

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRISIS IN THE SUDAN 1973-1985

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the political economy of the Sudan to reveal the nature and causes of the 1973-85 particular crisis in that country. The 1973-85 crisis is placed within the historical context of recurrent crises which have characterised the independent Sudan. It is argued that political and economic crises have occurred over the period 1956-1985 and several common features of these crises can be identified to constitute general political and economic trends. In their turn, they have characterized the general crisis since independence in 1956.

The general crisis facing the Sudan is an organic crisis of transformation. Twenty nine years have elapsed between the Sudan becoming independent and 1985, the end of the period under study. The problems of transforming the inherited colonial economy and structures have remained on the national agenda since then, without resolution.

The study of the colonial political and economic legacy provided an important component of the thesis as it reflected on the process of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production and the pre-capitalist modes of production which had prevailed in the country before the re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Political, institutional and market inter-relationship affected the nature of the Sudanese economy, class structure and class struggle. The nature of the colonial state as an authoritarian and relatively autonomous state left its features in the political economy of the country.

In trying to understand the crisis both in its particular and general manifestations the thesis examines the nature of the post-colonial state and its historical development. The colonial heritage of the country and the concrete class struggle gave the post-colonial state its nature and constituted its crisis. In revealing the nature of the post-colonial state a ruling power bloc is identified. That power bloc was composed of the religious and tribal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the military and civilian bureaucracy.

The thesis argues that the crisis of the post-colonial state is a crisis of hegemony. The failure of the dominant power bloc, a fraction or a class of it to establish its hegemony is the main cause of the crisis of the state and the particular form of that crisis: the military-civilian governments alterance in power.

The post-colonial state's ability to use coercion was legitimately limited and its tendency towards authoritarianism was challenged by the urban democratic movement and the effective regional forces, especially the Southern Sudanese. The politics of ethnic conflicts were closely related to the composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern, and of Arab Islamic culture. It was in the politics of ethnic conflicts that coercion was widely used against the Southern people. The civil war which struck the country twice contributed to the crisis of the post-colonial state.

The essence of crisis of the economy is found in the crisis of agricultural production both in its irrigated and rain-fed sub-sectors. Though the nature of the crisis in both sectors is found in the process of articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes, the result of the articulation process is different in both sub-sectors.

Within this context the particular 1973-85 crisis is studied. The particular crisis is a continuation of the general post-colonial crisis, yet distinguishable. The military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which dominated the state during the 1973-85 period failed to establish its hegemony and ruled the country through an authoritarian state. The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup d'état was a turning point in the history of the Nimeiri regime. The National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening the base of the regime. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 did not promote the regime's quest for legitimacy and remained to be an additional tool of repression.

The study of the economic crisis of 1973-85 revealed that it was a continuation of the general crisis, as well as a particular crisis of simple and extended reproduction that resulted from specific policies of the regime. The regime failed to transform the structure of the economy. Despite the expansion, the economy remained unevenly developed, export-oriented, with weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages; liable to be severely affected by international crises and moderately benefiting from international booms.

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The department of Politics, the African Studies Unit and the Development Centre had provided the atmosphere for developing my ideas and exchanging views with high calibre scholars. I find myself greatly indebted to Dr. Ray Bush, Professor Lionel Cliffe and Dr. David Bell. No one can pass through the Department Office without feeling the friendliness and efficiency of Alex, Loraine and Shella.

This work would not have been possible without the kind support of my family: Ekhlas, Nada and Ahmed, to whom my thanks and love remain.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACR: Africa Contemporary Record, edited by Colin Legum and published annually by the African Publishing Corporation, New York and Rex Collins, London.

DUP: The Democratic Unionist Party

FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.

F.O.: the Foreign Office in London.

GGAR: governor-general Annual Report which was an annual report on the finance, administration and conditions of the Sudan presented to the Governments of the Condominium and published thereafter by her Majesty's Stationary Office on behalf of the Sudan Government.

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HADTW: Al Harka al Democratya lil Tahrur al Watanie, (The Democratic Movement for National Liberation).

HASTW: Al Harkha al Sudanya lil Tahrur al Watanie, (The Sudanese Movement for National Liberation)

IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ILO: International Labour Organisation.

IMF: International Monetary Fund

NRO: National Record Office

NUP: The National Unionist Party

PDP: The Peoples' Democratic Party

RFACS: Reports on the Finance, Administration and Conditions of the Sudan, annual reports presented by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the subject to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who in turn submitted to the Parliament.

SAD: Sudan Archives in Durham University, England.

SCP: The Sudan Communist Party.

SRO: Sudan Records Office, Khartoum.

SSU: The Sudanese Socialist Union.

SWTUF: Sudan Workers Trade Unions' Federation.

GLOSSARY

Ansar = followers of al Mahdi

Asiqa = brothers

Baraka = blessing

effendia (plural of effendi) = a word of Turkish origin for government officials

feddan = 1.038 acres

Jallaba = Merchants (literally: who bring the goods).

Kadi = judge.

Khalwas = school for the teaching of Koran.

Lubia = Dolichos lablab.

Mandub = representative/ delegate.

Mamur = administrative assistant to the district commissioner.

Mudir = commissioner of a province.

Mufti = Islamic scholar appointed by the Government to advice the people and the administration on religious matters.

Muhajirin = Migrants.

Murtazaga = mercenaries.

Shail = local system of money lending to farmers and peasants in rural Sudan.

Sharafi (pl) = tribal chiefs

Sheikh = tribal leader/notable/religious person.

Sirdar = commander-in-chief


Sulatin (pl) = tribal chiefs

Tariqa = religious sect

Ulema = Islamic Scholars.

Wakeel = representative.

MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN



ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS BY REGION PROVINCE AND DISTRICT 1983




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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"...there are some things in sensation which do not stimulate the intelligence to inquiry because the judgement of sensation is satisfactory, and others which positively insist upon the intelligence inquiring into them because the sensation gives no satisfactory result."(Socrates in The Republic, Plato:1984, 216).

1.1.An Overview

Sudan became an independent republic on 1st January 1956. For the following next years a democratic parliamentary system was established under the First Republic. The Second Republic was established in November 17th 1958 when the military took power and it lasted for six years. The military and Second Republic were overthrown by a popular uprising on October 21st 1964, known among the Sudanese and in the literature as the October Revolution. After the Revolution, a transitional government led the country in the Third Republic in which a democratic system was re-installed. Four years were to pass before on May 25th 1969, Colonel Gaffar Mohamed Nimeiri led a coup d'etat establishing the Fourth Republic, known as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The Nimeiri's Republic remained in place for 16 years. It was overthrown through a joint action of a popular uprising, beginning on March the 26th 1985, and a coup d'etat concluding the uprising on 6th April on the same year.

The alternate military-civilian regimes were not the only political feature of the Sudan, before and after Nimeiri. Civil war was a second striking feature. On the eve of the independence a short and limited mutiny took place among the forces of the Southern Corps stationed in Toriet, Southern Sudan on August 16th 1955. Since then civil war has twice struck the Sudan.

A third important feature of the post-colonial Sudan has been economic crises. It has been observed that each civilian military alterance in the country was preceded by economic crises (Kaballo:1988,21-30). The longest and deepest crisis was that of 1973-85 which was the inspiration for the research that has led to the writing of this thesis. The choice of the 1973-1985 as the period of the study is justified by the fact that by 1973 the specific features of the particular crisis of the Nimeiri regime began to gather momentum slowly and disguised at first, and fast, deeply and apparent in the second half of the seventies and the early eighties. The choice of the period 1973-85 is also justified by the length, extent, and intensity of the 1973-85 Crisis which was one of the longest compared to the previous crises of 1957-58, 1963-64 and 1967-69.

Chapter 6 discusses this assertion in detail. the manifestations of the 1973-85 crisis are reviewed in Chapter 4, while Chapters 5 attempts an analysis of the historical process of the 1973-85 crisis: how it occurred and gathered momentum, the forces that contributed

to the process and the policies that led to it and deepened it. Chapter 5 further attempts to disclose the specific nature of the crisis of the state and the economy during that period.

1.2. The Research Problem

The fall of Nimeiri brought the hope to most of the Sudanese people that their problems might come to an end. Hence wide democratic discussions began just after his fall on the issues of the crisis facing the country and their resolution. More emphasis and greater effort was given and put on the discussions on the economic crisis suffered during the Nimeiri regime. It was in response and as continuation of those efforts that the problem of this research has been formulated. As I carried out research on the economic crisis and was involved in public discussions on the nature and causes of the economic crisis 1973-1985 (Kaballo:1985), I became increasingly aware that to further the understanding of that crisis one has to set a different research problematic and scope.

Notwithstanding the important insights one can acquire by trying to understand that particular crisis by limiting its analysis to the scope of economics and to the period in which it had been manifest, I have become convinced that the restricted level of inquiry is unsatisfactory in revealing the causes of the crisis and its continuation for a long period. Two key issues are of relevance in studying the crisis, if a better understanding is to be achieved.

The first is the interrelation between the economic and the political in the crisis. It can be seen that there was simultaneous and sequential occurrence of economic and political crises since the independence of the Sudan. This observation is subjected to thorough analysis in chapter 3. It has also been observed that the post-colonial state in the Sudan continued to be central to the economic system of the country on the different levels of production, distribution and accumulation through the direct ownership of means of production and the acquisition of surplus, through the economic and financial policies in affecting distribution and allocation of resources and through the administrative measures in controlling the economic activities of different classes in the Sudan. In general the post-colonial state is observed to be central in the process of capital accumulation and the reproduction of the economic system. Chapter 3 highlights that important role of the post-colonial state in the economy.

This has brought the study of the state to the very centre of the research problem and has broadened the scope of the research from that of pure economics, where the main problematic is the study of economic phenomena, to one of political economy, where the problematic is the study social relations including economic and political relations in a concrete socio-economic structure, that is in a social formation.

The second issue is that of the historical dimension of the study. The need for a historical analysis has arisen, not simply as a matter of time series analysis and statistical verification of the existence or non-existence of a trend or a set of trends that discloses the interrelation of variables and/or events, but by trying to understand the phenomena in

their development, the phenomenon as its history. It is not only the question of the phenomena in isolation from each other, but also as expressions of objective elements in their interrelations: as systems that are assumed to be better understood in their historical development. This led the research to go deep into the colonial legacy, not in search for an apology or for escape goat to justify the crisis of the state and the economy; but rather to identify the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the process of formation of the Sudanese socio-economic structure. Chapter 2 provides such an attempt by analytically reviewing the colonial legacy. The analysis is further continued in Chapter 3 to focus on these elements of continuity and discontinuity after the independence and up to the coming of Nimeiri to power.

Such a historical approach makes the analysis of continuity and discontinuity, as well as the distinction between the general and particular, possible. It is also possible through historical analysis to distinct the particular as being a moment of condensation or eruption of the general. This led to re-formulate the problem of the research to be the study of the 1973-85 crisis in its historical context.

The re-formulated problem, suggests a different approach. This different approach is not to simply assimilate several different disciplines,(the bringing together politics, economics, history and sociology), but it is attempting a different level of enquiry that of political economy.

1.3. Some Conceptual Problems

The use of several categories in this thesis is not governed by a pre-determined rigid theoretical model of explanation, (except in the sense that the methodology used in the research is based on a theory of knowledge, a model of enquiry). Though the concepts and categories of political economy are used, they are used as the starting point whenever the abstraction from reality has made it necessary. The continuation of their use has been determined by their ability to express an element or a " relation of a... whole, which already existed historically" (Marx: 1976, 34). In other words categories have been defined in relation to objective reality and not the contrary.

1.3.1. On the concept of Crisis

Crisis is defined in language as "*turning-point in illness, life history, time of difficulty danger of anxiety about the future,..*" (Oxford Advanced Dictionary, 1985, 204.) Stern returns the word to its Greek origin '*Krisis*' where it means "to separate or divide", "to sift, to decide' and that crises in ancient Greece were "moments of truth when significance of and events were brought to light" (Stern, 1970, 9). Crisis is introduced by Hypocrite to characterise "the turning point in a disease when death or recovery hangs" (Rader, 1979, 187). According to Habermas the linking of crisis to illness made the concept familiar within medicine before its use in social science (Habermas, 1976,). O'Connor noticed that " 'economic crisis' as well as 'moral crisis' and 'spiritual crisis' were common as early

as the seventeenth century, but their meanings were vague and their status in social and political thought was weak" (1987, 108). By the eighteenth century the concept was related to the problems of nation building (Ibid., 108). Stern showed that historians used the term to describe "critical moments when national character and institutions were thought to have been decisively tested" (1971,9). Andre Gunder Frank summed the definition using the medical analogy:

"... crisis is a period in which a diseased social, economic, and political body cannot live on as before and is obliged, on pain of death, to undergo transformation that will give it a new lease on life" (1981,111)

The basic problem that faces one in searching for a relevant theoretical definition and explanation for the crisis, is the state of fragmentation of the social sciences. The crisis is either dealt with as economic crisis, political crisis or social crisis (as the area of the research of sociology). Such a state of fragmentation and specialisation makes it difficult to grasp social reality in its complexity as a whole. The state of fragmentation and specialisation in social sciences has arisen to satisfy the needs of a dominant mode of production in a relatively stable social formation (the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society). The role of social sciences under such society is the justification and promotion through reform and maintenance of the established order of things. A theory of crisis in this context attempts partial explanation of 'what went wrong' rather than a comprehensive questioning of the social foundation of the whole system. The latter was achieved by bourgeois science before and during the bourgeois revolutions (the role of the thinkers and scientists of the Renaissance and the classical political economists, including the Physiocrats, Adam Smith and Ricardo) when they challenged the foundation of the feudal and pre-capitalist systems. The new trends in social science began by what Marx described as 'vulgar economists', but within the context provided here, any social formation has or should have its 'vulgar' social science. The role of that 'vulgar science' is not only to justify, as asserted by some radical critics, but also to maintain, remedy and develop the socio-economic system (and that why it could be described as science and not pure ideology). In that context the different theories of crisis in the fragmented social sciences, have a limited role in studying social formations which are facing an organic or structural crisis, a crisis of transformation. Castells define the structural crisis as a situation when:

"it becomes impossible to expand or reproduce the system without transforming or reorganisation of the basic characteristics of production distribution and management and their expression in terms of social organisation." (1980, 80).

This is similar to the definition of organic crisis provided by Gramsci and his disciples, "An organic crisis is a crisis of the whole system" (Forgacs, 1988, 427). The question remains on how the crisis of the whole develops. Since the whole is not just the arithmetic sum of its elements, but rather the interrelation of these elements, a partial crisis, (a crisis of one element), might trigger the crisis of the whole (of the system or structure). An

organic crisis in its development might also results in a chain of particular crises whether particularity is concerning its time limit or its partiality (economic, political, ... etc).

The distinction that Gramsci made between organic movements, which are relatively permanent and conjectural which "appear as occasional, immediate, almost accidental" (Gramsci, 1971, 177), is very important in distinguishing organic crisis which "sometimes lasting for decades" and gives "rise to socio-historic criticism" (Ibid., 178) from conjectural crisis that might be political of "minor, day-to-day character" (Ibid., 177). Despite this important distinction, Gramsci noticed the relation between conjectural phenomena and organic movements by specifying the dependency of the former on the latter (Ibid., 177). This distinction is similar to the one suggested by Elmat Altvater between small and great crises. Altvater defines small crises as those "which only require adaptive processes within the given form of social production "and great crises as those " ..breaks of more or less important parts of the formal structure of social reproduction" (1984, 9-10). The latter definition is similar to that provided by Connell for transitional crisis of the whole which results from "the coming together of crisis of tendencies in a number of substructures" (1979,253). Castells defines the structural crisis:

"What defines a situation of structural crisis is that it becomes impossible to expand or reproduce the system without a transformation or reorganisation of the basic characteristics of production, distribution and management, and their expression in terms of social organisation" (1980, 80)

The fragmented social sciences could only recognise this or that crisis tendency 'of substructure', small crises in Altvater words, conjectural phenomena in Gramsci's, as economic, political or social in dimension and periodical and short in time.¹

It is in the traditions of classical political economy (had tackled the question of transformation of pre-capitalist to capitalist modes of production) and Marxism (which assigned itself the task of refuting the eternity of the capitalist mode of production and provoking its revolutionary change), that a possibility of a theory of organic or structural crisis could be found. Both orthodox traditions could only provide the methodology of investigating the problems of transformation, rather than providing satisfactory explanation of these problems and their probable solutions.

These formulations help in this thesis to distinguish between particular crises and a general crisis. The particular crisis (which is particular in time and dimension) is one that is resolvable within the existing socio-economic system (or at least having its effects moderated). The general crisis, on the other hand, is an organic or structural crisis that requires restructuring the socio-economic formation, a task uncompleted in the modern Sudan. This view is similar to that expressed by Basil Davidson on the African crisis:

¹I have benefited from a personal discussion with Peter Lawrence of Keele University about the problem of time in the definition and concept of crisis. The discussion took place during a ROAPE conference in Coventry University in 1990.

"Africa's real problems are those of a period of major transition from systems of development viable in the pre-colonial past to other systems, similarly viable, which can face the challenges of the future..."

"The crisis which thus arises is, therefore, one of institutions. Those of the past have lost their continuing power. Those of the present offer little save confusion. Those of the future have yet to appear." (1974, 6)

A similar identification of the crisis is presented by Onimode:

"... this is a crisis of system and structure, and the profound institutional failure is beyond the remedial power of any more modification or reform, since the system or systems as they stand simply do not work and cannot be made to work" (1988, 2)

In situations where a general crisis prevails the particular crisis tends to manifest a moment of condensation of the general crisis, and hence attempts to resolve it might only result in moderating the effects of the general crisis.

1.3.2. The State

The category of 'colonial state', used in Chapter 2 in this thesis², expresses the colonial state that was found in the Sudan from 1898-1954. It was a construction of a concrete reality and not a colonial state as such, an abstraction expressing a general phenomenon. This approach enables us to qualify some theoretical statements like that of Alavi's, one of which states that the basis of the colonial state lies "in the metropolitan structure", (1972, 61). By arguing in Chapter 2 that the specific colonial state in the Sudan had been a product of the Condominium Agreement between Britain and Egypt in 1898 and that the Agreement had created a situation in which the colonial state enjoyed a relative autonomy, it is shown that the relation is not as simple and direct as has been suggested by Alavi. The colonial state in the Sudan stands as historical evidence to confirm that, "the colonial state cannot be reduced simply to that of a loyal minister of capital" as Lonsdale and Berman have stated (Lonsdale and Berman: 1973, 484). Chapter 2 argues that the members of the "political service" in the condominium era were able to achieve a relative autonomy from both of the condominium powers and the Sudanese society. The tendency to preserve the relative autonomy of the colonial state had motivated most of the policies that contributed to the formation of the colonial and post-colonial Sudanese socio-economic structure.

This led to take the colonial state as the starting point, which contradicts the approach suggested by Colin Leys: "*In order to understand the significance of any state for class struggle we must start out from the class struggle, not the state.*" (Leys: 1976, 43).

In ex-colonies like the Sudan, one needs to go back to the colonial state and its policies of economic and political articulation to understand the classes and their struggle and hence the post-colonial state. The inquiry, in this research, takes the sequence State-Classes and Class Struggle -State. The understanding of the post-colonial state requires both the

²In a footnote to that Chapter, it is explained why Sudan is treated in the thesis as a colony despite the fact that it was never part of the British Colonial Office and legally speaking it was under a condominium rule of Britain and Egypt.

studies of the colonial state and the class struggle before and after independence. That line of inquiry leads to a similar position from that of Lonsdale and Berman that "the articulation of modes of production must form the basis for any theoretical analysis for the colonial state" (op. cite., 489). In order to avoid a reduction of the colonial state to one of the causes of its establishment or to one of the results of its policies, it is important to differentiate between the international and local levels of articulation of the modes of production and their interrelationship. It is hence becomes clear that the articulation of the modes of production on the local level is central in understanding the colonial legacy, (the socio-economic structure that resulted from the colonial period, and in that context the post-colonial state). The study and analysis of the articulation of modes of production at both the local and international level become therefore, essential for the study of the post-colonial state, as well as being the basis for a theoretical analysis of the colonial state itself. The point is that the colonial state was not a result of the articulation of the modes of production in the colony, but was its initiator. It had continued holding the rein of its progress until independence. The articulation of modes of production in the previous colonies was a creation of colonial power and was not an internal historical development of the societies of these colonies. The articulation was possible because of the relative autonomy of the colonial state from the colonised societies and its authoritarian nature. The particular situation of the colonial state in the Sudan created the base for the relative autonomy from both the colonised society and the colonial powers and that was reflected in the articulation policies that had shaped the economy and the class structure of the Sudan.

The articulation process, as argued below, is not an internal process only. It involved an important international dimension: the articulation of the economy of the colony as a whole (and on regional and sector levels) with the international capitalist economy in general and the metropolitan capitalist economy in particular. This justifies the continued influence of the metropolitan country and the international capital on the post-colonial state. That influence does not qualify the argument that the post-colonial state by definition is a puppet or even has its economic base abroad. The question becomes the common interests of the ruling classes in the post-colonial state and those of foreign capital and the interrelation developed between the particular national economy and the world capitalist system. It is within this frame of the articulation of the international and local economies that the policies and foreign relations of the post-colonial state in the Sudan were discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Saying that does not exclude that there were interests for some countries in the Sudan regarding its strategic geopolitical position in the region. Chapter 3 provides an example of such interests of the United States which brought the Sudan in the focus of the US foreign policy before 1969. The question is also discussed in Chapter 5 when the argument for new economic interests in the Sudan is stated.

1.3.3. The Relative Autonomy of the State

The concept of 'relative autonomy' of the state is used in this thesis to mean that a state is performing "its functions in a relatively independent manner vis-à-vis the dominant classes and also vis-à-vis the other dominated classes, that is vis-à-vis 'the civil society' in Marx terms" (Thomas: 1984, 67). It is differentiated here between the relative autonomy of the colonial state from the colonised society and that of the colonial power, and a relative autonomy of a 'national' state from its own society. The former depends on the structure of the colonised societies, their response to the process of colonisation; and the colonial power(s) and the sort of administration they established to administer the colonies, the policies they had used in articulating or incorporating forces, systems and modes of production in order to achieve their colonial goals. The specific case of the colonial state in the Sudan, its relative autonomy and the policies it had adopted to achieve its goals are discussed in Chapter 2 below.

National states autonomy, on the other hand, is either a product of authoritarianism or hegemony. The former could, by analogy, be compared with the Bonapartist model. Miliband had rightly stated that Bonapartism

" is not the religion of the bourgeoisie at all- it is a last resort in conditions of political instability so great as to present a threat to the maintenance of the existing social order, including of course the system of domination which is the central part of that order". (Miliband:1973, 91).

On the same line, one can argue that authoritarianism in general is not the religion of the Sudanese power bloc, though the authoritarian model was used as "a last resort". The Abboud's coup d'etat which was organised mainly by the elected prime minister in November 1958, and discussed in Chapter 3, is an attempt to construct such a model. In that sense 'relative autonomy' arises as a reflection to the absence of a hegemonic class or a fraction of a class, as a manifestation of a crisis and as an attempt to resolve the crisis. The form it takes depend on the historical conditions that make it an option. National state relative autonomy may take the form of a military dictatorship or a civilian one (which is a result of a constitutional coup d'etat) which either concentrates power in a president or a single party.

1.3.4. The Concept of Hegemony

By contrast the other kind of relative autonomy rises as a result of the hegemony of a ruling class which because of its established hegemony does not need to control the state directly. In such a situation a state not only appears as the state of all the civil society, but performs like one, though on the basis of the rules of the game set in the process of establishing the hegemony of the dominant class. Gramsci pointed out that,

"..the fact of hegemony presupposes account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed" (Gramsci: 1971, 161)

The results of this process are not determined solely by the dominant class. Hegemony is established in the course of class struggle. In that context the relatively autonomous state "seeks to implement and guarantee the collective interests of all members of a class society dominated by capital" (Offe:1984, 120). The base of the relative autonomy, in this sense, is the acceptance by ordinary people, from the dominant and dominated classes, of a set of 'rules of the game'; i.e. their recognition of the legitimacy of the political system. In other words relative autonomy is based on hegemony and not just domination, consensus and not mere coercion. The role of ideology in establishing this process is great, not only as 'false consciousness' for the dominated classes, but as an ideological discourse which incorporates some aspects of the ideology of the dominated classes. Compromises are made both on the ideological as well as the economical level. Laclau writes:

"A class is hegemonic not so much to the extent that it is able to impose a uniform conception of the world on the rest of society, but to the extent that it can articulate different vision of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralised." (Laclau: 1977, 161).

When relative autonomy of the state is based on the hegemony of the ruling class/, it becomes a symptom of political stability. The relative autonomous state is the best in performing the rule of the bourgeois state as "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" to use Marx and Engels' expression, Miliband qualifies the concept, however, in this way:

"..the notion of common affairs assumes the existence of particular ones, and the notion of the whole bourgeoisie implies the existence of separate elements which make up that whole. This being the case, there is an obvious need for an institution of the kind they refer to, namely the state; and the state cannot meet this need without enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. In other words, the notion of autonomy is embedded in definition itself, is an intrinsic part of it."(Miliband: 1973, 85, fn 4).

The need of the ruling class for such a relatively autonomous state is not only to mediate and articulate the interests of the fractions of the dominant class among themselves, but to assist in the establishment of their hegemony over the dominated classes and civil society as a whole. The concept of hegemony becomes important in the analysis of political stability and/or instability and of the crisis of the state.

It is necessary, however, to differentiate here between the economic and political domination of a social class, a fraction of a social class or a social bloc of several classes. Economic domination is determined in the field of production, exchange and distribution, but the reproduction of this economic domination, in a class society does not depend on the reproduction of goods and services alone, it requires the reproduction of a system of social relations, including the relations of production themselves, that is the reproduction of the social formation as a whole. In class societies, classes struggle among themselves and against each other in their attempt to destroy, alter, change, or reproduce the system of social relations whether the economic, political, legal, cultural... etc., in order to achieve new or more material and non-material benefits or to preserve and enhance

existing ones. Political domination enables a class or fraction or a bloc of classes to influence the direction of the reproduction of the social formation, including, of course, the production system and its dominant mode of production or articulated modes of production, whether towards radical change, reform or preservation. The economically dominant class becomes a ruling power, a politically dominant class; but political domination could only be achieved at a moment in history when a class or a fraction of class,

"can arouse, in itself and in the masses, a moment of enthusiasm in which it associates and mingles with society in general identify itself with it, and felt and recognised as a general representative <emphasis in the origin>, of this society...It is only in the name of general interests that a particular class can claim supremacy." (Marx:1956, 179).

To extend that moment, a politically dominant class needs to establish its hegemony, its "ideological predominance over subordinated classes", (Miliband: 1969, 162), to practice its intellectual and moral leadership (Gramsci: 1971, 48). This is a process, Miliband shows, which involves " a permanent and pervasive effort" and to which a multitude of agencies and individuals contribute. Nun noticed that,

"classical Marxist proposition to which representative democracy is the form of government which most closely corresponds to the interests of the bourgeoisie depends on ...the consolidation ..of its hegemonic supremacy, its development of a metaphysical justification of its leading rule, and its efficacy as a ruling class." (Nun, 1970 ,334).

Chapter 3 argues that the Sudanese bourgeoisie was not the dominant class at the eve of independence, both economically and politically and that its intellectuals lost the initiative in organising the masses and establishing their intellectual and ideological leadership. After the rejection of their first demands which they had presented to the colonial state in 1942; their response instead of adopting a strategy of mass mobilisation and organisation, was to retreat seeking the support of the religious and tribal aristocrats and making use of the contradictions between the two condominium states, Egypt and Britain. They lost the historical opportunity of establishing their political, intellectual and ideological leadership. It is also argued in Chapter 2 and 3 that the Sudanese bourgeoisie intellectuals, the product of the colonial education policy, failed to formulate an ideological discourse that would enable them to mobilise the masses, especially after achieving independence.

Political stability under authoritarian states is not thus a product of the hegemony of the ruling class/. Political stability under such states depends on the acceptance of the economically dominant class/ of the rule of the authoritarian state either as direct representative of their interests or as guardian, a 'master', or an arbitrator; that is accepting its relative autonomy for the sake of the reproduction of socio-economic system. That does not necessarily guarantee the acceptance of the dominated classes,

which are to be repressed through the destruction of their independent organisations, the use of coercion and the spread of an ideology of fear.³

The process of establishing a hegemony of an economically dominant class becomes more difficult and complex where and when the dominated classes are independently organised and their intellectuals produce a counter ideological discourse. Class struggle intensifies in such cases and the possibility of authoritarian state increases (Thomas:1984, 82). That was the case in the Sudan in 1956-69 as Chapter 3 argues. The tendency towards authoritarianism within the different factions of the ruling power bloc is attributed to their intention go establish their domination by destroying independent mass organisation, i.e trade union, students unions, ..etc., and to impose the unity of the power bloc; that is to achieve by coercion what they had failed to achieve through consensus. The problem remains that the success of the authoritarian state itself depends on its ability to stand up to the challenges set by the dominated classes; that is its ability to suppress or incorporate the independent organisations of the dominated classes or co-opt their leaders and to unify the power bloc. This might maintain some political stability for a while . Political stability in such condition does not deny the existence a crisis of hegemony , but it disguises it.

1.3.5. Hegemony and Legitimacy Crises

A crisis of hegemony is defined by Gramsci as a situation where the ruling class loses its authority on the masses because it

" has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses.., or because huge masses... have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward together demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution" (1971, 210).

A crisis of hegemony is, hence, a challenge from below to the authority of the ruling class and in that sense, it is an organic or structural crisis which involves the whole socio-economic system. The hegemony crisis involves by definition a state crisis because it includes a legitimacy crisis which is defined as:

"a crisis in which the allegiance needed if the dominant institutions are to function effectively is well below the level they actually receive." (Connolly,1984, 12).

While the hegemony crisis expresses the crisis of the ruling class or a power bloc, the legitimacy crisis is the crisis facing the state. Hence a legitimacy crisis may rise without a ruling class or power bloc faces a hegemony crisis. The development of a legitimacy crisis into a hegemony crisis depends on the response of the ruling class to the legitimacy crisis and its ability to reform the political system and the state apparatus, change the leading personnel or to adopt new policies in order to regain the legitimacy of the actions and decisions taken by or through them. Legitimacy crisis and its resolution is the product of

³:. By ideology of fear it is meant the state of mind created by a wide use of coercion,(detention, torture, extra-judicial execution...etc), which prevails among the masses under some authoritarian state; ie Chile after 1973, the Sudan after 1989..etc

social and class struggle. The transition from colonial to post-colonial states may lead to serious legitimacy crises because of the expectations of the people from their new rulers. People do not only expect a rise in their standards of living, but also expect a change in the way they are governed.

The rise and fall of civilian and /or military regimes could be understood in the context of the crises of hegemony and legitimacy. The crises of the state under both military and civilian regimes could be sought in the crisis of hegemony of the ruling class/ or fraction/s of them. It might take the specific form of a legitimacy crisis as was the case during Abboud's regime in 1964. The question remains as to why a crisis of hegemony or legitimacy rises and why it takes the form of civilian military alterance. The answer to such questions have to be sought in the concrete social and class structure and social and class struggle; i.e. in the historical process of political economic and social struggle. This is a basic theme through out this thesis.

1.3.6. Articulation and Class Structure

Class structure in post-colonial societies is the result of the policies of articulation that reshaped the socio-economic structure in the former colonies. That makes the study of class formations in such societies, if not equivalent to the study of articulation of the modes of production, at least derived from it. That is why a great part of Chapter 2 in this thesis is concerned with the policies and process of economic and political articulation.

The concept of the articulation of modes of production is used in this research to mean the interrelation of the capitalist mode of production with pre-capitalist modes of production mainly to serve the interests of capital owners. That is whether the interests of capital owners are achieved by the direct production and realisation of economic surplus, whatever form it takes, or the indirect production and realisation of that surplus through the insurance of a sustained supply of cheap labour power and/or raw materials, and ensured markets for commodities produced by that capitalist mode of production,(whether on a world scale or a national one). Chapter 2 discuss this process as it was carried in irrigated and rain-fed agriculture in the Sudan.

Articulation as a process of interrelation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, (Rey in Foster-Carter, 1978), has a multi-dimensional effect that gives capitalism its particular characteristics in the post-colonial societies. For example while capitalism in the developed countries developed the productive forces, in post-colonial societies this is not always the case where capitalist relations of production, (mainly capital-wage-labour relation), are found without any developed means of production, especially the tools of production. This has its effects on both the capitalist and working class and their level of discipline, organisation, consciousness...etc.

The articulation process suggests that the penetration of capitalist production in pre-capitalist modes does not necessarily follow the pattern described by Marx which was assumed to take two stages, in the first,

"Capitalist production makes the sale of products the main interest, at first *apparently without affecting the mode of production itself*. (italics not in the origin)." (Marx:1977, a, 36)

While in the second stage,

"whenever it takes root capitalist production destroys all forms of commodity production which are based on self-employment or merely on the sale of excess products as commodities." (Ibid. , 36).

In the second stage capital completes the generalisation of commodity production and transforms it all into capitalist production. Rey, has made this last statement a different third stage, with the qualification that no Third World country has reached it, (Foster-Carter, op. cite. ,56).⁴ Rey's concept of stages is mechanistic and assumes sequence of even development which might or might not take place. Instead different pattern of articulation are suggested as not exclusive. We identify four of these:

a) political articulation which subordinate the pre-capitalist modes of production through the incorporation of its politically and economically dominant social groups, stratum and class, the articulation of tribal and religious aristocracy in the Sudan is an example of that (Chapter 2),

b) institutional articulation which involves reorganisation, legislation and introducing managerial or administrative organs to capture, control and achieve the goals of the articulated system, the Gezira Scheme in Sudan is a good example,(see Chapter 2 below),

c) the articulation through exchange, which is not only a relation between merchant and commercial capital and the pre-capitalist producers (peasants, nomads craftsmen and women, the latter is very important where most of the domestic crafts industry was dominated by women), but it is a process in which the state plays a great role (taxation, organisation of markets, construction of infra-structure ..etc.),

d) articulation on the cultural and ideological level, in which despite the supremacy of the capitalist ideology and culture, the coexistence of social elements of the two kind of modes, leads to both modes adopting some aspects of the other's culture and ideology. In chapters 2, 3 and 5 the role of religious sectarianism and Islamic fundamentalism as pre-capitalist ideologies used to justify capitalist exploitation and capital accumulation is discussed.

The articulation process in one pattern is by analogy compared with the relation between merchant capital and the English cottage weaving industry in the Seventeen century when, as described by Marx, weavers as independent producers were controlled by merchant capital through the selling of the wool to them and buying their produce of cloth.(Marx, 1977 b, 334). "Such a pattern of exchange relation cannot by itself contribute to the overthrow of the old mode of production", wrote Marx (ibid., 334). In contrast to Kay's

⁴The three stages of articulation which have been suggested by Rey are:

"1. an initial link in the sphere of exchange, where interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist mode; 2. capitalism 'takes roots', subordinating the pre-capitalist mode but still making the use of it, 3.(not yet reached in the Third World), the total disappearance of the pre-capitalist mode, even in agriculture" (Foster- Carter:1978, 56)

assertion when evaluating the role of merchant capital in the production of underdevelopment that, "capital created underdevelopment because it did not exploit it enough" (Kay:1975, X), Marx argued that such a pattern would have worsened the conditions of direct producers more than if they would have been under the immediate control of capital (op. cite.. 335). David Booth was accurate when included in his definition of articulation the tendency of capital to sustain pre-capitalist "forms of labour process which *ensure a supply of labour power...at less than its value, that is less than its full cost of production.*" (Booth: 1985, 76). Bernstein showed, incidentally in a critique of Kay, that articulation permitted capital, in colonial societies, to make a partial payment for the costs of reproduction of labour, usually that of the individual worker, while the costs of maintaining the workers family and the generation reproduction of labour power are borne by the worker's family, which still engaged in agricultural production in the home village. " (Bernstein, 1976, 59). Cliffe emphasised the purpose of the process as of keeping those societies as a "source of primitive accumulation" for the wider international capitalist system (1976, 125). Meillassoux brought to attention its direct effect on the "agricultural communities" as "being both undermined and perpetuated at the same time, undergoing a prolonged crisis" (1980, 199). This relation between the articulation of modes of production and the crisis in agriculture is of great importance in this thesis.

In the Sudan, the colonial state played great role in the articulation process, (see Chapter 2 below), with intensive and extensive use of coercion.⁵ Since the main characteristic of the pre-capitalist modes which were subjected to the articulation process were agricultural, the peasants and rural population in general were the main subject to state coercion. Pre-capitalist superstructure institutions themselves articulated in this process, played an important political, ideological and economic role in the process of coercive articulation of the peasants and rural population. Hence was the political articulation of the tribal and religious, (sectarian, in the Sudanese case), leadership and their maintenance as an aristocracy, (Chapter 2 below).

The articulation process which had the commoditization as its main mean to appropriate economic surplus necessitated the spread of traders and merchants in the different parts of the pre-capitalist formations, constituting the primary cell of a bourgeois class. The process involved the establishment of commercial and financial (banks) firms, plantation and mining companies and hence the foreign capital in these societies, (in the Sudanese case there was a limitation to this part of the process, see Chapter 2). Settlers followed in some countries from the metropolitan, which was not the case in the Sudan.

Chapter 2 argues that the spread of commoditization had required the relative development of transportation, communication and other economic and social services

⁵According to Foster-Carter, Rey asserts a use of violence, " violence is a necessary component of all articulation" (Foster-Carter:opt.cit., 60). Coercion might be a better description because it includes the use of violence.

which consequently required the employment of wage labour, (in Southern Sudan, compulsory labour was used to construct road and build government stations). A need for processing industries, (gins in the Sudanese case, see Chapter 2 below), had also arisen as part of export production which led to the formation of a small working class. The monopoly of these activities by the colonial state and/or foreign capital contributed to the working class acquisition of national consciousness early in the class struggle.

The great role played by the state in the articulation process, led to the emergence of a local bureaucratic social stratum. The use of coercion in the process including the use of violence to suppress the resistance of local population, led to the formation of local armies in the former colonies. Minimising the cost of administration and repression was a main reason in including natives in the bureaucracy and the army, but the idea of using educated natives as a link with the population was among the reasons of creating such a group. The analysis of the role of bureaucracy and armies in post-colonial states has arisen in a debate in the literature⁶. Taking into account the conceptual problems which arise in that debate and in relevance to this research, some clarification on the position of the bureaucrats and the military in the class structure has to be established.

The stand in this thesis on the question of bureaucrats, the military and the professionals is based on two propositions. The first is that classes are defined as:

"large groups of people distinguished from one another by their position in some historically defined system of production, by their relations to the means of production (for the most part registered in laws), by their roles in the social organisation of labour, and consequently by the methods of acquisition and the magnitudes of those share of social wealth which they obtain." (Lenin, 1971 , 231)

The second proposition is that:

" Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with. The persons appointed for this purpose form a new branch of the division of labour *within society* (italics in the origin). This gives them particular interest of those who empowered them, they make themselves independent of the latter and the state in being. " (Engels, 1977, 635-6).

Applying the first proposition, the definition of the bureaucrats, the military and all the professionals as petty bourgeoisie is rejected. The petty bourgeoisie as a class is defined in this thesis as commodity producers who own their means of production and provide most of the labour power in the production process. They are petty producers, but as petty producers were and are found in all pre-capitalist modes of production, they become petty bourgeoisie under the capitalist mode of production because of the generalisation of the commodity production, i.e. labour power became a commodity itself. The basic characteristic in the definition we adopt is that the petty bourgeoisie own their means of production, which make them recognise and defend the right to private property, the right to the private ownership of the means of production. Though others who don't own

⁶ Example of the contributions to the debate on the question in the African context are: Meillasoux (1970), Leys (1973, 1976, 1978), Saul (1974, 1979), Shivji (1976) Freylond (1977), Zienmann and Lanzendörfer (1977), Brett (1978) Beckman (1980), Kitching (1980), Bernstein (1981), Balyies (1985), Charney (1987), Forrest (1987)

private means of production are not petty bourgeoisie in this sense, they may adopt a petty bourgeoisie stand from the private ownership. But they may adopt other ideological stands on the question of the private ownership of the means of production. In such an ideological stand they are not united according to their class nature. The other important characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie is that they are not alienated from the produce of their labour in the production process itself though they may be in the exchange process⁷. Though they share with the proletariat that they both work, they differ in this important aspect of the alienation. The petty bourgeoisie is neither alienated from their means of production nor from the produce of their labour. This definition is adopted because of its epistemological usefulness. It keeps the category of petty bourgeoisie in line with the general definition of other classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class. Accordingly some of the professionals who do not sell their labour power to the state or private sector and work independently might be defined as petty bourgeoisie, not because they are professional or technocrats, but because they produce commodities and/ or services by their own means and own their products or the returns to their service. Some of these professionals do employ others to work for them with wages and salaries and produce the commodities or services and could only be identified as bourgeoisie. In both cases there is a risk that basing the analysis on the economic definition might keep it on the abstract level, while the concrete analysis which brings in the political and ideological elements and the class struggle as a process may identify these groups according to the specific position they take politically and ideologically in the class struggle. Stating that raises many questions than providing answers to the main question as to why these groups can have contradicting positions in the class struggle.

Applying the second proposition those groups are identified as social groups different from the defined classes of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class. They are the product of the modern bourgeoisie state, education and social services and their development becomes a function of the development of science and technology necessary for the development of capitalist production. Their role in the division of labour is determined by their education and training that give them a high social prestige compared to the working class, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and some fractions of the bourgeoisie itself. This is especially true in the developing countries where there are still high percentages of illiteracy and the bourgeoisie failed to establish its hegemony. The role in the division of labour cited to these groups is defined as the mental work, an ideological definition which does not always describe the work done by these groups or some of them. Poulantzas wrote:

⁷In articulated modes of production, as discussed in Chapter 2, the situation become more complicated and peasants and agricultural producers may be alienated from their products.

"The division between manual and mental work is not a physiological or biological division between those who work with their hands and those who work with their brains. It has to do with the social conditions under which the division between mental and manual labour exists, which as Gramsci pointed out, concern the whole series of rituals, 'know how', and symbols." (1977, 122)

Thus it is not enough to describe them as urban petty bourgeoisie. as Munck did when he identified them as urban petty bourgeoisie in contrast to the traditional rural petty bourgeoisie composed mainly of the peasants⁸. He described them,

"The urban petty bourgeoisie for its part is a broad catch-all category covering teachers and traders, clerks and civil servants prostitutes and policemen, etc. There is a tendency towards proletarianisation in this group too, although new layers constantly re-form, making it more a process of simultaneous conservation/ dissolution. in the much the same way as the small-scale production of the peasants, these sectors cannot withstand the advance of capital"(Munck, 1984, 93)

Similarity is not identity and to establish that some similar behavioural attitudes between the petty bourgeoisie and other groups like teachers, professionals, bureaucrats and policemen (not speaking of prostitutes !) will make all these groups identical is not useful from epistemological and cognitive point of view.

Munck argued that there is a tendency towards proletarianisation, which by all means will not include all the groups. Some of the urban petty bourgeoisie, especially craftsmen are subject to this tendency; also poor peasants in rural areas, but not the bureaucrats, professionals and the military. It is true, as it is shown in Chapter 4 in this thesis, that the real incomes of some professionals and civil servants may decline in the process of income redistribution through inflationary measures such as the structural adjustment programmes. This similarity does not make those groups alienated producers of surplus value.

The solution presented to the problem by Nicos Poulantzas might be of some relevance here, though he had tackled the question within the perspectives of developed capitalist societies. Poulantzas argued: "To define the working class as the whole of the 'wage-earning class' has the effect of reducing the class divisions in society to the divisions between rich and poor." (Poulantzas, 1977, 114). He then went to define the wage-earners whom he did not include in the working class as salaried non productive workers arguing that they "have a specific class membership" and could not be designated as an "intermediate strata" as the French Communist Party" does (Ibid, 111-2). His position which is shown in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* is based on three propositions. The first that these groups are members of a specific class which he called the new petty bourgeoisie'. The second proposition is that there are transformations in modern capitalism that "have to do with the extensions limits of the working class"(Ibid, 117) but those transformations "do not change the specific class situation of the new petty

⁸In the debate on this subject some writers tend to define the Kulaks as petty bourgeoisie, which is not accurate because the kulak as a rich farmer might be a capitalist who employ wage labour. Peasants, hereby are identified as petty bourgeoisie only when they are petty producers who cultivate their land or the land they rent.

bourgeoisie." The third proposition is that although as a result of the transformations of capitalism the new petty bourgeoisie is "objectively polarised towards the working class", that happens for the new petty bourgeoisie as 'a specific class'; ie as a class which has its own interests (Ibid, 118). Poulantzas propositions led him to an important conclusion which is of great relevance to our discussion of the Nimeiri regime, that is:

"...they [the new petty bourgeoisie] must be won to an alliance with the working class, and...even when they are won, they can be lost as allies and they can turn to the other side. This is what happened in Allende's Chile and also in Portugal. If these salaried non-productive workers can shift from an alliance with the working class to an alliance with the bourgeoisie it is precisely because they are not automatically polarised towards the working class. This is not because they do not have specific class interests, but because they have a very dubious class specificity."(Ibid, 116)

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 it will be argued that the change in the policies of the Nimeiri regime after 1971 was a reflection of a change in the alliance with the working class and the democratic urban movement in a concrete political situation in which different political actors assuming representation of different classes or national interests, consciously or unconsciously dismantled the possibility of the continuation of such an alliance.

It is important to notice the structure of this new class and its composition of different divisions and fractions. One can identify two broad divisions of great importance: the military and the civilian. In Third World countries this division acquires great importance because of the role played by the military in politics. Its relevance to the Sudan is examined in Chapter 3 and 5. The fraction composition of the new class include the bureaucrats, the professionals and the technocrats. While the role of the latter is limited in the Sudan because of the backward situation of the forces of production especially industry and agriculture which led to the disintegration of this small fraction between the former two⁹. The bureaucrats and the professionals on the other hand played great role in the Sudanese society.

Bureaucracy according to Max Weber is "a technically efficient instrument of administration" (Beetham, 1974, 64), which is characterised by an "inherent tendency to exceed its instrumental function and to become a separate force in the society", (Ibid, 65); at the same time of being characterised as "unable to free itself from the outlook of the social classes from which it was recruited and to which it was allied" (Ibid, 66). Alfred Weber went further than his brother to state:

" It is a fundamental error to imagine that the bureaucracy has the characteristic of being independent of any social basis. It finds its social basis in those power groups which control the organisation of the society." (quoted in Beetham, Ibid, 66)

Gramsci pointed out that bureaucracy at "a certain point... becomes a cast" (1971, 246), that looks at the representative system as a "nuisance" because it "hinders and delays the

technical action of the government", that is of the bureaucracy (Ibid, 254). It is within this theoretical frame that bureaucracy is defined in this thesis as a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie and its development and role are examined through out the thesis in a concrete historical analysis.

The professionals on the other side are the most complex fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie in the Sudan. The fraction as such is a modern one despite that some groups within it went through the same development conditions as the bureaucrats and the military, (the teachers), but the majority is the product of the development of higher education after the second World War. Though they supplied the ruling bloc with its most dynamic part, the bourgeoisie intellectuals who formed the Graduates Conference (See Chapter 2 and 3), they became predominantly attached to the left and the democratic movement until the Nimeiri regime. Their role in Sudanese politics will be discussed through out the thesis.

In contrast to the literature dealing with these groups in developed capitalism, the literature on the African experience concentrates not on their polarisation towards the working class, but rather towards the bourgeoisie. Frantz Fanon was pioneer in bringing the "university and merchant classes" and the "business, agricultural and liberal professions" (Fanon, 1976,120) together as 'the national middle class' and 'the national bourgeoisie' using the two categories alternatively. Though Fanon's analysis which was based on these definitions is interesting and provide many valid arguments about the adoption of the one party system and the rise of the 'leader' in the post-colonial state, his concept of classes was rather a simplification of a more complex issue. Roxborough once wrote:

"the class structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced nations in two principal ways: they more *complex* (emphasis added), and classes themselves are usually much *weaker* (emphasis added)" (1979, 72)

The fact that classes in Africa are weak does not mean that they do not exist, nor does mean that different classes can form one class. That is why the concept of power bloc is used in this thesis to express how and why the post-colonial state in the Sudan is dominated by a group of classes and class fractions. Fanon's failure to distinguish between different classes among the power bloc undermined his interesting analysis. He, for example, equated the bourgeoisie, and what Poulantzas called the new petty bourgeoisie. This led him to generalise that, "The single party is the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted unscrupulous and cynical" (Fanon, opt cited, 132) and that the "bourgeoisie dictatorship of underdeveloped countries draws its strength from the existence of a leader." (Ibid,135). For sure, one can argue that both statements are true if the 'bourgeoisie' is replaced by the new petty-bourgeoisie; which, in my opinion, was the experience of many African countries such as Egypt under Nasser, Algeria under Boumedienne, Guinea under Sekou Tore and Tanzania under Nyerere. It will be difficult if Fanon's argument is accepted to understand the role of the bourgeoisie,

or fractions of it, in the struggle for democracy in countries like Sudan (1958-64 and 1969-1985). Nor is it possible to understand, for example the difference between the post-colonial state in Kenya and Tanzania. The distinction between the bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie is important in this thesis for the analysis of the nature and different stages of the Nimeiri regime, in particular and the post-colonial state in general.

This thesis argues that the behaviour of the new petty bourgeoisie in the Sudan is determined by the concrete historical condition of the development of its different generations. These conditions include the level and nature of the social and political struggle of the different classes in the Sudan and its effect on them, the sort of education and training they have been through and the economic conditions they work in. Until the rise of the Nimeiri regime in 1969, it is differentiated in this thesis between the pre-World War and the post-World War generations among the bureaucrats, the professionals and the military. Generally speaking the pre-War generation had identified themselves with the power bloc since the division in the Graduates Congress (see Chapter 2 and 3); while the post-War generation was critical of the power bloc and until 1969 had identified themselves with movements on the left or the Muslim Brotherhood. Few of the latter maintained relations with political parties which represented the power bloc, but even those were either provoking some political change or new patterns of capital accumulation. This was apparent after the October revolution of 1964 and was reflected in the divisions in the Umma Party and the struggle within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). It is also argued that this fraction had acquired its national political awareness in the struggle against colonialism and the rise of the working class movement in the Sudan. It was influenced by the international conditions: the rise of a socialist bloc and the revolutions in China, Cuba and Vietnam, and the rise of the liberation movements and more directly the regional conditions (especially the rise of Nasser in Egypt and the Pan-Arab movements, the Pan-African movements, the Islamic Brotherhood and the African socialism). The latter have deeply affected the ideological orientation of the post-War and the post-independence generations.

The discussion on the African petty bourgeoisie is brought to the stage in the attempt to understand the nature of the post-colonial state, especially in countries where the new petty bourgeoisie, (according to the definition argued above), had prevailed after the independence. Terms like bureaucratic bourgeoisie and state bourgeoisie were used to describe the ruling class in some African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, .. etc.)¹⁰. In the Sudan the question did not rise until the May 1969 coup, despite the fact it was not the first coup. The military of the 1958 coup were considered as part of the ruling bloc (see Chapter 3), but this did not disguise their class nature as a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie. Their concrete conditions of development as a pre-war generation

¹⁰ See footnote 6.

determined their polarization towards the power bloc rather than the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie (See Chapter 2 and 3). The opposite was the case of the military of the May 1969 coup, who belonged to the post-War generation

The question of why this is so is rather a question of concrete analysis, because theoretically the two possibilities of polarization are found in the interests and nature of the new petty bourgeoisie as such, as an abstract concept. In the concrete analysis two main factors may influence the ideological orientation of the petty bourgeoisie, their education (particularly the education system) and the class struggle in the definite historical period of their arise or formation. Their actual political stand depends on the concrete political struggle of the different classes and their political organisations and the different tactics adopted by them. Looking into these aspects, it is attempted in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 to discuss the different policies and alliances made by the military in 1958-64 and 1969-85. A pause is taken in Chapter 3 to reflect on the historical development of the Sudanese military and the attempts to establish secret political organisations in the army. The question of alliances is of particular importance to the prolonged crisis of the Nimeiri regime is discussed in Chapter 3 and 5. It distinguishes between two crisis' phases the 1969-1971 and the 1973-85. While the first phase is discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the second phase is discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

1.4. A Statement of the Theme of the Thesis

This thesis examines and seeks to explain the crisis of 1973-85 by using the methodology of political economy. By studying the political economy of the Sudan the crisis is understood in its concrete historical context. This study has revealed that the 1973-85 crisis was one of a chain of other crises that took place in the Sudan between 1956-1985. All these crises despite their particularities are found to have an element of continuity that linked them together. This element is the organic crisis of transformation that has prevailed in the country since independence in 1956.

The Sudan has inherited a socio-economic structure that is based on a specific articulation of a capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production and their respective social forces. This structure had been developed and sustained by the colonial state and because of the specific articulation of the modes of production could not continue to develop or be sustained without that colonial state (the state being defined as a condensation of social relation and not the state apparatus or personnel). It was through coercion that the colonial state was able to keep the structure and to secure the development and growth of the colonial economy. The post-colonial state was not able to provide that level of coercion, not because physically it was not able¹¹, but because the post-colonial state as an expression of a new condensation of social forces has no justification to use such a

level of coercion. The new condensation of power required a quest for legitimacy that was based on hegemony. The colonial process did not result in a hegemonic class or a fraction of classes, nor did the post-colonial era led to a class being able to establish its hegemony. This resulted in a crisis of hegemony. The crisis of hegemony (as being defined above in sub-sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5) is central to the general crisis that has faced the country since 1956. The crisis of hegemony is found to be the result of both of colonial and post-colonial processes of social, economic and political development and change.

The use of coercion by the post-colonial state, in the absence of a hegemonic class and the failure to establish the hegemony of the power bloc, found different kinds of resistance and both were main causes behind the unstable state in the Sudan from 1956-85. On the other hand the inability to use absolute and unchecked coercion left the structure unsustainable and could not be developed without a basic transformation; at the time its different elements changed in quantity and quality which aggravated the situation more bringing it to a level of serious organic crisis. The change in political regimes through 1956-85 is discussed as attempts to resolve the crisis. The failure to address the essence of the crisis, the transformation of the scio-economic structure, accelerated the levels of political instability and economic decline and brought the existence of the post-colonial state and a unified Sudan into question. The basic transformation of the structure of the socio-political and economic system became a necessary condition as a resolution to the organic crisis and establishment of the hegemony of a ruling power that provides political and social stability and economic development.

Within this context the crisis of 1973-85 is understood and analysed. The 1973-85 crisis was both a continuation of the general crisis that had prevailed in the country since independence and a particular condensation of that crisis that resulted from the nature and policies of the Nimeiri regime. The elements of continuity were those that characterise the socio-economic structure as a special articulation of modes of production. It was a particular crisis of the only regime that came to power aiming at resolving the transformation problem while ending in keeping a decayed version of the structure it set itself the task to transform.

On the political level, the modernisers who dominated the state after 1971 thought that they could bring political stability and provide for Peoples' participation by establishing a new state based on four main institutions: the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the Presidency of the Republic, the National Peoples' Assembly, and the Peoples' Local Councils. The relation between the institutions was thought to be determined by the Permanent Constitution, which was drafted and promulgated in 1973. This thesis argues that these new institutions failed to bring political stability, to allow the democratic representation and participation of the Sudanese people in the decision-making and to provide the rational management of the economy. Political stability is argued through out

this thesis is a function of the hegemony of the ruling class and the legitimacy of the state. This thesis argues that the nature of the state in the 1973-85 period was governed by being fairly dominated by the new petty bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie not only failed to establish an alliance with other classes, it was unable to maintain its unity. This thesis shows the resistance of some of the fractions and groups of the new petty bourgeoisie and their contribution to political instability. It argues further that a split was persistent among the ruling group itself. This split has allowed for an increasing power of the President and his use of the tactics of playing the different fractions against each other. The authoritarian nature of the state and the weakness of the institutions established by the Permanent Constitution enhanced the powers and the role of the President. The character of the President himself contributed to both the weakness of the institutions and hence to the instability of the system. The ruling group failed to establish its hegemony and its resort to coercion and repression intensified as the resistance of other classes and their political and trade union organisations increased. The legitimacy of the state declined as its policies failed to deliver the goods which were both expected by the population and promised by the regime. Within this context the National Reconciliation is discussed and evaluated as an attempt to regain legitimacy. Its failure to obtain that target rested on the authoritarian nature of the state and the particular role and powers of the President. The promulgation of the Islamic laws in September 1983, the declaration of the State of Emergency and the Prompt Justice Courts in April 1984 were a dual attempt for a quest for legitimacy and a resort to intensified repression at a time when the economic crisis, famine and popular resistance dominated the Sudanese agenda. Neither legitimacy was gained, nor repression was able to prevent the overthrow of the regime in March-April 1985 through a popular uprising.

Of particular importance to the political crisis was the renewals of the unrest in the South which is described in the thesis. It is argued in chapters 3, 4, and 5 that the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 which brought an end to the civil war in the South was the greatest achievement of the Nimeiri era. While Chapter 4 describes the process through which the Agreement turned to be obsolete, Chapter 5 argues that the Agreement failed in bringing any change to the domination of the North-Arab groups on the Sudanese state. As a result the policies that preserved uneven development in the country continued. Chapter 5 also argues that the Agreement and the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, which was promulgated as a result of the Agreement, provided for a sort of parliamentary democratic system within the authoritarian presidential republic. The contradiction between the two systems contributed to the failure of the Agreement. The particular policies of the President towards the South and the promulgation of the Islamic Laws in 1983 provided for the concrete process through which the Civil War was renewed in the South.

The modernisation policy has added new production capacities to the economy in both industry and agriculture, built a new net of modern roads and highways, modernised the telecommunication net work and increased the number of those enrolled in the general and higher education. Despite all these achievement in the economy, the economic crisis of 1973-85 was the longest and deepest in the history of the Sudan. The thesis argues that the particular economic crisis of 1973-85 was in essence part of the organic crisis of transformation. This was reflected in both levels of simple and extended reproduction. On the simple reproduction level the economy failed to maintain itself resulting in the under-utilisation of the already installed capacities and the low and declining levels of productivity and yields, the increasing debt of the state and the country, and the high rate of inflation (all of them are documented and verified in the thesis). On the extended reproduction level, the new projects failed to compensate for the decline and decay of the old ones while they, the new ones themselves, suffered from inadequate planning, and from mis-mangement of their construction and execution. They suffered after their completion from financial and managerial problems that led to the same problems of under-utilisation of capacities and low productivity and yields.

Of particular importance both for the political and the economical crises of the Nimeiri regime were the policies adopted in 1978-85 under the auspices of the IMF. It is argued in this thesis that these policies contributed to the deepening of the crisis of the regime. The policies that were suggested by the IMF did not provide the immediate solution to the particular economic crisis. Instead they contributed to the loss of the already eroding legitimacy of the regime. It was no wonder the March-April combined popular uprising and coup d'etat were instigated by the last measures of austerity the regime had announced. dramatically the measures were taken despite the fact that the IMF had already suspended the last Stand-By Arrangement (1984/5 SB Arrangement), agreed on with the Sudan on June 1984.

1.5. The Sources of the Research:

This research has benefited from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are mainly of three types: direct political experience, informal interviews and data and information collection from government files, official documents and memorandums, political statements by officials and publications of political parties, newspapers and magazines (both Sudanese and foreign) and memoirs of prominent political figures. The secondary sources are both theoretical works on the questions of the crisis, political economy, the state, classes, ideology.. etc, and empirical studies mainly on the history, politics, economics of the Sudan as well as studies on the third world, especially on Africa, the Middle east some Asian and Latin American countries.

discussed are of contemporary nature. The concentration on information gathering through this method was for the periods following the October revolution of 1964 and which directly affected the May Coup of 1969 and the Nimeiri regime period (1969-1985). Among those interviewed were military men, ex-ministers, leaders of political parties (especially the Umma, DUP, Communist parties and the National Islamic Front) and trade unionists. Some of those interviewed were faced by information gathered from other persons or sources in order to check the information or to find some justification for actions taken by the interviewed, their parties, trade unions or governments in which they were ministers. Some of the interviewed were very critical towards events, decisions or actions they participated in. The result of the interviews assisted the author in his analysis.

1.5.3 Governmental Information:

Two sources of primary governmental information are used. The first is unpublished government information and data from internal files of some departments (especially those of the Ministry of Finance, National Economy and Planning and the Ministry of Trade and Supply, the Company's Registrar of the Public Attorney Chamber, .. etc)¹³. Of these information are the documents concerning the minutes of the Paris Club¹⁴, the files on Sudan Debts, letters by ministers to the IMF and internal departmental memoranda concerning development expenditure and negotiations with the IMF.

The second source is official publications by the different government departments. Of these there are annual publications such as: the Economic Review published by the Research Section of the Department of Economics¹⁵, the Annual Report of the Bank of the Sudan which is published by the Bank of the Sudan, the National Accounts and Supporting Tables, published by the National Accounts Division of the Department of Statistics¹⁶ the Internal Trade Statistics and Price Indices which published by the Internal Trade division of the department of Statistics, and the Year Book of Agricultural Statistics which is published by the Statistics Division of the Department of Agricultural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, the Gezira Board Report published by the Gezira Board and the Mechanized Farming Corporation agricultural Statistics Bulletin published since 1982 by the Mechanized Farming Corporation. There are also other official non-periodical documents such as: the Five Years Plan 1970/71-1974/75, the Six Years Plan of Economic and Social Development 1977/78-1982/83, both published by the Ministry of Planning and the Sudan Foreign Trade Analysis 1970-81, published by the Foreign Trade Section of the Department of

¹³The author used his connection as ex-employee of this Ministry (1976-77)

¹⁴ Paris Club is a meeting of creditor countries held in Paris, convened by the World Bank, chaired by a senior Official in the French Treasury. The IMF is invited to report (testify) on the

Statistics. Several other government publications provided primary data are quoted and cited in the thesis. In 1985 the Department of Statistics prepared 'The Economic Indices' which was a collection of statistical data for the Nimeiri period and was published by the National Economic Conference. This publication is used in this thesis as a main source for national economic indices.

The National Economic Conference of 1985/86, provided a rich primary data. It included reports and papers from different government departments, public corporations and a special statistical data information prepared by the Conference Secretariat

1.54. Other Primary Sources

Political literature produced or published by the political parties, political leaders and government officials was one of the primary sources of this research.

1.6. The Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is organised in six chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 2 deals with the question of the legacy of colonialism in an attempt to establish an understanding of the colonial state and economy. The crisis of the post-colonial state between 1954-73 is discussed in Chapter 3. While Chapter 4 provides an extensive survey of the manifestation of the 1973-85 crisis, Chapter 5 and 6 attempt to explain the crisis by studying its genesis in Chapter 5 and its place within the general crisis in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM

2.1. Introduction

This Chapter provides a brief historical account of the formation of contemporary Sudanese socio-economic and political structure. That process began with the re conquest of the Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian armies under the leadership of Lord Kitchner and resulted in the defeat and destruction of the Mahdist State (1885-1898) in the battle of Omdurman on 1st September 1898.

The re conquest of the Sudan was an unusual international element because it was carried by both Egypt and Britain.¹ Both the Egyptian flag and claim were used during the Fashoda incident to keep the French out of the Sudan (Beshir, 1977, 20, Holt and Daly, 1979, 117). Lord Cromer rejected the idea of annexing the Sudan by Britain because of its international complications amongst the European forces scrambling for Africa; and at the same time he rejected the country's re-incorporation with Egypt in defence of the interests of Britain based on the right of conquest. This conflict of interests was to be resolved by the settlement between the two countries in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of January 1899, known widely as the "Condominium Agreement"

The Anglo-Egyptian military victory of 1898 was to be followed by establishment of a new state to replace the defeated and the destroyed the Mahdist State [1885-1898]. imposing a military administration with the *Sirdar* [the commander-in chief], of the Egyptian Army assuming the post of the Governor General of the Sudan.

This chapter reveals the nature of the Sudanese socio-economic and political structure established after the re conquest and which is the outcome of a prolonged and complex process of destruction, transformation and articulation. It identifies the social, economic and political forces that had resulted from that process. The identification of these forces and how they interrelated with each other and with the colonial state is of great analytical importance in understanding the character of the post-colonial state, and the presence of political and economic crises in the Sudan.

The chapter is organised in four sections. Section 2.1 is an introduction, while section 2.2 deals with the colonial state, its origin and its main characteristics. It discusses three of these characteristics; its relative autonomy, its militarism and its economic statism. Section 2.3 discusses the formation of the colonial economy and its effects on the

transformation of the socio-economic structure of the country. Section 2.4 analyses the effect of some of the policies of the colonial state on the socio-economic structure of the country. Section 2.5 discusses the controversial aspect of the colonial policy towards Southern Sudan. Section 2.6 provides a conclusion which summarises the main findings of the chapter.

2.2. The Colonial State

The colonial state established by the Condominium Agreement had three main characteristics which affected the future development of the socio-economic structure in general and the post-colonial state in the Sudan in particular. These three characteristics were relative autonomy, militarism and economic statism.

The relative autonomy of the Colonial State in the Sudan was of two dimensions: the first in relation to the two condominium states, and the second towards the Sudanese population. The relative autonomy of the Colonial state vis-à-vis the Condominium was strengthened by two main factors which had affected the implementation of the Agreement. The first was the British occupation of Egypt which turned Egypt into a weak partner as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, (the third Governor- General, 1916-1924), in 1924 when the Egyptian army was compelled to withdraw from the Sudan. Egypt was, in reality, excluded from the administration of the Sudan even after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which allowed the return of Egyptian personnel and troops. After the 1936 Treaty the Egyptian role in the administration of the Sudan was insignificant, though Egypt always played an indirect role through its influence on the Sudanese intelligentsia and the Khatimyya religious sect.

Egypt was supposed to play a greater role in running the affairs of the country because it was financing the administration and the army in the Sudan. Until 1913, when the Sudan's budget was balanced for the first time, Egyptian financial subsidy was crucial and it amounted to LE 5.35 million. Egypt paid the entire cost of its army in the Sudan until it was withdrawn in 1924. Furthermore, Egypt also provided some LE. 5.4 million in loans to finance the capital needed for the infra-structure until the First World War. (Daly, 1991, 3)

The financial regulations adopted by the Condominium states in 1899 and amended in 1910 empowered the Egyptian Council of Ministers to approve, supervise and audit the budget of the Sudan (MacMichael, 1934, 111-113). The British occupation of Egypt reduced these powers to nominal ones, yet the danger of Egyptian control and interference was, at least theoretically, present. Hence the Colonial State in the Sudan recognised the importance of generating revenues from domestic sources; but this was constrained both by the scarcity of such resources and political considerations necessitating low taxation rates. Thus the Colonial State sought to increase its revenue by

developing cotton production in Sudan which resulted in the second factor, the creation of a strong relation with the British textile industry. The latter was interested in "securing an increased supply of cotton drawn from within the Empire" and since the Sudan was "found to be suitable for the growing of long staple cotton", (Niblock:1987, 12), the British Cotton Growing Association, (BCGA), the representative of the British textile industry, backed the Colonial State plans to develop the Gezira. Hence a "*collaboration between a colonial government desperate for revenue and in need of British support, and Lancashire textile industry which could provide both*" was established.(Daly, 1991, p3).²

However, the direct influence of Britain was limited, mainly because "the Sudanese affairs were handled by the Foreign Office rather than the Colonial Office", which resulted in "the local British officials " having "more administrative" autonomy "than was the case in much of the rest of the British Empire."(Voll and Voll, 1987, 51). Sir John Schuster, the Financial Secretary in the Sudan 1922-1927, described this situation as "a very fortunate arrangement for me because the Foreign Office had no machinery for controlling overseas territories and therefore left me completely free to do my job. (emphasis added)" (Schuster, 1979, 40).

The relative autonomy of the colonial state vis-à-vis the Sudanese population was natural since it was a foreign body imposed on the country by force. Its implications were reflected in the economic, religious, administrative and educational policies adopted by the colonial state. Those policies, which are the focus of discussion below, affected the structure of the Sudanese economy and society.

The second characteristic of the colonial state in the Sudan was its militarism which was due to the fact that the colonial state was a product of a military conquest. Despite the continuous denial by Lord Cromer that "it is not a military government .." (Annual Report, 1902, 75), the colonial state was a military establishment, not the least because it was run by the British officers of the Egyptian army whose Sirdar, the Commander-in-Chief, was the Governor General and "Commander-in-Chief of the civil government"³ in the Sudan (MacMichael, 1934, 121-122). It was, in fact, "a benevolent autocracy", (ibid.). The Times described it in 1900 :

²It is interesting to note that the re-conquest of the Sudan was not initiated in anyway by its economic potentialities and it was considered a ' white elephant ' depending in General Gordon's statement that, "The Soudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be so", to which Colonel Stewart remarked "I quite agree with General Gordon that Sudan is an expensive and useless possession." (Quoted in Lord Cromer's Report of 1900, p 99|

³The Agreement established an autonomous administration to be headed by a Governor General, nominated by the British Government and appointed by the Khedive of Egypt. The Governor General would assume the supreme military and civil command

"Everything derives from the will of the Governor General. He unites in himself, and delegates from himself, all legislative, executive and judicial powers. He 'notifies' his ordinances to the joint Sovereigns, [Great Britain and Egypt], but he is under no obligation to attend to their advice." (The Times, 8 April 1900, italics added).

Policies adopted were conveyed to governors through confidential memoranda; governors had to convey them to subordinates, and reports were expected to reflect both the implementation and the evaluation. Until 1945, when the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan was established, no direct official consultation with Sudanese was carried and they were not involved in the decision -making process. As from 1910, ordinances and policies were decided by the Governor-general in Council, though the Council remained an advisory body. Annual meetings of the governors of the provinces were held to review and discuss issues referred to by the Governor-General or his secretaries, yet only recommendations were issued by such meetings. Despite this centralisation of the decision making process the governors, in their provinces and the district commissioners, in their districts, had exercised great powers in dealing with the day-to-day affairs. They combined legislative, judiciary, financial, and administrative powers. The Sudanese people used to call the system '*Hukamat al-Muftishin*', the government of the district commissioners. The district commissioner remained the sole authority in the district until after the independence. The governors of the provinces and the districts commissioners, their deputies and assistants constituted the Sudan Political Service, which was headed by the Civil Secretary and attached directly to the Governor General. Other technical departments developed through time to constitute the Sudan Civil Service.

The post of Governor General was held by a military officer until 1924⁴. In addition all posts of the provincial governors and their assistants were held by British officers until the beginning of the World War 1. Moreover, "Railway, Posts, Telegraphs, Works and Surveys were in the hands of Sappers, the Steamers and Boats Department, as it was then known, was run by two naval engineers, two ex-marine sergeants and about thirty marine engineers from Britain, Italy and Greece with Bimbashi Azmi and some junior officers from the Egyptian Army."(Scott Hill, Some Sudan Memoirs, SAD, 20-1). The jobs of clerks, storekeepers, and junior technicians in some departments were held by British NCOs.

Ruth First noticed that the colonial administration in the Sudan not only "*resembled armies, in their formations and ethos,*" but it was "*the instrument of military men. Military conquest was followed by military administration..*" and "*The military cast of government and administration was one of the dominant characteristics of colonial policy in the Sudan*" (First, 1970, 127).

⁴Three military men assumed the post from 1898 to 1924, they were: Lord Kitchner, 1898-1899, Sir F.R. Wingate, 1900-1916, and Sir Lee Stack, 1916-1924.

This 'dominant characteristic' was reflected in the form of routine that governed the relation between the Governor-General, his assistants and subordinates which was determined by a "chain of authority from the top downwards" (Ibid., 27), and complete submission of subordinates to their seniors, in short a military discipline.

This characteristic remained although after 1901, civilians were taken in the service of the colonial state. The appointment of civilians was not meant to change the military system of government, which was advocated by Lord Cromer as "the form of government ... suitable to the present very backward condition for the country." (RAFS., 1902, 75). It was rather because the military officers were liable "to be removed at the time when their services are of the greatest value" (Ibid.), as happened during the Boer War in 1899.

The military personnel continued to be influential through the first three decades of the Condominium. (Collins, 1972, 298). MacMichael provided a list of 33 military who held the posts of governors of the provinces, *Mudirs*, until 1933 (MacMichael:1934, 299). Collins found that few of the military personnel remained till the independence of the Sudan in 1956, some resigned from the army and took jobs with the colonial state. Most of the military who remained in the service were stationed in remote areas to administer regions and tribes known for their resistance to the colonial administration (Collins, op. cit., 289).

Militarism of the system continued through the process of the selection of civilians to the Political Service. The process was carried by boards dominated by British officers of the Egyptian Army. They tended to choose candidates in "their own image." (Ibid., 296), Physical fitness of the candidates was given great importance in selection to the extent it was said that Sudan was "the country of blacks ruled by Blues"⁵. Military training was an important item of their training.

The militarism of the colonial state was justified by the priorities it had determined, the first of which "was the elimination of popular resistance" (Holt, 1961, 119). To that task Lord Kitchner explicitly directed his subordinates in his first policy memorandum, "All insubordination must be promptly and severely repressed [my emphasis]." (GGAR., 1899, 55). Resistance continued for the first three decades of the colonial state and Sir Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary, was to write in 1934, "Hardly a year had passed since the re-occupation without the need for punitive expedition." (MacMichael, 1934,). Though the Battle of Omdurman and the killing of Khalifa Abdullahi and his senior associates in November 1899 had brought an official end to the Mahdist State, the Mahdist Chapter was never closed. About twenty Mahdist or religious revolts took place over the first three decades of the Condominium. But religion and Mahdism were not the

⁵By 'Blue' is meant the traditional Oxford and Cambridge recognition of a person who has represented his university at a major sport in the annual varsity contest between the two universities (Collins and Deng, 1984, p 249.)

sole motivates of resistance, the tribes of the Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains rejected the alien rule leading to more than seventeen revolts in the South and twenty one in the Nuba Mountains .(For details see: Beshir, 1977, 50- 55, MacMichael, op. cite., 96-107 and 174-187). So the colonial state constantly kept its guard firm for the first three decades which promoted militarism of the state.

The third characteristic of the colonial state was economic statism. This was a product of the colonial state to finance itself without provoking the population by imposing high taxation or losing its autonomy by depending on Egyptian finance conditioned by Egyptian control. It was also promoted by the personal interest members of the Sudan Political Service developed in the development of the government revenue on which their career depended. Economic statism had many implications on the socio-economic structure of the country, its class structure and its post-colonial state. The next section discusses the policies that developed economic statism.

2.3.The Economy

2.3.1. The Colonial Vision

Lord Cromer, the designer of the Condominium, had set a general outline for the establishment of a colonial economy in the Sudan. In 1907, during a visit to the Sudan he expressed his wishes to link the Sudan with the international market through a railway extended to Suakin on the Red Sea, and another one extended to Kassala and the Abyssinian borders. He also wanted to extend the railway line to El Obied to collect the gum from Kordofan. He wanted to clear the Sudd on the White Nile , to erect one or two dams on the Blue Nile and to invest in the Gezira. (Cromer's Speech reported in Shuqair, 1967, 1342.). The same year, Wingate Pasha, the Governor General , repeated the same programme in his annual report,

"The task which the Sudan Government has set itself to perform is primarily to confer the benefits of civilisation on the inhabitants by rendering secure , as far as is possible, their persons and their property; by improving communications across those wide stretches of desert or wilderness which intervene between the main centres of population and yields; by adding to the fertility of the naturally rich soil by means of artificial irrigation suitable to the varying conditions over so large and extent of a country; and finally by providing- in addition to the great Nile waterway and railway which bind Sudan to Egypt- a good port and harbour on the Red Sea within easy access of the interior, whereby *the inhabitants may be more furnished with their requirements from abroad, and may find outside markets for their natural products.*" (RAFS, 1907 p34)

The implementation of this programme was constrained by the availability of capital. The British government was unwilling to spend the British tax-payer money or to guarantee the borrowing of capital on London money market until 1913. It was then convinced, [or persuaded], by the British Cotton Growing Association, [BCGA] to provide the required guarantee. The colonial state was hesitant to attempt raising such capital through taxation from within the Sudan for political reasons. From the start a policy of low taxation to

avoid political unrest was decided. Another possible source of capital was private foreign investment. Despite the attempts of many investors to come to the Sudan just after the reconquest, "The Sudan soldier-administrators were in any event not wildly enthusiastic about an influx of foreign entrepreneurs." (Daly, 1986, 219). It was thought that foreign investors might interfere in government policy, bring influence of other European states and/ or upset the government's relation with Sudanese. (Ibid., 219). Egypt was, hence, left to bear the financial burden of balancing the annual current budget and provide the necessary capital for most of the infra-structure investment in the Sudan. The details of Egyptian financial contributions are discussed in section 2.1 above. Following Marx's remarks on the British in India (Marx, 1978 a, 659),⁶ one can easily argue that Sudan was held under the British by the Egyptian Army (until 1924), at the Egyptian cost (mainly until 1913 and slightly after that) and by the Sudan Defence Force at the Sudanese people cost after 1924 and until independence.

There were other social and political constraints to the implementation of the programme. These constraints contributed in shaping and specifying the structure of the colonial economy. Among these was the policy of the colonial state to avoid any measures which initiate revolutions or uprisings and its continuous attempt to articulate the "best class natives" (see below). Both considerations constrained the range of government policy towards taxation, land tenure, foreign investment, economic statism and articulation of pre-capitalist production relations in cotton production.

The result was low taxation rates as we have pointed before which meant that government had to depend on the revenues which would be generated by running public utilities, i.e. Sudan Railways, the River transport, posts ..etc. and involvement in production ie the Gezira Scheme, Toker, Nuba Mountains etc.; hence the rise of statism in the colonial economy. Seeking revenues was not the only promoter of statism; the fear to involve foreign capital and enterprises was another reason. Though the latter was also related in some aspects to the attempts of avoiding revolutionary agitation; other reasons might be found in the fact that the colonial state, "was...intensely jealous of its monopoly of power,...deeply concerned that this monopoly be instantly and unambiguously visible."; for "Successful capitalist development would have created new centres of non-government influence and even power, and new administration problems which the heavy emphasis on rural administration had not equipped the Political Service to solve." (Sanderson, 1985, 104). In addition to all these reasons statism was the best formula to maintain the relative autonomy of the colonial state vis-à-vis Egypt, Britain , foreign

⁶ India, according to Marx, "was held in the English thralldom by an Indian army maintained at the cost of India" (Marx, 1978 a, p 659).

capital and the internal local social forces through providing its independent sources of finance.

The policy to avoid revolution which led to political articulation was one of the reasons behind the colonial land policy. One aspect of this policy was the recognition of the established rights of ownership (the Title to Lands Ordinance of 1899), either by providing ownership documents, (issued by previous regimes), or by proving the successive cultivation of the land for the previous five years, the latter was considered as having, "an absolute title as against all persons" (Cromer, 1900, 1047). Another aspect was the recognition of the communal rights of land utilisation, in spite of the fact that such lands were considered the ownership of the government, according to the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1905. A third aspect of the land policy was the prevention of land speculation and its transfer to the foreigners, hence as early as 1900 the government issued a Proclamation;

"Whereas it has to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General that certain persons taking advantages of the want of money in the Sudan are acquiring lands from the inhabitants at prices below the actual value, notice is hereby given that until such times as it may be found possible to establish a land register, as contemplated by the Title to Land Ordinance 1899, all contracts for the purchase of land should be submitted to the Mudir for approval and that power will be given to land Commissions which may be appointed to revise the terms of any sales ...of which notice shall not have been given to the Mudir."(Sudan Government Gazette, 1 April 1914, quoted in Gaitskel, 1959, 43).

In 1905 , a stiffer control was decreed. Any sale, mortgage or disposal of the land by another means by any native without the prior consent of the Mudir was declared void and money thereby paid might not be recoverable (Gaitskell, op. cit., p44). A special Proclamation was issued in 1912 to prevent any sale of the Gezira land except for local Gezira natives. (Ibid.) The logic behind this aspect of the land policy was stated clearly by a land officer,

"If unsophisticated people are given the chance to sell their land, they will do so, and a large discontented land-less class, easy prey for agitator, is formed." (Miskin, 1950, 283.)

A fourth aspect of the land policy was the declaration that, "all waste, forest and unoccupied land shall be deemed to be the property of the government, until the contrary be proved."(Simpson, 1955, 12) The consequences and implications of the land policy were very important in shaping the colonial economy in the Sudan. The first important consequence was the prevention of land ownership by foreigners which ruled out the colonial settlers' model of Kenya and Rhodesia (See Collins:1975, 29-62, Sender and Smith:1986, 24-28, Ake:1981, 80-81, and Amin:1976, 327-328). Foreigners granted concessions for agricultural investment were to be allotted government lands which were far from the banks of the Nile which required costly capital investment in pumps and canalisation, the profitability of which was possible only in large areas which were impossible to grant under another constraint , water to be discussed below. Hence, no

foreign company was able to keep its concession except the Sudan Plantation Syndicate (SPS) which was granted a 10000 *feddans* concession in 1905, after a relaxation in the water constraint following the construction of Aswan Dam (see below) and kept in business by the colonial state when in 1911 was "entrusted with the management of Tayiba", the Gezira experimental farm and promised to be given an area of 10000 *feddans* of the area to be irrigated in the Gezira.(Gaitskell, op. cit., 63.)

The second important implication of the land policy was that by preserving both the ownership and cultivation rights, and preventing the sale of lands which might have resulted in a landless class, primitive accumulation of capital, the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production.,(Marx: 1967, 737), did not take place in its classical way. That was responsible for the absence of people ready to sell their labour power for several decades during the colonial period, a problem mentioned in many colonial reports yet attributed to the laziness of the Sudanese people. To quote only one of these reports, Lord Cromer wrote in 1900, regarding

"...the further question of whether the Soudanese are willing to work. The local officials are well-nigh unanimous in their opinion that, as a general rule (sic), the Soudanese are not industrious race. In this respect they are the very reverse of Egyptian, who are a singularly industrious race."(Cromer, 1900, p80)

The shortage of labour could have been solved by the liberation of the slave population in the Sudan which was estimated to be 20-30% of the population of Northern Sudan. Yet the colonial state did not attempt this solution for political and economic reasons. The colonial state argued that the intervention of the Slavery Department of the Egyptian Government, which was established in 1880, to abolish slavery in the Sudan, might lead to political unrest. Wingate wrote in 1908,

"It is no longer possible to ignore the fact that there is a strong feeling of discontent among the Arabs at the loss of their Sudanese servants(sic!)"(quoted in Khalafalla, op. cite.. 30)

He went on to threaten that any attempt to interfere in "Domestic Slavery (sic)" would "produce hundreds of Abdel Kader"; referring to Abdel Kader Wad Habuba who led a revolt in 1908, though the latter had nothing to do with slavery. (Daly, 1986, 235). The economic reason for not interfering with slavery was, as clearly put by Wallis the Director of Intelligence in 1918, "keeping labour on the land" (Ibid., 234); but that would not solve the problem of the demand for labour by foreign investors and the colonial state itself. Many other suggestions were brought forward. One of these was the import of foreign labour , "either Indian or Chinese", because the "Egyptian labour market is far from being over-stocked" (Cromer, 1901, 64). Leigh Hunt, the founder of Sudan Plantation Syndicate, attempted solving the problem by "bringing in American Negroes", but those brought in "soon asked to go back home" (Beshir, 1977, 33). The only foreign labour possible to attract was that of the West Africans, specially the Fallata from Nigeria. Tokar, Gash, Gezira, Nuba Mountains as well as Port Sudan, were the areas

were the greater settlement of Fallata encouraged by the colonial state had taken place. In the Gezira area alone their number increased from 5000 in 1929 to 60000 in 1956. (Khalafalla, 1982, 16).

The most important implication of the land policy and its corollary, the labour policy was the sort of arrangements carried by the colonial state in the Gezira scheme. To solve both the problem of land and labour the colonial state adopted the policy of articulating the pre-capitalist mode of production existing in the Gezira with a capitalist mode of production introduced by the state and its foreign agent the Sudan Plantation Company, later renamed as the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, (SPS). This articulation took the shape of what is widely known as the tripartite crop-sharing arrangement between the state, the SPS and the Gezira tenants. The Gezira model was to haunt most of irrigated agriculture in the Sudan. The dynamics and complications of this articulation will be discussed in Chapter 6 below. One of the most important constraints on the colonial economic policy was that of the Nile Waters which was imposed by Britain in order to protect Egyptian interests. Lord Cromer wrote in 1904,

"I know of but one issue where any conflict of interest between Egypt and the Soudan is possible. That is of the question of water supply..

"It is essential that, in all matters connected with utilisation of the waters of the Nile on any large scale, the control exercised from Cairo should be absolute.."(Cromer, 1904, pp 80-81).

This control was eventually practised by the British advisers of the Egyptian Department of Irrigation. Until the construction of the Aswan Dam in 1902 , only 2500 *feddans* were licensed for perennial irrigation in the Sudan. After the completion of the Dam , the irrigation of further 10000 *feddans* was permitted, and was increased by another 10000 in 1912 when the Dam was raised. Open permission for pump irrigation during the flood period, July to February, was given in 1905 (Gaitskell, 1959, 109).

The plans to cultivate the Gezira with cotton brought the whole question of the Nile Waters to the fore. A contradiction appeared between extending the Scheme area to the optimal size which would make the project profitable according to projected yields/feddan and cotton price/lb on one hand and the water available, taking the Egyptian needs into consideration. This contradiction provoked different proposals and estimates which necessitated the formation the Nile Projects Commission in 1920. The Commission, which was composed of three members, failed to reach a unified report. Of the three members, two suggested that Sudan should use the Nile during the flood season only, and the third suggested the acknowledgement of Egypt's existing rights and that in the future any saved water through the construction of new projects should be equally divided (Fabnumi, 1960, 116-25).

The reports of the commission were shelved following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack the Governor General in Cairo in November 1924 which led to the ultimatum presented

by Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Egyptian government. In the ultimatum Allenby notified the Egyptian government that the Sudan Government would "increase the area to be irrigated at the Gezira from 300000 *feddans* to an unlimited figure as need may arise." (Henderson, 1965, 65). The crisis in the Anglo-Egyptian relations that followed the ultimatum overshadowed the Nile Waters question which then became a card to be played by the British. The colonial state in the Sudan lost no time in suggesting the appointment of a new commission to study the question. The Nile Commission was formed in 1925 to study "the basis on which irrigation can be carried out with full consideration of the interests of Egypt and without the detriment to her natural historical right" (Fabunmi, op. cit., 117). For Chamberlain, then British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the commission "was one side of a bargain", the other side of it was that Egypt should contribute to the costs of the administration in the Sudan and especially to the maintenance of the newly formed Sudan Defence Force if the Condominium was to be kept and Egyptian interests in the Nile were to be maintained. (Daly, 1986, 319). The report of the Commission was the basis for the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement.

According to the Nile Waters Agreement the Sudan share in the Nile waters was determined to be 1/22 of that of Egypt (that is 922, 1,000,000 cubic meters compared with 22, 000,000 cubic meters to Egypt) .(Treaty Series No. 17, 1929). The Agreement provided for technical arrangements and discharge schedules which clearly defined the dates and quantities of water discharge in the Gezira and pump schemes. Areas to be irrigated by pumps between January and July were specified. Though the Agreement relaxed the constraint on the government irrigation plans by providing water for the Gezira and limited area for pump irrigation, the constraint continued to constitute part of the colonial heritage of the independent Sudan .

2.3.2. From Subsistence to Commodity Production

The history of the colonial economy is the history of the process of transformation of the Sudanese pre-colonial economy from subsistence to commodity production. In 1899 an official report described the Sudan:

"...was essentially a subsistence economy, [wit] the people self-sufficient in essential foodstuffs. There was little production to be offered to the external market. Within the country trade did not extend much beyond local barter, except in those commodities destined for export. Industry was limited to the handicraft manufacture of articles in wood, metal and earth. There was a small domestic production of rough woven cotton articles."(GGAR., 1899, 53.)

The process of transforming that subsistence economy began as we have shown above by settling the land question, land being the most important means and object of any agricultural economy. But this, in itself, was not enough to enhance the development of commodity production. In addition to private property, simple commodity production

requires a division of labour which involve the specialisation of independent producers in the production of different items. The generalisation of commodity production requires, in addition, the transformation of labour power into a commodity. (Marx, 1967, 668).

Of all these conditions only one existed in the Sudan, private ownership of land in the riparian and Gezira areas and the right of land utilisation within community lands in other parts in the country. The latter only partially served the function of private ownership of land, because it remained short of changing land into commodity which had its repercussions on land utilisation on the sub-sector of rain-fed agriculture which is discussed in Chapter 6. The division of labour was carried within the family or the household on gender and age lines.(Khalfalla:1984, 14). Exchange and trade existed, but items were surplus goods produced basically as use-values.

Instead of promoting the internal division of labour towards more specialisation, the colonial process of commoditization took a different historical path. The Sudan economy was to be integrated into the international division of labour as a producer of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods. Wingate outlined that the policy of the colonial state was to link the Sudan through a port on the Red Sea with the international market so that "the inhabitants may be more economically furnished with the requirements from abroad and may find outside markets for their products" (emphasis added). To achieve that the Sudanese producers had to develop a need for "requirements", which they did not produce and/ or to shift from locally producing some goods to importing them. They should also either have surpluses to sell or especially produce exchange-values. The need for new requirements was developed through a 'demonstration effect', where the role of traders, especially the *Jallaba*, was great. In 1904, Colonel Sparkes, the Governor of Bahar el Gazal wrote in his annual report, "There is an increasing demand for civilised commodities..". (GGAR, 1904, 98). Major Fieldman reported from Bahar el Gazal in 1913 that after,

"the introduction last year of general stores at Maridi, Yambio and Tembura, inspectors of the three districts write enthusiastically as to the keenness of the population to obtain money to enable them to purchase articles at the store which have taken their fancy." (GGAR, 1913, 68).

Locally cottage-based cotton industry which used to exist in the Gezira area and the Northern province disappeared due to the shift of demand to the more competitive imported textiles of higher quality and cheaper price (Ibrahim:1989, 74).

The need for money to pay taxation also led to the development of the market relations. During the first decade of the colonial rule a range of different taxes on land, crops, *saggias* (water-wheel), palm trees, cattle, sheep and camels were introduced. In addition a poll-tax was imposed in some areas like the Nuba Mountains, Southern Sudan and the Ingassana area in the Blue Nile.

The development of market relations and commodity production was enhanced by the extension of the railways to Khartoum in 1899, between Berber on the river Nile and Suakin on the Red sea in 1906, to Meddani in 1909 and through the Gezira via Kosti to El-Obied in Kordofan in 1911, and to Port Sudan, the new port, in 1909. The British Cotton Growing Association reported in 1913 that, "no single other colony in tropical Africa can boast of such excellent transport facilities". Cromer's desire to extend the railway to El Obeid to bring Kordofan's gum to the Market (Shuqair, 1967, 1342,) was fulfilled in 1911. Following that organised markets spread in Kordofan; El-Nahud, Um-Ruaba, El-Rahad and El-Obeid itself, gum-arabic became the greatest source of export revenues until 1920 when cotton took its place.

In the Sudan the relation of the so-called tradition sub-sector with the international market was established before the establishment of the modern sector. The list of exports from the former contained millet, cattle, sheep and goats, honey, hides and skins, sesame, dates, ostrich feather and dura. In 1908 they represented about 92% of Sudan exports earnings and decreased to 88% in 1913.

This relationship has continued despite the development of the Gezira scheme and the independence of the country. It came to constitute the most important single simulator of commodity production in this traditional sub-sector and was, in reality, responsible for the change in the crop structure and the bias towards the production of oil-seeds, ie sesame and groundnuts, following the Second World War. Through this relation indigenous, expatriates merchants and commercial companies were able to accumulate large sums of capital from the economic surplus appropriated from the peasants as commercial profits through the exports and imports from and to the traditional sub-sector. Most of the surplus appropriated from operations in this sub-sector were transferred to urban areas and the modern sector, accumulated as capital and re-invested in trade, contracts, pump irrigation, and later in mechanised agriculture and/or industry (after independence). The part of the surplus which remained in the sub-sector itself usually invested in expanding trade and transport, (private lorries), or as financial capital, especially through the *Shail* system which is a financial system introduced by merchants to provide credit to peasants during the rainy season and compel them to sell part or all of their crops in advance, before the harvest, at low prices .

Mahmoud in her study of the Sudanese Bourgeoisie (1984) revealed the importance of the Western Sudan, one of the areas as the source of capital accumulation and showed that, "During the later 1930s and in the 1940s, the majority of the now leading edible oil capitalist in Khartoum originally accumulated their capital in western Sudan." (Mahmoud, 1984, 122). My own observation in other spheres of investment confirm these results. Almost most of the cattle, sheep and camel merchants had accumulated capital from trading in western Sudan and transferred it to Khartoum. Some of them who were

residents in Khartoum had their agents from the *Jallaba* resident in the west. Agents of foreign companies exporting crops like groundnuts, sesame and gum-arabic transferred their accumulated capital to Khartoum and Port Sudan and themselves became involved in export import trade.

The momentum of this process was not uneven between different parts of the country. It depended to great extent to accessibility to foreign markets which was made possible by railway extension and improvement of other sorts of transport and communication facilities. This condition excluded the Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, and parts of Darfur and the Blue Nile provinces. The Passport and Permit Ordinance of 1922 and the Closed District Ordinance of 1929 prevented the free movement of traders, and especially the *Jallaba*, (who were the catalysts for commodity production), in these areas. Even in such areas Mahmoud found evidence that suggested that merchants had also accumulated capital, ie the South, and had transferred it to the North (mainly to Khartoum and Port Sudan), (Ibid., 123). It is important to notice that the commoditization process did not introduce a new internal division of labour in the traditional sub-sector that resulted in the specialisation in commodity production, instead the production of commodities was annexed to the subsistence economy, increasing the burden on labour and land. It is also important to notice that despite the increase of the burden, a general commoditization of land and labour did not take place. This was mainly the result of the colonial state articulation policy which kept the land tenure system; ie land as communal property, though tribal aristocracy became more involved in land allocation including land for cultivation, pasture and gum-arabic gardens. One important result of these constraints was the stagnation of the level of the development of the productive forces and its corollary the low-level of productivity in the sub-sector. The implications of this process on the rain-fed agricultural production will be discussed in chapter 6.

The process of commoditization was given a great push by the establishment of the Gezira Scheme. Here commodity production was imposed by direct state coercion. The 1921 and 1923 Gezira Land Ordinances and their amendments in the 1927 Ordinance had provided for the legal control of the Gezira land through its compulsory lease to the government for forty years. But instead of changing the landowners into free labourers and hence laying the base for the generalisation of commodity production by converting labour power itself into a commodity, the colonial state as we have shown above opted for the articulation of the pre-capitalist relations of share-cropping, the implications of which will be discussed in Chapter 6. The base for regional uneven development was established governed by the needs of international market rather than the internal development and integration of the economy. Sudan link with the international market was confirmed.

2.3.3. The Link with the International Market

The confirmation of the Sudan link with the international market was established through three types of relations: the relation with the international money market, the relation through foreign enterprises having branches or subsidiaries in the Sudan, and through the export/ import relation.

The relation of the Sudan with the international money market began by the British Treasury Bill in 1919 which guaranteed the interests on a loan of £3 million to be raised by the Sudan Government in the London Money Market at a rate of interest of 5.5% for the construction of Sennar Dam and the canalisation works of the Gezira Scheme. World War I interrupted the construction and raised the costs. The loan had to be increased to £6.5 million, issued in two instalments in 1919 and 1921 at 5.5% rate of interest and payable in 30 years starting in 1929. Another loan was guaranteed by the British Treasury in 1923 to complete the construction and to provide for the increase of the proposed area from 300, 000 *feddans* to 450,000 *feddans*, to be repaid at 4% rate of interest in 25 years starting in 1950. The Sudan Government through issuing Debenture Stock guaranteed a loan of £1.3 million to Kassala Railways Company, which was owned by the Government, at a rate of interest of 4.5%, repayable in 20 years starting in 1934. Two other similar loans were issued to the Sudan Construction Company and the Gedaref Railway and Development Company both owned by the Sudan Government and guaranteed by her in London Money Market. The Sudan Government also guaranteed the privately owned Sudan Light and Power Company (Limited) to raise £0.4 million and offered it the monopoly of generating and distributing the electricity in major Sudanese towns and the running of the tram service in Khartoum. Two of these loans apart, all of them were repaid before the country's independence .

The second type of relationship was through the foreign private enterprises working in the Sudan. The most important of them was the Sudan Plantation Syndicate which was first established as the Sudan Experimental Plantation Company by Leigh Hunt, an American, in 1904. The Company was registered in London with a capital of £80, 000 distributed in £1 shares. In 1907 the Company changed its name to the Sudan Plantation Syndicate. For the first six years the Syndicate was involved in the production of cotton in Zeidab, north of Khartoum on the east bank of the Nile. In 1910 it increased its authorised capital to £250, 000 of £1 shares. In 1911, the British Cotton Growers Association took 5, 000 shares in the Syndicate and the BCGA chairman joined its boards of directors. That was not by chance because the same year it was entrusted with the management of the Gezira experimental farm at Tayiba (Gaitskell:1959, 75-76) and after long negotiations it was co-opted as a partner in the Gezira Scheme entrusted with the management and entitled to 20% of the gross profits of the cotton sales. The Syndicate concession was to last for 25 years (Ibid., 126-128). The Syndicate achieved a gross

share in the profits of the Scheme during the period it managed it 1926-1950 of £22.7 million and a profit, (before tax deduction), of £6 million of which £8.7 million were divided to shareholders mounting to 15% of the nominal value of the share per year (Ibid., Table 6, 273). The Syndicate profit is a classical case of economic surplus generated within one country and exported to another. The Syndicate concession was withdrawn in 1950.

In addition to the Syndicate, private foreign companies dominated foreign trade in the Sudan. Most of these companies were British. They included the Mitchell Cotts Group, Gellately Hankey and Co., Sudan Mercantile and a number of cotton specialised trade companies. My estimate of their total capital is that it ranged between £8 to £10 million, while they were dealing in exports and imports of the value of £ 100 to £250 million until their nationalisation in 1970. They were dependent on the credit facilities provided by the commercial banks in the range of £11-22 million per year.(Estimates based on data of foreign trade statistics published by Sudan Government and the Annual Reports of the Governor General on Administration, Finance and Accounts of the Sudan, presented annually to the Condominium Powers, a copy of which was submitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the House of Commons in London and published by it, among its States and Accounts Papers; copies of the original reports are kept in the Central Documents House, in Khartoum.)

The commercial banks themselves were foreign enterprises. The first of these banks, the Egyptian Ahli Bank, was established in 1901, it was followed by the Barclays DCO in 1913 which soon dominated the market providing credit facilities until 1946 when the British Ottoman Bank established its first branch in 1946. It was followed by Bank Misr (Egyptian) and the Credit Lyonnais (French) in 1953 , the Ethiopian Commercial Bank and the Arab Bank in 1956. The commercial banks restricted their activity to the finance of foreign trade providing credit facilities for both exporters and importers. In 1956, 67% of the credit facilities provided by these banks were allocated to the finance of exports, 50%, and imports 17%. (Salih:1975,39).

The most important linkage with the international market was found in the nature of the colonial economy as a mono-export-crop economy. By the establishment of the Gezira Scheme, the Sudanese economy became structurally dependent on the export of cotton. It was not only the source for the income of 100,000 tenants and their families, but it was also the source of foreign currency to finance the country's imports' bill. It was also the main source of the government's revenue whether through its direct share from the cotton profits or through the indirect taxation and excise duties imposed on the cotton exports, (which by 1956 constituted 72% of the total earning of exports). Government revenue also befitted from the tariff duties on imports financed by cotton's export earnings. A

failure in the cotton crop and/or a collapse in the international cotton market lead to economic crisis. The Great Depression of 1929-33 was a classical example of the latter.

2.3.4. The Great Depression and the Colonial Economy

The Great Depression of 1929-33 was disastrous to the newly established mono-crop export economy. The average price of cotton in International Markets decreased from 18.4 in 1928/29 to 7.9 pence/LB in 1929/30 and to 6.4 pence/LB in 1930/31. (Gaitskell:1959, 152). The direct result was the collapse of export earnings from £13.5 million to less than £6 million in 1932. The Government revenue decreased from £6.8 million in 1928 to £3.8 million in 1932 the Sudan Government was forced to ask for Egyptian financial aid. Austerity measures were introduced including cutting the salaries of government employees and the reduction of their number and the reduction of government expenditure on public utilities. Salaries of all government employees were cut by 5 to 10%, and the starting salary of the newly appointed graduate of Gordon College was reduced from £8 to £5.5 per month, leading to the Gordon College Student's strike of 1931. The total number of government employees decreased from 5888 in 1930 to 4773 in 1932 and 4753 in 1933. Those who lost their jobs included 20% of the 1000 British. Some 800 Sudanese and Egyptians had their employment terminated. Some departments suffered more than others. For example, in the Department of Sudan Railways, 31% of British, 33 of the Egyptian and almost all the Greeks personnel lost their jobs.

Education suffered greatly from the effects of the Great Depression, especially because the Depression occurred at times unfavourable for education. The Gordon College's student admission fees were raised to £15 from £12 charged before and student's boarding fees to £28 instead of £25. Elementary school fees were raised from £8 to £10. Grants for education were generally curbed.

This classical example of the effect of an international depression illustrates the possible effects of an international crisis on the economy of the Sudan which had become linked with the international market through the export of primary commodities, dominated by one, cotton.

2.3.5. The Post War Boom and the Colonial Economy.

The international link could bring the crisis right into the Sudan, but on the other hand it could also bring in a boom. The post-World War Boom was a classical example for the Sudanese economy. The mechanism through which the positive effects of the boom were transferred was, (as in the crisis), the price of cotton and the earnings from cotton exports. The price of cotton began an increasing trend after World War. It increased from 10 pence/LB in 1945/46 to 19 pence/LB in 196/47. It jumped to 38.5 pence/LB in 1947/48, an increase of more than 100%, and remained at that high price during 1948/49,

to increase further to 41.3 pence/LB in 1949/50.(Gaitskell, op. cit., 263). The good prices were reflected in the exports revenues which increased from £10 million in 1946 to £15.3 million in 1947 , to £1 in 1948.

The increase of revenues of cotton exports were reflected in an increase in the revenue of the government and the incomes of the Gezira tenants. The government revenue increased LE8.2 million in 1946 to LE10.1 million in 1947 to LE12.7 in 1948 to LE19.2 in 1949 to LE41.9 in 1950/51 (when the fiscal year was changed from a calendar year one running from July to June one) (Kaballo:1984, 34-35).

The income per tenancy in Gezira increased from LE29 in 1946 to LE96, LE189, LE221 and LE281 during the years 1947,1948,1949 and 1950 respectively. The total cotton revenue for all Gezira tenants increased from LE0.5 million in 1946 to LE5.8 million in 1950.

It is impossible to equate the effects of an international economic crisis and a boom on a mono-export crop economy like the one established by the colonial state in the Sudan. One important difference is the long period effect of any international recession compared with the short-run effect of a boom. A recovery from an international recession (as the Sudanese experience had shown) did not mean a return to a pre-recession level of prices. In 1930 the price of cotton declined to 7.9 pence/LB from a level 18.4 pence/LB in 1929 and did not return to the 1929 level for seventeen years, during which the average price was less than half that of 1929.

While the period of declining prices continued for seventeen years that of increasing prices above the average price from the first season of the Scheme in 1925/26 to 1929, continued for only four seasons. If the accumulated loss is compared with the accumulated gain, the former, which amounted to LE34 million, was greater than the latter, which amounted to LE23.1 millions. (Calculated from data provided by Gaitskell:1959, 267, Table 1).

2.3.6. The Management of the Colonial Economy

Although one can apparently distinguish between direct and indirect management of the colonial economy (the Gezira Scheme as compared to the rain-fed agriculture sub-sector, the so-called traditional), the difference was not that substantial. That was because of the degree of the potential coercion, in the nature of the authoritarian colonial state, which could be used to enforce the decisions on both levels. It is true that a distinction might be made between direct administrative control and the use of economic and financial policies to affect the behaviour of economic variables through the responses of economic agents (producers, buyers and/or sellers, etc.), but this itself involves a degree of coercion.

While direct management in agriculture was based mainly on what we defined in Chapter 1 as the institutional pattern of articulation, in other sectors it was based on the capital-

labour relationship despite the presence of a militarist pattern of routine and discipline which, as it has been argued above, was a general characteristic of the colonial state. An example of the former was the Gezira Scheme, which was run by the Syndicate as part of this institutional pattern of articulation to the extent that for the tenants the Syndicate and the State were identical. Examples of the latter were the Sudan Railways and the Steamers department which were run to maintain a satisfactory rate of profit to contribute to the government revenue which owned the capital. Production and services were carried in both cases according to detailed plans to the extent that the schedule of agricultural activities in Gezira was compared to a Ford Factory discipline (Founu-Tchuigoua:1978, 29), and a retired railwayman described the trains during the colonial period "as punctual as Big Ben"(Discussion with Sudan Railway workers and employees, Railway Club, Khartoum 1987, on the 'Causes of decline of Sudan Railways'). The authoritarian colonial state did not face a real challenge to its management of the economy until after World War, when both the Gezira tenants and the railway workers went on strike, the former demanding the distribution of the reserve fund and the latter demanding the right to form their trade union organisation. It was for the post-colonial state to face the outcomes of these challenges ten years later.

The indirect management involved the patterns of political articulation, the articulation through exchange and co-existence where a greater autonomy of the pre-capitalist modes of production existed. The political articulation, as we have already discussed, contributed to strengthening the tribal and religious aristocracy by allotting pump schemes on the banks of the Blue and White Nile. The tribal aristocracy also used the recognition of their traditional powers by the colonial state in the management of communal land, Hashab (acacia Senegal) gardens, and through local tax collection to accumulate capital. They all became part of the economic management and as beneficiaries of the system, active elements in its reproduction. The district and provincial commissioners reserved for themselves the powers of interference to issue licences, to estimate the business profit tax, to determine the maximum prices and rents as well as the minimum wages to government's temporary workers. In the closed areas they had the powers to permit or deny the entry of merchants to their districts or provinces. Hence bringing the pattern of articulation through the exchange mechanism under their last resort control and continuous influence.

The members of the political and civil service themselves, who as it has been argued before were not employees of the colonial office in London and their careers development and pensions depended on the 'Sudan Government', developed interests in the reproduction of the articulated system of modes of production as it maintained the financial independence of the colonial state and ensured their careers. They made

themselves an economic base and an external and internal allies, all benefited from the restoration of the status quo and the reproduction of the articulated system.

To maintain the reproduction of the economic system, the state had to insure the reproduction of the producers, their means of production and their articulated production relations. The articulation of modes of production ensured that the minimum requirements for the reproduction of the producers' labour power were produced by them in the articulated system, ie tenants produce their grain (dura) in the Gezira, and the peasants, the nomads or the trans-nomads, became partially a subsistence and partially a commodity producer. This is the essence of what we argue as incomplete generalisation of commodity production. It is incomplete because the producer had not been completely divorced from his/her means of production, ie labour power in general did not become a commodity.

The commodity product of the articulated system had to be exchanged if capital was to realise economic surplus and if the production process was to be repeated whether as a simple or extended reproduction. The fact that the commodity product was export-oriented, (it was not just produced for exchange, but for exchange abroad), made the reproduction of the system depend on the international market. The system for its reproduction, relied on the international market for the supply of some of the means of production, some of the consumer goods, especially for those living in the urban areas and which attract through a demonstration effect more and more of the rural population who came in contact with the market. Part of the value of the exported commodity was appropriated as economic surplus by the owners of the capital: the state, the Syndicate and commercial companies and local merchants, while the tenants and peasants return some of the value of their labour power. Part of the economic surplus was exported (see above), by the Syndicate to be paid as dividends to its shareholders, part by the state to pay back the loans used in the construction of the Scheme and a part by other foreign commercial companies and banks, even if their profits were not directly related to the export activities. The state used part of its share to finance its personnel and activities as a state. Simple reproduction requires a value of exports which should cover all these requirements. Extended reproduction require a value of exports which should not only cover all these requirements but should achieve a surplus to be accumulated and reinvested. The colonial state, except during the great depression maintained the conditions for an extended reproduction, though extended in a limited scale and mainly aimed at expanding the export production, by ensuring two conditions: a) an annual increase in exports of about 8.6% between 1910 and 1942 and 15.5% between 1942 and 1956. b) curtailing public and private consumption, government expenditure increased by 3.7% between 1910 and 1942 and by 12.8% between 1942 and 1956, which were, in

both cases, less than the growth rate of exports. The surplus accumulated during the 1935-42 period allowed the higher expenditure during the 1942-56 period.

The first condition, the growth of export, was maintained by the factory-like system of production and the horizontal expansion of the cultivated land. The second condition, the curtailing of consumption, was maintained through a set of measures: a) insisting on maintaining not only a balanced budget, but also a surplus to be deposited in a reserve fund, through the restriction of government expenditure; b) a rigid exchange control and foreign trade permit and approval system which required the registration of exporters and importers and the obtain of a valid licence for the export and import of any commodity; c) the curtail on consumption through price fixing policies, wage and salaries determination, taxation, especially indirect taxation with its high income distribution incidence against the poor; in addition to direct subjection of some commodities during World War II to strict rationing system.

2.4. Religion, Native Administration and Uneven Development

In its attempt to bridge the gap between itself and the population, the colonial state used a number of policies such as a religion policy, an indirect rule policy and an education policy. These policies had their implications on the socio-economic structure of the country. The following sections will discuss these policies. An additional section will discuss the so-called Southern Policy for its importance in the discussion of the uneven development and civil war in the post-colonial Sudan.

2.4.1. The Religious Policy

The religious policy of the colonial state in the Sudan which was "determined largely by considerations of politics and security" (Holt and Daly, 1979, 124), attempted by several measures to avoid any feeling among the Muslims of Northern Sudan that the colonial state was undermining Islam or trying to convert Muslims to Christianity. Lord Kitchner wrote to the Mudirs "...Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in anyway interfered with and that the Mohammedan religion is respected." (FO. /78/5022).

In 1901 the colonial government issued a proclamation to encourage 'true Islamic religion' and hence a 'Board of *Ulema*' [Religious Scholars], was established formed of an orthodox-Islamic-cult which included the *Mufti*, [an Islamic scholar whose responsibility is the distinction between *al-Halal*, that is what is permitted, and *al-Harram*, what is prohibited, according to Islamic beliefs, and to provide spiritual guidance for Muslims in controversial matters], the *Grand Kadi*, [Chief Justice of Islamic Courts], and some other Islamic notables. The aim of the Board was to counteract the

influence of Islamic sufism which was thought to be the fertile soil for Mahdism ⁷ and religious uprising. Further a system of Islamic Sharia Courts was established under the Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance of 1902 to deal with:

"(a) any questions regarding marriage, divorce, guardianship of minors or family relationship, provided that the marriage to which the question related was concluded in accordance with Mohammedan law, provided the parties are all Mohammedans.

"(b) Any question relating to Waqf, gift, succession, wills, interdiction or guardianship of an interdicted or lost person, provided that the endower, donor, or the deceased or the interdicted or lost person is a Mohammedan.

"(c) Any question other than those mentioned, provided that all the parties, whether being Mohammedans or not, make a formal demand signed by them, asking the Court to entertain the question and state that they agree to be bound by the ruling of Mohammedan law." (El Nur:1960, 79)

Moreover, the government encouraged the rebuilding of mosques and *khatwas* and subsidised them, facilitated the pilgrimage to Mecca and observed great sensitivity when dealing with Islamic matters (Daly 1991, 3-4). Christian missions were prevented from work in the Muslim dominated Northern Sudan and when a concession was made to the missions to operate in education and the health services, it was on the condition that they did not preach Christianity to Muslims. However, full consent of Muslim children's parents was required before any religious instructions could be given.

Despite the colonial state's suspicion towards Sufist Islam, Ali al-Mirghani, the leader of the Khatimyya religious sect was allowed to move freely to reorganise his sect and though sufists were prevented from building their mosques and zawyas, [small mosques], Ali al-Mirghani was allowed to rebuild the Khatimyya mosque in Kassala. In 1900 he was awarded, on the recommendation of the colonial authorities, the C.M.G. in recognition of his collaboration and as an act to promote his personal image and social prestige among Sudanese relative to the defeated Mahdist notables. al-Mirghani made use of these opportunities to increase his wealth through possession of estates and agricultural lands and collecting Zakaht (Islamic tax) and gifts from his followers.

The colonial state's attitudes towards Ali al-Mirghani suggests that their policy with regard to Sufist Islam was pragmatic and depended on the dual role that it might play in enlisting collaborators or eliminating enmity. This was illustrated during the World War I, when the government, afraid of the possible religious agitation that might rise in support of Turkey and the Ottoman Sultan as the leader of the Muslim countries, sought the service of the Sudanese religious notables, including Abdul Rahman, the son of Al Mahdi. As a result of the of Wingate's efforts, Abd al-Rahman and "five hundred other religious and tribal leaders signed the Sudan Book of Loyalty, pledging their full support for Great Britain and her allies during the War (Warburg, 1971, 107). The Book was followed after

⁷Mohamed Ahmed who declared himself al Mahdi and led the Mahdist Revolution of 1881 was originally a member of the Sammaniyya Sufist Sect.

the War by a delegation of religious and tribal leaders to Britain in 1919 to congratulate King George on victory. This began a new era in the collaboration of traditional religious leaders and the colonial state. Sheriff Yusuf al-Hindie, the leader of the Hindyya religious sect "who in 1909 publicly charged by the Board of Ulema for interfering in tribal affairs became persona granta and was recommended for a C.M.G."(Ibid., 107). Al-Hindie's political rehabilitation enabled his ascent to being one of the wealthiest Sudanese, possessing lands in Gezira and Khartoum and also like al-Mirghani received gifts from his followers.

In addition to traditional leaders, Abd al-Rahman appeared as a valuable collaborator.⁸ Abd al-Rahman proved to be useful to the colonial state both in internal and international affairs. Internally Abd al-Rahman condemned the 1924 Revolution, was a go-between in ending Gordon College Student' strike, stood against the radical wing in the Graduate Congress and backed the moderates who preferred co-operation with the colonial state, and with his followers participated in all the institutions created by the colonial state in its policy of gradual constitutional development which was rejected by the militants. Internationally, Abd al-Rahman expressed the rejection of the unity with Egypt and travelled twice to Britain to rally the support of British officials against any possible British concessions to Egypt in the Sudan, ie the Sidqi-Bevin Protocol of 1946.

Abd al-Rahman benefited from his services to the colonial state. Though Abd al-Rahman agricultural activities began as early as 1908, the outstanding growth in his wealth, commercial and agricultural activities were due to the direct and indirect assistance of the colonial state, as a reward to his services during the War and the 1924 events. Due to the shortage of fuel supplies during the War, Abd al-Rahman was granted a contract to supply the government with wood from the forests of Gezira Aba⁹ and to cultivate the land cleared by cotton. In 1919 he was offered contracts to supply the construction of the Sennar Dam by local building materials. In 1926 he was granted a loan of 4500 Egyptian pounds which was written off later. He was also given a lease, with two of his relatives, a lease to cultivate Gondal Scheme on the Blue Nile which was *originally developed by the government*.

On the other hand, Abd al-Rahman making use of the opportunity given to him by the government to tour the Gezira areas during the war, laid the foundation for organising his followers "into a religious *tariqa*" (Ibrahim, 1989,pp173-174). His organisation was build

⁸In a private letter to Clayton, Wingate claimed that the government was able to deal with a Mahdist uprising in Jebel Qadir in 1915 because Abd al-Rahman "informed about him.." (Wingate to Clayton, 24 April 1915, SAD/469/9).

⁹Gezira Aba is a small island on the White Nile, north of Kosti. Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi began his revolution from this Island in 1881, where he maintained his first victory against the Turko-Egyptian forces.

on a system of *mandub*, (representative/delegate), and *wakeel*, (agent), that spread to cover most of the provinces where the Mahdiyya was popular, especially the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur. He also organised reading groups of his father's book of blessings and prayers which the Grand Kadi declared legal after a long hesitation by the authorities.

Abd al-Rahman used the organisation of his *Ansar*¹⁰ to enhance both his political and economic career. His success to keep his followers calm during the War proved to the authorities that he was influential. He used his followers to demonstrate his power by rallying them in Aba Island during religious and political occasions. The two Muslim Eids [festivals] were occasions used by Abd al-Rahman to perform a show of power by gathering his followers for Eid pray. He used also to gather them whenever an official was visiting the area.

Abd al-Rahman used his religious influence to enhance his wealth and agricultural activities. His *mandubs* and *wakeels* collected Zakaht (Islamic tax) from his followers. He accepted gifts from them in exchange of *barkah* (blessing) . In addition the *muhajirin* worked in his agriculture schemes for "pittance.. bellila [boiled dura meal], porridge and a blessing" (Robertson, 1974 , 33).

Ali al-Mirghani never accepted the promotion of Abd al-Rahman, and since 1919 when the latter presented his father's sword to King George, al-Mirghani accused the British of planning to install Abd al-Rahman king on the Sudan. This established a sort of rivalry between the two notables which aggravated the historical conflict between their two religious sects. This led al-Mirghani to seek alliance with Britain's rival in the Sudan, Egypt.

Hence religious policy in the Northern Sudan which was started by the desire to counter Sufist Islam as the origin of Mahdism, concluded, through pragmatism, by promoting religious sectarianism and alliance with Neo-Mahdism leaving the Northern Sudan divided between two competing religious sects led by wealthy religious aristocracy.

2.4.2. Education Politics and Politics of the Educated

From the start the colonial state thought of education as an important tool to establish their hegemony. Salisbury wrote to Kitchner in 1898 that, "The only method" to "count securely upon... their,[Sudanese] co-operation either in the duties of government or the promotion of industrial progress "was" to give the races whom you have conquered *access to the literature and knowledge of Europe*" (Quoted in Beshir, 1977, 39). Lord Cromer, on the other hand, thought of the creation of" a class of Soudanese who before

¹⁰The Ansar are the followers of Sayed Mohamed Ahmed al Mahdi(1844-1885) who led the 1881-1885 Revolution in the Sudan against the Turko-Egyptian rule(1821-1885), and created an independent state (1885-1898).

long be capable of filling some subordinate posts under the Government." (Cromer Speech at Khartoum, 28th January. 1903, FO/635/25). Sir James Currie, the first Director of Education, defined the objectives of the education policy in his first annual report in 1902 as the creation of indigenous class of administrators and artisans and the diffusion of elementary education among the masses to enable them to cope with the machinery of government and administration of justice. (GGAR. 1902, .114).

Moreover , education of the Sudanese was thought important to replace the Egyptians working in the Sudan. Egyptians were thought to endanger the hegemony of the colonial state, (dominated by the British), either through corruption which would created mistrust and discontent among the Sudanese or by spreading hostile feelings towards the British in line with the growing nationalist feeling in Egypt itself. The Court of Inquiry into the mutiny of Sudanese Battalions in 1900, accused the Egyptian Officers of inciting the mutiny. Colonel Jackson who headed the Court went further and suggested the removal of the Sudanese cadets from the Egyptian Military School in Cairo and the establishment of a similar school in Khartoum to avoid the influence of Egyptian Nationalism on the cadets .The recommendation was implemented in 1905.

The policy led to the creation of a new class of *effendia*, the predecessor of the Sudanese bureaucracy. By 1920 out of 4178 classified jobs within the colonial state apparatus, 1544 junior post were held by Sudanese as compared to 535, British, 1824 Egyptian, 167 Syrians, and 108 other nationalities (Beshir, 1969,p55). The expenditure on education increased from 0.3% of total expenditure of the government in 1901 to 2.4%in 1920 and number of attending elementary schools from 1280 in 1907 to 7649 in 1920.(ibid., pp44-55).

Though the outcome of the first twenty years was significant in elementary education, the achievement of education as a tool of hegemony was unsatisfactory as far as the colonial state was concerned. Instead of creating an educated strata which would, as expected by Salisbury and Currie, facilitate the acceptance of the colonial rule, it was clear by the end of the war that the educated were carriers of the 'germs', to use Maffey's famous expression, of nationalism "from which" the Sudanese rural population should be protected. The rise of nationalist feelings was reflected in the organisation of the League of the Sudanese Union in 1920 and the White Flag League in 1923 and the 1924 Revolution which were all initiated by the educated elite. The response of the colonial state was aggressive repression and education suffered a major set-back between 1924 and 1938. Expenditure on education was stagnant between 1924 and 1926 and suffered from major cuttings from 1930 to 1937. It was to bear most of the burden of the Great Depression of 1929-1933 ; expenditure declined substantially from 179,609 to 112,393 Egyptian pounds, the number of children at elementary schools decreased by 0.3%, at primary schools by 32% and students in Gordon College, the only secondary school by

39.1% and those in technical schools by 45%. The salaries of the College's graduates were cut by % which led to the Student's strike of 1931. At the same time the number of classified jobs was decreased by more than 1000 between 1930-1933. Though those measures might be reviewed as a necessary response to the Great Depression, a general attitude against the development of education in the Sudan was widespread amongst the British Officials. A British arrival in the Sudan in 1929 wrote that he found "strong disapproval of education, especially of Gordon College, amongst most of the British officials .."(Griffith, 1953, 6).

The dissatisfaction with the Sudanese educated strata was reflected in addition to the cut in education expenditure and opportunities, by the adoption of the policy of indirect rule after 1922 (see sub-section 2.4.3 below)

The suspicion of the educated and the anti-education policy in the Sudan at that time could be attributed to an overall colonial policy. This policy contributed to the hostility to education. It was based on the principle of indirect rule which had spread through the British Empire following the publication of Lugard's 'Dual Mandate' in 1922 and the practical experience of indirect rule in Nigeria. It could also be explained by the Milner Report of 1920 ¹¹ which advised the Government of the Sudan to take in the "matter of education, not to repeat the mistake (sic) which has been made in Egypt of introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than in employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to government employment" (quoted in MacMichael, op. cit., 262). Hence the Commission advised the expansion of education that would give" the Sudanese a capacity and taste for employment in other directions ."(Ibid., 262). This did not imply an anti-education policy, but rather suggest a shift in emphasis from educating for government employment to education for "employment in other directions". Even for government employment, the colonial state should have extended education because supply was far behind demand. In 1928 there were 270 vacancies than available graduates (Sanderson, 1989, p78). Although the need for more junior and technical personnel was great due to the expulsion and compulsory retirement of Egyptian personnel after the 1924, the education system was not able to provide enough Sudanese to replace them. paradoxically, though the intermediate and secondary schools students had increased between 1920 and 1930 before it began to decline, the intake and number of elementary schools declined sharply during this period and a shift towards replacing them by khalwas was hastened . Meanwhile the need for junior and middle-rank posts was satisfied by employing more

¹¹The Milner Commission was appointed in 1919 to investigate the events and causes of the 1919 Revolution in Egypt; Sudan was not part of its terms of reference, yet two of its members visited the Sudan and the Commission in reality submitted a separate report on the Sudan.(see MacMichael, opt. cit. Chapter XII for elaborate review of the Commission Report.)

British junior personnel whose number was estimated to be 464 in 1930 and decreased during the Great Depression to reach 358 in 1934 and remained at that size till 1939.

The anti-education policy might be explained by the fact that the members of the Political Service had developed a vested interest in both preserving the colonial state and slowing and delaying any Sudanization of its personnel because, unlike the officials of other British colonies who might not lose their jobs if replaced by the nationals of the colony or even if that colony got its independence, the personnel of the colonial state in the Sudan were the employees of that state and their future and careers were linked to it. Education of Sudanese, hence, would have resulted in two things that might endanger that vested interest; nationalism and Sudanization. The irony was that those colonial officials who restricted education in the Sudan were the same officials supposed by the paternal colonial ideology to be the guardians of the people to preparing them for self-government. But in the 1920s that was not seen contradictory by the colonial ideologists because self-government, according to them, was supposed to be achieved through the institutions of indirect rule. So education ceased to be a tool of establishing and exercising hegemony during the 1920-1935 period. Sir Stewart Symes who replaced Maffey as Governor-General (1934-1940), was more liberal and thought of winning the educated Sudanese rather than leaving them to be recruited by the Egyptian nationalists, especially as the negotiations between Egypt and Britain had been continuing since 1930 threatening that a compromise on the Sudan question might lead to the return of the Egyptians personnel to the Sudan; an issue which was actually agreed to in the 1936 Treaty. In addition, Symes recognised the need for a central bureaucracy of efficient employees and not of 'native tribal chiefs' if the colonial state was to carry its objectives. (Bakheit, 1987, 172). This central bureaucracy, according to Symes was to build on the shoulders of the British administrators and, in order to keep the costs of administration as low as possible, he argued for collaboration not with tribal authorities, but with Sudanese intelligentsia. (Daly and Holt, 19, p145) When Symes took over the governor-generalship, the educated Sudanese were emerging as a pressure group for the change of education. That was expressed in the articles published in *al-Fajar*, the Sudanese magazine edited by Arfat Mohamed Abdalla, demanding more education. M A Mahjoub who would later become prime minister, wrote in 1934, "Give Us Education" demanding the enhancing of the development of education and the establishment of a "school of law, an agricultural school, and a higher school of engineering" (quoted in Beshir, 1977, 126). Many other articles played the same tune. In addition the educated strata came out openly to attack the native administration policy of the government vis-à-vis the development of education and the promotion of the Sudanese to senior jobs.

By 1935 the government itself recognised the need for the development of higher education and in 1936 a decision was made to establish higher schools for engineering,

agriculture and veterinary in addition to the schools of medicine (1924) and law (1931) which were established earlier.

The promotion of educated Sudanese in the administration was hastened. The Sudanese officials replaced British and Egyptian personnel in Divisions 2 and 3. Accordingly the number of Sudanese in these posts increased from 2736 in 1930 to 4162 in 1939, while the corresponding number of British personnel decreased from 464 to 356 and that of Egyptians from 1003 to 574 in the same period.

The new attitude of the colonial state towards education and the educated Sudanese since 1934, which was a result of many factors as we have seen, and the general atmosphere created by the negotiation and conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, brought to the agenda of the Sudanese Intelligentsia the question of their role in the determination of the future of the Sudan. Without going in the details, the educated Sudanese strata was able to establish its first officially recognised organisation in 1938 by forming the Graduates Congress. The Congress conceived itself as a body concerned with matters of public interest, a wide definition which understood by Congress members to include issues ranging from encouraging and promoting education to demanding self-determination. The colonial state on the other hand, understood the Congress on a different level as a "semi-public organisation interested in philanthropic and public affairs and competent to hold and express opinions on such matters as comes within its purview" (Hunderson, 1953, 540/1) and as far as it *should not seek recognition as a political organisation or claim the representation of any but its members*. Hence from the start there were a conflict in defining the role and nature of the Congress. This conflict manifested itself when the congress submitted a memorandum in 1942 demanding, among other things, the British and Egyptian governments to "issue, on the first possible opportunity joint declaration granting the Sudan, in its geographical boundaries, the right of self-determination, directly after the War." (Ibid., 540/1).

The colonial state did not only reject the memorandum, but also declared that by submitting it the Congress had forfeited her recognition and co-operation. It expected the Congress to "co-operate with [her]... in furthering what is sincerely [sic] imagined to be the best interest of the Sudan as a whole." (Civil Secretary to Governors/March, 28th, 1938 Bag, 1/1/1, NRO, Khartoum). The Civil Secretary bluntly told the Congress "to renounce any claim, real or implied to be the mouth-piece of the whole country ." (ibid.) Hence after four decades of colonial education policy the colonial state found itself in conflict with the same class of its own creation.

Yet the educated strata was frustrated by the rejection of their memorandum and were faced by the challenge of their own claim that they represent the people. They were not able to rally the people in any form of popular organisation or mass activity that could have proved their claim and gained them the recognition of the colonial state as

representative of the people. Instead they turned to the traditional religious sectarian leaders to get access to the masses. This resulted in the split of the Congress and hence the national movement and affected the formation of the political parties in the Sudan where the biggest two were to be dominated by the two big religious sects, the Mahdiyya and Khatimyya. The frustration of the educated strata led them to seek alliance with the two Condominium States, Egypt and Britain. A trend allied with Britain accepted the colonial state policy of gradual constitutional development that prepare the Sudan for self-government. This trend was linked with the Mahdiyya sect which formed the Umma party in 1945. The other trend thought alliance with Egypt to demand the withdrawal of the British and the unity of the Nile Valley, Egypt and the Sudan, under the Egyptian Monarch and these formed the Ashiqqa party.

A new and different generation of the educated strata appeared in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was a result of internal and regional as well as international circumstances.

On the internal level, the upgrading of the Gordon College to a post-secondary college in 1944/45, the transfer of the secondary branch to Wadi Seidna in 1944, and the establishment of new secondary schools in Hantoub in 1946, Rumbeck in 1949 and Khor Tagat in 1950 diversified and widened the education opportunities. Since 1939, the Graduate Congress had encouraged the establishment of non-governmental schools [Ahlia Schools which means native schools], and organised an annual Education Day to raise funds for building them. By 1956 32 intermediate and 4 secondary schools were built through such initiative. The Congress also encouraged Sudanese students to seek higher and university education in Egypt and in 1946 the delegation of the Sudanese parties which visited Egypt "urged the Egyptian Government to open more opportunities for Sudanese education in Egyptian universities and schools" (Beshir, 1969, p166). By 1949 there were about 789 Sudanese students in the Egyptian universities and high education institutes (Ibid., 166). Some of those students were influenced by the Marxist literature and introduced to the communist ideology through the Egyptian Communist Party, known the as the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, [HADATW, the Arabic abbreviation]. A group of those students joined HADATW and by 1944 they formed a cell of the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation, [HASATW] which later to be renamed as the Sudanese Communist Party. At the same time Marxist literature was known to some Sudanese intellectuals during the Second World War when introduced by British soldiers influences by the British Communist Party.

The international situation during and after the War and the role played by the Soviet Red Army and the establishment of the communist rule in Eastern Europe, all created an atmosphere which promoted the spread of communist slogans and Marxist ideology. Sudan was no exception. In 1946 a communist organisation was established in the Sudan

and its first cell was among the students of the Gordon College . This affected the student movement which had begun in 1938/39 as a cultural society in the secondary and high schools of the college and developed into a student union in 1941. Under the pressure of the newly organised communists, the College Union launched the first public demonstration since that organised by the League of the White Flag in 1924. That was a different development in the struggle against the colonial rule because it introduced direct agitation of the masses instead of raising memorandums and behind closed-doors discussions and negotiations which were the tactics adopted by the Congress. In 1947 the Student Union leadership was won by the communists and their allies. The political activities spread among the students of the newly established secondary schools and in 1949 a Student Congress was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the national students movement.

At the same time the new trend among the educated strata extended their activities to contribute to the organisation of the workers trade unions in 1946/47 and of the Gezira Tenants in 1952. Instead of seeking alliance with religious sectarian leaders or co-operating with one of the Condominium states, the new trend sought the organisation of the masses and raised the slogans of the right to self-determination and the joint struggle with the Egyptian people against the British colonialism . This new attitude was reflected in the strikes of the railway workers and the College Students in 1947 demanding the official recognition of their unions. It was also reflected in the wide demonstrations of the students, workers, and other urban dwellers against the establishment of the Legislative Assembly in 1948 .These activities represented different tactics from those adopted by the Congress. In 1944, for example, when the colonial state decided to establish the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan, the Congress decided to boycott it, but no popular activity was involved. In 1948, the demonstrations against the Legislative Assembly took place in most of the Sudanese towns and resulted in the death of two workers and many casualties. The Ashiqqa, being mostly an urban party, was drawn to this new struggle tactics, while the Umma party accepted the participation in the gradual constitutional development institutions.

In 1949 a group of students formed the Islamic Liberation Movement, as a response and rejection to the communists influence among the students. This movement developed through the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren Movement into a Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Movement which would play influential rule in Sudanese politics later.

Another group emerged in 1951 named itself ' independents ' and although remained a student group, its leaders in the fifties were, as individuals, to serve as ministers during one of the important periods of rule (1971-1976).

The instability and lack of continuity of the colonial education policy resulted in fewer educated Sudanese compared with what could have been achieved if the restriction on education between 1920 and 1935 were not imposed. A corollary to that result was the delay in Sudanisation of senior and middle-level personnel jobs until the period of self-government in 1954-56. By 1948, for example, the Sudanese held only 14.3% of the administrative jobs (Niblock:1987, 59). Their number in the Political Service was only 119 in 1952. In 1954 when the Sudanisation Committee began its work according to the Self-Government Agreement of 1953, there were 1069 British employees, compared with a number of 550 in 1920. Table 1 shows the classification, according to nationality, of the Civil Service (including the Political Service) in the Sudan for selected years from 1920 to 1956.

In 1956, when the Sudan became independent, 71.1% of the employees of the Sudan Government and its public corporations had completed intermediate or elementary schools only. Those who completed secondary schools represented 23.2% and those who attended higher education, including university, constituted 5.7% of the government and public corporations employees. (Calculated from Al Amin, n.d., 31)

Table 1. Nationality of Civil Servants 1920-1956 (Including the Political Service)

nationality	1920	1930	1953	1954	1955	1956
Sudanese	1520	2760	7860	9774	9007	11621
British	550	1030	1168	1111	732	259
Egyptian	1630	1320	145	108	124	120
Others	260	320	45	56	52	227
Total	3960	5430	9218	10049	9915	12127

Source: Beshir, 1977, *Education Policy and Employment in the Sudan*, Khartoum, DSRC, University of Khartoum

2.4.3. Native Administration

Though the policy of indirect rule in the Sudan is associated in most of the literature with the developments in the aftermath of World War 1, (ie Beshir, 1977; Al Terraffi, 1982, MacMichael, 1934), the policy of incorporating the tribal leaders in the colonial administration had been practised since Wingate's governor-generalship (1900-1916). A handbook issued to assist the sub-mamurs advised them that the *Sheikhs* "perform work of the greatest important and responsibility.." and that it "is the aim of the Government to associate [them] as a class with the work of the administration." (Quoted in Warburg, 1971, 142/43). Though the *Sub-mamur's Handbook* notified the *sub-mamurs* that *sheikhs* were not 'public servants', the colonial state regarded them as "its tribal agents, who could be appointed, overruled, and dismissed just as any government official" (Ibid., 143). The Governor-General reported in 1906 that the "policy adopted has been to raise the status of the sheikh as far as possible in the eyes of his people by trying to impress on them (and

on him) that he is the representative in his own village of the government"(GGAR., 1906,).

The implementation of this policy was left to the governors of the provinces without further directives or ordinances being issued. The invasion of Darfur and its annexation to the Sudan brought up the issue of indirect rule for the first time. MacMichael suggested a "conservative policy which leave the power of the existing *sheikhs*, '*sharatis*', '*meliks*' and '*sultan*' over their people unimpaired.."(Daly, 1986, 198). Wingate who accepted the suggested policy insisted on the subordination of the native administration to the colonial state and rejected a proposal of using Abd al-Hamid, a rival of Ali Dinar and a son of a former Sultan of Darfur, as an independent Sultan or as "...a the hereditary and legitimate Sultan of Darfur", but he did not mind using him in the "capacity of Government delegate or official intermediary"(Ibid., 189).

The question of native administration was brought to the agenda once again when S. Wallis the Director of Intelligence suggested granting judiciary powers to some notables in urban and rural areas in 1917. The same year, Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary, made a similar proposal suggesting that such judiciary powers granted to native notables should be supervised by the British inspectors and not the Egyptian *mamurs* so as to limit the powers of the latter. He also suggested the formation of advisory local councils composed of native notables and tribal leaders to assist the inspectors and bring them in direct contact with the people instead of depending on the Egyptian *mamurs* as mediators. When these proposals were put to the annual meeting of the governors of the provinces in 1918, 1919, and 1920, a dual policy of appointing more Sudanese to minor jobs and the promotion of native administration was adopted. At the same time a tendency towards the Anglicisation of the Sudan Government appeared. This was reflected in the increasing powers of the inspectors, whose title was changed to district commissioners, (DC), to reflect their direct responsibility of the administration of the districts which led to the marginalisation of the Egyptian *mamurs* until they were expelled in 1924. Districts were re-arranged and became smaller which resulted in the increase of the British administrators.

The Milner Committee intervened in the discussion already undergoing within the Sudan Government to suggest in 1921,

"Having regard to its [the Sudan] vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left as far as possible, in the hands of Native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present economy and efficiency." (quoted in MacMichael 1934, 144-45)

The report of the Milner Committee concluded the long discussion among the officials of the colonial state and 1922 witnessed the issue of the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs

Ordinance. It regularised, "the customary" powers of the *sheikhs* of nomads of "punishment upon their tribesmen and of deciding disputes among them", which had been exercised by them "from time immemorial". The Ordinance authorised the Governors of the Provinces with the consent of the Governor-General to grant such powers of punishment and settlement of disputes to the nomad sheikhs on condition that these powers are exercised on their tribesmen only. Punishment was limited to a fine of 25 Egyptian pounds or equivalent in kind if the sheikh exercised his powers in a council of elders or up to 10 Egyptian pounds if he was sitting alone (El Nur, 1960, 78). The right to appeal to the district commissioner against sentences passed by sheikhs was clearly stated in the ordinance. By 1923, about 300 Sheikhs were exercising judiciary powers according to the Ordinance. The 1922 Ordinance was substantial in upgrading the prestige as well as the performance of the Sheikhs who were by the time carrying administrative duties of maintaining order, preventing crimes, arresting wrongdoers and collecting tax (MacMichael, op. cit., 245).

The 1924 revolution and the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General who advocated the dual policy, marked the retreat from that policy and the adoption of the policy of 'indirect rule'. Sir Geoffrey Archer, who replaced Lee Stack as Governor-General, attempted a continuation of the policy; but was compelled to resign in 1926, leaving the platform to Sir John Maffey (1926-1933) who provoked the policy of indirect rule as "protective glands against septic germs" of the nationalism thought to be spread from Khartoum in the future (Sanderson, 1989, 81; Daly, 1988, 366). Maffey from the start, declared his policy as of favouring tribal leaders to appointment of "executive officials selected.. from the ranks of native population". His choice of the former, he argued, was because it was a proper instrument of devolution, a less costly one, and would allow an "opportunity... to lay a foundation upon which a lasting structure may be built from the best material to be found in the country" (Quoted in MacMichael, op. cit.. pp 250-1). A logical corollary to that policy was "gradually to reduce the number of sub-mamurs, clerks, accountants, and similar bureaucratic adjuncts in out districts" (Ibid., 251).

No time was wasted, the 1922 Ordinance was revealed to be replaced by the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance of 1927 which was not to be applied to nomads alone. The new ordinance enabled the Governor-General to establish by warrants Sheikhs Courts in any area in the country. The Governors of the Provinces were empowered to issue regulations to organise courts procedures. In 1928 the same ordinance was amended to allow smaller tribes to be attached to bigger ones. By 1931, the 1928 Ordinance was replaced by the Native Courts Ordinance which was more "simple in structure, broad and elastic in sanctions", as described by the Civil secretary (Ibid., 254). It was to be applied to all Sudan except the Southern Provinces where the Chiefs Courts Ordinance of 1931 was in

power (Al Terraffi, 1982, 12). It established five classes of courts: a village court, a court of Sheikh sitting alone, a court of Sheikh sitting with elders, a court of Sheikh presiding a council of Sheikhs, and a special court to be convened to look at genuine inter-tribal fights and/or disputes. All courts, except the village and the special courts, were to be established by warrants issued by the Governor-General. The village court was to be appointed by a written order of the Governor of the Province, while the special court was formed with the approval of the Legal Secretary (El Nur, 1960, 85).

The judicial powers granted to the tribal leaders enhanced their social status and allowed the devolution of more administrative powers and responsibilities. This included the control of grazing rights, water resources, gum-arabic gardens, distribution of land for rain-fed cultivation, control of markets, and collection of tax. This provided tribal leaders with new powers which enabled them to increase their wealth and accumulate capital. Hence a social strata which was during the Mahdiyya on the decline, had been rehabilitated and promoted by the colonial state. This led to the conservation and encouragement of the tribal system, especially in Western and Southern Sudan where no economic development took place during the Condominium.

The Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922 and the Closed Districts Ordinance of 1929 backed the tribal policy of the colonial state by allowing the declaration of vast regions of western Sudan, the Funj area of the southern Blue Nile, and all the Southern Sudan as closed districts preventing the free movement of citizens; especially the riverine merchants, (the *Jallaba*), who were required to obtain a priory permit to enter and practise trade in these areas from the Governors of the concerned provinces. Both the tribal and closed districts policies contributed to the prevention of the possible integration of the Sudanese tribes and ethnic groups.

The restriction of education which constituted part of the policy of indirect rule kept the areas dominated by native administration at the bottom of the educational development in the Sudan. Until 1944 only one graduate from Gordon College was from Darfur and in 1952 only 14% of the pupils of elementary schools in the province could find places in intermediate schools, compared with 42% in Khartoum province. In 1953 only one intermediate school was operating in Darfur, compared to two in each Kordofan and Kassala, three in the southern provinces and an average of five schools in each Khartoum, Blue Nile and Northern provinces (Daly, 1991, 334).

2.4.4. The Southern Policy

The term "the Southern Policy" is generally used in the literature on the Sudan to refer to the set of directives detailed in the Civil Secretary's Circular of January 25th 1930. However, the term is used here to define the set of policies and measures practised or attempted through the Condominium era (1898_1956). This is because the 1930 Circular

was only one element in the Southern Policy, and in perspective, was not even a new one. It was in reality a formal statement of a number of measures which had been practised and executed for a long time before its issue.

The 1930 memo constituted of four main directives: the replacing of Arabic-speaking staff by a non-Arabic speakers; the control immigrant traders from Northern Sudan, the need for the British staff to familiarise themselves with the beliefs, customs, and languages of the people of the South, and the use of English language wherever communication in the local vernacular was impossible. All these elements of the policy had been practised *before* 1930. For example in 1910, following the establishment of the Equatorial Corps that took over from the Egyptian Army Battalions that had been stationed in the South since the re conquest Wingate agreed to introduce English as a semi-official language. (Wingate to Fleiden, private, 27 December 1910, SAD, 103/7/2). This was followed by the expulsion of the Arabic-speaking Battalions of the Egyptian Army. Another example was the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, which was soon followed by the Closed District Order the same year, both had restricted the movement of the Northern traders, *Jallaba*. It is, hence, absurd to assume that the 1930 memorandum determined the Southern Policy, unless we mean by the use the term to ignore other important elements of the practised policy of the colonial state in the South; elements such as the repressive policy of the punitive expeditions, the religious, educational and investment policies.¹² The first objective of the British in the South was international, to reach the remote frontiers preventing other European forces, the French and the Belgium, from claiming any rights in the area. Hence the reason behind the early military presence which provoked the resistance of the tribes in the South. The Southern resistance generated the most important element of the Southern Policy which was the punitive expeditions and patrols marched through the Southern Region for three decades in order to pacify the country. The core of the Southern Policy was the suppression of the resistance of the Southern people. MacMichael reported more than twenty four expedition sent against the Southern tribes, especially the Nuer, between 1904-1934 (MacMicheal, op. cit., Chapter 8 and 15). Even the Royal Air Force, "recently stationed

¹²The concentration on the relation between the North and the South, or on the policies towards the northern traders in the south, the policy towards Islam and Arabic language, is the North-biased and in reality ignores the most important elements of the Southern Policy, the term defined as all the measures taken or attempted by the colonial state in Southern Sudan and implicitly assumes that if the Northern traders, the Arabic language and Islam are allowed to spread, the post-colonial Sudan would not have suffered from a Southern Problem. That understanding suggests a policy of arabization and Islamization may solve the problem. A suggestion we find ridiculous because it is not democratic, it ignores the right of the Southern people to develop their culture and it undermines the role of ethnicity, uneven development and the unequal distribution of wealth in the country.

in the Sudan was called in to fly several missions against the Nuer" (Daly, 1986, 401), who had the "distinction of being a perennial thorn in the flesh of the government"(MacMichael, op. cit., 179).

These expeditions gave the administration in the South its main characteristic. "Administration in the South", wrote Sanderson, "became synonymous with military operations" (1991, 46). The result was disastrous; people were killed, villages burnt and cattle raided and looted. Some of these punitive measures could be identified as genocide missions as in the expedition against Dinka Aliab in 1919 (Ibid., 46).¹³ By the early 1920s, the coercive policy of punitive was heavily criticised. Sir Wasey Sterry, (1866-1955), the Legal Secretary (1917-1926), who was acting Governor-General in 1920, described the policy as a failure (Sterry to Woodland, 23 September 1920, SGA, CIVEC 1/9/3). Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General (1917-1924), himself a leader of a punitive expedition in 1902, was reported by Willis, then Director of Intelligence, to have been convinced "to set his face against any more petrols (Quoted in Daly, 1986, 399). Although alternative measures were taken to establish a stable administration in the area, the punitive expeditions continued until 1932, despite these criticism.

These measures represented new elements of the Southern Policy and were in line with similar measures taken in the Northern Sudan; the expulsion of Egyptian *mamurs* and the articulation of indigenous political systems by the introduction of native administration. The district commissioner among the *Azande* was nothing else than a Paramount Chief, while the *Nuer*, after the 1929 expedition, recognised the government authority and the district commissioner as their chief (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981, 180). The DCs-Chiefs administration continued to rule the South until independence in 1956.

In addition to the punitive expeditions and the establishment of the colonial authority in the South, the Southern Policy included other important elements which were, also, in practise before the 1930 memorandum such as the religious and educational policies.

The religious policy in the South was a result of a compromise made by Lord Cromer and the Colonial State in Khartoum to the different Christian missions which were prevented from work in the North as part of the religious policy in that area which was designed to avoid any religious agitation. The missionaries attacked the administration in Khartoum as one preventing the spread of Christianity and the promotion of Islam. Leaning to the pressure the government in Khartoum allowed the work of the missions in the South.

¹³In a recent article A. Dickie, writing about "Systems of Agriculture production in the Southern Sudan", mentioned 'sparse population' as a constraint to agricultural development in the area. Investigating the causes of 'sparse population', he cited "years of exposition to raiding and destruction by slavers, Turko-Egyptian and Dervishes" as well as civil wars after independence (Dickie:1991, 280); but he failed to mention the 'contribution' of colonial state through the policy of punitive expeditions!

Three Christian missionary societies were active in the South: the Italian Roman Catholic (known as the Verona Fathers), the Anglican Missionary Society and the American Presbyterian Mission. The South was divided into spheres among the three societies. Education in the South was left totally to missionary societies, the result was a poor quality of education and the product an educated Southerner who was different than that educated in Gordon College and government schools in the North.

2.4. Conclusion

This Chapter has analysed of the colonial state and economy which had developed in 58 years in the Sudan. They represented the colonial legacy which the social and economic forces in the independent Sudan, although they were its product, had to examine, evaluate, continue or/and change. It was the challenge, the historical conditions in which the Sudanese people had inherited, that they have to overcome if they were to shape their history. These conditions were of an uneven developed, export-oriented economy with weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages; liable to be severely affected by international crises and moderately benefiting from international booms. The social structure was composed of an influential religious and tribal aristocracy, based on a system of articulated modes of production where the capitalist mode of production through its international linkage was the dominant, a weak national bourgeoisie, a small, though organised and militant, working class, and a wide rural population composed of tenants, peasants and nomads. The social classes also included a divided bureaucracy, military and intelligentsia, formed of the old effendia fraction who were the product of Gordon College and a new fraction affected by the growth of the national movement after World War II.

After almost half the length of time of the colonial rule, the country faced a crisis which is described in Chapter 4. Could that crisis be related to the colonial legacy? The questions remain how and why?

CHAPTER 3

THE CRISIS OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE 1954-1973

3.1. Introduction

A pioneer work that has attempted the analysis of crisis in the Sudan was that of Mohamed Hashim Awad,(1966)¹. Awad based his analysis for the ten years 1956-1966 on the study of the ruling group which he held responsible for the corruption and bad government. According to Awad this group was mainly composed of businessmen who had great influence in the political parties through financing the activities of these parties(1966, 78-81). He found the origin of the power of the businessmen in their collaboration with the colonial rule, their domination of the local councils because the intellectuals refused to participate in them when they were first established by the colonial government, and their ascendancy to the central government through the domination of the parties and the parliament. Awad argued that the Sudanese businessmen group had allied itself to the foreign businessmen group. Through that alliance the foreign group found safeguards against the growing nationalism and the local group gained finance by the foreign banks and profits in joint operations with foreign commercial companies.(pp58-60) He also argued that a fraction of the Sudanese businessmen group were mostly money lenders to agriculture in both modern and traditional. He went on to argue that the main problem of agriculture was exploitation by money lenders to which even the owners of large irrigated schemes on the White and Blue Nile banks as well as those on the Northern Province² were subjected.(Ibid, 22)

By studying the origin of the members of the Advisory Council (1945-47), the Legislative Assembly (1948-5) and the first Parliament (1954-58), he noticed that they were either businessmen, tribal leaders or ex-government employees. By comparing the origin of members in the three institutions found that there was increasing weight of the businessmen compared to that of the aristocracy of the tribal leaders. He also noticed that increasing numbers of the tribal leaders were becoming part of the businessmen and that there was a change in the ex-employees category which tended to be composed of mainly of junior employees who resigned their jobs to be full-time politicians, compared to the retired senior employees who were members of the two first councils (Ibid, 115) Those new politicians became more dependent on political parties on their living, and hence

¹ "Exploitation and the Corruption of Government in the Sudan" which was published in Arabic " الأستغلال وفساد الحكم في السودان "

²According to the provinces in 1966, the Northern Province is equivalent to the Northern region in 1993.

dependent on the businessmen who financed the parties. They were also tended to establish their own business enterprises to safeguard their future (Ibid, 115-116).

Awad held the businessmen group responsible for all the problems of the country including the problem of the South (Ibid, 51-52). He identified the other problems as the exploitation of agricultural producers which undermined the development of agriculture in the country (Ibid, 22-27), corruption which wasted resources and increased inequality and increased the uneven development of the country which endangered its unity (Ibid, 4, 136-7). Awad rightly criticised those who reduce the crisis in the country to a crisis of an unstable government which could be resolved by some constitutional amendment or a draft of a permanent constitution (Ibid, 4).

Another pioneer work in the analysis of the long run crisis was the report of the Central Committee of the Sudan Communist Party to the Fourth Conference of the party held in November 1967 presented by its late secretary general Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub (1927-1971). In addition to its Marxist approach, the report benefited from two factors that made it a comprehensive attempt to study the crisis since 1956. The first it was tackling a period between the two party conferences which was concurrent to the crisis period at the time (1956 -1967)³. The second factor which contributed to making the report comprehensive was the structural organisation of the party which in addition to its branches that spread on the basis of work and living places had also adopted the method of establishing specialised committees on aspects of economic, education, foreign affairs ... etc. This structure provided the writer of the report with a wider comprehensive view of the Sudanese society.

The concept of backwardness is central to the analysis of the Sudanese economy in the report (1968, 70). Despite this centrality of the concept of backwardness, backwardness was described in the report rather than analysed. This led to the adoption of the modern-traditional dichotomy in its static descriptive form: a traditional sector where 50% of the national income was produced and 75% of the population were living and a modern sector that produces "agricultural commodities for export" of which cotton represented 60% (Ibid, 79). The presence of a traditional sector was sighted as the evidence of backwardness of the Sudan and that it "did not enter the stage of economic revolution" (Ibid, 94) and that the failure "to shake the tradition sector and the bringing in of centres of progress within it is the greatest evidence to the failure of the pattern adopted by our country after independence" (Ibid, 94). This pattern defined as the capitalist path of development. The report described the crisis in the Sudan as a crisis of the capitalist path of development which according to the report is historically closed and is unable in breaking the chains of backwardness. Though the report presented a thorough analysis of the development of the Sudanese capitalist class, its origins and the sources, sectors and areas of capital accumulation, it did not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of

³The third party conference was held in February 1956.

the failure of the development of production forces in the economy. This question is of great importance especially when the report states the development of a capitalist class in industry and agriculture. Did that lead to a development of capitalist relations and if so why it did not lead to a development of the forces of production? The report answer was based on the analysis of the role of foreign capital in foreign trade and industry and the dependency of a single primary agricultural product. It rightly suggested that the presence of foreign capital permitted the exportation of surpluses abroad yet it did not try to estimate the volume of exported surplus and its relative value to the national income (Ibid, 85-86, 93). It also pointed out the tendency of the international prices of primary agricultural products to fall and of the manufactured goods to rise (Ibid, 81, 86); yet it did not explicitly discuss the question of Sudan terms of trade⁴ while unequal exchange was mentioned twice without qualification or clarification. It concerned itself in the aspect of foreign trade with the trade partners of the Sudan and it held as evidence of the presence of neo-colonialism the development of Sudan foreign trade with Western countries compared with Socialist countries. The effect of the cold war was clear in this part of the report (Ibid, 74-78).

When dealing the economic crisis the report did not discuss explicitly the question of uneven development and the mechanism that used to deepen it. The report, by adopting the static modern traditional dichotomy ignored the development of capitalism in the so-called traditional sector. In discussing the industrial development the report concentrated on the role of foreign capital avoiding the discussion of the industrial strategy itself which was based on the import-substitution strategy.

The report went on to discuss the political crisis since the independence in 1956 dividing it in three periods: the first parliamentary period 1956-58, the military rule 1958-64 and the October revolution 1964. The report adopted a class struggle approach in its attempt to analyse the three periods. The first period was characterised by the struggle and split among the political leadership of the national bourgeoisie about political power which was reflected in a split among the masses that weakened its ability to confront and resolve the problems of social change. The report did not give a satisfactory explanation for that split and whether the struggle for political power had different economic interests⁵ and did not explain the role of foreign powers (ie Egypt) in that struggle. The report rightly analysed the role of trade unions and the tenants movement and the other urban democratic forces in the struggle for social change and democracy in this period. The report summarised the crisis which led to the 1958 coup:

⁴By the time the report was written, the question of terms of trade was thoroughly discussed in development literature in general.

⁵Ali (1989) tried to give an explanation based on the different interests on the question of the Nile waters negotiations between Egypt and Sudan. In Chapter 3 of this thesis an attempt is made to provide more concrete analysis.

"The failure of the political system in resolving the post-independence problems and the split among the national masses led to an acute crisis in the country. Meanwhile there was a continuous growth of revolutionary elements, especially the communist party, among the mass movement. The initiative was at the hands of the forces of the extreme right which transferred the class struggle from the peaceful arena to a military dictatorship targeting the democratic forces basically." (p 108).

According to the report the success of the 1958 coup proved the weakness of the social foundations of the "Western Parliamentarianism" in the Sudan due to the presence of "a heavy weight for the forces of traditional sector in the social and economic life" (Ibid, 108).

In analysing the crisis of the military rule of 1958 the report provided an evaluation of the role of high rank bureaucrats as part of the ruling bloc. In contrast the lower rank bureaucrats were identified as part of the popular masses, yet for that situation to continue "the revolutionary movement has to develop its relations with these cadres ...and to work consciously in the different education institutes to enlarge the circle of those cadres by supplying it with militant elements.." (Ibid, 111).

One of the important parts of the report was the analysis of the military and their role in politics. The report in its analysis of the military and the composition of the Sudanese army reached the conclusion that "it has become clear that it is wrong to speak about the armed forces as unified body or a class; it represents in reality the class and national struggle that takes place in our society." (Ibid, 115). Reaching this conclusion was not synonymous to developing a strategy based on organising a coup⁶, for the report criticized what it called "the left opportunist trends which propagate that there is no place for the mass struggle" and that "what is remaining for the revolutionary movement is to retreat and organise a military action for that will prepare the political army of the masses." (Ibid, 142). The alternative strategy was, according to the report, to maintain and strengthen the daily struggle of the masses (Ibid, 152).

In analysing the period that followed the October revolution of 1964, the report maintained the theme of the weak bases of the Western Parliamentarianism and the weakness of the Sudanese capitalist class that pushed it to ally itself with "the old tribal and semi-feudal forces". The nature of the parliamentary system under that alliance was reactionary and destructive to the an important foundation of the system: the bourgeoisie democratic rights and because such a system became a daily instrument to stop development and economic growth, the active masses had search for a different way of development. Hence the impossibility of political stability because it meant to surrender and stop the struggle. (Ibid, 152). By this conclusion the report did not only present an analysis of the reasons of instability, but become one of the reasons to it by going on to suggest how the masses should strengthen their struggle. This led the report to focus on the importance of the democratic rights to the masses and to disclose an important contradiction in the position of the ruling power bloc from liberal democracy when they

⁶What was called in the SCP literature after 1969 "a coup mentality"

used it to achieve political power and used that power to deny the masses their democratic rights (Ibid, 132-4).

One important shortcoming of the report was its failure to discuss a comprehensive analysis of the question of Southern Sudan or the other regions which suffered from the uneven development. This was strange in a report written after the October Revolution in the Sudan which brought forward to the agenda of Sudanese politics the questions of even economic development and the representation of the different regions in the central government and state apparatus⁷. The report mentioned the situation in the South as a 'real' obstacle to the possibility to "induce a revolutionary development depending on the forces of the modern sector", because of the existence of a political movement in the South which was anti-national, pro-imperial and antagonistic to the democratic revolution. No evidence or analysis was provided to justify this strong judgement.

An interesting Sudanese writer who has written a number of books on the crisis in the Sudan is Mansour Khalid⁸. Khalid main theme is built on the concept of the elite. For him the crisis in the Sudan is the crisis of the elite (1993, 15-17). This theme has been elaborated in Khalid's last two works: "*The Government They Deserve: the role of the elite in Sudan political evolution*"⁹ and "*The Sudanese Elite and Addiction of Failure*"¹⁰.

Khalid critically examined the behaviour and attitudes of the Sudanese elites whom he defined as "the educated" (1993, 15-16). He emphasised the intellectual failure of the elite which reflected in

"< an> unrealistic conception of how power structure inside the Sudan should work, complete failure to learn, or care to learn from the experience of others, and sheer inability by the politicians to put their national roles above their sectarian adherence and fraternal sympathies" (1990, 142)

He accused them of the "Lack of vision," and "the complete absence of a spirit of co-operation " among them to establish "credible policies for the nation as a whole" (Ibid, 120). The elite was predominantly from the riparian northern Sudanese who failed to "reach out, at the grass-roots level, for recruitment of Southerner or other non-Muslim (Ibid, 120-1). When they formed their parties, they allied with sectarian leaders and the two Co-domini. The latter amounted to "a mortgaging of will" (Ibid, 89). The elite , according to Khalid had failed in solving the two main problem that faced the country:

⁷One year after the report, Mahgoub, the Secretary general of the party presented a document entitled "Problems of the Aftermath of the Conference" قضايا ما بعد المؤتمر in which he discussed the role of the regional forces and their relation with the communists.

⁸Mansour Khalid (1931-), born in Omdurman and educated in the Sudan, USA and France, worked as lawyer before joining the UN Legal Administration and the UNESCO. After the May 1969 Coup in the Sudan he held several ministerial portfolios such as the Youth and Sports, Foreign Affairs and Education as well as acting as Assistant to the President of the Republic. In 1978 he defected the Nimeiri regime and took some academic jobs in USA before joining the UN again, albeit this time to work in environmental issues. He published several books and articles in English and Arabic on the problems of the Sudan

⁹Published in 1990 by Kegan Paul, London.

¹⁰In published in 1993 in Arabic النخبة السودانية وامن الفضل

national unity and development. In his listing of the failure of the Sudanese elite, Khalid used to make a comparison with the Indian elite and the different way it had tackled the problems of India which were of great similarity to those of the Sudan.

The crisis of the elite was reflected most in its failure to produce a "pre-eminent national who could transcend the divides of religion, region, and ethnic affiliations" (Ibid, 120), again in comparison with India, "the Sudan, was deprived of a Nehru" (Ibid, 140).

Though Khalid's analysis provided a valuable historical account of the failure of the Sudanese elites, it was not able to answer the question why was the failure? Why the Sudanese elite did not behave like that of India? Was it as Khalid advised politicians and thinkers inside the Sudan to recognize as "form of intellectual infertility if not a moral escapism stemming from a desire to delay the moment of truth" (Ibid, 142)? Why there was "a desire to delay the moment of truth"? An alternative way to look at the failure of the elite is to relate their vision, programmes (or the lack of it) and their actions and policies to the interests of the classes they represent or assume they represent. This thesis is an attempt to provide such an alternative. Yet it remains that Khalid's contribution to the analysis of the intellectual bankruptcy of the ruling power bloc is invaluable. His critique of the alternative policies, programmes and stands of the democratic forces which represent the oppressed people of the Sudan worth to be taken seriously by those forces.

Though Tim Niblock (1985) did not explicitly use the concept of crisis, he provided an important contribution to the study of the political economy of the Sudan. Niblock historical approach enabled him to see the continuity of "two kinds of imbalance or inequality which had become prominent under the condominium", those were "differentiating both regions of the country and social groupings within it" (Niblock, 1985, 204). He revealed that the interests of he called 'the incipient bourgeoisie' had found their expression in the conservation of the socio-economic structure which was inherited from the condominium in alliance with the "senior establishment figures whose social influence (whether based on tribal, religious or economic pre-eminence)" (Ibid, 204). He was able to see the other face of the coin "Political movements based on those who were regionally or socially disadvantaged". (p 205). The struggle between two forces was the main element in the dynamics of the 1956-69 period. There are many similarities between Niblock analysis and the analysis in this thesis. The main difference is the emphasis on the thesis on the analysis of the economic structure applying the concept of articulation of the modes of production and the treatment of the whole period as one of an organic crisis of transformation.

Peter Woodward contributed to the Study of the crisis in the Sudan. A common theme in his several works on the Sudan¹¹ is the study of political stability which led him to build

¹¹Of particular interest to the crisis question are rd Woodward, P., (1979), *Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism*, Rex and Collings, London 1979, (1983), 'Islam, Radicalism and Nationalism in Sudanese Politics Before Independence' in *Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in*

his analysis of the Sudanese crisis around the phenomenon of the unstable state¹². For Woodward the state is

"the institutions of a government that both endeavours to maintain political order and implement policies within its own frontiers and that deals with other states" (1990, 1).

Three elements in Woodward's approach to the Sudan crisis worth mentioning. The first is his historical approach to the question which he insisted on emphasising in the several works he has written (1985, p 3; 1986, p 65; 1990, p 1 and 1992, p 1). Using this approach, he attempted to search for the origin of the crisis, the elements of continuity (and discontinuity) as well as the development (accumulation or condensation) of the crisis elements. In his preface to *Sudan After Nimeiri*, he wrote about the famine, floods, locusts, political instability and civil war in the 1980s:

"None of these were new to Sudan, but the close conjunction was unusual and *all were far more intense (emphasis added)* than at any time since independence in 1956" (1986 p 1)

It was not the appearances that attracted Woodward to hold the threads of continuity, but also the search for the essence of the crisis. For example he noticed the importance of the dominance of the centre as an element in the continuity. He wrote about the change brought by Nimeiri and his fellow officers in 1969:

"<they> sought to sweep away the personnel, the institutions and the interests, *but they did so still as people from the centre taking over the centrally dominated state <emphasis added>*" (1985, 5)

This historical approach allowed him to point out one of the contradictions in the political life in the Sudan:

"<While> political debate and activity of a national character remained predominantly an urban activity, the bases of support necessary for electoral success remained the rural areas, where sectarian support was overwhelmingly the largest single factor in elections." (1990, 98).

It was strange that Woodward did not go far enough to point out the repercussions of this contradiction on the stability and instability of the system. He only saw that "the major parties "could reach out and command a majority of the rural areas of the north, which was vital in the parliamentary system" (Ibid, 133), and that "when converted into governments it worked out unstable coalition cabinets" (Ibid, 133). He overlooked the role of the urban areas in the instability. While the major traditional party could control the parliament, they could not control the masses and their democratic organisations in the urban areas. This was reflected in a contradiction in the practise of liberal democracy which was responsible for the tendency to confiscate democratic rights of the masses and the establishment of an authoritarian state whether on the basis of military dictatorship

Egypt and the Sudan, edited by Warburg and Kupferschmidt, 1983, (1985), *Sudan: Threats to Stability*, the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies Number 173, (1986), 'Military Civilian Relations' in Abd Rahim, et al, editors, (1986), *Sudan Since Independence*, Gower Publishing Company, England, 1986, pp 65-73., (1990), *Sudan, 1898-1989, The Unstable State*, Boulder and Lester Crook Academic Publishing, London., and (1991), *Sudan After Nimeiri*, Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, (SOAS), and Routledge, London and New York, 1991.

¹²This became the sub-title of his book "*Sudan 1898-189: The Unstable State*" published 1990.

(1958-64) or civilian dictatorship (Khalil's attempt to rule the country under a state of emergency in 1958, the ban of the communist in 1965 and the attempt to build an Islamic state by the draft of the permanent constitution of 1968).

The second element was the attempt to analyse and link the class, religion and ethnical elements in the Sudanese politics. Though Woodward analysed ably the development of the commercial bourgeoisie class, his analysis was one sided for he ignored the ruled classes except for a paragraph on the peasants (1990,127). The role played by the small working class and the tenants of the irrigated agricultural schemes was of great importance in the instability of the state in the Sudan. In this thesis more attention will be given to these classes in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Woodward pointed out the complications of the ethnic origin of the commercial bourgeoisie and its reflection on the stability in the Sudan, especially the South. he also pointed to the role of religion both in maintaining the domination of the class and dividing it. He wrote:

"The wealthy class was less than homogeneous, for though leading members of both main parties have a common stake in the system, they lacked the vision or capacity to operate. The failure in turn, weakened the system. As a class in itself it was riven not only by sectarian and faction rivalries in politics, but also by highly clannish nature of much of its capitalist activity." (1990, 133)

He rightly pointed out that the clientelism through which class, religion and ethnicity were employed had left the South out of the benefits of the system.

The third element was his attempt to build connection between the international and the local elements that contributed to the crisis of the Sudanese state. This was obvious when dealing with the condominium, but it became more complicated after independence. The relation with Egypt and the united States contributed to instability in the period 1956-58 (1986, 65 and 1990,131). While adopting revolutionary politics towards Eritrea and the then Congo Kinshasa after the October revolution in 1964 and concentrating on the relation with the Arab countries after the June 1967 Middle East war made it easier for the Anya-nya movement to win the African countries.

Charles Gordon (1989) also contributed to the study of the unstable state in the Sudan. Gordon surveyed the history of state in the Sudan to show that "<when > Sudan became independent it had only been a single unitary state for forty years" (Ibid, 61). Though a state has been created, "no government succeeded in crating a Sudanese nation" (Ibid, 61). He then went on discussing the factors that contributed to instability of the state which he classified under "five groups of factors- the geographical, demographic, historical, economic and political" (Ibid, 66).

Three geographical factors were listed by Gordon. The large size of the country, its climatic diversity and harshness. He added to these three factors an additional which is related to the economic geography of the country and that was "the paucity of Sudan's infrastructure" which " make <s> transport and communication very difficult" (Ibid, 67).

When discussing the demographic factors, he pointed that the 22 million population of the country are of "597 tribe who speak 115 languages" (Ibid, 67) of whom 15-20 "is also very mobile" (p 68). While Islam is predominant in the North, only 15% of the Southern population are Christian (4% of the total population of the country).

In listing historically the political factors, he put together the South-North relation, the unstable coalition governments which were characterised by "inter-party rivalry and instability" (Ibid, 69) and a list of political events without trying to give reasons why things happened that way and another. Dealing with the economic factors he concentrated on the issue of uneven development which was, and will remain, a vital issue when attempting any solutions for the questions of national unity, development and democracy in the Sudan. Saying that it is important to look at the dynamics that created uneven development and continued to re-generate and deepen it. It is hoped that this thesis contributes positively in that direction.

Despite the effort Gordon made in pages 74-77 to demonstrate the unique problems facing nation-building in the Sudan compared to other Arab and African countries, he did not tackle whether the question itself was on the agenda of the different political and social forces. Though implicitly Gordon related stability and the lack of it to the success and failure of nation building, he did not try to analyse the reasons why the question of nation-building had not been tackled, not saying resolved, by the different Sudanese governments or political leaders. Putting together factors, though very important, he failed to provide a concrete analysis of the reasons of the crisis of the instability of the state. However, Gordon was able to point out the sort of problems which should be faced if stability would ever be maintained in the Sudan.

Salih (1975) argued that the Sudanese economy inherited from the colonial rule a "productive structure" that

"... despite the elapse of nearly two decades of political independence during which national (in contrast to colonial) economic policies were pursued remained substantially unchanged

"..the productive structure thus inherited and perpetuated, colonial and malformed, does not only failed to provide the basis and support for a process of dynamic development but, much worse, it actually constitutes an obstacle both to the initiation and sustenance of such process." (1978, 94)

After providing a historical account of the process of the malformation of the economy under the colonial rule, Salih went on analysing the structure concluding that by 1956 it was a structure of a dual economy with underdeveloped sectoral structure which was characterised by being disproportionately developed, weak sectoral interdependence and a rudimentary manufacturing sector (109-112). He further noticed the high degree of openness and sensitivity to a distorted foreign trade which led to financial as well as physical dependence on foreign trade (Ibid 112-4). For Salih these characteristics were connected and interrelated and together they formed a malformed structure which was

"archaic, non-integrated and outward oriented". Hence the question for Salih become one of the transformation of the economy from its colonial malformed structure to "a modern, integrated, and in which the production and investment activities in various sectors are, to the maximum possible degree, self-reliant, inwardly directed and internally linked"(Ibid, 137)

Though most of the analysis provided by Salih is found to be sound and constructive in the study of the long run crisis, some critical remarks to clarify the difference between that analysis and the one adopted in this thesis.

The first remark is related to the role of political force (administrative measures). Salih mentioned that the colonial state "applied purely administrative measures (ie political force)" in the initial stages, but as the "process gathered momentum, this political force was supplemented with economic forces", and he argued that "the weight of the latter increased steadily through time" (Ibid, 101). Though he did not say that the use of political force faded away, the emphasis in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) is that political force was crucial to maintain and run the colonial economic structure and that the failure, which was a result of inability (see Chapter 3), to continue the use of political force to the same extent used by the colonial state, while perpetuating the colonial economic structure, was one main reason for the crisis of the economy and the state.

The second remark is about Salih use and definition of the modern-traditional dichotomy. The use of this dichotomy prevented Salih from looking to the unity of the economic structure and the interrelation between the so-called modern and traditional parts of the economy to the extent he declared "Each part was almost an economy by itself" (Ibid, 103). The relation between the traditional part and the international market was underestimated by Salih. The dynamics of capital accumulation, labour migration, resource allocation and environmental imbalances were not revealed. These dynamics could have been revealed if the formation of the economic structure was dealt with as an articulation of modes of production. This is a task attempted in this thesis.

This chapter and the next three argue that the Sudan has faced a general political and economic crisis since its independence in 1956 and that the 1973-1985 crisis was only one of a series of individual crises that the country had passed through while undergoing a general crisis. Though any of these particular individual crises represented a moment/point of intensification of the manifestations of the general crisis in all or some of its general trends, it had its own logic which could be found in the particular historical events of the period of its occurrence. The existence of its own logic might suggest that it could have been avoided. Saying that does not mean that the overall trends of the general crisis could have been suppressed altogether without tackling the structural reasons responsible for the general crisis (which have nothing deterministic about them). The dealing with these structural reasons, does not eliminate the possibility of a particular short-run crisis; though may alter their logic, length and depth.

The general crisis has been manifest in general political and economic trends. The particular political and economic crises are discussed in this chapter as elements in the dynamics of the social process and contributing to the trends of the general political and economic crisis.

On the political level two of these trends have dominated the contemporary period. Both trends could be classified as symptoms of political instability and expressions of a crisis of the post-colonial state. The first trend is of a civilian-military alternation of governments through a dialectic of military coup d'état and popular uprisings; the coups brought military to power and the uprisings overthrew them and re-instated civilian democratic rule. Neither the military nor the civilian democratic governments were able to install political stability or solve the crisis of the post-colonial state .

The other trend is of a continuous conflict between the North, which dominates the central government, and the South which demands a fair share in power and wealth. This trend has been reflected in two civil wars, the first lasted for seventeen years, (1955-1972), while the second has continued since 1983. The renewal of the civil war despite eleven years of peace following the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972, suggests that either the reasons for the conflict were not dealt with or that new reasons have arisen. We argue in chapter 5 that despite the specific events that led to the beginning of the second civil war, the main reason behind it is that the causes of the conflict had not been resolved whether by the peace agreement or by the policies that followed it. The origins of the conflict are part of the reasons for the general political and economic crisis. The central component of this general crisis is the crisis of the post colonial state. This reflected in what seems to be a continuous political instability which takes different forms. It has been reflected in a civilian-military alternation in governments a civil war in the south, or mismanagement of the economy, a civil service crisis and the maladministration of the para-statal corporations.. etc, are all but appearances of the crisis of the post-colonial state; despite the relative independence of these phenomena and the reasons for their own particular crises.

3.2. The Nature of the Post-Colonial State

The crisis of the post-colonial state in the Sudan could be sought in its structure and its performance in relation to the economy, the different social classes, ethnic, religious and regional groups; all in a historical context, that is in the social and political conflicts and struggles of the different social classes and groups. Both the structure and performance were haunted by the colonial heritage. Yet one cannot argue as Ali (1989) has done that the state in the Sudan, "remained after independence, in essence unchanged"(60); or as Mahmoud claimed, "After independence in 1956, the nature of the state did not change." (1984, 15). Arguing the static nature of the state, reduces the post-colonial state to the colonial heritage. The post-colonial state is certainly the product of the colonial state, but it is, also, its potential negation. It is impossible to equate the colonial and post-colonial

states, they cannot be assumed to be identical, not least because of the formal contradiction in terms, and also because of the definition of the state which was adopted by Ali himself. The state is

"a condensation of social relation, constituted through a long process of struggle and negotiation by socio-economic forces aspiring to achieve domination." (Ibid, pp58-59).

Looking to this "condensation of social relations", one can find the absence of the colonial power as an element in the internal social relations represented by the colonial state and its personnel and as an element of an external political-legal relation to which the post-colonial state is subordinated. This does not mean to exclude the effects of the international forces, whether they are the ex-colonial or neo-colonial, generally what Alavi calls "foreign imperial bourgeoisie" or "metropolitan bourgeoisie" (Alavi, 1972, 61). Alavi argued, "At independence, however the direct command of the latter over the colonial state ended." (Ibid, 61). The fact that the Sudan has become an independent sovereign country could not be reduced, as Thomas rightly argues, to "certain formalities.. flag and national anthem, new constitution, membership in the United Nations, and so on." (Thomas:1984, 50). Such a reduction:

"ignore [s] the significant expansion of the state functions and the modification of methods of rule that of necessity followed independence, and leads to a serious misunderstanding of the qualitative leap involved in the transition from colonial to post-colonial state structure" (ibid, 50).

Political independence is not a formal change, even if some social forces in a newly independent country tried to reduce it to one, because the absence of the colonial power is not equal to subtracting a quantity from an arithmetic sum. It is an absence of an element which changes the relations among the remaining elements, forming a new identity, ie 'whole'. It is an expression of the development of the indigenous social forces, to the extent of obtaining political independence. It is a qualitative change. Similarity in some aspects between the two states does not mean identity, and could be explained by recognizing the elements of continuity expressed in the colonial heritage in the structures of both the state and the society in general. Carolyn Baylies rightly argues that,

"For while independence of itself does not alter the economic or class structure, it does effect a change in the political process and the mechanism through which class forces are brought to bear on the state" (Baylies:1985, 15).

Hence there is a justification for the use of a different category, 'the post-colonial state'.

It is, thus, the concrete analysis of this new 'whole', though composed mostly of inherited elements, that reveals the nature of the 'social relations' and its 'condensation', a thing which Ali attempted with regard to the state's agricultural policies and arrived at results which revealed the class nature of those policies; yet that has not proved that "the state remained, after independence, in essence unchanged.". Mahmoud had attempted in her study of the Sudanese bourgeoisie such a concrete analysis which, contrary to her assertion of the unchanged nature of the state in the post-colonial era, showed the influence of the Sudanese bourgeoisie in shaping the policies of the post-colonial state

and in influencing the process of capital accumulation, (Ibid,6), in which the state policies are determinant. Unless there is an implicit argument the Sudanese bourgeoisie were practising the same influence during the colonial rule, then the argument of the unchanging nature of the post-colonial state is false. Such an implicit argument could easily be proved wrong. If the 'essence' and 'nature' of the state are terms used by Ali and Mahmoud to mean the function of the state "to secure the reproduction of the society", which "on a very general level every state has" (Ziemann, and Lazendorfer, 1977, 149); or "the enlarged reproduction of commodity production and exchange" (Charney, 1987, 59), then the class structure of the post-colonial state gains great importance in the analysis. It is also necessary to find out whether a "conflict.. between local dominant classes and foreign capital over the distribution of surplus and possibilities of accumulation" does rise and whether it has been resolved and how. It is equally important in determining the nature of the post-colonial state, to identify the dominated classes and whether post-colonial state has been able to destroy "the organizations of the masses" (Thomas:1984, 92), or co-opt them. The latter issue is important if the state is understood to express the 'condensation' of the class struggle which will intensify following the absence of a foreign enemy that used to necessitate the unity of the different classes of the ex-colonies.

However, this must not prevent the observation and analysis of the increasing influence of international forces of the world capitalist system on the Sudanese State, (and of course the economy). The relation here is not just a direct economic relation with the 'world market' which plays a decisive role in the reproduction of any export-oriented economy based on the production of primary products, but also a political one which might not directly involve a particular economic relation. An example is the relation between the Sudan and the USA which for the latter was governed, for a long time (until the discovery of oil in the Sudan by the American Chevron Oil Company¹³), by its world strategic considerations, the economic interests involved in them were existing outside the Sudan. We shall notice that this was part of the process through which the political and economic crises were generated and deepened.

Ali identified the power bloc which dominated the post-colonial state in the Sudan, "the religious aristocracy, indigenous capitalists engaged in agriculture and commerce together with elements of the educated Sudanese"(61). To that identification of the power bloc it is necessary to add the tribal aristocracy and to specify the elements of the educated Sudanese and identify them as the high hierarchy of the civil service and the army, the top ranks bureaucrats and the military, the new petty bourgeoisie.

The policies of the post-colonial state were to serve the interests of some or all elements of the power bloc and that was the 'essence ' of the post-colonial state. Whether those interests were similar or identical to or part of those of the ex-colonial power does not

¹³a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California (SOCAL).

reduce the post-colonial state to a colonial one. The interests of the former, or at least what it conceived as its interests, became the goal to be achieved, maintained and reproduced, and whether the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie were met was a by-product.

The post-colonial state was unable to perform like a colonial state in the management of the economy and society. That was despite the fact that it had kept the structure and institutions of the colonial economy and most of the state apparatus unchanged. This was not only because it was in "essence" and "nature" different from a colonial state, but also because it could not perform like one¹⁴. The colonial state was authoritarian and was relatively autonomous vis-a-vis the Sudanese population; it was imposed on them, though it sought alliances and political articulation through its religious, tribal, education and economic policies. The post-colonial state, on the other hand, was not autonomous and was not able to become authoritarian. This was one of the basic contradictions of the post-colonial state. It was unable to run the economy and society in a colonial way, yet it had preserved the structures and institutions of the colonial state and economy. This contradiction had arisen mainly because the basic change in the social power structure, which was due to the elimination of the colonial state, had not only changed the balance, but had created new expectations among the different classes. The elimination of the colonial power was not followed with a change in the structure and final objective of the economy which was unevenly developed, weakly interlinked on sectoral and regional bases, oriented towards the export of agricultural raw materials (basically cotton which by 1956 constituted 72% of the country's export earnings) and dependent on its supply of capital goods and manufactured consumer goods on imports. It was an economy which did not aim to satisfy the increasing and changing needs of the Sudanese population.

Those who had formed the ruling power bloc were the beneficiaries of the economic structure as owners of cotton schemes, agents of export and import companies, lawyers of commercial enterprises, employees of the state, the revenue of which was directly and indirectly linked to the production of cotton and foreign trade. They were all anxious to capture the mechanism of capital accumulation and to enhance their wealth, while the dominated classes had expected improvement in their incomes and living conditions.

Mohmed Ahmed Mahjoub, an ex-prime minister in the Sudan and a prominent Umma leader, wrote in 1974 recalling the immediate period after independence,

¹⁴The question is a contradiction between a "developed state

"Trouble started soon after independence. It stemmed from one basic cause; having either worked for or opposed independence, the parties found themselves without any particular aim once it was achieved. Much was expected of the parties and they all fall short of expectation. They had no defined programmes to deal with economic or social development." (emphasis added), (Mahjoub, 1974:175)

This was partly true, because keeping the old structures and attempting to expand them was a programme in itself, while these structures did not satisfy the 'expectations' of the population. Niblock noted that,

"Those who ruled the Sudan over these years [1956-69] sought to develop the country within the socio-economic structure which they had inherited from the Condominium era, with minor changes." (Niblock, 1987:204)

What was lacking was a programme for changing the colonial economy and structures. It was unavailable because the dominant classes did not want one because they were the beneficiaries of the status quo. The ruling power bloc tried to reproduce, sometimes with horizontal expansion, the structures, institutions and methods of the colonial economy. Two problems had arisen from this attempt. The first was the failure to manage the economy in the colonial authoritarian way, specially where the articulation of pre-capitalist modes of production involved compulsion by the state directly; ie the Gezira Scheme, or indirectly, ie the private pump schemes, and the rain-fed sub-sectors. The history of the post-colonial state was one where attempts to exercise authoritarian power were challenged by the masses, as it will argued below. The second has been identified as "a basic... contradiction" between the expectations of the people and an economy basically not designed to satisfy their rising and changing needs (Bush and Kabbalo, 1991:11). This failure to "deliver the goods" had been one of the important interrelations between the political and economic crises which had characterized the post-colonial state in the Sudan. Economic crises had provided a "...possible condition for the loss of hegemony" (Charney:1987, 63) of the ruling power bloc and had provoked the 'masses' to pass "from a state of political passivity to a certain activity" (Gramsci:1971, 210) which was both political and economic in nature. At the same time it was used as justification by different political groups competing for power not to abide by 'the rules of the game' and attempt reaching power by military coups. All leaders of military coups used the presence of economic crises and the failure to meet the expectations and to satisfy the basic needs of the people in their political discourse which is usually broadcast in their first statement. In the Sudan economic crises had contributed to the several political crises faced the country since independence.

3.3. The Non-autonomous State

Chapter 2 identified the colonial state was relatively autonomous from the Condominium powers and the Sudanese socio-economic formation. That allowed the colonial state to articulate forces and structures both on the economic and political level. The post-colonial state history is one of its quest and attempt to establish this relative autonomy,

with little success during the military regimes, in vain most of the other times, as we will see in this Chapter. Niblock noticed that,

"...the pre-1969 Sudanese state enjoyed only limited autonomy. It was controlled fairly directly by the 'incipient bourgeoisie', through the influence which the Sudanese establishment could exert on the main political parties and on the military leadership" (Niblock:1987, 233)

The main reason behind this lack of relative autonomy was the competition among the different fractions of the ruling power bloc to inherit, not only the political power of the state but its economic power. This in turn was a direct result of economic statism developed during the colonial era and the articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production.

By 1955 the government's current revenue was 16.5% and its expenditure was 14.8% of the Sudan GDP. Its share in the gross national capital formation reached 5.1% of the GDP, compared with 3.4% the share of the private sector. Moreover, the importance of the state as a tool of capital accumulation and a device for financial transfers from the public sector to the private sector in the Sudan was apparent from the decisive role it played in issuing export and import licences, allotting new mechanized rain-fed agricultural schemes and irrigated pumps schemes, approving the establishment of new industries and granting them concessions, as well as sorting government's bids, appointing government's contractors and determining its purchases. The prolonged discussions in the first Sudanese parliament on these issues and the exchanged accusations of corruption and utilization of official positions to give licences or allot schemes to relatives or political followers or partners were clear evidence on the importance the different fractions in the ruling club was giving to the domination of the state apparatus. It was, as Morris Szeftel, (1983), described the situation in Zambia, the politics derived by the aim of distributing the spoils. The discussions in the parliament also showed the backing that some fractions of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was expecting from the state in its competition with foreign enterprise (Awad: 1966, 37,56); which is shown in chapter 4 was dominating Sudan foreign trade and its banking system.

The competition itself could have taken place among rival fractions of the ruling power bloc when the hegemony of the bloc as a whole was established, and rules were set for the competition game that ensure the reproduction of the social relations.

The relative autonomy of the state in such a case, as it is argued in Chapter 1, would have been an expression of that hegemony. It would also have been a manifestation of the role of the state as a mediator and/or arbitrator of a last resort in the competition game without losing sight of its obligation safeguard the conditions for reproduction and expansion of the dominant mode of production or the articulated system of modes of production.

In the Sudanese case the ruling power bloc was unable to establish its hegemony as a bloc, nor was any fraction of it was able to establish its own hegemony. Ali noticed that,

"..neither the bourgeoisie in the state nor any other class or fraction succeeded in retaining ascendancy over the entire power bloc indefinitely. In fact, frequent change in the structure and distribution of power within the ruling bloc, and unabated and unceasing quest for hegemony therein, characterized the post-colonial state and prevented the dominant social forces from achieving any enduring or stable equilibrium of class alliances." (Ali, 1989 :74)

This situation was partially an element of the colonial heritage. Sudan, like other Third World countries, "was left with a heterogeneous set of class forces where no single or bloc of classes could ensure the sustainability or reproduction of their political domination."(Bush and Kabbalo, 1991:4).

The adoption of the colonial state of political and economic policies of articulation did not lead to a classical transformation of the pre-capitalist modes of production and social forces in the Sudan into a capitalist mode of production. Instead an articulated system of modes of production was established. As a result the Sudan was left with a weak capitalist class. The colonial economy in which this class emerged and developed was dominated, (in modern irrigated agriculture,) by the colonial state and (in foreign trade and finance) by foreign capital. The rain-fed agriculture was mainly a peasant economy dominated by pre-capitalist relations politically articulated under the auspices of tribal leaders and internationally linked through exchange relations by commercial capital. The local merchants in these rural areas were petty traders who were mainly commercial agents of foreign capital. Some of them began investing in groundnut production as the boom in oil-seeds prices began after independence (For data on oil-seeds prices see Kabbalo, 1984, Appendix)

The presence of local capital in agriculture was in the private pump schemes on the White and Blue Niles as well as the Northern province. Although by 1954 (the first year of self government) their investment reached 57, 000 *feddans* of cotton, it only constituted 9% of the 628 thousands *feddans*, the total area cultivated by cotton that year.

The presence of the local capital in mechanized rain-fed agriculture was also weak and did not gather any momentum before the beginning of the implementation of the recommendation of the working party formed by the first national government to study the development of the mechanized rain-fed agriculture and which favoured the encouragement of private investment (Kabbalo, 1984, 4).

The industrial fraction of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was also weak due to the recent history of manufacturing industry in the country, its primary processing type as well as its small share (1%) in the GDP in 1956 (Harvey and Klive, 1959,).

The commercial fraction of the Sudanese capitalist class, except for a few individuals, was mainly a fraction of petty-traders distributing commodities imported by foreign companies and/or collecting agricultural products for export by the same foreign enterprises. In addition to the weakness of its economic base, the Sudanese capitalist class was, due to the uneven development of the economy, a class composed of Northern Sudanese of Islamic and Arab origin. This had great complication in Sudanese politics, especially if it is noticed that the other fractions of the power bloc, the religious aristocrats and the

educated petty bourgeoisie were mainly from the same region and origin. This was one of the basic reasons behind the politics of the ethnic conflicts faced the Sudan since 1955.

The capitalist class was also weak because it was divided on sectarian and tribal lines. It has already been shown in Chapter 2, how the colonial state, seeking its own allies, promoted sectarian and tribal leaders and strengthened their political and economic powers which conserved and enhanced their cultural and ideological influences, especially in the rural areas. That chapter also indicated how the leaders of the Graduate Congress in their first confrontation with the colonial state sought the support of the sectarian leaders instead of seeking the support of the masses. By that action that fraction of the Sudanese new petty bourgeoisie lost its independence and was not able, as in other African countries, to dominate the post-colonial state.(ie Ghana, Tanzania...etc, see Saul, 1974; Murray, 1967; Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966);

All these weaknesses of the bourgeoisie were reflected in their political organizations. When the Sudan became independent in 1956, two political parties were dominating the political scene: the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party (UP). Both parties were a result of a split in the Graduates Congress which had assumed the role of the Sudanese national movement(1938- 1945)(see Chapter 2 above) .

The split was on two main issues. The first was ideological concerning the religious sect that the movement should seek alliance with. The two predominant sects in the Sudan were the Khatimyya and Ansar. The Khatimyya sect had followers among the tribes of northern and eastern Sudan and in urban areas. The Mahdist Ansar sect influenced the tribes of western Sudan, the Gezira, the White Nile areas and the Danagla tribe in the north.

The second issue was the relation with Britain and Egypt, the Condominium powers. Though there were common economic interests between the two countries and their respective allies, the relation could not be explained by those economic interests alone. It had roots in the conflict between Egypt and Britain on the Egyptian claim of sovereignty on the Sudan and the trend among some Sudanese to use that conflict in their fight for independence. The group allied with the Khatimyya and Egypt formed a party called al-Ashiqqa which, through a process of internal splits and unity, changed its name to the National Unionist Party (NUP). The other group allied with the Mahdist sect and the British formed the Umma Party.

Both parties represented an alliance of fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie educated strata, the commercial and agricultural fractions of the capitalist class and the aristocratic strata of the tribal and religious leaders; with different weights of these social groups in the two parties. The weight of the educated and merchants was greater in the NUP. The Umma Party was dominated by the religious aristocrats of the Mahdi family, agricultural capitalists and tribal leaders.

These social forces were distributed in the two parties according to different tribal and religious sectarian affiliations. They reflected two important non-class cleavages in the Sudanese society, which they had their roots in the pre-capitalist social formations. Both parties were dominated by Northern social classes which were Arab Islamic in orientation and inspiration. That formed an important element in the political split between the North and the South.

The division of the Sudanese capitalist class on tribal and sectarian lines in the two parties and its economic weakness compared to foreign capital and the religious and tribal aristocracy hindered their ability to lead the masses. Both sections of the class, whether in the NUP or in the Umma, were dependent in their ideological appeal to the masses on religious sectarianism: Khatimyya and Mahdism respectively. This in itself was a sign of ideological bankruptcy. Historically the bourgeois class in Europe is a secular class and for social and economic modernization. The Sudanese bourgeoisie chose, voluntarily or compelled, a schizoid ideological stance. Among its intellectuals, they were discussing Balzac and Voltaire, reading Taha Hussein and Raffie, fond of Montesquieu and Rousseau, learning by heart the poems of Milton and Elliot, but in public they were either Khatimyya or Ansar (the follower of the Mahdist sect)¹⁵. They isolated themselves from the people as an 'educated strata', the 'graduates of Gordon College' and the '*effendia*'. When the time had come for the quest of the 'masses' support, they opted for rallying that support through the religious sectarianism and traditional tribalism.

In 1955, when the petty bourgeoisie of the educated strata in the NUP thought that by leading the independence struggle they had established their hegemony and that they did not need the influence of the Khatimyya sect any more, they tried to isolate the Khatimyya from the process of decision making in the party and the government. They lost power for a coalition instigated by the two religious leaders. The religious aristocracy felt the need for their coalition in order to face the danger of losing their potential hegemony as the traditional leadership of the people, and hence losing their domination of the state. The Khatimyya formed their own party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in 1955. This resulted in a number of events which led to expulsion of the NUP from the government and the formation of a coalition of the Umma party and PDP.

Although the conflict appeared to be ideological as a conflict between "politics and holiness", as it was quoted in the contemporary Sudanese newspapers, it was more down to earth than that. The conflict was about the domination of the state : who should inherit the colonial power?

The Umma and PDP coalition united the traditional religious and tribal aristocracy, agricultural bourgeoisie and parts of the commercial bourgeoisie. This unity involved many internal contradictions. The traditional tribal and religious leaders were anxious to

¹⁵To be fair, it is necessary to mention the small group of the Sudanese intellectuals known as *Abu Rauf Group* which rejected to be part of any religious sectarianism.

expand their agricultural interests most of which they gained during and with the assistance of colonial rule. On the other hand, the commercial bourgeoisie and a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie, composed mainly of retired government employees and professionals, formed the leadership of the NUP, thought they should be allotted the new agricultural schemes, export and import licences, presenting themselves as the country's new entrepreneurs who could challenge the foreign enterprises and make deals with them at the same time as the parliamentary discussion in 1954-56 revealed. (Awad:1966, 55-57).

There was also a contradiction between the Khatimyya and the Ansar merchants concerning trade and economic relations with Egypt. Egypt was a traditional market for Sudanese cattle, camels and oil-seeds. It was also a traditional source of cheap popular textile imports. While the Khatimyya merchants had a wide interest in developing the relations with Egypt, the Mahdists persisted in their traditional conflict with her which was aggravated by the failure to reach a new agreement on the distribution of the Nile waters. Both the religious aristocracy of the Mahdi and Mirghani families had great interest in pump irrigation on the banks of White and Blue Niles. In addition the Mirghani family had interests in agricultural production in the Northern province, both as investor and receiver of tributes.

The movement of Abdalla Khalil, then the Prime Minister of the Sudan to accept American Aid (which was at that time condemned by most of the political parties as part of the Eisenhower Doctrine which governed the American foreign policy in the fifties and aimed at establishing defence pacts in the Middle East linked to the American defence policies), resulted in more deterioration of the relations with Egypt as well as a wide internal opposition.

3.4. The State Crisis 1954-58

Divided and weak, the different fractions of the power bloc were not able to agree on a set of rules for the contest of power. During the first two years of independence it appeared as if the parliamentary democracy would set the rules of the game, but the handing of the power over to the military in 1958 showed that was not the situation. One level of the political instability was caused by constantly changing governments between 1954-1958. Five governments handed power to each other during this short period. Three of them were headed by Azahari of the NUP, in January 1954, November 1955, and February 1955. The other two were headed by Khalil of the Umma in July 1956 and March 1958. Taking into account that only two elections took place during this period, then the split in the NUP and 'crossing of the floor' by parliament members were responsible for this instability. When Azahari was first elected on January 1954, he had a majority of 19 votes in the Parliament, he lost a vote of confidence on November 10th 1954 by two and regained it after four days by four votes to lose the confidence vote in Parliament again on June 1956. Khalil was elected in July with 28 votes majority.

'Crossing Parliament floor' was another manifestation of the weakness and the divisions of bourgeoisie in the Sudan at the time.

By 1958, when the 'project' of the ruling power bloc to establish its hegemony was not achieved through a democratic form of government, the ruling power bloc sought the authoritarian option. This was partially as a result of the colonial heritage which by adopting the articulation on the political and economic levels, not only kept a strong aristocracy but also prevented the emergence of a bourgeoisie capable of establishing its hegemony which in its turn would have made it possible for the state to gain a relative autonomy vis-a vis the civil society. It was also due to the inability of the petty bourgeoisie intellectuals to establish an independent mass movement in their struggle against colonialism and depended instead on the religious and tribal aristocracy in their appeal to the masses which kept the latter imprisoned within the sectarian and tribal ideological discourse. The mass movement which had developed after World War II, acquired radical dimensions.

3.4.1. Class Conflicts and the Authoritarian Tendency

Authoritarianism was one of the characteristics of the colonial state in the Sudan and was very important in the functioning of the political and economic institutions and the suppression of the national movement under colonial rule. The post-colonial state in the Sudan had begun as a constitutional democratic state where there was a provision for the separation of powers: the executive, the parliament and the judiciary which allowed for accountability of the government to the parliament and for sovereignty of the rule of law constitution guarded and by an independent judiciary, on one level, on the other level the basic democratic rights which allowed independent organisation of the social groups and classes not affiliated to the ruling power bloc. Such a system required that the ruling power bloc should recognize the contradiction between a democratic state and the colonial heritage of authoritarian institutions and structures and the need for changing them. It also required making compromises to establish the hegemony of the ruling power bloc or a fraction of it on consensus and not by simple/ crude coercion. It further required the change of the management of economic institutions by providing for economic incentives and market forces to allocate and re-allocate resources.

There are always limits to the use of coercion in different societies depending, not only on the readiness and ability of the ruling class, but also on the consciousness and organization of the ruled classes and their ability to challenge the use of coercion. The concrete analysis of the Sudanese case reveals that the ruling power bloc was not able to make the needed compromises and changes and failed when it opted for the use of coercion under the first civilians to establish and sustain an authoritarian state. The use of coercion against the tenants of the private pump schemes on the white Nile in 1956 provoked a wide condemnation. The declaration of state of emergency in 1958 was met with resistance and was actually ignored by most of the people, ie the workers strike in

1958 took place despite the state of emergency. The failure of the civilian authoritarian option was due to the existence of a mass movement in the urban areas. This urban mass movement had three forms.

The first was a political form. It was constituted, at that time, by two political parties: the NUP and the Sudan Communist Party. The NUP was the most single influential political force in the Urban areas, in terms of membership and supporters. The NUP membership had greater weight of merchants and intellectuals compared to the Umma party. Its influence among the tribes of the Northern province was greater than the Umma and it was only competing with the PDP, the Khatimyya backed party . The Urban areas of the Sudan were greatly inhabited by people migrated from the Northern province who composed the largest sections of the merchants, educated strata, and the working class.

Since July 1956, the NUP was compelled to stand in the opposition. Before the 1958 elections, the Umma - PDP government, being conscious of the fact that the NUP was influential in the Urban areas redistributed the electoral constituencies to give the rural areas more weight and representation in the new parliament.(Niblock:1987, 211 and Haj Musa:1970 , 254/256). The results of the 1958 elections confirmed the position of the NUP in the opposition. The NUP got 44 seats in the new Parliament of 173 members, where the Umma had 63, the PDP 26 and the Southern Liberals 40 seats. The leadership of the party adopted a "populist" stand to the extent of making alliance with the trade unions movement, in contrast to the stand of the government of the NUP (1954-1956) which was the first to deny the trade unions the right to participate in politics.

The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was established in 1946. Its membership was composed mainly of that part of the petty bourgeoisie educated strata which after the war had chosen to form independent mass organizations, some workers and students. Its influence was mainly among the educated, the students and the workers in the urban areas. The party was illegal and was performing through the Anti-Imperialist Front formed in 1953. The SCP contributed to the organization of workers, farmers, tenants and students trade unions.

The second dimension of the mass movement was a trade unions. The trade union movement constituted of two parts: the workers trade unions and the farmers and tenants unions. The workers were organized since 1947 (for details see Fwazi, 1957, Beshir, 1977, Sayeed,1990), and in 1949 a Workers Congress unifying these unions was formed, reorganized in 1950 as the Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF)(Beshir, 1977,p196). The SWTUF was closely associated with the SCP. According to Beshir the SCP, "not only provided the militant leadership which the movement needed, but it also provided the ideological and political orientation which characterized the Sudan labour movement over the years"(Ibid, 198). This might be one of the reasons for participation of Sudan trade unionist movement in national politics. Yet, a fundamental reason, it could be argued, was the role of the state in the economy in the Sudan, and especially as the

largest individual employer of wage-labour in the country. The first trade union was formed by the workers of Sudan Railways, which was a government department. The battle to obtain recognition for the railway's first trade union, the Workers Affairs Association, was seen as a fight against British Colonialism. This developed a conceptual link, through the history of Sudanese trade unionism, between economic and social demands and political struggle. The different political parties accepted this linkage during the struggle for independence and the SWTUF initiated the formation of the United Front for the Liberation of the Sudan in 1950. Soon after the NUP formed the first national government in 1954, it began denying the political role of the trade union movement; but when the NUP was compelled to move to opposition, the political role of the trade unions was again recognized.

Table 2. Number of Unions and Union Membership 1949-1968

Year	Number of Unions	Total . Membership
1949	5	NA.
1950	62	NA.
1951	86	37793
1952	99	NA.
1953	NA.	NA.
1954	134	NA
1956	NA.	NA.
1957	NA.	NA.
1958	135	86355

Source: Ahmed A.G.M.1984 28.

The importance of the trade union movement in the Sudan did not result from the size of the urban working class. By 1955/56 the urban working class was less than 0.4% of the population of the country and about 0.8% of the labour force; however it constituted 45% of the Urban population. The real importance was due to its role in the national economy. The economy was dependent on the railways as the most important means of transport, especially as far as the exports and imports were concerned. In 1953 there were 25,000 railway workers and their trade union was the largest of all the Sudanese workers trade unions. By 1958 (as table 2 shows) there were 135 trade unions organizing about 86,355 workers, the bulk of them was united in the Sudan Workers Trade unions Federation (SWTUF).

By 1958 the SWTUF was in wage disputes with the government and when the government accepted American Aid, the SWTUF declared a successful one day strike which generated a campaign of opposition resulting into a formation of an opposition front composed of the NUP, the ACF, the SWTUF and the student unions of the Khartoum University and Polytechnic.

The third dimension was the students movement. The origins of the movement were shown in Chapter 2. Like the workers' trade unions, the student movement developed a political tradition and participation in public affairs. The student movement, being under a radical leadership, joined the opposition groups. Following the strike of the SWTUF, the Khartoum University Students Union (KUSU), initiated the formation of the opposition

front in 1958. The agenda of the front was the stand against the authoritarian project of the prime minister Abdalla Khalil.

The 1956-58 period revealed that the religious and tribal aristocracies could control the parliament through their influence in the rural areas but were not able to control either the urban areas or the modern forces of the petty bourgeoisie and working class. The latter were well organized to perform as pressure groups and cause economic and political instability.

3.4.2. The Regional Question on the Agenda

Chapter 2 indicated how the policies of the colonial state resulted in an unevenly developed Sudan. It is also discussed in this chapter how the ruling power bloc was composed of the bourgeoisie, religious and tribal aristocrats and the educated petty bourgeoisie strata of Northern Sudan who were of Arab-Islamic origins. From the start this brought to the post-colonial state's agenda the question of other ethnic and religious groups.

The failure of the ruling power bloc to include representatives of other groups, especially the Southerners was evident during the Sudanization process when only eight Southerners were promoted to senior posts replacing the 800 British officials, while the remainder posts were allocated to Northerners. An apologist from the North described that as "Following the best traditions of the British Civil Service", for the Sudanization Commission "allocated jobs and made promotion in accordance with seniority, experience and qualifications" (Beshir, 1968:72). Actually what happened was a failure "to take into account that the South would eventually need some compensating mechanism whereby to gain greater representation as the years went by" (Khalid, 1990:158). The promises made by Northern representatives in the Juba conference and during the 1953 elections were forgotten. The Northern power bloc needed the alliance with the Southern Sudanese in the struggle against British Colonialism, when the latter was giving way, that alliance became outdated and the representation of Southerners in constitutional institutions would then become merely a decoration.

The events which took place immediately before the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps in August 1955, were evidence of the attempt of the Northern power bloc to monopolize the state power and exclude Southerners from real power. Though two Southern ministers were appointed to the cabinet, (raised to three in some government), the South itself was put under the administration of the Northern Sudanese who also assumed the leading role in forces of the Equatorial Corps (composed of Southerners) after the Sudanization of the Administration and the Armed Forces in October 1954.

The dissatisfaction of Southern MPs with the Sudanization process led them to cross the floor to join the opposition. The Southern Liberal Party called for a conference in October 1954, some days after the announcement of the Sudanisation Committee's final report. The conference which took place in Juba adopted the demand for a federal union

between the South and the North (Sayeed:1990, 255). The message was clear: because the Northerners did not give the Southern petty bourgeoisie its share in the post-colonial state, the Southerners would demand a federal system to get their 'fair share', and in that they would rally the masses and make use of ethnic and religious differences between the South and the North. A minor contradiction between the Northern ruling power bloc and the Southern petty bourgeoisie would develop into a major conflict and into an antagonistic contradiction between the North and the South.

On May 1955, the two Southern ministers resigned from the NUP parliamentary group and the Cabinet and joined the Liberal Southern Party (LSP) which was demanding a federal status with the North (R of S:1956, 21). Azhari's government responded by issuing accusations and threatening Southerners with using force against any attempt to cause troubles within the South. The third conference of the LSP, the only Southern political party, to be held in Juba in July 1955 was faced with obstacles. The NUP government and the administration in the South were accused of trying to intimidate the LSP (Ibid, 91). In the same month, the new Northern administration of Anzara agro-industrial project, the only one in the South, dismissed some 300 hundred workers. On the 25th of that same month a Southern member of the Parliament, Mr. Elias Kuze, was sentenced to 20 years in prison following a rally in which he attacked the government policy and its attitude to make an alliance with the Southern tribal leadership. Though the accused was a member of the Parliament, his parliamentary immunity did not prevent his arrest and trial in a Chief's Court without permission from the Parliamentary authorities concerned. The second day of the trial, demonstrations broke out in Anzara, the army was called in to shoot the demonstrators and six Zande were killed and many others wounded. Though the situation became critical, the NUP government in Khartoum was not concerned with the South since it declared as early as 1954 that it would use force against any Southerner who would endanger the security and unity of the country.¹⁶ This official threat made an apparently false telegram, which was assumed to have been signed by the Prime Minister Ismail al-Azahari, easy to circulate and likely to be believed. The false telegram ordered the Northern administrators to oppress and ill-treated the Southerners.(O'Ballance:1977,.40, Sayeed:1990,257/258). On August 7th, 1955 two civilian were arrested in Juba accused of contributing to a plot to cause a mutiny in the Southern forces of the army. Demonstrations demanding their release were dispersed by the use of tear gas for the first time in the South. On August the 18th the Southern units of the army in Torit in the Equatoria province, refused the orders issued to them to move to the North. The mutiny resulted in the death of 275 Northerners and 70 Southerners.

¹⁶The threat was issued on August the 18th, 1954 following a visit of a joint parliamentary delegation of the Umma and the Liberal parties headed by Buth Diu, the Secretary of the latter, which attacked the government policy.

The politics of ethnic conflicts claimed a new era throwing dark shadows on the real issues behind them.

Despite these shadows, the political movement in the South continued to believe in a possible peaceful solution to the contradiction between them and the Northern power bloc. In December 1955, the Southern members of the Parliament agreed to vote for the immediate independence of the Sudan, following a promise given as a decision passed in the Parliament to consider their 'claim' for a federal system of government when the permanent constitution was written. But when the Constitutional Committee was formed only three Southerners out of 46 members were appointed to it. When the Committee 'considered' the Southern 'claim' for a federation, it rejected them and the Southern members walked out. One of the Southern leaders, Father Saturino Lohure, a Catholic priest and a founder of the Federal Bloc, summarized the position of many educated Southerners when he said in the Parliament on June 1958,

"The South claims to federate with the North.. a right that the South possesses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly through political, social and economic subjection of the South."

In less than eleven years, since the Juba Conference decided the unity of the Sudan, the Southern demands developed from mere constitutional safe-guards to a federal state to a threat to separate. It is absurd to explain that change in position merely by reference to the colonial heritage, because the colonial heritage did not prevent the Southern representatives in the Juba Conference from choosing the unity of the Sudan. The explanation, though should take into account the colonial heritage of the Sudan as a whole (in the sense how the North and South developed and were structured), should be sought in the way different actors on the stage performed. Because the play no longer had an author, the actors were the authors and they should be held responsible about their performance.

Most of the Northern politicians and scholars do not go beyond the circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past. They try to explain what they call the Southern problem by recalling the colonial past as if the history of the Sudan had stopped on independence day. Prime Minister Azahari told a press conference in September 5th that, "What has happened in the South now is a predetermined result of the heritage of the past and the plots which had been prepared over years." (al-Ayam Daily, 6/9/1955). Ali Abd al-Rahman, a founder and president of PDP and ex-minister who held important ministerial portfolios including those of education and interior as well as of foreign affairs, wrote explaining the 1955 events,

"Colonialism and Missionaries had cooperated in creating the feelings of hatred and enmity in the hearts of Southerners preparing by that a time-bomb which was just triggered off by the withdrawal of the British in 1955 and after the establishment of the self-government and its success in the Sudanization.."(Al Amin:1970, 51).

Generally this was an apologetic approach by the leading members of the ruling bloc, not only to justify their failure but also to treat the Southerners who did not surrender to their authority and accept their hegemony as 'the half-educated elements', 'the mission boys', 'the British agents '(Garang:1971, 22).

On the other side some of the Southerners had the idea that the difference in the development between the South and North could only be overcome under the trusteeship of the British Administration ignoring the fact that the colonial state was responsible for the state of uneven development. According to Joseph Garang that was a rightist group which was incited by and allied themselves with the British and later with the Umma party. They base their stand on North-South conflict, taking the whole North as Arabs and Moslems who wanted to exploit and suppress the Southerners. Like the Northern ruling power bloc, they retreat to history, but this time the history of slave trade in the Sudan, to search for the causes of the conflict. The rightist group was building its ideological discourse, again like the power bloc, on ethnic and religious grounds with Africans on the ethnic level and Christianity on the religious as elements opposing Northern Arabs and Islam.(Ibid, 14-15).

This wing of the Southern political movement of tried to bloc the process of the self-determination before the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 (Ibid, 21). Their failure was due to the rise of a national group in the Southern politics, led by Bullen Alier on the same year. The latter allied itself with the national movement in the North. The problems of 1955, were a direct result of the betrayal of the power bloc in the North of its Southern allies by forgetting "the promises they had made during the election campaign". and their failure to "meet the urgent needs of the South-e.g economic construction, the principle of equal pay to equal work, abolition of the poll tax, raising the standard of living of the masses, adequate share in the state apparatus, etc." (Ibid, 22) As a result, the rightist group in the Southern political movement flourished.

The mistrust and worries about the policies of the power bloc spread to other less developed regions in the Sudan and a Federal Bloc was formed after the 1958 elections. Though mostly constituted of Southern members, the Federal bloc inspired the rise of important regional awareness.

The Beja Congress held in October 1958 demanded an autonomous rule for Eastern Sudan,(where more than 500,000 Beja people were living at the time), and more representation for the Beja in the Central government. The November coup brought the Beja movement to a temporary halt.

3.4.6. The Economic Crisis of 1957/58

Failing to change, or even being conscious of the necessity of change, the post-colonial state maintained the Sudanese economy within the international division of labour where it was subject to the conditions in the international market, especially the fluctuations in the prices of primary commodities. This was more clear as far as the prices of cotton, which by independence constituted 72% of the earnings of Sudanese exports were concerned. The cotton prices which rose sharply in 1951 during the Korean war to reach 134.7 cents per lb, declined sharply to 70 cents in 1952, and 67.4 cents in 1953. In 1954 it began a smooth rise to 72.8 cents and continued rising during 1955 and 1956 to reach 77.1 and 80.7 cents respectively. It dropped sharply to 51.7 cents per lb in 1957 and to 35.7 cents in 1958.

The decline in cotton prices, linked with a poor output of cotton in 1957/58 and the failure to sell the production of 1956/57 and 1957/58 were enough to create a crisis for Sudan mono-commodity export economy. The cotton output of 1957/58 was 1061, 000 kantars, less than half the output of 1956/57 and about 60% of the average cotton output for the years 1951/52-1955/56. In addition by the beginning of 1958 there were 494,000 bales of cotton unsold and only 231,000 bales of that had been sold by November 1958 (Haj Musa:1970, 191).

The crisis in cotton production, prices and trade was combined with a bad season for two other export crops, sesame and groundnuts. The output of sesame declined from 153, 000 metric tons in 1956/57 to 141, 000 metric tons in 1957/58, a decline of 7.9%. The total output of groundnuts decreased by 11% from 146 to 129, 000 metric tons in the same period.(MoF:1968,)

The decline of the output of the main exports, the fall of cotton prices and sale combined together lead to a deficit in the trade account in 1957 of LS 16.2 millions compared with a surplus of LS 21.6 millions in 1956. Sudan terms of trade declined from 125 in 1956 to 112 in 1957 and further to 103 in 1958 (taking 1953 as base year:100)(MoF:1964, 36).

The government budget which showed a surplus of LS 13.2 million in 1956/57, realized a surplus of only LS 6.1 million in 1957/58, a decline of more than 50%. In the 1957 budget the government decided to increase customs on some commodities to remedy the decline in its revenues. (The price of sugar increased by 20% as a result). Generally, the effect of the crisis was a sharp rise in the prices of consumer goods, the price indices showed a rise of 21.9% in 1957 compared with 1956 and of 109.8% compared with 1953. In general the Gross National product declined by 1.5% with a general decline in agricultural production of 25.4% over 1957/58 compared to those of 1956/57 (Ibid, 64, Table 1).

Facing these economic difficulties, the government of Khalil decided to seek foreign aid. This brought the controversial issue of American aid (see below) and the crisis brought the trade unions in confrontation with the government.

3.4.6. The Foreign Dimension

The post-colonial state in the Sudan was not only subject to the contradictions of internal social forces and political groupings, it was also subject to regional and international contradictions and struggles. The two Condominium states Egypt and Britain did not cease to have interests and seek influence in the Sudan, and were joined after World War II by the United States of America. The USA decided its policy in the light of colonial withdrawal on the Truman Doctrine of 'filling the gap' guided by the Cold War. The post-war importance the American policy anticipated to Egypt on the geo-political map of the Middle East could be interpreted accordingly. Ethiopia, whose emperor developed strong personal relations with many Sudanese notables during his exile in the Sudan at the time of Italian invasion, became more concerned after the changes in Egypt in 1952, and also contributed to foreign intervention in Sudanese politics (see below).

The Egyptian claim of sovereignty over the Sudan which remained the basic demand of all Egyptian governments and constituted an obstacle to all the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Sudan, was, at least tactically, replaced in 1952 after the coup in Egypt by the recognition of Sudanese right to self-determination. In October 1952 the new Egyptian government invited the major Sudanese political parties to negotiations in Cairo, at the end of which an agreement on a united Sudanese-Egyptian amendment to the Self-Government Statute proposed by Sir Robert Howe, the Governor-General, was signed. The new Egyptian position was declared in a "Note from the Egyptian Government to the British Government concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination for the Sudan" which reads,

"The Egyptian Government firmly believes in the right of the Sudanese to self-determination and the effective exercise thereof in the proper time and with necessary regards."

This was followed by great efforts by Egypt to unite the unionist parties in the Sudan into one party the NUP (Mahjoub, 1974:53). The basic aim was that the Sudan (under NUP government) would opt for unity with Egypt. Hence Egypt backed NUP in 1953 elections which followed the agreement between Britain and Egypt signed on February the same year. The relation between the NUP elected government and the Egyptian government went through a period of tension after the March 1954 events in Khartoum when the Umma party and the Ansar Mahdist sect organized violent demonstrations during General Neguib's visit to attend the official opening of the Parliament. The events made the NUP leaders aware about the extent of the opposition possible to be launched against any attempts for the unity with Egypt. The events in Egypt during the same period contributed to the NUP adoption of a cautious attitude. The struggle among the Free Officers in Egypt, the dismissal of Neguib, and the crushing of the Wafdists, Communists and Muslim Brethren, all well reported and covered in the free Sudanese press and discussed among the educated and the urban masses as signs of a dictatorial regime. Hence was the legitimate question, "With whom should we unite?" was the cry of Sudanese press (Beshir:1988, 17). Another question which contributed to the tension was

the Nile Waters. The NUP government came under increasing pressure from the fraction of agricultural capitalists in and out the government to denounce the 1929 Nile Waters' Agreement and negotiate a new agreement which would "allow the expansion of pump schemes and the production of cotton." (Bush and Kabbalo, op. cit., 11). Negotiations on this question with Egypt were held in vain and lead to conflicts within the government which resulted in Prime Minister Azahari's expulsion of three senior ministers who accused the government of being "swept by the Egyptian tide" and of being "weak willed about the Nile Waters"(quoted in Ali: 1989, 106).

However, since November 1954 the NUP government was becoming more pro-independence¹⁷ (Sayeed:1990, 226-228, Beshir:188,17), the response of the Egyptian government was harsh: immediately began putting pressure on Prime Minister's Azahari and encouraged other unionist leaders to denounce his leadership. This contributed to the splits in the party which resulted in 1956 in the formation of the PDP and the replacement of Azahari by Abdalla Khalil of the Umma as prime minister in July 1956.

An Umma dominated government was the last thing Egypt wanted in the Sudan, but it came partially a result of Egyptian manoeuvres against the NUP and partially a result of Egyptian stand on the Nile Waters issue which pushed the unity of the agricultural capitalist fractions despite the religious and tribal cleavages. It was just natural that the relations between Egypt and the Sudan would deteriorate more after 1957. The failure of the negotiations between the two governments on the Nile Waters issue and the Egyptian plans to build the High Dam in Aswan with its consequences for Sudan district of Wadi Halfa was the first obstacle.

In 1958 a boundary dispute emerged between the two countries when Egypt claimed that its frontier with the Sudan according to the 1899 Agreement, which was adopted as reference for the frontiers in the 1953 Agreement granted the Sudan the right of self-determination, was Latitude 22 degrees north. Though the Egyptian claims were withdrawn, the damage in the relations between the two countries was to remain until the coup in November 1958.

The relation between the two countries deteriorated further by the negotiations between the Sudan government and the United States of America concerning the US aid to the Sudan. For Egypt the American presence in the Sudan was thought dangerous at the time the Egyptian-American relations were deteriorating concerning the question of security in the Middle East (The Baghdad Alliance), and the problem with the World Bank concerning the finance of the High Dam at Aswan. These worries were reflected in the stand taken by PDP in the coalition government during the discussion of the US aid agreement.

¹⁷Selwyn Lloyd (1956) quoted Prime Minister Azahri as telling William Luce, the political secretary to the Governor General, that the Sudan should be friendly with Egypt but independent. Azahri said to Luce "You must not suppose anyone in his senses, having thrown off one, would put himself under a new master." (Lloyd, 1978, 16).

Rumours and allegations also contributed to the tension in the relation between the two countries. A rumour about the interference of Egypt in bringing the PDP and NUP leaders together in Cairo was circulated by the press and found its way to the prime minister in an official memorandum from the Sudan Ambassador in Cairo (Mukhtar:1987, 145). The leaders of both parties denied the rumour. (see Al Amin, and Sayeed:1991, 343). There was also an allegation that there was an Egyptian plot to use young officers to initiate a coup (Al Tom:1987, 156/7).

While the relations between Egypt and the Sudan were febrile, the relations between Britain and the Sudan were passing a calm and sometimes disguised transformation. Despite the fact that the British had left behind strong political allies in the form of the Umma party, and substantial economic influence because of the colonial heritage of a mono-crop agricultural economy and a presence of British commercial and banking enterprises, the British influence in the Sudan was declining. This was mainly due to the international changes after World War II and the relative decline of the British influence in international politics and economics. The crisis of the British textile industry due to international competition, left the Sudanese cotton without its traditional market. The Sudanese exports to Britain (in which cotton was dominant), declined from the high level of LS 32 millions in 1956 to LS 11.8 and 11.9 millions in 1957 and 1958. While exports were declining, imports from Britain were increasing from LS 12.5 millions in 1956 to LS 17.9 and 19.1 in 1957 and 1958 respectively. In response to this trade crisis, Sudan began searching for other markets. This was the period when economic relations with the United States of America, West Germany, Italy, East Germany, Soviet Union and other European countries began to gather momentum, albeit at different speeds. Britain was "dismayed" by those attempts (Khalid:1990, 153). This was reflected in the way meetings and negotiations between Sudanese ministers and representatives of those countries were reported in the British Embassy reports to the Foreign Office (Ibid, 153 and fn 62, 160).

The stances of the Sudanese Foreign Minister (1956-58), Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, were of particular concern to the British Foreign Office, especially during the Suez Crisis and his speech in the UN General Assembly in 1957. Mahjoub was described in British Foreign Office papers as "unreliable, vain and colour-conscious". (Ibid,

Despite all these tensions, the British government and its Ambassador kept close relations with Sudan. During the Azhari's premiership (1954-56), Azahari, his government and his opponents asked for British assistance (Ibid, 140-142). The Umma faced by its defeat in the 1953 elections urged the British government to "denounce the agreement [of February 1953 that had established the transitional self-government] dissolve the parliament, set up a caretaker government and arrange elections, under international supervision, for an independent Sudan" (Ibid, 147). The British ruled out the proposal as underestimating the role of nationalism in the Sudan. According to recently released British Documents, Azahari was reported seeking funds from the British government for

his 'National Unionist' party to preserve a working majority in the parliament in exchange for some economic concessions for British business in the Sudan (JE 1081/6 1956). His minister of Social Affairs and National guidance was reported seeking assistance, both financial and advisory for counteracting the communist influence in the trade union movement. Britain did provide the advisory assistance through its Labour Attache in Beirut, but declined, (at least that what the official documents claimed), to provide the financial assistance for both the minister and his prime minister (JE 1081/6 1956)

When Khalil became prime minister (1956-58), the British Ambassador's meetings and consultations were frequent and reported in the despatches to the Foreign Office, along with surveillance of the political events in the Sudan and analysis of the attitudes of different political parties and leaders. The Ambassador, for example, raised with Prime Minister Khalil the dissatisfaction of the British government with the anti-British attitudes of Mahjoub, the Foreign Minister, especially his speech in the UN General Assembly. He reported to London that Khalil told him that many people had advised the prime minister to dismiss Mahjoub, but he was compelled to keep him until the general elections to preserve the unity of his government (FO/371/125959 From Khartoum No. 162/13/2/1957).

In his first dispatch after the November coup, the British Ambassador revealed that he had advised Khalil against organizing the coup (FO/371/ 131713, From Khartoum to FO. No. 1470, November 21 1958). Instead of the coup the Ambassador suggested to Khalil to negotiate with the NUP in order to form a wider coalition (Ibid, No.99 November the 25, 1958). The coup of November 1958, though according to the Ambassador did not change the situation as far as the relation between the Sudan and Britain was concerned, took place despite the British advice which had reflected that Britain was no longer the single decisive power in the country.

Since the end of World War II, the USA had become more interested in the Sudan for geo-political and strategical reasons. Following the Truman Doctrine of filling the gap created by the withdrew of the British from some of their colonies, the USA considered the Sudan was geo-politically of strategic importance vis-a-vis Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt was of great strategic importance for the USA in the security of the Middle East. In Ethiopia the USA had a communication station in Eritrea since 1942 which they upgraded in 1953 when they replaced the British military mission which was withdrawn in 1952. The communication installation in Asmara were by then "ideally situated for the US global radio communication network" (Halliday:1977, 10-11). Before July 1952, the USA policy towards the Sudan was simply to put pressure on Britain to hand Sudan over to Egypt. This was thought to contribute to settling the Egyptian position within the Western alliance. This position continued during the negotiations with the new Egyptian government after the coup of July 1952 and the American Ambassador in Cairo was quoted by a Sudan Government senior official as had been unable to understand why

"anybody should be bothered about the destiny of a few million Sudanese niggers" (Mavrogadato:1986, 106). But that position was clearly changed when the radical attitudes of the new Egyptian regime began to appear and the influence of the Sudan Communist Party became apparent after Sudan's independence. A presence of a potentially growing communist party was an important element in determining the USA policy towards the Sudan, the first sub-Saharan African country to gain its independence with its geo-political importance in the Middle East and Africa. The USA, also, might have thought to use the Sudan as an element of pressure on Egypt, especially on the issue of the Nile waters and the building of Aswan High Dam. .

When Nixon, then Vice-President, visited Khartoum in 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine was the issue of the day. Though the Sudanese government rejected any participation in military pacts and the provision of military bases, it accepted USA's offer of economic aid. On November 1957, a technical mission from the US International Cooperation Association visited Khartoum to discuss the details of the offer. The question of the US aid generated a tense political atmosphere. On one hand the opposition parties and organizations launched a campaign against it, while the other hand the fragile Umma - PDP witnessed its most serious test. Sudan had become one of the fields of the already started Cold War. According to Philip Agee, an ex-CIA employee, the CIA was behind the 1958 coup (Agee:1975, 82), though it is questionable whether they were, like prime minister Khalil who invited in the army, able to control the regime that resulted from the coup.

3.4.7. The Culmination of the Political Crises

On the eve of the second session of the second parliament, the political crisis was gathering momentum on five levels. The first was the weakness, divisions and ideological bankruptcy of the ruling power bloc. The second was the rising opposition to the government within the dominated classes which were becoming more politically active. The third was the beginning of the regional demands. The fourth was the 1957/58 economic crisis and the fifth level was the active intervention of the foreign forces in Sudanese politics. All these levels were interrelated and composed the crisis of the post-colonial state in 1956/58.

For the ruling power bloc the key to the resolution of the crisis was to overcome the divisions within itself. There were, at least four ways of achieving that target as an important condition to the resolution to the political crisis of 1958. Three of them were within the civilian democratic system. The first was to form a coalition government of the NUP and PDP. Negotiations were said to have been held in Cairo to achieve that goal (Suliman, 1969:351). The leaders of the two parties denied that such negotiations had taken place.(AL Amin, 1969, 91, Sayeed, 1990,343-344).

The second solution was a broad coalition government of all parties represented in the parliament. This was suggested by a number of distinguished Sudanese including the

speaker of the Parliament and the chairman of the Journalists Union, who tried to mediate in bringing that solution. Negotiation with different political parties were carried and the only obstacle was Mr Khalil the Prime Minister (Sayeed, 1990,342).

The third solution which faced the same obstacle was suggested by Siddik al-Mahdi the President of the Umma party, the formation of a coalition between the NUP and the Umma. While the negotiation for the formation were carried in the Prime Minister's house, but he had already invited the army to take power. One of his ministers who worked also as his assistant Secretary General of the Umma Party wrote,

"..Then he, [Khalil], accepted the formation of a new government. An agreement was reached after many meetings between the leaders of the Umma, the NUP and the Southerners, on the formation of the government, the number of ministers and the general targets to be achieved by that government.. While that was the situation and we thanked God that we had overcome all the difficulties and obstacles that faced us , we, the ministers, were awoken by armed officers and soldiers who delivered to us letters, seemed to have been hurriedly written, conveying our dismissals as ministers which was signed by General Abboud, the Army's Commander in Chief." (my translation from El Tom, 1987:157)

The fourth solution was a military coup d'etat following the experiences of Egypt, 1952, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan (1958). Khalil decided to chose the option of a military coup d'etat. Gramsci noted that "...a particular political act may have been an error of calculation on the part of the leaders of the dominant classes" (Gramsci:1988, 191). The decision of Prime Minister Khalil to hand over the power to the Military was one of these errors. His intentions were to use the military to govern on behalf of his party and under his auspices.(see El Tom, 1987:158, and The Report of the Judicial Inquiry Committee on the Causes of the 17 November 1958 Coup; 1965:23-27). He was not able to control the military whom he had invited. General Abboud, being handed the power, decided to play the role of the master and not the puppet. He established an authoritarian military regime. The coup d'etat of 1958 could not just be explained by the "proceeding historical developments" because that would be more than "a historical apologia" as Marx criticized Proudon's explanation of the coup that brought Louis Bonparate to power in France in 1852 (Marx:1978 b, 4). The coup could not also be explained by the historical error of Khalil or the authoritarian tendencies of Abboud, unless these two were looked at within the concrete class struggle in the Sudan and the conflict of interests of the regional and international forces in the period 1954-58. The coup in itself was evidence of the failure of the ruling power bloc in resolving the issue of the leadership and of setting and accepting rules for the game for power contest among its different fractions. It was also evidence that these fractions were unable to compromise among themselves on one hand, and with the dominated classes on the other. It was an expression of the intellectual failure to compose a vision which would have gone beyond their interests as classes in-themselves to classes for-themselves, in other words, their failure to have a programme that dealt with the problems of the independent Sudan linked to an ideological discourse to provide a legitimacy to their rule paving the road for the establishment of their hegemony.

3.5. The State Crisis and The First Military Rule 1958-64.

3.5.1. A Historical Background of the Sudanese Military

Military intervention in Sudanese politics is not a post-colonial phenomena. In 1900 14th Battalion of the Sudanese Units mutinied, the British authorities "accused the junior Egyptian officers of having incited the Sudanese soldiers". (Mohamed, 1980, p17.) Accordingly, the British decided to reorganize some military units to be composed of Sudanese only. In 1905 a military school was established to train Sudanese to be commissioned as officers. Later the Western Arab Corps in Darfur, the western Sudanese province, and the Eastern Arab Corps in Kassala, the eastern province, were formed. In 1910, the Equatoria Corps were formed and had "remained the only permanent garrison in the South until the mutiny of 1955" (Ibid, p17).

The events of 1924 stands as another example of the intervention of the Sudanese military in politics during the colonial period. An ex-officer in the Sudanese Units was responsible for organizing and leading the White Flag League which played a significant role in these events. In August 1924, the cadet of the Military School demonstrated in arms in Khartoum. The 11th Battalion of the Sudanese Units mutinied objecting to the orders of the British authorities to evacuate the Egyptian Units following the assassination of Le Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan in November 1924. The mutineers who established themselves in the Military Hospital in Khartoum and were surrounded by the British troops, fought for the last man. The British used artillery fire, destroying the Hospital building. The leader of the mutineers who died under the ruins holding his gun became a symbol of Sudanese patriotic militarism.

In order to avoid events such as those of 1924, the British authorities reorganized the Sudanese Units and formed the Sudan Defence Force (SDF). The Military School was closed and its graduates were encouraged to apply for retirement following Act No. 80 of 1930 "which contained offers of generous pensions and incentives.." (Ibid : 22).

The presence of the Italians in Ethiopia led the British to expand the SDF and reopen the Military School in 1935; but this time, commissioned officers were carefully chosen from families loyal to the British authorities. This enforced the position of officers loyal to the existing institutions who remained in the Sudan Defence Force after its formation following the 1924 revolution. About 51 officers had been commissioned until the School was closed in 1944.

When the Military School was reopened in 1948 , it was upgraded to a college. Its cadets were chosen from secondary school leavers. By then secondary school education had expanded, the social origin of students had changed to include the sons of the first and second educated generation as well as of town traders and craftsmen and wealthy farmers. The aftermath of the Second World War, as we have seen in chapter 2,

witnessed the rise of the Sudanese national movement, in which the students including those of the secondary schools, were actively involved. The cadets of the new Military College were the product of those new conditions. Despite the close screening practised by the senior officers to avoid enlisting radical students¹⁸ some of them were commissioned.

By independence time and the Sudanization of senior officers posts two different layers of officers dominated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The senior officers who were either, because of their non-political activities during the 1924 revolution, remained in the army, ie General 'Abboud himself, or were commissioned between 1935-1944 when the military School was open in its second phase.

The second layer was of the middle-rank and junior officers most of them were commissioned after the re-opening of the Military School and its upgrading to a post-secondary College in 1948. There were two sub-groups among the group of senior officers, one was a reflection of the effects of the 1924 Revolution, which its members either did not participate in the revolution or they were disappointed by the stand of the Egyptian units and Egyptian government during the events of 1924. This trend was composed of the most senior officers, most of whom were commissioned before 1935 and were closely linked with the British authorities and the two sectarian leaderships. This sub-group, despite the different sectarian affiliations of its members was united by the military tradition and discipline and they were mainly non-politicized.

The other sub-group was affected by the rise of the Graduate Congress, the national movement and the formation of the political parties and mainly composed of officers who were commissioned after 1935 and, despite the formal unity and discipline the army imposed on them, they were politically divided on the same lines of the divisions that took place among the members of the Congress. They were supporters of the Umma, NUP or the PDP.

Both sub-groups were part of the ruling power bloc, the only difference between them was the degree of politicisation. As the other elements of the power bloc, the senior officers group was totally of Northern Arab Islamic origin, because at that time there were only 9 junior southern officers in the whole SAF.(O'Ballance, 19 :40). This was the group which was invited to take power in 1958. We will see below how and why conflicts and power struggle appeared among them after they seized power.

Among the middle-rank and junior officers group three different trends were formulating during this period. Two main factors influenced the formulation of these trends. The first factor was the influence of the new trends in the national movement after World War II, (mainly the Sudan Communist Party, SCP, the trade union movement, the students

¹⁸A retired Colonel M M Osman, commissioned in 1956, wrote that he was asked during the interview for the selection of cadets for the Military College, about the kind of books and magazines he used to read (Osman:1988, 3)

movement and the Muslim Brotherhood). The other factor was the influence of the Egyptian Coup d'etat of July 1952. The latter had two dimensions, one was cultural while the other was direct interference of the Egyptian intelligence agents to recruit officers in the SAF, in an attempt to build an organization similar to the Free Officers Organization which carried the 1952 coup in Egypt.

Beshir (1974), Mohamed (1980) and Osman (1988) agreed that Salah Salim, a member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister Of Sudan Affairs until 1956 in Egypt, attempted the establishment of a pro-Egyptian organization in the army. According to Mohamed, this resulted in a "group of Nasserist officers in the Sudanese Army" which represented "one of the vehicles of Egyptian influence" (Mohamed, 1980: 23). Osman differentiates between two groups influenced by the coup in Egypt. One group, he claims, composed of recruited agents of the Egyptian government of whom the core was some Sudanese officers commissioned in the Egyptian Army and transferred to the SAF after independence. The other group was of nationalist officers who were culturally influenced by the "Egyptian Revolution".(Osman 1988:3). El Kidd, a retired Lieutenant Colonel and a leader of an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1966, emphasized the cultural influence of Nasserism on himself and his generation. For them, he confessed, Nasserism "continued to be seen, [by them of course], as the only way out of the state of political chaos and corruption.." (El Kidd:1988, 3).

The allegations of Egyptian interference where among the arguments used by Prime Minister Khalil to convince the army to take over (The Report of the Judiciary Enquiry Committee, 1965:37)

According to Ahmed, the Moslem Brethren in the Sudan were also influenced, albeit in a different direction, by the Egyptian experience. An Egyptian Muslim Brother who escaped following the crack down on the Muslim Brethren in Egypt in 1955, recommended that the movement in Sudan should build its own organization in the army, in contrast to what happened in Egypt where they joined the Free Officers Organization. As a result some young members of the Moslem Brethren movement joined the Military College and founded a military branch of the movement (Ahmed, n.d:93)¹⁹.

That was the situation in the SAF when the army took power in 1958, though in appearance, it was united, different political groups were emerging and developing beneath the surface. The coup of 1958 was to release all these forces, as we will see below.

3.5.2. The Authoritarian Project: The 'Abboud's Coup.

The 1958 coup was a project to establish an authoritarian state capable of resolving the political and economic crisis in the country. The original version of the project, as had

¹⁹Ahmed mentioned the names of the officers Bashir Mohamed Ali, Abdalla al-Tahir, Abdul Ragman Farah, and Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab as the pioneers of the Muslim Brothers organisation in the army(Ahmed, n.d., 93, fn. 3).

been revealed later by testimonies given to the Enquiry Committee on the Reasons of the Coup in 1965 and some memoirs of some politicians published after that, was to establish an authoritarian state by imposing the unity of the power bloc through the appointment of representatives of its different fractions in the different organs of the state formed by the coup (Maj General M.A Al Tigani Testimony the Enquiry Committee, pp 37-38, also Al Tom: 1987, 157-158). That was the project suggested by Khalil. According to that project a council of state formed of five members representing the Umma, PDP, NUP, the Southern Parties and the military. The representative of the army, General 'Abboud, should be the president of the state council and the prime minister of a council of ministers to be formed on Khalil's own advice. The state council should be the highest constitutional authority and should rule by decrees after the suspension of the constitution and the parliament. The aim of the project, it seems, was to achieve the unity of the power bloc under the guardianship of the army. Apparently the leaders of the army accepted Khalil's project in a meeting held a week before the coup. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of that version of the project because it had never been carried.

Instead, 'Abboud announced on the 17th of November a different version, the army leadership decided to monopolize political power, hence putting the state under the direct control of one fraction of the power bloc that of senior army officers and state bureaucrats. The British Ambassador in Khartoum wrote to the Foreign Office just after the Coup, describing the military take-over in Sudan as one carried by the thirteen most senior officers in the Army. He clearly distinguished what happened in the Sudan from other radical coups in the area; ie Egypt and Iraq. It was hence logical for the Ambassador to expect no change of policies (Foreign Office:371/131713), British Embassy Despatch No.99 November 25 1958). The change was within the power bloc.

3.5.3. The Authoritarian Project in Action

The first constitutional decrees, issued by General 'Abboud, suspended the Transitional Constitution of 1956, dissolved the Supreme Commission, which was the head of state according to the Constitution, the council of ministers and the Parliament. It dissolved all political parties and suspended the publication of newspapers until new licences were issued. when the latter were issued, General 'Abboud told the press editors that they should not publish any news or ideas that might undermine the new regime, and should subject the religious sects, the dissolved parties and their previous members to any attack or assault and should not publish anything that might undermine Sudan relations with other countries, and finally should not publish any news about the armed forces except those authorized by official sources.(Sayeed:1990, 350)

The regime immediately declared a state of emergency. It promulgated according to the Sudan Defence Act, the Sudan Defence Regulations which stated the authorities and powers designed to implement the state of emergency, which were in reality had become the law of the land for the six years of the Second Republic. According to the

Regulations, the Minister of the Interior or whom he might authorize, had the right to censor all mail, newspapers and any other publications. He had the right to compel any citizen to provide information required by the police, the right to declare curfew in any place or district in the Sudan, to prevent any citizen from leaving the country and to deny the import of any news papers or publications in the country. The minister had the powers to prevent any demonstrations, rallies and public meetings and to order the search of any house, building, cars, boats or aeroplane by any police officer or soldier during day or night without a judiciary and to permit the use of force if needed to implement that. The Minister might order the detention of any person without judicial warrant or obligation to bring the detained before a magistrate as required by the Criminal Procedure Act of 1925. He might extend the detention of such person for unlimited periods. He might order the restriction of the movement and determine the residence of any person in any place, and the prevention of any person from the entry of any specific area in the country. To complete the circuit, the Sudan Defence Act of 1939 was amended to define forming political parties, organizing strikes, plotting or working to overthrow the government or spreading any anti-government sentiment as crimes punishable by death. Such crimes or any crimes according to the Sudan Defence Act of 1939, amended 1958 might be tried before military courts (Haj Musa, 1970, 236/237). On 3rd of December 1958, the council of Ministers, empowered by article 3 of the Sudan Defence Act, ordered the Sudan Federation of Workers Trade Unions and all trade unions dissolved. (Ibid, 237 and Sayeed, op. cit.,354).

In its first meeting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF, delegated all its powers to General 'Abboud, the Chairman and Supreme Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Regional military leaders were designated Military Governors of the then nine Sudanese provinces whose ex-Commissioners became executive directors. Hence a foundation of an authoritarian state was laid before the end of 1958. Despite all the decorations made in 1963 by introducing the Central Council, this foundation remained intact as the solid base of an authoritarian state until the overthrow of the military regime in 1964.

The implementation of the authoritarian project was faced by opposition from different groups at different periods of the regime. The two senior religious leaders of the Ansar and Khatimyya sects announced their welcome and support (Al Neil newspaper 21/11/1958 and Suliman:1970, 358). The tribal leaders hurried to give their support while the capitalist class, divided as it was, did not express a unified response; some individuals sent messages of support others kept silence. There was no immediate response from the political parties which were dissolved by the military authorities in the first day of the coup. However, the underground SCP was the only party that issued a statement opposing the coup (see Suliman, 1970, 360/366 , for the full statement). The response of the military was the immediate detention of seventeen of the party's cadres on the 27th of

November 1958. Fifteen were brought before a military court which on the 29th of January 1959, sentenced eight of them to imprisonment period between 5 years and six months and ordered the release of the other seven. Among those who were sentenced to 5 years was the Secretary General of the SWFTU, which brought the regime the condemnation of national and international trade unionists and trade union organizations.(Haj Musa, opt. cit.,241/243). The Sudanese newspaper Al Ayam demanded in an editorial on January 30th that the Government should publish a statement on the trial explaining the crimes committed by those who were sentenced, because the trial were secretly held and the press was denied the right to attend. The following day the Minister of Interior withdrew the licence of the paper preventing its publication. There was no doubt by then that the Military meant what they had said; the authoritarian project was in action.

3.5.4. The Crisis of the Military

Despite the authoritarian foundation and practises, the crisis of Sudanese state continued. The manifestations of that crisis were: a) Three coup attempts in March, May and November 1959, b) Continuous opposition from the trade unions expressed in strikes in November 1959, June and July 1961, memorandums to the authorities on December 1958, November 1959, June 1961, and the conferences of August 1963 and 1964. All of them expressed explicitly political demands concerning the basic human rights, as well as the economic demands. c) The students opposition which took the form of memorandums, demonstrations and strikes in addition to the role they played in bringing the political parties together and the initiative they took in organising public meetings to discuss the Southern question; d)The Gezira tenants who organized a long strike in December 1963 which had the significance of being the only successful strike by any group during the military regime; e) The opposition of different political parties which began to gather around the leader of the Ansar Sect and Umma party Siddiq al Mahdi by the end of 1960 and continued for two years and disintegrated after Siddiq's death in October 1961 and the release of leaders of the opposition in January 1962. f) The opposition of the people of Wadi Halfa which was inspired by the government decision to transfer them to Khasham al Girba area which led to their demonstrations in October 1959. g) The intensification of the war in the South as response to the government neglect of the South in the recommendations of the Constitutional Developments Committee which was formed in 1961 and presented its recommendation on 1962.

The continuation of the crisis of the state was due to the failure of the November regime to unite the power bloc under its leadership, first by rejecting Khalil's project of representing all the elements of the power bloc in the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, and secondly when deciding to monopolize the state power by the armed forces, it excluded some elements of the leadership of the army which led to March and May 1959 coups. As a result of the March coup, the Umma and Ansar were in reality

weakened in the Military Council due to the expulsion of Major-General Ahmed Abdul Wahab and Colonel Awad Abdul Rahman who were both strong Umma supporters. The expulsion of Major-General Ahmed Abdalla Hamid after the failure of May coup attempt almost excluded all the supporters of the Umma from the Council. The May coup also led to the exclusion of the NUP elements from the Council. Hence the Council was left under a strong Khatimyya affiliation which meant that by 1959, the power of the state instead of being in the hands of the high rank military as a fraction of the power bloc, it was in the hand of the officers who were linked to the Khatimyya sect and represented only a fraction of the military. The regime was unable because of the religious sectarian cleavage, the Egyptian connection, and the commercial capital's interests domination of uniting the power bloc. It remained an alliance of the high ranks of the military and the bureaucrats on one side the Khatimyya on the other side.

The regime did not attempt to neutralise the dominated classes, instead it tried to repress them which provoked more opposition and intensified the class conflicts in the country. It contributed, albeit in a negative way, to emphasize an element of a democratic dimension in the ideological discourse of the left in the Sudan. The struggle for democracy became an important issue in the programme of the communists and other leftist groups which began to emerge in the Sudan influenced by the rise of Nasserist and Arab Nationalists in the Middle East. By the fall of the regime a democratic urban movement was developed constituted of the same elements who opposed Khalil's attempts to establish a civilian authoritarian state in 1957/58, albeit increased in number and obtained experiences in the struggle under tiring circumstances.

The issues of class struggle were democracy and the living conditions of masses, especially workers and organized tenants. The interrelation between the struggle for democracy and economic demands was established firmly because for both causes the workers and tenants had to face the authoritarian state, which confiscated their rights to have independent organizations, as employer or share-cropper. While the issue of democracy was capable of uniting a wide front including the students, the professional, and even those of the power bloc who left out of state decision making organs while unsuccessivabilty of the authoritarian state by definition, prevented their legal contest for power.

The economic crisis which began gathering momentum in 1963 (Kaballo: 1988, 25), was manifested in declining yields of the main export crops, increasing inflation rates and a worsened balance of trade and payments accounts. The yields of long stable cotton declined from 774 kg per feddan in 1961/62 to 565 kg per feddan in 1962/63 to 363 *feddans* in 1963/64. If this decline in yields is combined with the decline in land cultivated by cotton at the same period from 1.13 million *feddans* in 1961/62 to 1.04 million *feddans* in 1963/64, problems in Sudan trade and balance of payments would just be expected. The trade account which was already in the red by 1961/62 showing a deficit of

LS 27.8 millions, improved in 1962/63, yet still in the red at a deficit of LS 16 million, deteriorated sharply in 1963/64 to a deficit of LS 36.5 million. The balance of payments showed similar performance, the deficits were LS 7.2, 3.8 and 19 millions for the years 1961/62, 1962/63 and 1963/64. The rate of inflation increased from 1% in 1962 to 4.2% in 1963 and reached 6.6% in 1964.

The economic crisis was a resultant of the economic policies of the regime which kept the structure of the economy inherited from the colonial era unchanged. The Ten Years Plan of 1961/62-70/71 was the best expression of these policies. Its strategy was built on extending the economic structures of production, not changing them. The designer of the plan described that as the strategy,

"...to develop the country through the expansion of the already developed centresto concentrate the resources of the country on an improvement and expansion of the modern part of the economy rather than an equal rise in the modern and traditional parts."(Mirghani:1983, 39)

A logical result of such policy was a higher growth rates and better incomes and services in the relatively developed areas of central Sudan than other parts of the country, especially the most underdeveloped South and Western Sudan. Reading this result with the failure of the Constitutional Reform Committee to bring real devolution of power from Khartoum to these areas and the absence of democracy and democratic institutions to allow the expression of regional grievances, a civil war culminated in the South by 1963 and an underground organization called Sony (after a place in Jebel Mara in Darfur Province), distributed pamphlets against the domination of Jallaba in Darfur. The regional conflicts made their contribution to the crisis, and it was the discussion on the Southern Question that ignited the uprising which overthrew the regime.

3.6.The Rise and Fall of the Second Democracy

3.6.1. The October Revolution

The October Revolution of 1964, by overthrowing an authoritarian military regime through a 'general political strike' (civil disobedience), demonstrations of unarmed masses, and the backing of the middle and lower rank officers raised new challenges to the power bloc. The first of these challenges was the experience of the masses in overthrowing an authoritarian regime, which would be a danger hanging over the heads of the ruling power bloc. The power bloc 're-discovered' the importance of the mass organizations, especially trade unions, and the presence of radicals and communists in the leadership of these organizations. This importance was reflected in the Professional Front which had come to existence during the revolution and assumed the role of leading the masses from the declaration of the 'general political strike' to the announcement by General 'Abboud of dissolving the SCAF and promise to hand over the power to civilians. The absence of the representatives of the power bloc in that Front compelled the political

parties of the power bloc to rally to the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the only possible organization to challenge the leadership of the radicals. That possibility had arisen because of the class origin and composition of the Moslem Brotherhood was mostly composed of the new- petty bourgeois which initially began among the students and developed among them and the professionals. It had also arisen as the only organization capable of providing an ideological challenge to the radical ideological discourse which was in a way supported by the ideological influence of the radical regime of Nasser and the publications from Cairo and Beirut. From October 1964, the MBs had grown with the support of the traditional power bloc as a challenge to communists and radicals in schools, universities and trade union movement.

It raised also the importance of the armed forces in political struggle. The role played by young officers in compelling Abboud to dissolve the SCAF made the Free Officers Organisation, though illegal, widely respected in the aftermath of October Revolution of 1964. The Organisation itself was established during the struggle against the Abboud's regime. Its program which was published in its secret magazine, *Sout al-Goat al-Muslaha* (The Voice of the armed Forces), was composed of four points to be achieved by working closely with the popular movement. These were the overthrow of Abboud's regime, to restore parliamentary democracy, to issue a democratic constitution suitable to the economic, political and social conditions of the country that would provide for public liberties, and to present those responsible for Abboud regime to popular courts and to dismiss corrupt members of the civil service (Free Officers, 1961, 1). In response to this important role there were several attempts by political parties to form secret organisations within the army²⁰.

The second challenge which faced the power bloc, as a result of the success of the Revolution in shifting the balance of power, was expressed in the formation of the first transitional government in which the radicals were majority. This was a direct challenge which could not be assigned to the MBs to resolve it on behalf of the power bloc. The Umma party brought its traditional Ansar supporters to the streets of Khartoum led by Mr. al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the grandson of Mohamed Ahmed and the Chairman of the Umma party. The first transitional government was compelled to resign and a new government in which the power bloc ensured its domination was formed in February 1965. The second transitional government lost no time before calling an election where the political domination of the power bloc was maintained. The whole process was interpreted as a counter-revolution by the radicals, an interpretation which would affect the development of Sudanese politics, especially after the dissolution of the SCP in 1965 and the events that followed it.

²⁰Many of the officers who talked to me on this issue sighted Sadiq al Mahdi and the Muslim Brothers as the parties who attempted new organisations, they insisted that the communists were organised in the army a long time before October and that the Nasserists revived their interest which began just after independence.

The third challenge faced the power bloc was the rehabilitation of the regional questions. The first of these was the Southern Question which contributed to the ignition of the revolution as mentioned before. A Round Table Conference was held in Khartoum in March 1965 to negotiate a peaceful solution. The Conference which was attended by representatives of the Southern and Northern political parties, the government and delegations from neighbour countries as observers, failed to reach an agreement and the Question was referred to a Twelve Man Committee. It was to haunt the ruling power bloc after the elections.

The Beja Congress re-emerged as a parliamentary group of 10 members. The Nuba Mountains Union also re-emerged as a parliamentary group holding ten seats. Darfur regionalism which was first expressed by the Sony under ground organization, found itself in a Darfur Renaissance Front which unlike the other regional organization did not contest the 1965 elections, but influenced the political parties' choice of their candidates by emphasizing that candidates should be Darfurians. The leader of the Front, who stood for election as independent candidate, was elected to the parliament. Regional politics were in the agenda due to the October Revolution.

3.6.2. Unity and Split in the Power Bloc

The elections which was carried in April 1965, resulted in a 'hung' parliament. Though the Umma emerged from the 1965 elections as the largest party with 92 seats out of the 233 seats, it opted towards a coalition not with the small parties in the parliament, but with the largest party, its historical rival, the NUP which had 73 seats. The coalition was a tendency to maintain the unity of the power bloc against the challenge of the urban democratic movement which tended to call itself the modern forces. The unity of the power bloc was fragile because it was built on a compromise on the distribution of the constitutional posts rather than a detailed programme. One thing that came to the front was to stop the development of the democratic movement. In this context the dissolution of the Communist Party in November 1965 and the dismissal of eight of the eleven members of its parliamentary group needs to be understood.

All the SCP's parliamentary bloc was elected in the Graduates 15 especially allocated seats, which in itself reflect the influence of the radicals among the educated Sudanese. The communists competed closely with the NUP in urban constituencies, especially those of the Capital, Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North. The focus on the challenge of the leadership of the masses in the urban areas between the SCP and the NUP was reflected in a challenge between the leaders of the two parties in Omdurman Southern Constituency. The NUP leader won the challenge, yet the votes of the Secretary General of SCP showed how the influence of SCP was growing and endangering that of the NUP as the single most powerful party in the urban areas. This might explain the great role in dissolving the SCP played, by Mr. Ismail al-Azahari, the leader of the NUP who was elected to the presidium of the Supreme Commission in 1965. It might also explain his

role in the government's rejection of the Khartoum High Court judiciary order of November 1966 which ruled the constitutional amendments allowing the dissolution of the SCP as being illegal and should be void.

In contrast to what the leaders of the ruling power bloc expected, the SCP and the urban radical movement were able to rally a wider popular support to the right of the SCP to exist. The ideological discourse played great role in that battle. It is noticed before how the struggle against the Military regime deepened the democratic slogans among the masses. The SCP and supporters made great use of that by contesting the whole challenge in the name of democracy. The dissolution of the SCP also fired back as an issue of the legitimacy of the system of liberal democracy and the ruling power bloc. The feasibility of achieving a change of the ruling power bloc through democratic means was questioned by some leading members of the SCP and some radical officers in the Organization of the Free Officers.

It remains that one of the major problems of the power bloc was the failure to unite and solve the minor contradictions among themselves. Though the coalition government of the two traditional parties (NUP and Umma) which were representing the main elements of the dominant power bloc, was an attempt in the way of unity, it excluded an effective part of the power bloc, the Khatimyya which did not represent only part of the aristocracy, but an important part of the commercial bourgeoisie. But this problem was resolved before the 1968 elections by re-uniting the PDP and NUP in the Democratic Unionist Party, (DUP), bringing together most of the commercial bourgeoisie, part of the newly developing industrial bourgeoisie with the aristocracy of the Khatimyya sect.

The split in the Umma party on June 1966, not only divided the power, but also brought instability in the government. From June 1965 to May 1969, two elections were held and four governments were elected by the Constitutional Assembly, the parliament of the Third Republic. Three of these were headed by Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub (June 1965-July 1966, May 1967-April 1968, and April 1968-May 1969) and the fourth was headed by Sadiq al Mahdi from July 1966 to May 1967.

The NUP and later the DUP was a common partner, who exploited the division in the Umma party to consolidate its position in the coalition. By holding important ministerial portfolios, the DUP had also attempted consolidating its influence in the economic and commercial fields. For four years the Ministry of Trade and Supply was under a DUP's Minister. The prominent DUP politician al Sharif al Hindie who held the portfolio of the Ministry of Finance and Economics from May 1967 to the overthrow of the third democracy in 1969, used his position to enhance the position of DUP supporters. Despite this privileged situation, by the end of 1968, unrest began within the DUP parliamentary group which was reflected in a memorandum signed by a number of DUP MPS demanding a ministerial reshuffle. While the DUP was showing signs of disunity, the Umma was reunited in April-May 1969 when Sadiq al Mahdi and his uncle El Hadi al-

Mahdi agreed to share power after the presidential elections which would follow passing the draft of the permanent constitution in the Assembly. That constitution was never issued because of the May 1969 Coup.

One area in which the power bloc preserved a united front was drafting a permanent constitution. The unity was preserved because there was a common vision among the power bloc to set through the constitution new rules for the 'democratic game' which would keep state power within their bloc, and excluding the dominated classes and the urban democratic movement from it. A constitutional authoritarian state was the project. The draft ensured that a compromise was made to regional groups, by introducing regional governments. The power bloc project was based of gaining legitimacy by legislation, while legitimacy in a sovereign state could only be insured through hegemony.

The 1969 Coup was a direct response to the authoritarian project. The irony of the Nimeiri regime was that it lasted to establish the same project it had come to stop.

3.6.3. The Economic Crisis of the Second Democracy

The second democratic era showed the beginning of the financial crisis of the state, which would become an important element in the economic crisis. Despite the apparent balance in the current budget of the central government, the public budget which was composed of the current budget of the central government, local government and development budget, was in deficit for the whole period of the second democracy 1965-1969 (Kaballo, 1988, 26). The deficit was LS 34.2 millions in 1965/66, LS 24.9 millions in 1966/67, LS21.3 millions in 1967/68 and LS29 millions in 1968/69. The main reason

The government turned to borrowing from the Bank of Sudan to finance the deficit. In 1965, its borrowing amounted to LS 7.9 millions, which was increased to LS14 millions in 1966, decreased to LS10.4 millions in 1967 and increased to LS 24.3 millions in 1968. The decrease in 1967 was necessitated by the conditions of the IMF to support the balance of payment deficit.

Except for 1966, when the balance of payment deficit of payment deficit declined to LS 3 millions from the then relatively high LS7 millions in 1965, it showed a general increasing trend by rising from LS 8.4 millions in 1967 to LS12.7 millions in 1968. At the same time the Sudan foreign reserves continued its decline until reached LS 16.6 millions in 1968 which was equal to the value of 2.5 month's imports. An important component of the deficit in the balance of payments was the deficit in the trade account which showed continuous deficit amounted to LS 4.3 millions in 1965, LS 6.7 millions in 1966, LS0.2 millions in 1967 and LS 8.6 millions in 1968. The deficit in current accounts during the period 1965-1968 did not reflect a decline in exports or export values or a deterioration in the terms of trade, but rather an increase in the quantity of imports; the Bank of Sudan Annual Report of 1968 noticed that "The economy seems to have been provided with more goods- especially consumer goods than it needed" (Bank of Sudan, 1968, 17-8).

3.7. The State Crisis Under Nimeiri 1969-73.

3.7.1. The Change in Power

In contrast to the 1958 coup, the May 25, 1969 coup was launched by a group of young officers who were considered, at the time, to be on the left advocating radical solutions to Sudan's long standing problems. The leaders of the coup formed a Revolutionary Command Council of ten members (9 military and a civilian), issued three 'republican orders' and appointed a council of ministers of 26 members, two of them were from Southern Sudan.

The coup transferred the political power from the traditional ruling bloc to the left wing of the military and civilian bureaucrats and professional, the new-petty bourgeoisie of the Sudan. The possibility that such a regime could establish the hegemony of a new fraction, class or an alliance of classes would have depended on its achievement on the ideological, political and economic levels because the regime was established through a coup d'etat.

Its ideological discourse was based on the raw-material which had been provided by the urban democratic movement before the coup: the continuation of October 1964 revolution, the rejection of liberal democracy and the call for a "new democracy", the peaceful resolution of the Southern question, and the expansion of the public sector in the economy and establishing strong relations with the then socialist countries and the Soviet Union. The left in the Sudan between 1964 and 1969, though was dominated by the SCP, had used an ideological discourse similar to that of Nasser and other Arab nationalist organization. The officers who took power were themselves affected by that discourse. But the ideological discourse pursued by the new regime was not attractive to the masses outside the urban areas. From the beginning the new regime faced the problem of having a narrow urban base.

3.7.2. The Response of the Traditional Power Bloc

In the rural areas where the traditional ideologies of the sectarian religious groups were dominant, the Mahdists were able to rally the Ansar and organized their migration to Gezira Aba to join their leader, *Imam*, and to represent the greatest challenge to face the regime. The leader of the Ansar was joined with Mr. Sharif el Hindi, the ex-minister of Finance and the prominent leader of the DUP, some of the Muslim Brothers, led by Dr. Mohamed Salih Omer, a militant Islamic Fundamentalist, ex-minister and ex-lecturer in the University of Khartoum. In Gezira Aba they formed the National Front which would be the most important opposition force to the regime until 1977. The first confrontation with the regime took place in March 1970 during Nimeiri's visit to the White Nile area, a strong hold of the Ansar.

The Sudanese urban bourgeoisie was reluctant to take an open position with or against the new regime despite the first policy announcement made by the prime minister

(Ministry of National Guidance, 1970, 6). In 1969-70, a tragic Shakespearian situation of 'a lull before the storm' governed the business theatre. While in the period 1964-68, for example about 260 new private industrial enterprises were given licences and 227 new private companies were registered, only 69 private industries were granted licences and 50 private companies were registered in the period 1969-73. The Sudanese bourgeoisie was not only reluctant politically, but as private capital they were reluctant to invest or form new companies.²¹ The storm came in May-June 1970 when the regime announced a series of nationalisation and confiscation decisions. All commercial banks (two British, one Egyptian, one Ethiopian, one Jordanian, one Sudanese and one a French-Sudanese joint-ventur) were nationalised on the first anniversary of the coup (25 May 1970). The nationalisations included four British companies: Gellattaly Hankey, Mitchell Cotts, Sudan Mercantile, and the Imperial Chemical Industries (Sudan). Later on June 1970 more foreign companies were nationalised including the Sudan Portland Cement Company, the Blue Nile Brewery, Bata Shoe Company (Sudan), Blue Nile packing Company, Red Sea Stevedoring Company, National Cash register Company and the Pepsi Cola company. In addition more than sixteen Sudanese companies were confiscated. Despite the nationalisation and confiscation decisions, the regime and its president continued speaking about the role of private sector in development. In his two speeches presenting and declaring the start of the Five Years Plan 1970/71-1974/75 (Nimeiri's speeches on June and October 1970), the president focused on the investment allocated to be carried by the private sector described the role expected to be played by the private sector as a great one. Of the total planned investment of LS 385 million, the private sector was expected to contribute by LS170 millions, of which almost 14% was to be invested in industry.

It was during the last quarter of 1970 that the regime tried to strike a deal with the national bourgeoisie without involving their political representatives, a consistent attitude by the regime in trying to establish its alliances while demonstrating its relative autonomy. In reality the need was rising because of the economic response of the business circles to the confiscations and nationalisation, and the growing problems with the communists, as would be noticed when discussed in the next section. Following the split with the communists in November 16 1970, the regime began approaching the Sudanese capitalists more directly. In his speech on the 12th of February in which the president attacked the SCP aggressively, he appointed a businessman to represent what he called "National capitalism". He went to explain his decision:

²¹Information on industrial enterprises were collected from Ministry of Industry and Mining, Administration of Statistics and Research, 1973. "*A List of Working Industries in the Sudan*" (in Arabic), while the number of companies is calculated from information gathered from the Office of Commercial Companies Registrar, Attorney -General Chamber by the author.

"The representation of national capitalism in the Council of Ministers has a great significance. We felt their reluctance to enter 'the door of the revolution' despite my repeated assurances; and I want again to assure the national capitalism that it is one of the forces of the revolution and its role is necessary in the building of the country. The revolution gives it the chance together with public sector because the responsibility for the building of a nation is greater than to be carried by a sector without the other" (Ministry of National Guidance, 1971(1), 14)

He promised to explain the government policy in a meeting to be held with the businessmen on February 15, 1970. When the promised meeting took place, after speaking again about the role of private sector in the Five Years Plan, the president announced that there were three factors necessary for the private sector in order to play its role properly (Ministry of National Guidance, 1971,(2),1-5). The first was to create a suitable and encouraging atmosphere for private investment which he promised by making a new investment act and he declared that:

"the 1967 Act and the suggestions presented by the Ministry of Industry to amend it will constitute a good base for a discussion with the businessmen to know their point of view and their suggestion before issuing the act in its final form" (Ibid, 14)

The second factor was the specification of the role of private sector in different stages of economic development and this was done in its first stage by the Five years Plan. The third factor was the elimination of all obstacles that stand before the private sector fulfilling its investment role and here the president made a number of positive gesture towards the private sector. He promised that the government would not confiscate any wealth or property of any citizen except according to the law and especially the Fourth Republican Order, the Sudan Penal Code or any existing law. He determined the crimes that would be punished by confiscating of property as those committed against the state and the independence of the country. He promised to make a law to govern the decisions of nationalisation and that the state would make just compensations for nationalised enterprises. He declared three decisions to compensate the Sudanese owners of nationalised enterprises. The first was to pay to them the realised profits of their nationalised companies for the year before nationalisation up to 12% of the values of their shares. The second was to shorten the period of compensation to those who would promise to re-invest their compensations in the Sudan. The third was to pay annual interest on the shares until they transferred to other investments (Ibid , 11). The response of some of the businessmen who attended the meeting was to organise public rally for the president under the slogan of national unity in April 1971, but the event was a failure compared with similar events organised by the trade unions or the supporters of the SCP. It was not until after the July 1971 events when new initiatives towards the private sector were taken. In fact, the regime expressed good gesture when Nimeiri admitted that some mistakes were made in the confiscation decisions of 1970. The regime went further to revise the confiscations and in August 1972, " two private companies were restored to their owners" followed by another three in October, the same year.(ACR:1972/73, B113). Other decisions on the same line followed. In 1972/73 the regime issued a number of investment legislations that provide concessions and safeguards against confiscation and

nationalization. The promised changes in the 1967 Organisation and Promotion of Industrial Investment came as Legislation No.91 issued by the president of the Republic in August 1972 under the title "The Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1972". Without detailing that Act (see Kaballo, 1974), it is important to point two important features of the Act which governed the industrial investment for seven years until the 1980 Act was issued. The Act gave the Minister of Industry wide powers from defining the meaning of 'enterprise and craft' to be covered by the Act to the number of concession and the time limit in which they were provided to private investors (Ministry of Industry, 1973, Sections 3 and 8, Article 14). Such powers in the previous acts were either vested in the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Industry or strictly defined by the legislator²².

3.7.3. The Response of the Urban Democratic Forces

But Nimeiri's particular state crisis was its failure to establish a stable alliance between the fractions of the military and civilian professionals that came to control the state after the May coup, and the dominated classes, especially the urban population. Instead Nimeiri attempted to incorporate the trade union organizations, the tenants unions etc, in his single one-party system. This brought the conflict between the supposed allies to the open. The essence of the conflict was of several dimensions.

The first dimension was a result of discussions which began before the success of the coup²³. It was about the coup itself, whether it was a right tactic at the right time. The question was raised both in the leading committee of the Free Officers Organisation and the political bureau and central committee of SCP and in the discussions between the representatives of the two organisations.

In March 1969, the Central Committee of the SCP discussed a report from its Secretary General in which he argued against the coup mentality on one hand and disputed a suggestion that the country was passing through a revolutionary crisis on the other. Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub repeated the same arguments in his report to the Party Congress which was held to settle the dispute among the party cadres and members 15 months after the coup. He argued that the "military operation should become the climax of a general

²²As it would be argued later this had two repercussions: one was the weakening of the authority of the bureaucracy, a symptom of the Nimeiri regime which described by some authors as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the second was opening the way for corruption by providing licences for new investments in industries considered as not a priority because the existing capacity was enough to supply the market; ie vegetable oil and soap.

²³Many authors had provided a discussion of this dimension, see for example First, 1970; Woddis, 1970, Nibloc, 1985; al-Gadal, 1986, Khalid, 1993. The author of the thesis was a witness and part of the discussions among the SCP's members on the question and has access to most of the documents of the party during that period.

revolutionary upsurge among the masses" (Mahgoub, 1970, 6)²⁴. The communists were not united in that position. It was clear for the observers at the end of 1968 and the early months of 1969 that there were two conflicting trends in the SCP. The main stream was led by Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub and a minority trend led by Ahmed Suliman, the member of the Central Committee who represented the party in the two governments of the October 1964 Revolution. Ahmed Suliman wrote a series of articles in December 1968²⁵ arguing for an alliance between the progressive officers and civilians. His argument was based on the experience of the October Revolution when the professional Front and the young officers toppled the Abboud regime. The first October Revolution government was not able to last long enough to fulfil the tasks of the revolution because, Suliman claimed, of the failure to sustain the cooperation between the two groups (al Ayam Newspaper,, 8/12/1968, 4).

Among the Free Officers Organisation²⁶ the same issues of the coup tactic and its timing was discussed in the leading committee of the organisation in October 1968 and April 1969 (Niblock, 1987, 238-241). The first meeting decided to formulate a plan to seize power when time was ripe. In the second meeting in April the majority voted against launching the coup, but the minority insisted on implementing the plan. Since most of those opposed to the idea of launching the coup were associated with the SCP, representatives of the minority group thought to discuss the matter with the leadership of the party. Colonel Nimeiri and the retired major Farouk Hamdalla, from the minority group, carried the discussions with Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub and Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud of the SCP. The communists insisted on postponing the coup and the minority refused²⁷. The second dimension of the conflict was on the strategy of the 'revolution'. While the communists stood with the strategy adopted since their party's third conference in February 1956 which was re-confirmed in its fourth conference in November 1967 and which was based on the concept of the 'national democratic revolution', the May regime declared itself a socialist revolution and that its strategy was to build socialism in the Sudan. When Nimeiri announced the regime's nationalisation decisions in May 1970, he declared "We are at the beginning of socialism. We must show the world that we can

²⁴Although there were many reports written by Mahgoub as Secretary General of the SCP, the one quoted was the only one known to the author which had Mahgoub's name cited as its author before his death in 1971..

²⁵The articles was seen as implicit commemoration of the execution of on December the 9th, 1959 of a group of officers who led a coup against Abboud's regime.

²⁶See section 3.5.1, and section 3.6.1 and fn 54, 55, above.

²⁷ According to the SCP sources Hamadalla was more stronger in defending the coup plan while Nimeiri was reluctant after the discussion. This was confirmed to the author by a military source who was an officer in the paratroops who said that Nimeiri after a meeting with Nugud, his school mate, tried to convince the group of officers who were gathered to put the last touches to the plan in the evening of 24 may 1969 to postpone the operation. According to that officer, Lieutenant Colonel Osman Haj Hussein told Nimeiri that it was too late to postpone the operation because he had issued the orders to his soldiers. Colonel Hussein was later executed in the 1971 coup.

build our country through socialism" (quoted in Khalid, 1985, 22). On the other hand, Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub, the secretary general of the SCP wrote in 1970,

"The call for socialism now, not as a historical horizon chosen by our party since its foundation which is an understandable and known issue, but as a strategy for this stage, would only lead to ambiguity among the cadres. That would lead to a choice of tactics which are not suitable for the current stage and will necessarily result in the collapse of the democratic revolution which will make impossible to achieve socialism" (Mahgoub, 1970, 4)

The third dimension was about the leadership of the revolution. The SCP described the group who led the coup as a progressive petty bourgeoisie group. The take-over of state power by that group according to Mahgoub, the SCP leader, created "an intermediate period in the development of the revolution [the national democratic revolution]." (Mahgoub, 1970, 18). The SCP argued that to complete implementing all the tasks of the national democratic revolution (see the first dimension above) the working class should qualify itself for leading the revolution when this intermediate period was passed. Mahgoub argued that

"History has laid a burden of serious responsibilities on the working class. On its {the working class's} abilities depends the achievement of the tasks confronting the revolutionary movement during this intermediate period of the development of the revolution and hence the movement to complete implementing all the tasks of the national democratic revolution" (Ibid, 25)

Mahgoub then went on to determine the conditions for the working class to qualify itself for the tasks 'assigned to it by history'. He mentioned four conditions. The first was the continuous expansion of trade union organisation to include all sections of the industrial and agricultural working class and to give enough consideration for the working class in Southern Sudan. (Ibid, 25-6). The second condition was that the working class should play a greater role in organising the poor masses and the peasants in particular. The third condition was that the working class should play its role in production and should provide the lead in implementing the Five Years Plan. The last condition was that the working class should stand up to all the problems of the democratic revolution as the class which had the greater interests and should take the initiative in providing and in implementing the appropriate solutions for such problems (Ibid, 27).

There were two responses to the SCP analysis. The leaders of the coup, the military, insisted that the armed forces was the leadership of the revolution. They considered their description as petty bourgeoisie as an insult. They saw in the SCP's call for the working class to qualify itself for the leadership an open plan to replace their leadership with members of the SCP²⁸.

The other response was that of the minority group in the SCP, which argued theoretically for the leadership of the revolutionary democrats following the official Soviet Communist

²⁸Most of these opinions were expressed by Nimciri directly to the late Brair al-Ansari who worked as economic adviser for the Revolutionary Council. Mr. al-Ansari told the author that he believed the SCP position was wrongly reflected to Nimeiri by Ahmed Suliman group

Party's stand from the "socialist-oriented countries' in the Third World. The question became element in the dispute in the SCP which led to its split in September 1970.

The fourth was the independence of the then existing mass organizations or their incorporation in the regime's one-party system on the Nasserist model²⁹. This included the independent existence of the SCP itself. The Republican Order No.1, (Article 8), dissolved all political parties³⁰. The SCP ignored the Order and continued its activities. It was critical towards the leaders of the coup who contacted the party for the support of the coup before it was launched and who were rejecting to deal with the party after the success of the coup. The leaders of the coup were insisting that they were dealing with the communists as individuals and the party was banned like other political parties. the spokesman of the Revolutionary Command Council said:

"All official parties, without exception, are dissolved; this includes the Communist Party. The Revolutionary Council deals with all people in their individual capacities, not as representatives of any party. We welcome the support to the cause of the revolution of all, so long as they abide by its purpose, and come to us as individuals."(ACR, 1969/70, B49)

The conflict was reflected in the party itself and took the shape of a contradiction between a hard line wing in the SCP which argued for the independent existence of the party, and a right wing which advocated the individual cooperation of party members and the regime. A party congress was held in August 1970 to decide on the conflict and the majority of the conflict adopted the proposals of the main stream which called for the independent existence of the party and the mass organisation.

The SCP suggestion for a democratic front that unite all revolutionary forces was suspiciously looked at by the military as a plan to impose communist domination since most of the mass organisation were communist dominated.

The coup d'etat in Libya in September brought a new dimension to the conflict , that was the question of the unity of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. The SCP firmly rejected the plan to unite the three countries. The dispute on the question of unity was reflected in the Revolutionary Command Council, where it was clear that three of the members were opposing the unity proposal.

On November 16th 1970, Nimeiri organized a Palace Coup and dismissed the three of the Revolutionary Council who opposed the unity with Egypt and Libya, accusing them of collaboration with the SCP.

²⁹The term Nasserist model is used in this thesis to describe the political and economic system built by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt between 1952 and 1970. The main feature of the political system was a presidential republic with a one-party system with great role assigned to security forces and the incorporation of all mass organisation within the system. On the economic side it was featured by a strong public sector.

³⁰The Article reads "All political parties are to be considered dissolved as from today. No political formation or any organisation which could be used for political targets is allowed unless by a permission from the Reversionary Council" (al-Ayam newspaper, 1/6/69, No.5651, p 4)

In response the left wing in the Free Officers Organization, attempted a military take over on July 19th 1971. They seized power for three days when a counter coup brought Nimeiri back. The defeat of July 1971 coup attempt gave the justification the regime waiting for to settle its accounts with the SCP. Three of the leaders of the party: the secretary general, the secretary of SWUTF, and only Southerner in the party leadership (and the only Southerner in the leadership of any non-Southern party), were executed. The trade unions were dissolved, bending a new arrangements and legislation to reorganize them. Nimeiri achieved what the others regimes since independence failed: the defeat of the urban democratic movement and the destruction of their experienced organization, the SCP and the trade unions.

Although state power remained in the hand of the military and civilian bureaucrats, they themselves went a shift to the right in an attempt to survive their local and international isolation. An intensive and extensive effort was made to find new allies both locally and internationally, the former were difficult to find while the latter were available in a world divided then by a cold war.

The second period of the Nimeiri regime which began by his election President of the Republic was a period of the authoritarian state of the military and civilian bureaucrats, where the technocrats played the role of organizers and ideologists. Their organization was the Sudan Socialist Union, the only legal party in the country, and under its umbrella came all the other organization: trade unions, youth and women unions, and the newly established committees for the development of villages. Their ideology was modernization in practise, and socialism in propaganda (the regimes manifesto (the National Charter) and the public speeches of the regime's military leaders). It was the longest period of relative autonomy any Sudanese state had enjoyed since independence. It was a relative autonomy of an authoritarian state, a failure of establishing a hegemony, except in the Southern Sudan where, for a limited period as it is argued in the coming chapter, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 had stopped the first civil war and established a local autonomy for the region, eliminating one of the main elements of the post-colonial state's crisis in the Sudan. For the first time in the history of post-colonial state in the Sudan, its legitimacy was recognised in the South. But from the start there was a contradiction between the parliamentary system established by the Agreement in Southern Sudan and the presidential system in the centre. The first was to some extent a democratic system, and despite the one party system which was supposed to prevail in the South as in the North, Southern political parties and groupings had existed and competed to power. The presidential system in the centre was authoritarian. The Southern leaders underestimated this contradiction when they thought the coexistence was possible and that Nimeiri would leave them to settle their problems. Future events was to prove that was an illusion. The Agreement did not change the composition of the ruling power in Khartoum which dominated the state. Despite the fact that an alliance of several groups

of the new petty bourgeoisie dominated the state in the North and South, the real power was still with the Northern portion which was holding the national economic resources, the military machine and the constitutional political power.

An important obstacle to the stability of the Nimeiri's regime after 1971, was its failure to attract the elements of the traditional ruling bloc, (who stood to benefit from the shift of the regime to the right), to fill the gap created by the break with the urban democratic movement and the SCP. Instead the traditional ruling bloc main two parties continued their attempts through the National Front which united them with the Muslim Brothers to detribalise the state.

In addition, the regime on the international level restored its relation with the Western Countries, especially the United States, Britain (with which a settlement on the compensation of the British firms nationalized in 1970 was reached in 1973), and West Germany. On the regional level, the relations with Egypt and Libya underwent a big setback, as Nimeiri was compelled to denounce any attempts of unity with the two countries following the Addis Ababa Agreement. At the same time, Nimeiri pursued a good relation with the Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia which became Nimeiri's regime source of foreign finance

As from 1973 the economic crisis began to manifest a new cycle (the details will be described in Chapter 4). By August 1973, (as has also been shown in Chapter 4), the opposition of the regime was expressed openly in mass demonstrations, and in response the regime increased its repression. Since then, the dialectics of resistance-repression continued to characterize the crisis of the Nimeiri state until its overthrow in 1985. The authoritarian state which crashed the urban democratic movement in 1971, was challenged all through 1973-85 by a growing opposition, albeit weak, divided, and lacked a strong leadership.

CHAPTER 4

THE MANIFESTATION OF THE CRISIS 1973-85

4.1. Introduction

The 1973-85 crisis was both a continuation of the general crisis that had prevailed in the country since independence and a particular condensation of that crisis that resulted from the nature and policies of the Nimeiri regime. The elements of continuity were those that characterise the socio-economic structure as a special articulation of modes of production. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. Despite the claim made by the leaders of the coup when they took power that their aim was to bring radical changes in the country, the socio-economic structure remained basically unchanged. Following the July 1971 coup attempt, the regime adopted a policy of modernisation rather than radical transformation.

On the political level, the modernisers thought that they could bring political stability and provide for Peoples' participation by establishing a new state based on four main institutions: the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the Presidency of the Republic, the National Peoples' Assembly, and the Peoples' Local Councils. The relation between the institutions was thought to be determined by the Permanent Constitution, which was drafted and promulgated in 1973. Chapter 5 argues that these new institutions failed to bring political stability, to allow the democratic representation and participation of the Sudanese people in the decision-making and to provide the rational management of the economy. Symptoms of political instability are discussed in this Chapter 4. Political stability is argued through out this thesis is a function of the hegemony of the ruling class and the legitimacy of the state. Chapter 5 argues that the nature of the state in the period understudy was governed by being fairly dominated by the new petty bourgeoisie. the new petty bourgeoisie not only failed to establish an alliance with other classes, it was unable to maintain its unity. This Chapter shows the resistance of some of the fractions of the groups of the new petty bourgeoisie and their contribution to political instability. Chapter 5 argues further that a split was persistent among the ruling group itself. This split as argued below allowed the increasing role of the President and his use of the tactics of playing the different fractions against each other. The authoritarian nature of the state and the weakness of the institutions established by the Permanent Constitution enhanced the role of the President. The character of the President himself contributed to both the weakness of the institutions and hence to the instability of the system. The ruling group failed to establish its hegemony and its resort to coercion and repression intensified as the resistance of other classes and their political and trade union organisations increased. The legitimacy of the state declined as its policies failed to deliver the goods which were both

expected by the population and promised by the regime. Within this context the National Reconciliation is discussed and evaluated as an attempt to regain legitimacy. Its failure to obtain that target rested on the authoritarian nature of the state and the particular role and powers of the President. The promulgation of the Islamic laws in September 1983, the declaration of the State of Emergency and the Prompt Justice Courts in April 1984 were a dual attempt for a quest for legitimacy and a resort to intensified repression at a time when the economic crisis, famine and popular resistance dominated the Sudanese agenda. Neither legitimacy was gained, nor repression was able to prevent the overthrow of the regime in March-April 1985 through a popular uprising.

Of particular importance to the political crisis was the renewals of the unrest in the South which is described in this Chapter. It is argued in chapters 3, 4, and 5 that the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 which brought an end to the civil war in the South was the greatest achievement of the Nimeiri era. While this chapter describes the process through which the Agreement turned to be obsolete, Chapter 5 argues that the Agreement failed in bringing any change to the domination of the North-Arab groups on the Sudanese state. As a result the policies that preserved uneven development in the country continued. Chapter 5 also argues that the Agreement and the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, which was promulgated as a result of the Agreement, provided for a sort of parliamentary democratic system within the authoritarian presidential republic. The contradiction between the two systems contributed to the failure of the Agreement. The particular policies of the President towards the South and the promulgation of the Islamic Laws in 1983 provided for the concrete process through which the Civil War was renewed in the South.

The modernisation policy has added new production capacities to the economy in both industry and agriculture, built a new net of modern roads and highways, modernised the telecommunication net work and increased the number of those enrolled in the general and higher education. Despite all these achievement in the economy, the economic crisis of 1973-85 was the longest and deepest in the history of the Sudan. The manifestation of this crisis is already discussed in this Chapter. Chapter 5 argues that the particular economic crisis of 1973-85 was in essence part of the organic crisis of transformation. This was reflected in both levels of simple and extended reproduction. On the simple reproduction level the economy failed to maintain itself resulting in the under-utilisation of the already installed capacities and the low and declining levels of productivity and yields, the increasing debt of the state and the country, and the high rate of inflation (all of them are documented and verified in this Chapter). On the extended reproduction, as is argued in Chapter 5, the new projects failed to compensate for the decline and decay of the old ones while they, the new ones themselves, suffered from inadequate planning, and from mis-mangement of their construction and execution. They suffered after their

completion from financial and managerial problems that led to the same problems of under-utilisation of capacities and low productivity and yields.

Of particular importance both for the political and the economical crises of the Nimeiri regime were the policies adopted in 1978-85 under the auspices of the IMF. It is argued in this chapter that these policies contributed to the deepening of the crisis of the regime.

This chapter attempts a description of the manifestation of the crisis of 1973-85. In section two and its subsections, the economic manifestations of the crisis will be outlined. Four main symptoms are important and characteristic of the economic crisis in the Sudan during the period under investigation. These are: 1)the decline of output and productivity, and 2)the under-utilization of existing capacities, 3)the internal fiscal imbalance, 4)the external imbalance and 5)the evidently spiralling inflation and 6)the continuous decline in real incomes.

Section three tries to give an account of the most prominent features of the political aspect of the crisis. Three of these are discussed: 1)the increasing opposition to the Nimeiri's regime despite the increasing repression on one hand and the attempts of reconciliation on the other, 2)the discontent in southern Sudan and the beginning of the second war, and 3)the instability of the government as evident in the high turnover of its ministers, leading civil servants and army officers.

Section four is an account for some of the social manifestations of the crisis; like the increasing income inequality, class stratification, increase in unemployment, internal and external migration and the decline in social services and an increase in the rate of crimes.

4.2.The Economic Manifestation

4.2.1.The Decline in Output

The most significant economic manifestation of the crisis was the general trend of declining productivity and capacity utilization. All main agricultural crops showed long term secular trends to declining yields per feddan as shown by the time series analysis carried for five leading crops in Sudanese agriculture (four principal cash crops and a fifth is dura the staple food crop), for the period 1970/71- 1984/85. The fourth crop (gum-arabic) showed a general decline in output. However no data for yields per feddan is available, and time series analysis is carried for total annual output.

The yields per feddan of irrigated long staple cotton, the most important Sudanese export commodity, declined by 2.8% per year between 1970/71-1984/85. There was a marked sharp decline between 1970/71 and 1980/81, from 741kg to 300 kilogram per feddan, though it was reversed after 1981/82 to a steady increase, it did not offset the general trend.

Groundnuts, the second principal Sudanese export crop, showed a trend of declining yields of 2.4% per year. Although yields of groundnuts showed significant fluctuations between 1970/71-1978/79, there was a sharp decline from 362kg/feddan in 1979/80 to 220kg/ feddan in 1984/85. Sesame, the third, showed a sharper decline yields trend of 3.6% annually during 1970/71-1984/85. Yields declined from 166kg/ feddan in 1970/71 to 72kg/ feddan in 1984/85.

The fourth cash product is gum-arabic. Its output had shown a declining trend of 2.5%. Although the output of gum-arabic fluctuated sharply between 1970/71 to 1975/76, declining from 42,300 tons in 1970/71 to 29,000 tons in 1972/73 and increasing to 53,000 tons in 1975/76; it showed a continuous declining trend to 1979/80 when it started fluctuating again to reach the lowest output since 1970/71 in 1984/85 of 14,000 tons.

Table 3. The Yields/feddan of the Main Crops in the Sudan 1970/71-1984/85

Year	Yields in kilogram/feddan except for gum-arabic output in metric tons					
	cotton irrigated	cotton rain-fed	groundnuts	sesame	dura	gum-arabic
1970/71	741	95	370	160	313	42.5
1971/72	697	119	257	158	455	35.0
1972/73	566	168	345	119	317	29.0
1973/74	655	88	317	108	311	22.9
1974/75	617	116	518	107	301	53.2
1975/76	387	115	338	107	332	43.0
1976/77	495	153	386	104	267	32.0
1977/78	529	137	385	104	300	32.0
1978/79	381	40	344	104	310	35.0
1979/80	304	102	362	105	267	23.5
1980/81	300	136	332	110	297	29.4
1981/82	281	122	307	123	354	38.5
1982/83	575	111	267	82	256	27.3
1983/84	570	131	225	95	206	38.0
1984/85	652	186	220	72	137	14.0

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, *Agricultural Year Book*, 1974, 1983.

On the other hand, the staple food grain ,dura (sorghum),showed a steady but accentuated decline in yield by 3.6% per year over the same period of 1970/71-1984/85. Some of these declining trends in yields summarized in Table 3, were offset by an increase in the area under cultivation. However this was not the case for cotton and sesame. The area under cotton decreased from 1,210,000 *feddans* in 1970/71 to 996,000 *feddans* in 1984/85. The combined result of declining yields and diminishing area cultivated by cotton was a fall in the total output of cotton from 731, 000 tons in 1970/71 to 649,000 tons in 1984/85. During the same period cotton reached the lowest output in 1980/81 when output amounted to 286, 000 tons. Sesame, on the other hand, showed a decline of only 4,000 *feddans* from 1857,000 *feddans* in 1970/71 to 1853,000 *feddans* in 1984/85, and in realty area under sesame between 1970/71 and 1983/84 was on average greater

than that of 1970/71. Hence the actual decline in output could really be attributed to the decline in yield.

For both groundnuts and dura, output increased because the area under cultivation increased. The area under groundnuts increased from 915,000 *feddans* in 1970/71 to 1,758,000 *feddans* in 1984/85, reaching its maximum in 1981/82 when it amounted to 2,370,000 *feddans*. Meanwhile output fluctuated, mainly as a result of changing yields, to reach its maximum in 1977/78, 1,030,000 tons, when it began declining steadily to 386,000 tons in 1984/85.

Table 4. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1970/71- 1984/85

Year	(area in, 000 <i>feddans</i> , output in,000 metric tons)									
	Dura Area	Dura Output	Wheat Area	Wheat Output	Sesame Area	Sesame Output	Gr/dnuts Area	Gr/dnuts Output	Cotton Area	Cotton Output
70/1	4894	1535	290	163	1857	297	915	339	1210	731
71/2	4556	1590	288	124	1921	295	1512	387	1219	685
72/3	4095	1301	248	152	2846	339	1643	569	1176	554
73/4	5448	1692	425	235	2228	243	1745	552	1217	671
74/5	5727	1753	592	269	2177	225	1791	926	1219	648
75/6	6516	2158	693	263	2273	233	2311	781	982	315
76/7	6722	1791	633	289	2246	238	1902	733	1008	457
77/8	7139	2160	589	312	2366	264	2080	1031	1120	559
78/9	6908	2192	574	166	2041	216	2341	806	1011	379
79/0	5559	1444	453	232	1979	222	2353	858	989	323
80/1	6956	2068	437	218	2011	221	2129	712	961	286
81/2	9231	3272	329	142	2044	242	2376	838	972	474
82/3	7564	1938	233	442	1999	163	862	492	982	583
83/4	8782	1806	349	169	2177	206	1834	413	1018	629
84/5	7987	1097	362	179	1853	133	1758	386	996	649

SOURCE: 1)Ministry of Agriculture, *Agricultural Year Book*, Different issues. 2)National Economic Conference, *Basic Economic Indicators*, 1986, Khartoum.

The area under dura increased from 4,900,000 *feddans* in 1970/71 to 9,200,000 *feddans* in 1981/82, and then decreased to 7,990,000 *feddans* in 1984/85. Considering the recent increase in wheat consumption and attitudes to achieve wheat sufficiency, the performance of wheat cultivation is accounted for hereby. The area under wheat showed two different trends. The first was an increase from 1970/71 to 1975/76 when the area under wheat increased from 290, 000 *feddans* to 693,000 *feddans*, an increase of 139% over six years, while the other trend was a declining one from 1975/76 to 1984/85, when the area under cultivation decreased from 693,000 *feddans* to 362,000 *feddans*. Output increased during the first period from 163,000 metric tons in 1970/71 to 312,000 metric tons in 1977/78. By 1984/85 wheat output had declined to 179,000 tons. Table 4 shows the area under cultivation and output of the most important agricultural crops in the Sudan.

Despite the relative small contribution of industrial output compared to agriculture in the economy of the country, the role of industry in the supply of important manufactured commodities is of increasing importance (sugar, textile, edible oil, soap and cement)

The situation in industry was not significantly different from that of agriculture. Under-utilization of installed capacities was the main characteristic of the crisis. The sugar industry which had improved its capacity in the period 1970/71- 1973/74, showed a declining trend in capacity utilization from 1974/75 to 1979/80 (when the utilized capacity reached 21% of the installed capacity). By 1980/81 total sugar output began to increase and capacity utilization improved from 31% in 1980/81 to 74% in 1984/85, due to the high capacity utilization in the newly operated Kennana Sugar Factory and the rehabilitation program of the sugar industry.

Capacity utilization in the cement industry reached the highest ratio in 1972/73, then began to decline sharply to reach 44.2% of the installed capacity in 1977/78, to increase to 56.3% in 1978/79, declining the following year to 46.8% and then showed a steady increase to 72.9% in 1983/84.(Mohamed:1986, 5 ; and MFNE: 1975/76, 1986/87).

The situation in the textile industry was more even disastrous. As Fadul showed in 1985, textile industry was working at 25% of the installed capacity. Of 10 public sector factories, 4 were not working, 2 were working under 25% of the installed capacity, 3 working at 50% capacity and only one working at 67%. Private sector factories were working at 10% capacity one had closed down since 1982/83(Fadul, 1986, p5-6). The output of the textile industry decreased from 120,300,000 yards in 1974/75 to 68,500,000 yards in 1982/83.(collected from Department of Customs and Tariffs, Khartoum,1986).

Edible oil factories were working at 32% of installed capacity. Although the output of soap increased from 27.9, 000 metric tons in 1970/71 to 56.3, 000 tons in 1984/85, the soap industry was working at below than 50% of the installed capacity.

Shoes production was also on the decline, 1.8 million pairs of shoes less were produced in 1983/84 than in 1970/71.(collected from Department of Tariffs and Customs, head quarters, Khartoum, 1986).

In 1986, the National Economic Conference held in the Sudan to discuss the economic crisis, estimated that capacity utilization in Sudanese manufacturing industry was 25% of the installed capacity (NEC., 1986, 21). The Industrialists Union and the Ministry of Industry reported to the conference that about 100 factories were closed down as result of shortages in energy and raw-materials.

Data on Sudan Gross Domestic Product(GDP) shows that, though the GDP in current prices increased 23.7% per year during the years 1970/71- 1984/85, in real terms the growth for the same period was a mere 0.04% , far less than population growth rate, estimated at 2.8% per year. The data also shows that GDP in real terms declined by 1.2%

from 1975/76 to 1984/85. This resulted in a decline of real per capita GDP of 4%. The GDP data is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Sudan Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1970/71-1984/85

(in Current and Constant 1970's Prices)

(million Sudanese pounds)

Year	GDP/Current Prices	GDP/Constant 1970 Prices
1970/71	761.1	761.1
1971/72	832.4	744.7
1972/73	896.8	684.4
1973/74	1246.2	808.9
1974/75	1510.8	883.4
1975/76	1848.0	1016.5
1976/77	2339.7	1003.2
1977/78	2882.7	897.9
1978/79	3253.8	905.8
1979/80	3972.0	926.2
1980/81	4979.8	996.6
1981/82	6720.5	1029.1
1982/83	9344.3	990.4
1983/84	11471.7	847.4
1984/85	14920.1	925.8

SOURCE: 1) Ministry of finance and National Planning, economic Survey, different issues 1970-1989
2) World Bank(1982, 1987)

4.2.2. Internal Fiscal Imbalance

The internal fiscal and financial imbalance was a general symptom of the period 1970/71-1984/85. This is shown by a continuous deficit in the public sector budget. (The public sector budget is defined here as the sum of the central government budget, local government budget and the development budget; the latter constitutes the government investment expenditure and its finance).

The deficit of the overall public sector operations increased from LS 19.8 million in 1970/71 to LS 753.9 in 1983/84. All the components of the public budget contributed to overall imbalance. The central government current budget contributed by a growth rate of central government current expenditure higher than that of its current revenue. While the latter had grown by 18% per year, the former had grown by 20%.

The local government deficit grew by 25.9% and that of public enterprises by 16.2%; while the government investment expenditure increased by 25% per year. All of them, except the public enterprises deficit, had a growth rate higher than that of the central government revenue.

Another characteristic of the internal imbalance, and at the same time a by-product of it, was the dependency of the state on internal and external borrowing to finance the overall deficit. In 1970/71 the deficit amounted to 10.6% of the total expenditure of the public sector; foreign finance was 6.1% and internal borrowing was 4.4% of total expenditure.

In 1983/84, the deficit increased to 33.9%, foreign finance was 25.7% and internal borrowing 8.2% of the total expenditure. Although the contribution of foreign and internal borrowing to the finance of the total deficit varied from year to year according to the size of the deficit and the availability of foreign finance, both had increased in absolute and relative terms.

Internal borrowing, on the one hand increased up to 1976/77 when it then began slowing down till 1979/80 before it increased up to 1981/82 and then declined through 1982/83 and 1983/84, but never to its 1970/71-72/73 levels. The overwhelming source of the internal borrowing was the Central Bank. The result of borrowing from the Central Bank was the increase in the quantity of money in both its broad and narrow definitions. According to the narrow definition, the quantity of money is defined as the sum of currency at circulation and the public deposits in current account in commercial banks. The broad definition of the quantity adds to the narrow definition all sorts of deposits at banks which are called 'quasi-money'. (Salih, 1986,p166)

The quantity of money increased from LS 35.2 and LS 40.8 million in 1960 to LS 2.55 and LS 3.26 billion in 1984 according to the broad and narrow definitions respectively. It is necessary, however, to note that the average annual growth rate in the quantity of money between 1968 and 1976 amounted to 48% and from 1976 to 1984 to 72%, while it was only 15% between 1960 and 1968.

The growth of currency in circulation showed an accelerating growth, especially in the period 1979-1984. Generally the total amount of currency in circulation was LS 68.5 million in December 1970, and nearly doubled in 1975 to amount to LS 132.5 million. In 1979 it was more than five folds that of 1970 and more than double that of 1975. However, in December 1984 it reached 20 times that of 1970 and nearly ten times that of 1975 and 'only' four times of 1979.

The increase in the quantity of money, when related to the levels of material production, discussed before, reveals another important item of internal imbalance, between the quantity of money and the total production of commodities and services. This imbalance usually reflects itself in spiralling inflation, another symptom of the Sudanese crisis.

4.2.3.Spiraling Inflation and Declining Real Incomes

The creeping inflation in the Sudan is clearly shown, though underestimated, by three official costs of living indices, the first for low income groups, the second for high income groups and the third is unified cost of living index. This data is shown in Table 6.

The low income costs of living index (C.L.I.) had increased from 100 in December 1970 to 2060.2 in December 1985, an increase of 1960.2 points, ie 19.6 times the base year; with a growth rate of 22.3 annually. The high income C.L.I. increased from 105.5 in 1970 to 1938.7 in December 1985, with an annual growth rate of 21.4%. The unified C.L.I.

rose from 106.8 in 1970 to 1999.6 in December 1985, with a growth rate of 21.6% per year.

Table 6. The Costs Of Living Indices (C.L.I.) 1970- 1985

Year	(January 1970 = 100)		
	Low Incomes C.L.I	High incomes C.L.I	Unified C.L.I
1970	100.0	105.5	106.1
1971	178.7	106.8	107.5
1972	221.4	115.5	118.2
1973	141.6	133.7	137.6
1974	178.7	165.9	172.6
1975	221.4	200.9	199.0
1976	225.1	203.4	202.6
1977	262.9	240.7	251.8
1978	314.9	288.8	301.9
1979	412.0	385.9	399.0
1980	516.6	487.5	503.0
1981	643.5	603.9	623.4
1982	880.9	765.2	787.1
1983	1055.9	1007.5	1031.7
1984	1417.2	1317.3	1367.2
1985	2060.2	1938.7	1999.6

SOURCE: Ministry of finance, Planning and National Economy: *The Economic Survey*, different issues, 1970 - 1986.

The inflation rate in general was at its lowest level in 1971 when it amounted to 3%; and reached its highest level in 1984 when it amounted to 46.2%. From 1978 to 1984 the average rate of inflation was 31.1% per year. Fadlalla estimated the rate of inflation between 1977 and 1982 at 38.8%. (Fadlalla, 1984. Table No. 1)

On the other hand, creeping inflation was consequently followed by a decline in real incomes of the wage workers and salaried employees as well as farmers in the irrigated and rain-fed agriculture.

In a study in 1987, it was found that in 1983 the real minimum wage was equal to 28.9 % of that of 1970 while the highest wage paid in the public sector was equal to 16.4% of its corresponding in 1970. (Kaballo, 1987, pp.14-15). The average nominal wage in the Sudanese manufacturing industry (establishments employing 25 or more workers) increased from LS 304.2 per year to LS 1120.7 annually in 1981/82, (calculated from Industrial Survey 1981, Table No.6), while if the latter is converted to its real 1970 value, it becomes a mere LS 174.2.

The real salary of a newly appointed university graduate¹ amounted to 16% in 1983 of its corresponding real salary of 1970. The salary of an assistant undersecretary in the civil service ² was 18.2% in 1983 of its value in 1970.

¹The 9th degree correspondent to the Q scale in the old job scale prevailing before 1978 when a new scale was established following the Jobs Evaluation Scheme.

²In 4th degree corresponding to group seven in the old jobs scale prevailing before 1978.

Average real income in agriculture is estimated to have declined from LS 74 in 1976/77 to LS 56.4 in 1982/83.

Table 7. Real Salaries and Wages of Some Scales

scale/year	<u>As % of Their 1970's Values</u>			
	1970	1978	1983	1986
4	100	46	18	13
9	100	39	16	16
14	100	42	60	16
18	100	64	29	21

SOURCE : Kaballo, 1987, *Wage Policy in the Sudan*, Khartoum, ESRC., 14.

4.2.4. The External Imbalance

From 1971/72 to 1984/85, except for the year 1972/73, Sudan balance of trade (Exports minus imports) was generally in deficit. The deficit jumped from LS 19 million in 1971/72 to LS 125.4 million in 1974/75, declined to LS 85 million in 1975/76 and to its lowest level in 1976/77. By 1977/78 it began increasing steadily to reach its highest level LS 532.7 million in 1981/82 and then to decline to LS 454.7 in 1982/83 and LS 158.2 in 1983/84.

On the other hand, the current account (trade balance plus invisible transfers minus invisible payments) showed a continuous deficit from 1971/72 to 1983/84. It registered even a low deficit in 1972/73 when the trade account was in a surplus of LS 14.5 million. The highest current account deficit in the period was registered in 1981/82 was to Ls429 million, which was better than the trade balance deficit of the same year.

The overall external balance, the balance of payment, showed a continuous deficit from 1970/71 to 1983/84; reaching its maximum of LS 364,200,000 in 1982/83 and its minimum of LS 700,000 in 1972/73 (Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1970-1985).

Those features of the external imbalance are closely linked with the performance of Sudan foreign trade. The most important feature of this performance was the decline in the volume of some of the main Sudanese export. The quantity exported of the long staple cotton, the most important Sudanese export since the year 1927, was 19.7% in 1981 of the volume cotton exports in 1970. The quantities of long stable cotton exported annual from 1973 to 1981 never reached its level of 1970. In four out of these nine years Sudan cotton exports were less than 50% of the 1970 level. (Department of Statistics, 1983 p16).

The Sudan used to contribute 87% of the world supply of gum-arabic, but this too suffered from a sharp decline in exports. In 1981 the Sudan gum exports were 73.2% the volume of 1970. From 1971 to 1985 the exports of gum never reached the volume of 1970. (Ibid, .,16)

Although until 1977, sesame exports registered an average above that of 1970, in 1978 its volume of export declined to 82.6% of that of 1970 and to 21.5% in 1979 and never,

reached the 1970 level again. Overall, the index of export volume declined from 100 in 1970 to 65.5 in 1981. At the same time, the index of the volume of imports increased from 100 in 1970 to 137.2 in 1981. This led to a decline in the relative volume of foreign trade (defined statistically as the quantity index of exports divided by the quantity index of imports multiplied by 100), from 100 in 1970 to 47.7 in 1981. The relative value of Sudanese exports decreased from 94.4 in 1970 to 31 in 1981. The Sudan net terms of trade declined from 100 in 1970 to 53.3 in 1981 (Department of Statistics, 1983, . 15). Other features of the external imbalance were the increase in borrowing from international and regional financial institutions as well as from governments and private banks. The Sudan outstanding debt increased from LS 110.5 million in 1970 to LS 4342 millions in 1985. Its total debt by the down fall of Nimeiri in April was estimated at \$8 billions.

4.3.The Political Manifestations

The crisis also manifested politically in three main ways. The first appearance was the contradiction between the increasing and continuous opposition to the Nimeiri regime at the same time as the regime's intensification of its repressive measures,(particularly after the 1975 failed coup).

The second manifestation was the instability of the institutions and leading figures of the regime itself, despite the continuation of Nimeiri as president of the Republic.

The third manifestation of the political crisis was the renewed discontent in Southern Sudan which began to appear in the mid-seventies and developed into a new civil war in 1983.

4.3.1.Growing Opposition and Intensified Repression

In May 1973 the Nimeiri regime had appeared to be stable. Nimeiri crushed the Ansar revolt of March 1970 and the leftist coup in July 1971, and established the Republic and wrote a ' Permanent Constitution' and set up the regime's political institutions and organizations. This feeling of stability and security was expressed in the release of all political detainees the day the President of the Republic signed the new constitution on May 13th 1973. But the appearance was soon detected by events.

Some minor events began in the University of Khartoum and culminated in a popular uprising in August /September 1973 to begin a period of instability in the country which subsequently became a prominent feature of the Sudanese economic and political crisis and led to the overthrow of the Nimeiri regime in 1985.

The events began with a leftist student organization, the Democratic Front³ celebrating the second anniversary of the of the leftist 1971 coup. The President in his monthly TV speech criticized the celebration and threatened to take harsh measures to prevent the

³The Democratic Front is an alliance between Communist and leftist students, established in 1953 as a response to the split in the Student Congress

exploitation of the University by elements opposed to his May revolution elements. The president's speech provoked students to pressure on the Students Union to take steps to 'defend and maintain' the 'independence of the university', (as a memorandum handed to the union by four student organizations demanded). This led to demonstrations within the university campus which by the 30th of August had spread over the entire country and continued at different levels until September 6th, when partial strikes began in the railways and some factories. The response of the regime was aggressive, a state of emergency was declared, the army was deployed onto the streets, and the President, who happened to have been in an official visit to Morocco, cut it short and returned home.

The August/September 1973 demonstrations and strikes were the first popular opposition to the Nimeiri regime since the failure of the July 1971 leftist coup, but the 1973 events had some contradictory results. The first immediate result was that the popular movement, despite its division in two main streams, began to gain some confidence in itself and its capabilities. The atmosphere of fear which dominated the country began to disappear, despite the harsh security measures undertaken by the regime (as will be discussed later).

The second result was the beginning of a wide dialogue among the people and the politicians about the alternative to the Nimeiri regime. At that time two main approaches to the question appeared in the underground literature of the opposition groups. The right wing, represented by the National Front⁴ which suggested (in a charter distributed during the demonstrations) a one party system, a presidential republic and an Islamic constitution. The other approach was the leftist one suggested mainly by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and which argued that the question of an alternative was a false one. It had been asked to paralyse the popular movement and to involve it in indefinite discussions while the main task was the immediate unity of popular opposition forces to dismantle the Nimeiri dictatorship and establish democracy, respect for human rights and the sovereignty of the rule of law under an independent system of judiciary (SCP, 1973).

The third result was an increase in the regime's repression. A "State Security Act of 1973" was issued to permit trials before special courts selected by the President Of the Republic in accordance with powers given to him by the same act. Under the act new crimes were defined as "Crimes against the State Security" and to be punished by a scale harsh punishments including life imprisonment and execution.(DRS, 1973,a). An amendment in "The Criminal Procedure Act 1970" permitted, (under Article 92), the detention by administrative order issued by either the minister of interior, the director of Public Security, the director of the National Security or the National Security Council. The

⁴The National Front constituted the Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party(DUP), and the Muslim Brethren (MB) and was formed in 1969 to oppose the coup which had brought Nimeiri to power on May 25th 1969.

result of these oppressive laws was a wide scale of detentions of politicians, trade-unionists, student activists and ordinary citizens. Sudanese prisons were virtually devoted to keeping detainees from 1973 to 1978 when a general amnesty, following the attempt of national reconciliation between the regime and the right wing opposition.

From 1973 to the fall of Nimeiri in April 1985, the opposition to the regime took different forms. The history of this period is rich in events and activities carried by different social, political and military groups and individuals. In the remaining part of this section some of these events (which seems to have affected the development of the dialectics of opposition and repression as a symptom of the political instability) are discussed.

One example of such events were the High Secondary Schools students' strikes and sit-ins in December 1973 and January 1974 which were the first to register an important victory for the popular movement against the regime. The students demanded the right to establish free student unions, they were able to obtain that right after two month of students' unrest. This was an important achievement, because until that time the branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) used to control the activities of all unions and societies.

The second event which we think had established a form of opposition that lasted to the end of the regime was the 'Sugar Demonstration' of December 1974 which brought about two important forms of opposition. The first was the association between the student movement and the rest of the population in the response to economic decisions affecting the costs of living, bringing the struggle of students against the regime 'more down to earth'. The second was the beginning of new forms of demonstration by ordinary people in neighbourhoods, popular residential areas and districts. The two forms of opposition had been carried on virtually every year, and intensified after 1978 when official decisions to increase the prices of popular necessary goods followed agreements with the IMF.

On September 5th 1975, the regime faced a big challenge. A coup d'etat was attempted and the forces which had carried out the coup were able to capture the Army Headquarters and the National Broadcasting Station. The leader of the coup managed to make his first, (and last), announcement abolishing the basic institutions of the regime and although the coup was crushed within hours, "its effects was far reaching" (Fadlalla:1986, 48).

The 'state of emergency' was immediately declared. The Peoples Assembly was called to convey an extra-ordinary session where the declared state of emergency was soon ratified ;and the Assembly passed a set of amendments to the constitution to give the President and his government more powers. As Fadlalla noted, that the amendments had

"sanctioned the legislative enactment of preventive detention, made provisions for the establishment of special courts and enhanced the presidential powers in a manner which greatly, with retrospective effect, the original constitution" (Ibid, 49).

The amendments were a great set back to the opposition forces. The Permanent Constitution of 1973 abolished the Republican Orders No. 2 and No.4, which legalize preventive detention and, as we mentioned above, preventive detention was reintroduced by Article 92 after the amendment of the 'Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 ' in 1973. In 1974 some detainees appealed to the Supreme Court to declare that amendment unconstitutional and hence to order their release. The new amendments to the constitution provided a constitutional sanction for preventive detention. The same session of the Assembly amended the State Security Act of 1973 to allow for an indefinite extension of three month periods of preventive detention.

Soon after the failure of the coup special courts were formed and the leaders of the coup were executed.

In less than ten months later, the regime faced another major challenge. This time the parties of the National Front were able to smuggle armed civilians, trained in Libya, into the capital Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North to attempt to seize power in July 2nd 1976. The three towns of the capital witnessed fierce fightings for three days, after which the regime forces were able to destroy the infiltration, killing and capturing its planners and executors. For many weeks after that Khartoum Province was under a security's state of siege and house-to-house searches for hidden arms and haunts those who participated in the attempt, went ahead with rigour.

Special courts were summered and these sentenced to death and life imprisonment those who had participated in the attempt. The National Front leaders in exile were condemned to death in absentia. The immediate result of the July 2nd confrontation between the National Front parties and the regime, as Woodward put it, was:

"not long term division and recrimination, but apparent recognition on both sides of their respective strengths and weaknesses"(Woodward, 1986, 69).

This led to the 1977 National Reconciliation (NR) which brought the elements of the National Front, except Sheriff al Hindie⁵ to an understanding summarized in an eight point agreement reached between Nimeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi in Port Sudan early in 1977. On the one hand the agreement included the release of detainees and political prisoners, the rehabilitation of those who had suffered from repression by the regime and the guarantee of individual liberties. On the other hand al-Mahdi recognized the regime, its constitution ,its one party and its local governments. Changes in the constitution and the State Security Act were agreed on, and the SSU structure and operation were to "be

⁵Sheriff al Hindie(- 1983), was a minister of finance when the 1969 coup took place, he then fled the country to Ethiopia where he convinced the late Emperor Hile Selassie, an old friend of Sheriff father, to help National Front parties to oppose the new regime, being a prominent leader of the DUP, he assumed the leadership of the party after the death of Azahari in 1969.

reviewed with the view to opening its bodies to elections at every level and permitting government policies to be freely debated and decided". The agreement included a point of foreign policy emphasizing "neutralism in Sudan foreign policy"(ACR, 1978/79 pp 109/110).

From the start NR faced three problems which undermined its expected contribution to political stability in the country. The first problem was that NR did not, in reality, involve all the opposition groups. Even within the National Front, al-Hindie one of its prominent leaders was not involved until April 1978, when he reached a separate agreement with the regime, which neither he nor the regime ever implemented. On the other hand, the SCP was not involved in the reconciliation (communists detainees were not released, at the time detainees from the National Front were released).⁶

The SCP criticized the NR as an acceptance of the traditional parties of the dictatorial regime. Traditional parties were criticized by the SCP that they had a political, social and economic program similar to that of the regime. The party called for a wide front "for democracy and the salvation of the country", to be "open to all political parties, organizations, and national characters," to continue the struggle for "democracy, basic human rights" and the overthrow of the dictatorship (SCP, 1977,).

The second problem which had faced the NR was the rejection of the main stream in the SSU, the 'old guards', of the idea of NR which had been imposed on them by the President. This was reflected in the conflicts within the SSU and the other institutions of the regime between those 'old guard' and the 'new comers' or the 'returnees' (as those joined the regime after the NR were called), (Khalid, op. cit., 176). According to Khalid, Nimeiri enjoyed this situation which enabled him to "contain Sadiq and introduced an element of conflict in the SSU itself, between the new comers(Sadiq and Islamicists) and the old guard" (Ibid, 176.)

The third problem which faced the NR was that it did not seek the inclusion of the trade-union movement, which was an important element in the political arena. By 1978 trade unions were undertaking a new round of confrontation with the regime. It began in April 2nd 1978 by a general strike of all the technicians in the country which was called off on its fifth day after reaching an agreement on payment conditions. On the same day of the beginning of the technicians' strike the railway workers at Atbara launched a demonstration demanding free elections for their trade-union. Demonstrations continued for two days, then culminated into a strike and a sit-in in the workshops on April 7th, compelling the First Vice President to fly to Atbara to look for a solution. The strike was

⁶They remained in detention till May 1978, when the then First Vice President Abul Gasim M. Ibrahim decided to release them thinking of using them in the power struggle started in the regime after the incorporation of Muslim Brethren and members of Umma in the political institutions of the regime.

called off when an agreement on new elections for the railway union was reached (Al Meidan, May 1978, 3).

On 8th of the same month the Doctors' Trade Union started a strike which continued for three days and was ended only after a settlement on payment and working conditions was reached.

This wave of strikes continued through 1978 and became a factor of instability during the following years. In 1979, in addition to the workers and the professionals strikes, the Gezira Tenants carried out their first strike since 1963.

Responding to the rise in the popular movement, the regime launched a wide detention campaign in July and August 1979. The detention camps which were closed in May 1978 reopened in 1979; but this time to face campaigns against detention from the Bar Association and the families of the detainees. The latter organized demonstrations in Port Sudan, Khartoum and Gedaref demanding the release of their relatives and the repeal of the State Security Act which permitted their detention. The former sent memorandums to the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, demanding the respect for basic human rights, the independence of the judiciary and the sovereignty of the rule of the law.

Despite these campaigns, preventive detention continued as the main repressive measure used by the regime. In 1981, the regime attempted another measure which had not been used so widely since 1971, the dismissal of professionals, technicians, employees and workers for political bases. In that year more than 2,000 were believed to have been dismissed.

In addition to the continuation of the demonstrations and strikes as forms of oppositions to the regime's policies, the 1980s witnessed a new type of action: a limited town, or region uprising. Two of such events might be cited.

The first incident took place in El-Obied, the capital of Kordofan region, on November 3rd and 4th 1980. Complaining about the decision of Northern Kordofan Commissioner to increase the price of dura, demonstrations exploded in the town and a general strike was declared. The demonstrators attacked the grain market and stores, and distributed the dura to the people. The Commissioner, failing to cope with the situation asked the local army command to interfere, but they refused. The Central Reserve Police was flown from Khartoum to assist the Commissioner, but the situation was not contained till the Commissioner was removed from office.

The second incident took place in Darfur, the western region of the Sudan on January 3rd 1981 when Nimeiri appointed a governor who was not a native of the region. In objection to the appointment demonstrations and a general strike began in El Fasher and spread to other parts of the region. The general strike paralysed the region. Six people were killed and twenty five injured. The situation was resolved when the decision was rescinded and a native of the region was appointed Governor.

The two incidents were very important in the development of the popular movement that recognized the possibility of compelling the regime to respond positively to their demands. This was reflected in the increasing role of trade unions and regional blocks.

The regime tried to counter the rise in the popular movement by depending more on the Moslem Brethren, especially with their strong base among students. In 1983 the regime introduced Islamic Sharia laws. Facing a growing trade-union movement in 1984 a state of emergency was declared in April and continued until September 1984. The repression by the regime reached its maximum when a 76 year old Islamic thinker was executed in January 1985; yet the opposition continued until the regime was overthrown in April 1985.

4.3.2. The Discontent in the South and The New Civil War

One of the most important achievements of Nimeiri's regime was the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1973 between the regime and the Anya-nya rebels of Southern Sudan which ended the eighteen years (1955-1973) war between southern rebels and the north dominated central government. In its report on the events of 173/74 the ACR noticed,

"The Southern Sudan, for the first time since Sudan's independence on 1 January 1956, has become an important stabilizing political element" (ACR, 1973/74, . B90).

By the mid seventies this element of stabilization began to appear as one of political instability. Although some isolated events took place in 1974 provoking tension, the sound beginning of instability could be suggested by a motion of non-confidence in Abel Alier's regional government in 1975 presented by the four prominent Southern politicians Joseph Aduhu, Clement Mboro, Benjamin Pol Akok and Philip Pedak Leith. The motion failed to gain the support of the Regional Assembly ; the former two were detained, the latter fled the country to Ethiopia.

In 1976 the discontent began to appear among the Southern soldiers, mainly commissioned from the former Anya-nya forces under Addis Ababa Agreement. In February some soldiers mutinied in Wau and took their arms to the bush, and in March another mutiny took place in Akobo, 225 miles from Juba towards the Ethiopian borders. Trouble were reported the same year in Kapoeta when southern soldiers refused the orders from their northern officers. One year later a mutiny was reported in Juba Airport when the mutineers occupied the airport for several hours killing nine soldiers and an American pilot. Soon government forces recaptured the airport and arrested 98 soldiers and their leader, a sergeant. The government accused "foreign powers" of the "Juba conspiracy".(AL-Ayam, 12.2.1977).

Although these events were not directly connected, they were expressions of the discontent about the way the Addis Ababa Agreement was implemented and the conduct of the High Executive Council, the regional government of the south. Complains were voiced by tribal representatives concerning the overwhelming domination of the Dinka,

the biggest tribe in the south, both on the regional government administration and the SSU and about the level of representation of the South in similar national bodies. Dissatisfaction was expressed by wider groups in the South, including prominent Dinkas, about the development policy of the regional government and the flow of funds from the central government to the South. Allegation of corruption and nepotism were made without being fully investigated or brought to trial.

The National Reconciliation of 1977, brought another element in the Southern discontent. Bona Mallwal⁷ wrote in 1981,

"Since 1977, dangerous talk of an even wider role of religion in politics has begun again. There renewed talks of an Islamic Republic of the Sudan. This very decisive issue, which almost split the country into two parties in the 1960s is now a matter of national debate once more." (Mallwal, 1981, .249).

The question of introducing Islamic laws was raised when a committee was formed following NR to "review Sudanese laws in conformity with Sharia"⁸ (ACR, 1977/78, .B119). Bona Mallwal, then Minister of Information and Culture and, hence, editor of the Ministry's monthly magazine *Sudanow*, expressed the fears of "some people" and called for the principle "the religion for the individual and the country for all." (Sudanow: October, 1977). In the same issue of *Sudanow*, General Lagu⁹ expressed the South "great concern" on the issue of Sharia which the General predicted would cause discontent (Ibid.).

Another problem which contributed to the Southern discontent was the controversy over Jongeli Project (JP). The project was first suggested by Lord Cromer on the advice of Sir Garstin who surveyed the Nile in 1904. The aim of the project is to save the water losses in the Sudd area and provide a navigable water way between Juba and Malkal. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan has given the Sudan "the right to construct such projects as to decrease the losses of water at Bahar el-Gebel, Bahar el-Zaraf, Bahar el-Gazal and tributaries Sobat and tributaries and the White Nile." (Kaballo, 1972,.9). The costs and waters of the project/s to be shared and divided equally between Egypt and the Sudan. The Agreement gave Egypt the right to construct the JP if she needed the water before the Sudan, and the Sudan could pay its share when it needed its share in the water. In 1974 a joint communique following a visit to Egypt by Nimeiri

⁷Bona Mulwal,(1938-) a Dinka southern politician, Minister of Information and Culture (1974-1977) and regional Minister of Industry (1980-1983)and a long period member of the SSU 's Central Committee and Political Bureau.

⁸ Sharia is the sum of Islamic laws.

⁹General Joseph Lagu was able to unite the different political and military southern groups fighting the government forces in 1970 and assumed the military as well as the political leadership of the Anya-nya. In 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was reached he became a general in the Sudanese Armed Forces. In 1978 he was elected Chairman of the High Executive Council, lost the job in 1980 when appointed as Vice President of the Republic, a job he had held till the overthrow of the regime in 1985.

declared the intention to "complete the feasibility studies on the Jongeli Canal and the Upper Nile projects." (Khalid, 1985 ,.315). In 1976 an agreement between the two countries was signed to construct the Jongeli Canal (ACR: 1976/77, B116). Allegations and rumours about the Canal and its aim to settle Egyptian farmers in the south spread and found some response among some circles in the South specially students who launched some demonstrations.(ACR, 1977/78,B122)

The discontent caused by these problems was submerged, for a while, by the internal conflicts among different political and tribal groups. By 1975, three groups emerged as opposing Abel Alier's government .¹⁰

The first group was led by the former leader of the Anya-nya rebels General Lagu who found himself and his fellow Equatorians under the shadow of Abel Alier's Dinka's domination. The second group was led by Samuel Aru and unifying the former SANU¹¹ members. The third group led by Clement Mboro and composed mostly of the members of the Southern Front¹².

These internal conflicts resulted in the defeat of Abel Alier in the regional elections in 1977; and General Lagu became Chairman of the HEC uniting several groups under his leadership. Soon internal conflict paralysed Lagu's government. In 1979 the front which joined Alier's three rivals collapsed. Lagu in February dismissed SANU leader Aru, who had held the post of Deputy Chairman of the HEC, and in July Lagu dismissed Mboro who was the Speaker of the Regional Assembly. By 1980 the President interfered to call for new regional elections and Alier returned to power in the South.

During this second office of Alier new issues came to the front line between the North and the South. The first of these issues was the decision of the central government to locate an oil refinery in Kosti, in central Sudan, instead of Bantiu in the south, where most of the oil discoveries were made.

The second issue was the question of the boundaries of Southern Region, which was raised, apparently, during the decision to adopt regionalization as a system to govern northern Sudan. In reality the question of boundaries goes back to the Addis Ababa Agreement which defined the boundaries of the Southern Region as those in force on the date of Independence, 1st January 1956. According to these boundaries an area amalgamated by the first military government in 1960 in Darfur, should be reunited with

¹⁰Abel Alier, a judge from southern Sudan, appointed Minister of Commerce in 1969 in the first government after the 1969 coup, in 1971 he became Minister of Southern Affairs, after the Addis Ababa Agreement ,he was elected Chairman of the HEC and appointed Vice President of the Republic.

¹¹SANU, the Sudan African National Union, established by William Deng (-1968) as the political arm of the Anya-nya forces and accepted to transfer its activities to the Sudan in 1966, but only a fraction of it returned to the country with their leader.

¹²The southern front was formed in 1964, after the October Uprising which overthrew the first military dictatorship (1958-1964) in the Sudan.

the south. Another problem concerned an area which had been part of the Kordofan Region since the Independence, but inhabited by Dinka. The Southerners were demanding a referendum in the area to ask whether the people there wanted to remain part of Kordofan or unite with the south.

The third issue, although raised by Nimeiri and suggested by General Lagu, was to re-divide the south into three regions according to the old boundaries of three provinces, Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahar el-Gazal. Lagu argued that by dividing the North into regions the logic of uniting the South versus the North was outdated (Sudanow, June, 1981). The issue divided the Southerners and gave Nimeiri a chance to interfere extensively in Southern politics.

When, in March 1981 the Southern Regional Peoples' Assembly adopted a resolution rejecting the re-division plan, Nimeiri dissolved the Assembly, dismissed the Regional government and appointed a care-taker government under Major General Rassas. Immediately 22 Southern leaders signed a letter to the President announcing the formation of a 'Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan' and objecting to the attempts to divide the south claiming that the "preponderance of Southern opinions is against" the division and accusing the President of choosing to "abide by the opinion of the minority". (ACR, 1981/82, pp. B99- B100). The response of the president was to order the detention of those who signed the letter.

By the beginning of 1983, incidents of small-scale 'guerrilla' activities were being reported and in February 1983 the army units mutinied in Bor in the Upper Nile. The officers and soldiers were reported to have entered the bush. By mid-1983 two armed movements were reported to fight the government forces in the South. The second war has had started to become the most significant instability element for the regime. By 1984 both the oil explorations and the Jongeli Canal construction were stopped because security could not be assured (ACR: 1984/85, B85).

Although the second war has had already begun, in September 1983, Nimeiri gave the 'rebels' a new justification to continue the second war by announcing the enforcement of Islamic Sharia Laws.

4.3.3. Instable Government

One of the orthodoxies of the Third World militaries is their critique of civil democracies as unstable governments. The same might be said of the military regime of 1969-1985 in the Sudan. Although Nimeiri was the head of the State for the entire sixteen years of the regime, it is very difficult to speak of a stable government during that period.

Two symptoms of government instability prevailed on the political scene since the 1969 Coup. The first symptom was the continuous cabinet reshuffles and as the Financial Times noticed,

"The President reshuffles his Cabinet and the Political hierarchy once or twice a year, apparently with the aim of keeping his ministers on their toes and of adjusting the power balance among rival political groups which thrive unofficially within Sudan's single party system." (The Financial Times 31 July 1978).

From 1969 to 1985 there were 16 ministers of finance and 11 ministers of planning. The average span of office in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning was one year. In the Ministry of Agriculture 10 ministers and 12 state ministers held office with an average of 18 months in office. The portfolios of Education, Interior, Defence, and Information and Culture changed hands twelve times with an average of 16 months per minister. The President himself held the portfolio of defence five times ; and one minister held the portfolio of irrigation three times.

The second symptom was the frequent changes in the leading posts of the civil service, the police, the army, the judiciary and state enterprises. Khalid noticed that between 1971-78 "Khartoum Province had six governors ; so did Gezira. None of them stayed long enough to see his plans through." (Khalid op. cit., . 35). Change of under-secretaries, their deputies and civil servants at different levels was a common phenomenon. Article 26 of the Civil Service Pensions Act of 1973 gave the President of the Republic the powers to send any civil servant or government employee into retirement for "the public good". In July 1977, the government decided to exclude all opponents from the civil service. In March 1981 more than one, 000 government employees were dismissed for political reasons which resulted in "a profound sense of insecurity within the civil service which was hardly conducive to better performance and efficiency." (ACR, 1981/82, B94).

The situation in government enterprises was not different. Eight general managers changed office in Sudan Railways and Sudan Airways with an average period in office of two years. The change in the management of the public sector banks and companies was to a great extent related to change in ministers concerned. From April 1978 to April 1985 the Bank of Sudan, the central bank, had three governors, with an average period of 28 months in office.

The army officers also suffered casual dismissal and compulsory retirement. Dismissals and forced retirement followed every coup attempt, others were part of the President policy to keep the army under his own control. The most famous flurry of retirements was that of 1982, when the President dismissed his first deputy (who was the Minister of Defence and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces), his chief of staff and twenty two of his senior officers (ACR: 1982, B92).

4.4. The Social Manifestations

4.4.1. Increase of Income Inequality

As has been shown in section 4.3.2 that spiralling inflation had led to a decline in the real incomes of workers, employees, and farmers. The decline in real incomes was accompanied by increasing income inequalities, especially after the implementation of the

different adjustment programmes 1978, on the advice/condition of the IMF and the World Bank.

Table 8. The Relative Distribution of Population and Incomes

(According to the Sectors of the Sudanese Economy for the years 1969/70, 1976/7, 1982/83)

Sectors	1969/70	1969/70	1976/77	1976/77	1982/83	1982/83
	population %	Income%	population %	Income%	population %	Income%
Agriculture	69.7	39.0	68.5	39.2	65.8	34.3
Social Services	16.4	23.7	16.0	13.0	19.5	12.6
Industry	3.3	5.6	4.5	6.4	3.5	7.9
Utilities	0.9	4.9	0.9	1.7	1.1	2.0
Construction	1.7	4.1	1.8	4.9	2.1	4.9
Transport	3.3	7.1	3.4	10.6	3.8	9.6
commerce and finance	4.7	15.7	4.9	24.2	4.2	28.6

SOURCE: calculated from: 1) Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 1973, *Economic Survey*. 2) Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 1985, *Economic Survey*,. 3) Department of Statistics, National Accounting Section, *National Income and the Supporting Tables*, Different years.

The first symptom of this income inequality is the redistribution of incomes between 1969 and 1985 favoured unproductive sectors of the economy. The Gini coefficient ¹³ for the inter-sectoral distribution of incomes calculated for the years 1969/70, 1976/78 and 1982/83 using National Accounts Tables data, and the results of 0.34, 0.37 and 0.42 for the three years respectively showing the unproductive sectors of commerce and finance in comparison with the productive sectors of agriculture and industry. Table 8 shows the relative distribution of population and their relative share in the National Disposable Income for the years 1969/70, 1976/77, and 1982/83.

Ali and Hussein have shown that between 1976/77 and 1982/83 per capita income in trade, commerce and finance sector of the economy had grown by 9.5% per year; compared with the growth rates of per capita in the sectors of construction, (6.4%), both industry and public utilities, (2.7%), and agriculture, (-13%) (Ali and Hussein:1986, 80).

A symptom closely related to this sectoral-biased income distribution, was the distribution of private investment between 1970-1982; when 76% of private investment went to trade, commerce and non-productive services (Salih, ,1986,). The Islamic Banks were the most

¹³Gini coefficient "is a measure of inequality derived from Lorenz Curve "(Penguin Economic Dictionary p. 192), which itself "shows the relation between the cumulative percentage of some group units (e.g Households) and the cumulative percentage of the total amount of some variable (eg income)"; with the purpose of showing "the degree of inequality"(Ibid, p.275) and "As the degree of inequality increases, so does the curvature of the Lorenz Curve, and thus the area between the curve and the 45 line become larger."The Gini Coefficient measures the ratio between Lorenz Curve and the 45 degree line and the area above the line. It could expressed as G; where $G = \frac{\text{area between Lorenz Curve and 45 degree line}}{\text{area above the line}}$ (Ibid p. 192 ;also see Theil, 1967, pp.121-123, Sen, 1973, pp.29-31, Atkinson, 1983,pp.53-54, and Van Der Ploeg, 1984,pp.406-408)

important institution in encouraging the growth in trade and commerce sector. 89.2 % of their credit facilities went to trade and commerce between 1978-1984, and only 9.4% went to agriculture; and even this was offered on the commercial terms of these banks for purchases of raw-materials or intermediate goods exported by the same banks, their commercial companies or exporters financed by them.

While the number of the industrial establishment, employing 25 workers or more increased from 204 to 347 establishment between 1971/72 and 1981/82, the number of individuals and companies registered as importers and exporters with the Ministry of Commerce increased from 1379 in 1971 to 10955 in 1981 (Industrial Survey, 1971/72, Industrial Survey, 1981/82, Annex 2. and collected information from the Ministry of Trade, 1987.)

Investment in the financial institutions was another area which led to increasing income inequality and of these institutions Islamic banks were the most important. The first of these banks, the Faisal Islamic Bank, was established in 1978. By 1985 there were five Islamic banks which capital amounted 52% of the total capital of all the commercial banks in the Sudan. Eighteen thousands Sudanese shareholders contributed 42% of the paid capital, while 3,000 foreigners, mostly from Gulf countries contributed the remaining 58%. The rate of profit realized by these banks was very high. In 1983 the Faisal Islamic Bank, for example, distributed profits to its shareholders equal to 135% of the share for local shareholder and 110% for foreign shareholders (Hashimie, 1986, 6). The average value of shares held by a local shareholder was equal to LS 3920, which means that in 1983, assuming the rate of profit in Faisal Islamic Bank to prevail, the local shareholder gained LS 5292 which was equal to 10.5 times the minimum wage that year. The average value of the shares held by a foreign shareholder amounted to LS 32480 in 1983, which means they gained LS 35728 which was equal to 70.1 times the minimum wage in Sudan in 1983.

Another source of income inequality was the foreign exchange black market. The traders in this market were estimated to have gained LS 80 million in 1980 and LS 110 million in 1984.¹⁴ The IMF, in a confidential document to the Sudanese government, described the effect of expectations in the foreign exchange market in the Sudan as "of determinantal economic effects" which resulted in "transfer of income from consumers to the traders". (Quoted in Ali, 1986 ,)

The state played important role in increasing income inequality. This was accomplished in three ways. The first were great privileges for those who held what was called the 'higher constitutional offices ' (the President of the Republic, the First-Vice President, the

¹⁴Calculations are based on Ali and Hussein(1986) estimations that [800 million were circulated in 1981 and [110 million circulated in 1984 in the black market in the Sudan and that the margin of profit was 10 Sudanese piasters (LS 1= 100 piasters per dollar). (Ali and Hussein, opt. cit., 76-77)

Speaker of the National Peoples' Assembly, [the Assembly], the Ministers and the members of the Assembly).

In 1974 the salary of a member of the Assembly was 7.6 times the minimum wage and 4.6 times the salary newly employed university graduate (NEUG). By 1977 the ratio increased to 18.8 times the minimum wage 10.9 times the salary of a NEUG. The Minister's salary in 1974 was 24.2 times the minimum wage and 14 times the salary of a NEUG. By 1977 it increased to 33.3 times the minimum wage and 19.2 the salary of a NEUG.

The salary of the Speaker of the Assembly was 26.7 times the minimum wage and 15.5 times the salary of a NEUG in 1974. in 1977 it became 38.7 times the minimum wage and 22.4 the salary of a NEUG. The First Vice President's salary was 31.8 times the minimum wage and 18.4 times the of a NEUG and increased to the ratios of 56.1 and 32.4 respectively in 1977.

The President's salary was 90.9 times the minimum wage and 52.6 the salary of a NEUG in 1974 and increased in 1977 to the ratios of 136.4 and 78.9 for a minimum wage and a starting salary of a NEUG respectively.

The second level was the use of the state apparatus to transfer incomes and surpluses to the private sector, specially in agriculture. In rain-fed agriculture¹⁵ the government used to provide the private sector in what is known as the 'guided schemes' with loans through the Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC). These loans originally provided by the World Bank. They made to provide agricultural machinery, mainly tractors and discs and to cover cost of land clearance and preparations. The Sudan Agricultural Bank, provides the short-run finance for the seasonal agricultural operations. By 1977 690000 *feddans* were financed in this way by Mechanized Farming Project 1 and 2. Of these 690000, 190000 were in Simsim, 350000 in Um Seinat, both in Geddarif area in Eastern Sudan, and 150000 *feddans* were in Habila in Southern Kordofan. Except for Simsim area where the size of schemes followed the old mechanized scheme of 1000 *feddans* each, size of schemes in Um Seinat and Habila was increased to 1500 *feddans*. Although one of the conditions for allotting schemes to individuals was their financial ability, they don't need to use this 'ability' ,except for paying one third of the value of the tractor and to clear 100 *feddans*, to satisfy the eligibility condition for the MFC's two loans. The MFC 1 and 2 added to the fortune of the rich and were designed to get the "rich.. richer", as Affan put it.(Affan,1978, .40). If we took Habila in Southern Kordofan as an example, we find that most of the schemes went to merchants (60%) and ex-government employees and ex-army officers (26 %) (Ibid, .40).

¹⁵Agriculture in the Sudan could be classified as rain-fed and irrigated. The rain-fed could in turn be classified as mechanized capitalist, non-mechanized capitalist and peasantry; the latter is usually referred to in the literature and official documents as traditional agriculture within a traditional sector.

Following the Agricultural Investment Act of 1974 and the Unified Investment Act of 1980, the number of companies investing in mechanized rain-fed agriculture increased. Before 1977, only one company, the African Plantation of 20 Sudanese shareholders and issued capital of Ls150000 was operating in 20,000 *feddans* in Simsim area. In 1977, the Sudanese Egyptian Agricultural Integration Company started 0.5 million *feddans* concession in the Damazine area. The same year witnessed a Saudi-Sudanese joint investment with a concession of 0.7 million *feddans* in the Damazine area. By 1985 the concessions of companies reached million *feddans*.

To provide an estimation of the income inequality generated by mechanized agriculture let take the figures of 1982/83, the year before the 1983/84 -1984/85 drought. In 1982/83 the area under sorghum reached 5.81 million *feddans* in mechanized agriculture, of which 3,010,000 *feddan* were in Gedaref, 1,270,000 *feddans* were in Damazine, 90,000 *feddans* were in Renk, 350,000 *feddans* were in Habila and 280,000 *feddans* were in Kosti.

The profitability of one *feddan* of sorghum in mechanized agriculture was estimated in 1980/81 as ranging from LS 10.44 (average yield) and LS 29.56 (high yields) (MFEP, 1982, 99). Hence mechanized dura production was estimated to obtain a total profit of LS 60.7 million (average yield) or LS 171.9 million (high yield). An average scheme of 1500 *feddans*, which supposed to cultivate 1000 *feddans* sorghum provided a profit of between LS 10440 and LS 29560 which was equal to 20.5 and 58 times the minimum wage in the Sudan at that time. Comparison could also be made with the peasant cultivation in what is called traditional agriculture. Affan estimated that 45% of peasants in Kordofan cultivate a farm ranges between 8.8 *feddans* and 17.6 *feddans* and 93% cultivate less than 35 *feddans*. If an average holding of 20 *feddans* per peasant family cultivated by sorghum is assumed, then the income of a peasant family could be estimated between LS 58 (average yield) and LS 451 (high yield) ¹⁶. Taking these estimates, the profit on an average scheme were 65.5 times (high yields) and 186.4 times (average yield) the net income of a peasant family.

Using the 1967/68 and 1978/80 House Budget Surveys, the ILO in an official report presented to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan in 1986 argued that income distribution in the Sudan had worsened between the two periods 1967/68-1978/80. The results which are shown in Table 9 show that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.41 to 0.50 for all Sudan, from 0.34 to 0.51 in rural areas and from 0.41 to 0.42 in urban areas; which indicates increasing income inequality over all Sudan, and more inequality in rural areas than in urban.

Another source of income inequality was the high incomes generated by working in the rich oil gulf states and the concessions and incentives granted to them through the

¹⁶MFEP estimated the net income from one *feddan* of sorghum in the so-called traditional agriculture as ranging from LS 2.9 (average yield) and Ls 22.59 (high yield) (Ibid, p.99)

government policy to encourage their flow. Table 10 shows the transfers of the Sudanese working abroad through official channels (the commercial banks). The transfers increased steadily from LS 0.29 millions to LS 620 millions between 1968 and 1985¹⁷. There was a big jump in the transfers after 1977 due to the increase of the numbers of the Sudanese working abroad (see next section), the devaluation of the Sudanese currency (see section 5. ., table), the extension of the concessions provided by the state to encourage transfers and the rise in oil prices.

Table 9. Income Distribution in the Sudan

Docile	Rural		Urban		Total	
	1967/68	1978/80	1967/68	1978/80	1967/68	1978/80
Bottom	2.3	1.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.0
Second	1.3	2.4	3.6	3.7	3.6	2.6
Third	5.5	3.6	1.7	4.9	4.7	4.0
Fourth	6.0	5.0	5.4	5.8	5.0	4.8
Fifth	6.6	6.1	6.5	6.8	6.3	6.0
Sixth	8.0	7.2	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.4
Seventh	9.8	8.8	9.5	9.5	9.7	9.4
Eighth	12.1	11.1	11.6	11.3	12.0	11.5
Ninth	14.8	15.3	15.7	14.9	15.0	15.5
Tenth	26.7	39.5	33.2	33.2	33.1	37.8
gini coeff.	0.34	0.51	0.41	0.42	0.41	0.50

SOURCE: ILO, 1986, *Employment and Economic Reform :Towards a Strategy for the Sudan*, ILO, Geneva, 1987, .36.

Table 10. Transfers of Sudanese Working Abroad

Year	Transfers	Year	Transfers
1968	0.29	1977	14.0
1969	0.85	1978	55.0
1970	1.2	1979	90.1
1971	0.4	1980	154.8
1972	1.1	1981	195.0
1973	1.2	1982	174.4
1974	1.3	1983	356.8
1975	2.1	1984	370.2
1976	4.3	1985	620.0

Source: Bank of Sudan, *Annual Reports*, 1969-1985

Hamed and Amin found that remittances of Sudanese working abroad had "contributed to new modes of behaviour which distinguish emigrants and their dependents from the rest of the society" (Hamed and Amin, 1987, 169). They found that distinction involved "economic and social mode of behaviour" and was reflected in "ownership and expansion of assets as well as ...of durable consumer goods and electrical goods in particular" (Ibid, 169). They found that more than 80% of the emigrants and their families were in urban areas which add "a geographical dimension" to the distributional factor of the external migration (Ibid., 170).

Another Sudanese scholar had noticed that:

¹⁷In foreign currency this amounted to an increase of one million dollar to \$150 millions

"Most emigrants' savings were used for land speculation, weddings, investment in tertiary sector, or for imported consumer goods... This has reinforced certain undesirable traditional social patterns and structures, or in contrast, created tastes for foreign goods in poor country not likely to meet the demands created for a significant proportion of its population" (Galal-al-Din, 198 , 306).

Corruption was another factor that contributed to income inequality in the Sudan. It was a wide practise during the 1973-85 period to the extent a popular saying was spread expressing that ' who does not become rich during May (meant the May 1969 regime) will never become rich'. Kameir and Kursany (1985) mentioned six types of corruption practises that took place during the period of study. Three of these forms of corruption could be classified as embezzlement of public funds and they include the acquisition of liquid assets, the sale of state durable and consumer assets and the sale of state residential land (Ibid, 14-17) . The fourth form was the fraudulent of official government permits to allow the smuggle of goods and commodities across the regional boarder and the issue of import licences for prohibited items(Ibid, 17-18). The fifth form was the acquisition of agricultural land specially in the mechanised farms schemes (Ibid, 18-20). the sixth form was the use of political power to obtain investment shares in commercial companies (Ibid 22-26)

Kameir and Kursany provided 20 cases of acquisition of liquid assets from government ministries and departments, public corporations, Bank of the Sudan, and government owned commercial banks and factories, Sudanese embassies and the Sudan Youth Organisation which was financed by the government. The total of the liquid assets acquired amounted to more than one million Sudanese pounds, \$12500, and 166000 Saudi Rial (Ibid, table 1, 15). The sale of government assets included the sale of huge amounts of medicine from Omdurman hospital and petrol from the Survey Department, the Civil Aviation Department and the ministry of Public Works (Ibid, table 2, 17). The value of residential land illegally acquired in one area, El Ashara in Khartoum amounted to LS 4 million while the authors were not able to estimate the value of the land from four other areas, all of them in the three towns of the capital. (Ibid, 17)¹⁸. The re-allocation of the schemes of the state farm at Habila was a clear evidence of corruption in allotting agriculture land. Three of the schemes went to close relatives of the managing director of the Mechanised Farming Corporation, including one to his father and one to his son (Ibid, 20). The misuse of political power as a form of corruption was discussed by Kameir and Kursany through analysing the shares obtained by the President of the Republic, the Vice president, the Minister of Finance, the director of the military economic Corporation and two leading figures in the Muslim Brothers Movement which was allied to the regime at the time, in the Islamic Development Company which was established in 1983. All of the

¹⁸Kamier and El Bakri (1987) provided more information on the corruption in allotment of land for residential, agricultural use as well as land registered in the name the University of Khartoum and was re-alloted to individuals without the consent of the University.

six held shares of \$100,000 each. The authors, analysing their income concluded that there was no way for them to have such money from their savings to buy these shares which suggests that it was political corruption (ibid, 25-6).

Khalid (1985) concerned himself with the last form of corruption. In his "*Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May*", Khalid discussed the role played by Nimeiri's minister for Special Affairs, Dr. Idris¹⁹, in corruption. Dr. Idris was part of a group in the presidential palace who were "in the business neither of delivering the goods nor of political mobilization, rather they used their special position inside the palace to promote their personal interests" (Khalid, 1985, 71). The effects of the palace corruption went far beyond affecting income distribution by creating new millionaires to affect Sudan foreign debt, relations with other countries and international institutions as will be discussed in the following chapter. The list of the palace corruption involved the creation of the Sudan Development Corporation and the Saudi guarantee for a \$200,000,000 loan in which Adnan Khoshoggi profited \$4million while another \$6 million went missing. (Ibid, 95-106). The second on the palace corruption list was the Sudan satellite project, in which prices were inflated by \$1 million (Ibid, 112- 3). The third of the corruption list included the purchase of four used helicopters for which the army did not ask and would not accept (Ibid, 120). The Magirus trucks deal with Klokner Humboldt Deutz of Cologne in Germany was another corruption deal which involved Dr. Idris, Adnan Khoshoggi and Mustafa Nimeiri, the President only brother (Ibid, 121-4) . The corruption involved arms deals for the benefit of foreign countries. *The Observer* (20 February 1983) revealed the involvement of a Sudanese Minister in issuing an end -use certificate to enable arms dealers to purchase Exocets on behalf of the Argentine Government. The Minister received \$200,000 (Ibid, 226).

4.4.2. The Increase in Unemployment

Three kind of data are available on the situation of employment and unemployment in the Sudan. Two of these are published annually by the Department of Labour, Ministry of Labour and Social Security. One is on the registration and employment of the new graduates of the universities and higher education institutes, and this data represents a good indicator to employment and unemployment among graduates; because all graduates seeking employment are required to have registration cards from the Department of Labour. The second kind of data published by the Department of Labour is about skilled and unskilled workers and those of intermediate qualification seeking work through the Labour Offices. It provide some indications about the urban labour market, but not a complete picture because not all job-seekers register in these offices. The third kind of

¹⁹He had held the job from 1971 to 1973 except for a brief period in 1984. Dr. Idris an ex-university lecturer who "was made *for conduct unbecoming his profession, divulging the zoology examination papers to a girl student*" (Khalid, 1985, 71)

data is the one provided by population censuses on the labour force, its distribution, employment and unemployment.

The 1973 census estimated the unemployment ratio at 6.3%, while the 1983 census estimated it at 8.2% (ES, 1984/85, 74 and ES, 1988/89, 85). This suggest an increase of the unemployment of more than 30% in ten years.

The annual figures of the employment of the universities and higher institutes graduates show that only 49.4 of them found jobs between 1976/77 and 1984/85. Of all the science and applied science graduates 63.1% found jobs, while of social sciences and arts graduates 42.4% found jobs. Among the graduates of higher institutes 42.8% found jobs during the same period.

Only 15.2% of the skilled, unskilled workers and those with intermediate qualifications seeking work through the department of Labour 's Employment Offices found jobs during the period 1976/77-84/85 Among those registered 18.9% of the skilled, 14.1% of the unskilled and 12.6% of those with intermediate qualifications found jobs. All the figures are shown in Table 11.

These figures do not represent the actual level of unemployment because they show the percentages of these seeking employment through Labour Offices, while most of the people seeking employment do not seek employment through these offices because they simply do not know about them or because they have not the official documents required for registration;(identity cards or nationality certificates).

Table 11. Employed Graduates AS Percentage of Graduates Seeking Jobs 1976/77-1984/85

year	1984/85		
	Applied Sciences	Social Sciences	Higher Institutes
76/77	55	30	13
77/78	34	58	7
78/79	56.6	54.2	18.5
79/80	83.5	67.2	95.6
80/81	91.5	48.3	57
81/82	41.5	41.6	51.5
82/83	69.7	46.7	60.4
83/84	49.5	24.2	56.5
84/85	36.4	11.8	25.7

SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey*, Different Issues, 1977-1985.

The number of unemployed is believed to have increased after the beginning of the draught in 1983/84, when 425000 people were estimated to have been displaced in North Kordofan and were compelled to make "an exodus to large urban centres, principally the three town (the capital) and El Obied."(Regional Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1987,. 3). About 70000 were believed to have moved from Darfur to Central region as a result of the famine of 1983/84-84/85 (Bush,1989, 10)

In addition to that Sudan is believed to be host to 750,000 Ethiopians, 250,000 Ugandans, 121,000 Chadians and 5,000 Zairians refugees because of the political situation in neighbouring countries.(MFEP, 1985, .84)

Table 12. The Employment of Workers Seeking Jobs Through Labour Offices
1976/77-1984/85 (Employed as % of registered)

year	skilled	unskilled	intermediate
76/77	11.2	14.1	8.1
77/78	18.2	14.8	15.1
78/79	13.6	11.0	14.6
79/80	23.6	19.8	13.7
80/81	31.1	21.1	17.0
81/82	12.4	11.4	10.5
82/83	22.8	10.6	12.5
83/84	20.3	12.0	11.1
84/85	17.1	12.1	9.7

SOURCE : As in previous table.

The Sudan witnessed during the same period an increase in the number of Sudanese working abroad (SWA), specially in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Those are estimated to be 300, 000s in 1985. Of these 51, 000 got official contracts, through the Department of Labour, between 1979 and 1981; 10% were professionals, technicians and scientists. In 1982/83 the number of Sudanese who got new contracts amounted to 8800s, it declined by 27.3% in 1983/84 to 6.4 thousands and declined again in 1984/85 by 54.9% to about 4, 000, 1982/83 base year.(MFEP, 1986,.91) The decline was a direct result of the decline of international oil prices.

4.4.3.The Decline of Social Services

The decline in social services is one of the most prominent features on the social level. Although it is difficult to quantify when the quality of these services us concerned, some indicators may suggest some quality valuation.

The first of these indicators is financial. The share to social services in government current expenditure declined from 17.6% in 1970/71 to 3.5 in 1980/81.²⁰

In the health sector, health services declined, despite the increase in the number of doctors, beds, hospitals and health centres between 1971 and 1983,. The increase in the number of cases of typhoid fever, malaria and nutritional deficiencies, including malnutrition, show vividly the deterioration of the health service in the Sudan. The number of cases of typhoid fever referred to the outpatient sections in clinics and hospitals increased from 957 in 1971 to 5,478 in 1978 to 5,764 in 1983, while those of malaria increased from 713,392 in 1971 to 2,660,753 in 1978 to 3,129,130 in 1983. The cases of nutritional deficiencies and malnutrition increased from 310,848 in 1971 to

²⁰The year 1980/81 is chosen for comparison to avoid the complicating introduction of regional government when most of the funds for social services were transferred to regional governments. The ILO assumed that all the subsidy paid to regional governments by the central government went to social services, an assumption which is not a valid one.(see ILO, opt. cite., p.43)

792,387 in 1978 and declined slightly to 735,088 in 1983 (Ministry of Health Annual Reports 1971-1983)

The education service had its own problems. Although generally there was a growth in the number of schools, pupils, and teachers as shown in Table 13: , the education service suffered from many set-back. The first was the increase in costs to the poor. In 1969, when Nimeiri came to power, public general education was free to all Sudanese. Pupils and students used to receive in addition free textbooks, notebooks and some stationary. Although no official decision had been taken to abolish free education; students and pupils were not only asked by their schools to bring their textbooks notebooks and stationery, but they were asked in some schools to bring their chairs, and in all schools to pay a 'popular contribution' or 'self-assistance contribution'. At the beginning these contributions were voluntary and their payment or not did not affect the pupils or students' attendance to classes; but by the 1976 pupils and students were prevented from attending classes if they did not pay these contributions. Free education was in this way practically abolished.

Table 13. Growth Rates of Number of Schools, Pupils and Teachers and the Pupils/teachers Ratios 1970/71-1983/84

level	Growth Rates			pupils/Teacher	
	schools	Pupils	Teachers	1971	1983
Primary	4.5%	6%	7.9%	42	33
Intermediate	11.9%	15.1%	8.0%	11	24
Secondary (academic)	14.2%	16.2%	7.9%	11	24
Secondary(Tec hnical)	16.7%	20.9%	9.1%	16	30

SOURCE: Ministry of Education and Instruction, *Annual educational Statistics* 1975-1983

The second set-back in education was the increase in the size of classes. Till 1970, the class in any school should not exceed 40-50 students or pupils, but by the 1976 the average class in primary schools reached 90-100 pupils, in intermediate schools reached 50-60 students and in secondary schools 45-55 students.

The third set-back was the rise of pupils and students per teacher ratios for all schools except primary schools due to the migration of teachers to Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries and Yemen Arab republic, ie. 21% of Sudanese working in Yemen were teachers (ALI, 1981, .16). The pupils per teacher ratio improved from 44 pupil/teacher to 33 pupil/teacher between 1971 and 1983 in primary schools. In the intermediate schools the ratio increased from 11 students per teacher to 24 students per teacher during the same period. In the academic secondary schools the ratio increased also from 11 to 24 students per teacher; while for the technical secondary schools it increased from 16 in 1979 to 30 in 1983/84 (Data from Ministry of Education and Instruction, Annual Education Statistics, Different issues 1975-1985)

4.5. The Famine

The last and comprehensive manifestation of the 1973-1985 crisis was the famine of 1983-85. Though that was not the first famine under the Nimeiri Regime, for a previous limited famine took place in 1973 in Darfur, and some 200,000 were estimated to have died in Western Sudan (De Vaal, 1988,1).

The 1983-85 famine was a culmination of the regime crisis which exposed the economic, political and moral dimensions of that crisis. Nimeiri and his associates were aware of that for they, at the beginning, refused to acknowledge the presence of the famine which was reported from an early time by the Governor of Darfur region where the symptoms had been apparent since 1982. In 1983 the then Governor of Darfur fled to the Gulf and Europe in protest of the President rejection of the declaration that Darfur had been struck by famine and appealed for international relief.²¹ Meanwhile the Governor of Kordofan was suppressing the reports from his junior government officials on the famine in his region. One year later, in October 1984, the famine struck the population of Northern Kordofan were on the move towards the Nile, their Governor was accusing the international media of spreading rumours about 'a famine' in the region to discredit "the most magnificent revolutionary achievement of the May Revolution"(in Al Rayah:1987, 3). At the same period the National Security Apparatus reported the sudden arrival of '*murtazaga*' (the Arabic word for mercenaries) west of Omdurman. When the Military Commander of the area hurried to investigate the situation he found the impoverished Kordofan citizens displaced by the worst disaster that living generations could remember. The President paid a visit to the displaced and immediately (November 1984) ordered a formation of a committee headed by the Minister of Health to look after the displaced. It was until March 1985 that the Sudan Government (through the Minister of Health) acknowledged there was famine and appealed for relief assistance and aid. Ironically, international assistance had already been decided by a number of countries and international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The USAID had committed itself to 82,000 metric tons of relief grain to Darfur and Kordofan in September 1984, appointing the Save the Children Fund (SCF) of the UK. and CARE of the U.S.A. to distribute on its behalf. Oxfam and UNICEF were engaged in the relief process since October 1984, especially in the Red Sea Hills where the famine struck about 750,000 people in Senkat, Haya, Dardaib, Halaib and North Tokar. In February 1985 they were joined by the World Food Program. In total there were about 42 NGOs, international organizations and foreign government agencies already working in relief when Sudan tabled its official request in the Geneva meeting of donor countries in March 1985 (Ibid,4).

²¹Personal communication with Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Dreig 1989.

The famine struck two regions in addition to the Red Sea Hills: Darfur and Kordofan. In the Red Sea Province 750,000 people stricken by the famine, all were believed to have lost all their entire animal wealth. Kordofan Regional Government, (KRG), estimated the number of people who died as a result of the famine as 10,000. (KRG:1987, 2). This was an almost certainly underestimate, for the Saudari Council of the region estimated that between August 1984 and March 1985, 5200 children died of malnutrition related diseases in the Council area and 7000 children died in el Moelih Displaced Camp at the same period. (Saudary Area Council:1987, 2).

One million people were estimated to have migrated from original homes towards the Nile or water supply centres within the region. For example the Saudari Council estimated 16.8, 000 people had migrated from the Council area, half of them to el Obeid area, a quarter to Bara area, and the remaining quarter towards the Nile and Gezira areas.(Ibid, 4).

The loss in animal wealth was estimated at 69% of total cattle, 36% of sheep, 90% of goats and 84% of Camels (KRG, op. cit., 2). A study carried by the Regional Ministry of Finance and Economics and the Regional Administration of Animal Wealth in three administrative areas in Northern Kordofan estimated the loss as 93%, 92% 86%, 62% and 72% of the cattle, sheep, goats, camels, horses, and donkeys respectively (KRMFE:1986, 4)

In Darfur Region almost 100,000 people were estimated to have died as a result of the famine of 1983-85. Because of early indicators of the drought in Darfur, by August 1984, 25% of the three and half million inhabitants of the region were classified as "seriously affected by famine (Bush:1988, 2). By January 1985 when the President of the Republic acknowledged the existence of the famine in Darfur, the sale of a cow could not provide enough grain for a family of five for one week.(Ibid, 4) While the price of livestock declined by ten time between January and October 1984, the prices of dura and millet, the basic grain food had increased by three times, a classical example of the price-scissor effect or a loss of the Market entitlement, to use Sen's terminology (Sen: 1988, 151).

The 1983-85 famine in addition to being a human tragedy in itself, had manifested the crisis of the Sudanese state and economy. The economy was not able to provide relief to the famine struck population and the state which had to appeal for international relief assistance, was not able to manage the relief aid provided by donors, to transport it to the affected areas and to rationally distribute it to those who needed it. The national buffer-stock had been exported in search of foreign exchange, table 2:15 shows the dura balance sheet.

The famine exposed the weakness of the state apparatus in the management of the relief operation. The burden of the management was shouldered by the non-government organizations of which 42 were reported working in the Sudan in 1986. Of these Save the

Children Fund and Oxfam, of the UK., and CARE of the United States of America played the main role in relief operation, while the USAID, WFP, EEC, FAO, and UNCIEF, provided the funds and the grain supply.

Table 14. Table 14. Dura Balance Sheet

1979/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	Average
Local Production	1669	2068	3345	1938	1806	1097
consumption	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100
Surplus/Deficit	431	-32	1245	-162	-294	-1003
Exports	286	241	413	256	24.9	--
Balance	-717	-273	832	-418	-318	-1003
Durae exports as % of total exports	5.8%		22%	8.3	1%	-

Sources 1) Output figures from the National Economic Conference, *Economic Indicators*, 1986 39. 2) For exports of dura, Bank of Sudan *Annual Reports*, 1981-1986. 3) % calculated from Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1981-198

4.6. Conclusion

In this chapter an attempt to provide a description of the crisis through its main manifestations and symptoms has been made. The description has revealed how extensive and deep was the crisis in the country. The main target now becomes to try and understand how this crisis situation had developed and what were the reasons behind it and whether the crisis constitutes a continuity or a disruption in the political and economic history of the country.

CHAPTER 5

THE GENESIS OF THE 1973-85 CRISIS

5.1. Introduction

This Chapter provides an explanation of the 1973-85 crisis by discussing the forces, institutions, structures and policies that led to the crisis.

In section 2 in this chapter a critical survey of the attempts to explain the 1973-85 crisis is provided.

In section 3 the nature of the Nimeiri regime and its implications on the crisis of the state is discussed. The legal frame work and the political institutions of the authoritarian state are discussed in section 4. The policies of the state are discussed in section 5. Sections .6 deals with the particular economic crisis of 1973-85. It discusses the crises of simple and extended reproduction, and the financial crisis of the state as well as the Sudanese debt crisis. Section 7 provides a conclusion by focusing on the nature of the crisis of hegemony during the 1973-85 period..

5.2. Attempts to Explain the 1973-85 Crisis in the Literature

The literature on the crisis of the Nimeiri regime is rich with diverse contributions. It is a rich literature because it is numerous, extensive and enlightening. It is diverse in both its themes and contributors. The themes included those of orthodox political science and economics as well as those of political economy.

The differences in explaining the crisis included the determination of the duration of the crisis (ie when did it start? for how long did it continue?), and what kind of crisis was it (political, economic, or organic...etc). the question has also been raised comparing the specificity and continuity of the crisis with previous crises.

5.2.1. A Testimony of an Insider

As an active and influential participant in the regime between 1969 and 1978, Khalid¹ was able to disclose some of the internal conflicts and practises of the regime which makes his works one of the primary sources of the study of the crisis under Nimeiri

¹Mansour Khalid held the portofolio of Foreign Minister twice: 1971-1975 and from February to September 1977. He was also influential in determining the foreign policy between August 1976 and February 1977 when he served as assistant to the President for Coordination and Foreign Affairs.

Khalid has divided the Nimeiri era into four periods: 1969-72, 1972-76, 1976-83 and 1983-85. In all four phases he found the elements of crisis. These elements were the character of Nimeiri, the totalitarian nature of the regime (and any regime based on the single party system) and the centralisation of state power, the divisions among the elite, the cultural failure of that elite to recognise the relation between modernisation and continuity and the presence of a corrupt group within the same elite around president Nimeiri (Khalid, 1982, 1985, 1990 and 1993). He tried through a historical documentation and discussions of the different important events, to show how these elements worked together to build the crisis of the regime until it was overthrown in April 1985

Khalid's contribution to the analysis of the crisis has been very positive. His contribution stands as an important source of primary information because he was an insider and has an excellent ability to document. Yet it lacked the appreciation of the role and interests of the ruled classes, for him the crisis of the state emerged from within the elite. The absence of class struggle in Khalid's analysis made it difficult for an analysis of strikes, demonstrations and unrest in the army from 1973 to the fall of Nimeiri.

5.2.2. A Political Science View

There are many attempts to explain the crisis from the stand point of political science (Woodward, 1985, 1990, ... etc; Hamid, 1982, Wai, 1982). Of these Woodward works were the best representative because he was consistent in his methodological approach to the Sudanese crises pre and post-1969. He kept examining the elements of ethnicity, religion, class with respect to the economy, political and state institutions and foreign relations and their reflection and interrelation with Woodward's common theme of the unstable state. This is especially clear in his 1985 paper to the Conflict Studies series of the Institute for the Study of Conflict and his book of 1990². An important aspect in Woodward's analysis, is his study of the political and trade unions movement, an aspect ignored in many other studies. In addition Woodward, as Khalid (1984), focused on the role of Nimeiri and his misuse of the presidential system, he wrote:

"Above all, the man who had begun as a little-known officer and *primus inter pares* in the Revolutionary Command Council had moved from the degree of support of a neo-patrimonial ruler into a sultan seen by many as a devil incarnate and the source of all Sudan's woes" (1990, 164)

He noticed as early as 1971 that Nimeiri had developed some skills of "political calculation, flexibility and element of surprise" based on pragmatism. Woodward also pointed out the problem of the regime was in seeking alliances with other groups "always ultimately on its own terms" (Ibid, 164). He stressed a point which is argued in this thesis

and February 1977 when he served as assistant to the President for Coordination and Foreign Affairs.

²Both works have stability in their titles, though the first emphasises the threats to stability

as a key to the understanding of the regime in its post-1971 period, that is following the 1971 coup the regime was left "with unstable army and no allies in "civil society whatsoever" (Ibid, 141). In that context Woodward looked rightly to the Addis Ababa Agreement. and he was also accurate in emphasising the role of the central government and Nimeiri in particular in the failure of the Agreement (pp 158-59) . National Reconciliation of 1978 is also evaluated in that context and its failure to "construct a new political frame work" (Ibid, 157) is argued as a back ground to the introduction of *Sharia*.

Woodward's discussion of Sudan foreign relations is fairly satisfactory, especially when he pointed that at "the central feature of Sudan's foreign relations was to be domestic politics, and as these changed from radicalism, through institution-building to personal rule and long decline, so too did foreign relations" (Ibid, 165). His analysis has enlightened the writing of this thesis in that particular aspect as in many others.

5.2.3. An Economic Interpretation of the Crisis

It could be noticed that some of those who look at the crisis as essentially an economic one, see its starting point as the mid-seventies (1975-78) which continued to the end of the regime in 1985 (Kruger, 1982; Ali, 1985; IMF,1985; Brown, 1986; Faaland, 1987; ILO, 1987).

Most of the literature concerning the economic crisis during 1978-85 was centred around the IMF analysis of the crisis and the response to that analysis. This is the literature known in the academic Sudanese circles as the 'the IMF Debate'. Ali (1985), provided a good summary of the IMF argument and their critiques. Although the IMF argument were found in an undated note presented to the Sudan government some times around 1977, the basic argument of the IMF was first elaborated by Nashashibi (1980) and Kruger (1982).

The IMF argued that:

"Over the past few years a number of domestic and external developments affecting budgetary operation, credit expansions and cost-price relationships have resulted in structural disequilibrium in the Sudanese economy; these are clearly indicated by the severe imbalances in the budget and balance of payments." (quoted in Ali; 1985, 27)

According to the IMF the causes of the internal imbalance were to be found in the increase of investment expenditure from LS30 million in 1972/73 to LS100 million in 1974/75 which was financed from external and internal borrowing (Ibid, 28). It is true that such a large investment expenditure financed from borrowing would have inflationary pressures in the economy in the short run. But such a reasoning would not explain inflationary pressures in the medium and long term. It did not justify that the new investment did not contribute to the increase of the supply of goods and services to offset the inflationary pressure. It also did not explain the stagnation of exports which the IMF

argued it had "lasted over a decade (1965-75). The formal logic of trying to provide reasoning by linking economic variables might lead in such a case vicious circle. Although Nashashibi³ (1980) has provided a more sophisticated analysis, he fell in the same trap. He explained the decline in exports by the reduction of 20% of cotton acreage and decline in average cotton yields (Nashashibi, 1980, 32). The decline of cotton production was a result of the government policy to diversify by altering "the cropping pattern and the shift of incentives away from cotton" (Ibid, 36). Nashashibi asked an important question: "were the tenants incentives consistent with the newly established cropping pattern?". He did not answer the question, but he noted that the answer required "a detailed analysis of the potentialities and constraints affecting Sudan's major productive activities, and the overall allocation of resources" (Ibid, 36). That was generally true, but in the particular case of Gezira Scheme there is a need for the study of the production relations and the institutionalised articulation as will be argued below. Though the study carried by Nashashibi for the competitiveness of Sudan major crops was necessary, it is irrelevant to the Gezira main problem. Whatsoever the result of the calculations of the economic efficiency of the cropping pattern to be adopted in the Gezira would be, the diversification within the Gezira articulated model would have undermined the production of cotton. What required change was the Gezira model itself.

Of these economic interpretation of the crisis, Richard Brown has provided an interesting analysis. Though he determined the beginning of the crisis by 1978 (Brown, 1986, 488), he tried to identify two origins of the crisis from the 1960s and the early 1970s. Those were the stagnation in agricultural output and the scarcity of resources for development expenditure (Ibid, 488). By analysing the trade gap and the current account deficit, Brown established a relation between the decline in cotton output and the decline of yields of other agricultural products and the growth of the deficit from about 1% in 1970 to almost 10% by the end of the decade. He argued against the conventional wisdom of relating such growth in the deficit to the deterioration of Sudan's terms of trade. He substantiated his argument by quoting both the statistics of cotton's acreage and yields to show the decline of its output and hence the volume of its exports. At the same time he provided statistics on Sudan terms of trade to show that they fluctuated around the 90 index (1977-78=100), while arguing that the demand for long-staple cotton and its international price were stable because Egypt reduced its production. He rightly attributed the decline in cotton output and yields to government's price policy and prevailing production relations in irrigated agriculture which were all discriminating against cotton. This argument is further substantiated by a thorough discussion of the production relations and their dependency on a specifically rigid institutional articulation

³ Mr Karim Nashashibi was then Senior Economist of the IMF Middle East Department.

and how independence brought some changes in the state and class relations that made these relations obsolete and represented an obstacle to the development of production forces, productivity and production itself.

Though the latter point was mentioned in a different perspective by the World Bank's Rist Report of 1966 and the discussions of the SCP (1966, 1976), of the problems of Gezira, in this thesis the discussion is part of a comprehensive analysis of the crisis of the socio-economic structure (in particular the state and the economy). The decline of cotton yields is looked at in this thesis as a socio-political question as well as an economic and technical one (see the building of the argument through Chapters 2,3, 5 and 6). The argument could be summarised as follows: despite the contribution of the technical problems which were the result of the failure to replace depreciated means of production (the agricultural equipments and the irrigation system) and the price policy of the state (the multiple system of exchange rates for cotton exports and cotton's inputs imports), the development of class struggle which resulted in the inability of the state to pursue the colonial coercion on which the whole production relation was built, was the main reason for the decline of yields. This was because the Gezira Board (the arm of the state) was not able any more to compel the tenants to carry on the agricultural activities according to the schedule, pattern and quality which they used to do under the colonial state. A corollary to this argument is the need to replace institutional administrative measures by economic measures (incentives). Both the World Bank (1966) and the SCP (1968, 1976) accept this corollary though through different analysis and with different alternate policy perspectives to what these economic measures should be. The World Bank actually made the acceptance of his report a condition for financing the rehabilitation of the Gezira, when it was financing the new Rahad Scheme which was based on the production relations suggested in the Rist Report (Awad, 1983, 13).

Brown also examined what he had seen as the other origin of the crisis, the internal imbalance and its relation with the development expenditure. He pointed out that while the combined current and development expenditure rose from 20% in 1970/71 to 22% in 1977/78 of the GDP, the government revenue declined from 22% to 16% during the same period. Until 1974/75, the massive external flow of resources financed the deficit; but when the "external resources flows tapered off" the deficit finance through the borrowing from the central bank increased to enhance inflation (Ibid, 492-30). That analysis was partially true, for deficit finance, as shown Chapter 4 in this thesis was on going long before that. On the other hand Brown did not say why "external resources were tapered off". He did not say why revenue did not match the increase of current and development expenditure.

Brown's most important contribution was the study of the 1978-85 period. Showing the failure of the IMF backed *Economic Recovery Programmes*, he asked an important

question about the reasons why the programme despite its failure was not abandoned by the IMF, the donor countries or the Nimeiri regime. His answer to the question was that the programmes and the different agreements reached between the IMF, the Sudan and donor community were not meant to be implemented but were to bail the Nimeiri regime (Ibid, 503-508). This attitude was motivated by the US government (p 508). In an earlier paper Brown suggested that a hardening attitude was adopted by the IMF in 1984/85 when the US became disinterested in the regime and decided to facilitate its downfall (Brown, 1985, 12).

Of these explanations depending on an economic interpretation is that of Charles Gurdon (1991). Gurdon has determined the beginning of the crisis by the 1980s and warned that "It would be too easy to use Nimeiri as a scapegoat for all Sudan's economic problems" (1991, 18). In this thesis, it is argued that the particular crisis began as early as 1973, and that crisis, despite its particularity which was the 'contribution' of the Nimeiri regime to the general Sudanese crisis, had its common origins with the previous crises. It is not the intention to make any particular person a scapegoat, however it is not also the intention to deny any person the 'honour' of contributing to the crisis if he had done so!

Gurdon contribution has suffered from untrue statements and definitions. For example Gurdon stated that they were "thousands of expatriates" who left the country after the nationalisation and confiscations of 1970 (1991, 18). This is simply untrue. Sudan was one of the few African countries that never had such numbers of expatriates working in it after independence, whether they were from the West or East. It is not true that the Soviet and Eastern European technicians who replaced them "became indispensable in ensuring the smooth operation of the essential industries as well as the armed forces". Simply because the essential industries in the Sudan were run by Sudanese experts, even those established by the Russian during Abboud's regime (1958-1964). Another example is the definition of groundnuts "of which the locally important 'ful sudani' is made" (Ibid, 20) which is a strange definition. 'Ful Sudani' is the name of groundnuts in the Sudan and not one of its products⁴. A third is his definition of AAAID as " a body controlled and financed by the Saudi Arabian royal family", which again is not true. AAAID is a regional inter-governmental Arab authority financed by the Arab countries, including Sudan. It is true that the rich Arab countries contributed most of its capital but it is controlled by its Board of Directors which is composed of the Arab ministers of finance or their representatives. There is another inaccurate statement about the Arab capital inflow and the oil supply. The statement is about the cut back of Arab aid to the Sudan. It says, "The problem for Sudan was that Arab investment specifically directed to ambitious and

⁴The question itself is not important if it does not imply that Gurdon wants to show his knowledge of the country that he writes about!

expensive agricultural projects disappeared and the Sudanese government was left with half-completed schemes on its hands" (p 27). The statement is not true because no Arab finance for any on-going project was withdrawn. It is true that the plans for the rehabilitation of the existing projects suffered during this period not because finance was withdrawn, but finance was not agreed on with the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, mainly for political reasons.

Despite all these misgivings in Gurdon's analysis, he tackled some of the important factors that contributed to the extent and intensity of the particular economic crisis of the Nimeiri regime like what is called in this thesis the absorption capacity of the Sudanese economy and Gordon calls the "Sudan's infrastructure problems and bureaucracy" (Ibid, 21) or Sudan attempt "to develop its agricultural sector too quickly"(Ibid, 22). His discussion of Western and Arab aid to Sudan has contributed positively to the literature in this area and is found to be useful to strengthen the discussion in this Chapter on the debt crisis and the failure of debt re-scheduling.

5.2.4 Political Economy Interpretation Attempts

In the literature studying the Sudanese crisis, several attempts were made from the stand point of political economy (Niblock, 1989, 1991; O'Brien, 1985, O'Neil, 198 ; and Barnett, 198 .)

Tim Niblock's analysis (1985, 1991) of the Nimeiri regime and its crisis is one of the most serious works which studies the period. One important characteristic of Niblock's early analysis (1985) was his ability to both document and evaluate the performance of the one-party system in 1974-77. He recognised the limited role played by the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) at grass-roots and its failure to function in mobilizing support to the regime or to reflect popular demand and concern (1985, 267-272). Niblock was not able in his 1985 analysis to pursue the results of his empirical analysis to a conclusion of studying the nature of the state and was content with his conclusion that government after 1972 was dominated by the ' technocratic neutrals' (1985, 264-5). This left him with the alternative of judging the regime according to its declared aims of national unity and development. Even within that role his account was unimpressive. Though he reached the conclusion of the failure of the regime in reaching its self-assigned targets, he did not provide satisfactory analysis for the reasons of that failure. For example in his evaluation for the national unity, he emphasised the internal struggles among the Southern Sudanese factions rather than the contradiction between the semi-democratic parliamentary system established by the Addis Ababa Agreement and the presidential dictatorship established by the 1973 Constitution and its amendments in 1975. In his discussion of the development issues he concentrated on the failure of economic planning rather than pursuing an interesting argument he only touched on of the change of tack from the "transformationist

perspectives of 1969-70" to "national unity and economic development" (1986, 256). This thesis has argued that without resolving the question of the transformation of the socio-economic structure inherited from the colonial period, the general crisis will continue.

In a later work, Niblock (1991), provided a more interesting theoretical question:

"to identify the nature of the Sudanese state under Nimeiri and consider whether the fall of the regime stemmed from the inherent weaknesses of this state-form, from the particular characteristics of Nimeiri's rule, or else from the wider economic and social conditions over which Nimeiri had no direct control" (Niblock, 1991, 34)

Niblock has arisen a number of theoretical and empirical problems in his study. The first was his distinction between three forms of the state that existed in the Arab countries. His first form is that of "A dominant social forces state" which "existed in the Sudan prior to 1969", his second form is that "reformist/revolutionary autonomous state" which existed in Sudan between 1969-72, while his third form is the bourgeois-bureaucratic state which prevailed from 1972 and until the fall of Nimeiri in 1985 (1991, 34-36). Two critical remarks need to be made here. One of these remarks is about the distinction between the second and the third forms in Niblock's model. While the distinction according to policies and ideologies could be understood, the question is whether there is really a distinction in term of the class in power. This thesis has argued that there is no distinction, it is the same new-petty bourgeoisie, albeit different fractions of the same class. Even the fractions are distinguished according to their political stands and alliance with other classes. It is argued in the previous section that the new petty bourgeoisie could be won or lost by the working class in the concrete class struggle and in its political manifestation in particular. The tension among the urban democratic forces, the split in the communist party and the tension between the main stream in the party and the May regime which developed into open confrontation after the palace coup of November the 16th 1970 and reached its climax in the 19th of July 1971 Coup and the 22nd of July bloody counter coup, could only be understood within the context of a conflict on the conditions of the alliance and the failure to establish an alliance with the working class, the left fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which allied itself with the communist party and the international allies of these groups, the countries of the Eastern bloc. That failure, whatever the bloody shape it took, did not mean that one side of the conflict had changed its class origin. It is argued in this Chapter that power continued within the new petty bourgeoisie, though under new constitutional arrangements. That fraction also failed in establishing an alternative alliance for the same reasons: the conditions of the political alliance and this was reflected in the failure of the negotiations sponsored by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia between Nimeiri and Sheriff al Hindie in Jeddah in 1972 (See Khalid,

1984, 172-3 and 1993,555-6)⁵. No genuine attempt to build a new internal political alliance was made until 1978 except with the Southern fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie. In March 1972 the fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie in power, which was Northern Sudanese of Arabic Islamic origin won a hegemonic fraction of the Southern new petty bourgeoisie through what was known as Addis Ababa Agreement, but the power of the state remained firmly within the Northern fraction. Another success was the international and regional alliance the regime was able to make. But even here and because of the lack of internal base the regime was a weak partner, a dependent one, which reminiscent of Alavi's discussion of the post-colonial state (Alavi, 1972).

A further criticism of Niblock's works is to his use of the concepts of bourgeois-bureaucratic state and the state bourgeoisie. He wrote:

"The term 'state bourgeoisie becomes appropriate in this state-form by virtue of the personal involvement of state bureaucrats in the private sector where as direct investors, or through support for business run by family members, or through contacts which envisage the bureaucrat ultimately leaving the public for the private sector (where his or her knowledge of government personnel and procedures will duly be utilised)" (1991, 35-6).

If one adopts such a reasoning then there is no need for concepts like corruption, nepotism or clientelism, for all of them will be descriptions of a state bourgeoisie. Further more one should classify private sector employees according to whether they held a government job before or not, for those who were ex-employees of the government are state bourgeoisie! A more challenging argument is whether under Niblock's first state-form which existed in the Sudan before 1969 the three practises mentioned above were carried out or not and if they were carried, as real life in Sudan showed, would the bureaucrats be defined as a state bourgeoisie?

Despite of these critical remarks, Niblock suggested three possible types of explanation of the crisis of the state were very enlightening. He argued:

- 1) "the bourgeois-bureaucratic state is inherently unstable, possessing dynamics which lead to its own destruction.
- 2) "a narrowly based, ineffective and/or corrupt political leadership exacerbated the inherently unstable dynamics of the bourgeois-bureaucratic state
- 3) "factors in the international environment, interacting with Sudan's domestic environment, rendered the bourgeois-bureaucratic state's dynamics particularly destructive" (Ibid, 40-41)

The three types are not exclusive, but they lack one important element: the response of other classes. In the former element one can find the difference between the Sudan and other Arab (and African) countries: the existence of an independent political movement which rejects the authoritarian form of state (despite the fact that some fractions of the movement wanted to build their own authoritarian state).

⁵Khalid was a witness to that meeting.

Another attempt to explain the crisis in the Sudan from a political economy stand point was Jay O'Brien (1986, 193-200) who argued that an agrarian fraction of the Sudanese bourgeoisie adopted a policy of expanding mechanised agricultural food production oriented towards the internal market. This expansion, according to O'Brien, ignored that the economy depended on export revenue to import inputs, equipments and other consumer goods and to pay its debts. The negligence of the export-sector and concentration of resources on the expansion of the food production for the internal market is hence led to the crisis. "However," wrote O'Brien, " the hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie took no significant steps to resolve the contradiction of the switch to a pattern of internally oriented growth from a structure of acute export dependency." (Ibid, 195). He suggested that the reason behind the crisis was

" Pursuit of capitalist growth led by expansion of food production for internal market without any solution to the problem of export dependency to finance the imports involved thus paved the way for a crisis of massive proportions,.. " (1986, 195)

Despite the apparent consistency of O'Brien's argument, his analysis suffered from many shortcomings. The first is his basic proposition about the hegemony of the agrarian bourgeoisie. The agrarian fraction of the Sudanese class played a great role in the Sudanese politics and economy, yet it was never able to establish its hegemony (at least in the sense hegemony is defined in Chapter 1 in this thesis). This thesis has argued (Chapter 3) that no class or a fraction of class was able to establish its hegemony and that was the main reason behind instability of the state in the Sudan. O'Brien took the launch of mechanised agriculture as a proof of the interest of the assumed hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie of "expansion of food production for the internal market" at "the expense of the government-operated export (cotton) sector", which was simply untrue. The Sudan foreign reserves inherited from the colonial state were spent mostly in the expansion of irrigated agriculture. Abdel Rahim Mirghani, an authority in Sudanese economic development and planning until 1969,⁶ wrote about that period,

"During this period increasing emphasis was laid on productive schemes in order to raise the output and income of the country as quickly as possible. For example, expenditure on productive schemes increased from 16.8% in the 1951/56 development budget to 55% in the 1957/58 budget, 45.9% in the 1959/60 budget and to 65.2% in the 1960/61 budget. These increases *reflect the high priority given to cotton, the country's major cash crop and the source of a substantial part of government revenue* {emphasis added}" (Mirghani, 1983, 10)

The Managil project which added 800,000 *feddans* to the Gezira area was implemented between 1957/58 and 1961/62 and cost about LS 30.5 millions. The irrigated area under cotton increased from 245000 *feddans* in 1948/49 to 643769 *feddans* in 1960/61. The

⁶Abdel Rahim Mirghani was Director-General of Planning in the Sudan in the early sixties, he became the Under-Secretary of the Department of Economic Planning in the Ministry of Finance and Economics, when it was established in 1963. In 1967 he became Governor of the Bank of Sudan.

period of the Ten Years 1961/62-1970/71 were the years of constructing the Damazine Dam, Khasham el Girba Dam and the Khasham El Girba agricultural scheme where cotton was also a dominant crop. The Nimeiri period was not an exception with projects like Sukki, Rahad and later the rehabilitation of all the irrigated schemes. Almost all the effort in the agricultural research was directed towards the improvement of cotton production. On the other hand the mechanised rain-fed agriculture passed through four development stages under different regimes. The first phase during the colonial period 1944/45- 1953/54 was mainly a period of experimentation in both cultivation methods and farm organisation. The second period began by the acceptance of the Working Party Report of 1954, (Sudan Government, 1954)⁷, which advised leaving investment in mechanised agriculture to the private sector. All investment during the period 1955-1968 was mainly financed by private savings and commercial banks finance. The Agricultural Bank began its involvement into mechanised agriculture soon after its establishment in 1959 when the mechanised farms faced its first crisis of declining prices because of over-production⁸. The government instructed the Agricultural Bank to interfere and bale the scheme owners by issuing credit on *dura* (sorghum) delivery to the Bank's stores. In 1960, the Bank again interfered to issue credit for the purchase of machinery which the machines dealers refused to sell to scheme owners on credit terms because of the "unacceptable number of defaulters" (Simpson and Simpson, 1978, 12). Concentration on *dura*, (sorghum), production was not planned by the "hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie" as argued by O'Brien, but rather a result of the failure of producing two cash crops: sesame for exports and short-staple cotton⁹ for local industry (Sudan Government, 1962, 89-90). The third period (1968-1978) was different because it was characterised by government establishment, on the recommendation of IBRD, of the Mechanised Farming Corporation (MFC). This was the period when the government established its state farms in Simsim, Agadi, Habilla, Nertiti, and Um Ajaj. It was the period when private sector benefitted from the easy loan provided by the International Development Association (IDA), a member of the World Bank. It is questionable whether this was the period of the hegemony of agrarian bourgeoisie or "the import-export oriented commercial bourgeoisie, which captured the state by 1972", as O'Brien suggested (O'Brien, 1986, 199); or "the

⁷Known as the 'Butting Report', after its author the head of the working party Mr Butting.

⁸By December 1959 there were over one million *feddans* cultivated by *Dura* and the prices decreased to the extent that scheme owners declined to harvest their crop. (Simpson and Simpson, 1978, 12)

⁹Though cotton cultivation failed in the Gedaref area because it was found to be labour intensive, in Habilla it was continued to be cultivated in the State farm until my last research field work in 1976. In 1976/77 a total of 27 thousand *feddans* were still under cotton representing only 1% of the total area of mechanised farms, while that under sesame was 564 thousands, about 16% of the total area.

bourgeois-bureaucratic state" (Niblock, 1991, 36), because the state was fairly dominated by the new-petty bourgeoisie as it would be argued in this Chapter. For the state to be dominated by one or another fraction of a class, or by the whole class, is one thing and for that fraction or class to establish its hegemony is another, completely different thing.

Another point which needs to be clarified is the question of the "bread-basket strategy". O'Brien wrote :

"Foreign Arab capital began, following the October War of 1973, to promote Sudan as the potential 'bread-basket' of the Arab world. Arab oil exporters agreed to guarantee Sudan's mounting debts provide short-term balance-of-payments support and development aid in return for Sudan's *acceptance of the stringent terms of the IMF stabilisation plan and Arab access to Sudan's agricultural resources for direct private investment (emphasis added).*" (1986, 198).

It is important to point out the misleading connection between the flow of foreign capital, bread-basket, IMF and private investment. The connection made between the flow of Arab capital between 1973 and 1978 and the bread-basket strategy is simply not true. The former whether private or public flow of capital was not initiated by the bread-basket strategy and most of it was not invested in agriculture in general or food production in particular. Between 1971 and 1978, the government of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Fund presented ten loans to the Sudan Government of a total value of 81.3 million Dinar (equivalent to 101.5 million Sudanese pounds at the time). Only three of these loans were directed to agriculture, the largest (14.5 million Dinars) to finance al-Rahad scheme which concentrates in cotton production, the second was to finance the Sudan purchase of Kuwaiti produced fertilizers while the third was to finance the state farms in the mechanised agriculture and was the smallest of the three (1.6 million Dinars). On the other hand the Kuwait and Sudan formed a joint-venture called 'the Sudan Kuwaiti Investment Company' in 1973/74 with an issued capital of one million Sudanese pounds (equal to \$2.8 million at that time), with the Government of the Sudan holding 44%, the Kuwaiti Foreign Trade, Contracting and investment Company, (a Kuwaiti government owned company), holding 49% and Sudanese private sector investors holding the balance of 7% of the shares. Of the subsidiaries established by the company only one was to invest on the agricultural sector that was the Sudanese Kuwaiti Animal Production Company (SKAPC) with a capital of LS 3.2 million which was later doubled to LS 7 million. The SKAPC did not begin production until 1985. Other subsidiaries included Sudanese Kuwaiti Road Transportation and the Sudanese Kuwaiti Building and Construction Company. One can conclude that the Kuwaiti capital in the Sudan had nothing to do with the bread basket strategy. In reality the same could be said about the Saudi official loans to the Sudan. Between 1975 and 1978 the Saudi Government and the Saudi Development Fund provided the Sudan with eight loans for the investment in different sectors, five of them went to transport, one to education and only two to

agriculture including one to the Rahad project which mostly a cotton production scheme, and the second to the Savanna Development Project dealing with small farmers in Western Sudan. Abu Dhabi aid was not an exception. Six loans were made available to the Sudan by the government of Abu Dhabi and Abu Dhabi Fund between 1971 and 1980. Of these three were in cash to support the balance of payment and one to finance a textile factory, one for rural water supply and the three others for transport sector including one for railways, one for a highway and a third for improving Khartoum airport. Arab capital flow to the Sudan between 1973 -77, except for the contribution in the capital of the Arab Authority for Agriculture Investment and Development (AAAID) which was established by a decision of an Arab Summit of Head of States in Rabat in April 1976, had nothing to do with the bread-basket strategy. Arab capital flow was initiated by political and profit-making motives. The first governed the government aid while the second governed the joint ventures. Sudan between 1973-76 was implementing its Interim Action Programme which amended the Five Years plan for 1970/71-74/75 and extended it to 1976/77. The main target of the programme was self-sufficiency in food items like sugar, rice and wheat, in some other commodities like textile and the improvement of transport and communication and the increase of Sudan traditional exports: cotton, groundnuts and sesame.

The story of the bread-basket strategy was different. The discussion about the bread-basket strategy began in 1974, when the FAO began speaking about a World's food crisis. Sudan was then sighted as one of the few countries which had un-exploited agricultural resources. Mohamed Hashim Awad, then the Convener of the Secretariat for Development and Services in the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), provoked the idea of the "World Granary for the future" by writing a number of articles in local, regional and international newspapers and Magazines (ie the Sudanese daily Al Sahafa, May 1974, African Development, January, 1975). Following the World Food Conference in November 1974, an international symposium organised by the Sudan in February 1975 discussed the possibilities of the Sudan becoming the 'World Granary'. The idea was then circulated among Arab parliamentarians in their meeting in Khartoum in March 1975 and the Arab economists in Baghdad in May 1975. By the time the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development had submitted to the government of the Sudan the study of agricultural resources in the country and suggesting the "Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in the Democratic republic of the Sudan 1976-85". The Ministry of Planning in the Sudan included the first phase of the programme in the "Six Years Plan for Economic and Social Development 1977/78-1982/83". That plan was never implemented because the Sudan in 1978 accepted the IMF stabilisation programmes which called for seizing new investment, abandoning the plan and implementing a rolling three years programmes which were mainly concerned with the rehabilitation of the

existing industrial and agricultural schemes. It is not only that the flow of Arab capital before 1977 had nothing to do with the bread-basket strategy but that the IMF in reality halted the implementation of that strategy. Osterdiekhoff and Volmuth rightly noticed that :

"The most important outcome of the IMF supported "reform" programme is the implicit rejection of the basic priorities of the bread-basket strategy. The new programme favours the promotion of the traditional export cash crops of the country (first long staple cotton and traditional sector groundnuts; second medium staple cotton and irrigated grown groundnuts). This reorientation should be at the expense of those products which were central at the breadbasket strategy (grains like wheat and sorghum, sugar and rice)" (Osterdiekhoff and Volmuth, 1983, 57).

The *Middle East Economic Digest* reported shortly after the beginning of the implementation of the IMF supported policies,

" talk about Sudan being the bread-basket for its oil-rich but food starved Arab neighbours has been muted since the IMF imposed tight financial restrictions on the Government's development programme as a condition for its SDR 200m (\$256.8m) credit in May [1979]"

Thus O'Brien was right in arguing that there was a change of policy which undermined food production, but that change of policy also undermined the bread-basket strategy which was consistent in raising food production for self-sufficiency and export at the same time. The only element of that strategy which continued was the establishment of the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAID) which decided to begin its activities by Sudan and concluded an agreement to that effect with the Sudan Government in January 1977¹⁰. Yet the AAID became involved in the IMF-World Bank suggested policy of rehabilitation of the existing schemes as well as implementing few and limited new schemes which are allowed by the new investment policy adopted after the abortion of the Six Years Plan that included the new projects of the bread basket strategy in 1978.

It is true as O'Brien mentioned that Arab capital played role in Sudan's acceptance of IMF conditionality in 1978; but the flow of Arab capital until 1978 played great role in strengthening Sudan position in negotiation with the IMF before that year. Mansour Khalid wrote:

"By mid-1978 Saudi Arabia, not without reason, decided that budget support to the Sudan would only be made on the basis of a certificate of good health from the IMF." (Khalid, 1986, 137).

The reasons for this change of heart were concerning the dissatisfaction of the Saudi officials about the management of their financial and commodity assistance (Ibid, 137) and effort made by the IMF to stop the Arab capital flow to the Sudan to accept their

¹⁰The writer who was at the time working in the Ministry of planning, wrote the minutes of the meeting of the Ministers of Finance who reached the agreement and attended all the technical meetings which prepared it.

conditionality¹¹. However, it is important to emphasize here that before 1978 the flow of Arab capital into the Sudan played the opposite role. Salih wrote:

"For three years -1974 to 1977 - the economy was shielded from bearing the full brunt of the balance of payments deficit through a sizable inflow of foreign loans (and grants) coming principally (80 per cent) from the oil-rich Arab countries' (1984, 94)

5.3. The Nature of the State

The state in the Sudan between 1973 and 1985 resembled what Alavi identified as the "bureaucratic military oligarchy" which 'mediate{d}'{the} competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands" of "the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan neo-bourgeoisie and the landed classes" (Alavi, 1972, 59). The main difference was the absence in the Sudanese case of "landed classes" and the addition of the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia) to the neo-colonial bourgeoisie (as their allied forces, if not their satellites). The political power in the Sudan for the 1973-85 period was controlled by a military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie, which tended to mediate the interests of the national and international capital. The tendency to mediate started as a result of both the political events that took place between 1969 and 1971 and the group of technocrats and professionals who dominated the government in the post 1971 coup. The political events of 1969-71 led to a failure of the project of the alliance between the military and the organised democratic movement which was dominated by the SCP¹². The expression of this failure was the coup d'etat of July 19, 1971 and the counter coup of July 22, 1971 which reinstated Nimeiri to the power. The bloody events which included the massacre in the Guests House on the 22nd of July and the execution of the leaders of the coup and the SCP in the week that followed marked a dramatic end to any possibility of reviving the project. The dissolution of the Revolutionary Command Council and the dismissal or resignation of its members¹³ from the government and the political institutions of the regime, isolated from power and decision-making centres those who

¹¹An official in the Sudan Government who attended negotiation between the then Minister of Finance Mamoun Behiri and Abdul Shakour Shalan, the IMF representative for the Middle East, told the author that Mr. Behiri said to Shalan "I can obtain three time the money you are offering by telephoning the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and he will not ask for the devaluation of Sudanese currency". The Minister was sacked after this discussion and all the Gulf governments and the Arab Funds made the condition that the Sudan should reach an agreement with the IMF before being legible to any financial assistance from them.

¹²The difference that led to the failure in the project are discussed in Chapter 3.

¹³This started by the resignation of Mj. General Khalid Hassan Abass, then Vice-President and Minister of Defence in February 1972, followed by Babiker Awadalla, the First Vice President in May 1972. On May 29, 1972 the removal of Major Ma'mon Awad Abu Zaid, then Secretary-General of the SSU was announced, though rumours about his resignation were circulated since February. In November 1972 Major Zein al-Abdin Mohamed Ahmed, then Secretary of the Public Services in the SSU, resigned. By then only President Nimeiri and Major Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim of the dissolved RCC remained in the Government.

could be motivated by their political orientation to revive the project or to attempt a national Nasserist model. Meanwhile, the technocrat who were promoted to the decision-making in the SSU and the Council of Ministers advocated new policies of a trilateral partnership between European technology, Arab oil money and Sudanese natural and human resources. Mansour Khalid, then Foreign Minister, explicitly stated the policy, "We envisage as our ultimate aim a partnership between Europe with her technology and skills, the Arab with their oil wealth and Africa {Sudan} with her great untapped natural resources" (Africa, February, 1974, 61). Musa Awad Billal, then Minister of Industry and Mining was more articulate when he said to the same magazine " My vision is that of European technology being combined with Arab oil money to develop the Sudan" (Africa, September 1974, 61). It was not an accident that the two Sudanese officials were repeating Tony Roland's¹⁴ view expressed to African Development, "in the future, I see a partnership between Western technology, Arab oil money and African resources" (African Development, June 1973, 7).

The tendency to mediate between foreign capital and Sudanese private sector was reflected in the economic and financial policies of the Sudanese state in the period under consideration. This will be discussed in the following section 5.4.

Though, as argued in Chapter 3, the Northern military fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie was able to strike a deal with the Southern fraction in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1973, the political power at the centre continued to be based firmly with the hands of the Northern fraction. With the concentration of power was the concentration of economic resources and investment decision.

The state thus continued to express the domination of a fraction of the military-bureaucrats and professionals of Arab-Islamic origin. Even within the military -bureaucrats- professionals groups the ruling group was not able to rally the majority, not only by failing to intellectually win them, but also by the failure to represent their interests. This was expressed by the fact that most of the trade unions of the professionals, technicians and government employees remained in the hands of the regime opponents whether members of the opposition political parties or independent individuals. That was reflected in the strikes and trade union disputes enlisted in Chapter 4 above and in the leading role played by these trade unions in the overthrow of the regime in March-April 1985. The regime support within the army was not as strong enough to prevent the occurrence or discovery of coup plots (12 May 1974, 7 October 1974, 19 May 1975, 5 September 1975, 2 July 1976, 2 February 1978) or the regime dismissing or sending on compulsory retirement some of the leading officers of the armed forces (dismissal of 17

¹⁴Tony Roland, a managing director of Lonrho, played significant role in the counter coup that reinstate Nimeiri in July 22, 1971 according to Cronje et al(1976)

leading officers in February 1979, the dismissal of another 22 leading officers including the First Vice-President and Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff and his deputies in January 1982).

5.3.1. The Relative Autonomy of The State

During the period 1973-85 the state was characterised by being an authoritarian state which maintained its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the indigenous classes and social forces.

The elements of discontinuity were reflected in changes in policies, slogans, and the social groups the regime had used or approached to co-opt or incorporate in its quest or claim to establish its legitimacy. They were reflected in what appeared to be three different sub-periods of the regime: 1973-77, 1978-83 and 1983-85. In the first period the regime depended on the moderate professionals and bureaucrats in establishing the state political and executive institutions and negotiating peace in the South and establishing new foreign relations with the Gulf and Western countries. The second period was characterised by the National Reconciliation and the attempt to co-opt the leaders of the parties of the National Front. The regime recognising its narrow social base and deteriorating legitimacy was compelled to accept the Saudi second proposal for a national reconciliation with the traditional opposition parties. The elements of discontinuity were in reality a direct result of the attempts of the regime to claim or renew its legitimacy as its previous claim eroded or new challenges rose. These elements of discontinuity remained temporary features of the regime. Yet, it was the relative autonomy that was based on an authoritarian state which prevented the necessary changes in the state, and especially in the political power structure, which were required if the composition of the state and its political institutions were to express the changes in the class structure and social forces which were instigated and brought by the policies of the same regime. One example was very striking.

The National Reconciliations of 1977/78 was a result of the regime's awareness of its weakness after the July 1976 military insurrection attempt by the National Front. Both the Port-Sudan Agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in July 1977 and the London Agreement between Sheriff el Hindi and a Sudanese Government delegation in April 1978 demanded some changes in the political institutions including the SSU. These changes never materialised. What appeared as an attempt by the regime to widen its social base was in fact a delaying tactic by Nimeiri to gain time. The apparent attempt to establish a new alliance, materialised in reality as an attempt to incorporate and co-opt new forces without representing them or giving them any political power. Even those who were appointed to the high leading posts in the SSU and the government became mere tools of Nimeiri because as a President, Chairman of the SSU, the Supreme Commandant of the Peoples Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Supreme Judiciary Council was able to

remove them, over-rule their decisions and even detain them. The latter was what happened to the leadership of the Muslim Brothers in 1985. They were holding prestigious posts in the political and executive institutions of the regime¹⁵ when they were detained by the security and distributed to Port-Sudan, Kober and Shalla prisons.

5.3.2. The Foreign Dimension

Although during this period 1973-85, the state was relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the indigenous classes, it lost its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the foreign forces. After 1973 the influence of the foreign forces increased as the political and economic crises in the Sudan deepened and the economic and financial dependency of the state and the country on foreign aid and borrowing increased. The United States, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states as well as other Western countries became the most important sources of finance and trade partners of the Sudan. The influence of these countries, especially the USA and Saudi Arabia, affected the Sudanese state policies both in economic and political areas. In addition, the economic decisions after 1978 became more influenced by and dependent on the sanctions of the international financial institutions and the Paris Club. The policies of US and Saudi Arabia were not always identical towards the Sudan, though their strategic concern about the Sudan was a common one: the security of the region¹⁶. The cold war gave the security of the region an anti-communist dimension. Almost the role of undertaking the "control of the anti-communist offensive towards Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti" was assigned to the Saudi Arabia which

"has acquired a direct hold on forces in these countries that the USA could never match, because it would be more visible. There are also no pressmen and Congressmen in Saudi Arabia, demanding to know how state money was spent" (Halliday, 1977, 23).

Within this context the following subsection will review the US-Saudi-Egyptian relations with the Sudan.

5.3.2.1. Saudi Arabia and the Sudan

Saudi Arabia played significant role in the politics and economics of the Sudan after the failure of the 1971 coup of Hashim al-Atta¹⁷. Soon after the defeat of the coup and the return of Nimeiri the Saudi King sent his congratulations to Nimeiri. Nimeiri visited Saudi Arabia in November 1971 for the first time. Following his second visit in November 1972, Saudi Arabia provided the Sudan with \$200 million loan and concluded a number

¹⁵The list of detainees included Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the Advisor of the President for Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Abd al-Rahman, member of the SSU political bureau and ex-minister of Interior, al-Mukashfi Taha al-Kabashi, the president of the Appeal Court, and Mohamed Adam Eisa, a State-Minister in the Attorney General Chambers (ACR, 1984/85, B82).

¹⁶The author found himself in complete agreement with Halliday (1977), "The two parties have independent but converging approaches" (halliday, 1977, 24)

¹⁷Sudan had accused Saudi Arabia and King Faisal of "complicity in the Mahdist plot which led to the confrontation at Aba Island." (ACR, 1971, B52)

of agreements concerning the financing of joint projects. In 1974 the Saudi Arabian Development Agency agreed to guarantee a \$200 million loan¹⁸ to be raised in the international money market. In January 1976 Nimeiri carried his third visit to Saudi Arabia and concluded an agreement to establish a joint authority to explore and exploit the mineral resources in the Red Sea. In December 1977 Saudi Arabia agreed to finance Sudanese purchase of 12 Northrop F-5 fighters and six Lockheed C-130 at a cost of \$74 million. This was followed in February 1979 by financing more military equipment from the US composed of 50M-60 tanks and 100 armoured personnel carriers. Table 16 shows the importance of financial and economic assistance provided by Saudi Arabia to the Sudan until 1985.

Table 16. Saudi Loans and Financial Assistance to the Sudan As of December 1985

Project or Loan	Value (millions)	interest rate
Rahad Project	Riyal 98.00	3%
Port Sudan Airport	Riyal 35.30	2%
Kassala Haya Road	Riyal 91.78	2%
Western Savanna Development	Riyal 30.00	2%
Microwave (Domestic Satalite)	Riyal 35.30	2%
Telecommunication Project	Riyal 24.70	25
Education Equipment	Riyal 12.30	2%
Nyala Kass Zalingi Road	Riyal 123.60	2%
Rahad Interior Roads	Riyal 20.10	2%
Kenana Sugar Factory	Riyal 20.20	2%
Gezira Rehabilitation	Riyal 56.80	2%
Balance of Payments	\$ 50.00	2%
Saudi Monetary Agency (loan)	\$ 200.00	5%
Saudi Monetary Agency (loan)	\$ 400.00	5%
Saudi Monetary Agency (loan)	\$ 50.00	5%

Source: Bank of Sudan (1985), *Twenty Sixth Annual Report, Khartoum.*

On the political side Saudi Arabia affected both the internal and foreign politics of the post 1971 state in the Sudan. Saudi Arabia tried to achieve an internal strong coalition after the defeat of the July 1971 coup attempt which was closely linked with the SCP. King Faisal brought Nimeiri and Sheriff al-Hindie, the leader of the opposition National Front to the negotiating table in 1973. By that time Nimeiri felt that he was mastering position. He had had success in dismantling the urban democratic movement by detaining most of the cadres of the SCP, dissolving the SWUFT and reorganising it according to new laws, (see below), on one hand, and he had brought to an end the civil war in the South. The failure of the negotiations drifted al Hindie towards the more radical states of Libya and Iraq, while Nimeiri became the ally of the Saudi Arabia Egypt and the Gulf states, and the West. In 1976, after the armed military-civilian attempt to overthrow the regime in July the second, the Saudi pressed again for the conciliation between Nimeiri and the National Front (this time through negotiations with Sadiq al-Mahdi). By 1976

¹⁸This was the loan which involved later Triad and Adnan Khashogi and began the accusation of corruption against Nimeiri's Minister for Special Affairs (see Chapter 4 above).

assistance was greater than 1973. In May 1977 President Nimeiri announced that he decided "in response to the *efforts and good offices of friendly governments and individuals* to welcome all those who have been misled into committing crimes against their country" (*al-Sahafa*, 26 May 1977).

The Saudis pressed for Islamic laws in the Sudan. In 1975, *toto Kora*, (the lottery run by the government to finance sport and youth activities) was closed. The same year the President issued directives for government leading officials to restrain from drinking alcohol or resign. In both cases general opinion in the Sudan claimed the Saudi were behind the actions (ACR, 1976/77, B117). After the National Reconciliation, the Saudi played their greatest role in influencing the future political development in the country by contributing to the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan.

The relation between the Saudi and the Moslem Brotherhood Movement in the Sudan began after the October Revolution, when the Saudi adopted to assist the Sudanese Islamic movement through the Patriotic Youth Union¹⁹. The organisation kept close relations with Prince Mohamed al-Faisal and King Faisal attended one of its festivals. (El Effendi, 1991, 98). The relation between the Muslim Brothers and the Saudi continued after the May Coup through Ali Abdalla Yagoub, the President of PYO, who became an employee of Prince Mohamed -Faisal al-Faysal-Faisal. Just before the National Reconciliation Prince Mohamed al-Faysal got a licence to establish the Faisal Islamic Bank in the Sudan. As a main shareholder, he brought the Sudanese Muslim Brothers, as shareholders and as management and employees (el-Effendi, 1991, 116) Though the Sudanese Muslim Brothers' share in the Islamic Banks was not influential, their "power comes from being able to influence loans and other advances to customers who could be supporter" (Ibid, 117)

For Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan that "was an era of Islamic economic activity, which began before the [National] Reconciliation, and continued after that. It became one of the institutionalised achievements of the Islamic Movement" (El-Turabi, 1992, 37). The Islamic Banks provided "financing facilities for those committed to the rules of Islam...enabled them to compete and gain profits... which increased the donations {to the movement greatly" (Ibid, 88).

Yet the significance of the Islamic financial institutions, according to El-Effendi, was that

¹⁹El -Affendi, a Sudanese Islamic Fundamentalist defined PYO as one of the "sattelite orgainsation " which was "broadly anti-communist, supported by both Umma and NUP" (1991,.98)

"they opened up *avenues of economic mobility for many who would otherwise have been at most high civil servants* [italics added]. In this sense the significance of the *Ikhwan* [Muslim Brothers] movement is that it represents one important avenues of social, economic and political mobility on merit for young people who would have otherwise lacked the necessary connection" (El-Effendi, 1991, 119)

The effect of Saudi capital which established Islamic financial institutions in the Sudan was the transformation of the Muslim Brothers Movement from a small movement of young professionals and students to a movement of a new capitalist class of merchants and financial dealers which attracted through financing a group of craftsmen and owners of small workshops.

5.3.2.2. The US Connection

The diplomatic relations between the USA and the Sudan were broken when Nimeiri took power in 1969. They had been broken since the June 1967 War in the Middle East. The relations were restored in July 1972 making the Sudan the first country of the members of the Arab League to do so. While the relations were in the process of takeover²⁰, the assassination of the American Ambassador Cleo and his aide George Moore the Palestinian Black September Organisation in March 1973 brought a halt to any development. A major set back took place when the Sudan accepted to transfer the convicted assassins to a PLO Prison to serve their sentences. For the USA government that was equal to their release, so the American Ambassador was recalled to Washington in protest in June 1974. The USA-Sudan relations kept low profound until the first visit of President Nimeiri to the US in June 1976. Despite the interest shown by the private American companies to invest in the Sudan after the visit, the official USA response was delayed. The most significant sign of change of attitude was shown in November 1976 when President Ford decided that the Sudan became eligible for the purchase of American military equipment, the Washington Post wrote

"President Ford has taken another significant step to deepen US involvement in Africa by formally declaring that Sudan, the largest country on the continent, is eligible for the purchase of American military equipment... his declaration ... is a major move in US efforts to encourage Sudan to play a role as a buffer state to more radical Arab and African states adjoining it.[emphasis added]" (Washington Post, 17 November 1976).

Between 1976 and 1980 the USAID was involved in more than 25 projects in the Sudan which included projects in agricultural, health and education sectors. The Sudan returned to benefit from the programme of PL 480 by buying American wheat and rice and paying in local currency. Yet the most important assistance provided by the US, was its

²⁰According to Saeed (1984), an official USA embassy report written in December 1972 favoured expanding economic relations with the Sudan a conference on the trade development between the two countries was held in March 1973 in which "the Department of State expressed its support of the Sudan's undertaking and noted that the US was encouraging the expansion of trade and development there" (Saeed, 1984, 157)

interference to influence the IMF policies towards the Sudan (Brown, 1985, 1988 and 1989).

The US change of heart was governed by political consideration of the situation in the region (both the Middle East and Africa and in particular the Red Sea region). The first of these were the problems in Chad, the west neighbour of the Sudan, and the involvement of the Libyan government in these problems. The second was the fall of the old friend and ally of the US, Emperor Hile Selassie, and the rise of a left military government (the Dergue) led by Mengistu Hailla Mariam in his place²¹. The third was the alliance made by the left government in the Southern Yemen with Ethiopia and Libya and the involvement of the Soviet Union in supplying military equipments to them and the presence of Cuban soldiers in Ethiopia. This development put the southern entrance of the Red Sea, *Bab al-Mandeb* under the influence of anti-American powers. The fourth consideration was the isolation imposed on Egypt by the Arab countries because of its peaceful settlement with Israel in Camp David in March 1979 (Ismael and Ismael, 1991,347-8). The Sudanese support to Egypt was needed both for security and political reasons.

As Sudan's strategic position for the security of the region increased, US developed economic interests in the Sudan. Chevron Oil company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), discovered oil in Southern and Western Sudan. Starting its operations in Sudan in 1976, and drilling its first well in 1979, by July 1985 Chevron has drilled about 88 wells. Chevron was estimated to have spent \$500, 000 daily in oil exploration in the Sudan.

Sudanese security itself had worsened because of internal and external threats. The immediate external threat came from Libya which hosted the Sudanese National Front and was resulted in practise in the July 1976 insurrection. Ethiopia became another threat as the war in Eritrea intensified. President Nimeiri denounced the Ethiopian regime openly and accused it of interference in the Sudanese affairs in December 1976 and repeated his accusation in January 1977 (ACR,1977, B115). The Ethiopian threat increased in 1983 when Ethiopia hosted the SPLA/SPLM which started the second civil war in the Sudan in September 1983. Internally, despite the National Reconciliation the Sudanese regime became more unstable after 1978 as the economic crisis led to the implementation of the austerity measures agreed on with the IMF. The Sudan became dependent of the US and Saudi Arabia to bale her out as she was not able to meet her financial obligations towards the IMF, a necessary condition for reaching any arrangement concerning the use of the IMF facilities. Arrangement with the IMF turned to be another necessary condition to have the Sudanese debt rescheduled in the Paris Club (see below).

²¹For interesting account of the development of the relations between the USA and the Dergue between 1974 to 1977 when it turned to open hostility see Halliday (1977)

Although the US-Saudi-Sudanese relations had always an element concerning Egypt, (political pressure on Egypt before 1973, security of Egypt and Egypt as partner in the security of the region after 1973), the Sudanese Egyptian relations have always their own dynamics. Egypt quest for political influence in the Sudan is historically governed by three main concerns: its own security, the Nile waters, the possibilities of economic benefits that arises from the Sudan as a market and as a potential area for investment.

5.3.2.3. Special Relation with Egypt

The Sudanese Egyptian relation suffered a temporary set-back in 1972, when Nimeiri, after the Addis Ababa Agreement, retreated from the plans to join the Federation of Arab Union with Egypt, Libya and Syria. The Sudan restoration of diplomatic relations with the USA in July 1972 and the prevention of Libya from fly military assistance to General Amin in Uganda in September 1972, increased the tension in the relations between the two countries. The Sudan insisted on maintaining its relations with Egypt. The Sudanese Foreign Minister told the press in January 1973,

"Sudanese Egyptian relations ... stem from a common heritage and common destiny which is far larger than any one incident or any one man. Certain instances of misunderstanding and misinterpretation that have occurred last year [1972] have not distressed us... Intense diplomatic activity was generated between Cairo and Khartoum; exchange visits and contacts between the Socialist Unions in both countries, as well as consultations at higher levels, have augured well and ushered an era of vast and genuine co-operation, be that in the fields of irrigation, agriculture or communications...*Any system that fails to appreciate, exploit and expand areas of mutual co-operation cannot be useful It goes without saying that a Sudanese, who fails to review these areas of common endeavour within the context of Sudanese interest is not worthy of representing his country. Nor is an Egyptian who is not mindful of his country's best interest worthy of representing*" (ACR, 19773/74, B 107).

In April 1973, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union sent a high delegation to Khartoum. In May, the same year, President Sadat and Nimeiri discussed the mutual relation in Addis Ababa, during their attendance the African Summit. In June the SSU sent a delegation to Cairo. The major breakthrough in the relation between the two countries was the signing of the *Programme of Political Action and Economic Integration* in February 1974 in Alexandria. The joint High Ministerial Committee which was formed accordingly met in August 1974 to draw the outlines of the Programme. The Committee decided to form six technical committees dealing with different aspects of the Programme. The most important item in the Programme was the implementation of Jonglei Canal in accordance with the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between the two countries. The Jonglei project provoked a lot of discussions and immediate students demonstrations in the South. (see Chapter 4 above).

Following the July 2, 1976 military insurrection in the Sudan and the deterioration of relations with Ethiopia in 1976, the Sudan and Egypt signed a Joint Defence Agreement

on 20th of July 1976²². The Agreement provided that signatories would consider any attack on one side as an attack on the other.

The Egyptian Sudanese relation became a problem for the Sudanese regime after President Sadat visit to Israel in November 1977 and the Camp David Agreement in March 1979. The internal effect was its obstruction to the National Reconciliation efforts because Sadiq al-Mahdi denounced Sadat's visit and Camp David Agreement. In foreign relations Sudan was left with the difficult option of choosing between close relations with Egypt or the rest of the Arab countries. Sudan chose to continue its relations with Egypt despite a tactical withdrawal of Sudanese ambassador from Cairo. There was a strengthening of Sudan's relations with the US, but a worsening Sudanese relations with Gulf countries.

5.4. The Political and Legal Structure of the Authoritarian State

5.4.1. The Permanent Constitution and the Legal Frame of Authoritarianism

By 1973 both the legal and political structures of the authoritarian state were well established. The promulgation of the Permanent Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the 8th of May 1973 established the basic legal framework of the authoritarian state. The Constitution ruled that the Sudan was a single-party state. Article 4 of the Constitution stated that "The Sudanese Socialist Union is the sole political organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan" (Attorney Generals Chambers, 1973, 2).

It established a system of presidential republic where the President was "the head of state", in whom "vests the executive powers and he participates in making law" (Ibid, 15, Article 80).

The Constitution established a Peoples' Assembly which should be, "together with the President", "the legislative power" (Ibid, 2, Article 118). The Assembly "shall approve the General plan for Development, pass the general Budget and exercise supervision and control over the Executive " (Ibid).

The Constitution defined the role, powers and status of some of the already existing institutions such as the judiciary, the armed forces, the security forces and the civil service.

When discussing the political institutions established by the 1973 Permanent Constitution or codified by it, one has to look at the model theoretically to examine its consistency and to examine and evaluate its practical experience. One has to find out whether the crisis of

²²The Agreement was announced after Nimeiri and Sadat met King Khalid of Saudi Arabia in Jeddah following their joint talks in Alexandria between 13 and 17 July 1976 (ACR, 1976/77, B 116).

these institutions was built in the model or a result of a diversion from that model²³. Those who stood behind the establishment of the system (drafting the Permanent Constitution, the Local Government Act, the Basic Rules of the SSU etc) thought they had built a system of institution which would allow democratic practises (decision-making, checking and controlling of power) (see for example Khalid, 1985, Chapter 2).

Theoretically the system raised the question of whether a single-party rule could ever be democratic. The one-party system by definition was based on the restriction of the right to associations, particularly the right to establish competing parties. Such a restriction meant that those who did not agree to be members of the single-party should not participate in the political process except as voters in the plebiscite to accept or reject the nominee determined by the same single-party or in the elections for the members of the Peoples' Assembly or the People Local Councils, where the single party sanctioned the nominees. The single party owned all the newspapers while the government owned the state radio and television. The State Security Act of 1973 prevented the establishment of any political organisation, the holding of any political meetings or the printing or distribution of any political publications that oppose the government policy.

The legal frame of the authoritarian state was tightened after every show of opposition. Chapter 4 provided evidence of that. In 1973 after the popular uprising in August, the State Security Law was promulgated and the Sudan Criminal Procedure was amended to provide for preventive detention without judiciary warrant. In 1975, after the failed coup d'état of September 5, the Constitution and the State Security Act were both amended to tighten the hold of the Authoritarian state (see 4.3.1 above). Following the growing opposition at the beginning of 1980s (which almost included all the social classes and groups, see Subsection 4.3.1 above), the regime announced its Islamic Laws in September 1983 and the state of emergency and the system of Prompt Justice in April 1984.

5.4.2. The Sudanese Socialist Union

The model was based on, what was called in the SSU circles, the supremacy and governorship of the organisation.²⁴ It was simply meant that the SSU had to be the ruling party, the higher policy and decision maker. The President and all the state apparatus within the model would be the executive arm of the SSU that implement the policies and decision made by the organisation. The organisation was said to be a popular one which represented the alliance of the Peoples' working forces²⁵ who were identified as the workers, farmers, the officers and soldiers, the intellectuals and the national capitalists

²³Though the recent experience of the collapse of one-party system provides enough evidence of the failure of the model, the exercise worth doing because, for this thesis, the study of the crisis in the Sudan require doing it.

²⁴Hakimiyat al -Tanziem حاكمية التنظيم

²⁵Tahaluf Quah al-Sha'ab al-Amylah تحالف قوى الشعب العاملة

(SSU, 1972, 29). Though the organisation was built from above, in its performance it was expected to function according to the principal of 'democratic centralism' where the leadership was to be elected from the basic units through branch conferences, provincial conferences to the national conference that would elect the chairperson and the central committee. The elected Chairperson should appoint not more than 10% to be members of the Central Committee to assure the representation of the different forces of the Peoples' alliance. He should also nominate to the Central Committee a list of persons to be members of the political bureau. He had to be the nominee of the SSU to the presidency of the Republic. A plebiscite then would be held so the people should approve or disapprove the election of the sole nominee to the presidency.

The Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was built on the model of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt. President Nimeiri appointed its first preparatory committee in May 1971. In January 1972 it held its founding conference, in which it elected Nimeiri as its Chairman, adopted its organisational regulations and elected its Central Committee. The Conference also adopted a National Charter that defined the nature and objectives of the regime. The Conference adopted a new economic programme entitled 'The Interim Action Programme', according to which the Five Years Plan 1970/71-74/75, was amended and extended to 1976/77. When the first national conference was held in January 1974, the President, in his capacity as Chairman, reported the completion of building the structure of the SSU (Al Ayam, 26/1/1974). The second national conference was held in January 1977, attended by 2,004 delegates and re-elected Nimeiri as Chairman of SSU and the sole nominee for the presidency of the republic (Sudanow, March 1977, 10). The events that followed the second conference provided the most convincing evidence of that the SSU was not the policy maker in the country. They proved that the President both in his capacity as the president of the Republic and Chairman of the SSU can make decisions and undertake obligations that would change, not only the nature of the regime and the policies of the state, but also the history of the country without the mere consultation of the SSU.

Six months after the second conference, on the 12th of July 1977, the President of the Republic held a meeting in Port Sudan with one of the leaders of the opposition, Sadiq al Mahdi, to discuss a national reconciliation. As Khalid pointed out rightly that was carried behind the back of the SSU, the Council of Ministers and the National Peoples Assembly (Khalid, 1993, 546-7). The meeting itself reached an agreement which touched almost all aspects of the policies of the state including the structure of the SSU (See Appendix). Whatever the real outcome of that agreement, the mere decision to negotiate and sign it without the consultation of the SSU, was not the policy maker in the country as the regime used to declare.

Following the National Reconciliation, appointed 51 persons as members of the SSU Central Committee. The appointment of these new members showed that the SSU Basic Regulations were not binding to the President because he appointed people who were not members in the SSU in its Central Committee and that he had appointed members (51) more than the 10% that the Basic Regulations allowed him.

Although it had been imposed on the SSU, the National Reconciliation, would have provided a good opportunity to reorganise the SSU and for the SSU to reclaim its lost authority. In reality that was what the modernisers, building on the article in the agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq, proposed in a memorandum submitted by Mansour Khalid to the SSU Politburo in May 1978. The memo suggested ten recommendations concerning the democratization of the SSU by holding elections to all its posts and membership of the Central Committee and the Politburo including the election of the SSU Secretary General, who was appointed by the Chairman. It suggested that the President should act according to the decisions of the Politburo in both capacities as President of the Republic and Chairman of the Organisation. It also proposed that the specialised committees of the SSU should address themselves to the question of policy making and plans and programmes drafting. The memorandum suggested that the SSU should cut its bureaucratic apparatus and raise its own fund without depending on state finance. (Khalid, 1985, 178-9, and Khalid, 1993, 564-5). The Politburo rejected the recommendations.

In August 1979 the President himself criticized the SSU as being absent in dealing with the problems facing the people and being silent or neutral in the face of the corruption in the executive organs of the state and the problems facing some development projects (*Al-Ayam*, 7 August, 1979). He attacked the SSU, its structure and its bureaucracy. He dissolved its political bureau and Central Committee and appointed a care-taker committee to prepare for the third National Conference. Nimeiri dismissed his First Vice-President who was holding the position of Secretary-general of the SSU from both jobs. He himself took over as Secretary General. He further announced that he would organise a new plebiscite, after the Conference, in which he will seek re-election as President, though his official term would last in March 1983

The third National Conference of the SSU in 1980 was very special. It came after the President, attacked on the SSU in August 1979. The Conference in addition was the first to be held after the National Reconciliation of 1977/78. The Conference witnessed a relatively more open discussion than any of the previous two. The most significant discussion was the one on the division of Northern Sudan to regions because it showed how strong was the regional movements especially in Darfur and in the Red Sea Hills among the Beja people. The representatives of Darfur insisted on having their own region, instead of the government's proposal to a united region of Western Sudan which

would join Kordofan and Darfur (Sudanow, March, 1980, 10). The representatives of the Beja refused to be part of the Northern Region and demanded to join Kassala to form an Eastern Region (Ibid, 10). The discussion on National Reconciliation suggested that the SSU suffered a deep division between the 'old guards' and the 'new comers' and that instead of the Reconciliation being the means to resolve the political crisis, it gave new dimensions while the SSU remained as inefficient as before. The elected Politburo represented the victory of the 'old guards' with Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brothers, the only 'new comer' being elected.

The crisis of the SSU was to be the focus of the political agenda once again when the President in his speech in January 1982 before the political and military leadership dissolved the SSU. In February 1982 he appointed a Popular Committee to reorganise the SSU and in April a Preparatory Central Committee to lead the national political action until the Fourth National Conference to be convened in 1983.

The Fourth National Conference of the SSU was held in February 1983. As if the SSU used to practise any power on the executive, the President in his keynote speech to the Conference proposed that the SSU should not exercise any authority on the executive. Instead it should be indulged in policy making and programmes preparation as well as stimulating public debate and discussion on them. As usual the Conference adopted the President Programme and nominated him for a third mandate.

The aftermath of the Fourth Conference provided a new proof for the disrespect of the President for his own organisation. The President in September 1993, announced the immediate implementation of Islamic *Sharia* Law without the consultation of his organisation and against his own programme for the third mandate which was discussed and adopted by the Fourth Conference. In that programme he pointed that the Islamic transformation would be a long-term strategy and that the process of revising the existing laws would be slow and cautious and would depend on building religious consciousness by "lifting morals and social well-being" (ACR, 1983/84, B60).

When the SSU leadership appealed to its members and the population to show their support to the revolution on the second of April 1985, the turnout was incomparable with the masses who gathered to attend the opposition rally on the third of April. That was enough to "convince the military commanders that at least as far as {Nimeiri} and the SSU were concerned the Sudanese had made their feelings abundantly clear" as Woodward (1986, 63) by noted.

5.4.3. The President: From Member to Master of the Ruling Institutions

According to the Constitution, the executive powers were vested in the president. The constitution did not establish a council of ministers as an independent institution. Yet it empowered the President to appoint a Prime Minister if he wished. The President used

that power to appoint a prime minister in August 1976. The appointed Prime Minister remained in his post for 13 months only and was removed in September 1977. Except for these 13 months President Nimeiri was also the prime minister. The Constitution did not require that the President seek ratification for the appointment of his ministers or aides. Article 88 of the Constitution empowered the President to appoint any number of vice presidents and relieve them from office without any other institution like the Peoples Assembly or the SSU.

Five persons, all except one were army officers, held the position of the First Vice-President. Two of them resigned because of difference of policy (Awadalla in 1972, and Mohamed al-Bagir Ahmed in 1977), two were dismissed (Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim in 1979 and Abdel Magid Khalil in 1982), while the fifth was overthrown with Nimeiri in 1985. Four others, of whom two were Northerners and two were Southerners, held the post of Vice-President. While Khalid Hassan Abass resigned as early as 1972, Abel Alier remained Vice-President for 14 years of Nimeiri rule. Though while he was Vice-President, the First-Vice President post changed hand several times, he was never promoted to First Vice-President. The only apparent reason was that he was a Southerner. This is very significant in a country where until Nimeiri's announcement of the Sharia Law in September 1983, had a secular constitution and its citizens were supposed to be equal.

During his sixteen years in power, Nimeiri appointed about 128 Ministers to serve in the Council of Ministers Table 16 shows the previous occupations of those served as ministers between 1969-85. Almost 80% of Nimeiri's ministers came from four occupational backgrounds: 21.9% of the total were officers, 19.5% were university lecturers, 18% were civil servants, 10.2% were lawyers and 10.2% were diplomats. The technocrats (mainly engineers, agriculturists and economists) represented 8.6%.

While Nimeiri's cabinet was dominated by the left groups between 1969-71 (communists, Arab Nationalists and their allies), a transitional period, 1971-73, witnessed a council of ministers where communists who defected from SCP, Arab Nationalists and independent modernizers shared its membership. By 1973 the independent modernisers led by Mansour Khalid, Gafar Bakhiet and Abdul Rahman Abdalla²⁶ became the majority of the council of ministers and continued to influence the policy making of the regime until the major reshuffle in January 1975. Most of the investment projects which would remain to

²⁶The group included Ibrahim Muniem Mansour, a director in the Gulf-International which owned a number of factories in the Sudan, Wadie Habbashi, an experienced agriculturist and ex-undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Musa Awad Billal, an expert in sugar industry, Yahya Abdul Mageed, an engineer and expert in irrigation and water management., and Zaki Mustafa, an ex-Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum (information collected by the author).

remind the people of Nimeiri his regime, had their plans, programmes and decisions drafted, passed, contracted, their finance sought or their implementation began or carried during this period. It was the period when the foreign policy of the regime was directed towards serving the investment programme included in the Interim Action Programme which amended the Five Years Plan 1970/71-74/75.

Table 17. The Previous Occupations of Nimeiri's Ministers 1969-85

Occupation	No.	% of Total
Officers	28	21.9
University Lecturers	25	19.5
Civil servants	23	18
Diplomats	13	10.2
Lawyers	13	10.2
Technocrat	11	8.6
Teachers	4	3.1
Journalists	3	2.3
Doctors (medical)	3	2.3
Businessmen	3	2.3
Workers	1	0.8
Farmers	1	0.8
Total	128	100

Note: 128 ministers were employed by Nimeiri in his 16 years rule, a number of them held several portfolios at different periods, dismissed or shifted to the political organisation, and reappointed as ministers

Source: Data collected by the author from the Sudanese newspapers and ACR (different issues).

The January 1975 reshuffle was an important incident, not because reshuffles of the council of ministers were rare in Nimeiri's time (see Chapter 4 above); but rather because it reflected on the nature of the regime and the role of the President in the system²⁷. It was the first public incident, after the promulgation of the Permanent Constitution and the apparent establishment of the state's institutions, that showed the disunity of the ruling group on one hand and the awareness of the President of it and his attitude to use it to promote his own authority on the other hand. Khalid identified three groups within the regime until 1978 when the National Reconciliation was adopted. The first group was the technocrats and professionals whom he named as the 'doers', while the second group was constituted of those who were involved in the SSU political and organisational activity. The third group, according to Khalid, were "the palace queries and place-men" who were interested in promoting their own interests (Khalid, 1985, 70-1).

Nimeiri's ability to manoeuvre among the three groups was enhanced by the amendments of the Permanent Constitution following the 5 of September coup attempt. Among these

²⁷In one way it resembled the major reshuffle of the ministers in October 1969 which followed the statement made by the then Prime Minister Babiker Awadalla in the German Democratic Republic about the relation of the communists with the regime. That reshuffle showed that the real power was vested within the military, especially Nimeiri and the Arab Nationalist. The 1975 Showed that the real power was vested in the President.

amendments in the constitution, the amendment of Article 82 concentrated more powers in the hand of the President and declared him "the protector" of the constitution and the achievements of the "May Revolution". It reads "And to that effect he may take such actions and make such decisions as He deems fit and His decisions in this respect shall be binding and valid with accordance with provisions" (DRS:1973,b, 15) One of the draftsmen of the 1973 constitution wrote ten years later that after

"September 1975 the constitution we had promulgated two years before was never the same again, not because of preventive detention, but because of the very nebulous addition to articles 81 and 82 which turned out to be pretext for undoing the constitution itself." (Khalid, 1985, 149).

The political theatre in the period between 1975-85 was dominated by one man. There were almost annual cabinet reshuffles. The leadership of the SSU was also subjected to the President's will of change. Ministers who lost their portfolios were appointed to the SSU leadership. Except for the Constituent (1971-73) and the first National Peoples' Assembly (1974-78), none of the other four elected Assemblies had completed their term, because the President dissolved them and called for new elections. Major decisions and important legislations during this period were taken by the President without proper consultation of the state political, executive and legislative institutions. Among these decisions were the National Reconciliation, the establishment of regional governments in the North (a decision which referred to the third SSU Conference to ratify after the President declared it and appointed a technical committee to determine the boundaries of the new regions), the division of the Southern Region and the promulgation of the Sharia Law in September 1983.

5.4.4. The Local and Regional Government

Despite the Peoples Governments Act of 1971, (Ministry of Local Government, 1974, 9-42), which alleged the transfer of power to the people at their villages, towns and provinces, political power in Northern Sudan remained concentrated in the centre until 1980 when the Regional Government Act was passed. In reality the powers of the Peoples' local councils established by 1971 Act were a sort of a decoration by virtue of Article 6 of the same act which provided for the appointment of a province commissioner and specified his powers. These powers were extended and detailed in 1973 when the Minister of Local Governments issued 'The Powers, Authorities and Duties of the Commissioners of the Provinces Regulations for 1973' (Ibid, 44-50) and the similar regulations that defined the powers, authorities and duties of the local government administrative officers (Ibid, 51-58). According to article 6 of 1971 Act and to the regulations issued by the Minister, the Commissioner who was to be appointed by the President of the Republic and should be responsible to him (Article 6-1, 6-2, Ibid, 12) He

was to be "the first representative" of the central government in the province (Article 6-3 of the 1971 Act, Ibid 12, and Articles 4 and 5 of the Regulations, Ibid, 45). The duties assigned to the Commissioner made him responsible for the security, the finance, and the execution of the state and government policies (Article 6-4, 6-5, of the Act, Ibid, 13; and article 27 of the regulations, Ibid, 48). He was to be responsible to the consolidation of national unity and enlightening and educating the masses and their organisations (Article 5 and 6 of the Regulations, Ibid, 45). The Commissioner was ex-officio the Chairman of the Peoples' Executive Council and his deputy was ex-officio the secretary of the Council. Both the 1971 Act and the 1973 Regulations explicitly put the Commissioner above the Peoples' Executive council in the province by stating that the Commissioner could overrule any decision taken by the Council which he thought to be in accordance to "the public good or the general policy of the state or endangers the security or violates the rights of the citizens or the principle of equity" (Article 6-6 of the Act, Ibid, 13; and Article 29 of the Regulations, Ibid, 49). The Commissioner in such cases should report to the Council of Ministers and unless the latter objected to the decision of the Commissioner, it should be carried (Ibid, same articles). The same scenario was repeated in the relation between the local government administrative officer and the correspondent local Peoples' council. Generally it could be argued that the Commissioner and the Administrative Officer were the real governments in rural Northern Sudan. Since they were representing and responsible to the central government, it seems that power remained firmly in the centre. In addition to the powers and authorities of the Commissioner and Administrative Officer, ministers in the central government had powers to intervene in the work of the local Peoples' councils. The Minister of Local Governments had the right, according to Article 28, to suspend any local order exclusively or partially for three months, during which he had to advise the Council of Ministers on whether to repeal or to amend that local order (Ibid, 27). He had the authority to instruct the Peoples' Executive Council to promulgate a definite local order or ordinance within a specific time limit and the Council should carry the Ministers' instruction (Ibid, 27).

The domination of the centre was not only through the concentration of political and administrative power, it was also practised through the concentration of economic and financial power. The local governments remained dependent on the fund transfers from the centre to supplement its budget. El Raffia noticed that the "financial weakness of local government units is an extremely potent factor in the failure to fulfil the goals and objectives of 1971 Act" (El-Arifi, 1978, 25).

In 1980 regional governments were established in Northern Sudan. The five regions of Darfur, Kordofan, the Central, the Eastern and the Northern were to have their governors, regional governments and regional peoples' assemblies. Khartoum would

have a commissioner and a people' local council. the regime justified the move as an attempt for bringing government closer to the people and widen popular participation, to stimulate and to take the burden of local issues from the central government to increase efficiency in delivering the public goods locally and nationally. These aims were not fully achieved during. The regional peoples' assemblies' elections draw the attention of many people and the competition among some of the nominees contesting in these elections was high. Most of the competition was on tribal or clan basis. The Tribal competition intensified when it came to the nomination of the governors and their deputies and the appointments of regional ministers. Instead of providing for national unity, it seems that regionalisation renewed tribalism which was a dying phenomena in Northern Sudan. In practise the powers of the Governors, their appointment by the President (though from a list of nominees suggested by the Regional Peoples' Assembly and the Regional Conference of the SSU), to whom they were held responsible for the good administration of the region, made the Governor both powerful and weak. He was very powerful as representative of the President and the Central Government and weak as representative for his region. The case of Darfur Governor who tried to be a real representative of his region compelled him to resign and flee the country during the famine in 1983 (see Chapter 4 above).

The experience of regional governments in the North for five years (1980-85), confirmed both the Southern experience (1972-85), that political power without funds would achieve too little. The 1980 Regional Government Act assigned the regional governments the task of the development and utilisation of financial resources in the region (Article 8b), the organisation of trade, commodities, cooperation and industries in the region, and the organisation and provision of care for agriculture, pastures, and animal wealth in the region. Yet the Act did not provide for any satisfactory sources of finance to carry these tasks or any other duties of a good government. The act specified four sources for regional revenue: 1) revenue obtained from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects and activities in the region; 2) funds approved by the national government to the regions; 3) loans and donations; and 4) direct and indirect taxes levied by the region. For the period 1980-85, the only source proved to be practical was the funds provided as subsidies by the central government.

The Central Government subsidy constituted 80% of the revenues of the Northern Region between 1980/81-1983/84. They were 66%, 67%, 68%, 80% and 69% of the revenue of the Eastern, Central, Darfur Regions and Khartoum Commission for the same period (1980/81-1983/84) respectively. Most of the subsidy was used to finance the increase of regional governments employment. The regional budgeted posts increased from 218,792 to 250, 200 between 1980 and 1985 (of these posts 109 thousands were

classified jobs in 1980/81 and they increased to 126 thousands in 1984/85) (ILO, 1986, 124).

By the end of Nimeiri regime it was clear that the financial burden of the regional government was greater than what an economy in crisis can bear. If the announcement of the regional system government was an attempt by the regime to shift the pressure of the political and economic crises from single unified centre in Khartoum to many several regional capitals, in reality it concentrated the financial crisis of the state, and focused the concern of the people in the regions on the economic crisis as general. the question of uneven development as a cause of regional dissatisfaction was no resolved (see section 6.3 below).

5.5. The Policies of the State

5.5.1. The Interim Action Programme

In November 1972, the SSU approved the Interim Action Programme to amend the Five Years Plan for Economic and Social Development for the years 1970/71-74/75 and to extend it to 1976/77. The Programme was adopted by the President as his 1 programme for the remaining of his presidential mandate (until 1977). The Programme shifted the emphasis of public investment from increasing production by the utilisation of existing capacities and limited new investment in agriculture and industry to investment in infrastructure especially road construction and a wide range of projects in agriculture and agro-industry. the Programme envisaged a total investment of LS666.2 million. The transport and communication sector was allocated LS228 millions which amounted to 34% of the total investment of the Programme. The share of the agricultural sector was reduced from 38% in the Five Years Plan to 23% in the Interim Programme. The share of industrial sector was increased to 18% as compared with the previous 17%. The share of services declined to 14% as compared to 20% in the Five Years Plan..

The financing of the Programme depended on internal and external borrowing. The government accumulated debt to the Central Bank increased from LS149 million in 1973 at the beginning of the implementation of the programme to LS 610 million by the end of its period in 1977 (Bank of Sudan, 1973, 1977). The private sector's debts to the banking system increased at the same period from LS107 to LS287 million (Ibid).

The Government foreign borrowing increased from LS 18.4 million in 1969 to LS 21.7 million in 1973, jumped to LS 137.6 million in 1974, when it began to decline until 1977 when it reached LS 26.5 million.

By the end of the programme period, Sudan foreign debts amounted to LS356.4 million (\$ 891 million, 1977 prices). Table 17 shows the net disbursement of concessionary development assistance provided to Sudan by different sources between 1973 and 1978.

Table 18. Concessionary Development Assistance 1973-1978 (Net Disbursement in

SOURCE	<u>US \$ million</u>					
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Western Europe	42.6	54.4	110.3	115.6	109.2	224.2
OPEC (ARAB)	3.3	80.0	188.2	253.2	111.3	71.7
Eastern Europe	8.8	10.9	-2.0	-6.2	-6.1	-3.3
China	7.9	9.2	3.4	2.8	2.7	-

SOURCE :Khalid, 1985, .68

By 1975, the ability of the Sudan to pay its debts was deteriorating. The actual debt service ratio increased from 11.2% of the total exports earnings in 1972 to 23% in 1974 and in 1975 it pointed to 33.4% of export earnings. It declined to 27.2% in 1976 and to 16.6% in 1977.

It was during this period 1973-77 that the main causes of the particular economic crisis began to gather. The Interim Action Programme ignored the renewal, replacement of the tools of the production of the existing schemes. The Programme did not provide for the investment in the development of the energy resources. The shortages in electricity supply was evident and causing low capacity utilisation in some main industries (Bank of the Sudan, 1976, 14; 1977,14; etc). The Railway transported less freight in 1976/77 compared to 1970 (82% of the 1970/71), (Sudanow, April 1982, 24-25). All the other symptoms of the crisis began to manifest clearly: low productivity and yields, balance of trade and balance of payment deficit, high rates of inflation .. etc (see Chapter 4 above).

5.52. The IMF and the Abortion of the Six Years Plan

Despite the clear manifestation of the economic crisis, the government insisted on drawing a new optimistic Six Years Plan of Economic and Social Development (1977/78 -192/83), (Ministry of National Planning, 1977). The Plan which was the expression of the 'Bread - basket strategy, was aborted just after one year of implementation. It was replaced by a three years rolling Public Investment Programme. The main target became the rehabilitation of existing schemes and projects and the completion of the on-going projects from the interim Action Programme.

As shown in Section 5.4.1 above, by the end of the Interim Programme period, Sudan foreign debts amounted to LS356.4 million (\$ 891 million, 1977 prices). As the debt service burden reached 23.1% and was expected to increase as more debt matured and interest payment were due to be paid, Sudan tried to seek re-scheduling arrangements for its outstanding debts, but in vain, because such arrangements required an agreement with the IMF, which the Sudan failed to reach before 1978.

By June 1978 the Sudan began to implement a series of arrangements with the IMF. The first of these was a 'Credit Tranche Purchase' of SDR (Special Drawing Rights) 21 million on June 1978 and an Extended Facility and Compensatory Financing of \$90 million. It was followed by a declaration by the Sudanese Government of the 'Economic Reform

Programme'. The programme included a devaluation of the Sudanese pound from \$2.8715 to \$2.5 per Sudanese pound which amounted to 13%.

In May 1979 a three years 'Extended Fund Facilities' of SDR 200 million was reached. In September 1979 the Sudan announced the 'Economic Stabilization Programme' which included a new devaluation and the establishment of a foreign currency market (though deals were limited to commercial banks) allowing the free movement of foreign currency from and into the Sudan (Al Ayam Newspaper, 16.9.1979)

One year later the Sudan asked for an increase of the Extended Facility to SDR 427 million which she obtained. In November 1981 an 'Economic Recovery Programme' was announced. The Programme included a new devaluation. It further removed immediately subsidies on petrol and petroleum products and phased the removal of subsidies on sugar and wheat eighteen months. The programme committed the government to cut its expenditure and its borrowing from the central bank, to increase indirect taxation on imports and to replace the share-cropping system in the public irrigated schemes by a new system of land and water charges system. The programme also announced the government intention to the rationalisation of the public sector and to ensure its management according to commercial principles (El Ayam Newspaper, 10.11.1981). The programme paved the way for an agreement on February 1982 on a one year 'Stand-by Arrangement' of SDR 190 million. In November 1982 another devaluation was announced to provide for a new Stand-by Arrangement February 1983 and another one in June 1984. The latter was shelved after 17 days only because the Sudan failed to meet its financial obligations towards the IMF. The Sudan by the time had \$18 millions of arrears on payment due to the IMF. The United States government intervened to bail out the Sudan by diverting the amount required from USAID funds already committed to the Sudan to be paid to the IMF (Brown, 1985, 5).

These IMF arrangements resulted in five direct and six indirect devaluations of the Sudanese pound from \$2.87 per LS in 1977 to \$0.40 per LS in 1985, a total devaluation of 86.1%. Table 18 shows these changes in the Sudanese currency.

As early as 1982, Professor M. H. Awad, a prominent Sudanese economist who resigned as Minister of Trade in opposition to the devaluation in June 1978, pointed out that

"[It] is clear that the FRP [Economic Reform Programme], ESP[economic Stabilisation Programme] and ERP [Economic Recovery Programme] have failed to produce the intended rise in exports, fall in imports, increase in capital inflows and reduction in inflation rates. But they have succeeded in a) curtailing our growth rate, b) increasing living costs tremendously, c) redistributing income from the poor to the rich, d) encouraging capital flight, and e) creating a speculative atmosphere in the country, so that no one wanted to invest in agriculture or industry and all wanted to speculate in land, hard currencies and hoarded goods and f) encouraged dealing in luxuries at the expense of essentials with controlled prices." (Awad, 1982, 21)

Chapter 4 noted that the economic situation in the Sudan deteriorated after 1978. The IMF policies deepened the economic crisis instead of resolving it. By doing that, they contributed to political instability and the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. Evidence of political unrest accompanied every announcement concerning the devaluation, the removal of subsidies and the increase of indirect taxation is shown in Chapter 4 above.

Table 19. Devaluations of the Sudanese Pound 1978 -1985

Date	Actual Price (in US \$)	Official Price (in US \$)
May 1978	1.75	2.87
June 1978	1.50	2.50
September 1979	1.25	2.00
November 1981	Free	1.11
June 1982	0.881	1.11
November 1981	0.48-0.58	0.77
March 1983	0.57	0.77
May 1983	0.48- 0.55	0.77
June 1983	0.43	0.77
October 1984	0.35-0.44	0.77
December 1984	0.22-0.29	0.77
February 1984	0.22-0.29	0.40

SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, (1986), (in Arabic), *The Report of the Technical Committee for Evaluating the Relation of the Sudan, the IMF, and the World Bank* August 1986 Khartoum.

5.5.3. The Policy Towards Private Investment

Chapter 3 argued that the tendency to co-opt the Sudanese capitalist class into the regime started as early as February 1971 and was followed after the events of July 1971 by the decisions of denationalisation and deconfiscation and by issuing a new act to promote industrial investment. It included the dissolution of trade unions and their re-organisation according to the Labour Trade unions Act of 1971. These decisions were followed by a number of legislations to promote private investment in all fields. In 1974 the Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act was revised to extend the tax holiday to be granted to new investors from five years in the 1972 Act to ten years. The guarantees and concessions in the 1972 Act were extended when the act was replaced by the Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act of 1974. The new act clearly stated that no distinction was to be made in granting the licenses or concessions between private or public enterprises, or between national or foreign capital. (Ministry of Industry, 1974, Section 15).

The concessions were extended to non-manufacturing investment when a new act to encourage investment in non-manufacturing activities (tourism, transport and storage) was promulgated in 1974 as 'The Organisation and Encouragement of the Investment in Economic Services Act'²⁸. The objectives of the act were stated as

"to encourage the investment of foreign and national capital in economic services in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, with the view to realizing the state's economic plans or, of accelerating the economic growth of the country, by granting concessions, facilities and guarantees which would achieve these objectives." (DRS, 1974, Act No. 18, 1974, sect.4).

The Minister of National Economy was empowered by the act to grant the approved enterprises a range of concessions including allocating land at low prices, business profit tax holidays, exemption from paying custom duties on imported materials and equipment ...etc. As in the tradition of industrial investment acts, guarantees against nationalisation and confiscation were clearly stated as well as guarantees to transfer profits of foreign capital invested.

It was followed in 1976 by 'The Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act' to encourage agricultural investment. The Minister of Agriculture, Food and National Resources was authorised to grant new agricultural projects similar concessions to those granted to investors in industry and economic services.

The whole legislation package to encourage private investment was unified in the Encouragement of Investment Act of 1980²⁹ which created a new governmental body called 'the General Secretariat for Investment' which was responsible to the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to simplify and shorten the procedure of issuing investment licences.

The authority to approve new investment in industry, agriculture and economic services was assigned to the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. The Minister was authorised to grant new approved projects concessions which included business profit tax holidays, exemption from paying excise and customs duties, allocating land at low prices, and taking adequate protection measures by restricting or raising custom duties on competing imported goods. The Act continued the grantees as to nationalisation, confiscation and the transfer of profits of foreign capital.

²⁸The act was first issued by the President as Provisional Order No. 14, and was confirmed after being passed by the National Peoples' Assembly and signed by the President as Act No. 18 for the Year 1974.

²⁹This act repealed the three acts; 'The Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment of 1974', 'The Organisation and Encouragement of Investment in Economic Services Act of 1974', and 'The Development and Promotion of Agricultural Investment of 1976'.

5.5.4. Policy Towards Foreign Capital

In addition to the guarantees and concessions provided for in the above legislations, the government policy towards foreign capital was characterised by forming joint ventures with public and private sector in industry, agriculture, banking and transport. In March 1974 a decision issued by the President established a special financial institution, the Sudan Development Corporation, (SDC), to promote the joint venture. Its authorised capital is \$500 million while its paid capital was \$200 millions³⁰, paid by a loan guaranteed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The SDC was assigned the role of bringing together foreign and local investors.

Table 20. Projects financed by the Sudanese Investment Corporation 1974-84
(million of dollars)

Sub-sectorst	Total Cost	SDC Contribution	SDC Contribution. as %	Employment
Textile	249.2	36.3	14.6	5,628
Food Industry	836.8	64.0	7.8	22,291
Transport	55.3	16.8	30.0	81
Housing and Construction	28.8	28.4	98.6	—
Total	1170.9	145.5	12.4	28,000

Source: Ministry Finance and National Planning (1985), *The Economic Survey 1984-85*, p.168

By 1985 the SDC was able to attract \$1,250 million in the joint ventures formed under its supervision. Table 17 shows the sectoral distribution of the projects in which the SDC has contributed financially.

In the period 1972-81 there were 58 joint venture projects in the Sudan with an estimated capital of LS 413 millions (1982 prices) (Gad Karim, 1986, 26). About 27 enterprises owned by foreigners were established during the same period (Ibid, 26). Table 20 shows the distribution of both joint ventures and enterprises according to different economic sectors and sub-sectors.

³⁰The SDC recieved only \$190 million from the loan and it wrote the remaining \$10 million as a loan to the government.

Table 21. Joint-Venture and Foreign Enterprises in the Sudan 1973-81

Sector/ Sub-sector	Joint ventures				Foreign				Total			
	Capital (in LS million)	%	No. of enterprises	%	Capital Value	%	Number of enterprises	%	Capital Value	%	Number of enterprises	%
Transport and communication	11.15	2.7	11	19.0.	0.50	0.4	7	18.9	11.65	2.2	18	18.9
Building and Construction	5.10	1.2	4	6.9	---	---	-	---	5.10	0.9	4	4.2
Agriculture and Animal production	239.72	57.9	16	27.6	1.00	0.9	1	2.7	240.72	45.7	17	17.9
Industry	105.54	25.5	10	17.2	48.12	42.8	4	10.8	153.66	29.2	14	14.7
Engineering Consultation	0.15	---	2	3.4	0.78	0.7	7	18.9	0.93	0.2	9	9.5
Petroleum and Survey	6.00	1.5	1	1.7	0.80	2.5	9	24.3	8.80	1.7	10	10.5
Trade and Commerce	1.16	0.3	2	3.4	24.30	21.6	5	13.5	25.46	4.8	5	5.3
Tourism	0.95	0.2	3	5.2	27.25	24.2	2	5.4	28.20	5.4	7	7.4
General Investment	22.18	5.4	6	10.3	---	---	-	-	22.18	4.2	6	6.3
Banking and Insurance	22.13	5.3	3	5.2	7.74	6.9	2	5.4	29.87	5.7	5	5.3
Total	413.98	100	58	100.0	112.49	100.0	37	100.0	526.47	100.0	95	100.0

Source: Gad Karim, H., (1986), *Some Characteristics and Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on the Developing Countries- The*

Sudan, a paper presented to the Tenth Arkewit Conference, Institute of Extra-mural Studies, university of Khartoum, 25-28 January,

1986, Khartoum, p 26.

5.6. The Particular Economic Crisis 1973-1985.

The particular economic crisis under the Nimeiri regime was the result of two main effects. The first was the long-run effect of the economic structure¹, inherited from the colonial period and sustained, though expanded, by the post-colonial state. This long-run effect will be discussed in Chapter 6. The second effect was the result of the particular policies of the Nimeiri regime which responsible for two kinds of interrelated crises: the simple and the extended reproduction crises. The first generally produced the decline in productivity and yields and the low capacity utilisation of the schemes and establishments inherited by Nimeiri from the previous regimes. The main reason behind that trend was the absence of maintenance and renewal. The crisis of simple reproduction was one of the replacement of used means of production. The second crisis of extended reproduction was different from the ordinary extended reproduction crises of over-production, under-consumption or disproportionate sectoral investment (though it involves an element of disproportionate distribution of investment), as it will be shown below. Its main result was the low or no returns from the newly established projects, with their consequences on internal and external debt and inflation.

The particular economic crisis of the Nimeiri regime was that the old productive schemes declined while the new one's were not implemented on time and some never implemented despite the money spent in importing their equipment (ie Melut sugar factory and Gadow Spinning and Weaving Factory). Even those implemented, did not utilize their full capacity and most of them continued to produce at below-economic capacity level.

5.6.1. The Simple Reproduction Crisis

In capitalist production simple reproduction is hypothetical, because capital by definition is an expanded value. The concept is used here on the same hypothetical meaning assuming that all the economic surplus produced is consumed, still there is that part of the constant capital transferred into the product which has to be maintained to permit the repetition of the production process (this is in analogy with Marx's hypothetical capitalist who consumes all the surplus value that has been realized).

By 1976/77 the symptoms of a simple reproduction crisis began to show up, the economy was not maintaining, renewing or replacing some of its fixed capital: its machines, irrigation network, railway locomotives and waggons...etc. In Gezira Scheme for example, the sharp decline in output in 1975/76 was a resultant of decline in both yields and area cultivated The Bank of Sudan in its annual report of 1976 stated that "*In Gezira Scheme (including the Managil Extension), the area under cultivation decreased substantially by 35%*"(Bank of Sudan: 1976, 6). The Government appointed a Cotton

¹See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

Technical Committee to investigate the reasons. The decline in output and area continued through 1976/77-1978/79 and in response a 'Fact Finding Commission' in the Ministry Of Agriculture was appointed. In 1981, by the time it was not a secret any more, the Bank reported that the decline in cultivated area was due to "*inadequate irrigation, shortage of machinery needed for land preparation...*" (Bank of Sudan:1981, 11). Al Amin Ali noted that by 1979 only 50% of the Gezira Scheme's crawlers, deep blades, disc ploughs, 75% of its harrow ploughs and 30% of its land levellers were in good working condition (Al Amin Ali:1990, 258).

Other irrigated agricultural schemes were facing similar problems. The Economic and Social Research Council reported on the situation in the Blue Nile and White Nile Corporation showing that both pumps and agricultural machines and equipments were obsolete to the extent that they hindered irrigation and proper agricultural operations (Economic and Social Research:1978, 43). These results were confirmed by a Commission appointed to study the future of the two corporations (Report of the Commission, 1983, 7).

Awad (1983) accepts the argument that the decline of Sudanese economy during the 1970's was the result of the neglect of maintaining the existing schemes, but he goes further to argue that was partially because the World Bank "refused to assist in the rehabilitation of existing schemes until the recommendation of the Rist Mission of 1966 as to changing production relation had been implemented" (Awad, 1983, 13). This seems to be true because the IBRD, during the same period, contributed to the finance the new Rahad Scheme in which the water charge and land rent system was implemented. The IBRD also launched a large rehabilitation of the irrigated agriculture just after Sudan was compelled to implement the water charge and land rent system as a part of the IMF-World Bank package in 1981.

Industry faced the same problem. The Bank of Sudan stated that the Sudanese industries encountering some problems concerning the under-utilization of capacity which were due to "*obsolete and inefficient machinery, shortage in raw material, failure in electric power, transporting bottle-necks and marketing problems*"(Bank of Sudan:1978, 14)

The transport sector had faced similar problem. The best example was Sudan Railways which reported to the National Economic Conference in 1986 that by 1983/84 only 34% of its steam and diesel locomotives, 72.9% of its freight waggons, and 71% of its oil-tanks waggons were in a satisfactory condition.

The problem extended to the education and health sectors where the buildings of schools and hospitals were not maintained regularly and obsolete implements were not replaced.

Generally the problem reflected the irrationality in resource allocation and the inefficiency of the management of the economy if looked to from one side, and reflected a new pattern of capital accumulation and class interests from another side. For example the

allocation of financial resources in the government current budget favours defence and security compared to economic and social service. In the period 1969/70-80/81 all economic and social services' share in current government expenditure was 15.9%, while that of defence was 17.8% of the total expenditure. The average expenditure of the Ministry of Irrigation and Hydro-electric Power for 13 years (1971/72-1983/84) was LS 13.7 million per year while that for defence and security was LS 84.3 million (calculated from Ministry of Finance, different years). This irrational allocation of the state financial resources was governed by the fact of the dependence of the state on the military for its survival. Since the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 and until the restart of the civil war in 1983, the Sudanese army was enjoying the longest peaceful period in its history.

The inefficiency in the management had many examples, but to take one concerning the underpricing of public sector's commodities. Government was paying a price for local sugar which was far behind the international price and the consumer retail price in the period 1971/72-1980/81. The international price in 1971/72 was LS 55/ton while the government was paying LS 46. In 1972/73 the price for the imported sugar increased to LS 135 while that paid for the local sugar increased to LS 52. In 1974/75 the international price increased to LS 465 and that paid to local factories increased to LS 101. The government kept a difference LS 162 in 1980/81 between the price of the imported (LS 525) and that locally produced. When local factories needed funds for the spare parts and the renewal of machinery, they had to wait in the queue for public funding.

Another example was the loss from the decline in cotton output in 1975/76 which was equal to 500,000 bales of export value of LS 100 million, enough in 1975/76 prices to pay for the rehabilitation of the Scheme and save substantial losses thereafter.

The National Energy Plan Committee estimated that in mechanised agriculture there a loss of LS18.5 was incurred for each unavailable gallon of gasoline costing LS2.7 (Ministry of Energy, 1985, 7). In 1983 the loss incurred due to energy shortage was estimated to be LS133 million (Ibid, 7).

The crisis of simple reproduction could also be attributed to the shift of resources to the extended reproduction, the new schemes, though most of the latter were financed by external resources and internal deficit finance.

5.6.2. The Extended Reproduction

The concept of extended reproduction is usually used to define the process of capital accumulation where part of the surplus value is used to expand the production process. In the Sudan most of the investment programme of the 1973/74-1977/78 was financed by borrowing from external sources while the local component of the investments was financed by borrowing from the central bank (see Chapter 4). Instead of allocating these resources or part of them for renewing the existing capital stock and raising the efficiency

of capacity utilization, new investment were planned. The Interim Action Programme which replaced the Five Years Plan (1970/71-1974/75) in 1972 aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in a number of agricultural and manufactured commodities like wheat, rice, sugar and textile. The crisis of simple reproduction would have appeared less significant if this programme would have achieved its goals.

The new schemes and projects were not implemented on time, and some never implemented despite the money spent in importing their equipment (ie Melut sugar factory and Gadow Spinning and Weaving Factory). Delays in implementation was a serious problem because it involved direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include the increase in the costs of implementation due to inflation, insurance cost of labour...etc The indirect costs which are, usually, more important include the costs of delay in debt service (when the project is financed by a loan or expected to contribute to exports earnings to meet part of the debt burden, or to substitute imports, allowing the use of freed resources to meet other external obligation...etc), loss of income and losses incurred by other projects depending on the output or service of the project. The delays also contributed to the inflation both through cost-push and demand push inflation.

In irrigated agriculture the Rahad Scheme was completed six years behind schedule due to the long process of negotiation with the World Bank. Road construction had the least delay period of 36% of the planned. In industry the delay period was 113% of planned implementation period.

The industrial programme of the Nimeiri regime was an example of the cost to an economy from implementation delays. The cost of sugar imports borne by the Sudanese economy as a result of the delays in implementing the planned sugar factories in Sennar and Assalya amounted to \$193 million in the period 1975/76-1980/81. The costs of delay of the textile programme of six weaving sheds and three spinning factories was estimated to be around LS 82 million between 1976-1980. (El Tayeb and El Tayeb:1984, 43). The delay caused some LS 34 million as direct costs for both industries.(Ibid,43)

The failure of new investments to contribute to production and hence to release funds for debt servicing contributed to the accumulation of external and internal debt. With the decline in exports and increase in imports due to the collapse of old schemes and industries, the balance of payments deficit increased and the economy became unable to service the debt. By 1977/78 the Sudan was to seek the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank to ease its balance of payments deficit, to re-schedule its debt and to seek finance for the rehabilitation of its existing projects and schemes. The period 1978/79-1984/85, the Sudanese state was under the pressure of the international institutions on one hand and the popular opposition on the other. The austerity measured suggested by the IMF, led to the fall of the Nimeiri regime bending the solution of the economic and political crisis of the country .

5.6.3. The Financial Crisis of the State

The essence of the financial crisis of the state is the decline of its ability to capture enough portion of the actual economic surplus² to provide for the goods and services expected by the population in order to sustain its legitimacy. This suggests that there two sides of the financial crisis of the state: the first the actual portion it has captured of the economic surplus, ie its actual revenue; while the other side is the actual value of goods and services it is able to supply, ie its actual expenditure. In responding to its own financial crisis, the Sudanese state was "caught within a set of contradictory institutional imperatives", to borrow Habermas perception of the state legitimation crisis: "if it responds to one set, it undermines the rationality of the economy, and if it responds to others, it depletes the legitimacy the state itself." (Connolly, 1984, 12).

Chapter 2 has argued that the colonial state kept a low level of direct taxation to avoid discontent. The colonial state depended on indirect taxation and income from state owned (or shared) production or economic service entities (ie Gezira Scheme, the Railways, the Post etc.). The post-colonial state before the May 1969 depended financially on the increasing indirect taxation and introducing new direct taxes as well as the stagnant and declining revenues from the state owned production and services activities. When the Nimeiri regime nationalised and confiscated a number of private foreign and local companies in 1970, the state became the potential holder of a greater portion of the economic surplus. From 1973 this potentiality declined and the Sudanese state faced a deep financial crisis. Chapter 4 has shown the increasing deficit in the public budget from 1970/71 to 1984/85. The figures in Chapter 4 show that the government current revenue increased by 18% while its expenditure increased by 20% annually for the period 1970/71-1984/85. The public enterprises instead of providing the government with substantial revenue, became receivers of government subsidy. Their deficit increased by 16.2% per annum during the same period. There were two main reasons behind that poor performance. The first and this mainly concerned the public agricultural enterprises was the obsolete level of institutional articulation of modes of production that governed the production relation in Sudanese irrigated agriculture until 1981. This will be discusses in Chapter 6 below. The second reason which has been discussed in subsection 5.6.1. is the neglect of maintenance and renewal of the tools of production and the shortage in the supply of raw materials, what is defined as the crisis of simple reproduction.

The state to increase its revenues was left with the unpopular alternative of increasing direct and indirect taxation. Table 20 shows how some items of direct and indirect

²Baran defines the actual economic surplus as "the difference between society's actual current output and its actual current saving" (Baran, 1962, 22).

taxation increased dramatically during the period under study. The inflationary result of increasing custom duties, which were mainly laid on import items, and excise duties, which were mainly laid on locally produced goods and services, was obvious. This was even linked to the cycle of devaluation and inflation³ which governed the Sudan economy since the first direct devaluation in 1978.

Table 22. The Value and Growth Rates of Some Items of Direct and Indirect Taxation 1974/75-83/84

Revenue Item	Average 1974/75-77/77	Average 1977/78-79/80	Average growth rate	Average 1980/81-82/83	Average growth rate	Average 1983/84	growth rate
Custom Duties	139.5	234.5	68.1%	498.5	104.7%	722.1	44.8%
Excise Duties	42.9	68.2	59%	98.5	44.4%	148.2	50.4%
Business Tax	25.6	41.6	62.5%	85.5	105.5%	175.7	105.4%
Personal Income Tax	8.5	18.4	116.5%	56.3	206.0%	61.4	9.1%

Source: Calculated from Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, *Economic Survey*, various issues, 1975-1985

The other side of the financial crisis of the state was the rapid increase of its expenditure. The volume and structure of the state expenditure did not express the optimal utilisation of resources. It was affected by the nature of the authoritarian state on one hand and the increasing demand for public goods and services by the population on the other hand.

5.6.4. The IMF, the Debt Crisis and the Rescheduling Illusion

By the mid seventies as argued above Sudan was not able to serve her debts. Sudan sought the rescheduling of debts through the Paris Club. Between November 13th 1979 and May 3rd 1984 the Sudan signed four agreements to re-schedule her due debts under the auspices of Paris Club(1). Although, legally speaking, the term "agreements" was not used in Paris Club ("Agreed Minutes" was used to describe the re-scheduling arrangements signed). The term 're-scheduled agreements' is used here to refer to these "Agreed Minutes".

The first re-scheduling agreement was signed on November 13th 1979 between the Democratic Republic of the Sudan (DRS.) and eleven creditor countries, (this agreement will be referred to as Paris Club1). The creditor countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, F.R. of Germany, Italy Japan, Holland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The second agreement, (Paris Club2), was signed on March the 18th 1982 with Canada and Norway in addition to the countries signed Paris Club1. Spain and Sweden joined the third agreement, (Paris Club3), of

³The cycle worked in this manner: devaluation would lead to inflation which would lead to rise in wages and salaries, which lead to government increasing indirect taxation and its borrowing from central Bank to finance increase in wages and salaries which would increase inflation leading to new devaluation ... etc; to mention only some elements of the cycle.

February 14th 1983 to bring the number of creditor countries to fifteen, all of them involved in the fourth agreement of May 3rd 1984.

The four "Agreed Minutes" between the Democratic Republic of The Sudan and the western creditor countries in the Paris Club were generally identical in structure and similar in contents. They were composed of five sections. The first section is a preamble that outlines the countries involved in the meeting, the international and regional organizations attending the meetings as observers, the place and the date of the meeting. The second section defines the debts to be re-scheduled and the terms of consolidation and the rates of interests to be paid. The third section outlines the general conditions while the fourth lays down specific conditions to be met before the implementation of the agreed minutes. The fifth section includes the signatures of the chairman of the Paris Club, the representatives of the Sudan and the creditor countries.

The most important items of the "Agreed Minutes " were the conditions made for the implementations of the re-scheduling arrangements. Section four makes the clear condition that,

"the provisions of the present agreed minutes will apply provided that the Government of D.R.of S. has an effective arrangements with the IMF in upper credit tranches. For this purpose, the Government of the D.R.of S. agrees that the IMF inform the chairman of this creditor group regarding the status of Sudan relations with the IMF."(Section 4:3).

This condition was made in all agreed minutes despite the fact that the delegation of the Sudan, *"outlined the serious economic and financial difficulties faced by their country and the strong determination of their government to reduce the economic and financial imbalances and to reach the targets of the program underlying the stand-by arrangements with the International Monetary Fund." (emphasis is added)(Section 1:3).*

The IMF representative were there to give their testimony on

"the economic situation of the Sudan and the major elements of the adjustment program undertaken by the government of the Sudan and supported by a twelve-month stand-by arrangement with the IMF" (Section 1:3).

For the participating creditor countries what was important was not only "their taking note of" the measures of adjustment program undertaken by the government of the Sudan, but also "the importance they attach to the continuing and full implementation of this program, in particular the revitalization of the productive sector of the economy and the improvement of public finance and foreign exchange management." (section 1:4) So the IMF was appointed a 'watch-dog' to "inform the chairman... regarding the status of the Sudan relations with the IMF" (Section 4:3). Future debt re-scheduling was also conditional on "the Sudan continues to have an arrangement with the IMF involving use

of the Fund's resources subject to upper tranche conditionality" (Section 4:5 in Paris Club4 and 4:4 in Paris Club2).

The "Agreed Minutes" also determined that the Sudan should treat her creditors equally in any bilateral arrangement and "on terms comparable to those set forth in this agreed minutes for credits of comparable maturity making sure to avoid inequity between different categories of creditors." (Section 3:1). The government of the Sudan was demanded to "accord to each of the participating creditor countries a treatment *not less favourable than which it may accord to any other creditor*", as long as that the debts concerned were of "a comparable term". (Section 3:2). It was also agreed that any agreements to re-schedule the Sudanese debts with commercial banks or any other creditor not participating in the meetings should be comply with the terms of the "Agreed Minutes".

Both the Sudan and the participating creditor countries were required to inform the Chairman of Paris Club of any bilateral agreement between the Sudan and any of the participating creditor countries. The "agreed Minutes" determined the payment of all arrears less than SDR 250000 on the "original due dates" and those arrears which were not paid when the minutes were signed were to be paid before a date defined in the minutes, ie Paris Club4 defined June 1984.

The "Agreed Minutes" also determined that all debts not included in the re-scheduling minutes should be paid on "original due dates".

The 1984 "Agreed Minutes" introduced a new condition. The government of the Sudan had to deposit in "Central Bank of one Creditor Country of at least SDR 4760000 at the end of each month of 1984", to create a special account "so that The Government of the DR. of S. will pay from [it] due payments." No other payment should be made of that account before "all payments due for 1984 under the bilateral agreement are to be made." (Paris Club 4 section 4:4)

All the four re-scheduling arrangements covered commercial credits guaranteed by creditor governments as well as governmental loans before a date specified in every "Agreed Minutes" (Paris Club1: January the 1st 1979, Paris Club2: July 1st 1981, Paris Club3: January the 1st 1983, Paris Club4: January 1st 1984). In addition Paris Club3 provided for re-scheduling of the arrears of Paris Club1 and Paris Club2, as well as 50% of the interest due on 1983 not included in Paris Club 3. The 'Agreed Minutes' of Paris Club 4 dealt with 50 % of the interest due on 1984 for debts dealt with in Paris Club 3 and Paris Club 4.

The first re-scheduling agreement (Paris Club 1) dealt with two types of debts according to their due dates. The first type was all debts due up to October 1st 1979. These debts were divided into five groups, as shown in Table22. The first group amounted to 14% of all due debts and was to be paid in four instalment beginning in July 1980 and ending on

October 1981, with an interest rate of 3.5%. The second group amounted to 28% of total, to be paid in four instalments between April 1982 and October 1983, at a 7% interest rate. A third 17% group was to be paid at an 8.5% interest rate in two instalments in April and October 1984. The fourth division was 20% of the total debt to be paid at a 10% interest rate in two instalments in April and May 1985. The last division amounted to 21% of the total, payable in April and October 1986 at 10.5% interest rate.

Table 23. Re-scheduling of Sudanese Debt Due Before October 1979

Division	% of Total	Interest Rates	Instalments	Payments
1	14%	3.5%	4	15/7/1980 1/10/1980 1/4/1981 1/10/1980
2	28%	7%	4	1/4/1982 1/10/1982 1/4/1983 1/10/1983
3	17%	8.5%	2	1/4/1984 1/10/1984
4	20%	10%	2	1/4/1985 1/10/1985
5	21%	10.5%	2	1/4/1986 1/10/1986

SOURCE: Paris Club, *Agreed Minutes*, November 13th 1979.

The second type of debt dealt with in Paris Club1 was that debt due between October 1st 1979 and June 30th 1981. Only 85% of this debt was re-scheduled, which implied that the remaining 15% had to be paid on "original due dates". The former were to be paid in 14 equal instalment beginning June 30th 1983 for debts due before June 30th 1980; and on June 30th 1984 for payments due during the following year (July 1980-June 1981). Interest rates and terms of payment were left to be negotiated bilaterally.

The second re-scheduling agreement signed on March 18th 1982 (Paris Club2) dealt with debts, principal and interest, which were due before or on the 31st of December 1982. The major part of these debts, 90% of them, was to be paid in eleven biannual instalments between July the 1st 1987 and 1992 with five years grace period (1982-87). The remaining 10% of these debts were to be paid in three instalments. The first 2.5% of the total due debt, was paid on or before December 31st 1982. Another equal instalment was due on December the 31st 1983 while the last instalment was, equal to 5% of the total debt due, was to be paid on December the 31st 1984. Rates of interest were left to bilateral negotiations.

The third re-scheduling agreement, (Paris Club3), dealt with debts due before or on December the 31st 1983. Paris Club3 re-scheduled all the principals due and 50% of the due interest which was capitalized, while the remaining interest was to be paid on the original due dates. Those re-scheduled were to be paid in twenty equal biannual

instalments commencing in July 1st 1989 and ending on January 1st 1999 and thus giving 6 year moratorium and ten year repayment period. Interest rates on the re-scheduled debt were left to be determined through bilateral negotiations.

The fourth agreement, (Paris Club4), re-scheduled all principals due during 1984 and 50% Of the interest during 1983 and 1984, while the other half of the interest due during 1983/84 was to be paid. Payments should be in 20 equal instalment commencing on January 1st 1991 and ending in July the 1st 2000. Interest rates were left to be determined through bilateral negotiations. Table 2 summarizes Paris Club 2, Paris Club 3, and Paris Club 4.

Table 24. Summary of The Terms of Paris Club 1, 2 and 3 Agreed Minutes

Agreement	% of Total	No. of Instalments	Grace Period	Payment Period
Paris Club1	90%	11	5	5.5
	10%	3	-	3
Paris Club2	100%	20	6	10
Paris Club3	100%	20	6.5	10.5

SOURCE: Agreed Minutes Between The Government of Democratic Republic of the Sudan and Creditors Countries, 1982,1983 and 1984.

Despite all these arrangements, the Sudan failed to pay its debts and accordingly the debts accumulated to reach \$11 billion by 1985 and the debts service was to constitute more than 150% of the value of the Sudanese exports. Though all the debts rescheduling arrangements were arrived at in Paris Club where both the IMF and the World Bank were present, they did not reflect the ability of the Sudan to pay according to her actual economic situation. The arrangements did not provide for the new funds the Sudan needed then in order to rehabilitate its productive schemes to ease its ballance of payments problems by improving the production of exports and the import- substituting commodities. The rescheduling arrangements, thus, turned to be an illusion. The debt trap was fastened rather than being eased.

5.7.The Crisis of Hegemony and the Quest for Legitimacy

The political economy of the Nimeiri regime between 1973-85 showed how the regime attempts to establish its hegemony and its quest for legitimacy failed. It is argued in Chapter 1 that authoritarian states are the product of the inability of a class or a group of classes to establish its hegemony. The Nimeiri regime which came to power through a military take-over was to resolve the crisis of hegemony if it was to rule through the consent of the people and not mere coercion. Its history from 1969 to it downfall was a history of a continuous quest to legitimacy, a condition for the establishment of hegemony.

The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup d'état was a turning point in the history of the Nimeiri regime. Between 1971 and 1977, the regime failed to incorporate or work out an alliance with the traditional political parties and the Islamic Charter Front. The National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening the base of the regime.

The change in tactics, the shift in alliances and the attempts of co-opting could only be understood as part of this quest for legitimacy. Political instability with its main elements of the growing opposition and the increasing repression were the direct result of the failure in the quest of legitimacy.

When the crisis accelerated in the early eighties, the regime turned back to use Islam as the only remaining possibility that could provide both 'the carrot and the stick', a quest for legitimacy and a justification and tool for repression. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 did not promote the regime's quest for legitimacy and remained as an additional tool of repression. It was too late for the crisis of legitimacy had already reached the point where "the allegiance needed if the dominant institutions are to function effectively is well below the level they actually receive" (Connolly, 1984, 12). In March-April 1985 the crisis of hegemony reached its turning point. Tens of thousands of the Sudanese people all over the country took to the streets demanding the end of Nimeiri regime (Abdelkarim, el Hassan an Sedon, 1985, 86-89). The masses, to borrow from Gramsci, had "passed suddenly from a state of political passivity" (Gramsci, 1971, 210) and they launched their second popular uprising.

The military intervention on April the 6th 1985 was to prevent the uprising from becoming a revolution. Nimeiri regime was overthrown a new phase of the Sudanese general crisis began.

CHAPTER 6

THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR: IN THE CRISIS OF 1973-85

6.1. Introduction

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 it has been shown that four particular crises had struck the Sudan over the period 1956-1985. The manifestation of those crises has been described and discussed. In this Chapter, the 1973-85 crisis is discussed as part of the general crisis. The relation between the general economic and political crises and the 1973-85 crisis is examined to show whether the latter was a phase of a complex crisis of an uncompleted socio-economic transformation. This is done through an analysis of the particular and general in the 1973-85 crisis in an attempt to discover the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the political economy of the post-colonial Sudan. Those elements of continuity and discontinuity could not be just reduced to comparison of what manifestations had continued over the whole 1956-85 period and what were the specific manifestations to the particular 1973-85. It is rather a process of discovering forces and structures that have allowed the continuation or otherwise of policies and organisational procedures that kept a specific level of articulation of modes of production to continue as an obstacle in the development of new structures that would express new levels of articulation. This is particularly clear and significant in the case of Sudanese agriculture where the level of articulation of the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production that was inherited from the colonial era could not provide for the development of productive forces in the agricultural sector any more. The relative development in the productive forces in irrigated and mechanised agriculture reached its maximum possible limit under the existing level of articulation. This explains the trend towards horizontal expansion of cultivated areas rather than the vertical development in labour productivity and land yields which governed agricultural production between 1956-85.

In section 6.2 it is argued that the decline in agricultural yields is related to the production relations in agriculture especially the land tenure system which is part of the articulated modes of production and the institutional organisation of irrigated agriculture as well as the process of capital accumulation and re-investment of surpluses generated in the agricultural sector which favoured the non-agricultural sectors and worked against the most undeveloped areas in the country.

The mechanism, which was set during the colonial rule and preserved and strengthened during the post-colonial era, to attract new investment and or enhance the process of capital accumulation, favoured the Khartoum-Kosti -Sennar Triangle and continued to govern the process of uneven development. The outcome of this process is discussed in section 6.3.

The class structure in the country had changed since independence. The 1973-85 period had contributed significantly to these changes bringing the question of the domination of the state and class hegemony to the fore front of Sudanese political, economic and social agenda. The prevalence of the authoritarian state between 1973-85 prevented social classes and groupings from democratically competing for political power, promoting their political organisation and manifesting their political and ideological discourse. This had prolonged the particular crisis of the Nimeiri regime. Changes in class structure are discussed in section 6.4.

6.2.The Crisis of Agricultural Production

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (constant 1955/56 prices), grew at 3.6% over the period 1955/56 - 1984/85. The real per capita income grew with only 0.8% over the same period (population growth rate was 2.8%). The value of agricultural production had increased over the period by 2.3% per year. Taking into account the prevailing trends of declining yields over the same period for the main agricultural crops, (that of cotton had been reversed since the abolishing of the crop sharing system in irrigated agriculture in 1981/82), it is important to underline that the growth of agricultural output was mainly the result of horizontal expansion of the area under cultivation. All cash crops except groundnuts confirmed the declining trends in yields. The trend of cotton yield between 1955/56 -1980/81 was declining by 2.9% per year from 642 kg/*feddan* in 1955/56 to 298 kg/*feddan* in 1980/81; (for the four years 1981/82-1984/85 yields increased by 21% annually, a growth rate which suggests that the abolishing of the crop-sharing system provided incentives for the increase of productivity, but that needs to be examined in the next section.). Despite the declining cotton yields, the output of cotton over the period 1955/56-1980/81, increased by 0.4%, which could be explained by the 1.8% annual rate of expansion of the area under cotton cultivation.

The average yield of sesame from 236 kg per *feddan* in 1955/56 to 118 kg /*feddan* in 1981/82 (taken instead of 1984/85 to avoid the effect of the drought of 1983-85.) The growth rate of 0.2% in sesame output could be attributed to an expansion in cultivated land by 4.4% per year over the period 1955/56-1981/82.

The output of gum Arabic declined by 0.4% annually over the period 1955/56-1981/82 . The only cash crop of the four under discussion which preserved a rising yields trend was groundnuts. Groundnuts yields increased from 217 kg /*feddan* in 1955/56 to 353 kg, an

annual increase of 1.8% (83.4% of the area under cultivation was in 1981/82 in the rain-fed traditional sub-sector where yields over the same period increased by 1% per year only.) The area under groundnuts cultivation increased from 297,000 *feddans* in 1955/56 to 2,376,000 in 1981/82 increasing by 8% per year. Output of groundnuts increased by 6.6% over the same period

The yields of *dura* declined by 0.7% annually from 428 kg/*feddan* in 1955/56 to 354 kg/*feddan* in 1981/82. Despite the decline in yields, the output of *dura* increased by 5.1% (which should have left per capita share in *dura* output increased by 1.3%). This increase of output was mainly due to the increase in areas cultivated by *dura* from 2,135,000 *feddans* in 1955/56 to 9,231,000 *feddans* in 1981/82, an increase of 5.6%. Wheats yields declined from an average yield of 597 kg/*feddan* in 1955/56 to 494 kg in 1984/85, an annual decline of 0.7%. The output of wheat increased by 5.9% annually, from 30,000 tons to 142,000 tons over the same period. The areas cultivated by wheat increased by 7.5% per year between 1955/56 and 1984/85.

Table 25. Areas Under Cultivation of Five Major Crops

1955/56-1984/85					
(in thousand <i>feddans</i>)					
year	cotton	sesame	groundnuts	<i>dura</i>	wheat
1955/56	576	636	298	2135	42
1981/82	982	2044	2376	9231	432
1984/85	996	1853	1758	7987	362
growth rate*	1.8%	4.4%	8%	5.6%	7.5%

Note:* calculated for 1955/56-1981/82 to avoid the effect of 1983-85 drought, except for cotton and wheat.

Source: Calculated from: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources: *Agricultural Year Book*, Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics.

The horizontal expansion of agriculture was the main characteristic of Sudanese agricultural policy between 1955/56 and 1984/85. Table :1 shows the areas and their respective rates of growth over the same period. While the horizontal expansion in irrigated agriculture in the Sudan was mostly a repeating of the model of the Gezira Scheme, in rain-fed agriculture it was mainly the expansion of the mechanized agriculture in the central clay plain. Both were initiated by the state policies.

A third expansion took place in response to market incentives as well as its own internal dynamics (the development of commodity production, the increase in population and animal wealth.

6.2.1. The Crisis of the Gezira Model

The irrigated agriculture in the Sudan is of two forms, the big state managed schemes, such as the Gezira, the White and Blue Nile Schemes, al Rahad, al Suki...etc, and the relatively small pump schemes on the banks of the Nile, the White and Blue Niles and the *saggia* of Kassala Province. Except for al Rahad and the Northern Region irrigated

schemes, the state schemes followed the Gezira model in their organization and production relations, despite the different irrigation systems.

The Gezira model was built on the institutional articulation of the capitalist mode of production and what had remained of the feudal patriarchal mode of production which had prevailed during the Sennar Sultanate (1504 -1821), the share-cropping arrangement for the distribution of the output. The colonial state used coercion to compel the landowners in the Gezira to lease their land to the state. Land itself was prevented from becoming a commodity. Labour power was not transformed into a commodity, instead it was articulated through the tenancy contract into the production of cotton. The tenant was subjected to a tied time table for carrying the agricultural operations which require high discipline. The tenancy agreement reads:

"If the tenant neglects or is careless in the cultivation of his crops the Syndicate [later the Board] shall have the right without the consent of the tenant to take such steps as the Syndicate may consider proper for the safeguarding of the crops, and any expenses incurred thereby shall be a debt from the tenant to the Syndicate and may without his consent be deducted by the syndicate from his share of the crop." (reproduced in Gaitskell, op. cite., 342)

The reproduction of the labour power of the tenant and his family was partially carried by producing *dura* and *lubia* (*Dolichos lablab*), and partly from his share in the cotton proceeds. The tenant had to hand over his cotton crop to the Syndicate. The tenant as a producer was alienated from his basic means of production, the land, and from part of his product (cotton). The essence of capitalist mode of production, the alienation of the producers, was not complete. This was part of the institutional articulation to mystify the exploitation of the tenants by the state and the Syndicate. This pattern of articulation was capable of extracting the maximum economic surplus because of the use of coercion. Barnett noted that the "organizational form adopted in the Gezira Scheme" was "highly authoritarian in tone and hierarchical in structure" (Barnett:19 , 194). Saying that Barnett failed to see the origins of the authoritarian nature of the management in the state and the tenancy contract which the Syndicate duty was to see to it that it was implemented. The working of the system depended on the authoritarian state. The rise of the tenants movement in the aftermath of the World War II, and its first strike in 1946, was a challenge to the authoritarian state and the Gezira system. The Gezira Board which took over from the Syndicate (in 1950 after the elapse of the contract period) and the post-colonial state, failed to maintain the authoritarian manner of administration.

This failure affected the performance of the static Gezira model in four of its basic elements. The first was the crop pattern of the scheme which was set to include two types of crops. A cash crop, the cotton, the production of which was the aim of the scheme and its proceeds were the subject matter of the whole share-cropping arrangements. Everything in the Scheme was determined relative to the cotton. The subsistence crops cultivated by the tenants (*dura* and *lubia*) were for the reproduction of the labour power. All the calculation and estimates of costs and revenues were based on this crop pattern.

The change in this pattern through the diversification and intensification had resulted in the introduction of wheat and groundnuts, both were cash crops. The logic of the system should have included them in the share-cropping arrangement with the cotton, but instead they were left out of the arrangement as 'tenants' crops'. The tenant was no more dependent on cash earnings from cotton. Of course it was just logical to expect the tenant's inputs, including labour power, to be shifted to the production of the new crops, the total earnings of which went to the tenant. The part of the costs of production operations carried by the Board, were deducted from the cotton proceeds. This was the case, more supervision would have needed to ensure that the tenant carried the operations of cotton cultivation according to the Board's requirements.

The decline of the authoritarian management made such supervision unavailable. Four reasons contributed to the decline of the management. First the decline of the infrastructure and logistics available to the field inspectors to carry a close supervision (the roads, cars, petrol, maintenance etc). Secondly, the increasing bureaucratization of the management and the involvement of the field inspectors in office work, letters and report writing, lessened the time available for field supervision and contact with the tenants. Thirdly the challenge to the authority of the field inspector by the intervention of his work by tenants organizations. Abdel Salam noted that, *"there is currently more involvement in their [field inspectors] work by tenants associations and various local political organizations"* (1987, 373). Lastly the decline in the real incomes of the field inspectors (as was the case for other government employees, see Chapter 4), led to their involvement in other income generating activities, *"such as money lending and livestock rearing (though not officially allowed)"* (Ibid, 373).

The distribution of the burden of the costs of production among the partners underwent a change under the pressure of the tenants union which pressed for including new costs items in the joint account. In 1961/62 the costs of cotton seeds had been shifted from the tenant account to the joint account. In 1963/64 the costs of ploughing were transferred in the same manner, and the same happened for the costs of cotton picking in 1965/66 and the ridging in 1968/69 and the first weeding in 1968/69. (Hakim, 1976, 60)

The distribution of the net cotton earnings also changed under the pressure of the Tenants Union. The profitability of the Scheme was calculated on the bases of: 40% for the tenant, 20% for the Syndicate (the Board) and 40% for the Government. After the December 1963 Tenants strike the tenants share increased to 42%, the government 42%, the Board 10% and 2% for each of the tenants reserved fund, the social services' fund and the local government. In 1965/66 the tenants share increased to 48% while that of the governments decreased to 38% and the share of the board and the other funds remained as they were before.

Apparently the tenants income from cotton should have increased, because the struggle of the tenants had increased their shares in the net returns of cotton and more items of the costs of the production of cotton were transferred to the joint account. Despite that appearance, empirical studies had shown evidence of the decline of real incomes of the tenants in the Gezira and other irrigated schemes working on the Gezira model (Al Amin Ali, 1990, Chapter, VII). There were four main reasons behind that decline in real income. The first was the spiralling inflation in the Sudan, (See Chapter 4 above). The second was the increase in the costs of production which was partially because of the substantial dependency of the scheme on imported inputs, (fertilizers, insecticides and other chemicals, petroleum and spare parts...etc), and partially because of the indirect taxation imposed by the government on the imports of those inputs. The Sudan Gezira Board official figures showed that the costs deducted as under joint account increased from LS 33 per *feddan* in 1970/71 to LS 85 in 1978/79, an increase of 165%, while the tenant's individual costs per *feddan* of cotton increased from LS 9 to LS 10, and increase of 11% only. (calculated from Sudan Gezira Board, 1980). The third reason was the taxation imposed by the government on the crops themselves. Taxation on cotton gross proceeds were a 10% export duty, 2% development tax, 2% stabilization fund, 2% national equalization fund and 2% for the cotton marketing corporation. An implicit tax was laid on cotton by the different exchange rates according to which cotton imported inputs and cotton exports were calculated. It could easily be said that the state through taxation and exchange rates policies not only took back what the tenants had achieved through their struggle, but subjected them to more exploitation. The fourth reason for the decline of the incomes was the decline in yields per *feddan* (see both of this section and Chapter 4).

The decline in cotton yields in particular affected the government revenue as well, albeit in a complex manner. It directly decreased the government earnings as a partner, and indirectly decreased its revenue from taxes on cotton gross proceeds and on cotton generated incomes and activities (including imposed duties on imports which were mostly financed by the earning of cotton exports). This contributed to the financial crisis of the Sudanese state.

Faced with declining income from tenancy and especially from cotton, the Gezira tenant spent overall less labour on the tenancy and tended to find income compensating activities whether by selling his/her labour power in or out of the scheme area. This was facilitated by the decline of the management ability to use coercion in carrying out the tenancy contract or agreement. It was also made possible by the illegal share-cropping practise between the Gezira tenants and sub-tenants, especially in groundnuts cultivation. Al Amin Ali showed that 49% of the tenants in four Gezira areas did cultivate their groundnuts

tenancies through sub-sharecropping arrangements.(Al Amin Ali, opt. cit.,324, Table 7.14).

While institutional articulation in the Gezira model curtailed the development of production relations, it generated a contrasting development in the forces of production in irrigated agriculture. In addition to the modern irrigation system, there were other developments such as the use of tractors and other agricultural equipments, the introduction of fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides and the application of scientific research (the Gezira Research Station was established in 1918). The tenants as cultivators themselves underwent a progressive development in skills and accumulated experience in cotton cultivation in particular and irrigated agriculture in general.

The introduction of land-water charges to replace the fixed percentage share in cotton proceeds did not change all the aspects of the production relations. The land tenure system remained as before with the government owning about 68% of the land and compulsory renting the remainder. Tenancies are allocated by the Board, though a minor change towards fixing the plots cultivated by tenants overtime was introduced. No right of tenancy transfer is established and all the sub-renting and sub-sharecropping in practise is illegal and is practised without the consent of the Board. All the decisions on crop patterns and farm enterprises are still taken by the Board (in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture). The time table for agricultural operation continues to be determined by the board as well as the use of some inputs such as the frequency of irrigation, the number and times of herbicides and pesticides spreading and theoretically the use of fertilizers.

Despite the increasing role of permanent workers on the Scheme (tractor and other machines operators), they have no say in the Scheme management and they are not directly employed by the tenants, hence he/she could not supervise them or see to their work to be done according to the tenants' satisfaction. Cotton, groundnuts and wheat are still to be handed to the Board at the prices determined by the Government. The alienation of tenants from their means of production and their products does still exist. The Gezira model's tenant is not a partner (because he has no saying in the production organization and management), is not an agricultural worker and is not an independent small commodity producer. The articulated institutionalizing continues and with it the crisis of the Gezira model.

6.2.2. The Crisis of Rainfed Agriculture

Rainfed agriculture in the Sudan is of two types, mechanized farming and non-mechanized farming. The latter is usually referred to as the traditional agricultural sector. It is important in referring to the latter as traditional to explain that the term here describes the means of production and not the production relations. It is not synonymous as used commonly with pre-capitalist or small commodity production.

6.2.2.1. Mechanized Farming

Mechanized farming was introduced in the central clay plain of the Sudan in 1944/45. Four periods could be distinguished in the development of mechanized farming in the Sudan.

The first period was between 1944/45 and 1952/53 which characterized by the direct involvement of the government in investment and the organization of production. The experience was carried in the Gadambalia area north of Gedaref in eastern Sudan. On the first year 12,000 *feddans* were cultivated. The farm and tractors were owned by the Government. Because the production process was not completely mechanized, seasonal agricultural labour was sought (for weeding and harvesting). The failure of getting enough supply of labour from the area made the government revise the organization of production and to attempt to apply the crop-sharing system. Land was distributed in 28 *feddans* tenancy to local population. The government was to provide the tractors for ploughing seeding, while the tenant was to be responsible for weeding and harvesting. The yield was to be divided equally between the government and the tenant. Not like the Gezira, the experience failed because the area had no tradition of share-cropping, and the tenants were used to cultivate small peaces of land for their subsistence while their main concern was animal husbandry. The government returned to hiring labour in 1948/49 and continued to carry the experience until 1952/53 when a working party was formed to evaluate it.

The recommendations of the working party began a new period in the development of mechanized farming in the Sudan. The most important of the working party's recommendations was that investment should be left to private sector while the government should concentrate on providing the services, the infra-structure and to carry research. The government immediately accepted the recommendations and private sector was invited to invest in schemes of 1000 *feddans* each. The period 1954/55-1960/61 could easily be described as a period for the 'scramble for Gedaref'. By 1960/61 new areas (the Dali and Mazmoum in southern Blue Nile Province, and the Renk area in northern Upper Nile Province) were opened for mechanized farming and the total area reached over one million *feddans* (1,040,000 in 1961/62).

The third period began by the establishment of the Mechanized Farming Corporation in 1968 to plan, demarcate and allot areas for mechanized farming and to provide finance for new schemes. The area of the mechanized farm increased to 1,500 *feddans*. Land rented to investors at LS 0.05/ *feddan* This period was dominated by the influence of the IBRD, which proposed the establishment of the MFC and provided two loans towards financing the new extensions in Habilla (Southern Kordofan), Damazine (Southern Blue Nile), Samsam and Um Seinat (Southern Gedaref), and Al Miganis (near Kosti, Southern White Nile Province). By 1976 the area under mechanized farming reached 3.5 million *feddans*.

While the investment in mechanized farming before the IBRD finance was financed by the private resources (previously accumulated capital in other activities) or the Sudan Agricultural Bank (since 1961), the investments after 1971 were financed by the MFC. MFC provided two loans to the 'farmer', one for clearing the land and the other for buying a tractor and a disc (supplied by the MFC). The first loan (LS 2.5/*feddan*) was to be repaid in equal ten annual instalments. The second loan (equal to 80% of the price of the tractor) was to be repaid in equal five annual instalments.

The fourth period began after 1976 (following the 1974 and 1977 Investment Acts) when for the first time since 1950 large scale plantations were allotted to individuals and companies (see Chapter 4).

Almost more than half the national *dura* production is produced in mechanized farming. It also produces between 50 to 70% of the output of country's sesame. It became an important source of seasonal employment of peasant from traditional agriculture. In all these aspects, mechanized farming had a positive effect on the economy. On the other hand, mechanized farming had negative effects on the traditional farming, the pastors and the environment. Its effects on income generation and distribution were discussed in Chapter 4. The nature of land tenure in mechanized agriculture is like mining industries, and it has encouraged continuous large scale farming practises which has exhausted the land through , The experience of Gadambalia north Gedaref stands as an undisputed example.

6.2.2.2. Rain-fed Agriculture.

It has been discussed in Chapter 2 that the rain-fed sub-sector had been subject to an early articulation process. The link with the international market had been established during the early days of colonialism. After World War II, groundnuts came to play great role in this link and thus contributed to the transformation of the sub-sector into commodity production. Just after independence the land under groundnuts increased from an average of 141, 000 *feddan* between 1954-56 to an average of 455, 000 *feddans* between 1957-59. It continued expanding to reach 847, 000 *feddan* by 1964. The contribution of irrigated agriculture constituted less than 5% which meant that most of the newly cultivated lands were in the rain-fed sub-sector. In 1974/5 the area under groundnuts in the rain-fed sub-sector underwent its third major increase, to 1,783,000 *feddans* an increase of 26% in comparison with the previous year. In 1976/7 the area exceeded two million *feddans* and remained around the two millions until the drought of 1982/3-84/85. Sesame was the second oil-seeds cash crop that had shown increasing importance, in the traditional rain-fed sub-sector. The area under sesame's cultivation increased from an average of 557,000 *feddans* in the period 1953/54-1957/58 to around two million *feddans* just before the drought of 1982/83-84/85. The increase of groundnuts and sesame cultivation was related to a spread of three types of capitalist operations in that sub-

sector. The first was a share cropping operation to finance the production of groundnuts jumping over the constraints of the communal land tenure system existing in most of the areas of the sub-sector, hence pushing the articulation process a step forward. The second was the arrangement through the tribal chiefs, local government officials or clientele relations to acquire land which would be cultivated by hired labour directly. Both village shopkeepers and rich farmers were reported to "*operate a proprietor set up in which they rely in hired labour for all cultivation tasks*" (Saad:1989, 85). The two types of operations were not exclusive and a share cropping which involve wage labour was also observed in areas like Western Kordofan and eastern Dar Fur(personal information collected from the area in 1979, 1984 and 1986). The main labour force were Dinka and Nuer coming from the South and the poor peasant families of the Hamar and Berti of the area. As early as 1976 in a field work I had carried¹ among the Habilla seasonal workers, it was found that almost 80% were found to supplement their farm incomes by working for rich farmers or merchants' farms. Saad reported that the majority of farmers he interviewed in his research in Kordofan "*state that they work partly as labourers and partly on their farms*"(Saad:1989, 85). Haaland pointed that in the Baggara area "*Rich herd owners have also invested in groundnut production, by employing cheap labour from the Dinka areas of Bahar al-Gazal*" (Haaland, 1990, 243).

The third was the spread of the *shail* system for financing groundnuts cultivation by the farmers themselves. All three types of operations were the result of the articulation of the pre-capitalist modes of production and the capitalist mode through market and exchange relations. The result was the spread of commodity production and capitalist production relations. The institutional frame established by the colonial regime underwent a substantial change. The closed districts ordinance and the passport and permits order ceased to exist. The native administration had been dissolved since 1969. The tribal aristocracy had been transformed into a rural capitalist class investing in capitalist farming, transport (especially lorries), and commerce. The tribal aristocracy continued to play its political in the newly established political institutions of the Nimeiri Regime, especially after 1971.

In contrast to the irrigated agriculture the commoditization process did not lead to a development in the means of production. The same traditional tools like hoes and cutlasses were used. No use of chemical fertilizers, limited use of pesticides (controlled by Central Government in locusts eradication campaigns), and limited application of scientific research. Tully reported that the government provided groundnuts seeds in the early fifties in Dar Masalit in Western Darfur, and they were not changed since then.(Tully:1988,99). The same was reported about groundnuts seeds in Kordofan (Kaballo:1984,61).

¹I was working as research assistant to Khalid Affan (see Affan, 1978)

The stagnation in the means of production left the burden of production on labour and land only. Capital benefited from both cheap labour power and land. Capital had to pay less than the necessary value for the reproduction of labour power because part of that value was produced by the peasant and his family in their subsistence cultivation. The land tenure system based on communal land ownership (and legally state ownership) was either obtained free for members of the community or at below opportunity costs for non-members through the relation discussed above.

The increase of areas in cash crops disturbed the traditional rational rotation of hariq and shift cultivation which had been practised by the peasants to maintain the land fertility and the ecological balance of bush-cultivated land. The fallow period decreased from average of 6 -7 years to 3 years. Tully reported that in Dar Masalit that; "*currently, any land that has been fallow for three years is considered uncultivated (bur) and available for anyone to cut.*" (Tully, op. cite., 207). When 275 farms were investigated by Tully, he found that land cultivated by old people had mostly been cut from bush, while as the age decline, the younger generations either inherited the farms or received them as gifts. Tully's finding were rearranged and calculated in percentages in table 6:2.

Table 26. Source of Land Cultivated by farmers in Dar Masalit (in percentage)

source of land	age groups			
	over 50	41-50	30-40	under 30
Inheritance	16.9	25.9	16.1	22.6
Gift	16.5	40.3	59.7	62.3
Cut from bush	62.6	32.5	24.2	15.1
Other	3.6	1.3	0	0

Source: Calculated from Tully, 1988, Culture and Context in the Sudan: The Process of Market Incorporation in Dar Masalit, State University of New York Press, New York, page 21

Haaland noticed that the communal land tenure system

"may operate quite smoothly as long as production on family farm's geared towards satisfying one's own consumption requirements and as long as there is relatively low population pressure." (Haaland, 1990, 235)

This process of commoditization through the production of groundnuts in vast communal areas permitted the supply of cheap groundnuts and large profits for merchant capital and oil manufacturers. Capital accumulated in the process was transferred to Central Sudan and most of groundnuts merchants of the fifties and sixties moved to Khartoum and Port Sudan in the seventies and eighties leaving behind new generations of merchants and oil manufacturers. (Mahmoud, op. cit., 212).

The process had its effect of the peasants economy and the environmental and ecological balance. Traditional peasants became more dependent on the market and affected by the fluctuations in the market prices of groundnuts. The restriction of their cultivation-fallow bush rotation led to the decline of the yields of both their cash and staple food crops. As it is noted above more of them were compelled to sale their labour power both in the local

market and through seasonal migration to near by mechanized farms or irrigated agricultural schemes.

The ecological effect of the increasing commoditization was disastrous because vast areas of bush were cut especially in the savannah areas north of the central clay plain. The effect in the Qoz areas of North Kordofan and Dar fur were greater because of the unstable soil. The location of the area adjacent to the Sahara made it more viable to desertification and accumulation of sand dunes. Although no research had established the relation between the decline in rainfall and the process described above, it is believed that the two phenomena were interrelated.

More emphasis in the literature on desertification was given to the phenomenon of over-grazing and exceeding the carrying capacity of the land (Ibrahim:1984, El Sammani 1984,1986... etc). In reality the increase in the number of livestock and the vast cultivation of cash crops both contributed to desertification and both were related to the utilization of communal resources by the merchant capital and the tribal aristocracy. The latter had transferred their accumulated wealth into livestock herds because they could enhance their social prestige and gain large profits since the costs of pasture was the burden of the communal land according to the land tenure system, central to the articulated modes of production. Haaland wrote "...the income from pastoral production accrues to the individual management unit while the costs in term of over-grazing are shared by every one." (Haaland, op. cite., 243).

The crisis of the traditional rain-fed agriculture had its reason deep in the land tenure system which permits the 'mining' of the communal land without investors paid the real costs. With land utilization far below its opportunity costs, the exhaustion of the land would continue since no efforts from private beneficiaries would be made to develop the means of production and the introduction of new technologies and patterns of cultivation. The crisis will continue unless land tenure reforms are introduced and/or direct investment by the state is made.

It was tragic that the sub-sector which was the source of most of the foreign currency when irrigated agriculture declined in the mid-seventies was to suffer the longest and more acute famine of its history as a result.

6.3. The Reproduction of Uneven Development²

One important element in the colonial legacy that has continued is the uneven development of the different Sudanese regions. This was not only an economic problem,

²This section draws on a paper presented by the author to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the SPC in 1987 and was incorporated in the SCP memorandum to the political parties on the Sudan entitled: *National Constitutional Conference: For Consolidated Democracy, Even Development and Permanent Peace*' and published in *El Meidan Newspaper* on 18 December 1988.

but it was, (and still is), the major element in the political instability and the unstable state in the Sudan.

Uneven development was a result of the rigid articulation of modes of production inherited from the colonial era and preserved by the post-colonial state. Uneven development in the Sudan is an expression of the local division of labour, albeit dependent on and linked to the international division of labour as has been argued in Chapter 2.

It was just logical for the market forces to deepen the uneven distribution of private investment, for capital tends to seek areas of high average rate of profit (or high marginal efficiency of capital in Keynesian terminology). Government intervention was not enough to upset this general trend. Its intervention took two measures: the first was the encouragement of private sector to invest in the most undeveloped areas, especially through the investment laws; while the second was direct government investment. Except for the investment in mechanised agriculture, the first measure failed to attract private investment outside the triangle area of Khartoum-Kosti- Sennar, where most of the infrastructure and public utilities were concentrated. Though mechanised agriculture did contribute in generating extra income by providing seasonal work opportunities, its effects on the environment, the peasant agriculture, the availability of pastures for pastoralists were negative. Many empirical studies have argue that surpluses generated by mechanised agriculture were transferred to urban areas and to the Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle (See Affan, 1978). The direct government investment was mainly limited to social services and public utilities. There are some other isolated government projects (Wau Fruit and Vegetable Canning Factory, Babanosa Milk Dehydration Factory, and the Textile factories in Nyala, and Kadogli) which did not constitute part of a comprehensive rural or regional development strategy. Both the central government the regional governments failed in drafting such a strategy.

Uneven developed in the Sudan has been reflected in three main characteristics: a) the uneven development of the forces of production, b) the uneven development of social services (especially education and health) and the other infrastructure and public utilities which are necessary for the development of both social services and productive forces (transport and communication, electricity and water)

6.3.1. Uneven Development of the Forces of Production

The most important symptom of uneven development in the Sudan was the uneven development of the forces of production. agricultural producers in the less developed areas (despite the production relations that governed their production) were still by 1985 using primitive tools and means production (no irrigation facilities and complete dependency on rain fall, no modern agricultural equipment, no use of modern fertilizers or chemicals, absence of agricultural research and instruction ... etc). This resulted in a low crop yields. This is shown in table 27. The yields of *dura* in the less developed areas

amounted to 54% of the yields per *feddan* in the most developed areas. Groundnuts yields amounted to 25.2% and those of sesame were 73.4% of the respective yields per *feddan* in the most developed areas

Table 27. Yields per *Feddan* for Three Main Crops in the Sudan (Average of 1975/76-1984/85 in Kg /*feddan*)

	<i>Dura</i>	Groundnuts	Sesame
Less developed areas*	238.9	203.1	92.4
Most Developed areas**	442.4	807.1	125.8
All Sudan average	272.7	321.3	101.6

Note: *The less developed areas are defined here as the non-mechanised rainfed agriculture

**The most developed areas are defined as the irrigated and the mechanised rainfed agriculture

Source: Calculated from: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, (1984), *Sudan Year Book of Agricultural Statistics, 1984*.

In industry the discrepancy in the forces of production could be shown by the relative distribution of industrial establishments, their fixed assets, production, contribution to value added, number of workers and the salaries and wages they paid. Table 28 shows the relevant data on that. The Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle is taken as the most developed areas, while the rest of the country is defined as less developed.

It is clear from table 28 that industry in 1981/82 was concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle³. The discrepancy in the level of the development of forces of production is shown by the fact that although the less developed areas had 43.6% of the total number of industrial establishment they employ 20.1% of the industrial labour force and paid 19.1% of the industrial wage bill, produced 23.4% of the total industrial production and 29.8% of the value added. Their of the fixed assets was only 20.7%, most of it located in Port Sudan and Kassala towns of the Eastern Region.

Table 28. Uneven Development of Industry in the Sudan 1981/82 (%)

	No. of establishments	No of Workers	Salaries and Wages	Total Production	Value Added	Fixed Assets
Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar Triangle	56.4%	79%	80.9%	76.6%	70.2%	79.2%
The rest of the Sudan	43.6%	21%	19.1%	23.4%	29.8%	20.7%*

Note: * Of this 16% were located in the Eastern Region (mainly in Port Sudan and Kassala) and the remaining 4% is located in the other regions of the Sudan

Source: Ministry of Industry: *Industrial Survey of 1981/82, Khartoum*.

6.3.2. Uneven Development of Social Services and Infrastructure:

6.3.2.1. Education Services

The discrepancy in the distribution of education services throughout Sudan could be shown by comparing the number of pupils in general education in every region as percentage of the total number of pupils in the country with the size of the population of

³For and interesting discussion of the geographical location of industry in the Sudan see Mohamed Ali (1989), Chapter 3 and 4.

that region as percentage of the total population in the Sudan. Table 29 shows the percentage distribution of pupils and teachers in the different Sudanese region in 1983.

While only 8.8% of the population of the Sudan lived in Khartoum in 1983, Khartoum had 15.7% of the primary schools pupils in the country. It had 22.5% of the intermediate schools pupils, 27% of the academic and technical schools pupils and 9.7% of the teachers institutes students. The Central Region share in education service was also greater than its relative size of population. While its population constituted 20.5% of the population in Sudan it had 30.3% of primary school pupils, 30% of intermediate schools pupils, 28.4 of academic secondary schools students, 33% of the technical secondary schools and 20.9% of the teachers institutes students.

Table 29. The Distribution of Population, Pupils and Teachers in the Different Regions in the Sudan (in percentage, 1983)

Regions	Population	Primary	Intermediate	Secondary Academic	Secondary Technical	Teachers Institutes
Northern	5.4	11.0	14.5	13.5	8.8	14.7
Eastern	10.7	9.6	8.7	8.3	13.4	10.8
Northern and Eastern	18.1	20.6	23.2	21.8	22.2	25.5
Central	20.4	30.3	30.0	28.4	33.0	20.8
Khartoum	8.8	15.7	22.5	27.0	27.1	9.7
Central and Khartoum	29.2	36.0	52.5	55.4	60.1	30.6
Kordofan	15.0	10.8	9.8	8.7	4.8	9.1
Darfur	15.0	13.1	7.1	5.2	7.5	15.9
Equatoria	6.8	5.7	4.2	4.6	3.8	7.7
Bahar el Gazal	11.1	1.3	1.5	2.2	1.5	11.1
Upper Nile	7.8	2.3	1.8	2.1	--	—
Less Developed	55.7	33.2	24.4	22.8	17.2	43.8

Source: 1) Department of Statistics, Population Census 1983 (unpublished). 2) Ministry of Education and Instruction, (1985), *Educational Statistics 1984/85*, Khartoum.

If the figures for Kordofan, Darfur and the Southern Regions are together compared with those of Khartoum and Central Region, the disparity in the distribution of education services will be clearly apparent. The less developed region was the home for 55.7% of the population. It had 33.2%, 24.4%, 22.8% 17.6% and 43.8% of the pupils and students in primary, intermediate, academic secondary, technical secondary schools and teachers institutes respectively, compared with 46.5, 52.5%, 55.4%, 60.1% and 9.1% for Khartoum and the Central Region together where only 29.2% of the population were living.

The comparison of the less developed areas with the Northern Region raises directly the question of the regional and ethnic composition of the ruling classes in the Sudan. The Northern Region had more pupils and students than its relative size of population. This has no explanation except that the ruling classes who predominantly of Northern regional origin favoured their areas in allocating educational services.

The uneven distribution of general university services was reflected in the higher education. Students from Khartoum, Central and Northern regions continued to dominate the annual intake in higher education. They represented about 70% of the University of Khartoum annual intake for the years 1979/80-1984/85, while students from Kordofan and Darfur regions represented 12% on average during the same period (Al Maidan, 18 December 1988, 6).

6.3.2.2. Health Services

the disparity in the distribution of health services could be looked at by evaluating five indicators: the number of persons per doctor, per hospital bed, per specialist doctor, and per nurse; and the number of hospital beds per doctor. Table 29 shows these indicators in the different Sudanese regions.

Table 30. Indicators of the Distribution of Health Services in the Different Sudanese Regions

Region	Persons/ Doctor	Persons/ Hospital bed	<u>Regions</u>		
			persons per Specialist doctor	Persons/ nurse	Hospital bed / Doctor
Khartoum	1367	484	5474	456	2
Eastern	9324	945	41928	1421	9
Northern	9783	654	30500	864	14
Central	14643	1156	67360	1445	12
Kordofan	19585	1449	89222	1196	13
Darfur	49600	2591	16047	2871	19
Southern	42739	1023	173333	2977	41
Sudan	8861	1035	33707	1298	7

Source: Calculated from: Ministry of Health, (1982), Annual Health Statistical Report, Khartoum 1982.

In 1982 there 1,367 person per doctor in Khartoum, while there were 19,585 persons/ doctor in Kordofan and 49,600 persons/ doctor in Darfur and 42,739 persons/ doctor in the Southern Region. While there were one hospital bed for every 484 persons in Khartoum, the ratio was a bed for 1449 in Kordofan, 2491 persons in Darfur, and 1023 persons in the Southern Region. there were two bed per doctor in Khartoum, 13 beds per doctor in Kordofan , 14 bed per doctor in Darfur and 41 bed per doctor in the Southern Region. The indicators of persons per specialised doctor and per nurse confirm the same trend of uneven distribution of health services. There was a specialist doctor for every 5,474 persons in Khartoum. The indicator for Kordofan was 17 time higher (89 thousand persons per specialised doctor), in Darfur 32 times higher, (160 thousand persons per specialised doctor) and in the Southern Region 34 times higher (173 thousand persons per specialised doctor). There was a nurse per 456 persons in Khartoum, 1,196 persons in Kordofan, 2,871 persons in Darfur and 2, 977 persons in the Southern Region.

6.3.2.3. Other Infrastructure

The National Electricity Grid is concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti-sennar triangle. Except for the Eastern Grid which distributes Khasham al-Girba Dam electricity to New

Halfa and Kassala towns, the other urban parts of the Sudan depended on local diesel generated electricity. Most of the regional thermal stations suffer problems of shortage of diesel oil and spare-parts supply.

Darfur and Kordofan Regions suffer from continuous shortage in water supply.

Until 1985, out of eleven modern roads built to connect the main Sudanese towns only three were in the less developed area. The total length of modern road built between 1973 and 1985 was 2,148 kilometres, of them only 401 kilometres were in Kordofan and Darfur.

6.3.3. Regional Responses to Uneven Development and their National effects

Chapter 3 has argued that uneven development was responsible for the rise of regional movements between 1956 and 1969. After 1969 many regional movements⁴ were discovered within the armed forces. The first of these groups was disclosed and members arrested in July 1969 (Wai, 1979, 98). The September 1975 coup was labelled racist. The leaders of the coup in their testimony in Atabara trials argued that "a deep feeling of Regional deprivation and disillusionment, especially among the Western province and the Nuba hills- provided the core motivations" (ACR, 1975/76, B113).

Chapter 4 has shown that discontent in the South began since 1974.

6.3.3.1. The Rise of The SPLA/SPLM

The rise of the SPLA/SPLM was a response to the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement to solve the problem of uneven development. Its appeal to all the people of the less developed areas in the Sudan was significant.

The SPLA/SPLM provided in its "Manifesto", an attempt to explain the crisis that led to its formation. The SPLA/SPLM analysis was based on the proposition that there

"is generally a 'Problem of Backward Areas' in the whole country that is particularized and exacerbated in the South by successive minority clique regimes in Khartoum." (SPLA/ SPLM, 1983, 1)

The uneven development that led to the creation of these backward areas was traced back to the colonial regime (Ibid, 1). These areas were defined as the whole Sudan except Khartoum and Blue Nile old provinces⁵, the latter two were together defined as the North. The problem of underdevelopment, according to the *Manifesto*, "was particularized in the South especially in the field of education." (Ibid, 7), which led to a development of a Northern elite more rapidly than a Southern one. This was "to become the central problem in Sudan's post-independence politics" (Ibid, 7). Accordingly the *Manifesto* evaluated the mutiny of Turit and the rise of *Any-anya 1* as a response to the distribution of jobs after independence, "The objective and aims of Anya-nya 1 therefore

⁴The official description for such movements was that they were racist movements.

⁵The old provinces, which became regions according to the Regional Government Act of 1980, were divided into smaller provinces in 1974 .

centred around jobs and jobs titles" (Ibid, 8) . That is why it was possible to reach an agreement such as Addis Ababa which "was a deal between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elites" (Ibid, 9). Such an agreement was "thus bound to collapse as it ignored the real interests of the masses of the people" (Ibid, 9). In addition to that, the Northern elite in Khartoum undermined the agreement by its policies and actions, the *Manifesto* did not say why? Instead it went on listing the policies and actions on the political economic, and military sides (Ibid, 10-14). In response to these policies and actions Southern people began to organise themselves in different opposition groups : National Action Movement (NAM), Movement For Total Liberation of Southern Sudan (MTLSS), Equatoria Central Committee for Re-division (ECC), and the Council for the Unity of South Sudan (CUSS) (p 12). At the same time

" the old CNF (Congress of New Forces, which included the Fur, Nuba and Beja) took advantage of the political crisis in the South and organized African-based coups against Khartoum" (p 12)

The 1975 coup was quoted as an example.

John Garang, in a speech to the nation from SPLA/SPLM radio, tried to sum up the reasons of the crisis by saying:

"The neocolonial system that has developed in our country since 1956 and was represented by Nimeirism since 1969 is a regime in which a few people have amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority. The injustice has resulted in profound crisis and distortion in our economy, politics, ethics and even religion which Nimeiri has perverted into an article of trade" (Garang, 1992, 19)

Though Garang was more explicit in exposing the national nature of the crisis on both economic and political levels, he emphasised the particular crisis in the South which justified that his movement began from there to liberate the whole Sudan. The SPLA/SPLM's and Garang's analysis concentrated on the problem of uneven development and they did not see any classes beyond the bush! This led to a serious undermining of the democratic movement in the North (within the limits of the definition of the North in the SPLA/SPLM *Manifesto*). It is not enough to define the ruling bloc as 'a minority elite in Khartoum' or a 'bourgeoisified bureaucratic group' in the North and South, though the latter represent an important step towards a class -based analysis. The analysis of *Anay-nya* and the *Addis Ababa Agreement* was more sound than the rest of the analysis, yet it is not enough alone to provide satisfactory explanation of the reasons for the 17 years war or for signing or failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Concrete analysis requires a comprehensive outlook to all the elements and their interrelation. The "distribution of colonial jobs between the Southern an Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elite" might be an important element in the 17 years war initiation, but it was not the sole element and the continuation of the war for seventeen years had other additional reasons. The same could be said about the reasons for reaching the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Both

international, (including regional), as well as internal conditions contributed to reaching the Agreement.

The rise of the SPLA/SPLM and the continuation of civil war in the Sudan provided an evidence of the importance of the question of uneven development in the organic crisis in the Sudan. The contribution of the second civil war to the 1973-85 crisis was important in deepening the crisis after 1983.

6.4. The Failure to Establish a Hegemony

Chapter 3 argued that the traditional power bloc who ruled the country between 1954 and the coup d'état in May 1969 failed to establish its hegemony. Chapter 3 and 5 extended the argument to show that the military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie had failed to establish its hegemony as well. Hence, the failure to establish hegemony is an important element in the general crisis in the Sudan.

6.4.1. Change in Class Structure

The policies of the state between 1973-85 greatly affected the development of the social classes in the Sudan. The change that development has brought to the class structure in the country made the question of the transformation of the socio-economic structure more urgent than any time before. This explains why the crisis under the Nimeiri regime was more acute and deep than previous crises. It also explains why the class struggle was more extensive and intensive, despite the confiscation of the rights to association and expression under the authoritarian state

During the period 1973-85 there were quantitative and qualitative changes in almost all social classes in the Sudan. These changes were instigated by many factors of which three were main: capital accumulation, the expansion of state apparatus and the expansion of education. Through capital accumulation changes happened in both the capitalist class and the working class, while through the expansion of education and the state apparatus the new petty bourgeoisie went through important quantitative and qualitative changes. The rural masses of peasant and nomads who are the majority of the Sudanese population were affected by the factors which brought these changes. Though some of them joined the irrigated agriculture (Suki and Rahad), others suffered drastically from the effects on environment and the redistribution of resources, wealth and incomes.

The following sections give an account of the changes in class structure.

6.4.1.1. The Aristocracy: Decay or Change?

The 1969 coup that brought Nimeiri to power was in itself a great blow to the tribal and religious aristocracy which were the main partner in the ruling power bloc in the post-colonial era in the Sudan. In August 1969, native administration was dissolved in Northern Sudan. In March 1970 during the confrontation with the Ansar sect, the

property of the Mahdi family, the leading religious aristocrats were confiscated. The properties of Al Mirghani family, the leading Khatimyya family, were confiscated in May-June 1970.

When the Peoples Local Councils were formed in 1971, the ex-tribal leaders wasted no time in joining them. A study conducted in 1972 showed that the tribal leaders and their families had dominated the Peoples' Local Councils (Alassam, 1983, 72-73). During the 1973-85 period, the tribal leaders and members of their families participated in the elections for the several National Peoples' Assemblies. They were fairly represented in the five assemblies elected during that period.(AFC, 1975/76, B116)

Most of the tribal aristocracy shifted to investment in trade, transport and agriculture, especially mechanised agriculture⁶. The tribal aristocracy decided to change into a rural capitalist class instead of decaying.

While most of the members of the Mahdi family went into exile to participate in the opposition until 1978, the Mirghani family stayed in the country and shifted activities to trade. As part of the National Reconciliation agreement in 1977 the confiscated properties of the religious aristocracy were either returned to them or generous compensation was paid instead (see Appendix A below).

6.4.1.2. The Capitalist Class

All fractions of the capitalist class expanded and increased in number. The number of registered private companies increased from 995 in December 1971 to 2811 in May 1984. In 14 years of Nimeiri rule, the number of registered companies were about 182.5% all those companies registered under the Companies Act from its promulgation in 1925 to 1971 (Information and data gathered by the Author from the Commercial Companies Registrar Office, the Chamber of the Attorney General, Khartoum, Sudan, 1987). A spiral increase in the number of capitalist who were registered as export-import dealers happened between 1971 and 1984. When the register was cancelled by the President in April 1984 there were 13113 dealers while in December 1971 there were only 1379 dealers, an increase of 850.9% (Information and data gathered by the Author from the files of the Ministry of Commerce). The expansion, though no reliable statistics were available, was observed in retail traders. Research carried in the three towns of Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman confirmed that almost 81% of the grocery shops in six

⁶In 1975/76, during a field work conducted by the author in Habilla Mechanised Farming, he interviewed both Babu Nimir, the ex-Nazir of Missarya Baqqarra of Southern Kordofan and Mr. Abdul Gabar Zaki el Deen, the ex-Nzir of the Bedairyya.

main streets⁷ were opened after 1971 (Data collected by the author in October 1987). The three most popular markets in the three towns were established in the same period⁸.

The number of people classified in the national statistics as working in trade commerce and finance⁹ increased from 4.75% of the total labour force in 1969/70 to 4.9 in 1976/77 to 5.7% in 1983 (calculated from data of Ministry of Economics and National Planning, 1985, 79 and 1990, 27).

The second large expansion was in financial capital. The Sudanese financial capital lost its only banking institution, the Sudan Commercial Bank, when the commercial banks were nationalised in May 1970¹⁰. No private banks were allowed to operate in the Sudan until 1976 when the Bank of Sudan issued a statement allowing foreign banks to establish branches in the Sudan. In 1978 the Sudan Investment Bank, a joint private French-Sudanese bank commenced its operation. (Bank of Sudan, 1978, 57). In the same year the first Islamic bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, began its operations in May 1978. By 1985 there were five Islamic banks, the capital of which amounted to LS168 millions which represented 52% of the total capital of all the commercial banks in the Sudan. Eighteen thousands Sudanese shareholders contributed 42% of the paid capital, while 3,000 foreigners, mostly from Gulf countries contributed the remaining 58%. There were other four joint venture banks, the capital of which was equal to 38.6 millions (Kaballo, 1987, 4).

By 1970 there were six local insurance companies¹¹. After the new economic policy of 1974, new 9 insurance companies were established. There were 15 insurance companies in 1985. By 1985 the issued capital of these companies amounted to LS21 millions, their paid capital LS 9 millions, while they were dealing in LS67 million of insurance premiums (Ibid, 4). In 1985 the premium collected increased to LS 100 million, of which 60% was collected by the big four companies: the General Insurance (LS17 million), the Blue Nile Insurance (LS 17 million), the United Insurance (LS 15 million), and the Islamic Insurance (LS 11 million) (Sudanow, August 1986, 18).

The fraction of agricultural capitalists was characterised by the expansion in mechanized agriculture, the expansion of groundnut production in rain fed areas and the expansion mixed farming around big towns of the Nile valley. Small farms of less than 100 *feddans* (average size of 14 *feddans*) dominated Sudanese private agriculture by 1985. Although

⁷These were Sharia al Daim and Sharia al-Amarraat in Khartoum, Sharia al-Postah and Sharia al-Mo'ana in Khartoum North, and Sharia al-Hijara and Sharia al Arbeen in Omdurman ,

⁸al-Suq al Shabi in Khartoum was established in 1970, Suq Saad Gishra in Khartoum North in 1973 and Suq al Shabi in Omdurman in 1979.

⁹The group included all those working in trade commerce and finance whether they were capitalist or employed by them.

¹⁰For a history of the Sudanese banking system see Ali (1982, 1985) , and Kaballo (1987)

¹¹The six companies dominated the market after foreign insurance firms lost their licences in May 1970. Insurance industry became totally owned by indigenous capital.

the number of large farms and company farms was not great, their size and the total area they claimed were substantially great. By 1985 there were about 8,000 large farms of more than 100 *feddans* and less or equal to 1500 *feddans*. The average size of such farms was 1125 *feddans*. They command about 9 million *feddans* which constituted about 32.6% of the total area under cultivation. There were about 36 companies' farms of an average size of 500,000 *feddans*. Of these only four are public sector companies (sugar-cane farms of total area of 127,000 *feddans*). They command an area of 1.8 million *feddans* constituted about 6.5% of the total area of cultivated farms. (Zaki and Satar, 1986, 18-19). Table 18 shows the distribution of farms according to size.

Table 31. Estimated Number of Agricultural Farms

Category	Farms Number	%	Area (000) <i>feddans</i>	%
Small holders (Under 100 <i>feddans</i>)	1,200,000	99.3	16,800	60.9
Large Private Farms (100-1500 F)	8,000	0.7	9,000	32.6
Company Farms	36	-	1,800	6.5
Total	1,208,036	100	27,600	100

Source: Zaki and Star, (1986), Structure of Sudanese Agriculture As Basis For Estimation and Projection of Agricultural Production, Table 2.4, p 18.

The fraction of the industrial capitalists had expanded in the period 1971/72/-1981/82¹². The number of industrial establishment that employed more than 25 workers, increased from 209 in 1971/72 to 347 in 1981/82. Those employing less than 25 workers increased from 1,067 in 1971/72 to 6,656 establishments in 1981/82. The gross capital invested in all the Sudanese industry increased from LS112.5 million in 1971/72 to LS1,905 millions in 1981/82. The fixed capital of these industries increased from LS95 millions to LS1, 091 millions in 1981/82. Within the Sudanese industry the role and size of the private sector increased. Almost all the industries employing less than 25 workers were owned by the private sector in 1981/81. As for the manufacturing industries that employed 25 workers or more, the role of the private sector increased substantially. By 1981/82, 290 establishments, (83.6% of total establishments) were owned by the private sector compared with 153 establishments (73% of the total) in 1971/72. Though the private sector's share in industrial employment increased in absolute from 20,690 workers in 1970/71 to 44,020 in 1981/82, its relative share decreased from 48.6 to 41.8% during the same period. This was mainly because of the presence of 7 joint ventures¹³ (2% of the

¹²The comparison is made with 1981/82 figures because the last reliable industrial within the limits of the study period was carried in 1981/82 (Ministry of Industry, 1985)

¹³Of the seven joint ventures three were joint-venture between private Sudanese and private foreign capital, two were public sector and foreign capital and two were private sector-public sector and foreign capital joint venture. By 1985 the number of the latter increased to four raising the number of the joint ventures to 9. (information collected from Ministry of Industry in 1987 by the author.)

total establishment) which employed 31.8% of the workers in the Sudanese manufacturing industry. The private sector increased its total capital investment in industry LS42.1 millions in 1970/71 to 1,021 millions in 1981/82. The private sector produced 78.6% of the gross output value and 69.5% of the gross added value of manufactured industry in 1981/82 compared to 48.4% and 46.9% in 1970/71 respectively. Table 19 shows the structure of Sudanese manufacturing industry according to the ownership of the means of production.

Table 32. Sudanese Manufacturing Industry According to Ownership of the means of production in 1970/71 and 1981/82

Sector	Number of establishments		Employment		Wages and Salaries		Gross Output		Total Value Added		Invested Capital	
	Number	%	Number	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
					1970/71							
Public	56	26.80	21870	51.10	6,505	50.20	42,231	51.60	14,565	53.10	60,603	59
Private	153	73.20	20690	48.90	6,442	49.80	39,661	48.40	12,886	46.90	43,101	41
Total	290	100	42,560	100	12,947	100	81,892	100	27,451	100	102,704	100
					1981/82							
Public	50	14.40	27,724	26.36	29,498	25.02	92,784	10.35	29,223	10.35	250,364	13.13
Private	290	83.57	44,020	41.85	79,4279	58.39	794,279	69.48	196,177	69.48	1,021,222	53.59
Joint-Venture	7	2.03	33,434	31.79	19,543	16.59	123,935	20.17	56,922	20.17	633,862	33.28
Total	347	100	105,168	100	117,866	100	1,010,998	100	282,322	100	1,905,548	100

Source: Ministry of Industry, (1986) The Industrial Survey 1981/1982, Draft report, Table 6

6.4.1.3. The Working Class

The period 1973-85 witnessed a growth in the working class in the Sudan. The industrial working class increased in number from 49,216 in 1971/72 to 144,889 in 1981/82, a total increase 194.4%. While 87% of the industrial working class used to work in establishments that employ 25 workers or more in 1971/72, only 72.6% worked in these establishments in 1981/82. The relative decline in the size of the workers in the large establishments was not due to an absolute decline in the number of workers in such establishment which grew by 246% on the period 1971/72-1981/82, from 42,823 to 105168. The reason for that relative decline was the relatively high growth in the size of the working class in the industries employing less than 25 workers. The number of the latter increased from 6,393 workers, (13% of the total industrial working class), in 1971/72 to 39,721 workers, (27.4%), in 1981/82, a total increase of 621%. This had its repercussions on the organisation of the working class especially as far as trade unions were concerned. The direct effect was that 27.4% of the industrial working class remained by law outside the trade union movement, because the law determined the minimum number of workers allowed to form a trade union to be 30 workers.

The industrial working class remained concentrated in Khartoum and the Central Region (the previous Blue Nile Province). In the two regions together lived 79% of the industrial working class. The relative weights of the two had changed during the period under study. While Khartoum used to be the industrial area with the greatest number of industrial workers in 1970/71 (a total number of 30,335 workers which accounted to 61.6% of the total number of industrial workers), it became the second industrial area (with a total number of 49,942 workers which amounted to 47.8% of the industrial working class in the country) in 1981/82.

The Central Region became the greatest industrial area in the Sudan as far as the size of the industrial working class was concerned. In 1981/82, 44.6% of the industrial working class (about 64,592 workers) were employed in the Central Region; compared with about 21% (10,327 workers) in 1970/71. The Eastern Region, (the old Kassala province), remained in the third place with 8.8% of the industrial working class. Kordofan had 5.7%, the Northern Region 3.3%, and Darfur Region with 2.3% of the industrial working class in 1981/82. No reliable information about the size of the industrial working class in Southern Sudan because the industrial survey of 1970/71 covered Bahar al Gazal only while that of 1981/82 covered the Equatoria only. However, since most of the private industries in the South were concentrated around Juba, the figures provided by the 1981/82 survey, (Ministry of industry, 1985, Annex 5), are taken to be a base for the estimate of the industrial working class in the South. The number of the workers was estimated to be 1,779 in Equatoria, (Deng, 1986, Table I, 5-6) and 96 in Upper Nile (Ibid,

Table II, 7), and 263 workers in Bahar al Gazal (Industrial Survey, 1970/71, table 20, 75). The total size of the industrial working class in the South before the beginning of the second civil war could be estimated at 2,138 workers. Only 70% of them were working in establishments that employed 30 or more workers and hence had the right to form a trade union.

While the distribution of the industrial working class did not constitute an element of weakness to its trade union movement before 1971, it became an element of that weakness according to 1971 and 1977 trade unions acts. Trade unions according to the 1948 Workers Trade Unions Act were organised according to employer. This was changed in the Labour trade Union Act of 1971 and 1977 and organisation was based on industry. Most of the industries were distributed in the different parts of the Sudan. For example, the textile industry was almost in all the Northern provinces and in Equatoria, the food industry in all the Sudan. The workers in one establishment constituted a branch or a branch unit which had no legal or juristic identity independent of the trade union according to Article 8 (2) of the 1977 Act (Abu Eisa, 1990, 78). The branch or branch unit had to seek the ratification of the trade union executive to its decisions before implementation. (Ibid, 79).

Though there is no detailed statistics on the workers in the services sector, the total statistics provided by the Department of Labour in 1980 showed that the number of workers in the service's public sector amounted to 450, 000 (compared to 27,724 in the industrial public sector). Of those working in the services' sector, the number of the workers in transportation and communication is the greatest

The total number of workers organised in trade unions according to the Department of Labour were 623, 792 workers in 1980, organised in 501 trade union branch which were united in 39 General Trade Unions. Of these 479,225 (77%) were employed by the public sector (including the Central and Regional Governments) and 144,567 (23%) were employed by the private sector.

An important fraction of the working class which had grown fast during the period under study was the agricultural working class. The development of the agricultural labour force went through different periods¹. During the early period of the colonial role, as argued in Chapter, the absence of people who were ready to sell their labour power, was one of the main reasons for adopting the Gezira model of articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. After the establishment of the Gezira scheme in 1925, and as a need for seasonal work increased, the colonial government had encouraged West African Muslim immigrants to settle in and around the Gezira Area and had used the native

¹For a thorough discussion see Jay O'Brien (1980) and (1983).

administration to recruit (rather in a compulsory manner) peasants from Kordofan and Darfur to pick the Gezira Cotton (O'Brien, 1983, 19-20). The practise of recruiting seasonal labours by the direct intervention of the state apparatus continued after the independence. It involved in addition to the use of native administration, the use of the state propaganda and information machinery (especially the only State owned Radio Omdurman, the moving cinema ... etc). The scramble for Gedaref in the fifties and early sixties to establish private mechanised schemes, the Managil extension of the Gezira scheme. Khasham al-Girba agricultural scheme and sugar factory increased the demand for agricultural labour. The trend of increasing demand for agricultural labour continued in the seventies and the eighties. The expansion of mechanised agriculture, the establishment of the Rahad project and the Sugar factories with their large sugar-cane farms in Kenana, Assalya and Sennar In order to insure the growth of the supply of agricultural labour to satisfy the increasing demand, the state continued a policy reproducing uneven development, while increasing the cash requirements of the peasants in the less developed areas. The need for economic measures as the dissolution of native administration in 1969 had weakened the administrative and non economic measures to recruit labour. The import policy not only encouraged the demand for imported commodities but also undermined the non-agricultural products of the rural handicraft that used to be sources of earning cash and supplying rural population by locally produced goods. The rising inflation since the early seventies and the IMF supported inflationary policies of the mid-seventies worsened the rural population terms of trade with the urban area and the international market contributing to the increase in their cash requirements. The potentialities to produce forest products (building materials, household furniture and wood and coal for energy, both for household consumption and near-by urban markets), in the Savanna Belt of Central Northern Sudan (both the Central Clay Plain and the Qoz Area), had declined because of the expansion of mechanised agriculture (in the Central Clay Plain) and commercial groundnuts production (in the Qoz Area), especially during the 1970s. The same reason, as argued in Chapter 6 below, contributed to the decline of land available for the peasants which meant the collapse and removal of the agricultural rotation based on shifting and *hariq cultivation* leading to the decline of the productivity and yields. The environmental consequence of the expansion of both types of capitalist agriculture was making the whole Savanna Belt in general and the Qoz Area in particular vulnerable to drastic climatic changes² (See Chapter 4 and 6).

² Among those who tried to explain the relation between human activity and environmental changes in the Sudan are Hulme and Trillbach (1991), Callaghan et al (1985), Musand and El Rasheed (1979), Ibrahim (1978).

A study carried by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 1983 showed that there were a core of agricultural working class representing 5% of the resident labour force in rural Northern Sudan (Ministry of Finance, 1983, 70). These were people who were classified as depending on their living on selling their labour in the process of agricultural production. Of this core about 74% were employed within their villages and 26% were working outside their villages (Calculated from Ibid, 70). In addition to this core the number of those who became used to supplement their farm income by seasonal temporary agricultural hired work increased substantially. The ILO described this pattern of employment as being "more than a purely temporary type of employment ... and that for many at least it represents a sizable contribution to their yearly employment." (ILO, 1985, 62). The ILO estimated the number of the seasonal agricultural workers employed annually in mechanised farms to be about One million (ILO, 1987, 41). The same report estimated that about half a million seasonal labourers are employed annually by the large irrigated schemes in the Sudan. According to the ILO, about 2 millions of the rural labour force "migrate seasonally in search of cash income-earning opportunities on large scale rainfed or irrigated farms" (ILO, 1987, 41). Neither the core of the agricultural working class nor the large number of the seasonal labourers were organised in any sort of trade union, though a tendency among the seasonal workers who were coming from the same locality, ethnic, or tribal origin to have a *sheikh* or a leader to speak and negotiate on behalf of them was observed (O'Brien, 1983, 21).

6.4.1.4. The New Petty Bourgeoisie

The new petty bourgeoisie in the Sudan increased in number because of the spread of general and higher education. Higher education intake had increased from in 1970/71 to in 1984/85. By 1984/85 there were 36,226 students in Sudanese higher education institutes. The number of medical doctors employed by the Ministry of health increased from 1,082 in 1970/71 to 2,728 in 1982, an increase of 152.1%. The numbers of dentists increased from 30 to 159 and that of pharmacists from 20 to 71 for the same period (Ministry of Health, 1982, 38). Substantial numbers of medical doctors, dentists and pharmacists were either self-employed, emigrant in the Gulf³.

The number of registered lawyers in the Sudan amounted to 663 on the average between 1978-81.

By 1982 the number of teachers in all levels of general education were 63,960 teachers compared with 24,635 in 1970/71 (Ministry of Education, 1982, 20)

³Almost 315 of the general practitioners and 1.3% of the specialist doctors were working abroad in 1983/84 (ESRC, 1984, 13)

The growth in the size of the Sudanese bureaucracy could be shown by looking at the posts incorporated in the budget every year both in the central and local/regional governments. Table 30 shows the budgeted posts between 1978/79 and 1984/85.

Table 33. Budgeted Posts: Central and Local/ regional Government 1978/79-1984/85*

Years	All budget Posts			Classified posts		
	Central	Regional	Total	Central	regional	Total
1978/79	106,153	168,788	274,941	56,358	77,788	134,146
1979/80	103,738	173,300	227,038	52,591	83,300	135,891
1980/81	103,110	218,792	321,902	55,329	109,792	165,121
1981/82	109,753	221,000	330,753	56,679	105,000	161,679
1982/83	112,392	230,000	342,392	57,632	109,000	165,632
1983/84	108,809	228,400	337,209	56,523	109,200	165,723
1984/85	81,800	250,200	332,000	43,000	126,600	169,600

Note: *Regionalisation began in 1980/81; prior to that year posts refer to local government

Source: ILO, (1986), *Employment and Economic Reform: towards a Strategy for the Sudan*, 1986, Geneva

In addition to the Central and local/ regional government posts, the other public sector corporations and institutions employed about 168,872 in 1984/85, of whom 50,392 were employed in classified posts. If the classified posts are considered to be those of the bureaucrats, professional and technicians, then the total number of these factions employed by the public sector and the government increased from some 200 thousand in 1978/79 to 350 thousand in 1984/85, an increase of 75%.

According to the Department of Labour (1980) there were 132,707 employees, teachers and technicians who were organised in 327 trade union branches which were part of 35 general trade unions. The number of professionals, according to the same source, were 76,817 who were organised in 104 trade union branch which were part of 18 general trade unions.

By 1983, the Sudanese armed forces which was composed of 58 thousand soldiers (ACR, 1984/85, B 86), had about 3.5 to 4 thousands officers (SCP, 1985, 51).

6.4.5. The Peasants, Tenants and the Nomads

The majority of the Sudanese population remained peasants and nomads living in the rural areas. The nomadic population of the Sudan was estimated to be 10.7% of the total population, compared with 69.1% sedentary in rural areas and 20.25 in urban areas (Abdel Salam, 1987, 21)

The labour force engaged in agriculture in the declined from 69.5% in 1969/70 to 68.5% in 1976/77 an to 65.3% in 1983. The total number of peasant, tenants and herdsmen amount to 4 million persons. Two million of them are small holders farmers cultivating about 9 million *feddans* in the rainfed sub-sector (ILO, 1987, 40). The irrigated sub-

sector cultivates about 2.5 million *feddans* most of them are within six large schemes which were divided into some 200,000 tenancies (Ibid, 41).

Peasants in rainfed sub-sector and nomads in savanna belt of Northern Sudan suffered greatly from the 1983/84 draught. Almost eight million people were affected by the draught in the five Northern region, of them about 1.9 million persons were displaced from their original homes. Table 24 shows the details of drought victims and displaced people.

In Southern Sudan peasants and nomads suffered from the start of the second civil war in 1983. Almost 2 million people were displaced and the whole region suffered from a war created famine.

Generally during the period 1973-85, the rural population had their living condition deteriorated and their share in national income declined (See Chapter 4 above). The peasants and nomads suffered from the expansion of the mechanised agriculture, which, though created seasonal jobs as agricultural workers for them, decreased the size of land available for their shift agriculture and grazing practises.

Table 34. Drought Victims and Displaced Persons in the Sudan 1983/84

Region	Draught Victims		Displaced People	
	No.	%	No.	%
Darfur	2,830,000	33.7	500,000	27.8
Kordofan	2,870,000	34.2	425,000	23.7
Central	1,350,000	16.0	420,000	23.4
Northern	150,000	1.8	50,000	2.8
Eastern	1,200,000	14.3	400,000	22.3

Source: Mudoawi, Soluman and Ahmed, (1987) 'Population, Employment and adjustment', in Saghayron, et al., (1987), *Population and Development in the Sudan*, Proceedings of the third National Population Conference, 1987, Khartoum., pp41-66

6.4.2. Class Struggle: Ideological and Political Problems

The change in class structure has put forward again the question of who should dominate the Sudanese state? Who would provide the leadership that is capable of resolving the question of transformation and nation-building? The answer to both questions was to be found on two levels. The first is the level of the objective class structure and the change that happened to different classes in the course of economic development. The second level is that of the ability of those classes to be aware of their interests, to express them in programmes and to create organisations and provide leadership that are capable of arguing these programmes through a political and ideological discourse that is able of putting forward that programme not only as an expression of the interest of that particular class but as the expression of the interests of the whole nation. In other words the need for a class to establish its hegemony

The 1973-85 crisis added, to the previous failures of the ruling power bloc 1954-69, the failure of the military bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie to establish its

hegemony. Yet the failure of that fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie posed a number of questions on the level of ideological and political discourse as well as mass political organisation.

The authoritarian state of the military bureaucratic fraction was the only state in the post colonial history of the Sudan to destroy the urban democratic movement at the same time in which it dismantled the old political parties representing the power bloc that ruled the Sudan from 1954 to 1969. Yet it failed to produce an ideological and political discourse and an effective political organisation capable of rallying the masses. It is no use to be the sole actor in the theatre when the audience starts leaving. The question remains always whether the audience is interested on the play or not. In a regime established a coup d'etat, legitimacy would not be gained by exposing the mistakes, corruption and bad policies of the dismantled regime. The masses need material evidence in terms of actual benefits to be convinced that the new regime worth their support. Instead the Nimeiri regime through out its history was providing promises about future benefits; ie self-satisfaction in sugar, wheat, rice and textiles which was never achieved until the overthrow of the regime. Despite the massive investment programme in the period 1973-76, the masses did not feel any benefit. On the contrary their living standards were deteriorating (see Chapter 4 for the decline in real income and the increase in income inequalities). As from the uprising in August 1973, the audience insisted to establish their independent theatres and to act their own plays. Despite the authoritarian state and its repressive legislation and institutions, the masses sought new forms and means to put forward their demands, ie the towns uprising, the general meeting of trade unions that were held and strikes that were organised despite the will of the official leadership (the case of the railway workers and the primary school teachers in 1978 who both were able to organise strikes despite the official leadership of their trade unions). The political organisation returned to other old ways they had abandoned during the second democracy as being unnecessary or primitive (writing slogans on the walls, issuing and distributing underground pamphlets and newspapers ... etc).

The 1973-85 crisis as a crisis of hegemony focussed the importance of constructing an ideological discourse in acquiring legitimacy and establishing hegemony. Between 1973 and 1978, the regime ideological discourse was composed of three elements: national unity, development and popular participation. The achievement of Addis Ababa Agreement provided a ground for the regime quest for national unity and was capable of providing the regime with legitimacy in the South. The argument for development and popular participation was less convincing. The former did not materialise as actual benefits for the people and the latter was impossible under the authoritarian nature of the regime and the confiscation of democracy and human rights. The question of national unity was raised again within the context of the National Reconciliation, but the

authoritarian nature of the regime did not allow for the necessary changes in political and government institutions to achieve that national unity.

As from 1975, an Islamic ideological discourse began to appear in Nimeiri's speeches. Except for the abolition of *toto Kora*, (the lottery run by the government to finance sport and youth activities) and the directives issued by Nimeiri to government leading officials to restrain from drinking alcohol or resign, no major Islamisation measure was taken. General opinion in the Sudan claimed the Saudi were behind the actions (ACR, 1976/77, B117). In May 1977, a committee was formed to revise the existing laws so that they would become in line with Islamic Sharia. Though the question of Islamic Sharia was brought in the National Reconciliation negotiation between Sadiq al-Mahdi and Nimeiri in 1977, the agreement between them did not include any mention of it. Following the National Reconciliation, new members were added to the above mentioned committee, including Dr Hassan al Turabi, the leader of Muslim Brothers in the Sudan. In 1980 Nimeiri published a book, '*Al-Nahaj al-Islami limmadha?*, (why is the Islamic Path?), in which he described why he shifted from his national leftist tendencies to strict observance of Islam. He promised to publish a second book to explain how the Islamic path would be implemented, but before the book was published⁴ he announced the Islamic Sharia laws in September 1973..'

The Islamic ideological discourse contained in the Islamisation measure composed of three elements: the return to the Sudanese cultural heritage, the prevention of crime (purification of the society) and the prosperity that would follow the Islamisation of the economy. Such a discourse ignored two things about the Sudanese heritage. The first was that Sudanese cultural heritage did not compose of Islamic culture alone. It contained non Islamic culture both in the North and the South whether it had its roots in the ancient Sudanese civilisations, Christianity or African traditions and customs. The second was that Sudanese Islam because of the effects of the roots of Sudanese culture mentioned above was different from the fundamentalist Islam which was expressed in the 1983 laws. Sudanese Islam which is based on *sufist* Islam is one which adheres to preaching and teaching of the followers providing spiritual guidance rather than adheres to punishment and imposing values on the people. Islam was used as an ideology by the Neo-Mahdist and the Khatimyya aristocracy to accumulate wealth as argued in Chapter 2. The relation between the religious aristocracy and followers was based on blessing (*barka*) by the former in return for tribute in kind, money or work by the latter. Between 1964 and 1969, the power bloc that ruled the Sudan used Islamic ideology in order to face the challenge from the urban democratic movement.

⁴The book, *Al-Nahaj al-Islami kayfa?* (Islamic Path: How), was actually published in April 1985.

The prosperity promised by the change of the economy to an Islamic one never materialised. Instead the economic situation deteriorated. The regime had to announce new austerity measure in March. These measures instigated the March-April uprising. The adoption of an Islamic ideological discourse by the regime resulted in its loss of any legitimacy claim in the South and contributed to the decline of its already deteriorating legitimacy in the North.

6.5. Conclusion

Chapters 4 and 5 argued that the 1973-85 was a particular crisis that had specific manifest and it was a product of a definite authoritarian state and was caused by specific policy measures. This Chapter has argued that it had its roots in the rigid level of articulation of modes of production, in the continuation of the uneven development and the failure of a class or group of classes to establish its hegemony.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1. The Theme of the Thesis

The thesis has examined the political economy of the Sudan in order to reveal the nature and causes of the 1973/85 crisis in that country. The 1973-85 crisis was placed within the historical context of a more general political and economic crisis which has been a characteristic of the independent Sudan.

The general crisis facing the Sudan is identified as an organic crisis of transformation. The thesis argued that the transformation crisis has faced the Sudan since her independence. The main reason for the crisis was that the problems of transforming the inherited colonial economy and structures which had risen to the national agenda since then, have not been resolved.

The thesis further argued that particular political and economic crises had occurred over the period 1956-1985. Despite the distinguishable features of those particular crises there were several common features. These features constituted general political and economic trends that, in their turn had characterized the general crisis since independence in 1956.

The study of the colonial political and economic legacy provided an important component of the thesis as it reflected on the process of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production and the pre-capitalist modes of production which had prevailed in the country before the re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Political, institutional and market articulation affected the nature of the Sudanese economy, the class structure and class struggle. The nature of the colonial state as an authoritarian and relatively autonomous state left its features in the political economy of the country.

The thesis studied the historical development of the post-colonial state. The colonial heritage of the country and the concrete class struggle had given the post-colonial state its nature and constituted its crisis. In revealing the nature of the post-colonial state a ruling power bloc is identified. That power bloc was composed of the religious and tribal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the military and civilian bureaucracy.

The crisis of the post-colonial state, has been argued in the thesis, is a crisis of hegemony. The failure of the power bloc, a fraction or a class of it to establish its hegemony is the main cause of the crisis of the state and the particular form of that crisis: the military-civilian governments alterance in power.

The ruling power bloc, mainly empowered and enriched through the political and economic articulation carried by the colonial state, had basic interests in the continuation of inherited institutions of articulation of the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. The power bloc was divided in the politics of the spoils distribution using religious sectarianism both as clientelist linkage and ideological cover. Meanwhile an urban democratic movement and several regional movements challenged the authoritarian tendencies of the power bloc which were aimed at preventing the dominated classes from having a say in the future of the country. The ruling power bloc was not able to 'deliver the goods', because delivering them required a deep transformation in the legacy of the colonial economy. The colonial economy was not established to meet the ever increasing needs of the population. It was an export-oriented, linked to the international world market through the export-import of commodities and capital.

The thesis argued that the crisis of the economy has its basic causes in the patterns of agricultural production both in its irrigated and rain-fed sub-sectors. Irrigated agriculture is characterized by a rigid and static institutional articulation that prevented the development of production relations to match the relative development in the productive forces. In the rain-fed agriculture, with the exception of the large scale capitalist mechanized farm, the articulation through exchange led to the spread of capitalist relations of production, but, in contrast to the irrigated agriculture, without the development of productive forces. Both sectors are found to be strongly linked to the international capitalist market, a link which has enabled the export of economic surplus, the import of devastating effects of international depressions and the limited effects of booms. The crisis of agricultural production explains most of the other features of the economic crisis because of the dominant role of agricultural production in the Sudanese economy.

The expansion of the economy without radically transforming the rigid level of the articulation inherited from the colonial era had resulted in changes in the forces of production and the class structure. The changes in productive forces and class structure aggravated the crisis situation and made the question of radical transformation more urgent and vital.

The failure of transforming the economy was accompanied by a failure in managing it. The management of the economy during the colonial period was based on the vast powers of the authoritarian colonial state. Coercion became central in the management of the colonial economy. The post-colonial state's ability of using coercion was legitimately limited and its tendency towards authoritarianism had been challenged by the urban democratic movement and the effective regional forces, especially the Southern Sudanese. The politics of ethnic and regional conflicts were closely related to uneven development of the country and the composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern and of Arab

Islamic culture. It was in the politics of ethnic and regional conflicts that coercion was widely used against the Southern people. The civil war which struck the country twice contributed to the crisis of the post-colonial state.

The crises of the state and the economy strengthened each other through the politics of spoils and the failure to deliver the goods expected by the population.

Within this context the thesis studied the particular 1973-85 crisis. The particular crisis is found to be a continuation of the general crisis despite its specific features. The military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which dominated the state during the 1973-85 period failed to establish its hegemony and ruled the country through an authoritarian state. The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup d'état was a turning point in the history of the Nimeiri regime. Between 1971 and 1977, the regime failed to incorporate or work out an alliance with the traditional political parties and the Islamic Charter Front. The National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening the base of the regime. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 did not promote the regime's quest for legitimacy and remained to be an additional tool of repression.

Nimeiri's greatest achievement in the quest for legitimacy was the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement which ended the first civil war in 1972. The Agreement failed in application because it did not provide for a fair share in the distribution of wealth and its attempt to establish a fair distribution of power was haunted by the contradiction between the authoritarian state in the centre and the semi-democratic state in the South. By 1983, when the second civil war started in the South, the regime had lost its legitimacy in the South.

Despite being a continuation of the general economic crisis, the particular crisis of 1973-85 was a crisis of simple and extended reproduction that resulted from specific policies of the Nimeiri regime. The regime deepened the general trend when it failed to transform the structure of the economy. Despite its expansion, the economy remained an unevenly developed, export-oriented economy with weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages; liable to be severely affected by international crises and moderately benefiting from international booms. Between 1973 and 1985 the economy became more unevenly developed in contrast to all the claims of the regime about regional governments. The failure to maintain and utilise the existing producing capacities of the economy led to the decline of yields of agriculture and the productivity of industrial and services sectors. As a result, the country failed to maintain the previous levels of exports and its imports bill increased drastically bringing the trade balance and with it the balance of payment into great deficit. The economy also suffered from the failure to complete the construction of the new project or to optimally utilise the new added capacities. Instead of compensating the decline in output and revenues due to the lack of maintenance and repairs, the new

projects added to the problems of the Sudanese economy by increasing the national debt. Unable to serve its debts and to pay the bill of the increasing imports, the Sudan turned to the IMF for financial rescue. To qualify for the IMF extended facilities, the Nimeiri implemented an austerity programme that led to the deterioration of the standard of living of the majority causing a further decline in the legitimacy of the regime and its overthrow in April 1985.

7.2. The Sudanese Case: A Comparative Analysis

The Sudan was not unique in facing a transformation crisis. Many African, Asian and Latin American countries face the same crisis. Sudan was different from some African countries in her political culture and her strong mass organisation. These differences made the Sudan more unstable than other African countries. In this section comparison would be limited to two African countries. The first is Nigeria where the military civilian alterance of governments resembles what happened in Sudan. The second is Egypt to which Nasserist model the Nimeiri regime was closely linked.

7.2.1. Nigeria: Petroleum Won't Solve the Transformation Crisis

There are many similarities between Nigeria and the Sudan. The main similarity is the structure of their economies: both are unevenly developed and export-oriented. The second similarity is that both countries face a transformation crisis. The case of the Sudan has been argued above. The case of Nigeria has been summarised by Bangura:

"The Nigerian economy was incorporated into capitalist world economy through the activities of giant trading companies... and the colonial state. Colonialism dissolved the multiple pre-capitalist socio-economic systems and connected them to a wider, centrally-controlled imperialist system. The colonial state imposed a specific system of division of labour on the economy, forcing it to specialise in the export of selected raw materials and the importation of manufactured commodities" (Bangura, 1986, 47).

Ihonybere (1991) noticed that:

"Political independence in October 1960 did not witness any termination or fundamental restructuring of unequal relations with imperialist states" (Ihonybere, 1991, 74)

Oil production remained an enclave of a "notoriously capital intensive" production which "had very little direct effect on the mass of Nigerians" (Freund, 1978, 93). Nigeria began exporting oil in 1957 and revenues of oil exports overtook others after the Nigerian civil war. It was the vast sums of revenue which accrued to the Nigerian government that were centre of the crisis of the Nigerian state and economy. The conflict over oil revenue was behind the civil war, the military civilian alterance of government, the rise of Nigerian bourgeoisie and the corruption of the Nigerian bureaucracy and political life. Connected with oil production and utilisation of oil revenues was the domination of foreign capital and multi-nationals in Nigeria. (See Turner, 1976; Beckman, 1982)

Though different the details of and the forces that contributed to the Nigerian crisis than those in the Sudan, the essence of the crisis remained the same: an organic crisis of

transformation. Poor the country (Sudan) or rich (Nigeria), without solving the crisis of transformation, political instability, economic crises and regional problems will continue.

7.2.2. Nasserist Egypt Similar Political Model Different Policies:

If compared with the similar regime in Egypt during Nasser's era until 1967, one can argue that there were similarities in the political model, but differences in the policies and their outcome. The similarities were those of the single party system, the presidential republic and the authoritarian nature of the state. The first difference was the popularity of the Nasserist regime and the isolation of the Nimeiri regime. There were many reasons for this distinction.

The first reason for the popularity of the Egyptian regime was due to actual benefit acquired by the masses. For example the agrarian reform in 1952 "released almost a million *feddans* for redistribution and improved life for some 342,000 families, namely tenant families and permanent wage labourers" (Zaalouk, 1989, 26). Another example were the measures "taken to ease the burden of poverty on local classes", such as subsidies which "were raised to reduce prices of basic commodities," and "rents, fares and educational fees" which were all cut (Woodward, 1992, 91).

The second difference was the ideological discourse of the Nasserist regime which was used to rally the masses on anti-imperialist, anti-zionist and Arab unity slogans as well as local issues of agrarian reform and industrialisation.

The third reason was the charismatic character of Nasser which was categorically different from that of Nimeiri. Nasser "spoke like a rural *saidi of upper* and was full of well-known references to daily rural life." He was "not just an Egyptian, he was an ordinary Egyptian and this increasingly was the way he was perceived" (Woodward, 1992, 36). Nimeiri, in comparison, was not able to communicate through public speeches with the people and when he did not adhere to the text written for him by his advisers he usually made a laughing stock of himself. One example is striking in the difference between the two characters. While Nasser resigned after the Egyptian loss of the 1967 war assuming all responsibility of what happened, Nimeiri always blamed other (including his associates and advisers) for in any mistakes or shortcomings. For Nimeiri the escape-goat was always there : the communist, the SSU or the Islamic fundamentalists.

Both regimes were authoritarian and were not keen on developing any independent mass movement. Malak Zaalouk noticed that: "Nasser was not particularly keen on the issue of democracy, nor was he keen to allow a working class movement" (19989, 24). Nasser succeeded in destroying any significant independent political or trade union movement as early as 1953 when parties were dissolved in Egypt (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, 340). In 1961 when the Cairo University students demonstrated in protest against the coup in Syria that broke its political union with Egypt, Nasser "closed down the universities for

having demonstrated at all" (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, 138 fn18). The re-emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of the Qutub brothers was promptly dealt with in 1966. Nasser was careful in dismantling any independent mass movement.

Nimeiri was only able to defeat the democratic movement after failed coup of Hashim al-Atta in 1971. By 1973, the movement had began to grow again, albeit as underground movement. Nimeiri succeeded in weakening the trade union movement and incorporating its leadership. His alliance with the Muslim Brothers (1979-85) contributed to their growth. While Nasser began with the alliance of the Muslim Brothers and ended in alliance with the left, Nimeiri went completely in the opposite direction.

There were differences in the international and regional political and economic condition in which both regime existed. Nasser's revolution was part of a rising liberation movement linking anti-imperialist slogans (and policies) with development and social change. The Nimeiri regime came after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries which was a land mark in the decline in the national liberation movement. The role of the conservative Saudi Arabia and the Gulf state in the politics of the region, especially after the 1973 war between Israel and the Arab countries and the rise of the prices of oil, influenced the Nimeiri regime as well as that of Sadat's in Egypt.

Though the Nimeiri regime was modelled on the Nasserist model, it adopted totally different policies between 1973 and 1985. The regime policies were rather comparable to Sadat's policies than to Nasser's. These were: the alliance with the West and the conservative Arab regimes in foreign policy and the open-door policy towards foreign capital and the austerity measures in internal economic policies.

7.3. The Thesis Contribution to Sudanese Studies

The main contribution of this thesis to Sudanese studies is its analysis of the problems facing the Sudan as a general crisis of transformation. Within the context of the transformation crisis, the need to transform the rigid level of articulation of modes of production in the Sudan is argued. The interlink between the political crisis and economic crisis has been established. The crisis of the unstable state is revealed as a crisis of hegemony.

The thesis also made a main contribution to the study of the Nimeiri regime in general and the 1973-85 period in particular. It provided the most comprehensive account of the manifestation of the political, economic and social aspects of the 1973-85 crisis. It revealed the authoritarian nature of the regime by discussing its constitutional and institutional structure. It discussed the particular economic crisis of 1973-85 and related it to the general crisis of the economy while revealing its particular nature as a crisis of simple and extended reproduction.

In order to provide the above contributions the thesis has to provide an account of the political economy of the Sudan from the colonial period. In doing so, it provided a new interpretation of the colonial state and colonial economy.

The main distinction between this thesis and previous Sudanese studies is its different analysis and interpretation. Though it was not the first to attempt a political economy analysis of the Sudanese society, it has been more comprehensive than other attempts to study the political economy of crisis in the Sudan. The thesis has also provided a theoretical frame work and basic background data for further and future studies in the post-Nimeiri era.

APPENDIX A
The National Reconciliation Agreement

The Port Sudan Agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi¹

1. All the political prisoners shall be freed, and a general amnesty declared for those charged with offences with political activities.
2. All actions taken against individuals involved in the political struggle (confiscation of property, dismissal from civil service position, etc) shall be revoked.
3. The structure and operation of the SSU shall be reviewed with a view to opening its bodies to election at every level and permitting government policies to be freely debated and decided by majority vote.
4. The constitution shall be revised so as to ensure a greater protection of individual liberties.
5. Greater emphasis shall be given to neutralism in Sudan's foreign policy.
6. The laws restricting personal liberties (primarily the State Security Act) shall be revoked
7. The local government structure shall be reviewed so as to remove the negative aspects of it, especially with a view to cutting down the vast expenditure of resources in this field.
8. The prejudicial attitude to members of the Ansar sect should be revised, mainly by issuing a statement of regret at the death of Imam al-Hadi in 1970.

¹The Agreement was first published by the Financial Times, 13 July 1978. It is quoted here from ACR, Vol. 10, 1978-79, pp B109-B110.

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