Towards a Relational-Processual Understanding of Informal Settlements in Saudi Arabia: Informality, Collectives, and Urbanization.

Abdulla Saeed Difalla

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Sheffield
Faculty of Social Science
Department of Urban and Regional Studies

September of 2021

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. (Quran 1-1)

Abstract

This thesis presents the first relational study of urban informality in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. There are more than 60 informal areas in the city representing one-third of its land area and housing more than 1.2 million residents. However, existing research on these neighbourhoods has centred on the physical structure and built environment, while their social structure and relations within them (and also with the outside) have remained largely unexplored. In addressing this gap, the thesis synthesizes Norbert Elias's theory of "established-outsider" relations and international literature on urban informality in understanding the complex, ambivalent, and dynamic nature of these marginal spaces.

Using interviews and ethnographic observations in the Aljameaah neighbourhood, the findings reveal how informal areas in Jeddah are characterized by diverse interdependent groups such as tribal communities, long-standing and newly arrived immigrants, and undocumented immigrants living together, sharing spaces and resources in an informal context. This diversity and complex figuration of interdependencies serve as the foundation for understanding Aljameaah: as a dynamic space of relations that is re-made alongside continuous urbanisation processes, which transform and reconfigure it over time.

The central findings of the research and thesis can be summarized in three overlapping areas. First, the specific history of informality in Aljameaah articulates the complex processes under which its groups and communities develop over time and how members of the same group identify with each other (and *dis*identify from others). A spatial relational-driven typology of the "hara" (an Islamic concept referring to the immediately proximate community) is formulated which can inform the interpretation of social relations and group differentiation in Aljameaah. Second, the research captures the relational dynamics of Aljameaah, highlighting how groups relate to "others" and how these relations are in flux over time and space. Tracing group relations across different generations reveals the ambivalent collectives that are formed between tribes, migrants and marginalized others, but also how the stigmatizing perceptions of Aljameaah are also made symbolically in relation to other places. Third, the research addresses the interdependence between urbanization and the making and re-making of the urban margins in Jeddah. Sensitivity to longer-term urbanisation processes alongside analyses of contemporary public policies reveals the way in which they impact on Aljameaah's residents and the scope for collective solidarities.

Acknowledgements

I thank the residents of Aljameaah neighbourhood for their cooperation with me during the fieldwork for this research. They were very kind and friendly and had the time to answer my questions. Special thanks go to the Kilo 6 area's residents who were very respectful and polite toward me despite my ignorance about the realities of their communities. In general, they taught me many valuable lessons during my visits there and I am thankful for that. I would also like to thank specific participants (Jaffar the informant, Osamah, Rakan, Hamed, Abdulla and many others) who contributed significantly to this research.

My gratitude also goes to my first supervisor Ryan Powell who introduced me to the field of figurational sociology. His advice and insights along with his expertise in Norbert Elias' works helped me tremendously in my research. His positivity was always there when I had doubts. He also took on his shoulders the task of correcting my grammar and language mistakes which were common in my writing. I would also to thank my second supervisor, Dr Melanie Lombard, for her constructive comments and suggestions on how I could improve my thesis. She was always willing to help and her expertise in urban informality was very useful in synthesising my findings. Her commitment was very much appreciated. I do not forget to thank Dr Steve Connelly and Dr Glyn Williams for their works in Doctoral Training in Urban Studies Module (TRP626) which was extremely valuable with its diverse contents.

Finally, thanks to my parents, Aisha and Saeed, for their prayers and support, their weekly calls were helpful to keep me motivated. Also, thanks to my wife, Afnan, who always was next to me with her smile and positive attitude. It would have been very hard to finish this research without her. My son, Basel, was a complete and total blessing and I'm really thankful to him. Lastly, without funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I would not have been able to complete this research. Thanks to my government for allowing me to conduct this PhD in the United Kingdom.

Table of Contents

List of Table

List of Figures

List of Pictures

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Informal areas in Saudi Arabia may be different from those in Latin America, India, and Africa. Differences here rest upon historical, economic, social and political context. Economically, Saudi Arabia is a wealthy country that produces oil. Hence, informal areas in Saudi Arabia have different physical conditions from those around the globe. Unlike many other such areas across the world, informal areas in Jeddah, the second-largest city in the Kingdom, have clean water, a formal electricity supply, and formal schools. No one can describe the physical and social conditions of such areas inhumane (Mutisya and Yarime, 2011, p. 200). Furthermore, most of the local people enjoy a decent standard of living, and poverty is rare. However, while this is the case for Saudi local people, there are international immigrants who also live in these areas, and they are economically in far less comfortable positions. Socially, these areas are diverse with a wide range of different nationalities: some areas have very clear segregation, but others are relatively homogeneous.

Saudi Arabia is a neglected and new context for studying informality. It is a country that in the past was characterized by traditional ways of living but with the discovery of oil a rapid shift happened to adopt a more modern way of living and this has affected residents socially and economically. It is also a country that acknowledges the religion of Islam as the source of its laws and regulations and this plays a major role in defining how people relate to each other. All these processes affect urban informalities in Saudi Arabia and considering them will expand our understanding of how different people live within these areas.

In 2003, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) established a new redevelopment project targeting Jeddah's informal areas, one of the country's largest and most diverse cities in the kingdom. The project's initial aim was to document illegal houses – those without title deeds – and find solutions to deal with them. In 2008, the Council of Ministers announced the establishment of a private company called Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC) to be responsible for guiding the redevelopment project, along with Jeddah's Municipality (Abdulaal, 2011). In the same year, a shift happened in the aim of the policy "from regularizing to removing informal areas", and the municipality announced the Informal Areas Development Ordinances (IADO), which categorised informal areas in Jeddah, based on their economic potential. The new logic was to eradicate these areas

and relocate residents to peripheral regions. However, the project was not able to achieve its aims, due to stiff resistance from residents, who have opposed any attempt to relocate them. Instead, the Municipality has gradually applied certain public policies to confine the scope and space of the daily life of the residents, such as preventing them from accessing electricity for further construction (Al-Rajhi, 2017), shutting down some medical services, ordering them to leave these areas, and no longer providing maintenance services. However, local people still live in their neighbourhoods and refuse to move out, leading to the failure of the project in 2019.

The international literature on informality is rich with many different perspectives and theories but studies of Saudi Arabia's informality, particularly from a social dimension, are almost absent. The research relating to Saudi Arabia generally focuses more on documenting the physical conditions of such areas (Mortada, 2008; Karimi and Parham, 2012; El-Shorbagy and El-Shafi, 2014), as well as reviewing redevelopment project policies (Abdulaal, 2011). Some earlier studies looked at the urban history of Jeddah but were concerned with the conditions of informal areas and how they were constructed for a temporary purpose (Osama Jastaniah, 1984; Duncan, 1987; Salagoor, 1990). However, to the knowledge of the researcher, there is no prior investigation that specifically studies the daily life of different groups who live within informal areas in Saudi Arabia. This research attempts to rectify that deficiency through a qualitative approach that focuses primarily on a processual and relational understanding of the different groups within an informal context, that of Aljameaah neighbourhood in Jeddah.

1.1 Studying urban informality through a relational and processual approach

To study urban informality in Saudi Arabia, the research adopts a theory from the discipline of sociology, which is explained and discussed in Chapter 2. The rationale for using a sociological framework is a reflection of a gap identified while engaging with the literature of urban informality. In particular, this gap is related to the lack of a clear understanding of the nature of the relation between groups and how they have different interests and capacities. In addition, this relational and processual theory is supported by studies in urban informality literature, which allow for going beyond the usual focus on dichotomies of tribal tradition

versus modernity and global South versus North in attending to the constant making and remaking of Jeddah's urban margins.

The prevalent view of informal areas has been that they are disorganised enclaves of poverty (Jackson, 1974; Davis, 2006). This way of thinking became translated in such a way that planners in the developing world conceived informal areas as obstacles to urban development and the only way to deal with them was by eradicating them. But in the 1960s, many scholars started to emphasise the potential of "slums", for example, how the people living in them contributed positively to the housing and job markets, their strong social ties and the kind of skills they had (Whyte, 1943; Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1969). Mangin wrote in this regard: "Obviously one major contribution is that millions of people have solved their own housing problem in situations where the national governments were practically unable to move" (Mangin, 1967, p. 74). These ideas had driven the literature from focusing only on the negative consequences of these areas to also consider their positive.

Before the 1970s, the term "informality" had not been used to describe informal areas. Terms like "informal settlements" or "slums" were used to describe the informal and poor areas during that time. Informality was first used to describe the informal economy in 1973 (Hart, 1973). Currently, the term now used to describe both informal settlements and the informal economy. The expansion of the term included informal housing as a vital part of the economy of the developing world (Benjamin and Beegle, 2014). The informal economy here mainly refers to economic activities that function outside formal regulatory systems such as self-organised activities like street markets, street hawkers, and small enterprises. Informal housing refers to a type of settlement that usually is self-built and located on the outskirts of large cities. That is, they are built illegally on private or public land without obtaining any permits. This prompts the idea of formalising informality as a win-win solution for both local people and states.

De Soto formulated his popular theory on the assumption that informal areas and informal economies should join the formal sector because they represent "dead capital" that should be revived (De Soto, 1989). The process of formalising informality usually occurs through providing local people with legal land titles or legal permissions so they can function under the supervision of the state. That means although local people would benefit from economic protection, they may also be obliged to be included in the tax system. There is a large body of literature that critiques De Soto's theory and points out the limitations of transferring

informality to the formal sector. These critiques relate to the displacement of local people in informal areas due to rising prices of land and housing after the formalisation process (Payne, 2001; Neuwirth, 2006); the disruption of communal life through gentrification (Varley, 2002); and the fact that formalisation is not the main aim of the poor themselves (Perlman, 2004).

AlSayyad and Roy (2003) define informality as "an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformations itself" (cited in (Roy, 2005, p. 148). They reject the idea that informal and formal are separate entities and consider both as closely related. The basis of such a claim is that "informality exists at the very heart of the state and is an integral part of the territorial practices of state power" (Roy, 2009, p. 84). The point here is that states use and practise informal activities (McFarlane, 2012) while at the same time, punishing ordinary people's informal activities. This understanding led to the idea that informality is by nature a logical choice of both state and people. In this context, informality is not just a reflection of the poor and marginalized groups but also a choice or practice made by state elites in order to pursue their own interests.

Just as formal areas are rich in different people socially, economically and culturally, the same applies to informal areas. Picturing an informal area as one abstract body where the spectrums of all its people are equally fixed in their status is deceptive. These areas have a variety of people who ultimately differ in their positions, circumstances, and how they respond to public policies. Lindell (2010, p. 210) writes: "Some influential perspectives on such politics have tended to treat 'informals' as a rather undifferentiated crowd mainly made up of the 'working poor' and sharing one and the same structural position." She points out that diversity and complexity within informality imply complexity in their relationships and behaviours, hence they are complex spaces whose operations are difficult to predict (Lindell, 2010, p. 218). Whyte (1943) also draws attention to this, his distinction is based on the level of the district, noting that "social life differs so fundamentally from one district to the other that any attempt to lump the two together and make generalizations upon this basis is bound to be fruitless and misleading" (p. 37). Although Whyte's research context was "slums" in the USA, his early emphasis on the diverse nature of these areas, in the 1940s, is critical.

Dealing with informality as one single entity where all actors are identical can result in undesirable outcomes. The task here is to try to "see other axes of power, other sets of relations, as well as the variety of actors, positions and agendas" (Lindell, 2010, p. 210). It is essential to

study the "varied nature of interactions" (Watson, 2009, p. 2261) inside informal areas so that the differentiation between different groups in these areas becomes clear and understood. A multi-dimensional approach to informality is needed to understand the dynamic nature of informal areas and grasp the various processes that take place in them.

Informed by this literature, this research aims to contribute to the idea that there are variety and diversity within informal areas and will delve deeply into the internal dynamics and power relations within informal areas in Jeddah. The primary focus is not on how informal areas relate to the rest of the city, nor how local people interact with outsiders - although that is a crucial and interdependent context. Rather, the aim is to study and understand the social relations between different groups within informal areas and the implications of such relations. The research investigates how these local groups interact and the nature of their interdependencies (economic, social, political): how Saudis and immigrants exist together in one area and whether they produce segregation, integration, or both. This draws upon relational concepts of dis/identification, power and stigmatization between groups, a neglected area of research in Saudi Arabia.

The research develops Norbert Elias's (1994a) theory of Established-Outsider relations as a guiding framework for understanding the dynamic nature of group interdependencies and unequal power relations. Elias's theory has proved fruitful in application to contexts in the global north, and by adopting the theory here, the research extends it to a new spatial and social context which can help refine and develop Elias's framework. Also, it is worth mentioning that this theory has been neglected by scholars of informality and using it will provide a good opportunity for providing a different perspective for understanding these areas. Elias's theory can be usefully synthesized with works in the field of informality in contributing to an understanding of informality which places group dynamics and collectives at the centre.

1.2 Aims and research questions

The main aim of the research is to study the social relations between the groups who live within informal areas in Jeddah - Saudis, documented immigrants, and undocumented immigrants - with a focus on their interdependencies. The groups are conceived of as embedded in a social configuration in an informal context which is affected by different factors.

The research has two connected secondary aims which are:

- Understanding the historical development of informal areas in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia with a special focus on the long-term process of urbanisation and development of public policies in dealing with these areas: how do these processes and policies affect the daily life of local people and their internal group relations?
- Situating Saudi Arabia's informality within global context and debates, and thereby making an empirical contribution to those debates.

Themes	Research Questions	Methods
Relational	What is the nature of everyday relations and interdependencies between different groups in Aljameaah?	Interviews with local people. Observations.
Relational	How is power manifested in terms of relations and outcomes for different groups?	Interviews with local people. Observations.

Processual and relational	How have urbanization and urban policy affected and driven changes in informal areas and groups relations in Jeddah?	Interviews with policy makers.
		Analysing documents (Law of Village and Municipality, Law of Informal Areas Development in Jeddah).

Table 1. Research Questions and Methods.

Since the main aim of the research is to study social relations between different groups, the first research question is related to the nature of interdependencies between these groups (Table 1). The term "interdependencies" in this context refers to the socio-economic activities that these groups are involved in, and the way they share, use and benefit from the space that they occupy. The second question relates to the concept of power. The term "power" in this context refers to the ability of one group to influence the activities of other groups or to impose its own norms and values on others. Answering this question is important because it is an extension of the first question, and it would help to understand how interdependencies between different groups are formed and how they change over time. The third question is concerned with the historical development and structural factors that shape the context of the research. These factors include the influence of public policies and the role of religion and media in shaping social relations within Aljameaah. By answering the second and third questions, the two secondary aims of the research would be achieved.

The research focuses on a single case study, the neighbourhood of Aljameaah, to enable a rich, detailed understanding of its historical development and everyday socio-spatial relations. Aljameaah is a very vital neighbourhood that is located in the southern part of Jeddah next to the second-largest university in Saudi Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz University. The main reason for choosing this informal area is that it has a very diverse population of people who have lived together for more than 40 years. They come from Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Palestine, along with Saudi nationals and are a mix of long-standing

immigrants, newly arrived documented immigrants, and undocumented immigrants, along with Saudi nationals. It is one of the biggest informal areas in Jeddah (population around 120,000), as its location provides a large number of jobs for labourers. It is also an area that has been stigmatized in official documents and media. No previous study has researched this high level of diversity to explore the internal processes between these groups and the effects of the wider context they live in.

1.3 Methodology

Since this research is concerned with understanding actors' experiences and their perceptions of the context, the qualitative approach is used to answer the questions that are being investigated. This approach acknowledges the presence of multiple meanings and understandings of truth and that truth here in this research is not universal but rather is subjective (Jones, 1995). That is, the results of this research are a product of the interviewees' experiences of living in Aljameaah. Because three research questions are being investigated, multiple qualitative methods are used. First, documentary analysis is an important element in this research because it allows the researcher to examine and read public documents to gain an understanding of or look for explanations about tackling change and development (Bowen, 2009). Hence, this method is used to understand how public policies in Saudi Arabia affect the relations between different groups within informal areas. Specifically, the research analyses: The Law of Villages and Municipalities, The Law of Informal Areas Development in Jeddah, the First Master Plan of Jeddah, the Second Master Plan of Jeddah, Laws of Commercial and Civic Activities, and relevant newspapers articles.

Secondly, semi-structured interviews enabled me to define the scope of the research and also gave the participants the chance to add ideas that might have needed more elaboration (Gill *et al.*, 2008). Additionally, it gives an in-depth understanding of the everyday relations and practices within the informal area. The third method is observation. This method supports the information from interviews and is a tool to validate this data (Kawulich, 2005). Also, it helps me to see what the physical appearance of the built environment is like for the different groups and if there is any segregation or tangible differences.

A thematic analysis of the data was used in order to identify themes that emerge from the data collected from the interviews and observation. Three main themes and their sub-themes emerged: (1) the establishment of Aljameaah and its groups' identifications and what implications this has on space, (2) the relations between Aljameaah groups and how these relations change over time, which is affected by concepts like power and stigmatization, and (3) the wider context of Aljameaah and how this context impacts the groups and their relations. Results show that the Saudi, documented and undocumented immigrants are living in a social configuration that produces ambiguous results. On the one hand, the Saudi and undocumented groups are able to create a homogenous group that identified with each other through their shared spaces and experiences (the *hara* as a spatial identification). On the other hand, some Saudi and documented immigrants are unable to identify with each other and conflicts exist between them while others relatively exist in harmony. The findings also shed light on the nature of urban informality in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia as a particular case of Arab cities in an Islamic context.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis has eight chapters.

After this Introduction, Chapter Two summarises the relative literature and has two parts. The first is a chronological review of the literature on urban informality to show how informality has been associated with negative discourses in the past. It reveals how a shift occurs in dealing with informal areas where the attention changes from seeing informal areas negatively to seeing them positively. This shift, although is important, is not sufficient for dealing with these informal areas. New emerging studies have called for a closer look at these areas to show how they function in terms of social relations. Second, to address this issue, the chapter reviews theoretical frameworks and some related concepts as a basis to examine Aljameaah as an informal area. It shows how concepts like power, stigmatisation, and social identification are crucial in understanding the shifting relations between different groups tied to urbanization over time.

Chapter Three describes the methodology of the research and provides a description of the process of conducting the fieldwork. This involves clarifying the ontological position of the research and the qualitative methods employed to explore and evaluate the case study. It

provides the rationale for the use of observation and interviews as means to explore the research questions. Finally, it addresses some specific methodological issues in the study which include: (a) some ethical challenges of the fieldwork; (b) gender issues in a religious context like Saudi Arabia; and (c) an overview of the participants' information and the data collection and analysis process.

Chapter Four sheds light on the local context of the Aljameaah in Saudi Arabia. This involves highlighting some macro and micro issues along with policies that have had an impact on shaping informal areas in general. It shows how rapid urbanisation policies guided by Western norms and models have been associated with a growth in informal areas. These imported norms and development models have been used to develop contemporary public policies in the Kingdom. In addition, since this research focuses on the relations between different groups, Chapter Four describes the historical backgrounds of the groups that are the focus of this study: Saudis, documented immigrants, and undocumented immigrants. This allows a better overview of their socio-economic situation before and after the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Chapter Five presents the first empirical findings of the thesis, which tackles the process of the formation of the groups in the Aljameaah. I start by looking at how groups were identified in the first place, and how these groups have evolved over time, as well as what factors can be taken into account to determine a group's composition. By studying the groups and their own members' relations, it is demonstrated that groups are not static, but evolve and change according to the interests of their members. This leads to a spatial understanding of the current state of these groups. In particular, it reveals how Aljameaah is divided relationally into three different areas: tribal areas, diverse areas, and stigmatised areas. Furthermore, the Chapter shows how in the case of some diverse areas the structure of the members' relations, although solidarity and coherence are observed, is still informed by their own groups' identifications and norms. This is made clear by delving into their day to day interactions. Finally, it is shown that in stigmatised areas, groups are composed of a diverse set of members, whose identification with one another is based on space rather than group memberships. This is illustrated by the high level of cohesion between them and how they are exceptionally different from other areas.

Chapter Six gives a detailed account of how different groups relate to each other and how these relationships develop over time. Then it moves to describe the historical relations between groups at the level of the neighbourhood. Three stages of development are identified, with each

stage having its own set of circumstances and factors that affect how the groups react. The first stage is that of the 1960s and 1970s when tribal groups were the dominant actors in Aljameaah. In the second stage, which is the 1980s and 2000s, a more complex social configuration emerges in which Saudi migrants and undocumented immigrants are the most important actors. In the third stage, which is the contemporary period, the tribal groups are no longer the dominant actors in the neighbourhood and new actors emerge like the Burmese and transient immigrants. These stages of development show how the role of power is central in understating social realities in the Aljameaah. It explains how the groups in the Aljameaah often use stigmatisation to justify or increase their power and hence their ability to control others.

Chapter Seven also describes the relation between groups, but this time taking into account the role of external factors. It explains how broader political and economic structures influence groups' choices and hence their actions. These factors include the influence of news media, the establishment of a new tax system, and religious beliefs. It is shown that these factors are important for groups' power and how one group may find itself winning in one circumstance but losing in another. In the end, this variation in the group' status leads to conflict between groups. This Chapter shows the complexity of an informal area like Aljameaah when it comes to its interactions with urbanization and public policies. Additionally, it demonstrates how groups may use religion to their benefit. Religion is used as a powerful tool for gaining more resources and claiming more rights.

Chapter eight is the conclusion that summarises the findings of the thesis. It starts with answering the three research questions. The first question relates to the nature of relations and interdependencies of Aljameaah's groups, and it is answered by explaining the different ways in which groups relate to each other and how these relations change over time in reference to Elias' theory of "established and outsider". The second question relates to power and how it manifests itself in Aljameaah, and it is answered by showing how groups use different strategies like social cohesion and religion to increase or maintain their power. The third question relates to the influence of public policies on Aljameaah and groups relations, and it is answered by describing how groups have reacted to policies like urbanisation, *kafeel* system, and taxation. The chapter then moves to describe eight contributions to knowledge; six are theoretical, one is empirical, and one is methodological. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of limitations to the study, and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 2: The Literature Review

Since this thesis aims to study different groups' relations within informal areas in Jeddah and to look at different ways of understanding them, this chapter explores dominant theoretical perspectives regarding urban informality. The literature on urban informality shows a lack of understanding of the relation between informality and immigration, and how these co-exist and what implications might be expected from this interplay. Furthermore, informality in Saudi Arabia has been neglected in the global literature, even though its cases may offer insights into the complexity of how informal areas. Recent studies of informality have called for more awareness of these spaces, suggesting relational and processual approaches to exploring their actors' relations. This thesis contributes to these debates in its aim to understand informal areas more deeply by using a theoretical lens that captures the complexity of social interactions and appreciates diversity and richness.

This chapter has two main parts, aiming to bring two distinct fields of research together. The first part evaluates the literature on urban informality chronologically, to highlight dominant themes across time. This time-based review is a slight oversimplification and yet is useful to show how the urban informality literature evolves over time, and to situate this thesis within the literature's current gaps and challenges. In this part, global literature on informality is analysed to show how countries from different geographic locations, whether they are developed or developing, have dealt with informal areas. The approach does not to adopt dichotomies but reviews processes and patterns of knowledge regardless of their origin. It provides an overview of the various ways in which informality is discussed in different places around the world and concludes that informality needs to be understood from different angles in order to avoid creating false perceptions about these areas and to appreciate the complexity, interdependence, and diverse nature of these spaces.

The second part of this chapter describes and explains Elias's *Established and Outsider* (1994) - the adopted conceptual approach to interpreting dynamics of informality through group relations - and how it is operationalised, critiqued, and developed in application to Jeddah. This part aims to introduce this theory into the field of urban informality research by describing its key aspects and defining its elements and how the literature of figurational sociology built upon it.

2.1 Background

This section offers a review of informality literature from a range of global contexts, in order to demonstrate how the field has evolved over time. It looks at the way informal areas were conceived before and in the 1960s and how they were seen by scholars of that era. It reveals how initial perceptions of informality were mainly focused on studying the physical properties of these areas, which were then interpreted as "slums" and therefore dangerous areas.

Historically in the USA and the UK, informal areas were referred to as "slums" (Whyte, 1943) which was a reference to urban areas that had been seen as dangerous and should be avoided or removed from the urban landscape. Although these slums were formally classified and designated by the state, they were often associated with many informal problems, such as high-density housing, public health issues, and social problems. A characteristic slum was frequently defined as 'an overcrowded and squalid back street, district, etc. usually in a city and inhabited by very poor people, and a house or building unfit for human habitation' (Hawkins and Allen, 1991, p: 1396)[1]. In addition, slums were often characterised as being disorganised and lacking any sense of community, and also as being filled with "aliens" and those individuals who held different attributes and characteristics than the majority (Harvey, 1929). That is, slums in the USA and the UK became associated with concentrations of poverty. They became areas with a "culture of poverty" where the children living there were unwilling to improve their conditions if given a chance (Lewis, 1966).

Scholars at this stage – roughly before the 1960s - focused on the physical appearance of these areas. That is, they simply focused on the basic idea of how slums appeared in terms of their patterns and materials. They assumed that the low quality of the built environment would be enough to harm its inhabitants (Monson, 1955). Hence, slums were treated as a 'public health problem' and the existence of a low-quality environment meant the existence of an immoral population. In this sense, the word "slum" often combined empirical insights on housing quality and the environment with moralizing discourses of social problems, poor population, and spaces that needed to be removed. Thus, programs in the US in the 1950s and 1960s were established to wipe out these areas and built new public housing units to replace them (Friedman, 1966). The same process was happening in the UK in the 1950s:

---

[1] Refers to a slum from the Victorian era.

approximately 1.5 million units were eradicated by the government in massive slum clearance programs (Yelling, 2000). This era, both in practice and in the literature, saw a lack of understanding of how these "slums" functioned internally and the way in which groups interacted and developed their realities. That is, the single focus on physical appearances and how they affect the population misunderstood how these areas function and prevented many from grasping these areas' potentials. It was not understood that it was not necessary to eradicate slum areas in order to improve them, nor that wholesale demolition could have unintended consequences such as creating new slums in other areas or weakening social networks of targeted populations.

However, also at this time, voices emerged that called for other solutions. A few scholars started to question the dominant view and attempted to build new arguments that grasped the positive processes and characteristics that informal areas might have. It was thought that it would be much more effective to improve city problems and engage with them instead of fighting them. The new emerging theme was that informal areas contribute positively to the housing and job markets of the city and hence rehabilitating rather than eradicating was a logical choice to deal with them. Mangin (1967) found that in Latin American squatter settlements, the level of local political participation could be higher compared to formal areas. He also noted how informal areas represented a solution and that "obviously one major contribution is that millions of people have solved their own housing problem in situations where the national governments were practically unable to move." (Mangin, 1967, p: 74). Those scholars chose to go beyond judging and measuring the performance of these slums according to their physical appearances and considered other perspectives such as their economic and social conditions and political context.

Other scholars started to question who the people living in slums were, and how they could be helped. This shift was an attempt to better understand "slum" areas and go beyond the concept that these areas are dangerous. Stokes (1962) suggested - away from the usual views at this time - a new approach to deal with slums in the United States. His approach was to advance perceptions of slums by analysing their residents and understanding their motivations for being there. Although his perception of slums was that they were places for strangers "those who just migrated to cities", he tried to understand their diverse communities when he proposed two types of these areas: slums of hope and slums of despair. The latter, he suggested, were areas that had people who were willing to absorb the city' traditions and values and seek better

opportunities, while the former were areas that had people who found it hard to integrate due to their culture. In line with this perspective, Turner (1968) suggested that authorities should apply " a relaxation of standards" so local people in these areas could have the freedom to build in a way that is compatible with their circumstances. Both assumptions conceptualize informal areas positively rather than negatively. Their approaches were unique in this era and were subsequently developed and adapted by local government planners or even by international agencies.

Similarly, in the 1970s, many scholars challenged the negative views of "slums" that had been promulgated during this period. One of the key texts in this area was Janice Perlman's book, "*The Myth of Marginality*" (Perlman, 1979) which showed, through ethnographic evidence, that the poor who lived in these areas were often not unorganised or isolated but were instead living in a way that was different from how society had always expected them to live. She revealed that favelas, "slums in Brazil", were more welcoming and accepting than those areas in which middle-class families lived (Perlman, 2004). She looked closely at these areas and was able to prove that similarities between "slums" and middle-class communities were more than assumed in terms of the socio-economic situation. The only difference between slums and middle-class areas was that residents of the former were using strategies that did not seem typical to city officials (Marques, 2015). That is, by seeing positive aspects of the "slums", residents of these areas changed from being the cause of the disorder to victims of state policies and behaviours. This set the stage for a new approach to the problem of "slums" in the literature that began to take shape, as we will see in Section 2.2.

Another shift that happened in the literature in the 1970s was regarding the label of these areas. Because the word "slums" is used repeatedly in negative contexts that suggest they are sources of trouble for cities, many scholars tended to dismiss this term since it is "dangerous because it confuses the physical problem of poor quality housing with the characteristics of the people living there" (Gilbert, 2007, p. 697). Instead, scholars used another term that is more appropriate: "informality", which is often used as a generic term that refers to any practice or activity that operates outside the legal system. The term informality was first used in academia when Hart decided to investigate how the unemployed and poor migrants in Ghana generate incomes "outside the organized labour force", which he called informality (Hart, 1973). It was associated – in its beginning as a term – not with territories but as activities – particularly in terms of economy- as a means of accumulation.

From the above, some general observations about the informality literature in this period can be drawn. Clearly, informal areas were misconceived by a significant number of researchers who did not understand the rationalities of their existence and their actors' culture. It seems they judged the situation based solely on pre-defined features that reflected urban planning standards that were obsessed with orderliness principles rather than understanding the culture of these areas, in particular the social dimension (Gilbert, 2007). This superficial approach had a profound impact on practice and theory, contributing to the misguided impression that informal areas were isolated and alien. This is why there was a conflict between what some scholars wrote about the danger of slums and reality when researchers found these informal areas more friendly than they thought (Perlman, 2004). When later researchers started studying the phenomenon more closely, it became clear that informality is an important sector for many people and countries (Günther and Launov, 2012).

2.2   Engaging with informality

By the 1980s, many scholars had become convinced that informal areas may be used as opportunities for the advantage of states and residents alike. One example is De Soto (1989) whose concept was that informal areas should be acknowledged and turned into the formal market by giving its residents property rights. The reasoning was that such areas represent 'dead money' that should be revived with minimal public intervention. In doing so, local residents would benefit by accessing the formal market and adding formal security to their houses, while states would benefit from getting taxes. However, evidence suggests that such an approach does not always lead to a successful outcome. For example, some studies argue that formalising these areas can cause residents to move due to increases in rents (Payne, 2001; Neuwirth, 2006; Porter, 2011). In addition, there is the question of whether formalising informal areas is what residents want to achieve in the first place (Perlman, 2004). Nonetheless, even if it "is not a panacea capable of solving all the problems" (Rigon, 2016, p. 9), this approach at least did not "blame the victims" (Perlman, 1986, p: 40), and instead tried to find win-win solutions for both formal and informal actors.

By the beginning of the 2000s, more attention was devoted to questioning states roles in causing and worsening the condition of informal areas, and at the same time, accusing states themselves of sometimes functioning informally. To illustrate, McFarlane (2012) shows how states may

put themselves beyond the scope of legality in order to create new forms of urban projects that could be considered unlawful based on their own regulations. For example, a state may construct megaprojects on reserved lands, change the land use for some developers, create zones of exception and bypass certain laws (Ong, 2006; Haid, 2017). Indeed, states usually use informality to obtain more resources since states can use informality as an instrument of "accumulation" and "authority" (Roy, 2009, p. 81). Also, states produce informality by not regulating some social practices that with time, facilitate informal practices to arise (Haid, 2017). This idea has been called "tolerated informality" (Smart and Smart, 2017), "grey areas" (Yiftachel, 2009), and "semi-informal" (Davis and Cross, 1999). When state actors create and form new abstract laws, these new laws can be implemented flexibly. In other words, enforcement agents usually modify new rules based on their personal assessments in such a way that they may tolerate some informal practices: that is, "enforcement officers exercise their power ambiguously" (Perlman, 2004, p. 290). It is essential to understand this selective toleration of some informal practices by state so we can explore its effect on the daily life activities within informal areas - a neglected area in informality research in general but which is central to the empirical findings on Jeddah that follow.

Such tolerations indicate how the rule of states is ambiguous. The literature highlights how states might tolerate not just those practices that are located under the 'grey area' but also those which are classified as illegal. Ghertner (2008) points out how state actors tolerate some "illegal" activities just because they occur in "world-class" neighbourhoods while punishing the same activities just because they occur in areas that appear "slums" or informal. His evidence suggests that states have double standards when it comes to dealing with neighbourhoods. Illegal activities that happen in informal areas get widely highlighted in the media and become the focus of policy makers, yet the same activities get overlooked in formal areas.

With this unfair scene, many questions arise, such as '"why institutional bodies turn a blind eye to certain activities that are not tolerated in other settings?" (Haid, 2017, p. 291). Why were states absent when informal areas and practices started to emerge but when developed fully, states appear suddenly to punish them? (Wacquant, 2008). Although these questions are not the main core of this research, recognizing them is essential to emphasize the negative rule of states and to stress the idea that not just informal areas are functioning outside the legal system but also states share this responsibility. In other words, the intention here is not simply to suggest

that informality takes place within communities of poor or marginalised people alone (Davis, 2006). Rather, it occurs also within formal systems (Roy, 2009) which indicates that informality is a generic practice that is used to perform activities, whether in informal settlements or not, or whether people who practise informality are poor or elite.

Al Sayyad and Roy (2003) define informality as "An organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformations itself" (Roy, 2005, p. 184). The reason for such a claim is that "informality exists at the very heart of the state and is an integral part of the territorial practises of state power" (Roy, 2009, p. 80). The point here is that states use and practise informal activities (McFarlane, 2012) and at the same time punish ordinary people's informal activities. In this respect, what were "slums" and pictured as "threats" are now seen as products of the state itself. States may establish urban plans and regulations to control and manage urban growth and urban actors, but sometimes they may overlook these regulations if they are in conflict with some of the state's goals. However, although this range of literature has been useful in showing the link between states and informality, it is not without its limitations. It confines itself to the "interplay" between formal actors and informal areas and fails to bring these areas to life by understanding their actors and how they deal with their day-to-day struggles.

2.3 Drivers of informality and how states deal with them

In this widening debate on informality, Foster (2008) argues that informality has flourished when government capacities have not been well established. Stated differently, she emphasizes that a "regulatory slippage" (p: 267) occurs when there is a massive demand for raw land, which makes governments desperate to control this demand if they don't have means or manpower. Hence, this opens the door for people who cannot afford the market rate for urban land to search for other alternatives and raw lands are the best option. Regulatory slippage usually materialises because of rural migrants' relocation to cities: "The principal component of the growing squatter population, however, is the rising tide of rural migrants entering the cities" (Jackson, 1974, p. 25). Similarly to this perspective, Mutisya and Yarime (2011, p. 201) put the blame on the "lack of good governance" and "proper leadership" by states because informal settlements are ignored in development policies until they become hard to control. These processes put urban informality in a "permanent temporary" space where they are not "white" or "black" (grey spaces) but awaiting for correction (Yiftachel, 2009).

Other scholars believe that states fail to manage informal areas because the regulatory barriers they impose are not logical or reasonable. As Durst and Wegmann (2017, p. 283) describe, in terms of the history of housing informality in the US "greater regulation often leads to more rather than less informality". That means if states have strong regulations but at the same time, they are implemented or lead to negative consequences, targeted populations become less likely to comply and may prefer to engage in informal activities (Monkkonen and Ronconi, 2013). For example, when states adopt rigid regulatory standards in building housing units, this can increase housing costs and as a result, people choose informal means for accessing affordable housing. They cannot wait for states to help them because usually, the process takes several years and sometimes decades (Mangin, 1967). Therefore, people rely on the illegal occupation of public lands and establish their communities based on their needs, which in return means establishing more informal areas. Watson (2009, p. 2267) suggests understanding the "conflict of rationalities" between states and marginalised people to understand the phenomenon of informality and concludes that a "consensus-driven" model rather than a conflict model might facilitate the road to force more people to not to conform to urban planning laws and regulations and thus creating more informalities.

This assumption, that informal areas grow more than they disappear, can be seen in many places across the globe. Allan Gilbert's study (2004) shows the relationship between liberalization and informality and concludes that neoliberal housing policies are linked to the establishment of more informal areas in Latin America. Also, from Janice Perlman's observations (2004) in Rio de Janeiro, although local government carried out a massive favela removal policy in the 1970s, ten years later the population of informal areas surged by 40.5%. Indeed, in her book *The Myth of Marginality* (1979), she stated plainly that these policies caused the conditions that they were trying to solve. In her interviews with local people who had been relocated from the favela, one can see how they kept practising many forms of informality in the new locations. For example, many of their children were still selling goods on the streets after the relocation. Another example can be found in Muller and Segura's paper (2017) of their study of the uses of informality and how in 2003, real estate developers promised the state to end the "informal sprawl", in the western periphery of Mexico City. The authors note, according to the municipal plans of urban development, informal settlements numbered 61 in 2003 and increased to 122 by 2009. Similarly, in Hong Kong, despite the introduction of many policies and techniques to minimize informal

hawkers in the city, the government found that hawkers who had been ousted created other informal activities at the periphery (Smart and Smart, 2017).

Confining informality may produce social resistance. As states want to eradicate or regularize informal areas or activities, some informal actors might use different strategies to halt the state's interventions. For example, local people may use international agencies as a means to put pressure on the state (Yiftachel, 2009), or use the media to express their opposition (Lindell, 2010). The common pattern of resistance here is that it is a collective effort rather than an individual (Bayat, 2009); and the reason for such resistance is basically the idea that people want to show that they belong to the city. As Yiftachel (2009, p. 96) writes in this regard, they "have mobilized not just for their own (very important) local demands, but also to assert their urban citizenship". Although informal actors may be motivated by a desire to remain in the informal sector and not be legalised/regularized, their resistance should be understood as a complex concept which involves their relationship with space, culture, and people they live with.

The above literature, although hugely beneficial in showing hidden processes of how informality is formed, places less focus on understanding the nature of these areas and their internal dynamics. In particular, it is trapped within a framework of "who causes what" that does not allow for a close examination of "how these causes work and when". It is another attempt to deal with informal areas as an abstract construct, rather than addressing their inherent complexity and dynamism. This is why recently, many scholars have called for an understanding that focuses on relational concepts, such as identification and stigmatization, in analysing these realities instead of identifying social practices performed by formal and informal agencies in static isolation (Martínez and Roitman, 2019). It requires us to see these areas in their contexts, constantly in motion, and how these shifting contexts influence how actors within these areas interact with each other. This research argues for a more direct and contextual understanding of informal areas that sees them as complex products of their internal and external conditions. This understanding should also be informed by an appreciation of their inter-relationship within larger networks, nationally and globally, if any.

Although the literature on urban informality covers a wide range of geographies in the global North and South, there are very few studies on informality in Saudi Arabia. This is primarily due to the lack of data on informal housing and the fragmentation of the definition of such

areas. Most of these Saudi studies have focused on the physical characteristics of informal settlements rather than their socio-economic context or what led people to live in these areas in the first place (Mortada, 2008; Karimi and Parham, 2012). Such an approach underestimates the complexity of informality in Saudi Arabia, which is primarily the result of the country's rapid urban transformation in recent decades. This study aims to fill this knowledge gap by looking closely at how they function socially, economically, and spatially.

2.4 Diversity within Informality

This section highlights scholars who are critical of what they see as a lack of understanding of the nature of informal areas. They note how earlier studies have neglected to consider how these spaces with their actors functioned in relation to one another or how their diverse nature was explored. In other words, all these areas were "tarred with the same brush" (Gilbert, 2007, p. 703). These scholars suggest that this gap could be filled by using relational and processual approaches that may help us to understand these spaces and appreciate their complexity.

Informal areas are rich with different people socially, economically and culturally. Picturing informal areas as one abstract body with all groups equally fixed in their status is deceptive. These areas have different people who differ in their positions, circumstances, and how they respond to public policies. Lindell (2010, p. 210) acknowledges that and writes "Some influential perspectives on such politics have tended to treat 'informals' as a rather undifferentiated crowd mainly made up of the 'working poor' and sharing one and the same structural position". She points out that diversity and complexity within informality imply complexity in relationships and behaviours hence making these spaces highly complex. Whyte (1943) also draws attention to this based on the level of the district, arguing that "social life differs so fundamentally from one district to the other that any attempt to lump the two together and make generalizations upon this basis is bound to be fruitless and misleading." (Whyte, 1943, p.37).

Approaching informal areas as one single entity where all its actors are identical can result in adverse outcomes. The task here is to try to "see other axes of power, other sets of *relations*, as well as the variety of actors, positions and agendas" (Lindell, 2010, p. 210). Seeing the "varied

nature of interactions" (Watson, 2009) is essential inside informal areas to capture the nature of group relations, differing levels of agency and access to power and resources. Zooming in on these areas would facilitate new theoretical outputs that might help to uncover many social processes within informal areas - and formal ones, too. Recent literature calls for considering these areas as sites for "critical analysis", rather than seeing them as outcomes that are correlated with only marginalized populations (Banks, Lombard and Mitlin, 2020). This emerging theme in the literature informs the research scope and position of this study. However, proceeding with this approach requires a theoretical lens that is aware of and captures the dynamic and complex nature of different groups who live within informal areas and that employs different related concepts to understand a social phenomenon.

Informed by this literature, this research aims to contribute to the idea that there is great variety and diversity *within* informal areas. It delves deeply into the internal dynamics and power relations of informal areas in Jeddah. The primary aim is not to study how informal areas relate to the rest of the city or how local people interact with outsiders, though that is a crucial context, but to study and understand the social relations *within* informal areas and between different groups. The research investigates how these local groups interact and the nature of their interdependencies (economic, social, political): how Saudis and non-Saudis exist together in one area and whether they produce relative segregation or integration, conflict and solidarity at different times and in different spaces. This draws upon relational concepts of dis/identification, power and stigmatization between groups – a largely neglected area of research in Saudi Arabia. Although this research finds some parallels with Bastia's work (2015) in Argentina regarding the existence of different groups in one informal area and how race shapes relations between immigrants and natives, the case of Jeddah offers a very different context.

There is some recent research that calls for processual and relational approaches to understanding the dynamics of informal areas or social realities in general, which this research responds to (Boudreau and Davis, 2017; Pasquetti and Picker, 2017; Martínez and Roitman, 2019; Van Krieken, 2019). Relying mainly on studying urban informality as physical spaces neglects substantial perspectives and processes that may explain or improve our understanding of other realities. Hence, the intention here is an attempt to conceive urban informalities as spaces of rich diversities and to "critically analyse" the interactions between different actors and groups to reveal processes that otherwise would be hard to detect (Banks, Lombard and Mitlin, 2020). This critical engagement - the researcher argues – represents a new and emerging

theme in the literature. To contribute to such a trend, this research draws on sociological theory as one possible framework that might facilitate a new critical approach to the study of urban informality.

2.5 The Theoretical framework

This section introduces Norbert Elias's (1994) theory of established-outsider relations as a theoretical starting point for understanding the informal relations of Aljameaah neighbourhood. Since the theory is not well known in informality and urban studies, a detailed description of its main elements is given. The theory has been developed in a global-north perspective, in particular, in the UK. Applying it to the context of Arab cities is novel since they have different socio-economic structures from those of western cities.
The section starts with a brief overview of how Elias's sociological approach is distinct from that of his predecessors' and how. Then, this section moves to discuss key concepts in the theory - power, stigmatization, and dis/identification. Finally, it briefly considers some critical views of the theory in order to be aware of its weaknesses and shortcomings. The Chapter concludes with how the theory can be advanced and synthesized with ideas from the informality literature.

2.5.1 Elias's approach explained

Norbert Elias (1978) studies sociology from a different unique processual perspective emphasizing the complex interdependence between human beings and the figurations[2] that they form with each other at different scales and often over very long timeframes. Studying individuals to infer facts about society as a whole is not effective in understanding societies. It is the group level of human relations that need to be studied in order to understand how society works. For example, wars do not happen because of conflict between individuals. Rather, wars happen because two groups have different perspectives, power positions, and resources. The two groups might be both strong or one is strong and the other is weak. In this scenario, what we as humans fear is their means of using machines like the nuclear bomb. However, the real fear comes from their relations, not their tools. The Elias Model focuses more on a relational

---

[2] A figuration in Elias's writing refers to the web of interdependencies in which individuals are embedded and which constrains actions and shape norms and traditions. In short, it refers to the modes of living together of human beings and acknowledges that individuals must always be understood in the plural, and the relations that they form with others are always in flux (see Elias, 1978).

approach in dealing with understanding societies especially between groups who live in one area, or as Norbert chooses to describe "the human interweaving". That means societies are basically "webs of interdependence or figurations" (Elias, 1978, p. 15). These figurations are very complex and exist on many levels and layers and they are always changing or in flux: more figurations mean more complexity.

Elias discusses this complexity in his book *What is Sociology*? (1978) through the use of Primal Contest as an example. The more players in the contest the more opaque it becomes. When the game becomes very complicated, players are unsure about the outcomes because the game is disorganized and there is no clear rule to follow. There is no dominant player who might force rules on the others, and "the game itself has power over the behaviour and thought of the individual players" (p:96). This fact makes it impossible to study the contest with scientific approaches and methods because outcomes solely rely on the process of the game, not the decision of players. The task in studying societies is then to be aware that the individual's actions or social beliefs are not central here. Rather, the people's interdependencies are the core to be studied.

This is in contrast with the conceptual framework of Max Weber (2009) who stresses the importance of "individual behaviours" in studying and understanding societies. Weber argues that in order to understand society, one must understand the actions of its components because these actions are motivated by subjective desires and values "individualism" (Heath, 2005). His work was often used to argue that societies are the results of a combination of individual acts where the outcome is unintended (Hayek, 1942 cited in Lewis, 2017). The relations of individuals' actions are the focus of Weber's theory and the context of these individuals, their interactions with their environments and how they are being affected by such circumstances are not considered to be important. This contrasts with other scholars who argue that an individual holds dualistic values, one value affected by his/her own experiences while the other is affected by the collective demands of society (Durkheim, 2005). Both Weber and Durkheim put a great emphasis on what Elias calls "the present moment" as a key aspect of understanding societies. The question of how individuals and societies came to be the way they are today remains without a clear explanation.

For Elias, the idea is not to deal with individuals and societies as separate identities which are different from each other - or as he describes it, the "chicken or egg" problem - but to conceive

of them as connected entities that feed each other. From birth to death, an individual is attached to parents, friends, teachers, governments, and many other actors their identity - and picturing an individual as an isolated object is wrong. This idea corresponds most closely to Bourdieu's (1990) concept of habitus which is a set of pre-established norms and beliefs that individuals follow without rationally investigating or exploring other options (Vincent, Neal and Iqbal, 2018) – what Elias referred to as "second nature". One can argue here that Bourdieu and Elias recognise the dynamic aspects of social organisations and thus suggest more complex models. Hence, an individual goes through a process and actually "[s]he is a process" (Elias, 1978, p. 118). From this theoretical opposition between "society" and "individual", Elias establishes his contribution by identifying the idea of "figuration" which is formed by interdependent groups of people.

But this similarity between the two scholars does not mean that they share a common worldview. One of the main criticisms of Bourdieu's thinking is that he overstates the importance of collective unconsciousness over individual conscious reflections and calculations (Bottero, 2010). This is because Bourdieu sees any change in habitus behaviours as due to an individual's inherited disposition rather than to a decision to think and act differently. That is, agents are restricted by their predispositions which means that human actions, or at least most of them, are a product of their subconscious. This view, however, is not shared by Elias, who argues that habitus, individually or collectively, must be understood in relation to the figuration these individuals and groups are embedded in. In this sense, such social entities are more likely to change in accordance with the power dynamics in which they find themselves (Moore, 2010). Therefore, despite their similarities in terms of a focus on the relational and processual making of social units, Bourdieu's and Elias's ideas are not entirely identical. Since this research focuses more on the relations between groups, fluctuations in power and thus their dynamics and interaction, Elias's approach is more in tune with the research aim.

The figuration concept can be applied to many different forms with different scales. For example, "teachers and pupils in class, doctors and patients in a therapeutic group, regular customers in a pub …etc." (Elias, 1978, p. 131). These are small figurations, but Elias's theory can also be applied to bigger scales like cities, neighbourhoods, and villages. However, when applying it to large societies, Elias emphasizes that the figuration would be complex and hard to "be perceived directly" (Elias, 1978, p. 131) because these interdependencies take longer to

develop and function at many different levels. In observing such complex systems indirectly, it is helpful to perceive them by analysing groups of interdependencies together. This shifts the focus from studying individual behaviour to group behaviour and not as static objects but as changeable processes. This is not to say that individual behaviour is not important, but it is to say that individuals and groups are connected to each other and not separate identities. "Human behaviour is directed less by inborn drives and more by impulses shaped by individual experience and learning" (Elias, 1978, p. 109). Experience and learning imply the attachment of individuals to other individuals – "people among other people" (Elias, 1978, p. 121) - which indicates a relationship between two individuals or two societies. "Elias's sociology is radically *processual* and radically *relational* in character; that is, it is processual and relational at its roots or core" (Dunning and Hughes, 2012, p. 50).

The two concepts of process and relation here are always dynamic. Elias puts a lot of emphasis on this idea because the transformation of humans over time entails a change in beliefs, norms, and relations tied to the development of knowledge and changes in the psychic structure. To put it differently, Landini (2013, p. 22) indicates that there is no " substance called culture or society that persists over time". Thus, change is inevitable whether it is at the macro-level (societies, cultures, religions, countries, … etc.) or at the micro-level (individuals, personalities, communities, … etc.) and whether it happens in days or takes centuries. Furthermore, change is "unplanned" because it happens as an outcome of "the interweaving of interdependent individuals" (Elias, 1978, p. 47) which means that change happens under complex circumstances over the longer term, such as -"the correlation between the increased level of interdependence among people, the increasing level of consideration for others, and an increase in the level of mutual identification between people" (Landini, 2013, p. 25). All these complexities and other causes mean the process of change is largely unplanned and unforeseen. This takes us beyond static conceptualisations and dichotomies in drawing attention to how urban and group relations are continually reconfigured and re-formed.

2.5.2 Established and outsider relations

Based on the key concepts, outlined above of, figurations, webs of interdependence, processes, and shifting power dynamic, Elias and Scotson (1994) developed a theoretical framework to understand societies called *Established and Outsider Relations*. Their theory was based on a

small suburban area in Leicester, England – given the fictitious name of Winston Parva - where they observed two groups who had the same nationality, race, status and income but were in conflict[3]. The theory studies the relation between two or more groups in terms of power. Who is the stronger? Who is the weaker? And why? Elias and Scotson found a variation in power between the two groups and called the stronger one in terms of power *established* and the weaker one *outsider*. This power is not static but a dynamic relation that changes with time between groups. Also, power is dynamic in its formation being manifested in many forms and shapes. For example, in the case here power was manifested in the relative social cohesion within the two groups. The group who had lived in the area for a long time and had strong ties with other old families were "established". The other group who were newcomers to the area and lacked ties with others were "outsiders". These two categories were a result of a long process between individuals who share the same space.

The idea of power is central to this framework and the concept of figuration as well. The stronger group can form power sources to be used against a weaker group and these tools must be distinctive to the stronger group's members. For example, in the case here, members of strong groups use exclusion and stigmatization as weapons to attack others. They did not allow the new families to have contact with old ones, and they tried hard to make the image of newcomers as inferiors by accusing them of strange and bad habits. But these tools might be also used against members of the stronger group itself. Any individuals from the old families who might contact or be friends with the new families would be punished with the same weapons. They would be considered as "lower human value" for violating the collective norms or values of the group.

2.5.3 Groups relation discourses

Concepts like power, dis/identification, and racial tension imply the existence of two social subjects or more - normally groups - who live in the same area or close to each other. Elias (1978) usually emphasize the interdependencies of two groups in order to understand the processes and the relations between them. Being aware of interdependencies between human beings helps unfold explanations of present outcomes by making processes easier to

---

[3] The city in the 1950s had a majority of white British while currently they represent only around 50% of the city population (NOMIS, 2011) which means it becomes a multicultural city, different from how it was in Elias' time.

understand and appear on the surface. Elias understands the nature of this interdependence as ambivalent which means the outcomes of these relations cannot be predicted. However, Dividio (2003) classified two types of interdependence between groups: positive and negative. The former refers to cooperative interdependence (Blanchard, Weigel and Cook, 1975) where two groups work together in achieving goals and conflicts are minimal. This usually results in smooth relations between groups without visible exclusion. The latter - negative interdependence - is competitive interdependence (Sherif, 1961). Here, groups fight to protect their resources and seek privileged locations over others in society. In most cases, this can result in conflicts and exclusion between groups.

In reality, group interdependencies require an important element: contact. The literature is abundant with concepts and ideas that measure and test the role of contact in affecting intergroup relations. The task here is to show how contact might change assumed outcomes and take them in a different direction. This idea goes back to the 1940s when scholars started to test the effects of contact between students from different races (Smith, 1943; Allport, Clark and Pettigrew, 1954). What they found was simple, more contacts between students who belonged to different races were helpful in improving their behaviours toward each other. Additionally, Deutsch and Collins (1951) studied two housing projects in New York: one was segregated and the other was more diverse. They found that local people in the latter were tolerant toward others than those from the former. This suggests that when different groups live in one area, they are prone to meet with each other repeatedly which might contribute positively to their relations in general. However, although these studies are important in highlighting how contact minimizes conflicts between different groups, they lack explanation and description of the nature of such contact.

To increase the benefits of contact, many scholars suggest the conditions that are needed to maximise the benefits. For example, the best choice from contact is when two groups share common goals and have defined activities to achieve (Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami, 2003), which is obvious in the context of schools and workplaces. In these cases, different groups do not need to start the contact because the start is already there, which is performing defined activities in specific contexts. Members of the dominant group work with members of weaker groups, for example, to complete a reading task, have discussions to solve problems, or an informal talk to explain things to each other. This is an important element in group relations which are slightly neglected in Elias's approach. For example, the approach does not

investigate how the rules of contact can change the impact of stigmatization between groups in their daily life interactions. Regular contacts, for example in school, may make members of both groups question each other's behaviour in relation to the imposed stigma they hear (Wilson, 2012).

The above literature is essential in understanding the present moment of groups and how they live in collective spaces, how they perceive each other, and what traits would make certain groups stronger than others. But although this is essential in highlighting concepts associated with the scope of the present research, this literature rarely emphasizes the role of processes and historical developments of such groups. Elias's approach to understanding social realities is more comprehensive as he sees contemporary social outcomes as actualities that are rooted in history. He criticizes scholars who "retreat" to the present moment in their explanations of social realities and argues that to understand how humans are today, we need to understand how they were in the past (Elias, 1987). Humans are strongly interconnected with their past and those who lived before them, and the social conformities inherited by those who live after. Hence, in describing present moments, it is crucial to shed light on the past and intergenerational processes. As Crow and Laidlow (2019, p. 8) put it: "From the past via the present toward the future."

2.5.4 Stigmatization and identification

Another idea that Elias uses in unfolding social processes is stigmatization. The idea here basically is that powerful groups - or the "established" - identify weaker groups - or "outsiders" - as sources of problems. Thus, the former give themselves the legitimacy to punish the latter based on "fantasy-laden explanations" (Elias, 1978, p. 27). As it appears to be simple and part of the nature of humans to talk about others based on gossip or general talk, it is a very powerful tool that may produce and cause outcomes beyond what is expected. It spurs differences between groups and can manifest in terms of emotion and spatial clustering. Emotionally, the targeted groups suffer from internal humiliation and the need to prove to others that they are worthy and equal to the dominant group: some weaker groups might accept these stereotypes and spread them around against other weaker groups or internally (Loyal, 2011). Spatially, stigmatization might reach wider levels and be represented in urban policies, as it happens with Gypsies in Roma who were clustered at the edge of urban areas and targeted by specific policies (Powell, 2008).

Stigmatization cannot emerge without stimuli that allow it to develop and become embedded in groups relations. Hence, for stigma to operate it must be associated with someone who holds different practices or values. The literature provides an extensive list of such differences between groups (Link and Phelan, 2001). Some are clearly observable like race (Picker, 2017) and class while others are more subtle, like the length of residency (Elias and Scotson, 1994), mental health (Vaccari *et al.*, 2020), or education. In these cases, an established group is not familiar with a specific character of another group and uses this as an excuse for discrimination. An example of this is when natives show a tendency to criticise the way some immigrants use public spaces (Pratsinakis, 2014). Another is when natives also show an aversion to those immigrants who speak their own language or dialect. In other words, established groups first detect and construct outsiders' differences and then collectively disidentify from them. According to Elias (Elias, 1994b), the rationality behind such behaviours for established is to maintain their power resources.

Two key features shape stigmatization processes. First, established groups model themselves on what Elias calls the "minority of the best". Even if, as cohesive groups, they recognize some negative characteristics of some of their members, positive ones would dominate their general reputation. Similarly, weaker groups would be modelled based on their "minority of the worst". These negative and positive characteristics of groups are not fixed: over time they expand and become loaded with many fantasies and false assumptions which subsequently increase conflicts between groups (de Swaan, 1997). The role of the media in these processes is significant. Newspapers, television, and social media may provide means for stronger groups to express their views and exaggerate the problems perceived to be related to outsiders. Sometimes politicians will use these channels to promote themselves and support stronger groups that they believe can help them win elections i.e. mobilizing disidentifications against "outsider" groups for political ends. This increases conflicts between those seeking power and those seeking to keep it. That is, media is used negatively as a means of controlling others.

As people stigmatize other people, this sets the stage for what De Swaan (1995) describes as "circles of identifications". To identify, a group idealizes themselves based on positive characteristics which involve the classification of undesirable characteristics. These undesired characteristics are imposed on others who are different, which leads to disidentifying certain

groups from others. Over time, repeated circles of identifications construct "shared properties" among one group who also may conceive other groups' shared properties as immoral (Volkan, Julius and Montville, 1990). De Swaan (1995) explains how people identify themselves based on changing concepts. In the beginning, humans identified themselves based on kinship and later on proximity. People long ago were nomadic; they needed to group themselves with something stable regardless of location and thus bonded based on blood kinships. The sedentary lifestyle introduced with agricultural activities changed the way people identified themselves to include nearby neighbours who share the same challenges and obstacles. Similarly, after repeated circles of identifications, new bonds emerged: believers of faith against other believers of different faiths and rebels against hostile rulers. People continually change their identifications according to their evolving circumstances. For instance, some identify with others based on the level of skills they have acquired (Gill, 2010), class and education (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008), descent (Pratsinakis, 2014), nationality (Pratsinakis, 2018), and length of residency (Elias and Scotson, 1994). However, bonds based on blood and soil still persist more firmly across societies than any other.

One common type of identification between groups is nationality. Although it is a mental bond that groups different people together in an "imagined community" (Anderson, 2006), people may participate in killing others in wars in order to protect their nation's fellows who they don't know or never met. When studying relations between natives and immigrants, a key aspect is the use of nationality (Harney, 2006; Gill, 2010). Usually, nationality is used by natives to protect their power and privileges from those who seek to challenge them (Loyal, 2011). It helps them to construct an easy collective identity "we" to legitimize their actions. At the same time, it is used by immigrants - using the nationality of their original country - as a way to enhance their cohesion and to keep the group together in order to ensure their survival.

Another idea that comes hand in hand with "identification" is "disidentification". Based on De Swaan's approach (1997), when people identify themselves with other people who share the same circumstances and culture, they disidentify from others who are different. He directly links the processes of disidentification to the emergence of hatred between people. He also sees stigmatization as a condition for disidentification. For humans to disidentify from others, they need to be told about other humans, usually negatively. Then they conceive

of each other as threats which facilitates the road to hatred and hostility. Generally, disidentification processes are performed by established groups to disidentify *from* outsiders and this affects public perceptions of outsider groups as aliens who must accept lower status (Lever and Powell, 2017). Also, established members use disidentification processes as means to implement their desires and interests and to spread their hegemony (Parker and Aggleton, 2003). However, although the concept of disidentification has been studied to show how it works between different groups, there is a lack of empirical studies that utilize this in application to groups in Saudi Arabia.

Building on both Elias's and de Swaan's theories, Powell (2008) studies how the stigmatization of Gypsies and Travellers in the UK have survived and been maintained through time. Examining daily activities between the outsider and the established, he finds – by observing the *process* - that stigmatization become perceptible after processes of identification and power are developed and recognized. Variation in power positions of two groups may enhance the development of identification and [dis]identification between them based on many factors. Thus, power and identification are intertwined as breeders of potential stigmatization that can become stronger over time if outsiders accept the term of stigmatization and situate themselves accordingly. This last step – outsiders accept their positions – can become visible in public policies and spatial distributions, in this case (Powell, 2008) where the outsider group is located at the periphery of the city and in industrial places unlike the established group: the bottom-up approach here is very clear in the way that these small behaviours affecting the relations between two groups may lead to divides and collective clusters at the city level, for which some scholars might read the resultant macro inequality as products of racial differences.

2.5.5 Power

It would be hard to understand and pursue the development of human relations without considering the dimension of power (Elias, 1978, p. 80). Because human relationships as a term is an abstract idea, in reality, it needs additional concepts to explain why human relations change over time. One of these concepts is the resources of power that humans use to impose their collective norms and social codes on others. That does not mean power is a weapon of strong groups only; the literature is rich with examples of how weaker groups might use this weapon also to push back (May, 2004; Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008).

What makes a stronger group of people able to dominate others is the tools they use to hegemonize their territories, to spread their social codes and make them the general norms, and to make other human beings accept lower status. Likewise, what makes a weaker group open to domination is the lack of powerful tools.

The tools being used to control others are also not fixed (Loyal, 2011). At any stage, established groups may lose control and then would find themselves in lower positions. The figuration of established and outsider changes according to local contexts and wider figurational dynamics of the neighbourhood, city, nation, and internationally. Space is crucial in such dynamics: for example, ins some schools in Amsterdam, Turkish "outsiders" children were able to become "established" due to their large numbers, yet at the scale of the city itself they were still outsiders (Karsten, 1998). This spatial and temporal shift in figuration has consequences. Karsten found that there was a "sharp divide between girls and boys" (Karsten, 1998, p. 579) in these schools as the newly established children imposed their culture, which originated from the gendered divisions of Islamic traditions at odds with mainstream Dutch society. In line with this, there is research that demonstrates how outsiders sometimes use certain strategies to overcome constraints that are imposed on them by established groups. For instance, using entrepreneurship to dominate local economies and then minimizing power differentials to claim higher status (Lever and Milbourne, 2014) and living for long periods in the host country (Zimmermann, Zimmermann and Constant, 2007). Although these studies enrich and nuance our understanding of urban groups dynamics, they tend to examine figurations in institutions or in places and settings that are largely governed by public policies. Applying a figurational approach in marginal and informal areas of cities is neglected in this literature, especially in the informal areas of the "global south".

With this in mind, it is also important to study how urban policies affect and shape relations between groups and hence modify the everyday interactions according to the interest of certain groups. Sometimes, without the state's intervention, outsiders may succeed in gaining power resources and claiming higher positions across different spaces and domains, but states operating with nationality-based prejudice appear suddenly to restore or limit power differentials (Loyal, 2011; Pratsinakis, 2018). Sometimes, by using the media, politicians may use the temporary gains of outsider groups as helpful tools to mobilize support for elections by exaggerating the perceived threats of outsiders to get votes from established members (Castles and Davidson, 2000). Here, Elias's theory, seeing social realities as processual and

relational, shows its vital usefulness. Studying conflict between groups without taking into account the historical, spatial, political and economic perspectives obscure hidden elements in the construction of public policies (Powell and Lever, 2017). However, public policies should be situated in a holistic approach, meaning that just as public policies give powers to established groups, they may also give powers to outsiders to build themselves into dominant positions.

2.5.6 Critical evaluations

Social theories are useful conceptual tools that enable researchers to explain and understand social realities and phenomena, but they come with shortcomings. This section describes some criticisms that target Elias's established/outsider theory - and discusses how this research acknowledges and accounts for such criticisms.

One of the issues with Elias's approach that has been criticized is the dimension of scale (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008). The community that Elias studied was small in size and population, and he based his theory on what happened *within* the boundaries of this community. What happened outside the community is slightly underemphasized, which minimizes the complexity of the outside world (Dunne, 2009). Studying the external factors that affect internal mechanisms is vital to revealing invisible processes. Internal groups may sometimes seek help from related groups from different contexts (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008). Another crucial point is related to space. The theory was based on an area that was clearly spatially into two groups. This made it easy to distinguish between the two areas under two simple categories: the established and the outsider (Bauböck, 1993; May, 2004). Thus, exposing and testing the theory at a wider scale is needed which this present research contributes to through the specific case of Jeddah.

2.6 Conclusion

The idea of informality has been well-investigated over the last decades. However, there are many varied assumptions in understanding and conceiving informality that produce different schools of thought in dealing with the issue. First, informality originally, before the 1960s, was embodied in the word "slum". Slums were considered dangerous places that were repositories

for crimes, illegal activities and disorder. At the time, the focus was purely on negative aspects of slums and how they represent risks to formal areas and economies. The implication of these assumptions was translated into attempts to eradicate these areas, hence the growth of slums clearance programs around the world. However, little attention was paid to the social and political potentials of informal areas.

Both Whyte (1943) and Turner (1968) started to shift the focus in the literature to point out some positive aspects of informal areas and how they represent opportunities rather than problems. First, on their own terms, these places provide affordable houses for the poor who cannot afford the formal market and where states do not provide them with any help. Second, these people use "self-help" strategies to survive and meet their needs without the help of the state. There are many workers with high technical skills who live in informal areas and who can build houses for themselves in a timely manner. Such research trends point out the positive aspects of informal areas and how states can provide access to resources to develop these areas instead of removing them. Building on these ideas, De Soto (1989) caught the value of these positive perspectives by recommending that these areas needed to join formal markets so they would boost the economies of states. Also, the word itself "informality" is no longer limited to physical informal areas. It has expanded to include any activity that functions outside legal systems (Hart, 1973). This opens the door to a huge range of research that focuses more on informal economies and informal practices. It also opens the door to questions about the informal practices of states and how sometimes the planning regime itself is part of the informal sector. The main point here is that informal areas are not alone in functioning outside the legal system, but also states do.

After realizing that informality is the practice of people and states, research now focuses more on dealing with informality as a reality. The dominant idea to be summarized is that informality and formality are connected and exist together (Roy, 2005), and sometimes together they may work better than just relying on formal means. This way of thinking spurs a wide range of studies of how formal policies affect informal areas and calls for the relaxation of controlling informality and the creation of pro-poor policies to enable informality to function independently.

Building on these pioneering works in urban informality, this research argues that the next shift is to reveal the rich and varied nature of informal areas. The realities of informal areas have

been acknowledged and the next step is to understand the daily lives of the people and to grasp the nature of the different actors who prefer being in the informal sector. This understanding should not only serve as intellectual contributions to the knowledge of informality in general but should also provide the basis for better policymaking and to promote better solutions and practices when dealing with informal areas. Hence, this research agrees with the need to understand informal areas through the lens of everyday life as well as through the groups who live there. To develop this position, Elias's approach is utilised to provide a holistic understanding of informality.

Elias' approach can be summarised as processual and relational. Humans do not live solely individually; they live as groups that are interdependent on each other and interact in a multitude of aspects. They are not isolated from their inherited knowledge which contributes in part to constructing their everyday interactions. Elias's theory of *The Established and Outsiders* is an example of such an approach. Established groups are those who claim responsibility for the way things should be done, while outsiders are those who refuse to comply with the rules and expectations of the established. This approach is based on a model that consists of many elements including power, stigmatization, and identification. This way, we can gain insights into how groups are formed and how they relate to each other.

Stigmatization and identification are crucial concepts when trying to understand social processes between different groups. Humans stigmatize other humans according to collective norms and practices. The effect of stigma can be seen in the media and space and manifests itself - sometimes - in national policies. Generally, established groups model themselves on their own positive traits while at the same time model outsider groups based on their perceived negative traits. However, little attention is given to the other way around: how outsiders produce their own stigmatization toward established groups. Furthermore, when groups stigmatize other groups, they engage in processes of identification. For example, using nationality to identify members of established groups and to claim resources and to exclude different "others". These identification processes are then followed up by stigmatization processes.

Finally, synthesizing the informality with Elias's theory enables us to uncover the internal nature of Aljameaah neighbourhood and its complexity. Elias's concepts (Elias, 1994a) are useful in understanding the neighbourhood's social dynamics and the nature of conflicts

between Aljameaah's groups. However, Elias always argues that these dynamics and conflicts may produce ambivalent relationships among residents. In other words, some groups' relations may not conform to processes of identification and stigmatization. The examinations in the urban informality literature of the assumptions about and wider processes of urban informality are useful to uncover this ambiguity, and this might allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the variables that produced blurred boundaries between groups. Concepts of "grey areas" (Yiftachel, 2009), toleration by the state (Haid, 2017), and how states exercise power ambiguously (Perlman, 2004) are essential to understand and explain some empirical features of Aljameaah and how they may influence Aljameaah's social dynamics.

CHAPTER 3: Historical overview of the formation of Informal Settlements in Jeddah

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the rapid urbanisation processes and their implications for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It starts with a review of the pre-urbanisation era, then goes on to explain how economic developments played a crucial role in changing the urban environment and demographic composition. It also discusses the impact of formalised planning processes which lead to the conflict between the old and the new modes of settlement buildings. Finally, in light of these national trends, an overview of the case study of Aljameaah neighbourhood is presented. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the nature of informality in Saudi Arabia and relates them to the research's questions and contributions.

3.1 Background

Jeddah is the second biggest city in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, located on the western coast of the Red Sea. The religious significance of the city comes from its location close to the Holy City of Makkah pilgrims from around the world arrive at Jeddah's international airport to access Makkah for *Hajj* and *Umrah*. These two Islamic practices run throughout the year because *Hajj* must be undertaken by every Muslim in a lifetime and *Umrah* can be performed multiple times. Because of this, Jeddah attracts millions of people yearly whether from Saudi Arabia itself or other countries across the globe. These two holy events are known to be the largest diverse gatherings, in terms of ethnicity and culture, in the world (Yezli *et al.*, 2017). Most of these visitors are foreign nationals who visit the Kingdom through the visa system. As shown in Figure 2, many of them visit for *Umrah* and numbers have grown in recent years, peaking at over 6 million in 2016, due to an expansion in the infrastructure of the Holy Mosque.

Figure 3.1: a) Location of Jeddah in reference to Saudi Arabia. b) An image of the structure of the city now (Aljoufie, 2016).

Figure 3.2: Number of Islamic Pilgrims from 2006 to 2016 (Yezli et al., 2017).

Jeddah is also a very populous and dense city, estimated to have a population of approximately 4 million with a density of around 2,500 people per square kilometre (GAS, 2015). The demographic make-up is diverse, including residents of different nationalities, ethnic

backgrounds, including Arabs and non-Arabs, Saudis and non-Saudis, and tribes and families[4]. In addition, international immigrants come from Asia, Africa, and some Western countries who brought there by oil's wealth. The city also has many refugees like Palestinians, the Rohingyas, and recently some Syrians. This is an important and famous characteristic of the city perpetuating a media-driven, relational place-image of Jeddah as "liberal Saudi Arabia" (Hoffer, 2020). Its diverse mix of cultures and traditions has made the city more open to outsiders relative to other Saudi cities. Historic Jeddah is also registered on the UNESCO World Heritage List (Arabiya, 2014). Its historic significance stems from its role within many great civilisations such as the ancient Islamic era, the Ottoman period, and finally the urbanised era under the rule of the Al-Saud royal family from the 1960s.

Until 1947, Jeddah was relatively a small city with a wall that clearly defined the boundary of its territory, and it had just 35,000 inhabitants. This wall restricted the city growth, but it did not prevent the Bedouin from establishing scattered settlements outside the wall which later became informal settlements within the city (discussed below). These Bedouins usually constructed their houses with mud, wood and any other materials and resources that were available in the surrounds. The building process did not cost much at that time, and they cooperated with each other in the construction by dividing the tasks based on their skills. In time, these buildings became informal communities based on traditional practices and located outside the urban area of the city, known today as Al-Nuzlah al-Yamaniyah, Al-Sabeel, Al-Hindawiyah, and Al- Sahifah. All these settlements are classified as "informal" by Jeddah Municipality's Regulations and became an extension of the historical city centre later (Makkah Council, 2008). Today, Jeddah has 51 "informal settlements" out of 102 settlements overall, housing around 1 million people in 200,000 houses with an average density of 407 person/hectare (Shabrawishi, 2007).

There is a lack of data on how informal areas in Jeddah were enveloped by the city. Gadou (2009) mentions that the third master plan for Jeddah in 1978 proposed decreasing the density of informal areas in the city. It appears that the second master plan had dealt with these areas as part of Jeddah's development by increasing their density which suggests that at that time

---

[4] Families are those who could not trace their origin to a tribe or those who migrated long ago from other countries to Saudi Arabia before its establishment as a modern country.

informal areas were not seen as aliens or a problem to be solved[5]. In other words, informal areas were simply left alone since they contributed positively in absorbing waves of internal migrants and international immigrants in the 1970s. It is possible that the state found itself unable to manage these waves of immigrants properly and hence tolerated the existence of informal areas until it decided to address them. This could explain why the state waited until 2003 to launch an official plan to deal with them (Difalla, 2015). Such an interpretation corresponds with Mortada's (2008, p. 57) argument that informal areas increased during 1963 and 1978 when the city was "without any building ordinances". It is, therefore, more likely that Jeddah's first master plans were concerned with the establishment of urban standards and guiding new modern developments toward the city's north, while the traditional way of building was taking place on the city's southside at the same time. That is, in this transitional period, traditional and modern ways of building co-existed together.

In order to understand how rapid urbanisation has affected Jeddah's urban informality, we should trace its beginning in the Kingdom *processually* in showing how it changed the country's mindset from traditional to modern state in terms of political, social, economic, and cultural perspectives (see also Menoret, 2014). This step is important because it will show how traditional means of building and living were disrupted by modern methods. Additionally, we should also not ignore the fact that the cornerstone of these changes is the discovery of oil, in which the American Standard Oil of California Company (SOCAL) was heavily engaged, not just in the process of producing Saudi oil, but also in constructing new urban standards for the major Saudi cities at that time; Riyadh, Khobar, and Jeddah. The rest of this chapter reviews the above changes in more detail since these urbanisation processes have affected the neighbourhood of Aljameaah (as we shall see in Chapters 5,6, and 7) when urbanisation produced new patterns of informality as well as set the stage for new dynamic social configurations between different groups.

---

[5] In undertaking this research, many attempts were made to find the original master plans for Jeddah to see how specifically the first three master plans of the city (1963-1978) dealt with informal areas, but nothing was found across different Departments in the Municipality of Jeddah.

3.2 Saudi Arabia urbanization and American Standard Oil of California Company

3.2.1 Before oil

Before the foundation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the country was inhabited by two groups: nomadic populations, who depended upon cattle for their subsistence, and settled populations. Most of the nomadic tribes travelled between different parts of the Kingdom, in order to find water and food. Travelling paths were fixed, meaning destinations were not chosen randomly, but Bedouins had to follow some specific routes and avoid others (Awad, 1959). This selective approach relied on the Bedouins' relations with each other and with other tribes. Their interdependent relationships gave rise to strong loyalty among them, making them cohesive units that tried to maintain their tribal identity through common norms and traditions. However, there were some areas that had communities who were not Bedouins - called *hadars* in Arabic which means settled or civilized- such as in the south of the kingdom (Asir region), in the east (Ahsa region), and in the west (Hijaz region) (Freitag, 2020). These communities depended on agriculture, fishing, and trade activities for their livelihood. The relationship between Bedouins and *hadars* have not been positive throughout history (Peterson, 1977). The majority of *hadaras* have also tribal origins like the Bedouins[6] but in the former, loyalty and cohesion among members is much stronger than in the latter.

The tough and harsh climate of the Arabian Peninsula made living in these regions extremely difficult since rainfall was usually only occurred once in every few years. As a result, these people relied heavily on the social structures of tribes and clans as a means to adopt to their environment. They develop what Ibn Khaldun, the well-known 14th-century Arab scholar, called the "*asabiyya*" - group solidarity (Khaldûn, 2015), or can be translated as group feeling (Sümer, 2012). This was why many of the tribes and clans had a strong sense of loyalty to their own members and did not like outsiders to enter their lands: a very strong group identification was reinforced through collective social organisation and tribal practices.

The way these tribes operated was similar to tribes across the Arab world. There was an internal hierarchy of social organisation which was respected by all members. Each tribe

---

[6] Many *hadaras* in Hijaz can trace their origins to Arabic tribes, see Freitag (2020) for more examples in the context of Jeddah.

might be composed of several clans linked by a perceived ancient father and the tribe usually held his name. For example, the *Harb* tribe's name came from its father, Harb ibn (son of) Saad ibn Khawlan which became the reference of all members belonging to the group (Al-Biladi, 1984, p. 19). The same is true with many other tribes such as Qahtan, Otaibah, Tamim, Zahran, etc. Although these ancient men were regarded as the fathers of these respective tribes, these claims are difficult to validate in terms of genealogy (Al Fahad, 2015; Hajjej *et al.*, 2018). The strong identification between tribe members ("*asabiyya*") and the high level of trust among them led them to believe and take for granted that they had a collective. It reinforced a sense of shared history and blood-based relationship. Also, the name of the tribe would appear to be in reference to the physical environment. For example, the newly named Al-Baha region in the Kingdom was known until recently as *Ghamid and Zahran Space* which refers to the names of the two tribes that inhabited it. The same occurs with the Asir region which is named after the Asir tribe, Al-Dawasir valley which is named after the Al-Dawasir tribe, and so on. In other words, tribal members use the name of their tribes to identify the places they settle in.

Each tribe had its own memories and its own oral history which is usually built upon pride in their heritage. To maintain and strengthen asabiyya between members, each tribe constructed narratives that emphasise the distinction from others: how they are superior, stronger and better than other tribes. These narratives are used to establish and maintain a positive "we-image" (Elias and Scotson, 1994) of themselves which then led to higher social prestige. The stories of superiority, bravery and glory were often enhanced and extended through means of socialisation, in-group controls, poetry and literature. For example, the tribe of Subaia'a conceives of themselves as having loyalist pride to the Al Saud royal family, which alludes to their staunch support for the royal family in fighting its enemies to establish modern Saudi Arabia (Al-Harbi, 2007). Similarly, the tribe people of Otaibah propagate the narrative that they are the only tribe who never lost a battle in its lifetime; while the self-image of the Qahtan tribe, which has a history that dates to ancient times, is built on the idea that they are descendants of the true Arabs; and so on. Since these narratives were transferred orally from generation to generation and never written down, it is hard to legitimize their claims.

Tribes were considered as mini-states since they shared similar characters. Each tribe used to have a degree of autonomy over their territories and resources before 1932 (Al-Mubarak, 1999). The tribal leader held power that enabled him to control the tribal community and

make decisions on tribal matters and needs. He even could declare wars against rival groups and attack neighbouring tribes. In terms of land, usually, tribal territories were usually shared among the members. One can own land, but this must be with the agreement of his clan or neighbours. This way of land ownership is derived from Islamic principles regarding land rights. According to the Holy Book, Quran, land is not an end product or a goal to aspire toward or to attain, but rather it is a gift from Allah (God), which must be used well in a way that fulfils a person's needs (Salasal and Malinumbay, 1998). Hence, Islam gives its followers the chance to *ihya*[7] (bring new life) to any dead (undeveloped) land (Hamed, 1993). The concept of *ihya* was used by tribes in the Arabic Peninsula for hundreds of years. This is not to suggest that the *ihya* was the only mechanism by which land could be reclaimed for development. There were areas under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, such as Jeddah - within the walls - where established laws already applied (Freitag, 2020). This clash in land tenure systems contributed to the emergence of informal areas in Saudi Arabia (see Menoret, 2014), as we shall see later in this chapter and also in Chapter 5.

The concept of *ihya* applies only to "dead land", i.e., land that does not belong to someone. Or land that belonged to someone and which he has abandoned. According to Shariah laws, a person loses his rights if he does not use it for three years, even if he had previously used it and brought it to life (Alsubhi, 2015). Thus, ownership is conditional on the owner's continued utilization of it. There are many types of uses for which dead land can be used: digging a well, building a house, planting trees, and making a farm out of it. Each of these uses has certain laws attached to it. For example, if someone digs a well on the land, the digging must reach the water table (i.e., to the point where water is accessible), otherwise, it is not considered land belonging to anyone. Furthermore, the Imam (or local ruler) may give ownership of dead lands to anyone who is able to use them or set certain criteria for giving these lands to others. However, there are different interpretations as to whether individuals must seek permission from the Imam to utilize land or not (Alsubhi, 2015).

The internal social structure of tribes before the establishment of the Kingdom can be summarized as having four classes. The first class, representing the highest rank, were *Sheikhs*: those who were leaders of tribes and had responsibility for managing conflicts between people

---

[7] According to Sahih Al-Bukhari (1978), the Prophet said, "Whoever builds in a land that does not belong to anyone, it is his".

and controlling the tribes' resources. The second class were the people who genetically - in theory - belonged to the imagined father of the tribe and had known descendants. The third class were also individuals who (genetically assumed) belonged to the tribe but were distinguished in the internal hierarchy by occupation, tending to be employed in jobs that confer lower social status within the group. These jobs included tanning, soldering, and makers (any job involving metal processing). Because of the different nature of their jobs compared to the general population, this third class was often stigmatised as lacking the "purity" of the tribe and hence were excluded socially. For example, no one from the higher classes within the tribe would think of marrying anyone from this third class. The fourth class, which represented the lowest class socially, were slaves. These slaves were not specific to one race but were from different ethnicities, including Arabs. They were considered the lowest class.

The first class and the second class in the tribe represented what is called in Arabic *asil*, and the third and fourth classes represented non-*asil*. The word refers to "pure," so if one was *asil,* that meant she or he belonged to the tribe and enjoyed its prestige (Nahedh, 1989). However, if an individual was non-*asil,* then they would face discrimination in many aspects of their relationship with the tribe. They would be excluded and must find other social networks. Furthermore, if an *asil* decided to marry from non-*asil* families, then they would be categorized as non-*asil* too as a punishment (a classic example of established-outsider relations). This social procedure applied equally to both men and women, though it was more severe in the case of women. This suggests that the *asil* and non-*asil* categories were not based on a genetic/inheritance notion, as tribes conceived of it, but rather, were formed relationally and shaped by adherence to group norms and traditions. Abdul-Aziz (2015) argues that the core of it was not based on blood but on social relationships and power positions. He suggests that "purity of genealogy is nothing more than a reflection of power relations among the constantly warring, adversarial tribal groups" (p. 239).

The social and cultural aspects of tribes at this time, roughly before the advent of urbanisation in the 1950s, affected the way they physically build their homes and settlements. The built form was extremely compact with narrow hallways and streets; buildings used local materials like mud bricks and stone. This limited the height and scale of buildings which were small (Eben Saleh, 2002). As shown in Figure 3.3, towns were typically built in an unorganized way since there were no specific standards to be adhered to. This way of planning is called today *afawi* which means organic and not ordered, a characteristic that later became

associated with informal areas in Saudi Arabia. These organic towns usually had narrow and winding streets and their capacity for movement could only handle three pedestrians as a total width. It is argued that this way of organic development allowed people to survive in the desert heat by providing natural shade (Al-Zubaidi, 2007).

Figure 3.3: A typical plan of a residential area in Al-Hasa City which shows the compact and unorganized shape of the built environment at that time. (Eben Saleh, 2002)

The influence of religion upon on tribes' culture was immense. Although the tribes were like mini-states with their own social organisation, they were still interdependent with one another because they shared space, resources, customs, traditions, and language (the Arabic language). In the absence of a centralised authority, what regulated these inter-relationships was left in the hands of Islamic traditions and beliefs. The religion has its own code of conduct based on the concept of *Umma*, which means one universal nation (Lapidus, 1973). The Islamic concept of Umma is very complex and there is no precise translation for it: yet it is based on the concept that all individuals who believe in Allah as their God and the prophet Muhammed (PBUH – Peace Be Upon Him) as the final prophet of Allah are equal and belong to one nation. They have rights based on the Sharia Law which is a set of rules and obligations for the Muslims to abide by (Haj, 1993). This is why King Abdelaziz, who unified Saudi Arabia in 1932, went to war with many tribes because these tribes saw the establishment of a state as going against the concept of *Umma* (Al Fahad, 2015).

This was the conditions of the tribes before the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Members of self-sufficient groups relied on each other to protect their lands, provide food, and to maintain their society. The greater the tribe's *asabiyya*, the stronger the tribe would be. This social structure was not born in the present moment but was developed over hundreds of years, reflected and perpetuated in oral history, and in the era of the Prophet Muhammad era, PBUH, one could see a similar pattern. In other words, the social processes in these tribes were not new and some of their constitutive practices were inherited through generations. Tribal members follow these inherent processes without questioning or conscious thought. Hence, their understanding of the world around them was shaped by their identification with their tribe's traditions. They did not seek outside knowledge or external assistance from beyond their narrow circles of kinship.

This was to change with the arrival of urbanisation which brought with it new forms of life and introduced a more diverse culture which expanded tribal social identifications and weakened their bonds to one another, setting the stage of Saudi detribalization. This research does not construct a classical narrative that seeks to establish a dichotomy between traditional tribal lifestyles and modernity. Rather, the aim is to provide a nuanced account that positions these two modes of life side by side through the relational and processual lens of Norbert Elias, supplemented by prevalent concepts of urban informality.

3.2.2 The establishment of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil

After the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932, citizenship was awarded to those who were; 1) natives of the Arabian Peninsula who had Ottoman documents from 1914; 2) local people who were born in the country and had stayed within its territory since 1914 without holding another nationality. This was the basis for the formation of Saudi society, represented by a majority of tribes, along with a minority of families, living together under one citizenship. This process was led by King Abdelaziz, the founder of the country, with the help of the *Ikhwan* army. This army was formed from tribes who supported the king at that time to reform the new country, and they successfully defeated most of his enemies (Lipsky, 1959). These enemies included the Ottomans, Ibn Rasheed[8] and his followers, and the Hashemite

---

[8] Former rulers of Najd Region, the central part of Saudi Arabia, where the Ibn Saudi family originally came from.

Kingdom in Hijaz. The central role of tribes in the formation of Saudi Arabia and their support for the King informed the self-perception of tribes (and individual members of tribes) as the founders of the Kingdom.

The discovery of oil in 1933 transformed the country from an underdeveloped country to a rapidly urbanising nation (Difalla, 2015). The country's urbanisation started with three settlements built by the Standard Oil of California Company (SOCAL) (Owen, 1975) in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia when the company secured the right to manage the oil resources. These settlements were distant from existing ones since they were close to oil fields. They would provide housing for workers from the U.S. as well as a few local workers. Solon Kimball describes it as follows:

> "*No … Westerners would have difficulty in identifying the senior staff camp as a settlement built by Americans in our south western tradition of town planning. It is an area of single-story dwellings for employees and their families, each house is surrounded by a small grassed yard usually enclosed by a hedge.*" (Kimball, 1956, p. 472; Al-Naim, 2008).

The distinctive feature in these new buildings was that they were built with cement and concrete, two materials that had never been used in housing construction in Saudi Arabia before. Although these materials were rarely found even in nearby areas, local elites adopted them immediately and began building their houses with them.

To increase the process of urbanisation, SOCAL introduced urban regulations for ordinary people to follow if they wanted to build a house, in an attempt to formalise the built environment and its development (see also Menoret (2014) on Riyadh). This took place in the 1950s in the eastern part of the Kingdom where the American company established an ownership program for its employees (Al-Naim, 2008). First, they had to have a building permit to construct a house which means no one could build in any place they liked. Therefore, the concept of *ihya* (see the previous section) could not be used by anyone who wanted to build a house[9]. Second, before having a permit, they should have a house layout plan. As it was hard

---

[9] The abolition of the *Ihya* law goes back to 1925 when the state prevented any form of collective ownership of land but this prohibition was not enforced at that time (Fabietti, 1982).

to find local architects for these new arrangements, many locals relied on SOCAL's architectures or others from nearby countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. These two rules were meant to end the informal house-building by ordinary people and create an "ordered" environment by establishing formal (Western) regulations to create an orderly society similar to those in the developed world. This was at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s when SOCAL (or later Aramco) was responsible for drawing up modern urban regulations – specifically to the eastern region where oil was discovered - along with its responsibility to manage oil reserves.

Anxious about the presence of a foreign company having control over many aspects in the country, before his death the King ordered the establishment of The Council of Ministries of Saudi Arabia (CMSA) in 1954. This Council is responsible for all matters concerning the country, including all issues related to the development of Saudi cities. Currently, it is still the highest and most powerful institution of the Saudi government. Among its top priorities in the 1950s/60s, the CMSA was tasked with settling the Bedouin residents of the Kingdom in fixed places and to prepare them to be settled in cities i.e., the sedentarisation of nomadic tribes. Another major concern of the CMSA was to issue national development plans to be executed by the government, each plan serving as a guide for every five years (for more detail see Niblock, 2008). The first two plans covered the periods 1970-1975 and 1975-1980. Alongside economic and infrastructure goals and aims, large parts of their agenda were also concerned with sedentarisation programs aimed at nomadic tribes. However, the beginnings of this process of encouraging Bedouin to settle in cities can be traced back to the beginning of the 1950s (Nahedh, 1989).

From the 1940s to the 1960s, Saudi Arabia focused on what might be termed the "detribalisation" of its nomadic tribes. There are many studies from the 1970s/80s about the sedentarisation processes that occurred at that time (Ibrahim and Cole, 1978; Helms, 1980; Fabietti, 1982; Nahedh, 1989). The common themes among them are that some tribes were sedentarised by planned efforts and others by spontaneous actions. For example, in 1968, the state introduced a new law that gave tribal individuals plots of lands to be used and allowed them to have fixed places (Menoret, 2014). These plots were free of charge and were an attempt to encourage them to adopt a new lifestyle that would eventually replace traditional nomadism. Yet, according to Ibrahim (1978), many of these programs failed to encourage tribal communities to adapt. For example, they used both cement and mud in building their houses

instead of using only cement. Also, they did not settle in areas that were allocated to them by the government and instead they chose other areas according to their leaders. This may have been due to the nature of the nomads who did not accept following a plan. Instead, it was observed in this era that many nomad tribes appropriated lands without official agreement with the state, especially in sites close to urban areas that were promising from an economic perspective. However, the tribal leaders (sheikhs) had the right to decide which sites should be taken (Helms, 1980).

One can claim that at this period (the 1940s-1960s) the tribal way of life coexisted with the new modern way of life brought by economic development. Tribes were still cohesive, and the sheikhs (leaders) were powerful and influential. At the same time, all these tribes were deeply supportive of and acknowledged the *Al Saud* family as their rulers, representing a central authority of the state. Sometimes the state would cooperate with these sheikhs to distribute resources to tribal members and give them special privileges, e.g., yearly allowances. The state was not interested in diminishing tribalism but ensuring that it would not become more dominant than the central authority. This is why at this time many urbanisation processes were integrated with tribal concepts (Nahedh, 1989): for instance, formalising collective ownership of tribal territories by giving them formal rights; allocating tribal units in the national guards; acknowledging sheikhs as formal heads of their tribes, naming some cities after the tribes inhabiting them and so on. All these initiatives have helped to ensure a strong relationship between the state and tribes. However, identifications with the tribe were weakened when tribal members moved to large urban areas.

By the end of the 1960s, Saudi Arabia introduced a new approach to the management of public lands. Under the new policy, a land-use commission was established to distribute lands to Saudis based on the Islamic Sharia Law. Any public land could be claimed if it met certain standards. For example, individuals who wanted to claim public lands must undertake them properly, meaning to take advantage of their resources and benefits within two to three years. In addition, local committees would assess the economic benefits before granting or denying ownership. However, even if individuals could not manage to use lands properly, they would still get extensions until conditions were met (Hajrah, 1982). That is, there was a tendency by the state to tolerate those who tried to use lands as they saw fit. It was hard at that time to prevent a "traditional attitude" (Nahedh, 1989, p. 242) in claiming lands informally since tribal peoples were used to using such lands without a central authority. But it was a necessary change

in a state that was modernising, although at this point the implementation of the new policies was weak. In other words, by the end of the 1960s, a "tenure continuum" (Payne, 2001, p. 418) was observed in which customary and statutory systems in terms of land could be legal depending on whether the location was urban or rural.

By the middle of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia witnessed a massive increase in its oil production and its exports to the world and Saudi oil revenues reached a peak in 1973 of 26 billion dollars compared to $5 million in 1950 (Nahedh, 1989). Furthermore, the GDP per capita of Saudi Arabia reached $11,260 in 1980, only $100 below that of the United States (World Bank, 1982, p. 111). Also, according to Al-Farsi and Braibanti (1977), the number of foreign experts was high, reaching around 50,000 in 1978. Given that Saudi citizens were not familiar with urbanisation processes, these experts, had the task of guiding the country to modernisation by establishing the solid foundation of an urban future. These dramatic economic changes and the globally growing importance of Saudi's oil industry prompted tribal Saudis to start accepting modernisation and absorb its implications in terms of jobs, culture, and education. It was a time of intense change for both the state and its people. The state at this time had large revenues from the oil sector, but many parts of the country and the population were considered underdeveloped, and still relied on the traditional, nomadic way of life structured around the tribal organisation. After the new land policies discussed above, tribal people could settle in any town or city they desired and claim any available land as their own.

3.2.3 The urbanised state of Saudi Arabia

Driven by mass immigration, massive developments were constructed, in the 1970s, in three major cities in Saudi Arabia: Riyadh as the capital city in the centre; Jeddah to be a metro city in the west part of the country; and Dammam in the east. This step was an attempt to attract more Saudis, who were scattered across the country in villages and small towns, into mega urban centres. In these cities, the state constructed large infrastructures and urban projects such as schools, hospitals, highways, and roads. Consequently, by the 1990s, around 80% of the population of Saudi Arabia lived in urban areas. Also, it was estimated that by the middle of the 1980s, the number of students attending school had reached 2.5 million which represented 80% of boys at that time and 43% of girls, in contrast to 1960 which had been 22% and 2% respectively (Almubarak, 1992). The education system helped to create a generation of citizens that saw the state as a guarantor of their economic and social well-being instead of relying on

the tribe. Also, due to oil wealth, the country offered jobs to Saudis in the public sector and the army.

Today, many Saudis see the public sector and the military as their main source of employment while the private sector is often seen as inferior in terms of work and security. The causes of such views are largely economic and cultural (Alajaji, 1996). The public sector offers higher salaries, shorter working hours, and greater flexibility, whereas the private sector offers lower salaries, longer working hours, and less protection. This leads to high demand for public sector jobs among young Saudis (Abualjadail, 1992). As a consequence, the state finds itself forced to adopt this mindset. Hence, each time the unemployment rate increases, more public jobs are created. And because young Saudis are not interested in working in the private sector, this sector is heavily reliant on migrant labour. To meet this need, the government established a system called *kafala* (sponsorship) to issue visas to workers conditional on their employers mentoring them and being responsible for their residence status, as explained in the next section.

3.2.4 The *kafala* system

In 1974, the percentage of foreign workers in the country was 11% while in 2010 it had risen to 31%, roughly representing a third of the country's population (Fayad, 2012). Companies owned by rich Saudi families became dependent on cheap foreign labours to maximise their profits (Abualjadail, 1992). According to the Ministry of Labour, foreign workers, mostly young men, accounted for 93% of the workforce in the private sector (Alhamad, 2014). It was estimated that they sent $18 billion in remittances annually back to their home countries, which accounted for 6.2% of the GDP (Fayad, 2012). As Table 3.1 below shows, in 1975 Saudi workers were still the majority in the country yet just five years later non-Saudi workers became the majority.

	1975	%	1980	%	1985	%	1990	%	1995	%	2000	%
Saudi	1439.7	74.8	1818.7	47.3	1621.1	37.3	1923.2	33.3	2357.1	39.4	3172.9	44.2
Non-Saudi	484.0	25.2	1694	52.7	2721	62.7	3848.6	66.7	3628.2	60.6	4003.4	56.8
Total	1923.7	100	3512.7	100	4342.1	100	5771.8	100	5985.3	100	7176.3	100

The idea of *kafala* (Sponsorship, introduced by the government in the early 1980s) is mainly a tribal idea rooted in the culture of tribes (Wapler, 2001). However, Al-Shihabi (2018) argues that the *kafala* system is a legacy of the British empire, as they used a similar concept initially for safety and protecting those who were subjected to British rule. It started in Bahrain when the British ruler decided to "organise" the foreign fishermen who came to Bahrain's waters searching for pearls (see Figure 3.4). Before this decision was made, Arab fishermen were freely roaming the waters without restriction. With the establishment of this policy in 1928, each foreign fisherman needed a Bahraini fisherman as a *kafala* in order to fish in local waters. Local fishermen were held responsible for the presence of foreign fishermen and would be punished if they did not follow the rules. The rationality was to minimize fishers searching for pearls.

Figure 3.4:A copy of the policy when it was announced in 1928 in Bahrain. Source: www.qdl.qa

Under the current system of *kafala* in Saudi Arabia, immigrants are required to work under the supervision of a Saudi entity, whether an individual or a company. Once the sponsorship ends, immigrant workers need to return to their home countries (with their family members if they have a family). If they do not return, in theory, the Saudi *kafeel*[10], is liable for their return. However, in practice, not all immigrants conform to the system. Many of them simply access the country through temporary visas, which are issued to those who want to perform the Hajj pilgrimage and Umrah, and do not go back home (Al-Omari, 2008). With

---

[10] *Kafalah* is noun while *kafeel* is adjective in the Arabic language.

tolerance from the Saudi government, these immigrants cluster in specific areas in cities. They often choose to live in overcrowded informal areas like Aljameaah or Karentina where they have access to housing and social networks.

To make sure they are under control, some Saudi *kafeels* take their workers' passports so they can control their movement. The foreign worker does not need his passport for any purpose unless he wants to leave the country. This worker has something called "*Iqama*" which replaces the passport as a form of identification in the Kingdom (Wapler, 2001). Many foreign workers may be involved in illegal activities and then leave the country in an attempt to escape, which means their *kafeels* are responsible for their actions. Thus, some *kafeels* try to get their worker's passport in their hands. Other Middle Eastern nations use this sponsorship scheme, including UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, which allows states to hand responsibility for workers and their problems to individuals or private companies, which would also help in decreasing the foreign worker's population (Akzahrani, 2014). Instead of coming to the country on a visa to work, immigrants need to find a local sponsor who is willing to take responsibility for their actions, a step that requires time and trust between both parties (the immigrant and the sponsor). It is an attempt to constrain the flow of immigrants which in practice did not work.

This system is controversial and has been criticised both from the worker's side and from the Saudi's side. There are certain conditions that must be met for non-Saudis to work in the country, and for instance, for them to open a store, they must work with a Saudi partner, usually their *kafeels* (sponsors). But to get around this, some foreign workers in Saudi Arabia give their *kafeels* a fixed amount of money, usually on a monthly basis, in order to allow them to get a licence to open a business. In this way, the foreign worker can run the business without constraint by the Saudi partner who acts as a nominal sponsor (Alshariff, 2015) but is still responsible. This attempt to avoid the *kafala* system is called locally *Tasattur* ("covering"), and many of the policymakers think this discourages young Saudis from working in the private sector (Adham, 2018). On the other hand, foreign workers in Saudi Arabia argue that the *kafala* system is a means of exploiting foreign workers and is therefore not a fair way of dealing with workers in the Kingdom. This notion of exploitation is also supported by the media and some newspapers have reported that some Saudi citizens "achieve personal gains" from such workers (MAL, 2020, 3 Feb).

In a recent development in 2020, the government announced it has revised the *kafala* system. The new system decreases Saudi's control over foreign workers by giving the latter more freedom over when and where they work (BBC News, 2020). Under the new arrangement, foreign workers can change jobs and leave the country without their *kafeels*' permission. The new system requires digital documentation of contracts to ensure no workers get exploited or is discriminated against. These new changes are significant and will provide a better work environment for foreign labourers.

Since these are recent reforms that occurred at the end of doing this research, their implications and consequences are not part of this study. The empirical findings were analysed in relation to the old kafala system in which Saudi's had complete control over foreign workers. The findings have pointed to the need to critically revise the kafala system and ensure greater autonomy for workers in relation to their *kafeels* as well as making sure these changes will not negatively hinder the Saudization processes (prioritizing Saudis over immigrants in the private sector).

3.2.5 Illegal immigration and refugees

Since the country's rapid rise in economic development during the 1970s and1980s, many undocumented immigrants found ways to access the country and have created their own communities. The reasons for entering the country illegally are many, but the main one is the high entry fees for visas and administration costs (Alshariff, 2015). Unfortunately, studies or data about this issue remain sparse and inconclusive (See Figure 3.5). How undocumented migrants entered the country, and under what circumstances they left have not been observed carefully. Studies suggest two distinct waves of migration; before and after the 1970s (Jastaniah, 1984; Alshariff, 2015). Before the 1970s, immigrants were mainly from Africa and Yemen. After the 1970s, they were from around the world and came because they had hopes of living in a new and growing country. It is not well established how African immigrants came to be in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the western region of the country; some studies suggest they were freed slaves while others reported they were pilgrims who had come to Makkah and then decided to stay.

Year	Apprehension at the Saudi border
2000	378382
2001	337723
2002	474210
2003	652454
2004	650070
2005	659991
2006	344455
2007	428725
2008	514313
2009	804095
Total	5244418
Average	524442

Figure 3.5: Number of illegal non-Saudis detained at the country's borders. Source: (Al-Mutairi, 2012)

The way undocumented immigrants now arrive in the country, especially those from Africa, is to come from Yemen (Gardner, 2019). The Yemeni-Saudi border is estimated to be 1,300 km (CIA, 2020) with rugged terrain and many mountains, and it can easily be crossed undetected. This route has always been a source of trouble for Saudi border controls, and smugglers use it to avoid being intercepted by the Saudi border guards. After illegal immigrants cross into the country, usually they go to the west, particularly, to Jeddah, Al-Madinah and Makkah (Alshariff, 2015). Their existence is tolerated by the state since most of them belong to poor countries like Eritrea, Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Somalia (Thiollet, 2007). Some of these migrants are able to find work and earn money in the region by taking part in various informal activities and they tend to live in informal areas in relatively stigmatized neighbourhoods, like the Kilo 6 area in Aljameaah neighbourhood (discussed in detail in Chapter 6).

Furthermore, there are refugees who have arrived in the country from other unstable countries, including Palestinians who were expelled from their country by Israel as well as those fleeing conflict zones in Somalia and Myanmar (Rohingya or "Burmese" as they are referred to locally within Saudi Arabia), among others. Refugees are not put in confined camps as in some countries but are instead allowed to settle anywhere they wanted. However, they tend to be concentrated in low-income neighbourhoods. The exception to this is in the case of Rohingya Refugees who came from Myanmar. In the late 1970s, the Muslim Rohingya of the Rakhine region of Myanmar were systematically forced to leave their villages because the state of Myanmar was refusing to grant them citizenship (Rahman, 2010). This led to their forced migration to other Islamic countries, mainly Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. According to Al-Arabiya (2017), it is estimated that at least 190,000 Rohingya live in Saudi Arabia, mainly

around Makkah on a famous mountain called *Nakassah*. Around 44,000 of them live in the city of Jeddah, although this figure is only for the documented refugees (Alsahafi, 2020). They mainly live in the southeast of the city, in a neighbourhood named after them where they have established a semi-formal council to represent the community and serve their needs (ibid). In addition, there are many of them in Aljameaah (see Chapter 6).

3.2.6 Saudization: helping Saudis to compete with immigrants

The rapid rate of urbanisation along with increasing numbers of immigrants have transformed the labour market. These labourers tend to work for cheaper salaries, depressing wages, and work longer hours on average compared to natives (Bosbait and Wilson, 2005). According to the General Authority for Statistics, the average monthly working hours for non-Saudi employees is 214 while for Saudis it is estimated to be 200 hours. Furthermore, the average salary for non-Saudis per month is 2,731 SR ($725) while it is 7,372 SR ($1965) for Saudis (GAS, 2017). In 2017, it is estimated that non-Saudis represent 83% of the country's workforce in the private sector (ibid). In 2020, the unemployment rate was more than 15% among Saudis citizens, more than half of whom hold a bachelor's degree (GAS, 2020). For these reasons, the Fourth National Plan (1985-1990) established a program of "Saudization" to enhance the presence of Saudi workers in both the private and public sectors (Wynbrandt, 2010). The state then established a specific system called *Nitaqat* - ("zones") – in which companies are categorized according to their level of compliance with the government in terms of their rate of Saudization, meaning how many they employ Saudis. If these companies do not hire Saudis, then they themselves will face legal penalties. Each zone has its own requirements and the higher the level a company reaches in terms of Saudization, the more incentives it receives from the state (Alshanbri, Khalfan and Maqsood, 2015; Koyame-Marsh, 2016).

In 2017, the state also established a new tax system mainly designed to reduce the number of non-Saudi immigrants. In this system, companies that hire non-Saudis, in general, are required to pay a certain amount of money for each foreign worker. This amount was gradually increased every year until 2020; for example, in 2018, companies paid $80 for each worker every month (MEE, 2018). These new revenues are used to increase the number of Saudis working in the private sector. However, despite these measures, the number of Saudis in the workforce has not increased and at the same time, the number of non-Saudi immigrants

in the country has declined. According to the General Authority of Statistics, it is estimated that around 2 million immigrants left the country between 2017 and 2018 (Arabi, 2019) mainly because of this tax system.

This section described the transition of Saudi Arabia and its population from nomadic agricultural communities into modern-day urban cities. This change was accelerated by the discovery of oil reserves in the country when the state began to use its vast oil wealth to build infrastructure and detribalize the population. This detribalisation process did not remove the tribe identity entirely but sought to establish a central authority that could enforce modern standards of living. Additionally, the rapid rate of urbanisation attracted large numbers of international immigrants who eventually became the majority workforce of the private sector. This trend continued until 2017 when the state introduced a new tax system which targeted foreign workers in order to enhance the process of Saudisation.

In the next section, I further elaborate on the process of urbanisation, this time focusing on the city scale of Jeddah. This enables appreciation of Aljameaah's wider urban context and interdependencies, the implications of rapid urbanisation for the area, and the impact it had on internal group relations.

3.3 The urbanization of Jeddah

This section describes the context of Jeddah (where the case study is located) in the context of the processes of national transformation. It starts with an overview of the city before the advent of oil and the unification of Saudi Arabia and moves to the urbanising period of the 1970s and 1980s, during which the city saw a conflict between the traditional built environment and modern urban development. It also describes the marginalized urban neighbourhood in which this research was conducted: Aljameaah.

3.3.1 Before oil and urbanisation

Jeddah is an old city mentioned in many books across different historical periods. It was chosen by the third Muslim caliph, Othman bin Affan in 647 AD, to be a port for Makkah (Sahahiri, Arrowsmith and Alitany, 2019). It was also mentioned in the books of the famous explorer Ibn Battuta, when he visited Makkah and commented on its apparent Persian architecture (Ibn-Baṭṭūṭa, 1829). Indeed, it is argued by many Islamic scholars that the city's

name is derived from an ancient Arabic tribal man called Jeddah bin (son of) Hazem bin Rayan bin Kuda'a (Al-Hamawi, 1866). Over its history, Jeddah witnessed many wars between different civilizations and groups, since its close location to Makkah gave it strategic importance in the Islamic world. Additionally, the city faces the Red Sea (Figure 3.6) and the area is a major hub of trade routes since it links Africa and Europe to the Middle East.

Figure 3.6: The Wall of Jeddah as it looked before the demolition in the 1930s. (Source: jeddahattraction.wordpress.com)

Figure 3.7: Jeddah as it looked during the 1940s. Source: (Jastaniah, 1984)

Due to many conflicts and wars, and during the Mamalik and Ottoman rule, Jeddah witnessed the construction of its wall built in 1505. This fortification served to block outsiders from reaching the town and to protect its inhabitants from attacks. At this stage, most of these inhabitants were traders who gained wealth through the visitors who came to visit Makkah for Hajj and Umrah (Jastaniah, 1984). Freitag's comprehensive study of the history of Jeddah (2020) shows how people lived before the establishment of Saudi Arabia, focusing

particularly on life within the walled city. She shows how the walled city was a highly urbanised space, as it was heavily influenced by the Ottoman Empire and the existence of some European consuls[11]. The Ottoman Empire invested in the construction of the port, hospitals, roads, and other public facilities in Jeddah while turning the area outside the walled city into peripheral areas where the poor and marginalised lived. This thesis focuses on one of these areas that emerged outside the walled city, in the south of Jeddah: Aljameaah.

The Bedouins did not have a good relationship with the Ottoman Empire and its agents. They posed a threat to the economic and political interests of the empire, especially with regard to trade routes and the Hajj. The Bedouins were stigmatised as dangerous and uncivilised and were therefore treated with hostility and suspicion. This led the authorities to favour the urban population inside the wall over the Bedouin outside the wall. This preference was evident in how urbanisation within the wall was relatively organised. For example, it was observed that the walled city had a land registry system, a court to resolve conflicts, and labour organisations (Freitag, 2020). This inequality created tensions between the urban and rural populations. The Bedouins considered the Ottomans and the urban population as their enemies, so raids on the city were not uncommon, especially during the Hajj season. The raids consisted of Bedouin groups raiding Jeddah or Ottoman caravans on their way to Mecca. This negative perception towards the Bedouins facilitated their support of any new political regime that was against Ottoman rule, which in this case was the Al-Saud.

In 1932, when King Abdelaziz unified the country of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah was one of the cities that were captured by the King. In 1925, the King went to war with, and defeated, the ruler of Jeddah Sharif Husain. Until 1947, Jeddah was surrounded by the wall and therefore could not grow beyond its rigid boundary. The built environment was compact, similar to the rest of Saudi Arabia, with narrow streets and few open spaces. The area was mostly developed with houses, shops, and mosques with some small green spaces. Since there was no vacant land, small communities began settling outside of the wall (Salagoor, 1990). These communities included: four tribal communities, one African, one Russian (Muslim Bukhara), and one Indian (Figure 3.8). This spatial segregation was normal practice throughout the Islamic period where communities were built along borders of tribes and ethnicities (Abdulsattar, 1988). However, within the walled city, the inhabitants were of different ethnicities who had settled in Jeddah

---

[11] Some European countries like the United Kingdom and Netherlands were interested in the Red Sea trading.

long ago. These ethnic groups include Arabs, Turks, Indians, Africans, Persians, and others (Freitag, 2020). This was in contrast to the homogeneous communities in other regions of Saudi Arabia, where the population was mainly composed of Arab tribes.

Figure 3.8:Distribution of people in Jeddah in 1948. (Source: Jeddah Municipality; Salagoor, 1990*, illustrated by the researcher).*

3.3.2 The *hara* and the *mirkaz*: traditional concepts rooted in Islam

One of the concepts that were spatially significant before the demolition of Jeddah's wall was the *hara*. Although it is a popular concept in Islamic cities (Yanagisawa and Funo, 2018), its historic origins are still unclear (Salagoor, 1990). The word means "quarter" and refers to a group of neighbouring houses. Because the prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) emphasizes the importance of neighbours in Islam and encourages his followers to take care of them[12], it seems that ordinary Jeddah residents facilitated the concept of *hara* to comply with the Prophet's instructions. Indeed, the hara concept is suggested by some commentators as the "unit of Arab urban social life" (Lapidus, 1973, p. 28). There were four haras inside the walls of Jeddah: Madhlom, Yemen, Bahur, and Sham (Figure 3.9). Also, there were many haras located outside the wall, such as Barah *hara*, Al-Bukhariyah *hara*, and Al-Hindawiah *hara*. Each *hara* represented a small, contiguous community and its individuals identify with each other more strongly compared to others of their neighbourhood.

---

[12] For example, in one of the Prophet's words, he said: "By Allah, he is not a believer.'' It was asked, "Who is that, O Messenger of Allah?'' He said, "One whose neighbour does not feel safe from his evil". Also, he said in another place: "Jibril (an angel) kept recommending me to treat my neighbour well until I thought that he would tell me to make him one of my heirs" (Al-Bukhari et al., 1978)s.

Figure 3.9: The four Haras inside Jeddah's walls. Source: Jeddah Municipality

This spatialized identification is not reproduced in the formal areas of Jeddah. It only exists nowadays in Jeddah's informal areas and urban peripheries. It was briefly mentioned as a concept that enhances social relations between its members in Saudi urban studies (Salagoor, 1990). However, understanding of its formulations and social processes remain to this day very limited. This has prevented us from understanding its social dimensions and its historical significance. A *hara* has no specific or designated size since its formation depends on local contexts and how local people define their boundaries (Chatterjee, 2004). Furthermore, the naming of *haras* shows no clear pattern or system. For example, *Madhlom* (oppressed) *hara* took its name from a myth about a man who was killed by mistake. Yemen *hara* took its name because it is on the south side of Jeddah facing the direction of Yemen. In other cases, *hara* names were an indication of ethnicity like Al-Bukhariyah *hara* which had a majority of Bokhara people.

The *hara* society becomes a strong source of collective identification along with religion and city identifications. It encourages people to visit each other, to gather and to share a common experience, which in turn fostered their sense of belonging and unity. The small size of the *hara* enabled a high degree of interdependence between its residents, which facilitated encounters with difference after urbanization. Therefore, many *haras* were heterogeneous and included different ethnicities and nationalities and the *hara* within Jeddah's walls included members from many different ethnicities: families who were originally from Yemen, Turkey, India, Indonesia, and from tribes of the Arabic Peninsula. Each *hara* has its own festivals and

gatherings where local people meet publicly to share food and enjoy entertainment (Al-Zahrani, 2017).

Another concept that comes hand in hand with the *hara* is the *mirkaz* space. Although there are few studies of this kind of space, it has been known for hundreds of years. Each *hara* has its own *mirkaz,* a gathering place where the *Omdah*, the leader, and older men sit and discuss matters of their hara. *Mirkaz* is located outdoors with used chairs and tables arranged so that members can face one another. Often it is next to a grocery store so people can get food and drinks while sitting and talking. These spaces are warehouses for the "secrets" of local people (Kamel, 2014). Mainly, the secrets are related to those people who are in need, for example, someone who is unable to get married or is married but had a problem with his wife. They share their stories and then participants collectively suggest a solution. Sometimes, the place becomes a court where people gather and have their say in matters related to conflicts or disputes that have arisen within the *hara*. A *mirkaz* may also serve as an entertainment space where young and old alike gather to listen to stories. Storytellers are called "*hakawati*" (a person who, "tells stories") since he is usually someone with knowledge about the past. Mirkaz is a gendered space, participants are always men since the space is located outdoor. Women have their spaces of meetings but usually, they are indoors.

gathering place

Figure 3.10: An image drawn by a Saudi PhD student in 1989 who was studying the old part of Jeddah where he highlighted the Mirkaz spaces (Alharbi, 1989).

The *mirkaz* also plays a role in modern times, as a medium between the government and the people. For example, if someone wants to open a store, the people of the *mirkaz* would help him to contact the local officials to get permission. This might be done by calling specific public actors or visiting the institution to support their neighbour. In some cases, if the police come to investigate a crime, they would first visit the *mirkaz* to see if there is any information

about it (Al-Zaid, 2013; Kamel, 2014). On some occasions, *mirkaz* visitors play an important role in observing the hara and distinguishing those who are locals from those who are strangers. Alharbi's (1989) PhD on the built environment of old Jeddah and mentions these areas as "gathering places" (see Figure 3.10) suggesting that they were usually located in alleyways or at the end of cul-de-sac blocks away from strangers. In this way, a *mirkaz* becomes a security measure in *haras* where many eyes are active for any suspicious movements.

However, as a social space, the *mirkaz* has been in decline. It is a tradition that is supported currently by the older generation who have lived and experienced the *mirkaz*. These older people generally believe that there is a need to revive it as a means of exchange and communication to enhance social harmony in a digital society of phones and the internet. But for the younger generation, who have never experienced the *mirkaz*, this idea seems a bit dated. The older generation thinks that their younger fellows are "spoiled" because they only want to play video games in air-conditioned rooms in their houses (Al-Zaid, 2013). This is why *mirkaz* in Jeddah can be observed only in the older parts of the city, in the centre and some informal areas.

Today *mirkaz* has become a nostalgia of the old culture of Jeddah. It is seen as a place of the golden time when local people of *haras* knew each other well. In an attempt to preserve the culture of *mirkaz*, many members of the older generation try to bring the culture of sport to the *mirkaz* so it will be more accepted by the younger generation (Hod, 2018, 2020). The two most famous football clubs in Jeddah are Al-Ittihad and Al-Ahli. Many older members paint the space with the colours of yellow and black (Al-Ittihad) and white and green (Al-Ahli) as an indication that the *mirkaz* welcomes the younger generation and welcomes their most loved subject football clubs to be discussed around the table. But the *mirkaz* does not exist in the formal areas of Jeddah and the social place is still considered to be odd by the younger generation, mainly because of decreasing identification with neighbourhoods and increasing identification with jobs and education friendships. However, both the *hara* and the *mirkaz* figure are relatively strong in the empirical material of this research in terms of their continued role in building collectives and fostering gatherings in the informal context of Aljameaah.

3.3.3 From a small town to a modern city

With the advent of oil revenues, in 1947 and as part of urbanisation, the government decided to demolish the historical wall of Jeddah. This step was conducted to facilitate the path for the city to be a container for mass international and national immigration. Accordingly, the city's population rose to 150,000 by 1961, and just ten years later, the population had exploded to over 400,000. During these years, the city also witnessed the importation of modern urban planning standards in responding to rapid urbanisation, driven by SOCAL and other Western consultants. In 1963 the City issued its first Master Plan with the help of the UN (Baesse, 2012) and one of its aims was to avoid the "organic" mode of development, meaning a shift away from the traditional or informal practices that had predominated. This plan envisioned the foundation of Jeddah's modern era and the transformation of the city into a metropolitan centre. It also set out the development strategy for the city, relocating the King Abdelaziz airport to the north and adopting a linear pattern for the development of the city. Additionally, it proposed guiding the future growth of the city to the north and increasing density in the south.

With many challenges due to the pace of growth, and at the beginning of the 1970s, the City increasingly relied on Western consultants to solve its problems. In 1973, the City hired Robert Matthew, a well-known English architect and urban planner who worked on several major projects around the world. Also, in 1978, another Western consultant, Sert-Jackson Association, was hired by the City to help with some of its issues including the "problem" of informal areas, flood protection, and housing shortages. Since these Western consultants brought in modern practices that were not rooted in the local context, a sharp difference emerged between the areas that were created based on modern planning and those created using local methods and practices (See figure 3.11). For example, the introduction of the grid-plan layout, in which all developers were forced to plan their lands based on a rigid framework, was completely at odds with local culture and practices of inhabitation (Salagoor, 1990). As part of this transformation in urban planning, Jeddah also witnessed a shift toward planning using central public agencies such as Municipalities and Planning Commissions. It was no longer acceptable for individuals or groups (tribes) to permit and build shelters based on self-help practices; instead, standards and guidelines regarding size and layout were introduced.

Figure 3.11: The geographical distribution of informal areas in Jeddah from 1948 to 2007. (Source: JCUD, assembled by the author)

Figure 3.12: To the left: the formal Al-Tahlia Street, to the right: the informal Al-Sabeel settlement. Source: (Fadan, 1983)

As shown in Figure 3.11, the informal settlements in Jeddah grew significantly between 1964 to 1971. In fact, the Figure shows that informal settlements have grown little since 1971 and

the spatial pattern remains as we know it today. The main reason behind the growth of informality in this era was the shift toward urbanisation. In 1947, the government issued a royal decree that transferred the ownership of vacant land inside or outside Jeddah to the public authority. Before that, Sharia law was implemented where according to its rules, anyone can claim any vacant land (See Section 3.2.2 in this chapter). When Jeddah started to urbanise in the late 1950s, many local and international immigrants arrived. Jeddah as a small city could not absorb these massive waves of immigrants, so the newcomers used Sharia law, *the Ihya concept,* as a means to provide housing for their families and themselves by building shelters with "self-help" techniques. Because these activities happened without prior planning and were based on the individual's needs, the outcome of the built environment was "organic". The local government in Jeddah was not happy with this situation, so the royal decree was issued seeking to end the claiming of vacant lands by individuals by transferring the ownership of so-called "dead lands" to the authority.

Figure 3.13: Difference between formal (left) and informal (right) areas in Jeddah. (Source: The author)

In the 1990s, a formalised differentiation between formal and informal areas was adopted by the local municipalities. On one hand, places that grew based on traditional practices - the Sharia law's "*Ihya*" for example - are nowadays considered as "informal" areas or "slums", based on regulatory frameworks which were subsequently developed and imposed (Menoret, 2014). On the other hand, areas that grew based on the Municipality's standards that have been shaped by urbanisation processes and American, grid-like planning principles are considered formal areas. As a result, one can say that informal areas in Jeddah were simply constructed based on "self-help" practices, on land that was acquired through traditional tribal and religious

tenure systems. In contrast, formal areas are built based on "official" methods by state-level authorities, on land acquired from the local authority, and they are designed to achieve the concept of "order", a core feature of modernity (See figure 3.13). Formal areas were in general regarded as the best option for Jeddah, and with public financial support, in the 1990s, many local people left informal areas to reside in these new formal areas in the north. Many scholars (e.g. Mandeli, 2008; Abdulaal, 2011) argue that poor urban planning policies had played an important role in creating this gap between the traditional areas and the formal ones, where the former became increasingly more marginalized and associated with poverty, crime, and social problems in the eyes of many Jeddah citizens.

From a central perspective, informal areas are defined as areas that have been built and developed without regulatory approval and do not comply with municipal codes and building regulations (Makkah Council, 2008)[13]. This definition is stated in the framework of the redevelopment of Makkah Region's informal areas. The problem with this definition is that it conflates both the historical areas that were built before urbanisation, including the city centre of Jeddah "*Al-Balad*", with the areas that were built illegally in recent decades and normally located in the peripheries. For this reason, there are different interpretations between Saudi urban planners and scholars regarding the definition of informal areas. For example, Alnaim (2020) argues that the definition of informal area is vague and a definition is needed that distinguishes between historical areas and more recent informality. Within universities and between academic staff, the Arabic word *affawi*, meaning organic, is more commonly used to refer to historical informal areas, while the term *ashwai*, meaning informal, is more commonly used in reference to recent informal areas. Historic informal areas in this context are areas that existed before the city was planned under the imported urban policies, such as Aljameaah in this research. Newer informal areas are areas built without permits after the mid-1990s when Jeddah Municipality began to develop further north and already the city has an established formal system.

Informal areas in Jeddah have similar characteristics to those found in many parts of the globe, such as "inner-cities" in Latin America (Rosemary and Jones, 1996). They are located near or within the city centre boundaries and many of the original inhabitants had migrated

---

[13] Most of the discourse on urban informality in Saudi Arabia focuses on Jeddah, more than any other city. The reason is that Jeddah has many informal settlements that occupy a third of the city's area, which is not the case in Riyadh or Dammam.

away, which were replaced by the arrival of poorer groups. They suffer from a lack of services and have older populations. Another important similar feature is that they are stigmatized as dangerous and hotbeds of disorder, which usually is not true in reality (Perlman, 2004). Similarly, informal areas in Jeddah share with African informal areas a tendency to develop a legal pluralism with formal tenure coexisting with traditional rights, though the latter is often seen as less secure (Payne, 2001; McAuslan, 2005). Traditional rights in Jeddah are based on religious conceptions which might be exclusive to Islamic cities, making it different from many other examples of informality around the globe. Finally, conflicts between the old and new, "modernizing" cultures arose because rapid urbanisation took place under the influence of Western models instead of local values and traditions that could help to ease such conflicts, making the Saudi case a particular medium between the global South and North. Hence, one can argue, informal areas in Jeddah are located in "grey space", meaning they are on hold temporarily to be developed later (Yiftachel, 2009). This temporary permanence/permanent temporariness is a feature shared with many informal areas in the global South and North (Maestri, 2019).

3.3.4 Immigration: looking for jobs and opportunities

In the 1970s, in parallel with economic growth, Jeddah witnessed a rapid increase in foreign immigration. It was estimated that immigrants made up 37% of the total population of the city by1974 (Summan, 2016). The majority of immigrants came from India, Yemen and Egypt. According to the General Authority for Statistics, in 2016, the number of Saudis in the Region of Makkah - where Jeddah is located and contains most of the population was estimated at around 4,600,000 (GAS, 2016). Similarly, the number of non-Saudis was estimated to be around 4,200,000. This means roughly 48% of the Makkah Region's population are non-Saudis and 52% are Saudis. This is an increase of more than 10% in the non-Saudis population since the 1970s and is reflected in their dominance of the city's private sector where 80% of all businesses are run by immigrants (Eremnews, 2020).

The above numbers do not even account for the many illegal immigrants living in Jeddah (Alshariff, 2015). From searches for this research, it seems there are no studies or statistics on illegal immigrants in Jeddah except for a PhD dissertation by Alshariff (2015), who studied a small African community in the city, investigating their experience of living in Saudi Arabia. However, it is safe to claim that majority of immigrants are originally from African countries

like Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, and Kenya. Some of them entered the country through Yemen by way of smuggling and others came to perform Hajj and Umrah but then decided to not return due to insecure economic and political conditions in their home country. Many individuals were born in the country of immigrant parents and have absorbed the local culture to the point where it would be difficult to distinguish them from natives (Naffee, 2011).

Immigrants populations tend to live in the informal areas of Jeddah which have lower rents than formal ones, and immigrants, in general, are attracted by the low cost of living. Hence, informal areas in Jeddah have become hubs for immigrant groups, although some Saudi families, especially the older generations, still choose to remain in these areas.

Currently, informal areas in Jeddah are places with diverse groups from a wide variety of nationalities and cultures. They are home to international immigrants, whether documented or not, whether entering the country to perform pilgrims or refugees who seek asylum. They are also home for many second and third generation immigrants who have grown up in these neighbourhoods and know little about their parents' country of origin. Their identification is tied to their neighbourhoods rather than nationality. Adding to this complexity are the established groups, the tribal Saudis who are privileged over others and have the state's approval as natives of their neighbourhoods. These groups have different identifications, practices, and values which contribute to the making and remaking of informal areas, in particular in the case of Aljameaah in this research. The intersection of religion, nationality, neighbourhood and policies have created uneven spatial and social changes which can be seen through a relational lens that considers their historical contexts and the informal environments they exist within.

Figure 3.14: Aljameaah is shaped by many intersections that contribute to its establishment and re-establishment.

The state was not happy with the numbers of immigrants clustering in informal areas in Jeddah and tried to control them by redevelopment. In 2003, the Council of Ministries asked Jeddah Municipality to solve the issue of informal areas in the city within five years and the Municipality launched a new project to control the problem. The reason for such a move was because the media emphasized informal areas' disorders, crimes and the poor built environment. The project involved relocating residents to new areas while also building new modern residential and commercial buildings in the former informal areas. Residents of informal areas were asked to show their deeds and to sign contracts with the Municipality but a very limited number of them did so in an attempt to show their disapproval (Abdulaal, 2011). In 2008, the Municipality announced a massive redevelopment project that targeted all informal areas - 55 districts - categorized based on their "investment potential", and established a public-private company - the Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC) - which was responsible for the redevelopment processes (Makkah Council, 2008). Residents were given three options: to become a shareholder in the project; get cash compensation; or get a housing unit free of charge. None of these options was deemed acceptable by local communities, who showed no desire to move away from their informal neighbourhoods (ibid).

From 2007 to date, the project has been through many stages and was often delayed. It stopped in 2010 for three years since local people refused to let construction proceed and were not happy with the project as a whole. In 2015, the Municipality decided to offer more

options for residents to choose from and give them a say in the way the project was to proceed (Al-Roqi, 2015). However, all the new options were again rejected by locals and they collectively organized their opposition by establishing online forums to voice their opinions[14]. Officials made some statements about the delayed project, acknowledging that one of the main reasons for its delay was the "obstinacy of locals" (Maal, 2015). It was clear, then, that the project has not gained the desired level of approval from locals. In 2013, the Ministries' Council had decided to reform the JDURC's Board of Directors and similar reforms occurred in 2017 and 2020 (Interior Ministry, 2017; WAS, 2017; Hazazi, 2020). However, at the time of writing (2021), nothing is happening, municipal services are suspended in some of these informal areas, and communities still wait for a solution to their condition.

3.3.5 Aljameaah district: A popular district with unknown history

Aljameaah is one of the designated informal areas planned to be redeveloped by the JDURC. It is about 3 square kilometres in area, which makes it relatively one of the largest informal areas in Jeddah. It has a population of more than 120,000 people at a density of 417 persons per hectare, which also puts it among the most populated of Jeddah's informal areas. Although Aljameaah is important due to its economic and education sectors - plenty of shops and schools) - its development is not well documented, which is common in Saudi cities where data about such neighbourhoods is limited due to lack of research. In contrast to other informal areas in the city, Aljameaah is adjacent to one of the most important institutions in the Kingdom: The University of King Abdelaziz (KAU) which is ranked among the world's top 50 universities (U.S. News, 2021 ranking). Indeed, its name *Aljameaah* means "university" in Arabic, which reflects the existence of KAU within its boundaries. Historically, however, there is no data about its establishment, how or why settlements formed there, who formed them and how they developed.

---

[14] This did not happen in the Aljameaah neighbourhood but in two informal neighbourhoods which were in the top priority for redevelopment: Al-Rowais and Al-Nuzlah.

Figure 3.15:An aerial photo of Aljameaah. (Source: Google Earth, 2020 edited by the author).

The only documentation that exists for Aljameaah is a planning proposal written report, written in 2003, that belongs to a private company called Zuhair Fayez (Fayez, 2003). They had a contract with Jeddah Municipality to prepare plans for Jeddah's informal areas and to document their physical environments drawing on information based on household surveys. Aljameaah was one of these areas being considered. In this report, it is estimated that residential areas in Aljameaah represent 53% of the land uses and roughly 11% are commercial and mixed uses (Fayez, 2003). The rest falls into religious and education uses and other types of uses. The company surveyed the conditions of the buildings to determine their physical qualities and found that 32% of these buildings were classified as deteriorated, 54% as average, while the remaining 14% were good (see Figure 3.16). In terms of religious and educational services, the report found that Aljameaah is served by approximately 62 mosques and 12 male schools and 13 female schools.

Figure 3.16: Map showing buildings conditions in Aljameaah. Source: Zuhair Fayez, 2001 edited by the author.

However, there was a lack of services mentioned in the document. For instance, there are only four private medical clinics in Aljameaah which is relatively low in comparison to the size of the population and there is no public hospital. Additionally, the area has no entertainment services, no public spaces, and no green spaces. In most of Aljameaah's areas, water pipes, sewer lines and fire hydrants are present and function normally, though they are old and not well maintained. Socially, it was noted that in the year 2003 when the report was written, the majority of Aljameaah's population were Saudis (around 70%) while non-Saudis made up around 30%. In relation to education levels, only 7% of people residing in Aljameaah hold a bachelor's degree, 22% were illiterate, as compared to the national figure of 13% illiteracy (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2007). These figures reflect the fact that most of the population of this area are either older Saudis who have not adopted a fully urbanized lifestyle (Bedouins) or low skilled immigrants from abroad. In terms of housing, most residents in Aljameaah were renters - 75% - while 25% were owners. Forty-one per cent of buildings were over 25 years old and 55% of buildings were 10 to 25 years old. Only 4% of Aljameaah's buildings were newer than 10 years. With such an environment, one striking fact mentioned in the report was that 98% of people wanted to stay in the area reflecting a high level of attachment to Aljameaah among its residents.

Besides King Abdelaziz University, there is also the Prince Muteab Market, a well-known market in the south of Jeddah. Although it is a formal market operating under the Municipality's regulations, there are many informal activities taking place. This market offers several mini-markets within its boundaries. For instance, there is a mini-market for clothes, furniture, electrical products, jewellery and many more. Each mini-market has its own zone where visitors can walk between them freely. There is also an auction area where one can bid on different products that are being sold, usually second-hand items (See Figure 3.17). This market has witnessed many fire incidents in the past and was always a place of concern to Jeddah's Municipality. In 2017, the Municipality demolish the existing market and proposed establishing a new modern one called "Seven Mall" (See Figure 3.18) to replace the old one, however, to date this has not been built. According to local people, the demolition is not related to the redevelopment project but is a result of the owners' desire to maximize profits.

Figure 3.17: Images of the auction area in the market months before the demolition. (Source: The author, 2015)

Figure 3.18: Seven Mall: the proposal of the modernist market in Aljameaah. (Source: @SaudiProject in Twitter).

Aljameaah represents a typical informal area that has the characteristics that define informality in Saudi Arabia. It is an area that does not conform to the regulations of Jeddah's Municipality, meaning it emerged without formal guidance or authority from the Municipality's authorities. The organic layout of the neighbourhood which was a result of informal practice is also an indicative sign of its informal nature. Streets are narrow with few parking spaces and open spaces are limited or do not exist. Buildings heights and layouts vary greatly from building to building. Socially, it has a large number of older Saudi residents, who migrated from rural areas in the 1960s. However, the majority of the residents are international immigrants who arrived in Aljameaah searching for cheaper housing and work opportunities starting from the late 1970s. Hence, one could argue that informal areas are defined more by social and physical features than by economic aspects.

Figure 3.19: The Characteristics of Informality in Jeddah

Beyond the limited sources and evidence drawn upon in this chapter, there is very little research or data on Aljameaah. It is representative of a popular phenomenon that can be seen across the Kingdom. In terms of neighbourhood level data, formal neighbourhoods in Saudi

cities are also no different from Aljameaah and other informal areas, where social and economic simply data do not exist at local scales in the detail necessary for information about neighbourhood compositions. Usually, data of these types are produced at the level of the city, which may not provide enough context to understand specific neighbourhoods and can mask localised differences. Although Aljameaah is one of the biggest informal areas in Jeddah, its local context is hidden, marginalised and therefore not known in the Saudi context. Here lies one of the contributions of this research: addressing the need to explore the local context to gain empirical knowledge of social, economic and political dimensions. Being aware of local conditions and internal processes entails a deeper engagement with local actors and a better grasp of their dynamic and complex relationships in light of structural changes and external circumstances. This approach seeks to link the neglected case of Saudi informality with other global examples in situating Aljameaah and Jeddah within wider debates.

3.4 Conclusion

Saudi Arabia can be considered to be relatively newly developed given the rapid process of urbanisation. Until the 1940s, the population was largely comprised of tribes who lived traditional lives as farmers or nomadic Bedouins who travelled across the Arabian Peninsula. The tribe as a social identification was the main survival unit in the country at that time and it structured the way people related to each other. Tribe culture had implications for many aspects of their lives from how they constructed their communities to their internal social structures. With the boom in the 1960s and 1970s, and with the formation of a central authority, local people started to accept a more sophisticated lifestyle different from that of previous eras, which represented a break from the past. Many of them, supported by state aid, adopted an urbanised lifestyle in major Saudi cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah. The state also relied on Western influences in producing urbanisation programmes and development plans in which a new physical environment emerged based on the grid system prominent in the US. This new environment was orderly in terms of streets, layouts, and urban forms and created a distinction between the old and the new urban areas. The old urban areas were a product of a traditional culture that was based on tribal and religious principles, while the new urban areas were modern and developed in response to the economic and political changes.

This rapid urbanization has produced new challenges and systems. A massive wave of immigrants to the Kingdom took place in response to the rapidly growing economy. The state introduced new laws to manage the situation, including a sponsorship system (*kafeel*) in addition to laws that restrict immigrants' commercial activities. In addition, undocumented immigrants found ways to enter the Kingdom, mainly via the vast border with Yemen. Additionally, many refugees from Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Palestine arrived in the Kingdom to seek asylum from persecution in their countries. In the western part of the country, immigrants and refugees resided in informal areas that were associated with previous Saudi traditional practices and modes of dwelling. These rapid changes in demography and transformations to urban fabric led to the development of saudisation programs where the state tries to support its citizens in preference to immigrants. Currently, with decreased oil revenues, saudisation has become more important than ever with unemployment as a continuous concern.

These key national processes at the level of the Kingdom have affected and shaped the development of the urban margins in Jeddah. The city was initially a small walled settlement built based on traditional Islamic culture with narrow streets and compact urban form. Driven by oil wealth and immigration, it became the second-largest city in Saudi Arabia. However, today one-third of the city's areas are considered and classified officially as informal neighbourhoods, meaning they are areas that were built before the arrival of formalized - or Western – planning standards. These areas are characterised by high concentrations of immigrant settlements (including refugees), poor infrastructure, lack of services, lack of land rights, and are seen to be "hotbeds of crime and disorder" which puts them in the state's priorities to be redeveloped. Therefore, the Municipality of Jeddah announced a massive redevelopment project aimed at eradicating most of these informal areas in order to, on one hand, create an orderly city, while on the other, to evacuate immigrants from them to support the saudization process. However, since these areas have many tribal families still living in them, residents refused to accept the redevelopment project, and the project has been unsuccessful to this date.

The case study for this research is Aljameaah, an informal area located in the south of the city. It is one of the largest and most populated informal areas and has existed since the 1960s. It has a large number of Saudi and immigrant residents, where the latter resided due to the existence of a large economic sector. The area also benefits from KAU - the second-

largest university in the Kingdom - being located near the area too. Although it is a significant informal area, little is known about the groups, actors, or internal dynamics and discourses regarding everyday life within this relatively marginalized zone.

This research, therefore, explores these aspects in depth. First, in Chapter 5, the research explores the nature of the groups who live in Aljameaah and how they function in an informal context. In chapter 6, the focus is on how, given the high degree of diversity in the neighbourhood, these different groups relate to each other in daily life. This will help elucidate and deepen the analyses and allow a better understanding of the interdependencies between them. Chapter 8 explores how policies and collective practices affect these relations and what their consequences are. This connects Aljameaah to the wider context of Saudi Arabia and sheds light on the group relationships with the outside world.

CHAPTER 4: Methodology

In this chapter, a description of the research methods and strategies is given. It starts by explaining the research approach, that is, how the study is positioned itself in social science philosophies, and why interpretivism is the preferred approach in line with the aims and purposes of the research. Then, it outlines the data collection methods used to obtain information, with justifications of why they were chosen. To show how the research was conducted, a detailed description of the stages of fieldwork is provided, in which changes in the research scope is highlighted. This is followed by a discussion of the method used to analyse empirical data, the translations of interviews, and the researcher's positionality. Finally, some ethical considerations are discussed and how this research addressed them.

4.1 The research approach

This research investigates informal areas in Jeddah using a qualitative approach to generate data. This approach is used to understand and describe actors' subjective experiences and attitudes, thus it is concerned with words and meanings rather than with numbers and measures (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In this context, the data generated by the research does not represent a universal scientific model like those adopting a positivist position seeking to observe regularities. Rather, it represents the experiences and opinions of individuals who live and act in their unique informal contexts. Since there is a lack of empirical evidence on Saudi Arabia's informality and a lack of knowledge about the diverse processes within informal areas around the globe, this research seeks to understand relationships between individuals within identifiable groups in the area as well as the relationships between groups. These two approaches - understanding individuals' experiences as well as studying groups relations - meant the research came under the epistemological and ontological perspectives of interpretivism.

Interpretivism recognizes the importance of context and its influence in the construction of meaning. It appreciates how humans are shaped by their surroundings and their relationships with the world they inhabit. This means groups and individuals are always in process of change, often with unexpected results since any change in their world is a change in the meanings they hold (Thomas, 2003). Actors are complex, as they are often in transition, and are constantly being influenced by new circumstances, social norms, and values. This

philosophical perspective allows for a greater understanding of how actors and realities happen to be as they are (Chowdhury, 2014). Hence, seeking to understand the present entails an investigation of the past and its influence on groups actions, and this agrees with many calls from different authors for a processual approach in understanding urban informalities (see Chapter 2). Hence, interpretivism works in conjunction with processual and relational approaches that are adopted by the research. At the same time, it promotes an awareness of marginalised voices that may be under-represented in the academic field (Goodsell, 2013).

Based on the above considerations, an inductive reasoning approach is utilized to understand urban informalities in Jeddah. This approach focuses on starting from the bottom (raw data from the fieldwork) to up (themes and concepts collecting similar processes to form broader categories), where a researcher seeks to find patterns within collections of data and then draw conclusions (Arthur, 1994). It requires the researcher to be close to the data to gain a deeper understanding of the patterns that exist. Since the local context of this research is rich with many actors and changes, this approach enables an analysis that allows localities to emerge and hence prevents the researcher from relying on dominant views and assumptions that may hide local dynamics that are specific to the case under investigation.

Gather Data → **Look for Patterns** → **Develop Theory**
Specific level of focus   *Analysis*   *General level of focus*

Figure 4.1: The process of inductive reasoning. (Source: scientificinquiryinsocialwork.pressbooks.com/)

4.1.1 Case study

This research focuses on a single case study to explore the rich and diverse nature of urban informality in Jeddah. This kind of method is designed to study " a particular neighbourhood within a city" (Berg, 2001, p. 233) to investigate all its elements. This type of case study is called methodologically intrinsic which means that the case is unique in its characteristics (Crowe *et al.*, 2011). As described before in (Chapter 3), the choice to study Aljameaah was taken to address its academically and empirically marginalised status. It is an informal area with a very diverse population of new arrivals from Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Palestine, along with long-standing Saudi citizens. It is one of the biggest informal areas in Jeddah, and its location provides jobs for labourers (Table 4.1). A large illegal immigrant population also live in this area which adds to its complexity and

diversity. It is the closest informal area to the researcher's house, which made it very accessible for fieldwork, and one local informant was known personally.

Neighbourhood name	Population	% Of Saudis	% of non-Saudis	Distance from my home	Known informants
Al-Sabeel	50,715	68%	32%	11 km	No
Bani Malik	20,350	66%	34%	14 km	No
Kandarah	30,000	29%	71%	12 km	No
Aljameaah	121,595	69%[15]	31%	6 km	Yes
Al-Rwuais	34,000	32%	68%	16 km	No
Al-Nuzlah	49,210	69%	31%	14 km	Yes

Table 4-1: The selection criteria for the case study of this research.

One of the critiques of interpretive case studies is that they lack historical context. Doolin (1998) argues that these case studies are not able to explain changes in social relations because they emphasize the actions of actors without reference to the group or broader social structures. This research avoids this tendency by considering the political contexts, economic changes, cultural norms, and other factors that may affect realities within Aljameaah. This allows for an understanding of actors' actions with reference to the local, national, and international context they are operating in. Another criticism of interpretive case studies is that they do not produce generalised explanations (Crowe *et al.*, 2011). This research acknowledges that the findings cannot and should not provide generalised explanations, as this would require time and resources, a limitation that is mentioned in Chapter 8.

4.2 Methods of data collection

This section provides a brief account of each method that is adapted to obtain empirical data in the field. Four methods are discussed in relation to the research and literature of social science methods: documentary analyses, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and focus group study.

---

[15] Based on a 2003 report by Fayez Partnership (see Chapter 3). However, this figure does not reflect reality as it is out of date and based on a limited sample which was not specified in the report.

4.2.1 Documentary analyses

The documentary analysis method is an important element in this research. This method allows the researcher to examine and analyse public documents to gain an understanding of, or look for explanations with regard to the logic and rationalities underpinning urban change and development (Bowen, 2009). However, documents are not simply sources facts but need to be linked to the research context and the adopted theory (Ahmed, 2010). For this purpose, this research extracted evidence from these documents of processes that might have led to shifts in realities within Aljameaah and its groups and their activities. This tries to overcome the critique associated with interpretivist case studies discussed in the previous section to allow for a broader understanding of Aljameaah. However, one of the disadvantages of this method is that documents need to be available (Appleton and Cowley, 1997). This is true in contexts like Saudi Arabia where data and documents are - sometimes - hard to access or obtain if they exist at all. This disadvantage prevents the research from being able to capture, for example, a detailed picture of the numbers of illegal immigrants living in Aljameaah, since no data were found to allow for such a detailed assessment.

The research uses this method to understand how public policies in Saudi Arabia target and affect the relations between different groups within informal areas. Specifically, the research analyses public policies such as The Law of Villages and Municipalities (Ministry of Municipalities and Rural affairs); The Report on Informal Areas Redevelopment in Jeddah (Makkah Council, 2008); The First Master Plan of Jeddah (Makhlouf, 1962); The Second Master Plan of Jeddah (Mathew, 1973); Laws of Commercial and Civic Activities (Ministry of Commerce); Aljameaah's Zuhair Fayez Report (Fayez, 2003); and annual reports from the General Authority for Statistics (GAS) and Ministry of Labour. Furthermore, the research examines some media articles about Aljameaah specifically or about urban informality and immigration in Jeddah in general. Media articles fill in the gaps in state-level information on Aljameaah.

The Document	What Was Studied
Law of Villages and Municipalities	Historical processes about national programs related to Bedouin and urbanisation.
Report on Informal Areas Redevelopment in Jeddah	Understanding rationales of Jeddah Municipality regarding informal areas.

Aljameaah's Zuhair Fayez Report	Extracting data about Aljameaah's groups and spatial information about the quality of physical characteristics of the area.
Master Plans for Jeddah	The role of Western experts in controlling and managing urbanisation problems in Jeddah.
GAS Annual Reports	Tracking the level of immigration and Saudi populations over time with its implications to unemployment rates, economic performance, and education data.
Ministry of Labour Annual Reports	Understanding processes related to Saudization regulations related to it.

Table 4-2 List of Documents analysed

This research also relies on the analysis of some media content, namely online newspapers, which fall under the method of documentary analysis (Dalglish, Khalid and McMahon, 2021). From this analysis, the research obtains data on many themes relevant to the objectives of the study. These themes include information about certain changes in the kafala system and structural challenges faced by the public-private corporation (JDURC) responsible for redeveloping the informal areas of Jeddah. In addition, the analysis of media content reveals important views on some issues that are directly linked to related conceptual issues, namely issues like stigmatisation and social identification. Since many newspapers in Saudi Arabia publish public statistics on employment and labour, the research also uses the analysis of these statistics to confirm the observations made about Aljameaah. The following table illustrates the range of these newspapers used in this thesis (Table 4-3).

The name of newspapers	Access date	Themes explored
Sabq (Saudi newspaper)	08-2019 (approximately)	Exploring updates regarding the Redevelopment Project of Informal Areas in Jeddah
BBC news (International newspaper)	10-05-2021	Details about some changes that occurred recently in the *Kafala* System.
Al-Jazira (Saudi newspaper)	04-2020 (approximately)	Data about Saudi Arabia's unemployment rates.
Watan (Saudi newspaper)	08-2019 (approximately)	Some observations about the *Mirkaz*.
Mal (Saudi newspaper)	10-05-2021	Potential changes in the *kafala* system, data about the delayed redevelopment project of informal areas in Jeddah.
Okaz (Saudi newspaper)	10-05-2021	Potential changes in the *kafala* system.

Al-Eqtsadya (Saudi newspaper)	11-2019 (approximately)	Information about the public-private company that had the responsibility to redevelop informal areas in Jeddah.
Eremnews (Saudi newspaper)	04-2020 (approximately)	Some data about the number of documented immigrants in the Saudi private sector.
Albawaba (Saudi website)	12-2020 (approximately)	Information about the identity of undocumented immigrants.

Table 4-3: Newspapers used in this thesis with data access and themes explored.

4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews are used in this research to explore and understand Aljameaah's actors. This method is used by researchers to obtain data from individuals or groups by asking open-ended but pre-planned questions and topics needing to be explored and analysed by the researcher (Jamshed, 2014). One of the advantages of this method is that it allows participants to reflect on experiences more freely than structured interviews and it is better than unstructured interviews in terms of saving researchers time and effort.

The sample size required is usually based on the context of the research, however, a provisional estimate is recommended based on time and resources available (Robinson, 2014). Hence, it was decided to have 51 participants in this research to cover diverse groups in Aljameaah, but the total ended up being 56 due to changes in the scope of the research (detailed in Section 4.3). Participants were selected from three categories: 1- Saudis; 2- Immigrants; and 3- Policymakers. Since this research focuses on different groups to capture the diversity of informal areas, choosing Saudis was based on their living in different areas of Aljameaah. Similarly, different immigrant nationalities living in different areas of Aljameaah were chosen to understand different views. Although policymakers are not directly related to the research objectives, they were interviewed to understand the state's views about Aljameaah. The two public agencies chosen were: Jeddah Municipality and Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC). The former is responsible for the management of Aljameaah in general and the latter is in charge of preparing Aljameaah redevelopment project. Table 4.4 shows the total number of participants in terms of nationality and gender.

Participants by Nationality		Participant by gender	
Saudis	31	Male	51

Immigrants	25	Female	5
Total	**56**		

Table 4-4: Participant Categorization by Nationality and Gender

These groups were asked questions regarding their daily life practices and activities. The focus was on how they relate to each other, their social and economic interdependencies, why they have decided to reside in the area and what causes made them do so. In Elias's terms, a figurational approach, beyond the individual, focuses attention on the various modes of human beings living together within Aljameaah, and how the human figurations that they form with each other are characterised by fluctuating power balances and shifting social interdependencies tied to urban change. The researcher also explored their friendship and social networks and how they have been developed and what enabled them to get resources and what deprivations they suffered. These aspects allowed a better understanding of their power positions and how they are manifested.

Two policymakers[16] were interviewed, and questions were mainly about their roles in governing the area, their perceptions and images of it and its inhabitants, its relation to other areas, and how they conceive of, and deal with, different groups. This enables assessment of the role of public policies in shaping the area and of the extent the state is involved in the local people's daily lives.

The interviews lasted between 20 and 50 minutes. And were all recorded by the researcher on a SONY recorder. The total length of all interviews was around 21 hours. Recording interviews is recommended in academia since it allows researchers to focus and engage with their participants without having to write notes, which could get in the way of in-depth discussions (Jamshed, 2014). It also allows researchers to transcribe interviews digitally to start the analysis process. However, a major concern with this approach is whether participants will talk freely and without restriction. Hence, verbal consent was taken to make sure participants felt comfortable being recorded. In this research, several participants withdrew from being interviewed; one (an immigrant female) refused for security reasons; and three policymakers refused to participate, giving no explanations.

---

[16] Since the redevelopment project was frozen, interviewing two policymakers was enough as the situation was still an ongoing process, and no solid conclusion was reached yet.

4.2.3 Participant observation

The third method used in this research was participant observation. This involves being fully engaged with local people and understanding their daily life activities and being able to ask questions about their behaviours (Becker and Geer, 1957). This method supports the information the researcher gathers from interviews thus making it possible to validate collected data (Kawulich, 2005). It is recommended when visiting tan area being studied that the researcher acts and appears in a way that makes actors in the field naturally comfortable so they keep their regular routines (Bernard, 2017). Researchers need to improve skills of deception and impression to be able to be accepted in fieldwork. In line with this, at the beginning of the fieldwork, the researcher visited Aljameaah in formal Saudi clothes and carried an official Sheffield University card to verify his identity. However, local residents did not feel comfortable and looks of suspicion were clear on their faces. An informal act was applied where the researcher wore casual clothes - sport outfits - similar to the one's locals wear. This move worked and resulted in locals becoming more open to talking.

The total number of observations completed for this research is around 32. The time of these observations was varied since sometimes the researcher went to observe events that occurred late at night or during social gatherings in some *haras*. Sometimes *Iftar*[17] events between haras were observed after 6 pm. Usually, observation took place from 6 pm to 11 pm - the peak time for local residents to be outside their houses doing their after-work activities. This is very typical in Jeddah where residents function at night to escape the heat of the day. Roughly, the total time of observations was around 150 to 200 hours. These observations were not only about social relations but also about observing physical features and materials across Aljameaah. This involved taking pictures of houses and narrow streets between haras and identifying differences between spaces that belong to different groups in the neighbourhood. They were also collected evidence about claims made by certain groups against others which became the basis for understanding stigmatisation processes.

To document the research observations, the researcher took many field notes and pictures. Laurier (2010) recommends notes and pictures because they help to recall experiences and

---

[17] *Iftar* is the fast-breaking meal in Ramadan where Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset.

feelings about the place. He describes three stages of taking notes: write, analyse, and reflect; and he recommends that writing should be "after the event". In line with this, after observation, the researcher went to his car and usually took 20 minutes to write up what he saw and what he learned. The researcher then took these notes to his house and reflect on and analyse what he wrote and what he observed. Sometimes the researcher forgot his notepaper and had to use his phone to record ideas then write them as notes later. In terms of pictures, the researcher took around 200 images to make the research data more detailed. He took pictures of most *haras* that he visited along with gathering places, landmarks, narrow streets, and other relevant features. He stored these images on an online cloud storage website called Flicker. This website allows the researcher to search for an image by its location and date. The website also allows attaching a tag for each picture with a description. In this way, it is easy to organise images based on the research themes.

4.2.4 Focus group study

The Focus Group method is used in this research to explore group attitudes toward each other. This method focuses on the "interaction" between the groups being examined and the interaction becomes the core of analysis and results (Kitzinger, 2005). When the researcher found a clear distinction between Kilo 6 area's groups and those from other areas in Aljameaah, it was decided that it would be helpful to see how different groups in Kilo 6 act and behave with each other and at the same time, how different groups outside Kilo 6 act and behave with each other as well. Since outside Kilo 6 area, different groups were in conflict with one another, the researcher could not conduct focus groups with them. One attempt was made between Saudi and Burmese individuals in one of the haras which ended by a heated verbal argument before it could even begin. In contrast, a focus group in Kilo 6 in which participants were from diverse backgrounds and ethnicities went well and lasted for four hours and participants talked freely about their issues and thoughts. The number of participants in this group was six which is in the range of research recommendations[18] (Redmond and Curtis, 2009).

It is clear that one focus group study is not enough, especially given the Aljameaah's high diversity. However, this method is supplementary to a more comprehensive method which is the semi-structured interviews. This method was added at the halfway stage of the fieldwork

---

[18] Redmond and Curtis recommend between 4 to 12 participants.

to explore emerging themes including how Saudis and immigrants seemed to be in continuous conflict in some areas, while other areas were largely harmonious. The amount of information generated by this one focus group study was impressive and it allowed a better understanding of the nature of Kilo 6 area and how its groups were able to resolve their differences. The data generated from the focus group was more about their relations and their feelings about others rather than their personal issues (Guest *et al.*, 2017). This single focus group was able to capture the majority of the research themes (Guest, Namey and McKenna, 2017) and enhance the data collection, especially for research that relies on multiple methods as in the case of this research.

Figure 4.2: Major themes which emerged from the first focus group study. (Source: Guest, Namey and McKenna, 2017)

4.3 Fieldwork stages

4.3.1 The pre-planned phase: Conflict between vision and reality

This phase was the preparation of the details of the selecting participant. It was decided that groups should be classified according to the state's view: Saudis, non-Saudis (those who entered the country legally), and *Mukhalifin* (non-Saudis who entered the country illegally) (see Chapter 3)[19]. Hence, 15 interviews were allocated to each group to capture a general picture of their views; in addition, there were 10 interviews with policymakers giving a total of 55 interviews. However, research requires continuous reflexivity between the pre-planned

---

[19] These are the three formal categories adopted by the state when classifying population groups.

aims and reality on the ground (Naveed *et al.*, 2017). Several constraints were faced during the course of fieldwork which led to changes in the selection process.

After conducting several interviews, it was clear that the formal narrative of the state in classifying groups was not well-informed or at least does not work in Aljameaah's context. The line between legal and illegal non-Saudis is difficult to draw in an abstract way. There were those who were born in the country with illegal immigrant parents, who had absorbed the local culture; and there were those immigrants who had recently entered the country illegally with different cultures and languages, but both groups are classified as illegal immigrants. Indeed, the research found that "illegal" immigrants who were born in the country, represented the established community in many haras, alongside the officially Saudi residents. This conflict between the abstraction of the formal categorisation and the complex situation, in reality, means that the legal - illegal dichotomy has been avoided in this study and "undocumented immigrants" is used to refer to "illegal immigrants".

Similarly, the intention was to cover all Saudi tribes established the area since the 1960s. However, many of these tribes have left the area (e.g. Juhainah tribe, Sulami Tribe, Ghamid Tribe, Thaqif tribe, … etc) and the only tribe that still live there is Harb tribe. This tribe is the biggest in terms of population and they were the first to become established in the area. This situation facilitated the research by presenting a clear figurational interpretation in which the long-standing tribes formed an established society and the new immigrants were conceived of as outsiders. It also enabled the researcher to capture the ways power is exercised, collective stigmatisation, and inherited informal practices in order to meet the research goals and aims. The areas that migrated tribes left behind became attractive to many waves of immigrants. Thus, tribes, long-standing immigrants, and new immigrants live together today, turning Aljameaah into an extremely diverse neighbourhood. This diverse nature became an asset in understanding established-outsider boundaries and how these boundaries are shifting based on their interdependencies.

It was also decided that the researcher would meet with participants from the Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC). This company oversees implementing the redevelopment project of informal areas in Jeddah (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3). The researcher tried many times during 2018 to arrange meetings with them but with no success. Attempts were made by phone and by email, but no communication came back.

Another attempt was made by going to their building at 10 am during weekdays to get face to face contact, but then a security guard told the researcher from the main door that no one was in the building. He was later told by a policymaker from Jeddah Municipality that it would be very difficult to meet anyone from the company because of an investigation by authorities regarding some of their activities. As a result, they were removed from the research sample. The researcher acknowledges the absence of their views as a limitation of this research as their views would have helped to understand a range of issues such as reasons for removing the Market, details about immigrants' social and economic situation, and the insights of the redevelopment project itself.

4.3.2 The first round of fieldwork

The first round of fieldwork took place from 28 October 2018 to 28 January 2019 a total of three months. The number of participants interviewed during this period was 31. In this round, the goal was to focus on experiences, relations, the built environment, and group dynamics within Aljameaah, and defer interviewing the policymaker participants to the second round of fieldwork. This allowed the researcher to be aware of group relations at that stage, how they are affected by the informal environment, what groups lack and struggle to achieve, and then take this information into consideration when meeting policymakers. Dividing the fieldwork into two rounds is also helpful for the researcher to fix gaps or errors when carrying out the second round.

Access within Aljameaah was secured via an informant (Jaffar) from Sudan, who has been a resident of the area for more than 40 years. He lives in a rental flat in a building owned by a Saudi of the Sulaim tribe, one of the tribes that had left the area. He lives with his family; his wife and four of their children. The researcher had no prior relationship with him, but one of the researcher's relatives knew the informant and suggested the Sudanese informant may help. The researcher met the informant in Aljameaah in the grocery store he had suggested, where he facilitated the first interview with an old person who knew the area very well. After that, he suggested another person who unfortunately cancelled the meeting. I asked the informant to find participants from Chad, Mali, and Ethiopia but he was not able to. He informed me that most were too scared to take part as the process involves recordings. However, the researcher managed to contact three immigrants suggested by the informant.

Only two meetings took place with this informant and contact with him was not continued since he was busy working on his grocery store.

To find more participants, the researcher adopted many different approaches. In other words, in situ innovations were adopted to recruit participants from different groups (McCormack, Adams and Anderson, 2013). The first one was walking the streets to search for participants who met certain criteria that were based on emerging themes. The process involved targeting areas that were mentioned by the first three participants, then choosing new participants from there. For instance, two initial emerging themes about the Kilo 6 area and social conflict between Saudis and Burmese in one hara, led the researcher to investigate these areas and recruit participants from there and this, in turn, became one of the main focuses of this research. This process helped to contact the majority of participants in the first round of fieldwork. The researcher argues that this spontaneous strategy is necessary for a marginalised area where actors are afraid to talk or may face negative stereotypes from society.

The second approach for finding more participants was the use of social media. This method is very often used in health research, usually for "hard to reach" populations, such as women in Saudi Arabia (Topolovec-Vranic and Natarajan, 2016). Meeting Saudi females face to face is not acceptable according to Saudi culture[20]. It may be easy to meet Saudi women from elite or families that are educated abroad. However, traditional areas, as the case of informal areas in Jeddah, where Saudis tend to be from tribes, may present difficulties. The only tolerated way to meet with Saudi women is through social media. The researcher posted many tweets asking Saudi females in the neighbourhood to contact him about participating. Three women responded and agrees to answer research questions sent by email. Two of these women answered with texts while the third one answered with a recorded voice file.

After the end of the first round of fieldwork, the researcher spent two months transcribing then analysing the data and found that an essential theme started to emerge. This theme showed there was a clear difference in terms of relations between the older and younger generations and helped to understand how younger generations construct their relations.

---

[20] A PhD thesis by a Saudi female studying abroad (Nahedh, 1989, p. 164) discusses in detail the issue of male-female interaction in Saudi Arabia and how it sometimes hinders doing research.

Another main theme was the conflict between Saudis and Burmeen and hence the power differentials between immigrants and Saudis in Aljameaah which involves dimensions beyond the neighbourhood. Subthemes related to the importance of tribe, the physical construction of Aljameaah as an informal area, historical processes of groups, and the nature of group relation were all identified in this phase. Finally, a repeated pattern observed in this phase was regarding the danger of Kilo 6 area with many participants warning the researcher not to go there.

4.3.3 The second round of fieldwork

This round of fieldwork ran from April to June 2019. The main goal was to interview policymakers with a specific role in dealing with the informal areas in Jeddah which are mainly represented in two organizations. The first is the Municipality of Jeddah and the second is Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC). Another goal was to visit themes that emerged from the analysis of the first-round interviews that required further clarification and exploration. An example was regarding visiting schools and interviewing students and teachers to investigate youth and younger generations' behaviours and interactions in these schools.

In regard to meeting with policymakers, the researcher made use of contacts in the Municipality of Jeddah, such as an urban planner who had worked there for more than 11 years. He agreed to participate and helped the researcher to make contact with two policymakers who work closely on redeveloping and managing informal areas in Jeddah. The researcher also contacted one consultant from the Municipality, but he apologized because - in his opinion - the two policymakers already contacted "more than enough" to help the researcher. The first policymaker's interview took place in a coffee shop close to his house in one of the neighbourhoods located on the north side of Jeddah. The second interview took place in the policy maker' office. The second organization that I should have met is JDURC which I could not meet as I mentioned earlier.

One of Aljameaah areas where different groups live is Kilo 6. The researcher did not visit the area in the first round because many participants claimed that this area was too dangerous and unsafe for the researcher to visit. For example, Samer, a participant from Yemen, told the

researcher that visiting Kilo 6 required "a special passport", meaning its degree of difference is relatively high. Others claimed that this area is dangerous to walk in after 4 pm. These stigmatisations by participants created a negative picture of Kilo 6 in the researcher's imagination. Reinforced by the poor physical appearance of the physical environment, the researcher became certain that this area could cause threats to his life. After discussing this with research supervisors, the researcher was advised to avoid visiting Kilo 6. However, in the second round of fieldwork, the researcher decided to take the risk and walked there with some friends. This step was not to bypass supervisors' guidance but being with friends to walk in Kilo 6 was much safer than walking alone. This walk happened to be before sunset, close to one of the *haras* with a big *Mirkaz* where more than 40 people were gathered. Many people stared at the researcher with his friends, and it was evident that they knew they are strangers. After a couple of days, the researcher drove in the area many times to observe it closely and to familiarise himself with its entrances and exits and check for any sign of possible danger.

The researcher found that Kilo 6 was safe to visit and did many interviews with its residents. Local people there were very friendly and cooperated with the researcher more than in any other area within Aljameaah[21]. When he encountered participants in one *Mirkaz*, two individuals approached him and asked him politely if he needed help. This was the important step that allowed the researcher to established trust between himself and Kilo's residents. They invited him to their *Mirkaz* where they offered him water and some chips from a nearby grocery store. This was the first time participants had provided food and drink for the researcher. After knowing the educational purpose of this study, they offered their help by calling older people from the area to participate. They even offered their WhatsApp numbers for future contact. They assured the researcher that people in Kilo 6 are not as outsiders think of and challenged the researcher to walk around Kilo 6 at 2 am or any time alone to see how safe it is. The researcher's experience is that the nature of meetings with Kilo's individuals was friendly, respectful, joyful, and pleasant compared to other places in Aljameaah.

Many issues were identified that enhanced the researcher's understanding of Aljameaah in this stage. Among them were the uneven quality of Aljameaah's physical environment, processes related to stigmatization and identifications in shaping the group relations and the

---

[21] It was a similar experience to Perlman's (2004) during her studies of favelas in Brazil.

role of religion as a tool used between groups. The themes of this phase enhanced an understanding of Aljameaah as a local place connected to global networks, whether socially or economically.

4.4 Thematic analyses

This research used a strategy of thematic analysis to address the research questions and aims. It allows researchers to develop their analysis by connecting different texts to a single idea or theme (Bryman, 2016). Each text that has meaning is given a code as a reference to the meaning of the text from the researcher's viewpoint. Thus, a group of texts could create subthemes and a collection of subthemes would create themes which would lead to the analysis chapters. In order to proceed, the researcher spent around six months transcribing and translating all interviews into English (see the next section) and printing the transcripts.

This research used Vaismordai *et al.*'s (2016) approach in conducting the thematic analyses. They propose four stages for analysing interviews: initialisation, construction, rectification, and finalisation. In this first stage of initialising, the researcher took the printed interview transcripts and carefully read them many times to make sure they were well understood. Then he started to manually highlight and extract information that might be relevant to the research scope (see Appendix 8). In line with Vaismordai *et al.*'s, written notes were attached to the transcripts to record some emerging ideas and concepts and reflect on them. It is estimated that 300 codes were produced and around 30 reflection notes were written. The second stage was construction. In this stage, the task was to classify and label these codes by their connections so they could be used in later analysis. The researcher used a mind map tool called MindMup 2 which visualises nodes and easily moves them from one category to another. It is integrated with Google Drive which means all mind maps are saved to the University's storage account. At this stage, main themes were intensified with many codes such a: informal practices, social cohesion, power dynamics, structural changes, … etc.

Rectification is the third stage in analysing data based on a thematic approach. The main aim of this stage is to link the data generated from previous stages to the research scope and literature in general (Vaismoradi *et al.*, 2016, p. 106). The first step is to distance oneself from the data so one can better see the world from the research viewpoint, after being immersed in, and seeing the world from participants' views. The researcher did this

distancing by revising the literature review chapter and reading new articles on informality and group relations. This was helpful when going back to the data since new ideas and concepts sharpened the results. For example, ideas about how Aljameaah emerged as an informal area were compared to other informal areas in the global north and south; processes of stigmatisation and social marginalisation were compared to similar processes in Europe and the USA. It is also recommended to think about themes not as separate entities, but as interdependent to avoid repetition of information. This stage was fully developed using NVivo, a powerful tool for linking information from different sources.

The last stage is finalising the data by developing a "story line". The rationale for this stage is to present a coherent story of the data and to show how the data links to other parts of the research. This strategy was used as the basis to develop the first empirical chapter (Chapter 5) which describes the emergence of Aljameaah and its groups as a chronological story to show how the neighbourhood was constructed through different time periods.

4.5   The process of translation

Cross-language research usually involves translating interviews into another language. The translation is done by transferring the meaning from the source language to the target one (Esposito, 2001). In this research, the source language is in Arabic and the target language is English. Arabic is the first spoken language in Saudi Arabia while English is the dominant language for research purposes (Choi *et al.*, 2012). In most cases, cross-language researchers rely on outsider translators who are hired to translate interviews into English (ibid). However, translators must be aware of the context and local culture of the targeted participants, otherwise, their results may not reflect what is being said (Jones and Kay, 1992). Hence, bilingual researchers often produce better results in catching meanings in the translation processes if they belong to the country being researched but are also aware of the culture of their targeted participants. The researcher is considered to be bilingual and he did all the translation himself without assistance from an outsider. The process was positively beneficial and led to better understandings of participants' feelings and thoughts. It enabled him to go into their answers in depth and be attached to the data he produced, thus improving the analyses later. Many of the themes that have been defined in the research were a result of in depth thinking while translating.

There are two ways to do translation: literal translation and meaning-based translation. The literal strategy involves translating interviews word by word, though overall meaning also is considered, but a focus on the meaning of individual words is more important. This may be useful for surveys or positivist studies where the rigidity of meaning is essential (Brislin, 1970). Given the epistemological position of this research, meaning-based translation is considered in line with the research aims and goals. This strategy puts the overall meaning, which is usually understood in terms of culture and local context, at the forefront. Since expressions and phrases do not have universal meaning across different cultures (Jones and Kay, 1992), it makes sense that translation should be more concerned with how participants use words, rather than what words themselves mean.

To illustrate, some examples encountered in this research are indications of the importance of being aware of local culture in the translation process. Given that the case study for the research is an informal area with many different groups, it was important to be aware of the "colloquial Arabic" (Al-Amer *et al.*, 2016) in Aljameaah in order to translate some words and phrases that otherwise would be vague even for native Arabic speakers to capture. For example, the word *Kalli Walli* has no meaning in Arabic and most Arabic speakers would not understand the meaning of this phrase unless they were born in one of the informal areas in Jeddah. This phrase is an Arabic phrase influenced by Bangladeshi grammatical forms. It mirrors the rich diversity of different ethnic groups who live in the informal areas of Jeddah where the Arabic language has been modified to fit the local culture. Another example is the word *Shalooh* which means "eradicated" in English. However, local people used this word differently because they refer to the Market which the government decided to close down at the beginning of 2019. They used this word to tell the researcher that the government closed down the market because it wanted to harm the informal economy. Hence, the meaning of the word would change from eradicated to destroyed to capture the real meaning of what participants wanted to say.

4.6 Researcher's position

As a researcher, my position was in a grey area. I was trying to find a clear position for myself while doing the fieldwork, but it was not as easy as I thought it would be. Elias (1956) discusses in-depth how social scholars should "detach" from the real world in order to see the

truth. While this may seem to be logical in investigating any social phenomena, the reality is that as humans researchers are not removed from the real world. There are plenty of burdens on the investigation processes that may affect the result even if we deny such a thing; in the end, there are many things that we do not have control over. The resultant outcome would be a truth that is neither "true" nor "not true" for us. This outcome is exclusive to the context and the influence of the researcher. The influence here is in his choice of "what to write" and "what to not write". These burdens - whether they are political or cultural - may not distort the truth but they may prevent it from expanding further to a greater extent. However, there are some reflections that are worth mentioning.

Although I tried to be neutral in studying Aljameaah, being an outsider who belongs to a different class from the people of Aljameaah is hard to ignore. I belong to the middle-class category but lived the first six years of my life in Aljameaah and then moved to a formal public housing complex in the south of Jeddah, planned by an American company in the 1970s. Urban life there was organized differently from informal areas, meaning the pattern of planning was grid-based with clearly defined land uses. Schools and commercial areas were not scattered around like they were in informal areas but grouped together based on urban standards. I went to schools that were modern and newly built by the state. Later I was accepted by King Abdelaziz University and in 2012 received a scholarship to study in the US. This information is provided to demonstrate my status as a male who does not represent the usual male of Aljameaah who may have a completely different background and experience. Therefore, I am an outsider in the eyes of Aljameaah' people and I accept this perception.

However, I enjoy some identity privileges that help in this research. First, I am a native of Jeddah city which helps me to understand the city's situation more deeply and connects neighbourhood changes to changes that take place at the level of the city across different times. I also belong to a Saudi tribe and know the different accents and cultures of the tribes as well as their relationships to each other. It was easy for me to communicate with individuals from the Harb tribe who established Aljameaah and earn their trust. It allowed me to understand their views and concerns. Also, I'm lucky enough to have many connections with urban planners in Jeddah who work in different public agencies and were able to provide me with reports relating to Aljameaah, particularly with regard to documenting the physical environment of the area, and many other informal areas. All these advantages facilitated my progress in this research. Finally, I'm Muslim myself which has been crucial for

understanding participants' Islamic beliefs and values and the implications of these values for space and their interaction with each other.

Conversely, my identity hindered my ability to have a deep understanding of some of Aljameaah's groups. As a male researcher, it was hard to find female participants in a traditional society like Aljameaah. Only three women participated, all via digital means which made it extremely difficult to examine and evaluate their feelings and reactions properly. The same goes regarding other groups like the Burmese, Bangladeshi, and some others who do not share language and culture with Saudis. I felt that these individuals, especially the Burmese, were anxious in answering questions. Some of them speak Arabic but not fluently which may limit their capacity to fully answer questions. Even when some of them speak Arabic fluently, it seems that they talked with me in a diplomatic way since I am from a country that helped them in their struggle against oppression in their country. They made sure they sounded grateful because of this but might otherwise have had more critical things to say about their lives in Aljameaah. Thus, they may speak more freely and in-depth with researchers who are not from Saudi Arabia.

4.7 Ethical considerations

Doing social research usually involves challenges in terms of ethics. Researchers are required to commit to ensuring the confidentiality of participants and to get their consent for participating in the study. These processes are important for social science research since social enquiry studies are moral-driven in nature (Bellah, 1981). This research went through the procedure to gain ethics approval from the University of Sheffield before starting the fieldwork in 2018. The application was reviewed by experts from the Department (Urban Studies and Planning) and after many rounds of feedback, it was approved.

The main issue raised was regarding participants born in Saudi Arabia whose parents were illegal immigrants and who, in theory, were living illegally in Aljameaah. To make sure that they would be safe in participating in this research, I did not collect any personal information from them and their consent had to be verbal. No sign-in forms were provided during the fieldwork and since Aljameaah is an informal area, and to encourage participants to talk freely and comfortably, verbal consent was adopted for all participants. Asking for written consent is a barrier in field research where populations are vulnerable and illiterate (Brod and

Feinbloom, 1990). It was observed during the fieldwork that willingness to participate was higher when participants were told they did not need to sign a paper form. Participants' names were kept confidential by giving each participant a unique identification code (for example N00034) and a pseudonym to protect their identity. Any information that might lead to potential identification also was removed.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has described the methodology of this research. Since this research is interested in understanding internal processes between different groups in Aljameaah and observing these processes in light of urbanisation and informality in Saudi Arabia, it has adopted a qualitative method of investigation to understand actors' experiences and realities. Guided by an interpretivist epistemological approach, it was decided to choose a case study as the basis for qualitative research. This approach and position combined with the theoretical framework adopted enabled the study of Aljameaah through a unique lens placing processual and relational dynamics to the forefront. In this way, Aljameaah is seen to be a place of possibility for reflection and investigation, instead of a place of marginalisation. The qualitative methodology also allows for deeper exploration into the political, economic, social context of Aljameaah and how, as a local area, it mirrors regional, national and international changes and processes.

This has required multiple methods of data collection. First, to understand how policies and urban regulations affect Aljameaah and its groups, a documentary analysis method was needed. Second, a semi-structured approach was adopted to interview members of different groups in Aljameaah to understand how they relate to each other and the environment they live in. Additionally, policymakers were added to understand their positions on Aljameaah's issues and concerns. Third, to understand realities in the field, and examine the physical environment of informality in Aljameaah, participant observation was necessary. It allowed the researcher to explore the internal processes between groups and validate the information generated from interviews. Finally, a focus group study was conducted to explore and examine how Kilo 6's groups relate to one another and similarly how different groups in Aljameaah relate to one another. This method enabled the researcher to closely examine the level of conflict or solidarity between different groups within the Kilo 6 area and outside it.

A detailed description of the fieldwork stages was also presented. The fieldwork was pre-planned in a manner that would allow the researcher to conduct a comprehensive investigation to cover most of Aljameaah's groups. However, many assumptions were not valid on the ground: for instance, the formal categorisation of groups, the migration of many tribes from Aljameaah, and the absence of JDURC's participation. The fieldwork was conducted in two stages in which the first one aimed at studying Aljameaah's groups while the second aimed at interviewing policymakers and developing themes that emerged from the first round of fieldwork. The interviews were in Arabic and the researcher translated them into English using a "translating by meaning" approach. Thematic analyses were carried out in order to interpret the information from these interviews and observations. All participants' names were anonymized, and a paperless engagement was used to overcome ethical issues related to the confidentiality of participants.

The next three chapters are the empirical findings of this research. Chapter 5 discusses the way Aljameaah was developed, focusing on how members of the same group identify with each other. It also explores how the informal context of Aljameaah influences the space and the impact such influences have in everyday life. Chapter 6 explores the relations between these different groups and their dynamics. It involves examining relations based on concepts such as stigmatisations and power dynamics in order to understand conflicts or building cohesion between groups. Chapter 7 examines the influence of media, public policies, and religion in Aljameaah. Specifically, how these issues affect groups and change their status.

In Informal Context

| Chapter 5 Groups identifications | Chapter 6 Relation between different groups | Chapter 7 Localities affecting groups power |

Figure 4.3:The rationale of the structure of the empirical finding's chapters

CHAPTER 5: Between Blood and Soil: Urbanisation and Group Dynamics in the Making of Aljameaah

Grasping the social realities of Aljameaah requires close observation and contact with the people of the area to identify social elements such as group dynamics, relations, conflicts, and mutual identifications. Studying Aljameaah from a formal perspective, or "from afar" (Wacquant, 2013), might give the impression of a relatively homogeneous space - Saudis and immigrants living under an abstract name like Aljameaah, categorised as an informal area. By adopting this view, we would only have two groups identified based on the concept of citizenship. Such abstractions deny the social complexity of Aljameaah and contribute to its misrepresentation and stigmatisation from the outside. One can see this reductive approach in formal papers and documents on Aljameaah. For example, in 2003, in a report written by a private company commissioned by the Jeddah Municipality, it was found that the area has two groups, namely Saudis which represented 69% of the population, and non-Saudis which represented 31% (Co, 2003). However, in reality, a more appropriate approach is needed to unfold the complex social situation of the area based on a relational analysis that can nuance such blunt assessments and capture the complexity and ambivalence of group relations.

As outlined in Chapter 2, this is a critical element that has not been sufficiently explored considering the marginalised status of Saudi Arabia's informality in relation to the global context. To address these issues, Norbert Elias's (1994) relational and processual theory of social realities is used to investigate group interdependencies and their implications spatially. This entails the necessity of understanding how group relations are shaped and changed dynamically over time, including their power positions, social identifications, practices - whether inherited or newly emerged - within an informal space like Aljameaah neighbourhood. It also involves an appreciation of the outsider and external factors that affect such processes.

Given the lack of information about Aljameaah and its marginalised status (see Chapter 3), the focus in this chapter is on the complex process of group formations in Aljameaah. That is, it will address how Aljameaah is configured spatially, along with the evolution of groups. In order to understand this, we must first look at how groups were originally defined in the past, and what it means to categorise a group in this way, particularly, the groups who first

established the area. Such a consideration of long-term group formation, identification and interdependencies necessitates a processual and relational approach. The purpose of this chapter is not to describe the relation between different groups (Chapter 7), but rather, to articulate the process through which members of the same group identify with each other (and *dis*identify from others). Doing this allows us to better understand group processes of interdependence and identity formation which set up the foundation of their relations with others along with how their identifications change over time. The chapter draws on findings from observations of, and interviews with the residents of Aljameaah.

The chapter starts with a new relational-oriented typology of *haras* driven by the research data which is adopted to structure it. This typology is an attempt to simplify the complexity of Aljameaah so one can understand these *haras* in its context.

5.1 The significant of *hara*

As discussed in Chapter 3, the *hara* is a space relating to groups of houses in close proximity. As a group, the households share the same challenges and struggles, and because the *hara* is built around the proximity concept in its construction (de Swaan, 1995), experiences of these small clusters are popular, since the close distance enables households to be interdependent. If an individual from one *hara* faces a challenge or a problem, they are more likely to share it with neighbours and this, in turn, means they become more related to others in the cluster (*hara*). Also, these *haras* are often created through collective activities such as playing games, exchange of information, sharing materials, or simply having chatting at front doors. In terms of its size, there is no limit to the number of household units in a *hara*. Since there is no data available to quantify the size of a *hara*, on average it may consist of between 20 to 50 households but can be as small as a few houses. H*ara* size is based on people's experiences and needs, rather than following rigid guidelines.

Based on interviews with residents of different *haras*, four broad types of *haras* in the Aljameaah that can be discerned: tribal, fragmented, resisted, and stigmatised haras. The first is the *tribal hara* which is based on a social element: membership of the tribe. In this kind of space, it is forbidden for any individual to live in the *hara* unless they belong to the tribe of *hara*. Usually, the leader of the tribe, who is called "Sheikh" in Saudi culture, establishes the space and then would reserves lands for his people, establish a tribal space that takes its name

from the tribe. For example, Juhaniah *hara* is exclusive to the Juhainah tribe members and likewise the Sulaim *hara*. The social cohesion of the tribal *hara* was strong and firm: there is strong group identification and collective identity and history passed down from one generation to the next. However, this group cohesion is currently threatened with fragmentation due to many of its members moving to live in formal areas.

The second type of *hara* is the *resisted haras*. The word resisted here is chosen to indicate how established members resist the fully *hara* identification with other members of the same *hara*. Resisted *haras* are more diverse and less exclusionary spaces with Saudis and immigrants living together. This type of space emerged as a reflection of Jeddah's urbanisation processes. Jeddah was a small city before increased oil prices globally and resulting a tremendous economic growth attracted hundreds of thousands of international workers to fill the demand labour (Chapter 3). This led to the emergence of the resisted *haras* which have relatively strong social cohesion. Unlike the tribal *haras*, resisted *haras* have multi-faceted identifications that shape the complex nature of residents' relations with each other, as will be shown later in this chapter.

The third space is the fragmented *hara* where conflict is present and there are weak relationships among residents. Fragmented haras are characterised by immigrants who move regularly from place to place – or "floating population" as Perlman (2010, p. 60) describes them - since they work on open-ended contracts and keep appear and disappear with no fixed location. This pattern of employment creates spaces that are diverse but not homogeneous. People living in fragmented haras are not always in contact with each other, and the hara itself does not represent a cohesive unit.

The final type is the stigmatized *hara* which are located in Kilo 6. They are different from the other types demographically and spatially. In terms of physical appearance, this type of *hara*, appears more deprived compared to others in Aljameaah. Although Aljameaah itself is deprived relative to the wider city of Jeddah, Kilo 6 has an even higher level of deprivation and this reinforces the relational understanding of it as a place on the margins (Shields, 2013). However, stigmatised *haras* have stronger social cohesion between groups, which corresponds with notions of internal solidarity and collective identifications in deprived neighbourhoods in other contexts (Wacquant, 2008). Although these four types of *haras* are different from each other, they are interdependent with each other spatially.

	Tribal *haras*	**Fragmented *haras***	**Resisted *haras***	**Stigmatized *haras***
Composition	homogeneous	heterogeneous	heterogeneous	heterogeneous
Location	Centre of Aljameaah	Close to the Market	Distance from the Market	Northwest Aljameaah
Identification	Tribe	Nationality	*hara*	*hara*
Marriage Identification	Tribe	Tribe & nationality	Tribe & nationality	None
Population	Saudis	Saudis and documented immigrants	Saudis and documented immigrants	Saudis, documented immigrants, undocumented immigrants
Cohesion	Strong	Weak	Strong	Strongest
Social Gathering Spaces	No	No	No	Yes

Table 5.1: Categorisation of different *hara* types in Aljameaah, characteristics listed will be discussed throughout the chapter.

This chapter discusses the four types at length, including their longer-term development, the in-group identifications that shape the members' relationship to one another and externally, and the social processes that structure their everyday interactions. This is an important step in understanding the "we-image" of each type and what influence it has on members' behaviours with others. Identification (see Chapter 2) here refers to the dialectical process through which people and groups come to see others as similar to, or different from themselves (*dis*identification) or their own group (de Swaan, 1995, 1997).

The spatial distribution of hara types in Aljameaah is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Aerial image showing the spatial distribution of haras across Aljameaah. Fragmented haras are located next to the Market and the main commercial streets, while resisted haras are located further away. Tribal haras are in the centre of Aljameaah since they were the first to settle there. (Source: Google Earth, illustrated by the author).

5.2 Tribal *haras* - maintaining the blood relationship

5.2.1 From rural areas to sub-urban areas

First, I describe the tribal *hara*. Tribal haras were the first to be established in Aljameaah; this is why they are in the centre of the district as shown in Figure 5.1. In the 1960s, many local Bedouin immigrated from rural areas to Aljameaah to seek better options and economic opportunity and this move reflected structural changes and the state's desire to settle the Saudi Bedouin. The tribes saw the location of Aljameaah as their best option. The first tribe that came to the area was the Harb tribe who migrated from the rural areas located to the north of the city. When they migrated in the 1960s, they chose Aljameaah because it was on the periphery of Jeddah and the land itself belonged to one businessman who did not seem to be interested in protecting his property since it was outside the urban area. Harb tribe members also belonged to different branches within the tribe, for example, Biladi, Ruhaili,

117

Subhi, and Sefran. Each branch established its *hara* to form distinct neighbourhood spaces bound together on the basis of blood and kin. Hence, the Sifran branch of Harb established what is known today as the Sifran *hara*. The same process happened with other branches: the tribal *hara* emerges from early settlement in Aljameaah as a distinct space that has a clear social group and membership based on the tribe. These ethnic haras were similar to the "quarters" that Arab Muslims inhabited in Basra city in Iraq in the early days of Islamic expansion (Lapidus, 1973).

That is not to say the only tribal members are those who belong to Harb in the area. After this tribe established itself in the area, many tribes followed them and resided next to them. For example, the Sulaim tribe, Otaibah, Ghamid, Zahan, and many others. They also established their *hara* based on the blood relation with their tribe's members. However, the case of the Harb tribe is emphasized because they are the only tribe who are still attached to the area and have not left yet. Other tribes have left the area and the sites of their former *haras* are now occupied by immigrants, which has opened the door for other type of *haras* to emerge. The case is different in *haras* that belong to the Harb tribes. They still retain a presence in the neighbourhood, particularly the older generation. What makes this specific tribe stay while other tribes have left is the sense among them that they are the first tribe to settle in Aljameaah, as we will see later. Although Harb tribe members are not as numerous as they used to be, they are still in Aljameaah and have the same level of social cohesion among older people which also influence younger generations. The younger generation in tribal *haras* inherit how their older generations behave – intergenerational transfer ensures the feelings, judgements and sentiments are shared to some degree - especially when it comes to identifying *with* others and disidentifying *from* others. In interviews for this research, there was no sharp distinction between the answers of younger generations compared to their elders.

5.2.2 Claiming the land of the Aljameaah

The claiming and development of these *haras* usually occurred in an informal way. Bedouins from the Harb tribe came to Aljameaah and quite literally "put their hands" on vacant lands regardless of who was the owner of that land. The land itself, as one of the policymakers, Jameel, told me, belongs to a businessman from the Baglaf family who could not evacuate

the settlers at that time since law enforcement was weak, so he ignored them and continues to tolerate them. Where the incoming groups chose to take up land was based on their common calculation of, for example, how far the place was from their job locations and how it is connected to the city centre which made Aljameaah the best option.

As one participant, Anwar, who belongs to the Otaibah tribe, said when I asked him about how tribes built their physical buildings at the beginning:

> *Yeah, tribes came here first, and they created this place, but they did not pay any amount of money to buy lands here because there was no ownership system at that time. People just came and reserved lands informally. We call it here "put a hand"; if you put your hand on land first, it is yours.* [Saudis, M, 24, student]

This is the way the land was developed, and it was common practice among Saudi tribes, in particular. This informal practice of acquiring land was the only option for people to establish new communities. At the beginning of the 1960s, Jeddah had a fragmented and very underdeveloped land system in terms of tenure and property rights. The historical city centre was the urban area that had been built on a formal system of land ownership and property rights, and everyone knew their own land (Duncan, 1987). However, at the periphery of the city, there was still little by way of land control policy, enforcement or regulation of development. The fact that most areas were just empty desert, meant there was little residential interest in the area, except for the tribal individuals who saw these places as chances to improve their lot as a reflection of urbanising tribes in Saudi Arabia in general. The participant above mentions the notion of "putting hands on" land. It refers to the process of claiming ownership of land informally a practice informed by the religious concept of *Ihya* (Salasal and Malinumbay, 1998).

The practice of claiming lands in this way was the norm before the advent of modern land management and the process of rapid urbanisation in the 1970s and is still practised in part today in rural areas. What these tribes had done was a long-standing customary practice, part of their everyday life and not unusual for them. Since tribes are usually very conservative in terms of Islam, it is not surprising that the practice of claiming lands this way was not considered illegal in the eyes of tribes because it derived from a traditional religious belief

and group norms which had been followed by those tribes for hundreds of years. The motives for settling in Aljameaah speaks to Jackson's (1974) argument regarding the distribution of informal areas in which he suggests that vacant land near city centres is more likely to be developed informally given proximity to economic opportunities. That is, Saudis tribes produced informalities "from below"[22] through internal migration to Jeddah (Yiftachel, 2009).

The state also used the concept of *Ihya* to distribute land and settle the nomads in urban centres. For example, in 1940, the state issued a lease program that mimicked many of the principles of *Ihya* (See chapter 3). This program gave the Saudis the opportunity to claim any land for a period of 5 years (Hajrah, 1982). Provided that they must utilize it at the end of that period, or it becomes the property of the government. The utilization of the land could be in the form of agriculture, housing, or any type of development as long as it did not harm the surrounding properties. However, there was a board made up of various government departments that managed the allocation of the land and based on the decisions of this board, the land was allocated. In 1967, a new system was introduced, the "Public Land Utilization" program. This program allowed Saudis to claim land outside the urban area, and types of utilization were specified. Years later, other rules were added to the program, such as frequent requalification processes and permission to sell for others. This last point opened the door to land speculation and privatization (Fabietti, 1986).

After the tribes claimed the land, they divided it informally between them as a tribe. This explains today why Sifran *hara* is near Suboh *hara*, and the latter is near to Biladi *hara*. They were chosen spatially because their ancestors built there based on blood relations, that is, based on belonging to the mother tribe: Harb.

 I asked one of the leaders - "Sheikh" of Harb tribe – Ahmed about how they established the area and under what conditions, he explained:

> *We as nomads tend to migrate from place to place searching for*
> *water and food. This neighbourhood was a flat vacant land without*

---

[22] Yiftachel (2009) understands informalities "from below" as collective movements of marginalized groups to establish their communities; while informalities "from above" refers to unclassified [unauthorised] developments or projects established by state actors to gain more power or profits.

even trees, there was nothing here. We decided as Harb Tribe to
settle down here over 52 years ago. I was just married. We named
this part that we chose as "Sifran hara". Sifran refers to the branch
that we belong under the leading tribe, which is Harb in this case.
As soon as we chose this place, we started to build from scratch
houses for residential uses. We built it without rules or ordinances,
we just divided lands randomly and we did not know to whom this
land belonged. After everyone from our tribe got land, we started to
sell further lots to different Saudis who belonged to different tribes
such as Ghamid, Zahra, Shumran, and others. The price was cheap;
a 20*20 m [plot of] land cost was like SR 150 (around 30 pounds).
[Saudi, M, 85]

Relations built upon blood ties are one of the earliest ways of establishing a shared culture and collective norms among people and often involve very strong group identifications (de Swaan, 1995). From this perspective, we can appreciate the importance of the tribe in constructing the Aljameaah neighbourhood: this type of urbanisation entails the urbanisation of the formerly rural tribes. Also, it shows how these Bedouins *were able to impose their way of living on space*, and their customary Islamic practices that they were familiar with in order to create houses and communities in the new place. The process of distributing land between tribal members in this way was observed in the development of early Islamic towns which is similar to what happened in Aljameaah case (Akbar, 1989). Additionally, as this participant indicates, they built their houses "without rules or ordinances" or "off the books" (Martínez, Short and Estrada, 2017, p. 34). This explains why the Aljameaah district has an "organic" layout that is different from the way formal areas look, and which contributes to a different sense of place. In Saudi Arabia, the aesthetic forms and physical spaces of Aljameaah reinforce its categorisation as due to appearance rather than economic categorisation (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5).

Another practice which explains tribal expansion in Aljameaah is built on exchange and group identifications between tribes. After a tribe guaranteed land to each member of the group, they sold further lands to Saudi tribes who decided to reside in their area, and they did this to gain additional income. This action of "privatisation of informality" (Roy, 2009)

cannot be understood without considering the historical context of this practice. It was popular among tribes in the past where tribal leaders could give permission to other tribes to live in the area where they lived. For example, if tribe A's place enjoyed more rain than others, tribe B could ask tribe A to allow it to live in their area for a fee or "token gifts" (Al Fahad, 2015). The same could be said here in the case of Aljameaah, the Harb tribe established the Aljameaah and then, after other tribes saw the potential of this place, they decided to reside in Aljameaah after getting the permission of the Harb tribe. The "token gifts" for this process were a small fee, which would be paid to the tribal leaders of Harb. This social change happened not because of the intentions of tribal leaders as one might imagine, but because of the historical processes that tribes were familiar with, and which they followed in Aljameaah without question (Elias, 1978).

The informal practices not only involved selling land but also renting to others. Many immigrants were visiting the holy city of Mecca for religious reasons, and tribes in Aljameaah also thought they could increase their economic power and resources by renting out housing. This shows how the established Harb tribe and tribal Saudi groups in Aljameaah, were not challenged in terms of power. They were able to make claims based on customary practices and to divide that land among the tribe and others. Hence, they became the dominant and most powerful group in this area to the extent that they later claimed more land and turned them to economic benefit by building more informal housing to rent. By this time, by "being here first" (Verkuyten and Thijs, 2019), the dominant Harb tribe were able to claim a relative monopoly on resources (i.e. land and housing).

Furthermore, the statement shows what drove tribes to settle in Aljameaah. It is driven by close proximity to an essential place like *Bab Makkah* "Makkah Door", which was already an established market that had stores selling food products and materials such as wood and gasoline. In the 1960s, there was not a reliable or adequate supply of electricity for the centre of Jeddah, let alone the peripheries, so wood and gasoline were essential goods for cooking and lighting. Sheikh Ahmed also refers to "eating together" many times while he was speaking. In the culture of local Saudis, eating together contributes to creating a more cohesive society within the group. In a society with scarce resources, tribes eat as a collective practice, rather than an act of individuals. This way, when they eat together, they get to know each other's issues and problems. A meal could include rich and poor people together, or strong and weak members of the tribe. In many cases, it helps the tribe to feed those who

cannot afford to feed themselves. In sum, this practice encourages the mutual sharing of resources as well as improving social ties between members of tribal groups. It fosters a sense of mutual identification both *within and between* tribes (de Swaan, 1995).

From this, it can be seen that informal areas in Jeddah have emerged from complex processes. They have emerged because of urban dynamics, including rural migration to cities (Jackson, 1974; Bastia and Montero Bressán, 2018) and lack of enforcement that enabled groups to practise their traditional ways (Durst and Wegmann, 2017). As Haid (2017) illustrates, informal areas are a "production of the state" where state actors tolerate informal practices (Smart and Smart, 2017) and then intervene later by classifying them as illegal. In the case of Aljameaah, tribal Saudis were carrying on their informal activities without state interference, even though at that time building based on the "*Ihya*" concept was considered illegal. Due to this lack of law enforcement, construction took place without formal state regulation and tribal Saudis were able to establish the area to serve their needs. Also, it could be said that there was a plural tenure system at this time in the 1960s (McAuslan, 2005). Formal areas were constructed in accordance with the statutory system, while informal areas were claimed through customary practices.

One of the policymakers, Taher, told me that the state could not enforce rules at the beginning of the 1970s, because there was a huge demand for undeveloped land. Since the state did not have the resources, staffing, expertise to deal with such demand, it was faced with what Foster (2008) calls "regulatory slippage" where the state simply ignores its rules until they have developed the means to enforce them. This is what happened in AL: the state ignored the tribal Saudis' establishment of Aljameaah in lands that belonged to a businessman since the law had not yet been developed to enforce such regulations. At the same time, tribal groups who were seeking to be urbanised, supported by this slippage, continued to practice their traditional habits and established the Aljameaah. This is why the state had to wait until the middle of the 1990s to attempt to deal with this "problem".

5.2.3 Tribes and pride - attachments to the space

Between a tribal *hara*'s members, there is a sense of pride in what the ancestors had accomplished. In the tribe's eyes, they are entitled to their place within Aljameaah, as descendants of those who established the area. It is easy to see this in Loai's (a 51 years old man from Harb tribe) answer, when asked about how they happened to be here:

> *The first man who resided in this area was a guy called Aiban [...] then came, my father. Aiban now is dead, and my father is still alive. When they came here, they liked the place, so they invited most of our tribe to come here [...] This happened over 60 years ago, [...] the Bedouin were just coming from rural areas to reside in Jeddah and my father was helping them. [...] My father was a poet and he was very popular at that time among my tribe. [...] my grandfather was the founder of Kilo 4[23] Mosque but after a while my father built a house here and decided to reside in Aljameaah. My grandmother is the founder of Al-Tawn Mosque here in the area. We are the ones who established this area thanks to Allah.*

Words like "*founder*" and "*established*" are repeated three times in this statement alone. While I was interviewing Loai, he also repeated the statement "our *hara*" many times, conveying a sense of collective belonging and how he understands his position as responsible for the place. The tribal *hara* that he belongs to is called "Biladi *hara*". The same example occurred when I was interviewing local people in the Sefran *hara*. They also repeated the same pattern of answers such as "*We are the first who come here*"; "*When we came here no one was there*"; and "*We established this area*". They have a sense of " perceived entitlements" (Toruńczyk-Ruiz and Martinović, 2020) that enables them to have the right to make decisions that are related to their space. This regular pattern in tribal *hara* suggests that tribal groups, in particular, the Harb, developed a sense of "we-identity" (Elias, 2001) tied to Aljameaah that is symbolized in the *hara* concept and customs.

This sense of "purity" within Saudi tribes also manifests itself in Aljameaah spatially. During my interviews with leaders of the tribal *haras*, I saw the importance of the tribe identity embedded in their answers. These statements represent their satisfaction with belonging to a superior group that gives its members distinguished status; a desire to be viewed as special compared to others. For example, the same participant, Loai, who is also a leader of a tribal *hara*, politely mentioned his affiliation with the tribe and the sense of pride he had:

---

[23] Another informal area different from Kilo 6 and located outside Aljameaah's boundaries.

"Sure, our pride came from our help to our religion. As I told you when my father came here he invited the rest of our tribe and with time this area became full of Biladi people from Harb. If you go to any area in this district and ask them about Biladi hara they would tell you immediately where our hara where is located. We are very popular here. You see this small street right there, they used to call it Sifran Street. The street is from Kilo 6 until you reach this grocery store. After the urbanisation that happens in Jeddah, the street was given a formal name which is Rashad Feroun but informally we call it Sifran Street. Right next to us there is Sifran hara and they are bigger in size than our hara." [Saudi, M, 51, real estate agent]

Establishing the *hara* and naming it in reference to his tribe is a form of pride; he clearly states the "popularity" of his tribal *hara* and how everyone recognizes it. Hence, as tribal *hara'*s members are strongly identified with the tribe, they were also able to name streets based on their tribe. As the participant points out, they have a parallel name for nearby streets. The Municipality gives a formal name - "Rashad Feroun" - to a street located in front of his building. However, tribal Saudis with a strong identification with their tribe, have no trouble naming it Sefran Street informally; Sefran is the name of a branch belonging to the mother tribe, Harb. In other words, tribal leaders and members had the ability to express a strong identity with space through the symbolism of street names and in the title of the *hara* itself, which signals to outsiders that they are established residents (Pratsinakis, 2018).

In the Aljameaah, tribes still preserve their tribal identity even after the urbanisation processes. Before the unification of the country in 1930, tribes were the primary unit of identification, not the nation-state (see Chapter 3). No one could survive without belonging to a cohesive tribe. After the unification of the nation and the discovery of oil, the social function of the tribe was weakened, in tandem with rapid urbanisation. I interviewed a teacher in Aljameaah, Talal, who now lives in another part of the city but teaches in one of Aljameaah's schools. He belongs to the Harb tribe and moved from Aljameaah over 12 years ago. I asked him if he still felt a sense of pride in the tribe in his place of residence:

"No, no, no. We don't have this there, the situation today is "my friend is before my cousin". For me, I go with my friends more than I go with my relatives. Although my relatives live near my house, I call my friends to go shopping or drink coffee. In the past, we grouped [together] based on our tribes, but today we group based on our interests and common ideas. So, if my friend likes football games and my cousin doesn't like football games, I would prefer to go with my friend. Some Saudis cluster [together] based on Quran learning, based on poems, or based on other ideas. " [Saudi, M, 40, teacher]

Therefore, the tribal *hara* appears unique to informal areas and remains a source of collective identification for some. It is when tribal Saudis leave Aljameaah, that the sense of tribal belonging becomes weaker and more fragmented. However, the sense of the tribe is still strong in tribal *haras* because of the social function it still serves and its role in the formation of Aljameaah: local people in the *haras* still see themselves as superior relative to other more recent arrivals since they established the area. In addition, naming the space with reference to the tribe is important because it perpetuates the group into the next generation. In other areas of Jeddah, relating spaces to tribes is not seen in any particular way and is rare or does not even occur. I have lived in a formal area - Prince Abdul-Majeed neighbourhood - for more than 25 years and have not seen spaces named after tribes. I am also familiar with many formal areas in the north of Jeddah – Rabwah, Safah, Haramain and others – and none of them has tribal spaces or *haras*.

The establishment of tribal *haras* was the "result of the continual combination and interweaving of individuals" (Elias, 1978, p. 98). For example, naming a street after the tribe in Harb was not done specifically to honour them, but was an urban manifestation of long-standing practice to establish places, that the tribe was familiar with. Similarly, giving other tribes lands in the Aljameaah in exchange for token gifts was not done specifically under tribal leaders' authority, but was the continuation of a practice that Harb tribal members had collectively engaged in for decades, they reused and adapted their past memories, customs, experiences and modes of collective organisation in the initial making of the Aljameaah (Lawler, 2015). These social processes are an outcome of interdependent people's actions and seeing it this way helps to explain change rather than merely observing it (Elias and Scotson, 1994).

5.2.4 Tribe members leaving Aljameaah

By the 1980s, one can see clear boundaries in Aljameaah between tribal *haras*. The boundaries of areas with houses that belong to the Harb tribe are easily identified. The same is true with areas that belong to Otaibah, Ghamid, Zahran, and Sulaim tribes. In addition, this spatial division became what Elias describes as "second nature", meaning that, tribal Saudis did not question these informal tribal boundaries, but rather simply conformed to them - each newcomer tribal individual would choose to reside in their tribe's place in the area. For example, if someone decided to live in Aljameaah and they were from Otaibah, they would choose to reside in Otaibah *hara* and would never think of settling in Harb *hara* or Sulaim *hara*. If they tried to live in another hara that belongs to a different tribe, they would not be able to. This way of defining a tribe's boundaries is clear even to immigrants who live in the area. For example, I interviewed Faisal, who is from Sudan and has lived in the area for more than 20 years. He said:

> *Basically, Aljameaah was built socially based on the tribe. Do you see*
> *this area behind us? It belongs to Gushosh, which is from Juhaniah. So*
> *there is Gushush hara then Sawaid hara, Sefran hara, Hadarem hara.*
> [Legal non-Saudis, M, 31, private worker]

However, it is not to say that only tribes live in Aljameaah today. That is true in tribal *haras*, but many of them have managed to gradually move from Aljameaah where they have left their houses empty. The process of their departure can be seen as the result of economic and social restructuring (see Chapter 7).

One of the participants, Abdullah, from Myanmar (Burma), talked about this phenomenon of some Saudis leaving the Aljameaah for other areas of Jeddah:

> *After the establishment of North Jeddah districts [in the 1990s], local*
> *people here left the area for better chances. Non-Saudis started to fill*
> *the new empty places [left by] Saudis.* [Myanmar, M, 42, carpenter]

Another participant, Fahad, explains some of the reasons Saudis leave Aljameaah:

> *So when new neighbourhoods were established in the north of Jeddah,*
> *many established people here saw that this was a chance for them to*
> *leave the area because it was stigmatised as an informal area, so they*
> *left. When they left, they sold their buildings to other Saudis who were*
> *interested in gaining more profits by renting these buildings.* [Saudis,
> M, 37, public sector]

Tribal Saudis moved to the north of Jeddah, which is the newest part of the city where many modern housing developments have been built to absorb the influx of Saudis from rural areas (Almubarak, 1992). In Fahad's view, Saudis left Aljameaah mainly because there was a sense of shame attached to living in an area that the media portrayed in a negative light and associated with crime and disorder (see Chapter 3). At the same time, the media depicted the grid system and new housing as a step toward being modern (Salagoor, 1990) (see chapter 7). There was a regular pattern in participants' answers telling me that Saudis who left the area showed no interest in upgrading their houses in Aljameaah. Gradually, houses were sold to other Saudis who were interested in gaining more profits by renting them to immigrants who were ready to take over - a change in tenure from ownership to private renting. This change meant that the Municipality of Jeddah became even more akin to redeveloping the area.

Because of this increased residential mobility, there is a sense of loss among some members of tribal *haras*. It is as if tribal members feel they have lost their identity, and therefore they no longer want to stay in the Aljameaah: this is the case for the younger generation. This involuntary disruption, according to Milligan (2003), will lead to what he calls "identity discontinuity". In other words, the members of a tribal group draw their identities from two sides: from the place attachments, the *hara* itself, with its shared experiences and mutual values; and from other members of the tribe and their shared history, and past generations. Any loss in these two sides - spatial and social - causes a loss of identity. Although the tribe itself is the primary source of identification between its members, collective space is also crucial in making their identification sustainable and firm (Lofland, 1973) and in perpetuating the group. This means if a tribal member loses the collective space that enhances belonging to the tribe, then that member is lost between waves of strangers in the new place with which

they have no connection. But discontinued identity can lead to the establishment of a new identity and therefore new circles of identifications.

Figure 5.2: The Processes and Dynamics of Tribal haras.

5.3 Diverse spaces: resisted and fragmented *haras*

Resisted and fragmented *haras* are distributed across Aljameaah and can be easily identified by the existence of many immigrants and Saudis together in the same *hara*. These haras are not homogeneous and not all those living in them belong to the same tribe. They are diverse in the sense that they have different people from different backgrounds. They are originally tribal *haras*, but with urbanisation in the 1970s/80s, they changed demographically. The tribal members of the *hara have* usually moved to the formal areas of the city, whether because of economic conditions, due to problems in Aljameaah, or both (see Chapter 7). When they move from Aljameaah, their houses can become vacant and abandoned which opens the door for immigrants to move into them. With time, tribal Saudis and newcomers (immigrants) live together for years and in some cases for decades. In resisted *haras*, newcomers and established members reproduced the social scheme and together have become the established of the *hara*. That is, the *hara* membership is no longer confined to familial or blood ties - there is a widening in the scope for *hara* identifications to encompass non-tribal and non-Saudis neighbours. However, in fragmented *haras*, the opposite is true where conflict and tension are more common. The immigrants and Saudis who live in these areas have a clear figuration where Saudis are established and non-Saudis are outsiders.

5.3.1 Toward a complex figuration

Take interview respondent, Mutaz as an example: his parents were undocumented immigrants, he was born in Aljameaah but has no citizenship. He is financially in a good position, and he has the capacity to move outside Aljameaah, but when I asked him why he has not made a move he said:

> *Because everything is close to us. Stores are in every corner, and the location of Aljameaah makes it hard for me to move outside [...] We have more than four malls thanks to Allah. First one is Prince Muteab mall, second is Aljameaah Market and the third one is the formal one which is the newest one. The last one is the Plaza mall. It is a very vital place; we also have Ba Khashab Stree[24]t.* [Undocumented immigrant, M, 55, Islamic leader]

 Mutaz's statement represents a typical example of how immigrants conceive of the area. The Aljameaah has many advantages making it accessible to immigrants in general. There are plenty of shopping malls throughout the area along with hundreds of local restaurants across the district. These are places for jobs since Saudis do not generally work in the private sector. The four malls mentioned above are located in the centre of Aljameaah, and near them, there are many housing options and streets busy with stores (see Picture 5.2). Usually, immigrants only need minutes to reach these malls which means lower transportation costs. Hence, Aljameaah becomes an ideal option for many of them to both live and work.

---

[24] A popular commercial street in Aljameaah and it used to be one of the main streets in the South of the city.

Picture 5.1: A typical street in Aljameaah where there are commercial stores on both sides of the street.

Picture 5.2 The beginning of the remaining Prince Muteab Mall "The Market, informally" where hundreds of shops are clustered together in one place.

Fragmented and resisted *haras* represent the first time tribal Saudis have shared spaces with others, not from their tribes. The figuration - the space that connects interdependent groups - now is much more diverse, and the number of actors who share the resources is increasing. Based on Elias's theory, a figuration becomes filled with many actors, and they share one space, they become more interdependent with each other. Thus, with limited resources in the place, conflict can arise between those who established the area and those who are

challenging the established group's power (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Lindell, 2010): the outsiders, in this case, the newcomer immigrants.

Since private sector jobs are numerous in Aljameaah, this leads to rapid changes in the job market patterns and some immigrants do not spend a long time in one particular job. When they find better options, they change their jobs and then accordingly move to live near to them. This makes immigrants more likely to move than others and hence less interested in establishing social networks with their neighbours. It is a regular pattern in some immigrants' answers when I ask them why they do not know their neighbours. For example, Faris is from Myanmar (Burma) and is considered to be an undocumented immigrant: he said, commenting on a question about whether he knows his neighbours, "*No, all my time is working. We do not have time to have friends here.*" This way of answering is common in many countries where outsiders, usually immigrants, have no time to consider relationships with established groups (Lever and Milbourne, 2014). Their main interest is not to establish social networks but to survive since they are vulnerable to the lure of the market in Aljameaah. As we shall see in the next chapter, such a pattern is a cause of social conflict.

Hence, one may argue that the *haras* located close to the Market are those where neighbourhood social ties are relatively weaker than those in other parts of Aljameaah. It may seem that some immigrants choose the closest *haras* to their jobs as they prefer shorter distances to work. The result of their preference for shorter distances produces a distinct spatial dimension. *Haras* located on the border of the Market struggle to maintain a sense of community and hence have a less cohesive or connected social base (see Picture5.1). However, when we go further away from the Market location, social networks begin to be stronger because immigrants in these spaces do not usually work in the Market but are usually employed in hospitals and schools and they live in their *haras* for longer, compared to those who work in the Market. Being in one place for longer enables them to establish and maintain strong links with their neighbours which produces diverse *haras* with high social cohesion. That is, based on relational categorising, the *haras* with weaker relations affected by the Market have been categorized as "fragmented *haras*" in this research, while the ones with stronger relations are called resisted *haras*. The latter are *haras* that well integration between Saudis and immigrants, but Saudis still resist this integration when it comes to intermarriage.

5.3.2 Fragmented *haras*: A struggle to establish A community

The job market has affected fragmented *haras* negatively. Since these *haras* are close spatially to the Market, they were more likely to be vulnerable to this effect. It is explained by this older participant, Taib, when I asked him about the social life of his *hara*:

> *There is no social life between people these days. We used to have a lot of social events, but now we see new faces every day because people come here to live for months and then disappear suddenly. They follow their jobs and want to reside close to them.* [Sudanese, M, 67, grocery store cashier].

Because social ties need time to be developed, as this participant said, the market for jobs is changing a lot, and people like to reside near their job locations. In this fragmented *hara* which is close to Sifran *hara*, many people do not know their close neighbours, and sometimes they do not know if the nearby houses are inhabited or not. This is because some residents live in the house for only a few months, and then change jobs and move to a new area since open-ended contracts are the norm for employment (Lever and Milbourne, 2014). The result of this behaviour is that local people in fragmented *haras* usually do not have much interest in knowing newcomers. They either already have their small social circle and do not expand it, or they simply establish new social networks outside their *haras*. That is, in fragmented *haras*, the instability of the job market makes it hard for people to expand the scope of identifications and cohesion among them. The sense of belonging to a place-based group in these *haras* is therefore weak, and in some places, it does not exist.

The majority of participants in this type of *haras* in Aljameaah show the same response. They usually mention the idea of "familiarity" with others since they know each other through the "Hi" friendship[25], a local phrase used to indicate familiarity with another person but not being deeply related to them. In other words, they both know that they are neighbours so to show respect they would welcome each other by words like "How are you?" or "How's it going?" but they do not know each other's details such as jobs, relatives' names, and other personal details that indicate the kind of strong connections we will see in stigmatized *haras*. The participant, Mutaz, in describing the *hara* concept and its meaning for him. said:

---

[25] Usually this kind of friendship in the Saudi society is an indication of superficial relations.

Its effect is no longer the same as before, those who established the concept most of them have left the area. In the past when the concept of hara was strong, one can know all people of the hara, all of them. Now, it is hard to tell who your neighbour is. Because in the past, all who reside next to you were Saudis. But now, those who reside next to you mostly are non-Saudis who would stay for temporary time and leave. They would not stay more than one year in most cases. Some of them might stay for years but most of them keep shifting their places from location to location according to their jobs. Until now people are leaving the area to be honest, I mean Saudis. [Yemeni, M, 55, Islamic leader]*

Here, the sense of *hara* is depended on how long residents have lived together. This is clear in the statement when he refers to immigrants being "temporary" residents in the *hara,* because there is no point in establishing a friendship with neighbours who would only be in the place for a short period. The literature of figurational sociology shows the negative impact of being "temporary" and how this increases the stigmatisation of those who are given this label (Bosmans *et al.*, 2015). The established groups show their disapproval in an indirect way against transient populations. Mutaz also points to the fact that established Saudis made the *hara* stronger because they knew each other, and when they left the *hara*, the area became weak socially.

5.3.3 Resisted *haras*: From blood to soil

In contrast to fragmented *haras*, resisted *haras* have strong social cohesion between Saudis and immigrants since they have lived together for so long. However, their cohesion is not total, meaning they identify with each other strongly in some aspects but in many others, this identification disappears.

From the interviews, those immigrants who have lived many years in the *haras* located away from the Market are seen as "established". Because they have spent an extended time in Aljameaah, they absorb Saudi culture and are more aware of the collective norms of the established group. I interviewed a tribal Saudi male, Ibrahim, who left Aljameaah seven years

ago but had been a resident of one of these *haras*. He had an immigrant neighbour from Palestine who had lived in the area for more than 30 years, Ibrahim said:

> *One of my neighbours was from Palestine and he has been in the area for more than 30 years. I asked him, "Why don't you just leave the area? It is an informal area and the built environment here is very poor". He said that he wouldn't because at least he can go to work with a stress-free mind because he trusts people of the hara and his children are safe as the people of the hara would help them if they need anything while he is away. He said that he is still here because of the people of hara not because of the hara itself. The situation was like everyone trusted his neighbours.* [Saudi, M, 34, private worker]

An attachment to Aljameaah based on social ties and sociability is a common theme among the participants in resisted *haras*. Many participants, Saudis and immigrants alike, said that they have the financial capacity to move elsewhere, but they stay in Aljameaah only because of their strong ties. The dilapidation of the built environment has not prevented them from conceiving Aljameaah positively. Being part of a collective in the resisted *hara* gives this Palestinian man a "stress free" mind when he is away from his family, as the people of the *hara* "*protect his back*". Space, reflected in the *hara* concept, becomes very crucial in times of crises because its care and support from others are close by if something happened to his family (Blokland-Potters, 2003 cited in (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008). The relations between Saudis and immigrants in these *haras* becomes "infrastructure" to support one another: as Simone (2004) explains, people cooperate with each other when they face "uncertainty", even if they are different from each other.

Many participants expressed the "stress-free" mind concept. Being in a society where members are close to each other and open for personal interactions and meetings is crucial in the life of diverse *hara*'s residents. I asked a young Saudi male, Bander, who also lives in a cohesive, resisted *hara,* whether he had considered leaving Aljameaah:

> *"If it is my choice, I will choose what makes me psychologically healthy. If I feel mentally comfortable in a place, I will live in it. If you have a*

lot of money, then you can use this money to redevelop your house and make it so beautiful. Living in an informal area wouldn't prevent me from developing my house. And as I told you earlier if I feel mentally good, I will live in this place regardless of whether it is formal or informal. I will tell you something that happened in the last month in my hara, there is a pregnant woman that had contractions and her husband was not in Jeddah, so she called her neighbours who came immediately to help her and got her so fast to the hospital." [Saudi, M, 20s, unemployed]

It is clear from his answer that he prefers living in Aljameaah regardless of the status of the district as an informal area. He prioritises the social aspects of the place over the physical and aesthetic. The sense of identification between *hara* residents is strong since they live side by side (de Swaan, 1995). The woman who had contractions while her husband was away is a clear example of how this social aspect over physical appearance makes a difference in their perception. As Elias notes: "The figuration of interdependent players and of the game which they play together is the framework for each individual's moves" (Elias, 1978, p. 85). The basis of the participant's decision to remain in Aljameaah is not a question of individual preference but of a shared sense of community, his feeling of belonging to a large group that fulfil his social needs. Although local residents here do not have blood ties, as in the case of tribal *haras*, they have a sense of community that is built on proximity and informed by collective space and interaction. They share the same challenges and have the same expectations of each other's living conditions. Hence, they develop a sense of "we-feeling" that keeps them connected (de Swaan, 1995) - " a powerful sense of affiliation" that is connected to space (Orum and Chen, 2003, p. 12).

As discussed in Chapter 2, identification processes between individuals are not static. They are dynamic in the sense that they are driven by a number of variables and factors. Relying mainly on a processual and relational approach, Troung (2019, p. 141) suggests the idea of fluid identification where people's "identification with the neighbourhood is always circumstantial". This concept is key for describing some irregularities in the pattern of identifications between residents of Aljameaah as this Section will show.

Although Saudis and immigrants in resisted *haras* live together for many years and share collective interests and experiences, there are still differences between them when it comes to marriage. According to tribal Saudi norms, women are encouraged to marry males from the same tribe. This is consistent even between Saudis and immigrants. The following statement from Faisal, a 31-year-old male from Sudan, shows how there are "red lines" between Saudis and immigrants in resisted *haras,* even if they have lived together for years:

> *I can say with Saudis we have a normal relation with them except the idea of marriage, since Saudis are more conservative. If we have dinner, we invite all Saudis in my hara and they come. Even if we get in trouble, all these Saudis would come and help. But in terms of marriage and because I was born here, I know that Saudi tribes are very strict on this issue. But I know a tribe who are less strict, which is the Harb tribe. Actually, I know an Indian guy who is married to a girl from the Juhaniah tribe. I know one of my relatives who was married to a girl from Ghamid 30 years ago. Her tribe refused the idea of marrying a Sudanese guy but the girl went to Prince Ahmed Bin Abdulaziz and talked with him and then he talked with her father to permit her to marry the guy. But today all the girls' relatives left her and are no longer in contact with her.* [Sudanese, M, 31, private worker]

It is "taboo" between tribal Saudis that girls marry outside their tribe. As a male whose parents are from Sudan but he was born here in Aljameaah, Faisal knows that it would be hard for him to marry a Saudi girl, so he told me that "*I don't even imagine going to ask to marry a Saudi girl, this is hard*". It is not that he cannot marry a Saudi girl, sometimes immigrants do marry Saudi girls, but it comes with a price, and it is not worth challenging the norms of the established community. As he mentions, a Sudanese male married a Saudi girl from the Ghamid tribe, the husband was born in the country and spoke with a Saudi accent and knows the Saudi norms very well. However, her tribe did not accept such a marriage, and as a result, she was punished by her tribe putting her in the "outsider" category and preventing tribe members from contacting her, since she broke the tribe's social norms.

The case of a Sudanese man marrying a Saudi woman is controversial. The Saudi society calls it "red lines", and if one crosses them, then he or she will be punished by the group,

which chimes with the notion of internal group controls in maintaining taboos on social contact (Elias and Scotson, 1994). The same goes between Saudi tribes themselves. Tribe A would prevent their girls from marrying men from tribe B, especially if the latter has a lower level of social status. Even if these two tribes share the same space and same culture and norms, they still will not allow such marriages (for example: (Samin, 2012) s. The tribe places the priority on protecting its honour and prestige. In Aljameaah, this practice has reproduced itself, but this time against immigrants, males in particular. It is unusual to see immigrant men marrying Saudi girls. In the resisted *haras*, time and proximity do not play a role in changing the tribes' norms. The "red lines" are still in place and the consequences for breaking them are severe. That is, although resisted *haras'* residents have mutual identifications and conflict is rare, in some contexts, fluid identifications appear on the surface which can cause serious conflicts between members. Tribal Saudis, following many traditional processes, would *disidentify* from fellow established members in their *hara* when it comes to marriage.

As one tribal Saudi male, Ibrahim, who belongs to Otaibah tribe, said when I asked him about the issue of intermarriage:

> *Most of my friends are immigrants. But in terms of marriage it is*
> *impossible. This is our tradition in our tribe. All my friends know that*
> *this is impossible,*
> *The researcher: So if a Sudanese guy came to marry your sister you*
> *would refuse, right?*
> *He doesn't need to come because he knows that already.* [Saudi, M, 34,
> private worker]

In his answer, he distinguishes between his friendship with immigrants in the *hara* and personal issues like marriage. Being friends with immigrants does not mean that one can accept intermarriage. For Saudi tribal men, being friends with immigrants means one can visit them and be present at their social events. It also means supporting each other emotionally and financially. In fact, Faisal and Ibrahim have been friends for more than two decades. They were friends at the same school in Aljameaah, and they work together in the same private company. When I sat with the two and talked with them, I thought they were relatives. Speaking with the same accent and wearing the same type of clothes indicated to

me that they may be relatives. However, when they introduced themselves, I was surprised that one is a tribal Saudi and the other has a Sudanese background but was born in Aljameaah.

This suggests that "red lines" drawn in the past are still being drawn in the present, specifically in the Aljameaah context: the gradual widening of circles of identification tied to shifting power relations does not extend to intermarriage. The individuals here cannot form their actions on a basis that is entirely separate from their own group beliefs and if they do, it may result in ostracization from the group. They must follow the collective norms of their tribe and then make their own decisions accordingly. In the context of resisted *haras*, long-standing immigrants are considered established members with the Saudis in their daily life interactions, but they are "outsiders" when it comes to marriage. Put it another way, both Saudis and immigrants in the resisted *haras* are considered established group members since they have lived in the same *hara* for many generations. Saudis identify with immigrants who live in the *hara* more than with their fellow Saudis who live outside the *hara*. They together form one group against others. However, Saudis disidentify themselves from their fellow established immigrants in the resisted *hara* when it comes to intermarriage. For understanding identity between groups, it is important to consider the context that identities are negotiated in (Truong, 2019). The fluid identification that emerged here is not an issue between "established-outsider", but rather between established-established members.

5.4 Kilo 6: Stigmatised *haras*

In the 1980s, many undocumented immigrants found their way to Aljameaah. The majority were from Chad, Somalia, Yemen, and Ethiopia (see chapter 3). Most of them clustered in an area of Aljameaah called *Kilo 6*, located in the north-west of the neighbourhood: it looks and feels more compact than the rest of Aljameaah. I asked a 28-year-old Saudi female, Samia, about areas that she tries to avoid, since she said she lives in Kilo 6, and she said:

> *Mmm, those areas that have narrow alleys and streets. Sometimes I need to go walking to nearby places but I cannot because it is scary to walk in these narrow streets, so I order a taxi with my iPhone as a safer choice which costs more money. Walking here is not a good option*

> *because we have here bad houses and bad people and it is not ready for a Saudi girl like me to walk, it will be suspicious walking.* [Saudi, F, 28, student]

It is clear how the spatial aspects and built form of Kilo 6 has affected her perception of walking in her neighbourhood. Several residents reported feeling claustrophobic in Kilo 6 because they had to go along the narrow alleys, and they thought they might be confined there. The participant was also referring to "bad houses" and from my observation in Aljameaah, Kilo 6 has lower quality housing units than the rest of the Aljameaah. For example, in areas like Sifran *hara* and Yemen *hara*, located outside the Kilo 6 area, house exteriors were painted and relatively clean, and one can feel that people take care of upgrading their houses. Picture 5.4 shows houses that belong to residents of Sifran *hara* - a tribal *hara* - built with concrete and steel and renovated with a modern design. The street is wide and paved and has specified parking spaces. This is different from houses in the Kilo 6 area. Picture 5.5 shows houses that have not been taken care of and no signs of modern design are visible. The street is narrow with no pavement and no parking spaces. The outside of the houses do not seem to be painted recently, and houses look very dated and not well maintained. While walking in many streets in the Kilo 6 area and outside it, I saw that the Kilo 6 area is darker. Streetlights are not adequate compared to the rest of Aljameaah. Sometimes I found myself walking through the dark streets in Kilo 6 using the light from my iPhone to help finding my way back.

Picture 5.3: Houses of residents of Sifran hara (a tribal hara), built with concrete and steel and renovated with a modern design. The Street is wide and paved and has specified parking spaces.

Picture 5.4: Typical houses in the Kilo 6 area looking neglected and no signs of modern design are visible. The street is narrow with no pavement and no parking spaces.

From interviewing many older residents who have experienced the evolution of Aljameaah, it is clear that the first established Saudis who left the area (who "moved up" to relatively more affluent parts of Jeddah) are those who were residing in Kilo 6 of Aljameaah. Undocumented immigrants who lived in the area in the 1980s found many empty houses in Kilo 6 that used

to house those established tribal Saudis. Hence, shifts in urbanisation and migrants flows brought about transformations and different group dynamics in Kilo 6: it became a place for remaining tribal Saudi residents along with new arrivals who were predominantly undocumented immigrants coming to Jeddah in search of opportunities and found cheap housing in Kilo 6.

There are further distinctions between Kilo 6 area and the rest of Aljameaah when it comes to stores and streets. Stores in the rest of Aljameaah have formal signs that allow people to identify them quickly. However, stores in the Kilo 6 area are not as easily identified since most of them do not have front signs on the front. Local residents know what is being sold at these stores because they are familiar with them, but for a stranger like me, it is hard to grasp what they sell unless I go in and see for myself. From my talking with shopkeepers there, most of these stores are not under formal control. They work under informal contracts between sellers and owners of stores without formal authority over them. This is in contrast to the rest of Aljameaah where stores have formal contracts between landlords and renters. Another area of concern is the streets: most of the roads in the Kilo 6 carry wastewater, which can cause serious problems for people. Picture 5.6 shows a flooded road close to *Sikkah hara* in Kilo 6 area covered with wastewater, sewage, and garbage - the presence of a doll is a clear example of children using this water. This water is not only dirty but can be hazardous for children's health. In a casual conversation, one of the locals said that his relatives give him excuses not to come and visit him when he invites them because they do not want to have to deal with the pollution. It could be said that the difference in the appearance of Kilo 6 and the rest of Aljameaah is evidence of the marginalisation processes, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Picture 5.5: An internal road in Kilo 6 close to the Sikkah hara showing wastewater, sewage, and garbage. The presence of a doll is a clear example of children using this water.

The differences also are observable in main streets and attached houses. The main streets in the rest of Aljameaah (see Picture 5.7) have clean, well-ordered sidewalks and trees. Pavements are smooth with only occasional bumps and crevices on the surface. Also, the stores work with a fixed schedule and are easily visible. In contrast, the main streets in Kilo 6 area (Picture 5.8) have pavements with many cracks and uneven surfaces, stores seem closed or abandoned. There are no trees in sight and garbage is strewn across streets which seem marginalised and neglected. Houses are in similar states. Picture 5.9 shows attached houses located close to Jihnan *hara* (tribal) and they look upgraded: well-painted, good street lighting, a semi-paved street with no leaks or cracks, and electricity cables are covered. Picture 5.10 shows attached houses in the Kilo 6 area, but they look marginalised: paintwork is in bad condition, with lots of writing on walls, electricity cables are not covered, and the place looks a shambles. These pictures demonstrate that the Kilo 6 area has a much worse built environment than the rest of Aljameaah.

Picture 5.6: A typical example of a main street in Aljameaah with no potholes, stores are open, and trees are observable.

Picture 5.7: A typical example of a main street in the Kilo 6 area showing potholes, closed stores that seem abandoned. There are no trees in sight and garbage is strewn across the street.

Picture 5.8: Attached houses located close to Jihnan hara. They look upgraded: good paintwork and well lighting, a semi-paved street with no leaks or cracks, and electricity cables are covered.

Picture 5.9: Attached houses in the Kilo 6 area. They look marginalised: paintwork is in bad condition, the road is unpaved and covered in water, uncovered writing in wall and electricity cables.

However, the stigmatised *haras* of Kilo 6 have different social attributes from the rest of Aljameaah's *haras*. Although only a couple of metres separate tribal *haras* in the Aljameaah from the *haras* of Kilo 6, the difference is stark. Kilo 6 *haras* have a strong sense of the collective that is not witnessed in other areas in Aljameaah. The different elements and layers of identifications we have seen in the context of resisted *haras* across Aljameaah are often secondary to place. But in Kilo 6, residents identify with each other mainly based on their geographic location, meaning proximity. Aisha is a female resident who migrated from Yemen looking for better work. She is 51 years old and has lived most of her life in Aljameaah, particularly in the Kilo 6 area. I asked her how she chooses her friends, and she said:

> *I choose my friends based on proximity. So, houses that are close to my house I usually tend to have friends from. That means all my friends, or let's say most of them, are my neighbours. It is a very limited circle because we build it based on distance. If your house is close to my house, then we would be friends. It is easy for me to meet them and to feel that we are one. They protect my back and I protect their backs.*
> [Yemeni, F, 51, informal seller]

The proximity concept she refers to is the *hara* concept. Local residents of *haras* in Kilo 6 construct their social world based on friendships within the *hara*. When I was interviewing local residents there, I was surprised to see how they were different from the others in Aljameaah. The sense of *hara* is strong, and they have a sense of connection to each other. Moreover, words like "one body", "one family", "one hand" were particular to Kilo 6 interviews. As the Yemeni participant described, they "protect my back" and she also does the same.

Although residents express their feelings about the negative stigmatisation associated with the area (illustrated in depth in the next chapter), they are still able to live and work in a positive environment and indeed, are proud of it. Qahtan is an Egyptian male who was born in the Kilo 6 area, and his father - Uncle Ahmed - raised many children in the haras of Kilo 6. We were talking about the nature of their life as groups, and he said:

146

> *I swear to Allah I have a brother who lives in the US, he tried many times to convince me to go to the US and he would provide anything I want but I swear I refused. I can't imagine myself being outside Kilo 6.*
> [Egyptian, M, 38, unemployed]

His feeling of attachment is no different from others I met. Many of them also repeated that "*I can't imagine myself outside Kilo 6*". They feel that this is the only home that they will ever get. When this participant was talking to me, and although he is an immigrant, he was talking as if he owned Kilo 6. "*Come with me to show you the Mirkaz and many areas that we meet in*" and "*I know everyone here, just point to anyone, and I will tell you all his information*" are examples of how he speaks. Many of his friends, Saudis and immigrants alike, seem to give him a particular treatment. The reason behind this is that he is the son of a famous man called Uncle Ahmed. This man is very well-known for his love of the Kilo 6 area. He is around 90 years old and he was working in a juice store. He helped a lot of young people in the area. Many participants from Kilo 6 mentioned that "*All these young people in their 20s and 30s are raised by Uncle Ahmed, the Egyptian father*", "Uncle Ahmed raised me too" and "*We are all kids of Uncle Ahmed*". In reality, he did not raise them, but this expression shows that he was emotionally supportive of them.

To illustrate the strong social cohesion in Kilo 6, it is useful to contrast the sense of intimate neighbourhood knowledge between Kilo 6 residents with the wider Aljameaah. When I was meeting some members of Sifran *hara* (tribal *hara*), I asked one participant if he knew his neighbour. He laughed, saying, "*You will not believe me if I say this neighbour has been here for more than one year and we don't know each other*". This is common amongst members of tribal *haras* who often interact mainly with their tribal fellows. They do not usually show interest in others unless they belong to their tribe. In the Kilo 6 area, the social scheme is completely different. While I was interviewing participants, I asked one of them if he knew his neighbour. His answer was a reflection of the social interactions where he started to mention their names while pointing to their houses. Furthermore, he pointed to a group of children playing next to us and said: "*Do you want me to tell you the kids' names? Their parent's names and jobs?*". Kilo 6 is ideal when it comes to social cohesion while *haras* outside Kilo 6 area struggle socially. In Meier's words (2013, p. 460), it looks like "everyone knew everyone". Nevertheless, many of the conversations I had with residents of Kilo 6

focused on the lack of services: "*There is no park here for women*", "*Kids can't play outside*", and "*A lot of leaks in streets*" were recurring and widespread complaints.

5.4.1 Mirkaz: a social place for gathering

One of the social phenomena that have a strong influence on the way people see their own relationships with others is the space of gathering. There is a sharp difference between Kilo 6 and the rest of Aljameaah here. Outside the Kilo 6 area, people often gather inside their houses or elsewhere in the city outside Aljameaah itself. From my observation, local residents outside the Kilo 6 area have little sense of social interaction between different groups. However, in the Kilo 6 area, there is an intense and easily observable social atmosphere between different groups.

One example of gathering in Kilo 6 is *mirkaz*. This is a collective traditional space that is created and controlled by members of the community. Because the community of the Kilo 6 area is heterogeneous, there is an element of group solidarity in this space (see Chapter 3). Hence, I argue that *mirkaz* can play a role in bringing members of different groups together to share information and ideas, and more importantly, to make common ground on which to build their collective identifications.

Some characteristics of *mirkaz* places include: firstly, the location is usually located in a street busy with pedestrians, so in that sense, it is easy to find. While I was observing Kilo 6, I found multiple *mirkazes* even though I had no prior knowledge of them. These places are minimalist in their layout and constructions, yet they are crowded with residents. The physical appearance of these places is not as essential as the value of bringing people together, which is the primary purpose of a *mirkaz* (Picture 5.11). A *mirkaz* usually contains a group of chairs with a table in the middle. The number of chairs varies from 10 to 14, which enables the residents to share a meal or to have a meeting at the level of the community. Secondly, a *mirkaz* usually is next to a grocery store or a cafeteria because people are talking, they also want to enjoy a snack or some drink. Also, as they did with me, if a guest suddenly appears, they will immediately buy a snack or water for him as a sign of friendship. Finally, the ownership of this place is a collective responsibility. No single person owns it, but each member of the *hara* is assigned the responsibility of running the space.

Picture 5.10: This is a Mirkaz showing where people sit and talk. It is located in one of the hara's corners and always outdoors.

5.4.2 Bringing people together

These characteristics are repeatedly referred to in the interviews. They are not acting in accordance with a formal code or based on a specific collective agreement but are a means to establish social cohesion among the *haras'* community within the Kilo 6 area. These spaces have made the social structure of Kilo 6 unique in Aljameaah. When I asked Mshari about the concept of *mirkaz* and how it emerges in his *hara*, he told me:

> *There is no specific one who suggests that, but all of hara's people suggested this to support our hara. There are many people who left the hara and sold their houses and currently they don't have a place to stay in the hara so they come here as it is a public place for everyone. It connects many generations together and different people to keep them informed with current news. About three days ago, we had a large breakfast for our hara to meet and eat together. We enjoyed our meetings and we really want to do it every month but the norm is to do it every year.*

I asked him about how they pay to keep the *mirkaz* active:

> *It is based on the income of people. We don't force anyone to pay, if you have the money you would pay, if you don't that is fine, just come and enjoy. There is no fixed amount of fees that we charge, it is like charity; if you have money and want to pay it is your choice. But honestly, a lot of people pay to keep this mirkaz active. Actually, even children sometimes pay towards it*. [undocumented Chadic immigrant, 29, M, informal worker]

In this world of social media and the internet, it becomes harder and harder for people to meet face to face. And, as this participant mentioned, it is even harder to meet people who have left to live in another area. In the eyes of Kilo 6 residents, *mirkaz* is the solution to enhancing social life within their *haras*. Those who left the area and sold their houses can come and visit the mirkaz to reconnect with their friends. People who still live in the hara also can meet regularly and share their daily stories and experiences. Even paying for *mirkaz* to continue is not through a fixed fee that is paid over a regular time, but it is based on people's income. If anyone is poor financially, they are not required to pay but can come and enjoy the companionship of others. Even children contribute towards the maintenance of *mirkaz* so that the feeling of belonging is enhanced and preserved in the younger generation. The fact that many residents contribute financially, although it is optional, reveals their strong social sense.

To make *Mirkaz* more appealing, residents of *haras* attempt to make changes in the physical environment to improve its atmosphere. When I was walking to observe one *hara*, *Shumran hara*, I saw that in their *mirkaz*, residents had collectively put up a new light fixture for LED lighting that makes their *mirkaz* more observable from a distance (Picture 5.12). When I visited this *mirkaz*, the residents were very proud to describe their efforts to make it more attractive to passers-by. The *mirkaz* becomes a symbol of pride among the members. In addition to this, the *mirkaz* becomes the starting point for the residents' efforts to contact and communicate with other *haras* in the Kilo 6 area. As Qahtan and Hussam told me in this regard:

Qahtan: *Today, we had a very big Fotor [the break of a fast in Ramadan], where we invited all haras in Kilo 6 to eat together at one table. It was so big; I wish you could come but maybe next year.*

Hussam: *If you just came three hours earlier, you would see what happened. But go to the Snapchat app and subscribe to our channel and see our snaps. You will see tens of nationalities, to be honest, eating and talking together. Everyone is welcome regardless of what county they are from.* [Egyptian, M, 38, unemployed]

Because my visit was in Ramadan, the holy month of Muslims, residents of *Shumran hara* invited other nearby residents from other *haras* within Kilo 6 to eat *Fotor* together. *Fotor* is the practice of eating after fasting the whole day. I visited them after they had finished their collective *Fotor* with their neighbouring *haras*, so I did not witness the event, but they had documented it and shared their stories on YouTube and Snapchat.

While I was talking with them in the *mirkaz*, a person whom they had invited to their collective *Fotor* came by, and said to them that they are, as *Shumran hara*, all invited to the *Fotor* of *Hadrami hara*, a *hara* close to them. Every year, they invite each other, as *haras*, to bring people together, sharing memories and experiences. The *Mirkaz* as a social space facilitates social cohesion, not just among the members of the same *hara,* but between the members of the different *haras* within Kilo 6 area.

Picture 5.11: The Shumran hara's Mirkaz decorated it with LED lighting to make it observable and welcoming.

It is worth mentioning here how Kilo 6 residents see themselves as different from the rest of the Aljameaah neighbourhood. As Qahtan and Hussam stated, local *haras* in Kilo 6 invite their fellows from other *haras* within Kilo 6 to visit each other. In my observation, no group invited *haras* from outside the Kilo 6 area. Although Kilo 6 is located within Aljameaah, by adopting a relational understating of the social reality in Aljameaah, one can see a different picture. The stigmatisation of Kilo 6 by the rest of Aljameaah has enabled Kilo 6 *haras* to conceive of themselves as different from others in Aljameaah. They found themselves forced to unify under the name of Kilo 6 area, the informal name, instead of Aljameaah, the formal name. These processes of how Kilo 6 residents relate to the rest of the Aljameaah residents and vice versa is discussed further in detail in Chapter 7.

5.5 Conclusion

If normative social categories and frameworks are adopted to study Aljameaah - Saudis versus non-Saudis - then it would be hard to see the difference between *haras* within the neighbourhood. This is the reason why this research adopts a qualitative approach instead of labelling and grouping all immigrants in one static category. A relational and processual approach can better capture these complexities and the dynamic group relations and identifications that constitute everyday life in Aljameaah. The typology adopted in this

chapter - tribal, fragmented, resisted, and stigmatized *haras* - can provide more nuanced insights about diversity in Aljameaah based on groups interactions and relations. Using a quantitative approach, or statistical profiling of households and neighbourhoods, *haras* in Aljameaah may well appear similar to each other. However, when one considers the situated urban relations of Saudis and immigrants and the nature of their interdependencies, then differences appear in many aspects and categorisations become blurred.

This chapter has focused on how Aljameaah has developed and been constructed through time. In doing so, I have sought to foreground the crucial role of group dynamics and collectives in the making and remaking of Aljameaah and its internal organisation, based on a processual and relational approach. The processual approach is important for understanding how historical forms of social identification are maintained or modified across groups. This would not be possible without considering the relationship between members of groups in Aljameaah. A processual and relational approach - always understanding shifting power relations, group and neighbourhood dynamics in tandem with wider urbanisation processes - enables understanding of "the variety of actors, positions, and agendas" within the Aljameaah neighbourhood (Lindell, 2010, p. 210). This also opens up Aljameaah as a space for "critical analysis" (Banks, Lombard and Mitlin, 2020) in developing a more complex understanding of different types of spaces within Aljameaah based on the relations of groups members, distinct from existing accounts of Aljameaah that tend to homogenise it as a marginal space.

Based on the "interweaving of individuals" and groups (Elias, 1978), I have proposed four types of spaces within Aljameaah. The first is the tribal *hara* where members are grouped according to the relationship of blood. This type of space represents the first phase of the construction of Aljameaah and *hara* members are strong in terms of their social cohesion and are likely to act together in a common effort to solve the problems facing them. They established Aljameaah based on informal practices rooted in their traditional practices of the time. In addition, members of the tribal *haras* have imposed their own culture on the physical environment of Aljameaah and it is this that forms their mutual identification as the established group. This type of space is primarily a "product of social relations: rights to use land and exclude outsiders were based on tribal affiliation" (Barfield, 1990, p. 156). They have a sense of entitlement and pride in the space that stems from their longevity within it and the fact they are the first group to settle in Aljameaah.

The second space is the fragmented *hara* where Saudis and immigrants live together. This space is shaped by extensive urbanisation processes operating at the state and city level, leading to huge increases in the number of migrants arriving in Jeddah to work and settle. Many of them chose Aljameaah as their place of residence after many tribal Saudis from the established groups moved to other areas of the city. Change in societies is inevitable (Landini, 2013), fragmented *haras* became different from tribal *haras*. These *haras* have low social cohesion due to their close location to the Market which has an unstable labour market. In this space, the established and the outsiders do not have a sense of belonging, and conflict between the members of the *hara* is the norm. In contrast, resisted *haras*, the third space, have relatively strong social cohesion and conflict between members is not common. Here, the established and outsider groups reproduce their own group structures through their long-term relationships and together become the established group where the mutual identification is with the *hara* itself. However, in some aspects, like marriage, other forms of identification are observed where local people still resist the new identifications and hold to their prior identifications.

The final space is the stigmatised *hara* as found in the Kilo 6 area, where some spatial and social characters are unique. This area is defined in terms of space and has clear boundaries. What makes this area stand out from the rest of Aljameaah are the changes that happened in the rest of Aljameaah which led to solidarity between the members of the space. They are from different nationalities and backgrounds, but they are able to build mutual identification based on the *hara* being more important than other secondary identifications. The figuration is as they like to describe: "we are one body". However, Kilo 6 lacks services and the area is in poor physical condition compared to the rest of Aljameaah.

Having shown in this chapter how these *haras* are constructed, symbolically represented, who their groups are, and the nature of informality in Aljameaah, the next chapter explores the interdependencies between *haras* and the dynamics of these relationships across time and space as a means to get to power relations. By addressing these issues, the chapter can answer the research questions regarding the power position of these groups and the relative impact of stigmatisation on their day-to-day life.

CHAPTER 6: The Configuration of Aljameaah and Its Dynamics

This chapter considers the issue of the relation between the Aljameaah's *haras* and their groups by studying the nature of their interdependencies. Since the lens of seeing social reality in this research is guided by Elias's relational power perspective, this chapter will examine these relations by foregrounding dynamic processes of stigmatisations and fluctuations in power resources and imbalances. It draws on findings from interviews with members of different groups and observations from the field. It reveals how group relations are shaped by territorial stigmatisation, power resources, length of residency, and space. It shows how power imbalance is at the heart of any change in the figuration of Aljameaah. The chapter also examines the relation between groups over a period of time (the 1970s - present) through the study of their interactions with each other. It shows that the social configuration in Aljameaah is not fixed but changes over time in relation to power resources and social identifications.

6.1 First stage (1960s-1970s): Tribal *haras* and their relations

The first stage of social relations between residents of Aljameaah represents the period when tribes established the district (see Chapter 5). At this time, Saudi tribes dominated the area. The established and outsider figuration is represented by the indigenous tribe. Each tribe has its own space (*hara*). One can claim here that those who were "established" were those who belonged to the tribe, while "outsiders" were those who did not. For example, Sifran *hara's* members represent the established group and anyone who was not from the tribe are the outsiders. This was the condition in the early 1970s.

The condition in this stage was that all tribes were relatively independent of each other, or at least, they tried to be. They had their own resources and spaces and were able to distance themselves from each other spatially. One can observe that Jihnan *hara* and Sifran *hara* are divided by a street: and it is similar for the Sulaim *hara* and Biladi *hara*. Streets or open spaces were used to distinguish tribes' spaces. It would be impossible to find a person who belongs to the Jihnan tribe residing in Sifran hara. At this time, norms between tribes were respected, and everyone followed common customs. Each individual would marry from the

same tribe; it was extremely rare to witness intermarriage between different tribes. A female interviewee, Aisha, an immigrant stated, when I asked her about isolated areas in the neighbourhood:

> "*Yes, there are some certain areas that are isolated from the rest,*
> *these areas belong to Saudi tribes. These tribes like to reside in one*
> *area without mixing with others. They do not like to mix with other*
> *tribes or other nationalities.*" [Yemeni, F, 51, informal seller]

She was referring to tribal *haras* that were established in the early 1970s when they did not even accept fellow Saudis from other tribes. In fact, when I met with one leader of a tribal hara, Ahmed, he clearly indicated how tribes members dealt with other tribes' members: "*do not talk with me and I will not talk with you*".

6.1.1 Soccer fields as places of conflicts

However, as Elias writes (1994), sharing space with others produces inevitable interdependencies between residents; they have the ability to affect each other. This is what happened between tribes, and although they tried to be self-sufficient and independent, this was not the case. Tribes' children were playing together on soccer fields in the Aljameaah. In the late 1970s, they informally turned vacant lands into soccer fields so they could play after school and have fun with other children. But children have their own problems, and there were conflicts among them. Tribal Saudi children started to have conflicts with other groups, and usually, these conflicts were exaggerated by the involvement of adults. Ibrahim described the situation:

> *I remember in the past we had soccer fields for each tribe so that way*
> *we do not have to fight over the same field and who has the right to be*
> *there. The problem was soccer fields were limited so some tribes had*
> *no fields so their kids had no choice but to fight to play. I remember*
> *this was so bad because after kids fight, adults would intervene and*
> *protect their own kids and this would cause a conflict between two*
> *different tribes. Honestly, it was a horrible situation for children and*

for adults alike and it was in a daily manner. [Saudis, M, 34, private worker].

Each tribe tried to claim more resources by allocating soccer fields to its own children, but this left some tribes without fields to claim. Although at this stage the inhabitants shared the same culture, citizenship and traditions, the scarce resources created conflicts between them (Elias and Scotson, 1994). However, these conflicts were often resolved by mediation and did not usually result in lasting and serious consequences.

The more powerful tribes in the neighbourhood had their own places for soccer. For example, the Gushush tribe, which belongs to the Juhainah tribe, was a powerful group that had its own soccer field, and no one could play without their permission. The locations of these soccer fields usually were outside tribes' territories, in vacant lands next to main streets. As Faisal said when I asked him about who were the powerful groups:

> *I think the number is more powerful than the muscles. I remember this piece of land [he pointed to nearby land] belonged to Gushush who treated it as their football field. They were a nightmare for me; they were very strong. No one could take or play in their field unless he gets their permission.* [Sudanese, M, 31, private worker]

Soccer fields were turning to a resource that was essential to daily life, but only a few tribes could claim them. Those powerful tribes - and power here is manifested through the tribe's relative numbers and cohesion - had allocated resources to their own members. The observation that I carried out showed that larger tribes had more resources. For example, Gushush, Sifran, and Otaibah had allocated soccer fields while small tribes like Ghamid, Asmari, Sulaim and others had no allocated soccer fields. Put simply, larger tribes had claimed more resources, and smaller tribes had to rely on the resources of larger ones and ask their permission for access.

At this stage, there were mainly tribal Saudis living in Aljameaah, so the group figuration was relatively clear, and conflicts were limited. Each tribe had its territory, claimed resources, and members. Those who belonged to the tribe were established and those who did not belong to the tribe were outsiders excluded from resources and the relations that might

negotiate access. Due to there only being a few tribes, the figuration was not complex (Table 6.1). However, some disputes were due to competition over neighbourhood resources. The tribe that had the greater numbers in terms of members was often the most powerful. The next section shows how this figuration became more complex and there were more conflicts.

6.2 The second stage (1980s-2000s): Stigmatized and resisted *haras*

After the establishment of many formal areas in Jeddah at the beginning of the 1980s, a demographic shift took place in Aljameaah (see Chapter 3). Jeddah witnessed a massive growth toward the north; as a consequence, members of several Saudi tribes began to leave Aljameaah and join those who moved to the north. Their empty houses attracted immigrants, in particular, undocumented individuals who came to Jeddah on their way to Makkah to perform Umrah and Hajj. After they performed their rituals, they decided to settle in the informal areas, one of which was Aljameaah. They replaced the tribal Saudis who had moved to the north. In this context, the figuration became more complex and multi-polar and tribal Saudis of Aljameaah lived side-by-side with newcomers from different countries who had different norms and customs.

From the interviews, many older participants, and younger ones who inherited their views, showed concern about the relative newcomers. Their attitude toward newcomers was often expressed negatively. When I asked Ahmed, a leader of a tribal hara, about the undocumented immigrants, he said:

> *If they come, we will kick them. "[shows me a bullet]". Look at this, I have a licensed weapon that I can use to fight them. If they try, we will kill them, we will protect our life and our women. If a black person comes to you with a knife how would I fight him with my stick? This is impossible. I need to use my weapon. He wants to kill me, what do you think I'm going to do? All my weapons are licensed and renewed every year.* [Saudi, M, 85, tribe leader]

The views of this participant, who is 85 years of age and has lived in Aljameaah for more than 60 years, are an example of how tribal Saudis dealt with the newcomers in the 1980s and

after. He specifically mentioned the "black person" with a knife, it was popular at this stage to refer to all undocumented immigrants as "black" since the majority of them came from African countries. That is, when newcomers came to the territory of the established tribal groups, the latter used stigmatisation as a weapon against the former. Although at this stage, Saudi Arabia as a nation was tolerant of undocumented Muslim immigrants, tribal Saudis felt that such immigrants were problematic because they were relatively concentrated in Aljameaah and represented a potential threat to the monopoly of resources. It was a typical example of established-outsider figuration in which the established group disidentifies from the outsider through stigmatisation processes.

It is clear from the data that tribes who migrated away from Aljameaah in this stage were mainly from the Kilo 6 area. It is not known how undocumented immigrants took over their places. One can suggest those tribal members who left rented their houses to the new arrivals.

Kilo 6 is close to tribal *haras* that belong to the Harb tribe which is the established community in Aljameaah which is why there was a negative reaction to such a change. Tribal members stigmatised Kilo 6 area as a dangerous place that was a breeding ground for "illegal activities". They blamed the undocumented immigrants for any problems in Aljameaah. The fact that these immigrants were undocumented meant that they came to stay in the country for a long time and Aljameaah may become their new home. Legal entry meant that the immigrants would eventually leave the country, but that is not the case for undocumented immigrants and blurs notions of temporariness and permanence. Hence, they represented a continuous threat to tribes who had enjoyed being the dominant actors in Aljameaah from the 1960s.

Also, in this stage, many documented immigrants started to arrive at Aljameaah. These newcomers were different from those without papers in many ways. First, they were not clustered in one area but were distributed across different tribal *haras*. Second, they were not planning to live in Saudi Arabia. They came for work purposes, having formal visas and contracts with known organisations such as hospitals and private companies and at the end of their contracts, they were supposed to return to their home countries. Hence, tribes had not seen them as a threat to their spaces. Up to this point, the broad figuration can be described as triadic: tribal Saudis who lived in tribal haras and who had established the area; documented immigrants who were distributed across different tribal haras (resisted *haras*), and

undocumented immigrants from Chad, Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Mali, living in the Kilo 6 area near some tribal Saudis (stigmatised *haras*).

The older generations in resisted *haras* also adopted the denigrating narratives and tropes of tribal haras utilized against stigmatised haras. Samer, a Yemeni who lives in a resisted *hara* and has lived in Aljameaah for more than 40 years, said to me while we were talking about the area:

> *To access Kilo 6, you need a specific passport which is your colour.*
> *You must be black; otherwise, you will be stolen from easily, especially*
> *at night.* [Yemeni, M, 57, Taxi driver]

This was said about Kilo 6 by many participants. The idea here is that tribal Saudis succeeded in stigmatising Kilo 6 and its residents based on racial differences reinforced by spatial separation. Using stigma, they facilitated the segregation of Kilo 6 and distanced it psychologically and socially from the rest of Aljameaah, which led to the marginalisation of Kilo 6 and its residents as we shall see. This marginalisation is not limited to African groups but extends to other populations such as Saudis and Yemenis which shows how stigmatisation has a "paralysing effect on groups" (Elias and Scotson, 1994, p. xxiv). As Elias shows, established groups use "the minority of the worst" of the "outsider group" to draw negative distinctions between themselves and the newcomers. The goal here is to exaggerate troubles created by *some* newcomers and show them as the dominant "norms" of the outsider groups as a whole. This is why the Kilo 6 area has not been integrated with other parts of the Aljameaah. This stigma placed on it by tribal Saudis - the established - have negative consequences in the present situation, as we shall see in the next section.

One of the main arguments that tribal Saudis use to justify their stigmatisation of undocumented immigrants is the fact that these immigrants are "invisible". Majed is an example: when I asked him why he would not deal with undocumented immigrants, he said:

> *They are invisible. Because if this undocumented person does a*
> *criminal activity, no one can judge him or catch him. Your rights are*
> *lost here; you need to start by yourself by trying to avoid them. Because*
> *seriously they are not scared of anything.* [Saudi, M, 24, student]

That is, undocumented immigrants are not seen visible to the state and cannot be identified by official channels. Everyone living in the country is required to register their fingerprint to make it easy for the authorities to trace them. This law is not applied to undocumented immigrants since they are living in the country illegally. This is a fundamental issue against them for the established groups in Aljameaah (Table 6.1).

This pattern of stigma is also observed in the female participants' answers. For instance, Samia is a 28 years old female who lives near the Kilo 6 area, she belongs to one of the tribal *haras*. She was asked which group she is comfortable dealing with, and she said:

> *In general, I do not feel comfortable dealing with non-Saudis and any*
> *foreigners because of the prevailing assumption that they are all*
> *illegal immigrants. Their social status does not make me feel*
> *comfortable dealing with them. I only deal with them when we want to*
> *help them financially for religious purposes, for example, giving them*
> *Zakah[26]. Some of them are very annoying because they knock on the*
> *door every day asking for money or materials that they use to recycle*
> *in their houses. These are the situations we are forced to deal with.*
> [Saudi, F, 28, student]

This is an example of how females in Aljameaah have inherited narratives against Kilo 6 area. She thinks it is hard for her to distinguish between documented immigrants and those who are undocumented. She tarred all the immigrants with the same brush ("minority of the worst"). However, I argue, it is a strategy for the established group to keep its own identity in the face of outsiders. Since women are more likely to be confined in their houses than men given gendered expectations, they do not have the same chance to interact with immigrants and instead may rely on their male relatives' narratives to understand the urban world around them. These narratives usually emphasize the status of outsiders as "illegal" and hence "dangerous" and "risky".

---

[26] Compulsory practise that Muslims do where they pay 2.5 percent of their earnings for poor people

Not only tribal women have this view but also immigrant females from resisted *haras*. It is not surprising that a Saudi female would describe the Kilo 6 area in this way, given that they cannot go outside their houses unless a male guardian comes with them. Since they have not visited the area, they repeat what they hear from their parents or elders, their assumptions from afar stem from an imagined symbolic reality. Aisha is a female Yemeni participant: I asked her about areas that she avoids, and she said:

> *There are many areas here that are bad, and they are sources for illegal activities and those who are criminals and terrorists. These places are dangerous, and I try to avoid them as much as I can because they are places of suspicion.* [Yemeni, female, 51, informal seller]

She refers to "illegal activities" that are always associated with this area. As she indicates, Kilo 6 is a place of "suspicion" where people are advised not to go. The stigmatisation of Kilo 6 by the established groups in this era has caused severe negative consequences today and can be perpetuated through intergenerational transfer. Although the residents of Aljameaah are formally under one name, it is clear that residents of Kilo 6 suffer from a lower status and a more acute territorial stigmatisation that conceives of them differently. As a result, and although they are under the formal name of Aljameaah, symbolically the neighbourhood becomes two parts: Kilo 6 area as one part and the rest as a second. The next section describes the current condition of Aljameaah and its groups.

6.3   The contemporary stage (2000-present): Informality and territorial stigmatisation

6.3.1 Negative impacts of Kilo 6 stigma of the past

During my fieldwork, I developed a negative feeling about Kilo 6 since many participants (from *outside* Kilo 6) consistently expressed negative attitudes towards it. While I was interviewing Saudis and immigrants alike, large numbers of informants warned me against going to the area and speaking to residents there. For example, Tariq is a Yemeni labourer who works in maintaining car tyres. While I was interviewing him and asking about nearby areas, he advised me not to go to Kilo 6:

> *Researcher: So, you do not recommend me to go inside [to the area]*
> *and do interviews?*
> *Tariq: They are all Somalis and Chads. There are some Saudis and*
> *Yemenis, but maybe 5 or 6 houses. I do not recommend you go inside;*
> *I mean if you go in the morning maybe this would be fine. But if you go*
> *at night, you might be in trouble. Honestly, we do not like to access this*
> *area. All its residents are from Chad and Somalia. I do not encourage*
> *you to go there at all.* [Yemenite, M, 56, tyre worker]

He is not the only one who refers to the Kilo 6 area as "inside". Many participants have also referred to it as "*if you go further down*" or "*if you keep going inside*" to indicate Kilo 6 area and imply spatial and psychological distance. They do not use the popular informal name of it because in their minds this area is different from Aljameaah. They have constructed their views based on "micro-differences" (Fattah and Walters, 2020). One can see how long-standing immigrants, like Tariq and many others, have inherited and internalized the stigmatisation of Kilo 6 area from their neighbours, the established tribal Saudis. It became a "second nature" to see the Kilo 6 area as a dangerous place and also to tell others to be careful about going there – a kind of spatialized "blame-gossip" in Elias's terminology. This scenario was the result of the continuous processes of stigmatisation against the area by the older generations of Saudis in the tribal *haras*.

As a result, I felt I had no choice but to postpone any interviews involving people in Kilo 6 and I thought that I would need to exclude the Kilo 6 area from my work, as requested by my supervisors who were very concerned about the safety of their student.

After I decided to remove Kilo 6 from the research, in the second phase of fieldwork, I decided to take a closer look for myself and drive through it (see Chapter 4 for more information). It was clear to me that the area was like the rest of the Aljameaah in terms of safety - meaning, no discernible dangerous places or dangerous conditions were seen. As I was driving through, Kilo 6 appeared darker than the rest of Aljameaah (i.e. infrastructural inequalities) but what made me comfortable to proceed was a *mirkaz* located in Tihinia *hara*. This *mirkaz* had many LED lights with their flashing visible from far away (See Picture 5.12). It was packed with many people who seemed to be from different nationalities and was

an excellent opportunity for me to get closer. When I went there, they were staring at me while holding on with a smile. They asked me if I needed anything and from then and on, I changed my perception of Kilo 6. After many walks with them, I found that the area was safe, and its residents were amiable in general. Indeed, they collaborated with me more than the residents located elsewhere within Aljameaah.

According to Kilo 6 residents, the perceived problems of the area were a phenomenon of the past but today the area is better. When I asked one participant, Mshari, who has lived all his life in Kilo 6 about the area's bad reputation, he said:

> *Look, people naturally follow a rule: they generalise bad things, and they specify good things. When they hear something bad about Kilo 6, they make it the norm here. They try to picture Kilo 6 as a bad area because of this. When something good happens here, they usually say that these good things rarely happen here and happens only with those who are old. But as I told you, in the past we were having a lot of problems here. With time, things changed, and the Kilo 6 area has changed to something very good today. I know when I was young people warned that the Karantina area [another stigmatised informal area outside Aljameaah] is dangerous. Today we see a lot of engineers and doctors who are from there which means the area is good.* [undocumented immigrant, M, 29, informal worker]

The participant agreed that in the past, there had been some problems but, as he stated, with time the situation became different. This type of answer was repeated to me by other participants from the Kilo 6 area. They think that it is unfair to judge Kilo 6 based on its reputation rooted in the past, something is also seen in the literature (Fattah and Walters, 2020). The statement Mshari provided in answering my question is an example of the tendency to perceive, imagine, evaluate and talk about Kilo 6 with reference to the "minority of the worst " of its residents (Elias and Scotson, 1994). Established groups drew upon a small number of negative assumptions about Kilo 6 and generalised them.

To counter these past stigmatisations, the local people of Kilo 6 do not forget to show the positive aspects of their *haras* in an attempt to convey the message that they are different

164

from what people expect and believe. They try to do this by showing how some residents of Kilo 6 are contributing positively to national security, with many participants also showing positive aspects of their haras. For example, when I was interviewing Qahtan, who was born in Kilo 6, he was telling me how Kilo 6 is not a threat to city security:

> *You see that guy with the red clothes; he is a soldier in the Saudi Army he just came from the southern border, he was fighting Houthis to protect Saudi Arabia. He came to visit his mother since she is sick now and you know what? He will go back to the south after only five days to continue his job in fighting the enemies of the country.* [Egyptian, M, 38, unemployed]

Another participant, Hussam, an undocumented immigrant from Chad, also said:

> By the way, we have a lot of officers in the Saudi Army here, I know so far seven people who are from the Kilo 6 area and they are right now in the south fighting Houthis. We have many educated people also. [Undocumented immigrant, M, 25, unemployed].

Because the general picture of Kilo 6 is associated with negative traits, like criminals, its residents make efforts to counter this impression and portray the area as contributing to national security with many officers in the army. Currently, Saudi Arabia is fighting the Houthis on the southern borders of the country and citizens are very sympathetic to the Saudi armed forces. The media show pictures of Saudi soldiers fighting in the field and their families left behind so Saudis can feel safe at home. In mosques, Imams keep emphasising that citizens must not forget soldiers in their prayers. Here, participants from Kilo 6 are trying to show the reality that Kilo 6 is not a hotbed of crime, but an area that has officers and soldiers in the army who make sacrifices every day in their profession to protect the country. The reason for mentioning the officers and soldiers is to help to change the way people perceive Kilo 6. They want to prove that the lived experiences of Kilo 6 residents are not as depicted in the dominant logics of territorial stigmatisation imposed from the outside. It is a counter-narrative that the reality is the opposite of what is conceived of as the norm.

6.3.2 Fragmented *haras* vs stigmatized *haras*

Even Burmese participants - who are usually residents of fragmented *haras* - have indicated that the Kilo 6 area is dangerous. In my observations, Burmese distanced themselves from the undocumented immigrants who live in Aljameaah. The *haras* with a majority of undocumented immigrants usually do not have Burmese populations[27]. The Burmese also refer to the Kilo 6 area as "inside" in describing it. For example, I was interviewing a Burmese resident, Abdullah, from a fragmented *haras*, who had his six-year-old son with him, and when I asked him about the troublemakers in their area, they said:

> The father: *Chads and Somalis are the troublemakers, but we don't have*
> *them in our hara. They live further inside in an area called Kilo 6.*
> The son: *Sometimes they call it Mashhad [another informal name for*
> *Kilo 6].*
> The researcher: *I can access the area or is it dangerous?*
> The son: *Now it is fine, but not at night.*
> The father: *Everything has its time. Kilo 6 is dangerous at night. I think*
> *they cannot attack you because you dress formally,* [Burmese
> immigrant, M, 42, carpenter]

Since most of the immigrants who stigmatised Kilo 6 were long-standing residents of the neighbourhood who were influenced by the narrative of the established groups, I was not surprised to hear these narratives repeated in many contexts. The powerful influence of the stigmatisation of Kilo 6 and its residents in the past is still clear among older populations. This influence has an entrenched effect even after the second and third generations of these undocumented immigrants have absorbed the local culture and traditions. Abdullah is a Burmese immigrant, and this group is a new arrival to Aljameaah, and it seems they also reproduce what they hear.

This is why I asked him again in order to understand how he constructed this view and where it came from. It is an attempt to understand how residents of fragmented haras who are mostly newly arrived immigrants also share the attitude against Kilo 6. When I asked Abdullah about why he conceived of the populations of Kilo 6 in a negative way, he said:

---

[27] This is how local people in Jeddah refers to the people of Myanmar and this research will use this term.

Look in the Market there are good African people. Usually, they are Africans who have families and kids. I do not have problems with these because they want to do their job, and that is it. To be honest and to be fair, I have never faced any problem with Africans, but this is what I hear from people - that Kilo 6 is a dangerous area, and its people are criminals. [Burmese immigrant, M, 42, carpenter]

This type of answer is also repeated in many of the newly arrived immigrants' answers which stigmatise Kilo 6 and its residents and express a negative attitude towards it. But when asked about the causes of such assumptions, they are usually unable to answer or respond with "*This is what we hear*". This suggests that, in general, immigrants inherit stigmatising attitudes from the Saudis who established the area. The concept here, then, is that stigmatisation is transmitted from group to group, irrespective of nationality. Although both Africans and Burmese groups are immigrants, and they can face the same type of experiences and challenges. The Burmese participant adopts the terminology of tribal Saudis that conceive of Kilo 6 as a problem. This process has also been documented in other contexts in which different international immigrants stigmatise each other based on the perspective of established groups' stereotypes - the "internalization of negative or stigmatized self-images" (Loyal, 2011, p. 195).

However, with the recent demographic changes in Aljameaah, this has become less so. As the figuration now is filled with many more players, Saudis, as established, shift stigma from Kilo 6 to a new category of people, as we shall soon see (Table 6.1).

6.3.3 Tribal *haras* vs fragmented *haras*

In terms of social and economic perspectives, established Saudis had dominated Aljameaah's landscape from 1960s. But because most established Saudis had left the area, the remaining Saudis who still lived in Aljameaah felt they were losing their power. They were the ones who controlled the economy and sold land to others and more importantly, they had established the area. Generally, to begin with, immigrants had conformed to these established norms and traditions. However, Burmese immigrants started to arrive in the area in about

2003, and became more visible, the minority Saudis shifted the focus of stigmatisation from Kilo 6 area to the immigrants of fragmented *haras*, and in particular, the Burmese.

When Burmese immigrants started to appear in Aljameaah - according to participants, at the beginning of 2003 - they were still a minority. Gradually, the number of Burmese increased due to the Aljameaah Market, which had many job opportunities. Abdullah is a 42-year-old male Burmese immigrant who lives in Aljameaah with his wife and their seven children and works in the Market as a carpenter. I asked him about how Burmese immigrants had become the majority in one of Aljameaah's *haras*. He said:

> *There were not enough carpentry shops in the Market, so the Burmese came here and opened a lot of carpentry shops then they reside next to them. This hara is close to the Market, so they chose to live here. Our older generation did not study and most of them have no formal education, so they relied mostly upon their skills to provide money for their families.* [Burmese immigrant, M, 42, carpenter]

Originally, Burmese immigrants lived in Makkah City, approximately 50 km from Jeddah, on a big mountain known as *Nakssah* where they built an informal settlement (see Chapter 3). There was interest in Aljameaah among Burmese since the area is large and has many shops. They had not chosen to live in the north of Jeddah since rents there are high compared to Aljameaah's rent rates. Many of the Burmese participants in this research indicated that they chose their houses based on two factors: proximity to jobs and schools. As a result, they decided to settle in Aljameaah since jobs and schools were there, and by 2013, there were large numbers of them in many fragmented *haras* in Aljameaah. As Abdullah stated, the older generation of Burmese living in Aljameaah was not educated and relied on their skills and experience, particularly in carpentry. Since Saudis work mostly in the public sector, this enabled Burmese to dominate this type of shop in the Market.

The growth of the Burmese population has coincided with a heightened level of stigmatisation toward them. Established Saudis construct a picture of the Burmese as a threat to their security. Osamah is a Saudi male who belongs to Zahran tribe and lives with his family in Aljameaah:

I think Burmese women give birth 4 times every year [joking] and this is very dangerous to us. If the government does not pay attention to this point, we will be in big trouble. They are the most dangerous thing to Saudis. First, they are in big numbers. Second, you do not get benefits from them. [Saudis, M, 40, Unemployed]

The participant here clearly stigmatises Burmese women as giving birth at a higher rate than Saudis. He is referring to the fact that Burmese families have a large number of children compared to Saudi families. But it should not be surprising to know that Saudi families themselves have a large number of children: for example, in 2000, the average was about five children per family (Al-Khraif, Abdul Salam and Abdul Rashid, 2020). The participant himself has four children, three girls and one boy. However, being a member of the established group, he has the power to stigmatise newcomers for having more children. He connects this fact with the perception that they are a threat because they do not benefit the country through providing high quality work.

What also concerns established Saudis is not only the issue of large numbers of Burmese but also the Burmese's desire to cluster together in specific areas. From my observations, Burmese are clustered in *haras* that are close to the Market, and they choose buildings that have many flats which acquire and occupy collectively. Bassam and Saeed are both Saudi teachers at a public school in Aljameaah but do not live in the area. I asked whether they conceive of the Burmese as dangerous to the area or not:

Bassam*: Not dangerous but something causes negative consequences. I do not support the existence of Burmese in big numbers in one area. Their numbers are increasing every day.* [Saudi, M, 33, teacher]

Saeed*: To be honest we say in general we are fine with Burmese, but we are against their clustering in one area. This is the problem; we need them to be distributed. I will tell you something, it is very rare to see a Burmese who is single. They force their individuals to marry, so they become bigger and bigger in numbers.* [Saudi, M, 32, teacher]

169

This response suggests that the established group think they are entitled to Aljameaah, given the fact that these two participants left Aljameaah two years before but still teach in one of its schools. They still talk about Aljameaah as their own place of residence. They have developed what is called "collective psychological ownership" (Brylka, Jasinskaja-Lahti and Mähönen, 2016) of the space. They share the same feeling with those Saudis who still live in the area, and are concerned the number of Burmese is rising, and this is a threat to their *haras* and the neighbourhood in general. It is a regular theme across Saudi participants to mention the number of Burmese. While I was conducting the fieldwork, many Saudis told me that the *Nakkasah* area had been eradicated by the government for redevelopment reasons and were concerned that this meant more Burmese would come to Aljameaah. Clearly, the strongest power apparatus Burmese have, in the eyes of the established group, is their increasing numbers (Table 6.1). Also, Having the nationality of Saudi Arabia enables Saudis who currently live in the Aljameaah and those who moved out, to judge and stigmatise the Burmese. The Saudis think Burmese encourage their single people to marry to keep increasing their numbers. Here established Saudis want to refocus the government's attention onto their own problems with outsiders so the government will help them stay as powerful as possible.

The nature of stigmatisation and the ways in which it is used are varied, but it is often based on the idea that the stigmatised groups are responsible for disorder, which is often interpreted as being due to their different culture. Established groups, such as the Saudis in this case, often use outsiders as scapegoats to blame for the problems they face in their districts. This is often done by gossiping about the behaviour of the stigmatised group and by claiming that they are not the same as the rest of the community in a process Elias calls "blame-gossip" (Elias and Scotson, 1994). In this process, some "bad behaviours" by outsiders are generalised as the fault of the entire group although, in reality, it is only a minority of the group who are guilty of such behaviours (Bosmans *et al.*, 2015). Hence, outsiders, in public perception, are regarded as being of lesser worth than the established groups. These perceptions are reinforced and perpetuated by symbolic representations in media and political discourses on Aljameaah. Any adverse action against an outsider can be justified as an act of order against a perceived disorder. The stigmatised group is then expected to respond in a manner that conforms to the expectations of the established group.

One of the Saudi participants, Wail, who belongs to the Harb tribe, described how Burmese immigrants cause disorder in his *hara*. He was asked why there is an apparent conflict between Saudis and Burmese, and he said:

> *I would tell you something, we do not have problems with Burmese because they are different from us. We are annoyed with their behaviours. See how they throw waste in every corner, which leads to more rats in the area. Bugs are spreading now more; we have never seen bugs before. You see this street in front of you? Burmese slaughter cows in front of everyone here. They store fish for long periods, which contribute to spreading more bugs.* [Saudi, M, 30, student]

"Blame-gossip" is a regular pattern in established respondents' answers. They tend to say that Burmese are the cause of the spread of insect pests, which from my observations in Aljameaah, are very common. However, rather than the cause being the Burmese, this is because, as an informal area, Aljameaah has a decaying and neglected infrastructure with, in particular, leaks in sewer systems. Such systems are not upgraded regularly, and they are also not maintained. In other words, this situation is the responsibility of the Municipality. Established groups have created the image of outsiders based on what Elias calls collective "group fantasies", which may well prove to be false. But again, the goal of the established group here is not to find the truth but to promote a negative image of Burmese so they can distance themselves from them. The case of slaughtering cows seems to be the same: I talked with many different people from the community, and no one was able to validate the claim. In fact, the Burmese participants denied it and said that they generally do not eat beef since they prefer chicken in their culture.

6.3.4 Resisted *hara*s vs fragmented *haras*

The case of the relation between resisted *haras* and fragmented *haras* is not very different from the previous one. The residents of resisted *haras* see also Burmese groups as a threat and they repeat the same arguments as tribal *haras'* residents. It seems that the success of the Burmese in getting jobs in the Market and their ability to maintain their presence have accelerated their stigmatisation by both tribal and resisted *haras*. For example, Hamed, a

Yemeni who was born in Aljameaah, and Osamah, a Saudi of Zahran tribe and lives in a resisted *hara* next to a fragmented hara, said:

> Hamed: *I hope you will walk late at night to see disasters that are caused by the Burmese.* [Yemeni, M, 38, unemployed]
>
> The researcher: *Is it the area in the Sunbula Market?*
>
> Hamed: *Yes, you see this tree? Just turn right after it and you would see them there.*
>
> *Osamah: You will see a lot of disasters and diseases. They dominate the Market, I mean the Burmese. They dominate it, honestly.* [Saudi, M, 40, unemployed]

Another example can be found in Wail's answers. He also lives in a resisted *hara* and when I asked him if his children play with Burmese children, he said:

> *No. My children can play with Africans but not Burmese. Burmese are criminals and a group of gangs. If one Burmese operated one store, all his people would come to support him and take nearby stores.* [Saudis, M, 30, student]

The *Sunbula*[28] market that they were referring to is a place for Burmese where they sell products that they used to have in their home country. Herbs sold there are alien to established groups, whether grown locally or imported from abroad. The Burmese also sell things like "*Tambul*" which is an Indian plant that is considered locally to be illegal since it has the potential to cause serious health issues (Phukan *et al.*, 2001). Additionally, they sell types of fish and fruits that are not recognised by Saudis. These unfamiliar products are negatively associated with the Burmese group and serve as symbolic markers of neighbourhood change, that threatens the established Saudis who use it as a tool to stigmatise the Burmese. Hence, in exaggerating the threat posed, they label these differences as "disasters" which could produce potential "diseases". However, the underlying reason is that Burmese now controlled this mini market which had been controlled by Saudis ten years ago.

---

[28] A mini market that is located in a main street containing only around 13 stores, close to fragmented *haras*.

Established members here feel that they have lost this resource and therefore, they need to do something to regain it.

Picture 6.1: Different types of fish observed in Burmese areas where they sell them to each other.

Picture 6.2: Chicken slaughterhouses are common in Burmese spaces.

The established residents of resisted *haras* do not only target Burmese in fragmented *haras,* but also other immigrants. Many established residents assume that, as outsiders, transient

immigrants engage in illegal activities. The cause of this "fantasy" often seems to be related to the fact that some immigrants do not speak Arabic very well and some Saudis think that immigrants "pretend" not to speak Arabic. Anwar is an example of this. He insists that immigrants do not speak Arabic because they handle illegal activities and therefore, they are afraid of socialising with established members:

> *I think they have their own languages, but trust me, you can't communicate with them because they do not want to talk with Saudis in general [...] For example, if you stopped any non-Saudi in this area and ask them, "How are you?", he would answer you "I do not know Arabic, this is my first day in Saudi Arabia" and I know this person has been here for a long time. The reason they do this is because they are not interested in communicating with Saudis, as most of them have illegal activities.* [Saudis, M, 24, student]

This type of "blame gossip" can be seen as an attempt to create an illusion that immigrants, in general, do not interact with Saudis because they wish to hide their illegal activities. Although in Aljameaah many immigrants do not speak Arabic very well and have nothing to hide, some members of established groups generalise this claim. This reinforces the established members' feeling of superiority since they established the area. This group self-image of superiority is associated with a feeling that they are losing their power over the immigrants and the area in general.

Anwar also emphasised the nature of the transient immigrants living in fragmented *haras*. His answer is typical of many resisted *hara* residents (and also residents of tribal *haras*), conceiving of these transient immigrants as people without any desire to interact. I asked him if he tried to meet them and establish contact:

> *Actually, you cannot meet them because they go outside only at late night. They are scared because if they show up on a daily basis they might get captured by the police. They are not even interested in dealing with you or making friends. They do not have a fixed place; they keep changing their places based on their circumstances. I mean because we watch them, they like to change their places. One day they might be in*

As shown in chapter 5, a fragmented *hara* is home for those immigrants who have open-ended contracts where they work according to availability rather than work in more structured contexts. This is why they keep changing their locations. According to many of them, they do not have enough time to interact with others and they may appear later at night to have a walk or talk with their friends since most of their time during the day is in their workspace. However, Anwar and many others like him illustrate, these ways of life are a chance for established members to highlight their own superiority over others who are newly arrived and have no time to socialise.

Elias mentions the "uneven balance of power" as a central factor in any human figuration. When stigmatisation processes begin to appear, that means the balance of power is changing. When established groups feel threatened by newcomers, they tend to turn to stigmatisation as a means of either protecting their power resources or regaining their relative superiority. This is what happens here in the context of Aljameaah. Saudis and long-standing immigrants as established groups (tribal and resisted *haras*) saw that their influence in the neighbourhood was diminishing and the need to maintain control of their district was becoming more urgent. Their social cohesion was being eroded when the majority of Saudis moved to formal areas and transient immigrants increased their presence in the neighbourhood. The Burmese, in particular, began to advance their influence in the area through economic activity by controlling more shops and housing (Table 6.1).

6.4 Changes in the relations between *haras*

Although tribal Saudis have stigmatised undocumented immigrants since the beginning of the establishment of Aljameaah (see Section 6.2), currently there is a discernible shift towards acceptance of them. Many younger Saudi participants said that they have no problem with the Africans (meaning Kilo 6's undocumented immigrants since the majority of them are originally from Africa) and regard them as fellow members of the community. As Wail pointed out when I asked him about his relationship with Africans compared to Burmese:

Look to be fair, African people live with us for so long and we do not have any problem with them. These people are polite because poverty makes them good people. [Saudis, male, 30, student]

For the young established members in tribal and resisted *haras*, it appears that Africans, most of whom lack citizenship status, are not conceived as a threat. As Wail said, African immigrants have lived in the country for a long time and the majority of them were born in Aljameaah. They have absorbed the culture and traditions of the established groups: they speak like them; they live like them and they have even forgotten their language of origin and only speak Arabic. This is very important, as the new generation of Africans in Aljameaah is no different from their fellow Saudis but with no citizenship.

It is clear that younger established members accept the second and third generations of the undocumented immigrants in Aljameaah, since the latter have shown themselves to conform to the expectations of the Saudis. Africans do not have strange norms or a different language like the transient immigrants do. Although most of them are not educated, sharing the collective social norms of the established group enables them to be accepted. Fahad is a Saudi man who belongs to the Harb tribe and lives in one of the tribal *haras*. He is a participant who has a negative opinion of Burmese and transient immigrants in general and expressed his concerns about their increasing power and influence in Aljameaah. When I asked him about his relation with the undocumented immigrants in the Kilo 6 area, he responded that:

Africans, in general, are good and they don't hurt others. Most of them were born here and they know the Saudi traditions. But still they are proud of their origins. For example, Chads who were born here tell others that they are Chads while Burmese who were born here tell others that they are Saudis. Some new arrived African people steal stuff but rarely and not in a big deal but Africans who were born here are not included. They are very good in terms of social behaviour. [Saudi, M, 37, public sector]

The first generation of Africans was considered a threat by Saudis who established the area in the 1960s, but as one can see from his participant's words, Saudis now value the fact that the current generation of undocumented immigrants are "*good in terms of social behaviour*"

176

which means the second and third generation have assimilated into the Saudi culture and are seen by the younger established members as not alien. Also, Fahad mentions the idea of Chads being proud of their nationality, whereas the Burmese claim they are Saudis. Here established members are concerned about the fact that some immigrants may become Saudis in the future, a red line that the Saudis would not be happy with. The established groups are appreciating the fact that the current Africans who were born in the country do not want to compete with them by asking for Saudi nationality, so they change their behaviours towards them.

One can observe how established Saudis shift their stigmatisation from Kilo 6 (stigmatized *haras*) to Burmese and transient immigrants (fragmented *haras*). Some would argue that the shift is due to multi-generational socialisation and processes that lead eventually to the assimilation of the long-standing undocumented immigrants in Kilo 6 and their acceptance by established Saudis (Alba and Nee, 2009). This would be partly correct but is secondary to the main reason for the shift. I argue that it is power that is at the heart of the shift in relationships. A change in the power balance between groups is often accompanied by a shift in the relations between them (Verrips, 2005s cited in (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008). In the 1980s, established groups did not view newcomer immigrants as part of their society, given that they were undocumented. Established groups saw immigrants as an invasion of their culture, and they feared them since they would have shared resources with them. Saudis felt they had to protect their power resources, so they stigmatised these immigrants based on difference and status (e.g., undocumented, skin colour, … etc). After decades, the undocumented immigrants started to be seen not posing a threat to the established groups' power, because there was a new threat posed by the new arrivals who were transient immigrants. This is why many younger established members (tribal *haras* and resisted *haras*) have expressed tolerant views towards Kilo 6's undocumented immigrants who were no longer considered a threat to their power. The argument is that established groups calculate their moves based on the figuration's dynamics and complexity. Here, established members see the transient immigrants, in particular the Burmese - the newcomers - as the new threatening outsiders.

From the above scenarios, one can see the importance of the processual approach in understanding the complexity and fluidity of relations between different groups. Also, one can see how the figuration is not fixed but is always shifting alongside wider neighbourhood

and urban transformations, as well as economic and political changes at the national level. It changes along with what Elias calls "the feeling of the game" meaning that groups see the changing context and behave accordingly. When the figuration only consisted of tribal Saudis, the conflict was minimal because collective norms were respected. However, when undocumented immigrants began living in Aljameaah, an "established-outsider" figuration emerged and power resources along with stigmatisation played an important role in shaping social relations and outcomes. When a figuration becomes more and more complex with many diverse groups, its dynamic becomes clearer. Established Saudis along with long-standing immigrants point their weapons toward a new threat which is transient immigrants who live in fragmented *haras*, and the enemy of the past became less threatening.

Relations	Tribal hara	Resisted hara	Fragmented hara	Stigmatized hara
Tribal hara	Respected boundaries and clear segregation. Soccer fields were a source of conflict between children.	Tribal members see long-standing immigrants as established members of Aljameaah, but intermarriage is an obstacle to full integration.	Tribal members see the transient immigrants living in fragmented haras as a threat to Aljameaah because of their lack of permanence and their domination of the local economy.	The older generation still stigmatise undocumented immigrants, but the younger generation are tolerant of them and do not see them as threats to Aljameaah
Resisted hara	They inherit the views of tribal members, and absorb the local culture and adopt the stigmatisation of the transient immigrants.	No conflict was observed between members of different resisted haras.	Resisted hara members see them as a threat to Aljameaah and have a similar position of tribal haras' views.	The same views as tribal *hara* members above.
Fragmented hara	Transient immigrants and Burmese think Saudis are supported by the	No specific relation was found in the data.	No specific relation was found in the data.	They see undocumented immigrants as a danger to Aljameaah since

	state (explored in Chapter7).			they are "invisible".
Stigmatized hara	Members of stigmatised *haras* see tribal *haras* as different where their members still live in the past.	No specific relation was found in the data.	Members of stigmatised haras are tolerant of transient immigrants and see no threat from Burmese or others.	They see each other differently from the rest of Aljameaah and relate to each other more (a sense of collective identification and solidarity).

Table 6-1: Summary of relations between different haras in Aljameaah

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter shows the relations between the different *haras* and how these relations change over time. It demonstrates how urbanisation, as well as stigmatisation and power, are important to understanding the neighbourhood-based dynamics. All these processes are necessary for answering the second research question regarding power and its consequences in terms of groups relations.

Aljameaah was a space where many Saudi tribes who established their *haras* and tried to be independent. The tribal *haras'* boundaries were respected, and each tribal member lived in the hara of their tribe. However, small conflicts occurred between children of these tribes over scarce resources like soccer fields. As a result of these conflicts, powerful tribes were those who had a larger number of group members and strong social cohesion. Their relatively increasing power over others enabled them to claim more soccer fields for their children than other tribes with a smaller number of people and less cohesion. That is, in the 1970s, Aljameaah's configuration was simpler and dominated by these tribes who share the same language, traditions, and citizenship.

With the advent of oil, the country witnessed revenues which were reflected in higher salaries for Saudis and more rapid urbanisation processes. At the beginning of the 1990s, some of the established Saudis migrated to formal areas in Jeddah to express their disidentification from Aljameaah spatially since it had become a stigmatised place (Wacquant, 2007). This upward

mobility causes a dramatic social change in Aljameaah. Many undocumented immigrants started to move into the empty houses. The first newcomers were African immigrants along with some Yemenis who lived in an area called Kilo 6. As an established group, tribal Saudis stigmatised this area as a dangerous place because it became the new home for arrivals who were different from them. The motive of such a move was that tribal Saudis saw them as a threat to the monopoly of resources (Elias and Scotson, 1994) and hence they disidentify from them (de Swaan, 1995; Lever and Powell, 2017). These historical processes and relations explain why the Kilo 6 area is conceived of differently from the rest of the Aljameaah today. But local residents in the Kilo 6 area resist and reject this stigmatisation, claiming that it reflects realities of the past (Fattah and Walters, 2020).

With more Saudis leaving Aljameaah, a wave of Burmese and transient immigrants moved into Aljameaah. The Burmese have a different language and culture from the tribal Saudis, but they have skills that enable them to control the private sector in Aljameaah. It is perceived that they do not "integrate" well with the local community and are clustered in specific fragmented *haras*. In contrast, transient immigrants are from different nationalities and their mobility for labour market opportunities means they do not stay in one location long but keep moving. The figuration shifted, and established Saudis changed their moves accordingly. Undocumented immigrants were no longer conceived threats, and the new "outsiders" became Burmese and transient immigrants.

Furthermore, the established members now are more tolerant of members of Kilo 6. The residents of Kilo 6, especially the second and third generations of undocumented immigrants, now conform more, relatively, to the standards of Saudis and speak and act like them. More importantly, they do not compete in the labour market with the established Saudis. Hence, stigmatisation of them has gradually decreased since they are no longer perceived as a threat in the eyes of tribal Saudis. These processes suggest that over-emphasis on ethnicity can mask power conflicts, especially when approached within a static orientation, and that power resources are the key analytical tool for understanding relational dynamics in Aljameaah. Therefore, in order to understand power differentials between groups, the next chapter examines how public policy, media, and religion affect Aljameaah in reference to the rapid urbanisation of Jeddah and other Saudi cities (Menoret, 2014), specifically how such factors negatively or positively influence groups power and the implications of these processes on

their relations. By addressing this, the research would be able to answer the third question regarding how urbanisation and urban policy affect groups relations.

CHAPTER 7: Localities in Aljameaah and Interactions: Maintaining Power and Status.

In Saudi Arabia, many public policies control migrants and residents, restricting their mobility and new policies that have been applied as a result of internal and external events. These policies together have created different sets of relations within Aljameaah. The task is to explore how day-to-day interaction within the neighbourhood is changing as a result of these new conditions in the context of dynamic urbanisation. That is, it is mainly focusing on the interaction of wider social transformations and planning policies from one side and its implications for space and people from the other side (See Menoret (2014) for Riyadh). This is achieved through qualitative analysis, interviews, and fieldwork observations. This chapter also draws upon analysis of public documents from various public bodies, to investigate governing logic and which policies affect relations between citizens and immigrants. Since this chapter addresses the wider context, it discusses the role of Media and religion in these interactions to provide insights into how religious concepts and collective sentiments are used as power instruments by groups to achieve their goals.

This chapter is structured around three intersecting aspects of this relationship: media, public policies, and religion. The first part examines the role of the media and how it affects some groups attachments to Aljameaah. The second section explores the role of new policies like the new tax system, the demolition of the Aljameaah's Market, commercial permits, and the sponsor system (Kafeel) in creating new forms of inequality and social tensions between different groups. These policies have had both negative and positive effects on different groups. They were selected because they were main themes during analysing the empirical data. The third part examines how religion influences the relationships between residents and immigrants. The findings suggest that the making and remaking of Aljameaah must be understood from specific standpoint of its residents and their relations internally and externally. This is an inherently ambivalent process: sometimes generating social tension, stigmatisation and group disidentification; and sometimes solidarities and collective identification. Finally, since there is ambiguity about the redevelopment project, the project is not addressed in this chapter due to a lack of data (see Chapter 4).

7.1 The Role of the media

The media in Saudi Arabia plays a major role in affecting Aljameaah through continuous stigmatisation of the area and its population. The name of Aljameaah become nationalised in media reports and news as "synonyms for social hell" (Wacquant, Slater and Pereira, 2014, p. 1273). The territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007) of Aljameaah affects Saudis and immigrants who live there alike and produces feelings of shame among those who live in Aljameaah. Some residents of Aljameaah internalise their stigmatisation by those who live outside Aljameaah. It is an example of the powerful impact of stigmatisation. This "territorial stigmatisation" informs actions, perceptions, and behaviours of residents in the Aljameaah and can make them uncomfortable in their everyday interactions, particularly beyond the area.

This feeling of shame among Aljameaah's dwellers comes from the fact that they are perceived as "outsiders" at the city level. This sentiment is a regular pattern expressed by a number of respondents and widespread among Saudi residents in particular, although it is not unique to them. When I asked Ibrahim whether he thinks he belongs to Aljameaah, he said:

> *I do not know what to say. There is belonging, but at the same time, I want to move out honestly. I have good memories here, but the problem is Aljameaah has a bad reputation. I mean when someone is asking me where are you from, I would say from Aljameaah (laughing). Sometimes I fake the answer and say I'm from another formal area which has a better reputation.* [Saudis, male, 23, private worker]

This response captures the emotional impacts and relative ambivalence of everyday life, relations, and experiences in Aljameaah. Although some local people from Aljameaah have strong social cohesion and socially, they are better integrated compared to their fellows in the formal areas of the city (i.e. in terms of the density and reciprocity of neighbourhood relations), they suffer from the stigma of living in an informal area that is thought to be associated with crimes and disorder. Ibrahim refers to his "good memories" which are usually from the past when he was growing up with other children in his *hara*. They shared everyday experiences and constructed their identification as the *hara* society as an established group.

However, when they got older, they realised that they are outsiders at the level of the city to the point that they sometimes fake their answers and pretend to be from formal areas in managing their "spoiled" identities. As Goffman (2009, p. 46) suggests: "When the individual first learns who it is that he must now accept as his own, he is likely, at the very least, to feel some ambivalence". Ibrahim is not sure to which category his real identity belongs. Although he lives in an informal area, he often does not want to admit to others that he lives there. At the same time, he does not belong to the formal areas that he claims to live in. The territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007) that they suffer invokes feelings of shame in residents of Aljameaah. As Elias argues, such people not only suffer materially from a lack of financial capacity and state support, but they also suffer psychologically from an awareness that their area is considered inferior. Because Aljameaah has a different layout - organic and not a grid system - along with the presence of poor-quality housing across Aljameaah (see Chapter 3), they feel that their area is different from other areas. This feeling forces them to hide their addresses from others in concealing their place identity. The feeling of shame that results from stigmatisation by residents of formal areas has a substantial impact on the making and re-making of space within Aljameaah. Many Saudis interviewed said that they left the area because of its bad reputation in the rest of Jeddah, or at least saw this as contributing significantly to their decision to leave.

Another participant, Faisal, reclaims the good memories of Aljameaah and counteracts these stigmas. He was born in Aljameaah, but he is originally from Sudan and belongs to one of the resisted haras. He talked about how he was heartbroken when he was answering a question related to his belonging, and how stigma affected Aljameaah as a whole:

> *This is sad because in the past Aljameaah was a very nice place. I mean Prince Mutaib resided here; the richest family in Jeddah Bin Laden has resided here and still in their mansions; the family of Ba Khashab which is very, rich lived in Aljameaah. They are all very popular names.*
> [Sudanese, male, 31, private worker]

For Faisal, the way to fight stigmatisation by the media and by those who live in formal areas is to counter negative claims and narratives by mentioning the existence of some rich inhabitants of Aljameaah. This is why he mentions Prince Mutaib, who still lives in his

palace in the northern part of Aljameaah which is much better than the rest of Aljameaah[29]. This part of Aljameaah is the newest and richest and the Majority of buildings there are of modern design. As well as the large houses of wealthy families, there are also many big companies and banks. Faisal also mentions the Bin Laden family, the wealthiest family in Jeddah who have a large palace in the middle of Aljameaah. However, it is abandoned, and the family itself is known to live in the north of the city. Finally, he mentions the family of Ba Khashab who also migrated from the area to the north and no longer lives in Aljameaah. The families he mentions are considered as the elite. His strategy to fight the stigmatisation is to use the fact that they have lived in Aljameaah to suggest that it is not a place of criminals but a place of wealthy people. In fact, many participants mentioned that "*This district was for the rich*" or "*In the past no one could live in Aljameaah; it was an elite area*". To avoid the harsh stigma, from the public, they recall the good days of the neighbourhood in the past when Aljameaah was an area of the rich and not just the poor.

The feeling of shame is compounded by the fact that in Saudi Arabia, media coverage, regarding informal areas, is often biased. From the 1990s, Saudi media, especially newspapers, launched a campaign to attack informal areas in Jeddah. They describe these areas as "cancer in the body of Jeddah" and " places for drugs and criminals" (Awsat, 2009; Sabq, 2017; Voice, 2018). They represented these places with imagery of abandoned houses and degraded environments on the front pages of newspapers in an attempt to produce negative perceptions of informal areas. It is true that the crime rate is high and abandoned buildings are seen across Aljameaah, but the media pictured these disorders as the norm in Aljameaah and created a symbolic representation of the neighbourhood of crime and abandonment. Although such a campaign was successful in contributing to convincing some of Aljameaah's population to gradually leave the area, residents of informal areas in vital locations, like Al-Nuzlah and Al-Rowais, did not leave. In the end, the informal areas redevelopment project was cancelled in 2019 due to resistance from local residents.

Nevertheless, newspapers continue to emphasize the presence of undocumented immigrants and the bad quality of the built environment in Aljameaah. They stigmatise Aljameaah as a place synonymous with illegal activities and criminals causing problems for the government and the country. They blame undocumented immigrants for the drugs and prostitution they

---

[29] The prince died the 2nd of December 2019 (Arab News, 2019) while this thesis was being written.

apparently cause in Aljameaah, this is also seen in the favelas of Brazil (Perlman, 2004) where the state blames these places and their residents for the spread of drugs. Many residents of Aljameaah have accepted this perception and expressed some negative sentiments towards immigrants in general. A Saudi participant, Salman, from *a tribal* hara, referred to Aljameaah as a bad place, and when I asked him the reasons behind this perception, he explained:

> *I mean it is informal and it is very old. I can't find a parking lot here, why? This is ridiculous. But if we eradicate all buildings here and then build new ones based on modern standards then this area would become nice and good otherwise nothing would improve here.* [Saudi, male, 44, retired]

Then when I asked him if Aljameaah is dangerous to society in general, he continued:

> *No, it is not. But how it was planned is bad. There are a lot of buildings here without deeds. We want to sell our homes to the government. We do not have money to move; if we have money, we are going to move immediately. All the problems here are from non-Saudis they are 90% of people here. We are, as Saudis, minority here. Their children have no school, they are usually in the streets trying to create trouble.* [Saudi, male, 44, retired]

Salman's perception that Aljameaah is "bad" is due to two facts. The first is related to physical appearance and environment. He refers to a lack of parking spaces which in reality is a common problem across the city, whether in informal areas or not. He indicates that the way Aljameaah was planned is "bad", meaning that it is not based on "modern" standards. Aljameaah looks organic in its shape and structure since residents in Aljameaah established the area based on their needs, not in accordance with state ordinances and laws (which did not exist at the time, see Chapter 3). The second fact is related to the presence of immigrants who he thinks are responsible for Aljameaah's disorder. Both these assumptions are media-driven and this participant repeats what he read and see.

186

7.2 Public policies

This section highlights the effects of public policies, whether at local or national level, in relation to group relations. The focus is on how such policies affect the status of groups in terms of their power positions. Particular attention is given to how groups use these policies as strategies to expand their gains or prevent other groups from expanding or gaining more power resources.

Jeddah experienced rapid urbanisation after the city wall was demolished in 1947. It grew from a small town of 150,000 in 1961 to a metropolitan area of 3.5 million in 2008 (see Chapter 3). This rapid growth is a product of the country's economic progress, backed by immigration waves from countries like Bangladesh, Yemen, Africa, and South Asia. According to official estimates, in 2015 about two million immigrants lived in Jeddah compared to 1.9 million Saudis (GAS, 2015). This influx of foreigners has caused the city's unemployment rate to rise rapidly, particularly among youth. A 2003 survey estimated the city's unemployment rate to be 20% (Newspaper, 2003). These statistics led the state to enact laws to keep the unemployment rate under control, such as imposing restrictions on immigrants to limit their flow and reduce their numbers.

Immigrants send a very significant amount of money to their home countries annually: about $34.1 billion, in 2013, that is about 4.6% of Saudi Arabia gross domestic product (GDP) for that year (Al Akayleh, 2016). At the same time, the country's economy is facing difficulties as oil revenue has fallen dramatically since 2015. This triggered a massive drop in revenue to the extent that in 2017, the government slashed public employees' wages to meet its budget. Therefore, the government decided to enforce new immigrant regulations, such as requiring them to pay to stay in the country.

7.2.1 The new tax system

In 2018, Saudi Arabia established a new tax system in order to diversify the economy and create more job opportunities for citizens of the Kingdom (see Chapter 3). One of the main impacts of the new tax system is the fact that many immigrants began to leave the country due to the increase in fees. Sabri is a Bangladeshi taxi driver who has been working in Aljameaah for more than 20 years. When I met him, he was sitting in the grocery store owned by his friend, who is also from Bangladesh. His friend assumed that I was from the

immigration agency: when I told him that I was not, he said: "*Even if you are from the immigration office, I'm fine if you deport me to my country because the market here is a bit more difficult and not as it used to be*". He was referring to the fact that many Bangladeshi workers have left Aljameaah, and his grocery store has far fewer customers than in the past. When I asked them about how many Bangladeshi labours have left, Sabri said:

> *Yes, a lot of them. Based on our news in my country there are 1 million Bangladeshi labourers who have left the country. They couldn't pay the new taxes, so they left. Maybe there were 2 million of us here so we can say 50% of Bangladeshis have left the country. There are also many who are here illegally. They couldn't pay the new taxes so they decided to stay in the country and work here until the government caught them.*
> [Bangladeshi, Male, 58, shopkeeper]

Because many Bangladeshis are not able to pay taxes, they have either left or have remained in the country "illegally". In both cases, Bangladeshi business owners are harmed. From my observation, the most affected group from this tax system is the Bangladeshi group. In fact, two participants who live in fragmented haras indicated that the incidence of strokes and heart disease had increased across the Bangladeshi population in the Aljameaah as a result of the stress caused by the new tax system. When Bangladeshis started to leave the fragmented haras, Burmese began to take their empty houses and expand in the area. This new policy affects all groups, whether negatively or positively. However, Burmese are affected positively by way of less competition for jobs since they do not have to pay the new taxes because they have a special exemption, while Bangladeshi labourers along with other immigrants in general are adversely affected since they need to pay or leave the country.

The new tax system also has a severe impact on housing. Currently, the number of vacant houses is large, and many real estate agents complain about the high number of empty properties. One of them showed me many keys in his office and said: "Look at these keys they are for houses which are not filled up". The impact of new taxes is felt by real estate agents, local residents, and landlords. As one, Qahtan, said:

188

Look, all of us are affected by these new taxes. Even the Saudis, if you go around our hara, you would see a lot of empty houses because many non-Saudis decide to leave. [Egyptian, male, 38, unemployed]

These newly vacant housing units affect Aljameaah negatively. The local residents told me that they saw many homeless people sleeping in them. This makes many established members feel insecure since their families live in the area. Also, tens of stores are closed as there are no longer workers to open them. Walking around Aljameaah, especially away from streets, one can see many abandoned stores. This in turn causes prices of services to increase since, according to many participants, the supply of labourers is limited and decreasing.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the Burmese are normally concentrated in fragmented haras, but the impact of the new tax measures have changed this situation. I found that, since there are many vacant housing units, the Burmese have spread into adjacent buildings into some resisted haras or even tribal haras. According to many participants from tribal haras, rich Burmese use these nearby buildings to their advantage by transforming each flat in the buildings into multiple rooms with separate entrances to house poor or homeless Burmese. This is an indication of the strong cohesion of the Burmese population in Aljameaah. Many Saudi participants complained about it because, for them, it represents a change they had not experienced before. They used phrases like: "*Look, this building was for Saudis but now it is for Burmese" or " They [Burmese] spread around us*".

Although Saudis are not targeted by the new taxes, there was an indirect negative impact. Samer's parents are from Yemen but he was born in Aljameaah and lives in one of the resisted haras; he has many Saudi friends and relatives. We were talking about the effects of new taxes and he told me that he is preparing himself to go back to Yemen forever. For him, Saudi Arabia is his country, but he thinks it is time for him to leave and go to the country of his ancestors, Yemen. He described how Saudis are affected by this policy:

Even Saudis are affected negatively by this tax system. Most of the non-Saudi population started to go back to their countries, and because of this, most apartments are vacant. Saudis are the owners of these vacant apartments, and they tell us that they are facing financial problems, as there are no new renters. One of the Saudis who own a building here

> *told me one time: "I know now the value of non-Saudis labourers because we were financially fine, but after they left, we are struggling now.* (Yemeni, Male, 57, taxi driver)

Faisal is a real estate agent who also complained about how the new taxes meant some immigrants in Aljameaah were unable to afford housing and therefore had to leave the country:

> *I know a lot of tenants here who did not pay their rents in full because suddenly they called us from Somalia or Ethiopia to tell us that they were deported, or they left the country. I know a guy who has been here for more than 20 years, I asked him to pay the rent last month and he asked me to wait only for two weeks, and he would pay. Now, people told me that he is in Somalia because there are no more jobs in the market. He is no longer in the Kingdom, he is gone.* [Saudi, Male, 31, real estate agent]

The bottom line is that this tax system is not welcomed by most of the groups in Aljameaah. Its consequences caused some immigrants to leave the country, which left their houses in Aljameaah empty. Consequently, Saudi landlords were unhappy at the loss of tenants and therefore rental income. This highlights the interdependency between groups within Aljameaah and beyond and the unintended consequences of policies specifically targeting immigrants in the neighbourhood. A new policy to negatively affect immigrants can also indirectly affect some members of established groups, like landlords who usually live outside Aljameaah.

However, tribal Saudis who established Aljameaah were happy to see the tax system implemented, and thought it would help young Saudis to find jobs. Similar sentiments have been described in the migration studies literature, with migrants being vilified for taking up perceived scarce resources (Dancygier, 2010). Furthermore, many Saudi participants advocated that the Burmese population should be included in these new tax systems. Economic and demographic changes induced in Aljameaah are not caused by day-to-day interactions (from below) but rather, are stimulated by urban governance and economic reforms which take place at the municipal and national level (from above). This illustrates the

need to situate Aljameaah within the wider urban and national context: to go beyond the local dimension of group relations and understand how urban and national governance agendas affect group actions (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2012).

Many Burmese respondents in this research were happy with the new tax system because it reduced rents. Saud, a Burmese man, talked about how rents became lower after the system was implemented. "*In the past rents were very high, but today we enjoy cheaper rent rates because there are many who left the hara [...] My monthly rent was SR1000 and today my rent went down to SR500*". Immigrant participants mentioned many times that their rents had been reduced by 30% to 50%. That is, the effects of a new policy on a complex configuration, like Aljameaah, has a multi-faceted impact. Although the intention of the state is to support the Saudi citizens over migrants, targeting the latter with hostile and biased policies, the consequences of such policies on the community and the state may not be fully appreciated by some established members in Aljameaah. For example, some Saudi landlords in Aljameaah may be considered "losers" in this process, along with Saudi customers who pay higher prices for services that used to be cheaper. Similarly, some outsiders were happy to see such a process, and as outsiders, they are relative "winners".

What is worth mentioning in this section is that the state does not really intervene in the everyday economic and social life of Aljameaah but governs from afar. The new policies are responses to the recent trend in the global market of falling oil prices and falling demand, which has affected the economy of Saudi Arabia (Khan, 2017). The state is not aware of the social processes taking place within Aljameaah, and the policies are driven by the perceived negative impact of immigrants dominating the private sector in the country as a whole. Hence, they have created this new tax system to open the door for Saudis to access the private sector. This way, the country aims to minimise the amount of wealth that is lost by immigrants sending money abroad. This scenario further supports Elias's idea of the social structure as a "plural form" that interconnects many systems and is not static. That is, to understand Aljameaah and what it stands for, it is not only "necessary to consider its relations to the multiple other places to which its residents are connected" (Rogaly, 2020) but also to situate Aljameaah within a wider urban and national context.

7.2.2 The demolition of the Aljameaah Market

Although many Burmese are relative "winners" when it comes to the new tax system, they are "losers" when it comes to other aspects. Before the start of my fieldwork, the Municipality of Jeddah had decided to demolish the marketplace. This market was crucial for immigrants, and in particular, the Burmese, since they dominated most of the shops there. By the beginning of my fieldwork, I was shocked to see the Market was gone entirely. I contacted many policymakers from the Municipality and asked them why they did this, but no answer was given. The only reason provided was, "*I think the Municipality wants to build another new modern market*".[30] The impact of this move was devastating for the Burmese population. I interviewed Hasan, who is a young Burmese, and when I had finished talking to him, I asked him if I could interview his father. He told me it would be hard since his father had worked in the marketplace, and now he has no job he is sad and spends most of his time sleeping. In fact, the young participant told me that his father sometimes gets money from his relatives who live in Bangladesh to support him and his family. This indicates how some groups in Aljameaah are connected to wider networks of support that reach beyond the Kingdom's borders.

Saud is an example of how Burmese are now struggling to make a living as a result of the demolition of the Market. He said to me:

> *Allah is generous. Most of Burmese in this hara are affected by the Market's demolition. We used to send money to our parents in Burma, and now we cannot do that. To be clearer, we send our money to Bangladesh, not Burma, because our parents fled to Bangladesh due to the religious war in Burma.* (Burmese, Male, 27, unemployed)

It is clear that the marketplace was a symbol of power for the Burmese population. It is the place that had provided them with economic and social resources. Financially, they had earned enough money to the extent that they sent money to Bangladesh to help their parents there. Socially, with the money from the Market, they were able to increase in numbers in Aljameaah which also added to their power resources. However, with the recent demolition

---

[30] According to one of the policy makers, the demolition of the Market has nothing to do with the redevelopment project. One of the participants from Aljameaah said that the sons of Prince Mutaib wanted to maximise their profits by building a new modern mall.

of the Market, they may face challenges and hardships. In this sense, the physical eradication of the marketplace not only removes economic opportunity but also serves a symbolic function. It is a symbol of the shifting power relations and a more hostile anti-immigrant policy framework.

This is confirmed by one of the participants, Walid, who is a Saudi teacher in one an Aljameaah school. He talked about his experience with Burmese students:

> *I have been here for more than 19 years, and recently many Burma students' fathers came to me, and they were crying. They said all their money is gone now because the market no longer exists.* [Saudi, Male, 44, teacher]

The Burmese group knows the high value of the Market to them, and that is why they are "crying" - a word Saudis use to describe the bad situation of a person who seems so sad. While it was good for Burmese to see rents falling, they were unfortunate to see one of their power resources demolished: the Market. The fact that they get some financial help from their friends who live outside Saudi Arabia corresponds with the idea of "jumping scale" (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008) where local actors may reach a higher level of influence beyond their own community, and hence, get more resources that they could use in their efforts to survive.

Picture 7.1:Part of the Market is already gone. Date: 2018

Picture 7.2:Many parts still awaiting demolition. Date: 2018

Picture 7.3: After the demolition, was complete, local people still continued their activities. Date: 2019

Although the Market is gone now and only small parts of it are still open, the majority of Burmese still live in Aljameaah. Some Burmese did leave to seek work in other parts of the city, but they are not as numerous as those who stayed in Aljameaah. When I talked with Loai, A Saudi real estate office, about how the Burmese are affected by such a situation, he said:

> *The Burmese have been here for more than 12 years, they are trying to dominate the area but honestly after [the Muncipility] removed the Market, now they are moving to other areas. I think many of them have already moved to Swarik Market and some go to Makkah. They are gradually moving, but the majority are still here because they think the Market might come back again.* [Saudi, Male, 51, real estate agent]

Swarik Market is located further south of Aljameaah. It is also an informal market that has a reputation for selling cheap goods. Burmese are present there as well but in smaller numbers. After the demolition of Aljameaah's Market, some Burmese joined their fellows in the Swarik Market or went to Makkah, their home city, but they were the minority. The majority of Burmese stayed in Aljameaah, whether they are unemployed or work from home.

Why did the majority decide to stay, given the removal of their key source of economic activity? Because, as Loai said, there is a strong rumour going around Aljameaah that the

Municipality would build a massive mall in the place of the demolished Market. The Burmese are awaiting this project, hoping that the Municipality is going to build it soon. When I talked with policymakers from the Municipality, they acknowledged that the proposal may be a new mall, but this is not for sure and even if it is true, the building process might take two to three years to finish. Again, this shows how the Burmese are relying on "scale strategies" (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008) in their approach to structural change, rather than just passively accepting it. Due to the Market being demolished, Burmese seek help from other Burmese societies outside Aljameaah, in this case, the Sawarikh Market further south of the city, as well as financial support from relatives in other countries.

Picture 7.4: The distance between Aljameaah and Sawarik Markets. *(Source: Google Earth illustrated by the author)*

The case of the demolished Market shows how policies at the national or city level affect the condition and relation of the groups living in Aljameaah. It connects the local dimension of Aljameaah to a wider urban, national and international context of flows and fluctuating interdependencies which are mirrored within Aljameaah. This is a crucial aspect in grasping the drivers of changes in group status, group power imbalances and how these shifts affect the relations with others.

7.2.3 Commercial permits

This section highlights aspects of national policies that are related to commercial permits. A particular focus is on how this policy enables specific groups to become relatively dominant within the local economy while preventing others from doing so. It also addresses how this scenario affects relations between the groups and how some groups try to close ranks economically.

Saudis, in general, complain about the proliferation of regulations that they must follow to access the private sector. Many participants have complained that these restrictions impede their ability to participate fully in it and make the Saudization processes successful (Madhi, 2003). Since the private sector is dominated by immigrants and the government minimises the number of public sector employees in recent years, this means that many young Saudis have started to access the private sector for employment, an option that is considered less attractive than the traditional route of the government sector. Osamah and Rakan are both Saudis who live close to a fragmented hara. One of them is unemployed, and the other is employed in a small company. They both want to open stores, but neither has succeeded in opening one yet. When we were talking about which groups have more advantages than others, they said Burmese and when I asked them why they said:

> *Because if I issued a commercial permit from the government to open a store, the government itself will put in my way hundreds of obstacles. They would ask me to go to the immigration office first and meet their needs then to the commercial activities office and the latter would give me tens of conditions and regulations to follow. So as a Saudi individual I would be reluctant to open a store but when a Saudi businessman opened a store he would then give Burmese his permit to work under his name.* [Osamah, Saudi, Male, 40, unemployed] [Rakan, Saudi, Male, 42, private worker]

These frustrated Saudis think that the current regulations are too restrictive and that their Burmese neighbours found their informal ways to open stores. From my observation, it is true that most immigrants dominate the private sector in this scenario. They cooperate with rich Saudi businessmen to work under their names, and they share the profits with them. With

more profits, the rich Saudis apply for and receive more permits and thus co-operate with more immigrants making it harder for other Saudis to open stores. In Aljameaah, because ordinary Saudis face difficulties in opening stores, some rich Saudis chose immigrant labourers to open shops under their names since these immigrants are "hard workers". These processes affect the relation between groups in Aljameaah and make the figuration of established-outsider more complicated and sharper. Saudis as an established group, think they are losing resources in favour of transient non-Saudis who have found a way to make the private sector their own space.

While observing the neighbourhood, I found that not a single Saudi worked in local stores. They were all operated by immigrants and Saudis were usually customers. This is common across Jeddah. I asked many immigrants who work in Aljameaah stores how they had found a way to open a store, but many were very nervous about responding as the process involved informal, and possibly illegal, activities. One Burmese participant was honest in describing the process; He told me that given the law that prevents immigrants from opening stores unless, under Kafeel name, they rely on Saudis from outside Aljameaah as Kafeels. If they find a Saudi ready to cooperate with them, they usually give him/her a modest monthly fee as a gift, but sometimes this fee may be higher. It all depends on the relation between the two sides. The Burmese choose Saudis from outside Aljameaah because if they chose someone living in Aljameaah, he might observe their activities and calculate their revenues and ask for a higher monthly fee.

As Aljameaah continues to be seen as a place where immigrants dominate the local economy, some young Saudis try to open small businesses across the district. These young entrepreneurs are often in need of jobs or are seeking new sources of income. They rely on small start-ups that have no fixed opening hours, which means that they can open and close as they see fit. These start-ups do not appear to be very profitable and tend to be experience-based as opposed to the provision or sale of goods. For example, PlayStation stores that attract children to play per use, or trampoline use where children pay to play per 5 minutes. For example, Badran is a young Saudi who has a small 2m by 2m shop in one of the fragmented haras. He has one PlayStation and rents it out for 5 minutes at a time. When we were talking about his plan for his start-up, he said:

> *I need to take the store next to me and combine it with the current one
> so I can have more space. This store next to me is a grocery store and
> the guy who operates it is a Burmese. I talked with him about my idea
> but he asked for a high price, to be honest. I offered him SR 5,000 but
> he asked for SR 30,000 to leave and this price is very high and I can't
> afford that, it is impossible. He said if I offered this price he would go
> although in this area there are a lot of Burmese people who buy daily
> stuff from him.* [Saudi, Male, 28, store owner]

I later went to the grocery store that is next to him and invited the store owner to participate in the research, but he refused. From my observation, he is using the same tactic as other immigrant businesses: he is the owner of this grocery store, but it is under the name of his Kafeel sponsor, a Saudi businessman who is helping him. The young Saudi offered the Burmese shopkeeper SR 5000 to locate to another area, but the latter refused. The Saudi man knows that the Burmese individual is responsible for the store, so he did not contact the Saudi Kafeel. However, because the grocery store is located in an area with a majority Burmese population, fellow Burmese nationals support it by purchasing goods that they are already accustomed to buying there. Thus, the shopkeeper refused to relocate to another area. This shows how Aljameaah immigrants are "needed yet unwanted" (Fattah and Walters, 2020). While dominating the local economy by informal means, they are productive, contributing to Aljameaah's affordability and well as providing a steady stream of cheap labour to their host community. Their significant presence in Aljameaah and at the national level, however, is used to justify policies and programmes that are supposed to benefit Saudi citizens over them.

From the above information, it can be seen how the effects of this policy are crucial in generating conflicts between establish group members and immigrant (particularly the transient immigrant) outsiders. The latter found ways through collective techniques to dominate the local economy, while the former used political and cultural barriers to access the market. This brings about a response from Saudis as a threatened established group. They call upon national identifications and notions of Saudi citizenship in mobilizing disidentification from immigrant outsiders and constructing them as a danger to the national economy.

7.2.4 Sponsorship system (*kafeel*)

This section highlights the final national policy example that is key to relations between groups in Aljameaah: the sponsor system or Kafeel in Arabic. The consequences of this national policy are deeply relational in nature because it requires an interdependency between established and outsider groups. Here, public policies force the relation to take place through direct interactions and responsibilities. Indeed, from the beginning, this policy creates an "uneven balance of power" which is the core requirement of the emergence of social figuration (Elias, 1994, p. xx).

Under the Kafeel system, immigrants can choose a sponsor in order to access the country and to work, in which the Kafeel is accountable for the behaviour of the immigrant. This system has been in place for more than 30 years and initially was based on a Bedouin notion (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). This system produces and reinforces an unequal relation of power and makes conflicts between Saudis and immigrants more likely. It also perpetuates stigmatisation processes.

From talking with many participants, it seems that some established groups may use the Kafeel system to prevent immigrants, especially transient immigrants, from working. The established groups use not only stigmatisation to impose their power but also any tool at hand to fight or stop the outsiders from gaining more power. For example, this participant is a Burmese immigrant, and in his case, he was not able to work or even to use his SIM card because his Kafeel ordered from the online website of Saudi Immigration Agency an "exit from the country" for him. When I asked him why he did not search for jobs, since he is unemployed, he said:

> *I have a Kafeel who is Saudi. He issued an order through the online system for me to exit the country as he can do that because he is my Kafeel. When immigration officers ask me for documentation, they usually find I have an online order from my Kafeel to exit the country. Then they catch me every time and put me under arrest. Then they let me go after I pay fees. Then they catch me later and so on, all our problems are from the Kafeel system.* (Burmese, Male, 27, unemployed)

Some Burmese immigrants find themselves in a situation where they cannot work because their *kafeels* have used the online system to issue exit orders. These orders prevent immigrants from accessing many essential things such as getting jobs, renting a house, or even moving around. This situation is caused by the way public policies are designed in favour of established groups. Most of the participants having these issues were transient immigrants like Burmese and Bangladeshis.

Many immigrant participants express their wishes to see a change in the Kafeel system. They think this national policy constricts their ability to work. It is evident that this policy creates a power imbalance in favour of established groups. The same participant, Saud, said:

> *I swear to Allah I would pay money for the government every day if they remove the Kafeel system. We do not want the Kafeel system to judge us and make a lot of money from us every day.* [Burmese, Male, 27, unemployed]

This sponsorship system causes conflicts between Saudis and immigrants. According to several informants, some Saudis ask immigrants under their sponsorship to pay them money. When an immigrant refuses to pay their sponsor can issue an exit order. As a result, many immigrants have expressed their wish for a transformation of the *kafeel* system from an individual-driven system to a state-led one. Since the relation between the *kafeels* and their labourers are informal and left to individual choices, immigrants desire more formalised arrangements that would better define their relationship with the *kafeels*[31]. Indeed, many of these participants stated that they are even ready to pay more fees in order to achieve this goal. The rationale behind such a demand is that they have a strong belief that the Kafeel as it is now is a barrier to their ability to earn income. From my observation, due to this, many immigrants chose their *kafeel* from outside Aljameaah area so that their financial status and their movements are hidden from their *kafeels*. Hence, these conflicts between the two are related more to an unequal power relation that is manifested in economic exploitation or deportation. The *kafeel* system gives established members considerable power through their ability to deport outsiders.

---

[31] This system is changed while I was writing this thesis and details of these changes is described in Chapter 3.

When I talked with Faisal and asked him about the nature of his relationship with Saudi *Kafeels*, he said:

> *I don't want to generalise, there are some Saudi kafeels who are not cheaters, but the majority are. Some Kafeels keep asking for money and if you don't provide them with that, they are going to force you to exit the country [by activating] the online system. When we are under exit order, our situation turns from legal to illegal. After that we cannot even issue a SIM card, all our work is gone. Now my SIM is disconnected.* [Burmese, Male, 31, private worker].

Part of the struggle for Burmese in Aljameaah is that they think *kafeels* are making their lives harder by asking for money in exchange for the cover of their sponsorship. The amount of money depends on the sponsor's subjective calculation and it is usually paid on a monthly basis. When Burmese refuse to pay this amount, they are often threatened with being expelled from the country, through the online system that the sponsor can use. However, this is not the norm. In the majority of cases, sponsors do not ask for money and they let workers work for free. Many participants indicated that their *kafeels* are their close friends and they have no issue with their working conditions as long as they follow the guidelines of the system and pay the specified fees. This is the case in the resisted and stigmatized haras where Saudis and get along with long-standing immigrants very well. However, there is conflict in fragmented haras. But Burmese respondents often articulated a different reality - that the majority of Saudis abuse this sponsorship system. Indeed, many Burmese immigrants hope the sponsorship system will be replaced, and the state will be the sponsor instead of individuals. Here, Burmese generalise the "bad guys" to represent all Saudis and they do this to counter back and gain more power: it is the same mechanism that Saudis use against Burmese but in reverse.

Abdullah who is a Burmese immigrant reflected on the perceived group hierarchies in Aljameaah:

> *Saudis are way better than others [...] I think it is because most of them work in the public sector. Most Saudis here work in the army so they have a stable income every month. Even those who don't work are*

retired now and they still have a monthly salary. They are comfortable, they don't pay taxes like non-Saudis. They don't pay rents, they own their houses. So their salaries are only for food and they can spare a lot of money every month. And this is very normal, the native people always have better situations than those who are not native. [Burmese, Male, 42, carpenter].

The pattern here is that each group undervalues its own benefits and overvalues the relative benefit of others. This way, they create a situation where they want support from the state. Both Saudis and Burmese are aware of the power imbalance between them. Here, Abdullah thinks that Saudis work in the public sector and hence they are comfortable financially. The truth is that since 2014, the government has stopped creating new public sector jobs and as a result many younger Saudis in Aljameaah are unemployed. Even some older Saudis who have public jobs are struggling financially. In this sense, the established and outsider groups change their approach to the issue of stigmatisation. Usually, the established picture the outsiders based on their "bad behaviour", and outsiders would do the same. However, in this case, each group tries to attach the label of "being rich" to the other. Saudis claim Burmese are rich and at the same time, Burmese claim Saudis are rich. Both groups try to create a more privileged image of other groups when it comes to the economy. They do not want to appear "winners" since the state may not provide support for them.

This section showed how different groups within Aljameaah benefit from, or are affected by, urbanisation processes and policies. This adds another level of interdependency besides hara (space) between groups. The hara relations and their implications are driven from "below"; that is, by day-to-day activities and interactions and how individuals in each group identify with some and disidentify from others. However, in this chapter, the changes examined came from "above" and these changes are represented by policies which affect groups differently by increasing or decreasing power, leaving some groups "winners" in some aspects and "losers" in others. It shows how Aljameaah is embodied in higher scales of national and international processes and how Aljameaah, as an informal area, is highly complex.

7.3   The Role of religion

When studying a conservative society like Saudi Arabia, it is crucial to be aware of the powerful role of religion. Islam dominates the way many people view their own lives, the social world around them, and their judgements and evaluation of others. Muslims - in general – conceive of their religion as a way of life, and not just as a belief and set of practices that only take place in mosques. It teaches its followers how to eat, sleep, or even how to talk with others: it is also a code of social conduct which serves to govern behavioural expectations of others which influences relations between people. Thus, studying a context like Saudi Arabia without taking into consideration the role of religion would result in a misleading and incomplete understanding of the situation being studied (Lapidus, 1973). In this section, I extract those aspects of the findings in which participants show some relevant signs of how Islam affects their views, their dis/identification, and therefore wider group relations.

Some transient immigrants use religion as a means to escape the established-outsider figuration, or at least to diminish the power imbalance that characterises it. Because Saudis believe that many assets are held by immigrants, there is an emergent call for saudisation which gives preference to Saudi workers over foreign ones. Immigrants, who dominate the private sector, found this a difficult situation and therefore used religion to fight back. As this participant, Amen, from Bangladesh told me:

> *In Yousif Chapter Phrase Number 106 in the Quran, it is said that all Muslims are brothers. There are no Saudis, Bangladeshis, Burmese and so on. There are only Muslims. If you do good deeds, then you are good regardless of your citizenship [...] [But there] is a dangerous problem today: we are Saudis, we are Bangladeshis, we are kings, we are princes. But guess what? We all must die. What will be remembered is your good deeds which will help you in the final life.* [Bangladeshi, male, 75, Retired]

Because Islam prevents any prejudice, there is widespread belief among Muslims that nationality is a type of prejudice. As Amen did, this belief is invoked widely between immigrants to justify their rights to local resources, and to send a message to established

groups that their stigmatisation of immigrants is against Islam. The religion here becomes a power apparatus to fight back against stigmatisation and national public policies. Established groups take advantage of being the natives to get a foothold and gain support, while outsiders take advantage of being Muslims like the Saudis, to minimise the effects of their status as outsiders.

From my ethnographic observations in Aljameaah, I found that many Burmese immigrants are learning or can recite all Quran verses by heart. This performance in public space symbol of Islamic devotion has been mentioned many times by Burmese participants as something that they are proud of. Such behaviours, Saving Quran verses, is appreciated by the locals and seen as a good sign of a true Muslim. For instance, talking about his special statues as a Burmese individual in Aljameaah, Saud said:

> *Honestly Saudi Arabia is the best country in the world. This country is the best because they receive us free of charge from what Buddhists are doing against us. And by the way, all Burmese here are saving the Quran in their minds.* [Burmese, male, 27, unemployed]

Memorizing the Quran completely becomes a power in itself, as it is a mark of a Muslim who has reached a certain stage of being a "real" Muslim. This stage is not achievable by the majority, whether Saudis or immigrants, and it is something Burmese are happy to share with others, often unprompted (as in my case). Hence, religion is used as a power tool in the hand of outsiders for the purpose of "fighting back" against stigmatisation by established groups. That is, instead of religion being used to foster and enhance social relations (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2009), it is used as a means to maintain power gains.

Many residents of Aljameaah show their support to the Burmese population because the latter are oppressed in their own country. The notion that " *it is hard to deport Burmese*" or "*Burmese have special consideration*" is repeated many times across the interviews. Saudis and immigrants alike express this idea that there is no way of deporting the Burmese to their country even if they are responsible for troubles in Aljameaah. Abdullah is a Burmese male who was born in Makkah and has rich experience in dealing with public agents. When I asked him if he belongs to legal non-Saudis or the illegal ones he said:

There are a lot of things I can do legally and I'm actually can do most of the Saudis can do. You know the immigration office? We don't belong under them. We have a camp in Makkah that is responsible to identify us. When Burma do wrong things and we get arrested they [public agents] release us after a while because we don't have a country and they can't deport us. The Saudi government is very tolerant with us, because we don't cause a lot of problems. I think they can deport us to any place but they have mercy. Also all my kids are saving the Quran totally in their minds and can read it to you completely. Most of the sheikhs are from Burma and they are also Imams. Thanks to Allah.
[Burmese, Male, 42, carpenter]

Abdullah, like many others from the Burmese population, is aware of their advantageous position compared to other immigrants. They are the only non-Saudi nationality that does not require a visa to stay in the country. They are also the only non-Saudi nationality that does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Immigration Office but are granted special residency status by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and their leader is recognised by the state. If a Burmese resident has problems with the state, he or she does not have to go to visit the Immigration Office; instead, they have to go through a separate process, through their leader. This is a significant advantage for the Burmese, who are not restricted in their movements or choices. These special considerations for the Burmese are given to them because Islam encourages helping "brothers" who are oppressed only because they are Muslims. At the same time, the Burmese population show their commitment to Islam, as Abdullah said, where there are many imams who are Burmese, not only Aljameaah but throughout the city. Also, Burmese children tend to memorise and study the Quran, which indicates that they have an Islamic mindset.

Another example comes from Mutaz, who is a religious leader working in an Islamic office in the Aljameaah. When I met him in his office, the person who opened the door for me was a man from Chad wearing Saudi clothes. According to the participant, all nationalities from different countries living in Aljameaah are represented in his office and they volunteer to help clean mosques nearby and also help poor people. They help poor people who live nearby by providing them with clothes, food, and other necessities. Their income as an office comes from donations from the people who live in Aljameaah. The participant's experience showed

the importance of religion as a means to build bridges between different groups. When I asked him about the nature of his relationship with the residents of Aljameaah, he said:

> *We have different nationalities in the district. But all these nationalities say: there is no God except Allah and we believe that Muhammad peace be upon him is the prophet. All of them unite under this statement. These nationalities live here in the area for a long time. Our costumes and traditions are like theirs. There is no difference between them and us. They pray with us in the mosque and ties are solid to be honest because it is an informal area, and the only place we meet together is in the mosque.* [Yemeni, Male, 55, Islamic leader]

There are two factors that influence how these different groups react to and identify with each other, namely: religion and time of residence. For him, and for many others like him in Aljameaah, they comprehend the "other" based on their degree of the practice of Islam. Do they go to the mosque? Do they fast during Ramadan? And so on. In this case, religion facilitates the initial ground to building a common mutual identification between established and outsiders. That is, Mutaz's religious group tries to hide their conflicts by downplaying their differences since social differentiation could potentially mean a departure from or dilution of Islamic traditions.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has centred on the way in which urbanisation interacts with discourses and policies and how the continuous re-making of Aljameaah is connected to wider national and international events, social dynamics and transformations which together have affected the affective, material, and power relations between different groups. An established-outsider figuration is a processual and relational model that is very useful for operationalising stigmatisation in time and place. However, there are factors that influence groups relations and power that can be understood beyond the processes of identification. These factors (and strategies) have been illustrated in Aljameaah in the context of media discourses and narratives, public policies, and religion. This chapter exposes the inherent interdependence of groups in Aljameaah and how what happens to one group affects another and another.

The media affects Aljameaah groups equally by creating a sense of shame about belonging to the neighbourhood, but it is the established groups that are most affected. Because Aljameaah is classified as an informal area and has a relatively poor physical environment, the media portrays Aljameaah negatively by picturing it as an ideal environment for disorder and criminal groups. This negative image has become a driving force for local groups to distance themselves from Aljameaah, as they perceive themselves as "outsiders" at the city level. Many members of the established groups conceal their address when asked where they live (Wacquant, 2007). This contributes to many tribal members migrating to formal areas and preventing other tribal members from residing in Aljameaah. This scenario has led to a decline in the power of tribal Saudis in general, where they regularly express a tendency to leave Aljameaah.

The role of public policies in Aljameaah has a great impact on the groups' power. Although in general, immigrants control the private sector in Aljameaah and are present in the district in large numbers, their economic power has been weakened by the establishment of new tax regulations. Hence, they start to leave the country in large numbers, leaving behind their own businesses and housing. Although this process is positive for specific groups, mainly the Burmese and established Saudi, it has been negative for immigrants in general, and for Saudi landlords as well. Furthermore, the Municipality of Jeddah demolished the Market in Aljameaah, leaving transient immigrants and the Burmese population without a viable economic option to sustain themselves, and this has affected their power capacity tremendously. To maintain their power, the Burmese population started to find another market to control, like *Sawarik* Market further to the south of Jeddah. Also, public policies are used by established and outsider members to maximize their control over Aljameaah. One example is the use of commercial permits, which allows business owners to operate in Aljameaah. Some immigrants cooperate with Saudi businessmen (usually they live outside Aljameaah) to gain access to the market, and thus dominate it and prevent any Saudi from being able to compete. However, Saudis use the *kafeel* system as a means to minimize the advantages of immigrants controlling the private sector. In all these scenarios, established and outsiders use some aspects of public policies to gain advantage and leverage power.

In a religious society like Saudi Arabia, groups also use religion to justify their actions and maintain power. When established members call for the implementation of saudization to

help natives enter the private employment market, outsiders complain that this is a form of prejudice which is prohibited under Islamic traditions. They, outsiders, see Saudi Arabia as the place where the prophet Muhammed was raised and received the message of Islam from Allah, and hence, it is an ideal place for Muslims, in general, to live regardless of nationality. That is, outsiders use religion to escape their status as outsiders and thus their gains should not be seen as a danger to the country.

CHAPTER 8: Conclusion

This thesis offers many contributions since it uses insights from sociology, urban studies, geography and planning in nuancing everyday life within Aljameaah neighbourhood. The study provides new insights into the neglected internal dynamics of the informal neighbourhood in Saudi Arabia. It shows how the neighbourhood is characterised by group conflicts, competition, and urban ambivalences that shift alongside urbanisation and migration. The thesis also draws attention to the way in which the neighbourhood is being constantly made and re-made when viewed in a longer-term perspective which is demanded by Elias's process sociology, and when understood in tandem with the literature on urban informality – its contradictions, inconsistencies and the vitality, collectives and solidarities that can be located within them.

Empirically, it is the first about Jeddah's informal areas based on their social dimensions, instead of merely studying their physical characteristics, a theme dominating previous planning-centred studies in the Kingdom. The interdisciplinary approach adopted represents an original work that attempts to gain a different understanding of Aljameaah that take into consideration the social, economic, and political processes at work in the neighbourhood. Conceptually, the thesis draws on Elias's figurational sociology where groups are seen as the product of social relations and in which concepts like power, stigmatization, and processes of identifications are central. This conceptual framework is then operationalised in a unique context like Aljameaah that is defined by the presence of diverse groups with different social and cultural backgrounds. The thesis also draws attention to the interplay between informality and international immigration, a theme that has received little attention in the literature on urban informality literature.

In line with the literature on urban informality and informed by the centrality of power and group interdependence to the theory of "established-outsider relations" (Elias and Scotson, 1994), the thesis developed three main questions to investigate:

1) What is the nature of everyday relations and interdependencies between different groups in the informal area?
2) How is power manifested in terms of relations and outcomes for different groups?

3) How have urbanisation and urban policy affected and driven changes in informal areas and group relations in Jeddah?

In the next sections, I engage with these questions and discuss how the theoretical framework provides a useful tool to answer them. Then I describe seven contributions of the research, namely, one empirical contribution, five theoretical contributions and one methodological contribution. Finally, I provide a discussion of the limitations of this research and spotlight areas for future research.

8.1 Nature of relations and interdependencies

Groups within Aljameaah are interdependent because they share the same space and resources, and this interdependence has been shown to affect the way they interact. In the 1960s, when first the Harb tribe and then other Saudi tribes established themselves in the area, they had a common culture, language, and religion, that allowed them to live and cooperate harmoniously in a similar manner. They imposed their tribal culture spatially through allocating lands based on tribal membership, using the same method that had been used for centuries to "put their hands" on lands that were not theirs because these lands looked "uninhabitable" (Simone, 2016) which justified their claims based on Islamic practise (Salasal and Malinumbay, 1998). This has produced, as the study shows, segregated spaces (*haras*) that allow individual tribes to maintain their identities while contributing to an integrated society since they are all Saudis. They also maintained their identity by making sure that their members do not move into other tribes' lands. Hence, the tribal hara becomes ethnicised by its members and this ethnicisation is essential for the distribution of privileges and resources (Yiftachel, 1999).

In the 1970s and 80s, many immigrant groups from Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and Nigeria started to move to the area. Most of these groups had different cultural practices, and many of them spoke different languages. They often came to the country as pilgrims to perform Umrah and Hajj and supposedly were required to go back to their homelands. However, they decided not to return and instead, some of them settled in Aljameaah, specifically in an area called Kilo 6. The research shows that a specific urban figuration was taking place in this space: Saudis becoming the "established" group and the undocumented immigrants positioned as "outsiders". This interdependence of the two groups spurred the established

groups to act against the outsiders and to try to make sure that these newcomers would not cause any trouble to their traditional culture and the monopoly of resources (Elias and Scotson, 1994). According to many older participants in this research, Saudi tribes stigmatised the Kilo 6 area (the place of undocumented immigrants) as being a dangerous place to live. As a result of these processes of stigmatisation, in the eyes of the locals, Kilo 6 became a different place from the rest of the Aljameaah – tainted by the blemish of place (Wacquant, 2007).

According to many participants from established groups, Kilo 6 was stigmatised as a place of "illegal immigrants" who were usually "black". The older generation of Aljameaah - those who belong to tribal haras - were more likely to express negative attitudes towards Kilo 6 and its migrant residents than younger ones. They used what is visible - skin colour - as a means to facilitate their stigmatisation (Goffman, 2009). This finding is consistent with Wacquant's (2007) territorial stigmatisation theory, which proposes that minorities are more prone to be stereotyped and dehumanised by established members because of their perceived status as a separate ethnic group. Furthermore, established groups did not disidentify themselves from the newcomers based only on their ethnicity, but also on cultural and social characteristics, for example, the way they dressed and the food they ate. Because newcomers lived in Kilo 6, the area was not considered to be part of the Aljameaah community, and it was portrayed as a "social hell" (Wacquant, Slater and Pereira, 2014, p. 1273).

However, this research also shows that the relation between "established" and "outsider" is not fixed and that the perceived differences between groups are not always absolute. Instead, the relationship is dependent on the context and the power dynamics of groups within a community. As shown in this research, when many different groups started to settle in Aljameaah, the relationship between established (Saudis) and outsiders (undocumented immigrants in Kilo 6) changed. Over time, the established groups no longer saw Kilo 6 as a dangerous place, and it became less stigmatised by them. The second and third generations of outsiders conform more to the established groups' norms and traditions and they do not compete with them for jobs. However, established groups stigmatise a new specific outsider group, the Burmese population and transient immigrants. This is not surprising since, as Elias (1994) argues, power is critical in understanding the nature of conflict in a given community. In the context of Aljameaah, this is particularly important because the change in the relationship between established and outsiders cannot be explained without bringing the

notion of power into consideration. That is, when Saudi groups began to realise the increasing power of the Burmese population and transient immigrants, they began to seek strategies to limit this power in order to defend their own power. In this sense, the stigmatisation of the Kilo 6 community became less relevant to them, while the stigmatisation of the Burmese and transient immigrants became increasingly necessary.

The Burmese population is constantly growing in Aljameaah: they are an organised group who are also highly skilled workers who dominate the local economy and cluster together, often with close kin or associates. Many structural factors favour them with regard to access to resources and education. The established groups, who have a vested interest in maintaining the existing power structure, see the Burmese as an obstacle to their interests and to their "we-ideal" status (Elias and Scotson, 1994). This is why the established groups portray the Burmese as the cause of many problems in their community. The stigma of "collective disgrace [is] attached to the outsiders" (Elias and Scotson, 1994, p. xx) as a barrier to the advancement of Burmese. The latter, in turn, counteract their stigmatisation with the same tactic. They also justify their dominance by portraying the Saudis as lazy and needing to work harder in the private sector, since they usually work for the public sector which is more lucrative and secure. The interdependency between the two groups, and the fact that they share the same space and resources, led to conflict.

At the same time, the nature of the relation between established and outsider groups in Kilo 6 takes an entirely different direction. Saudis and undocumented immigrants have been in Kilo 6 for generations, and although the initial stages of this relationship had been negative, today it appears to have a more positive orientation. Both groups, informed by their long history of interaction with each other, have developed mutual identifications (de Swaan, 1995) which lead to solidarity and mutual respect for others, regardless of nationality, language and ethnic background. These identifications provide the basis for their ability to work harmoniously with each other and this is reflected in the rich and diverse social events taking place in this area. For example, *haras* in Kilo 6 are less exclusive and invite others to socialise and share experiences in public spaces, which is unusual in *haras* outside Kilo 6. This research suggests that haras within the Kilo 6 area have reproduced the established-outsider figuration in a way that helps both groups to avoid tension and conflict. Indeed, the stigmatisation by the rest of Aljameaah's areas has formed the basis of the internal cohesion of Kilo 6's residents against those from outside Kilo 6.

Based on these relations, the analysis showed that Aljameaah can be spatially categorised into four types of *hara* (see Chapter 5). This socio-spatial categorisation is built from the empirical findings gathered from the fieldwork and speak to the aims of the thesis in nuancing the internal dynamics of Aljameaah. First, tribal haras, which are located in the centre of the neighbourhood and consist of people who belong to the same tribe and speak the same language; this category is defined as those who established Aljameaah and have the power to display their identity as such. The second category is fragmented *haras*, which are located near the Market and consist of transient immigrants and the Burmese population. This category is characterised by the lack of social cohesion between its different members, where the sense of *hara* as a collective space has been eroded. People here are not interested in building a hara society as they constantly change their places according to job opportunities. Third, resisted *haras* which include tribal members with immigrants (most are documented) who have a strong sense of community based on the hara concept and are able to reproduce the figuration of established-outsiders. However, their identification is fluid because many members still resist full assimilation when it comes to intermarriage (Truong, 2019). The fourth type is stigmatised *haras*, where tribal members, along with undocumented immigrants, have strong social cohesion, collective identity, and a desire to improve society. In this space, people have outdoor areas for regular social events. An established-outsiders figuration is hardly visible, and they always refer to themselves as "one body".

The existence of these different types of haras within one neighbourhood reveals the highly dynamic nature of Aljameaah's social relations in an informal context. It also highlights the importance of understanding the neighbourhood as an interdependent community rather than as a set of discrete groups. This interdependency is expressed through the conflict or solidarity between these different haras, which are usually governed by power resources. In other words, the hara concept becomes a spatialised representation of the production of interweaving relations between established and outsider groups in Aljameaah. These haras are not formal systems but an informal way of organizing space and social life. Similarly, the Mirkaz as a gathering space is another informal space since it is not formally managed by any institution or state agency but is managed by the community itself. These informal modes of organizing space indicate the importance of informality as a mechanism for creating alternative forms of sociality that may not be seen in formal neighbourhoods.

8.2 The manifestation of power

This research shows that length of residence is a power apparatus that has profound implications in understanding the social configuration of Aljameaah (Elias and Scotson, 1994). The group that established the area first was enabled to claim dominance and superiority over the other groups. This is true in the case of the Harb tribe when they first came, and later other Saudi tribes joined them. At that time (in the 1960s/70s), the Harb tribe was in charge and because they established themselves first, they were able to present themselves as superiors to other tribes. This enabled them to claim more land and create economic advantages for their own members. Length of residence was enhanced by tribe identity, another tool of power. Harb tribe members were able to demonstrate their superiority by imposing their identity on the built environment, for example, by naming streets and spaces after their tribe's sub-units. These two factors, length of residence and the tribe identity, together made it possible for Harb tribe members to stay attached to the Aljameaah, unlike other tribes who had left the area. This strong group identification produces disidentification from others and enables them to stigmatize others, in particular, the Kilo 6 area as a dangerous place. It is a typical example of how powerful groups weaponize stigmatisation against less powerful groups (Bos *et al.*, 2013).

Although the tribe identity feeds the members' pride and group charisma, established groups today rely on a broader social identification – nationality - to stay in power (de Swaan, 1995; Pratsinakis, 2018a). The presence of immigrants, especially the Burmese population and transient immigrants in fragmented *haras*, was the major contributor to this nationalistic phenomenon. Informed by structural factors (e.g., saudisation) as well as decreasing oil prices, established groups in Aljameaah - called for the importance of supporting Saudis over non-Saudis in the private sector: the outsiders were blamed for Saudi inability to secure more resources and jobs. The private sector was and still is the medium through which immigrants acquire the means of livelihood and power, whereas Saudis use the tribe to acquire an internal strong identification and, at the same time, they use claims to nationality and citizenship to justify the exclusion of outsiders. This corresponds with the pattern found in the literature that shows how established groups use the nationality card only when they feel an "endangerment of their monopolized resources" (Pratsinakis, 2018, p. 10).

Some outsiders are group-oriented and thus their influence and power rest on internal group cohesion; in particular, the Burmese population is the most visible example. This research shows that social cohesion has enabled the Burmese to develop into a dominant group. Sharing many social identifications, they are able to mobilise their own interests to the advantage of their group, especially through dominating specific economies in the private sector. They are also able to create a self-sufficient society within fragmented *haras*. This also explains why many established (Saudi) members who participated in this research show signs of negative social attitudes toward the Burmese group. In contrast, many non-Saudi participants expressed their admiration for the Burmese since they are strong socially and economically, and because for them, the Burmese represent how immigrants should work. This finding supports that the notion that social cohesion tied to group histories and norms is a fundamental driving factor behind the relative success of a group and its ability to access power resources within established-outsider figurations (Elias and Scotson, 1994). As a cohesive community, the Burmese have shown themselves capable of gaining more resources than other immigrant groups, despite the fact that they are the newest arrivals in the area.

The Market, with its numerous and varied shops, represented a form of power for the transient immigrants and the Burmese population. They lived in fragmented *haras* located near the Market so that they could take advantage of being able to reach it on foot. This market was dominated by them and was an important source of income that enabled them to grow in Aljameaah. The established groups were not interested in competing with the immigrants as most of them preferred to work in the public sector. This enhanced the newcomers' ability to control the Market and even expand spatially to some tribal *haras*. However, when the market was demolished for redevelopment, these groups experienced a drastic decline in their power and are now struggling to sustain their livelihoods and maintain their presence in Aljameaah. For example, many Burmese residents have begun to migrate to nearby areas to find work.

Religion is illustrated as a tool to enhance social cohesion between members, but in this research, religion is also used as a tool of power. For instance, when Saudi groups try to favour their fellow citizens in jobs by claiming that non-Saudi workers damage the economy of the country, some outsiders have reacted by using the traditions of Islam as a way to counter back. Islam promotes the idea of brotherhood among Muslims and therefore any kind of discrimination, whether based on race or tribe, is regarded as a sin. As this research shows,

many non-Saudi participants have claimed that national prejudice is a prohibited behaviour that is not acceptable in Islam. Because Saudi society is highly religious, outsiders are aware that a powerful way to counter the national prejudice is to mobilize religion in their favour. Some studies have shown how different groups use religion to strengthen their internal cohesion and identity (Hirschman, 2004; Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2009; Gill, 2010), but in the context of Aljameaah, religion is used as a means to counter national prejudices. That is, it is used to maintain the level of power they, as outsiders have achieved in a time when established members find their power decreasing.

These power resources and their implications on groups relations enable us to explain the shift of stigmatization in Aljameaah across time. The shift is in line with how established members perceive the newcomers; do these outsiders represent threats to their status and power? As this research shows, in the 1970s, when many undocumented immigrants resided in Kilo 6, they were perceived as a threat by the established groups, who responded by stigmatizing the area as 'dangerous" and filled with illegal activities. Over time, this stigma causes a powerful impact that can be seen currently where Kilo 6 symbolically has become 'the ghetto" and "no-go" zone of Aljameaah. This effect today is not limited to undocumented immigrants who live in Kilo 6, but to all established members or documented immigrants who live in this area too. However, with the emergence of other new powerful groups, the Burmese and to some extent transient immigrants, stigmatization has gradually shifted from a focus on the illegal activities of undocumented immigrants to a discussion of the economic effects of Burmese and transient immigrants on the national economy. This change is again tied to the perception of the newcomers and their power. Established groups have realized that undocumented immigrants do not represent a threat to their power today because they have been in the country for a long time and have absorbed the norms of the established groups. At the same time, the Burmese and transient immigrant populations have become powerful groups and hence are seen as a threat by the established groups. That is, power resources are crucial in explaining the shift of stigmatization in Aljameaah.

8.3 Public policies: different groups in an informal place

Public policies play a crucial role in creating and reforming status and power structures between communities. The emphasis in this thesis is not on how marginalisation mechanisms influence public policies (Lever and Powell, 2017), but how they impact groups and actors

within Aljameaah. Some public policies favour one group and this has negative consequences for another (Pratsinakis, 2014). Aljameaah's shows multiple patterns of differentiated group experiences. Establishing policies that target immigrants (e.g., taxation) indirectly affected established groups in a negative way since most of their real estate became vacant due to many immigrants leaving the Kingdom. Similarly, when many immigrants left Aljameaah, many businesses closed which negatively affect the local economy of the neighbourhood. This shows the high level of interdependence between Aljameaah residents and the way in which some groups were affected by public policies that were not intended for them. Policies targeting migrants have a wider impact in terms of a general decline in the neighbourhood.

At the macro level, constructing policies that conceive informal areas as spaces of disorder and illegal activities led to residents of Aljameaah having feelings of inferiority (Fattah and Walters, 2020). The Western ideals of grid and order brought in the 1970s because of urbanisation had a direct impact on Aljameaah. It was as if Aljameaah was a space that did not fit into the vision of the 'new' in which grid-like formal areas were created (see Chapter 3). As a result, some tribes migrated from Aljameaah to the formal areas. This leads to a loss of social cohesion between established groups and opens the door for the formation of new groups, which in turn changes the social structure of the neighbourhood. For these reasons, the established-outsider figuration is not the same today as it was 30 years ago. Outsider groups, some of them strongly socially cohesive, gain more power and influence. This gain would be impossible without the public policies which have the effect of encouraging established members to leave the Aljameaah. The research also shows how some established members resist the idea of living in a dangerous and informal area like Aljameaah, a status they feel is imposed on them at the city level, claiming that Aljameaah has historically been a place for the rich. This resistance illustrates that the dominant discourses about Aljameaah illegality have not been internalized by all groups, suggesting resistance to territorial stigma from outside.

While the established members who remain in the area have witnessed a weakening of cohesion among them since their numbers are decreasing, the *kafala* system, as a public policy, gives these established members a sense of control over the neighbourhood. According to this policy, outsiders cannot enter the country without having a *kafeel* (sponsor) in charge of the immigrant's affairs and security, which gives the established groups a sense of superiority over the outsiders. This research shows how established residents may use this

system to prevent outsiders from gaining access to resources and hence limiting their influence. The majority of *kafeels* do not exploit this system and allow outsiders to freely operate in their neighbourhood. But because of the conflict between Saudis and some immigrants in Aljameaah, immigrants claim that the *kafeel* system is an obstacle for them and accuse the Saudis of exploiting the system to increase their income in a way that could not be done without it. This *kafeel* system - many of its structures have been abolished recently - becomes a weapon for some established members to weaken the advance of some outsider groups, and at the same time, is a tool for immigrants to stigmatise established members as abusers of the system.

Furthermore, this research shows that unpredictable changes in public policy can have a major impact on an established-outsider figuration. For instance, the demolition of the Market in Aljameaah affected the Burmese and transient immigrant groups, who were an increasingly strong group, in a negative way. In the eyes of the Burmese, the Market was the reason they moved to Aljameaah and a source of bringing them together. As a result of the demolition of the Market by Jeddah Municipality, the Burmese population are now struggling to maintain their group power. Indeed, some Burmese participants now ask for money from their fellows in Bangladesh, to help them and their families to survive. Some of them have already moved to other areas of the city with Burmese populations. This illustrates how groups are linked to areas beyond Aljameaah, and the way in which groups are in a continuous process of establishing new connections with others and with other places globally. Although the Burmese have strong social cohesion and share mutual identification that helps them to advance their interests, the sudden demolition of the Market left them in a state of uncertainty.

8.4 Contributions to the research field

This thesis offers one empirical contribution, five theoretical contributions and one methodological contribution.

The first contribution of this thesis is that it fills a clear gap in the literature related to the absence of the Saudi case in research on urban informality. The absence of the Saudi case stems from the fact that Saudi scholars focus too much on the physical aspects of informal areas and neglect the social and economic dimensions of such places. This focus on the

physical aspects renders the local population invisible, if not absent. It also prevents scholars from relating the Saudi case to the broader international literature which usually foregrounds the social dimensions of these areas. This thesis has attempted to rectify this situation by analysing the interactions of Aljameaah groups and how these interactions influence the production of space. The findings show that informal areas - especially those that share the social and economic character of Aljameaahs - are highly complex spaces and require careful consideration of their social interactions in order to fully appreciate their dynamics and diversity.

The second contribution is that this study used a bottom-up approach to examine these shifting interdependencies. This approach relies on building arguments by examining people's actual practices and how they relate to local issues, rather than relying on secondary sources. It requires the researcher to spend time with people, observing and interacting with them (see, for example, Menoret's (2014) work in Riyadh). These people happen to live on the margins of society, but they are the ones who shape and reshape Aljameaah, a complex space that cannot be understood with a top-down approach. This approach is then brought together with a broader approach - the relational and processual perspective theorised by Norbert Elias (1978) - to examine how issues such as identification, stigmatisation, and the role of power operate in the processes of urban informality. The result is an overall picture that goes beyond the conventional binary of North and South, traditional and modern, and shows how these categories intersect and overlap.

The third contribution related to the role of the state and the western influence and the emergence of informal areas. The thesis has demonstrated that the lack of state capabilities was one of the main causes of the emergence of informal areas in Jeddah. This conclusion is in line with previous studies that have identified the state's incapacity as a key factor in the development of informalisation (Foster, 2008). More specifically, in the transition from informal/customary practises to formalisation, the nascent state was generally unable to implement the new regulations of the 1960s and 1970s. This inability was further exacerbated by the increasing migration to Jeddah during the same period. The combination of a rapidly growing population and a slow state response led to the emergence of "grey areas" (Yiftachel, 2009), meaning newly arrived migrants continued to practice customary behaviours (e.g. informal encroachment of land based on Islamic *Ihya*, self-help housing, ... etc.). Although these practices were illegal at the time, the state was unable to effectively enforce the law due

to a lack of human and technical resources. When the state tried to combat informalisation, it relied on Western-style urbanism introduced by Western experts, such as the grid-like street network and cement buildings that divided the city of Jeddah into two distinct parts, the ordered part and the "chaotic" informal part.

The fourth contribution is about the concept of race in the study of group relations. While some studies suggest that race is crucial for understanding social relations in informal areas (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Bastia, 2015; Vincent, Neal and Iqbal, 2018), other studies question whether race masks other differences of power between groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994). In this thesis, race has not been a central focus in understanding social relations in Aljameaah. Race and racaialisation are present in the empirical data, mostly by older participants where "blackness" resulted in the racialisation of undocumented immigrants from various African countries living in Kilo 6 and assumptions about them. Race emerged as important to the imagining of a specific space and specific racialized group but was not used to position black people who are Saudis or documented immigrants from other countries. Furthermore, ethnicity and tribal origin is much more frequently mentioned in the data and is an important factor in understanding how residents perceive social relations in Aljameaah, particularly between tribal groups and Burmese migrants for example. However, both ethnicity and race are part of complex social relations in Aljameaah and there is a need to consider the interdependencies between groups and the dynamics of their figurations, which potentially criss-cross and intersect tribe, race and nationality especially within the overtly racialized space of Kilo 6 (see Chapter 5 and 6).

The fifth contribution is in terms of critical engagement with Elias' concepts. This thesis also tries to address the critique of Elias's neglect of the role of state and local government in the development of group relations (Petintseva, 2015) and the role of space and scale (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlouw, 2008; Pratsinakis, 2018a). State regulations can be restrictive, especially for outsiders, and can confine a group's activities to specific locations and restricted practices (Pasquetti and Picker, 2017; Özlem Akkaya, 2019). All these constraints are problematic for a group because they lessen its capacity to influence the political and economic processes of a given area and hence undermine the group's ability to gain more power. In Elias's established-outsiders figuration, both groups belonged to the same nation, which may reveal why he did not consider the state's role in shaping these groups' relationship with one another, but the Aljameaah case is different. The area here is an

informal area that is a site of territorial stigmatisation and has different nationalities living in it subject to migration governance, which exposes Elias's theory to different challenges. The context of Aljameaah and Jeddah can therefore help advance and critique the theory of established-outsider relations.

This leads to another contribution - the sixth one - that relates to the dichotomy of (global) North and South in knowledge production. As in the case of Elias's theory, most theories in urban studies are produced from Northern contexts that are differently affected by rapid urbanisation, religion, ethnicity, informality and other contextual factors (Yiftachel, 2006; Watson, 2009; Parnell and Robinson, 2012). These Northern theories are transferred through globalisation to dominate local understanding and practices in "Southern" spaces and sometimes do not work on the ground or at least do not work as fully as they should. This is demonstrated in Chapter 3 where a conflict between old and new approaches to constructing settlements in Jeddah have contributed to the emergence of the city's informalities. Similarly, by showing the high level of diversity in Aljameaah and its effects on space and public policies, this thesis may provide insights and open the door to new possibilities in understanding local knowledge production in similar "Southern" urban contexts (McFarlane, 2012). This scenario shows that the North and the South are not in fact binary. As Aljameaah already shows, the influence of Western practises and Western knowledge - oil and Western experts - has a direct impact on the re-making of the neighbourhood. Similarly, the practices and knowledge of the local "South" - such as the construction of informal housing and social networks - have a direct influence on how the neighbourhood is built and framed. This dialectical relationship means that the North and the South are interdependent and can only be understood together, not in isolation.

Here the thesis promotes the questioning of this dichotomy of the North knowledge versus South knowledge and calls for alternative ways of examining realities. Not only does this dichotomy exclude many less privileged countries (see, for example, Muller (2020) for the case of communist countries), but it also hinders our understanding of realities within the South itself by abstracting different countries such as India, China, and Saudi Arabia and placing them in a homogeneous category, assuming that they are all the same. Moreover, the dichotomy implies that the North has nothing to gain from studying the South, suggesting that any data collected in the South is not useful for building or adding to theories of the North (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). The same is true for the South, which studies its own

spaces, processes, and people, and assumes that the South's theories are incapable of contributing to the North. The case study of Jeddah facilitates this thinking beyond binarity. The empirical findings of this thesis point to strong theoretical connections between Jeddah and other North-South cases and open new avenues of theorising that challenge the current North-South divide.

The Aljameaah case findings reveal that, in the face of exclusion by others, territorial stigmatisation may lead to mutual identification between the groups affected, and this is considered the seventh (final) contribution. Such results provide evidence that contrasts with other accounts that emphasize how territorial stigmatisation can undermine interpersonal trust and promote conflict between groups (Bourdieu *et al.*, 1999; Wacquant, 2007; Vincent, Neal and Iqbal, 2018; Fattah and Walters, 2020). Analysis of the findings from Aljameaah has shown that, although its residents come from different ethnic backgrounds, the area of Kilo 6 is an example of how such stigma promotes internal solidarity among different groups and reduces conflict. While groups in this area disidentify from the broader imagined geography of Aljameaah, they are nonetheless able to strongly identify with their distinctive area - Kilo 6 -and perceive it proudly as a place that has given them meaning. Despite its deteriorated condition, they believe it will change in the next few years, and their lives will change with it.

8.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research

The first limitation of this research is the time required to study Aljameaah. The researcher spent approximately six months in the neighbourhood which resulted in more than 55 interviews with residents from different backgrounds. Nonetheless, this is a small sample size compared to what the researcher hoped to achieve. This is because Aljameaah population has more than 150,000 individuals and it is hard to represent them all in a PhD study that requires a fixed time to complete. Considering the diversity and heterogeneity among Aljameaah residents, this timeframe was unlikely to allow the research to capture the entire community. For this reason, it is clear that the findings are concerned with some specific groups more than others. For example, a particular focus was given to relations between Burmese, Saudis, and African residents of the area, but not to others, such as Egyptians, Bangladeshis, Bukharin, or other ethnic groups, for example, who may have different positions and power

dynamics. The researcher estimates that a timeframe of two to three years for fieldwork might be enough to capture the entire community, although this is an optimistic assessment.

This leads to the second limitation of this research, which is the generalisation of findings. It is by no means possible to generalise from these findings to all informal areas in Jeddah, let alone Saudi Arabia. However, it is possible to extrapolate processes and effects that may exist in these informal areas. For example, the concept of "*hara*" may not be the same in all of Jeddah's informal areas, since some of them have different social structures and different groups. Similarly, localities within Aljameaah, like the Market or the presence of the Burmese population, affect group relations with one another in complex ways, but these conditions may not necessarily apply equally to other informal localities. In other words, these findings represent only a partial view of reality in Aljameaah, which is subject to considerable change over time. However, they do suggest a range of possible social processes and outcomes that could lead to a generalised understanding of the emergence of informal areas in Jeddah and how urbanisation can change the dynamics of such areas. The case of Jeddah shows how informal areas in the city does not fit neatly into the North-South dichotomy because of the complex interplay of people and ideas from near and far, from North and South.

The third limitation of this research is the representation of female participants. The ratio of female participants to men is low: only six women decided to participate, and they preferred to use email for contact, instead of face to face interviews. It is a very common phenomenon to find difficulty in interviewing women in a conservative society like Saudi Arabia. It is even more difficult to try to meet Saudi women who live in informal areas. In Jeddah, informal areas had been the best places for tribal Saudis to live. These Saudis have very conservative traditions when it comes to women, and women can only meet other women or their male relatives, their fathers, husbands, and brothers. It might have been possible to employ Saudi women to assist in the research, but it was expensive to find skilful females who have the time to assist the researcher in speaking to Saudi women. Only two trained women were willing to help the researcher, and both are from Riyadh, which is far from Jeddah city. Thus, the researcher relied on Twitter to find women from Aljameeah willing to participate. The researcher tweeted three times about the study and found five females who were ready to answer questions by email.

The implications of the absence of female participants are evident in their absence from the research discussion. There is no mention of where the women outdoor or indoor gathering spaces, their role in decision making regarding their haras, and their attitudes towards the Kilo 6 area. Furthermore, it is interesting to examine how women from established groups relate to women from outsider groups. In particular, do women mimic the social configurations of their male counterparts or do they differ? Finally, women's experiences in the marketplace and their economic activities are another perspective that has not been considered in this research. Only through the voices of women can the researcher fully comprehend the complexity of social experiences in the Aljameaah.

Finally, this research has revealed that there are several areas that warrant further investigation. The first one is related to the gender of the participants since in the sample only 5 were females. Future research should include a greater number of female participants and in particular, those who belong to tribes as they are in large the ones who are considered as established members. This could be achieved better if the researcher is a female herself who can easily find access to female members of the tribes. As this research shows in chapter 4, some tribes have a lot of restrictions on women especially when it comes to participating in a study led by a male researcher. Questions such as how they perceive others, their gathering places, and the nature of their interdependencies with their male partners and how this affects the way they see the world should be investigated. It is not to argue that immigrant females should not be included but it is important to note that they are less in number and eventually may require more time to be accessed.

The second research area that is worth exploring is the aspect of land rights. Although this research is focused on the social aspects of Aljameaah and not on land rights, it is important to mention that during many interviews, the land ownership issue was raised. Some participants clearly stated that their land was not registered and hence it is not secure while others mentioned that their lands were registered. This ambiguity in land rights is crucial to understand. This area would make it possible to understand how Jeddah's municipality dealt with informal areas and whether they had plans to register the lands of Aljameaah or if these plans were targeting specific areas in the neighbourhood. By doing so, future research could shed more light on the land dynamics of Jeddah's informality and how this relates to the wider debates on land tenure in the informal areas of developing countries.

References

Abdulaal, W. A. (2011) 'Public-private partnership in regenerating unplanned settlements in Jeddah', *International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning*. doi: 10.2495/SDP-V6-N2-181-194.

Abdulsattar, M. (1988) *Islamic City*. The National Council of Literature and Arts.

Abualjadail, M. A. (1992) 'Problems affecting productivity of public and private sector employees in Saudi Arabia'. elibrary.ru. Available at: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=5865238.

Adham, A. (2018) 'The Political Economy of Work in Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Labour Process Analysis in Two Firms'. De Montfort University. Available at: https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/16578.

Ahmed, J. U. (2010) 'Documentary research method: New dimensions', *Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences*. researchgate.net, 4(1), pp. 1–14.

Akbar, J. (1989) 'Khaṭṭa and the Territorial Structure of Early Muslim Towns', *Muqarnas*, 6, pp. 22–32.

Akzahrani, M. M. (2014) 'The System of Kafala and the Rights of Migrant Workers in GCC Countries-With Specific Reference to Saudi Arabia', *Eur. JL Reform*. HeinOnline, 16, p. 377.

Al Akayleh, F. (2016) 'Do foreign workers' positive contributions to GDP outweigh the negative effect of their outward remittances on GDP? A case study of Saudi Arabia', *Advances in Economics and Business*. researchgate.net, 4(12), pp. 657–666.

Al Arabiya (2017) *190,000 Myanmar nationals' get residency relief in Saudi Arabia*, *Al Arabiya*. Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/01/25/Over-190-000-Myanmar-nationals-granted-Saudi-residency.html.

Al Fahad, A. A.-A. (2015) 'Raiders and Traders: A Poet's Lament of the End of the Bedouin Heroic Age', in *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231–262.

Alajaji, A. A. (1996) *Obstacles to the employment of male Saudi university graduates by the private sector in Saudi Arabia*. elibrary.ru. Available at: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=5612188.

Al-Amer, R. *et al.* (2016) 'Language translation challenges with Arabic speakers participating in qualitative research studies', *International journal of nursing studies*, 54, pp. 150–157.

Al-Asmari, M. (2008) 'Saudi labor force: Challenges and ambitions', *JKAU: Arts & Humanities*. kau.edu.sa. Available at: http://www.kau.edu.sa/Show_Res.aspx?Site_ID=320&Lng=EN&RN=51275.

Alba, R. D. and Nee, V. (2009) *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and*

Contemporary Immigration. Harvard University Press.

Al-Biladi, A. (1984) *Linage of Harb Tribe*. Makkah Home.

Al-Bukhari, M. and Others (1978) *Sahih al-Bukhari*. Dar Ul-Hadith.

Alhamad, H. S. (2014) 'The labor market in Saudi Arabia: Foreign workers, unemployment, and minimum wage', *Inquiries journal*. inquiriesjournal.com, 6(06). Available at: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/905/the-labor-market-in-saudi-arabia-foreign-workers-unemployment-and-minimum-wage.

Al-Hamawi, Y. (1866) *MuJam Al-Buldan*. Edited by F. Wüstenfeld. Leipzig. Brock-haus.

Al-Harbi, M. (2007) 'Subaia'a is the oldest loyal tribe since the establishment of the Saudi state', *Okaz*, 10 May. Available at: https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/103731.

Alharbi, T. H. (1989) *The development of housing in Jeddah: changes in built form from the traditional to the modern*. Newcastle University. Available at: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335226.

Aljoufie, M. (2016) 'Exploring the Determinants of Public Transport System Planning in Car-dependent Cities', *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Elsevier, 216, pp. 535–544.

Al-Khraif, R., Abdul Salam, A. and Abdul Rashid, M. F. (2020) 'Family Demographic Transition in Saudi Arabia: Emerging Issues and Concerns', *SAGE Open*. SAGE Publications, 10(1), p. 2158244020914556.

Allport, G. W., Clark, K. and Pettigrew, T. (1954) 'The nature of prejudice'. Addison-Wesley Reading, MA. Available at: http://althaschool.org/_cache/files/7/1/71f96bdb-d4c3-4514-bae2-9bf809ba9edc/97F5FE75CF9A120E7DC108EB1B0FF5EC.holocaust-the-nature-of-prejudice.doc.

Almubarak, F. (1992) 'Urbanization in Saudi Arabia', *Urban devlopment in Saudi Arabia*. Available at: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-1263-2_2.

Al-Mubarak, F. (1999) 'Oil, urban development and planning in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia: the case of the Arab American oil company in the 1930's-1970's', *Journal of King Saud University*, 11. Available at: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Oil+,+Urban+Development+and+Planning+in+the+Eastern+Province+of+Saudi+Arabia+:+The+Case+of+the+Arab+American+Oil+Company+in+the+1930+'+s-1970+'+s#0\nhttp://repository.ksu.edu.sa/jspui/handle/12.

Al-Mutairi, H. (2012) *Measuring the hidden economy and its influence on macro-economic variables with an applied study on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during 1970-2009*. PhD . Umm Al-Qura University.

Al-Naim, M. (2008) 'Identity in transitional context: open-ended local architecture in Saudi Arabia', *International Journal of Architectural Research*, 2(2), pp. 125–146.

Alnaim, M. (2020) 'Informal areas and the culture of poverty', *Riyadh*. Available at:

https://www.alriyadh.com/1838038.

Al-Omari, M. (2008) *Yemeni Illegal Immigration to Saudi Arabia on the Increase: Illegal Immigrant Tells his Story*, *Yemen Post*. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20110426220514/http://www.yemenpost.net/28/Reports/20081.htm.

Al-Rajhi, A. (2017) '"Jeddah Development" clarifies to "Sabq" the circumstances of stopping the power cut in the Al-Ruwais neighborhood', *Sabq*.

Al-Roqi, M. (2015) *Jeddah, after 3 years of stumbling, a new plan to develop the Ruwais slum*. Available at: https://www.aleqt.com/2015/06/18/article_966552.html.

Alsahafi, M. (2020) 'When homeland remains a distant dream: language attitudes and heritage language maintenance among Rohingya refugees in Saudi Arabia', *International journal of bilingual education and bilingualism*. Routledge, pp. 1–12.

AlSayyad, N. and Roy, A. (2003) *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia*. Lexington Books.

Alsayyad, N. and Roy, A. (2006) 'Medieval modernity: On citizenship and urbanism in a global era', *Space and Polity*. Routledge, 10(1), pp. 1–20.

Alshanbri, N., Khalfan, M. and Maqsood, T. (2015) 'Localization barriers and the case of Nitaqat program in Saudi Arabia', *Journal of Business Economics and Management*. International Association of Computer Science and Information Technology …, 3(9), pp. 898–903.

Alshariff, F. L. (2015) *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Undocumented Labour in Saudi Arabia The Case of Jeddah*. University of Exeter. Available at: https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/18529 (Accessed: 20 October 2020).

Al-Shihabi, O. (2018) *the establishment of the sponsorship system for workers in Gulf countries*. Available at: http://gulfpolicies.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2710&Itemid=628#_ftn20.

Alsubhi, M. (2015) 'Ihya Almouat in Islam', in. *Laws and Investments* , Al-Azhar University.

Al-Zahrani, M. (2017) *The Constitution of the West Coast ' ' :forgotten stories about the old Hijaz neighborhoods*, *Raseef*. Available at: https://raseef22.net/article/103137-.

Al-Zaid, M. (2013) *Al-Merkaz .. a phenomenon that Ramadan renews in the old neighborhoods of Jeddah*, *Watan Newspaper*. Watan Newspaper. Available at: https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/191385/تكنولوجيا-القد-جدة-أحياء-في-رمضان-يجددها-ظاهرة-المركاز.

Al-Zubaidi, M. S. S. (2007) *The sustainability potential of traditional architecture in the Arab world - with reference to domestic buildings in the UAE*. doctoral. University of Huddersfield. Available at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/965/ (Accessed: 6 January 2021).

Anderson, B. (2006) *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of*

nationalism. Verso books.

Appleton, J. V. and Cowley, S. (1997) 'Analysing clinical practice guidelines. A method of documentary analysis', *Journal of advanced nursing*, 25(5), pp. 1008–1017.

Arab News (2019) *Saudi Arabia's Prince Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud dies*, *Arab News*. Arabnews. Available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/1592901/saudi-arabia (Accessed: 24 February 2020).

Arabi (2019) *About two million foreign workers left Saudi Arabia due to difficulties*, *Arabi21*.

Arabiya, A. (2014) *Jeddah Historical Area joins list of U.N. World Heritage sites*, *Al Arabiya English*. Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/life-style/travel-and-tourism/2014/06/22/Jeddah-Historical-Area-joins-list-of-U-N-World-Heritage-sites.

Arthur, W. B. (1994) 'Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality', *The American economic review*. American Economic Association, 84(2), pp. 406–411.

Awad, M. (1959) 'SETTLEMENT OF NOMADIC AND SEMI-NOMADIC TRIBES IN THE MIDDLE EAST', *Ekistics; reviews on the problems and science of human settlements*. Athens Center of Ekistics, 7(42), pp. 338–343.

Awsat, S. (2009) 'Slums in Saudi Arabia: "blisters" in the faces of cities', *Sharq Awsat*.

Baesse, S. (2012) *Towards more effective urban planning in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia*. researchbank.rmit.edu.au. Available at: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/view/rmit:161451.

Banks, N., Lombard, M. and Mitlin, D. (2020) 'Urban Informality as a Site of Critical Analysis', *The journal of development studies*. Routledge, 56(2), pp. 223–238.

Barfield, T. J. (1990) 'Tribe and state relations: The Inner Asian perspective', *Tribes and state formation in the Middle East*. University of California Press Berkeley, CA, pp. 153–182.

Bastia, T. (2015) 'Transnational migration and urban informality: Ethnicity in Buenos Aires' informal settlements', *Article Urban Studies*, 52(10), pp. 1810–1825.

Bastia, T. and Montero Bressán, J. (2018) 'Between a guest and an okupa: Migration and the making of insurgent citizenship in Buenos Aires' informal settlements', *Environment & planning A*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 50(1), pp. 31–50.

Bauböck, R. (1993) *Etablierte und Außenseiter, Einheimische und Fremde. Anmerkungen zu Norbert Elias' Soziologie der Ausgrenzung*. na.

Bayat, A. (2009) *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East.*

BBC News (2020) 'Saudi Arabia eases "kafala" system restrictions on migrant workers', *BBC*, 4 November. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54813515 (Accessed: 10 January 2021).

Becker, H. and Geer, B. (1957) 'Participant observation and interviewing: A comparison', *Human organization*. blogs.ubc.ca. Available at:

http://blogs.ubc.ca/qualresearch/files/2009/09/Becker-Geer.pdf.

Bellah, R. N. (1981) 'The Ethical Aims of Social Inquiry', *Teachers College record*. ERIC, 83(1), pp. 1–18.

Benjamin, N. and Beegle, K. (2014) 'Informal Economy and the World Bank'. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/416741468332060156/pdf/WPS6888.pdf.

Berg, B. (2001) 'Qualitative research methods for the social sciences'. A Pearson Education Company. Available at: http://repository.umpwr.ac.id:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/3723/qualitative_research_m ethods_for_the_social_sciences.pdf?sequence=1.

Bernard, R. (2017) *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Blanchard, F. A., Weigel, R. H. and Cook, S. W. (1975) 'The effect of relative competence of group members upon interpersonal attraction in cooperating interracial groups', *Journal of personality and social psychology*. American Psychological Association, 32(3), p. 519.

Blokland-Potters, T. V. (2003) 'Urban bonds'. narcis.nl. Available at: https://www.narcis.nl/publication/RecordID/oai:dare.uva.nl:publications%2Fefd0b668-6719-481f-a95f-011e9e505628.

Bos, A. E. R. *et al.* (2013) 'Stigma: Advances in Theory and Research', *Basic and applied social psychology*. Routledge, 35(1), pp. 1–9.

Bosbait, M. and Wilson, R. (2005) 'Education, School to Work Transitions and Unemployment in Saudi Arabia', *Middle Eastern studies*. Routledge, 41(4), pp. 533–546.

Bosmans, K. *et al.* (2015) 'Temporary agency workers as outsiders: an application of the established-outsider theory on the social relations between temporary agency and permanent workers', *Society, Health & Vulnerability*. Taylor & Francis, 6(1), p. 27848.

Bottero, W. (2010) 'Intersubjectivity and Bourdieusian approaches to "identity"', *Cultural Sociology*. SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England, 4(1), pp. 3–22.

Boudreau, J.-A. and Davis, D. E. (2017) 'Introduction: A processual approach to informalization', *Current sociology. La Sociologie contemporaine*, 65(2), pp. 151–166.

Bourdieu, P. (1990) 'Structures, habitus, practices', *The logic of practice*. Stanford University Press Stanford, CA, pp. 52–65.

Bourdieu, P. *et al.* (1999) *The weight of the world: Social suffering in contemporary society*. Alhoda UK.

Bowen, G. A. (2009) 'Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method', *Qualitative Research Journal*. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 9(2), pp. 27–40.

Braibanti, R. and Al-Farsy, F. A. S. (1977) 'Saudi Arabia: A Developmental Perspective', *Villanova, Pa*. search.proquest.com, 1(1), p. 3.

Brislin, R. W. (1970) 'Back-Translation for Cross-Cultural Research', *Journal of cross-cultural psychology*. SAGE Publications Inc, 1(3), pp. 185–216.

Brod, M. S. and Feinbloom, R. I. (1990) 'Feasibility and efficacy of verbal consents', *Research on aging*, 12(3), pp. 364–372.

Brylka, A., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I. and Mähönen, T. A. (2016) 'The majority influence on interminority attitudes: The secondary transfer effect of positive and negative contact', *International journal of intercultural relations: IJIR*. Elsevier, 50, pp. 76–88.

Bryman, A. (2016) *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press.

Castles, S. and Davidson, A. (2000) *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. Psychology Press.

Chatterjee, P. (2004) *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*. Columbia University Press.

Choi, J. *et al.* (2012) 'Understanding the Language, the Culture, and the Experience: Translation in Cross-Cultural Research', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*. SAGE Publications Inc, 11(5), pp. 652–665.

Chowdhury, M. F. (2014) 'Interpretivism in aiding our understanding of the contemporary social world', *Open Journal of Philosophy*. Scientific Research Publishing, 2014. Available at: https://www.scirp.org/html/20-1650412_48986.htm.

CIA (2020) *Middle East :: Saudi Arabia — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency*. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.

Co, Z. F. (2003) *Preparing detailed plan for the Al-Jameaa Area*.

Crow, G. and Laidlaw, M. (2019) 'Norbert Elias's extended theory of community: From established/outsider relations to the gendered we–I balance', *The Sociological Review*. SAGE Publications Ltd, p. 0038026119829772.

Crowe, S. *et al.* (2011) 'The case study approach', *BMC medical research methodology*, 11, p. 100.

Dalglish, S. L., Khalid, H. and McMahon, S. A. (2021) 'Document analysis in health policy research: the READ approach', *Health policy and planning*, 35(10), pp. 1424–1431.

Dancygier, R. M. (2010) *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Davis, D. E. and Cross, J. C. (1999) 'Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City', *Contemporary sociology*. Stanford University Press, 28(3), p. 344.

Davis, M. (2006) *Planet of Slums*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 6–11.

De Soto (1989) *The Other Path*. New york: Harper & Row.

Deutsch, M. and Collins, M. E. (1951) *Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a*

Social Experiment. U of Minnesota Press.

Difalla, A. (2015) *Jeddah's slum areas: the attempt to redevelop Al-Nuzla Al-Yamania*. Ball State University.

Doolin, B. (1998) 'Information technology as disciplinary technology: being critical in interpretive research on information systems', *Journal of Information Technology Impact*. Palgrave, 13(4), pp. 301–311.

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L. and Kawakami, K. (2003) 'Intergroup Contact: The Past, Present, and the Future', *Group processes & intergroup relations: GPIR*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 6(1), pp. 5–21.

Duncan, G. (1987) *The planning and development of the city of jeddah1970-1984*. Durham University. doi: 10.1080/1331677X.2014.947132.

Dunne, S. (2009) 'The Politics of Figurational Sociology', *The Sociological review*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 57(1), pp. 28–57.

Dunning, E. and Hughes, J. (2012) *Norbert Elias and Modern Sociology: Knowledge, Interdependence, Power, Process*. Bloomsbury Academic.

Durkheim, E. (2005) 'The dualism of human nature and its social conditions', *Durkheimian Studies*. Berghahn Journals, 11(1), pp. 35–45.

Durst, N. J. and Wegmann, J. (2017) 'Informal Housing in the United States', *International journal of urban and regional research*, 41(2), pp. 282–297.

Eben Saleh, M. A. (2002) 'The transformation of residential neighborhood: the emergence of new urbanism in Saudi Arabian culture', *Building and environment*, 37(5), pp. 515–529.

Elias, N. (1956) 'Problems of involvement and detachment', *The British journal of sociology*. JSTOR, 7(3), pp. 226–252.

Elias, N. (1978) *What is sociology?* Columbia University Press.

Elias, N. (1987) 'The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present', *Theory, Culture & Society*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 4(2–3), pp. 223–247.

Elias, N. (1994a) 'Introduction: A theoretical essay on established and outsider relations', *Elias, Norbert & John Scotson. The Established and the Outsiders. London: Sage*.

Elias, N. (1994b) 'Introduction: a theoretical essay on established and outsider relations', in *The Established and the Outsiders*. London: Sage.

Elias, N. (2001) *Society of Individuals*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Elias, N. and Scotson, J. (1994) *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems*. Sage Publications, p. 199.

El-Shorbagy, D. A.-M. and El-Shafi, D. M. (2014) 'an Assessment Study of Unplanned Settlements Case Study : Al-Ruwais District , Jeddah ', *European Scientific Journal*, 10(32),

pp. 266–277.

Eremnews (2020) *Statistics: Foreigners occupy 80% of the private sector jobs in Saudi Arabia*. Available at: https://www.eremnews.com/economy/2265441.

Esposito, N. (2001) 'From meaning to meaning: the influence of translation techniques on non-English focus group research', *Qualitative health research*, 11(4), pp. 568–579.

Fabietti, U. (1982) 'Sedentarisation as a means of detribalisation: on some policies of the Saudi Arabia Government towards the nomads'. Croom Helm. Available at: https://boa.unimib.it/handle/10281/32557.

Fabietti, U. (1986) 'CONTROL AND ALIENATION OF TERRITORY AMONG THE BEDOUIN OF SAUDI ARABIA', *Nomadic peoples*. White Horse Press, (20), pp. 33–39.

Fattah, K. N. and Walters, P. (2020) '"A Good Place for the Poor!" Counternarratives to Territorial Stigmatisation from Two Informal Settlements in Dhaka', *Social Inclusion*, 8(1), p. 55.

Fayad, G. (2012) *Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues; IMF Country Report*. International Monetary Fund. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12272.pdf.

Fayez, Z. (2003) *The Documentation of Al-Jamea'a Neighbourhood*.

Foster, S. R. (2008) 'Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma', *U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.* HeinOnline, 40(2), pp. 301–325.

Freitag, U. (2020) *A History of Jeddah: The Gate to Mecca in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, L. M. (1966) 'Public housing and the poor: an overview', *California law review*. HeinOnline, 54, p. 642.

Gadou, H. M. A. (2009) *Role of planning and management in promoting urban development: Case study of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia*. aun.edu.eg. Available at: http://www.aun.edu.eg/journal_files/19_J_5631.pdf (Accessed: 4 January 2021).

Gardner, T. (2019) 'Ethiopians face beatings and bullets as Saudi "deportation machine" cranks up', *The Guardian*, 16 August. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/16/ethiopians-face-beatings-and-bullets-as-saudi-deportation-machine-cranks-up (Accessed: 11 January 2021).

GAS (2015) *Population Estimates Report*. General Authority for Statistics.

GAS (2016) 'Population in Makkah Al-Mokarramah region by gender, age group, and nationality (Saudi/Non-Saudi) - Mid 2018 A.D', *Population and Demography of Makkah Region*.

GAS (2017) *Employment and Wages Survey*.

GAS (2020) *Labour Market Statistics, Second Quarter Report*. General Authority for Statistics.

GCC Secretariat-General (1987) *Economic Review*.

Ghertner, D. A. (2008) 'Analysis of New Legal Discourse behind', *Economic and political weekly*, 43(20), pp. 57–66.

Gilbert, A. (2004) 'Love in the Time of Enhanced Capital Flows: Reflections on the Links between Liberalization and Informality', in *Urban informality: Transnational perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia*, pp. 33–66.

Gilbert, A. (2007) 'The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?', *International journal of urban and regional research*. Wiley Online Library, 31(4), pp. 697–713.

Gill, N. (2010) 'Pathologies of Migrant Place-Making: The Case of Polish Migrants to the UK', *Environment & planning A*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 42(5), pp. 1157–1173.

Gill, P. *et al.* (2008) 'Methods of data collection in qualitative research: Interviews and focus groups', *British dental journal*, 204(6), pp. 291–295.

Goffman, E. (2009) *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Simon and Schuster.

Goodsell, T. L. (2013) 'The interpretive tradition in social science', in *Annual Conference of the National Council on Family Relations, San Antonio, TX*. Available at: https://www.ncfr.org/sites/default/files/2017-01/interpretive_tradition_in_the_social_sciences_goodsell.pdf.

Guest, G. *et al.* (2017) 'Comparing focus groups and individual interviews: findings from a randomized study', *International journal of social research methodology*. Routledge, 20(6), pp. 693–708.

Guest, G., Namey, E. and McKenna, K. (2017) 'How Many Focus Groups Are Enough? Building an Evidence Base for Nonprobability Sample Sizes', *Field methods*. SAGE Publications Inc, 29(1), pp. 3–22.

Günther, I. and Launov, A. (2012) 'Informal employment in developing countries: Opportunity or last resort?', *Journal of development economics*, 97(1), pp. 88–98.

Haid, C. G. (2017) 'The Janus face of urban governance: State, informality and ambiguity in Berlin', *Current sociology. La Sociologie contemporaine*. SAGE PublicationsSage UK: London, England, 65(2), pp. 289–301.

Haj, T. (ed.) (1993) *The Notion of Ummah in Quran and Sunnah*. Al-Wai.

Hajjej, A. *et al.* (2018) 'The genetic heterogeneity of Arab populations as inferred from HLA genes', *PloS one*, 13(3), p. e0192269.

Hajrah, H. H. (1982) *Public land distribution in Saudi Arabia*. London ; New York: Longman.

Hamed, S. E.-D. (1993) 'Seeing the environment through islamic eyes: Application ofShariah to natural resources planning and management', *Journal of agricultural & environmental ethics*. Springer, 6(2), pp. 145–164.

Harney, N. D. (2006) 'The Politics of Urban Space: Modes of Place-making by Italians in Toronto's Neighbourhoods', *Modern Italy: journal of the Association for the Study of Modern Italy*. Cambridge University Press, 11(1), pp. 25–42.

Hart, K. (1973) 'Informal income opportunities and urban employment in ghana', *The Journal of modern African studies*, 11(1), pp. 61–89.

Harvey, W. Z. (1929) 'The Gold coast and the Slum', *Chicago: Universityof Chi-cagoPress*.

Hawkins, J. M. and Allen, R. E. (1991) *The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Hayek, F. A. v. (1942) 'Scientism and the Study of Society. Part I', *Economica*. [London School of Economics, Wiley, London School of Economics and Political Science, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines], 9(35), pp. 267–291.

Hazazi, H. (2020) *Restructuring the Board of Directors of the Jeddah Development and Urban Development Company*. Available at: https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/local/2043657.

Heath, J. (2005) 'Methodological Individualism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Summer 2020. Edited by E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/methodological-individualism/.

Helms, C. M. (1980) *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hirschman, C. (2004) 'The role of religion in the origins and adaptation of immigrant groups in the United States 1', *The International migration review*. Wiley Online Library, 38(3), pp. 1206–1233.

Hod, M. (2018) *Markaz Al-Kandara .. challenge and hustle before the match*, *Alriyadiah*. Available at: https://arriyadiyah.com/622657.

Hod, M. (2020) *In Jeddah, .. caution overwhelms optimism*. Available at: https://arriyadiyah.com/679376 (Accessed: 5 March 2020).

Hoffer, S. (2020) 'Jeddah, the Liberal Saudi Arabia?' Vimeo. Available at: https://vimeo.com/456478638 (Accessed: 4 October 2020).

Hogenstijn, M., van Middelkoop, D. and Terlouw, K. (2008) 'The Established, the Outsiders and Scale Strategies: Studying Local Power Conflicts', *The Sociological review*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 56(1), pp. 144–161.

Ibn-Baṭṭūṭa, M. I.-ʿabdallāh (1829) *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*. Oriental Translations Fund.

Ibrahim, S. E. and Cole, D. P. (1978) *Saudi Arabian Bedouin: an assessment of their needs*. The American University in Cairo.

Interior Ministry (2017) 'Vice Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Presides over the Cabinet Session', *Interior Ministry Website*. Available at:

https://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/Home/sectors/weapons/contents/!ut/p/z0/04_Sj9CPykssy 0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8ziDTxNTDwMTYy8_Z2cnQ0cAy1DAnwDwowMnAz1gxOL9L30o _ArApqSmVVYGOWoH5Wcn1eSWlGiH5Gbn6mQklmemKdqAGJm5OemKoAl80oUEotU DUACqgZ5qeXFEBIomJyRWZYKVh4PEok3NNE1MNY1MjA0T4oHOqMg2z0cACIM5D k!/.

Jackson, J. C. (1974) 'Urban Squatters in Southeast Asia', *Source: Geography*, 59(1), pp. 24–30.

Jamshed, S. (2014) 'Qualitative research method-interviewing and observation', *Journal of basic and clinical physiology and pharmacology*, 5(4), pp. 87–88.

Jastaniah, O. R. (1984) *The urban functions of Jeddah : a geographical appraisal*. Doctoral. Durham University. Available at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1156/ (Accessed: 20 October 2020).

Jones, E. G. and Kay, M. (1992) 'Instrumentation in cross-cultural research', *Nursing research*. psycnet.apa.org, 41(3), pp. 186–188.

Jones, R. (1995) 'Why do qualitative research?', *BMJ* . bmj.com, p. 2.

Kamel, G. (2014) *The Mirkaz: The Traditional Parliament*, *The Old Altaif*. Available at: https://taifzman.wordpress.com.

Karimi, K. and Parham, E. (2012) 'AN EVIDENCE INFORMED APPROACH TO DEVELOPING AN ADAPTABLE REGENERATION PROGRAMME FOR DECLINING INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS'. Available at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1359082/1/Karimi_KKarimi_EParham_unplanned settlements_SSS8_01 2012.pdf.

Karsten, L. (1998) 'Growing Up in Amsterdam: Differentiation and Segregation in Children's Daily Lives', *Urban studies* . SAGE Publications Ltd, 35(3), pp. 565–581.

Kawulich, B. (2005) *Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method*. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 43.

Khaldûn, I. (2015) *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History - Abridged Edition*. Princeton University Press.

Khan, M. I. (2017) 'Falling oil prices: Causes, consequences and policy implications', *Journal of Petroleum Science & Engineering*. Elsevier, 149, pp. 409–427.

Kimball, S. T. (1956) 'SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY*: AMERICAN CULTURE IN SAUDI ARABIA**', *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 18(5 Series II), pp. 469–484.

Kitzinger, J. (2005) 'Focus group research: using group dynamics', *Qualitative research in health care*. Berkshire: Open University Press, 56, p. 70.

Koyame-Marsh, R. O. (2016) 'Saudization and the Nitaqat programs: overview and performance', *Journal of Accounting*. zantworldpress.com. Available at: https://zantworldpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/3.-Rita.pdf.

Landini, T. S. (2013) 'Main Principles of Elias's Sociology', in Dépelteau, F. and Landini, T. S. (eds) *Norbert Elias and Social Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 13–30.

Lapidus, I. M. (1973) 'The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society', *Comparative studies in society and history*. Cambridge University Press, 15(1), pp. 21–50.

Laurier, E. (2010) 'Participant observation', *Key methods in geography*. Sage, 133. Available at:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_wk4kVABqE4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA116&dq=Participant+Observation+Author:+Eric+Laurier&ots=Q3g9VyFlYj&sig=xeRo7Iz97VcksYyfEFmuw7LS_jI.

Lawler, S. (2015) *Identity: Sociological Perspectives*. John Wiley & Sons.

Lever, J. and Milbourne, P. (2014) 'Migrant workers and migrant entrepreneurs: changing established/outsider relations across society and space?', *Space and Polity*, 18(3), pp. 255–268.

Lever, J. and Powell, R. (2017) '"Problems of involvement and detachment": Norbert Elias and the investigation of contemporary social processes', *Human Figurations*. Michigan Publishing, 6(2). Available at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/33498.

Lewis, O. (1966) 'The culture of poverty', *Scientific American*. JSTOR, 215(4), pp. 19–25.

Lewis, P. A. (2017) 'Ontology and the history of economic thought: the case of anti-reductionism in the work of Friedrich Hayek', *Cambridge journal of economics*. Oxford Academic, 41(5), pp. 1343–1365.

Lindell, I. (2010) 'Informality and collective organising: Identities, alliances and transnational activism in Africa', *Third world quarterly*, 31(2), pp. 207–222.

Link, B. G. and Phelan, J. C. (2001) 'Conceptualizing Stigma', *Annual review of sociology*. Annual Reviews, 27(1), pp. 363–385.

Lipsky, G. A. (1959) *Saudi Arabia :its people, its society, its culture*. Hraf Press.

Lofland, L. H. (1973) 'A WORLD OF STRANGERS; ORDER AND ACTION IN URBAN PUBLIC SPACE'. elibrary.ru. Available at: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=7046541.

Loyal, S. (2011) 'A land of a hundred thousand welcomes? Understanding established and outsiders relations in Ireland', *The Sociological review*, 59(SUPPL. 1), pp. 181–201.

Maal (2015) *The development of slums in Jeddah was delayed due to the complications of traders and residents*. Available at: https://www.maaal.com/archives/89514.

Madhi, S. T. (2003) 'Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia', *Career Development International*. MCB UP Ltd, 8(2), pp. 70–77.

Maestri, G. (2019) *Temporary Camps, Enduring Segregation: The Contentious Politics of Roma and Migrant Housing*. Springer.

Makhlouf, A. (1962) *Jeddah's First Master Plan*. The United Nation.

Makkah Council (2008) *The Framework of the Redevelopment of Makkah Region's Informal Areas*.

MAL (2020, 3 Feb) '"Mal" sources confirm: imminent decision to cancel the sponsorship system in Saudi Arabia', *MAL Newspaper*. Available at: https://www.maaal.com/archives/20200203/135233.

Mandeli, K. N. (2008) 'The realities of integrating physical planning and local management into urban development: A case study of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia', *Habitat international*, 32, pp. 512–533.

Mangin, W. (1967) 'Latin American squatter settlements: A problem and a solution', *Latin American research review*, 2(3), pp. 65–98.

Marques, E. (2015) 'Urban Poverty, Segregation and Social Networks in São Paulo and Salvador, Brazil: URBAN POVERTY, SEGREGATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS IN BRAZIL', *International journal of urban and regional research*, 39(6), pp. 1067–1083.

Martínez, L., Short, J. R. and Estrada, D. (2017) 'The urban informal economy: Street vendors in Cali, Colombia', *Cities* . Elsevier, 66, pp. 34–43.

Martínez, M. A. and Roitman, S. (2019) 'Informal Settlers', in Orum, A. M. (ed.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Studies*. 1st edn. Wiley, pp. 1–4.

Mathew, R. (1973) *Jeddah's Second Master Plan*. JohnsonMarshall Partners (RMJMP).

May, D. M. (2004) 'The interplay of three established-outsider figurations in a deprived inner-city neighbourhood', *Urban studies* , 41(11), pp. 2159–2179.

Mazumdar, Shampa and Mazumdar, Sanjoy (2009) 'Religious Placemaking and Community Building in Diaspora', *Environment and behavior*. SAGE Publications Inc, 41(3), pp. 307–337.

McAuslan, P. (2005) 'Legal pluralism as a policy option: Is it desirable? Is it doable', in. dlc.dlib.indiana.edu. Available at: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/218.

McCormack, M., Adams, A. and Anderson, E. (2013) 'Taking to the streets: the benefits of spontaneous methodological innovation in participant recruitment', *Qualitative research: QR*. SAGE Publications, 13(2), pp. 228–241.

McFarlane, C. (2012) 'Rethinking Informality: Politics, Crisis, and the City', *Planning Theory and Practice*, 13(1), pp. 89–108.

MEE (2018) 'Saudi levy on foreign workers pushes thousands to leave country'. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-levy-foreign-workers-pushes-thousands-leave-country.

Meier, L. (2013) 'Everyone knew everyone: diversity, community memory and a new established–outsider figuration', *Identities*. Routledge, 20(4), pp. 455–470.

Menoret, P. (2014) *Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt*. Cambridge University Press.

Milligan, M. J. (2003) 'Displacement and Identity Discontinuity: The Role of Nostalgia in Establishing New Identity Categories', *Symbolic Interaction*. Wiley Online Library, 26(3), pp. 381–403.

Ministry of Economy and Planning (2007) *The Demographic Survey of the Kingdom*.

Ministry of Planning (1996) *Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000)*.

Monkkonen, P. and Ronconi, L. (2013) 'Land Use Regulations, Compliance and Land Markets in Argentina', *Urban studies* . SAGE Publications Ltd, 50(10), pp. 1951–1969.

Monson, A. (1955) '"Slums, Semi-Slums, and Super-Slums"', *Marriage and family living*. [National Council on Family Relations, Wiley], 17(2), pp. 118–122.

Moore, A. (2010) '"I" and "We" Identities – an Eliasian Perspective on Lesbian and Gay Identities'', *Sociological Research Online*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 15(4), pp. 47–54.

Mortada, H. A. (2008) 'A Socio-Urban Account of Jeddah Slums , Saudi Arabia', *Dirasat: Engineering Sciences*, 35(2), pp. 53–70.

Müller, F. and Segura, R. (2017) 'The Uses of Informality: Urban Development and Social Distinction in Mexico City', *Latin American perspectives*. SAGE PublicationsSage CA: Los Angeles, CA, 44(3), pp. 158–175.

Müller, M. (2020) 'In Search of the Global East: Thinking between North and South', *Geopolitics*. Routledge, 25(3), pp. 734–755.

Mutisya, E. and Yarime, M. (2011) 'Understanding the grassroots dynamics in Nairobi: The dilemma of Kibera informal settlements', *International Transaction Journal of Engineering, Management, and Applied Sciences and Technologies*, 2(2), pp. 197–213.

Naffee, I. (2011) *Saudi Arabia-born expats face an identity crisis*, *Albawaba*. Available at: https://www.albawaba.com/saudi-arabia-born-expats-face-identity-crisis.

Nahedh, M. (1989) *The sedentarization of a Bedouin community in Saudi Arabia*. phd. University of Leeds. Available at: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/468 (Accessed: 13 October 2020).

Naveed, A. *et al.* (2017) 'Understanding, embracing and reflecting upon the messiness of doctoral fieldwork', *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. Routledge, 47(5), pp. 773–792.

Neuwirth, R. (2006) *Shadow cities: a billion squatters, a new urban world*. Routledge.

Newspaper, A.-J. (2003) 'Measuring and analyzing unemployment rates in Jeddah', *AL-JAZIRA*, 1 May.

Niblock, T. (2008) 'Saudi Arabia's Economic Development: Ambitious Visions, Difficult Dilemmas', *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*. Routledge, 2(2), pp. 13–31.

Nieguth, T. and Lacassagne, A. (2012) 'Space without scales: established/outsider relations

in Hérouxville', *Culture and Local Governance*. uottawa.scholarsportal.info, 4(1), pp. 50–61.

NOMIS (2011) *Ethnic Group, Usual Residents*. Official Labour Market Statistics .

Ong, A. (2006) 'Aihwa Ong-Neoliberalism as Exception_ Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty'. Duke University Press, p. 292. Available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bVQJ0Pe2iQkC&oi=fnd&pg=PP8&dq=ne oliberalism+as+exception&ots=nEBszLdccP&sig=BpLveqvBm63XzrKmy_vRwGqoDk0#v= onepage&q=neoliberalism as exception&f=false.

Orum, A. M. and Chen, X. (2003) 'The World of Cities: Places in Historical and Comparative Perspective'. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Osama Jastaniah (1984) *THE URBAN FUNCTTONS OF JEDDAH*. University of Durham.

Owen, E. W. (1975) 'Trek of the oil finders: a history of exploration for petroleum'. American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Tulsa, OK. Available at: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/7343783.

Özlem Akkaya, -Egemen Yılgür (2019) 'Locally Confined Territorial Stigmatization: The Case of "Gypsy" Stigma', *Review of urban and regional development studies: RURDS: journal of the Applied Regional Conference*.

Parker, R. and Aggleton, P. (2003) 'HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrimination: a conceptual framework and implications for action', *Social science & medicine*. Elsevier, 57(1), pp. 13–24.

Parnell, S. and Robinson, J. (2012) '(Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism', *Urban geography*. Routledge, 33(4), pp. 593–617.

Pasquetti, S. and Picker, G. (2017) 'Urban informality and confinement: Toward a relational framework', *International sociology: journal of the International Sociological Association*. SAGE PublicationsSage UK: London, England, 32(4), pp. 532–544.

Payne, G. (2001) 'Urban land tenure policy options: Titles or rights?', *Habitat international*, 25(3), pp. 415–429.

Perlman, J. (1986) 'Six misconceptions about squatter settlements', *Developing Areas: A Book of Readings and Research*. Berg Publishers, p. 336.

Perlman, J. (2004) 'Marginality: from myth to reality in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1969--2002', *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia. New York: Lexington*. dreamscanbe.org, pp. 105–146.

Perlman, J. (2010) *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*. Oxford University Press.

Perlman, J. E. (1979) *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*. University of California Press.

Peterson, J. E. (1977) 'Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia', *The Middle East journal*. Middle East Institute, 31(3), pp. 297–312.

Petintseva, O. (2015) 'Approaching new migration through Elias''established'and'outsiders' lens', *Human Figurations*. Michigan Publishing, 4(3). Available at: https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/6906313.

Phukan, R. K. *et al.* (2001) 'Betel nut and tobacco chewing; potential risk factors of cancer of oesophagus in Assam, India', *British journal of cancer*. nature.com, 85(5), pp. 661–667.

Picker, G. (2017) *Racial cities: Governance and the segregation of Romani people in urban Europe*, pp. 1–173.

Porter, L. (2011) 'Informality, the commons and the paradoxes for planning: Concepts and debates for informality and planning', *Planning Theory and Practice*, 12(1), pp. 115–120.

Powell, R. (2008) 'Understanding the stigmatization of Gypsies: Power and the dialectics of (Dis)identification', *Housing, Theory and Society*, 25(2), pp. 87–109.

Powell, R. and Lever, J. (2017) 'Europe's perennial "outsiders": A processual approach to Roma stigmatization and ghettoization', *Current sociology. La Sociologie contemporaine*. SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England, 65(5), pp. 680–699.

Pratsinakis, M. (2014) 'Resistance and Compliance in Immigrant–Native Figurations: Albanian and Soviet Greek Immigrants and Their Interaction with Greek Society', *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*. Routledge, 40(8), pp. 1295–1313.

Pratsinakis, M. (2018a) 'Established and outsider nationals: Immigrant–native relations and the everyday politics of national belonging', *Ethnicities*, 18(1), pp. 3–22.

Pratsinakis, M. (2018b) 'Established and outsider nationals: Immigrant–native relations and the everyday politics of national belonging', *Ethnicities*, 18(1), pp. 3–22.

Rahman, U. (2010) 'The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh', *Journal of immigrant & refugee studies*. Routledge, 8(2), pp. 233–239.

Redmond, R. and Curtis, E. (2009) 'Focus groups: principles and process', *Nurse researcher*. journals.rcni.com, 16(3), pp. 57–69.

Rigon, A. (2016) 'Collective or individual titles? Conflict over tenure regularisation in a Kenyan informal settlement', *Urban studies* . SAGE Publications Ltd, 53(13), pp. 2758–2778.

Robinson, O. C. (2014) 'Sampling in Interview-Based Qualitative Research: A Theoretical and Practical Guide', *Qualitative research in psychology*. Routledge, 11(1), pp. 25–41.

Rogaly, B. (2020) *Stories from a migrant city: Living and working together in the shadow of Brexit*. Manchester University Press.

Rosemary, B. and Jones, G. A. (1996) 'Identifying the Inner City in Latin America', *The Geographical journal*. [Wiley, Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)], 162(2), pp. 179–190.

Roy, A. (2005) 'Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning', *Journal of the American Planning Association. American Planning Association*, 71(2), pp. 147–158.

Roy, A. (2009) 'Why India cannot plan its cities: Informality, insurgence and the idiom of urbanization', *Planning Theory*, 8(1), pp. 76–87.

Sabq (2017) 'Slums neighbourhood cancer in cities!', *Sabq*.

Sahahiri, R., Arrowsmith, C. and Alitany, A. A. (2019) 'Mapping the historical places: A case study of promoting tourism in Jeddah, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', *Cogent Arts & Humanities*. Cogent OA, 6(1), p. 1691315.

Salagoor, J. (1990) *the Influence of Building Regulations on Urban Dwelling in Jeddah*. University of Newcastle opun Tyne.

Salasal, S. and Malinumbay, S. M. (1998) 'The concept of land ownership: Islamic perspective', *Bulletin Geoinformasi*. pdfs.semanticscholar.org, 2(2), pp. 285–304.

Samin, N. (2012) 'Kafāʾa fī l-Nasab in Saudi Arabia: Islamic Law, Tribal Custom, and Social Change', *Journal of Arabian Studies*. Routledge, 2(2), pp. 109–126.

Sherif, M. (1961) *Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment*. University Book Exchange Norman, OK.

Shields, R. (2013) *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity*. Routledge.

Simone, A. (2004) *For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities*. Duke University Press.

Simone, A. M. (2016) 'The uninhabitable? In between collapsed yet still rigid distinctions', *Public Culture*. read.dukeupress.edu. Available at: https://read.dukeupress.edu/cultural-politics/article-abstract/12/2/135/25836.

Smart, A. and Smart, J. (2017) 'Formalization as confinement in colonial Hong Kong', *International sociology: journal of the International Sociological Association*. SAGE PublicationsSage UK: London, England, 32(4), pp. 437–453.

Smith, F. T. (1943) 'An experiment in modifying attitudes toward the Negro', *Teachers College Contributions to Education*. psycnet.apa.org. Available at: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1944-03563-001.

Stokes, C. J. (1962) 'A Theory of Slums', *Land economics*. [Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, University of Wisconsin Press], 38(3), pp. 187–197.

Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990) *Basics of qualitative research*. Sage publications.

Sümer, B. (2012) 'Ibn Khaldun's asabiyya for social cohesion', *Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*. dergipark.org.tr, 11(41), pp. 253–267.

Summan, M. M. (2016) 'Immigration social challenges in public spaces in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia', in *Back to the Sense of the City: International Monograph Book*. Centre de Política de Sòl i Valoracions, pp. 1358–1368.

de Swaan, A. (1995) 'Widening Circles of Identification: Emotional Concerns in Sociogenetic Perspective', *Theory, Culture & Society*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 12(2), pp. 25–

39.

de Swaan, A. (1997) 'Widening circles of disidentification: on the psycho-and sociogenesis of the hatred of distant strangers-Reflections on Rwanda', *Theory, Culture & Society*, pp. 105–122.

Thiollet, H. (2007) 'Refugees and Migrants from Eritrea to the Arab World: The Cases of Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia 1991--2007', *Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, The American University in Cairo, Egypt October*, pp. 23–25.

Thomas, M. (2003) *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations*. Corwin Press.

Topolovec-Vranic, J. and Natarajan, K. (2016) 'The Use of Social Media in Recruitment for Medical Research Studies: A Scoping Review', *Journal of medical Internet research*, 18(11), p. e286.

Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. and Martinović, B. (2020) 'The bright and dark sides of length of residence in the neighbourhood: Consequences for local participation and openness to newcomers', *Journal of environmental psychology*. Elsevier, 67, p. 101383.

Truong, F. (2019) 'Fluid Identifications in the Age of Advanced Marginality', in Powell, J. F. R. (ed.) *Class, Ethnicity, and State in the Polarized Metropolis: Putting Wacquant to work*, pp. 137–157.

Turner, J. C. (1968) 'Housing Priorities, Settlement Patterns, and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries', *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*. Taylor & Francis Group, 34(6), pp. 354–363.

Turner, J. F. C. (1969) 'Uncontrolled urban settlement: problems and policies', *The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization*, (1), pp. 107–128.

Vaccari, P. *et al.* (2020) 'Stigma towards people with a diagnosis of severe mental disorder in primary healthcare centers: perspectives of service users and health teams in Chile', *International journal of mental health systems*. Springer, 14, p. 6.

Vaismoradi, M. *et al.* (2016) 'Theme development in qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis'. Sciedu Press. Available at: https://nordopen.nord.no/nord-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2386408/Vaismoradi.pdf?sequence=3.

Van Krieken, R. (2019) 'Towards process-figurational theory in organization studies', *Cambio. Rivista sulle Transformazioni Sociali*. Firenze University Press, 8(16), pp. 141–157.

Varley, A. (2002) 'Private or public: Debating the meaning of tenure legalization', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research pp*. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 26(3), pp. 449–461.

Verkuyten, M. and Thijs, J. (2019) 'Being here First: Ethnic Majority Children's Autochthony Beliefs and Attitudes toward Immigrants', *Journal of youth and adolescence*. Springer, 48(7), pp. 1281–1295.

Verrips, J. (2005) *En boven de polder de hemel. Een antropologische studie van een*

Nederlands dorp 1850-1971. Het Spinhuis.

Vincent, C., Neal, S. and Iqbal, H. (2018) *Friendship and Diversity: Class, Ethnicity and Social Relationships in the City*. Springer.

Voice, A.-J. (2018) 'Slums are cancers spreading in Saudi cities', *Al-Jazeera Voice*, 15 November.

Volkan, V. D., Julius, D. A. and Montville, J. V. (1990) *The psychodynamics of international relationships: Concepts and theories*. Free Press.

Wacquant, L. (2007) 'Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality', *Thesis Eleven*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 91(1), pp. 66–77.

Wacquant, L. (2008) 'Urban outcastes: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality'. Polity, p. 342.

Wacquant, L. (2013) 'Bourdieu 1993: A Case Study in Scientific Consecration', *Sociology*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 47(1), pp. 15–29.

Wacquant, L., Slater, T. and Pereira, V. B. (2014) 'Territorial Stigmatization in Action', *Environment & planning A*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 46(6), pp. 1270–1280.

Wapler, F. (2001) 'Sponsors in Saudi Arabia: Myths and Realities', *Arab Law Quarterly*. Brill, 16(4), pp. 366–373.

WAS (2017) *The Council of Ministers restructures the Board of Directors of the Jeddah Company for Urban Development and amends one of the provisions of the Check Crimes Law*. Available at: https://www.aleqt.com/2017/03/13/article_1150391.html.

Watson, V. (2009) 'Seeing from the South: Refocusing Urban Planning on the Globe's Central Urban Issues', *Urban studies* . SAGE PublicationsSage UK: London, England, 46(11), pp. 2259–2275.

Weber, M. (2009) *The Theory Of Social And Economic Organization*. Simon and Schuster.

Whyte, W. F. (1943) 'Social Organization in the Slums', *American sociological review*, 8(1), pp. 34–39.

Wilson, H. F. (2012) 'Multi-ethnic schooling and the future of multiculturalism in the UK', *multi*. academia.edu. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/download/30335981/Seref_Kavak_Steve_Garner_Debating-multiculturalism-2.pdf#page=260.

World Bank (1982) *World Development Report*. Oxford University Press. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5965.

Wynbrandt, J. (2010) *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. Infobase Publishing.

Yanagisawa, K. and Funo, S. (2018) 'How mohallas were formed: Typology of mohallas from the viewpoint of spatial formation and the urbanization process in Varanasi, India', *JAPAN ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 1(3), pp. 385–395.

Yelling, J. (2000) 'The incidence of slum clearance in England and Wales, 1955-85', *Urban history*. Cambridge University Press, 27(2), pp. 234–254.

Yezli, S. *et al.* (2017) 'Umrah. An opportunity for mass gatherings health research', *Saudi medical journal*, 38(8), pp. 868–871.

Yiftachel, O. (1999) '"Ethnocracy": The politics of judaizing Israel/Palestine', *Constellations*. Wiley, 6(3), pp. 364–390.

Yiftachel, O. (2006) 'Essay: Re-engaging planning theory? Towards "south-eastern" perspectives', *Planning theory*. SAGE Publications, 5(3), pp. 211–222.

Yiftachel, O. (2009) 'Theoretical notes on "gray cities": The coming of urban apartheid?', *Planning Theory*, 8(1), pp. 88–100.

Zimmermann, L., Zimmermann, K. F. and Constant, A. (2007) 'Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants', *The International migration review*. SAGE Publications Inc, 41(3), pp. 769–781.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Plan for the research sample (written before fieldwork)

Type			Number of Interviews	Comments
Saudi	Tribes	Ghamid	3	Ghamid and Zahran tribes are originally from the same city – Albaha in the south of the country – and they relate to each other in terms of tribal ties.
		Zahran	3	
		Mutairi	3	This tribe is distributed in the centre and the West part of the country and have different customs from those above.
		Harb	3	They are from the west part of the country and also have unique customs.
	Families	Ba	1	These families usually lived in the walled old city of Jeddah and migrated to Aljameaah. They are richer and the majority of them have left the area and moved to the formal side of the city.
		Bukhari	1	
		Hadari	1	
Immigrants	Individuals	Yemen	4	There is a large population of Yemini in Saudi Arabia. They are also Arab like Saudis and they usually work in retail.

		Bangladesh	4	They are also present in large numbers.
		African	4	They are fewer in number than those above, but they tend to cluster in certain areas.
	Families	Yemen	1	Families exist here in limited numbers.
		Sudanese	2	
Undocumented immigrants	Individuals	African	3	They are usually born in SA and work in washing cars in the informal sector.
		Yemen	3	Some of them born in SA and they work selling food in the informal market.
	Families	African	5	They are women and work in recycling materials.
		Yemen	4	They usually rely on their legal Yemeni friends.
Policy Makers	Jeddah Municipality		5	They are from the Department of Informal Areas Management.
	Jeddah Private Company		2	They are responsible for the redevelopment project.
	Ministry of Rural and Urban Affairs		3	They are responsible for planning in the national level.

Appendix 2: Details of research participants

Name	Category	Gender	Age	Job	pseudonyms	Notes
N0001	Saudi	F	23	Student	Nora	She is a student at the King Abdulaziz University. I contacted her via Twitter and got her email to send her my questions. She answered me with texts.
N0002	Saudi	M	85	Tribe leader	Ahmed	He has a small real estate office in a tribal *hara* where he works from 4 pm until midnight. He lives in the area with his wife and two of his grandsons. His work mostly involves providing rental apartments to newcomers.
N0003	Saudi	M	20s	Unemployed	Bander	He has many illegal non-Saudi friends. I met him while he was talking with his Sudanese friend.

N0004	Documented immigrant	M	20	Student	Sami	He is from Sudan. He was wearing Saudi outfits and talking like a Saudi with a local accent. He lives with his family and has brothers and sisters.
N0005	Documented immigrant	M	57	Taxi driver	Samer	I talked to him while he was eating in a local restaurant. At the time of the interview, he was preparing to go to Yemen as a result of the new tax system. He has a family with three children and has lived in the area for a long time.
N0006	Undocumented immigrant	F	57	Informal seller	Fatimah	She is from Chad, I met her while she was selling African herbs in Kilo 6. She is a widow with four children.

N0007	Saudi	M	40	Public Sector	Khaled	He is managing his parents' house who died three years ago. When his parents died, he left the area and moved to a formal neighbourhood. He said he visit his home every day only to remember his parents.
N0008	Saudi	M	56	Retired	Bader	He lived in a building he owns. He thought was from the Municipality so he came to see why I were in his building.
N0009	Saudi	F	28	Student	Alia	She contacted me via Twitter, and I sent questions by email. She replied with an attached voice note. She lives with her family.
N00010	Documented immigrant	F	51	Informal seller	Aisha	She contacted me via Twitter and replied to my questions by email. She lives with her family and helps her husband selling informally.

N00011	Saudi	M	24	Student	Anwar	He had lived in Aljameaah for more than 20 years but now lives somewhere else and still visits it every day. His aunt is lives in Aljameaah.
N00012	Saudi	M	24	Student	Majed	He lives in Aljameaah and contacted me via Twitter suggesting he wanted to participate. He invited N00011 to participate too.
N00013	Documented immigrant	M	21	Unemployed	Hasan	He is from Burma and his father is also unemployed. They suffer because of the demolition of the Market.
N00014	undocumented immigrant	M	55	Islamic leader	Mutaz	He was working in an Islamic organization which is now closed by the government. His family is originally from Yemen. He was born in Saudi Arabia but was not able to get Saudi citizenship. He

						considers himself to be from the established group. We met in his office
N00015	Documented immigrant	M	56	Car worker	Tareq	He works changing oils for cars. He is from Yemen and works alone while his family is in Yemen.
N00016	Saudi	M	40	Unemployed	Osamah	He lives with his family in a rented flat and is struggling financially. He is from Zahran tribe and has lived in the area for more than 20 years.
N00017	Saudi	M	42	Worker	Rakan	He lives alone and works in the private sector. He has lived in the area for more than 20 years.

N00018	Documented immigrant	M	38	Unemployed	Hamed	He was born in Jeddah and is from Yemen originally. He has lived in the area for more than 30 years.
N00019	Documented immigrant	M	42	Carpenter	Abdullah	He is from Burma and lives with his family and has six children. He was affected by the demolition of the Market, but now work informally.
N00020	Documented immigrant	M	17	Student	Hatem	He is from Palestine and was born in Aljameaah. He came with two of his friends: one Saudi and two Yemenis.
N00021	Saudi	M	51	Real estate agent	Loai	He has a small real estate office and he rents out apartments. He has lived all his life in Aljameaah and his father was one of those who established the area.

N00022	undocumented immigrant	M	75	Retired	Amen	He has lived in Aljameaah for more than 50 years. His parents were from Yemen, he was born in Jeddah but could not get citizenship. He is an expert when it comes to knowing Aljameaah's history.
N00023	Documented immigrant	M	31	Private worker	Faisal	He had lived in Aljameaah for more than 20 years and has recently moved to a nearby area. He is from Sudan and has a bachelor degree from Egypt.
N00024	Saudi	M	34	Private worker	Ibrahim	He lives on the border of Aljameaah and belongs to Otaibah tribe.
N00025	Documented immigrant	M	58	Driver	Sabri	He is from Bangladesh, and has good knowledge in the Quran. He lives alone, his family is in Bangladesh.

N00026	Documented immigrant	M	61	Tailor	Raid	He is from Pakistan. and has lived in Aljameaah for more than 15 years. He works with his brother and his family is in Pakistan.
N00027	Saudi	M	39	Teacher	Sharif	He belongs to Zahran tribe and works in a private school in Aljameaah. He lives outside the area.
N00028	undocumented immigrant	M	27	Unemployed	Saud	He is unemployed because of the demolition Market. He lives with his family with five children.
N00029	Saudi	M	24	Soldier	Hammad	He works in the Royal Army and lives in the new part of Aljameaah. He is from Harb tribe.
N00030	Undocumented immigrant	M	33	Informal worker	Wajdi	He operates his own informal store. The store belongs to him but he employs a documented Indian immigrant to

						work in the store for him.
N00031	Saudi	F	25	Student	Afnan	She lives with her family and she has lived in Aljameaah for more than 11 years. She is from the kilo 6 area.
N00032	Saudi	M	30	Student	Wail	He belongs to the Harb tribe. He lives with his family and his house is next to his brothers' houses. It is also very close to the area where most Burmese live.
N00033	Saudi	M	44	Teacher	Walid	He is from Qahtan tribe and is the Vice President of a primary school with high diversity rate in Aljameaah.
N00034	Saudi	M	40	Teacher	Talal	He belongs to Harb tribe. He does not live in Aljameaah but he has been a teacher in an Aljameaah

						school for more than 9 years.
N00035	Saudi	M	33	Teacher	Bassam	He is from Ghamid tribe. There is no data about where he lives. He participated in a group discussion.
N00036	Saudi	M	32	Teacher	Saeed	He is from Sulaim tribe. He lives in Makkah close to the Burmese area (*Nakasah*) which was the first settlement of Burmese population in the country.
N00037	Undocumented immigrant	M	53	Informal worker	Faris	He is from Burma and has seven children. He has lived in Jeddah for more than 30 years and speaks very little Arabic.

N00038	Saudi	M	28	Store owner	Badran	He belongs to the Harb tribe and rents a room that he uses it for entertainment purposes targeted at young residents of his Hara.
N00039	Documented immigrant	M	55	Unemployed	Omar	He is from Burma and father of four. He was standing while I was interviewing someone and showed interest to participate.
N00040	Saudi	M	35	Public sector	AbuBakar	He was supposed to be a participant in a focus group study but Burmese participants withdrew from the study. I interviewed him alone,
N00041	Saudi	M	37	Public sector	Fahad	He is from Harb tribe. His father had died before four months earlier. He lives now with his mother and has refused to marry so he can look after her.

N00042	Saudi	M	44	Retired	Salman	He belongs to Sifran tribe of Harb. He lives with his family and relatives from the same tribe next to each other. He wants to leave Aljameaah as soon as possible.
N00043	Saudi	M	41	Public sector	Shadi	He is from Jizan city. He works at King Abdulaziz University as an administrator. He was part of a focus group study.
N00044	Documented immigrant	M	38	Unemployed	Qahtan	His father - Uncle Ahmed - raised most of Kilo 6's children. He is very popular with bith Saudi and immigrant residents. He was part of a focus group study.
N00045	Undocumented immigrant	M	25	Unemployed	Hussam	He is from Chad and has an electrical trade background. He usually decorates his *hara* with electrical lights.

N00046	Undocumented immigrant	M	21	Unemployed	Sultan	He is from Chad and lives with his family.
N00047	Saudi	M	28	Soldier	Sattam	He works in the Saudi Army and had just came from a war with Houthis in the southern part of the Kingdom. He is from Shumran tribe.
N00048	Saudi	M	72	Retired	Sahl	He is from Shumran tribe. They call him "Uncle" because he is old and has lived in the area for more than 50 years. He is a wise man.
N00049	Saudi	M	34	Informal worker	Suhail	He operates a small entertainment shop that serves his *hara*. He lives with his family.
N00050	Documented immigrant	M	29	Informal worker	Musab	He assists N00050 in operating his shop. He lives with his mother and his father is dead.

N00051	Saudi	M	39	Public Sector	Odai	He lived in Kilo 6. He owns an entertainment shop and tries to make Kilo 6 lively. He has left the area but still manages his shop.
N00052	Undocumented immigrant	M	26	Informal worker	Basel	His parents were from Chad and he was born in Kilo 6. He assists in operating the N00051's entertainment shop. He lives with his father and mother and six of his brothers.
N00053	Undocumented immigrant	M	29	Informal worker	Mshari	He is from Chad and was born in the hara. He lives with his family and one of those who established the Mirkaz in his hara.
N00054	Undocumented immigrant	M	26	Unemployed	Yazen	His parents were from Chad and he was born in Kilo 6. He operates the social gathering place, a Mirkaz, on a voluntary basis.

N00055	Saudi	M	33	Policy maker	Jameel	He is an employee of Jeddah Municipality.
N00056	Saudi	M	48	Policy maker	Taher	He is an employee of Jeddah Municipality.

Appendix 3: An example of how I reflected on each interview.

N0001

Here the participant is female, and from her answers, it is noticeable that she is attached to her family's norms and traditions. She shows that her friendships are based on her father's friendships, which means she is reliant on family ties for her social life. Although she is from an established group which enjoys many advantages, she claims that immigrant groups enjoy a more satisfying life as they "earn more and pay less". She imposes bad characteristics on others, in particular, undocumented immigrants, and believes they are the source of problems and troubles in Aljameaah. She in her email replies, she circles many remarks that stigmatised undocumented immigrants: "they are strong", "they are in big numbers", "they are very dangerous" and "we need to be careful dealing with them". She indicates that the problem with illegal non-Saudis does not with their race or nationality, but their culture. What is important here to keep in mind is that she is female, and it would be helpful to see what role gender plays in the answers to these questions.

N0002

The participant is a male from the older generation. He is an example of how older generations think and perceive their world. He has a licenced gun because he thinks he needs to protect his area from those who are living illegally in Aljameaah. He conceived other Saudis as outsiders: "We are the original people because we came here first before other tribes". This is an indication of how even between Saudis (I mean the older generation), there is an established-outsider figuration based on kinship. Older generations still are very attached to their memories of the past when they identified each other based on tribes, unlike the younger generations.

What I need to keep in mind is that I need to show how older people think differently from the younger generation. This old man is an example of how the old generation thinks.

Appendix 4: Examples of fieldnotes

Fieldnotes (25-04-2019)

- The Market has been eradicated further.
- I met two Bangladeshi workers who work in a grocery store next to the Burma area.
- Both said clearly that they suffer economically, and they would like to go back to their country if they find the chance.
- One of them said that every day there are 3 or 4 labourers who die from heart attacks due to the mental stress which is caused by the current economic condition.
- More than 2 workers left the grocery store when they saw me assuming that I'm from the government.
- Burma students' fathers couldn't communicate with Saudi teachers.
- Burma students don't speak Arabic very well (most of them).
- The teacher asked one of the Burma students about his teachers' names and he couldn't tell, only told us one teacher's name.

Fieldnotes (29-04-2019)

- I went to the Burma area again to know and ask about why they don't integrate with the local people. I couldn't find a clear answer as they were so vague in answering me. Some of them were smiling when I asked them and keep saying "I don't know". One man said "difference" and then said, "Because of work".
- Most of the stores that belong to Burma are illegal. I mean they don't have formal permissions to open these stores. When I visited one store and asked about its formal permission the seller ran away and I was standing alone inside the store.
- I asked the Burma people about an open hole that has a nasty smell and they claimed that an Egyptian guy is the cause. I went to the store that belongs to the Egyptian guy and asked him about this hole and he was so angry from their claim and said he doesn't know about this hole and that Burma is the cause.
- It seems for me Burma people shop in Burma stores. I see Only Burma in their shops. This is not the case with non-Burma shops because I see the Saudis and immigrants shop together.

- There are two African males who were walking next to me. I asked them where they are from and they said from Kilo6. I asked them to participate but they refused immediately. They asked me to "solve the problems between people".

Appendix 5: Timeline of Developments in Jeddah from 1917 to 2017 (assembled by the author)

Keys:

| Local context |
| International and national context |
| Mass informal areas occurred |

1509	Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghory ordered to build a wall surrounding Jeddah.
1917	Jeddah was under the rule of Hashemite family.
1920s	The urban fabric was organic and compact in shape.
1920s	The "Suq" area, located in the centre, was a public space with multiple activities: commercial, education and religion.
1920s	Animals and walking were the prevailing mode of transportation.
1920s	Land ownership was according to the "Sharia Law".
1920s	All houses were attached, no setbacks from streets and building activities were based on need.
1920s	A house usually had many nuclear families.
1920s	Building materials were stone and whitewash, and both from local sources.
1920s	Some building practices were brought from Turkey and Egypt.
1920s	Woods was imported from India for house construction.
1920s	Mud-house community south of the wall belonged to West African pilgrims who decided to settle [later known as Al-Hindawiyah].
1920s	Traditional houses for Bedouin north of the wall – [Later known as Al-Nuzlah, Al-Baghdadiyah, Al-Ruwais].
1924	Jeddah entered Saudi rule.
1932	The establishment of Saudi Arabia.
1933	Estimated population was 30,000
1933	The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and first contract assigned with Aramco in return for £35,000
1933	First government hospital in Jeddah with capacity of 80 beds
1936	There were only 254 subscribers for the telephone system.
1938	The establishment of municipalities in Saudi Arabia.
1939	First post office opened in Jeddah
1943	The daily average consumption of water was 350 tons
1945	Arab-Israeli conflict: [many Palestinians fled to Jeddah]
1945	Saudi Arabia Airlines was founded
1946	The country received $10 million from oil revenues.

1947	The establishment of the first piped water supply in Jeddah
1947	Jeddah's wall demolished
1947	Royal decree issued that transferred any vacant land to state ownership ending the land revival practice "*Ehya*".
1947	Aramco (the oil company) introduced the grid pattern of urban development in Dammam for the first time in the country by building some communities for American labours.
1947	Aramco introduced detached houses for the first time - [they were not existed before and the norm was attached houses].
1947	Aramco established the first loan program for its employees for housing purposes
1940s	Manpower shortage and low finance capacities were observed in the literature
1948	Jeddah linked to Makkah by a paved road
1950	First oil boom (570,000 barrels per day)
1951	First attempt to introduce grid-iron pattern of development in Al-Baghdadia Neighbourhood.
1953	The National Council of Ministries was formed
1953	A royal decree was issued to relocate all government offices from Jeddah and Makkah to Riyadh.
1955	The establishment of the technical department in the Municipality of Jeddah to make urban regulations and laws compulsory for citizens.
1956	The country received $280 million from oil revenues.
1959	Estimated population was 106,000
1961	Estimated population was 150,000
1962	Number of informal houses was 7,123
1962	First Master Plan for Jeddah prepared by UN. The main aim was to avoid organic development.
1962	Building types were: 45% traditional houses, 36.75% apartments, 18.96% huts, 4.86% villas.
1963	Number of non-Saudis was 51,732
1963	Desalination plant was constructed in Jeddah.
1963	The grid pattern of streets was adopted.
1960s	Lack of effective technical department notes in the literature
1970	Oil production was 3.5 million barrels per day.
1970	State's budget was $1billion.
1971	Estimated population was 381,000
1971	88% of the population was born outside Jeddah, of which 60% were born outside Saudi Arabia.
1971	Dwelling types were: 52% traditional houses, 28% flats, 15% Huts, 5% Villas
1972	Number of informal houses was 38,900.

1973	Second master plan prepared by Mathew & Marshall
1974	Number of non-Saudis was 210,331
1974	The establishment of the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) with main objective to provide long-term interest-free loans for Saudis.
1974	The city demolished one type of informal housing; *Sandaga* or shanties, the lowest category of informal areas.
1975	The second oil boom
1975	Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs established.
1975	Two modern public housing projects constructed.
1975	Ministry of Public Housing was established.
1975	The establishment of two modern highways connecting Jeddah to Makkah and Al-Madinah (the holy cities)
1977	Law of Village and Municipality: the main aim was to give Municipalities more powers. [McKinsey Consultancy formulated this law]
1978	95.5 of residents in the centre area of Jeddah were renters
1978	Dwelling types were: 54.2% flats, 29.4% traditional houses, 3% Huts, 7.7% villas
1978	One large public housing constructed of 3,420 apartments.
1978	Number of non-Saudis was 455,658
1978	Estimated population was 862,000
1980	State's budget was $90billion.
1980	Oil production was 9.6 million barrels per day.
1980	1200 villas were constructed.
1982	Estimated population was around 1,200,000.
1982	Oil production was 6 million barrels per day.
1985	Council of Ministries halted all urban projects to prepare growth boundaries.
1987	Population was 1,300,000.
1989	Urban Growth Boundaries for large cities approved.
1990	Yemen Civil War [many Yemeni fled to Jeddah].
1991	Gulf War
1993	The Municipality prepared "Local Action Plans" for informal areas that aimed to improve physical conditions and accessibility.
2002	The Municipality established a new department, Administration of Informal Settlements Affairs" [to improve the conditions]
2003	Ministries Council requested Jeddah Municipality to solve the issue of informal areas in terms of land ownership, The Municipality invited local people in informal areas to show their deeds. However, very limited number did so.
2004	Al-Beeah Consultancy Office prepared the Third Master Plan for Jeddah
2004	Ministries Council again requested Jeddah Municipality to resolve the issue of informal areas within five years.

2005	Building types in all informal areas were: 66% traditional houses, 30% apartments 4% villa
2006	The Municipality tried to widen streets and make some improvements in Al-Sabeel informal area but the project failed.
2006	Mayor of Jeddah announced that the Municipality needed £22 billion to redevelop informal areas.
2007	Royal decree issued that gave the Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) the responsibility for developing informal areas in Jeddah.
2007	Jeddah Municipality established a private-public partnership company - Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC) - to finance the redevelopment project.
2008	Informal areas redevelopment program officially adopted by the Prince of Makkah. A total of 55 areas in Jeddah were considered informal.
2008	The new redevelopment project classified the 55 informal areas in Jeddah into 4 categories: 1- areas that had economic potential for private developers; 2- areas without economic potential; 3- areas with self-improvement potential; 4- areas needing urgent demolition.
2008	Al-Nuzlah Al-Yamaniyah and Al-Ruwais informal areas were in the first category - areas with economic potential for private developers - and chosen at the starting points for the redevelopment project.
2008	Ruwais Master Plan and detailed socio-economic studies were approved.
2008	Each stakeholder in Al-Nuzlah Al-Yamaniyah and Al-Ruwais was given three options to choose from before demolition took place: 1- to become a shareholder in the development; 2- to get compensation; 3- to get a housing unit.
2009	The total amount of compensation for the Al-Ruwais project was around £500 million
2009	Local people refused to move and insisted on staying.
2010	The Municipality froze any form of licencing commercial stores or services in Al-Ruwais and Al-Nuzlah Al-Yamniah [they closed the only hospital in the area and asked them to leave].
2011	Al-Nuzlah Al-Yamniah' residents went to the King's palace to express their opposition.
2013	The author met with group of people in informal areas and they accepted the fact their neighbourhood would be demolished but they stated that the offered compensation was not enough and that they would fight the redevelopment project.
2017	The Municipality decided to cut the electricity supply to some informal areas, but at date of writing, this has not happened.

References

Abdu, M. S., Salagoor, J. Y. and Al-Harigi, F. A.-N. (2002) 'Jeddah Urban Growth and Development Process : the Underlying Factors', *Development*, 1422(1), pp. 111–136.

Akbar, J. (1989) 'Khaṭṭa and the Territorial Structure of Early Muslim Towns.', *Muqarnas*, 6, pp. 22–32.

Daghistani, A.-M. I. (1993) *A CASE STUDY IN PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA*. Newscatle. Available at: http://www.ncl.ac.uk/guru/assets/documents/ewp5.pdf.

Duncan, G. (1987) *The planning and development of the city of jeddah1970-1984*. Durham University. doi: 10.1080/1331677X.2014.947132.

El-Shorbagy, D. A. and El-Shafi, D. M. (2014) 'an Assessment Study of Unplanned Settlements Case Study : Al-Ruwais District , Jeddah ', *European Scientific Journal*, 10(32), pp. 266–277.

Jamaludden Yousef Salagoor (1990) *the Influence of Building Regulations on Urban Dwelling in Jeddah*. University of Newcastle opun Tyne.

Mandeli, K. N. (2008) 'The realities of integrating physical planning and local management into urban development: A case study of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia', *Habitat International*, 32, pp. 512–533. doi: 10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.02.005.

Mortada, H. A. (2008) 'A Socio-Urban Account of Jeddah Slums , Saudi Arabia', *Dirasat: Engineering Sciences*, 35(2), pp. 53–70.

Osama Jastaniah (1984) *THE URBAN FUNCTTONS OF JEDDAH*. University of Durham.

Appendix 6: A mind map of the themes of interviews findings

Appendix 7: A copy of initial interview translation by the author

Code	N0004
Category	Long-standing Immigrant
Citizenship / Tribe/Family	Sudanese
Age	20
Location	Resisted *hara*

Do you work?

No, I am student.

Why did you choose to live here in this area?

My parents chose, not me. This area is informal area but if you go to the north, you will see some formal areas that are better.

Who live in these area? I mean the formal ones?

People who can afford to live there, everyone will pay based on his financial ability. There are people, who have money so they chose to live in the formal part, and there are those who do not have financial abilities so they chose to live in the formal side and the later are the majority.

What do you think about the informal part of the neighborhood?

Many people say the informal areas have very bad children and they are crowded with people not like the formal areas which are quiet and peaceful. Nevertheless, formal areas have people who do not know each other. Here in the informal part people know each other very well, every one here know everyone. I know all my neighbors and they all know me.

As a non-Saudi person, how do you describe your relation with Saudis?

It is good. We know them very well and we live together peacefully. Rarely you will see problems between us. Even if problems occurred, people will solve it without the need to call the government. In my opinion, the relation is good because we live together for more than 10 years in the same Hara. You are my neighbor you see me every day and I see you every day regardless of your citizenship. As people say here, you will not harm me and I will not harm you.

So Saudis deal with you regardless of you citizenship?

Right, there is no racism between us here.

Do you see Saudis as the same or do you prefer to deal with specific Saudi tribes?

No, I deal with them individually. If he is good with me, I will be good with him.

However, why do people cluster as tribes here in the case of Saudis and cluster based on citizenship in the case of non-Saudis?

Maybe they feel comfortable with each other and they do not want strangers. For example, maybe one sheikh came to the area and then he invited his people to reside next to him, this what happened in the Sufran *hara*. Even when some of them left the area, they use the same style. One person goes and then he invites the other.

So they used the same style when they came here?

Right. You know? In the past, the majority were Saudis but now the story is different. Most of them left the area and they are now minority. For example, Jehnan *hara* most of them are gone.

Is there a *hara* for Jehnan?

Yes, also Sulman *hara*, and if you go further north you will see Bogom *hara* and next to them the Malki *hara*.

What about the Sudanese people, do they cluster as the Saudi tribes do?

Rarely.

How you describe your relation with the illegal non-Saudis?

I'm little bit anxious to deal with them.

Why?

The government can't follow them or document them, how you do that when they don't have papers? They even are not registered in any form formally. If they did something bad no one would know that.

But they were born here.

Mmmm

Are you scared dealing with them?

No, I have friends but look there are two different of them. First, there are those who were legal but because they cannot afford government fees any more they are now illegal. Second, there are those who were born here illegally.

Ok, if I ask what are the nature of problems here?

There are no problems here; people are busy with their jobs.

What about in the past?

Usually it happened between kids when they play football.

What about between adults?

You will not find adults who belong to the same *hara* fight with each other. The normal case is usually one man fights another one from different *hara*. The *hara* system was very strong in the past, one *hara* would bring people together regardless of their citizenship. This is what our parents told us and they describe the situation as "our hands are together against the stranger".

So when the older people left the area, this culture is disappeared.

Actually what disappeared is ignorance, now most people are educated and act as civilized individuals.

But when *hara* culture is no longer valid or not strong as it used to be then what replace the *hara* culture now?

No *hara* is still valid but in a weaker volume. Also what is might substitute Hara is the school. Most of my friends are from m elementary school. But to be honest also there are a lot of my friends who I know from playing soccer together.

So if I walk in a *hara* they would not try to tell me "who are you"?

No, who will ask you are the older people but trust me younger generations will not try to ask you anything.

So there is a difference between the older generation and the younger one?

Yes, sure. There is a difference in terms of that older people were ignorant and they lacked education in general while the younger generation are educated so they have different way of life and thinking.

So you see that education has affected the way of life in the area?

Yes. In general uneducated people have a lot of free time so they go to drugs to fill this time or they might go to form organized gangs that might create unwanted results.

I will ask another question, could you please identify your neighbours? Are they Saudis or not?

Most of them are non-Saudis. There are some Sudanese and Pakistanis too. In general, my *hara* is mostly non-Saudis.

Do you think there are some areas here that are isolated?

What do you mean?

I mean like areas that you try to avoid or areas that people are scared of?

Yes, there are some. For example, there is one *hara* that has a very bad reputation because we think its residents are selling drugs. We call them drugs *hara*. My parents forbid me from walking there and they asked me to be careful because most of this *hara* kids are drug sellers.

How did your parents know that this *hara* has drugs?

They hear from people. So when you go outside your house you are already knew these places from your parents because they know everything.

You said that you don't deal with people based on citizenship or race, so what about your parents, do they also have the same mindset?

My father is different because most or maybe all his friends are non-Saudis.

He doesn't have Saudi friends?

No even if he has it is just "Hi friendship". He spent most of his time with non-Saudis especially those who are from Sudan.

What about Municipal services, are you satisfied with it?

Yes, they are excellent.

Appendix 8: Interviews were printed out and highlighted with notes and potential codes.