THE LABOUR LEFT

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CHAPTER SIX

DEMOCRACY IN THE PARTY(2): The Rank and File Mobilising
Committee and electing the Party leadership

Two days after the decision, at the 1979 Party
conference to introduce reselection CLPD issued a
newsletter to conference delegates entitled 'The Fight for
Democracy Must Go On' in which it stated that "the rank
and file must organise to defend, secure and advance the
gains already achieved".(1) It's first object was to
defend the new reselection procedures from a Right wing
counter attack but it also intended to advance the
constitutional reforms by removing the PLP's sole right to
elect the Party Leader and by establishing the NEC's right
to have final responsibility for the Party's election
manifesto. We have already examined in the previous
chapter the campaign to introduce automatic reselection
procedures and we now consider the campaign to advance the
Party reforms in these other areas. This campaign to
further extend the accountability of the parliamentarians
to the Party activists resulted in a single, organised
Labour Left grouping which brought together as an alliance
a wide range of groups which had previously developed
their own strategies and had sometimes been in open
conflict.

The Rank and File Mobilising Committee

In May 1980 the Rank and File Mobilising Committee (hereafter RFMC) was established to defend the constitutional reforms agreed by the 1979 Party conference and to campaign for additional Party reforms. The Left feared that the Party leadership, in alliance with certain trade union leaders, and encouraged by the majority of political commentators, would deflect and defeat the demands for constitutional reform.

The Right's hopes that Party reform could be halted and reversed were concentrated on a Commission of Enquiry which was established by the NEC in September 1979 in response to demands from the committee of Trade Unions for a Labour Victory (hereafter IULV)

> to institute as a matter or urgency, an inquiry into the structure, organisation, finances and internal democracy of the Labour Party at all levels and relations with affiliated organisations and other party interests.(2)

TULV had emerged in 1979 from a group of senior trade union officials who had provided funds for the Labour Party's move to new offices in Walworth Road and had then co-ordinated trade union assistance to the Labour Party during the General Election campaign. Both Left and Right were represented on TULV's ten-member committee.(3) They made it clear that they had no desire to become an organisation attempting to influence Labour Party policy(4) but the fact that a senior right wing trade unionist, David Basnett, was the moving force in TULV's

activities and that TULV had suggested to the NEC that all motions on the 1979 Party conference agenda dealing with organisational and constitutional matters should not be debated but referred to this new Commission was seen by the Left as a subtle means of delaying the implementation of reselection whilst opposition to this and other reform proposals could be effectively co-ordinated.

The terms of reference and membership of the Commission of Enquiry were almost identical with TULV's recommendations to the NEC. The only amendment made by the NEC was a significant addition to the terms of reference. The NEC added

> to bring forward proposals to ensure that the Party is open, democratic and accountable at all levels; and to ensure that all levels of the party leadership, and all aspects of the work of the party, are fully accountable and responsive to the wishes of the membership.(5)

A bitter argument occurred over the composition and membership of the Commission with the PLP demanding equal representation with the trade unions and the NEC. This demand was rejected by the NEC and the membership of the Commission comprised five trade union representatives, six NEC representatives, and the Leader and Deputy Leader of the PLP.(6) The NEC's only concession to the PLP was to invite the Chief Whip (Michael Cocks) to sit on the Commission as an observer.

It was in response to the existence of this Committee of Enquiry that the RFMC was established after initial moves made by the Socialist Campaign for a Labour

Victory(7) to the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy which were then taken up and extended to include five other organisations - the Labour Co-ordinating Committee,(8) Independent Labour Publications,(9) the Institute for Workers' Control,(10) the National organisation of Labour Students,(11) and the Clause Four Group.(12) Another four groups consequently joined the alliance - the Militant Group,(13) the Labour Party Young Socialists,(14) the Labour Action for Peace,(15) and the Socialist Educational Association.(16) Revolutionary and non-revolutionary Left were united on five specific constitutional objectives(17) and this alliance lasted over a period of twelve months. Disagreements over tactics led to the withdrawal of Independent Labour Publications,(18) and it is significant that the Tribune Group refused to affiliate and become part of an extra-parliamentary organisation. CLPD continued to provide the tactical and organisational skills in the alliance but the Left now had a larger organisational and financial base from which to mount an extensive campaign for constitutional reform.

Each organisation associated with the RFMC was represented on the organising committee but it was CLPD and the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, later to become the Socialist Organiser Alliance, which provided the direction and organisational drive for the campaign. John Bloxam, from Socialist Organiser was the campaign organiser and Jon Lansman, a recent recruit to CLPD, became its secretary. Prior to the 1980 Party conference

the RFMC organised twenty country-wide rallies to win support for the Left's reform proposals. It successfully provided the tactical drive and organisation in the face of opposition from both the Right and parts of the parliamentary Left, to secure the adoption of new procedures for electing the Party leadership, and it then went on to provide the main base for the campaign to elect Tony Benn as the Party's Deputy Leader. The RFMC was a remarkable organisation in the history of the Labour Left. For a period the Labour Left was united around one issue (limiting the powers of Labour parliamentarians) and the multitude of organisations operated together as a single unit. Its importance can best be ascertained through an examination of the debates and decisions on constitutional reform which took place in the Labour Party.

In a previous chapter we have outlined some of the tensions which developed between the NEC and Labour Government between 1975 and 1979. The NEC's response to these tensions was to concentrate its activities and thinking towards devising the programme for a future Labour Government and so the election manifesto became of considerable importance both as a means of winning electoral support and as a means of investing with authority proposals which civil servants and Ministers alike would then find more difficult to abandon.

Responsibility for the election manifesto

The formal powers over the Party's election

manifesto are outlined in Clause V of the Party Constitution which deals with the Party Programme. It stipulates:

1. The Party Conference shall decide from time to time what specific proposals of legislative, financial or administrative reform shall be included in the Party Programme. No proposal shall be included in the Party Programme unless it has been adopted by the Party Conference by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes recorded on a card vote.

2. The National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party shall decide which items from the Party Programme shall be included in the Manifesto which shall be issued by the National Executive Committee prior to every General Election. The Joint Meeting of the two Committees shall also define the attitude of the Party to the principal issues raised by the Election which are not covered by the Manifesto.

A considerable number of ambiguities are contained within these clauses: for example, the Parliamentary Committee only exists when Labour is in Opposition; the circumstances in which a meeting is necessary to define the Party's attitude on a principle issue during an election campaign are not defined; and, there is no clarification of the status of statements and

resolutions passed at annual conferences on a show of hands. But these ambiguities tended to be of secondary importance in the debate over the responsibility for the Party Manifesto which developed after the 1979 General Election. The crucial question became the respective powers of the NEC, the Labour Leader and the Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet in drawing up the manifesto.

In 1976 the NEC presented to the Party conference Labour's Programme for Britain which was intended to be the basis for a future election manifesto. Subsequent Party conferences approved a range of statements from the NEC and Liaison Committee elaborating and extending this programme and, furthermore, a resolution was passed with the requisite two-thirds majority to abolish the House of Lords.(19)

The Head of the Party's Research Department has outlined(20) the means by which the Party, in collaboration with the Government, prepared to translate these policy commitments into a draft election manifesto in order that the Party was well-prepared for any future general election. Eight NEC-Cabinet working groups were established during 1977-1978 and then during the first three months of 1979 an NEC-Cabinet group met on eleven occasions to consider a NEC draft manifesto which incorporated the proposals of the working groups and the NEC's sub-committees.

Nevertheless after the defeat of the Government in the House of Commons in March 1979 on a 'confidence motion' and the calling of a General Election, a draft

manifesto was prepared by the Prime Minister's staff which not only ignored many of the agreed decisions of the NEC-Cabinet group, but also many basic planks of Party policy.(21) This draft became the basis upon which a small NEC Committee(22) and then the formal Clause V meeting of NEC and Cabinet devised the election manifesto. The problems for the Left on the NEC were that the initial draft from the Prime Minister's staff was very different in tone from Party policy, that on the small committee were some NEC members at worst hostile and, at best, not very sympathetic to some of the Party commitments, and that the NEC was confronted with a press conference deadline and the threat of public disunity if the manifesto was not approved. The Head of the Party's Research Department has concluded that "despite all the planning over the previous two years, all the meetings, all the decisions, the NEC had been set-up to agree the very kind of Manifesto, in the very circumstances it had always hoped to avoid" and that Manifesto was "remarkably weak in terms of Party policy".(23)

The Manifesto either ignored the commitments made by previous Party conferences or dealt with them in an ambiguous manner. The whole tenor of the Manifesto on economic affairs differed from the NEC's commitments to an alternative economic strategy of reflation, import controls and public control of industry. Other economic commitments that the manifesto ignored were those to acquire certain banks and insurance companies, to introduce a wealth tax, and to publicly own North Sea oil.

Similar ambiguities and omissions occurred in the fields of social and educational policy. Omissions included the commitment to improve long-term benefits for the unemployed, to introduce a non-means-tested benefit for one-parent families, to give a formal date for the withdrawal of all pay beds from the National Health Service, and to end the charitable status of public schools. Finally the Party's commitment to total abolition of the House of Lords had been personally vetoed by the Prime Minister and replaced by a commitment to "abolish the delaying power and legislative vote"(24) of the House of Lords.

It was in response to this that the Left mounted a campaign to rewrite Clause V of the Party Constitution. Prompted by CLPD and the Labour Co-ordinating Committee twenty five constituency parties submitted general resolutions to the 1979 Party Conference regretting that policies devised by the Party in the NEC and at the annual conference were often omitted from election manifestos and therefore instructing the NEC to submit constitutional proposals for 1980 that would give it final responsibility for the contents.(25) Initially the NEC agreed by nine votes to eight to propose a constitutional amendment for the 1979 conference asserting its responsibility "after consultation with the Leader of the Party and the Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party" to decide which items from the Party programme should go into the manifesto.(26) However, immediately prior to the Party conference this amendment was withdrawn and the NEC

agreed by 16 votes to 10 to support a general composite resolution which stipulated that the NEC alone "after the widest possible consultation with all sections of the movement, would take the final decision as to the contents of the Labour Party general election manifesto".(27) This resolution, instructing the NEC to submit an appropriate constitutional amendment in twelve months' time was approved by 3,936,000 to 3,088,000 votes.(28)

At the 1980 Party conference the NEC did as instructed and prepared a constitutional amendment, in fact of similar wording to its withdrawn 1979 amendment, but this was defeated by 3,625,000 to 3,508,000 votes.(29) On this issue of constitutional reform the Left suffered defeat and in 1981 the Left was again defeated when the Party conference narrowly approved the reform in principle but then immediately rejected a constitutional amendment to put the reform into practice.(30)

Election of the Party leadership

Demands that the Party Leader should be elected by a larger body than the PLP first emerged after Callaghan's election in 1976. Five resolutions and six amendments appeared on the 1976 conference agenda and a composite resolution moved by Rushcliffe CLP and seconded by Sheffield Brightside CLP instructed the NEC to establish a working party to "define the Office of Leader of the Labour Party", to consider "appropriate means of widening the electorate involved in the choice of Leader",

and to report to the 1977 Party conference.(31) This was accepted by the NEC and approved by the Party conference. The subsequent working party reported that the Party had three options in choosing a Leader: either to leave the decision with the PLP, or to give the decision to the annual conference, or to create some form of electoral college. These three options were then debated at the 1978 Party conference at which the decision was taken to leave the election in the hands of the PLP.(32) This clear-cut expression of opinion by the Party conference was challenged in a sustained, and ultimately successful campaign, by the Left over the following two years in which the campaigning of CLPD and the assistance of the NEC was most crucial.

Twenty five resolutions and amendments proposing an extension of the franchise for election of Party Leader appeared on the 1979 conference agenda paper(33) as a result of CLPD promptings, and the NEC in July decided to waive the 'three year rule' in order to allow further debate only a year after the Party conference had decided to confirm the existing arrangements. Two composite resolutions were debated at the 1979 conference, the first being a CLPD-sponsored resolution calling for an electoral college made up of all members of the PLP, all endorsed parliamentary candidates, a delegate from each CLP, or two from each CLP where no parliamentary candidate had been selected, and delegates from affiliated organisations with a vote proportionate to their affiliated membership. The resolution proposed that the total vote of the affiliated

organisations should be double the votes of the CLPs. The second composite resolution merely called for constitutional amendments to be introduced in 1980 implementing an electoral college made up of the PLP and parliamentary candidates, the CLPs and the Trade Unions. The NEC asked the movers of the CLPD resolution to remit and recommend the conference to support the second resolution but both resolutions were defeated.(34)

CLPD pressure was maintained however and fifty resolutions and amendments appeared on the 1980 conference agenda, of which forty one were CLPD inspired, calling for the introduction of an electoral college and the consequent constitutional amendments to be passed without the one year delay stipulated by the '1968 rule'.(35) This time the NEC went further than just allowing yet another debate to occur at the conference: it proposed a constitutional amendment similar to the CLPD wording which had been defeated at the 1979 conference. First, the NEC asked for the conference approval of the principle that the franchise for the election of the Party Leadership should be widened and when this had been given by 3,609,000 to 3,511,000 votes it then proceeded to ask for approval of its constitutional amendment.(36) Rather extraordinarily the NEC spokesman, Eric Heffer, in winding up the debate, admitted that his personal preference was for an alternative amendment also being discussed which proposed creating an electoral college of three equal parts - members of the PLP in attendance at the annual conference, delegates from the trade unions and the

socialist societies and delegates from the CLPs. But both amendments were defeated, the NEC's by 3,557,000 to 3,495,000 votes and the other by 3,737,000 to 3,322,000 votes.(37) The NEC's response then was to propose another amendment revising the overall balance of votes within the electoral college so that the PLP would secure 30%, the CLPs 30% and the affiliated organisations 40% of the total vote, but this further amendment was defeated by 3,910,000 to 3,235,000 votes.(38) The Party conference had approved by a very narrow margin the principle of extending the franchise for electing the Party Leader but could not agree on the form of the electoral college. The confusion which prevailed was only just settled when the conference approved an emergency resolution, inspired by senior trade union leaders, which accepted the principle of an extended electoral college and called for a special rules revision conference to be held in three months' time.(39)

The Wembley Special Party Conference: January 1981

Three hundred and seventy organisations submitted two hundred and seven proposals to amend the Party constitution, which were classifiable into four major choices.

- an electoral college giving 30% of the vote to the PLP, 30% to CLPs and 40% to affiliated organisations

- an electoral college giving 33.3% of the vote

to the PLP, CLPs, and affiliated organisations

- an electoral college giving 50% of the vote to
the PLP and 25% respectively to the CLPs and
affiliated organisations

- an electoral college made up of all individual
members of the Party.

The Labour Left was opposed to the proposal to
introduce an electoral college of all individual Party
members and supported some form of electoral college based
upon the Party conference. But it was divided over the
specific formula for the respective segments of the Party
in this electoral college, with some proposing the one-
third principle, some a 30, 30, 40 formula, and some a 50,
25, 25 formula.(25)

The Left campaign which was spearheaded by the
RMFC and masterminded by senior figures in CLPD, was
remarkable in the weeks immediately preceding the special
Party conference. Some sense of this campaign can be
captured by the letters sent out to supporters in the
three weeks before the conference headed 'Urgent Call for
Action' (January 9th), 'Suggested Strategy for Victory'
(January 13th), 'Emergency: Our Only Chance of Victory'
(January 15th), and 'The Only Way to Win' (January 23rd).
The purpose of the campaign was two-fold. The first was to
reaffirm the Party's commitment made at the previous Party
conference to establish an electoral college and the
second was to marshall support for the 30, 30, 40 formula.

This it did by recommending support for the Union of Shop,
Distributive and Allied Workers' resolution proposing this
formula. In a letter(41) to supporters it stated

> This union wields 429,000 votes but has not,
> hitherto, favoured constitutional changes. The
> only way to ensure the support of the USDAW is
> to rally behind their submission and to make it
> the only alternative to the option of giving 50%
> or more to the PLP. The latter option is certain
> to reach the final ballot.

CLPD therefore advised

> ... if the USDAW proposal enters the first
> ballot it is absolutely vital that it should
> receive and retain the maximum vote to ensure
> its survival until the final round. There is
> very little likelihood that USDAW will switch to
> one-third-one-third-one-third rather they will
> opt for 50% of the PLP. We therefore strongly
> urge that your delegate supports the USDAW
> motion on the first, and of course, on the
> succeeding ballots.

Two days later CLPD advised(42) supporters

> ... the NEC representative may appeal to all
> organisations to unite behind the NEC proposal.
> This should also be resisted, as the NEC's
> proposal, based on one-third-one-third-one-third
> is almost certain to be defeated in the final
> round of the eliminating ballot.

This campaign proved successful in that the USDAW
resolution remained on the conference agenda whilst other
resolutions, including the RFMC model, were withdrawn in
its favour.

After the conference had overwhelmingly approved
the principle of an electoral college based upon the
annual Party conference(43) delegates had the option of

seven constitutional amendments covering various forumlae.
Three of these amendments were serious contenders for
majority support.

Formulae	Ballot 1	Ballot 2	Ballot 3
Resolution 103 (50%, 25%, 25%)	2,386,000	2,685,000	2,865,000
NEC amendment (33%, 33%, 33%, 1%)	1,763,000	1,757,000	-
Resolution 76 (30%, 30%, 40%)	1,763,000	1,813,000	3,375,000
Other four proposals	1,267,000	-	-

How perilously close the Labour Left came to
defeat on this issue of the formula can be seen by the
fact that the USDAW and NEC resolutions tied in the first
ballot. Just one constituency party with one thousand
votes cast for the NEC amendment would have released the
USDAW vote of 429,000 to be switched to resolution 103 in
the second ballot and have given the PLP 50% of the vote
in the electoral college. The final victory of the USDAW
proposal represented a shrewd tactical victory for the
RFMC in that it recognised that without the USDAW vote
there was no majority for an electoral college in which
the PLP was not the dominant sector and therefore it was
willing to abandon its own constitutional amendment.(44)

A remarkable factor in the Labour Left's victory
was the behaviour of the AUEW delegation led by Terry
Duffy. The AUEW had a mandate to support any proposal that

gave the PLP a majority in the electoral college and thus after the defeat of its own proposal to give the PLP 75% of the votes it then abstained. If the 928,000 votes of the AUEW had been cast in favour of resolution 103 in the second ballot then the proposal that the PLP should have 50% of the college votes would have won an absolute majority.

An immediate consequence of this Party reform was to provide the grounds for the defection of some leading right wing personnel from the Party and the subsequent formation of the Social Democratic Party. Discussion had been taking place prior to the Wembley conference between some members of Labour's Right dissatisfied at the trends within the Party. The Wembley conference decision was not the cause of the defection but the most opportune moment for those planning to break with the Party to make their exits.(46)

As a consequence of this decision to alter the procedures for choosing the Party leadership it was now open for any CLP, affiliated organisation or member of the PLP to nominate someone for the posts of Party Leader or Deputy Leader so long as the person concerned gave consent and was able to muster the support of 5% of his/her fellow parliamentarians. Many senior Party figures felt, however, that after the Wembley conference a period of unity behind the incumbent Party leadership of Michael Foot and Denis Healey, combining both Left and Right within the Party, would be beneficial in winning electoral support. Thus an informal agreement was reached amongst TULV members

immediately after the Wembley conference that no contest would take place in 1981.(47) Informal discussions amongst some members of the Tribune Group also revealed a similar viewpoint and an appeal for Party unity was therefore being drafted.(48) It was to forestall this appeal that Tony Benn, recently recruited to the Tribune Group, announced his candidature for the Deputy Leadership of the Party on April 2nd in a rather hurried manner during an all-night sitting of the House of Commons. His announcement and the subsequent contest for the Deputy Leadership led to considerable divisions within both the Party and the Labour Left. The major boost that Tony Benn gave to the fortunes of the Labour Left in the 1970s, culminating in his campaign to become the Party's Deputy Leader in 1981, is the subject of the following chapter, but before considering his influential role we will draw some general conclusions concerning this campaign to make the parliamentarian more accountable to the party activist which commenced in 1973, gathered momentum in 1978 and 1979, and peaked in January 1981. We will also consider some of the consequences of the campaign for the Party.

Accounting for the Left's victories in the Party democracy debate

The Right based their hopes on defeating the demands for greater accountability on the Commission of Enquiry first by its delaying the immediate demands for reform (especially on automatic reselection) and then by

producing a wide-ranging and authoritative report which would recognise the need for changes but not the ones being demanded by the Left. But the Right was disappointed in these hopes. After ten meetings and a final weekend drafting session the Commission produced a fifty one page report with one hundred and twenty separate recommendations covering Party finance, organisation, membership and political education, but on constitutional questions the Commission reported that

> ...having carefully considered all the evidence
> on the constitutional issues and having
> discussed the issue at length, in the absence of
> a consensus make no recommendations.(49)

The Right's hopes that the Commission would halt and reverse the progress of constitutional reform which endangered the existing powers of the PLP had been dashed. In fact the Commission stimulated the demands for constitutional reform by publishing the breakdown of Party evidence to the Commission which revealed very strong support for constitutional reform. On the three major constitutional issues on which the Left was campaigning the extent of its support was clearly demonstrated.

Support for mandatory reselection of MPs was widespread within the Party and was not restricted to the Left only. The Commission received 228 comments from affiliated organisations on this issue and only 1 advocated a return to the procedures which operated between 1970 and 1978, whilst 22 organisations supported optional reselection and 205 supported some form of

mandatory reselection. It was this extensive support which helped secure the reform and then maintain the change in the face of parliamentary opposition.

Form of reselection	CLPs	TUs	Others	Totals
Maintaining the old rules	1	-	-	1
Optional	7	4	2	13
Optional: choice by all Party members	7	2	-	9
Optional: choice by GMC	-	-	-	-
Mandatory	85	6	7	98
Mandatory: choice by all Party members	53	-	-	53
Mandatory: choice by GMC	52	1	1	54
				228

Source: Labour Weekly, June 20, 1980.

On the election of the Party Leader there were 189 comments from affiliated organisations of which only 19 wished to maintain the status quo whilst 80 wanted an electoral college and 53 preferred the Party conference to have the power.

Form of Leadership election	CLPs	TUs	Others	Totals
PLP	13	5	1	19
Party Conference	52	-	1	53
All Party members	19	-	-	19
Electoral College	72	4	4	80
Wider franchise	14	-	-	14
National Council of Labour	-	1	-	1
Short listing by NEC then PLP ballot	1	-	-	1
Opposition electoral college/ Government PLP	1	-	-	1
Jointly by NEC and PLP	1	-	-	1
				189

Source: Labour Weekly, June 20, 1980

An additional stimulus to change which the Commission contributed on this issue was the support given by the Party Leader and Deputy Leader (Callaghan and Foot) to a vote amongst its members supporting the principle of expanding the leadership electorate to a constituency wider than just the PLP. Callaghan and Foot had ensured that the Commission became not the saviour of the Right but the Trojan Horse by conceding on this principle and thus undermining the Right's commitment to election by the parliamentarians.

Evidence given to the Commission of Enquiry also revealed a majority favouring the NEC possessing sole responsibility for the Party's election manifesto but the strength of opinion was not so great. This helps to explain why the one defeat for the Labour Left on an issue of major constitutional importance concerned the writing of the Party's manifesto. Fewer organisations submitted on this issue although almost two-thirds of those doing so believed that the NEC should be the responsible body.

Formal responsibility	CLPs	TUs	Others	Totals
NEC solely	42	-	1	43
NEC plus Annual Conference decisions	22	-	-	22
NEC after consultation with PLP	13	-	-	13
NEC after wider consultation	42	4	3	49
Joint NEC/PLP	25	1	-	26
No change	4	4	2	10
Other recommendations	1	1	-	2
				155

Source: Labour Weekly, June 20, 1980.

What this evidence reveals is the widely held belief amongst Party activists that the balance of power between parliamentarians and Party activists needed alteration in order to ensure that Labour in Office did not again pay so little attention to the opinions of the individual membership. It is possible in hindsight to believe that too great an emphasis was placed on this as the panacea for Labour's past failures and too little emphasis on weaknesses in the Party's policies and strategies, but at the time Party reform was the priority and was given widespread support. Without this the reforms would not have been achieved. This is stressed because one extended account(50) of the Labour Left's campaigns to change the structure of the Party has been published which, although a very detailed and accurate description of the campaigning, particularly that part led by CLPD, is an unbalanced account because the authors concentrate all their attentions upon the organised groups and their leaders and ignore the Party membership. The authors make the point that "without the active support of many Labour Party members who perceived the (Party) leadership as oligarchic and distant"(51) changes in the Party would not have occurred, but they make no attempt to explain this groundswell of support for a more radical Party. They do not examine developments within either the CLPs or the trade union branches. Neither do they examine the reasons for the collapse of the Right's political dominance but instead concentrate upon its tactical inferiority and lack

of organisational unity.(52) Nor do they consider the evidence from CLPs and Trade Unions to the Commission of Enquiry which reveals extensive support for the Labour Left's demands. Instead they concentrate upon "the small groups of manipulators..."(53) and upon "comparatively small numbers of barely known, mostly young, party activists..."(54) who used "exceedingly skilled and astute strategies..."(55) to secure their goals. The authors conclude that the changes were achieved by "small groups working for structural change within the Labour Party..."(56) which is only part of the story. The authors are correct to regard the contribution of CLPD as vital - articulating specific demands, mobilising constituency support, and pressuring the NEC in particular - but without the wide base of support which existed throughout the Party - on the Left and Right and within the constituency and trade union membership - the reforms would not have been introduced.

The Reselection of Labour MPs

Many Labour MPs who go to Parliament with the best of intentions end up being seduced by the job prospects or by the club facilities afforded by the Palace of Westminster. Many come to believe that the Parliamentary Labour Party is an independent institution with a life of its own, with a right to make its own policy decisions and generally to behave as it pleases. To some MPs the Labour Party, to which they owe everything, becomes an inconvenient pressure group - except at election times when grudging lip-service has to be paid to the Labour manifesto.

Reselection must be used to make clear to Labour MPs that this elevated view of their role in

life has had its day. Labour MPs have no rights
more or less than the ordinary card carrying
Party members. They are simply the Party members
to whom has fallen the honour of giving
practical expression to the ideals of the Labour
movement.

(Chris Mullin & Charlotte Atkins How To Select
or Reselect your MP, p.11)

It will create the biggest night of the long
knives and the biggest purges that you have ever
seen for many a long time.

(Joe Ashton, speaking at the 1978 Labour Party
conference. LPACR, 1978, p.278)

In March 1981 Oldham West Labour Party made
history by becoming the first constituency to complete the
process of reselecting its incumbent MP. By the time the
process was completed in 1983 208 CLPs had operated the
procedures and 8 MPs had failed to be reselected. They
were: John Sever (Birmingham, Ladywood), Eric Ogden
(Liverpool, West Derby), Ray Fletcher (Ilkeston), Ben Ford
(Bradford North), Stanley Cohen (Leeds South East), Frank
Hooley (Sheffield Heeley), Fred Mulley (Sheffield Park)
and Arthur Lewis (Newham North West). With the exception
of John Sever they had all been MPs for a long period of
time. The basic characteristics of the deselected MPs were
as follows:

Age		Years of Service as MP		Sponsorship	
31-40	1	1-10	1	Trade Union	6
41-50	0	11-20	5		
51-60	5	21-30	0	CLP	2
61-70	2	31-40	2		
	8		8		8

Apart from Frank Hooley all would appear to be on the Right of the Party by the time they were rejected. Fred Mulley, as a member of the NEC for twenty years and as a Minister in the Labour Governments of the 1960s and 1970s was the most senior figure associated with the Right of the Party not to be reselected. Ray Fletcher had been associated with the Left of the Party when first elected to the House of Commons and had been a member of the Tribune Group, but was no longer in this organisation by 1974. Four of the backbench MPs were not involved in any of the major rebellions against Labour Government policies between 1974 and 1979.(57) Only Frank Hooley was a consistent rebel. Almost 50% of his rebellions were in opposition to the Government's commitment to the European Economic Community, but he also expressed opposition to Government policies which threatened civil liberties, eroded the value of social security benefits, increased defence expenditure, and developed the nuclear power industry. The only area of Government policy in which he did not join the Labour Left rebels in the 1974-1979 Parliament was economic affairs. Frank Hooley is revealed as a traditional backbench individualist by his being the only Labour MP to cross vote with the Conservative Party on the issue of the Rate Support Grant in December 1978 because he felt that the Government had not given the House of Commons adequate time to discuss the issue.(58)

BACKBENCH REBELLIONS 1974-1979

Frank Hooley	51	
Arthur Lewis	24	(including 6 votes expressing an anti-devolution sentiment, and 4 votes expressing an anti-ECC sentiment)
Eric Ogden	19	(including 12 votes expressing anti-devolution sentiment)
Stan Cohen	8	(including 3 votes expressing anti-devolution sentiment)
Ben Ford	6	(including 2 votes expressing anti-devolution sentiment)
Ray Fletcher	6	(including 2 votes expressing anti-ECC sentiment)

The most significant factor about the deselected MPs was the difference of opinion between the MP and the local CLP in the vote for the Party's Deputy Leader in 1981. (See Chapter seven) All but one of the CLPs, but only one of the MPs, voted for Benn in both ballots.

Deputy Leadership Election 1981(59)

	MPs	CLPs
Benn 1st ballot	1	7
Benn 2nd ballot	1	7
Silkin 1st ballot	1	0
Healey 1st ballot	4	1
Healey 2nd ballot	4	1
Abstention 2nd ballot	1	0
Abstention 2nd ballot	2	0
Did not vote in either ballot	1	0

Nevertheless whilst 78% and 81% of CLP votes were cast for Tony Benn only 22% and 29% of PLP votes were cast similarly in the first and second ballots respectively. Almost half of Labour MPs(47%) cast a vote contrary to their CLPs but only 2% of these were not reselected. An attempt on the part of some Labour Left activists to make the MP's preference in this Deputy leadership ballot a critical factor in the reselection deliberations had little impact.(60)

Parliamentary boundary changes and defeats at the General Election resulted in only five of the persons chosen in the place of the deselected MPs being elected to the House of Commons in June 1983.(61) All five became members of one of the two left organisations in the House of Commons.(62)

On the first occasion when reselection procedures were introduced few Labour MPs failed to be reselected. The numbers, however, are lower than they might have been for two reasons. First the defection of twenty six Labour MPs to the SDP saved some from deselection. It is mere speculation to estimate the numbers but indications from the CLPs would suggest that amongst the defectors Neville Sandelson (Hayes), Michael O'Halloran (Islington North), David Ginsburg (Dewsbury) and Tom McNally (Stockport South) would have had considerable difficulties in being reselected,(63) but it should also be noted that three MPs, Dickson Mabon (Greenock), Bruce Douglas-Mann (Mitcham) and George Cunningham (Islington South) who eventually defected to the SDP had previously been reselected by their CLPs. Loyalty and support towards the incumbent MP remained strong in these cases. Second, the imminence of parliamentary boundary changes at the time of reselection conferences led some Party activists to believe that these were mere 'trial run-throughs' with the real reselection contests coming when the new constituencies had been established. For example, in the Barnsley constituency the MP, Roy Mason, had poor relations with the Yorkshire area of the National Union of Mineworkers. Increased NUM activity in Barnsley CLP appeared likely to culminate in a mineworkers' nominee challenging Roy Mason at the reselection conference, but no NUM challenge emerged because Barnsley constituency was scheduled for change under the Boundary Commissioners' proposals and the trade

union preferred to bide its time until the selection
conference for the new Barnsley constituency. The NUM in
Barnsley, along with other Party activists who had
calculated along similar lines, were thwarted however
because the Boundary Commission proposals were not
submitted to Parliament until March 1983.(64) By then the
possibility of a General Election necessitated a speedy
process of selection in the new constituencies. The NEC,
on the grounds of speed and efficiency, ruled that, with
very few exceptions, only the candidates previously
selected for the old constituencies could be considered
for the newly-created constituencies.(65) This made it
impossible for local parties to make new nominations at
this stage. So mineworkers in Barnsley with a mind to
challenge Roy Mason and Party activists elsewhere with a
similar intention now found the NEC rules forbidding
consideration of new nominees. The NEC, well aware of the
damaging electoral consequences of deselections so close
to an election, had stifled any further challenges to
sitting Labour MPs. Even where such challenges were
possible within these new rules the need not to 'rock the
boat' in this pre-election period protected the MP's
position.

In the speech in which he predicted "the biggest
night of the long knives and the biggest purges..." Joe
Ashton also predicted Labour's votes being split in 25
constituencies as a consequence of deselected Labour MPs
fighting as independent candidates. In only one instance
did a deselected MP contest the constituency in which he

had been the elected representative as an Independent Labour candidate and cause Labour to lose the seat,(66) but Labour lost an additional fifteen constituencies which it might have been expected to win but for the Party split and the formation of the SDP. In four constituencies previous Labour incumbents were elected as SDP MPs - John Cartwright (Woolwich), Robert MacLennan (Caithness and Sutherland), David Owen (Plymouth Devenport) and Ian Wrigglesworth (Stockton South) - and in eleven constituencies a Conservative was elected where the percentage vote obtained by the SDP candidate, previously a Labour MP, was greater than the percentage Conservative majority.(67)

The full political impact of this reduction in the Labour MP's security of tenure will become apparent only over a period of time - at a minimum over two sessions of Parliament during which time the CLP will have two chances in approximately five years to consider the MP's performance. At the time of writing one hundred and eighty two reselection contests have occurred since the 1983 General Election and the total number of deselections is four which suggests only a marginal impact for this reform in terms of changing the faces of the members of the PLP. But this is to judge the reform in a limited manner. The influence of reselection is likely to be more subtle than is suggested in Joe Ashton's scenario. It is likely that Labour MPs will make more efforts to take note of CLPs' opinions and attitudes and modify their behaviour accordingly. It is almost impossible to measure this

impact in any general manner.

One example of such impact may have been the choice of Michael Foot as Party Leader in November 1980.(68) One purpose of James Callaghan's resignation as Party Leader may have been to secure the election of Denis Healey as his successor prior to the introduction of any new electoral college to choose the Party leadership. Many on the Left regarded Callaghan's's move in this light and as a consequence considerable pressure was mounted by the Left to ensure the election of Michael Foot. CLPD encouraged Party activists to discuss the vote with their Labour MP. The Labour Co-ordinating Committee encouraged local Parties to call special meetings at which, after discussion, Labour MPs would complete their ballot forms in public.(69) Many constituency Parties did put pressure on their Labour MP to vote for Foot.(70)

The election rules prevailing at that time stipulated a secret ballot and therefore there is no way of ascertaining MPs' voting behaviour. But some MPs, aware of the imminence of reselection procedures, were influenced by the opinions expressed by their CLPs. Michael Foot's victory can be explained in various ways - respect for this senior figure in the previous Callaghan Administration, desire for Party unity, or strong antipathy towards Denis Healey - but the imminence of reselection should not be underestimated in explaining Michael Foot's high vote in the PLP. Foot's victory was of considerable significance first in demonstrating the leftwards shift in the Labour Party; second in

contributing further to that shift by providing grounds for the defection of some right wing Labour MPs to the SDP(71); and, third, saddling the Party with a Leader who lacked the necessary communicative skills to appeal to a wider body of voters than the Party activists.(72)

FOOTNOTES

1. CLPD Letter to individual supporters, October 1979.

2. Minutes of TULV, September 10, 1979.

3. The members were Moss Evans (TGWU), John Boyd, (AUEW), David Basnett (GMWU), Alan Fisher (NUPE), Alf Allen (USDAW), Joe Gormley (NUM), Sid Weighell (NUR), Clive Jenkins (ASTMS), Bill Keys (SOGAT) and Ray Buckton (ASLEF).

4. "It was agreed that we should re-emphasise that the TULV is not and cannot be a body for agreeing on policy issues nor indeed on the major constitutional issues facing the Party. It existed to help the Party as it had done in Walworth Road and in the Election and would not do in the Inquiry." Minutes of TULV, September 10, 1979.

5. LPACR, 1979, p.476 (my emphasis).

6. The five trade union representatives were Moss Evans, Terry Duffy, David Basnett, Clive Jenkins and Bill Keys; the six NEC representatives were Frank Allaun, Norman Atkinson, Tony Benn, Eric Heffer, Joan Lestor and Jo Richardson, all of them from the Party's Left. Jim Callaghan and Michael Foot were members as Party Leader and Deputy Leader respectively.

7. See Chapter eight.

8. See Chapter eight.

9. See Chapter eight.

10. The Institute for Workers Control was formed in 1968 "to act as a research and educational body, to co-ordinate discussion and communication between workers' control groups and trade unions, to provide lists of speakers and to publish important materials on the subject of industrial democracy and workers control". Membership has not been restricted solely to Labour Party members and IWC has recruited support from a broad Left spectrum. In the 1970s IWC's concern with worker democracy and Party democracy resulted in its close alliance with Tony Benn.

11. The National Organisation of Labour Students was established in 1971 and is affiliated to the Labour Party. During the 1980s it has become an important base for countering Militant Group support amongst Labour youth.

12. The Clause Four Group was formed in the late-1970s by Labour youth to combat both Trotskyist and orthodox parliamentary Left within the Labour Party. It is committed to a 'third road to socialism' which combines parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle.

13. See Chapter eight.

14. The Labour Party Young Socialists was formed in 1965 after the Party disbanded the previous youth organisation due to Trotskyist infiltration. The LPYS is a section of the Party and has rights of representation at the local, regional and national level, as well as a Party newspaper and officers within the Party bureaucracy. Since the early-1970s the majority of the members of the LPYS National Committee have been supporters of the Militant Group.

15. Labour Action for Peace was established in 1970; previously it had been the Labour Peace Fellowship.

16. The Socialist Educational Association is a socialist society affiliated to the Party.

17. The five original demands were
    1. Defence of mandatory reselection
    2. Defence of the present structure of the NEC
    3. Ultimate control of the Manifesto by the NEC
    4. Election of the Leader and Deputy Leader of
       the Party by the Party as a whole
    5. Accountability of an open and democratic
       decision-making within the PLP

18. Independent Labour Publications disagreed with the other members of RFMC over the proposed electoral college to choose the Party Leader. It believed that the PLP should have 50% of the total vote in the electoral college but the RFMC was campaigning for 33%.

19. The 1977 Party conference approved a resolution to secure the total abolition of the House of Lords by 6,248,000 to 91,000 votes. LPACR, 1977, pp.270-275.

20. G. Bish 'Drafting the Manifesto' in K. Coates (ed) What Went Wrong? pp.187-206.

21. ibid., p.197.

22. Membership of the NEC sub-committee is given by G. Bish loc.cit.

23. G. Bish ibid., p.200 & p.201.

24. The Labour Party Manifesto, 1979, p.27.

25. Labour Party Agenda for the 78th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1979, pp.48-51.

26. ibid., p.7.

27. LPACR, 1979, p.275.

28. ibid., p.282.

29. <u>LPACR</u>, 1980, p.148.

30. <u>LPACR</u>, 1981, p.210 & p.212.

31. <u>LPACR</u>, 1976, p.212.

32. <u>LPACR</u>, 1978, pp. 266-271 & 281.

33. Labour Party <u>Agenda for the 78th Annual Conference of the Labour Party</u>, 1979, pp.19-23.

34. <u>LPACR</u>, 1979, p.262 & 271.

35. Labour Party <u>Agenda for the 79th Annual Conference of the Labour Party</u>, 1980, pp.20-24.

36. <u>LPACR</u>, 1980, p.152.

37. <u>ibid</u>., p.155.

38. <u>ibid</u>., p.191.

39. <u>ibid</u>., p.191-194 & p.196.

40. The Tribune Group, in its evidence to the Commission of Enquiry, proposed that the college be comprised of three equal parts. A majority of the NEC also supported this 1/3 division, but the TGWU, NUPE and 43 RMFC-sponsored resolutions all supported the 30, 30, 40% formula. The ILP believed that the PLP should have 50% of the total votes.

41. CLPD <u>Letter to individual supporters</u>, January 13, 1981.

42. CLPD <u>Letter to individual supporters</u>, January 15, 1981.

43. Approved with 6,283,000 votes in favour and only 882,000 votes in favour of four alternative proposals. See <u>Report of the Special Rules Revision Conference 1981</u>, NEC Report 1981, p.135.

44. This was not the case with the NEC spokesman, Eric Heffer, who was unwilling to acknowledge the strength of the RFMC's organisation or tactical knowledge either before or during the conference. This is based on the author's own observations at the compositing meeting and then during the conference deliberations.

45. For the secret negotiations between David Owen, Bill Rodgers, Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins see <u>Labour Weekly</u>, March 27, 1981.

46. Labour's electoral support was recorded as 46.5% (January 1981), 35.5% (February) and 34.0% (March). Source: <u>Gallup Political Index</u>.

47. Author's interviews.

48. Author's interviews.

49. <u>Report of the Labour Party Commission of Enquiry 1980,</u> p.39. This statement was added as an insert after the Report had been printed.

50. D. and M. Kogan <u>The Battle for the Labour Party</u>.

51. p.17.

52. p.72 & p.102.

53. p.15. In the second, revised edition the word "manipulators" has been deleted: see p.17.

54. p.13.

55. p.17.

56. p.196.

57. This analysis is based on the data in Philip Norton <u>Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979</u>. Fred Mulley is not included because he was a Minister between 1974 and 1979. Neither is John Sever because he was only elected to the House of Commons in August 1977.

58. P. Norton <u>op.cit</u>., p.394.

59. <u>LPACR</u>, 1981, pp.327-355.

60. <u>London Labour Briefing</u>, 15, November 1981.

61. Albert Bore, chosen in John Sever's place at Birmingham Ladywood was not reselected for one of the new Birmingham seats created by the new Boundary Commission report. Pat Wall failed to win Bradford North and David Bookbinder failed to win Amber Valley.

62. Tony Banks (Newham North West) Campaign Group; Richard Caborn (Sheffield Central) Tribune Group; Derek Fatchett (Leeds Central) Campaign Group; Bill Michie (Sheffield Heeley) Tribune Group; Bob Wareing (Liverpool West Derby) Campaign and Tribune Groups.

63. B. Criddle suggests that nine defectors to the SDP had poor chances of being reselected. In addition to the four MPs referred to he mentions John Ellis (Wrexham), Edward Lyons (Bradford West), Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool Toxteth), James Dunn (Liverpool Kirkdale), and Bryan Magee (Waltham Forest, Leyton). B.J. Criddle <u>Candidate Selection 1980-1983</u> (Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, 1983) p.10.

64. The reason why the Boundary Commissioners' proposals were not submitted to Parliament until March 1983 was that

the Labour Party challenged them in the law courts.
Neither the NEC nor the PLP formally sanctioned this
challenge which was made in the names of Michael Foot,
Michael Cocks, David Hughes and Jim Mortimer. The source
of financial support for this costly and ·unsuccessful
challenge was never made public. It could have undermined
Labour's legal challenge if local Labour Parties had
selected candidates for the proposed new constitutencies
and therefore the NEC was instructed that no preparations
should take place to form new Parties and make candidate
selections, in contrast to the readiness of both the
Conservative Party and the SDP/Liberal Alliance.

65. In February 1983 the NEC ruled that full, open
selection procedures would only take place in those CLPs
in which the old CLPs constituted less than one-half of
the electorate of the new constituency. See Report of the
National Executive Committee 1983, p.5.

66. Ben Ford stood as an Independent Labour candidate in
Bradford North and secured 8.6% of the vote. A
Conservative was elected with a 3.4% majority over his
Labour challenger, Pat Wall.

67. In seven constituencies Labour was in second place to
the Conservatives with the Alliance candidate (a defector
from the PLP) winning a larger % of the vote than the %
Conservative majority. The seven were

Constituency	Alliance candidate	Alliance vote (%)	Conservative majority (%)
Leicester East	Tom Bradley	21.1	1.9
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	John Horam	22.3	5.0
Hayes & Harlington	Neville Sanderson	29.0	10.4
Dewsbury	David Ginsburg	25.3	4.0
Stockport	Tom McNally	27.6	13.2
Cardiff West	Jeffrey Thomas	25.5	4.4
Mitcham & Mordern	Bruce Douglas-Mann	27.4	13.9

In another 4 constituencies the Conservative % majority was smaller than
the Alliance % vote but in these the SDP candidate (again a defector
from the PLP) forced himself into second position. These 4 constituencies
were:

Clwyd South West	Tom Ellis	30.2	3.6
Erith & Crayford	James Wellbeloved	34.9	2.2
Renfrew West & Inverclyde	Dickson Mabon	29.5	3.2
Southampton Itchen	Bob Mitchell	31.5	10.0

68. The results of the PLP ballots for Party Leader in November 1980 were

	1st ballot	2nd ballot
Healey	112	129
Foot	83	139
Silkin	38	-
Shore	32	-

69. This LCC letter caused considerable anger on the Party Right which argued that this was unconstitutional pressure on an MP.

70. For example, both Barnsley and Dearne Valley CLPs passed resolutions in support of Foot as a means of influencing their respective MPs. But because the PLP ballot was secret there is no way of ascertaining how MPs voted.

71. Bill Rodgers has stated that Foot's election was a major factor in the timing of the breakaway. "If Denis Healey had been elected leader rather than Michael Foot I have no doubt that any break on our part would have been postponed. We would have to say give him a chance..." The Writing on the Wall, Channel 4, Programme 7.

72. "... only 29 per cent (of respondents in the British Election Survey) thought that he (i.e. Foot) would be effective compared with 90 per cent for Mrs. Thatcher, 78 per cent for Mr. Steel and 48 per cent for Mr. Jenkins." A Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice How Britain Votes, p.163.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TONY BENN

        The Labour Left initially developed in the 1970s
as a collective force closely identified with no single
personality. No one person dominated the Tribune Group.
Amongst trade unionists Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon were
key left-wing figures as a consequence of the size of the
votes cast by the TGWU and AUEW at Labour Party
conferences but traditional lines of demarcation in the
labour movement between industrial and political matters
placed limits on the extent of their influence within the
Party. Within the constituency parties CLPD stressed the
collective nature of its organisation and placed little
stress upon a personal style of leadership.

        Increasingly however Tony Benn emerged in the
latter part of the 1970s as a leading figure on the left
of the Party and by 1981, at the time of the election for
the Party's deputy leadership, he had become the
figurehead of the Labour Left. By then Benn personified
the Labour Left in the same way as Bevan in the 1950s.
Just as the term 'Bevanite' had been used to describe a
member of the Labour Left so the terms 'Bennite' and
'Bennism' were used to describe Labour Left personnel and
ideas. Such political shorthand has its dangers because
ideas and people are then directly associated with a
single person in a way that can be inaccurate or can fail

to distinguish shades of opinion, but, nevertheless, Benn's six month campaign to become the Party's Deputy Leader welded together left parliamentarians and rank and file Party members into a cohesive force that justifies the use of such terms albeit with caution. Benn's experience, political seniority and communicative skills enabled him to act as the Left's figurehead and inspiration. One contemporary historian has described him as a "powerful symbol" providing "charisma and credibility for grass-roots pressure on behalf of greater socialism".(1) No other figure on the Labour Left at this time played such an inspirational role.

Benn had first been elected to the House of Commons in 1950 replacing Stafford Cripps as the MP for Bristol South East. He represented this constituency for thirty years.(2) Eight months after his defeat in the 1983 General Election he was re-elected to the House of Commons as MP for Chesterfield. He was first elected to the NEC in 1959 but resigned after twelve months; he was re-elected in 1962 and has been a member ever since.(3) In 1964 he was appointed Postmaster General in the Labour Administration and then, in 1966 he was promoted to Minister of Technology with a place in the Labour Cabinet. By 1970 he was a senior figure in the Party; not yet in the top echelons alongside Harold Wilson, Roy Jenkins, Denis Healey, Jim Callaghan and Barbara Castle, but part of a new, rising generation of leading parliamentarians including Tony Crosland, Roy Hattersley and Shirley Williams. His influence continued to increase in the

1970s, first as Party Chairman in 1971/72, then as Chairman of the Home Policy committee of the NEC from 1974 onwards, and then as the Minister responsible for the implementation of Labour's industrial policy in the new Labour Cabinet formed in February 1974.

Benn was not the source of Labour Left ideas and neither did he provide the organisational drive to Labour Left campaigns as, for example, did Stafford Cripps in the 1930s.(4) Furthermore, there were other people on the Labour Left with a greater understanding and grounding in socialist theory and ideas than Benn(5), and there were very many people with a longer personal involvement in Left organisations and commitment to Left issues. Benn had not been a member of the Bevanites, believing that such a grouping "...isolated itself from the mainstream of the party..."(6), had not been a unilateralist in the 1950s, believing that "...British renunciation of nuclear weapons would not of itself contribute to the solution of the problem"(7), did not join the Tribune Group until February 1981, and was a late supporter of the most successful of contemporary Labour Left organisations, the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy.(8)

Benn's ability to develop a principled alternative to Harold Wilson's apparently cynical and manipulative politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s appealed to the demands and mood of very many Party activists. Furthermore, his political experience and seniority enabled him to command political attention. Whereas it is commonly assumed that age and experience

temper radical commitment here was a long-serving MP with nine years experience as a Cabinet Minister admitting that his administrative experiences compelled him towards a more radical, socialist position. "I've learned by experience", he claimed, and continued: "When I was Minister of Technology (1966-1970) it really made me into a socialist, in middle age."(9) Such a claim is rare, if not unknown within the PLP and had a considerable impact within the Party.

Benn's inspirational role amongst Party members is reflected in his annual election as a CLP representative on the NEC since 1962 and the regularity with which he has topped the poll in this section from the mid-1970s onwards, in the very high vote he secured amongst CLP delegates in the 1981 deputy leadership election, and in the extent of personal support he received from all over the country during his by-election campaign in January 1984.(10)

Table 1

Benn's membership of the NEC

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Ballot position in CLP section	3	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	3
Benn's vote as a % of possible CLP vote	77	80	63	58	53	59	72	63	59	56	52

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Ballot position in CLP section	1	1.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
Benn's vote as a % of possible CLP vote	72	83.	78	78	72	74	68	84	81	88	91	82

Source: Labour Party Conference Reports 1962-1985

Table 2

Result of the election for Labour Party Deputy Leader, October 1981
(second ballot)

	Healey	Benn	Total(%)
Trade Unions	62.5	37.5	100
CLPs	19.0	81.0	100
Labour MPs	66.0	34.0	100

Source: calculated from LPACR, 1981, p.26

However, Benn's position as Labour Left figurehead was not universally accepted by others in this faction. Some doubted his left wing credentials. His past refusal to join left organisations and identify with major left causes and his identification with Harold Wilson's pragmatic and technocratic approach to socialism caused a great deal of wariness amongst the longer serving members of the Labour Left.

Benn's social origins also attracted hostility. This son of a Labour Peer, brought up in a "conventional middle class"(11) family, and educated at a private school and Oxford was distrusted by some, particularly at the time that an apparent change of persona, from The Rt. Hon. Anthony Wedgewood Benn to Tony Benn, was taking place.(12) Finally there were those who were wary of a cult of

personality developing on the Labour Left. As Benn became a serious contender for Party leadership he attracted around him those whose own political careers would benefit from his success. By 1981 a close group of Benn's associates were meeting to discuss campaigning strategy.(13) The emergence of this personal 'kitchen cabinet' brought with it the dangers of the clique, namely a dependence upon the whims of the dominant individual and the lack of any accountability to a wider body of people. The Bevanites had displayed such characteristics.(14)

A clique always generates opposition from those feeling that they have been excluded from the 'inner sanctum'. But another reason why some were critical of Benn's increasing dominance of the Labour Left was the lesson of the past. The history of the Labour Left is littered with 'lost leaders': men such as MacDonald, Cripps, Bevan and Wilson who had appeared to abandon their left commitments on obtaining responsibilities and Office in the Labour Party. There were some who feared that Benn would follow a similar course.

The practical politician

Benn's slow emergence as the leading figure on the Labour Left commenced in the late 1960s as a result of his experiences as Minister of Technology. He has recorded that

> It was during this period (i.e. the late-1960s)
> that my socialism was emerging from experience.

> It wasn't clearly formulated, did not have the
> class basis it later acquired, did not have the
> theoretical superstructure or historical sense
> that were needed to make it effective. I was
> locked into a heavy programme of daily business
> that made it very hard to do more than air my
> developing ideas to myself and to others. It was
> after the 1970 defeat that the outcome of that
> inner conflict began to take shape for me, in a
> clearer socialist perspective.(15)

Important landmarks in developing this socialist perspective were the publication in 1970 of his Fabian pamphlet The New Politics: a socialist reconnaissance, the establishment of personal links with the Institute for Workers Control, and his chairmanship of the Labour Party between October 1971 and October 1972.

In the Fabian pamphlet Benn states that governing has become increasingly complex, that a better informed and educated new citizenry has emerged to make more demands on governments, and that socialists need to redistribute power to this new citizenry by introducing a range of institutional reforms and by encouraging worker control. He argues that the Labour Party should work more directly with the newly-formed pressure groups and community action groups. Many of Benn's positions and arguments in this pamphlet run counter to the arguments he developed by the end of the decade(16) but this publication marks an important stage in his political development as he associates himself so closely with a socialist form of populism, with the belief that the Labour Party has to move away from its traditional parliamentarianism, and with the need for close links between socialism and democracy.

Benn's commitment to worker democracy brought him into close contact with the Institute for Workers Control - a broad left organisation spanning the trade unions and the Labour Party. The first worker control conference, from which the IWC eventually emerged, had been held in 1964 with less than one hundred participants. By 1970 the IWC conference in Birmingham attracted one thousand three hundred participants. The links between the two were mutually beneficial: the IWC benefitted from the support of such a senior Labour Party spokesman and Benn was provided with the valuable platform of this broad-based organisation. The IWC was one of the few organisations on the Left which directed its activities towards both Labour Party and trade union activists. Until the 1980s the IWC was the only organisation through which members of the parliamentary Labour Left could make regular contact with trade unionists.

Another significant marker in Benn's emergence as Labour Left figurehead was his Chairmanship of the Labour Party and, in particular, of the 1972 Party conference. Benn was concerned to ensure the power and importance of the extra-parliamentary Party in intra-party debate. "I tried", he wrote immediately after the 1972 Party conference

> to treat the delegates with the respect due to a
> body of men and women who bring together a wide
> experience of life, a high sense of personal
> responsibility, long service to the movement and
> deep convictions - rather than as an unruly mob
> who have to be kept in order by tough
> chairmanship.(17)

He adopted new conference procedures as Chairman in an attempt to shift the balance of power from the NEC to the conference delegates thus winning him the support of many conference delegates used to the moves of the Party leadership between 1966 and 1970 to diminish the authority of the Party conference.

Benn increasingly identified with the Labour Left in his practice. At the same time he began to emerge as a leading populariser of the Labour Left's socialism, first, in speeches and articles, and later, in his writings.(18)

The socialist theorist

Benn's socialism is rooted in a radical, christian morality, in English history and parliamentary democracy, and in populism.

"My brand of socialism", he states, "derives from Christian teachings".(19) It is the teachings of the radical, revolutionary Jesus which provides Benn with the moral basis of his political beliefs. His christian commitment is not as a member of any particular contemporary religious organisation. He is as critical of the religious establishment as of all other elite groups. He is part of a radical, dissenting, non-conformist tradition not church-based but drawing inspiration from the words and practice of Jesus.

Benn's inspiration is not only the New Testament but also an historical tradition of challenge to

established power. He makes constant use of history, referring to 'the common people' and, in particular, to the example of the Levellers, the Diggers, the Chartists and the Suffragettes as groups of people with courage, determination and foresight. He argues that this radical tradition is a central part of British history, that the wisdom and courage of these dissenters should be remembered, and that their example is an important means of boosting the self-confidence and belief of people today in the possibilities of change in what appears to be an increasingly hostile environment.

I have already referred in an earlier chapter to the important influence of Marxism upon the Labour Left. Benn is not himself a Marxist but he recognises the importance of Marx in analysing the nature of capitalism.

> The painstaking scholarship which he and Engels brought to bear on capitalism has left us with a formidable set of analytical tools without which socialists today would have a much poorer theoretical understanding of the tasks which they are undertaking.(29)

However, Benn argues that Marx failed to recognise that a radical social and political morality can exist independent of economic forces. "Inequality", for Benn "is not by any means confined to the class relations deriving from the ownership of capital, though that remains a central obstacle which must be overcome... (but also) there is a whole philosophy of inequality embedded in the moral values which underpin capitalism...(21)

Benn also objects to Marxist practice because so

often it underestimates the importance of accountability. Socialist transformation requires popular consent and continuing support. He argues that

> A socialist economic transformation may be achieved by force, but if so, it then cannot be sustained by agreement; and socialism may degenerate into the imposition of a regime administered by those whose attempts to maintain it can actually undermine it rather than develop it.(22)

Marxist practice undermines democracy

> ...socialism achieved by revolution lacks the explicit endorsement of the people, which is what democracy is about, and the Communist Parties which control such countries by limiting or denying basic rights of political expression, assembly, organisation and debate, and the right of people to remove their governments, are open to the abuses of civil rights which occurred under Stalin and continue today.(23)

A belief in the wisdom of 'the common people' is the basis of Benn's democratic socialism. "The people", he argues, "have too little power".(24) His overriding concern is with the redistribution of power. Unaccountable elites dominate business, industry, finance, media, military, church and parliament. There is the need for popular control by greater accountability, improved information and public ownership of powerful economic institutions. Power relationships have to be transformed and Benn argues that "one of the greatest failures of the British labour movement... is that throughout its history and even in periods of parliamentary power, it has done practically nothing whatsoever..." to change them.(25)

Benn believes that parliamentary democracy has been eroded and that there is a need "to reintroduce constitutional democracy in Britain".(26) Power resides with the people and they merely lend their power to parliamentary representatives for a period of time. At the end of that period power must be returned to the people fully intact.

The two essential characteristics of a parliamentary democracy are first that parliamentary representatives are elected and second that they are fully accountable to the people. Governments must be made to disclose more information, patronage in the state must be replaced by election, and collective rather than personal decision-making must be encouraged.

Benn has campaigned for the reform of British institutions whilst many others on the left regarded such matters as of marginal importance compared with substantive economic issues. He has argued for the abolition of the House of Lords, the extension of the House of Commons Select Committees, parliamentary confirmation of major public appointments, parliamentary control of the security services and armed forces, the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act, and the establishment of a Press Authority to ensure fairer reporting.

Benn regards the political party as an essential feature of parliamentary democracy because through this institution political accountability is exercised. He argues that "political power must come from the

electorate, through the party, up to MPs, Cabinets and the parliamentary leadership in a series of unbroken links".(27) The political party acts as the channel for popular opinion and for this reason it is important that democracy is fully operational within the party. Benn has argued for party reforms, including the election of the Party leadership, the reselection of Labour MPs, the annual election by the PLP of Labour Cabinet Ministers and the general strengthening of PLP powers over Labour Cabinets.

His experience as a Labour Minister between 1964 and 1970 generated his commitment to public ownership as a central feature of socialism. Benn argues that industrial and economic power needs to be made "fully accountable to the community, to workers, and the consumer".(28) It is impossible to direct "unaccountable power" and "unacceptable privileges".(29) He argues "... you cannot bully and bribe businessmen into pursuing policies to meet our regional unemployment needs, our investment needs and our national interests against the interests of their shareholders".(30) Public ownership is essential, not along the lines of the old Morrisonian corporations, but with workers in the industry, the consumers, and the local community involved in the decision-making. In an oft-quoted statement Benn argues that "...nationalisation plus Lord Robens does not add up to socialism".(31)

Benn avoids any specific commitments concerning the number of companies that need to be nationalised but argues the need to "redefine the mixed economy" in a way

in which "the major companies would have to be owned or accountable to the community" and as a consequence "the medium or small companies would then be seen as operating... in response to them".(32)

By 1981 Benn had become the leading figure on the Left, as an articulate and magnetic exponent of socialism in public meetings and an unflagging and dedicated spokesman of the labour movement. But his success in drawing the crowds and the publicity also attracted distrust and criticism from those who recalled his close association with Harold Wilson's version of 'technological socialism' in the 1960s, his continuous membership of Labour Cabinets between 1974 and 1979 when other critics of this Administration resigned, his past refusal to join the Bevanites and his belatedly late commitment to the Tribune Group, and his development of a personal coterie of supporters to whom he turned for advice and support. Not all of these critics were on the Right of the Party. These critics were joined by others when it became known that Benn was considering standing against Denis Healey as the Party's Deputy Leader. The critics felt that an election campaign would undermine Party unity at a time when forthright attacks on the Conservative Government and the newly-formed Social Democratic Party were necessary whilst others felt that his candidature was a tactical error because a defeat would undermine the steady advance of the Left within the Party since the 1970s.(33)

The Deputy Leadership campaign

The manner in which Benn announced his nomination in April 1981 was bizarre. A hurriedly-called press conference was held at 3.30 a.m. in the House of Commons during an all-night session of parliament. The reason for this form of announcement was that he had not consulted his new colleagues in the Tribune Group but kept counsel with his close 'confidants'. When news filtered through to Tribune Group members that he was considering accepting nomination a small group of them (led by Robin Cook) began to circulate an appeal asking him not to stand in the interests of Party unity.(34) Benn's hurried announcement was made in order to forestall the support that might build up for this memorandum.

Benn issued a five point manifesto with sixteen supporting signatories from the PLP.(35) In his statement he reaffirmed his commitment to the alternative economic strategy and, in particular, to the restoration of full employment by another Labour Government; to the expansion of public services; to the withdrawal of Britain from the EEC; to a non-nuclear defence strategy; and to a range of reforms which would extend democracy, including abolition of the House of Lords, and enactment of a Freedom of Information Bill.

Between April and October 1981 Benn mounted an extensive campaign within the Labour movement appealing to the activists especially within the trade unions. The Rank and File Mobilising Committee now became the Benn campaign

organisation with the single exception of CLPD. CLPD believed that as an organisation its commitment should be to structural reform rather than personality and therefore it withdrew formally but some of its leading members contributed a great deal of time and effort to the Benn campaign.(36) Benn had a campaign committee to plan the day-to-day strategy and the RFMC provided the organisational framework for meetings to be held, particularly at all the main trade union conferences with the object of sustaining a pressure from below on trade union leaders to support his candidacy in the electoral college. For the first time in its history the Labour Left, or part of it, concentrated its attentions on the industrial wing of the Labour movement. Never before had such a comprehensive and systematic attempt been made to appeal directly to active trade unionists. The point has been made previously that the Labour Left had very little contact with trade unionists, leaving such contacts either to union left caucuses where they existed or to general approaches though the IWC. Very often in the past it had been the Communist Party which had mobilised support for left politics within the trade union movement.

The primary thrust of Benn's campaigning activities was concentrated at first on the delegates to trade union conferences, meeting in the Spring and Summer. Fringe meetings were held at these conferences, most often with Benn himself as the main speaker, in order to win the support of the rank and file delegates. Attendances at these meetings were often high and Benn's presence at the

trade union conferences was often condemned by trade union leaders who disapproved of his left wing opinions and of his success in diverting delegates' attentions from the 'bread and butter' industrial issues. TUC leaders were especially annoyed by the media's concentration throughout the meeting of the annual Congress in September on the internal politics of the Labour Party rather than more immediate industrial issues.(37)

Whilst all parts of the Labour Party had conducted an extensive debate on the proportions to be allocated to the respective segments in the Party's new electoral college nothing similar occurred over the procedures to be adopted in ascertaining opinions in the event of a ballot. Because the trade unions commanded 40% of the total vote a great deal of attention was concentrated upon the manner in which they would arrive at their decisions. They did so often in an arbitrary, ill-considered and, in some cases, indefensible manner. The procedures adopted to consult their members and whom to support in the election varied from union to union. Some unions consulted their membership, either by individual ballots (e.g. The National Union of Public Employees and The National Union of Mineworkers), or by branch discussion and consultations (e.g. The Transport and General Workers' Union); some decided at their annual conferences (e.g. The Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs; The National Union of Railwaymen; The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen; The Association of Professional, Executive,

Clerical and Computer Staff); some left the decision to their executive bodies (e.g. The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers; The Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades Union), or union delegation to the Labour Party conference (e.g. The Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians). It was very rare that no consultation occurred whatsoever.

The NUM confirmed its leaders' support for Benn in a branch ballot but some other unions with a Left leadership were embarrassed by consultative procedures amongst their members that revealed Healey to be more popular. The General Executive Council of the Transport and General Workers' Union voted overwhelmingly to support Benn even though those of its members who were consulted appeared more inclined to favour Healey. Eventually the TGWU delegation to the Party conference decided to support Silkin on the first ballot and Benn on the second.(38) The National Union of Public Employees after a branch ballot was forced to abandon its traditional support for the Left and cast its vote for Healey. Postal ballots in the Post Office Engineering Union, and in the printers' union (NATSOPA) also produced Healey majorities. The election revealed how flimsy was the Left's support amongst some trade unions traditionally associated with the Labour Left.

After the main trade union conference season had finished in June the campaign turned to winning the support of Party members. A series of twenty rallies were held all over the country, attracting large audiences, and

confirming the very considerable interest and enthusiasm that Benn's candidature had generated amongst the Party rank and file.(39)

The culmination of this remarkable campaign came on the Sunday evening in Brighton immediately prior to the week-long deliberations at the 1981 Party conference when, after a second ballot, Benn came within 1% of victory.

ELECTION OF DEPUTY LEADER

1st ballot	CLP %	TU %	PLP %	TOTAL %
Tony Benn	23.483	6.410	6.734	36.267
Denis Healey	5.367	24.696	15.306	45.369
John Silkin	1.150	8.894	7.959	18.004

2nd ballot				
Tony Benn	24.327	15.006	10.241	49.574
Denis Healey	5.673	24.994	19.759	50.426

Source: LPACR, 1981, p.26

Benn's vote was astonishing considering the desire of senior Party and trade union figures to re-establish Party unity around the Foot/Healey leadership and therefore the very considerable pressures that had operated to defeat Benn. But the Benn campaign had succeeded in challenging these pressures by arousing the individual Party member in a manner unknown since the campaigning days of Aneurin Bevan in the early 1950s.

Paradoxically this moment of near triumph presaged the Left's decline. Sunday September 27th marked the pinnacle of the Left's advance within the Party.

We have referred earlier to the hostility shown by some on the Left to Benn's moves in the 1970s to lead

the Labour Left. Some of this hostility was expressed in John Silkin's nomination in the Deputy Leader election by some senior figures from the Tribune Group.(40) The extremely close result in the ensuing election exacerbated these divisions within the parliamentary Left. It had required only an additional four MPs to have voted for Benn in the second ballot for him to have been elected. The fact that sixteen members of the Tribune Group who voted for Silkin in the first ballot abstained in the second ballot whilst another four voted for Healey in the second led to considerable personal recrimination.(41) The Tribune rally, held three nights after the announcement of the deputy leadership result, was the occasion for a bitter personal attack on the "traitors" by Margaret Jackson from the platform. She threatened that they would suffer for their voting behaviour, implying that CLPs would not reselect those who had failed to vote for Benn.(42)

For some, the Left was now defined exclusively as those voting for Benn in the ballot. Both Neil Kinnock and Joan Lestor were no longer regarded as part of the 'real' Left.(43)

This election was a watershed. Rather than the Party uniting around the leadership that had been confirmed in this new election procedure, it became engaged over the next eighteen months in an intense factional conflict in which the bitterness and anatagonism were considerable. Left and Right argued over the Party's policies and structures, but the divisions were not solely

between Left and Right. They also embraced the Left itself. Fraternity and comradeship were noticeably absent amongst many on the Left who previously had united against their common enemy on the Right. Now for many of the Left the enemy was within. The Left could no longer agree its attitudes to Michael Foot's leadership of the Party, to the demands for further internal Party reforms, and to the methods for dealing with the Militant Group. Over these matters a 'hard' and 'soft' Labour Left emerged which had very little in common. The Party became more divided than ever before and it suffered the political consequences of these internal divisions when it recorded one of its worst election results in June 1983.

We will return to these divisions within the Left later but finally in this chapter we need to assess Tony Benn's overall impact on the politics of the Labour Left.

Tony Benn: an assessment

Benn's major contribution to the Labour Left has been to provide it with renewed vision and drive. In the face of disillusion and despair brought on by the pragmatic opportunism of Harold Wilson, Benn provided an alternative. In contrast to the mechanistic socialism concerned with the intricate details of managing the social democratic state, Benn reminded socialists of past struggles in which the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity prevailed and suggested that such ideals

remained relevant in contemporary Britain. Socialism, reminded Benn, was more than changing one set of leaders for another; it was concerned to establish an alternative set of power relationships in which 'the common people' would play a much more prominent part in controlling their lives. During the 1960s the Labour Party appeared to have no vision of the future, to be a social elite increasingly removed from its electoral base, and to be denigrating the importance of the Party member. Benn provided a vision, challenged the political isolation and often arrogance of the parliamentarians and appealed to the importance of the humble Party worker. The Party had become directionless, lifeless and moribund. Benn provided a major impetus in recreating its vitality and dynamism.

Benn's refusal to be contained by any 'parliamentary embrace' is also important. He has a commitment to the wider labour movement and therefore is willing to identify with rank and file activities. His energy and dedication are reflected in his punishing schedule of work.(44) At the same time he is confronted with a hostile press which has subjected him to considerable personal attacks.

Benn has a tendency to make ill-considered generalisations and eye-catching statements with little consideration of the practical means of their implementation. For example, on the relations between Labour Ministers and civil servants he states

> We need to ensure that ministers are able to
> secure compliance with the policies they were

> elected to implement. Proposals to this end have
> been widely discussed and would certainly
> involve making the most senior officials in each
> department more responsible to the Ministers
> whom they serve.(45)

What this means in practice is never developed.

He also has a tendency to shift his ground with little apparent thought or reason except to win popularity. For example, in 1982 Benn was stating "I'm not arguing for annual parliaments... I favour the four year parliament"(46) but by 1985 he was stating that "the only electoral change that would be relevant... is the Chartist demand for an annual parliament...".(47)

Benn also has a very distinct view of political and electoral strategy. His assumption is that agitational activities (e.g. strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, occupations, etc.) generate socialist commitment, but there is no research evidence to confirm his belief. It is possible that such activities will lead to disillusion, despair and withdrawal from further political activity, particularly so in the event of a defeat. Benn refers to the impact of the miners' strike by suggesting that "a giant leap... occurred in political consciousness, understanding and awareness... amongst those who may never have been in any way political before".(48) It will certainly be the case that this occurred amongst some, particularly amongst many young miners assumed before the dispute to be 'a-political', but others may have withdrawn from further political commitment as a consequence of their experiences. It is surprising that no research has been conducted on the impact of disputes on people's

political consciousness, but Benn presents certainty on a subject central to the Party's electoral strategy and prospects without attempting to test his hypothesis.

Benn's electoral strategy is based upon the notion of a body of committed socialists needing to be mobilised. A large reservoir of political support exists for socialism ready to be tapped. He has argued that the June 1983 General Election result revealed the existence of eight and a half million committed socialists. Labour lost in 1983, Benn has argued, not because voters were frightened by a radical party but because socialist electors were not convinced that the Party had in fact changed from its old revisionist or reactionary past.(49) However, there is no evidence to show that Labour's low numbers of voters were all committed socialists. They may just as easily have been the last residue of a habitual commitment to the Labour Party as a consequence of socio-economic location with little commitment to specific policies, socialist or otherwise. Neither is there any evidence to reveal that non-voters are frustrated socialists waiting for the emergence of a distinctly ideological Labour Party.

Benn believes that Labour's electoral strategy needs to place less emphasis upon sampling public opinion and devising sophisticated techniques of political advertising in order to win 'floating voters' and more on involvement in extra-parliamentary agitation.

> Our road to victory does not lie in coaxing back
> half a dozen Guardian readers from their

flirtation with the SDP but in mobilising the 10 million people who don't vote but who are our natural constituents because they are the ones, more than any other, who are repressed by our society.(50)

Benn's view is that "...democractic socialism in all its aspects does reflect the true interests of a majority of people in this country"(51) and therefore the Labour Party has to confront people's false consciousness, created by media bias and by Labour leaders, by directly confronting this consensus through mass mobilisation. Benn's suspicion towards opinion polls and advertising is understandable because the Party's Right has used both as a means of undermining the Party's socialist commitments. But a political party concerned with power has to understand the perceptions and views of its potential electors even if it is no more than to learn what voters dislike about Labour policies and how necessary it is to campaign to change the electors' views (and not the Party's political commitments as is often argued). Benn is justified also in some of his criticisms of the media and the need to by-pass these distorting influences, but the need is not solely mass mobilisation as Benn implies. This is the strategy of last resort. The first resort must be to listen and observe and then respond by educating and campaigning beyond the narrow, restricted circle of committed socialists.

Benn's campaigning, especially during the deputy leadership election, attracted support from a wide body of people on the left. He created and recruited democratic socialists but he also attracted into the Party many with

revolutionary socialist commitments. Benn's response to this has been that the Party should be a broad alliance in which democratic and revolutionary socialist should operate side by side. He has no enemies on the Left. He would welcome affiliation from the Communist Party. It is social democrats and Conservatives who are Labour's enemies. He is unwilling therefore to make a distinction between the two socialist traditions.

It is possible to understand his reluctance to make such a distinction. On the one hand the Labour leadership's behaviour in the past in expelling individuals whose opinions were regarded as unpopular (for example, George Brown's attempts to have Bertrand Russell expelled for his views on direct action and nuclear weapons) was deplorable and Benn did not wish to become involved in similar behaviour. On the other hand Benn needed all the support he could muster in 1981 and was therefore unwilling to attack any potential allies. It may be that Benn believes that revolutionary socialists will shift in time and abandon their commitments to democratic centralist strategy. Benn is quite clearly a democrat, as we have seen in earlier statements, but he makes no attempt to define the basic frontiers of democratic socialism and establish some intellectual boundaries to his Party.

Finally, Benn has a limited notion of collective loyalty. He remained within the Labour Cabinet between 1974 and 1979 explaining his position by the advice he received from his Bristol South East CLP. But he angered

very many of his Cabinet colleagues after Labour had
returned to Opposition in 1979 by the attacks he made on
Labour policies in which it appeared as if he had played
no part in their implementation. The counter claims of
party loyalty and individual conscience are considerable
and there can be no generalised solution to the dilemmas
they raise, but Benn has laid claim since 1979 to be the
'keeper of the socialist conscience' on this matter,
failing to acknowledge that others resigned Office as a
consequence of _their_ socialist commitment.(52)

Neither did Benn as a member of the Shadow
Cabinet between 1979 and 1981 abide by collective loyalty
on all occasions. For example, in November 1981 'winding
up' for the Opposition in a House of Commons debate on
Labour's reacquisition of a privatised oil industry, he
drew his own interpretation concerning compensation to be
paid to the oil companies, contrary to previous Shadow
Cabinet agreement. He again failed to abide by Shadow
Cabinet policy in voting against the Government's White
Paper on the Defence Estimates in May 1981, contrary to
the agreement that the Party should abstain.(53)

Benn also made no attempt to develop collective
agreement with his new colleagues in the Tribune Group. He
joined the group in February 1981 but then made his
decision to contest the election for deputy leader without
consulting his fellow-members.

Finally, Benn has lacked loyalty to conference
sovereignty when its decision has not suited his purpose.
For example his move within the NEC in 1985 to reopen the

debate on Labour's defence policy and, in particular,
Britain's membership of NATO, is remarkable from a senior
member of the NEC, elected to implement conference policy
which had been agreed in October 1984.(54)

Conclusion

Tony Benn has described the period between 1979
and 1981 as "the most creative, most important period in
the recent history of the Labour Party...".(55) If one
judges it in terms of Left activity then it is a time of
flourishing organisations and publication, but the manner
in which the Left conducted its campaigning was both
narrow in its concentration on internal Party affairs and
insensitive in its treatment of those with opposing views.
The Party was dominated by a faction either unaware or
uncaring of the consequences of some of its actions.

During much of the post-war period the Right
imposed its will on the Party. It did not tolerate
individual or organised dissent. It strictly controlled
parliamentary candidatures and it acted in an
authoritarian manner towards many constituency parties. It
was often sustained in its action by a media
overwhelmingly hostile to the Left. The Left in power
operated in a very similar manner. It manipulated the
Party rules in its favour. Both the 'three year' and the
'1968' rules were put to one side on occasions. Defeated
on a topic at one Party conference the Left would return
to the subject at the following year's conference. For

example, both the procedures for electing the Party leader and for agreeing the Party's general election manifesto were discussed annually in the hope of securing reform even after a previous Party conference had rejected constitutional change.

On major issues of Party reform the Left secured only very small majorities and yet they pushed on with the proposals with little thought of compromise or of the consequences. For example, reform of the procedure for choosing a Party Leader was approved by a majority of one hundred thousand in a vote of seven millions. Even with this very narrow majority the Left proceeded with the proposal that the PLP should have only a minority vote in the new electoral college. Only one part of the Labour Left - Independent Labour Publications - expressed reservations and was bitterly attacked by the remainder of the Left.

One senior member of the Benn caucus has commented since that the campaign within the Party was conducted "with a virulence and intolerance towards those who disagreed which sometimes made a mockery of the democracy which was allegedly being fought for".(56)

One variation, however, from previous Right practice which should be noted was the Left's unwillingness to expel individuals from the Party. But the Left's tolerance extended too far. It was willing to accept into the Party all who claimed to be socialists without question. Aneurin Bevan had been clear that a democratic socialist Party needed to establish clear

political boundaries distinguishing its democratic commitments from other revolutionary objectives,(57) but the Left abdicated such responsibility. In its pursuit of power it was willing to accept the support of all those who might boost its majority in the Party.

By its behaviour the Labour Left contributed to the Party's break-up in 1981 and its electoral defeat in 1983. Evidence that 'the Gang of Four' had been planning their break with the Party over some time would suggest that no matter how the Left behaved they would have still departed,(58) but the Left's behaviour made it less likely that other potential defectors might have remained within the Party and argued their point of view.

During this period the Left appeared to regard the public as mere spectators. The faction was solely concerned to win Party support and appeared unable or unwilling to consider the impact that the political divisions and personal attacks might have on the voters. After securing the establishment of an electoral college, at considerable cost to Party unity, a period of stability under the Foot/Healey leadership might have been beneficial. The Benn candidature for deputy leader was counterproductive to the Party's future and only after its defeat in June 1983 did the Left recognise the shortsighted nature of some of its campaigning. This has resulted in a realignment of the Left which will be examined in Chapter nine.

FOOTNOTES

1. K.O. Morgan 'The High and Low Politics of Labour : Keir
Hardie to Michael Foot' in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson
(eds) High and Low Politics in Modern Britain, p.309.

2. The only break in his thirty-year-period of
representing Bristol South East was between 1960 and 1963
after inheriting his father's title and peerage. The story
of his fight to revoke his peerage and be re-elected to
the House of Commons is described in R. Jenkins Tony Benn:
A Political Biography, Ch.3.

3. Benn resigned from the NEC in protest at the manner in
which Hugh Gaitskell handled the defence policy
disagreements.

4. See P. Seyd 'Factionalism within the Labour Party: The
Socialist League' in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds) Essays
in Labour History 1918-1939, pp.204-231.

5. Both Eric Heffer and Stan Newens had a far wider grasp
of socialist ideas.

6. Tony Benn Parliament, People and Power, p.2.

7. ibid., p.7.

8. Benn became a CLPD subscriber in 1978 and began
campaigning publicly for CLPD in 1979. Interview with CLPD
Officers.

9. 'Talking with Tony Benn' Spare Rib 35, December 1980,
p.32.

10. Benn has been a member of the NEC ever since 1962. As
a CLP section representative he topped the poll every year
between 1974 and 1984. In the Deputy Leadership election
in 1981 81% of the CLP vote was cast for Benn in the
second ballot. The evidence concerning Benn's support
during the Chesterfield by-election is based on the
author's own observations.

11. R. Jenkins op.cit, p.28.

12. In 1970 Benn still had a multi-line entry in Who's Who
listing his family, educational and political background
(Who's Who, 1970, p.230) but by 1976 this had been reduced
to a three-line entry stating nothing more than position
as MP and Minister, and by 1977 his entry had been
withdrawn. (Who's Who, 1976, p.177)

13. The personnel involved fluctuated but some of the
permanent members involved in the group discussions
included Frances Morrell, Michael Meacher, Ken Coates,
Tony Banks, Chris Mullin, Jon Lansman and Nigel
Williamson.

14. See J. Morgan (ed) <u>The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman</u>, p. 53 and p.336.

15. Tony Benn <u>Parliament, People and Power</u>, p.20.

16. His views on the limits of the nation state led him to doubt the beneficial impact of any national economic strategy as, for example, outlined later in the AES. ("Any nation could theoretically turn its back on all this [i.e. interdependent international forces] and legislate itself into a siege economy free from this intricate network of national and international power structures. But... it could only do so at a price in lower living standards that would not be politically acceptable." p.5) He also argues that the power of government is very limited. ("The power of a national government is far more limited than political leaders and the public either realise or like to admit." p.6) Throughout the pamphlet his citizens are all described in the masculine form.

17. Tony Benn <u>Speeches</u>, p.297.

18. Especially <u>Arguments for Socialism</u> and <u>Arguments for Democracy</u>.

19. T. Benn <u>Arguments for Democracy</u>, p.130.

20. T. Benn 'Democracy and Marxism' <u>Marxism Today</u>, May 1981, p.9.

21. T. Benn <u>Arguments for Democracy</u>, p.xii.

22. T. Benn 'Democracy and Marxism', <u>Marxism Today</u>, May 1982, p.10.

23. <u>ibid</u>., p.14.

24. T. Benn <u>Arguments for Democracy</u>, p.19.

25. T. Benn 'Who Cares Wins' <u>Marxism Today</u>, January 1983, p.14.

26. T. Benn <u>Arguments for Democracy</u>, p.67.

27. <u>ibid</u>., pp.190-191.

28. T. Benn <u>Arguments for Socialism</u>, p.49.

29. <u>ibid</u>., p.52.

30. <u>loc.cit</u>.

31. <u>ibid</u>., p.60.

32. T. Benn <u>Parliament, People and Power</u>, p.124.

33. Vladimir Derer, Secretary of CLPD, has written of "the

unwise use made of the Electoral College during the Deputy Leadership Campaign of 1981 (which) meant that much of the original sympathy for the democratic reforms was lost". <u>Socialist Organiser</u>, May 8, 1985.

34. Discussions within the Tribune Group concerning a possible appeal for Party unity are reported in <u>Labour Weekly</u>, April 10, 1981.

35. The MPs who first signed his nomination statement were Norman Atkinson (Tottenham), Ron Brown (Leith), Martin Flannery (Sheffield Hillsborough), Stuart Holland (Lambeth Vauxhall), Robert Hughes (Aberdeen North), Robert Litherland (Manchester Central), Joan Maynard (Sheffield Brightside), Michael Meacher (Oldham West), Ian Mikardo (Bethnal Green), William McElvey (Kilmarnock), Reg Race (Wood Green), Jo Richardson (Barking), Allan Roberts (Bootle), Ernie Roberts (Hackney North), Ernie Ross (Dundee West) and Dennis Skinner (Bolsover). All sixteen were members of the Tribune Group. The initial statement announcing Benn's candidature was published by the Institute for Workers Control.

36. Andy Harris, Jon Lansman and Chris Mullin played an active part in Benn's campaign but Vladimir Derer and Victor Schonfield were not directly involved.

37. A 'fringe' debate at the TUC Congress between the three candidates attracted considerable media attention.

38. A detailed and authoritative account of the TGWU's deliberations has been written by Frank Whitelaw 'The Battle for the Block Vote' (unpublished Diploma Essay, July 1982, Northern College, Barnsley).

39. Benn's meetings attracted audiences of one thousand in Birmingham, seven hundred in London, and six hundred in Sheffield.

40. The following members of the Tribune Group were Silkin's original sponsors: Stan Orme, Judith Hart, Alec Jones, Norman Buchan, Arthur Davidson, Doug Hoyle, Albert Booth and Guy Barnett.

41. The sixteen members of the Tribune Group who abstained in the second ballot were Jo Ashton, Guy Barnett, Andrew Bennett, Norman Buchan, Arthur Davidson, John Evans, Doug Hoyle, Russell Kerr, Robert Kilroy-Silk, Neil Kinnock, Martin O'Neill, Stan Orme, Keven McNamara, Jeff Rooker, John Silkin and Sheila Wright. The four members of the Tribune Group who voted for Denis Healey in the second ballot were Frank Field, Alec Jones, Oonagh McDonald and Julius Silverman.

42. Author's notes of the meeting. <u>London Labour Briefing</u> (November 15, 1981) published a list of London MPs and their voting record in the election as an implicit guide to deselect the "traitors". As we have already noted only

eight deselections actually occurred; seven of the MPs involved did not vote for Benn. Frank Hooley believes his deselection was very closely related to his refusal to vote for Benn after Sheffield Heeley GMC had carried a resolution, almost unanimously, instructing him to vote for Benn. (Interview with Frank Hooley, April 28, 1982) None of the prominent critics of Benn (e.g. Neil Kinnock, Jeff Rooker and Frank Field) were deselected.

43. For example, Reg Race commented that "Neil Kinnock is not a left-winger" (London Labour Briefing, 32, August 1983, p.3) and John O'Mahony dismissed Joan Lestor's commitment to the Labour Left stating that "...(her) hair is the only thing about her still red..." (Socialist Organiser, June 3, 1982, p.3).

44. For details see P. Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt The Civil Servants, pp.215-216, and F. Morrell From The Electors of Bristol.

45. Arguments for Democracy, p.66.

46. Parliament, People and Power, p.59.

47. 'Who Dares Wins' Marxism Today, January 1985, p.13.

48. London Labour Briefing, 47, March 1985, p.6.

49. Tribune, June 8, 1984.

50. Marxism Today, January 1985, p.15.

51. Marxism Today, May 1982, p.8.

52. For example, Joan Lestor resigned in February 1976 from her post as Junior Minister in the Department of Education and Science in protest at the cuts in nursery education provision. We have already noted (footnote 43) the attacks on her for failing to support Tony Benn in 1981. One of the people leading the attack on her, Margaret Beckett, replaced Joan Lestor in March 1976 at the Department of Education and Science.

53. Benn's speech in the oil debate in Nobvember 1981 prompted Michael Foot to issue a statement on Shadow Cabinet responsibility which accused Benn of producing "a shambles" when "a debate which should have concentrated our attack on the Tory policy about North Sea oil was transformed... into a quarrel about our own policy on the issue of compensation". (The Times, November 14, 1981) Benn responded to this by arguing that the matter had been "deliberately blown up" and claimed that no "breach of faith, or even of collective Shadow Cabinet responsibility" was committed. He argued that the real issue was whether the Shadow Cabinet had "the right, if it chooses to do so, to change conference policy and then to bind all its members to its own interpretation of that policy, under the guise of upholding collective

responsibility". (<u>The Guardian</u>, November 18, 1981).

54. "The Labour Party is committed to continuing British membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation." <u>Defence and Security for Britain</u>, p.15. This NEC statement to the 1984 Party conference was approved by 5,352,000 to 1,332,000 votes <u>LPACR</u>, 1981, p.157.

55. <u>The Writing on the Wall</u>, Channel Four, programme 7, 1985.

56. Nigel Williamson <u>Tribune</u>, March 14, 1986.

57. K. O. Morgan <u>Labour in Power, 1945-1951</u>, p.72.

58. For an account of these deliberatins see <u>Labour Weekly</u>, March 27, 1981.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FLOURISHING OF THE LABOUR LEFT

One of Tony Benn's major achievements was to weld together the various left groups within the Party and a considerable number of the rank and filers into a single cohesive force. The Labour Left was a reality in 1981, but this faction was made up of a wide variety of groups and interest. During the 1970s there had been a rapid growth in the number of Labour Left groups and publications. Never before in the Party's history had there been such a wide range of left activities. The reasons for this expansion are varied. They include the flourishing of new ideas and new campaigns (for example, the development of feminism), the greater tolerance shown by the Party leadership to organised activities and, in particular, to groupings which had revolutionary socialist commitments, and the emergence of a very strong anti-parliamentary sentiment which prompted the growth of extra-parliamentary groupings. We will examine in turn developments within the parliamentary left, the extra-parliamentary left, and the revolutionary left.

The parliamentary left[1]: the Tribune Group

One segment of the Labour Left has coalesced around the newspaper Tribune. Associated with the name of

this newspaper has been an organised parliamentary group, numerous local groups, as well as various local rallies and meetings of which perhaps the most renowned has been the well-attended annual rally at the Party conference, first instituted in 1951. An untrained observer in Labour Party politics might conclude from these activities and the publicity that many of them attract that this has been a coherent and well-organised segment of the Labour Left but in reality Tribune provides nothing more than a convenient title for a set of ad hoc groupings and activities which at times reflect no more than a general and vague left-wing sentiment. This is not to deny the importance in their particular ways of these various Tribune activities but rather to deny that their existence is proof of an organisation, straddling both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Party, from which emanates a coherent and consistent set of policies and strategies.

The Tribune Group has, for most of the contemporary period, operated as the left in Parliament. The Group was established in 1966 following the relaxation of discipline in the PLP and it remained the only organised grouping of the Labour Left in Parliament until 1982. John Tilley, an ex-Treasurer of the Group, has defined it as "the Parliamentary supporters club of the Tribune newspaper".(1) He believes that members have felt themselves to be "custodians of the wider Tribune tradition - the resistance of the left of the Labour Party to the machine politics of the right".(2) We will return

to the newspaper but first we will examine the parliamentary grouping.

The Tribune Group has no constitution, no statement of aims and no oath of allegiance for persons joining. What the Group has offered over twenty years is the opportunity at weekly meetings to discuss political issues with people of broadly similar political viewpoint. Further it has offered the backbencher mutual support and advice on parliamentary tactics and procedures.

The group's leading figures at its formation in 1984 were Ian Mikardo, Eric Heffer, Stan Orme, Norman Buchan, Russell Kerr and Stan Newens. Membership of the group was forty one in the 1966-1970 Parliament, 11% of the PLP. Between 1970 and 1978 membership rose from forty eight to eighty six, from 17% to 27% of the PLP. Notwithstanding this growth in group membership the Labour Left remained a minority within the PLP during the decade. On only two occasions could the Left claim a majority in the PLP. The first was the election of Ian Mikardo as Chairman of the PLP in March 1974 but this success can be explained by his being a senior parliamentarian. The consequence of his election and, in particular, his refusal to set aside his factional commitment, prompted the Right to organise a counter-move which resulted in the election of Cledwyn Hughes in November 1974. The second occasion on which the Left was in a majority position in the PLP was in 1975 when the PLP rejected the terms negotiated by the Labour Government for entry into the EEC. But apart from these two occasions the Right retained

its majorities and as a consequence it predominated in the elected positions on the Parliamentary Committee and then the Liaison Committee.(3)

An increase in group membership occurred after the 1974 General Elections. This was taken by Labour's opponents as confirmation of the leftward trend within the Labour Party. But concentration upon membership figures gives a false impression for there is no doubt that some members of the PLP joined the group for cosmetic reasons believing that membership would act as an insurance against any criticisms from their constituency parties. It is possible to distinguish between those inactive members, paying the group subscription but rarely attending group meetings or displaying any solidarity with the group by Parliamentary rebellion of one sort or the other against the Party Whips, and those active members regularly attending the group meetings and displaying their commitment by regular Parliamentary rebellion. We will return to this point later in examining the voting behaviour of members in the Parliamentary Lobbies.

Membership of the group has been restricted to parliamentarians(4) and as a consequence of this parliamentary orientation the group traditionally has been concerned with the 'politics of the Chamber'. In the 1970s it held a regular weekly meeting to discuss the current business in the House of Commons. Neil Kinnock has written that the meetings were informal, the contributions of members were brief and a general consensus was reached.(5) The purpose was "to give an organised lead to opinion in

the PLP" and this was done by members speaking in the Chamber or in meetings of the PLP, by sponsoring Amendments on the Order Paper, and by sponsoring and signing Early Day Motions. At infrequent intervals the Group issued a policy statement intended as a guide to the Left in the labour movement.(6)

It should be noted that the group did not issue detailed instructions to members on their voting behaviour. Consensus might have been arrived at by discussion but this was in no way binding on group members and no action was taken by the group against its members for going against the consensus in the Division Lobby. At times of serious disagreement between the Group and the Party leadership between 1974 and 1979 members did have long discussions on voting tactics, as for example in October 1978 at the time of dispute over the Labour Government's wages policy. But no semblance of Group discipline was invoked. In fact the Group was a rather loose and amorphous body operating as a meeting-ground for like-minded members of the PLP at which discussions on Parliamentary business and tactics took place but at which no attempt was made to organise a regiment of MPs to act in a concerted manner in the House of Commons.

It is important to stress that an MP's loyalty, in both major parties, is primarily to the Party rather than the faction. Party precedes faction because the MP is well aware that it is as Party representative not faction member that he or she has been or will be elected to Parliament. Nevertheless the ultimate sanction that a

backbencher has over his or her Party is the refusal to support it in the Division Lobbies. This sanction was of considerable potential significance in the 1974-1979 Parliaments when the Government's majorities were so small and eventually dwindled away. During this period members of the Tribune Group were confronted with a serious dilemma - on the one hand they disagreed with many of the policies of the Labour Government yet on the other hand parliamentary rebellion would cause its downfall. Principle and loyalty were often in conflict.

Philip Norton's studies of Parliamentary dissent since 1945(7) reveal the increasing extent of parliamentary rebellion within the PLP during periods of Labour government.

Dissenting divisions within the PLP(8)

1945 - 1950	79
1966 - 1970	109
1974 - 1979	309

Between 1974 and 1979 dissent in the division lobbies was not exclusive to the Labour Left. Nevertheless the existence of a rebellious Labour Left is apparent. All eighty six members of the Tribune Group opposed the Government at least once in the division lobbies in the session between October 1974 and May 1979. Twenty six divisions occurred involving two or more MPs, in which the Group provided ninety per cent of the dissenting lobby; in eleven of these divisions less than ten MPs were involved.

Sixteen divisions were made up exclusively of Group members: only five involved more than ten MPs. There were thirty three divisions, involving more than forty members of the PLP, in which Tribune Group members constituted two-thirds of the lobby.

Examination of all these divisions in which Group members constituted two-thirds or more of the lobbies reveals that the economy, civil liberties, defence and Europe were the subjects on which rebellion occurred. On the economy, dissent was expressed in opposition to wage controls, public expenditure cuts and the raising of income tax bands, and in support of a strengthening of the Industry Bill. On civil liberties opposition occurred over aspects of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the continuation of emergency regulations in Northern Ireland, and a proposed curb on peaceful picketing, and support was forthcoming for an extension of civil liberties into the armed forces. Dissent was also expressed concerning defence expenditure and plans to institute direct elections to the European Parliament.

A majority of the Group voted against the Government on forty or more occasions and twenty seven members voted against on seventy or more occasions. No Labour MP from outside the ranks of the Group entered this list of persistent rebels.

Tribune MPs dissenting votes

Dissenting votes	Tribune MPs	Tribune MPs as % of PLP dissidents
1	3	9
2-9	10	11
10-19	8	21
20-29	12	37
30-39	8	47
40-49	10	50
50-59	2	60
60-69	6	75
70-79	5	100
80-89	7	100
90-99	6	100
100+	9	100
	89	

The twenty seven persistent rebels made up entirely from the Group, who dissented on over seventy occasions were:

Dennis Skinner	156 dissenting votes
Ron Thomas	137
Audrey Wise	136
Jo Richardson	132
Martin Flannery	120
Max Madden	112
Dennis Canavan	110
Ian Mikardo	108
Joan Maynard	105
Stan Thorne	99
James Lamond	99
George Rodgers	98
Eddie Loyden	98
Tom Litterick	94
Sid Bidwell	90

Jeff Rooker	87
Arthur Latham	85
Robin Cook	84
Andrew Bennett	84
Stan Newens	81
Russell Kerr	81
John Lee	80
Bob Parry	79
Doug Hoyle	76
Neil Kinnock	72
Eric Heffer	71
Ted Fletcher	71

It was from the ranks of the Group that "the most persistent, sizeable and cohesive dissent" in the PLP emerged, but it should not be concluded from this that the Group provided "the necessary organizational element" to factional dissent.(9) The Group did not organise the parliamentary Left but rather it was from the Tribune ranks that the persistent rebels emerged not necessarily in their capacity as Group members or because the Group had a collective opinion on the particular subject.

This persistent group of Labour rebels inflicted defeats on the Labour Government, some of which were on issues central to its programme. A House of Commons motion in March 1976 to approve the Government's Expenditure White Paper involving proposed public expenditure cuts was rejected by 284 votes to 256. Thirty seven Labour MPs abstained in the vote, thus directly contributing to the

Government's defeat, and thirty three of them were members of the Tribune Group. The following evening the Government sought, and received, a vote of confidence in the House of Commons in which no Tribune Group member abstained. But Government fears of being defeated on this issue yet again in 1977 led it to adopt the Parliamentary tactic of not debating the Expenditure White Paper on a substantive motion and then, when it appeared that it might even be defeated on the adjournment motion, to pursue the extraordinary tactic of not contesting the division, and thus being defeated by 293 votes to 0.

Another defeat on a key area of Government policy was inflicted in December 1978, over the Government's 5% pay policy, although in this case more by accident than design by members of the Group. An Opposition amendment opposing the Government's economic policy of sanctions against firms breaking the 5% limits was carried by 285 votes to 279 with five labour MPs abstaining, four of them members of the Group.(10)

Government defeats during the 1974-1979 Parliament on specific items of policy, in which the main bulk of Labour dissenters were drawn from the Group, included two occasions on the Report stage of the Industry Bill, involving disclosure of information by Government(11), a clause in the Scotland Bill providing that the Scottish Secretary should have regard to national pay policy(12), and an amendment to the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Bill providing for female representation on midwifery committees.(13) Group MPs were

also responsible for a number of the defeats that the Government experienced in standing committees, the most notable being the 'Rooker/Wise' amendment to the 1977 Finance Bill raising the levels of income tax allowances and partially indexing them against inflation.

But where Government defeats were serious enough to warrant a consequent 'confidence motion' Group members then voted to sustain the Government in Office. This voting behaviour attracted increasing criticism of the Group for being so tied up with the intricacies of Parliament as to have lost sight of any ultimate socialist objective. Christopher Hitchens, writing in the New Statesman in 1978 was scathing in his complaints about the group's lack of consistent opposition to the Government.(14) Another criticism was that the Lib-Lab pact had led to formal consultations between Labour Ministers and Liberal spokesmen whilst the Tribune Group was offered nothing of a similar nature. It appeared at this time as if the Liberal Party was securing greater influence on the Party leadership than members of the Tribune Group.

John Tilley has been quoted earlier as describing the Tribune Group as "custodians of the wider Tribune tradition" which has been associated with the newspaper of that name since 1937.

Tribune newspaper

Tribune was first published to "advocate

vigorous Socialism and demand active resistance to Fascism at home and abroad" and, in particular, to support Stafford Cripps in his campaigns for, first a United Front against Fascism and then, a popular Front.(15) For over forty years _Tribune_ has appeared as a weekly or fortnightly newspaper covering a wide range of national and international issues and providing a platform for the Left in an otherwise relatively unfavourable media. It has been associated with such Left campaigns as opposition to rearmament in 1951, support for public ownership, support for unilateral nuclear disarmament and opposition to entry into the EEC and such Left personalities as Aneurin Bevan, Barbara Castle, Michael Foot, Tony Benn, Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon who, at times, have been part of the Labour Left. From 1937 until the early 1980s it was the most important medium for the expression of Labour Left opinions. This remained the case during the nineteen seventies even though there was a growth of alternative Left publications, some associated with particular left sects competing with the Labour Party for political allegiance and others, within the Labour Party, advocating an alternative Left position to that of _Tribune_. But its importance should not be overestimated. With an editorial staff of three its scope has been severely limited. Furthermore, the paper has been very rooted to a particular Left tradition associated with the Bevanites and then the Tribune Group which revolved around parliamentary and trade union politics. It did not act in its political reporting, as distinct from its arts and

reviews pages, as the sounding board for some of the ideas and movements flourishing on the Left during this decade, in particular the debates on racism and feminism. Tribune remained the representative of the traditional Labour Left, whose main focus was class, industrial, and parliamentary politics. Tribune only abandoned this commitment to the traditional Labour Left in 1982 after the appointment of a new editor.(16)

Nevertheless Tribune under its previous editor, Dick Clements was not the house journal of any particular Left group within the Labour Party, certainly not the parliamentary Tribune Group. He made this position clear in 1980:

> ...Tribune does not 'organise' within the Labour movement. This newspaper has no organic link with the Tribune Group in the House of Commons or with the Tribune Groups which have formed themselves in the constituencies. Tribune was and is and will remain an independent socialist newspaper which argues out the major issues of the day.(17)

He attended Tribune Group meetings whenever possible and published Group statements and generally publicised Group activities, but he was concerned with a wider range of issues than those of a group which primarily concentrated on 'the politics of the Chamber'. Furthermore the newspaper's columns were not restricted solely to members of the parliamentary Group. The editor published articles which fitted the paper's general political stance even though the writer was not on Labour's left. For example, during the debate over British membership of the European

Economic Community in 1975 one of _Tribune's_ regular contributors advocating rejection of the terms of entry into the EEC was Stephen Haseler, a member of the right wing grouping Campaign for Democratic Socialism in the 1960s and of the Social Democratic Alliance at the time of writing for _Tribune_.

Dick Clements, held a strong belief in the need for debate and argument on the Labour Left and disliked what he saw as the closed mind of some of his competitors such as _Militant_, _Socialist Challenge_ or _Socialist Worker_. He wrote:

> Tribune's basic function is to exist as a forum for socialist argument. We are not a political party, we are a newspaper. So we will invite the various shades of socialist thought into our columns to discuss what should be done. We are constantly probing the collapsing capitalist system... But one thing we are not - and that is 'sectarian'. We abjure those who would censor argument because it does not fit in with their particular view. No socialist newspaper can be run on the principle that we will fit everything into our view of the firmament.(18)

Tribune has been an important newspaper on the left of British politics. It has had a clear and continuous commitment to the Labour Party. It has appealed to a wide body of people on the political and industrial left and its importance has been as a transmitter of left ideas to this group of people. But by the end of the 1970s _Tribune's_ influence was waning. It was too closely identified with the parliamentary left and seemed out of touch with some of the new developments in left ideas and groupings. _Tribune_ now had to face rivals as alternative

left newspapers were being published in a field which previously had been its monopoly.

Associated with the <u>Tribune</u> newspaper has not only been an organised parliamentary group but also numerous local Tribune groups which emerged for a time in the mid-1970s. The Tribune Group has been condemned by many on the Labour Left for failing to initiate an extra-parliamentary political force. Tribune Group statements often called for debate "up and down the country"(19) yet Group members did little to stimulate or organise such a debate. In fact members were very wary of organising any extra-parliamentary activity since many of them had experienced the infiltration of various organisations by left sects, especially the Trotskyist groupings, and were conscious of the proscriptions of such Trotskyist groups by the Party leadership in the post-war period.(20) Furthermore some parliamentarians with careers to pursue felt that an extra-parliamentary organisation not tuned to the detailed manoeuvres of Westminster might hamper their personal political progress.(21) Thus the Tribune Group adopted an hostile attitude to the demands for it to organise outside the Palace of Westminster and was unsympathetic to the creation of local Tribune groups in anything but the ad hoc manner which occurred from 1975 onwards.

Local Tribune Groups

The first local Tribune group was established in

Bristol in 1975. It came into being as a consequence of the EEC Referendum campaign and the need for a local organisation to campaign for a 'no' vote because Labour Party divisions at national level meant that many CLPs were unwilling to involve their local Party machinery in the campaign.

From 1975 groups were formed in various parts of the country to provide a local forum for the Labour Left.(22) The groups pursued their own interests and causes with no guidance from the Tribune Group. There was no formal organisation to co-ordinate their activities although a National Register of the groups was maintained by the Bristol group secretary and he acted as a 'postbox' for communications. In 1978, and in subsequent years, the secretaries of the local groups met and at the annual Party conference a meeting was held for conference delegates organised by the local Tribune groups.

At the very end of the decade in response to the the criticism that the Tribune Group had no extra-parliamentary basis it called meetings in particular localities to sound out Party opinion.(23) In 1980 the Tribune Group called its first ever national conference to discuss general political issues. At this conference the chairman of the Tribune Group promised that future conferences would be held and a further conference, on local government, was held in 1981.

But these tentative moves towards some sort of extra-parliamentary organisation came too late to defuse the criticism of the Group for its parliamentary

isolation. By the late-1970s other groups were attempting to fill this extra-parliamentary vacuum. We will examine some of these groups but beforehand we need to consider the emergence of a parliamentary rival to the Tribune Group in 1982.

The parliamentary left [2]: the Campaign Group

One of the Labour Left's strengths in the 1970s had been the collective nature of much of its activities but between 1981 and 1983 it increasingly developed some of the characteristics of the cabal rather than the faction, as Tony Benn and Michael Foot became counter-attracting poles of political loyalty.

Foot had been universally welcomed by the Left as Party Leader in 1980, but his actions after his election came to be regarded by Benn and his supporters with increasing suspicion and hostility. Foot was opposed to the PLP only having a minority of the votes within the electoral college approved in January 1981 at the Wembley conference and therefore he attempted to reverse the decision; he appealed to Benn not to stand against Healey as Deputy Leader; he criticised Benn's behaviour in the Shadow Cabinet and eventually recommended that Benn should not be supported in the elections for the Parliamentary Committee in November 1981; and he disowned and refused to endorse Peter Tatchell as the prospective parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey in December 1981. His behaviour generated considerable hostility amongst Benn's

supporters. Benn, on the other hand, was condemned by Foot's supporters for his consistent criticism of the Parliamentary Committee over, what he believed to be, its failure to abide by policies approved by the Party conferences and his lack of loyalty to his front-bench colleagues.

This division between Foot and Benn was most acute within the Tribune Group. Foot's election as Party Leader had caused tension within the Group for it was now no longer possible to unite around opposition to the Party's right wing leadership when the Party leader was himself a member of the Left. Personal loyalty to Foot became an important factor in the Group's deliberations. The selection of twenty five members of the Tribune Group by Foot to speak on the parliamentary Front Bench both reinforced the personal loyalty of some but also exacerbated the tensions by excluding others.

John Tilley has written that Michael Foot's election as Party Leader was "the greatest triumph of the Tribune Group" but also "contained the seeds of its destruction".(24) From November 1980 onwards Tribune Group members began to drift apart. The watershed which forced the Group to fracture was the deputy leadership contest. As already pointed out in the previous chapter twenty Tribune Group MPs abstained or voted for Denis Healey in the second ballot for deputy leader thus causing Tony Benn's defeat. Bob Cryer, writing in Tribune immediately after the election accused the Tribune Group of possessing "the establishment symptoms of anaemia"(25) and argued the

need for a new parliamentary group much more closely
involved with the rank and file. Reg Race was another
prominent critic of the Tribune Group claiming that

> ...it performs no useful function. It is a
> talking shop, and an exclusively Parliamentary
> one at that. Its membership is disparate: some
> MPs are members because they consider themselves
> on the Left; some are members because their
> constituency parties expect it of them; some are
> members for no apparent reason at all.

and he argued for a new grouping which should not be

> ...just a Parliamentary group of like-minded
> MPs. We should invite sympathetic constituency
> Labour parties and the Broad Lefts of trade
> unions to send delegates to our meetings - in
> that way breaking down the exclusive
> Parliamentarianism of the Labour Left, and
> ending the domination of decision-making on the
> Left by a small group of people, most of whom
> are MPs and nearly all of whom live in
> London.(26)

What eventually prompted the formation of a
rival group was the Party proposal to establish a register
of groups and to expel leading members of the Militant
Group. (See the following chapter for a discussion of this
issue.) As a consequence eighteen Labour MPs, all but one
previously members of the Tribune Group and all voters for
Benn in both ballots in the deputy leadership contest,
issued a leaflet at the 1982 Party conference entitled
'Unity, Victory and Socialism' deploring the proposal to
establish a Party register.(27) In December 1982 twenty
three members of the PLP formally launched the Campaign
Group as an alternative parliamentary left group.(28)

This division extended beyond the parliamentary Left. Tribune, the standard-bearer for the Labour Left for over 40 years, became caught up in this bitter debate. Dick Clements left the newspaper after twenty two years as editor, to join Michael Foot's personal staff. His successor, appointed by Tribune's board of directors in May 1982, was Chris Mullin, a prominent associate of Benn and a critic of the Tribune Group. Subsequent Tribune editorials entitled "The Death of the Tribune Group?" which claimed that the Group had "long been one of the least effective organisations on the Left"(29), and "The Tribune Group: is there life after death?",(30) created considerable antagonism. John Silkin's response to Mullin's attacks was to mastermind a shareholders' coup, supported by Lord Bruce, Russell Kerr and Jennie Lee in an attempt to gain control of the board of directors and then to sack the new editor. A bitter war or words between the Tribune staff and John Silkin revealed the deep antagonisms that now prevailed on Labour's Left which, in this particular case, were to proceed to the law courts.(31)

The eventual consequence of this division into two rival groupings in the PLP was the failure of the Left to agree upon a 'slate' for the 1984 elections to the Parliamentary Committee. The result was that ten of the fifteen places were filled by persons on the Right of the Party and only five on the Left were elected. Chris McLaughlin, writing in Labour Weekly, commented on the result that "the left is split, disorganised and arguably

directionless".(32)

Serious divisions had emerged within the parliamentary left from 1981 onwards. But a development of greater significance was the increasing criticism of the left parliamentarians from 1973 onwards and, as a consequence, less deference shown towards them. In the immediate post-war period the left parliamentarians - members of the Keep Left and Bevanite groups - had dominated intra-party factional debate. Tribune Group members expected to continue this tradition of authority and deference. The author remembers the 1969 Socialist Charter conference at which two members of the Tribune group stipulated to the audience what the left parliamentarians would and would not accept.(33) From 1975 onwards this deference to the left parliamentarians declined as the extra-parliamentary left developed its own organisations, ideas, strategies, and independence. We now turn to an examination of this extra-parliamentary left.

The extra-parliamentary left[2]: Independent Labour Publications

Some of the strongest criticisms of the Tribune Group for its unwillingness to provide more leadership in the extra-parliamentary Party and to disengage from the immediate concerns of parliamentary tactics came from a Leeds-based organisation, the remnant of the leading group in the Labour Left in the late-1920s and early-1930s, the Independent Labour Party.

The Independent Labour Party had remained apart from the Labour Party as a separate political organisation after its disaffiliation in 1932. Moves *for* it to become reaffiliated to the Labour Party in 1939 were thwarted by the war and the amendment to the Labour party constitution passed in 1946 ruled out affiliation on the previous basis since the Independent Labour Party was a separate organisation with a branch structure. And so for almost thirty years the Independent Labour Party remained a distinct political organisation until in 1975 it was disbanded and in its place Independent Labour Pulications (hereafter ILP) was established. This change was made with the intention of enabling ILP members again to play a part within the Labour Party. The previous structure of the Independent Labour Party was maintained, namely an elected ten-person National Administrative Council charged with the overall direction of the organisation, answerable to an annual conference, and an individual membership, now concentrated into readers' groups associated with the newspaper <u>Labour Leader</u> rather than into party branches. Perhaps better than any other persons within the labour movement members of the Independent Labour Party were aware of the historic dilemma for members of the Labour Left between establishing an organisation independent of the Labour Party which then competes with the Labour Party for working class support and votes and establishing an organisation within the Labour Party which becomes 'a party within the Party' and is expelled. The creation of a publications organisation was an attempt to remedy the

disastrous period of thirty three years in the political wilderness yet steer clear of any accusations by the Labour Party of constitutional impropriety.(34)

Independent Labour Publications in a policy statement 'About Ourselves' made clear that membership of the organisation was incompatible with any political party other than the Labour or Co-operative Parties, and that it was committed "to work for the return or retention of a Labour Government and to work for the introduction, extension and implementation of Labour Party socialist policy". The policy statement concluded:

> We regard ourselves as being deeply engaged in the task of helping the Labour Party to move more surely and effectively towards its goal of a democratic socialist society.(35)

The ILP has remained primarily a Leeds-based organisation, with two hundred and fifty individual members, attempting to educate the Labour Left through a good monthly newspaper, Labour Leader, with a circulation between three and four thousand copies, and through the production of some interesting pamphlets on previous periods in the Labour Left's history.(36)

In the 1980s it has pursued its own distinctive position on the Left which has on occasion antagonised other groups. It argues that a conservative political culture is dominant in Britain and therefore the Left needs to mount a broad-ranging challenge to Thatcherism involving all Party members. It argues in favour of involving many more Party members in the Party's affairs

and therefore adopting procedures which enable Party members to participate in selection/reselection procedures. It is also antagonistic to the idea of creating additional sections within the Party to represent groups arguing instead for a fundamental overhaul of the whole Party structure. In local government matters the ILP has argued the tactic of 'majority opposition' as a means of opposing Conservative Government cut-backs but has met with little support amongst Labour-controlled local authorities on this proposal.

The ILP was involved for a time in the Rank and File Mobilising Committee but withdrew over disagreements concerning the proportion of votes the PLP should be entitled to in the new electoral college(37) and also for a time it was linked with the Labour Co-ordinating Committee through one of its leading members, Barry Winter, being an elected member of the executive of the Labour Co-ordinating Committee. It has chided Tribune and the Tribune Group on numerous occasions for the failure to develop and give a lead to a more co-ordinated extra-parliamentary Left. But the ILP has made little effort itself to pull the fragmented Left together. Instead it argues its distinctive, and often very compelling case, in the pages of Labour Leader hoping to have some impact on Labour Left politics as a consequence.

The ILP has shown a good deal of interest in the developments in other European socialist parties and movements and has reported these fully in Labour Leader. One group within the French Socialist Party that has

occupied the newspaper's attentions has been Centre D'Etudes de Recherches et D'Education Socialiste (CERES) but the ILP has not been able to develop in such a fashion as to become a comparable research and propaganda organisation within the Labour Party. That role has been filled to a limited extent by the Labour Co-ordinating Committee.

The extra-parliamentary left[2]: The Labour Co-ordinating Committee

The Labour Co-ordinating Committee (hereafter LCC) was launched at the 1978 Labour Party Conference by a group of London-based political 'notables' at a meeting addressed by Moss Evans, Alan Fisher, Peter Shore and Tony Benn. Two people had taken the initiative in the group's formation - Michael Meacher and Frances Morrell. Both of them were committed to Labour's 1974 manifesto's pledge to secure "a fundamental and irreversible shift in wealth and power to working people and their families", both had been directly involved in the struggle to implement the Party's industrial policies at the Department of Industry(38), and both believed that the lack of political discussion in the extra-parliamentary Party had made it easier for the Party leadership to undermine these areas of Labour's policies. Both felt there was the need for an organisation to co-ordinate the ideas, research, campaigns and activities taking place on the fringes of the Labour Party and in various pressure groups committed to political and social

change. Both felt that the Party should take more note of the work being carried out by such groups as the National Council for Civil Liberties, Amnesty, the Child Poverty Action Group, Shelter, the Socialist Educational Association, Counter Information Services and Friends of the Earth. The LCC, Meacher and Morrell believed, should be a research, education and propaganda organisation equivalent to CERES.

After informal discussions lasting almost a year Meacher and Morrell had drawn together a launch committee of seventeen, the majority of whom were young, university-educated intellectuals. Seven were Labour MPs, of whom all but one had been elected to the House of Commons in 1974: Michael Meacher, Bob Cryer, Bryan Gould, Stuart Holland, Jeff Rooker, Brian Sedgemore and Audrey Wise. Four were from the trade unions: Ray Buckton, Bernard Dix, Tony Banks and John Jennings. Two were journalists: Chris Mullin and Stuart Weir. Two were academics: John Griffith and John Hughes. And, finally, two were Tony Benn's political advisors: Francis Cripps and Frances Morrell. It was the involvement of these last two, plus Michael Meacher, which caused the group to be directly associated with Tony Benn by some of the media. The LCC was regarded by them as nothing more than a 'Bennite' support group. But Benn was never a member of the LCC executive and the group, whilst having close sympathies with him and his ideas, developed its own policies and strategies.

The group has produced ten pamphlets, co-sponsored a book with the Conference of Socialist

Economists, organised seven conferences, and published for eighteen months nine issues of a glossy newspaper, Labour Activist.(39) It received substantial financial support from the Joseph Rowntree Social Services Trust between 1978 and 1982, enough to pay for a London office and a part-time organising secretary, and occasional financial support from the Transport and General Workers' Union and the National Union of Public Employees.

The group is a membership organisation with an elected executive and an annual policy-making conference. Individual membership of the group averages 1,000 with approximately twenty Labour MPs as members. A Scottish LCC was established in 1979 and this has been the most active section of the organisation within the Labour Party and an important focal point for the Scottish Labour Left. A regional group also operates in Wales and there are also some local groups in England. One problem that has faced the LCC has been the attempt by Trotskyist organisations such as the International Marxist Group and the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory to capture the group. No doubt the Trotskyist attentions have been increased by the Rowntree money available to the group, but their attempts at control have been rebuffed at the group's annual general meetings.

The LCC's activities have been two-fold: first, an attempt to stimulate the Labour Party to discuss and develop its programme; and second to develop the Party's mass, campaigning role.

No group in the history of the Labour Left has

developed as explicit and comprehensive a political programme as the LCC. At the time when Labour's 1979 election manifesto was being drafted Labour Activist published an alternative manifesto with thirty eight proposals which covered the British economy, social security and education, the EEC, foreign affairs and defence, and the press(40). The LCC's priorities were to defend and elaborate on the Alternative Economic Strategy, to highlight the conservatism of Britain's political institutions, to campaign for a reform of the media and to argue for disengagement from the EEC. The LCC has, in particular, expressed more concern over the location of power within British institutions than any group on Labour's Left since the Socialist League in the 1930s. The LCC argued:

> Britain is not as democratic a country as is
> often assumed. Our society is dominated by the
> class system: it has a ruling class who run
> financial and big business enterprises, the
> civil service and the media. They have common
> interests in keeping elected government weak so
> that it does not interfere in their financial
> and industrial operations. So we must
> redistribute power as well as wealth and
> income.(41)

The LCC therefore argued the need to reform the civil service by injecting a great deal more political control and involvement, to reform the media by placing the control of newspapers with independent trusts and providing state-funded print facilities, to reduce official secrecy by implementing a Freedom of Information Act, and to improve the House of Commons scrutiny powers

by extending the select committees and by reducing the patronage powers of a Labour Prime Minister.

The second aspect of the LCC's work has been concerned with developing the Labour Party's role as a campaigning party rather than solely as an electoral organisation. This aspect of the LCC's work was, and has remained, most closely associated with the views of one member of the group's executive - Peter Hain. The LCC's view has been that the Labour Party needs to become much more actively concerned with community issues, to be involved with local community groups and tenants' organisations and, in particular, to be engaged with local unions in industrial struggle. It has been in this area that the LCC has concentrated by attempting to extend the influence of the Labour Left into rank and file trade union activities, an area in which the Labour Left has been so weak.

Since the mid-1960s the Communist Party-controlled Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions had played a significant role in the trade unions in mobilising pressure, first, against the Labour Party's proposals in the late 1960s to limit trade union bargaining power and, then, against the Conservative Government's Industrial Relations Act. But by the mid-1970s the declining membership of the Communist Party and its support for the social contract had undermined the influence of the LCDTU and serious attempts were made by other left groups, the Socialist Workers' Party in particular, to exploit this vacuum. In response to these

activities of other Left parties and the Labour Left's traditional weakness in this area, the LCC organised two conferences specifically to discuss the issue of trade unions and the left, attracting a broad range of trade unionists engaged in left-wing activity within their own trade unions.

The contribution of the LCC to the development of the Labour Left is difficult to judge. At the time of its formation in 1978 it appeared to be an organisation more akin to a Conservative Party grouping in organisational style - namely an impressive list of sponsors, a launch meeting with speakers more renowned for their leadership roles than for their political commitment to the group concerned, a London office, a glossy newspaper, and a grant from the Rowntree Trust. But its contribution to the debates on the Labour Left concerning programme and its campaign commitment to reform of the Party structure, especially on the issues of responsibility for the Party's election manifesto and responsibility for electing the Leader of the Party, were impressive. The LCC was the only body on the Labour Left attempting to explain the Alternative Economic Strategy to Party members. Similarly, it made a most important move to remedy one of the Labour Left's greatest weaknesses - its absence within the trade union movement.

But the LCC was weakened as a research and propaganda organisation by its very close association with particular factional issues within the Party. As a consequence it was unwilling to extend the debate on the

Labour Left into areas that deserved discussion. For example, the LCC's submission to the Labour Party Committee of Inquiry (See Chapter six) entitled <u>Towards a Mass Party</u>, suffered from an unwillingness to consider the wider role of the Party, in particular in improving the Party's democratic basis, beyond the issues involved in the particular factional dispute of that time, namely whether mandatory reselection of Labour MPs should be maintained. Clearly the LCC believed that since the Labour Left was now in control of the Party machine it should manipulate that power within a Party structure that one might have expected this group to examine in a more critical manner.

Since Labour's election defeat in June 1983, followed by Neil Kinnock's election as Party Leader, LCC has adopted a more prominent role within the Labour Left. Its analysis of the Party's election defeat and its subsequent campaigns to improve both the Party's policies and its presentation of these policies have won support from Party activists tired of the Party's constitutional wrangles. The breakdown of the Left alliance that had existed in 1981 and the slow demise of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy has meant that the LCC has filled the political vacuum which had opened up on the democratic socialist left. The fact, also, that a number of Neil Kinnock's political advisers (Robin Cook, Henry Neuberger) are LCC members has given the group the opportunity on occasions to present its case at the highest level in the Party.

By 1983 most of the original launch committee were no longer involved and had been replaced by a relatively young group of people, of whom the leading figures are Peter Hain, Nigel Stanley, Mike Gapes and David Griffiths. Barry Winter, from the ILP, has been the only one of this younger group of people within the LCC to withdraw. He resigned from the LCC Executive in 1984 in protest at the group's political direction and at the very close relationship between LCC and the Clause Four group.(42)

Because the LCC gives a high priority to Labour's ideological, programmatic and strategic weaknesses it is likely to achieve a prominent position within the Labour Left merely because other Left groups continue to concentrate on narrow, internal Party matters. LCC's weaknesses will remain, however, because it continues to attract some suspicion as a group too closely identified with the parliamentary leadership and with 'Westminster politics'. Furthermore, the group still lacks extensive Party support amongst Party members. It may have the Party Leader's ear but only in Scotland has it developed organised support within the constituencies. It is now, however, attempting to remedy this defect by associating itself more closely with the revamped Tribune, under its new editor, and establishing local LCC/Tribune groups.(43)

We have referred earlier to the major impact that the rising recruitment of women to the Party has had on the Left's fortunes. One impact of this recruitment has

been the emergence of a women's group on the Left of the Party, concerned with the specific question of women's representation in the Party.

The extra-parliamentary left[3]: the Women's Action Committee

CLPD has always argued that constituency parties should adopt a policy of positive discrimination towards manual workers when they are drawing up parliamentary selection short lists. By the end of the decade it had extended this principle to include women as well, which reflected their growing influence within the organisation. Women members of CLPD had established a separate sub-committee in 1979 and by May 1980 this had been formalised into the Women's Action Committee (hereafter WAC). At CLPD's 1980 annual general meeting its constitution was revised to guarantee four places on the main CLPD executive for the WAC representatives. But over the next three years considerable tension developed between the leading figures in WAC and the dominant Derer group in CLPD which eventually culminated in WAC's breakaway to form an independent group.

There were three explicit causes of the tension. First, the decision of a special CLPD executive meeting in June 1982 that the CLPD Party conference rally should have a 'women-only' platform produced a hostile reaction from Vladimir Derer and other leading CLPD personnel. Second, WAC felt excluded from the discussions taking place on the

Left concerning a 'left state' for NEC elections in 1981 and 1982. By 1983 WAC was insisting that the left candidates chosen for the 'slate' in the NEC Women's section should not be opposed to WAC's demands for the reform of the Party organisation. In 1983 disagreement on this question culminated in the CLPD and WAC 'slates' for the Women's section representatives having four names in common but on the fifth there was disagreement. Frances Morrell, a leading figure in WAC, was not included on the CLPD list of recommended candidates because of her disagreement with the Derer group.(44) The final issue of dispute was the CLPD Officers' belief that WAC was not giving enough priority to CLPD affairs and was in danger of being infiltrated by revolutionary socialists. Victor Schonfield, CLPD Treasurer, reported to the executive in May 1983 that leading WAC personnel had not paid subscriptions to CLPD, and that many attending WAC meetings were not WAC members.(45)

Underlying these specific issues was a general tension based upon WAC's view that CLPD Officers were authoritarian and intolerant of any independent actions, and CLPD's view that the women were unwilling to abide by collective decision-making procedures or make general, rather than gender-based, constitutional reforms their main priority.

WAC has concentrated its attentions on aspects of the Party's constitutional arrangements believing, in a similar fashion to its parent organisation, that power relationships within the Party have needed transforming

before it is possible to attract outsiders (in this case feminists) to work with and join the Party. But the same criticism that can be made of CLPD can also be made of WAC, namely that by concentrating on internal matters of Party reform it has ignored the challenge to shift attitudes and win support within the community for socialism and feminism.

WAC has campaigned for five major reforms of the Party. First, the formalisation of the Labour Party's Women's Organisation, in particular the National Labour Women's Conference, by establishing a clear structure with distinct rules. Second, that each year five resolutions carried at the Party's Women's conference should automatically be placed on the agenda of the annual Party conference. Third, that the Women's conference should elect the five women representatives of the NEC. Fourth, that the Women's conference should elect the membership of the National Labour Women's Committee. And fifth, that every parliamentary selection short-list should include one woman.

WAC has mobilised support for these demands in the classic CLPD manner of circulating 'model' resolutions and amendments to supporters for them to push through their organisations for submission to the Party's annual conference, then organising delegates to demand that space be allocated on the conference agenda for discussion of these issues, and finally persuading delegates to support their resolutions.

WAC pressure has succeeded in forcing these

issues onto the Party conference agenda since 1981. Each year some, if not all, of these specific topics have been discussed but so far none of the WAC proposals have been approved. Support is growing for the proposal that five resolutions from the Women's conference should be placed on the annual Party conference agenda for automatic debate,(46) for the five Women's representatives on the NEC to be elected by the Women's conference(47), and for the constituency parties to draw up parliamentary short-lists which include at least one woman.(48) But the proposal which has come closest to approval is for the rules and procedures of the Women's conference to be formalised.(49)

The increasingly important role of women within the Party has led to certain Party reforms in which WAC's role has been significant. First, the right of constituency parties with four hundred or more individual women members to send an additional female delegate to the Party's annual conference(50); second, that regional women's conferences may now elect the women members of the regional Party Executive Committees (a useful precedent in the campaign to elect the five women members of the NEC)(51); third, that women's sections can be established in constituency parties without the formal approval of the CLP(52); fourth, that the membership of the National Committee of Labour Women is now elected by Regional conferences of Labour Women(53); and, fifth, that the procedures at the National Labour Women's conference have been improved in part by the introduction of Standing

Orders.

But at a time when many in the Party are more concerned with winning electoral support than with internal Party reforms WAC is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its position. A WAC Officer has described the organisation in 1985 as "a feeble little machine"(54) able to mobilise less support on Party reforms (as measured by resolutions and amendments to the annual party conference agenda) than at any time since its formation, able to make little impact on the women's section of the 'left slate' for NEC elections, and seeing very limited success in its campaign to secure the selection of more women parliamentary candidates.(55)

Furthermore, some of the tensions between left men and women, apparent at the time of the split between CLPD and WAC, have become more explicit. Anne Pettifor, secretary of WAC, has written

> We are marginalised on the one hand by that
> section of the Left which makes a big issue of
> democracy, while consistently excluding women
> from the forums of power. And we are considered
> irrelevant by heroic men of the Left, bent on
> challenging Capital through struggles. All the
> while of course, both groups make great play of
> their devotion to our cause.(56)

Her experiences during the parliamentary selection process led her to claim that

> ...the Labour Party is a Men's Party. Any
> feminist work therein needs first to serve the
> interests of men who exercise power within our
> movement - before securing authority to advance
> the interests of women.

and she complained that discussions on parliamentary candidatures meant that women

> ...once again (will) be expected to jump hoops
> and overcome hurdles - in order to prove our
> acceptability to a group of mainly white men -
> who have it in their power to organise for the
> candidatures of women.(57)

So far in this chapter we have examined the developments in the parliamentary left, in particular the split in its ranks, and the growth of the extra-parliamentary left. Until now we have been dealing with the "revolutionary reformists", Eric Heffer's term to describe those wanting a socialist transformation through the incremental change associated with winning electoral support, securing parliamentary majorities and then proceeding via the recognised parliamentary procedures. The "revolutionary reformists" have recognised that the speed of the revolutionary transformation would depend upon the strength of electoral opinion and the extent to which the Party was committed to such change. They have also been well aware of the institutional conservatism likely to thwart such change without pressures from the Party.

But another socialist tradition - the revolutionary - has claimed that socialist pressures to transform capital would produce a counter-revolution amongst the capital-owning class in which parliamentary democracy would be set aside. Revolutionary socialists have believed it to be necessary to organise in a strictly

democratic centralist manner in preparing to win power. This tradition, which in Britain has been associated first with the Communist Party and then from the 1930s onwards with various Trotskyist organisations is not unimportant first because of the attempts on occasions to join the Labour Party and on other occasions to infiltrate the Labour Party, and second because the combination of both traditions at the rank and file level by people engaged in advancing the interests of the left in general. The third important development in Labour Left politics in the 1970s was the emergence and organisation of revolutionary socialists as part of the Labour Party.

The Communist party has wavered in its attitude towards the Labour Party. Between 1920 and 1924 it requested affiliation but by 1928 it was attacking the Labour Party for its 'social fascism'. The rise of Hitler again prompted Communist requests for affiliation. Throughout the period the Labour Party leadership strongly opposed the Communist Party's requests.

The Labour Party leadership adopted a similar hostile position to those of its members who co-operated and combined with Communists on specific issues. In 1930 the Labour Party had established a list of proscribed organisations which members were forbidden to join. The 'proscribed list' was meant to curb Communist penetration of the Labour Party through the creation of 'front organisations'. And its response to the Unity Campaign - a Labour Left alliance with the Communist Party to fight the rise of fascism in the 1930s - was to disaffiliate the

Socialist League and to threaten the expulsion of individuals who continued to support the Unity Campaign.(58)

The Labour Party also expelled those individuals who it regarded as 'entryists'. The tactic of entryism has been one particularly associated with Trotskyists. In 1936 two entryist groups were operating within the Labour Party - the Bolshevik-Leninist Group and the Marxist League. The first of these argued

> As Bolshevik-Leninists we enter the Labour Party for one reason alone - to make contact with the masses of politically conscious workers and to gain supporters from among them for the formation of a Marxist party and a Fourth International... A minimum requirement may be stated, namely that within a year some hundreds of Labour Party workers are ready to form with us a new party when the moment comes.(59)

Since the entryism of these two groups in 1936 a range of groups claiming loyalty to Trotsky and to the Transitional Programme, adopted by the Fourth International in 1938, have persisted with this tactic. Trotsky argued that they should

> ...advance such slogans as will aid the striving of the workers for independent politics, deepen the class struggle of these politics, destroy reformist and pacifist illusions, strengthen the connection of the vanguard with the masses, and prepare the revolutionary conquest of power.(60)

The purpose of this transitional programme was to bridge the demands of the present with the future socialist revolution but "not one of the transitional demands... could be fully met under the conditions of preserving the

bourgeois regime".(61)

The history of the Fourth International and its affiliated groups has been one of internicine strife, expulsions, disaffiliations and the creation of rival Internationals. The impact of these groups on British politics has been marginal and would not deserve examination but for the fact that at particular times they have pursued their entryist tactics. In the 1950s the Labour Party leadership dealt with this entryism by proscription and expulsion.

After the break up of the Revolutionary Communist Party in 1949 three strands of Trotskyism emerged, all pursuing, at times, entryist tactics. The first was associated with Gerry Healey and the journal Socialist Outlook, which was first published in 1948 and created readers groups linked with it until the Labour Party proscribed the organisation in 1954. The group then re-formed as the Socialist Labour League. The second was associated with Tony Cliff and the Socialist Review Group. Both these groups competed to win control of the Labour Party's youth section and published papers, Keep Left and Young Guard, around which factional organisations developed in the 1950s/1960s. At periodic intervals the Labour Party wound up its youth section and would then create a new body in an attempt to curb the success of Trotskyist groups in winning majority support within the controlling committee of the youth section.(62) But eventually both these strands of British Trotskyism abandoned their entryist tactics and became established

independent organisations, in the case of the first, the Workers Revolutionary Party, and the second, the International Socialists, which subsequently became the Socialist Workers Party.

By the late 1960s only the third strand, associated with Ted Grant and the Revolutionary Socialist League, remained to advocate Trotskyist ideas within the Labour Party. Because of its refusal to obey the Fourth International's instructions to cease entryist activities the RSL was expelled from this body in 1965. The Revolutionary Socialist League published a journal International Socialist Revolution until in 1964 it was retitled Militant - the Marxist paper for Labour and Youth, from which the title of the Militant Group originates.(63)

The revolutionary left[1]: the Militant Group

Militant has played a vital role in the Labour
Party in stimulating debate and in bringing back
into prominence the role of Marxist ideas.

Nick Bradley in a letter to the New Statesman,
January 25 1980.)

...a pestilential nuisance to the Party as a
whole.

The Leader of the Labour Party, Michael Foot,
speaking in Preston on February 13th, 1981.
Reported in Tribune, February 20 1981.)

...the Militant tendency is a maggot in the body
of the Labour Party.

Neil Kinnock, Labour Weekly, November 29 1985.)

We have noted earlier that the Labour Left's programme wants to shift the mix of the economy in a manner that will transform the motivations of people in a socialist society. But the revolutionary socialist is not concerned with the mix of public to private ownership since s/he wishes to destroy the prevailing economic relationships.

The Militant Group has argued that capitalism is on the point of imminent collapse. Capital's falling rate of profit makes the collapse inevitable. But to ensure that the working class will support a socialist revolution it is necessary to put forward a series of apparently reasonable, but unacceptable, transitional demands which highlight capital's inability to reform itself. The creation of a revolutionary working class is stimulated by this strategy.

Ted Grant argues the need to make a complete break with capitalism in the following terms

> The policies of reformism, of gradually reforming capitalism, have been shown to be bankrupt... There is no enduring solution to the problems facing the working class under capitalism... It is impossible to plan capitalism. The national and world markets are dominant in this system. The Labour and trade union movement must break with capitalism.(64)

The belief that it is impossible to plan capitalism has led the Militant Group to oppose the Alternative Economic Strategy.

The group opposed both the particular proposals and the overall objectives of the AES. For example, it

opposed any notion of import controls because such controls, it claimed, would lower workers' real wages, would undermine international working class solidarity, would provoke retaliatory measures by other countries, and would not guarantee any improvement in economic efficiency. It also rejected proposals to introduce exchange controls and controls on capital movements believing such measures to be ineffective unless companies were nationalised. But its basic objection to the AES was the belief that capitalism could be planned. Andrew Glyn has written

> The assumption that capitalism can be planned in the interests of society, that reforms in terms of improved living standards etc. can be guaranteed, not by the free market itself, but by the free market tamed by the N.E.B. and Planning Agreements, would provide an objective basis for the class collaboration implicit (in) these schemes. The objection to the schemes follows from the belief that such extensive clipping of the wings of free enterprise is impossible...(65)

Furthermore, the Militant Group believed that the AES would provoke a capitalist backlash. As Glyn has argued

> An attempt simply to implement such a programme would be met by the capitalist using the enormous economic power left in their (sic) hands to sabotage the government's plans. The danger is not just that the ideas of socialism would be discredited in this way, but that the economic chaos which would result would pave the way for a reactionary takeover on the basis of crushing the organisations of the working class...(66)

And Glyn concludes by asserting that "...no ruling class will ever surrender its power without a struggle".(67)

The Militant Group demands the nationalisation of all the banks and insurance companies and the two hundred leading monopolies with compensation paid "only on the basis of proven need". On the industrial front the demand for a 35 hour working week "must form the hub of traditional demands"(68) and a minimum wage which has risen during the years of inflation from £90 in 1981 to £115 in 1985 "must be the core of our agitation".(69)

The Militant Group's long-term perspective has been that during the 1980s "British capitalism will stagger from crisis to crisis" which will result in "the Italianisation of British politics". What this means is that

> The social crisis of Britain will be protracted.
> It will end either in the greatest victory of
> the working class, achieving power and the
> overthrow of the rule of capital with the
> installation of workers' democracy or we will
> have a military police dictatorship which will
> destroy the labour movement and kill millions of
> advanced workers, shop stewards, ward
> secretaries, and even individual members of the
> labour movement.(70)

It is in order to organise support for its programme that Militant newspaper generates readers groups, Marxist discussion groups, summer schools, and pamphlets. But the Militant Group operates at two levels: first, there is the open, public aspect associated with the newspaper; and, second, there is the closed, private aspect of a structured and disciplined membership organisation with its own cadre training schools.

The Militant Group's public organisation

The public aspect of the group centres around the once monthly and now weekly newspaper, which advertises readers meetings and groups, and Marxist discussion groups and conferences. The newspaper, printed on the group's own presses and sold primarily by supporters, has an estimated sales of about 20,000 copies.(71) Its weekly output consists of a mixture of domestic and foreign news, plus theoretical discussions centred around the works of Trotsky. The domestic reporting covers both political and industrial events, but great emphasis is placed upon reporting and supporting trade unionists involved in industrial disputes. Finally, one page is devoted to the 'Weekly Fighting Fund' in which donations are solicited and welcomed towards meeting an annual financial target figure.

Questions are often asked concerning the Group's sources of funds to provide a weekly newspaper, its own printing press, and paid full-time organisers. In 1980 Militant stated that

> The sole source of Militant's finances... is our readers and supporters in the labour movement... We rely entirely on activists within the labour movement...(72)

Militant claim three sources of funds: cash from sales of the newspaper; cash raised by the Militant fighting fund; and loans from World International Review Publications Ltd., of £148,500 repayable by 1986. WIR Ltd's income

is derived solely from the donations of active
members of the Labour Party and the trade unions
who... are prepared to make regular
contributions to develop the support for Marxist
policies within the labour movement.(73)

Individuals, open in their support for the
newspaper's politics, stand for office within the Labour
Party in order to increase the influence of the group. For
example, Ray Apps, Pat Wall and Nick Bradley stood for the
elections to the constituency parties section of the NEC
in 1978 and stated

We are seeking election to the National
Executive Committee of the Labour Party as
Marxists and supporters of Militant in order to
fight for policies in the interests of working
people.(74)

No candidate standing for the constituency parties section
of the NEC as a supporter of Militant has been elected.
The highest vote achieved by a Militant supporter standing
in the constituency section ballot was 103,000 votes for
Pat Wall in 1982, placing him in 13th position.(75)

Prior to June 1983 no Labour MP was identified
with Militant, but seven candidates, explicit supporters
of the newspaper, had been selected by CLPs before the
General Election.(76) Subsequently, parliamentary boundary
changes, introduced prior to the 1983 General Election,
reduced the number of Militant candidates to four, of whom
two - Terry Fields and David Nellist - were elected.

At the regional and local levels of the Party
Militant supporters have been candidates for Office, but

no Party regional Executives have been Militant-controlled and only a limited number of CLPs have been in this position. Liverpool District Labour Party, Brighton Kemptown, Shipley and the Isle of Wight are local parties that are, or have been, Militant-controlled.

This is a summary of part of the public activities associated with the Militant newspaper, but there is also the private operations of the Militant Group.

The Militant Group's private organisation

The role of the newspaper in recruiting members into a disciplined and structured organisation with local branch committees, district committees, a central committee, a national conference and a full-time staff spread around the country is of considerable importance. This is admitted in an internal Militant Group newsletter entitled Bulletin.

> By the use of the paper we are able to select
> the most class conscious workers as prospective
> members.(77)

Whereas Militant generates supporters, members are being recruited to the group on a strict basis after completing a programme of political education and satisfying a local vetting comittee.(78) Membership is not open to any Labour Party member who might be interested in the Militant programme, as an issue of Bulletin, made clear in 1975.

> No one is suggesting an open door policy. We
> have to maintain and constantly lift the
> theoretical level and the cohesion of the
> organisation, considerations that should be
> weighed very carefully when recruiting new
> members.(79)

Political cadres are recruited to the group who are then expected to devote considerable time and money to the organisation.(80) Selling of the newspaper is a major priority for members as well as working within the Labour Party to win political support for the <u>Militant</u> demands. This strategy is made perfectly clear in the organisation's policy statements which are not available openly to interested observers or potential recruits. The annual policy statement of the Group in 1974 outlines the strategy:

> We must dig roots in the wards and the YS. Many
> are still shells dominated by politically dead
> old men and women. They are now ossified little
> cliques. They will begin to change with an
> influx of new members. The YS branches where we
> have support are already a springboard for work
> in the wards and GMCs. We must draw the YS into
> the work in the constituency parties. A period
> of upheavals and changes on a far more extended
> scale is opening up in the Labour Party.
> Enormous opportunities will open up and we must
> be ready organisationally and politically to
> take advantage of them.(81)

Again in 1975 it states

> ...we must consciously aim to penetrate every
> constituency party in the country... A citadel
> in every constituency, a base in every ward.(82)

And again in 1977 it asserts

Many ward/branches can become citadels of the ideas of Marxism, like many branches of the youth movement at the present time.(83)

What this means in specific terms is contained within the Bulletin, the group's private newsletter in which reports are provided on the progress of this campaign of penetration. For example, in 1976 a report on the Bracknell area states that a good position had been built up on the General Management Committee of the Wokingham CLP "with political control of one branch ensuring that our resolutions are debated".(84) Or again, a report on Merseyside in 1978 comments:

We have taken over one Party and will be using it to organise discussion meetings.(85)

The objective of this organisational work is made clear in the 1975 policy document

When we gain a sizeable strength in Wards and Constituencies, it will be necessary to take them over and transform on Marxist lines, building a mass support among workers in the area.(86)

Militant's impact?

Assessments of the impact of the Militant Group vary according to the political perspectives of the observer. The Militant Left, the Labour Right and the Conservative Right are agreed that the impact has been considerable but the non-revolutionary Labour Left denies

its impact.(87)

Militant's greatest organisational success has been the capture of the Party's Young Socialists in 1970 by securing a majority on its National Committee. Since 1972 the LPYS has elected a representative on to the Party's NEC and the Party also subsidises a LPYS newspaper, Left, which as an official Party newspaper is advocating a Militant programme. Every LPYS representative on the NEC, elected by the LPYS annual conference, has been a supporter of the Militant Group and this gives the group both an air of legitimacy and an entre into the extra-parliamentary Party's highest decision making procedures.(88) A considerable boost was given to the Group's legitimacy in 1976 when the NEC appointed a Militant Group supporter, Andy Bevan, to be the Party's Youth Officer.

There are other prominent personnel within the Party who have an explicit attachment to the policies of the Militant Group - for example, the two Labour MPs elected in June 1983. But these two have succeeded in becoming parliamentarians only because of the support generated for them amongst the local Party activitists prior to the candidate selection conferences. More activists are directly associated with Militant than with other Left groupings.(89) Much of this activist support originates from some of Labour's traditional areas of strength where Party support has been taken for granted and Party membership has been low. In such areas Party activity was primarily concerned with local government and

tended to be less concerned with national issues. Further, it was within such local Parties where local government was the predominant concern that the Labour Right was in control. In the absence of organised Labour Left activity in such constituencies the ideological vacuum was filled by the Militant Group. Its instant socialism of easily-remembered slogans is attractive to a particular section of Labour youth, and its involvement in local industrial disputes and local Party activity has earned it support. Whilst the Tribune Group was agonising over whether to support Labour governments or not in the late sixties and seventies, and was unwilling to mount an organised left wing campaign in the extra-parliamentary Party, Left activists within the labour movement were supported on day-to-day issues by Militant. But the reciprocal support which Party activists gave Militant did not necessarily imply commitment to a revolutionary programme of transitional demands which capitalism could not meet and therefore would help drive capitalism further into crisis and towards the socialist revolution. And none of these commitments, such as nationalisation of the two hundred leading monopolies, a thirty five hour week with no loss of wages and a high minimum wage, were included in the Left programme approved by the Party from 1970 onwards. Furthermore, the economism of Militant - its concentration upon a class analysis of capitalism - resulted in its lack of sympathy and support for emergent radical movements campaigning for women's rights, against nuclear disarmament and nuclear power, for racial equality, and

the defence of civil liberties. <u>Militant</u> was cut off from these campaigns, some of which have had a considerable impact upon the Labour Party over the last ten years.

The Militant Group's impact has been more organisational than ideological. As 'a party within the Party', with its own programme, bureaucracy,(90) press and members, it is the clearest example of a group transcending the rules and spirit of the Labour Party constitution. We will examine the Party's response to this transgression in a later chapter, but the prevailing opinion within the non-revolutionary Labour Left in the 1970s, was reflected in the NEC's statement that "Trotskyist views cannot be beaten by disciplinary action".(91)

Until 1978 the Militant Group had no Trotskyist rivals pursuing entryist tactics within the Party. But in that year Workers Action, a breakaway group from the Workers Revolutionary Party, combined with the Chartist Group to form the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory (SCLV). Workers Action argued that

> It is necessary... to create a revolutionary movement in the working class movement, inside it, of it, and not outside it and needlessly counterposed to it.(92)

It was forthright in its opinion of liberal democracy:

> Workers Action holds no brief for Parliament, nor for the view that power is to be found there, but the choice for the labour movement is either that it will engage in the political processes and institutions of the society in which it exists - <u>even if its purpose is to</u>

subvert and replace them - or it must abstain from effective political action in the here and now...(93)

The revolutionary left[2]: the Socialist Organiser Alliance

The SCLV was launched in July 1978 "to ensure a Labour victory at the next election, despite and in opposition to Labour's governmental record". The launch conference was sponsored by two Labour MPs - Joan Maynard and Harry Selby - three parliamentary candidates - Ken Livingstone, Ted Knight and Jane Chapman - four London CLPs - Brent East, Hackney North, Hornsey and Norwood - and over sixty individuals, the majority of whom were from the London area. SCLV's political programme combined such general objectives as "to make the decisive sectors of industry social property under workers control" and support of "all struggles for better living standards and conditions" with specific commitments to scrap all immigration controls, provide free abortion and contraception on demand, remove British troops from Ireland and repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act, support all demands to weaken the power of the police and freeze all rents and rates.(94)

SCLV launched a newspaper, Socialist Organiser, in September 1978 which became a monthly in January 1979, a fortnightly in 1980 and finally a weekly in 1981. After the 1979 General Election SCLV became the Socialist Organiser Alliance, although immediately prior to the 1983 General Election it established Socialists for a Labour

Victory in order to draw in wider support during
electioneering.(95) In comparison with the Militant Group
the Socialist Organiser Alliance is more open an
organisation. It has argued the need for

> an open, democratic, outward-looking, non-
> sectarian and indeed anti-sectarian,
> organisation, radically different from the
> would-be Marxist organisations that exist in and
> around the labour movement.(96)

It holds a bi-monthly delegate meeting and although its
political base is overwhelmingly in London over twenty
supporters groups have been formed in other parts of the
country.

The Socialist Organiser Alliance is very
critical of the Militant Group's programme arguing that it
is "sterile materialism"(97) and also that the Group is a
"passive propagandist sect incapable of collaboration with
anyone else".(98) In comparison Socialist Organiser
Alliance has created particular organisations to campaign
on specific issues and as such has made more of an impact
within the non-revolutionary Labour Left. It has
concentrated on four issues: Northern Ireland, local
government, women's rights and democracy within the Labour
Party. It initiated a conference on local finance and
services in June 1979 and has been prominent in
encouraging local authorities, especially in London, to
refuse to implement either cuts in services or to raise
rates. It initiated the Fightback for Women's Rights
campaign with conferences held in January and March 1980.
Most successful of all has been its sponsorship of the

Rank and File Mobilising Committee in 1980 to defend and extend the structural reforms of the Labour Party. Its prominent role within the RFMC gave it considerable contacts and links in the labour movement throughout the country. It then followed this up by taking a leading part in the organisation of Tony Benn's deputy leadership campaign in 1981. In 1979 <u>Socialist Organiser</u> had been a hostile critic of Benn and the AES but now it had become part of the mainstream of Labour Left activity, attempting to create an extra-parliamentary organisation to fill the vacuum which the Tribune Group had ignored.(99)

One of the common features of the revolutionary left is the ideological disputation and the consequent splits in the organisations. Within one year the Socialist Organiser Alliance had split over the issue of local government finances. A division occurred between those arguing that rate rises should be regarded as a temporary means of dealing with reductions in central government grants to local authorities and those arguing that rate rises would harm working class people's budgets. The upshot of this division was the Chartist group seceded in November 1979 and launched <u>London Labour Briefing</u> in February 1980.

The revolutionary left[3]: London Labour Briefing

Graham Bash, political editor of <u>London Labour Briefing</u>, has stated

> We're not a disciplined revolutionary
> organisation. I'm not at all denying the need
> for a disciplined revolutionary organisation -
> I'm a Leninist and I accept the need for such an
> organisation. But in Briefing we're operating at
> a different level.(100)

This is a London-based group involved in local government politics, primarily around the GLC and some of the Labour-controlled London Boroughs, which produces a monthly paper London Labour Briefing. It was identified at its beginning with Ted Knight and Ken Livingstone and their campaigns in London local government. But by 1983 it was attempting to provide the lead for all the revolutionary left by establishing a national network of Briefing groups(101), a National Committee made up of two representatives from each local Briefing group, twelve officers and one delegate from each national organisation of the Left. London Labour Briefing argued

> There is now an unprecedented recognition on the
> 'hard left' that while ideological pluralism and
> debate are essential, we can simply no longer
> afford to allow our differences to obstruct the
> maximum possible unity in action on all those
> issues on which we are agreed... We must build a
> kind of 'Joint Command' for all revolutionary
> and anti-capitalist tendencies and organisations
> in Britain which are serious in their
> determination to win the power to transform
> society.(102)

Conclusion

During the period of the late-1970s and early-1980s the extent of the Labour Left activity was greater than ever before in its history. Never before had there been such a range of organisations: the list included the

Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, the Rank and File Mobilising Committee, Labour Liaison '82(103), the Tribune Group, the Campaign Group, Independent Labour Publications, the Labour Co-ordinating Committee, the Militant Group, the Socialist Organiser Alliance, and the London Labour Briefing Group. Never before had the Labour Left published such a wide range of regular newspapers including Tribune, Labour Leader, Labour Herald,(104) Militant and Socialist Organiser.

The people attached to these groups were united in their opposition to many of the measures of the Labour Government from 1976 onwards, they demanded greater accountability of parliamentarians to the Party activists, and they supported Tony Benn in his deputy leadership candidature. By 1981 their list of successes was considerable: the Party was led by a man whose whole political career had been associated with the Tribune left and the whole tenor of its policies was left wing; future leaders of the Party would be elected to office by an electoral college in which the parliamentarians' vote was a minority of the total; the parliamentarians would now have to go through a regular procedure of scrutiny and reselection; and after a powerful six-month campaign the challenger and 'outsider' had almost won a startling victory for a position in the Party leadership. The Labour Left appeared to be a single, coherent, united and successful faction within the Party. But the successes had been achieved by capturing the support of the Party activists: the less active Party members and the voters

had often been ignored. It was just assumed that both
would welcome this new-found Party radicalism. But some
Party members were unimpressed and left to join the SDP
jeopardising the alliance between socialist and social
reformer which had been so important a feature of the
Labour Party. And the electors were unimpressed by
Labour's disunity.(105) Little attempt was made to explain
Labour's new policy commitments. Jim Callaghan pointed to
this weakness in a debate at the 1983 Party conference on
defence policy when he argued

> What the movement has failed to understand is
> that it reversed the traditional policy of the
> Labour Party on which we had fought 11
> succeeding elections without any real attempt to
> convince the British people that what we were
> doing was right.(106)

Opposition to the Callaghan leadership, the
campaign to reform the Party constitution, and then the
Benn deputy leadership campaign united a set of disparate
forces in the Party. Revolutionary and non-revolutionary
socialists had combined to shift the Party leftwards. But
the Left was united on nothing more than a defence of the
Party reforms so far achieved (reselection) and the
extension of these reforms in order that the right-
dominated parliamentary Party would come under the control
of the Party activists. The Benn candidature gave added
force and significance to the Left as a force in the
Party. But by October 1981 this alliance was beginning to
reveal its fragility and soon began to crumble. By 1983
the responses to Labour's election defeat and the
strategies for dealing with various aspects of

Conservatism (especially over the coal dispute and the curbs placed on Labour-controlled local authorities' expenditure) revealed fundamental differences over economic policies, the nature of the state, the meaning of parliamentary democracy, and the extent of change in contemporary social structure. Division, fragmentation, and realignment occurred in which distinctions emerged between 'hard' and 'soft' left, 'new' and 'traditional' left, 'vanguardist' and 'participatory' left. It is this fragmentation and realignment which we will examine in the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Tilley. Unpublished statement on resigning from the Tribune Group, 1982. (A copy in the author's possession.)

2. loc.cit.

3. The Parliamentary Committee is the elected Shadow Cabinet when the Labour Party is in Opposition. When the Labour Party is in Government the PLP establishes a Liaision Committee of fourteen persons. The Chairman is elected by the PLP and is a backbencher. Six backbenchers are elected by their own number and six Government representatives, always including the Leader of the House and the Chief Whip, are appointed by the Prime Minister. The backbench Labour Peers elect one representative.

4. In May 1981 Janey Buchan, a member of the European Parliament, was included in the Group's membership as advertised in Tribune (May 1, 1981). Since then other MEPs have joined the Group.

5. N. Kinnock in D. Hill (ed) Tribune 40, pp.193-195.

6. For examples of their policy statements see footnote 19, chapter 3.

7. P. Norton Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979 and Dissension in the House of Commons 1945-1974. I am grateful to Philip Norton for his help in providing me with additional information concerning Tribune Group rebellions on which a great deal of the material in this section is based.

8. Dissent is defined as votes against the Labour Whip. P. Norton Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979, p.428.

9. ibid., p.434.

10. The five abstainers were S. Bidwell, R. Hughes, E. Loyden, R. Thomas, and A. Latham. D. Telegraph, December 14 & 15, 1978.

11. HC Deb 894, 1623-8, 1974-5, No. 267 and HC Deb 894, 1631-6, 1974-5, No. 269.

12. HC Deb 940, 1557-60, 1977-8, No. 44.

13. HC Deb 962, 471-2, 1978-9, No. 74.

14. C. Hitchins 'The Tribune Group goes missing' New Statesman, July 21, 1978.

15. B. Pimlott Labour and the Left in the 1930s, pp.107-8.

16. The editors of Tribune have been William Mellor (1937-1938); H.J. Hartshorn (1938-1940); Raymond Postgate (1939-1941); Aneurin Bevan (1941-1945); Jon Kimche and Evelyn Anderson (1945-1948); Michael Foot and Evelyn Anderson (1948-1960); Dick Clements (1960-1982); Chris Mullin (1982-1984) and Nigel Williamson (1984-).

17. Tribune, March 28, 1980.

18. Richard Clements Tribune, December 27, 1974.

19. Back from the Brink, June 1975.

20. Socialist Fellowship had been proscribed as a Trotskyist organisation in 1951. Trotskyists had attempted to infiltrate Victory for Socialism in 1958.

21. A good example of this antipathy of Left parliamentarians towards extra-parliamentary Left organisation occurred when Socialist Charter decided to nominate its Chairman, Royden Harrison, for the CLP section elections to the NEC in 1970. Socialist Charter's pressures on some Tribune Group candidates to withdraw from the election in order not to undermine Harrison's chances were viewed with a great deal of hostility by some in the Tribune Group.

22. By 1978 eighteen local Tribune groups had been established.

23. For example, a Tribune Group meeting was held in Sheffield in April 1978.

24. J. Tilley op.cit.

25. Tribune, October 8, 1981.

26. Socialist Organiser, October 8, 1981.

27. 'Unity, Victory and Socialism' was signed by eighteen MPs, only one of whom was not a member of the Tribune Group. The signatories were Joan Maynard, Norman Atkinson, Jo Richardson, Michael Meacher, Tony Benn, Bob Cryer, Martin Flannery, Bob Parry, Ernie Roberts, Reg Race, Stan Thorne, William McElvey, Bob McTaggart, Ian Mikardo, Alan Roberts, Bob Litherland, Dennis Skinner and Andy McMahon. The last-named was not a member of the Tribune Group.

28. An advert in Tribune (April 24, 1983) gave the membership of the Campaign Group as the original signatories to 'Unity, Victory and Socialism' minus Jo Richardson, Ian Mikardo and Stan Thorne plus Ron Brown, Denis Canavan, Don Dixon, Stuart Holland, Les Huckfield, Ray Powell, Ernie Ross and John Tilley.

29. Tribune, July 2, 1982.

30. Tribune, October 29, 1982.

31. The legal dispute was only settled out of court in November 1985. See the statements in <u>Tribune</u>, November 22, 1985.

32. <u>Labour Weekly</u>, November 2, 1984.

33. Socialist Charter did not take kindly to this attempted dominance by the Tribune Group. Royden Harrison's candidature in the 1970 NEC elections provoked considerable opposition from some members of the Tribune Group. Harrison's large vote in the 1970 elections, the highest for any non-parliamentarian since Harold Laski back in the 1940s, reflected the disillusion with Left parliamentarians.

34. In 1975 the ILP secured approval for its new structure from the NEC. Back in the 1950s and 1960s this would not have been given since the group's structure and activities contravened Clause II(3) of the Labour Party Constitution.

35. 'About Ourselves'. Independent Labour Publicatons.

36. For example, D. Howell <u>The Rise and Fall of Bevanism</u>.

37. See Chapter six.

38. Michael Meacher was a Junior Minister at the Department of Industry during the fifteen month period that Tony Benn was Secretary of State for Industry and Frances Morrell was Benn's political adviser.

39. Between 1980 and 1984 LCC published the following pamphlets: Towards a Mass Party (1980); There Is an Alternative (1981); Can Local Government Survive? (1981); Trade Unions and Socialism (1981); The Realignment of the Right (1982); Labour and Mass Politics (1982); Activists Handbook (1982); Trade Union Broad Lefts (1983); Go Local To Survive (1984); Reconstruction: How the Labour Party and the Left can Win (1984); Party Organisation Report (1984). LCC published its book, in co-operation with the Conference of Socialist Economists, <u>The Alternative Economic Strategy</u>, in 1980. The seven conferences have been <u>Debate of the Decade</u> (1980); Trade Unions and Socialism (1981); Social Policy (1982); Policies for Victory (1983); After the Landslide (1983); Trade Unions and the Political Levy (1984) and Taking Liberties (1985).

40. <u>Labour Activist</u>, 3 March 1979.

41. <u>loc.cit.</u>

42. Writing in the LCC <u>Newsletter</u> Barry Winter stated that "The LCC has been set on a political course that is deeply pragmatic and eclectic - for all its talk about campaigning and mass politics. What now seems to matter is the opportunity to whisper into the ears of Party leaders, and to manage the LCC's image so that it does not upset

anyone. The preference seems to be for politically fudged positions which seek to please all." (June 1984)

43. Tribune issued a "relaunch statement", signed by fifty four prominent figures on the Labour Left, on September 20 1985. Tribune and LCC combined to sponsor a local group in Sheffield at the end of 1985.

44. See Chapter nine for details of the dispute within CLPD.

45. 'Note from the Treasurer' CLPD Executive Committee Minutes, May 1983.

46. The votes on this proposal have been as follows:

	FOR	AGAINST
1982	522,000	6,317,000
1983	1,377,000	5,418,000
1984	2,123,000	4,533,000

LPACR, 1982, p.121; 1983, p.243, 1984, p.232

47. The votes on this proposal have been as follows:

	FOR	AGAINST
1982	1,101,000	5,771,000
1983	lost on a show of hands	
1984	1,634,000	4,917,000
1985	1,643,000	4,697,000

LPACR, 1982, p.122; 1983, p.242; 1984, p.232; 1985, p.202.

48. The votes on this proposal have been as follows:

	FOR	AGAINST
1982	1,095,000	5,720,000
1984	1,386,000	5,078,000
1985	1,731,000	3,875,000

LPACR, 1982, p.115; 1984, p.232; 1985, p. 202.

49. The votes on this proposal have been as follows:

	FOR	AGAINST
1983	3,134,000	3,660,000
1984	2,800,000	3,820,000

LPACR, 1983, p.243; 1984, p.232.

50. LPACR, 1984, p.178-179.

51. loc.cit.

52. LPACR, 1981, pp.183-195.

53. NEC Report, 1981, p.16.

54. Interview with Anne Pettifor, September 1985.

55. By December 1985 the Party had selected three hundred and fifty candidates, and of these forty five were women.

56. Bulletin of the Labour Women's Action Committee, June 1985, p.5.

57. London Labour Briefing, 46, February 1985, p.12.

58. LPACR, 1937, p.164.

59. 'On the Work of the Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour Party' Revolutionary Communist Papers, 8, 1981, p.26 quoted in D. Hallas 'Revolutionaries and the Labour Party' International Socialism, 16, Spring 1982, p.20.

60. The Death Agony of Capitalism and the tasks of the Fourth International, p.39.

61. ibid., p.40.

62. On entryism into the Labour Party youth movement see Jack Cleary and Neil Cobbett 'Labour's Misspent Youth' Workers Action, supplement, 1979.

63. Trotskyist terminology for a faction is a tendency. For the sake of consistency in this thesis I refer to the Militant Group although all the group's internal documents refer to the Militant Tendency.

64. 'Britain in Crisis' Militant, February 23, 1979.

65. Capitalist Crisis: Tribune's Alternative Strategy or Socialist Plan, p.39.

66. ibid., p.65.

67. ibid., p.76.

68. British Perspectives, 1977, p.10.

69. loc.cit.

70. ibid., p.12.

71. M. Crick Militant, p.116 & p.125.

72. Editorial statement, Militant, February 8, 1980. The total money raised each year for the Fighting Fund, as published in Militant, has been: £47,000 (1977); £66,000 (1978); £80,000 (1979); £94,000 (1980); £103,000 (1981); £148,000 (1982); £152,000 (1983). See also M. Crick, op.cit, pp.116-7.

73. Editorial statement, _Militant_, February 8 1980.

74. _Militant_, September 22, 1978.

75. _LPACR_, 1982, p.66.

76. The seven were Terry Harrison (Liverpool Edge Hill), Terry Fields (Liverpool Broadgreen), Tony Mulhearn (Liverpool Toxteth), David Nellist (Coventry South East), Pat Wall (Bradford North), Cathy Wilson (Isle of Wight) and Rod Fitch (Brighton Kemptown).

77. _Bulletin_, September 1975, p.9.

78. For example, see the experiences of an (ex) member of the Militant Group, published in the _New Statesman_, February 1, 1980.

79. _Bulletin_, September 1974, p.9.

80. _New Statesman_, February 1, 1980. The Minutes of the Blackburn branch of the Militant Group (September 24, _1982) record the stipulation that unemployed and students should give £3 per week and income earners should have a minimum levy of between ten and fifteen per cent of their annual income._ (Photocopy of the Minutes in the author's _possession._)

81. _British Perspectives and Tasks_, 1974, p.15.

82. _British Perspectives_, 1975, p.17.

83. _British Perspectives, 1977, pp. 18-19._

84. _Bulletin_, September 1976, p.4.

85. _Bulletin_, June 1978, p.7.

86. _British Perspectives and Tasks_, 1975, p.10.

87. From the Labour Right D. Webster argues that "...the strength of the Trotskyist position in the Labour Party stems primarily from the widespread acceptance of the worldview it implies. _The Labour Party and the New Left_ (Fabian tract 477, 1981, p.32.) Conservative assessments of the Militant Group's influence are contained in B. Baker _The Far Left_; P. Shipley _Revolutionaries in Modern Britain_; and J. Tomlinson _Left, Right_. From the Labour Left _Tribune_ has dismissed "the infantile bletherings that come from this group". January 18, 1980. See also _Tribune_, March 27, 1981.

88. LPYS representatives on the NEC have been P. Doyle (1972-3); N. Bradley (1974-77); T. Saunois (1978-80); L. Coates (1981-1983); S. Morgan (1983-4); and F. Curran (1984-).

89. By September 1982 the membership of the Militant Group is recorded as 3,267. Minutes of the Blackburn branch, September 28, 1982. Crick records a membership of 4,700 by the end of 1983. M. Crick, op.cit., p.132.

90. One hundred and thirty eight full-time organisers are reported in September 1982. Minutes of the Blackburn branch, September 28, 1982.

91. LPACR, 1977, p.385.

92. Workers Action, 182, March 1981, p.5.

93. loc.cit. (my emphasis).

94. Socialist Campaign For a Labour Victory, Launch statement.

95. Socialists For a Labour Victory was launched in March 1983 with Jo Richardson, Joan Maynard, Reg Race and Ken Livingstone as the four Chairpersons. It was sponsored by the Socialist Organiser Alliance, the Socialist League (previously the International Marxist Group) and London Labour Briefing.

96. Socialist Organiser, 24, August 30, 1980.

97. International Communist, 9, August 1978.

98. Socialist Organiser, 24, August 30, 1980.

99. The Socialist Campaign For a Labour Victory had been most hostile to Benn immediately after the 1979 General Election, attacking him for remaining a member of the Labour Government, for failing to give a lead against pay restraint and for avoiding key issues on the NEC. SCLV also attacked the "Bennites AES" on the grounds that "it springs from an incorrect analysis of what is wrong with British capitalism and a fanciful view of the ease with which institutions hostile to the idea of state control can be persuaded to co-operate with such a policy". (Socialist Organiser, May 1979). SCLV described the Tribune Group as "a club of MPs, with no connection with or accountability to an organised rank and file movement". (Socialist Organiser, July 1980)

100. Socialist Organiser, January 6, 1983.

101. Briefing groups had been established in London, Brighton, Merseyside, Nottingham, Stoke, Swansea and Glasgow by July 1983.

102. London Labour Briefing, 32, August 1985, p.5.

103. Labour Liaison '82 was a loose alliance of Left Labour MPs, trade unionists, representatives from the various Left groups (minus the Tribune Group and the LCC both of which declined the invitation to become formally

involved) and individuals who met in London in January and May 1982. At the May meeting a Left NEC 'slate' was agreed but not without considerable argument. The subsequent leaking of the meeting's Minutes led to the collapse of the group.

104. Labour Herald was first published in 1981, with Ted Knight, Ken Livingstone and Matthew Warburton as the paper's three editors. Ken Livingstone resigned as an editor in 1985 after the GLC's decision to fix a rate (see Chapter ten) and was replaced by John McDonnell. At the end of 1985 it ceased weekly publication as a consequence of the internal disputes within the Workers Revolutionary Party because the paper was printed on the WRP's presses.

105. A. Heath, R. Jowell & J. Curtice How Britain Votes, pp.163-5.

106. LPACR, 1983, pp.160-1.

CHAPTER NINE

FRAGMENTATION AND REALIGNMENT OF THE LABOUR LEFT

The divisions that now emerged within the Labour
Left involved questions about the fundamental nature of
the Party - its power structure, its electoral strategy
and its methods of opposing the Conservative Government.
Underlying these questions was a dispute about the nature
of parliamentary socialism. The 'hard' left, which
encompasses both revolutionary reformist and Trotskyist
elements, have taken the view that no compromises should
be entered into with either the Party leadership or with
the Conservative Government. On intra-party matters they
have argued that the campaign to reform the Party by
extending the powers of the extra-parliamentary Party
should be maintained. They have opposed any modification
of policy commitments made by annual Party conferences
which, in the light of the 1983 election result, appeared
to be electorally unpopular (for example, the Party's
commitment to withdraw from the EEC and not to encourage
the sale of council houses). On the other hand they have
argued that certain Left policy commitments should be
extended further (for example, that Labour's non-nuclear
defence policy should involve withdrawal from NATO).(1)
They have asserted the need for the Party to adopt a
class-based strategy which defends organised labour in all

its conflicts with capital and with Government and which appeals for electoral support on the basis of defending the working class. Finally, the 'hard' left have argued that if the Party leadership was unwilling to adopt such an overall strategy then it should be opposed in the annual leadership elections. In dealing with the Government this section of the left have felt that trade unions should be willing to call a general strike if necessary in order to defeat the Government and that trade unions, local authorities and individuals should directly confront the Government by refusing to obey its laws.

In contrast the 'soft' left have felt that there is little support amongst the Party membership for further constitutional reforms with the exception of certain specific issues, such as the extension of women's rights within the Party, and that the left should concentrate upon maintaining the present reforms rather than extending them further. They have been willing to rethink some aspects of policy which appeared to be unpopular with Labour supporters or unlikely to be so relevant by the time of another General Election. The 'soft' left have argued that the socio-economic composition of the workforce is changing and therefore a political strategy based simply on appeals to 'the working class' might be damaging. They have asserted that the weaknesses of the organised labour movement are such that calls for a general strike are unrealistic. Similarly the lack of

popular support for a confrontationist strategy within the Government makes it very difficult to mount campaigns of civil disobedience. Such a strategy has to have popular support and that can be won only over time and in exceptional circumstances. The 'soft' left argue the need for a careful and realistic assessment of social structures and popular sentiment rather than what they regard as the mindless incantation of political slogans.

This division into 'hard' and 'soft' camps has emerged as a consequence of the deputy leadership election, the establishment of a Party register of non-affiliated groups of Party members and the subsequent expulsion of five members of the <u>Militant</u> editorial board, the 1983 General Election result, the election of a new Party leadership, the twelve month coal dispute and, finally the resistance campaign of local authorities to the Government's rate-capping legislation.

The deputy leadership election

We have already referred to the bitter personal antagonisms generated by this contest. The close margin of Denis Healey's victory exacerbated some feelings of betrayal towards those on the Left who had not voted for Benn. These divisions were further generated in the next few months. There were some on the Left who wanted Benn to run again for Deputy Leader in 1982 in order to combat the right wing majority that had been re-established on the

NEC in 1981. This NEC had removed Benn and Heffer from their NEC committee chairmanships and had refused to endorse Peter Tatchell as parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey. Others were opposed to Benn standing again and also believed that it was time now for the Left to adopt a low profile. For example, Vladimir Derer, who had regarded Benn's campaign in 1981 as "unwise" argued in his annual report to CLPD that some of the group's demands "must be set on one side for the time being" and that there should be an "insistence on a low profile in all elections for Party offices".(2) However, Derer's report was rejected at the 1981 annual meeting of the CLPD by 63 votes to 32 and the members went on to carry a resolution appealing to Benn and Norman Atkinson to publicly declare their intention to run for election in 1982 as Deputy Leader and Party Treasurer respectively. The majority of members at this meeting were of the opinion that there could be, and should be, no peace or unity within the Party whilst the Right in the PLP and the NEC attempted to reverse the Party reforms introduced during the previous two years.(3)

The second issue to divide the Labour Left was the Party's response to the presence within its ranks of members of the Militant Group.

The expulsion of five members of the Militant editorial board

For over five years the Party's National Agent,

Reg Underhill, had been trying to persuade the members of the NEC that the Militant Group was acting in a manner contrary to the Party constitution. The NEC's response in 1977 had been to examine the documents that Underhill possessed, which he believed to show the organised presence of Trotskyist infiltrators in the Party, and then to conclude that the best way to counteract the influence of Trotskyists within the Party was by intensive membership drives and political education. The Left's desire not to return to the disciplinarian days of the 1950s in which the Party leadership dealt with left wing opinions by expelling individuals from the Party, by closing down constituency parties and by refusing to endorse certain parliamentary candidates played a major part in the NEC concluding that "Trotskyist ideas... (could not) be beaten by disciplinary action".(4)

Before Underhill's retirement from the Party in 1981 he attempted to persuade the NEC to publish the documents he had in his possession in the hope that Party members would then demand that the Militant Group be forced to abide by the Party constitution, but NEC refusal led Underhill after his retirement to publish a twenty nine page document entitled 'The Entryist Activities of the Militant Tendency'.

The pressure from Underhill, sustained by considerable media interest, forced the NEC in December 1981 to agree that the Party's General Secretary (Ron Hayward) and National Agent (David Hughes) should enquire

into the activities of the Militant Gpoup.(5) After hearing evidence they concluded that the Militant Group was a "well-organised caucus centrally controlled"; was "not a group formed solely to support a newspaper"; had a "hard core of supporters who form an organisation with its own programme and policy for distinctive and separate propaganda"; and therefore was "in conflict with Clause II Section(3) of the Party Constitution".(6) However, the Hayward/Hughes report, rather than recommending the expulsion of the Militant Group for transgressing the constitution, offered an indirect and, at first sight, more subtle means of achieving the same end.

A problem for the report's authors was that any proposal to ban the Group on the grounds that it contravened Clause II Section(3) of the Party constitution would almost certainly lead to demands for the expulsion of other groups which also had their own programme for distinctive propaganda.(7) Because this part of the Party constitution had been very loosely applied over the past ten years, and in the absence of any clear idea of the legitimate role and organisation of Party factions, the report recommended the establishment of a register of all non-affiliated groups of Party members as a means of dealing with this specific problem. All groups would have to apply for inclusion on the register and their aims, internal organisation and funding would be open to Party scrutiny. Furthermore, their deliberations would have to be opened up to all individual Party members. Group

secrecy and the operation of internal group discipline
were deemed to be unacceptable and on these grounds the
report concluded that the Militant Group would not be
eligible for affiliation. In June 1982 the NEC endorsed
the Hayward/Hughes report by 16 votes to 10 and instructed
the General Secretary to invite all non-affiliated groups
of Party members to apply for registration and in doing so
to give detailed answers to fourteen questions concerning
their aims, internal organisation and funding.(8)

The Hayward/Hughes proposal for a Party register
was a devious way of dealing with the Militant Group's
operation as a 'party within the Party'. The demand that
registered groups open their decision-making procedures to
all individual Party members was not complied with by some
of the groups who subsequently appeared on the register(9)
and groups, other than Militant, who refused to register
suffered nothing more than their exclusion from the
Party's annual conference diary advertising 'fringe' group
meetings and withdrawal of their opportunity to set up
stalls to advertise their activities in the immediate
environs of the Party's annual conference.(10) None of
their members were expelled from the Party. The Militant
Group offered to make its annual meeting an open one and
applied for inclusion on the Party register but the NEC
took the view that this move to openness was mere window-
dressing and proceeded with its policy that the Group's
members were ineligible for Party membership. Perhaps the
NEC was correct in its belief that the Militant Group

would continue to operate as a secret organisation based upon the principles of democratic centralism but rather than selectively interpret and administer the rules governing registration it would have been better to expel the Group either for breaking the Party constitution or for having objectives contrary to democratic socialism.

By acting in this manner the NEC dismissed an opportunity to establish a clear, formal and legitimate role for Party factions and groups.

An additional problem for the NEC once it had decided that Militant Group members were ineligible for Party membership was how to define them. Were they paper sellers, those who publicly supported a _Militant_ programme, the parliamentary candidates closely associated with the newspaper, or the newspaper's editorial board? The NEC's decision was that the five-person editorial board should be expelled and this was confirmed at the Party's 1983 conference.(11)

This issue caused considerable disunity within the Labour Left. For some it was a return to right-wing disciplinarianism and a prelude to a widespread 'witch-hunt', but for others the idea of a register was acceptable so long as the NEC was not given arbitrary powers to include and exclude those groups that it pleased. After the 1982 Party conference had agreed to the establishment of a register a bitter argument occurred over whether Left groups should apply for inclusion.

Both CLPD and the Tribune Group suffered

extensive damage as a consequence of this debate over registration. For nine years CLPD's major objective had been the principle of Party conference supremacy. How could it now ignore the decision taken by the 1982 Party conference? A ballot of the CLPD membership came down narrowly in favour of registration(12) and the majority of the CLPD executive proposed to the 1982 annual meeting that

> In accordance with CLPD's principal aim of making conference decisions binding, this AGM agrees that CLPD should apply for inclusion in the NEC's Register of Groups.(13)

This resolution was carried after a very acrimonious debate by 297 votes to 270. The bitter division was reflected in the fact that every post in the elections to the CLPD executive except that of Secretary, Treasurer and Auditors was contested by candidates from two rival 'slates' representing those in favour and those against registration. The registration 'slate' supporters included both the Derers, Victor Schonfield, Peter Willsman and Steve Bodington whilst the rival non-registration 'slate' supporters included Tony Benn, Joan Maynard, Jo Richardson, Reg Race, Chris Mullin, Nigel Williamson, Francis Prideaux, Andy Harris and John Bloxham. The result of the election was that twenty six of the thirty seven places on the executive went to the Derer group.

The personal acrimony within CLPD on this issue was considerable and longlasting. As a consequence CLPD

was never again able to mount the effective campaigns that it had initiated over the previous period of nine years.

The Tribune Group was another group on the Left which decided to register.(14) This decision led to the resignation of the Group's Chairperson and Secretary and prompted the formation of the Campaign Group. The parliamentary left had become completely split between two rival organisations with a good deal of personal antagonism and public abuse. The immediate consequence of this split was that the right in the PLP gained an even tighter control over the personnel elected to the Shadow Cabinet.

The Labour Left's disintegration was further stimulated by the Party's defeat in the 1983 General Election.

Labour's defeat: June 1983

Measured in terms of votes per candidate this was Labour's worst electoral performance since 1900.(15) The immediate responses from Right and Left of the Party were predictable. The Right blamed the defeat on the Party programme and the internal Party reforms and the Left on the treachery and lack of commitment of some senior Party personnel. Tribune's response is summed up in its headline the week after the election defeat - "Guilty Men: their part in our downfall". It argued that Labour had done so badly because the Party leadership had been unsympathetic

towards both the Party's programme and the internal
democratic trends and therefore what the Left needed to do
was to organise a majority in the Party ("Don't mourn -
Organise").(16)

Eric Heffer was another who rejected the idea
that the Party's policies might be in any way at fault. He
claimed that

> It had nothing to do with the manifesto, which
> was good... It is a question of explanation...
> If it's properly explained we can win...
> (people's) support.(17)

But for others on the Left it was the Party's reformist
policies that were at fault. For example, Labour Herald
suggested that "the lesson of Labour's defeat is not just
that our leadership was inadequate but that its policies
were bankrupt too".(18) And Militant went further blaming
the Party's leadership, policies and campaign and argued
that

> If the Labour Party had fought nationally with
> the same degree of organisation, with the same
> policy, determination and resolve as was
> demonstrated in places like Bradford North,
> Liverpool Broad Green, Coventry South East and
> Brighton Kemptown, then it would have been swept
> into government.(19)

But if there were some differences of opinion on the Left
over whether it was the leadership, communication, or
policy which was more to blame for the defeat these were
marginal compared with the differences which opened up
after time for more considered responses to emerge.

Paradoxically perhaps, the major contribution to the debate came from outside the Labour Left - from Eric Hobsbawn, Marxist historian, long-standing member of the Communist Party, writing in its theoretical journal Marxism Today.

Hobsbawn had first raised questions about the future of the Left in the 1978 Marx Memorial Lecture entitled 'The Forward March of Labour Halted?'(20) and then had returned to the topic in a series of articles for Marxism Today after the 1983 General Election.(21)

Hobsbawm's thesis was that Thatcherism had succeeded in taking a commanding hold of popular perceptions and, as a consequence, the Labour Party needed to adopt a very cautious political strategy in order to win future political support. He argued that changes in the socio-economic composition of the labour force had resulted in its fragmentation and that the idea of a homogenous labour movement was myth. Appeals to working class solidarity would be of limited electoral value and instead the Party needed to create alliances with the range of newly-emergent groupings and interests such as women, blacks and environmentalists. He also argued that the advance of the Labour Left within the Party over constitutional reforms had been a contributory factor in Labour's election defeat.

This generated considerable discussion on the Labour Left but was given added political significance because Neil Kinnock identified himself closely with

Hobsbawm.(22)

Within the Labour Left it was the LCC which produced the most considered and detailed response to the electoral defeat. Theirs was one that was similar to Hobsbawm's in that it concentrated upon the *socio-economic* changes in British society. In <u>After The Landslide</u> the LCC argued that in the years prior to 1983 "so much of (the Left's) politics rested on false assumptions and wrong analysis". The Left had failed to understand the changes taking place in British society and the impact this was having on voters. The Party was regarded "as more and more a narrowly sectional party, the party of the old declining industrial areas, the depressed inner cities, the poor, blacks and public service workers". The image that was conjured up by socialism was of "more state control, a drab greyness, Eastern Europe, queues, autocratic trade union power, (and) lack of individual freedom. LCC believed that, with the exception of the Party's EEC and housing commitments, the policies were "broadly right". But what was needed was a restatement of principles and values. Equality, democracy and liberty needed to be reaffirmed and restated as socialist ideals and LCC concluded

> We are doomed to further decline unless we can
> present a real vision of what a socialist
> Britain would be like and turn our whole party
> into enthusiastic promoters of socialist
> ideas.(23)

The 'soft' left's view was that the changing social

structure necessitated a rethinking of the Party's class-based strategy which had emerged after 1970. Appeals to class solidarity and loyalty were unlikely to generate much popular support. But the 'hard' left's response to Hobsbawm, the LCC and others of similar opinions was to identify such sentiments as bearing considerable similarity with those of the revisionists after Labour's electoral defeat in 1970. Members of the Campaign Group and of the Socialist Organiser Alliance argued that class remained central to modern British politics and Labour's commitment to the working class should remain its first priority. Tony Benn's public endorsement of <u>Class Politics</u>(24), a pamphlet produced by a group of Communists campaigning against the 'Euro-Communist' trends within their own party, was an affirmation of this viewpoint.

The argument intensified after Neil Kinnock's election as Party Leader and his subsequent attempts to devise a political strategy which would appeal to a wide segment of the electorate.

<u>Election of the new Party leadership</u>

In October 1983 Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley were elected as Party Leader and Deputy Leader respectively under the new electoral college procedures approved in January 1981. The result revealed wide Party support for this 'dream ticket' of Left and Right united to restore Labour's electoral fortunes. Tony Benn's

enforced absence from the House of Commons(25) removed the only major challenger to Kinnock from the Left of the Party. Eric Heffer and Michael Meacher were regarded as the 'hard' left candidates, put forward by those unable to forgive Kinnock for his abstention in the 1981 deputy leadership election and unwilling to accept a dedicated rightwinger as part of the Party leadership. But neither were able to dent the Party's support for this alliance of Left and Right.(26)

The divisions on the left which this election caused were not so much due to the result as to the procedures adopted to consult the Party membership. Many Party members, in both trade union and constituency branches, had an opportunity to participate by ballot in the choice of candidates.(27) Many on the Left regarded this participative exercise as valuable and worth repeating on occasions in order to stimulate an active and participatory Party membership. 'One member, one vote' has become an issue on which the Left divided: no longer does it agree on a single model of Party government. For one section of the Left the Party activist must play the major role whilst for another section it is the Party member. CLPD have consistently opposed the proposal to introduce a system of one member one vote, arguing that it would undermine the delegatory basis on which the Party is organised, would weaken the role of affiliated bodies (i.e. the trade unions) in constituency parties, and would encourage greater media intervention and influence in

Party affairs. It also views the Right's support for one member one vote with suspicion. On the other hand, the LCC and the ILP have favoured schemes for encouraging greater membership participation so long as they were not based upon the idea of postal ballots of members.

For a short period of time the new Party Leader received the support of the 'hard' left and there was some limited degree of personal rapprochment between Kinnock and Benn during the latter's by-election campaign in Chesterfield. But the final break-up of the Labour Left and its realignment occurred as a consequence of the coal dispute and the confrontation between Labour-controlled local authorities and the Government over rate-capping. Both issues raised questions concerning the nature of the state and its laws, about industrial and political militancy, and about the basis of Labour's electoral support.

The coal dispute

The miners' strike over the National Coal Board's proposed run-down of the coal industry and closure of pits was a classic instance in which the Left could be expected to come to the defence of organised labour. But the twelve-month dispute revealed divisions within the Labour left. There were those who demanded unquestioning support for the NUM in the dispute; argued that other sections of the labour movement should assist and,

finally, claimed that the miners' defeat was the result of weak leadership within the Party and the TUC.

But other parts of the Labour Left argued that the NUM leadership lacked support in many of its own mining areas, lacked support amongst many trade unionists and lacked electoral support. Therefore whilst it offered material support to the striking miners it was not willing to offer unquestioning support to Arthur Scargill and the NUM executive.

Neil Kinnock's attitude to the dispute divided the left. Kinnock's refusal to identify himself closely with Arthur Scargill's strategy in the dispute guaranteed some Left antagonism towards him. The Left divided between those who regarded Kinnock with personal dislike and distrust and those who were willing to work with him and trust him. At the end of 1984 there was some talk of this uncompromising section of the left running a candidate (either Benn or Skinner) against Kinnock in 1985 as Party Leader. Private discussions that Tony Benn was having on this issue were brought to a halt, however, by the publication of an article in The Times, written by James Curran, in December 1984 which suggested that Benn's nomination was being considered. Benn was forced to respond publicly by denying the story.(28)

If one of the results of the miners' dispute was to confirm that trade unions were unlikely to act as an institutional bulwark against the Conservative Government then there were those who argued that Labour local

authorities would fulfil this role. This brings us to the last point of disagreement within the Labour Left.

Labour authorities resistance to rate-capping

The response of many Labour authorities to the Government's rate-capping legislation, introduced for the first time in 1984, was not to set a rate - a tactic agreed in Sheffield in July 1984 at a meeting convened by the Local Government Campaign Information Unit. The Left's view appeared to be that in this case the law should be disobeyed if enough local authorities could be persuaded to stick together. But when the time came for acts of disobedience major divisions on the Left emerged. The initial move to comply with the legislation came in March 1985 from the Greater London Council, to be then followed over a period of time by all the other rate-capped authorities. Bitter arguments broke out within the Labour groups on the affected local authorities with some left Labour councillors claiming that the 'no rate' tactic of disobedience had been a strategy to try and shift the Conservative Minister rather than a point of principled disobedience. When the Minister failed to respond to this tactic there was no point, so some argued, for continuing with the confrontation. The GLC decision to levy a rate caused considerable personal antagonism between people who previously had been allies on the Labour Left. Ken Livingstone was denounced by some of his colleagues in the

GLC for 'selling out' and they were joined in criticising him by London Labour Briefing, Socialist Organiser and Labour Herald, from which he soon resigned as one of the editors. This issue revealed that a simple Left/Right division of Labour councillors was inadequate: instead divisions were apparent between the Right who were unwilling to disobey the law, an accomodatory Left who were willing to refuse to implement the law to the point of personal surcharge and expulsion as councillors but then believed it better to compromise and the resisting left who were unwilling to make any accommodation with what they regarded as an unacceptable piece of legislation.

Realignments on the Labour Left have occurred as a result of these divisions of opinion. First, Tony Benn has become isolated from some of his 1981 supporters. He is no longer the left figurehead, uniting all in support of him, as in 1981. His absence from the House of Commons for seven months after the 1983 General Election was one factor contributing to his declining influence. Other factors were his statements during the miners' dispute, culminating in his move to commit the NEC to call for a general strike, and his demand that Labour's defence policy be modified on the question of British membership of NATO. Considering the lack of unity amongst mineworkers, and the limited support shown for the NUM by other trade unionists, the demand for a general strike lacked political credibility. And the demand to re-open

the debate on Labour's defence policy after the Left and Right had produced an agreed non-nuclear policy appeared to be politically destructive and inappropriate coming from a senior member of the NEC, the body responsible for implementing the policies agreed by the Party's annual conference.

Second, a cohesive bloc no longer exists on the NEC. For example, on the question of Britain's membership of NATO, neither Tom Sawyer, David Blunkett nor Michael Meacher - all members of the Left - supported Tony Benn and Eric Heffer in their move to secure commitment to withdraw. Tony Benn, Eric Heffer, Joan Maynard, Jo Richardson, Dennis Skinner and Audrey Wise have continued to act together as a cohesive and united left wing bloc on the NEC. But Tom Sawyer, David Blunkett and Michael Meacher have increasingly distanced themselves from their left-wing colleagues. The NEC recorded fourteen votes between October 1983 and September 1984 during which Sawyer broke ranks with his left-wing colleagues only twice, Meacher once and Blunkett on no occasion. But over the following twelve months, during which the NEC recorded thirty eight votes, Sawyer broke ranks with Benn and others of the left faction on eighteen occasions, Blunkett on fourteen, and Meacher on eleven. The break-up occurred over the miners' dispute and the behaviour of Liverpool City Council, but subsidiary matters on which divisions occurred within the NEC left were to do with industrial relations legislation, Labour's future election programme,

the organisation of Labour's Head Office, and the creation of special Black sections within the Party.

Third, since the appointment of a new editor of _Tribune_ in 1984 the paper has moved away from its almost total support for Tony Benn and has argued the need for more positive thinking by the Labour Left.(29)

Fourth, resignations have occurred from the Campaign Group,(30) leading to quite bitter personal arguments concerning people's socialist commitments and credentials,(31) and a new alliance on the 'hard' left has taken place.(32)

The community of interest which existed on the Left for a time in the early-1980s has fragmented.

FOOTNOTES

1. Tony Benn and Eric Heffer introduced a discussion paper to the NEC in 1985 questioning British membership of NATO, notwithstanding the fact that the Party had made clear its commitment to NATO in the policy document Defence and Security for Britain approved at the 1984 Party conference by 5,352,000 votes to 1,332,000 votes. LPACR, 1984, pp.142-147 & pp.148-157.

2. Annual Report of the Secretary of CLPD, 1981.

3. Because of a rail dispute the 1981 annual meeting of CLPD was poorly attended by members from the provinces. As a consequence a group of London Trotskyists in attendance were able to play a more influential role than might otherwise have been the case. The experience of this annual meeting led the CLPD Officers to ballot all individual members prior to the 1982 annual meeting on the question of the Party register and to move the venue of the annual meeting from London.

4. LPACR, 1977, p.385.

5. The NEC agreed by 19 votes to 15.

6. NEC Report 1982, p.134.

7. The group often mentioned as transgressing the constitution was Labour Solidarity. Labour Solidarity has held private meetings of its supporters although it has never developed the extensive organisational network of the Militant Group. But the ILP could have been accused of possessing a branch structure, annual meeting, etc. which would not satisfy the constitution. Labour Friends of Israel might have found itself in some difficulties over the source of its funds (as is revealed in information it provided to the Party at the time of its registration).

8. NEC Report 1982, pp.135-136.

9. Question 7 to groups applying for registration asked: "Are the group meetings open to all Labour Party members? If not, is the group prepared to change to open meetings?" Six groups, including the Tribune Group, the ILP and LCC (Scotland) answered 'no' to this question and yet they were accepted on to the register. (The returns of all the groups seeking registration were made available by the General Secretary of the Labour Party for the author's inspection.)

10. The Labour Abortion Rights Campaign (LARC), Labour Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Socialist Environment and Resources Association (SERA) decided not to apply for registration.

11. The NEC approved their explusion by 19 votes to 9 in February 1983. At the Party conference their expulsions were confirmed by majorities of over 3 million votes. See LPACR, 1983, p.66.

12. A consultative ballot of 682 individual members and 165 affiliated organisations produced a result in which 50.6% agreed with registration and 49.4% disagreed. It is worth noting that the majority of individual members in London were opposed to registration (53%) but the majority of members outside London were in favour of registraton (53%). CLPD Bulletin, 6 December 1982.

13. Agenda, CLPD Annual General Meeting, 1982.

14. The vote in favour was by thirty nine votes to twenty seven with six abstensions.

15. A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice How Britain Votes, p.3.

16. June 10, 1983.

17. Tribune, June 24, 1983.

18. Labour Herald, June 17, 1983.

19. Militant, June 17, 1983. The writer did not include the Isle of Wight in the list, where the Militant supporter secured just 2.4% of the vote.

20. Marxism Today, September 1978.

21. 'Labour's Lost Millions' Marxism Today, October 1983; 'Labour: Rump or Rebirth' Marxism Today, March 1984; 'The Retreat into Extremism' Marxism Today, April 1985.

22. In 1981, at the Party conference Tribune fringe meeting, Kinnock quoted extensively from Hobsbawm's 'The Forward March of Labour Halted?', prompting Dennis Skinner to ridicule Hobsbawm from the same platform later in the meeting. At the 1983 Party conference Kinnock chaired a Fabian Society fringe meeting at which Hobsbawm was the guest speaker.

23. Labour Co-ordinating Committee After the Landslide, November 1983.

24. B. Fine, L. Harris, M. Mayo, A. Weir and E. Wilson Class Politics: An Answer To Its Critics.

25. Tony Benn had lost his seat in Bristol South East in June 1983 and was not re-elected to the House of Commons until January 1984.

26. Both Eric Heffer's and Michael Meacher's parliamentary sponsors were drawn overwhelmingly from the Campaign Group. 18 of Heffer's 23 sponsors, and 23 of Meacher's 32 sponsors. (For the result of the election see LPACR, 1983, p.29.)

27. A survey of the London constituency parties revealed that 28 (42%) of those replying (67) had conducted a ballot of all individual Party members. Greater London Labour Party, Ballot for Leader and Deputy Leader, March 1984.

28. The Times, December 27, 1984.

29. Nigel Williamson replaced Chris Mullin. Williamson had previously been the Treasurer of the Benn deputy leadership campaign and had been associated with the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory in 1983. See the Tribune relaunch statement in Tribune, September 20, 1985. In advertising prior to the relaunch, Nigel Williamson was writing "...the Left at present has a strategy for fighting but not necessarily a strategy for winning. Too much energy has gone into internal battles and not enough into creating a majority in favour of change outside. Tribune offers a forum in which the Left can restate, develop and argue for socialist values in a way that can build popular support." 'Where We Stand' Tribune Relaunch, n.d. (Williamson's own emphasis).

30. Kevin Barron and Derek Fatchett announced their resignation in Tribune, October 18, 1985. They argued that the Group "...is structurally incapable of contributing towards the development of a coherent view of socialism"; "...very rarely shows a perceptive understanding of current working class attitudes, often falling into vanguardism of quite staggering proportions"; and "...too often displays an unpleasant degree of authoritarianism."

31. See Bob Clay and Joan Maynard 'In Defence of the Campaign Group' Tribune, November 1, 1985.

32. Labour Left Co-ordination brought together fifteen groups including Labour Briefing, the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, Socialist Viewpoint, Socialist Action, Socialist Organiser, Unite and Fight, and Target Labour Government. The Campaign Group also sent observers to the meetings.

CHAPTER TEN

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEFT

We have written of the parliamentary left, the NEC left, and the rank and file left in both local parties and trade union branches; but another significant development has been the emergence of a local government left. It is another feature in the emergence of an influential left outside Parliament which has contributed to the evolution of a rather different Labour Party nationally. One author has described this phenomenon as "The New Urban Left".(1) What is "new" is the recruitment of young councillors with distinct ideas which represent a break with the past. What is "urban" is that the councillors tend to represent industrial areas where Labour's traditional electoral support is concentrated. Not all Labour-controlled urban authorities should be classified as part of this new left, nor should all Labour councillors from rural areas be considered as part of an old right. But certain Labour-controlled authorities in urban areas have developed left wing reputations over the past ten years and they merit examination as a new phenomenon in Labour Party politics. The leaders of these councils have often established significant local political bases from which to develop a national reputation.

Great Britain is a unitary state in which the

centre of political activity is London. As a consequence there is a tendency amongst students of Labour politics to assume a single, national Party organisation ranging from CLP to PLP in which the bulk of activity is concerned with national affairs. But for many Party members their major concern is not with the PLP, except for the selection and election of a Labour MP, but with local government. In some local communities the Labour Party has been the governing Party without break for many decades. In such communities CLPs are Party machines recruiting local candidates, winning local elections and governing the local community. For this reason use of the title 'The Labour Party' can be misleading because, whilst there is a Party nationally organised into over six hundred CLPs there is also a myriad of local Parties which, although part of the overall Party structure in organisational terms, are pursuing their own distinct objectives in local government.

Local government has been an area of Party activity in which the Labour Left has traditionally taken little interest and the Labour Right has been dominant. The Labour Left's objective has been the transformation of society and it has believed that overall control of the economy through centralised public ownership was the first priority. As a consequence it regarded local government, whilst not unimportant, to be of secondary concern. Furthermore, the need in local government to concentrate upon matters of practical detail, to become immersed in problems of administration, and to recognise the

structural and legal constraints on local authorities' powers made local government unattractive to those more concerned with principled beliefs. Local government was regarded by many on the Left as nothing more than the rest home for the geriatric Right! Ken Livingstone has graphically described the left's perception of local government in the 1960s as being nothing "much more than old white men coming along to general management committees and talking about rubbish collection".(2)

The Labour Left's interest and involvement in local government emerged in the 1970s for various reasons. First, local authority expenditure became a central target of both Labour and Conservative governments determined to cut the overall level of public expenditure. As a consequence the Left was increasingly drawn into a defence of, and involvement in, local government. Second, the struggles between Left and Right over the issue of the accountability of parliamentarians to local parties spilled over into local government. Debates over the reselection of local councillors and over the responsibility for, and implementation of, local election manifestos became an issue in local Parties, particularly when the Left was attempting to maintain the level of public expenditure. Third, local government went through a period of political and structural upheaval in the late-1960s/early-1970s which had considerable impact on the elected personnel. In the 1968 local elections Labour suffered enormous electoral losses. In the large County Boroughs Labour polled under thirty per cent of the vote,

whilst the Conservative share was over sixty per cent, and over all England and Wales Labour had a net loss of one thousand six hundred and two seats and the Conservatives made a net gain of six hundred and thirty seats.(3) One of the local authorities lost by Labour in this electoral upheaval was Sheffield after thirty six years of continuous Labour rule. John Gyford has written that these 1968 elections "destabilised a pattern of local Labour politics that had persisted in some cases for a generation".(4) The electors had cleared out a very large number of Labour councillors far more effectively than any Party reselection procedure. But as Labour's local popularity began to improve from 1970 onwards opportunities existed for new, younger people to come forward as local councillors. The structural changes to local government introduced in 1973 further assisted this process of replacement and recruitment by abolishing Aldermanic representatives on local councils, who tended to be the older members of Labour Groups, and scheduling 'all-out' elections for the new Metropolitan Authorities in 1973. 'All-out' elections necessitated a much larger number of Labour candidates than would have been necessary if only one-third of the seats were vacant thus bringing forward many more people and resulting in further additions to the new elected personnel on Labour-controlled local authorities. These new councillors had very often entered the Party with experience of working within community action groups, or working in such local government professions as planning and social work. In

such cases they were likely to encourage a new style of politics which was more open to community involvement and less likely to encourage professional detachment in local government.

A fourth factor in the Labour Left's discovery of the 'local road to socialism' was that it fitted well with the renewed enthusiasm for decentralisation of power, particularly through workers' control and workers' co-operatives. One of the reasons for this enthusiastic endorsement of decentralisation was the experience of government intervention and planning between 1974 and 1979 which was regarded as too centralist and ignorant of local trade unionists' demands. The argument for decentralisation was extended to the provision of local services since, it was argued, this *would make them more* accessible to users, would overcome remote bureaucracy, would stimulate local community initiatives, would increase local accountability and would increase the efficiency of service delivery.(5)

A final factor in the Labour Left's increasing involvement in local government affairs was that after the Conservatives' electoral successes of 1979 and 1983 Labour councils were 'oases in the Conservative desert'. By their example in certain important policy areas they could boost Labour's national popularity. They could also provide an important test-bed for new socialist ideas. Labour authorities were a "fertile source of ideas and energy for socialist reconstruction".(6) And they had also become significant arenas in which to mount effective resistance

to Conservative governments.

The local government left has emerged to prominence in the Greater London Council, the London Boroughs of Hackney, Islington, Camden, Southwark and Lambeth, Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. There are other Labour-controlled local authorities such as Birmingham, Newcastle, Bristol, Leeds, Barnsley, Rotherham and Doncaster which either do not possess this left reputation or have shifted in a leftwards direction only recently. Some of the key figures in this local government left are Ken Livingstone, David Blunkett, Ted Knight, Margaret Hodge and Derek Hatton. A study of all these left local authorities and their leading personalities would require extensive treatment but a brief consideration of the Greater London Council and Sheffield will give some idea of the developments within this local government left.

The local government left [1]: the Greater London Council

The Greater London Council (hereafter GLC) was established in 1973, was controlled by Labour between 1973 and 1977, and then again between 1981 and its abolition in 1986. The Left first emerged as a potential force in the GLC in the mid-1970s. A rank and file organisation emerged from a conference held in 1975 to protest against cuts in housing revenue and the raising of council house rents brought about by Labour Government policies and a right wing Administration at County Hall. By 1977 the Left had

won a majority on the executive of the London Labour Party, revealing the extensive support for the Left now developing in the local London parties. In 1978 a conference was held to discuss the question of rates and council house rents in London from which emerged the group producing London Labour Briefing. Michael Ward(7) has written that the Briefing network "played a crucial role in the selection of candidates for the 1981 GLC election".(8) This organised Left activity on candidate selection resulted in a left majority within the GLC Labour Group when it was elected to power in the 1981 elections. The consequence of this was that Ken Livingstone was elected leader of the GLC.

Ken Livingstone

Ken Livingstone had joined the Labour Party in 1968 and was first elected as a councillor for Lambeth in 1971 at the age of twenty six; two years later he was elected to the GLC. By the time he was selected as a parliamentary candidate for the winnable seat of Brent East in 1985 he had gained fourteen years' political experience as a local councillor and as a Vice-Chairman and then as Chairman of a Housing committee.

Livingstone has never been a leading theoretician on the Labour Left. He acknowledges that it was practical things which inclined him to socialism such as "my workplace involvement, helping my American friends, and so on".(9) He is an excellent communicator. He also

has the ability to raise questions for debate which others on the Left ignore. For example, he is critical of the Left's style of operations, especially its tendency to be introverted and to have a fixation with personal betrayal of Labour Left leaders. He argues.

> Granted that all of us make an endless number of
> mistakes and errors, the structure of the Left
> is such that before you've really had time to
> think through that you've made a mistake, admit
> it to yourself and then to others, you've been
> denounced in the most bitter fashion. This
> normally has the effect of causing the
> individual concerned to move away from the Left,
> first organizationally and then politically. I
> think that the Left needs to be much more
> supportive.(10)

Another example of his willingness to think about subjects which transcend the limits sometimes placed upon political debate by factionalism are his views on the overall nature of political activity. He argues that

> In politics nothing is ever wholly a defeat or a
> victory. Even when you think you are coasting
> home to a great victory, things are probably
> happening as a by-product of your success which
> are laying the seeds for future problems and
> which might mushroom into future defeats.(11)

Between 1981 and the GLC's abolition in 1986 it has attracted considerable media publicity, by no means all of it favourable, under Livingstone's leadership. There are a wide range of subject areas in which the GLC has made a distinct impact but there are three, perhaps, which are of particular significance to this study. First, the Council's commitment to popular participation and to the decentralisation of decision-making. Michael Ward has

written

> Elected power is not an end in itself, but a
> resource, to be shared with other groups and
> movements, and used in alliance with them to
> achieve social change.(12)

One way in which this has been attempted is the GLC's encouragement of a very wide range of groups to make use of GLC resources.

Second, the development of a distinct industrial and employment policy for London which has involved the establishment of an Industry and Employment Committee, from which emerged the Greater London Enterprise Board, and the recruitment of committed socialist economists into an Economic Policy Group which would counter resistance from the GLC bureaucracy. The objective of the GLC's economic policy has been direct involvement in the production process, the development of technology networks, and the encouragement of worker participation in the production of corporate plans for all industrial and service sectors of the London economy.(13) By 1985 an Industrial Strategy for London had been produced itemising a very detailed micro-economic strategy far removed from the vague macro-economic planning contained within the Labour Government's National Plan(1965).

Third, the encouragement of women to play a more active part in local politics has been a distinctive feature of the GLC's policies. We have already referred to

the impact of female recruitment on the Labour Party in the 1970s, the links developed between socialism and feminism, and the emergence of powerful demands for women to be accorded a more prominent role in the affairs and organisation of the Labour Party. Another feature of this female input has been the important role played by women in the local government left. A great deal of their energies have been channelled into the establishment of local Women's Committees. A GLC Women's Committee was established in May 1982, which then established working groups on a wide range of topics, and also holds three-monthly open meetings.

We have mentioned in a previous Chapter the tendency towards London dominance of the Labour Left in the 1980s. Certainly the GLC and Ken Livingstone received a great deal of publicity, inevitable perhaps with the London-based concentration of the national media. But the impact of the local government left in provincial Britain on the Labour Party has also been important. Often the tone and tenor of political debate in the provinces differed from that in London but the objectives were quite often similar to those set by the GLC, as we will see in our examination of Sheffield city politics.

The local government left[2]: Sheffield

Labour first won control of Sheffield City Council in 1926 and since then has maintained its dominant position for all but two of the ensuing sixty years. The

Council has had a reputation for municipal socialism which has tended to transcend the usual Left/Right Party divisions. Its record in community provision is reflected in the extensive post-war council house building programme, the early introduction of comprehensive schools, and the continuous commitment to public libraries, art galleries and museums. But a dispute in 1967 within the ruling Labour Group over a proposed rent rebate scheme which involved raising many council house rents led to a bitter internal Party argument and animosity between the Labour Group and Borough Labour Party. Labour's loss of Office in 1968 - partly the consequence of Labour's national unpopularity but also the consequence of this dispute - prompted the first changes in local politics with a new leadership, the development of a more influential local Party input into Council matters, and the recruitment of a new generation of Labour councillors which was given an additional boost by the 'all-out' elections of 1973. A survey of Labour councillors in 1967/68 revealed that "nearly two-thirds were over fifty five" and only one councillor was under the age of thirty five.(14) Nearly two-thirds of them had left school at elementary or secondary stage and only eight per cent had received any form of higher education.(15) But it is worth noting that even in 1967 a minority of Labour councillors were manual workers: forty three per cent had manual occupations.

The new, younger councillors recruited in the 1970s did not have to serve their time in the manner of

young Roy Hattersley back in the 1950s.(16) David Blunkett
was one such new councillor, elected for the first time in
1970. He has described the Party dispute of 1967 and
Labour's loss of Office as "traumatic" and argues that it
began "a shift in attitudes as well as in politics".(17)
He was one who benefitted from this shift in attitudes and
rose quickly to a senior position in the Labour Group and
was able to give a distinctive lead in local politics.

David Blunkett

David Blunkett is a well-known public figure who
has made a considerable mark in national politics from his
Sheffield base. He was born in Sheffield, graduated from
Sheffield University with a degree in Politics, and then
became a lecturer at Barnsley College of Technology. In
many ways he is a classic product of Labour's post-war
social democracy from working class home on a council
estate through to higher education and then into a
professional occupation; the only exception to his being a
typical product is his blindness.

At the age of twenty three, whilst still a
student at Sheffield University, he was elected to the
City Council. After six years service on the Council he
became Chairman of the Family and Community Services
Committee and ten years after his initial election he was
elected Party Leader.

He has made his name in Sheffield but he is now
certain to move into a more national political framework

because in 1985 he was selected for the Brightside
constituency to replace Joan Maynard, who at the age of
sixty four, was retiring.(18) Brightside Constituency
Labour Party has played its part in certain significant
developments involving the Labour Left over the past
twelve years by first, deselecting an MP and replacing him
with a female, left wing trade unionist and then, on her
retirement, selecting a young (38 years old) left wing
councillor.

But David Blunkett's national reputation
precedes his election to parliament. In 1983 he was
nominated and subsequently elected to the NEC as one of
the seven constituency party representatives. To be
elected on the first occasion on which he was nominated
was a remarkable achievement and contrasts starkly with,
for example, Eric Heffer who was nominated for eleven
consecutive years before eventually being elected in 1975.
David Blunkett was the first non-parliamentarian to be
elected in the constituency section of the NEC since
Harold Laski's tenure between 1937 and 1948. In the 1984
NEC elections his vote rose by 226,000 and his position
from fifth to third; by 1985 he had topped the poll in the
CLP section of the NEC displacing Tony Benn. Since his
election to the NEC Blunkett has helped to revitalise the
Party's attitude to local government by being elected to
chair the up-graded Local Government Committee.

Blunkett's political commitments are
comprehensively outlined in a Fabian pamphlet by him and
his co-author, Geoff Green, entitled <u>Building from the</u>

Bottom: the Sheffield experience. The title of the pamphlet is important: it sums up his approach to politics and in particular his belief that power should not be in the hands of an elite leadership. This is a very different style of leadership from that of the enlightened authoritarianism associated with such previous leading local Party figures as Sydney Dyson and George Wilson. Blunkett's view is that the local community groups, tenants groups, trade unions and local Labour Parties must play an active party in council affairs.

There are four policy areas that Blunkett and Green treat as central to local socialism. First, the need to plan the local economy and to generate local employment. They suggest the desirability of drawing up industrial sector plans as a prelude to local authority intervention, of concluding local planning agreements, of directing local funds into socially-useful projects, of encouraging research on the local structure of industry, and of devising ways in which industry might meet local social priorities. They advocate using council money to generate local employment and ensuring that the local council's purchasing policies benefit local firms. They also propose that economic planning needs to be linked with environmental planning to ensure that council land and property is used to promote community initiatives rather than private property speculation.

Blunkett and Green recognise that a socialist local authority is unlikely to make a major contribution to the number of jobs created or maintained in the private

sector but it should use its bargaining power to establish good working practices in th private sector. And it should be aiming to reform local social relations by establishing alternative forms of organisation which challenge the market economy: for example, the establishment and encouragement of worker co-operatives and by employing its own direct labour force.

They argue that a local socialist social policy should challenge what they describe as welfarism and centralist parliamentary benevolence which have prevailed in Labour's social policies. Welfarism is seen as distributive socialism in which Labour governments have attempted to compensate for inequalities through its welfare state. But a socialist welfare policy should be concerned to prevent these inequalities by public control over production, distribution and exchange. They argue that centralist parliamentary benevolence has meant that services have been provided in the past for people and not with people. Service delivery is most important and they believe that decentralisation is one way to improve both political direction and accountability. Further, there is also the need for the active involvement of the deprived (for example, inner-city residents) in the shaping of their own lives and a need for positive discrimination in the delivery of services in favour of the deprived because universal provision benefits the privileged.

Finally, they argue the need for a new socialist approach to the bureaucracy. Rather than the traditional distinction between the committed, amateur politician and

the neutral specialist administrator they demand that the people who work for the local authority must have a commitment to the community, namely to the objectives as set out by the Labour-controlled local authority.

There has certainly been a change in political content and style in Sheffield in the 1980s. Attempts have been made to share power with other community groups. For example, council house tenants and trade unionists have been formally placed on certain Council committees. There have also been very extensive attempts to involve both parents and teachers in the consultations prior to the reorganisation of post-sixteen education. The relations between the District Labour Party and the Labour Group have remained on good terms due in part to the close working relationship between the Officers from both bodies. The District Labour Party plays its part in local council affairs through special Working Parties which cover all areas of Council responsibility and which are responsible for the development of local election manifesto commitments. District Labour Party representatives are also entitled to membership of the important Budget sub-committee of the Council's Policy Committee.

The development of a socialist employment policy has been difficult due to the major problem of the run-down of the local steel industry. The Employment Committee has established Enterprise Workshops to sponsor the preservation of local skills in socially-useful projects, and support has been provided for new developments in

technology. But there has been an absence of any of the detailed sector plans as outlined in the London Industrial Strategy.

The extent of decentralisation of service delivery has been limited due to councillor and bureaucratic resistance. Only in housing and family and community services have there been any major changes in the manner of service delivery.

Perhaps the major problem facing the authority, apart from the cuts in Central Government grants and the imposed rate-capping, has been the running of an institution which employs over thirty thousand people. At the senior officer level some appointments have been made which are in line with the commitment to have persons sympathetic to the Council's overall objectives.(19) But tensions have developed with the local authority staff which resulted in a long dispute in 1984 between the authority and the local government union (NALGO). All the commitments to the establishment of a new pattern of working relationships with organised labour had broken down and many senior councillors regarded the union representatives as selfish and sectional and the union leaders regarded these councillors as typically bad employers.

We referred in Chapter nine to the divisions on the Left which emerged over the strategy that 'rate-capped' Labour local authorities should adopt. Sheffield, along with the GLC, was one of those authorities which eventually agreed to set a legal rate as a result of a

Council majority made up of Labour rebels and Conservative and Liberal councillors. The Labour Group was divided between those unwilling to break the law, those reluctantly accepting the need to back down in the face of Government intransigence, and those wanting confrontation with the Government on this issue. For the *first time* since David Blunkett had become Party Leader the Sheffield Left was badly divided.

Conclusion

I have argued in this Chapter that the emergence of a local government Left has been important for the Labour Party. There are three particular aspects of this development that I wish to emphasise.

First a large body of talented men and women has been created with experience of administration, of budgetary matters and of determining resource priorities. This experience is of considerable value particularly so since it is something that the majority of the members of the PLP lack. Members of the local government left, such as Livingstone and Blunkett, who are proceeding into parliamentary politics, will bring to the PLP a governing experience which is so often missing.

Second, the local government left has made significant contributions to political ideas in the Party. For example, the work carried out by the GLC and the West Midlands County Council on local economic strategies, including the development of local Enterprise Boards, is

important in the development of Labour's overall economic policies. In the words of one socialist economist involved with the GLC these municipal initiatives "have been a laboratory for new economic policies".(20) Another example is in the provision of public welfare services. Local experiments in decentralised provision could provide experience of value to the Party, particularly since the remote and bureaucratic aspect of much service delivery in this field has antagonised many users.

Third, local authorities have provided almost the sole institutional resistance to Conservative Government policies. The challenges have succeeded in winning public support in some cases: for example, the GLC's fight against abolition and various local authorities' campaigns against rate-capping.(21) The local authorities have not succeeded in defeating a very determined Conservative Government. Future local authority resistance will have been curbed to a greater extent by the abolition of the Metropolitan County Councils and the imposition of prescribed rate levels on many Labour councils. These defeats have led a section of the Labour Left to abandon its previous enthusiasm for local politics and conclude that local Labour Groups are still, after all, centres of right wing reaction. For example, a writer in Socialist Organiser has recently claimed that

> A whole layer of the Labour Left has been drawn
> into municipal politics - into creating a
> refurbished local machine for the Labour Party
> status quo, into adopting a basically right wing
> posture of administrators counterposed to the
> local working class and local government unions,
> even while continuing some leftism in other

arenas...(22)

Another writer from a very different political perspective has recently raised three questions which he believes confront the local government left.(23) First, what will be the future relationship between central and local government? Traditionally the Labour Party has been a centralising party.(24) But the establishment of local 'socialist republics' raises questions about central/local relations which have not been resolved on the Left.

Second, the creation of a coalition of dispossessed groups may be the basis for an electoral majority but it may also drive away the traditional working class Labour voter. This is more of an issue in London where there is only a limited manual worker/trade union presence in the local Parties. Predictably Ken Livingstone has raised this dilemma in public and has said

> The Labour Party, whether it likes it or not, has become a party that can only win power if it actually maintains its skilled working class role, but also attracts the votes of the really poor and of those without work experience in a way that it has not done successfully. To try and appeal to both wings is really very difficult and the Party hasn't really given it any thought.(25)

Third, the local government left's emphasis upon popular mobilisation may create problems of "populism, pluralism and preceptoralism".(26) What this means is that there is the danger of a reactionary populism emerging which is difficult to deal with. How does one ignore popular demands if one has been preaching the language of power to the people? This problem was raised in Sheffield,

for example, when popular consultation through school governing boards revealed strong antagonism to the local authority's proposal to abolish corporal punishment in its shools. The danger of pluralism is of community groups being given powers which they then wish to use for anti-socialist purposes. The location of gypsy sites is an issue in Sheffield in which a community solution might contradict a socialist solution. So also might there be a clash between a community's perception of its needs and that of a socialist local authority involved in a policy of positive discrimination. And finally the response to the dilemmas thrown up by both these issues can lead to "preceptoralism", namely manipulative elitism. Elitism, it might be claimed, of a left wing disposition but nevertheless the same style of enlightened authoritarianism that prevailed in many local authorities in the 1950s and 1960s.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Gyford 'The New Urban Left: Origins, Style and Strategy' (Town Planning Discussion Papers, University College, London, 1983).

2. K. Livingstone 'Interview' in M. Boddy and C. Fudge Local Socialism, p.263.

3. J. Gyford op.cit., p.5.

4. ibid, p.7.

5. K. Beuret and G. Stoker 'The Attack on Labour's Centralist Faith: Local Paths to Socialism? (Unpublished paper to the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, 1984).

6. D. Blunkett and G. Green Building from the Bottom: the Sheffield Experience, p.28.

7. Michael Ward, in 1985, was Deputy Leader and Chairman of the Industry and Employment Committee of the Greater London Council.

8. M. Ward 'Labour's Capital Gains: the GLC experience' Marxism Today, December 1983, p.25.

9. T. Ali 'Who's Afraid of Margaret Thatcher: Tariq Ali in conversation with Ken Livingstone', pp.43-44.

10. ibid., pp.61-62.

11. ibid., p.98.

12. M. Ward op.cit., pp.28-29.

13. See R. Murray 'New Directions in Municipal Socialism' in B. Pimlott (ed) Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, pp.219-226.

14. W. Hampton Democracy and Community, p.187.

15. ibid., pp.188-189.

16. R. Hattersley.

17. D. Blunkett 'Why I am a Socialist' New Socialist, 8, Nov-Dec 1982, p.56.

18. In 1978 he failed to win the nomination to fight the Penistone by-election by just one vote.

19. For example, the person appointed in 1981 to direct the new Employment Department, John Bennington, was identified with a radical, left tradition and his successor, in 1985, was Dan Sequerra, who was at the time

of his appointment, Chairman of Sheffield District Labour party.

20. R. Murray op.cit., p.227.

21. In June 1984 55% of people in Sheffield disapproved of the Government's rate-capping legislation. 'Attitudes to Rate-Capping in Sheffield' MORI Research Report, p.4. The success of the GLC's campaign against the Government's proposal to abolish the authority is revealed in various public opinion polls. By April 1985 74% of Landowners opposed the Government's plans to abolish the council. See New Society, November 15, 1985, p.284.

22. F. Ennis Socialist Organiser, January 26, 1984, p.12.

23. J. Gyford op.cit, p.21.

24. See L.J. Sharpe 'The Labour Party and the Geography of Inequality: a Puzzle' in D. Kavanagh (ed) The Politics of the Labour Party, pp.135-170.

25. K. Livingstone in M. Boddy and C. Fudge op.cit., p.271.

26. J. Gyford op.cit, p.21.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have attempted to explain the Labour Left's emergence as a powerful force within the Labour Party in the 1980s. I have suggested four major contributory factors. First, the poor performance of the British economy since the mid-1960s undermined the attraction of managed welfare capitalism and the credibility of social democracy. Second, the increasing international tension, the escalating nuclear arms race and the more aggressive tone and behaviour of President Reagan generated criticism of a British defence policy based upon nuclear weapons and an alliance with the Americans. Third, the policies of recent Labour governments, in particular the gap between promise and performance, and the defection of some MPs to the Conservative and Social Democratic parties, raised doubts about the Labour leadership's political integrity. And fourth, Conservative government's attacks on particular sections of the working class stimulated a defensive counter-reaction by organised labour.

Over a period of twenty years these factors provided the basis for the re-establishment of Labour's socialist commitment to make structural changes to the economy, to defend organised labour, to abandon nuclear weapons, and to withdraw American nuclear bases from

Britain. Alongside this socialist revitalisation was internal, Party structural reorganisation with the purpose of limiting the parliamentarians' freedom of action.

Labour Left victories were secured as a consequence not only of the revitalisation of socialist ideas and the distrust of leading Party politicians but also of the organisational skills developed by Labour Left leaders. The Labour Left, particularly outside of parliament, organised its support in a manner never before attempted (or tolerated by the Party leadership). This Left advance was given additional impetus by the recruitment to its ranks of a segment of revolutionary socialists (either Trotskyist 'entryists' of the covert or open variety, or other Marxist-Leninists of various commitments). But the major factor in explaining the Labour Left's re-emergence as a powerful Party force has been neither organisation nor entryism but the commitment of Party activists to *fundamental change*.

The consequence of this shift in power within the Party was to prompt a remarkable outburst of condemnation of the Labour Left from the Labour Right and from some commentators in the media. This was referred to in the introduction to this thesis.

Critics of the Labour Left

One criticism of the Labour Left was that it was guilty of totalitarianism. Bryan Magee described the Party's constitutional changes as having "totalitarian

implications"(1) and Edward Lyons in his resignation
statement as an MP to his CLP commented

> I volunteered from school for the Army in order
> to fight one form of totalitarianism. Yet I have
> to share the Labour Party with some who believe
> in another form of totalitarianism...

and he argued that parliamentary democracy was threatened
by the Labour Left. He concluded his statement by saying

> I have always said to myself that I would not
> remain in a Party which represented a threat to
> Parliamentary democracy. The constitutional
> changes approved at the Wembley conference are
> hostile to Parliament as an instituion.(2)

Edward Lyons' claim that the Labour Left's
demands for constitutional reform were "hostile to
Parliament as an institution" was correct if his
assumption was that a Labour MP should be the repository
of political wisdom, making decisions in the name of the
Party with only the most haphazard and arbitrary form of
accountability. The Labour Left was challenging this
assumption and was attempting to modify the relationships
within the Party but was not challenging a form of
parliamentary government in which periodic accountability
of parties to electoral approval or disapproval remained
fundamental. Tony Benn has written

> Political power must come from the electorate,
> through the party, up to MPs, Cabinets and the
> parliamentary leadership in a series of unbroken
> links.(3)

What Benn and the Labour Left were attempting to impose

was a distinct view of Party government within a parliamentary framework in which decisions would be taken by majorities of branch members, General Committee delegates, members of the NEC, and annual conference delegates - and Party representatives would be bound by these decisions.

No legitimacy is afforded in this theory of Party government to parliamentarians arguing that their responsibilities to the electorate override any particular Party decisions. Once the electorate sanctions the Party manifesto by electing the Party into Office then its representatives are bound to a specific set of commitments which the electorate has the right to expect will be implemented.

What the Labour Left has never clarified, however, is how the Labour MP deals with the conflicting priorities that might emerge between the commitments of the Party conference, the sponsoring trade union, the constituency party, as well as his or her own individual conscience. As we saw in examining the relations between the Newham North East CLP and its parliamentary representative part of the Labour Left would argue that the Party conference is the sole institution to which the Party representative owes his or her complete allegiance irrespective of other institutional or personal points of view. But in our discussion of the campaign to secure automatic reselection procedures in all constituencies with an incumbent Labour MP we referred to those within CLPD who recognised alternative and legitimate sources of

loyalty for an MP.

The Labour Left's model of Party government differs from the one that has prevailed in practice within the Party for most of the twentieth century. It is collectivist rather than individualist and is more delegatory than representative. There is nothing in it which undermines parliamentary government, merely that it is a different form. It remains dependent upon periodic electoral approval although the process is one in which the elector has to provide a more specific and detailed mandate. In such a model the idea that elections are determined by party image is rejected. Instead electors deliberate on specific proposals and cast their vote accordingly. The problem is that electoral research reveals a variety of factors at play in determining voters' behaviour ranging from general values to specific issues, that often these factors are mutually contradictory, and that the final electoral choice may not provide the specific legitimacy for Party policy that is assumed in this model.(4)

Another accusation made by Labour Left critics was that political liberty was now threatened. Phrases used by the critics, such as "revolutionary junta"(5), implied that if the Labour Left was given power it would abandon elections and civil liberties and would implement some form of dictatorship. But the overwhelming bulk of the Labour Left are democrats committed to win power through the ballot box and govern by means of a parliamentary majority. Certainly the Labour Left's

proposals to eliminate private education and health, to nationalise the banks and to introduce a wealth tax <u>would</u> curtail people's abilities to use their resources as they thought fit. The Labour Left is proposing to curb individual liberties in these areas in order to extend community provision, which is the essence of socialism.

Only a very small number of the Labour Left are critical of its electoral and parliamentary commitments. There are those who wish to substitute worker soviets for parliament and those who are unwilling to wait the necessary time to win parliamentary majorities. An example of the first would be Rachel Lever, from the Socialist Organiser Group, who argues for the "alternative democracy of workers' councils"(6), and an example of the second would be Peter Tatchell's demand for direct, extra-parliamentary action because "the many victims of Tory policies - the homeless and the jobless - cannot wait that long" (i.e. until a general election) and therefore "their lives depend on Labour taking action now..."(7) But views such as these do not command majority support on the Labour Left. There are critics of particular parliamentary procedures and institutions, reflected for example in the view that the House of Lords should be abolished, but the overwhelming bulk of the Labour Left are committed to working for an electoral and parliamentary majority as the springboard for their programme. Enforcing MPs' accountability to their constituency parties, granting Party members the right to participate in the election of the Party leadership, and affirming their right to

determine Party policy would modify but not undermine parliamentary democracy.

Another accusation made at this time concerning the Labour Left was that it had secured its majorities by conspiratorial behaviour. One media critic wrote that the Labour Left's tactic was to "seize control" by "muscle not persuasion".(8) This accusation is of only limited validity. A previous chapter has outlined the conspiratorial nature of part of the Militant Group's activities. The covert activities of this group should not be linked with the organisational skills developed by such groups as CLPD or the Rank and File Mobilising Committee. The Labour Left had developed skills which in the past had been the monopoly of the Party leadership. But the Left's victories on internal Party reforms or on defence policy would not have been won without the deep commitment of the Party membership. This same media critic qualified his original assertion by writing later

> The advance of the Left is not due simply to manoeuvres, plots and a commitment to stay at meetings longer than anyone else. It has something to do with a simple fact often overlooked: namely that there is clearly a bigger demand than ever for a left-wing party in Britain. For a long time, the manoeuvres of the right have succeeded in stifling this. Now it is emerging as a durable - and wholly unsurprising - response to Britain's present condition.(9)

Here was belated recognition that the reasons for the Labour Left's successes within the Party were more straightforward and less sinister than he had suggested earlier.

Shifting power relationships in 1980 had

prompted an angry outburst from some Labour MPs used to a dominant position within the Party. Their attacks were sustained by certain political commentators, many of whom had no attachment or commitment to the Labour Party. These specific attacks on the Labour Left can be explained and understood as an outraged response to a shift in control of the Party with one group no longer able to influence affairs in the manner that it had become well used to.

A more sober, dispassionate analysis of the Labour Left is possible if we place it in the context of a continuous Labour Left since the late-1920s and judge the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary faction by comparing with previous periods.

Comparisons with the Labour Left in previous periods

One of the Labour Left's major weaknesses in earlier periods was its social isolation from the mainstream of Party membership. Ernest Bevin was able to mock the Socialist League's demands for a general strike in the event of war with Germany by pointing to the lack of trade union background amongst those making the demand. Hugh Gaitskell was able to deride the Bevanites as a group of "frustrated journalists". But part of the Tribune Group's strength in the late 1960s/early 1970s was that because many of its members were from a manual worker/trade union background they readily understood the fears and apprehensions of trade unionists over the Wilson Government's attempts to reform the trade unions, to curb

wage increases and to cut public services. It was the revisionist wing of the Party, with its Oxbridge-educated intellectuals, who appeared to be socially unrepresentative of the Party. The Labour Left was able to turn the tables on the Labour Right by accusing its leaders of being socially unrepresentative of the rank and file and out of touch with their demands and views.

Only in the 1980s did the Labour Left again appear to be developing some of the social distinctiveness reminscent of earlier periods. Within many CLPs a tension was emerging between young and old, professional and manual in which the Left, with its preponderance of young, educated professionals, often with only a few years Party membership, was in danger of becoming isolated from important social groups and traditions within the Party.

There was also a danger that the Labour left was becoming geographically unrepresentative. The centralising tendencies in British politics are very strong and it is difficult to counter them. But increasingly the Labour Left has appeared to be a 'metropolitan' left dominated by London CLPs which lack the manual trade union input of many provincial CLPs and also experience greater revolutionary socialist involvement than their provincial counterparts. There has been a tendency for the London Left to adopt more uncompromising positions than the provincial Left.(10) An important countervailing pressure, however, has been the left local authorities in some of the major cities and industrial conurbations. Nevertheless there remains a tendency for Left discussions and

decisions to be London-based.(11)

A second point of comparison is the role of personality in Labour Left politics. In the 1930s and 1950s the Labour Left was dependent to a great extent on the fortunes of one man - Stafford Cripps and Aneurin Bevan respectively. Both possessed very considerable political strengths but neither operated in any collective manner. They were individualists who found some difficulty in working within a faction. The Labour Left was not dominated by any single personality in the 1970s; only by the 1980s had its fortunes become inextricably linked with those of Tony Benn. All too easily Left politics became associated with an individual, resulting eventually in splits and a consequent loss of influence.

A third area of comparison concerns the Labour Left's associations with the Communist Party. The British electorate has remained unimpressed with the Soviet regime and the Communist Party's close attachments to the Soviet Union has resulted in its winning only very limited electoral support. This dislike of the Communist Party has extended into the labour movement. On occasions the Communist Party has engaged in a process of undermining the Labour Party and trade union leadership and at other times it has campaigned to secure affiliation to the Labour Party. Neither strategies have endeared the Party leadership to the Communist Party. At times therefore the close association between Labour Left and Communist Party has enabled the Party leadership to accuse the Labour Left of electorally damaging and organisationally divisive

ventures. The Socialist League's formal links with the Communist Party in the Unity Campaign of 1937 did the Labour Left a great deal of harm by enabling the Party leadership to disaffiliate the organisation immediately.

The development of the 'cold war' meant that Communists, for many in the labour movement, were both external and internal enemies. The Labour Right often used this sentiment to 'smear' the Labour Left. 'McArthyism' was not unique to the United States of America. In some of Britain's trade unions communists were barred from holding office and a Labour MP who adopted a position sympathetic to the Italian Communist Party in 1948 was expelled from the Party.(12)

By the 1970s a much more relaxed attitude prevailed within the labour movement towards the Communist Party as a result, first, of the development of international detente, second the emergence of a Euro-Communist commitment to the ballot box and to parliamentary institutions and, third, the decline in individual membership of the British Communist Party. All three factors resulted in less concern with the Communist Party and the 'Communist threat'. Fears can still be generated as a consequence of particular incidents, such as 'the Blunt affair', and a segment of the Labour Right (the Social Democratic Alliance) did try to win support in the mid-1970s with stories of Labour Left MPs visiting Moscow and of others publicly supporting the Morning Star newspaper. But a sign of the changed times was that this SDA campaign met with indifference or hostility. The

Communist Party remains of some importance in the labour movement with traditional pockets of strength in some trade unions and some parts of the country, with new 'broad left' alliances developing within some unions, and with some Labour MPs very closely associated with the Morning Star. But none of this has had the detrimental impact on the Labour Left that had been the case between the 1930s and the 1950s.

For a period in the 1930s the Labour Left was rivalled by the Communist Party in attempts to recruit individual socialists. By the late-1960s the main threat to the Labour Left in this recruiting programme was no longer the Communist Party but new socialist groupings such as the International Socialists and the International Marxist Group. But the contemporary Labour Left has had no such extensive competition. Membership of the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party (previously the International Socialists) and the International Marxist Group has declined, the parties and groups have often split and their impact on left wing politics has diminished.(13) Their failure to establish a significant electoral or political base in the working class, and the success of the Labour Left in securing internal Party reforms, convinced many socialists that the Labour Party was a more meaningful socialist alliance.(14) The NEC's abolition of the 'proscribed list' in 1973 and its tolerance of individuals whose socialism did not accord with official Party policy made such a socialist alliance more possible.(15) Many individuals who previously were

members of one of the left sects or were critical of the Labour Party but aligned with no other political organisation joined the Labour Party. Others who felt unable to join but recognised the importance of the Party in contemporary British politics established a Socialist Society to engage in the labour movement and influence the Labour Party.(16)

A final point to make in this examination of some of the most salient features of the Labour Left over time is that it has made no attempt to become closely involved with the trade unions. A shrewd observer of the labour movement, with experience of the Communist Party and then the Labour Party, has written that the Labour Left was "cocooned within the constituency parties".(17) Jimmy Reid was referring to the Labour Left's organisational absence from the trade union movement, in contrast to the Communist Party and the various Trotskyist groupings, because it did not wish to be seen to be interfering in the unions' internal affairs. But the establishment of an electoral college in 1981 highlighted the important political role of the affiliated trade unions and forced the Labour Left to become directly involved in a more organised manner. The Benn campaign in 1981 amongst delegates to the trade union conferences was the first Labour Left attempt at organising their support and since then the development of Broad Left organisations in a number of trade unions, in which Labour Party members participate, is an important continuation of this involvement. Also the opportunity to organise Labour Party

workplace branches provides an incentive to the Labour
Left to campaign among trade unionists.

Comparison of the Labour Left over time reveals
many strengths of the contemporary faction, but a current
assessment also reveals significant weaknesses.

An assessment of the contemporary Labour Left

Assessments of the current position of the
Labour Left vary. Perhaps not surprisingly the
Conservative Party argues that its position within the
Party is most powerful.(18) Tribune agrees with this
assessment arguing that "...the Left has never been
stronger and the prospects of a radical, Left-wing Labour
government have never been greater".(19) Ken Livingstone's
estimation is more pessimistic. He states that "the last
few months (i.e. summer/autumn 1985) have been the worst
period for the Left within the Labour Party in 20
years".(20) The ILP's judgement is similarly pessimistic:
its General Secretary asserts that "...we have a left in
disarray, either sectarian or individualist, without
cohesion, without consistency - unless it is that
consistent overestimation of the readiness of the working
class to rise spontaneously to the socialist call".(21)

Immediate judgement might be that with a Labour
leader so clearly identified with the Labour Left its
position must be strong. But a Left Labour leader is not a
new phenomenon: Ramsay MacDonald, Clement Attlee, Harold
Wilson and Michael Foot have all had, or claimed to have

had, similar associations and yet all were bitterly
attacked by the Labour Left during their incumbency. But
Kinnock's position differs from these earlier leaders
because he was elected by the Party as a whole rather than
the PLP as in the past. His *overwhelming* victory,
involving a wide participation by both affiliated and
individual Party members, suggests a base of support for
left wing policies. The electoral college and re-selection
procedures in all Labour-held constituencies now enables
the Party membership to play a more prominent role in the
composition and balance of the Party leadership and the
parliamentary Party.

But a Left Party Leader and parliamentary Party
will realise its potential only so long as it has a
convincing ideology, programme and strategy - convincing
both to the Party membership and to the electorate. But in
1986 the Labour Left displays ideological uncertainty,
programmatic weaknesses, and strategic myopia.

Today the 'revolutionary reformists' lack
ideological clarity concerning the nature of democratic
socialism which leaves them vulnerable to attack from both
the revolutionary left and the radical right. The nature
and extent of collective ownership and provision, and the
characteristics of socialist internationalism, need to be
defined and stated with conviction. The Labour Left still
relies on Clause Four of the Party constitution with its
commitment to common ownership and popular administration
but a clarity as to why and how this objective is relevant
in the last quarter of the twentieth century is lacking.

Reiteration of Labour's need to publicly own two hundred and fifty monopolies, one hundred and fifty companies, or the top twenty five companies carries little conviction when there are doubts concerning the economic objectives, structures and accountability of nationalised industries. Much of the Left's intellectual energy and commitment over the past five years has been channelled into micro-industrial planning as reflected in the work of local authority enterprise boards. The Left needs a powerful intellectual justification for public ownership as was provided by Stuart Holland early in the 1970s in The Socialist Challenge.

Socialist internationalism is an area which appears to be nothing more than admirable sentiment with little apparent relevance to modern conditions. The British Government's conflict with the Argentine Government in 1982 over the Falkland Isles revealed the paucity of Left thinking on such topics as Britain's world role, its sovereignty and people's rights to self-determination. In 1982 the Left was hopelessly divided and apparently far removed from popular opinion - not surprising with its complete lack of thought and analysis.

Earlier reference has been made to the emergence in the 1970s of a Labour Left programme centred around the Alternative Economic Strategy (public ownership, popular planning, import controls, and withdrawal from the EEC) and a non-nuclear defence commitment. Parts of this programme still remain central to Labour Left action in 1986 (e.g. the non-nuclear defence policy) but other

parts, in particular the Alternative Economic Strategy, appear to have been abandoned. The reason for this abandonment is, first, the belief amongst some of the Left that the 1983 General Election revealed parts to be electorally damaging (e.g. the withdrawal from the EEC), second their inability to agree upon the range and relevance of public ownership and, third, the view amongst some that a national strategy for dealing with the collapse of industrial capitalism is outmoded.

The Left's use of the term strategy in describing its economic programme has already been described in an earlier chapter as a misnomer. But it helps to make the point that the Left avoids strategic thought. One of the reasons why the Labour Left is so often in the position of condemning its own leaders for 'selling out' or of accusing others (e.g. civil servants) of acting in conspiratorial manner is because its own absence of strategic thought leaves a political vacuum easily filled by conservative forces. This lacuna in Left thinking is difficult to explain. It is as if the Left believes that to think about structures of power is to become contaminated by them.

The Left's commitment to withdraw from the EEC is an issue which requires such strategic thought. The Left is right to be concerned at the probable EEC restraints on a socialist economic programme but it needs to develop strategies involving other European socialists for establishing alternative political and trading relationships. Just to assert a need to withdraw from the

EEC leaves a political vacuum which is easily filled by those preferring to maintain the status quo.

Any governing Party with an alternative economic programme which involves reflation of the economy is likely to be confronted with the problem of inflation yet the Left avoids the problem since it might involve the politically sensitive issue of incomes and trade unions' commitment to free collective bargaining. But an examination of incomes need not imply a return to Labour's wages policies of the 1960s/1970s. Reform of the tax and social security systems, combined with a commitment to a legal minimum wage, might provide a strategy to deal with both the rise and the distribution of money incomes.

A similar absence of strategic thinking is apparent in the non-nuclear defence commitment. The Labour Left has succeeded in channelling the passionate concern that a nuclear holocaust is possible in such a way as to transform Labour's defence commitments, but it has failed to elaborate on the practical details concerning the dismantling of Cruise missile bases, the abandoning of Britain's Polaris forces, the renegotiation of Britain's NATO role, and the developing of Britain's conventional arms commitments. Again this lack of any detailed consideration of the methods and means of implementing its commitments renders them more liable to abandonment by the very powerful forces ranged against the non-nuclear policy.

If it clarifies these ideological, programmatic and strategic weaknesses can the Labour Left realise its

potential?

The future of the Labour Left?

Gavin Kitching argues in Rethinking Socialism: A theory for a Better Practice that

> ...the popularity of the Labour Party electorally is in almost exactly inverse proportion to the strength of the Left within it.(22)

But measurements of the Party's popular support at times when the Labour Left has been powerful within the Party would suggest that Kitching's hypothesis is unproven. If we compare Labour's popular support in 1962 when Signposts for the Sixties was issued - a policy document which reflected the strength of the revisionist Right in the Party - and in 1973 when Labour's Programme 1973 was issued - a policy document which reflected the more powerful influence of the Labour Left - we find little variation. The Gallup political index records Labour support as 42.8% in 1962 and 42.3% in 1973.(23)

If we examine the Party's electoral support at the peak of Labour Left influence, namely between 1979 and 1981, we find variation. Between 1979 and 1980 it increased (41.8% to 45.0%) and then decreased dramatically in 1981 (35.0%).(24) The 1981 Wembley conference, the subsequent split in the Party, and then the bitter deputy leadership campaign was, not surprisingly, electorally damaging. But the evidence from this one year is not

enough to prove Kitching's point.

A recently-published study of the British electorate suggests that it _is_ possible for a Labour Party with radical commitments to win popular support. The authors of <u>How Britain Votes</u> argue that Labour's policies in 1983 were not as unpopular as many commentators have suggested,(25) that people's values remain of significant importance in determining their electoral preference,(26) and that it remains possible for political parties to shift those values.(27) British voters are fairly unimpressed by the rhetoric of class struggle but are receptive to social justice.(28) This study of recent electoral behaviour would suggest that it is possible for the Labour Party to win the electoral support necessary to gain Office with a Labour left programme. What it requires beyond the earlier points made concerning ideology, programme and strategy is for the Labour Left to make serious attempts to convince the voters rather than just the Party activists of its case. Over the past sixteen years the Labour Left has been too much concerned with resolutions and too little concerned with revolution. In order to secure the second, as the Conservatives have since 1979 in areas of elite and popular opinion, requires a massive outward-looking campaign addressing the public in a manner and on subjects which concern them and not a small group of resolutionary ideologues.

The Labour Left also needs to recognise that the manner in which it conducts its debates within the Party is crucial to its long term chances of political office.

It should therefore create the conditions within the Party in which differences of opinion can be recognised and debate encouraged. The Labour Left needs to create a Party in which there is trust of Party leadership, there is respect for the views of the individual Party member, and intra-party debate is tolerated. There should be a respect for minority points of view and a recognition that paper majorities are inadequate. Arguments have to be won by the strength of the case and not by the strength of the vote. There should also be no place within a democratic socialist party for the practice of democratic centralism.

The Party should recognise that factions have a legitimate position and role. The organisation of groups of people to develop their arguments and to win majorities within the Party is valuable so long as all such groups owe their loyalty and commitment to the sovereign bodies of the Party and not some outside body. But the Party has never possessed clear ground rules concerning factions. We argued in Chapter one that two aspects of the Party's value system - its commitment to democratic debate and its commitment to working class unity - have often been in conflict and the result has often been an unclear attitude towards factions. Furthermore, we have shown that for much of the Party's history the Party leadership curbed the organised activities of the Labour Left.

The Party constitution stipulates that to be eligible for individual membership a person "must accept and conform to the constitution, programme, principles and policy of the Party".(29) To expect the member to conform

to Party programme and policy could be very restrictive of factional debate, but the constitution has never been interpreted in so narrow a manner. But the constitution also stipulates that individual members should not be members of organisations having "their own programme, principles and policy for distinctive and separate propaganda, or possessing branches in the constituencies..."(30) We have noted that this constitutional requirement was introduced in 1946 to curb further organised Labour Left activities within the Party along the lines of the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist League, and was used in the 1950s to stop the formation of any branch-based faction. Only in the 1970s did the NEC modify its stringent attitude towards factions best illustrated by its recognition of Independent Labour Publications in 1975.

The only organisations since 1945 which have been regarded as legitimate have been those affiliated to the Party. The Fabian Society is the longest-standing of such groups but the current list of affiliations also includes Poale Zion, the Socialist Medical Association, the Socialist Educational Association, the Society of Labour Lawyers, the Association of Labour Social Workers, the National Organisation of Labour Students, and the National Union of Labour and Socialist Clubs. Apart from the Fabian Society, the Labour Clubs and Poale Zion the others are all functional groupings bringing together people from specific sectors of the labour market. Attempts in recent years by non-functional issue groups to

affiliate to the Party have failed.(31) In 1983 the NEC raised the question of affiliation, asking the Party membership for its comments, but so far no clear position has emerged for either widening or even defining the grounds for affiliation. Recent argument over the question of Black sections within the Party has failed to galvanise the Party into some action on this question.

The ambiguous state of affairs in which the constitutional restrictions on factionalism appear severe and yet interpretations of the constitution vary according to the NEC's political persuasion are unsatisfactory. The establishment of the principle of Party registration in order to deal with the question of the Militant Group is unsatisfactory for the reasons advanced in Chapter nine. Factionalism has been given some degree of formal legitimacy by this procedure and registered branch organisations no longer transcend Herbert Morrison's constitutional restrictions. But registration is dependent upon NEC approval, therefore there is no right for a faction to exist subject only to the Party conference's refusal. Furthermore, the manner in which the rules have been interpreted is arbitrary. It is time that the constitutional ambiguities and ad hoc interpretation of the rules were removed by establishing formal constitutional rights for Party groups, clear ground rules for day-to-day operations, and a direct group input into the Party's deliberative processes.(32)

This thesis began by arguing that factionalism has been a central feature of Labour's politics, whereas

it has been rare within the Conservative Party until recent times. The intensity of this factionalism has varied over time and not all Party members have been participants, nevertheless the Party has been almost continuously divided into a Left and a Right. For much of the Party's history the Labour Right has predominated - within the Party leadership elected by members of the PLP, and within the NEC and annual Party conference elected and supported by a trade union bloc vote. The Labour Left's historical role has been to challenge this right wing leadership by defending those socialist ideals incorporated into the Party's 1918 constitution and resisting any later attempts to modify those earlier commitments, by asserting the importance of political principle over administrative and practical necessity, and by arguing for specific policies. Its particular commitments have changed over a period of fifty years, nevertheless it has possessed a common identity of ideas and the people with those ideas have coalesced as a distinct community aware of their common identity and of their rivals. This Labour Left has not been a 'party within the Party' in the sense of possessing a tight organisational structure and system of command, but a loose mixture of policies, sentiments and organisations. But the people involved have possessed enough in common for the Labour Left to be a term of significance in an analysis of the Labour Party during any period in its history from the 1920s onwards but, in particular, for the period since 1970.

FOOTNOTES)

1. B. Magee The Times March 2, 1981.

2. E. Lyons MP. Resignation statement to Bradford West Labour Party, March 19, 1981. Copy kindly provided by Edward Lyons.

3. T. Benn Arguments for Democracy, pp.190-191.

4. Butler and Stokes research on electoral behaviour suggests that voters do not form a tight cluster of political beliefs consistent with a particular Party programme and their behaviour is shaped more by general party image rather than specific policy commitments. See: D. Butler and D. Stokes Political Changes in Britain, (2nd ed) Chs. 15 & 16. See also S.E. Finer The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979, pp.122-127.

5. Editorial Sunday Telegraph, October 5, 1980.

6. The Leveller, October 29-November 11, 1980, p.15.

7. Peter Tatchell The Battle for Bermondsey, p.82.

8. Hugo Young The Sunday Times, October 5, 1980.

9. Hugo Young The Sunday Times, May 3, 1981.

10. In the ballot of CLPD members in 1982 to consider whether the group should apply to join the Labour Party register the majority of London members voted not to join and the majority of provincial members took a contrary point of view. Both CLPD and the LCC have held their annual meetings in locations other than London in an attempt to limit the London dominance.

11. The annual exercise to determine a left NEC 'slate' is carried out by various London-based personnel with little consideration of provincial opinion. For example, in 1983 the 'slate' was agreed in this manner and David Blunkett's candidature was initially ignored by this London cabal.

12. For example, the Transport and General Workers Union introduced such a ban in 1948. For a general examination of the trade unions' attitude towards Communists at this time see K. Kearney Anti-Communist campaigning in the British Labour Movement 1945-1950, (unpublished Northern College diploma essay, 1980). J.F. Platts-Mills was expelled from the Labour Party in 1948: he was the reputed author of the 'Nenni telegram' sent to the leader of the faction of the Italian Socialist Party which was advocating co-operation with the Communists. See: A. Ranney Pathways to Parliament, p.182.

13. Communist Party membership declined from 29,943 in 1973 to 15,691 in 1983. In 1985 the Communist Party

suffered a major split during which the Party leadership lost editorial control of The Morning Star. See: J. Blomfield 'Crossed Lines: Communists in Search of an Identity' Marxism Today, April 1984, p.27. In 1975 membership of the International Socialists was estimated to be between 3,000 and 3,500. In 1976 IS split and the dominant faction, renamed the Socialist Workers' Party, has since had a membership averaging 3,500. See: P. Shipley Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, p.146. (For the current figure I am grateful to Steve Ludlam.) The International Marxist Group was reported as having 750 members at the time that it disbanded in 1979. Since then its members moved into the Labour Party producing Socialist Action newspaper. In November 1985 this group split and a new organisation based around the journal International has emerged. See Martin Linton The Guardian, December 31, 1985.

14. For example Martin Shaw, previously a leading member of the International Socialists, announced in Labour Leader that he had joined the Labour Party because

> I am now convinced that there is little
> likelihood of major progress outside the Labour
> Party, and that the fortunes of the Labour Left
> are an essential part of the future of socialism
> in Britain.

Labour Leader, January 1980.

15. But note that the Labour Party's tolerance did not extend so far as to allow Tariq Ali to become a member. Tariq Ali's mistake was to publicise his new-found conversion to, and membership of, the Labour Party in every possible media outlet. If Ali had sought less self-publicity and become an ordinary humble Party member his membership might have been accepted. But perhaps Ali enjoyed the publicity! For his expulsion see NEC Report 1983, p.32 and NEC Report 1984, p.26.

16. The memorandum outlining the objectives of the new Socialist Society, founded in 1982, stated that

> The creation of the proposed Society would be
> conceived as an intervention in the present
> debates within the Labour movement. It would
> have the general intention of strengthening the
> weight of the Left and furnishing it with more
> adequate and authoritative research and
> programmatic guidelines... From the outset the
> Society would have in its ranks socialists both
> inside and outside the Labour Party and would,
> in this way, function as a sort of bridging
> organisation between the Labour and extra-Labour
> Left in the area of broad policy debate... The
> desirability and feasibility of affiliating to
> the Labour Party at a national level would be

considered subsequent to the formation of the Society.
Initial memorandum on the objectives of the Socialist Society, Author's copy. It is also worth noting that Ralph Miliband has modified his attitude towards the Labour Party. Writing a 'Postscript' to Parliamentary Socialism in 1972 he had argued the need to develop a socialist alternative to the Labour Party and had been very critical of the Labour Left, but by 1985, although still arguing the need for an independent Socialist party he adopted a much warmer tone towards the Labour Left. For example: "...to comrades who think they can best pursue the enterprise (i.e. socialist objective) inside the party, one can only say 'Good luck to you'" 'A road to take the Left inside Labour' The Guardian, August 5, 1985.

17. J. Reid The Times, September 29, 1980.

18. Conservative Research Department The State of the Labour Party, December 1985.

19. Editorial in Tribune, October 11, 1985.

20. Chartist, 106, October/November 1985.

21. Anne Marie Graham Labour Leader, December 1985.

22. p.102.

23. This is an average of the twelve monthly returns of voting intentions. N. Webb and R. Wybrow The Gallup Report (1980), p.171 & p.173.

24. ibid., p.168 and N. Webb and R. Wybrow The Gallup Report (1981), p.192.

25. A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice How Britain Votes, p.89.

26. ibid., p.99 & pp.107-109.

27. ibid., p.112.

28. ibid., p.166 & 174.

29. Clause III,3(a).

30. Clause II,3.

31. Since 1970 the following groups have applied for affiliation: the Labour Middle East Council; the Labour Economic, Finance, and Taxation Association; the Christian Socialist Movement; the Labour Action for Peace; the Labour Campaign for Criminal Justice; and the Socialist Environment and Resources Association. All the requests have been refused.

32. For example, groups should be invited to submit

written memoranda to all Party policy-making committees, both in the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Party. Groups should receive all Party documentation (committee minutes, papers, etc.). Groups should have the right to submit resolutions and amendments to the Party conferences (national and regional) in the same way as do presently-affiliated bodies (but not have the right to formal representation at each level of the Party from CLP to NEC and Party conference as is the case with affiliated groups).

Appendix 1

CORRELATION MATRIX: NEC VOTES 1982/1983

The members of the NEC have the following identity numbers
in the matrix:

1	Benn
2	Boothroyd
3	Cure
4	Davis
5	Dunwoody
6	Evans (J)
7	Heffer
8	Hough
9	Kinnock
10	Kitson
11	McCluskie
12	Richardson
13	Sawyer
14	Skinner
15	Tierney
16	Wise
17	Hadden
18	Evans (R)
19	Varley
20	Allaun
21	Coates
22	Hart
23	Foot
24	Golding
25	Healey
26	Howell
27	Summerskill
28	Tuck
29	Williams

-----------PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS---------------

VARIABLE PAIR		VARIABLE PAIR		VARIABLE PAIR		VARIABLE PAIR		VARIABLE PAIR		VARIABLE PAIR	
ID1 WITH ID1	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID2	-0.7727 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID3	-0.9905 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID4	-0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID5	-0.9506 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID6	-0.4815 N(52) SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID7	0.8841 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID8	-0.9621 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID9	-0.2010 N(52) SIG .077	ID1 WITH ID10	0.1181 N(52) SIG .202	ID1 WITH ID11	0.1512 N(52) SIG .142	ID1 WITH ID12	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID13	0.8842 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID14	0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID15	-0.4571 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID16	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID17	-0.7951 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID18	-0.8990 N(52) SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID19	-0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID20	0.8582 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID21	0.9258 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID22	0.7334 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID23	-0.6533 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID24	-0.9621 N(52) SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID25	-0.9419 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID26	-1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID27	-0.9621 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID28	-0.9619 N(52) SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID29	-0.8155 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID1	-0.7727 N(52) SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID2	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID3	0.7546 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID4	0.7227 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID5	0.7614 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID6	0.2263 N(52) SIG .053	ID2 WITH ID7	-0.7702 N(52) SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID8	0.7720 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID9	-0.0017 N(52) SIG .495	ID2 WITH ID10	-0.1483 N(52) SIG .147	ID2 WITH ID11	-0.1849 N(52) SIG .095	ID2 WITH ID12	-0.7727 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID13	-0.6743 N(52) SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID14	-0.7227 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID15	0.4920 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID16	-0.7727 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID17	0.7100 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID18	0.7156 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID19	0.7227 N(52) SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID20	-0.6256 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID21	-0.6727 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID22	-0.5174 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID23	0.3841 N(52) SIG .002	ID2 WITH ID24	0.7720 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID25	0.7364 N(52) SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID26	0.7727 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID27	0.7720 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID28	0.7245 N(52) SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID29	0.5544 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID1	-0.9905 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID2	0.7546 N(52) SIG .000
ID3 WITH ID3	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID4	0.9124 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID5	0.9401 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID6	0.4698 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID7	-0.8957 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID8	0.9516 N(52) SIG .000
ID3 WITH ID9	0.2040 N(52) SIG .073	ID3 WITH ID10	-0.1180 N(52) SIG .202	ID3 WITH ID11	-0.1498 N(52) SIG .145	ID3 WITH ID12	-0.9905 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID13	-0.8744 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID14	-0.9124 N(52) SIG .000
ID3 WITH ID15	0.4610 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID16	-0.9905 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID17	0.7837 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID18	0.8875 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID19	0.9124 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID20	-0.8493 N(52) SIG .000
ID3 WITH ID21	-0.9531 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID22	-0.7401 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID23	0.6401 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID24	0.9516 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID25	0.9307 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID26	0.9905 N(52) SIG .000
ID3 WITH ID27	0.9516 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID28	0.9528 N(52) SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID29	0.8225 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID1	-0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID2	0.7227 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID3	0.9124 N(52) SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID4	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID5	0.9098 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID6	0.4018 N(52) SIG .002	ID4 WITH ID7	-0.9270 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID8	0.9621 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID9	0.2727 N(52) SIG .013
ID4 WITH ID10	-0.1181 N(52) SIG .202	ID4 WITH ID11	-0.1512 N(52) SIG .142	ID4 WITH ID12	-0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID13	-0.8842 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID14	-1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID15	0.5079 N(52) SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID16	-0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID17	0.8802 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID18	0.8579 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID19	1.0000 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID20	-0.8582 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID21	-0.8487 N(52) SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID22	-0.6889 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID23	0.7391 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID24	0.9621 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID25	0.9419 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID26	0.9226 N(52) SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID27	0.9621 N(52) SIG .000

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ID4       0.9619   ID4       0.7726   ID5      -0.9506   ID5       0.7614   ID5       0.9401   ID5       0.9098
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID28     SIG .000   ID29     SIG .000   ID1      SIG .000   ID2      SIG .000   ID3      SIG .000   ID4      SIG .000


ID5       1.0000   ID5       0.3981   ID5      -0.8598   ID5       0.9117   ID5       0.1863   ID5      -0.1257
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID5      SIG .000   ID6      SIG .002   ID7      SIG .000   ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .093   ID10     SIG .187


ID5      -0.1623   ID5      -0.9506   ID5      -0.8683   ID5      -0.9098   ID5       0.4015   ID5      -0.9506
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID11     SIG .125   ID12     SIG .000   ID13     SIG .000   ID14     SIG .000   ID15     SIG .002   ID16     SIG .000


ID5       0.7898   ID5       0.9460   ID5       0.9098   ID5      -0.9001   ID5      -0.8743   ID5      -0.7727
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID17     SIG .000   ID18     SIG .000   ID19     SIG .000   ID20     SIG .000   ID21     SIG .000   ID22     SIG .000


ID5       0.6178   ID5       0.9117   ID5       0.8883   ID5       0.9506   ID5       0.9117   ID5       0.9502
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID23     SIG .000   ID24     SIG .000   ID25     SIG .000   ID26     SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28     SIG .000


ID5       0.8597   ID6      -0.4815   ID6       0.2263   ID6       0.4698   ID6       0.4018   ID6       0.3981
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID29     SIG .000   ID1      SIG .000   ID2      SIG .053   ID3      SIG .000   ID4      SIG .002   ID5      SIG .002


ID6       1.0000   ID6      -0.3752   ID6       0.4491   ID6       0.5519   ID6       0.4565   ID6      -0.1754
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID6      SIG .000   ID7      SIG .002   ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .000   ID10     SIG .000   ID11     SIG .107


ID6      -0.4815   ID6      -0.3548   ID6      -0.4018   ID6       0.3664   ID6      -0.4815   ID6       0.4013
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID12     SIG .000   ID13     SIG .005   ID14     SIG .002   ID15     SIG .004   ID16     SIG .000   ID17     SIG .002


ID6       0.4274   ID6       0.4018   ID6      -0.3079   ID6      -0.4174   ID6      -0.2706   ID6       0.6303
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID18     SIG .001   ID19     SIG .002   ID20     SIG .013   ID21     SIG .001   ID22     SIG .026   ID23     SIG .000


ID6       0.4491   ID6       0.4174   ID6       0.4815   ID6       0.4491   ID6       0.4348   ID6       0.3760
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID24     SIG .000   ID25     SIG .001   ID26     SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28     SIG .001   ID29     SIG .003


ID7       0.8841   ID7      -0.7702   ID7      -0.8957   ID7      -0.9270   ID7      -0.8598   ID7      -0.3952
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID1      SIG .000   ID2      SIG .000   ID3      SIG .000   ID4      SIG .000   ID5      SIG .000   ID6      SIG .002


ID7       1.0000   ID7      -0.8903   ID7      -0.2140   ID7       0.1302   ID7       0.1856   ID7       0.8841
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID7      SIG .000   ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .064   ID10     SIG .164   ID11     SIG .094   ID12     SIG .000


ID7       0.7930   ID7       0.9270   ID7      -0.5629   ID7       0.8841   ID7      -0.9066   ID7      -0.8263
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID13     SIG .000   ID14     SIG .000   ID15     SIG .000   ID16     SIG .000   ID17     SIG .000   ID18     SIG .000


ID7      -0.9270   ID7       0.8098   ID7       0.8551   ID7       0.7113   ID7      -0.6574   ID7      -0.8903
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID19     SIG .000   ID20     SIG .000   ID21     SIG .000   ID22     SIG .000   ID23     SIG .000   ID24     SIG .000


ID7      -0.8644   ID7      -0.8841   ID7      -0.8903   ID7      -0.9221   ID7      -0.7374   ID8      -0.9621
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID25     SIG .000   ID26     SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28     SIG .000   ID29     SIG .000   ID1      SIG .000


ID8       0.7720   ID8       0.9516   ID8       0.9621   ID8       0.9117   ID8       0.4491   ID8      -0.8903
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID2      SIG .000   ID3      SIG .000   ID4      SIG .000   ID5      SIG .000   ID6      SIG .000   ID7      SIG .000


ID8       1.0000   ID8       0.2489   ID8      -0.1157   ID8      -0.1455   ID8      -0.9621   ID8      -0.9255
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .038   ID10     SIG .207   ID11     SIG .152   ID12     SIG .000   ID13     SIG .000


ID8      -0.9621   ID8       0.4561   ID8      -0.9621   ID8       0.8423   ID8       0.8591   ID8       0.9621
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID14     SIG .000   ID15     SIG .000   ID16     SIG .000   ID17     SIG .000   ID18     SIG .000   ID19     SIG .000


ID8      -0.8243   ID8      -0.8853   ID8      -0.6802   ID8       0.7004   ID8       1.0000   ID8       0.9806
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID20     SIG .000   ID21     SIG .000   ID22     SIG .000   ID23     SIG .000   ID24     SIG .000   ID25     SIG .000


ID8       0.9621   ID8       1.0000   ID8       0.9255   ID8       0.7709   ID9      -0.2010   ID9      -0.0017
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID26     SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28     SIG .000   ID29     SIG .000   ID1      SIG .077   ID2      SIG .495


ID9       0.2040   ID9       0.2927   ID9       0.1863   ID9       0.5519   ID9      -0.2140   ID9       0.2487
WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)   WITH     N(  52)
ID3      SIG .073   ID4      SIG .018   ID5      SIG .093   ID6      SIG .000   ID7      SIG .064   ID8      SIG .038
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ID9        1.0000   ID9        0.4004   ID9       -0.1760   ID9       -0.2010   ID9       -0.1991   ID9       -0.2927
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID9       SIG .000   ID10      SIG .002   ID11      SIG .106   ID12      SIG .077   ID13      SIG .079   ID14      SIG .010


ID9        0.2708   ID9       -0.2010   ID9        0.2403   ID9        0.1650   ID9        0.2927   ID9       -0.1294
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID15      SIG .026   ID16      SIG .077   ID17      SIG .043   ID18      SIG .121   ID19      SIG .018   ID20      SIG .100


ID9       -0.2514   ID9       -0.0513   ID9        0.5996   ID9        0.2489   ID9        0.2539   ID9        0.2010
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID21      SIG .036   ID22      SIG .359   ID23      SIG .000   ID24      SIG .038   ID25      SIG .035   ID26      SIG .077


ID9        0.2489   ID9        0.2451   ID9        0.1780   ID10       0.1181   ID10      -0.1403   ID10      -0.1180
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID27      SIG .038   ID28      SIG .040   ID29      SIG .103   ID1       SIG .202   ID2       SIG .147   ID3       SIG .202


ID10      -0.1181   ID10      -0.1257   ID10       0.4565   ID10       0.1382   ID10      -0.1157   ID10       0.4004
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID4       SIG .202   ID5       SIG .187   ID6       SIG .000   ID7       SIG .164   ID8       SIG .207   ID9       SIG .002


ID10       1.0000   ID10       0.1985   ID10       0.1131   ID10       0.1778   ID10       0.1181   ID10       0.1473
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID10      SIG .000   ID11      SIG .079   ID12      SIG .202   ID13      SIG .104   ID14      SIG .202   ID15      SIG .145


ID10       0.1181   ID10      -0.1347   ID10      -0.1256   ID10      -0.1181   ID10       0.2221   ID10       0.1134
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID16      SIG .202   ID17      SIG .171   ID18      SIG .187   ID19      SIG .202   ID20      SIG .057   ID21      SIG .212


ID10       0.2305   ID10       0.1491   ID10      -0.1157   ID10      -0.1469   ID10      -0.1181   ID10      -0.1157
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID22      SIG .050   ID23      SIG .146   ID24      SIG .207   ID25      SIG .149   ID26      SIG .202   ID27      SIG .207


ID10      -0.1208   ID10      -0.0946   ID11       0.1512   ID11      -0.1849   ID11      -0.1498   ID11      -0.1512
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID28      SIG .197   ID29      SIG .252   ID1       SIG .142   ID2       SIG .095   ID3       SIG .145   ID4       SIG .142


ID11      -0.1623   ID11      -0.1754   ID11       0.1856   ID11      -0.1455   ID11      -0.1760   ID11       0.1985
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID5       SIG .125   ID6       SIG .107   ID7       SIG .094   ID8       SIG .152   ID9       SIG .106   ID10      SIG .079


ID11       1.0000   ID11       0.1512   ID11       0.1572   ID11       0.1512   ID11      -0.1844   ID11       0.1512
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID11      SIG .000   ID12      SIG .142   ID13      SIG .133   ID14      SIG .142   ID15      SIG .095   ID16      SIG .142


ID11      -0.1782   ID11      -0.1609   ID11      -0.1512   ID11       0.1791   ID11       0.1400   ID11       0.1648
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID17      SIG .103   ID18      SIG .127   ID19      SIG .142   ID20      SIG .102   ID21      SIG .161   ID22      SIG .121


ID11      -0.1767   ID11      -0.1455   ID11      -0.1484   ID11      -0.1512   ID11      -0.1455   ID11      -0.1572
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID23      SIG .105   ID24      SIG .152   ID25      SIG .147   ID26      SIG .142   ID27      SIG .152   ID28      SIG .133


ID11      -0.1558   ID12       1.0000   ID12      -0.7727   ID12      -0.9905   ID12      -0.9226   ID12      -0.7506
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID29      SIG .135   ID1       SIG .000   ID2       SIG .000   ID3       SIG .000   ID4       SIG .000   ID5       SIG .000


ID12      -0.4815   ID12       0.8841   ID12      -0.9621   ID12      -0.2010   ID12       0.1181   ID12       0.1512
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID6       SIG .000   ID7       SIG .000   ID8       SIG .000   ID9       SIG .077   ID10      SIG .202   ID11      SIG .142


ID12       1.0000   ID12       0.8842   ID12       0.9226   ID12      -0.4571   ID12       1.0000   ID12      -0.7951
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID12      SIG .000   ID13      SIG .000   ID14      SIG .000   ID15      SIG .000   ID16      SIG .000   ID17      SIG .000


ID12      -0.8990   ID12      -0.9226   ID12       0.8502   ID12       0.9258   ID12       0.7334   ID12      -0.6533
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID18      SIG .000   ID19      SIG .000   ID20      SIG .000   ID21      SIG .000   ID22      SIG .000   ID23      SIG .000


ID12      -0.9621   ID12      -0.9419   ID12      -1.0000   ID12      -0.9621   ID12      -0.9619   ID12      -0.2155
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID24      SIG .000   ID25      SIG .000   ID26      SIG .000   ID27      SIG .000   ID28      SIG .000   ID29      SIG .000


ID13       0.8842   ID13      -0.6743   ID13      -0.8744   ID13      -0.8842   ID13      -0.8683   ID13      -0.3548
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID1       SIG .000   ID2       SIG .000   ID3       SIG .000   ID4       SIG .000   ID5       SIG .000   ID6       SIG .005


ID13       0.7930   ID13      -0.9255   ID13      -0.1991   ID13       0.1778   ID13       0.1572   ID13       0.8842
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID7       SIG .000   ID8       SIG .000   ID9       SIG .079   ID10      SIG .104   ID11      SIG .133   ID12      SIG .000


ID13       1.0000   ID13       0.8842   ID13      -0.3568   ID13       0.8842   ID13      -0.7915   ID13      -0.8166
UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)   UITH      N(  52)
ID13      SIG .000   ID14      SIG .000   ID15      SIG .005   ID16      SIG .000   ID17      SIG .000   ID18      SIG .000
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ID13    -0.8842   ID13     0.8936   ID13     0.8131   ID13     0.7353   ID13    -0.6069   ID13    -0.9255
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000


ID13    -0.9043   ID13    -0.8842   ID13    -0.9255   ID13    -0.8441   ID13    -0.7324   ID14     0.9226
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000


ID14    -0.7227   ID14    -0.9124   ID14    -1.0000   ID14    -0.9098   ID14    -0.4018   ID14     0.9270
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID2     SIG .000  ID3     SIG .000  ID4     SIG .000  ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .002  ID7     SIG .000


ID14    -0.9621   ID14    -0.2927   ID14     0.1181   ID14     0.1512   ID14     0.9226   ID14     0.8842
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID8     SIG .000  ID9     SIG .018  ID10    SIG .202  ID11    SIG .142  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000


ID14     1.0000   ID14    -0.5079   ID14     0.9226   ID14    -0.8802   ID14    -0.8579   ID14    -1.0000
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID14    SIG .000  ID15    SIG .000  ID16    SIG .000  ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000


ID14     0.8582   ID14     0.8487   ID14     0.6889   ID14    -0.7391   ID14    -0.9621   ID14    -0.9419
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000


ID14    -0.9226   ID14    -0.9621   ID14    -0.9619   ID14    -0.7726   ID15    -0.4571   ID15     0.4720
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000


ID15     0.4610   ID15     0.5079   ID15     0.4015   ID15     0.3664   ID15    -0.5629   ID15     0.4561
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID3     SIG .000  ID4     SIG .000  ID5     SIG .002  ID6     SIG .004  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000


ID15     0.2708   ID15     0.1493   ID15    -0.1044   ID15    -0.4571   ID15    -0.3568   ID15    -0.5079
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID9     SIG .026  ID10    SIG .145  ID11    SIG .075  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .005  ID14    SIG .000


ID15     1.0000   ID15    -0.4571   ID15     0.5863   ID15     0.4592   ID15     0.5079   ID15    -0.3741
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID15    SIG .000  ID16    SIG .000  ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .003


ID15    -0.5064   ID15    -0.2337   ID15     0.6194   ID15     0.4561   ID15     0.4651   ID15     0.4571
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .048  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000


ID15     0.4561   ID15     0.5098   ID15     0.5071   ID16     1.0000   ID16    -0.7727   ID16    -0.9905
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000  ID3     SIG .000


ID16    -0.9226   ID16    -0.9506   ID16    -0.4815   ID16     0.8841   ID16    -0.9621   ID16    -0.2010
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID4     SIG .000  ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .000  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000  ID9     SIG .077


ID16     0.1181   ID16     0.1512   ID16     1.0000   ID16     0.8042   ID16     0.9226   ID16    -0.4571
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID10    SIG .202  ID11    SIG .142  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000  ID14    SIG .000  ID15    SIG .000


ID16     1.0000   ID16    -0.7951   ID16    -0.8990   ID16    -0.9226   ID16     0.8582   ID16     0.9258
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID16    SIG .000  ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000


ID16     0.7334   ID16    -0.6533   ID16    -0.9621   ID16    -0.9419   ID16    -1.0000   ID16    -0.9621
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000


ID16    -0.9619   ID16    -0.8155   ID17    -0.7951   ID17     0.7100   ID17     0.7837   ID17     0.8802
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000  ID3     SIG .000  ID4     SIG .000


ID17     0.7898   ID17     0.4013   ID17    -0.9066   ID17     0.8423   ID17     0.2403   ID17    -0.1347
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .002  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000  ID9     SIG .043  ID10    SIG .171


ID17    -0.1782   ID17    -0.7951   ID17    -0.7915   ID17    -0.8802   ID17     0.5863   ID17    -0.7951
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID11    SIG .103  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000  ID14    SIG .000  ID15    SIG .000  ID16    SIG .000


ID17     1.0000   ID17     0.8457   ID17     0.8802   ID17    -0.7679   ID17    -0.7210   ID17    -0.6085
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000


ID17     0.7055   ID17     0.8423   ID17     0.8157   ID17     0.7951   ID17     0.8423   ID17     0.8342
WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)   WITH    N(  52)
ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000
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ID17    0.6842   ID18   -0.8990   ID18    0.7156   ID18    0.8875   ID18    0.8579   ID18    0.9460
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  N(  52)
ID29    SIG .000  ID1   SIG .000   ID2    SIG .000  ID3    SIG .000  ID4    SIG .000  ID5    SIG .000


ID18    0.4274   ID18   -0.8263   ID18    0.8591   ID18    0.1650   ID18   -0.1256   ID18   -0.1609
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID6     SIG .001  ID7   SIG .000   ID8    SIG .000  ID9    SIG .121  ID10   SIG .187  ID11   SIG .127


ID18   -0.8990   ID18   -0.8166   ID18   -0.8579   ID18    0.4592   ID18   -0.8990   ID18    0.8457
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID12    SIG .000  ID13  SIG .000   ID14   SIG .000  ID15   SIG .000  ID16   SIG .000  ID17   SIG .000


ID18    1.0000   ID18    0.8579   ID18   -0.8479   ID18   -0.8206   ID18   -0.7070   ID18    0.6493
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID18    SIG .000  ID19  SIG .000   ID20   SIG .000  ID21   SIG .000  ID22   SIG .000  ID23   SIG .000


ID18    0.8591   ID18    0.8343   ID18    0.8990   ID18    0.8591   ID18    0.8992   ID18    0.8446
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID24    SIG .000  ID25  SIG .000   ID26   SIG .000  ID27   SIG .000  ID28   SIG .000  ID29   SIG .000


ID19   -0.9226   ID19    0.7227   ID19    0.9124   ID19    1.0000   ID19    0.9098   ID19    0.4018
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID1     SIG .000  ID2   SIG .000   ID3    SIG .000  ID4    SIG .000  ID5    SIG .000  ID6    SIG .002


ID19   -0.9270   ID19    0.9621   ID19    0.2927   ID19   -0.1181   ID19   -0.1512   ID19   -0.9226
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID7     SIG .000  ID8   SIG .000   ID9    SIG .018  ID10   SIG .202  ID11   SIG .142  ID12   SIG .000


ID19   -0.8842   ID19   -1.0000   ID19    0.5079   ID19   -0.9226   ID19    0.8802   ID19    0.8579
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID13    SIG .000  ID14  SIG .000   ID15   SIG .000  ID16   SIG .000  ID17   SIG .000  ID18   SIG .000


ID19    1.0000   ID19   -0.8582   ID19   -0.8487   ID19   -0.6889   ID19    0.7391   ID19    0.9621
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID19    SIG .000  ID20  SIG .000   ID21   SIG .000  ID22   SIG .000  ID23   SIG .000  ID24   SIG .000


ID19    0.9419   ID19    0.9226   ID19    0.9621   ID19    0.9619   ID19    0.7726   ID20    0.8582
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID25    SIG .000  ID26  SIG .000   ID27   SIG .000  ID28   SIG .000  ID29   SIG .000  ID1    SIG .000


ID20   -0.6256   ID20   -0.8493   ID20   -0.8582   ID20   -0.9001   ID20   -0.3079   ID20    0.8098
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID2     SIG .000  ID3   SIG .000   ID4    SIG .000  ID5    SIG .000  ID6    SIG .013  ID7    SIG .000


ID20   -0.8243   ID20   -0.1294   ID20    0.2221   ID20    0.1771   ID20    0.8582   ID20    0.8936
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID8     SIG .000  ID9   SIG .180   ID10   SIG .057  ID11   SIG .102  ID12   SIG .000  ID13   SIG .000


ID20    0.8582   ID20   -0.3741   ID20    0.8582   ID20   -0.7679   ID20   -0.8479   ID20   -0.8582
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID14    SIG .000  ID15  SIG .003   ID16   SIG .000  ID17   SIG .000  ID18   SIG .000  ID19   SIG .000


ID20    1.0000   ID20    0.7916   ID20    0.8156   ID20   -0.5760   ID20   -0.8243   ID20   -0.8179
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID20    SIG .000  ID21  SIG .000   ID22   SIG .000  ID23   SIG .000  ID24   SIG .000  ID25   SIG .000


ID20   -0.8582   ID20   -0.8243   ID20   -0.8936   ID20   -0.7905   ID21    0.9258   ID21   -0.6727
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID26    SIG .000  ID27  SIG .000   ID28   SIG .000  ID29   SIG .000  ID1    SIG .000  ID2    SIG .000


ID21   -0.9531   ID21   -0.8487   ID21   -0.8743   ID21   -0.4174   ID21    0.8551   ID21   -0.8053
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID3     SIG .000  ID4   SIG .000   ID5    SIG .000  ID6    SIG .001  ID7    SIG .000  ID8    SIG .000


ID21   -0.2514   ID21    0.1134   ID21    0.1400   ID21    0.9258   ID21    0.8131   ID21    0.8487
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID9     SIG .036  ID10  SIG .212   ID11   SIG .161  ID12   SIG .000  ID13   SIG .000  ID14   SIG .000


ID21   -0.5064   ID21    0.9258   ID21   -0.7210   ID21   -0.8206   ID21   -0.8487   ID21    0.7216
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID15    SIG .000  ID16  SIG .000   ID17   SIG .000  ID18   SIG .000  ID19   SIG .000  ID20   SIG .000


ID21    1.0000   ID21    0.6885   ID21   -0.6629   ID21   -0.8853   ID21   -0.9029   ID21   -0.9258
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID21    SIG .000  ID22  SIG .000   ID23   SIG .000  ID24   SIG .000  ID25   SIG .000  ID26   SIG .000


ID21   -0.8853   ID21   -0.8906   ID21   -0.8559   ID22    0.7334   ID22   -0.5174   ID22   -0.7401
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID27    SIG .000  ID28  SIG .000   ID29   SIG .000  ID1    SIG .000  ID2    SIG .000  ID3    SIG .000


ID22   -0.6889   ID22   -0.7727   ID22   -0.2706   ID22    0.7113   ID22   -0.6882   ID22   -0.0513
UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)   UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH    N(  52)  UITH   N(  52)
ID4     SIG .000  ID5   SIG .000   ID6    SIG .026  ID7    SIG .000  ID8    SIG .000  ID9    SIG .359
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ID22      0.2305    ID22      0.1648    ID22     0.7334    ID22      0.7353    ID22      0.6889    ID22     -0.2339
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID10     SIG .050   ID11     SIG .121   ID12    SIG .000   ID13     SIG .000   ID14     SIG .000   ID15    SIG .048


ID22      0.7334    ID22     -0.6085    ID22    -0.7090    ID22     -0.6889    ID22      0.8156    ID22      C.6885
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID16     SIG .000   ID17     SIG .000   ID18    SIG .000   ID19     SIG .000   ID20     SIG .000   ID21    SIG .000


ID22      1.0000    ID22     -0.3918    ID22    -0.6882    ID22     -0.6565    ID22     -0.7334    ID22     -0.6882
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID22     SIG .000   ID23     SIG .002   ID24    SIG .000   ID25     SIG .000   ID26     SIG .000   ID27    SIG .000


ID22     -0.7353    ID22     -0.6673    ID23    -0.6533    ID23      0.3841    ID23      0.6401    ID23      0.7391
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID28     SIG .000   ID29     SIG .000   ID1     SIG .000   ID2      SIG .002   ID3      SIG .000   ID4     SIG .000


ID23      0.6178    ID23      0.6303    ID23    -0.6574    ID23      0.7004    ID23      0.5996    ID23      0.1491
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID5      SIG .000   ID6      SIG .000   ID7     SIG .000   ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .000   ID10    SIG .146


ID23     -0.1767    ID23     -0.6533    ID23    -0.6069    ID23     -0.7391    ID23      0.6194    ID23     -0.6533
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID11     SIG .105   ID12     SIG .000   ID13    SIG .000   ID14     SIG .000   ID15     SIG .000   ID16    SIG .000


ID23      0.7055    ID23      0.6493    ID23     0.7391    ID23     -0.5760    ID23     -0.6629    ID23     -0.3718
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID17     SIG .000   ID18     SIG .000   ID19    SIG .000   ID20     SIG .000   ID21     SIG .000   ID22    SIG .002


ID23      1.0000    ID23      0.7004    ID23     0.7361    ID23      0.6533    ID23      0.7004    ID23      0.6930
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID23     SIG .000   ID24     SIG .000   ID25    SIG .000   ID26     SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28    SIG .000


ID23      0.7138    ID24     -0.9621    ID24     0.7720    ID24      0.9516    ID24      0.9621    ID24      0.9117
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID27     SIG .000   ID1      SIG .000   ID2     SIG .000   ID3      SIG .000   ID4      SIG .000   ID5     SIG .000


ID24      0.4491    ID24     -0.8903    ID24     1.0000    ID24      0.2489    ID24     -0.1157    ID24     -0.1455
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID6      SIG .000   ID7      SIG .000   ID8     SIG .000   ID9      SIG .038   ID10     SIG .207   ID11    SIG .152


ID24     -0.9621    ID24     -0.9255    ID24    -0.9621    ID24      0.4561    ID24     -0.9621    ID24      0.8423
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID12     SIG .000   ID13     SIG .000   ID14    SIG .000   ID15     SIG .000   ID16     SIG .000   ID17    SIG .000


ID24      0.8591    ID24      0.9621    ID24    -0.8243    ID24     -0.8853    ID24     -0.6882    ID24      0.7004
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID18     SIG .000   ID19     SIG .000   ID20    SIG .000   ID21     SIG .000   ID22     SIG .000   ID23    SIG .000


ID24      1.0000    ID24      0.9806    ID24     0.9621    ID24      1.0000    ID24      0.9255    ID24      0.7709
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID24     SIG .000   ID25     SIG .000   ID26    SIG .000   ID27     SIG .000   ID28     SIG .000   ID29    SIG .000


ID25     -0.9419    ID25      0.7364    ID25     0.9307    ID25      0.9419    ID25      0.8883    ID25      0.4174
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID1      SIG .000   ID2      SIG .000   ID3     SIG .000   ID4      SIG .000   ID5      SIG .000   ID6     SIG .001


ID25     -0.8644    ID25      0.9806    ID25     0.2539    ID25     -0.1469    ID25     -0.1484    ID25     -0.9419
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID7      SIG .000   ID8      SIG .000   ID9     SIG .035   ID10     SIG .149   ID11     SIG .147   ID12    SIG .000


ID25     -0.9043    ID25     -0.9419    ID25     0.4651    ID25     -0.9419    ID25      0.8157    ID25      0.8343
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID13     SIG .000   ID14     SIG .000   ID15    SIG .000   ID16     SIG .000   ID17     SIG .000   ID18    SIG .000


ID25      0.9419    ID25     -0.8199    ID25    -0.9028    ID25     -0.6565    ID25      0.7361    ID25      0.9806
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID19     SIG .000   ID20     SIG .000   ID21    SIG .000   ID22     SIG .000   ID23     SIG .000   ID24    SIG .000


ID25      1.0000    ID25      0.9419    ID25     0.9806    ID25      0.9043    ID25      0.8080    ID26     -1.0000
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N( . 52)
ID25     SIG .000   ID26     SIG .000   ID27    SIG .000   ID28     SIG .000   ID29     SIG .000   ID1     SIG .000


ID26      0.7727    ID26      0.9905    ID26     0.9226    ID26      0.9506    ID26      0.4815    ID26     -0.8841
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID2      SIG .000   ID3      SIG .000   ID4     SIG .000   ID5      SIG .000   ID6      SIG .000   ID7     SIG .000


ID26      0.9621    ID26      0.2010    ID26    -0.1181    ID26     -0.1512    ID26     -1.0000    ID26     -0.8842
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID8      SIG .000   ID9      SIG .077   ID10    SIG .202   ID11     SIG .142   ID12     SIG .000   ID13    SIG .000


ID26     -0.9226    ID26      0.4571    ID26    -1.0000    ID26      0.7751    ID26      0.8970    ID26      0.9226
UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH     N(  52)    UITH    N(  52)
ID14     SIG .000   ID15     SIG .000   ID16    SIG .000   ID17     SIG .000   ID18     SIG .000   ID19    SIG .000
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ID26    -0.8582   ID26    -0.9258   ID26    -0.7334   ID26     0.6533   ID26     0.9621   ID26     0.9419
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000


ID26     1.0000   ID26     0.9621   ID26     0.9619   ID26     0.8155   ID27    -0.9621   ID27     0.7720
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000


ID27     0.9516   ID27     0.9621   ID27     0.9117   ID27     0.4491   ID27    -0.8903   ID27     1.0000
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID3     SIG .000  ID4     SIG .000  ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .000  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000


ID27     0.2489   ID27    -0.1157   ID27    -0.1455   ID27    -0.9621   ID27    -0.9255   ID27    -0.9621
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID9     SIG .038  ID10    SIG .207  ID11    SIG .152  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000  ID14    SIG .000


ID27     0.4561   ID27    -0.9621   ID27     0.8423   ID27     0.8591   ID27     0.9621   ID27    -0.8243
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID15    SIG .000  ID16    SIG .000  ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000


ID27    -0.8853   ID27    -0.6882   ID27     0.7004   ID27     1.0000   ID27     0.9806   ID27     0.9621
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000


ID27     1.0000   ID27     0.9255   ID27     0.7709   ID28    -0.9619   ID28     0.7245   ID28     0.9528
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000  ID3     SIG .000


ID28     0.9619   ID28     0.9502   ID28     0.4348   ID28    -0.9221   ID28     0.9255   ID28     0.2451
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID4     SIG .000  ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .001  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000  ID9     SIG .040


ID28    -0.1208   ID28    -0.1572   ID28    -0.9619   ID28    -0.8441   ID28    -0.9619   ID28     0.5098
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID10    SIG .197  ID11    SIG .133  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000  ID14    SIG .000  ID15    SIG .000


ID28    -0.9619   ID28     0.8342   ID28     0.8992   ID28     0.9619   ID28    -0.8736   ID28    -0.8906
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID16    SIG .000  ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000


ID28    -0.7353   ID28     0.6930   ID28     0.9255   ID28     0.9043   ID28     0.9619   ID28     0.9255
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID22    SIG .000  ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000


ID28     1.0000   ID28     0.8186   ID29    -0.8155   ID29     0.5544   ID29     0.8225   ID29     0.7726
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID28    SIG .000  ID29    SIG .000  ID1     SIG .000  ID2     SIG .000  ID3     SIG .000  ID4     SIG .000


ID29     0.8597   ID29     0.3760   ID29    -0.7374   ID29     0.7709   ID29     0.1780   ID29    -0.0946
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID5     SIG .000  ID6     SIG .003  ID7     SIG .000  ID8     SIG .000  ID9     SIG .103  ID10    SIG .252


ID29    -0.1558   ID29    -0.8155   ID29    -0.7324   ID29    -0.7726   ID29     0.5071   ID29    -0.8155
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID11    SIG .135  ID12    SIG .000  ID13    SIG .000  ID14    SIG .000  ID15    SIG .000  ID16    SIG .000


ID29     0.6842   ID29     0.8446   ID29     0.7726   ID29    -0.7905   ID29    -0.8559   ID29    -0.6673
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID17    SIG .000  ID18    SIG .000  ID19    SIG .000  ID20    SIG .000  ID21    SIG .000  ID22    SIG .000


ID29     0.7138   ID29     0.7707   ID29     0.8030   ID29     0.8155   ID29     0.7707   ID29     0.8186
WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)    WITH    N( 52)
ID23    SIG .000  ID24    SIG .000  ID25    SIG .000  ID26    SIG .000  ID27    SIG .000  ID28    SIG .000


ID29     1.0000
WITH    N( 52)
ID29    SIG .000
```

Appendix 2

CORRELATION MATRIX: NEC VOTES 1984/1985

The members of the NEC have the following identity numbers
in the matrix:

1   Ambler
2   Benn
3   Blunkett
4   Boothroyd
5   Clarke (E)
6   Clarke (T)
7   Cure
8   Curran
9   Davis
10 Dunwoody
11 Evans (J)
12 Haigh
13 Hattersley
14 Heffer
15 Hough
16 Hoyle
17 Kitson
18 McCluskie
19 Maynard
20 Meacher
21 Richardson
22 Sawyer
23 Short
24 Skinner
25 Tierney
26 Turnock
27 Wise
28 Hadden
29 Kinnock

------------PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS--------------

VARIABLE PAIR	VARIABLE PAIR	VARIABLE PAIR	VARIABLE PAIR	VARIABLE PAIR	VARIABLE PAIR
ID1 WITH ID1: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID2: -0.7033, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID3: 0.1106, N(37), SIG .257	ID1 WITH ID4: 0.7944, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID5: -0.5015, N(37), SIG .001	ID1 WITH ID6: 0.6144, N(37), SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID7: 0.7021, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID8: -0.4341, N(37), SIG .004	ID1 WITH ID9: 0.6618, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID10: 0.7944, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID11: 0.5717, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID12: 0.1073, N(37), SIG .264
ID1 WITH ID13: 0.7944, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID14: -0.6708, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID15: 0.7715, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID16: 0.0048, N(37), SIG .489	ID1 WITH ID17: 0.2967, N(37), SIG .037	ID1 WITH ID18: 0.3269, N(37), SIG .024
ID1 WITH ID19: -0.7283, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID20: -0.1823, N(37), SIG .140	ID1 WITH ID21: -0.4732, N(37), SIG .002	ID1 WITH ID22: 0.0766, N(37), SIG .326	ID1 WITH ID23: 0.6288, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID24: -0.7944, N(37), SIG .000
ID1 WITH ID25: 0.4509, N(37), SIG .003	ID1 WITH ID26: 0.6856, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID27: -0.4870, N(37), SIG .001	ID1 WITH ID28: 0.7715, N(37), SIG .000	ID1 WITH ID29: 0.7894, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID1: -0.7033, N(37), SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID2: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID3: 0.1023, N(37), SIG .273	ID2 WITH ID4: -0.9216, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID5: 0.8020, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID6: -0.7613, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID7: -0.8489, N(37), SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID8: 0.7574, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID9: -0.8251, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID10: -0.9216, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID11: -0.6821, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID12: 0.0457, N(37), SIG .394	ID2 WITH ID13: -0.9216, N(37), SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID14: 0.9018, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID15: -0.9064, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID16: -0.0493, N(37), SIG .386	ID2 WITH ID17: -0.3602, N(37), SIG .014	ID2 WITH ID18: -0.1448, N(37), SIG .162	ID2 WITH ID19: -0.9642, N(37), SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID20: 0.1863, N(37), SIG .135	ID2 WITH ID21: 0.8264, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID22: 0.0834, N(37), SIG .312	ID2 WITH ID23: -0.7462, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID24: 0.9216, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID25: -0.7299, N(37), SIG .000
ID2 WITH ID26: -0.8354, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID27: 0.7884, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID28: -0.9064, N(37), SIG .000	ID2 WITH ID29: -0.8834, N(37), SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID1: 0.1106, N(37), SIG .257	ID3 WITH ID2: 0.1023, N(37), SIG .273
ID3 WITH ID3: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID4: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID5: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID6: -0.0751, N(37), SIG .329	ID3 WITH ID7: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID8: 0.0983, N(37), SIG .281
ID3 WITH ID9: 0.0665, N(37), SIG .348	ID3 WITH ID10: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID11: 0.2811, N(37), SIG .046	ID3 WITH ID12: 0.5447, N(37), SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID13: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID14: 0.0350, N(37), SIG .418
ID3 WITH ID15: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID16: 0.4518, N(37), SIG .002	ID3 WITH ID17: 0.1933, N(37), SIG .126	ID3 WITH ID18: 0.2336, N(37), SIG .082	ID3 WITH ID19: 0.0680, N(37), SIG .345	ID3 WITH ID20: 0.4178, N(37), SIG .005
ID3 WITH ID21: 0.3164, N(37), SIG .028	ID3 WITH ID22: 0.6256, N(37), SIG .000	ID3 WITH ID23: -0.0379, N(37), SIG .412	ID3 WITH ID24: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID25: -0.1600, N(37), SIG .172	ID3 WITH ID26: -0.1078, N(37), SIG .263
ID3 WITH ID27: 0.2931, N(37), SIG .039	ID3 WITH ID28: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID3 WITH ID29: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500	ID4 WITH ID1: 0.7944, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID2: -0.9216, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID3: 0.0000, N(37), SIG .500
ID4 WITH ID4: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID5: -0.7575, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID6: 0.8549, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID7: 0.9363, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID8: -0.6843, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID9: 0.7023, N(37), SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID10: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID11: 0.7748, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID12: 0.0581, N(37), SIG .366	ID4 WITH ID13: 1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID14: -0.8589, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID15: 0.9849, N(37), SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID16: 0.1484, N(37), SIG .190	ID4 WITH ID17: 0.4563, N(37), SIG .002	ID4 WITH ID18: 0.1662, N(37), SIG .163	ID4 WITH ID19: -0.9388, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID20: -0.0725, N(37), SIG .335	ID4 WITH ID21: -0.7215, N(37), SIG .000
ID4 WITH ID22: 0.0192, N(37), SIG .455	ID4 WITH ID23: 0.8403, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID24: -1.0000, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID25: 0.7152, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID26: 0.8191, N(37), SIG .000	ID4 WITH ID27: -0.7426, N(37), SIG .000

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ID4    0.9849   ID4    0.9708   ID5   -0.5015   ID5    0.8020   ID5    0.0000   ID5   -0.7575
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID28   SIG .000 ID29   SIG .000 ID1   SIG .001  ID2    SIG .000 ID3    SIG .500 ID4   SIG .000


ID5    1.0000   ID5   -0.7366   ID5   -0.8090   ID5    0.5284   ID5   -0.6834   ID5   -0.7575
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID5    SIG .000 ID6    SIG .000 ID7   SIG .000  ID8    SIG .000 ID9    SIG .000 ID10  SIG .000


ID5   -0.6066   ID5    0.1043   ID5   -0.7575   ID5    0.7101   ID5   -0.7383   ID5   -0.0956
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID11   SIG .000 ID12   SIG .269 ID13  SIG .000  ID14   SIG .000 ID15   SIG .000 ID16  SIG .287


ID5   -0.2599   ID5    0.0730   ID5    0.8225   ID5   -0.0344   ID5    0.5916   ID5    0.2260
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID17   SIG .060 ID18   SIG .334 ID19  SIG .000  ID20   SIG .420 ID21   SIG .000 ID22  SIG .089


ID5   -0.8055   ID5    0.7575   ID5   -0.6929   ID5   -0.7133   ID5    0.5713   ID5   -0.7769
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID23   SIG .000 ID24   SIG .000 ID25  SIG .000  ID26   SIG .000 ID27   SIG .000 ID28  SIG .000


ID5   -0.6879   ID6    0.6144   ID6   -0.7613   ID6   -0.0751   ID6    0.8549   ID6   -0.7366
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID29   SIG .000 ID1    SIG .000 ID2   SIG .000  ID3    SIG .329 ID4    SIG .000 ID5   SIG .000


ID6    1.0000   ID6    0.7639   ID6   -0.6304   ID6    0.7293   ID6    0.8549   ID6    0.7374
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID6    SIG .000 ID7    SIG .000 ID8   SIG .000  ID9    SIG .000 ID10   SIG .000 ID11  SIG .000


ID6    0.0561   ID6    0.8549   ID6   -0.6885   ID6    0.8336   ID6    0.2164   ID6    0.5101
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID12   SIG .371 ID13   SIG .000 ID14  SIG .000  ID15   SIG .000 ID16   SIG .099 ID17  SIG .001


ID6    0.1605   ID6   -0.7847   ID6   -0.0324   ID6   -0.6693   ID6   -0.0741   ID6    0.8210
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID18   SIG .171 ID19   SIG .000 ID20  SIG .425  ID21   SIG .000 ID22   SIG .327 ID23  SIG .000


ID6   -0.8549   ID6    0.8268   ID6    0.7977   ID6   -0.6889   ID6    0.8336   ID6    0.8114
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID24   SIG .000 ID25   SIG .000 ID26  SIG .000  ID27   SIG .000 ID28   SIG .000 ID29  SIG .000


ID7    0.7021   ID7   -0.8489   ID7    0.0000   ID7    0.9363   ID7   -0.3090   ID7    0.7639
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID1    SIG .000 ID2    SIG .000 ID3   SIG .500  ID4    SIG .000 ID5    SIG .000 ID6   SIG .000


ID7    1.0000   ID7   -0.6008   ID7    0.8316   ID7    0.9363   ID7    0.6881   ID7   -0.0055
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID7    SIG .000 ID8    SIG .000 ID9   SIG .000  ID10   SIG .000 ID11   SIG .000 ID12  SIG .487


ID7    0.9363   ID7   -0.7782   ID7    0.9196   ID7    0.0895   ID7    0.3339   ID7    0.0230
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID13   SIG .000 ID14   SIG .000 ID15  SIG .000  ID16   SIG .299 ID17   SIG .022 ID18  SIG .446


ID7   -0.8678   ID7    0.0733   ID7   -0.6449   ID7   -0.0485   ID7    0.8975   ID7   -0.9363
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID19   SIG .000 ID20   SIG .333 ID21  SIG .000  ID22   SIG .388 ID23   SIG .000 ID24  SIG .000


ID7    0.6050   ID7    0.7322   ID7   -0.6961   ID7    0.9196   ID7    0.8973   ID8   -0.4341
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID25   SIG .000 ID26   SIG .000 ID27  SIG .000  ID28   SIG .000 ID29   SIG .000 ID1   SIG .004


ID8    0.7574   ID8    0.0983   ID8   -0.6843   ID8    0.5284   ID8   -0.6304   ID8   -0.6008
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID2    SIG .000 ID3    SIG .281 ID4   SIG .000  ID5    SIG .000 ID6    SIG .000 ID7   SIG .000


ID8    1.0000   ID8   -0.5747   ID8   -0.6843   ID8   -0.4494   ID8    0.2008   ID8   -0.6843
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID8    SIG .000 ID9    SIG .000 ID10  SIG .000  ID11   SIG .003 ID12   SIG .117 ID13  SIG .000


ID8    0.7930   ID8   -0.6654   ID8   -0.0612   ID8   -0.2673   ID8   -0.1756   ID8    0.7463
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID14   SIG .000 ID15   SIG .000 ID16  SIG .360  ID17   SIG .055 ID18   SIG .149 ID19  SIG .000


ID8    0.0979   ID8    0.5834   ID8   -0.0612   ID8   -0.4720   ID8    0.6843   ID8   -0.6473
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID20   SIG .282 ID21   SIG .000 ID22  SIG .360  ID23   SIG .002 ID24   SIG .000 ID25  SIG .000


ID8   -0.5636   ID8    0.5408   ID8   -0.6654   ID8   -0.6428   ID9    0.6618   ID9   -0.8251
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID26   SIG .000 ID27   SIG .000 ID28  SIG .000  ID29   SIG .000 ID1    SIG .000 ID2   SIG .000


ID9    0.0665   ID9    0.9023   ID9   -0.6834   ID9    0.7293   ID9    0.8316   ID9   -0.5747
WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)    WITH   N( 37)   WITH   N( 37)   WITH  N( 37)
ID3    SIG .348 ID4    SIG .000 ID5   SIG .000  ID6    SIG .000 ID7    SIG .000 ID8   SIG .000
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ID9 UITH ID9	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID10	0.9023 N(37) SIG .000	IU9 UITH ID11	0.8104 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID12	0.1286 N(37) SIG .224	ID9 UITH ID13	0.7023 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID14	-0.7684 N(37) SIG .000

ID9 UITH ID15	0.9135 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID16	0.2310 N(37) SIG .084	ID9 UITH ID17	0.5178 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID18	0.0774 N(37) SIG .324	ID9 UITH ID19	-0.8471 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID20	-0.0229 N(37) SIG .446

ID9 UITH ID21	-0.6038 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID22	0.0691 N(37) SIG .342	IU9 UITH IU23	0.7087 N(37) SIG .000	IU9 UITH IU24	-0.9023 N(37) SIG .000	IU9 UITH IU25	0.5931 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID26	0.6855 N(37) SIG .000

ID9 UITH ID27	-0.6215 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID28	0.9135 N(37) SIG .000	ID9 UITH ID29	0.8759 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID1	0.7944 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID2	-0.9216 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID3	0.0000 N(37) SIG .500

ID10 UITH ID4	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID5	-0.7575 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH IU6	0.8549 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH IU7	0.9363 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID8	-0.6843 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH IU9	0.9023 N(37) SIG .000

ID10 UITH ID10	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID11	0.7748 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID12	0.0581 N(37) SIG .366	ID10 UITH ID13	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID14	-0.8589 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID15	0.9849 N(37) SIG .000

ID10 UITH ID16	0.1484 N(37) SIG .190	ID10 UITH ID17	0.4563 N(37) SIG .002	ID10 UITH ID18	0.1662 N(37) SIG .163	IU10 UITH ID19	-0.9388 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID20	-0.0725 N(37) SIG .335	ID10 UITH IU21	-0.7215 N(37) SIG .000

ID10 UITH ID22	0.0192 N(37) SIG .455	ID10 UITH ID23	0.8403 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID24	-1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID25	0.7132 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID26	0.8191 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID27	-0.7426 N(37) SIG .000

ID10 UITH ID28	0.9849 N(37) SIG .000	ID10 UITH ID29	0.9708 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID1	0.5717 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH IU2	-0.6821 N(37) SIG .000	IU11 UITH ID3	0.2811 N(37) SIG .046	ID11 UITH IU4	0.7748 N(37) SIG .000

ID11 UITH ID5	-0.6066 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID6	-0.7374 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID7	0.6881 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID8	-0.4494 N(37) SIG .003	ID11 UITH ID9	0.8104 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID10	0.7748 N(37) SIG .000

ID11 UITH ID11	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID12	0.2798 N(37) SIG .047	ID11 UITH ID13	0.7748 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID14	-0.6039 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID15	0.7592 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID16	0.3207 N(37) SIG .026

ID11 UITH ID17	0.4113 N(37) SIG .006	ID11 UITH ID18	0.0145 N(37) SIG .466	ID11 UITH ID19	-0.6996 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID20	0.1788 N(37) SIG .145	ID11 UITH ID21	-0.5032 N(37) SIG .001	ID11 UITH ID22	0.1497 N(37) SIG .188

ID11 UITH ID23	-0.6104 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID24	-0.7748 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID25	0.5499 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID26	0.6066 N(37) SIG .000	ID11 UITH ID27	-0.5179 N(37) SIG .001	IU11 UITH ID28	0.7592 N(37) SIG .000

ID11 UITH ID29	0.7925 N(37) SIG .000	ID12 UITH ID1	0.1073 N(37) SIG .264	ID12 UITH ID2	0.0457 N(37) SIG .394	ID12 UITH ID3	0.5447 N(37) SIG .000	ID12 UITH ID4	0.0581 N(37) SIG .366	ID12 UITH ID5	0.1043 N(37) SIG .269

ID12 UITH ID6	0.0561 N(37) SIG .371	ID12 UITH ID7	-0.0055 N(37) SIG .487	ID12 UITH ID8	0.2008 N(37) SIG .117	ID12 UITH ID9	0.1286 N(37) SIG .224	ID12 UITH IU10	0.0581 N(37) SIG .366	ID12 UITH IU11	0.2798 N(37) SIG .047

ID12 UITH ID12	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID12 UITH ID13	0.0581 N(37) SIG .366	ID12 UITH ID14	0.0632 N(37) SIG .355	ID12 UITH ID15	0.0344 N(37) SIG .420	ID12 UITH ID16	0.4316 N(37) SIG .004	ID12 UITH ID17	0.3496 N(37) SIG .017

ID12 UITH ID18	0.3350 N(37) SIG .021	ID12 UITH ID19	0.0210 N(37) SIG .451	ID12 UITH IU20	0.3357 N(37) SIG .021	IU12 UITH IU21	0.0815 N(37) SIG .316	ID12 UITH IU22	0.7298 N(37) SIG .000	IU12 UITH ID23	0.0293 N(37) SIG .432

ID12 UITH ID24	-0.0581 N(37) SIG .366	ID12 UITH ID25	-0.0845 N(37) SIG .310	ID12 UITH ID26	0.0444 N(37) SIG .397	ID12 UITH ID27	0.0839 N(37) SIG .311	ID12 UITH ID28	0.0344 N(37) SIG .420	ID12 UITH ID29	0.0453 N(37) SIG .395

ID13 UITH ID1	0.7944 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID2	-0.9216 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID3	0.0000 N(37) SIG .500	ID13 UITH ID4	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH IU5	-0.7575 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID6	0.8549 N(37) SIG .000

ID13 UITH ID7	0.9363 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID8	-0.6843 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID9	0.9023 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID10	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID11	0.7748 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID12	0.0581 N(37) SIG .366

ID13 UITH ID13	1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID14	-0.8589 N(37) SIG .000	ID13 UITH ID15	0.9849 N(37) SIG .000	IU13 UITH ID16	0.1484 N(37) SIG .190	ID13 UITH IU17	0.4563 N(37) SIG .002	ID13 UITH ID18	0.1662 N(37) SIG .163

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ID13      -0.9388  'ID13      -0.0725  ID13      -0.7215  ID13       0.0192  ID13       0.8403  ID13      -1.0000
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID19      SIG .000  ID20     SIG .335  ID21     SIG .000  ID22     SIG .455  ID23     SIG .000  ID24     SIG .000


ID13       0.7152  ID13       0.8191  ID13      -0.7426  ID13       0.9049  1D13       0.9708  ID14      -0.6708
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID25      SIG .000  ID26     SIG .000  ID27     SIG .000  ID28     SIG .000  ID29     SIG .000  ID1      SIG .000


ID14       0.9018  ID14       0.0350  ID14      -0.8589  ID14       0.7101  ID14      -0.6385  ID14      -0.7782
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID2       SIG .000  ID3      SIG .418  ID4      SIG .000  ID5      SIG .000  ID6      SIG .000  ID7      SIG .000


ID14       0.7930  ID14      -0.7684  ID14      -0.8589  ID14      -0.6039  ID14       0.0632  ID14      -0.8589
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID8       SIG .000  ID9      SIG .000  ID10     SIG .000  ID11     SIG .000  ID12     SIG .355  ID13     SIG .000


ID14       1.0000  ID14      -0.8447  ID14       0.0249  ID14      -0.3742  ID14      -0.2013  ID14       0.9175
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID14      SIG .000  ID15     SIG .000  ID16     SIG .442  ID17     SIG .011  ID18     SIG .116  ID19     SIG .000


ID14       0.0856  ID14       0.7132  ID14       0.0249  ID14      -0.6741  ID14       0.8589  ID14      -0.6216
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID20      SIG .307  ID21     SIG .000  ID22     SIG .442  ID23     SIG .000  ID24     SIG .000  ID25     SIG .000


ID14      -0.7393  ID14       0.6702  ID14      -0.8447  ID14      -0.8108  ID15       0.7715  ID15      -0.9064
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID26      SIG .000  ID27     SIG .000  ID28     SIG .000  ID29     SIG .000  ID1      SIG .000  ID2      SIG .000


ID15       0.0000  ID15       0.9849  ID15      -0.7383  ID15       0.8336  ID15       0.9196  ID15      -0.6654
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID3       SIG .500  ID4      SIG .000  ID5      SIG .000  ID6      SIG .000  ID7      SIG .000  ID8      SIG .000


ID15       0.9135  ID15       0.9849  ID15       0.7592  ID15       0.0344  ID15       0.9849  ID15      -0.8447
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID9       SIG .000  ID10     SIG .000  ID11     SIG .000  ID12     SIG .420  ID13     SIG .000  ID14     SIG .000


ID15       1.0000  ID15       0.1851  ID15       0.4567  ID15       0.1346  ID15      -0.9247  ID15      -0.1054
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID15      SIG .000  ID16     SIG .136  ID17     SIG .002  ID18     SIG .214  ID19     SIG .000  ID20     SIG .267


ID15      -0.7011  ID15      -0.0096  ID15       0.8178  ID15      -0.9849  ID15       0.6865  ID15       0.7960
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID21      SIG .000  ID22     SIG .477  ID23     SIG .000  ID24     SIG .000  ID25     SIG .000  ID26     SIG .000


ID15      -0.7217  ID15       0.9689  ID15       0.9561  ID16       0.0048  1D16      -0.0493  ID16       0.4518
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID27      SIG .000  ID28     SIG .000  ID29     SIG .000  ID1      SIG .489  ID2      SIG .386  ID3      SIG .002


ID16       0.1484  ID16      -0.0956  ID16       0.2164  ID16       0.0895  ID16      -0.0612  ID16       0.2310
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID4       SIG .190  ID5      SIG .287  ID6      SIG .099  ID7      SIG .299  ID8      SIG .360  ID9      SIG .084


ID16       0.1484  ID16       0.3207  ID16       0.4316  ID16       0.1484  ID16       0.0249  ID16       0.1851
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID10      SIG .190  ID11     SIG .026  ID12     SIG .004  ID13     SIG .190  ID14     SIG .442 -ID15     SIG .136


ID16       1.0000  ID16       0.5349  ID16      -0.0921  ID16      -0.0787  ID16       0.2098  ID16       0.1465
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID16      SIG .000  ID17     SIG .000  ID18     SIG .294  ID19     SIG .322  ID20     SIG .106  ID21     SIG .194


ID16       0.3912  ID16       0.0010  ID16      -0.1484  ID16       0.1347  ID16      -0.0614  ID16       0.1507
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID22      SIG .008  ID23     SIG .498  ID24     SIG .190  ID25     SIG .213  ID26     SIG .359  ID27     SIG .187


ID16       0.1526  ID16       0.1497  ID17       0.2967  ID17      -0.3602  ID17       0.1933  ID17       0.4563
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID28      SIG .184  ID29     SIG .188  ID1      SIG .037  ID2      SIG .014  ID3      SIG .126  ID4      SIG .002


ID17      -0.2599  ID17       0.5101  ID17       0.3339  ID17      -0.2673  ID17       0.5198  ID17       0.4563
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID5       SIG .060  ID6      SIG .001  ID7      SIG .022  ID8      SIG .055  ID9      SIG .000  ID10     SIG .002


ID17       0.4113  ID17       0.3496  ID17       0.4563  ID17      -0.3742  ID17       0.4567  ID17       0.5349
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID11      SIG .006  ID12     SIG .017  ID13     SIG .002  ID14     SIG .011  ID15     SIG .002  ID16     SIG .000


ID17       1.0000  ID17       0.3462  ID17      -0.3978  ID17       0.0478  ID17      -0.2870  ID17       0.1586
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID17      SIG .000  ID18     SIG .018  ID19     SIG .007  ID20     SIG .389  ID21     SIG .043  ID22     SIG .174


ID17       0.3486  ID17      -0.4563  ID17       0.4014  ID17      -0.3258  ID17      -0.2954  ID17       0.4567
UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)   UITH      N( 37)
ID23      SIG .017  ID24     SIG .002  ID25     SIG .007  ID26     SIG .025  ID27     SIG .038  ID28     SIG .002
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ID17 WITH ID29 0.4493 N(37) SIG .003	ID18 WITH ID1 0.3269 N(37) SIG .024	ID18 WITH ID2 -0.1668 N(37) SIG .162	ID18 WITH ID3 0.2336 N(37) SIG .082	ID18 WITH ID4 0.1662 N(37) SIG .163	ID18 WITH ID5 0.0730 N(37) SIG .334
ID18 WITH ID6 0.1605 N(37) SIG .171	ID18 WITH ID7 0.0230 N(37) SIG .446	ID18 WITH ID8 -0.1756 N(37) SIG .149	ID18 WITH ID9 0.0774 N(37) SIG .324	ID18 WITH ID10 0.1662 N(37) SIG .163	ID18 WITH ID11 0.0145 N(37) SIG .466
ID18 WITH ID12 0.3350 N(37) SIG .021	ID18 WITH ID13 0.1662 N(37) SIG .163	ID18 WITH ID14 -0.2013 N(37) SIG .116	ID18 WITH ID15 0.1346 N(37) SIG .214	ID18 WITH ID16 -0.0921 N(37) SIG .294	ID18 WITH ID17 0.3462 N(37) SIG .018
ID18 WITH ID18 1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID18 WITH ID19 -0.1622 N(37) SIG .169	ID18 WITH ID20 -0.3446 N(37) SIG .018	ID18 WITH ID21 -0.1119 N(37) SIG .255	ID18 WITH ID22 0.3624 N(37) SIG .014	ID18 WITH ID23 0.0838 N(37) SIG .311
ID18 WITH ID24 -0.1662 N(37) SIG .163	ID18 WITH ID25 0.1508 N(37) SIG .186	ID18 WITH ID26 0.2836 N(37) SIG .044	ID18 WITH ID27 -0.0796 N(37) SIG .320	ID18 WITH ID28 0.1346 N(37) SIG .214	ID18 WITH ID29 0.1677 N(37) SIG .161
ID19 WITH ID1 -0.7283 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID2 0.9842 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID3 0.0680 N(37) SIG .345	ID19 WITH ID4 -0.9388 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID5 0.8225 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID6 -0.7847 N(37) SIG .000
ID19 WITH ID7 -0.8678 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID8 0.7463 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID9 -0.8471 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID10 -0.9388 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID11 -0.6996 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID12 0.0210 N(37) SIG .451
ID19 WITH ID13 -0.9388 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID14 0.9175 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID15 -0.9247 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID16 -0.0787 N(37) SIG .322	ID19 WITH ID17 -0.3978 N(37) SIG .007	ID19 WITH ID18 -0.1622 N(37) SIG .169
ID19 WITH ID19 1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID20 0.1524 N(37) SIG .184	ID19 WITH ID21 0.7877 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID22 0.0536 N(37) SIG .376	ID19 WITH ID23 -0.7709 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID24 0.9388 N(37) SIG .000
ID19 WITH ID25 -0.7222 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID26 -0.8260 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID27 0.7488 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID28 -0.9247 N(37) SIG .000	ID19 WITH ID29 -0.9002 N(37) SIG .000	ID20 WITH ID1 -0.1823 N(37) SIG .140
ID20 WITH ID2 0.1863 N(37) SIG .135	ID20 WITH ID3 0.4178 N(37) SIG .005	ID20 WITH ID4 -0.0725 N(37) SIG .335	ID20 WITH ID5 -0.0344 N(37) SIG .420	ID20 WITH ID6 -0.0324 N(37) SIG .425	ID20 WITH ID7 0.0733 N(37) SIG .333
ID20 WITH ID8 0.0979 N(37) SIG .282	ID20 WITH ID9 -0.0229 N(37) SIG .446	ID20 WITH ID10 -0.0725 N(37) SIG .335	ID20 WITH ID11 0.1788 N(37) SIG .145	ID20 WITH ID12 0.3357 N(37) SIG .021	ID20 WITH ID13 -0.0725 N(37) SIG .335
ID20 WITH ID14 0.0856 N(37) SIG .307	ID20 WITH ID15 -0.1054 N(37) SIG .267	ID20 WITH ID16 0.2098 N(37) SIG .106	ID20 WITH ID17 0.0478 N(37) SIG .389	ID20 WITH ID18 -0.3446 N(37) SIG .018	ID20 WITH ID19 0.1524 N(37) SIG .184
ID20 WITH ID20 1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID20 WITH ID21 0.2546 N(37) SIG .064	ID20 WITH ID22 0.3576 N(37) SIG .015	ID20 WITH ID23 0.0513 N(37) SIG .382	ID20 WITH ID24 0.0725 N(37) SIG .335	ID20 WITH ID25 -0.1449 N(37) SIG .196
ID20 WITH ID26 -0.2509 N(37) SIG .067	ID20 WITH ID27 0.1928 N(37) SIG .126	ID20 WITH ID28 -0.1054 N(37) SIG .267	ID20 WITH ID29 -0.0828 N(37) SIG .313	ID21 WITH ID1 -0.4732 N(37) SIG .002	ID21 WITH ID2 0.8264 N(37) SIG .000
ID21 WITH ID3 0.3164 N(37) SIG .028	ID21 WITH ID4 -0.7215 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID5 0.5916 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID6 -0.6693 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID7 -0.6449 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID8 0.5834 N(37) SIG .000
ID21 WITH ID9 -0.6038 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID10 -0.7215 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID11 -0.5032 N(37) SIG .001	ID21 WITH ID12 0.0815 N(37) SIG .316	ID21 WITH ID13 -0.7215 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID14 0.7132 N(37) SIG .000
ID21 WITH ID15 -0.7011 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID16 0.1465 N(37) SIG .194	ID21 WITH ID17 -0.2870 N(37) SIG .043	ID21 WITH ID18 -0.1119 N(37) SIG .255	ID21 WITH ID19 0.7877 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID20 0.2546 N(37) SIG .064
ID21 WITH ID21 1.0000 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID22 0.2696 N(37) SIG .053	ID21 WITH ID23 -0.4486 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID24 0.7215 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID25 -0.7106 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID26 -0.7535 N(37) SIG .000
ID21 WITH ID27 0.9716 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID28 -0.7011 N(37) SIG .000	ID21 WITH ID29 -0.6900 N(37) SIG .000	ID22 WITH ID1 0.0766 N(37) SIG .326	ID22 WITH ID2 0.0834 N(37) SIG .312	ID22 WITH ID3 0.6256 N(37) SIG .000
ID22 WITH ID4 0.0192 N(37) SIG .455	ID22 WITH ID5 0.2260 N(37) SIG .089	ID22 WITH ID6 -0.0761 N(37) SIG .327	ID22 WITH ID7 -0.0485 N(37) SIG .388	ID22 WITH ID8 -0.0612 N(37) SIG .360	ID22 WITH ID9 0.0691 N(37) SIG .342

ID22	0.0192	ID22	0.1497	ID22	0.7298	ID22	0.0192	ID22	0.0249	ID22	-0.0096
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID10	SIG .455	ID11	SIG .188	ID12	SIG .000	ID13	SIG .455	ID14	SIG .442	ID15	SIG .477

ID22	0.3912	ID22	0.1586	ID22	0.3624	ID22	0.0536	ID22	0.3576	ID22	0.2696
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID16	SIG .008	ID17	SIG .174	ID18	SIG .014	ID19	SIG .376	ID20	SIG .015	ID21	SIG .053

ID22	1.0000	ID22	-0.1098	ID22	-0.0192	ID22	-0.1767	ID22	-0.0964	ID22	0.2775
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID22	SIG .000	ID23	SIG .259	ID24	SIG .455	ID25	SIG .148	ID26	SIG .285	ID27	SIG .048

ID22	-0.0096	ID22	0.0129	ID23	0.6288	ID23	-0.7462	ID23	-0.0379	ID23	0.8403
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID28	SIG .477	ID29	SIG .470	ID1	SIG .000	ID2	SIG .000	ID3	SIG .412	ID4	SIG .000

ID23	-0.8055	ID23	0.8210	ID23	0.8975	ID23	-0.4720	ID23	0.7087	ID23	0.8403
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID5	SIG .000	ID6	SIG .000	ID7	SIG .000	ID8	SIG .002	ID9	SIG .000	ID10	SIG .000

ID23	0.6104	ID23	0.0293	ID23	0.8403	ID23	-0.6741	ID23	0.8178	ID23	0.0010
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID11	SIG .000	ID12	SIG .432	ID13	SIG .000	ID14	SIG .000	ID15	SIG .000	ID16	SIG .498

ID23	0.3486	ID23	0.0838	ID23	-0.7709	ID23	0.0513	ID23	-0.6486	ID23	-0.1098
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID17	SIG .017	ID18	SIG .311	ID19	SIG .000	ID20	SIG .382	ID21	SIG .000	ID22	SIG .259

ID23	1.0000	ID23	-0.8403	ID23	0.6282	ID23	0.8509	ID23	-0.7022	ID23	0.8178
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID23	SIG .000	ID24	SIG .000	ID25	SIG .000	ID26	SIG .000	ID27	SIG .000	ID28	SIG .000

ID23	0.7971	ID24	-0.7944	ID24	0.9216	ID24	0.0000	ID24	-1.0000	ID24	0.7575
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID29	SIG .000	ID1	SIG .000	ID2	SIG .000	ID3	SIG .500	ID4	SIG .000	ID5	SIG .000

ID24	-0.8549	ID24	-0.9363	ID24	0.6843	ID24	-0.9023	ID24	-1.0000	ID24	-0.7748
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID6	SIG .000	ID7	SIG .000	ID8	SIG .000	ID9	SIG .000	ID10	SIG .000	ID11	SIG .000

ID24	-0.0581	ID24	-1.0000	ID24	0.8589	ID24	-0.9849	ID24	-0.1484	ID24	-0.4563
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID12	SIG .366	ID13	SIG .000	ID14	SIG .000	ID15	SIG .000	ID16	SIG .170	ID17	SIG .002

ID24	-0.1662	ID24	0.9388	ID24	0.0725	ID24	0.7215	ID24	-0.0192	ID24	-0.8403
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID18	SIG .163	ID19	SIG .000	ID20	SIG .335	ID21	SIG .000	ID22	SIG .455	ID23	SIG .000

ID24	1.0000	ID24	-0.7152	ID24	-0.8191	ID24	0.7426	ID24	-0.9849	ID24	-0.9708
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID24	SIG .000	ID25	SIG .000	ID26	SIG .000	ID27	SIG .000	ID28	SIG .000	ID29	SIG .000

ID25	0.4509	ID25	-0.7299	ID25	-0.1600	ID25	0.7152	ID25	-0.6929	ID25	0.8268
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID1	SIG .003	ID2	SIG .000	ID3	SIG .172	ID4	SIG .000	ID5	SIG .000	ID6	SIG .000

ID25	0.6050	ID25	-0.6473	ID25	0.5931	ID25	0.7152	ID25	0.5499	ID25	-0.0845
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID7	SIG .000	ID8	SIG .000	ID9	SIG .000	ID10	SIG .000	ID11	SIG .000	ID12	SIG .310

ID25	0.7152	ID25	-0.6216	ID25	0.6865	ID25	0.1347	ID25	0.4014	ID25	0.1508
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID13	SIG .000	ID14	SIG .000	ID15	SIG .000	ID16	SIG .213	ID17	SIG .007	ID18	SIG .186

ID25	-0.7222	ID25	-0.1449	ID25	-0.7106	ID25	-0.1767	ID25	0.6282	ID25	-0.7152
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID19	SIG .000	ID20	SIG .196	ID21	SIG .000	ID22	SIG .148	ID23	SIG .000	ID24	SIG .000

ID25	1.0000	ID25	0.7263	ID25	-0.6949	ID25	0.7238	ID25	0.6680	ID26	0.6856
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID25	SIG .000	ID26	SIG .000	ID27	SIG .000	ID28	SIG .000	ID29	SIG .000	ID1	SIG .000

ID26	-0.8354	ID26	-0.1078	ID26	0.8191	ID26	-0.7133	ID26	0.7977	ID26	0.7322
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID2	SIG .000	ID3	SIG .263	ID4	SIG .000	ID5	SIG .000	ID6	SIG .000	ID7	SIG .000

ID26	-0.5636	ID26	0.6855	ID26	0.8191	ID26	0.6066	ID26	0.0444	ID26	0.8191
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID8	SIG .000	ID9	SIG .000	ID10	SIG .000	ID11	SIG .000	ID12	SIG .397	ID13	SIG .000

ID26	-0.7393	ID26	0.7960	ID26	-0.0614	ID26	0.3258	ID26	0.2836	ID26	-0.8260
UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)	UITH	N(37)
ID14	SIG .000	ID15	SIG .000	ID16	SIG .357	ID17	SIG .025	ID18	SIG .044	ID19	SIG .000

```
ID26   -0.2509   ID26   -0.7535   ID26   -0.0964   ID26    0.8509   ID26   -0.8191   ID26    0.7263
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID20   SIG .067   ID21   SIG .000   ID22   SIG .285   ID23   SIG .000   ID24   SIG .000   ID25   SIG .000


ID26    1.0000   ID26   -0.7438   ID26    0.7960   ID26    0.7834   ID27   -0.4870   ID27    0.7884
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID26   SIG .000   ID27   SIG .000   ID28   SIG .000   ID27   SIG .000   ID1    SIG .001   ID2    SIG .000


ID27    0.2931   ID27   -0.7426   ID27    0.5713   ID27   -0.6889   ID27   -0.6961   ID27    0.5408
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID3    SIG .039   ID4    SIG .000   ID5    SIG .000   ID6    SIG .000   ID7    SIG .000   ID8    SIG .000


ID27   -0.6215   ID27   -0.7426   ID27   -0.5179   ID27    0.0839   ID27   -0.7426   ID27    0.6702
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID9    SIG .000   ID10   SIG .000   ID11   SIG .001   ID12   SIG .311   ID13   SIG .000   ID14   SIG .000


ID27   -0.7217   ID27    0.1507   ID27   -0.2954   ID27   -0.0796   ID27    0.7408   ID27    0.1928
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID15   SIG .000   ID16   SIG .187   ID17   SIG .038   ID18   SIG .320   ID19   SIG .000   ID20   SIG .126


ID27    0.9716   ID27    0.2775   ID27   -0.7022   ID27    0.7426   ID27   -0.6949   ID27   -0.7428
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID21   SIG .000   ID22   SIG .048   ID23   SIG .000   ID24   SIG .000   ID25   SIG .000   ID26   SIG .000


ID27    1.0000   ID27   -0.7217   ID27   -0.7102   ID28    0.7715   ID28   -0.9064   ID28    0.0000
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID27   SIG .000   ID28   SIG .000   ID29   SIG .000   ID1    SIG .000   ID2    SIG .000   ID3    SIG .500


ID28    0.9849   ID28   -0.7769   ID28    0.8336   ID28    0.9196   ID28   -0.6654   ID28    0.9135
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID4    SIG .000   ID5    SIG .000   ID6    SIG .000   ID7    SIG .000   ID8    SIG .000   ID9    SIG .000


ID28    0.9849   ID28    0.7592   ID28    0.0344   ID28    0.9849   ID28   -0.8447   ID28    0.9689
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID10   SIG .000   ID11   SIG .000   ID12   SIG .420   ID13   SIG .000   ID14   SIG .000   ID15   SIG .000


ID28    0.1526   ID28    0.4567   ID28    0.1346   ID28   -0.9247   ID28   -0.1054   ID28   -0.7011
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID16   SIG .184   ID17   SIG .002   ID18   SIG .214   ID19   SIG .000   ID20   SIG .267   ID21   SIG .000


ID28   -0.0096   ID28    0.8178   ID28   -0.9849   ID28    0.7238   ID28    0.7960   ID28   -0.7217
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID22   SIG .477   ID23   SIG .000   ID24   SIG .000   ID25   SIG .000   ID26   SIG .000   ID27   SIG .000


ID28    1.0000   ID28    0.9561   ID29    0.7894   ID29   -0.8834   ID29    0.0000   ID29    0.9708
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID28   SIG .000   ID29   SIG .000   ID1    SIG .000   ID2    SIG .000   ID3    SIG .500   ID4    SIG .000


ID29   -0.6879   ID29    0.8114   ID29    0.8973   ID29   -0.6428   ID29    0.8759   ID29    0.9708
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID5    SIG .000   ID6    SIG .000   ID7    SIG .000   ID8    SIG .000   ID9    SIG .000   ID10   SIG .000


ID29    0.7925   ID29    0.0453   ID29    0.9708   ID29   -0.8108   ID29    0.9561   ID29    0.1497
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID11   SIG .000   ID12   SIG .395   ID13   SIG .000   ID14   SIG .000   ID15   SIG .000   ID16   SIG .188


ID29    0.4493   ID29    0.1677   ID29   -0.9002   ID29   -0.0828   ID29   -0.6900   ID29    0.0129
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID17   SIG .003   ID18   SIG .161   ID19   SIG .000   ID20   SIG .313   ID21   SIG .000   ID22   SIG .470


ID29    0.7971   ID29   -0.9708   ID29    0.6680   ID29    0.7834   ID29   -0.7102   ID29    0.9561
WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)   WITH   N(  37)
ID23   SIG .000   ID24   SIG .000   ID25   SIG .000   ID26   SIG .000   ID27   SIG .000   ID28   SIG .000


ID29    1.0000
WITH   N(  37)
ID29   SIG .000
```

Appendix 3

Party Activists' survey: Sheffield Hallam and Attercliffe Constituency Labour Parties

Permission was granted by the two CLPs for the author to conduct a survey of the General Committee delegates on the proviso that the anonymity of the individual respondents would be guaranteed. CLP Secretaries provided the names and addresses of delegates and questionnaires were sent by post. Respondents were asked to return the questionnaires in the stamped addressed envelopes provided. The requirement of personal anonymity meant that there was no means of individual identification and therefore no way of following-up non-respondents. Questionnaires were sent to the 158 Attercliffe delegates in January 1986 and to the 104 Hallam delegates in February 1986. Eighty nine Attercliffe delegates (56.3%) and sixty three Hallam delegates (60.6%) replied. For a postal survey the initial response rate is high. The author would have liked to have had the means to follow-up non-respondents and recognises that a higher response rate would have been preferable. Nevertheless the survey remains of value as a limited exercise in ascertaining the socio-economic composition and political attitudes of Party activists for this thesis.

General Committee Delegate's Survey

ote that all individual answers in this questionnaire are confidential and will not be divulged in any manner.

☐☐☐☐
1 - 4

answer all questions. Write "Don't Know" on any question where you are unsure how to respond.

ch *type* of organisation do you represent as a gate to this General Committee

Please tick one box only

Ward branch	☐ 1
Trade Union branch	☐ 2
Socialist society	☐ 3
Young socialists	☐ 4
Cooperative organisation	☐ 5

☐ 5

ase write in *the name* of the particular organisation you represent as a delegate to the General mittee

....

☐☐ 6 - 7

long have you been a delegate to the General mittee altogether?

Please tick one box only

Less than one year	☐ 1
1 – 5 years	☐ 2
6 – 10 years	☐ 3
Over 10 years	☐ 4

☐ 8

you

Male	☐ 1
Female	☐ 2

☐ 9

e you born in Sheffield?

Yes	☐ 1
No	☐ 2

☐ 10

w old are you?

.... years

☐☐ 11 - 12

OYMENT

at is your present employment position?

Please tick one box only

Domestic Homecare	☐ 1
Student/retraining	☐ 2
Unemployed	☐ 3
Full-time	☐ 4
Employed	
Part-time	☐ 5

☐ 13

ou are currently in *full-time* employment what is
r job? Can you tell me exactly what you do? ....

☐☐ 14 -15

9. Do you work *full-time* for any of the following:

Please tick one box only

A private firm or business .... ☐ 1
The Civil Service .... ☐ 2
A Local Authority .... ☐ 3
The National Health Service .... ☐ 4
A Public Service/Institution .... ☐ 5
A trade union .... ☐ 6
A voluntary organisation .... ☐ 7
Yourself (self-employed) .... ☐ 8

10. If you are *not* currently employed full-time have you previously been in a full-time job?

No .... ☐ 1
Yes .... ☐ 2

11. If YES what was your last full-time job? Can you tell me exactly what you did?

....

12. When you were growing up, in your teens, what was your father's job? Can you tell me exactly what he did?

....

13. When you were growing up, in your teens, what was your mother's job? Can you tell me exactly what she did?

....

14. When you were growing up, in your teens, was your father a member of the Labour Party?

Yes .... ☐ 1
No .... ☐ 2
Don't know .... ☐ 3

15. When you were growing up, in your teens, was your mother a member of the Labour Party?

Yes .... ☐ 1
No .... ☐ 2
Don't know .... ☐ 3

EDUCATION

16. What type of school did you *last* attend?

Please tick one box only

Elementary .... ☐ 1
Secondary Modern .... ☐ 2
Comprehensive .... ☐ 3
Grammar .... ☐ 4
Private .... ☐ 5
Other (please specify) .... ☐ 6

17. Here are some types of educational qualifications. Could you tick those which you have gained

School Certificate .... ☐ 1
Higher School Certificate .... ☐ 2
CSE .... ☐ 3
GCE 'O' level .... ☐ 4
GCE 'A' level .... ☐ 5
Technical qualifications .... ☐ 6
Degree .... ☐ 7

18. Is there another type of qualification not mentioned above which you have gained? If so, please write it in

....

you ever attended or are you now attending a
rsity to study for a degree?

Yes .... ☐ 1   ☐
No .... ☐ 2   29

you ever attended or are you now attending a
echnic to study for a degree?

Yes .... ☐ 1   ☐
No .... ☐ 2   30

NG

king of the accommodation where you live now,
you

Please tick one box only

own the property .... ☐ 1
rent it from a council .... ☐ 2
rent it from a private landlord .... ☐ 3
rent it from a university/college .... ☐ 4
rent it from a housing association .... ☐ 5   ☐
or are you living with family/friends .... ☐ 6   31
Other (please specify) .... ☐ 7

UR PARTY MEMBERSHIP

hich year did you first join the Labour Party?

19 . . . . . .   ☐
32

re you joined the Labour Party, were you ever a
ber of another political party?

No .... ☐ 1   ☐
Yes .... ☐ 2   33

Which party was that?

....   ☐
34

you ever left and then rejoined the Labour Party?

No .... ☐ 1   ☐
Yes .... ☐ 2   35

In which year did you leave?   19 . . . . . .   ☐
36
And in which year did you rejoin?   19 . . . . . .   ☐
37

UNION MEMBERSHIP

you currently a member of a trade union?

No .... ☐ 1   ☐
Yes .... ☐ 2   38

What is the name of your trade union?

....   ☐☐
39 - 40

MEMBERSHIP

you been active in any voluntary organisation/
nunity organisation/action group/other group?

No .... ☐ 1   ☐
Yes .... ☐ 2   41

What is the name of the group(s)?

....
....   ☐☐
42 - 49
....

YOUR POLITICAL OPINIONS

27. Here are some questions about political attitudes. Please tick your response to each statement in the appropriate box.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't know	
(a) The central concern of the next Labour Government should be to implement Clause 4 of the Party Constitution	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 50
(b) At all Labour parliamentary selection meetings at least one of the candidates should be female	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 51
(c) The Labour Party should not support trades unionists, councillors or anybody else undertaking activities which break the civil or criminal law of the land	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 52
(d) The next Labour Government should encourage a voluntary prices & incomes policy in order to control inflation	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 53
(e) Britain should not withdraw from the European Economic Community	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 54
(f) The next Labour Government should nationalise the largest 200 British companies	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 55
(g) The next Labour Government should withdraw from NATO	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 56
(h) The next Labour Government should not unilaterally give up Britain's nuclear weapons	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 57
(i) In elections for the Party Leader & Deputy Leader CLPs should conduct a ballot of all individual members in order to find out their views	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 58
(j) The next Labour Government should abolish all private fee-paying schools	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 59
(k) The next Labour Government should not completely abolish all aspects of private sector health care	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 60
(l) The next Labour Government should allow local authorities to sell council houses	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 61
(m) British troops should be withdrawn from Northern Ireland in the next five years	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 62
(n) Individual members of the Militant Tendency should not be expelled from the Party	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 63
(o) The Left should nominiate a candidate to contest Neil Kinnock's post as Party Leader	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 64
(p) The Party should establish a separate section for Black members	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 65
(q) At the time they join all new Party members should sign a declaration that they abide by the principles of democratic socialism	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 66

Thank you very much for your help. Please return the questionnaire in the reply-paid envelope as soon as possible. If you have any co, which you would like to add please make them below:

....

....

....

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The material in this study dealing with the contemporary Left is often drawn from primary sources. These include:

1. Interviews, both formal and informal, with a wide range of persons involved in Labour Left activities. These interviews took place between 1968 and 1986 and total over one hundred. It is difficult to include all the names (some requested exclusion from such a listing) and therefore I merely note that the persons interviewed included Labour MPs and Peers, members of the Labour Party national staff (first at Transport House and then Walworth Road), members of the Labour Party regional staff, Officers of Labour Left groups, and very many Party activists.

2. Personal observation of all Labour Party annual conferences since 1963.

3. Personal attendance and participation in many Labour Left conferences, meetings and rallies since 1968.

4. Personal experience as a Party activist, Party Officer, and parliamentary candidate.