined as well (Van de Walle, 2012). This, therefore, could be a starting point for a comparative study on the dimensions of clientelism in democratic and non-democratic states.

Salih observes that the politics of conflict becomes interwoven into the fabric of the new political economy that peacebuilding is trying to establish, thus allowing criminal markets to thrive (Salih, 2017). Similarly, Medard notes: "while it is necessary to have the political power to be rich, it is also necessary to be rich in order to retain political power" (Medard, 1992, p. 172). Tim Kelsall also states that development in nations such as African states has been adversely affected by a system in which the leader is known as a 'big man' through the allocation of lucrative productive economic opportunities to their various clients to secure legitimacy (Kelsall, 2012). As such, studies around development and economics need to develop a means of replacing these clientelist ties or bonds with a more arm's length programmatic relationship at all levels, such as between political parties, officials, business associates, and – especially – electorates. The examination of this relationship with the intention of transforming it into a more productive and transparent one forms a basis for new analysis, which could study the relationship between conflict and neopatrimonialism. Thus, this research examines the clientship bonds between patrons and clients and how it shapes peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers state and how this shapes the informal economy based on the gaps also observed by Salih (2017) and Kelsall (2012)

Conclusion

This literature review chapter has provided an overview of key academic discussions and interpretations on the informal economy, peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism. Section one drew on the definitions, scope and nature of the informal economy, highlighting the various theories within the literature. While recognising the weakness and strengths of previous work, it argued that this thesis adopts the globalisation thesis, complementary theory and the illegal school, which fully capture the universal and interlinked nature of the informal economy and formal economy while recognising the existence of social networks within both. This section recognised that there is a link between the informal economy and conflict, which is characterised by inequalities, hierarchies, privilege differences, neopatrimonialism and clientelism, which together increase activities within the informal sphere undertaken in order to survive, while also promoting growth in the size and scope of the informal economy. While the relationship between the informal economy and peacebuilding exists, a study of this relationship is lacking as hown by the works of Meagher (2014,2015,2016, 2017), Daneilson (2015)and Jones.

Section two examined the understanding of liberal peacebuilding and the political economy of conflict and peacebuilding within Africa. It noted that the promotion of liberal peace has led to a disconnect in the political economy within the African states, where there is control and competition for resources, which can be seen as the site of power and has also become the site of domination within post-conflict societies. The activities of peacebuilding create opportunities for political influence and competition, which leads to a struggle for power among elites. Thus, reinforcing the need to examine the nature of peacebuilding in a specific state.

Section three addressed the conceptualisation of neopatrimonialism, looking into the current literature that has addressed the relationship between conflict and neopatrimonialism and what the implications of this are in post-conflict or peacebuilding settings – a focus which is the main component of this work. It further examined the notion of the 'big man', distinguishing between political clientelism, political entrepreneurism, and godfatherism.

The final section linked the three conceptual terms, peacebuilding, the informal economy and neopatrimonialism together. It noted that linking the three are a number of factors: poverty, the trade-off that sometimes occurs at the end of a conflict while trying to transition into the post-conflict stage, political competition and the power struggle. This section further noted that to fully understand how

neopatrimonialism shapes peacebuilding and how it influences the informal economy these elements must be examined within the context of the political economy of peacebuilding.

Based on this gap and the above-mentioned arguments, this chapter shows that the link between peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism with regard to the informal economy has not received adequate attention in the literature. Consequently, this is the area in which this study becomes relevant. This study draws on popular political, economic, social and scholarly discourses discussed in this chapter on the informal economy, peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism, as well as on data from fieldwork, in order to examine how and to what extent state-led and donor-based initiatives are influenced by neopatrimonialism, and what implications this has for the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. Having discussed the conceptual framework of this thesis, in Chapter 3, we take this investigation further by presenting a case-study analysis of the conflict, peacebuilding process and the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State.

Chapter 3 – Conflict, Peacebuilding and the Informal Economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

Introduction

This chapter focuses on providing a broad overview of the Bayelsa state and Rivers state, systemically taking into consideration the conflict and peacebuilding process thus far. As the focus of this thesis is peacebuilding and the informal economy in these states, this chapter will start by providing an overview of the long and complex conflicts in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. The specific objective of starting with the conflict within the states is to ensure that despite the focus of this thesis being on peacebuilding, a background knowledge of the conflict will facilitate understanding of the peacebuilding initiatives and how they shape the informal economy. Thus, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section highlights the history behind the conflict, exploring the incidence of violence within the states, the interplay between resource conflict and contextual factors responsible for the conflict, exploring the cultural, political and socio-economic dynamics. It will also highlight the various causes and the interplay the conflict, which include ethnic divides, oil bunkering, environmental degradation, the weak and fragile state, arms proliferation, the emergence and spread of armed youth groups, militant groups, noting elite bargains, resistance, and patronage networks as they evolve over time. This section then discusses state-led peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa state and Rivers state, dividing them into 'carrot' and 'stick' approaches. The specific objective of this section is to help shape our understanding of the current peacebuilding agenda, this is important as it provides an understanding of the peacebuilding landscape examined by this thesis. This exploration also serves to aid the understanding of the blurred lines between peace and conflict in these states and the continued lack of sustainable peace.

The second section discuss the informal economy in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. Although there is no evidence that measures the exact size of the informal economy within these states, this section highlights the levels of unemployment and types of jobs in the informal sector. Providing a foundational understanding to the informal economy as this is examined in Chapter 5.

The third section examines donor-based peacebuilding initiatives that address the conflict within Bayelsa state and Rivers state. It gives an in-depth overview of the peacebuilding initiatives selected, that is, the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), and the Foundation for the Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), focusing specifically on the Partner for Peace (P4P)

and Integrated Peace and Development (IPDU) programmes. This section analyses the peacebuilding initiatives carried out by these organisations focusing on how they were formulated and designed, as well as how they framed peace. Furthermore, it will discuss the types of initiatives engaged in, and how this structured the peacebuilding agenda, as knowledge of this plays a pivotal role in understanding the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa and Rivers states which will also be examined in more detail in chapter 4.

Therefore, the overall objective of this chapter is to provide a solid foundational understanding of the political economy of conflict and peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Understanding the crucial dynamics in the conflict and exploring the peacebuilding initiatives will aid understanding of the research questions: how and to what extent state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and political patronage; and how these initiatives influence the informal economy and the illicit informal economy and shape post-conflict development and the formation of positive peace.

The Political Economy of Conflict in the Bayelsa and Rivers States

To understand the nature and characteristics of peacebuilding in Bayelsa state and Rivers states, there is a need to briefly examine the conflicts. Home to about 20 million Nigerians, the Niger Delta is one of the regions within Africa that has been plagued by intense conflict and violence over the years (Courson, 2009; Benson et al., 2014). The Niger Delta is in the south-eastern part of Nigeria and is mainly covered with creeks, forest and marshes. It is home to several minority ethnic groups, who have, over the years, all borne their share of the cost of oil exploration and believe that the government has marginalised them (Courson, 2009; Benson et al., 2014). The Niger Delta is marked by an amalgam of smaller ethnic groups, from the Ijaws to the Efik, Esan, Ibibio, Itsekiri, Annang, Oron, Okrika, Ogoni, Isoko, Urhobo and Epie-Atissa people, to mention a few (Mähler, 2010).The discovery and exploration of oil within the region have led to continuous investments within that sector that have not only crippled other sectors but have further lead to conflict over its ownership and rewards (Benson et al., 2014). The region of the Niger Delta has been the site of active and violent conflict since 1999, with major actors ranging from the Nigerian government, the oil corporations and the indigenous people, as well as militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF) (Ifeka, 2000; Ikelegbe, 2006; Oyefusi, 2007; Courson, 2009; Akpan, 2010; Ajala, 2016). Due to the violence and the constant disruption of oil exploration, poverty within the region has increased, thus leading to socio-economic unrest that has been attributed to a number of factors, such as a lack of transparency,

violations of human rights, high levels of corruption, lack of accountability in governance, political and social injustices, and environmental degradation over the last 50 years (Ukeje, 2008, p. 10; Mähler, 2010; Bamidele, 2017). The conflict is complex and interwound with various overlapping problems, such as poverty, corruption, political instability and conflict (Basedau and Mehler, 2005, p. 9), and is further intensified by political elites and the struggle for power.

Map 1 Map of the Niger Delta showing Bayelsa and Rivers States

Source: by Endoro Oweikeye, 2017, p. 13

Prior to the discovery of oil, the economy in the Bayelsa and Rivers depended upon cash, food crops and fishing (Alley et al., 2014, p. 377; Akanmidu, 2015, p. 18). As far back as 1970, Nigeria was producing rubber, palm oil, palm kernel, cotton, rubber and cocoa, which boosted its foreign earnings, enhancing them by 75 per cent; however, as a result of the oil boom agriculture was slowly replaced, transforming the country and both Rivers and Bayelsa's economy to becoming highly dependent on oil rents (Sekumade, 2009, pp. 1385–1386; Pak and Ebienfa, 2011, p. 140). The harmful effects on these states have led to the destruction of employment opportunities in agriculture, extending beyond Rivers state and Bayelsa state to the netire Niger Delta region rents (Sekumade, 2009, pp. 1385–1386; Pak and Ebienfa, 2011, p. 140). Created in 1996 by the late Head of State, Gen. Sani Abacha Bayelsa State has

eight local government areas namely, Brass, Ekeremor, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Nembe, Ogbia, Sagbama, Southern Ijaw, and Yenagoa local government. it also has 105 electoral wards or registration areas, 24 state constituencies, and three Senatorial Districts. It shares boundaries with Rivers State in the east; Delta State on the north the Atlantic Ocean on the west and south (Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021). Agricultural production and petty trading are the main sources of income with a majority of the population in the rural areas being farmers. Rivers state was formed in 1967 by the government of General Yakubu Gowon, with its capital known as Port Harcourt, with Anambra state bordering it to the north, Bayelsa to the west, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. It became home to various armed militant groups from the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021). With prominent militant leaders like Ateke Tom, Alhaji Asari Dokubo, Soboma George, Sobomabo 'Egberipapa' Jacreece, and Farah Dagogo. Both states serve as hobs to decades of socio-economic instability and underdevelopment with the Niger Delta region that led to various forms of environmental conflicts, political violence, backwardness, extreme poverty, deprivation, unemployment, and poor infrastructures, that was further exacerbated by competition for resources and various armed groups (Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021)

As highlighted by many previous studies on what is termed the 'resource curse', Bayelsa and Rivers has served as a prime example for discussion on natural resources (Auty, 1993; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Le Billon, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Over 50 years of oil production has indeed not resulted in socio-economic development, thus reinforcing the resource curse dynamics present in the region. In addition, previous work on Bayelsa and Rivers have analysed the regional conflict using the greed and grievance paradigm (Renner, 1996; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, 2002). Also, as noted by Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010) and Beyers (2015), ethnic and religious identities in Africa have been the instruments through which there is competition for political power However, a closer look into the conflict within the region reveals that it is not so much the distribution of resources that was the problem, although this was partly the issue; rather, the distribution and management of resources by the government served as a major cause of the conflict (Ajala, 2016; Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021)). This problem stemmed not only from a dependence on oil, but also from weak resource management leading to further socio-economic challenges (Mähler, 2010; (Ebiede, Bassey and Asuni, 2021) .This situation led to high levels of unemployment as the population was left without jobs, unemployment levels in the Niger Delta being higher than the rest of the country as shown with over 50 per cent of the population living on less than a dollar a day and 80 per cent on less than $2 a day

(UNDP, 2008, p. 35). As shown in Figure 5 Unemployment Rates in Nigeria by Geopolitical Zones (2018) (IDEA, 2001, p. 254; UNDP, 2006, p. 131; Aigbokhan, 2007, p. 195).

This chapter distinguishes between the primary and secondary actors in the peacebuilding (conflict) process in Bayelsa and Rovers The key players in the conflict in these states were the federal government, the state governments, regional development organisations, oil companies, militant groups and communities. The primary actors consisted of the militants, political elites and Niger Delta communities. The political elites (who I also refer to as the patrons in this research) and militants constitute primary actors as they have been the main actors in the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers. The resource curse arguments were strengthened by the notion that Nigerian elites and oil companies were in pursuit of oil wealth, thus fuelling various drivers of violence. This is evident from the allocation formula of resources in the region, as oil profits largely benefited a select few Nigerian elites and oil companies, to the detriment of the Niger Delta communities (Wengraf, 2018). The elites have benefited from the oil profits, neglecting problems such as poverty, unemployment and pollution. Thus, corruption and the indices of oil bunkering have increasingly worsened the living conditions of the general population. This situation, along with the presence of ethnic rivalries, and the rise in and competition among militant groups has further fuelled violence in Bayelsa and Rivers.

The secondary actors in the conflict were the traditional leaders and civil society, who played a supportive and intermediary role (Mawere, 2014,. The secondary actors have largely played supporting and intermediary roles in the conflict. They include traditional and religious leaders, and civil society. Traditional leaders are recognised authorities who have for decades aided in sustaining the customs and traditions of the Niger Delta. They serve as intermediaries between the state, federal government and the local population, dealing with cultural matters such as issues about land, land customs and promoting cultural values, as well as performing intermediary roles for members of their respective traditional areas (Mawere, 2014, p. 3). Traditional leaders or community chiefs served as agents, who represented their communities when oil spillages happened, in order to discuss or review compensation. Van Kessel and Oomen (1997, p. 585) have noted how traditional authorities in Africa have adapted to the changing times. They have remained relevant despite political regimes changing from dictatorships to democracies; this highlights how traditions adapt to societal transformations. Traditional leaders in the Niger Delta have played various roles in the resource-based conflict in the region, mediating between the government and fighters (Ikelegbe, 2005; Asuni, 2009).

Van Kessel and Oomen (1997) have also highlighted how easily traditional leaders have been manipulated by the patrons of Bayelsa and Rivers, aligning themselves within the patronage networks. It has also been observed that some traditional leaders have also contributed to the oil conflict while also aligning their interests with oil companies and political elites (Ikelegbe, 2005; Asuni, 2009; Kiipoye, 2015; Iwilade, 2017). For example, the process of paying compensation to host communities was done through traditional leaders; payments were made by the leaders, whose job was to distribute funds to the affected members of the community. However, this rarely happened; in practice what occurred was that the bulk of the payment remained with the leaders, and some of it was given to leaders of militant groups in the creeks (Kiipoye, 2015; Iwilade, 2017. Thus, the payment was not received by members of the affected community. In many cases, the community was told that compensation had not been given, which further fuelled conflict with the oil companies. As previously noted by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2005), corruption-related funds flow not just from the state levels to the federal government, they also flow to the traditional leaders, who function as local contractors. Thus, it can be deduced that traditional leaders play both positive and negative roles in the conflict. As noted by a traditional ruler of the Efuts in Calabar of Cross River State, Muri Effiong Mbukpa, "some traditional leaders are militants in traditional attire" (*The Guardian*, 2016b). He further stated:

> I don't think there is any traditional ruler that is worth his salt that does not know who the bad boys or guys are in his domain; there is no traditional ruler except the traditional ruler in Diaspora. But any traditional ruler who dwells within his domain knows who the bad guys are. (ibid.)

Thus, it can be noted that certain traditional readers have indeed played a role in the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers states, and have aligned themselves within the patronage system. The mutually beneficial relationship between the primary and secondary actors in the conflict has hindered the peacebuilding process in the Niger Delta.

Taken together, analysing both the primary and secondary actors also demonstrates that, just as in other African societies, the conflicts in Bayelsa and Rivers states have been affected by socio-economic groups that influence local politics for their personal interest. Furthermore, analysis of both the secondary and primary actors provided understanding of the important background in which the involvement and importance of certain actors (e.g., patrons, traditional leaders) in peacebuilding initiatives has contributed to patronage peacebuilding; this will be further explored in the next chapter. The table below further highlights the main stakeholders in the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers.

Federal Government	Receives taxes, royalties, and equity income from the oil companies and decides on their distribution among the federal, state, and local governments.
State and Local Governments	The nine oil-producing Niger Delta states receive 13% of the revenues from the oil and gas which they produce, along with the statutory monthly allocation given to all 36 Nigerian states. The substantial increase in revenues flowing into these states and their local government areas has not translated into sustained development. Given the high stakes of holding public office, a number of local politicians have been charged with rigging elections in order to win, thereafter misappropriating funds. To reassure their oil producing communities, seven states have created specific organizations to channel oil revenue funds for their development.
Regional Development Institutions	The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC, 2000) is funded by both public and industry sources to plan and implement projects for the region. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA, 2008) has an overarching mandate to implement major regional infrastructure projects and support programs for youth. In general, regional organizations have shown mediocre performance due in part to inadequate planning, poor focus on results, lack of transparency and under-funding.
International Oil Companies	About two dozen international oil companies (IOCs) operate in the region. Nearly all actively contribute to the NDDC and directly fund development in local communities as a way of

	acquiring a social license to operate within the region. Increasingly, the development projects are applying best-practice development strategies and are being undertaken in partnership with international donors, NGOs, and government institutions at various levels. At times, IOC community projects have been hampered by inadequate planning and co-ordination and poor regional security.
Resistance and Armed Groups	Since the 1990s, a variety of resistance and armed groups have emerged, a number joining together in 2005 under the umbrella Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Typically they pursue a dual agenda, one a political struggle against grievances of resource control and development neglect, the other violent tactics to further profits from oil theft or other illicit trade. Many "militants" justify violence as a response to the perceived injustice of not benefiting from their own resources while suffering the negative consequences of industry activity. They often demand greater local control, more transparent management of oil revenues, and adequate compensation to those affected by oil extraction. A number of groups have taken advantage of the situation to operate as criminal gangs that engage in petty crime and kidnapping for ransom. The various groups and networks are very diverse, ranging from criminal gangs to non-violent advocacy groups, and they do not fit easily into fixed categories. In October 2009 more than 20,000 ex-combatants accepted amnesty from the government and have been

	participating in a program of disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) that will continue until 2015.
Communities	Most men and women in the Niger Delta feel politically disenfranchised and disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of Nigeria. They are frustrated that they cannot legitimately benefit from the oil resources, and they often distrust leaders who purport to negotiate on their behalf. Conflict occurs both among and within communities over access to benefits from government and companies. Being designated as a "host community" to an oil facility comes with benefits, but historically this practice has exacerbated jealousy and fighting among communities and has also led to disputes over "oil" boundaries. Surveys show that communities welcome contributions of assistance but prefer to be in charge of planning and managing their own development

Source: Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco, 2011, p. 5-6

Table 4 Main Stakeholders in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

Over the years, various scholars have attributed different causes to the conflict in the region. Ejibunu (2007) noted that the causes of the conflict are: the degradation of the environment, high employment rates, economic distortions, violations of human rights by both private and public organisations, the overall structure of the Nigerian government, and the division tactics used by oil companies within the region, as well as corruption. Ajala (2016) notes that negligence on the part of both the government and oil companies can also be linked as a factor to the build-up of conflict in the region. The lack of proper oil exploration and the failure to clean up oil spills further created a climate of pollution (Ajala, 2016). For example, it has been estimated that between 1958 and 2010 there have been between 9 and 13 million barrels of oil spilled through oil exploration activities within the region (Baird, 2010). With Amnesty international reporting people in the Niger Delta have "to drink, cook and wash with polluted water" (Amnesty International (AI), 2009), thus resulting in health problems within the region

ranging from skin lesions to lung problems, which have been linked directly to environmental degradation (Ojakorotu and Gilbert, 2010).

Another cause of the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers was attributed to the oil revenue distribution allocation carried out by the Nigerian government was at the expense of the indigenous people of the region. The proceedings of the oil discovered was used to develop the regions of the three major ethnic groups and to line the pockets of their elites, at the expense of the Niger Delta states, the region where the oil was found (Ojakorotu and Gilbert, 2010). It is crucial to note that years after the discovery of oil the residents of the Niger Delta are still regarded as minorities, and, as rightly observed by Ojakorotu and Okeke-Uzodike, at present, "Nigerian federalism is skewed, and it does not adequately cater for the interests of the minority." (2006, p. 101). This is important as hostilities between ethnic groups in Rivers state and Bayelsa state were intensified by the increase in oil prices and the struggle for oil lands, which were a symbol of power. Thus, the conflict saw ethnic hostilities being reignited due to the existence of oil royalties, the need for political influence and even over electoral representation (Ajala, 2016). Consequently, conflict was exacerbated, as the only way people in the region could benefit was to have some affiliation with oil. The need to be affiliated with oil led to oil bunkering (Ajala, 2016)..

Another oil-related cause of conflict was economic sabotage because of oil bunkering. Oil bunkering here refers to the siphoning and transport of refined or crude oil that is usually sold in illegal black markets, transported not only within the Niger Delta region but also shipped to the neighbouring states of Senegal, Benin and Ivory Coast, Asia, Europe and even America (Asuni, 2009; Vreÿ, 2012; Alohan, 2013; INGWE, 2015). The theft of oil has transitioned from small-scale theft with canoes in the 1980s to larger-scale more organised attacks from cartels and militant groups (Ajala, 2016). The actors within this thriving illegal oil economy vary from members of militant groups, security personnel of the Nigerian navy, and the police force (AI, 2005, p. 35; ICG, 2006, p. 9), to even local politicians and elites, as well as godfathers of the community. Experts who have analysed the chains of sales have said that involvement in illegal oil bunkering goes up to the "highest levels of government" (Lubeck et al., 2007, p. 9). Thus, it is clear that due to the inconsistent nature of conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers and the high levels of corruption and lack of transparency and accountability, along with growing militarisation, illegal oil bunkering is a thriving business that is here to stay, as it aids the poor and lines the pockets of those in power (Mähler, 2010). What is interesting to note, however, is that from 2006 till the present (2021), the government has remained nonchalant in dealing with oil bunkering issues, raising questions again about the priorities of the state and the factors put in place to ensure the continued flow of illegal oil bunkering.

Another element that has led to violent conflict in the region is the destruction and mismanagement of resources. The resources in the Niger Delta have been mismanaged, or rather lack effective sustainable management, and this has triggered several conflicts (Sala-i-Martin, 2003). The lack of proper exploration on the part of the oil corporations, and the lack of enforcement of proper exploration methods by the Nigerian government have led to violent responses by the people. Improper resource management affected economic distortions, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty. Furthermore, a key element that has emerged through analysis of the Niger Delta is that not only is the distribution of resources an issue in the region, but also the governance behind the distribution is problematic. Consequently, economic distortions and lack of proper resource management are central contextual links to violence within the Bayelsa and Rivers (Mähler, 2010; Alohan, 2013)

Furthermore, a significant aspect of the conflict was the circulation of weapons within the region, which was a crucial factor in the onset of conflict (Zinn, 2005, p. 106; Okonta, 2006; Mähler, 2010; Nwonwu, 2010. The proliferation of arms within the region can also be linked to electioneering campaigns. Youth in these regions have been armed during elections since as far back as 1999. (Zinn, 2005, p. 106; Okonta, 2006; Mähler, 2010; Nwonwu, 2010). The sources of these weapons are different, with some being traced to the Biafra war, and others being imported from neighbouring countries due to porous borders such as those with Cameroon and Chad (HRW, 2003, p. 25; Hazen and Horner, 2007, p. 34). Groups were enabled with cash and given arms, with the sole aim of intimidating voters and ensuring 'the right candidate' was selected. The weapons used during elections were the same weapons used to carry out crimes such as stealing and terrorising communities, which served as an alternative response to unemployment, in addition to attacks on oil pipelines and various oil installations (Zinn, 2005, p. 106; Okonta, 2006; Mähler, 2010; Nwonwu, 2010). In addition to the proliferation of arms, dirty politics and antics have been promoted due to the lack of transparency and poor structures leading to personal enrichment through patrimonialism and corruption that existed within the system fostering crimes like blackmailing and kindapping (HRW, 2007, p. 96; Corruption Perception Index). These crimes manifested into the areas of kidnapping and blackmailing (Zinn, 2005, p. 106; Okonta, 2006; Nwonwu, 2010). The phenomenon of kidnapping was dominant in the 1990s and grew over the years as a lucrative business in the region (ICG, 2006, p. 1; Hazen and Horner, 2007, p. 69). This business thrived while expatriates of oil companies were held captive, and, over the years, the dimension of kidnapping changed to include wealthy Nigerian children and members of the elites themselves. According to Bulwark Intelligence in 2018 the states that recorded the highest number of kidnapping s included Kaduna, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Zamfara, and Katsina (Assanvo and Okereke, 2019)The motive for conflict has

shifted, overtaken by a thriving economy of violence that is fuelled by the illegal oil trade and kidnapping. Hence, networks have continued to build and grow in complexity, changing leadership and continuing to embezzle funds from the people through kidnappings, blackmail, terrorising communities and so on (Mähler, 2010; Obi, 2010; Omotola, 2012; Iwilade, 2017; Obi and Oriola, 2018).

Figure 4 Perceptions of Causes of Conflict in the Niger Delta

Source: Amoateng, 2020, p. 120

The above table was compiled by Elvis Nana Kwasi Amoateng in his thesis on the Niger Delta, highlighting what people of the Niger Delta believed to be the actual cause of the conflict in the region (Amoateng, 2020). According to his analysis many believed the conflict in the region was a result of bad institutions and environmental degradation, while also considering the factor of greed among the leaders in the region to be significant (Amoateng, 2020).Thus it can deduced that the are varying factors that have caused the conflict in both Bayelsa and Rivers among which are environment degradation, weak state institutions, oil bunkering, youth dissatisfaction, frustration, poverty, the mismanagement of state resources to mention a few. Thus these factors can be grouped into structural factors, driving factors and provocating factors as illustrated by the table below.

	Social	Government System	Economic	Cultural / Political	Security
	High Social Fragmentation	Flawed Federalism	Political Economy of Oil	Patrimonialism	Weak State Capacity to Protect Citizens
Structural Factors	Strong bonding within groups, weak bridging between groups, Youth Bulge	Strong center, weak periphery State vs. traditional systems	High dependency on oil, capital intensive	Weak state-citizen relationships, primacy of informal networks	Weak rule of law Security forces poorly oriented and coordinated, limited presence of the State
Driving Factors	Hardening of social identities, tensions over access to oil benefits, intergenerational conflicts	'Winner-takes-all' political system Sense of relative inequality, lack of inclusive, transparent and democratic political institutions	Perception of relative deprivation, environmental damage, loss of traditional livelihoods	Pervasive corruption, poor governance and impunity, rent-seeking behavior, lack of public transparency and accountability	Highly profitable illegal activities, arms proliferation, culture of violence, poorly trained and equipped security forces
Provocating Factors	Weak mechanisms for dispute resolution, patterns of social protest	Sense of political marginalization, under-representation	Profiting from instability, e.g. oil bunkering	Political manipulation of tensions, rigged elections	Vigilante justice, private security contracts

Table 5 Factors Influencing Instability in the Niger Delta

Source: Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco, 2011, p. 23

Thus far this section has shown that there are indeed many contributing factors – both resources based, and non-resources based – that are responsible for conflict within the Bayelsa state and Rivers states. Thus, there is no consensus as to which of these factors resulted in the conflict. However, it is crucial to note that oil is said to have been the major motive for grievances held by the population of the

region. There are other causes of the conflict beyond but closely linked to oil, which include overall mismanagement, weak state institutions, indebtedness and falling oil prices (Mähler, 2010; Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco, 2011).

Consequently, the injustices within the Niger Delta states gave rise to various forms of resistance from different groups, such as militant groups, gangs and vigilante groups, who demanded the transparent management of resources and compensation within these states.

The underlying causes of resistance were unemployment, economic marginalisation and poverty. It holds that the absence of socio-economic inequalities in society would provide conditions in which such resistance would exist. These groups used violence as a means of obtaining their objectives and fought for the control of local communities. Additionally, the opportunities for violent conflict were increased by the presence of oil, which served as a financing tool for militant groups. As noted in the Introduction, with regard to the self-financing nature of conflict explored by Johnathan Goodhand (2008) (see Chapter 1), the rents from oil promoted patronage networks and corruption, which formed the foundation for illegal oil bunkering (Mähler, 2010). Apart from militant groups other criminal gangs were formed within the Niger Delta; however, it is crucial to note that the line between these two is often blurred (Francis, 2008). While some groups were criminal organisations obsessed with the pursuit of power, others were mere indigenes fighting for what was rightfully theirs in the only way they knew how (Bamidele, 2017).As some of these groups will be discussed further in the empirical chapters, rather than providing selection from a broad spectrum of groups that have played a role – whether through action or debate – in the Bayelsa and Rivers' conflict, the table below the table below provides a briefer overview of some prominent non-violent advocacy, militant, cults, villante groups.

Group	Description	Activities
Isaac Adaka Boro's Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF, 1966)	NDVF was the first Ijaw nationalist armed group, which in 1966 called for creation of an independent Niger Delta republic. This action pre-dated the well-known secession of Biafra, contiguous with Nigeria's then eastern region. The leader, Isaac Adaka ('leopard') Boro, has been a	Isaac Boro is an Ijaw hero, who mobilised a force of 150 men that fought valiantly for 12 days until they were arrested on charges of treason. Boro was later pardoned by General Gowon and led the Federal forces in their first attacks against Biafra in the coastal Niger Delta. He was killed in battle at the age of 30 and is remembered by Ijaws throughout the world on 'Isaac Boro Day.'

	point of reference for Ijaw nationalists ever since. He was a native of Kaiama, hence the symbolism of the 1998 Kaiama Declaration. Dokubo Asari (below) named his Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force after the original NDVF	
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF, 2003)	Led by Ateke Tom, and based in the Okrika area of Rivers State, this large force was independent of MEND, but was occasionally allied for specific operations. Known for sophisticated and lucrative bunkering operations, a direct pipeline from the Port Harcout refinery to Tom's camp was found in March 2008.	Asari was famed for his violent clashes with militant Ateke Tom (below) over territory, bunkering routes, and political alliances. They vied for the role as former Rivers State Gov. Odili's 'chief security officer'. Asari was arrested on charges of treason in September 2005 after calling for the dissolution of Nigeria and was released in June 2007 as part of a political arrangement aimed at engaging militants in dialogue. In 2008, Asari organized a conference on the Niger Delta in Abuja, opened by then vp, Goodluck Jonathan. He is now a 'militant statesman' who did not accept the 2009 amnesty because his acceptance would, by implication, cast him in the role of a criminal, not a rights campaigner.
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF, 2003)	NDPVF has been led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari since declaring "all-out war" on the Nigerian government in 2004. The group has now become a non-violent political platform for Asari's demands for self-	Asari was famed for his violent clashes with militant Ateke Tom (below) over territory, bunkering routes, and political alliances. They vied for the role as former Rivers State Gov. Odili's 'chief security officer'. Asari was arrested on charges of treason in September 2005 after calling for the

	determination in an 'illegitimate' federal Nigerian State. He justifies bunkering as a form of resource control. A breakaway faction from Asari's NDPVF is the 'Martyr's Brigade', whose spokesperson 'Cynthia Whyte' announced MEND's first 2005 attacks. She (or he) also speaks for a high-minded political umbrella group, the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC).	dissolution of Nigeria and was released in June 2007 as part of a political arrangement aimed at engaging militants in dialogue. In 2008, Asari organized a conference on the Niger Delta in Abuja, opened by then vp, Goodluck Jonathan. He is now a 'militant statesman' who did not accept the 2009 amnesty because his acceptance would, by implication, cast him in the role of a criminal, not a rights campaigner.
Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM, 2003) Sometimes called the "Icelanders"	Led by Ateke Tom, and based in the Okrika area of Rivers State, this large force was independent of MEND, but was occasionally allied for specific operations. Known for sophisticated and lucrative bunkering operations, a direct pipeline from the Port Harcout refinery to Tom's camp was found in March 2008.	In December 2007, following increased incidents of piracy and sabotage, the JTF launched an aerial attack on Ateke Tom's camp. On Christmas and New Year's Days, the NDVM counterattacked in PH, shooting up a major hotel and other targets. Tom and his men have accepted the amnesty.
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP, 1990)	Co-founded by the late Kenule Saro-Wiwa and G. B. Leton, MOSOP is headquartered at both Port Harcourt and Bane, the Saro-Wiwa Ogoni family compound. Active members are drawn from Ogoni youth. Typically, all adults among the 500,000 Ogoni pay levies to the organization.	Saro-Wiwa and eight followers were imprisoned in 1994 for allegedly conspiring to murder four Ogoni chiefs acting as negotiators with the government. The Ogoni nine were hanged in November 1995 in what MOSOP termed an "ex- judicial murder." The execution led to a three- year period of international sanctions against Nigeria by

	Ken Saro-Wiwa authored the Ogoni Bill of rights, calling for greater Ogoni autonomy, share of oil revenue, compensation for environmental damage, and eventual withdrawal of Shell from Ogoniland's 96 oil wells and five oilfields. Website: http://www.mosop.net	many Western nations, including suspension from the Commonwealth, until the death of military dictator, Sani Abacha, in 1998.
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC, 1998)	Founded by Oronto Douglas, Asume Osuoka, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari, and others, the ICC was formerly headed by Chris Ikiyor and currently by Abiye Kroymiema. This vocal advocacy and civil rights group seeks justice and equity for the oil-bearing Ijaw communities in the Niger Delta. The IYC militant wing, the Egbesu Boys, was headed by Asari until late 2003 and is now inactive.	The IYC became the driving force behind the famous Ijaw manifesto or 'Kaiama Declaration'. Today, the IYC regularly dialogues with the government and industry to seek common ground on issues or to resolve conflicts. The group also negotiates for security contracts and other forms of employment for Ijaw youth.
Deegbam ("Be Strong," 1991). Also called "Klansmen" and Deywell ("Be Well," 1991)	These two groups are often at odds. Deegbam operates in Rivers State, especially Ogoni, Buguma, Degema, and many slums of Port Harcourt. The founder, 'Occasion Boy', or Onengiefori Terika, was killed in 2003 by Deywell. Deywell operates in peri-urban areas of Port Harcourt, Rivers	Deegbam is a 'street' wing of the Klansmen Konfraternity. It was once allied with Dokubo Asari's NVDF, created in 2004 (see below). Deywell is a 'street' wing of the Supreme Vikings Confraternity (SVC). It attracts petty criminals and controls drug and other forms of trade in peri-urban areas of Port Harcourt.

		State, and other large cities and towns in the eastern Niger Delta, including Bayelsa State.	

Table 6 Overview of Resistance Groups Discussed in Empirical Chapters

Source: Francis et al., 2011, p. 55

The next section aims to examine the state-led peacebuilding response adopted by Rivers state and Bayelsa state.

State-Based Responses to the Niger Delta Oil Conflict

Conflict within Bayelsa and Rivers emerged with the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta between 1956 and 1958, arising out of tensions between the foreign oil corporations and the Ijaws and Ogoni people, who felt marginalised (Adeyeri, 2017).. This began what is today seen as a long, complex and zigzagging process that continues to relapse, and as conflict changes so does the peacebuilding process: from the Ijaw unrest in the 1990s to the creation of the Niger Delta Commission in 2000, and the emergence of armed groups, which led to the oil crisis that started in 2004 and still continues (Adeyeri, 2017). Included in the oil crisis were the phenomena of kidnapping and piracy, and the full-blown emergence of militant groups, which reached its peak in 2008–09, leading to the amnesty programme in 2009 (Adeyeri, 2017). Both military and civilian governments of the Nigerian state have, since independence, tried to resolve efforts in the Niger Delta. A 2006 report found that there have been more than 12 panels in the 46 years of independence aimed at ending poverty and the problems associated with poverty (ICG, 2006, p. 17). These approaches have, however, been seen in different ways. According to Cyril Obi, the methods used by the Nigerian government have been based upon "avoidance and confrontation" (Obi, 2002, p. 99). This implies that the efforts made by the government have not been aimed at resolving the conflict and were not in the interest of the people in Bayelsa and Rivers states. These approaches by the government rather further exacerbated the conflict within the region, as observed by Inuwa (2017), who stated that the approaches to peacebuilding were based upon minimalist and maximalist approaches. According to the minimalist perspective, the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers is a threat to the stability and security of the country, thus, the nation must apply lethal force in order to maintain the situation. In contrast, the maximalist approach views the conflict in the region as being grounded in deep underdevelopment in the region (Inuwa, 2017, p. 160). Overall, the analysis of the state-led peacebuilding approaches in both Bayelsa state and Rivers state below, shows the use of both thr 'carrot' (positive)and the'stick' (coercive methods) -"heavy-handed military tactics" (Hazen and Horner, 2007, p. 96).

116

The 'Carrot' Approach

The carrot approach is a non-violent method of peacebuilding; according to Nye (1990), this is a soft-power approach. For example, the Willink Commission report, commissioned by the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) between 1960 and 1966 (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 223) was a soft-power approach used by the government. It was aimed at developing agriculture within the region; however, it failed because of the Nigerian Biafra civil war which took place in 1967–76(Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 85). Following this initiative was the River Basin and Development Authorities Decree, established by the civilian government of Shehu Shagari (Ezenweani, 2017,. The River Basin Development Authority was then created (NDRBDA) "to address the environmental challenges in the region and aimed at irrigation, water supply facilities, fishing regulations and pollution control" (Ezenweani, 2017, p. 1590). However, the agency failed because of funding and its board nature as those in charge were accused of embezzling funds (Adegeye, 1982, p. 301).

Subsequently, in 1982, the Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development (PTFNDD) was established by the government (Ahonsi, 2011, p. 25). This enabled the national assembly of the country to enact the revenue provision allocating 1.5 per cent of oil profits to development in the Niger Delta (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 223). However, this also failed, as the national assembly was unable to create an administrative agency to manage the funds (Akinyoade, 2018. The next initiative aimed at addressing conflict in Baeylsa and Rivers was during the Ibrahim Babangida administration in 1992, and was based on the Belgore Commission report, which was set up by the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). OMPADEC was supposed to focus on environmental pollution (Gabriel, 1999, p. 94). However, OMPADEC's projects collapsed because of the embezzlement of the commission's fiscal allocations, thus leading to many debts and fraud (Gabriel, 1999). As a result, the Nigerian government set up an Interim Management Board, which was saddled with the responsibility of reducing OMPADEC's task (Frynas, 2001, p. 34). Despite this, OMPADEC ended up in 1999 with a lot of unfinished projects (Omotala and Patrick, 2010, pp. 123–125). All this led to the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, to fill the gap created by OMPADEC, with the objective of developing the Niger Delta states. As found within its mandate, the NDDC aimed to build:

> a strong and progressive society in which no one will have any anxiety about basic means
> of life and work; where poverty and illiteracy no longer exist, and diseases are brought
> under control; and where our educational facilities provide all the children of the Niger

Delta region with the best possible opportunities for the development of their potential. (NDDC, 2015, p. 1)

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) aimed to boost development programmes and ensure peace within the Niger Delta communities (Christmas, 2018, p. 72). The focus of the initiative was geared towards building social, human, environmental and physical infrastructure development (Idemudia, 2009; Adeyeri, 2017). Although funded by both public and private sources, operations by the NDDC were disrupted due to inadequate planning, corruption and poor funding (Francis, 2008; Idemudia, 2009; Adeyeri, 2017). In addition, operations were awarded without due process and board decisions were not implemented by the state governments: hence, the NDDC suffered as huge financial crimes continued within it, and this led to abandoned development projects because of the embezzlement and misappropriation of funds (Aghalino, nd, p. 46). Although these peacebuilding initiatives were aimed at building peace, they were rather seen as political moves aimed at ensuring that the oil bunkering stopped. Rather than addressing the causes of oil bunkering, the initiatives were aimed at boosting the production of oil (Steinmo, 2008). The NDDC also failed to surmount its challenges because it was corrupt (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 152–153). The creation and failure of these commissions led to initial rises in the expectations of people in the Niger Delta, followed by frustrations, thereby leading to more aggression, and further leading to pitting people against the state (Steinmo, 2008; Francis, 2008; Idemudia, 2009; Adeyeri, 2017; Akinyoade, 2018, p. 223).

Another 'carrot' approach used by the government was to turn a blind eye to violence, especially when it did not disrupt the flow of oil (Akinyoade, 2018,). The federal government, the state, local government, and even oil companies have also not played a role in stopping oil bunkering, thus leading to a lack of accountability in dealing with oil bunkering. According to the former managing director of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), Chris Finlayson, in 2003, small-scale oil theft was tolerated by the company as they believed they were unaffected by it and it was a way 'to keep the locals happy' (Akinyoade, 2018, p. 223) . It has been claimed that the reason oil theft was tolerated by the local and state governments was to elevate pressure on the state to provide economic and development support to the region. Consequently, to ensure the youths are happy oil bunkering is ignored, thus ensuring they will cause no trouble. In an interview with the International Crisis Group in 2006, an officer of the state government stated that "when the boys are bunkering, they are quiet" (International Crisis Group, 2006), and added that clamping down on this will lead to tensions within the state. Consequently, this unwillingness of the state to curb oil bunkering has not gone unnoticed by militant groups, who have taken the opportunity to capitalise on this(Akinyoade, 2018). The oil

bunkering business is seen as a thriving industry and one of the quickest ways of making money within the region. Therefore, it has resulted in further clashes between militant groups over routes and pipelines. Between 2001 and 2004 there were several clashes between militant groups over oil bunkering routes, resulting in more harm being done environmentally and even the loss of lives and destruction of properties (Ajala, 2016).

Likewise, in 2004 various new patronage alliances were being formed. Peter Odili, the governor of Rivers, attempted to broker peace within the state by initiating the 'Millionaires Programme' (CEHRD, 2004, 2005; Watts, 2007. The aim of this programme was to offer 1 million Naira (£4100) to all youths who turned in a weapon to the government. This weapons-for-cash programme was implemented as a response to the rivalry between Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and Ateke Tom, which was escalating into violence in Port Harcourt. However, despite meetings with the government the peace failed to hold when Asari-Dokubo accused the government of insincerity, insisting the government was favouring Ateke Tom. This led to a break in relations between Odili and Asari-Dokubo (CEHRD, 2004, 2005; Watts, 2007). A further consequence was the formation of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), as Asari-Dokubo sought the support of Government Ekpe and an arms dealer, Henry Okah (Watts, 2007; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Ubhenin, 2013). What is interesting to note here is that the peacebuilding process did not refer to establishing and building peace within the region, but rather focused on handing out cash pay-outs within the clientelist relations. Thus the methods by the government was leading to alliance between militant groups and gangs.

Another initiative aimed at peacebuilding in the Niger Delta was established in 2008 by the late president, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. He established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), aimed at addressing development challenges as well as unemployment in the region as part of the wider government framework (Ekpenyong et al., 2010; MNDA, 2013; Uchennia, 2014; Babatunde, 2017; Kpae and Adishi, 2017). It is crucial to note that although MNDA was implemented during a period of intense conflict in the Niger Delta, a proposal was made for a peace summit (Isidiho and Sabran, 2015; Onapajo and Moshood, 2016, p. 42). However, yet again, the peace summit failed, thus leading to the formation of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND), which was tasked with developing non-violent approaches in addressing the conflict within the region (TCND, 2008, p. iv). The TCND recommended the establishment of the amnesty, which was later implemented in the Niger Delta region in 2009, serving as the last state-led regional carrot approach in the Niger Delta (Onapajo and Moshood, 2016, pp. 42–43).

The carrot approach to peacebuilding was furthered solidified in 2009 with the emergence of the amnesty programme. Between 2006 and 2008 Bayelsa and Rivers faced the peak of intense conflict with the emergence of various militant groups. As a response to this, the Nigerian government implemented an amnesty programme across the Niger Delta region (Budd 2004; the *Vanguard*, September 19, 2009, pp. 15–16; *This Day*, November 4, 2009, p. 7; the *Vanguard*, February 3, 2010). The amnesty programme aimed to repair and rebuild the trust between militants and the Nigerian government. Many elites were seen to visit militant camps to re-establish dialogue with the youths, which to many was aimed at restabilising the patrimonial system (Budd 2004; the *Vanguard*, September 19, 2009, pp. 15–16; *This Day*, November 4, 2009, p. 7; the *Vanguard*, February 3, 2010, p. 5). The programme received mixed reviews from Deltans as well as peacebuilding analysts, with some viewing it as a success while others saw it as a complete failure (Oluduro and F. Oluduro, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013; Okurebia, 2013; Udegbunam, 2013; Chinweike, 2017; Ebiede, 2017; Wilade, 2017; Omoleye, 2020). The amnesty programme was not seen as a peacebuilding initiative that targeted peace, rather it was another 'band-aid' which strove in the direction of 'patronage peacebuilding' – a concept which will be explored in the next chapter (Chapter 4). As noted by Iwilade and corroborated by Watts and Nwa-jiaku-Dahou, the amnesty programme was merely performative, and served neopatrimonialism rather than development and peacebuilding (Watts, 2007; Nwa-jiaku-Dahou, 2012; Iwilade, 2017). Iwilade noted that the amnesty was rather a tool used by the elites to restore incentives and participation in the patron network, as well as being intended to link patrons and clients beyond the Niger Delta region to the broader Nigerian society (Iwilade, 2017). The programme was designed to grant amnesty and provide finical assistance to the perpetrators (Watts, 2007; Nwa-jiaku-Dahou, 2012; Iwilade, 2017). This was not only seen as a means of buying peace but was also viewed as a reward programme by patrons. It was for this reason that the programme did not address the root causes of the conflict, but rather aimed to stop the attacks on refineries by offering up another quick and, yet again, 'band-aid' approach to peacebuilding. Thus, the amnesty programme was not viewed as a peacebuilding initiative, but rather as a power restructuring tool, whereby clients were repositioned, and the client networks restored in order to re-establish the flow of oil and restore the failing Nigerian economy.

The table below provides an overview of the state-based initiatives aimed at addressing conflict discussed above and why each imitative failed providing a better foundational knowledge of peacebuilding within the region.

| Year | Initiative | Mandate | Why it Failed |

1960–1966	Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB)	Facilitate agricultural development	Outbreak of Biafra civil war
1976	River Basin and Development Authority Decree	Assist irrigation, fishing regulations and control pollution	Inconsistent mandate with objectives of 1958 Willink Commissio
1980	Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA)	Address ecological and environmental concerns	Inadequate Funds
1982	Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development (PTFNDD)	Design development strategies	Corruption
1982	1.5% Revenue Derivation	Tackle development	Bureaucratic derivation
1992–1999	Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC)	Address ecological and environmental pollution	Corruption, embezzlement and fraud
2000	Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)	Promote sustainable development and peacebuilding	Corruption and non-strategic planning
2008	Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA)	Address development and infrastructural challenges	
2009	Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Programme (NDA and DDR)	Promote peace and address security and development challenges	

Table 7 Periodisation of State Policy Responses in the Niger Delta (1960–2009)

Source: Ayuk, 2020, p. 61

The nest section discusses the "stick" approaches used by the state and national government to response to conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers

Coercive 'Stick' Approach

Apart from the above-mentioned 'carrot' approaches to violence, the Nigerian government has also employed the hard-power, or 'stick' approach, which is linked to violence or coercive methods to respond to agitation (Nye, 1990, p. 157; Emeseh, 2011, p. 58). This was done using the military through the formation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) also known as "Operation Restore Hope", (Chiluwa, 2011, p. 199). As was seen in the 1990s, the Nigerian government decided to match 'weapons for weapons', thus using excessive force and violence when responding to conflict (Iwilade, 2017).This approach not only increased the intensity of violence in Bayesla and Rivers but also between militant groups and the (JTF) (Punch, 2017). From the early onset of the conflict, the response by the Nigerian government has mostly been oppressive, as exemplified when Adaka Boro's NDVF twelve-day revolution was met with brutal force by the government. Not only were Boro and his members arrested but they were also sentenced to death. However, they were granted amnesty during the Biafra war (Bourne, 2015, p. 7).

Another example of brutal force was the treatment of members of MOSOP, and their leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, who protested the environmental degradation in the region and was sentenced to death in 1995 (*Independent*, 1995). Protest in the region was almost always met with violence by the government. In 1994, the Nigerian government created a task force intended to reduce the violence (Civil Liberties Organization, 1994). The task force was seen to raid villages associated with MOSOP, and within just a couple of months was seen to have raided over 60 towns (Civil Liberties Organization, 1994). Troops were further deployed to various villages leading to the violation of human rights, such as the molestation of women (Amnesty international, 2004). During this period the region was marked by clear mayhem caused by the security forces (HRW, 2004). According to Human Rights Watch (2004), abuses ranged from random killings and the arrest of people without cause, to the detainment of hundreds of people, as well as the rape of women and girls. In addition, various prominent MOSOP activists were declared wanted by the government. The security forces remained in the Delta carrying out several human rights violations acts in the name of reducing violence, without any check from the government (HRW, 2004). It is also crucial to note that the armed response by the Nigerian government contributed to the militarisation of the region.

Another stick response by the state government was in November 1999, when the military was deployed to the Odi community in response to the death of seven policemen; as a result, there was a total wipe-out of the Ijaw community on purpose at the request of the president normally referred to as the Odi massacre (Ukeje, 2011, pp. 89–90; Punch, 2017). As a result of this, the JTF was deployed to maintain law and order within the region and to ensure oil infrastructure protection. However, as noted by Owonikoko (2018), the JTF was formed not to provide security to the people of the region; rather, it was deployed to provide security to the multinational personnel and ensure a safe environment in which to produce oil. Thus, the Nigerian government failed in its duty to ensure proper monitoring and to enforce proper oil exploration in the region; rather, the government used excessive force as a means of peacemaking, which further led to the destruction of the Niger Delta states. Furthermore, between 1998 and 1999 there were numerous clashes between the security forces and militant groups. It was during this time that the government deployed warships and troops to curtail peaceful protest (HRW, 1999; Owonikoko, 2018. Brutal force was used during this period, with the killings, torture and forced detention of many in the region (HRW, 1999). Further crackdowns occurred in Bayelsa and Delta states because of the Kaima Declaration issued by the IYC, which led to further violations of human rights (HRW, 1999; Owonikoko, 2018, p. 124).

Another 'stick' approach was seen in 2005, when military troops not only openly and randomly opened fire on residents in Odioma, Bayelsa, but also raped women and burnt down houses.

Security forces were deployed in search of miltants however rather than peacedully conducting the searches, the troops worsened the situation not only by the killing of civilians who were mistaken for militants but also by committing violations of human rights (ICG, 2006, p. 6). In an HRW report (2007, p. 20), Asari-Dokubo was quoted as stating that the war against the oil companies and the government by the NDPVF was "provoked by the government's attack on his base [...] and his recognition that the state government's behind-the scenes diplomatic effort to resolve the crisis threatened to marginalise him" (HRW, 2007, p. 20).

In addition to such actions, the Nigerian government implemented the use of the 'stick' approach into law, for example: the 1967 Petroleum Decree, which allowed for groups to be punished using illegal action (Fayemi et al., 2005, p. 55); the 1975 Anti-Sabotage Decree, which enacted the death penalty; the Treason and Treasonable Offenses Decree, passed in May 1993 in response to the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights launched by MOSOP, thus deeming MOSOP actions as treasonable, and punishable by death. These were seen as political strategies to control the communities in Rivers and Bayelsa, instilling fear

in them, and using fear to crush protest rather than addressing the issues being protested about (HRW, 1999). The stick method was seen as being used for two reasons: firstly, to crush protest, and, secondly, to bring an end to insecurity and bring the youth back into the patronage networks (Iwilade, 2017).

Despite numerous state-led peacebuilding initiatives the Niger Delta region still suffers from abject and low human development. Omokhoa and Ikelegbe (2016) noted that many of the victims of the conflicts in the Niger Delta remain uncompensated and there remains the problem of unemployment. It can be seen that the failure to bring about improvement is because the peacebuilding policies and approach implemented by the Nigerian government and the individual states of Rivers and Bayelsa have focused on two approaches (Omokhoa and Ikelegbe, 2016; Iwilade, 2017). Firstly, the use of brutal force, and, secondly, the strategy of co-opting youths into the patronage network. Thus, this section has shown that state-led peacebuilding initiatives have not led to durable peace in Bayelsa and Rivers and have, rather, given rise to new conflicts and militant groups. Initiatives such as the amnesty programme have shown that rather than fostering durable peace the result has instead been to contribute to a perverse incentive structure that makes violence and power appealing in Bayelsa and Rivers. Consequently, this thesis argues that such initiatives have led to 'patronage peacebuilding', a concept I coined and on which I elaborate further in the next chapter (Chapter 4).Thus The next chapter explores patronage peacebuilding through the various militant networks and power structures discussed above, and how this has influenced the overall peacebuilding agenda, addressing the first research question, which seeks to examine how and to what extent donor-based and state-based initiatives are influenced by neopatrimonialism. However before then, the next section examines the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers state.

The Informal Economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

As are most informal economies, the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers state is large, heterogeneous and dynamic, and currently few studies have been able to ascertain its size, its determinants or its characteristics. Despite its wide importance, current knowledge of the size, causes, characteristics and dynamics of the informal sector, remains very scanty and inadequate. Despite an increase in discourse and narratives on the increasing interest in Nigeria's informal sectors as a tool for the actualisation of sustainable growth and development, among other beneficial effects, there seems to be a shortage of research work in the field in Nigeria, specifically in the Niger Delta. Several attempts have been made using a single paintbrush to understand the informal economy of the whole country, painting it with one paintbrush (Meagher, 2013; Etim and Daramola, 2020; Onwo and Ohazulike, 2021). Although these studies spark conversations on the informal economy, representing the economy as

one fails to capture the differences that occur regionally, in various states, and even within the different geopolitical zones of the country. This lack, therefore, serves as the motivational basis for this study. This study aims to address one aspect of this lack by firstly providing a state understanding of the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers and seeing how that can be translated into a regional understanding, the informal economy of the Niger Delta. Information on the size and employment structure within the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers it was hard to obtain; however, through analysis of the informal economy in Nigeria and the scope of unemployment rates Bayelsa and Rivers and the National Bureau of Statistics, I was able to come up with a structure of the informal economy in these states entailing the jobs, level of unemployment and the natural environment.

The informal economy plays a significant role in the Bayelsa and Rivers economy by creating employment and reducing unemployment and poverty. Bayelsa and Rivers states is largely underdeveloped and suffers from high levels of poverty, inequality and rising unemployment (Ismail and Fasanya, 2012). As previously discussed an era of violent conflicts, extortion and instability have hampered sustainable development efforts and made equitable growth and poverty reduction extremely difficult. The contribution of the informal and formal sectors in employment generation, poverty reduction, inequality and unemployment are still increasing significantly in Rivers and Bayelsa state (Ismail and Fasanya, 2012). Nigeria's Poverty Profile, released by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics in 2019, shows 40 percent of the total population equating to almost 83 million people live below the country's poverty line of 137,430 naira ($381.75) per year (NBS,2019).

In many communities affected by conflicts in Bayelsa and Rivers states, for decades the informal economy has been the main – or one of the main – sources of job (most of the employees work within the informal economy, in a precarious situation, with low pay and no social security or safety net; they find the informal sector a haven – since the government cannot provide them with suitable jobs, working in the informal sector seems to be the last resort (Agbuabor and Malaolu, 2013). This pattern simply continues through the conflicts, but the context and type of work are affected by violence, and new economic structures emerge as a direct result of crises. The informal economy is associated with microeconomic activities, such as furniture making, woodwork, tailoring and carpentry, and tax evasion is predominant in this sector (Agbuabor and Malaolu, 2013).

The informal economy faces a lot of challenges with one third of businesses challenged by instability, while all businesses in Rivers and Bayelsa are affected by an acute lack of electricity (Meagher, 2013). All these factors combine to have a major impact on the fragility of the economy. These conditions

increase the vulnerability and impoverishment of the population and have increased the level of unemployment over the last decade, particularly among male and female youth. Poverty rates, therefore, are also high. Without functioning labour exchanges, workers rely on unscrupulous brokers. Furthermore, there are many examples of how individuals and communities revert to, and rely on, each other to overcome the lack of regular supplies of goods, services and the absence of governance, which illustrates both the strength of social capital and the resilience of informal economies during and in the immediate aftermath of violent conflicts. Broadly speaking, they all represent informal 'livelihood economies' that begin with survival and in time can improve security situations. For example, in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, the emergence of a criminalised service supply is often consolidated. Organised gangs or 'mafias' operate water, electricity and transport sectors, fight over 'turf' or unpaid 'loans', and suppress or extort small-scale enterprises (Ikelegbe, 2006; Meagher, 2013)

It is key to understand the informal economy in both Bayelsa and Rivers thrive beyond the very obvious implications of the persistent conflict within the region (see The Political Economy of Conflict in the Bayelsa and Rivers States). The challenges are many and include inconsistent government policies, taxation, poor socio-economic environment, inadequate credit facilities,   as well as problems with scarcity of inputs or raw materials, low production and returns, high cost of enterprise establishment/operation, poor and sometimes non-existent infrastructure, lack of information, knowledge, and access concerning productivity-enhancing technologies, land tenure and irregular means of transportation.

As previously stated, the informal economy is present in both developing and developed countries; although its size differs it nevertheless contributes to the economic growth and development of each country (Ihua, 2009). The composition of the informal economy includes the provision of services and products, and job creation, enhancing the standard of living while also creating wealth (Ihua, 2010; Anyadike-Daness et al., 2013).The informal economy within Nigeria contributes 53 per cent of the official GDP and has a participation rate of 66 per cent, with cheap labour, accessible goods and resources that enable income generation to those involved in it (BIS, 2013). Such activities range from construction, trade and commerce to the manufacture of vehicles, radios, television sets and refrigerators, and other services, such as carpentry and agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Agricultural activities include petty trading and farming, i.e. crop and animal husbandry, while non-agricultural activities include tertiary activities such as hairdressing, photography, transport, small-scale distribution and production, private taxi drivers, and modern and traditional crafts. It is crucial to note that as Rivers and Bayelsa state is an oil production region, its informal activities differ from those of

the Nigerian state, as it includes the oil economy. However, despite the discovery of oil most of its population still live in poverty, and there is a high level of unemployment within the region as shown in Figure 5 Unemployment Rates in Nigeria by Geopolitical Zones (2018) (Kayode et al., 2014). Despite this there is no current data on the size, make of the informal economy in the country as whole, as well as regional break down of the informal economy. As such this analysis of the informal economy is incomplete as is highlights the level of unemployment but does not fully capture the full nature of the informal economy in Rivers state and Bayelsa state.

Figure 5 shows the level of unemployment in Nigeria across the six geopolitical zones in 2018. It can be seen that the south-south (Niger Delta) has the highest level of unemployment, despite being the oil producing state, as discussed above.

Unemployment rates by zones

Figure 5 Unemployment Rates in Nigeria by Geopolitical Zones (2018)

Source: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, 2018

Figure 6 Unemployment and Underemployment in Southern States of Nigeria

Source: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, 2018

A closer look at the south- south region (Niger Delra) as shown in Figure 7 expands on Figure 6 by breaking down the south-south into its individual states. It shows both levels of unemployment and underemployment. Of most relevance to this thesis is the data for Bayelsa and Rivers states: in 2018, Rivers State recorded the second-highest rate of unemployment (36.54%) and underemployment (21.7%). Bayelsa State was close behind Rivers, recording 32.6 % unemployment and 17.2 % underemployment. This it can be assumed that these states have a thriving informal economy due to the high level of unemployment.

Figure 7 Unemployment Rate in Nigeria in 2020

Source: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, 2020

Furthermore, when comparing the unemployment rate across the whole country as in Figure 7 in 2020, it can stiil been seen that both states still reporting very high levels of unemployment. In fact, the rate of unemployment has increased in both states, which raises questions about how sustainable and successful economic programmes within those states have been. Furthermore, it can be inferred that as the unemployment rate rises, so does participation in the informal economy (and the illicit informal economy).

Furthermore, In the neoliberal environment, poverty and unempolyemt in Nigeria has therefore rendered increasing participation in the informal economy. Within the dynamics of the Niger Delta region, this comes about because of the failure of various development programmes, as discussed above (see

The next section aims to examine the state-led peacebuilding response adopted by Rivers state and Bayelsa state.

State-Based Responses to the Niger Delta Oil Conflict . In addition to this, within the informal economy diverse interest groups such as political leaders, elites, bureaucrats and militia groups are in constant pursuit of not just power, but also wealth, thus leading to the blurring of lines between formal and informal activities especially in the illicit informal economy. Thus, the illicit informal economy within Bayesa and Rivers is characterised by unrestricted trade, illicit financial flows, exploration activities by political elites who serve as patrons, and clients who are from the general population, such as youths who have some affiliation with militancy and crime. Activities within the illicit informal economy exist especially within the oil sector, such as illegal oil businesses and refineries (Garuba, 2010, p. 4).

Although this section did not discuss the size of the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers state due to limited data, it has however highlight activities in both the illicit informal and informal economy. It also discussed the poverty and unemployment levels within these states which when combined with the knowledge of the informal economy in the chapter and the political economy of conflict and peacebuilding discussed in this chapter form a basis in which to examine how state-led peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism (chapter 4) and how this influences the informal economy (chapter 5). To examine how donor-based initiatives influence peacebuilding and the informal economy, the next section examines the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND).

Peacebuilding Initiatives (NSRP and PIND)

This section focuses on introducing and analysing the structure, framework, scope and limitations of the peacebuilding initiatives analysed in this thesis, namely the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND). It examines the economic initiatives of these programmes, bringing into focus the Partner for Peace Initiative and the Integrated Peace Programme, which operate under PIND. It aims to critically examine these peacebuilding initiatives with the hope of assessing their roles in peacebuilding and how they interact with the informal economy. This will provide a foundational understanding of the peacebuilding initiatives in order to critically explore: firstly, how to what extent are state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives shaped by neopatrimonialism–clientelism and political patronage? (Chapter 4)

Secondly, how state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives shape the informal economy and challenge post-conflict development and the construction of peace economies.(Chapter 5)

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)

Funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the NSRP was a $33 million programme designed specifically to prevent violent outbreaks of conflict, create mechanisms for responding to conflicts and support a proactive reconciliation process in the Niger Delta (NSRP, 2014, 2017). It was a five-year programme conducted between 2013 and 2017 that was spearheaded by the British Council in conjunction with Social Development Direct (SDD) and International Aid (IA) aimed at supporting peacebuilding initiatives that were Nigerian-led in establishing and maintaining peace in non-violent ways (NSRP, 2014, 2017). It strived to reduce the negative impacts of conflict on vulnerable and marginalised groups, which they defined as women and girls, as well as reduce the numbers of deaths resulting from violent conflicts (NSRP, 2017). The NSRP goal was to transform the conflict environment into a more stable, proactive and safe wealth-creation environment (NSRP, 2014). This was a goal that most would view not only as overambitious but also as hard to measure and sustain, a recurring theme within most peacebuilding initiatives in Rivers and Bayelsa.

The NSRP's major work took place in eight states within the country, namely: Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers in Southern Nigeria, Plateau and Kaduna in the middle belt, and Borno, Kano and Yobe in Northern Nigeria. The selection of the focus areas was based upon their having high levels of conflict, but also included areas where local opportunities and capacities could be strengthened in accordance with the programme's objective of achieving proactively transformed conflict environments (NSRP, 2014). In addition to this, the selected states were of crucial importance to Nigeria's economy; specifically Kano, Kaduna viewed as the economic power of the North, and Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta with its high concentration of oil. While the inclusion of Borono and Yobe were because of cross-border militancy and ideologies being promoted there; the NSRP wanted to build up the states' resilience to these ideologies and to the cross-border militancy occurring in the states (NSRP, 2014). In addition to this, these states also had a concentration of other DFID-supported programmes; for example, the Market Development Programme for the Niger Delta that was implemented in 2014, the UNICEF-led Girls' Education Programme (GEP), funded from 2005 to 2019, and the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN), delivered by a Cambridge education-led consortium during 2008–14. DFID has spent £102 million to date, with a further £126 million committed in 2019.

The NSRP worked at the national, state and federal level concentrating in four specific areas, namely: security and governance, economic and natural resources, women and girls, and research, media and advocacy (NSRP, 2014) as shown below in Table 12:

Output Stream	**1** Security and Governance	**2** Economic and Natural Resources	**3** Women and Girls	**4** Research, Media and Advocacy
Aim	Improved conflict management mechanisms	Mitigating drivers of conflict	Increasing participation of, and reducing violence against, women and girls	Improved conflict prevention policy and practice
Achieved through	Broader societal participation in and oversight of conflict management mechanisms at federal, state and local level. To be accomplished by technical assistance to improve the coordination of security providers and make them more accountable to the public.	Reduced grievances in target areas around economic opportunities and distribution of resources. To be accomplished by supporting communities to manage conflicts about economic opportunities, land use and oil spills	Increased and more influential participation by women and girls in institutions and initiatives relevant to peacebuilding, with reduced prevalence and impact of VAWG. To be accomplished by supporting the implementation of a National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) as well as creating safe spaces for girls and women.	Research, advocacy and the media having an increasingly positive influence on policy and practice relevant to stability and reconciliation. To be accomplished through commissioning, delivering and disseminating high quality policy-relevant research; strategic partnerships with key Nigerian institutions; training to media partners and others to increase conflict sensitive practice.

Table 8 Key Activities Delivered Through NSRP's Platforms and Initiatives

Source: NSRP (2017)

Within the above-mentioned areas the NSRP's major objectives were to enhance broader social participation, to improve conflict management mechanisms, and to reduce violence against vulnerable groups – specifically women and girls – as well as incorporating them into the peacebuilding process (NSRP, 2014). The NSRP also focused on the drivers of economic and natural resources with the aim of mitigating them, and through research and disseminating information improved policies geared towards conflict prevention as well as increasing conflict sensitivity and media training through supporting Nigerian-led initiatives (NSRP, 2014). Superficially these objectives were impressive; however, yet again they are quite overambitious and hard to sustain (NSRP, 2014). Empirical data has revealed that since the end of the NSRP programme in Rivers, the inclusion of women into the peacebuilding process has not continued, with women returning back to the household role they previously occupied rather than attending peacebuilding meetings as used to occur during the life of the NSRP (DB3, 2019; DB6, 2019). Some women still engage in the peacebuilding process; however, without constant funding and supervision, peacebuilding processes such as the peace clubs have not continued. In addition, the NSRP objectives had no sustainability plans; thus, like most donor-based

initiatives that cease when the funding ends, there was no continuity or methods put in place to sustain the implemented structures.

The integrated approach adopted by the NSRP and DFID-Nigeria, while concentrating on the above-mentioned areas, overall aimed to accomplished three things: first strengthening the peace architecture to mediate and resolve conflict; second included a broader part of the marginalised population into the peacebuilding process; and finally, influencing policies that addressed managing conflict (NSRP, 2017). Thus, it can be deduced that the NSRP aimed at increasing initiatives, capacities and interventions within society in order to broaden the participation of institutions and actions within the conflict area so as to bring about positive changes not only in the practice of peacebuilding, but also in policies to enhance stability and sustain peace (NSRP, 2017). An overambitious bold objective, however when considering pervious peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers this was a push in the right direction The question remains, however, whether the NSRP accomplished this and whether it has been sustained after the end of the initiative. This point will be further analysed below, after fully understanding the framework and make-up of the NSRP.

The NSRP brought together various initiatives at different administrative levels to strengthen the peace architecture for the National Peace and Security Forum, Women Peace and Security, and State Conflict Management Alliances. Despite this it did face some challenges, for example, with regard to broadening societal participation. The NSRP report identified long and medium-term goals, thus bringing into question how sustainable this platform would be after the NSRP was gone (NSRP, 2018). Furthermore, another challenge for the NSRP was where it was difficult to determine when a conflict had truly been resolved or whether it had merely halted, with the probability of said conflict resurfacing; as such, this made it difficult to measure the value of the mediation or prevention method.

Recognising the multifaceted nature of conflict in the Niger Delta, the NSRP adopted an approach that was based on four major principles:

- Being strategic: this involved working with initiatives that depicted a "demonstrative effect" to resolving conflict non-violently.
- Playing a facilitating role: creating spaces that brought people together, both marginalised and non-marginalised groups, for constructive dialogue to take place that involved managing violence.

- Supporting and working to establish change: working with the architecture that was already available rather than creating one from scratch.
- Operating with political neutrality, in a way that exemplified conflict sensitivity. (DFID, 2012, p. 14–15; NSRP, 2017)

Table 12 below highlights the key activities delivered through the NRSP's initiative

Target Group	Key Activities: Targeted influencing and persuasion	Key Activities: Convening platforms and bringing people together
Powerholders / state and traditional authorities	Advocacy and mobilization (including research) on targeting powerholders around specific, pre-defined agendas and issues. Building strong networks with key allies and champions within government.	Convening key powerholders into longer term organization / platforms ('strengthening the peace architecture')
Citizens / protagonists of conflict	Sensitisation, awareness-raising and training of conflict sensitive ways of action	Bringing stakeholders in / protagonists of conflicts together, providing the space for mediation, dialogue, and collective decision-making on conflicts. Building ongoing relationships with communities undergoing conflict.

Table 9 NSRP Work Areas and Target Groups

Source NSRP, 2017, p9

The designs of the NSRP programme were centred around creating policies and practices that peacefully managed and reduced the incidence of violent conflict. It also targeted the negative impacts of violent conflict within its operational states, especially on the vulnerable and marginalised groups (NSRP, 2017). It was for this reason that it was selected as one of the peacebuilding initiatives to be analysed within this research, (NSRP, 2017). Although not an element fully explored in this thesis, it is, however, crucial to note that gender was embedded in all outputs of the programme, which aimed to facilitate situations of gender equality. It focused on broadening societal participation; this was specifically aimed at the women and young girls. The reason for this was that the NSRP recognised the prevalence of violence against women and girls and structured essential elements of its programme to address this and sought its reduction. The ambition of the programme with regard to women and girls was to achieve more influential participation by women and girls in institutions and initiatives relevant to peacebuilding, and to reduce the prevalence and impact of violence against women and girls; however, given the time scale of five years, this goal was found to be overambitious, thus the

programme shifted its goals accordingly, to only represent the views of women in peacebuilding (NSRP, 2018). Which the empirical data showed stopped once the progam ended.

Thus, taken together , although during the life of the NSRP, it was reported that there was a reduction in the incidence of violence, thus strengthening the peace architecture, although the 2017 report states that there is little evidence to show how the NSRP contributed to mediating and resolving conflict (NSRP, 2017). It is impossible to determine whether this reduction in violence was because of initiatives carried out specifically by the NSRP or because of other factors. The objective of the NSRP to increase the peace capacities of the stakeholders, and to improve their skills and understanding of peacebuilding with training not only seemed overambitious but also difficult to measure and more so to sustain. Despite this, it can be observed that the NSRP did indeed establish spaces for state and non-state actors to work together through the establishment of Peace Clubs. This allowed for the flow of information between the two, enabling stakeholders to have a shared position in the peacebuilding process. However, the sustainability of this after the end of the programme is indeed questionable, especially after the NSRP funding ended. Therefore, it can be noted that the NSRP did create space for dialogue and bring 'marginalised' groups to the peacebuilding process; however, the overall agenda of the problem was overambitious and hard to measure.

Thus, this thesis aims: firstly, to examine how and to what extent the NSRP was influenced by neopatrimonialism (Chapter 4), and secondly, how the initiative shaped the informal economy beyond what has been stated in its policy briefings (Chapter 5). The next section examines the framework of the second donor-based initiative the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND).

The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND)

Established in 2010, PIND, funded by Chevron Corporation, is a regional strategy that set out to analyse socio-economic problems in the Niger Delta (PIND, 2011). It aimed to do so through the building of networks between local and international partners that would work together to develop and implement new sustainable solutions that address conflict and reduce the dependence on oil within that region and the country at large. Understanding that the multifaceted socio-economic challenges in the Niger Delta cannot be addressed by one organisation alone, PIND is based upon recognising the need for partnerships and collaboration; this creates an opportunity to learn and adopt from others, thus leveraging existing network resources and expertise. The overall objective of PIND is to build equitable development in the Niger Delta and a strong legacy of sustainable peace by striving to move

towards a unified community that possesses shared goals, through co-creation and organisational transformation that builds economic development (PIND, 2011).

PIND is a non-profit organisation with its headquarters based in Abuja and office branches in Warri, Delta and Port Harcourt. (PIND, 2011). Working together, Chevron funds PIND through the Niger Delta Development Initiative (NDDI), with the strategic objective of attaining an equitable economic environment and sustainable peace in the region. The initial funding received from Chevron was used to set up the organisational structure of PIND. The NDDI based in Washington focuses on the planning, funding and partnership development by raising awareness with the international community and supporting poverty alleviation, while also providing grants for various projects (PIND, 2011). PIND within the Niger Delta works on the project implementation and operational planning, the day-to-day decision making on the ground as well as monitoring the performance of various projects. The initiatives PIND engages in focus on market development, building local capacity and mitigating conflict, as well as rising awareness on issues within the region (PIND, 2011). PIND also added capacity building and advocacy to its agenda, aimed at promoting economic growth with local partners and serving as a catalyst for system change in order to reduce poverty (PIND, 2011). This entails pursuing a healthy civil society by functions such as advocates, supporting policies and institutions that drive economic advancement, addressing gaps created by the infrastructure such as information, power, communications and so on. This allows for a holistic approach that strives to create a healthy economic development environment in the Niger Delta (PIND, 2012). This just like the NSRP sought to create partnerships, echance peace architecture and economic advancement.

Through the sharing of information between actors, change is communicated. PIND sets out to build and sustain partnership networks that have shared goals, shared knowledge, shared resources and shared success, aimed at forging peacebuilding that leads to equitable economic development in the Niger Delta so as to achieve a legacy of peace and development in the region (PIND, 2012). Partnership with various networks is not about agreements, but rather embraces and pushes to create spaces where constructive discussions and shared resources can create long-term development solutions. For example, PIND officials have established links between the local police and the population. As a result, when there are instances of gang violence or community clashes, members of the population report it to PIND, who in turn report this to the police (PIND, 2019;DB4, 2019). An interview with a member of PIND revealed that due to the established network between the organisation and the police force, PIND has been invited into security hearings and even to mediate local conflict, a privilege not enjoyed by

other organisations. Thus, it can be deduced that PIND has indeed established networks of partnerships between the local community and the state forces.

Furthermore, PIND recognises that without extensive knowledge of the region and its dynamics, economic growth is impossible. Therefore, PIND works on extensive research that serves to supplement information on the economy, industries and people to further economic opportunities within the region (PIND, 2019). While recognising the gaps within its analysis, and that it will not always have sufficient information, PIND strives to ensure that it does. As admirable as this sounds, it is critical to examine how the lack of sufficient knowledge affects PIND's research and peacebuilding agenda- such as the informal economy

PIND recognised the gap in Bayesla and Rivers with regard to economic inequality, and minimal success in sustaining peacebuilding within the region by the government; this resulted in a deep-rooted analysis to address this issue, specifically regarding the poor and marginalised groups. Understanding that economic development is the pathway to prosperity, and acknowledging the link between economic development and conflict, PIND took a market-based approach to achieve sustainable economic development (Fund for Peace et al., 2015). This was especially important since 70 per cent of the Niger Delta lives below the poverty line as well as having limited access to basic amenities such as safe water, healthcare and shelter as well as educational attainment. PIND's approach aimed at identifying the driving forces for growth in the market systems as well as the factors hindering economic growth. Designed to increase the efficiencies of various sectors such as palm oil and aquaculture through research and analysis to raise awareness and people's incomes within these sectors, each programme aimed to increase capacity and connections, and create platforms by identifying market systems and sectors where the poor were not achieving, and the potential opportunities created to promote pro-poor market development (PIND, 2019). PIND's reason for its focus on economic growth was because conflict hinders economic growth and a lack of economic growth sparks conflict.

PIND focus on economic development focused on sustaining improvements to incomes for a significant number of the poor through symmetric change. This model was adopted by many, including DFID, in various programmes in Africa, Asia and other places. This approach fit with the vision of PIND that strove for poverty reduction and improved incomes (PIND, 2014). The market development approach aimed to strengthen market systems to ensure these markets effectively benefited the poor. It involved an analysis of the market to identify a market weakness that prevented the poor from benefiting, and initiatives that focused on addressing causes and not symptoms of market weakness. PIND aimed to

produce initiatives that strove for systematic change to ensure a clear vision. To carry this out effectively, PIND had to better understand the economy with regard to the position of the marginal groups within the region. Thus, additional research was carried out by NNF to build upon previous PIND studies. It was on this basis that groups were selected and further investigated (PIND, 2019; Fund for Peace et al., 2015). Thus, economic development and conflict as well as peace are dependent upon one another (PIND, 2019). As such, as will be examined in chapter 5, its key to analysis how the program focused on the informal economy as strived for economic development.

Beyond the economic development intervention, PIND implemented conflict sensitivity training as part of an overall strategy targeting effective leadership (PIND, 2019. Small grants were given out that focused on strengthening a peacebuilding and early warning system, and reducing ethnic conflict – in response to the levels of lethal violence in the Niger Delta which increased in the last quarter of 2018, mainly due to the elevated incidence of gang, communal violence and election violence (Fund for Peace and PIND, 2018). Although most peace interventions undertaken in this quarter were focused on election violence mitigation, there were interventions undertaken by the Partners for Peace network, for example, in Bayelsa State they conducted a sensitisation campaign against cultism and criminality in the state. This involved carrying out a school-to-school campaign against cultism in hotspots in Yenagoa, Southern Ijaw, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Nembe, Ogbia, and Brass local government areas (Fund for Peace and PIND, 2018). In addition, further campaigns were conducted at the University of Port Harcourt. Further analysis of the programs showed that the impact of these programs with regards to reducing election violence, and the reduction of cultism was not measure, thus bringing into question the impact of these programs (DB3,2019).

The Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU)
To fill the gap for more concentrated and operational level support in targeting and responding to conflict, PIND created the Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU). The IPDU is a response strategy that seeks to promote synergy and collaboration between international, local and regional partners to address early warning signs of conflict, focusing on youths as well as gender issues. It serves to respond to emerging threats by mobilising actors and resources through research, capability and applied learning, and as a research powerhouse that fills the gap in the needs of partners in terms of knowledge, as well as being a clearinghouse for existing research (PIND, 2016). IPDU was intended to have a sustained impact on clearing information on the conflict in the Niger Delta as well as being a platform for training and undertaking projects (PIND, 2015). IPDU carries out various functions, such as

providing research to various donors and private sector actors, and fulfilling their own peacebuilding mitigation objectives, bringing promising initiatives to life, for example, peace messaging and early warning analysis. It is made up of three core components, namely:

•Applied learning: this aspect implements the projects.

•Research: this is geared towards filling the gap and sharing knowledge between the donor community and the government stakeholders.

•Capacity building: this serves to provide defined training that is needed. (PIND, 2015).

Some of IPDU's key achievements include the successful running of an SMS warning platform were served as a means of tracking, reporting conflict in communities in Bayelsa and Rivers. It has further built the capacity of conflict management, ensuring inclusivity by incorporating International Oil Companies (IOCs), security agencies, government workers, NGOs, development practitioners and so on, providing training as well as using the Partners for Peace network and working with other security and peace agents. Also, between January and March 2015, IPDU was able to successfully run a sensitisation programme on peaceful elections in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states.

The Partners for Peace (P4P)

The Partners for Peace (P4P) is a regional platform that was launched in 2013 in the Niger Delta (within PIND) that brought together people of different backgrounds and perspectives in order to identify and address the root causes of conflict and to build sustainable peace (PIND, 2014). The P4P programme membership was open to individuals and organisations who had a drive and commitment towards peace and development in the Niger Delta region (PIND, 2015, 2016). P4P chapters were created across the nine states of the Niger Delta region. It is governed by a Board of Trustees that provides fiduciary and strong oversight; these state chapters are intended to create enabling environments where economic development could happen as well as interventions that establish peacebuilding. P4P serves as a network that builds peace by identifying agents of peace at the grassroots level and strengthening these networks and empowering them towards sustainable peace (PIND, 2016). It creates new conflict risk factors for detecting early warning signs to conflict. It aims to establish and strengthen grassroots networks to build up conflict resolution capability by establishing a network of self-identified agents to build peace in the Niger Delta region, as well as creating initiatives that are more integrated, and enabling economic growth and development. The P4P networks within each state are independently managed and organise their own interventions; however, technical and capacity support is given by the overall network (PIND, 2015, 2016).

P4P works as a catalyst that promotes collaboration between stakeholders to facilitate effective peacebuilding. These grassroots networks, along with PIND, work to amplify the voices of the participants (PIND, 2016). PIND created the P4P to ensure the voices of all peace agents are included and heard within the peacebuilding process, by creating inclusive networks. This network strives to increase proactive action, build team spirit and encourage volunteerism. Partners for Peace objectives are carried out by implementing three components: network, action and voice:

•Network – this strives to build a strong network of inclusive stakeholders ranging from civil societies, NGOs, private companies, community-based organisations, and so on, who aim to strengthen economic growth and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta.

•Action – through small grants the network is able to carry out trainings.

•Voices – this seeks to empower the voices of positive actors as well as broadening the P4P network (PIND, 2015).

Below is a visual representation of how these components work together:

Figure 8 Partners for Peace Framework

Source: PIND Website

Partners for Peace works to address early-stage conflicts before they worsen; some of the roles include improving conflict situations during elections and establishing a Community Stakeholders Network (CSN) in various local government areas (Fund for Peace et al., 2015). These networks are made up of trained volunteers comprising various individuals who work hand in hand with the Community Life Project (CLP) to create a text-platform that enables people to send early conflict warning text messages to a dedicated Short Message Service (SMS) hub. In response to these messages, the hub involves the necessary security forces. P4P also supports local peace actors and capacity networks. My fieldwork at PIND revealed that this is indeed a sustainable initiative, as they are able to monitor and connect with the platform daily, hence, they can report crimes and violence to the local authorities. However, the process is not simple, as it requires verifying the information and sometimes this can take a long time, at which point the conflict might already have happened.

P4P has also created a peacebuilding map that helps it address conflict in the Niger Delta. The map is populated with conflict information on the nine states through shared knowledge and holistic patterns of conflict risk, and cuts across communities, organisations, private companies, civil societies, NGOs, the general population and so on (PIND, 2019). The map serves as an effective way of tracing conflict within the region and observing the impact of their peacebuilding initiatives within the region (PIND, 2019).

This section set out to analyse the two peacebuilding initiatives explored in this thesis: the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND). It discussed their overview, design and structure, and each peacebuilding initiative was analysed. It also noted the limitations of the programmes. It can be deduced that both the NSRP and PIND are indeed exceptional peacebuilding initiatives whose objectives and framework do fall within the economic agenda of peacebuilding; however, when examining the initiatives in detail there is a problem of a lack of sustainability and of failing to measure the effectiveness of the initiatives. Both iniatives served to address the economic needs of the Niger Delta. PIND, serves to create a networking space to allow peacebuilding agencies to come together, to share ideas, communicate and to identify early warning signs and mitigate them. Both striving to positively impact the peace architecture of Bayelsa and Rivers states. However, the programmes were both overly ambitious, and their success could not be measured. After conclusion of the NSRP its sustainability has been difficult to maintain, raising the question of the efficiency of the programme in the first place. With this in mind, this thesis aims to examine how and to what extent the NSRP and PIND are shaped by
Neopatrimonialism in Bayelsa state and Rivers state and how this shapes the informal economy

Conclusion

The main goal of the this chapter was to provide background knowledge of Bayelsa and Rivers exploring both conflict and peacebuilding within the region. The chapter was divided into three subsections that focussed on analysing the interplay between the conflict, peacebuilding and the informal economy in the Niger Delta with a specific focus on Rivers State and Bayelsa State. The first subsection analysed the conflict in the Bayelsa and River, highlighting the discovery of oil, exploring violence within the region in terms of oil bunkering, crimes and the proliferation of small arms. The exploration of violence also served to depict the complexity of sides to the conflict and showed the need to shift from previous known paradigms and theories on conflict to embrace new ones within the current dynamics of fragile peace within the region. As noted by Shahrbanou and Chenoy: "underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict but poor social, economic, and environmental conditions, as well as weak or ineffective political structures, diminish a state's capacity to manage tensions in a non-violent manner." (Shahrbanou and Chenoy, 2007, p. 34). Thus, when relating this to Bayelsa and Rivers it is evident that the decades of neglect on the part of the state have indeed impacted peace and security in the region. Furthermore, the conflict within these states are not only linked to oil but also to the arms trade between networks of militant groups, the elites, international actors and security forces. The broader interplay between these different actors has led to the impediment of several governmental initiatives as the actors remain the same (Mähler, 2010). Hence, depending on the approach used, each research yielded varying results, concluding that the blame was on the Nigerian government and/or the oil companies. The continued environmental degradation, weak structures, high levels of corruption and thriving patrimonial networks have resulted in violence that continues to occur in the region.

In sum, it can be taken that several factors are indeed associated and responsible for conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers that go beyond oil. It is still crucial to note that the era was indeed marked by conflicts such as the various ethnic cleavages which later manifested into national polarisation between the geographical entities of the north and the south. Furthermore, the perennially weak institutions within the region also play a crucial part and the discovery and exploration of oil further led to the consolidation of political institutions. Bayelsa and Rivers has also been a region marked by poverty and lack of modernisation due to the lack of resource management and sustainable development initiatives.

The second subsection analysed the transition from conflict to peacebuilding initiatives, highlighting the various responses by the government. This analysis divides the state-led responses to conflict into two main groups: the 'carrot' and 'stick' approaches. The third subsection examines previous research

on the informal economy in Nigeria and then moves to the Niger Delta, linking it to the political economy of peacebuilding to pave the way to addressing the objective of this research.

The fourth section discussed the peacebuilding initiatives used for the empirical data, namely: the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), analysing the structure, framework, scope and limitations of the initiatives as well as their achievements over the years, specifically with regard to economic development through the market. Both initiatives work to address early warning signs conflict within the Niger Delta, build economic development through peacebuilding, amplifying the voices of the community and to promote synergy and collaboration between international, local and regional partners. However, this chapter showed a mismatch between the objectives and what the initiatives delivered, (which is furthered explored in chapter 4), as lot of their objectives were overambitious, hard to sustain and measure the effects and impacts.

The next chapter aims to answer the first research question, which seeks to analyse in greater detail the extent to which peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and the implications of this for the peacebuilding agenda. The peacebuilding initiatives carried out by PIND and the NSRP serve as a focal point to broaden the scope of the analysis on peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Furthermore, to provide a more holistic analysis, this research also incorporates the initiatives carried out by various partners of both PIND and the NSRP.

Chapter 4 – Peacebuilding: Through the Lens of Clientelism and Power in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

Introduction

The specific objective of this chapter is to answer the first research question-how and to what extent are state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives shaped by neopatrimonialism–clientelism and political patronage. It gives an account of the research findings about the understanding of peacebuilding, and the influence of neopatrimonialism on both donor-based and state-led peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa state and Rivers state, emerging from the perceptions of participants in interviews. Existing studies that have analysed the impact of state-led initiatives have looked at the overall impact across the Niger Delta states, instead of taking an individual state approach (Omeje, 2004;2006; (Eberlein, 2006) Omotola, 2009; Uduji, Okolo-Obasi and Asongu, 2019; Ufua, 2019).Also works such as those by Ushie (2013), Kiipoye (2015), Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016), and Iwilade (2017), which have analysed the impact of patronage politics specifically on the amnesty programme, have not sufficiently explored the impact of patronage politics beyond the amnesty programme. This chapter integrates respondents' perceptions, views, understanding and experiences to illustrate the degree to which the donor-based and state-led actors have shaped the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa state and River state. Together with the data obtained from respondents, the data is triangulated with secondary sources to evaluate how state-led and donor-based initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism that previously existed in the conflict setting and how this shapes the post-conflict setting. In turn, this chapter investigates the degree to which both state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiative can enhance our understanding of peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism. This is important because despite several state-led and donor-based initiatives the status of conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers states has alternated between 'active' and 'inactive' resulting to the emergence of new actors and unstable peace (Newsome, 2011; Onuoha, 2016; Reuters, 2017b). The chapter begins by examining firstly the donor-led initiatives, and then the state-led initiatives exploring the reasons why some actors tend to benefit more than others, and the broader impact of this is on the peacebuilding agenda.

To fully answer the first research question, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section examines the understanding and the focus of both state-led and donor-based initiatives – the overall peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. It highlights whether the overall peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa State and Rivers State has changed .The empirical data presented here helps to set the scene for an understanding of the current peacebuilding agenda in order to effectively

examine whether and how state-led and donor-based initiatives are being influenced by neopatrimonialism.

The second section begins to answer the research questions, examining how and to what extent the donor-based initiatives carried out by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation (NSRP) and PIND are shaped by neopatrimonialism. This section finds that although these donor-based initiatives do intersect with the governmental structure at various levels, they are, however, not shaped by the neopatrimonialism in Bayelsa and Rivers. Rather, they are shaped by the interests of their respective donor organisations. Leading to donor centric approaches which according to participants leads to autonomy of initiatives, the reliance on foreign aid which makes these organisations serve as gap fillers in Bayelsa and Rivers. As noted by Bailey (1998), Dicklitch (1998); Lind (2000) and Chiller and Fouron (2001, p 212) have termed NGOS an "apparent state". The data also revealed that there is a gap between the theory (knowledge) of peacebuilding and the reported reality of the achievements of these initiatives (PIND and the NSRP).

As it is difficult to place state-led peacebuilding efforts within the liberal peacebuilding narrative, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is because instead of reducing and addressing violence and grievances such as poverty, environmental degradation and pollution, the state-led initiatives in Rivers State and Bayelsa State did not address the underlying causes of conflict, or the grievances of not bringing about institutional change; rather, they restructured the patron—client network, incentivising militants to stop violence using financial deals with patrons. This demonstrates how conflict is managed, and cooperation between the patrons, militants and clients is permitted and in turn increases the level of conflict. The distribution of economic privileges and favours is central to the establishment of power relations and the entire patronage network. Thus, it can be deduced that the state intends to provide financial opportunities for both the patrons and clients in order to maintain and establish institutional arrangements that will in turn help shape the patronage network, therefore, reshaping the different conflict drivers and entrepreneurs. This makes it problematic to conceptualise state-led peacebuilding as an integral trajectory of liberal peacebuilding. Consequently, in place of liberal peacebuilding, and encompassing its relationship with neopatrimonialism, this chapter argues that patronage peacebuilding is a better explanatory framework for the state-led peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers states. The third section, therefore, examines how state-led initiatives are influenced by neopatrimonialism by examining how these initiatives have enhanced the involvement of certain key actors in peacebuilding, namely the patrons – who are the political elites, ex-militant leaders, politicians and military generals – as well as the clients – who are ex-militants, youth and sometimes the general population of Bayelsa State and Rivers State. The data suggested that state-led peacebuilding initiatives

are fuelled by neopatrimonialism and based on reconstructing the power structures that existed during the conflict in Bayelsa State and Rivers State; consequently, this led me to coin the term 'patronage peacebuilding' to describe this phenomenon. This notion best explains state-led intervention measures in Rivers State and Bayelsa State.The central argument is that patronage peacebuilding is understood as a political and economic process of establishing peace that is centred on the advancement of the various political agendas, not just of the patrons – that is, the godfathers, ex-militant leaders, political elites – but also of the clients, through the manipulation of socio-economic conditions and institutional arrangements to the reconstruction of power dynamics in Bayelsa and Rivers states. It is a process that restructures the power dynamics within the post-conflict setting, reinforcing the apportionment of the benefits that existed within the conflict. It shows that although these arrangements sometimes keep violence at bay, it is, however, detrimental to the overall peacebuilding agenda. Also, rather than focusing solely on the intentions of patrons and clients this chapter also examines on the institutional impediments that have undermined peacebuilding. Additionally, this section also examines the roles patrons and clients play in peacebuilding process, how it fuels the struggle for power, and the socio-economic factors and institutional practices contributing to patronage peacebuilding, all of which have further led to corruption and competition in the political economy of peacebuilding.

The fourth and final section examines our understanding of how donor-based and state-led initiatives have shaped the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. The empirical data suggests that both state-led and donor-based initiatives have influenced the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa State and Rivers State in three ways. Firstly, the effect of the initiatives has led to the tolerance of patronage peacebuilding; secondly, it has also led to the reliance on NGOs by the local population and finally it has facilitated the 'blame game' that occurs between state-led and donor-based organisations. The understanding of this concludes the analysis of how state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by clientelism, making an important contribution to the field of the political economy of peacebuilding and neopatrimonlism. This opens the door to explore how state-led and donor-based peacebuilding shape the informal economy in the preceding chapter.

Understanding and Focus of Peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

Before examining how and to what extent donor-based and state-led peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism, this section highlights the of the understanding and focus of peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State by participants. This was an emerging theme within the empirical data, as participants who answered questions on peacebuilding within these states noted that it is not enough to analyse the peacebuilding initiatives without taking into consideration the

understanding and the focus of the overall peacebuilding agenda (AD3,2019; DB2, 2019; DB6, 2019). Thus, even though this was not within the initial scope of this study, the prominence of the theme in the empirical data could not be ignored, and hence constituted an unanticipated finding. Interviews with both state-led and donor-based peacebuilding organisations in Bayelsa State, Rivers State and Abuja showed that there is a general understanding of peacebuilding which subscribes to the notion offered by liberal peacebuilding, as expressed in Chapter 2 (see

Liberal Peacebuilding). This notion of peacebuilding goes beyond the absence of conflict and/or violence to include sustaining the livelihoods of the population,as DB8 described in his interview, peacebuilding is:

> …initiatives, methods that are used to manage and resolve conflict. (DB8, 2019)

Simialry, DB7 also describes the theory of peacebuilding processes as a means of:

> …teaching people how to manage conflict to ensure sustainable development and growth, cutting across family, and agencies globally, nationally and locally. (DB7, 2019)

In the same vien, SB1, a representative within a state-based institution, described peacebuilding as:

> …the process of addressing the drivers and outcomes of conflict by speaking to the drivers, dealing with the root causes, the drivers and the conflict itself. (SB1, 2019)

While DB5 highlights the economic dimension of peacebuilding stating , that peacebuilding is a process of:

> …building capacity around information that helps to de-escalate issues when language comes in to play. A process that builds economic and social structures to facilitate the promotion of peace and reduce the recurrence of violence. (DB5, 2019)

This view was further supported as SB10 notes that:

> …peacebuilding goes beyond peacekeeping and peacemaking to ensure society is reconstructed, enabling actors to have stable livelihoods, enabling environments to work. (SB10, 2019)

Similarly, DB1 agreed stating that:

> …peacebuilding is an inclusive process that brings about political, social and economic and attitudinal changes to sustain livelihoods. (DB1, 2019)

Thus, taken together, the overview is that peacebuilding is understood as the process of reconstructing the minds of the people in hope and the assurance of hope as well as aiming to resolve injustice in non-violent ways. It is also seen as the process of educating youths, women and leaders – both traditional and political – and resolving conflicts as noted above. Thus, it can be deduced that both state-based and donor-based organisations subscribe to the same understanding of peacebuilding, which falls in line with liberal peace, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see Liberal Peacebuilding). This universal understanding allows us to then move on to examining the activities and roles these organisations play in peacebuilding, to see whether they subscribe to the universal understanding of liberal peacebuilding or are shaped by other factors: of specific interest to this thesis, neopatrimonialism, and how this influences the peacebuilding agenda.

Interviews with participants revealed that opinions were divided on whether the focus of peacebuilding remained the same – that is, resolving violence by appeasing the clients and patrons – or whether it has changed and evolved over time. The chart below (Figure 9) represents the perceptions of interviewed participants on the focus of peacebuilding in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. As highlighted in the previous chapter, state-led peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers has been based on two distinct methods, characterised as the 'carrot' and the 'stick' approaches. These initiatives mainly focused on resolving violence by appeasing the perpetrators of the conflict, who we now refer to as the clients, and the political elites, who are the patrons (see The 'Carrot' Approach and Coercive 'Stick' Approach).Thus, the peacebuilding agenda has failed to take into consideration the causes and motivations of the conflict, such as environmental degradation, ethnic divides, high levels of unemployment, inequalities and the oil economy, to mention a few (see The Political Economy of Conflict in the Bayelsa and Rivers States). It shows that there is a nearly even split among participants, with 48 per cent of participants believing that the focus of peacebuilding has changed, and 52 per cent disagreeing.

Participants who argued that the focus of the peacebuilding agenda had changed believed that the dimension of peacebuilding in Bayelsa state and Rivers state had changed, but not fundamentally. They held the opinion that the environment had changed within these states; however, the factors – such as the need for environmental development, issues of oil rents, unemployment rates and so on – and

actors had not changed entirely (DB5,2019; DB3, 2019; SB3, 2019). They recognised that the focus has moved from the study of militants to the study of ex-militants, thus the concentration is no longer on militant groups. This has resulted in a shift in the mindset of the people, from being agitators to being ex-agitators and currently being advocates of peace (SB3, 2019; SB5, 2019). According to interviews, the peacebuilding agenda has shifted from environmental needs to a development dimension that is aimed at restoring Bayelsa, Rivers and the entire Niger Delta region. It is crucial to note that early state-led peacebuilding initiatives in the Bayelsa and Rivers state saw the indigenous people being ignored; recently, however, channels have been opened and panels set up where citizens can openly express their opinion as well as being part of the peacebuilding initiatives even donor-based orgnisations. Consequently, this indeed represents a change from the neglect they had previously suffered. However, it becomes important to ask to what extent these panels do indeed create and implement peacebuilding in these states, or whether they are a means by which 'false power' is being given to the people in an attempt to buy peace. Figure 10, above, gives a breakdown of the participant's opinions based on the institutions they are affiliated with (state-based, donor-based and academia). Interestingly, it shows that the majority of those who believe the focus of peacebuilding has changed work within the donor- based institutions.

On the other hand, other participants disagree, stating that the focus of peacebuilding has indeed changed in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. According to these interviews the peacebuilding agenda has shifted from environmental needs to a development dimension that is aimed at restoring Bayelsa, Rivers and the Niger Delta region. They are of the opinion that actors, elements and dimensions have changed. An interview with DB9 (2019), highlighted a controversial point – that there had been no oil issues from 2009 to 2015, as well as a reduction in cultism and kidnappings, thus showing that the focus of peacebuilding has indeed, in their opinion, shifted from peacemaking to actual peacebuilding, with development and sustainability coming into play (DB9, 2019). This point is controversial because as there have been attacks on oil companies, clashes between gangs, the emergence of new militants groups. Thus raising an importamt question, how has the focus peacebuilding shifted when the same issues since 1999 are the issues in 2019? Furthermore, with regards to the reduction of violence, especially when this reduction of violence has come about through the buying of peace amid existing patron networks? What about considering the establishment of positive peace, as discussed in the section on

Liberal Peacebuilding in Chapter 2? As shown in Figure 9, 52 per cent of participants believe the focus of the peacebuilding agenda has not changed; they believe that the 'actors', whether being referred to as militants, ex-militants, patrons, political elites or godfathers, are still the focus of peacebuilding. They

further recognised that the focus of peacebuilding remains on environmental challenges, especially since these issues were never addressed. Furthermore, as we take a deeper look into 'patronage peace', the general structure of power and the informal economy within Bayelsa State and Rivers State, these actors (militants or ex-militants – the clients – and the godfathers and political elites – the patrons), irrespective of how they identified themselves, indeed remain the focus of the peacebuilding agenda. This shows that although there was some change in how actors were seen or referred too, fundamentally the focus of peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State remained the same over the last ten years. The 52 per cent of participants (who believe the focus has not changed) argue that the post-conflict period has brought about the emergence of new actors – that is, new clients and new patrons – who did not possess power during the conflict period but who now do within the post-conflict environment. The emergence of these new actors is linked to the struggle for resources and the changing nature of power structures, which is examined further below.

Perceptions of the Focus of Peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers States

- 52% Focus has not change
- 48% Focus has changed

■ Focus has changed   ■ Focus has not change

Figure 9 Focus of Peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State

Source: Author's notes and interviews

Figure 10 Percentage of People within Institutions who Believe the Focus of Peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State has Changed

Source: Author's notes and interviews

Figure 11 Percentage of People within Institutions who Believe the Focus of Peacebuilding in Bayelsa State and Rivers State has not Changed

Source: Author's notes and interviews

It is interesting to note when comparing Figure 10 and Figure 11 that, overall, a greater percentage of people working in donor-based organisations believe the peacebuilding agenda has changed, while in the state-based institutions, in contrast, workers predominantly believed it has not.

In summary, from the data presented in this section it can be deduced that although there is evidence to support the notion that the focus of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states has changed, a deeper and closer look has shown that the focus of peacebuilding has not changed. The overall dynamic of the focus of peacebuilding has remained political: although there has been an emergence of new structures and institutions, for example, the involvement of actors such as new NGOs, new patrons and clients, the lack of focus on the actual roots of conflict (ethnic divides, environmental degradation, inequalities and so on) remains. The focus on peacebuilding in the Bayelsa and Rivers states has always been what I would term a 'band-aid' approach. Just as a band-aid stops the flow of blood on an injury, so also the 'band-aid' approach refers to momentarily addressing conflict but failing overall to address the root causes of the conflict. The 'band-aid' approach is aimed at quickly restoring negative peace – as this analysis will show – for the continuation of personal economic agenda in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Only the actors and perhaps even the political entrepreneurs changed, while the nature of the conflict remained the same over the years. As DB6 points out:

> It is for this reason the Niger Delta remains where it is today. As the focus remains truly political and the hunger and struggle for power remains, true peacebuilding will never occur. (DB6, 2019)

The next section examines how and to what extent donor-based initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism. It integrates respondents' perceptions, views, understanding and experiences to illustrate the degree to which the donor-based and state-led actors have shaped the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa and Rivers states. The roles donor-based actors play within the peacebuilding agenda of these states is examined, providing a context for understanding the actors' inclusion or exclusion of various groups from initiatives, as well as exploring whether and why some actors have benefited more than others.

Donor-Based Peacebuilding Conducted by the NSRP and PIND

This section aims to examine how and to what extent the donor-based initiatives carried out by the NSRP and PIND are shaped by neopatrimonialism in Bayelsa and Rivers states.As stated in Chapter 3 (see

Peacebuilding Initiatives (NSRP and PIND)), it was noted that these donor-based organisations are united by a common goal of reducing violence and sustaining peace in the Niger Delta Region. The roles of these groups ranged from mobilising local people, strengthening the participation of the people, building ethnic alliances, and creating platforms articulating the demands of the people to promote peace and economic opportunities. During fieldwork, respondents shared some views and perceptions regarding whether and how donor-based peacebuilding initiatives conducted by PIND and the NSRP were influenced by neopatrimonialism. Most of the participants believed these donor-based initiatives were not influenced by neopatrimonialism but were solely influenced by their respective donors. According to AD2:

> NGOs go where the money is, or rather where the research money is, and donors decide
> what they want and that's where the money is focused. (AD2, 2019)

Similarly, DB3 pointed out:

> PIND goes where the problems are, through data-driven approaches we assess what needs
> to be done in a specific community and what we can do practically. We focused on the
> grassroots approaches because that is where we believe it will be more effective. (DB3,
> 2019)

DB1 argued:

> We work with the government, but we are not influenced by it. The government listens to
> what we have to say in terms of security like the Niger Delta Peace and Security Network
> in both Rivers and Bayelsa. (DB1, 2019)

As PIND is formed along the lines of interest of the donors, rather than along vertical cleavages based on either regionalism or ethnicity, this falls in line with thoughts by Larry Diamond who recognised that donor this helps organisations like this "cross-cut the principal polarities of political conflict." (Diamond, 1994, p. 9). However, it is interesting to note that when it comes to engaging with people in different local governments, members of PIND expressed how important it was for them to know how to negative through the inter-party rivalry occurring in the state. This inter-party rivalry is part of the struggle for power that occurs within patronage peace discussed further below. It's crucial to note this inter-party rivalry served as a hindrance

to peacebuilding exercises. As expressed by DB6, who highlighted the need to understand the political terrain

> We have to understand the political and economic terrain in which we find ourselves. We cannot just go here or go there because the perception of our activities by the population can hinder how we do our jobs. So, we try to have no political association with any party or government. Yes, we work with those who are in power, but we do not go beyond that relationship. (DB6, 2019)

As DB5 stated:

> There are elements of politics in peacebuilding, we see it, we know it. All you have to do is look at the political terrain. But it is not from our end. We are held to a higher standard than the Nigerian government or the state governments. This system put in place keeps us accountable, there is no accountability in Nigeria or the individual states. (DB5, 2019)

Likewise, DB3 noted:

> Because we have no political motivations or benefits, we do not need political merit, we are guided and structured by the objectives of our donors. The politicised climate does not affect how we work. Yes, we take into consideration danger and instructions from the government based on security. (DB3, 2019)

What is important here is beyond the patronage nature of peacebuilding, which the donor-based organisation are aware of but also their understanding of how donor base organisations are able to carry out their initiatives despite this. As noted by DB3 (2019),

> We don't just operate without permission. To go into certain places we seek permission from the traditional leader and only when we are granted permission do we go

This point was further echoed by AD1 (2019) who highlighted the importance of not just seeking permission by all organizations but also the need to offer "blessings" to traditional leaders. He expressed how "blessings" were previously offered to traditional leaders and then shared among members of the community. However today, these blessings are no longer shared within the community but are means of bribery and ways of appeasing traditional leaders who are now ex-militants like Atdeke Tom. DB4 reflected on the importance of working with the state

> We cannot work without stable collaboration between us and the various levels of government. We inform the state of our findings, analysis and reports, and even collaborate on programmes. (DB4, 2019)

Furthermore, participants stated that even though these initiatives worked within the states at various levels, they were not influenced by swayed by the dynamics of party rivalry, or the struggle for power

need for favouritism and pollical favours noting that peacebuilding initiatives were carried out based on data and collaboration with various levels of the state. As expressed by DB2:

We use hotspots of conflict and conflict indicators to track conflicts especially violence affecting women. There is no involvement from the state in our intervention process or communities we target for sensitisation programmes. Our organisation is strictly data-given (DB2, 2019).

When asked how they stay neutral, he stated:

We focused on the objectives of our donors, beyond that we have no power or influence (DB2, 2019).

While also agreeing with the above view, DB9 recognised the power struggle that not only occurs in Rivers and Bayelsa but also in the whole country by saying:

There is a power battle going on not just in the Niger Delta but across Nigeria, the trick is to know how to avoid these battles. NGOs like ours stay neutral, we do not influence or pledge allegiance to politicians, political parties, or government. (DB9, 2019)

This discussion introduced a dimension of fake NGOs versus real NGOs. As noted by AD6:

We know the real NGOs, the ones carrying our real peacebuilding, we know them. The ones run by our own people are something else. But these international ones, they seem to be doing good. (AD6, 2019)

Similarly, AD2 further noted:

Depending on the donor, local councilmen, senators are involved in some donor-based peacebuilding initiatives. However, when the donors are international donors, the local Nigerian government has little or no influence on the approach of the initiatives. (AD2, 2019)

Additionally, AD3 noted

Because these donor-based organisations like the NSRP are not funded by the Nigerian government they cannot be run by the government. As far as the government is concerned these groups are helping to do the work they (the government) should be doing. Which allows them (state government) to continue their activities. (AD3,2019)

This suggests that because donor-based initiatives are based on the funding of international or foreign bodies, they have little accountability to the constituency they operate in. the empirical data suggest that the organisations foreign agencies are autonomous are more facilitators of foreign funds, than aiming to implement grassroots change. In addition to this creates a situation that lead to the dependency on foreign aid, thereby fostering what Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001,p 212) have termed

an "apparent state", where NGOs take on the repsoblibily of the state as the population become depend on it for aid. Which when projects end creates long-term stability issues and a lack of continuity.

In addition to the dependence on foreign funding, donor-based organisations' projects tend to focus on problems that can lead to quick and acceptable relays to their donors. This leads to projects such as the provision of primary health, income generation through grants and group farming, safe water projects and so on, rather than intangible things like political empowerment or addressing 'hot' or conflict issues. Likewise, AD3 also noted:

> The NGO sector is involved in early warning detections, capacity building and raising awareness of peace. For example, the Niger Delta dialogue is much disjointed even within this sector. Concern continues to be on how we stop the militants from resuming attacks. There is no regulation of the activities of NGOs with regard to this. (AD3, 2019)

Similarly, DB6 also noted:

> Yes, we work to prevent conflict through different programmes like Partner for peace initiatives but understand that conflict mitigation resolutions do not address criminality around Rivers or Bayelsa. These are the real issues that need to be addressed. We are limited to our core focus and what we can carry out. (DB6, 2019)

This lack of regulation led some participants to raise questions on the effectiveness of the initiatives carried out by PIND and the NSRP. As AD6 noted:

> A lot of these NGOs are limited not just in terms of resources but also their influence and its overall impact. The real question that needs to be asked is, what is the real impact of all these sensitisation programmes and workshops? You go to Okolobiama, and you talk to them about peace, what does that do to people with no jobs and starving? (AD6, 2019)

In the same vein DB6 noted:

> NGOs try to do the government's work. However, NGOs mostly treat symptoms. (DB6, 2019)

This thought was echoed by AD4, who raised an interesting point. He believed donor-based initiatives never really address the conflicts within any given society. He asked:

> How can you expect someone who has never experienced a day of poverty, a day without light (power supply), have access to clean water, to solve the problems of people who go through this daily? (AD4, 2019)

He further argued that donor-based initiatives are here for a limited time and once their resources run out or they achieve their objectives they leave, without even questioning the notion of the sustainability

of the implemented initiatives (AD4, 2019) and hence whether donor-based initiatives are effective.DB3 admitted that despite the organisations' success in various activities, when it came to measuring the effectiveness and impact of various initiatives, such as local sensitisation programmes, nothing had been done. DB3 stated:

> PIND works with various partner donor-based corporations like us; we carry out KAP workshops – knowledge-based workshops based on attitude and practices to help people see each other as one rather than as tribes. However, we haven't measured how this affects or influences the communities, but I feel there is an influence. (DB3, 2019)

This was evident with the peace club initiative formulated by the NSRP. A commendable objective of the NSRP was how through coordination, capacity building and accountability of conflict institutions it engaged both non-state and state actors in fostering an inclusive sustainable peace process. Focusing on two things. Firstly, "targeted influencing and persuasion" among the protagonists of the conflict, that is, the local communities; this was carried out through awareness raising, conflict sensitisation and so on. Secondly, this platform that brought people together; thus provided a space in which collective decision-making and dialogue could occur (NSRP, 2014), thus creating a space for dialogue and teaching. Peace clubs have created a safe space where individuals can build their confidence and are made aware of their rights. For example, in Rivers State, it was noted that 80 per cent of participants strongly agree that the training provider was extremely important and relevant and built their self-confidence (NSRP, 2018). This brings into question the effectiveness of peace clubs: if the primary impact was boosting confidence, how does this influence peacebuilding, criminality, and violence? Furthermore, at the initial stage, peace clubs took a long period of time to get up and running, especially in Bayelsa and Rivers states, however in the long run it was ultimately were not sustained (D3, 2019; AD2, 2019).

In the same vein, AD3 observed:

> Donors involved in various stages of economic empowerment have used various tools, like the media, drama and even football, targeting specific elements like early warning signals, focusing on women and youth. The NSRP stated its domestic enhancement of women's inclusiveness in peacebuilding brought structural change and promoted co-ordination. However, the real question is whether this has continued since it ended: sadly, the answer is 'no'. (AD3, 2019)

According to NSRP reports, women's involvement was promoted by the Rivers State peace clubs, with communities applying what had been taught in the various peace clubs (NSRP, 2017). However, empirical data on the ground suggested otherwise. Despite reports of 353 initiatives contributing to peacebuilding and raising awareness about VAWG (NSRP, 2018) between 2014 and 2017, DB6(2019)

revealed that the presence of women during meetings went no further than mere presence. Yes, they did receive some training, but it was difficult to measure the effect of these trainings and whether they had indeed made an impact on the peacebuilding process. In addition, NSRP officials believed participants attended simply for the food being given at the event and not for any other reason. While the NSRP reports that in Rivers and Delta the role of the peace clubs was evident, with approximately 200 reports being made to 'the observatory' on the positive impact of the platform (NSRP, 2016).

This point also reinforces the notion that NGOs serve as gap fillers discussed in more detail below. Thus, the research evidence referred to in this section indicates that among the different participants it was believed that owing to the involvement of international donors in PIND and the NSRP, these initiatives were not influenced by local patronage networks in Rivers and Bayelsa states. Although the NSRP and PIND were not influenced by patronage it was observed, however, that because of the donor-centric approach these initiatives were regulated neither by the Nigerian government nor by the state governments, which caused participants to question the impact and language used by both organisations. There seems to be a consensus between some academics and workers in state-based institutions on the language used by NGOs and, surprisingly, some donors as well. For instance, when lamenting the issue of inter-party rivalry and how this feedings into the struggle of power furthering the narrative patronage peacebuilding SB11 explained:

> Now you have to understand the dynamics of peace in both areas, from the perspective
>
> of the state and international NGOs. Yes, they (donor-based organisations) are not swayed
>
> by the local politics, they have their bubble in which they function.

As discussed above, although donor-based organisations seem not to engage in patronage peacebuilding they, however, must navigate through the inter-party rivalry which is a manifestation of the struggle for power to carry out peacebuilding's initiatives. And while many participants did not go into the specifics of what this looked like in reality beyond the blessings paid to traditional leaders, there is a sense that thongs are not always black and white, And sometimes donor-based organisations have to operate within the grey areas to get things done.

Similarly, another dimension expressed by, SB2 examined how

> There is a separate reality in which not only the state and these NGOs function. What we
>
> know to be peacebuilding from the books is perfect, but it is not always manifested in real
>
> life. There are too many factors that shape, reshape and influence the whole narrative,
>
> and what you are left with is a peace that is structured to a specific area, both at the nation,
>
> state, local and NGO level. (SB2, 2019)

Thus, the participant's positions suggest that despite the overwhelming successes reported in both PIND and the NSRP reports, there is however a visible discrepancy between when it comes to the reality Bayelsa and River state. Not only is there a problem of sustainability which can be seen especially with the NSRP initiatives as they have failed to continue after the end of the initiative- but there is also an issue with measuring the impact of these initiatives like peace clubs, the meetings held by partners for peace and various sensitization programs. The empirical data revealed that not much is known about the impact of these problems. Thus, showing a difference in the reality of projects versus the reported which harms the quality of the organizations' activities. Furthering this point, DB7 exclaimed:

> In the Niger Delta big money talks, as a result there is no regulation of practices of donors
> by the government and that is where the problem lies. (DB7, 2019)

In summary, the evidence in this section indicates that data from field research revealed that the NSRP and PIND peacebuilding initiatives are not influenced by neopatrimonialism, however, they are donor-centric. Participants were therefore of the opinion because these initiatives are donor-centric they tend to be autonomous and not accountable to the locals leading to the reliance on foreign aid. Furthermore, the dependence on foreign aid lets to lack of regulation of initiatives as such most initiatives are quick and tangible such as the creation of water supplies, provision of healthcare, which in the long run does not address conflict or violence. Additionally, this makes NGOs become service providers and gap fillers as noted by Bailey (1998), Dicklitch (1999) and Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) in addition this section highlighted how donor-based organisation negative within the local politics to sometimes engaged in grey areas not always talked about in textbooks. Finally, this section also noted a difference in the language used in policy briefings, the reality in Bayelsa and Rivers state as well as the impact of these initiatives.

Another interesting finding in the interviews was the contrast between the theory of liberal peacebuilding and the reality, or rather the practice of peacebuilding initiatives as conducted by the state-led initiatives in Rivers and Bayelsa. This third subsection focuses on furthering the understanding of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers by exploring the theory versus the reality of peacebuilding in state-led initiatives. To do this, this section examines the empirical data on the peacebuilding initiatives carried out in the states of Rivers and Bayelsa, bringing into focus the second theme of this chapter: 'patronage peacebuilding'. This finding raises intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of peacebuilding being practiced within these states, and its implications for the broader peacebuilding agenda. The understanding and interpretation of 'patronage peacebuilding' is further analysed in

relation to power, bringing to light from the interviews recurring themes of corruption and competition, and how these have shaped the peacebuilding agenda.

Theory of Peacebuilding vs the Reality of State-Led Peacebuilding Initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers State

The findings of the thesis are interesting because they indicate that there was a difference between the generic understanding of peacebuilding, as discussed in the literature review (see Liberal Peacebuilding),and the beginning of this chapter, its practice by the state at both the national and state levels. However, despite this apparent consensus in the definition of peacebuilding, a recurrent theme in several of the interviews was a sense among interviewees that the generally agreed definition of peacebuilding did not apply within Bayelsa state and Rivers state. These interviewees observed that what existed in Bayelsa state and Rivers state was a self-seeking economic and political engagement disguised as peacebuilding, citing as an example the amnesty programme that started in 2009 and pipeline protection initiatives. As recognised by Jonathan Goodhand (2003, 2005), conflict becomes self-financing to elites and clients; this characteristic has now been reflected in the peacebuilding process, especially in Bayelsa and Rivers. In both these states, the central focus of the national and state governments' peacebuilding policies has been one dimensional – focusing only on rebel–state conflict, as shown in Chapter 3 (see Table 7 Periodisation of State Policy Responses in the Niger Delta (1960–2009)). The reason for this was that the conflict affected the oil industry, which in turn undermined the economy of the state. This led to two crucial consequences: firstly, the other dimensions of conflict, such as ethnicity, environmental degradation and crime, were ignored and became more complex in nature; secondly, the focus on militancy led to a need for 'band-aid' in order to restore the economy. Hence, interviewees constantly referred to state-based peacebuilding initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers as "peacebuilding in terms of the Niger Delta", or "peacebuilding in the Niger Delta". Thus, the empirical data indicates that what in reality (or in practice) existed, had been interpreted and understood from the local perspective as "peacebuilding in terms of the Niger Delta", or, as I elegantly put it, 'patronage peacebuilding'. Patronage peacebuilding is the process of restructuring the patron–client networks that existed during the time of conflict, in the post-conflict environment. The concept of patronage peacebuilding is important because it helps us to examine the shifting nature of neopatrimonial relationships that underpin the state-led peacebuilding process in Bayelsa and Rivers states, highlighting the actors, motives and practical processes, which sum up the major focus of this section. The major objective of the restructured networks is to ensure that a stable

flow of oil rewards clients, and the maintenance of power dynamics within the state. Thus, this section will examine the subtheme – the struggle for power. This section will, further, examine patronage peacebuilding as a network of shifting alliances around securing power and wealth through peacebuilding, thus making it a lucrative industry. It also highlights how methods of buying peace by state-led initiatives have turned peacebuilding into an economy that breeds corruption and competition for power. These components serve not only to provide an understanding of patronage peacebuilding but also to highlight how state-led peacebuilding initiatives have been influenced by neopatrimonialism in Bayelsa and Rivers, shaped by clientelism and what this means for the peacebuilding agenda supported by works like Salih (2017) discussed in chapter, Iwilade (2017) and Ebiede; (2017).

Patronage Peacebuilding

As noted in Chapter 3, elite politics is a distinct feature of Nigerian politics, which accelerates governance failure and fundamentally inhibits state capacity Ebiede, 2017). It involves a 'cake-sharing' psychosis and the corruption of state officials, the determination of public policies based on competition for sectional advantages, the misuse of state resources and lack of accountability in the democratic political process. As with clientelism (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007, pp. 425–446; Elischer, 2008, pp. 175–201; Omo-bowale, 2008, pp. 203–224), neo-patrimonialism (Von Soest, 2007, pp. 621–645) and other internal failings of the state in Africa, this feature of Nigerian politics is a debilitating element of the political culture with adverse impacts on development and the entire social structure. This form of government has also been referred to as the neopatrimonial state "in which officeholders systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses and political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including patronage, various forms of rent seeking, and prebendalism" (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 52). It 'is a complex mode of government' that denotes 'the accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power' (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 52).

Thus as the term suggests, 'patronage peacebuilding' refers to a political and economic process of establishing peace that is centred on the advancement of the various political agendas, not only of the patrons (that is, godfathers, ex-militant leaders, political elites), but also of the clients, in order to reconstruct the power dynamics in Bayelsa and Rivers states (AD1, 2019, SB 12, 2019). It is a process that restructures the power dynamics within the post-conflict setting, reinforcing the distribution of benefits that existed during the conflict. Thus, to continue to survive and thrive within the new post-conflict era, those in power in the conflict era must develop creative means of maintaining their power. As noted by Sandbrook (1986) work on the need of political elites to survive which leads to economic

objections. Similarly, as Bailey (1971) notes in order to survive opponents must collect more resources and where possible destroy their opponents. The data revealed that patronage peacebuilding is turning peacebuilding into a productive economy that lines the pockets of the patronage peacebuilding entrepreneur and advances their personal goals. Hence, 'patronage peacebuilding' is also a short-term political practice that institutionalises self-enrichment and power-sharing through clientelist networks made up of godfathers, political elites, ex-militant leaders and members of groups, youths and the general population of Bayelsa and Rivers states, which overall destroys political and economic development. It also means that there is a form of power-sharing between state actors and non-state actors; thus, the current and previous state-led peacebuilding initiatives have always contributed to the continued flow of oil, as well as restructuring and maintaining the power structures in Bayelsa and Rivers. The state-led peacebuilding initiatives created a space for power and competitive political manipulations that marked the struggle for control through the ownership resources such as land and oil. As noted by DB6:

> Peacebuilding is an interesting space in which to analyse the shifting nature of relations
> amongst the various social categories and networks and how they are called into service.
> (DB6, 2019)

Patronage peacebuilding came about as result of the breakdown of patronage network that existed in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. In the early 2000s, elites in the Niger Delta began to lose control of their clients as a result of the attempts to clamp down made by the then president, Obasanjo, in order to maintain "resource control" (Iwilade, 2017, p. 270). President Obasanjo's agenda was geared at stopping the appropriation of resources by the local politicians in the south as well as curbing their influence (Iwilade, 2017). This resulted in the arrest and embarrassment of many southern politicians, such as the impeachment of the late chief Diepeye Alamaseiegha, who was the former governor of Bayelsa State (Iwilade, 2017). This clampdown resulted in links between patrons and clients being broken as patrons were no longer able to protect and provide for their clients (Iwilade, 2017). Consequently, the clients became impatient, leading to breakdown of the client networks. Hence, the Obasanjo regime disrupted the patron–client linkages which maintained relative peace within Bayelsa State and Rivers State (Iwilade, 2017). Thus, it was argued that youth militancy that thrived between 2000 and 2009 was the result of a fall out between the Nigerian political elites and their clients (Tarela, 2013 int; Obi, 2014; Ajala, 2016; Iwilade, 2017). This was seen in studies that linked the rise of insurgency and the collapse of public order to break the clientelist network (HRW, 2004; Osaghae et al., 2007; Courson, 2009; Ukeje and Iwilade, 2012). Thus, it can be observed that the rise in insurgencies

coincided with the decline of local elites, thereby influencing their clients, and resulting in the mobilising of armed groups.

As such, political competition within an environment fuelled by neopatrimonialism is all about the struggle for wealth and power, where the weak or poor serve as mere pawns who have no chance of competing. To succeed, the patrons and entrepreneurs must, therefore, engage in less than fair means, such as embezzlement and corruption, to get what they want. This often leads to both patrons and clients engaging with the informal structure just to succeed. (Kelsall, 2011; Sigman and Lindberg, 2017). This engagement, therefore, entails clients and patrons participating within the scope of conflict economies to fulfil their economic agendas, be it self-enrichment for survival or merely for continuing a conflict. It becomes plausible, therefore, to imply that clientelism emerges because of a state of generalised insecurity. This places both insecurity and clientelism as by-products of the lack of peacebuilding or state structures. As such, in situations of inadequate distribution, productive clientelism functions as an alternative to the lack of 'social security' within the state. The use of violence as well as the lack of functioning institutions, therefore, helps to maximise the enrichment opportunities of patrons, not just politicians here but also former military heads who could later become warlords, as was the case in Somalia (Compagnon, 2012).

As such elites attempted to recapture their clients and main the power structures in Rivers and Bayelsa. To address the violence in Bayelsa and Rivers the national government launched many state-led initiatives. with Earlier responses by the government have been described as "inadequate" and "half-hearted" by the media (*Daily Champion*, 30 August 2004). With the World Bank report seeing the response by the Nigerian government as "ineffective" (*Moja*, January 2000, p. 42) because the responses failed to stem the resurgence of violence (*Daily Trust*, 6 August 2002; *Smah,* May 2001, p. 5; HRW, 2019).For example, in 2004 the government approved an operation called 'flush out three', which was aimed at cleansing Rivers State of illegal weapons. This was a joint mission between the navy, air force, police and army. In addition to this, there was a behind-the-scenes peace agreement conducted between Asari's NDPVF and Tom's NDV by the governor, Peter Odili. (HRW, 2005). During this period troops were deployed to areas such as Amadi-Ama, Tombia, Okrika, Buguma, Bukuma and Ogbakir. However, the NDPVF accused the government of launching raids in Tombia, Bukuma, Ogbakiri, Buguma and Oru Sangana. Although these attacks were denied by the army spokesman, Captain Kanu, local NGOs in the state reported attacks on several fishing villages. (HRW, 2005).

In a bid to restore peace and stop the violence between Asari and Tom, a peace agreement was finally signed on October 1 2004, calling for an immediate ceasefire and disbandment of Asari's NDPVF and Tom's NDV (HRW, 2005).. To maintain the ceasefire several local committees were established to monitor the progress. In addition to this the government offered $1800 in exchange for each rifle surrendered (HRW, 2005).. Furthermore, members in detention were released in exchange for weapons, and amnesty from prosecution was granted to other members of these two groups. The initiative saw about 1100 weapons being collected; however, it was noted that these were old weapons, while more sophisticated ones remained in the possession of these groups (HRW, 2005). In addition, the government started an employment generation programme, which sought to rehabilitate former fighters; despite this, however, the initiative suffered as officials did not develop proposals for the creation of these jobs (HRW, 2005).

However, tensions between Asari and Ateke Tom continued engulfing the city of Port Harcourt (CEHRD, 2004, 2005; Watts, 2007). Which led to another early initiative used by the state government to restore peace was the Millionaires' Programme, which offered every youth one million naira (about £4100) for turning in a weapon. The initiative came about as tensions between Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and Ateke Tom However, before an arrangement could be reached Asari-Dokubo accused the government of favouring Ateke Tom. As a result, the relationship between Odili and Asari-Dokubo was broken (CEHRD, 2004, 2005; Watts, 2007). One consequence of the breakdown of this patron–client relationship was Asari-Dokubo collaborating with Government Ekpemupolo (Watts, 2007; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Ubhenin, 2013; Iwilade, 2017).Thus, these early initiatives by the state, rather than addressing conflict, were breaking down client relationships, furthering the conflict as well as leading to the collaboration of various militant groups.

The popular state-led peacebuilding initiative on which many believed was aimed at reconstructing the patronage network was the 2009 amnesty that was granted to 20,000 ex-militants which has been ongoing for over a decade (Ikelegbe, 2005; Tarela 2013; Obi, 2014; Kiipoye, 2015; Nwankwo, 2015; Ajala, 2016; Iwilade, 2017; Ebiede; 2017). Its achievements and failures have been contested across the literature (Ikelegbe, 2005; Tarela 2013; Obi, 2014; Kiipoye, 2015; Nwankwo, 2015; Ajala, 2016; Iwilade, 2017; Ebiede; 2017). The amnesty granted by the Ya'ardu administration included the following: the state would not prosecute any offences associated with militants' activities (Yar' Adua in *The Vanguard*, June 25 2009, p. 8); the state also offered training, education and cash pay-outs to all ex-militants in the programme who returned their weapons (Ikelegbe, 2005; Tarela 2013; Obi, 2014; Kiipoye, 2015; Nwankwo, 2015; Ajala, 2016; Iwilade, 2017; Ebiede; 2017. In addition to this, ex-militants were

expected not to attack any oil infrastructures within the Niger Delta region. Although it was noted that the amnesty led to relative peace in Bayelsa and River state this was not attributed to the cease fire but rather the restoration of the patronage network (Iwilade, 2017). As noted by Iwilade, the amnesty programme served as an idiom of 'bridges and dams', as it was a means by which the patrons rebuilt the "dams" for their clients rather than a means for "building bridges", which he referred to as infrastructure, health and education to name a few examples (Iwilade, 2017).

The amnesty program ensured that while the general population of Bayelsa and Rivers do not benefit from the oil revenues, they have, however, created a system in which ex-militant leaders transition from being clients, some positioning themselves as patrons, or partners of other patrons, thus forging an alliance between the two. It was for this the reason that the amnesty programme was exclusive in nature, as observed by AD5:

> The amnesty programme was an initiative implemented by the Nigerian government that
> was characterised by negotiations as well as the solidification of patronage networks as
> efforts were made to draw youths in. (AD5, 2019)

Thus, another reason the amnesty programme was viewed as an element of patronage peacebuilding was due to its 'inclusive', or as some scholars refer to it, 'exclusive' nature (Iwilade, 2017; Nwokolo and Aghedo, 2018). As noted by Iwilade, when questioning how inclusive the amnesty programme was, he determined that despite the notion that the amnesty programme was an exclusive process, it was, however, inclusive. He stated that it was an inclusive process because it did not leave out anyone who belonged to the patron–client network that the state was aiming to reconstitute (Iwilade, 2017). This distinction not only indicates the motivation for the amnesty programme but also highlights it as a co-opting mechanism and another 'band-aid' mechanism by the government. In an interview with Iwilade, Taerla stated:

> Nobody who was an armed fighter and wanted to participate in the amnesty was left out.
> In fact, people had to go about looking for people to include. Many of the commanders
> got slots more than the number of fighters. Even the JTF people lobbied our commanders
> and got people inside. In my own case, I was able to include my girlfriend, my cousin, and
> another friend. (Iwilade, 2017, p. 16)

Iwilade further stated that the problem various scholars had was that they viewed the amnesty as a process that targeted the public; it was, however, an exclusive process aimed at a specific group of people – the clients, who were connected to the pre-2004 patronage network (Iwilade, 2017). Thus, it

can be assumed that the amnesty programme targeted specific individuals (the clients) and reintegrated them back into the patronage network. This thought was expressed by DB6:

> The amnesty programme was one of the biggest ploys the Niger Delta region has ever seen. It saw the likes of Tom Akeke, rise to more power, becoming traditional leaders while the boys (militants members) suffered. (DB6, 2019)

One efficient way by which the neopatrimonial networks were reconstructed within peacebuilding was the granting to militant leaders of multi-million-dollar pipeline protection contracts. This method of establishing peace can be seen as the 'buying of peace', as identified by Paris and Newman (Newman et al., 2010). Although these contracts were open and business-like, they resembled payoffs that were made to host communities by oil companies (Ebiede; 2017). This finding is consistent with that of Dr Tarila Marclint Ebiede's (2017) work in *Beyond Rebellion: Uncaptured Dimensions of Violent Conflicts and the Implications for Peacebuilding in Nigeria's Niger Delta*. He noted that these contracts were awarded especially in Rivers and Bayelsa states as a means of patronage, thus leading to further violence within the region as it validated one group above others (Ebiede, 2017). It was reported that multi-million-dollar contracts were signed between the elite network and militant leaders, as well as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). In 2011, the NNPC is reported to have paid Ekpemupolo 22.6 million dollars to guard the pipelines he used to attack. Likewise, the NNPC paid Victor Ben and Ateke Tom 8 million dollars (*Wall Street Journal*, August 22 2012; *The Nation*, August 28 2012; *National Mirror*, January 13 2013). This raises questions as to the extent of the influence the militants exerted in the peacebuilding process, and, as noted by Peel (2009) and Nwajiaku-Dahou (2010), the nature of the complex networks and interests of ex-militants. When discussing the pipeline protection deal offered to militant leaders, Asari-Dokubo stated:

> It's true, to some extent. I will not deny it. So, if somebody takes food from my mouth, me and my 18 children make we no eat [should we not feed?]? Jonathan dey eat for Aso Rock with his children [The President, Goodluck Jonathan, is living comfortably] [...] If Jonathan, with all my contributions, cancels my pipeline protection contract – if I had one – I will fight him. (*The News*, January 13 2013, p. 20)

However, what was seemingly interesting was that despite these huge amounts paid to the militant leaders, the volume of oil still increased as noted in chapter 3 (Fabiyi, 2012). Some said this was due to militant groups revolting against their leader because they did not reveal their share of the 'national cake'; others attribute this to militant leaders' continued attacks despite receiving funds, to see how much they could continue to receive from the government (Fabiyi, 2012; Ajala, 2016; Iwilade, 2017;

Ebiede; 2017). As state-led initiatives seen not to building peace thus raising questions about the interest and effect of buying peace whether these were not just for short-term goals, paying lip-service, or indeed initiatives that were simply not working. Furthermore, despite the funds paid to militant elites, there have still been clashes between groups over protection of pipelines and even attacks on pipelines; this has furthered the proliferation of arms because sometimes security forces get involved and, as previously discussed, their weapons are obtained. Thus, the protection of pipelines has added another complex dynamic to the conflict in the region that continues the cycle of violence and arms proliferation, along with the effects of the peacebuilding initiatives, which perpetuate violence and the struggle for power.

Similarly, Kiipoye has noted:

> Ex-militant commanders who were once enemies of the Nigerian state now hobnob with managers of the state. The state and oil TNCs [transnational corporations], once seen as symbols of exploitation and oppression to be subverted whenever possible, are now the allies of ex-militants. Militants, once seen as energy infrastructure attackers, are paid heavily to protect it; whether actual protection takes place or not is a different matter altogether. (2015, p. 9)

Likewise, this was noted by Iwilade (2017) in his interview with Tarela who was an ex-miltant, who stated that:

> They have even politicised this amnesty programme. They have dragged all our militant head [s] into politics. They have changed the mentality of our heads from freedom fighters into political activists. (Tarela, 2013 int.)

While discussing why the amnesty program had continued despite high levels of insecurity and violence, AD5, (2019) ackonwlodge that this was due to lack of understanding of peacebuilding describing the imitative as mockery of what peacebuilding.He further stated that to really understand the amnesty programme and why it has continued, one must look closely at the political powers that make up not just Bayelsa and Rivers alone but the entire Niger Delta region. AD5 stated:

> This peacebuilding as you call it, is just a game, a political game, and as long as the same structures remain in place, amnesty will continue, and nothing will change. (AD5, 2019)

He concluded by asking what the amnesty programme had really done in terms of development for the region, for individuals, and for the state, emphasising again that this initiative was used to quickly restore

peace, restore oil and keep full the pockets of those in power – but it had truly failed in promoting and maintaining peace.

Furthered expressed by Elvis Nana Kwasi Amoateng (2020), who emphasised that the 2009 amnesty programme was, rather, an amnesty trap. He noted that rather than serving as a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, it was a rearmament, remobilisation and disintegration (RRD) programme that rearmed, remobilised and disintegrated clients. Amoateng expressed this using an image, displayed below – Figure 13. According to Amoateng (2020), through conflict containment, peacebuildinginitaitves underlines institutional arrangements in the system in Bayelsa and Rivers that have enriched political manipulation and socio-economic conditions; these conditions have led to further violence, which is contained for the benefit of the political elites, which then led to the "amnesty trap"(Amoateng, 2020, p. 8). This thesis contends that rather than establishing institutional reforms and resolving conflict, the state-led initiatives such as the 2009 amnesty programme provided a short-term containment of violence, without any established plans for sustaining long-term peace in Bayelsa State and Rivers State, as expressed by Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye (2016, p. 71). Furthering the logic of Iwilade Amoateng (2020), noted that the amnesty program largely targeted amnesty programme largely targeted a political settlement aimed at political leaders, prominent traditional leaders and ex-militant leaders. Thus, the amnesty largely excluded the general population. It was rather a short-term conflict containment plan explained by the 'amnesty trap', the political containment was merely a short-term containment programme; this falls in line with Chikwem and Duru's (2018, p. 50) argument that the Niger Delta region will return to violence once the contracts and cash handouts stop, which reinforces Amoateng (2020) logic of an amnesty trap and the logic of patronage peacebuilding.

Figure 12 Amnesty Trap

Source: Elvis Nana Kwasi Amoateng, 2020, p. 173)

Thus, the logic of patronage peacebuilding underscores the manipulation of socio-economic conditions that contain violence in Bayelsa and Rivers, using secret bargaining between the patrons and ex-militant leaders (Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye, 2016). These bargains created conditions in which the conflict appeared to be resolved; however, there is still the likelihood of violence when these networks break down, as they did previously, leading to the 2009 amnesty programme. This was further seen in 2016 when violence resurfaced in which there was a strong presence of militant groups in Port Harcourt and Yenegoa. Thus, it can be deduced that despite the amnesty programme and the pipeline protection initiative rather what thrived was a perverse incentive structure was created that reshaped the patronage network system- patronage peacebuilding. When broken, violence ensued, therefore reinforcing claims that the payment of youths and training through the amnesty programme did not constitute a lasting solution (Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye, 2016, p. 82).However, one thing in particular that can be observed from the views expressed by the participants is their focus on what the amnesty was 'meant' or 'intended' to achieve, rather than on the amnesty's outcome. This brings into scope the difference between the theory of peacebuilding, as discussed in Chapter 2, and the reality of peacebuilding in terms of its actual effects on the ground as reflected in Salih work (Salih, 2017). Most participants agreed that the 2009 amnesty programme was aimed at containing violence temporarily, rather than addressing the root causes of conflict and building sustainable peace, thus demonstrating the state's lack of commitment to long-term peacebuilding to resolve conflict.

Apart from the national amnesty programme that started in 2009, Rivers State carried out a state-led amnesty in 2016. In September, Governor Wike created an avenue for cults and militants to surrender their weapons, offering reconciliation and rehabilitation (Akasike, 2020). The state-led amnesty saw 22,430 cultists accept the amnesty, with Governor Wike also stating that the collection of 911 assorted arms, 7661 assorted ammunitions and 147 explosives made the programme a success and the state relatively peaceful (BellaNaija, 2016). It is critical to note that this amnesty was not monetised like the 2009 amnesty, as the governor claimed that those who would surrender would do so sincerely and not out of the need for money, and further claimed that those cultists and militants would be rehabilitated and become part of society (BellaNaija, 2016). To prove the success of the programme, Governor Wike disbanded the committees in charge of the state-led amnesty (BellaNaija, 2016). However, two things are interesting when considering the state-led initiative. Firstly, the state-led initiative took place at the same time as the ongoing 2009 amnesty programme. This raises questions as to the success of the 2009 amnesty, if there was a reduction of violence due to the 2009, what was the need for another program especially while payments were still on-going to the ex-militants? Also, Wike made it a point to stress that this initiative was not politically motivated, thus raising questions as to whether the 2009 amnesty which many had already speculated to be politically motivated was indeed politically motivated. It is also crucial to note that despite the nation 2009 amnesty programme, and the state-led 2016 amnesty in Rivers State, the cultists and militants still returned to crime as reported in 2017 and 2018 (*Vanguard*, 2020) Thus, it can be deduced that this state-led amnesty was not successful.

Furthermore, despite the 2016 state-led amnesty, three other peacebuilding iniiatives by Rivers state governor, Wike, were the anti-crime and anti-gang bills in 2018 (Akasike, 2020.). The Rivers State Neighbourhood Safety Corps Law No. 8 of 2018; the Rivers State Secret Cult and Similar Activities (Prohibition) (Amendment) Law No. 6 of 2018; and the Rivers State Kidnap (Prohibition) (Amendment) No. 2 Law No. 7 of 2018. (Akasike, 2020.). These initiatives were aimed at enhancing security in Rivers state, as Wike stated any cultist caught breaking the law would face the death penalty. However, it was speculated that this was an attempt by Wike to arm the youths for the upcoming elections (Akasike, 2020) which comes back to the logic of patronage peacebuilding and reshaping patronage network.

Furthermore, as shown form discussion above and in chapter 3 any of the state-led peacebuilding efforts aimed at building and fostering peace within the region have not yielded. The empirical data further revealed that in order to secure political power, 'patronage peacebuilding' exercises were carried out within various communities (AD1,2019; DB3, 2019). These exercises went beyond the peacebuilding initiatives and were aimed at ensuring the control of power. This could be seen happening

in the time before an election within the states, be it presidential or even a governor election. Patrons were also able to build and establish legitimacy through elections and the delivery of some development services (Engel, 2005, p. 205). During elections, political elites and godfathers sponsor their candidates and hegemonic groups to ensure their political power is maintained and interests in the revenue distribution are not undermined. Gubernatorial elections in Nigeria have further complicated issues of power and resources, especially in the Niger Delta region (Watts, 2007, p. 650), as state governors control and appoint civilian positions, patrons and godfathers, and usually try to reinforce their positions and candidates using militant groups, cults and gangs. These groups disturbed the voting process through intimidation as disruptive military officials have provided arms to NDV and NDPVF and finance (Bøås, 2011, p. 119). For example, the governor of Rivers, Peter Odili, deployed NDV and NDPVF for his re-election in 2003; however, after winning the elections he distanced himself from both groups (Bøås, 2011, p. 120), thus, such happenings have become the norm within the region. For example, it was speculated that the Niger Delta Development Corporation was formed as a means of the clientelist electoral contract to buy votes for former president Olusegun Obasanjo (Engel, 2005, p. 205). Pre-election months were filled with candidates engaging in vote-seeking activities such as providing food, gifting money, and making the promise of jobs (AD1,2019; DB3, 2019; SB6, 2019).

Hence, access into the clientelist networks is exchanged for different political favours, thus leading to weakened and dysfunctional political structures as this system no longer represents the interests of the people, but, rather, that of the patrons. (Oyebode, 2014, p. 139). However, what became interesting, emerging from the perception of interviewees, was the assumption that these efforts were also a means of controlling the population. As noted by SB6:

> During the period of elections, we (military) are told to patrol more. We are dispatched to various Local Governments Areas (LGA) to arrest and keep an eye on gang members. In Khana LGA, earlier this year (2019) we were deployed to round up boys (thugs) even before any violence happened. We never knew where the orders came from, but we suspected. (SB6, 2019)

He further stated that sometimes the locking up of the boys (thugs) would handicap the opposition parties:

> When we have these boys in lock-up it means whoever sent us can carry out his objectives within the communities, especially the LGAs. (SB6, 2019)

Similarly, AD6 stated in his interview:

Peace during elections means that people can elect their candidates of choice or rather the candidate selected for the people. (AD6, 2019)

He further explained that, especially in Nigeria, elections weren't as simple as electing an official of choice, but, rather, involved a lot of back-channel movements and the manipulation of the police and military to carry out raids, increasing paroles and investigating more crimes. AD6 exclaimed:

The manipulation of state resources comes into play right around elections, there are so many: "raids", and "paroles" just to take rivalry gangs out of commission. Efforts by both the police and military are no longer genuine but they become puppets for politicians. (AD6, 2019)

The participants' opinions discussed above can be seen as vividly exemplified in the 2003, 2005 and 2019 elections, which were primed with electoral rigging across the whole of Nigeria but more prominently in Rivers State. Specifically in 2003 as noted by an HRW report (2004, pp. 14–19), young men were recruited by politicians to intimidate and bring in votes with the promises of "money, cars and trips to the US in exchange for their efforts to 'canvass the votes' for the PDP" (HRW, 2004, p. 15), thus, escalating violence and criminal intimidation within the region. Additionally, in an interview with HRW (2007, p. 81), Ateke Tom, leader of the NDV acknowledged his role in carrying out criminal intimidation for the then Rivers State governor, Peter Odili, saying:

…any place Odili sent me, I conquer[ed] for him. I conquer[ed] everywhere. (HRW, 2007, p. 81)

This view was supported by SB12 who stated
It is a known fact that militant leaders and gangs were used by politicians to control the population. Manipulating votes and instilling fear. But so were the members of the police and army, you didn't know who was trustworthy and who was dirty. And that has been the way things have been for years. (SB12, 2019)

Furthermore in 2005 elections in Port Harcourt, Human Rights Watch reported that security forces were unavailable to curb violent attacks; when questioned about it the State Commissioner of Police exclaimed: "The police don't have the fire power in comparison to the militia." (HRW, 2005, p. 6). It was

also reported by NDPVF members how security forces watched and did not act when they attacked villages or tried to stop clashes between groups: "The MOPOL [mobile police] in this town (Tombia) protected them [Tom's NDV]. MOPOL shot at us." (HRW, 2005).

Later elections were no different: in 2015, as Rivers State recorded the highest amount of violence with 16 out of the 66 incidents reported by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The perceptions of interview participants were that violent acts were carried out by militants hired by parties in order to disrupt the voting process. This was due to the ongoing rivalry between the political elites (Independent National Electoral Commission, HRW, 2019) As noted by A4:

> I do not vote: not because I believe my vote does not matter which it doesn't, but the insecurity is too much. I stay home and so does my entire family. It is better not to get involved and caught outside. (A4,2019)

Between 2017 and 2019 in Rivers State, supporters of the PDP and APC candidates for the position of governor clashed several times. Collaborated by AD4:

> You never knew when it would start (violence), all you needed to know was never to stick around when it did. Even to report to the police, for all you know you could be reporting to the enemy. (A4,2019)

Similarity, SB13 noted in her interview:

> Gangs and cults belong to the highest bidder and have no loyalty to anyone. (SB13, 2019)

This was more recently seen in 2019 elections at both the federal and state levels showed intense levels of violence with security agencies such as the army and local police used by political elites and political parties (HRW, 2019). During the national and state elections in February, March and April 2019 the deployment of the military during the election period stirred concerns about the role the security forces would play (HRW, 2019).. It was found that in areas like Bonny, Abonnema, Isiokpo and Okrika in River states voters were scared off by armed men while military men just stood and watched and, in some cases, even helped the armed men load the ballot boxes and intimidate voters (HRW, 2019). Despite claims by the police of increased security and the deployment of troops it was, however, that there was little or no response by the security agencies to acts of violence (HRW, 2019). Security agents did nothing to curb violent attacks; this fuelled the complicity of security agents to patrons as they aided in the theft of election materials and intimidated voters. Organisations such as SB Intelligence reported that 626 people were killed during the election cycle in 2019.

Furthermore, during the state elections in Emuoha, Phalga and Bonny (towns in Rivers State) it was reported that men with glass bottles, rods, machetes and sticks attacked the polling centres, targeting voters (HRW, 2019).. They stole ballot boxes, threatened to kill electoral officials and destroyed some ballot boxes. These men were working for either the APC and/or the PDP and were strategically placed at various polling centres (HRW, 2019). It was reported that in these areas officials were told to go to certain locations to sign off election results (HRW, 2019). For example, it was also reported that in Abonnema security agents arrested the only doctor, detaining him in a base in Port Harcourt for over three days to treat the injured militants (HRW, 2019). Also, in Abonnema both security agents and INEC officers did nothing to stop armed thugs who were sent by the APC to intimidate voters (HRW, 2019).

Additionally, in Kalabiama in Bonny, APC supporters and the military attacked PDP supporters at the polling centre. In a battle between APC and PDP supporters at the polling centre, military officers shot at civilians injuring many (HRW, 2019). They ransacked homes, intimidating people (HRW, 2019). As described by a 23-year-old man in Emuoha, the police took off their uniforms and ran with protesters when attacked by thugs at the polling centre (HRW, 2019). No backup security agents were sent when asked, in addition to there being no investigation of the crimes (HRW, 2019). Representatives of the organisation We the People reported 40 dead and 52 injured. They noted that people jumped into nearby rivers to escape the gunfire, and some drowned. (HRW, 2019)

Thus, beyond the use of militants, police and army to intimidate voters and disturb the voting process and control the citizens, pre-election initiatives saw the solidification of patronage alliances between militant leaders and politicians within the state, which is another element of patronage peacebuilding. According to DB5, peacebuilding functions as both a battleground for the struggle of power as well as an instrument in which performance power is carried out to control the population. As noted by DB5:

> After the elections the numbers of raids decreased, check points were removed from villages. Not only did the police presence disappear but so did the politicians, promises of jobs and better development within the region, all gone. (DB5, 2019)

This quote reinforces the patronage peacebuilding' further depicting it as a means through which the struggle for power is fought serving the economic needs as noted by Goodhand (2003, 2005)

To summarise, the logic of patronage peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states stems from the goal of maintaining institutions to sustain the selfish economic interest of patrons such as political elites, traditional leaders and ex-militant commanders at the expense of the local population. As seen with

the pre-election initiatives, amnesty program, pipeline protection initiatives and state-led amnesty by Rivers state. Leading to patrons and clients having mutually beneficial relationship that has perpetuated violence in these states. Also well as state security agencies have been used to suppress community protests, allowing patronage networks to thrive. This has contributed significantly to the lack of consistent institutional reforms to address the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Thus, this state-led initiative has restored previous clientelist relationships between local elites in the Niger Delta and their clients, elevating the political, economic, and social significance of former fighters and integrating new individuals into the power structures.

Struggle for Power

A recurrent theme in the interviews was a sense among interviewees that the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers has been based upon competition, as described earlier, and its aftermath, and that the competition then continues on into the peacebuilding process (DB4, 2019; SB11, 2019). Thus, patronage peacebuilding has continued the struggle for power – for control of oil, wealth and financial advantage that was part of the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers states. The focus on the power structures is important for two reasons. Firstly, the aim of examining the power structures, or rather the restructuring of the power structures in peacebuilding, is to shift the narrative of the literature from focusing on the role the patrons have within the power structures to also examining the role of clients within the power structures. Classical models of neopatrimonialism have fallen short of capturing the role of clients in the shifting nature of actors. Secondly, highlighting and noting the impact of the re-alignment of the power structures within Bayelsa and Rivers brought about by peacebuilding policies shows the emergence of new dominant actors, whether as patrons or clients, as well the potential of new conflict trajectories. Therefore, this analysis shifts from the neopatrimonial relations in the arenas of conflict in which both the patrons and clients engaged, to the struggle that still exists within the 'post-conflict' stage. The focus on the struggle for power aims to show how both clients and patrons manipulate and question the narrative of peacebuilding within post-conflict Rivers and Bayelsa. This is synonymous with Ekeh's analysis of the war of independence Africa (Ekeh, 1975). He notes that everything is more to do with the struggle for power between the European and African bourgeoisie than with the needs and rights of the people. This is like the case in Rivers and Bayelsa, with the slight difference being that the competition is between the African bourgeoisie and elites. Thus, building on Ekeh's narrative, it is crucial to note that the struggle for power functions regardless of who it comprises. Thus, it is not about *who* fills the positions, but rather about *how* that position fits within the system and how the system in turn fits within the culture of the state and the country. Thus, the struggle for power is not just about the actual people who are engaged – the patrons and clients – as

it continues to thrive even as the patrons involved change but specifically within this thesis is how it influences the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa and Rivers.

Exploring patronage peacebuilding and the dynamics of conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers revealed that there was immense competition and struggle for power among patrons, clients and conflict entrepreneurs. The interests of patrons are conveyed through political considerations for them to stay longer in power in order to manage oil rents, land ownership, resource control and distribution (Beuran et al., 2011. As such power is accumulated through oil wealth as such, patrons and clients struggle and compete by offering various rewards and favours to their allies and clients (Beuran et al., 2011, p. 1). As such, those who lack power (clients) and desire to be included in decision-making matters in high political positions, and have access to oil, thrive, to climb the patronage ladder, thus leading to violent resistance. Especially within the context of the Niger Delta, as explained by SB1, power is synonymous with the control that an individual possesses in terms of territory. Territory refers not just to large acres of land, but to land with oil. Land that, as he puts it, is:

> …rich in natural resources, the more oil you have or, rather, have access to, the more
> power you hold. (SB1, 2019)

As such, it is not just about how much "turf" (land) an individual possesses, but the true value of the turf is the availability of oil and how that can influence people. Hence, power structures are shaped and controlled on the basis of the ownership, perceived ownership and control of natural resources (SB1, 2019;). Thus, in order to possess this power, there is an intense competition among not just the various patrons, but also among clients versus other clients. Thus, it becomes key to examine how competition between patrons takes place, how it is different from competition between clients, and how this shapes the peacebuilding agenda.

The competition between patrons is instrumental in further understanding patronage peacebuilding, as it is because of this competition and the need for power that patronage peacebuilding thrives. Hence, different groups formed tactical alliances with different patrons to seek and benefit from resources (Ebiede, 2017, p. 13). The empirical data shows that this struggle has continued beyond the conflict and even been restructured by the peacebuilding process. As groups struggle for power there is a constant shift in alliances as groups such as MOSOP, Ijaw Youth Council, CSOs, and even some local NGOs form alliances to not only challenge the legitimacy of the state but also the patronage networks Interviewees shared the opinion that the lines were constantly blurred between who the actors were, how they fought, what they fought for, and the nature and depth of their alliances. However, within the narratives certain variables were relatively constant. supported by work such as Iwilade's work, in

which he recognised that for the patrimonial networks to thrive, certain levels of violence must exist. This is because the clientelist order is dependent upon the informalisation of power and the ability of those in power to perform violence when needed (Iwilade, 2017). Thus, the continuation of low-level violence in Rivers and Bayelsa is a deliberate act on the part of the elites to privatise violence as they struggle for power. Thus, power is maintained by the ability of patrons to use violence to their advantage. Hence, as patrons compete to gain power this translates through the actions of clients, as stated above, and in turn fuels competition among clients.

In addition to how patrons compete, it is also key to examine how clients compete with one another. One way is through exerting authority to show patrons they are stronger by carrying out attacks on energy infrastructure – the more gruesome the attack the more dominance and power the individual gained. As noted by AD3:

> Clashes in the rural areas are means of showing power. These cult and militant groups are showing the powers that can be used. (AD3, 2019).

Also noted in his interview, SB5 stated:

> The rate of poverty and lack of development in the Niger Delta region makes competition between the boys (clients) for power more fuelled with aggression that leads to clashes between various gangs and cults. (SB5, 2019)

The process of competition among the clients differs slightly from that of the patrons clients compete by forming new networks. It was seen that the clients were subverting the process of inclusion within these networks in order to build their own networks. Themner (2012) noted that to understand the dynamics of post-conflict policies it is essential to examine the role of mid-level ex-fighters as they represent a key notion in the re-organisation of power. These networks, therefore, serve to disempower the existing power structures because of the grudges it bore but also as a form of resistance against the existing system, thus showing resentment towards the existing patronage network. Clients were not only fighting against the existing power structures but were transitioning from clients to patrons by creating their own networks in which they were seen no longer as clients, but as patrons. This therefore created another vacuum, one that was filled by lower-level armed fighters and not politicians. Hence, the positions of all actors within the power structures remained precarious as the system was insecure with constant exchanges happening (Pratten 2013). This finding highlighted how previous research has failed to take into consideration the exchange between these clients or ex-militants because they do not possess a high profile and, as such, it is believed they do not

have access to the centre of power and are unable to exert any real influence; however, the research reveals that these clients challenge the neopatrimonial logic, 're-capturing' various ranks. Thus, the reconstruction of the patronage networks has not only reconstructed these networks but has also led to a counter process of the creation of new networks run by clients also noted by Iwilade (2017). These newly established networks are, in theory, diffusing authority and control. A further study with more focus on these newly built networks is, therefore recommended. These emerging networks are based on a common concern for the distribution of power and politics within the region, as well as for what life would look like after the conflict within the post-conflict area. As noted by SB6:

> The focus of the boys (clients) is no longer the political incentive of criminal activities within the state but what life looks like beyond the security and comfort they once enjoyed. How they can be in control. However, the real question is how not how long elites stay in power but how long till new formation emerge and take over (SB6, 2019)

The ability of ex-militants to form their own alliances demonstrated that, in this sense, combatants or clients have their own interests and even use the regional problems as motives to continue rebellions that were seen as having ended. Hence as these new networks are formed, they undermine and break down the existing power structures. It therefore becomes necessary to be aware of the impact this has and whether this would lead to another insurgency outbreak that is no longer led by the patrons, but rather by the clients, and what this means not only for the power structures in the region, but also for peacebuilding Is there an expectation of a shuffling of the power struggle? How can this be prevented – or is this the reform the River and Bayelsa so desperately needs? Thus, it can be deduced that the perception of participants was that state-led peacebuilding initiatives are fostering patronage peacebuilding; but also the emergence of new power structures led by clients as a means of struggling and competing for power.

The empirical data from this research also suggested that most clients compete to gain power for themselves but also to provide for their families; as such, they are increasingly likely to have more than one patron (DB6, 2019; DB2, 2019). It is this endless competition that fuels the re-emergence of conflict within the region, as clients/patrons compete to climb the power ladder. This situation was worsened by the dominance of ex-militant leaders being challenged when the Buhari regime's antiterrorism approach to peacebuilding involved the displacement of militancy leaders (Iwilade, 2017). This gave room to those who previously did not benefit from the patronage network to finally struggle to be on top and make their claim to power. As noted by DB6:

> The boys (militants, cults and gang members) are constantly fighting and struggling to get
> out of the creeks, because of this no one remains on the top for long. Today Tom is in
> power, tomorrow someone else takes over.(DB6, 2019)

This results in an increase in violence as clients fight to become the new leader of their groups.

Furthermore, the displacement of militant leaders empowered rival groups to seek control. This created a space in which groups could confront each other. The struggle for power was, thus, not just within groups but also between various groups, with some of these hostilities being fought based on differences of ethnicity. For example, in Rumuji and Ovogo communities in Emohua local government area, in June 2016, a cult clash between 'Icelanders' and 'Greenlanders' saw two police officers and five other persons killed. Also, in June 2017, in the Tai local government area of Rivers, in Sime community, 14 persons were killed in another clash between the Icelanders and the Greenlanders (*Vanguard*, 2020). In Omerelu community in Ikwerre local government area, in 2018, five people were killed and four more beheaded in a clash between rival cult groups (*Vanguard*, 2020). It was speculated that these attacks were to attack patrons to show what groups could do.

As DB9 notes, clients might not need the power they acquire immediately, but the possibility of being the next in line or the next leader, fuels constant competition, through crimes, kidnapping and hostilities in various communities, all for a share of the 'national cake':

> They (cleints) saw how peacebuilding operations like protection pipelines were given to
> their oga (leaders). Everybody wants part of the national cake. (DB9, 2019)

Hence, peacebuilding is no longer concerned with building peace, but, rather, serves as means for the continuous struggle for power to control and as both clients and patrons compete for the benefit this control offers after the conflict.

Consequently, the views expressed by interviewees indicate that the current state-led peacebuilding agenda within Bayelsa and Rivers has been less than comprehensive and is still focused on the rebel–state dimension that shaped previous peacebuilding approaches. The method of displacing militant leaders served only to create power vacuums that clients struggled to fill, which further led to intensifying violence within the 'post- conflict' area. Also, it failed to address the other dimensions of conflict that were emerging, or rather that were never addressed in the first place, thus calling into question whether peacebuilding was even occurring in Bayelsa and Rivers states, and the Niger Delta as a whole.

179

In addition to this, the empirical data showed that the struggle for power led to the political space being shared between state and non-state actors. As SB5 states:

> Sovereignty is shared between the political elites, the state and the boys. In fact there are some areas in the Delta that have been left to militants to control. No security agent goes there unless there are looking for trouble. (SB5, 2019)

Similarly, AD6 noted:

> Power is still shared between the political elites and the creeks (militants). It is the constant battle between these actors that brings about problems in the region because at one point the political elites are in control and another time, the militants are in charge. Right now, I will see there is some balance. However, who is to say tomorrow the militants don't seize control. I don't know. (AD6, 2019)

Hence, as both state and non-state actors competed for power over resources, this led to the creation of ungoverned spaces (AD1, 2019; BD5, 2019). Although the notion of ungoverned spaces was not a prominent theme emerging from the empirical data, it is, however, crucial to take note of, as a few participants did mention it. Furthermore, this reinforces Iwilade notion that some sort of violence needs to occur in order for the patrimonial networks to thrive (Iwilade, 2014). Thus, SB5 (2019) notes that it is within the ungoverned spaces that these occurrences happen. He said that such spaces are deliberately left for non-state actors to operate within. SB5 further stated that ungoverned spaces are manifested practically through protection money paid to the non-state actors by the local community to ensure their business are protected or not harmed. Within these ungoverned spaces the state actors have no control or power over what goes on. Similarly, SB8 (2019) noted that these ungoverned spaces further manifest themselves as physical areas within the Niger Delta region that are under the total control of non-state actors. According to SB8:

> There are physical areas within the Niger Delta that belong to (thugs) non-state actors. These are areas given to them by the government. Everyone knows it and accepts it. (SB8, 2019)

Iwilade (2017) and Kiipoye (2015) both state that the patron–client relationship does not fully capture the institutional arrangements between political elites (patrons) and their clients, who engage

especially in using co-option or co-optation. Co-option connotes a one-sided political or business alliance in which the elites dominate and control their clients within the patronage networks, and, as noted by Cheng et al. (2018, p. 2), these clients are controlled through informal and formal structures. However, co-option cannot fully be used to define the mutual symbiosis that exists in the Niger Delta, as patrons do not necessarily have the upper hand in the peacebuilding process in the Rivers and Bayelsa. Both the clients and patrons benefit from the relationship, and interchange positions as the struggle for power continues. Patrons must make clients happy to keep the balance of power and ensure their (clients) carry out the interests of the party. Thus, elites provide financial deals, and clients, who could be ex-militant leaders, keep elites happy by carrying out their agenda

Thus, one can speculate that the struggle for power within the region outweighs the need for positive peace. It can be observed the lack of liberal peacebuilding (as understood in the literature) within the region can even be seen as a deliberate act by the state actors, because as the state system continues to weaken, the patronage power structures remain, and economic interests are met. It can be said that patronage peacebuilding is adversely affecting the advancement of development in Bayelsa and Rivers and is more concerned with re-establishing the power structures in order to advance the personal and political agendas of patrons. As peacebuilding initiatives serve as means of restructuring Parton networks, a battleground for the struggle of power and competition among clients and patron alliances are constantly shifting. This is represented by the patronage pyramid in Figure 14, below (see Figure 14 Power Pyramid in Bayelsa and Rivers States), with the arrows representing the constant movement amount various positions.

Figure 13 Power Pyramid in Bayelsa and Rivers States

Corruption

The empirical data also showed a prominent subtheme within patronage peacebuilding to be the nature of corruption within state-led peacebuilding. Corruption can be understood as the conflation of public and private domains by patrons for personal benefit. However, as noted by Olivier de Sardan (1999, p. 28), corruption occurs in various forms and it is therefore important to distinguish between them. For example, between 'big-time corruption', which is "practiced at the summit of the state (presidents, ministers, directors of important offices, directors of public or parastatal enterprises), involving millions or even billions of CFA francs" (Sardan, 1999, p. 28); and 'petty corruption', which is carried out by clerks, nurses or customs officers and policemen (Sardan 1999, p. 28). He further noted these two forms can be seen as two poles of a continuum. Beyond personal greed and the necessities

of rewarding a circle of supporters, or co-opting potential opponents, the sustainable pattern of high-level corruption is further embedded in and rationalised by the insecurity of power tenure. Thus, inviting political corruption – the use of corrupt gains for political aims rather than economic ones, sometimes this can be an exchange of favours and not necessarily money. Hence, corruption can be seen as part of the fabric of social and political relationships, and is synomous with stealing especially in Bayelsa and Rivers, as noted by former president, Goodluck Jonathan in his seventh Presidential Media Chat in 2014:

> Over 70 percent of what are called corruption, even by EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) and other anti-corruption agencies is not corruption, but common stealing. Corruption is perception, not reality. (*Premium Times*, 2014)

Similarly, as AD6 notes:

> Corruption extends beyond the influence of special treatment by the executive and legislative branches. (customs) Officials can extract payoffs in return for overlooking the illegal underpayment of taxes or for tolerating illegal activities such as smuggling. (police) Officials may demand payoffs (bribes) in exchange for not arresting citizens. (AD6, 2019)

In contrast DB notes that nature of corruption among state agents:

> Kidnappings are not just kidnappings anymore. The police in the state arrange the payment of ransom, where is that done? Beyond that the police receive their own cut from the kidnappers. You even have police officers who sell/lease their guns to non-state actors. All this happens because of a lack in the system. A lack in training and a lack in funds. So, the system is broken. (DB6, 2019)

In 2019 TransparencIT carried out an analysis of corruption in Nigeria, highlighting the levels of corruption within various organisations (TransparencIT, 2019). It showed that the top five groups with the highest levels of corruption were: the police, members of parliament, local government officials, government officials, and judges and magistrates. As shown in Figure 14 Level of Corruption by Institutions in Nigeria in 2019 This analysis complements the findings of the research empirical data discussed in this thesis.

LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA BY INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUION	LEVEL OF CORRUPTION
The Police	69%
Member of Parliament	60%
Local Gov't Officials	55%
Government Officials	54%
Judges and Magistrates	51%
Business Executives	44%
President (Presidency)	43%
NGOs	40%
Traditional Leaders	35%
Religious Leaders	20%

Source: Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019

TransparencIT   f ✔ ⊙ @TransparencITng   🛈 www.transparencit.com

Figure 14 Level of Corruption by Institutions in Nigeria in 2019

Source: TransparencIT, 2019

This endless circle of payoffs that results in a vicious spiral begins with political leaders buying off powerful actors such as wealthy businessmen, criminal groups and so on, through patronage. In turn those powerful actors buy off weak politicians, and more criminal groups and other individuals with the promise of business ventures and future jobs. Thus, the 'post-conflict' political system is then caught in a corruption trap of pay-offs. This leads to the formal institutions being undermined and to greater competition, not only concerning power, but also over state rents and corrupt proceeds. Thus, leading to violence, part of which many believe to be what led to the conflict in the Niger Delta. hence,

patronage peacebuilding fuels the struggle for power which in interpreted through competion which further leads to corruption.

Also, the flamboyant lifestyles of leaders within the region not only raise the question of what the money in the region was being used for, but are also an indication of how funds were being diverted for personal use (Ejibunu, 2007). For example, Dr Peter Odili, the former governor of Rivers State, in 2006, budgeted $1.3 billion for the entire state; within the budget he allocated $65,000 a day for transportation to the office of the governor, which, when looked at in context, is clearly inflated. In addition to this, $38 million was allocated for two helicopters, which also begs the question of the need for two helicopters, and how much these would actually be used (Ejibunu, 2007). Furthermore, within the budget a mere $22 million was allocated for healthcare for the whole state, which is less than that budgeted for the helicopters: this surely brings into question the priorities of the state (Ejibunu, 2007). Furthermore, in 2012 the former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, was set to be imprisoned for fraud for 13 years for the sum of £50 million. Although he was discharged and acquitted for the same charges in Nigeria, in a London court he was found guilty of ten counts of conspiracy to defraud and money laundering (BBC, 2012). The misappropriation of public funds is another reason why elites in the Niger Delta have not been trusted to deal with problems within the region, especially as politicians have financially supported militant groups such as the NDPVF and NDV (HRW, 2003a/b).It can be taken that although the relationship between private and public power does not always involve corruption through monetary pay-offs, it can, however, serve the interests of a particular businessman and politicians, and most times this involves criminal elements. All this contributes to a trickle-down effect: violence and the demand for pay-offs doesn't just stop with patrons and clients, it also streams down criminals' organisations, guerrilla groups, para-military organisations, or even the nation's regular armed forces. Furthermore, in 2012, Global Witness (2012), cited in Martini (2014, p. 5), estimated that between US$300 billion and US$400 billion has been lost to corruption since Nigeria's independence. In addition, Kellogg, Brown and Root – a US construction company – pleaded guilty to the payment of about US$180 million as a bribe to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the petroleum ministry, and other government officials in order to secure US$6 billion worth of contracts (Martini, 2014, p. 7) .This also brings into question how and why he escaped the charges in Nigeria: was it because of corruption, and what does this, therefore, show about the Nigerian government and its institutions? These examples also show how, at the local level, actors are connected, and in essence the embezzlement of such large amounts only leads to the suffering of the general population. Corruption within the region raises many questions as it shows that there actually sufficient resources

however the problem is how they are distributed by the state, because the state is not accountable and transparent thus funds are embezzled leading to further corruption (Ajala, 2016).

Considering the perceptions of participants, it can be understood that the combined method of political and economic profit is used as a method not only by patrons to struggle and maintain power against their opponents, but also as a means by which individuals join militant groups in order to survive, further leading to violence that serves the personal economic interest of patrons. This work has also shown how patronage networks and corruption have been fuelled due to weak institutions and still formative state building processes and the rising importance and status of oil (Brunner, 2002, 292ff.), which fosters informal political arrangements and the mismanagement of public funds (Mähler, 2010). Thus, the failure of the political institutions can be considered not only as a contributing factor to the conflict but also as having provided the opportunity for violence and corruption to continue in the region.

Through the power structures the patrons can capture the political and economic benefits of reconstruction, thus, turning the peacebuilding process into a profitable economy. Corroborating this point, an interviewee, DB2, stated:

> War is in indeed profitable, but so is peace. And in the Niger Delta, state-led peacebuilding
> is a lucrative economy. (DB2, 2019)

Affirming that if the elite who are in power during a conflict can maintain their position, they can therefore position themselves to benefit further, as credible sources of power and institutional constraint remain weakened, he further noted:

> (State-led) peacbeuidling ensure state institutions remain weakened, so these fail to take
> them (patrons) out of power. Funds have been diverted to private accounts so peace
> becomes an economy for those in power. (DB2, 2019)

Similarly, SB9 (2019) noted that the lucrative nature of state-led peacebuilding has led to indigenous NGOs now being composed of professionals, local elites and bureaucrats who see it as an alternative source of income. As people have seen the flood of donor money, many have turned their ambitions towards starting NGOs. SB9 stated:

> I remember a specific NGO that was started by a prominent leader who I will not name.
> He used his girlfriend as front man, and everything went into her personal account. Believe

me when I say no initiative was carried out by that NGO and there are many like that out (t)here. (SB9, 2019)

However, despite the negative connotations of patronage peacebuilding, part of the empirical data revealed that it has, however, led to relative peace and in some instances halted violence. The patronage approach to peacebuilding has resulted in various skill acquisitions programmes, despite their being specifically around election times. Patronage peacebuilding is also seen to be bringing youths together to form a united front for change that is aimed at development. The extent to which this will happen is yet to be determined. Thus, with the establishment of relative peace, albeit short-lived, can we really view patronage peacebuilding as destructive? If the actors constantly remain the same, and the struggle and control for power are the sole aim within the region, does patronage peacebuilding not ensure some sort of balance or control? Should the focus then be on changing how peacebuilding has always been? What are the risks of doing so? Will that not just be another way of re-establishing power structures? Thus, there is abundant room for future research in truly understanding patronage peacebuilding and its influence beyond the peacebuilding and development agenda.

Another emerging theme in the empirical datat was that aatronage peacebuilding has simultaneously challenged the structures of power to influence the culture of social, political and economic infrastructures. Thus, it not only affects the formal structures of power but also the traditional space, which will be explored in the next section.

Patronage Peacebuilding and the 'Destruction' of Traditional Structures

Interestingly, the traditional structures in Bayelsa and Rivers states was another subtheme that emerged from the interviews with participants, within the narrative of state-led peacebuilding initiatives. As explained in the previous chapter the traditional structures, such as chiefs, titleship, palaces, beads and so on are sacred, and represent the culture and customs of the land. These structures evolved out of ceremonies (for example, traditions existed that the leaders were consulted before members of the society made decisions such as the purchasing of various territories, for the 'gods' to bless the purchase), and there even began to be engagement with peacebuilding activities within the region, and homage was paid to the ancestors and traditional leaders. SB3 noted:

> Traditions in the Niger Delta were built on over 50 years of sacred respect of the land. The land represented more than just oil and wealth but represented deep connection of the different groups of peoples, a sense of belonging, representing a collective identity in the customs of the land. (SB3, 2019)

Furthermore, traditional leaders voiced concerns for their communities, mediated kidnapping issues as well as carrying out philanthropic work. Through the intervention of some traditional leaders, there has been a reduction in criminality, and these leaders served as the protectors of the land. Overtime, however, the roles of these traditional structures began to change, and there have been various theories as to why this was so. One theory, which was referred to by various participants, is that over time traditional structures have lost their value "selling out to Western culture", and to the patrons and political leaders, because of greed and their (the traditional leaders) need for survival. As explained by AD3 in his interview:

> Tradition in the Niger Delta has been corrupted and the ancestral integrity westernised due to the discovery of oil which led to traditional leaders becoming greedy, struggling for their own share of the national cake or chin chin. (AD3, 2019)

In his opinion, the discovery of oil led to the empowerment of various militants, who later became more widely respected, feared and even honoured than traditional leaders, thus changing the dynamics of the economy and the power to allocate resources. Customs such as offering a sacrifice to the ancestors by paying homage to the traditional leaders were no longer upheld, thus the legitimacy of earlier traditions was no longer valued. Similarly, DB9 noted:

> Traditional structures have been watered down and what exists now is rather a structure that upholds tradition just in face-value and name. (DB9, 2019)

Patronage peacebuilding is continued through the traditional structures not only by means of various appointments, but also by the distribution of handouts or 'gifts', given to various traditional leaders as part of the patron system, which further reshapes the traditional structure (AD1, 2019).

DB9 argued that the traditional structures were now a means to attain power, as militants began to take what they wanted and some even bribed various traditional leaders just to acquire more "turf" and to bless their actors, so that people would accept the militants. Thus, the nature of traditions is changing to no longer focus on the people and customs of the land, but, rather, to be used as a means of acquiring wealth and power in Bayelsa and Rivers.

Tradition was further influenced when a new trend emerged, with few viewing this as an approach to peacebuilding and many others viewing it as yet another means by which patronage networks were being restored, in other words, another element of patronage peacebuilding: the appointment of militants as traditional leaders – an example is Ateke Tom. As SB7 stated in his interviews:

> Militant leaders as traditional heads, whether figurative or performative is the ultimate erosion of traditional powers – it linked the sacred power of tradition to militancy. The sacred nature of strength, kinship, identity that was associated with the traditions of the region that should have been upheld by the elders of the land, was thrown, and associated to the dirty game of power. (SB7, 2019)

This further reinforces the narrative of patronage power networks and shows that what really mattered was maintaining power. AD1 stated:

> Previously traditions were upheld and even believed to have been more powerful than the state as it outlived the state, however the new link between militancy and tradition saw that militancy sought to transcend the state, through traditional power. (AD1,2019)

Thus, it can be deduced that patronage peacebuilding created and fostered an enabling environment for certain actors, in this case various militant leaders, who were and still are connected to power structures, in order to obtain more power. The ascension of these militant leaders to traditional leaders brings into question the motives of those who placed them in power, as well as the role these new traditional leaders will play in society. AD3 (2019) offered his opinion by stating that this was a power move on the part of the patron in terms of positioning their clients, but it was also another means by which institutions change, and new power wants to occupy the old spaces of power. The aim of disempowering the traditional was to restructure the power structures that had existed, or rather in this case restructure the power structures that existed during the conflict into the post-conflict society. For example, according to SB13:

> Former Governor Amaechi appointed someone who he knew would be loyal to him as chief, however, the youths refused, which resulted in conflict as they burned down the traditional leader's house. Something that would have never been thought of in the past. (SB13, 2019)

The reshaping of traditions therefore led to the disconnect between traditional leaders and their communities, further affecting how peacebuilding, or in this case how patronage peacebuilding, was carried out. The population of communities believed that the leaders no longer "felt their pain" or "fought for them" as SB3 (2019) noted in her interview. This led to increasing the gap between the community and the state, and also now between the community and the traditional leaders who had once upheld the customs of the land. She believed that the lack of support from the traditional leaders

and the state has led to communities beginning to fend for themselves, thus empowering various community networks. She exemplified this by stating:

> Communities now must fend for themselves and protect their own. So a lot of illegal oil bunkering sites are being protected not just by thugs but by the community as a whole, as these are the source of income for everyone. (SB3, 2019).

Further highlighting the way these changes feed into how individuals identify themselves, SB3 said:

> …Nigerians, especially Niger Deltans, as they prefer to be called that. Or rather to be identified from the ethnic group or community they come from. Whether Ijaw, Itsekiri, this shows a link to the power structure of that ethnic group but also shows loyalty to your community because they owe more to their communities than the state. (SB3, 2019)

Thus this here is a sense of loyalty to the community led to an identity based on tribalism rather than nationalism, which could form the basis for future research. As noted by Asari-Dokubo:

> [the struggle] has something to do with our Ijawness. The Nigerian state is stealing from us, we say no more stealing of our resources. Give it back to us. Our language and our culture which the Nigerian constitution has dubiously eliminated and said that it is Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba [...] that will be taught our children, we say no, we want to speak our Ijaw language, exhibit our culture. (Newswatch, January 13 2004, p. 13)

In sum, identity, culture and tradition play a part in how people react to conflict and the peacebuilding process. These ethnic links form the basis of a foundation on which alliances are formed. Thus, the empirical data suggest that patronage peacebuilding fostered the disempowerment of structures, and has led to institutional and transformative methods of peacebuilding being sought after by the members of communities more than by the traditional leaders who previously did this. Patronage peacebuilding has further increased the gap between the state and the population, with the effects being seen not only in the appointment of militants as traditional leaders and the disregard for traditions, but also in the reaction of youths. These factors also bring into question the peacebuilding agenda in Rivers and Bayelsa.

To summarise, this section has shown that taking a historical overview of analysis of the political economy of conflict and peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers, it is clear that state peacebuilding initiatives have rather enhanced the capacity of patrons and clients to the detriment of building durable

peace (Kiipoye, 2015; Iwilade, 2017). The poor execution of state-led initiatives, and the struggle over and reconstruction of power dynamics has led to patronage peacebuilding in which the patrons and clients are benefited, further incentivising rebellion and violence within the region. Thus, state-led initiatives, rather than addressing the problems, have substituted a mutually beneficial arrangement between patrons and clients, demonstrated by the fact that ex-militant clients who were once enemies of the state have now become influential members of power structures through the distribution of special financial favours. These empirical findings suggest that the approaches taken by the government, both at the state and the national level, have been 'quick-fix' responses to complex issues. These responses, whether forceful or tactical in nature, were aimed more at stabilising the oil economy than at addressing peacebuilding. The constant 'band-aid' method resulted in a short-cut approach to peacebuilding that over the years has redefined peacebuilding within the region to become what is known as 'patronage peacebuilding'. This raises questions regarding the state's capacity and political will; after all, maybe this is all the state has the capacity for? If so, when and how will the state develop the capacity to do more and go beyond 'quick fixes'? However, despite all this, I believe the state does have the capacity to go beyond patronage peacebuilding. As such, through the constant competition for power and wealth, the state does not lack the financial capacity for the development of roads, buildings and basic amenities. However, this financial assistance keeps on being 'redirected' into the pockets of patrons. Furthermore, the lack of accountability on the part of the state towards its people regarding these funds makes the establishment of peace even more challenging – as we saw recently when public funds were 'redirected', and attributed to a snake swallowing $100,000 or £72,250 (BBC News, 2018; Bukola Adebayo, 2018), and a monkey running away with N70 million ($170,076.29 or £122,570.00) (Busari, 2018). Thus competition amog clients and partons has led to corruption and the disempowerment of tradationa structures. The next section explores the overlap between patronage peacebuilding and the donor-led peacebuilding initiatives explored within this thesis. This is critical, because the way in which donor-led peacebuilding initiatives are intertwined with state-led peacebuilding projects makes it impossible to avoid patronage peacebuilding. Thus, it becomes crucial to examine whether and how patronage peacebuilding influences these initiatives and vice versa.

The Overlap between Patronage Peacebuilding and the NSRP and PIND

Another emerging theme from the empirical data was the overlap between state-led peacebuilding initiatives and donor-based initiatives. This section explores the overlap between patronage peacebuilding and the NSRP and PIND. It examines two emerging themes from the literature: a reliance on NGOs, and the 'blame game' played out between the state and NGOs.

Tolerance of Patronage Peacebuilding

One unanticipated finding, as seen in the difference between the initial template and the finalised template in Chapter 1, despite the negative connotations of patronage peacebuilding and its effects in Rivers and Bayelsa, was the acceptance, or rather the tolerance, of patronage peacebuilding as a way of life. The perceptions of participants, as seen in the empirical evidence, suggested that the patronage networks in Rivers and Bayelsa have existed and structured the way the states have been run for years. Thriving on networks, back channels and godfathers in the way they do, in order to begin to question the system, one would need to know where to start from: something that is not difficult, but, rather, impossible. This view was echoed by SB4, who stated:

> You may knock one patron out or he may lose power, but that just means someone more powerful has taken his place. (SB4, 2019)

She further stated:

> To survive in the Niger Delta is about who you know and what you can accept. (SB4, 2019)

As noted in the Iwilade interview in 2013, Tarela, who was an ex-militant included in the amnesty programme, stated that the state-led peacebuilding initiatives were not to be questioned. Tarela recollected the treatment he received as a result of questioning the system. In his words:

> They called me to Abuja [...] other people from other schools were there. [...]without even giving me an opportunity to speak, they said by protesting I was threatening the presidency [...]. Before I [understood what was going on] the SSS [State Security Services] came in, hand-cuffed me and one of my colleagues and took us to the guardroom. They forced us to write undertakings. All those things were being done to shut us up [...] they seized our ID Cards and told us we were no longer in the programme. We were even beaten up, you know? By Soldiers and SSS [...] the most painful part of it is that when I reported to my commander, he just said I should shut up. That what was I complaining about. We are just enduring the situation now because there is no choice. (Iwilade, 2017, p. 17)

Thus, it can be deduced that coercion also plays a role in maintaining the power structures. And when that is encouraged even by those within the power structures, order must be ensured.

Similarly, one concern expressed regarding the tolerance of patronage peacebuilding was that it connotes 'negative peace', especially in Bayelsa and Rivers. Talking about this issue DB6 said:

> When looking at Rivers State especially, it can be noted tha there is relative peace, however when looking at it in terms of positive peace and negative peace – negative peace is all the state enjoys. (DB6, 2019)

He further pointed out that this is "all the Niger Delta is going to get" (DB6, 2019). He believed that the need for power and the need to control the resources in states like Bayelsa and Rivers drives all decision-making. It is for this reason that state-led peacebuilding within these states will continue to be politically and economically driven, thereby bringing about only negative peace, and further illustrating that until patronage networks are fully dissolved and power structures truly redefined, these states will continue to suffer from the recurrence of conflict. This raises questions such as: who will dissolve these power structures, and how will new power structures be implemented? Or even the question of whether the dissolution of the power structures will be enough to maintain peacebuilding. Or, rather, is peacebuilding going to continue in the same vicious cycle, serving patrons, incorporating more clients into the patronage network and not solving the needs of the people? However, currently the needs of the people are being catered to, or rather not catered to, by the very same patrons this has led to system of tolerance and acceptance whether the population is more concerned with getting into patronage networks than bringing about change.

Reliance on Donor-Based Organisations by Population

The perceptions of participants suggested that, apart from traditional networks, because state-led peacebuilding has rather taken the form of patronage peacebuilding this has created a vacuum: the gap between the on the ground reality of the governance of resources and control of power in these states, versus the liberal peace vision. This gap is being filled by the creation of various NGOs within the Niger Delta region. The creation of these NGOs as such does not seem to be the issue; however, there seems to be an emerging reliance on NGOs as problem solvers (DB3, 2019). When asked about the reliance on NGOs, the participants were unanimous in the view that indeed NGOs are now tasked with filling the vacuum created by patronage peacebuilding. As seen with the emergence of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s as a "magic bullet" t and as a means to people empowerment so also is the case in Bayelsa and Rivers (Edwards and Hulme, 2000). Rather than serving as agents of empowerment, donor-based organisations have served as 'gap fillers', thus reflecting the structural reality interest of donors, and the regime in power. Donor-based organizations in Bayelsa and Rivers provide crucial services to the states like the Niger Delta Youth Employment Pathway, Aquaculture value chain project and cassava values chain project which provide funding and training to farmers. In their account of the development of reliance on NGOs, DB7 said:

> Patronage in the Niger Delta is no secret, people are waiting and positioning themselves for aid and no longer trust the system, if you can't get in with the network you rely on the next best thing, the NGOs. (DB7, 2019)

Due to weak institutions in Bayelsa and Rivers states, donor-based organisations serve to fill the gaps providing poverty alleviation projects, basic social care and education. A surprising number of participants disagreed and argued that in societies such as Bayelsa and Rivers, donor-based peacebuilding is exactly what is needed. SB5 (2019) noted that the Nigerian government had tried for years to stabilise and resolve conflict within the region and had failed. She observed that organisations such as PIND filled the gap where the government was unable to and built bridges where the state failed to act. DB3 (2019) further agreed, noting that the relationship between the state and the population had been destroyed, thus making carrying out peacebuilding operations harder. Thus, donor-based institutions aid by facilitating these relationships and filling the gap caused by the state's failure. . With PIND serving as a gap filler to the state, this has led to a continued lapse in the provision of services by the state. The state has come to depend on the provision of services by various donors. "NGOs get co-opted (consciously or unconsciously) by the regime, which uses the NGOs for legitimacy building and social service gap-filling". Also, programmes targeted at advocacy and service provision may not be mutually exclusive but there is a dominance on service provision. Thus, donor organisations become service providers rather than agents of change. Consequently, going back to the notion of questioning the impact of donor-based initiatives due to it quick and tangible programs as these serve merely as service providers and gap fillers that are not regulated.

In this sense, the relationship between NGOs and the regime is not competitive, but complementary, where donor-based organisations do not challenge the state, though they are aware of the power structure by serving as gap fillers. However, it is crucial to note in the age of neo-liberalism that the responsibility for peacebuilding lies not only with the state by also with various donor organisations who should keep the state accountable. Thus, these organisations must go beyond being gap fillers and take more proactive empowerment roles towards building peace and ensuring development. However, at the same time, the limitations to attaining this must be realised, especially the limitations that come as a result of the state. In the case of the Bayelsa and Rivers states the limitation is patronage peacebuilding.

This was further echoed by DB5 and DB6 (2019) who collectively agreed that real peacebuilding does not occur in Bayelsa and Rivers; where possible, NGOs are expected to pick up everything. DB6 (2019) stated:

> NGOs have specific agendas and interests, and above all else have a limited timeframe and resources, so we can't do it all, but we are expected to do it. (DB6, 2019)

He further noted that this has resulted in members of the community running to them (NGOs) to solve their problems before going to the police or even the government. Thus, one of the more notable roles that PIND plays is as an interface between the population and state institutions such as the police (DB6, 2019).

However, despite this some participants disagree with the notion that there is a reliance on NGOs. In fact, contrary to the belief that NGOs are the saviours, there was some contention that the activities of the NGOs have been hindered due to patronage peacebuilding. In an interview with DB1 (2019), he recalled an incident where his team were forcefully removed from a community in Bayelsa State. As expressed by numerous participants from PIND, members of the local community were not welcoming when they were approached by the organisation, because they mistake them for government officials. DB5 exclaimed:

> They thought we work with the state government – despite seeking permission from the local elders, when we began our sensitisation programme, they demanded we leave, mobilising thugs to escort us out, which they did. (DB5, 2019)

He revealed that this was not the first time, and in fact some communities even refused any form of help saying, "we are tired of the government "or "it will always be the same" or "you only want our votes", "you are just back to take numbers and go" (DB5, 2019). He concluded by saying:

> Peacebuilding is a collective effort between peacebuilding researchers, managers and the community. We depend on the community a lot, not just for guidance within the remote areas, but also as potential conflict managers as we can't always be there. How do you build peace when a community does not help? (DB5, 2019)

This illustrates the gap between the power and governance dynamics of the Delta and the views of the world expressed by peacebuilding professionals.

DB5 further exclaimed that as a peacebuilding agency most of the time they are forced to renounce any association with the government, and only once this is done to the satisfaction of the community, can peacebuilding programmes such as sensitisation within these communities take place (DB5, 2019). We can see that not only has state-led peacebuilding created challenges for NGOs, but they have also worsened the already existing condition of mistrust between the people and the government, which now includes other peacebuilding agencies who are not, in fact, affiliated with the state.

It was what the donor deemed important or necessary that they addressed or tried to address. As such, these limitations led to situations where only the symptoms seemed to be approached, and the various root causes were not dealt with (DB5, 2019). Such approaches act only as a quick-fix response to peacebuilding that may not be sustainable, especially after the completion of the NGO's goals. Thus, as identified by a few interviewees, the negative cycle of peacebuilding is perpetuated. Upon review, the data revealed that the NGOs indeed felt the effect of patronage peacebuilding; however, on the other hand, government agencies felt that NGOs and the way they carried out peacebuilding were to be blamed for the resulting negative peace. This then brings out another theme – the 'blame game'.

The Blame Game

As mentioned above, participants perceived that blame shifting or blame avoidance was another emerging subtheme, which mostly occurred between NGOs and governmental agencies both at the state and national levels. There was a consensus expressed by most participants that there was now a reliance by the local population upon NGOs, who were expected to address concerns of insecurity and to establish sustainable peace. This reliance upon NGOs has further led to mistrust of the Nigerian government as well as of the federal states of Rivers and Bayelsa. According to Hood (2007), blame avoidance is a descriptive account of a force that is often said to underlie much of political and institutional behaviour in practice. However, there seems to be a lack of exploration of blame avoidance from a local dimension, especially within an Africa perspective. A significant contribution that sought to address this was Anna Mdee's work on blame and responsibility on local governance performance that was centred on Tanzania (Mdee and Mushi, 2020). Mdee and Mushi (2020) noted that the avoidance of blame has been used to sidestep responsibility. This is evident in Bayelsa and Rivers as both NGOs and governmental agencies feel each has failed in their responsibility and they constantly push the blame onto one another. Thus, this not only makes it difficult for any form of accountability to take place, it also constitutes the blame game.

196

As noted by Mdee and Mushi (2020), blame can be shifted either sideways, upwards, downwards, or outwards depending on the positions of players. There are three main ways in which blame avoidance occurs, namely: presentational, agency and policy. 'Presentational' uses the media to shape the narrative; 'agency' diffuses responsibility by distributing it between various actors; and 'policy' concerns the use of various policies that succeed in either shifting or reducing the blame. In Bayelsa and Rivers states we can see agency being in constant use, especially on the part of the state and national governments. As noted by SB10:

> Issues are resolved by creating committees, these committees create sub-committees who also create ad hoc groups. What makes this worse is that there is no cooperation within these groups. Rather these committees are a waste of time as nothing is ever resolved but resources are spent on endless meetings and future policy recommendations that are later ignored. (SB10, 2019)

On the other hand, AD4 (2019) argues that the problem lies not so much with these committees but rather with the communication or lack of communication. He argues:

> The lack of communication between parties consists of the real problem in the Delta. Once that is addressed real change will begin to occur. (AD4, 2019)

AD2 (2019) also argued that there is a lack of communication within organisations: he claims that briefings and reports are not even read by the responsible parties; how, therefore, are policies to be implemented when the reports containing them are not even read? This is corroborated by AD1 (2019) who knows that policies, not just in Bayelsa or Rivers but in the whole of Niger, are shaped by internal politics rather than by the recommendations of the real experts. This hints at the gap between a performative level of policy speaking to the liberal peace world, and the real dynamics of power.

Additionally, according to AD1 (2019) the blurring of lines between the various levels of state institutions has led to further blame and avoidance in Bayelsa and Rivers. He states:

> If responsibilities are shifted within an agency on who is meant to carry out a project and when, how much more would that translate to the overall agenda of that agency be it peacebuilding, development or providing a specific service to the region? (AD1, 2019)

It is key to note that mapping dynamics of blame and responsibility is necessarily a complex multi-level process that requires engagement with citizens, non-state actors and government actors across all levels. Thus, when the lines of cooperation and responsibility are blurred this can be challenging.

AD1 further argues that the problem lies within the organisations, whether they are run by the government or by NGOs, noting that there needs to be a transformation of organisations so that they are firstly accountable to themselves, and then can be accountable to the people they serve (AD1, 2019). AD3 (2019) had a similar view, further stating that a crucial problem within the region is the lack of understanding of responsibility, not only on the part of citizens, but also on the part of government agencies. He notes:

> Most government agencies do not know their mandate or what they are meant to do. These organisations are understaffed and overworked so most times this is where the problem lies. (AD3, 2019)

However, SB10 (2019), who works for a government agency, had a contrasting view of where the problem really lay in terms of responsibility and blame, and did not see the difference NGOs were making within the Niger Delta. She stated:

> All they (NGOs) continuously do is have one town hall meeting after another. What does that really achieve? We see so many NGOs within that region, but what is it they really do? (SB10, 2019)

Interviewee SB10 argued that NGOs take on more than they should and beyond this there is little or no cooperation between the NGOs and the government (SB10, 2019). In contrast, DB3 (2019) noted that government agencies do not want to cooperate with NGOs, exclaiming:

> On paper the government is willing to help; however, in practice they never really do. Rather, the process of involving government agencies is filled with bureaucracy and lack of planning. But there is no partnership in terms of interventions in peacebuilding. (DB3, 2019)

Similarly, DB6 (2019) noted that there is only so much the NGOs can do, stating:

> NGOs try to do the government's work. However, NGOs mostly treat symptoms. And if the government does not do its job, we will keep treating victims (DB6, 2019)

Thus NGOs are limited not only in their agenda and scope but also by their resources. They are geared towards the interests of the donor and, as shown in Mdee's work, tend to have little impact on the public space in terms of, for example, aiding citizens to hold the government accountable, which can be problematic (Beckmann and Bujra, 2010; Mdee and Thorley, 2016b).Thus far, exploration of the blame game and blame avoidance has raised a couple of questions for further research, such as: who

is responsible for acting? Does responsibility lie with the citizens to ensure their government provides for them? Should the burden fall on NGOs, and, if so, why? Should NGOs have the right to hold governments responsible for the lack of peace and development? What would this look like, in practical terms? In societies such as Bayelsa and Rivers, where patronage peacebuilding is the form peacebuilding takes, what practical steps can be taken to address blame avoidance and to hold not only governments, but also NGOs accountable?

As Mdee noted, when thinking specifically about the liberal peace type of social accountability, the line of responsibility needs to be clear in order for social accountability to be successful, based on the notion of the 'citizen holding the government to account' (Wild et al., 2015; Andrews, 2015; Mdee and Thorley, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Beyond this, there also needs to be clarity in showing how these social accountability and responsibility policies are to be implemented, especially in societies that claim to practice liberal peace but are neo-liberal in nature: in societies such as Rivers and Bayelsa, where the public outcry and protest aimed at holding the government responsible for the neglect of development has backfired on the people, there needs to be more than the expectation of merely underlining the responsibilities within government policies.

Thus, it can be inferred from the data that there is a blame-avoidance game occurring in the sphere of peacebuilding within the Bayelsa and River Niger Delta, with donor-based and state government agencies on opposing ends. The narrative seems to shift the blame back and forth, consequently there is no room for real accountability. It is not clear who should be blamed, or held accountable; what is clear, however, is that beyond the policies, there needs to be cooperation and communication between NGOs and government agencies to effectively carry out peacebuilding and ensure development.

Conclusion

This chapter has principally demonstrated the extent to which donor-based and state-led peacebuilding initiatives were influenced by neopatrimonialism in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. It showed that the donor-based peacebuilding organization the NSRP and PIND were not influenced by neopatrimonialism within the state. However, these initiatives are donor-centric, which participants reviewed meant that the issues were autonomous and account to the local state. As a result, these lead to a lot of quick and tangible programs by the NSRP and PIND which led them to become services providers and gap fillers of state weakness. It also showed that there was a difference in the language used with regards to the reporting the impacts of programs by PIND and the NRRP and the reality in Bayelsa and River state.

The chapter has also shown that state-led peacebuilding initiatives have not adequately dealt with the conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers states, and have instead created a perverse incentive structure that can fuel further violence. There has been limited effort on the part of either Rivers state or Bayelsa state in pursuing long-term peacebuilding initiatives. This chapter supports scholarly views – such as Kiikpoye (2015) and Iwilade (2017) – that have argued that there has been a transformation of patronage politics, especially when looking at the amnesty programme. However, this chapter has shown that such analysis can be applied beyond the amnesty programme to include other state-led initiatives. While some of the initiatives, such as the amnesty programme, did bring about temporary peace, it however fuelled informal agreements between the patrons and clients which were not accompanied by substantial institutional change. As noted by Aduloju and Okwechime (2016, pp. 524–525), proper implementation of peacebuilding initiatives needs to go hand in hand with addressing problems such as environmental degradation, infrastructural facilities and poverty. This chapter has argued that state-led initiatives in Bayelsa and Rivers states have been characterised by political manipulation of socio-economic conditions to maintain power structures and reshape the patronage network. As such, examination of state-led initiatives has raised questions regarding the sincerity and commitment of Bayelsa and Rivers state governments to peacebuilding (Osah and Amakihe, 2014; Osah, 2016; Iwilade, 2017). As a result, integrated theoretical understanding of liberal peacebuilding, as discussed in Chapter 2, does not align with the reality of the state-led initiatives being carried out in Bayelsa and Rivers states, which are, rather, shaped by patronage networks, resulting in patronage peacebuilding. More specifically, patronage peacebuilding has led to the incentivisation of militancy in Bayelsa and Rivers states and the recurrence of hostilities in various places that have previously experienced conflict, as well as the struggle for power among patrons and clients. As the name conveys, 'patronage peacebuilding' involves peacebuilding efforts being carried out that are specifically based on patronage networks as well as purposely targeting client networks. The struggle for power among patrons has led to various lucrative financial offerings to both clients and patrons, which has resulted in longstanding problems such as corruption and the 'destruction' of traditional structures, furthering the notion of patronage peacebuilding. As such it is believed that peace within the Niger Delta states has been a means of enriching patronage networks and buying loyalties through the purchase of peace, rather than addressing the incidence of conflict itself. This led to the struggle for power among patrons, leading to further corruption and even to the deconstruction of traditional structures and powers within the Delta, with the buying of traditional leaders. The traditional structures within the Niger Delta were sacred customs that brought together the people of the region with their ancestors and the ancestral heads chosen to represent them. There existed a bond between the people and their

traditional leaders, and many believe that these traditional structures held even more power than the states governments, as they outlived the authority of whoever was in power. However, as the struggle for power in the region heated up, the traditional structures were corrupted. Existing traditional leaders began taking bribes from patrons, as community lands were sold off at the expense of the people. Furthermore, traditional leaders were replaced by ex-militants as a means of buying peace to secure power in the favour of certain patrons. This further advanced the agenda of patronage peacebuilding, destroying the bond that once existed between the traditional structures and power.

Against this backdrop, the next chapter evaluates donor-based and patronage peacebuilding shape the informal economy in Bayelsa and River state.

Chapter 5 – Shaping the Informal Economy? The Nexus between Patronage Peacebuilding and the Informal Economy

Introduction

Having explored how donor-based and state-led peacebuilding are influenced by neopatrimonialism and the effect of this on the construction of peace and the overall peacebuilding agenda, this chapter focuses on expanding the analysis by introducing the second key element of this thesis, the informal economy. The chapter aims to understand the nexus between donor-based peacebuilding and state-

led peacebuilding – now recognised as patronage peacebuilding – and the informal economy, by examining how and to what extent state-led and donor-funded peacebuilding initiatives have shaped the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section combines the knowledge of the informal economy from both Chapters 2 and 3 with understanding of peacebuilding initiatives, analysing firstly how the donor-based initiatives (the NSRP and PIND) influence the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. This section finds that these donor-based peacebuilding initiatives do not deliberately consider the informal economy; however, their initiatives do involve members of the informal economy as such the informal economy is not full addressed, making its member seek alternative means of survival as discussed in the second section.

The second section examines how patronage peacebuilding shapes the informal economy in both Bayelsa and Rivers states. The empirical data revealed a prominent theme – patronage peacebuilding as the criminal enterprise of peace. The criminal enterprise of peace focuses on how patronage peacebuilding functions as a thriving economy of profit for its actors and how it overlaps with the informal economy, adversely creating various criminal enterprises among the local population in three dynamics. Firstly, the relationship between patronage peacebuilding and the informal economy leads to 'positioning' for aid by the population. In the illicit informal economy this positioning has led to the second dynamic, which is the 'performance of militancy' in Bayelsa and Rivers. Thirdly, as patronage peacebuilding prioritises power structures at the expense of true liberal peacebuilding, the population in the informal economy is increasingly marginalised, which further leads to the underdevelopment of the Bayelsa State and Rivers State. Consequently, patronage peacebuilding shapes the informal economy by deliberately pushing people into both the formal economy and the illicit informal economy, thus fuelling violence.

The NSRP, PIND and the Informal Economy

As stated in the introduction, the informal economy refers to those activities undertaken outside state control, and beyond the reach of tax authorities, at various levels and by different actors, aimed at generating profit, meeting personal or household welfare needs, circumventing state control and taxation, or facilitating advantages in business and politics (ILO, 2013). It includes small-scale, local practices – such as casual labour – and organised criminal activities which generate very significant revenues (ILO, 2013). The findings show that both PIND and the NSRP have facilitated the agency of some members of the informal economy in a number of ways, including through providing different life skills, the practical orientation of the training and self-confidence thus gained, and their increased

participation in work and income generation. While many donor-based organisations' involvements in peacebuilding – especially within their official project and reports – are highly remarkable, these projects do not deliberate target the informal economy. Various donors avow the involvement of members of the informal economy through the monitoring, project design, and evaluation stage (PIND, 2017; NSRP, 2017). The informal economy, however, is not deliberately included in their managing and monitoring plans. In surveying the scene regarding the involvement of the informal economy among both the NSRP and PIND's activities. Firstly, this is seen through the information about the informal economy as it was apparent that information about the informal economy from these organisations in the field is scarce. As noted, DB6 remarked:

> I cannot really say how many people make up the informal economy, it is hard to measure
> not just for our organisation but for the entire state (DB6, 2019).

A survey of the PIND website yielded little evidence of the importance attached to the informal economy. Though there are universal mentions of supporting, promoting and ensuring the effectiveness of various development projects that target farmers, there is almost no mention of the overall impact of this on the informal economy and other dimensions of the informal economy. In addition, some of the evaluations carried out included providers that examine various grants; however, this is more focused on the number of grants received rather than the impact on the recipient and the overall community (PIND, 2017). Consequently, how sustainable is grants projects beyond the life of the donor-based organisations. As seen within the NSRP, when projects ended and no more grants were being awarded, what did people within the community then do? In addition, an anecdotal review of PIND projects showed that the informal economy is rarely an integral part of the project reporting process. Reports highlight the number of grants but fail to consider the impact and long-term sustainability plan of the informal economy. As DB3 observed:

> Our initiatives do not really focus on those who are in the illicit informal economy or a
> wide variety of the informal economy. We target farmers, local businesses willingly work
> with us and provide trainings, work and grants. Who you can say are part of the informal
> economy. However, in terms of local carpenters, hairdressers and others we haven't really
> measured the impact of this on lifestyle choices and involvement in the informal economy
> beyond this but (DB3, 2019)

In a similar vein DB5 noted:

PIND is yet to play its part measuring how the informal economy is affected by our initiatives, however PIND has pumped in a lot of money into peacebuilding. We are limited as we are donor focused. (DB5, 2019)

Furthermore, an examination of current policies and practices by PIND revealed that the donors indeed have expectations, but not requirements, to include the informal economy within their contracts or grants. Although some governments have plans to include the informal economy within their objectives, donor-based organisations have no requirement to do so (DB5, 2019). Maybe this is due to the financial constraints that various donor-based organisations face. There are pockets of projects that target specific areas of the informal economy like farming and mining; when looked at as whole, however, these projects do not amount to 5 per cent of peacebuilding initiatives. As noted by DB3:

We have worked with those in the informal economy in contact with other local NGOs. We work with market actors through capacity building programmes, conflict sensitising trainings, evaluating how the market actors affect the community they are in positively and negatively. For example, we have with various area boys (thugs) talking about how they tax those in the market. (DB3, 2019)

PIND did consider the dynamics and changes within different channels of supply within the market and what drives those changes. It carris out market survey on groups that they deemed marginalised to determine the value chains and the needs of these groups. The analysis also showed opportunities for growth and areas in which the poor could participate in these opportunities. Who defined who were the 'poor'? How were participants therefore selected? The random selection of who was deemed 'poor' was therefore not intentional and did not provide for the sustainable future development of either Rivers or Bayelsa. In theory, the development of value chains mapped out the function and contrasts of growth on the position of the marginalised within these systems as well as how the markets failed to meet their needs. As SB11 remarks:

Peacebuilding initiatives focus on research through mapping, interactions with various networks, some forums, education about conflict. Some programmes target the general population but not necessarily the informal economy, or even illegal informal economy within the area. (SB11, 2019)

One of the unique things about the NSRP was that it aimed to support Nigerian institutions, organisations and individuals in the management and reconciliation of conflict, specifically focusing on

the marginalised and vulnerable, which, as identified by the NSRP, were women, youth and some work focused on disabled individuals. However, it is crucial to note that although the NSRP did include an aspect of the marginalised population, and indeed was an economic programme that aimed to target economic development and sustainability, it was limited in its understanding of the marginalised groups. Although the programme focused on marginalised groups, it is key to note the people who, although marginalised, were not included in this analysis, that is the disabled groups; likewise, members of the informal economy were not included, even though the NSRP aimed to focus on economic advancement (NSRP, 2014). Yes, it did include women and girls, who were otherwise not involved with peacebuilding, but it failed, however, to also focus on the parts of the population that were marginalised due to lack of economic development in the Niger Delta. Within its framework the NSRP did not officially include the informal economy, although it did touch on a few members within that sector – a process identified and labelled as 'the touch and leave' approach, or rather what I refer to as a 'band aid' approach.

Although this partially inclusive approach by the NSRP created opportunities for participants to better express their opinions and allowed them the opportunity to engage in the process, yet again the NSRP approach was limited in its delivery; while providing a space for the 'marginalised groups', the language used by the organisation, its narrative of the marginalised groups being a conflict driver was misguided. What the NSRP failed to make clear was how and whether the inclusion of women within the peacebuilding agenda had any sustainable impact on the process. Indeed, creating a space where the voices of the marginalised can be safely heard is essential, especially to growth and development; however, as the literature suggests it is hard to determine how this is transformative to the peacebuilding process. This again shows the limitations of the NSRP, especially with regard to members of what they deemed to be marginalised groups and its economic aspect.

Thus, this section has argued that although some members of the informal economy are included in initiatives like meeting with partners for peace, grants to farmers, market analysis on the poor and marginalized- which is focused on girls, women, and handicap. There is however no deliberate effort to include the informal economy as a whole in the peacebuilding initiatives of PIND and the NSRP. Hence as the next section will show this has led to a large part of the informal economy is ignored therefore looking for alternative means to survive.

Patronage Peacebuilding and the Informal Economy – The Criminal Enterprise of Peace

As discussed in Chapter 4, the end of the conflict may not encourage the development of a transparent and accountable government, especially if those who gained financially from the conflict are in power and seek both to preserve past gains and to benefit from the rebuilding effort. Thus, to continue to survive and thrive within the new post-conflict era, those in power in the conflict era must develop creative means with which to maintain their power. One such means is transforming state-led peacebuilding initiatives into a productive economy that lines their pockets as well as serves their personal goals, as discussed in Chapter 4, through various initiatives such as awarding contracts to ex-militants, stealing funds, and fake development programmes. Moving this discussion forward, this section examines how patronage peacebuilding shapes the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State, exploring an emerging theme from the empirical data – the criminal enterprise of peacebuilding, which can be analysed into three parts: 'positioning' for aid, the 'performance of militancy', and the further marginalisation of the population in the informal economy.

When discussing whether the informal economy was situated within the peacebuilding agenda of the state, participants had differing views. One recognition expressed by AD2 (2019), was that the informal economy had not been included in the state-led peacebuilding process:

> The informal economy in the Niger Delta region serves oil production chains and agriculture. There is no deliberate effort from the state to develop these value chains that will give a trickle-down effect into the broader informal economy that will help the people. (AD2, 2019)

He further stated:

> The informal economy as a whole is not factored into development plans or peacebuilding initiatives of the state, and this does affect people's lifestyle choices. There are so many skills acquisition programmes but no skills assessment. There needs to be a strategy that involves the people. (AD2, 2019)

Similarly, AD1, argued that:

> The informal economy was not planned by the state, most of it came about as a result of survival instincts, and as such will never be included in its plan. (AD1, 2019)

In the same vein, AD3 stated in his interview:

> The relationship between the state and the local population is tense partly because it remains to be seen how the state involve people in the informal economy in the decision-making process. (AD3, 2019)

However, an interesting point was made by SB4, who further recognised that the informal economy has not been included in the peacebuilding process, saying that, thus the:

…informal economy is a ticking time-bomb, that will soon go off. (SB4, 2019)

She explained that the lack of focus on the informal economy continues to foster frustration within the members, stating:

> The frustration is not just felt by the locals like farmers who can't farm, or fishermen who can no longer fish, but even civil servants who have to have a side business because the government deals salaries payments. Everyone is angry, look at the history of the region when the people become frustrated. (SB4, 2019)

She links lack of development and sustainable peacebuilding initiatives to the incidence of violence, comparing the frustration of the people to a ticking time-bomb. This view is supported by the work of several scholars, such as Ibaba (2011), Aniche (2019), Nwagbara (2015), Odoemene (2011), Offiong and Cocodia (2011), Otite and Umukoro (2011), Kaur (2013), Amaraegbu (2011), Edafejrhaye and Alao (2019), Afinotan and Ojakorotu (2009) to mention a few, who have linked the frustration to violence in the Niger Delta. The consensus among these scholars is that the high level of unemployment, lack of development, slow response of the political systems, corruption and environmental decay have made the people ill-equipped to cope with the environmental changes, thus sowing the seeds of frustration (Otite and Umukoro, 2011; Offiong and Cocodia, 2011; Odoemene, 2011; Kaur, 2013; Edafejrhaye and Alao, 2019). As a result, the people have become susceptible to aggression and militant activities. The frustration-aggression explanation, which was pioneered by John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O.H. Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939 explores conflict as resulting from a blockage of goal attainment. This work was furthered by Faleti (2006, p. 47), who noted there is a gap between what people feel they deserve and what they get; this results in frustration which then manifests into aggression and then violence. In the same vein, Ibaba expands on this theory, exploring the notion of the frustration-aggression trap (Ibaba, 2011). Ibaba (2011) observes that the frustration trap is a condition where groups and individuals are unable to release themselves from frustration due to the surrounding policies and environment, which reinforces the blockage of goal attainment. Blockages such as corruption thus create the conditions for violence, which can be triggered in the region. He further highlights the challenges posed to peacebuilding, noting that Port Harcourt is the centre of frustration, thus leading to more violence as it is the 'oil headquarters' of Nigeria (Ibaba, 2011).thus due to durstation from high unemployment levels, those in the infromal economy are referred to as a bomb, ready to explode.

Furthermore, SB4 (2019) noted that peacebuilding initiatives do indeed carry out training and sensitisation programmes for those who are unemployed, programmes aimed at ending cultism and so on; however, there remains a failing to empower individuals – the enabling environment is yet to be established and sustained. This point is corroborated by several participants, as there is a consensus that the informal economy is not situated in the current peacebuilding agenda of ether Bayelsa or Rivers. As SB3 remarked:

> The lack of a deliberate focus on the informal economy creates a gap in society, people are not carried along. There is a lack in various industries as dropouts and those with just a school leaving certificate cannot find work beyond the informal economy. In other ways, we failed to incorporate them, thus pushing them back into an informal sector. (SB3, 2019)

AD2, further corroborated this, saying:

> No deliberate effort from the state that will develop other value chains that will trickle down into great informal economies that will help people. The informal economy is not situated in the peacebuilding agenda as the state does not see the value chains from the point of the people. So, some communities develop associations that try to empower unemployed youths as well as women. They also protect illegal bunkering projects, protecting their communities as these are the projects providing for the villages. (AD2, 2019)

Similarly interestingly remarked by AD1:

> Except threaten by the informal economy the state does not concern itself with the suffering of its people. The state of Niger Delta is a micro-organism of the Nigeria state. The informal economy that does not relate to the stability of power of the ruling class is none of their business. The criminal economy that cannot be controlled, tolerated, and therefore undermines the security of power concerns the state. (AD1, 2019)

In view of all that has been mentioned so far, one may suppose that the informal economy and its members are not considered within the peacebuilding agenda of the state beyond sensitisation programmes aimed at building knowledge of peacebuilding. As participants suggest, as long as the informal economy does not tamper with the formal economy or rather the oil economy, the state government does not bother with it. However, there were interesting views contesting these notions, as some participants believed the informal economy was indeed included within the state's agenda. As opined by DB2:

> There was not much state focus especially in the past on the informal sector of the whole Niger Delta, as long as things like illegal refineries did not disrupt the flow of oil, they

(government) did not bother with it. However, now through the Niger Delta Development pathways we are working with the government in particular states. (DB2, 2019)

A broader perspective was adopted by AD3, who highlighted the motivations of the state including the informal economy within the peacebuilding agenda, stating:

> The informal economy is situated in the peacebuilding agenda, non-state actors operate within the realm of the informal economy. In terms of targeting, the government is targeting parts of the informal economy, for example, the bikes and sowing machines initiatives. But the questions are, what the nature of the targeting is: how have the resources allocated to this sector served as an enabler to sustain the informal economy? How have the challenges of those in the informal economy been addressed by the initiatives, what are the infrastructural challenges (roads, power supply), and how has the government addressed the issue of organised taxation by the informal actors? (AD3, 2019)

This view was supported by DB3, who stated:

> Recently this year there has been so much talk from the government about the informal economy, but specifically the illegal oil refineries. They are working to create an initiative to make all the illegal refineries formal. But we all know this is because of the self-interest it has. What about other dimensions of the informal economy? What happens to them? Where are the initiatives for them? (DB3, 2019)

The motives of elites in the Rivers and Bayelsa state has been questioned by various authors across time(see Ibeanu, 1997; Omeje, 2005; Abang, 2014) question the motives of the patrons, which further reinforces the notion of patronage peacebuilding discussed in chapter 4. As Abang (2014) notes, the elites have ulterior motives; this can be seen especially when looking at the establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta to complement the already existing Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). According to Abang, despite the state's efforts to establish peace through the NDDC, there is a recurrence of violence. He blames the ruling class, as corroborated by Ibeanu, who explains that:

> The Nigeria petty bourgeoisies are not given to ideological fidelity. They are simply powered fetish. In another case, they lack the discipline and strength of character to consistently pursue any ideological line. What is always overriding is power, money…
> (Ibeanu, 1997, p. 21)

In the same vein, Dafinone (2008) questions why, despite the efforts of the NDDC, various militants have gained credibility, arguing that the "NDDC has achieved very little", and went further to maintain that the master plan was crafted by expatriates in collaboration with a few political elites and was imposed on the people (cited in Akinwale and Osabuohien, 2009, pp. 149–153).Omeje, (2005) takes

this a step further by referring to these elites (patrons) as "rentier elites", stating that these are individuals whose economic interest and institutional roles are interfaced with the distribution and extraction of rents. Thus, the patrimonial political culture in Bayelsa and Rivers fosters 'rentier elites', and the absence of bureaucratic, functional, legal, and developed institutions further encourages and skews the motivations of elites. Thus, these scholars note that economic, business and political interests and profit drive the motives of the state with regard to the interests of the local people. Expanding on this notion, AD2, breaks down the motives of the state, remarking:

> Sometimes the state supports skill acquisition programmes, this is done as a buying strategy due to push-back from the people. The state does have a methodology to incorporate the informal economy, it is always a peace buying technique to continue the flow of oil. (AD2, 2019)

Similarly, AD1 argues that the informal economy is indeed included in the peacebuilding agenda of the state due to the benefits it provides to the formal economy, stating:

> The formal economy depends on the patronage of the informal economy. It has helped those in the informal economy. Where those in formal economy fund the informal economy,. (AD1, 2019)

Likewise, AD2 holds the view that:

> Value chains in the informal economy have emerged as a result of the kind of political climate and the type of initiatives occurring. As a result of these value chains, there seems to be subtle support in terms of looking the other way at illegal refineries when it does not harm the government, especially when they know the people – their boys used during elections. The patronage system safeguards them and the security agendas also look the other way. (AD2, 2019)

Overall, there seems to be some evidence to indicate that the informal economy is included within the state's peacebuilding agenda; however, it is a method of buying peace and continuing the established patronage network by rewarding the perpetrators of conflict either through funds or jobs, targeting especially those in the informal economy. Taken together, thus far, there have been contrasting views on whether or not the informal economy is included within the peacebuilding agenda. However, overall the perceptions of participants have provided crucial insights into an important theme emerging from the discussions: the criminalisation of peace. Patronage peacebuilding is leading to the criminalisation of peace, as the perception of participants below show. As DB6 notes, patronage peacebuilding is:

...redirecting people, channelling people into the informal economy as there is nothing to do in the formal economy, some of the (state-led) peacebuilding initiatives are given to people in the sector as a result of patronage network. (DB6, 2019)

What is particularly interesting from the quote above, is the apparent lack of a functioning formal structure. Indeed, Bayelsa and Rivers are rich states, not just in the natural resource of oil but also because of agriculture in terms of farming and fishing, as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as everyday business ventures. However, the notion that despite this "there is nothing in the formal economy" is alarming, because this paints the state as a weak state, unable to cater to the needs of its people. It also raises questions regarding state capacity and the nature of the state. As discussed in Chapter 3, both Bayelsa State and Rivers State have suffered from environmental degradation which has indeed affected their capacity. This argument is furthered by Sobek (2010, p. 267), who notes that state capacity plays a critical role in the conduct and onset of violence, as strong states can deter violence while weak states are unable to. In the same vein, Fearon and Latin (2003) noted that weak states cannot police their territory effectively. As AD1 observes:

The illicit informal economy thrives when it meets the needs of those the state did not capture. It provides employment. When the state is weak there is a rise in the illicit informal economy, people become more desperate. And who and what makes the state weak? The patronage networks, lack of development, lack of real initiatives. It's an endless cycle. (AD1, 2019)

Likewise, the work of Theobald and Englebert is further reinforced by Eric Budd and Jay Oedlbaum on the relationship between neopatrimonialism and underdevelopment (Budd, 2004; Oelbaum, 2002). Budd recognises that although all states are characterised by patrimonialism, they all possess different levels of it, and he goes on to examine the various levels of patrimonialism in African states. Through a ranking system, he notes that the more patrimonial a state is, the lower their national gross product (Budd, 2004). Within the ranking there are nations such as Botswana being categorised as "moderately patrimonial" and states such as Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe that are described as "highly patrimonial". Oelbaum takes this notion a step further by examining international financial institutions within the postcolonial era and their interactions with other developing countries (Oelbaum, 2002). He examines Ghana under Jerry Rawlings' regime, explaining that neopatrimonial relations show how neoliberal market reforms might be accomplished where there is a lack of popular support (Oelbaum, 2002). Within his research, he argues that various international actors subscribe to the view that "donor-support programmes of economic liberalisation undermine clientelism and require a fundamental change in the way African leaders relate to and reward their followers." (Oelbaum, 2002, p. 286) Despite this, African leaders are still able to capture these resources and operate in an informal

flexible network of 'personal' relationships, which could further lead to the corruption of the IMF and other bureaucratic structures (Oelbaum, 2002). It can be implied, therefore, that the capture of these resources by African leaders creates a situation in which the citizens lack the necessary support to live a normal daily life as their support is being stifled by the elites, thus forcing them to engage within the informal economy as a coping strategy. As identified by Jonathan Goodhand (2003), there is a gap in recognising whether the capture of this donor support has any influence on the functioning of the citizens in the illegal economy because of lack of support from the government.

This further advances the argument that, as a result, weak states share sovereignty with non-state actors, as discussed in Chapter 4. Hence, weak governments amplify poverty and violence, making conflict more feasible (Akpan and Umoh, 2016). Thus, as the culture of corruption and patronage have become the norm in Bayelsa and Rivers, the state institutions have further weakened as noted in chpater 4. As patronage peacebuilding interacts with the informal economy, purposely integrating and redirecting people back into the informal economy and the illicit economy, this further weakens the state. On the flip side, as noted by Ogunkola, Aiyede and Haruna (2018), this situation allows the informal economy – especially the illicit informal economy – to thrive at the expense of peacebuilding, leading to crimes such as the vandalization of oil infrastructures, oil bunkering and kidnapping, which are carried out by members of the illicit informal economy, such as the Greenlanders, Icelanders and MEND. This point is supported by DB3, who stated:

> (State-led) Peacebuilding initiatives being carried out affect people's choices because peacebuilding does not take into account the skills and needs of the people, that is why the informal economy thrives. (DB3, 2019)

Further leading to various adverse effects, the violence starts up again when the perpetrators are not satisfied. This brings into question the effectiveness of patronage peacebuilding in the first place. In addition, the patrons maintain their position of power, capturing the political and economic benefits of peacebuilding as patronage peacebuilding interacts with the informal economy through the criminal enterprise of peace; this is seen through the distribution of incentives, causing individuals to 'position' themselves for aid, as well as criminalising those who are outside the peacebuilding process. The perceptions of participants were that 'patronage peacebuilding', rather than addressing the conflict and developing the informal economy, redirects clients in the patronage networks and the general population in the informal economy as victims, who are then pushed to 'position' themselves –by forming strategic alliances with various patrons in order to survive. As DB5 noted:

> Lack of resources in the Niger Delta brought about 'creativity' – resources depend on connections for people and the influence of the resources. (DB5, 2019)

This was further raised by AD1:

> (state-led) Peacebuilding can also be seen as a criminal enterprise that criminalises those
> that are outside of it. (AD1, 2019)

He observed that due to the absence of comprehensive policy frameworks, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as overlapping functions and institutional rivalry within the state, people must become "creative" to survive in Bayelsa and Rivers. Explaining that this was a strategy employed by the government, rather than addressing the root causes, the formal economy is left to suffer thus pushing people into the informal economy. Thus, if this follows, we can take it that to possess power in the formal economy, patrons seek to destroy it to push people into the illicit informal economy, by offering inclusion in various peacebuilding initiatives. AD1 further stated:

> It is not enough to merely have a 9–5 job, when government pays, what do you do? When
> you don't sell your goods in the markets, because there was a clash between two rivalry
> groups who still taxed you at the end of the day. What do you do? You have to align
> yourself with someone who will throw "small jobs" your way. Peacebuilding in the Delta
> region is a process that incentivises informality to be formalised. (AD1, 2019)

This point was further corroborated by AD3, stating that:

> Peacebuilding is redirecting people, channelling people into the informal economy
> because there is nothing to do and the peacebuilding agenda does not cater to them.
> State-based peacebuilding in the Niger Delta is not about the victims but the perpetrator.
> (AD3, 2019)

Similarly, SB11 argued:

> The political nature of peacebuilding initiatives pushes people to the informal economy.
> Where they find the need to be linked to a patron than working a normal day job. Having
> two or more patrons is better than working here. (SB11, 2019)

Thus, it can be deduced that citizens (who later become clients) position themselves, but in this case it is, however, the government officials or patrons pushes them to positioning themselves. Clients are now being redirected and positioned into the illicit informal economy. This is where the struggle for power within the formal economy takes place, and, as such, for a patron to be able to access and hold power within the formal economy they must first have a strong power pull in the informal economy (AD1, 2019; AD2, 2019, DB5;2019). Thus, the channelling of people into the informal economy is seen as a deliberate act to achieve this power pull over other patrons(AD2, 2019; SB12; 2019). This positionality can either be seen as a reward from a patron to a client, a client's family member, or a means of buying loyalty. Thus, this takes away the opportunity from individuals who really should be a

part of the peacebuilding process to include members, who are, rather, pawns in the struggle for power within the region. As noted by AD1:

> More people are trying to get into the informal economy to be formalised. This increases competition in the informal economy, everyone wants to be included, to have a patron to get their share. Everyone wants in at all costs. (AD1, 2019)

In the same vein, AD3 notes:

> Peacebuilding needs to be participatory, and where this is lacking the state will have to impose quality programmes from the top. As such, the informal economy is alienated. There is a gap between the state and those who find themselves in the informal economy as a coping mechanism. State actors want to leverage development programmes to support their own agendas to those who need it. (AD3, 2019)

The evidence reviewed here seems to suggest that the clients are purposely pushed into the informal economy, to position them to survive. However, the empirical data revealed that not only is this happening, but clients are more specifically 'positioned' into the illicit informal economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are various dimensions of the informal economy. The illicit/shadow or criminal economy is the part of the informal economy that deals with criminality. The empirical data suggested that at the interface of patronage peacebuilding and the illicit informal economy lead to the performance of militancy. The 'performance of militancy' occurs when individuals pretend to be affiliated to specific militant group, which sometimes leads to the individuals becoming involved in militancy, paying dues to be part of militant groups, or even just running errands for militant groups (AD1, 2019). He describes it as the process or act of pretending to be a militant or be part of a militancy group, thereby placing oneself in a position to receive the benefits accorded to the militant groups by the government. According to empirical evidence, this became a popular theme because many youths and victims of crime in the Niger Delta do not see a way out of poverty, thus fuelling the problem. He remarked:

> Amnesty didn't foresee the youths, but the youth foresaw themselves in the amnesty "performing militancy" therefore agitating people to be included, thus a process of incentivising agitators to be included, describing peace as the process that incentivises informality to be formalised. (AD1,2019)

He further noted that the youths agitated to be included in the state peacebuilding process; they pretended to be involved with militant groups and stole guns so they could be included in the amnesty. He concluded by describing:

> ...a process of incentivising agitations to be included. (AD1,2019)

The act of performing militancy might not have been all that harmful if it had been just that – a 'performance'; however, empirical data suggested that, as time went by, many dropped the 'performing' and actually joined militancy groups. After all, one can't just claim to be part of a militant group and expect to just be accepted. As one interviewee put it, many had to pay their "dues" in order to be included onto the list supported by the government. The dues in question ranged from petty crimes and running errands for the groups, to actually becoming initiated into the groups as members. This illustrates how the incentive for 'performing militancy' was pushing people into actually embracing militancy, making it an everyday thing. As described by one interviewee, performing militancy therefore became a process that "incentivises informality to be formalised", as well as being a means by which peacebuilding was becoming a criminalising enterprise. Supported by the work of Peter Evans (1987,) who argues that the state turns its population into prey, similarly Boas and Jennings (2005) note that as response groups seek profit and means of survival. Thus, it can be taken that at the interfaces of patronage peacebuilding and the informal economy, patronage peacebuilding is pushing people into the informal economy and the illicit informal economy because the state did not include them in the peacebuilding architecture. Consequently, this creates a social imbalance as there is no clear path for social mobility, or rather a path for peace and survival, beyond the patronage networks. This route then in turn leads to further crimes and violence, thereby creating what I have termed the 'patronage peacebuilding cycle'.

Figure 15 Patronage Peacebuilding Cycle in the Informal Economy

A third consequence of the interaction between the informal economy and patronage peacebuilding, beyond positioning and performing militancy, is that it has led to the further marginalisation of the population in Rivers and Bayelsa states. Marginalisation is synonymous with being excluded from the mainstream; groups are made marginal by rendering a section of the population politically inconsequential, thus leading to their neglect. Ibeanu (1999) noted that marginalisation is the process of setting different standards for different people in a polity. This was similarly noted by Kuper and Smith (1969, p. 440), who state that marginalisation is "the total exclusion of subordinate sections from the inclusive public domain." As discussed in Chapter 3, the population of Rivers and Bayelsa states were already marginalised as a result of the political, social and economic situation in the states, such as lack of development, high levels of unemployment and violence in the region. The empirical data revealed that this is continued and even furthered by the state into the informal economy. Thus, state-based initiatives focus on power structures and there is a deliberate lack of focus on the informal economy; beyond criminalising clients these practices have played a key role in the ongoing exclusion of the population in a disempowering context. The context of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers adds additional layers of marginalisation and inequalities, especially among various vulnerable groups. As a result, people in Bayelsa and Rivers states are confronted with serious issues, including threats to life, liberty and security, damage or destruction of homes and other properties, forced displacement and restrictions on freedom of movement and access to livelihood systems, lack of education and health, and lack of accountability and effective remedy (Iwilade, 2017; Ebiede; 2017). These are issues which peacebuilding does not fully resolve. Furthermore, according to Guttere (2018), marginalisation breeds inequality in the social system. Thus, structural dislocations interact with patronage peacebuilding and the informal economy to create further inequality in the social system. As clients and the general population are disempowered and struggle to be part of the patronage network by forming alliances, this leads to the disempowerment of these groups as it pushes them into crime and violence Iwilade, 2017; Ebiede; 2017; AD1, 2019; SB12, 2019. This marginalisation furthers state abuse, with pervading insecurity and violence engendering contradictions and tension within the public sphere (Omemma, 2019). Thus, domination and exclusion among individuals and groups have become endless and widespread – leading to struggles and violent conflicts and loss of ownership and rights in respect of the natural resources in their territories (Omemma, 2019). Thus, peacebuilding initiatives in the region are complex and varied, and underlie most conflicts – especially those that have erupted within the last decade – resulting in marginalisation. These situations have engendered contradictions and tensions in the public sphere. They have also underlined an almost pathological context in which allegations of domination and exclusion among individuals and groups have become ceaseless and widespread –

leading to struggles and violent conflicts – over oil-based revenues in the region. Thus, the criminalisation of peace further leads to the marginalisation of the population, thereby triggering violence.

Taken together, the nexus of peacebuilding and the informal economy has led to the criminalisation of peace; this, in turn, has led to positioning and the performance of militancy, which have further led to increasing marginalisation in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Thus, marginalisation further explains the disposition to militancy and violence, the recurrence of conflict – and the overall failure to build peace economies.

Conclusion

This chapter examined how donor-based and state-led peacebuilding initiatives interact and shape the informal economy. It examined the connection between actors, their interests and correlations, as well as the incentives used to include or exclude the informal economy from the peacebuilding agenda. It argued that the informal economy is not deliberately included the peacebuilding agenda of donor-base organisation

Despite the existence of contrasting views – as to whether or not the informal economy has been included in the agenda of state-led peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states – it is my opinion, based on the empirical evidence, that the informal economy has officially been included within the peacebuilding agenda; however, there exists an interaction – and even, some might say, an overlap – between participants in the peacebuilding process and members of the informal economy, as well as the illicit informal economy. This conclusion is grounded in the logic that the secret deals in the informal economy between patrons and clients have helped to maintain the patronage network that has been important for containing violence. At the interface of patronage peacebuilding and the informal economy, patronage peacebuilding reinforces the political manipulation of violence in Bayelsa and Rivers states. As the analysis above has shown, the chapter argues that patronage peacebuilding has pushed people into the informal economy as a means of survival, as patrons have used oil rents to entice the clients –militants and the general population, thereby criminalising peacebuilding in three ways: firstly, by forcing people to 'position' themselves for 'aid'; secondly, 'performing militancy'; and thirdly, furthering marginalisation of the population, especially those in the informal economy. This raises the question of the state's capacity to cater for the population. Thus, the findings of this study add a new perspective to studies of the informal economy within the peacebuilding agenda. The patronage peacebuilding framework shows how the state has disempowered and marginalised

communities, or rather enabled empowerment within a disempowering context, thus providing empirical evidence that state-led peacebuilding initiatives do inadvertently affect the peacebuilding agenda in Bayelsa State and Rivers State.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

The specific aim of this chapter is to highlight the contribution of this research as well as the motivations for further research. This thesis study has critically investigated the impact of neopatrimonialism on state-led and donor-based peacebuilding initiatives and the relationship between peacebuilding and the informal economy in Bayelsa State and Rivers State.

This thesis has analysed the conflict and peacebuilding process in Bayelsa and Rivers states, highlighting the key actors involved in the conflict (Chapter 3). The destruction of the environment and of livelihoods due to the discovery and exploration of oil, has further heightened poverty and unemployment in the region, as well as the capacity of greedy patrons to accumulate enormous oil wealth to the detriment of the local population. Thus, the institutions and behaviours of state and non-state actors have shaped human development (or rather the lack thereof), thus contributing to violence and poverty leading to militancy (Chapter 3). This thesis also discusses the state-led initiatives aimed at peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, during the conflict, categorising the initiatives as either 'carrot' or 'stick' approach and examining the framework of the donor-based organisation, PIND and the NSRP in order to provide foundational knowledge of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and River state. Thus, setting the scene to analyse

how state-led and peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism and how this shapes the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers states, using a thematic content analysis approach.

Methodology

The thesis has reached these findings through its fully integrated analysis based on a combination of qualitative methods to provide a grounded perspective. The use of qualitative methods allowed to fully attain a high degree of analytical and research rigour when exploring firstly the understanding of peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states and how and if it is shaped by neopatrimonialism. And secondly how this narrative of peacebuilding affects the illicit informal economy within these states. This was achieved by integrating semi-structured interviews, government documents, reports, and policy documents. Which aided in providing in-depth accounts of participants' experiences feeding to this research. Furthermore, through this thesis data triangulation was used to utilise the research content which helps in validating and comparing materials from different sources

Research Hypothesis

The original starting point of this thesis was the puzzle Chapter 1 of this thesis. It began by introducing three central concepts of the informal economy, peacebuilding, and neopatrimonialism. It noted that the illicit informal is part of the informal economy that not only serves as a driver to conflict but can also continue to operate once opened conflict has ended. And when considered in a post-conflict setting it can lead to the con consolidation of peace, thus consisting of a problem. This becomes a problem not only because it threatens peacebuilding but also because it also threatens the non-illicit part of the informal economy which as this thesis pointed out functions as a coping mechanism. Furthermore, the illicit informal economy promotes activities out of the control of the state which also threatens the establishment of public institutions. As such, the needs to be a proper understanding of the nature, dynamics, and scope of the illicit informal economy, how it related to the informal economy and is shaped by various factors, factors such as peacebuilding. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter one the way in which the use of power by the elites has led to formal institutions being supervised by corruption and personal leadership, as actors operate both in the illicit informal economy and the formal economy. As such the interactivity blurs the already complicates lines of where the informal economy and formal economy start and began. Furthermore, the peacebuilding initiatives in the post-conflict environment reinforce this personal leadership and corruption, especially between patrons and clients. Therefore, the political economy of peacebuilding functions as a lucrative economy that politicises elites in various formal leading to the accumulation of networks that thrived within conflict

settings (Chandler, 2013). Taken together it can be implied that the nexus between peacebuilding initiatives and the illicit economy is not only rooted in political protection, clientele network but the struggle for economic power which as the interface shows peacebuilding to anti-democratic. (Chandler, 2013; Iwilade, 2017). This implies a paradoxical nexus between peacebuilding initiatives and the illicit informal economy, a nexus which is rooted in a tight association of political protection, clientele networks and economic capital between the various networks and agents within the state (Chandler, 2013; Iwilade, 2017). Consequently, this thesis seeks to test out this hypothesis by giving the illicit informal economy a central role within the peacebuilding agenda, using Bayelsa state and Rivers state as case studies. By examining firstly, it explores the type of peacebuilding being promoted in Bayelsa state and Rivers state, focusing on the two main stakeholders – the state, and donor-based organisations. Secondly, it analyses how the peacebuilding agenda shapes the illicit informal economy.

In order to accomplish these objectives chapter 2, served as aimed to provide an extensive literature review clarifying terms, such as the informal economy peacebuilding, neopatrimonialism, and the informal economy. While also highlighting the understanding or lack of understanding of the illicit informal economy through the lens of peacebuilding. And although this was not an original contribution, such clarifications provided an important foundation for the ideational…this chapter started by acknowledging there was no universally accepted definition of the informal economy, however it explored definitions by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It noted that while the definition of the informal economy has continued to change over the years there were similar elements across time. These similarities included:

a. It refers to economic activities that are not recorded (Schneider, 2002).

b. These activities are not captured by the state's national or statistics accounts (Castells and Portes, 1989; De Soto, 1989; Harding and Jenkins, 1989; Fiege, 1990; ILO, 2013).

c. They are invisible to policy formulation (ILO, 2013).

d. Actors employed within the informal economy are excluded from labour standards such as safety, health, minimum wage, working hours (ILO, 2013

As such, the definition of the informal economy used through this thesis is based upon the points listed above. This chapter then analyses the theories of the informal economy to build an understanding of the interactions between the informal economy and the formal economy. It argued that to fully capture this interaction, scholars need to combine the two or three theories to account for their weaknesses. As such this thesis adopted the globalisation thesis, complementary theory, and the illegal school, which capture the relationship between the formal and informal economy through social networks that

are interlinked and sometimes lead to illicit activities. This chapter then sought to explain the liberal peace theory identifying the gaps within the literature as it pertained to the informal economy especially in Africa. It highlighted works like Salih (2018), Meagher (2014,2015,2016, 2017), Danielson (2015) and highlighted the existence of the relationship between peacebuilding and the informal economy but stressed a lack of knowledge of the type of relationship this was and who it really served. Thus, also shows a link between the three concepts in this thesis to form the conceptual framework of this thesis. That is poverty, the trade-off that sometimes occurs at the end of a conflict while trying to transition into the post-conflict stage, political competition, and the power struggle which highlights the niche for this study. While also highlighting the gap this thesis aimed to fill. This led to the final section in this chapter which examined not only the definition of neopatrimonialism but also its relationship with conflict and how these feeds into the cycle of conflict. Thus, providing foundational knowledge to the gaps within the literature and how accounts for the obstacles around building peace.

Chapter 3 aimed to provide background knowledge of Bayelsa state and Rivers state. Firstly, it explored the interplay between conflict and peacebuilding. It showed that there were main factors responsible for the onset of conflict within these states ranging from the discovery of oil, environmental degradation, corruption, greed, and the militarization of the region to mention a few. As such it is quite difficult to pinpoint a single cause of the conflict, highlight the complex and intrinsic nature of the conflict. This highlights the need to shift from previous paradigms that embrace greed and grievance alone to one that took into consideration the current complex nature of the conflict. Secondly, this chapter focuses on providing an overview of the state-led peacebuilding initiatives implemented across the Niger Delta states. It broke down these approaches into stick and carrot initiatives, highlighted the failures within each. The overall analysis of the peacebuilding initiatives in the Niger Delta should that attempts to peacebuilding were not only short term but also driven by corruption and greed which resulted in most of their failures. Another dimension of the peacebuilding initiatives as they were mostly an attempt at buying peace rather than addressing the root causes of conflict. The third and final section of this chapter analysed the informal economy in Bayelsa state and River state. Although the data within the area was specifically limited with no report having a full number of members of the informal, this section was able to depict various activities within the informal economy. It also highlighted activities that fell within the illicit informal economy therefore the difference between the informal economy and the illicit economy. For example, the difference between an unregistered captured and an ex-militant leader bunkering oil refineries Therefore, the overall objective of this chapter is to provide a solid foundational understanding of the political economy of conflict and peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Setting the scene for the analysis in chapters 4 and 5.

Research findings

In answering the first research question on how and to what extent state-led and donor-based initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism, this thesis has made two critical findings. Firstly, it can be discerned that the donor-based organisations were not influenced by neopatrimonialism but, rather, were very donor-centric. This donor centric approach led to the belief that donor-base organisation were autonomous therefore they were not accountable to the local government or population. Hence, it was argued that this leads to the execution of quick and tangible programs that were unregulated by the state. Thus, the NRSP and PIND became service providers and gap fillers to that filled the gap occurred because of the state weakness. Consequently, the led to the dependency of foreign aid for the development of the region, questions the impact and suitability of these initiatives. This thesis also argued that there was a discrepancy with regards to the language used by donors in the policy reports and the reality in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. Arguing that despite the positive conations, various initiatives that are implemented serve rather as gap fillers and are hard to measure the impact and effectiveness to the local communities. This notion was supported by the works

Secondly, this thesis found that state-led peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states was influenced by neopatrimonialism. (Chapter 4) Arguing that the lack of peace in Bayelsa and Rivers states is neither because of the oil economy, nor because of the destruction of resources or inadequate resources, but can further be attributed to the nature of state-led peacebuilding occurring within those states. As state-led peacebuilding initiatives have elevated corruption and reconstructed patronage networks that existed during the conflict, these state-led peacebuilding initiatives have, thus, led to institutional arrangements that undermine peacebuilding measures but focus instead on incentivising the elites and restructuring the patron–client relationships. This complex nature of peacebuilding and the perceptions of participants allowed me to frame the relationship between peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism, as 'patronage peacebuilding', one of the more significant findings to emerge from this study.

'Patronage peacebuilding' refers to the political and economic process of establishing peace that is centred on the advancement of the various political agendas of the patrons. It is a process that restructures the power dynamics within the post-conflict setting, reinforcing the benefits that existed during the conflict through institutional arrangements. It is a short-term political purpose which institutionalises self-enrichment and power sharing that is, in turn, reinforced through neopatrimonialism–clientelism and godfatherism; this overall destroys political and economic

222

development, not only at the state level but also at the federal and local levels. Thus concept of patronage peacebuilding highlights how peacebuilding has reverted to the remobilisation of ex-fighters and the reconstruction of power structures that existed during the conflicts in these states, thus leading to the further disintegration of Bayelsa state and Rivers state. Further, patronage peacebuilding highlights the transformation of relations between political elites and their clients, as noted by Iwilade (2017), who states that the real goal of state-led initiatives such as the amnesty programme was to re-constitute power relations between patrons and clients. This thesis argued that state-led peacebuilding, otherwise reframed as patronage peacebuilding, has largely been involved in the crafting of institutions that have perpetuated the struggle for power and short-term containment of violence in order to restore and reshape the patronage network. This included the patrons – political elites, traditional leaders, godfathers and ex-militant commanders who serve as the main architects of the conflict in the first place. As well as the clients, ex-militants, youths and the general population of Bayelsa and Rivers states have played supporting and intermediary roles to the patrons. It expanded on William Reno work discussed in chapter 2. Reno (1997) observed that the institutional arrangements of power and the personal wealth accumulation by elites had led to the creation of the "shadow state" . this shadow state therefore led to a narrative of how a how a state was meant to function and how it did (Reno, 1997). He lined violence and neopatrimonlism to the disruption of resources as well as the prevalence of criminal networks, which Ilkhamov (2007, p. 71) similarly noted led to "parallel power network, matching existing state hierarchies". Which can be seen in Bayelsa and River state when exploring patronage peacebuilding. Hence, patronage peacebuilding has therefore led to two defining features: it leads to institutional weakness that provides insufficient democratic policies; and it leads to political actors who utilise this weakness to retain power.

This thesis also argued that patronage peacebuilding depicts how a short-term or temporary peace is achieved in Bayelsa and Rivers states through institutional arrangements that support the creation and distribution of wealth and power. Thus, in this vein, the extent to which patrons can form alliances and beneficial arrangements with clients helps to determine the duration of peace in these states. Hence, patronage peacebuilding does not guarantee peacebuilding and conflict resolution, especially when institutional reforms are excluded from the peacebuilding process. Patronage peacebuilding reinforces patron–client relations as political elites find protection under dispersed armed groups that are loyal to them and pay off non-state fighters who pose a significant threat to the elite revenue generating stream. Thus, violence in Bayelsa and Rivers tends to be temporarily halted by the state government without any intention of addressing the underlying problems that continue to fuel conflict in these states. Thus, various state institutions have enhanced the capacity of patrons to contain violence and

continue their activities. Patronage peacebuilding, therefore, has largely pursued the interest of patrons and clients as the two groups who most benefit from the spoils of patronage networks to the detriment of peacebuilding for the local population (Wengraf, 2018, p. 159). Thus, peacebuilding in Rivers and Bayelsa is more focused on restructuring the socio-economic dimension and re-establishing and maintaining power than on sustaining peace and development. furthering the analysis of Medard(Medard, 1982) on predominance of personal relationships within African politics (Medard, 1982) as well as Sandbrook (2000) who identified that in some African states, a representation of "economic objectives [is subordinated] to the short-run exigences of political survival" for the elites (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 97) examined in chapter 2.Thus, the peacebuilding process has not just been fuelled by neopatrimonialism, but, more importantly, it reconstructs the power structures that existed during the conflict era within the post-conflict.

Furthermore, a crucial finding of this research is how patronage peacebuilding affects the power structures, leadership and governance in Bayelsa and Rivers states. Clearly, as indicated by this research, because the patronage network has become a major determinant of access to a better livelihood, it has become the dominant way of life and means by which individuals thrive within post-conflict Bayelsa and Rivers. Some of the power-sharing opportunities involve traditional authorities, politicians, local leaders and members of the community, receiving their share of funds or the 'national cake', as it is commonly referred to. Fundamentally, patronage peacebuilding has changed the power relations between the traditional leaders, who represent the traditional authority, and those who represent it figuratively. As Faleti (2006) explains, the advantages and disadvantages of unequal distribution that occurs in society reshapes relationships and behaviours, which also serves to bring about conflict. In the same vein as disused in chapter 2 Lucy Mair noted that need for a patron does not reflect the "necessity for survival" but is more to "advance one's economy and social status. This also falls in line with Jonathan Goodhand's (2003; 2005; 2012) work which examined the notion that conflicts shift to becoming more about vested interests and economic. Hence as indicated in Chapter 4, ex-militant leadership is slowly displacing traditional structures. Thus, competition for local positions and rulership becomes even more fierce due to the benefits they accord; thus, groups and individuals all engage in violence to remain in power. It is for this reason that the post-conflict environment is flooded with the sparks of conflicts.

The struggle for power has also reconstituted social and economic structures, creating new social relations and the emergence of other alternative power structures that are no longer led by patrons but are now being pioneered by clients themselves. The new relations, however, are still characterised

by the effects of conflict economies, such as lack of employment, environmental scarcity and the struggle over land, as well as the exclusion of most of the population. Iwilade (2017) also notes the emergence of new networks in the Niger Delta region and calls for the examination of what the means for the region. Consequently, new power relations have been created by patronage peacebuilding that are sustained through violence and fierce struggles. Thus, there is an intense tug-of-war over power going on, in order to continue profiting in the post-conflict society, not just among patrons but also among clients. Hence, any opportunity that will provide access to patron networks becomes highly valued. The desperation and need to be included within these power structures leads to violent killings and fierce struggles that lead to competition for resources and access to development programmes. A pattern of violence emerges as the quest for political positions thrives, with elites and clients struggling to gain and retain political authority. Thus, there is fierce competition and a struggle for leadership, and for access to patron networks, as the benefits and opportunities serve as catalysts that fuel the struggle for power.

Taken together, the knowledge and understanding of patronage peacebuilding highlights the importance of including power relations in the socio-economic and political processes of peacebuilding, as it plays an important role in the survival and governance of a given society. This exploration has also shown that an increase in peacebuilding initiatives will not reduce conflict. However, peacebuilding initiatives need to focus on destabilising the power structures that thrived during the conflict, as power structures do substantially shape peacebuilding, with political elites continuing to seek more ingenious access to political positions. Peacebuilding initiatives also need to re-introduce new power structures that promote proper governance that is aimed at sustainable peace and development.

While expanding on the impact of neopatrimonialism on donor-based and patronage peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers (Chapter 4) the empirical data also revealed three subthemes: the tolerance of patronage peacebuilding, the 'blame game', and the reliance of the population on NGOs. These factors all contribute to the failure to construct positive peace. As shown by this thesis, lack of cooperation has led to blame avoidance, which not only makes the pursuit of accountability difficult but also leads to issues with assessing the suitability of initiatives. The lack of cooperation between the state and federal government, and NGO agencies has resulted in an overlap of non-implementation of projects and an increase in bureaucracy.

The second aim of this study was to investigate how donor-based peacebuilding initiatives and patronage peacebuilding (state-led initiatives) shape the informal economy (Chapter 5). Through

analysis of interviews and document analysis this thesis argued that, firstly, about donor-based initiatives, we find that the informal economy is not included in the peacebuilding agenda of either PIND or the NSRP. It found that even though these peacebuilding initiatives do sometimes cater to people within the informal economy, for example, market women, unemployed youths and so on, the informal economy is not deliberately included within the peacebuilding agenda. As such this ignored members of the overall informal economy pushing them to look for alternative means of survival.

Secondly, concerning patronage of peacebuilding, this thesis argued that the informal economy is selectively included in the peacebuilding agenda, which has led to the criminalisation of peace in three ways. Firstly, it has led the population into 'positioning' themselves within the community for aid. As noted by Murphy's work discussed in chapter 2 the patron client relationship led to a trickle-down effect of taking advantage of youths and controlling resources and returning loyalty of protection and even arms. As such, as the population in Bayelsa and Rivers are deliberately included in the peacebuilding they have to "position" themselves for assistance. This involves operating in the informal economy to attract a patron. Beyond the population positioning themselves, the patrons position the population as they (patrons) are more concerned with restricting the power structures that establishing and maintain peace and building economic advancement. Secondly the criminalisation of peace led to "performance of militancy". As observed in the empirical data the youths were not foreseen in the plan of the state, as such they had to foresee themselves into the plan- this was done by "performing militancy". This was the act of pretending to be part of a militant group. As noted by Khan (2005) failure of state system pushes the population to provide for itself, which is the case in Bayelsa and River state. Which according to Van de Walle (2012) is because even the smaller pollical benefit of clientelism would be valuable, as such with regards to Bayelsa and Rivers, citizens would rather pretend to be included in the patronage network. Thirdly, the further marginalisation of the population, especially those in the informal economy. Thus, the new nature of selective inclusion means that the population now directly and indirectly depend on patronage of peacebuilding to survive. Paradoxically, instead of peacebuilding initiatives improving the economic and social wellbeing of the informal economy, it has rather led to the further marginalisation of agency within the informal economy. This is heightened by the struggle for power and the benefits that power brings – benefits such as access to patron networks, ownership of land, employment, education and so on. Thus, it could be argued that while patronage peacebuilding creates an opportunity for change it comes at a cost: an alliance within the patronage networks – networks that are full of back-channel deals, corruption, and crime. Consequently, it can be deduced that patronage peacebuilding creates conditions of conflict within the informal economy in Bayelsa and Rivers states.

In summary, this dissertation has centrally argued, firstly, that donor-based initiatives are not fuelled by neopatrimonialism but rather driven by the motives of their donors, while state-led peacebuilding initiatives are shaped by neopatrimonialism leading to patronage peacebuilding, which centres on institutional arrangements to restore and maintain the patronage network. Secondly, that this has impacted the peacebuilding agenda by leading to a blame game and the reliance of the population on NGOs, leading to failure to construct positive peace. And, finally, the lack of a deliberate focus on the informal economy by state-based and donor-based initiatives has led to the criminalisation of peace, where people in the informal economy position themselves for aid and perform militancy, and which has further led to the marginalisation of the population.

Contributions to Academic Research

This thesis has demonstrated and applied original and innovative methods of study, not only exploring peacebuilding initiatives but also examining the nexus between peacebuilding and the informal economy from the perspective of the work of the NSRP, PIND and governmental agencies. The sheer complexity of the informal economy entails no single approach to understanding the phenomenon's articulations is possible or appropriate – hence, the use of rich and critical descriptive interviews to provide in-depth accounts of participants' experiences, which fed into this research. Thus, all the components and foundations within the qualitative research make for contextualising and understanding the research questions within this study. The study design also fosters a better understanding of peacebuilding within Bayelsa and Rivers and how it is shaped by neopatrimonialism, and, overall, how it influences or is influenced by the informal economy. The research has created an interesting thematic template that illustrated the significances of themes within the analysis, thus, demonstrating the usefulness of the theoretical framework in studying the different themes especially within a political economy narrative, which still adopts a rather narrow conceptualisation of the informal economy. Building on previous academic studies highlighting the link between peacebuilding and the informal economy as discussed in chapter 2. Firstly, it expanded on the works of Meagher (2014, 2017) which identified the need to shift from a blanket representation of the informal economy to focus on specific states and cities. As such this work focused on the informal economy in the states of Bayelsa and Rivers as a gateway to understanding the broader picture in the Niger Delta. Thus, provides an understanding of these states' informal economy while also expanding on a regional understanding of the informal economy. Secondly, Meagher (2014) also identified the need to explore how the informal economy is shaped by governance with regard to history, gender noting a lack of information on underlying factors that influence how state institutions and economic development

agenda interact and influence the development (and size) of the informal economy. As such, this thesis expanded on this notion by exploring how the iilicit informal economy is shaped by peacebuilding initiatives, recognising how the notions of neopatrimonialism and power are key elements not just within peacebuilding in Bayelsa and Rivers states but also influencing the conflict within these states. Consequently, this thesis has demonstrated the value of thematic template analysis through which the emerging themes can be directly compared prospectively and retrospectively. Thus, in methodological terms, this thesis has shown the conduciveness of sequencing the narratives of the fieldwork into themes and how these themes interact and shape various perspectives.

This thesis contributes to political economy scholarship by exploring how peacebuilding initiatives shape the informal economy and what this means for the overall peacebuilding agenda. It builds on three notable contributions to political economy literature. The first is the continuation of the thematic analysis on the political economy of peacebuilding, and how the political economy of conflict can be detrimental to the overall peacebuilding agenda. As discussed in chapter 2 both Danielsson and Meagher recognised the need to better understand the informal economy beyond its scope and size to include the implications it holds for economic change, especially within local institutions in Africa (Meagher, 2014; Danielsson, 2015). To shift to inclusion of economic change in local institutions to question whose interests were being met and who was being included Meagher, 2014; Danielsson, 2015). Likewise, as observed by Keith Hart: "We need to know...what social forms have emerged to organise the informal economy as well as examine the institutional particulars sustaining whatever takes place beyond the law." (2006, p. 33). Meagher recognised that the informal economy was useful more as more interventionist goal in which the pool of workers, as well as institutions within the informal economy, were regarded as useful for reducing cost and facilitating access to the informal market. The outcome was that a part of the informal economy became marginalised, while other actors within the informal economy were 'included' (Meagher, 2016). As such the informal economy became an exercise that rather fell in line with the agendas of governance, thus leading to techniques of governance became more involved with working, classifying, managing and restructuring the informal economy in order to build inclusive markets that were synonymous with global businesses. Hence, the informal economy is viewed more as a workforce to be harnessed than as a system that needs to be transformed, especially within the continent of Africa. Thus, this research expanded on this showing that indeed the informal economy specially in Bayelsa and Rivers state were harnessed for the use of political elites leading to the positioning of aid, performance of militancy and the further marginalisation of the population.

This research also renforces the liberal assumptions of mainstream peacebuilding highlight thr rule of law are the bedrock for liberal peacebuilding efforts. Howeevr it provides an alternative to the liberal peacebuilding idea recognizing that the theory of liberal peacebuilding differs from the reality of peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding, therefore, is context specific as with the case of Bayelsa and River state is fuelled by patronage networks, the exclusion of local stakeholders. Promotion of liberal democratization without addressing causes to conflict. Thus, as Bhikhu Parekh and Claude Ake reject a universal idea of liberal peace so also does this thesis argues for a more content-specific understanding of liberal peacebuilding that takes into consideration the political, historical, and cultural ideas of a given state or nation. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, Salih (2017) notes that the reality and its manifestations differ in different countries, leading to varying forms of democratic experience. Giving the examples of Africa nations peacebuilding is contingent upon the outcome of the political economy of peace rather than the imposition of liberal peace, which in turn leads to the negative effects of neoliberalism. Similarly work of Iwilade and Amoateng (2020) critical liberal peacebuilding in the Niger Delta focusing on the amnesty program bringing the notion of the amnesty trap discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore Salih (2017) notes that liberal peacebuilding does not take into consideration the post-conflict economy especially those carried on from the conflict setting- a gap this thesis aimed to fill. He noted that in the post-conflict setting especially among the poor liberal peacebuilding was fostering economic marginalisation, grievances, and social injustice. Thus, as this thesis shows liberal peacebuilding in practice is promoting relationships of clientelism within certain areas of states building on this showing how peace in Bayelsa and Rivers start has rather foster patronage peacebuilding.

This thesis furthers contributes to neopatrimonialism scholarship in two ways. Firstly, previous work on Rivers and Bayelsa have been particularly focused on understanding them from a perspective of conflict. Thus, this thesis builds on this neopatrimonialism scholarship that has shaped the interpretation of the conflict and expands to consider the interpretation of peacebuilding in both states, rather than relying on a blanket representation of the whole Niger Delta. Secondly this thesis places the patron–client relations at the centre of its analysis and explores the fluid relation both to peacebuilding and the informal economy, to further understand how the informal economy is shaped in post-conflict societies. Rather than adopting the usual conceptualisation of these relationships – with the clients being exploited by the patrons, as previous studies on Nigeria have understood – this thesis explores how these networks create agency within the informal economy, which created new power relations in Bayelsa state and Rivers state. This thesis not only draws attention to often-ignored elements in the political economy discourse, especially within the Niger Delta, which has been

dominated by the greed and grievance dichotomy, but also advances the understanding of the informal economy.

The final contribution this thesis makes is the knowledge and understanding of "patronage peacebuilding", which is the nexus of peacebuilding and neopatrimonialism. Thus, understanding the nexus between the neopatrimonialism- patronage and peacebuilding ensures that designs for economic and social policy aim to tackle the power structures within the informal economy and not re-institutionalise the already existing power structures. Therefore, as the term suggests, 'patronage peacebuilding' refers to a political and economic process of establishing peace that is centred on the advancement of the various political agendas and the reconstruction the power dynamics in Bayelsa and Rivers states to reinforce the distribution of benefits that existed during the conflict. it notes that as the patrons struggle to remain in control and power in the post-conflict setting as noted by Sandbrook (1986) there is competition which Bailey (1971) manifest in the need to knock out opponents. Consequently, patronage peacebuilding institutionalises self-enrichment and power-sharing through clientelist networks made up of godfathers, political elites, ex-militant leaders and members of groups, youths, and the general population of Bayelsa and Rivers states. As such with the literature, this thesis marries the empirical data with studies by, Kiipoye (2015) Iwilade (2017) and Amoateng (2020) on the peacebuilding process in Nigeria Delta specially observing that in Bayelsa and Rivers state demonstrating that peacebuilding is a process where cooperation between the patrons, militants and clients is permitted and in turn increases the level of conflict in the post-conflict setting. Thus, in place of neopatrimonialism-and patronage this thesis contributed to the neopatrimonial scholarship by coming up with a better explanatory framework of state-led peacebuilding which can be use in future studies.

Overall, the interview and case study approach has allowed the exploration of positive, negative and neutral responses of participants, thus being a more balanced approach than one focusing only on the negative responses. The interviews also aimed to gather the viewpoints and perspectives of peacebuilding agency's staff and officials in order to compare and, most importantly, enrich the data. This was done by including analysis of selected committee reports. The structure of the interviews also allowed participants to set their own definitions and understand concepts such as peacebuilding and the informal economy. It also provided insights into institutional themes, as well as how donors and state organisations expressed sustained perspectives on peacebuilding and the informal economy. The structure of the interviews also provided understanding as to why and how narratives did or did not change, thus, allowing the research to comprise rich and varied data.

Furthermore, the research questions explored within this thesis are highly essential and timely, especially within a political and democratic context, as the political role of both formal and informal institutions remains uncertain in Bayelsa and Rivers. Efforts to restore peace in the Niger Delta further adds to this uncertainty, alongside a broader global debate about the political security, not only of the Niger Delta, but of Nigeria as a whole through the Niger Delta Clean-up Project and the President Buhari's economic agenda mentioned in chapter 2. As this thesis has shown, the roles of peacebuilding agencies, their nature, responsibilities, and functions are equally a source of uncertainty even within these organisations themselves. Even members of peacebuilding agencies remain uncertain about the real impact of peacebuilding initiatives and when real peacebuilding will occur within these states. They question what successful peacebuilding would look like and whether it will ever occur. They further recognised the need to include the informal economy within the peacebuilding and development agenda, but fear, however, that this will only involve efforts to formalise the informal economy based on the interest of the patrons – a development which could lead to more harm than good.

Thus, the theoretical, methodological and analytical framework of this thesis has provided a valuable means of understanding and examining the attitudes, perceptions and understanding of partipants not just of peacebuilding, but also of the nexus between peacebuilding and the informal economy, contributing to an understanding of how peacebuilding initiatives are influenced by neopatrimonialism and shape the informal economy.

Future Research

The findings of this research are applicable beyond Bayelsa and Rivers and could be employed as theoretical frameworks for broader studies on the informal economy and development institutions. As this thesis has illustrated, the effects of narrative are contextualised by the respective audience, thus no single narrative can be effective across all disciplines, and no single narrative can therefore be universally related to by an audience, hence further research will make room for understanding various narratives, not just of the political economy of peacebuilding, but also of the informal economy. As such, this topic does indeed merit greater scholarly attention. These studies could make remarkable contributions to the study of the political economy of peacebuilding and further understanding of the informal economy.

A prospective study could expand on the narrative of patronage peacebuilding, examining this in relationship to the formal economy in various cities, states and countries as a whole. In addition to this,

studies could also focus more specifically upon comparing several different informal economies – a cross-national approach on how patronage peacebuilding shapes development at a regional and national level. This study could either be a report or an impact paper, thus ensuring that its value stems from observations emerging from the thesis, as well as the significance of the informal economy in other areas. Future research could also examine different layers of the informal economy beyond the illicit/criminal economy, and how these shape engagements in development, formalisation, and so on. This could encourage greater engagement with theories and serve as a means of more deliberate empirical analysis. This analysis could be applied in countries where the clientelist web and predatory practices corrupt and frustrate the process of institution-building and democratic consolidation, in a similar way as was carried out in this thesis. Furthermore, another study could focus on changing the orientation of the people, especially the youths, in the informal economy, which could focus on the culture and identity of the indigenes and the make-up of the informal economy. A study of this nature is essential in understanding perceptions, not only of peacebuilding initiatives but also of the informal economy within the individual states in Nigeria, in Nigeria as a whole, and in other countries as well. Thus, the conclusions drawn from the research are applicable and relevant beyond the narrow understanding of the informal economy.

Bibliography

Abang, S., 2014. The Niger Delta crisis and the roles of governmental agencies in Nigeria. *African Identities*, 12(2), pp.180-195.

Addison, T., Billon, P. and Murshed, S. 2001. Finance in conflict and reconstruction. *Journal of International Development*. 13(7),pp.951-964.

Adeyeri, J. 2017. Niger Delta Environmental Degradation and Resource Control Conflict: A Post-Amnesty Analysis of the Yar' Adua/Jonathan Administration Conflict Resolution and Peace Policy. Localities. 7, pp.189-200.

Afinotan, L. and Ojakorotu, V., 2009. The Niger Delta crisis: Issues, challenges and prospects. *African Journal of POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*,.

Agbiboa, D. 2014. Transformational Strategy or Gilded Pacification? Four Years On: The Niger Delta Armed Conflict and the DDR Process of the Nigerian Amnesty Programme. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 50(4),pp.387-411.

Agbuabor, J. E &Malaoul, V. A (2013). Size and Causes of the Informal Sector of the Nigerian

Ajibola, I. 2015. Nigeria's Amnesty Program: The Role of Empowerment in Achieving Peace and Development in Post-Conflict Niger Delta. SAGE Open.,pp.1-11.

Akasike, C., 2020. [online] Punchng.com. Available at: <https://punchng.com/cult-violence-rises-as-rivers-cultists-defy-tough-anti-cultism-measures/>

Akinyoade, D., 2018. Doing Both Harm and Good: The Nature, Dynamics and Implications of the Niger Delta Development Commission's (NDDC) Interventions in Odi, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 73(1), pp.53-76.

AKPAN- ITA, N., Wodu, N. and Esinwoke, E. 2016. Conflict Profiles.

AKPAN, O. and UMOH, U., 2016. Nigeria: State Capacity and Insurgency in the Niger Delta since the 1990s. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, 15, pp.92-110.

Aliff, S. 2014. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in post conflict societies. . 8(1),pp.10-20.

Alozieuwa, H.O (2005). 'The political economy of the presidential system in Nigeria' (doctoral diss. University of Abuja, 76.

Amaraegbu, D., 2011. Violence, terrorism and security threat in Nigeria's Niger Delta: An old problem taking a new dimension. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 5(4), pp.208-217.

Andreas, P. 2004. The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia. International Studies Quarterly. 48(1),pp.29-52.

Aniche, E., 2019. Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta Region. In: O. OshitaIkenna, F. Onuoha and M. Alumona, ed., *Internal Security Management in Nigeria*. pp.139-164.

Arosanyin, T., Ijaiya, T., Oludoyi, B., Ajayi., A. &Ipingbmi, O. (2011). An Empirical

Assanvo, W. and Okereke, D., 2019. *Nigeria's kidnapping crisis - ENACT Africa*. [online] ENACT Africa. Available at: <https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/nigerias-kidnapping-crisis> [Accessed 29 September 2021].

Asumah, S. Diversity, social justice, and inclusive excellence.

Asuni, J., 2009. *Blood oil in the Niger Delta*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Babiker, M. and Özerdem, A. 2003. A future disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process in Sudan: lessons learned from Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda. Conflict, Security & Development. 3(2),pp.211-232.

Bach, D. 2011. Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: comparative trajectories and readings. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 49(3),pp.275-294.

Bach, D. and Gazibo, M. 2013. Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

Bagia, T. 2009. Delta in distress. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

Bailey, K., 1998. *NGOs Take to Politics: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Mexico's Democratization Effort*. [online] Citeseerx.ist.psu.edu. Available at:

<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.577.5275&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
[Accessed 29 September 2021].

Ballentine, K. and Nitzschke, H. 2017. The Political Economy go Civil War and Conflict Transformation. Bergof Research Center for Constructivr Conflict Management.,pp.1-20.

Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J. 2003. The Political economy of armed conflict. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Barbara, J. 2008. Rethinking neo-liberal state building: building post-conflict development states. Development in Practice. 18(3),pp.307-318.

Bartlett, L. and Vavrus, F. 2017. Rethinking case study research. New York: Routledge.

BBC News 2019. Nigeria election 2019: Poll halted in last-minute drama. *BBC News*. [Online]. [Accessed 28 July 2021]. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47263122.

BBC News, 2018. *Nigerian snake ate millions of naira, clerk says*. [online] BBC News. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-43030827>

Bell, N. 2006. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration Mapping issues, Dilemmas and Building Principles. Netherlands Institute of International Relations.,pp.1-23.

BellaNaija, 2016. *22,430 Cultists Surrender Arms, Embrace Amnesty in Rivers State*. [online] BellaNaija. Available at: <https://www.bellanaija.com/2016/11/22430-cultists-surrender-arms-embrace-amnesty-in-rivers-state/>

Berdal, M. and Malone, D. 2000. Greed and grievance. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Berents, H. and McEvoy-Levy, S. 2015. Theorising youth and everyday peace(building). Peacebuilding. 3(2), pp.115-125.

Bernard, H. 2013. Social research methods. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Bhatia, J. 2021. Unsettling the Peace? The Role of Illicit Economies in Peace Processes. International Journal of Drug Policy. 89,p.103046.

Biles, J. 2009. Informal Work in Latin America: Competing Perspectives and Recent Debates. Geography Compass. 3(1), pp.214-236.

Bindi, I. and Tufekci, O., 2018. Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: A Critical Exploration. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 53(8), pp.1158-1172.

BISINA, J. 2001. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Niger-Delta the Bayelsa Experience. IFE PsychologIA. 9(3).

Blackburn, K., Boseb, N. and Capasso, S. 2012. Tax evasion, the underground economy and financial development. Pdfs.semanticscholar.org. [Online].

Blunch, N., Canagarajah,, S. and Raju, D. 2001. The Informal Sector Revisited: A Synthesis Across Space and Time. Documents.worldbank.org. [Online].

Blunt, P., Turner, M. and Lindroth, H. 2013. Morton's Fork: "Democracy" Versus Neopatrimonialism in Developing Countries. International Journal of Public Administration. 36(1),pp.45-62.

Bøås, M. and Jennings, K., 2005. Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed State'. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 17(3), pp.385-395.

Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., 2015. The Politics, Practice and Paradox of 'Ethnic Security' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 4(1).

Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. *World Politics*. 46(4),pp.453-489.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2019. Reflecting on reflexive thematic analysis. Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health. 11(4),pp.589-597.

Brinkmann, S. and Kvale, S. 2015. Interviews. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Broodryk, A. and Solomon, H. 2011. FROM WAR ECONOMIES TO PEACE ECONOMIES IN AFRICA. Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies. 38(1).

Brown, K. 2006. War Economies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Identifying a Weak Link. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. 3(1),pp.6-19.

Brown, M., Jones, S. and Miller, S., 2001. *Debating the democratic peace*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Brown, M.(1994) Economics of Imperialism. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books

Budd, E., 2004. *Democratization, development, and the patrimonial state in the age of globalization*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Bukola Adebayo, C., 2018. *Nigerian clerk: "I didn't say snake swallowed $100,000"*. [online] CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/13/africa/nigerias-snake-swallows-100000/index.html>

Burmeister, E. and Aitken, L. 2012. Sample size: How many is enough? Australian Critical Care. 25(4), pp.271-274.

Busari, K., 2018. *Monkey carted away N70 million in senators' farm house - Shehu Sani*. [online] Premium Times Nigeria. Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/259430-monkey-carted-away-n70-million-senators-farm-house-shehu-sani.html>

Call, C. and Cousens, E. 2008. Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies. International Studies Perspectives. 9(1), pp.1-21.

Carbonnier, G. 2003. Conference Papers: 5. The Challenge of Reconstruction and of Rebuilding Societies Undoing War Economies: A Prerequisite for Peace?. Refugee Survey Quarterly. 22(4),pp.165-177.

Carroll, E. 2011. TAXING GHANA'S INFORMAL SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN. Shareweb.ch. [Online].

Castells, M. and Portes, A. 1989. World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics and Effects of the Informal Economy In: A. Portes, M. Castells and L. Benton, ed. The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Cater, C. 2002. The Political economy of War and Peace. New York: International Peace Academy.

CBN/FOS/NISER (CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA/FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS/ NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RESEARCH). (2001a). A study of Nigeria's informal sector, Volume 1: Statistics on Nigeria's informal sector. Abuja: CBN.

Chakravarty, S., Standing, G. and Tokeman, V. 1992. Towards Social Adjustment: Labour Market Issues in Structural Adjustment. Bulletin of Latin American Research. 11(3), p.355.

Chandler, D. 2000. Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press.

CHANDLER, D. 2010. The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'. Review of International Studies. 36(S1),pp.137-155.

Chant, S., 2014. Exploring the "feminisation of poverty" in relation to women's work and home-based enterprise in slums of the Global South. *International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship*, 6(3), pp.296-316.

Chege, M., 2002. Sierra leone: The state that came back from the dead. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3), pp.147-160.

Chen, M. 2007. Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment. Un.org. [Online].

Chen, M. 2009. Informality and Social Protection: Theories and Realities. IDS Bulletin. 39(2), pp.18-27.

Chen, M. 2012. The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies. Wiego.org. [Online]. from: http://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Chen_WIEGO_WP1.pdf.

Chen, M. 2012. The Informal Workforce in a Global Economy. Academy of Management Proceedings. 2012(1), p.12331.

Chen, M. 2013. Informal Workers in the Developing World. New Labor Forum. 22(1),pp.67-73.

Chen, M. 2015. Women and the Informal Economy in Urban Africa: From the Margins to the Centre. Gender & Development. 23(2), pp.394-397.

Chen, M. 2016. The Informal Economy. NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy. 26(2),pp.155-172.

Chen, M., Carr, M. and Vanek, J. 2018. Mainstreaming Informal Employment and Gender in Poverty Reduction A Handbook for Policy-makers and Other Stakeholders. Wiego.org. [Online]. Available from: http://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Chen-Mainstreaming-Informal-Employment-and-Gender.pdf.

Chopra, J. 2002. Building State Failure in East Timor. Development and Change. 33(5),pp.979-1000.

Colletta, N., Kostner, M. and Wiederhofer, I. 1996. Case studies in war-to-peace transition. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Collier,P. (2000). 'Doing well out of war: an economic perspective', in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2000).

Cooper, N. 2005. Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy. *Security Dialogue*. 36(4),pp.463-478.

Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. 2008. Basics of qualitative research.

Corcoran, P., Walker *, K. and Wals, A. 2004. Case studies, make-your-case studies, and case stories: a critique of case-study methodology in sustainability in higher education. Environmental Education Research. 10(1),pp.7-21.

Creswell, J. 2011. Research design. New Delhi: Sage.

Crow, G. 1989. The Use of the Concept of `Strategy' in Recent Sociological Literature. Sociology. 23(1), pp.1-24.

Danielsson, A. 2015. Informality and Peacebuilding: Field Notes on the Intrinsic Reproductive Principles of Informal Economic Practices in Post-Conflict Kosovo. International Peacekeeping. 23(1), pp.1-28.

Danielsson, A., 2016. Reforming and Performing the Informal Economy: Constitutive Effects of the World Bank's Anti-informality Practices in Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 10(2), pp.241-260.

De Castro, J., Khavul, S. and Bruton, G. 2014. Shades of Grey: How do Informal Firms Navigate Between Macro and Meso Institutional Environments? Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal. 8(1), pp.75-94.

DE SOTO, H. 2001. de Soto, Hernando (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books.

Debiel, T., Held, T. and Schneckener, U. 2016. Peacebuilding in crisis. Rethinking Paradigms and Practices of Transnational Cooperation.

Degila, D., 2014. Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. *African Affairs*, 113(453), pp.623-625.

deGrassi, A. 2008. "Neopatrimonialism" and Agricultural Development in Africa: Contributions and Limitations of a Contested Concept. African Studies Review. 51(03),pp.107-133.

Delamont, S. and Atkinson, P. 2011. SAGE qualitative research methods. London: SAGE.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. 2002. The Sage handbook of qualitative research.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. 2018. The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Derrida, J. 1970. Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. Www2.csudh.edu. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: http://www2.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f13/drrdassp.pdf.

Diamond, L. 1994. Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*. 5(3),pp.4-17.

Dicklitch, S., 1999. The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda. *African Studies Review*, 42(3), p.106.

Distler, W., Stavrevska, E. and Vogel, B. 2018. Economies of Peace: Economy Formation Processes and Outcomes in Conflict-Affected Societies. Civil Wars. 20(2),pp.139-150.

Dreher, A. and Schneider, F. 2009. Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis. Public Choice. 144(1-2), pp.215-238.

Duru, E. and Ogbonnaya, U. 2012. The Poverty of Crisis Management Strategies in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Focus on the Amnesty Programme. *African Research Review*. 6(2).

Eberlein, R. 2006. On the road to the state's perdition? Authority and sovereignty in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 44(4),pp.573-596.

Eberlein, R., 2006. On the road to the state's perdition? Authority and sovereignty in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(4), pp.573-596.

Ebiede, T. 2016. Beyond Amnesty: The Challenges of Democracy and Sustainable Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. Rsearcch Gate. [Online]. [Accessed 17 November 2017]. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290760278.

Ebiede, T. 2016. Beyond Rebellion: Uncaptured Dimensions of Violent Conflicts and the Implications for Peacebuilding in Nigeria's Niger Delta. African Security. 10(1),pp.25-46.

Ebiede, T. 2017. Community Conflicts and Armed Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Change and Continuity?. *Society & Natural Resources*. 30(10),pp.1197-1211.

Ebiede, T., Bassey, C. and Asuni, J., 2021. *Insecurity in the Niger Delta*.

Economy: Evidence From Error Correction Mimic Model - Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 2013.

Edafejrhaye, V. and Alao, A., 2019. CSR as Public Relations Strategy for Niger Delta Peace and Development. *OALib*, 06(09), pp.1-14.

Edede, O. E. 2006. 'The Niger Delta: A Cradle of Violence. Retrieved June 12 2021, from http://www.onlinenigeria.com.

Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. 2000. *Beyond the magic bullet*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Eisenstadt, S. 1973. *Traditional patrimonialism and modern neopatrimonialism*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Ejukwa Edim, M., Timipre Okou, F., Asu Odok, E. and Ekun Ekuri, P. 2013. Problems Accentuating Effective Sports Development among Youths in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria. Journal of Life Sciences. 7(6).

Eke, S. 2014. No pay, no peace: political settlement and post-amnesty violence in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 50(6),pp.750-764.

Ekeh, P. 2007. *History of the Urhobo people of Niger Delta*. Ikeja, Lagos: Urhobo Historical Society.

Ekpon, T. 2011. Crises of Natural Resource Control in Nigeria: The Case of Niger Delta Region. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Ekumaoko, C. 2013. The Amnesty Question in Post Conflict Niger Delta and Peace-Building. Oman Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review. 2(10),pp.1-12.

Elbahnasawy, N., Ellis, M. and Adom, A. 2016. Political Instability and the Informal Economy. World Development. 85,pp.31-42.

Elem, M. and Azibasuam, A., 2021. Informal Settlement and Teenage Prostitution in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. *GSC Advanced Research and Reviews*, 6(3), pp.011-018.

Emerson, R., Fretz, R. and Shaw, L. 1995. Writing ethnographic fieldnotes.

Erdmann, G. and Engel, U. 2007. Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*. 45(1),pp.95-119.

Erdmann, G. and Engel, U., 2006. Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept. *SSRN Electronic Journal*,.

Esterberg, K. 2002. Qualitative methods in social research. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Etim, E. and Daramola, O., 2020. The Informal Sector and Economic Growth of South Africa and Nigeria: A Comparative Systematic Review. *Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity*, 6(4), p.134.

Evans, P. 1986. State, capital, and the transformation of dependence: The Brazilian computer case. *World Development*. 14(7),pp.791-808.

Evans, P. 1992. The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change. *In*: P. Evans, J. Waterbury, R. Kaufman, S. Haggard, M. Kahler, J. Nelson and B. Stallings, ed. *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State*.

Evans, P., 1989. Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative political economy perspective on the Third World state. *Sociological Forum*, 4(4), pp.561-587.

Feige, E. 1989. The Underground economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feige, E. 1990. Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: The new institutional economics approach. World Development. 18(7), pp.989-1002.

Ferman, P. and Ferman, L. 1973. The Structural Underpinnings of the Irregular Economy. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources. 8(1), pp.1-17.

Festic, A. and Rausche, A. 2004. War by Other Means : How Bosnia's Clandestine Political Economies Obstruct Peace and State Building. Problems of Post-Communism. 51(3),pp.27-34.

Fischer, M. 2000. *The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Fischer, M. and Schmelzle, B. 2005. Dilemmas and options in transforming war economies. Bergof Research Centre for Construtive Conflict Management.,pp.5-9.

Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry. 12(2), pp.219-245.

Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta 2011. Ndpifoundation.org. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://www.ndpifoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Economic-Opportunities-in-the-Niger-Delta.pdf.

Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta 2012. P4P Qualitative Research Report on Drivers/Impacts of Conflict in the Niger Delta. Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delt. PIND PB-01-PQRRDIC.

Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta 2019. MONITORING AND EVALUATION REPORT Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta. Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta. (1).

Fragiskatos, P. 2010. Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-Regional Perspectives on Rentier Politics, Kenneth Omeje. ed., Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2008pp. 251. Canadian Journal of Political Science. 43(4),pp.1011-1012.

Freedman, L., Arnson, C. and Zartman, I. 2006. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Foreign Affairs. 85(2), p.194.

Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. 2000. Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries. Journal of Public Economics. 76(3), pp.459-493.

Fukuyama, F. and Lund, M. 1996. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. Foreign Affairs. 75(5),p.134.

Fund for Peace 2014. Violence Affecting Women and Girls in the Eight NSRP Target States. Fundforpeace.org. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: http://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FFP-VAWG-Observatory-Data-Monthly-Memo-6_FINAL.pdf.

Fund for Peace and The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta 2018. Domestic Violence in Rivers State: A Threat to Social and Family Stability. The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta.

Fund for Peace, The Foundations for Initiatives of the Niger Delta and Niger Delta Partnership Initiative 2015. Renewed Potential for Violence: Bayelsa Gubernatorial Election.

Gadd, D., Karstedt, S. and Messner, S. 2012. The Sage handbook of criminological research methods. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Galtung, J. 1980. Peace and world structure. Copenhagen: Ejlers.

Gërxhani, K. 2004. The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey. Public Choice. 120(3/4), pp.267-300.

Gifford, A., Knott, A., Mant, H. and DeVries, A. 2020. PIONEERING NEW OPERATING MODELS AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR-LED DEVELOPMENT ASSESSING IMPACT IN NIGERIA'S NIGER DELTA. Beamexchange.org. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://beamexchange.org/uploads/filer_public/b3/f8/b3f8f11a-68dd-4ebb-86fb-f9143bcdb1e7/pioneering-new-operating-models-and-measurement-techniques-for-private-sector-led-development_compressed.pdf.

Ginifer, J. 2017. Reintegration of ex-combatants. ,pp.39-52.

Godwin, A., 2018. *Rivers House of Assembly to relax death penalty in anti-cultism, anti-kidnapping bills | The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News*. [online] The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News. Available at: <https://guardian.ng/news/rivers-house-of-assembly-to-relax-death-penalty-in-anti-cultism-anti-kidnapping-bills/> [Accessed 25 August 2021].

Goodhand, J. 2003. From war economy to peace economy?. London School of economis and Poltical Science.,pp.1-19.

Goodhand, J., 1999. From wars to complex political emergencies: Understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(1), pp.13-26.

Goodhand, J., 2003. From war economy to peace economy?. *The London Schol of Economics Political Science*,.

Goodhand, J., 2008. Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(3), pp.405-423.

Greenberg, J. 2014. After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia. Stanford University Press.

Griffiths, M., 2009. *Critical approaches in qualitative educational research*. [online] Pure.ed.ac.uk. Available at: <https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/15324325/Critical_Approaches_in_Qualitative_Educational_Research.pdf> [Accessed 30 August 2021].

Gubrium, J. 2012. The Sage handbook of interview research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.

Guest, G., Bunce, A. and Johnson, L. 2006. How Many Interviews Are Enough? Field Methods. 18(1), pp.59-82.

Guha-Khasnobis, B., Ostrom, E. and Kanbur, S., 2012. *Linking the formal and informal economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Guliyev, F., 2011. Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies. *Democratization*, 18(4), pp.1055-1056.

Gutmann, P. 1977. The Subterranean Economy. Financial Analysts Journal. 33(6), pp.26-27.

Gutmann, P. 1980. The Subterranean Economy, Redux In: W. Gaertner and A. Wenig, ed. The Economics of the Shadow Economy. Berlin: Springer, pp. 2-18.

Guyer, J. 1994. Representation without Taxation: An Essay on Democracy in Rural Nigeria, 1952-1990. African Studies Review. 35(1), p.41.

Haas, P. and Hird, J. 2016. Controversies in globalization. Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press.

Harding, J. 2013. Qualitative data analysis from start to finish. London: SAGE.

Harding, P. and Jenkins, R. 1990. The Myth of the Hidden Economy: Towards a New Understanding of Informal Economic Activity. Man. 25(4), p.719.

Hart, K. 1973. Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 11(01), p.61.

Held, B. 2009. The Logic of Case-Study Methodology. Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy. 5(3).

Henry, S. and Sills, S. 2006. Informal economic activity: Early thinking, conceptual shifts, continuing patterns and persistent issues – a Michigan study. Crime, Law and Social Change. 45(4-5), pp.263-284.

Hobbes, T. and Tuck, R. 2011. Hobbes: Leviathan 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press.

Hobbes, T., Tuck, R., Silverthorne, M., Geuss, R. and Skinner, Q. 1998. Hobbes: "On the Citizen". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hopper, T., 2017. Neopatrimonialism, good governance, corruption and accounting in Africa. *Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies*, 7(2), pp.225-248.

Human Rights Watch, 2005. *Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria's Rivers State A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper February 2005*. [online] Hrw.org. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/nigeria0205.pdf> [Accessed 25 August 2021].

Human Rights Watch, 2019. *Nigeria: Widespread Violence Ushers in President's New Term*. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/10/nigeria-widespread-violence-ushers-presidents-new-term> [Accessed 25 August 2021].

Ibaba, I. 2011. Nigeria's Niger Delta: Militia Violence, Amnesty, and Energy Security. *Peace and Conflict Studies*.

Ibaba,, I., 2011. Amnesty and Peace-Building in the Niger Delta: Addressing the Frustration-Aggression Trap. *Africana*, 5(1), pp.238-271.

Idemudia, U. 2009. The changing phases of the Niger Delta conflict: implications for conflict escalation and the return of peace. Conflict, Security & Development. 9(3), pp.307-331.

Idemudia, U. 2010. Corporate Social Responsibility and the Rentier Nigerian State: Rethinking the Role of Government and the Possibility of Corporate Social Development in the Niger Delta. Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement. 30(1-2),pp.131-151.

Ihonvbere, J. (1989),The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected

Ikelegbe, A. and Umukoro, N. 2016. Exclusion and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An Assessment of the Presidential Amnesty Programme. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. 11(2),pp.25-36.

Ikelegbe, A., 2006. The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *African and Asian Studies*, 5(1), pp.23-56.

Ilkhamov, A., 2007. Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan. *Central Asian Survey*, 26(1), pp.65-84.

ILO 1972. Decent Work and the Informal Economy. Ilo.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_policy/documents/publication/wcms_210442.pdf.

ILO 1993. Ilo.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1992/92B09_385_engl.pdf.

ILO 2013. Measuring informality: A statistical manual on the informal sector and informal employment. Geneva: ILO.

ILO 2013. Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture: Second Edition. Ilo.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_234413.pdf.

INGWE, R., 2015. Illegal Oil Bunkering, Violence and Criminal Offences in Nigeria's Territorial Waters and the Niger Delta Environs: Proposing Extension of Informed Policymaking. *Informatica Economica*, 19(1/2015), pp.77-86.

Institute for Economics & Peace 2020. POSITIVE PEACE REPORT 2020 ANALYSING THE FACTORS THAT SUSTAIN PEACE. Economicsandpeace.org. [Online]. [Accessed 19 July 2021]. Available from: https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/PPR-2020web.pdf.

Institute for Economics & Peace., 2021. *GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2021 Measuring peace in a complex world*. [online] Economicsandpeace.org. Available at: <https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web.pdf> [Accessed 8 August 2021].

International Alert 2017. Out of the shadows: Adopting a peacebuilding approach to the social effects of drug use in Nigeria - Nigeria. ReliefWeb. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/out-shadows-adopting-peacebuilding-approach-social-effects-drug-use-nigeria.

International Labour Office 2018. Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical picture (third edition. International Labour Office. 3.

International Peace Academy, 2002. *The Political Economy of War and Peace*. [online] Ipinst.org. Available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/political_economy.pdf> [Accessed 30 August 2021].

International Trade, Economics and Environment. Briefing paper

iNtgrty, 2021. *Research Paradigms: Critical Theory – iNtgrty*. [online] Intgrty.co.za. Available at: <https://www.intgrty.co.za/2016/08/08/research-paradigms-critical-theory/> [Accessed 30 August 2021].

Investigation into Urban Informal Tire Repair Service in Ilorin, Nigeria, Canadian Social Science.

Ismail O. and Fasanya (2012) Informal Sector and Employment Generation in Nigeria: Research

Ite, U., 2007. Changing times and strategies: Shell's contribution to sustainable community development in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Sustainable Development*, 15(1), pp.1-14.

Iwilade, A. 2014. Networks of violence and becoming: youth and the politics of patronage in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 52(4),pp.571-595.

Iwilade, A. 2017. Slipping through the net: everyday agency of youth and the politics of amnesty in Nigeria's Niger Delta (2009–2015). *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 35(3),pp.266-283.

Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P., 2015. *Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action*. Taylor and Francis.

Jayasundara-Smits, S. 2018. Lost in transition: linking war, war economy and post-war crime in Sri Lanka. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 3(1), pp.63-79.

Jennings, K. 2009. The political economy of DDR in Liberia: a gendered critique. Conflict, Security & Development. 9(4),pp.475-494.

Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., Shleifer, A., Goldman, M. and Weitzman, M. 1997. The Unofficial Economy in Transition. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1997(2), p.159.

Jones, T., Ram, M. and Edwards, P. 2006. Shades of grey in the informal economy. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. 26(9/10), pp.357-373.

Juul, K. 2006. Decentralization, Local Taxation and Citizenship in Senegal. Development and Change. 37(4), pp.821-846.

Kant, I. and Reiss, H., 1971. *Kant's political writings*. London: C.U.P.

KANU Ikechukwu, A. 2017. GWEBUIKE PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN AFRICA. *An African Journal of Arts and Humanitie*. 3(7).

Kaplan, R. and Rieff, D. 2000. The Coming Anarchy. World Policy Journal. 17(2),pp.95-96.

Kar, S. and Marjit, S. 2009. Urban informal sector and poverty. International Review of Economics & Finance. 18(4), pp.631-642.

Karunakaran, A. and Balasubrama, V. 2012. Entrepreneurship within informal economies in rural city. In: Academy of Management Boston. Conference, Boston. Boston.

Kaur, S., 2013. Oil as a source of political conflict in Niger Delta. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 7(2), pp.33-37.

Keen, D. 1998. The economic functions of violence in civil wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

KEEN, D. 2012. Greed and grievance in civil war. International Affairs. 88(4), pp.757-777.

Kelsall, T., 2011. Rethinking the Relationship between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 42(2), pp.76-87.

Kendhammer, B. 2015. Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 21(2),pp.143-165.

Khan, F., 2018. Neopatrimonialism and corruption: towards a new common sense. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 36(4), pp.553-562.

Kilroy, W. 2017. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: the co-evolution of concepts, practices and understanding. The Graduate Center.

Kimani, D., Ullah, S., Kodwani, D. and Akhtar, P., 2021. Analysing corporate governance and accountability practices from an African neo-patrimonialism perspective: Insights from Kenya. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 78, p.102260.

Kimenyi, M., Deressa, T., Pugliese, J., Onwuemele, A. and Mendie, M. 2014. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA'S NIGER DELTA REGION: USE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT (IAD) FRAMEWOR. AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE WORKING PAPER. 14.

King, N. and Brooks, J. Template analysis for business and management students.

Knight, M. and O÷zerdem, A. 2004. Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace. Journal of Peace Research. 41(4),pp.499-516.

Knight, W. 2008. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security. 1(1),pp.24-52.

Kohli, A. 2012. *State-Directed Development Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge University Press.

Kostovicova, D., Martin, M. and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V. 2012. The missing link in human security research: Dialogue and insecurity in Kosovo. Security Dialogue. 43(6), pp.569-585.

Krippendorff, K. 2013. Content analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. 2008. The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development. SSRN Electronic Journal.

La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. 2014. Informality and Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 28(3), pp.109-126.

le Billon, P. 2001. Angola's political economy of war: The role of oil and diamonds, 1975–2000. African Affairs. 100(398),pp.55-80.

Le Billon, P., 2008. Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Corruption. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(3), pp.344-361.

Lekha Sriram, C. 2007. Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice. *Global Society*. 21(4),pp.579-591.

Leonard, M., 2000. Coping strategies in developed and developing societies: the workings of the informal economy. *Journal of International Development*, 12(8), pp.1069-1085.

LEWIS, W. 1954. Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. The Manchester School. 22(2), pp.139-191.

Lind, A., 1992. Power, Gender, and Development: Popular Women's Organizations and the Politics of Needs in Ecuador. In: A. Escobar and S. Alvarez, ed., *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America*. New York: Routledge.

Lippert, O. and Walker, M. 1997. The Underground economy: global evidence of its size and impact. Choice Reviews Online. 35(03),pp.35-1648-35-1648.

Lochmiller, C. 2021. Conducting Thematic Analysis with Qualitative Data. The Qualitative Report.

Lock, P. 2003. War Economies and the Shadow of Globalisation. Bergof Research Center for Constructivr Conflict Management.,pp.1-10..

Losman, D. 2010. The Rentier State And National Oil Companies: An Economic And Political Perspective. The Middle East Journal. 64(3),pp.427-445.

Lough, O., Mallett, R. and Harvey, P. 2013. Taxation and Livelihoods: A Review of the Evidence from Fragile and Conflict-Affected Rural Areas. SSRN Electronic Journal..

Mac Ginty, R., 2010. Warlords and the liberal peace: state-building in Afghanistan. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10(4), pp.577-598.

Mähler, A. 2010. Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Maloney, W. 2004. Informality Revisited. World Development. 32(7), pp.1159-1178.

Martin, G. and Bourmaud, D. 1997. La politique en Afrique. *African Studies Review*. 42(1),p.182.

Mbah, F. 2019. Nigeria elections postponed by a week. *Aljazeera.com*. [Online]. [Accessed 28 July 2021]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/16/nigeria-elections-postponed-by-a-week.

Meagher, K. 1990. The hidden economy: informal and parallel trade in Northwestern Uganda. Review of African Political Economy. 17(47), pp.64-83.

Meagher, K. 1995. Crisis, Informalization and the Urban Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. Development and Change. 26(2), pp.259-284.

Meagher, K. 2006. Social capital, social liabilities, and political capital: Social networks and informal manufacturing in Nigeria. African Affairs. 105(421), pp.553-582.

Meagher, K. 2013. ASR FORUM: ENGAGING WITH AFRICAN INFORMAL ECONOMIES. African Studies Review. 56(03), pp.209-234.

Meagher, K. 2014. Disempowerment from Below: Informal Enterprise Networks and the Limits of Political Voice in Nigeria. Oxford Development Studies. 42(3), pp.419-438.

Meagher, K. 2016. Taxing Times: Taxation, Divided Societies and the Informal Economy in Northern Nigeria. The Journal of Development Studies. 54(1), pp.1-17..

Meagher, K. 2016. The Scramble for Africans: Demography, Globalisation and Africa's Informal Labour Markets. The Journal of Development Studies. 52(4), pp.483-497.

Meagher, K. 2017. Cannibalizing the Informal Economy: Frugal Innovation and Economic Inclusion in Africa. The European Journal of Development Research. 30(1), pp.17-33.

Meagher, K., 2010. *Identity Economics: Social Networks & the Informal Economy in Nigeria*.

Meagher, K., 2013. *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meagher, K., 2013. *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meagher, K., Mann, L. and Bolt, M. 2016. Introduction: Global Economic Inclusion and African Workers. The Journal of Development Studies. 52(4), pp.471-482.

Medard, J. 1982. The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-patrimonialism? *In*: C. Clapham, ed. *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Médard, J. 2002. Corruption in the Neo-Patrimonial States of Sub-Saharan Africa *In*: B. Heidenheimer and M. lohnston, ed. *Political Corruption*. New York: Routledge.

Medard, J., 1982. he underdeveloped state in Africa: political clientelism or neo-patrimoni- alism?,. In: C. Clapham, ed., *Private Patronage and Public Power*. London: London: Frances Pinter, pp.162–189.

Medina, L., Jonelis, A. and Cangul, M. 2017. The Informal Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Size and Determinants. IMF Working Papers. 17(156),p.1.

Mehran, W., 2018. Neopatrimonialism in Afghanistan: Former Warlords, New Democratic Bureaucrats?. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 13(2), pp.91-105.

Meyer, C. 2001. A Case in Case Study Methodology. Field Methods. 13(4),pp.329-352.

Ministry of Budget & National Planning 2017. NIGERIA: Economic Recovery Plan. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series. 54(2), pp.21604B-21605B.

Mkandawire, T. 2010. How the New Poverty Agenda Neglected Social and Employment Policies in Africa. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities. 11(1), pp.37-55.

Mohamed, S. 2017. A ciritquw of the political economy of liberal peace: Elements. of an African expericne *In*: E. Newman, R. Paris and O. Richmond, ed. *New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding*.

Morrisson, C. 2000. Stabilization Programmes, Social Costs, Violence, and Humanitarian Emergencies *In*: E. Nafziger, R. Väyrynen and F. Stewart, ed. *War, Hunger, and Displacement The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies*. Oxford University Press, pp. 207-238.

Moser, C. 1978. Informal sector or petty commodity production: Dualism or dependence in urban development? World Development. 6(9-10), pp.1041-1064.

Munive, J. and Stepputat, F. 2015. Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. 4(1).

Murphy, W., 2003. Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars. *African Studies Review*, 46(2), p.61.

Murphy, W., 2003. Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars. *African Studies Review*, 46(2), p.61.

Murshed, S. and Tadjoeddin, M. 2008. Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Newman, E. and Keller, N. 2007. Criminal Legacies of War Economies. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. 3(3),pp.49-62.

Newman, E., 2010. Peacebuilding as Security in 'Failing' and Conflict-Prone States. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4(3), pp.305-322.

Newman, E., Paris, R. and Richmond, O. 2009. New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Niger Delta Development Forum 2015. Niger Delta Development Forum: regional challenges and opportunities - Wilton Park. Wilton Park. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/niger-delta-development-forum-regional-challenges-and-opportunities/.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2017. Final Evaluation Report: Independent Evaluation Provider to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme. Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/701037/Nigeria-Stability-and-Reconciliation-Programme-Volume-1.pdf.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2017. IMPACT REPORT: OUTPUT 3 Women and Girls in Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. Nsrp-nigeria.org. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Impact-Report-Women-and-Girls.pdf.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2017. IMPACT REPORT: OUTPUT 2 Economic and Natural Resources. Nsrp-nigeria.org. [Online]. [Accessed 25 October 2018]. Available from: http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Impact-Report-Economic-and-Natural-Resources.pdf.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2018. P06132 Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) – Independent Evaluation Provider (NIEP). Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/701039/Management-Response-Nigeria-Stability-and-Reconciliation-Programme.pdf.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2018. WHAT VIOLENCE MEANS TO US: WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES SPEAK. Nsrp-nigeria.org. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/What-Violence-Means-to-us-Women-with-Disabilities-Speak.pdf.

Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2017. Dealing with the Past: Justice Reconciliation and Healing in the North East of Nigeria - NIALS-NSRP. Nials.edu.ng. [Online]. [Accessed 17 August 2020]. Available from: https://nials.edu.ng/pdf/NIALS-NSRP%20Dealing%20with%20the%20Past%20Report.pdf.

Nitzchke, H. 2003. Transforming War Economies: challenges for Peacemaking and Peace building. New York: International Peace Academy.

Nitzschke, H. and Studdard, K. 2005. The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping. 12(2),pp.222-239.

Njie, B. and Asimiran, S. 2014. Case Study as a Choice in Qualitative Methodology. IOSR Journal of Research & Method in Education (IOSRJRME). 4(3),pp.35-40.

Nowell, L., Norris, J., White, D. and Moules, N. 2017. Thematic Analysis. International Journal of Qualitative Methods. 16(1),p.160940691773384.

Nwagbara, U., 2015. From Frustration-Aggression to Peace: Advancing Stakeholder Engagement Through Communicative Action in Post-Conflict Niger Delta, Nigeria. In: S. Idowu, S. Vertigans and R. Schmidpeter, ed., *Corporate Social Responsibility in Sub-Saharan Africa*. pp.241-258.

Nwajiaku-Dahou, K. 2012. The political economy of oil and 'rebellion' in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Review of African Political Economy. 39(132),pp.295-313.

Nzeadibe, T., Ajaero, C. and Nwoke, M. 2015. Rethinking corporate-community engagement in the petro-economy of the Niger Delta. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography. 36(3),pp.376-393.

O'Reilly, M. and Parker, N. 2012. 'Unsatisfactory Saturation': a critical exploration of the notion of saturated sample sizes in qualitative research. Qualitative Research. 13(2), pp.190-197.

Oarhe, O., 2013. Tonic or Toxin? The State, Neopatrimonialism, and Anticorruption Efforts in Nigeria.

Obi, C. 2010. Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related Conflict. Africa Development. 34(2).

Obi, C. 2010. Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta. Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement. 30(1-2), pp.219-236.

Obi, C. 2014. Oil and conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta region: Between the barrel and the trigger. The Extractive Industries and Society. 1(2), pp.147-153.

Obi, C. and Oriola, T. 2018. The Unfinished Revolution in Nigeria's Niger Delta 1st ed.

Odoemene, A., 2011. Agony in the Garden': Incongruity of Governance and the Travails of Port Harcourt City, Niger Delta, Nigeria, 1912-2010. *Africana*, 5(1), pp.108-139.

OECD 2002. Measuring the Non-Observed Economy, A Handbook. Oecd.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/sdd/na/1963116.pdf.

OECD 2002. Oecd.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/43280298.pdf.

Oelbaum, J., 2002. Populist Reform Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana's Triple Alliance. *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 36(2), pp.281-328.

Offiong, O. and Cocodia, J., 2011. Charting Pathways to Development in the Riverine Areas of the Niger Delta Region. *Africana*, 5(1).

Ogunkola, O., Aiyede, E. and Haruna, B., 2018. The Practice and Promise of Social Protection Policies in Nigeria, International Review of Politics and Development, Vol. 16, No. 1, 21-43. *Journal of International Politics and Development*, 15(1).

Ojeleye, O. 2011. The Application of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) at the Sub-National Level in the Niger Delta. Civil Wars. 13(2),pp.141-156.

Ojo, E. 2009. New Missions and Roles of the Military Forces: The Blurring of Military and Police Roles in Nigeria. *Contemporary Issues in Military and Strategic Studies*. 11(1-2).

Okonofua, B. 2016. The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of Transitioning From Peace Settlements to Long term Peace. SAGE Open. [Online]. [Accessed 17 December 2017]. Available from: http://ego.sagepub.com.

Oladayo N. A., Joyce A., and Oladimeji D. A. (2014). Rebased Nigerian Gross Domestic Product: The Role Of The InformalSector In The Development of the Nigerian Economy. International Journal of Education and Research Vol. 2 No. 7 July 2014.

Olken, B. and Singhal, M. 2011. Informal Taxation. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 3(4), pp.1-28.

Oluduro, O. and F. Oluduro, O. 2012. Nigeria: In Search of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development*. 5(7).

Omeje, K. 2006. The Rentier State: Oil-related Legislation And Conflict In The Niger Delta, Nigeria. Conflict, Security & Development. 6(2),pp.211-230.

Omeje, K., 2004. The state, conflict & evolving politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(101), pp.425-440.

Omeje, K., 2005. Oil conflict in Nigeria: Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta people. *New Political Economy*, 10(3), pp.321-334.

Omeje, K., 2006. The Rentier State: Oil-related Legislation And Conflict In The Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6(2), pp.211-230.

Omemma, D., 2019. Marginalisation and Restructuring in Nigeria: An Exploration. *South East Political Review*, 4(1).

Omotola, J., 2009. Dissent and State Excesses in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(2), pp.129-145.

on Humanities and Social Sciences www.iiste.org ISSN 2222-1719 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2863 (Online)Vol. 2, No.7, 2012.

Onapajo, H. and Moshood, A. 2017. The Civilianisation of ex-combabnts of the Niger Delta: Progess and Challenges in reintegration. ,pp.35-59.

Onwo, A. and Ohazulike, G., 2021. EMPLOYMENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. *UNIZIK JOURNAL OF BUSINESS*, 4(1).

Orogun, P. 2009. Resource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in Nigeria: the Niger Delta question. GeoJournal. 75(5),pp.459-507.

Oseafiana, O., Ajike, A. and Esedebe, J. 2020. Assessing the Contributions of the National Directorate of Employment-to-Employment Generation and Poverty Alleviation in Delta State, Nigeria. International Journal of Business Systems and Economics. 11(2),p.-.

Osunmuyiwa, O., Biermann, F. and Kalfagianni, A. 2017. Applying the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions to rentier states: the case of renewable energy transitions in Nigeria. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning. 20(2),pp.143-156.

Otite, A. and Umukoro, N., 2011. Amnesty Programme and the Niger Delta: Overview of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Strategy for Sustainable Peace. *Africana*, 5(1), pp.216-237.

Oviasuyi, P. and Uwadiae, J. 2010. The Dilemma of Niger-Delta Region as Oil Producing States of Nigeria. Journal of Peace and Conflict Development. (16),pp.110-126.

Oxfam 2012. COMMODITIES OF WAR Communities speak out on the true cost of conflict in eastern DRC. Oxfam.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp164-commodities-of-war-drc-protection-201112-en.pdf.

Oyefusi, A. 2008. Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Journal of Peace Research. 45(4), pp.539-555.

Oyewo, H. 2016. Nigeria: The Challenges of Reintegrating Niger Delta Militants. Conflict Studies Quaterly. (17),pp.57-72.

Özerdem, A. 2012. A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: 'social reintegration' approach. Conflict, Security & Development. 12(1),pp.51-73.

Packard, T. 2007. Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice. Openknowledge.worldbank.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from:

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7121/wps4232.pdf?sequence=1&isA llowed=y.

Packard, T. 2007. Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice. Openknowledge.worldbank.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7121/wps4232.pdf?sequence=1&isA llowed=y.

Parmar, I. 2013. The 'knowledge politics' of democratic peace theory. International Politics. 50(2),pp.231-256.

Patton, M. 2001. How to use qualitative methods in evaluation. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage.

Pavlovskaya, M. 2004. Other Transitions: Multiple Economies of Moscow Households in the 1990s. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 94(2),pp.329-351.

Pedersen, S. 2003. The Shadow Economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia A measurement based on questionnaire surveys. Rockwoolfonden.dk. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.rockwoolfonden.dk/app/uploads/2015/12/The-Shadow-Economy-in-Germany.Great-Britain-and-Scandinavia.study_10.pdf.

Peterson, V. 2010. Informalization, Inequalities and Global Insecurities. International Studies Review. 12(2),pp.244-270.

Philipsen, L., 2014. When Liberal Peacebuilding Fails: Paradoxes of Implementing Ownership and Accountability in the Integrated Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 8(1), pp.42-67.

Pimhidzai, O. and Fox, L. 2013. Taking from the poor or local economic development: the dilemma of taxation of small informal enterprises in Uganda. World Bank.

Plant, R. and Plant, B. 2009. The Neo-liberal State 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Powell, J., 1970. Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 64(2), pp.411-425.

Prasad, P. 2005. Crafting qualitative research.

Prud'homme, R. 1992. Informal Local Taxation in Developing Countries. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. 10(1), pp.1-17.

Pugh, M. 2004. Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Kosovo. Problems of Post-Communism. 51(3), pp.53-60.

Pugh, M. 2006. Post-war economies and the New York dissensus. Conflict, Security & Development. 6(3),pp.269-289.

Pugh, M., Cooper, N. and Goodhand, J. 2004. War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation. Choice Reviews Online. 42(02),pp.42-1060-42-1060.

Puljek-Shank, R. 2016. Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism. Democratization. 24(4),pp.670-688.

Rakowski, C. 1994. Convergence and divergence in the informal sector debate: A focus on Latin America, 1984–92. World Development. 22(4), pp.501-516.

Rampton, D. and Nadarajah, S., 2016. A long view of liberal peace and its crisis. *European Journal of International Relations*, 23(2), pp.441-465.

Reno, W. 1997. War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States. *Comparative Politics*. 29(4),p.493.

ROBERTS, B. 1994. Informal Economy and Family Strategies. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 18(1), pp.6-23.

Roberts, D. 2013. Liberal peacebuilding and global governance. [Place of publication not identified]: Routledge.

Saldaña, J., Saldaña, J. and Miles, M. 2013. The coding manual for qualitative researchers + qualitative data analysis. London: Sage Publications.

Samson, M. 2004. Privatizing Collective Public Goods: A Case Study of Street Cleaning in Johannesburg, South Africa. Studies in Political Economy. 79(1), pp.119-144.

Sandbakken, C. 2006. The limits to democracy posed by oil rentier states: The cases of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya. Democratization. 13(1),pp.135-152.

Sandbrook, R. 1986. The state and economic stagnation in Tropical Africa. *World Development*. 14(3),pp.319-332.

Sawani, Y. 2017. Security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias: the challenges for state building in Libya. Contemporary Arab Affairs. 10(2),pp.171-186.

Schneider, F. 1997. The Shadow Economies of Western Europe. Economic Affairs. 17(3), pp.42-48.

Schneider, F. 2002. SIZE AND MEASUREMENT OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN 110 COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD. Dergiler.sgb.gov.tr. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: http://dergiler.sgb.gov.tr/kutuphane/ekutup/Sizeandmeasurement_july2002.pdf.

Schneider, F. 2005. Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know? European Journal of Political Economy. 21(3), pp.598-642.

Schneider, F. 2012. The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know? Ftp.iza.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6423.pdf.

Schneider, F. and Enste, D. 2000. Shadow Economies around the World, Working Paper 00/26 (76 countries). Imf.org. [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2018]. Available from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0026.pdf.

Schneider, F., Linsbauer, K. and Heinemann, F. 2015. Religion and the Shadow Economy. Kyklos. 68(1), pp.111-141.

Seidman, I. 2013. Interviewing as qualitative research. New York: Teachers College Press.

Sepulveda, L. and Syrett, S. 2007. Out of the shadows? Formalisation approaches to informal economic activity. Policy & Politics. 35(1), pp.87-104.

Sigman, R. and Lindberg, S., 2017. Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes. *SSRN Electronic Journal*,.

Silverman, D. 2017. Doing qualitative research. London: Sage.

Singh, A., Jain-Chandra, S. and Mohommad, A. 2012. Inclusive growth, institutions, and the underground economy. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund.

Smith, A. and Stenning, A. 2006. Beyond household economies: articulations and spaces of economic practice in postsocialism. Progress in Human Geography. 30(2), pp.190-213.

Snyder, C. 2015. A Case Study of a Case Study: Analysis of a Robust Qualitative Research Methodology. The Qualitative Report.

Soto, H., Vargas Llosa, M. and Abbott, J. 1989. The other path. New York: Perennial library, Harper and Row.

Spear, J., 2006. From political economies of war to political economies of peace: The contribution of DDR after wars of predation. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 27(1), pp.168-189.

Stake, R. 1995. The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stake, R. 2010. Qualitative research. New York: The Guilford Press.

Stankovic, T. 2015. Microdisarmament and Compliance Costs: An Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 38(9),pp.691-709.

Stavros, C. and Westberg, K. 2009. Using triangulation and multiple case studies to advance relationship marketing theory. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal. 12(3), pp.307-320.

Stedman, S., Rothchild, D. and Cousens, E. 2003. Ending civil wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements.

Suhrker, A. 2021. Timeline: U.S. War in Afghanistan. Council on Foreign Relations. [Online]. [Accessed 19 July 2021]. Available from: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.

Swanborn, P. 2012. Case study research. [Place of publication not identified]: Sage South Asia.

Taofik Oyewo, H. 2016. Nigeria: The Challenges of Reintegrating Niger Delta Militants. Conflict Stuides Quarterly. (17),pp.57-72.

Tellis, W. 1997. Introduction to Case Study. The Qualitative Report.

The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta 2016. 2016 Annual Report. The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta.

The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta 2015. 5 years if Catalysing Change in the Niger Delta: Our Growth and Impact. The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta.

The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta 2015. Briefing: Conflict Prevention in the Aftermath of the Presidential Amnesty Programme. The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta.

The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta 2019. Building a Prosperous and Stable Niger Delta. The Foundation for the Initiatives of the Niger Delta.

The Guardian, 2016. *Wike inaugurates Rivers State Amnesty Programme Committee | The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News*. [online] The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News. Available at: <https://guardian.ng/news/wike-inaugurates-rivers-state-amnesty-programme-committee/> [Accessed 25 August 2021].

The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019. *POSITIVE PEACE REPORT 2019 ANALYSING THE FACTORS THAT SUSTAIN PEACE*. [online] Economicsandpeace.org.

The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020. *POSITIVE PEACE REPORT 2020 ANALYSING THE FACTORS THAT SUSTAIN PEACE*.

The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 2014. Winners or losers? Assessing the contribution of youth employment and empowerment programmes to reducing conflict risk in Nigeria. Nsrp-nigeria.org.

The State House, Abuja 2020. Economic Recovery and Growth Plan - The Statehouse, Abuja. *The Statehouse, Abuja*. [Online]. [Accessed 23 September 2021]. Available from: https://statehouse.gov.ng/policy/economy/economic-recovery-and-growth-plan/.

Thomas, G. 2011. How to do your case study. Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE.

Thomson, B., 2007. Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform. *Chatham House Report*,.

Titeca, K. and Kimanuka, C. 2012. Walking in the dark: Informal cross-border trade in the great lake's region. International Alert..

Tokman, V. 1978. An exploration into the nature of informal—formal sector relationships. World Development. 6(9-10), pp.1065-1075.

Torjesen, S. 2006. The political economy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) selective literature review and preliminary agenda for research. Norwegian Insutute of International Affairs. 709,pp.7-17.

Turner, M. and Pugh, M. 2006. Towards a new agenda for transforming war economies. Conflict, Security & Development. 6(3),pp.471-479.

Udegbunam, K. 2013. Repositioning Nigeria's Amnesty Programme for Conflict Transformation and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *Singaporean Journal of Business , Economics and Management Studies*. 2(1),pp.42-58.

Uduji, J., Okolo-Obasi, E. and Asongu, S., 2019. Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of Rural Women in Sustainable Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence From the Niger Delta in Nigeria. *SSRN Electronic Journal*,.

Ufua, D., 2019. Exploring the Effectiveness of Boundary Critique in an Intervention: a Case in the Niger Delta Region, Nigeria. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 33(5), pp.485-499.

Ugor, P. 2013. SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND CITIZENSHIP CLAIMS: YOUTH AND THE UNDERGROUND OIL ECONOMY IN POST-AMNESTY NIGER DELTA. Africa. 83(02),pp.270-292.

Ugur-Cinar, M., 2017. Embedded Neopatrimonialism: Patriarchy and Democracy in Turkey. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 24(3), pp.324-343.

Ukiwo, U. (2007). 'From "pirates" to "militants": A historical perspective on anti-state and anti-oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta', African Affairs,

UNEP 2017. Nigeria Launches $1 Billion Ogoniland Clean-up and Restoration Programm. [Online]. [Accessed 23 September 2021]. Available from: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/nigeria-launches-1-billion-ogoniland-clean-and-restoration-programme.

United Nations Development Programm 2019. Human Development Report 2019 Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Empowered lives. Resilient nations. Inequalities in human development in the 21st centur. the United Nations Development Programm.

Valodia, I. and Devey, R. 2011. Formal-informal economy linkages: What implications for poverty in South Africa?. Law, Democracy & Development. 14(1).

Valodia, I. and Devey, R., 2011. Formal-informal economy linkages: What implications for poverty in South Africa?. *Law, Democracy & Development*, 14(1).

van der Molen, P. 2018. Informal economies, state finances and surveyors. Survey Review. 50(358),pp.16-25.

Vandeginste, S., 2012. Book Review: Illegal Peace in Africa: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing with Warlords, Rebels, and Junta. Africa Spectrum, 47(2-3), pp.204-206.

Vanguard, 2020. Report details how 100 cult groups held Rivers hostage. [online] Vanguard.

Varrella, S. 2021. Africa: GDP, by country 2020 | Statista. *Statista*. [Online].

von Soest, C., 2006. How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? The Case of Tax Collection in Zambia. *SSRN Electronic Journal*,.

von Soest, C., Bechle, K. and Korte, N., 2011. How Neopatrimonialism Affects Tax Administration: A Comparative Study of Three World Regions. *SSRN Electronic Journal*,.

Vreÿ, F., 2012. Maritime aspects of illegal oil-bunkering in the Niger Delta. *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs*, 4(4), pp.109-115.

Vuletin, G. 2008. Measuring the informal economy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: Internat. Monetary Fund.

Walter, B. 1999. Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace. International Security. 24(1),pp.127-155.

Walters, T. 2016. Using Thematic Analysis in Tourism Research. Tourism Analysis. 21(1),pp.107-116.

Wapmuk, S. 2012. The Amnesty Programme and the Challenges of Ending Youth Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Insight on Africa. 4(2),pp.153-168.

Watts, M. and Ibaba, I. 2011. Turbulent Oil: Conflict and Insecurity in the Niger Delta. African Security. 4(1),pp.1-19.

Webb, J., Bruton, G., Tihanyi, L. and Ireland, R. 2013. Research on entrepreneurship in the informal economy: Framing a research agenda. Journal of Business Venturing. 28(5), pp.598-614.

Weinstein, J. 2005. Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Wells, D., 1989. The Profits of War and the Politics of Peace. *Studies in Political Economy*, 29(1), pp.155-161.

Wennmann, A. 2005. Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and Their Implications for Peacebuilding. Security Dialogue. 36(4), pp.479-494.

Wennmann, A. 2010. Grasping the strengths of fragile states. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies-CCDP.

Wennmann, A. 2011. Economic dimensions of armed groups.

Wennmann, A. 2011. The political economy of peacemaking. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Wennmann, A. 2021. Illicit Economies Through the Lens of Urban Peace: Towards a New Policy Agenda. Journal of Illicit Economies and Development. 2(2),pp.256-266.

Widdowson, M. 2011. Case Study Research Methodology. International Journal of Transactional Analysis Research & Practice. 2(1).

WIEGO 2017. Counting the World's Informal Workers: A Global Snapshot. Wiego.org. [Online].

Williams, C. 2009. Informal entrepreneurs and their motives: a gender perspective. International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship. 1(3), pp.219-225.

Williams, C. and Renooy, P. 2009. Measures to tackle undeclared work in the European Union. Eurofound.europa.eu. [Online].

Williams, C. and Round, J. 2007. Beyond formalization: rethinking the future of work. Foresight. 9(3), pp.30-41.

Williams, C., Shahid, M. and Martínez, A. 2016. Determinants of the Level of Informality of Informal Micro-Enterprises: Some Evidence from the City of Lahore, Pakistan. World Development. 84, pp.312-325.

Works of Claude Ake (Lagos, JAD Publishers, 1989), 38–40.

Wuest, J. 2011. Are We There Yet? Positioning Qualitative Research Differently. Qualitative Health Research. 21(7), pp.875-883.

Yadav N. (2009) informal sector: Definitions and its implications for Growth. Cuts centre for

Yin, R. 2016. Qualitative research from start to finish. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Yin, R. 2017. Case study research and applications. Singapore: SAGE publishers.

Yin, R. 2018. Case study research and applications. Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE

Young, G. 2020. Urban informal economies in peacebuilding: competing perspectives and implications for theory and praxis. Third World Quarterly. 41(11),pp.1937-195

Appendix A (Interviews)

Date	Respondent	Gender	Organisation	Interview Mode	Interviewer
10th November 2019	AD1	Male	Peacebuilding Scholar	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya

12th November 2019	AD2	Male	Peacebuilding Scholar	Face to Face	Ramya
30th August 2019	AD3	Male	University of Port Harcourt	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
30th August, 2019	AD4	Male	University of Port Harcourt	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
25th August 2019	AD5	Male	University of Port Harcourt	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
27th November 2019	AD6	Male	Open University	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
26th August 2019	DB1	Male	PIND	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
26th August, 2019	DB2	Male	PIND	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
26th August, 2019	DB3	Female	PIND	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
27TH August, 2019	DB4	Male	PIND	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya

27th August, 2019	DB5	Male	PIND	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
27th August, 2019	DB6	Male	PIND	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
21st October, 2019	DB7	Male	NSRP	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
29th August, 2019	DB8	Female	NSRP	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
29th August, 2019	DB9	Male	NSRP	Face to Face Port Harcourt	Ramya
23rd October, 2019	SB1	Male	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
5th November 2019	SB2	Female	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)	Face to Face Bayelsa	Ramya
18th October 2019	SB3	Female	Institute For Peace and Conflict Resolution	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
18th October 2019	SB4	Female	Institute For Peace and Conflict Resolution	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya

4th November 2019	SB5	Male	Military	Face to Face Bayelsa	Ramya
4th November, 2019	SB6	Male	Military	Face to Face Bayelsa	Ramya
6th November 2019	SB7	Male	Military	Face to Face Bayelsa	Ramya
6th November, 2019	SB8	Male	Military	Face to Face Bayelsa	Ramya
18th November 2019	SB9	Male	Ministry of Defence	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
18th November, 2019	SB10	Male	Ministry of Defence	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
21st November 2019	SB11	Female	College of War	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
21st November 2019	SB12	Male	College of War	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
24th October, 2019	SB13	Female	Institute For Peace and Conflict Resolution	Face to Face Abuja	Ramya
24th October	SB14	Male	Institute For Peace and Conflict Resolution	Face to face Abuja	Ramya

Appendix B Sample of Interview Questions

1. What is your understanding of peacebuilding?
   a. Has the focus of peacebuilding changed overtime in Rivers and Bayelsa state? How? In your opinion, has the population that is self-employed become situated within the current peacebuilding agenda?
   b. How have you seen the peacebuilding initiatives in Rivers and Bayelsa state support the part of the population that are self- employed? Any examples?

c. In your opinion how has this affected/influenced i) people's lifestyle and job choices? What kind of self- employed jobs do they do? Are they more criminal related or not? ii) people engaging in criminal activities.

d. In your opinion, have the resources that have been made available for peacebuilding activities increased or decreased people's reliance on self-employment in Bayelsa/Rivers? How?

2. How have you seen the state participate through with various peacebuilding organisations in initiatives that are targeted at the population that is self-employed?

a. How have you seen the relationship between the state and the population that is self-employed evolved over the years? Does this affect how peacebuilding initiatives are carried out? If so how/? Any examples? How has this promoted or obstructed peacebuilding?

b. In your opinion, how has the state (Rivers or Bayelsa government) provided support for peacebuilding initiatives specifically focused on those that are self-employed? Do you think this has this promoted or obstructed peacebuilding? If so how?

c. In your opinion, is the state doing enough to be involved in peacebuilding initiatives.

3. Over the years how have you seen areas or communities (in Bayelsa and Rivers) selected for peacebuilding operations? How involved has the state been i.e. Local councilmen, senators etc. involved in the process?

a. Have you seen these policies evolve over the years, if so how and why? In your opinion, have these polices been effective in curbing peacebuilding initiatives based on political merit.

b. Does the involvement of state influence peacebuilding outcomes? Example?

c. Has there been any incidence of peacebuilding initiatives being carried out as a result of political favouritism or merit? If so, how was this dealt with?

4. How involved have you observed donors in the process of peacebuilding? How does the donor's influence or agenda influence peacebuilding? In your opinion, does this have any influence on those that are self-employed.

a. Do you feel there is an abundance of NGO's working within Rivers and Bayelsa state? In your opinion has this affected the state's role in engaging with peacebuilding. How? Is this also influencing the part of the population that is self-employed?

5. Have traditional structures (leaders, organisations, traditions) played in a role in peacebuilding in Rivers and Bayelsa? How?

a. How has this influence/ shaped peacebuilding?

b. How has this affected the part of the population that is self-employed?