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Social media and feminist activism in Saudi Arabia: a corpus-aided critical discourse analysis of the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign

By:

Nouf Abdulrahman M Alotaibi

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

In 2016, a social media campaign with the hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, particularly on Twitter, was launched by a group of (largely female) activists in Saudi Arabia, calling for an end to the male guardianship system. Under this system, a Saudi woman must have a male guardian (one of her close male relatives) provide written consent for her to participate in a wide variety of activities, such as enrolling in higher education, applying for official documents (e.g. passport, family ID, or personal ID), and so on. In such a conservative society, the campaign has unsurprisingly attracted considerable opposition, leading to some highly charged debates in both social and news media, in which women and their position in Saudi society have been placed in the spotlight. This thesis investigates those debates by applying a critical discourse analysis with the help of corpus linguistic analytical tools. It examines the representation of Saudi women, as well as the argumentation strategies used by proponents and opponents of the campaign, in order to reveal the discursive strategies underpinning this feminist social movement. It combines the corpus linguistic software tools with a range of text analytical methods, including systemic functional grammar and van Leeuwen's model of social representation to analyse a corpus of tweets from 2016 to 2018. This 'Twitter corpus' was further divided into four corpora in order to compare representational choices by male and female tweeters on both sides of the debate, namely proponents and critics of the guardianship system. In addition, the content of YouTube videos (a corpus of 32 videos) and online Saudi newspapers (52 news articles) was analysed following Toulmin's model of argumentation (1958), and the arguments evaluated in light of Aristotelian appeals (2008).

The analysis of Twitter found that salient patterns: categories of women, men and institutional actors in the textual representation of social actors served as legitimation strategies used to variously support or undermine the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (#EMGS) campaign. It also showed that, on both sides of the debate, the general attitude towards women was negative; campaigners against the male guardianship (MG) system reflected on the negative circumstances of Saudi women living in a restrictive patriarchal society, while somewhat surprisingly, those in favour of the MG system also represented women in a negative way, although this was largely due to their criticism of women who support the system. In terms of their social agency, lexico-grammatical patterns construe a representation of Saudi women which aligns with the competing ideological viewpoints on women's rights in the debates surrounding the campaign. This is realised on the one hand through personalised narratives

about specific women, and on the other through more generalised claims about the position of women in Saudi society.

Intertextual analysis of the Twitter data sought to identify the range of voices, texts and practices which were used to support the main arguments on each side of this debate, as well as to construe social relations of power and solidarity by means of the relations, values and roles associated with those ‘borrowed’ practices. These intertextual patterns helped texture arguments which drew liberally on religious and political discourses in particular, with men being the dominant source of these intertextual voices. In addition, the analysis of intertextual references in Twitter indicated that the #EMGS discourse is truly heteroglossic. In addition, YouTube and online newspaper articles revealed the strategic arguments used by both positions to (de)legitimise the end of the male-guardian system, and showed that both of these media share a number of key argumentative themes: discussion of the MG system from an Islamic perspective, the legal foundations of the system, and the aims of the #EMGS campaign. In addition, the thesis theorises the online debates on the MG system in a wider socio-political frame, which reflects women as a subordinated social group and their struggle against patriarchy in Saudi society. While the dynamic of the (counter-)discourse was taking place online, the offline world has witnessed a number of changes in favour of women, for example, the partial removal of the guardian’s consent requirement when providing services to female citizens in April 2017, and the granting of travel rights without a guardian’s permission for women above the age of 21, as of August 2019. However, these changes cannot be claimed with any confidence to be the outcomes of this online activism.

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Contents

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Contents.....	iv
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures.....	xii
List of Abbreviations.....	xiii
The transcription of the Arabic alphabet.....	xiv
Chapter 1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. Research context.....	2
1.2. The critical discourse analysis approach.....	4
1.3. Research questions.....	5
1.4. Outline of the thesis.....	7
Chapter 2. Background and Concepts.....	9
2.1. Introduction.....	9
2.2. Historical background.....	9
2.2.1. Religion and politics.....	10
2.2.2. Economic change and the emergence of an ideology.....	11
2.2.3. Reform.....	12
2.3. Saudi feminism.....	13
2.4. Social media in Saudi Arabia.....	15
2.5. The male guardianship system (MGS).....	18
2.5.1. Campaigns against the male guardianship system.....	20
Chapter 3: A review of the research on social media.....	26
3.1. Introduction.....	26
3.2. Twitter genre.....	26
3.2.1. Hashtivism and hashtag feminism.....	27
3.2.2. Global feminist hashtags.....	31
3.2.3. Arab and feminist hashtag.....	34
3.2.4. Saudi hashtag feminism.....	35
3.3. YouTube genre.....	40
3.3.1. Global context.....	41
3.3.2. Arab context.....	42
3.3.3. Saudi context.....	43
3.4. Newspaper genre.....	44
3.4.1. Global context.....	44

3.4.2. Arab context.....	45
3.4.3. Saudi context.....	47
Chapter 4: Theoretical and Methodological Framework	49
4.1. Introduction.....	49
4.2. Theoretical basis for the research.....	50
4.2.1. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the dialectic relational approach.....	50
4.2.2. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony	55
4.2.3. The public sphere and “counterpublics”	56
4.2.4. Theory of social justice	59
4.2.5. New social movement.....	59
4.2.6. Logics of action: Collective action and connective action.....	61
4.3. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) approaches.....	64
4.3.1. Fairclough’s dialectical relational approach to CDA.....	65
4.3.2. Socio-semantic approach	68
4.3.3. Systemic functional grammar (transitivity)	69
4.3.4. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity	70
4.4. Argumentation theory and rhetorical theory	71
4.5. Corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis (CADS).....	72
4.6. Critical discourse studies (CDS) and social media	74
4.7. Feminist critical discourse analysis (CDA)	77
4.8. Summary	79
Chapter 5: Research Methodology.....	81
5.1. Introduction.....	81
5.2. Research questions.....	81
5.3. Research ethics.....	83
5.4. Pilot study	84
5.4.1. Procedures for the pilot study	84
5.4.2. Implications for the main study	86
5.5. Data collection	86
5.5.1. Twitter.....	87
5.5.2. YouTube	89
5.5.3. Online newspapers	90
5.6. Preparing the data for analysis	92
5.6.1. Twitter.....	92
5.6.2. YouTube	98
5.6.3. Online newspapers	100
5.7. Methods of data analysis.....	101
5.7.1. Twitter.....	101

5.7.2. YouTube	111
5.7.3. Online newspapers	114
5.8. Summary	115
Chapter 6: Social actors and Saudi women in #EMGS on Twitter	116
6.1. Introduction	116
6.2. The findings from the pilot study	116
6.2.1. Summary	120
6.3. The social actors in the Twitter #EMGS campaign	122
6.3.1. Distribution for social actors	124
6.4. <i>Saudi women</i> in the #EMGS	127
6.4.1. General attitudes towards the female social actors in Twitter corpora	127
6.4.2. Representations of Saudi women/woman in the four Twitter corpora	134
6.4.3. Comparison of the representations of Saudi women/woman in the anti-MGS and pro-MGS corpora in the #EMGS campaign	191
6.5. Summary	195
Chapter 7: Intertextuality in #EMGS on Twitter	196
7.1. Introduction	196
7.2. Main discourses in the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora	196
7.3. Integrated with main discourses	198
7.3.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora	198
7.3.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora	202
7.4. Producers of the intertextual references	206
7.4.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora	206
7.4.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora	215
7.5. Text-types and names of intertextual references	222
7.5.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora	222
7.5.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora	228
7.6. Discussion of findings	235
7.7. Summary:	239
Chapter 8: Debates on the MGS from YouTube and News Media	240
8.1. Introduction	240
8.2. Arguments surrounding the #EMGS on YouTube	241
8.2.1. Anti-MGS arguments	241
8.2.2. Pro-MGS arguments	249
8.2.3. YouTube corpus: anti- and pro-MGS	257
8.3. Arguments surrounding the #EMGS in Saudi online newspapers	259
8.3.1. Anti-MGS arguments	260
8.3.2. Pro-MGS arguments	268

8.3.3. Online newspapers corpus: anti- and pro-MGS	275
8.4. Discussion of findings.....	277
8.5. Summary	279
Chapter 9: Conclusion.....	280
9.1. Summary	280
9.2. Contribution	293
9.3. Limitations and suggestions for further research	294
References.....	296
Appendices.....	I
Appendix A: Codes adopted from van Leeuwen’s (2008) model of the representation of social actors and Halliday & Matthiessen’s (2014) model of social actions.....	I
Appendix B: Discourses of the intertextual references.....	III
Appendix C: argument structure and evaluation in the YouTube corpora	IX
Appendix D: argument structure and evaluation in the News articles corpora.....	XIII
Appendix E: the distributions of six categories across the four corpora.....	XVII
Appendix F: Semantic prosody (SP) for the representations of women in Fanti-MGS and Manti-MGS Twitter corpora.....	XVIII
Appendix G: Semantic prosody (SP) for the representations of women in Fpro-MGS and Mpro-MGS Twitter corpora.....	XXVI
Appendix H: Integrated discourses in the four most frequent discourses in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	XXXIII
Appendix I: Integrated discourses in the four most frequent discourses in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	XXXV

List of Tables

Table 5. 1 Analytical research design used in the study	83
Table 5. 2 Procedure for including Saudi news organisations	91
Table 5. 3 Number of tokens before and after preparing the four Twitter corpora.....	96
Table 5. 4 Metadata for the Saudi anti-MGS YouTube videos over the period July 2016 to October 2018.	99
Table 5. 5 Metadata for Saudi pro-MGS YouTube videos over the periods July 2016 to October 2018.	99
Table 5. 6 Metadata for Saudi anti-MGS/pro-MGS YouTube videos.....	100
Table 5. 7 Newspaper articles in the two categories: anti-MGS and pro-MGS.....	100
Table 5. 8 The representation of social actors grouped into six categories	102
Table 5. 9 Social actions adopted from Halliday & Matthiessen (2014)	107
Table 5. 10 The Aristotelian appeals: ethos, pathos and logos, adopted from Aristotle (2008).	114
Table 6. 1 Occurrence of the top five social actors in the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora in the pilot study.....	116
Table 6. 2 Examples of concordances for negative discourse prosody in the anti-MGS corpora.....	129
Table 6. 3 Examples of concordances for positive discourse prosody in the anti-MGS corpora	130
Table 6. 4 Examples of concordances for negative discourse prosody in the pro-MGS corpora	131
Table 6. 5 Examples of concordances for positive discourse prosody in the pro-MGS corpora.....	132
Table 6. 6 Unexpected patterns for the representation of the search term “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora	134
Table 6. 7 The social actions related to unexpected assimilation within the search term “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora.....	137
Table 6. 8 The role of unexpected assimilation within the search term “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora.....	137
Table 6. 9 The representation of “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora.....	139
Table 6. 10 The social actions of “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora.....	140
Table 6. 11 The role of “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora	141
Table 6. 12 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi woman” in the three categories in anti-MGS corpora.....	141
Table 6. 13 The representation of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora.....	152
Table 6. 14 The social actions of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora.....	153
Table 6. 15 The role of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora	153
Table 6. 16 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi women” in the three categories in anti-MGS corpora.....	154
Table 6. 17 Unexpected assimilation for the representation of the search term “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora	163
Table 6. 18 The social actions of the assimilated actor within the search term “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora	164
Table 6. 19 The role of the assimilated actor within the search term “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora	164
Table 6. 20 The representation of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora.....	167
Table 6. 21 The social actions of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora.....	168
Table 6. 22 The role of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora	169
Table 6. 23 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi woman” in the three categories in the pro-MGS corpora.....	169
Table 6. 24 The representation of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora.....	178
Table 6. 25 The social actions of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora.....	179

Table 6. 26 The role of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora.....	180
Table 6. 27 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi women” in the three categories in the pro-MGS corpora.....	180
Table 6. 28 Representation of Saudi woman (IND.CLASS) in the four Twitter corpora.....	192
Table 6. 29 Representation of Saudi women (ASSIM.CLASS) in the four Twitter corpora.....	193
Table 7. 1 Examples of religious discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	199
Table 7. 2 Examples of policy discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	200
Table 7. 3 Examples of media discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	200
Table 7. 4 Examples of political discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	201
Table 7. 5 Examples of religious discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	202
Table 7. 6 Examples of media discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	203
Table 7. 7 Examples of other women’s rights discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora.....	204
Table 7. 8 Examples of generic producers of religious discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	207
Table 7. 9 Examples of backgrounded producers of religious discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	208
Table 7. 10 Examples of institutional producers of media discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	210
Table 7. 11 Examples of generic producers of policy discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	211
Table 7. 12 Examples of backgrounded producers of policy discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	212
Table 7. 13 Examples of backgrounded producers of political discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	214
Table 7. 14 Examples of generic producers of religious discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	216
Table 7. 15 Examples of backgrounded producers of religious discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	216
Table 7. 16 Examples of producers of media discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	218
Table 7. 17 Examples of producers of other women’s rights discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	220
Table 7. 18 Comparison of text-types in religious discourses in both the anti-MGS sub-corpora	222
Table 7. 19 Examples of intertext’s names of religious discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	223
Table 7. 20 Comparison of text-types in media discourses in both the anti-MGS sub-corpora	224
Table 7. 21 Examples of intertext’s names of media discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	225
Table 7. 22 Text-types in policy discourses in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	225
Table 7. 23 Examples of intertext’s names of policy discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	226
Table 7. 24 Text-types in political discourses in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	226
Table 7. 25 Examples of intertext’s names of policy discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	227
Table 7. 26 Comparison of text-types in religious discourses in both pro-MGS sub-corpora.....	228
Table 7. 27 Examples of intertext’s names of religious discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora	229
Table 7. 28 Comparison of text-types in media discourses in both pro-MGS sub-corpora.....	230

Table 7. 29 Examples of intertext’s names of media discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora.....	231
Table 7. 30 Text-types in the other women’s rights discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora.....	231
Table 7. 31 Examples of intertext’s names of other women’s rights discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora	232
Table 7. 32 Text-types in the reflective campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	232
Table 7. 33 Comparison of text-types in political discourses in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus.....	234
Table 8. 1 Main categories of arguments in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus	241
Table 8. 2 Sub-arguments for the main argument “Saudi women’s situation and the campaign” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	242
Table 8. 3 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the legality of the MGS and the government’s role” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	243
Table 8. 4 Sub-arguments for the main argument “reflecting on the pro-MGS stance” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	244
Table 8. 5 Sub-argument for the main argument “Islamic views of the MGS” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	245
Table 8. 6 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of society and its reactions” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus	245
Table 8. 7 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the role of social media” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	246
Table 8. 8 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the misuse of the campaign” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	246
Table 8. 9 Main categories of arguments in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	249
Table 8. 10 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	250
Table 8. 11 Sub-arguments for the main argument “women’s rights in Islam” in the pro-MG YouTube corpus.....	251
Table 8. 12 Sub-arguments for the main argument “role of (social) media” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus.....	251
Table 8. 13 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the role of government” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus.....	252
Table 8. 14 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the pro-MGS’ actions” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus.....	253
Table 8. 15 Sub-argument for the main argument “the flaws in the MGS” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus.....	254
Table 8. 16 Sub-argument for the main argument “international law” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	254
Table 8. 17 Newspaper articles divided into anti-MGS and pro-MGS, based on the stance towards the #EMGS campaign in four Saudi news organisations.....	259
Table 8. 18 Main categories of arguments in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus	260
Table 8. 19 Sub-arguments of the main argument “changes needed” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	261
Table 8. 20 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the MGS and Islam” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	262
Table 8. 21 Sub-arguments of the main argument “reactions to the new changes” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	263
Table 8. 22 Sub-arguments for the main argument “flaws of the MGS” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	264
Table 8. 23 Sub-arguments for the main argument “empowering women aligned with Vision 2030” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	265

Table 8. 24 Sub-arguments for the main argument “reaction to the pro-MGS” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	265
Table 8. 25 Sub-arguments for the main argument “Saudi women’s role” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus.....	266
Table 8. 26 Main categories of arguments in the pro-MGS newspapers corpus	268
Table 8. 27 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus	269
Table 8. 28 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the problems of the MGS and amendments to it” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus.....	270
Table 8. 29 Sub-arguments for the main argument “reaction of society to the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus.....	270
Table 8. 30 Sub-arguments for the main argument “women’s situation” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus.....	271
Table 8. 31 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the MGS and Islam” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus.....	272

List of Figures

Figure 4. 1 Dimensions of discourse and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2013, p. 133).	67
Figure 4. 2 A framework for corpus-assisted critical analysis of social media discourse (adapted from KhosraviNik & Unger 2016).....	77
Figure 5. 1 The process of collecting data for the pilot study from July 2016 to February 2017.	84
Figure 5. 2 Process of preparing the data in the pilot study for corpus analysis: female anti- and pro-MGS Twitter sub-corpora, from July 2016 to October 2018.	85
Figure 5. 3 Process of collecting data for the study covering the period from March 2017 to October 2018.	89
Figure 5. 4 Process of preparing the four Twitter sub-corpora for the main study.	92
Figure 5. 5 Linking Farrelly’s (2019) intertextual framework to Fairclough’s (1992) analysis of interdiscursivity.....	109
Figure 5. 6 The steps followed in applying the argumentation analysis for the YouTube data.	111
Figure 5. 7 Argument structure adopted from Toulmin (1958).	113
Figure 5. 8 Steps followed in applying the argumentation analysis for the news articles.	115
Figure 6. 1 Social actions taken by Saudi women in the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora (adopted from Alotaibi & Mulderrig 2021)	118
Figure 6. 2 Relative prominence of women represented in each corpus.....	122
Figure 6. 3 Relative prominence of men represented in each corpus	123
Figure 6. 4 Relative prominence of institutional actors represented in each corpus.....	123
Figure 7. 1 Percentages of discourses in the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora.....	197
Figure 7. 2 Comparison of religious discourse producers in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	206
Figure 7. 3 Comparison of media discourse producers in the anti-MGS sub-corpora.....	209
Figure 7. 4 Producers of policy discourses in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	211
Figure 7. 5 Producers of political discourses in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	213
Figure 7. 6 Comparison of religious discourse producers in the pro-MGS sub-corpora	215
Figure 7. 7 Comparison of media discourse producers in the pro-MGS sub-corpora	217
Figure 7. 8 Producers of other women’s rights discourses in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora	219
Figure 7. 9 Producers of campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora.....	220
Figure 7. 10 Comparison of political discourse producers in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpora	221
Figure 8. 1 The three argumentative appeals in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	247
Figure 8. 2 Types of logos appeal in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus	247
Figure 8. 3 The seven emotions in the pathos appeal in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus.....	248
Figure 8. 4 The three argumentative appeals in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	255
Figure 8. 5 Types of logos appeal in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	255
Figure 8. 6 The eight emotions in the pathos appeals in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus	256
Figure 8. 7 The three argumentative appeals in the anti-MGS newspaper articles.....	266
Figure 8. 8 Forms of logos appeals in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus	267
Figure 8. 9 Emotional categories of pathos appeal in the anti-MGS newspaper articles.....	267
Figure 8. 10 The three argumentative appeals in the pro-MGS news articles	273
Figure 8. 11 Forms of logos appeals in the pro-MGS newspaper articles	273
Figure 8. 12 Emotional categories of pathos appeals in the pro-MGS newspaper articles.....	274

List of Abbreviations

Antis	The campaigners against the male guardianship system
Fantis	Female campaigners against the male guardianship system
Mantis	Male campaigners against the male guardianship system
Anti-MGS	Corpus of the campaigners against the male guardianship system
CADS	Corpus-assisted discourse studies
CDA/S	Critical discourse analysis/studies
CL	Corpus linguistics
#EMGS	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem
FCDA	Feminist critical discourse analysis
MGS	Male guardianship system
Pros	The campaigners in favour of the male guardianship system
Fpros	Female campaigners in favour of the male guardianship system
Mpros	Male campaigners in favour of the male guardianship system
Pro-MGS	Corpus of the campaigners in favour of the male guardianship system
SFG	Systemic functional grammar
SM-CDS	Social media critical discourse studies

The transcription of the Arabic alphabet¹

No.	Arabic letter	Transliterated Arabic keyboard
1.	ا	·
2.	ب	b
3.	ت	t
4.	ث	ṭ
5.	ج	ǧ
6.	ح	ḥ
7.	خ	ḫ
8.	د	d
9.	ذ	ḏ
10.	ر	r
11.	ز	z
12.	س	s
13.	ش	š
14.	ص	ṣ
15.	ض	ḍ
16.	ط	ṭ
17.	ظ	ẓ
18.	ع	‘
19.	غ	ǧ
20.	ف	f
21.	ق	q
22.	ك	k
23.	ل	l
24.	م	m
25.	ن	n
26.	ه	h
27.	و	w
28.	ي	y
29.	َ(short vowel)	a
30.	ُ(short vowel)	u
31.	ِ(short vowel)	i
32.	آ(long vowel)	ā
33.	أ(long vowel)	ū
34.	إ(long vowel)	ī

¹ The Arabic words in the thesis are transliterated using the DIN 31635 (Deutsches Institut für Normung 2011), which is the standard for the transliteration of the Arabic alphabet.

Chapter 1. Introduction

This research aims to investigate the identity of Saudi women in relation to the online #EMGS campaign to end the male guardianship system (MGS), first on Twitter and then extends to other public forums, namely YouTube and online newspapers, situating the data in their socio-political context. Thus, it is necessary to undertake appropriate linguistic analysis and interpret the findings in relation to the social and political conditions in which the discourse is constructed. The analysis shows how a discursive space was opened up for Saudi women to express important aspects of their identity, i.e. by producing alternative interpretations of their identities in ways unprecedented before social media, and to engage in political deliberation and action.

Discourse operates as an important vehicle for ideology (Marx & Engels 1970; Althusser 1971; Volosinov 1973), i.e. a text brings a voice to a certain dialogue, along with a set of perspectives, objectives, interests and so forth. It therefore follows that, to understand the operation of ideology, we must necessarily turn to the analysis of texts (Kress & Hodge 1979; Bolinger 1980; Fairclough 1989). Indeed, we can attempt to comprehend the intended meanings in the discourse by providing an interpretation against the backdrop of the socio-political surroundings at the time when the discourse is produced and basing the interpretation on a grounded theoretical framework. Thus, the procedure in conducting linguistic analysis in this study involves diverse tools and an abductive approach which “sets up a dialogue between theory and empirical data, so that theory informs the analysis, while the analysis informs theory” (Montesano Montessori 2019, p. 41) in order to support socio-semantic interpretation and ultimately explanation in terms of the ideology regarding Saudi women’s identity and role.

The focus of inquiry in this research is on the representation of Saudi women as a social actor and their roles and relations with others in the online discourses surrounding this campaign. As indicated above, the primary platform for this campaign is Twitter, with other social media playing an ancillary role. In order to generate detailed insights into the representation of Saudi women, van Leeuwen’s (1996, 2008) socio-semantic taxonomy of social actor representation is applied to the Twitter data, combined with Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2014) systemic functional grammar. A further focus of this project is on exploring the communication strategies used across the relevant media platforms, the discussion in YouTube videos and in news media articles commenting on the campaign. Both of these data sets are analysed to

understand the argumentation strategies surrounding the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem by applying an analytical framework based on Aristotle (2008) and Toulmin (1958). Together, these elements provide a framework that serves to represent Saudi women and other actors in particular ways and in particular discursive and social contexts. In short, this online campaign to defend and extend the rights of Saudi women, is shaped by the wider social and ideological conditions in which it is produced, and attempts to intervene in and shape those same conditions. These dialectical linkages are explored by means of textual analysis of patterns of representation, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and argumentation.

This introductory chapter sets out the significance of the study. It starts by providing a brief introduction to Saudi women's struggle in their demands to end the male guardianship system. It then introduces the approach adopted, namely critical discourse analysis, and its role in investigating the social problem. The research questions are then delineated and finally an overview of the structure of the thesis is provided with a brief overview of the chapters.

1.1. Research context

In 2016, a group of (largely female) activists in Saudi Arabia launched a social media campaign, particularly on Twitter, which has come to be known by its hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem. Under this system, a Saudi woman must have a male guardian (one of her close male relatives) provide written consent for her to participate in a wide variety of activities, such as enrolling in higher education, applying for official documents (e.g. passport, family ID, or personal ID), and so on. In such a conservative society, the campaign has unsurprisingly attracted considerable opposition, leading to some highly charged debates in both social and news media, in which women and their position in Saudi society have been placed in the spotlight.

The guardianship system is not enforced by the judiciary or royal decree, but instead through Saudi Arabia's powerful religious tier. In brief, Saudi Arabia follows the Hanbali School doctrine's interpretation of Islamic texts, among the four Sunni schools (Commins 2006). One of its precepts that has been enforced rigorously is the male "guardianship" of women. According to the Hanbali School, a male guardian is required in just two cases: within marriage and when travelling (Al-Zuhayli 1999). However, the male guardianship system in Saudi Arabia was extended to other institutions – universities, hospitals and so forth – in the 1980s. This resulted in massive change and control over Saudi women's lives in that they were treated

as legal minors and subjected to unprecedented legal restrictions (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 2).

In terms of campaigning, as noted by Mojab (2001), “Each technological innovation has affected the balance of forces and contributed to the intensification of the struggle” (p. 43). Social media sites offer a public platform on which to highlight and contest political structures (the 2011 Arab Spring) or the unequal social status of a certain group (#BlackLiveMatters). More specifically, women’s rights activists have made the most of the online sphere. In Arabic regions, social media has given women visibility in challenging the traditional norms of public (men) versus private (women) and the dominance of the patriarchal ideology that has characterised Arab and Muslim societies. It is achieved by providing access to a forum offering the opportunity and flexibility to advocate for their rights as equal citizens and make their voices heard via the online world with anonymity and at low cost (Tazi 2020). This has been recognised by Saudi women’s rights activists who are aware of the Saudi law with regard to the prohibition of political parties, civil society organisations or marches in the public sphere. Thus, social media in Saudi Arabia has offered new avenues to challenge the status quo and demand rights (Al-Rasheed 2018). Indeed, such activists have benefited from the power of social media to bring about socio-political change, for instance through #Women2Drive.²

This work investigates the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, that is one of the most high-trending hashtags since its launch in 2016 and has sparked widespread public debate about the male guardianship system (hereafter MGS). What sets this research apart from other related work is that it examines the discursive construction of Saudi women’s representations in the online sphere. Relatively little academic attention has been paid to drawing connections between patterns of gender inequality in Saudi society and sociological issues of female misrecognition; this study contributes to addressing this knowledge gap. Furthermore, it examines the discursive arguments that call for reform and change with regard to Saudi women’s rights on YouTube and in online news. Another point marking the significance of this work is that it investigates the views of both groups: those calling for the empowerment of women and those adopting a more traditional conservative stance on women in three platforms.

² #Women2Drive was remarkable on social media, mainly on Twitter, in 2011 by Saudi women’s right activists and aimed to lift the ban on female driving in Saudi Arabia (Almahmoud 2015; Altoaimy 2017). Although this campaign was active for several years, it only resulted in attracting the public support and challenging the socio-political backlashes (see Lim 2018).

In addition, this study combines a variety of approaches in examining both stances and is critically driven under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis (CDA), such that it offers an examination of counter-discourse claiming to resist an unjust status quo, along with discourse claiming to defend the status quo, on various platforms. It seeks to investigate the linguistic mechanisms which produce and maintain social inequality with the focus on (counter-) hegemonic practices on both sides of the debate in order to capture the dynamic between them. This twin approach also aims to embrace the full complexities of this campaign and the public debates surrounding it by examining not merely voices at the grassroots level (i.e. Twitter and YouTube), but also at the ‘official’ institutional level (i.e. online news). The study thus seeks to contribute both empirically and methodologically to the academic literature on new social movements and feminist activism. Moreover, the focus on the use of the internet as a powerful tool for female activism, giving voice to the politically silenced, advances contemporary feminist studies by means of this Saudi case study.

1.2. The critical discourse analysis approach

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), developed as a branch of linguistics, views language as a social practice and examines it from an interdisciplinary perspective. In this regard, the approach combines social scientific theory and text analytical methods and is positioned in a broadly neo-Marxist tradition; thus, it is concerned with the social injustices arising out of certain power relations discursively performed within particular social structures and institutions. The nature of these structures, socially structured and transformable, and their inherent conflicts, allows for a “social struggle, hegemonic resistance, and ultimate social change” (Mulderigg 2006, p. 17). It is therefore best to “see CDA as a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agendas” (Fairclough et al. 2011, p. 357).

The core focus of analysis for this approach is discourse, which in a broad sense covers text, talk and other forms of semiosis, e.g. symbols and visual images. As an interdisciplinary approach, CDA primarily examines “the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk 2015, p. 466). As a field of research, it involves a variety of different theoretical and methodological emphases. A recent volume edited by Flowerdew and Richardson (2018) presents a range of approaches and analytical methods within the tradition. This research principally draws on the version developed by Fairclough (1992, 2003, 2015). It is a dialectical-relational approach that explicitly engages both social scientific theory and textual analysis; it

views social practice as something which people actively produce in specific social/institutional contexts, based on shared social goals, behaviour(s) and role relations that are partly constituted in language. In addition, CDA aims to interpret practices within the production and transformation of wider social structures (for instance classed or gendered power), thus making its central objective the investigation of social struggle, resistance, and change.

It is a problem-oriented approach, which means its application involves first identifying discourse as a part of social phenomena and then employing the appropriate methodology informed through theory; this entails a variety of approaches, “drawing on various linguistic analytic techniques and theories, although all will involve some form of close textual (and/or multi-modal) analysis” (Fairclough et al. 2011, p. 359). Thus, this approach provides an appropriate framework to approach the social problem addressed in this study, i.e. the representation of Saudi women in the online campaign against the male guardianship system, by using social theories, e.g. Fraser (1995) and Gramsci (1971), explaining the non-discursive elements of a social practice under investigation, i.e. understanding the particular ideological discourses and social relations of power. This needs close textual analysis to explain the workings of discourse elements, e.g. Twitter analysis (micro-level) and analysis of interdiscursivity to illustrate the realisation of that intersection, e.g. YouTube and Newspapers analysis (meso-level).

1.3. Research questions

This work aims to investigate the representations of Saudi women and the ways in which ideologies are discursively constructed around the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem. Embracing a discourse analytical approach, it sheds light on how Saudi women’s rights activists have used language to demand the end of the MGS and how some have sought to maintain it. At issue are the scenarios of how Saudi women are depicted under the MGS in relation to two stances: those who campaigning for an end to the MGS and those who wish to see it retained. To examine the role of language in constructing identities and representations in this online campaign, the study examines the textual representation and construal of Saudi women as social actors in the Twitter campaign. Due to the linguistic features of Twitter as a genre, i.e. a highly truncated and linguistically elliptical genre that only permits the user to post a limited number of characters (Baker & McEnery 2015), its coherence relies heavily on intertextual links to other texts. These texts are realised through hashtags (i.e. point to other, sometimes much longer texts) and elaborate the arguments in more detail. I therefore conduct intertextual (Farrelly

2019) and interdiscursive analysis (Fairclough 2003) in order to examine the persuasive strategies used in this campaign, and to trace the voices, genres, and discourses this drew on. Among these intertextual sources were YouTube videos and online news articles in which arguments related to this campaign are elaborated in more detail. Therefore, two additional corpora are compiled from each of these data sources and analysed for the discursive and argumentation strategies employed by groups on each side of the debate. The overall conceptual framing of these investigations draws on the dialectical relational approach to CDA developed by Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2003, 2006).

The study aims to reveal the various representations assigned to Saudi women in relation to the MGS, identifying the discursive strategic aspects in the hashtag and exploring the arguments made by each side (for and against) in both the public and official forums. The following five research questions are formulated to achieve the previously mentioned aims:

1. Which social actors are represented in the Twitter #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign? (micro-level)
2. How do both anti-MGS (i.e. against the male guardianship system) and pro-MGS (i.e. in favour of the male guardianship system) campaigners in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign represent Saudi women/woman as social actors on Twitter and what are their social actions? (micro-level)
3. Do anti-MGS and pro-MGS of #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? (meso-level)
4. What are the main arguments used by anti-MGS and pro-MGS in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem in the “public” YouTube and “official” online newspaper corpora? (meso-level)
5. What is the potential significance of social media as a tool for counter-hegemonic struggle? To what extent has it been instrumental in bringing about changes in relation to Saudi women’s rights? (macro-level)

Because the subject intersects several theoretical fields by its nature, a variety of theoretical concepts and perspectives have been drawn on to locate the study in the wider context when explaining, analysing and interpreting the data (see Chapter 4).

1.4. Outline of the thesis

To answer the research questions, the thesis is organised into eight chapters following this introductory chapter, as follows.

Chapter 2 provides the historical context of Saudi Arabia and explains how religious, political and economic events have shaped and contributed to the circumstances in which women are living. It also provides an overview of Saudi feminism and its various forms and discusses the use of social media in Saudi Arabia. It clarifies the establishment of the MGS and presents the previous campaigns against/for maintaining it.

Chapter 3 reflects on the characteristics of the social media genres and provides a review of previous studies that have examined forms of online activism.

Chapter 4 presents the epistemological underpinnings of the study in order to understand the investigation of this social problem. It explains the combination of the text analytical methods of CDA with broadly neo-Marxist theories, e.g. Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony, Fraser's (1995) theory of social justice and Melucci's work on (1980, 1985, 1996) new social movements.

Chapter 5 concerns the practical methodological processes conducted in collecting and analysing the data. After briefly recapitulating the research questions and the research design, it explains the research ethics. It also summarises the procedures followed to collect the Twitter data for the pilot study and then outlines how it has shaped the subsequent method for the main study. The processes of collecting, preparing and analysing the data for the main study are explained.

Chapter 6 starts by reporting the results of the pilot study conducted on Twitter data in the period 2016–2017 (on only two female sub-corpora). It then presents and discusses the findings derived from the Twitter platform data to answer the first two research questions regarding the representation of Saudi women (and other actors) in the discourse of both hegemonic (i.e. female and male in favour of the male guardianship system) and counter-hegemonic voices (i.e. female and male against the guardianship system). The findings showed that categories of women, men and institutional actors are salient patterns in the textual representation of social actors and serve as legitimisation strategies used to variously support or undermine the #EMGS campaign. In addition, on both sides of the debate, the general attitude towards women is negative: campaigners against the male guardianship system reflect on the negative

circumstances of Saudi women living in a restrictive patriarchal society, while somewhat surprisingly, those in favour of the system also represent women in a negative way, although this is largely due to their criticism of women who support it.

Chapter 7 discusses the results of the intertextual analysis from Twitter sub-corpora in order to identify the voices used in the #EMGS campaign to serve the main rhetorical purposes of each stance and to provide social relations of power and solidarity by bringing other diverse events and social practices into the texts. By examining four Twitter sub-corpora, the results show that the intertextual patterns help texture arguments that drew liberally on religious and political discourses in particular, with men being the dominant source of these intertextual voices.

Chapter 8 concerns the main arguments made by the anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EMGS campaign in the YouTube (public) and online newspaper (official) corpora, a corpus of 32 videos and 52 online news articles, respectively. The findings reveal the strategic arguments used in the two forums by both positions to (de)legitimise the end of the male-guardian system. In addition, they share a number of strategic arguments: discussion of the male guardianship system from an Islamic perspective, the legal foundations of the system, and the aims of the #EMGS campaign.

Finally, *Chapter 9* revisits the research questions, summarises the findings and highlights the implications for the social problem under investigation. It also attempts to answer the last research question concerning the role of social media as a tool for counter-hegemonic resistance by oppressed social groups, and explores recent changes to women's rights in Saudi Arabia. The chapter also discusses the limitations of this endeavour and concludes with some suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2. Background and Concepts

2.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the historical context of Saudi Arabia and the religious, political and economic events that have shaped and contributed to the situation of women. It also provides an overview of Saudi feminism in its various forms. This will then be followed by a discussion of the use of social media in Saudi Arabia. The chapter concludes by explaining the background of the male-guardianship system, and the previous campaigns against/for maintaining it.

2.2. Historical background

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, founded in 1932, is considered the third Saudi state, unified by King Abdulaziz al-Saud. The first Saudi state was established in 1744 following the forging of an alliance between the Founder Muhammad ibn Saud and the religious activist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and ended in 1818. Twenty years later, Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad managed to establish the second Saudi state, which lasted until 1891. Today, almost 300 years after the establishment of the first Saudi state, the current kingdom has been reconstituted in the same territory and exists under the leadership of the Saud royal family.

The kingdom's recent history has been influenced by three significant aspects: its geographic location, its adherence to the Islamic religion and the discovery of oil (Al-Fassi 2013). Geographically, it is located on the Arabian Peninsula and has benefited from ongoing relationships with neighbours on both sides, being connected to Asia to the east and Africa to the west. Religiously, it is the birthplace of Islam and the location of the two most important cities in Islamic history, Mecca and Medina.

The discovery and production of oil has been a major factor in political, economic, and social changes in the kingdom. The oil-generated revenue of the 1970s not only brought wealth to the country but also regional and international allies. It could be said that the discovery of oil was the primary factor influencing changes in the state politically, economically and socially (Al-Fassi 2013). However, another powerful factor has had a direct impact on the state's affairs, namely the Islamic ideology birthed from the first version of the prophet's message. The following sections discuss the religious background of Saudi Arabia, the discovery of oil and Vision 2030, along with social changes, in particular those affecting Saudi women's status.

2.2.1. Religion and politics

In Saudi Arabia, several ideologies have influenced society, for example *Wahhabism* and *Sahwa*, each of which I explain below. It should be noted that these ideologies have frequently played a role in both the political and social spheres. In this regard, naturally the role of women has been a major factor in the agenda due to what they embody for the religion and the state.

Pre-alliance

Before the establishment of the first Saudi state and the alliance with ibn al-Wahhab, society in the Arabian Peninsula was politically and religiously unstable. In describing the Arabian Peninsula, Zarabozo (2003) introduced descriptions of both social and economic conditions. The society was mainly characterised as tribal, comprising predominantly Arab tribes, as well as non-Arabs who came originally through either slavery or Hajj convoys. In general, it was a lawless and rebellious society, with ongoing conflicts. In comparison to the economies of other Muslim countries around the Arabian Peninsula, it was exceedingly poor. Political stability was almost impossible due to the continuous devastating raids between tribes and on passing convoys. Al-Fahad (2004) divided the crises of political stability into two types according to two communities, city residents and nomads. First, the city residents had lost their tribal structure, which left them unable to face the onslaught of raids. Second, the nomadic way of living had been in a state of flux, causing chaotic relationships among the members of a single tribe, between tribes, or between tribes and city residents (Al-Fahad 2015). In terms of religion and spirituality, religious practices have been characterised as representing the pre-Islamic era, called *jahiliyya* (the era of ignorance) (Al-Rasheed 2004; Commins 2006). Although the inhabitants proclaimed themselves to be Muslims, they knew little about the Islamic faith and applied few of its principles (Wynbrandt 2004); their beliefs were described as “myths, superstitions and polytheistic” (Murad 1990, p. 1). Thus, imposing Islamic concepts and practices and ensuring political stability were necessary for society at that time.

Alliance

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a religious scholar and preacher, whose teachings are ascribed to the Hanbali School (Abukhalil 2004; Algar 2002). The Hanbali School is considered in some matters to be the strictest and closest to the Quran and Sunna of the four schools (Vikør 2005).³ When he returned to his family from his journey seeking knowledge in

³ In brief, jurisprudence in Islam developed through many philosophical and theological debates among scholars (Hallaq 2009; Vikør 2005) and four Sunni Islamic law schools emerged in the 17th to 19th centuries, each with its own interpretations: the *Hanafi* School of Abu Hanifah al-Numan (AD 699–767), the *Shafi* School of Muhammad al-Shafi (AD 767–820), the *Maliki* School of Malik bin Anas (AD 711–795), and the *Hanbali* School of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (AD 780–855) (Tønnessen, 2016). In general, the four sources of Islamic law are the Quran,

various Muslim countries, ibn al-Wahhab was certain that Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula were not living their lives in parallel with the teachings of the Quran and Sunna (Zarabozo 2003). He met ibn Saud, who ruled Diriyah at that time, and stated his motivation to spread the true principles and practices of Islam to ibn Saud, who on his part accepted the mission to revive the Salafi; thus, ibn al-Wahhab was responsible for religious and social reformation and ibn Saud was committed to addressing political affairs (Murad 1990).

The mission mainly aimed to establish a unified Islamic country under the rule of the Al Saud family. In implementing this, ibn al-Wahhab sought to spread literacy so that all people of both genders could understand the word of God (Commins 2015; Murad 1990). Before 1932, when the current kingdom emerged, the followers of Wahhabism experienced suppression due to a lack of political backing for their mission (Commins 2006). Thus, when King Abdul Al-Aziz announced the Wahhabi teachings as the official doctrine of Saudi Arabia for the 20th century, they viewed their mission as no longer limited to theology, but going beyond that to protect themselves and their mission in case of politically difficult times in the future (Commins 2006). However, the king restricted their role to being the “guardians of ritual correctness and public morality,” which they accepted, and he plainly identified his own role as pursuing “what he deemed necessary for the kingdom’s and his dynasty’s welfare” (Commins 2006, p. 72).

2.2.2. Economic change and the emergence of an ideology

In 1938, Saudi Arabi began producing oil and since then it has become a significant factor in both the political and social spheres (Al-Fassi 2013). The discovery of oil is usually followed by an urbanisation process. The country “witnessed the proliferation of government ministries and agencies, some of them quite ephemeral, designed to manage particular aspects of economic development: communications, agriculture, education, petroleum and finance” (Commins 2006, p. 108). As result of this, women were marginalised; prior to the urbanisation process, Saudi women were active in almost all aspects, inside and outside the house; they worked “as farmers, weavers, nurses, wet nurses, midwives, sellers, healers, painters, business women, and more. They were also teachers, poets, and, in some instances, even warriors” (Al-Fassi 2013, p. 210). Moving toward a more modern and urbanised life, these practices were more restricted for women (Al-Fassi 2013; Ross 2008). Ross (2008) argued that the oil boom and the wealth brought to families, rather than Islam, was to be blamed for this, stating that

the Sunna, *Ijma*, and *Qiyas*. The Sunna has the exemplary nature of the Prophet Muhammad’s biography. *Ijma*, or consensus, is the agreement of the community of key jurists. *Qiyas* refers to a set of methods of legal reasoning, among which analogy is the most prominent (Hallaq 2009).

“Oil production reduces the number of women in the labor force, which in turn reduces their political influence” (p. 107).

In the 1960s, the arrival of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia brought a new ideology that dramatically influenced the nation’s social structure, more particularly Saudi women’s status. Their Islamic ideology, along with that already existing in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi ideology, resulted in the birth of a more strict ideology called the *Sahwa* movement (the Islamic Awakening) (Lacroix 2015). The *Sahwis* (followers of *Sahwa*) started to spread their control over Saudi intellectual inputs through:

...an outgrowth of the Saudi education system, and especially of its extracurricular activities, including the summer camps, the Saudi scouts, the committees for raising Islamic awareness, and the Qur’an memorization circles, which served for recruitment purposes as well as to provide resources. (Lacroix 2015, p. 170)

In addition, they tended to adopt extreme social values in relation to women’s roles in Saudi society; the development of *Sahwa* and its networks was encouraged by the state at that time (Lacroix 2015). Intellectual input through education for girls was also under the control of the religious establishment from early 1961 in order to “follow the objective of keeping the schools’ curriculum in the private sphere to train girls to be good mothers and obedient wives” (Al-Fassi 2013, p. 209). In late 1979, the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by armed anti-government groups led to more control for the religious establishment over the public sphere, for instance further reinforcing Islamic content in education and empowering religious police (Al-Fassi 2013; Moaddel 2006). The 1980s and 1990s witnessed dramatic social change, in particular for Saudi women; they were increasingly being pulled away from the public arena, with constraints imposed on their education, movement and work, along with complete segregation based on sex (Al-Fassi 2013).

2.2.3. Reform

The reform that has taken place in the country in the 21st century has been due to several factors. The events of 9/11 in 2001 in the United States (US), followed by the terrorist attack in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on 13 May 2003, required a wave of reform in relation to the beliefs and practices in the kingdom, along with the issue of women’s status (Al-Fassi 2013). In an attempt to fight against radicalisation and promote tolerance and diversity, the kingdom adopted an open-door policy and increased the visibility of women (Al-Rasheed 2013). Among the national reform projects have been the opening of the King Abdulaziz Centre for National Dialogue in 2003, the launch of the King Abdullah Scholarship Abroad Program for both male

and female students in 2005, the appointment of the first Saudi female minister in 2009, the assigning of 30 Saudi women to the Shura council in 2013 and allowing women to vote and run in municipal council elections in 2015.

Following the same direction, the current Saudi government, led by King Salman ibn Abdulaziz and his son, deputy Crown Prince Muhammad ibn Salman, has extended the wave of reform to cover the economic sphere to tackle the rapid decline in oil prices. Saudi Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan and Fiscal Balance Program introduced in 2016 are among the major plans (Moshashai et al. 2020) designed to usher in this reform. The combination of these plans aims to implement social reforms through “promoting a more ‘moderate’ Islam and expanding rights for women” (p. 389) and economic reforms through diversifying investments rather than relying heavily on oil revenues. In favour of social reform, a halt has been called to divisive and extremist discourse, and the power of the religious police (i.e. the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) has been controlled (Moshashai et al. 2020). In 2017, several political and economic initiatives to improve the position of women were launched. Indeed, 2017 was referred to as “the year of Saudi women” due to the various major changes affecting them, for example “the appointment of Princess Rima to head the Multi-Sport Federation, the naming of Fatima Baeshen as the spokesperson for the Saudi embassy in Washington, DC, choosing Hind Al-Zahid as the executive director of Damman airport, and naming Sarah Al Suhaimi as head of the Saudi stock market” (Mustafa & Troudi 2019, p. 135). At the end of the year, the king issued an order to lift the driving ban on women and started to prepare for this change to be brought into effect in 2018.

2.3. Saudi feminism

The status of Saudi women is defined by several intersecting religious, political and economic factors, some of which have been mentioned in section 2.2. It is important to explain the reasons behind the restrictions on women, both related to Islamic principles and other aspects. An entire chapter in the Quran (al-Nisa) is devoted to women’s subjects, and the sayings and deeds of the Prophet guide Muslim societies in the articulation of gender. Whereas Al-Rashidi (2000) argued that the Arab traditions and views of women “were largely responsible for them lagging behind and being under-utilized in their participation in the development of their societies” (p. 27), Al-Rasheed (2015) described Saudi women as positioned symbolically as a sign of state piety and commitment to Islam. Therefore, the image of the kingdom as the birthplace of Islam was strengthened (Yamani 2005). To prevent women engaging in the public realm and to position them as having secondary status, Al-Rasheed (2015) argues that Saudis were fed a

strict diet of teachings of women as weak and lacking the ability to participate, for instance in political positions.

For Muslim societies, feminism is a foreign concept borrowed from the West and aims to westernise social, cultural and political structures through the United Nations and various organisations; these assumptions have isolated feminists from the public (Grami 2014). Specifically, the terms “feminism” and “emancipation” have negative connotations, both being typically associated with Western hegemony and sexual freedom (Al Fassi 2016, p. 188). Historically, feminism has also been “perceived as being anti-Islam and against the Saudi culture” (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019, p. 16).

Research on the existence of Saudi feminism is still lacking. In her recent work, *Does Saudi Feminism Exist?*, the Saudi female historian and activist Hatoon El-Fassi (2014 p. 122) notes that “the concept of feminism as an awareness that there are discriminatory rules, notions and practices against women, regardless what names these are given, has always been there” (also see Al Fassi 2016). The acts of demanding legal rights and other privileges came to the kingdom from feminist movements in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf region. In these countries, feminist movements were part of national liberation movements and anti-colonial struggles, in contrast to the feminist movement in Saudi Arabia (El-Fassi 2014).

El-Fassi (2014) tried to answer the question of the existence of Saudi feminism by identifying not a comprehensive feminist movement, but smaller stances by individuals or small groups. She started with contemporary experiences and researched as far back as the 1960s. El-Fassi concluded that Saudi feminism does indeed exist and its levels vary according to the discourse in which it is enacted. With a view to identifying Saudi female activism, Al-Fassi (2013) articulated three categories to which activism could belong depending on the stance adopted:

1. The traditional position: accepting changes in women’s status from the authorities and denying feminism and liberation.
2. The enlightened position: originating in the 1930s with male activists calling for women’s education, over the years more women have started adopting this position in demanding their rights. Its first public mark was in 1990, when female activists challenged the driving ban and drove into Riyadh, the Saudi capital, in protest.

3. The revival Islamic position: a radical line (following Sharia in women's rights) and a reactionary line (reinterpreting women's rights in Islam and challenging the religious establishment).

The campaign #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (#EMGS) could be positioned as enlightened and reactionary, unlike the opposing stance (i.e. in favour of MGS), which constitutes a combination of the traditional and radical positions.

Saudi feminism is characterised as comprising variable and conjoined forms of knowledge because it “is shaped by different ways of knowing and modes of engagement with gender and women's issues, as well as different social and political developments” (Lim 2018, p. 468). Four Saudi feminist trends are identified: (i) the legal position, challenging patriarchal laws; (ii) the political position, arguing that Islamic or tribal traditions are not the causes of the subordinated role of women, but rather the marriage of nationalism and religious ideology; (iii) the cultural position, challenging the male-dominated culture and religion; iv) the Islamic position, situating women's rights within an Islamic framework, rejecting any calls for a more open society and calling for the demands of divorced and widowed women to be met (Lim 2018). As an intertwined form, on the one hand, the campaigners against the MGS (anti-MGSs) in the online campaign #EMGS challenged the MGS in terms of its legal validity. The MGS system came into existence in the 1980s after the seizure of Mecca (section 2.5). The #EMGS campaign does not run contrary to the beliefs of Islam but challenges the patriarchal interpretation of Islamic principles. On the other hand, the campaigners in favour of the MGS (pro-MGSs), who consider the #EMGS an ‘unpatriotic’ campaign, reject the movement for its potential negative influence on Islamic values and deny that any harm could be caused by the MGS, although they have accepted a partial end to the MGS for those women in need.

2.4. Social media in Saudi Arabia

In the Saudi context, the discovery of oil and modernisation coincided with the appearance of mass media. However, the influence of the media remained weak until the 1960s, with the establishment of the Ministry of Information and the issuance of a regulatory code for newspapers (Commins 2006). When radio and television broadcasting appeared, women's voices and appearance were attacked by religious groups. Although there were attempts to stop this outrage, the siege of Mecca in 1979 allowed them to extend their control over television, radio, and new outlets, by banning women from appearing, on TV and radio, and their photographs from appearing in newspapers (Commins 2006). For three decades, this restrictive

environment was maintained by the government until the arrival of the Internet in 1994, which became available to the public in 1999, albeit under pervasive and effective censorship (Schanzer & Miller 2012), through the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. However, maintaining censorship has become difficult in the current online environment, specifically with the existence of social media; thus, the government has brought citizens in to participate in censorship by reporting inappropriate and critical materials (Schanzer & Miller 2012). For instance, a mobile app called “We are all security” was launched in 2016 by the Ministry of the Interior as an attempt to engage citizens in the security system, encouraging them to report violations and offenders. Thus, tweets can be used as evidence in Saudi court and could be a cause for arrest of those who “go too far in their social criticism” or “have insulted a person of authority” (Al-Jenaibi 2016, p. 66).

Despite the restrictions, social media platforms have introduced “new avenues of dissent and resistance” and have changed the public sphere, being a site “where Saudis assess the performance of their leadership and dare to launch criticism of their shortcomings online,” as well as demanding rights and better infrastructure (Al-Rasheed 2018, p. 3). With the open-door policy adopted by the government, the king’s and other official offices exist online, benefiting activists (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019). For Saudi women, social media provide a gateway to the public sphere, a means of introducing their arguments to, and discussing them with a wider audience and explaining their causes. Alsahi (2018) argued that women’s movements should not be treated homogeneously, simply defining outgrowth cycles, protest and political action, and concrete mobilisation, because the reality is that these movements take place in multiple arenas around the globe, each facing their own unique conditions which impose diverse constraints on possible action. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the law stipulates that no political parties, civil society organisations or marches be allowed. Thus, women’s rights activists saw the value of social media in demanding socio-political change, specifically during the Arab Spring in 2011.

In Saudi Arabia, the use of Twitter in particular has grown considerably among a large proportion of the population under the age of 35 (Sreberny 2015). According to a study that examined the state of social media in Saudi Arabia, 40% of the Twitter base in the Middle East and North Africa is from Saudi Arabia, Saudis create more than 210 million tweets monthly with 51% of Twitter users being female and 49% male (The Social Clinic 2015). Another study investigated the use of Twitter by Saudi authorities and found that 93 Saudi government authorities have adopted its use to provide ease of communication, increase transparency and

deliver government information and services (Alasem 2015). Mapping and analysing the structure and content of the Saudi Twittersphere and identifying online communities, Noman et al. (2015) found 36 network clusters and identified several Saudi media organisations, journalists, political and social critics, religious figures and preachers.

This research thus not only investigated the use of Twitter in the #EMGS campaign, but also how activists and the traditional media outlets have utilised YouTube in discussing at length the arguments for or against the MGS. On YouTube, more than 15 million users have their own accounts in Saudi Arabia, with 100 million daily YouTube views (The Social Clinic 2015). Due to restrictions on organising offline discussion groups, several online groups have been active in discussing the new measures with experts and citizens, which are then posted on YouTube (Al-Rasheed 2018). Saudi activists have employed YouTube as a platform for spreading news of local demonstrations. For instance, a Saudi female activist drove in Riyadh and posted a video of her driving on YouTube in 2008 for the #Women2Drive campaign (Almahmoud 2015). YouTube has been increasingly used to advocate for human rights because of the unlimited space provided to express personal and others' thoughts. In addition, the platform not only enables ordinary citizens to upload their videos, but also provides a platform for traditional sources of media, for example the CNN TV channel (Arif 2014).

I also examined a more controlled and closed form of media, i.e. online newspapers, to understand how the official media organisations promoted the #EMGS campaign to the public. In Saudi Arabia, media content is supervised by the Ministry of Culture and Information, which takes printed newspapers more seriously than online sources (Alnajrani et al. 2018). Saudi media law prohibits publications that include false news, threats to national security, the country's public image and public morality, and unconstructive criticism of officials (Duffy 2014). Kudri (2014) argues that government censorship has been declining since the terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2003 (see 2.1.4, Reform). For instance, Saudi media of the female activist who drove in 2011 as a protest to the driving ban represented coverage of both parties: there were those who opposed the idea, but "the majority of the press support[ed] it" (Kudri 2014, p. 132). Coinciding with Vision 2030, Saudi journalists are now able to expand their range of topics and criticisms in a way that helps in constructing the country, more specifically for female journalists in relation to women's rights.

2.5. The male guardianship system (MGS)

One of the Islamic concepts is male guardianship, requiring a male guardian for females in two cases: marriage and travel. However, the strict MGS in Saudi Arabia dating back to the 1980s is a system in which Saudi women are treated as legal minors, positioned as second-rate citizens and subject to legal restrictions that mostly do not have a legal basis in Saudi law. Under this system, a Saudi woman needs a male guardian (i.e. one of her close male relatives, such as her father, husband, brother, grandfather, son, etc.) to provide consent to receive several services and participate in the public and private sectors. These could include enrolling in higher education, applying for official documents (e.g. passport, family ID, or personal ID), applying for a scholarship, being released from state institutions (e.g. prisons or rehabilitation centres), undergoing certain types of surgery (e.g. abortion, caesarean, or cosmetic surgery), accessing bank services (e.g. opening an account), working in the governmental and non-governmental sectors, and accessing the judicial system.

The ideology behind implementing the MGS relates to the common belief that biological differences exist between men and women and that women are both mentally and physically inferior to men (Tønnessen 2016; Warren 2008). This system seems to entrench the superiority of men in Saudi society and any attempt to change it would be arduous as it is represented as endorsed by Sharia.⁴ In the religious discourse, advocates of this system rely on the strict interpretation of Quranic verse 4:34 in Surah al-Nisa:

Men are *qiwamon* in charge of women by right of what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth.

By interpreting the word *qiwama* as “responsibility,” a male guardian has to maintain authority over and look after women in both his family and public life (Jawad 2009; LeBenger 2013; Tønnessen 2016). This interpretation supports the typical depiction of a Muslim woman’s role as confined to the domestic sphere under her male guardian’s care and protection. However, this verse is controversial and there are different interpretations. It has been argued that this verse has been misinterpreted and misread, since *qiwama* can be interpreted as “breadwinner,” so it “deals exclusively with family issues, because it is mentioned in the context of married life” (Jawad 2009, p. 14); such an interpretation changes the meaning entirely (Tønnessen 2016).

⁴ *Sharia* is the Islamic law based on the Quran and Sunna, which legitimises the religious and secular actions of individuals and groups (Reed 2003).

In addition, this strict interpretation by the system's devotees might be characterised as supporting patriarchal values. Accordingly, the MGS is probably best described as a patriarchal legal system. It is based on the assumption of men in various Islamic jurisprudence schools that the practice of interpreting Quranic verses is their preserve (Al-Hibri 1997); in the kingdom, this practice is also dominated by male religious scholars. Male resistance towards equal rights could also be described as resistance to losing their superiority. This insistence by men on their right of interpretation reminds us of when the Prophet recited the Quranic verse explaining women's right to inheritance. At the time of the Prophet, men tried to manipulate the interpretation of a Quranic verse to suppress the new laws on inheritance and to preserve their privileges, al-Nisa, verse 5

... And do not give the weak-minded [sufaha] your property, which Allah has made a means of sustenance for you, but provide for them with it and clothe them and speak to them words of appropriate kindness.

It means that ignorant persons of both sexes are excluded from inheritance due to their incompetence in dealing with money, whereas a relatively competent person could use it for his/her benefit. In this regard, a throwback to *jahiliyya*⁵ traditions was apparent in their interpretation of the word *sufaha* (the foolish), who are excluded from inheritance (Mernissi 1991). In their explanation, they interpreted *sufaha* as referring to women because both women and children are considered to be foolish in *jahiliyya*, thereby justifying their exclusion from inheritance rights (Mernissi 1991). In turn, this can be traced back to an earlier argument related to the strict interpretation of the word *qiwama*, which, dating back to pre-Islamic traditions, considers women to be minors and incapable of making decisions.

Thus, the MGS is defended by its advocates solely on the basis of a strict interpretation of a Quranic verse, the meaning of which is in fact ambiguous. Several competing explanations have been offered for how and why this system came to be imposed on Saudi society. First, women activists believe that the MGS was devised because of the strong influence of religious discourse in Saudi culture (Tønnessen 2016). Another reason for the existence of this system is the seizure of the holy mosque in Mecca in 1979 by armed men (see section 2.2.2). As Al-Fassi (2013) observed, after this seizure, religious institutions started to impose their power in the public sphere and subsequently the status of Saudi women was restricted in various respects related to education, employment and freedom of movement, which resulted in a dramatic

⁵ *Jahiliyya* is the period of pre-Islamic Arabia, known as the era of ignorance.

change in their economic status. The MGS was introduced and applied without a legal basis by passing these constraints under the name of religion into the public sphere to establish a “better” society under the *Sharia* framework. Since it was first imposed, the consequences of this system have continued to emerge. Over time, its application extended to cover all aspects of Saudi women’s lives and resulted in more male dominance, with the result that few attempts have been made to abolish it.

2.5.1. Campaigns against the male guardianship system

In 2016, Saudi women started an online campaign to eliminate the MGS with minimal participation from well-known women activists in the initial stages. Although the campaign’s hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem had semantic issues with the use of the word “guardian,”⁶ it trended daily on Twitter through the first months of the campaign and has led to a series of regulations from the state. This campaign was not the first to demand an end to the MGS.

The Saudi Ministry of Commerce enacted a regulation so that a legal guardian could be endowed with power of attorney to enact a woman’s business, but it was abolished in 2004 after wide criticism (Yamani 2008). In practice, however, Saudi businesswomen faced many obstacles with officials, who usually insisted on the presence of a legal guardian and despite being told that regulation had been abolished, continued to insist or refused to provide services. In 2009, Saudi businesswomen campaigned for the complete abolition of the legal guardian requirement to start a business (Al-Fassi 2013), because even though it had been abolished in 2004, it was still being followed in practice. Their campaign was divided into three stages: sending emails to the media and journalists (a total of 6,000 emails) to introduce their demands through the media, boycotting the Chamber of Commerce, and signing a petition to King Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz explaining the damage caused by the requirement (Hamidi 2009). The Ministry of Commerce released a statement in response clarifying the abolition of legal guardianship that had been in place since 2004 (Al-Fassi 2009).

Going a step further, a campaign entitled *Treat Us Like Adult Citizens – Or We’ll Leave the Country* was launched in July 2009 by Wajeha al-Huwaider, a liberal Saudi women’s rights activist, with other Saudi female activists to eliminate the MGS. As part of the campaign, al-Huwaider proclaimed that she went to the King Fahd Bridge joining Saudi Arabia to Bahrain

⁶ The *wali*, “guardian” in Islam is related to marriage and his role is crucial to complete a female’s marriage; thus, the choice of the term “guardian” has led to heated debate, although the anti-MGSs have explained that they know it is inaccurate. However, the same terminology, “guardianship”, is applied in official documents.

and to the airport in Dammam on Thursdays and Fridays to demand the abolition of the MGS until she was allowed to pass the border without a guardian's consent. She also made an announcement on a liberal website calling for all Saudi citizens to email or fax the authorities to stop this system (Admon 2009). The campaign and its activists were heavily criticised. One of those critics was a Saudi journalist, Sabria Jawhar, who wrote in an article for the Huffington Post (Jawhar 2011) that the campaign was being managed from outside the country and described the activists, particularly al-Huwaider, as "the darling of Western conservatives" (para. 2) and the campaign as "silly" and "unseemly in Saudi society" (para. 3). She supported her stance by declaring that the majority of Saudi women did not get involved in this campaign because it demands "defy Islam" and stating that demanding the Saudi authorities abolish the system was fighting a losing battle. By contrast, she reported that even though many Saudi males treat their female relatives fairly and have freedom of movement, other families misuse the system and women are abused. For her, it is "not a system ripe for abuse. It's already a system abused with regularity" (Jawhar 2011, p. 2). She here refers to the Saudi judicial system, which in some instances fails to protect women from abuse, and the tribal traditions, which are placed by some above Islamic principles. In her opinion, a complete abolition of the MGS would not solve the problem of abuse; rather, the solution should involve amending the system, encouraging fair guardianship, enacting laws to protect the abused, and imposing consequences on abusive guardians. In general, the state applies the law in terms of how individuals should act, expects them to behave accordingly, and overlooks the fact that not all do so; thus, guardianship issues do not seem to be included in the criminal law. The assumption of correct behaviour comes from Islamic principles, wherein:

Islam begins with the premise that individuals have obligations to each other, without which individual rights are unachievable. Individual and group rights are capable of mutually reinforcing each other; a person can fulfil his or her duty to protect the rights of others without undermining his or her individual rights (Reed 2003, p. 493).

As a response to the July 2009 campaign, a counter-campaign called My Guardian Knows What's Best For Me, led by a Saudi Princess, Jawaher bint Jalawi, and 12 Saudi female activists, aimed to redefine the concept of guardian and defeat the previous campaign against the male system. They sent a petition with 1,000 signatures to King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz stating their vehement opposition to the campaign against the MGS. They claimed that the campaign misinterpreted the notion of guardianship by presenting the system as a means for men to control women and that their liberal calls would westernise Islamic principles (Admon 2009).

They also attempted to rectify the notion of guardianship in society and then propagate that rectified notion in the media, and through religious and educational institutions. In addition, they demanded the officials to provide legal protection for women abused by their guardian, to enact punishments in the judicial system for those attempting to destroy the reputation of Saudi women or conspiring to mislead public opinion, and to define the role of guardian in order to enable women to have their rights and to protect family values (Admon 2009).

Their campaign also received a range of criticism from Saudi activists and journalists. Criticism was published online in 2009 and Admon (2009) reported the most influential aspects in his article *In Response to Calls to Improve the Status of Saudi Women, Saudi Princess Launches "My Guardian Knows What's Best For Me" Campaign*. Among the criticisms was one comment made by a Saudi activist saying that the campaign limited the freedom of Saudi women and contradicted their rights as stipulated in Islam and thus their human rights. A female writer, Nabila Mahjoub in *Al-Madina*, said that the campaign represented women as dependent on males and that the campaigners seemed to have no faith in their own abilities and no awareness of their value in life (Admon 2009). Another journalist, Sultan Al-Jumeiri, stood against the campaign by reporting that it would harm women by considering them minors without any Islamic basis. Other journalists were shocked that the campaign could be led by women and even suspected that it may have been initiated by a male guardian strongly against abolishing the system (Admon 2009).

In 2011, the hashtag #SaudiWomenRevolution was used on Twitter by Saudi women campaigning for various women's rights including, but not exclusively concerned with the end of the MGS (Saudi Women's Rights Blog 2011). The campaigners also created a page on Facebook which released a statement to demand the elimination of this MGS and explained in detail all aspects of the obstacles it causes. They included details about employment, receiving education inside and outside the kingdom, marriage and divorce, issuing official documents, having surgery, acting on behalf of children to open a bank account, enrolling children in school, and traveling with or without children. In terms of the educational obstacles, these exist even in instances when a governmental scholarship has been awarded. For travel, although the Ministry of Interior Affairs permits women over the age of 45 to travel without a male guardian's consent, airport officials continue to ask women over this age for their guardian's permission (Kareem 2011; Saudi Women's Rights Blog 2011). Despite these efforts via social media, the campaign did not result in any progress on the issue of male guardianship.

In an interview with the satellite television station al-Khalejia on 30 October 2016, the Saudi activist Aziza Al-Yousef declared that in her opinion, the initial act towards abolishing the MGS in a practical and organised way was taken by Dr Aisha Al-Mana at the end of 2011, when she and other women, including Al-Yousef herself, organised an unofficial five-day workshop in three cities: Riyadh, Jeddah and Al-Khobar. These workshops aimed to understand the Quranic verses about women and their interpretations, before demanding abolition of the MGS. After the workshops, the organisers contacted a well-known lawyer to do research on the guardianship system in Islam in order to identify the sources of its requirement. Al-Yousef stated that a petition with the signatures of 15 Saudi women was sent to King Abdullah, to the Council of Senior Scholars,⁷ and to 150 members of the Consultative Council.⁸ Each recipient received a copy of the petition addressed to him or her directly; only two female members of the Consultative Council, Dr Thoraya Obaid and Princess Moudi bint Khaled, responded by directing the petition to the correct committee.

Since 2013, various hashtags about male guardianship have appeared on Twitter; however, they have not had the same effect as the hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem from 2016. Al-Yousef admitted that neither activists nor the 15 women behind the 2011 petition were responsible for initiating the 2016 hashtag, but rather female Saudi citizens were behind it. When activists noticed that the hashtag was trending daily, they uploaded an online petition to collect as many signatures as possible with the same demands as previously sent to the officials. They gathered 14,700 people of the 30,000 included their full names and ID numbers. These were sent to King Salman bin Abdulaziz in October 2016 and the hashtag has continued trending daily. It is noteworthy that the Twitter hashtags and the petition have not been the only approaches used; a Saudi female lawyer, Nasreen Alissa, released a smartphone app called KNOW YOUR RIGHTS on 4 July 2016, aimed at providing advice and explaining the rights of Saudi women under Sharia law as well as the Saudi judicial system in both Arabic and English. Along with the tweets, the female anti-MGSs also posted online proof of their Saudi national ID to deny the accusation that those posting were foreigners. In addition, the anti-MGS campaigners encouraged the public to participate with them in sending telegrams to the king on the Saudi national day in September 2016. Also in 2016, a counter-campaign, similar in its demands to the My Guardian Knows What's Best for Me campaign, was organised by

⁷ The Council of Senior Scholars is the highest religious council in the kingdom. Its role is to advise the king on the religious issues.

⁸ The Consultative Council (Shura) is a formal advisory council. Its role is to propose regulations to the king but not enforce them.

opponents of both genders. A petition starting with the signature of 21 academics requesting that the king's office prevent the #EMGS campaign, which for them constituted a foreign intervention in Saudi women's rights, and reform the MGS, was sent in September 2016 by Rawda Al-Youssef.

Since then, new regulations have been enacted regarding the abolition of guardian consent across a variety of government offices. The Civil Status Department can now issue a family ID card for every mother (married, divorced, widowed, or married to a non-Saudi) that allows her to act on behalf of her children and to add a new-born child. The Civil Status Department also allows women to be issued IDs without a guardian's permission from the age of 18 (in some cases 15). Furthermore, as female students in both junior high and high schools are obliged by the Ministry of Education to have an ID, the Interior Minister, Prince Mohammad bin Naif, announced that the Civil Status Department had to simplify the ID issuing process by providing services for female students and employees in their school or workplace. To complete the governmental and legal procedures, the Ministry of Justice announced a new policy on Ending a Male Guardian's Consent and directed all courts to be open at specific times to facilitate marriage processes for women who do not have a guardian or those whose guardian refuses to see them married for no logical reason. The Ministry of Education has allowed the emergency medical services to enter the educational institutions of females; other educational institutions, such as the Prince Nora and King Saud universities, have abolished the male guardian consent requirement for their services.

In April 2017, the king's office posted a royal decree on this matter, stating that implementation and enforcement of the ban was required by all governmental bodies; it required all governmental sectors to remove the guardian's consent requirement when providing services to female citizens unless there was a legal basis. This was to come into effect within three months (by the end of July 2017). The decree also stated that the Ministry of Labour and Social Development should provide all possible means of transportation for female employees. Furthermore, in the decree, the government of Saudi Arabia acknowledged its obligations under international law and called for greater women's rights awareness.

The majority welcomed the royal decree and started to analyse its consequences. It was expected that within a short time, Saudi women would be able to access higher education, access all healthcare services including surgery, work in all governmental offices and some private sectors, be released from state institutions (e.g. prisons and rehabilitation centres), and

receive bank services, all without a male guardian's consent. However, gaining scholarships, getting married, being issued with a passport, and traveling abroad would continue to require a guardian's permission because for these services there is a legal basis in the Saudi judicial system. Nevertheless, the General Directorate of Passports in the Department of the Ministry of the Interior later assured citizens that they were working on new regulations to facilitate the ability of Saudi women to travel without a guardian's consent and without age restrictions, depending on the purpose of travel.

In September 2017, the king's office announced that women would be allowed to drive starting from June 2018 as part of achieving Vision 2030's agenda concerning expanding the economy. In August 2019, a royal decree was issued that met an important demand of the campaign for women above the age of 21 to be able to travel and have their passports issued without permission from a guardian. In October 2020, a new programme of scholarships called the Path of Excellence was announced, with no restrictions on the age of the students or their previous fields of study and, for female students, no requirement for a guardian's consent; this programme specifies the best international universities for enrolment and several subjects needed in the country to participate later in Vision 2030. In June 2021, a new legislation was issued that adult females can live alone without the consent of their male guardian. This comes with two amendments: a women's guardian cannot report her as a fugitive or file lawsuit against her if she chooses to live alone, and women who finish their sentence and move to rehabilitation/care centre can now live alone without the need to be handed over to their guardians.

Chapter 3: A review of the research on social media

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the characteristics of Twitter, YouTube and newspaper genres and provides a review of previous studies that have examined forms of online activism. Because tweets on the #EMGS are the primary data in this study, the chapter starts with the Twitter genre, as well as hashtag activism and feminism. Then, it examines the YouTube genre, followed by the online newspaper genre. Each section is divided into three sub-sections: global, Arab and Saudi, in order to locate this study in the literature of these contexts.

3.2. Twitter genre

Twitter, a microblogging network that is considered a different genre of online communication, has turned into a mass phenomenon since its launch in 2006 (Weller et al. 2014). It has continuously developed and changed in terms of its appearance and features, for example doubling the number of permitted characters per tweet from 140 to 280 in 2017. However, the basic idea underpinning its foundation has remained the same: broadcasting short public messages and following others' updates; it leads to the formation of complex social networks (Weller et al. 2014) via its many communication conventions, including retweeting, liking and replying. This communication medium is a real-time information source, as well as a place for various debates in news, politics, and so forth. In other words, Twitter has become "less of a sociable medium, and more of a distributed, mass medium" (Halavais 2014, p. 37).

Twitter is considered a means of covering multidimensional levels as it includes a variety of everyday aspects of people's lives and their reactions, for example related to social issues (Murthy 2013). One way in which the characteristic of being multidimensional can be portrayed is the existence of hyperlinks embedded in tweets. These hyperlinks allow "texts to be instantaneously linked to a multiplicity of other discourses" (Barros 2014, p. 1223). Thus, the digital texts have certain properties in which discourse analysts are interested – intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisation – due to the technological affordances of hyperlinks (Jones et al. 2015). These properties of hyper-intertextuality and hyper-recontextualisation mark "Twitter as a unique site of discourse (re)production; the format allows for instantaneous recontextualisation and reinterpretation of social practices and of discourses, and this in turn is a powerful method of legitimation" (Bennett 2018, p. 148). Moreover, interdiscursivity creates a "link between specific texts in specific contexts and the

societies and cultures in which they are produced and consumed” and “uncover[s] how ideology operates in the ways we use language” (Jones 2010, p. 477).

The hashtag is one of Twitter’s most powerful features, in that it includes significant phrases or keywords contained in a tweet. It is a “convention for labelling the topic of a micropost and a form of metadata incorporated into posts” (Zappavigna 2012, p. 1). In terms of labelling a topic, it is possible that the same topic will have multiple labels (or hashtags), but usually one hashtag is dominant. In this research, for example, multiple hashtags appeared as #EMGS in both languages, Arabic and English; however, one was dominant – the Arabic hashtag of #EMGS: *اسقاط_نطالب_سعوديات_#*. Hashtags as metadata differ from the common understanding of metadata in other contexts (i.e. descriptive and hidden information), namely that these metadata are in-line, direct, visible to the participant and unseparated from the text of a tweet (Zappavigna 2012).

The use of hashtags has various pragmatic functions: “as prompts for conversation, to crowdsource ideas or resources, and often to express sarcasm or parenthetical commentary on a tweet” (Halavais 2014, p. 37). This grouping of tweets under a label/hashtag is the beginning of what is known as “*searchable talk*,” enabling the online communication to be found by others (Zappavigna 2011, p. 789). Thus, researchers can search and collect tweets on a certain topic via hashtag(s). The structure of online communication via hashtags facilitates the formation of collective, original, instant and tagged tweets that are useful for social movements (Murthy 2013). For instance, during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, Twitter appeared to be a more reliable format for supporting information flows than others, facilitating the structuring of and influencing change (Lotan et al. 2011); even if one believes that Twitter did not help the movements, it can be argued that it raised global awareness, which then increased diplomatic pressure (Murthy 2013).

3.2.1. Hashtivism and hashtag feminism

Since 2009, Twitter has been associated with movements in the Middle East and North Africa (Murthy 2013), functioning “as a forum for spreading awareness and information on social justice (or activist) movements, as well as for dialogue between users on a given social justice subject” (Konnolly 2015, p. 1). Thus, the role of Twitter in different forms of socio-political activism does not suggest an intrinsic revolutionary nature, but it does serve an important ancillary role (Murthy 2013). A growing body of studies on Twitter activism in social or political protest in various contexts has focused on communication and information flows, for

example in Egypt and Tunisia (Lotan et al. 2011; Meraz & Papacharissi 2013), Libya (Lindgren 2013), Iran (Gaffney 2010), Pittsburgh (Earl et al. 2013), and in mobilising protests, for example in Spain (González-Bailón et al. 2011, 2013) and Greece and the US (Theocharis et al. 2015). Because Twitter activism has evolved from the use of the hashtag, it is termed “hashtag activism” or “hashtivism” (Campbell 2019; Havard 2019; Herrera 2015; Ramírez & Metcalfe 2017).

Hashtag activism can be defined as “the act of fighting for or supporting a cause with the use of hashtags as primary channel to raise awareness of an issue and encourage debate via social media” (Tomblinson & Wolf 2017, p. 15). Another definition considers it “a form of participatory culture [that] enables individual users to form groups around particular topics and events” (Xiong et al. 2019, p. 12). Hashtag activism has been utilised by feminists and women activists to discuss matters of concern. A study investigating the presence of hashtags in online feminism stated that the reasons for the use of feminism hashtags include overcoming the limitations of women’s mobility and of being a feminist (Dixon 2014). Another study examined the motivations for the use of hashtags in the feminism activist context and how their use is connected to broader discourses and ideologies (Konnolly 2015). Drawing on a corpus of tweets from two hashtags – #YesAllWomen and #HeForShe – the study applied systemic functional linguistics and feminist critical discourse analysis to address three issues: 1) the functions of the hashtag in interacting and the messages sent to the audiences; 2) the meaning added to a tweet when using the hashtag; 3) the social ideologies and identities of the discourses surrounding the hashtag. The findings revealed that the hashtags functioned as a social device because users tended to apply them in their tweets for two reasons, namely to link them to a larger group with similar desired views and beliefs, and to assert their collective group identity and ideological affiliation. For example, “#YesAllWomen is used primarily in this data set to establish a collective identity of *women*, whereas #HeForShe is used primarily here to establish a broader collective identity of *supporters of gender equality*” (Konnolly 2015, p. 13, italics in original). In addition, hashtags function as a linguistic device able to mark the topic of the tweet using them. A hashtag cannot independently carry the meaning; however, the contribution of a hashtag (i.e. what meaning it adds to a tweet) works when the message and function of the hashtag are combined with the information added by the users in the tweet.

In particular, hashtag feminism has been defined as “a virtual space where victims of inequality can coexist together in a space that acknowledges their pain, narrative, and isolation” (Dixon 2014, p. 34). The term can also be used to describe those “cases concerning gender equity [...]

within the burgeoning sphere of online feminism” (Clark 2016, p. 788). Furthermore, it “can be understood as a particular form of feminist linguistic activism that, due to the immediacy of Twitter, is event-oriented and focused on the discourse surrounding a highly visible social phenomenon unfolding in the moment” (Clark 2016, p. 793). It has been argued that hashtag feminism is redefining feminism by introducing a new (fourth) wave (Dixon 2014; Evans & Chamberlain 2015; Guillard 2016). This is because it shows:

...an ability to redefine social realities by combining new ways, and ideas, in forming communities for women who are seeking a place to express their beliefs, globally, with other women who share in their social identity. (Dixon 2014, p. 39)

Research on hashtag feminist movements and their socio-political impacts is still underdeveloped. Feminist activists have tried to benefit from Twitter to raise the agenda of freedom and rights (e.g. Clark 2016; Altoaimy 2017; Arbatskaya 2019). From a communicative perspective, feminist hashtag activism can function as “an intermediate step in a longer process of creating a higher consciousness regarding gender equality issues” (Larrondo et al. 2019, p. 207). In this capacity, hashtag feminism is considered a form of discursive activism because of the aggregated power of turning individual stories into shared experiences and thence into a collective voice aimed at inciting social change (Baer 2016). This is facilitated on Twitter due to the connective nature of hashtags: internally between participants and externally beyond Twitter (Barker-Plummer & Barker-Plummer 2018).

However, many arguments have been made in relation to the effectiveness of Twitter in feminist activism, for instance whether Twitter can in fact link the online and offline worlds. Clark (2016) investigated the conditions under which the interactions in a hashtag feminism movement can initiate offline socio-political change. Her case study investigated the processes of amplifying #WhyIStayed, that arose in 2014 in response to a domestic violence controversy, by analysing data from Twitter and news media. She argued that a hashtag feminism can initiate a socio-political change because it provides all the elements of making collective storytelling, whose discursive influence leads to an online collective action. In addition, the mainstream news media can help in providing a context for the issue and amplifying the movement’s message. She demonstrated a three-stage process for the emergence of the social drama of hashtag feminism: first, it begins with a breaching event that sparks the hashtag; second, there is the crisis stage; finally, the reintegration period occurs, in which the discursive contestation of the movement changes, is revised, or is rejected. She concluded that “By linking together

numerous individual voices without relying on organizations, hashtag activism enabled a more intersectional movement against domestic violence than that of previous generations” (p. 797).

Another concern regarding the feminist hashtag is whether it can carry multiple social and political issues, along with its capability for amplifying the social/political problem. For example, the #BringBackOurGirls movement, launched mainly for the release of the abducted schoolgirls in Nigeria, was then used to push for social change in the country (Akpojivi 2019). Akpojivi (2019) applied CDA on a sample of tweets and the results showed that the educated women who were the key leaders of the campaign used the hashtag to highlight a variety of discourses. A fundamental discourse raised within the tweets was that of education for girls; this touched on the discourse of violence against girls and women seeking education. This was aligned with another discourse regarding state neglect and failure in rescuing the schoolgirls, as well as the discourse of victimhood as women’s and girls’ welfare was being neglected by the state. It showed that hashtag activism raised significant issues in the public domain that affected the cultural and socio-economic status and development of women. While the movement reached wide audience, among them high profile personalities, e.g. Michelle Obama, David Cameron, and Malala Yousafzai, tweeted/retweeted in #BringBackOurGirls, the offline domain witnessed an organisation of “daily sit-in sessions with families of the abducted girls at different gardens/parks across Nigeria” in order to identify the activities of the movement and to embark on a march to institutions (Akpojivi 2019, p. 29). This spoke against the critiques of the hashtag activism as being ‘slacktivism,’ meaning “a feel-good effort that improved the self-esteem of activists but failed to produce palpable results” (Maxfield 2016, p. 886).

One of the pervasive concerns is whether Twitter is a safe space in which to express personal or political experience. Drüeke and Zobl (2016) noted that Twitter does not in fact provide a safe space, as everyone might assume. In their study, aimed at analysing the arguments in #aufschrei, a German hashtag of personal experiences of sexism, as an example of sexism and sexual harassment negotiations. The findings showed visible anti-feminist and sexist comments that might propose new experiences of violence against women. They argued that although Twitter functions as a simple public sphere in which traditions and values are discussed at an everyday level, and the feminist hashtag fulfils “a central democratic function by allowing the public debate of the marginalised topic of structural dimensions” of a certain problem (p. 48), it allows a space for the formation of public criticism and a space for discrimination and opposition. This is in line with Eagle’s (2015, p. 352) claim that “Twitter is by no means a utopian space” for women.

In the literature, research on contemporary feminist discursive activism can be categorised according to the context of activism: global (European, African and Asian), the Arab world, and more specifically, the Saudi context. The following section will focus on studies in these contexts that have examined hashtag feminism, along with supporting material, to understand how feminists and women activists have used Twitter – and hashtags – in their calls for social or political changes.

3.2.2. Global feminist hashtags

This section focuses on the discourse of Twitter activism, particularly feminist hashtags. Discourse analysis has been used to investigate the construction of identity on Twitter, for instance, the national identity, for both men and women, during the consultation on Catalonia's independence (Iveson 2017), the women's identity in Philippines (Alingasa & Ofreneo 2020) and the feminist identity in South Korea (Kim 2017). It has also been examined to identify the legitimisation strategies for and against certain discourses (Arbatskaya 2019). The final section covers intertextuality and interdiscursivity on Twitter, with a specific focus on feminist activism (Barker-Plummer & Barker-Plummer 2018; Li et al. 2020; Quinn et al. 2019).

To examine the constructions of national identity on Twitter during the public consultation on Catalonia's independence, Iveson (2017) analysed the representations of men and women by applying corpus-based and multimodal discourse analytical approaches. The findings revealed that while men were represented in the tweets as the defenders of the nation and the heroes, women were depicted as the embodiment of the nation, “the biological reproducers, the life-givers and nurturers” (p. 61). The traditional representations of women were due to the domestic view of their role (in the home). However, the data also showed frequent references to women “as the guardians and reproducers of the Catalan language and culture” (p. 62). It was argued that this construction of national identity reproduced and mirrored the offline world in the online sphere.

Another study focused on identity negotiation in the Philippine hashtag campaign #BabaeAko ('I am a woman'), that launched in 2018 after a public interview with the Philippine President who stated that the next Ombudsman in the country must not be a woman (Alingasa & Ofreneo 2020). The conversational engagement of #BabaeAko was between the women of the campaign on the one hand and the president and his supporters on the other. This study found that those in the latter group positioned their claims in terms of patriarchal ideologies, while those in the former explicitly attributed fearlessness and power to the identity of women. The advocates of

the campaign not only reconstructed women's identities online, but also resisted and rejected the identity claims that reflected structural inequality. Similar to this study, Kim (2017) investigated the #IAmAFeminist hashtag, aimed at reconstructing the feminist identity in South Korea. Because of the stigma against feminists, being identified as a feminist in Korean society is difficult and associated with hostile discourses. This hashtag opposed this stigma and promoted feminist identification by sharing narratives concerning personal motives for being a feminist and highlighting women's role in Korean society. Moreover, the hashtag was not limited to the online space, but also to the offline world via initiating and mobilising offline gatherings. This showed that opposing the stigma challenged both the online and offline spheres via hashtag activism.

Regarding the discursive strategies for (de)legitimising certain discourses, an interesting study applied CDA to a set of tweets from a Russian hashtag, #ItIsNotAReasonToKill, to investigate the discursive strategies that campaign participants used to delegitimise the victim-blaming discourse and legitimise their discourse for asserting their values (Arbatskaya 2019). The findings showed that the most dominant strategy of legitimisation was through emotions. For example, fear was used to legitimise the campaign participants' stance by expressing that "It is terrible to live in a world where women are killed and then blamed for what transpired" (p. 267). Another strategy was legitimisation through an appeal to a hypothetical future, for example "Victim-blaming is dangerous to the society because it justifies future victims" in order to delegitimise the victim-blaming discourse (p. 267).

The intertextual approach to examining Twitter data has investigated references from other platforms borrowed in tweets. A study examined the #hernamewasclodagh campaign on Twitter that reacted against Irish news media coverage that omitted the name of a female victim, focusing instead on the perpetrator (Quinn et al. 2019). This study also examined news media coverage by applying a CDA framework. The intertextual approach was used to analyse correlations between the Twitter campaign and the re-framing of the news media coverage before and after the campaign. The Twitter data were divided into 1A (tweets containing their messages) and 1B (tweets that intertextualised the content of the news articles); both datasets were coded on the basis of dominant emphases therein. The newspaper dataset was organised based on the metadata of the articles and then coded on the basis of their content relevant to the study. The findings showed that the print media prior to the Twitter campaign omitted the victim's name and provided overly sympathetic coverage of the perpetrator. This reflected the imposition of a patriarchal perspective on news reportage, casting the male as the central and

main character in a narrative and the female as secondary. This practice decreased after the Twitter campaign. The Twitter dataset showed the criticisms of the media, identified its flawed practices and highlighted “other issues in Irish society contributing to this failure, such as the perpetuation of an inherited patriarchal mindset, failure to adequately accept and address the problem of domestic violence” (p. 324). While some evidence of the reframing of the media coverage was in response to the discourse on Twitter, it cannot be definitively stated that the change in the newspaper’s stance was because of the social media campaign.

A study by Barker-Plummer and Barker-Plummer (2018) investigated ways of building collective identity in #YesAllWomen, as well as its recirculation through media and other platforms, by applying content and discourse analysis methods. Two remarkable findings concerning the discursive activism were that the feminist hashtag had two functions: (i) it functioned as a collective identity/consciousness event (i.e. internal movement) constituted by shared experiences and stories, interpretive frameworks, deep affective engagement, opposition to oppressive practices and struggles, and solidarity; (ii) it functioned as a public protest event (i.e. via external communications) that influenced public discourse outside Twitter through the hyperlinks and their recirculation to other (social) media platforms. It was public because “media treated #YesAllWomen as if it was a ‘real’ public protest articulating a serious social problem” (p. 93). The open nature of Twitter (i.e. public/private) allows not only online participants but also others to access Twitter conversations equally. It is possible to spread the debate and the arguments out into other discursive spheres through the journalists who consider the hashtag important news, through bloggers who participate in the hashtag and write about it, and through activists who connect to others (e.g. cross-tagging/mentioning, using the oppositional hashtag). Thus, a feminist hashtag can simultaneously be shifted from online activism represented in the internal structure of collective identity into external communications represented in agenda and protest building beyond Twitter. This circulation of the hashtag discourse between social media platforms requires a type of network built by the actors.

Kuo (2018) went beyond questioning the effectiveness of hashtag activism and investigated the strategies underpinning its effectiveness (i.e. ways of circulating discourse across networked online publics within and outside Twitter). To do so, Kuo (2018) analysed two racial justice hashtags, #NotYourAsianSideKick and #SolidarityisforWhiteWomen, in terms of their content, users and interface, together with underlying ideologies, by combining CDA and network analysis. The findings revealed that the role of the actors producing the hashtag was

to build and strengthen networks in terms of its density and activity. Indeed, they showed “a dual role in circulating discourse on and beyond Twitter across multiple publics” via their connections across platforms and media (p. 511). However, while the hashtags kept spreading and speaking across boundaries and borders, and constructed networks, thereby moving discourse beyond the original space, the initiators (i.e. the actors who initiated the hashtag) no longer remained at the centre of the conversation. It is important to highlight that although digital media allows greater diversity and broader participation, the diversity of participants can cause a lack of loyalty among the public and strong oppositional perspectives from some participants, which could result in a shift in the mainstream direction of the cause, thus slowing it down (Norris & Rodriguez 2019).

While Barker-Plummer and Barker-Plummer (2018) and Kuo (2018) investigated the intertextual references, another study focused on interdiscursivity in Twitter by examining tweets related to the hashtags #WhyIDidntReport and #MeToo (Li et al. 2020). This work comprised two parts aimed at: (i) examining the use of social media in describing the sexual assault victims’ experiences online and reasons for not disclosing them offline; (ii) investigating how users can engage in digital activism for social action (Li et al. 2020). The results showed that the victims did not disclose their experiences because of the difficulties they faced when bringing their cases to the authorities. A significant finding from the second part was that it showed the heavy share of other resources, reports, statistics and blogs in half of the tweets with the public to increase their engagement in social actions (e.g. protest or vote). This study supports our understanding of the nature of the Twitter genre, namely that it is highly interdiscursive. It also shows that the use of hashtag activism is not merely employed to express experiences or views about a certain social/political issue, but is also used to promote certain social actions, which could include signing a petition or voting. The Saudi online movement #EMGS has followed the same pathway in first gathering similar and supportive voices in the hashtag, then being referred to on other platforms (for example YouTube) and in public discourse (for example news media), before finally reaching the offline world through signing a petition to the king.

3.2.3. Arab and feminist hashtag

During and after the Arab Spring, women across the region utilised social media platforms that were effective in raising their voices and encouraging social and political engagement (Khamis 2014; Newsom & Lengel 2012; Radsch & Khamis 2013). For them, these platforms are “alternative civic spaces [allowing them] to organise and enact social and political change”

(Neumark 2017, p. 15). Up to now, the research on the hashtag feminism within the Arab context has tended to focus on other platforms, particularly Facebook (see Zlitni & Touati 2012), rather than on Twitter, despite the existence of feminist hashtags (see Basch-Harod 2019, for more detail).

Thus, a relatively small body of literature is concerned with Twitter feminist hashtag within the Arab context. A study aimed at understanding the boundaries of online communities was undertaken in Morocco by applying CDA to the discourse of #RIP Amina in order to push for legislative change (Neumark 2017). Feminist activists revived the case of Amina, who committed suicide in the face of being forced to marry her rapist, on the basis of Article 475 in the Moroccan Penal Code, which was subsequently changed. This revival aimed to reflect the legislative change to the Article and call for further action in relation to similarly oppressive laws. The findings showed that this hashtag feminism not only aimed to revive and popularise a certain topic by situating the discourse within the wider context, but also served as a condemnation, a mourning and a call to action. One of the findings also reflected the digital divide according to gender in terms of access to social media in the most rural and marginalised communities in Morocco. Women within these communities “are excluded from participation in popular streams of civic discourse and least likely to easily utilize [social media discursively] as an alternative means of communication and knowledge production” (p. 21).

3.2.4. Saudi hashtag feminism

Twitter, notably among other online platforms, has provided space for both power and counter-power discourse (Alotaibi 2017). Due to limitations in accessing the public sphere, for example lack of access to traditional media, as well as the lack of political and civic parties, it has been argued that Twitter offers a public discourse space for Saudi society, in particular Saudi women, to discuss concerns and needs (Almahmoud 2015; Alotaibi 2017; Altoaimy 2017; Bahammam 2018; Sahly 2016). Academic work has recently focused on Saudi feminism hashtags and discourse analysis regarding the women driving feminist campaigns (e.g. Almahmoud 2015; Altoaimy 2017) and the end MGS campaign (e.g. Alsahi 2018; Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019).

Bahammam (2018) studied gender division in the Saudi context by examining Twitter hashtags as devices for public debate over issues like a new policy of travel controls for Saudi women, and reported statistics on the proportion of unmarried Saudi women. Her study aimed to reveal the various perspectives adopted by the conservative (anti-change) and progressive (pro-change) groups by investigating the discourses and discursive strategies used in Twitter. Thus,

CDA tools were applied to a corpus of 1,000 original tweets from the two hashtags. The findings showed two main discourses in the hashtags: the discourse of patriarchy, and the discourse of gender equality and human rights. The discourse of patriarchy comprised two mutually supporting subsidiary discourses: (i) discourse about the subordinated status of women; (ii) a discourse of dominance with men controlling women. The other main discourse – the discourse of gender equality and human rights – discussed changes to women’s citizenship status. Meso-level discursive strategies were notably realised by means of non-hyperlinked interdiscursivity (i.e. identified linguistically within tweets) and hyperlinked interdiscursivity (i.e. assisted by Twitter-based affordances: mentions and hashtags). Bahammam (2018) found that participants tended to use intertextual and interdiscursive links in expressing their confirmation or contestation while co-constructing the gendered discourses. An interesting finding was that recurring references to certain prominent actors were evident in the interdiscursivity and intertextuality, for instance “King Salman.” With respect to these meso-level strategies, she concluded that it was “These two features [that] have helped to demonstrate the inherent multiplicity of voices and the plurality of discourses found in the tweets” (p. 267). This study perhaps reflects the social and discursive patterns that occur when an ongoing change is discussed or takes place in Saudi society.

A number of studies have investigated the Twitter campaign regarding women’s driving from various perspectives. Almahmoud (2015) contrasted the marginalised role of Saudi women in the socio-political system and their active role on Twitter, where they demanded the right to drive. Framing and intertextual analysis were applied to two datasets comprising 10 public Twitter accounts that participated in #Women2Drive (five were female Saudi activists and five were male Saudi clerics, thus representing opposing sides in the campaign) to investigate how social hierarchies of power and gender operated in an online environment. Almahmoud (2015) found that both groups employed intertextuality as a prominent discursive strategy to frame the campaign according to their positions. The use of hashtags was identified as an intertextual resource. Unlike men, the female activists tended to use hashtags in both languages, Arabic and English, to signal group membership and to reach a wider audience as a way of framing the campaign within a global human rights issue. In contrast, the male clerics framed the campaign as a foreign conspiracy against the Saudi moral and political system. However, it is clear that the study avoided addressing and situating this hashtag feminism within Saudi feminist activism. Another study aimed to understand how the discussion on women driving was framed on Twitter and used framing theory to conduct a quantitative content analysis on a

sample of tweets about Saudi women driving (Sahly 2016). This study used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, a software containing pre-set dictionaries to measure linguistic expressions, to analyse the tweets for their linguistic qualities with a view to identifying three categories of language: ‘cognitive’ (i.e. argumentative/logic), ‘emotional’ and ‘religious/moral.’ The results showed that the tweets containing ‘cognitive’ language “of logic, causation, assessment, problem-solving, and thinking while discussing this issue” (p. 59) were prevalent and were likely to be retweeted. In relation to ‘emotional’ language, the study found that anger was the most common negative emotion expressed in the tweets and was also the strongest specific predictor of retweeting behaviour. Sahly (2016) explained that the expression of anger in such discussion only reflected human nature and not a certain culture. With respect to the influence of anger concerning subsequent language and retweeting behaviour, the study explained that “in social or political movements people are influenced by content in which they personalize, emotionalize, or dramatize an issue to capture the interest of others” (p. 65).

A similar study debating the Saudi ban on women driving was carried out by Altoaimy (2017). Her work was situated in the frame of women’s struggle against social tensions and the dynamics of power and patriarchy. She analysed the views and arguments in a corpus consisting of 5,876 tweets by applying the discourse-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak 2001) and corpus linguistics. The findings showed that those participants against women driving (i.e. anti-driving) made arguments concerning the social and moral threats that could occur if women were allowed to drive and placed women in a symbolic function as markers of commitment to both the country’s religious and traditional identity. However, the majority of participants expressed their desire to lift the ban (i.e. pro-driving), publicising the victimisation of women caught in the tension between public aspects concerned with preserving traditional norms and patriarchal values and the country’s policies heading towards modernity. Their level of awareness of women’s rights was clear in the way that they resisted the contradictions challenging Saudi women.

Aljarallah (2017) examined a total of 450 tweets collected from three different hashtags concerning Saudi women driving, applying discourse-historical approach: referential and nominalisation strategies, predicational strategies and intertextuality. The analysis of the anti-driving tweets showed that positive qualities (e.g. being sensible, chaste) were attributed to women against driving and negative qualities (e.g. being instigators and morally corrupt) referred to those supporting driving. However, the analysis of the pro-driving tweets revealed that positive qualities (e.g. being free) were attributed to women supporting driving, while

negative attributes (e.g. slaves, puppets) were attributed to women against driving. In addition, negative references (e.g. being backwards and ignorant) were used for those who misused religious values to support their stance (i.e. anti-driving). Both groups showed the use of intertextual references to favour their side of the argument. For example, the Crown prince's interview, when he was asked about women driving, was intertextualised by both groups. However, it was recontextualised so as to support their ideologies/arguments. The prince stated that driving is subject to the readiness of society and is not a religious matter. Both groups expressed their views as part of the Saudi society: the agreement and readiness of the pro-driving group and the refusal of the anti-driving group.

Alotaibi's (2017) work aimed to understand the reasons for the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia by applying the framework of gendered moral panics, which is defined as the narrative of fear and concern about specific threats against traditional societal expectations of gendered roles. A sample of tweets from the hashtag #Women2Drive in 2011 was examined using content analysis. Four themes emerged: westernisation; mockery; defiance of state; defiance of gender discrimination. Interestingly, the opponents of women driving were tweeting against driving because, for them, other social issues (e.g. unemployment problems) were more worthy of negotiation and debate. Proponents of women driving were viewed as betrayers of society and their English tweets were considered an act linked to westernisation and conspiracy themes. She argued that the Twitter debate over women's driving reflected the development of a gendered moral panic in Saudi society, which aimed at maintaining the status quo through instigating fear in the public towards #Women2Drive campaign.

In relation to the campaign against the MGS, a recent study focused on #TogetherToEndMaleGuardianship to shed light on the new landscape of Saudi digital feminist activism, viewed through the lens of social movement theories (Alsahi 2018). Social network analysis and content analysis were applied to data gathered from one Twitter account, @FreeKsaWomen, to examine the composition of its tied network and its content. The findings showed that a network of 160 Twitter users mentioned the chosen account, these being mentioned or replied to by this account. The content analysis indicated that the account was mainly informative because 44.3% of the tweets comprised distributing and updating information about the campaign, calling for stories from its followers, or citing reports and news by including links to the materials. In addition, the contents of its tweets were organisational- and encouragement-oriented. Another category that its content matched was action-oriented, namely that it "included explicit calls for online connective action such as

signing online petitions and sending collective telegrams to the king on 25 September 2016” (p. 315). Despite the offline constraints on mobilisation, Saudi feminists were adopting and utilising the digital sphere and they were “successful in forming a sizeable, strong collective [network] that articulated vast gender focused claims for social recognition and representation [and] lively mobilization efforts” (p. 317).

Another study on #EndMaleGuardianship examined the extent to which Twitter could facilitate cross-gender communication and how it helped in the emergence of new spaces for the expression of opposition (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019). Qualitative content analysis of the communicative characteristics of 150,245 tweets was conducted after dividing them into two sets: supportive of the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign and in opposition to the campaign. The tweets were coded for the communicative attribute of the utterance, as either rational discourse (covering critical arguments, judgement based on reasoning and inspiration discourse) or irrational discourse (covering unreasonable argumentation: hateful discourse, cursing and threats); both were then sub-coded thematically. While six core themes concerned women involved in the hashtag, there were fewer for men, only four. The interesting findings were that women supporting the campaign expressed anger as an indication of their suffering caused by the MGS. They also used the discursive strategy of intertextuality to convey their messages in a more historical context. For example, influential and inspirational quotes by famous human rights activists were intertextualised in their tweets. In addition, the counter-campaigners labelled those who supported the campaign “as traitors, liberals and atheists, which became de facto descriptors of all people who demanded an end to male guardianship” (p. 17). They also tended to use intertextual references from the Quran to echo their strong support for religion and to support their arguments.

To conclude, a number of empirical studies in the last decade have examined the role of Twitter as an important instrument in new social movements, including campaigns with a feminist agenda like the construction of women’s identity in Philippines after the public political exclusion by the president (Alingasa & Ofreneo 2020) and the call for legislative change in Morocco by reviving a suicidal case of a female victim (Neumark 2017). These studies revealed that although the action was primarily online, it can lead to a change in the offline world. I would argue that the online collective action only can result in an offline recognition of the problem, which might lead to a set of outcomes. Similar to the #EMGS campaign, it was officially recognised by the media organisations, on TV and newspapers, before the changes took place, starting in 2017. This study adds to this body of literature by examining the

discursive construction of Saudi women's representations in this Twitter hashtag in order to draw connections between patterns of gender inequality in Saudi society and sociological issues of female misrecognition. It also expands our understanding of this problem by looking at other online forums, i.e. YouTube and online news.

3.3. YouTube genre

Similar to Twitter, the YouTube platform is “an enabler of encounters with cultural differences and the development of political ‘listening’ across belief systems and identities” (Burgess & Green 2009, p. 77). YouTube, an online communication platform, provides a form of dialogical communicative interaction that serves both elites and non-elites. For example, politicians use YouTube as a strategy to reach undecided voters in the US, while the platform also allows the public to address their political concerns to election candidates (Kellner & Kim 2010). Thus, it works as a “forum for citizen participation” in providing self-expression for individuals wishing to enact potential social and political change (Kellner & Kim 2010, p. 29). As an archive, YouTube has significant prospects in terms of spreading and maintaining the “popular co-creation of cultural heritage, supplementing the more specifically purposeful and highly specialized practices of state-based cultural archiving institutions like public libraries and museums; or media companies and broadcasters” (Burgess & Green 2009, p. 88).

During the first five years following the launch of YouTube in 2005, its content and uses were understood to fall within two categories: (i) professional content, employing forms and genres of conventional media, and created by formal media organisations; (ii) amateur content, using everyday forms and genres, and created by individual members of the public, outside formal organisations (Burgess & Green 2018). However, these two classifications touch on other aspects: producer identity, political economy and genre; their combination could generate more classification of the producing YouTube videos. Therefore, Burgess and Green (2009, 2018) conducted a content survey in 2007 of popular videos on YouTube to understand how these aspects can form distinctive practices, genres and creative identities through time. The videos were coded based on four aspects: *origin*, concerning the properties of content from traditional media sources, e.g. television or the music industry, labelled as traditional media, or shown to have been created outside the media industries, e.g. vlog, live material or informational content, labelled as user-created content; *uploader*, concerning the people or institutions uploading the videos, either traditional media companies and large rights holders, or individuals; *genre* and *theme* of the videos. The results of the survey revealed difficulties in fitting YouTube's popular

videos into the traditional media/user-created content dichotomy; the chaotic everyday creative videos and the emergent genres were the essential features of the platform.

YouTube has attracted academic interest in a newly emerging literature, tending to view it as a cultural, media or technological phenomenon (Burgess & Green 2018; Lovink & Niederer 2008; Snickars & Vonderau 2009). In addition, YouTube is used during political activism in many forms, for instance official campaign advertisements and clips of citizen-generated content (Thorson et al. 2010). With a lack of uncontrolled media sources, YouTube has served as an alternative platform of communication, a voice of the public and minorities, with the ability to distribute videos to a global audience without a media filter (Arif 2014; Glazunova 2020; Mesbah & Almujaibel 2019; Thorson et al. 2010). In the following sections, I focus on YouTube and online activism in the global, Arab and Saudi contexts.

3.3.1. Global context

In the global context, YouTube has been an alternative medium and a voice for the public in political activism, for instance in California (Thorson et al. 2010) and in Russian anti-corruption cases (Glazunova 2020). Thorson et al. (2010) examined YouTube activism around a passage of California's Proposition 8 ballot, which called for a change to the state constitution regarding the ban on same sex-marriage by looking at the reaction of citizens and organisations and their use of YouTube at the time, as well as the audience responses to video content: pro- vs. anti-Proposition 8 videos. Content analysis was applied to a sample of 801 videos to identify the various voices discussing the topic and explore how advocates on each side used YouTube to circulate original content and build supporting content. The findings revealed that although YouTube is a platform free to all citizens and organisations, financed organisations are very much engaged in uploading preferred content to ensure that they are being heard. Unlike anti-Proposition videos, the pro-Proposition videos were often professionally created. However, the anti-Proposition users exploited the YouTube platform to a greater extent for mobilisation and engagement than the pro-Proposition users.

Glazunova (2020) focused on Russian anti-corruption activist's YouTube videos, exposing the corruption and power abuse in Russia. Applying context analysis to 77 videos of investigative documentaries about Russian corruption, the study examined populist discourses and the use of communication strategies in challenging the dominant political elite. The findings revealed that the populist ideological content contained four types of populism that played a fundamental role in the narration. Superficial or passive populism was characterised as lacking reasons to

motivate the public to engage in activism; however, it would serve as an introduction to investigation and relationship building with the audience, e.g. “we” and “us,” as an attempt to create a collective identity (i.e. anti-elite). Investigative populism aims to destroy the elite’s credibility by exploiting textual references as evidence of their corruption, e.g. photos, interviews, social media data. Radical populism includes citizen activism via various forms of online and offline calls to action. While online calls are “an everyday form of digital action with political meaning which users can exercise in Russia without fear of persecution typical to the Russian,” e.g. sharing YouTube videos or subscribing to YouTube channels, offline calls “are mostly associated with political participation in elections and protests,” e.g. protesting or boycotting the elections (Glazunova 2020, p. 128). Finally, advocacy populism combines evidence of the elite’s corruption and is a call to political action. This populism has a dramatic influence on the YouTube audience due to the coverage of “evidence” with inaccessible properties and the fact that this has probably not been seen on any media mainstream in the country.

3.3.2. Arab context

Arif (2014) examined the use of YouTube as an alternative medium of communication and resistance during political crises by comparing two contexts, the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Arab Spring in Egypt, to the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan. In doing so, quantitative (visual) content analysis and thematic analysis approaches were applied to the 60 most viewed protest-related YouTube videos. It was found that YouTube served as a platform for communication and opposition in these contexts. In addition, YouTube is a free channel that allows the public to be producers, uploading videos to disseminate information on protests and promote resistance. In this regard, online political activists use the anonymity of YouTube. Visual content analysis showed that YouTube videos implement religious and national ideologies to support and spread the narratives of online protests. In addition, the visual content revealed that in the three social movements, the voice of the protests was amplified in the videos against unemployment, corruption and authoritarianism. To spread the videos, a set of techniques was applied to promote political activism, for instance emotional appeals and the use of English.

Many studies have investigated the role of social media, such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, in the 2011 uprisings and how protestors used them to criticise the political regimes and call for change (Arif 2014; Bebawi & Bossio 2014; Castells 2015). Shirazi (2013) examined their role in communication discourse in the Islamic Middle East and North African

countries by analysing a set of messages on social media sites. While digital media allowed citizens in these countries to create meaning and organise civil resistance and social actions, YouTube videos played a fundamental role in demonstrating the brutal reaction of the government-run military forces against demonstrators. McHale (2004) argued that videos can generate a greater impact on the audience when they are used as a social change medium because they can personalise social/political issues by combining audio and visual elements. However, although social media sites played a key role in these events, media systems and the complexity of new communication networks should be examined in relation to interacting and shaping them, for instance images extracted from YouTube that were circulated in mainstream news media in documenting attacks on rebel forces by the Libyan army (Cottle 2011).

3.3.3. Saudi context

In Saudi Arabia, YouTube producers “have decided to shy away from direct political messages because of the restrictions on free speech in Saudi Arabia” (Mesbah & Almujaibel 2019, p. 272). Thus, few studies have investigated YouTube content in relation to public issues and opinion, although some Saudi YouTube channels have shown the use of comedy in criticism (Hameededdin 2017; Mesbah & Almujaibel 2019). Hameededdin (2017) examined the YouTube content of three young Saudi YouTubers’ channels. Applying qualitative content analysis to 218 videos, she investigated how the Saudi YouTubers presented and addressed issues on their channels and how they differed from others as being marginalised and lacking essential facilities for the wellbeing of youth. The findings revealed that despite their different communication styles in approaching the topics, they relied on comedy. In addition, their YouTube content mainly stemmed from the issues of local Saudi society, for instance critical conversation in public discourse, men speaking about women’s issues and violence as form of aggressive lifestyle. In this regard, YouTube can function as a form of public sphere. In studying whether YouTube empowers Saudi professional amateurs to build a business model for their channels, interviews with a group of YouTubers indicated how they drew on the discussion of social issues (Mesbah & Almujaibel 2019). They also tended to accommodate the agenda of the government by avoiding political and religious issues. However, Saudi women used the anonymity afforded on YouTube when recording their activism. In the #EMGS campaign, the anti-MGSs intertextualised domestic and international reportage in TV channels and on YouTube.

3.4. Newspaper genre

After realising the potential of the Internet as a unique medium for producing, distributing and consuming the news, the newspaper industry launched online editions of newspapers on the Web (Chyi & Sylvie 2001). Most of the online editions are “owned and operated by their print counterparts, which also serve as online editions’ primary content providers” (p. 232). To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the online newspaper genre, Ihlström and Lundberg (2004) conducted qualitative analysis of the web pages of nine Swedish online newspapers in 2001 and 2003 with regard to the genre concepts: content, form, functionality and positioning. They proposed eight design recommendations for online newspapers based on the newspapers’ purpose, use and changes regarding design. The study also revealed that some features from print newspapers, i.e. regarding form and content elements, were inherited and passed to the online editions. In other words, the online newspapers used Internet features, e.g. “interactivity, hypertext, multimedia capability, unlimited space, timeliness, and global reach—each [representing] a certain facet of this online media revolution” (Chyi & Sylvie 2001, p. 232). The following section provides an overview of the studies that have examined the news, print or online, in relation to online activism in the global, Arabic and Saudi contexts.

3.4.1. Global context

In the global context, studies of online activism have examined, for instance, how the news media amplified the hashtag feminism #WhyIStayed and together with dramatic elements, propelled tweets from online personal expressions to online collective action (Clark 2016), and how the #hernamewasclodagh campaign fed into journalistic output (Quinn et al. 2019). Bouvier (2017) investigated how news outlets increasingly rely on social media for sourcing stories and how this has changed the nature of news and the role of journalists. Through applying CDA on a sample of 29 news stories and 40,000 tweets in #twowomentravel, the analysis aimed to identify different kinds of discourse in the original Twitter feed and how the news outlets reported them to examine the role of news in disseminating, legitimising and naturalising ideologies. Although the news used to be reliant on official sources and carry ideologies passed from elites and forms of official organisations, this study articulated another direction. It revealed an integrative process behind news texts due to the dependence on social media for sourcing stories. In addition, the findings indicated an erosion of the role of journalists in providing the context and verifying stories, with the news increasingly being defined by trending topics.

Reaching similar conclusions, Prendergast and Quinn's (2020) comparative study first identified mainstream media discourses on judicial verdicts in sexual violence cases in Ireland and Spain and then analysed the dominant hashtags that emerged on Twitter as a response to these court decisions. Applying social media CDS, the discourse patterns of the mainstream media and the hashtags were examined for similarities and differences. The Irish print media news was more defensive of the juridical process. The Spanish, on the other hand, debated the legal understanding of sexual violence. On Twitter, the results showed more direct criticism of the judiciary, and more personalised and vigorous defence of the victim in the Irish hashtag. The Spanish hashtag developed solidarity with the victims and was outward-oriented in gathering support not only from Spain but also from Latin America. This study connected the online (i.e. Twitter) and offline spheres by analysing the print media with longstanding influence on the process of forming public opinion. Moreover, Guha (2015) argued that the news media play a fundamental role in the success of hashtag campaigns; an example is the feminist hashtag #victimblaming, about preventing victim blaming in cases of sexual violence and abuse in India, which failed to engage the public in online broader conversation due to the lack of media coverage.

3.4.2. Arab context

In the Arab region, many studies have investigated the role of the Arab news media in activism, specifically during the Arab uprisings in 2011. Before reflecting on this, Moussa and Douai (2014) examined how Arab newspapers and journalism benefitted from the Internet during the first decade of the 21st century. They undertook a comparative analysis of 54 Arab news websites in nine Arab countries, examining their online and print publications to identify the structural features and explain their appropriateness to the regional contexts. The findings showed that several online features allowing users to deliver and consume content were employed in both forms of newspapers. While Arab news in the past was mainly institutional, it is now produced by individuals or non-institutional groups. Moreover, print newspapers have tended to use the Internet to expand and reach new audiences, confronting economic hardship and the difficulty of accessing public funds. During the Arab Spring, the ongoing social and political transformation taking place in Arab societies brightened the future of online news in the region; while traditional media was downplaying the popular discontent in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, social media provided an alternative place for Arabs to post narratives about their struggles and their political mobilisation. Thus, the new media resulted in a transformation of contemporary journalism.

To understand the roles of both new and old media during the Arab Spring, Al-Jenaibi (2014) assessed their use by the public and by Arab media experts, combining 789 surveys with qualitative data from 35 interviews conducted with media experts employed by various media organisations in the UAE. Although traditional media outranked new media as the primary sources, new media played an important role; the majority of respondents reported that they first visited traditional media in researching a news story and then turned to social media to verify the story. Among media professionals, many interviewees used new media to post an article, follow breaking news and post discussions. Therefore, new media “acts as a major resource that media professionals tapped into for journalistic duties at their work” (Al-Jenaibi 2014, p. 252). For instance, there were evident references in the news to social media platforms and blog posts from activists and citizens, and relying on social media was necessary “when it was too dangerous for journalists to report using their true identity” (Bossio 2014, p. 12). In addition, the media professionals agreed that new media granted users’ freedom in expressing their opinions, and the respondents showed growing interest in social media as a source of news. However, this is not to say that new media are completely replacing old media, rather that they play a supplementary role (Al-Jenaibi 2014; Moussa & Douai 2014).

EL Issawi (2016) undertook a comparative study examining the role of traditional media in shaping Arab political transitions, during and after the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The study conducted 200 semi-structured interviews with journalists and media stakeholders to reflect on the various changes that occurred in these countries with regard to journalism, and to explore journalists’ perceptions of their roles and their relationship with the political sphere. The findings showed that during the uprisings, the Arab journalists did not challenge their assigned role as messengers of the regimes for several reasons, one of which was the lack of openness of the media environment, including the lack of legal protection for journalists. In addition, the regimes inhibited key professional aspects of journalism, such as independent reporting, having long held media platforms hostage to politics, indeed for decades. Since the Arab uprisings, similar media restrictions have been maintained by successive regimes: if openness and professionalism are not encouraged in national media, regimes will not encounter the problems experienced traditionally with Arab news media. This gives rise to questions concerning the role journalists are supposed to play in monitoring the political sphere.

Focusing on women-related social, economic and political topics, Almujaivel (2017) analysed the Arabic newspapers in the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) Arabic corpus. He examined the discursive patterns of anti-feminist and pro-feminist

discourses by applying CDA. The concordances of the lexical units *almarʿa* (woman) and *alnisāʾ* (women) revealed three discursive constructions of positive, negative and residual voices. The residual voices were mainly general instructions for women concerning their personal and family lives. The positive voices covered several topics, for instance marital status, sexual harassment, violence, the removal of male guardianship and political participation. The negative voices addressed topics such as discrimination, male guardianship, the veil, driving and pro-divorce settlements. The discursive construction of the discourses reflected the heavy hegemonic reproductions embedded within them. Within these discourses, social power only aims to maintain the status quo, whether negative or positive.

3.4.3. Saudi context

Studies that have investigated the coverage of local and international (online) activism in Saudi media are scarce. However, the representations of Saudi women and their circumstances have been examined in both local and international newspapers. A recent study by Elyas et al. (2020) aimed to examine the representations of Saudi women and uncover the hidden ideologies underlying the discursive practices in online local news articles using CDA. The study examined 17 online articles published in the pre-driving era for women in order to analyse the representations of women. It was argued that the findings reflected the ideologies of Saudi writers in depicting Saudi women. The representations were generally positive in activating Saudi women within Saudi society. However, there were exclusion and passivated representations that might reflect the writers' belief in the need for further improvement in women's rights and roles. Although these negative representations constituted only a few instances, they were interpreted as presenting a realistic view of the role of Saudi women. Thus, it was argued that online articles tend to be neutral in relation to women's issues.

Another study examined online Arabic news presented by the Saudi Arabian Al-Jazirah and BBC Arabic channels in reporting the restriction on Saudi women driving by analysing the use of modality in the news outlets (Harun et al. 2018). A corpus of online news articles published between 2010 and 2014 was subject to a combination of CDA and corpus linguistics. The results revealed that political agendas and ideologies have influenced the portrayal of the restriction on driving in the two news outlets. Specifically, Al-Jazirah backed the driving ban on Saudi women, and used the traditional cultural norms of Saudi Arabia and Islamic teachings as reasons to legitimise it, while the BBC Arabic articles went beyond the driving ban to highlight other restrictions, for example the MGS.

To understand the factors that lead to avoiding women's issues or supporting traditional norms in Saudi media, Alnajrani et al. (2018) investigated the role of non-state religious and cultural factors in drawing the lines for Saudi journalists' freedom of expression. They examined the content of the news in the newspaper *Medina*, and undertook semi-structured interviews with Saudi journalists. The study found a relation between the non-state factors and the journalists' freedom of expression. The findings revealed three themes that determined journalists' work. First, powerful religious forces, either internal (the journalists' religious background) or external (the power of religious people), affected the journalists in practising freedom of speech. Second, criticism and pressure from their tribes, family and society, along with the religious factor, resulted in avoiding the publication of women's activities. The last theme was the pressure exerted by social and national roles on society, such that some journalists would "avoid reporting bad news" to protect the institution and image of Saudi Arabian society (p. 9).

This section provided an overview of the studies that have examined the print or online news, in relation to (online) activism in the global, Arabic and Saudi contexts. On the one hand, both global and Arabic contexts revealed how the media was aligning with the online and offline activism. While the newspapers in the global context maintain the same role, the Arab newspapers have witnessed a shift in their role during the uprisings. On the other, within the Saudi context, the newspapers have influenced by a number of factors, including religious, personal and national reasons.

To conclude, this chapter has focused on the characteristics of the (social) media genres and provides a review of empirical studies that have examined forms of online activism. First, it has examined the Twitter genre, because it is the main focus in this study, as well as hashtag activism and feminism. Then, it is followed by the YouTube and the online newspaper genres. Each section has provided a review of previous studies in three contexts: global, Arab and Saudi, in order to locate this study in the literature. The studies on social media have reflected the connection between the online instruments and the offline changes, e.g. as sources for journalists.

Chapter 4: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

4.1. Introduction

To examine and understand the social problem presented by the MGS for Saudi women, the study investigated its online discursive representation, mainly on Twitter, as well as in surrounding debates on YouTube and in online newspapers. To do so, it combined corpus linguistic tools with Faircloughian critical discourse analysis (CDA). Through its discourse dialectical framework, I sought to uncover the intersection between social practices under investigation (MGS and the debates surrounding calls for its abolition), and the associated ideas, values and (gendered) power relations.

First, this chapter outlines the theoretical framework, which seeks to go beyond the text to recognise the social context. It lays out the ontological and epistemological assumptions which structure the CDA approach. Then, the Gramscian concept of hegemony (1971) is proposed to denote the maintenance of power over a certain social group by means of a dominant ideology. Despite its focus on legitimising the capitalist state in Italy, it is applied here to understand hegemonic consensus over a (historically) conservative religious ideology. The idea of the public sphere by Habermas (1991) provides a key to a critical explanation of the relationship between the media and democracy. However, Fraser (1990) criticises the public sphere and introduces the concept of counterpublics to overcome the limitations of the public sphere. Another work by Fraser (1995) is significant for this study, the theory of social justice. She explains forms of injustice and their remedies; the #EMGS campaign concerns the injustice of applying the MGS and demands recognition on both cultural and institutional levels. Melucci (1980, 1985, 1996) examines the characteristics of new social movements in Europe to understand new forms of collective actions. However, offline collective forms in the Saudi context are not allowed and online spaces are censored. Despite these restrictions, Saudi women have engaged in online activism to campaign against the MGS and represent their identities under the system. While Melucci's work focusses on the offline world, Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013) theorised the logic behind various recent actions (e.g. Arab Spring) on both spheres.

Second, the chapter sets out a series of methodologies (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2015; Toulmin 2003; Aristotle 2008; van Leeuwen 2008; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Farrelly 2019) aimed at understanding the problem and its socio-political context with the aid of corpus linguistics.

4.2. Theoretical basis for the research

This section presents the theoretical elements of the dialectical relational approach to CDA (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2006), Gramsci's (1971) theory on hegemony, the public sphere (Habermas 1991), criticised by Fraser (1990), the theory of social justice (Fraser 1995), the new social movements (Melucci 1980, 1985, 1996) and the logic of connective and collective action (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, 2013)

4.2.1. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the dialectic relational approach

CDA is:

...an approach to social scientific research which combines detailed analysis of texts with theoretically informed accounts of the phenomena under investigation, in order to identify the processes by which language (re)produces social practices and helps privilege certain ways of doing, thinking, and being over others (Mulderigg et al 2019, p. 1).

It examines real instances of social interactions in a (partially) linguistic form, with regard to a certain social problem (Fairclough & Wodak 1997). In addition, discourse, the core of the analysis, is a form of social practice and recognises the link between language and power (Fairclough 1989). CDA is thus a discursive-focused, problem-oriented interdisciplinary approach, comprising a way of investigating language at various contextual levels and in different dimensions, and drawing on various disciplines outside traditional linguistics, such as sociology, anthropology and cognitive science.

The theoretical roots of CDA can be traced back to critical theory, Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics and Western Marxism. It attempts to theorise concepts such as ideology (Althusser 1971) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). It is proposed that these theories can be employed to fill a gap by bringing critical social science and linguistics together within a single analytical and theoretical framework (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2006; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). CDA is influenced by Halliday's (1978) theory of language, which stresses its multifunctionality. In this vein, CDA views language use as both socially shaped and always socially constitutive "of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and belief" (Fairclough 1995, p. 131). Thus, it is linguistically realised through ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings. These relate respectively to the representation of the world and experience, the (re)production of social identities and the relationships between them, and the distribution of meaning in a cohesive and coherent linguistic form. Fairclough (1995) considers that these three elements to be interwoven in any text.

CDA also has been influenced by the work of key figures and movements in social and political thought, notably Michel Foucault, the Frankfurt school (including Jurgen Habermas), Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. This approach accords with Harvey's (1996) dialectical-relational view of six elements (or moments) of social practice: discourse/language, material practices, institutions/rituals, power, social relations, beliefs/values/desires. Although these elements are distinct, they are dialectically related in that discourse can be analysed as power, material practice, institution, etc., and vice versa. Thus, the approach strongly reinforces the socially shaped and constitutive properties of discourse. Taking account of the dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between discourse and other non-discursive elements of social practices, the approach goes beyond the normative critique (i.e. a critique of problematic discourse leading to its change) to explanatory critique (i.e. a critique of the existing social reality that causes the discourse practice, leading to a transformation in social order). Thus, it requires an “interdisciplinarity [... and] transdisciplinary engagement with other disciplines, putting the logic and categories of other disciplines to work in developing one’s theoretical and methodological framework” (Mulderigg et al. 2019, p. 10).

Fairclough’s work focuses upon the concept of hegemony and how power is worked out in discourse. The concept of hegemony proposed by Gramsci (1971) is compatible with the view of discourse advocated by Fairclough. Hegemony involves a constant struggle around points of instability between classes in order to sustain or fracture relations of domination/subordination (i.e. in economic, political and ideological forms) and alliances. To be sustainable, hegemony requires consent rather than force or repression. Hegemonic struggle takes place across a number of domains, i.e. institutions of society (e.g. education, family). An important distinction in Gramsci’s work on hegemony is between hegemony derived from the state and counter-hegemony derived from a collective consent in society to change the status quo. I consider the #EMGS campaign to be a counter-hegemony movement. In that, the MGS has become hegemonic in Saudi society, i.e. a system whose widespread acceptance ensures the maintenance of a powerful social patriarchy and gender inequality; the #EMGS campaign aims to disrupt that power asymmetry and contests the ideological consensus on which it rests (see section 4.2.2).

Gramscian theory shows the role of language and discourse as central to achieving hegemony. In his theory of cultural hegemony, he explained that the ruling classes use cultural institutions to maintain power in capitalist societies. Thus, they rely heavily on discourse that carries certain ideologies conducive to the maintenance of existing power relations (i.e. bourgeoisie

rule) in order to become dominant, mainstream and accepted as 'normal.' Because of the consent rather than coercion in achieving cultural hegemony, it is very crucial to investigate language in order to uncover these ideologies and therefore to foreground hegemony. At the discursive level, the hegemonic struggle is carried within the discourse practice itself, i.e. in its reproduction, restructuring or challenging of existing orders of discourse. In addition, counter-hegemonic struggles can generate alternative practices by "rendering explicit [...] contradictions, tensions, and uneven distribution of power in the empirical 'messy reality' of texts" (Mulderigg 2006, p. 27).

Althusser's (1971) theory of ideology has been influential in the debate concerning discourse and ideology. Fairclough (1992) discussed three claims made by Althusser as theoretical bases in his work. First, ideology has a material existence within institutions (e.g. educational, religious, legal or political); thus, it can be investigated in discursive practices. Second, ideology is a constitution of social subjects (i.e. it is built into different dimensions of forms of discursive practices and contribute to the (re-)production of dominant relations), one of the effects neglected by linguists in discourse. Third, Althusser (1971, p. 143) characterised institutions, for instance, educational and media, as "ideological state apparatus" in that they have stakes in and are sites of class struggle; this claim indicates a struggle in and over discourse, thus it turns the focus of discourse analysis to consider ideology. On these bases, CDA understands ideology: (i) be a construction of reality (i.e. social relations and identities, the physical world); (ii) be established in various dimensions of discursive practices; (iii) contribute to the (re)production and transformation of dominant relations.

The philosophy of the French sociologist Michel Foucault has made a weighty contribution to the social theory of discourse due to his influence on the social sciences and humanities and the contextualisation of the concept of discourse and discourse analysis (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1981). In the early 1990s, Fairclough (1992) critically examined both Foucault's (1972) "archaeological" work, concerned with all historical relations and material processes for forming discourses, and his (1979, 1981) "genealogical" work, focused on the relationships between knowledge and power. Fairclough (1992, pp. 55–56) summarised the major insights identified in Foucault's work in relation to discourse. Specifically, in the archaeological work, two claims are of significance:

- The constitutive nature of discourse: discourse constitutes the social.

- The primacy of interdiscursivity and intertextuality – any discursive practice is defined by its relations with others and draws upon others in complex ways.

From the genealogical work, three aspects are considered influential:

- The discursive nature of power – power relations are constituted, transformed or resisted by discursive means.
- The political nature of discourse – power struggle occurs in and over discourse.
- The discursive nature of social change – social change is often shaped and achieved through transformative discursive practices.

While these insights are fundamental for a general understanding of the relation between discourses and social practices, Foucault's work has several limitations: it neglects concrete examples in terms of textual analysis (i.e. there is a high level of abstraction), and there is a narrow concern on quite a specific sort of discourse, the human sciences (e.g. medicine, economics, grammar), and an emphasis upon the rules of knowledge (Fairclough 1992). CDA, therefore, aimed to strengthen social analysis in addressing these limitations.

CDA scholars provide the general principles in their own terms based on their different disciplinary backgrounds (van Dijk 1993; Meyer 2001; Fairclough 2005; Wodak 2011). However, Fairclough et al. (2011) discuss commonly shared principles of CDA, summarised as follows:

- CDA addresses a particular social problem or struggle. The focus is not only on language or its use, but also on the linguistic character of social and cultural structures. CDA thus contributes to hegemonic critique, for instance, by highlighting how any ideological project relies on weaving together existing discourses in novel ways. It has a similar contribution to make to counter-hegemonic struggle. For example, in the case study examined in this thesis, we will see how the anti-MGS campaigners attempt to build a counter-hegemonic movement by subverting elements of the existing MGS hegemony, notably by reframing religious discourse in terms of women's rights and combining this with policy discourse, unlike the pro-MGSs, who attempt to maintain a hegemonic position for the MGS.
- Discursive power relations: CDA highlights the linguistic and discursive aspects of power relations and struggles by explaining how they are exercised and negotiated in and behind discourse. In this study, we see women have chosen the discursive plane on which to enact their power struggle and battle for emancipation.

- Dialectical relation of discourse: discourse constitutes society and culture, as well as being constituted by them. This means that every instance of language use makes its own “contribution to reproducing and/or transforming society and culture, including power relations” (p. 370).
- Ideological work of discourse: ideology is a process of representing certain aspects of the world and certain constructions of identity, which contribute to the reproduction of unequal power relations. The version of ideology followed in this study is that used by Fairclough (2003), which in turn takes inspiration from Eagleton (1991). Ideology has two perspectives: “descriptive” views of ideology concern, for instance, the attitudes, beliefs and perspectives of social groups without reference to the power relations and “critical” views of ideology, as seen by Fairclough (2003), consider it “a modality of power” that can be identified in the representations of the world aligned with particular vested interests (p. 9). In other words, they lead to unequal power relations. To investigate the ideology that is conveyed in a particular discursive event, textual analysis is not enough; the discursive practice (how texts are interpreted and received and the social effects of the text) should also be considered.
- Discourse as historical: discourse cannot be produced without some context. Indeed, “Discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently” (p. 372). Thus, intertextuality and sociocultural knowledge can be included in the concept of context.
- The mediated relationship between text and society: CDA is concerned with making connections between sociocultural processes and structures on the one hand and the linguistic properties of texts on the other. However, the connections are complex and best seen as mediated. One way of investigating this mediated relationship is to look at the orders of discourse (i.e. the hybridisation of genres and the relationships between them).
- Being interpretative and explanatory: a text in CDA is not only deconstructed, but also embedded in its social conditions and linked to power relations and ideologies. CDA tends to show the different implications of different readings for social action. In doing so, critical reading, implying a systematic methodology and a thorough investigation of the context, is required, along with self-reflection on the part of the researcher. This study, for instance, involves investigating intertextuality and the hybridisation of genres, utilised by the pro- and anti-MGSs in their attempts to (de)legitimise the demands of #EMGS. These

interpretations and explanations are never finished, and are dynamic and open to new readings and new contextual information.

- Finally, discourse is a form of social action: CDA aims to uncover power relationships and/or bring about changes in communicative and socio-political practices.

After examining the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning this study, I argue that CDA can enrich the conceptualisation and thus analysis of the social problem under investigation because of its nature as an interdisciplinary approach, i.e. integrating linguistic and sociological approaches. The following sections lay out a set of concepts and theories that can be drawn upon to understand the mediated relationship between discourse and a particular social problem.

4.2.2. Gramsci's theory of hegemony

The neo-Marxist theory of hegemony was developed by the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci (1971), whose work focuses on the centrality of culture and ideology to the exercise and maintenance of power by the ruling capitalist class. Based on his reflections on political action and life, the core concepts are domination and hegemony (i.e. intellectual and moral leadership). In the modern world, the dominant social group manifests itself in two ways: (i) domination, i.e. the process of practising political power publicly that may require force and coercion to exert control over social groups; (ii) hegemony, i.e. the process of maintaining power over social groups by promoting the dominant social group's ideology, values, morality, religion and so forth, in both public (education, art, the law, etc.) and private domains. In this regard, it is not sufficient for dominant groups to maintain power through political domination alone; it is a necessary requirement to exercise a degree of hegemony to obtain the consent of the dominated group to their subordinate position and the continued authority of the dominant group. For Gramsci, the expanded integral meaning of the state encompasses two societies: political and civil. The former "comprises the elements of the limited notion of the state or the idea of a juridical-administrative state," for instance the police, the judiciary and so forth; the latter "constitutes the voluntary [and private] organizations within society," for example schools, family, the media and so forth (Green 2011, p. 72).

Unlike the democratic regime on which Gramsci's work focused (a post-war capitalist state), Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with extremely strong ideological forces at play. Nonetheless, certain aspects of Saudi society can be understood better with recourse to Gramsci; namely, there is a role for hegemony and cultural-ideological consent as largely realised through religious ideology. Thus, the dominant social group in Saudi society adheres to a

conservative ideology (i.e. the *Sahwa* movement) (see section 2.2.2). The twin dimensions of political and civil society are illustrated in the role of the religious police in Saudi society. At the political societal level, the religious police (known as the Commission for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) has operated as a key coercive force. Equally, at the civil societal level, the religious police have also had a role in maintaining cultural and moral norms until recently. Moreover, such ideologies have control over the Saudi media sector and the education sector, adopting extreme social conservatism “in particular when it [comes] to women’s role in society” (Lacroix 2015, p. 170). The pro-MGS research participants in this study are advocates of the conservative ideology and aim to maintain the traditional women’s role and the patriarchal hegemony. However, with the announcement of Vision 2030, the status quo is being threatened by new policies, for instance the suspension of the religious police in 2016 (see section 2.2.3). Moreover, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, in an interview with the Guardian in 2017, vowed to return the kingdom to moderate Islam and said ‘honestly we won’t waste 30 years of our life combating extremist thoughts, we will destroy them now and immediately.’ This was later followed by various cultural and economic changes, one of which was the rescinding of the ban on women driving and the changes to the guardianship system.

4.2.3. The public sphere and “counterpublics”

The German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas was centrally concerned with the idea of the public sphere, which is “made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state” (Habermas 1989, p. 176), a significant concept for democratic theories and key to a critical explanation of the relationship between the media and democracy. He elaborated his theory of the public sphere while tracing the development of the intellectual and political perceptions of a new emergent class called the bourgeoisie in the 17th and 18th centuries. This public sphere depended on a critical reasoning in debate and deliberation that took place in, for example, coffee houses and salons. These places had institutional criteria in common. First, they maintained “a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” (Habermas 1991, p. 36). Second, the area of discussion within such a public sphere entailed unquestioned and untouchable problems and common concerns. Third, they established the principle of the public inclusive, which means that they are always “immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people” and everyone is capable of participating (Habermas 1991, p. 37). For Habermas, the ideal public sphere is where all members of society have the right to participate

in discussions or debates freely, openly and equally to reach a consensus and formulate public opinion.

For Habermas, the proliferation of the press in the 19th century presented a new forum in the public sphere; however, he noted that the institutions that used to ensure “the coherence of the public as a critically debating entity have been weakened” (Habermas 1991, p. 162), due to the transformation of the function of the press such that it became commercialised and “the gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public sphere” (p. 185). According to Habermas, the increasingly commercialised and profit-driven control over the quality and flow of information and communication had a destructive impact on the conditions of the rational-critical public sphere and its ability to sustain political and moral debate in the face of stock market pressures. However, looking at the historic and long-emerging nature of the press, specifically newspapers, the relation between the press and commercial enterprise had been intertwined ever since its emergence. Indeed, the press can be considered a commercial entity because the language of newspapers has always captured selling features in order to create “readers, not news, as their primary function” (Conboy 2010, p. 7). However, the press today is influenced by technology, which “[competes] with the newspaper as the prime provider of topical information about the world” and newspapers are thus forced “to alter the structure and address of their language as they bid to retain a profitable and influential share of the market for news and entertainment” (p. 2).

In the Saudi context, the question is whether Saudi newspapers, as arguably a form of public sphere, are challenged by internet communication in promoting or stifling rational debate and in constituting a further erosion of the critical-rational public sphere, or do they instead offer a means of escaping the pernicious commercial interests of media monopolies? Althiabi (2017) examined the emergence of social media and its impact on journalism practices in Saudi Arabia by conducting interviews with journalists and staff at YouTube channels, while also observing the working practices of those channels. He focused on how social media is blurring the lines between politics and entertainment, and placing pressure on traditional media to create and adapt content that reflects a more everyday lived experience. The digital public sphere allows Saudi citizens to participate in public discourse, because of its characteristics, e.g. being “more inclusive, [and] encouraging citizens to express their subjectivities, which invariably stimulates political engagement” (Althiabi 2017, p. 191). For example, one of the YouTube channels, BanaTube, represents a feminist voice and discusses women’s issues; however, it “is not revolutionary in the traditional sense, and does not call for direct action” (p. 189). He states

that this sphere is in the very early stage of providing the instruments to express views in public discourse. However, I argue that despite the free space provided by social media platforms, they potentially share features similar to those of newspapers as a form of public sphere. For example, YouTube can represent a public sphere based on two dimensions: first, in an individual having a certain social topic to share (i.e. an individual act); second, when a sponsored individual/group discusses a social problem, not only for the purposes of public debate but also to attract a wider audiences to achieve a commercial end. In the Saudi context, both acts are performed under legal restrictions.

However, Habermas' work on the concept of the public sphere was subject to considerable criticism. One of his critics was Fraser (1990): in her article, *Rethinking the Public Sphere*, she stated that one encounters confusion in applying the concept of the public sphere in contemporary feminism, and argued against the four constitutive assumptions of the bourgeois masculinist conception of the public sphere. First, societal equality and free access are never really fully realised in the practice of the bourgeois public sphere due to the exclusion of certain groups based on gender, property and race. Second, the concept of a single public sphere does not achieve the ideal of participatory parity. She proposed "subaltern counterpublics," whereby "members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (Fraser 1990, p. 67). Third, the discursive arena of the bourgeois public sphere must be restricted to common concern, while economic and domestic topics can be labelled private interests and issues, and thus excluded, due to the lack of prior boundaries between what public or private matters are. Finally, the Habermasian concept of the public sphere regarding the sharp separation of (economic) civil society and the state is inadequate for contemporary critical theory due to its inability to consider "the forms of self-management, inter-public coordination, and the political accountability that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society" (p. 76).

The application of the idea of the Habermasian public sphere in its physical domain is restricted in Saudi Arabia, but nevertheless it does arguably operate in a different domain due to the emergence of the Internet and other new advanced technologies. In this regard, the Internet provides a virtual public space in which individuals can locally and globally communicate and (re)produce information, and it can also be referred to as a "new global public sphere" (Castells 2008, p. 90). However, the Saudi women's campaign against the MGS and their online discussions do not represent the Habermasian public sphere; indeed, the campaign is a

formation of counterpublics as defined by Fraser. Her conception of the subaltern public sphere points out the ways in which feminists have reframed hegemonic discourse, demonstrating injustice, recasting identity and providing access to public debates (Fraser 1990). In this respect, social media plays a vital role in amplifying the voices of Saudi women.

4.2.4. Theory of social justice

In her theory of social justice, Fraser (1995) distinguished socioeconomic injustice from cultural injustice, the former being rooted in the political-economic construction of a society, such as exploitation, economic marginalisation and deprivation, and the latter – including cultural domination, misrecognition and disrespect – rooted in the social paradigms of representation, interpretation and communication. Of course, these are intertwined and lead to overlapping demands as shown in her descriptions of social movements, in which demands for cultural change intermingle with economic change. This is exemplified in the recent social campaign against male guardianship that has taken hold in Saudi Arabia. The demands of the campaign against the MGS have hybrid aspects, calling for both cultural and socioeconomic changes because, not only are Saudi women not recognised, they are also economically marginalised due to the MGS. This produces both cultural injustice through the cultural devaluation of women and the denial of their legal rights and socioeconomic injustice by denying women independent access to economic resources. According to Fraser, “neither redistributive remedies alone nor recognition remedies alone will suffice. Bivalent collectivities need both” (1995, p. 78). The recognition remedy for cultural injustice involves “revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups,” while the redistributive remedy requires transforming the politico-economic structure of society and abolishing the system (Fraser 1995, p. 73). Thus, a critical theory of recognition for Fraser (1995) entails considering cultural recognition and the social politics of equality as combined and supportive of each other.

4.2.5. New social movement

The Italian sociologist, Alberto Melucci (1980, 1985, 1996) examined new social movements, particularly in Europe, from the late 1970s to the 1980s; his work is framed in a way that is compatible with our explanation of the Saudi women’s campaign. The emergence of a new social movement (NSM) approach was prompted by the need to understand new forms of collective actions with their new conflicts. One of the characteristics of NSMs is that they were transmitted from political and organisational actors into movements through media; this means that a condition for changing the present is to maintain an open communicative space for

society to address its fundamental problems and to facilitate the coexistence of its tensions in its current constitution. Within the sphere of digital communication networks, social media provides a free space for diverse voices to be socially included and recognised (Dahlgren 2013). Another characteristic is that NSMs have a high capacity to command symbolic resources, unlike old movements which were deeply rooted in the material state; this shift toward informational and symbolic resources brings a change in the definition of power and inequality. Power is not merely about those who control material resources or influence the political system, but about those who have the capacity to arrange and manipulate people's thinking. Inequality is measured not only by the monopoly over economic resources, but also by the distribution of social power, which allots control "over those powerful symbolic resources that frame the information" (Melucci 1996, p. 179). Melucci's work has tended to focus on cultural promotion because culture is the locus of power, inequality and production. The ideas entering scientific and cultural debates in a certain society are due to the selection performed by institutions and policies, by expertise, cultural markets and religious figures. New marginalities and centralities are determined based on this power over production and the diffusion of ideas. Thus, political choices are organised and framed by hidden cultural and scientific codes.

In addition, NSMs have exposed the ineffectiveness of traditional systems and the apparatus of institutions in a society. Thus, they generally aim to redefine the rules, or reconstruct individual identity due to the clash between the identities imposed by the external authority and "the self-realization needs of individuals" (Melucci 1996, p. 105). For instance, movements of women and minorities have been explained as "a struggle for equalization of rights" and "seeking inclusion or political recognition" (Melucci 1996, p. 98). There are two different interpretations in terms of reactions to marginalised groups who have lost their identity: (i) there are those who accept the resulting social order by claiming a justification or explanation that is intended to deny the idea of conflict in anomic reactions, and to disregard every form of opposition (such supporters of the male guardianship system); (ii) there are those who focus on every instance of breakdown in the social order and in social norms, an interpretation that highlights the reactions fostering opposition and conflict (such as opponents of male guardianship). This shows that NSMs do not primarily focus on the political system; their orientation is directed more toward the restriction of autonomy. This means that searching for solidarity by centring the struggle on group identity is a primary objective, and pursuing change in the political system becomes a secondary objective.

Melucci (1996) clarified the notion of identity and the concept of collective identity. Identity always includes three features: “the continuity of a subject over and beyond variations in time and its adaptations to the environment; the delimitation of this subject with respect to others; the ability to recognize and to be recognized” (Melucci 1996, p. 71). On a higher level of recognition, collective identity needs to locate itself within a system of relations, i.e. to be dependently constructed and to be recognised, for instance through denial or opposition by other social and political systems/actors. While identity gives a sense of static and more permanent definition, collective identity provides greater dynamism and less permanence due to the influence of surrounding changes.

Collective identity comprises an ongoing process of construction and negotiation among individuals and groups who identify the purpose of their action and the field of possibilities. To construct, maintain and adapt it, two components should be combined: an actor's inner complexity and orientations, and the actor's relation with other actors, limitations and opportunities. This process, involving a network of relationships, can occur at two levels: (i) cognitive, whereby the goals, resources and the field of social action are defined through a shared language in order to comprise forms of organisation and channels of communication; (ii) emotional, conveying the feeling of belonging in a common unity for individuals. For instance, a study found that certain influential Twitter accounts in the context of ‘end male guardianship’ have structured a network of exchange and a form of organisation (Alsahi 2018). Therefore, collective identity assumes the ability of social actors to be self-reflective, to have a sense of belonging and to tie action to its influences. However, collective identity faces a challenge when it becomes subjected to contradictory forces in intense conflicts. The elites in a society, for example, tend to see social movements as groups fuelled by deception and conspiracy; in short, they are seen as a “threatening, unitary, and organized adversary” (Melucci 1996, p. 42). This was certainly found to be the case in the present study; campaigners against the male guardianship system were routinely portrayed by those on the ‘establishment’ side of the debate as outsiders and a threat to national security.

4.2.6. Logics of action: Collective action and connective action

Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013) argued that two logics were at play in various recent protests, such as the Arab Spring, los indignados in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street and beyond. In a digital world in which new social movements benefit from the use of technologies in offline and online collective action, it is vital to recognise the logics of actions behind these kinds of collective action networks. Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013) suggested that the

contemporary action of large-scale networks can be understood fully by distinguishing between two logics of action: the familiar, collective action and the less familiar, connective action. They also outlined three types of large-scale action networks: traditional collective action, which can be contrasted with two modes of connective actions depending on whether the action is more or less organised.

According to Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013), connective action (i.e. digitally networked activism) is a logic that is similar to but not the same as collective action (i.e. offline networked activism). It is crucial first to understand what is at the core of the more familiar logic of collective action, which seeks to induce individuals to share a common problem through transforming their collective identities and involving them in collective action in pursuit of the public good. However, Olson (1965) observed that sharing a problem or an interest does not necessarily lead rational individuals to contribute to collective action as they might know that their effort will not be noticeable, so they decide simply to enjoy the good that others achieve (free-riding behaviour). Consequently, solutions should be centred on organisations: “only organizations that have the ‘selective incentives’ available are those that (1) have the authority and capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals” (Olson 1965, p. 133). An effective logic for organising collective action requires a resource-rich organisation, shared-identity populations and a solution to free-riding behaviour (Bennett & Segerberg 2012). Collective action networks utilise organisational resources “in organizing, providing leadership, developing common action frames, and employing brokerage to bridge organizational differences” (Bennett & Segerberg 2013, p. 33). The logic of collective action reflected in large-scale networks is constructed on the individual level through rather centralised mobilisation by highlighting social network connections and relationships as important conditions, and on the organisational level by means of strategic work undertaken through coalitions of various organisations. However, the tendency towards “more individualised and technologically organised sets of processes” results in the emergence of a different logic of organisation: the logic of connective action (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, p. 750).

Digitally networked activism is the core of connective action and consists of personal communication organised through social technologies. The logic of connective action recognises digital media as organising agents leading to economic logic. Although connective action performs the same role as collective action, the former requires neither formal organisations nor identity transformation. Connective action starts with self-motivated

individuals who share already existing personalised ideas and network sites for co-production and co-distribution; the success of personal expression transmission across networks depends on individuals' use of appropriate social technology and opportunities to incite anger or compassion in them. Their action becomes "an act of personal expression and recognition or self-validation achieved by sharing ideas and actions in trusted relationships" (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, p. 753). In this logic, action networks based on digital technology easily spread and enable communication throughout the world. Moreover, these networks are "flexible organizations in themselves, often enabling coordinated adjustments and rapid action aimed at often shifting political targets, even crossing geographic and temporal boundaries in the process" (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, p. 753).

Both actions may co-occur within the same ecology of action in different formations. Three forms of large-scale action networks can be distinguished based on the role of formal organisation and personalised action: (i) a collective action network, (ii) a connective action network and (iii) a hybrid collective-connective action network. The first large-scale action network is collective action. It relies on formal organisation to facilitate mobilisation, distribution and production; it builds social networks, emphasising interpersonal networks based on shared identities; it organises social technologies to facilitate its activities; it foregrounds the organisation, and gives it a high level of resources. The second large-scale action network is a form of connective action. It self-organises without formal organisational agents; it depends heavily on social technologies as organisational agents; its social networks emphasise the transmission of personal expression; it is characterised as decentralised. The third form of large-scale action network lies between organisational-brokered collective action and self- and technology-organising connective action. In this hybrid network, the formal organisation operates in the background of the action, and social networks are built through technologies to enable personalised engagement. It is characterised by loose organisational coordination to enable the contributions of more informal organisational actors in mobilising resources and building coalitions without collective identities.

In a recent study, Khalil and Storie (2020) used the theory of connective action to explore the role of social media in the Saudi women's movement to gain the right to drive and to identify its features as a collective and/or connective action. To do so, they used interviews and the case study method, i.e. employing a variety of sources to capture the surrounding socio-political context, and considering the movement from its the very early days, starting in 1990, all the way through to 2017. The findings showed that during the pre-social media era, the driving

movement reflected only collective action (i.e. in the offline world, with campaigners driving together on a specific day), but in the age of social media, it reflected the features of hybrid action, both connective and collective action. Specifically, the connective action concerned efforts to reach a larger audience and recruit participants, while collective action was demonstrated in planning and monitoring of the postings.

In the case of the Saudi women's campaign against the MGS, Alsahi (2018) analysed the #TogetherToEndMaleGuardianship (#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem) under the lens of connective action. She argued that "Twitter-based networks could be used to mimic certain bureaucratic organizing functions, while serving as the connective tissue" (p. 302). Connective action is reflected by more personalised content and hashtags that allow messages to reach across to the Saudi public and the international community. However, the campaign also used some collective action tactics. Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) mentioned a variety of individual offline acts, identifying the themes that reflected women's online and offline involvements in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign. Although the movement "represented a networked structure of exchange and a form of organization" (Alsahi 2018, p. 316), combined with some individual acts, the activists stressed that "the lack of a named leader [or organisation] reflected their shared unity as a social movement" (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019, p. 14). Thus, it can be said that the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign is predominantly a form of connective action.

Having discussed the major concepts and theories that explain the roots of CDA (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2006), Gramsci's (1971) theory on hegemony, the public sphere (Habermas 1991) and its criticism by Fraser (1990), the theory of social justice (Fraser 1995), the new social movements (Melucci 1980, 1985, 1996) and the logic of connective and collective action (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, 2013), I now turn to a series of sociologically grounded text-analytical methodologies (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2015; Toulmin 2003; Aristotle 2008; van Leeuwen 2008; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Farrelly 2019), in order to critically examine, with the assistance of corpus linguistic (CL) tools, the problem under investigation in relation to its socio-political context,

4.3. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) approaches

CDA is multidisciplinary in nature, permitting scholars from various disciplines to approach their problem-oriented investigations from various theoretical positions. Thus, it has led to the creation of a range of methods. Fairclough et al. (2011) present an overview of some of the most important approaches to CDA research, in which each variety is characterised by a focus

on the linguistic dimensions of injustice, power, change and conflict, as well as the ways in which they are variously applied, for instance to examine media and political discourse, racism and discrimination, democracy and governance. This study applies a broadly Faircloughian (2003; 2015) CDA approach to investigate the patterns of Saudi women's representation in the #EMGS over the period 2016–2018. More specifically, a number of text analytical models are combined with corpus linguistic tools in order to track the development of this feminist campaign since its inception. Each of these approaches is discussed below.

4.3.1. Fairclough's dialectical relational approach to CDA

Fairclough's (2003) discourse-dialectical approach includes a set of concepts that imply texts are not separable from their social surroundings; rather they are socially shaped and shape the social world in return. Thus, CDA examines social practices, associated with particular areas of social life in their discursive dimension, i.e. discourse practices. Such discourse practices concern the processes of text (re)production, distribution and consumption through various semiotic forms, together with the ideological and power relations of a particular social practice. To understand Fairclough's (1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2013, 2015) approach, it is important to introduce some key concepts.

One of the crucial terms in CDA is *text*, which is defined as any actual use of language (i.e. written or spoken) in social events. However, this is too limited, in that (i) texts not only involve language but also visual images and sound effects (e.g. on television) and (ii) while some social events are highly textual in character, others have “a bodily performance as well as linguistic performance” (e.g. a lecture) (Fairclough 2003, p. 21). Thus, text encompasses written and spoken language, visual and sound effects, as well as body language.

The term *discourse* has been variously defined based on different theoretical and disciplinary standpoints across the social sciences and within the field of CDA. Discourse in the abstract sense refers to “an analytical category describing the vast array of meaning-making resources available to us” (Fairclough et al. 2011, p. 357). The term ‘semiosis’ (i.e. incorporating words, symbols, colour, gesture, and so forth) is often used as an alternative term, partly in order to distinguish it from the more specialised sense in which discourse (as a count noun) is used in CDA. Discourse in this sense is defined as a representative means of categorising certain aspects of social life (e.g. conservative and liberal discourses regarding the effects of the MGS on Saudi women). Fairclough (2013) points out that:

The question of discourses is the question of how texts figure (in relation to other moments) in how people represent the world, including themselves and their productive activities. Different discourses are different ways of representing associated with different positions. (p. 174)

CDA has a dialectical nature because it views discourse (or semiosis) as a form of social practice. This indicates a dialectical relationship between a discursive event and all the surrounding elements that frame it, i.e. the situation(s), institutions(s), and social structure(s). A dialectical relationship is a two-way relation: a discursive event shapes and is shaped by situations, institutions, and social identities and relationships. It is constituted in order to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and to transform it. Being socially influential, discourse highlights significant issues of power. In this dialectical sense, a certain structure of a society, for instance domination or difference relations, is tied up with a linguistic conceptualisation of the world (i.e. we do not arbitrarily name things, instead we conceptualise them). Therefore, discursive practices may entail major ideological effects by which unequal power relations, for example between women and men or ethnic groups, are produced and reproduced. This can be detected through particular ways of representing things and positioning people. Consequently, discourse may “be racist, or sexist, and try to pass off assumptions (often falsifying ones) about any aspect of social life as mere common sense” (Fairclough et al. 2011, p. 258). The relations of power and ideologies in particular discursive representations are often opaque to people. Thus, CDA aims to examine discourse in order to make these unclear aspects more visible.

CDA (Fairclough 1992, 2015) adopts the term *order of discourse* from Foucault to capture the power and social constitution of discourse. This is a distinctive set of configurations of genres⁹ (ways of acting and interacting), discourses (ways of talking about the world from a particular perspective) and styles (ways of being) that are seen as part of a social practice. It is the “highest” level of context in Fairclough’s theoretical model of the relationship between language, power and society in that it is usually associated with some social domains or particular institutions. For instance, the order of discourse of schools covers the discursive practices of the classroom, assessment, the staffroom and the playground, and the order of discourse of a society covers the various local orders of discourse and the relationships between

⁹ Some aspects of genre are as follows: (i) it is a means of textual structuring, and has a collection of relatively stable conventions, being “simultaneously creative and conservative” (Fairclough 2000, p. 169); (ii) it can belong to a local level, associated with a network of particular social practices (e.g. within an institution) or be specialised at the global level, interacting across networks of social practices (e.g. genres of governance); (iii) change in genres can be a vehicle for social change, and the appearance of new genres is developed through the combination of previously existing genres.

them, e.g. the order of discourse of the school, community organisations, the workplace, the political establishment, religious institutions, and so forth. These orders are linked and can be analysed in terms of *interdiscursivity*, namely the link between social practices. They can mirror social change and power, i.e. when a social practice dominates other social practices, and their values and relations.

A closely related concept is *intertextuality*. This analytical concept refers to “the presence of actual elements of other texts within a text” (Fairclough 2003, p. 39). It reflects the type of relations between texts; instances of these relations occur in direct and indirect quotations. By analysing patterns of intertextuality we can trace the linkages between different social practices. As an example, a new analytical approach proposed by Farrelly (2019) examines the “meta data” of “inter-texts” detected in a social practice (section 4.3.4).

Fairclough’s (1992, 2003, 2013, 2015) analytical framework was developed based on three fundamental processes – description, interpretation and explanation (Figure 4.1).




Figure 4. 1 Dimensions of discourse and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2013, p. 133).

First, the description process requires the analyst to describe the textual/linguistic properties of texts (including multimodal texts where relevant to the object of inquiry). Thus, this stage in this study involves linguistic description of the social actors’ representation (Van Leeuwen 2008) (aided by corpus linguistic tools) and actions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014), and the arguments used by the pro- and anti-MGSs (Toulmin 2003). Second, the interpretation process concerns the relations between the formal properties of a text and the meanings construed by the interpreter (including the analyst), a process which is always dynamic and contingent upon a background of common-sense assumptions (what Fairclough terms the “members’ resources,”

alluding to the fact that this constellation of background knowledge and assumptions can be attributed to our membership of one or more discourse communities). In addition, the stage of interpretation is also concerned with the participants' processes of text production, i.e. the processes of intertextuality (Farrelly 2019) and interdiscursivity (Fairclough 1992, 2003). Finally, the explanation process seeks to uncover the relationship between discursive practice and social practice, i.e. the linguistic description should consider the particular social conditions in which the discourse was produced. With the theoretical background (section 4.2), the intended meanings of the participants can be understood along with the social and political conditions operating at the time. It should be noted that these processes are not fixed in one order; rather, each feeds into the others. In this respect, constant movement back and forth between the levels and stages of the analysis is required.

4.3.2. Socio-semantic approach

Van Leeuwen's (2008) socio-semantic approach offers a taxonomic model for analysing how social practice is represented in language. It was developed out of the important insight that sociological agency is not always realised by linguistic agency. Thus, the traditional categories of grammatical description, like nouns and verbs, cannot reveal much about the ideational and evaluative significance of linguistic choices when representing actors and their actions. The following two phrases uttered by the Crown prince in various interviews represent essentially the same topic: 'The Vision2030 assured that the engagement of Saudi women is vital' and 'Muhammad bin Salman vowed to give more rights to Saudi women.' However, in each case, the representational choices are made in subtly different terms: the second choice is more personalised, and functions as a form legitimation by the powerful agency. In order to capture this kind of semantic nuance, van Leeuwen's model posits socio-semantic categories like '(im)personalisation vs functionalisation.' These enable the critical discourse analyst to identify the linguistic strategies which help produce and reinforce power asymmetries, discrimination, inequality and injustice; thus, his socio-semantic inventory allows analysts to apply it to languages other than English (van Leeuwen 2008; 2009). Similarly, the categorisation of transitivity in this study will be socio-semantic, rather than strictly grammatical in order to reflect the sociological reality of the event. Although van Leeuwen has developed a counterpart taxonomy for social actions, I decided to work Halliday & Matthiessen's (2014) model of transitivity because it is a richer model and more suitable for the data.

Moreover, van Leeuwen (2009) conceptualises discourse as a recontextualisation of social practice. Recontextualisation is the process of reconstructing discourses from (parts of) texts taken from their original setting or context; during this process, certain elements of the recontextualised social practice are transformed (e.g. certain interests, goals, or values) to achieve various purposes. Thus, recontextualisation is not only about transforming social practices into discourses, but also the contextually specific legitimations of these social practices, in effect answering the question: why (or not) do we do this? Van Leeuwen (2008) set out a framework for analysing the discursive construction of legitimation strategies containing four major categories: (i) authorisation, through reference to the authorities or persons in authorities; (ii) moral evaluation, through reference to value systems; (iii) rationalisation, through reference to the goals of institutionalised social action; (iv) mythopoesis, through reference to narratives of the outcomes. Although all these categories can be identified in the #EMGS, I focused on one in particular, authorisation, because it aligns with the main focus on social actors in this study. An authorisation is defined as “[a] reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and/or persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested” (p. 105). For example, a sentence uttered by the Crown prince in a different social practice is recontextualised in the #EMGS campaign thus: ‘Muhammad bin Salman vowed to give more rights for Saudi women #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.’ This is perhaps in order to legitimise the campaign through his status, which conveys legitimate authority.

4.3.3. Systemic functional grammar (transitivity)

Systemic functional grammar (SFG) offers a functional, rather than formal framework of grammatical description, whose categories are designed to explain spoken and written language in their contexts of use (Halliday 1994). In this approach, language is not arbitrary. It is considered a resource shaped by the way it is used, and evolves to satisfy its users’ needs; the approach therefore examines various forms of language in relation to the meanings expressed by these forms (Halliday 1994). Thompson (2009) stated that a distinctive feature of SFG is its emphasis on function rather than structure. In this regard, language is viewed as having three meta-functions, each realising a different, broad type of meaning: ideational (ideas and knowledge), interpersonal (the identities and relationships between people), and textual (coherent organisation of meaning). This study focuses on a key vehicle for the production of ideational meaning, namely transitivity, to investigate how key actors are represented and socio-culturally positioned in the debate about the Saudi MGS. Transitivity encompasses the

process realised by the verb, the participants of that process and the circumstantial factors (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). Processes are divided into six main types: material, mental, relational, behavioural, verbal and existential (section 5.7.1), reflecting the main conceptual domains used when we linguistically construct events happening around us. For each process, participants are functionally assigned to different roles to reflect their relation to the process.

4.3.4. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity

The term intertextuality was coined by Kristeva (1986) in her philosophical study of literary texts and in her dialogue with the work of Bakhtin. The term sought to capture the ways texts recontextualise elements from other texts, bringing with them values and ideas from the array of borrowed texts and their respective contexts. The concept was later adopted within CDA by Fairclough (1989, 1995) as a means of considering the historical and social context of a text under analysis. However, the work that has been done on intertextuality is considered ambiguous, emphasising the form and content of texts, rather than the (consistent) patterns and orders of discourse that may reflect hegemony (Farrelly 2019). In CDA, the focus of intertextuality should be on the various sources of texts that tend to be transformed into others and the possible powerful impact that comes with this transformation; thus, Farrelly (2019) developed a framework including five key concepts: *text*, which contains the intertextual relations; *inter-text*, or what is referred to in the text; *network of inter-texts*, comprising a text of a specific event that includes preceding and anticipated inter-texts; *network of social formations and practices* concerning the origin and form of the inter-text; *typicality*, focusing on patterns in a social practice.¹⁰ He also developed a methodological approach designed to clarify the connections across aspects of social practices beyond the content of texts by focusing on the meta-data of inter-texts (see section 5.7.1).

Interdiscursivity is defined as the heterogeneous nature of texts that are constituted by combinations of different genres and discourses (i.e. discourse types). It is inspired by and related to the concept of intertextuality and is often referred to as “constitutive intertextuality” (Fairclough 1992, p. 124). On the three-dimensional framework of analysis, interdiscursivity can be seen as a mediating concept through which the connection between texts and social practices can be analysed (Fairclough 1992, 1995). Given the infinite hybridity of texts, there is no fixed or closed list of discourse types, thus Fairclough (1992, 2003) defined them in a flexible way for his analytical framework of interdiscursivity. Bearing this in mind, I link the

¹⁰ Typicality also covers the network of inter-texts (i.e. specific texts or text-types referenced) and the network of social practices and formations (i.e. practices or formations that are typically a source of inter-texts).

analytical elements of interdiscursivity to Farrelly's intertextual relations (2019). Farrelly's framework (2019) is a development of Fairclough's (1992, 2003) work, which views intertextuality as not merely about the content of text but also the aspects of social practices that it brings to bear. Similarly, the concept of interdiscursivity is a way of viewing (inter)texts as embedded within and weaving together particular social and institutional discourses, genres and their associated styles. Consequently, intertexts not only carry traces of other texts into a new context, but also bring with them the social and discursive conventions, values, relations and assumptions of the source contexts. In Farrelly's (2019) analytical framework, intertextual relations are placed within and between social practices, and networks of social practices and formations, by analysing the meta-data on inter-texts. His analytical elements are text types, producers of inter-text, origins of inter-text, and named text. I attempted to identify each element in relation to the analytical elements of interdiscursivity developed by Fairclough (1992) (section 5.7.1).

4.4. Argumentation theory and rhetorical theory

The term argumentation concerns a set of statements with “a *communicative act complex* consisting of a functional combination of communicative moves” and “an *interactional act complex* directed at eliciting a response that indicates acceptance of the standpoint that is defended” (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 5, italics in original). While the communicative act complex of argumentation, for instance within a monologue, can contain verbal or nonverbal communicative moves, belonging to the broad meaning of discourse in the field of pragmatics, the interactional act complex of argumentation is shaped by a dialogue that can be explicit (i.e. with an interactive audience to elicit responses), or implicit (i.e. with a non-interactive audience or readership that is not physically present) in the argumentative discourse (van Eemeren et al. 2014). The arguments are the backbone of the debate or discussion because they represent the central idea upon which the discourse is based, and are considered a tool for social change because of their aim to persuade a target audience (Liakopoulos 2000). The focus of the theories of argumentation makes a shift from the traditional concern with the logic of the argumentation structure, for example Aristotle's theory of reasoning. Rather, an interactional view of argumentation is highlighted in the new theories in the modern era of mass media influence, such that “their focus [is] on the informal use of arguments in everyday discourse and within a particular context” (Liakopoulos 2000, p. 153).

An example of this new view is Stephen Toulmin's theory of argumentation, presented in his work *The Uses of Arguments* (2003). Toulmin is interested in the legal argumentation in the

course of lawsuits and his view is functionally oriented in relation to the elements of an argument, rather than grammatically. In addition, his theory conveys “the idea of ‘informal’ logic according to which, in everyday life, ‘invalid’ arguments can be found to be quite reasonable as bases for practical decisions” (Simosi 2003, p. 185). This means the study of arguments occurs in real-life contexts, which better suits the information age and its informal interaction. For Toulmin (2003), an argument is like an organism, with an anatomical and a physiological structure. The argument’s anatomical structure can be shown in a schematic form, in which the physiological function is performed while processing its critical evaluation and validity. This means that the quality of an argument is judged based on the function of its elements, rather than its form.

For the process of evaluation, Aristotle's (2008) theory of rhetoric was interested in the effectiveness of language used to persuade the audience and its validity. He proposed three critical elements (logos, ethos and pathos) to evaluate the elements of an argument addressed to others in terms of the effectiveness of persuasion. In the *Art of Rhetoric*, the persuasion came from a combination of three appeals: *ethos*, being the speaker’s moral character; *pathos*, being the appeal to the hearers’ emotions; *logos*, being the appeal to logic or reason. While the Toulmin’s work focuses on the elements of the argument, the Aristotle’s appeals help to evaluate them in order to measure their effectiveness.

4.5. Corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis (CADA)

The term corpus (plural corpora) comes from Latin, meaning a body (Baker & McEnery 2015) and is defined as “a large collection of authentic text (i.e. samples of language produced in genuine communicative situations)” (Stefanowitsch 2020, p. 1). Corpus linguistics (CL) is defined as the study of a digitised collection of such authentic texts (McEnery & Wilson 2001) to investigate “any form of linguistic inquiry based on data derived from such a corpus,” which is representative of a variety of languages or a language (Stefanowitsch 2020, p. 1). Corpora have been divided into a variety of types, depending on the lens of research goals (Baker 2006; McEnery & Hardie 2012): a specialised corpus is a selective sample of texts used to study the linguistic aspects of a particular variety or genre of language; a diachronic corpus is a sample of texts collected over a particular period of time or from multiple time periods to track linguistic changes within it; an annotated corpus is a sample of texts that is tagged with additional linguistic information (e.g. semantic tags, whereby each word is assigned to a tag(s) showing its semantic category or its semantic relationship to other words). Tognini-Bonelli (2001) differentiates between two analytical approaches to CL studies. A corpus-based

approach is used to test hypotheses, theories or researcher's intuitions in a corpus. A corpus-driven approach is when a researcher draws on the data to provide theoretical statements. However, these approaches are more fluid and cyclical in practice, as stated by McEnery & Hardie (2012):

A corpus-based researcher may apply a scheme based upon a pre-existing theory but then, when the scheme is applied to data and is found to be deficient, goes on to refine the scheme in what could be termed a corpus-driven fashion. (p. 150)

In this study, an abductive approach was taken (Montesano Montessori 2011), involving an iterative movement back and forth between analysis of the main digital corpus, other data and emergent ideas. For example, initial findings led me to use other types of data (YouTube and online newspapers) to explain and understand the Twitter corpus in greater depth. CL is a more sophisticated and comprehensive method to look at the data; Baker (2006) explains the benefit of such a method, in that it enables a researcher to test existing theories of language on a large representative sample of language data, it helps in revealing language patterns, that could be difficult to notice on such sample, and importantly it can help to reduce researcher bias.

The combination of CDA and CL has led to debates over the relationship between the two, in particular whether CL is an equal theoretical partner or a tool used to support CDA. The first view sees CL as an analytical approach that is not only quantitative but also interpretative and qualitative (via the use of the concordance), and importantly, as having its own theoretical concepts (Baker et al. 2008, 2013). The second view sees CL more as a tool that can enrich and support critical discourse research. CL can certainly add value to CDA, enabling the researcher to work with volumes of data which would not otherwise be feasible, thus facilitating diachronic studies of change, as in Mulderrig's (2008, 2009, 2012) work on the effects of emergent neoliberalism on the language of education policy, which exemplifies the application of an "automated gaze" on textual data (2012, p. 6). While it is true that concordance provides an extended co-text allowing linguists greater interpretation, it is also the case that the interpretation is not derived from the corpus method per se, but rather from the researcher whose analysis is informed by the empirical and theoretical framework within which the corpus is situated. CL has no theory of language and no theoretical concepts; for instance, collocation and keyness are operational processes and not theoretical concepts (Fairclough 2015). Thus, this study adopts the view that CL is a tool which can serve analysis.

Corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) is a term coined by Alan Partington (2004) to characterise a growing field of research that seeks to exploit the computational and quantitative methods of CL in order to conduct discourse analysis. The reason for the specification “corpus-assisted” is because “corpus techniques were only one sort amongst others and that CADS analysts employ as many as required to obtain the most satisfying and complete results” (Partington et al. 2013, p. 10). Unlike traditional CL, which has tended to privilege the application and development of quantitative methods, the aim of CADS radically differs in that analysts seek a fully rounded understanding of the discourse types under investigation, and draw on CL methods to assist with this. The last two decades have seen significant growth in this type of discourse research. Recent examples with more of a focus on social and ideological critique can be found in the Bloomsbury series on *Research in Corpus and Discourse*, for example, Jeffries and Walker (2018) on keywords as an index of core values during the New Labour years, or Gomez-Jimenez and Toolan's (2020) volume on discourses of social inequality.

4.6. Critical discourse studies (CDS) and social media

Critical discourse studies (CDS) is often used as an umbrella term within the CDA research community to capture the range of different approaches to discourse-led social critique (for an overview and discussion of some of the core principles they share, see Wodak and Meyer [2016]). This socially oriented critical approach cannot be oblivious to new digital communication, and the production and distribution that come with it (KhosraviNik & Unger 2016). This new communicative environment is “a major imposing reality and challenge for traditions of theorisation in mass media” (KhosraviNik & Zia 2014, p. 756). However, early studies in computer-mediated communication (CMC) did not consider this challenge, instead supporting the idea of separating the online world from the border, offline context and considering online as a strikingly independent discursive arena; this, of course, would not be endorsed by critical discourse scholars (KhosraviNik & Unger 2016). Thus, it is not surprising that linguists initially tried to adopt and adapt research methods to be applied in studies on CMC, such as conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics (KhosraviNik 2017).

Two influential works by Herring (2004) and Androutsopoulos (2008) envisaged a CDS approach to social media; both focused on the social contextualisation of language and users' identities in virtual communities, and applied a problem-oriented analysis. Susan Herring provided a computer-mediated discourse analysis (CMDA) approach aimed at researching online interactive behaviour from a linguistic perspective, in which methods in language-

focused disciplines could be applied to social media. Jannis Androutsopoulos's discourse-centred online ethnography (DCOE) uses a combination of two methods; one is the systematic observation of online activities, while the other is direct contact with online social actors. CMDA and DCOE can be applied to social media to examine users' interactions, identity construction and other linguistic phenomena through systematic observation of online discourse and direct contact with its social actors. Herring (2004) argued that the implementation of CMDA not only enables questions to be answered from a linguistic perspective, but also investigates questions of broad social and psychological significance. In addition, Androutsopoulos (2008) argued for a second wave of language-focused CMC studies examined features and strategies of online discourse with an emphasis on context.

In social media critical discourse studies (SM-CDS), CDS shows an interest in a multitude of social media platforms due to the kind of communication that they afford (KhosraviNik & Unger 2016). Unlike traditional mass media, characterised as a linear, one-sided and one-to-many flow of text, social media provides a more interactive, participatory and many-to-many flow of texts (KhosraviNik 2014). Thus, the notion of power also changes from one controlled by the elites/privileged and centralised, to decentralised and offering non-elites, ordinary and marginal individuals the space to express socio-political issues through online social practices (Kelsey & Bennett 2014; KhosraviNik & Unger 2016). Online discourse can reflect a struggle hidden in the real world when the public post and/or discuss it online in an attempt to influence each other. Thus, unlike controlled traditional media, new online media made it possible to analyse power in discourse (KhosraviNik 2014). In the #EMGS campaign, Saudi women are expressing their struggle against the MGS through social media to find the solidarity and support they need to raise public awareness and bring about change.

Cyberspace "is not only a tool for information retrieval and exchange, but also a huge repository of authentic data" (Mautner 2005, p. 809). Moreover, various online forms of social activism offer rich opportunities for social effort and social action to be formed in a short time and at a low cost (Gurak & Logie 2003). These forms are called online protest-related innovations, such as online petitions, emails, letters and boycotts; these collective actions make individual participation easy (Earl 2010). Kelsey and Bennett (2014) argued that social media provides an opportunity for resistance and oppositional power because the existing unfixed power relations in any discursive process can change and develop according to the contextual environments in which they are produced. Looking to this research, I argue that social media has indeed provided the opportunity for Saudi women to demand a socio-political change, of

course along with online petitions. Saudi women are able to work within – and be seen to respect – the state’s regulations, which ban political protest, by instead taking advantage of social media to take their protest online.

For SM-CDS, discourse is the central unit of analysis in which the interest is not merely in investigating interactive communication in the media but how it shapes and is shaped by the socio-political sphere (thereby analytically dissolving the boundary between online and offline worlds) (KhosraviNik 2017). Moreover, online discourse is seen as stretching across mediated and social practices, rather than being limited to one form/outlet. That being said, SM-CDS aims to consider the findings within a wider offline and online context, although some analysts have decided “to analyse texts and communication practices in a single outlet” (KhosraviNik 2017, p. 586). In doing so, it is important to understand the conceptually crucial aspects for a viable SM-CDS, namely the horizontal digital context and vertical social context, the two not being equivalent to each other, but complementary. The horizontal digital context covers:

the intertextuality among textual practices on (potentially) multi-sites and interconnectedness of Social Media users through observation and by linking the available textual platforms and practices horizontally across the sites, platforms, and genres. (KhosraviNik 2017, p. 585)

The vertical social context “links both the micro-features of textual analysis and horizontal context to socio-political context of users in society” (KhosraviNik 2017, p. 585). My analysis covers the horizontal digital context through Twitter, YouTube and online news articles and on the vertical social context links the findings to the Saudi socio-political context (Figure 4.2).




Figure 4. 2 A framework for corpus-assisted critical analysis of social media discourse (adapted from KhosraviNik & Unger 2016).

The horizontal digital context covers the norms of production, consumption and distribution of texts on three platforms: Twitter, YouTube and online news. The *corporate, social and political institutions* concern the affordance of these social media sites in Saudi society and particularly in relation to the Saudi women’ online resistance. The horizontal context also deals with the *semiotic characteristics* of the three platforms. The *users’ processes of production and consumption* cover the interconnectedness of online users through observation and the textual patterns used to legitimate their stance. This horizontal digital context is linked to a broader socio-political context in the vertical social context, i.e. the analysis of online discourse is socio-politically and historically contextualised in relation to Saudi society.

4.7. Feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA)

Feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) is a branch of CDA constituting “a critical perspective on unequal social arrangements sustained through language use, with the goals of social transformation and emancipation” (Lazar 2005, p. 1). FCDA is a fruitful engagement of feminism and CDA due to the overlap of social liberation aims and the overt “advantage of operating, at the outset, within a politically invested programme of discourse analysis,” unlike other feminist approaches that merely apply descriptive methods of discourse analysis (Lazar 2005, p. 4). In FCDA, feminist discourse scholars employ CDA’s theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches – including their integration with political theories – to argue that

discourse forms and is formed by social practices (Mills & Mullany 2011). Thus, under the umbrella of CDA research, feminist scholars can learn more about the sustaining power of an oppressive social order, the ongoing struggles for change and other diverse forms of social inequality, which feeds back into their critical analysis and tactics for social change (Lazar 2005, 2007). Thus, FCDA focuses its analytical attention on discourse practices that seek to maintain a patriarchal social order, whereby power relations privilege men and disempower women as social groups. In addition, its ultimate goal in politically critiquing gendered social practices is to effect social change and arrive at a feminist vision of a just social order (Lazar 2007).

FCDA's interrelated principles are outlined in the works of Lazar (2005, 2007, 2014, 2018). Ideologies, from a critical perspective, are representations of social practices formed from certain perspectives in order to maintain relations of dominance and unequal power and other relations of domination, including gender. For FCDA, gender is both an ideological structure and practice, which divides individuals into two classes – men and women – “based on a hierarchical relation of domination and subordination, respectively” (Lazar 2007, p. 146). The hegemonic gender ideology is often not noticeable as dominant; rather, it is acceptable to the majority in a particular community. The dominance of a gendered social group is thus achieved through its integration into the “common sense” logic of institutions and social structures, continuously (re)produced through the everyday social practices between men and women. This view of power as something that is continuously and actively produced through everyday practices emphasises the central role of discourse in the structuring of gender inequality. Of course, this does not mean that the discursive construction of gender relations is the same in all situations for all women and men. Rather, gender exists alongside and intersects with other social identities, for instance, age, class, ethnicity, profession and so on.

FCDA views power as something which is relational and reliant on hegemonic consensus, intertwined and co-existing in gender relations, and subject to continual discursive struggle. First, modern power, as theorised by Foucault, concerns the ongoing struggle over certain interests and is embedded throughout networks of disciplinary systems. Second, the concept of patriarchy “points towards hegemonic masculinist dominance and systemic inequalities based on gender” (Lazar 2018, p. 373). Due to the complexity of and variation in the work in the mechanisms of power (i.e. based on different variables, such as situation and culture), FCDA suggests an implicit comparative perspective, rather than a universal perspective. It is

discursively interested in forms of gender oppression, and deals with interests that lead to divide and/or unite groups of women.

A principle of the (de)construction of gender in discourse shares the same ground as CDA; FCDA focuses on the ways of (re)producing, negotiating and representing gender ideology and gendered relations of power in social practices, in the relationships between people, and in their social and personal identities in texts and talk. FCDA attempts “to connect the detailed analysis of spoken, written and visual texts and intertexts to an analysis of the hegemonic ideologies” functioning at different levels in discourse (Walsh 2001, p. 64). Another principle for FCDA concerns critical reflexivity as a practice. To utilise knowledge for shaping subsequent practices, two areas are of interest: 1) “how reflexivity is manifested in institutional practices, with implications for possibilities for change in the social and personal attitudes and practices of individuals”; 2) the need for “[an] on-going critical self-reflexivity among feminists [who are] keen on achieving radical transformation of gendered social structures” (Lazar 2007, p. 152). The last principle concerns analytical activism that links the discourse under investigation to material consequences. For a just society, constant consideration of how to achieve social inclusivity and equality is needed. In the #EMGS campaign, for instance, signing the online petition that was sent to the king’s office was a form of feminist activism.

4.8. Summary

This chapter has divided into two sections. First, in order to examine the social problem and understand its context, it has discussed the major concepts and theories that help to contextualise the social practice under investigation (MGS and the debates surrounding calls for its abolition), and the associated ideas, values and (gendered) power relations. It introduced the roots of CDA (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2006), Gramsci’s (1971) theory on hegemony, the public sphere (Habermas 1991) and its criticism by Fraser (1990), the theory of social justice (Fraser 1995), the new social movements (Melucci 1980, 1985, 1996) and the logic of connective and collective action (Bennett & Segerberg 2012, 2013). The second section, then, has explained a series of methodologies (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003, 2015; Toulmin 2003; Aristotle 2008; van Leeuwen 2008; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Farrelly 2019) and aimed to examine the social problem and to understand its socio-political context with the benefit of CL.

This chapter has explained the nature of CDA, that the social problem under investigation should be represented neither as neutral nor impartial. Thus, an analyst should be able to

articulate his/her views in terms of contextualised evidence. This study shows my identity as a Saudi woman born and raised in Saudi Arabia. I have experienced the limitations of the MGS and have witnessed women's struggles because of it. Thus, my experience has had an effect on the analysis and interpretation of the data. In addition, I witnessed the campaign and the heated discussion from the beginning, and accordingly developed my own opinion about it. I share many of the anti-MGSs' views and subject positions. However, I have also attempted to understand the mindset of the pro-MGSs to explain their positions to the reader.

Chapter 5: Research Methodology

5.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explain the methods used to collect and analyse the data. It starts with a reminder of the research questions and the research design, followed by the research ethics. Section 5.4 summarises the procedures followed to collect and analyse the Twitter data for the pilot study and then outlines how it has shaped the subsequent method for the main study. Section 5.5 explains the processes employed for collecting the Twitter data, YouTube videos and news articles. Section 5.6 covers the procedures for preparing the collected data and section 5.7 explains in detail the data analysis methods.

5.2. Research questions

This research sought to answer the following questions:

1. Which social actors are represented in the Twitter #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign? (micro-level analysis)
2. How do both anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign represent Saudi women/woman as social actors on Twitter and what are their social actions? (micro-level analysis)
3. Do anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? (meso-level analysis)
4. What are the main arguments used by anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign in (public) YouTube and (official) online newspaper corpora? (meso-level analysis)
5. What is the potential significance of social media as a tool for counter-hegemonic struggle? To what extent has it been instrumental in bringing about changes in relation to Saudi women's rights? (macro-level)

The methods employed to answer these research questions involved iteration between quantitative and qualitative modes of analysis. RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 required the compilation of four (sub-)corpora from the Twitter platform to identify (1) the social actors, (2) the representation of Saudi women/woman and (3) other voices (or sources). A corpus is "a body of electronically encoded text" (Baker 2006, p. 26) and there are two common approaches to analysis, namely corpus-based and corpus-driven. The former is a problem or hypothesis-

oriented approach with a set of questions prepared in advance, while the latter is used to identify changes in language within the corpus without a set of questions in the analyst's mind (McEnery et al. 2006).

Two corpus-based tools were used in this research: (i) the frequency listing tool, which “summarize[s] the overall quantitative distribution of lexical items in a given corpus”; (ii) concordance lines, which “are a way of displaying the distribution of an expression across different syntagmatic contexts” (Stefanowitsch 2020, p. 54). The tools allowed closer qualitative analysis and selection of illustrative extracts from the data to be analysed in greater detail. In using these tools, I drew on a range of textual analytical methods. Combining a corpus-based approach (i.e. a computer-based method) with textual analytical methods (van Leeuwen 2008; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Farrelly 2019) was advantageous because it is “a relatively systematic and readily replicable approach to CDA,” as well as “directing the analyst's gaze in unexpected and often fruitful directions” (Mulderigg 2015, p. 449).

It should be noted that CDA proposes

a framework for conducting systematic, yet contextually sensitive, analysis of texts based on a critically grounded theory of discourse. Its abductive, multi-layered research methodology involves continual movement between theory, method, and data, allowing the researcher to link macro social processes to micro discursive events such as texts or conversations (Mulderigg et al. 2019, p. 5)

Thus, these questions focused on the three-level analysis; however, this does not mean that the analysis occurred in isolation from their social context, but rather it was used as a springboard and conduit to the discursive and social practices from which they stem. Thus, for example, textual patterns in the representation of social actors led to the identification of intertextual linkages in the data, collated by means of four additional intertextual Twitter sub-corpora, which were investigated through the third research question.

To foreground the #EMGS within a broader context, YouTube videos and Saudi online news articles reflecting and discussing the MGS and the #EMGS were collected. These data helped answering RQ4 in identifying the main arguments by applying Toulmin's (1958) model of argumentation and then the Aristotelian appeals – logos, ethos and pathos (Aristotle 2008) – to overlay an evaluation of the arguments. The final research question required a wider investigation of social context, which would be achieved by reflecting on the new policies formulating during and after the campaign; this was introduced earlier in Chapter 2 (Table 5.1).

Table 5. 1 Analytical research design used in the study

Textual analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tweets: representations of Saudi women/woman and their social actions • YouTube videos: arguments made by the public • News articles: arguments made by official representatives
Intertextual analysis	Tweets: intertextuality and interdiscursivity (metadata)
Contextual analysis	Explaining the socio-cultural context before and after the #EMGS campaign (i.e. the social conditions of producing #EMGS and interpreting it); it cannot be claimed that the massive changes regarding this system are due to this campaign.

5.3. Research ethics

Internet-mediated research is “any research involving the remote acquisition of data from or about human participants using the internet and its associated technologies” (British Psychological Society 2017, p. 3). Social media provides an interactive communication environment that creates public or private content. Access to content on social media is restricted by users and by the individual policies of various platforms (University Research Ethics Committee 2016). This research used two platforms: Twitter and YouTube. On Twitter, users can create two forms of account. The first is public, with all tweets posted by the user visible to followers and anyone else, regardless of whether they have a Twitter account or not. The second is private, in which tweets posted by the user are only visible to followers pre-approved by the user. Twitter users may place hashtags (#) in their posts to generate significant collections on a particular topic and to extend the public nature of content (Rogers 2014; Weller et al. 2014). Although individuals use hashtags on Twitter to make their tweets more visible, their perception of how their content is accessible to others varies (Markham & Buchanan 2012; University Research Ethics Committee 2016).

YouTube, a video-sharing platform, is another contrasting platform. YouTube provides a free archive that is easily accessible through the website and search engines. YouTube is both integrated and networked in that its content can be viewed through hyperlinks via Twitter and it has a greater audio-visual and textual capacity than Twitter (Arif 2014). Content on YouTube is generally accepted to be public in nature; in contrast, posts on Twitter do not indicate whether they are public or whether it is the user’s intention to make them public. It is important for researchers to be cautious when dealing with online users and their data, especially if content

is about religious beliefs and political opinions. Thus, the tweets were collected anonymously, i.e. without retrieving the username, as well as they were paraphrased when presented in the thesis.

5.4. Pilot study

I conducted a pilot study only on Twitter data because the #EMGS campaign was initiated on Twitter before seeking to benefit from other online platforms. It had two main aims: to test the corpus-aided methods, and to generate initial empirical insights into patterns of social representation in the main platform, Twitter. In the following, I summarise the methodological processes involved in the pilot study and then move onto how these procedures shaped the subsequent method for the main study.

5.4.1. Procedures for the pilot study

The process of collecting data contained four stages: participant observation (resulting in identifying four groups: male and female *against*, and male and female *support of* the male guardianship system), listing the Twitter accounts, filtering them, finally deciding the inclusion criteria and the tools to collect the data (Figure 5.1). All stages are explained in detail in section 5.5.1 because the same procedures were followed for the main project.




Figure 5. 1 The process of collecting data for the pilot study from July 2016 to February 2017.

For the pilot study, Twitter’s advanced search function (section 5.5.1.3) was used to collect 1,500 tweets for all groups over the period from July 2016 to February 2017. These data, forming the basis of the ‘Twitter corpus’ were then saved in a Storify browser (with the tweets organised in a PDF file), ready to be further refined based on the research questions. Taking a narrower focus than the main project, the pilot looked exclusively at how *women* are represented only by *female* campaigners, i.e. the representation *of* women, *by* women, as they debated the pros and cons of the male guardianship system. I refer to these Female-authored sub-corpora as Fanti-MGS (females *against* the male guardianship system) and Fpro-MGS

(those in favour of retaining it). I use similar terminology to refer to the women authors themselves; ‘Fantis’ and ‘Fpros’ respectively. When I turn later to the main study and discussion of the representation of men, I adopt parallel terminology; thus male-authored (sub) corpora are referred to as the Manti-MGS corpus (male campaigners against the guardianship system) and Mpro-MGS corpus (those in favour of it) respectively, while their authors I refer to collectively as ‘Mantis’ and ‘Mpros.’

Before analysing the two female sub-corpora, corpus files “always need to be cleaned up and standardized, and they often need to be marked up and annotated” (Gries & Newman 2013, p. 263). The cleaning and standardising the data were also conducted for the main study; thus, they are explained in detail in section 5.6.1. However, the last stage of marking and annotating was only applied to the pilot study in order to test its feasibility (Figure 5.2).




Figure 5. 2 Process of preparing the data in the pilot study for corpus analysis: female anti- and pro-MGS Twitter sub-corpora, from July 2016 to February 2017.

For marking and annotating the data, the corpora were tagged using the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI Consortium 2016) to demarcate tweets. Then, they were annotated by generating a coding system linked to the social actors in order to identify how they were represented in the #EMGS campaign (Alotaibi & Mulderrig 2021). Codes are defined as short phrases/words that “symbolically assign a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña 2013, p. 3). The codes covered the references for the social actors, among them a code for all representations of Saudi women/woman (see Alotaibi & Mulderrig 2021). However, the pilot indicated that it was not feasible to code the entire four Twitter corpora within the time available.¹¹ AntConc (Anthony

¹¹ The coding system was applied to the 3,000 tweets after checking the inter-coder reliability measure. Cohen’s kappa value (κ) is the most commonly used value for measuring the stability and usability of a coding system

2017a) was used for this analysis because it works with different languages including Arabic, and allows users to build their own corpus. At this stage, more sophisticated tools were not needed because of the tagset availability, unlike the main study, which required another tool to handle the size of data and variations (see 5.6.1.5).

After coding each corpus according to the social actors represented therein, I identified the most prominent (statistically frequent) social actors, then examined their representations and actions following van Leeuwen's (2008) framework and Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014) transitivity analysis. I used both models in the main study, as detailed in section 5.7.1. The findings from the pilot study are summarised in section 6.2.

5.4.2. Implications for the main study

The pilot study helped in shaping the subsequent methods for handling the Twitter data as follows:

1. Providing the main study with a list of Twitter accounts for the four groups (in 5.5.1.1);
2. Testing a variety of software to collect the data from a number of Twitter accounts at once (5.5.1.2)
3. Finalising the keywords (in 5.5.1.3);
4. Eliminating the stage of marking up and annotating because of its impracticality within the time available;
5. Searching for software, other than AntConc, to handle the size of data and variations therein (see 5.6.1.5).

In the following sections, I explain the processes employed for collecting the Twitter data (for the main study), YouTube videos and online news articles, cover the procedures for preparing the collected data and explain in detail the data analysis methods.

5.5. Data collection

Twitter and YouTube were the main online platforms used to collect data, besides the Google search engine. The risk of losing Twitter data is high compared to YouTube (where archived

among two or more coders (Cohen 1960; Saldaña 2013). Twenty per cent of tweets were selected randomly to be coded by three coders, and the level of agreement was recorded between the researcher and the first coder and between the researcher and the second coder. An average pairwise agreement (Conger 1980) was then calculated using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25. The obtained level of agreement measurement for the Fanti-MGS tagset was $\kappa = .95$, and for the Fpro-MGS tagset, it was $\kappa = .93$. According to Saldaña (2013), an agreement between 80-100% is regarded as satisfactory evidence of reliability.

videos can freely be accessed) and online newspaper articles. Thus, my priority was to start with Twitter.

5.5.1. Twitter

5.5.1.1. Participants and online context

On Twitter, participant observation was a crucial step to systematically plan data collection, understand the context of the problem and information about the affordances of social media platforms regarding the campaign (Unger et al. 2016). I could easily have obtained a huge amount of data as online platforms have search engines and built-in systems; it was therefore vital to select and downsize the data according to certain criteria within the process (Unger et al. 2016).

Based on participant-oriented observation, four Saudi groups were identified and categorised according to their gender and stance from their tweets, as “language is both a site of and a stake in ... struggle, and those who exercise power through language must constantly be involved in struggle with others to defend (or lose) their position” (Fairclough 2015, p. 66). The groups comprised those supporting the campaign to end the MGS, i.e. female and male anti-campaigners (anti-MGSs), and those opposing the campaign and wishing to maintain the system, i.e. female and male pro-campaigners (pro-MGSs). Each group used a set of hashtags to express their ideas and arguments. While all groups made heavy use of Arabic hashtags and used Arabic to tweet, the female anti-MGSs created a variety of English hashtags (among them #TogetherToEndMaleGuardianship, #IAmMyOwnGuardian and #StopEnslavingSaudiWomen). One Arabic hashtag was used by the four groups, #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية424 (translated as #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem424). This was noticeable among the hashtags trending in Saudi Arabia with a number that counted the days since the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign began.

The next step was to create a list of criteria that identified participants in each group. Many people from various geographic areas and with a variety of perceptions can use or reuse a hashtag since its main significant use is to form a topical group (Halavais 2014). Twitter has “backstage access” to “public algorithms that matter so much to the public circulation of knowledge” (Gillespie 2014, p. 185). This means that when a user searches for keywords from a hashtag, the resulting tweets represent an algorithmic selection of the top tweets for that particular hashtag, which are selected based on their level of engagement, the number of its sender’s followers and the number of times it has been favoured and retweeted (Bruns & Burgess 2011). Based on these top tweets, I developed a set of Twitter accounts for the four

groups (i.e. the gender was recognisable from their name and/or profile, and their stance was confirmed in their tweets) generated according to the following criteria: (i) nationality: users who identified as Saudi in their profiles; (ii) number of followers: users who had at least 2K followers, indicating their popularity; (iii) originality of tweets: tweets expressing the user's stance, not retweets or hyperlinks from other accounts. I also took a screenshot of users' Twitter accounts to keep a record of their location, number of followers and whether they presented the campaign's logo as an indication of their stance.

5.5.1.2. Software

To collect tweets from the prepared list of Twitter accounts for the main study, more sophisticated software, including TAGS, Mozdeh, NodeXL, DiscourseText, Sifter and PowerTrack,¹² was required to collect tweets containing certain keywords from the enormous selection of Twitter accounts. FireAnt is a freeware social media toolkit for processing small or large datasets for use in corpus research (Anthony 2017b). The program includes a Twitter Data Collector tool, able to collect a user's twitter history up to almost 3,000 tweets, with or without retweets. It can add several filters to input data, allowing data retrieval through keywords (see 5.5.1.3). Tweets were collected from each account covering the period between March 2017 and October 2018, over three time periods: March to August 2017, September 2017 to March 2018, and April to October 2018, excluding retweets, which were saved in the JSON format ready for corpus analysis (see Figure 5.3). However, after checking each file individually, I found that certain crucial periods were missing. For example, FireAnt collected historical tweets for User A from the period June 2017 to August 2017, but the tweets for the period March 2017 to May 2017 were not included as these caused the total to exceed the limit of 3,000 tweets. Thus, I used Twitter's advanced search function to collect the missing data as per the approach used in the pilot study.

¹² The NodeXL, DiscourseText, Sifter and PowerTrack enable researchers to collect historical data through a third party, while TAGS and Mozdeh can obtain data up to seven days prior to the request.




Figure 5. 3 Process of collecting data for the study covering the period from March 2017 to October 2018.

5.5.1.3. Keywords vs hashtags

Both Twitter advanced search and FireAnt make it possible to use keywords and hashtags as search features to export related data. However, when attempting to use the hashtag, the searches either failed to find results or they were insufficient. The reason was that the search was for the exact characters in the hashtag, which were always linked to a number referring to the day indicating the time that had elapsed since its start, such as #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem100, #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem101 and so on. Looking for tweets through the hashtag based on each day would be a very time-consuming approach. As an alternative, I used keyword search, which is the process of searching for words or phrases mentioned in a tweet about a certain topic. The keywords for the dataset were the same as those in the hashtag; thus, the tweet set must include at least one of the following terms:

ālmrāh āls'wdyh “Saudi woman” OR *āls'wdyāt* “Saudi women” OR *āwlāyh* “guardianship” OR *wly* “male guardian” OR *āsqaṭ* “abolish.”

The keyword dataset produced “necessarily contain[s] fragments of [a] wider conversation” and unlike a hashtag dataset, it provides tweets that discuss the topic of the hashtag but without using the hashtag (Bruns & Stieglitz 2014, p. 75). Thus, I found in my corpus a set of related hashtags that syntactically differed from the main one, #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, and occasionally appeared with it; this set provided more diverse insights into how participants expressed this topic and reacted to it.

5.5.2. YouTube

To find a sample of related videos in the YouTube archive, Google’s search engine was particularly effective due to the advanced search capabilities. I used the same keywords in the search as for the Twitter data. The YouTube data were collected over two periods: July 2016 to February 2017 and March 2017 to October 2018. More specifically, the search parameters

comprised the Google Tools location, i.e. the Web, and the source, i.e. YouTube. This resulted in a wide range of videos due to YouTube's "multiple roles as a high-volume website, a broadcast platform, a media archive, and a social network" (Burgess & Green 2009, p. 5). To obtain a more representative sample, a filter was required for the types of videos and a list of inclusion criteria. YouTube videos were categorised into three groups: (i) television interviews – episodes originally aired on TV; (ii) video selfies (velfies) – videos originally recorded on snapchat; (iii) vlogs – "video blogs" (Burgess & Green 2009, p. 145). A list of inclusion criteria was also generated: nationality of participants – the users who recorded the videos were Saudi; type of video – the users posted videos that could be categorised as being within one of the three identified video groups; period of time – users uploaded videos between July 2016 and October 2018; number of views – users uploaded videos that had at least 2K views. In total, 32 videos were collected (see 5.6.2).

5.5.3. Online newspapers

To collect newspaper articles, it was necessary to generate a list of Saudi news organisations that published on the MGS or reported on the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign. The same search terms used for the Twitter and YouTube data were applied in a quick search on Google, resulting in the identification of 10 Saudi news organisations. A search was then conducted within each news organisation's website of the term "guardianship" (*ālwlayh*) to collect all related articles in the period from July 2016 to October 2018; this resulted in 127 newspaper articles (Table 5.2). To focus on the most influential, the news organisations were examined based on four criteria:

- 1) Age and scope
- 2) Offline-online existence
- 3) Level of activity on Twitter and Facebook
- 4) Number of hits returned for the search term

The first criterion assessed the age (length of existence) of each news organisation and its circulation (local or national). Second, the offline-online existence showed whether the organisation would have been familiar to its audience before having a social media presence. Third, Twitter and Facebook activity was used as an index of the degree to which the organisation exploited digital news technologies and to assess audience loyalty as measured by number of followers. Finally, the number of hits of the search term reflected the level of the

organisation's coverage of the topic. Table 5.2 shows the results of the examination of these criteria. Due to time constraints, for the third criterion I focused on Twitter and the number of followers (more than 1.5M). The Twitter platform was the main focus of this research and thus it was considered rather than Facebook. The data for analysis were taken from four news organisations: *Sabq*, *Akhbaar24*, *Okaz* and *Alriyadh*; in total, there were 52 online newspaper articles.

Table 5. 2 Procedure for including Saudi news organisations

News organisation	Age & circulation	Offline-online existence	Twitter/Facebook	Hits between 2016/18
<i>Akhbaar24</i>	Offline edition: - Online edition: n/a National	Online	Facebook: 168K Twitter: 2.23M	16
<i>Al-Jazirah</i>	Offline edition: 1960 Online edition: 1996 National	Both	Facebook:n/a Twitter: 1.12M	5
<i>Al-Marsd</i>	Offline edition: - Online edition: 2009 National	Online	Facebook: 39K Twitter: 54K	19
<i>Alriyadh</i>	Offline edition: 1965 Online edition: 1998 National	Both	Facebook:77K Twitter: 4.52M	5
<i>Makkah</i>	Offline edition: 1958 Online edition: n/a National	Both	Facebook: 177K Twitter: 465K	12
<i>Okaz</i>	Offline edition: 1960 Online edition: n/a National	Both	Facebook: 547K Twitter: 1.63M	17
<i>Sabq</i>	Offline edition: - Online edition: 2007 National	Online	Facebook: 313K Twitter: 12.8M	14
<i>Sada</i>	Offline edition: - Online edition: 2009 National	online	Facebook: 4.850 Twitter: suspended	7
<i>Saudi Al-Hayat</i>	Offline edition: 2005 Online edition: 2002 National	Both	Facebook: 325K Twitter: 450K	9
<i>Twasul</i>	Offline edition: - Online edition: 2011 National	Online	Facebook: 36K Twitter: 1.23M	23

5.6. Preparing the data for analysis

5.6.1. Twitter

For the main study, the Twitter data were only cleaned up and standardised (Figure 5.4). Based on the pilot (section 5.4), the stage of marking and annotating could not be conducted for the entire data set due to time limitations; one of its implications was to search the full frequency list for social actors to be grouped in categories.




Figure 5. 4 Process of preparing the four Twitter sub-corpora for the main study.

5.6.1.1. Cleaning the corpus data

As part of data processing, all files “need to be cleaned of any undesired information they may contain” (Gries & Newman 2013, p. 263). Therefore, information unrelated to the research questions, for example the time and date of tweets, and personal information, for example Twitter users’ names and accounts, had to be removed. The latter was necessary for privacy reasons and to ensure confidentiality. In addition, two sets of tweets needed to be excluded from the data: irrelevant and non-Arabic tweets. Twitter has an episodic nature that rapidly ascribed it a source of real-time information and a place for discussion and debate on various topics (Zappavigna 2012; Weller et al. 2014). For instance, contextual circumstances, such as seasons, crises or natural disasters, influence what is generated online. This effect is intense and evident in microblog corpora, in particular on simple measures such as frequency lists. Although this might be detected in any linguistic dataset, it could be reduced by building a diachronic corpus (Zappavigna 2012). In this research, the Twitter corpora were collected over a period of time, from July 2016 to October 2018; however, it was not possible to avoid the influence of contextual factors. For instance, the diplomatic crisis concerning Qatar appeared in the tweets collected in the last phase. Indeed, the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign was related to this issue (see section 6.4.2).

After cleaning the tweets of irrelevant data, the second step was to filter out non-Arabic tweets. Significant numbers of tweets in English and with English hashtags were found in the larger

and richer category, female anti-MGS. This was not surprising because it has been found that Saudi female activists campaigning to lift the driving ban frequently tended to use English hashtags to situate the issue within the international context and attract a wider audience (Almahmoud 2015). This is probably a factor driving the pro-MGSs to campaign against them because they considered this action an invitation for the international world to intervene in an internal matter which should be dealt with by Saudis. For this research, I aimed to focus on Arabic tweets in all corpora to investigate how this campaign was discussed by Saudi society and Saudi citizens' reaction to it.

5.6.1.2. Standardising the corpus data

Gries and Newman (2013) suggested a list of tasks, albeit not conclusive, for researchers to undertake when standardising a corpus. For my data sets, three tasks were required: (i) converting all files into one file format (e.g. plain text); (ii) standardising undesired elements (e.g. hyperlinks into LINK tags) to provide contextual understanding; (iii) standardising various spellings and character representations (i.e. Arabic variations). The last task was crucial for two reasons: addressing the nature of online communication and dialectic diversity. In online communication, the emergence of new linguistic conventions, such as non-standard spelling and punctuation, can be expected due to limited space and other technological factors (Crystal 2001; Murray 1988). The nature of the content is also characterised by diversity, in particular the use of informal language, which causes some issues (Risse et al. 2014). In this research, two variations of Arabic were detected: dialectal Arabic (DA), which is everyday spoken language, “mostly used in chats, microblogs, blogs, forums, informal email, many recent TV shows and newspapers” (Al-Sabbagh & Girju 2012, p. 2882), and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), which is the formal language used in intellectual and official situations. DA differs from MSA at almost all linguistic levels: semantically, syntactically, morphologically and phonologically (Al-Sabbagh & Girju 2012; Habash 2010). In Saudi Arabia, different regions also have several dialects which vary in terms of linguistic levels.

Having such variations necessitates standardisation because of the problems in merging the use of different dialects. As Darwish and Magdy (2014) put it: (i) dialects cause diversity in lexical choices, resulting in large sets of words; (ii) dialects do not have standard orthographies, leading to word taking multiple forms, which presents challenges in building a dialectical model; (iii) dialects are not phonologically similar, causing differences in pronunciation (although this was not a major concern in this study); iv) foreign words are occasionally used

and there is often a mix of MSA and dialect, particularly on online platforms. To prepare the Twitter corpora data, orthographical issues and spelling variations were therefore tackled.

5.6.1.3. Orthographical issues

Three issues related to orthographical issues were of major concern: letter normalisation, word lengthening and spelling mistakes. Normalisation is defined as “the process of unifying the shape of some Arabic letters that have different shapes,” usually the “Arabic letters (أ, ؤ, ي, و) are normalized” (Al-Twairsh et al. 2017, p. 66). The different forms of the letter *alf* (ا, آ, إ) are automatically normalised in the corpus tool used for this research (i.e. Sketch Engine), while the three letters were normalised using the find-and-replace option in the word processing package: *ha'* (هـ) to (هـ), *ya'* (ي, ي) to (ي), *waw* (و) to (و) and (وو) to (وو). It was necessary to normalise the letter *ha'* in this form and not vice versa because the feminine forms were of significance in the analysis and this letter is a morphological marker for the feminine ending (Habash 2010). However, this caused another problem as for several words *ha'* was not at the end. To solve this problem, I created a list of patterns to produce the same word again in the correct form.

In online discourse, participants “routinely elongate words by repeating some of the characters in the word to express emotions or importance” (Darwish & Magdy 2014, p. 26). For instance, in the word *mrrrrrh* “very,” the consonant is lengthened, whereas in the word *aywwwh* “yes,” the vowel is lengthened. All instances were shortened to one letter. The last orthographical issue was “misspelled words [which] increase the variability in the forms for expressing a single concept. One solution to this is the normalisation of text before processing” (Risse et al. 2014, p. 212). Unlike letter normalisation, the process here focused on spelling mistakes in certain words, such as *ldalk* “for that” (لذالك) and *lakn* “but” (لاكن). These mistakes resulted from the lack of standard orthography in DA; it might also reflect the level of users’ education. Al-Sabbagh and Girju (2012) found that Twitter users often prefer to use MSA spelling to “show their decent educational background; while others simply write the way they speak” (p. 2884). To overcome this issue, spelling mistakes were replaced using the find-and-replace function in the word processing program.

5.6.1.4. Spelling variation issues

It is crucial to address spelling variations, together with the prior issues, because of their possible influence on the frequencies listed in the corpora. There could be many reasons for spelling variations. Darwish and Magdy (2014) found that “Due to regional and dialectal variations in pronunciation, authors of informal text (e.g. tweets) may choose to spell words in

a way that matches their pronunciation” (p. 31). Al-Sabbagh and Girju (2012) attributed spelling variations to the “phonetic and phonological differences between MSA and DA” and “the lack of a conventional standard tradition of writing” (p. 2884). For instance, the spelling variants for the social actor Saudi men, *als'ewdywn* (السعوديون) and *als'ewdyyn* (السعوديين), occurred separately in the frequency list. According to Harvey (2013), “the analyst reading frequency and keyword lists cannot take such quantitative information at face value” and he proposes that “Unless the analyst is prepared, somewhat laboriously, to scour the list manually, such variations will, of course, be overlooked and an inaccurate frequency reading [will be] obtained” (p. 78). Thus, I went through the frequency list and examined it for all spelling variations to be replaced with MSA spelling. This process aimed at “deriving more reliable frequency information” and “ensur[ing] a further degree of quantitative validity” (Harvey 2013, p. 78).

5.6.1.5. Twitter corpora information

Corpus tools

Depending on the research’s purpose, a variety of software packages can be used, for example, the freeware AntConc and WordSmith Tools, and the web-based Sketch Engine, among others (Partington et al. 2013). Despite differences in these software in terms of availability and access, they offer certain tools. The CL concepts/tools relevant to this research are tokens, concordance, semantic prosody, frequency list and collocation. Tokens are the total word counts in a corpus. Concordance lines are the display of a search term in its context within a corpus. Using this tool, the analysts can examine search terms and their discursive surroundings in more detail, which in turn helps them to answer their questions. For discourse analysts, concordances are the most powerful aids in looking closely at discursive strategies and in examining semantic prosodies. Semantic prosody (or discourse prosody) is “The tendency exhibited by some words or idioms to occur consistently with either positive or negative meanings” (McEnery & Hardie 2012, p. 250). Frequency list (or wordlist) is a count list of all the elements (e.g. words and tags) in a corpus. Collocation is “A co-occurrence relationship between two words” (McEnery & Hardie 2012, p. 240).

Different tools are available for processing and analysing a corpus in Arabic. A study evaluated seven corpora tools that work with Arabic and found that three – Khawas, Sketch Engine and aConCorde – achieved the highest scores according to eight criteria, including displaying Arabic text correctly, normalising diacritics and providing an Arabic user interface (Alfaifi & Atwell 2016). In this research, Sketch Engine was the preferred option for several reasons. First,

Sketch Engine deals with hashtag terms as one entity rather than counting each word within the hashtag as a single term in the frequency list (Altoaimy 2017). For example, the Arabic hashtag for the campaign includes the term [سعوديات] “Saudi women,” which is not counted under the noun “Saudi women” in the frequency list. Second, Sketch Engine provides advanced search options for complex grammatical or lexical patterns in the concordance analysis. For instance, RQ2 concerns the representations of Saudi women/woman in the four Twitter corpora and thus the search terms would be *s'ewdyh* [“Saudi” + feminine] and *s'ewdyat* [“Saudis” + feminine]. However, in Arabic, the determiner *the* is attached to the word, resulting in four separate terms: *als'ewdyh* and *s'ewdyh* [“(the) Saudi” + feminine] and *als'ewdyat* and *s'ewdyat* [“(the) Saudis” + feminine]. Sketch Engine provides a feature to cope with this issue. A corpus query language (CQL) provides “sophisticated structured searches, matching all- or part-strings, to be built for as many fields of information as are provided (such as the word form, lemma, and POS-tag)” (Kilgarriff & Kosem 2013, p. 33).

Twitter corpora

For the main study, four Arabic corpora were compiled from Twitter for the period from July 2016 to October 2018: female anti-MGS, male anti-MGS, female pro-MGS, and male pro-MGS, comprising a total of 641,786 words (Table 5.3).

Table 5. 3 Number of tokens before and after preparing the four Twitter corpora.

Category/Phase	Female anti-MGS	Male anti-MGS	Female pro-MGS	Male pro-MGS
First phase July 2016 to Feb 2017	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Second phase March 2017- Aug 2017	5,746	2,926	2,987	1,928
Third phase Sep 2017- March 2018	4,662	2,223	2,026	1,080
Fourth phase April-Oct 2018	3,409	1,771	1,792	950
Total no. of Tweets	16, 317	8,420	8,305	5,214
No. of tokens (Before preparing)	335,459	217,920	196,105	134,115
No. of tokens	255,373	141,756	127,192	80,167

(After preparing)				
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Ideally, balanced corpora would contain the same number of words per tweet, tweets per account, word tokens per corpus and/or tweets per corpus. However, in the process of building a corpus, researchers might obtain proportions that “reflect, in some way, the numbers of each type of interaction of interest that actually occur” (McEnery & Hardie 2012, p. 9). Thus, seeking the ideal scenario would fail to reveal the different levels of involvement among the four corpora. Table 5.3 shows that there was more tweeting in the female corpora than in the male corpora on each side. Similarly, a study investigating the Saudi Twitter campaign #Women2Drive found that female campaigners tended to post more than men due to “the nature of the event where women are the direct stakeholders of the driving campaign” (Almahmoud 2015, p. 51). Moreover, the female anti-MGSs tweeted double the amount of female pro-MGSs; this is perhaps due to the limits of the public sphere, in which feminists tend to use the online space as their counter-public sphere, in this case for their counter MGS discourse.

Intertextual sub-corpora in Twitter

Four intertextual sub-corpora were extracted from the Twitter corpora when conducting the analytical procedure of checking the concordance lines of all social actors for non-human references (see 5.7.1). Because of the diversity of online communication and its chaotic linguistic convention, the process of identifying the textual cues for instances of borrowing (i.e. voices, discourses, genres) in this research entailed social actors and hyperlinks.

First, social actors in many ways can be intertextual references through direct discourse, for example, ‘Muhammad bin Salman [MBS] said that society is going to live life as before #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem [i.e. the one before the 1970s].’ It should be highlighted here that quotation marks are not commonly used in online discourse due to the informal use of language in social media (Risse et al. 2014). In this example, the intertextuality was fairly explicit with the source clearly identified as MBS. However, this was not the case in other instances, such as ‘Our society is going to live life as before, #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem don’t lose hope.’ In this truncated quote, the intertextual source was less explicitly articulated (unacknowledged but attributable intertextuality) without the quotation marks. The identification of this implicit quote happened through matching features of the sentence or phrase with the knowledge gained as part of a discourse community. The term given to this

knowledge by Fairclough (1989) is members' resources, which are collective prototypes (some of which are linguistic), "socially determined and ideologically shaped, through their 'common sense'" (p. 11). Social actors are also signalled events, iconic texts, named texts, generic text-types; these intertextual references are called the "whole texts" by Farrelly (2019, p. 7). These references were identified in the impersonalised category (section 5.7.1), for example 'The report showed women's status in Saudi Arabia #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, stop denying the problem'; this example found in the female anti-MGS.

Second, hyperlinks can be considered traces of intertextuality and interdiscursivity because through them "texts can be transformed and given multiple and alternative interpretations, hence clarifying, complexifying and multiplying their links to other discourses" (Barros 2014, p. 1223). Hyperlinks created in the tweets link to other semiotic sources outside Twitter or other tweets. The hyperlinks were identified in the corpora under the LINK tag, which was replaced during the process of preparing the data; hence, it was necessary to go back to the original tweet (i.e. files before standardisation) to access the hyperlink. However, some links were no longer working because of the changing nature of online communication or no longer existed due to the deletion of the tweets. All intertextual references from social actors and hyperlinks were extracted in separate files to be analysed for the four Twitter groups.

5.6.2. YouTube

Thirty-two videos were collected and transcribed in the ELAN software package, a multipurpose and multimedia annotation tool. Similar to the Twitter data, the videos were divided into two categories based on their stance to understand the patterns used in the arguments. The gender of the speakers in the videos was noted. Thus, the anti-MGS category comprised the advocates of the campaign #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (Table 5.4) and the pro-MGS comprised the opposition party (Table 5.5). However, two videos had two guest speakers defending one of the two sides (Table 5.6). After transcribing the data, each part of the interview was extracted to the related categories: anti-MGS or pro-MGS. Metadata for each video are presented in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6: video type (one of three groups; see 5.5.2), speakers' gender (female: F or male: M) and their function/role, duration of the video, number of views, and date on which the video was uploaded online.

Table 5. 4 Metadata for the Saudi anti-MGS YouTube videos over the period July 2016 to October 2018.

Video Type	Speaker(s)	Duration	Views	Date of video upload
Vlog	F activist	0:08:37	2K	24 Sept 2016
Velfie	M lawyer	0:04:55	2K	19 Aug 2016
TV Interview	F activist F activist	1:16:55	9K	26 Oct 2016
TV Interview	M cleric F activist F lawyer	1:14:25	3K	12 Dec 2016
TV Interview	M cleric	0:11:00	34K	02 Oct 2016
Velfie	F lawyer	0:03:00	7K	09 Aug 2016
Vlog	M activist	0:02:22	3K	18 Aug 2016
Velfie	M lawyer	0:06:30	4K	15 Dec 2016
Velfie	M public figure	0:08:00	3K	22 Sep 2016
TV Interview	F princess	0:02:20	11k	29 Jun 2018
TV Interview	F lawyer	0:03:00	10k	5 Mar 2017
Velfie	M lawyer	0:07:00	2k	11 May 2018
Velfie	M public figure	0:05:18	7k	9 Nov 2017
Velfie	F activist	0:28:50	2k	28 Sep 2017
TV Interview	F activist	0:07:44	79k	21 Jan 2018

Table 5. 5 Metadata for Saudi pro-MGS YouTube videos over the periods July 2016 to October 2018.

Video Type	Speaker(s)	Duration	Views	Date of video upload
Vlog	F activist	0:02:20	22K	31 July 2016
TV Interview	M cleric	0:26:30	7K	18 Aug 2016
Velfie	M cleric	0:07:11	6K	16 Aug 2016
Velfie	F lawyer	0:09:23	12K	01 Jul 2016
TV Interview	M cleric M lawyer M researcher M lecturer in Islamic law	1:01:13	8K	20 Nov 2016
Velfie	M cleric	0:19:04	7K	13 Nov 2016
TV Interview	M lawyer	0:05:02	2K	10 Aug 2016
Velfie	M public figure	0:05:41	2K	18 Aug 2016
Velfie	M public figure	0:05:22	2k	7 Apr 2018
Velfie	M public figure	0:04:44	9.7k	8 May 2018
TV Interview	M cleric	0:17:00	2k	17 Nov 2017
TV Interview	F academic	0:04:00	2k	9 May 2018
TV Interview	M cleric	0:25:18	2k	7 Apr 2018
TV Interview	M cleric	0:24:35	17k	4 Jun 2017
TV Interview	M cleric	0:25:35	13k	4 Jun 2017

Table 5. 6 Metadata for Saudi anti-MGS/pro-MGS YouTube videos.

Video Type	Speaker(s)	Duration	Views	Time of video's download
TV Interview	F public figure (pro-MGS) F activist (anti-MGS)	00:37:42	98k	5 May 2018
TV Interview	F public figure (pro-MGS) M cleric (anti-MGS)	00:53:26	98k	5 May 2018

5.6.3. Online newspapers

In total 52 news articles were collected from four Saudi news organisations. Similar to the YouTube videos, the articles were categorised based on the main message: (i) anti-MGS, i.e. articles that talked positively about the campaign, for example an article in *Okaz* entitled “Guardianship on women, the minefield of awakening movement”¹³; (ii) pro-MGS articles that negatively presented the campaign, for example an article in *Okaz* entitled “After the illegal birth on Twitter, 680 days exposed the hashtag EndGuardianshipSystem”¹⁴ (Table 5.7).

Table 5. 7 Newspaper articles in the two categories: anti-MGS and pro-MGS

News organisation	anti-MGS articles	pro-MGS articles	Total
<i>Sabq</i>	4	10	14
<i>Akhbaar24</i>	9	7	16
<i>Okaz</i>	14	3	17
<i>Alriyadh</i>	3	2	5

Table 5.7 shows that three of the news organisations included articles supporting the campaign, whereas one heavily reported against it. These findings are interesting and contradict my original hypothesis that the official voices represented in the newspaper articles might be against the campaign, for the reason that the campaign would be seen as an external threat to the establishment and to the traditional values of Saudi society.¹⁵

¹³ Accessed in September 2016, «<https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/1073649>».

¹⁴ Accessed in May 2018, «<https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1642828>».

¹⁵ While the data was analysed in its Arabic form, the examples included in the study were translated into English by a professional translator who is familiar with Saudi dialects.

5.7. Methods of data analysis

5.7.1. Twitter

To answer RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3, the Twitter data were examined in terms of the following:

- 1) Salient actors in the Twitter corpora.
- 2) The representations of Saudi women/woman and their actions.
- 3) Other sources or voices supporting their positions.

The analysis was divided into three sections: first, a list of social actors in the four corpora was generated through the frequency list (or wordlist) tool in Sketch Engine, then the concordance lines were checked in Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis software program that helps to analyse and organises the data by applying multiple codes to the same passage of text; second, all concordance lines for the two search terms “Saudi women” and “Saudi woman” were extracted and subjected to analysis in Nvivo based on van Leeuwen's (2008) examination of social actors and Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014) analysis of social actions developed in their transitivity model; finally, while checking the concordance lines for the social actors, instances of borrowing from other discourses/genres were extracted applying Farrelly's (2019) intertextuality framework. The last step resulted in the compilation of four intertextual sub-corpora in Twitter.

Section 1. Salient social actors

The frequency list was checked to identify the salient social actors in the corpora. Identifier for social actors, according to van Leeuwen (2008, p. 46) are “representational choices which personalize social actors, represent them as human beings” and can be realised by, for example, proper names, nouns and adjectives whose meanings imply a human feature. However, they “can also be impersonalized, represented by other means, for instance, by abstract nouns or by concrete nouns whose meanings do not include the semantic feature ‘human’” (p. 46). In Arabic, the singular form of *s'ewdyh* [Saudi+ feminine] can refer to the country, Saudi Arabia, and can also be used as an adjective for grammatically feminine nouns, for instance “Saudi Airlines” or “Saudi journalism.” To disambiguate the data, all non-human uses of *s'ewdyh* and references to actors other than Saudi woman (e.g. non-Saudi) were excluded. The plural form, *s'ewdyat*, is rather less complicated as it always refers to social actors; however, when the representations referred to non-Saudis, these instances were excluded.

In Arabic, the determiner *the* is attached to the word and this resulted in two forms of an actor occurring in different places in the frequency list; thus, the approach had to be changed. First, the frequency list was checked and all representations of social actors were written down.

Second, to merge the different lexical patterns (i.e. two terms representing [the +] Saudi), corpus query language (CQL) was used through the concordance tool. The same format was employed for all social actors. As an example, “(the) Saudi” is extracted as [word = "السعودية|السعودية"]; the pipe (|) indicates that all the instances contain the first token or the second token to show both tokens. Then, the concordance lines were examined in Nvivo to eliminate the (non-)social actors from the data using a node/code of *non-human*, e.g. *am* means a mother, but also denotes the conjunction “or.”¹⁶

Third, the representations of social actors were grouped into six categories: i) representations of women referring to female categorisation, nomination, and other representations: distillation and impersonalisation (abstract, utterance, instrument, somatisation, psycho-social identity); ii) representations of men referring to male categorisation, nomination, and other representations: distillation and impersonalisation (utterance, instrument); iii) representations of authorities, categorised references, nominated, collected, and impersonalisation (utterance, instrument, somatisation, specialisation); iv) neutral representations referring to a generic reference, categorised references, collected and other representations: distillation and impersonalisation (abstract, utterance, instrument, somatisation); v) indeterminate representations referring to unspecified social actors; vi) aggregate representations referring to quantifiers of social actors (Table 5.8).

Table 5. 8 The representation of social actors grouped into six categories

Categories of social actors	Representations of social actors	Examples
1) Representations of women	Female categorisation	‘Girls,’ ‘ladies’
	Nomination	‘Aisha,’ ‘Mariam’
	Distillation	‘Queens,’ ‘prisoners’
	Impersonalisation: -Abstract -Utterance -Instrument -Somatisation -Psycho-social identity	‘Conspiracy’ ‘Stories’ ‘Telegram’ ‘Mouths’ ‘Name of’
2) Representation of men	Male categorisation	‘Men,’ ‘boys’
	Nomination	‘Adam,’ ‘Khalid’
	Distillation	‘Master,’ ‘dictator’

¹⁶ Two other codes applied: *nominalisation*, concerned the process of an action, e.g. *msharkat* means participants but can also refer to the action of participation; and *other social actors*, covered social actors who have a different reference, e.g. *s'ewdyh* can refer to Saudi Arabia or Saudi airlines.

	Impersonalisation: -Utterance -Instrument	'Permission' 'Message'
3) Representations of authorities	Categorised references	'Prince,' 'Sheik'
	Nominated	'Muhammad bin Salman'
	Collected	'Government,' 'Police'
	Impersonalisation: -Utterance -Instrument -Somatisation -Specialisation	'Fawa' Twitter account: '@CNN' 'Necks' 'The US'
4) Neutral representations	Categorised references	'Enemies'
	Collected	'people,' 'nation'
	Distillation	'slaves,' 'troop'
	Impersonalisation: -Abstract -Utterance -Instrument -Somatisation	'Troubles' 'Tweet' 'Video clip' 'Hand'
5) Indeterminate representations	-	'Someone,' 'the other'
6) Aggregate representations	-	'Several,' 'many'

Section 2. Representations of "Saudi women/woman"

Before examining the representations of Saudi women/woman, the general attitudes towards women, among them Saudi women, were investigated as an attempt to understand the intentions behind the use of different representations. The process of extracting all social actors from the frequency list, which "reflects the content of the texts in the corpora" (Stubbs 2002, p. 42), and dividing them into categories helped investigate the general attitudes in each corpus. One of the resulted categories from the frequency list was the category of women; the concordance lines for each instance of this category were studied. The references of women were analysed within the context of semantic/discourse prosody (Louw 1993; Stubbs 2002). Semantic prosody is "a consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates," often revealing the speaker's/writer's real attitude (Louw 1993, p. 157). For example, in Louw (1993), the concordance lines for *utterly* showed "an overwhelmingly 'bad' prosody" (p. 160) due to its co-text including undesirable meanings being transferred to the node. Discourse prosody "extends over more than one unit in a linear string" (Stubbs 2002, p. 65); the term was proposed to better describe the relations of speakers and hearers (i.e.

pragmatic function) and emphasise their role in creating discourse coherence (i.e. discourse function). For example, the lemma CAUSE “occurs overwhelmingly often with words for unpleasant events.” Semantic/discourse prosodies are evaluative in that they “often express the speaker's reason for making the utterance, and therefore identify functional discourse units” (Stubbs 2002, p. 65). To reveal the attitudes and reasons for the use of a variety of representations of women, the concordance lines were examined. Concordance lines present the instances of the search word in the immediate co-text and “the number of words on either side of the word/cluster in focus can be usually set to fit the researcher’s needs” (Baker et al. 2008, p. 279). This helps provide the evaluation needed for such references, avoiding generalisation about a word.

Having gained an understanding of the general attitudes towards women in each corpus, the focus on Saudi women was deepened. The concordance lines for “Saudi women” and “Saudi woman” were subjected to in-depth analysis by applying van Leeuwen’s (2008) sociosemantic model and Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2014) model for analysing transitivity. These were employed as the basis for formulating a set of codes for use in Nvivo (Appendix A). The two search terms “Saudi woman” and “Saudi women” were coded for their representation, roles and actions. The first round of coding focused on actor representation; each instance was coded with multiple codes to explain how the actor was represented. The second round of coding drew on Halliday’s (2014) model of transitivity, focused on the actions in which actors were involved and their role within the actions.

In van Leeuwen’s (2008) sociosemantic inventory of the manners in which social actors can be represented, the terms and definitions are as follows:

- Social actors in the social practices are represented as either included or excluded to suit the interests and purposes of the intended readers.
- The reasons for excluding social actors are either “innocent” or less innocent: innocent when they are known to readers or irrelevant to them, but less innocent when their exclusion is intended as a propaganda strategy.
- The two main means of exclusion are *suppression*, making no reference to social actors in the text, and *backgrounding*, mentioning social actors elsewhere in the text.
- Social actors can be represented as singular individuals, referred to as *individualisation*; or they may be represented as groups, referred to as *assimilation*.

- There are two typologies for assimilation: *aggregation*, whereby actors are represented by quantifiers and treated as statistics, and *collectivisation*, whereby a group of actors is referred to using a mass noun or a noun denoting a group of people.
- Social actors can either be indeterminate (i.e. social actors as anonymous individuals or groups), or determinate (i.e. social actors specified by the process of nomination or by the process of categorisation).
- Categorisation comprises three typologies: (a) functionalisation, when actors are referred to according to an activity they enact or something they do (e.g. an occupation or role); (b) appraisal, when actors are referred to in evaluative terms (e.g. bad or good); (c) identification, when actors are referred to in terms of what they are more or less permanently. The three processes of identification are *classification*, when actors are classified according to major categories generated by a society or institution (e.g. age, gender, race, religion and so forth), *relational*, when actors are identified according to their kinship, or personal or work relations to each other; *physical*, when actors are identified according to their uniquely physical characteristics.

So far, the representation of social actors outlined above has concerned personalised representation as human beings. However, the model also includes occurrences of impersonalised social actors, taking two main forms as follows:

- *Abstraction*, when social actors are represented by a quality ascribed to them, e.g. ‘the trouble wants to ruin our values,’ in which the trouble refers to the campaigners.
- *Objectivation*, in which social actors are represented by referring to a thing or place closely related to them. This takes four common forms: *somatisation* (i.e. representing social actors by a part of their body), for example ‘my life is in his hand’; *spatialisation* (i.e. representing social actors by their place), for example ‘Saudi Arabia signed the treaty’; *utterance autonomisation* (i.e. representing social actors by their utterances), for example ‘no one listens to her scream’; *instrumentalisation* (i.e. representing social actors by the instrument used to perform their action), for example ‘their [Twitter] accounts mention foreign [Twitter] accounts.’

The pilot study revealed the frequent representation of certain social actors who were not readily classifiable using van Leeuwen’s inventory. Examples include ‘the identity of Saudi women,’ ‘the image of Saudi woman,’ ‘the reputation of Saudi woman’ and ‘the honour of Saudi woman.’ The social actor, Saudi women/woman, here is deemphasised as a dependent

prepositional phrase in which the head comprises the qualities, ‘image, identity, honour, reputation.’ The closest potential category in Van Leeuwen’s taxonomy of social actor representation (2008), is the concept of “semi-objectivation” in the process of somatisation (i.e. the reference to the body part), which “still adds a touch of alienation” (p. 47), such that the actors themselves are not involved, but their body does figure in the representation (van Leeuwen 2008). However, numerous examples in the data, like those cited above, do not quite refer to the actor in terms of physical attributes, but instead in terms of their psychological and sociological qualities. Such examples cannot be accounted for in Van Leeuwen’s model, therefore a new category of ‘psycho-sociological identity’ was coined:

- *Psycho-sociological identity*, in which social actors were represented by an aspect of their psychological and sociological characteristics. For example, ‘the campaigners in the #EMGS aim to ruin the reputation of Saudi woman.’

Forms of metaphor were also illustrated in van Leeuwen’s (2008) model:

- The process of *overdetermination* is divided into *connotation* and *distillation*, among other categories. This process is considered a way of legitimising practice within a text.
- *Connotation* occurs when the social actors are referred to by “a unique determination (a nomination or physical identification) [which] stands for a classification or functionalization” (p. 49). For example, the Twitter data contain ‘bearded *Sahwai*’ to denote the male pro-MGSs (see section 6.4.2.1).
- *Distillation* occurs when the social actors are connected to certain social practices “by abstracting the same feature from the social actors involved in these several practices” (p. 50). For example, Saudi women were represented as ‘queens’ to connect the social practice of ‘queens’ as being served and protected to the situation of Saudi women within the MGS.
- Finally, representations can endow social actors with a role to play; *active actors* are the active and dynamic forces within an action and *passive actors* undergo an activity or are on the receiving end of an action. Passivated social actors are either subjected (i.e. the goal) as the object of a representation, or are third party beneficiaries of an action.

To examine the social actions of Saudi women/woman, Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2014) transitivity model was applied. This model presents an experiential analysis of clause. The transitivity model encompasses the process realised by the verb, the participants of that process

and circumstantial factors (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). It incorporates six processes reflecting the cognitive categories used when we construct events happening around us linguistically (Table 5.9).

Table 5. 9 Social actions adopted from Halliday & Matthiessen (2014)

Social actions	Definitions	Examples
Material processes	cover events, activities and actions (i.e. doing and happening) and involve: an <i>actor</i> , who does the action and brings about change; the <i>goal</i> at which the process is directed; the <i>beneficiary</i> of the action, who may also be involved in the process.	‘Saudi women [goal] are guarded by their male guardian [actor].’
Mental processes	are concerned with events in our consciousness (i.e. thinking and feeling) and involve the <i>senser</i> and the <i>phenomenon</i> .	‘She [senser] disrespects her father [phenomenon].’
Relational processes	<p>are those acting to identify and characterise (i.e. being and having) and have two moods: <i>attributive</i>, whereby the carrier (i.e. an entity) is ascribed to the attribute (i.e. some class), and <i>identifying</i>, whereby the identified is to be distinguished by the identifier (i.e. what serves as an identity).</p> <p>Both are classified into intensive, circumstantial and possessive:</p> <p>1) In <i>intensive attribution</i> processes, the attribute refers to the carrier either by naming the class or a criterion for class membership (i.e. a quality constituting the class). An <i>intensive identifying</i> process recognises the identified and the identifier either as token or value. Participants functioning as tokens represent lower expressions and those that function as values represent higher content. In this process, token represents value.</p> <p>2) The circumstantial processes convey meanings about “time, place, manner, cause, accompaniment, role, matter or angle” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014, p. 290). In <i>circumstantial attribution</i>, the attribute is a circumstantial element, or the attribute is not a circumstantial element and the circumstantial relation is expressed by the verbal group, e.g. <i>depend on</i>. In <i>circumstantial identifying</i> processes, the process is semantically recognised by the</p>	<p><i>Intensive attribution:</i> ‘A husband [carrier] is a male guardian [attribute].’</p> <p><i>Intensive identifying:</i> ‘My father [identified/token] is my guardian [identifier/value].’</p> <p><i>Circumstantial attribution:</i> Example 1: ‘Saudi women are <i>here</i> in the #EMGS’</p> <p>Example 2: ‘We <i>depend on</i> our guardian.’</p> <p><i>Circumstantial identifying:</i></p>

	<p>relationship of the two participants (i.e. the identified and the identifier), in which both participants express circumstantial elements of time, place, manner and so on, or the circumstantial relation is realised by circumstantial verbs that convey the circumstance of manner, accompaniment, time, place, etc., for example <i>accompany</i>.</p> <p>3) The possessive process is when “one entity possesses another” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014, p. 294). The <i>possessive attribution</i> is when the possessed represents the attribute. Within the <i>possessive identifying</i> process, the two entities represent the notion of possession. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014, p. 263) concluded that “Every language accommodates, in its grammar, some systematic construction of relational processes” and in Arabic these forms of processes may be different to those occurring in English.</p>	<p>Example 1: ‘tomorrow is a new day with hope’</p> <p>Example 2: ‘our guardians accompanied us to every place.’</p> <p><i>Possessive attribution:</i> ‘Every Saudi woman has a guardian’</p> <p><i>Possessive identifying:</i> ‘Males own the women,’ [reversible as the women are owned by males]</p>
Verbal processes	are those of saying and involve the <i>sayer</i> , who is the initiator of the process, and the <i>receiver</i> , who is the addressee.	‘They [sayer] insulted our guardians [receiver].’
Behavioural processes	represent physiological and psychological behaviour and have no clear characteristics. However, their identified characteristics are similar to those of material and mental processes.	‘Listening to the news about the new regulations makes me so proud of participating in #EMGS.’
Existential processes	represent the existence of something through use of the word <i>there</i> , which has no functional role in the transitivity structure.	‘There is no man who would accept this system for his mother, sisters or wife #EMGS.’

Section 3. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity

At the meso level, Farrelly (2019) developed an analytical framework for analysing intertextuality, linked to Fairclough's (1992, 2003) concept analysing interdiscursivity. The combination was applied in this study to understand which voices took part in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, and which discourses and genres were associated with this Twitter discourse. Four analytical elements of the intertextual analysis were connected to those in interdiscursive analysis: text types, producers of intertext, origins of intertext and named text (Figure 5.5).

First, the identification of text type as part of metadata is crucial for intertextual analysis. By means of this identification, the source from which intertexts are extracted directly or indirectly carry semantic, grammatic or lexical features related to its genre and reflect its style. Second,

the producers of intertexts could be significant voices belonging to a particular discourse (e.g. an intertext produced by a religious figure belonging to religious discourse). The last two elements are the origin of intertexts, concerning the production of the intertexts originally for a particular purpose, and named text, it being a common practice for some text producers to name their texts. These two elements point to a specific social practice, namely conveying a certain topic (i.e. discourse).




Figure 5. 5 Linking Farrelly's (2019) intertextual framework to Fairclough's (1992) analysis of interdiscursivity.

Having explained the link between the elements of intertextual and interdiscursive analysis, we take a closer look at the procedure conducted and the limitations:

- The intertexts were categorised in relation to their topic and content as *discourses* (i.e. the ways of representing one topic in a range of genres). (See Appendix B)
- Another layer was added to the analysis, *other integrated discourses*, to show how they were integrated with other discourses (i.e. for other subject matter referred to in the intertext). For example, “Our country is ruled by the Sharia from Allah and those opponents have no place here based on the saying of Allah almighty (And if you turn away, He will replace you with other people) #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.” This tweet, taken from the female pro-MGS corpus, has two discourses: 1) political in the reference to Sharia as a legal system applied by the authorities, and 2) religious in the verse from the Quran. Thus, this instance belongs to political discourse and at the same time is integrated with religious discourse.
- The *origin of the intertexts* was clarified for instances within the thesis and not the entire dataset due to time constraints.
- The producers of the intertexts were analysed based on three criteria: *gender*, *institution* and *affiliation*. These criteria varied depending on the research questions under investigation (Farrelly 2019). For this aspect, two analytical elements were added and borrowed from van Leeuwen’s (2008) framework of social actors, namely *backgrounded* when social actors were not mentioned but one “can infer with reasonable [...] certainty who they are. They are not so much excluded as deemphasized” (p. 29), and *generic references*, such that the social actors are referred to as a class of entities (unlike specific references to identifiable individuals).
- *Text types* tend to be widely recognised (e.g. academic essays, political speeches or news reports), or less well defined.
- *Named text* concerned the inclusion of a name of a text, a set of events and social practices. The naming practices could be varied according to the intended purpose. For example, “al-Nisa” is an intertextual reference to a Quranic text while “Quran” is an intertextual reference to a 114-text book. In both examples, the intertextual references are named texts; however, while the former focuses on a single text in order to emphasise this particular text, the latter is a generic reference to the whole book in order to bring in authority from the source, i.e. as a divine source. Thus, a reference to a social practice (including discursive and non-discursive elements) can also be a naming practice, for example, “Vision 2030” is an intertextual reference to a social practice that covers a variety of texts

(conferences, policies, programmes). By referring to this practice, the producer tends to lend authority from the source, i.e. the Crown prince.

- *Absence* as another element of intertextual analysis concerns a lack of the aforementioned elements (i.e. origins, producers, text types or named text). In CDA, a significant feature is showing absences in the patterns of discourse, for example which category is less or more absent among the elements.
- Style was omitted because it was not an aspect of focus in this study.

5.7.2. YouTube

Liakopoulos (2000) suggested five steps for conducting argumentation analysis: (i) having a representative sample; (ii) summarising the main ideas; (iii) identifying the parts of argumentation and applying reliability testing; iv) organising all arguments in a schematic representation; v) finally, interpreting the results within context and reporting the level of completeness of the arguments. Although measuring the latter aspect, completeness, is a significant step in indicating the argument's strength, this can be tested in many ways, one of which is by evaluating the argumentation structure through looking closely at the content of the argument. The content carries the expected output to persuade the audience. Thus, two frameworks were combined: one focused on the structure, employing Toulmin's (1958) model of argumentation to deconstruct the arguments in the YouTube videos, and the other comprising the Aristotelian analysis of rhetorical appeals: logos, ethos and pathos (Aristotle 2008), used to evaluate the content of the parts of the argument (Figure 5.6).




Figure 5. 6 The steps followed in applying the argumentation analysis for the YouTube data.

Each step is explained in greater detail, as follows:

- **Dividing and transcribing:** Having collected and transcribed the 32 YouTube videos, they were divided into two groups: anti- and pro-MGS. However, a few of the videos included two or more guest speakers discussing the topic, each defending one of the two sides.
- **Familiarisation and summarising:** The data were examined to understand their nature. Two types of data were found: persuasive monologue and persuasive dialogue. The former has two major components, “the intuitive ‘case building’ of presenting arguments in support of the thesis” and various techniques in presenting the counterarguments to the thesis and defeating them (Reed & Long 1997, p. 3). The latter has one crucial feature that is retraction, i.e. not involved in the monologue (Reed & Long 1997). The differences mainly concern the set of limits influencing the creation of the two components; however, there is no intrinsic difference in the process of analysing the structure of an argument (Reed 1998). Thus, the dialogic data were extracted to be placed in the aforementioned “belonging” category. Then, the main ideas were summarised.
- **Identifying the argumentation parts:** It was necessary to devise appropriate definitions for the parts of argumentation in advance due to the lack of consistent and clear definitions in Toulmin’s (1958) conceptualisation (Liakopoulos 2000). Such definitions should draw on the context in which the research is conducted. In this research, the argumentation structure comprised a combination of formal and informal spoken discourse, and by looking at the nature of the subject, it was clear that the definitions and identification of the argument parts would take a less controversial approach. The majority of the speakers in both parties were well-known, clerics, lawyers, lecturers, doctors and researchers. Therefore, the definitions would be in the context of a relatively formal social debate, which depends on the articulation of “explicit facts ... with a view to supporting legal decision-making” (Liakopoulos 2000, p. 157). In the *Uses of Argument*, Toulmin (1958) proposed an argument structure (outlined in Figure 5.7) containing five segments: claim, data, warrants, backing and rebuttal. The *Claim* (C) is the challenge and logical conclusion of the argument, and it is the answer to what the speaker is seeking to establish or convince the audience of. The *Data* (D) comprise the foundations for (C), including facts, proofs or religious principles, providing the answer to why one reaches a particular conclusion. The *Warrant* (W) is the bridge connecting (D) to (C), containing general statements, regulations and all justifications used to authorise (C), providing the answer to how one gets to a resolution and what one has to go on. The *Backing* (B) for the (W) comprises the

clarifications, such as examples, religious sayings and traditions, official statements and statistical facts/reports, provided to support the authority and currency of the (W). The *Rebuttal* (R) relates to the exceptions to the (C), providing the answer of whether X is always the case. These definitions of the argumentation parts were construed after two stages of coding: (i) checking the data in terms of the context and understanding of the concepts in each part; (ii) coding the entire data set to see what might come up in terms of new structures.




Figure 5. 7 Argument structure adopted from Toulmin (1958).

- **Collection thematically:** After analysing the parts of the argumentation, the claims (i.e. arguments) were collected under thematic clusters, i.e. according to the dominant ideational content and rhetorical purpose.
- **Evaluating the parts of argumentation:** All the argumentation parts were given special weight in the light of the Aristotelian appeals: ethos, pathos and logos (Aristotle 2008); Table 5.10 demonstrated the definitions of each appeal (Appendix C).
- **Testing reliability:** Intra-coder reliability was measured after two months to clarify the coding process followed and to overcome any identification difficulties (the kappa value was .819).

Table 5. 10 The Aristotelian appeals: ethos, pathos and logos, adopted from Aristotle (2008).

Appeal	Definition
Ethos	Concerns the personality of the speakers, their virtues and credibility, which are revealed when delivering the speech.
Pathos	<p>Concerns the hearers' emotions evoked while persuading.</p> <p>Eight emotions could be evoked:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <i>Anger</i>: when the speakers provoke their hearers' state of mind into rage to see justice in punishing their adversaries; this is detected by using offences or presenting instances showing that they are indifferent to the pain of others. 2) <i>Pity</i>: provoking the feeling of pain caused by destructive, immoral or unjust events experienced by someone who does not deserve them and that we may also experience. 3) <i>Enmity</i>: provoking the feeling of hatred, usually towards classes, for example "any thief" or "any informer." 4) <i>Friendship</i>: the tone of the speech elicits feelings of being close, loving and caring towards the hearers. 5) <i>Fear</i>: provoking a painful or destructive picture expected to happen in the future in the hearers' minds. 6) <i>Confidence</i>: provoking a mental picture of a safe or successful expectation. 7) <i>Shame</i>: provoking a feeling of disturbance and disgrace for bad actions due to moral badness or cowardice, for example "abusing someone." 8) <i>Shamelessness</i>: provoking a feeling of carelessness or contempt in regard to the bad things, for example "The accusations against this campaign increase its power."
Logos	Concerns the argument and its proofs, for example facts, statistics, quotations, historical analogy (i.e. all means appropriate for the case in question).

5.7.3. Online newspapers

The same steps followed in the analysis of the YouTube data were applied for the news articles, (Figure 5.8). First, dividing entailed the process of understanding the stance of the writer to place the article in one of two categories: anti-MGS or pro-MGS. Few articles included both stances. For these articles, the section with the opposing stance was extracted from the original article to be placed in the belonging category; the reason was to understand the arguments from both sides and not to examine an individual's style of writing. Second was the process of summarising the main arguments in the articles. Third, the argumentation parts were identified based on Toulmin's (1958) model, as defined in 5.7.2. After analysing the argumentation parts, the claims (i.e. arguments) were thematically collected and divided into sub-arguments. Applying the Aristotelian appeals (Aristotle 2008) was the next step in evaluating the argumentation parts (Appendix D). Finally, one month after undertaking the analysis, intra-coder reliability measures were employed using the kappa statistic to establish the rigour of the results ($k = .885$).




Figure 5. 8 Steps followed in applying the argumentation analysis for the news articles.

5.8. Summary

This chapter has presented an outline of the methodology used in the study. It has set out the processes of data collection and preparation for analysis. It has then explained the methods of analysis applied. The following chapters present and discuss the results of the analysis of Twitter data (Chapter 6 & 7), YouTube data and data from online news articles (Chapter 8).

Chapter 6: Social actors and Saudi women in #EMGS on Twitter

6.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to discuss the findings related to the Twitter platform in order to answer two research questions with regard to the social actors and the representation of Saudi women in the #EMGS campaign. The chapter begins by summarising the results from the pilot study examining Twitter data from 2016-2017. The chapter then moves onto a discussion of the main study, discussing the results addressing my first research question: Which social actors are represented in the Twitter EMGS campaign? The chapter then considers the second research question: How do both #EMGS campaigners represent *Saudi women* as social actors and what are their social actions?

6.2. The findings from the pilot study

This research project began with a pilot study of two corpora spanned 2016-2017 and contained 3,000 tweets (Alotaibi & Mulderrig 2021). It examined the most prominent (statistically frequent) social actors in each corpus, then identified those who were *excluded* from the representation, either by being backgrounded or suppressed (see Van Leeuwen's model in section 5.7.1). Given the narrower remit of the pilot study, and mindful of the key protagonists in this social issue, the next step looked exclusively at the representation of *Saudi women*. I analysed how they were represented by integrating Van Leeuwen's sociosemantic model for identifying social actors with a transitivity analysis of their social actions.

The coding process resulted in 28 codes representing social actors in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 34 codes for social actors identified in the Fpro-MGS corpus. Besides Saudi women, four categories of social actor were prominent in the corpora: Fantis, male guardians, Fpros and the government (Table 6.1). The five actors were analysed with regard to the processes of exclusion and inclusion (van Leeuwen 2008) and their social actions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). Significant findings are reported in the following sections.

Table 6. 1 Occurrence of the top five social actors in the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora in the pilot study

Social actor	Corpus	Included		Excluded (Backgrounded)		Excluded (Suppressed)		Total
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	
Saudi women	Fanti-MGS n=1012	698	69	152	15	162	16	100
	Fpro-MGS	169	76	49	22	4	2	100

	n=222							
Fantis	Fanti-MGS n=1537	984	64	246	16	307	20	100
	Fpro-MGS n=436	248	57	92	21	96	22	100
Male guardian	Fanti-MGS n=551	353	64	49	9	149	27	100
	Fpro-MGS n=171	143	84	19	11	9	5	100
Fpros	Fanti-MGS n=314	195	62	69	22	50	16	100
	Fpro-MGS n=205	154	75	33	16	18	9	100
Government	Fanti-MGS n=319	86	27	19	6	214	67	100
	Fpro-MGS n=114	58	51	16	14	40	35	100

In the process of exclusion, social actors can be either backgrounded (i.e. mentioned somewhere in the text) or suppressed (i.e. no reference in the text). In the Fanti-MGS, one of the significant excluded social actors was the government (suppressed 67%, mainly through the process of nomination, and backgrounded 6%). The actor was excluded during acts related to ‘women’s empowerment’ and ‘abolishing the male guardianship system.’ It was also excluded in negative acts, such as ‘the elimination of women’s participation’; this strategy of representing the government probably signified avoidance of clashing with authority. In the Fpro-MGS, an interesting finding concerned the relatively less excluded actor of the ‘male guardian’ (suppressed 5% and backgrounded 11%). The actor was mainly de-emphasised in negative actions: ‘dominating women’s life’ and ‘abridging women’s rights.’ This was perhaps due to two reasons: 1) pushing the actor into the background or making no reference in these negative acts might, respectively, be to avoid making a direct connection between these actions and the male guardian, or to lend a sense of uncertainty (i.e. it might, for instance, have been another person/institution that caused these actions) as an attempt to justify the MGS, thus furthering the interests of the Fpro-MGS; 2) the fact that negative actions were less frequently assigned to excluded male guardians could indicate how rarely they occurred and that these actions were not part of their role.

I now turn to the inclusion of Saudi women and their most frequent social actions in both sub-corpora. The results showed that the social actor was represented mainly in material and relational processes (Figure 6.1).




Figure 6. 1 Social actions taken by Saudi women in the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora (adopted from Alotaibi & Mulderrig 2021)

In the Fanti-MGS, Saudi women were most frequently engaged in material processes (41% of the total) among all the types of social action. Within these processes, social actors were assigned to three roles: activated (115 instances), passivated (132 instances), or beneficialised (14 instances). First, the representation of Saudi women in an active role was classified in terms of gender (e.g. ‘young woman’ and ‘woman’), appraised (e.g. ‘ambitious girls’ and ‘powerless and marginalised women’), identified by their relationships with others (e.g. ‘sisters’ and ‘married’); Saudi women were mainly represented as unable to perform the actions of ‘travelling,’ ‘working’ and ‘studying’ without a male guardian’s permission. Second, the representation of Saudi women in the passive role was also classified (e.g. ‘Saudis’ [+female]), appraised (e.g. ‘sane’), relationally identified (e.g. ‘daughter’) and distilled (e.g. ‘victim’ and ‘queens’). The Fantis described Saudi women as being ‘oppressed,’ ‘controlled’ and ‘guarded’ by their male guardians. Third, the representation of Saudi women in a beneficiary role was classified (e.g. ‘Saudi’ [+female]) and appraised (e.g. ‘sane’). These results indicated that Fantis railed against the MGS by explaining processes that cannot be conducted by Saudi women because of the MGS; thus, Saudi women were assigned to passive roles more often than active roles.

As in the Fanti-MGS, Saudi women were frequently involved in material processes (37% of the total) in the Fpro-MGS corpus. Saudi women were activated in 33 instances, passivated in

24 instances and beneficialised in 8 instances. First, the representation of Saudi women in the active role was classified (e.g. ‘Muslim woman’ and ‘Saudi’ [+female]), relationally identified (e.g. ‘daughter’ and ‘sister’) and distilled (e.g. ‘pearl’); Saudi women were said to ‘work’ without their male guardian and to ‘succeed’ in life without being obstructed by the MGS. However, they cannot travel alone and this was justified by the Prophet’s saying “A woman also may not travel with anyone except with a *Mahram* (relative)”¹⁷ (Al-Asqalani 2003, p. 259). Second, their representation in the passive role was classified (e.g. ‘Saudi woman’) and relationally identified (e.g. ‘daughters of men’). Third, in beneficiary roles, Fpros indicated that Saudi women need the ‘protection’ of their male guardians to avoid being ‘abused’ or ‘harassed.’ They also supported the idea that Saudi women were being used in a conspiracy that aimed to ‘separate Saudi women from their families.’

In both the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora, relational processes (i.e. for identifying and characterising Saudi women) occurred second most frequently of the different types of social action. The patterns of Saudi women’s representations within these were according to the categories of the relational processes: intensive, possessive and circumstantial.

In the Fanti-MGS, Saudi women were identified and characterised 35% in relational processes. First, the intensive attributive processes contained classifications for Saudi women as ‘abused’; the Fantis clarified that Saudi women were neither ‘queens’ nor ‘backward.’ The intensive identifying processes identified them as ‘second-class citizens,’ ‘belonging to men’ and when compared to women worldwide, ‘the only women who are considered minors.’ It was argued that Saudi women should have their rights, because they are ‘one half of society.’ Second, the possessive attributive processes were used to make comparisons between contemporary Saudi women, who are required to ‘have male guardians,’ and their grandmothers. In addition, Fantis suggested that talented Saudi women scientists ‘are lucky,’ because they ‘have kind and open-minded male guardians.’ In possessive identifying processes, they were identified as ‘being owned by their male guardian.’ Third, the circumstantial attributive processes characterised Saudi women as ‘depending on their male guardian and his mood swing.’ In circumstantial identifying processes, Saudi women were metaphorically treated as ‘minors’; Fantis criticised the MGS, which categorised Saudi women as minors requiring a chaperone and protector.

In the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus, Saudi women were identified and characterised in 30% of all types of social action in relational processes. First, within the intensive attributive processes,

¹⁷ In Islam, *mahram* refers to a male who a female Muslim cannot marry.

Saudi women were given attributes (e.g. ‘being queens,’ ‘aware of the conspiracy’ and ‘proud of their male guardian’). In addition, they were represented as not being ‘slaves’ or ‘oppressed’ and not being treated as ‘commodities.’ In intensive identifying processes, they were identified as ‘the most respected women in the world’ because of their decency and respect towards their families, being both ‘hero makers’ and ‘mothers of men.’ Second, the possessive attributive processes identified Saudi women as having ‘the lowest rates of harassment and rape in the world.’ Third, the circumstantial attributive processes represented the United States as a carrier, such as in the phrase ‘the US busied themselves with Saudi women.’ Fpros tended to support their tweets using a collection of screenshots of news headlines and articles showing support from the US towards Saudi women over time. In addition, Fpros displayed statistics suggesting that Saudi women experienced the lowest rates of various crimes, unlike women in the US, whose problems the US should confront.

6.2.1. Summary

The findings of the pilot study revealed that different roles were assigned to Saudi women by Fantis and Fpros. In the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus, Saudi women were active in negative statements, as in unable to do an action. This was perhaps in order to convey the status of Saudi women as helpless and powerless due to the MGS, despite their capability. Interestingly, the aggregate representation was used most; according to van Leeuwen (2008, p. 37), “aggregation is often used to regulate practice.” Therefore, the use of aggregation for the representations of Saudi women by Fantis tended to regulate the practices of being controlled and abused. In contrast, Fpros frequently positioned Saudi women in an active role to serve their aim of maintaining the MGS by representing Saudi women as capable of participation and involved in various material processes.

One of the representations of Saudi women is as ‘queens.’ The use of this symbolic language for women was first practised by religious figures in their sermons and publications to justify the proposed limited role of women and to maintain the patriarchal system in Saudi Arabia (Alhussein 2018). Thus, they portrayed women as queens who did not have to earn a living and who were supposed to be served and financially supported by their male relatives; such practice aimed to normalise domesticity, and motivate women to endorse and encourage the community to embrace male dominance. However, Fantis failed to see how Saudi women could be ‘queens’ while being controlled under the MGS.

To justify the MGS, Fpros tended to use the preachers' strategy by referring to a Saudi woman as a 'queen' or 'pearl.' In doing so, they were implying that women should be protected by their male guardians. This resemblance in persuasive methodology between discourses indicates that Fpros were influenced by conservative Islamic discourse. The results also reveal sexist language in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus when referring to Saudi women as 'daughters of men.' Unlike calling a man a 'woman' or 'woman's son,' in Arabic, calling a woman a "man" or a "daughter/sister of men" is not an insult. Indeed, it is deemed to be a compliment, as a strong woman is seen to have male qualities, such as bravery (Joubin 2013). However, it also means that "her strength comes from her relationship to men and not from her own person" (Joubin 2013, p. 198). Fpros seem to unconsciously represent Saudi women as a marginalised group through their use of sexist language.

The analysis of relational processes brings out how Saudi women can be seen in these opposing ways simultaneously. In the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus, Saudi women were identified as free women and independent, among other identifications. However, in reality, Saudi women have faced strict boundaries in compliance with the MGS and are being undermined (Al-Fassi 2013). In addition, Fantis were found to use various persuasive strategies to make their case, as identified in the relational processes. For instance, they used logical evidence to argue that Saudi women were fully fledged Saudi citizens who should be treated and recognised as such, and given full privileges. To support this argument, Saudi women were represented as having all the qualities necessary to be treated as independent citizens, such as being educated, aware of their rights and so on. Their argument was also supported by comparing the state of Saudi women to that of their grandmothers, who did not have male guardians.

In contrast, Fpros had different views concerning Saudi women and their rights, believing that Saudi women are queens and have full rights awarded by Islam; however, this is only the case for women whose guardians fulfil their duties and responsibilities. There was a tendency to highlight the lives of the majority, and to marginalise the lives of abused women, who were in the minority. In addition, Fpros used sexist language to subjugate Saudi women, in that they were represented as "mothers of men." Again, there were similarities in the discourse of Fpros and conservative Islamic discourse, demonstrating how patriarchal power influenced their portrayal of Saudi women.

To conclude, the pilot study aimed to test the corpus-aided methods and to generate initial empirical insights into patterns of social representation on Twitter, as the main platform where

the campaign has started. Unlike the main study, it focused exclusively on how *women* are represented by female campaigners, i.e. examining the representation of women, by women in Fanti- and Fpro-MGS sub-corpora. MGS. The findings of the pilot study provided a partial image of this social problem; thus, the investigation of the other social actors and the representations of Saudi women by men are necessary to fully recognise the problem.

6.3. The social actors in the Twitter #EMGS campaign

This section aims at identifying salient patterns in the textual representation of different categories of social actor. After going through the frequency list in each corpus, the references to social actors are divided into six categories based on the references: representations of women referring to all female actors (i.e. ladies, queens), representations of men referring to all male actors (i.e. men, guardian), representation of institutional actors (e.g. Sheik, @CNN), neutral representations referring to all generic references (e.g. people, enemies), indeterminate representations referring to unspecified social actors (e.g. someone, the other) and aggregate representations referring to quantifiers of social actors (e.g. several, many). The findings reveal that all four corpora, Fant-MGS, Manti-MGS, Fpro-MGS and Mpro-MGS, contain the six categories (Appendix E). In the following, I discuss their distribution across the corpora, and then focus on the interesting patterns in the representations of social actors.




Figure 6. 9 Relative prominence of women represented in each corpus

The most statistically prominent category of actor is, unsurprisingly, women. Moreover, this pattern is even more obvious in the corpora written by women; as we see in Figure 6.2, both of these female corpora have more representations of women compared to the male corpora. The representation of women takes five main forms: categorised (e.g. students, abused), nominated (e.g. Azizh, Eve), overdetermined (e.g. prisoners, goods) and impersonal (e.g. voices, body). In addition, these representations of women in the four corpora is analysed within the context of semantic prosody (see 6.4.1).




Figure 6. 10 Relative prominence of men represented in each corpus

The next step is to discover how *men* are represented in the corpora. As illustrated in Figure 6.3, men are more prominent in the anti-MGS than the pro-MGS corpora; this might be because of the nature of the campaign, whose focus is, of course, objecting to male guardians. As with women, men are also represented in the following keyways: categorised (e.g. father, abuser), nominated (e.g. Adam, Adnan), overdetermined (e.g. master, ISIS member) and impersonal (e.g. permission). The impersonal references in the four corpora are not particularly significant; thus, they are excluded from further analysis.




Figure 6. 11 Relative prominence of institutional actors represented in each corpus

Finally, I turn to the representation of institutional actors; authorities of various kinds, whether public or private. Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 6.4, the results suggest that the female campaigners are more preoccupied with institutional actors than their male counterparts. Institutional actors are represented in the following ways: categorised (e.g. king, Sheikh), collected (e.g. religious police, government), nominated (e.g. Hillary, Al-Manyei) and impersonal (e.g. article, country).

As we have seen, the most prominent types of social actor represented in the data are *women*, *men*, and *institutions*. However, there are a number of other representations which fit neither of these categories. These include, for instance, neutral (i.e. generic) forms of reference like ‘society,’ ‘world,’ indeterminate forms where it is simply not clear which actors are being referred to, like ‘one,’ ‘someone,’ and aggregate forms of reference whereby actors are referred to in quantified terms, like ‘many,’ ‘several.’

6.3.1. Distribution for social actors

As discussed above, the social actors in the #EMGS on Twitter are divided into six categories: women, men, institutional actors, neutral, indeterminate and aggregated. In this section I examine the patterns for each category in turn.

Representations of women

Compared with the other corpora, the representations of women (in general) in the Fanti-MGS corpus are interestingly represented through a greater diversity of proper nouns (e.g. Azizh, Fatima). These forms of representation occur in intertextual references to activists’ words, or actions, as well as abused women’s personal stories. I would argue this serves as a legitimisation strategy in their campaign against MGS, personalising their arguments, through name, individual women and their narratives. As Thorsen & Sreedharan (2019) argue, in identifying the ways Saudi female campaigners applied to be involved in the #EndMaleGuardianship campaign, their tweets tended to connect offline acts to the online campaign, in order to “arouse emotion, including anger, with their tweets, especially when they presented or reacted to cases of domestic violence that occurred offline” (p. 14).

In addition, the overdetermined representations (e.g. pearl, diamond, queen) usually refer to women *against* the campaign across the four corpora. Such representational choices may appear odd to others. As explained in 6.2, this highly symbolic way of referring to women is originated by religious figures. In fact, Al-Harby (2017) notes that such representations reflect an ideological stance towards Saudi women, which views them as a precious commodity to be preserved, much like a gemstone; this is not merely an allusion to Saudi affluence, but “the image of hidden jewellery for the sake of protection and preservation” (p. 10). However, women who reject this social ideology “are considered cheap, degraded and inappropriate” (p. 11); thus, the pro-MGS campaigners in general (both women and men) have tended to represent Fantis as ‘immoral’ and ‘slaves.’

Women who are represented impersonally are construed as an abstract quality, utterance, instrument, part of their body or their psycho-social identity. Within such forms of representation, negative qualities are assigned to Fantis, through terms like ‘conspiracy’ and ‘agenda.’ Utterances frequently refer to them by means of the actions they perform (e.g. campaign, reevaluation) and the instruments used, such as the ‘telegrams’ sent to the king from the anti-MGS campaigners and the ‘petition’ signed by the pro-MGS campaigners (see 2.4.1). Somatised actor representations (referring to them by means of their “body”) are found in all corpora. In many Muslim nations, a woman’s body “symbolically represents her nation and its political, religious and cultural ideologies” (Shirazi 2000, p. 122). Therefore, these representational patterns can project the ideological cornerstone of the entire campaign, whether Saudi women should have ownership and control over their own bodies, both symbolically and materially. Finally, representations of women by means of their psycho-social identity including, for example, women’s ‘reputation’ and ‘dignity,’ reflect the major role that Saudi women play not only in terms of their own reputation and dignity, but also their responsibility “for the social reputation and dignity of their male family members” (Al-Harby 2017, p. 19).

Representations of men

For the male social actors, the most prominent forms of representation are kinship terms referring to women’s male relatives (e.g. uncle, father etc.); this is unsurprising because male guardianship is exclusively about assigning power over a woman to her male relatives. Another prominent pattern involves nomination; the anti-MGS campaigners “sought to provide intertextuality between their messages and those of historically famous human rights activists, by tweeting influential or inspirational quotes” in order to sustain the motivation of participants (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019, p. 15), for example “Mandela” and “Gandhi.” With respect to the representation of men, here again overdetermined representations are a vehicle for controversial and ideologically-loaded forms of representation. One notable example of this is the term ‘ISIS,’ a reference to the terrorist Islamic organisation which refers to itself as the ‘Islamic State.’ In the Fanti corpus, male *supporters* of the guardianship system are referred to as ‘ISIS members,’ with this nomenclature also being applied to male *campaigners against* the guardianship system in pro-MGS corpora. However, the inferences in each case are subtly different. In the first, female campaigners *against* the system refer to male supporters of the system as ‘ISIS members’ in order to liken their ideology, and their views towards women, to those of ISIS, an extremist organisation known for its oppression of women. In the second

example, both *supporters* of the system refer to male campaigners *against* the system as ‘ISIS members,’ as an allusion to their way of manipulating the religious scripts so as to convince the public of the legitimacy of their socio-political campaign (#EMGS). Both representational choices trigger negative evaluative meanings in order to delegitimise the other campaigners’ position.

Representations of institutional actors

The category of institutional actors is interesting for its role in reflecting powerful voices in each corpus. This category covers those in the political, religious, educational, and media sectors. The most diverse set in this category comprises impersonal references, whereby the institutional actors are referred to by their utterances (e.g. agreement, decision and Fatwa), by the instrument (e.g. Twitter accounts and TV channel), by their body parts (e.g. necks) and by their place (e.g. kingdom, America and school). Unlike other corpora, the Fantis tend to draw international attention to the #EMGS campaign by mentioning the Twitter accounts of human rights organisations (e.g. @hrw and @UN_Women) and foreign press (e.g. @CNN and @France24_ar). Moreover, it aims to gain national attention by mentioning the Twitter accounts of a Saudi human rights organisation (e.g. @HRCSaudi), and Saudi media (e.g. the TV channel: @MBC_Group, the TV show: @YaHalaShow, and the newspaper @OKAZ_online). Another reason for mentioning these social actors is to refer to their coverage of the campaign (i.e. intertextual references), either through TV reporting or articles, because “the campaign was reported in newspapers, TV channels and on YouTube” both domestically and internationally (Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019, p. 15). Other intertextual references to powerful voices are made through proper nouns, namely ‘Allah’ when referring to God’s sayings and ‘Salman’ when referring to the king’s sayings and actions. These linguistic patterns consistently occur in the four Twitter corpora and serve rhetorical purposes, e.g. delegitimising, legitimising, denigrating, valorising (further analysis in Chapter 7). Finally, the group of institutional actors include individuals or groups related to a certain institution (e.g. Sheikh and prince).

Neutral, Indeterminate, and Aggregated actor representation

The group of neutral actors (i.e. generic references) is dominant in the four corpora and includes a variety of representations (e.g. children, enemy and tribes). The category also includes a set of impersonalised representations, making generic references using abstract qualities, (e.g. sample, agenda and troubles), an utterance (e.g. speech, tweets and stories), the instrument by which an action is carried out (e.g. Twitter accounts and clips), and body parts (e.g. face and

heart). In the indeterminate category, the four corpora contain references to unspecified social actors (e.g. someone and others); these anonymised representations tend to treat the identity of social actors as irrelevant to the reader, while the representation of “others” create a difference between the “self” and the “other” (van Leeuwen 2008). In the aggregated category, quantifiers stand alone for social actors, for example, ‘some’ and ‘many’ of the social actor, Saudi women.

While it is clearly illuminating to see the representational choices made in construing the various categories of social actor in the #EMGS campaign, this only provides a partial picture. To get a more three-dimensional picture of how women, in particular, are treated in this data set, we need to go beyond what Reisigl & Wodak (2001) call ‘naming’ strategies (examined here using Van Leeuwen’s model), to examine wider predicational strategies: how are female actors evaluated? What roles and actions are construed for the main social actors, Saudi women/woman?

6.4. Saudi women in the #EMGS

To answer this question, the findings are divided into three sections, addressing: (i) the general attitude towards women in each corpus, in order to understand the general views on women’s rights and also to provide a preliminary picture of the data (section 6.4.1); (ii) the representations of Saudi women/woman and their actions in the four corpora (section 6.4.2); (iii) an overview of the findings (section 6.4.3).

6.4.1. General attitudes towards the female social actors in Twitter corpora

To understand the general attitude towards women construed in the #EMGS discourse, the meaning attributes of the collocates of the relevant node words (i.e. those nouns used to represent women) are examined. As Baker et al. (2008, p. 278) argue, such an approach to corpus data “can provide a helpful sketch of the meaning/function of the node within the particular discourse.” The concordance lines of the four sets of women categories are thoroughly examined in co-text, in order to shed light on their semantic/discourse prosody. So, the overarching question here is: what positive or negative meanings are construed for *women in general* across the Twitter corpus? The hypothesis is that while female and male supporters of the guardianship system (Fpro- and Mpro-MGS) might represent women in a positive way (as something to be valued and protected), both female and male campaigners *against* the system (Fanti- and Manti-MGS) would be likely to represent women in a rather negative way, highlighting the oppressed lives they lead, so as to convince others of their core argument that the MGS should end. The results are rather surprising.

As mentioned in 6.3, examining the frequency list has resulted in a set of representations of women. Each representation has investigated, through the concordance lines, for its semantic/discourse prosody. Similar to the abovementioned hypothesis, both Fantis and Mantis contextualise women within negative context. The findings show that of the representations of women, 64% (139 out of 218) by Fantis and 59% (98 out of 166) by Mantis use words denoting unpleasant meanings or events (Appendix F). For example, 'mother' by Fantis is used regularly in negative contexts (Table 6.2). The semantic/discourse prosody works differently in different sentences; the identification process is occasionally very clear due to the intrinsically negative semantics of a collocate (e.g. humiliated, unqualified and inadequate, insult). However, it is more complex in other instances, in Table 6.2, example 4, the negative prosody here stems from a presupposed negative prosody for 'guardian,' i.e. by accepting first the inference that 'guardian' is a bad role for 'your own mother' in order to make sense of this question. Thus, the negative semantic prosody of the female actor representation in turn helps construing a negative evaluation of the concept of 'guardian.'

Another example by Mantis, the discourse prosody for 'queen' is a more complex picture (Table 6.2), in that, the word itself is semantically positively pre-evaluated and thus, it carries this positive semantic prosody. However, these positive connotations are undermined by Mantis. This is done in various ways which are more or less explicit; Table 6.2, example 1 implicitly constructs a meaning opposition between 'queen/princess' and 'free/independent' and example 2 provides an implicit definition of queen (can't drive, hiding face, lack of control). In a more explicit way, examples 3 and 4 negatively contextualise queen in the noun phrase as 'without freedom,' 'abused and oppressed.' Fairclough's (2003) idea of equivalence (i.e. involving additive and elaborative relations) and difference (i.e. involving contrastive relations) captures the semantic relations surrounding 'queen.' The surrounding expressions stands for both relations: 1) equivalence, when they are sharing the property of being oppressed, abused and without freedom, and 2) difference, when they are contrasting the actions - being capable of driving, and controlling their lives. In both relations, the expressions contribute to building up an opposed vision of 'being queen'; such process of meaning-making "takes place within a struggle over meaning, and depends for instance on how pervasively these meaning relations are repeated in various types of texts, and how successfully alternatives are excluded" (p. 101).

Table 6. 2 Examples of concordances for negative discourse prosody in the anti-MGS corpora

	“mother” in the Fanti-MGS corpus	“queen” in the Manti-MGS corpus
1.	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية64 كل ذكر ولد من ام مكسورة ذليلة يظن ان النساء كسيرات كامه الى ان يصطدم بالواقع</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem64 Every man who was raised by an abused, humiliated mother thinks that all women are just like this, until reality hits him.</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_الولاية318 لانريد المرأة في الوطن ملكة ولا نريدها اميرة نريدها فقط مواطنة حرة مستقلة لها كامل الحقوق التي تحميها</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem318 We don't want the Saudi woman to be a queen or a princess in our country, we just want her to be a free and independent citizen with rights that protect her.</p>
2.	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية84 المرأة والرجل شركاء في المجتمع ولا يمكن ان يقوم المجتمع يرى ان الام والزوجة والاخت والابنت فردا ناقص وغير مؤهل</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem84 Men and women are equally parts of society; but what if society considers mother, wife, sister, and daughter to be unqualified and inadequate individuals?</p>	<p>انا ملكة لا اقاد السيارة ولكن وجهي عورة و لا املك امر نفسي و طفلي هو من يتولى امري انا ملكة انا درة</p> <p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية92</p> <p>I'm a queen but I cannot drive, my face is a shame, and I have no control over my life, my child is my guardian. I'm a queen... I'm a pearl! #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem92</p>
3.	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية220 استعبدوا النساء باسم الولاية عن اي تكريم تتحدثون؟ بوجود نظام فيه الام تهان</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem220 Enslaving women under the name of guardianship. What is so honouring about it? A system that insults the mother.</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية110 السفهية التي تصدق انها درة تستحق ان تسلب حقوقها ملكة بلا حرية غياب</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem110 A fool who believes that she's a “pearl” and gives up her rights just to be a queen without freedom.</p>
4.	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية72 اللي يشوف ماضي امه معه كيف يتجرا ان يستنقصها ويقبل ان يصبح ولي عليها</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem72 How could you accept to be your mother's guardian after all the efforts she put into bringing you up?</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية27 انا اول مرة اعرف ان هناك ملكة تمثل نصف المجتمع مضطهدة الحقوق مظلومة في مجتمعا</p> <p>This is the first time I've ever heard of an abused and oppressed queen!</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem27</p>

In contrast, 36% (79 out of 218) of representations of women in the Fanti-MGS and 41% (68 out of 166) in the Manti-MGS employ words with positive connotations, for example the social actors, ‘feminists’ and ‘female guardian’ (Table 6.3.). First, ‘feminists’ are surrounded with positive semantic collocates, e.g. ‘raising society’s awareness,’ ‘supporting the political decision,’ and ‘being humanitarian and true believers.’ In addition, the collocates with negative connotation, e.g. ‘hate’ is undermined by rejecting the action. Second, ‘female guardian’ is surrounded by positive prosody because of the acceptance that women are ‘mature and sane,’

‘allowed to be responsible for their children and have the bond of marriage in Islam,’ and ‘have equal rights as men.’ Thus, this presupposed positive prosody for ‘female guardian’ is constructed in order to understand the question why they cannot be guardian and also to help legitimating their argument against the MGS.

Table 6. 3 Examples of concordances for positive discourse prosody in the anti-MGS corpora

	“feminists” in the Fanti-MGS corpus	“female guardian” in the Manti-MGS corpus
1.	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية300 النسويات السعوديات رفعوا مستوى وعي المجتمع</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem300 Saudi feminists have <u>raised the level of society’s awareness.</u></p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية3 ثم ان الولاية هي ولاية التزويج لا ولاية على النفس فالمرأة ولية نفسها ما دامها عاقلة راشدة لا خلاف في ذلك</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem3 The guardianship system is only required in marriage contracts, other than that, a woman can be her own guardian as long as she’s <u>mature and sane.</u></p>
2.	<p>اليوم كله نسويات يدعمون محمد بن سلمان هذا ان دل يدل على شيئين ان ما يكرهون كل الرجال مثل ما يقولون و ان المرأة تشوف الرجل المناصر لحقوقها رجل جدير بالحب و الاحترام #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية301</p> <p>All Saudi feminists are <u>supporting</u> Mohammed bin Salman, which means that they <u>don’t hate</u> all men like they say, in fact they respect the men who support their rights #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem301</p>	<p>اية القوامة الخاصة بالزوج و المشروطة بفضلة و بالنفقة لا تعتبر دليلا على سلب الاهلية الكاملة من المرأة فلو كان كذلك لما كانت المرأة ولية على ابنائها و يحق لها شرعا الولاية على الابناء!! #اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>The verse in the Qur’an that states male guardianship only includes the husband’s maintenance of his wife. However, it doesn’t state taking full advantage of women! a woman can be <u>the guardian of her children</u>- why, then, cannot she be her own guardian? #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>
3.	<p>النسويات بتويتر هم الانسانية يغردون بيننا انا انسانة في المقام الاول قبل ان اكون امراة #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية233</p> <p>The feminists on Twitter are <u>humanitarian</u> by tweeting for women’s rights in this hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem233: “I am a woman but first I am a human being!”</p>	<p>للمعلومية يجوز في الاسلام ان تكون العصمة في يد الزوجة فمن باب اولى اذا ان تكون ولية نفسها اذا اقتضى الامر #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية21</p> <p>For your information, women in Islam can have <u>the bond of marriage</u> – why, then, cannot she be her own guardian? #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem21</p>
4.	<p>#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية130 اللي وري هالوسم نسويات مؤمنات بحقوقهن و رجال داعمين لنصفهم الاخر</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem130 The feminists in this hashtag are <u>true believers</u> of their rights, and men who support their partners</p>	<p>لا ولاية على المرأة الا في الزواج المنيع لعكاظ اكد عضو هيئة كبار العلماء الشيخ عبدالله المنيع لعكاظ بان المرأة ولية نفسها في كافة امور حياتها و لا ولاية عليها الا في النكاح و لها مثل ما للرجل من حقوق #اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>“Male guardianship is only required in the marriage contract; <u>women have the same rights as men</u>” Shaikh Abdullah Al-Menea member of the Senior Scholars Council to Okaz</p>

	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem. He endorsed that a woman is her own guardian .
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Unlike the hypothesis stating that Fpros and Mpros might represent women in a positive way, the findings reflect that women are negatively represented in 73% (143 out of 196) of cases by Fpros and 67% (69 out of 103 cases) by Mpros (Appendix G). For example, ‘feminists’ in Table 6.4 co-occurs with the intrinsically negative semantic collocates (e.g. extremist, recruited, immoral, being against the Sharia). Another example of the negative semantic prosody of female actor representation is ‘naturalised women’ by Mpros in Table 6.4. These instances construe the female campaigners *against* the MGS as ‘others’ from the Saudis, ‘us’ (e.g. interfere in our affairs, on behalf of Saudis, pretending to be Saudis). In Table 6.4, example 4, the negative prosody here stems from their action, i.e. demanding to end the MGS in the country of two Holy Mosques- as a place applying the Sharia. Both negative semantic prosodies in turn help construe a negative evaluation of the #EMGS campaign and its campaigners.

Table 6. 4 Examples of concordances for negative discourse prosody in the pro-MGS corpora

	“feminists” in the Fpro-MGS corpus	“naturalised” in the Mpro-MGS corpus
1.	ما يحدث في قروبات المجندات النسويات المتطرفات المطالبات ب#اسقاط_الولاية هو تجميع فتياتنا لتشوية صورة الدولة	#سعوديات_نفخر_باسلامنا_المشكلة بالمجنسات التي تتدخل بشؤونكم و تطالب باسمكم (بالسعوديات) !
	What is happening within the groups of <u>extremist-recruited</u> feminists who call for #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem is only to gather our girls to distort the image of the country.	#SaudiWomenProudOfIslam the problem is those naturalised women who <u>interfere in our affairs</u> and demand women’s rights on behalf of (Saudis)!
2.	نحن امام مخطط ليس بمحض الصدفة انما منظم و مدروس يتم فيه المتاجرة و التلاعب بمعاناة [حالات فردية و قليلة ليست ظاهرة] حسابات تم تجنيدها من نسويات متطرفات #اسقاط_الولاية	#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية200 كالعادة المجنسات و المحرضات يطالبون باسم السعوديات من تضررت من الولاية عليها ان تذهب الى القضاء هو الملجا الوحيد و ليس جهات اجنبية
	We’re facing a planned and determined organisation that has <u>recruited</u> extremist feminists to manipulate facts using [rare domestic violence cases] to propagate their ideas #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem200 As usual, naturalised women and instigators are demanding the rights of women <u>on behalf of Saudis</u> . Whoever faces a problem with the system should go to the judiciary not to outside organisations.
3.	#الولاية_لها_لاعليها ترى النسويات المنحرفات ان ثقافة المجتمع التي نشأ عليها الابناء سببا لتحيز و التميز بين الجنسين و الاصل المساواة!!	عضو بمجلس الشورى: اكثر من مليون حساب في تويتر يدعون انهم من السعودية اتوقع يقصد المجنسات حقين #اسقاط_الولاية 170

	<p>#GuardianshipSystemIsForHerSake most of the <u>immoral</u> feminists think that the prominent culture in our society is based on discrimination and gender inequality, while equality is the most prominent!!</p>
<p>4. صدی المجتمع #السعودي للحملة العدائية فانسحب النسويات شكليا .. فقط تعددت حيلهم و الهدف واحد لتتسلخ المملكة من تطبيق الشريعة #اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>#Saudi society's resilience forced the feminists to withdraw. Their strategies varied but their purpose was one: to <u>derogate the application of Sharia</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>	<p>“More than million accounts on Twitter <u>pretending</u> to be Saudis,” Member of the Shoura Council. I think he referred to the naturalised women in #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem170</p> <p>نستغرب من المجنسات انهن يطالين باسقاط الولاية في بلاد الحرمين لا تكثرون من المطالب ثم الدولة تحسب جنسياتكم #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية159</p> <p>I'm surprised by the naturalised women who <u>demand</u> the end of the male guardianship system in the country of the <u>two Holy Mosques</u>! Don't go too far or the country will withdraw nationality from you</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem159</p>

The representations of women are positive 27% (53 out of 196) in the Fpro-MGS and 33% (34 out of 103) in the Mpro-MGS corpus. For instance, ‘queen’ by Fpros co-occurs with intrinsically positive semantic collocates (e.g. being served, taken care of, protected, honoured by religion) (Table 6.5). In example 4, the role of queen is demonstrated as being protector of religion, values and principles, and in doing so, she supposedly rejects the #EMGS campaign. The Mpros positively represent women, who have already practising their rights; thus, they question the reasons behind the #EMGS campaign (Table 6.5). For instance, divorced women have sums of money from the state for their financial support, are allowed to have custody of their children, along with other privileges that they share with the widowed. Thus, the positive semantic prosody of the female actor representation in turn helps construe a positive evaluation of the MGS.

Table 6. 5 Examples of concordances for positive discourse prosody in the pro-MGS corpora

	“queen” in the Fpro-MGS corpus	“divorcee” in the Mpro-MGS corpus
1.	<p>الولاية تنظيم للحياة وبها تكون المرأة ملكة حيث يلزم الرجل بخدمتها ورعايتها #الولاية_لها_لا_عليها #اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>Male guardianship organises life and through it a woman is treated as a queen by <u>obligating men to serve and take care of them</u> #GuardianshipIsForHerSeek #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>	<p>#اسقاط_الولاية #مالذي_ينقص_المرأة_السعودية ماينقصها شيء معززة مكرمة في بيت ابوها وتدرس وتتعالج مجاني واذا هي ارملة او مطلقة تستلم راتب من الدولة</p> <p>#EndMaleGaurdianshipSystem #WhatDoesSaudiWomanLack A Saudi woman does not need anything. She is raised with honour and dignity at her father's house, she gets free healthcare and free education, and if she's divorced or widowed, she <u>gets paid</u> by the state.</p>

<p>2. #الولاية_لها_لاعليها ربنا العظيم الخبير فرق في تكوين الجنسين ليباشروا دورهم المناط فمن جميل ذلك ان تكون المرأة ملكة يقام بخدمتها و رعايتها</p> <p>#GuardianshipIsForHerSake Allah the Almighty has differentiated between men and women and has given each of them specific roles. It is part of the <u>men's role to protect</u> and treat a woman like a queen.</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية19 فرض المجلس الاعلى للقضاء التطبيق باثر رجعي للقرار القاضي بمنح المطلقة حق الولاية على ابنائها الذين في حضانتها في افضل قرار لة منذ انشائة</p> <p>#EndMaleGaurdianshipSystem19 The supreme council has passed a legislation that allows a divorced woman <u>the custody of her children</u>; this is the best decision the council has ever made.</p>
<p>3. #اسقاط_الولاية2 انا سعودية و افخر ولاية ابي لي و باخي سندي و كل زوجة فخورة بولاية زوجها لها هكذا اكرمني ديني و جعلني ملكة</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem2 I'm a Saudi woman who is proud of her father's guardianship, and every wife is proud of her husband's guardianship; this is how <u>my religion honours me</u> and made me feel like a queen.</p>	<p>المرأة السعودية معززة مكرمة و اذا هي ارملة او مطلقة لديها امتيازات أكثر من قبل الدولة #اسقاط_الولاية لماذا؟ ما هو مفهوم الولاية على المرأة؟</p> <p>The Saudi woman is honourable and dignified, and if she's widowed or divorced; she <u>has more privileges by the state</u>. Then, why #EndingMaleGuardianshipSystem?</p>
<p>4. انتي حرة انتي ملكة اشغلت الشرق و الغرب بسبب تمسكك بدينك بمبادئك بقيمك #ضد_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>You're free and you're a queen who attracts the attention of the whole world, because you protect <u>your religion, principles, and values</u></p> <p>#AgainstEndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>	<p>المطلقة لها حقوق من الدولة وكذلك الارملة #ضد_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>The divorced and widowed have <u>more rights</u> to be provided for by the state</p> <p>#WithMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>

This section has provided an overview of attitudes towards women as represented in context in each corpus. The hypothesis before conducting this examination was that those campaigning to end the guardianship system would be more likely to represent women in a rather negative way. However, the results showed that all four corpora present negative attitudes towards women. The anti-MGS corpora are aligned with this hypothesis, i.e. a preponderance of negative representations is used to highlight the pitiful condition of women's lives in Saudi society, as well as more generally in patriarchal societies with systems similar to the Saudi one.

Second, it was suggested that the supporters of the guardianship system might represent women in a positive way in order to support a maintenance of the status quo by demonstrating the benefits to women's lives brought by this system. Surprisingly, however, both corpora represented women in a predominantly negatively way. Looking closely at the data, the main referents of these negative representations were, in fact, female campaigners against the MGS.

Thus, it is clear that their primary goal was to react to the #EMGS campaign by attacking the Fantis through these negative representations, while describing women’s lives under the MGS through positive representations was only a secondary, and thus less textually prominent, goal.

Looking at the variety of women’s representations in context helps reveal the participants’ differing stance and the reasons underpinning them. Based on this stage of the analysis, a preponderance of negative representations of women in the four corpora can be observed. However, this gives only a preliminary picture of the data. The next step in the analysis is to narrow down the focus specifically to *Saudi* women.

6.4.2. Representations of Saudi women/woman in the four Twitter corpora

To investigate the representation of Saudi women, I identify two basic search terms, “Saudi woman” and “Saudi women,” to undertake detailed analysis in the four corpora. The two search terms are examined in each corpus; however, the results show unexpected patterns of representations in English, for example aggregation with a singular actor, explained in the following.

6.4.2.1. The anti-MGS corpora

In this section, I present the unexpected findings concerning the representations: aggregation with a singular actor, unexpected assimilation and aggregation with an assimilated actor. I then discuss the representations and the actions of the two search terms: “Saudi woman” [السعودية] and “Saudi women” [السعويات].

Unexpected patterns in the singular term

A preliminary observation of the results reveals a surprising finding in the analysis of “Saudi woman.” There are three instances of the actor being aggregated with a singular term under the code (AGG.IND.CLASS) in the Fanti-MGS corpus. Two assimilated forms (AGG.ASSIM.CLASS) occur only four times in the Manti-MGS corpus and (ASSIM.CLASS) occur in both corpora: fifteen times in the Fanti-MGS corpus and nine times in the Manti-MGS corpus (Table 6.6).

Table 6. 6 Unexpected patterns for the representation of the search term “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora

Coding of unexpected patterns	“Saudi woman” in the Fanti-MGS corpus		“Saudi woman” in the Manti-MGS corpus	
AGG.IND.CLASS	3	17%	-	-
ASSIM.CLASS	15	83%	9	69%

AGG.ASSIM.CLASS	-	-	4	31%
Total	18	100%	13	100%

Aggregation with a Singular Actor (AGG.IND.CLASS)

Concerning aggregation with a singular actor (AGG.IND.CLASS), it should first be noted that this is a proper representation in Arabic, such that the number thousand(s) is followed by a singular noun, for example ‘1400 Saudi woman’ in the Fanti-MGS.

Fanti-MGS:

1400 امرأة سعودية يهرين سنويا بسبب العنف لو لهن كيان منفصل لاستقلت وازدهرت وانتجت
#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية31

“A 1400 **Saudi woman** escape annually due to domestic violence”! If they were treated as independent citizens, they would have thrived #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem31 [link of a video clip]

This intertextual reference is taken from a video on the Al-Arabia channel reporting on a recent statistic showing the number of Saudi women fleeing the country. This intertextuality might suggest an association between the problem of fleeing the country and the MGS by using #EMGS. However, the clause clearly clarifies the reason, namely domestic violence, and the video ascribes it to a lack of communication between the parents and their children. Although linguistically neither term, the MGS or the guardian, are mentioned in the video, the process of attaching a form of semiosis (i.e. video) in the tweet seems to serve the purpose of legitimising the policy of ending the system through providing official proof from a well-known channel among Saudis. Adding the hashtag functions “as [a] facilitative device for asserting one’s collective group identity and ideological affiliation” (Konnolly 2015, p. 13). In addition, it perhaps tends to provide a negative connection between the male guardian and the violence.

An interesting question is whether there is a connection between fleeing the country, the violence and the MGS. The hidden power behind the video and the report mentioned within the video does not allow for more explanation beyond a miscommunication issue. The video avoids touching on handling the case of domestic violence and its consequences. In practice, when women face abuse at home, the regulations for their protection are limited; however, they have recently been formulated. The Saudi Law of Protection against Abuse, which was

approved in 2013, criminalises domestic violence and a helpline has been set up to report such cases. When women are physically abused, they are taken to ‘protection centres’ or ‘safe houses’ (in Arabic *Dawr Al Diyafa*). The regulation states that a woman can leave the centre with a male guardian. However, an interview on BBC Arabic News (2019) with a social worker, Amani Alajlan, explained the changes regarding women’s rights after the royal announcement in April 2017. One of these changes, she said, is that a woman could be released from jail or a rehabilitation/care centre without a guardian if she was financially capable of having a place to live. Another interview with one of the directors of the Ministry of Labour and Social Development in 2018 mentioned the conditions for women to leave a protection centre being that they needed to be aged 30 years or older, financially independent, capable of work and having completed her education (Alissa 2018). However, the policy regarding these cases is not clear; thus, another campaign was launched in 2020 to drop the remnants of the guardianship system, which concerned specific cases, for instance female prisoners and abused women. In June 2021, an amendment was issued that women who finish their sentence and move to rehabilitation/care centre can now live alone without the need to be handed over to their guardians.

Another problem mentioned in the tweet is fleeing the country due to violence. The reason for this is perhaps because of the fear of being abandoned by family and forced to live in a protection centre with the prospect that the guardian might refuse release. Unlike men, women are always under the spotlight in Middle Eastern society because of what they represent. Indeed, “women are held more responsible for upholding family honor than men” (Shoup 2009, p. 177) and thus they live under the strict constraints of regulations supported by society.

Unexpected Assimilation (ASSIM.CLASS)

An unexpected finding is the representation of a plurality of women in the singular search term *s'ewdyh* under the code ASSIM.CLASS, whereby the singular *s'ewdyh* is describing women, “women of Saudi” [in Arabic, نساء السعودية]. This representation cannot be found in the second search term, the plural “Saudi women” although it belongs to the plural representation. Because the instances of this representation are in the category of “Saudi woman,” they will be analysed separately from the search term “Saudi women.” As shown in Table 6.7, the representation is involved in three social actions in the Fanti-MGS corpus, i.e. material, mental and relational (attributive) processes, and four processes in the Manti-MGS, i.e. material, verbal, behavioural and existential. Interestingly, the verbal processes (i.e. saying and expressing) are the most

prominent actions in the Manti-MGS, unlike the material processes (i.e. doing and happening) in the Fanti-MGS. In Table 6.8, the role assigned to the actor in both corpora is by far the most subjected; however, the actor is active in the Manti-MGS.

Table 6. 7 The social actions related to unexpected assimilation within the search term “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora

Social actions of (AGG).ASSIM.CLASS	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
Material processes (MA)	9	60%	3	23%
Mental processes (ME)	2	13%	-	-
Verbal processes (VE)	-	-	8	61%
attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	4	27%	-	-
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	-	-	-	-
Behavioural process (BE)	-	-	1	8%
Existential processes (EX)	-	-	1	8%
Total	15	100%	13	100%

Table 6. 8 The role of unexpected assimilation within the search term “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora

The role of the actor in (AGG).ASSIM.CLASS	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
Activation (ACT)	5	33%	5	38%
Initiator (INIT)	-	-	-	-
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	-	-	3	24%
Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	10	67%	5	38%
Total	15	100%	13	100%

Fanti-MGS:

#الولاية_تعطل_حياتي الولاية بلاء اصاب **نساء السعودية** الولاية عطلت حياة الكثير من النساء: دراسة، ابتعاث، طموح، عمل، استقلالية

#GuardianshipThwartMyLife Guardianship plagues **Saudi women** and it has disrupted the life of many: education, scholarship, ambitions, work and independence.

Manti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية69 اغلب المطالب التي يطالب فيها في وسم اسقاط الولاية سوف تتحقق **لنساء السعودية** قريبا ولن يكون هناك متسلط على المرأة

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem69 Most of the demands in this hashtag will be achieved soon and changed for **Saudi women**, and there will be no authority over women.

In the first example taken from the Fanti-MGS corpus, ‘Saudi women’ are being infected by the MGS, which is metaphorically presented as a disease. Within this material process, their role is passivated by having this disease. Another social actor in the tweet is classified under the code SEMI.OBJECTIVE. Within this representation, the actor is partially represented and referred to in terms of one aspect of her psycho-social identity: ‘life of many women.’ The role is also passivated within this material process. The second example, taken from the Manti-MGS corpus, represents ‘women of Saudi’ as the beneficiary of forthcoming changes very soon; this might have been intended to encourage Fantis to proceed with their demands and perhaps indicates a trust in authority aligned with the goals of Vision 2030.

Another proper Arabic representation found only in the Manti-MGS is ‘women of Saudi’ preceded by the quantifier ‘majority’ or ‘all’ under the code AGG.ASSIM.CLASS. The only difference between this representation and the assimilated actor (ASSIM.CLASS) is the aggregation.

Manti-MGS:

هي احدى المعنفات التي وصل صوتها **والاغلبية من نساء السعودية** لاتستطيع اقبال صوتها خوفا من بطش الرجل الحل هو #اسقاط_الولاية [link]

She’s one of the abused women whose voice was heard, but what about the **majority of Saudi women** who cannot speak up because they’re afraid of men’s oppression, the only solution is to #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem [link of video of an abused woman telling her story]

This example represents the majority of Saudi women as an active actor in a verbal process, ‘speaking up.’ However, they are not able to do so because of their fear of ‘men’s oppression.’ In addition, this includes an intertextual reference in the form of a link to a video of one of the abused women talking about her struggle. The intertextuality here serves as supportive evidence reinforcing the demands of #EMGS. This example shows the general purpose of Mantis corpus, i.e. being supportive.

The representation of Saudi woman

As presented in section 6.4.1, the social actor “Saudi woman” in both anti-MGS corpora has co-occurred within words denoting negative meanings and events. This reveals the general attitudes of female and male anti-MGS campaigners towards Saudi woman living their lives under the MGS. To conduct an in-depth analysis of the representation of “Saudi woman,” the concordance lines for 711 occurrences (out of 1010) in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 277 (out of 468) in the Manti-MGS corpus are examined. The analysis results in several representation patterns that varies in each corpus: the Fanti-MGS corpus contains 12 different representations while the anti-MGS corpus contains 5 (Table 6.9). The most prominent representation is IND.CLASS, which codes an individual actor identified by class(es) and occurs 610 times in the Fanti-MGS and 245 times in the Manti-MGS. The actor is generally classified by her gender and provenance, “Saudi woman.” Following the IND.CLASS representation, the second prominent is SEMI.OBJECTIVE, identified 53 times in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 24 times in the Manti-MGS corpus. In this representation, Saudi woman is partially backgrounded and represented by her psycho-social identity, for example, “dignity,” “rights,” “life” and “fate.”

Table 6. 9 The representation of “Saudi woman” in the anti-MGS corpora

Representations of “Saudi woman”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
IND.CLASS	610	86%	245	88%
IND.CLASS.APPR	18	3%	-	-
IND.CLASS.FUN	6	0.8%	2	1%
IND.CLASS.FUN.NOM	4	0.4%	2	1%
IND.CLASS.FUN.NOM.RELAT	1	0.1%	-	-
IND.CLASS.NOM	1	0.1%	-	-
IND.CLASS.RELAT	7	0.9%	-	-
INSTRUM	2	0.2%	-	-
PHY	1	0.1%	-	-
SEMI.OBJECTIVE	53	7.3%	24	9%
SOMATIZ	2	0.2%	4	1%
UTTER	6	0.8%	-	-
Total	711	100%	277	100%

The actor “Saudi woman” is not only coded in terms of her representation but also her actions (Table 6.10) and the role that she plays in processes (Table 6.11). The first observation arising from the analysis is that “Saudi woman” is represented as passivated in both corpora. However,

van Leeuwen (2008, p. 33) argues for a further distinction regarding the representation of the passive actor: “subjected social actors” and “beneficialised social actors.” Thus, the actor is closely investigated in relation to process and role.

By examining the social actions performed by the actor (Table 6.10), “Saudi woman” most frequently occurs within relational processes: 385 instances in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 123 instances in the Manti-MGS corpus, which are sub-coded into an attributive mood and identifying mood. The second most frequent processes are material: 220 instances in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 106 instances in the Manti-MGS corpus. Similarly, these processes are dominant in the pilot study (section 6.2.). The material and relational processes reflect a general pattern, namely that “Saudi woman” is described and identified within the relational processes and performing or receiving actions in the material processes. Overall, the actor is engaged in these two processes more than mental and verbal processes.

Table 6. 10 The social actions of “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora

Social actions of “Saudi woman”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Material processes (MA)	220	31%	106	38.2%
Mental processes (ME)	35	5%	29	10.4%
Verbal processes (VE)	60	8.4%	13	5%
attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	265	37.2%	53	19.1%
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	120	17%	70	25.2%
Behavioural process (BE)	2	0.2%	2	0.7%
Existential processes (EX)	9	1.2%	4	1.4%
Total	711	100%	277	100%

Table 6.11 shows that the role of “Saudi woman” is by far the most subjected (548 instances in the Fanti-MGS; 213 instances in the Manti-MGS), whereby the actor is either under or receiving an action in the material processes, or being described through the relational processes.

Table 6. 11 The role of “Saudi woman” in anti-MGS corpora

The role of “Saudi woman”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
Activation (ACT)	161	23%	64	23%
Initiator (INIT)	2	1%	-	-
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	81	10%	13	5%
Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	467	66%	200	72%
Total	711	100%	277	100%

Table 6.12 focuses on the representations of “Saudi woman” under the code IND.CLASS because it is the most prominent in both corpora. However, the representations within this code do not always refer to “Saudi woman” when examining the concordance lines. Thus, three categories are identified regarding the reference to Saudi woman: (i) a generic reference; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros. Table 6.12 shows that the prominent representations are mostly for Saudi woman as a generic reference (nine patterns in anti-MGS corpora), whereas there are few representations for Fantis and Fpros.

Table 6. 12 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi woman” in the three categories in anti-MGS corpora

Representations of IND.CLASS	“Saudi woman” as a generic reference		“Saudi woman” as Fantis		“Saudi woman” as Fpros	
	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus
Saudi woman المرأة السعودية	504	163	19	16	4	10
Free Saudi woman المرأة السعودية الحرة	10	2				
Saudi (female)- السعودية- الانثى السعودية	32	30	1	3	5	1
Saudi girl البنات/الفتاة السعودية	22	12	1			
Saudi child الطفلة السعودية	1					
Saudi teenager المراهقة السعودية	1					
Saudi Muslim سعودية مسلمة			1			

Strong independent Saudi woman المرأة السعودية القوية المستقلة	1					
Saudi citizen مواطنة سعودية	4	1				
Mature, sane, adult, Saudi woman المرأة السعودية الراشدة البالغة العاقلة	4	3				
Human Saudi woman المرأة السعودية الانسانية		1				
Successful Saudi woman المرأة السعودية الناجحة		2				
Educated Saudi woman المرأة السعودية المتعلمة		1				
Total Fanti-MGS=610 Manti-MGS=245	579	215	22	19	9	11
Percentage %	95%	88%	4%	8%	1%	4%

Saudi woman as a generic reference

The code IND.CLASS refers to Saudi woman as a generic reference, comprising 95% of the representation in the Fanti-MGS corpus (9 forms) and 88% in the Manti-MGS corpus (9 forms) (Table. 6.12). As shown in the above table, there are a number of similarities and differences between the representations of “Saudi woman” in the three references in the two anti-MGS corpora: “Saudi woman,” “free Saudi woman,” “Saudi female,” “Saudi girl,” “Saudi citizen,” and “adult, mature, sane Saudi woman.” While “Saudi child,” “Saudi teenager” and “strong independent Saudi woman” are representations found in the Fanti-MGS corpus, “human Saudi woman,” “successful Saudi woman” and “educated Saudi woman” are found in the Manti-MGS corpus.

Fanti-MGS:

الاميرة بسمة ال سعود: **المرأة السعودية** معنفة ومستعبدة ويمارس عليها القانون رقا #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية

Princess Basma Al-Saud: **Saudi woman** is abused, subjugated and enslaved by the law #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

This intertextual reference is found in the Fanti-MGS corpus. It is uttered by a female member of the royal family: Princess Basmah Al-Saud. ‘Saudi woman’ is categorised under the actions of being abused and enslaved; this depicts her as powerless actor. Two excluded actors in this

representation are those abusing and subjugating, and those legitimising or practising the law in a such way. To identify these excluded actors (i.e. if they are backgrounded or not mentioned), the main context is investigated. This example is decontextualised from an interview on BBC Arabic News in 2011, when the princess was asked about Saudi women's situation. My focus is on the social actors mentioned in her interview (BBC Arabic News 2011) as an attempt to understand her intertextualised utterance.

Five actors were mentioned in relation to this intertextual reference: 1) the royal family; 2) the Ministry of Justice; 3) the Ministry of Education, 4) the religious police, and 5) society. The royal family was represented as being in favour of empowering and supporting women by mentioning how King Abdulaziz, the founder of the kingdom, was proud to identify himself as Nora's brother in public. The second actor was the Ministry of Justice, which did not activate the regulations, passing them without putting them into practice; the reason for this was the bureaucracy which emerged from the Arabic and patriarchal culture. The third actor was the Ministry of Education, but she did not elaborate on this. The religious police helped oppress society with a focus on women (i.e. women's clothes, mobility and segregation) and they tended to have different agenda that did not serve Saudi society. Finally, Saudi society was criticised because of its tribal structure and norms, with the princess declaring that before making any decision, the level of acceptance and the reaction of society were always considered by the authorities.

In the aforementioned interview, the princess alludes to the actions of the five actors. She mentions the stance of her family towards empowering women and as an example of her family's treatment of women, she mentions the practice of the founder of the kingdom in addressing his sister by her name, Nora. The practice of representing women by their name among Arabs is usually avoided in the public sphere and specifically among men. Eid (1994) refers to this phenomenon as name avoidance and explains that this could be "attributed, among other things, to women's lack of public identity – itself attributed to male control over the public domain (e.g. education, economy, space), and the power associated with it, to the exclusion of women" (p. 83). In addition, this name avoidance for women is considered one of the "subtle forms of discrimination against women" (Romaine 2001, p. 154). Thus, using his sister's name implies his attitude towards women.

The religious establishment is another of the social actors mentioned in the interview. Princess Basma refers to their practices as "religious and social terrorism" in a different context (BBC

Arabic News 2011). This is not surprising looking at the history of Saudi Arabia and their actions in the public sphere. Originally, religious forces were established particularly in relation to overseeing commercial transactions (*hisbah*); however, their role changed after the Mecca incident (section 2.2.2) and their power expanded to ensure “public morality like gender segregation and a ban on women studying outside the country” (Commins 2006, p. 169). Moreover, the religious police exerted control over the education system and legal system. However, they faced much criticism, until the power of the religious police was stripped from them in 2016. Since this reining in of their power, the kingdom has witnessed an expansion of women’s rights (i.e. working opportunities in the public sphere and being allowed to drive, among other changes).

The Ministry of Education is another actor mentioned, but without elaborating. In relation to women’s rights, women’s education has been influenced and shaped by the religious establishment. While men’s education has been overseen by the Ministry of Education, women’s education was administered by the Department of Religious Guidance until 2002, in order to ensure the kind of education that would prepare good Muslim wives and mothers and provided knowledge for those jobs viewed as suiting their nature, e.g. teachers and nurses (Hamdan 2005). As a result, women have had limited choices in terms of the subjects available to them in schools and colleges.

The Ministry of Justice is a significant actor in relation to activating the regulations. When the Ministry of Justice was first founded to institutionalise the legal systems, the religious establishment resisted the separation of statutory regulations from Islamic law, wishing to maintain their power over the issuing of fatwas concerning legal arrangements (Commins 2006). As a result, the government established the Council of Ministers, a body responsible for issuing statutory regulations to be passed to the Ministry of Justice and for creating statutory courts for each category of regulations; however, “Even with the expanding jurisdiction of statutory courts, religious law has remained the essential basis of legitimacy for Saudi rule” (Commins 2006, p. 117).

The last actor is society. Saudi society comprises a mix of two main components: (i) the tribes with their traditions and values and (ii) that governed by the religious establishment. The latter was “in control of only the social arena, and in particular issues relevant to women” (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 295). These actors have played a role in shaping Saudi women’s status over time and in any attempt to reform their roles, their status would possibly change. Thus, Vision

2030 is not only aimed at identifying new economic opportunities, but also lessening the power of the religious establishment (Moshashai et al. 2020).

Fanti-MGS:

المرأة السعودية كشخص متعافي اجبر على كرسي متحرك ومنعوه من استخدام قدماء وفرضوا عليه ان يتصرف كما لو انه معاق #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية

Saudi woman is like a healthy person who has been forced to use a wheelchair and prevented from using her own legs and compelled to act as if she's disabled #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Another example of Saudi woman's representation in the Fanti-MGS corpus is the depiction of a relational process, categorised under the circumstantial identifying clauses 'be + like,' meaning 'resemble.' The circumstantial element expresses the role of the token (i.e. Saudi woman). The value is a nominal group with the name of a class of circumstance, 'healthy people are forced to behave as if disabled.' Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) explain that "all clauses of this type are metaphorical" (p. 293). This clause describes the Saudi woman's situation within the guardianship system as being that of 'a healthy person who has been forced to use a wheelchair'; this resembles the restrictions on her in practising her life despite her full capacity.

Manti-MGS:

المرأة السعودية أسيرة الولاية وعبء على المجتمع والاقتصاد #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية66

Saudi woman is a captive of the male guardianship system and she is a burden on society and the economy #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem66

#بماذا_تمتاز_المرأة_السعودية رغم ان المرأة السعودية أقل حظاً في نيل حقوقها بين نساء الخليج إلا أنها برزت في أغلب المجالات وأصبحت عالمية عصامية #اسقاط_الولاية

#WhatDistinguishSaudiWoman Despite the fact that **Saudi women** are less fortunate in achieving their rights than women of the Gulf countries, they have ruled in many different areas and become self-made global icons #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

خلف كل امرأة سعودية ناجحة أب أخ زوج عظيم لم يستغل سلطة الولاية للتسلط عليها وتهميشها إنما تركها لتكون عظيمة بذاتها فشكراً لهم #اسقاط_الولاية

Behind every successful **Saudi woman** is a great father, brother and a husband who don't use the guardianship power to their own advantage, but instead they let the woman be great on her own, so thanks to them #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

In the Manti-MGS corpus, Saudi woman is represented negatively by being assigned negative attributes within the relational processes. For example, she is functionally represented as ‘guardianship’s detainee’ and assigned the attribute ‘burden on society and the economy’ due to the MGS, forcing her to rely on her guardian and not on herself. Being a burden on society is a way of justifying the campaign against MGS because “If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens” (Wodak 2015, p. 7). For Saudi women to participate in the economy, it will be necessary to lift “the legal restrictions on their travel, personal identity cards, and economic opportunities” (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 305). In addition, Saudi woman’s situation is compared to that of women in other Gulf countries. Despite ‘being less fortunate in terms of rights in the Gulf,’ Saudi woman is represented positively in ‘becoming self-made and a global icon’ by succeeding in various fields. To provide a full picture of this reason underpinning her success, a relational process shows that ‘behind a successful Saudi woman is a great father, brother, husband who does not misuse the power given by the MGS.’

Manti-MGS:

المرأة السعودية شاركت بجميع قطاعات الدولة لتنظيم الحج وأثبتت بأنها كاملة الأهلية وتستحق أن يُعترف بها نظامياً كمواطنة راشدة وولية على نفسها #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية (4 photographs of her participation)

Saudi woman has participated in all state sectors, e.g. organising pilgrimage, and proved that she is fully qualified and that she deserves to be recognised as an independent citizen who can be her own guardian #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

كانوا فية من هم ضد البطاقة وكما حصلت **المرأة السعودية** على البطاقة ستحصل على كل حقوقها ومنها إسقاط الولاية الزمن لا يعود للوراء #اسقاط_الولاية

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem They were against issuing ID cards for women, but **Saudi woman** got it eventually; and so she will have all her rights including the end of the male guardianship system. Time doesn’t go backward.

تعقيدات وتبعية ولي الامر تنفك على **المرأة السعودية** بالتدريج الدولة عازمة وبقوة على حل هذا الملف وبالبيت القرارات هذي ما تشمل الدرر #رؤية2030 #تمكين_المرأة #اسقاط_الولاية

The complications and over-dependence on the male guardian will break apart for **Saudi woman** gradually. The country is very determined to solve this case, but hopefully such resolutions won’t include the pearls [women who are against the campaign]. #2030Vision #WomenEmpowerment #GuardianshipSystem

In the Manti-MGS corpus, Saudi woman is represented in relation to her status and role at the governmental level. She is activated in the material process, ‘participating’ in all governmental sectors; this tweet is posted during the pilgrimage, which she also helps ‘organise.’ She proves her abilities and thus she deserves to be recognised legally as a citizen. This tweet comes with evidence in the form of photographs of female participants during the pilgrimage. The second tweet represents Saudi woman in a recipient role, when she ‘receives her ID.’ This shows a similarity between the reaction of society to the #EMGS campaign, and to the legislation for issuing ID for Saudi women. In both events, society divided into opponents and proponents, as well as into the media and religious figures. Eventually, Saudi women gained their own ID and recently it has become compulsory. These reactions have become familiar, especially for issues related to Saudi woman’s rights, for example reactions to the driving ban campaigns (Aljarallah 2017; Almahmoud 2015; Alotaibi 2017; Altoaimy 2017; Sahly 2016). A Saudi woman is a beneficiary in the material process, ‘breaking apart the complexities for Saudi woman’; this comes with the new regulations being put place in the country regarding Saudi woman’s rights, aligned with the aims of Vision 2030.

Manti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية99 لم يعد بوسع المجتمع تحمّل مجاملة ومساندة التيارات الدينية المتطرفة على حساب
ظلم المرأة السعودية المتعلمة

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem99 the Saudi society can’t bear or support the radical religious movements that perpetuate oppressing educated **Saudi woman**.

#كوني حرة إن نالت المرأة السعودية حريتها فقد التيار الصحوي المتطرف نفوذة وتأثيرة على المجتمع فلا تتعجب من
فجورهم في الخصومة في مواضيع حقوقها #اسقاط_الولاية

#Be_Free If **Saudi woman** earns her freedom, the *Sahwa* movement will lose their authority and impact on society, therefore, don’t be surprised if you see them fighting fiercely against women’s rights.

The Saudi woman’s situation and the radical ideology are connected in this set. Saudi woman is passivated in the material process, ‘being oppressed,’ and is represented as ‘educated Saudi woman.’ The oppression comes from the radical religious teachings that also influences Saudi society. The *Sahwa* has influenced the Saudi education system, along with its extreme social views, “in particular when it came to women’s role in society” (Lacroix 2015, p. 170). Thus, Mantis perhaps consider the MGS an outgrowth of the *Sahwa* and as members of Saudi society, they express their attitudes towards the MGS and the radical religious movement/teachings by

refusing to please them while women continue to be oppressed. In the second example, Saudi woman is a beneficiary in the material process when she potentially ‘receives’ her rights. This is a conditional clause expressing a likely situation: when Saudi woman gains her rights, the radical ideology will lose its power. This perhaps intends to show how the existence of the radical ideology is attached to women’s status and also “interpreted as a reflection of their marginalization in political and economic matters” (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 295).

Saudi Woman as Fantis

In terms of references to Fantis in the representation IND.CLASS, the Fanti-MGS corpus has more representations than the Manti-MGS (Table 6.12). While both corpora represent the Fantis as “Saudi woman” and “Saudi female,” the Fanti-MGS corpus has two more representations for Fantis: “Saudi girl” and “Saudi Muslim.” Surprisingly, “Saudi Muslim” occurs only once in both corpora.

Fanti-MGS:

كنت **سعودية مسلمة** حتى شاركت بتغريدات عن حقوق المرأة فجأة اصبحت ملحدة مصرية انها قوة الاقصاء الداعشي
##سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية

I was a **Saudi Muslim woman** until I tweeted about women’s rights, suddenly I became an Egyptian atheist one! This is the *Daeshi* ISIS power of exclusion
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

In the Fanti-MGS corpus, a female campaigner describes the pro-MGS campaigners’ reaction after her participation in the #EMGS campaign through a self-reflective clause. Two relational processes are used, ‘be’ and ‘become,’ categorised as intensive (i.e. ‘x is a’) and identifying (i.e. ‘a is the identity of x’). The identifier in both processes is similar in terms of the categories, ‘Saudi Muslim’ and ‘Egyptian Atheist.’ She describes the reaction of the pro-MGS campaigners and identifies the process they intend to use as elimination not only in relation to her belief (‘atheist’) but also her nationality (‘Egyptian’). She then refers to the action of elimination as similar to the behaviour of ISIS members, who tend to exclude all Muslims who do not support them by eliminating them, and addressing them as non-Muslims. In both the anti-MGS corpora, the participants use the term ISIS in certain instances when referring to the pro-MGS campaigners; this is perhaps to highlight the similarity in ideology as concerning extreme conservatism. This also illustrates the ongoing construction of the identity of Fantis by the pro-MGS campaigners through social exclusion.

Fanti-MGS:

#سعودية_واقدر انا **سعودية** ماقدر انجح ماقدر ابتعث بسبب ولي. ماقدر اروح لدوامي قبل ما اتبهذل بين السواقين ممكن تنزلين شوي من برجك العاجي ياسمو الاميرة #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية

#IAmSaudiWomanAndICan I am a **Saudi woman** and I cannot! I can't get a scholarship abroad, I cannot go to my workplace without struggling with transportation and I cannot achieve anything because of the guardianship system. It's time you came down from your ivory tower, your highness. #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Another female campaigner in the Fanti-MGS corpus represents herself as a 'Saudi' in a relational process, and replies to a hashtag by Fpros, #IAmSaudiAndICan. She posts that she 'cannot succeed and cannot get a scholarship' due to the requirement for a guardian. In this sentence, she repeats Fpros' hashtag, #IAmSaudiWoman&ICan, but in a negative sentence (i.e. I am Saudi woman and I cannot). Moreover, this adaptation is further emphasised by repeating the verbal phrase 'cannot succeed,' 'cannot get a scholarship' and 'cannot move.' It has the effect of mocking the hashtag, and carrying the opposite of its desired effect. Fpros are represented using a form of honorific, 'your highness.' The metaphorical structure here, 'come down from your ivory tower,' might indicate their privileged status or their limited knowledge of the real world. In addition, this aligns with the representation 'queens' later in reference to Fpros.

Manti-MGS:

صمود **المرأة السعودية** في مطالباتها وخصوصًا اسقاط نظام الولاية دليل واضح على حجم الضرر الذي عانت منه بسبب
#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية105

The resistance of **Saudi woman** for her demands, especially that of ending male guardianship, is a clear proof of the extent of damage she has suffered #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem105

#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية305 **المرأة السعودية** كتبت عن ظلمها وظلم غيرها هؤلاء هم المناضلات

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem305 The **Saudi woman** who has written not only about her own suffering but of others is the true activist.

In the Manti-MGS corpus, Fantis are referred to as 'Saudi woman' and activated within material processes of 'resisting' and 'writing.' In their stance, the Fantis are resisting generally and specifically in their demands for the end of the MGS. This might also imply a reference to other demands and campaigns in the history of activism among Saudi women in relation to

their rights, such as the driving campaign. In comparison to their resistance in other campaigns, a preference and greater effort are clearly shown for the #EMGS campaign; this resistance is interpreted as coming from the damage and consequences of the MGS for women. Another representation of Saudi woman as Fantis is in the material process ‘writing about her own suffering and of others’ due to the MGS. In the same tweet, Fantis are also functionally represented as ‘true activists.’

Manti-MGS:

بِفَضْلِ **المرأة السعودية** وحدها خلقت وعي إجتماعي ورسمي للتفريق بين مفهوم الولاية والقوامة كحقوق لها بهذا الرسم سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية72

Because of the **Saudi woman**, the social and official awareness has increased and people now recognise the difference between male guardianship and male stewardship through this hashtag. #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem72

Another activated role assigned to Fantis is in the material process ‘increasing.’ The female campaigners use this hashtag as a tool to help them demand their rights and it results in ‘increasing’ social and official awareness. It is perhaps a strategy to encourage the female campaigners in their efforts by conveying that the awareness of the concept ‘guardianship’ and ‘stewardship’ among official bodies and society has increased with the #EMGS campaign. Indeed, these two concepts are always intertwined in various contexts.

Saudi Woman as Fpros

For references to Fpros in the representation IND.CLASS, anti-MGS corpora contain two representations, “Saudi woman” and “Saudi” (Table 6.12).

Fanti-MGS:

"#سعودية_واقدر" بلا كذب ياكذبات يامطبلات. قولوا **سعودية** و ولي أمري متفهم لان غيركم سعودية وماتقدر #اسقاط_الولاية

#IAmSaudiWomanAndICan Stop lying you liars fawners, just because your guardian is considerate doesn't mean that everybody else's is. Say I'm **Saudi** and my guardian allows me because there are Saudi women who cannot.

Fpros, who launch the #IAmSaudiWomanAndICan hashtag, are negatively appraised as ‘liars’ and ‘fawners.’ Then, Fantis seek to correct their hashtag by referring to them as ‘Saudi,’ a classification based on their nationality, and assigning their ability to the supportive guardian.

The clause finishes with a comparison to other Saudi women who cannot control their lives because of the guardian. Regardless of the negative appraisal, Fantis do not seem to exclude Fpros; rather, they recognise them as Saudi women.

Manti-MGS:

المرأة السعودية عقبة فعلاً شي حقير أنك تكون مدلل وعايشة حياة رفاهية وبذخ وسفرات وطلعات ويكون أكبر همك تستفز اللي أقل منك وما تبية يكون مثلك #اسقاط_الولاية

Saudi woman is truly an obstacle. It's very low to have a luxurious lifestyle of endless traveling and shopping and then make your main concern provoking those who have less than you just because you don't want them to be like you #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

المرأة السعودية التي تعارض بالطاعة العمياء للرجل تمتاز بالايمان بانها ناقصة عقل التنازل عن حقوقها وهي راضية الاعتقاد بانها ملكة ودرة مصونة #اسقاط_الولاية

The Saudi woman who is against women's rights and who blindly follows men, simply believes that she is lacking in mind; she happily gives up her rights believing that she is a queen and protected pearl #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

In the Manti-MGS corpus, Fpros are represented as 'Saudi woman,' described within relational processes. She is an 'obstacle' because of her campaign against #EMGS and she is also described as living 'a luxurious lifestyle.' It is the case that elite women, "female entrepreneurs, scientists, literary figures, and media specialists have been allowed to enter the public sphere, but this remains dependent on the approval of men" (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 293). In addition, she has accepted the MGS and given up her rights because she is 'lacking in mind' and has the belief that she is a 'queen' and 'protected pearl.' These representations of women are borrowed from the religious context, as mentioned in section 6.2.

The representation of Saudi women

From Section 6.4.1, the social actor "Saudi women" is contextualised in words denoting negative meanings and events in the Fanti-MGS corpus; however, the actor is surrounded by words with positive meanings or events in the Manti-MGS corpus. While the general attitude of Fantis towards Saudi women living their lives with the MGS is attributed with negative associations, Saudi women are represented in a more positive and encouraging way in the Manti-MGS corpus; this might indicate the reason for their campaign being perceived as supportive. The total occurrences of "Saudi women" in the Fanti-MGS corpus are 377 (out of 381), with 10 different representations, and 220 in the Manti-MGS corpus with 8 representations (Table 6.13). The prominent representation in anti-MGS corpora is

ASSIM.CLASS (278 in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 168 in the Manti-MGS corpus), denoting an assimilated actor identified by class(es). The main representation of this classification is “Saudis” in the plural female form, whereby the actor is represented by gender and provenance. Following the ASSIM.CLASS code, the second most prominent representation is AGG.ASSIM.CLASS (43 in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 22 in the Manti-MGS corpus), denoting an aggregated actor represented with class, for example “thousands of Saudi women” and “many Saudis.”

Table 6. 13 The representation of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora

Representations of “Saudi women”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
ASSIM.CLASS	278	74%	168	76%
ASSIM.CLASS.APPR	3	0.7%	-	-
ASSIM.CLASS.FUN	17	4.5%	17	8%
ASSIM.CLASS.FUN.APPR	1	0.2%	-	-
ASSIM.CLASS.RELAT	1	0.2%	1	0.4%
AGG.ASSIM.CLASS	43	11%	22	10%
AGG.ASSIM.CLASS.FUN	2	0.5%	4	2%
INSTRUM	-	-	1	0.4%
SEMI.OBJECTIVE	25	6.7%	5	2.3%
SOMATIZ	1	0.2%	2	0.9%
UTTER	6	2%	-	-
Total	377	100%	220	100%

The search term “Saudi women” is examined with regard to actions (Table 6.14) and role (Table 6.15). The most prominent social actions in both the anti-MGS corpora are relational and material processes. Within the relational processes, 160 instances in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 80 instances in the Manti-MGS corpus are divided into two types – attributive and identifying – both descriptive in nature. “Saudi women” are assigned to an attribute or an identity in these clauses and are not performing any action. In contrast, the second most prominent action entails material processes (93 in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 76 in the Manti-MGS corpus), which require an active actor doing the action, and a passive actor receiving or undergoing the action. Overall, the actor is engaged in material and relational processes more than the mental and verbal processes. Looking at the role of the actor in Table 6.15, it is clear that the actor is more passive in both corpora: 239 instances in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 137 instances in the Manti-MGS corpus.

Table 6. 14 The social actions of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora

Social actions of “Saudi women”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Material processes (MA)	93	25%	76	35%
Mental processes (ME)	46	12%	22	10%
Verbal processes (VE)	57	15.1%	36	16.3%
attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	98	26%	49	22.2%
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	62	16.4%	31	14%
Behavioural process (BE)	2	0.5%	1	0.4%
Existential processes (EX)	19	5%	5	2.1%
Total	377	100%	220	100%

Table 6. 15 The role of “Saudi women” in the anti-MGS corpora

The role of “Saudi women”	Fanti-MGS corpus		Manti-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Activation (ACT)	138	37%	81	37%
Initiator (INIT)	-	-	2	1%
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	10	3%	6	3%
Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	229	60%	131	59%
Total	377	100%	220	100%

Comparing the findings to those in the pilot study, “Saudi women” are never assigned to an initiator role in the Fanti-MGS corpus, probably indicating that they do not have the power to initiate actions. The highest representation (i.e. ASSIM.CLASS) in both corpora is thoroughly examined. Similar to the actor “Saudi woman,” there are three references for the plural form “Saudi women”: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros (Table 6.16). The variations in prominent representation mostly refer to Saudi women generically (8 patterns in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 4 in the Manti-MGS corpus); then, the references for Saudi women as Fantis come second (9 in the Fanti-MGS corpus and 4 in the Manti-MGS). Few representations refer to Fpros.

Table 6. 16 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi women” in the three categories in anti-MGS corpora

Representation of ASSIM.CLASS	“Saudi women” as a generic reference		“Saudi women” as Fantis		“Saudi women” as Fpros	
	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus	Fanti-corpus	Manti-corpus
Saudi women النساء السعوديات	19	13	24	3		
Saudis السعوديات	125	89	66	40	10	16
Creative Saudi women السعوديات الميداعات	1					
Saudi females اناث سعوديات	2					
Saudi citizens مواطنات سعوديات	2		6	1		
Fully qualified, adult Saudi citizens مواطنات سعوديات بالغات كاملات الاهلية	1					
Young Saudi women شابات سعوديات	7	2				1
Adult, sane Saudi Muslim women سعوديات مسلمات عاقلات راشدات			1			
Saudi girls بنات سعوديات			3	2		
True Saudi women سعوديات اصليات	3		1			
Fully qualified Saudi girls فتيات سعوديات كاملات الاهلية			1			
(Strong) free Saudi women نساء سعوديات حرائر (قويات)			5			
Loyal Saudis سعوديات مخلصات			1			
Saudi teenagers المرهقات السعوديات		1				
Total Fanti-MGS=278 Manti-MGS=168	160	105	108	46	10	17
Percentage %	57	63	39	27	4	10

Saudi women as a generic reference

Table 6.16 shows several similarities and differences in the representations of Saudi women in the two anti-MGS corpora. They both include “Saudi women,” “Saudis” and “young Saudi.” The Fanti-MGS corpus contains the representations “creative Saudi women,” “Saudi females,” “Saudi citizens,” “fully qualified adult Saudi citizens” and “true Saudi women,” while the Manti-MGS corpus contains the representations “Saudi teenagers” and “young Saudi women.”

Under the code ASSIM.CLASS, 57% of the representations of Saudi women in the Fanti-corpus are generic references. The following examples show the representations in this corpus:

Fanti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية251 **السعوديات** يهاجرون للخارج بسبب الأنظمة العنصرية ضد المرأة

Most of the **Saudi women** emigrate abroad because of the misogynistic systems
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem251

مهما حاولتم اخفاء حقيقة ان **النساء السعوديات** يهاجرون وانتقدتم اعلان كل فتاة لهجرتها تجاهلكم لانتهاك حقوق
السعوديات وتبجحكم باكرامها يزيد من العدد # سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية182

No matter how hard you try to hide the fact that many **Saudi women** seek asylum abroad,
and to criticise the public announcement of such news, you are only raising the number of
these women by ignoring the violation of Saudi women’s rights
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem182

Saudi women in these examples are represented in relation to the same problem of fleeing the country; they are activated in the material process, ‘emigrating and seeking asylum.’ Fantis clarify one of the reasons for this problem, namely the discriminatory regulations against women. They attach the topic of fleeing the country to the #EMGS campaign as a way of showing how the MGS, among other regulations and systems, causes this problem. Saudi women under the MGS flee the country to seek greater rights in other countries; thus, the #EMGS campaign needs to be supported to tackle the problem. The second tweet addresses the pro-MGS campaigners, and their reactions towards women who fled the country and the #EMGS campaign. The pro-MGS campaigners tend to criticise these women and ignore the problems that the MGS caused. The Fantis are trying to shift the focus from criticising the action on criticising the lack of women’s rights.

Fanti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية33 **السعوديات** اقتحموا كل المجالات ولكن لم يسمح لهم بالولاية على انفسهم

Saudi women have participated in all different areas, but they still are not allowed to guard themselves #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem33

#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية44 نقطتين تحد من **السعوديات** القوانين (نظام الولاية) و الثقافة الدينية الذكورية التي تعزز بنصوص تحقر المرأة

Two different things pose a challenge to **Saudi women**: The law (guardianship system) and the masculine religious culture that enhances the culture of misogyny #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem44

Saudi women are activated in the first material process, ‘participated in all fields’; despite this, they are still controlled by the MGS. In the second example, they are passivated in the action, ‘being challenged’ because of the MGS and the masculine religious ideology that embraces the interpretation of marginalising women. The reason for describing religious ideology as ‘masculine’ is the patriarchal power controlling this realm (i.e. religious). The Arab–Islamic patriarchy is based on the notion of the division of space (Mernissi 1993; Sadiqi 2006): access to public spaces is allowed for men and forbidden to women, whereas private spaces are usually associated with women and children. The former space “is the arena for taking the initiative and making decisions in all matters” (Mernissi 1993, p. 63). It covers all arenas that “are associated with the male attributes of rationality and reason,” for instance dictating the law, managing the state, leading businesses, controlling the economy and handling religious affairs (Sadiqi 2006, p. 10). The private space is associated with powerless members (i.e. women and children), and is subordinate to the public space, which is also directed and controlled by men (Sadiqi 2006). The religious space is restricted for women; for example, women are not encouraged to participate in Friday prayers, and their opinions “in matters of religion lack authority and are not publicly sought” (Sadiqi 2006, p. 12). Fantis are aware of their exclusion regarding religious matters and the passive role assigned to Saudi women. However, Saudi women have recently tried to challenge this by discussing religious matters despite the negative attitudes prevalent in society, which generally considers women to lack religious credibility (see Chapter 7).

In the Manti-corpus, 63% of the representations of Saudi women in ASSIM.CLASS are generic references. The following examples show the representations in this corpus:

Manti-MGS:

#تمكين_المواطنات_ياولي_العهد_واحدة من اساسيات نجاح الرؤية تمكين المرأة بجميع المجالات و استثمار **السعوديات** وخبراتهم و اعطائهن الاهلية الكاملة #اسقاط_الولاية

#EmpoweringFemaleCitizens,CrownPrince one of the basics of Vision 2030 is to empower **Saudi women** in all different areas, giving them full qualifications, and investing in their potentialities. #TheEndOfMaleGuardianship

#ولي_العهد_علي_قناة_CBS_الامير محمد بن سلمان لبرنامج 60 دقيقة : النساء **السعوديات** اللاتي لم تكن ظاهرات تماما في السابق لديهم حقوق جديدة و يمكنهن بسهولة البدء بتجارة او الانضمام الى الجيش او حضور الحفلات و الاحداث الرياضية و في يونيو سيكون بمقدورهن الجلوس خلف المقود #اسقاط_الولاية

#CrownPrinceOnCBSChannel “**Saudi women** who weren’t identifiable in the past now have new rights that easily enable them to start businesses, join the army, attend concerts or sports events, and in June, they’ll get to be behind the wheels” Mohammed bin Salman on 60 Minutes TV show #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Saudi women in these extracts are passivated in the material process ‘being empowered, given their rights and invested in,’ activated in ‘starting businesses, joining the army, attending concerts or sports events and driving,’ and beneficiarised in ‘receiving their rights.’ In the relational process, Saudi women are described as ‘not being + identifiable’ before. One of the strategies that is being used to legitimise the #EMGS campaign is to be positioned within the new Vision 2030 developed by Prince Muhammad bin Salman. This strategy seems to empower their position, and enable them to receive more support from society. In doing so, Mantis attempt to suggest a condition that is necessary to the success of Vision 2030, namely empowering women by investing in their potentialities. However, this cannot be achieved without giving them their full rights and ending the MGS. The hashtag aims to show this. The alignment of this campaign to Vision 2030 is not the only strategy employed; intertextuality is used as a technique, exploiting the prince’s interview to legitimise the #EMGS campaign. In the second example, the intertextual reference is taken from an interview for 60 Minutes, a program aired on CBS, an American channel, when the prince was asked about Saudi women’s rights.

Manti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية101 المجتمع لازم يفهم **السعوديات** يهاجرون علشان يعيشون بحرية او يعيشون في بلدهم بحريتهم الكاملة

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem101 Saudi society should realise that **Saudi women** will either emigrate abroad to live freely or stay in their own country with complete freedom.

#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية133 انا مع اسقاط الولاية و مع **السعوديات** يهاجروا اذا الموضوع معاد يتحمل لكن اتمنى يهاجرون و بوعي كامل و يعتمدون ع انفسهم

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem133 I'm with ending male guardianship and if this can't be ended, I support the emigration of **Saudi women** abroad. However, I wish that this emigration is with full awareness and self-reliance.

Similar to the Fanti-MGS corpus, the Manti-MGS attaches the #EMGS campaign to the problem of fleeing the country. In the above examples, Saudi women are activated in the material process, 'emigrated.' Mantis interpret the action of Saudi women fleeing the country as a reaction to the restrictive policies, one of which is the MGS. Despite their encouragement to leave the country, they warn Saudi women that they should be prepared for what is to come in making such a decision. Posting such tweets could lead to an aggressive reaction towards the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS campaigners by society, in particular from the pro-MGS campaigners, as expressing such attitudes might be considered as incitement for Saudi women to flee.

Saudi women as Fantis

Within this representation, the two anti-MGS corpora have four similar patterns: "Saudi women," "Saudis," "Saudi citizens" and "Saudi girls" (Table 6.16). However, the Fanti-MGS corpus has more representations for themselves: "adult, sane, Saudi Muslim women," "true Saudi women," "fully qualified Saudi girls," "(strong) free Saudi women" and "loyal Saudis." In the Fanti-MGS corpus, 39% of the representations of Saudi women coded ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fantis, i.e. themselves:

Fanti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية22 لكل مشكك أننا **سعوديات** بالرغم أن كلامهم ما يهمننا نهائيا لكن وجب التأكيد link

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem22 To everyone who suspected that we're not **Saudis**, even though we don't care at all, we have to confirm it. [Link: photograph of her Saudi ID]

هذه الخطوة أثبتت جدبتنا و كذلك وطنيتنا و أننا **سعوديات** و لسنا مجرد معرفات و همية لذلك كونوا فخورين بأنفسكم
#برقية_الولاية_للملك_25_سبتمبر#اسقاط_الولاية

This step proves our determination and patriotism, and shows that we're truly **Saudis**, not just fake Twitter accounts, so we should be proud of ourselves
#PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Fantis in these examples address everyone accusing them of not being Saudis and lacking patriotism. In the relational processes, they represent their identity, 'we are Saudis,' and deny the identity assigned to them as 'not Saudis' and 'fake Twitter accounts.' In the first tweet, a participant in the Fanti-MGS corpus attaches a photograph of her Saudi national ID to prove her nationality. In the second tweet, another participant adds the hashtag launched by Fantis, #PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep, to encourage the participants to sign a petition to the king and send an individual telegram to his office. The telegram is considered further proof of their nationality because it could not be sent without Saudi national ID.

Fanti-MGS:

يؤكد أن الوعي ارتفع بين الشعب هذه أولى الخطوات العملية لنا ك **سعوديات مخلصات** لوطنهن نحتاج لصوت كل مواطن
حر معنا... فلنثبت صدقنا و ولاءنا #برقية_الولاية_للملك_25_سبتمبر #اسقاط_الولاية

This step proves that awareness has increased among the people and it's the first practical step for us **loyal Saudis** to prove our integrity and devotion. However, we need every free citizen's vote
#PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

الوقوف في صف القوي هو سبيل الجبناء مطالبتنا ك **سعوديات** لم و لن تمس أمن الدولة و ماعدا ذلك لا يهمننا
سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية110

To take the stronger team's side is the way of quitters. As **Saudis**, our demands will not affect national security and we don't care for anything else
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem110

These examples indicate the loyalty of Fantis and their true intentions behind the #EMGS campaign. In the first tweet, they represent themselves as 'loyal Saudis' in a relational process. For them, raising public awareness is the first goal, which they believe they have achieved;

thus, they then move to the next step, signing the petition and sending a telegram to the king. The second tweet addresses an accusation by the pro-MGS campaigners that they represent a threat to national security (see section 6.4.2.2). In the tweet, they include themselves through the identification ‘as Saudis,’ stating ‘As Saudis, our demands will not affect national security.’

In the Manti-MGS corpus, 27% of the representations of the Saudi women coded ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fantis.

Manti-MGS:

#وسم سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية335 انطلق من **سعوديات** بافضل طريقة سلمية متميزة واضحة و نرفعة مرة اخرى قطر مالها دخل ترا

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem335 This hashtag was started by **Saudis** in the most peaceful, outstanding, and clear way and we’ll trend it again if we have to, Qatar has nothing to do with it.

السعوديات فقط هنا في #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية و يطالبون بحقوقهم و منهم بالخارج لا يمثلونهم و اذا تبونها ناحية دينية المنيع و كثير مشائخ واقفين معهم

Saudis are here in this hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem demanding their rights, and those foreigners campaigning don’t represent them, and if you want to talk on religious terms, there are a lot of Sheikhs like Al-Manei who support them.

Mantis represent Fantis in an active role with ‘Saudis launched the hashtag.’ In this example, Mantis also respond to the accusation started after the Qatar diplomatic crisis in 2017, regarding Qatar’s responsibility for launching the #EMGS campaign. However, this accusation by the pro-MGS campaigners is inaccurate because the campaign’s actual starting year was 2016. In the second example, ‘Saudis’ are passivated in the relational process, ‘be + here’ and activated in the verbal process, ‘demanding their rights.’ Mantis identify those who did not represent Saudi Fantis, ‘those foreigners campaigning in the #EMGS’; this is an attempt to silence the pro-MGS campaigners, who tend to extract tweets by foreign participants to present the #EMGS campaign as a threat to national security. In addition, Mantis defend the #EMGS and Fantis by mentioning the supportive religious voices for ending the MGS; this seems an attempt to clarify that this campaign does not contradict religious law: ‘from the religious point of view, Al-Manei among other Sheikhs support them (i.e. Fantis).’ This intertextual reference (i.e. the name of the actor) is to a religious figure who was interviewed in the Okaz newspaper, and answered a question about the legitimacy of the MGS in Islamic law; his answer was that the

system has no religious basis in Islam. These examples show the purpose of Mantis, namely supporting and defending Fantis and the #EMGS campaign.

Manti-MGS:

#برقية_الولاية_للملك_25_سبتمبر_حتى_لايتهمكم_بعدها_ملتحين_الصحة_انكم_صهاينة_ولستم_سعوديات_بل_انتم_بنات_الوطن
و اشرف من هؤلاء #اسقاط_الولاية

#PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep To stop bearded *Sahwai* of accusing you of being Zionists or not **Saudis**, while you're the complete opposite of that; you're the daughters of this country and you're more honourable than any of them
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.

Mantis reply to the pro-MGS campaigners regarding Fantis' identities within the relational process: 'the bearded *Sahwai*'s accusation that you are Zionists and not Saudis; but you are the country's daughters.' The first representation is the opposite of the pro-MGS campaigners' representation of Fantis; the pro-MGS campaigners identify the anti-MGS campaigners as 'Zionists' and 'not Saudis.' However, the campaign about signing the petition shows that they are 'the daughters of this country' because of having to provide their Saudi ID number to sign it. This representation is a relational identification, 'the daughters of this country'; this perhaps shows how closely tied Fantis are to Saudi Arabia, as 'daughters.' Mantis represent Mpros as 'bearded *Sahwai*'; this representation belongs to one of the overdetermination categories, called connotation (van Leeuwen 2008). It is the unique determination that stands for a class through the use of a physical identifier, e.g. 'bearded'; this can be seen when it is associated with "the reader's knowledge of popular culture" although "Such knowledge is not necessarily conscious" (p. 49). The readers can associate 'the bearded *Sahwai*' with the religious figures who have adopted the ideology of *Sahwa* movement, and have then projected onto Mpros all of the qualities associated with the culture and tradition.

Saudi women as Fpros

In Table 6.16, the two anti-MGS corpora have one similar representation of Fpros, "Saudis." Another representation for the same actor is found in the Manti-MGS, i.e. is "young Saudi women." In the Fanti-MGS corpus, 4% of the representations of Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fpros:

Fanti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_تمنيت_لو_استبدلت_عبارة_سعوديات_بسفيهات_ليكون_الأمر_أكثر_دقة_ففي_العبارة_إيهام_ان_كل_السعوديات_سفيهات_يفخرن_بولاية_القصر_والسفهاء

#SaudiWomenProudofMaleGuardianship I wish that you would replace the word in “**Saudis** are proud of male guardianship” with “Foolish women are proud of male guardianship,” so people won’t mix Saudi women up with these fools who’re proud of guardianship of those lacking minds and minors.

Fpros are represented as ‘Saudis’ in the relational process shown in the suggestion by Fantis. They propose a change in the identity of Fpros, as shown in their hashtag #SaudiWomenProudOfMaleGuardianship. Fantis’ suggestion is to replace the reference to ‘Saudis’ with ‘foolish women’ to prevent confusion that ‘all Saudi women are fools’ because only ‘fools’ would accept and support the MGS, which is originally developed in Islam for “minors” and “those lacking minds.” Fantis seem to be opposing a generalisation that could cause confusion for others, or seem to reject the labelling of Fpros as ‘Saudi women.’

In the Manti-MGS corpus, 10% of the representations of Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fpros.

Manti-MGS:

ممکن يقال انکم **سعوديات** و تفخرون بحب اهلکم لکم اما ان يقال #سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا42 فهذا معناه ان كل النساء قصر و رمم

It is possible to say that you’re **Saudis** who are proud of their family’s love, but if you want to say #SaudisAndProudOfMaleGuardianship42, that means all women are immature and slackers

Mantis react to the hashtag #SaudisAndProudOfMaleGuardainship42 launched by Fpros and refer to them as ‘Saudis’ within a relational process ‘be + proud of.’ This indicates that it would be understandable if Fpros mention being ‘proud of their family’s love.’ However, being proud of the MGS, as in their hashtag #SaudisProudOfGuardainship42, has a different meaning and could be misinterpreted. First, their hashtag implies that Fpros are minors and untrustworthy because the MGS is designed for those people in need for guidance. Second, it could be interpreted that all Saudi women have characteristics similar to those categorised as needing guardians; Mantis suggest that such connotations might come to mind when supporting the MGS.

Manti-MGS:

#سعوديات_نرفض_اسقاط_الولاية2 هؤلاء **السعوديات** يعبدون التراث المحرف الذي يقدر الطائفية و العنصرية و يحتقر المرأة نحن مشغولين بعبادة الله #اسقاط_الولاية

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship2 Those **Saudis** worship the corrupted traditions which sanctify sectarianism, racism, and misogyny against women while we're busy worshipping Allah #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Interestingly, Mantis represent Fpros in an active role within the material process, 'worshipping.' Fpros are worshipping 'corrupted traditions' that convey actions such as 'sectarianism, racism, and misogyny against women,' rather than worshipping Allah. While Fpros are focused on these traditions, the anti-MGS campaigners are 'busy worshipping Allah,' followed by the hashtag #EMGS; this might be an attempt to assign an attribute to the #EMGS campaign indicating that it is a way of worshipping Allah, namely by campaigning against the MGS that should only be for certain categories.

6.4.2.2. The pro-MGS corpora

This section presents the findings concerning the representations of unexpected assimilation: assimilated actor and aggregated with an assimilated actor. It then discusses the role relations within the actions of the two search terms: "Saudi woman" [السعودية] and "Saudi women" [السعوديات], in the pro-MGS corpora.

Unexpected assimilation in the singular term

Based on initial observation of the results from the analysis of "Saudi woman," the actor is assimilated under the code ASSIM.CLASS in 30 instances in the Fpro-MGS and in 8 instances in the Mpro-MGS and is aggregated with an assimilated actor once under the code AGG.ASSIM.CLASS in the Fpro-MGS (Table 6.17).

Table 6. 17 Unexpected assimilation for the representation of the search term "Saudi woman" in the pro-MGS corpora

Code of unexpected patterns	"Saudi woman" in the Fpro-MGS corpus		"Saudi woman" in the Mpro-MGS corpus	
ASSIM.CLASS	30	97%	8	100%
AGG.ASSIM.CLASS	1	3%	-	-
Total	31	100%	8	100%

Assimilated actor (ASSIM.CLASS)

For this representation, “women” are represented with the collocated singular search term *s'ewdyh* under the code ASSIM.CLASS, “women of Saudi” [in Arabic, *نساء السعودية*]. Although the classification of this representation pertains to the plural form, “Saudi women,” it will be analysed in this section due to the complexity of extracting the instances from these files. As shown in Table 6.18, the representations are linked to four social actions – material, mental, verbal and relational processes – in pro-MGS corpora. While the relational processes are most prominent in the Fpro-MGS corpus, verbal processes are more prominent in the Mpro-MGS corpus. Compared to the anti-MGS corpora, both male corpora present the same dominant actions, i.e. the verbal processes of saying and expressing. In Table 6.19, the role assigned to the actor in both corpora is by far the most subjected, which might be an indication of the treatment “Saudi woman” is receiving as beneficiary, or a description of her life in the relational processes.

Table 6. 18 The social actions of the assimilated actor within the search term “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora

Social actions of (AGG).ASSIM.CLASS	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
Material processes (MA)	7	23%	1	12%
Mental processes (ME)	4	13%	1	12%
Verbal processes (VE)	5	16%	5	64%
attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	4	13%	-	-
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	11	35%	1	12%
Behavioural process (BE)	-	-	-	-
Existential processes (EX)	-	-	-	-
Total	31	100%	8	100%

Table 6. 19 The role of the assimilated actor within the search term “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora

The role of actor in (AGG).ASSIM.CLASS	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
Activation (ACT)	4	13%	2	25%
Initiator (INIT)	-	-	-	-
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	2	6%	4	50%

Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	25	81%	2	25%
Total	31	100%	8	100%

Fpro-MGS:

نعم يحصل لدينا حالات عنف ضد المرأة و لكن لما يتم تضخيمها للعالم و اظهار نساء العالم مكرمات معززات و **نساء السعودية** لا الهدف زعزعة الاستقرار #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية

Yes, we have domestic violence cases, but why dramatise it internationally and point out that women around the world are more respected than **Saudi women**? Clearly the only purpose of this is to undermine stability #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية عندما تشاهد **بنات السعودية** ما يحدث للمرأة الغربية من ضرب وتعذيب وسحل في الشارع تحمد الله هل تعلم ان دولة الحرية امريكا هي الاعلى من حيث عدد "السجينات" دولة الحرية!

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem When **Saudi girls** see what happens to western women from beating, torturing and dragging on the street, they'll be grateful for what they have. Do you know that the free country, America, has the highest percentage of female prisoners, the free country!

The examples provided above concern the representation of ASSIM.CLASS in pro-MGS corpora. The first example in the Fpro-MGS corpus represents how Saudi women in the relational process, 'be + not,' are being depicted in the #EMGS campaign. In comparison to women around the world, the campaign represents Saudi women as more respected. Fpros contend that there is domestic violence in every country, including Saudi Arabia; however, amplifying only the cases in Saudi Arabia to the world in the hashtag #EMGS is aimed at destabilisation. The process of destabilising is here left open to the interpretation of the recipient: is it destabilising the country's security, society (i.e. the relations between family members), or religious beliefs? In all possible instances, the action of destabilising has a negative connotation attached to the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS campaigners.

The second example in the Mpro-MGS corpus represents Saudi girls in a mental process, 'seeing' what happens to the Western woman's life. Western women are negatively represented in the actions of being 'beaten, tortured, and dragged on the street.' The US, the free country, is also referred to negatively with an intertextual reference to the statistics of women in jail in the US. The intertextual reference here is originally taken from a 2016 article in the Guardian

newspaper, reporting on a study that showed increasing numbers of women going to jail in the US. In this tweet, the actions of killing, torturing and hitting assign negative attributes to the #EMGS campaign and its demands, to the Western women’s life and to the emancipation and the free country. The tweet conveys the idea that the #EMGS campaign is aimed at Saudi women’s emancipation and living a life with such freedom that it has resulted in negative outcomes witnessed in the West. For many Muslims, emancipated Muslim women are considered a symbol of Westernisation that is associated with immorality and various social problems (Al-Fassi 2013). In Saudi Arabia, only women “could ensure the piety of the nation and its protection from the increasing Westernisation. As wives and mothers, they were responsible for keeping boundaries between a unique Saudi nation and those accused of corrupting it and diluting its character” (Al-Rasheed 2013, p. 110).

Fpro-MGS:

احنا قبائل ما نرضى نسقط الولاية عن ابائنا و اخواننا ولاينهم حماية لا تسلط، شوفي نسبة اللي داخلين الملاعب مقارنة
بعده نساء السعودية لذلك ان سقطت سقوطها بيكون شكلي المرأة السعودية الاصيلة مكرمة مصونة
 #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية525

We, as people from Saudi tribes, don’t accept the end of our fathers’ and brothers’ guardianship because it’s a form of protection rather than oppression. If you compare the percentage of those who went to sports stadiums with the number of **Saudi women** who didn’t, you’ll see that they were very few. Similar to the ending of the guardianship system, if it happened, it would only be a formality, because real Saudi women will always be dignified and well-protected #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Aggregated with an assimilated actor (AGG.ASSIM.CLASS)

The aggregated with an assimilated actor representation is found once in the Fpro-MGS corpus as shown in the example. In the tweet, women of Saudi are proceeded by a quantifier, ‘the number of.’ The actor is represented in an omitted material process, ‘not going to sports stadiums.’ Despite the new regulation allowing Saudi women into sports stadiums, there is no comparison between the percentage of women who have done so and those who have not. In the ‘percentage of,’ the actor Saudi women who have been to a stadium are backgrounded, while the number of Saudi women who have not gone are activated with the aggregation ‘the number of.’ The aggregated representation makes them appear like a “large horde” (van Leeuwen 2008, p. 38). It is then mentioned that if there were an official change in the MGS, it would not be activated or practised in reality. One reason the Fpros give for resisting the changes is that ‘we are tribes,’ with the inclusive ‘we’ (i.e. both Fpros and society). A

significant attribute expressed in this example indicates the nature of Saudi society as tribal. For the tribes and a female member belonging to a tribe, ending the MGS will not be accepted because for Fpros, the system is regarded as protective and not abusive. Overall, the tweet shows how society would be perceived to react to new changes, like women in the stadium. More specifically, the tribes and their female members are represented as ‘the true.’

The representation of Saudi woman

As presented in section 6.4.1, the social actor “Saudi woman” in both corpora co-occurs within words denoting positive meanings and events. This reveals the general attitude of female and male pro-MGS campaigners towards Saudi woman living their lives within the MGS. In total, there are 376 occurrences of “Saudi woman” in the Fpro-MGS corpus (out of 576) and 167 in the Mpro-MGS corpus (out of 313). The representation patterns vary in each corpus: the Fpro-MGS corpus contains 11 different representations and the Mpro-MGS corpus 5 (Table 6.20). The most prominent representation is in IND.CLASS, which codes an individual actor identified by class(es), with 292 occurrences in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 148 in the Mpro-MGS. The actor is generally performed as “Saudi woman,” classified by her gender and provenance. Following the IND.CLASS representation, the second most prominent representation is SEMI.OBJECTIVE, with 60 instances in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 14 in the Mpro-MGS corpus. Within this representation, Saudi woman is partially backgrounded by the representation of one of her psycho-social identity attributes, for example “reputation,” “identity” and “dignity” in the Fpro-MGS corpus and “capability” and “issues” in the Mpro-MGS corpus.

Table 6. 20 The representation of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora

Representations of “Saudi woman”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
IND.CLASS	292	78%	148	89%
IND.CLASS.APPR	7	2%	2	1.1%
IND.CLASS.FUN	2	0.5%	1	0.5%
IND.CLASS.FUN.NOM	3	0.7%	-	-
IND.CLASS.PHY.APPR	1	0.2%	-	-
IND.CLASS.NOM	1	0.2%	-	-
IND.CLASS.RELAT	3	0.7%	-	-
IND.CLASS.RELAT.APPR	2	0.5%	-	-
INSTRUM	4	1%	2	1.1%
SEMI.OBJECTIVE	60	16%	14	8.3%

SOMATIZ	1	0.2%	-	-
Total	376	100%	167	100%

The actor “Saudi woman” is also coded for her actions in these representations (Table 6.21) and the role she plays in the processes (Table 6.22). Interestingly, the first observation in the analysis is that “Saudi woman” is a passive participant in both corpora; this is not expected in these corpora, which it is assumed would support the idea of maintaining the MGS and indicate its advantages.

The analysis of social actions performed by the actor in Table 6.21 reveals that Saudi woman most frequently occurred within material and relational processes. Within material processes, 177 instances found in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 53 instances were in the Mpro-MGS corpus. Within relational processes, 122 instances occurred in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 76 instances were in the Mpro-MGS corpus, that are sub-coded into an attributive mood and identifying mood. Similarly, these processes are also heavily used in the representation of “Saudi woman” in the pilot study (section 6.2). These results show that Saudi woman occurs more within relational processes (i.e. concerned with being, possessing and becoming) and second within material processes (i.e. concerned with happening and doing, or receiving an action). Overall, the actor is engaged in these two processes more than mental and verbal processes. Table 6.22 shows that the role of Saudi woman is by far the most subjected (272 instances in the Fpro-MGS; 134 instances in the Mpro-MGS), whereby the actor is either under or receiving an action in material processes, or being described through relational processes. Unlike the Mpro-MGS corpus, the actor is an initiator (4 times) in the Fpro-MGS. This might be an attempt to represent Saudi woman with more power within the MGS and it not being an obstacle, as mentioned in the #EMGS campaign. Surprisingly, Mpros do not assign this role to Saudi woman; this might reflect how they, as male guardians, are responsible for initiating the action for “Saudi woman,” who is active in 33 instances.

Table 6. 21 The social actions of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora

Social actions of “Saudi woman”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
	Instances	Percentage	Instances	Percentage
Material processes (MA)	177	47%	53	32%
Mental processes (ME)	31	8%	18	11%
Verbal processes (VE)	44	12%	17	10%

attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	72	19%	50	30%
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	50	13%	26	16%
Behavioural process (BE)	-	-	-	-
Existential processes (EX)	2	1%	3	1%
Total	376	100%	167	100%

Table 6. 22 The role of “Saudi woman” in the pro-MGS corpora

The role of “Saudi woman”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
Activation (ACT)	100	27%	33	20%
Initiator (INIT)	4	1%	-	-
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	37	10%	2	1%
Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	235	62%	132	79%
Total	376	100%	167	100%

Because the most prominent representation in Table 6.20 is under the code IND.CLASS, this section focuses on this representation. Similar to the anti-MGS corpora, the representations within this code are categorised regarding the reference Saudi woman as: (i) a generic reference; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros. As shown in Table 6.23, the variations in the prominent representations mostly refer to Saudi woman as a generic reference, with a few representations referring to Fantis and Fpros.

Table 6. 23 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi woman” in the three categories in the pro-MGS corpora

Representations of IND.CLASS	“Saudi woman” as a generic reference		“Saudi woman” as Fantis		“Saudi woman” as Fpros	
	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus
Saudi woman المرأة السعودية	157	103		1	14	
Saudi (female)-السعودية- الانثى السعودية	35	26	25	11	16	3
Saudi girl البنات/الفتاة السعودية	8	2	1		3	

Saudi child الطفلة السعودية						
Saudi lady سيدة السعودية	2					
Saudi Muslim سعودية مسلمة	11	1			3	
Saudi citizen مواطنة سعودية		1			2	
Adult Saudi woman المرأة السعودية الناضجة	3					
Settled Saudi woman المرأة السعودية المستقرة	5					
True Saudi سعودية اصيلة	4				3	
Total Fpro-MGS=292 Mpro-MGS=148	225	133	26	12	41	3
Percentage %	77%	90%	9%	8%	14%	2%

Saudi woman as a generic reference

Table 6.23 shows that the representations of Saudi woman as a generic reference occurred 77% in the Fpro-MGS (8 forms) and 90% in the Mpro-MGS (5 forms). Several similarities and differences are observed between the representations of “Saudi woman” in pro-MGS corpora. The share representations include “Saudi woman,” “Saudi (female),” “Saudi girl” and “Saudi Muslim,” while the different representations are “Saudi lady,” “adult Saudi woman,” “settled Saudi woman” and “true Saudi” in the Fpro-MGS corpus and “Saudi citizen” in the Mpro-MGS corpus.

Fpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية142 **السعودية** تستطيع ان تكون كل شئ موظفة تاجرة دكتورة بدون اسقاط الولاية

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem142 **Saudi woman** can be an employee, a businesswoman, a doctor, or anything she likes without ending the male guardianship system.

د.بندر العيبان رئيس هيئة حقوق الإنسان #السعودية: #نظام_الولاية لا يعيق **المرأة السعودية** وهناك حالات تتطلب وجود إذن ولي الأمر ولا يمكن إلغاؤها وهي من متطلبات الشريعة الإسلامية
link [video of the representative of Saudi human rights talks to United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva – 2018]

“#MaleGuardianshipSystem is not an obstacle **Saudi woman** faces, yet there are some cases where male guardian permission is necessary, as it’s a Sharia (Islamic law) requirement” Dr. Bander Al-aeban, Head of the Human Rights Commission in Saudi [link]

تعتبر **المرأة السعودية** الأكثر احتراماً في وطنها في السعودية نسبة التحرش العنف قتل الزوجات الاغتصاب الاقل عالمياً
#لن_تسقط_سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية

Saudi woman is considered the most respected person in her country, and the rates of harassment, violence against women and rape in Saudi Arabia are the least internationally. #MaleGuardianshipSystemWillNotEnd

Fpros represent Saudi woman and her status in these examples. In a relational process, Saudi woman ‘can be anything she likes,’ ‘employee,’ ‘businesswoman’ and ‘doctor’ with the continued existence of the MGS. This aims to show that the claims about the MGS in the #EMGS campaign are not true and Saudi women can be involved and work in any sector. However, the reality is different and engagement in these sectors requires male guardians’ permission; thus, women can be ‘anything’ but under the MGS condition. By making this *generalisation*, the tweet intends to *exclude* those women who have guardians not allowing them to work. The second tweet represents Saudi woman as ‘not facing a problem’ with the MGS in an intertextual reference. It is taken from a YouTube video of the representative of the Saudi human rights committee talking about the MGS and Saudi woman’s status to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2018. This intertextual example aims to construct the legitimisation of maintaining the MGS through a reference to a person whose status or role is vested in an institutional authority (van Leeuwen 2008); the Dr and head of the Human Rights Commission in Saudi give their stance more authoritative power. The last example represents how Saudi women are treated in a respectful way based on the international statistics of harassment, killing and abuse. These statistics are mentioned in the tweet without the source or the actor who produced them.¹⁸ This strategy of excluding the actor for these ‘international statistics’ seems to suit the interests of Fpros in maintaining the MGS by shifting the reader’s attention to the actions; this can be considered one of “the propaganda strategies of creating fear,” setting up the occurrence of these actions if the MGS were to end (van Leeuwen 2008, p. 28).

¹⁸ After searching in Arabic and English for similar statistics, it seems that there are no articles or studies confirming this.

Fpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_بالولاية_نفتخر200 أضطرابات العالم والحروب والتشرد والفقير لم يشغل الغرب سوى **إمراة سعودية** مستقرة وهناك من ينكر المؤمرات ! link [photographs from a video on CBSN showing a question about Saudi women's rights in the US congress, and a study by WH Council on Women (2014)]

#SaudiWomenAreProudOfMaleGuardianship200 Living in a troubled world full of wars, homelessness, and poverty, but then the West is only concerned with the **settled Saudi woman** and there are still people who deny the conspiracy theory.

#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية_وسم من عصابة قطر يدعون حقوق المرأة وهدفهم اسقاط اسرة ومجتمع ودولة من خلال اسقاط ولي الخاص على **المرأة السعودية**

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem This hashtag is created by a Qatari gang who claims to advocate women's rights, while the real purpose is to break down the families, society, and the country through ending the male guardianship system for **Saudi woman**.

Fpros represent Saudi woman in these examples using various roles assigned to her. In the first tweet, Saudi woman is portrayed as an initiator of the action 'making the West concerned' with her and distracting from 'the problems of the world, wars, poverty and homelessness.' Two instances of intertextual references with different aims are included: (i) a screenshot of a YouTube video aired on CBSN when the US Secretary, Rex Tillerson, was asked about Saudi women's rights; (ii) a report by the White House Council on American Women analysing data on rape and sexual assault in 2014. The first is intertextualised to provide an example of the West's concern about Saudi women's rights and the second aims to provide an example of the problems that the US should be handling, instead of interfering in Saudi women's issues. The intertextual references aim to delegitimise the #EMGS campaign, and by using #SaudiWomenAreProudOfMaleGuardianship200, they aim to deny all the demands of the #EMGS campaign. It is framed as foreign interference that threatens the nation's religious and social values.

In the second example, Saudi woman is assigned the role of a beneficiary, with a Qatari gang aiming to end the MGS for her. For Fpros, the #EMGS hashtag is from a Qatari gang who claims to be defending woman's rights but their true aim is to break up the family, society and country after ending the MGS. Two points should be highlighted in this example: first, Fpros try to connect a diplomatic problem to the #EMGS campaign, perhaps to gain more supporters for their stance, and to frame the campaign as a conspiracy; second, the intention is to highlight the supposed real consequences of ending the MGS, namely the breakdown of families, then

society and eventually the country, perhaps again relating the #EMGS campaign to a threat to national security.

Fpro-MGS

المرأة السعودية حققت انجازات تذكر في ظل ولاية ومساندة ومعاونة اهلها #اسقاط_الولاية

Many achievements have been made by **Saudi woman** under the protection, love, support and guardianship of her family #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

السعودية فقط هي من تعتر وتفتخر بولاية اهلها وليست من تنكر جميلهم وتطالب باسقاط ولايتهم
#انطلاق_سعوديات_ضد_الاسقاط

Only **Saudi woman** is proud of her family's guardianship and she is not ungrateful as are the ones who demand to end male guardianship.
#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem

Saudi woman is activated in the first tweet, in which Fpros represent her in a material process, 'made.' These achievements are accomplished with the support of her family and with the existence of the MGS. This tweet seems to contradict what happens in reality, or to generalise the idea that there are good relations between Saudi woman and her guardian and to exclude those who suffer from the system. The second tweet identifies the attribute 'proud of her family's guardianship' in relation to 'Saudi woman.' However, those who demand the end of the MGS (i.e. Fantis) are excluded from being Saudis and ascribed 'ungrateful' because, for Fpros, it seems that accepting the MGS is a way of being grateful to family. It can be noted in these two examples that the MGS is attached to the entire family, not to the male guardian himself. This is perhaps intentional to show that the campaign is aimed at breaking up the family.

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية19 المرأة السعودية تتمتع بأخلاق رفيعة وحياء عظيم وايمان يملؤ قلبها وادب عالي يجعلها كالجوهرة المصونة التي لا تقدر بثمن

Saudi woman has a great manner, modesty and faith that makes her a valuable well-protected diamond #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem19

#ما_الذي_ينقص_المرأة_السعودية_المرأة_السعودية تعيش أفضل حالاتها بفضل الله ثم ما تجده من رعاية واهتمام من ولاة أمرنا وفقهم الله ومن مجتمعا #الولاية_لها_لا_عليها

#WhatDoesSaudiWomanLack **Saudi woman** is living the best life, thanks to Allah and then to the attention and care she gets from her guardians and society
#GuardianshipIsForHerAndNotAgainstHer

#ولي_امري_يسهل_اموري_السعودية وصلت للعالمية ب اجتهادها وتسهيل امرها من وليها! لكن الفاشلة دايم تربط نجاحها بالولاية!

#MyMaleGuardianMakeMyLifeEasier **Saudi woman** participates internationally and succeeds. This is thanks to her own efforts and to her guardian who facilitates it. On the other hand, the unsuccessful ones (the losers) will always blame the guardianship system for their failure.

Mpros describe the status of Saudi woman in terms of relational processes. She has ‘a great manner, modesty and faith’ and is distilled as ‘a valuable well-protected diamond.’ The piece of jewellery as a metaphoric term is generally used for women by religious clerics in their sermons (section 6.2). Another relational process describes her living situation, ‘living her best life,’ due to the care and support from the guardians and society. Within a material process, ‘Saudi woman’ is activated in ‘participating internationally’; her success is associated with her guardian as a facilitator and supporter. Interestingly, this reference cannot be considered to cover all Saudi women in that it only identifies Saudi women who are allowed to participate internationally and those who cannot because their guardians are represented as ‘unsuccessful’ and ‘losers.’ In the second clause, the blame is not put on the MGS or the guardian, rather on the women, specifically on the female campaigners in the #EMGS. This might perhaps indicate Mpros’ attitudes towards Fantis who are demanding an end to the MGS, and expresses Mpros’ lack of knowledge of women not involved in the #EMGS campaign but suffering because of the MGS.

Mpro-MGS:

استبداد ولي المرأة لا يعني إسقاط الولاية ولو تم سد هذه الذريعة بعقاب على الولي المستبد لكان خير **للمرأة السعودية**
#الولاية

If there was a legal punishment for the authoritarian guardians instead of ending the male guardianship system, it would be better for **Saudi woman** #GuardianshipSystem

لا يرد نص القرآن بالعقل: ومن قال أن ولاية الرجل تسلط؟ من أساء الولاية يسلبها القاضي منة شرعا.. يجب ان تفهموا ان ولاية الرجل على **المرأة السعودية** تكليف لا تشريف! #اسقاط_الولاية

Quranic manuscripts answer with justification; and those who misuse their male guardianship authority can legally be disqualified by law. You should realise that the male

guardianship system for **Saudi woman** is a responsibility not a privilege
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

In these examples, Mpros seem to recognise the existence of authoritarian guardians and make a proposal. ‘Saudi woman’ is classed as beneficiary in a conditional clause when proposing their ideas for tackling this problem, ‘legal punishment for the authoritarian guardians,’ rather than an end to MGS as a whole. Mpros’ proposal might indicate their wish to maintain their power, but those who are oppressive should be punished. To maintain the patriarchal order, they claim that the MGS is ‘better for Saudi woman.’ In such a masculine state, women are “depicted as needing to be protected, controlled, and guided within an authoritarian, paternalistic, and protective framework” (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 293). In the second tweet, Mpros use the paternalistic and protective framework in representing their role as guardians for Saudi woman as ‘a responsibility and not a privilege.’ Another strategy in maintaining their power lies in associating the MGS with Islam; this is also considered a means of delegitimising the #EMGS campaign as being against God’s law. In Islamic law, a judge can disqualify authoritarian guardians by assigning someone else as a guardian for a woman. For Mpros, this provision would be maintained, together with their proposal for punishment, rather than ending the MGS for all men. These ideas are consistent throughout the corpus, perhaps indicating male resistance towards stripping their role entirely.

Mpro-MGS:

#لماذا يطالبون باسقاط الولاية السعودي او السعودية لا يثير هذا الموضوع في هذا الطرف الذي تمر به البلاد
أولاً ولعلمة أن هذا الشرع

#WhyDemandingEndMaleGuardianship Saudi man and **woman** don’t discuss this topic under such circumstances that our country is going through and also knowing very well that this is from the Sharia.

Mpros explain how Saudis act (or do not) in a drastic situation such as this, i.e. war in Yemen. ‘Saudi’ is represented in a verbal process, ‘not talking about this topic at such a time,’ for two reasons: the country is at war, and the MGS is based on Islam. Both rationales reflect the exclusion of the anti-MGS campaigners as not Saudis and outsiders, not concerned about national security or Islamic law. This exclusion delegitimises the #EMGS campaign and its demands. This strategy of connecting national security to the demand for women’s rights is not new (see Altoaimy 2017).

Saudi Woman as Fantis

In the Fpro-MGS corpus, 9% of the representations coded IND.CLASS refer to Fantis and comprise two forms: “Saudi” and “Saudi girl” (Table 6.23).

Fanti-MGS:

#سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية1 من تطالب ب الاسقاط اما جاهلة ولا تعرف انظمة وقوانين البلد مجرد اثاره بلبلة كيف **سعودية؟**

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship Those who want to end the male guardianship system are ignorant people who don't know the country's systems and laws; their only purpose is to make trouble, how come she is **Saudi**?

#وسم_الاسقاط_مؤامرة_اممية_أجنيبات حسدونا ع الأستقرار ف بادروا بأسلوب (**أنا سعودية** وأطالب بحقي)

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystemHashtagIsConspiracy Those foreigners envy us for our stability and prosperity, so they started this hashtag with (I'm a **Saudi** and demand my rights) attitude.

In the above tweets, Fpros question the national identity of Fantis. Fantis are represented as ‘ignorant of the country’s regulations’ as a way of excluding them. This is also a strategy that delegitimises the demands of the #EMGS campaign by claiming such constraints do not exist. In the second tweet, Fpros represent Fantis as ‘Saudi’ as a way of imitating them; however, they are represented at the beginning of the sentence as ‘foreigners envying us for our stability and prosperity.’ This also links to the issue of national security by indicating that the #EMGS campaign affects ‘stability and prosperity.’

In the Mpro-MGS corpus, 8% of the representations coded IND.CLASS refer to Fantis and comprises two forms: “Saudi woman” and “Saudi” (Table 6.23).

Mpro-MGS:

#الولاية_امان_وحماية_الوسم_المغاير_لِلوسم_هذا_لما_تدخل_حسابات_الأغلبية_تلاحظ: **مو سعودية** مراهقين تحريض واتهام بالاستعباد الفاظ نابية

#GuardianShipSystemIsSafety&Protection Most of the Twitter accounts in this hashtag are either **not Saudis** or teenagers who instigate the public, make allegations that the MGS is a form of slavery and use profanity.

Mpros represent Fantis by referring to the instrument ‘Twitter accounts’ within a relational process, identifying them as not ‘Saudi’ and ‘teenagers.’ The representation is followed by

aggregation, ‘most of,’ to reflect the large quantity and thus delegitimise their action. The actions collocated with the representation of Fantis are usually negative, for example ‘instigating,’ ‘making accusations against the MGS’ and ‘using profanity.’ The use of the representation ‘teenagers’ aims to show how the #EMGS campaign might be led by inadequate voices because of their youth.

Saudi Woman as Fpros

For Fpros, 14% of representations are coded IND.CLASS and there are six representations: “Saudi woman,” “Saudi,” “Saudi girl,” “Saudi Muslim,” “Saudi citizen” and “true Saudi” (Table 6.23).

Fpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية7 ك **السعودية الأصلية** قادرة تثبت وتطالب ب اسمها ماتحتاج مجنسة تطالب بلسانها

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship7 As a true **Saudi woman**, we’re determined to have our demands, we don’t need outsiders and naturalised women to ask for our own rights.

#سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية **المرأة السعودية** صامدة تجاة الطوفان التغريبي والإعلام المتأمر والأقلام المأجورة أثبتت أنها الجندي المخلص لدينة ووطنه

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship The **Saudi woman** is standing in the face of Westernisation moves, media misrepresentations, and paid writers. She has proved that she’s a soldier faithful to her religion and country.

Fpros represent themselves in these relational processes as ‘true Saudi,’ who tweet in the hashtag #SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship. In addition to the emphasis on nationality in the self-representation, the exclusion of Fantis is identified. Fpros represent Fantis as ‘outsiders’ and ‘naturalised,’ interfering and demanding Saudi women’s rights. Another attribute assigned to Fpros is ‘standing in the face of Westernisation moves, media misrepresentations and paid writers’ within a relational process; thus, they represent themselves as ‘faithful soldiers’; this representation combines functional and appraisal identification.

In the Mpro-MGS corpus, 2% of the representations of the Saudi woman coded IND.CLASS refer to Fpros, comprising one representation “Saudi” (Table 6.23).

Mpro-MGS:

#الولاية_لها_لا_عليها حساب قذر يصف **السعودية** التي تخالف الاسقاط بلفظ قذر وملاحظ الدعم اللوجستي بالرتويت

#GuardianshipIsForHerSeek a filthy account who tweets using profanity in describing a **Saudi woman** who is against the end of male guardianship system; you should notice the Logistic support it gets with retweets.

Mpros defend Fpros in this tweet. They represent Fpros as ‘Saudi woman’ in a material process, ‘receiving the tweet with profanity,’ because she is tweeting against the #EMGS campaign. The tweet also provides a sense of targeting the pro-MGS campaigners through an organisation or a group excluded in the noun phrase ‘logistics support.’ This shows a tendency towards representing hidden actors behind the attack they (i.e. Fpros) experienced.

The representation of Saudi women

As was apparent from section 6.4.1, the social actor “Saudi women” is contextualised within words denoting positive meanings/events in both the pro-MGS corpora. This shows that the general attitude towards Saudi women living their lives with the MGS is assigned positive associations; this might be aimed at delegitimising the #EMGS campaign and indicating that the MGS is not an obstacle. In total, there are 497 occurrences of “Saudi women” in the Fpro-MGS corpus (out of 504) with 10 different representations; in the Mpro-MGS corpus there are 164 (out of 174), with 8 representations (Table 6.24). The prominent representation in both the pro-MGS corpora is ASSIM.CLASS (342 in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 118 in the Mpro-MGS corpus), comprising an assimilated actor identified by class(es), for example “Saudis.” Following the ASSIM.CLASS code, the second most prominent representation is SEMI.OBJECTIVE (72 in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 15 in the Mpro-MGS corpus), comprising a partial representation of Saudi women by referring to one of her psycho-social identities, for example “rights” and “capability.”

Table 6. 24 The representation of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora

Representations of “Saudi women”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
ASSIM.CLASS	342	69%	118	72.2%
ASSIM.CLASS.APPR	10	2%	6	3.6%
ASSIM.CLASS.FUN	13	3%	7	4.2%
ASSIM.CLASS.RELAT	5	1%	2	1.2%

AGG.ASSIM.CLASS	30	6%	13	7.9%
AGG.ASSIM.CLASS.APPR	1	0.2%	-	-
AGG.ASSIM.CLASS.FUN	5	1%	1	0.6%
INSTRUM	8	1.6%	-	-
SEMI.OBJECTIVE	72	14%	15	9.1%
SOMATIZ	11	2.2%	2	1.2%
Total	497	100%	164	100%

“Saudi women” is also examined with regard to actions (Table 6.25) and role (Table 6.26); the most prominent social actions in pro-MGS corpora are relational and material processes. Within relational processes, there are 186 instances in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 51 instances in the Mpro-MGS corpus, divided into two types – attributive and identifying – that are descriptive in nature. “Saudi women” are assigned to an attribute or an identity in these clauses and are not performing any action. However, the second prominent action concerns material processes (160 in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 50 in the Mpro-MGS corpus), which requires an active actor doing the action and a passivated actor receiving or undergoing the action. Similar to the anti-MGS corpora, the actor is engaged in material and relational processes more than the mental and verbal processes in the pro-MGS corpora. Looking at the role of the actor in Table 6.26, it is clear that the actor is more passivated in both corpora: 408 instances in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 114 instances in the Mpro-MGS corpus.

Table 6. 25 The social actions of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora

Social actions of “Saudi women”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Material processes (MA)	160	32.1%	50	30%
Mental processes (ME)	40	8%	28	17%
Verbal processes (VE)	111	22.3%	35	21%
attributive relational processes (RE.ATT)	107	21.5%	37	23%
Identifying relational processes (RE.IDEN)	79	16.1%	14	9%
Behavioural process (BE)	-	-	-	-
Existential processes (EX)	-	-	-	-
Total	497	100%	164	100%

Table 6. 26 The role of “Saudi women” in the pro-MGS corpora

The role of “Saudi women”	Fpro-MGS corpus		Mpro-MGS corpus	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Activation (ACT)	88	17.7%	50	30.5%
Initiator (INIT)	1	0.2%	-	-
Beneficialisation (BENEF)	61	12.1%	17	10.4%
Subjection/goal (SUBJ.GOAL)	347	70%	97	59.1%
Total	497	100%	164	100%

Unlike the findings from the pilot study, “Saudi women” are only once assigned to an initiator role in the Fpro-MGS corpus; this is probably to convince others that they have the power to initiate actions; however, it is limited. Similar to the anti-MGS corpora, the highest representation (ASSIM.CLASS) in both corpora presents three types of reference when mentioning “Saudi women”: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros (Table 6.27). The variations in the prominent representations mostly refer to Saudi women generically (8 patterns in the Fpro-MGS corpus and 7 in the Mpro-MGS corpus). This is followed by references to Saudi women as Fantis (3 in both corpora). However, there are few representations for Fpros.

Table 6. 27 The representations of the social actor, “Saudi women” in the three categories in the pro-MGS corpora

Representation of ASSIM.CLASS	“Saudi women” as a generic reference		“Saudi women” as Fantis		“Saudi women” as Fpros	
	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus	Fpro-MGS corpus	Mpro-MGS corpus
Saudi women النساء السعوديات	3	2	1	1		
Saudis السعوديات	222	70	60	27	42	4
Saudi women aware, free, Saudi women سعوديات واعيات حرات	2					
Saudi citizens مواطنات سعوديات	1	1	2			
Young Saudi women شابات سعوديات	1	1				
Educated Saudi women مثقفات السعوديات	1					
Saudi girls بنات سعوديات	3	1				1
True Saudis اصليات سعوديات				2	3	6

المسلّمات السعوديات المصونات Protected Saudi Muslim women		1				
سعوديات المحافظات Conservative Saudi women		1				
السعوديات المسلمات Saudi Muslim women	1					
Total Fpro-MGS=342 Mpro-MGS=118	234	77	63	30	45	11
Percentage %	68%	65%	19%	26%	13%	9%

Saudi women as a generic reference

Table 6.27 shows several similarities and differences between the representations of Saudi women in the two pro-MGS corpora. They both have “Saudi women,” “Saudis,” “Saudi citizens,” “Young Saudi women” and “Saudi girls.” The representations found in the Fpro-MGS corpus are “aware, free Saudi women,” “educated Saudi women” and “Saudi Muslim women,” and those in the Mpro-MGS corpus included “protected Saudi Muslim women” and “conservative Saudi women.” In the Fpro-MGS corpus, 68% of the representations of Saudi women coded ASSIM.CLASS are generic references, distinguished in 8 patterns. The following examples show the representations in this corpus:

Fpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا من يحاول تغيير الدين بمسميات الحرية و تقليد الغرب خسنت و لن تستطيع
فالسعوديات هن حفيدات عائشة و الصحابيات

#SaudiWomenProudoofMaleGuardianship How dare you try to change our religion under the name of freedom and for the purpose of imitating the West. You can't because **Saudis** are the successors of Aishah and the Prophet's women companions.

#سعوديات_نرفض_اسقاط_الولاية_808 السعوديات يتبعون شرع الله و امام مشروع التغريب صامدات، عن دين الله
مدافعات و لانظمة بلادهن مؤيدات، وبولاية اباهن مفتخرات

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship808 **Saudis** are following Allah's sharia, and are steadfast in the face of Westernisation, defenders of Islam, supporters of their country's systems, and are proud of the male guardianship system.

Fpros identify Saudi women in a relational process in terms of their role as ‘successors’ of the Prophet’s wife, Aishah, and women companions. Another representation indicates that religious Saudi women are in a material process ‘following Allah’s sharia’ and in the relational

processes are ‘steadfast in the face of Westernisation,’ ‘defenders of Islam,’ ‘supporters of the regulations’ and ‘proud of male guardianship.’ Thus, the #EMGS campaign would not succeed in Saudi society because of the Saudi women who would not accept it.

Fpro-MGS:

باللي تطالبين وتناجين **السعوديات** لم تمنعن الولاية الشرعية من تحقيق اهدافهن هذا يعمل بة الشرع كفل محاسبة الولي المتسلط بالنصح او نزع الولاية #اسقاط_الولاية

Those of you who are barking and demanding the end of male guardianship, can’t you see that the system didn’t stop **Saudis** from achieving their goals! Shari’a has ensured that every authoritarian guardian is to be disciplined or disqualified from his authority #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

الحمدالله مو محرومة من عمل او تجارة و **السعوديات** الان ينافسون في سوق العمل و انتي اجلسي نابجي هنا #اسقاط_الولاية

Thankfully, I’m Saudi and not deprived of taking jobs or doing business, and **Saudis** too are competing in the business world while you are barking here #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Fpros represent Saudi women as activated actors in ‘achieving’ their goals in the first tweet and ‘competing with others in the business world’ in the second tweet. This aims to reflect the notion that the MGS has not been an obstacle for Saudi women. Indeed, they argue the MGS is not a problem for those who are supported by their guardians, and allowed to enter the business world. Both tweets include a generalised view of Saudi women’s status regarding the MGS, considering only those who have supportive guardians; thus, they are able to succeed. The policies for authoritarian guardians are mentioned in the first tweet, such that they will either being cautioned against oppressive actions or will be disqualified and replaced by another male guardian. Fantis are addressed as ‘you,’ along with the action ‘barking’ in the #EMGS.

Fpro-MGS:

#انا_راشدة_بولاية_اهلي_هي_ليست_حملات_لمساندة_السعوديات_فلو_كانت_انسانية_لساعدوا_المغتصبات_و_المشردات_من_انحاء_العالم_هم_يچاربون_دينك_و_عفتك

#AdultWithMaleGuardianshipSystem It’s not a campaign to support **Saudis** because if it was a humanitarian one, it would’ve helped the raped and homeless women around the world instead. This campaign’s only purpose is to ruin your virtue and religion.

تنوعت اساليبهم و الهدف تشوية **السعوديات** و اسقاط مكانتهن تلك الخلايا المؤقتة يستخدمها اعداء بلادنا للضغط ع المملكة و زعزعة امنها الداخلي لكنها ستفشل باذن الله #اسقاط_الولاية

Their techniques varies and the purpose is one: to denigrate **Saudis** and tear them down. Those timed cells which are used by the enemies of our country to put pressure on the Kingdom and undermine our national security, but they'll fail by Allah's will #MaleGuardianshipSystem

#اسقاط_الولاية اجانب دعم خارجي، **السعوديات** ليسوا خائنات للوطن.. هم قنابل موقوتة احذروهم

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem do you think we need outside support! **Saudis** are not traitors betraying their country... those who demand are time bombs, so you should be aware.

In the Fpro-MGS corpus, Saudi women are passivated in 'being supported' and 'being denigrated and torn down.' The #EMGS campaign is considered to have hidden goals, 'ruining your virtue and religion,' because if this campaign were truly about humanity, it would aim to help 'raped and homeless women around the world.' The other tweet indicates a different reason, namely to 'denigrate and tear Saudi women down.' In the relational process, Saudi women are identified as 'not traitors to their country.' Interestingly, Fpros represent the anti-MGS as 'timed cells used by our enemies' and 'time bombs' that could be activated at any time to 'destabilise national security.'

In the Mpro-MGS corpus, 65% of the representations of Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS are generic references in which 7 patterns could be discerned. The following examples show the representations in this corpus:

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_منجزات **سعوديات** حققت انجازات في براءة الاختراع لم يحققها الرجال لكن اعلامنا الفاشل جيد في مطالبة قيادتها و تحريرها من #الولاية!

#SaudiWomenAreAccomplishers **Saudis** have achieved patents and other things that no men were able to achieve. Unfortunately, our media fails to present this and it is only good at representing the demands of women to drive and to #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.

يتعامل معنا **سعوديات** من مختلف فئات المجتمع و يدرن استثمارتهن و يسافرن لكل مكان و لم اسمع بعائق الولاية الا في الاعلام #الولاية_امان_وحماية

We deal with **Saudis** from all social classes who invest in the country and who are able to travel wherever they like; and I've never heard anyone complain about the male guardianship system except in the media #GuardianShipSystemIsSafety&Protection

In the Mpro-MGS, Saudi women are activated in the material processes, ‘achieving’ and ‘investing and travelling.’ These tweets assert that the MGS has never been an issue. Interestingly, the media as an actor is criticised both for covering the #EMGS campaign and for focusing on the problems of the guardianship system. Mpros express their rejection of ending the MGS through the use of the hashtags #SaudisWomenAreAccomplishers and #GuardianshipSystemIsSafety&Protection, along with #EMGS. Similar to Fpros, Mpros exclude the cases of those suffering under their male guardians.

Mpro-MGS:

لو خيرت نساء الشرق و الغرب ان يبقين متحررات في بلادهن و بين ان يكن **سعوديات** كالدرر المصونة لما ترددن لحظة واحدة #كوني_حرة #الولاية_امان_وحماية

If women around the world were given the option to be free or to be well-protected pearls like **Saudis**, they wouldn’t hesitate for a second to pick up the latter #BeFree #GuardianShipSystemIsSafety&Protection

#لن_تسقط_ولاية_العفيفات العفة احد عناصر الاخلاق الاسلامية والولاية لدى **السعوديات** دين راسخ لا تستطيع الاعداء اقتلاعة من قناعات الاصيلات

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship Virtues and male guardianship are parts of the basics of Islamic manners. **Saudi women** have both deeply rooted in their beliefs, therefore the enemies can’t rip it out of the real women’s beliefs.

Saudi women in the first representation are distilled as ‘well-protected pearls’; this expression is borrowed from the religious discourse representing women. Similar to the findings in the pilot study, Fpros use the same representation for Saudi women as ‘pearls.’ In addition, the tweet shows Mpros’ confidence in the situation of Saudi women over that of women around the world. In a conditional clause, they argue that if women around the world were given the choice to be like Saudis, they would not hesitate. The tweet includes two hashtags: #Be_Free and #GuardianshipIsSafety&Protection. While the latter hashtag is created by the pro-MGS campaigners, the former is an intertextual reference. #Be_Free is an advertisement campaign started after the #EMGS by one of the well-known TV channels. It has been heavily criticised because it is considered a call to liberate Saudi women and in support of the #EMGS campaign. In the second tweet, Saudi women are assigned the attribute ‘having virtues and deeply rooted acceptance of the MGS,’ which comes from their Islamic values and cannot be removed by ‘enemies.’ Saudi women are partially backgrounded in the representation ‘the true women’s beliefs,’ coded SEMI.OBIEC.

Mpro-MGS:

يظهر **السعوديات** بالوسم المسيء #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية153 بانها تريد ان (تتحرر) من (ظلم) المجتمع و الحكومة بالتغريب بالفتيات للهرب!

Showing that **Saudis** want to be (liberated) from the (oppressive) society and government in this hashtag #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem153 will only lead girls to emigrate.

اللي يسمونة #الحراك_النسوي_السعودي لم يقدم الا تحريض **السعوديات** على الهرب للخارج و تفكيك الاسرة و الاساءة للبلد مع الطعن بالدين #اسقاط_الولاية

What you call #SaudiFeministMovement only leads to instigating **Saudis** to emigrate abroad, to break down families, to disrespect the country and to defame the religion #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

The problem of fleeing the country is addressed in the Mpro-MGS corpus. Saudi women are passivated in the first tweet as being misrepresented in the #EMGS campaign by representing them in a mental process, namely that they ‘want to be emancipated from the oppression of the society and the government.’ This misrepresentation will lead Saudi women to ‘flee the country.’ There is a noticeable difference in the representation of Saudi women in this tweet: they are represented as ‘Saudis’ in relation to the misrepresentation, but as ‘girls’ in being deceived into fleeing the country. The use of ‘girls’ and the implication of youth might be to suggest that they could easily be influenced. Another reason might be that the girls who have fled the country have generally been young, for example 18 years old. The second tweet refers to the #EMGS campaign as a Saudi feminist movement by including the hashtag #SaudiFeministMovement. ‘Saudis’ are activated in the action of ‘fleeing the country.’ It is significant that the feminist movement is recognised in the Mpro-MGS corpus. Looking at the collocations of the #SaudiFeministMovement in this tweet, the actions are negative, ‘inciting Saudis to flee,’ ‘breaking up the unity of the family,’ ‘disrespecting the country’ and ‘defaming the religion.’ This might indicate negative attitudes towards feminist movement as a reflection of their degree of rejection.

Saudi women as Fantis

Within this representation, the pro-MGS corpora present two similar patterns: “Saudi women” and “Saudis” (Table 6.27). The Fpro-MGS corpus has another representation for Fantis, “Saudi citizens.” 19% of the representations of coded ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fantis in the Fpro-MGS corpus.

Fpro-MGS:

نعم لنظرية المؤامرة نعم ليسوا **سعوديات** الواقع يثبت و يتحدث ..معرفات نسوية باسماء سعوديات و قبائل لاجانب ملحدين يطالبون ب#اسقاط_الولاية

I believe in the conspiracy theory; those behind the hashtag are not **Saudis** and real life proves it. These feminist Twitter accounts are atheist foreigners who use Saudi women' names and tribe names in demanding #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.

#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا31 تتاجر سفيهات الحراك النسوي المعتوة بولاية الاباء و قوامة الأزواج لصالح مخططات الغرب و يؤسف ان المنفذ **سعوديات**

#SaudiWomenAreProudOfMaleGuardianship31 Foolish Feminists are trading their fathers' and husbands' authority for Western authority. Unfortunately, this was executed by **Saudi women**.

These tweets show a contradiction in terms of establishing the identity of Fantis as 'not Saudis' or 'Saudis.' In the first tweet, Fpros represent Fantis in relational processes: 'they are not Saudis' and there are 'feminist accounts of atheist foreigners using names of Saudi women and tribes' in the #EMGS campaign. Thus, Fpros state their belief in a conspiracy theory. In the second tweet, Fantis are represented as 'Saudi women' and 'foolish feminists' in an active role within the material processes 'trading' and 'executed.' Fantis are showed as trading guardianship in favour of the Western agenda by their demands in the #EMGS campaign. The beliefs of serving the Western agenda and conspiracy are not new accusations in relation to women's rights; similar patterns are also observed in the arguments made by the proponents of banning driving (Aljarallah 2017; Almahmoud 2015; Alotaibi 2017; Bahammam 2018).

Fpro-MGS:

#سجن_المحرض_علي_اسقاط_الولاية و بالمناسبة هؤلاء لسن **سعوديات** بقدر ماهن مجندات و عميلات و عبيد لاطار الانحراف و اعداء الدين و الاخلاق بل اعداء السعودية

#ImprisonTheInstigatorOfEndingMaleGuardianship by the way these are not **Saudis**, they're more like recruited agents and enemies of moral and Islamic values and of Saudi Arabia and they're slaves to immorality.

اذا كانت هناك قصور من افراد فيوضع ضوابط. لكن هؤلاء المطالبات لسن **سعوديات** يردن تفكيك المجتمع السعودي يتبعون لجماعات و دول ارهابية #اسقاط_الولاية

If there are any individuals who misuse their authority, they should be disciplined by strict legal measures. However, these female campaigners are not **Saudis**. They only want to

break down Saudi society by following terrorist groups and countries
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.

The hashtag in the first tweet is an intertextual reference taken from a newspaper report in Okaz about imprisoning the person behind the hashtag. A set of negative representations are assigned to Fantis in both tweets. Fpros represent them as ‘not Saudis’ in a relational process and they are functionalised as ‘recruited agents and enemies of moral and Islamic values and of Saudi Arabia’ and distilled as ‘slaves to immorality.’ A study of online debates about Saudi women’s issues found that “women who demand their rights, including free mobility, were associated with immorality [which reflected] a sexist view of women” (Bahammam 2018, p. 259). In the second tweet, Fantis are represented as ‘not Saudis’ and activated within material processes, ‘breaking up Saudi society’ and ‘following terrorist groups and countries.’ These representations are due to their use of cases of authoritarian guardians in their demands in the #EMGS campaign, construed as a way of ‘breaking up society.’ Similar to the Mpro-MGS corpus, they suggest strict legal regulations for those guardians who misuse the MGS.

In the Mpro-MGS corpus, 26% of the representations of the Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fantis. A representation of Fantis found in the Mpro-MGS was “not true Saudis.”

Mpro-MGS:

#معلومة من يطالب باسقاط الولاية من النساء كلهن غير **سعوديات حقيقيات** الا انهم من الخارج يخططوا للفتن
#برقية_الولاية_للملك_25_سبتمبر

#FYI those women who demand to end guardianship are not **true Saudis**, they are outsiders who plan for trouble #PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep.

نزع الولاية من اساليب الشيطان و اعوانة من شياطين الانس لاغواء بني ادم غير **سعوديات** عميلات و ادوات تستخدم
لغرض ما ##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية27

Ending the guardianship is one of Satan’s ways and his minions from humans to seduce sons of Adam. Those **non-Saudis** are agents and tools used for a certain purpose
#EndMaleGuardainshipSystem27

The exclusion of Fantis is expressed in these tweets. Similar to Fpros, Mpros in the first tweet represent Fantis in the relational process ‘they are not true Saudis and outsiders,’ who plan trouble. In the second tweet, Fantis are classified and functionalised as ‘not Saudis and agents’

and overdetermined by making a comparison to ‘tools used for a certain purpose,’ adding a negative connotation to the #EMGS.

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_تبون_نكتة_فيه_معنفات_ينابحو_215_يوم_مايسقطو_الولاية_من_المحكمة؟_لانهم_مو
سعوديات

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem you want to hear a joke, why are the abused women barking for 215 days to end guardianship instead of going to court? Because they are not
Saudis

#سجن_المحرض_علي_اسقاط_الولاية_و_الله_مافيهم_من_السعوديات_الا_المراهقات_و_الجاهلات_و_ربما_بعض
المعنفات

#ImprisonTheInstigatorOfEndingMaleGuardianship I swear they’re not Saudis except for some teenagers, ignorant, and only few of the abused women.

Another contradiction lies in establishing the identity of Fantis as ‘not Saudis’ and ‘some Saudis.’ Fantis are represented as ‘abused women barking for 215 days’ but unable to go to court because they are not Saudis. This indicates that the court would handle their cases regarding their authoritarian guardians but because they are not Saudis, i.e. not living in Saudi, they cannot go to the Saudi court. The reason for using the terms ‘abused’ is that Fantis explain ending the MGS as benefiting abused women more than anyone else. The use of the action ‘barking’ is meant to disrespect them and express disbelief about the abuse. The second tweet contradicts the first: Fantis ‘are not Saudis, except teenagers, ignorant [females] and some abused women.’ This might express a sign of recognition for those women needing to end the MGS; however, the representation of ‘teenagers and ignorant women’ might convey the idea of ineligible participants making demands for Saudi women. In addition, the second tweet uses the hashtag as an intertextual reference taken from the newspaper report in Okaz about the news of imprisoning the person behind the hashtag, perhaps in order to support the stance against the #EMGS.

Saudi women as Fpros

In Table 6.27, the two pro-MGS corpora contain similar representations of Fpros as “Saudis” and “true Saudis.” In the Fpro-MGS corpus, 13% of the representations of Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS refer to themselves.

Fpro-MGS:

#انا_راشدة_بولاية_اهلي_الحمدالله_نفتخر_ك_سعوديات_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_و_كثير_سعوديات_وصلوا_لل قمة_بولاية_اهلهم_و_مساعدة_هم_لهم

#AdultWithMaleGuardianshipSystem Thankfully we're **Saudis** who are proud of our families' guardianship, and there are many Saudi women who have reached the top with their families' guardianship and support.

#سعودية_معززة_مكرمة_في_وطني_نحن_ال_سعوديات_ملكات_في_بلادنا_#سعوديات_نرفض_اسقاط_الولاية

#SaudiWomenDignified&Honourable, we, the **Saudis**, are queens in our country
#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem

Fpros represent themselves as 'Saudis' who are proud of their family's guardianship; this indicates their satisfaction with the MGS. In addition, there is a representation of Saudi women as a generic reference in the material process 'reached the top with the support of their family.' Neither representations mention the guardian, but rather the family, perhaps showing a perspective in favour of accepting the MGS as a way of being grateful and obedient to the family. Similar to the findings in the pilot study, the second tweet shows the representation of 'queens' assigned to them to show how their country is treating them.

Fpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_يُحاربون_فتنة_الاسقاط_نحن_مستهدفون_من_منظمات_خارجية_ليس_لاننا_سعوديات_و_حسب_بل_لاننا_مسلمات_و_نفخر_باسلامنا

#SaudiWomenFightingAgainstEndingMaleGuardianship We're targeted by external organisations, not only because we're Saudi, but also because we're proud Muslims.

سعوديات_نقف_بوجه_الذكور_الذين_تدخلوا_في_شؤوننا_و_حرضوا_ضد_احكام_الشريعة_مشككين_في_نظام_الدولة_#اسقاط_الولاية

Saudi Women are standing in the face of these males who are interfering in our internal issues, instigating against Sharia law, questioning our country's system
#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Fpros represent themselves using the pronoun 'we,' which also includes the Saudi women as a generic reference in a passive role. They explain the reason for this campaign, stating 'we are targeted by external organisations,' not only because of their identity as 'Saudis,' but also as 'proud Muslims.' These identifications perhaps reflect two problems in relation to the #EMGS, namely attacks at the Saudi national level and the Islamic national level. In the second tweet,

Fpros represent themselves as ‘Saudis’ who are standing up against the ‘males’ (i.e. Mantis) who ‘interfered in our internal issues, instigated against Sharia law and questioned our country’s regulations.’ These negative connotations surrounding Mantis are similar to those in the representation of Fantis. In the Fpro-MGS corpus, the reasons concerning national security and faith are repeatedly mentioned in relation to the #EMGS campaign.

In the Mpro-MGS corpus, 9% of the representations of Saudi women under the code ASSIM.CLASS refer to Fpros. On such representation was “Saudi girls.”

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نرفض_اسقاط_الولاية188 وحدة الحمد لله الوسم وصل ترند بفضل **بنات سعوديات** و ليس انتم ووسمكم نعلم من يوصله

#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem188 Thankfully our hashtag is a trend now by **Saudi girls**, unlike your hashtag, which we know who made a trend.

Mpros congratulate Fpros for the trending of their hashtag #SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship188. They are represented as ‘Saudi girls’ in an active role within the material process ‘making the hashtag trending.’ There is also a comparison between the participants in the #EMGS and the opposite campaign, whereby those in the former are excluded with ‘we know who made it a trend.’ The exclusion here is “tie[d] in closely to the propaganda strategies of creating fear and of setting up [the anti-MGS] as enemies” of the country’s interests (van Leeuwen 2008, p. 28).

Mpro-MGS:

#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_هاهم **السعوديات الاصيلات** الذين لهم الحق بالتحدث باسم بنات السعودية

#SaudiWomenProudOfFamily’sGuardianship Here are the **true Saudis** who can speak on behalf of Saudi women.

The highest representation in the Mpro-MGS corpus for Fpros is for ‘true Saudis,’ with 6 occurrences (Table 6.27). The tweet refers to those in the hashtag #SaudisProudofOurFamily’sGuardianship as ‘true Saudis.’ This shows a tendency to separate Saudis into two groups: true Saudis (participating in the hashtags against the #EMGS campaign) and those not (participating in the #EMGS campaign). In addition, a relational process indicates that those ‘true Saudis’ have the right to represent Saudi women as a generic reference. Thus,

differentiating between those who are Saudis or not is based on their action concerning the #EMGS campaign, such that true Saudis reject it and those who are not true Saudis, excluded as anti-MGS, participate in the #EMGS.

6.4.3. Comparison of the representations of Saudi women/woman in the anti-MGS and pro-MGS corpora in the #EMGS campaign

In the four Twitter corpora, the general attitude towards women is negative, with the anti-MGS campaigners reflecting on the situation of women, among them Saudi women, living in patriarchal societies. Interestingly, the pro-MGS campaigners also negatively contextualise women; however, this is due to the nature of their campaign in opposition to #EMGS. Thus, their negative attitude towards women is mainly towards Fantis. In what follows, the anti-MGS and pro-MGS findings are compared.

6.4.3.1. Representation of Saudi woman

The four corpora showed unexpected representations in the English language for Saudi woman (i.e. assimilated and aggregate representations with a singular actor). However, these patterns are recognised in the Arabic. This set of patterns was found in the singular form, although it referred to assimilated and aggregate representations. The processes of these patterns varied in that Fantis represent the actor in material processes (i.e. doing actions), while Fpros drew on relational processes in describing her status. However, both male corpora represented Saudi woman within verbal processes. Within the processes of social actions, the actor in the four corpora was by far the most subjected.

Saudi woman was contextualised differently in that she co-occurred with negative events in the anti-MGS corpora, perhaps as a strategy to legitimise the #EMGS campaign, unlike the pro-MGS corpora, which tended to delegitimise the #EMGS campaign based on the positive contexts surrounding Saudi woman. The representation patterns of Saudi woman varied in each corpus; the female corpora showed more patterns than the male corpora (12 in the Fanti-MGS and 11 in the Fpro-MGS against 5 each in the Manti-MGS and Mpro-MGS). This might be due to the main concern of the #EMGS campaign that influences women. The four corpora present the same dominant patterns: IND.CLASS (code for the representation of an individual actor identified by class) and SEMI.OBJECTIVE (code for the representation of one of the actor's psycho-social identities).

The representation of IND.CLASS in the four corpora was closely examined and the findings showed three types of reference to Saudi woman: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros (Table 6.28); the generic reference to Saudi woman was the most dominant and varying compared to the

other two references in the four corpora. In the four corpora, the two most frequent social actions performed by Saudi woman were relational (i.e. concerned with being, possessing and becoming) and material (i.e. concerned with happening and doing, or receiving an action), more than mental and verbal. Her role was by far the most passivated (i.e. under or receiving an action in the material processes or being described through the relational processes). This was not expected in the pro-MGS corpora because they were assumed to be in support of the idea of maintaining the MGS through activating the actor. Unlike Mantis and Mpros, both female corpora represented the actor within an initiative role. While the context of this role was negative (i.e. unable to initiate action) in the Fanti-MGS, the role of initiator in the Fpro-MGS was expressing her ability and power to initiate an action withing the MGS as an attempt to indicate that the MGS was not an obstacle as mentioned in the #EMGS campaign.

Table 6. 28 Representation of Saudi woman (IND.CLASS) in the four Twitter corpora

References to Saudi woman	anti-MGS corpora	pro-MGS corpora
Generic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi woman,” “free Saudi woman,” “Saudi female,” “Saudi girl,” “Saudi citizen,” and “adult, mature, sane Saudi woman.” •Fanti-MGS has “Saudi child,” “Saudi teenager” and “Strong independent Saudi woman” •Manti-MGS has “human Saudi woman,” “successful Saudi woman” and “educated Saudi woman” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi woman,” “Saudi (female),” “Saudi girl,” and “Saudi Muslim” •Fpro-MGS has “Saudi lady,” “adult Saudi woman,” “settled Saudi woman” and “true Saudi” •Mpro-MGS has “Saudi citizen”
Fantis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi woman” and “Saudi female” •Fanti-MGS has “Saudi girl” and “Saudi Muslim.” •Manti-MGS: - 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi female” •Fpro-MGS has “Saudi girl” •Mpro-MGS has “Saudi woman”
Fpros	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi woman” and “Saudi” •Fanti-MGS: - •Manti-MGS: - 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi female” •Fpro-MGS has “Saudi woman,” “Saudi girl,” “Saudi Muslim,” “Saudi citizen” and “true Saudi” •Mpro-MGS: -

6.4.3.2. Representation of Saudi women

Saudi women frequently co-occurred within positive events in three Twitter corpora: the Manti-MGS and both the pro-MGS corpora. Fantis depicted Saudi women in relation to their life under the MGS with negative events; in contrast, Mantis positively represented Saudi

women as a way of supporting them and indicating their capability of living their life without the MGS. In the pro-MGS, they indicated that living with the MGS is positive and supportive for Saudi women. Similar to the singular form, the representations of Saudi women in the female corpora have more diverse patterns than in the male corpora (10 in both the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS against 8 in both the Manti-MGS and Mpro-MGS). The four corpora showed the same prominent representation, ASSIM.CLASS (code for the representation of an assimilated actor identified by class); however, the second dominant representation varied among the four corpora: AGG.ASSIM.CLASS (code for the representation of an aggregated actor represented with class) in anti-MGS corpora, and SEMI.OBJECTIVE (code for the partial representation of Saudi women by referring to one of their psycho-social identities) in pro-MGS corpora.

The representation of ASSIM.CLASS in the four corpora was closely examined and the findings showed three types of reference to Saudi women: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros (Table 6.29); the generic reference to Saudi women was the most dominant and varying compared to the other two references in the four corpora. Similar to the processes related to Saudi woman, the two most frequent social actions performed by Saudi women were relational and material processes and their role was passivated. Unlike Fantis and Mpros, Mantis and Fpros represented the actor within an initiative role. In the Manti-MGS, the initiative role tended to support the #EMGS campaign by indicating that women can make it happen. In the Fpro-MGS, it was expressing the same intention as in the singular form.

Table 6. 29 Representation of Saudi women (ASSIM.CLASS) in the four Twitter corpora

References to Saudi women	anti-MGS corpora	pro-MGS corpora
Generic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both corpora have “Saudi women,” “Saudis” and “young Saudi.” •Fanti-MGS has “creative Saudi women,” “Saudi females,” “Saudi citizens,” “fully qualified adult Saudi citizens” and “true Saudi women” •Manti-MGS corpus has “Saudi teenagers” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi women,” “Saudis,” “Saudi citizens,” “Young Saudi women,” and “Saudi girls.” •Fpro-MGS has “aware, free Saudi women,” “educated Saudi women,” “Saudi Muslim women” •Mpro-MGS corpus has “protected Saudi Muslim women” and “conservative Saudi women”

Fantis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi women,” “Saudis,” “Saudi citizens,” and “Saudi girls” •Fanti-MGS has “adult, sane, Saudi Muslim women,” “true Saudi women,” “fully qualified Saudi girls,” “(strong) free Saudi women,” and “loyal Saudis” •Manti-MGS: - 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudi women,” and “Saudis” •Fpro-MGS has “Saudi citizens” •Mpro-MGS has “true Saudis”
Fpros	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have “Saudis.” •Fpro-MGS: - •Manti-MGS has “young Saudi women” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Both have two “Saudis” and “real Saudis” •Fpro-MGS: - •Mpro-MGS has “Saudi girls.”

By and large, the four corpora drew on sets of topics to (de)legitimise the #EMGS campaign, along with these representations. First, the anti-MGS campaigners referred to the topic of domestic violence policies in Saudi Arabia and that women can be protected in care/safe houses, but then they cannot be released without a guardian. However, new regulations are a work in progress at the time of this research. Another topic was the problem of fleeing the country. The anti-MGS campaigners tended to highlight this issue and relate it to the MGS controlling women’s lives when represented as a ‘guardianship’s detainee,’ a healthy person forced to use a wheelchair and assigned the attribute being a ‘burden on society and the economy.’ In this, they blamed the radical religious views towards women, that were being ‘worshiped’ by the pro-MGS campaigners in defending the MGS. Fpros were represented as accepting these interpretations in believing that they were ‘queens,’ ‘protected pearls,’ ‘minors’ and ‘lacking minds’; thus, they needed the MGS. Mpros were also referred to as having thoughts similar to ISIS group concerning women. The anti-MGS campaigners responded to the representations and claims made by the pro-MGS campaigners in relation to their identities; therefore, the topics of nationalism and identity were observed. Fantis denied the ‘not Saudi’ and ‘fake Twitter account’ claims by proving that they were Saudis when they called for #PetitionOfGuardianshipToTheKing25Sep. Finally, the anti-MGS campaigners had hopes that Vision 2030 would see changes in women’s rights.

Second, the pro-MGS campaigners applied the topic of Saudi women’s rights arguing that the MGS is not an obstacle but supportive, as demonstrated by those women who have competed with men and invested in the business world. However, this view tends to exclude those who have suffered under the MGS, who were also rarely mentioned in their corpora. Saudi women

are represented as ‘queens’ and ‘well-protected pearls’ who require protection and care from their guardians. This might reflect what Saudi women stand for in society as being responsible for the honour of men, family and the tribe (Al-Harby 2017). Thus, campaigning to end the MGS was seen as a threat to this social value. Another topic was that the #EMGS campaign was considered a threat to religious values and national security and this was supported by the tweets from the anti-MGS campaigners questioning the rightfulness of the MGS, mentioning the accounts of human rights organisations, referring to the timing of the campaign (i.e. during the war on Yemen), and referencing the international reports and news reports on the campaign. Therefore, the anti-MGS campaigners were represented as ‘breaking up the unity of family,’ ‘disrespecting the country’ and ‘defaming the religion.’ The national identity of the anti-MGS campaigners was also noticeable, in that they were represented as ‘outsiders’ and ‘non-Saudis,’ and in a few instances, they were recognised as Saudis but as ‘agents,’ ‘recruited’ and ‘foolish feminists’ who were planning trouble. This elimination was also noticed in the Fpro-MGS corpus in the pilot study. Unlike the identity of the anti-MGS campaigners, the pro-MGS campaigners tended to represent themselves as ‘true Saudis’ because of their stance against the #EMGS campaign and maintaining the status quo.

6.5. Summary

This chapter has discussed the findings from the Twitter platform. It has examined four Twitter corpora in order to answer two questions: 1) Which social actors are represented in the Twitter EMGS campaign? 2) How do both #EMGS campaigners represent *Saudi women* as social actors and what are their social actions? The findings revealed a variety of social actors in all corpora; however, the most prominent were the women, men and institutional actors. In addition, the representations of Saudi women/woman showed that the actor referred to three groups: Saudi women in general, Fpros and Fantis. Thus, each has certain representations; however, the most dominant was the first group, construed mainly as doing or receiving material processes and being described in relational processes.

Chapter 7: Intertextuality in #EMGS on Twitter

7.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to answer RQ3: Do anti-MGS and pro-MGS of #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? In order to understand the (borrowed) texts used to support or contradict the arguments of ending the male guardianship system, the analysis was applied to four intertextual sub-corpora that were extracted from the four Twitter corpora (Fanti-, Manti-, Fpro-, Mpro-MGS) because they exhibited intertextuality. Farrelly's (2019) analytical framework of intertextuality, linked to Fairclough's (1992, 2003) concept analysing interdiscursivity was applied to examine intertextual references. The chapter is organised into five main sections which present the findings for each of the sub-corpora examined in this stage of the project. Section 7.2 begins with the intertexts' topic and content as discourses (i.e. the ways of representing one topic in a range of genres). Section 7.3 focuses on the other integrated discourses (i.e. how they were integrated with other discourses) in order to provide a wider picture of the content and to understand the complexity of arguments and topics in the #EMGS campaign. Section 7.4 moves onto the producers of the intertexts and Section 7.5 analyses the text types and named text (i.e. a title for texts or the name given by the producer to a social practice). In addition, the origin of the intertexts (for selective samples due to time constraints) and the absence (i.e. a lack of the aforementioned elements) are investigated in each section. Section 7.6 discusses findings from analysis of these Twitter intertextual sub-corpora in order to critically reflect on the overall role played by these references in this feminist campaign. One of the interesting findings is that the anti-MGS sub-corpora intertextualised female producers of religious discourses, whereas female producers were never intertextualised in the pro-MGS sub-corpora. This perhaps reflects the ideology of male dominance across the arguments of the pro-MGS sub-corpora.

7.2. Main discourses in the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora

This section focuses on the discourses found in the four intertextual sub-corpora. As mentioned in section 5.7.1, the intertexts were categorised based on their topic and content as *discourses* (i.e. the ways of representing one topic in a range of genres). First, I provide a brief summary of the main discourses found in the sub-corpora and then compare the anti-MGS and pro-MGS sub-corpora.




Figure 7. 1 Percentages of discourses in the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora

As shown in Figure 7.1, 13 main discourses are identified. The Fanti-MGS sub-corpus has 12 discourses (excluding conspiracy and anti-government), the Manti-MGS sub-corpus has 11 discourses (excluding international campaign and conspiracy), and both pro-MGS sub-corpora have 11 discourses (excluding international campaign and economics). Interestingly, both anti-MGS sub-corpora express economic discourses in their intertextual sub-corpora; this might indicate how the MGS has affected Saudi women's economic status: for example, "the legal restrictions on their travel, personal identity cards, and economic transactions were believed to hinder wider international economic opportunities" (Al-Rasheed 2015, p. 305). However, this is not an issue in either of the pro-MGS sub-corpora, perhaps because they would consider the role of guardian to be that of financial supporter as well as protector. The four most frequent discourses in each sub-corpus are as follows:

- 1) Fanti-MGS: religious (17%: 309), policy (17%: 298), media (16%: 278), political (14%: 256);
- 2) Manti-MGS: religious (34%: 451), media (15%: 192), policy (14%: 182), political (13%: 165);
- 3) Fpro-MGS: reflective campaign (21%: 311), religious (18%: 269), media (16%: 232), other women's rights (10%: 141);
- 4) Mpro-MGS: media (30%: 253), religious (23%: 193), political (12%: 104), other women's rights (10%: 85).

Examining the intertextual sub-corpora – anti-MGS and pro-MGS – reveals that both anti-MGS sub-corpora present the same frequent discourses: religious, political, media and policy. This might indicate the use of similar strategies in supporting their arguments in the #EMGS campaign. Unsurprisingly, the anti-MGS campaigners intertextualise religious discourses in their arguments for #EMGS to reflect self-conceptions and internal thoughts in Saudi society. This reflects their strategy “enter the social world [...] via some form of discourse” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005, p. 587). In the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus, policy and religious discourses occur in the same proportion (17%); this might be an indication of the constant link in the policy discourses (new or old) with a religious base in order to convince others and contradict the claims by pro-MGS campaigners that the #EMGS campaign’s demands are not following Islamic teaching. Unlike the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus, political discourses are not significant in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus.

Both pro-MGS sub-corpora contain similar discourses: religious, media and other women’s rights. Interestingly, the discourses concerning other women’s rights are more dominant in the pro-MGS sub-corpora than in the anti-MGS sub-corpora; this might be due to the heavy comparisons made in the pro-MGS sub-corpora to show how privileged Saudi women are compared to other women around the world. This in turn linked to the pro-MGS arguments that, given this privileged status, no change to the existing guardianship system is necessary. In the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus, the reflective campaign discourses are the most prominent; this might indicate the main reason for their campaign against #EMGS. Unlike the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus, political discourses are frequent in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus; this perhaps relates the references to structural reasons not to end the existing MGS.

7.3. Integrated with main discourses

This section examines the integrated discourses in the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora. The integrated discourses refer to the occurrences of the intersection of the four most frequent intertextual discourses in the Twitter sub-corpora (section 7.2) with other discourses - topics or genres. Thus, the (counter-) #EMGS discourse are textured in a more complex way. First, it discusses the findings in each of the anti-MGS sub-corpora, and then summaries the main points of contrast. Second, it presents the integrated discourses in each of the pro-MGS sub-corpora and concludes with the key findings.

7.3.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora

Although the anti-MGS sub-corpora have the same frequent discourses, they vary in terms of the integrated discourses (Appendix H). First, religious discourses integrate with 10 other

discourses by Fantis and with 8 discourses by Mantis. Fantis rely on the media (e.g. TV interview, online articles) (16 times) when discussing the religious base of the campaign. In Table 7.1, the first example shows the tendency of Fantis in integrating religious discourse with media discourses, whereby the claim that the MGS is not religiously based is supported by reflection on an interview with a religious figure in a newspaper article from a well-known Saudi press called Okaz. However, Mantis rely on historical stories of women’s rights in Islam (48 times), along with the religious discourse. The second example reflects this reliance when Mantis refer to a story of the prophet’s wife traveling to Iraq without mentioning taking permission from a guardian to travel. This then links to questioning the basis of the MGS.

Table 7. 1 Examples of religious discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية60 انه ليس من ديننا هذا عضو هيئة كبار العلماء يقولكم حكمها الشرعي يالجاهل المتخلف اللي تقول انها دين link [photograph of Okaz newspaper]</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem60 it is not based on our religion, this is a <u>member of the Senior Scholars Council</u> telling you about the Islamic provision of the male guardianship system, whoever said it’s a religious rule are ignorant fools <u>LINK</u> [photograph of Okaz newspapers].</p>	<p>ام المؤمنين سيدتنا عائشة عندما سافرت من مكة الى العراق ويتبعها ٣٠ الف رجل وقت موقعة الجمل هل اخذت اذن السفر من ولي امرها اخاها عبدالرحمن بن ابي بكر ام اخاة محمد؟ كيف هذا من الاسلام؟ #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية 15</p> <p>When <u>Umm al-Mu'minin, Aisha</u>, travelled from Mecca to Iraq along with 30.000 male soldiers in the time of the Battle of the Camel, did she get her brothers,’ Abdulrahman’s and Mohammad’s, permission to travel? how this is Islamic? #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem15</p>

Second, policy discourses integrate with 7 other discourse by Fantis and with 4 discourses by Mantis. The most frequent integrated discourse with policy in the anti-MGS sub-corpus is political (447 times by Fantis and 21 times by Mantis). For example, the two tweets (Table 7.2) refer to a new policy issued by the royal decree in April 2017 and align with the provisions of international agreements on women’s rights. In the first tweet, the producer of this policy is included, perhaps to link a supportive powerful voice to the campaign. In the second tweet, the producer is excluded but the attachment of the royal decree from the king’s office perhaps adds legitimate approval of the campaign’s demands from the government. The reasons behind the integration of policy and political discourses when referring to new policies or adjustment to policies by politicians in anti-MGS sub-corpora are perhaps rhetorical strategies that aim to

legitimise their arguments for ending the MGS by attaching the #EMGS to the actions or words of politicians.

Table 7. 2 Examples of policy discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>الملك سلمان ينهي الجدل ويأمر هيئات حقوق الانسان لتعريف <u>بينود</u> الاتفاقيات الدولية##سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية303</p> <p>King <u>Salman</u> ends the controversy by ordering the Human Rights bodies to publicise the <u>provisions of international treaties</u> #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem303</p>	<p>##سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية ##تمكين_المرأة_بلا_ولي_مبروك_لنساء_بلدي_هذا [photograph <u>هذا</u> الانتصار العظيم سيسطر التاريخ هذا of royal decree] link</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem #EmpoweringWomanWithoutGuardian Congratulations to the women of my country, <u>this great victory</u> [the royal decree] will go down in history <u>LINK</u> [photograph of the royal decree].</p>

Third, media discourses integrate with 11 other discourses by Fantis and with 7 discourses by Mantis. Fantis tend to intertextualise media coverage on the #EMGS campaign (122 times). In Table 7.3, the first tweet contains a report of a Saudi citizen who supported the #EMGS in Australia, along with the hashtag on day 45; the media coverage of the #EMGS campaign could be a strategy to demonstrate the global extension of the campaign as reported by the media, nationally and internationally; this could help in maintaining the campaign, and in encouraging the proponents to continue tweeting. While Fantis focus on the media coverage of the campaign, the Mantis intertextualise media coverage of successful Saudi women (23 times). The second tweet reports on a Saudi woman being assigned as a representative in the UN programme; this perhaps aims to display how Saudi women can be trusted in official positions, if given the opportunity. Thus, the end of the MGS is perhaps a step towards this.

Table 7. 3 Examples of media discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية45 مواطنة سعودية ترسم جدارية في ميلبورن بأستراليا تطالب فيها link [report from Sabq News] باسقاط الولاية</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem45 a <u>Saudi female citizen painted a street mural in Melbourne, Australia, demanding the end</u></p>	<p>##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية92 اختصار الطالب رزان العقيل كأفضل ممثل دولة في مجلس الأمم المتحدة للشباب link [report from Okaz newspaper]</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem92 the student, <u>Razan Al-Aqeel was chosen as the best youth representative in the United</u></p>

of the guardianship system LINK [report from Sabq News]	Nations Youth Delegate Programme LINK [report from Okaz newspaper].
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Finally, political discourses integrate with 13 other discourses by Fantis and with 13 discourses by Mantis. Fantis frequently combine Saudi women’s rights with political discourse (34 times). In Table 7.4, Fantis intertextualise the minister of foreign affairs being asked about women’s empowerment in Saudi. His response is used to support the campaign and its campaigners because it indicates more changes will take place in this regard; this can be seen as a strategy by Fantis, i.e. intertextualising politicians’ comments regarding Saudi women helps to maintain and support the campaign. While Fantis integrate political discourses with Saudi women’s rights, Mantis integrate it with policy discourse (48 times). In the second tweet, the intertextual reference is uttered by the Crown prince during the CBS 60 Minutes interview in 2019; he was commenting on the driving-ban policy on women and how he found it a ‘painful period that cannot be justified.’ Mantis may refer to policies on women by political figures in order to indicate a change in the upcoming policies and a regret of the previous unjust ones. Both purposes perhaps aim at maintaining support for the campaign.

Table 7. 4 Examples of political discourse integrated with other discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p><u>وزير الخارجية السعودي عادل الجبير لا يمكن أن نتقدم للأمام إذا أهملنا حقوق ٥٠٪ من مجتمعنا</u> <u>#تمكين_المرأة_بلا_ولي</u> <u>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية570</u></p> <p>“We can never move forward if we neglect the rights of 50% of our society” <u>Adel Al-Jubeir, the Minister for Foreign Affairs</u> <u>#EmpoweringWomanWithoutGuardian</u> <u>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem570</u></p>	<p><u>ولي العهد : منع قيادة المرأة للسيارة في البلاد كانت حقبة مؤلمة من الزمن ولا يمكننا تبريرها انه قادم</u> <u>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية</u></p> <p>“Banning women from driving in the country was a painful period that cannot be justified,” the Crown prince, it is coming #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>

This section has examined the integrated discourses within the main four discourses in both anti-MGS sub-corpora. First, both anti-MGS tended to integrate different discourses with religious discourse. While Fantis focused on the media, the Mantis intertextualised the historical narrative of women’s rights in Islam. This might reflect their different strategies in campaigning for #EMGS: the Fantis focused on the recent events and actions reported by the

media, and the Mantis looked back in history to support their views. Unsurprisingly, the policy discourses in both sub-corpora integrated with political discourses, perhaps because of the close relationship between making policies and the political domain. Within media discourses, the topics varied in the anti-MGS sub-corpora. While Fantis focused on the coverage of the #EMGS, the Mantis intertextualised the coverage of the successful Saudi women. It seems that the Fantis were more concerned about expanding the campaign worldwide in order to gain the international support, while the Mantis were nationally focused on the ability and success of women if given the chance. The Mantis integrated political and policy discourses, whereas the Fantis intertextualised political discourses with topics on Saudi women's rights.

7.3.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora

Although the pro-MGS sub-corpora present the same three discourses, their integrated discourses vary (Appendix I). First, religious discourses integrate with 7 other discourses by Fpros and with 10 discourses by Mpros. Fpros produce discourse reflecting the campaign (22 times) along with religious discourses. In Table 7.5, the Fpros intertextualise two tweets with comments from a religious figure, Imam of the Grand Mosque, on the campaign against the male guardianship system. This intertextualisation may reflect the negative religious views on the #EMGS in order to delegitimise the campaign, and to imply that it is anti-Islamic/Sharia. Mpros, on the other hand, frequently integrate religious discourse with discourse relating to the anti-campaign (i.e. the pro-MGS's discourse) (11 times). In the second tweet, the hashtag #SaudiWomenThankAlAriafi was launched by Fpros for the Islamic scholar who tweeted his standpoint against the #EMGS campaign. The pro-MGS campaigners intertextualise comments from religious figures who are against the campaign, perhaps to signify their position as the defenders of Islamic values.

Table 7. 5 Examples of religious discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>مام الحرم المكي الشيخ/سعود الشريم حفظة الله طلب إلغاء ولاية الرجل على المرأة مضاد للشرع ولاية الرجل على المرأة حماية لها link [photograph of two tweets by Islamic scholar #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>“Demanding the end of the male guardianship system is against Sharia, because the system is for women’s own good” Imam of the Grand Mosque, Saud</p>	<p>#بنات_الوطن_يشكرون_العريفي_على_توضيحة باسقاط_الولاية_هولاء_نساء_السعوديات_الاصيلات [Tweets by @MohamadAlarefe] #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>Those are the true Saudi women #SaudiWomenThankAlAriafi for his clarification about #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem LINK [Tweets by religious scholar Al-Ariafi].</p>

<u>Al-Shuraim</u> #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem _____ LINK [<u>photograph of his tweets</u>]	
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Second, media discourses are integrated with 18 other discourses by Fpros and 19 other discourses by Mpros. Fpros frequently combine media discourses with religious discourses (29 times). In Table 7.6, the first tweet intertextualises #BeFree, a hashtag by a media organisation called MBC group, along with the Islamic teachings (i.e. sayings) on hijab, modesty and femininity. This, however, is understood by the pro-MGS campaigners to be a call for emancipation (i.e. #BeFree) which attacks Islamic principles, one of which is guardianship. Mpros integrate media discourses with discourses reflecting on the campaign (44 times). In the second tweet, Mpros intertextualise a report on fake foreign accounts found tweeting Saudi hashtags; this is linked to the tweets in the #EMGS, which trend daily in the Saudi Twitter domain. This indicates that pro-MGS campaigners tend to attack media figures supporting the campaign, and use religious conspiracy and reports of fake accounts in order to delegitimize the #EMGS campaign.

Table 7. 6 Examples of media discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpora	Mpro-MGS sub-corpora
#كوني حرة هكذا تريد MBC ان تهدم تربيتنا الإسلامية بترسيخ الاذهان بأن الحرية هي التحرر من التدين والحجاب والحياء والانوثة #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية	#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية119 الوسم ذا سيتصدر الترنند كل يوم والسبب 6 آلاف حسابات وهمية خارجية برا المملكة تغرد فية link [report in Alarab News]
#BeFree this is how MBC wants to destroy <u>our Islamic teachings</u> , by consolidating in our minds that freedom comes only by being liberated from religion, <u>hijab, modesty and femininity</u> #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem119 <u>This</u> <u>hashtag</u> will keep trending every day because of 6,000 fake foreign accounts, tweeting from outside the Kingdom LINK [report in Alarab News]

Third, other women’s rights discourses integrate with 12 other discourses by Fpros and with 5 discourses by Mpros. Fpros most frequently combine the other women’s rights discourses with discourses of international policy (34 times). In Table 7.7, the first tweet intertextualises the policy of women running for the Shura council in Qatar.¹⁹ While Fpros refer to international

¹⁹ First implemented in November 2017.

policy, Mpros most frequently combine media coverage (36 times) with discourses on other women's rights. For example, the second tweet intertextualises an article on Sky News Arabia which talked about women's rights of inheritance among the nobility in Britain. This reflects that the pro-MGS campaigners tend to intertextualise other women's rights issues, international policy, and the media, as a strategy to show how unfortunate women are in comparison with Saudi women.

Table 7. 7 Examples of other women's rights discourse integrated with other discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#قطر الداعمة لحملات #إسقاط الولاية و #قيادة المرأة تحرض من منابر الغرب في حين سلبوا نسانهم حق الترشح للشورى</p> <p>#Qatar supports #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem and #WomenDriving, and incites against Saudi Arabia from Western platforms, while <u>they robbed their women of the right to be elected to the Shura Council.</u></p>	<p>في بريطانيا ومنذ عقود طبقة النبلاء لا يورثون العقارات للبنات أين المحاربين عن الغرب؟ أين المدعيات بأن الإسلام سلب حقوقهن؟##كلنا مع الولاية link [photograph from Sky News Arabia website]</p> <p><u>In Britain, for decades, women could not inherit property among the nobility, where are the Western activists, and those accusers who claim that Islam has robbed women of their rights?</u> #WeAreAllWithMaleGuardianship LINK [article from Sky News Arabia website]</p>

Unlike in the Mpro-MGS, reflective campaign discourses are frequent in the Fpro-MGS and they integrate with 20 other discourses, one of which is the discourse around the national identity of the anti-MGS campaigners (45 times). Questioning the national identity of the anti-MGS campaigners is evident in the pro-MGS corpus (section 6.4.2.2). In the following tweet, Fpros intertextualise the female campaigners' tweets, and highlight their way of writing certain words in other Arabic dialects; this is seen as an evidence of the real identity of the female campaigners. Thus, the #EMGS campaign must be stopped because it is a threat to Saudis' faith and national security.

#سعوديات ضد الانسة كوهين وجوارية ضد الملحدين والروافض وكل مجنسة تتكلم باسم السعودية وتعبث
بعقيدتنا وأمن حكومتنا [link \[photographs of tweets by Fantis, highlighting their way of writing certain non-Saudi terms\]](#) #
سعوديات نطلب إسقاط الولاية

#SaudiWomenAgainstMissCohen&HisOdalisques Against atheists, Rafida
(rejectionists), and every naturalised woman who speaks on behalf of Saudi women,
messes with our faith and destabilises our government's security

#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem LINK [photographs of tweets by Fantis, highlighting their way of writing certain non-Saudi terms]

While reflective campaign discourses are dominant in the Fpro-MGS, political discourses are frequent in the Mpro-MGS and integrate with 8 other discourses, one of which is conspiracy and media discourses (37 times). In the following tweet, Mpros intertextualise an official figure reporting on the fake Twitter accounts that daily target the Saudi Twitter domain. This perhaps serves to provide evidence for the conspiracy theory that there are interferences in the #EMGS campaign: by adding the hashtag #PunishTheTraitorsOfEndMaleGuardianshipSystem and citing a report by official actors, it represents this to be legitimate.

مدير المباحث العامة هناك 10 الاف حساب في تويتر و130 الف تغريدة تستهدف المملكة يوميا لزرع الفتنة #محاسبة_خونة_اسقاط_الولاية Link [Tweet by Ajal News]

“There are 10,000 Twitter accounts and 130,000 tweets targeting the Kingdom every day to sow discord” Director of General Investigation #PunishTheTraitorsOfEndMaleGuardianshipSystem Link [Tweet by Ajal News].

This section has examined the integration of the four main discourses in both pro-MGS sub-corpora. Interestingly, religious discourses integrated with different discourses in both sub-corpora; Fpros relied on the reflective discourses of the #EMGS, while Mpros used the reflective discourses of the counter- #EMGS (i.e. by the pro-MGSs). This, however, indicated different strategies in both sub-corpora; on one hand, the Fpros tended to religiously illegitimate the #EMGS. On the other hand, the Mpros aimed to focus on the religious legitimacy of their own counter-campaign. Within the media discourses, both sub-corpora varied in the use of the integrated discourses. While Fpros integrated media and religious discourses, the Mpros focused on the reflective discourses of the #EMGS in the media; this might serve to criticise and attack the media agencies covering the #EMGS campaign. Within the discourses of other women’s rights, the integration mostly served to criticise international policies (in Fpro-MGS sub-corpus) and media coverage (in Mpro-MGS sub-corpus). It seems that criticism of international policies in relation to women’s rights tended to highlight other nation’s inadequacy at fulfilling those rights. In addition, the media coverage of other women’s rights seems to indicate that women struggle worldwide. Interestingly, the Fpro-MGS mainly integrated the reflective discourse of the campaign with the topic of anti-MGs campaigners’

identity. This was highly significant in the pro-MGS corpora throughout the whole project (see Chapter 6 and 8).

7.4. Producers of the intertextual references

This section focuses on the producers of the intertextual references in the four most frequent discourses in the Twitter sub-corpora. It aims to investigate the powerful voices referred to in the sub-corpora in order to support the arguments on both sides by looking at their gender (male, female, or group), the institutions, their affiliations, and their absence (i.e. if they could not be traced); the producers can be included (i.e. cited in the text), backgrounded (i.e. not mentioned because they were already known to the readers) or referred to with a generic reference. First, it reveals who the producers are in the anti-MGS sub-corpora, and then summarises the main findings. Second, it shows who the producers are in the pro-MGS sub-corpora, and then concludes with a brief summary of the key points.

7.4.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora

Section 7.2 shows that both anti-MGS corpora present the same most frequent discourses: religious, media, policy and political, that are closely examined. First, the producers of religious discourses are predominantly male in the anti-MGS (Figure 7.2).




Figure 7. 2 Comparison of religious discourse producers in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

For example, Islamic scholars occur 97 times in the Fanti-MGS²⁰ and 119 times in Manti-MGS.²¹ However, this is not surprising because the religious committee is under the control of male Islamic scholars, although this was not the case in the history of Islam as at one time women discussed Islamic issues in various fields. Despite that, female voices (e.g. Islamic scholars and researchers) have recently begun to participate in the Saudi religious context, although they are not officially recognised. They have started to introduce themselves through social or traditional media and writing. One such example is Souhaila Al-Abidin, an Islamic researcher, writer and a member of the Saudi National Society for Human Rights. Female voices are recognised to a minor extent in anti-MGS sub-corpora (Fanti-MGS: 7 times; Manti-MGS: 3 times).

In Table 7.8, the producers in these intertextual references, ‘Islamic scholars,’ are genericised and collectivised in explaining the legitimacy of the male guardianship system; the Fantis refer to women’s travelling without permission, and the Mantis highlight that there is only one case in which the MGS is formally required (in marriage). The actors here lend power to the argument because collectivisation “helps to signal their agreement” (van Leeuwen 2008, p. 38).

Table 7. 8 Examples of generic producers of religious discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية600 لكل من يعتقد انها تطبيق لشريعة الشرع (العلماء) أجاز سفر المرأة بدون تصريح برفقة اي محرم</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem600 To everyone who believes that they’re applying Sharia law by supporting the MGS, <u>Islamic scholars have permitted women to travel without permission or the company of a Mahram (guardian)</u></p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية185- لا ولاية الا التزويج وهذا صرح به كبار العلماء</p> <p>According to <u>the leading scholars</u>, the guardianship system is only required in marriage contracts #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem185.</p>

²⁰ Producers of religious discourses in the Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (in total 239) are Islamic scholars (97 times), Prophet Muhammad (67 times), Islamic researchers (44 times), Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta (7 times), theologians (4 times), Grand Mufti (4 times) and absent (16 times).

²¹ Producers of the religious discourses in the Manti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total of 283) are Islamic scholars (119 times), the prophet (98 times), theologians (13 times), Islamic preachers (8 times), Islamic researchers (7 times), Islamic schools (7 times), grand mufti (three times), Calipha (twice), and absent (26 times).

One of the backgrounded producers is the prophet in the Fanti-MGS (35 times), and in the Manti-MGS (48 times). In Table 7.9, the first tweet by Fantis intertextualises the prophet’s words which explain how women should be treated. The second tweet by Mantis shows how the prophet represented women as the “counterpart of men” and this is interpreted as supporting the need to treat them equally to men and not as “minors.” Both anti-MGS campaigners rely on the prophet’s words about women in their campaign against the MGS, which may serve to legitimate the campaign as Islamic.

Table 7. 9 Examples of backgrounded producers of religious discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية37 <u>رفقا</u> سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية38 <u>بِالْقَوَارِيرِ وَاسْتَوْصُوا بِالنِّسَاءِ خَيْرًا</u> رفقاً بقلوب نساء</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem37 #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem38 “<u>be kind to the Qawareer (women)</u>”and “<u>treat women with kindness</u>” So you should be kind to women</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية61 إنما النساء <u>شقائق الرجال ما أكرمهن إلا كريم ولا أهانهن إلا</u> <u>لئيم الإهانة أن تعامل كقاصر ولا تكون ولية نفسها</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem61 “<u>Woman are the counterparts of men</u>” and “<u>only a honourable man would treat women with honour, and only a dishonourable man would humiliate them</u>” – the humiliation is to treat a woman as a minor and not to allow her to be her own guardian.</p>

Second, the producers of media discourses are predominantly institutional in both sub-corpora (Figure 7.3).




Figure 7. 3 Comparison of media discourse producers in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

One of the most frequent intertextualised institutions covering the #EMGS campaign is the MBC group, owned mainly by the Saudi Arabia government. The MBC group is cited 29 times by Fantis²² and 35 times by Mantis²³. In Table 7.10, the first tweet mentions an episode of a TV series called *Selfies*, aired in Ramadan 2017 on MBC, which was about Saudi women's lives under the MGS. Producing and airing the episode suggests that MBC supports the campaign #EMGS. Another way of providing support is demonstrated in the second example; a tweet uses the hashtag #Be_Free on Twitter, calling on women to refuse to be dependent and to choose their way of living. Thus, the work of the MBC group is heavily intertextualised by the anti-MGS campaigners. This might have been to lend power from such an influential media agency, although of the anti-MGSs' realisation that this group has received many criticisms from Saudi society. In addition, it might be a way of promoting the media support for the #EMGS campaign.

²² Producers of media discourses in the Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total 381) are journalists (151 times), other institutions (100 times), MBC (29 times), researchers (25 times), akhbaar24 (14 times), Alarabia (13 times), Khalejia group (6 times), Youtuber (6 times), absent (37 times).

²³ Producers of media discourses in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus (total 192) are other institutions (57 times), journalists (44 times), MBC group (35 times), Akhbaar24 news (20 times), Khalejia group (17 times), Okaz news (9 times), Alwateen news (3 times), Alarabia channel (once), and absent (6 times).

Table 7. 10 Examples of institutional producers of media discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>الحلقة شرحت الكثير حياة المرأة تتشكل حسب مزاج ولي امرها يقدر يوسعها لة ويضيقها عليها بكيفية وكلة بصفة قانونية وليست رجولته طبعاً #انا راشدة# [video of an episode of Selfies on MBC channel] link# The episode #IAmAdult has explained a lot about the Saudi woman’s life, and how her male guardian can control her life depending on his mood and this is because it’s his legal right, of course #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem, LINK [video of an episode of Selfies produced by and aired on MBC].</p>	<p>#كوني حرة تغريدات MBC عن حرية المرأة صحيحة ولكن مشكلتها أنها صدرت من MBC اسقاط الولاية #BeFree MBC’s tweets about women’s freedom are right but the problem is that it came from MBC #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem.</p>

Interestingly, the second highest producers of media discourse are different in the sub-corpora. Fantis cite the reports/articles of female journalists 110 times, while Mantis cite those of male journalists 72 times. During the analysis, the producers of the intertextualised articles and reports were analysed by their gender, rather than their institutional agency, in order to investigate the role of gender (i.e. their role as journalists). My hypothesis is that female journalists would be dominant in the media discourses in both anti-MGS sub-corpora. However, the results show an agreement in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus, but interestingly not in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. This might suggest that the Fantis more likely rely on female journalists in their intertextuality while Mantis depend on the sources by male journalists in their tweets.

Third, the producers of the policy discourses are governmental or private institutions: 230 times by Fantis²⁴ and 174 times by Mantis²⁵ (Figure 7.4).

²⁴ Producers of policy discourses in the Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total of 312) are Ministry of the Interior (88 times), the King (52 times), Ministry of Education (36 times), Saudi government (33 times), Ministry of Justice (23 times), UN general (20 times), lawyers (16 times), universities (10 times), Ministry of Health (8 times), private sector (7 times), judges (6 times), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (5 times), ministers (twice), and absent (6 times).

²⁵ Producers in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus (total 182) are Saudi government (111 times), Minister of the Interior (38 times), Ministry of Education (8 times), Ministry of Human Resources (5 times), Ministry of Justice (4 times), Ministry of Health (3 times), Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta (3 times), other committees (twice), and absent (8 times).




Figure 7. 4 Comparison of policy discourse producers in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

In Table 7.11, the first intertextual reference taken from the Fanti-MGS references ‘private companies,’ who are generically aggregated with ‘some.’ Those companies agreed to follow the royal decree in April 2017, although the decree was directed only at the governmental sector. Fantis indicate that the acceptance of this new policy by the private sectors seem to reflect a supportive work environment for women; however, there is still one problem that male guardian can report his female relative as a fugitive when she goes to work. This can disrupt this environment and also cause a burden on these companies in hiring women. In June 2021, an amendment to this was issued that a women’s guardian cannot report her as a fugitive. The second intertextual example by Manti refers to the policy that requires male consent in various sectors of officialdom. The producers of these policies are generically construed; this might be to genericise this policy across offices, for example, among them are the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, and the Ministry of Education.

Table 7. 11 Examples of generic producers of policy discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpora	Manti-MGS sub-corpora
<p>وافقت بعض الشركات لإلغاء طلب موافقة الولي لتوظيف المرأة إلا أنه يحق لـ أن يبلغ عنها بأنها هاربة حين تذهب للعمل #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية37</p> <p>Some companies agreed to abolish the rule of the guardian’s consent for a woman’s employment, but the male guardian is still entitled to report his</p>	<p>المسؤول يطلب خطاب موافقة ولي الأمر مطلوبة في التعليم والعمل والعمليات الجراحية والسفر ولا يجب ان يكون مصير الراشدة مقيد بولي #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية3</p> <p>The one in charge requires a guardian’s approval letter for women in education, work, medical surgeries, and travel. However, an adult woman’s fate must not</p>

woman as a fugitive when she goes to work! #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem37	be restricted by a guardian #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem3.
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The backgrounded producers vary in the anti-MGS sub-corpora. In the first tweet (Table 7.12), Fantis backgrounds the producer of the royal decree, King Salman. The royal decree of April 2017 mentioned the phrase ‘all equal,’ which has been used as a hashtag accompanied with #EMGS. Although the producer here is backgrounded, the phrase from the decree endows the tweet with power. Another backgrounded actor found in the Manti-MGS is the Ministry of the Interior. The second example refer to the travelling policy for women issued by this ministry. According to the law, the male-relative is not required to accompany women; however, his consent is obligatory. The producer of this policy is backgrounded; this might aim to shift attention from the producer to an inadequate policy.

Table 7. 12 Examples of backgrounded producers of policy discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpora	Manti-MGS sub-corpora
<p>#تمكين_المرأة_بلاولي#السعودية_الجديدة_تحليل هذا الخطاب والتغيرات المتعلقة فيه link حفظة الله قال #على حد سواء [photograph of the royal decree]</p> <p>#EmpoweringWomanWithoutGuardian #TheNewSaudiArabia to sum up <u>the decree and the related changes</u>, it has been said <u>#AllEqual LINK</u> [photograph of the royal decree].</p>	<p>نظام لا يشترط وجود محرم في السفر#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية6</p> <p>According to the law, <u>the presence of a mahram in traveling is not obligatory</u> #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem6.</p>

Finally, the producers of political discourses are predominantly male in anti-MGS sub-corpora (Figure 7.5). The Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman is most frequently intertextualised in the Fanti-MGS (53 instances)²⁶ and in the Manti-MGS (80 instances)²⁷ and then the institutions

²⁶ Producers of political discourses in the Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora are (total of 257) MBS (53 times), other politicians (33 times), Saudi government (33 times), Shura council (28 times), Shura members (25 times), other princes (14 times), foreign ministers (14 times), King Salman (12 times), Princess Basma (10 times), other kings (9 times), Prince Naif (7 times), Princess Reema (7 times), Princess Ameerah (6 times), and other princesses (6 times).

²⁷ Producers of political discourses in the Manti-MGS sub-corpora (total 165) are MBS (80 times), Shura council (15 times), Saudi government (13 times), other princes (13 times), King Salman (11 times), other politicians (10 times), Shura members (7 times), other kings (6 times), Princess Reema (5 times), Saudi human rights (4 times), and Foreign Ministry (once),

(61 times in the Fanti-MGS and 33 times in the Manti-MGS). Interestingly, the voices of female politicians are present in both anti-MGS sub-corpora, mainly as Shura members (49 times in the Fanti-MGS and 12 times in the Manti-MGS). This might reflect their role in Saudi women’s rights in general, and in ending the male guardianship system in particular.




Figure 7. 5 Comparison of political discourse producers in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

One of backgrounded producers is the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman; In Table 7.13, the first tweet is intertextualised by Fantis about the Crown prince when he was asked about Saudi women’s rights and the MGS during his interview with the Atlantic in 2018. In the first example by Mantis, the Crown prince is also intertextualised when he was asked about the future plans for the country and women’s rights during the future investment initiative conference in 2017. Another backgrounded producer is Princess Ameerah intertextualised by Fantis. In the second example, they use her utterance when she was asked about Saudi women’s rights during an interview with Forbes in 2011. Mantis also intertextualise women in the political domain. For example, two women of Shura members, Latifa Al-Shaalan and Moudhi Al-Khalaf, submitted a recommendation, calling for Saudi Human Rights Commission to limit the existing regulations that discriminate against women, e.g. the male guardianship system. Such intertextual references lend power to the #EMGS and help legitimate its end.

Table 7. 13 Examples of backgrounded producers of political discourse in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية660 قيل ١٩٧٩ لم <u>تكن ثمة قوانين ولاية على المرأة</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem660 <u>“Before 1979, the guardianship system did not exist”</u></p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية77 معاً مجتمع <u>نظيف خالي من الصحوة إسقاط الولاية + قيادة المرأة</u> <u>+ عودة المجتمع السعودي كما كان قبل 30 سنة</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem77 <u>Together for a clean society and free from the Sahwa movement: end the male guardianship system + women’s driving = it is how Saudi society was 30 years ago</u></p>
<p>قوانيننا التي تخص المرأة رجعية و لكن نحن لسنا <u>رجعيات نحن</u></p> <p>متعلمات#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية36</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem36 <u>“Our laws regarding women are backward but we are not, we are educated”</u></p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية- عضوات <u>بالشورى تتقدمان بتوصية تطالب بتعديل أنظمة التمييز</u> <u>ضد المرأة ومنع الولاية عليها</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem two women of Shura members proposed a change in laws that discriminate against women, among them is the male-guardianship system.</p>

Overall, both the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora have shown that they referred to the religious discourses produced by male religious figures; interestingly, they also recognised female voices, but with significantly fewer occurrences. However, this revealed a new tendency towards recognising women’s voices in religious issues within the public sphere. While the producers of media discourses in both sub-corpora were predominantly institutional, the second most significant producers varied, with the Fanti-MGS tending to intertextualise the reports/articles of female journalists, unlike the Manti-MGS. This perhaps indicated that, unlike Mantis, Fantis aimed to maintain relations with the female journalists, who in turn wrote about the #EMGS campaign.

Within policy discourses, the intertextual references in each sub-corpus differed in that Fantis referred to texts produced by the Ministry of the Interior, the body responsible for covering interior affairs, for example travel and issuing passports, while Mantis referred to texts produced by the Saudi government. Finally, the political discourses were mainly produced by male politicians in both the anti-MGS sub-corpora. However, the voices of female politicians in these discourses were present. The backgrounded producers were known to the readers,

while those producers who were never mentioned anywhere were considered absent. The absences, generic references and backgrounded actors occurred less frequently.

7.4.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora

In section 7.2., the pro-MGS sub-corpora contain three similar discourses: religious, media and other women’s rights. They differ with regard to one type of discourse: the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus contains reflective campaign discourses, whereas the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus includes political discourses.

First, the producers of the religious discourses are predominantly male (Figure 7.6). Unlike the in the anti-MGS sub-corpus, female Islamic scholars are not recognised at all by the pro-MGS campaigners, in total of 179 producers in Fpros²⁸ and 148 in Mpros.²⁹




Figure 7. 6 Comparison of religious discourse producers in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

One of the generic references in the pro-MGS is the Islamic scholars. Table 7.14 demonstrates instances of intertextuality by Fpros and Mpros. The Islamic scholars are generalised and collectivised to signal general agreement among the scholars. The first matter of agreement in the Fpro-MGS example concerns women’s education, and the fact that they are allowed to proceed with their education; thus, the MGS is not viewed as an obstacle. The second issue of

²⁸ Producers of religious discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (in total 179) are Islamic scholars (87 times), Prophet Muhammad (59 times), Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta (14 times), Grand Mufti (8 times), theologians (7 times), Salaf (twice), and the Calipha (twice).

²⁹ Producers of the religious discourses in the Mpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total of 148) are Islamic scholars (59 times), the prophet (47 times), grand mufti (22 times), Islamic preachers (6 times), the Calipha (5 times), theologians (4 times), institutions (twice), and absent (3 times).

agreement in the Mpro-MGS example concerns the #EMGS campaign, described as “full of lies and false allegations,” perhaps to delegitimize the demands of the #EMGS campaign.

Table 7. 14 Examples of generic producers of religious discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpora	Mpro-MGS sub-corpora
<p>#يوم_المرأة_السعودية#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية تستطيع_المرأة_تصل_الى_مراتب_العلم_بالتمسك_بعقيدتها وبحجابها "وعلمائنا الكبار قالوا لا حدود لتعليم المرأة وطلبها العلم</p> <p>#SaudiWomanDay #EMGS women can acquire knowledge in different fields by holding on to their beliefs and hijabs and as <u>our senior scholars once said</u>, there are no limits to women’s education or pursuit of knowledge</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نرفض_اسقاط_الولاية20 رأي علماء السنة بالولاية عن وسم المطالبة باسقاط الولاية فيه من الكذب والباطل مايشيب الرأس</p> <p>#SaudiWomenAgainstEndMale-GuardianshipSystem20 Sunni scholars said: the hashtag to end the male guardianship system is full of lies and false allegations.</p>

The prophet is one of the backgrounded actors (10 times by Fpros and 16 times by Mpros). In the first tweet (Table 7.15), Fpros indicate the responsibility of men towards women, and warn the guardians against abusing the power that was given to them; this perhaps shows resistance to ending the MGS, because abuses reflect a deficit in the abuser, not in the system itself. In the second tweet, the Mpros legitimise the MGS through generalising the hadith on marriage to other aspects, e.g. education, working and so forth.

Table 7. 15 Examples of backgrounded producers of religious discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpora	Mpro-MGS sub-corpora
<p>#انطلاق_سعوديات_ضد_الاسقاط_الولاية_تكليف_للرجل ومسؤولية_عظيمة (كلكم راع وكلكم مسؤول عن رعيتة) فليتق الله أولياء الأمور فليس للولي التسلط والظلم</p> <p>#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem Guardianship is a mandate and a huge responsibility on men, “<u>Each of you is a shepherd and each is responsible for his flock.</u>” So, guardians should fear God and not use their authority to be abusive and unjust</p>	<p>في الحديث (لا نكاح الا بولي)#حقوق_المرأة_في_الاسلام#اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>In <u>the hadith</u> “no marriage without a <u>guardian</u>” #WomansRightsInIslam #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>

Second, institutional agencies are the most dominant producer of media discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora (Figure 7.7).




Figure 7. 7 Comparison of media discourse producers in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

The most frequent media group is MBC, 77 times by Fpros³⁰ and 39 times by Mpros.³¹ In tweets (Table 7.16), the hashtag, #BeFree has caused heated discussion in Saudi society, especially among pro-MGS campaigners, because it has been seen to support the call for emancipation. The pro-MGS campaigners campaigned to boycott the channel and all advertised products aired on it, and demanded the MBC group make an apology. MBC on its part, released a letter of apology. The former example indicates the refusal of pro-MGS campaigners to accept the apology, with the hashtag #SaudiWomenAgainstEndingMaleGuardianship.

³⁰ Producers of media discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total 232) are journalists (98 times), MBC (77 times), other institutions (30 times), Tawasal (10 times), Saudi channels (7 times), the Khalejia group (6 times), Makkah newspapers (twice), and absent (twice).

³¹ Producers in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (total 226) are journalists (103 times), other groups (48 times), MBC group (39 times), Tawasal news (18 times), Akhbaar24 news (8 times) and absent (10 times)

Table 7. 16 Examples of producers of media discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>اعتذار MBC غير مقبول نهائيا #كوني حرة #سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية</p>	<p>لماذا لا تقولون "كوني عاهرة" بدلا من كذبكم في #كوني حرة كوني عاهرة كوني بين الرجال #اسقاط_الولاية [link for MBC's tweet in #BeFree]</p>
<p>MBC's apology is utterly unaccepted #BeFree #SaudiWomenAgainstEnding- MaleGuardianship</p>	<p>Why don't you say: "Be a wh*re" instead of lying by saying #BeFree! #EndMaleGuardianshipsystem LINK [photograph of MBC's tweet in #BeFree].</p>

Interestingly, the second most frequent intertextualised references differ in the sub-corpora. Unlike the frequent intertextualisation of female journalists (62 times) in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus, male dominance is witnessed in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (71 times). The producers of the intertextual articles were analysed by gender, rather than by institutional agency, as the research aimed to look at the role of gender regarding this campaign (i.e. their role as journalists). My hypothesis is that for both the pro-MGS sub-corpora, male journalists would be dominant in the media discourses. However, the results show this was the case in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus but not in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus. This is similar to the anti-MGS sub-corpora, whereby both female campaigners rely on female journalists who write about the #EMGS, while male campaigners find the male journalists more likely to express their views.

Third, the producers of other women's rights discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora (Figure 7.8) are mostly institutional agencies: occurring 94 times by Fpros³² and 34 times by Mpros.³³

³² Producers of other women's rights discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total 141) are other governments (31 times), the Independent (23 times), journalists (15 times), other institutions (15 times), human rights organizations (12 times), politicians (8 times), other campaigners (7 times), Saudi human rights institutions (7 times), Saudi government (6 times), researchers (three times), and absent (14 times).

³³ Producers in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (total 83) are researchers (13 times), the MBC group (9 times), the Telegraph (9 times), journalists (7 times), the Guardian (6 times), other media groups (6 times), Sky News (4 times), lawyers (twice), Brazilian president (twice), and absent (25 times).




Figure 7. 8 Comparison of other women’s rights discourse producers in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Unlike the Mpro-MGS, the Fpro-MGS contains generic references to other campaigners (7 times). The following example shows the intertextualisation of an online campaign on Twitter by Emirati female campaigners demanding an end to the MGS in their country. The pro-MGS campaigners relate their campaign to the Saudi campaign and describe both as a ‘malignant cancer,’ ‘disloyalty and treachery.’

#اماراتيات نطالب باسقاط الولاية حتى انتوي اهل الامارات عندكم عاقات في والديهم اسأل الله لنا ولكم الشفاء من هذا السرطان الخبيث هذا اسقاط تلطيف الا هو عقوق وقللة خاتمة لكن الدنيا تدور أيها التافهون #اسقاط_الولاية

#EmiratiWomenDemandEndMaleGuardianshipSystem, even Emiratis are suffering from these untrustworthy women who disobeyed their fathers (guardians)! I ask God for a cure to this malignant cancer. No matter how hard you try to soften this demand, it’s still a great disloyalty and treachery, #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem;

For the backgrounded producers, the pro-MGS sub-corpora have indirectly intertextualised the sources. In Table 7.17, Fpros refer to other international governments by citing the Western law regarding women’s rights. The West does not have the MGS and their laws have been ineffective in protecting women from men, as opposed to the MGS, which is seen as protecting women. Another institution is intertextualised in the second tweet by Mpros, the Telegraph newspaper. This article is cited as an attempt to depict Western women’s lives without a male

guardian, aiming to delegitimise the #EMGS campaign by spreading fear of living without the MGS.

Table 7. 17 Examples of producers of other women’s rights discourse in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>لا يوجد ولاية في الغرب و هناك قانون قوي فلما مازال الرجال يمارسون كل العنف والتسلط والاهانة للمرأة وحتى القتل #سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية1</p> <p>Although there is a strong <u>law</u> and <u>no male guardianship system</u> in the West, men are still practising domestic violence, dominating, humiliating, and even murdering women #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem1</p>	<p>#رسالة_الي_المطالبات_بالاسقاط_ود_المرأة_الغربية_لو_كان_لها_ولي.._تطرد_من_بيت_أسرتها_في_سن_18_80%_نسبة_الاغتصاب_>> <u>Link [report from the Telegraph newspaper about rape]</u></p> <p>#MessageForEndMaleGuardianshipSystem women in the West wish to have guardians, they are kicked out of their families’ homes at the age of 18, and with <u>the rape rate 80%</u>. >> <u>Link [report from the Telegraph newspaper about rape].</u></p>

On the one hand, reflective campaign discourses appear frequently in the Fpro-MGS, unlike in the Mpro-MGS. The producers are mostly anti-MGS campaigners who are deleted from the analysis for privacy reasons (Figure 7.9).³⁴ Their tweets are cited by Fpros, usually to criticise the anti-MGS campaigners.




Figure 7. 9 Producers of campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus

³⁴ Producers of reflective campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (total of 291) are anti-MGS (101 times), other institutions (21 times), pro-MGS (14 times), UN general (7 times), absent for privacy reasons (142 times) and absent (6 times).

On the other hand, political discourses are prominent in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus, unlike the Fpro-MGS. The producers' gender is primarily male (Figure 7.10); they mainly refer to national security detectives.³⁵ Interestingly, the voices of female politicians, for example female Shura members, are present 13 times.




Figure 7. 10 Producers of political discourse in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus

One of the backgrounded actors in the Mpro-MGS is Prince Naif (6 times). The following intertextual example has been strongly ascribed to Prince Naif, although there is no record of when or where it was said. However, assigning such an utterance to him tends to legitimise it as a means of opposing all calls for women's rights as a way of protecting them.

إن الذين ينادون بحرية المرأة لا يريدون حريتها بل يريدون حرية الوصول إليها #لماذا يطالبون باسقاط الولاية

“Those who advocate for women's freedom don't really want their freedom, all they want is the freedom to reach them” #WhyEndMaleGuardianshipSystem

Overall, this section has compared three discourses with regard to their producers in the pro-MGS sub-corpora. First, the producers of religious discourses were predominantly male in both pro-MGS sub-corpora. Interestingly, female Islamic scholars were not recognised at all. Second, media discourses were frequently produced by institutional agencies in both pro-MGS

³⁵ Producers of political discourses in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (total 104) are detectives (38 times), Shura members (27 times), Prince Naif (24 times), MBS (5 times), ambassador's wife (3 times), Saudi government (3 times), ambassador (2 times) and other princes (twice).

sub-corpora. Fpros also intertextualised female journalists, whereas Mpro-MGS intertextualised males. Third, the producers of other women’s rights discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora were mostly institutional agencies (i.e. produced by other non-Saudi institutions). In the Fpro-MGS, the reflective campaign discourses were produced by anti-MGS campaigners. In the Mpro-MGS, the producers of political discourses were predominantly male; however, the voices of female politicians were also present. The known actors were often backgrounded, while those never mentioned anywhere were considered absent. The absences, generic references and backgrounded actors occurred less frequently.

7.5. Text-types and names of intertextual references

This section focuses on the text-types and names of the intertextual references in the four most frequent intertextual discourses in the Twitter sub-corpora. The former analyses the different types of the intertexts (e.g. report, article, book). The latter concerns text names (i.e. the name of a text, a set of events and social practices). The analysis aims to investigate the most text types/genres used in the intertextual references. The section is divided into two sub-sections. The first presents the findings in the anti-MGS sub-corpora, and then summaries the key points of contrast. The second explains the findings in the pro-MGS sub-corpora, and concludes with a brief summary.

7.5.1. Anti-MGS sub-corpora

In section 7.2, both Fanti- and Manti-MGS sub-corpora were found to contain the same most frequent discourses: religious, media, policy and political. First, the text-types of the religious discourses present similarities and differences in both anti-MGS sub-corpora: 17 text-types in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 15 text-types in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. Table 7.18 presents (i) text-types which refer to religious discourse and (ii) an absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 18 Comparison of text-types in religious discourses in both the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	The Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	The Manti-MGS sub-corpus
Hadith	66	94
Quranic verse	26	74
Biblical verse	8	-
Fatwa	19	19
Religious book	42	73
Jurisprudence	-	27
Sermon	8	4

YouTube video:		
-TV episode	44	47
-Q&A session	1	1
-Selfie video	7	-
TV news	3	-
Twitter		
-hashtag (#)	-	-
-tweets	2	8
News report	7	17
News article	11	4
Book	30	10
Legislation	36	25
Historical story	5	41
Other genres (less well-defined)	2	1
Absent	10	55

Both anti-MGS sub-corpora share fourteen text-types, e.g. news article and news report. The most dominant text-type in both sub-corpora is the hadith (i.e. the prophet's sayings and doings), occurring 66 times in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 94 times in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. In addition, there is a remarkable absence in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus (55 times).

Table 7.19 gives an example of a Quranic verse, al-Nisa-34, one of named texts in the Fanti-MGS. This verse is interpreted by the pro-MGS campaigners to legitimise the MGS, in that men are given power over women in both family and public life; thus, "women are expected to be obedient toward their guardians" (Tønnessen 2016, p. 8). Therefore, Fantis intertextualise it to highlight the verse's multiple interpretations,³⁶ with the misread interpretation being circulated by the pro-MGS campaigners as "it has wrongfully given men virtual control over women's lives" (Tønnessen 2016, p. 8). The second tweet by Mantis cites the story of Umm Salama, whose advice the prophet took. This aims to provide evidence of how women were treated in the prophet's days. In this story, the prophet took Umm Salama's advice in a battle, here aligned with the contemporary political situation.

Table 7. 19 Examples of intertext's names of religious discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
الرجال قوامون على النساء وليس الرجال أولياء على النساء سعوديات_ نطلب_ اسقاط_ الولاية712	عندنا نقرأ التاريخ الإسلامي وتبرز شخصية ك أم سلمة أيقن يقيناً بأن مانعيشة اليوم هي عادات وتقاليد تراثية #سعوديات_ نطالب_ باسقاط_ الولاية56

³⁶ One of which is that men are "breadwinners" and this changes the meaning of the verse (Tønnessen 2016).

<p>“Men are the protectors and maintainers of women” They’re not the patriarchs over women, #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem712</p>	<p>When a female character like Umm Salama stands out in Islamic history, it makes me certain that what we are going through today is only ancient customs and traditions #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem56.</p>
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Second, the text-types of media discourses show similarities and differences in both anti-MGS sub-corpora: there are 13 text-types in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 8 text-types in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. Table 7.20 shows (i) text-types refer to media discourses and (ii) absence of the intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 20 Comparison of text-types in media discourses in both the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	The Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	The Manti-MGS sub-corpus
YouTube video:		
-documentary	2	-
-TV episode	57	42
-selfie video	4	-
-TV interview	26	15
TV news	20	15
TV show	29	-
Twitter:		
-hashtag (#)	-	14
-Tweets	4	9
News report	96	69
News article	77	16
Radio show	3	-
News caricature	3	-
Blog	22	-
Infographic	-	3
Academic article	3	-
Absent	32	9

Both anti-MGS sub-corpora share a set of text-types, TV episode, TV interview, TV news, tweets, news reports and articles. The most dominant text-types in both sub-corpora comprise YouTube video. In addition, the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus reveal a remarkable absence (32 times) in the types of the intertextual references.

In Table 7.21, the first tweet demonstrates one of the named texts by Fantis, the title of a newspaper article commenting on the reactions of pro-MGS campaigners to the #EMGS

campaign. This article attacks the ideology of pro-MGSs, who argue against the #EMGS by representing women as being envied by the West. The second tweet by Mantis intertextualises the title of a newspaper article covering the #EMGS campaign.

Table 7. 21 Examples of intertext's names of media discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية72 وليد حسونة صحيفة مكة يغسلون عقول الفتيات بأنهم محسودات من الغرب [photograph of the article from the Makkah newspaper] link</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem72 “<u>They have brainwashed girls by making them believe that the West envies them,</u>” Walid Hassouna, Makkah Newspaper LINK [photograph of the article from the Makkah newspaper].</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية17 السجال يشتعل حول إسقاط ولاية الرجل على المرأة link [report in al-Hayat newspaper]</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem17 “<u>The discussion is intense on the topic of ending the male guardianship system</u>” link [report in al-Hayat newspaper].</p>

Third, the text-types of policy discourses present similarities and differences in both anti-MGS sub-corpora: there are 8 text-types in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 7 text-types in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. Table 7.22 presents (i) text-types which refer to policy discourses and (ii) absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 22 Text-types in policy discourses in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	The Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	The Manti-MGS sub-corpus
Legislation	245	164
Report	-	5
Treaty	-	4
Constitution	-	1
Conference	2	-
YouTube video:		
-selfie video	4	11
-TV interview	12	-
-Tv news	4	-
Twitter (tweets)	15	-
News report	8	-
Narrative story	7	6
Curriculum	-	2
Absent	4	-

The two anti-MGS sub-corpora share three text-types, legislation, Selfie video and narrative story; the most dominant text-type in both sub-corpora is legislation (245 times in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 164 times in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus). Unlike the Manti-MGS, the text-types are absent in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus (4 times).

In Table 7.23, the first tweet by Fantis cites a named text, a policy that allows men to act without their guardian's consent after the age of 22, making a comparison between women's and men's rights in order to question the heavy criticism of the #EMGS campaign. In the second tweet, Mantis intertextualise a significant named text, the royal decree in April 2017.

Table 7. 23 Examples of intertext's names of policy discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية_اسقاط_الولاية ليست عصيان وعقوق النظام يسقط الولاية عن الابن عند بلوغه فهل الدولة تشجع عقوق وعصيان الابناء</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem is not a rebellion or disobedience, <u>the government doesn't require the guardian's consent for men</u> when they reach the legal age, does that mean they encourage men's disobedience and rebellion?</p>	<p>الان الدراسة لا تستوجب موافقة ولي الأمر ولا يحق لولي الأمر منعها من قيادة السيارة #تمكين_المرأة بلاولي</p> <p>According to the <u>announcement</u>, now guardian's consent for education or driving is not required, #EmpoweringWomenWithoutGuardians.</p>

Finally, the text-types of political discourses present similarities and differences in the anti-MGS sub-corpora: the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus contains 15 text-types and the Manti-MGS sub-corpus contains 10 text-types. Table 7.24 presents (i) text-types which refer to political discourses and (ii) absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 24 Comparison of text-types in political discourses in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
Conference	17	9
Treaty	7	-
Report	12	-
Legislation	27	55
Constitution	14	-
Political speech	3	-
Fatwa	3	-
Quranic verse	-	3

YouTube video:		
-sermon	3	-
-TV interview	44	30
-TV news report	-	12
-TV episode	-	1
Twitter:		
-hashtag (#)	4	-
-Tweets	12	3
News report	27	20
News article	3	-
Interview	43	25
book	2	3
Absent	34	20

Both sub-corpora share seven text-types, legislation, conference, YouTube videos, Twitter, news reports, interviews and books. The most dominant text-type in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus is TV interviews (44 times) and in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus is legislation (55 times). There is a remarkable absence in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus (34 times).

In Table 7.25, Fantis intertextualise the royal decree and the goals of Vision 2030; these references seek to lend power to the campaign because the former was issued by the king's office and the latter by the Crown prince. In the second tweet, Mantis cite a named text concerning the historical event of opening girls' schools. This intertextual reference from the past aims to compare the voices who were opposed to having girls' schools to those opposing the #EMGS campaign. It is perhaps also a reminder aimed at assuring the anti-MGS campaigners that the pro-MGS campaigners would follow the regulations despite their dissatisfaction as a similar situation had happened before in relation to women's rights.

Table 7. 25 Examples of intertext's names of political discourse in the anti-MGS sub-corpora

Fanti-MGS sub-corpus	Manti-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية682_الوسم_هدفة الأول يتواكب ومأعنة خادم الحرمين من #تمكين_المرأة_بلا_ولي ويتوافق وما أعلنته المجدد #محمد_بن_سلمان أن للمرأة في الإسلام حقوق لم ينلها بعد</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem682 The first goal of the hashtag is to keep up with the <u>announcement</u> of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques #EmpoweringWomenWithoutGuardians and with what the <u>reformer</u>,</p>	<p>#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية259_أمر من الحاكم يخرس جميع المعارضون ولنا بالماضي مثال حينما قرر الملك سعود فتح مدارس لبنات هذا ما نحتاجه الان</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem259 One order from the ruler would keep all the opponents silent. The same thing happened in the past when <u>King Saud decided to open schools for girls</u>; this is what we need now</p>

#MuhammadBinSalman said “Islam has given women rights that they have not yet acquired”	
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This section has focused on the text-types and names of the intertextual references in the anti-MGS sub-corpora. First, the text-types of the religious discourses in both sub-corpora showed no significant differences in terms of variation, for example both used hadith. The named texts were used to strongly support women’s rights in relation to Islam and Islamic history. Second, the text-types of the media discourses showed slight differences: 13 text-types in the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus and 8 text-types in the Manti-MGS sub-corpus. The YouTube videos were the most intertextualised. The named texts predominantly related to articles covering the #EMGS campaign. Third, the text-types of policy discourses showed no significant differences in terms of the variation, for example, both used regulations and YouTube videos. Among the significant text names, the royal decree in April 2017 and the policy of men’s rights after the age of 22 were intertextualised to legitimise the #EMGS campaign. The last set of discourses was political and showed no significant difference in the anti-MGS sub-corpora. Similar to the policy discourses, intertextualisation occurred more often in legislation and YouTube videos. The text names were about Vision 2030 and a historical event in terms of women’s rights. In all four discourses, the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus was most notable in terms of the absence of intertextualised text-types.

7.5.2. Pro-MGS sub-corpora

In section 7.2, the pro-MGS sub-corpora contain three similar discourses: religious, media and other women’s rights. They differ in one discourse: Fpros includes reflective campaign discourses, whereas Mpros has political discourses. First, the text-types of religious discourses present similarities and differences in the two pro-MGS sub-corpora: there are 13 types in the Fpro-MGS and 11 in the Mpro-MGS. Table 7.26 presents (i) text-types which refer to religious discourses and (ii) absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 26 Comparison of text-types in religious discourses in both pro-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
Hadith	70	50
Quranic verse	60	45
Jurisprudence	-	3
Fatwa	12	-
Religious book	31	-

Sermon	-	15
YouTube video:		
-TV episode	11	4
-Q&A session	2	8
Twitter:		
-hashtag (#)	11	7
-Tweets	35	11
News report	24	24
Article	2	-
Book	24	-
Legislation	22	-
Historical story	-	5
Other genres (less well-defined)	2	2
Absent	21	14

Both pro-MGS sub-corpora share 8 text-types, e.g. tweets and news report. Similar to the anti-MGS sub-corpora, the most dominant text-type in both pro-MGS sub-corpora is the hadith, occurring 70 times in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus and 50 times in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus. There is a notable absence in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus (21 times).

In Table 7.27, one of the named texts highly intertextualised by Fpros in describing the anti-MGS campaigners is a Quranic verse, Al-munaafiqoon-4. This verse is intended to describe the anti-MGS campaigners as ‘real enemies’ along with the reasons in their tweets that show their criticism of the MGS. In addition, they are represented negatively as ‘Saudi liberals’ and ‘time bombs.’ In the second tweet, a Quranic verse, Al-baqara-229 is significantly intertextualised by Mpros. This presents a resemblance between the limits imposed by Allah and the MGS; thus, people should be aware that it is not wise to change them. The aim here is to delegitimise the #EMGS campaign, understood as one of God’s limits. Their understanding is aligned with the Quranic verse mentioned earlier (i.e. al-Nisa-34) in its interpretation of men having authority over women.

Table 7. 27 Examples of intertext’s names of religious discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
#حقيقة_وسم_اسقاط_الولاية_البيرايين_السعوديين قنابل موقوتة في خاصرة الوطن هم العدو فأخذهم [photographs of tweets by the anti-MGS] link	#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_لا_تجادل نصوص القرآن فيما اختصة الله في الولاية واحذر أن تنزع الله في أحكامه (تلك حدود الله فلا تعتدوها)
#TheTruthBehindEndMale-GuardianshipSystem the Saudi liberals	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem Don’t argue with the <u>Quranic text</u> for the

are time-bombs in the country, “ <u>they’re the real enemies; so beware</u> ” LINK [photographs of tweets by the anti-MGS].	guardianship system and beware of going against God’s rules, “ <u>These are the limits of Allah, so do not transgress them.</u> ”
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Second, the text-types of the media discourses exhibit similarities and differences in both the pro-MGS sub-corpora: there are 15 text-types in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus and 9 text-types in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus. Table 7.28 presents (i) text-types which refer to media discourses and (ii) absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 28 Comparison of text-types in media discourses in both pro-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
YouTube video:		
-videos	9	-
-documentary	-	6
-TV episode	56	37
-TV report	15	5
-TV interview	10	-
Twitter (#)	21	32
Twitter (tweets)	15	7
News report	83	131
News article	29	19
Facebook	2	-
Letters	1	2
Symposium	5	5
Academic article	7	-
Treaty	7	-
Religious book	4	-
Book	1	-
Absent	2	10

Both pro-MGS sub-corpora share 8 text-types, e.g. TV episodes, TV reports, Twitter (hashtags and tweets), news reports and news articles. The most dominant text-type in both sub-corpora is news reports, occurring 83 times in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus and 131 times in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus. There is a remarkable absence in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (10 times).

In Table 7.29, one of a significant named text cited by Fpros is the title of a newspaper. However, the article did not identify the #EMGS hashtag as offensive, as stated in the tweet. The attachment of the #EMGS campaign with this article creates a form of relation that is seemingly intended as a warning. Mpros intertextualise a named text that is a title of a news

report. The report concerned what the head of Saudi human rights said in a meeting with the UN delegation about the MGS. The response supported the argument of the pro-MGS against the anti-MGS.

Table 7. 29 Examples of intertext's names of media discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>#بنات_المملكة_مع_الولاية_جامعة_نايف_للعلوم_الأمنية_تحذر من_الأصبياع_خلف_الوسوم_المسيئة_منها_وسم_مطلب link [Photographs of the فطن_#كن_الولاية_# Alwatan newspaper]</p> <p>#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem Naif University for Security Sciences warns against participating in the offensive hashtags, including #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem #BeClever LINK [Photograph of the Alwatan newspaper]</p>	<p>#اسقاط_الولاية_#حقوق_الانسان : لوفد الامم الولاية على_المراة_شرعت_لحمايتها_وليس_لانتقاصها [report in Sabq online newspaper] link</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem #HumanRights said to the delegation of the UN: “Guardianship system is legitimised for women’s protection not for their derogation” LINK [report in Sabq online newspaper]</p>

Third, the text-types of the other women’s rights discourses show similarities and differences in both pro-MGS sub-corpora: the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus has 11 text-types and the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus has 9 text-types. Table 7.30 presents (i) text-types which refer to other women’s rights discourses and (ii) absence of intertextualised text-types.

Table 7. 30 Text-types in the other women’s rights discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
Legislation	36	-
Report	12	3
YouTube video:		
-debate	9	-
-TV show	4	2
-videos	13	10
-TV episode	-	3
Twitter:		
-hashtag (#)	14	9
-Tweets	2	-
News report	38	35
News article	11	-
Political speech	4	-
Book	2	7
Hadith	-	2
Narrative story	-	7
Absent	4	23

Both sub-corpora share 6 text-types, e.g. report, TV shows, videos, hashtag, news reports, and books. The most dominant text-type in both sub-corpora is news reports, occurring 38 times in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus and 35 times in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus. There is a remarkable absence of intertextualisation in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus (23 times).

In Table 7.31, the first tweet by Fpros intertextualises the title of a newspaper report. This intertextual reference is taken from the Independent newspaper about traffickers’ victims and is used along with #EMGS, perhaps to make a link between women’s lives and the MGS to support the argument that the MGS is for women’s protection. In the second tweet, Mpros refer to a US show, Dr Phil. The intertextual reference here is a US program that includes episodes featuring abused women; it is used to suggest that abused women will still exist after the MGS is abolished, and thus it is not the reason for women’s problems.

Table 7. 31 Examples of intertext’s names of other women’s rights discourse in the pro-MGS sub-corpora

Fpro-MGS sub-corpus	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
<p>##معاناة_المرأة_الغربية_بعض من فيض نساء للبيع!!! # اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>[<u>photograph of news about women as traffickers’ victims: The Independent</u>] Title: <u>Human traffickers’ victims “branded like cattle”</u></p> <p>#TheSufferofWesternWoman it’s just the tip of the iceberg: <u>traffickers’ victims!!!</u> <u>LINK [photograph from The Independent: women, traffickers’ victims]</u> #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>	<p>د فيل له برنامج يقابل الكثير من المعنفات @TheDrPhilShow ملاحظة: لم يكن عليهن ولاية #لا_تشارك_بوسم_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>@TheDrPhilShow has hosted many abused women in <u>his programme</u>. Note, they don’t have the guardianship system #DoNotParticipateWithEndMale-GuardianshipSystem;</p>

Reflective campaign discourses are prominent in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus, unlike the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus. The 13 text-types in the reflective campaign discourses are categorised into: (i) text-types which refer to the discourses, e.g. petition and new report, and (ii) absence of text-types (12 times) (Table 7.32). The most prominent text-type comprises tweets by others, either as links or screenshots (187 times).

Table 7. 32 Text-types in the reflective campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Fpro-MGS sub-corpus
Symposium	22

Twitter:	
-hashtag (#)	21
-Tweets	187
Petition	11
Treaty	7
YouTube video:	
-selfie videos	3
News report	20
Book	2
Religious book	7
Report	6
Narrative stories	14
Legislation	5
Curriculum	3
Absent	12

One of the significant named texts in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus is the anti-MGS' campaign for signing the petition to the king. The following tweet intertextualises it in order to demand that authority arrest the anti-MGS campaigners through the hashtag #PunishTheTraitorsofEMGS; they also suggest a way to do so, namely via their ID used in the petitions. This intertextual reference is one of the pro-MGSs' strategies in representing the producers of these texts, i.e. the telegrams, negatively to the public.

#حاسبوا_خونة_اسقاط_الولاية_انا_عاجبني_حملة_البرقيات_لازم_بسجل_يعني_قفطتهم_صارت_سهلة_وما_احد_بياكلها_الا_الدخة_اللي_صدقتم_المعرفات_الوهمية

#PunishTheTraitorsofEndMaleGuardianshipSystem, to participate in the telegrams, you need to register with your ID, which will make the arresting process easier. The fools who believe these fake accounts will be sorry.

Political discourses are among the most prominent in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus, unlike in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus. There are 9 text-types categorised into: (i) text-types which refer to political discourse, e.g. legislations and constitution, and (ii) the absence of the text-types in 17 instances (Table 7.33). The most prominent text-type in the Mpro-MGS is news reports (28 times).

Table 7. 33 Text-types in political discourses in the Mpro-MGS sub-corpus

Text-types (genre and sub-genres)	Mpro-MGS sub-corpus
Constitution	3
Legislation	5
YouTube video:	
-TV news report	13
-TV episode	4
-Tv interview	1
Twitter	
-hashtag (#)	4
-Tweets	22
News report	28
Religious book	3
Absent	17

A significant named text in the Mpro-MGS is the Vision 2030, this perhaps implies the disagreement of the anti-MGS campaigners towards the development of the country. For example:

القضية ببساطة أعلن الأمير محمد بن سلمان عن برامج تحقق للسعوديات حقوقهن ورفاهيتهن فتم اطلاق وسم
#سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية153 لإخراج الجميع

The story is simple, Prince Muhammad bin Salman has announced programmes [Vision 2030] that would assure the rights and welfare of Saudi women, so #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem153 was trending to embarrass everyone.

Overall, this section has examined the text-types of the three similar discourses in the pro-MGS sub-corpora with some of the significant text names. First, the text-types of religious discourses showed no difference with regard to variations, for example favouring the hadith and Twitter genre. The most frequent named text was Quranic text, used to describe the anti-MGS campaigners and the #EMGS campaign as anti-Islam. Second, the text-types of media discourses presented more variations in the Fpro-MGS than the Mpro-MGS. However, both included news reports as the dominant genre. The text names were usually titles of articles that would tend either to reflect warnings from a campaign or aim to delegitimise it. Third, the text-types of the other women's rights discourses presented no differences in the pro-MGS sub-corpora, for example news reports. The significant text names included TV programmes and news articles, mainly aimed at comparing the lives and rights of Saudi women with those of other women. The most frequent text-types concerning reflective campaign discourses in the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus comprised anti-MGS tweets, while those of political discourses in the

Mpro-MGS were news reports. The significant text names for the former related to the action of signing the petition in the Fpro-MGS and for the latter concerned Vision 2030. In all the discourses, the Mpro-MGS had the most absent instances of intertextualised text-types.

7.6. Discussion of findings

Let us return to the key research question driving the analysis presented in this chapter: *Do anti-MGS and pro-MGS of #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? (meso-level)*

This question aims to examine the intertextual references in the Twitter sub-corpora, applied in order to serve their main purpose and provide social relations of power and solidarity by bringing diverse events and social practices into the texts and the social practice under investigation. In doing so, I analysed the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora (Fanti-, Manti-, Fpro- and Mpro-MGS), in particular, their meta-data, i.e. the producers, text-types and text names, after examining the types of discourses. Although the four sub-corpora here are merged into two groups: anti-MGS and pro-MGS, the differences found in relation to gendered behaviours are highlighted.

Intertextual references from a variety of discourses

Both anti-MGS and pro-MGS sub-corpora made connections and relations to some social practices over others. Interestingly, the most frequent discourses in both sub-corpora were religious; this perhaps reflects how the MGS is religiously conceived and how Saudi society usually contextualises social or political issues, in particular women's topics. For instance, the discussion concerning the women's right to drive was religiously dominated (see Altoaimy 2017). Each party used the religious justifications that served their stance into their discussions. For instance, the al-Nisa verse (see section 2.5). Another interesting finding was that political and policy discourses were found in both sub-corpora; however, they were more dominant in the anti-MGS. The strategies of bringing political discourses may serve to form a relationship between power and the #EMGS. Intertextualising policy discourses may have served to indicate a degree of access to knowledge in regard to legislations for women. Surprisingly, while the Fanti-MGS sub-corpus frequently intertextualised political discourses, the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus showed no significant interest in political discourses; this might reflect their approval of the MGS and no need for a change, unlike the Fanti-MGS.

Although both sub-corpora involved other women's rights and Saudi women's rights discourses, they were more prominent in the pro-MGS. This would reflect the level of

comparison made between other women's and Saudi women's rights; unlike other women around the world, Saudi women already enjoy their rights. This, however, seems to neglect those Saudi women who suffer from the MGS. One of the strategies in these sub-corpora was the reflective (anti-)campaign discourses. On one hand, the anti-MGS significantly intertextualised discourses reflected the pro-MGS's social practices, i.e. anti- #EMGS campaign; on the other hand, the pro-MGS mostly used discourses which negatively reflected the #EMGS campaign; these repeated patterns form types "of discursive relation between aspects of social formations and practice" (Farrelly 2019, p. 1). Unsurprisingly, these patterns of intertextuality aimed to legitimate the #EMGS in the anti-MGS, while at the same time attacking and delegitimizing the #EMGS and its proponents in the pro-MGS.

In addition to the significant patterns of intertextual references found in both sub-corpora, others were unique to either the anti- or the pro-MGS sub-corpora. The anti-MGS included economic and international campaign discourses; the former intertextualised references to women's economic status under the MGS and the latter referred to the international campaign supported the #EMGS. On the other hand, the pro-MGS intertextualised conspiracy and anti-government discourses; both discourses described the #EMGS campaign and its proponents. This brings us to a crucial concept, typicality in the analysis of intertextuality. Typicality aimed to emphasise specific intertextual references in order to achieve certain purposes, e.g. (de)legitimate the #EMGS. I would argue that the economic and international campaign are typically patterns of intertextuality of the anti-MGS campaigners on Twitter, and conspiracy and anti-government are typical intertextualised by the pro-MGS campaigners on Twitter.

Producers of intertextual references

The analysis of producers of the discourses yields interesting findings. It should be noted that the producers of intertextual references tend to serve to lend texts (e.g. tweets) more authority and legitimacy in their arguments, what van Leeuwen (2008, p. 106) called "authorization." The results indicated that the producers were either directly intertextualised, backgrounded (i.e. de-emphasised or not mentioned, but known to the readers), absent (i.e. unknown and not mentioned anywhere), or generic references (i.e. referring to a group or class) that were less significant in terms of occurrence. Of course, each type of intertextualising producers lends different degrees of power and authority to the social practice dependent upon the producers. The direct citation of producers like the Crown prince in the anti-MGS lend power to legitimate the #EMGS. The intertextuality of backgrounded producers in the sub-corpora is a less radical exclusion that more likely be innocent because the public are assumed to know already. For

instance, the reference to the royal decree without mentioning the producers was frequently intertextualised because the Saudis already know that it was announced by the king's office; thus, the king is the producer. The intertextuality of generic reference can be tied in closely to the propaganda strategies of either creating fear and of setting up the proponents as enemies in the pro-MGS, or creating a common agreement on the intertextual references like the scholars in this example by the pro-MGSs, 'Sunni scholars said: the hashtag to end the male guardianship system is full of lies and false allegations.' The absence can be more critical because it leaves no traces behind and aims to direct the focus on the intertextual references.

Remarkably, both sub-corpora showed male dominance in relation to the producers of intertextual references, for instance, religious and political discourses. This would reflect the degree of patriarchy in such social practices. However, the most surprising finding was the female producers in these intertextual references, although small in number. For instance, the anti-MGS revealed less significant recognition of female voices in the religious discourses compared to the pro-MGS that showed no references at all; with regard to the political discourses, the voices of female politicians were present in both sub-corpora.

Another type of producer in both sub-corpora was institutional actors, mostly in media, policy and other women's rights discourses. In the media discourses, although both sub-corpora were dominated by institutional actors, the analysis focused on the gender of the journalists who produced the intertextual articles, rather than the institutional agency which published their work. This was because the research aimed to look at the role of gender in this campaign. An interesting finding was that the female sub-corpora (i.e. Fanti- and Fpro-MGS) intertextualised the reports/articles of female journalists, unlike the male sub-corpora. This perhaps reflects a division among female journalists in terms of the #EMGS campaign, used by Fantis and Fpros to legitimise their arguments and could also reflect what information those journalists have access to. In the policy discourses, the producers in the anti-MGS were primarily institutional (i.e. Saudi institutions). This was similar to the producers of other women's rights discourses in the pro-MGS, which were again mostly institutional (i.e. other non-Saudi institutions). The third type of producers was the campaigners of the #EMGS. For instance, the Fpro-MGS sub-corpus intertextualised the anti-MGS campaigners in the reflective campaign discourses.

These findings help draw a picture of typicality in the anti- and pro-MGS sub-corpora with regard to the producers of intertextual references. It may be significant that the sub-corpora refer to texts mostly delivered by male producers, rather than female. In addition, the quantity

and quality of intertextuality, in particular by females, are varied and affected by the gender and stance of the campaigners. For example, in relation to religious discourses, female voices were acknowledged in both anti-MGS sub-corpora, but received no recognition in the Fpro- and Mpro-MGS. Male dominance, however, reflects the nature of Saudi society; I would argue that the presence of female voices in religious discourses reflects a new tendency towards engaging women in this domain; this comes with the views of the country about women's empowerment and moderate Islam within Vision 2030. In terms of the absence, the male sub-corpora have showed more instances of absent producers of intertextual references, i.e. cannot be traced; this might reflect their tendency to shift the focus to the intertexts, rather than the producers, who are probably unknown or could not serve their stance in the #EMGS (i.e. powerless).

Text-types and texts names of intertextual references

The (sub-)genres and text names used in the arguments for and against the #EMGS campaign were also examined. Identifying the text-types for the analysis of intertextuality "is crucial for mapping which elements of social practices are being linked together textually or discursively" (Farrelly 2019, p. 12). First, the variation of the (sub-)genres in both intertextual sub-corpora shows how the map of this social practice is open to a variety of text-types. For instance, the most prominent genre referred to in intertextualised religious discourses was YouTube in the anti-MGS and Twitter in the pro-MGS. This might reflect that the anti-MGS campaigners prefer the genre that can be more deliberative and informative compared to the genre favoured by the pro-MGS campaigners, when discussing religious discourses. These features of the intertextualised genre also found in other discourses, for example, the prominent text-types of intertextualised references in political discourses by the anti-MGS were YouTube videos, whereas the references in other women's rights discourses in the pro-MGS were mainly news reports.

In addition, identifying the naming practices in the intertextual analysis is important because it assembles a set of texts relating to certain events or social practices into a common reference and this can be an important indicator of control (Farrelly 2019). The text names significantly varied in the sub-corpora. For instance, Quranic verses were among the most significant texts named in the religious discourses in all sub-corpora, one of which was al-Nisa. Within the media discourses, the articles' titles were intertextualised in order to fulfil certain purposes, in that, the anti-MGS campaigners heavily referred to articles discussing and supporting the

#EMGS campaign, while the pro-MGS campaigners tended to cite articles warning against the campaign or delegitimising it.

Another example of naming practice covering a set of texts in different events was Vision 2030. This was significantly intertextualised in both sub-corpora in order to refer to a variety of events, for instance, conferences in 2017 when launching the Vision, or a variety of texts, for example, the Crown prince talking about its aims to achieve moderate Islam and women's empowerment. In addition, the royal decree in April 2017 was notably intertextualised in the anti-MGS corpora in order to legitimise the #EMGS. The named texts, Vision 2030 and the royal decree, carry a degree of power because of their producers.

7.7. Summary:

This chapter has answered the research question concerning the voices and the sources intertextualised in the anti-MGS and pro-MGS sub-corpora to legitimise their arguments about the #EMGS campaign. A combination of Farrelly's (2019) intertextual framework and Fairclough's (1992, 2003) interdiscursive analysis has been applied to closely investigate these voices/sources. In doing so, the four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora were analysed with regard to the discourses, integrated discourses in the most frequent four discourses, the producers of these discourses, the text-types and the text names referred to. One of the significant findings was that the anti-MGS campaigners referred to economic discourses in relation to the MGS, while the pro-MGS campaigners used conspiracy and anti-government discourses, along with the #EMGS campaign. This, however, served their main purpose, i.e. (de)legitimising the #EMGS. On one hand, the anti-MGS were more concerned about women's and the country's economic status with the MGS; thus, they campaigned for its end. On the other hand, the pro-MGS aimed at delegitimatising the campaign by using conspiracy and anti-government discourses. Therefore, the four sub-corpora tended to intertextualise a variety of religious and political figures, among others, in order to support their arguments about #EMGS. These findings also provide an understanding of the representations of Saudi women in Chapter 6, for example, in the pro-MGS Twitter corpora, it was argued that Saudi women are protected and do not need such campaign; thus, the campaign was negatively intertextualised. In order to build up a broad picture of this social practice, Chapter 8 investigates the voice of the public on YouTube and the voice of official institutions in the online news articles, which the different groups tended to variably use for intertextualisation in this chapter.

Chapter 8: Debates on the MGS from YouTube and News Media

8.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to answer RQ4: What are the main arguments used by anti-MGS and pro-MGS campaigners on YouTube and in mainstream Saudi newspapers? The analysis here connects to and builds upon the analysis on Twitter; in that, it helps to expand our understanding of Saudi women's representations and the nature of the MGS by investigating the voice of the public on YouTube and the voice of official institutions in the online news articles. It was applied to two data sets: a corpus of 32 YouTube videos posted by members of the public and 52 online news articles from four Saudi news organisations. Toulmin's (1958) model of argumentation was used to deconstruct the arguments, enabling a categorisation of the data into the main *types* of argument used, based on their ideational content. This was then overlaid with an *evaluation* of the arguments in light of the Aristotelian appeals they draw on – logos, ethos and pathos (Aristotle 2008). The aim of this dual approach was to capture not only the main ideas used in the debates around the MGS, but also their potential rhetorical impact on the audience/readers. The chapter is organised into three main sections which present the findings for each of the data sets examined in this stage of the project. Section 8.2 begins by taking the reader through the results of this dual argumentation analysis as applied to the YouTube data, first looking at the anti-MGS corpus and then the pro-MGS corpus. It concludes with a summary of the main findings and key points of contrast between these two corpora. Section 8.3 moves onto the analysis of argumentation in online news, once again presenting results from each side of the debate and summarising the main points of contrast. Section 8.4 then synthesises findings from the analysis of these two types of data in order to critically reflect on the overall role played by argumentation strategies in this feminist campaign. In particular, one significant pattern found in YouTube and online newspapers corpora was the Islamic origin of the MGS, in that each side of #EMGS used certain Islamic interpretations to support their arguments in (de)legitimising the end of MGS. In addition, the logos appeals dominated both corpora; one of its most frequent types was citation (i.e. the intertextual references). However, the key arguments in the anti- and pro-MGS varied due to the different positions towards the #EMGS; while the main focus of the anti-MGS in both YouTube and online news articles was women's rights and their lives with the MGS, the fundamental argument for the pro-MGS in YouTube and online news articles was to attack the #EMGS and the anti-MGS campaigners.

8.2. Arguments surrounding the #EMGS on YouTube

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the transcriptions of the YouTube videos were divided into two groups based on their stance towards the campaign: anti-MGS (i.e. those campaigning for an end the guardian system) and pro-MGS (i.e. those in favour of the system and therefore against the #EMGS campaign). After applying the dual approach (i.e. deconstructing the arguments and evaluating them), I grouped the arguments into main categories, according to the dominant ideational content and rhetorical purpose, and then each main category was divided into sub-arguments, according to multiple contents and purposes. Analysis of the argumentation patterns in both anti- and pro-MGS corpora yielded seven main categories of argument, with each argument then divided into sub-arguments. Some of the argument categories were found in both corpora, for example comments on the role of social media, while others were unique to either the anti- or the pro-MGS corpora. The arguments (i.e. claims) discussed on YouTube are of significance in foregrounding the #EMGS within a broader context and reflecting how the public talk about the campaign.

8.2.1. Anti-MGS arguments

This section presents the results of the dual argumentation analysis applied to the anti-MGS YouTube corpus. First, it provides a brief summary of the main categories of arguments found in the corpus and then explains in more detail their sub-arguments.

Table 8. 1 Main categories of arguments in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Main categories of arguments	Freq.	%
Saudi women's situation and the campaign	31	24
The legality of the MGS and the government's role	29	22
Reflecting the pro-MGS stance	25	20
Islamic views of the MGS	19	15
The nature of society and its reactions	16	12
The role of social media	6	5
Misuse of the campaign	2	2
Total	128	100

Table 8.1 presents the main seven categories in the anti-MGS corpus. Unsurprisingly, the most prominent argument is reflecting on Saudi women's situation under the MGS and how the campaign would play a major role in changing their situation. This reflects the main purpose of the anti-MGS YouTube corpus, i.e. supporting the campaign. In doing so, arguments about the legality of the MGS, the role of the government, the Islamic views surrounding the MGS and the role of social media are also discussed in this corpus, perhaps to provide a solid ground

for the overall purpose. In addition, the reaction of society, the pro-MGS's campaigns and the misuse of the #EMGS campaign are argued; this, however, reflects the negative backlash against #EMGS. In the following sections, each of these main categories of arguments is explained in more detail by examining the sub-arguments of which they are comprised.

The first main category of arguments concerns Saudi women's situation and the campaign (n=31) and contains four sub-arguments, examples of which are given in Table 8.2.

Table 8. 2 Sub-arguments for the main argument "Saudi women's situation and the campaign" in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Women's situation under the MGS (n=11)	1) A woman's success in life is totally dependent on the existence of a caring and an understanding guardian	نجاح المراه مرهون بوجود ولي امر متفهم
The relation of other Saudi women's rights to #EMGS (n=6)	2) We cannot say ending the system is more important than lifting the driving ban or vice versa	ما نقدر نقول ان الولايه اهم من القيادة و ان القيادة اهم من الولايه
The aim of the #EMGS campaign (n=12)	3) This is a very powerful and peaceful feminist movement that follows the rules	حركه نسويه قويه جدا وحمله سلميه مقيده و ماشين على النظام
The benefits to be gained from the end of the MGS (n=2)	4) When women start driving and gain their legal rights, we will see an increase in national production and economic growth	وبيشوفوا كيف الانتاج في الوطن لو ساقه المراه وتأخذ باقي حقوقها شوفوا كيف الاقتصاد بيزيد

First, arguments concerning women's situation describe how the anti-MGS campaigners feel under the system. Example 1 argues that the only way women can achieve success is with the permission of their guardians; in Aristotelian terms, we might characterise this as a form of pathos appeal, inviting pity or sympathy for those women who do not have the necessary support or consent from their guardians. Second, other Saudi women's rights are connected to the #EMGS campaign. Example 2 argues that all women's rights are equal in terms of priority, so that lifting the driving ban is as much importance as ending the MGS. Third, the anti-MGS campaigners consistently argue the importance of #EMGS, as in example 3 which characterises it as a feminist campaign which is powerful, peaceful and law-abiding. This description evokes a sense of confidence and trust in those leading the campaign, and is perhaps a pre-emptive defence against the negative connotations sometimes ascribed to feminist movements; Fraser

(2012) describes this negativity as “tapp[ing] into a certain orientation toward revolt and feminism” (p. 5). In addition, describing the campaign as principled and law-abiding is considered as a form of ethos appeal, promoting respect and support to the ethical values of the campaign and its proponents. The last set of sub-arguments are visionary in nature, aimed at getting the audience to participate in the #EMGS by painting a positive picture of the future if the campaign succeeds. For instance, example 4 argues that the country’s economy will improve by giving women their rights. This argument is well-fitted to the current social context, given that creating more job opportunities and strengthening businesses in order to boost the economy are key aims of the monarchy’s ‘Vision 2030.’ It has a form of logos appeal, in that with women’s contribution, these possibilities might be enhanced. However, in order to do so, they need to have control and authority over their lives.

The second main category of arguments concerns the legality of the MGS and the government’s role (n=29), within which three types of sub-argument were identified (Table 8.3).

Table 8. 3 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the legality of the MGS and the government’s role” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The system’s legal features (n=13)	1) I think there is discrimination against women when it comes to obtaining a passport compared to men; this is against the CEDAW	اعتقد ان هناك تمييز ضد المرأة فيما يتعلق باستخراجها لجواز السفر مقارنة بالرجل وهذا مخالف لبنود الاتفاقية
Changes needed by the government (n=7)	2) A country is supposed to consider the rights of all its citizens; and this is what we hope and expect from our country	المفترض ان تكون الدولة راعية للحقوق وهذا مانأمل من دولتنا وماتعودنها منها
The new changes by the government (n=9)	3) I’m personally very optimistic about Vision 2030 with regard to women’s empowerment	انا شخصيا جدا متفائلة برويه 2030

First, there is a set of sub-arguments concerned with the legality of the system, as in Example 1, which argues that the regulations of the MGS are in breach of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). For example, if a woman wants a passport, she needs a male guardian to sponsor the application, unlike the issuing of passports for men. This example has two types of rhetorical appeals: the logos appeal is the intertextual reference to the UN convention, and the pathos appeal is made by provoking a sense of pity in the audience. These have a rhetorical impact on the audience, alerting them to the breach of international law and its support for an end the MGS. The second set of sub-

arguments highlight the changes needed on the part of the government, as in Example 2, which articulates what it sees as a country's role and responsibilities towards its citizens, expressing hope that it will end the MGS; this is a pathos appeal evoking a sense of confidence about the future. A similar appeal is found in the last type of sub-arguments about the new changes implemented by the government. Example 3 argues in favour of Vision 2030 and expresses optimism concerning its direction, particularly for women.

The third main category of arguments reacts to the pro-MGS's stance (n=25) and contains three sub-arguments (Table 8.4).

Table 8. 4 Sub-arguments for the main argument "reflecting on the pro-MGS stance" in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The pro-MGS focus (n=6)	1) The attention given to the definition of the concept of male guardianship is irrelevant when it comes to the suffering of women	التركيز كله على تعريف والاخلاق في تعريق الولاية مو مهم مقارنة بمعانه النساء
The pro-MGS reaction to the #EMGS campaign (n=9)	2) The campaign is blamed for ruining society and the family unit because it lowers the respect for and dignity of men	انها تتهم من يرى هذا القول بانه يفسد المجتمع ويفسد الاسرة ويفكك الاسرة و هيبه الرجل الشيخ سي سيد بيتهم انه تروح هيبته وكذا لازم تصير هيبته
The reasons for their refusal to end the MGS (n=10)	3) Those who are still holding onto the guardianship system, whether individuals or institutions, are doing so to maintain their male dominance	التمسك بالولاية لانها تهدد سلطتهم سلطه الذكور سواء كانوا من المؤسسات او مواطنين

The first of these discuss the focus of the pro-MGS' own arguments with regard to the #EMGS campaign. Example 1 claims that the pro-MGS campaigners are only concerned with definitions, rather than with the actual problems the system creates for women. This has a pathos appeal evoking a sense of shame for ignoring women's suffering, and an ethos appeal showing the pro-MGS campaigners' morals when focusing away from the actual problem and discussing the definitions. Second, a type of sub-arguments concerns the pro-MGS' reaction to #EMGS, and often tends to attack the ethos of the pro-MGS (i.e. ad hominem arguments). Example 2 argues that the pro-MGSs see the campaign as disruptive, aimed at ruining society and destroying family unity by inciting disrespect for men and diminishing their dignity. The last sub-arguments discuss the reasons for the pro-MGS' refusal to end the MGS, and usually attack the ethos of the pro-MGS, as shown in Example 3, in which the anti-MGS campaigners

argue that the pro-MGS feel threatened by the end of the MGS, which represents patriarchal power within institutions and held by individuals.

The fourth main category of arguments discusses Islamic views of the MGS (n=19). The example in Table 8.5 argues that there is nothing in Islam about the MGS as practised today; this is a logos appeal aims at convincing the audience of the origin of the MGS. In Islam, the only mention of guardians is in the two cases of marriage and travel, although the latter has various exceptions and is not as strictly required as the former. In August 2019, a royal decree was issued that women above the age of 21 are able to travel without a guardian's consent.

Table 8. 5 Sub-argument for the main argument “Islamic views of the MGS” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Translated example	Original example
Any other law regarding guardianship rule, apart from marriage, isn't part of religion	اي ولاية اخرى غير الزواج ليست من الدين

The fifth main category of arguments focuses on the nature of societal reactions to the MGS (n=16), containing two sub-arguments (Table 8.6).

Table 8. 6 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of society and its reactions” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The relation between society and women's rights (n=11)	1) The Saudi ideologies are fighting over women's issues	التيارات في المملكة متصارعة على المرأة
Reaction of society to the #EMGS campaign (n=5)	2) The topic of guardianship is highly misunderstood among the public. I think it is because of the term itself rather than the demands it's making	موضوع الولاية اساء الناس فهم الولاية والخلاف الحاصل اعتقد بسبب اللفظ وليس بسبب المطالبات

The first assesses the historic treatment of women's rights in Saudi society; example 1 argues that the different Saudi ideologies have made women's issues a point of contention, for example the *Sahwa*³⁷ (see Chapter 2). This has two types of rhetorical appeals: pathos appeal here provokes a sense of pity towards women, and logos appeal refers to sets of ideologies

³⁷ In the 1960s, a new ideology appeared in Saudi Arabia and resulted from the combination of Wahhabism and the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood.

concerning only women, e.g. their black dress, specific subjects to study and certain jobs to work. Example 2 in Table 8.6 represents the second theme of the sub-arguments, namely the reaction of society to #EMGS. It states that the campaign is misunderstood by the public, which could be because of benign semantic connotations of the term “guardian,” and not because of the demands.

The sixth main category of arguments examines the role of social media (n=6) in the campaign. The example in Table 8.7 argues for the benefits of the online world which, it claims, not only gives the anti-MGS a place to express their needs, but is also introducing different perspectives to society in various issues. This is a form of ethos appeal by reflecting on their role as informative and enlightening.

Table 8. 7 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the role of social media” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Translated example	Original example
Introducing the campaign online has helped change the way the public thinks about certain issues	دخولها لمعترك الفضاء الافتراضي غير كثير حتى تفكير المجتمع تجاه المواضيع

Finally, there is a small set of arguments discussing the misuses of the #EMGS campaign (n=2). The example in Table 8.8 responds to the claim that the campaign is foreigner-oriented and has hidden goals against the country. The anti-MGS campaigners argue that Twitter is an online space and they cannot control who participates in the hashtag.

Table 8. 8 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the misuse of the campaign” in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Translated example	Original example
There are traitors and secret agents participating in the hashtag. They claim that the campaign has started from outside Saudi with the aim of disrupting the inner system	هاشتاق اسقاط الولاية دخلو عليه ناس مغرضه وهناك خونه وعملاء هم قالو بان الحركة بدأت من برا وتحاول ان تخل النظام ابدا

These different argument types in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus were analysed based on the types of rhetorical appeals they used (ethos, pathos, and logos). The evaluation of the arguments shown in Figure 8.1 indicates the coverage of the anti-MGS corpus of the three appeals. It is clear that the most dominant appeal used in this corpus is logos (n=478).




Figure 8. 1 The three argumentative appeals in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

Appeals to logos include examples, statistics, citations, facts, arguments and so on (Figure 8.2). For example, the citations included are political and Islamic, i.e. produced by representative figures in these domains. The most cited political figure is the Crown prince, for example, in an interview with Bloomberg 2016, he said ‘the problem I am working to resolve is with those who distort the facts of the religious establishment, so that women don’t get their complete rights granted them by Islam.’ Such intertextual references lend power and legitimacy to the arguments in the anti-MGS corpus. The frequent references by an Islamic figure are the prophet’s sayings, for example, he said, ‘Every one of you is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock’; this intertextual reference aims at explaining the differences between responsibility in this saying and guardianship applied in reality.




Figure 8. 2 Forms of logos appeal in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

The second most frequent type of rhetorical appeals is pathos (n=245), which is focused on evoking various emotions like shame, fear, enmity (Figure 8.3). The most dominant emotions

were pity and confidence; pity is usually attached to women’s situation living under the MGS, and confidence is evoked when discussing women’s rights and Vision 2030.




Figure 8. 3 The seven emotions in the pathos appeal in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus

The next used are appeals to ethos (n=208), which concern the speaker’s moral character. The campaign is positively discussed in 117 times, for instance, ‘we are a powerful and law-abiding movement,’ while their opponents are negatively addressed in 91 times by ad hominem attacks on their ethos.

This section has outlined the main categories of arguments used in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus. As we saw, seven main categories of argument were used. The most prominent arguments in this corpus are those of Saudi women’s situation and the aim of the campaign. This is, of course, not surprising because the main purpose of the anti-MGS campaigners on YouTube is to discuss and argue the women’s situation with the MGS and how the campaign could help in empowering women. Of course, these claims needed another type of argument that questioned its legal base and discussed the role of the government in correcting the women’s situation; these arguments are necessary in legitimating the #EMGS. In addition, the arguments in this corpus were examined in order to understand the different appeals used to convince the audience and convey the intended meaning. It was found that the anti-MGS campaigners mainly employed logos appeals to support #EMGS; they heavily relied on citations, e.g. in questioning the legality of the MGS relative to international agreements, the campaigners intertextualised articles of CEDAW and the Saudi policy of issuing passport for women. In addition, the rhetorical appeals of pathos and ethos were identified; the former aimed at evoking the audiences’ feelings, for example, pity mostly towards women’s situation with the MGS, and the latter aimed at revealing the speaker’s moral, for example, their good

intentions in supporting the campaign. These features of the anti-MGS YouTube corpus reflected the linguistic strategies used in order to positively impact the public of the legitimacy of the #EMGS's demands.

8.2.2. Pro-MGS arguments

In this section, we turn to the other side of the debate, the pro-MGS corpus. It focuses on the results of the dual argumentation analysis applied to the pro-MGS YouTube corpus, by providing first a brief summary of the main categories of arguments, and then explaining in more detail their sub-arguments.

Table 8. 9 Main categories of arguments in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Main categories of arguments	Freq.	%
The nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS	51	37
Women's rights in Islam	26	19
The role of social media	18	14
The role of government	17	12
Pro-MGS actions	12	9
Flaws in the MG system	10	7
International law	3	2
Total	137	100

Table 8.9 presents the main categories of arguments in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus. Although both anti- and pro-MGS corpora have seven categories, one of the most striking features of this corpus, compared with the anti-MGS, is that its arguments are markedly preoccupied with the campaign and its proponents. While women and their rights are the central and primary concern of the anti-MGS corpus, in the pro-MGS these are secondary to attacks on the validity and legitimacy of the EMGS campaign. In the following sections, each of these main categories of arguments is explained in more detail by examining the sub-arguments of which they are comprised.

The first main category of arguments reflects on the nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS (n=51) and contains four sub-arguments, examples of which are given in Table 8.10.

Table 8. 10 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Misrepresenting Saudi women’s rights (n=4)	1) They [anti-MGS campaigners] think that it is impossible for a woman to have control over her money, to choose her job or her partner; she is under the man’s control	يظنون انها لا يمكن..خلاص..معلق عليها لا في مالها ولا في عملها ولا في زواجها ولا في شأنها الا كلها تحت هالرجل
The aim of the #EMGS campaign (n=13)	2) The problem is that they want absolute freedom	انت تتكلم حاليا عن حرية مطلقة هي هاذي مشكلة
The nature of the #EMGS campaign (n=15)	3) Their work is obviously systematic and directed, it is impossible that is spontaneous in any way	عن عمل واضح الملامح انه ممنهج وموجه وعمل لايمكن يكون عشوائي في أي حال من الاحوال
The traits of the anti-MGS campaigners (n=19)	4) The majority of them have not read about Islamic legislation with regard to male guardianship or its benefits to women	ويغلب ظني ان اكثر من يتكلم عن الولاية لم يقرأ أحكامها الشرعية ولافانيتها للمرأة

The first of these discusses how the #EMGS campaign misrepresents Saudi women’s rights. In Example 1, the pro-MGS campaigners argue that the anti-MGS campaigners do not know women’s rights and picture women as being controlled. This implies anti-MGS campaigners’ ignorance of the law according to the pro-MGS. The second set of sub-arguments explains the aims of the #EMGS campaign; in Example 2, the pro-MGS campaigners argue that the #EMGS campaign is a call for ‘absolute freedom.’ In general, this concept is negatively contextualised in Saudi society; as Al Fassi (2016) explained that ““Feminism” has a negative connotation in Saudi Arabia, as does the term “emancipation” as both are usually associated with Western hegemony and sexual freedom” (p. 188). This negative connotation thus invokes feelings of enmity in the audience and helps to construct an ad hominem attack on the ethos of their opponents (i.e. anti-MGS campaigners). Another set of sub-arguments discusses the nature of the #EMGS campaign, along with the hidden parties behind it. For instance, example 3 argues that the #EMGS campaign is not a spontaneous movement; it is systematic and directed. This implies that it has been orchestrated by unknown individuals with hidden agendas. Thus, it provokes two feelings: enmity towards those unknown “movers” and fear of their actions and hidden purposes. It is also a form of ethos appeal, indicating the disloyalty and betrayal of those who support the #EMGS. The last sub-arguments focus on the traits of the anti-MGS campaigners, and often tend to attack their ethos by ad hominem arguments. For instance, they argue in Example 4 that the majority of anti-MGS campaigners are ignorant of Islamic

teachings and the benefits of the MGS for women. If they knew, they would not ask for it to end.

The second main category of arguments discusses women's rights in Islam (n=26), within which two types of sub-arguments were identified (see Table 8.11).

Table 8. 11 Sub-arguments for the main argument “women’s rights in Islam” in the pro-MG YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Women's position in Islam (n=10)	1) There is special care for women in Islam	عناية خاصة للمرأة في الاسلام
The MGS in Islam (n=16)	2) Guardianship is established by an Islamic provision to meet a need	شرع الاسلام الولاية للضرورة

First, there is a set of sub-arguments explaining women's position in Islam, as in Example 1, which argues that the Islamic rules governing women's issues are in their favour, and one of these rules is the MGS. The second set of sub-arguments covers the MGS in Islam, as in Example 2, and argues that the need for the system is why it was instituted and why it needs to be maintained. Both examples show a form of pathos appeal, evoking trust and confidence in the MGS because, as they claim, it is Islamic.

The third main category of arguments highlights the role of (social) media (n=18) and contains three sub-arguments (Table 8.12).

Table 8. 12 Sub-arguments for the main argument “role of (social) media” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Misunderstanding the MGS (n=9)	1) A number of concepts and definitions related to the guardianship system must be highlighted	لا بد من تسليط الضوء على عددا من المفاهيم والمصطلحات المصاحبة لمفهوم الولاية
Amplification of the media (n=4)	2) It is the amplification that we see in the media that makes women look oppressed	يشاع والتضخيم الاعلامي الي نشوفه في وسائل الاعلام ان اعتقدت ان المرأة فعلا عليها الضغوط
Social awareness regarding women's rights through media (n=5)	3) To stop such campaigns, we should spread awareness about women's rights	لا يقاف مثل هذه الحملات يجب علينا ان ننشر الوعي عن حقوق المرأة

The first of these discusses the misunderstanding of the MGS circulated in the (social) media, as in Example 1, which argues that although the MGS is related to other concepts, it was partially understood and explained by the #EMGS campaign, and its connected concepts must be highlighted in order to fully understand its benefits and how it operates. This is a form of logos appeal, indicating the multiple definitions of guardianship, for instance, protecting, caretaking, and so on; each can reflect different relations between men and women, i.e. wife and husband, daughter and father. It, however, reflects the argument of the anti-MGS campaigners that the pro-MGS campaigners are more concerned about definitions of the MGS, rather than its problems for women (section 8.2.1). Second, a type of sub-arguments discusses the amplification of media coverage, as in Example 2, which argues that the media amplifies the #EMGS campaign and manipulates the public into believing that women are being oppressed under the system. This pathos appeal evokes anger towards the media agencies for their role in supporting #EMGS. The last sub-arguments focuses on social awareness of women's rights, as in Example 3 which argues that the key to stopping such campaigns, i.e. #EMGS is by raising women's awareness of its definitions and benefits; this perhaps tends to convince the audience of the idea that the MGS is being misrepresented.

The fourth main category of arguments focuses on the role of government (n=17), within which three types of sub-arguments were identified (see Table 8.13).

Table 8. 13 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the role of government” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
No actions needed (n=6)	1) We should not respond to the demands of those who blackmail and antagonise us, because you never know what they would come up with tomorrow	لكن اذا حققت مطالب هالاشكال بهاالسلوب المليء بالابتزاز والاستقزاز ماتدري بكره وش يطالعك
Some efforts required (n=8)	2) Ending the MGS should be measured by the male's health status or financial ability	-اسقاط الولاية في حاله عدم الكفاءة التي يتم قياسها بالصحة او القدرة المالية
New changes instituted by the government are sufficient (n=3)	3) The changes that are currently taking place in the Kingdom are empowering and liberating for women	التغيرات التي صارت حاليا في المملكة فيها حرية للمرأة وفيها تمكين المرأة

First, a type of sub-arguments claims that no action is needed by the government, as in Example 1, which argues that the government must ignore campaigns such as this one because of their way of demanding, i.e. threatening and blackmailing by, for example, mentioning the Twitter accounts of international organisations in the hashtag #EMGS. The pathos appeal here evokes anger towards the anti-MGS campaigners as they are portrayed as inciting public outcry. It also indicates their ethos as disloyal and betrayal. If these calls result in what they want, the pro-MGS campaigners claim that it will give rise to the possibility of more campaigns asking for more rights. This view of what might happen if these demands receive a response engenders fear. The second set of sub-arguments discusses partial efforts needed from the government in regard to women's rights. In Example 2, the pro-MGS campaigners argue that the MGS should be adjusted based on certain criteria (e.g. health status or the financial ability of the guardian), rather than ending it entirely. This shows the ethos of the pro-MGS campaigners as being considerate of some regulations that need adjustment. The last sub-arguments explain the new changes brought in by the government, as in Example 3, which highlights the new changes taking place in the country. The logos appeal is here shown in the intertextual references that concern new policies, e.g. lifting the driving ban and the royal decree of 2017, which are considered empowering and liberating for women; thus, there is no need to continue in the #EMGS.

The fifth main category of arguments reflects the pro-MGS' actions (n=12) and contains two sub-arguments (Table 8.14).

Table 8. 14 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the pro-MGS' actions” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The role of the pro-MGS campaigners (n=5)	1) Allah, the Almighty, commanded us to show the right path to people and that is the goal I want to achieve; thus, it is our responsibility to deny wrong deeds	الله تعالى أمرنا ان نبين الحق للناس إذا تبين الحق لناس خلاص الغاية التي اريد ان اصل إليها لذلك الكلام الذي قادر على ان ينكر منكرا
Reasons for their actions (n=7)	2) Personally, I don't remember any time that I was asked for my guardian's consent	" شخصيا ماذكر في يوم من الايام طلب مني ولي الامر

The first argues for their role as opponents to the #EMGS campaign and often tend to reflect their ethos, as in Example 1, which supports the pro-MGS campaigners' role in speaking out

against the #EMGS campaign and represents it as a divine role because they enlighten the public about the truth of the MGS and warn them against the #EMGS campaign. This perhaps tends to categorise the campaign as a sin and defines it as being against God’s will which, in turn, attempts to delegitimise it. Second, a type of sub-argument discusses the reasons for their actions (i.e. campaigning against the #EMGS) and usually reflects on the anti-MGS campaigners’ ethos. Example 2 argues that the demands in #EMGS are not realistic because the MGS defined in the campaign does not apply in the real world; this perhaps tends to deny the demands of the campaign by suggesting that the anti-MGS’ actions are shameful and dishonest.

The sixth main category of arguments discusses the flaws of the MGS (n=10). The example in Table 8.15 argues that one of the reasons for these flaws is women, particularly abused women, because they neglect their rights and do not report the aggression. Thus, no reason to end the system because it is effective, and its flaws are due to bad implementation. This is a discursive strategy blaming the victim and aiming to shift attention away from the flaws of the MGS and its influence on women’s lives (see Rentschler 2015).

Table 8. 15 Sub-argument for the main argument “the flaws in the MGS” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Translated example	Original example
Women’s irresponsibility is the reason for the aggression	تفريط المرأة هو سبب التعسف

Finally, there is a small set of arguments discussing international law (n=3). The example in Table 8.16 argues for the dangers of the CEDAW for society because it pertains to Western countries and should not apply to an Islamic country. This evokes enmity towards the #EMGS campaign, which is represented as a means of Westernising Saudi society.

Table 8. 16 Sub-argument for the main argument “international law” in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Translated example	Original example
The CEDAW, which we have mentioned before, is in fact a very dangerous treaty that can be considered the United Nations’ Constitution on women’s issues	اتفاقية سيدو نكلمنا عنها قبل شوي وهي في الحقيقة خطيره جدا وانا اسميها دستور الامم المتحده فيما يتعلق بقضايا المراه

These different argument types in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus were analysed based on the types of rhetorical appeals (i.e. ethos, pathos, and logos). The evaluation of the arguments in Figure 8.4 shows the coverage of the three appeals in the pro-MGS corpus. Similar to the anti-MGS corpus, the logos (n=611) was also the dominant appeal in the pro-MGS corpus.




Figure 8. 4 The three argumentative appeals in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

Appeals to logos involve statistics, citations, arguments, facts and so on (Figure 8.5). For example, the citations included are policies and Islamic teachings, i.e. produced by official representatives. An example of an intertextual reference for policies is a women’s right to file a lawsuit against her guardian if he prevents her from getting married; this lawsuit is issued by the Ministry of Justice. One of the most frequent Islamic references is a Quranic verse, al-Nisa 34: ‘men are *qiwamon* of women’ [guardian]; this seeks to lend a religious authority in order to maintain the MGS.




Figure 8. 5 Forms of logos appeal in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

The second most frequent type of rhetorical appeal is ethos (n=270), which concerns the speaker’s moral character. The anti-MGSs are frequently discussed in negative context (144

times), e.g. ad hominem attacks on their ethos, while the pro-MGSs describes their counter-#EMGS positively (126 times), for instance, ‘we are an enlightenment movement.’

The last used are appeals to pathos (n=255), which aims at evoking various emotions, for example, shame, fear and enmity (Figure 8.6). The most dominant emotions were enmity and anger; enmity is usually attached to the identity of the anti-MGS campaigners (e.g. unknown individuals) in order to convey that the campaign aims at more than women’s rights and has a hidden agenda. Anger is also evoked when they describe media coverage of the #EMGS campaign.




Figure 8. 6 The eight emotions in the pathos appeals in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus

This section has outlined the main categories of arguments used in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus. As we saw, seven main categories of argument were used. The most prominent arguments in this corpus are those around the nature of the #EMGS and the role of anti-MGS campaigners. This reflected the main purpose of this corpus, i.e. attacking #EMGS and its proponents. The attack and rejection of the #EMGS comes from the second dominant type of arguments, that discuss the Islamic origin of the MGS; thus, the campaign is considered as an attack on Islamic principles and norms. Within this type of arguments, it was claimed that all Islamic systems positioned women appropriately. Therefore, there is no need to end the MGS. In addition, the arguments in this corpus were examined in order to understand the different appeals used to convince the audience and convey the intended meaning. It was found that the pro-MGS campaigners frequently used logos appeals in order to delegitimise #EMGS; they heavily relied on citations, for example, the intertextual references from the Quran about women’s situation and relation to men. In addition, the appeals of pathos and ethos were identified; the former aimed at evoking the audiences’ feelings, for example, enmity towards #EMGS and the anti-MGS campaigners, and the latter aimed at revealing the speaker’s

morality, for example, the pro-MGS campaigners' role in this matter as divine and enlightening. These features of the pro-MGS YouTube corpus reflected the linguistic strategies used in order to negatively impact the public of the legitimacy of the #EMGS's demands.

8.2.3. YouTube corpus: anti- and pro-MGS

This section focuses on the main findings and key points of contrast between these two corpora. Both corpora included seven arguments in total, each of which is divided into sub-arguments. Each corpus presents a set of arguments in support of their stance regarding the #EMGS.

Key findings of contrast

One of the significant findings is the difference in the main argument featuring in the two corpora. On the one hand, the anti-MGS aimed to provide a descriptive account of Saudi women's living situations under the MGS. Of course, this purpose has a set of complementary arguments. For instance, they argued for the #EMGS campaign by explaining its importance and aims, and the possible future outcomes for women as aligned with the goals of Vision 2030. On the other hand, the pro-MGS disagreed with these claims; thus, they attacked the #EMGS and its proponents. For instance, they criticised the #EMGS campaign by arguing its demands were unrealistic, denying the reality of the system and arguing that Saudi women and their situation were misrepresented in #EMGS. They also explained its aims in a negative light, e.g. 'ultimate freedom,' 'hidden purposes' and 'unknown individuals promoting the hashtag.' In their view, the campaign had ulterior motives that would ruin society and the family; thus, their role was argued as necessary to stop the campaign. The anti-MGS were also considered ignorant and outsiders because of their supposed illiteracy in terms of the advantages of the MGS for women. This shows similarities with the representations of anti-MGS campaigners by the pro-MGS campaigners on the Twitter platform (see Chapter 6). On various occasions, anti-MGS campaigners, specifically women, were negatively represented in the pro-MGS Twitter corpus.

Although both corpora referred to Islamic principles in relation to the MGS, each cited the principles supporting their stance. While the anti-MGS argued that Islam only mentioned the MGS with regard to marriage and travel and thus other applications needed to end, the pro-MGS argued for women's rights in Islam and the MGS was considered a protective system for women. Moving from the arguments about its Islamic base to the legal one, a set of arguments discussed the role of the government in this matter and how this could be defined in relation to international law. The anti-MGS usually referred to international law, specifically CEDAW, in questioning the legality of the MGS and argued for the role of government in ending the MGS

and changing the policies for women. Interestingly, they frequently linked ending the MGS to Vision 2030; this perhaps tends to lend the #EMGS power because one of the Vision 2030's goals is to empower women, and this can be achieved by ending the MGS. However, the pro-MGS argued for three governmental roles. First, no actions were needed as women were already enjoying their rights; thus, the #EMGS should be ignored. Second, some changes were needed, e.g. adjusting the MGS according to a certain set of criteria. Third, the new changes that were taking place in the country would give women their rights; thus, no further actions were needed to end the MGS. This indicates their strong resistance to the end of this patriarchal system. The pro-MGS also argued against international law, specifically CEDAW, and how it could lead to Westernisation of the country.

The last contrast in both corpora concerned a set of arguments about (social) media. The anti-MGS argued for the benefits of social media in expressing their needs and providing a platform for discussion of women's rights, among other issues. However, the pro-MGS argued that (social) media was being manipulated. Both social and traditional media were criticised in that social media circulated incorrect definitions of the MGS through #EMGS, while traditional media, e.g. newspapers and TV, tended to amplify the stories in the #EMGS campaign and manipulated the public. They considered this to result in a lack of social awareness in relation to women's rights; thus, (social) media needed to be used to spread awareness to avoid similar campaigns in the future.

Key findings of resemblance

One set of arguments concerning the pro-MGS' stance showed an agreement in both corpora. The anti-MGS argued that the pro-MGS focused on clarifying the definitions of the MGS more than the problems it caused for women, thus the pro-MGS criticised the #EMGS for attempting to ruin society and the unity of the family. This was, as explained by the anti-MGS, because of their fear of losing power and authority over women. Comparing this set of arguments in the anti-MGS corpus to those in the pro-MGS corpus showed agreement, in that the pro-MGS stated that they aimed to enlighten the public about the truth of the MGS. Thus, they wished to focus on the definitions of the MGS more than its problems and, despite highlighting a few arguments explaining the MGS's flaws, mainly dwelt on how it was applied.

In addition, the evaluation of the appeals in both YouTube corpora reveal that logos appeals were most frequently applied; this was probably because of their focus on convincing the audience by using logical arguments. While the anti-MGS used them in order to legitimise the

#EMGS campaign, the application of the pro-MGS aimed at delegitimatising it. The other rhetorical appeals were slightly different between the two corpora. The anti-MGS tended to evoke the feeling of the audiences towards women’s situation via the feelings of pity and confidence, and then they reflected their ethos, e.g. through demonstrating the equality that would result from ending the MGS; these strategies perhaps aim at prioritising the audience and their reaction towards the campaign. The pro-MGS first indicated their ethos, e.g. through explaining their role as divine and then evoked enmity and anger towards the #EMGS campaign and its proponents; these strategies seem to reflect that their defence of religious matters was prioritised; this perhaps tends to justify their attack on #EMGS and its proponents by the ad hominem arguments.

8.3. Arguments surrounding the #EMGS in Saudi online newspapers

As explained in Chapter 5, the articles about the MGS by four of Saudi news organisations were divided into two groups based on their stance towards the #EMGS campaign: anti-MGS (i.e. those campaigning for an end the guardian system) and pro-MGS (i.e. those in favour of the system and thus against #EMGS). It is important to note that Saudi newspapers are heavily censored, so likely to voice non-controversial views. Thus, I hypothesised that the majority of newspapers would be against the #EMGS campaign in order to maintain the status quo. However, an interesting observation of the stance of newspapers towards the campaign contradicts the hypothesis; Table 8.17 shows that three of the news organisations: *Akhbaar24* with 9 articles, the *Okaz* with 14 articles and the *Alriyadh* newspaper with 3 articles, included substantial materials in support of #EMGS and only one (*Sabq* with 10 articles) reported strongly against it.

Table 8. 17 Newspaper articles divided into anti-MGS and pro-MGS, based on the stance towards the #EMGS campaign in four Saudi news organisations

News organisations	<i>Sabq</i>	<i>Akhbaar24</i>	<i>Okaz</i>	<i>Alriyadh</i>
anti-MGS	4	9	14	3
pro-MGS	10	7	3	2
Total	14	16	17	5

Similar to the analytical procedures employed on YouTube data, I applied the dual approach (i.e. deconstructing the arguments and evaluating them) to the news articles and then grouped the arguments into categories according to the dominant ideational content and rhetorical purpose, whereby each main category was divided into sub-arguments. The results showed different main categories of argument in each corpus: the anti-MGS corpus has seven, while

the pro-MGS corpus has five categories. Interestingly, one main category of arguments was shared in both corpora, that is those around Islamic views and the MGS, while others were unique to either the anti- or the pro-MGS corpora. The arguments discussed by official news media are of significance in foregrounding the #EMGS within a broader context and reflecting how Saudi news organisations talk about the campaign.

8.3.1. Anti-MGS arguments

This section presents the results of the dual argumentation analysis applied to articles in favour of #EMGS, i.e. anti-MGS corpus. First, it briefly summarises the seven main categories of arguments and then explains in more detail their sub-arguments.

Table 8. 18 Main categories of arguments in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Main categories of arguments	Freq.	%
Changes needed	35	28
Islamic views and the MGS	27	21
Reactions to new changes	21	17
Flaws of the MGS	18	14
Empowering women aligned with Vision 2030	12	9
Reaction to pro-MGS	10	8
Saudi women's roles	4	3
Total	127	100

Table 8.18 presents the main seven categories in the anti-MGS corpus. Interestingly, the most prominent category argues for changes in relation to women's rights. This indicates the main purpose of this corpus. Of course, such demands need religious support in order to be introduced to society; thus, the MGS is also discussed from an Islamic perspective. It is also supported by another set of arguments concerning the recent economic direction of the kingdom; in that, the anti-MGS articles used the 'Vision 2030' in supporting #EMGS. This is a form of logos appeals, discussing one of the Vision 2030's goals which aims at empowering women within the process of improving the economy. It also evokes the feeling of trust and confidence that the changes regarding women's rights will take place in the country. In addition, the reaction of the pro-MGS campaigners is argued in the anti-MGS corpus, and ad hominem arguments are often used to attack their ethos. In the following sections, each of these main categories of arguments is explained in more detail by examining the sub-arguments of which they are comprised.

The first main category of arguments focuses on the changes needed in relation to women's rights (n=35). These have three sub-arguments based on the actor(s) supposed to implement these changes (Table 8.19).

Table 8. 19 Sub-arguments of the main argument "changes needed" in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The role of official authorities (n=23)	1) There are many contradictions in the regulations attached to the guardianship system, which make it really unclear and vague	كما ان قضية الولاية أيضاً بها العديد من المتناقضات فيما يخص الأنظمة واللوائح والتي تعد غير واضحة بل ضبابية إلى حد بعيد
The role of Islamic institutions (n=5)	2) Surely, it is inconceivable for a woman to be held hostage to the human interpretations that could restrict her	اوكد انه لا يعقل أن تبقى المرأة رهينة التفسيرات والاجتهادات البشرية التي يمكن أن تضيق عليها
The role of society (n=7)	3) Gentlemen, we are talking about half of our society (women); how come we appreciate and trust their abilities to do great tasks, yet we exclude them when it comes to their rights, dignity and independence?	نتحدث عن نصف المجتمع يا سادة (المرأة) فكيف نعترف بها ونثق بقدراتها أمام هذه المهام الجمة، ثم نقصبها عندما يتطلب الأمر الاعتراف بحقوقها وكرامتها وولاية نفسها

First, arguments discuss the role of official authorities in applying the regulations of the MGS. Example 1 argues that there are 'many contradictions' in these regulations, creating vagueness around the MGS and questioning its legitimacy. Therefore, the anti-MGS articles argue that the officials should start taking action in regard to the MGS; in Aristotelian terms, this can be characterised as a form of logos appeal, discussing the inconsistent application of the MGS, for example, some universities used to ask their female students for consent while others did not. Second, the Islamic institutions also have an essential role to play in the changes needed. Example 2 argues that their interpretations are strict, particularly when it comes to women's roles; this might be because of the absence of official feminine voices in Islamic interpretations. However, this might change because of the new feminine voices interpreting the Quranic verses and hadith on women's rights, despite these not being recognised by the authorities as valid (see Chapter 7). This is a form of pathos appeal, evoking pity towards these strict interpretations in regard women's rights in Islam. Third, there is the role of society in these changes, as in Example 3 which applies a pathos appeal with a friendly tone, 'gentlemen,' to evoke trust in their judgment. It discusses the situation of the other half of society, women, and the need to recognise their rights by trusting them and ending the MGS. Although a woman is trusted to

raise her boys to men, among many tasks, she requires their consent to practise her rights; this argument urges the society to think about the MGS and participate in changing it.

The second main category of arguments concerns Islamic views and the MGS (n=27) and contains three sub-arguments (Table 8.20).

Table 8. 20 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the MGS and Islam” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
MGS in Islam (n=14)	1) The guardianship system as we know it in our law today is not mentioned in the Qur’an	القرآن ليس فيه أي ذكر للولاية بالمفهوم المتعارف عليه في قوانيننا
Islam and women’s rights (n=4)	2) Islam has given women certain rights and duties, and placed them in their rightful position; thus, the discussion of Dr Latifa Al-Shalan’s recommendation to end the guardianship system at the Shura council stands on solid religious grounds	أعطاه الإسلام من الحقوق والواجبات ووضعها في المكان اللائق بها ولذلك مناقشة توصية الدكتورة لطيفة الشعلان بمنع الولاية على المرأة إنما يقف على أرض صلبة أساسها ديننا
Scholars’ stance towards the campaign/system (n=9)	3) The courage of Sheikh Al-Manea has always been admired and appreciated, and so is his scientific honesty	شجاعة الشيخ المنيع كانت دوماً مثار إعجاب وتقدير لأمانته العلمية

The first of these discuss the roots of the MGS in Islam, as in Example 1 which argues that there is no mention in the Quran of the concept of guardianship as used today; this contradicts the arguments made by the pro-MGS campaigners about the Islamic roots of the MGS. The logos appeal of this argument aims at providing Quranic fact. Second, a type of sub-argument focuses on women’s rights in Islam. Example 2 argues that Islam gave women their rights and placed them in a proper position; therefore, the demands to end the MGS are compatible with Islam. The example intertextualises a proposal of a female Shura member to end the MGS; this intertextual reference lends power to the position of anti-MGS, and also evokes a sense of encouragement and confidence in readers about participating in and supporting the #EMGS campaign. The last sub-argument discusses scholars’ stances towards the MGS and #EMGS. Example 3 highlights the courage of those scholars who stand with #EMGS, regardless of the numbers holding the opposite view. This example intertextualises a newspaper interview of a religious scholar who, when asked about the #EMGS campaign, confirmed that, according to Islam, women are fully responsible for their lives and are their own guardians. He also clarified

that women do not need a guardian, except in marriage. This intertextual reference provides a religious opinion from a well-known scholar. Thus, it evokes the feeling of confidence that this campaign is not against Islamic principles and encourages the readers to consider or continue participation in #EMGS.

The third main category of arguments concerns the reactions to the new changes (n=21), within which two types of sub-arguments were identified (Table 8.21).

Table 8. 21 Sub-arguments of the main argument “reactions to the new changes” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Reaction of society (n=15)	1) Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s speech about the guardianship system has had a positive impact on Saudi society	ترك حديث ولي العهد الأمير محمد بن سلمان؛ بشأن قضية الولاية على المرأة ردود فعل إيجابية في أوساط المجتمع
Influence of changes on women’s situation (n=6)	2) The decision supports Saudi women’s empowerment and enhances their success at every level	ان القرار يدعم مسيرة المرأة السعودية ويعزز من نجاحاتها على جميع المستويات

The first type of sub-arguments addresses the reaction of society, as in Example 1, which argues that the reaction to ending the MGS has been positively influenced by a series of events, e.g. the speech of the Crown prince. This intertextual reference, when the Crown prince was asked during an interview with *The Atlantic* about the guardianship system, lend legitimacy and power to the #EMGS campaign. He said that such a system had not existed previously, and he supported women’s rights and there would be more changes to come. This also evokes the feeling of trust in the upcoming change and encourages the readers to consider or continue participation in #EMGS. The second set of sub-arguments discusses the changes that took place in the country and how Saudi women could benefit from them. Example 2 argues that the decision in April 2017 would ‘support and enhance women’s success at all levels.’ This intertextual reference lends power to #EMGS because it was announced by the king’s office, and evokes a sense of admiration for such decisions and confidence in the upcoming changes.

The fourth main category of arguments concerns the flaws of the MGS (n=18) and contains three types of sub-arguments (Table 8.22).

Table 8. 22 Sub-arguments for the main argument “flaws of the MGS” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Women’s status for being under the MGS (n=6)	1) At different times, religious scholars have compared the status of women to that of orphans, minors and even those lacking mental capacity	وقد قاس العلماء حال النساء على الأيتام حيناً وعلى القصر حيناً وعلى غير العاقلين حيناً آخر
The institutions and Saudi women (n=3)	2) The state should not require the consent of another person for any individual (man or woman) to complete dealings	يُفترض أن أي علاقة بين الفرد -رجل أو امرأة- وبين الدولة لا تشترط موافقة شخص آخر لإتمام تلك العلاقة أو التصرف
The MGS as an abusive system (n=9)	3) Some male guardians abuse the concept of guardianship, and women are always the victims in such cases	هناك بعض الأولياء يتعسف في استخدام مفهوم الولاية، ودائماً المرأة هي الحلقة الأضعف والضحية في مثل هذه القضايا

The first type discusses whether women are eligible to be controlled by the MGS. Example 1 argues that the MGS was not meant to apply to women, but to certain categories in society (e.g. orphans, minors, those lacking mental capacity). This flaw in applying the MGS to women was assigned to scholars and seeks to evoke a sense of shame and pity in the readers for this injustice. This is also a form of logos appeal; an Islamic principle obligates an assignment of guardian to those categories in order to take care of their basic needs and legal arrangements. The second type of sub-argument concerns the relations between (non-)official institutions and Saudi women. Example 2 argues against the assertion that women have no authority in dealing with institutions, and that in any relation between an individual and an institution the consent of a third party should not be required to obtain the legal services. It is the case that there are certain categories requiring the consent of a third party, i.e. those who are unable to deal with official procedures. However, women do not belong to any of these categories although they are treated as if they do under the MGS. This evokes a sense of shame in placing women as those groups. The last sub-arguments concern problems with the MGS and its misuse by some guardians. Example 3 argues that the MGS can allow unstable and abusive guardians to exert their power over women. Such an argument gives rise to two points: are they using the MGS to facilitate their act of abuse, or does the MGS authorise guardians to act in an abusive way? In both cases, however, the MGS could be a tool to abuse women. This evokes two feelings: fear of the legal authority the MGS lends to abusive guardians, and pity for the women rendered powerless by the legal situation.

The fifth main category of arguments discusses empowering women aligned with Vision 2030 (n=12), containing two sub-arguments (Table 8.23).

Table 8. 23 Sub-arguments for the main argument “empowering women aligned with Vision 2030” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
New stance of the government (n=6)	1) Passing this legislation is an affirmation of the state’s intention to move forward steadily towards empowering women and gender equality	تأكيدا على عزم الدولة في المضي قدما بخطوات جادة عنوانها التمكين والإنصاف بأن تتولى المرأة شؤونها الشخصية بنفسها
Aims of Vision 2030 (n=6)	2) The new vision obviously works to amend many regulations regarding women	أن الرؤية الجديدة كما هو ظاهر تعمل على تعديل الكثير من المواضيع المتعلقة بالمرأة

The first type discusses the new stance of the government in relation to women’s rights. Example 1 argues that the royal decree announced in April 2017 could be understood as a sign of a new direction towards ‘women’s empowerment and gender equality.’ This perhaps suggests that the #EMGS campaign (started in 2016) has begun to gain the attention needed from officials and it is time for society to be supportive. This new stance towards women’s rights is also linked to the second type of sub-arguments, the aims of Vision 2030. Example 2 argues that the Vision 2030 also ‘works to amend many regulations regarding women’s rights,’ in order to allow women to play a role in economic reformation; this evokes trust in the future changes for women.

The sixth main category of arguments responds to the reaction of pro-MGS regarding the campaign (n=10). Table 8.24 clarifies that the #EMGS campaign ‘is not a call for female rebellion,’ as claimed by the pro-MGS, who used such ad hominem arguments in order to attack its proponents.

Table 8. 24 Sub-arguments for the main argument “reaction to the pro-MGS” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Translated example	Original example
This is not a call for female rebellion	هذه دعوة للتمرد النسائي ولكنها ليست كذلك

Finally, there is a small set of arguments discussing Saudi women’s roles (n=4). In Table 8.25, the instance argues that women’s roles have changed over time, and that nowadays women are

more educated, less vulnerable and more independent than they used to be. Therefore, the MGS is no longer needed and should be abolished. This argument presupposes that women once willingly accepted being cast as ‘ignorant, vulnerable and powerless’; I would, however, argue that they have been forced to act as such, either by social ideologies, religious teachings or policies.

Table 8. 25 Sub-arguments for the main argument “Saudi women’s role” in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

Translated example	Original example
Today, woman is no longer the ignorant, vulnerable or powerless person under man’s dominance	لمرأة اليوم لم تعد تلك المستضعفة الجاهلة التي تنقاد خلف سطوة الرجل

These different argument types in the anti-MGS newspapers corpus were analysed based on the types of rhetorical appeals (ethos, pathos, and logos). Figure 8.7 shows the evaluation of the arguments in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus and it is obvious that the logos category is the most dominant (n=425) in this corpus.




Figure 8. 7 The three argumentative appeals in the anti-MGS newspaper articles

Appeals to logos include facts, statistics, historical analogy, arguments, citations and so on (Figure 8.8). For example, the citations included policies and Islamic references. The policy that prevents women from traveling without a male-consent by Ministry of Interior is frequently intertextualised. This tends to show how policies control women’s movement. One of the Islamic references is the prophet’s saying: ‘no marriage without *wili*’ [i.e. a guardian];

this was frequently intertextualised in order to prove the only case in which guardianship is required.




Figure 8. 8 Forms of logos appeals in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus

The second most frequent type is the ethos appeal (n=143), which concerns the writer’s moral character. The articles are frequently presented the campaign and its demands in a positive context (86 times) by showing credibility in examining the non-Islamic origin of the MGS. The negative context is surrounding the ad hominem arguments by the pro-MGS (57 times).

The pathos appeal (n=127) focuses on evoking various emotions, like shame, fear and enmity (Figure 8.9). The most dominate emotions were pity and shame; pity is frequently attached to women’s situation under the MGS, and shame evoked when discussing abusive guardians, who supposed to be supportive, but they misused their authority.




Figure 8. 9 Emotional categories of pathos appeal in the anti-MGS newspaper articles

Overall, this section has examined the main categories of arguments in the anti-MGS newspaper corpus and found seven arguments applied to legitimise #EMGS. Interestingly, the most prominent arguments in this corpus were of the role of government, religious institutions and society in the required changes for women. Similar to the anti-MGS YouTube corpus,

another type of argument discussed the Islamic views and the MGS; this seems to be necessary in arguing the MGS within Saudi context. In addition, the arguments in this corpus were examined in order to understand the different appeals used to convince the readers and convey the intended meaning. Of course, the appeals of logos were the most prominent pattern due to the frequent facts, statistics, historical analogy, arguments among others. One type of logos was interesting, which is exemplified by the citation of the speech made by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in his interview with *The Atlantic* about the MGS and how it was not issued before. Also, two additional rhetorical appeals, pathos and ethos were identified; the former aimed at evoking the readers' feelings, for example, pity and shame mostly about women's situation under the MGS, and the latter aimed at revealing the writer's moral, for example, their refusal of the role assigned to them by the pro-MGS, 'not rebelling against Islam or Saudi values.' These features of the anti-MGS corpus reflected the linguistic strategies used in order to positively impact the readers of the legitimacy of the #EMGS's demands and to encourage the anti-MGS campaigners to continue in #EMGS.

8.3.2. Pro-MGS arguments

This section focuses on the other side of the debate, the pro-MGS corpus. First, it provides a brief summary of the main categories of arguments, and then explains in more detail their sub-arguments.

Table 8. 26 Main categories of arguments in the pro-MGS newspapers corpus

Main categories of arguments	Freq.	%
Nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS	24	32
Problems with the MGS and amendments	18	24
Reaction of society to the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS	13	17
Women's situations	11	15
The MGS and Islam	9	12
Total	75	100

As shown in Table 8.26, the pro-MGS newspaper corpus has five main categories of arguments, that were divided into sub-arguments. Interestingly, the main dominant category is the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS campaigners; this, however, reflects their main concern – i.e. to attack the validity of the #EMGS campaign by using ad hominem arguments. It is followed by recognising certain flaws in the MGS and thus, the call for amendments. Another interesting finding is the category of arguments about Islam and the MGS, which was the least frequent

set in the pro-MGS corpus; this probably reflects some uncertainty about its Islamic base. In the following sections, each of these main categories of arguments is explained in more detail by examining the sub-arguments of which they are comprised.

The first main category of arguments focuses on the nature of the #EMGS campaign and anti-MGS (n=24) and contains three sub-arguments (Table 8.27).

Table 8. 27 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the nature of the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Religious figures' views about the campaign (n=9)	1) Al-Mutlaq considered calling for the end of the male guardianship system inconsistent with Islamic law and that there would be no-one supporting it in the Kingdom	واعتبر المطلق أن المطالبات بإلغاء الولاية وإسقاطها تتعارض مع الشريعة الإسلامية ولن تجد لها في المملكة شخصاً يسندها
Conspiracy against the government, society and religion (n=8)	2) The hashtag end male guardianship system was activated under the umbrella of women's rights and it seems that it has following a plan rather than being spontaneous tweets	وتحت شعار حقوق المرأة نشط الهاشتاق، ظهر فيها أنها تسيّر بخطة وليست بعفوية
anti-MGS' focus and attitude (n=7)	3) The vulgar voices are now calling for the abolishment of the system	هذه الأصوات المتفكّنة الآن التي تريد إلغاء الولاية

The first of these discusses religious figures' views about the campaign, as in Example 1, which argues that the #EMGS campaign is against Islamic principles. This belief is supported by an intertextual reference produced by a religious scholar who is against the #EMGS and its demands. With his authority, the campaign obtains a non-Islamic characteristic and thus no-one would support it. In addition, this evokes fear of the campaign and the anti-MGS in the readers, and attacks the anti-MGS's ethos. The second set of sub-arguments considers the #EMGS campaign to be a conspiracy against the government, society and religion. Example 2 argues that the #EMGS is using women's rights as an excuse for a hidden agenda. This also aims to evoke fear of this agenda in the readers and enmity towards the anti-MGS campaigners. The last type of sub-arguments focuses on the anti-MGS's attitude in the #EMGS, as in Example 3, which argues that their voices are vulgar in their demands. This is an ad hominem attack and aims to evoke hatred and enmity towards them.

The second main category of arguments concerns problems with the MGS and amendments to it (n=18), within which two types of sub-arguments were identified (Table 8.28).

Table 8. 28 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the problems of the MGS and amendments to it” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Drawbacks of the MGS (n=9)	1) It is true that there are a few abusive men, but that does not mean that we should end an Islamic regulation because of them	صحيح يوجد بعض الرجال ظلمة لكنهم قليل جداً لا يعني الغاء حكم شرعي
Actions needed (n=9)	2) So, it is necessary to revise the regulations of the male guardianship law and other rules regarding women	لذا لا بد من مراجعة الولاية وعدد من القوانين الخاصة بالمرأة

First, a set of sub-arguments discusses the drawbacks of the MGS; as in Example 1 which argues that there is unjust behaviour by a very few guardians, but this does not mean the MGS should end. The evaluation of this example reflects an ethos appeal (i.e. the writer’s moral sense) by admitting the misuse of the MGS, but then the writer proposes that this does not justify abolishing the system because it is an Islamic regulation; it seems that the claim of having a religious base is used to uphold the MGS. The second set of sub-arguments discusses some suggestions for solving the problems caused by the MGS, as in Example 2, which argues for revising and adjusting the regulations of the MGS, but not abolishing it.

The third main category of arguments concerns the reaction of society towards the #EMGS and the anti-MGS (n=13), within which two types of sub-arguments were identified (Table 8.29).

Table 8. 29 Sub-arguments for the main argument “reaction of society to the #EMGS campaign and the anti-MGS” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Effects of the campaign (n=3)	1) Anyone who has been harmed by the campaign (end male guardianship), which was circulating on Twitter, can file a criminal suit before the court	لمن لحق به ضرر من جراء الوسم الخاص ب(إسقاط الولاية) الذي تم تداوله في موقع تويتر أن يتقدم بدعوى جزائية أمام المحكمة الناظرة
Reactions to the campaign (n=10)	2) Many citizens have expressed their dissatisfaction on social media regarding the trending hashtag “end male guardianship system” which has triggered public opinion	وعبر مواطنون كثر عن استيائهم في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، إذ نشط أكثر من وسم في "قضية الرأي العام إلى "إسقاط الولاية" عن المرأة"،

The first of these cover the alleged negative impacts of the #EMGS campaign, as in Example 1, which argues that the hashtag has caused harm to society and thus those who are affected can file a criminal lawsuit. The evaluation of this example reflects two appeals: logos via mention of a legal procedure and pathos by evoking the risks in tweeting the hashtag; both have the same purpose of deterring the readers involvement in the #EMGS. Second, a set of sub-arguments conveys the reactions of society towards the #EMGS campaign, as in Example 2, which argues that the public deplore the #EMGS and are dissatisfied, and that the campaign has caused heated public arguments; this tends to evoke enmity towards the anti-MGS.

The fourth main category of arguments focuses on women’s situation (n=11) and contains two sub-arguments (Table 8.30).

Table 8. 30 Sub-arguments for the main argument “women’s situation” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus.

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
Women’s rights and the law (n=7)	1) Thankfully, our wise government gave women their rights	الحمد لله حكومتنا الرشيدة أعطت للمرأة حقوقها
Women’s situation and the MGS (n=4)	2) The majority of men are servants to their families	وأكثر الرجال هم خدم لأهلهم

The first set of sub-arguments covers Saudi women’s rights under Saudi law. Example 1 contends that the government has already provided women with their rights; this view might imply no further changes or amendments are needed. This evokes the feeling of trust in Saudi law; thus, no further actions needed. The second set of sub-arguments discusses the situation of Saudi women under the MGS, as in Example 2, which argues that the majority of men are like servants and helpers to their families, specifically female relatives; this evokes no shame or guilt for the system in readers.

Finally, there is a small set of arguments concerning the MGS and Islam (n=9), within which three types of sub-arguments were identified (Table 8.31).

Table 8. 31 Sub-arguments for the main argument “the MGS and Islam” in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus

Sub-arguments	Translated example	Original example
The divine system (n=4)	1) The guardianship role is part of the divine roles and responsibilities of men	أكد أن الولاية جزء من القوامة الذي كلف بها الرجل ربانياً
Nature of the MGS (n=3)	2) The guardianship system was originally not an abusive system	مبيناً أن الولاية في الأصل ليست ولاية تعسف
Islam and women’s rights (n=2)	3) In my opinion, Islam has guaranteed women’s rights without prejudice	من وجهة نظري أن الاسلام ضمن للمرأة حقوقها ولم تظلم

The first set of sub-arguments focuses on the divine nature of the MGS, as in Example 1, which argues that the MGS concerns the wider role of men towards women, in that it enforces more responsibilities for men through Islamic teaching towards women; this evokes the feeling of confidence in its legitimacy and implication. The second set of arguments discusses the nature of the MGS and responds to the anti-MGS’ arguments that it is an abusive system. Example 2 argues that this system meant well originally and was not abusive; this has an ethos appeal in reflecting an understanding of the misuse of the MGS by comparing how it was originally intended and what it has turned into. The last set of sub-arguments examines women’s rights in Islam, as in Example 3, which argues that Islam confers full rights on women, and they are not oppressed under the MGS. Within this set of arguments, it is clear that the association made with Islam and its intended good will constitute an attempt to maintain the MGS, despite recognition of its problems.

These different argument types in the pro-MGS newspapers corpus were analysed based on the types of rhetorical appeals they used (ethos, pathos, and logos). The evaluation of the arguments in Figure 8.10 shows the coverage of the three appeals in the pro-MGS corpus. Logos (n=185) is the most dominant appeal.




Figure 8. 10 The three argumentative appeals in the pro-MGS news articles

Appeals to logos include showing facts, statistics, arguments, citations and so forth (Figure 8.11). For example, the citations included policies and Islamic references. The policy of cybercrime is intertextualised, e.g. ‘launching the hashtag #EMGS and attacking religious and national norms on Twitter violate the anti-cybercrime law’ was issued by the Council of Ministers. This, of course, seeks to criminalise the anti-MGS campaigners and evokes the feeling of fear. Similar to the pro-MGS YouTube corpus, the news articles corpus has the same intertextual reference, that is a Quranic verse, al-Nisa 34: ‘men are *qiwamon* of women’; the only verse indicating this relation between men and women; however, it has various interpretations, one of which is the meaning of *qiwamon* to care about and not control or have authority over women.




Figure 8. 11 Forms of logos appeals in the pro-MGS newspaper articles

The second most frequent appeal is pathos (n=136), focused on evoking emotions, like shame, fear and enmity (Figure 8.12). The most dominant emotions are fear and enmity; fear is

frequently attached to the #EMGS campaign and the erosion of religious principles, and enmity is usually towards the #EMGS campaign and its proponents.




Figure 8. 12 Emotional categories of pathos appeals in the pro-MGS newspaper articles

The ethos appeal (n=129) concerns the writers' moral character. They tend to negatively attack the #EMGS and its proponents (68 times), while they are positively discussing the MGS (61 times), e.g. when calling to keep the MGS and revise its regulations.

Overall, this section has discussed the five main categories of arguments found in the pro-MGS newspaper corpus. Similar to the pro-MGS YouTube corpus, the prominent set of arguments was about the nature of the #EMGS campaign and anti-MGS campaigners. This reflected the main purpose of the pro-MGS, i.e. attacking #EMGS and its campaigners. Surprisingly, the second most dominant argument was not related to Islamic views and the MGS, but the problems of the MGS and the call for amendments. This, however, showed recognition of the system's flaws, which require changes, rather than complete abolishment. I also included the rhetorical appeal of ethos, through recognising the problems and calling for amendments. In addition, the arguments in this corpus were examined in order to understand the different appeals used to convince the readers and convey the intended meaning. The rhetorical appeal of logos was prominent in this corpus, for instance citing policies about breaching the cybercrime law when participating in #EMGS, aimed at evoking fear and enmity, and delegitimising the #EMGS campaign. These features of the pro-MGS corpus reflected the linguistic strategies used in order to convince the readers of the illegitimacy of the #EMGS's demands.

8.3.3. Online newspapers corpus: anti- and pro-MGS

This section focuses on the main findings and key points of contrast between these two corpora. Both corpora present a set of arguments in support of their stance regarding the #EMGS, each of which is divided into sub-arguments.

Key findings of contrast

Interestingly, the number of categories of arguments varies in the online newspaper corpus, in that the anti-MGS has seven arguments applied to legitimise #EMGS, while the pro-MGS has five to delegitimise the #EMGS; this perhaps reflects the anti-MGSs' determination in legitimising and defending the #EMGS in comparison to the pro-MGSs, who aimed to attack it. One of the significant findings is the main purpose of the two corpora. On the one hand, the anti-MGS corpus mostly argued for changes by the government, religious institutions and society in women's favour: the role of government was required to change legislation; the religious institutions were assigned a role in these changes concerning the strict interpretation of women's rights; society, mainly men, was asked to participate in these changes by trusting, recognising and accepting women's rights in relation to the end of the MGS. The anti-MGS supported their call for changes using a set of arguments discussing the flaws of the MGS. First, they argued against the eligibility of the MGS (i.e. it was not assigned for women in the first place). Second, applying the MGS contradicted the rights of citizenship when dealing with (non-)official institutions in that women would have no authority. Third, the MGS provided power that could be misused by certain guardians. They also argued that women's roles had changed in modern times and had become very important on various levels, e.g. in economics and politics. It is important to highlight that the call for changes in relation to women's situations was not only found in the anti-MGS corpus. The pro-MGS also called for some changes to the MGS, but it argued for partial changes due to the misuse of some guardians, rather than ending the MGS entirely.

On the other hand, the pro-MGS corpus mainly discussed the nature of the #EMGS and the aims of the anti-MGS. These arguments negatively contextualised the campaign and its proponents, and significantly used ad hominem attacks in order to delegitimize the campaign. For instance, it was argued that the campaign and its proponents were against Islamic principles and conspiring against the government, society and religion. The negative effects the #EMGS campaign had on society were also cited, e.g. destroying its unity and initiating heated public debates (i.e. dividing people into for and against). The anti-MGS were also described as

outsiders and vulgar. In turn, the anti-MGS argued against these claims by the pro-MGS, e.g. stating that the #EMGS campaign was not a feminist rebellion.

Notably, both corpora utilised the Islamic basis for MGS in their arguments for or against the MGS. On the one hand, the anti-MGS questioned the existence of Islamic evidence for applying the MGS in institutions. They also argued that the MGS contravened Islamic views in relation to women's rights (i.e. them having full responsibility for their lives) and discussed the religious scholars' stance towards the MGS and the #EMGS campaign. On the other hand, the pro-MGS argued that the MGS was men's responsibility assigned to them according to Islamic teachings; despite the misuse of the MGS, it was originally designed for women's benefit. The pro-MGS arguments were usually aligned with the Islamic view of women's rights and the MGS was considered supportive in this narrative. By including the Islamic arguments in discussing the MGS in both corpora, this perhaps reflects that Islamic perspectives are necessary in debating social issues in Saudi context.

Key findings of resemblance

Both corpora showed a tendency to agree with all changes coming from the government. First, the anti-MGS argued that the reaction of society to new changes in supporting women was positive, and these empowering changes could help achieve the aims of Vision 2030. Interestingly, one of their strategies was to link the Vision 2030 with the end of MGS; for women to play a role in economic reformation, the MGS needs to be abolished. Second, the pro-MGS frequently discussed women's rights under Saudi law, in that Saudi women already enjoyed their rights, and their guardians were in fact their supporters. They also showed approval and encouragement regarding the new changes taking place in the country, and argued that these changes would give women their rights; thus, no further actions were needed to end the MGS.

The evaluation of the appeals used in the arguments in both online newspaper corpora revealed predominant use of the logos appeal to (de)legitimise the #EMGS campaign. The pathos appeal aimed at evoking the readers' feelings; on the one hand, pity and shame were the most dominant feelings in the anti-MGS corpus; on the other, fear and enmity towards #EMGS and its proponents were featured in the pro-MGS corpus. The ethos appeal concerned the writer's moral character, and were mostly presented in the ad hominem arguments.

8.4. Discussion of findings

Let us return to the key research question driving the analysis presented in this chapter: *What are the main arguments used by anti-MGS and pro-MGS campaigners on YouTube and in online newspapers?*

This question aims to explain how the #EMGS relates to other elements of the surrounding debates discussed on YouTube and portrayed in the online newspapers. To do so, I examined YouTube and online newspaper article corpora to identify the arguments that anti- and pro-MGS used, and then evaluated them to reflect the impact the strategies carried. This section discusses the findings from the anti-MGS corpora and the pro-MGS corpora, merging the results found for YouTube and the news articles in each stance, because of the broad similarities between the public and official strategies used in both.

Although anti- and pro-MGS corpora have different purposes, they shared the overall themes of their strategic set of arguments; in that, both relied on the Islamic discussion surrounding the MGS, and each applied what could support their stance. Unsurprisingly, the Islamic norms were the most prominent when discussing social issues in Saudi context. This was also noticed in the analysis of intertextuality on Twitter (see Chapter 7). Another area of argumentation found in both corpora was the legal actions needed for the MGS. By looking at the nature of this matter, this would be necessary to argue both for and against the MGS. In addition, the arguments about the campaign itself were different in the two corpora: the anti-MGS argued for the #EMGS and its aims of empowering women, while the pro-MGS argued against the #EMGS and its hidden agenda. In the following, I summarise the arguments in each position.

On the one hand, both anti-MGS corpora, i.e. YouTube and online news articles, focused on three main arguments: the Islamic basis for the MGS, the changes needed to align with Vision 2030, and defending the #EMGS campaign. First, the Islamic basis for legitimising the MGS was questioned, and it was argued that it never existed, other than in the two cases of travel and marriage. Thus, other applications of the MGS in (non)-official institutions needed to be abolished. These arguments reflect what the #EMGS campaign created a dialogue in the real-world, in that the religious establishments started questioning and discussing the basis of this system. Second, both corpora argued for changes by the government, religious institutions and society, whereby each has a role to play in this matter. The government has a major role in making the changes, that would help empower women and achieve the goals of Vision 2030; the religious institutions have to avoid the conservative ideology by rethinking this system and

all other practices related to women, in particular, if we want to practice moderate Islam. Society has, for a long time, been passivated, but they need now to question these practices. Third, the anti-MGS argued against the allegations in relation to the #EMGS campaign, for example ruining society and Islamic teaching, supporting their stance by discussing the flaws of the MGS. However, differences between the arguments in each corpus were observed, one of which concerned the notable references to international law, specifically CEDAW, in questioning the legality of the MGS in the anti-MGS YouTube corpus, whereas this was not mentioned in the anti-MGS online newspaper articles. This is probably because it is difficult for official news organisations to raise doubts about the decision of signing such an agreement.

On the other hand, the pro-MGS corpora from YouTube and online newspapers shared similar arguments: the Islamic basis for the MGS, the aims of the #EMGS campaign, the partial changes and Saudi law. First, both corpora argued for the MGS and its Islamic basis. They believed that it was assigned to men for women's sake and not to oppress women. These arguments reflect the dialogue mentioned earlier by the religious establishments, in that some scholars found it obligatory to defend the MGS and the ideology behind it. Second, the aims of the #EMGS campaign were associated with a set of claims, e.g. conspiracy against the government, society and religion. These arguments were often included *ad hominem* in order to attack the proponents; for the pro-MGS, it is a triangle relation: the #EMGS tended to destroy the relations within the families, that led to unstable society; the #EMGS argued about religious ideology and called for changing, which results in society doubting the dominant belief system; combining these two, the government would struggle to maintain peace in such situation. Third, partial changes to the MGS were discussed in favour of certain cases, e.g. guardians who misused the MGS. Both agreed that Saudi women enjoyed rights protected by Saudi law; thus, no major changes in legislation was needed. Although recognises some problems, they rejected the idea of entirely abolishing the MGS. However, differences between the arguments in each corpus were observed, one of which was the Westernised claim in terms of applying international law in the pro-MGS YouTube corpus, which was never mentioned in the pro-MGS online newspaper articles. This seems to be a repeated pattern by the official news organisation, i.e. avoiding doubts surrounding international law.

These arguments in all corpora applied three appeals: *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*. The most prominent one was the *logos*, that involved facts, citations, statistics and so on; this showed the importance of *logos*, as stating the logic/argument, along with its proofs. In the *pathos* appeal, they showed similarities and differences. For example, both anti-MGS corpora aimed to

provoke pity in discussing women's situation under the MGS; however, they varied in that the anti-MGS YouTube corpus revealed confidence in the forthcoming changes, whereas the anti-MGS online newspapers evoked a sense of shame, that women needed the permission in almost all aspects of their lives. Both pro-MGS corpora aimed to provoke enmity towards the #EMGS campaign and its proponents, but they differed in that the YouTube corpus showed anger while the online newspapers promoted fear. The ethos appeal were significantly varied, in that the anti-MGS tended to positively talk about their campaign and its aims, while the pro-MGS mainly aimed to negatively attack the proponents and their ethos. Although the nature of discourse differs in each forum (YouTube and online newspaper article), they shared the same appeal in discussing their arguments.

8.5. Summary

This chapter has answered the research question concerning the argumentation strategies used by anti-MGS and pro-MGS campaigners related to the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem in the YouTube corpus by members of the public and in online news articles published by four Saudi news organisations. Toulmin's (1958) model of argumentation was applied to deconstruct the arguments, and then overlaid with an evaluation of the arguments in the light of Aristotelian appeals (2008), to report the strength of the arguments and the types of emotional impact on the audience. One significant finding from investigating the voice of the public on YouTube and the voice of official institutions in the news articles was the prominent Islamic arguments in relation to the MGS. Both campaigners tended to use certain interpretations that (de)legitimate their position towards #EMGS. In addition, they heavily relied on the use of logos appeal, in order to support their arguments with facts, statistics, citations and so on. Interestingly, the pro-MGS corpora featured the ethos appeal of ad hominem arguments, aimed at attacking the anti-MGS campaigners. The anti-MGS corpora mostly focused on the pathos appeal in order to gain on the audience/readers' support in #EMGS. These findings provide a broader picture of the campaign and the surrounding arguments; they agreed with the results of Twitter data. For instance, the anti-MGS represented Saudi women's situation along with the urgent need to entirely abolish the MGS. On the other hand, the pro-MGS represented Saudi women as being envied and under attack, focusing on conspiracy theories. Although the pro-MGS admitted the flaws of the MGS, they argued for adjustment in some policies.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This final chapter summarises the thesis (aim, theory and methodology) and the findings, revisiting each of the research questions in turn. This is followed by stating the contributions of the study. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the work, and provide suggestions for future research.

9.1. Summary

This study sought to examine a discursive online debate in the #EMGS campaign, which was first launched on Twitter in 2016 to demand an end to the MGS in Saudi Arabia. The MGS has required women to obtain male consent in order to do a variety of things, e.g. studying, travelling and so on. Since 2016, the position of Saudi women has been dramatically changing. One of the major improvements was in April 2017, when the king's office announced a royal decree requiring all governmental sectors to remove the guardian's consent requirement when providing services to female citizens. This study investigated the #EMGS campaign relative to this social context by examining the different representations of Saudi women on Twitter, paying particular attention to their assigned roles and actions, as well as the communication strategies used by each side of the debate to legitimise their stance across other relevant media platforms, namely YouTube (a public form) and online news (an institutional forum). It drew on the dialectical relational approach to CDA proposed by Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2003, 2006).

To understand the social problem and justify the interpretations, a set of theoretical assumptions that informed this work were discussed. Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony explains the maintenance of power over a certain social group via a dominant ideology; this study employed his concept in investigating the social problem at hand. The application of the MGS conveyed a great degree of power over women; this power emerged from hegemonic consensus over a (historically) conservative religious ideology. The study showed that hegemony was present in the online space in which these debates were played out. Proponents of the male guardianship system were and are at pains to ensure the maintenance of the MGS and to advocate the conservative ideology about women's role in Saudi society. For example, one of the discursive realisations of hegemonic struggle over the maintenance of the societal status quo is the consistent intertextualisation to a conservative explanation for the prophet's hadith, 'no marriage without a guardian' in order to extend his role to cover other aspects of women's life, e.g. education and travel. Fraser's (1995) theory of social justice introduces forms of injustice and their remedies. This study showed that the perceived injustice of the

application of the MGS provoked the #EMGS campaign, aimed at gaining recognition both culturally and institutionally. Melucci (1980, 1985, 1996) discussed the characteristics of new social movements, employed herein to understand the new forms of collective actions. Offline forms of collective action are not allowed in the Saudi context and online spaces are censored. Despite these restrictions, Saudi women chose online activism in campaigning against the MGS and representing their identities under the MGS; this reflected the new social movements that would take place in Saudi Arabia. Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013) theorised the logic behind various recent actions (the Arab Spring, los indignados in Spain, Occupy Wall Street and beyond). They proposed two logics: collective and connective action, the former being more traditional and the latter concerning the digital age. It could be argued that the #EMGS applied both actions: starting by connective action on online platforms, mainly Twitter and then moving on to perform a collective action, e.g. signing a petition and sending telegrams to the king's office. However, these offline actions needed an organisational support and leadership and the campaigners were denied this; thus, the campaign can be considered as predominantly a form of connective action. My study suggested that the connective action could lead to a form of collective action which does not necessitate an organisation mobilising the action.

Because the focus of inquiry in this research was on Saudi women as social actors, and their roles and relations with others in online discourse, van Leeuwen's (2008) taxonomy of social actor representation was applied, combined with Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014) systemic functional grammar, with the benefit of CL. Intertextual references were investigated through the works of Farrelly (2019) and Fairclough (1992, 2003). The argumentations in YouTube and online news data were examined following Toulmin's (1958) model and evaluated based on Aristotelian appeals (2008). Together, these methods served to uncover the representations of Saudi women, and the ideology and power conveyed in the particular discursive and social context. In what follows, I summarise the answers to the five research questions.

RQ1: Which social actors are represented in the Twitter #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign? (micro-level analysis)

This question aims to identify salient patterns in the textual representation of different categories of social actor and how the references to these actors could (de)legitimise the #EMGS campaign. The first step in addressing this question was to consider frequency lists for the four Twitter corpora in order to extract all social actors, and then divide them into categories.

The results showed six categories of social actors in the #EMGS on Twitter: representations of women, representations of men, representations of institutional actors (e.g. @Okaz, schools), neutral representations referring to generic references (e.g. world, society), indeterminate representations referring to unspecified actors (e.g. the other, one) and aggregate representations referring to quantifiers of actors.

Unsurprisingly, the most prominent category of actor was women, comprising a set of representations of female actors. One of its interesting patterns was nominated representations, i.e. female proper nouns; this representation showed more variations in the Fanti-MGS than the other corpora. The Fantis tended to tweet stories of abused women, along with the #EMGS and to encourage women who were oppressed by their male guardian to share their stories. This linguistic pattern reflects one of Fantis' strategies in connecting online to offline world (see Thorsen & Sreedharan 2019). Within the overdetermined representations, the Fpros tended to represent themselves and Saudi women in general as 'queens,' 'pearls,' whereas the Fantis refused such representations along with 'candies,' 'diamond.' These symbolic ways of representing women were initiated within religious discourses. Al-Harby (2017) explained that such representations reflect Saudi affluence and an ideological stance towards Saudi women, "the image of hidden jewellery for the sake of protection and preservation" (p. 10). However, women who reject this social ideology "are considered cheap, degraded and inappropriate" (p. 11); such representations were noticed in both pro-MGS corpora, e.g. 'immoral,' 'slave.'

The second category comprised male social actors mainly referring to women's male relatives (e.g. husband, father). The overdetermined representations in this category are also of significance in reflecting one of the controversial and ideologically-loaded forms of reference to men. For instance, the reference to "ISIS members," a terrorist Islamic organisation, was used differently in comparisons made in the Fanti-MGS corpus and the two pro-MGS corpora. On one hand, the Fantis represented male supporters of the MGS as "ISIS members" and likened their ideology and their views towards women, to those of ISIS, who are known for their oppression of women. On the other hand, the pro-MGS campaigners also applied this nomenclature to male proponents of the #EMGS and aimed to reflect the similarities between the male proponents and "ISIS members" in regard to the manipulation of religious scripts in order to convince the public of the legitimacy of their socio-political campaign (#EMGS). However, both representational choices trigger negative evaluative meanings in order to delegitimise the other campaigners' position.

Another interesting category was of the institutional actors which indicated the powerful voices in the political, religious, educational and media sectors. The most diverse set in this category comprised impersonal references, namely institutional actors referred to by their utterances (e.g. agreement), by instrument (e.g. Twitter accounts), by their body parts (e.g. necks), and by their place (e.g. school). Unlike other corpora, the Fantis tended to draw international and national attention to the #EMGS campaign by mentioning the Twitter accounts of (inter-)national human rights organisations (e.g. @UN_Women, @HRCSaudi) and (inter-)national press (e.g. @CNN, @Okaz_online). This strategy helps attract attention domestically and internationally to the #EMGS campaign; however, this was interpreted by the pro-MGS campaigners as an attempt by the Fantis to conspire against the country and destroy its image. For the pro-MGS, these actions never reflected good intentions for Saudi women nor the country; therefore, attacking the #EMGS and its proponents becomes their defensive role.

This question focused on the micro-level analysis of textual patterns. However, this does not mean that such patterns were analysed in isolation from their social context, but rather it was used as a springboard and conduit to the discursive and social practices from which they stem. Thus, for example, textual patterns in the representation of social actors led to the identification of intertextual linkages in the data, collated by means of four additional intertextual Twitter sub-corpora, which were investigated through the third research question.

RQ2: How do both anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign represent Saudi women/woman as social actors on Twitter and what are their social actions? (micro-level analysis)

To answer this question, two processes were conducted: first, the attitudes towards women generally in each corpus were examined; second, the representations of Saudi women in particular were investigated. The results of the first process showed that in the four Twitter corpora, the general attitude towards women was negative. The anti-MGSs reflected on the negative circumstances of women, specifically Saudi women, living in patriarchal societies. Surprisingly, the pro-MGSs also negatively contextualised women, probably because of their negative attitudes towards the female anti-MGSs. The second process divided the social actor under investigation into two categories: Saudi woman and Saudi women.

Saudi woman

The four corpora exhibited representations that are unexpected in English for Saudi woman (i.e. assimilated and aggregate representations with a singular actor), but that are recognised in Arabic. This set of patterns cannot be identified in the plural representation of Saudi woman. Moreover, Saudi woman was contextualised differently in that she co-occurred with negative events in the anti-MGS corpora, perhaps as a strategy to legitimise the #EMGS campaign, unlike the pro-MGS corpora, which tended to delegitimise the #EMGS campaign based on the positive contexts surrounding Saudi woman.

With regard to the processes, all corpora represented the actor in material processes (i.e. doing actions) and drew on relational processes in describing her status. Within the processes of social actions, the actor in the four corpora was by far the most subjected. The representation patterns of Saudi woman varied in each corpus; the female corpora showed more patterns than the male corpora (12 in the Fanti-MGS and 11 in the Fpro-MGS against 5 each in the Manti-MGS and Mpro-MGS). This might be due to the main concern of the #EMGS campaign being to influence women. The four corpora present the same dominant patterns: IND.CLASS (code for the representation of an individual actor identified by class) and SEMI.OBJECTIVE (code for the representation of one of the actor's psycho-social identities).

The representation of IND.CLASS in the four corpora uncovered three types of reference to Saudi woman: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros. The generic reference to Saudi woman was the most dominant and varied compared to the other two references in the four corpora. The two most frequent social actions performed by the generic Saudi woman were relational (i.e. concerned with being, possessing and becoming) and material (i.e. concerned with happening and doing, or receiving an action), rather than mental and verbal. Her role was by far the most passivated (under or receiving an action in the material processes, or being described through the relational processes). Surprisingly, this was unexpected in the pro-MGS corpora because they were assumed to be in support of the idea of maintaining the MGS through activating the actor. Unlike the Manti-MGS and Mpro-MGS corpora, both female corpora represented the actor within an initiative role. While the context of this role was negative (unable to initiate action) and indicated a powerless role in the Fantis data, the role of initiator by the Fpros expressed her ability and power to initiate action within the MGS in an attempt to indicate that the system was not the obstacle it was argued to be in the #EMGS campaign.

Saudi women

Saudi women frequently co-occurred with positive events in three Twitter corpora: the Manti-MGS corpus and both the pro-MGS corpora. The Fanti-MGS corpus depicted Saudi women in relation to their life under the MGS in relation to negative events; in contrast, the Manti-MGS positively represented Saudi women as a way of supporting them and indicating their capability to live their lives without the MGS. The pro-MGS corpora proposed that living with the MGS was positive and supportive for Saudi women.

The processes were similar to those for Saudi woman: all corpora presented relational and material processes as the most prominent social actions. In addition, the representations of Saudi women in the female corpora presented more diverse patterns than those in the male corpora (10 in both the Fanti-MGS and Fpro-MGS against 8 in both the Manti-MGS and Mpro-MGS). The four corpora show the same prominent representation, namely ASSIM.CLASS (code for the representation of an assimilated actor identified by class); however, the second dominant representation varied among the four corpora: AGG.ASSIM.CLASS (code for the representation of an aggregated actor identified by class) in both anti-MGS corpora and SEMI.OBJECTIVE (code for the partial representation of Saudi women alluding to one of their psycho-social identities) in both pro-MGS corpora.

The representation of ASSIM.CLASS in the four corpora was closely examined and the findings showed three types of reference to Saudi women: (i) generic; (ii) Fantis; (iii) Fpros. The generic reference to Saudi women was the most dominant and varying compared to the other two references in the four corpora. Similar to the processes related to Saudi woman, the two most frequent social actions performed by Saudi women were relational and material, and their role was passivated. Unlike the Fanti-MGS and Mpro-MGS corpora, the Manti-MGS and Fpro-MGS corpora represented the actor in an initiative role. In the Manti-MGS, the initiative role tended to support the #EMGS campaign, indicating that women succeed. In the Fpro-MGS, it expressed the same intention as in the singular form. Interestingly, the disappearance of the initiative role in the Fanti-MGS reflects how the MGS limited women's role in Saudi context.

The representations of Saudi woman/women in the four corpora drew on sets of topics to (de)legitimise the #EMGS campaign. First, the anti-MGSs referred, for example, to the topic of domestic violence policies and the problem of fleeing the country. They also responded to the representations and claims made by the pro-MGSs in relation to their identities; therefore, the topics of nationalism and identity were observed. The suspicion of the campaigners'

identity is unsurprising because such a pattern has been witnessed before in other women's campaign; in her study on the campaign of women's right to drive, Altoaimy (2017) found that one of the techniques used by the anti-driving campaigners is to exclude the proponents of women's driving in order to evoke fear and label them and their "demands as a foreign threat," along with "the ideological affiliations ...[which] were understood as being anti-Islamic and therefore destructive to the entire nation of Saudi Arabia" (p. 123). Of course, this usually combined with the topic of the national security of the country, social values and so on. Second, the pro-MGSs contended that the system comprised one of Saudi women's rights and, unlike the claims made by the campaign, the MGS had a supportive function for women. This was evidence in the representations of Saudi women, as "queens" and "well-protected pearls," and in the social actions, whereby women were "requiring protection and care" from their guardians, as a way of legitimising the MGS.

Similar to the first question, this research question was not only focused on the discursive representation in a mere descriptive sense because "texts do not exist in a social vacuum" (Mulderigg 2012, p. 2) . Thus, the analysis of Saudi women as social actors was continuously oriented to the interpretive context in order to construct the discourse to fit the context. On one hand, the #EMGS discourse by the anti-MGS campaigners tended to represent Saudi women in the way that served their stance, in order to legitimate the end of the MGS. Thus, Saudi women were mainly represented negatively; they were passivated in powerless roles and the ideology of being 'queens' was also denied with the implication of the MGS. On the other hand, the counter- #EMGS by the pro-MGS campaigners tended to represent Saudi women in a way that aimed to delegitimize the end of the MGS. Therefore, Saudi women were positively contextualised, except for the Fantis who were represented in a negative context; Saudi women were allowed to have an initiative role with the MGS; the idea of being precious remarkably established. Both representations of (counter-)discourse are of significance in reflecting the strategies and discursive patterns used to change the status quo in regard to women's situation by demanding the end of the MGS in the anti-MGS corpora, or to resist the change and maintain the MGS in the pro-MGS corpora.

RQ3: Do anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? (meso-level analysis)

This research question aimed to examine the intertextual references on Twitter that serve to support each stance by bringing other diverse events and social practices into the texts under

investigation. To answer this question, the intertextual references were extracted from the Twitter corpora; this yielded four intertextual Twitter sub-corpora. First, the results found prominent discourses in the four sub-corpora, for example, religious and political, among others. Of course, religious discourses reflect the nature of Saudi society in discussing social issues, in particular women's rights. All sub-corpora applied religious justifications to support their stance and help them to gain the public's attention. The strategies of drawing on political discourses were necessary in order to lend power to each stance. While both stances shared similar discourses in their sub-corpora, other discourses were unique to either the anti- or the pro-MGS sub-corpora. On the one hand, the anti-MGS sub-corpora referred to economic discourses in order to reflect on women's economic status under the MGS, while the pro-MGS sub-corpora used conspiracy and anti-government discourses in order to attack the #EMGS campaign and its proponents. These findings indicated the typical patterns that each stance tended to apply in (de)legitimizing the #EMGS campaign.

Second, the analysis of the producers of the intertextual references yielded interesting findings. All four sub-corpora showed male dominance in relation to the producers of religious and political discourses; this seems to show the influence of patriarchy in this social practice. However, this is unsurprising because in Arab and Islamic society women are typically excluded from the public sphere, including political and religious domains (Mernissi 1993; Sadiqi 2006). Within religious discourses, however, there was more recognition of female voices in the anti-MGS sub-corpora, then in the pro-MGS sub-corpora which made no references at all. Interestingly, the voices of female politicians in the political discourses were present in both sub-corpora. The intertextualised producers were varied based on the gender and stance of the campaigners, as in religious discourses. I argued that the presence of the female voices within religious and political discourses seems to reflect the increasing engagement of women in the public sphere in Saudi Arabia; of course, this comes with the views of the country about women's empowerment and moderate Islam within Vision 2030.

The analysis of the (sub-)genres and text names used in the arguments for and against the #EMGs campaign reflected the textual and discursive elements linked to social practice. The intertextual sub-corpora revealed that the #EMGS discourse is heteroglossic, i.e. not a single voice but a mixture of many voices of other discourses (Cook 1992). Remarkably, the anti-MGS campaigners seem to prefer the genre that can be more deliberative and informative (e.g. YouTube videos) compared to the intertextualised genre by the pro-MGS campaigners (e.g. Twitter genre). In addition, naming practices can be an important indicator of power. The sub-

corpora referred to a variety of text-names. Two of the most significant examples are Vision 2030 and the royal decree in April 2017. They tended to lend power, mainly to the #EMGS campaign due to the different events they assembled and their producers.

At this level of analysis, the campaigners showed us the ways in which they assembled their arguments. It not only investigated the process of reproducing and transforming other social practices, but also revealed the intended effects that were carried out along with these borrowed practices. The significance of the intertextual analysis lies in uncovering the social relations of power and solidarity by bringing other diverse events and social practices into the texts under investigation. For instance, the direct reference to the producers, the use of the deliberative text-types and the naming practices are strategies applied to legitimate each position, as well as to lend power into their arguments.

RQ4: What are the main arguments used by anti-MGSs and pro-MGSs in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign in (public) YouTube and (official) online newspaper corpora? (micro/meso-level analysis)

This question aims to explain how the #EMGS relates to other elements of the surroundings discussed on YouTube and portrayed in the online news articles. In doing so, two types of data: YouTube and online news articles corpora were analysed in order to reveal the strategic arguments used by anti- and pro-MGS to (de)legitimise the end of the MGS. These arguments were subsequently evaluated to reflect the impact on the audience/readers. The findings showed broad similarities between the public (YouTube) and official (online news articles) strategies; thus, the corpora were merged, as the anti-MGS and pro-MGS.

Both anti- and pro-MGS corpora have a strategic set of shared and distinct arguments. Three shared arguments were the Islamic discussion about the MGS, the legal base of MGS, and the aims of the #EMGS. First, the arguments about the Islamic basis of the MGS were prominent in the corpora; of course, this is expected due to the nature of Saudi society. Second, the arguments regarding the legal actions for the MGS are key when arguing the policy of the male guardianship. Third, a set of arguments discussed the aims of the campaign differently based on relative positions: explained as empowering women by the anti-MGS, and performing hidden agenda by the pro-MGS. Interestingly, concerning the type of data, both YouTube corpora discussed international law, e.g. CEDAW, while the news articles corpora never mentioned this law. It seems that the official news organisations, unlike YouTube, avoid criticising or disagreeing with the decision of signing such a legal agreement.

In addition, the evaluation of these arguments indicated that the most prominent appeal is *logos* in all corpora. This is unsurprising because the *logos* appeal involves facts, citations, statistics and other types, that strengthen the arguments. The *pathos* appeal was also identified, mainly evoking pity while discussing women's situation under the MGS in the anti-MGS corpora; however, the pro-MGS tended to evoke enmity towards the #EMGS campaign and its proponents. The last appeal was *ethos*, i.e. revealing the speaker/writer's morals. While the anti-MGS positively represented their campaign and its aims, the pro-MGS mainly negatively attacked the proponents and their *ethos*.

This research in response to this question went beyond the Twitter platform to others in order to investigate the arguments surrounding the #EMGS campaign by the public on YouTube and by official organisations in news articles. By examining both corpora, it was possible to reveal how the campaign travelled from its initial platform to others and to examine society's reactions towards it; this reflects the contagious nature of the movement, and its consistency (i.e. daily trending) and demands lead to public debates. In addition, the arguments were evaluated as an attempt to examine the intended influence on the hearer/reader.

RQ5: What is the potential significance of social media as a tool for counter-hegemonic struggle? To what extent has it been instrumental in bringing about changes in relation to Saudi women's rights? (macro-level)

This question aims to critically reflect on the role of social media in bringing about changes in relation to Saudi women's rights by first explaining the reasons for applying CDA. It then demonstrates the offline changes and the role of online activism, and concludes by expressing my position in relation to this work.

In the struggle for a more empowered society, CDA has contributed to our understanding of this social movement by bringing together practices, power relations and hidden ideologies of the (counter-) discourse, as well as helping counter the legitimising systems that seek to control women's rights. CDA views language use as both socially shaped and always socially constitutive "of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and belief" (Fairclough 1995, p. 131). Thus, it investigates language at various contextual levels, i.e. looking at the mechanisms in the text, for instance, how social actors and actions are represented, and how argumentation is structured and the presentation of different moral dimensions. In addition, Fairclough's concepts of intertextuality and orders of discourse can

help to understand the text's relations to others, and recover the aspects of power and social constitution that are carried by the intertextual relations.

Having presented the reasons as to why CDA is important to this research, the main purpose here is to understand how the (counter-)#EMGS discourse discursively constructed Saudi women and what this entailed, and on what grounds and with what discursive mechanisms it contested the legitimacy of the MGS. Research questions addressed were: Which social actors are represented in the Twitter #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign? (micro-level); how do both anti-MGS and pro-MGS campaigners in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem campaign represent Saudi women/woman as social actors on Twitter and what are their social actions? (micro-level); do anti-MGS and pro-MGS of #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on Twitter draw on other sources or voices to support their positions? (meso-level); what are the main arguments used by anti-MGS and pro-MGS in the #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem on the "public" YouTube and in "official" online newspaper corpora? (meso-level).

By looking at these questions, it is possible to show the complexity of a discursive analysis which perceives discourse as a social practice (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997); thus, it functions on three levels of abstraction, whereby each carries a degree of power. For instance, a variety of social actors were identified within the four corpora; however, three significant categories were prominent: women, men and institutional actors. This was unsurprising because of the nature of the social problem, that mainly concerned women in their relation to men, who were obtaining power from the institutions. In addition, the representations of Saudi women conveyed a powerless status in the anti-MGS corpora, due to the passivated patterns, while their opponents assigned Saudi women to an initiative role as an attempt to express their ability and power to initiate action within the MGS. The intertextual analysis revealed that all Twitter sub-corpora intertextualised various discourses; the most prominent were religious and political ones. These findings seemed to mirror the arguments identified in the public and official voices, e.g. the Islamic and legal base of the MGS.

While the dynamic of the (counter-)discourse was taking place online, the offline world was reformed. Since the beginning of the campaign, many changes have taken place in the country in relation to Saudi women's rights. In April 2017, the king's office announced that all governmental sectors must remove the guardian's consent requirement when providing services to female citizens unless there was a legal basis (i.e. travel and marriage); five months later, the king's office posted that women would be allowed to drive starting from June 2018

as part of achieving Vision 2030's agenda concerning expanding the economy; in August 2019, a royal decree was issued that women above the age of 21 would be able to travel and have their passports issued without permission from a guardian; in October 2020, a new programme for scholarships called the *Path of Excellence* was announced, with no restrictions on the age of the students and, for female students, no guardian's consent. In June 2021, a new legislation was issued that adult females can live alone without the consent of their male guardian. This comes with two amendments: a women's guardian cannot report her as a fugitive or file lawsuit against her if she chooses to live alone, and women who finish their sentence and move to rehabilitation/care centre can now live alone without the need to be handed over to their guardians.

Although it is not possible to directly attribute these changes to the online activism, such activism may have been significant in this context due to the limitations around offline collective action. As argued by Castells (2015), the online social movement made it possible to increase the level of involvement of participants due to its decentred and unbounded characteristics. In this research, online activism was found to have moved from one platform, Twitter, to other platforms, e.g. YouTube and online newspapers. In doing so, the vulnerability of the movement could be protected from the threat of repression (Castells 2015). Clark (2016) stated that online activism such as so-called 'hashtag feminism' has the ability to initiate a socio-political change depending upon the surrounding conditions. Although the changes to the MGS cannot directly be attributed to the #EMGS campaign, the hashtag has resulted in offline action, i.e. signing the petition to the king. This research can be contextualised among many efforts of Saudi women to demand their rights through representing their roles in relation to the power relations and other forms of authority and problematising their situation. The discourse of the #EMGS campaign has led to heated debate and negotiation with the public to challenge the system of patriarchy and marginalisation under the MGS. It also allowed women to produce alternative interpretations of their identities in ways unprecedented before social media, i.e. Saudi women were represented differently, for instance, with the anti-campaign highlighted the inequalities experienced by women.

This online activism has frequently been attached to the government's announcement of Vision 2030 in 2016, a programme for the nation's economic development beyond the oil industry, along with the promulgation of moderate Islam (see section 2.2.3). The view is that the success of this vision depends upon the participation of Saudi women. The programme works on all levels: social, political and economic. It entails changes that the #EMGS campaign have

utilised in their arguments to end the MGS. First, the social level is greatly shaped by the religious establishment, which has the power to control women and social life in general through strict interpretations. However, the discourse of the #EMGS campaign revealed a discussion of these strict views and proposed a new arena of alternative interpretations, aligned with moderate Islam. Second, the political level has adopted an open-door policy. Modernisation was also addressed in the discourse of the #EMGS campaign with a view to recognising women's roles and allowing them to participate in the public sphere, and in Vision 2030 in particular. Third, women have been positioned passively with regard to the economy in the discourse of the #EMGS campaign due to the MGS; thus, the end of the MGS would allow women to progress further in the business world. The combination of these levels might foster social awareness of alternative interpretations with regard to women's rights, leading to political recognition of women's role in the public space and expanding the economy through the opportunities women can grasp when they are visible. This being said, social media in Saudi Arabia afford public discourse by facilitating dialogue concerning public debates. Thus, social media can be seen as a means of producing the practice of discourse, i.e. a site of social struggle.

In the spirit of reflexivity, it behoves me to explain explicitly my stance on this social issue, as a member of the targeted society in this study. As a Saudi woman, born and raised in Saudi Arabia, I have faced and felt the limitations imposed on women, as well as witnessed women's dissatisfaction of the situation. In 2012, I was a graduate student at Tabuk University when the wave of university protests started in other universities (see Doaiji 2018). In 2016, the online campaign against the male guardianship system started on Twitter, while I was doing my MSc studies in discourse analysis and focusing on the role of Saudi women in constructing the wedding invitation genre and how this could reflect their role in contemporary Saudi society. In 2017, the #EMGS campaign travelled from Twitter to other platforms, YouTube and news articles. I then led to my proposal for this study to examine this problem, as an attempt to recognise the efforts of Saudi women within the broad frame of their struggle against patriarchy and the dynamics of power in society. Throughout my work, I have given prevalence to women's voices although also in the presence of men's. I subscribed to the anti-MGS's subject positions, but at the same time I was eager to reflect the ideology of the pro-MGS by examining their discourse using objective empirical methods.

9.2. Contribution

By investigating one of the most high-trending hashtags since the phenomenon emerged in 2016, this work makes several contributions to the academic literature on social movements and activism, particularly in the Saudi context as follows:

In regard to the societal aspects,

- It has drawn connections between patterns of gender inequality in Saudi society and sociological questions of female misrecognition by reflecting on how gender intersects with socio-political contexts and the power dynamics that drive religious and patriarchal divisions in Saudi Arabia. This was completed by examining the discursive construction of Saudi women's representation in an online sphere and the discursive arguments that call for reform and change with regard to Saudi women's rights on two platforms: YouTube (public) and online news (institutional).
- It has investigated groups on both sides in the campaign to end male guardianship: one calling for empowerment and supporting changes in favour of Saudi women (i.e. anti-MGS) and the other adopting a more traditional conservative stance on women and women's issues (i.e. pro-MGS).
- Specifically, it advances understanding of this contemporary women's movement in Saudi Arabia, in which socio-political cultural restrictions, along with widespread negative attitudes towards feminism, which is considered a threat to society, to morals and to family cohesion. Thus, it can be placed in the genre of feminist studies, as an empirical example of Saudi feminist activism.

In regard to methodological aspects:

- It has combined a variety of approaches in critically examining both stances under the umbrella of CDA. By doing so, it has offered an examination of counter-discourse claiming to resist an unjust status quo, along with discourse claiming to defend the status quo, on various platforms. Thus, it differs from other analyses of discourse that criticise injustice and discrimination on a single platform.
- It has extended the area of investigation to cover not merely data from those at the grassroots level (Twitter and YouTube), but also at the institutional level (online news).
- With regard to the analytical approaches, van Leeuwen's (2008) approach assisted in identifying the representations of social actors; however, the data revealed a certain

representation that was not recognised by the model, namely a psycho-social identity referring partially to the actor by their psychological and sociological qualities (e.g. “the reputations of Saudi women” and “the image of Saudi women”).

9.3. Limitations and suggestions for further research

This section addresses the limitations of this study and provides some suggestions for future research.

In terms of limitations, first, due to time and word constraints, the plan to conduct interviews was abandoned despite obtaining ethical approval from the University of Sheffield. Interviews would have led to a better understanding of the anti- and pro-MGS campaigners’ motivations and strategies, as well as the outcomes of this online activism, and would have provided a fuller answers to the last research question. Future research might address this omission and interviews could also be conducted with journalists or members of the Shura council in an attempt to understand the wider socio-political context surrounding women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. This might also link to the new direction of the government, namely towards a more open and moderate kingdom.

The representation of social actors in this study was only focused on Saudi women/woman. Further research could investigate the representations and roles of more than one actor, for instance, the government, Saudi men/man, in order to investigate their role in the current Saudi women’s situation.

The intertextual references in this study were limited solely to Twitter data, despite noticeable references in the other platforms. Future research could compare the references in Twitter to those used in other platforms related to the same problem. In addition, future research in the Saudi context could make comparisons between the demands of this campaign and the new policy discourse emerging in the kingdom during the time of the campaign to investigate the socio-political effects of the movement.

The eclectic methodology used in this work can, with some adaptation, be applied to other campaigns from other languages as well.

Despite its various limitations, this thesis aimed to make a contribution to our understanding of the discursive representations and strategies used by competing social forces in Saudi society, with regard to women’s roles and lives under the MGS. I have juxtaposed the voices on both

sides of the argument using the same set of media for the first time, but above all giving prevalence to the voices of women. In the struggle for a more empowered society, free from conservative and biased interests, I suggest that CDA plays an important role. By rendering explicit some of the hidden ideological underpinnings of the (counter-) discourse, CDA helps counter the legitimising systems that seek to control women's rights. In turn, it can potentially offer one means of supporting women in their efforts to recast their citizenship rights. It can also counter the dominant ideology that seeks to maintain patriarchy by asserting conservative ideas about women's rights and defining them within a narrow Islamic framework.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Codes adopted from van Leeuwen's (2008) model of the representation of social actors and Halliday & Matthiessen's (2014) model of social actions.

Representation of Social Actors (van Leeuwen 2008)		
Code	Meaning	Example
IND	Individualisation: social actor is identified by singularity.	Saudi woman
CLASS	Classification: social actors are referred to in terms of major categories: wealth, class, age, gender, provenance, religion, race and so on.	Saudi woman here is represented based on her gender and provenance
ASSIM	Assimilation: when social actors are recognised by plurality.	Saudi women
AGG	Aggregation: when social actors are treated as statistics or identified by quantifiers.	A number of Saudi women
FUN	Functionalisation: when social actors are referred to by their occupation or role.	Businesswomen
RELAT	Relational identification: social actors are represented in terms of their work, kinship or personal relations to each other.	Saudi mother
APPR	Appraisal: when social actors are referred to in evaluative terms (good or bad).	Darlings
NOM	Nomination: social actors are referred to by proper nouns.	Aisha
PHY	Physical identification: social actors are referred to by their physical attributes.	Hijab of Saudi woman
UTTER	Utterance autonomisation: reference to social actors' utterances.	Tweets of participants
INSTRUM	Instrumentation: reference to the instruments by which social actors perform their actions.	Twitter account
SOMATIZ	Somatisation: reference to social actors' body (or part of it).	The hand of campaigners
SEMI.OBJECTIVE	Semi-objectivation: partial reference to social actors by one aspect of their psycho-social identities.	Life, dignity, name of Saudi woman
Social Actions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014)		
Code	Meaning	Example
MA	Material process: All clauses of doing and happening with the participants: initiators, actor, goal, beneficiary.	Saudi women can do anything and work in any area, why are they still considered minors? #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Fanti-MGS)
ME	Mental process: All clauses concerned with events in consciousness (i.e. thinking and feeling) with the participants: senser and phenomenon.	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystemIsConspiracy Those foreigners envy Saudi women for the stability and prosperity of our lives, so they started this hashtag. (in Fpro-MGS)

RE. ATT	Relational processes enacted to identify and characterise (i.e. being and having). Attributive, whereby the carrier (i.e. an entity) is ascribed to an attribute (i.e. some class)	#EndMaleGuardianshipSystem142 Saudi woman can't be an employee, a businesswoman, or a doctor without her male guardian's permission. (in Fanti-MGS)
RE. IDEN	Relational processes enacted to identify and characterise (i.e. being and having). Identifying, whereby the identified is distinguished by an identifier (i.e. what serves as an identity).	#GuardianshipIsForHerSeek a filthy account describes Saudi women who are against the end of male guardianship system with profanity. (in Mpro-MGS)
VE	Verbal process: All clauses of saying with the participants: sayer and receiver	They only report certain cases about Saudi women that serve their goals in #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Fpro-MGS)
BE	Behavioural process: All clauses concerning physiological and psychological behaviour.	When I watch the cases of Saudi women, I support them more #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Manti-MGS)
EX	Existential processes: All clauses representing the existence of something by use of the word "there."	There is no Saudi woman supporting this campaign #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Mpro-MGS)
Role of social actors (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014)		
Code	Meaning	Example
ACT	Activation: the social actor does the action (i.e. as subject)	Saudi women talk about their problems on Twitter and wait to be heard #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Fanti-MGS)
INIT	Initiator of the process	#SaudiWomenAreProudOfMaleGuardianship Saudi woman makes the leaders of the world concerned, see the point! (in Fpro-MGS)
BENEF	Beneficialisation: the social actors benefit from the action (i.e. they are recipients, receivers or clients), negatively or positively.	For Saudi women, I am supporting them in #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Manti-MGS)
SUBJ.GOAL	Subjection: the social actors receive or undergo the action.	The Vision2030 will be achieved and succeed when the government invests in Saudi women #EndMaleGuardianshipSystem (in Fanti-MGS)

Appendix B: Discourses of the intertextual references

Discourse	Definition	Associated genres (text-types)	Example
Religion	The male guardianship system (MGS) and the #EMGS campaign constructed from the Islamic perspective	Quran, hadith, fatwa and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>الرجال قوامون على النساء وليس الرجال أولياء على النساء</u> #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية712</p> <p>Allah, Almighty, said: “<u>Men are the protectors and maintainers of women</u>” not the guardians of women. #EMGS712</p> <p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>الرجال قوامون على النساء وليس الرجال أولياء على النساء</u> #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية61 إنما النساء شقائق الرجال ما أكرمهن إلا كريم ولا أهانهن إلا لئيم الإهانة أن تعامل كفاصر ولا تكون ولية نفسها</p> <p>#EMGS61 “<u>A woman completes a man, an honourable man treats women with honour and integrity, and only a vile dishonourable man humiliates and degrades women</u>” Humiliation is to treat women like minors and not to let them be their own guardians.</p>
			<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">#انطلاق_سعوديات_ضد_الاسقاط_الولاية_تكليف_للرجل_ومسؤولية_عظيمة_كلكم_راعٍ_وكلكم_مسؤول_عن_رعيتِه_فليتقِ_الله_أولياء_الأمر_فليس_للولي_التسلط_والظلم</p> <p>#SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem guardianship is a great responsibility on men “<u>All of you are shepherds and each of you is responsible for his flock</u>” Guardians should fear Allah and not use oppression and power against women.</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">#حقوق_المرأة_في_الاسلام_سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>In Arafa’s compound our prophet, peace be upon him, while stating the Islamic rules in lots of matters didn’t forget about women; he said “<u>Act kindly towards women</u>” #EMGS</p>

Political	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed from Saudi political perspective	Saudi constitution, political speech and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>link 660 #سعوديات نطالب اسقاط الولاية 660 قبل 1979 لم تكن ثمة قوانين ولاية على المرأة [a photo of crown prince's quote]</p> <p>#EMGS before 1979 guardianship system didn't exist.</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا 200 وصية نحن مستهدفون في #عقيدتنا و #امننا دافعوا عن دينكم ووطنكم نحن شقائق الرجال فالحفاظ على لحة الوطن [a photo of the quote by prince NAif]</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship200 The advice is: our #faith and #safety are targeted, therefore we should protect our religion and country because we are the counterparts of men and we must maintain the steadiness of our country.</p>
(international political)	The #EMGS campaign constructed from international political perspective	International treaty on women's rights (CEDAW), other countries polices	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية 39 قبل اعوام عاتبونا عندما كتبنا الى هيلاري كلينتون و مرت السنين ولم يتغير شيء قررت اربط تغريداتي بحسابها</p> <p>#EMGS39 Years ago, they blamed us for writing to Hilary Clinton. Now it has been years and nothing have changed! So, I direct my tweets to her account.</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>رحم الله الامير نايف بن عبدالعزيز عندما قال ان الذين ينادون بحرية المرأة لا يريدون حريتها بل يريدون حرية الوصول اليها #لماذا يطالبون باسقاط الولاية</p> <p>May Allah have mercy upon prince Naif bin Abdulaziz when he said: "Those who advocate women's freedom don't really want their freedom, all they want is the freedom to reach them #WhyDemandingEndMaleGuardianshipsystem</p> <p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>ثبت وقوف #قطر خلف حملة #اسقاط الولاية والقيادة كما ثبت دعمها لما يقارب 18 منظمة بأوروبا لتأجيج قضايا المجتمع السعودي [photos of news from Arabia and Ajaal] link</p> <p>Qatar has been proved to be behind the #EndMaleGuardianship and women's driving campaigns, as well as supporting 18 organisations in Europe to provoke Saudi social issues.</p>

			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>##لماذا المرأة السعودية مستهدفة إذا تعتقد أن الحكومات تترك أزمة الاقتصاد والعلاقات الدولية وتتفرغ للمرأة السعودية فعليك مراجعة شهر حالاً ##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية.</u></p> <p><u>#WhySaudiWomenAreTargeted If you think that the governments will leave aside their economic issues and international relations crisis to solve Saudi women's issues, you should see a doctor or go to a madhouse #EMGS</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية52 تدخل الحكومات الأخرى في هذه القضية أمر غير مقبول link [photos from international news about politicians comments on the campaign]</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS52 the interference of other governments in this issue is not acceptable</u></p>
Media	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed from media perspective	TV episodes, news reports and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p><u>##سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية مقال اليوم في صحيفة مكة النضال النسوي السعودي الراي السعودي link [photos of article by Makkah newspapers about Saudi women's rights]</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS Today's article in the Makkah newspaper: Saudi women's struggles and Saudi public opinion.</u></p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>##سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا #كوني حرة هكذا تريد MBC ان تهدم تربيتنا الاسلامية بترسيخ الاذهان بان الحرية هي التحرر من التدين والحجاب والحياء والانوثه</u></p> <p><u>#SaudiWomenAreProudOfMaleGuardianship #BeFree this is how MBC wants to destroy our Islamic teachings, by consolidating in our minds that freedom comes only by being liberated of religion, hijab, modesty and femininity.</u></p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>##سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية- نظام الوصاية لدينا يعتبر المرأة ناقصة اهلية وهذه اهانة كبيرة لها ايمن بدر كريم [video of Tv interview on Khalejia channel in yah ala link program]</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS "Our guardianship system deems Saudi women as legally incapable and this is a great insult to women" Aemin Bader</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>##نطالب اعتقال المحرضين باسقاط الولاية تُفضل المسجونات البقاء في السجن لأن أهلها رفضوا استلامها تحدثكم "نورة"</u></p> <p><u>[interview in Laha magazine]</u></p> <p><u>#DemandTheArrestOfInstigatorsOfEndMGS Most of Saudi women prisoners stay in jail because their families refuse to take them back—this is Nora.</u></p>

Policy	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed from the Saudi policy perspective	Saudi legislation, reports and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نطالب اسقاط الولاية اسقاط الولاية ليست عصيان وعقوق النظام يسقط الولاية عن الابن عند بلوغه فهل الدولة تشجع عقوق وعصيان الابناء?</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS This's not a rebellion or disobedience. The government doesn't demand the guardian's consent for men after the age of puberty, does that mean it encourages young men's disobedience and rebellion?</u></p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>الابتعاث السفر تصريح السفر تجديد الجواز مافية الابولي امر ماتغير شيء والباقي من الجيد تسهيل الامور فيها بل ضروري #تمكين_المرأة_بلا_ولي</u></p> <p><u>Women's travel permit, studying abroad, and passport renewal still need the male guardian's consent. Nothing has changed! It is a necessity to make these procedures easier. #WomenEmpowermentWithoutGuardians</u></p>
(International policy)	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed from the international policy perspective	International legislations, treaty and so forth	<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>لمعرفة بَعْضٍ من دوراللجنة الوطنية العليا الدائمة المتخصصة لشؤون المرأة #سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية20link</u> [photo of the roles of the committee]</p> <p><u>You should know the constant role of the National Supreme Council for Women's Affairs.</u> #EMGS20</p> <p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية باتتبع المنظمة العالمية لحقوق الانسان هو إلغاء نظام الولاية صورة من تقرير حقوق الإنسان لعام link2015</u> [Photo of human rights report 2015]</p> <p><u>#EMGS to follow the Global Human Rights Organisation's report of 2015, is to terminate the MGS.</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية124 إذا طلقها لا يحق لة أن يأخذ شيئاً مما أعطاه لها الاسلام قانون</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS124 If she gets divorced, the husband cannot take back anything he gave her during marriage; this is her right in Islam.</u></p> <p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا احترمي قانون فرنسا واخلي النقاب يا متخلفة في السعودية تقبضون عليها عشان عباية شعب مريض المنطق ينتحر !! [Tweet by campaigner criticised Muslim women who don't follow the law and later Saudi authorities for link not respecting the differences]</u></p> <p><u>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship you should respect the French law and take off your Niqab. But in Saudi Arabia, when women are arrested for not wearing Abaya, the society becomes the most irrational on earth!!</u></p>

			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_الأمريكان_أعطوا_للمرأة_حق_الترشح_لمقعد_الرئيس_تخلف_التعامل_بمبدأ_الجنس_هو_عند_مجتمعك_اللي_حتى_الولاية_على_النفس_محرومة_منها_المرأة [tweet by Muslim scholar assuming the win of a man over a woman in the US election] link</p> <p>#EMGS_The_Americans_have_given_women_the_right_to_run_for_president. Gender discrimination is the rule in our society where women still cannot be their own guardian!</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>link_هيومن_رايتس_تدعو_الأردن_لإلغاء_تهمة_التشهير_بالدين_دعت_منظمة_[link_of_Al_ghad_newspapers]_#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_80</p> <p>Human_Rights_urge_Jordan_to_remove_the_charges_of_defamation_of_religion. #EMGS80</p>
Reflective campaign	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed by the anti-MGS	Petitions, tweets to human rights organisations and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>#إسقاط_الولاية_نرجو_التحقيق_في_شكاوى_الفتيات_بخصوص_البرقيات_و_محاسبة_المسيء_#برقية_الولاية_للملك_25_سبتمبر</p> <p>We hope for an interrogation in the issue concerning the girls who filed complaints and petitions, but have not received a response. #PetitionToTheKing25Sep. #EMGS</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>مطالبات_#إسقاط_الولاية_خائنات_#الدين_و_#الوطن_أحدهم_تشارك_شأن_مجتمعي_داخلي_ببرنامج_أجنبي_[A_set_of_tweets_asking_women_for_more_suggestions_regarding_the_regulations_that_restrict_SW_to_present_them_in_an_American_program]_link</p> <p>#EMGS campaigners are traitors to their religion and their country for propagating internal affairs on a foreign platform</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>يا_صاحبي_اسقاط_الولاية_من_قبل_لايجي_تويتز_و_المطالبات_فيه_و_زيادة_ع_كذا_تراكان_موجود_من_2009_المطالبة_#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>People! the demands for ending MGS have been there since 2009, before the campaigners started it in Twitter #EMGS</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>فشلوا_باسقاط_الولاية_وفشلوا_بمطالبة_نزع_الحجاب_والان_يطالبون_ب_#قيادة_السيارة_مع_الحملة_خبثة_يقودها_اعداء_الوطن_#سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>They failed to end MGS and remove the hijab, and now they're demanding to let #WomenDrive in a malicious campaign led by the enemies of our country. #SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianship</p>
International campaign	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign	International conferences, speeches and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>

	constructed in the international contexts		<p>#سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية 246 دعوة الجمعيات التونسية لاصحاب القرار</p> <p>link (report from Assabah news)</p> <p>#EMGS246 The Tunisian associations have invited the decision makers to rethink the MGS</p> <p>Manti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: -</p>
Reflective anti-MGS campaign	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed by the pro-MGS	Petitions, anti-hashtags on Twitter and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية 243 متمردة مجنسة عميلة مجنونة مراة خائنة للوطن كل هذا العناء وصفت به امرأة قالت انا راشدة link</p> <p>[Tweets of the reaction of the pro-MGS campaign]</p> <p>#EndOfMaleGuardianshipSystem243 A naturalised, rebel, crazy, agent, teenager, traitor... this is what they call a woman who says I'm an independent adult.</p> <p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية- المرأة عندنا - درة مصونة جوهرة مكونة حلوى مغلفة لهدرجة مو متقبله الوضع انها إنسانة ونوصفها بالجمادات ؟</p> <p>#EMGS Women here are described as: <u>well-protected pearls, preserved gems, wrapped candies!</u> Is it so hard to believe that they're humans and treat them as such instead of describing them as inanimate objects?</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا الحمد لله المس في ردود الكثير من السعوديات و عي بوثيقة سيداو وخطرنا الدينية ووعي بان هناك من يعمل لفرضها علينا ولا بد ان يخيب الحمد لله</p> <p>#CEDAWSaudi</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship Thank God I see a lot of sense and awareness in Saudi women's responses to CEDAW. They're aware of its threat to our religious principles and the fact that there are people who are trying to impose it on us (may Allah disappoint them).</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>#الولاية لها لا عليها صوت الداعيات وأستاذات الجامعات يؤكد وعيا تجاة حقوق المرأة فهن لم يستسلمن لقيود المجتمع الخاطئة ولم يتمردن على الشرع!</p> <p>#GuardianshipIsForHerSake Women's advocates and university lecturers assure awareness of women's rights, they haven't gave up to society's wrong restrictions and neither have they rebelled against Sharia.</p>
Education	Women's rights constructed from the Saudi	Curricula, policies of educational institutions and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>#تمكن المرأة هل هناك سند نظامي يجبر الطالبة ان تضع من وقتها الساعات الى ان تفتح البوابة الساعة ١٢</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا أجنبيات يجهلون مناهاجنا الصورة التي يتم تداولها ليست بمناهج #المملكة بل #المغرب العربي</p>

	educational perspective		<p>جامعات تطالب بالموافقة للولي # #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية</p> <p><u>#WomenEmpowerment Is there any legal regulation that forces female students to stay in the university until 12 pm and waste hours of their day unless they have their guardians' permission to go out? #EMGS</u></p> <p>Manti-MGS: -</p>	<p># [Tweet by campaigner claiming a photo taken from the Saudi curriculum and another photo showed the origin of the curriculum] link</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship foreigners are unaware of our curricula since what they present in the hashtag is #Morocco's curricula not #Saudi's #BeClever</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>التعليم حذرت من #الجالية_البير_الية_وخطورتها_على_المجتمع link [of Makkah newspapers] #سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p>Ministry of Education has warned against the #LiberalDiaspora and their threats to our society #SaudiWomenWithEndMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>
Other women's rights	Women's rights constructed from the international policy perspective	Legislation, articles and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية4 فلم عن حث سيدات المجتمع على المشاركة بالمطالبة بحقوق المرأة لتحقيق المساواة مع الرجل link [photo of suffragettes movie (2015)]</p> <p>#EMGS4 a movie about activists participating in a women's rights campaign to achieve equality with men.</p> <p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>نيارك لنساء الكويت صدور أوامر بتعيين النساء في منصب القضاء كقاضية وكسر التمييز العنصري ضدهن #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية19</p> <p><u>Congratulations to Kuwaiti women</u> for appointing women as judges and eliminating discriminatory gender rules against women #EMGS19</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_باوروبا_واحدة_علاقل_من_كل_3_نساء_تتعرض_للغف_اضطهاد_اعتداء_لم_ينفعهن_اسقاط_الولايةLink ! link of report by world health organisation</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship in Europe 1 women out of 3 has been exposed to violence, assault and oppression; obviously ending the guardianship system didn't do them any good.</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>أين الغرب عن حقوق هذه المرأة أم أن مطالبة الغرب بالحقوق لا يخص إلا السعوديات فقط؟ #اسقاط_الولاية_مطلب_شعبي Link [Video of violent against women in African country]</p> <p>Why does the West call for Saudi women's rights? Why aren't they doing something about <u>African women's rights</u>? #EndMaleGuardianshipIsThePeopleDemand</p>

Social	The MGS and women's rights constructed from the social and individual perspectives	Narrative stories, interviews and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p><u>##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_34 عمتي ثمانية منفصلة ليس لها أبناء لها أخ واحد متوفي ذهبت بنفسها ع عكازها مع خادمتها تسندها لتجدد جواز سفرها</u></p> <p><u>#EMGS34 My aunt went alone to renew her passport, she's 80 years old, divorced, infertile and her only brother is dead.</u></p> <p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>شخصياً اعرف واحد عنده اخر انذار لهذي السنة لأنه يجري ورا مصالحة امة وزوجة ##سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية_139</u></p> <p><u>I personally know someone who has had his final warning this year because he is after his mother's and wife's benefits #EMGS139</u></p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>##فضيحة المعنفات لاسقاط الولاية المتحدث الرسمي: لا يوجد أي شكوى مقدمة ضد الزوج الفتاة المقطع ومن نشرته في تويتر أدعت كذباً تقديمها بلاغ ولم تتجاوب الشرطة معها</u> [report in Sabq newspapers] link</p> <p><u>#TheScandalOfTheAbusedInEndMGS spokesperson: There are no complaints against the husband. The woman who has filmed the video and tweeted it online, claims that she has filed a complaint against him, but the police say otherwise.</u></p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>الروائية كريستي: إن المرأة مغفلة لأن مركزها في المجتمع يزداد سوءاً لأننا بذلنا الجهد للحصول على المساواة مع الرجل ##سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية_19</u></p> <p><u>Novelist Christy: Women are fools, they are just weakening their status in society by demanding equality with men. #EMGS19</u></p>

Anti-government	The MGS and women's rights constructed from Saudi anti-government views	Tweets, TV videos and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p> <p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية- عملاء السفارات معروفين بالضبط وأغلبهم انكشفوا بعد الأزمة القطرية امثال عبيد الريال القطري اما الولاية فهي قضية وطنية محقة ليس للسفارات علاقة بها وان وجد من بين المطالبين أحد لة علاقة بها فنحن مع القضية التي نوقشت تحت قبة الشورى للأفراد</u></p> <p>#EMGS the agents of embassies are well-known and most of <u>them got exposed after Qatar's crisis</u>. The guardianship system is a national issue and has nothing to do with the international embassies, even if some of the campaigners are involved with the embassies. We'll pursue the case as it has been <u>discussed by the Shura Council not by the individuals</u>.</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا تحريض على المظاهرات تحريض على مراسلة دول اجنبية هو لاء أشد من داعش] جزء مما يحاك ضد وطنك ي سعودي في مجموعاتهم وجب تجريمهم ومحاسبة كل من شارك بتجمعات التخطيط والتحريض link</u></p> <p><u>[tweets of private chats between campaigners]</u></p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship those who incite protests and plea interference of foreign countries are worse than ISIS. It is every Saudi's duty towards our country to criminalise and hold everyone involved in such schemes accountable for the incitement to provoke chaos.</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#اسقاط الولاية مخطط خارجي اكثر 3 الاف حساب وهمي بأدارة المخابرات الايرانية من العراق وسوريا تهاجم السعودية وتبث سمومها [photo of the report from the times UK] link</u></p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystemIsOutsidePlan <u>More than 3 thousand fake accounts are operated by Iranian intelligence from Iraq and Syria to attack Saudi Arabia.</u></p>
Liberalism	The MGS and women's rights constructed from the liberal perspective	Articles, TV videos and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات نفخر بولاية اهلنا لنا السعوديات يسقطن الاسقاطيات أصدر الأمير نايف رحمة الله بإيقاف الشبكة البيرالية السعودية وتعود مجدداً بمسمى آخر {الشبكة البيرالية الحرة}!</u></p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship <u>Prince Naif has made a decision to terminate the network of liberals, and</u></p>

				<p>here it comes again under the name of “Free Liberal Network”</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>البراليين في السعودية مجتهدون المخطئ لة اجر والصائب لة اجران كلام مين هذا المنيع #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية86</p> <p>“Liberals in Saudi Arabia are hard workers, in the words of Al-meni: <u>“if they do it wrong, they get rewarded once, whereas if they do it right, they get rewarded twice”</u> #EMGS86</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>#اسقطوا_ولاية_البرالي_عن_بناتة_كاتبة_ليبرالية_تفضح_المطالبين_بالحرية_للمرأة_البرالي_يرفض_الحرية_لزوجة_ويطالب_الحرية_للمغفلات</p> <p>link !</p> <p>[an article in al-Arabiya news</p> <p>#EndMaleGuardianshipSystemForTheLiberal’sDaughters A female liberal author has exposed the liberal male campaigners who deny their wives’ rights to freedom and defend the freedom of other women—foolish women.</p>
Shia women	Women’s rights constructed from the Shia perspective	Shia speech, books and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_اضطهاد_المرأة_الايبرانية_الشيعة_من_أراد_أن_يعرف_أكثر_فاليقرأ_كتاب_أختي_وحبيبة_قلبي_الدكتورة_سهى_العيسى_وكتابها_متوفر_لدى_مركز_باحثات</p> <p>link [a photo of a book</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship #TheOppressedShiiteIranianWomen If you want to know more, you can read the book of my beloved sister Dr. Soha Al-essa, it’s available in the research centre.</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية39</p> <p>بما أن هناك " شيعيات " في هذا الوسم نهدي لهن هذا المقطع عن مكانة المرأة عند الشيعة</p> <p>Link [Video of Tv show on the Safa channel]</p> <p>#EMGS39 Since there are many Shiite women behind this hashtag, we dedicate this video to them <u>“Women’s status in the Shia tradition”</u></p>

Advertising	The #EMGS campaign constructed as advertisements	Announcements, posters, brochures and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: لوضرب بيد من حديد بداية لكل من تسول له نفسه الفساد لم يقم ندوة لإسقاط الولاية من أمن العقوبة أساء الأدب [photo announcing the symposium about the system] link اسقاط الولاية ضد اسقاط الولاية</p> <p>If we used an iron fist against anyone who incited corruption, they wouldn't dare to <u>make the ending the MGS seminar</u>—who grants no punishment, misbehaves #SaudiWomenWithMaleGuardianshipSystem</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: -</p>
Withdrawal	The MGS and the #EMGS campaign constructed from the perspective of former campaigners	Articles, tweets by withdrawing campaigners and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: #سعوديات_فخر_بولاية_اهلنا_لنا_تصدى_المجتمع_السعودي_للحملة_العنيفة_فانسحب_النسويات_شكلاً_فقط_تعددت_حيلهم_والهدف_واحد_#اسقاط_الولاية_لتنسَخ_المملكة_من_تطبيق_الشريعة [Photos of tweets by women formerly campaigning] link</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship #Saudi Society responded to the hostile MGS campaign; therefore, the feminists have withdrawn, their tricks have varied and their purpose is to #EMGS so the kingdom derogates from Sharia.</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS: #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية_305_لم_يكتفوا_بالانسحاب_والصمت_بل_شتموا_وقذفوا_وخونوا_كل_امرأة_سعودية_تحدثت_عن_ظلمها_وظلم_غيرها_هل_هؤلاء_مناضلات?</p> <p>#EMGS305 Other women, who chose not to fight, didn't only withdraw and remain silent; instead <u>they insulted, defamed, and betrayed every Saudi woman</u> who spoke out against oppression. Do we call them activists?</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: الناشطة نورة شنار: هناك تجنيد عبر وسم #اسقاط الولاية هدفهم زعت امن الوطن [Photo of her tweet] link اسقاط الولاية216</p> <p><u>Activist Nora Shanar: There are recruitments in #EMGS Hashtag, their purpose is to threaten the country's security #EMGS216</u></p>

Saudi women's rights	Topics of Saudi women's rights constructed from various perspectives	Driving scholarship and so forth policy, policy	<p>Fanti-MGS: المراة ملكة ولكن لا تقود بنفسها لا تستطيع السفر إلا بموافقة ولي الأمر الذكر حياتها متوقفة بالكامل على موافقة الذكر أو رفضة ولا تدرس #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية</p> <p><u>The Saudi woman is a queen, but she cannot drive or travel without her male guardian's consent</u>, her whole life depends on this man's approval or rejection. #EMGS</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: ملايين السعوديات اهلن فخر وتاج على رؤسهن من ابتلاءها الله "بجهلة" لا تعمم وتلجأ للقضاء اهلي ليسوا اعدائي سعوديات_نفخر_بولاية_اهلنا200# [Photo of Saudi women graduating from Jazan University] link</p> <p>Millions of Saudi women are proud of their families, and those ignorant women should not try to make this as a national issue or resort to the courts. #OurFamiliesAreNotOurEnemies.</p>
Women's rights in Islam	Topics of women's rights in Islam constructed from various perspectives	Historical narrative of Muslim women and so forth	<p>Manti-MGS: #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية- #انا_مواطنة_لست_ملكة الملكة لا تُملك بـصك ولاية الملكة لا سلطة عليها الملكة لا تحرم من حقوقها ولا تدرس لا تقود بنفسها لا تستطيع السفر إلا بموافقة</p> <p>#EMGS #WeAreCitizensNotQueens Queens don't need custodial bonds; they don't have any power above them; they're not deprived of their rights, <u>including driving, studying and traveling without a male guardian's consent</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية225 دراسة توضح مدى تفاؤل السعوديات بقرارات ولي الامر مصدر الدراسة link [the study] مركز خديجة بنت خويلد</p> <p>#EMGS225 <u>a study shows that Saudi women are optimistic about the King's decisions</u> (source: Khadija bint Khuwayild Center).</p>
			<p>Fanti-MGS: ٩٠ امرأة حكمن العالم الإسلامي لا يضحكون عليكم بان المسلمين لم يحكمهم نساء سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية45# [photo taken from Dostor newspapers] link</p> <p>90 women have ruled the Islamic nation, don't let them lie to you saying otherwise #EMGS45</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: -</p>

			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>في عهد عمر بن الخطاب تعينت بقرار منة أول قاضية في الإسلام وهي الشفاء بنت عبدالله بن عدى المخزومية</u> #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية56</p> <p><u>In Umar ibn Al-khattab's era, a woman named Alshifa bint Abdullah Almahzumi was assigned the first female judge in Islam</u> #EndMaleGuaranshipSystem56</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#سعوديات ضد اسقاط الولاية #حقوق المرأة في الاسلام مكانة المرأة الموثقة في كتبهم قبل الإسلام في حضارات وديانات العالم</u> Link [documentary video]</p> <p><u>#EndMaleGuaranshipSystem #WomenRightsInIslam woman's status before Islam is documented in different civilisations and religions.</u></p>
National identity	Topics of online participants' national identity	Tweets by pro- and anti-MGSs, news reports and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#حاسبوا خونة اسقاط الولاية اقتعوني أنهم سعوديات اقتعوني أنهم لا يريدون إسقاط الدين والوطن اقتعوني أنهم معنقات فقط</u> [Tweets by link campaigners]</p> <p><u>#PunishTraitorsOfEndMaleGuardianshipSystem You can't convince me that these women are Saudi, oppressed and after the end of MGS only! They just want to overthrow our religion and country.</u></p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>#برقية الولاية للملك 25 سبتمبر أتذكر أنكم قلتموا مراهقات وقلتموا مو سعوديات وش فيكم خفتوا يوم عرفتموا إنهم بيرسلون برقية</u></p> <p><u>#PetitiontotheKing25Sep I remember you said we're just teenagers and naturalised! Why did you get scared when we sent the petition then?</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>#رسالة الي المطالبات بالاسقاط من يقود حملة اسقاط الولاية هم اعداء الوطن و 90% من الحسابات تغرد من الخارج</u> [4 photos of tweets link by campaigners]</p> <p><u>#MessageForMGSCampaigners Whoever participates in this campaign are enemies of the Saudi country, and 90% of the accounts are tweeting from abroad.</u></p>
Slavery	Topics of slavery's history	Legislation on slavery, narrative of slavery before/after Islam and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p><u>الرفيق تم تحريمه دوليا وهو أهم معوقات الاقتصاد والتطور الاجتماعي</u> #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p><u>لله در ابن القيم حين قال: هربوا من الرق الذي خلقوا له *** فلبوا برق النفس والشيطان</u> <u>#كوني حرة لله درة #سعوديات ضد اسقاط الولاية1</u></p>

			<p><u>Slavery is internationally prohibited</u>, because it is one of the main obstructions to economic and social development. #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem</p>	<p>ibn Al-Qayyim was right when he said: “<u>They escaped from the slavery they were created for, so they accepted the slavery of desires and Satan</u>” #BeFree #SaudiPearls #SaudiWomenWithMGS1</p>
Christendom	Women’s rights constructed from the Christian perspective	Biblical verses, Christian traditions and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: #الولاية_لها_لا_عليها بل وصل بالغرب المسيحي ان يجتمع في القرن السادس هل انت انسانة هل لديك روح؟! #GuardianshipIsForHerSake Christians in the West in the 6th century discussed if women had souls or not?</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS: -</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: -</p>
Economics	Topics concerning the Saudi economy	News reports, conferences and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS: #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية_86 لا يمكن تنفيذ رؤية ٢٠٣٠ ولا رفع الاقتصاد بدوننا and 1 Link [file of Vision2030 and its goals] #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem89 you cannot implement the <u>2030 vision</u> or boost the economy without us.</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS: -</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS: #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية- ليست شماتة بل حقيقة أثبتتها الواقع؛ الظروف الاقتصادية التي تعرض لها النساء السعوديات بسبب نظام الولاية ومنع القيادة؛ كانت ولا زالت أعظم بكثير مما يتعرّض لة الجميع بسبب ارتفاع البنزين والكهرباء #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem Reality has proved that the despite the economic circumstances that women have gone through due to the <u>guardianship system and driving ban</u>, even now their situation is worse than the crisis of <u>high prices of gasoline and electricity</u>.</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS: integrated القضية ببساطة أعلن الأمير محمد بن سلمان عن برامج تحقق للسعوديات حقوقهن ورفاهيتهن ومشاركة في مجال الاعمال فتم اطلاق وسم #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية_153 لإخراج الجميع! The story is simple, <u>Prince Muhammad bin Salman has announced programmes [i.e. Vision 2030]</u> that would assure the rights and welfare of Saudi women, so #EMGS153 was trending to embarrass everyone!</p>

History	Topics concerning historical events (national and international)	Historical stories, past legislation (not in force now) and so forth	Fanti-MGS: #سعوديات نطالب اسقاط الولاية2 عائشة خرج بعد الرسول تقود الجيوش واخذ نصف الدين منها #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem2 after the prophet died, Aisha went out leading the armies, and the Muslims relied on her in religious matters.	Fpro-MGS: -
			Manti-MGS: #سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية259 أمر من الحاكم يخرس جميع المعارضون ولنا بالماضي مثال حينما قرر الملك سعود فتح مدارس ل بنات هذا مانحتاجه الآن #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem259 One order from the ruler would keep all the opponents silent. The same thing happened in the past when <u>King Saud decided to open schools for girls</u> ; this is what we need now.	Mpro-MGS: #سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية412 عمر رضى الله عنه حفظ الشريعة ولم يسقط ولاية المرأة وفي رعيته أمهات المؤمنين ألا ترضين بمرضيت به عائشة وحفصة رضى الله عنهن? #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem412 Umar ibn Al-khattab was well-versed in Sharia, yet he didn't end the MGS. He had all the mothers of believers under his care back then. Why don't you accept what Aisha and Hafsa accepted?
Security	Topics concerning Saudi security	News reports, hashtags on Twitter and so forth	Fanti-MGS: -	Fpro-MGS: -
			Manti-MGS: -	Mpro-MGS: #عمليات امنية بجدة والمدينة نلاحظ كل ماطلعوا اراهابيين وقبضت عليهم وزارة الداخلية طلع لنا الوسم ذا سعوديات نطلب اسقاط الولاية220 [To build similarities between their actions in attacking the security of the country.] #SecurityOperationsInJeddahAndMadina Have you noticed that every time terrorists get caught by the Ministry of the Interior; this <u>hashtag shows up?</u> #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem220

Atheism	The MGS and women's rights constructed from the atheist perspective	Tweets, books and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#فضيحة المطالبات باسقاط الولاية #كلنا مع الولاية3 ملحدة اجنبية داعمة للمطالبات لتحريض السعوديات link [tweet of campaigner identifying herself as an atheist in her profile]</p> <p>#ScandalOfEndMGSCampaigners #WeAreAllWithMGS3 an atheist foreigner supports the campaigners as an incitement against Saudi Arabia.</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>بما أن هناك "ملحدات" في هذا الوسم #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية نهدي لهن هذه الكلمات عن مكانة المرأة عند الملحدين link [photo of five quotes from atheists about the woman's role]</p> <p>Since there are "atheists" behind the hashtag #EMGS we dedicate to you these words which describe women's status in atheism.</p>
Judaism	The MGS and women's rights constructed from the Jewish perspective	Jewish beliefs, traditions, stories and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>تتهمونا بالجوء الى كوهين وبنظام ولاية المرأة لجاتوا للشرعية اليهودية بدلا من الشرعية الاسلامية افلا تعقلون؟ سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية73 link [4 photos of a book showing the women's rights in Judaism]</p> <p>You accused us of asylum to Cohen, while you're using the male's guardianship system which is originally a Jewish sharia rather than an Islamic one! Surely you've lost your minds? #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem73</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>هيو من رايتس ووتشو امثالها من المنظمات اليهودية هي من توجج نار العدوان على الاسلام فلنصلح احوالنا بانفسنا #سعوديات_نطالب_باسقاط_الولاية17</p> <p>Human Rights watch is one of the other Jewish organisations that instigates enemies against Islam. Why don't we resolve our problem by ourselves? #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem17</p>

			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>فكرة الولاية ابتدأت من اليهود في قصة بنات زيلفهاث كما في التوراة اليهود حالياً تركوا الولاية وتمسك بها غيرهم #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية159</p> <p><u>The idea of the guardianship system started with Judaism, in the story of Zefhatt's daughters in the Hebrew bible. Now they've abandoned this system while others have implemented it instead. #EndMaleGuarianshipSystem159</u></p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_ضد_اسقاط_الولاية_وسم_اسقاط_الولاية_يقوده_يهودي_والمغفلات_يتلقن_التعليمات_منة_منة link [report from slaati news]</p> <p>Link [report from Slaati news] #SaudiWomenWithMaleGuarianshipSystem the hashtag of end MGS is led by the Jews and the foolish among us are taking orders from them.</p>
Zionism	The MGS and women's rights constructed from the Zionist perspective	Tweets, hashtags and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>حسابات #اسقاط_الولاية_تعرض_على_الصهاينة_العمل_مع_الموساد_بالعمالة_ضد_#المملكة_نتمنى_ملاحقتهم_ومحاسبتهم link [A tweet by PM asking for women to work in Intelligence agency (Mossed) and female campaigner replied if they hire Saudi women]</p> <p>#EMGS accounts are working with Zionists and the Mossad against the #Kingdom, we demand their punishment.</p>
			<p>Manti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>
Conspiracy	Topics concerning conspiratorial views	Tweets, news reports and so forth	<p>Fanti-MGS: integrated</p> <p>يقولون الحملة مدعومة من الخارج لان مو قادرين يستوعبون ان النساء استيقظوا وبدأوا بالمطالبة بحقوقهم المشروعة #سعوديات_نطالب_اسقاط_الولاية33</p> <p><u>They say that the campaign started from the outside, because it is so hard for them to believe</u></p>	<p>Fpro-MGS:</p> <p>#سعوديات_بالولاية_نفتخر_200_أضطرابات_العالم_والحروب_والتشرد_والفقر_لم_يشغل_الغرب_سوى_إمرأة_#سعودية_مستقرة_وهناك_من_ينكر_المؤمرات!</p> <p>Link [photos from a video on CBSN showing a question about Saudi women's rights in the US congress, and a study by WH council on women (2014)]</p> <p>#SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship200 global disturbances, wars, homelessness, and poverty ... all means nothing to western leaders except when it comes</p>

			<p>that women have finally woken up and are demanding their legitimate rights. #EndMaleGuaranshipSystem33</p> <p>Manti-MGS: integrated</p> <p>#سعوديات نطالب باسقاط الولاية72 سقوط الولاية سقوط الأسرة وبالتالي سقوط الإسلام ما أكذبكم حين تريدون تلبس كذبة الولاية برداء الإسلام</p> <p>#EndMaleGuaranshipSystem72 <u>“If the guardianship system is over, the family bond will break and Islam will fall.”</u> You liars are trying to make the fake guardianship system part of Islam.</p>	<p>to Saudi Women! Yet there are people who still deny this conspiracy.</p> <p>Mpro-MGS:</p> <p>د لمياء البراهيم عبر صحيفة سبق " حملات إسقاط "الولاية" مبالغات وبيادات ينادون بالتمرد على الأسرة link [report in Sabq newspapers] #سعوديات_نطلب_اسقاط_الولاية669</p> <p><u>“End MGS campaign is an exaggeration and vulgarity that calls for rebellion against families”</u> Dr. Lamia Alibrahim in the Sapaq newspaper #SaudiAndProudOfMaleGuardianship669</p>
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Appendix C: Argument structure and evaluation in the YouTube corpora

Argument structure adopted from Toulmin's (1958) model					
Argument structure	Definition	Question answered	Examples of textual clues	Examples from YouTube data	
Claim (C)	The challenge and logical conclusion of an argument	What the speaker is seeking to establish or convince the audience of.	<i>Naetqd...</i> [We think] <i>fy raaey ...</i> [In my opinion...]	Anti-MGS: الولاية واي ولاية اخرى تطبق ليست من الدين This male guardianship or any other form of guardianship is not part of religion.	Pro-MGS: عن عمل واضح الملامح انه ممنهج وموجه وعمل لا يمكن يكون عشوائي في أي حال من الاحوال It's a clear systematic agenda; it cannot be random by any means.
Data (D)	The foundations for C (e.g. facts, proofs or religious principles)	Why one reaches a particular conclusion.	<i>lan ...</i> [because...] <i>alsbb hw ...</i> [the reason is ...]	Anti-MGS: فرضت في الداخل السعودي باسم الشرع It was imposed within Saudi Arabia under the name of Sharia.	Pro-MGS: لو لاحظتوا في وقت قريب اختفت حملات إسقاط الولاية فجأة كذا بدون أي مقدمات من التويتتر ثم ايضا فجأة بدون أي مقدمات رجعت خلال الايام الماضية مجددا نفس الحملات تطلع يوميا ترند If you've noticed, the campaign has disappeared suddenly from Twitter, and in recent days it has reappeared unannounced as a trend on Twitter.
Warrant (W)	The bridge connecting D to C (e.g. general statements, regulations and all justifications used to authorise C)	How you get there and what you have got to go on.	<i>wfqa l ...</i> [based on...]	Anti-MGS: الجهات تطبقها لانها تاخذ احتياطاها بالتعامل مع الولي Authorities applied the system because they're cautious in dealing with the male guardians.	Pro-MGS: تحليلات سريعة لهتغريدات ونشوف وش القاسم المشترك بينهم الي يتصفح الهاشتاقات هادي يتأكد انهم يهيئون لما هو اكبر بكثير من اسقاط الولاية ولو تتصفح الحسابات الي تغرد بشكل منتظم في الهاشتاقات لاحظت الاشتراك بصفات لا يمكن انها تكون من باب الصدفة Let's analyse the tweets quickly, see the common things between the tweeters and whoever supports them, and check on their tweets regularly. What they have in

					common cannot be a coincidence and it is clear that they are planning for a bigger goal.
Backing (B)	The clarifications of W (e.g. classifications, examples, religious sayings and traditions, official statements and statistical facts/reports)	What you have to support the authority and currency of W.	<i>Aela sbyl almthal ...</i> [for example...]	Anti-MGS: مثال في شراء السيارة او وظيفة او فتح حساب في البنك او سجل دراسي Examples: buying cars, getting jobs, studying, or opening bank accounts.	Pro-MGS: مثلا نفس الاسلوب باختيار الصورة الرمزية نفس الاسلوب بكتابة البايو في الملف الشخصي ونفس اسلوب التعبير فالتغريدات They also have the same avatar, writing style, profile pictures, and expressions.
Rebuttal (R)	Exceptions to C	If it is always the case.	<i>Lkn</i> [but ...]	Anti-MGS: ولكن عندما تخطى المرأة فهي تحاسب مثلها مثل الرجل But if a woman makes mistakes, she will be held accountable for it like a man.	Pro-MGS: القليل تم استغفالهم وهم في الواقع يعانون ولكنهم قليل A few true cases of suffering women were neglected, but they're not many.

Appeals adopted from Aristotle (2008)

Appeals	Definitions	Area of focus	Categories	Examples from the data	
Ethos	The speaker's moral character	Concerns the personality of the speakers, their virtues and credibility		Anti-MGS: انا اخاطب صاحب القرار والتزم بالانظمة الموجودة I speak to the decision makers, and I'm committed to the existing regulations.	Pro-MGS: شخصيا ماذكر في يوم طلب مني موافقة ولي امري Honestly, I personally don't recall I've been asked for a male guardian's consent at any time.
Pathos	The appeal to the hearers' emotions	Related to the hearers' emotions evoked while trying to persuade them	<i>Anger</i> When the speakers provoke their hearers' state of mind into rage by using offences or presenting instances	Anti-MGS: ان يكون هناك ذكر متسلط لعي المرأة ويحد من انسانيتها ووصولها الى العديد من الفرص There are oppressive males who use the legal power against women, degrade them and limit their chances.	Pro-MGS: فلا تغتروا بما ينادي به الزنادقة هم المنافقون من قبيح مسالكهم وخبيث مداخلهم النساء Don't be deceived by the pleas of the heretics and hypocrites, because their ugliest path is through women.

			<p><i>Pity</i></p> <p>Provoking a feeling of pain caused by destructive, immoral or unjust events</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>إذا تعتبر المرأة ناقصة الاهلية كيف تضع المرأة وكيلة وزارة</p> <p>If you consider the woman to be an unqualified person, then how could she become a deputy minister?</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>والنساء المتضررين جدا من اولياء امورهم وتحت ضغط نفسي تذهب للمحكمة</p> <p>Women who are abused by their guardians should go to court.</p>
			<p><i>Enmity</i></p> <p>Provoking a feeling of hatred, usually towards classes, for example, “any thief” or “any informer”</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>أي واحد يتجاوز شي من الثوابت بلغ مباشرة باستخدام تطبيق كلنا امن</p> <p>Anyone who exceeds religious constraints should be reported directly through the <i>Kuluna Amn</i> app.</p>
			<p><i>Friendship</i></p> <p>The tone of the speech evokes feelings of being close, love and care towards the hearers</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>ايها المعارض العزيز لما نسالك عن الدليل لا تسدل بايه القوامة</p> <p>Dear opponents, if we ask you for a proof, please don't mention the guardianship verse in Qur'an.</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>ياخوي يا حبيبي ياختي الي تطالبون باسقاط الولاية اسمعوا لي ..</p> <p>My dear brothers and sisters who demand the end of MGS, you should know that ...</p>
			<p><i>Fear</i></p> <p>Provoking a painful or destructive picture of what might be expected to happen in the future in the hearers' minds</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>ارفض كلمة تحرير المرأة لانها ترتبط بمسالة تفسخ الاخلاق</p> <p>We reject women's freedom because it provokes immorality.</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>هذه الحملات الاستجابية لها خطر كبير ولاننسى دور مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي كيف ضيعت اوطان واقامت ثورات وكانت لها عواقب</p> <p>You shouldn't seriously respond to this campaign because of its great threats. Also, never forget the role of social media in destroying countries and starting revolutions which has so many consequences.</p>
			<p><i>Confidence</i></p> <p>Provoking a mental picture of a safe or</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>نحن نومن بالدولة لانها تهدف بالنهوض بالمجتمع</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>المرأة هي عماد المجتمع ومن تعنتني بالاسرة وتربية الابناء</p>

			successful expectation	We believe in our country because it aims at social development.	Women are the pillars of society, they're the ones to take care of homes and families and educate children.
			<i>Shame</i> Provoking a feeling of disturbance and disgrace for the bad actions due to moral wickedness or cowardice, for example "abusing someone"	Anti-MGS: ابن صغير هو ولي امر لسيده وهي امراة راشده A little boy is the guardian of an adult woman.	Pro-MGS: تحاولون تقلدون الغرب الذين لا يحترمون المرأة You are trying to copy the West, which doesn't even have respect for women.
			<i>Shamelessness</i> Provoking a feeling of carelessness or contempt with regard to bad aspects	Anti-MGS: الحمله تركز على حقوق المرءه وغير ذلك لا يهم The campaign focuses on women's rights, regardless of anything else.	Pro-MGS: للمعلومية مجتمعنا يحضى باقوى روابط بين العائلة والمجتمع على مستوى العالم وتكاتف اسري يحسدنا عليه العالم ولهذا يجب تجاهل هذه الاصوات For the record, our society has the strongest bond within the family internationally—the world envies us for our social solidarity; thus, these calls should be silenced.
Logos	The appeal to logic or reason	All means are suitable for the case in question and are facts, statistics, quotations, historical analogy and so forth		Anti-MGS: وزارة الصحة تصرح بانها لا تطالب بتوقيع ولي الامر The Minister of Health announces that a male guardian's consent is actually not required of female patients.	Pro-MGS: فالقران يقولك الرجال قوامون على النساء Allah, Almighty, said in the Qur'an: "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women."

Appendix D: Argument structure and evaluation in the News articles corpora

Argument structure adopted from Toulmin's (1958) model					
Argument structure	Definition	Question answered	Examples of textual clues	Examples from news data	
Claim (C)	The challenge and logical conclusion of an argument	What the speaker is seeking to establish or convince the audience of.	<i>Naetqd...</i> [We think] <i>fy raaey ...</i> [In my opinion...]	Anti-MGS: لماذا الولاية على المرأة غير قابل للتفكير او النقاش او الاحتجاج؟ Why the guardianship system is unthinkable, non-negotiable, and indefensible	Pro-MGS: طرح موضوع الولاية بشكل عائم لا يقصد به نصرت المظلوم Bringing up MGS topic in this way doesn't mean victory for the oppressed.
Data (D)	The foundations for C (e.g. facts, proofs or religious principles)	Why one reaches a particular conclusion.	<i>lan ...</i> [because...] <i>alsbb hw ...</i> [the reason is ...]	Anti-MGS: خلقنا الله لتفكر وتندبر لتحقيق الافضل للمرأة والرجل وتستقيم الحياة Allah has created us to think, reflect and achieve the best for men and women; this is how life goes.	Pro-MGS: لانه يهدف الى زرع الفتنة حول المساواة بين الجنسين التي لا يمكن حدوثها They have the goal of sowing discord through the demands for gender equality, which cannot happen.
Warrant (W)	The bridge connecting D to C (e.g. general statements, regulations and all justifications used to authorise C)	How you get there and what you have got to go on.	<i>wfqa l ...</i> [based on...]	Anti-MGS: احكام علماء الدين تتغير بحكم ما يستمد ويستجد من حياة الناس Religious scholars' guidelines change based on updates in human life.	Pro-MGS: لان الشريعة التي تحكمنا تؤكد بان الرجال قوامون على النساء Because our Sharia confirms that men are the guardians of women.
Backing (B)	The clarifications of W (e.g. classifications, examples, religious sayings and traditions, official statements and statistical facts/reports)	What you have to support the authority and currency of W.	<i>Aela sbyl almthal ...</i> [for example...]	Anti-MGS: لا يعقل ان امرأة بالغة ومكلفة وعاقلة لاتستطيع السفر الا باذن وليها الذي قد يكون ابنها الصبي الذي ربته It's unbelievable that an adult, mature, sane, qualified woman cannot travel without a male's consent even if it's her little son.	Pro-MGS: ومن الامثلة على تولي الرجل زمام الامور هو الميراث و الدية وشهاد الرجل في القضايا Men's responsibilities are so many, for example: inheritances, diyahs, and testimonies in courts.

Rebuttal (R)	Exceptions to C	If it is always the case.	<i>Lkn</i> [but ...]	Anti-MGS: -	Pro-MGS: تسقط الولاية في حالة تضرر المرأة من وليها The MGS should be dismantled if a woman has suffered at the hands of her male guardian.
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Appeals adopted from Aristotle (2008)

Appeals	Definitions	Area of focus	Categories	Examples from the data	
Ethos	The speaker's moral character	Concerns the personality of the speakers, their virtues and credibility		Anti-MGS: لا يعقل ان احرم ابنتي من الدراسة واخضعها لرغبتى او ارادتي I wouldn't deprive my daughter of getting an education or subject her to my will.	Pro-MGS: انا ارى ان في التصرفات الظالمة يتم انتزاع الولاية من المخطى وتوكل لغيره I believe that it is a form of oppression to take custody away from the wrongdoer just to be given to someone else.
Pathos	The appeal to the hearers' emotions	Related to the hearers' emotions evoked while trying to persuade them	<i>Anger</i>	هناك حكاية العصبية التي تطول مع فن الابتزاز للمرأة لتوفير وتقديم حقوقها لها من قبل ولي امرها There are also the agnatic heirs (which is part of the art of blackmailing women) and it grants a woman her right only through the male guardian himself.	ان المطالبة باسقاط الولاية تعتبر جريمة Demanding the end of MGS is a felony.
			<i>Pity</i>	فتاة متعلمة تربط رقيبتها بموافقة ولي امرها على عملها An educated girl's future career is totally dependent on her guardian's consent.	هناك من ينادي لاسقاط الولاية ليجد الفرصة الانفلات والانحلال تحد مسمى الحقوق There are people who call for ending MGS to allow for moral decadence—disguised as women's rights.
			<i>Enmity</i>		

			<p>Provoking a feeling of hatred, usually towards classes, for example, “any thief” or “any informer”</p>	<p>يدعون انها دعوة علنية للانفلت النساء وتمردهن على قوانين العائلة</p> <p>They claim that it’s an invitation to moral decadence and a rebellion against family law.</p>	<p>ان الحسابات المطالبة اساءت للمملكة وللمجتمع السعودي</p> <p>The campaigners’ accounts have offended our country and society.</p>
			<p><i>Fear</i></p> <p>Provoking a painful or destructive picture of what might be expected to happen in the future in the hearers’ minds</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>هم يتخيلون ان اسقاط الولاية يشبه الاحداث السيئة مثل اسقاط دولة او سقوط مدينة</p> <p>They imagine that ending MGS will be a horrible event like ending a country’s reign or destroying a city.</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>ان المطالبة باسقاطها يعتبر تعدي على حدود الله وانتقاص لحكم شرعي</p> <p>Demanding the end of MGS is considered a rejection of Allah’s law and Sharia.</p>
			<p><i>Confidence</i></p> <p>Provoking a mental picture of a safe or successful expectation</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>تم مناقشة اسقاط الولاية في الشورى والذي يدل على ان اساسها ليس من الدين</p> <p>MGS was discussed in the Shura council, which proves that the system is not a religious law.</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>لم تمنع الولاية الكثير من المتعلمات والمتقنات من متابعة تعليمهن او العمل</p> <p>The MGS hasn’t prevented so many educated women from proceeding with their studies.</p>
			<p><i>Shame</i></p> <p>Provoking a feeling of disturbance and disgrace for the bad actions due to moral wickedness or cowardice, for example “abusing someone”</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>هناك بعض من المتشددات يناهضن المطالبة بحقوق المرأة المكفوله لهم شرعا ونظاما</p> <p>Some of the extremist women fight against the campaigners who are actually fighting for women’s rights based on sharia law.</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>وللاسف هناك من يعاني من التسلط من الولي</p> <p>Unfortunately, there are women who are suffering from men’s oppression.</p>
			<p><i>Shamelessness</i></p> <p>Provoking a feeling of carelessness or</p>	<p>Anti-MGS:</p> <p>الاتهامات ضد هذه الحملة تزيد من قوتها</p>	<p>Pro-MGS:</p> <p>ان الولاية تكريم للمرأة ومسؤولية يجب على الرجل</p>

			contempt with regard to bad aspects	The accusations against this campaign increase its power.	تحملها وتقديرها بالرغم من هذه الاصوات The guardianship system honours women, and men should take this responsibility seriously, regardless of these calls.
Logos	The appeal to logic or reason	All means are suitable for the case in question and are facts, statistics, quotations, historical analogy and so forth		Anti-MGS: ذكرت مصادر ان المحكمة ابدت حكما بنزع الولاية من اب يمارس التعنيف على بناته Sources indicated that the court has disqualified an oppressive father from his role as a guardian for using violence against his daughters.	Pro-MGS: وقالت الكاتبة: من وجهة نظري ان الاسلام ضمن للمرأة حقوقها ولم تظلم A female author said: "In my opinion, women have never been wronged in Islam because it guaranteed all their rights."

Appendix E: The distributions of six categories of social actors across the four corpora

Representations of social actors						
Corpus	women	men	authorities	Neutral	Indeterminate	Aggerate
Fanti-MGS N=599	N=218, 36% Categorised (62%: 134); Nominated (8%: 18); Overdetermined (16%: 35); Impersonalised (14%: 31)	N=116, 20% categorised (84%: 98); nominated (10%: 11); overdetermined (4%: 5); impersonalised (2%: 2).	N=126, 21% categorised (17%: 22); collected (6%:7), nominated (12%: 15); impersonalised (65%: 82).	N=111, 19% categorised (46%: 51); collected (24%:27), overdetermined (6%: 7); impersonalised (24%: 26).	N=8, 1%	N=20, 3%
Manti-MGS N=587	N=166, 28% categorised (62%: 103); nominated (5%: 8); overdetermined (17%: 28); impersonalised (16%: 27).	N=170, 29% categorised (86%: 146); nominated (6%: 10); overdetermined (6%: 10); impersonalised (2%: 4).	N=96, 16% categorised (18%: 17); collected (8%:8), nominated (16%: 15); impersonalised (58%: 56).	N=124, 21% categorised (51%: 63); collected (22%:28), overdetermined (3%: 4); impersonalised (24%: 29).	N=10, 2%	N=21, 4%
Fpro-MGS N=515	N=196, 38% categorised (64%: 125); nominated (6%: 11); overdetermined (11%: 21); impersonalised (19%: 39).	N=88, 17% categorised (84%: 74); nominated (7%: 6); overdetermined (8%: 7); impersonalised (1%: 1).	N=104, 20% categorised (19%: 20); collected (9%:9) nominated (16%: 17); impersonalised (56%: 58).	N=104, 20% categorised (35%: 36); collected (33%:35), overdetermined (8%: 8); impersonalised (24%: 25).	N=8, 2%	N=15, 3%
Mpro-MGS N=371	N=103, 28% categorised (67%: 69); nominated (2%: 2); overdetermined (12%: 12); impersonalised (19%: 20).	N=70, 19% categorised (90%: 63); nominated (1.5%: 1); overdetermined (7%: 5); impersonalised (1.5%: 1).	N=85, 23% categorised (15%: 13); collected (11%:9), nominated (18%: 15); impersonalised (56%: 48).	N=90, 24% categorised (39%: 35); collected (28%:25), overdetermined (4%: 4); impersonalised (29%: 26).	N=7, 2%	N=16, 4%

Appendix F: Semantic prosody (SP) for the representations of women in Fanti-MGS and Manti-MGS Twitter corpora

Representations of women in the Fanti-MGS corpus															
Categorised	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	mr'āh “the woman”	3.352	N	mz̄lūmh “(the) oppressed” *S	34	N	armlh “widow”	14	N	mtfā' ilh “optimistic” *S	8	N	rġ' iāt “backward” *P	5	N
	nsā “the women”	908	N	nāqsh “deficient” *S	34	N	mz̄lūmāt “the oppressed” *P	14	N	mḥrūmh “deprived” *S	8	N	ṣāmdāt “steadfast” *P	5	P
	s'ūdīh “Saudi woman”	729	N	nswyāt “feminists”	34	P	sīdh “lady”	13	N	ṣāmdh “steadfast” *S	8	N	m' tqlāt “detainees”	5	N
	s'ūdīāt “Saudi women”	377	N	ṣdīqtī “My friend”	31	N	mṭlqāt “divorcees”	13	P	'āqh “ungrateful” *S	8	N	dā' māt “supporters”	5	N
	ḥrh “the free woman”	227	P	tāb' i “Dependent” *S	30	N	zūġāt “wives”	13	P	mḏḥdāt “oppressed” *P	8	N	ḥrmh “the woman”	4	N
	ānta “the female”	211	N	qwylh “strong” *S	29	P	kāmlāt “fully-qualified” *P	12	P	wā' iāt “aware” *P	7	P	kwytīh “Kuwaiti”	4	P
	bnāt “the girls”	210	N	mswulh “responsible” *S	29	P	m' arḏāt “opponents”	11	N	bāḥṭī “researcher”	7	P	mnsīh “forgotten” *S	4	N
	mwāntī “the citizen”	181	P	ṣḡā' h “brave” *S	29	P	mslmh “Muslim”	11	P	mtfā' ilīn “Optimistic” *P	7	P	ḏkīh “smart” *S	4	P
	ām “the mother”	179	N	ġāhlh “uneducated” *S	27	N	mtḏrrāt “harmed” *P	11	N	ṭmūḥh “ambitious” *S	7	P	ġbīh “stupid” *S	4	N
	bnt “the girl”	158	N	d' īfh “weak” *S	27	N	ṣrīkh “partner”	11	P	rāḏīh “satisfied” *S	7	N	ṣġīrh “the little girl”	3	P

rāṣdh “the mature” *S	151	N	qādrh “capable” *S	26	P	mṣūnh “well-protected” *S	10	N	mu’hlh “(the) qualified” *S	7	N	dā’mh “supporter”	3	P
fāh “the girl”	143	N	mstqlh “independent” *S	25	P	ṣdīqh “friend”	10	P	nāṣṭāt “activists”	7	P	bā’ish “miserable” *S	2	N
m’nfī “abused” *S	134	N	mṭlqh “divorcee”	24	P	Mkrmāt “honoured” *P	10	N	ṭmūhāt “ambitious” *P	7	P	bḥrīnīh “Bahraini”	2	P
mṭālbāt “the campaigners”	129	P	ṭālbh “student”	24	N	’rbīh “Arabian woman”	10	P	Mnsīāt “Forgotten” *P	7	N	īhūdīh “Jew”	1	N
fūāt “the girls”	125	N	sīdāt “ladies”	23	P	mškīnh “poor” *S	10	N	Mqīmīh “resident”	7	N			
mwāṭnī “the citizens”	107	P	nswyh “feminist”	22	P	mṭqfīh “educated” *S	10	P	’āqlāt “sane” *P	6	P			
mṣṭrkāh “the participant”	97	P	bnāt “daughters”	22	N	mtḍrrh “harmed” *S	10	N	mūzfāt “employee s”	6	P			
’āqlīh “the sane” *S	97	N	mṣṭrkāt “participants”	22	P	sfīhāt “foolish” *P	9	N	’āgzh “powerless” *S	6	N			
kāmlīh “(the) fully-qualified” *S	95	P	dktūrh “doctor”	21	P	mḡflāt “dumb” *P	9	N	m’ḍūlh “a girl prevented from marriage”	6	P			
m’nfāt “abused” *P	77	N	wā’īh “aware” *S	21	P	mḡnūnh “insane” *S	9	N	Amārātīh “Emeriti”	6	P			
aḥwāt “sisters”	73	P	mkrmīh “honoured” *S	20	N	ḥzīnh “sad” *S	9	N	ḥlīḡīh “A woman from the gulf counties”	6	P			

	aḥt “sister”	71	N	fādlh “honourable” *S	20	P	ḥbībh “beloved” *S	9	N	a‘zīzātī “darling” *P	6	P			
	zūgh “wife”	71	N	mūzfh “employee”	19	N	mğnsāt “naturalised” *P	9	N	mrīdh “the sick” *S	6	N			
	bālgh “adult”	66	P	Sfīhh “foolish” *S	19	N	hārbāt “(the) escapees”	9	N	wāṭqāt “confident ” *P	6	P			
	bnt “daughter”	53	N	ṭālbāt “students”	19	N	ṣāḥbh “holder”	9	P	rḥīsh “cheap” *S	6	N			
	ansānh “Human”	52	P	m‘ārđh “opponent”	17	N	mđṭhdh “oppressed” *S	9	N	nāqṣāt “deficient” *P	6	N			
	zīzī “dear/sweeth eart”	48	P	ārāml “widows”	15	P	dā‘īh “preacher”	9	N	mṭḥlfh “retarded” *S	6	N			
	amhāt “mothers”	40	P	hrā‘ir “free women”	15	P	‘āṭlh “unemployed” *S	8	N	‘mīlāt “agents”	6	N			
	ūlīh “guardian”	40	P	hārbh “escapee”	15	N	ağnbīh “foreigner”	8	P	Mrāḥqāt “teenagers ”	6	N			
	ānāt “females”	35	N	ṭflh “child”	15	N	mt‘lmh “educated” *S	8	P	mḥrūmāt “deprived” *P	5	N			
Nominated	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	Mariam Al- otaibi	46	N	Azizh	12	P	Nora	7	P	Aisha	7	P	Fatima	5	N
	Amna	21	N	Khadijah	10	N	Tamadar Al- yami	7	P	Jwmanah	6	P	ghadh	5	P
	Dina	21	N	Suhailah	8	P	Alaa	7	P	Mia	6	P			
	Rawda Al- Yousef	13	N	Sofia	8	N	Eve	7	N	Wajihah al-Hwaider	5	P			

Overdetermination	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	drh "The pearl"	94	N	ǧwārī "odalisques"	35	N	qāsrāt "minors"	19	N	ḥbīsāt "trapped" *P	11	N	bṭlh "heroine"	7	P
	mlkh "queen"	78	N	mst'bdh "enslaved" *S	34	N	mmlūkh "owned" *S	16	N	bqrh "Cow"	10	N	'āhrāt "wh*res"	6	N
	'wrh "(the) forbidden entity"	66	N	ǧārīh "odalisque"	30	N	mlkāt "queens"	15	N	mst'bdāt "enslaved" *P	10	N	almkblat "handcuffed" *P	6	P
	ḏḥīt "victim"	59	N	'bdh "slave"	22	N	ḥlwi "Candy"	15	N	ḥbīsh "captive" *S	9	N	rhīnh "hostage" *S	6	N
	sǧīnāt "prisoners"	55	N	'āhrh "wh*re"	21	N	bḥīmḥ "Beast"	13	N	bḥāīm "Beasts"	9	N	dmīh "Doll"	6	N
	sǧīnh "prisoner"	45	N	qāsrh "minor"	20	N	rqiḳ "the slaves"	12	N	ǧūhrh "The diamond"	8	N	āmīrāt "the princesses"	5	P
	drr "The pearls"	45	N	mmtlkāt "The properties"	20	N	sl'h "goods"	12	N	mšlūlh "disabled" *S	8	N	mḥbūsh "trapped" *S	4	N
	Impersonalised	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq
mwāmrrh "Conspiracy"		21	N	ḥmlh "Campaign"	115	P	ṣūt "Voice"	215	N	nfs "The soul"	61	N	ḥqwq rights	330	N
ḥālāt "The cases"		43	N	ṣmt "Silence"	72	N	brqīh "telegram"	162	P	ǧsd "The body"	24	N	asm "Name"	84	N
ḥālḥ "The case"		27	N	tūrḥ "Revolution"	30	P	brqīāt "telegrams"	144	P	ār wāḥ "The souls"	18	N	ḥyāī life	36	P
āǧndh "Agenda"		9	N	qṣṣ "Stories"	28	N	āṣwāt "Voices"	52	N	āfwāḥ "Mouths"	14	N	āsmā' "The names"	29	N
nmādǧ		5	N	ūṭā'iq "Documents"	3	P	rsālḥ	38	N	rqbḥ "Neck"	9	N	krāmī dignity	22	N

	"Samples / Models"						"The message"									
													Mstqbl future	15	P	
													mşyr fate	12	N	
													qdrī capability	7	P	
													Mšākl issues	7	N	
													ḥwyī identity	3	N	
													sm'ī reputation	2	P	

Representations of women in the Manti-MGS corpus

Categorised	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	ālmrāt "(the) woman"	2427	N	m'nfāt "The abused" *P	41	N	ānāt "the females"	14	p	ṭālbh "student"	9	P	nāḡḡhāh "Successful" *S	6	P
	nsā' "(the) women"	580	P	mşūnh "Protected" *S	34	N	tflh "Child"	14	N	sīdh "The lady"	8	P	şḡā'h "Brave" *S	5	P
	s'ūdīh "Saudi woman"	290	N	Ūlīh "Guardian"	31	P	mt'lmh "The educated" *S	14	P	kwyīh "Kuwaiti"	8	P	Ġālīh "Precious" *S	5	N
	s'ūdīāt "Saudi women"	220	P	ansānh "Human"	31	P	Mḡnūnh "Insane" *S	13	N	qāḡīh "judge"	8	P	nāqşāt "Deficient" *P	5	N
	bnāt "the girls"	220	P	mwāṭnī "the citizens"	27	P	mzłūmh "Oppressed" *S	13	N	ḡāhlh "Uneducated" *S	8	N	Kāmlāt "Fully qualified" *P	5	p
	rāşdh "the mature" *S	155	P	Sīdāt "Ladies"	24	P	ḡrbīh "Western woman"	13	N	'rbīh "Arabian woman"	7	N	Ġbīh "Stupid" *S	5	N

	āht 'sister'	128	P	hrā'ir "Free women"	24	P	mṭlqh "The divorcee"	11	P	qṭrīh "Qatari woman"	7	P	mṭlqāt "The divorcees"	5	P
	ām "the mother"	126	P	Zūgāt "Wives"	23	P	mṭqfāt "Educated" *P	11	P	Qrībāth "relatives"	7	N	r'īsh "Leader"	5	P
	hrh "Free woman"	117	P	ṣhābī "Holder / Owner"	22	p	nswyāt "Feminists"	11	p	mnhrfh "Immoral" *S	7	N	Mknūnh "Well-protected" *S	5	N
	zūgh "wife"	108	P	kāmlh "Fully-qualified" *S	19	P	'zīzātī "Darlings / Dears"	11	N	hlīghīh "woman from the Gulf"	7	P	mghūrhd "Oppressed" *S	5	N
	bnt "girl"	99	P	al-mkrmh "Honourable" *S	19	N	Mskīnh "Poor" *S	11	N	ṭālbāt "students"	7	P	nswyh "Feminist"	4	P
	ānṭa 'female'	88	P	mstqlh "Independent" *S	18	P	Fāsdh "Corrupted" *S	11	N	m'lmh "Teacher"	7	P	lībrālīh "Liberal"	4	N
	bnt "daughter"	66	P	mu'mnāt "The believers"	18	P	ṣgīrh "Little girl"	11	N	Ṣrīfh "Honourable" *S	6	P	mrīdh "Sick" *S	2	N
	'āqlh "The sane" *S	65	P	astādh "Teacher / professor"	18	P	m'ārḍāt "The opponents"	10	N	mhrūmīn "Deprived" *P	6	N	Amrīkīh "American woman"	2	N
	Fatah 'girl'	64	N	m'zzh "Dignified" *S	18	N	'zīmīh "Great" *S	10	P	kbīrh "Adult" *S	6	P	kṛīmīh "Decent" *S	1	P
	aḥwāt "sisters"	61	P	d'īfh "Weak" *S	17	N	Qwyh "Strong" *S	10	P	dlīlāt "Humiliate" *P	6	N			
	m'nfh "The abused" *S	60	N	mīslmīh "Muslim"	16	P	Dktūrīh "Doctor/researcher"	10	P	Ṣrīkh "Partner"	6	P			

	nāqsh "The deficient" *S	52	N	amhāt "mothers"	16	P	mzlmāt "Oppressed" *P	10	N	mtḍrrāt "Damaged" *p	6	P			
	mwāṭnī "the citizen"	51	P	msu'ūlh "Responsible" *S	15	P	ṭbībh "Doctor"	10	P	ḥqūqīāt "activists"	6	N			
	mṭālbāt "The campaigners"	49	P	tāb'h "Dependent" *S	15	N	bkr "virgin"	9	P	ḥrīm "Women"	6	N			
	fīṭāt "the girls"	49	N	wā'īh "Aware" *S	15	P	armlh "widow"	9	P	nādgh "Mature" *S	6	P			
	bālgħ "adult"	48	P	m'ārdāt "Opponents"	14	N	Mrāhqāt "teenagers"	9	N	nāštāt "Activists"	6	P			
Nominated	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	Mariam Al-otaibi	29	N	Ahlam	6	N	Rawda AL-Yousef	5	N						
	Aisha	7	P	Reem	5	N	Hind	5	N						
	Azizh	6	N	Amna	5	N									
Overdetermination	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	drh "Pearl"	83	N	dhyh "(the) victim"	29	N	sḡnāt "Female prisoners"	16	N	ḥlwi "Candy"	10	N	qwārīr "glasses"	8	N
	mlkh "(the) queen"	67	N	'āhrh "Wh*re"	22	N	'āhrāt "Wh*res"	15	N	ḍḥāiā "Victims"	9	N	rhīnh "Hostage"	7	N
	ḡārīh "Odalisque"	47	N	Ṣḡālḥ "maid"	20	N	īāl'nz "Goat"	12	N	Asīrh "Prisoner"	9	N	Sfīhh "Foolish" *S	7	N
	ḡwārī "Odalisques"	41	N	bhīmḥ "The beast"	17	N	Mmlūkh "owned" *S	12	N	mlkāt "(the) queens"	9	N	Sbīh "Capture"	6	N
	'wrh "(the) forbidden entity"	34	N	qāṣrh "Minor"	16	N	'bdh "Slave"	11	N	'ālḥ "Burden"	8	N			

	Aldrr "(the) pearls"	30	N	mst'bdāt "enslaved" *P	16	N	'bdāt "Slaves"	10	N	adāī "Tool"	8	N			
Impersonalised	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	hālāt "Cases"	27	N	qsh "Story"	11	N	ṣūt "Voice"	80	N	ḡsd "Body"	15	N	hqwq rights	219	N
	mu'āmrh "Conspiracy"	21	N	hmlh "Campaign"	11	N	brqīāt "telegrams"	8	P	rūh "Soul"	12	N	asm "Name"	25	N
	mlf "File"	8	P	d'ūh "call"	7	N	aṣwāt "Voice"	8	N	qlb "Heart"	9	N	hyāī life	20	N
	al-āmtlī "Examples"	6	N	qṣṣ "Stories"	7	N							krāmī dignity	18	N
	ftnt "trouble"	1	N										asmā' "Names"	15	N
													Mstqbl future	14	P
													a'rād chastity	10	N
													qdrī capability	5	P
													hwyī identity	5	N
													mṣyr fate	4	N
													Mšākl issues	3	N
												sm'ī reputation	1	N	

Appendix G: Semantic prosody (SP) for the representations of women in Fpro-MGS and Mpro-MGS Twitter corpora

Representations of women in the Fpro-MGS corpus															
Categories	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	mrāh “Woman”	1053	N	mwāṭnāt “Citizens”	22	P	mts‘ūdāt “Pretending to be Saudis” *P	11	N	mġflāt “Idiots”	8	N	mnṭḥlh “Impostor”	4	N
	s‘ūdīāt “Saudi women”	497	P	mġnsāh “Naturalised” *S	22	N	m‘īlh “Provider”	11	P	mḏṭhdh “oppressed” *S	8	N	šrīfh “Honourable” *S	4	P
	s‘ūdīh “Saudi woman”	407	P	ḥqūqīāt “Activists”	21	N	fāšlāt “Unsuccessful” *P	11	N	ḥārbh “Escaped” *S	8	N	fāšlh “Unsuccessful” *S	3	N
	nsā’ “Women”	379	P	mlḥdāt “Atheists”	20	N	ġāhlāt “Uneducated” *P	11	N	mwāṭnh “Citizen”	8	P	šī‘īh “Shiite”	3	N
	bnāt “Girls”	211	P	nswyh “Feminist”	19	N	mṭlqāt “Divorcees”	11	N	sīdh “Lady”	7	P	mṭḥrrh “Liberal”	3	N
	mṭālbāt “Campaigners”	114	N	mġndāt “Recruited” *P	18	N	‘zīzī “Darling”	11	N	m‘zzāt “dignified” *P	7	P	‘rbīāt “Arab Women”	2	N
	mslmh “Muslim”	82	P	rāfdīāt “Rafidis”	18	N	mlḥdh “Atheist”	11	N	mšrīh “Egyptian woman”	7	N	īhūdīh “Jew”	2	N
	ām “Mother”	76	P	rāšdh “Mature” *S	18	N	mkrmh “Dignified” *S	11	P	nāqṣāt “Deficient” *S	7	N	dā‘mh “Supporter”	1	N
	nswyāt “Feminists”	73	N	mzḷūmh “Oppressed” *S	17	P	mḥġbh “Hijabi”	11	P	mškīnh “Poor” *S	7	N	nšrānīh “Christian woman”	1	N
	ḥrh “Free woman”	62	P	‘ġūz “Old woman”	16	N	mḏṭhdāt “oppressed” *P	10	N	ḥrīm “Women”	7	N			

m'nfāt "Abused" *P	56	N	mnhrfāt "Immoral" *P	16	N	aṣīlh "true"*S	10	P	tāb'h "Dependent" *S	7	N			
bnt "Girl"	56	P	rāfḏīh "Rafidi"	16	N	ḥā'īnh "Traitor"	10	N	ḥfīdāt "Grandchildr en"	7	P			
fīāt "Girls"	52	N	āntā Female	16	P	mšrdāt "Homeless" *P	10	N	'mīlh "Agent"	7	N			
m'nfh "Abused" *S	50	N	ḡrbīāt "Western women"	16	N	ḥqūqīh "Activist"	10	N	'mīlāt "Agents"	7	N			
mrāhqāt "Teenagers "	45	N	qdūh "Role Modal"	16	P	šrīfāt "Honourable" *P	10	P	ḥāqdāt "Spiteful" *P	7	N			
fīāh "Girl"	43	P	'fīfāt "Virtuous" *P	15	P	mkrmāt "Dignified" *P	9	P	mstrḡlāt "Tomboys"	7	N			
mšūnh "Protected "*S	40	P	dktrūh "Doctor"	15	P	mtmrdāt "Rebels"	9	N	aḡnbīh "Foreigner"	6	N			
bnth "Daughter "	39	P	ūlīh "Guardian"	25	P	mrtdh "Apostate"	9	N	mšrdh "Homeless" *S	6	N			
zūḡth "Wife"	37	P	ḡāhlh "Uneducated" *S	14	N	mṭlqh "Divorcee"	9	P	'ātlāt "Unemploye d" *P	6	P			
mḡnsāt "Naturalise d" *P	35	N	ṣāḥbh "Holder / Owner"	13	N	'rbīh "Arabian woman"	9	P	mtmrdh "Rebel"	6	N			
āht "Sister"	34	P	nāṣṭh "Activist"	13	N	āṣīlāt "true"*P	9	P	ṣḥābīāt "Companion s"	6	P			
aḡnbīāt "Foreigner s"	33	N	ārāmāl "(the) widows"	13	N	rāṣdāt "Mature" *P	8	P	ansānh "Human"	6	P			
ībrālīāt "Liberals"	33	N	m'ārḏh "Opponent"	13	N	'fīfh "Virtuous" *S	8	N	ṭāhrāt "Pure"*P	5	P			

	mslmsāt “Muslims”	31	N	ḥqūqīh “Activist”	12	N	ġbīāt “Stupid” *P	8	N	ānsh “Miss”	5	N			
	ībrālīh “Liberal”	30	N	ḥā’īnāt “Traitors”	12	N	ġbīh “Stupid”*S	8	N	šmṭā “Crone”*S	5	N			
	āīrānīh “Iranian woman”	30	N	āmḥāt “Mothers”	12	P	a’lānīh “media person”	8	N	rbh “Head of household”	4	P			
	ḥkūkīāt “Activists”	28	N	ġrbyī western woman	12	N	ḥbībh “Lover”	8	P	’rāqīh “Iraqi woman”	4	N			
	mḥrdāt “Instigator s”	22	N	a’īāt “Aware” *P	11	P	āmīkīh “American woman”	8	N	mḥtrmh “Respected” *P	4	N			
	mtṭrfāt “Extremist s”	22	N	ḥwālī “Sisters”	17	P	šāḥbāt “Owners”	8	N	mḥrdh “Instigator”	4	N			
Nominated	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	Rawda	14	P	Fawzia	9	N	Amerah Al- ssa’edi”	6	P	Manal	5	N			
	Mariam”	12	N	Azizh	9	N	Saad “Al- shamri	5	N	Fatima	4	N			
	Badriah	11	N	Haia Al-khidr”	8	P	Roqaya	5	P						
Overdeterm ination	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	ġwārī “Odalisque s”	115	N	mst’bdh “Enslaved” *S	18	N	sāqtāt “Sl*ts”	12	N	ḍḥīh “Victim”	7	N	ālhywān ‘animal’	3	N
	drh “Pearl”	54	P	nbāḥ “Barking”	18	N	sl’h “Item / Goods”	10	N	’ālḥ “dependent”	6	N			
	’bdh “Slave”	28	N	’bdāt “Slaves”	15	N	sāqth “Sl*t”	10	N	am’h “Flunky”	6	N			
	ġārīh “Odalisque ”	20	N	mlkh “Queen”	12	P	mlkāt “Queens”	10	P	asīrh “Captive”	5	N			
	drr “pearls”	18	P	’āhrāt “Wh*res”	12	N	al-bhīmḥ “Beast”	9	N	bqr “Cows”	5	N			
Impersonali sed	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP

	ḥālāt “Cases”	46	N	ḥmālḥ “Campaign”	269	N	ṣūt “Voice”	43	N	al-nfs “Soul”	71	N	asm “Name”	172	N
	mu’āmrh “Conspiracy”	8	N	tḡrīdāt “Tweets”	39	N	aṣwāt “Voices”	22	N	‘ql “Mind”	60	P	ḥqwq righths	130	N
	mšklḥ “Problem”	8	N	tḡrīdh “Tweet”	27	N	mqaṭ’ “Clips”	14	N	rūskn “Your heads”	27	N	asmā’ “Names”	33	N
	ftnh “trouble”	5	N	f’l “Action”	25	N	brqīḥ “telegram”	9	N	ḡsd “Body”	19	N	ḥyāt life	14	N
	ḥālḥ “Case”	5	N	qdf “Defamation”	25	N				blsān “Tongues”	17	N	Mšākl issues	6	N
				ṣīāḥ “shouting”	23	N							krāmī dignity	4	N
				qṣṣ “Stories”	18	N							ḥwyī identity	3	N
				blāḡ “Report”	12	N							mšyr fate	3	N
				tūrḥ “Revolution”	11	N							sm’ī reputation	3	N
				ṣrāḥ “Scream”	11	N									
				ndūḥ “Seminar”	11	N									
				ḥrāk “Movement”	10	N									
				d’wāt “calls”	8	N									
				al-štm “Insult”	8	N									
				ndwāt “Seminars”	6	N									
				fāz “utterance”	6	N									
Representations of women in the Mpro-MGS corpus															
Categories	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	mrāḥ “Woman”	771	P	‘āṭlāt “Unemployed” *P	23	N	mlḥdh “Atheist”	11	N	qdūḥ “Role model”	6	N			
	nsā’ “Women”	256	P	mḡflāt “Idiots”	23	N	ībrālīāt “Liberals”	10	N	ībrālīḥ “Liberal”	6	N			

s'ūdīh "Saudi woman"	175	P	m'nfāt "Abused" *P	22	P	ṭībāt "Good women"	10	P	ṭālbāt "Students"	5	P			
s'ūdīāt "Saudi Women"	164	P	āṣīlāt "true" *P	22	P	nāṣṭh "Activist"	10	N	rbāt "Heads of household"	5	P			
bnāt "Girls"	139	P	dkūrāt "Doctors"	20	P	mḥṣmh "Decent" *S	9	P	ānsh "Miss"	5	N			
mrāhqāt "Teenagers "	112	N	ḥkūkīāt "Activists"	20	N	mšārkāt "Participants"	9	N	āmīkīh "American woman"	3	N			
ḥrh "Free woman"	55	N	kātbh "Author"	18	P	mṣrīh "Egyptian woman"	9	N	mstqlh "Independen t" *S	2	P			
zūgh "Wife"	49	P	āmhāt "Mothers"	17	P	fāsdāt "Corrupted" *P	9	N	mšārk "Participant"	2	N			
m'nfh "Abused" *S	47	N	aḥwāī "My sisters"	17	P	ḥbītāt "Malignat" *P	9	N	aḡnbīh "Foreigner"	1	N			
mslmh "Muslim"	43	P	mzlmh "Oppressed" *S	16	P	nswyāt "Feminists"	9	N						
mṭlqāt "Divorcees "	37	N	m'zzh "dignified" *S	16	P	mu'mnh "Believer"	8	P						
mḡnsāt "Naturalise d" *P	36	N	ḥqūqīh "Activist"	15	N	mslmāt "Muslims"	8	P						
ārāml "Widows"	35	N	fāšlh "Unsuccessful" *S	14	N	mṭlqh "Divorcee"	7	P						
mḥrdāt "Instigator s"	30	N	ṣdīqāt "Friends"	14	N	dḥīlh "Outsider"	7	N						
fīāt "Girls"	29	N	ḡāhlh "Uneducated" *S	14	N	mḡnīh "Singer"	7	N						

	ām “Mother”	27	P	mṣūnh “protected” *S	13	P	m‘lmāt “Teachers”	7	P						
	fītā “Girl”	27	P	‘fifāt “Virtuous” *P	13	P	mnḥrfāt “Immoral” *P	6	N						
	bnt “Girl”	27	P	mkrmh “Dignified” *S	13	P	mḥāfzāt “Conservative s”	6	P						
	mṭālbāt “Campaign ers”	25	N	abnth “His daughter”	12	N	ṣāhbī “Holder / Owner”	6	N						
	ḡrbīh “Western woman”	24	N	mtḍrrāt “Harmed” *P	11	p	mmṭlh “Actress”	6	N						
Nominated	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	Nora	19	N												
	Mariam Alotaibi	11	N												
Overdeterm ination	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	ḡwārī “Obliques”	84	N	mst‘bdh “Enslaved” *S	11	N	‘āhrh “Wh*re”	6	N						
	sāqth “Sl*ṭ”	19	N	sl‘h “Item / Goods”	11	N	ṣḥādḥ “Beggar”	5	N						
	‘nz “Goat”	16	N	‘bdh “Slave”	9	N	bḥīmḥ “Beast”	5	N						
	ḡārīh “Oblique”	16	N	drh “Pearl”	9	P	‘ūrḥ “(the) forbidden entity”	3	P						
Impersonali sed	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP	Actors	Freq	SP
	ḥālāt “Cases”	22	N	al-ḥmlh “Campaign”	225	N	brqīh “telegam”	20	N	nfs “The soul”	47	N	ḥqwq rights	105	N
				al-d‘ūh “call”	31	N	ṣūt “Voice”	8	N	nfūs “Souls”	27	N	asm “Name”	30	N
				qsh “Story”	19	N				blsān “Tongue”	9	N	asmā’ “Names”	21	N

			ṣīāḥ “Shouting”	17	N				qlb “Heart”	9	N	a‘rād “chastity ”	9	N
			qṣṣ “Stories”	16	N							krāmī dignity	4	N
			d‘wāt “calls”	15	N							mšākl issues	2	N
			tūrḥ “Revolution”	5	N									

Appendix H: Integrated discourses in the four most frequent discourses in the anti-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Religious discourses			
Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=309, 17%)		Manti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=451, 34%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Media	16	Women's rights in Islam	48
Judaism	15	Policy	19
Political	13	Reflective campaign	13
Reflective campaign	11	Reflective anti-campaign	7
Education	11	Political	4
Policy	10	Liberalism	4
History	10	Judaism & history	4
Policy, political & media	3	Judaism	2
Reflective anti-campaign	2		
Conspiracy	2		
Total integrated instances	93	Total integrated instances	101
Total non-integrated instances	216	Total non-integrated instances	350
Policy discourses			
Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=298, 17%)		Manti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=182, 14%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Political	47	Political	21
Education	22	Religion	5
Reflective anti-campaign & religious	7	Reflective anti-campaign	1
Education & media	4	International policy & slavery	1
Saudi women's rights	4		
Media	4		
Religion	1		
Total integrated instances	89	Total integrated instances	28
Total non-integrated instances	209	Total non-integrated instances	154
Media discourses			
Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=278, 16%)		Manti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=192, 15%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Reflective campaign	122	Saudi women's rights	23
Saudi women's rights	44	Reflective campaign	22

Policy	20	Religion & policy	5
Reflective campaign & anti-campaign	13	National identity	2
Reflective anti-campaign	10	Saudi women's rights & international politics	2
Policy & political	9	Policy & Saudi women's rights	1
Reflective campaign & religious	9	Policy	1
Religion	4		
Women's rights in Islam	4		
Judaism & reflective campaign	3		
Political	2		
Total integrated instances	240	Total integrated instances	56
Total non-integrated instances	38	Total non-integrated instances	136
Political discourses			
Fanti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=256, 14%)		Manti-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=165, 13%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Saudi women's rights	34	Policy	48
Policy	27	Policy, Saudi women's rights & religion	20
Media	25	Religion	16
Religion	19	Policy & Saudi women's rights	11
International policy	15	Media	9
Other women's rights	8	Reflective campaign	4
Economics, policy & religion	7	Saudi & other women's rights	4
Policy & economics	6	Reflective aint-campaign & media	4
Economics & Saudi women's rights	6	Religion & policy	4
Policy & Saudi women's rights	4	Policy & media	4
Religion & policy	3	Saudi women's rights	3
Reflective campaign	3	Policy & economics	2
History	2	Economics	2
Total integrated instances	159	Total integrated instances	131
Total non-integrated instances	97	Total non-integrated instances	34

Appendix I: Integrated discourses in the four most frequent discourses in the pro-MGS intertextual sub-corpora

Religious discourses			
Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corporus (n=269, 18%)		Mpro-MGS intertextual sub-corporus (n=193, 23%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Reflective campaign	22	Reflective anti-campaign	11
Policy	20	Reflective campaign	8
Media	7	Conspiracy & media	7
Political	3	History	5
Political & media	2	Media & slavery	4
Conspiracy	1	Other women's rights	4
Saudi women's rights	1	Media	3
		Judaism & atheism	3
		Policy	3
		Political	3
Total integrated instances	56	Total integrated instances	51
Total non-integrated instances	213	Total non-integrated instances	142
Media discourses			
Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corporus (n=232, 16%)		Mpro-MGS intertextual sub-corporus (n=253, 30%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
Religion	29	Reflective campaign	44
Political & reflective campaign	22	Religion	27
Zionism	13	Policy	27
Policy	10	Withdrawal	22
Other women's rights	8	Judaism	11
Reflective campaign & anti-government	8	Liberalism	8
Saudi women's rights & other women's rights	7	Saudi women's rights	8
Saudi women's rights	7	Political, reflective campaign & conspiracy	6
Policy & religious	7	Saudi women's rights & other women's rights	6
Reflective campaign & Saudi women's rights	6	Other women & women's rights in Islam	6
Reflective campaign	6	policy & reflective campaign	5
National identity	6	Education	5
Conspiracy	4	Conspiracy & reflective campaign	5
Conspiracy & Saudi women's rights	4	Anti-government & reflective campaign	4

International political & media	3	International policy	3
Anti-government & conspiracy	3	Political & reflective campaign	3
Political	2	Political	2
Political & national identity	2	Security & reflective campaign	2
		Media	2
Total integrated instances	147	Total integrated instances	196
Total non-integrated instances	85	Total non-integrated instances	57
Other women's rights discourses			
Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=141, 10%)		Mpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=85, 10%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
International policy	34	Media	36
Media	32	International policy & media	5
International policy, conspiracy & Judaism	10	Shia & atheism	3
International political, Saudi women's & other women's rights	9	Education & liberalism	2
International political & media	7	Religion & international politics	2
International policy & Saudi women's rights	6		
International politics	4		
International policy & media	3		
Christendom	2		
Shia women	2		
Media & other women's rights	2		
Withdrawal	1		
Total integrated instances	112	Total integrated instances	48
Total non-integrated instances	29	Total non-integrated instances	37
Reflective campaign discourses		Political discourses	
Fpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=311, 21%)		Mpro-MGS intertextual sub-corpus (n=104, 12%)	
Integrated discourses	Occurrence	Integrated discourses	Occurrence
National identity	45	Conspiracy & media	37
Conspiracy	27	Conspiracy	20
Advertising	21	Media	10
Judaism & media	20	Economics, conspiracy & Saudi women's rights	5

Anti-government	12	Reflective campaign & media	4
Atheism	12	Religion	4
Religious & liberalism	12	Conspiracy, reflective campaign & media	2
Withdrawal	11	Reflective campaign	2
National identity & media	11		
Anti-government & national identity	8		
Religion & international policy	7		
National identity & Other women's rights	5		
Policy	5		
Reflective anti-campaign	3		
Judaism	3		
Education	3		
Media & other women's rights	2		
Liberalism	2		
Other women's rights & religion	2		
Anti-government & other women's rights	2		
Total integrated instances	213	Total integrated instances	84
Total non-integrated instances	98	Total non-integrated instances	20