THE SUBVERSION OF CITIZENSHIP

NEW RIGHT CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, THATCHERISM, AND THE 'NEW POLITICS'

VOL I

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"The sin of the academic is that he takes so long in coming to the point. Nevertheless, there may be some virtue in his dilatoriness; what he has to offer may, in the end, be no great matter, but at least it is not unripe fruit, and to pluck it is the work of a moment. We set out to consider the kind of knowledge involved in political activity and the appropriate sort of education. And if the understanding of politics I have recommended is not a misunderstanding, there is little doubt about the kind of knowledge and the sort of education which belongs to it. It is knowledge, as profound as we can make it, of our traditions of political behaviour. Other knowledge, certainly, is desirable in addition; but this is the knowledge without which we cannot make use of whatever else we may have learned."

- Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (1962).

Abstract

This research concerns the theory of citizenship, the new right's conceptions of citizenship, their influence on the Thatcher regime, and the contemporary left's reformulations of citizenship. Citizenship cannot be restricted to the social democratic orthodoxy, in particular the foundations supplied by T.H. Marshall. The new right developed powerful models of citizenship which offered alternative theoretical routes to 'universal membership', the key ethical notion at the heart of citizenship. However these were deficient in practical terms, leading to greater inequality and reduced genuine individual autonomy. Paradoxically, the new right's conceptions of citizenship were used ultimately to undermine full citizenship for all. These arguments are illustrated in four case studies of policy change under Thatcherism - the Education Reform Act 1988, the Community Charge, 'workfare' programmes, and Conservative rhetoric of 'active citizenship'. Despite their deficiencies, new right conceptions of citizenship found a better reception in the dominant political culture because their discourses on freedom and the market appeared more closely-aligned with common perceptions. Thatcherism and the new right are characterised as seeking to construct a rigid discursive order centring around the autonomy of the market, here termed the 'market society'. In response, the efforts of parts of the contemporary left to reformulate citizenship more astutely within the confines of the perceptions of the dominant political culture are examined.

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INTRODUCTION

0. General Introduction

"It is no doubt a sign of the times - that is, of the open questions at the end of the 1980s boom - that citizenship has become a fashionable concept all over the political spectrum. People sense that there is something in citizenship that defines the needs of the future - in this they are right - but proceed to bend the term to their own predilections. The right prefers to speak of 'active citizenship' in order to emphasise the obligations of people. The left tries to develop a notion of 'communitarian citizenship' which combines solidarity with welfare rights. The centre turns the concept into an almost vacuous label for everything that is not to be regarded as either right or left. At times one wants to despair at the distortions of one of the great ideas of social and political thought and begis to wonder whether it can be rescued from its ideological abuses. But it must be."[1]

This is, in part, the aim of the project here. The potential scope of the concept of 'citizenship' is immense. No single study can expect to note all of the questions it raises, let alone deal adequately with them. However, it is hoped that this enquiry cuts to the heart of the question of citizenship, in particular the issue of what constitutes social 'membership'.

It tries to develop a clearer and potentially more productive understanding of what citizenship is.

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[1] Dahrendorf, 'The Changing Quality of Citizenship', in Steenbergen (1994), p.13.

Further, it attempts to use this understanding to investigate aspects of the right and Thatcherism in particular, and in its wake the contemporary development of the left.

The concept of citizenship has become much discussed since the late 1980s. This has occurred for two main reasons. First, because of the scope of the concept, and its perceived relevance to so many areas of enquiry. Second, because of its perceived purpose. The latter is more contentious. It appears that the prevalence of citizenship has been seen as an opportunity for some form of project for social inclusion and solidarity combined with individual liberty and autonomy. Yet the limits of the concept need addressing as well as its possibilities.

This sensing of opportunities implied by the concept of citizenship is related to the feeling shared on the left that the contemporary era is one which is marked by its hostility to political projects seeking to unite equality and liberty. Despite recent political developments in Britain, progressives have come to feel that the last few decades have been ones of retrenchment against the continuing victories of the right. To understand what it has been to be a 'citizen' during the era of the supposed dominance of the right's ideas and of Thatcherism, forms the underlying motivation for this work. It is to understand this era, and not merely to criticise or lament its nature, which is important. If genuine citizenship for all is to be realised more fully, the most frequent proponents of

the concept and its usefulness must try to comprehend what it is about the environment of contemporary politics which has impeded them.

0.1 Thesis Introduction

The point is this. It is possible to 'rescue' citizenship from its conceptual mire and reassert its value with some theoretical clarity. Citizenship is a contested concept, but ultimately not 'essentially contested'. It is a concept which is argued over by many different political projects, and the interpretation of which will be a defining feature of any particular political perspective. It cannot be restricted to the model associated with social democratic orthodoxy. The new right developed its own conceptions of citizenship, which also informed the broader political project of Thatcherism. These were not illegitimate in theoretical terms, as has often been suggested by critics, but were deficient in practical terms. Only 'the left', or rather a particular type of left politics, will in practice be able to further the ideal at the heart of citizenship - a form of full social membership. But in order to do so, the left must alter its most common assumptions on citizenship, and engage in a wider critical re-thinking.

The structure of the thesis follows this form. Part One examines the theoretical debate over citizenship. Chapter One describes aspects of the 'orthodoxy' concerning citizenship. It notes four key aspects which will frame the initial

investigation of citizenship. These are the notion of 'modern citizenship' (to differentiate contemporary questions of citizenship from classical conceptions), the 'reformist debate' (the clash between critical Marxist theories and those which support the efficacy of citizenship to ameliorate inequalities), the two main political philosophical traditions of citizenship ('liberal' and 'communitarian'), and what are regarded as closely-related concepts such as rights, duties and social cohesion. It then describes the main currents in the left's conceptions of citizenship. This remains dominated by T.H. Marshall, despite the many criticisms which have been developed of his conception of citizenship. Post-Marshall conceptions of citizenship may be divided along the lines of the reformist debate, between those which criticise and those which support the progressive efficacy of citizenship (especially when underpinned by social welfare rights).

Chapter Two describes the main currents in the new right's conceptions of citizenship. To begin with, a case is made for the legitimacy of the term 'new right' itself, given that it has been criticised. But a more profound sense of the new right's project remains to be developed. It is suggested that previous reviews of the new right's conceptions of citizenship have helped obscure both its richness and diversity, and the new right's actual relationship to the concept. This is because such reviews have tended to derive from the left, and have been based on its progressive assumptions with

regard to citizenship. The new right is divided into four broad strands - neoconservatism, neoliberalism, libertarianism, and public choice - and their particular discourses on citizenship are noted. A fifth strand - a form of 'liberal-conservatism' - is examined, in both its Hayekian and 'modern conservatism' variants. It is suggested that despite these different strands comprising the new right, they share some fundamental themes and interests. These can be brought out especially with regard to the idea of citizenship. New right citizenship may be inegalitarian, authoritarian and anti-political. However, it cannot be dismissed as easily as this by its opponents.

Chapter Three proposes why. It returns to the theory of citizenship and suggests some important senses in which the concept is a less stable and reliable one than its proponents (particularly those on the left) have tended to assume. Indeed, in some respects, the new right can be seen to have formulated a more effective and theoretically-accurate conception of citizenship than the left. There are five main reasons why. First, virtually all conceptions of citizenship, including those from the new right, can be regarded as legitimate in theoretical terms because they offer a common promise - that of 'universal membership'. This simple concept refers to a vision of 'full social inclusion'. Conceptions of citizenship are differentiated from each other by their proposed routes to this ideal. The new right offered 'free market' participation and 'embeddedness' in the socially-conservative 'moral

community'. Second, it is suggested that the simplistic lines of the reformist debate need to be broken, and a recognition developed that citizenship can act both progressively and regressively in social operation. The social democratic and centre-left, in tending to assume exclusively benign and progressive consequences of citizenship, has neglected what the new right in effect recognised through its conceptions of citizenship. Third, concepts related to citizenship may in many circumstances conflict with each other. Thus citizenship is not a homogenous theory. The new right, as a result of its critical approach to many aspects of the 'citizenship agenda', has been more astute than the left in exploiting these tensions within citizenship. The left, in either not recognising them, or trying to unify the many aspects of citizenship, has been less effective than the new right in this respect. Fourth, the most influential political philosophical tradition of citizenship is the 'liberal'. The new right has appeared more attuned to this, the left has appeared more confused. Fifth, discourse analysis is introduced to show how concepts are more 'fluid' than often is realised (in particular how dangerous the left's assumptions of its 'ownership' of citizenship have been), and how important discursive struggle is to contemporary politics. The notion of 'sedimented discourses' is used to suggest that some discursive meanings are more entrenched than others. This is illustrated, in an argument which is regarded as having great significance for the left's

orthodox discourses of citizenship, in the notion of the 'dominant political culture'. This culture is critical or unreceptive to many of the left's themes of increased welfare rights and political participation as key elements of 'genuine' citizenship. It has however been capitalised on more effectively by the new right, whose notions of citizenship found more response within it. Thus in sum, the new right, however deficient its conceptions of citizenship are in not actually leading to the realisation of 'universal membership', has managed to formulate more 'powerful' discourses on citizenship than the left. This has had real social and political consequences.

Part Two seeks to illustrate these arguments, by using four case studies from the period 1987-1990, in which it is thought the new right and Thatcherism were most dominant. Previous case studies along similar lines have been inadequate in that they have either tended to make use of a conception of citizenship which has lacked a critical analysis, and so been prone to the same sort of tautologism which it was suggested has plagued the left's reviews of new right citizenship, or lacked a close interpretation of the policy-making process itself. The case studies here intend to rectify this. In addition, they demonstrate the new right's conceptions of citizenship 'in action'. This points to their power and influence, and also to the shape of a more productive critique of the new right and Thatcherism.

Chapter Five concerns the Education Reform Act (1988). Chapter Six examines the development of the Community Charge ('Poll Tax'). Chapter Seven focuses on the emergence of 'workfare' programmes as a result of reforms in social security and training. Chapter Eight discusses a Thatcherite use of citizenship which did not involve major policy change, but predominantly was rhetorical - the notion of 'active citizenship'. Though all of these were in effect corrosive of 'universal membership', in terms of social cohesion, equality and genuine individual autonomy, in addition they represent the substantive use of the concept of citizenship for non-progressive ends.

Part Three concerns political projects in citizenship, more specifically those of Thatcherism and, in its wake, the 'new politics' of the left. Chapter Nine analyses Thatcherism. It draws together the insights from present theorisations of Thatcherism, but suggests also where they are deficient. It constructs a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on, as well as discourse theory, forms of political economy, to depict Thatcherism as a flexible but very particular type of political project. Borrowing from Polanyi's critique of economic liberalism, *The Great Transformation*, it is noted that market societies are not natural, but made, by states and by the social construction of 'market values'. Thatcherism's hegemonic aspirations are characterised as a project for the 'great market re-transformation', the reinforcement of what will be termed the 'market society'. This is a rigid

discursive order based around a particular. vision of the 'free market' as a self-supporting social, rather than merely economic, phenomenon, which by way of its structure seeks to defend this established order from critique and alternative political projects which might question its operation. In a limited manner, Thatcherism used citizenship to achieve its ends, as is shown in the case studies. As a further result, the relationship between Thatcherism and previous forms of conservatism is altered.

Chapter Ten discusses how, in the light of these arguments, the 'subversion of citizenship' might be resisted, in the broader context of a 'new politics' of the left. Whether citizenship, in some form, could be used as a guiding principle for the left is examined. The consequences for the left of the perceived current 'crisis of politics' - the apparent absence of genuine alternative political choices concerning the organisation of society - are explored. Thatcherism's (re-) construction of the 'market society' has placed the left in an extremely problematic position. However, a 'new' form of left politics, incorporating a critical reformulation of citizenship, might be the only viable route forward. Citizenship needs to be re-thought along critical, material and contextual lines, and in particular around the idea of 'individual autonomy'. Only this can circumvent the problem of 'universality' inherent in citizenship. Citizenship might be a useful concept for the left, but is unhelpful merely as an assumed theory. This 'post-essentialist' model

of citizenship is applied briefly to key areas the left will have to engage (welfare, political economy, and 'social capital').

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Part One

Discourses in Citizenship

Chapter One

'Modern Citizenship', the Reformist Debate, and Social Democracy

Section One - The Parameters of 'Modern Citizenship'

1.0 Introduction

Before examining different conceptions of citizenship from left and right, it is necessary to note some of the issues which frame formulations of citizenship: what is meant by 'modern' citizenship; the related reformist debate; the two main traditions; and concepts which are closely associated with citizenship.

1.1 'Modern Citizenship'

'Modern citizenship' is a term used to differentiate the concept from classical conceptions. In the broadest sense (Waters, p.160, 1989):

"Modern citizenship is a set of normative expectations specifying the relationship between the nation-state and its individual members which procedurally establish the rights and obligations of members and a set of practices by which these expectations are realised."

However, the key aspect is that (Turner, p.22, 1986):

"..modern citizenship presupposes some notion of equality, an emphasis on universalistic criteria and a secular system of values to reinforce claims and obligations. Societies organised on this principle emphasise contract over status, the dominance of

secular reality over the sacred, the importance of universalism over locality and particularity, and the importance of extending citizenship rights to women and children so as to call into question the dominance of patriarchy."

Hence in the broadest terms, citizenship represents forms of 'universalism' in a post-feudal context. Though a more comprehensive historical study is outside the scope of this enquiry, it is important to note the danger in assuming any relationship between far older conceptions of citizenship and the 'modern'. There is a theoretical and practical break between them. The development of modern citizenship was coterminous with the development of the modern state, and the construction of constitutional democracy. It was only with the establishment of precise social, territorial and political boundaries that an unambiguous membership role could be assigned to those associated with inclusive political units. The idea of citizenship was 'generalised'. The extent and meaning of this 'generalisation' became in consequence the key debate over citizenship.

1.2 The Reformist Debate

The question of citizenship tends to bring out most clearly differences between social theories. Because it appears to focus on the individual, often it has been derided or neglected in the context of traditions of social theory which explain that political phenomena can be understood by reference

to deeper historical and social forces. Hence (Roche, p.363, 1987):

"Sociology's underlying suspicion of eighteenth century 'bourgeois' individualism and contractarian political philosophy tends to be carried over against the notion of the citizen that may be assumed to embody them. Thus political sociology tends, when examining the political phenomena of citizens' actions, struggles and movements, to reveal their impotence, dependency, and in any case their ignorance, in respect to the powers of such phenomena as the state's bureaucracy, the ruling groups and elites, dominant and mystifying ideologies, and ultimately socio-economic forces."

The best example of this, as well as being a crucial question of its own, is the 'reformist debate'. The issue at the heart of the 'reformist debate' concerns modern citizenship's ability to realise a genuine 'universalism' in practical terms within contemporary society. More specifically, in Britain (Roche, p.161, 1987):

"The central debate about citizenship is between 'reformist' sociological theorists and Marxist theorists and concerns whether extensions of citizenship rights, or 'reform', constitutes a genuine abatement of class inequality."[1]

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[1] There are two other (related) main debates aside from this particularly British/social class one: the North American relating citizenship to ethnicity, nationalism and the state, and the European concerning the relationship between the state and the citizen (Turner, General Commentary, in Turner and Hamilton 1995a).

Put simply, this tends to focus on whether the rights which have come to be associated with citizenship are 'sham', or represent a genuine advancement of the working classes and a significant inroad into the free operation of the capitalist market.

The 'Marxist school' tends to view citizenship as a necessary step in the dismantling of feudal status structures but regards it as fundamentally epiphenomenal in terms of class relations - an illusory overlay of formal universalistic rights which mask fundamental and substantive inequalities. Marx's *On the Jewish Question* (Marx, p.39-62, 1977) represents the denial of the possibility of citizenship, in a full sense, in capitalist society. Marx emphasises that the 'Jewish question' is really 'what sort of emancipation ?' In the historical context of the state, the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation is not full or completed but only abstract and limited (p.45, ibid):

"The state does away with difference in birth, class, education, and profession in its own manner when it declares birth, class, education and profession to be unpolitical differences, when it summons every member of the people to an equal participation in popular sovereignty without taking the differences into consideration, when it treats all elements of the people's real life from the point of view of the state. Nevertheless the state allows private property, education and profession to

have an effect in their own manner...Far from abolishing these factual differences, its existence rests on them as a presupposition, it only feels itself to be a political state and asserts its universality by opposition to these elements."

Marx does suggest that 'political emancipation' is a form of progress, and the extent of his rejection of 'liberal' rights discourses is an involved issue in itself.[2] But, fundamentally (p.47, ibid):

"The decomposition of man into Jew and citizen, protestant and citizen, religious man and citizen, this decomposition is no trick played upon political citizenship, no avoidance of political emancipation, it is political emancipation itself...The political drama therefore ends necessarily with the restoration of religion, private property, and all the elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace."

The broad alternative to this argument is found in the work of those who emphasise the genuinely ameliorating and reforming potential of citizenship. In effect, they suggest, in Marx's terminology, that modern citizenship is able to bridge the gap between 'citizen' (an individual with political rights) and 'bourgeois' (a member of civil society, a private individual). These, and particularly T.H. Marshall's thesis on citizenship, along with more recent

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[2] Bernstein (chapter four, 'Right, Revolution and Community: Marx's *On the Jewish Question*', Osborne 1991) suggests that this does not represent Marx's rejection of all discourses on rights, but only abstracted individualised liberal rights. Political rights which have their basis in practical mutual recognition and participation can be a source of radical change.

versions of the Marxist argument, are described in section two of this chapter.

Another key divide in citizenship theory concerns less structural economic matters, but political philosophical ones.

1.3 The Two Political Philosophies of Citizenship

As commonly understood, the two principal political-philosophical currents in citizenship are the 'liberal' and the 'communitarian' or 'civic republican'. Supposedly, the role of the citizen is essentially individualist and instrumentalist in the liberal tradition of natural law starting with Locke, including Bodin, Montesquieu and Hobbes, whereas a communitarian and ethical understanding has emerged in the tradition of political philosophy which draws upon Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel.

In this widely-shared dichotomy, 'liberal' citizenship is seen as securing a legal status external to the state. Citizens are no different from private persons who bring their prepolitical interests to bear on the state apparatus, contributing only in a certain manner to its reproduction in return for the benefits of organisational membership.[3] Conversely, 'communitarian' citizenship represents membership in a self-determining ethical community. Citizens can only form their personal and social identity in the

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[3] More recent liberal theorists who may be seen as having shifted this basic model in order to incorporate more 'social' or 'political' themes, and so undermined this dichotomy, are discussed later [3.5c].

horizon of shared traditions and intersubjectively recognised institutions.[4]

1.4 Related Discourses

There are a number of concepts which often are associated with that of citizenship. These are worth noting here. They include universalism, identity, membership, inclusion, social cohesion, equality, rights, duties (or obligations), individual autonomy, community, self-determination, status and participation. How, in specific terms, they are defined, and then related to citizenship, shapes the particular conception of citizenship being offered. For example, the importance of welfare rights as part of citizenship is associated more commonly with the left's conceptions of citizenship. How different conceptions of citizenship are constructed is the subject of section two (the left), and chapter two (the new right).

1.5 Summary to Section One

There are three main lines along which any contemporary conception of citizenship may initially be examined: its position with reference to the reformist debate over the efficacy of citizenship, which political philosophical tradition it appears to draw upon, and how it is constructed using related concepts. Of course, these are not wholly sufficient, and as will be suggested, are in many ways deficient, but they represent the starting-

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[4] Theorists of the latter conception include Arendt (1958), Barber (1984), Bellah (1985), Oldfield (1990), Conover and Searing (1994), Stewart (1995), and Miller (1995).

points of analysis of citizenship. These are the initial parameters within which competing conceptions of citizenship will be examined.

Section Two - The Social Democratic Orthodoxy

1.6 Introduction

In one sense, social democratic ideas of citizenship have been thought so accepted that in effect they have been presumed to form a second set of parameters within which contemporary citizenship is conceived of, further to those noted in section one. Whether this presumption is accurate or not, it is necessary to examine the actual conceptions of citizenship which have been developed by the dominant section of the British left in the post-war era, that of social democracy. This begins with the work of T.H. Marshall, and then notes the influence of, and reactions to, his model.[5]

1.7 T.H. Marshall's Theory of Citizenship

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[5] It is necessary to note briefly the use of terms to summarise political positions. What exactly constitutes 'the left', for example, is difficult to define, at least at this stage. The term shall be used here instead of 'socialism'. 'Socialism' has important historical connotations, and implies policies of state economic ownership and planning. 'Left' is a freer term, describing 'progressivism' in many variants. The terms 'left' and 'right' are common currency in political discussions. Usually, it is assumed one knows one's position according to one's views on the 'free market', the role of the state, the importance of (or threat from) 'equality', questions of individual and moral freedom, the nature and role of the community, and even supposedly 'private' issues. There are many qualifications to be made in this respect. However, it will be suggested that it is only after particular methodologies are introduced that a better understanding of these terms can be developed [10.3, 11.1].

"The question is not whether all men will ultimately be equal - that they will certainly not - but whether progress will go on steadily, if slowly, till, by occupation at least, every man is a gentleman."

- Alfred Marshall.[6]

T.H. (Thomas Humphrey) Marshall's thesis is the standard-bearer for the modern account of citizenship and also represents the paradigmatic foundations of many of the assumptions of the social democratic era.[7] Marshall delivered his seminal lectures on 'Citizenship and Social Class' at Cambridge in 1947, and his work could be seen to signify the high water-mark of reformism in Britain. His ideas on citizenship have become deeply-ingrained in common understandings. Though his paradigm may be shared by some on the right, they have had most influence on the left (particularly the social democratic and centre-left). Though in some respects his thesis was not wholly original, it forwarded the notion that citizenship had developed across a number of centuries, had a three-layer structure, and included as one of those layers an important role for rights to welfare. Marshall defined citizenship as (p.84, 1964):

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[6] This was the question T.H. Marshall began his 1950 lectures with, first raised by the economist Alfred Marshall in 1873 (Dahrendorf, p.36, 1988). In a sense, the answer provides Marshall his thesis of the effects of citizenship upon class - we are not made equal but 'gentlemen', or citizens.

[7] For biographical notes on T.H. Marshall and the place of his theory of citizenship within his other work in sociology, see Halsey (1984).

"..a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed."

Marshall identified three stages (or layers) in the development of citizenship - the 'civil', the 'political', and the 'social' - and the institutions which support them. The first layer, civil rights, comprises those rights which concern individual freedom which were associated with the sphere of civil society (p.71, 1964):

"...liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice."

Civil rights are associated principally with the institutions of legal justice, such as the courts; they are the rights held by individuals which they may come to law to vindicate. The second layer comprises political rights - the democratic rights of participation (p.72, ibid):

"...the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body."[8]

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[8] The development from civil to political rights is logical, since as Giddens (p.168-9, 1982) states: "Civil freedoms were essentially an end-process in the dissolution of the remnants of feudal society. They were the necessary foundation for the emergence of political rights; for only if the individual is recognised as a capable, autonomous agent does it become either possible or sensible to recognise that individual as politically responsible."

The institutions of representative democracy are central to the realisation and maintenance of these political rights. Third, social rights, meant by Marshall to be economic and welfare rights, are rights to a minimum standard of welfare and income (p.72, ibid):

"...the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society."

Members of society were deemed to need more than civil and political rights. They should be entitled a universal right to a real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant. Welfare state policies and institutions - the educational system and the social services - are the main expression of this third layer. The influence of Marshall's thesis is, in part, the reason why citizenship in Britain has appeared to have become so bound up with the development of the modern welfare state, while also a reflection of it.

Marshall's general conception is that by providing civil rights, society mitigates the impact of force and violence in relations between citizens, by political rights it ensures that power is not confined to an elite, and by minimum standards in areas of welfare and income the state offsets the vagaries of market processes and corrects the gross inequalities of distribution arising from the market. Only in the twentieth century has the

development of citizenship rights seriously challenged or undermined the inequalities of the capitalist class system.

Hence Marshall regards the extension of citizenship as an egalitarian and increasingly effective attack on the structures of class inequality. The consequences of citizenship for class are: "..bound to be profoundly disturbing, and even destructive" (Marshall, p.85, 1964). The specific consequences would be income compression at both ends of the scale, an increasingly common and universalistic culture, and the establishment of a firm link between education and occupation, which enriches the universal status of citizenship and stabilises status on the basis of equality of opportunity. Hence: "..the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of a conflict between opposing principles" (Marshall, p.84, 1950). Thus citizenship is given an historical role - in the emergence of layers of rights institutionalized in centralised and specialised structural arrangements, democratic political institutions and educational and income redistribution mechanisms, and in the related development away from nineteenth-century 'laissez-faire' capitalism.

Marshall developed this conception in his later work. His final theorisation of the issue conceptualised capitalism as a dynamic system in which the constant clash between citizenship and social class determined the character of political and social life (Marshall 1981). These tensions were

summarised in the notion of the 'hyphenated society' of 'democratic-welfare-capitalism', that is, a social system in which there were perpetual tensions between the need for economic profitability, the taxation requirements of the modern state, and the rights of citizens to welfare provision.

In another sense, Marshall uses 'citizenship' as a term to describe contemporary social change. This is in the context of mass production creating a common material civilisation in which the demand for the expansion of citizenship is enhanced. Marshall's theory of social integration depends only partly on the concept of citizenship, and he belongs to a tradition which does not emphasise normative integration, but integration based on the satisfaction of material interests.[9] This is how Marshall's citizenship directed attention to the realities of citizenship and away from its previous grounding in political philosophy, though it can also be seen to belong to a longer tradition of citizenship defined as universally established equal rights.[10] For Lockwood (1974), it represented a major advance in the theory of social stratification, because it highlighted what he regarded as the most important aspect of modern status systems - certain degrees of equality rather than inequalities of condition. 'Citizenship' was used to define the foundation of social solidarity,

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[9] Barbalet (1988).

[10] Marshall could be seen as part of the long tradition that has, in effect, seen citizenship as an extension of state protection, to life, conscience, to home or property (Walzer, p.206, 1970).

such that it is. Hence he thought that (p.364, ibid): "Marshall's essay is the most outstanding British contribution to the analysis of the structure and dynamics of capitalist societies as this has taken shape in the last two decades."

1.8 Critiques of Marshall's Conception

Despite the influence of Marshall's thesis, it has been widely criticised. There are seven main aspects - its over-optimism about the reforming potential of citizenship, normative position, inadequate conceptualisation of rights, teleologism, lack of theoretical clarity, lack of comparative analysis, and its problems in the face of significant contemporary structural changes.

1.8a Over-Optimism

Marshall is regarded as too optimistic about the progressive reduction of class (and other) inequalities to be expected from the combined impact of economic growth, the development of social citizenship rights, and of the presumed redistributive characteristics of the welfare state. Roche (1987) suggests scepticism about the state's power to alter the reproduction of class inequalities (let alone other inequalities) in industrial-capitalist societies.[11] According to Dahrendorf (1959), Marshall's account of the

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[11] Roche regards Marshall as 'fathering' some of the distracting depoliticizing features (that is, away from the almost civic republican model of the 'political community') of the post-war British welfare state (such as consumption, clienthood, consumer and welfare rights), and participating also in the parallel process of structural politicisation, with the state through welfare politicizing the social system as a whole.

levelling effect of social citizenship is irrelevant to class because it concerns an entirely different subject - social stratification. Marshall's conception of 'class' is one of common perception, which allows him to argue that the universalisation of social services is the basis of a common experience which therefore promotes 'class fusion'. But this does not confront other aspects of class inequalities. Further, Marshall seems to ignore the question of differential access to citizenship rights (for ethnic minorities, women within the family, and so on).

1.8b Normative Assumptions

Since Marshall's thesis is seen to represent the paradigmatic foundations of the social democratic era, it shares its criticisms. First, it has been suggested that a critical approach to Marshall's conception of citizenship reveals its 'liberal' (or 'social liberal') assumptions.[12] Turner (p.6-7, 1993) sees Marshall's thesis as the legacy of the liberal political response to the problem of the relationship between formal democracy and the social consequences of capitalism, essentially the welfare state. But this causes ambiguities [1.8e], and neglect of reforms which might have further promoted egalitarian citizenship (such as industrial democracy).

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[12] Precise categorisations are difficult. For example, Halsey (chapter five, 'T.H. Marshall and Ethical Socialism', Bulmer and Rees 1996), places Marshall in the tradition of English ethical socialism, which of course may be seen as 'liberal' in many respects. This issue returns in chapter ten.

Second, aside from the assumptions concerning the reformist potential of citizenship upon class, his argument accepts the given political order. It then appears as if the supposed realisation of political citizenship allowed an exclusive concentration on the construction of social rights (there are similarities with Anthony Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* in this respect). This is the root of his effectively apolitical approach to citizenship. Also, it neglects that the development of 'British citizenship' involved the dominance of England over political participation and regional autonomy in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The assumption of national homogeneity exacerbates the lack of critical political analysis in Marshall's conception (Turner, p.46-7, 1986).

1.8c Inadequate Theorisation of Rights

Marshall is seen to theorise rights inadequately. Citizenship rights should not be regarded as homogenous (Giddens 1982, Barbalet 1988). For Giddens, liberal rights which were the result of bourgeois struggles cannot properly be grouped with claims to welfare developed by working class socialist struggle.[13] Whereas liberal rights to the parliamentary process tend to confirm and reaffirm the social and political dominance of private property over labour, welfare rights are seen as, at

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[13] Giddens has also objected to the notion that civil liberties were in place before the development of political rights; rather the two were fought for concurrently and are interdependent. The rights of protest and demonstration, while classified as civil liberties, have an obvious and direct bearing on political rights.

least in principle, a potential challenge to the functioning of capitalism as an economic system. Further, 'economic civil rights' or 'industrial citizenship' (the rights to form labour unions and act collectively) won by the working class in the face of opposition from both employers and from the state, should not be equated with the civil rights of individual freedom and equality before the law fought for and won by the rising bourgeois or capitalist class in pursuit of their quest to destroy feudal obligations and restrictions on trade.[14]

To Barbalet, Marshall's homogeneous approach prevents the analysis of the internal tensions of citizenship rights, which are simply consumers' rights and therefore do not provide people with any real power. The provision of social rights to citizens is not the same as the social policies of the welfare state. The welfare state's provisions are not simply the outcome of the political struggles of subordinate classes, but play an important role in social integration, political security and economic development, and are constantly subordinated to the fulfilment of these functional requirements. Because social policy is by nature directed toward particular groups or issues, social rights cannot properly be seen as universal. Social 'rights' are always conditional upon an

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[14] Turner (1990) has suggested that Giddens is incorrect in this critique. Marshall argued that whereas individualistic civil rights correspond directly to the 'individualistic phase of capitalism', social rights are seen as anomalous (they do not seek incorporation).

administrative structure (and ultimately a fiscal basis), and so they are not rights but 'conditional opportunities'. Citizenship rights, however, must by definition be universal. Therefore, it cannot be that while civil citizenship was perfectly compatible with capitalist development, political and social citizenship challenge the system of inequality of the market economy. They do not alter the power relations within the productive sphere, because they affect the mechanisms of the distribution of resources rather than those of their production. The relationship between the different components of citizenship is then more complex. Civil rights, for example, are seen as crucial in the foundation of the capitalist economy, but also provide opportunities for workers to challenge aspects of it. Industrial rights tend to oppose aspects of civil rights, especially the property and contract rights of employers, but in helping to maintain and expand wages and provide security in employment, they tend also to stabilise commodity markets and industrial relations. To Barbalet, the logical relationship between different types of rights is connected with and in part reflects the social relations found in society at large. So social rights may facilitate citizenship, given a particular ordering of social relations, but as such they cannot be said to constitute it.

Zolo (1993) extends this critique by suggesting that (contra Marshall) some citizenship rights involve a pressure towards inequality. Liberties of contract, association, of the press and of economic

enterprise, will benefit only the few in free-market society who will be able to consolidate the acquisitive capacities of these kinds of rights. Hence citizenship produces inequality and freedom in exactly the same manner as the market produces inequality and wealth.[15]

However, having noted these criticisms, Marshall's basic conception of three layers or stages of rights is still useful to distinguish between civil, political and social rights as we refer commonly to them, even if the relationships between them are more complex than Marshall's schema suggests.

1.8d Teleologism

Marshall is seen as teleological: the image of an ideal citizenship drives the extension of citizenship rights to more and more members of society.[16] This is problematic, in two respects. First, it appears to assume a steady progressive development of citizenship rights, and second, it appears to assume that this process is 'one-way' only. It neglects that the development of citizenship may be a purely accidental and contingent process of evolution. Giddens (1982) has been particularly critical, since he feels this implies that citizenship emerges spontaneously from the 'enlightened' development of market institutions and the state rather than as a product of the

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[15] Further, Zolo argues that not only the fulfilment of social expectations but the very protection of each citizen's fundamental liberties risks being dependent less on his or her entitlement to citizenship rights than on his or her potential for corporate affiliation (parties, trade unions, economic and financial organisations).

[16] Marshall (p.84, 1964).

political struggles of subordinate classes.[17] Citizenship rights are more fragile and contested than Marshall suggests. In effect, Marshall also ignores complex questions of civic order by subordinating civil and political rights to stages in the formation of the welfare state.[18]

These criticisms are not universally shared. Turner (p.44-9, 1986) has defended Marshall. First, by suggesting that his account of citizenship does not entail necessarily some commitment to an immanent logic in capital. Second, by pointing to his later recognition of the importance of struggle developed in his notion of the 'hyphenated society', and the contradictory logic of politics versus economics within a democratic political structure. He does not assume a dominant ideology in capitalist society which incorporates the working classes as a subordinate element in the capitalist structure, but emphasises their conflictual role.[19] Marshall is seen by Turner to give proper recognition to the real advances achieved by the working classes as a result of their political and social opposition to the capitalist market. In *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, he rejected the macro-sociology

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[17] But similarly a critical view that such rights merely ensure the reproduction of labour power (Giddens, p.126, 1982): "..radically undervalues the struggles of labour movements that have played their part in the formation of liberal democracy."

[18] Giddens (p.73-4, 1994).

[19] Similarly, Halsey (1984), who places Marshall within the 'Cambridge history' school, whom Keynes had (self)-labelled 'meliorists', believers in continuing moral progress. Despite his 'tendency' to a Whig version of history, Halsey considers that Marshall recognises the key aspects of the nature of conflict in contemporary society.

of social change associated with Hobhouse. However, this was a later theorisation - his thesis had already had significant influence before then, informing the 'citizenship school' [1.9b] who arguably took a simplified view of Marshall's original work. Further, even the more refined conception of the 'hyphenated society', in common with many other conceptions of citizenship, suffers from a more important theoretical simplicity [3.8]. Undoubtedly, these criticisms are damaging.[20]

1.8e Lack of Theoretical Clarity

Turner (p.8, 1993) has suggested that it is not clear from Marshall's theory whether citizenship contradicts capitalism by requiring some redistribution of wealth on the basis of need, is in tension with it by inhibiting the full impact of 'free market' principles, or whether it supports it by integrating the working class into society by some complex means of welfare incorporation. However, this criticism is misguided. Marshall's account contains subtleties which are its strengths. It developed from a broad notion that citizenship represented a serious threat to class (though not to the extent of its total erosion) to that of a tension whereby both class and citizenship shaped the social order. The principles oppose each other, but Marshall appreciates that some of the elements

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[20] Though Marshall cannot fairly be criticised for not predicting some more recent developments. For example, understandably he took for granted the existence of powerful well-organised labour organisations to pressure for rights, which have been destabilised over the last twenty years (Offe, p.217, Moon 1988a).

considered as part of the rights of citizenship (especially civil rights) originated in bourgeois demands. However, a more profound critique has been developed by Barbalet (1988). He has asked why, if class inequality is abated by citizenship and Marshall has no account of the dynamics of class independent of his account of citizenship, Marshall suggests that social integration is never complete and class conflict is always possible.[21]

1.8f Structural Changes

There are other practical developments which may have undermined a Marshallian-modelled welfare state, such as shifts in the economic and demographic context of welfare, changes in patterns of employment and other organisational changes (Taylor-Gooby 1993). Roche (1992) has suggested that because the assumed context of Marshall's citizenship has changed (the nation-state functionalist model, industrial capitalism, a common culture), so should models of citizenship. Many of these are outside the scope of this enquiry, but may encourage further the belief that Marshall's model needs to be reformulated significantly.

1.8g Lack of Comparative Analysis

Marshall's thesis is seen to neglect a wider analysis, although to be fair there is no evidence

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[21] Dahrendorf (1959) was the first to point out this fundamental limitation in Marshall's account, but in Barbalet's view it has been ignored subsequently. To Dahrendorf (p.107-8, 1959), Marshall: "..leaves entirely untouched..the problem of power or authority and its social distribution..[and he] abandons the possibility to trace social conflicts back to structural conditions."

that Marshall sought to provide a general model of capitalist development. To Turner (1990), Marshall's lack of comparative (including non-Western) and truly historical (including classical) perspective on the question of citizenship rights is a debilitating weakness in his theory. Mann (1987) has criticised Marshall for implying a generally applicable evolutionary approach to global capitalist development, but producing a thesis which although it may fit the English example, is inappropriate historically and comparatively for other societies.

Marshall's thesis does then have some severe deficiencies. It is over-optimistic on the reduction of class and other inequalities, assumes too easily the stability of civil and political rights, theorises inadequately the relationship between different rights, and is open to criticism concerning its apparent lack of awareness of the contingent nature of the achievements of citizenship. In addition, it has limitations as a universal theory of citizenship. However, it does still contain a number of valuable insights. Marshall's thesis describes the historical development of citizenship in Britain in an intuitively attractive manner.[22] His presentation of the rights of citizenship as a three-fold schema is

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[22] Mann (p.339-40, 1987). Hindess (chapter two, 'Citizenship in the Modern West', Turner 1993) disputes Mann's claim. Marshall misrepresents the role of ideas in social life - the institutionalization of citizenship rights in particular has not meant the realisation of equal citizenship.

similarly acceptable, even if he ignores the contradictions and complexities between them.

1.9 Post-Marshallian Theories of Citizenship

Even if we retain these aspects of Marshall's thesis, it is clear that in contemporary British society social exclusion has not been eradicated, or political participation encouraged, to the degrees the left, drawing on the Marshall model, would have wished. Marshall's thesis is, in this sense, incorrect - either citizenship has not been realised progressively or it does not act so benignly as he supposed in its 'tension' with capitalism.

Reformulations of citizenship have then been thought necessary. As presented here, they are organised on the same lines as the reformist debate - hence, those which are essentially positive about the ameliorative reforming capacities of citizenship, and those which are essentially negative.[23]

1.9a Citizenship as Positive Phenomenon

The reformist democratic left, and centre-left, has tended to conceive of citizenship in a positive light. This is understandable. As suggested previously [0.], its politics has been concerned with the values which citizenship appears to connect together - equality, social inclusion and solidarity, and individual liberty and autonomy. Consequently, it has tended to view citizenship as a potentially valuable concept, in the context of a

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[23] Conceptions which construct a more helpful both positive and negative conception of citizenship are examined in chapter ten [10.5].

liberal-capitalist society, by which to spearhead its project.

Probably the most prominent recent sociological work, and highly indicative, is Turner's *Citizenship and Capitalism* (1986). Turner argues that the progressive inclusion of groups in citizenship can be understood in part as the outcome of class struggles, one of four main sources of increasingly universalistic and egalitarian citizenship (with war, migration, and egalitarian ideologies). Originally, property-owning male heads of households were the only citizens in capitalist states, then women, children and the elderly.[24] Turner appreciates that the expansion in citizenship is as a result of struggle against hierarchy and oppression, and hence should not be dismissed as mere mystifications of capitalism or illusory forms of democracy. It can be a direct challenge to capitalism and authoritarian forms of political rule, despite his recognition that some aspects of citizenship may support liberal capitalism.[25]

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[24] Turner (p.92, ibid) also suggests the expansion of 'personhood' via citizenship has in contemporary society began to incorporate nature. However, citizenship is probably not the right concept to describe new forms of environmental consciousness and concerns for animal welfare. Since children, and especially animals and inanimate forms of nature cannot participate and undertake duties (the two important aspects of citizenship as well as rights), the application of 'citizenship' to them is unhelpful.

[25] (p.137, ibid): "..by giving expression to bourgeois requirements in the market place and..providing some form of abatement of direct conflict between groups. This position is perfectly in line with Marshall's view of the role of such bourgeois freedoms as the right to own property. However, we can also argue that citizenship undermines the capacity of private capitalist enterprises to realise their investment through profits since the expansion of social rights is translated into increased taxation, state regulation of the

Welfare rights oppose the market, as in the Marshallian tradition.[26] Hence, despite his argument that (p.59, ibid): "The struggle for citizenship can be seen as a universalistic criterion of social development which is not ethnocentric, teleological or idealist", and involves (p.64, ibid): "..certain contingent relationships of a class nature [so that] the long-term survival of citizenship cannot be guaranteed on a teleological basis", Turner appears to restate (and extend) Marshall's thesis, with its main deficiencies intact.

The left has been attracted to the communal values, as well as assumed ameliorative capacities, of citizenship. For example, Heater (1990) represents a progressivist 'grand narrative' of citizenship (from the Greek city-state to the modern era) held together by the abstract essentialism of the idea of citizenship. The concept derives power from identity based on social reciprocity and common interests, reserved from being just another identity by its contribution to morality and order, and means to collective human dignity.

Raymond Plant has been an important voice in bringing the concept of citizenship to the notice of the contemporary left, emphasising the autonomy citizenship rights may grant and a 'politics of citizenship' to replace class or interest group

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market and legislation to control the inheritance of property."

[26] (p.38, ibid): "..there is a conflict between the redistributive character of citizenship rights against the profit motive of the free market."

politics.[27] He suggests (p.1, 1988): "The citizenship approach is much more at home with individualism: it sees citizenship as securing the framework of rights and resources within which individuals can pursue their own conception of the good in their own way; and the communal basis of society is reflected in agreement about the common resources and means of citizenship rather than in terms of common ends." In a counter to the (new right) argument that universal autonomy and liberty do not imply rights to welfare, Plant suggests that citizenship includes social and economic rights as well as political and civil rights because there is no clear conceptual difference between them. The philosophical case for social rights is no less plausible than the case for civil liberties. Often negative rights require a positive form of protection by the state, and therefore resources, and so the supposedly 'costless' nature of negative rights cannot be used as the boundary between them and positive rights. Similarly, the argument that positive and negative rights belong to different classes of rights because the former are impossible to make individually enforceable, is undermined. Since both involve claims to public services, both are subject to problems of enforceability.[28] If

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[27] Plant (1988, 1990, 1992), Chapter eight, 'Citizenship and Rights', in Milligan and Miller (1992), chapter three, 'Needs, Agency and Welfare Rights', Moon (1988a), chapter one, 'Citizenship, Rights and Welfare', Coote (1992), 'Autonomy, Social Rights and Distributive Justice', Gray (1992), Plant and Barry (1990).

[28] Also, Plant (Coote 1992) argues that social rights must be enforceable by individual citizens; enforceable social rights offer a new way of empowering citizens, different from the traditional methods of empowerment favoured by the right

(p.123, Gray 1992): "..autonomy is the central value to which negative freedom makes a central contribution, then autonomy cannot be separated from ability, resources and opportunities."[29] The maintenance of the separation of negative liberty from ability blocks claims by the poor, yet agency, autonomy and freedom could underpin both negative rights to freedom from coercion and access to positive resources. This is the argument for a basic class of goods necessary for agency. Although Plant argues that the idea of democratic citizenship is a profoundly anti-capitalist one, he accepts that the market may play a central role in promoting the efficient production of resources without which the ideal of democratic citizenship involving resources, liberties, rights and opportunities will be impossible.

Others have appeared to draw on the growth in interest in communitarian and civic republican models [1.3], to emphasise the importance of participation, particularly political forms of participation.

The 'political community' is seen as an important arena for the realisation of citizenship, but also participation in the community will enhance social cohesion and social justice. For example, Barber

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(market choices) and the left (democratic accountability); and that social rights can be introduced via a variety of mechanisms to suit different services and circumstances.

[29] Harris (p.122, 1987) has noted something similar: "Welfare rights support liberty. Indeed, at bottom, their justification draws upon precisely the same conception of individuals as potentially autonomous agents as does the justification of property rights..Welfare rights make the opportunities to act freely worth possessing and help sustain self-respect."

(1984) argues the case for *Strong Democracy*. 'Liberal' representative democracy secures neither liberty or democracy. It is a 'thin' theory of democracy, whose democratic values are a means to exclusively individualistic and private ends. Consequently, no stable version of citizenship or civic virtue can arise. Representation destroys participation, though it may serve accountability and private rights. It is not then a theory of 'political community' at all, but merely politics used to justify individual rights. However, because it is thought by Barber and others that this liberal model is ineffective in resisting assaults on citizenship and public justice (p.4, ibid): "Ultimately, this vulnerability undermines its defense of the individual; for the individual's freedom is not the precondition for political activity but rather the product of it." It constructs politics as 'zoo-keeping', in danger of being exploited by acquisitive individuals, creates radical dichotomies and hence conflict. Instead (p.xxii, ibid): "Strong democracy tries to revitalize citizenship without neglecting the problems of efficient government by defining democracy as a form of government in which all of the people govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the time."

The degree of participation urged varies, but the essential critique of 'liberal citizenship' and representative democracy is shared across many

proponents of this kind.[30] The alternative is seen as a fundamentally richer conception of citizenship, indeed a way of being. Just as Barber argued for 'thick' citizenship, Clarke (1996) proclaims the virtues of *Deep Citizenship*. Put simply, acting politically is a 'good', not only in terms of possible ends, but because it involves taking charge of significant and meaningful aspects of one's life in the company of others. This is a post-liberal, rather than anti-liberal, conception. Drawing on 'radical democracy' [3.8d], it seeks to re-contextualise liberalism to promote politics. It is perfectionist rather than procedural in its liberalism. Clarke suggests that 'shallow' liberal citizenship is contradictory - it appears to demand individual responsibility and empowerment, but then in refusing to politicise society, inhibits that empowerment.

In addition, the concept of citizenship has been used to support proposals for domestic constitutional reform and greater autonomy for local government (Wright 1994).

1.9b The 'Citizenship School' and Social Rights

Following Marshall, those whom Harris (1987) has referred to as the 'citizenship school' argued that a developed and extensive welfare state is an integral element of a morally acceptable society, to promote social justice, enhance individual self-development and foster a sense of community (in

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[30] For example, Marquand (1988) argues for a 'politics of mutual education' as part of a project for a 'developmental state'.

contrast to the exclusion promoted in market societies). Citizenship was seen as offering a distinct moral justification of the welfare state: social rights (rather than stigmatising institutionalised charity) were necessary to protect and reinforce full citizenship for all. 'Social justice' is driven by 'need'.[31] As has been noted (Barry, p.11-12, 1990): "Throughout the history of the welfare debate there is a theme of communitarianism and (to some extent) citizenship that recommends a form of welfare *society*:..the fostering of intimate communal bonds. In this view, an efficient welfare state that rested entirely upon individualistic assumptions would itself be divisive; its institutions would 'separate' human agents from each other, whereas a welfare society would join them in a common enterprise."

The principal supporters of this approach in the 1950s and 1960s included Titmuss, Robson and Townsend. Part of the orthodoxy constructed around citizenship is its 'tension' with free markets, following Marshall, though the characterisation of

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[31] Harris (p.29, 1987): "The role of 'need' in citizenship theory is essential to the theory's ideological identity. Three claims related to need are presupposed within this ideology: first, that needs are the foundation of welfare rights; secondly, that the needs relevant to claming welfare rights are those connected with sustaining a person as a full member of the community; and thirdly, that satisfying the range of morally required welfare rights involves establishing a framework of universal social policies..Titmuss writes of 'services provided, as social rights, on criteria of the needs of specific categories'...Robson in *Welfare State and Welfare Society* stresses the importance of social rights in a socially just society, at the same time as he warns of the danger of their abuse." See Marshall (1963, 1981), Titmuss (1968), and Robson (1976).

the latter varied widely from fierce hostility to measured acceptance (Harris, p.28-9, ibid).

However, Harris (p.47, ibid) notes that: "..Marshall seems to distance himself from the philosophy of other citizenship writers by not adopting equality as a key value to be promoted by the welfare state."[32] For Marshall, the key is the maximisation of welfare rather than the pursuit of equality, or guaranteeing a minimum for the poor.[33] Marshall appears to be the exception in having risen above a generally hostile disposition towards the private market (p.61, ibid). Indeed, he suggested that only (state) welfare and capitalism acting together offer the opportunity of eradicating poverty (p.117, 1981), rather than welfare taking over and dominating the market.[34]

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[32] Also, Giddens (p.170, 1982). Marshall does not suggest that social rights wholly dissolve class inequalities or that they are likely to do in the future. Others saw them as a possibility of going beyond class divisions altogether. For example, Marshall (p.119, 1981) states: "Poverty is a tumour which should be cut out, and theoretically could be; inequality is a vital organ which is functioning badly."

[33] Marshall (p.201, 1975) suggests these as the three possible aims of social policy. He suggested (p.39, extract from Marshall 1964, Turner and Hamilton 1995b): "Status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in terms of democratic citizenship provided they do not cut too deep, but occur within a population united in a single civilization; and provided they are not an expression of hereditary privilege. This means that inequalities can be tolerated within a fundamentally egalitarian society provided they are not dynamic.."

[34] In 'Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism' (Marshall 1981) he suggests the assumption of the 'welfare society' instead of the 'hyphenated society' has been a mistake. Social policy should not have been elevated to the top rank of political objectives. Socialists should concentrate on 'more genuinely socialist' categories of political action (socialisation of the economy and the redistribution of wealth). Social justice is not reducible to welfare policies. The 'welfare revolution' was always based on limited foundations. Welfare (through excessive use) is degraded if expected to compensate for the

However, many of the assumptions of the 'citizenship school' can be seen to have continued to be inherent in the left's more recent conception of citizenship, in two main respects. First, the emphasis on the role of social welfare rights as part of any project for full citizenship, and second, the view of the oppositional nature of citizenship and capitalist markets.

The first represents the 'citizenship of shared entitlement' (as termed by Ignatieff 1989) - a fundamental, almost ethical sense of what citizenship must mean. The second, inter-relatedly, tends to assume that, as Lister (p.1, 1990) suggests: "..the re-emergence of the language of citizenship as a potential challenge to the dominant language of consumerism and enterprise."

Because citizenship underpinned by social welfare rights is seen to erode capitalist market-derived inequalities (as well as others), it has been seen to break-down 'social exclusion'. This seems to be a broader and more fashionable term for inequality, useful in that it underlines that inequality and poverty can produce lack of access to the forms of participation and opportunity which others enjoy.

In the simplest theoretical terms, this means that: "..citizenship is never complete until it is world citizenship. Exclusion is the enemy of citizenship."[35] Indeed, the concept of 'world

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deficiencies in the market economy in meeting its social obligations.

[35] Dahrendorf, 'The Changing Quality of Citizenship', chapter two, Steenbergen (1994).

citizenship' continues to receive attention, as it always has on the margins of political theory (Heater 1996), though with the development of environmental concerns it may become more central.

In more substantive terms, it means that any meaningful conception of citizenship must be equated with a comprehensive programme to establish a full array of welfare rights, in order to combat exclusion. Hence citizenship comes to be seen as a useful concept in the defence of telocracy (the governmental promotion of social rights and welfare activities). These notions appear to be contained in much recent left (centre-left) work on citizenship.[36] Citizenship has been seen as a way in which to defend welfare protection for all who need it, in a more 'individualistic' era.

In addition, in supporting social rights, citizenship is thought to enhance social cohesion. Hence there is presumed a strong link between citizenship, participation and equality. Citizenship then acts as a kind of 'social glue', an opportunity to reverse the presumed movement towards a more atomised and fragmented society.

1.9c Citizenship as Negative Phenomenon

The more radical left, particularly the Marxist-left, has tended to develop far more critical conclusions on the ability of citizenship to transform contemporary societies. This is, of

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[36] Coote (1992), Dahrendorf (1988), Lister (1990), King and Waldron (1988).

course, unsurprising as it derives from their criticisms of reformist left politics in general.

Mann (1987) proposes that the evolution of citizenship as described by Marshall, what he calls the 'British strategy of citizenship', is one of five ruling class strategies pursued by advanced industrial countries - the others being 'liberal', 'reformist', 'authoritarian monarchist', 'Fascist', and 'authoritarian socialist'. Liberalism was the first viable regime strategy of an advanced industrial society, but Britain strayed from liberalism towards reformism, as Marshall depicted. In Mann's schema, Britain is a mixed liberal/reformist case.

Waters (1989) suggests when citizens press for a 'welfare state' (for example, for a minimum material condition for all the members of the state), their actions are constitutive of citizenship rights, rather than of class or status-group interests.[37] Minimum welfare benefits are accessible by 'membership' of the state (rather than a particular interest group). Hence (p.173-4, ibid): "..far from being a source for egalitarian developments, citizenship is a primary mechanism for the establishment of inequality under any conditions other than pure capitalism."

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[37] Waters draws on arguments about the state made by Offe (1984) - the labour generated by (welfare) state operations becomes decommodified and thus disengaged from class relations. Dahrendorf (p.108, 1988) has stated rightly: "It makes sense to distinguish between the great struggles for entitlements, or citizenship rights, and the incremental claims for redistribution at the margin among those who already enjoy the rights of citizens." Citizenship itself is the predominant new form of social conflict.

The anti-egalitarian consequences of modern citizenship are seen to operate at three levels. In the mode of production, citizenship atomises then reintegrates society into the 'nation'. Unequal class relations are denied, and an ideology of common objectives superimposed. In class structuration, citizenship rights and obligations provide techniques for the state to intervene in the lives of citizens. In political formation, the state is manipulated by ruling groups via terms granted by citizenship.[38] Similarly, for Poulantzas (1973), probably the most developed Marxist account of citizenship. It is seen as a juridical mechanism by which rights are located at the level of individuals and 'confer' on them the possibility of competition and exploitation in the economic sphere. Poulantzas accepts, however, the apparent contradiction between the need for the ruling class to maintain its internal unity and simultaneous need for the state to maintain a pattern of citizenship-based individualism. The outcome of this contradiction is periodic re-alignment of class interests at points of crisis so that ruling class domination is maintained.

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[38] Waters uses Habermas's characterisation of the processes of historical change ('strategic' and 'communicative' action), to characterise the historical development of citizenship: liberalism, and constitutional conservatism, through open forms of strategic action incorporating patterns of state regulation protecting bourgeois economic interests, Gramscian 'uninational citizenship' and Marshallian welfare state, ending in new right-imposed constraints on the underclass). Ironically, Turner (General Commentary, Turner and Hamilton 1995a) has likened Marshall's thesis of the 'hyphenated society' to Habermas' notion of tensions between capitalist economy, state and civil society which result in *Legitimation Crisis* (1975).

Some have focused their critiques on the 'liberal' foundations of citizenship, and its perceived abstraction of rights via universalism, ignoring the reality of structural power relations underlying both state and market (Taylor, D., 1989).[39] It has been central to the legal and political formalism developed by two major processes of differentiation accompanying the rise of the modern state - the separation of the political system from the ethical and religious, and the autonomization of the economic system from the political. The formal legal protection and universalism of rights is qualified by rules of exclusion and subordination (Zolo 1993).

Such theorisations have a long history, and only the more recent examples are described here. But it is important to note that while they tend to dismiss dominant contemporary understandings of citizenship, they do not deny the value of the ideals often attached to citizenship - 'freedom', 'individual autonomy', 'participation', 'collective decision-making'. Indeed, often they are attracted strongly to them. For example, Laski in his critical/Marxist phase identified many deficiencies in contemporary citizenship, but also valued the 'proper' realisation of citizenship especially in terms of participation and individual autonomy (Laski 1939, 1928).

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[39] Taylor suggests that citizenship is taken out of its liberal history and re-thought. He advocates instead a citizenship, based on need, which confronts 'social power' by radical democratic control and participation.

However, this group of theorisations tend to deny or neglect the ameliorative effects of some aspects of citizenship such as social rights, or the protection gained from civil and political rights. Also, they suggest the inadequacy of non-revolutionary (and especially non-political) forms of social participation, and devalue the ability of citizens to change existing social conditions by active participation.[40] They may value the ethical ideals associated with citizenship, particularly genuine social inclusion for all, but emphasise that such inclusion will only be possible within a radically reformed social, political and especially economic order. They contain important critiques of citizenship, particularly the manner it which it may atomise and individualise citizens, and its liberal roots.

1.10 Summary to Section Two

This is not a comprehensive review of all of the conceptions of citizenship which have been formulated on the left. The issue of the left and its conceptions of citizenship is returned to more fully in chapter ten. This brief overview

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[40] As Turner (p.35-6, 1986) has commented on Poulantzas: "..while frequently referring to the popular struggles of the working classes, [he] makes relatively little space in his theoretical system for the effectivity of class struggle against the system of control in capitalist society..In short, the critique of reformism tends to assume a dominant ideology thesis in which the working classes are perpetually incorporated..greatly underestimates the extent of oppositional views in society and the existence of delegitimizing practices..[and denies] any success on the part of the working classes in changing the conditions of capitalist exploitation through the quest for greater social and welfare rights."

represents only the most prominent discourses. The more critical (Marxist) perspectives in effect deny the possibility of full meaningful citizenship within the present form of Western liberal democratic capitalist societies. More reformist perspectives, however, have come, especially in recent years, to value the concept of citizenship. It has seemed to express, and offer the possibility of achieving, many of the values and ends the left holds to be most important. This set of ideas and debates may be seen to represent the second set of parameters for the contemporary political conflict over citizenship. The left has, of course, not been alone in considering the rights, duties, preferred forms of participation and identity, of the citizen.

Chapter Two

The New Right and Citizenship

2.0 Introduction

The new right represents a social, rather than just economic, project. It has addressed questions of agency, identity, role and representation, as well as the more explicit elements of citizenship - rights, duties and responsibilities. The new right has mounted a sustained and powerful attack on the social democratic Marshallian model of citizenship, both its theory, and social and economic effects. It has seen it as a contributing cause of economic inefficiency, moral corruption, political maladministration, individual constraint and democratic misrule. Yet the new right's citizenship is not only negative. This chapter will seek to establish that the new right developed alternative models of citizenship of its own, in many cases with a significant range and depth which have tended to be neglected by its opponents.

2.1 What Does 'New Right' Mean ?

There are two main objections which have been put forward to the use of the term 'new right'. The first is that it homogenises a diverse and often contradictory range of contemporary political thought to make it appear as one coherent movement. The second is that it is a misnomer, in that there is nothing really new, or exclusively right-wing, about the 'new right'.[1]

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[1] Parekh (Cohen et al. 1986).

However, the term may be defended. First, it is not meant to denote a singular body of thought. Here, the new right is presented in four distinct but inter-related strands, with complexities within each.[2] It does not deny the (sometimes fundamental) differences between strands. Rather it recognises that the new right gains a scope and depth precisely because of its multi-faceted nature. Further, parallels to the British experience of the new right throughout the capitalist industrialised world, especially France and the United States, imply that the new right represents a broad new ideological development.

Second, even if the total achievement of the new right is to have re-presented old ideas in new language, it would be significant. But there are three major, and two minor, inter-related reasons why the new right represents something substantively new.

The first is that by using the term, it separates the different elements within the new right from their other contemporary variants. Levitas (1986) notes the necessity to use the terms 'neoliberalism' and 'neoconservatism' to distinguish them from the previously dominant twentieth century versions of

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[2] However, different commentators who have used the term to emphasise different elements. For King (1987) 'new right' refers primarily to economic and political liberalism, similarly Bosanquet (1983) and Green, D.G. (1987). It is 'new' because it replaces the 'old' right's political philosophy - tradition and hierarchy - with economics, individualism and markets. Others, such as Hall and Jacques (1983) refer to both its neoliberalism and authoritarian conservatism. The latter approach appreciates better that new right ideas can be credited with a greater collective impact despite appearing contradictory in some theoretical aspects [2.9].

these ideologies, especially as they developed as part of the post-war settlement (neoconservatism from post-war conservatism and a specific form of welfare capitalism, neoliberalism from 'social' or new liberalism).

The second is that the 'new right' represent the changed politics and economic conditions of the 1970s and after, and particularly the common focus of attack on the 'crisis' of the social democratic welfare state. Hence (Gamble, p.32, 1988): "The New Right would like to be conservative but they are forced to be radicals", in that they have had to identify how the existing state can be reformed in order to permit the restoration of the rules, the institutions and the culture of the free economy. It is a radical and modern project restoring and rephrasing many earlier ideas.[3]

Third, because of the mutual 'enemy' in the social democratic state, Hall and Jacques (1983) have been most prominent in suggesting that the many elements of new right thought can be seen to weld together into a new ideological synthesis whose political

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[3] Gamble (p.37, 1988): "The doctrines and the political movements under the label 'New Right' may have revived many old liberal and conservative ideas. But the New Right does not represent a simple return to a nineteenth-century politics of liberal political economy and Victorian values. It is an expression of the new politics of the 1970s." Barry (p.50, 1990) argues this point with regard to classical liberal political economy. Neoliberalism is seen by many proponents as a re-emergence of the 'true' classical liberal tradition, lost in the 'dilution' of liberal principles towards the end of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century (Green 1987). For Graham and Clarke (1986), it represents *The New Enlightenment: The Rebirth of Liberalism*. Some neoliberals dislike the term 'new right' because they think it describes them as reactionary (Seldon, p.xi, 1985).

expression in Britain is Thatcherism. This demands a new perspective on recent liberal and conservative thought recognising the linkages between the traditional conservative concern for the basis of authority in social institutions, and the new emphasis on re-establishing free markets.

Fourth, for Levitas (1986) the new right may be distinguished from the conservatism of the post-war settlement by the class composition of its main exponents, who cut across class lines, as well as by the basis of its electoral support. Fifth, the new right is a 'movement' from the right that has been primarily ideas and groups-based, a new development (though it is important not to understate the ideological nature of post-war conservatism).

Despite the notion of the 'new right' initially being constructed by its opponents, and though few advocates imagine that they are working within an integrated system of ideas, it is useful. What makes the new right 'new' are developments and refinements upon earlier (liberal and conservative) thinking, entirely new insights (such as those offered by public choice), their reformulation and impact on the new economic, political and social conditions of late twentieth century societies, and the fusion between apparently contradictory strands which has created a powerful ideological force. A fuller characterisation, as opposed to a description, of the new right project, is developed later [3.11].

2.2 The Structure of the New Right

Some commentators equate the new right primarily with neoliberalism (Bosanquet 1983, Green 1987, Graham and Clarke 1986, Giddens 1994), and it is true that economic arguments have appeared dominant within Thatcherism while neoconservatism has been stronger in the United States.[4] Some concentrate exclusively on the liberal-market strand.[5] Often this is because the economic arguments are seen as most important, and liberals have a longer and closer relationship to the capitalist system while conservatives are pre-capitalist in orientation and have been forced to reach an accommodation with it. The conservative strand is seen as concerning itself with residual claims addressing the political consequences of the liberal economic policies (King 1987). Other commentators have seen the liberal/conservative combination as the hallmark of the modern right (Gamble 1981, 1985, 1988, Hall and Jacques 1983, Hall 1988). Most later accounts are concerned with this duality (for example Levitas

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[4] Roche (1992), however, in his study of new right citizenship, identifies 'radical' (neoliberal) and 'mainstream' (neoconservative) positions based on their respective antagonism towards the role of the state vis-à-vis civil society and the capitalist economy. Because mainstream positions can engage with the 'dominant' paradigm of citizenship, he prioritises them.

[5] Ashford (Ashford and Jordan 1993) suggests four main schools - Chicago, Austrian, Public Choice and supply-side, and identifies a six-part agenda - the reduction of inflation, lower taxation, privatisation, deregulation, the use of market forces in the public sector and institutional and constitutional reform. Barry (1983) also divides the 'new liberalism' into consequentialists and rights theorists, who divide around liberty (the consequentialists, including the Austrian, Chicago and Virginia schools, being the best known). Austrian economists are seen as methodological individualists, but differ from the Chicago school and its regard of man as automaton, with empirically predictable responses to external stimuli, and the originating source of social phenomena.

1986), especially as cultural themes have assumed more importance within Thatcherism itself.[6] Maurice Cowling (1989) suggests there have been five sources to the (British) new right (p.5, ibid):

"..the movement of economic opinion against Keynesianism, corporatism and collectivism, and in favour of capitalism, monetarism and the free market; the educational movement which derives from the Black Papers; the parliamentary, party and public movements known as Powellism and Thatcherism; the movement of academic opinion which is known severally as the Peterhouse Right, the London School of Economics Right, and Professor Scruton's Right; and a movement among Conservative journalists associated primarily with *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Sunday Telegraph*."

A broader historical study of the development of the new right, and in particular the role of the so-called 'think-tanks', is outside the scope of the present argument.[7] Here, no prior assumption will be

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[6] Indeed, Belsey (Levitas, p.173, 1986) suggests neoliberal and neoconservative positions as ideal types are directly opposed to each other in five areas. Neoliberalism is concerned with the individual, freedom of choice, market society, laissez-faire, and minimal government, while neoconservatism is constructed from strong government, social authoritarianism, disciplined society, hierarchy and subordination, and the nation. Belsey criticises Bosanquet (1983) because not only does he ignore neoconservatism in the makeup of the new right but he also underestimates the authoritarian and conservative aspects of neoliberalism.

[7] There are a number of useful sources for this material - Contemporary British History (1996), Cockett (1994), Desai (1994), Bosanquet (1983), Green (1987), Gamble (1988), and Levitas (1986). However, as Cockett (p.326, ibid) notes, the term 'think-tanks' is a little misleading: "What made the CPS [Centre for Policy Studies] and the IEA [Institute of Economic Affairs] so effective was precisely the fact that they had to spend little time doing any profound thinking - in the sense

made as to the dominant element of the new right. The four main strands identified are those of neoconservativism, neoliberalism, libertarianism, and public choice.[8] All have further subdivisions. These are necessarily aggregative, but help reveal the main positions relating to citizenship.

2.3 The New Right and Citizenship

2.3a Present Characterisations of New Right Citizenship

The new right's conception of citizenship typically has been characterised by critics as a denial of citizenship. There are three main reasons given. First, the new right is seen to neglect or deny the importance of social rights with citizenship. Second, some parts of the new right have replaced the role of social rights with an emphasis on duties and obligations, which both often neglects that many individuals are less able given their circumstances to fulfil properly such roles, and may be authoritarian in targeting certain less fortunate groups and trying to force them to act in a certain manner. Third, the new right is seen to seek to alter the 'proper' meanings of important concepts, such as freedom and justice, for the purposes of its own political project. First:

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of rational intellectual exploration - at all, for the free-market 'think-tanks' were formed to propagate an idea, not to find one."

[8] Gunn (1989) adds 'racist' to 'libertarian' and 'culturalist' strands of the European new right. Explicitly racist far right groupings and ideas are excluded from this study, though the issue of how racist in implicit terms the new right is, is discussed.

"..New Right conservative and neo-liberal political philosophy, in the light of the post-war development of the welfare state and of the social rights, have argued that there is a conflict of principle between civil and social rights, and in general between social equality and freedom as competing political aims and ideals."[9]

It is suggested that the new right claim the welfare state promotes passivity amongst the poor. Far from being the solution enabling the poor to enter mainstream society and exercise effectively their civil and political rights, the welfare state through social rights has created a 'culture of dependency'. But it is thought that the new right does not criticise social rights for this reason alone. More importantly, they are said to see social citizenship rights as a hindrance to free market mechanisms, and hence have an interest in dismissing their legitimacy.[10] Consequently (King, p.3, 1987):

"New Right advocates seek not only to revive the role of market mechanisms and to end collectivist state policy but also to dismantle the citizenship rights established during the last two centuries."

King implies that the dismantling of citizenship rights is central to the new right's purpose. He depicts them as seeking to reverse Marshall's

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[9] Roche (p.372, 1987).

[10] Hayes (1994), Kymlicka and Norman (1994), Quicke (1992), Vincent (1992).

theory of the development of citizenship.[11] This project is seen as uniting both the neoliberal and neoconservative new right in their fear of the extension of citizenship rights: neoliberals because it increases the role of government in society and therefore reduces individual liberty; neoconservatives because it extends rights to wider groups and thereby limits traditional hierarchical and authority relationships.

New right theorists are seen as according property, as opposed to social welfare rights, an ahistorically exclusive status. To the new right, social rights differ fundamentally from the negative liberties and immunities provided by civil and political rights since the latter are costless. Social 'rights' are not rights because they are resource constraint-dependent, are underpinned by a misconceived notion of 'freedom' ('to' rather than 'from') and an open-ended conception of needs. In theory they are unlimited, in reality limited. Hence (Plant, 'Citizenship, Rights and Welfare', chapter one, Coote, 1992, p.20):

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[11] King seems to contradict this by suggesting later that for the new right, citizenship rights should be restricted to those which are compatible with the market (p.31, 1987), which is different from saying that the new right would prefer for social citizenship rights to be secured by market mechanisms (via private provision). In stating that new right advocates place certain citizenship rights over others (p.33, 1987), the implication would be that they still admit to the status of social citizenship rights. This is not certain at all, given the liberal new right's argument that the very notion of rights to such resources may be debilitative itself of personal self-reliance and autonomy. Since the market secures freedom, such social citizenship rights are then attacks on freedom, and must be dismissed immediately, not merely prioritised as King seems to suggest.

"Essentially it [the new right] puts the whole weight of citizenship on the civil and political realms. The public sector is not to be construed as essential to citizenship."[12]

Second (Kymlicka and Norman, p.356, 1994):

"The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship underestimated the extent to which fulfilling certain obligations is a precondition for being accepted as a full member of society."

In particular they criticised social democratic/centre-left conceptions of citizenship as 'passive', partly because of their concentration on social rights. For some elements in the new right the failure to fulfil common obligations is as much of an obstacle to full membership as the lack of equal rights. But, their systematic ignorance of the impact of global economic restructuring creating an 'underclass' is criticised, because it makes their emphasis on the duties of citizenship ill-conceived and authoritarian (Hill 1992).

Third, new right 'citizenship' is seen as founded on very different fundamental conceptions. For example, to Hall and Held (Hall and Jacques, p.179, 1989):

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[12] Hoover and Plant (p.268, 1989) echo this: "..it is central to the strategy of conservative capitalism to define citizenship in terms of the equal absence of coercion rather than in terms of resources and opportunities." The new right's ideas are an attack on the very concept of citizenship, rather than the promotion of an alternative vision. The idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing has been rejected (Plant, in Andrews 1991). It is a retreat into civil society (Bellamy and Greenaway 1995).

"At root, the New Right is concerned with how to advance the cause of 'liberalism' against 'democracy' (or as they put it, 'freedom' against 'equality') by limiting the possible uses of state power."

From the new right's perspective, it is thought that the state can only intervene legitimately in society to enforce the formal rules which broadly protect the 'life, liberty and estate' of the citizen. The new right is seen as directly opposing the balance assumed needed between the individual and the social dimensions of citizenship rights, which are interdependent, particularly in the way that gross inequalities between class, sex and race erode universal citizenship. The new right is thought to believe that the free market, because key for the liberty of citizens, becomes constitutive of the nature of citizenship itself.[13] This is the reason why understanding the new right's attack on citizenship is crucial to understanding the new right's assault on the social democratic state.

An important aspect of this is the new right's critique of democratisation and the reliance of citizenship on the political sphere. Roche (1992) suggests neoliberalism is of limited relevance to the theory and practice of citizenship given its asocial nature, limited moral obligations, and lack of political community. Also Hoover and Plant (p.78, 1989) argue that neoliberalism has discarded the

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[13] The new right's asocial and individualistic project ignores the socially interdependent nature of individuals and socially constrained choices (Twine 1994).

nuances of classical liberal thought, in which there was usually at least a secondary regard for the welfare of the community. To Rustin (p.167, 1985) the new right represents an attempt to close down the social and economic pressures which mass citizenship has created. The new right has therefore to criticise democratic processes. Hence (Vincent, p.710, 1992):

"Democracy cannot be stopped, but it can be contained. Liberal theorists thus often make out a implicit case for a return to the security of civil citizenship and the balance of class structures."[14]

It replaces genuinely democratic citizenship with a patriotic bonding to the rituals and traditions (rather than resources) of British life, and a (not necessarily incompatible) conception of a de-politicised citizenship centred on the market (Ignatieff 1989).

Gamble (p.14-16, 1988), in a more thorough analysis of Thatcherism, regards the new right's 'attack' on citizenship as part of the move against the social democratic state. The demands for a citizenship involving equal rights came to be raised in the first place partly by the logic of social democracy and partly by the impact of national economies of the global Fordism of the 1950s. The erosion of the consensus on citizenship was felt first in the feminist challenge to the family and the response by the family's 'defenders', and by racial divisions and the questioning of the citizenship status of

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[14] Also Marquand and Crouch (1995).

ethnic minorities by groups demanding equal rights and those in response seeking to defend the 'white nation'. The attack on social democracy first took shape through an emphasis on the politics of gender, race, national identity and social and public order. Then, the need to restructure the economy from the world crisis of accumulation meant that the costs of restructuring could be more easily loaded onto groups with least political power (essentially, whose citizenship was weakest), especially if their case for equal rights had been destroyed first. Hence (p.16, ibid):

"A central goal has been to discredit the social democratic concept of universal citizenship rights, guaranteed and enforced through public agencies, and to replace it with a concept of citizenship rights achieved through property ownership and participation in markets. In this way, a class of sub-citizens is created, consisting of those who, being unable to participate in markets, are forced to remain dependent upon the state. State dependency becomes a stigma, and allows the demands of those groups to be discredited."

It is both negative (the welfare state costs too much) and positive (the free society is more moral). Its vision is citizenship through the 'daily plebiscite' in the market rather than the political system. The thrust of Thatcherism as an electoral strategy was away from 'One Nation' Toryism - national unity through a common citizenship and a

common loyalty to ideal nationhood - towards the consolidation of a bloc of interests.

2.3b The Need for a New Characterisation

The above characterisations of the new right's conceptions of citizenship, though powerful in their condemnation of the new right project, are limited. They effectively contend that the new right denies citizenship, at least in any 'proper' definition.[15] Of course, the underlying reason why they criticise the new right's 'citizenship' is because it is regarded as eroding real citizenship for many people, particularly the less privileged. As such, they are theoretical critiques of actual social effects.

But this does not mean that they are sound in theoretical terms. This is because they veer towards tautology: because the new right has appeared to have attacked the Marshallian conception of citizenship, they are seen to have dismissed 'citizenship' itself. Such characterisations do not proceed from an examination of the nature, meaning, role and origins of modern citizenship itself. They assume in effect the 'ownership' of citizenship by the progressive left. They rely on the left's models of citizenship, particularly its Marshall-derived social democratic or centre-left model [chapter one]. They tend to assume that because the new right is critical of, for example, the extent and nature of some social rights, the absence of reciprocal

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15 Though Roche (1992) recognises the ways in which some aspects of new right citizenship fall within the 'dominant', that is Marshallian, conception.

duties and prevailing conceptions of freedom and justice, it is no longer able to provide a conception of citizenship itself. The new right is dismissed from the theoretical terrain of citizenship as soon as it ventures in any of these directions. As a result, the new right's powerful ideas relating to citizenship are ignored.

It is better to disaggregate the new right, into its component strands of thought, in order to describe the conceptions of citizenship it has developed. The reasons why the new right's conceptions of citizenship should not then be dismissed, whatever their social effects, are examined later [chapter three].

2.4 Neoconservatism

It is helpful to distinguish between two types of new right conservatism.[16] 'Neoconservatism' itself is more sociological than philosophical, and is primarily American in origin. The 'philosophic' defence of conservatism claims affinities with older traditions of conservative thought, though it introduces some innovations, and has developed in Britain. There are similarities between them, particularly in their mutual desire to prevent the erosion of social and political authority and the need for a 'consensual' public philosophy on moral and political values in defence of 'traditional' values; but it is best to discuss them separately.

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[16] Giddens (1994) makes this distinction. See also Peele (1984).

2.4a American Neoconservatism[17]

Neconservatives claim to be free from nostalgia. They are aware of the pervasive influence of capitalism and liberal democracy, for which they have a modest enthusiasm. They accept as necessary a market economy with restrained government intervention. However, some see this order as also being part of the erosion of traditional practices on which a meaningful social existence depends. They have addressed themselves to three problems: the breakdown of the traditional family structure and the ethic which supports it, the poverty and 'underclass' problem which creates a non-citizen class (partially caused by family breakdown), and a perceived 'cultural crisis'. The (centre) left is criticised for proposing government intrusion in the marketplace, yet accepting a laissez-faire attitude towards morality and behaviour. Indeed, to Irving Kristol (p.x, 1995), 'neoconservatism' refers to the erosion of liberal (left) faith among a particular group of intellectuals and their turn towards a conservative defence of previously taken-for-granted bourgeois values. Neoconservatives are seen to be trying to reform social citizenship by rehabilitating the two great secular social ethics

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[17] It is noted that the term 'neoconservatism' is rejected personally by some of the thinkers who are included here, among them Daniel Bell, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Aaron Wildavsky, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, and James Q. Wilson (see Kristol, p.74, 1983). It is not properly to be regarded as a movement, but a broad set of ideas.

of modern society - the 'family ethic' and the 'work ethic'.[18]

They have identified, or incorporated into their ideas, six primary causes of government failure. These are the unintended consequences of many policies, the limits of knowledge, the pursuit of conflicting policies, the destruction of traditional problem-ameliorating institutions and mediating structures, the existence of a 'New Class' with vested interest in expanding the state's role, and a utopian view of the ability of government to change the nature of man and society (Ashford 1981).[19]

The neoconservative critique of the (American) welfare state is that it is positively dysfunctional in economic and welfare terms. It is seen as contributing to poverty and social problems, in particular that it tends to cause the growth of an 'underclass'.[20] The resulting crisis in confidence and trust has three main symptoms. First, the

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[18] Roche (p.122, 1992).

[19] Ashford suggests three schools of thought assisted the development of neoconservative ideas - classical political philosopher Leo Strauss and followers, economic liberals such as Friedman and Hayek, and the 'rediscovery' of the importance of community (provoking an interest in 'mediating structures' as the providers of the social bonds necessary for a stable society).

[20] Charles Murray (1984) in particular identified supposed 'welfare dysfunction'. He argued that the growth of the welfare state has caused a growth in poverty and in particular, crime, social disorganisation and a dependent underclass. It created a new series of incentives which encouraged people to sacrifice their long-term best interests - marriage, steady low-paid entry-level work, disciplined study - that traditionally made it possible for the poor to climb the social ladder, for short-term gains. But it is difficult to regard Murray as a proper neconservative, because he proposes smaller government rather than the inculcation of desirable values (which he thinks will develop spontaneously in the absence of state welfare).

expectation that government will redress all social and economic inequalities, which leads to government 'overload'. Second, the re-emergence of populism, identified by Kristol in particular as the growing belief that the 'will of the people' is being frustrated by structures and people of authority (there is an important debt to Leo Strauss in this respect, see Kristol, p.8-9, 1995). Third, pluralism is threatened by more direct democracy to, and the rejection of traditional values by such forces as the 'counter culture', the New Left, and the New Class.[21] This is encouraged not only by radical groups, but increasingly by the mainstream media as well (Kristol, p.102, ibid).

This negative critique is supplemented by a positive conception of the importance of family and work to citizenship.

Neoconservativism understands social citizenship as the project which cultivates the familial sphere and which helps to defend it against the demands of civil and political citizenship. Hence the family is thought fundamental to proper citizenship. The exercise of social citizenship in the family is also seen as one of the main prerequisites of civil and political citizenship. Gilder (1986), for example, has argued that the family is the 'great civiliser'. It is necessary for the security and socialisation of the young, and tames and regulates the otherwise

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[21] It was during the so-called 'counter culture' era that the key neoconservative journal, *The Public Interest*, was established in 1965 by Kristol and Daniel Bell, and it soon came to counter the counter culture.

anti-social and destructive forces of male natural aggression and sexual promiscuity. Hence he suggests (p.39, ibid): "It is the sexual constitution not the legal one, that is decisive [in bringing males to the] duties and disciplines of citizenship." Marriage creates the responsibility men need. Consequently, the decline of the sexual division of labour is seen as a dangerous trend, exacerbated by the social democratic conception of social citizenship which it is supposed allows responsibility to be neglected.

The main emphasis for neoconservatives remains on the informal (private, personal) rather than formal (public, political) duties of citizenship. Though they have emphasised duties, they do not see them necessarily as mutually-exclusive to rights. 'Rights' may be regarded as opportunities to fulfil duties unhindered by the state, though perhaps encouraged or supported by it.[22] State welfare is important, especially in helping the fulfilment of duties, particularly in the family.[23] 'Rights' may also be seen as a protection from the state.[24]

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[22] See the Bergers' (p.204-214, 1983) six general principles of a neoconservative pro-family policy. Novak (1987) even proposes that single mothers on welfare should be put on 'workfare' programmes, but this is controversial to other pro-family neoconservatives.

[23] Such regard for the 'traditional family' has been shared in Britain as well. For example, Ferdinand Mount (former editor of *The Spectator* and chair of the Family Policy Group for the Cabinet) argued for the revival of the nuclear family, 'freed' from state controls (Mount 1983).

[24] As Roche (1992) has noted, neoconservatives may use the dominant language of 'rights' in order to defend the family against state interference.

The other pillar to neoconservative citizenship is work, and in particular the obligation to work.[25] Lawrence Mead is probably the most important neoconservative proponent of the social obligations of citizenship. He has suggested (p.242-3, 1986):

"The following seem to be the main social obligations of adults in the United States today: Work in available jobs for heads of families, unless aged or disabled, and for other adult members of families that are needy. Contributing all that one can to the support of one's family (but public assistance seems acceptable if parents work and cannot earn enough for support)..Law abidingness, meaning both obedience to law and a more generalised respect for the rights of others. Work for the employable is the clearest social obligation."

Welfare support is, of course, not 'work', but it must be designed to reinforce the work ethic. To Mead, the main problem with the welfare state is its permissiveness rather than its size, since social programmes do not 'set standards' for recipients or require any functioning in return for support (p.ix, ibid): "If they did, the evidence suggests they would function better, bringing

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[25] This is illustrated by neoconservative attitudes to welfare tiers. While they concede some government assistance, they reserve their endorsement for the 'upper tier' (the contributory tier) of the welfare system, because it appears to require a recognition and exercise of personal responsibility and obligation to contribute in order to justify welfare benefits. Lower tiers are seen to grant social rights exclusively on the basis of need, and so are suspected of generating self-inflicted failure by undermining responsibility (Roche, p.85, 1992).

closer an integrated society." Poverty is allowed to derive from the functioning problems of the poor themselves. Dependent groups are shielded from the pressures to function well that impinge on others, particularly the market. Hence (p.2, ibid): "The world the recipients live in is economically depressed yet privileged in one sense, that it emphasises their claims and needs almost to the exclusion of obligations."

Mead prefers a balance of rights and duties. Ambiguously, he claims to support the 'equality of citizenship'. He suggests that cutting the welfare state alone would probably not achieve any higher level of 'social functioning', and that market individualism does not produce the social trust which a market society needs.[26] But perhaps more significantly, he wishes to support the 'civility' on which order is based. Mutual reliability is regarded as the foundation of a free society. Obligations go beyond the regulated (for example taxes). The capacities to learn, work, support one's family, and respect the rights of others are seen to amount to a set of social obligations alongside the political ones. These reciprocally tie recipients to society.

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[26] Wiseman (1988) has noted the significant impact that Mead and others have had on policy developments, particularly as part of the Working Seminar on the Family and American Welfare Policy, and their report *The New Consensus on Family and Welfare: A Community of Self-Reliance* published in 1987. He criticises the equation of poverty with dependency in such work; it assumes that all of 'the poor' receive assistance and that the problem of poverty consists in then reducing the numbers receiving assistance.

However, as noted already, neoconservatives do not identify only the threat to the social order which they think derives from citizenship underpinned by unreciprocal welfare rights. They have also been concerned about the relationship between 'traditional' morality and free market economics. For example, Irving Kristol does not accept that a capitalist system produces the morality needed to sustain it, but rather has a tendency to subvert traditions.[27] The (liberal) emancipation of the individual from social restraints may be considered as disastrous when extended to the polity as a whole, because the polity's destiny is (p.xiii, 1973): "..finally determined by the capacity of its citizenry to govern its passions and thereby rightly understand its enduring common interests." Unlimited liberal capitalism encouraged the post-war generation into instant satisfaction of appetites regardless of effort, in economic and political arenas. Neoconservatives appear to be criticising Friedmanite neoliberalism when they suggest that its problem is that it has replaced the idea of 'bourgeois virtue' with that of 'individual liberty' and 'self-realisation' (Kristol, p.102, 1995). They believe that only they realise fully that there must be another pillar of values to support citizenship, which do not derive from the market.

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[27] (Quoted Graham and Clarke, p.86, 1986): "A free market, in and of itself, doesn't tell you what kind of person to produce. A free market involves only the exercise of self-interest within a limited sphere, namely the economy. But you need an ethos that tells you how to raise your children, whether you should marry or stay married, whether you should be loyal to your friends or to your government."

2.4b Philosophic Conservatism

This concentration on the values thought necessary for social order is even more important to the second strand of new right conservatism - 'philosophic conservatism'. One leading inspiration is the work of Michael Oakeshott, though its leading proponents are more recent, and associated particularly with the journal *The Salisbury Review* and the Conservative Philosophy Group founded in 1975 by Roger Scruton, Hugh Fraser, John Casey and Jonathan Aitken. In the conclusion to *Conservative Essays*, Maurice Cowling (1978) characterises this school as less liberal and more populist than consensus conservatism, but less liberal and more political than the economic liberalism it has been associated with (the neoliberal new right). To Scruton, conservatism depends on three main organising concepts, authority, allegiance and tradition (p.19, 33, 1980):

"It is through the ideal of authority that the conservative experiences the political world..The conservative places his faith in arrangements that are known and tried, and wishes to imbue them with all the authority necessary to constitute an accepted and objective public realm."

Authority derives from the 'transcendent' qualities of established institutions, and is opposed to all social arrangements based on conscious choice and contract. Allegiance is what every member of an historical collectivity owes to authority and expresses the organic nature of society. In the

political sphere, the state brings authority, allegiance and tradition together, to define the citizen as 'subject'.

It is necessary first to examine the nature of this subjecthood, second to investigate how important it is to this conservatism to retain a significant distance from 'liberal' ideas, and third to appreciate the role of social institutions for social order within this form of neoconservatism.

First, 'subjecthood' suggests the inheritance rather than reform of the social order. For the sake of that order, power and authority preside necessarily in the central state. Hence this conservatism (Scruton, p.15-16, 1980): "..regards no citizen as possessed of a natural right that transcends his obligation to be ruled." This appears contrary to contemporary notions of autonomy and agency which are related to 'modern citizenship', which implies freely consenting allegiance to both the state and public duty. In this conservatism there is no 'liberal' allegiance of this kind. The individual is not citizen but the subject, indeed creation, of the state.[28]

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[28] Scruton (p.31, 1980) draws an analogy: "..the family, then, is a small social unit which shares with civil society the singular quality of being non-contractual, of arising (both for the children and the parents) not out of choice but out of natural necessity. And (to turn the analogy around) it is obvious that the bond which ties the citizen to society is like wise not a voluntary but a kind of natural bond." Similarly (p.45, ibid): "..[society] exists through authority, and the recognition of this authority requires the allegiance to a bond that is not contractual but transcendent in the manner of the family tie."

Second, notions of citizenship as non-subjecthood, as 'freedom' as a supposed ultimate value, are criticised. Freedom should not be regarded in such an abstract manner. In adherence to the British conservative tradition of thought (Casey, p.96, Cowling 1978):

"The conservative position, then, differs profoundly from liberalism. It cannot base itself upon an ideal of individual freedom that abstracts the individual from any historical continuity or particular loyalties. It is not that there is an objection to the individualist ideas as a *policy*, but rather that liberalism fails to give any full description of the 'individual self' in which freedom resides."

Hence, to Cowling (p.9, ibid):

"..it is not freedom that Conservatives want: what they want is the sort of freedom that will maintain existing inequalities or restore lost ones, so far as political action can do this."

Invariably, this requires social discipline, to Peregrine Worsthorne: "..surely a more fruitful and rewarding theme for contemporary conservatism than individual freedom" (p.150, ibid), whose legacy has been permissiveness, crime and anti-social behaviour. In this sense, these kind of conservatives do not criticise only left political projects. They appear to focus much approprium on (neo) liberal individualism. As Scruton (p.113, ibid) argues:

"To insist on the absolute validity of the individual wish is to treat society - in Kant's phrase - as a means only and not an end, as a means to the satisfaction individual desire. Such an attitude is essentially revolutionary; it involves a stance of social murder."

'Freedom' is rather the mature allegiance to family and then the whole social organism (p.66, 1980):

"It is basic to a conservative view of things..that the individual should seek and find his completion in society..He must see himself as the inheritor, not the creator, of the order in which he participates, so that he may derive from it..the conceptions and values which determine self-identity."

Hence it is unsurprising that (p.49, ibid): "There are only rights where there are obligations." There would seem to be some shared ground with (left-oriented) communitarianism in this respect, but this should not be exaggerated. Communitarianism may wish for social 'common purpose', but philosophic conservatism, because of its supposed rejection of political projects and abstract ideas, rejects the 'purpose' rather than the 'common'.[29]

Of course, this conservatism strongly resists not only liberal but socialist ideas, along the same

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[29] Scruton (p.11, 1991): "Conservatives find many things wrong with socialism, but perhaps nothing so wrong as this search for a 'common purpose'. However the purpose is conceived - as equality, fraternity, liberty or 'social justice' - it is not so much the conception as the common pursuit of it that we should abhor. Such a common pursuit is inherently destructive of allegiance, through the very fact of imposing on society a purpose besides itself."

lines. Both are seen as permissive and threaten social order, especially hierarchy. Hence the deep antipathy to the social and sexual liberation of the 1960s, and desire to reimpose traditional female roles within the family. These conservatives reject left conceptions of social membership and citizenship, when founded on universal social rights and especially expanded democracy.[30] The neoconservative defence of limited democracy is a defence against participatory and egalitarian democracy, preferring instead that the rational consensus of the people can best be discovered by constitutional processes and a representative pluralist system, in which an elite invariably has a significant role (Ashford 1981).

Conservatives of this kind might respond to criticisms of authoritarianism by arguing that true freedom is intimately bound up with moral responsibility and adherence to social rules. The real 'spirit of freedom' is seen to reside in the rights which come attached to obligations that we owe to each other rather than in the absolute notion of individual rights. Hence conservatives emphasise, in Oakeshott's (p.113, 1962) words, that these arrangements of rights and obligations are

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[30] Scruton (p.22, 1991): "..if we think that the 'task' [of social justice] exists, then surely this is because we have misperceived the relations of ownership and citizenship, neither of which can be derived, as the socialist seeks to derive them, from some simpler, de-legalised idea of social 'membership'."

not: "..a burden to be carried or an incubus to be thrown off, but an inheritance to be enjoyed."[31]

Third, they suggest further that freedom is protected by social institutions, in particular 'mediating structures'. These are organisations which come between individual and state (family, neighbourhood, voluntary organisations, church), as social resources for citizenship. They promote the development of civic virtues, allow citizens to identify with the larger society, empower them, and remind them that they have not fulfilled their responsibilities of citizenship simply by paying taxes. These mediating structures are seen to be threatened by the public provision of welfare and corresponding centralisation.[32]

2.5 Neoliberalism

2.5a 'Classical Liberalism'

In the classical liberal tradition, citizenship is founded on individual and property rights which enable citizens to relate to each other around the activity of market exchange as well as in personal aspects. Citizenship is conceived of negatively in terms of the legal protection of pre-existing rights

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[31] In particular, the liberal citizen is thought unable to recognise the importance of 'ought', obligations and responsibilities, that derive from the web of attachments citizens are born into. As Scruton (p.201-2, 1984) argues: "This is not the abstract, universal 'ought' of liberal theory..but the concrete, immediate 'ought' of family attachments. It is the 'ought' of piety, which recognises the unquestionable rightness of local, transitory and historically conditioned social bonds." The lack of 'self' then partially contributes to no idea of self-fulfilment other than the free satisfaction of desire (p.120, ibid).

[32] Griffiths (p.224-5, 1990), Willetts (p.147, 1992).

to life, liberty and property. It requires only some form of civil contract ensuring public goods and services are provided and agreements enforced. A sharp delineation is made between the public and private spheres, the private having priority over the public. Hence, to the ordinary citizen citizenship does not require any specific public participation, although they should be aware of potential infringements of their rights. It is claimed that a liberal social order of market capitalism can generate the conditions for full citizenship, and further that the pursuit of egalitarianism and socialist political institutions undermine citizenship. Market relations do not preclude 'virtuous' behaviour, and collectivist arrangements (universal welfare) do not breed communality any more than markets (Saunders, chapter four, 'Citizenship in a Liberal Society', Turner 1993). This is the basic root from which liberal new right conceptions of citizenship derive.

There is a danger in homogenising the liberal new right, given that there are important, if often technical, differences between varying schools.[33] However, in terms of their conceptions of

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[33] Gamble (Levitas 1986) distinguishes three strands - (traditional American) economic individualism/laissez-faire economics, libertarianism (including Nozick), and Austrian economics (including Schumpeter, von Mises and Hayek), the last two of which have undergone the major revival in the last forty years. But according to Bosanquet (1983), the dominant contemporary neoliberal approach, on approaches to growth, supply response in markets, macroeconomics and the role of the state, derives from Milton Friedman (though Bosanquet is critical, p.59, ibid). See also Barry (1987), and on the Austrian school Shand (1990).

citizenship, there are many shared themes which may be brought out.

2.5b The Primacy of the Market

The revival of liberal political economy is of greater significance than debates concerning narrow economic matters alone. It dictates the individual citizen's relationship to the state, and the environment of citizenship. Whatever the school, the neoliberal new right accords a primacy to 'free markets'.[34] The satisfaction of wants is the only satisfactory criterion for appraisal of social policy. 'Freedom', maximised in markets, is the best judge of social arrangements. This would seem to, if put simplistically, replace a concern with social membership founded on some degree of shared social resources, with a solely market-based notion of 'citizenship' (Barry, p.53, 1990):

"..the nature of the 'self' or 'agent' that is the object of Paretian welfare economics is highly pertinent to this austere liberal political economy. For this agent is simply the atomised individual found in orthodox micro-economics whose identity is established in terms of more or less immediate desires rather than by his membership of a politically organised community. Therefore, whatever

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[34] Seldon (p.146-185, 1990) suggested that the new right's defence of free market capitalism has derived from ten developments: new interpretations of capitalist history, new analyses of property rights, a new emphasis on the market as process, the 'economics of politics' (public choice), the critical examination of government regulation, the sceptical view of 'public goods', the nature and effect of externalities, the monetary control of fluctuations, the economics of self-investment in human capital, and the limited and minimal state.

entitlements to resources he has derive from individualistic exchange, from gifts and so on, and not from his status as citizen."

Since collective provision limits the role of market processes, which are the most effective guarantors of political liberty, collective provision reduces political liberty. Further, because the welfare state is financed out of taxation, it interferes with private property and may signify direct coercion of those individual tax-payers who would rather not contribute to 'compulsory charity' in this way. An expansive state does not restrain human self-interest, but transfers the same propensities to the political sphere where their scope for abuse is greater. Social discord and inequitable distribution of rewards follow (Friedman, chapter 10, 1962). Collective provision is seen as undermining the two 'natural' channels through which an individual's needs are properly met, the private market and the family. Markets work 'with the grain of human nature', indeed derive their strength from the instincts and abilities of 'ordinary people' (Griffiths 1990). Nothing depends on the fallible uncertainties of altruism and communal responsibility, but on citizens' innate need for individual responsibility and self or family-interest. The 'expansive' state threatens such relationships (Anderson, p.37, 1990):

"..the family and neighbourhood has a rich and changing knowledge which the state lacks...the crucial question to ask of any state intervention,

before asking whether it could be a success in its own terms, is to ask what effect it will have on the family, on the neighbourhood, on the values and institutions which provide this colossal informal welfare. Does the intervention undermine institutions more effective in welfare itself ?"

This vision, though, is to the liberal new right an alternative, and better, route to social integration. They see social democratic social policies as replacing the pursuit of independence with permanent mutual dependence, a much more fragile basis for mutual respect. Hence markets are not seen to erode citizens' autonomy, but as the arena in which that autonomy is exercised and encouraged. They tend to reverse the causation assumed by the 'citizenship school' and left citizenship theorists generally.[35] Though neoliberals may differ as to how moral they think markets are, they do regard them as encouraging responsibility.[36] Thus, the proper foundation for the free but responsible society is not social rights to welfare, which may cause irresponsibility, but the primacy of property rights.[37]

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[35] Barry (p.71-2, 1990): "..whereas the classical liberal notion of causality relates to responsibility for action, hence the reluctance to entertain easily obtainable welfare because it is likely to produce irresponsible and improvident behaviour, the social welfare theorist understands causality as running in the opposite direction."

[36] Friedman (p.33, 1962). "..freedom is a tenable objective only for responsible individuals..Paternalism is inescapable for those we designate not responsible."

[37] Graham and Clarke (p.133, 132, 1986): "..civil rights are threatened by economic decline, and economic decline follows the decline of economic [property] rights..A positive right, entitling someone to a house or a free meal, imposes a duty on others without specifying who is to provide it. The state,

2.5c Welfare

Neoliberals dislike the way in which the concept of 'welfare' has managed to engulf those of justice and individual rights, and pervert their proper meaning. Hayek has been the foremost critic of 'social justice' (p.100, 1976): "..the contention that membership in a particular community or nation entitles the individual to a particular standard that is determined by the general wealth of the group to which he belongs." This is wrong because (p.101, 1976): "The recognition of such claims on a national scale would in fact only create a new kind of collective (but not less exclusive) property right in the resources of the nation that could not be justified on the same grounds as individual property." 'Social justice' obscures the value of inequality, erodes incentives and leads to social disharmony. Justice and rights as concepts should, in effect, stand aside from debates on social welfare provision. Neoliberals regret that 'welfare' has become a collectivist term. Neoliberals have resisted the assimilation of what they see as different types of rights, particularly 'positive' and 'negative' rights. Barry (p.79-82, 1990) has suggested three main reasons why: welfare rights are indeterminate and necessarily subjective, difficult if not impossible to codify in a single document, and raise issues of personal responsibility unlike negative rights. The ethics of the welfare state are

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therefore, takes on the job. The terminology of 'rights' silences discussion of the relative costs and benefits of such action."

confused, more so by the grafting on of the local idea of citizenship identity. This makes them contested, and so possible sites of social conflict. This is the result of what has been termed the 'new acquisitiveness' (Zweig 1976) - the pressure on the state to provide universally. All this devalues 'citizenship' (Rose and Peters, p.238, 1978):

"..it implies that citizenship is little more than the by-product of benefits and bribes from government, expanding in meaning as well as in cash value with the growth of government spending."

Some would disagree that recipients could remain proper citizens, that (Pinker, p.142, 1971): "..holding authentic claims by virtue of citizenship remains largely an intellectual conceit of the social scientist and the socialist. For the majority the idea of participant citizenship in distributive processes outside the market place has very little meaning. Consequently most applicants for social services remain paupers at heart."

Instead, neoliberals propose two main alternatives. First, as discussed, access to the market distribution of life-chances in education, housing and health care should be met on the basis of merit, performance and productivity (termed the 'Industrial Achievement-Performance Model' of social policy, Titmuss, p.31, 1974). Hence (Barry, p.21, 1990):

"The ideal of citizenship hinted at is not one that includes a right to well-being, least of all a requirement of social justice. It is rather that education is required to enable individuals to

acquire those elementary moral principles on which a commercial order depends."

Second, despite neoliberalism's rejection of the discourses of social citizenship, this does not mean that in the neoliberal society there would be no 'guaranteed' state help. State welfare should provide only a minimum 'safety-net' for all, on the grounds of compassion and political stability. Designs vary, but the principle is that inequalities should not prevent all from having some basic purchasing power, hence the desire for minimum income or voucher systems, which it is presumed would introduce genuine choice and diversity into the public funding of state and private provision of education and health. The state's role should be one of 'enabling', not providing. It definitely should not be to ensure 'equality'. As Murray (p.233, 1984) proclaimed: "Billions for equal opportunity, not one cent for equal outcome."

Anderson et al. (1981) in a Social Affairs Unit (SAU) publication emphasised the need to 'break the spell' of the welfare state, its interest-groups and supposed legitimacy in the public political debate. Parker (1984), again in a SAU pamphlet, attacked the benefit (and tax) system as not only unnecessarily expensive to administer but an arbitrary system of 'pauperisation'. It was regarded as a chief cause of unemployment penalising marriage, subsidising family break-up, destabilising and dividing society and undermining the rule of law. It offered neither

opportunities for self-advancement nor encouraged self-reliance.

To the authors of the Adam Smith Institute's *Omega Report: Social Security and Pensions Policy* (Butler et al. 1985), social security policy should instead rest on four principles: help should go only to those 'in need', it should be given in the form of financial support to enable recipients to maintain a basic standard of living and to exercise individual choice over how to spend it, there should be an incentive towards taking work, however poorly paid, and circumstances capable of being provided for by insurance should be covered by a properly funded, private and compulsory system (with the state paying the premium of those unable to provide for themselves).

2.5d The 'Religion of Inequality'

"...the working of a free economy depends upon differentials at every level. Differentials attract people to jobs where labour is scarce, they make long training worthwhile, they require effectiveness, hard work, long work skilled work, and responsibility."[38]

The most comprehensive new right attack on the principle of equality is to be found in *Equality* (1979) by Joseph and Sumption, who argue (p.19, ibid): "Redistribution is unwise. But it is also morally indefensible, misconceived in theory and repellent in practice." It is merely a 'moral intuition', not a principle of justice. A modest

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[38] Joseph (p.76, 1976).

degree of redistribution can be justified in the name of relieving poverty and stability, but 'relative poverty' obscures a discussion of real or absolute needs by the 'proto-socialist project' of social justice (p.29, ibid): "Equality of opportunity is an attack on privilege in the name of liberty." Equality of opportunity demands a 'neutral' state, since one cannot have equality of opportunity and results. Whether citizens act selfishly or altruistically, (p.120-121, ibid): "..self-interest is indeed the first duty which a man owes to his community, so that he supports himself and does not depend on others."

Yet, paradoxically, neoliberals have also argued that the market has greater egalitarianism potential than the political or public sphere. First, neoliberals argue that because of its wealth-generating ability capitalism is able to benefit all strata in society.[39] Other forms of social organisation will not produce more equality. Second, markets are seen to allow individuals autonomy. They are geared towards the satisfaction of the uncoerced wants of rational individuals. Third, political processes are not only inefficient but culturally and socially biased, unlike markets (Seldon 1990). The notion that markets offer greater opportunities for ordinary citizens to act autonomously is a stark but under-examined reply to the assumptions of the 'citizenship school'.

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[39] Friedman (p.169, 1962): "..contrary to popular conception,..capitalism leads to less inequality than alternative systems of organisation and that the development of capitalism has greatly lessened the extent of inequality."

2.5e Role of the State

For neoliberals, only a small proportion of the products and services supplied by the state are genuine public goods, such as national defence or provisions which safeguard the legal basis for society. For Hayek, it should set the framework for 'fair play' between citizens, according to settled rules (and not use the coercive apparatus of the state to demand social and distributive justice). Murray (1984) proposes the scrapping of the entire American federal and state income support systems for people of working age, so 'freeing' them from the forces that encourage them to remain poor and dependent. Friedman (1962) suggests there are four areas in which state action is legitimate: the guarantor of the legal framework for the efficient functioning of the market system, natural monopolies (such as the postal system) which the state may provide without adversely effecting the market, the free provision of services where it is too expensive or impracticable for market provision, and paternalistic provision for those unable to assume full responsibility for themselves (such as the mentally ill).[40]

2.5f The Primacy of Market over Political Democracy

"The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society..Every extension of the range of

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[40] Friedman seems to have become more dogmatic in later works. In *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962) there must be a clear (efficiency or paternalistic) advantage if government is allowed to go beyond core functions. By the time of *Free to Choose* (1980) he proposes a more limited Smithian model.

issues for which explicit agreement is sought strains further the delicate threads that hold society together."[41]

How different from the radical participatory conception of citizenship. Bosanquet (1983) has characterised the neoliberal new right's fear of politicisation as their 'antithesis', the extension of processes of political choice leading to a growth of class conflict, an increase in the power of producer groups and greater 'vote-buying'.[42] This argument is most clearly stated in Arthur Seldon's rigorous defence of *Capitalism* (1990). One of the advantages of the free market is its 'populist democracy' rather than the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of politics. Politics serves those who have inherited or acquired the political or cultural skills which enable them to derive more benefits than others.[43] Communitarianism prejudices further politics and the notion that unpolitical people are inferior and irresponsible. Only the market puts power in the hands of common people.[44]

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[41] Friedman (p.23-4, 1962).

[42] The 'thesis' - the integrating force in society - is the underlying process of economic growth as best encouraged by the free market.

[43] Seldon (p.103, 1990): "The essential strength of the case for capitalism is that the democracy of the market offers the masses more than the democracy of politics. Political democracy has..been distorted in favour of the politically influential, skilled and adroit; its nominally representative assemblies reflect the influence of the organised at the expense of the unorganised; it has built a hierarchy of power; it is therefore inequitable and arbitrary. The doubt is whether the defects of the political process can be removed by the political process."

[44] (p.231, ibid): "..the capitalist system does not require active citizenship: it allows individuals the liberty to choose between the two main forms of human activity. The most endlessly discussed, and most extravagant of space in the

Its form of equality - the liberty to compete, emulate and feel self-achievement - is more stable and meaningful than the political 'imposition' of equality.

This is why Kenneth Minogue (1995) has attacked recent communitarian thought. Citizenship as the telos of democracy leaves no room for citizenship as civil society, as individuals interacting on terms they choose. He regards participatory theorists as having linked the notion of participation to a Marshallian satisfaction of needs, and re-packaged the combination as a 'revival' of classical republican virtue when it is nothing of the kind. Citizenship as participation is not always free. It is a dangerous concept, like all ideals, and must balance with others. Genuine republican citizenship would mean an active, self-sacrificing patriotism. Minogue of course favours a neoliberal citizenship, centring on 'justice' rather than 'social justice'. Citizenship demands compliance to the rule of law as the basis for individual conduct. This is a minimal conception but seen as of crucial importance (p.22, ibid):

"Citizenship is essentially the implicit morality which underlies our roles as moral agents, economic actors, aesthetically sensitive individuals, voters, members of families and all the rest of the forms of

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press and of time in broadcasting, is politics..The least discussed are the non-political activities that many more people enjoy far more.." (p.326, ibid): "The hope of making the vast machinery of the state accountable to participating citizens is the last refuge of the opponents of individual sovereignty in the market. The solution is the opposite: to make the state as small as possible."

life in which we are involved. What holds these things together is a form of moral probity, the performance of the duties appropriate to each...the only solution to this disaster as a practical problem [the communist states' collapse of private and public spheres into each other], is the slow and unambitious rebuilding of the barriers between spheres and activities. It is certainly not the positing of some grand ideal of citizenship to save us from our human frailty."

The neoliberal new right supports (Bosanquet, p.6, 1983): "..the limited sovereignty of the people" because they see another source - the market - as offering virtually unlimited sovereignty.[45]

2.5g Constitutional Reform

Neoliberalism's economic priorities have provoked an interest in constitutional reform (Littlechild, p.13, 1979): "The appropriate role of government is once more strictly limited to providing a suitable legal and institutional framework for the market..A revised constitution is thus seen as necessary to protect the country from an unwarranted and undesirable extension in the role of government." Hence (Vibert, p.vii, 1991): "..they see an unfinished agenda of constitutional and institutional change that must accompany the triumph of market economics if the victory is to be

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[45] Individuals are freer because society is less dominated by an all-encroaching power. Friedman (p.15, 1962): "By removing the organisation of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement."

sustained." The continual danger of the growth of the state is founded also on the Hayekian critique of majoritarian democracy.[46]

For the United States, the favoured proposal is a balanced budget rule amendment to the constitution, while in *The Consequences of Mr Keynes* (1978) Buchanan, Burton and Wagner consider similar ideas in the British context against the weakness of the British system of government. Burton (p.45-6, 1985) has proposed an 'Economic Bill of Rights', including a balanced budget rule and a limitation on government spending (also Rowley, in Littlechild 1979). More recently, Radnitszky (p.11, Vibert 1991) has argued that redistribution (only to the 'absolute poor') should be a constitutional matter and not one for majoritarian decision-making. Yet the constitutional reform agenda remains one of the most unrealised elements of the new right project.

Neoliberalism appears to invert left citizenship. The state, no longer the guarantor of citizenship through welfare, is its greatest threat. Capitalism is not a threat to political freedom, it is a precondition for it (Friedman, p.9-10, 1962). Neoliberalism has produced reaching questions for two important assumptions of social democratic citizenship - that social rights via the state may grant citizenship status, and that orthodox political processes can articulate reliably the preferences of citizens and enhance citizenship. It is from these arguments that neoliberals seek to

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[46] Also Buchanan's *The Limits of Liberty* (1975) and *Democracy in Deficit* (1977).

envisage a very different means (the market) to an integrated society. The notion that neoliberal citizenship is equatable merely with consumerism is a caricature which misrepresents the reasons why neoliberals have sought to undermine 'statism' - so that new and active forms of citizenship based on individual responsibility and genuinely collective forms of association can emerge.

2.6 Libertarianism

It is important that a differentiation is made between neoliberalism and libertarianism, though there are some thinkers who may it be difficult to place in one strand to the exclusion of the other. Confusion arises because both neoliberals and libertarians use similar language, and arguments, against their opponents. There may be some areas of agreement between them. But there are also important differences (Gamble, p.47, Levitas 1986): "For most New Right economists, libertarian attitudes to economic policy are quite compatible with neo-conservative attitudes on many other issues. They willingly exclude the application of libertarian principles from two key areas - the family, and internal and external security."

Libertarianism represents, in essence, 'freedom' over 'order'. It does not represent merely the extension of neoliberal themes, but a radical school of its own. Classification of the relatively few thinkers within this strand can be problematic. Even the common notions of 'left' or 'right' can become difficult in relation to libertarianism, given of

course that support for the 'absolute' liberty of the individual person is certainly not only a new right principle. 'Left' libertarianism and anarchism share many themes with the 'right' variant. But the thinkers mentioned here are included in the new right for two reasons - because of their strong defence of unrestricted capitalism, and their arguments against post-war social democracy.

Absolute rights to private property are seen as the central right of citizenship. As Murray Rothbard (p.23, 1978) suggests: "..no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else." This forms the basis for free contract and the free society. The so-called 'anarcho-libertarian' approach favours unrestricted private property and free exchange - truly laissez-faire capitalism. In an extension of Friedman's dictum about free markets and political freedom, libertarians argue that property and civil rights are inextricably linked (Green, D.G., p.36, 1987). Tibor Machan argues for negative rights only - we are born with no fundamental duties to the rest of society. Duties only come from the choices we make. Human beings as moral agents need space to make the genuine decisions from which genuine duties flow. Robert Nozick, within the basic assumptions of this strand, argues that if people have pre-social rights to property, then any social principles of justice will violate citizens' 'rights'. The emphasis is then on the freedom from social justice principles but to pre-social property rights.

The key aspect of the libertarian agenda is a radically reduced state, in order to allow individuals maximum autonomy and freedom. Rothbard (1978) proposes the abolition or severe reduction of taxation, and equivalent reductions in state expenditure, the abolition of subsidies to already wealthy interest groups, and the removal of restrictions on the productive energies of the poor. Nozick (1974) can be seen to accept the minimal state rather than anarchy. The state should be limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. But the conception still stands that (p.ix, ibid): "..the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their *own* good or protection." Taxation is permitted for the maintenance of a protective system of law and order but forbidden for welfare or social security services. This is seen as the only route to treating individuals with the dignity of rights (p.333-4, ibid):

"Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to realise our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary co-operation of other individuals possessing the same dignity."

There is a libertarian wing in the new right but it is not dominant, and the few genuine libertarians stand out. To Barry (1983) the normative doctrines

of libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism do not get the attention they deserve, primarily because the transition to a libertarian order is not really plausible from present political conditions. This is the first reason why the libertarian new right, and its conception of citizenship, are not described and analysed in any depth. It will be suggested that the other strands of the new right have had an important social, political and economic impact. Genuine libertarianism has not.

The second reason is because libertarian 'citizenship' does not fall within the parameters of 'modern citizenship', as outlined [chapter one]. Whatever the merits or problems of the genuinely libertarian position, it cannot be seen to represent an intervention into the mainstream modern citizenship debate. Citizenship includes social duties and the observance of social rules, whatever the model. It expects something from citizens which would go beyond what any libertarian would find acceptable. Libertarianism constitutes a radically powerful set of ideas, but as a result divorces itself from even the most general assumptions that underlie modern citizenship, most obviously in the size and responsibilities accorded to the state. In this broad and iconoclastic school, the notion of property rights reaches its zenith. There are, in effect, no other legitimate rights. Miller (p.443, 1995) has made the following critique of neoliberalism and libertarianism, though it is suggested here that it applies properly only to libertarianism as described here:

"The strength of the libertarian position is that it takes pluralism seriously. It assumes that people have radically different conceptions of the good life, and argues that the way to cope with this is to depoliticize citizenship, to convert the public realm into an ersatz version of the market..It founders on the fact that citizenship at its core concerns common rights and goods enjoyed in common..nothing remains of citizenship but the right to contract into the community of your choice.."

The third reason is that libertarian 'citizenship' is a vision, unlikely to be realised in the contemporary political environment, of freedom from a unitary conception of society. Such a unitary conception is shared by neoliberals, neoconservatives and the left as well, though of course their particular conceptions may be different from each other. The significance of this is developed in more depth later [3.11].

2.7 Public Choice

"Public Choice represents the application of economic methodology to the study of politics. In principle it is an objective study not wedded to any particular political belief, but its inquiries are shaped by its strongly individualist and rationalist assumptions. These assumptions lead to a critical view of the political process owing to the many opportunities which it is said to provide for self-seeking behaviour, and an adverse view of

the capacity of governments to satisfy individual wants compared with economic markets."[47]

Public Choice (PC) goes beyond a technical methodological tool. Many of its ideas have been popularised beyond the academic community that counts itself as it proponents.[48] They have assisted many neoliberal arguments, but have important implications for citizenship on their own.

PC had developed after the publication of Buchanan and Tullock's *The Calculus of Consent* (1962), which constructed a view of the demand side which noted the role of over-lapping coalitions of interest in promoting the growth the size of the public sector. In the British context, the Institute of Economic Affairs played a key role in popularising the arguments associated with the so-called 'economics of politics' during the 1970s, in addition to the neoliberal economic work of Friedman and Hayek.

Put simply, while neoliberals have argued that market mechanisms work, the new right PC agenda has sought to demonstrate that that the government alternative does not. The most important proponents of PC theory have been Buchanan and Tullock.[49] They

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[47] Self (p.x, 1993).

[48] The development of PC/Rational Choice theory beyond its new right origins is an important development for political science methodologies, but is not relevant here.

[49] James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock organised the Public Choice Society from 1963. In 1969 they established the Center for the Study of Public Choice at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, which in 1982 was moved to George Mason University. As Buchanan (p.13, 1986) has stated, PC arose out of the recognition that: "..an understanding of the market process was a necessary but not sufficient condition to secure the intellectual-analytical foundations of a free society. This understanding is greatly strengthened in practice by a

attribute to politicians a 'vote motive' analogous to the profit motive of businessmen (Tullock 1976). As a result of its analyses, PC is preoccupied often with structural reform, rather than liberal political economy's hope that politicians do not interfere in markets.

2.7a The Normative Agenda of Public Choice

PC accepts: "The challenge..of constructing, or reconstructing, a political order that will channel the self-serving behaviour of participants towards the common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to that described by Adam Smith with respect to the economic order."[50] This aims not to restrain individual rationalistic behaviour but discover how differing individual preferences be reconciled under political institutions. In applying methods of economics to the study of political behaviour, PC has brought with it the notion that people should be regarded as rational utility-maximisers in all of their behavioural capacities.[51] This theoretical understanding has two main implications for citizenship.

First, it casts doubt on the ability of political processes to satisfy the role citizenship theory grants typically to them. As Self (p.57, 1993) has suggested, in a critical analysis, under its

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complementary understanding of the political process." See also Buchanan et al. (1978), and Buchanan and Tullock (1981).

[50] Buchanan et al. (p.17, 1978).

[51] Dunleavy (p.3, 1991) within PC: "..people are basically egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their behaviour, choosing how to act on the basis of the consequences for their personal welfare (or that of their immediate family)."

assumptions the voter has a negligible capacity to affect political outcomes, and hence little incentive to think or act rationally or constructively about public affairs compared with his own private interest (Tullock 1970). Insofar as he does participate, he will be concerned primarily with his own material self-interest.

The second implication derives from the first. Citizenship appears to be limited because its denial of a public sphere-oriented active citizenship divorced from a citizen's private material (or otherwise) self-interest.[52] Citizenship, whatever it is left to mean, cannot be a form of behaviour separate from the micro-economic interests of individual citizens. But as Seldon (p.177, 1990) has stated: "Unlike the market, politics is the arena where self-interest does not generally tend to public advantage."[53]

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[52] As Tullock (p.5, 1976) has argued: "Voters and consumers are essentially the same people. Mr Smith buys and votes; he is the same man in the supermarket as in the voting booth. There is no strong reason to believe his behaviour is radically different in the two environments." Also Buchanan and Tullock (p.20-3, 1962), Mueller (1989).

[53] As Buchanan (p.87, 1986) has stated, there are two related components which set PC aside from orthodox approaches to politics: "One is the extension of the economists' utility-maximising framework to the behaviour of persons in various public-choosing roles. The second is the idealised conception of politics as complex exchange. In this conceptualisation the political process and the market process are analogous. In each process, individuals seek to further *their own* purposes, whatever these may be, by engaging in social interaction. There exists no purpose or objective over and beyond those of participating individuals. In the public choice perspective, properly understood, there simply are no such things as 'social objectives', 'national goals', or 'social welfare functions'."

Citizenship then loses its status as a sphere of public behaviour insulated from economic imperatives. PC is the theoretical 'spearhead' in the advance of value-laden economic imperatives into political questions. As Dunleavy (p.5, 1991) notes, PC's fusion of positive theory and empirical work on the one hand, and prescriptive theory and policy analysis on the other, was particularly important in securing a rapid breakthrough for new right thought.

2.7b The Critique of Democracy

PC allowed long-running suspicions of liberal democracy which were common amongst some sections on the right to be rephrased in intellectually respectable terms and enter mainstream discussion.[54] Arrow's 'impossibility theorem' (1963) was said to have demonstrated the severe limitations upon democratic decision-making based on aggregating the preferences expressed by every individual over a restricted range of options (the 'social welfare function'). Some part of society is seen to be dictating to the rest. Hence it is supposed to reveal the impossibility of any theory of an absolute popular democracy. Further, Riker (1982) argued that 'social choice theory', in this context, demonstrated that no democratic system can produce results which accord even roughly with the preferences of the population. Rather, such a system

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[54] Brittan (p.305, 1988) denies (as they all do) that this represents an attack on the idea of democracy, but is instead critical of the 'principle fallacy of the age' - majority rule's elevation to a moral principle.

is to be understood narrowly as an instrument of control (rather than decision-making), in the sense that coupled with constitutional safeguards restricting the role of government it may protect basic rights and prevent abuse of power through the opportunity to periodically change those who hold office.

While not all PC theory will be this dismissive of political preferences as expressed through democratic mechanisms, the underlying critique of the ideal of popular democracy has been significant. It can be seen as a project increasingly to remove distributional conflict from the political arena, in the name of efficiency and 'democracy'. The consumer-voter can now have everyday access to deciding on the distributional questions that he deems as most important to him.[55]

2.7c Public Choice Policy Agenda

The broad conclusion that: "..commonly, the government alternative is inherently inferior to the market" (Seldon, p.81, 1981) demands neoliberal

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[55] Harris and Seldon (p.14, 73, 1987): "The inevitable limitations of the ballot box as a guide to opinion on all aspects of policy do not detract from the indispensability of political democracy..[But] For a free society the 'best use' can be discovered only by individual 'voting' with money in the competitive market. It is thus the 'defenders' of the spurious case for democracy in large tracts of human action where it massively frustrates individual, group or minority choices, who are misapplying and discrediting 'democracy'." The Harris-Seldon studies ran from 1963-87. As Bosanquet (p.78, 1983) critically comments: "Representative democracy stands totally condemned both by its methods and by its results. Harris and Seldon indeed write as if representative democracy was a kind of conspiracy created by pundits and politicians. They believe that the machinery - Parliament, the ballot box, representative democracy - has never worked effectively."

economic reforms - the reduction of the state. It also suggests a 'constitutional revolution' (Buchanan 1978), to reassert and reconstruct checks on government expansion.

If the PC critique of bureaucracies is accurate, social democratic citizenship, 'secured' by the large and numerous bureaucracies of the welfare state, is fundamentally flawed. Hence there are two normative conclusions: shift government activity to the market, or improve the system (government, state or polity) to increase its efficiency. Niskanen, for example, has considered alternatives to state bureaucracy to be, broadly, internal reform, the evolution of market alternatives, or political and constitutional reform. In this respect, new right PC affirms and reinforces neoliberal arguments, and hence proposals for reform.

The consequences for citizenship as conceived by the left are significant. If PC: "..maybe summarised as the 'discovery' or 'rediscovery' that people should be treated as rational utility-maximisers in *all* of their behavioural capacities" (Buchanan, p.17, 1978), this undercuts the assumption that the fulfilment of many of the non-statutory duties of citizenship depends not on self-interest but on some sense of community or mutual moral bond. The pursuit of selfish individual utility alone generates a desirable social order. Strong methodological individualism denies real meaning to such terms as 'public interest' or 'public good'. To Self (p.233, 1993), Buchanan and the Virginia School are pursuing

the old utilitarian dream of founding a political system upon a spontaneous harmony of purely private interests (sometimes 'enlightened self-interest'), contending that free markets offer such a system in the economic sphere, while in the more difficult political sphere resting their hopes on the contractarian theory of a restrictive constitution. Further PC appears to leave little hope for a reconstructed justification of comprehensive state welfare provision founded on the aim of achievement of full and universal citizenship.

2.8 'Liberal-Conservatism'

Dividing the new right into these four strands, neglects variants which combine discourses associated with each. There are two broad types of syntheses, F. A. von Hayek's work, and more recent proponents of 'liberal-conservatism'.

2.8a Hayekian Liberal-Conservatism

Hayek's work deserves separate attention from the Friedmanite neoliberal strand, because his arguments often are constructed differently, and lead to some alternative conclusions. To Friedman, reduction in the power and scope of the state is the fundamental condition for greater freedom. For Hayek, the principal target is state monopoly, and state welfare services would be acceptable if offered in competition with private alternatives. Friedman concentrates on the choice between market and state. Hayek's work, though it shares concern at the expansion of the state, emphasises the need for a 'third force' of voluntary organisations. Friedman

considers that monetary policy could work without major constitutional change. Hayek proposes that it must take place in order to free the economy. Perhaps most importantly, Hayek's thought stems from different sources. As has been suggested (Bosanquet, p.3, 1983): "His economics starts well outside economics."

Hayek's thought can be broken down into distinct but closely-related sections. First, his theory of knowledge is a sceptical variant of Kantianism derived from the Austrian subjective theory of value. 'Constructivist rationalism' is wrong - it seeks to translate tacit knowledge into explicit theory and to govern social life by doctrine. Man's ignorance means that following rules is the only possible method for ensuring stability and continuity for individuals who have only a limited knowledge of the world around them. Rather than relying on a Lockean theory of property rights or dogmatic attachment to laissez-faire, Hayek uses this as a foundation for a critique of central planning. Social order cannot be the product of a directing intelligence. It is a spontaneous formation which is alone able to use the fragmented nature of knowledge. Unhampered and unrestrained markets transmit knowledge, dispersed as it is amongst people. It can only be realised in an environment of unhampered market-pricing. Socialism is an epistemological, as well as moral, impossibility. It would lead to the barbarization of social life, because in the absence of the signals transmitted by the price mechanism they would be

unable to direct actions for the 'social good' and the common stock of practical knowledge would decay.

Barry (p.9, 1979) notes this: "..means that individuals cannot be expected to have moral obligations to society as a whole, not merely because they are incapable of the degree of altruism this would require, but because they can never know what these obligations are."[56] Yet there is a concept of moral conduct in Hayek's work. In *The Road to Serfdom* (p.156, 1944): "..is not only that morals are of necessity a phenomenon of individual conduct, but also that they can exist only in the sphere in which the individual is free to decide for himself and called upon voluntarily to sacrifice personal advantage to the observance of a moral rule." A free society depends on independence, self-reliance but also co-operation.

Second, Hayek proposes a non-rights based procedural theory of justice. The progress of free societies depends on impersonal rules (like the similarly impersonal market) to guide the conduct of individuals. The 'objective' nature of justice is constituted by the process of reasoning within a system of general rules, rather than the prior identification of a just outcome.[57] Law becomes not

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[56] Hayek (p.66, 1978): "It was this unavoidable attenuation of the content of our obligations..that people with strongly ingrained moral emotions resented. Yet these are kinds of obligations which are essential to the cohesion of the small group but which are irreconcilable with the order, the productivity and the peace of a great society of free men."

[57] Hayek (p.166, 1967): "..the injustice to be prevented is the infringement of the protected domain of one's fellow men, a domain which is to ascertained by means of these rules of justice."

a barrier to individual liberty but a condition of it. Under the rule of law, justice and the general welfare are convergent. The rise of the 'administrative state', social welfare and redistributive projects, pose a major threat to the rule of law and therefore individual liberty. Modern legislation is *thesis*, the nature of true law should be *nomos*.[58] To criticism that this rule of law could be coercive, Hayek responded that if that coercion operates through general injunctions forbidding certain courses of action, no individual should have reason to fear them (p.142-3, 1960). These criticisms persist because Hayek's political philosophy does not contain at a foundational level any commitment to inviolable human rights.

Third, Hayek's rejection of critical rationalism and almost Burkean reverence for social rules leads to his 'spontaneous evolutionary' perspective.[59] Institutions develop as the unintended and unanticipated consequences of human action. Hayek has criticised consistently what he called the anthropomorphic explanation of social institutions (p.26-9, 1973). This stance would appear to draw a

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[58] Hayek (p.259, 1960): "..the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, in which the same representative body lays down the rules of just conduct and directs government, necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organised interests."

[59] However beneficial 'spontaneous evolution' is supposed to be for the experimentation of life-styles and hence progress, Hayek was no moral relativist (for example, his denunciation of the 'sixties counter culture', p.174, 1982). But neoconservatives still complain that Hayek fails to provide the moral foundations for market society; 'When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness', in Kristol and Bell (1972).

line between Hayek and other forms of liberal theory.[60] A genuinely free society develops spontaneously those rules which liberty requires, which explains Hayek's rejection of 'laissez-faire' as a rationalist construction.[61] A spontaneous social order is able to utilise the fragmented knowledge in a manner a planned order could not. To his admirers, Hayek's model emphasises 'freedom for progress'.[62]

Hayek uses a specific word to describe the spontaneous social order - 'catallaxy' - which represents the whole range of social exchange, wider than the market and other organisations.[63] A catallaxy is a network of many economies, firms, households and other institutions, but has no specific purpose itself. Hence it enables a great variety of individual purposes to be fulfilled (p.109-10, 1976): "..the order of the market rests not on common purposes but on reciprocity; that is, on the reconciliation of different purposes for the mutual benefit of the participants."

The fourth element of Hayek's thought is liberty. It is the supreme value and condition for all other values. In *The Constitution of Liberty* Hayek defines

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[60] Also 'Individualism: True and False' (p.10-13, 1949), and chapter four (1960).

[61] It is not entirely certain this rejects the contemporary (welfare) state, since it was Marshall's conception that it had *evolved*. His preference to *voluntary* exchanges forming the catallaxy then seems to stand alone.

[62] De Crespigny, chapter three, 'Hayek: Freedom for Progress', in de Crespigny and Minogue (1976).

[63] Hayek (p.164, 1967) suggests it is significant that its derivation (from the ancient Greek *katallatein*) means both 'to exchange' and 'to admit to the community', 'to turn an enemy into a friend'.

freedom as that "state in which a man is not subject to the will of another."[64] Freedom does not depend on the range and quality of the choices open to the citizen, but whether the restraint is of human origin. Hence the 'impersonal' market is not coercive. Other characterisations of liberty are critiqued in *The Constitution of Liberty*, in particular liberty as power to do as one desires and that which associates it with any form of possession of material resources. 'Political liberty' is an illegitimate extension of freedom from the individual to the collective sphere (p.14, 1960). As long as each individual is guaranteed equality under the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to own property, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation then the conditions of free society exist.[65]

Under a rightly constituted legal order, law and liberty may be consistent with each other. It is a main concern of Hayek's system of thought that liberty is shown to be compatible with general rules. Hence, as Barry (p.58, 1979) notes: "It follows that these conditions could be met in a

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[64] (p.11, 1960), (p.55-6, 1973).

[65] (p.19-20, 1960). In the third volume of *Law, Legislation and Liberty* (1982), Hayek made positive proposals for an elaborate scheme for constitutional reform. General rules would be set by an assembly based on suffrage exercised once in a lifetime by people over 45, to elect some of their peers for 15 years. There would also be a lower chamber elected by universal suffrage and concerned with day-to-day administration within this framework of general rules. Civil servants, old age pensioners and the unemployed would not have the vote. Local government would be strengthened and state monopolies reduced. As Bosanquet (p.39, 1983) comments: "Democracy is to be tamed by middle age and a Swiss constitution, with the denationalisation of money as the complementary element."

regime characterised by the absence of at least some of the conventional political liberties."

A 'depoliticised citizen' appears to be an oxymoron.[66] Hayek's aim is to ensure that there occurs no trade-off between political liberty and other forms of liberty - there can be no gain in freedom if political liberty is preferred to economic liberty (but this risks a Friedmanite dogmatism). It rejects in effect the role of politics in resolving these trade-offs. In particular, the private sphere is crucial to the preservation of freedom and genuine individualism, and so is the protected domain.[67]

The fifth element of Hayek's thought is that there is no agreed content to what constitutes social justice. The 'Great Society' cannot agree generally upon ends but only means. No ethical standards can be applied to situations which are the unintended consequences of human actions. The component parts of social justice - moral notions of desert, need and merit - stand in no coherent or rational relation with each other.[68] Any 'patterning' of justice would lead to unequal treatment, seen as

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[66] Robbins in his review of *The Constitution of Liberty* suggested that it would be difficult to describe a society as liberal if it did not include political rights among the rights of its subjects, 'Hayek on Liberty' (1963).

[67] See in particular (p.106-110, 1976).

[68] Hayek, chapter seventeen, 'What is 'Social' ? - What Does it Mean ?' (1967). It presupposes known common aims, but does not define them, is hence open to abuse by those with 'social aspirations'.

incompatible with the rule of law.[69] Hence (p.103, 1976):

"The old civil rights and the new social and economic rights cannot be achieved at the same time but are in fact incompatible; the new rights could not be enforced by law without at the same time destroying that liberal order at which the old civil rights aim."

It also would grant governments large discretionary power over the lives of their citizens. Inequality and private wealth make experiments in living possible independent of political status or privilege. The important point is not how much property any particular citizen possesses but that it is dispersed throughout society.

Hayek is critical of the notion that membership of any community entails an individual to a particular standard of living determined by the level of the general wealth of the group. Though the state may provide the minimum security against severe physical privation, it should not ensure (p.259, 1960): "..a given standard of life, which is determined by comparing the standard enjoyed by a person or a group with that of others." State welfare has done much to undermine personal responsibility. Freedom would be meaningless if agents were not thought to be responsible for their actions, but equally social morality cannot transcend personal responsibility.[70]

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[69] This theme is advanced in *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), and later in a refined form in *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960) and *Law, Legislation and Liberty volume II* (1976).

[70] See 'The Moral Element in Free Enterprise' (1967). And yet, as Kley (p.93, 1994) points out, Hayek actually thinks notions

Hayekian social welfare programmes could be developed because it is the type of intervention that is important. Hayek argues for 'demarchy', limited government. General welfare, based on the rules of justice, must override specific claims to welfare. Hayek has not objected to some form of compulsory insurance scheme against unemployment, sickness and other aspects of social security, even seeing some role for the state in the establishment of such schemes, he does object to the dangers of state monopoly.[71] With the erosion of the insurance principle, Hayek rejected the notion of officials being able to define supposedly 'objective' criterions of need.

The sixth element is a critical appraisal of majoritarian democracy. With legal positivism, majoritarian democracy has confused the distinction between 'nomos' and 'thesis', and led to the identification of law with the sovereign majority of any moment. The widening of the franchise (citizenship) has led to the dangerous assumption that limits to the powers of constitutional governments have become unnecessary.[72] The new faith in majority rule meant a return to a form of unlimited government, which given particular interests cannot serve the general interest.[73] Hence

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of responsibility in the spontaneous evolutionary perspective false.

[71] This why Hayek favours provision by local authorities when private initiative cannot be relied upon; there is less danger of coercive action, and competition between rival authorities.

[72] Hayek, 'Whither Democracy ?', chapter ten (1978).

[73] Hayek (p.261, 1960): "It is sheer illusion to think that when certain needs of the citizen have become the exclusive concern of a single bureaucratic machine, democratic control

(p.52, 1944): "..only within..a competitive system based on free disposal over private property..is democracy possible."

The institutions of the 'Great Society' do not then allow for much experimentation in politics. Hayek's thought represents an anti-communitarianism.[74] But the 'Great Society' is supposed to offer diversity in 'experiments in living', underpinned by private property which proves essential to the cultural evolution of human society.

The debate on whether Hayek is either conservative or liberal betrays the underlying assumption that there is an unbridgable gulf between these ideologies. Hayek himself argued 'Why I am not a conservative' in the postscript to *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960). He claimed to disavow the characteristically conservative project of using the power and authority of the state to protect endangered moral traditions and social hierarchies, and argued instead for a version of the classical liberal desire to curb all such political power. Hayek is certainly 'conservative', in the simplest sense, in arguing against left conceptions of citizenship, particularly 'social citizenship'. Such

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of that machine can then effectively guard the liberty of the citizen."

[74] Hayek (1988) suggested the root of the historical and anthropological hostility to capitalism is our reluctance in emerging from small-scale personal contacts in early communities to adopt the impersonal indirect relationships required for the nature of information and production of markets. Abandoning social justice and related concepts is the price paid for developing large societies. It is doubtful whether we can feel a sense of local responsibility in a anonymous mass society (also p.84, 1960).

conceptions are seen as part of a fundamental delusion (p.106, 1976):

"The naive prejudice that we can create any state of affairs which we think is desirable by simply decreeing that it ought to exist."

To Gray (1986), Hayek's work represented the restatement of classical liberalism purified of its errors (abstract individualism and uncritical rationalism), by the absorption of some of the insights of conservative philosophy (p.ix-x, ibid): "Hayek's work composes a system of ideas, fully as ambitious as the systems of Mill and Marx, but far less vulnerable to criticism than theirs because it is grounded on a philosophically defensible view of the scope and limits of human reason." As a result, Hayek produced a defence of liberty reconciling modern individuality with tradition: human individuality is a tradition. To Barry (1979) the fundamental difference between Hayek and conservatism is seen as his rejection of pragmatism - the commitment to liberty must be dogmatic and inflexible. Conservative paternalism, and metaphysical conceptions of 'community' and the 'state' threaten individual liberty.

2.8b 'British Liberal-Conservativism'

There is another form of 'liberal-conservatism' which has formed broadly around contemporary British conservatism, as expressed in Thatcherism.[75]

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[75] There has however been a recurring tension as well as relation between economic liberal and conservative 'Tory' elements in the Conservative Party and conservative thought (see Greenleaf, for example, p.192-3, 286-7, 1983).

Thatcherism is analysed in more depth in chapter nine, but new right theoretical work of this kind is worth noting here. There are similarities shared with Hayek's liberal-conservatism, which has been influential, though his more 'academic' concerns and complex theoretical arguments unsurprisingly often are neglected.

British conservatism has been changed irrevocably by the neoliberal economic agenda. Even the philosophic conservatism of Scruton and Cowling should be seen as reacting to, and in some limited ways drawing upon, the neoliberal new right agenda. But there are other more explicit attempts to produce hybrids of liberal-conservatism, in which a market economy is seen as entailing and depending on socially responsible citizens. The 'free market' inculcates a particular set of values - personal responsibility, duties and obligations, hard work, self-sufficiency, stable family life, moral restraint, patriotism and law and order. The values held dear by all conservatives, particularly responsibility, will only flourish in such an environment. The moral choices made by individuals are not only private but of public concern. Economic self-sufficiency and moral restraint are seen not just as personal but also as social responsibilities. The individual is a social being, and must be prevailed upon to exercise particular social responsibilities, recognise legitimacy in authoritative social institutions and to observe the fact of community (Harris 1989, Gray 1991).

These arguments are used commonly by many new right-influenced politicians and commentators, but there are three figures whose work is worth mentioning in more detail, and who share similar themes.

A principal proponent, and a key figure in helping to construct Thatcherism, was of course Keith Joseph. The failures associated with Heath's (1970-74) Government helped thrust emerging new right ideas from the margins to the centre of political debate. The Institute of Economic Affairs began to broaden its focus during this period, away from its previous emphasis on microeconomics towards some discussion of British macroeconomic problems. The new right's public intellectual ascendancy began when it won over several financial journalists from major newspapers, and was able to construct the debate over the complex British 'crisis' on favourable terms. In particular, the 'problems' of inflation, trade union militancy, burgeoning welfare expenditures, state monopolies and the 'denial' of free choice in important areas of consumption such as health and education, were identified. In co-founding the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1974, Joseph (with Margaret Thatcher) sought to convert the Conservative Party and key opinion-forming circles to a more rigorously free market form of conservatism, and advance new right ideas into government.

Joseph claimed to reject laissez-faire, and accept some role for the state. In an early period after the formation of the CPS, he used the term the

'social market economy' to underline this (Joseph 1975). This was significant because in addition it emphasised the need for a widespread change in attitudes on behalf of citizens, particularly to erode the supposed cultural dominance of 'statism' - too many people dependent on state provision, too few deemed sufficiently independent - as a prerequisite for economic reforms. It was this which led to the interest in so-called 'Victorian values' of hard work, thrift and self-reliance, an important theme in the speeches of both Thatcher and Joseph before and after 1979. Joseph revealed how anti-progressive values could, theoretically, be part of a 'free market' programme. He suggested that the departure from 'Victorian values' - seen as hard work, thrift, and self-reliance - was linked to economic decline. Hence economic regeneration demanded, as well as economic reforms, a moral regeneration, particularly in terms of individual responsibility. This represented an attempt to link the reinvigorated market economics of the 1970s with the older tradition of 'liberal-conservatism' thus legitimising it as a vital strand of conservative thought.[76] It was an attempt to claim a moral, as well as technical economic, superiority for capitalism and limited government.

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[76] Joseph was not alone in this, see Lord Blake's (1976) speech to the Conservative Philosophy Group and also Thomas (1976). As Lawson (p.2, 1980) tried to suggest: "To the extent that new Conservatives turn to new sages - such as Hayek and Friedman - that is partly because what those writers are doing is avowedly reinterpreting the traditional political and economic wisdom of Hume, Burke and Adam Smith in terms of the conditions of today.."

Second, and somewhat similarly, Shirley' Letwin (Cowling 1978) proposed a form of 'conservative individualism' in which freedom and order are not contraries but inseparable. Society is (p.59, ibid): "..a collection of materials on which each person cannot avoid drawing in the course of fashioning his own individuality. Society is therefore the cradle rather than the enemy of individuality." Government does not organise life for the members of the community, but maintains an order within which they can find and manage their own resources and find their own purposes. In her later characterisation of Thatcherism (1992), Letwin defended what she called the 'vigorous virtues'; essentially, individual responsibility in social behaviour (nurturing the family, for example), and the desire for self-reliance, in the context of a 'free market' economy.

Third, David Willetts' conception of *Modern Conservatism* (1992), which can be seen as only the most recent phrasing of the 'new conservatism' developed to legitimate new right (especially neoliberal) ideas within the Conservative Party, and so help Thatcherism secure a foundation. Willetts argues that 'free markets' have always been an important part of the conservative tradition. Conservatism has been a practical doctrine reflecting the deeply-felt values of ordinary citizens, but has not excluded necessary theoretical debates. In any case, adherence to markets is not excessively theoretical, because market exchange is instinctive, natural and defensible (chapter six, ibid). 'Modern conservatism' emphasises a commitment

to 'freedom' via the 'free market' and the limited state, applies it to economic management and shows how it leads to prosperity, and accepts a large part of the welfare state but on 'sound conservative grounds' (p.34-5, ibid). It accepts the Smithian 'system of natural liberty', without being rationalist. Willetts suggests that an understanding of the importance of 'tacit knowledge' is shared by traditional conservatism and Austrian economics. 'Modern conservatism' is thought to reconcile 'free markets' with community, though this is seen as an old conservative idea. Hence, echoing Joseph, this conservatism is not merely liberal individualism or laissez-faire, and these types of conservatives tend to resist the notion that the 'free market' is amoral (Brittan and Hamlin 1995). Rather it is regarded as the only route to a stable and responsible yet active and energetic social order. This is thought the 'reality' of 'conservative capitalism'.

2.9 The New Right as a Project in Citizenship

"The New Right..has been moving in divergent directions which have converged on the belief that there should in some sense be less government rather than more, even if at times on the way this involves more government rather than less."[77]

This encapsulates why it is possible to suggest that there is a relatively coherent new right project, which impacts on citizenship.

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[77] Cowling (p.12, 1989).

This does not deny that there appear to be important differences between the strands of the new right. Many of these differences can be reduced to the issue of pluralism in values. For example, Hayek suggests he is not a conservative (p.402, 1960) because it is only: "..the coexistence of different sets of values that makes it possible to build a peaceful society with a minimum of force..[and that] the most conspicuous attribute of liberalism that distinguishes it as much from conservatism as from socialism is the view that moral beliefs concerning matters of conduct which do not directly interfere with the protected sphere of other persons do not justify coercion." Most (neo)liberals would agree, and react in particular to the religious emphasis in philosophic conservatism (Clarke, p.111, Seldon 1985): "We want to ensure there is a free market in gods, where the Old Right only wanted one."

However, it is also clear that there are many common themes between the new right strands. Most obviously, the neoconservative emphasis on responsibility in civil society, and the neoliberal attack on welfare 'rights' and the size of the public sector, are mutually-supportive. Both criticise what they see as the supposed 'perfection' of government projects and programmes. Neoconservatives have supplied neoliberals with a more coherent conception of nationhood (and its security) upon which to draw. Neoliberals may learn in addition from conservatives' understanding of the remaining capacities of government within a given

state, the value of social obligations for all subjects (but especially for welfare recipients), reciprocity in civic association, and the desire to reassert the importance and morality of voluntary contribution. The latter of course allies with neoliberal opposition to collective solutions in welfare. For example, for Lawrence Mead, the American neoconservative (p.47, 1988): "Those who merely make demands on others are not fully citizens." Neoliberals would wholeheartedly agree. Further, if the welfare state was reformed along the lines Mead proposes, in particular in introducing work obligations for welfare recipients, and so producing a more 'self-reliant' society (p.52, ibid): "Conservatives could then make stronger headway towards cutting income benefits and returning to a more free market society."[78]

Further, when neoconservatives appear to criticise neoliberals for neglecting ('bourgeois') values thought vital for social order, such as hard work, self-reliance, deferred gratification and concern for family and community, they also note that (Kristol, p.127, 1995): "It is a commitment to such beliefs that creates a middle class, which then sustains a market economy." Hence they seek to support a somewhat similar order. They think that their particular defence of that order is more valuable than another. The American brand of neoconservatives still are committed to Smith's 'system of natural liberty' because they see it as

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[78] Willetts (p.74, 1992).

founded on bourgeois values which they regard Smith, for example, as recognising as well. Their problem is only that they sometimes think contemporary neoliberals, in their conception of 'capitalism', neglect such values. They dislike the present vulgarisation and reductionism of the case for the 'free society', not that society itself. 'Philosophic conservatives' may appear more critical still of neoliberalism, but they are by no means critical of an order in which the market has an important place.

Neoliberals have, in reverse, in short given neoconservatives the 'market'. Both main strands agree on maintaining systems of inequality - the market for neoliberals, general social stratification and order for neoconservatives (King 1987). Unsurprisingly, significant areas of disagreement remain. But both can be seen to be anti-progressive in that they resist feminist, multi-cultural and other radical agendas.

As a result, it is possible to construct a sketch of new right citizenship, consisting of five main themes - a defence of inequality, a concern to reassert the authority of the state, a belief in the role of voluntary association (particularly in the family), a resistance against a broader and more radical conception of 'politics', and a strong adherence to the 'rules' of the 'free market'.

2.9a A Citizenship of Inequality

The new right defends the legitimacy of inequalities, in varying forms. It does not see

this as incompatible with its conceptions of 'citizenship'. It resists citizenship seen as a vehicle for egalitarian aspirations. It is reluctant to integrate fully social and economic rights into a strategy to secure the status of citizenship for all insulated from other forms of stratification. Yet it proposes other models of citizenship - primarily, a national-patriotic, morally-cohesive community (in the case of neoconservatism), and a vibrant autonomy-inducing free market arena.

2.9b Respect for the State

Whatever the exact role and scope of the state, the new right has demanded that it retain 'respect' from citizens (often, conservatives have preferred 'subjects'). This has more than one sense. First, it denotes respect for forces of law and order especially the police, the legal system and its institutions, and the established constitutional order (though as has been noted, some neoliberals have proposed certain reforms so that the size of the state may be limited). Second, it demands a renewed respect for actions of the state. Political disobedience is not legitimised within new right thought.

2.9c Respect for the Community

In place of political activity, the new right has tended to support forms of individual voluntary contribution within the local community. This is preferred often, as a method of delivery of welfare, to collectivist solutions. This is further

examined in the particular discourse of 'Conservative active citizenship' [chapter eight].

2.9d Fear of the 'Political'

Both neoliberalism and neoconservatism resist the extension of the political sphere, though in different ways. Neoliberalism seeks to contain the 'political' itself, by limiting the legitimate sphere of struggle and collective protestation, by 'policing' politics. Neoliberalism's resistance to 'politics' is based on its adherence to market, as opposed to political, participation, and its individualist, as opposed to collectivist or social, action. But neoliberalism requires the discourses of neoconservatism in order to counter the threat from newer and more radical forms of politics (for example, feminism and green politics). This is because neoconservatism can supply a heavily social and cultural conception of the individual which may deflect the challenge of new forms of politics.[79] Though with a more expansive notion of the political, neoconservatism too resists politicisation.

2.9e The Order of the Market

There are two main reasons why 'free markets' are supported by the new right, in all its variants. The first relies on technical economic debates, which

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[79] Scruton (1988): "For the conservative, state and civil society are separate aspects of political order, the former consisting of sovereignty, law and the institutions with their own internal purposes. Movements, doctrines and ideologies, in so far as they threaten the balance between state and civil society, invite also the politicisation of the social order, and that total invasion of society by political decision-making which is the mark of totalitarian power."

are beyond the scope of this enquiry. The conclusion, for the new right, is of course in effect that market allocation is more efficient than any other form. The second, and more important here, is a kind of psychological, cultural and political argument for markets. They are, it is claimed, simply 'right'. They concur with irrevocable aspects of human nature, and the ways in which human beings prefer to relate to each other. They are regarded as protecting and enshrining genuine 'freedom'.

2.10 Summary

The new right represents a previously-neglected project in citizenship. It should not be characterised simply as a desire to retreat into the security of civil and political rights, and to demolish social rights. On its own terms, it has appeared to offer new forms of empowerment and mutuality, and to identify problems in the social democratic conception. Despite the differences between the strands of the new right, a common project is discernible. This may be brought out with regard to citizenship. The new right seek to bind citizenship to the 'inevitability' of social inequality, respect for the state, wariness of the political sphere, and in particular adherence to the 'order' of the market. The significance of these new right discourses is examined in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Analysis

3.0 Introduction

An initial framework for thinking around citizenship has been suggested, and in particular the notion of 'modern citizenship', the shape of the debate over reformism, the two principal political philosophical currents of citizenship, and related concepts. Subsequently, different discourses on citizenship have been outlined. First, T.H. Marshall's paradigmatic conception of citizenship was examined, along with its influence on social democratic and centre-left thinking. Post-Marshallian conceptions were noted which may be seen as reacting in large part to the Marshallian legacy. Second, the new right's conceptions of citizenship were described, in all their main variants. It was suggested that previous critiques of new right citizenship have tended to lack a more critical understanding of the complexities and problems of the concept of citizenship, and have dismissed the new right too quickly. Further, the different strands of the new right, despite some important internal differences, can be regarded as contributing to a comparatively coherent project in citizenship with some common ends, particularly the maintenance of forms of inequality, social order and the autonomy of the market. The task now is to develop ways in which these discourses may be critically evaluated against each other.

3.1 The Deficiencies of New Right Citizenship

There are important criticisms of new right conceptions of citizenship which have some validity, though as will be suggested later they do not capture the full significance and influence of its conceptions.

3.1a Neoconservatism

Neoconservatism appears to lack a secure conception of political freedom, instead lapsing into ad hoc defences of the status quo (Brenkert 1991). In its American variant, which does have a more liberal element, the defence of bourgeois values, and the reliance on discourses on the 'work ethic' and the 'family ethic', potentially has exclusionary effects, particularly in seeming to identify the already disadvantaged. It appears problematic to suggest that poverty is exacerbated by rights to welfare, in the face of the denial of many entitlements to the disadvantaged. British philosophic conservatism, in emphasising the importance of 'social discipline', appears to leave less room for political participation, let alone dissent. There seems to be little scope for challenging the explicit neoconservative defence of social inequality and hierarchy. The centrality of authority, rigid allegiance and tradition seem to reinforce criticisms that neoconservatism is generally anti-liberal in the broader non-ideological sense. Further, it is a somewhat Orwellian notion that 'true freedom' is to be found in the adherence to strict social rules.

Subjecthood, explicitly supported by philosophic conservatives, is not citizenship.

3.1b Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism appears to lack an appreciation of non-instrumental social relationships, even the 'non-contractual element in contract'. Market institutions rely on norms and mechanisms of trust not inherent in the economic contract itself. Neoliberalism seems to ignore this. This is why its conception of 'autonomy' seems to deny that all individuals rely on forms of dependence (or at least reciprocity) on others, just as 'individualism' relies on forms of sociality (Brenkert, p.94, 1990). This may lead to too-crude policy proposals. For example, the 'pure' neoliberal new right seems to assume that there is only one precondition for the growth of a sense of responsibility by citizens - a reduction in the scope of the state (Bosanquet, p.90, 1983). The neoliberal and neoconservative perspective that some individuals, often for micro-cultural reasons, resist 'individual responsibility' and in particular work obligations, is also controversial. Research tends to reveal that those who are deemed to constitute members of the 'work-shy' 'underclass' are more properly regarded not as a culturally detached group - they share the values of wider society - but simply lacking the resources necessary to participate fully in that society (Bradshaw and Holmes 1989, also Walker in Taylor 1990).

MacPherson's *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962) argued that a possessive market economy will inevitably result in a possessive market society and that such a society will face acute difficulties in generating a sense of social and political obligation. The new right is accused of inheriting this unstable feature of liberalism.[1] If the ends of life are merely individual and personal, this undercuts the society and community essential for humans. As such, liberals have not developed an adequate theory of political or social freedom that would seem essential for citizenship (Brenkert, p.100, 1991).

This caricature has been labelled the 'thin' conception of citizenship (Barber 1984). Such citizens are often described (by critics) as 'minimal citizens', implying in turn a minimalist conception of the state. To Barber, in this orientation of distrust and alienation towards government: "..citizenship very quickly deteriorates into a latent function" (Barber, p.220, 1984).

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[1] Gray (p.273-4, 1993): "In some cases, they subscribed to the unrealisable and dangerous utopian project of a minimal or neutral state enforcing a regime of common rules that is not underwritten by a fund of common culture...The political thought of the New Right, even in its subtlest expressions (as in Hayek), transmitted to conservatism an abstract rationalism and legalism that occludes serious theorising of the conditions under which market capitalist institutions have for centuries enjoyed an almost unchallenged hegemony in Britain and the United States." This differs from the neoconservative critique of liberalism. Gray thinks many of our traditions are individual. Oakeshott similarly argued (Franco, p.62, 1990): "The peculiar viciousness of rationalism is that it destroys the only knowlede which could possibly save it from itself, namely, concrete or traditional knowledge. Rationalism only serves to deepen the inexperience out of which it was originally generated."

Liberal citizenship is thus criticised as prevented from recognising the political nature of individuals and fostering the separation of citizens by emphasising the freedom found within the private realm behind the Lockean 'fences' thought so vital for our self-preservation.[2]

The apparent depoliticization inherent in the neoliberal (and also neoconservative) new right projects is, to critics (Harris, p.120, 1987): "..exposed as a sham. The assessment of rules cannot avoid taking account of the results they facilitate..The need to generate some kind of consensus on the morality of market outcomes is inescapable if society is to be based on something more than brute power. The 'depoliticization' of distributional issues..would be the moral equivalent of sweeping dirt under the carpet." 'Negative liberty' is a route to this end, limiting complex distributional debates and hence state action. The new right tends to rely on notions of 'absolute poverty' but, aside from the long-established debate in welfare over different definitions of what constitutes 'poverty', it is important to note that the neoliberal minimum welfare vision (Bosanquet,

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[2] Brenkert (p.66, 1991): "In seeking to identify the forces that constrain individuals, liberal freedom has painted a picture of society in which other people, as well as our social and political institutions, are constant sources of threat. It has fostered the separation and isolation of individuals rather than their union. By defining the realm of freedom as a realm of privacy, it has fostered a minimalist view of the individual self. By portraying political freedom as a neutral, non-political condition in people are, in essence, free from politics, liberal freedom has left the determination of the political realm open to forms of government which need not acknowledge the political nature of humans."

p.117, 1983): "..implies that society has an interest in maintaining the lives of its members on a purely physiological or animal basis but does not care about whether people's ability to function mentally and socially is maintained..It implies that society should be indifferent to their future potential for independence. Thus, rejection of the relative definition involves a view of human life which is both short-sighted and profoundly dispiriting."

Alternatively, neoliberalism attempts to hide its reliance on apparently conservative discourses. Giddens (p.4, 1994) has suggested:

"Neoliberalism..becomes internally *contradictory* and this contradiction is increasingly plain to see. On the one hand neoliberalism is hostile to tradition - and is indeed one of the main forces sweeping away tradition everywhere, as a result of the promotion of market forces and an aggressive individualism. On the other, it *depends upon* the persistence of tradition for its legitimacy and its attachment to conservatism - in the areas of the nation, religion, gender and the family. Having no proper theoretical rationale, its defence of tradition in these areas normally takes the form of fundamentalism. The debate about 'family values' provides a good example. Liberal individualism is supposed to reign in the marketplace, and the purview of markets becomes greatly extended. The wholesale expansion of a market society, however, is a prime force promoting those very disintegrative forces affecting

family life which neoliberalism, wearing its fundamentalist hat, diagnoses and so vigorously opposes. This is an unstable mix indeed."

Similarly, Kley (1994) critiques Hayek's almost Burkean adherence to social rules. Although Hayek claims for his own thought a scientific rather than moral superiority for liberalism over socialism as methodologies, it is only really an instrumental (and purposeful, so contradictory) justification. The tacit observance of social rules is crucial, betraying the apparent simplicity of his 'spontaneous evolutionary' perspective.

3.1c Public Choice

To Self (1993), its concept of rationality is one-dimensional and short-sighted, since it does not delve deeper into the roots of individual behaviour. To Kingdom (1992), a highly critical commentator, PC theorists are ethical individualists and their conception of 'politics' is actually a denial of politics, especially when defined as 'collective authority'. Hence (p.84, ibid): "The thin cardboard cut-out who replaces Aristotle's sublime political man removes all subtlety from the understanding of complex human behaviour. Central concepts, such as political culture, class and power, which lie at the heart of political science, largely disappear from view." PC proponents protest that: "..methodological individualism should not be confused with 'individualism' as a noun for organising social activity" (Buchanan and Tullock, p.vii, 1962, also Tullock, p.14, 1965). But to Kingdom, its model of

human behaviour is crude and stripped of its neologistic, scientific patina, PC is seen as little more than the classical liberal critique of bureaucracy. PC also, perhaps deliberately, neglects the examination of sources of social power. As Bosanquet (p.72, 1983) has noted: "It [PC] has failed to reconcile its individualistic approach with the problem that large private organisations may be permanent centres of power in society."

3.1d The New Right's Racism and Sexism

The new right, at the very least, resists anti-racist and anti-sexist agendas. As Gamble (p.47, Levitas 1986) has suggested: "The 'individuals' in New Right economics turn out not to be individuals at all but households represented by the male, wage-earning, head of the family..Maintaining the solidarity and cohesion of families by non-market means is seen as an essential prop for a free market economy." In this respect, the new right is profoundly antifeminist.[3] But it should also be noted that the new right's construction of sexualities often was far from crude. This may be surprising, given some of the sentiments which figures associated with the new right have expressed. This is noted further with regard to Thatcherism [chapter nine], and also the 'sexualisation of local government autonomy' as one element in the new right project for local democracy [chapter six], but some initial aspects are worth

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[3] David, M., and Levitas, R., 'Antifeminism and the British and American New Rights', in Seidel (1988), also Klatch (1988).

stating here. As Evans (p.8-9, 1993) has noted: "Sexual citizenship, to the extent that it guarantees differential market access, commodification of sexual immorality within 'private' environments, has served to largely maintain the purity of the moral community, conceal impurities and fragment and distract political dissent, and to quite clear material and ideological ends. Central to such a process has been the further social construction of sexualities within these by now well established material parameters..The history of citizenship is a history of fundamental formal heterosexist patriarchal principles and practices, ostensibly progressively 'liberalised' towards and through the rhetoric of 'equality' but in practice to effect unequal differentiation." The right often was more complex in its construction of arguments on sexuality and morality (Smith 1994), frequently turning left arguments against themselves. Again, this is examined more in the context of Thatcherism.

It is also 'racist', though the term is contentious. Parekh ('The 'New Right' and the Politics of Nationhood', Cohen et al. 1986) suggests the political strategy of the new right (especially those around the *Salisbury Review*) consists of (p.34, ibid): "..fostering a clear sense of national identity based on the unity of 'stock', a common public culture and a strong spirit of patriotism based on a sense of 'kinship'." This legitimates strongly held views against further immigration (including the wives and children of black British

citizens), and differing views on whether assimilation or repatriation should be enforced for blacks already citizens in Britain.

In sum, the new right's conceptions of citizenship appear to be exclusionary, against the already disadvantaged, including women and ethnic minorities. They seem simplistic, either reliant on crude notions of individualism which ignore the complexity and inter-dependence of social relationships, or a dogmatic cultural conservatism, or sometimes both. Most importantly, they appear to have a tendency towards depoliticization, particularly of distributional issues.

Yet however deficient the new right may be in these respects, this does not explore fully the nature of new right conceptions of citizenship, and why they have been so important. To begin to do this, it is first necessary to re-examine aspects of 'citizenship' itself. Otherwise, we will be repeating the same errors ascribed to previous critiques of new right citizenship [2.3b]. The four key aspects are the underlying ideal of 'universal membership', the need to go beyond essentialist positive or negative characterisations, the tensions within citizenship, and the predominantly 'liberal' nature of modern citizenship.

3.2 'Universal Membership'

The notion of 'universal membership' is at the heart of, and underlies, all conceptions of citizenship, from whatever political direction they emerge from. It is an ethical ideal rather than tightly-defined

concept. It refers to the notion of full and 'equal' incorporation into the society (or polity), all individuals integrated fully into the practices, opportunities and obligations of that society, and enabled to do so by the rights and duties that underpin the status of citizenship which is dominant in that society. Accepting that its proponents are sincere, both the left and the new right at some basic level hold to this ideal. The difference is in the means they perceive as necessary to reach towards such an ideal, and those which they think will hinder or erode the ideal.

Neoconservatives envision the morally-cohesive, respectful and stable society. All individuals should be rooted in some form of mutual 'subjecthood', particularly in accepting the social as well as personal importance of responsibility and obligations. Neoliberals see 'universal membership' deriving from active participation in 'free markets', which they may regard as a very social and mutual form of organisation. The limited state is thought to allow a vibrant and free civil society to develop. The most disputed aspect from the left's perspective is the new right's adherence to forms of inequality, but for the new right, the left's projects to reduce inequality themselves undermine the only possible foundations for genuine 'universal membership'. Hence at this basic level, all projects in citizenship stake claims to this ideal, though expressed in different ways.

3.3 'Differentiated' Citizenship

A simple division between theories of citizenship has already been used - that between essentially positive and negative characterisations [1.9]. It is suggested here that a more helpful conception of citizenship can be developed by drawing on both, and going beyond 'fixed' conceptions.

In broad theoretical terms, citizenship both may promote and hinder practical movement towards the realisation of 'universal membership', just as it is accepted that civil and political rights can act both as mechanisms of incorporation and opportunities for major social change via struggle, organisation and resistance.[4] The same conclusions can be extended to the social rights of citizenship, and indeed citizenship seen as a whole. It may facilitate genuine integration and ameliorate conditions that reinforce or construct forms of exclusion and hence erode universal membership. It retains the ability to be used effectively by many reformist groups in the struggle for their own social inclusion. This is not a wholly original

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[4] Giddens (p.126, 1982): "..[they] have proved to be of great significance in explaining certain features in the development of capitalist societies over the past century...the existence of citizenship rights, and the struggles of labour movements to actualise or expand them, have brought about major social changes." Barbalet (p.83, 1988): "A recognition that universal suffrage and representative institutions can enhance the opportunities and conditions of the working class need not deny that these same institutions can stabilise the existing social order and serve its dominant class by helping to channel and reduce popular pressure and conflict." For Nauta (1992), the rationality discourse of the citizen was both a form of pacification of civil society (the new areas in which subjects were linked to each other by a new social bond, a system of rights and duties) and has had emancipating effects (making life more humane, steadily eliminating state and social violence).

conception of course. A few theorisations have suggested a similar characterisation.

Giddens (1985) identified Marshall's three levels of citizenship as arenas of contestation about inequality, mobilised in relation to 'surveillance' (as constructed by Foucault). 'Surveillance' is a key mechanism by which control is managed by superordinate over subordinate groups. Civil rights are won in relation to the way in which order is policed, political rights in relation to the way in which state administration is maintained, and socio-economic rights in relation to the way in which control over workers is achieved by managers. Each of these struggles is continuous and incomplete. In capitalist societies they are focused on class relations but not restricted to them. Labour movements, workers' political parties and many other social movements may try to turn the universalistic practices of such surveillance mechanisms back upon themselves - as counter-surveillance mobilisation. Therefore Giddens can maintain Marshall's view of *de jure* universalism as a basis for a *de facto* substantive mitigation of class and status inequality. Hence (p.173-5, 1982):

"The separation of the economic and the political [achieved in part via Marshall's civil rights] has tended to canalise the conflicts in which workers' organisations have been involved in two, related, ways. In each of these, citizenship rights have been, and continue to be, a *focus* of class conflict, rather than standing opposed to it, as Marshall

suggests..it is more valid to say that class conflict has been a *medium of the extension of citizenship rights* than to say that the extension of citizenship rights has blunted class divisions. All three forms of citizenship distinguished by Marshall are double-edged. They *do* serve, as levers of struggle, to extend the range of human freedoms possible within Western societies; but at the same time they continue to be the sparking-points of conflict."[5]

For Goldthorpe (1974, 1978), citizenship promotes a form of social conflict. The welfare state supports the class conflict required to force a redistribution of social and economic benefits within capitalism, and is an institutional structure through which that conflict can be conducted, provided that the collective power of the working class is organised effectively. For Taylor-Gooby (1993) citizenship is a site of social conflict because via the role of the state in welfare, it both may reinforce the possibilities for struggle over welfare by those within the ambit of mass welfare services, and simultaneously permit the development of stronger barriers to exclude minorities. Bader (1995) similarly recognises the need for a 'multi-layered' conception of citizenship with regard to his discussion of national sovereignty, migration and exclusion.

But the ways in which citizenship may be characterised as negative are limited within these

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[5] Also Turner (p.11-12, 1993).

conceptions, to citizenship being ineffectual. It is proposed here that citizenship may act against 'universal membership', in three main senses. The first two relate to the ameliorist/Marxist divide. Either citizenship fails to promote a genuine social integration by obscuring significant differences of opportunity and status by its universalist 'veil' of one status, or actually enables social and political structures, practices and allocative decisions which promote further exclusion, extensions of inequalities and differences in status. The heart of the belief of those in the 'citizenship school' - the benign and wholly ameliorative value of citizenship - is rejected, but the progressive potential of citizenship is to be retained.

3.4 Internal Tensions

The third sense in which citizenship may be regressive is based on an internal conceptualisation. It has tensions within it, deriving primarily from its complex and multi-faceted nature. The instability of citizenship has been obscured by the benign and unitary view promoted by its proponents. These tensions are not unobvious, but have tended to have been neglected within citizenship theory. The movement from simplicity to complexity, from few to many being granted the status of citizenship, though desirable, invariably increases the tensions within it. The complexities and demands of modern society exacerbate this. Hirschman (p.149-151, 1991), in his study of reactionary and progressive rhetoric, terms

this fault in progressivism the 'synergy illusion', the cheerful assumption that progressive developments or reforms will invariably coexist in mutual support, simply because they are thought to be 'progressive'.[6] It is worth examining the many dimensions of the tensions within citizenship.

3.4a Universalism and Identity

Citizenship is supposedly a universal identity, but it may conflict with other group or individual notions of identity.[7] This is ironic particularly given citizenship's presumed progressive aspiration towards social inclusion, or rather, as the feminist critique shows, it may be because of it. If universalism is really 'universal', and discussions centre on global human rights, then citizenship tied to nation-state, region or local community (particularistic and in some form exclusive) again is in tension with universalism.[8] Indeed, citizenship may lie somewhere between 'liberal cosmopolitanism' and 'illiberal particularism' (Beiner, p.13, 1995).

3.4b Rights and Identity

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[6] Rees (1995) in particular draws out the ambiguities and problems with the notion of the 'social' incorporated into citizenship, and the dangers in obscuring the roots of citizenship in justice by using the notion to support hopes for fraternity, solidarity and benevolence

[7] Young, chapter six, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Idea of Universal Citizenship', Beiner (1995).

[8] For example, Brubaker's (1992) discussion of the history of state-centred modern national citizenship, in which citizenship is correlative with the distinct form of administrative and political legitimacy of emerging modern state power. It is then internally inclusive and externally exclusive, inherently bounded.

The rights of citizenship derive from its universal status. They can also then, following the tension between universalism and identity, conflict with 'non-universal' identities. To some, even when guaranteeing or providing the rights of citizenship, the liberal state isolates the sources of people's various oppressions, denying their relations. These limits are deeply entrenched, and cannot be neutralised simply by mouthing an alternative interpretation of contested rights (Fudge and Glasbeek 1992). Yet liberal *de jure* equality has been extended beyond the parameters originally set for it. Many movements have achieved transformation (Herman 1993). The content of rights for all citizens is dependent on perceived and agreed needs, but must be applicable to many sub-cultures within a political community. Hence liberal pluralism might be converted into cultural uniformity (Miller, p.vii-viii, forward to Harris 1987). Universalism, and universal rights, cause important but seemingly intractable problems along these lines within citizenship.

3.4c Rights and Duties

The rights and duties of citizenship may clash. One normative response is to prioritise one, but the supposed balance is upset. If rights were primary, this would devalue obligations to the community from which those rights were thought to derive. If obligations were primary, citizens rightfully might resent obligations as preconditions to rights. And, it has been noted that (Norman, p.37, Milligan and

Miller 1992): "..if citizenship is defined simply in terms of a package of correlative rights and obligations, we seem to be back with precisely that contractarian model of social relations to which 'citizenship' was supposed to offer an alternative."

Some have disagreed that there must be some relationship between rights and duties. To Dahrendorf, citizenship is an entitlement only, so he rejects the linkage between work obligations and citizenship rights. Citizenship is a universal 'social contract', work is private. The duties of citizenship should be general and public. Hence (Steenbergen, p.13, 1994): "Citizenship is a non-economic concept. It defines people's standing independent of the relative value attached to their contribution to the economic process. The elements of citizenship are thus unconditional. This is as true for obligations as it is for rights. The right to vote, for example, is not dependent on paying taxes, although paying taxes is an obligation associated with the status of citizenship."

Despite these arguments, most proponents of citizenship accept that rights and duties are in some way reciprocal. Often, the exact nature of the reciprocity is left unexamined, especially because the main project for progressivist proponents of citizenship is to find a way of defending rights. More recently, the left has begun to accept explicitly the importance of obligations.

A common response is to suggest a broad indirect notion of reciprocity, weighted towards rights and

entitlements, and supported by a general sense of obligation. Plant (Milligan and Miller 1992) has suggested that rights to welfare are consistent with the 'correlativity principle' - rights are held against society in general (or the state) rather than against specific individuals, and so it holds the obligation to protect and satisfy them. The duty of individuals is then to support the institutions (via taxes) that do so, not to personally provide resources to fellow citizens.

3.4d Duties and Autonomy

The performance of obligations requires time and resources on behalf of citizens, at the expense of other activities which form part of their autonomously-chosen projects. A relationship between rights and duties would imply that if citizens do not perform their duties, they should also lose 'autonomy' by the reduction of their rights. Yet without rights, the status of citizenship is eroded. Citizenship seems to dictate both a strong reciprocality and the protection of rights and autonomy. (see Oldfield, p.160-1, 1990).

3.4e Rights and Autonomy

One aspect of this, after the new right, is familiar. Rights may be seen to lead to 'dependence', passivity and alienation from social life, particularly from badly designed welfare systems. Alternatively, Marshall suggested that the granting of rights to welfare is consistent with a general duty to maintain oneself as an independent member of the community, but this leaves unanswered

what happens when that 'duty' is reneged upon. An exclusive focus on rights has been in danger of obscuring this. Hence it may be that the welfare state is vulnerable because (Moon, p.12, 1988a): "..it embraces a set of conceptions and principles any one of which, if articulated in an extreme or pure form, would contradict the others." It incorporates both market and non-market rights, responsibility and assistance, 'common interest' and individualism, security and liberty.

Even if welfare systems are non-stigmatising, if possible, recipients are still dependent in a formal sense on what the 'political community' and the state for providing rights. If citizenship emphasises the moral behaviour of citizens, it opens welfare services to discretionary judgement. This could be both valuable, from the citizenship perspective, and exploitative, against both the sanctity of rights and individual autonomy.

Further, the structure of some rights may act against the autonomy of some citizens. For example, historically welfare programmes have been aimed mainly at supporting male participation in the paid labour force, with a second tier of household programmes oriented towards families without a male 'breadwinner'.[9] Welfare services can also be impersonal and inflexible. Proponents of welfare

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[9] This derived from the formation of many welfare programmes in the 1940s, when women's participation in the labour force was still relatively low. Those in 'masculine' sectors of the welfare state were treated as the principle bearers of rights and purchasers of consumer services, those in the 'feminine' sectors as dependent clients.

reform from the left have more recently emphasised the importance of client's input in the design and delivery of welfare services.

3.4f Rights and Community

The rights of citizenship are, as Marshall himself noted, typically concerned with the rights of the individual.[10] A well-known critique of rights suggests that there is a tension between democratisation and the more general extension of individual rights, and the renewal of civil society. The proliferation of rights, far from enabling a sense of community to develop, erodes it by invading communal orders and practices of civil society and destroying them.[11] This has become an important part of the neoconservative critique of liberal rights. They also are wary of the expansion of the modern state demanded by the extension of the social rights, seen to risk 'political wars of distribution' that endanger civil society, casting all political discourse in legalistic rights (for example, Gray, p.12, 14-15, 1993). Alternatively, progressivist citizenship proponents might suggest that the content of the rights of citizenship must be decided by the political community.[12] Despite the assumption that rights and obligations (even though centred on the individual) are designed to create

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[10] However, in some areas of social provision collective rights tend to take precedence over individual rights, which could tend to counter the individualistic bias, for example, Brazier's (1993) examination of healthcare rights.

[11] The idea goes back to Tocqueville (p.338, 1945), in his famous passage on the individualism of American society.

[12] Harris (p.125, 1987) and Plant et al. (1980), though the latter argues that a set of objective needs for autonomy are available.

bonds as well as opportunities for participation in community, the relation between citizenship and community is far from clear.[13]

3.4g Community and Autonomy

The political community, especially as envisaged in the communitarian tradition, may pose a threat to pluralism and diversity. Traditional communities have been oppressive, and community can enforce conformity. A return to cultural segmentalism means an increased likelihood of social disintegration - the very opposite of what calls for a revival of civil society are designed to achieve. So as Giddens has warned (p.126, 1994): "Social solidarity can be effectively renewed only if it acknowledges autonomy and democratisation - as well as the intrinsic influence of social reflexivity." These issues are discussed further in the examination of the viability of the two main political philosophical traditions of citizenship [3.5].

3.4h Community and Universalism

There is little recognition of the potential tension between community and universalism by citizenship proponents, but (Harris, p.151, 1987):

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[13] For example, Norman Barry (p.40-1, 1990) has noted that the reciprocal nature of welfare rights promoting obligations owed by citizens to their community: "..is a serious problem for all theories of welfare that derive from citizenship; for to the extent that the concept validates economic redistribution, then 'reciprocity' must imply some control over the recipients of welfare. But could not that control lead to a diminution of those civil liberties which are also an integral part of citizenship ? If society has a legitimate claim on socially created wealth, does it not also have a claim on people ?..No amount of philosophical subtlety can avoid the necessity of confronting this issue."

"There is..a natural inclination for someone committed to citizenship principles to look to universal in kind programmes..[But] the political and ideological identity of citizenship theory is not governed by any particular type of institutional response to need and the tendency to treat any concession in the direction of selectivity or the use of cash transfers, vouchers and user fees as heresy has done it harm."

Community, to Anderson (1990), is based on ethical particularism ("..we owe more to some than to others, more to family, friends and neighbours, than to those distant", p.38, ibid) which contrasts sharply with the universalism of citizenship. While the obligations of community and citizenship are not in direct opposition, they are in tension because they lead to different policies (p.38-9, ibid):

"Emphasising citizenship means a standardised, nationalised welfare system, services standardised to ensure citizens' equal rights are met, obligations standardised through taxation. Community means allowing and encouraging more diffused sources to create the common good but each with more precise and very personal obligations."

Without accepting the new right project, it seems logical that (Oldfield, p.149, 1990): "The locality must have some guaranteed autonomy and independence, otherwise citizens will not feel it worth their while to participate.." It may be that welfare organised according to citizenship principles demands flexible and decentralised structures rooted

in local communities, which may allow differences in provision between localities.

3.4i Universalism and Participation

Citizenship without freely-chosen participation would have little meaning. Participation in the public arena was central to classical notions of citizenship, but the status itself was restricted to a minority. With the status universalised in modern citizenship, 'voice' may be diluted. This may be exacerbated by welfare universalism, in facilitating a privatist retreat from, and 'clientization' of, citizenship. The neoliberal new right, and in particular Public Choice theorists, pointed to a similar concern (Barry, p.85, 1990):

"Even if the values of citizenship were plausible additions to market relationships, it does not follow at all that the existing welfare state policies and institutions are addressed to this, for they are often a response to political pressure, brought about by electoral competition, than to the more elevated ethics of social solidarity. Citizenship theory is incomplete without an explanation of how the political system is to transmit a society's immanent moral values into satisfactory policies."

However contentious the new right project, there is some validity in this respect. The critique of the inability of political processes to express properly preferences is a powerful one. Analysis of how political mechanisms actually work has been lacking in citizenship theory, with vague but salutary

homilies to the importance of political representation in its place.

3.4j Rights and Rights

Some rights will clash, not necessarily between different types of rights - civil (property) versus social (taxes, welfare payments), but within any layer of rights (freedom of speech versus freedom from harm, for example). Discussions concerning these tensions, especially within liberal theory, have a long heritage. But there is not enough evidence of citizenship proponents being aware of them. The multiple rights of citizenship will not always be mutually reinforcing. Social welfare rights, because difficult to entrench, seem to be at a disadvantage in this respect.[14] Again, it has been suggested that the (Skillen, p.92, Milligan and Miller 1992): "..communitarian aspect of rights becomes especially clear when rights clash..For conflicts of rights can only be resolved..with reference to the common good or forms of life valued by the community." But this makes 'rights' appear more contingent than often suggested by progressive proponents of citizenship.

3.4k Political Sphere and Minority Rights

If community may threaten the autonomy of individuals or cultural groups, an enhanced political community may logically threaten

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[14] Lewis and Seneviratne's 'Social Charter for Britain' (chapter two, Coote 1992) suggests a way of securing social rights, but this focuses on the state's duty to provide, rather than the individual's right to entitlement, would be enacted in ordinary legislation, and does not solve the distributional problem.

minorities, because (Norman, p.40, Milligan and Miller 1992):

"..the danger is that the attempt to realise this ideal [a self-governing citizen body] will in practice consist of selecting a 'common good' which is necessarily only partial, which unites some sections of society only by excluding others. Implicit in this ideal of the actively self-governing citizen body, it may be argued, is the totalitarian tendency for self-appointed spokesmen of the citizens, of the 'general will' or the 'common good', to ride roughshod over the pluralistic character of society."

Despite the focus of progressive proponents of citizenship, not all inequalities in 'voice' in the political community derive from market inequalities. The articulacy and skills demanded in the political sphere may count against minority cultures. The solutions may be non-universal.

3.41 Universalism and Status

Citizenship seems a radical idea in its implication of a universal 'equal' status. Yet 'universal status' might be an oxymoron. This is the problem with the notion of 'world citizenship'.[15] The

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[15] Turner (p.85, 1986): "..citizenship is defined by various forms of social closure which exclude outsiders and preserve the rights of insiders to the full enjoyment of welfare and other social benefits." Oldfield (p.8, 1990): "Citizenship is exclusive: it is not a person's humanity that one is responding to, it is the fact that he or she is a fellow citizen..we recognise both who are fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our community, and thus who are potential enemies..This does not entail an aggressive posture towards strangers. It simply means that to remain a citizen one cannot treat everyone as a human being."

stronger the attachment to the status of citizenship, the greater the stigma associated with 'non-citizenship' (those excluded or failing to fulfil the duties attached). Progressivist proponents of citizenship have perhaps concentrated unnecessarily on equality as a condition for social integration.[16] As Harris (p.103, 1987) suggests, the key is equality with respect to the status of citizenship.

3.5 Liberal Citizenship

The two main political philosophic traditions of citizenship have been noted already [1.3]. The liberal tradition of citizenship is often perceived as the weaker, the communitarian the more authentic, with a rich heritage from the classical tradition and a focus on the citizen as active participant in the public affairs of the community. The liberal tradition is (early) modern, and characterised as the agent of change which eroded the vitality of the (socially consolidating) active tradition into an (atomising) passive private one. The contemporary communitarian revival is a kind of extended lament for the 'lost' ethos of the 'active citizen' (Burchell 1995). This 'Myth of Citizenship' is the ideal that through citizenship man transcends his

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[16] (p.85, 87-8, Harris, 1987): "It is by no means clear that equality of status is a necessary condition of self-respect. Self-respect can flourish in an hierarchical society..The self-respect of individuals may be primarily a function of the quality of their relationships with their friends, workmates, colleagues and families." Of course, following Marshall, progressive citizenship has tended to emphasis the satisfaction of material interests rather than other normative factors as the key to integration.

private interests and becomes 'political man' (Ignatieff, chapter two, Beiner 1995).

Whatever the interest generated by the re-examination of the classical tradition, it is the 'liberal' which holds the origins to the modern conception of citizenship, centring primarily on rights and individual autonomy rather than participation. Modern citizenship is essentially liberal for four reasons.

3.5a Citizenship and Capitalism

Citizenship developed alongside capitalism, reliant on its drive towards universality.[17] Older conceptions of citizenship did not ignore the logic of universality inherent in citizenship. They solved the problem it posed by denying citizenship to those who did not have independent and secure socio-economic positions already.[18] Of course, at first, civil rights belonged only to white male property owners and family heads, often by virtue of their responsibility for 'dependants'.[19] But the

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[17] Turner (p.23, 1986): "Capitalism undermines hierarchical, particularistic, patriarchal and religious institutions and values..Through exchange relationships, capitalism promotes the growth of a universalistic culture and by emphasising the autonomy of the consumer contributes to the emergence of individualism..Capitalism thus generates a set of institutions which favour the emergence of citizenship and indeed capitalism requires citizens as informed and as 'free' agents in the market place..The progressive dimension of capitalism promotes the emergence of citizenship by liquidating traditional and authoritarian institutions in favour of the compulsive control of the market."

[18] As Oldfield (p.156, 1990), a proponent of civic-republican thinking, has admitted: "The breaking down of concentrations of economic power and of the hierarchic and authoritarian structure of the workplace was not, and could not have been, a preoccupation of civic-republican thinking."

[19] Fraser and Gordon (p.98-9, in van Steenbergen 1994): "It was just such new forms of property right and labour contract

progressive potential of citizenship enabled its benefits and status to be gained by groups beyond those originally granted it. Hence while the tension between citizenship and capitalism is not denied, there has existed some form of historical relationship.

3.5b 'Liberal Security'

If liberalism's role in the development of modern citizenship is examined, it tends to be in terms of the bourgeois desire for civil rights, particularly to property and entrepreneurial freedoms. Liberal citizenship is seen to be superseded when social rights become primary to citizenship. However, the welfare state aspect of citizenship can be justified and founded within the liberal tradition alone. Indeed, welfare rights can be seen as a logical continuance of the liberal agenda of rights, despite the fact that they are not always welcome to those within the liberal tradition itself.

Holmes (Moon 1988a) highlights the similarities and interconnections between eighteenth-century liberal rights and twentieth-century welfare rights. These have been neglected (p.83, ibid): "..because of..a misleading contrast between *two kinds of rights*, between rights as liberties from government interference and rights as entitlements to government support. This is particularly unfortunate

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that T.H. Marshall had in mind when he claimed that the rise of civil citizenship at first set back social citizenship, impacting negatively on the welfare of many. But he failed to notice the gender and family meanings of civil citizenship, which helped to create the norm of the family wage and undercut earlier, kin-based claims on social resources." Also Hall (1986).

because..the original right to protection from unjustified and unpredictable physical violence was a right that *entitled* all citizens to affirmative state action." Liberals advocated not merely freedom from government but also order through government. 'Justice' has always been important in the classical liberal tradition, making liberals aware of the illegitimate use of private (as well as public) power, hence less anti-statist than often assumed.[20] The key value for Holmes here is that of 'security' (p.84, 91-2): "The importance of security for all liberal thinkers suggests that liberal justice, far from being limited to the protection of property and contract, had a marked redistributionist dimension...Those who discern an unbridgeable gap separating legal rights and welfare rights commonly focus on liberalism's commitment to the 'sanctity' of private property..Distrust of power alone, an irreproachably liberal sentiment, can clearly justify some degree of state regulation of private property."[21]

Holmes cites varying forms of universal commitments to security/welfare in Locke, Hobbes, Kant, Smith

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[20] Neoliberals, especially Hayek and Friedman, would disagree fundamentally with this conception of liberalism.

[21] Marx (p.53-4, 1977): "Security is the highest concept of civil society..[but] does not allow civil society to raise itself above its egoism. Security is more the assurance of egoism. Thus none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely a individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whims separated from the community. Far from the rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework exterior to individuals, a limitation of their original self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and egoistic person."

(see also Hont and Ignatieff 1983), and Mill, who advanced a more consistently needs-based justification for welfare transfers. Security was not to be equalised, but redistribution guaranteed some form of 'minimum security' for all. In more theoretical terms at first, all individuals had to receive some degree of legal and economic security within civil society, even if legal universalism was designed to displace political discourse.

In time, the focus shifted from state towards market-induced insecurity. Hence (p.96, ibid): "..welfare systems can be conceived as expressions of liberal guilt about the anti-individualistic implications of the inheritance of wealth." 'Individualism' was key to the emergence of the modern state, and so too the welfare state. Contrary to the assumptions of many proponents of citizenship, it does not rely on fraternal sentiments. To Holmes, welfare rights express liberal neutrality, not some form of common purpose.

In the British context, social welfare rights ('positive freedom') developed institutionally under 'new liberalism'. The new liberals remained attached to the ideals of individual effort, self-reliance and the improvement of character, and of course 'free markets', while accepting that there were social and economic obstacles in the way of individual self-fulfilment which had to be removed by a more positive (though not 'bountiful') state.[22] As Bosanquet (p.140, Greenleaf 1983) stated:

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[22] Vincent and Plant (1984), also Finlayson, chapter two (1994), Greenleaf (1983).

"..liberty, in the plainest and simplest sense of the word, does not depend on the absence of legislation, but on the comprehensiveness and reasonableness of life." This also provided a way for the liberals to reject the class-based analysis of the growing labour movement. Despite their emphasis on the development of citizens and 'economic security', they did not really examine how to moralise the market, and its destructive effect on citizenship and self-development. Yet they did propose a balance between individual and collective responsibility, and active and intelligent participation in society and of duties. In this sense, they are both the forerunners of Marshall, his notion of citizenship as the architect of legitimate inequality and the important role of the market, and they reveal the importance of participation within the liberal tradition.

Holmes emphasises that the idea that educational and economic rights are necessary preconditions for the proper utilisation of political and legal rights was not invented with more contemporary proponents of social citizenship rights but was well-known to eighteenth-century liberals. Liberals considered 'self-reliance' to be crucial, but the preconditions for self-reliance could be provided by the state. So instead of a fundamental breach being supposed between the classical liberal tradition and the normative foundations of the welfare state, the continuity between liberal rights and welfare rights (though of course not for the redistributionist state) is stronger than has been typically realised.

Liberal concern over the capacities necessary for free and responsible citizenship can form the basis for social justice projects.

This tradition is seen to continue in the supposedly collectivist architects of the post-war welfare state, especially Beveridge.[23] Rather they may be usefully labelled 'liberal-collectivists' (Cutler, Williams and Williams 1986), committed to minimal objectives and intervention to remedy limited 'malfunctions' in markets, as conditions for the existence of a liberal society and its general freedoms. They were a progressive force (at least at that time) for establishing new standards of welfare. In Beveridge's case, the authors effectively suggest that he demarcated the limits of state action, focusing attention on deficiencies of income at the bottom of the distribution range rather than general social inequality, and always trying to retain personal responsibility and independence.

3.5c Liberal versus Communitarian Citizenship

It is not necessary to seek some hybrid between liberal 'autonomy' and communitarian 'dependence' (Mulhall and Swift 1992), in order to offer a form

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[23] For example, from the Beveridge Report (1942): "Social security must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual. The State should offer security for service and contribution. The State in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family." (Finlayson, p.262, 1994, who suggests Beveridge expresses one of the central tenets of New Liberalism in his reiteration of the need for the 'active state' to encourage the 'active citizen').

of resolution to the liberal-communitarian debate. Modern citizenship may be regarded as 'liberal' in fundamental terms because characterised in a particular manner it is able to refute criticisms which have been made of it, that it is incapable of providing a theoretical basis for communality, obligations and participation. This will be suggested below.

First, there is the issue of communality. Critics suggest liberalism is so asocial as to scupper any meaningful conception of citizenship. Yet Kymlicka (1989) suggests that liberalism can contain a broader account of the relationship between the individual and society. He rejects communitarian criticisms. These are that the liberal view of the self is empty and ignores our embeddedness in communal practices, making us 'radically disembodied' (Sandel 1982). The liberal 'politics of neutral concern' rejects any conception of the 'good life', and liberal society is self-defeating, because it will be incapable of sustaining legitimacy and hence freedom. Kymlicka suggests that liberals do not deny that choice is only possible within a social context, but emphasise it is liberal freedoms which make those choices possible. Further the liberal 'common good' is a good precisely because it secures for individuals the capacity for free choice in conceptions of the good life, whereas the common good for communitarians is precisely the pursuit of shared ends, which constrains the freedom of individuals to choose and pursue their own life-style. Hence there is thought no incoherence in

saying that the common good for liberals is to bring about a society governed by a politics of neutral concern. Also, Kymlicka (p.86, 1989) notes that communitarian critics such as Sandel and Taylor are able to give no examples of shared ends or practices that may form a basis for the 'good life', and that for many groups, since the existing community is the problem, its extension will not solve it. Hence (p.127, 253-4, 1989):

"..liberal justice..expresses an attractive conception of community, recognising our dependence on a cultural community for our self-development and for our context of choice, yet recognising the independence we claim, as self-directed beings, from any of the specific roles and relationships that exist in the community. It recognises the equal standing of the members of the community, through an account of justice, without forcing people to exercise their entitlements at the expense of the people or projects that they care about. The individualism that underlies liberalism isn't valued at the expense of our social nature, or of our shared community. Rather, it seeks to recognise the value of each person's life in the community...the real disagreements between liberals and their critics cannot be understood as a contrast between 'individualistic' and 'social' theories..the value of the 'social' depends on, rather than conflicts with, the 'individualistic' picture of people forming and pursuing their own understandings of the good..Liberal individualism is grounded in this irreducible commitment to the role of individual

self-direction and responsibility in a just community, and to the principle of moral equality which underlies both."

Liberal citizenship should not be seen just as a passive legalistic category. Liberals can defend themselves against their communitarian critics and claim a broader, more social conception, without being unrealistically prescriptive. In particular, it is useful to draw upon the arguments made by the 'liberal virtue theorists'.

Macedo (1990) suggests liberal freedom requires very positive moral contributions from ordinary citizens: tolerance and respect for others' rights, self-control, reflectiveness and 'reasonable' engagement in the activities of citizenship. Spinner (1994) reiterates that liberal citizenship is demanding. Hence (p.47, ibid): "The liberal state cannot demand that people think of everyone as equal; it can merely demand that citizens treat each other equally in public institutions." That this is not followed so often reveals the importance of liberal citizenship. It is the reason why Holmes (p.207, 1993) has suggested that liberalism might even be defined as a systematic attempt to restrict the private abuse of public institutions. For these kinds of liberals, the forms of behaviour necessary in the public sphere are not just transferred private attributes, they are liberal public virtues. For liberal virtue theory, while political participation is not necessarily seen as the foundation for citizen identity, citizenship is seen

to demand a sense of respect for both social mutuality and plurality.[24]

In addition, we must ask what we want from 'community'. Young (p.305, 1990) has voiced two main concerns with regard to community as an ideal: "First, it denies difference within and between subjects. Second, in privileging face-to-face relations it seeks a model of social relations that are not mediated by space and time distancing . In radically opposing the inauthentic social relations of alienated society with the authentic social relations of community, moreover, it detemporalizes the process of social change into a static before and after structure." Similarly, to Hirsch (p.424, 1986, also Holmes 1993): "..the longing for community is a chimera - romantic, naive, and, in the end, illiberal and dangerous. Many recent discussions of community have been overly abstract, if not theoretically unsound, for they have misunderstood or ignored both the conditions under which a community can flourish and the methods by which a community must be fostered.." Marginalised groups seek not more 'community' but (liberal) rights, not (p.424, ibid): "..the strengthening of the community's abstract values or fraternal ties [but]..questions concerning who 'belongs' - who is a full member of society - in the first place."

Second, it has been argued along similar lines that liberalism has difficulty reconciling given (rather than voluntary) obligations with its stress on

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[24] See also Gutmann (1987), Galston (1991), Fullinwider (1995), Kymlicka (1989).

autonomy (p.8, Milligan and Miller 1992). Hence liberalism's 'language of strangers' (p.10, ibid): "..is defective both because it presents a false picture of what life is like, and because it then proceeds to idealise that falsehood, urging that a life totally unrestricted by non-voluntary obligations is the kind of life to which we must aspire." But positive duties are not denied by liberal theorists, at least the kind Kymlicka represents (p.80, 1989): "Liberals recognise the importance of duties to protect and promote such conditions [which sustain pluralism], and accept those duties precisely because they promote, rather than conflict with, the aims of liberal politics."

Third, though the liberal tradition does not appear to value political participation as highly as the communitarian, it does not deny or ignore its importance necessarily.[25] It does not have to abandon the idea of the 'political community' in favour of a 'privatised' society. Fullinwider (p.515, 1995) has argued: "A society founded on ethical, constitutional, and civic individualism is not wedded to neutered individualism. It is not committed to a politically quiescent citizenry, a

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[25] Miller (p.448, 1995) has suggested that the seemingly dogmatic emphasis on participation in communitarianism is an unfair characterisation: "What it requires is something weaker: that it should be part of each person's good to be engaged *at some level* in political debate, so that the laws and policies of the state do not appear to him or her simply as alien impositions but as the outcome of a reasonable agreement to which he or she has been party..One need not, then, regard political activity as the *summum bonum*.." But this weak notion of the centrality of political participation in communitarian citizenship seems equally compatible with the liberal tradition.

narrowly circumscribed public forum, or a blind eye to the multifarious ways group memberships of all kinds affect the fortunes of persons. It offers as much room as a society can offer for a radical politics that remains a politics, not a recipe for abolishing politics." This may be partially true.

What is certain is that 'participation' should not be regarded as a 'good' in itself. It is commonsensical that it depends on the political and social context, and the motivations of participants, for its character. Citizenship theory has to come to terms with the often pessimistic picture of citizens in representative democracies, without retreating to prescriptivism (discounting the evidence) or descriptivism (giving up on the theory, Thompson 1970).

Further, the communitarian tradition has been criticised for abstractly assuming the classical civic ethos within those elevated to citizenship and neglecting (unlike in the liberal tradition) the positive social construction of the citizen through notions of 'manners', (self) discipline and civic public-mindedness (Burchell 1995). There has always been a strand of liberalism which, aside from citizenship as individual rights against society, has suggested that the case for democracy is primarily that it fosters and educates the 'active citizen' in the public exercise of sovereignty (tensions brought to a head in Mill's writings, particularly in the contrast between *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government*). But

this strand has become more suspect when it includes a tendency to assume the educative effects of political participation (as can be found in Mill).

Many of the criticisms of liberal citizenship stem from the public-private distinction which has seemed so important for it. But this is not the 'root of all evils' communitarian-influenced critics appear to think it is. There are practical and theoretical reasons for retaining so deeply ingrained a dichotomy, provided it is not construed necessarily as a hierarchical opposition (Young 1990) and it is appreciated as a shifting political construction (an essentially contested concept), the understanding of which is central to analysing citizenship itself (Lister 1995). Further, liberals themselves should note more the public nature of supposedly private civil society (Spinner, p.40, 1994).

Not only are aspects of the liberal model defensible, the alternative tradition of citizenship is problematic and under-examined. The difficulties in securing the communitarian model in complex and rights-fixated contemporary society are significant. Kymlicka (p.62, 1989) argues that: "Since the attempt to promote social confirmation through communitarian politics involves working behind the backs of people, it is incompatible with the liberal vision of an undistorted, transparent community." Additionally, Kymlicka identifies an ambiguity in communitarian thought in that if communitarians allow the questioning and rejection of given embedded social roles and corresponding obligations,

then it is not clear how their views differ from the liberal individualist ones they claim to reject. Communitarian theories can be (perhaps only a little unfairly) characterised as attempting to escape the problem of legitimating political authority (as well as social fragmentation) by trying to force a self-determining citizenship (political identity and activity) to be paramount for all citizens, but they do not succeed. Further, communitarianism may be seen to underestimate the complexity of contemporary society (Femia 1996), and comes at least dangerously close to legitimating exclusion given its advocacy of the 'strong' cohesive society (Bader 1995). Communitarianism seems reliant on notions of 'communicative rationality', without which arenas of participation might be far less effective than is assumed. The abstraction which afflicts communitarianism is ironic, given its claim to be contextual.

It is suggested by some liberals that we take a 'chastened view of citizenship' as one role among many, particularly private, ones (Flathman, chapter four, Beiner 1995). While in many Western contemporary societies there does seem to be a debilitating lack of reciprocity between government and citizens, participation is viewed too narrowly (and the deficit in it blamed for many of the state's problems of legitimacy and effectiveness). Rather, participation encompasses more than endorsement of political proposals especially involvement in public service delivery (Raadschelders 1995). Ironically, the communitarian

tradition is sometimes in danger of ignoring or dismissing the non-'political' forms of participation that 'excluded' groups are involved in.

Participatory theories suggest that liberal society erodes political liberty (and also obligation) through its representative nature - they are 'thin' democracies (Barber 1984). But Delue (1989, especially chapter six, 'A Critique of Participatory Theories') suggests that citizens in liberal societies can gain the same kind of participatory ethos, as long as there is discourse between citizens and public officials based on public reason without corporatist impediments. He argues that a favourite proposal of participatory theorists, referenda, involves a similar need for public officials to engage the public in a manner which inspires public reason. Liberal society offers a culture not so 'thick' or 'thin' as to undermine a vibrant and critically reflective citizenship. Further, if what Delue calls this 'enlarged culture' is present, the political will will exist to ensure that the liberal principle of equal worth is realised in the provision of basic goods for all.

The dominant liberal model is suited to the real conditions of complex, contemporary society, and the demands of pluralism. It may not be the ideal picture of social relationships, but is more viable in theoretical and practical terms. It is of course a particularly modern (in the best sense) conception, having incorporated both the criticisms

against it, and contemporary notions of equality, representation and 'fairness'. The four key themes of contemporary liberalism - moral or normative individualism, universalism, meliorism, liberal egalitarianism[26] - are very similar to the form of modern citizenship described here. In terms of citizenship, this depends on the best elements from the liberal tradition - inevitably, some forms of liberalism may not be as compatible with modern citizenship as suggested here. Similarly, the communitarian (republican) conception of citizenship should not be dismissed in its contemporary form because in its original historical realisations it excluded groups such as women, ethnic minorities and the already economically excluded. Yet, as Mouffe (p.56-7, 1993) has stated:

"..we cannot go back to a premodern conception and sacrifice the individual to the citizen. A modern conception of citizenship should respect pluralism and individual liberty; every attempt to reintroduce a moral community, to go back to a *universitas*, is to be resisted. One task of a modern democratic political philosophy, as I see it, is to provide us with a language to articulate individual liberty with political liberty so as to construe new subject positions and create different citizens' identities."

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[26] Gray (p.286, 1993). Norman (chapter five, 'Socialism, Feminism and Equality', in Osborne 1991) suggests a direct continuity via equality between liberal, socialist and feminist traditions. Any critiques from the latter two of liberal equality should be seen as objections to its limited application, not its fundamental nature.

It has been suggested that (Arblaster, p.9, 1985): "This, then, is the strength of liberalism: its rooted pervasiveness. But this is also its weakness. Whereas in the past it was concentrated in a specific political form, today it is diluted and diffused." But this is difficult to agree with. The pervasiveness of liberalism (including, one expects, liberal models of citizenship), though not enshrined in the principles of a single political party, is hardly a reason for its weakness.

3.5d The Liberalism of the Citizenship School

It is odd then that given the pervasiveness of liberal citizenship, the left and the 'citizenship school' in particular have tended to neglect the liberalism contained within their conceptions. Modern citizenship is theoretically rooted in a principle of 'equal social worth', not merely of equal natural rights (Marshall, p.95, 1950). Yet as Harris (p.64, 1987) notes: "The arguments of the citizenship school powerfully suggest the limits of the moral appeal of markets. It is worth stressing, however, that it is *limits* which they suggest..That the moral reasons underlying an extensive welfare state imply only a circumscribed rejection of the market is seen most clearly in Marshall."[27] He

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[27] Marshall (p.135, 1981) himself stated: "I am one of those who believe that it is hardly possible to maintain democratic freedom in a society which does not contain a large area of economic freedom and that the incentives provided by and expressed in competitive markets make a contribution to efficiency and to progress in the production and distribution of wealth which cannot, in a large and complex society, be derived from any other source." The 'hyphenated society' is seen to contain three key sectors (private market, welfare system, and political democracy) of 'equal contributory status'.

recognised the close relationship between the development of modern citizenship, the modern state and liberal market society.[28] Arguably, Marshall can be placed within the tradition of 'socialised liberalism' himself (Ignatieff 1989, Roche 1987). He can be seen to describe the institutionalisation of the 'new liberal' positive state designed to 'moralise' ('make gentlemen') the poor to be able to exercise better their own initiative.

Liberals can support social citizenship rights because they may enable all citizens to participate in the market, or make more meaningful the preceding two layers of citizenship rights, or be necessary for 'equal social worth'. But these are very different conceptions from those which argue: "The rights [of citizenship] remove certain aspects of people's lives from the vagaries of the market; that is the idea of citizenship."[29] The fundamental mistake of many proponents of citizenship after Marshall is to assume necessarily that citizenship represents an attack on the market.

3.6 The Problem of Universality

Further it is important to incorporate the lessons from the feminist critique of citizenship and rights, which doubts the usefulness of the search

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[28] Turner (p.25, 1990): "..Marshall argued that while civil and political rights were based upon a notion of equality they did not seriously threaten or undermine the working of capitalism but at most represented a form of 'class abatement'. Indeed, to function effectively, capitalism required the development of civil and political rights since these also embraced the institutions of contract, fair exchange and economic individualism."

[29] Dahrendorf (1989).

for the 'universal' (but in fact gendered) model 'citizen' (man) abstracted from particular characteristics and communities (O'Donovan 1993, Frazer and Lacey 1993). To Pateman and many others, the notion of the free individual who contracts freely into the social contract is patriarchally constructed.[30] The 'public/private' distinction is particularly problematic (Pateman 1989). Liberal contract theory has omitted womens' lack of freedom and left a legacy of problems with how to deal with womens' full incorporation as citizens, especially economic dependency.[31] Liberal citizenship tends to focus on form (rights, status) rather than substance (how much access is actually facilitated to entitlements and participation).

The dilemma for feminist critics is whether women should aim to give up their shared understandings and values to become neutral *citoyennes* in an 'ideal', almost genderless society, or try to reformulate the whole citizenship debate so that it is able to valorise domestic experience and sexual discrimination, and validate female conceptions of duty and obligation. A corresponding debate also takes place of course with regard to ethnicity and culture.[32] But, it should also be noted that the

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[30] Pateman (p.184, 1988): "The conclusion is easily drawn that the denial of civil equality to women means that the feminist aspiration must be to win acknowledgement for women as 'individuals'. Such aspiration can never be fulfilled. The 'individual' is a patriarchal category."

[31] Lister, R., 'Women, Economic Dependency and Citizenship', in Turner and Hamilton (1995b), originally *Journal of Social Policy*, vol.19, 1990, pp.445-467.

[32] Mann's (1987) and Turner's (1990) criticisms of Marshall's ethnocentricism have already been noted; there is a similar

conservative implications of communitarianism do not seem to offer a route out of this problem, because it tends to stop short of a genuinely political analysis and critique of the institutions it deems to be so important (Frazer and Lacey 1993).

3.7 The Importance of New Right Citizenship

The new right's recognition of the 'failure' of citizenship ('universal membership' is difficult to achieve in contemporary Western liberal-capitalist societies) is its negative agenda. But alone this does not help explain the ideological dominance of the new right over the last twenty years. This is a fundamental deficiency with most previous conceptions of the new right and citizenship. They are unable to explain why, if all the new right represents is an attack on citizenship in theory and practice, their ideas have held such sway. New right arguments should not just be characterised as 'con-tricks', deceiving a gullible public. There must be a positive new right agenda on citizenship. The new right appeared to offer empowerment, via the market as opposed to the political process, and the importance of the moral community. The new right has been able to 'steal' elements of the progressive citizenship armoury - opportunity, self-expression, social solidarity, even egalitarianism. The new right's vision(s) of citizenship are deficient in many ways, as has been suggested. But given the issues raised above, previous examinations of new right citizenship need to be superseded.

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danger for all retaining 'universalistic' aspirations for citizenship.

First, at this stage, it is not clear on what grounds the new right can be said not to have a legitimate conception of citizenship. As has been suggested [3.2], their conceptions of citizenship were projects which included some vision for 'universal membership', with only the routes towards that end differing (even if significantly).

Second, new right conceptions of citizenship may be as essentialist in many respects as left conceptions, but in other respects they circumvent this problem in a manner that the left has been unable, or unwilling, to do [3.3]. Because the new right represents a fundamental and incisive recognition of the limits of citizenship, ignored by progressive proponents assuming a radical transformation of social structure achieved via citizenship, the new right has been more conscious of those limits by being critical of some aspects of the citizenship agenda.

Third, and this is one aspect of this, the new right has avoided some of the internal tensions identified within citizenship [3.4]. In doing so, and criticising the over-dominance of some elements within citizenship (especially welfare rights and political participation), it has mirrored the tensions within citizenship itself. When it seeks to re-order the priorities of elements within citizenship, it does so in the wake of the fault-lines already apparent, most obviously, the prominent one between civil (particularly property) rights and political and social rights. Conversely,

the left struggles (and fails) to contain such tensions, to unify citizenship in practice as easily as it does in theory. Further, the multi-faceted and even apparently contradictory nature of a new right conception of citizenship, mirrors the multi-faceted and potentially contradictory nature of citizenship. It is not a unitary concept.

Fourth, the new right, especially in its neoliberal variant, draws upon the liberalism of modern citizenship more ably than the left has tended to do [3.5]. Indeed, the left has tended to neglect the liberal foundations of modern citizenship. The neoliberal right, however, could be characterised as as seeking to reclaim liberalism in their own image, and certainly recognised liberal discourses as the key battleground. As Hayek suggested in his opening address to the first meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, a key moment in the early development of the neoliberal new right (p.149, 1967):

"..a great intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it in the course of time, and also facing up to some real problems which an over-simplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed."

Fifth, and this is another aspect in which the new right may circumvent the problem of essentialism, the new right gets around problem of universality

[3.6], by offering supposedly universalistic discourses but whose social effects are far from universal, for the reasons already suggested [3.1].

Sixth, the new right seem to have been more able to recognise the potential regressiveness of citizenship. Contrary to progressive assumptions, it is not necessarily egalitarian or liberating. Neoliberals have been criticised for not appreciating the importance of social rights, but sometimes such rights can be counterproductive and contradictory. In centre-left conceptions such rights were assumed the main vehicle for the overriding project of 'universal membership', hence the new right's apparent attack on social rights is interpreted as a theoretical attack on the notion of universal membership. Progressive citizenship theory tends to assume that in conjunction the elements of citizenship will produce broadly equal and compatible outcomes, creating a 'virtuous circle' between equality, status and participation. But citizenship can enhance inequality by exacerbating differences in status between those already citizens and those excluded. The regressive operation of citizenship is demonstrated in the case studies [chapters five-eight].

Hence the relationship between the new right and citizenship is paradoxical rather than simple. Ultimately the new right is deficient in terms of the ethical ideal at the centre of citizenship - 'universal membership' - because of the practical effects of its policies which are profoundly

inegalitarian and authoritarian. However, in the respects noted above, the new right has presented conceptions of citizenship which are somewhat similar to the dominant themes associated with modern citizenship. In this sense, if one political project could stake a better claim to 'ownership' of citizenship, it would be the new right rather than the left. But this does not explain the whole scope of the new right project. To do so, it is necessary to introduce a more formal methodology.

3.8 Discourse Analysis

"..to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life."

- Wittgenstein.[33]

The first part of this research deals primarily with forms of argument - claims for the importance of citizenship, social inclusiveness, rights, individual freedom, or obligations - and of course arguments as to what the definitions of these are. Since in this case they derive from political projects, this would seem to necessitate a discussion of 'ideology'. But it will be suggested that a useful understanding of ideology is possible only after an appreciation of 'discourses', and of the conflict between different discourses. 'Discourse' refers to the individual social networks of communication through the medium of language or non-verbal sign-systems.[34] Meaning is never fully

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[33] Shotter (p.38, 1993).

[34] Purvis and Hunt (p.484, 1993): "Discourse theory urges us to shake off the organisation of the world into two great realms of the mental and the material. The concept facilitates

referential and is always contestable. Language is no longer seen as serving solely a representative function, but formulating situations as situations. This suggests that discourses channel rather than control discursive possibilities, facilitating some things being said and others being impeded.

A methodology is needed which is helpful in critically evaluating discourses, but it will need to be judged with regard to two main factors. The first is internal coherence. The second is more particular to this research. Proponents of citizenship, as a concept and an organising principle for political action, often have sought to claim that it is a key concept because it unites many themes (liberty, rights, community, obligations, social justice) and implies a conception of politics as active and participatory rather than passive and resigned. As such, it is seen to enlarge the potential scope of 'politics', and encourage the forms of participation by citizens to support that enlarged conception. The model of discourse analysis chosen should also reflect this.

3.8a Post-Marxist Discourse Theory

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have offered the most developed account of 'post-Marxist' discourse

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the escape from the pervasive influence of the thought/being opposition in the grand trinity of oppositions that has formed the philosophical background for the project of the social sciences: nature/culture, individual/society and mind/body. One attractive way of effecting a breach with these pervasive dualities is to start with language as a defining character and condition of sociality. It provides an uncomplicated way to think of 'the social' as something distinct from the mere aggregate of individuals."

theory (Laclau 1977, 1990, Laclau and Mouffe 1985).[35] The first reason their work is useful to this research is that they attempt to unfix particular discourses and concepts from exclusive association with particular ideologies - in this case the supposed 'ownership' of ideas around 'social' citizenship with the progressive left.

Laclau (1977) insisted that mental elements and concepts do not have any necessary class or political implications, for example that nationalism is not tied to any particular class position. The concept of 'articulation', in its simplest form, focuses on the way in which discourses and ideologies emerge by bringing into proximity and combination elements that do not have any pre-given class or political significance. It is the way in which different elements are combined that gives each specific discourse its ideological significance

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[35] An alternative 'methodology' is offered by Michel Foucault. A fuller discussion of the deficiencies of Foucault's approach is beyond the scope of the discussion available here, but it is necessary to note that it seems to deny the efficacy of citizenship, the barest possible expression of submerged technologies of power and self-regulation. The irony is that while Foucault tried to emphasise that power induces resistance, he does not persuade us that resistance is possible given the ever more pervasive grip of disciplinary society. He underplays the possibilities of self-determination, and this condemns him to an oscillation between nostalgic passivity and irrationalist rebellion (Dews 1984). There is the temptation to suggest his account of discourse remains markedly structuralist - discourses are characteristically 'professional' which emanate from institutionalised sites of production and are imposed, generating subject positions. Foucault's conception is too general and too negative. Rather, there is a place within any oppressive social structure where individuals can operate from their own will, contrary to liberationists such as Foucault who assume effectively that total power has already been ceded. Individuals may appropriate discourses and use them for their own liberationary purposes.

or effects. The theory of articulation is located within a more fully developed account of discourse. Every discursive formation is to some extent open and characterised not by unity but dispersion, choice, division and opposition (though of course the coherence and unity of a discourse is important). They are always subject to the play of alternatives and of struggle. For example, no subject position can be fully fixed by reference to some given set of differences. This has important consequences for the view of social systems as well (p.10, ibid):

"Firstly, not every concept has a necessary relation with others. It is not possible, therefore, starting with only one of them, to reconstruct the totality of the system. Systematic wholes, in other words, depend on the articulation of concepts which are not logically inter-linked. Secondly, it is not possible to establish necessary relations between different conceptual structures - such that we could pass from one to the other by a purely deductive process - but only the conditions of possibility of their articulation. Thirdly, therefore, any approximation to the concrete presupposes increasingly complex conceptual articulations and not the mere exposition of the logical properties of a simple conceptual whole. Consequently, the more concrete is the analysis, the more theoretical determinations must be included in it;.."

Theoretical practice has in this view been hindered by the connotative articulation of concepts at the

level of common sense discourse and their rationalist articulation into essential paradigms (particularly given Marxism's class reductionism). A theoretical critique starts from the empirical confrontation of the system under construction. We must indicate the points of conflict between the empirical and theoretical system, identify the theoretical problems, hence demonstrate the internal theoretical contradictions and propose an alternative.[36]

Classes have no necessary form of existence at the ideological and political levels. Reduction is then impossible. Classes exist at these levels in processes of articulation rather than reduction. The form rather than content of an ideology becomes important, the principle of articulation of its constituent interpellations. The class character of an ideological discourse is revealed in its specific articulating principle. Articulation requires the existence of non-class contents which constitute the raw material on which class ideological practices operate.

The dominant class exerts its hegemony in two ways - through the articulation into its class discourse of non-class contradictions and interpellations, and through the absorption of contents forming part of the ideological and political discourses of the dominated classes. It is not in the presence of determinate contents of a discourse but in the

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[36] But (p.108, ibid): "..if not every contradiction can be reduced to a class contradiction, every contradiction is overdetermined by class struggle."

articulating principle which unifies them that the class character of politics and ideology lies. Class seems to be defined by hegemonic articulation.[37] As political and ideological class struggle takes place on a terrain constituted by non-class interpellations and contradictions, this struggle can only consist of antagonistic projects for articulation of those non-class interpellations and contradictions (the use of different terms for the same concept would imply the creation by the dominated class of popular interpellations, and again a fall into class reductionism).

Ideologies are transformed through class struggle, which is carried out through the production of subjects and the articulation/disarticulation of discourses. For example, while Marxism or socialism may be one part of working class ideology, the working class are also part of the 'the people' whose characteristics will depend on the social formation in question and will therefore respond to popular-democratic interpellation. The inadequacy of Poulantzas' analysis, for example, in this respect is that it ignores the autonomous domain of the popular-democratic struggle and tries to find a

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[37] Logically but contentiously (p.164, ibid): "If the hegemony of a class consists in the articulation into its own discourse of non-class interpellations, and if classes only exist at the political and ideological level as articulating principles, it follows that a class only exists as such as those levels to the extent that it struggles for its hegemony." Hence (p.164, ibid): "..it is possible to assert the class belonging of a movement or an ideology and, at the same time, to assert the non-class character of some of the interpellations which constitute it."

class belonging in every ideological element.[38] The identification between 'the people' and classes is far from being given in advance, but is the result of struggle (the basic struggle on which depends the resolution of any political crisis under capitalism). Otherwise, class reductionist approaches cannot deal with an analysis of populism, oscillating between reducing it to the expression of class interests and leaving the term undefined and elusive. The struggle for the articulation of popular-democratic ideology in class ideological discourses is the basic ideological struggle in capitalist social formations. In the middle classes' general ideological structure, popular interpellations play a much more important role than class. Their growing social and political strength determined a broader extension of the arena of democratic struggle and the growing importance of ideological struggle within the general arena of class struggle. Economism and class reductionism misread this (indeed, thought the opposite). Instead, the basic ideological struggle of the working class consists in linking popular-democratic ideology to its discourse, avoiding both class sectarianism and social-democratic opportunism.

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[38] (p.110, ibid): "In the perspective we are suggesting, on the contrary, *although the domain of class determination is reduced, the arena of class struggle is immensely broadened, since it opens the possibility of integrating into a revolutionary and socialist ideological discourse, a multitude of elements and interpellations which have up to now appeared constitutive of bourgeois ideological discourse*. Not the least of the bourgeoisie's successes in asserting its ideological hegemony, is the consensus it has achieved - shared by many revolutionaries - that many of the constitutive elements of democratic and popular culture in a country are irrevocably linked to its class ideology."

Laclau claims this perspective can appreciate the relative continuity of popular traditions, in contrast to the historical discontinuities which characterise class structures. Popular traditions constitute the complex of interpellations which express the people/power bloc contradiction as distinct from a class contradiction. If these traditions constitute class ideologies, but cannot be working class, they would taint 'proletarian ideology', but if not, must come from somewhere else than class. Laclau suggests his perspective can solve this impasse.[39] They are the residue of a unique and irreducible historical experience and as such constitute a more solid and durable structure of meanings than the social structure itself (this dual reference to the people and classes constitutes what he calls the 'double articulation' of political discourse). The abstract nature of some concepts (such as 'populism', or 'market economy') means they can never constitute the articulating principle of a political discourse - there is no popular-democratic discourse as such, democracy only exists at the ideological level in the form of elements of a

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[39] (p.167, ibid): "This enables us to explain two things. In the first place, in so far as 'popular traditions' represent the ideological crystallisation of resistance to oppression in general, that is, *to the very form of the State*, they will be longer lasting than class ideologies and will constitute a structural frame of reference of greater stability. But in the second place, popular traditions do not constitute consistent and organised discourses but merely elements which can only exist in articulation with class discourses. This explains why the most divergent political movements appeal to the same ideological symbols."

discourse. They can be articulated to the most divergent class discourses.[40]

In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) these themes are developed further. They suggest the crisis of socialism is of those unitary conceptions relying upon the ontological centrality of the working class, the role of Revolution and the illusory prospect of a perfectly homogenous collective will that will render 'politics' pointless.[41] The plural and multifarious character of contemporary social struggles has finally dissolved the last foundations of these conceptions. They suggest, instead of trying to fill the theoretical voids and patch together the split between theory and practice, to focus on certain discursive categories and unravel the possible meaning of a history in the various facets of this multiple refraction. They aim to operate discursively within Marxist categories, *one* of the traditions through which it is possible to formulate this new conception of politics. They claim to resist closed models. Rather than the concept of hegemony being complementary and contingent, they

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[40] (p.195, ibid): "It might be asked why, if popular-democratic ideologies do not exist separately from but are articulated within class discourses, we cannot proceed directly to a study of the latter as such, and leave aside an analysis of the former. The answer is that such an emphasis would eliminate what is most specific to the ideological class struggle - the attempt to articulate the same interpellations in antagonistic discourses."

[41] (p.2, ibid): "Peopled with 'universal' subjects and conceptually built around History in the singular, it has postulated 'society' as an intelligible structure that could be intellectually mastered on the basis of certain class positions and reconstituted, as a rational, transparent order, through a founding act of a political character."

trace its genealogy - how it has expanded, and attempt to anchor their theorisation of contemporary social struggles in it.

They critique previous attempts to utilise 'hegemony', because the working class is left with a contradictory status (even for Gramsci, the 'new political logic' of hegemony could not be theorised because of the dominance of essentialist categories). While its political centrality has an historical, contingent character (requiring it to articulate itself in a plurality of struggles and democratic demands), this articulatory role is assigned to it by the economic base.[42] By scaling down the pretensions and area of validity of Marxist theory they admit to breaking with something deeply inherent within it - the monist aspiration to capture the essence of History, hence 'post-Marxism'. But they suggest their approach, by recovering plurality, guarantees the survival of Marxist texts as a reference point of political analysis.

3.8b The Expansion of Political Space

'Antagonism', far from being an objective relation, is a relation where the limits of every 'objectivity' are shown and revealed.[43]

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[42] (p.69, ibid): "To assert, however, that hegemony must always correspond to a fundamental economic class is..to reaffirm determination in the last instance by the economy..Here the naturalist prejudice, which sees the economy as a homogenous space unified by necessary laws, appears once again with all its force."

[43] For example (p.9, 1990): "It is obviously not being denied that conflicts exist between workers and entrepreneurs, but merely that they spring from the logical analysis of the wage-labour/capital relationship..Once these [economic] categories

'Articulation' is any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. 'Discourse' is the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice. Every social identity is unfixed. There are no privileged subjects, and from the socialist point of view, the direction of the worker's struggle is not uniformly progressive. It depends, just as with any other struggle, upon its forms of articulation within a given hegemonic context. Other democratic antagonisms can be articulated with equal status to a socialist 'collective will'.

Articulatory practice is made possible by contingency, that is limits to the 'discursive totality'. This is why the paradox is that (Laclau, p.44, 1990): "To understand social reality, then, is not to understand what society *is*, but what *prevents it from being*." This allows a fluid conception of discourse without becoming merely discursive, wholly relative.[44] This is a rejection of the level of general theorisation of the social given the impossibility of closure (the impossibility of

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[of buyer and seller of labour power] are reintegrated into the social totalities forming the agents that are their bearers, we can easily imagine a multitude of antagonisms arising between those concrete social agents and the relations of production in which they participate." 'Concrete' here means specific. For example, there may be concrete struggles of social agents, individual and material, but they do not necessarily constitute class struggle.

[44] (p.113, ibid): "The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity."

'society').' The openness of society becomes the precondition of every hegemonic practice.[45]

The nature of contemporary political struggles helps drive the expansion of the political.[46] One example of the complexity introduced concerns classes (p.82, ibid): "The divisions within the working class are..more deeply rooted than many wish to allow: and they are, to a certain extent, the result of the workers' own practices. They are political, and not merely economic divisions." It is impossible to talk about the homogeneity of the working class and a fortiori to trace it to a mechanism inscribed in the logic of capitalist accumulation. The search for it and its 'objective interests' is a false problem given the rejection of the idea of perfectly unified and homogenous agents and the need to analyse the plurality of diverse and frequently contradictory positions within social antagonisms.

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[45] (p.130, ibid): "..the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity."

[46] (p.133, ibid): "Partly because of their very success, democratic struggles tend less and less to be unified as 'popular struggles'. The conditions of political struggle in mature capitalism are increasingly distant from the nineteenth-century model of a clear-cut 'politics of freedom'.." That is, struggles implying a plurality of political spaces rather than the division of a single political space into two fields (p.80, 1987): "..structural transformations of capitalism that have led to the decline of the classical working class in the post-industrial countries; the increasingly profound penetration of capitalist relations of production in areas of social life, whose dislocatory effects - concurrent with those deriving from the forms of bureaucratisation which have characterised the Welfare State - have generated new forms of social protest..[now] new generations..are constructing new emancipatory discourses, more human, diversified and democratic. The eschatological and epistemological ambitions are more modest, but the liberating aspirations are wider and deeper."

This creates four main consequences which add complexity - the identity of classes is transformed by the hegemonic tasks they take on, class becomes less a 'zero-sum' game, the notion of 'class alliance' becomes obviously insufficient in this context (since hegemony supposes the construction of the very identity of social agents), politics is no longer just taken to contain the representation of interests (the relation of articulation is not a relation of necessity), and the identification between social agents and classes is challenged (since the identity of social agents ceases to be exclusively constituted through their insertion in the relations of production and becomes a precarious articulation among a number of subject positions). 'Hegemony' becomes a political type of relation, a form of politics, rather than a determinable location within a topography of the social (in a given social formation, there could be a variety of hegemonic nodal points). Autonomy (of the state, for example), is itself a form of hegemonic construction (not the necessary structural effect of anything nor a single social force). In terms of understanding concepts, such a methodology goes way beyond recognising that they may be 'essentially contested'. It demands that we try to examine how forms of contestation *create* what does not already 'exist'.

3.8c Criticism

This work created much critical response. There are four principal and closely-related criticisms.[47]

The first is that it represents a collapse into relativist circularity without common reference points. This is problematic particularly in the context of subordination and oppression. To Meiksins Wood (p.61, 1986) it implies that material interests do not exist unless they are translated into political objectives, when clearly capitalists derive fundamental advantage from the exploitation of workers. Relations between capital and labour do have fundamental consequences for the whole structure of social and political power.

But this can be countered by recognising the difference between 'existence' and 'being', and the realisation that relativism is a false problem.[48] Material objects do of course have an existence independent of any differential context, but their being - their particular historicity - is distinguishable from this. Material interests, in the sense that they are understood, constructed, discussed and denied, are formed discursively, and (p.218, 1990): "There is no inconsistency in sustaining that a discursive structure is composed of some elements which do have a material *existence*

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[47] I use three main sources here: Geras (1987, 1988), Meiksins Wood (1986), and Mouzelis (1988). Laclau and Mouffe's (1987) response forms the basis of the discussion above.

[48] (p.84, 1987): "..outside of any discursive context objects *do not have* being; they have only *existence*. The accusation of the 'anti-relativist' is, therefore, meaningless, since it presupposes that there is a *being* of things as such, which the relativist is either indifferent to or proclaims to be inaccessible." But things only have a being within a certain discursive configuration.

and others which don't." The discursive becomes the theoretical horizon. In addition, the recognition of the 'sedimented' nature of many discourses helps explain why struggle is difficult [3.10]. Sedimented forms of 'objectivity' make up the field of what is called the 'social', and the moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of the 'political'. Hence (p.61, 1990): "'Politics' is an ontological category: there is politics because there is subversion and dislocation of the social." The boundary between the 'social' and the 'political' is being displaced constantly, and neither can dominate society (without the 'political', society would merely reproduce itself with repetitive practices, while the total political institution of society would depend on absolute omnipotent will and would consequently not be political).

Second, critics have pointed to Laclau and Mouffe's inability for structural analysis. They are seen to display a cavalier disregard for material realities, relationships and needs. Wood argues they randomise history and politics. Purvis and Hunt (p.493-4, 1993) note their apparent failure to specify the constraints that effect the emergence of discursive formations. Yet Laclau and Mouffe state (p.142, 1987):

"The problem of power cannot..be posed in terms of the search for *the* class or *the* dominant sector

which constitutes the centre of a hegemonic formation, given that, by definition, such a centre will always elude us. But it is equally wrong to propose as an alternative, either pluralism or the total diffusion of power within the social, as this would blind the analysis to the presence of nodal points and to the partial concentrations of power existing in every concrete social formation."

The concepts of classical analysis (centre, power, autonomy, and so on) can be re-introduced at this point, if their status is redefined as contingent social logics which acquire their meaning in precise conjunctural and relational contexts.

Third, Laclau and Mouffe stand accused of lacking any explanatory power, and disparaging every explanatory project by rejecting essences. Yet they are forced at times to rely on Marxist categories (the use of notions of 'advanced capitalism', 'accumulation', 'exploitation', and so on), descriptions of social totality and hence fixity. However, as with concepts from traditional political analysis, there is no reason why such terms and concepts cannot be used when redefined and historicized. Many, including Marxist, conceptual tools undeniably are useful.[49] But it should also be recognised that economic activity is as discursive as political or aesthetic ideas, because 'discourse' is the horizon of the constitution of any object.

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[49] For example, Laclau's (p.163-6, 1990) discussion on the necessity to historicize class for use in analysis.

Fourth, they are accused of 'progressivity without foundations', lending legitimacy to the existing state.[50] However, Laclau and Mouffe have developed their own conception of the shape of progressive politics.

3.8d 'Radical Democracy'

Given their rejection of privileged points of rupture, the confluence of struggles into a unified political space, and the acceptance of the plurality and indeterminacy of the social, Laclau and Mouffe have outlined a new politics for the left of 'radical democracy'. They suggest it is radically libertarian and more ambitious in its objectives than the traditional left. It emerged on the terrain of the 'democratic revolution' (p.58, 1985): "It is necessary to break with the view that democratic tasks are bonded to a bourgeois stage - only then will the obstacle preventing a permanent articulation between socialism and democracy be eliminated." As has been suggested elsewhere, it may

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[50] Laclau and Mouffe's reply to this is valuable, realistic and viable, against the myth of the transparent and homogenous society which implies the 'end of politics' (p.105, 1987): "If the radical democratisation of society emerges from a variety of autonomous struggles which are themselves overdetermined by forms of hegemonic articulation; if, in addition, everything depends on a proliferation of public spaces of argumentation and decision whereby social agents are increasingly capable of self-management; then it is clear that this process does not pass through a direct attack upon the State apparatuses but involves the consolidation and democratic reform of the liberal State. The ensemble of its constitutive principles - division of powers, universal suffrage, multi-party systems, civil rights, etc. - must be defended and consolidated. It is within the framework of these basic principles of the political community that it is possible to advance the full range of present-day democratic demands (from the rights of national, racial and sexual minorities to the anti-capitalist struggle itself)."

be that liberalism has a 'self-transcending' emancipatory logic, that is, it is capable of supplying principles which are used to demand reforms which are well beyond what its original exponents would have thought legitimate (Hoffman, 'Liberals Versus Socialists', Mclellan and Sayers 1991).

Forms of resistance are extremely varied, only in certain cases do they take on a political character in the sense of being directed towards putting an end to relations of subordination as such. In contrast to Foucault's work, there is attention to tensions within discourses that provide the raw material for discourses of resistance. There is no relation of oppression without the presence of a discursive 'exterior' (particularly liberal democratic citizenship rights, it seems) from which the discourse of subordination can be interrupted.[51] It is this which allows forms of resistance to assume the character of collective struggles - the existence of an external discourse which impedes the stabilisation of subordination as difference. Indeed, citizenship is valued within this conception (Laclau and Mouffe, p.163, 1985):

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[51] (p.154, ibid): "Our thesis is that it is only from the moment when the democratic discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against different types of inequality." But to do this it first had to impose itself as the 'new matrix of the social imaginary' (to constitute the fundamental nodal point in the construction of the political) which happened two hundred years ago with the French Revolution. Socialist demands seemingly grew out of ('are a moment internal to') the democratic revolution.

"It is the notion of citizenship itself which has been transformed with the social state, as 'social rights' are now attributed to the citizen. As a consequence, the categories of 'justice', 'liberty', 'equity', and 'equality' have been redefined and liberal-democratic discourse has been profoundly modified by this broadening of the sphere of rights."

Without this reformulation of liberal-democratic ideology (resulting in the expansion of struggles for equality), and the commodification and bureaucratisation of social relations, we cannot understand the present expansion of the field of 'social conflictuality' and the consequent emergence of new political subjects. There has been a deepening of the democratic revolution. The dismissal of the form of these struggles as 'liberal' allows that they may be articulated by a discourse of the right, in the defence of privileges.[52] Hence this can be seen as part of the general project to take the liberal-democratic form of politics, as opposed to the communitarian, and develop it in terms of stronger democratic politics and citizenship, because it is accepted that it can be weak.[53]

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[52] This theme is valuable in terms of this research (p.169, 1985): "That the forms of resistance to new forms of subordination are polysemic and can perfectly well be articulated into an anti-democratic discourse, is clearly demonstrated by the advances of the 'new right' in recent years. Its novelty lies in its successful articulation to neo-liberal discourse of a series of democratic resistances to the transformation of social relations."

[53] In contrast to more pessimistic perspectives on the contemporary efficacy of liberalism (Gray, 'Postscript: After Liberalism', 1989, 1996).

Since radical unfixity makes it impossible to consider the political struggle as a 'game' in which the identity of the opposing force is constituted from the start, analysis is freed-up, and is broader.[54] What is attractive about the approach Laclau and Mouffe suggest is that it opens up all kinds of critical approaches.

Laclau and Mouffe see themselves as within a progressive tradition (socialist, liberal, humanist, rationalist). Socialism is one of the components of a project for radical democracy, not vice versa. There are no intrinsically anti-capitalist struggles, although a set of struggles, within certain contexts, could become anti-capitalist. The point is to try to construct a chain of democratic equivalencies, rather than merely 'opposition' and reliance on the discourse of the universal with some privileged point of access to 'truth'. They offer the possibility of understanding the shared root of progressive ideas, and the contingent and radically open character of its values.

The focus on the democratic revolution does not deny that under liberal democracy many efforts have been

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[54] (p.174, 1985): "It would be an error to underestimate the importance of these [new right] attempts to redefine notions such as 'liberty', 'equality', 'justice' and 'democracy'. The traditional dogmatism of the Left, which attributed secondary importance to problems at the centre of political philosophy, based itself on the 'superstructural' character of such problems. In the end, the Left interested itself only in a limited range of issues linked to the infrastructure and the subjects constituted within it, while the whole of the vast field of culture and the definition of reality built upon the basis of it, the whole effort of hegemonic rearticulation of the diverse discursive formations, was left free for the initiative of the right."

made to diffuse the radical potential of 'popular sovereignty' and to create an institutional structure which reduces participation and insulates the decision-making machinery of the state from popular control. This diffusion is not a refutation of the progressive potential of liberal-democratic discourse (including citizenship), but an affirmation of it. Political struggle becomes a process of (Laclau and Mouffe, p.165, 1985): "..the displacement into new areas of social life of the egalitarian imaginary constituted around the liberal-democratic discourse." It is important to note that this does not mean liberalism (especially in its 'classical' variant) is 'the truth', the only valuable way of understanding the social world. Rather, that it is the dominant web of understandings. To take one aspect as an example, the liberal conception of the autonomous individual agent is itself the product of social construction. Hence (Frazer and Lacey, p.57, 1993): "So if liberalism is true as a social theory, this is only because it is, in a wider sense, false." In this sense, this approach is self-reflexive in its relationship to liberal discourses, recognising their value, but also the ways in which they may obscure and deny the social significance of relations of power in many spheres (for example the family, and sexual relations).

Hence, there are three basic reasons why Laclau and Mouffe's approach is preferred: first, for its appreciation of the fluidity of discourses and the undermining of assumptions of conceptual

'ownership'; second, their conception of the 'political', in particular the expanded space for democratic struggle; and third, its ability to incorporate other methodological tools, which are necessary (furthered in chapter nine).

3.8e 'Ideology'

From this methodology, it is possible to formulate a useful conception of 'ideology'. Though discourse and ideology refer broadly to the same phenomenon, that people participate in forms of understanding, and that the way in which they comprehend the social world has important consequences for their (in)action, they need to be differentiated.

Purvis and Hunt (1993) have suggested a method by which this may be achieved. 'Ideology' is concerned to identify the way in which forms of consciousness condition how people become conscious of their conflicting interests and struggle over them. It implies a link between interests and forms of consciousness. 'Discourse' focuses attention on the terms of engagement within social relations by insisting that all social relations are lived and comprehended by their participants in terms of specific linguistic or semiotic vehicles that organise their thinking, understanding and experiencing. It focuses upon the internal features of communicative practices (in particular their linguistic and semiotic aspects) whereas ideology focuses on the external, the way in which lived experience is connected to notions of interest and position that are in principle distinguishable from

lived experience. This distinction depends on an adherence to what the authors call 'soft realism'.[55]

Ideology is defined as going beyond the general claim that all thought is socially constructed; the concept adds the contention that it exhibits a directionality. The critical project of a theory of ideology is concerned to explain how the forms of consciousness generated by the lived experience of subordinate classes and social groups facilitate the reproduction of existing social relations and thus impede such classes and groups from developing forms of consciousness that reveal the nature of their subordination. Purvis and Hunt use the terms 'critical' and 'sociological' to denote two broad approaches to ideology. Critical conceptions delimit a realm in which social knowledge and experience are constructed in such a way as to 'mystify' the situation, circumstance or experience of subordinate classes or dominated groups.[56] The focus is on the

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[55] "We want to find a philosophical framework that allows us to hang on to 'truth' (with a small 't') and interests as not being reducible to subjective preference whilst passing on 'Truth' (with a capital 'T')..Our soft-realism is 'soft' in that it readily accepts the typical postmodernist claim that knowledge claims can never be verified and that there is no vantage point external to discourse from which truth-claims can be validated. Yet our position is 'realist' in that we insist that there is a non-discursive realm that can be known even though that knowledge can never be more than fallible, always liable to be displaced by some 'better' account." See Bernstein (1983) and his notion of a 'third way' between objectivism and relativism. Also, Laclau and Mouffe (p.108, 1985) affirm that every discourse has a material character. To admit the mental character of discourse is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought.

[56] But in general (p.481, ibid): "..the most significant implication of the vices of economism, reductionism and determinism is not that they concentrate one-sidedly on economic relations and practices, but rather that they impede

social consequences (hence 'ideological effects'). Sociological conceptions focus on ideology as the outcome of the specific social position of classes, groups or agents. Ideology is the result of objective social position and an arena of struggle. Potentially there are competing ideologies, but this does not imply an account in which every social class articulates its own specific ideology. However they are linked to some conception of social position and objective interests. Hence within these accounts ideology is real and material rather than fictional and illusory. It is unavoidable in that it describes the framework of meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their social lives.

However, Laclau (p.92, 1990) appears to echo this desire to retain 'ideology', in a similar way: "..we can maintain the concept of ideology and the category of misrecognition only by inverting their traditional content. The ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: it would consist of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate suture. The ideological would consist of those discursive forms though which a society tries to institute itself as such on the basis of closure, of the fixation of meaning, of the non-recognition of the infinite play of differences. The ideological would be the will to 'totality' of any totalizing

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and even exclude an adequate theorisation of so many other manifestations of human sociality."

discourse. And insofar as the social is impossible without some fixation of meaning, without the discourse of closure, the ideological must be seen as constitutive of the social. The social only exists as the vain attempt to institute the impossible object: society. Utopia is the essence of any communication and social practice." The concept of ideology can be maintained as (p.186, ibid): "..that illusion of 'closure' which is the imaginary horizon that accompanies the constitution of all objectivity."

Sociological accounts have unintentionally marginalized the critical conceptions (hence contemporary Marxists have subsequently conflated ideology and discourse). Purvis and Hunt attempt to retain a conception of ideology as the vehicle of 'lived experience' and to reinstate elements of the earlier critical tradition. (which makes possible a concept of ideology which is not reducible to discourse).

This aim, to separate ideology and discourse by delineating the boundaries between them (particularly by way of directionality and the notion of 'ideology effects') is a valuable conception, which somewhat contrary to Purvis and Hunt, may be integrated with Laclau-Mouffe discourse analysis.

3.9 Civil Society

'Civil society' has become a fashionable but vague term to describe areas of social life often neglected by political analysis. In its idealised

form, it is seen to uphold certain values, especially tolerance of a religious, political and ethical diversity of views which co-exist 'peacefully' (Gellner 1994). Restrained by the rule of law, the state (or any individuals) do not seek to impose any comprehensive doctrine, thus allowing this diversity of views and interests to shape the multifarious forms of civil association. Michael Oakeshott (1962) characterised civil society in the English form as reliant on the absence of an overwhelming concentration of power, hence allowing a multitude of associations to reproduce the diffusion of power. This diffusion of power is to be supported by the widespread holding of private property.

The recent 'rediscovery' of the state-civil society distinction has been encouraged by many factors and is thought by many to remain relevant (for example, Keane 1988). One underlying theme has been that the re-emergence of civil society represents its triumph over the state, and is somehow indicative of a significant change in the 'climate of opinion'. However, there is a profound danger of eulogising the presumed values of civil society, especially its 'freedoms', and so blunting a critical understanding of the many restraints as well as opportunities found in most citizens' social environments. This has anti-political tendencies.

Further, there are a number of problems with the concept itself. The idea of civil society should not be allowed to settle along familiar lines set by the

crude dichotomy between 'state' and 'market'. It should not be seen simply as a third 'social area', or even a broader conception of the non-state sphere than that allowed by the notion of the 'market' alone.

First, with regard to its relationship with the 'state', as Walzer (p.169, in Beiner, 1995) has noted: "Here is the paradox of the civil society argument. Citizenship is one of many roles that members play, but the state itself is unlike all the other associations. It both frames civil society and occupies the space within it. It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all associational activity (including political activity)." A conception of civil society as defined by the absence of the state will inevitably overlook the scope of the state in constructing much of the nature and parameters of civil society. Second, with regard to the 'market', seeing civil society merely as a sphere of non-state but also non-market activity and relations, reproduces the too-long held artificial separation of economic power from social identities and cultural values found in many conceptions. Analysis influenced by such assumptions can neglect the often complex relationships involved, and may lead ironically to policies which undermine civil society further.

A more general limitation on the usefulness of the concept of civil society is that it can appear quite an 'empty box'. It appears to describe a complex and ever-shifting array of unappreciated social

relations, which makes a general description difficult. However, without such a general description, its value appears limited. It cannot help suggest why certain values, concepts and discourses will find a more receptive audience within civil society than others. Here it may be useful to add to this basic conception of civil society, the notion of a 'dominant political culture'. This may help construct an analysis which does not separate the form of the economy, social identities and cultural values, and tries to examine the relationship between the 'state', the 'market' and 'civil society'.

3.10 Sedimented discourses - The 'Dominant Political Culture'

"..the extent to which intellectuals are able to articulate..the lived experience of the people should not be exaggerated; the limits, gaps and indeterminancies of the shaping and articulation of popular consciousness need to be stressed..hegemony often has a less consensual aspect than is usually supposed and may be ensured as often as not by the 'dull compulsion of economic relations'."[57]

A potentially valuable description of the 'dominant political culture' may be drawn from David Selbourne's *Against Socialist Illusion* (1985). He argues that socialists have tended to misjudge some of the crucial aspects of the historic relation between capital and labour, especially the impact on working people of industrialisation and industrial

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[57] Desai (p.38, 1994).

work. Despite the apparent hostility of the working class to capitalism, there has been a deep-seated and cross-class rejection of the socialist project. 'Conservative values' are spread throughout the working-class electorate, whose political culture much of the left has failed to understand. This is a key aspect of the left's theoretical and strategic weakness.

Within this dominant political culture, 'liberty' more often is associated with claims to individual economic independence than socialist transformation. Similarly, 'equality' signifies equal citizenship rights (including those to private property) and equality of opportunity, rather than equality of outcome. There is a general equation, particularly amongst the working class, of property-right with freedom. This, along with structural factors, constrains and hampers socialist attempts to constrain the capitalist market. Individual citizen-rights to personal ownership and possession are positively desired. The 'libertarianism' of this culture is not only pre-socialist, but essentially anti-socialist (in that it is anti-state). Hence a coherent left alternative to the politics of capital is disabled.

These more 'rigid' conceptions within civil society may, in the language of discourse analysis, be referred to as 'sedimented' discourses (Laclau 1990). They are the result of successful 'acts of institution', and the 'forgetting of origins' occurs. The system of possible alternatives tends to

vanish and the traces of the original contingency to fade. Such discourses come to assume the forms of 'mere objective presence'. Though we may, in the terminology, 'reactivate' the origins of the discourses, and so show their political essence and construction, it does not mean necessarily that they will be easy to replace with other discourses. Such is the case with many market-oriented discourses in civil society. As Hall (p.189, 1988) stated: "The first thing to ask about an organic ideology is not whether it is false but what is true about it. After all, under capitalism, men and women *do* live their lives and sell their labour, every day, in the market. It has its own materiality; it imposes its gross reality on everyone, whether we like it or not."

The left's previous disdain for market-derived conceptions and values (discourses) is at the root of its strategic failures (Selbourne, p.39, 1985): "But to merely reiterate, in conventional socialist fashion, that the right has shamelessly nailed the colours of freedom to its political mast, notwithstanding or because of the economic crisis of capital, no longer meets the case, or the political challenges socialism faces. Instead, socialists must fight first on the ground chosen by the right, and with its weapons. The right's version of the nature and purposes of individual freedom will not dissolve merely because of reflex moral objections to it, however worthy."

Hence the abandonment of the ground of Mill's 'region of human liberty' by the left has been the real danger. This presented great opportunity for the new right (and subsequently Thatcherism) to advance.[58] The left has found it embarrassing (often 'reactionary') to have to share this ground with the right, who are entrenched there. The left's denunciation of the neoliberal new right's vision of citizens, as merely selfish, egoistic and hence inhumane, is denied easily by the right, who claim simply that this represents the best opportunity for individual freedom. This is subsequently received well in the political culture. Further, it is a deeply-ingrained historical assumption that the development of market society promoted the establishment of certain fundamental democratic freedoms. The prominent struggle by working people for rights and freedoms may be forgotten, but the vague association of liberties with capitalist development is not.

Consequently, socialist utopianism - the 'replacement of the market' - is seen to threaten the reinforcement of state power. This is why the freedoms of individual appropriation outweigh

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[58] Consequently (p.38, ibid): "..right-wing 'anti-statism', in the name of 'freedom of the individual', is not automatically seen by working people as an alibi for the unleashing upon them of exploitative forms of ruling-class licence - even if socialists are perfectly justified in fearing it as a consequence. More damaging still to socialist, and in particular collectivist, versions of the politics of freedom is that, historically, the very core of radical working-class libertarianism has been essentially conservative. Rooted in concepts of the natural rights of the individual - and in ideologically crucial respects also anti-egalitarian - such libertarianism is in its foundation not merely pre-socialist, but anti-socialist also."

constantly the objections to the inequities which flow from them. It is why the ethics of capitalist accumulation, however obnoxious to middle-class socialists in particular, have rarely been called seriously into question by the working-class. This is a crucial aspect of the appeal of the right, and allows the new right in particular to emphasise that private property is the essential guarantee of the independence and freedom of the individual.

This reveals the danger of the left ceding in effect the private realm to the right, to make ideological gain with as it chooses. For ordinary working-class people, if not for many socialists, the private sphere (in terms of property, work and home life) has retained its primacy. Further, it follows that even for the supposed main beneficiaries, the welfare state has never been accorded any real or lasting ethical priority over the perceived values of 'self-reliance'. Rather, welfare benefits have the inferior ideological status of 'unearned' supplements to what can be gained from 'normal' methods of individual appropriation (p.113, ibid): "'True' rights are seen to be of an entirely different order, itself antithetical to the whole principle of welfare.." The post-war welfare state has failed consistently to undo the perception that citizenship is to some degree still deemed to be lost at the point of receipt of benefit. Benefits have not become associated with 'freedom', but the opposite.

Hence illusory welfarist expectations have and will be continuously defeated by the greater legitimacy which attaches to the right to individual appropriation.[59] Welfare universalism lacks the ideological reach to match the objections to it in a market system. Social services and social provision do not necessarily socialise.[60] The left has assumed that (p.130, ibid): "..universal provision is democratic or egalitarian in its effects under capitalist conditions, merely because it is democratic or egalitarian in intention." This allowed the (new) right to overstate its case against state welfare provision (including the resulting loss of incentives, 'moral hazard', and inefficiency).

Even if welfare rights (especially cash benefits such as unemployment) could be designed to be non-stigmatising, they would still be viewed from the perspective of this political culture. They would still represent a form of 'dependence' because not explicitly market-derived. Stigma stems primarily from the characteristics of the users of welfare services, in particular being poor in a competitive society, rather than from the character of the

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[59] Hence this analysis can show the weaknesses of the assumptions of the 'citizenship school', those in the Titmussian tradition who implied that in a better ordered society the values of the social welfare market would take-over and dominate those of the economic market. Marshall, in his conception of the 'hyphenated society' of welfare-capitalism, was more circumspect.

[60] Hence (p.128, ibid): "Adam Smith's ruthless proposition that 'nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens' would still command overwhelming assent across the classes - notwithstanding left protestations that 'benevolence' and the welfare system have nothing in common."

services (Harris, p.83, 1987). This then suggests serious limitations to the efficacy of 'decommodification', a fundamental idea to many leftist proponents of citizenship. It may be that an extensive welfare state may be able to provide services and provision as a matter of social right irrespective of an individual's market position, and that some individuals may be able to maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market, but not that they will ever fully be able to escape the centrality of the market discourse and its defining effect on other social relations. Income from outside the market is seen as exactly that, as not deriving from the main source of value, wealth and even individual autonomy. Hence the persistence of the 'deserving/undeserving poor' discourse, and its deep embededness on popular attitudes (Ditch 1989).

This does not suggest that the welfare state has no popular support. As Taylor-Gooby (1985, 1991, also Rose 1989) has found, the evidence of a welfare backlash is exaggerated. The notion of an overwhelming welfare consensus in the 1950s, which has eroded to a mass rejection of the welfare state in the 1980s, is one infected with false nostalgia, though of course many factors (including economic decline) have acted on the welfare state. Rather the picture is of continuity. The political conflicts which threaten the welfare state have been inherent in its structure since its inception.[61] Dominant

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[61] Taylor-Gooby (p.3, 1985): "For supporters of the welfare state the news that the outlook for tomorrow is not radically different from yesterday may be rosy. For those who question how far a patriarchal capitalist welfare practice can advance

opinions are shaped by the ideological context of modern society (Taylor-Gooby, p.113, 1985): "In general support for the welfare state is a matter of self-interest defined by the dominant ideology of a society in which desired goods are bought and sold."

Hence there is a general ambivalence in support for the welfare state. There is strong support for the principle of state welfare (especially in terms of pensions, the NHS, and education), but concern at its practice (particularly with regard to 'unfavoured' minority services such as unemployment and low-pay benefits, council housing and lone parent's benefits), its cost and the extent of transfer to other groups. The latter is the only justification for the 'welfare burden' thesis in public opinion, though it may have been used powerfully by the new right and Thatcherism.

This would seem to match the general thesis of the nature of the dominant political culture. The 'market' is a familiar and powerful presence in ordinary people's everyday lives, and they seek to be 'insulated' from politics and the macro-institutions of society (Rose 1989). Hence (p.179, ibid): "Insofar as government is part of the lives of ordinary people, it is through the delivery of private benefits, such as education, health care and

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human interests, the tale may prove less cheering. The enemy is the same dull enemy and the new right is a new distraction from the enduring struggle. The ideology of individualism in interests and of reformism in politics generates the contradictions in mass attitudes that have always been present, and perpetually bridges the precipices in reformist social policy theory. The enemy, of course, is the welfare state in capitalist society itself."

social security." This also implies that analyses which see decommodification as the heart of the welfare state's emancipatory potential for social transformation via working-class movements (Espring-Anderson 1990 and many others) are bound to be frustrated.[62]

The consequence is that to the left, 'individual responsibility' and 'independence' have become associated with the competitive self-interest of the market. Selbourne suggests these ideas should be reclaimed for socialism and socialist meanings of freedom, including a fuller recognition that poverty and unemployment erode independence.

It is from this analysis that the depth of the crisis of socialist thought, and the weakness of a reliance on too-vague visions of 'participatory democracy', may be appreciated.[63] How exactly, in an era of economic regression, social decline and educational failure, and a resistant dominant political culture, will such theoretical conceptions establish the relevance of socialist thought to ordinary working people ? It dangerously vacates the

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[62] Further, as Orloff (1993) has noted, the decommodification dimension is typically gender-blind, ignoring domestic and caring work. She suggests it is subsumed under a more generic dimension measuring independence or autonomy in a number of spheres.

[63] As Ignatieff (p.71, Beiner 1995) puts it sharply, in the context of the post-war welfare state: "Citizenship was thus a bureaucratic rather than a democratic reality; and as such was weakly implanted in the political culture, vulnerable to the first plausible attack from the right on social democratic red tape. It was never obvious in fact how exactly to make the welfare bureaucracy more accountable without reproducing more committees and review bodies. Participatory democracy..foundered on its inability to propose any solution to the problem of democratic control over the state bureaucracy other than more meetings."

battleground of materiality, and offers no new practices under accepted capitalist conditions. Ironically, the politics of the left can come to be narrow if reliant on the project of broadening the conception of the 'political', and trying to make it the central characteristic of citizens' identities and activities.

The main result of this culture is that (Walzer, p.156, Beiner 1995): "..politics rarely engages the full attention of the citizens who are supposed to be its chief protagonists. They have too many other things to worry about. Above all, they have to earn a living. They are more deeply engaged in the economy than in the political community. Republican theorists..recognize this engagement only as a threat to civic virtue. Economic activity belongs to the realm of necessity, they argue; politics to the realm of freedom..In practice, however, work, though it begins in necessity, takes on a value of its own - expressed in commitment to a career, pride in a job well done, a sense of camaraderie in the workplace. All of these are competitive with the values of citizenship." This is exacerbated by the distancing participatory theorists undertake between the values they seek to instil and this dominant realm of society. Not only do ordinary citizens often see the market as a realm of necessity, they are open, given the left's disengagement, to seeing it as a potential source of 'freedom' as well. Consequently, the emphasis on the political public sphere can come to be seen as a potential drain on that 'freedom'.

Proponents of participatory democracy may counter that a democratised polity would be extremely educative. It would re-orientate citizens and the way in which they think about not only politics, but the state and economy. An expanded conception of politics would become primary. The notion of political participation as a form of educative practice is of course not novel nor necessarily socialist (John Stuart Mill was the greatest exponent of this argument). Implicit in left participatory theorists' visions is the belief that such participation would further instil in citizens socialist values. But this is by no means the case, given the underlying dominance of market-derived discourses, just as it is not necessarily the case that public deliberation produces a greater sense of communal cohesion. For the mass of citizens to define themselves primarily via political participation is consequently a unrealistic aspiration. These considerations are aside from the enormous practical difficulties of participatory democracy.[64] To recognise the limits of participatory politics is not of course to disdain the attempt to enable an involved and knowledgeable citizenry, nor to discount the efficacy of social struggle, but in this context to emphasise how it has also dis-served the left.

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[64] Walzer (p.204, 1970): "The state has simply outgrown the human reach and understanding of its citizens. It is not necessarily monstrous, divided, or subjugated, but its citizens are alienated and powerless. They experience a kind of moral uneasiness."

The tragedy of these theoretical weaknesses in practical terms is that (Selbourne, p.213, 1985): "..so ideologically unpersuasive in our own culture have socialist conceptions of liberty become, that the right has been able to argue its case for greater individual freedom even in the teeth of the free market's destructive effects on basic forms of human equity and social justice."

It was because the 'crisis' of the welfare state came to be fought out on the grounds of political economy, and for the above reasons, the new right was discursively stronger than the left (Culpitt 1992).

The point is then that the new right's essentialism, aided by its neglected flexibility, was more effective than the left's.

3.11 The New Right as a New Order

"Reading ingenious theories showing why capitalism cannot survive, one is left wondering why the world seems ever more free-market."[65]

The use of this discursive methodology helps construct a more useful characterisation of the new right. The new right was a political project in discursive closure, which may be illustrated with regard to citizenship, though certainly this has other dimensions. This reveals why many analyses of the new right project are misguided, in concentrating on the reduction of the state, and the withdrawal of the state in guaranteeing a

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[65] Willetts (p.107, 1992).

citizenship status. For example, O'Sullivan ('The New Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America', chapter ten, Eatwell and O'Sullivan 1989), suggests that the new right may have unwittingly extended 'social politics' despite offering a revival in civil association ('limited politics'). Rather, the analysis offered here suggests that the new right was always a project in 'social politics' - to shape and secure forms of citizenship thought suitable.

The end, the goal, of this closure might be termed the 'system of natural liberty' - the vision of society shared by many new right proponents, the shape of which has already been outlined in terms of citizenship [chapter two], and will be explored further in subsequent chapters. Though it is a system, discourse analysis helps reveal it is not 'natural' nor necessarily one of 'liberty'. It might also be called the 'market society'.

This is not a new conception. The shape of the (new) right's society has been described before (Tawney, p.33-4, 1921):

"To the strong it promises unfettered freedom for the exercise of their strength; to the weak the hope that they too one day may be strong. Before the eyes of both it suspends a golden prize, which not all can attain, but for which each may strive, the enchanting vision of infinite expansion. It assures men that there are no ends other than their ends, no law other than their desires, no limit other than that which they think advisable. Thus it makes the

individual the centre of his own universe, and dissolves moral principles into a choice of expediencies. And it immensely simplifies the problems of social life in complex communities. For it relieves them of the necessity of discriminating between different types of economic activity and different sources of wealth, between enterprise and avarice, energy and unscrupulous greed, property which is legitimate and property which is theft, the just enjoyment of the fruits of labour and the idle parasitism of birth and fortune, because it treats all economic activities as standing upon the same level, and suggests that excess or defect, waste or superfluity, require no conscious effort of the social will to avert them, but are corrected almost automatically by the mechanical play of economic forces."

The new right likes to suggest its discourses are 'natural' or simply accurate social theories. For example, Hayek (p.6, 1949) claimed: "Individualism is primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces that determine the social life of man...It does not postulate the existence of isolated or self-contained individuals instead of starting from men whose whole nature and character is determined by their existence in society." Neoconservatives act similarly - the authority of the state and certain other social institutions, allegiance to them, and key obligations identified, are 'natural' and 'inevitable'. They are only corrupted by alternative and subversive forces and ideas.

This is why it can be stated that (Gunn, p.40, 1989): "[For] Europe's New Conservatives, the enterprise culture is not simply a means to economic revival, but the agent of a whole new moral order." Indeed, the new right, in proposing its discourses so persistently, recognises the importance of ideas and perceptions. As Buchanan, the Public Choice theorist, has stated (p.103, 1988): "..to the extent that we care to view our interactions as market transactions they may actually come more closely to approximate the model by which we seek to explain them..if we change our conception of ourselves profoundly we may change ourselves." Aside from the concrete reforms the new right in all its variants has proposed, its project centred on the efficacy of this notion. By changing conceptions, it sought to change citizens, indeed what it meant to be a 'citizen'.

Just because the new right has sought to enforce the 'market society', this does not mean that the new right was neoliberal to the exclusion of other discourses. As already noted, there are many common themes between the different strands of the new right [2.9]. But discourse analysis can emphasise the shared project in discursive closure across the new right.[66]

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[66] This analysis also shows why genuine libertarians may be excluded from this critique, because they reject the notion of a dominant social understanding and respect plurality. Though libertarians may have particular visions of the 'good life', they do not expect them to be shared by all citizens, hence their suggestions for a 'radically free' society. Further, given the limited state they propose, true libertarians would have no means to impose such a dominant discursive understanding of the social world. Neoliberals, however, it is

One of the apparent differences between neoliberals and neoconservatives is the extent of the claim that they make for the values and attitudes required in market society in relation to non-market behaviour or citizenship. 'Pure' Neoliberals may claim to reject the notion that the public good requires a morally elevated and socially concerned citizenry. Social well-being can be an unintended consequence of individual action. (Neo)conservatives, apparently very differently, tend to proclaim the importance of values. For example, Kristol (p.127-8, 1995):

"Today, the old-fashioned animus against a market economy is evolving into an aggressive animus against the bourgeois society that is organically associated with our market economy. If you delegitimate this bourgeois society, the market economy - almost incidentally - is also delegitimated. It is for this reason that radical feminism today is a far more potent enemy of capitalism than radical trade unionism."

Kristol ('Adam Smith and the Spirit of Capitalism', 1995) for example points to the crucial role of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment, and most importantly that it respected the prescriptive claims of traditional institutions and modes of individual behaviour, while emphasising individual liberty. Hence the mutual admiration of Burke and Smith. He claims (p.280, ibid):

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suggested here, do have a very particular vision of the 'good life' for all citizens, and seek to impose it.

"The individualism of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is distinctly 'bourgeois', in that it has as its goal, not merely the happiness of the individual, but the creation of a more humane and elevated bourgeois community, one with powerful feelings of fraternity and fellowship. It is explicitly anti-Mandevillean, envisioning a society in which individual liberty is perfectly reconciled with the conventional bourgeois - Christian - virtues, and in which this reconciliation is a source of profound satisfaction to all."

Hence Kristol thinks the 'economic man' of neoliberalism and public choice is not quite the same creature as the 'bourgeois man' of Smith's vision. The latter is more subtle and valuable. However, this does suggest that they are closely-related.

Neoliberals may appear to desire plurality, but this analysis suggests that their thought dictates otherwise. This may be teased out in many aspects. For example, it has been noted that neoliberals logically should not be able to draw on arguments positing 'welfare dysfunction', because they claim as respecters of plurality, to imply no right way of living or hierarchy of principles which ought to be imposed upon people (hence their support for negative income tax). Hence dysfunction should not be the source of their objections to the extended welfare state (Barry, p.109-10, 1990). The case studies explore further the anti-pluralist structure

of neoliberal discourse, as well as that of neoconservative discourse.

The dominant element in neoliberalism's discursive closure concerns the 'free market'. Once the market is seen as disciplinarian as well as liberator ("..not to emancipate the entrepreneur but to chastise the feckless", Edgar, p.75, Levitas 1986), the divisions between new right liberals and conservatives can seem less acute. The left's criticisms of neoconservative authoritarianism often have led to the neglect of neoliberal authoritarianism.

Its order requires great coercion for the 'free society' to operate - a 'strong state' suppressing alternative values and practices allowing full range for the discipline of market rules. The 'liberal' market order turns out to be profoundly illiberal. To Belsey (Levitas 1986) both liberal and conservative new right involve the necessity for authoritarian and conservative social control: "..[the] totalitarian social and political theory of neo-conservatism is hardly likely to be conducive to the healthy existence of civil rights and political liberties" (p.175, ibid), coupled with its antipathy towards mass democracy.[67] Similarly, the neoliberal market requires obedience. Genuine freedom of choice is eroded in the obedience to purely abstract rules

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[67] Of course, neoliberals deny their anti-political nature while emphasising the limits of 'politics'. They simplistically claim (liberal) democracy depends on the market economy (Berger, 'The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism', chapter one, Diamond and Plattner 1993). Far from being authoritarian, capitalism is the precondition for individual autonomy (Berger 1987).

of conduct that leads to the formation of a social order. The new right has tended to suggest that the 'market' is 'natural', its operation likened to a force of nature, its effects unintended, undesigned and enforceable, and so incontrovertible. They are in effect seeking to close-off market processes from critical analysis.

Yet market mechanisms are not neutral, but within particular institutional frameworks, may penalise those citizens whose behaviour is deemed to cut across the 'logic' of the market (Miller, p.93-4, 1990). For example, Hayek (1988) saw mutual assistance from other citizens as an atavistic regression, a sign that intellectually and morally we have not yet fully matured to the needs of the impersonal comprehensive order of mankind. Citizens are not brought together by some cohesive bond, but kept apart in private domains by abstract rules, despite seemingly being united in common discursive understandings. To Belsey, because of this, ultimately neoliberal*ism* cedes to neoconservative authoritarianism because the strong state *is* required to preserve the 'freedom' of the market. But it is not necessary to repeat the division here between neoconservative 'authoritarianism' and neoliberal 'freedom'. Both are 'authoritarian' in respect to discourses, and consequently this means they may be authoritarian in social practice.

This is illustrated best with regard to 'liberal-conservative' conceptions, because they attempt to

fuse together the two main strands of the new right. First, for example, in Hayek's thought.

As Gamble (p.79, 1996) has noted: "One of the central paradoxes of Hayek's work keeps re-emerging. His economic analysis demonstrated that there was only one form of economic organisation which was appropriate to the modern world and would actually work, while his political analysis implied that there was no guarantee that human societies would choose the institutions which would preserve and strengthen the institutions that were the supreme achievement of Western civilisation." Forsyth (1988) sees at the foundation of Hayek's thought a naturalist (or physicalist) conception of man, at variance with the classical tenets of liberalism. It does not seem to contain a genuine liberal conception of rational-choosing individuals. Forsyth regards his emphasis on abstract governing rules, and his organicism, as partly a contradiction, and partly a continuation of, this. Hence he suggests of Hayek's thought (p.250, ibid): "Far from being classical liberalism purged of its errors, it is liberalism purged of all its classical truths." This is more explainable within the analysis developed here. In effect, Hayek thinks his 'morals' will be selected by 'evolution'. In fact he is highly constructivist, for this reason. The value of the 'spontaneous order' conception is just as that of the claim to 'naturalness' - it deflects criticism. Since what would be the worth of criticising a phenomena which is the product of no-one's design, and (supposedly) unchangeable ? Far from suceeding

in reversing the perceived turn of liberalism into a 'rigid creed', to use his own terms noted previously, Hayek's project may be regarded as attempting to reinforce the rigidity of liberalism by 'purging' it of its progressive aspects.

Espada (1996) claims Hayek uses normative values he attributes to the market system to claim that the 'ethically neutral instrument' of the market ought to be respected, in effect using the same terms (benefits, rewards, and so on) as criticised concepts such as 'social justice'. And it is unclear on which grounds a minimal 'safety-net' welfare system is supported by Hayek, since why does 'moral duty' (p.87, 1976) not legitimate a more expansive system ?

Second, Willett's 'modern conservatism', which tries to unite 'historical traditions' of 'freedom' and 'individualism'. In a sense, Willetts' project is 'correct'. He claims that 'free-market' capitalism is not self-undermining, and that a caricatured conception of 'free markets' is unhelpful. This is true. The 'free market' does rely on community, and there is a strong link between 'free markets' and 'community'. The only point of departure comes as a result of discourse analysis - such a system is not natural or neutral, but highly constructed, and an order which needs political support to sustain it. This needs to act in the present, and continually, but also shape historical understandings as well.[68]

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[68] The best example of a new right-influenced attempt to make such claims historically is Clark (1990), who claims that

The power of the 'market society' even brings in groups the new right might appear to have marginalised, or might be thought resistant to its discourses, especially since they also embrace willingly the consumer role (for example, sexual 'minorities', Evans, p.57, 1993). New right discourses offer enticingly the possibility of transforming social fragmentation into 'order' and 'totality'. As a result, it may even be the case that (Smith, p.40, 1994):

"Because the hegemonic project strategically stigmatises alternative projects so that it appears to offer the most coherent resolution to the organic crisis, the subject may consciously disagree with the content of the hegemonic project and yet, through (mis-) identification, give that same project her cynical consent."

Unsurprisingly, the sustaining of such an order demands the marginalisation of threats, of alternative discourses and the groups or individuals they emanate from. Both neoliberals and neoconservatives share this dogmatic rejection of 'the alternative'. Again, there is nothing exclusively contemporary about this. Conservatives have always been most concerned with 'ability without property' (Burke), as a politically-dangerous combination. 'Talent' which had little or no stake in the established order was bound to cause 'trouble'.

'English individualism' was not liberal but authoritarian individualist.

Additionally, this analysis resolves two related paradoxes of the new right. First, according to their own theories, they should not have been able to achieve any success. Much of the new right project seems to depend on a change of values and perceptions on behalf of citizens [further illustrated with regard to the project of Thatcherism, chapter nine]. Yet the new right appears to offer no reasons why this should happen. Popular expectations and demands have become excessive, the state overloaded. Interests will dictate that this continue, and hence the discourses of the new right should not have any effect. Institutional reforms might have an effect, but why should they be initiated, and how will they withstand the interests which will remain ? Rather, the new right has demonstrated the influence of discourses: shaping the way citizens think about the social world may shape the way they act in it, even to the extent of how they understand (their own and other) 'interests'. Second, the new right criticised the scope and influence of political activity, in terms of collective group interests, the new left's politics of identity, the politicisation of the family, education and so on, yet formed in loose political organisation in order to influence the public and powerful political actors. The nature of the new right, despite its anti-political discourses, points to the primacy of the political in its project to construct and reinforce the 'market society'. This is why the new right can be seen as a political project - it has an end goal,

and a sense of how to achieve the end. The new right was instrumental in constructing the 'crisis' of politics and economics in the 1970s, and the struggle over its meaning (Hay 1995). In this sense, Thatcherism was a response to the 'crisis' the new right had been influential in constructing.

3.12 What is to be Done ?

From this analysis, what shape should the left's reformulation of citizenship take ? One option has been supplied recently by Clarke (1996), that of 'deep citizenship'. This claims to be a conception which draws on 'radical democracy', liberal themes such as 'individualism' recontextualised to promote political participation. Acting politically, taking inspiration from Dante's *politizare*, is seen as a good in itself. For the reasons suggested above, this option runs into many of the same criticisms as the established conceptions of citizenship on the left. An alternative conception will be outlined in chapter ten.

3.13 Summary

The new right represents the most significant political project in citizenship in contemporary politics. It should not be dismissed merely as a denial of citizenship, though it is deficient in many respects. For complex and inter-related reasons, it has expressed many key discourses associated with modern citizenship which previously had been somewhat neglected. However, in addition it may be seen to represent a project to close-off different and competing conceptions of what it is to

be a 'citizen'. As such the new right constitutes a highly expansive form of politics which seeks to reduce the scope of alternative political activity and thought. It represents an attempt to construct a 'new order', a rigid discursive structure of ideas and perceptions. Inherent in the construction, as well as often in the prescriptions and content, of new right discourses is a highly 'authoritarian' thrust. This analysis should now be explored in political and social practice.