The making of Uganda's oil:

An exploration of subnational dynamics in an

emerging East African oil frontier

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Abstract

How the extractive industries contribute to development outcomes continues to be an important question in light of continued promotion of the extraction model as a development strategy for countries in the global south. Oil is seen as posing a particular challenge in the context of the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African state, having been linked to conflict, authoritarianism and deepening inequalities. The literature has tended to focus on national scales of analyses and the struggles that take place over oil as revenues, rather than focus on the social and political transformations taking place prior to oil becoming a resource and the ways these might shape and constrain development outcomes.

The thesis seeks to contribute to understandings of subnational dynamics in a new Sub-Saharan African oil context. I use an assemblage approach, bringing together a focus on materialities, ideas, practices and agency to analyse the emergence of Uganda's oil assemblage in the pre-oil stage of the industry. The study demonstrates the importance of exploring subnational dynamics in the pre-oil stage; it is during this time that the interests of a range of actors are mobilised and shaped, and processes are taking place at the subnational level that have a bearing on equitable outcomes. The study finds that the subnational space is not a passive recipient of a global oil project but plays an active role in shaping the oil assemblage.

The findings of the study are presented in three empirical chapters. The first shows that Uganda's oil assemblage is shaped not only by oil capital, but also the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil. The second empirical chapter builds on this to explore the role of oil MNCs and corporate engagement practices in the oil assemblage. I find that corporate engagement practices and activities are driven and shaped by multiple factors and change over time. While all three companies draw on global norms to craft legitimacy in the resource space, implementation differs considerably, and the subnational space plays an active role in shaping outcomes. The third empirical chapter explores the role of civil society in the oil assemblage. I find that civil society activity on oil and gas is carried out by urban professionalised CSOs and is shaped by a resource governance assemblage, which has implications for outcomes. However, the findings demonstrate that subnational dynamics shape and constrain the role of CSOs at the local level.

Rather than a dichotomy between industry on the one hand and local communities supported by civil society on the other, I find that the subnational space in Uganda during exploration is

more complex and ambiguous. There are increasing vulnerabilities for some and opportunities for others, and at the same time as subnational actors contest the impacts of the industry, they also seek inclusion. The study generates insights into the more productive processes in frontiers, opportunities for agency, and actor positions that challenge the idea that oil frontiers are characterised solely by the hegemony of oil. The findings have broader relevance for understanding oil and development outcomes in new extractives contexts in the global south and demonstrate the importance of moving beyond a national focus in analyses and beyond a focus on oil as revenues.

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Publications

The book chapters and research articles that my PhD data has contributed to, my role in the work and the contribution made to my thesis are as follows:

Laura Smith, Anne Tallontire & James Van Alstine 2018 'Development and the Private Sector: the challenges of extractives-led development in Uganda' in Munck, R and Fagan, H (eds) Handbook on Development and Social Change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

> *The candidate was lead author of the book chapter with support from Professor Tallontire and Dr Van Alstine in terms of approach, suggestions of literature and reading drafts that I initiated. The book chapter contributed to the literature review in chapter two and informed some of the analysis in chapters five and six.*

Laura Smith & James Van Alstine 2018 'Neoliberal Oil Development in Uganda: Centralisation, Accumulation and Exclusion' in Wiegratz, J, Martinello, J and Greco, E (eds) Uganda: The dynamics of Neoliberal transformation. London: Zed Books.

> *The candidate was lead author of the book chapter with support from Dr Van Alstine in terms of thematic organisation of the chapter and reading drafts that I initiated. The book chapter contributed to the background context of the thesis in chapters four and informed some of the analysis in chapter five.*

Bebbington, C., Wilson, E., Smith, L., and Van Alstine, J. 2017 'Community liaison officers: exploring the frontline of corporate practice in the oil and gas sector'. London: Audire and ECW Energy Ltd.

> *The candidate contributed to this publication with data from the PhD research and wrote a section of the paper. I draw on some of the material from my contribution to the paper in chapter six.*

James Van Alstine; Jacob Manyindo; Laura Smith; Jami Dixon; Ivan Amaniga Ruhanga 2014, "Resource governance dynamics: The challenge of 'new oil' in Uganda.", *Resources Policy* Vol 40.

> *The candidate collected and transcribed data for the research article and contributed to some of the literature review section. I coded and analysed the data*

for chapter seven of the thesis, and the paper contributed to parts of the literature review section in chapter two.

Manyindo J, Van Alstine J, AmanigaRuhanga I, Mukuru E, Smith L, Nantongo C, Dyer J. 2014. The governance of hydrocarbons in Uganda: creating opportunities for multi-stakeholder engagement. Kampala, Uganda: Maendeleo ya Jamii.

The candidate was part of the research team for this project and carried out a proportion of data collection, validation and analysis. I contributed to the writing and editing of the final report.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
AFIEGO	Africa Institute for Energy Governance
AJWS	American Jewish World Service
BAPENECO	Bunyoro Albertine Petroleum Network on Environmental Conservation
BIRUDO	Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CLO	Community Liaison Officer
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CSCO	Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas
CSO	Civil society organisation
CRED	Civic Response on Environment and Development
DfID	Department for International Development
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
DLG	District Local Government
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FoE	Friends of the Earth
GRA	Global Rights Alert
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
KOC	Kakindo Orphans Care
KHEDA	Kitara Heritage Development Agency
LACWADO	Lake Albert Children and Women's Advocacy

LC	Local Council
MEMD	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
MIRAC	Mid-western Region Anti-corruption Coalition
MYJ	Maendeleo Ya Jamii
NAPE	National Association of Professional Environmentalists
NAVODA	Navigators of Development Association
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOGP	National Oil and Gas Policy
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NVI	Nile Vocational Institute
OWN	Oil Watch Network
ORRA	Oil Refinery Residents Association
PEPD	Petroleum Exploration and Production Department
PWYP-U	Publish What You Pay - Uganda
RAP	Refinery Action Plan
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
RWI	Revenue Watch Institute
ULA	Uganda Land Alliance
URA	Uganda Revenue Authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WGI	Water Governance Institute

1.0 Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 The special status of oil

There is something special about oil. As an object of 'mystification and fetishisation', oil has been imbued with magical, almost Olympian transformative powers (Watts, 2009c, Watts, 2009a). Its apparent power to distort development, to enable astonishing wealth and excess, to impoverish and to breed violence and war suggests that oil is indeed more than a regular substance. Since oil's emergence as a fuel to challenge coal in the early 20th century it has assumed a political reach like no other commodity. Leading industrialised countries are 'oil states' to the extent that without oil their "current forms of political and economic life would not exist" (Mitchell, 2009: 400).

Oil is the engine of growth and the price of peace and war, having long been entangled with foreign policy and militarisation (Hiro, 2007). The so-called scramble for Africa's oil during the early 2000s (Frynas and Paulo, 2007) and the accompanied military support for 'friendly' African states, has been framed as a low-level military competition with China for the loyalty of local African elites (Klare and Volman, 2006). Indeed, oil is frequently the epicentre of violence (Watts, 2009a). It has been associated with authoritarianism (Ross, 2001), secessionist claims (Le Billon, 2001), corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999), armed rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) while at the same time bringing unimaginable wealth to a few (Watts, 2004a), exemplifying Karl's assertion that:

> "[C]ountries that depend on oil for their livelihood eventually become among the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden in the world" (Karl, 2004: 662).

It is perhaps not surprising then, that Uganda's oil discoveries were met with cautionary optimism by international observers (e.g. Shepherd, 2013). While on the one hand, commercial quantities of oil could propel Uganda to middle income status. On the other hand, based on the experiences of Uganda's peers and neighbours on the African continent and recent trends in Uganda, oil could exacerbate existing challenges of poverty, inequalities,

and tendencies towards authoritarian rule (De Kock and Sturman, 2012, Hickey and Izama, 2017, Hickey et al., 2015). Uganda, like many of its contemporaries, could become "impoverished by its wealth" (Watts, 2009a: 8). This is the paradox of oil. It holds great promise and great peril in equal measure.

Yet Watts (2009c) cautions us not to invest powers in oil that it does not deserve. While oil is considered a seductive and cursed substance (Weszkalnys, 2009), oil does not have any intrinsic qualities and causality, rather it has forms and functions that are defined socio-culturally (Bridge and Le Billon, 2017). As such, oil has no inherent power outside the social and political relations that produce it as a resource (Huber, 2011). The curse of oil is not inevitable, yet in the context of the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African state, oil poses considerable challenges. It is in light of these challenges and assumptions of oil's causal powers that this thesis seeks to understand some of the processes that produce oil as a resource in the pre-oil stage of the industry.

As I embarked on this research in late 2012, Uganda was poised to become an oil state. Having surpassed the threshold for commercial viability in 2009, Uganda's fortunes had become tied to oil. The government's vision 2040, which aimed to achieve middle income status by 2017, was largely predicated on revenues from oil (Government of Uganda, 2013). Indeed, the amount of recoverable oil is estimated to be at around one billion barrels, out of total reserves of 6.5 billion barrels, with the potential to generate $3.3 billion in revenue annually for the government over the lifetime of the project (Global Witness, 2014). For Uganda, one of the world's poorest countries, heavily dependent on external aid, and with a GDP per capita of $730 in 2016 (World Bank, no date), this is potentially transformational.

However, as a landlocked country, Uganda's oil project requires considerable capital investment to meet the costs of the massive infrastructures needed to extract, process and transport the oil. A 1,445km pipeline is planned to the Indian Ocean, a route that will cross south eastern Uganda and northern Tanzania, to the port of Tanga on the Tanzanian coast. The material properties of Uganda's oil – a sweet, waxy crude – means that the pipeline must be heated, which adds extra costs. In addition to this, the Ugandan government is building a small domestic oil refinery to ensure some of the oil is processed locally, which requires investment. What this means is that for Uganda's oil to be economically viable to produce, the price of oil on the global market has to be at least above $60 per barrel (Patey, 2015). In

summer 2014, during the first round of my PhD fieldwork, oil prices peaked at just over $100 per barrel, then plummeted to below $35 a barrel, where they remained for much of the next three years. The viability of Uganda's oil project plunged into uncertainty with the oil price drop, and the target for 'first oil' continually pushed back.

While the wait for Uganda's first oil continues to drag on, there has been much activity on and around the shores of Lake Albert in the western region, where the oil deposits lie. Since Heritage Oil acquired the first seismic data in 1998, there has been ongoing exploration and development work; seismic surveys, hundreds of test wells drilled, heavy machinery transported in, infrastructure built (roads, drilling rigs, workers camps, bridges) permanent and temporary land acquisition (people moved, houses demolished, crops destroyed, bush cleared), noise and dust, and a myriad of consultations, meetings, and community development projects. Many of these processes and activities feature in this thesis, which considers what happens when a vast, globalised oil industry comes to a remote, marginalised, and ecologically sensitive region in Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.2 Conceptual and empirical gaps underpinning the study

If oil has no inherent powers outside of those social and political processes that produce it as a resource (Huber, 2011), then an appreciation of those processes is important to understand outcomes. In the literature however, oil is presented as a hegemonic force which produces predictable development outcomes, and as such the capacities for pathways for change are limited (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Although, the 'rules of the game' in which extraction occurs are being transformed, for example by norms and practices to govern industry (Larsen, 2015), or by the challenges from social movements (Bebbington et al., 2008b), the idea that the hegemony of oil capital will undercut obstacles to ongoing accumulation remains strong (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

One of the reasons why this idea of oil's hegemony persists is the approach in the literature predominantly from the viewpoint of oil as revenue, which misses the social and political transformations which take place *before* oil becomes a resource, and the ways in which these might have a bearing on which groups or actors benefit or not (Haarstad, 2016). Uganda provides an ideal context for empirically and theoretically assessing the emergence of a new industry and the associated social and political processes around the development,

management and governance of the industry and the implications for the equitable distribution of costs and benefits. The view of oil before it is revenue also directs attention to a wider range of actors that are involved in the emergence of a new industry, not only in terms of its operation and management, but also in its governance in the pre-oil stages. The literature review for the thesis demonstrates that there has been little focus on this wider web of actors. Surprisingly, given their impact, extractives MNCs have tended to be overlooked in debates about natural resources and development (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Watts, 2009c, Watts, 2009a). As I show in the literature review, debates tend to focus on the behaviours of national level elites. Further, and importantly for this study, where civil society has been examined in the literature, it has often been in relation to its role as promoting the interests of local people vis a vis extractives companies (Larsen, 2015, Sawyer, 2004, Gedicks, 2001). In the next section I highlight and summarise the key research gaps before outlining the research aims and objectives of the thesis.

The literature reveals that there is a tendency of studies on oil to do four things. The first is to present oil as a hegemonic force, and as a consequence there is little shift from seeing oil as having causal powers, for example oil as the 'crazy curse' (Behrends et al., 2013). Second, and relatedly, is the tendency to focus on oil as revenues. Studies discuss the oil rents, the income accruing after the petroleum is turned into government revenue. Third, struggles then are seen to emerge *over the resource rents*, which misses a focus on a broader set of actors and dynamics involved before oil is revenue. As Mitchell argues: "most of those who write about the question of the rentier state or oil curse… have little to say about the nature of oil and how it is produced" (2009: 400). The fourth, is that the focus tends to be on the national level of analysis. If the subnational is brought in, it is often in relation to the national, in terms of decentralisation and revenue sharing. Based on these observations, I aim to address the following gaps in this thesis:

Gap 1. The need to focus on the early stages of the industry, before oil is revenue

Scholars have pointed out that many studies which try to make sense of the relationship between oil and poor development outcomes pay little attention to "the ways that oil is extracted, processed, shipped and consumed, and the forms of agency and control these processes involve" (Mitchell, 2009: 400). In other words, the focus on oil as revenue misses a focus on the social and political transformations which take place *before* oil becomes a

resource, and the ways in which these might have a bearing on which groups or actors benefit or not (Haarstad, 2016). The focus on oil as revenue dominates studies, especially how the struggle over oil revenues plays out in terms of the nation as a whole, and in terms of macro-development outcomes, corruption, rent seeking, etc. This suggests that there is a need to focus on the early stages of the industry, *before oil is money* (Mitchell, 2009) and the social dynamics involved in this phase. Those contexts in which oil exploration is taking place or where extraction has only just begun, such as Uganda, are under-studied (Behrends et al., 2013). This suggests the shift from national levels of analyses to the subnational level, to the dynamics taking place at this level in the pre-oil stage of the industry.

Gap 2. The need to focus on interactions that are not 'conflict'

Many studies have focused on the conflicts that emerge in extractives and these are often framed as struggles over resource rents. Watts (2008) shows us the proliferation of indigenous militant groups, oil employees in heavily fortified compounds, government providing security to the industry and failing to protect communities that centres around the revenue sharing mechanism in Nigeria. Other studies also show the conflict promoting properties of resources, in terms of struggles over rents. Studies in which struggles are over identity and territory provide an alternative take, but the polarised positions of actors are often the starting point of studies, for example, Sawyer's examination of indigenous struggle against oil in Ecuador: the "slick corporate manoeuvres, knowing state complicity and oppositional indigenous tactics" (Sawyer, 2004: 7).

Much of what we understand about the social relations of oil is through such accounts. Yet on closer reading these accounts demonstrate how struggles *emerged*, and emphasise, if only implicitly, the importance of exploring these dynamics over time. Sawyer shows that indigenous identity is not an inherent social cleavage, but rather politicised indigenous identity is produced over time. Both Sawyer and Watts show the importance of links with a wider range of actors, which contributed to shaping the outcomes of the struggles. This supports Haarvard's and others suggestion that a wider range of different actors with a stake in resource outcomes must be considered (Haarstad, 2016) and following Logan and McNeish (2012b), so must the possibility of accommodation and compromise, as well as contestation. And, while recognising the important role that resistance and social struggle has played in shaping outcomes (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Bebbington and Bury, 2013), it is equally

important "to take account of the more mundane processes of confrontation and negotiation and to appreciate their social dynamics" (Logan and McNeish, 2012a: 23).

> *Gap 3. The need to focus on a wider web of actors and their interactions below the national*

What the review of the literature reveals is that central to questions about resources and development is the relationship between industry, the state, local communities and civil society. And although these relationships are played out on the ground, at the local level, they are influenced by global forces, be it through connections to international social movements, to international markets, to international guidelines on sustainable development, human rights, CSR etc. As Bridge (2008), Watts (2009c), Haarstad (2016), Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) and other critical scholars have argued, the relational aspects of oil are important to move beyond the narrow focus on oil as revenue, on national actors, and a national level of analyses. Scholars have pointed to the need to include a wider web of actors in studies. The role of western actors, especially extractives MNCs, have tended to be overlooked in debates about natural resource and development (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Watts, 2009c, Watts, 2009a). Extractives MNCs have been critiqued mainly from the perspective of CSR implemented in extractives as discrete activities, rather than their role in the wider development processes taking place in extractives contexts at the local level (Banks et al., 2016), and their role in shaping the trajectories of local struggle (Himley, 2013). The literature on social movements and resistance in relation to extractives industries highlights the importance of global actors and networks of support in shaping the contours of local struggle. However, there are few studies that bring oil MNCs and civil society into the same analysis to explore their respective roles in shaping outcomes.

To summarise, contrary to the dominant ways of studying oil in the literature, which I identify to be oil as hegemonic, oil as revenue, with a focus on a national framing and conflictual relations between actors, my thesis takes an approach which emphasises a range of interactions at the subnational level, prior to oil becoming revenue. This will enable a different perspective on the social and political processes and relations which produce oil as a resource.

1.3 Research aim and objectives

The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the subnational within Uganda's oil assemblage during the pre-oil stage of the industry. A subsidiary aim is to consider the implications of the social and political processes taking place at the subnational level for equitable outcomes. The study is guided by the following research objectives:

Objective 1a Map the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and show how their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry.

Objective 1b Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil assemblage to shape outcomes.

Objective 2 Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.

Objective 3 Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.

1.4 Summary of thesis contributions and key findings

In addressing the research aims and objectives, this thesis makes conceptual, empirical and methodological contributions.

Conceptually, this study develops a novel framing using an assemblage approach and brings together a focus on ideas, materiality, practices and agency into the conceptual framework. An assemblage approach enables a focus on the subnational as a constitutive part of the assemblage and identifies opportunities for change inherent in assemblages (Delanda, 2006). Through an analysis of the subnational within the assemblage the study shows that the subnational is not a passive recipient of a global oil project, but rather plays an active role in shaping and constraining outcomes. This conceptual contribution extends our understanding of the processes taking place in the oil frontier during the pre-oil stage of the industry, which influence equitable outcomes and open opportunities for change. The study shows that the

assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital and the project cycle, but ideas and materiality are also consequential in the pre-oil stage, mobilising actors interests and shaping social relations. The framing also provides insights into extractives relationships in frontiers by illuminating that actor positions in the assemblage are not fixed or clearly distinguishable, and that relations are not conflictual by default. The study emphasises the importance of conceptualising frontier processes not solely in terms of their destructive characteristics but also considering the role of aspirations and agency in frontier spaces.

Empirically, the study focuses on the interactions of a range of actors at the subnational level during the pre-oil stage. The findings across the empirical chapters show that the interests of actors in the assemblage are shaped over time and involve processes of collaboration, cooperation, negotiation and contestation. The analysis shows that the assemblage configuration is not only shaped by oil and the project cycle, but also by the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil. This means that there are material impacts of oil in terms of livelihoods implications through enclosure, restriction and displacement, and also in terms of development imaginaries which shape responses to the industry (chapter five).

A further empirical contribution is the comparative analysis of three international oil companies in the study; Anglo / Irish (Tullow Oil), French (Total) and Chinese (CNOOC). Findings show that while all three companies share similar aims and draw on similar discourses in relation to CSR, their approaches to managing the resource space and legitimacy seeking differ and shape the oil assemblage in different ways (chapter six).

The empirical focus on the emergence of resource governance in a new oil context with no previous extractive industries makes a novel contribution. The findings show that the influence of a resource governance assemblage shapes and constrains oil governance in the early stage of the industry through expert knowledge and oil narratives that shape the debate and delimit what issues are focused on (chapter seven).

An additional novel contribution is from the inclusion of civil society actors and oil company actors into the same study and analysing their activities and interactions during the early stages of the industry. The findings show that both CSOs and oil MNCs face the challenge of ensuring legitimacy in the oil region, and over time there is increasing cooperation between these actors. The focus on the subnational in the study shows the ways that subnational

dynamics shape and constrain the efforts of industry and CSOs to manage the resource space and govern oil. Subnational dynamics shape and constrain the legitimacy seeking process of oil industry actors by influencing the ways in which industry actors engage to improve community relations. Subnational dynamics shape and constrain how oil governance by CSOs plays out at the local level, and shows that the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil are consequential in mobilising the interests of actors across scales and opening new avenues for the agency of local actors (chapters five and seven).

Methodologically, this thesis makes a contribution through the longitudinal perspective to studying the oil assemblage. Due to my involvement in the context over a four-year period, I was able to map the oil assemblage over time and identify how actors, interests, events, narratives, practices and interactions changed and evolved.

1.5 Thesis structure

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two sets out the key literatures and concepts which inform, frame and guide my analysis in the thesis. I argue that in light of the gaps that the thesis seeks to address, an assemblage approach can provide important analytical insights to the study of an emerging oil frontier. Chapter three discusses the methodology, including the philosophical underpinnings of the approach, the data and the analysis. Chapter four provides important background and context for the study, including the key developments in Uganda's oil industry to date, and a brief social history of the region in which the oil industry is being established and this study takes place. The empirical chapters of the thesis follow.

In chapter five I address objective 1a and contribute to objective 1b. I map out the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and, drawing on the conceptual framework I set out in chapter two, I demonstrate how their interests are shaped by the assemblage elements as the oil industry develops. A range of actors' interests are mobilised by Uganda's oil, and I show that oil MNCs and civil society actors become key social actors at the subnational level. In chapter six, I address research objective 2 and contribute to objective 1 b. I focus on the role of oil MNCs in the assemblage and explore the ways that CSR and community engagement by oil companies changes as the industry develops and differs between companies. I highlight the importance of the subnational in shaping and constraining the role of oil MNCs. In chapter seven I address research objective 3 and contribute to objective 1b. I focus on the role of civil society and show

how their activities are shaped by, and shape, the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in this. In chapter eight I discuss the importance of the research and synthesise the results of the three empirical chapters to answer the overall aim and sub-aim of the thesis. Chapter nine concludes the thesis; I summarise the key findings, outline the main contributions of the study, note the limitations of the study and discuss ideas for future work.

2.0 Chapter Two

Literature and conceptual framework

2.1 Introduction

The extractives industries are operating in an increasingly complex environment with diverse pressures. There has been a geographical shift in the demand for resources, and the opening of new extractives frontiers in politically and environmentally fragile regions in the context of climate change, transparency and human rights concerns high on the agenda (Bridge, 2008). There are demands for increased benefits to accrue to producer states from civil society actors, IFIs, and host governments. The most recent commodities super cycle, which peaked in 2009, renewed optimism that the extractives industries could be harnessed for growth and poverty reduction in the global south. Indeed, the 2009 African Mining Vision sets out an extractives-based development vision, whereby the exploitation of mineral resources is to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development on the continent (African Union, 2009). It is the 'contention and ambiguity' inherent in the *possibility* that the extractives industries could contribute to development that is at the root of much social conflict in relation to the sector (Bebbington et al., 2008b).

This chapter critically reviews and synthesises the key literatures and concepts that this thesis draws on and contributes to. It establishes the research gaps by exploring the key debates on the topics of natural resources and development, resource governance, social struggle and social conflict in the extractives industries, CSR and the social licence to operate. These literatures and the identified gaps underpin the research objectives that I address in chapters five to seven of the thesis. The chapter then introduces the core concepts that the thesis draws on to carry out the study.

2.2 The extractives industries and the possibility of development

This section discusses the key debates about the contribution of natural resources and development, noting that oil is seen as posing a particular challenge in the context of the post-

colonial Sub-Saharan African state. Framings and approaches have been in terms of resource curse, however there is a recent focus in the literature on the politics underlying the resource curse, and the importance of the materiality of the resource for outcomes.

2.2.1 The natural resources and development conundrum

The question of whether or not ordinary Ugandans will benefit from its potential oil windfall has dominated discussions of the country's future. In the academic literature, in policy and NGO circles, and in the national and international media, the question tends to be framed in terms of the 'resource curse'. A global media headline in 2013 proclaiming 'Ugandans fear curse of oil wealth' (Akumu, 2013) is typical. This framing has its roots in academic work that has explored the linkages between natural resource wealth and poor development outcomes, under this catch-all term. Coined by Auty in 1993, the resource curse describes how countries rich in natural resources have paradoxically performed less well in economic and human development terms than those countries that are resource poor (Auty, 1993).

There are several sub-elements of the resource curse. Economic arguments raise concerns that an abundance of natural resources can distort the structure of the economy; the booming extractives sector draws resources away from other sectors, the production of non-tradeable goods falls, the national currency appreciates making imports cheaper and exports more expensive, a phenomenon known as Dutch disease (Acosta, 2013). Further, the extractives sector is vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, which makes economic planning difficult and can have negative consequences during times of bust.

Other scholars have focused on the political aspects of the curse, notably the behaviours of national elites and the negative effects of resources on institutions. They show that the influx of windfall revenues from a booming extractives sector effects processes of state formation and provides opportunities for elite rent seeking (Yates, 1996). Income is redistributed regressively and wealth is concentrated in a few hands (Acosta, 2013), and the result is resource extraction without development (Bridge, 2004). Studies began to focus on the problem of the weakness of the national institutions existing prior to investments in the extractives sector, and the further adverse impacts of the sector on institutions (Robinson et al., 2006, Humphreys et al., 2007, Ross, 2015).

The resource curse term is also employed to explain the afflictions of violent conflict, authoritarianism, rebellion and corruption in resource abundant states, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa; what Watts claims is a sort of 'commodity determinism' (Watts, 2004b). The associated terms of 'blood diamonds', 'resource wars' and 'petro-violence' attributed conflicts in the global south directly to natural resources, which Keen concluded are best explained as the continuation of economics by other means (Keen, 2005). Much of this thinking was inspired by Paul Collier's study, which claimed that the higher the proportion of primary commodity exports a country has, the higher the risk of civil war. Analysing civil war between 1965 and 1999, Collier claimed that "conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance" (Collier, 2000: 91). Although the direct link between natural resource wealth and conflict has been refuted by a number of other studies (Ross, 2004, Watts, 2009b, Ballentine, 2003), it played an influential role in shaping policy towards so called resource-wars in the global south, and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. One issue is that the 'greed' thesis places the causes of conflict on individual actors in the global south and misses the wider web of complicity, including the embedded commercial interests and the role of external forces (Cater, 2003).

The narrow focus on national states and individual actors is a general problem with 'resource curse' explanations, which fail to account for the role of social forces, or external political and economic environments in accounting for the curse (Rosser, 2006). The problem was framed as one of national elites managing oil rents, and as I show in section 2.2.5, the solution became one of 'getting the institutions right' (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008).

Although the existence of a 'curse' has been qualified in the literature, critical engagement with resource curse debates remains important for three reasons. First is the continued promotion of natural resource extraction as the key driver of economic growth across the global south; second is that states continue to struggle to harness natural resource wealth for development and poverty reduction; and third is that resource governance policies in the global south build on this academic architecture (Appel et al., 2015), a point I return to in section 2.2.5 below. Next, I consider why oil is more likely to be associated with resource curse outcomes.

2.2.2 Oil: a seductive and cursed substance

Oil poses a particular sort of challenge for development and democracy. Oil is likely to disrupt the 'normal' course of development, yet scholars tend to differ in their assessments of how and why this is the case. Drawing on a number of studies, Ross concludes that resource curse outcomes are more likely to occur in oil dependent states – oil tends to strengthen authoritarian governments, promote corruption and raise the risk of conflict (Ross, 2015). For Mitchell, oil tends to strengthen political and economic elites more than do other commodities due to its capital intensity (Mitchell, 2009). Karl argues that oil creates Petrostates, which are rentier states *par excellence*, "marked by especially skewed institutional capacities" (Karl, 1997: 34). These are thought to be especially problematic in the context of the of the post-colonial African state (Weszkalnys, 2011).

Explanations for African problems in relation to oil and development have concerned themselves with the problem of patrimonialism (Watts, 2004a, Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2005). This is seen to be a key feature of African post-independence politics, reflecting an apparent resistance to conform to western standards of liberal democracy and continue with tradition and modernity, seen simply as the way in which 'Africa works' (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is problematic when oil rents are inserted into this dynamic, which further reduces incentives for a social compact with citizens and increases opportunities for elite rent seeking (Yates, 1996). Petrodollars solicit more extreme actions on the part of leaders, who "rely on an unsustainable development trajectory fuelled by an exhaustible resource – and the very rents produced by this resource form an implacable barrier to change" (Karl, 1997: 31).

Although important, this work has a national level focus. Indeed, it tends to focus heavily on the behaviours of national elites in resource producing states. Speaking from the empirical context of Nigeria, Watts critiques Collier's and others' work for assuming a 'predation proneness' for what instead is state and corporate enclave politics. Watts notes the ways in which oil becomes an idiom for doing politics, the substance is "inserted into an already existing political landscape of forces, identities and forms of power" (Watts, 2004b: 76). This political landscape has been shaped by longer histories of colonial rule, identify formation, post-independence nation building. The politics around resource making then, have complex roots.

So, while oil interrupts development, it has no inherent causal powers (Huber, 2011). This means that oil does not automatically condemn Uganda to the category of countries whose resource wealth has paradoxically brought poverty, inequality and conflict. Rather, it is more accurate to say that oil and other extractive resources are *conducive to* particular types of social organization, and by extension, to particular development outcomes (Haarstad, 2016).

Given the discovery of oil in a post-colonial, semi-authoritarian, post-conflict, and ecologically diverse Sub-Saharan African nation – Uganda, the 'Pearl of Africa' - it is hardly surprising that many studies have sought to question the effects that oil will have. A number of studies on Uganda's oil industry have used the 'resource curse' framing to assess whether or not Uganda is likely to succumb to the curse, with little optimism that oil is going to benefit the Ugandan people (Bategeka and Matovu, 2011, Kiiza et al., 2011, Mosbacher, 2013, Olanya, 2015). Studies that do express some potential for positive outcomes promote the 'blueprint approach' and suggest lessons for success (Shepherd, 2013), for example, from the 'Norwegian model' (Polus and Tycholiz, 2017). Related to this approach are studies around managing expectations (Bategeka et al., 2009, Mawejje, 2019), the implications being that social conflict in the sector could be due to 'out of control expectations' fuelled by the expectation of oil wealth. As such, this scholarship follows the mainstream views of resources and development, and good resource governance, which privileges a focus on management, and replicating good behaviours and good institutions.

2.2.3 Beyond 'politics matters'

The literatures cited in the previous sections, particularly those which looked at the adverse political consequences of oil (Watts, 2004b, Ross, 2013, Mitchell, 2009, Karl, 2004) advanced thinking beyond a narrow economic focus of Dutch disease, or that encapsulated by the term 'resource wars'. Watts (2004a) and Logan and McNeish (2012a) work draws attention to the importance of the underlying historical, political and social forces shaping the political landscape that oil is introduced to. The recent work of Bebbington and colleagues also push the political perspective further, beyond the recognition that 'politics matters', to think about the *ways* in which it matters for outcomes (Bebbington et al., 2018). Using a political settlements framework, they engage critically with the institutional focus of resource governance to look at elite strategies of political pact making underlying institutional formation. They analyse the balance of power between contending social groups at the national, regional and local scales to understand why states have been unable to translate

natural resource wealth into broad based, inclusive development. They find that in the cases of study (Peru, Bolivia, Zambia and Ghana), elites prioritised the short-term objectives of political survival over a national development vision. While this finding in and of itself is not surprising, a focus on the politics underlying these outcomes reveals the various factors which shaped and constrained them, and broadens the focus out from one of national level elites as the problem (i.e. corruption) and national level institutions as the solution. They highlight the role of history, external intervention, post-colonial constraints, and excluded actors in shaping dynamics. The political settlements approach has been used to study the power dynamics underlying Uganda's transition to an oil state with a national focus (Hickey et al., 2015, Hickey and Izama, 2017, Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). Hickey and Izama's later work reveals important insights into the changing political settlement dynamics in the country and how this is likely to influence the politics of oil once oil revenues start flowing (Hickey and Izama, 2017). Indeed, the political settlement approach across cases helps to explain why similar sets of institutions often produce divergent outcomes. However, what it does not do so well, as Bebbington and co-authors acknowledge, is deal with the significance of ideas, such as the national imaginings invoked by resources, and the materiality of the resource in shaping outcomes.

There has been renewed interest in materiality in the study of natural resources (Bakker and Bridge, 2006). Haarstad (2016) argues that in order to understand the prospects for natural resource-led development, scholars must consider how the material properties of resources might shape development pathways. Mitchell (2009), Bridge (2009) and Le Billon (2008) have shown that the particular properties of natural resources have implications for how their extraction, distribution and consumption are organised. This means that "the development prospects of a resource-rich country is shaped not just by the 'quality' of its own institutions, but also by the materiality of its resource base and the relationships with various actors and stakeholders that emerges around these material properties" (Haarstad, 2016: 148).

Similarly, Bridge (2008), speaking about oil in particular, argues that missing from the current policy debate over extractive industries and development is a sense of the relational way in which production is organised. Mitchell also emphasises the importance of a broader, relational focus:

> "Failing to follow the oil itself, accounts of the oil curse diagnose it as a malady located within only one set of nodes of the networks through which oil flow... in the decision-making organs of individual producer states" (Mitchell, 2009: 400).

They are among a number of scholars critical of the national-scale mode of analysis that pushes questions about the transnational organization of production into the background. Such a narrow focus misses the wider web of complicity, which has implications for equitable outcomes, as well as policy in relation to resource governance, and serves as a key idea underpinning this thesis.

2.2.4 A subnational resource curse?

As demonstrated in the previous sections, debates about the relationship between natural resources and development – especially oil - have typically focussed on the national scale. The literature reviewed so far has focused on the links between natural resource abundance and poor growth, conflict, democracy and institutional quality at the national level. A more recent literature has focused on the subnational level, to suggest the existence of a subnational resource curse (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015, Arellano-Yanguas, 2011, Suutarinen, 2015).

Arellano-Yanguas (2011) showed that subnational authorities in Peru have been unable to harness resource revenues for poverty reduction, due to rent seeking among local elites and struggles over access to and control over revenues. Lawer et al. (2017) argue that unaccountable subnational institutions in Ghana constrain access to mining revenues. The literature tends to be focused on establishing if the curse exists at the subnational level and in what ways it manifests (Poncian and Jose, 2019). Further, the struggles identified are those which emerge over resource revenues, whereas the Ugandan context is in the pre-oil stage, prior to revenues flowing from oil production.

Some of the recent literature on oil which has a subnational and ethnographical focus does not debate the existence of a curse, but starts from the point of 'oil as the crazy curse' (Behrends et al., 2013). Here, oil is the hegemonic force and struggles are over oil as revenues, which mirrors the trend of national level studies. While this subnational literature broadens the debate from the national level focus, it remains focused on mineral wealth as revenues. Further, as Hinojosa and co-authors argue, resource curse thinking remains focused on questions of rent seeking, corruption, and government capacity which not only risks failing to

recognise or capture the complexity of what happens in these spaces but does not account for the pre-existing structure of the regional economy and society (Hinojosa et al., 2015). Struggles over the share of benefits from oil wealth often become caught up in longstanding issues of inclusion / exclusion, social identity struggles and complex relationships to land and resources (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Social identity struggles and complex relations to land are significant in Uganda, therefore it is important to pay attention to the relevance of these in the pre-oil stage.

2.2.5 Governance approaches for the extractives industries

Approaches to governance of the extractives sector have tended to reflect dominant understandings of the relationship between natural resources and development. In particular, 'resource curse' explanations for the poor performance of extractives economies have been influential, and as noted above, have tended to focus on the problems stemming from the weakness of national institutions, and the behaviours of national elites. As such, a focus on 'getting the institutions right' became central to avoiding the 'curse' and ensuring good governance of extractives industries (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Hilson, 2014, Haarstad, 2016). Resource governance policies in the global south have been informed by this 'institutional turn' in mainstream academic approaches, which generally sees national level elites as the problem and national level institutions as the solution. As Appel argues, building on the academic architecture on the 'resource curse', resource governance approaches treat the oil industry as a "mere revenue-producing machine—a black box with predictable effects" (Appel, 2012b: 693). This has given rise to a 'blueprint approach' to oil governance. The oil world is seen through a techno-managerial framework whereby oil can be managed into a blessing, or mis-managed into a curse (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Although these approaches recognise that there is no pre-determined path, the success (or not), comes down to prudent decision making and implementing the rights kinds of institutions.

Institutional mechanisms to ensure 'good governance' have tended to focus on policies to strengthen revenue management. The Extractives Initiative Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a case in point. To use the example of the transparency agenda, the idea that revenues from natural resources erode national institutions and prompt rent seeking behaviour in national elites led to transparency initiatives to address the challenge of corruption (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008). As Hilson and Maconachie (2008) argue, behind the EITI is the logic that if it can be shown that host governments receive substantial revenues from natural resources,

then it follows that failure to translate them into development benefits must be due to national elites mismanaging the revenues.

While there have been some notable achievements through EITI, including procedures put in place in host countries for multi-stakeholder consultations and oversight (Van Alstine, 2014), there is little evidence that transparency measures lead to any impact at the *subnational* level. An increase in information through openness of information does not mean that people can access the information or, if they can access it, are able to act on it (Acosta, 2013). This is one of EITI's significant shortcomings. Another issue is the 'empowerment' of civil society, which is assumed to occur through EITI, which fails to recognise that civil society organisations operate under restrictive and repressive conditions in many countries which have signed up to EITI (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000, Öge, 2017). And while Uganda had not yet signed up to the EITI during the period of my research, the repressive conditions that Ugandan civil society operates raise questions about the effectives of such an initiative going forward.

The institutional approach to resource governance in the African context can be seen in light of the wider good governance agenda in Africa, and the way that post-colonial Africa has been theorised. As Achille Mbembe, reminds us, Africa's complex social issues tend to be dealt with as technical matters, a result of the particular challenges on the continent coupled with the 'atomisation of knowledge' that is a result of the short-term research horizons of development agencies and NGOs that intervene (Mbembe, 2016: 212). Africa, he argues, is treated as a crisis-prone entity, as if the people involved have no histories or agency. Resource governance treads a similar path. 'Curse' or 'blessing' narratives simplify the complex features of resource politics, and shift the attention away from other explanations of poor resource outcomes (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). This is significant in the case of Uganda, where discussion of the industry by a range of actors has been framed in terms of resource curse, and as this thesis will show, much of the external support to Uganda from donors and NGOs has focused on the quality of national level institutions.

As I noted in section 2.2 there is a growing consensus among critical scholars that weak national level institutions cannot by themselves explain poor development outcomes from extractives led development (Haarstad, 2016, Hilson and Maconachie, 2008, Bebbington et al., 2018). Ross (2015) argues that policy interventions proceed without any systematic knowledge about which policies work and under what conditions. Dietsche (2012) further argues that

generic institutional reform is based on a pre-conceived idea of what good institutions are, with no shared definition. She points out that recognising that institutions are important is not the same as knowing how institutional change is brought about, and what is needed for institutional change. As I also showed in 2.2 scholars note the need to focus on the politics underlying governance arrangements (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Bebbington et al., 2018), as Haarstad articulates:

> "Resource governance is shaped by both longer term historical social power relations that are unique to specific contexts and transnational networks of oil companies, geopolitical interests, financial institutions etc." (Haarstad, 2016: 140)

Indeed, as Hilson and Maconachie (2008) argue, because the 'good governance' focus centres on the problem of national elites managing oil rents, the role of extractives MNCs, or western actors in general, in explaining poor performance of the extractives industries in Africa has been overlooked. As I discuss in section 2.4, extractives companies have largely been left to self-regulate, through corporate social responsibility and community relations efforts.

Before I go on to discuss the role of extractives companies in resource governance, I turn to review a wider literature on subnational social struggle and the extractives industries, which offers insights to the study of onshore oil during the early industry stages.

2.3 The extractives industries and subnational development struggles

For the study of subnational level oil in Uganda, a review of the literature on the subnational level dynamics of extractives industries is necessary, much of which has focused on mining, but shares commonalities with onshore oil development. Although this literature often overlaps with the 'resource curse' literature, the latter tends to focus on the macro-level developmental contribution of the extractives industries. This section reviews the literature on the subnational aspects of the extractives industries, including the social and environmental impacts, the enclave nature of the industry, social conflict in the sector, and forms of resistance and agency. This not only offers insights for the study of onshore oil, but provides the context for the discussion of corporate approaches to managing the complex local spaces that extractives companies operate in section 2.4.

2.3.1 Social and environmental aspects of extractives

Subnational studies provide important insights to how the complex relationship between natural resources and development play out at the subnational level. While some scholars, industry associations and IFIs point to the possibility that extractives can be harnessed to achieve socio-economic development, with good governance and corporate responsibility, there is a vast body of literature which suggests that local populations, and especially the most vulnerable, continue to lose out (O'Faircheallaigh, 2013, Hilson and Maconachie, 2008, Bebbington et al., 2008b, Acuña, 2015). As mentioned above, while these studies tend to focus on mining, the studies are relevant for onshore oil in the early stages of development, given the issues relating to land acquisition and displacement[1].

In a review of fifty-two empirical studies on the relationship between extractive industries and poverty, Gamu and colleagues found no evidence to suggest a 'universal' effect of extractive industries on poverty levels (Gamu et al., 2015). Rather, they found that the social and environmental impacts associated with extractive sector developments can exacerbate poverty through diverse mechanisms. The majority of the subnational studies were on mining, with large scale mining found to have the worst impacts, exacerbating poverty through its considerable social and environmental footprint, and lack of productive linkages to the local economic context. Subnational studies of oil looked at the impacts of oil spills and corporate irresponsibility in Nigeria, where gas flaring and pollution from oil spills have devastated local livelihoods (Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2012, Idemudia, 2012), and community grievances over oil in Ghana (Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).

The literature on natural resource extraction in Sub-Saharan Africa observes that large-scale natural resource extraction often takes places in regions inhabited by politically marginalised populations (Buur et al., 2017, Lavers, 2012). Some of the most vulnerable of these populations are youth (Maconachie, 2014) and women (Lahiri-Dutt, 2015, Jenkins, 2014). In Latin America and South East Asia, indigenous peoples have been among the worst impacted by extractives industries, experiencing the loss of land, water sources and erosion of cultural traditions (Bury, 2004, Li et al., 2010, O'Faircheallaigh, 2013).

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[1] While this section focuses on academic literature, it should be noted that civil society organisations have played an important role in compiling studies about the adverse impacts of extractives industries for local populations, documenting human rights, land, and indigenous struggles, and these have complemented academic studies.

Extractives industries are transforming local livelihoods in diverse locations through processes of accumulation by dispossession (Bebbington et al., 2008a, Harvey, 2004). Perreault (2013) notes that in addition to land dispossession, the accumulated environmental burdens can lead to 'dispossession by accumulation'. Acuña (2015) notes that dispossession also refers to the adverse impacts on health, habitat and way of life; what Nixon (2011) refers to as 'dispossession without moving'. These processes are leading to new forms of social differentiation and the emergence of new and potentially fragmented territorial identities (Humphreys Bebbington, 2012).

Extractives industries transform the social, political, and economic life of territories in complex and multiple ways (Hinojosa et al., 2015). While Bebbington and colleagues point to the "spectacularly unequal distributions of wealth" associated with mining, they also point out that extractives industries have long been caught up in the making of cultures, especially in Latin America (Bebbington et al., 2008b: 966). In a later paper, Bebbington and co-authors showed that the local effects of extraction depend considerably on the pre-existing structure of the rural and regional economy (Hinojosa et al., 2015). They pay particular attention to the imaginaries and ideas about development and argue that these aspirations can shape the outcomes of resource extraction. In the study, they show how visions of territory that preceded the gas boom in a regional department in Bolivia shaped struggles over the control and access to resources and revenues. Other literatures have also shown the ways in which extractives industries interact with pre-existing dynamics. Sawyer (2004) shows how indigenous identity was shaped by the experiences of extractive industries in the Amazon.

These studies are important in that they demonstrate the ways that the extractives industries, and local responses to the industries, have to be understood in the context of historical and contemporary relationships to land and resources and the formation of identities. What is also significant is that the knowledge of industry impacts becomes a reference point when populations in other areas are faced with the possibility of the extractives industries arriving in their areas (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). This is relevant in the case of Uganda, because what is known about the impacts of oil in the Niger Delta serves as a reference point for Uganda's potentially 'good' or 'bad' outcomes from oil (as discussed in chapters five and seven).

While there have been relatively few studies of oil in Uganda that focus strictly on the subnational so far, those that do have a subnational focus have studied the impacts of oil at

the local level, from the perspectives of actors living in the oil regions (Byakagaba et al., 2019, Mawejje, 2019, Ogwang et al., 2018, Manyindo et al., 2014). Recent ethnographical work from Witte (2018), which focuses empirically on some of the same sites as I do in my study, approaches oil in Uganda in terms of oils 'not yet' state, the uncertainty of the industry and the emplacement of risk which enables actors to negotiate their positions. Although both of our studies examine the 'resource-making' process in Uganda and some of the themes in Witte's work overlap with my own, for example the role of civil society in reproducing resource curse narratives, our work has crucial differences. In particular whereas Witte focuses on risk narratives and did not interview industry, I take a relational approach and bring in a focus on corporate engagement practices and the dynamics of subnational resource governance.

Building on the perceptions analysis in Manyindo et al. (2014), Van Alstine et al. (2014) identified emerging trends at the subnational level during the exploration period which suggest fragmented modes of resource governance. Industry-driven interaction at the local level was taking place in the context of weak local government capacity and limited, fragmented civil society activity. These questions relating to the roles of industry and civil society at the subnational level, along with the wider literature review, helped to inform the direction of my study. Among these impacts, land is a salient local issue, and a recent body of work explores the implications of the land and oil issue, raising important questions about oil and land, territory, and conflict (Kinyera, 2019, Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019, Sjögren, 2013b, Witte and Nakayi, 2019). Although land also emerged as an important theme in my research, it is not central to my study, but rather is one of the contentious issues which emerges and serves to influence social and political dynamics during the pre-oil stage.

2.3.2 Enclave nature of extractives

One of the contentious issues surrounding extractives is the enclave nature of operations. Not only do these projects interrupt the lives and livelihoods of local populations, but they often operate in securitised enclaves, providing little in the way of productive linkages to the local economy or society. Ferguson (2005) argues that especially in Africa, capital is invested in spatially segregated mineral-extraction enclaves. These 'socially thin' environments are separated from the cultural, economic, and legal contexts in which they are situated (Ferguson, 2006). As Ferguson explains, while oil companies are 'globally networked':

"Capital "hops" over "unusable Africa", alighting only in mineral rich enclaves

that are starkly disconnected from their national societies" (Ferguson, 2005: 380).

The enclave literature provides some insights into the development of oil, both onshore and offshore. Indeed, it is argued that enclave development is a particular feature of oil, as it absorbs less local labour than large scale mining, and operates largely independently of other economic processes (Humphreys et al., 2007). Yates (2006) posits that the enclave nature of oil development has been unique to the history of Africa's natural resource development in the post-colonial period. He argues that African extractives economies continue to have a high dependence on foreign firms who 'self-rule' and work in secured enclaves, like Shell in the Niger Delta, Total in Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, and Chevron in Angola, "their global oil distribution networks, investments, loans and commissions give them semi-sovereign power" (Yates, 2006: 29).

Recent studies on oil have noted the ways that oil companies seek to deliberately disembed themselves from their local surroundings (Appel, 2012b, Zalik, 2009). What Appel terms 'modularity' is the attempts by oil companies to replicate near identical operations across the world, that remain walled off and distant from the local politics in which they are deeply enmeshed (Appel, 2012a). Barry (2006) shows that standardization practices are important elements of capitalist disentanglement work that seeks to differentiate between the inside and outside of what he calls 'technological zones'; a space within which differences between technical practices have been reduced or common standards have been established. This is especially the case in the oil industry, where high quality standards, health and safety and a clean image has been increasingly important to reassure shareholders in the wake of disasters such as the Exxon Valdez spill (Appel, 2012a). As Barry states, to adhere to standards of conduct and safety, oil companies must demonstrate that they are disentangled from the locality that might be experiencing conflict, corruption and violence (Barry, 2006). But whilst they seek physical and discursive separation from the unruly surroundings, extractives companies are inevitably entangled in the contexts, and furthermore, they play a role in creating and sustaining those 'unruly surroundings'. Watts' work in Nigeria shows an extreme example of the complex and violent entanglements that have arisen partly through oil MNCs seeking to disentangle themselves from the local space by buying off local groups (Watts, 2012). Gardner, through her work in Bangladesh, has shown that MNCs seek to disentangle

themselves through corporate social responsibility projects through 'partnerships' that inevitably tie them (Gardner, 2015, Gardner et al., 2012).

Enns and Bersaglio (2015) note that recent oil development in the Turkana region of Kenya is developing in enclave fashion, which has significant implications in a region historically marginalised by the state. The local population seek to engage with oil companies to secure rights, creating new patterns of inequalities. Similarly, Lesutis (2019) shows that in Mozambique the mining enclave interacts with the broader socio-economic landscape to entrench class differences. What this work suggests is that the enclave is not entirely separate but interacts with the local context in complex ways, to mediate access to rights and services, and to influence development outcomes.

2.3.3 Social conflict in extractives

Given the considerable social and environmental costs, and the tendencies for extractives industries to pass over the local population in terms of productive linkages and benefits, it is not surprising that the sector has been plagued by social conflicts. With the latest boom in exploration and production, conflict in relation to extractives industries increased dramatically in the period 2000 to 2013 (Andrews et al., 2017). This increase can partly be attributed to the expansion of extractives frontiers in the global south. (Andrews et al., 2017) also note the increase in protests worldwide during this time frame. Much of the social conflict is related to the issues discussed in the section above: the adverse impacts on water, land, culture in the context of minimum benefits accruing to local populations. In a review of 'resistance to mining', Conde (2017) states that conflicts can arise due to a 'clash of metabolisms', between a subsistence and an extractive economy. Acuña (2015) frames this in terms of differing political ontologies that are in tension between extractives projects and indigenous people.

Franks et al. (2014) point out that the increase in social conflict is taking place in a context of increasing industry attention to sustainability standards, community relations and best practice, which aims to mitigate social conflict; a finding which resonates with Larsen's post frontier concept I discuss in section 2.5.3. As Hodge from the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) notes, this corresponding increase appears to present a paradox (Hodge, 2014). A debate about this apparent contradiction took place in the Journal of Cleaner Production in 2014 between Hodges and three political ecology scholars. For Hodges, mining

affected communities, able to share their experiences with other communities across the globe thanks to an exploding communications system, are becoming empowered to the extent that they are less likely to accept the imposition of an 'un-palatable future' and more and more likely to resist. This means that for industry, "the goal posts are moving more quickly than the team on the field" (2014: 32). The discussants cast doubt on whether industry performance is improving at all, and point to the stark power differentials between local communities and industry (Brereton, 2014); power imbalances which Hodges passes over as "alternative values" (2014: 28). Yet rather than see this dialogue as industry attempting to shift the blame for increasing conflict onto 'overly empowered' communities as suggested by Hodges, what the debate highlights is the significance of social conflict and community resistance in pushing the industry to take note and attempt to improve its performance. In this regard, Bebbington (2014) notes that the increase of social conflict is an important driver for industry innovation and institutional change.

However, the idea that social conflict is a positive or productive is not a view shared by the majority of scholars. Of course, social conflict is costly and disruptive of livelihoods, and it is well known that poverty and underdevelopment is further exacerbated by conflict (Stewart, 2002). The link between natural resources and conflict in the mainstream resource curse literature was noted in section 2.2, as were some of the critiques. The literature has progressed from viewing conflict as *caused* by natural resources (i.e. Collier's work), to acknowledging the longer historical trajectories of conflict; social conflict can be deeply rooted in a region's social history and can reflect wider struggles over territory and identity (McNeish, 2012). So, while conflict can be a clash of 'metabolisms' or 'ontologies' as Conde (2017) and Acuña (2015) respectively, point out, social conflict can reflect longer term struggles.

Much of the literature on natural resources and social conflict discusses conflict in terms of struggles over access to and control of resources or revenues (Watts, 2009a, Behrends, 2011). However, other studies highlight that social conflicts have deeper roots and are not always about the control of resources; they can be as much about social relationships as they are about material interests (McNeish, 2012). Hilson and Laing (2017) show that conflicts may appear to be about resource control, but can instead be a product of deeply rooted ethnic tensions. As Sawyer (2004) and Li et al. (2010) show in relation to indigenous struggles, cultural and emotional attachments to place can be a source of conflict. However Bebbington et al. (2008b) argue that it is important to consider that struggles are not always about

resistance to industry per se, but can be about the meaning of development more broadly, and if development should take place then what kind of process it should be. It is this recognition in the literature of the variations and complexities in local people's relationships with extractives projects that I engage with in this thesis. The focus on the pre-oil stage in the study provides an opportunity to consider extractives relationships in the early stage of a project, including how these relationships take shape, and if struggle and resistance emerges, how and why.

2.3.4 Forms of resistance and agency in extractives contexts

I noted in section 2.3.3 that social conflict in the extractive industries has increased, and I also noted that at the same time, there has been increasing industry attention to the need to address legitimacy issues and manage social relations which I discuss in section 2.4. The increase in social conflict and the corresponding increase in industry concern to address social conflict demonstrates the success of local community resistance, defined as 'opposition' and 'action' to power relations (Conde and Le Billon, 2017), and the ability of local communities to build, or become part of broad-based movements. As Hodge (2014) notes, these movements have gained additional strength through ability to have a global reach through globalised communications. But contrary to his suggestion, these global movements are not the *result* of a digitally networked society (Castells, 2010), although these connections have certainly intensified and increased the profile of local issues in recent years. Grassroots movements, such as the rubber tappers in the Brazilian Amazon, gained their momentum from international support in the 1970s and 1980s prior to the Internet age. Rather, they have been facilitated by these connections. An alliance between indigenous groups, scientists, human rights groups and environmentalists in the 1980s to defend the Amazon was the first example of "organised modern, political confrontation" by extractives affected communities in the global south (Gedicks, 2001: 11).

A decade later in the Niger Delta, Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader of the Ogoni people, linked the Ogoni struggle against the oil industry to the green movement to gain international support, successfully framing the struggle as an environmental struggle (Watts, 2004b). As Tsing (2011) notes, environmental advocacy was well established prior to the extractives expansion in Indonesia's frontier, and this knowledge helped to shaped local responses. The oil industry in Uganda is developing in a global context where social movements relating to the environment,

human rights and indigenous peoples are well established, and the experiences of communities such as those in the Niger Delta are part of the global imagination about oil extraction in the global south. These local struggles do not stay local. These experiences have shaped the context into which extractives projects now operate. In short, the literature on resistance and social movements in extractives contexts demonstrates not only the continuing importance of international networks to bring attention to environmental and social issues, but the role such connections can play in shaping the contours of social movements and protest. These studies point to the importance of global networks of support for local struggle against extractive (Gedicks, 2001).

However, it is important to note that not all communities resist extractives projects. A recent study by Conde and LeBillon found that resistance to extractives projects varies (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). Whilst they too note the dramatic increase of local resistance to extractive projects, they also find that not all communities resist, "and if they resist, they do not resist with the same objectives, narratives and intensity" (Conde and Le Billon, 2017: 682). Their explanations for these findings include the extent to which local people are dependent on extractives companies, the extent of political marginalisation and confidence in institutions. Resistance can take different forms and can be visible and overt or invisible and covert (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). They find that the likelihood of resistance increases in the context of large environmental impacts from projects. Interestingly, they note that although resistance is as common in Africa as in Latin America, violence in African cases is less common than in Latin America (Andrews et al., 2017).

Other studies highlight the differences between the Latin America and African cases in terms of the trajectories of struggle against extractives. In the volume by Bebbington et al. (2018) which analyses the underlying political settlements driving resource governance in four cases, they point to the possibility of excluded groups to challenge the political settlement using 'weapons of the weak' (Scott, 2008). They note that this has been less successful in the African cases of Zambia and Ghana, yet there is no explicit discussion of why that is the case. Indeed, the literature on natural resources and social struggle has less to say about the character of resistance in African states and the role played by social movements, in comparison to the vast literature on cases from Latin America. De Waal and Ibreck (2013) discuss the problem of African social movements sustaining change. They note that while protest in Africa is frequent, broad-based popular movements are weak and especially vulnerable to co-option or

collapse, a reflection not of the 'weakness' of society in these contexts, but rather of the distinct character of Africa's hybrid political orders. These insights highlight the importance of looking at the specific socio-political context of each case, as well as considering a range of responses and constraints. Studies have noted the seemingly contradictory responses to extractives, from outright rejection to acceptance (Maconachie, 2014). It is the case that local people might see the potential for benefits from extractives industries or might adapt to the realties brought by such projects. Yet in the literature, resistance tends to be emphasised over negotiation and accommodation (Bebbington, 2000). Bebbington (2000) argues that the ways in which people struggle for meaningful livelihoods necessarily brings them into contact with 'development interventions', and resistance is not the only response (Ibid.). He further notes that transformations in social relations brought about by extractives projects can structure access to resources and power, and identifies in the case of Latin America, the progressive expansion of grassroots influence and control over how these places are governed in some cases, for example by NGO and church, or by local popular initiative.

However, again, it is necessary to make a distinction between the African and Latin American experiences. A lot of the literature on social movements in extractives contexts includes cases from Latin America where NGOs have historically functioned in opposition to the government and played an important role in strengthening civil society (Banks and Hulme, 2012). In contrast, Africa did not have an NGO boom until the 1990s, and as such 'civil society' has unfolded differently. For example, 'civil society' in Uganda is conflated with professionalised NGOs whose role it is to provide a vehicle for social service delivery, as I show in chapter seven. Further civil society in Africa is a donor-nurtured section of civil society, and is based on a western conception of civil society which is seen to exist separately from the state (Lewis, 2001). Such a view becomes problematic in the context of postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, where African societies are plural and fragmented, with vertical relations and patronage bonds (Chabal et al., 1999). As such, scholars have questioned the idea of a distinction between state and civil society in the Sub Saharan African context (Markovitz, 1998, Karlström, 1999). This means that the NGO sector in Latin America emerges from a stronger and more radicalised body of civil society organisations in opposition to the authoritarian regimes across the region (Bebbington, 1997, Miraftab, 1997) whereas in contrast, "state and society in Africa intertwine in complex, changing ways" (Markovitz, 1998: 21).

2.4 The extractive industries and the social licence to operate

It is important for this thesis on subnational level dynamics in a new oil context to consider the ways in which oil companies engage with the resource space, especially in light of the above discussion on enclaves and social conflict. Extractives companies have realised that the negative impacts of extractive industries on communities can have damaging impacts on the company itself, in terms of time lost through stoppages, conflict and reputational damage (Wilson, 2016). Oil companies therefore seek to acquire a "Social Licence to Operate" (SLO), to ensure that the project and companies have the approval of society (Joyce and Thomson, 2000).

The Social Licence to Operate emerged as a key concept originally formulated by the mining industry to try to understand and explain the negative societal opinions of the sector (Gehman et al., 2017). As such, SLO emerged in response to opposition as a mechanism which aimed to ensure the viability of the sector (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Given its origins in the narratives of companies themselves, it is unsurprising that the term is critiqued as focusing more on business risk then business-society relationship building (Wilson, 2016). Nonetheless, as extractives companies face increased scrutiny, the SLO concept has grown in importance (Gehman et al., 2017), seen by some as a platform for stakeholder negotiation (Prno, 2013).

SLO is closely related to legitimacy, and if a company has the 'social licence', this broadly denotes its acceptability by the community in question. However, there has been less focus in the literature on the complexity of legitimacy-seeking for complex organisations such as oil MNCs, or the processes of how it happens. The increase of company and community conflict in extractives contexts and its far reaching implications for both companies and local communities (Franks et al., 2014, Andrews et al., 2017) suggests that local level legitimacy is of increasing importance. Legitimacy can be defined as a generalizable perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). A key issue then is which 'socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions' do oil MNCs engage with and how?

One of the most common tools that extractives companies use to build relationships, maintain legitimacy and manage the resource space is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Larsen,

2017, Billo, 2015, Rajak, 2011). CSR denotes the range of (mainly voluntary) practices undertaken by businesses to meet or exceed the ethical and legal expectations of society (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005). In fact, the oil and gas sector has been one of the leading industries to embrace CSR in order to reduce negative and promote positive externalities associated with operations (Frynas, 2005). The oil companies that have shown most commitment to engage with CSR are those dependent on international financial markets and international reputations, suggesting the importance of *external* norms and value systems (Frynas, 2009).

However, CSR continues to evolve over time to meet changing societal expectations, drawing on new management frameworks and philosophies in the process (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). Scholars have noted a shift from first generation CSR as 'philanthropy' to second generation CSR as 'social engagement', the latter embodying an aim to be more 'inclusive' of local communities in terms of consulting them about the costs and benefits from extractives projects (Laplante and Spears, 2008). In the oil industry, CSR has moved from old style 'philanthropy', featuring donations and infrastructure projects, to 'empowerment' projects which promote community self-reliance (Frynas, 2005, Rajak, 2011, Billo, 2015). The latter approach has been inspired by the 'win-win' or business case approach to CSR which flags not only compatibility, but synergies between doing good and profitability:

> "Approached strategically, [CSR] generates opportunity, innovation, and
> competitive advantage for corporations—while solving pressing social problems."
> (Porter and Kramer, 2006: 1)

As such, to avoid the idea that companies are 'patrons', a more strategic approach to CSR has been adopted among oil companies (Rajak, 2011). In this approach, social engagement and 'participation' of local communities have become a key strategy. However, this has tended to rely on the stakeholder model, which critics argue focuses on mitigating the risk to the corporation rather than addressing community concerns (Hamann, 2003, Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Indeed, the stakeholder model can reinforce or exacerbate power relations. Since the model recognises the most 'salient' stakeholders in terms of their potential impact on the company (Mitchell et al., 1997), it overlooks those actors which may be the most important in terms of ensuring wider social goals (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl, 2013).

Further, while the SLO may be a key concern, the motivations for implementing CSR can vary between companies, from instrumental approaches in which the economic motive is central, towards approaches where ethical considerations are more central (Garriga and Melé, 2004). Extractive industries actors have engaged in CSR to try to address the problem of 'socially thin' environments arising from the enclaving tendencies of extractives (Ferguson, 2006). However, Gilberthorpe (2013) among others has questioned if this 'framework of improved intervention' has benefitted communities at all. CSR is seen as creating patron / client relationships "on which structures of patronage and dependency are built" and is used to buy support from local communities (Rajak, 2017: 191). Indeed, the more critical work on CSR and the anthropological approaches of Gilberthorpe and Rajak among others, look at the 'social life of CSR' (Rajak, 2011) and have been useful in drawing attention to the wider power effects of CSR, especially in light of more 'innovative' and strategic CSR approaches. Linking back to the problem of 'socially thin' environments and the potential for instability, CSR and community engagement have played a role in attempting to contain and shape social struggle (Himley, 2013). This suggests that subnational social conflict and resistance must be placed within the broader framework of extractives relationships. Both social control and development are caught up together, which Banks et al. (2016) suggest can explain why CSR approaches by extractives companies seek both social control and community development at the same time.

2.5 Concepts and conceptual framework

The previous section reviewed the literature on the links between natural resources and poor development outcomes, social conflict, forms of resistance, and CSR. I identified a number of gaps relating to the ways in which studies of oil tend to focus on oil as revenue, on struggles over resource wealth, and on national scales of analysis and miss the important processes that take place in the pre-oil stage. I argued that it is important to focus on the interactions of a range of actors during the early stages of the industry to understand outcomes. This section outlines the key concepts that I draw on to explore the subnational dynamics of Uganda's emerging resource frontier. I first outline recent scholarship on resource frontiers, which provides some insights to how resource frontiers have been conceptualised in the literature, before outlining the assemblage approach, through which I will explore the subnational dynamics of Uganda's resource frontier.

2.5.1 Resource frontiers

Uganda's oil region is an emerging resource frontier, and this study seeks to understand and explain the processes taking place at the subnational level as it develops. A remote area becomes a 'frontier' when it encounters the attention of resource capture (Lund, 2019). What was previously a marginalised and peripheral area – the remote Albertine Graben - is now central to the vision of a modern Uganda, on the cusp of becoming one of the world's oil producing nations.

In the literature, central to the imagination of the frontier has been the idea of a wide empty space, an unpeopled and bountiful landscape ripe for investment and colonisation (Li, 2014, Tsing, 2003). The East African oil and gas frontier has been marketed in a similar way in the oil industry press; as a place of unique potential and opportunity, the 'last energy frontier' for the expansion of the global economy (DeLoitte, 2014). In political economy approaches, the resource frontier has been conceptualised in terms of a linear expansion of capitalist relations of production pushing forwards and absorbing outlying regions (Cleary, 1993). This takes place through the violent contestation between peasant and capitalist frontier actors (Foweraker, 2002), and involves processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004).

Whilst still emphasising the violence of these encounters, recent thinking on frontiers aims to go beyond this linear approach, and emphasises the uneven ways that frontier processes take place (Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2011). A key publication was Schmink and Wood's longitudinal study of the Amazonian frontier, which identified "not a unitary process of change defined solely by the occupation of space and exploitation of resources but rather... a multiplicity of simultaneous overlapping contested frontiers, both palpable and abstract" (Schmink and Wood, 1992: 19). This recognition of multiple and overlapping frontiers, emphasised the complexity of how these spaces are shaped and the range of actors involved at multiple scales (Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2003, Li, 2001).

This scholarship highlights the political dimensions of frontiers and the spatial dimensions of governance. Watts argues that frontiers are better understood as 'frontier spaces', and the resource frontier as a process (Watts, 2012). The frontier is not purely spatial, but also political, economic and social; it 'takes place' (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018); is characterised by social inequality, environmental degradation and conflict (Jepson, 2006); involves an

expansion of state power (Bridge, 2009), communal displacement and resource degradation (Tsing, 2003); it is a contested and complex empirical 'reality' (Barney, 2009).

However, while work on resource frontiers flag the frontier as a site of encounters between knowledge practices, jurisdictions, and visions of modernity, development and progress (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018), the literature continues to emphasise domination, contestation, and social conflict as its main, defining characteristics. Ultimately, the frontier is "a zone of destruction of property systems, political structures, social relations, and life-worlds to make way for new ways of resource extraction" (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018: 389). Given the apparent hegemonic nature of oil (section 2.2), this would suggest that the oil frontier develops in a predictable way. Indeed, Watts has shown that oil frontiers are unique spaces that attract powerful global players and become shaped by a global regime of accumulation, which in the case of Nigeria, erased local rights to land in favour of oil extraction (Watts, 2012, Watts, 2004b). He argues that oil frontier spaces develop as violent and exclusionary corporate enclaves, subordinated by the 'boom and bust', militarised and hegemonic nature of globalised oil.

Given the idea of oil's dominant grip on development outcomes in the face of overwhelming evidence of social and environmental destruction in oil frontiers, it is no surprise that less attention is paid to the productive processes which take place in frontier spaces. Next, I draw on three concepts that emphasise the productive and agentive capacities of frontiers, in order to push the concept of frontiers making to include a broader range of processes. These are Dream Zones, Post frontier, and Carbonscapes.

2.5.2 Dream zones

Cross (2014) in his ethnography on Special Economic Zones in India argues that contemporary capitalism is built upon dreams as well as nightmares. Similarly, in her work on the Indonesian resource frontier, Tsing (2003) and (2011) notes that the frontier is a place of trauma for some, but potential opportunity for others. Both Cross (2014) and Tsing (2011) argue that dreams of improvement are an integral part of frontier making, not only for local people who are promised benefits, but for a range of actors, including those who propose to promote the interests of the vulnerable, such as NGOs or community representations, or local government officials. It is these dreamed-of-futures of a range of actors that have material effects and converge in frontier spaces, sometimes aligning and sometimes in conflict (Cross,

2014). Cross (2014) argues that people's responses in frontiers depend on a complex mix of factors, one of which is the ways in which different people imagine the future and it is these imaginaries of development that shape consent and conflict. It is the "divergent ways of knowing about, imagining and living towards the future that play out in these sites" (Cross, 2014: 5) which help to understand how responses of conflict, resistance or consent are shaped.

This conceptualisation of frontiers as spaces productive of aspirations and (positive) development imaginaries is overshadowed by a focus on the more destructive processes that take place. It is the accounts of domination and the 'totalising logic' of capitalism which Cross (2014) and Tsing (2011) argue limit the understanding of a range of processes in frontier spaces. This work informs my approach to explaining frontier dynamics in Uganda, as I aim to move away from the focus solely on the dissolution and disruption of social order and the creation of something new in its place by bringing in a focus on ideas and the ways that different imaginaries articulate in these spaces to shape outcomes. The key idea from this work is the role of aspirations in shaping development imaginaries and the way these influence the responses of actors in the frontier.

2.5.3 The post frontier

To emphasise the qualitative shift away from frontiers characterised by predatory extraction and destruction, Larsen has conceptualised the 21st century frontier as the 'post frontier' (Larsen, 2015). He points out that corporate domination as experienced in the 20th century frontiers of the Amazon and south East Asia, is no longer viable:

> "Whereas frontiers represented uncharted territory out of sight and control, the post-frontier is in narrative terms, visualised, inventoried and managed" (Larsen, 2015: 7).

Indeed, the 21st century frontier is also characterised and influenced by the language of environmental protection and sustainable development, what Tsing (2011) calls the 'salvage frontier'. Extractives corporations operate under increased scrutiny, under pressure from civil society groups to ensure the rights of local populations and that extraction is carried out with appropriate 'best practice' social and environmental safeguards. He argues that this is a post frontier, 're-ordered' by new technologies, safeguard regulations, sustainable extraction and social change. Key post frontier devices in this new era are environmental and social impact

assessments (ESIAs) as standard, corporate community relations programmes and CSR (Larsen, 2017).

The post frontier discourse suggests that the legitimacy of extractives companies cannot be taken for granted. Oil MNCs must make pro-active efforts to territorialise the project in a context of 'competing territorialities' created by the existence of social movements and NGOs seeking to scrutinise corporate practices, if they are to ensure ongoing legitimacy, or earn a 'social licence to operate' (section 2.4). Delaney (2009) outlines the concept of territoriality as the ideologies, discourses, and practices that are employed to make one development strategy prevalent over others. For oil MNCs, this is carried out through CSR and stakeholder engagement, which are now the taken-for-granted post frontier devices through which companies seek to establish legitimacy (Billo, 2012). These practices use 'quieter' forms of power, which Frederiksen and Himley (2020) note embody the shift from 'accumulation by dispossession' in extractives frontiers towards more 'productive' forms of corporate control of space.

Larsen (2015) does not present the post frontier as a utopia. Rather he draws attention to the paradox of the post frontier; the apparent contradiction of frontier dynamics taking place and even deepening at the same time as post frontier regulation increases. As the literature review demonstrated, the extraction model continues to be promoted along with new language promising win-win outcomes and measures which aim to address the negative impacts of extraction. The post frontier concept draws attention to these practices and expert knowledges that seek to territorialise a project, while emphasising those processes and practices that provide the counter territorialisation.

2.5.4 Carbonscapes

In their approach to studying energy systems, Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) outline the concept of Carbonscapes, through which they seek to challenge the path dependency common in studies of oil. As with other work in resource geography (section 2.2.3) they highlight the importance of the materiality of resources in determining outcomes but argue that the way materiality is conceptualised in the literature tends to overplay its stability and inertia. They adopt an assemblage approach to analyse carbonscapes, emphasising the capacities for change inherent in carbonscapes / assemblages. Because assemblages are composed of various interrelated parts, it is through their involvement with other assemblages that they are subject

to change and destabilisation (Delanda, 2006). I expand on the value of the assemblage approach to this study in section 2.5.5.

Key to the carbonscapes concept are processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation which compete to stabilise or destabilise an assemblage (table 1), mirroring those of Larsen's post frontier concept. Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) argue that the materialities of carbonscapes are consequential for shaping these processes and in terms of oil extraction, these competing processes can make oil extraction sites inherently unstable and unpredictable. They show that it is through links to other assemblages that change (deterritorialisation) takes place, which they indicate as 'assemblage converters' in table 1 to demonstrate the built-in capacities for change in the carbonscape. In 'extraction hot zones', assemblage converters do not necessarily rupture the assemblage, but shape processes of destabilisation that can lead to change (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

Table 1. Example of territorialising, deterritorialising and assemblage converter processes in the oil assemblage. Source: Excerpt from Harstaad and Wanvik (2017: 445)

Carbonscapes	Territorialising	Deterritorialising	Assemblage converter
Extractive hot zones	- Infrastructure - EIAs - Impact benefits agreements - Employment - Royalities / taxes	- Environmental impact - Social impacts - Climate discourse - Indigenous rights discourse - Market shifts - Changing global energy matrix	- Sudden oil price changes - Local resistance movements - Geopolitical incidents - Environmentally damaging spills

My approach to studying Uganda's oil assemblage draws inspiration from the carbonscapes concept, as it emphasises agency and capacities for change and as such challenges the assumed hegemony of oil (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

I now set out the conceptual framework for the study which adopts an assemblage approach and draws on key ideas from the dream zones, post frontier and carbonscapes concepts to broaden the conceptualisation of frontier making dynamics.

2.5.4 Assemblage approach

Uganda's oil frontier is developing in the era of the 'post frontier', where what is known about oil in the context of a post-colonial sub-Saharan African state promises to shape the processes of territorialisation and deterritorialization, as state and non-state actors seek to establish, manage and govern the oil project. It is the actors, practices, ideas and materialities that are involved in the territorialising and counter territorialising processes in a contemporary resource frontier that give insight into the dynamics of the subnational space during the early stage of the industry. These processes become part and parcel of the making of Uganda's oil; of the 'assembling' of Uganda's oil frontier and of Uganda's oil resource. Before I outline the framework I use for the study, I discuss the assemblage approach and justify its use to explore Uganda's emerging oil frontier.

The origins of the assemblage approach are in social theory, developed as a way to analyse social complexity. The word assemblage is translated from the French word 'agencement' in social theory, a concept that was advanced by the philosophy of Deluce and Guattari and taken further by Michelle DeLanda (Delanda, 2006). 'Agencement', related to the word 'agency', implies a capacity to act through the coming together – or assembling - of things. DeLanda built on Deluce and Guattari to conceptualise social formations as assemblages, composed of individual heterogenous components – both human and non-human - that enter into relations with one another. These social formations are not predetermined, but rather they are made up of complex assemblages that come together in certain configurations to function as a system or a whole (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). Because these social formations emerge through new associations and the substitution of elements, an assemblage approach provides a framework through which to analyse how particular social formations emerge or change over time (Schritt, 2016). What is significant for the purposes of exploring an emerging oil assemblage in a resource frontier is that the heterogeneous elements that come together are linked to other assemblages. The elements of an assemblage have the capacity to act in different ways, depending on the configuration of elements that come together. Delanda (2006) refers to these as 'relations of exteriority', and it is the relations of exteriority in assemblages that Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) build on to develop their concept of carbonscapes. For the purposes of this study of a new oil frontier, another benefit of the assemblage approach is that it enables a focus on the multiplicity of actors, resources, ideas, technologies and different forms of power that come together in contingent ways. Using the assemblage lens to study the pre-oil stage of the industry in Uganda can shed light on the

emergence of these configurations of human and non-human elements, and how they play out in a local setting to shape outcomes. This allows me to explore Uganda's oil assemblage as a novel configuration of a diverse range of component parts, including practices, ideas and materialities that have come together at a particular point in time, that make some outcomes possible and others not.

2.5.5 The Assemblage conceptual framework

The assemblage conceptual framework focuses attention not only on the range of actors in the oil assemblage but also the materiality of the resource, ideas about the resource, the technologies of extraction and the ideas, norms and values that inform actors and action, including the discourses and practices of resource governance. The aim is not simply to map out an extensive range of factors and processes, but rather to explore and understand the emerging and dynamic configuration of social actors and the material world they inhabit (Brown and Spiegel, 2017). I do this by drawing on the dream zones, post frontier and carbonscapes concepts to outline a framework through which I focus on ideas / knowledge, materiality, practices and agency.

2.5.5.1 Ideas and knowledges

Cross (2014) and Tsing (2011) draw attention to divergent ideas and ways of knowing in frontier spaces. The ideas linked to resources can be generative of aspirations and dreams of improvement, as they become associated with progress, modernity and improved wellbeing (Tsing, 2011, Cross, 2014). In a similar way, ideas about resources and an understanding of oils 'potentialities' are translated into policy advice and blueprint approaches for managing resource outcomes (Weszkalnys, 2009). The idea of a resource curse has been influential in shaping these approaches to managing oil and has also played a role in shaping development imaginaries.

Expert knowledge is mobilised in the extraction and appraisal of resources, as well as its governance (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Local knowledge can be undervalued, but expert knowledge can be distrusted and even challenged by local ways of knowing (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). The importance of different ways of knowing is also relevant to how people understand a resource itself. Different resource ontologies can be in tension, for example the cultural attachments of some communities to water or land, what Conde has called a clash of metabolisms (Conde, 2017). Resources are known in different ways across

space and time, and as such, the uses and values attached to resources can vary between and within societies and across time (Bridge, 2009, Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014).

2.5.5.2 Materiality

The carbonscapes concept draws attention to how the materiality of a resource shapes processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation. In a similar way, Mitchell (2009) has shown that certain resources are conducive to certain forms of social organisation, for example the infrastructures required to extract and process oil can shape social and political formations. This is seen most clearly in Nigeria where oil infrastructure has become key to the ways that struggle against the oil industry is waged (Watts, 2012). The materiality of the resource is also linked to its potentialities; its values and affordances. Oil's status as a globally valuable and strategic asset at this particular historical conjuncture enrolls powerful actors across scales (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014, Watts, 2005). So, materiality refers not only to the physical properties of that particular resource which might mean that a resource is territorially grounded and requires physical infrastructures to process and transport it, but also to its affordances or potentialities and the processes and practices that emerge in response.

2.5.5.3 Practices

Work must be done to assemble, or bring together, the heterogenous interests and elements of any assemblage (Li, 2014). In the oil assemblage practices play a crucial role in territorialisation, by seeking to bring together elements that may be inherently in tension, especially in a new oil context where oil is at once a national strategic asset, a globally valuable commodity and a potentially 'cursed' substance (Weszkalnys, 2011). Efforts to territorialise are seen in the proliferation of post frontier practices including ESIAs, community agreements, consultation processes and CSR projects (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). As Li (2014) puts it, it is these practices which aim to make assemblage elements 'cohere'.

The social actors that aim to govern and manage a particular space draw on practices from other assemblages, and in this process alliances are forged and tensions emerge (Bueger, 2018). Li (2014) goes further to highlight not only the practices of territorialisation, but the practices which *underly* both territorialising and deterritorialising efforts of different social actors. She emphasises the importance to consider them as a political process. In her analysis of the

assembling of land as a resource, she identifies the practice of 'rendering technical', which aims to turn complex social processes into an intelligible field that can be managed; the practice of 'compromise' which is key to the legitimacy of assemblage practices, where contradictions must be managed and coercion is not an option, and finally 'anti-politics' as a practice by which political questions such as injustice and poverty are re-posed as ones amenable to technical solutions (Li, 2014). Li's work draws attention to the importance of viewing practices in the assemblage as 'practices of assemblage' which, as Delaney (2009) argues, comprise certain ideologies, discourses, and practices employed to make one development strategy prevalent over others.

2.5.5.4 Agency

The assemblage approach emphasises agency, of both the human and non-human elements of assemblages. Rather than suggest 'things' have agency, the understanding here is that the material world does not provide a passive context within which people act, but rather the material interacts with people in producing the social world (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). The material can constrain or enable social relations (Bakker and Bridge, 2006), and ideas can have material effects (Cross, 2014, Weszkalnys, 2011). As such, in addition to the 'hard work' required by human actors to produce a resource, to 'wrest it from its existing ecologies' (Tsing, 2003) and to enable an assemblage to 'cohere' (Li, 2007a), agency also refers to the potentialities of the resource, which are linked to materiality and ideas about oil. Oil is seen as a 'cursed' substance and this idea about oil has real effects through the production of policy to manage oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). Sites of resource extraction and infrastructure can become sites of mobilization and facilitate the political agency of the powerless or disadvantaged in these sites (Sassen, 2000). Forms and scales of protest might differ depending on the resource in question (Mitchell, 2009, Brown and Spiegel, 2017). Processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation which seek to establish or challenge the legitimacy of an oil project (Larsen, 2015) have agency due to their connections to other assemblages (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

2.5.6 Contemporary applications of the assemblage approach, and its critics

There is no single assemblage theory or methodology (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). On the one hand this makes setting out the parameters of the concept challenging, but on the other hand, it means that it is possible to draw on the diverse usages of the approach as I have

done to develop the framework set out above. The benefit of the assemblage approach is that it enables a focus on a multiplicity of actors, resources, ideas, technologies and different forms of power that come together in contingent ways. To this end, the approach has been usefully employed to study global governance, resource assemblages and policy formation.

Abrahamsen and Williams (2017) analyse the dynamics of security at a resource extraction site in Tanzania using the concept of global security assemblages to show that transformations taking place locally and globally lead to novel security assemblages that reshape the practices and institutions of security in place specific sites. While Abrahamsen and Williams flag tensions in the assemblage, Bueger (2018) shows that the assemblage approach can highlight cooperation. He analyses the emergence of a counter-piracy assemblage and demonstrates the value of assemblage theory for understanding international cooperation in practice. For Li (2007a), the assemblage is essentially a governance assemblage. She identifies a number of practices that are identified in governance assemblages which enable global discourses and governance technologies to 'cohere' in the local setting (Li, 2007a, Li, 2014). The assemblage approach has proved fruitful for examining natural resources beyond their existence as commodities (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). A resource itself, such as land, is an 'assemblage' of heterogeneous elements including material substances, technologies, discourses and practices (Li, 2007a).

Recent approaches to studying emerging resource frontiers have also employed relational approaches to study "the intertwined materialities, actors, cultural logics, spatial dynamics, ecologies, and political economic processes that produce particular places as resource frontiers" (Cons and Eilenberg, 2019: 2). Cons and Eilenberg (2019) combine 'frontiers' and 'assemblage' to come up with 'frontier assemblages' as a way to understand frontiers as sites of extraction and production in Asia. Although this approach takes on some of the main concerns that I discussed in section 2.5.1 to understand the frontier as not merely a site of capital and a zone of extraction, combining the two concepts risks bringing the assumptions inherent in much frontier thinking that I outlined above. While Cons and Eilenberg (2019) rightly point to frontier spaces as sites of creative production, this often implies the emergence of 'new cultural imaginaries' in ways that erase previous ones, rather than the possibility of new imaginaries articulating with existing ones. As Cross (2014) reminds us, it is important to look at the ways that divergent dreamed of futures articulate in these spaces which the combination of the frontier and assemblage concepts makes it less easy to do.

The assemblage approach has been critiqued on numerous fronts. Allen (2012) claims the assemblage is used in descriptive ways, for mapping out and describing, and as such provides little explanatory power. For Anderson and McFarlane (2011) it is limited in that it can mean 'everything and anything'. Friedman (2015) argues that the assemblage approach is inadequate to studying complex issues, such as those raised by oil politics, because it *lacks* the means to analyse global complexity by not allowing us to get past the messiness of the world. This contradicts Haarstad and Wanvik (2017)'s understanding of the assemblage approach's ability to shake up the scholarship on oil that tends to stress path dependencies and inertia. For the purposes of exploring an emerging oil assemblage and its subnational effects, the approach permits us to see certain things and think in certain ways (Savage, 2019), and as such I argue that assemblage thinking has several advantages. It acts as both a heuristic to map and describe, and also as a tool to explore subnational dynamics. First, scales are not hierarchical, so the global or national is not privileged over the subnational. Second, it focuses on human and non-human agency, which means that materiality and ideas are consequential. Third, it enables the focus on an emerging order and how social formations are contingent and connected to other assemblages. Fourth, it welcomes a conceptualisation of power that is productive.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed several key literatures underpinning this thesis and outlined the core concepts that will be used. I argued for a relational approach which enables a focus on the subnational level during the early stages of the industry, and on a wider range of actors and interactions. The literature review also highlighted the importance of ideas and materiality, and I argued that the assemblage approach enables a relational approach while at the same time allows a focus on materiality and ideas in the analysis. The chapter then set out the conceptual framework for the thesis which uses the assemblage approach to explore Uganda's oil assemblage as a novel configuration of a diverse range of component parts, including practices, ideas, technologies, materialities. To provide more conceptual depth to the framework I also draw from the critical development, social anthropology, political ecology and critical management literatures.

Having reviewed the literature and set out my conceptual framework, I will now turn to discuss the research design and methodology for the study.

3.0 Chapter Three

Methodology and research design

3.1 Introduction

The overall aim of the thesis is to explore and explain the dynamics taking place at the subnational level during the pre-oil stage in Uganda. In the previous chapter I set out the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis and argued for a relational approach using an assemblage conceptual framework. Researching the unfolding of power relations, as a global industry of considerable influence comes to a resource periphery in a post-colonial state in the global south, requires a methodology that can capture the complexities while remaining sensitive to the context. The assemblage approach enables a research design that allows me to capture a range of actors, interactions, perceptions and experiences, as well as identify narratives, materialities and practices.

This chapter describes the methods and research design most appropriate for the research aims and objectives of this study:

- Objective 1a: Map the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and show how their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry.
- Objective 1b: Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil assemblage to shape outcomes.
- Objective 2: Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.
- Objective 3: Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.

The chapter proceeds by introducing the Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons in Uganda project, which was my introduction to studying oil in Uganda and provided opportunities to be immersed in the Uganda context and collect data. I then discuss the research design in

section 3.3, including the research philosophy underpinning the study, the case study approach adopted in the design of the research, and the location of the study. Next, section 3.4 outlines the data and methods, which are discussed in relation to the research objectives, the data requirements, data sources, sampling and methods of data collection. Section 3.5 describes the data analysis process for each research objective. Finally, section 3.6 reflects on some of the key challenges and limitations of carrying out the study including access to field sites, the positionality of the researcher and ethics.

3.2 University of Leeds research project

My introduction to researching oil in Uganda was through my involvement as a research assistant in the University of Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons in Uganda project (the Leeds project). This was a four-year (2012-2016) project funded by the Democratic Governance Facility in Uganda. The project was carried out with Ugandan partners in Kampala and in the oil region and involved data collection in seven districts in the oil region, followed by multi-stakeholder workshops to explore opportunities for community-driven accountability in the oil sector. I provide full details of the project in the appendices and I reflect on my involvement in the Leeds project and its contribution in relation to my PhD throughout this chapter.

Involvement in the Leeds project immersed me in the Ugandan context, and I was able to combine visits for the Leeds project with PhD scoping and data collection as I outline in table 2. Between 2012 and 2015 I travelled extensively in the oil region, I spent time with Ugandan colleagues from the oil region and took part in meetings and interviews with local government leaders, local community members and representatives of oil companies. I contributed to facilitating multi-stakeholder workshops and I also helped to convene a conference in Kampala as part of a small University of Leeds British Academy grant to bring together academics and practitioners working on oil governance in East Africa. The research I carried out for the Leeds project provided the inspiration for the PhD and much of the background context. Some of the data I collected personally in 2012 as part of the Leeds project is included in the dataset for this thesis. However, the PhD is an entirely separate piece of work.

Table 2. Research visits to Uganda for the University of Leeds project and for PhD research

Visits to Uganda	Research activity	Relation to PhD
December 2012	Data collection in Bunyoro Interviews with CSOs Kampala	Leeds project, PhD scoping
January 2013	Data collection in West Nile Oil company interviews in Kampala; CSO interviews in Kampala	Leeds project, PhD scoping
March 2013	Data collection and validation in Kigezi, CSO interviews in Kampala	Leeds project, PhD scoping
June 2013	Workshops & interviews in Hoima, conference in Kampala	British Academy project, PhD scoping
September 2013	Multi-stakeholder workshops Kampala	Leeds project
January 2014	Action planning workshops in Kigezi region	Leeds project
March 2014	Multi-stakeholder workshop in Kampala	Leeds project, PhD scoping
June 2014 to Aug 2014	PhD fieldwork: data collection in Hoima, Kaiso and Kampala	PhD data collection
February 2015	PhD fieldwork: data collection in Hoima and Kampala	PhD data collection
June 2015	Multi-stakeholder workshop in Bunyoro PhD interviews in Hoima	Leeds project, PhD follow up
July 2016	PhD fieldwork: Follow up interviews in Nsonga Data validation in Hoima	PhD follow up and validation

3.3 Research Design

The research design refers to the approaches taken in the research, which are dependent on the research questions, as well as the resources available for conducting the research and analysis (Williams, 2003). The aims and research objectives of this study, illustrated in table 4, require a research design and methodological approach that enables me to explore a range of interactions, perceptions and experiences of actors over a period of time, as well as capture narratives, practices and materialities. As such, the study adopts a qualitative approach with a case study method to explore the dynamics of a developing oil frontier over a period of several years.

3.3.1 Qualitative approach

Qualitative research offers an interpretation of the social world of the research participants by focusing on their experiences, perspectives and histories (Lewis et al., 2003). A qualitative approach enables the researcher to study people in their natural settings to identify how their experiences and behaviour are shaped by the context of their lives (Hennink et al., 2020). As Suter argues:

> "The search for an objective reality, favoured by quantitative researchers, is abandoned to the assumption that people construct their own personalized worlds" (Suter, 2011: 344)

A qualitative approach is the most appropriate approach for my research, which broadly aims to understand the emergence of the oil assemblage and consider how elements of the assemblage shape the interests of the various actors involved. Qualitative research allows the researcher to explore people's experiences through in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, observation, content analysis and visual methods (Hennink et al., 2020). The research design evolves throughout the research process and requires creativity to analyse rich sources of data (Suter, 2011).

3.3.2 Interpretive paradigm

The underlying research philosophy of this study is informed by the ontological and epistemological inclinations of the researcher, who brings her own background, values and biases to the research both implicitly and explicitly. These assumptions inform the choice of

theories that guide the research (Creswell and Poth, 2016) and can be defined as a paradigm, or 'worldview' which defines the nature of the world and the individuals place in it (Guba and Lincoln, 2004). The researcher must be explicit about her choice of paradigm, as this informs and guides the researchers' approach. Ontology sets out the nature of reality and asks what can be known about this reality. Epistemology is the relationship between the knower and the known, and asks what can be known in light of the constraints presented by the researcher's ontological position. The methodology, by which the researcher goes about finding out what can be known, is in turn constrained by the answers to the two latter questions (Creswell and Poth, 2016).

This research is informed by the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm, which I consider to be the most appropriate for the study and which will enable the richness and depth of data to be explored to address the research objectives. Interpretivist/constructivist approaches to research aim to understand "the world of human experience" (Cohen and Manion, 1994: 36), and hold that the researcher should attempt to understand the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it (Schwandt, 2000). From this perspective, reality is socially constructed (Mertens, 2014). The interpretivist/constructivist researcher tends to rely upon the "participants' views of the situation being studied" (Creswell and Creswell, 2017: 8) and recognises the impact on the research of their own background and experiences. Specifically, I follow Jones (2002) in adopting a 'moderate' or 'contextual' constructionist position:

> "some forms of social constructionism enable us to simultaneously take on board the material conditions of our existence and its symbolic" (Jones, 2002: 248).

The importance here is that this approach allows for a degree of ontological realism by accepting the existence of a material world, while emphasising that people interpret that material world in different ways (Jones, 2002). Although I recognise that a material reality exists, my focus is on how people make sense of that reality through an interpretation of their experiences. So, although oil is real in a material sense, understandings of oil are socially constructed and subject to change over time (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This differs substantially from the positivist approach of an ontological realism that can be known through objective, reductionist and rational enquiry (Jones, 2002).

Interpretivists believe an understanding of the context in which the research is conducted is critical to the interpretation of the data (Willis et al., 2007: 4). As such, in the interpretivist/constructivist tradition, the findings are interpreted by the researcher rather than represent a definitive capture of reality; instead, they shed light on a phenomenon. As I am drawing on perspectives rather than 'truths' an actor-oriented approach to research is adopted, which places actors at the centre of enquiry (Long, 2003, Long, 2004). This approach acknowledges the complexities of interactions between actors and disaggregates actors, recognising "the coexistence of different understandings and interpretations of experience" (Long, 2004: 15). This is useful for exploring global and local interactions, such as those encountered by local people in Uganda as they become connected to a global oil industry. The actor-oriented approach to research which disaggregates actors will enable me to unpack the varied experiences of actors within actor categories, which is important for my goal to capture a range of responses and perspective. This approach allows me to disaggregate oil MNCs as separate actors and treat them as agents of change (Bury, 2008).

3.3.3 Case study

Studying the dynamics of a developing oil frontier is complex and multi-layered, therefore I need to employ research methods to capture dynamism and change, and allow for contradictory, conflicting perspectives and processes. The case study was chosen as the best method to give insight into complexity and capture "the unfolding of social processes" (Van Maanen, 1979: 520).

The study employs a bounded case study approach, in recognition that this is not a case study of the entire oil region but rather a snapshot, or microcosm of it. Because a case is a 'bounded system' (Creswell and Creswell, 2017), the researcher must be clear about the focus and extent of the research (Creswell and Poth, 2016). As such, the study is a bounded single case study of subnational oil dynamics in Hoima District in Uganda. There are a number of practical and opportunistic reasons for choosing Hoima District, which I outline in section 3.3.5, but one important reason is that this case allows me to address a significant research gap: the limited focus on the subnational level during the oil exploration period, both in Uganda specifically and in oil frontier contexts in general.

According to Yin (2009), a case study is the appropriate choice for "empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (2009: 14). For Stake (1995), the art of the case study is that it allows for the "study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity with important circumstances" (1995: xi). The case study is suited to capture the complexity of multiple variables and allows the researcher to use a range of methods and sources of evidence in order to shed light on the phenomenon being investigated. Case studies are not studied to understand other cases (Stake, 2005) but rather to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon in question (Yin, 2011). As such, this case study is exploratory (Yin, 2011) in that it is not undertaken to try to understand something else, but will allow me to develop theory to generate new knowledge about the resource frontier in Uganda.

Multiple levels of data collection and analysis were necessary to fully explore the subnational level dynamics of a globally connected industry (see section 3.4). The modern resource frontier is of interest to global actors, as well as those within Uganda. Further, change in oil company strategy is likely influenced by fluctuations in the global oil price as well as contestation at the village level and as well as national level policy. Similarly, the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) at the subnational level is influenced by international donors and agendas, as well as local level events.

Figure 1. Multi-level data collection for the subnational case study

3.3.4 Ensuring rigour

Denzin and Lincoln (2011a) argue that in interpretivist-constructivist enquiry trustworthiness and credibility is the goal; does the study accurately represent the realities of actors and contexts studied? The researcher must be able to provide evidence of the data collected and prove that findings are grounded in the data through the use of a consistent and coherent research design (Farquhar, 2012). The researcher must ensure that "data can be tracked to their sources, and the logic used to assemble interpretations can be made explicit in the narrative" (Mertens, 2014: 18). These goals replace more traditional measures of rigour in positivist science, which may focus on testing accuracy or validity (Maher et al., 2018). One critique of the case study method is the claim that case studies lack rigour and objectivity. However, in line with the philosophical perspective outlined above, I do not seek objectivity from the case study. Rather, an understanding of the case is reached through an interpretation of the data (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). For Yin, rigour can be ensured through 'triangulation'; using multiple sources of evidence to allow for the development of "converging lines of inquiry" (Yin, 2009: 120). I include how I aim to ensure rigour in table 4 where I present the data collected and analysed for each research objective.

3.3.5 The location of the study

The case study is a bounded study of subnational oil dynamics in Hoima District. Hoima District is located in Western Uganda, in the Bunyoro sub-region where oil deposits are confirmed. Hoima town is the main municipal, administrative, and commercial centre of Hoima District located approximately 230 kilometres northwest of Kampala, the capital of Uganda, along an all-weather road. At independence, Bunyoro was a Kingdom and Hoima was an entity within the Kingdom, becoming Hoima District in 1974, not long after the kingdoms were abolished (chapter four). Hoima District borders Kibaale in the south, Kiboga in the East, Masindi in the north-east and Lake Albert in the west. It has 13 subcounties, and oil exploration is active in two of these, Buseruka (Tullow Oil) and Kyangwali (CNOOC). People in Hoima District are mainly agriculturalists, and along the shores of Lake Albert people engage in subsistence fishing and in the fish trade.

The map in figure 2 shows Uganda, Kampala, the seven study districts visited for data collection during the Leeds project between 2012 and 2014, and Hoima District as the case study location for the PhD.

Figure 2. Location of Uganda in Africa (A), and the location of the 2012-2014 study districts (B), including Hoima, where the three 2014-2016 study villages were located and Kampala where interviews were conducted. Image sources (acquired August 2020): Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community.

Hoima District was selected as the focus for the study for a number of reasons. Time, financial constraints and practical considerations required me to narrow down the study to a geographical location within the oil region. Hoima is the district where most of the oil related activity was taking place during the fieldwork period, and where the oil project was moving towards the development stage, at the 'Kingfisher' site in Kyangwali subcounty. Hoima town hosts the liaison offices of Tullow Oil and CNOOC, the offices of the District Local Government and the offices of numerous civil society organisations (CSOs). Hoima town is the seat of the Bunyoro Kingdom and the Palace is in the town. Hoima District is also the location of the domestic oil refinery, and is where two main roads have been constructed to connect Hoima to the oil sites at the lake. Tullow Oil has been carrying out exploration activities in the district since 2005. In sum, Hoima District provides an opportunity to capture a realistic snapshot of oil related dynamics and the social relations that are developing between actors in the pre-oil stage.

Within Hoima District, I had to make decisions about where and how I could access the data I needed for the study. I based myself in Hoima town, which the media has dubbed the 'oil capital' of Uganda. A 'frontier town', described by the Bradts 2013 Uganda guidebook as "an unmemorable place to drive through on the way from Murchinson's Falls National Park to Queen Elizabeth" (Briggs and Roberts, 2013: 350), Hoima was becoming a town buzzing with oil and gas related activity. In between my first and second visits to Hoima - December 2012 and June 2013 – the town had grown; restaurants and hotels were springing up, new banks had opened, Tullow Oil had moved its office to the town and Kampala based CSOs were opening regional offices. By the time of my next research visit in 2014 Hoima hotels were busy hosting CSO oil and gas related workshops and oil company stakeholder engagement meetings.

The majority of interviews were carried out in Hoima town. Here I was able to travel easily to the offices of the District Local Government, Kingdom, oil company liaison offices and oil company Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) partner offices. I was also able to interview local government leaders from the subcounty in Hoima town, where they resided. I was able to observe stakeholder engagement meetings and CSO workshops held in the town.

The study also includes six villages in Hoima District that have experienced oil exploration activities since the early 2000s. All six villages were included in the Leeds project, and because I was restricted by time and finances, I selected just three of these villages to return to in 2014,

2015 and 2016 during the PhD fieldwork. I selected villages A, B and C because I knew from my previous interactions with key informants during the Leeds study that these villages had the most contact with industry (Manyindo et al., 2014). I was able to interview some residents from villages D and E at a workshop in Hoima town in 2015 (2 people from each village). Further, because villages A, B and C were also included in the Leeds study this presented me with an opportunity to collect data in these locations at different points in time. I decided to anonymise the villages in this study because of the need to anonymise my research respondents in light of the sensitivity of the topic. Table 3 shows the dates of visits to villages to collect data, and dates I interviewed respondents from the villages in Hoima town.

Table 3.Village interviews and dates

Village	Interviews in the village	Interviews with respondents from the village in Hoima town
Village A	2012, 2014, 2015	2015
Village B	2012, 2014, 2015	
Village C	2016	2014
Village D	2012	
Village E	2012	2015
Village F	2012	

Five of the villages in the study lie in what is referred to as the Kaiso-Tonya flat, a valley located at the bottom of a steep escarpment on the central eastern shore of Lake Albert. The valley was difficult to access until oil exploration activities began and roads were upgraded. Villages A, B, C, D and E are fishing villages located on the shores of Lake Albert. There is limited official data on the villages in the study, but the communities are multi-ethnic and include migrant fishing communities that live between Uganda and DRC. The main economic activities of lake communities are fishing and livestock rearing. The exception is village F, which is located at the top of the escarpment and is one of the villages displaced for the oil refinery. Here the main livelihood activity is farming.

Figure 3. Photo of escarpment to oil sites seen from Lake Albert. Source: author

Figure 4. Photo of boats at Lake Albert. Source: author

Figure 5. Photo of 'oil road' as it cuts through a village. Source: author

In interviews in 2012 it was recorded that village A has approximately 900 households, village B has 400 households, village C has 420 households, and village E has 100 households (with no data from village D). Village F comprised 150 households prior to displacement for the refinery in 2013.

Another location of data collection was Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. The offices of the national CSOs in the study are in Kampala and I carried out interviews with national CSOs there in 2012 and 2013. The headquarters of Tullow Oil, Total and CNOOC are in Kampala, and I interviewed Total's social engagement team in Kampala in 2013 and Tullow Oil's social engagement manager in Kampala in 2014.

3.4 Data and methods

3.4.1 Data required

To address the research aims and objectives, I required qualitative data that would enable me to identify a range of actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and understand and identify the

interactions between them. This was obtained from multiple primary and secondary sources to ensure that I captured a full picture. I also needed primary and secondary data about oil company activities in Uganda, including types of projects and activities, methods of implementation and partners used, to enable triangulation. Similarly, I required primary and secondary data on the activities and approaches of CSOs, including the partners, donors, and methods of implementation. Oil company CSR reports were useful secondary sources as were newspaper reports, and donor, International Non-governmental Organisations (INGO) and CSO websites and project publications. I also needed primary data to capture the perspectives of a range of subnational actors in relation to the dynamics taking place during the exploration period; including from oil MNCs and CSOs about their activities and interactions, and from a range of subnational actors in terms of their experiences of oil MNC CSR activities and / or CSO activities.

Table 4. Data requirements, data collection, data analysis and strategy implemented to ensure rigour (presented by research objective)

Research Objective	Data required	Data collection methods	Data analysis techniques	Strategy to ensure rigour
1 (a) Identify the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and show how their interests are shaped by oil (b) Explore how the emerging oil assemblage shapes / influences the subnational level	Actors involved in Uganda's oil assemblage Primary and secondary sources	Semi-structured interviews Focus group interviews Observations of CSO and oil company workshops / meetings Document analysis Involvement in University of Leeds research project and multi-stakeholder workshops	Coding interviews Actor mapping and actor relationship mapping by hand and electronically Analysis against assemblage framework Unpacking changes in relationships and interests using Excel tables	Validation of preliminary findings with select respondents
2. Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining this role	Qualitative data about the activities, engagements and interactions of oil MNCs with a range of actors Qualitative data about the subnational dynamics and how they interact with oil MNCs	Semi-structured interviews Focus group interviews Observations of oil company Stakeholder Engagement meetings Document analysis Involvement in University of Leeds research project and multi-stakeholder workshops	Coding interviews Writing detailed timelines Unpacking changes in relationships between industry and other actors using Excel tables	Triangulation of interviews, corporate reports, news sources Validation of preliminary findings with select respondents
3. Explore the role played by CSOs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining this role	Qualitative data about the activities, relationships, practices and narratives and interactions of CSOs with a range of actors in the oil assemblage,	Semi-structured interviews Focus group interviews Observations of CSO workshops Document analysis Involvement in University of Leeds research project and multi-stakeholder workshops	Coding interviews Writing detailed timelines Mapping CSOs, partners, donors Detailed timeline of CSO events and activities Unpacking changes in relationships between industry and other actors using Excel tables	Triangulation of interviews, CSO reports, donor reports Validation of preliminary findings with select respondents

3.4.2 Description of actors included in the data collection

In this section I describe the actors that are included in the study dataset.

Indigenous subnational actors

The dataset includes interviews and focus groups with indigenous subnational actors in Hoima District. By subnational actors I mean local community respondents in the oil communities and in Hoima District, including village leaders, elders, women, youth, fishers, subcounty government officials, District Local Government leaders and staff (e.g. Environment Office, Education Office, Community Development Office, Commercial Office) Bunyoro Kingdom officials, subcounty leaders. (Some of these actors and their roles are explained in further detail in chapter four).

Industry actors

The dataset includes interviews with staff from three international oil companies Tullow Oil, CNOOC and Total. These included Community Liaison Officers for all three, social engagement managers for Tullow Oil and Total, and CSR managers for CNOOC. I also carried out an observation of an oil company stakeholder engagement meeting with Tullow Oil and CNOOC present, and an oil company presentation on local content by Tullow Oil's National Content manager.

National and subnational CSOs

The dataset includes interviews with CSOs at the national level and the subnational level that are working on oil and gas issues. I carried out interviews and focus group interviews with subnational CSOs in Hoima District, which also include the Hoima-based offices of two national CSOs. The data includes an observation of a CSO capacity building workshop on oil and gas in Hoima town.

Oil company CSR partners

I carried out interviews with Hoima based organisations that are contracted by CNOOC and Tullow Oil to implement CSR and social investment programmes. These organisations are local organisations and were included to get different perspectives on CSR projects and their aims and benefits. I also had the opportunity to interview some CSR beneficiaries through the organisations.

3.4.3 Access to participants

My involvement in the Leeds project gave me access to key informants that would otherwise have been difficult to secure. Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), social engagement managers and CSR managers from Tullow Oil and CNOOC were happy to meet me due to my association with the Leeds project. Total on the other hand, while I interviewed them during the Leeds project in 2013, were unresponsive to the emails I sent to request interviews for my PhD research. My colleague in the Leeds study, a resident of Hoima town and well known in local government and CSO circles, provided me with a list of names and phone numbers of District Local Government and CSO contacts when I arrived in Hoima in 2014. This was my starting point for the fieldwork, and I believe it probably saved me weeks of time.

While I benefitted from some familiarity with the field due to my previous visits to Hoima and from the support of my colleague, there were some challenges associated with access to participants. My colleague acted as a gatekeeper, ensuring that I could gain access to key respondents in the villages and facilitating my access in the town (Clark, 2011). However, this also meant there were some limitations, as this relied on her own contacts and her own perceptions and bias of who I should speak to. This was overcome by not relying solely on my colleagues' recommendations; as I note below, I also employed different types of sampling. Nonetheless, I sometimes still needed to use gatekeepers given my lack of familiarity with the villages, and because there exists the custom of paying 'courtesy calls' to the village leaders on arrival in the community, which sometimes meant that the village leader had some say in which people in the village I spoke to. The inability to access village C during my first fieldwork visit also presented a challenge and required me to use someone to mobilise research respondents and bring them to meet me in Hoima town, which I discuss in more detail in section 3.6.1 (McFadyen and Rankin, 2016).

3.4.4 Data sources

In order to gather a range of data on the emerging industry to meet my objectives and ensure rigour, I needed multiple data sources from multiple levels. My main source of data was face to face interviews with research respondents in the field at the subnational and national levels. Information on the international actors involved such as donors and NGOs – i.e. the global level - were gathered using desk research.

Table 5. Sources of evidence used and associated strengths and weaknesses. Source: adapted from Yin (2014)

Source of evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Interviews	Focus is direct on the topic, insightful (Perceptions, attitudes, meanings)	Response bias Reflexivity Poorly articulated questions
Observations	Immediacy Contextual	Reflexivity Time-consuming selectivity
Documentation	Stable, can be reviewed repeatedly Unobtrusive Specific and broad	Retrievability Biased selectivity Reporting bias

While recognising the weaknesses of each of the evidence sources (table 5), semi structured interviews provided the most appropriate data, and aligned with the research approach. Observations were also carried out where possible to gather evidence about key processes (CSR and CSO activities).

Documents were used to augment evidence from other sources and some documents were used as a means to triangulate data (Patton, 2014). For example, corporate reports helped to compile the lists of CSR projects, document the changing approaches to social engagement and capture the changing narratives around corporate engagement, and also as a means to triangulate with data about CSR collected from interviews. NGO and CSO reports were also used to obtain evidence about the types of projects being carried out, and the donors and funders involved. I am aware of the bias in corporate reporting of CSR (Rost and Ehrmann, 2017) and the documents were analysed with this in mind. I am equally aware that NGO / CSO reports can present a biased view of the topic to justify further funding (Banks and Hulme, 2012). The use of these documents was also interesting as a way to compare this printed representation of the issues to external audiences, in comparison to what I observed and found from my own interviews with the companies and organisations, and with those people who experienced the activity. So in addition to augmenting and corroborating evidence (Yin, 2009), in this situation, oil company and CSO reports also helped to identify power issues and dominant narratives. News sources were also valuable, and since Uganda has a relatively reliable and free press, news sources from national newspapers were used for triangulation. Oil industry press were a useful source to understand how narratives of oil in Uganda have changed over time. Internet sources were also used to gather and supplement information

about key timeline events, including CSR projects, government speeches, and key conferences and meetings. Secondary sources were also an important way to build the context of the oil industry for the study, and triangulate key timeline events and industry developments.

3.4.5 Sampling

I used non-probability sampling in the selection of research participants. Purposeful sampling is widely used in qualitative research to enable the researcher to identify research participants that are especially knowledgeable or experienced in the phenomenon of study (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). Bernard (2017) also points to the importance of the availability of identified respondents to participate in the research, and their willingness to do so. In order to fulfil my research goal, it was important to achieve depth of understanding of the topic and this required a range of perspectives from an array of respondents (Patton, 2014). I drew up a list of actors that I wanted to interview. Many of these I was already aware of due to my involvement in the Leeds project, which had introduced me to some of the actors and actor groups I needed to interview. However, I also wanted to make sure I added actor groups that were not included in the Leeds project, such as national and subnational CSOs and Bunyoro Kingdom respondents. One starting point was my Ugandan colleague who provided me with a list of contacts, as I noted above.

I also employed other sampling strategies. Snowball sampling was useful (Blackstone, 2018); in interviews with national and subnational CSOs, respondents signposted me to other CSOs working on oil and gas. Similarly, District Local Government respondents gave me the names of organisations working on oil issues, or of those working with oil companies on CSR projects in the district. My budget and time restraints meant that I was limited in how far I could travel to reach participants. This was one reason I was only able to travel to three villages at the Lake; this required me to pay for a taxi for a full day, to take me to the study site and wait for me. As such, my aim to interview as wide a range of people as possible within my constraints meant I also relied on opportunistic sampling, taking advantage of opportunities to interview people as they arose (Patton, 2014). As it turned out, there were several instances where I was introduced to good data sources from such an approach. For example, after our interview one district government leader said, "you really need to speak to xx and xx" and introduced me to other colleagues in the same building; I met a former Tullow Oil consultant staying in my guest house and was able to interview him; and walking around Hoima town one morning I came across a CSO workshop and was invited in to observe for a full day. Convenience

sampling was also important given my travel constraints, and so I interviewed subcounty leaders who resided in Hoima town in the town rather than at their offices. I also interviewed the Bunyoro Gender Minister, whom I was unable to meet in Hoima, at her home outside Hoima town on my way back to the airport. Together, these strategies provided the opportunity to compare, contrast and identify a range of important themes until I was sure I had reached saturation, indicated by no new substantive information being acquired (Miles et al., 2014).

3.4.6 Interviews

I used semi-structured interviews to collect data during face-to-face interviews in local and informal settings. Interviews are "negotiated accomplishments of both interviewers and respondents that are shaped by the contexts and situations in which they take place" (Fontana and Frey, 2000: 633). My goal in the interviews was to create a relaxed and informal atmosphere for the respondents. I tried to interview community members in their own communal setting in the villages, for example sitting outside the home of the respondent. I interviewed industry actors and CSOs in their offices or in local hotel meeting areas. I interviewed local government and Kingdom officials in their offices or in local hotel meeting areas.

Interviews were loosely structured; I relied on guiding questions that were open ended (Ayres, 2008), and used probing and asked for clarification where necessary. I tried to use the conversational method of interviewing where possible, which enables the researcher to generate verbal data through talking about issues in an informal and conversational way (Given, 2008). I wanted my research participants to feel at ease, and I was aware from my involvement in the Leeds study that oil is a potentially controversial and political issue. After initial introductions and gaining verbal consent for the interview, I asked broad questions that formed the basis of the interview, and then I let the respondent speak. More often than not, respondents were eager to talk about their experiences of oil, and many interviews flowed like conversations and included many topics of interest and new information. Some of the new information I decided to follow further with other participants.

My aim was to get the respondents to speak about their experiences and perceptions of oil and the emerging industry. However, I also needed some specific information from some actors

about oil company CSR and civil society activities, so the guiding questions of the interviews were adjusted depending on the actor. Due to the political nature of the topic, it was not appropriate or acceptable to record the interviews. During the PhD scoping study where I interviewed national CSOs, I recorded some of the interviews with respondents. However, in one interview, although the respondent agreed to be recorded, the discussion in the interview moved on to concerns that the Government was 'clamping down' on CSOs working on oil, and I was aware that he had become uncomfortable with the presence of the recorder. Half-way through the interview I switched off the recorder and the interview continued in a more open and relaxed manner. Therefore, during fieldwork, instead of recording I took longhand notes which I then typed up as transcripts. It was important to add to the interviews immediately after the interviews, filling in the gaps from memory in a different coloured pen (Gorden, 1998).

The complexity of the interview process is often underestimated (Roulston et al., 2003). Indeed, social science investigations rely heavily on interview data, yet few researchers receive formal training in interviewing (Ibid). The focus of the research can get lost due to the behaviour of participants, distractions in the interview settings, poor phrasing and delivery of questions. This is even more challenging in a cross-cultural situation where English is used as an additional language to local dialects. I used English to speak to people who also spoke English as an additional language, and this was for the majority of interviews, using a translator only when necessary in villages. My research experience during the Leeds project helped to prepare me for some of these pitfalls, and one area I worked to improve on was my use of probing in interviews. During the interviews I practised active listening, along with the challenge of writing notes whilst remaining present in the interview. Table 6 shows the timeline of data collection for the thesis, over a four-year period.

Table 6. Timeline of fieldwork and data collection

	2012			2013			2014			2015			2016		
Subnational actors (Local communities, DLG, Kingdom)				■	■		■		■		■			■	
Oil companies (Tullow Oil, CNOOC, Total				■					■		■				
Civil Society organisations (national CSOs and subnational CSOs)					■	■	■		■		■				
Oil company CSR partners and organisations									■		■				
Oil company CSR reports and sustainability reports									■	■					
Civil Society documents (INGOs, national & subnational CSOs									■	■		■	■		■	■

3.5 Data analysis

The dataset consists of 137 interviews, focus groups and meeting observations (appendix I), in addition to CSO and CSR documents and news sources. Analysing qualitative data requires getting to know the data intimately through immersion, coding the data by organising it into themes and identifying patterns, and interpreting the data by writing it up into a meaningful story (Rossman and Rallis, 2003). A benefit of being involved in the Ugandan context over time during the pursuit of a part time PhD meant that I was able to immerse myself in the data for a prolonged period. Maher et al. (2018) argue that it is through deep and insightful interactions with the data that the researcher is able to maximise interaction with the data and generate understanding and theory.

Initial analysis of the data began during fieldwork. Miles et al. (2014) instruct that analysis should be concurrent with data collection, which enables the researcher to cycle back and forth between thinking about existing data and generating strategies for collecting new data. It was useful for me to have time in between fieldwork periods to analyse and think about the data and how it was developing. As I read my interviews and wrote fieldnotes, I began coding and following up on certain threads (Check and Schutt, 2011). All the interview notes were then transcribed into MS word, a process which Davidson argues is part of the analysis, since "transcription is a representational and interpretive process" (Davidson, 2009: 39). The researcher makes choices about what to record and how in transcripts, and the fact that I was not using recordings of interview made it more important to reflect on what I chose to write down as notes. What I focused on determined what I followed up, and also what came out in the transcript.

I used inductive analysis to explore and unpack my findings (Blaikie, 2007). Strong constructivist research requires inductive data analysis to ensure that theory is grounded and interpretations of findings are contextual (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011b). Collins and Stockton (2018) note, however, the importance of the theoretical framework to assist with the 'sense-making' of the data, and to search for the 'unexpected finding' in the inductive approach:

> "Our analysis and interpretation—our study's findings—will reflect the constructs, concepts, language, models and theories that structured the study in the first place" (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 88 cited Collins and Stockton, 2018: 7).

Inductive coding then, takes place within the system of concepts, expectations, assumptions, and beliefs that inform the researcher's work (Maxwell, 2012). However, while I was guided by initial concepts, my theoretical framework evolved and developed alongside data analysis over the period of study.

I started with open coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2014), which involved breaking the data into small parts for deep analysis. Inductive coding is a process of conceptual abstraction by assigning general concepts (codes) to singular incidences in the data (Vollstedt and Rezat, 2019). I read through the transcripts using a highlighter pen to highlight key words, concepts, important issues and made margin notes to form initial codes. I made a list of codes and then uploaded all the transcripts into Nvivo software (version 10), coded using these codes, and then coded again to generate another layer of codes. Bong (2007), among others, claim that the benefits of using such software include speeding up potentially mechanical tasks such as coding and retrieving, allowing for more rigorous, thorough and creative data analysis. However, other scholars have argued that it can lead to 'dehumanisation and mechanisation' (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994). I found that coding in Nvivo, while useful for the initial process of generating codes and chunking data, was indeed quite mechanical. As a visual learner, it was important for me to 'draw' the data and map out connections, ideas, narratives, influencing and contextual factors. This became a messy process as I used post-it notes and flip chart paper and pens to hand draw maps and timelines, but this was an important part of working with the data and helped me to incorporate situational and contextual factors (Denzin, 1994).

The data went through a number of iterations of coding, an example of which is shown in table 7. I coded for indexical and non-indexical material, whereby indexical material is descriptive, focusing on 'who did what' and was particularly important for understanding activities and interactions for research objectives 1a, 2 and 3, and non-indexical material focuses on judgements, concepts, opinions and theories about events (Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000). I then used axial coding to explore the relationships between concepts and categories (Corbin and Strauss, 2014).

Table 7. Coding example

Coding example from interview with two female residents in village A July 2014	Codes
There are no meetings with Tullow now, they are not as active. We have no clear picture, the local government or central government don't come here, only CSOs.	Lack of information Lack of leadership
I am afraid, I saw what happened to Nigeria and afraid it will happen here. People are scared that once drilling starts they may be evicted and may not be compensated and have nowhere to go.	Fear, uncertainty Comparisons with Nigeria (CSOs work)
[This woman] has been here for 20 years and produced children one is in senior 4. She is afraid. She is scared the oil extraction will disrupt the fish and they depend on fish for their livelihoods. The fish catch has reduced because of oil.	Oil's impacts on livelihoods, actual, perceived, anticipated

The analysis of the data to capture the range of interactions and the change over time in terms of actors, interests, practices, narratives and ideas was a huge task carried out over a number of years. The process has been one of layering as well as unpacking, meaning that the story became richer the more I delved into the analysis and tried different ways of presenting the data and writing the story.

The key theme emerging from the coding was change over time, and distilling this change over time into three phases became a way to organise the empirical story of thesis. Emergent themes were 'changing relations', 'new actors, new interests', 'alliance-making', 'power re-configurations', 'livelihoods transformations'. Seemingly contradictory themes of 'fear of oil' and 'hope for benefits' were also evident. Figure 6 presents an example of theme development for the theme 'power re-configurations'.

Figure 6. Example of theme development

In addition to thematic coding, techniques such as actor mapping, timelines, thematic content analysis and data displays were used for different research objectives. Miles et al. (2014) encourage creating displays of data during the analysis process, which they argue adds to the credibility and trustworthiness of the analysis when arranged to answer the research objectives.

For research objective one (chapter five), mapping of actors, interests and interactions was important, and this benefitted from the initial hand drawings onto flip chart paper. I used an approach to actor mapping developed from techniques used in conflict analysis (Fisher et al., 2000). This involves drawing out the key actors in bubbles on the page and then making links between them with a pen and labelling the character of the interaction. In this case, I expanded this process to consider the quality and quantity of the interactions and / or relationships between the actors. From an initial sense of drowning in the data, it turned out that the more I was immersed in the data the clearer the story became. Crucially, being involved in the literature alongside the data analysis through a process of 'zigzagging' (Riessman, 2008) between the data and theory was important to bring new insights to the 'story'. The distinction of the three phases was a way to show the increasingly complex oil assemblage configuration over time through the actor mapping technique (chapter five). The themes from the analysis were then used to explain the configuration in the narrative.

For research objective two (chapter six), I developed a detailed timeline of key industry developments between 2005 and 2016 from primary and secondary data, noting important oil

company events, and changes in relation to the historical timeline key events affecting oil companies and the industry. I coded all of the CSR reports for Tullow from 2006 to 2014, and the available ones for CNOOC and Total from 2012 to identify any mention of Ugandan activities and CSR projects. I coded the interview transcripts to identify interactions with oil companies and experiences or perceptions of CSR. The data analysis for this objective helped to inform the phases in chapter five, so the analysis was then focused around identifying and explaining the key changes over time through these phases and how the activities, narratives, practices interactions and contextual and situational factors changed over time. I coded the interviews, oil company CSR reports and news sources for indexical material which I developed into the figure displaying the CSR activities of three oil companies between 2005 and 2016 in chapter six.

For research objective three (chapter seven), I coded interviews and key CSO documents for indexical and non-indexical material. I wrote out the storylines of subnational and national CSOs and coded them. I was able to identify changes in narratives over time and identify CSO activities. I developed a timeline of key events relating to CSOs from the data and from secondary analysis (the historical timeline) which enabled me to see the development of CSO activities over time. I made several data displays, eventually compiling a large table showing CSOs, activities, funding sources, involvement in networks, links to partners / donors / CSOs in the assemblage.

3.6 Considerations and limitations

3.6.1 Access to field sites

Access to the oil region is controlled by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. Researchers are required to get permission from the Ministry to conduct research in the region, which is a notoriously difficult and time-consuming task for individual researchers. I was fortunate that the permission for my presence in the oil region as a researcher was covered by Dr Van Alstine's research permit for the Leeds project, which was ongoing during the course of my PhD fieldwork.

I was required to attend the Resident District Commissioner's (RDC) office in Hoima District when I arrived in Hoima with my passport and proof of research permission. The RDC

assigned one of his deputy Security Officers to keep an eye on me and I was also followed around briefly during my second research visit by a Security Officer from central government. As I reflect in section 3.6.2 however, I believe that my status as a white female westerner suggested I did not present any threat and I was left alone to carry out my research without much interference.

Physical access to one of the field sites was an issue. Village C in the study is close to CNOOCs area of operation, is very isolated and located down a steep escarpment with no access by road (photograph in figure 3). I was advised by a number of locals that I should not go there, and if I really wanted to go, I might be able to go for a day if I made an early start and hiked down the steep 2km escarpment before it got too hot. The people I spoke to in Hoima warned that the conditions at the landing site where village C is located were not good; cholera outbreaks were frequent due to bad sanitation, and there were no suitable places of accommodation. I planned to hike and spend the day interviewing in the village in August 2014, however, the day before I was due to travel, heavy rain wiped out the road and the taxi refused to take me the first leg of the route (approximately 80km). I had to wait until the road was completed one year later to access the village. Instead, my colleague phoned the Local Council (LC1) chairperson in the village on my behalf, and he put me in touch with a fisher who travelled regularly to Hoima town to sell fish. The fisher spoke English and so I interviewed him. He then agreed to arrange for a group of respondents from village C to travel to Hoima town to be interviewed, and I paid for their travel. Again, I was reliant on him selecting respondents for me, so I requested that he ensured a mix of gender and ages which he did; two women, a village elder and two male youths (one of whom was his brother).

3.6.2 Positionality

Conducting fieldwork in the global south requires careful consideration of the positionality of the researcher and the research process. Denzin and Lincoln emphasise the importance of the researcher to consider herself as 'multicultural subject' as a key step in the research process (2011: 12). This is especially pertinent for conducting research in Uganda, a post-colonial state with its present still shaped by colonialism (see chapter four). Indeed, politics in the region of study continue to be shaped by colonial discourses of injustice around land and resources. As a white, British researcher, I have to critically consider issues of power and positionality. As Sultana (2007: 375) explains: "Conducting international fieldwork involves being attentive to

histories of colonialism, development, globalisation and local realities, to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of relations of domination and control". Yet, not all of this can be decided before the fieldwork, nor can it be controlled; rather it is a process of everyday negotiation in the field (Sultana, 2007). The interface between myself as a researcher and the context I am studying determines the outcomes of the research. As such, it is important to be aware of power relations and how they influence methods, interpretations and knowledge production.

In line with the aim of the research and the interpretivist-constructivist tradition that underpins it, one of my concerns in the field was to capture the perspectives and stories of actors based on their own experiences (Guba and Lincoln, 2004). However, actor perspectives were influenced by these power interfaces. Some respondents made requests for resources and funding for projects. Some women in the village refused to speak to me. My translator and colleague explained it as an 'inferiority complex', because of my status as a white, western woman and their position as illiterate rural women. But in refusing to be interviewed the women exercised their power and agency to not be involved in the research (Scott, 2008). I was very much aware of my status as an outsider. My involvement in the Leeds project had prepared me for some of the challenges of fieldwork, and I was aware of the importance of paying courtesy calls to the village chairperson on my arrival in the villages and how to dress appropriately for the rural setting. But I also realised there is no way of 'blending in', and perhaps counterintuitively, the more time I spent in Uganda the more I realised that my knowledge was only ever partial; there was information, subtleties and cultural dynamics that I would never understand as an outsider.

Being aware of my position in relation to the research setting, I was also 'othered' in the field. The word "Muzungu" (white person) was shouted at me daily by children as I walked to and from my guest house in Hoima town. Because I am white, some research participants in the villages assumed I was from an oil company, so I had to be very clear that I was in the village as an independent researcher and not an industry representative. I was also aware of my position as a lone female. This proved interesting in the situation where I was meant to be 'monitored' by the deputy of the Resident District Commissioner. Instead of checking up on me to ensure I was not adventuring to places I should not, he instead contacted me repeatedly to ask me out on a date. Indeed, power relations can work both ways (Sultana, 2007). Being a female in a patriarchal field context, and the way I was treated by some men in the field,

highlights the issue of reverse power relations. I was made even more aware of this seeing a British male colleague treated as a 'VIP' by a district official in contrast to my own experience in our earlier interview, where I had the impression I was taking up his time.

3.6.3 Ethics

Research and research practices must be ethical, and this is especially important in a cross-cultural setting where a potentially sensitive topic such as the oil industry is being discussed. The researcher must be reflective and highly aware of and sensitive to her impact on the social situation under study. The University of Leeds has a comprehensive ethical clearance procedure through which this research was vetted and granted ethical approval in July 2014. A copy of the ethics application and confirmation of approval can be found in the appendices.

Sensitive information includes material that could be considered to be of a political nature (Harrison, 2006) and 'oil' falls into this category. Even what might appear to be general discussions about local people's experiences of the exploration period from the perspective of the researcher can lead local people to discuss issues relating to land, employment and / or interactions with oil companies that can be considered controversial topics locally. Here there is the risk that research respondents could be put into a compromising position. As such, the need to ensure the safety of the research participants was key. I was followed by security officers, which did not seem threatening to me, but I was made aware in interviews with certain CSO respondents that there were cases of people being arrested for speaking to journalists about oil. The levels of repression and threat appeared to fluctuate throughout the four years I was involved in the context, and at times the subnational CSO respondents I interviewed were visibly concerned. I was reminded of how little awareness I had personally of this securitised context when I was told by a plain-clothed security officer that I must delete the photographs I had taken of boats at the fish landing site during one of my first research trips to a village. My Ugandan colleague explained there was increased surveillance in the villages.

Informed consent was extremely important to build trust and ensure that research participants became involved in the research voluntarily. Ensuring anonymity of the interview respondents was also important to build trust and ensure the safety of participants in the context of heightened security around oil issues. I provided information to the research participants before the start of each interview and guaranteed their anonymity by assigning a

code for the interview and a pseudonym in my notes. Depending on the respondent, informed consent was gained by explaining my research aims and the process of informed consent verbally, or where appropriate by providing written information outlining my research aims and my contact details before the interview. The written material about my project and the informed consent process and right to withdraw was given to the village leaders and to respondents at the district level. In acknowledgement of the sensitive nature of the topic as well as being respectful and as unintrusive as possible, I did not record interviews.

Cultural sensitivity is also important and can impact on the research, meaning that the researcher has to be sensitive to the cultural context (Desai and Potter, 2006). This relates to positionality outlined in section 3.6.2 above and an awareness of the position of the researcher within patriarchal or post-colonial power relations. Of course, the nature of development research often means that fieldwork is carried out over short periods of time which makes it challenging to understand the local context (Harrison, 2006). In this respect I think I had time to get to know the local context more than had I only carried out one fieldwork stint, as I was able to continue to read up on history and politics in between visits. An understanding of the history of the Bunyoro region in relation to land and identity, for example, became increasingly important as the research progressed and helped me to be more aware of these issues in the field. However, I remained very much aware that I was an outsider and would never have a full grasp on local power dynamics.

I made sure that I dressed appropriately for different interview settings (Brydon, 2006). In Hoima town, while interviewing government officials I dressed in smart attire; in the villages I followed the culturally appropriate dress code for females, which requires a skirt to cover the knees. I tried to sit down at the same level as my research respondents in the villages during interviews because I thought this was a way to try to address any power imbalance, but this was sometimes difficult because I would be provided with a chair while the research participants sat below me on the floor. At first, this made me feel uncomfortable and that I was not practicing good ethics by perpetuating a power divide, but on reflection I realised that this was the communities' approach to receiving foreign guests, and a refusal of the chair would be more inappropriate than sitting at an elevated level. This made me aware that what I considered to be 'ethical' was not always what was culturally appropriate in the Uganda setting.

3.6.4 Limitations

One limitation to data collection was due to the sensitive nature of the topic which meant that I was unable to record interviews with national CSOs and district actors. At the village level, I believe that recording would not have been appropriate anyway, but this did mean that I missed some of the detail of the interviews that perhaps seemed less important at the time, but might have been important later during analysis and write up. In particular, I was unable to capture very long quotations. However, I am confident that my approach to writing notes during the interviews, probing, and writing notes immediately following the interview helped me to address this challenge.

Another limitation to data collection was my inability to stay in the villages for any length of time given my position as a sole female researcher and the lack of facilities in the villages at the lake. An ethnographic approach would have required me to immerse myself in the context and would have generated deeper insights about the experiences and relationships at this level. However, my ability to visit the three villages at least two times over the course of the research enabled me to capture different insights and highlight the changing experiences of the villages vis-à-vis the industry over time. I also interacted with some of the respondents from the villages in Hoima town which provided me with additional updates.

Another limitation was due to one of the oil companies refusing to let me interview staff for the PhD research. This meant I had to rely on the data from the Leeds study and secondary sources. However, I was able to capture the experiences of other actors in relation to their interactions with the company. Plus, their refusal to meet me contributed to building a picture of the character of the company.

Other limitations were related to my financial situation which restricted what I was able to do in the field. All of my flights to Uganda between 2012 and 2015 were funded by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) through the Leeds project. The longer PhD fieldwork visits were funded by two small grants from the Sustainability Research Institute at the University of Leeds, which meant that I had a small budget and was unable to employ a research assistant or hire a vehicle and driver. However, I believe that I did not require a research assistant; due to my involvement in the Leeds study and my engagement in the context over a period of time, I was able to carry out all the data collection and only required a translator for my visits

to the villages. The majority of the interviews for the study took place in Hoima town with respondents who spoke English.

4.0 Chapter Four

Background

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief background to contemporary Uganda and the key developments in Uganda's oil industry to date that are relevant to the thesis. The chapter also looks at the Bunyoro region where the oil is located, which is one of Uganda's five Kingdoms. This region is one of poorest in Uganda with a complex history and a complex land tenure system. The region is now 'hosting' the oil industry and as such, it is important to provide some context for the empirical chapters, especially in relation to the roles of subnational level authorities and in relation to land issues. First, I introduce Uganda, and then in section 4.3 I discuss Uganda's transition from a British protectorate to an emerging oil state. Section 4.4 describes key oil industry developments, 4.5 looks at the character of state-society relations in Uganda, 4.6 discusses the decentralised system of government in the country. Section 4.7 introduces the Bunyoro region and the Bunyoro Kingdom and discusses land tenure in what is now known as the oil region.

4.2 Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country in Eastern Africa that lies across the Equator. Uganda's landmass covers an area of 236,000 km2 of which 82% is dry land, 14% is open water and 4% is a permanent swamp (UNDP, 2017). The vast majority of Uganda's population of 42 million resides in rural areas (88%). The country is endowed with a great diversity of animal and plant species and ranks among the top ten most bio-diverse countries in the world (UNDP, 2017). The largest proportion of Uganda's economy is heavily dependent on biodiversity including the fishing industry, tourism (from wildlife biodiversity), livestock industry, commercial and subsistence use of medicinal plants, and ecotourism.

Figure 4.1. Map of Uganda. Source: nationsonline.org.

Uganda is a multi-ethnic country and multilingual country, with English as a main language, inherited from colonialism. The country is comprised of four administrative regions, fifteen sub-regions and 121 districts. The UN Human Development Report places Uganda in the low human development category, positioning it at 159 out of 189 countries on the 2018 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2019). The report states that in 2016, 55.1 percent of the population were multidimensionally poor in relation to health, education and standard of living, while an additional 24.9 percent were classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (UNDP, 2019). GDP per capita in 2014 was US$726.9, and Uganda's population growth is one of the fastest in the world.

4.3 Uganda's transition: from British protectorate to an emerging oil state

Uganda was ruled as a British protectorate from 1894, gaining independence in October 1962. The years after independence were marked by violent military rule, including the notorious brutal eight-year dictatorship of Idi Amin in the 1970s. In the mid to late 1980s Uganda emerged from decades of military rule a deeply divided and traumatised society. Extreme identity-based violence, economic decay and near state collapse was the legacy of the Obote and Idi Amin regimes (Dicklitch, 1998). The new government, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986 after a five-year revolutionary bush war, and promised to unite and stabilise the country, rid Uganda of ethnic divisions and repair the economy (Sjögren, 2013a). Transformational achievements were made during Museveni's first years. Uganda's economy grew at an average rate of 7.7 percent a year from the time Museveni took power and poverty fell sharply, even as the population grew (Ssewanyana et al., 2011) . A decade later, by the late 1990s, Uganda was held up by Western donors as a model of African Renaissance, a success story on the continent and "a governance showcase attracting attention and resources" (Sjögren, 2013a: 3).

Thirty-four years later and Museveni remains in power, having recently changed the constitution again in 2017 to lift presidential age limits. Many of the early successes of the NRM government have been erased in a gradual slip backwards towards tendencies of militarism and authoritarianism (Lynch and Crawford, 2011). Uganda is a classic hybrid regime, whereby "many democratic institutions have been introduced, often to be subverted for nondemocratic ends simply to keep Museveni's government and party in power" (Tripp,

2010: 3). President Museveni and his NRM party, on taking power in 1986, had established Uganda as a "no-party" state, with political candidates to be elected on merit rather than sectarian support. In 2005, the government abandoned the movement system in favour of a multiparty state—officially by public referendum, unofficially in exchange for the abolition of presidential term limits (Tripp, 2010). Kagoro (2016) argues that the Ugandan regime is a tripartite one, in which the government, NRM party, and the military function as one and the same. This has important consequences for the democratic process, particularly during elections. Over the past several years, Uganda has continued to backslide into a system of one-man rule (Mwenda, 2007). The country's political, economic and democratic ratings, including rankings on freedom of the press have been in steady decline in recent years (Kantel, 2019).

Oil now presents a further incentive for Museveni to stay in power. The President has played a paternalist role in oil developments to date, referring to the resource as "my oil" (Anderson and Browne, 2011). Uganda opened to international oil investment in the late 1990s and by 2014 had attracted an estimated $2.8 billion investment from international oil capital, promising a new era for Uganda (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018). However, as I discuss in section 4.4 Uganda's progress towards first oil has been painfully slow, and whether the country will ever become an oil state still remains an open question.

4.4 Oil industry developments

Oil seepages were discovered around Lake Albert in the remote Western Uganda region during the 1920s, and oil surveying has taken place sporadically since then, with any serious exploration efforts curtailed due to the two World Wars and then the political instability in the country since independence. Exploration efforts seriously got underway in the late 1990s in the Bunyoro region of Lake Albert, with major finds in 2006. Exploration efforts then expanded North, close to the border with Sudan, and south to Lake Edward close to the DRC border (Anderson and Browne, 2011).

The Albertine Graben area where oil exploration has been taking place is an area that forms part of the western arm of the Great Rift Valley system in East Africa. Oil exploration in the recent era began in the late 1990s when the government signed agreements with 'wildcatter'

Figure 7. Map showing oil blocks. Source: PEPD

oil exploration companies in 1997. These are small, risk-taking oil and gas exploration companies, UK's Heritage Oil, Australia's Hardman, and South Africa's Energy Africa. Energy Africa drilled the first well in 2002 (Anderson and Browne, 2011), and UK Irish company Tullow Oil took over Energy Africa in 2004 and continued exploration. In 2006, Hardman Resources found oil in three wells in block 2 (figure 3). Tullow then purchased Hardman Resources in 2007 and began to develop block 2 on its own and blocks 1 and 3a alongside Heritage Oil in a Joint Development Agreement. Tullow enjoyed an astonishing run of success from early 2006 and planned an Early Production Scheme for 2009.

After the successes of initial 'wildcatter' exploratory activity came investment from major players in the oil industry. The industry consolidated after Tullow's purchase of Hardman and the subsequent acquisition of Heritage Oil's interests in 2010, and Tullow planned to bring in French oil major Total SA and Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). However, due to a dispute over unpaid capital gains tax from the Heritage sale, and accusations of bribery by MPs, the industry became mired in controversy and setbacks. The Uganda Revenue Authority pursued Tullow for Heritage's unpaid tax bill of $434million and withheld the expired Kingfisher license in block 3a until Tullow paid. Tullow settled the bill and proceeded to sue Heritage Oil in a London court to recover the money in a case which dragged on for much of 2011 and 2012 (Patey, 2015).

In 2011, the agreement to bring in the two oil majors Total and CNOOC in a 'farm down' deal, as part of the Heritage purchase agreement with the government, was finalised. Tullow sold two-thirds of its Uganda interests to the two companies; Tullow, Total and CNOOC each shared a third operating interests in all three blocks, with Total lead operator in Block 1, Tullow in Block 2 and CNOOC in block 3a. CNOOC was awarded the production licence to develop the Kingfisher basin in 2013, but due to ongoing negotiations in the context of a falling oil price (figure 4), Total and Tullow Oil did not receive their licences until three years later, in August 2016 (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018).

By the time of Total and CNOOCs arrival, President Museveni was taking direct personal responsibility for all decisions relating to the oil industry and was directly involved in negotiations with oil companies (Anderson and Browne, 2011, Hickey and Izama, 2017). There were a number of contentious issues about industry developments that perpetuated the delays

to first oil. First was the government's plan to build a large domestic oil refinery, which the oil companies thought uneconomical and unfeasible. President Museveni determinedly rejected the advice of the oil companies and pushed hard for Uganda to develop its own refining capacity (Anderson and Browne, 2011). Then was the pipeline question. Due to Uganda being a landlocked country and its oil being a waxy crude, the oil has to be piped some 1,300km to the Indian Ocean in a heated pipeline. There were plans for a route through Kenya, connecting with the pipeline from South Sudan and ending at the port of Lamu. However, regional politics and negotiations with oil companies led to the government deciding on a route through Tanzania to the port of Tanga, which was agreed in 2015 (Hickey and Izama, 2017).

Figure 8. Graph showing oil price drop in 2014 and 2015 (macrotrends.net)

In the meantime, the government and the oil companies agreed to a small domestic refinery, with a 60bpd capacity, and Russia's RT Resources became the successful bidder to construct the project (Biryabarema, 2015). The refinery Resettlement Action Plan to displace,

compensate and / or resettle 7192 people from the site in Hoima District began to be implemented in 2012, by a Ugandan firm called Strategic Friends International. This compensation and resettlement process became mired in controversy (chapter seven) and was still ongoing as I completed the final field visit to Uganda in 2016. In a further delay to the oil project, RT Resources pulled out of the refinery deal in July 2016 forcing the government to go back to its second choice, a South Korean firm. This deal also fell through and the government finally reached an agreement in April 2018 with an international consortium, including US firm General Electric, to construct and operate the refinery (Biryabarema, 2018). Then, in early 2017 Total announced the purchase of a further 21.75% interest from Tullow Oil for $900million, making Total the lead partner in the project and confirming rumours that Tullow may be planning to leave Uganda (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018). Tullow sold its remaining stake in Uganda to Total for $575 million in April 2020, marking its complete exit from the project (Nasralla, 2020).

Table 8. Oil industry timeline

Phases of the pre-oil stage in the thesis	Key industry timeline events	Key events in historical timeline
2005 – 2008 Commercial oil discoveries in Uganda	2006 Hardman Resources finds oil 2007 Tullow Oil purchases Hardman Resources 2007 Tullow Oil joins FTSE 2008 Tullow ESIA for the Early Production Scheme	2005 Norway's support grant to GoU for $4.2 million through the Oil for Development program 2006 President Museveni "thanksgiving ceremony" for the discovery of oil 2008 National Oil and Gas Policy drafted with Norwegian financial aid and technical support 2008 Civil society activists show Nigeria video in oil region
2009 – 2012 Industry consolidates, oil majors join	2010 Tullow Oil acquires Heritage's Ugandan assets for $1.35 billion 50% interests in Blocks 1 and 3A 2010 GoU demands $434 million tax from Tullow (to be paid on Heritage's behalf) 2010 Gov refuses to give back Kingfisher licence during tax dispute 2010 MPs make allegations of Ministers taking a bribe from Tullow Oil 2011 Tullow agrees to sell interests in Uganda assets to Total and CNOOC for $2.9 billion 2012 Tullow Oil signs two new PSAs with GoU 2012 Tullow Oil completes farm-down deal to bring in Total and CNOOC	2010 Feasibility study on domestic oil refinery carried out by UK consultant 2010 Civil society organisations dispute draft Petroleum Bill claiming lack of checks and balances 2011 Museveni wins the election 2011 MPs vote for a moratorium on awarding oil contracts until further laws passed 2012 Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production) Bill passed into law 2012 Bunyoro King petitions Parliament for inclusion in oil revenue sharing (12.5%)

| 2013 – 2016

Industry is delayed due to ongoing negotiations and oil price drop | 2013 The High Court in London rules in favour of Tullow Uganda Limited in the proceedings against Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd

2013 CNOOC acquires the first ever oil production license in Uganda for the Kingfisher Well 1A in Hoima District

2013 Tullow Oil hosts stakeholder visits to oil wells in Kaiso Tonya

2014 Hoima to Kaiso-Tonya in Tullow Oil's area of operation is completed

2016 RT Global Resources pulls out of negotiations to construct the oil refinery in Hoima District

2016 Uganda and Tanzania enter a deal for oil pipeline of crude oil from Hoima to the Tanga port in NE Tanzania

2016 Hoima to Buhuka road giving access to CNOOCs area of operation is opened to the public

2016 Tullow sells interests to Total | 2013 Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Bill passed into law

2013 Public Order Management Bill passed preventing meetings of more than 3 persons on issues deemed 'political'

2013 GoU starts the compensation process for the 7118 residents in the proposed refinery area

2014 GoU announces increase in oil reserves from 3.5 billion to 6.5 billion barrels

2014 Global oil price plunges by 40% to below $50 a barrel

2015 Norway commits an additional 6.5 million dollars to support Uganda's oil and gas sector

2015 NGO Bill passed aiming to monitor the activities of CSOs

2015 Public Finance Management Act passed into law, providing a legal framework for oil revenue management

2016 Museveni wins the election

2016 Global oil price drops to below $30 a barrel |

4.5 State-civil society relations in Uganda

The nature of state-society relations in Uganda has significance for the discussion of civil society's role in oil the oil assemblage in chapter seven of the thesis. Ugandan civil society is a relatively recent phenomenon, promoted by international donors in the 1990s as part of democratisation efforts on the continent (Hearn, 2010). During the turbulence of Uganda's post-independence period, mass-based membership organisations of workers and peasants were decimated by authoritarian governments (Robinson and Friedman, 2007). Due to the state's withdrawal from service delivery, Uganda's citizens became preoccupied with economic survival, and community-based organisations were geared towards economic and social survival strategies (Dicklitch, 1998). In the post-1986 period, in the context of Uganda's 'no-party' political system, CSOs focused on service delivery and poverty alleviation with the support of international donors, and were marginal to the sphere of public policy (Hearn, 2010). Indeed, as Hearn (2001) argues, for much of the post-1986 period civil society in Uganda has played a reactionary and mostly marginal role, "not as a force for challenging the status quo, but for building societal consensus and maintaining it" (2001: 43).

Although a small number of donor-supported civil society organisations existed in the 1990s that worked in areas of advocacy, it was not until 2006 that civil society in Uganda began to step into the public policy terrain. The 2007 civil society struggle to save the Mabira Forest Reserve stands out as a significant moment as the first time that civil society had managed to galvanise public support for an issue of national concern. Due to pressure from an array of civil society actors, the government was forced to backtrack on its plan to degazette the Forest reserve and hand it over to the Sugar Corporation of Uganda to grow sugarcane (Child, 2009).

Oil politics have been taking place in the country in the context of increasingly poor relations between Uganda and Western donors. Uganda was the poster child for western donors' 'good governance' agenda of political and economic reform during the 1990s, during the structural adjustment period. Uganda has relied heavily on donor support since Museveni came to power, becoming one of the world's top foreign aid recipients during the late 1990s / early 2000s, with up to 40 and 50% of the state budget funded externally. Despite a number of democratic transgressions over the years, including the jailing of the main opposition politician and presidential candidate, Dr. Kiiza Besigye ahead of the 2006 election, donors have tended to more lenient towards Uganda, in comparison to other African states (Fisher,

2011). However, relations have soured in recent years, first due to the 'homosexuality bill' introduced in 2010, which proposed a punishment of life sentence and death penalty. Then, in 2012 with the alleged embezzlement of $11million aid funds by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Donors responded to these events with aid cuts, and Museveni began to build relations with non-Western allies including Iran and Russia (Hickey et al., 2015).

4.6 Uganda's decentralised system of government

Uganda carried out one of the most radical decentralisation programmes in Africa in the 1990s. After the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986 it suspended all party political activity, with the stated aim to end 'sectarianism' (Sjögren, 2013b). A five-tiered system of 'Resistance Councils' (RCs) from village to district was established, linking the rural population to the state, and anchoring the NRM among rural communities (ibid.). The RCs were later renamed Local Councils (LC) and became a uniform five-tiered local government structure from the district to the village level, as shown in figure 9. The LC system involved fiscal and political decentralisation as well as regular local government elections.

Figure 9. The local government structure in Uganda (Turyahabwe et al., 2006)

The idea of decentralisation was that it would better respond to local needs and priorities (Green, 2015). As such, Uganda's decentralisation programme was ambitious and extensive, with the aim to promote service delivery at the local level, ensure accountability for government resources by local leaders, and involve local people in the planning and implementation of government programmes.

The NRM's decentralisation programme has to be seen in the context of the problematic central-local relations that the NRM inherited on taking power. Crook (2003) argues that one objective of decentralisation was to fragment and weaken sub-national political entities that had been exploited and exacerbated by colonial rule. As Mamdani (1996) has argued, political fragmentation was a result of the colonial state in Africa, leading to what he calls the 'bifurcated state'; urban areas ruled by civil law and rural areas by customary law. This system was reproduced after independence by which the authority of the leaders was reproduced through vertical ties, through political alliances and patronage meaning certain parts of Uganda benefited at the expense of others in a classic 'gatekeeper state' situation (Cooper, 2005). In Uganda, the decentralised government system enabled Museveni to remove the power of local tribal chiefs (Green, 2015)

The district planning system involves the creation of five-year District Development Plans that are developed in consultation with the five tiers of local government. However, scholars have pointed out that the decentralised planning system has largely failed in terms of improving quality of service and local accountability (Ojambo, 2012). Green (2015) claims that a lack of funds, a lack of competent staff, corruption and an obsessive focus on the creation of new local government units are the biggest impediments to the effectiveness of the decentralised system. He argues:

> "it has become obvious that the Museveni government's main interest in the LC system has not been to provide good public services but instead to maintain the ruling NRM's network of power at the local level, especially after electoral party politics was legalized again in 2005" (Green, 2015: 6)

Indeed, from 2005 the central government started to take back some of the local government's powers (Green, 2008). Two key district level leadership posts, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), are appointed by the President and report directly to the centre, meaning that two powerful district leaders are

assigned rather than elected. New districts have been created out of older districts on a semi-regular basis every few years since the early 1990s under the pretence of bringing services closer to local people. Both of these trends have enabled the centre to maintain control of local government, and as Green (2015) argues, decentralisation has been transformed into a patronage-based political machine to ensure NRM votes in the rural areas.

4.7 Where the oil is: the Bunyoro region

Uganda's oil deposits lie in the Bunyoro sub-region in Western Uganda, which includes the five districts of Buliisa, Hoima, Kibaale, Kiryandongo and Masindi. The area is also the location of the traditional Bunyoro Kingdom, which has its seat in Hoima District. This means that in addition to the five-tiered decentralised government structure in those districts, there is also the traditional authority of the Bunyoro Kingdom.

Prior to colonisation, the Bunyoro Kingdom was one of the largest and most powerful Kingdoms in East Africa. Kingdoms were abolished by the Milton Obote government in 1967, and reinstated by Museveni in 1993 with the status of cultural authority. Traditional rulers in Uganda are politically limited, but are extremely important and command loyalty and respect from local people. The Bunyoro King or Omukama, is constitutionally forbidden from engagement in matters of politics, and therefore is restricted to cultural and development advocacy matters. The Kingdom's role has been to promote poverty reduction in the Bunyoro region, which has the highest poverty rate in western Uganda at 10.4 percent (World Bank, 2018). Doyle (2006a) argues that traditional leaders in Bunyoro feel frustration at their low status and lack of influence and wealth vis a vis other Kingdoms in Uganda, such as Buganda and Tooro, and this has links to Bunyoro's colonial experience.

Bunyoro suffered considerably under British colonial rule. Its fierce resistance against the British caused what Doyle has referred to as an ecological and demographic disaster, from which the region has never fully recovered (Doyle, 2006b). This colonial experience is entrenched in the collective memory. The loss of land, taken by the British to subdue the Bunyoro and given to the rival Kingdom of Buganda, remains part of contemporary Bunyoro identity and discourse about the 'lost counties' and ongoing marginalisation of Bunyoro (Doyle, 2006a). What is significant is that the contemporary history of Bunyoro has involved lobbying for compensation for colonial injustices and the preoccupation with reconnecting to

a past golden era. Oil is now being linked to colonial suffering and injustices. As Sjorgen states, the Kingdom's agitation for a share of oil wealth (12.5 percent originally demanded) is historical and moral, rather than legal (Sjögren, 2013b).

Figure 10. Map showing the Bunyoro region. Source: Bunyoro-Kitara.org

Politics in Bunyoro include continuation of historical grievances and contemporary struggles over land ownership. Land issues have heightened since the discovery of oil in the region, which has added to existing pressures and tensions in relation to land. The British created a

highly unequal land tenure system in 1900 that gave large tracts of land to the political elite in Buganda (Green, 2006). At the end of British rule in 1962 only 5 % of land in Uganda was turned into freehold (Batungi, 2008). Bugandan landlords have been one of the strongest forces to oppose attempts at land reform by the government (Green, 2006). The system of land rights in Uganda remains complicated today, with four different systems working on top of each other: customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold. The mailo system closely represents a feudal system and historically was a way for Buganda kings to control their subjects. Bunyoro is one of the few places in Uganda that still has some land under the mailo system, but the majority of land in the region is under customary tenure. Customary tenure is a complex land ownership system, in which rights are derived from being a member of a community, and within that community land can be owned by a family, individual or traditional authority (Kinyera, 2019). Customary tenure is managed by the local community, and in many cases the guiding laws are not written but are in oral form (Batungi, 2008). Uganda's constitution, under Article 237, grants ownership of land to the citizens and recognises the four land tenure systems. Further, the Ugandan constitution states that any community, person or family holding land under customary tenure can apply for a certificate of customary ownership of the land, by approval of a District Land Board (Coldham, 2000). For Kinyera (2019), complex relations to land in Uganda stem from this constitutional recognition that every Ugandan belongs to a group that owns land, meaning that land is more than a tradeable commodity. The state plays a custodian role, however, is constitutionally entitled to acquire land for development, such as oil infrastructure.

Unsurprisingly, oil discovery has been associated with an increase in land-related disputes in the Bunyoro region. Uganda Land Alliance reports that land disputes and land grabbing increased in the oil region after the oil discovery, and new land transactions were mostly acquisition of land from people outside the region from local land holders (Uganda Land Alliance, 2011). There are also numerous reports of land grabbing in the region by local government and other officials through gaining control over community land, obtaining land titles in their own name, and then selling the land (Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019). These recent pressures and tensions over land ownership are adding to the politics of identity and territory in Bunyoro (Sjögren, 2013b).

5.0 Chapter five

Uganda's emerging oil assemblage

5.1 Introduction

This thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of frontier dynamics during the pre-oil stage of the oil industry by exploring the subnational level within Uganda's emerging oil assemblage. Chapter two highlighted the need for a multi-actor, relational approach to studying oil, and I made the case for an assemblage approach, given its usefulness to capture emerging configurations of human and non-human elements and identify agency and change (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Because the particular properties of resource assemblages are especially dynamic at the beginning of an assemblage (Schritt, 2016), the approach is useful to analyse dynamics in the making of Uganda's oil during the exploration stage of the industry. The approach also expands the conceptualisation of resource frontiers as spaces of destruction and domination to include a diversity of processes, experiences and imaginaries (Cross, 2014, Tsing, 2011).

This first empirical chapter employs the conceptual framework developed in chapter two to analyse the emergence of Uganda's oil assemblage between 2005 and 2016. It uses the assemblage as a heuristic to map the changing assemblage configuration over three phases identified in the analysis (figure 11) and employs the conceptual framework to analyse how the assemblage configuration is shaped by non-human elements of the assemblage; ideas / knowledges, materialities, and practices.

In doing so the chapter addresses research objective 1 a: Map the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and show how their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry, and contributes to research objective 1 b: Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil assemblage to shape outcomes. The chapter draws on primary and secondary data to analyse the emergence of Uganda's oil assemblage over three phases of the exploration period. For each phase I show how the assemblage configuration is influenced by elements of the assemblage through a discussion of analytical themes. I also consider the material implications of the assemblage at the subnational level, and show how dynamics at the subnational level contribute to shaping the assemblage.

Figure 11. Assemblage configuration over time through three phases of the pre-oil stage

Figure 11 presents the assemblage diagrams which visualise the changing assemblage configuration over time and orient the discussion. Each diagram is presented in turn in this chapter. Phase one (2005-2008) captures the early exploration period during which time there were major oil discoveries, and the Uganda project went from high risk to commercial viability. Phase two (2009-2012) shows the period of industry consolidation and professionalisation in anticipation of first oil, controversies in the sector as the stakes in the industry were raised, and interests of external actors concerned about oil management and governance. In phase three (2013 to 2016) there is growing interest in governance and human rights issues as the impacts of the project increase, and oil company CSR and civil society activities begin to focus on the subnational level, key events and new narratives shape the assemblage and new alliances form among actors with shared interests.

The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the oil assemblage is shaped not only by oil capital and the project cycle, but by the materiality of oil, ideas about oil and the associated practices which aim to facilitate and govern extraction. The interests of actors are shaped by these assemblage elements, and interests align and shift over time as new elements become part of the assemblage. The chapter shows that the assemblage has material impacts in the pre-oil stage, not only due to the materiality of the resource but also ideas about oil. The subnational space, which is active and dynamic, becomes a constitutive part of the oil assemblage as the assemblage develops over the three phases.

5.2 Phase one

Phase one (2005-2008) was characterised by the pre-commercial threshold for oil and few actors in the assemblage in this phase, with control of oil centralised by the state and oil exploration companies engaging at the local level. The following analysis is structured thematically, with themes distilled from primary and secondary data. The first three themes explain the configuration of actors in the assemblage in figure 12. The first theme highlights the shift that takes place from the Albertine Graben as 'high risk' to one of considerable national and global value and interest. The second theme discusses the implications for existing local authorities given the increasing importance of this previously peripheral region, the centralised control of oil by the state, and the dominant role of industry in this space. The third theme relates to the role of external expertise in guiding the development of the industry, given Uganda's position as a post-colonial state which it is assumed by external actors lacks the technical and institutional capacity to develop and govern the oil resource.

The fourth and final themes show the material implications of the assemblage at the subnational level, including the imaginaries of development, the enclosure of land and resources and resulting livelihoods challenges for local people.

Figure 12. Phase one configuration of assemblage actors

5.2.1 High risk frontier to globally valuable resource

The assemblage configuration in phase one is partly explained by the remote nature of the Albertine Graben and the commercial and security risk involved in exploration during phase one. None of the oil majors were involved in this phase; Uganda's Albertine Graben was considered a 'high-risk outlier' by the industry (Energy Intelligence, 2008). The international companies in the assemblage in phase one were independent exploration companies - Heritage, Hardman, Energy Africa and Tullow Oil - known as 'wildcatters' for their ability to

explore for oil in high risk, challenging and politically volatile locations and then sell on to bigger companies to develop, if oil is found.

The materiality of the resource contributed to shaping the assemblage. Oil is a point source resource and territorially grounded, meaning "you've got to go where the oil is", as Dick Cheney famously said (Denning, 2010). As such, one risk of exploration in Uganda was due to unproven reserves within the tricky geology of the Graben. The remote location added to the considerable operational challenges; interview respondents in villages A and B located on the shores of Lake Albert note that equipment was brought by boats down the lake to exploration sites that could not be reached by road. Further, security risk was high given the location of oil in a conflict hot zone, straddling the disputed border between Uganda and DRC. As a result, the military was a key actor in the assemblage at the local level in phase one, justified by the ongoing security risk that was affirmed in 2007 by the shooting of a British oil worker in a skirmish with DRC troops on Lake Albert (Bavier, 2007).

The military and security presence in the oil region also reflected the value of Uganda's oil to the Ugandan state and the growing interests of powerful global players. In 2006, when Hardman found commercially viable oil deposits in the Graben, these were the largest onshore oil finds in sub-Saharan Africa in over two decades. These finds were instrumental in shifting the narrative of oil in East Africa from "sleepy backwaters to bonanza" (Deloitte, 2014: no page). Uganda was now the 'hottest inland exploration frontier' (Energy Intelligence, 2008) and other international exploration companies rushed to take up concessions (Anderson and Browne, 2011). Uganda's oil was of "intense interest" to the industry (Deloitte, 2014) with predictions that the country could be in the top fifty of world producers, demonstrating the close link between risk and opportunity in frontiers (Tsing, 2011).

The strong interaction between the state and oil affected communities illustrated in figure 12 was through the military and security arm of the state. Interview respondents in villages at the lake noted the increased presence of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF), and new rules being enforced by security forces. As one village elder noted: "when we try to access our land, we are asked for identification papers" (COMA02, 2012). Other respondents noted being fined for letting livestock roam near oil sites "we are not used to these kinds of things, this is our communal land" one said (COMA04, 2012). These quotes indicate that local communities

were experiencing the state in a new way, in a region where state presence has historically been very minimal.

This evidence suggests that the role of the Ugandan state in the oil assemblage in phase one was 're-regulatory'; to assign rights to international oil exploration companies through licencing, provide security for the oil sites and manage processes of enclosure for oil infrastructure (Bridge, 2014). Interview respondents in communities noted very minimum contact between local people and Government officials, however. Despite oil exploration taking place onshore, on land that is communally owned and used by fishing communities along Lake Albert, respondents noted that no meetings with government had taken place to discuss issues of community concern: "The government has not been here to sensitise us... we want to know if we should leave our homes before the land is no longer able to sustain life" (COMA07, 2014). Another commented "The government has not been to inform us, will we stay like this, or will oil benefit others?" COMA06, 2014). The quotes reveal issues of community concern that are discussed further in section 5.2.5. Data show that meetings during phase one were directly with oil exploration companies, organised through the village leaders, and involved oil companies providing information about operational activities. Only one village at the lake reported that the district leadership had been to tell them that they must cooperate with oil companies, and "leave the companies alone to do their work" (COME01, 2012). Village F on the other hand was one of the villages earmarked for displacement for the oil refinery site, and respondents noted meetings with Government officials. However, respondents claimed that these meetings were about ensuring community support for the 'government project' rather than providing information to address issues of community concern. This evidence suggests that the 'oil affected communities' in the assemblage in phase one were seen as important actors by the state and oil companies to the extent that they were occupying land and using resources that the industry required.

5.2.2 State-oil-community nexus and the exclusion of local authorities

Oil discoveries in a remote corner of Uganda shaped power relations in the assemblage, leading to a new configuration between the state, international oil companies and oil affected communities, which effectively excluded other actors at the subnational level (figure 12). The Bunyoro region is now central to the future of Uganda as an oil state and an integral part of the oil assemblage; of strategic interest to the Government of Uganda and the global oil industry. As a result, Uganda's oil was centrally managed and controlled by the Government of

Uganda, and oil MNCs were given rights to access land at the local level through licensing agreements with the Government (Bridge, 2014).

The centralised control and management of oil by the Government had implications for existing authorities in the oil region. As I discussed in chapter four, the Bunyoro region has local authorities through the five-tier decentralised government structure and the traditional authority of the Bunyoro Kingdom. It was clear from the data that these local authorities in Hoima District were excluded from involvement in oil development in the region. Focus group discussions with District Local Government officers revealed that they were physically excluded from accessing the oil sites:

> "To visit the oil fields you need to seek permission from MEMD and Tullow which is in Kampala" (DLG05, 2014).

District leaders felt particularly undermined by the new rule to control access to and within the oil region. As one respondent noted:

> "[The oil companies] went directly to central government at all the stages. We would see on the TV 'big people' coming to the area" (DLG07, 2014).

This meant that district officials were excluded from information and access to the developments taking place in the district in relation to oil, as one leader noted: "I am supposed to have all the information, but I don't" (DLG08, 2014).

As a further indication of the centralised control of oil, the Government gave authority to oil companies to negotiate access to land directly with communities at the local level. This reinforced the exclusion of the subnational government structure and exposed the shifting power dynamics at the subnational level. One district respondent explained:

> "The companies go from the centre (Kampala) directly to the grassroots (villages) and bypass the district. They meet only the LCI (village) and COA (District Administrator) and think it's representative of the community" (DLG01, 2012).

District respondents claimed that this exclusion prevented them from informing communities in the oil region what was taking place:

> "We have no facilities to visit the communities and no information to tell them. We have no mandate to move around" (DLG02, 2012).

The exclusion of subnational government from information and access partly explains why there was evidence of minimum interaction between local communities and government officials during phase one, as noted in section 5.2.1. In focus group interviews in 2012 district technical officers expressed concern that they were prevented from doing their jobs due to a lack of guidelines and budget. For example, environment officers were prevented from carrying out 'spot-checks' at the oil drilling sites, and noted the different way that oil was being managed:

> "The wetlands protection programme is linked with the district and linked with the community. There are guidelines. Not same has happened for oil... Monitoring is so difficult, there are no roles defined, no checklist and no budget...and no spot checks allowed" (DLG03, 2012).

The quote highlights the 'special' status of oil in relation to other less strategic natural resources that involved district management, and demonstrates not only the centralisation of control, but also the active marginalisation of subnational authorities from oil developments. The dynamics in this early phase also reflect that policy development was lagging behind industry development at this stage, especially in terms of environmental monitoring (Patey, 2015).

Bunyoro Kingdom representatives spoke of similar marginalisation to district officials during phase one, in the region that is considered "the King's former hunting grounds" (MED01, 2014). Kingdom respondents claimed that they had been side-lined from a project of considerable importance in their region: "No meeting with local government, no clear communication, nothing with central government" (KGD01, 2012); "We're here just to watch things move" (KGD02, 2012), one said. The exclusion was presented by respondents as contrary to the King's role of "trustee of the land" in Bunyoro, for "everything from 5 feet up, for all the resources on the land", as one respondent explained (KGD03, 2014). This position is in direct tension with the government's ownership of resources below 5 feet down - the oil resource - once again drawing attention to the implications of the territorial nature of oil on land with other uses and values (Bridge, 2009).

The King is constitutionally forbidden from involvement in politics as I noted in section 4.7, yet oil in Bunyoro poses a challenge to the Kingdom's apolitical role, since the issue has

become a hot political topic and the King's subjects "look to the King for guidance" (KGD03, 2014). As one respondent explained:

> "People think the King can solve things, problems such as roads, blasting etc. ... the King can't do much but people go to him with their problems. People are excluded from the cultural sites, they can't go there anymore because of the oil wells" (KGD06, 2015).

The quote also draws attention to the different knowledges about resources and the tension between the cultural and economic value of resources (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Kingdom respondents discussed many of the impacts being experienced by local people at this stage, some of which they claimed could have been avoided by the oil companies working closely with the Kingdom:

> "There are many things that oil companies didn't know because of [the exclusion of the Kingdom]. Oil wells are discovered at burial sites, which are a major issue, they are sacred sites, the King is buried with his whole palace buried inside. People go there to worship and ask for rain, and before they go on the lake to fish" (KGD01, 2012).

It was clear from the data that oil in the Bunyoro region exposed the inequities of power between the Government and the Kingdom in a similar way that it exposed them between the centre and the subnational government. The King's secretary recalled a discussion in which the oil companies said: "we can listen but at the end of the day we are dealing with the Government of Uganda" (KGD04, 2014). As such, the Kingdom, District Local Government and subnational government respondents all claimed that they and people in the Bunyoro region had become mere 'spectators' to oil-related developments in the region.

These findings suggest that oil has made more visible the ways in which decentralisation and devolution processes in Ugandan politics conceal processes of re-centralisation (Kantel, 2019). Oil is now central to the dreamed of futures of the Ugandan state (Cross, 2014). As such, when Uganda's decentralisation is viewed in terms of its function as increasing the power and reach of the centre as discussed in section 4.6, it is not surprising that subnational government is side-lined from a project of considerable national interest and strategic importance. So, rather than produce power asymmetries, oil has exposed them and made them matter more.

However, data show that these dynamics shifted over time. In comparison to the experiences of district respondents in 2015 in phase three (section 5.4), by which time there was greater

efforts for inclusion by both the state and oil MNCs, it appears that the exclusionary effects of the central control of oil were experienced more acutely in phases one and two. As I note in section 5.4, stakeholder engagement by oil MNCs addressed some of the perceptions of exclusion by selectively including subnational actors as stakeholders in phase three and providing opportunities for some district actors to engage through CSR. By this time the Government had also begun to selectively include the district and Bunyoro Kingdom through plans for future revenue sharing.

5.2.3 External expertise and 'good' oil management

Uganda's oil discoveries mobilised the interests of actors from outside Uganda with 'expertise' in oil management, meaning that external actors and expert knowledge became part of Uganda's oil assemblage, indicated by 'donors' in figure 12. The oil sector is developing from scratch in Uganda, requiring the Government to put in place the necessary policies and institutions to guide and manage the sector. In 2006, the year that commercial quantities of oil were confirmed, Norway began a programme of funding and support to Uganda through The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), under the title 'Strengthening the State Petroleum Administration in Uganda'. The Ugandan Government also engaged the services of Swiss oil consultants and an American legal team to provide further guidance (Patey, 2015). The support of external experts enabled the Government to put in place the institutional framework to manage and regulate this new sector of development in Uganda (MEMD, 2015). By 2007 Uganda was a 'core' country in Norway's Oil for Development (OfD) programme, the programme which channels Norway's petroleum related aid programmes to several countries in the global south.

The OfD programme reflects Norway's international standing as a success story and an 'expert' in oil governance. Indeed, the export of the 'Norwegian model' to nascent oil states is a key foreign policy objective for Norway (Thurber et al., 2011). OfD's stated goal is to ensure that petroleum resources are administered in a way that contributes to sustainable development of the national economy and welfare of the people in Uganda. Through this type of support, external actors played an important role in territorialising the oil project in phase one by helping the Government of Uganda to establish institutions and policies to manage and govern oil (Delaney, 2009). Central to the programme is the acknowledgement of the threat of the resource curse, which Norad notes can affect "poor states with weak governance systems" (Norad, 2012: xvii). As such, it was through this support that narratives linking effective oil

management and good governance became part of Uganda's oil assemblage, and led President Museveni to link Uganda's success to following the path of Norway (Miirima, 2008).

Uganda's involvement with the OfD programme and the engagement of external expertise draws attention to four key features of Uganda's emerging oil assemblage. The first is the status of Uganda's oil as a globally valuable commodity of interest to powerful global actors; the second reflects the concerns of western organisations and donors about Uganda's ability to manage the resource in a context of "corruption and political governance" (Norad, 2012: 61) which is directly linked to the ideas of the resource curse and oil's potentialities (Weszkalnys, 2008). Third is the role of external expert knowledge, the mobilisation of which reflects the position of Uganda in the global political economy; a post-colonial country lacking the technical and institutional capacity to manage an oil industry. Fourth, is the 'blueprint model' of oil governance, identified in section 2.2, underlying which is the idea that lessons of success can be implemented in new extractives contexts to shape governance outcomes (Logan and McNeish, 2012a).

However, while the terms of Norwegian engagement point to the power imbalance in the relationship between global north expertise and the relative incapacity of the global south, the data show that links between Uganda and Norway in terms of oil development go back to the mid-1990s. At this time Petrad, a Norwegian foundation providing capacity building support for managing petroleum resources, worked to build the Petroleum Exploration and Production Department's (PEPD) capacity, and helped to establish an 'island of effectiveness' in the Ministry of energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) (Hickey et al., 2015). This suggests that a relationship with Norway was strategically crafted by the Ugandan state with the aim of managing its future oil industry prior to oil discovery, demonstrating agency through the President's aim to build Ugandan expertise. This close cooperation between Western donors and the Ugandan state is in contrast to the role of Western donors in phase two (section 5.3), where donors went around the state to empower CSOs to challenge the Government in relation to the development of oil legislation (chapter seven).

5.2.4 Development imaginaries

There was evidence that ideas and narratives of oil in Uganda's oil assemblage had material impacts at the subnational level in phase one. While expectations of development shifted over the three phases identified in this thesis, it was in phase one that ideas about the 'promise' of

oil and the 'peril' of oil fostered imaginaries of development that were simultaneously positive and negative (Weszkalnys, 2011).

Links between oil and poverty reduction were made by President Museveni in numerous speeches during phase one in which he promised oil would bring prosperity to Ugandans. The President used the resource curse 'blessing / curse' dichotomy to emphasise Uganda was on the path to modernity: "Definitely oil discovery in Uganda is going to be a blessing", he said in 2006; "Uganda can firmly wave goodbye to disease, hunger, poverty, and donor dependency" (Miirima, 2008: 31). In 2009 he promised that oil would put Uganda on the path to "middle-income country status in the near future" (New Vision, 2009: no date). These narratives of prosperity and improvement play an important role in the oil assemblage at the local level, shaping development imaginaries and enrolling local people to support the industry in the present through the promise of a better life in the future (Cross, 2014).

The presence of international oil companies also brought the promise of modernity to a region experiencing high poverty levels and lacking social infrastructure (chapter six). The promise of development through CSR also played a role in shaping development imaginaries and ensuring support for the industry. As chapter six discusses in depth, oil exploration companies directed some CSR towards improving the welfare of local communities by bringing social amenities to people at the lake in phase one. As one subnational CSO observed: "the oil areas used to be no go zones, you have to appreciate the benefits (SCSO03, 2014).

At the district level, oil shaped the aspirations of local authorities, even as they were excluded from information and decision making on oil. "Oil revenues are vital to the rebirth of the Bunyoro nation", the Kingdom's official website proclaims (Bunyoro-kitara.org). One Kingdom respondent, describing the Bunyoro Kingdom as a "bruised institution with its foot in the colonial past" noted the potential for oil revenues to transform the marginalised and impoverished region, and "address a historical injustice" (KNG04, 2014). This ambition translated into demands for 12.5 percent of oil revenues to go to the Bunyoro Kingdom: "we are demanding revenue sharing to reduce poverty in the region" (KNG02, 2012). Respondents discussed an agreement with Tullow Oil to support cultural development in Bunyoro and boost tourism in the region. Tullow had agreed to provide $100,000, and at the time of our interview in 2012, a Kingdom respondent noted that $50,000 of this had been received as part of Tullow's CSR contribution to Bunyoro (KNG02, 2012).

District Local Government respondents expressed similar aspirations and discussed their ambitions for oil to boost business in the region and open up markets for local people. Individual departments in the district noted that they had made requests to oil companies for support, for example, for transport and for 'exposure visits' to other oil producing countries (which were denied). "We are hosting the oil industry and the oil companies, so what can we learn from other areas where oil extraction has been successful?" one respondent explained (DLG09, 2014). These examples demonstrate the potential for CSR to shape aspirations and open up possible avenues for exclusion of marginalised actors (chapter six).

Among people in the oil communities, the hope for jobs was expressed by many respondents; "it is the only available opportunity nearby" as one respondent noted (COMC01, 2014). However, an interesting finding was the way that ideas of oil and 'modernity' and 'progress' were also manifest in local people's expressions of *concerns* about the future. The analysis of the data suggests that within this narrative of a modern future, the self-awareness of people at the lake as "uneducated fisherfolk" (COMA09, 2014) did not seem compatible with the vision of a modern oil future. Although local people in the villages reflected on the oil future in which "we expect houses, electricity and other benefits" (COMA06, 2014) they were unsure about their place in it. "We are not educated, so how can we benefit?" (COMA10, 2014) was a typical comment. In this way the imaginaries of oil also shape people's concerns in the present. Many respondents in the oil communities talked about the uncertain future and expressed concerns of being left behind, at the same time as they expressed hopes for benefits.

Concerns about the oil future were fuelled by ideas about oil that were brought to the local level by national CSOs in phase one and became part of the oil assemblage. The link between CSOs and oil affected communities illustrated in figure 12 is not strong in terms of the quantity of interactions, because the data show only two CSOs visited the oil affected communities at this time. However, in terms of material impacts, the interaction was significant. It was through national CSOs, supported by international activist groups that the narrative linking oil to potential environmental despoliation and social harm travelled to the local level through the oil assemblage. Through this narrative, the potentialities of oil were connected to the idea of a resource curse. Interview respondents in villages during fieldwork in 2012, 2014 and 2015 recalled powerful imagery of the Niger Delta:

"They had a video of what had happened in Nigeria and that it might also happen here. There was no food, no road, no good water, no education" (COMC04, 2014).

There was a lack of clarity about where the video had originated from, with some CSOs I spoke to claiming there were two videos in circulation, one which showed both the 'good and bad' sides of oil (Botswana and Nigeria) and one which only showed the bad (Nigeria). Nonetheless, the narrative of oil and its negative potentialities, through the connection to the Niger Delta, had captured the imaginations of some local people and became a means through which they discussed oil.

The images from Nigeria contributed to concerns about the impacts of oil on land. During interviews in 2012 and 2013 throughout the oil region, a common theme was oil causing the land to dry up: "I am concerned that the land will dry up, and no food and no water" was a typical quote (COMD01, 2012). These concerns were further compounded by the lived realities of some people in the oil region who were experiencing exclusions and restrictions and negative impacts on livelihoods, especially at the lake. As one female respondent noted:

"I am scared the oil extraction will disrupt the fish, the fish catch has reduced because of oil already, and we have no idea of what to do" (COMA12, 2014).

Other respondents expressed concern that oil would benefit others "we feel we could be pushed out of [village A]" (COMA05, 2014). Indeed, people's expectations in relation to the industry are also mediated by historical state-society relationships in this region. As chapter four noted, the region is historically marginalised, poor and isolated; "Big men will come because of oil" (COMA06, 2014), was a phrase mentioned by a village leader during an interview in 2014, hinting at Uganda's existing way of doing politics. This type of response was not only expressed at the village level, but was a frequent comment made in relation to Uganda's politics and the concern that oil will feed into 'business as usual' and "benefit others" (COMB05, 2014); in other words, Uganda's system of patronage politics. It is these existing concerns that provide the fertile ground for other ideas about oil in the assemblage, such as the resource curse, to resonate with local people and provide a counter narrative to state and industry narratives about oil and prosperity. It is these divergent development imaginaries in the assemblage that shape the complexities and range of perspectives, concerns and aspirations among subnational actors.

5.2.5 Livelihoods impacts of exploration, enclosure and restrictions

The material impacts of the oil assemblage were also evident in the physical impacts on the lives and livelihoods of people in the oil region. These impacts were related to the materiality of the resource and the territorially grounded nature of oil, access to which required the temporary and permanent use of communal land and resources. Restrictions and enclosures were put in place by oil companies and enforced by state security and military as noted in section 5.2.1. Local people talked about areas previously used to access resources for subsistence livelihoods now being restricted due to industry use: "We can now access the areas two days in a week whereas before it was free every day" (COMA02, 2012). Another female respondent noted:

> "We had access to the wildlife reserve, to collect firewood and grass for houses and local herbs for treating children and sickness. Now they have fenced off areas, access routes have been diverted" (COMA03, 2012).

The quotes highlight the important role that nature plays to support livelihoods and wellbeing among rural communities in Uganda. Natural resources are important for subsistence and economic survival, they are used as materials, for example, to make grass-thatched houses and herbs are used for natural medicine by most rural Ugandans (Child, 2009). A CSO respondent noted "local people sell grass for money, and can't get enough grass now to buy foodstuffs" (CSO04, 2014). Respondents highlighted the gendered dimension of the changing frontier, as women are ones who traditionally collect fire and grass, "up to an hour of walking now for some women to collect resources" (CSO04, 2014).

The lake was significantly impacted. Respondents in the villages who rely on the lake for subsistence livelihoods noted the implications of oil exploration activities on the lake for local people:

> "During Tullow surveys in the water, residents were not allowed to carry out fishing in the lake for one week, many people suffered and slept without eating because the lake is a source of food" (COMB02, 2012).

The data show that fishers had been told by oil companies not to fish for up to four weeks during seismic testing: "They tell us to stop fishing for a whole week, even more, without compensation" (COMD01, 2012). Further, the space for fishing was reduced due to industry operations and it was believed by local people that seismic activity had disturbed the fish:

> "The fishing ground has reduced, some of the landing site is reduced, we can't go close to materials and no compensation has been given" (COMC07, 2015).

The issue of no compensation was raised by respondents in all the villages at the lake and it was clear that the livelihoods implications of restrictions to fishing had not been considered by industry or Government. Cultural values of resource were also disregarded:

> "In Ngasa 1 area (the name of the oil well) "Muisege" is its nickname, oil is there. It was a meeting point for fishermen who could sell fish in Congo, they'd wait there for the wind. Before Ngasa" (COMB05, 2014).

This quote, by a fisher, reflects on an important cultural site where local people used to pray before going to fish, now the site of an oil well. The interruptions to fishing without compensation suggests that this local industry and its related social and cultural practices are valued less, highlighting competing resource ontologies, as land and resources with cultural value are overturned for the industry (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). The experiences of local people resonate with Bridge (2009)'s assertion that in resource frontiers the future transformational possibilities of oil become valued greater than the current uses of nature. The restrictions to resource use and access show that land and resources that support local ecosystems and livelihoods must also support the industry, demonstrating that oil, even in its 'not yet' state has far reaching implications for local actors, ecologies and natures (Tsing, 2011).

5.3 Phase two

In phase two (2009 to 2012) the assemblage configuration was influenced by the surpassing of the commercial threshold in 2009 and the consolidation of the industry, which signalled that Uganda's oil project was moving towards the development phase. This mobilised the interests of new actors including global oil majors and international NGOs, donors and civil society actors concerned about governance issues. As shown in figure 13, new actors emerged (circled in blue), and existing actor groups increased in number (represented by blue circles). The first theme in the analysis relates to the tensions emerging between industry actors and the Government, which demonstrates the importance of Uganda's oil both to the global oil industry and the state. This increased importance led to contestations and controversies in the sector which delayed 'first oil'. The second and third themes demonstrate that growing concerns around oil governance mobilised the interests of CSOs, increased the influence of external actors and 'expert' knowledge and facilitated alliance making between actors with

similar interests in oil governance. The fourth theme discusses further material impacts experienced at the local level as the industry project cycle progressed and infrastructures needed for the industry opened up the region. The final theme discusses the pockets of discontent that began to emerge at the local level in relation to the ongoing impacts of industry.

Figure 13. Phase two configuration of assemblage actors

5.3.1 Industry consolidation, negotiations and controversies

In 2011 France's Total E & P and China's CNOOC entered Uganda's oil assemblage, demonstrating the global significance of Uganda's industry with the arrival of these two major players with the finance and expertise required to further develop the industry. However, the data show that as the stakes in Uganda's industry became higher, the sector became mired in legal problems and corruption allegations and drawn-out negotiations which delayed the move towards 'first oil'.

The Ugandan Revenue Authority insisted that Tullow Oil pay Heritage Oil's unpaid capital gains tax bill from the sale of its assets to Tullow in 2010. Interview respondents noted that the government had withheld the expired Kingfisher license until Tullow paid, which forced Tullow to pay $434 million to the Government. This was seen as an indication that the Ugandan government was re-asserting its authority in light of revelations that Uganda was not getting a good deal in the previous Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) (MED01, 2014). Indeed, the Ugandan Government's demand for taxes from Tullow Oil was interpreted as 'hard bargaining' and not what was usually expected of a developing country government vis-a-vis global oil (Hickey and Izama, 2017). According to some of my interview respondents, the tax disputes were also seen as an indication of the growing importance of oil revenues to the President in the run up to the 2011 election. As such, President Museveni's patronage needs became part of the oil assemblage in phase two.

Any optimism about an early production scheme was dampened as the elements and interests in Uganda's assemblage shifted. Negotiations about the best way to process and develop Uganda's oil revealed the tensions between the profit margins of international oil companies, and Uganda's own energy security (Vokes, 2012); a reflection of the wider tensions between oil as a national endowment and a globally valuable commodity. Uganda has long been reliant on Kenya's old Mombasa refinery for oil imports and so President Museveni began to push – against the wishes of the oil companies - for a large domestic oil refinery (Anderson and Browne, 2011). As will become clear throughout this thesis, the determination on the part of the Ugandan government for a domestic oil refinery, and the realisation of that plan, has significantly shaped the oil assemblage. Then, corruption allegations emerged in 2011 when the Ugandan Parliament established a committee to probe reports that three Ministers took bribes from Tullow Oil. Tullow claimed that the documents were false (Edwards, 2012), but these allegations resonated with ideas about oil and corruption, and fuelled the concerns of Ugandans and the wider international community about the pitfalls of oil in Uganda. The emergence of allegations, disputes and legal challenges in phase two speaks to the rising stakes in Uganda's oil industry and the lucrative potential of Uganda's oil even in the pre-oil stage (Behrends et al., 2013).

5.3.2 'Expert' knowledge and oil narratives

Section 5.2 noted that actors from outside Uganda with 'expertise' in oil management became part of Uganda's oil assemblage by providing assistance to the Government in efforts to

territorialise the oil project (Larsen, 2015) through the development of oil institutions and policies. In phase two, 'expert' knowledge from external actors continued to be a key feature of Uganda's oil assemblage with the increase of interests from donors and INGOs concerned about good governance of oil. A key difference was that this expert knowledge was focused on good governance of Uganda's oil and aimed to influence the practices of Ugandan CSOs in the assemblage. As chapter seven shows, this support in phase two acted as a 'counter territorialising' process by challenging the Government's oil legislation (Larsen, 2015).

Donors and INGOs expressed concern about the introduction of oil in the context of Uganda's "deteriorating governance environment" (Global Witness, 2010: 3). These concerns influenced the oil assemblage not only in terms of actors and partnerships in the assemblage (as discussed in section 5.3.3), but also in terms of knowledge and ideas about oil which brought new narratives to Uganda's oil assemblage around oil and corruption, transparency and good governance. A significant event which influenced oil narratives in Uganda was the leaking in 2010 of the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) signed between the early exploration companies (Hardman, Heritage and Energy Africa / Tullow) and the Government of Uganda. In 2008, two journalists and two CSOs had attempted to make the documents public by launching separate legal challenges against the government to obtain copies of the PSAs, using the 2005 Freedom of Information Act, without success (NSCO03, 2012). The petitioners drew on the discourse of the National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP), citing principle 3 of the Policy, which provides for a 'transparent and open oil sector' (MEMD, 2008), demonstrating the ability (and willingness) of civil society to challenge the government using oil legislation. What is interesting is that the court ruled that the government had the right to withhold information which it deemed could jeopardise national security (NSCO01, 2012). This ruling demonstrates the status of Uganda's oil as a strategic national resource and highlights the tension in the assemblage between oil's status as an issue of national security and the stated aims of the NOGP for transparency.

The leaked PSAs raised concerns among donors and INGOs, not only that Uganda was getting a 'poor deal' in the agreements, but also about weak environmental safeguards and the accountability of security forces in the oil regions (national CSO interviews, 2012). An international oil and gas advocacy NGO called PLATFORM carried out a legal analysis of the leaked documents and in February 2010 published the report "Contracts Curse" in cooperation with Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (CSCO), one of the Ugandan civil society networks

on oil. The report noted that the terms of the PSAs promised "huge profits for the companies while placing risks and responsibilities on the Ugandan government" (Lay and Minio-Paluello, 2010: 6). The use of the term 'cursed' drew on and linked to the discourse of the 'resource curse'. The partnership between CSCO and an experienced international advocacy-oriented organisation contributed to the increasing profile and impact of CSCO in Uganda and demonstrates the effectiveness of global-national alliances in the assemblage and their counter-territorialising role.

Following the 2010 PLATFORM report, there was increased vigilance among INGOs and Uganda's donors about Uganda's oil legislation, which as I discuss in chapter seven, linked to the transparency agenda. In 2010, a publication by the INGO Global Witness implored Uganda's donors to coordinate to ensure good resource governance in Uganda (Global Witness, 2010). This type of external intervention played a significant role in producing knowledge about oil; both 'expert' knowledge, in terms of the technical aspects of oil and gas and how oil should be governed and managed, and also knowledge that reflected dominant ideas about oil's link to development in the context of weak governance, i.e corruption. Consequently, the term 'resource curse' or 'oil curse' began to frame a number of CSO reports and briefings about oil and gas, for example the 2010 report of one prominent national CSO 'Escaping the resource curse and making poverty history' (Bainomugisha et al., 2010). Chapter seven shows how these dominant resource governance norms in the assemblage determined the types of practices and activities CSOs engaged in. Activities became focused around the transparency agenda in relation to avoiding the resource curse, and thus contributed to shaping development imaginaries at the local level through the resource curse narrative.

5.3.3 Civil society prominence in the assemblage

Another key shift in the assemblage configuration occurred in phase two due to an increase in the number of CSOs working on oil and gas issues in Uganda. The key difference in comparison to CSO activity in phase one was that in phase two CSO activity was largely directed at the national level around oil legislation, in contrast to the CSO intervention in phase one which involved activism at the village level (with the Niger Delta video). The mobilisation of civil society interests in phase two was a reflection of the growing concerns about 'good governance' of Uganda's oil among donors, meaning that funding for oil related work flowed to the oil assemblage and built the capacity of national CSOs to engage on oil issues (section 7.2). Many of the CSOs were already part of the transnational development

architecture, connected to donors and INGOs and with experience of policy and advocacy work mainly related to social service delivery. A number of global to national civil society networks on oil and gas were established in this phase, which further facilitated the flow of ideas, narratives and resources to Uganda's oil assemblage.

In 2012, national CSOs played a crucial role in pushing for accountability in the process of oil legislation development. Uganda's donors were concerned that a clause in the proposed Oil Bill gave licencing powers to the Minister and created opportunities for corruption. Although the Oil Bill was designed on similar lines to other legislation in Uganda, for example where the head of the Uganda Revenue Authority and head of the Bank of Uganda are appointed by the president via the Minister, oil was different. As section 2.2 showed the 'resource curse' is believed to be facilitated by clientelism, patrimonialism and corruption, and so the development of oil cannot be left to chance. Donors and INGOs trained CSOs to scrutinise the Bills and lobby MPs to challenge Clause nine.

One outcome of the Oil Bills challenge in 2012 was a more prominent role for CSOs in oil governance in Uganda's oil assemblage, and 'expertise' on oil in relation to other sections of Ugandan society. National CSOs then began to engage in the oil region to 'build capacity' of subnational CSOs and communities in the oil region, thus contributing to the increased profile of subnational CSOs in the assemblage. The inclusion of subnational CSOs was a logistical necessity for national CSOs seeking to work in the oil region, given the remote location of the oil communities and restrictions to access put in place by the state, but also reflected the weak links between national CSOs and communities in the oil region. However, as I show in chapter seven, contrary to the data from national CSOs, it was revealed that subnational CSOs also had weak links to communities in the oil region. Indeed, what is notable in figure 13 is that while the number of CSOs working on oil issues increased and civil society networks to engage on oil issues were established, there are not yet links to 'community'. This is to demonstrate the weak links to community in terms of interactions in phase two and emphasise that CSO activity was focused mainly at the national level.

Another outcome of the Oil Bills challenge was that the political space for CSOs to operate in was further restricted by the state (chapter seven). The intervention of donors and INGOs via Ugandan CSOs and MPs is an example of counter-territorialisation that sought to craft a different vision of oil development (Delaney, 2009). In doing so, it exposed the tension

between the different imaginaries of the oil future in the assemblage; one in which oil's potentialities, in the context of 'neo-patrimonial' Uganda, (corruption, patronage etc), requires expert intervention by the international community to avoid a resource curse. The other is one in which oil provides Uganda the possibility to gain autonomy and independence. As such, the reconfiguration of the relationships between donors, the Ugandan state, and civil society through the Oil Bill contestations became part of the resource-making process. Oil contributed to an already changing constellation of transnational alliances, by which from the mid-2000s the influence of Uganda's traditional state donors was in decline, and the influence of China as an 'investment partner' in Uganda was on the rise (Hickey et al., 2015).

5.3.4 Opening up to the outside

As the project cycle progressed, the materiality of the resource continued to shape the daily lives of people in the resource space. In phase two, as the project cycle progressed, the industry required infrastructures of access and transportation to further develop the resource in the remote Albertine Graben. Analysis of the data shows the significant transformational effects the construction of roads by industry had on the lives of people in villages; some of which became connected to the rest of Uganda for the first time.

> "There have been a lot of changes, we were land locked, now they've opened us up to
> access and people to come" (COMA05, 2014)

The 90km road built from Hoima town to the shores of Lake Albert is a tarmacked road to replace a substandard mud road. Known locally as the 'oil road', the road has reduced travel time from the lake to Hoima town by up to two hours. Before the tarmac road that was built to reach the Kingfisher site, the villages in the area were cut off from the rest of the district by the steep escarpment, which no vehicles could pass, so "merchants struggle up carrying things on their heads" (DLG03, 2014).

As one respondent exclaimed: "The road has put us on the map...the place is now known due to oil!" (COMC04, 2014). The quotes demonstrate that communities not connected to the nation state by roads consider themselves as marginalised (Harvey, 2018). As such, the roads are both a tangible and symbolic indication of the promised modernity and progress of oil and contribute to shaping development imaginaries (section 5.2.4).

The road has brought other indications of a modern future; "Fridges have arrived at the lake" (COMA05, 2014) one respondent noted; "Businesses are taking more", commented another, "Prices are increasing, there are already more people which is good for the market" (COMA11, 2014). Respondents spoke about travel times to hospital and other services reduced; "We used to have to walk 9km to get a boda (motorcycle taxi) to Hoima" (COMA06, 2014); "The sick can get to hospital easier" (COMA07, 2014); "We can access food from the outside" (COM08, 2014).

Yet for some, opening up to the outside had brought challenges. "Commodities have gone so high due to the improved road. Fish can go to Hoima, it's not cheap locally anymore" (COM09, 2014). Respondents noted that although they benefited from improved accessibility and some benefited from increased opportunities, other respondents associated the road with the population influx and an increase in the cost of living. "There are more people in (village C), many people" (COMC01, 2014). The village leader in village B noted that the population of the village had doubled, but government service provision had stayed the same, leading to more demands on basic services (COMB05, 2014). During a field visit to village A I observed a large, refrigerated truck at the lake shores, which respondents pointed out was taking the fish from Lake Albert to Kampala.

Indeed, there was the perception expressed by some respondents that people from 'outside' were able to benefit more than people in the villages: "Oil is good if you have money" (COMC01, 2014) was a phrase often heard in reference to people from Hoima town and Kampala. "People are not doing as well as they were, (local) fish traders and trade in the fish industry is not doing well" (COMA07, 2014). One canteen owner in village B explained the implications of the higher price of fish locally: "I'm not making much profit. I can't increase my prices of food or people won't eat here." (COMA08, 2014). These findings provide further evidence to show the uneven ways oil was beginning to impact local people's lives and livelihoods in the pre-oil stage at the local level. In addition to the restrictions and enclosures that had livelihoods impacts for some, oil infrastructures also exacerbated the uneven distribution of costs and benefits of oil prior to oil existing as a resource.

5.3.5 Pockets of discontent at the subnational level

During phase two, grievances relating to land, compensation and opportunities in the industry increased. The construction of oil infrastructure opened up the region and shaped the aspirations of some, however, for others it meant the loss of land and resources with

considerable economic, cultural and future value. People in Hoima District were due to be compensated for permanent and temporary land acquisition during construction for roads, and for property destroyed during exploration activities. During data collection in 2014 and 2015 these issues were still being contested.

Evidence shows that some respondents whose land and crops were assessed in 2009 during the Hoima to Lake Albert road construction had not received payment at the time of the Leeds study in 2012 and 2013. For those who had received compensation, the amounts received were believed to be much less than the value of land and property. The people displaced by the 'oil road', cited numerous examples from their communities where land and property had been undervalued, "somebody has a property that's worth 20 million and is being compensated 45,000 shillings" (COMA13, 2015). Losses for crops and property were paid according to rates set in previous years and did not reflect current values. The compensation rates for land and crops were set by the government, while the oil companies had the on-the-ground presence and were responsible for payments. Grievances relating to compensation tended to be directed at oil company Community Liaison Officers, as the most visible actors at the subnational level. A Total CLO explained: "The district sets the compensation rate, which is often too low and doesn't take into account inflation" (TOT03, 2013). Indeed, the advent of oil in Bunyoro had led to land speculation and inflated land rates. "People in the communities are suffering, 4 million shillings compensation won't even buy a plot" one local consultant noted (CNS02, 2015). In village C, "Compensation has not been enough. For each tree 5000 shillings is given but this doesn't cover the costs" (COMC07, 2014). And while companies were aware of this and were prepared to pay higher rates, they claimed to be constrained in doing so because the costs of compensation payments for land were recoverable costs to be claimed back from the Government from future oil revenues, and the Government's objective was to keep these recoverable costs to a minimum (COM01, 2014. MED01, 2014).

In some cases, there was a general lack of awareness about the processes involved in acquiring communal land and the state's right to acquisition. "When did the government buy this land from us?" (COME02, 2012) one village respondent asked. In the Multi-Stakeholder Forum (MSF) meetings for the Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons research project in 2013, the lack of clarity between the District Land Boards and the Ministry of Land was evident. There were contestations between levels of Government in relation to rates, responsibilities and mandates, as one CSO noted:

"It is not clear who Tullow is supposed to pay; the subcounty, the district or central Government. The sub-county chief is asking these questions, saying that we are the first custodians of the place" (SCSO03, 2014).

The politics around land and compensation reveal that the state is not a coherent and unified entity (Cross, 2014). Land issues further exposed the challenges of centralised control and the decentralised governance system. Indeed, in the MSFs in 2013 one outcome of the dialogues was local communities realising the different roles and agendas of district and central government in relation to oil, and between district and lower levels of government in relation to land issues. The grievances also demonstrate the government's interests to push through the land and resource acquisition in a way that did not respect the rights of local people, and in a way that conflicted with the oil companies' aims to manage community relations, as I discuss further in chapter six.

Other grievances emerged around opportunities in the industry. During fieldwork in 2012, interview respondents raised issues about the employment practices of the industry. Some respondents had benefitted or knew of those who had benefited from casual jobs during phase one of the exploration phase. However, these jobs were short term, insecure and low paid, as one respondent in Tullow's area explained: "We asked for jobs, but got only short-term contracts, so after three months you come back and to what?" (COMA06, 2014). A woman in CNOOC's area reported that "There are some temporary jobs in [the village] – casual works and then they stop. They are only for men not women" (COMC05, 2014).

The promise of potential benefits from the new industry plays an important role in ensuring support for the industry, and jobs are one of the key expectations of local people in resource frontiers (Himley, 2010). This presents a challenge, since the oil industry is predominantly a capital-intensive industry requiring mainly skilled labour. As some communities are displaced from traditional or previous sources of livelihoods as the industry develops, as I showed in section 5.2.5, there are few alternative sources of economic activity (Li, 2010); "we are fishers, what else can we do?" as one respondent noted (COMD02, 2012). Grievances about employment can be seen therefore as concerns about future livelihoods. This also led to concerns among respondents that others were benefitting because oil companies were bringing workers from 'outside' or 'up the top' (of the escarpment) region to do jobs that local people could do.

"They give us casual work only, they bring people from up the top and whites. We want our people to enjoy so that we benefit" (COMC10, 2015).

This narrative of 'outsiders' featured frequently in interviews in relation to the discussion of the benefits and impacts of industry, and this narrative about 'what is local' is discussed further in chapter six in relation to the local content agenda. Local content emerged partly as a way to address the tendency of oil to generate few opportunities for unskilled employment. As I discussed in section 4.7 the narrative of 'outsiders' in this region is not new, but rather has come to have a new meaning with the advent of oil (Sjögren, 2013b).

The emerging grievances during the exploration stage are significant for a number of reasons. They highlight the ongoing importance of alternative or co-existing resource ontologies (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Complaints about technical assessments disregarding crops and nature valuable to communities challenges the status of oil and the commodification of nature. It also demonstrates that post frontier measures, such as compensation schemes, meant to recognise the rights of local people, are themselves subject to contestation. The destruction of what are considered the cultural aspects of land have wide reaching implications; these are deeply embedded cultural practices "things [the industry] didn't know" (KGD01, 2012) and heighten local people's perceptions of being "spectators" (KGD01, 2012). The contestations also point to the importance of the agency of local actors as they mobilise around shared interests to address grievances (such as compensation, displacement). The experiences, and responses, of industry actors to land and compensation grievances calls into question the dichotomy between the state-industry nexus on the one hand and the local communities on the others. The evidence suggests that on the ground, this distinction is more blurred.

5.4 Phase three

Phase three (2013-2016) was characterised by post frontier practices of oil management by oil MNCs and oil governance by CSOs. There was an increasing number of actors and interactions in the oil assemblage as the project progressed, the interests of more actors were mobilised across scales, and the impacts of the exploration phase increased and became known to a wider number of actors. Analytical themes for phase three demonstrate the increasing importance both of global assemblages and the subnational level in shaping Uganda's oil assemblage as the project cycle progressed. The first theme discusses the geographical shift of

engagement by oil MNCs and CSOs to the district level, and the selective inclusion of district actors, which is in contrast to the exclusion of district level actors in phase one (section 5.2) and phase two (section 5.3). This shift indicated the changing needs of industry and the increasing importance of the subnational level in terms of the impacts of oil. The second theme demonstrates the importance of key events in the project timeline that shaped political action and brought new actors and narratives to the assemblage, and the third theme shows that new narratives and new alliances emerging in the assemblage provided new avenues for the inclusion of marginalised groups. The final theme refers to the way the boom-and-bust nature of the industry shaped the assemblage as industry scaled back at the subnational level due to the fall in oil price, while at the same the activities of CSOs increased. The themes in phase three are picked up in greater detail in chapter six, which looks at the role of oil MNCs in the assemblage and in chapter seven, which looks at the role of CSOs.


Figure 14. Phase three configuration of assemblage actors

5.4.1 Focus of oil governance shifts to the subnational level

In phase three there was a geographical shift in engagement to the district level by oil MNCs, CSOs and INGOs which demonstrated the increasing importance of the subnational in

Uganda's oil assemblage. For CSOs, greater engagement at the district level during this phase was due to the donor emphasis on engaging the communities in the oil region and a growing awareness of the need to address the local impacts of oil. As chapter seven discusses in detail, partnerships between national and subnational CSOs became a key feature of the assemblage during phase three due to the challenges national CSOs faced to engage in the oil region and their reliance on subnational CSOs to mobilise people at the local level. Further, the increasing impacts and grievances in relation to land and compensation at the local level in this phase focused CSOs and INGOs increasingly on subnational issues. Logistically, the district (especially Hoima town) was the preferred place for CSOs to hold meetings and workshops, and some national CSOs set up local offices. As such, along with oil MNC stakeholder engagement meetings and the establishment of oil company liaison offices by Tullow and CNOOC in the town, CSO activities increased the salience of the district level in the oil assemblage.

For oil companies, engagement at the district level in phase three contrasted with phases one and two when companies were "confined to the Graben" during exploration activities (SCSO04, 2014). The shift to the district took place at the same time as the project cycle moved further towards production, indicating that companies needed to seek legitimacy from a wider range of stakeholders to ensure the 'social licence to operate' (Joyce and Thomson, 2000). This shift in approach, which is discussed in more detail in chapter six, began to shift social relations in the assemblage, as those actors excluded in the earlier phases were now selectively included through formalised stakeholder engagement. Indeed, analysis of the data reveals that the outright exclusion of District Local Government, traditional authorities and subnational CSOs was more apparent during the first two phases of exploration, and by phase three, engagement at the village level had reduced in Tullow and Total's area. In 2014, during follow up interviews with district leadership and key technical staff, there had been a change towards pro-active (albeit selective) engagement at the district level by the oil MNCs. For example, the district leadership had received letters just days prior to our interview in July 2014 inviting them to meet the 'Joint Venture Partners' (Tullow, CNOOC and Total).

> "They went to the central government at all stages, but now look, look at this letter! Now at this stage they want to engage. They are asking how can we work together in partnership." (DLG04, 2014).

As I discuss in chapter six, this shift in phase three is directly related to the increasing pressures on oil MNCs to address subnational issues and effectively manage the impact of operations. This shift was driven by the oil MNCs and as such, it was on their terms. The district leadership noted that they had written to the oil companies several times over the previous years requesting meetings, but were told "we only deal with the Ministry of Energy". However, by phase three, local authorities were configured as 'stakeholders' and potential 'partners' in the project as industry needs changed. As I discuss in chapter seven, a similar change took place with subnational CSOs, who noted that previous exclusion and dismissal of requests for meetings had changed towards greater inclusion and recognition of CSOs as "serious stakeholders" (SCSO06, 2014). As such, in phase three selective inclusion of district actors by oil MNCs began to take place as the project cycle progressed, project needs changed and legitimacy concerns increased.

5.4.2 Key events at the subnational level

In phase three, a significant driver of change in the assemblage was the state-managed displacement and resettlement of over 7000 people for the domestic oil refinery in Hoima District. According to Larsen, in the post frontier era resettlement for oil infrastructure constitutes 'accumulation by repossession', taking place through participatory processes which protect rights. However, the data show that the poor handling of this process by the government created a crisis that national and subnational CSOs responded to, leading to closer connections between CSOs and oil affected communities. Further, the framing of the plight as a 'human rights' issue mobilised actors at the global level and connected Uganda's oil assemblage to human rights assemblages, thus providing opportunities for change in Uganda's oil assemblage (chapter seven).

The refinery resettlement planning process began in 2012 through the Refinery Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). The government exercised its constitutional right to compulsorily acquire 29.5 square km area of land for the oil refinery site in Hoima District and contracted a Ugandan organisation called Strategic Friends International to coordinate the resettlement and compensation process, in accordance with international guidelines (SCSO08, 2014). As noted in sections 4.4 and 5.3 the pursuit of a domestic oil refinery became President Museveni's personal project, which he made central to the imaginary of Uganda as a modern, oil producing nation. The refinery is an important means of achieving energy security and boosting Uganda's power in the wider East Africa region. The site of the proposed refinery,

however, is on land which supports the livelihoods of several hundred families. The 13 villages comprise communities that have lived on and farmed the land for generations; cultivation is an important source of income to pay for school fees and healthcare (KNG04, 2015). Already there is a tension which reflects competing resource ontologies.

The experiences of the respondents facing displacement for the refinery reflect the centralised control and management of oil, and the importance of the refinery to Uganda as an oil state. During research in 2012, I interviewed respondents in one of the villages earmarked for displacement and there was a general lack of clarity about the process of resettlement. Although respondents noted a number of meetings with the government, they claimed that they were unclear about the 'roles and responsibilities' and had only been told "not to plant crops" due to the imminent move. They had been visited by the Resident District Commissioner and other government officials: "they said the refinery is a government project and you cannot stop it" one respondent reflected (COMF01, 2012). Respondents claimed that their questions about the refinery were interpreted as opposition to it. The villagers also noted a visit from a CSO from Kampala in 2012, who advised them to negotiate on compensation rates. Only 29 families opted for resettlement, while the rest would receive monetary compensation. Respondents said they were in a state of limbo, having been told not to plant crops as they awaited the resettlement process. Respondents claimed they were "fenced off from benefits" and could not get jobs with the oil companies due to their imminent departure from the site. District leaders noted their exclusion from the RAP: "the (government appointed) consultancy did everything in the refinery resettlement, the District Local Government were spectators". One result is "this (compensation) money has been wasted. The resettlement action plan should not have involved giving cash but should have involved giving land and building homes". (DLG09, 2014).

Consequently, as respondents noted, the outcomes of the refinery process had been catastrophic for some local people. The compensation money, reportedly given to the male head of household without requiring the wife to sign, and given without any financial management advice, had been frittered away in many cases. In interviews with subnational CSOs, DLG and Kingdom in 2014 and 2015 the refinery issues was dominant, and respondents noted knock-on effects of domestic violence, families abandoned by husbands, impacts on education, and impacts on food production in the wider area.

Not all families received compensation in a timely manner, which created additional negative impacts at the community and household levels. The resettlement process was done in stages and the timeframe dragged on for years, leaving some families behind while others left. Those residents still awaiting resettlement at the time of interviews in 2014 and 2015 reported overgrown plots which are not being worked because the government ordered them not to plant.

> "[The people displaced for the refinery] are scattered, they're facing challenges. Food shortage is a problem because people can't cultivate, but even if they were allowed to keep cultivating, now the wild animals are eating the food" (NCSO10, 2014).

As Global Rights Alert reports: "what were once vibrant communities appear deserted today" (Global Rights Alert, 2015: 5). The outcomes of the RAP highlight the failure of implementation of post frontier measures, which were meant to recognise the rights of residents to compensation and resettlement in guidance with national and international laws and norms (Larsen, 2015). As the resettlement processes continued, and problems with the delays in compensation were increasingly voiced, local people began to organise around their shared interests. The plight of the displaced people attracted the interests of a range of actors, both within and outside the region, and led CSOs to organise to support the refinery residents. The refinery – at the time only a promise of industry infrastructure – became a key site on which 'assemblages of protest' developed (Brown and Spiegel, 2017).

The plight of local refinery residents became known to global activist organisations through national CSOs connected to global networks. The failings of the RAP gave CSOs the opportunity to provide support to local communities seeking help and restitution; they connected local people to lawyers and Parliamentarians. Prominent national CSOs framed the issue as human rights violations and the plight of the refinery reached a global audience. Many of the refinery residents rejected the compensation rates offered and with the support and encouragement of CSOs some of the refinery residents created an organisation of aggrieved residents and made petitions to district and national government. They received funding and resources from international donors via the national CSOs, for example, for video recording equipment to record their plight and upload to YouTube and NGO webpages (CSO interviews, 2014).

The oil refinery became the actual and symbolic site which brought together actors with similar interests (Brown and Spiegel, 2017). Subnational CSOs included support for refinery residents in their work plans, and the DLG and Bunyoro Kingdom also became involved. The refinery became a symbol to highlight the state's exclusion of important actors and issues in oil development, and shaped political action across scales. However, in response, the state acted in a repressive manner and accused the CSOs of conspiring to stall the oil project. Subnational CSOs, who played a role in mobilising refinery-affected people for meetings with national CSOs, lawyers and MPs were targeted by state security forces and interview respondents noted that colleagues were threatened with arrest (SCSO04, 2014, SCSO08, 2014). Surveillance of CSOs increased and organisations were required to submit work plans to district security to be scrutinised and ensure work was not 'political'.

The wider effects of this event mobilised (non-state) actors across scales and brought new narratives around human rights to the oil assemblage. This demonstrates the ways that the materiality of the resource can shape social relations and political action, and also the ideas about oil which mobilised the human rights advocacy network. The ability of CSOs to gain support from external actors was due to the framing of the refinery displacement as a human rights issue, something which resonated with external actors concerned about the links between oil and human rights and demonstrating the significance of external relations to influence the assemblage configuration, in this case acting as assemblage converter (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

5.4.3 New narratives and new alliances

The refinery displacement event and the resulting mobilisation of actors across scales demonstrates the ability for local level struggles to connect with global assemblages which in turn shaped Uganda's oil assemblage. This event also provided opportunities for some Ugandan actors to make connections with other actors sharing similar concerns and interests, both within and beyond Uganda. As a result, the narrative of human rights became a key narrative in Uganda's oil assemblage, in addition to the dominant ones of transparency and good governance.

The capacity of the human rights narrative to create opportunities for change in the oil assemblage was demonstrated in 2014, after a land eviction of almost 1000 people in Hoima District was tied to plans for an oil industry waste management plant to be set up by American

oil and gas service firm McAlster. A national CSO respondent explained that McAlster apparently had received a permit from the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), and this had "fuelled the forced eviction because of money" (NCSO14, 2015); in other words, the potential for local elites to profit from the lease of land to the company. CSOs were able to frame this as a human rights issue which raised concerns among the oil companies:

> "We approached Tullow and Total to ask about this. They sent a letter to say they will not deal with McAlster, they said they will not tolerate human rights abuses" (NCSO14, 2015).

While the oil companies did not intervene in relation to the refinery displacement, which was a government project, the waste plant eviction was directly linked to them. This clear distancing from an issue that could potentially damage their reputation demonstrates the influence of the 'human rights' advocacy network and the importance of 'social licence' issues, which chapter six shows became increasingly important in phase three. McAlster left Uganda and the event opened up dialogue between national CSOs and the oil companies on a matter that had the potential to act as a deterritorialising force given the connection of Uganda's oil assemblage to assemblages of human rights. As the CSO respondent further reflected "[The companies] have learned to hear and be responsive and improved their communication with CSOs" in contrast to phase one during which "there was antagonism between CSOs and oil companies, no proper channels of communication and limited responsiveness" (NCSO14, 2015). As chapters six and seven discuss in more detail, this indicates the changing relationship between oil companies and CSOs which was influenced by changing industry needs to craft legitimacy and 'manage' project impacts.

Closer connections developed between other actors in the assemblage and enabled some actors excluded by dynamics in phases one and two to be included in different ways. For example, while the Bunyoro Kingdom also began to be included in formal stakeholder engagement meetings by industry in phase three, in 2014 interviews the perception of exclusion and marginalisation among Kingdom respondents remained: "We have no serious relationship with the oil companies...they pay courtesy calls or when they have a problem" (KGD03, 2014). However, through links to national CSOs the Kingdom exercised agency by commissioning a national CSO to carry out a study on 'cultural sites' in the Bunyoro region and published a joint report on Sacred Natural Sites. One CSO Project Officer explained how the importance of traditional customs to preserve the "sacred natural sites" (NCSO10, 2014)

were now under threat due to oil. This study fed into the work being done in partnership with Friends of the Earth and Gaia foundation, and connected the Kingdom with international partners working on indigenous rights. The ability for the Kingdom to frame challenges in the oil region as 'indigenous' issues demonstrates the importance of global linkages and gave the Kingdom a means of inclusion through this marginal yet powerful narrative. This example also illustrates that actor positions in the assemblage are not always easily categorised (Cross, 2014). While working with the global alliance 'Keep the oil in the soil', the Kingdom was at the same time petitioning the government for a share of oil revenues to 'develop' the region. This apparent ambivalence was also evident within civil society. Chapter seven notes that the narrative 'Say no to oil' which came out of the work of the national CSO and the Kingdom was not supported by the locally based officers of the CSO as they claimed it contradicted the perspectives of local people who "say they want the industry but with safeguards" (SCSO10, 2015).

During phase three, although the grievances in relation to oil had increased significantly, there remained considerable hope for benefits from the industry. There was also evidence of a shift in narrative towards how people could benefit from the industry. Among district actors, there was growing awareness that "jobs are not coming" (DLG07, 2014), and the best way to benefit was through 'indirect benefitting'; as one CSO said "we are encouraging people to grow tomatoes, they can put up a stall at the side of the road" (SCSO04, 2014). Industry also began to draw on a similar 'local content' narrative[2], as a way to address the local pressures for opportunities and benefits from the industry. In 2014 the 'Joint Venture Partners' (Tullow, Total and CNOOC) released a report about opportunities for local people in the industry. Benefits were to be 'indirect', with the report indicating that up to 150,000 opportunities would be available through 'indirect and induced opportunities'. At a local content presentation in Hoima town that I was invited to attend by Tullow Oil's Social Engagement manager, I observed Tullow's National Content manager explain that Ugandans could benefit from the industry through participating indirectly. The presentation took place in the crowded conference hall of a hotel in Hoima town, with approximately one hundred religious and cultural leaders in the audience. This was one of a number of times the same presentation would be given to different subnational stakeholders.

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[2] Local content, also known as national content is defined as the value added or created in the Ugandan economy through the employment of Ugandan workers and the use of goods produced or available in Uganda and services provided by Ugandan citizens and enterprises (MEMD, 2008).

Tullow's National Content manager presented the results of the JVP report - and explained in detail how indirect and induced opportunities worked. It was clear that the responsibility was placed in the hands of local people to take advantage of what was on offer. For example, the national content manager relayed some advice he had recently given to a group of young men who complained to him they had lost their jobs with Tullow:

> "I said 'this is the best opportunity for you, go back and in the next six months or 1 year go acquire the skills for brick layer and craftsperson because in 2 years from now you'll be who we want, we won't want slashers'" (JVP02, 2014).

Indeed, the loss of casual work for 'slashers' (those who clear grass and bush to make way for construction of access roads) or 'lifters' (those who remove rocks or carry heavy materials), which was available to local people during phases one and two, was framed as a positive through the local content narrative. The loss was a chance for local people to retrain and skill-up to ensure that they could benefit in the future. In this way the local content narrative reframed the idea of benefits as something that should not be expected without some commitment from local people to acquire the necessary capacity. The local content narrative was a new way to promise benefits in the future as a way to encourage people to support the industry in the present (Cross, 2014).

5.4.4 Boom and bust in the frontier

In mid-July 2014, the global oil price fell dramatically to below $50 per barrel. As a clear demonstration of the ways in which oil has material effects prior to any oil being produced (Weszkalnys, 2008), the oil price drop considerably impacted Uganda's oil assemblage. The low oil price shaped negotiations between the government and oil MNCs and shifted the balance back towards the companies, who attempted to re-negotiate PSAs to get improved terms in light of the lower oil price (Patey, 2015).

The oil price also affected operations within Uganda, as Total and Tullow reduced staff further (TUL08, 2016). Tullow, the smaller company of the JVPs, was particularly affected by the price drop, which compounded the financial difficulties Tullow was already experiencing from the Heritage / Uganda Revenue Authority tax battle, as well as the ongoing delay to receiving the Uganda production licence. Tullow had already reduced workers in the oil camps, which had knock-on effects for the Traidlinks agriculture supply chain project that had started to supply

the camps (chapter six). From the optimism of phase one and two, during which time Uganda was the cornerstone of Tullow's success in Africa, by the time of the 2015 fieldwork trip during phase three, there was widespread belief among respondents that Tullow might leave Uganda; "we hear they're packing off" one district government respondent claimed (DLG08, 2014).

Indeed, the low oil price meant further delays to production and raised a question mark over the viability of the project, demonstrating the potential for dramatic oil price changes to disrupt the oil assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017) (and which certainly contributed to Tullow's decision to sell the majority of its Uganda assets to Total in 2016). At the local level, this meant the presence of Tullow Oil and Total reduced even further as the number of CLOs was scaled back. However, it was during such a period of uncertainty that questions about the industry that was promised as a means of progress and prosperity to Ugandans were increasing. In a follow up interview with one of the two remaining Tullow CLOs in 2016 the CLO explained:

> "Community engagement is more important now, as communities are used to seeing the presence of CLOs and interacting with them. The non-technical risks are so important..." (TUL08, 2016).

The quote demonstrates that while oil MNCs are waiting for the industry to be profitable to ensure a return on their investment, the material impacts of the oil assemblage in the pre-oil stage create the need for greater engagement. As I discuss in chapter six, it is these non-technical risks that are less of a concern in the pre-oil stage of the industry yet are a crucial part of the oil assemblage. Both Tullow and CNOOC CLOs noted during follow up interviews in 2016 that issues and grievances relating to land acquisition had come to dominate their work. It is in this context that stakeholder engagement at the subnational level became an important tool for managing community relations (chapter six).

While the industry presence scaled back at the local level in phase three, the activities of CSOs and INGOs increased in relation to industry impacts, further shaping the oil assemblage configuration. While the importance of the transparency agenda remained, donor funding became increasingly geared towards addressing the problems affecting refinery residents and on land issues more generally, as I show in chapter seven. Donors began to encourage coordination between the various organisations receiving funding. For example, a

representative of one organisation noted that her group had begun to work with other organisations working on oil and gas in the region:

> "Donor funding has caused an expansion, we were brought together, due to funding requirements we had to expand into the sub-county – so we approached Tonya parish, we strengthened through networking with [prominent national CSOs]" (SCSO11, 2015).

This is one example from the data that highlights how donor-funded CSO activity began to provide opportunities for subnational CSOs to build their capacity and networks in phase three, indicating a deepening of alliance-making between global and subnational actors. In contrast to phase two, by the end of phase three there was evidence of international donors directly funding subnational CSOs. The oil assemblage had changed considerably from phase one prior to any oil being produced.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed the emergence Uganda's oil assemblage over three phases of the oil exploration period, between 2005 and 2016. These phases are categorised as pre-commercial threshold (2005-2008), industry consolidation and progression to oil (2009-2012), post frontier practices of oil management and oil governance (2013-2016). In each phase, the configuration of actors in the assemblage changed and the interests of actors in each phase were shaped, mobilised and influenced by different elements of the oil assemblage.

In phase one, there were few actors in the oil assemblage and the control of oil was centralised around the state, with oil exploration companies dealing directly with oil communities, relatively out of sight in the Albertine Graben. In phase two, commercial discoveries attracted the interests of global oil players and mobilised the interests of civil society actors. It was in this phase, when Uganda's oil was progressing towards production, that tensions arose between Uganda's oil as a globally valuable commodity, and its use as a national endowment. It was also in phase two that links developed between actors with shared interests in the governance of Uganda's oil. Oil narratives, funding and practices from resource governance assemblages became part of Uganda's oil assemblage. In phase three the assemblage configuration was characterised by more actors and considerably more complex interactions. The focus of oil management by oil MNCs, and oil governance by CSOs began to draw on post frontier narratives and practices, and engagement shifted to the subnational level and

selectively included actors previously marginalised in phases one and two. Key events shaped social relations and mobilised political action across scales and human rights narratives became part of the assemblage, providing opportunities for agency.

The focus on the subnational in this chapter reveals insights into the role of the subnational within the oil assemblage. The subnational level is not a passive recipient of a global oil project but plays an active role in shaping the assemblage. The findings show that the assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital, but the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil are part of the assemblage and these have material implications at the subnational level. The material impacts of oil influence subnational dynamics, leading to pockets of discontent. Ideas about oil in the assemblage influence development imaginaries, simultaneously shaping aspirations and uncertainty about the oil future. Chapters six and seven explore some of these processes in the assemblage in greater depth.

6.0 Chapter six

CSR and stakeholder engagement in Uganda's oil assemblage

6.1 Introduction

In the contemporary era, extractives companies are operating in a context of a proliferation of international and national standards to guide their operations in countries of operation (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2016). Larsen (2015) refers to these as 'post frontier regimes' which aim to transform frontier practices of extraction and corporate predation into sustainable and positive outcomes for localities. It is in such a context that CSR and stakeholder engagement are used by oil companies as key strategies to manage subnational extractives spaces, build relationships and provide benefits to local people, with the wider aim of maintaining legitimacy (Larsen, 2017, Billo, 2015, Dolan and Rajak, 2016).

While CSR employed by oil companies is now a-taken-for granted measure, less is understood about the complexities of the legitimacy-seeking process in extractives contexts, and especially about how and why different companies go about implementing post frontier measures in the early stages of industry. Understanding these processes is especially pertinent in a new oil frontier in which the industry is starting from scratch and with no legacy of extractives industry. Further, Uganda's oil sector is being developed by three multinational oil companies with markedly different backgrounds and experiences and as such it is important to analyse them as separate entities rather than together as 'oil capital' (Bury, 2008). This chapter builds on the discussion in chapter five in relation to engagement by oil MNCs in the oil assemblage, and the way modes of engagement (CSR, community engagement and stakeholder engagement) articulate with the subnational level.

In doing so it addresses research objective 2 of the thesis; to explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining this role and also contributes to the overarching research objective 1b which is to explore how the emerging oil assemblage articulates with the subnational level to shape outcomes.

This chapter draws from data collected during field visits to Uganda between 2012 and 2016. As described in section 3.5, the primary data includes 137 semi-structured interviews, observations from oil company stakeholder engagement meetings, multi-stakeholder forums, and validation interviews, including with industry actors. The chapter also uses secondary data, including newspaper articles, information from Uganda's Ministry of Energy, and oil company CSR reports (see chapter three for more detail on methods).

The chapter is structured according to the key findings which emerged from thematic analysis. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 explore the strategies and rationales for CSR and community and stakeholder engagement of the three oil majors in the Bunyoro region during the exploration period, over time (6.2) and across companies (6.3). Section 6.4 discusses the extent to which subnational dynamics shape and constrain this engagement.

6.2 Change over time

In chapter five I showed how the oil assemblage began to emerge and take shape over three phases during the exploration period. In this section I discuss in more depth how this shifting context influenced how and why oil MNCs engaged at the subnational level.

6.2.1 Frontier engagement in phase one

One of the main reasons for oil companies to engage with local communities in the oil region during the exploration period is to ensure access to land and resources. In an interview in 2012, one of Tullow's social engagement team summed up the implications of the point source nature of Uganda's oil resource: "We can't avoid the community, we are working on their land" (TUL02, 2012). In an interview in 2015, a CNOOC Community Liaison Officer (CLO) reflected that exploration activities often had gone ahead before compensation payments were made to local people, meaning that negotiating access to land was a key driver of corporate engagement during the exploration phase (CNC03, 2015). However, while gaining access to land remained important throughout the three phases identified in chapter five, as the project timeline progressed industry priorities shifted, and how access was maintained changed and differed between companies.

In phase one (2005-2008), during which time 'wildcatter' companies carried out exploration, relationship building with the 'host' communities was an important part of engagement. The companies required the permanent and temporary use of community land, for example to build company worker compounds, construct access roads to oil sites and carry out seismic surveys. As I showed in section 5.2.1, the state was present through its military and security arm to provide security for the oil sites, and companies were left to negotiate with community leaders for land, meaning that arrangements were made between the companies and local leaders.

In return for access to and use of land "Tullow mangers gave handouts (of money) in [village A], the LC1s (village leaders) were earning 150,000 shillings a month" (GOV01, 2014). This suggests an informal relationship between Tullow workers and village leaders in a frontier context that was temporary and 'out of sight' (Barney, 2009). Given the location of the oil drilling sites close to villages along the shores of Lake Albert, oil company workers lived in close proximity to local people:

> "We feel we're part of them, we occupy community land. Relationships are maintained... our workers sleep in (village A), use the canteens, we share boreholes" (TUL02, 2012).

Interview respondents in the villages also reflected on the close relationship between the community and oil company workers that developed during this phase; "We are your neighbours" oil companies told local leaders. Respondents considered the oil companies to be part of their community, sharing resources and space, and it was in this context that local people believed that CSR was done to improve the welfare of the community; "They said you can't see a neighbour suffering... this was for our development", one elder recalled being told by a Tullow manager (COMA06, 2014). Indeed, relationship building was driven by industry needs to access and, but the material conditions of the Albertine Graben were also influential. Heritage Oil, Hardman Resources and Tullow Oil were hosted by villages that are fish-landing sites on Lake Albert, places where fish are collected and traded. Sanitation is poor, outbreaks of cholera are frequent and social infrastructure is very minimal; "It is so isolated, no food supplies, conditions are so bad" as one civil society interviewee noted (SCSO03, 2014).

Companies contributed to improving social amenities in their respective areas: Hardman gave a small wooden building (a former mess hall for workers) to village B to use as a school,

Heritage Oil built a primary school and a health clinic in village C. In interviews in 2012, community respondents noted other support from oil exploration companies during phase one, including bore holes, and donations of educational and medical supplies.

While village leaders benefited from being on the payroll, a practice which Tullow CLOs noted they inherited from Hardman Resources, local people in the villages benefited in other ways:

> "[Tullow management] hired locals as porters, they were getting food and good money, they were looked at as saviours. They created roads, at the time no vehicles could get there" (GOV01, 2014).

The exploration companies were responding to the immediate needs of accessing the land, and the material reality of the Albertine Graben, but through this engagement they brought material improvements to marginalised communities in a region with high poverty levels. Some interview respondents noted in 2012 that seeing vehicles and large trucks was itself a benefit, however, what this represented was a promise of progress in a region that was previously isolated (Anand et al., 2018). This shaped perceptions of the industry: "whoever makes a road is a hero" as one district leader pointed out (DLG03, 2014). This evidence shows the role played by industry in fostering the imaginary of development in phase one through these interactions (Tsing, 2003). The presence of industry was not only a promise; there were tangible opportunities and financial benefits for certain community members during this time. This type of corporate engagement reflects the paternalism of an 'old' style of CSR where companies would gain loyalty and support in exchange for 'gifts' (Rajak, 2017). 'Frontier engagement' during phase one was not guided by the industry norms and standards for CSR that would shape engagement in the later phases, but rather by the material reality of the frontier and the territorially grounded nature of oil which shaped industry needs (Bridge, 2009).

Tullow Oil went further than providing philanthropy and 'gifts' by implementing several explicitly 'development' focused CSR projects in phase one. This intervention was unusual for a small independent oil exploration company needing to negotiate land and resource use, and reflects Tullow's ambitions to become Africa's leading independent oil company (Tullow Oil plc, 2010). This also provides an indication that Tullow had a longer-term aim in Uganda, that is not the case for 'wildcatter' exploration companies, whose goal it is to find oil and leave (Anderson and Browne, 2011). The vision of Aiden Heavey, the founder of Tullow Oil and CEO

during this time, was to ensure that CSR was a core Tullow value. Heavey aimed to harness the entrepreneurial spirit of Tullow Oil to 'make a difference' in its countries of operation, and embraced a challenge set by the CEO of international development charity GOAL in 2005, for companies to use business solutions to address poverty (Tullow Oil plc, 2006). In a newspaper interview in 2007, Heavey explained this in relation to the Albertine Graben:

> "You find there are 30 people a month around the lake dying of cholera and you can do something by drilling a well for water. On average, 25 per cent of the babies would die at birth due to lack of hygiene, but it was the simplest thing in the world to solve: we built a little clinic" (Northedge, 2007: no page).

In addition to the maternity clinic, Tullow constructed a primary school in the same village, and built a health centre, a primary school and a lifeboat station in the neighbouring village. International NGOs were brought in to deliver health interventions and to train a number of local women in a selection of villages to become peer educators in the communities. In interviews in 2012 the women in village D showed us Tullow branded 'peer educator' T-shirts and explained their role to deliver HIV awareness and distribute condoms. Global development discourse of 'help communities to help themselves' (Billo, 2015) was also evident. Tullow implemented several enterprise projects in one village, which were intended to become self-sustaining and provide income generating opportunities to the local community to address the lack of a regional economy (Tullow Oil plc, 2010). Projects included a vegetable garden, an apiary, and a women's sewing project. Through these interventions Tullow Oil became a development actor in the region (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), and through its connections to global development actors and use of development discourse, linked Uganda's oil assemblage to global development assemblages.

A complex mix of motives are evident in Tullow's engagements in the oil communities in phase one. As Garriga and Melé (2004) show, philanthropic CSR can be driven by an underlying profit motive, or can be driven by a fundamental moral belief in the right to development. Heavey's strategic and moral vision for Tullow in Africa suggests a combination of the two. In interviews in 2012 community members in Tullow's area of operation discussed benefits from Tullow's arrival in the region, especially in improving access to health services. These benefits from the enterprise projects played an operational and strategic function for Tullow also; in the EIA for the 'early production scheme', benefits from the CSR enterprise projects in the villages are listed as part of negotiations (ERM, 2008), demonstrating their

instrumental use to territorialise the project. This suggests the 'modern' CSR guided by global development principles still has the underlying logic of the 'gift' in terms of buying support for the company at the local level (Rajak, 2017). The CSR investments also contributed to Tullow's strategic goal to gain competitive edge through 'Making a positive impact in Africa' and 'doing things differently' (Tullow Oil plc, 2010) in an industry notoriously criticised for its negative impact. Tullow won an international CSR award for the projects in 2010, indicating the important role the CSR projects played in shaping Tullow's international reputation (Nakaweesi, 2010).

6.2.2 Professionalisation of the project in phase two

In 2009 Tullow surpassed the threshold for commercial oil, signalling with greater certainty that Uganda was on the cusp of becoming an oil state. It was in this phase that corporate engagement changed further, reflecting the shift in the project cycle, changing industry needs and pressures, and the rising stakes in Uganda's oil. Tullow's CSR shifted from the 'paternalism' and 'voluntarism' that characterised CSR in phase one (Rajak, 2017) to a more strategic approach, which demonstrated Tullow's longer-term vision and aims (Porter and Kramer, 2006).

The industry consolidated with Tullow's purchase of Hardman and then Heritage, and Tullow was briefly the only remaining company as a deal was negotiated with the Government of Uganda to bring in oil majors CNOOC and Total (chapter four). As I discussed in section 5.3.1 the plan to 'farm down' to oil majors Total and CNOOC signalled the need for greater capital investment and technical expertise that Tullow lacked, and also spoke to the profit-making potential of Uganda's oil finds.

Tullow's transition from an oil exploration company to a producer had a number of implications for the company. Tullow was dealing with an increasingly demanding operational environment in Uganda and greater visibility of the company, which meant in contrast to the informal approach in phase one, Tullow was now subject to international industry standards, as a government respondent noted:

> "Tullow brought in a professional as manager, and things had to be done to acceptable international standards of working" (GOV01, 2014).

The shift to a 'professional' approach in phase two also influenced Tullow's approach to CSR and community engagement. Data show that Tullow restructured the corporate engagement function within the company, which became directed towards ensuring the 'social licence to operate', indicating the need for Tullow to seek wider societal approval for its operations (Joyce and Thomson, 2000). Whereas in phase one a key driver of engagement was access to land and build support at the local level through relationships with local leaders (LC1s), the explicit focus on 'social licence' indicated Tullow's shifting priorities and the importance of establishing a longer-term presence in Uganda.

One of the key tools used to establish this presence was Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). CLOs are Ugandan nationals originating from the Bunyoro region who possess in-depth knowledge of the local area, cultural and social practices, and local languages (in addition to English). Through CLOs, Tullow aimed to better manage the territory and address grievances over land, compensation and other complaints relating to the impacts of exploration activities that increased during this phase (chapter five). In our interviews CLOs explained their role as "to improve community relations" (TUL06, 2014), but it was clear that CLOs were an important part of territorialising the oil project through professionalising corporate engagement and implementing industry norm and standards (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). CLOs noted a number of international industry standards and norms they draw on to guide this work, including IFC standards, UN guidelines and social performance norms. The evidence demonstrates an increasing reliance on expert knowledge from global assemblages of CSR to inform local engagement (Rajak, 2011).

The use of global norms to guide CSR went hand in hand with the shift to strategic CSR from 2009. In interviews Tullow's social engagement team emphasised the importance of CSR to create long-term value. They explained that CSR had moved away from CSR as 'one off' - because "all communities want something, they all want a health centre" (TUL04, 2014) - towards a "collaboration and partnership approach" (TUL04, 2014) which would be about "creating value" (TUL05, 2014). There was further evidence that Tullow was drawing on external knowledge and expertise to guide its strategy:

> "Social Investment is providing lasting benefits. This is an approach we are seeing in other places such as Australia" (TUL04, 2014).

In 2012 Tullow contracted a UK based international development consultancy, Montrose, to review and restructure its local level CSR and help it make the transition from 'one off' CSR to 'social investment'. Montrose "made recommendations on [the CSR projects'] quality, relevance, value for money and shared value" (Montrose, 2012: no page). This also "included "retro-fitting" exit strategies to several of the larger projects" (Ibid.). In practice, this meant helping Tullow to disengage from the village CSR enterprise projects, which villagers claim "disappeared, they took away the projects without informing us" (COMA02, 2014). The local level CSR projects (which Tullow expected to become self-sustaining but in reality, had continued to rely on Tullow CLOs to support), were no longer part of Tullow's vision for social investment. As such, Tullow's 'professionalisation' and longer-term strategy had implications for local level social relations between Tullow and the oil communities.

In phase two, Tullow's corporate engagement strategy was influenced further as a result of Tullow becoming embroiled in the politics of Uganda's oil (sections 4.4 and 5.3.1). This series of crises was the context in which Tullow shifted its focus more explicitly onto reputation management and 'stakeholder' engagement. The accusations of bribery and corruption were a considerable blow to a company attempting to establish a competitive edge through CSR. Tullow's 2010 CSR report refuted the corruption claims and noted:

> "We must think about our good reputation in everything we do and engage a lot more with external stakeholders" (Tullow Oil plc, 2010: 4)

The exposure to Uganda's oil politics emphasised the importance of relationship building with powerful stakeholders on whom Tullow was increasingly reliant to ensure the company's long-term viability in Uganda (Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016). As such, Tullow's priorities shifted away from the local level rural communities and 'community engagement' towards fostering relationships with stakeholders though 'stakeholder engagement'.

The shift to the stakeholder model meant the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997), many of whom Tullow had overlooked in phase one. For example, to address concerns that the industry was operating in secret, Tullow responded to requests from subnational actors to visit the oil sites. Group visits were organised for district leaders and representatives of community organisations and religious and cultural institutions:

> "Tullow made tours for groups down to the wells. There were a lot of rumours about what was going on… 60-70 people went, each bus had 18 people. There was a

> presentation, they took us to see the wells and the waste management, the storage, they were open about it. The crude is sealed – the keys are with the government – Tullow can't touch it" (SCSO08, 2014).

This gesture was significant in that it opened the 'enclave' to (mainly district based) local elites and demonstrated Tullow's commitment to building wider relations and challenging the common perceptions of 'oil and secrecy', and indeed, the charge that Tullow engaged in corrupt practices. This also marked a geographical shift from Tullow's previous concentration in the villages towards establishing a presence in Hoima District. In 2012 Tullow opened a 'liaison office' in Hoima town, 90km away from the villages and this became the base in the oil region for Tullow's CLOs, enabling informal engagements to take place at the district level.

Tullow's response in terms of establishing the Hoima office and organising visits to the oil wells demonstrates their commitment to 'doing things differently' and sits in contrast to the strategy of Total, who remained based in Kampala and was largely unresponsive to stakeholder requests for information (interviews with CSOs, Kingdom and DLG). This also highlights that Tullow – a small company much less experienced and established than Total and CNOOC - perceived reputational issues to be of considerable importance during its transition to an oil production company, and closely linked to its continuing success (Joyce and Thomson, 2000).

6.2.3 Oil majors and the shift towards 'post frontier' extraction in phase three

Corporate engagement changed again with the arrival of CNOOC and Total to the oil region in phase three (2013-2016). The emphasis was on 'managing the impacts' of the project through strategic CSR and putting post frontier measures in place to territorialise the project (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). In interviews all three companies discussed the use of post frontier devices such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), baseline studies, grievance mechanisms, and local employment strategies. Some examples I observed in the Hoima liaison offices of Tullow and CNOOC in 2014, and in the offices of some district and subcounty leaders during fieldwork in 2013 and 2014 were small booklets; to introduce the oil project and outline land acquisition procedures (Tullow and CNOOC); to explain company employment hiring practices (Total); and to explain how the company grievance mechanism works (Tullow, CNOOC and Total).

CSR became explicitly tied to 'supporting operations' and managing risk. For example, Total's 2013 CSR report notes the importance of 'minimising impact' in Uganda (Total S.A, 2013). In interviews Tullow CLOs explained:

> "CSR is driven towards impact mitigation, towards social issues management, environment, health; geared towards addressing impacts" (TUL04, 2014).

CNOOC CLOs also emphasised managing impacts:

> "Our social investment focuses on managing the impact, for example the social impacts; how can we manage the influx of people? We focus on health and social amenities (CNC01, 2014).

The narrative shift from CSR as providing benefits to 'minimising harm' in phase three indicates industry needs moving towards reducing the negative externalities associated with oil operations (Frynas, 2005). The greater focus on engaging district stakeholders in this phase can be seen as part of this shift and the goal to sustain wider legitimacy for the project as it moved closer to the development and production stages. From 2013 formal stakeholder engagement meetings were held quarterly at the district level and included a wider range of district actors, such as the District Local Government officers, Bunyoro Kingdom, subnational CSOs and some community leaders who were excluded in phases one and two. CNOOC opened a Liaison Office across from Tullow's office in Hoima town which allowed for 'ad hoc' district level engagements in the same way as Tullow.

Figure 15 shows an illustration of the subnational resource space. The key relationship in this space is between the state, oil MNCs and 'affected communities' with whom oil MNCs must engage to ensure access to land and resources, as noted in section 5.2. The figure shows that those actors excluded from the resource space in phases one and two are now selectively included in the oil assemblage through stakeholder engagement.

Figure 15. Selective inclusion of subnational actors into the resource space

The shift towards greater stakeholder inclusion at the district level must also be seen in relation to the increasing pockets of discontent at the local level in phase three, which created a more complex operating environment for the companies. Grievances relating to land acquisition and compensation as people failed to receive adequate compensation for land and crops began to present a tangible challenge to efforts to territorialise the project (Larsen, 2015). CLOs note the increasing demands on the Social Engagement teams as complaints and disputes over land and payments began to embroil the companies:

> "The biggest challenge is the land related matters. There are so many speculators that came with titles on community land so, it is not straightforward.... What we have done is engaged the communities to give us consent to go ahead with our activities and also got consent from the title holders... then in time if the government finds that the titles were not got in the right procedure they can cancel so they don't get the money" (CNC05, 2016)

The data show that industry activities are going ahead before compensation payments are made to local communities. As the quote explains, companies gain the consent of whom they believe to be the rightful owner of land, but the compensation payments are not always made if disputes arise. The CLO continued:

> "Because of unclear land boundaries and unclear guidelines of ownership, this is leading to land pressures and land conflicts" (CNC05, 2016)

As the day-to-day managers of the space, the oil companies were seen by communities as the ones who had mishandled the compensation procedures:

> "We have lost hope of gaining from Tullow after they didn't compensate us for our crops" (COME01, 2012).

The loss of 'hope' indicates the potential loss of support for the project (Cross, 2014), as one local consultant explained: "Issues of compensation were really handled not very well, and as a result most people feel cheated" (CNS02, 2015). When grievances relating to the use of communal resources were not addressed by CNOOC, the members of village C sued the company. CNOOC CLOs claimed in interviews that CNOOC wanted to pay for the road construction materials. The murram, an iron-rich clayey topsoil used for covering road surfaces, is a communal resource which the community claimed CNOOC should be paying 80,000 ug shillings (approx. £20) per truck load to the community. The village leader reported that "[CNOOC] said the government says they can't pay for the murram because they are communal resources" (COMC02, 2014). In other words, CNOOC claimed it was the government's refusal to pay for the murram in order to keep the recoverable costs of the project low. In this context, the support of district leaders became a crucial part of companies' efforts to territorialise the project and maintain legitimacy.

The data show that formal stakeholder engagement was used to enrol district actors to support companies in managing community relations. The half-day Stakeholder Engagement meeting in Hoima District that I observed in 2014 provided an important platform for oil companies to share the challenges and responsibilities of community relations with community leaders and religious leaders from Hoima District. Tullow and CNOOC CLOs addressed approximately sixty religious and community leaders at the meeting. The CLOs recounted many of the problems with compensation for land acquisition, including financial mismanagement, wives excluded from payments, domestic issues and resistance to advice, revealing the extent to which the process had lacked the necessary support of the state and local leaders:

> "People say, why are you telling us how to behave with our money? You're almost coming to tell us how to sleep in our beds with our wives. People almost fought [District Chairman] when he said they have to be paid through the bank and release the money little by little, people got up in arms "we want our money it is our money",

those who drunk, now they are drinking great, then they marry a third wife…” (JVP01, 2014).

The CLOs explained the oil company land acquisition and compensation procedure in detail, including every effort they had made to 'sensitise' local people according to national and international guidelines. They also reminded leaders of the improvements that oil companies made to the oil regions through CSR, again indicating the use of CSR in negotiations around the industry. They then implored the leaders to work together with industry:

“We need to sensitise our people, compensation is a very tricky thing… so it's going to be upon all of us as religious leaders, as the oil companies, as community leaders to assist in whatever way we can. You support us to make sure that couples get the money and it is used very well, to improve the life situation in the homestead other than destroying it” (JVP01, 2014).

The crafting of a sense of togetherness in the oil future was very clear at the meeting. “We are all part of the impact of oil” another CLO said. In the context of increasing grievances and industry delay and scale back noted in section 5.4.4, the support of community leaders can be seen as a crucial part of sustaining community relations as part of the legitimacy seeking process. At the time of the stakeholder meeting (which the Total CLOs did not turn up for) there were only four Tullow CLOs in the region, down from eleven, which had further reduced to two CLOs by the time of a follow up interview in 2016.

The use of stakeholder engagement to gain support of local leaders demonstrates the importance of risk mitigation and 'managing impacts' in phase three. While these efforts demonstrate commitment of the JVPs to develop the Uganda oil project in accordance with international industry guidelines and post frontier measures, the different approaches to corporate engagement and varying levels of commitment to CSR during the exploration period as I discuss in section 6.3 emphasise the selective use of these measures to support operations and demonstrate the overriding role of the business case for CSR.

6.3 Differences between companies

Strategic concerns to territorialise the project and craft legitimacy drove the CSR and engagement of all three companies in phase three. There was evidence that all three companies drew on global norms to guide corporate engagement and each company

employed post frontier devices to manage the resource space. However, in terms of approaches to implementation, there were considerable differences between the three companies, signalling variations in the legitimacy-seeking processes and different assemblage relations as a result.

6.3.1 CSR themes and activities

All three companies carried out CSR in the pre-oil stage under similar themes. Tullow, CNOOC and Total's CSR projects are captured in figure 16, which shows the projects, theme, level implemented and approximate timeframe. CSR projects fall under the broad themes of education and health, which are typical for the oil sector (Frynas, 2009). The theme of environment reflects Uganda's status as a biodiversity hotspot; and Tullow and Total also include 'enterprise' demonstrating their engagement with the contemporary CSR agenda (Rajak, 2017). All companies were explicit that CSR projects should fall within the themes; "we have three areas of CSR, it must be in these three areas, education, health and environmental protection", as a CNOOC respondent stated (CNC01, 2014). Circumscribing themes for CSR serves a purpose of enabling companies to deflect requests for support that are inevitably likely to arise (Imbun, 2007). A former Tullow CLO emphasised the importance of this for managing community expectations; "The community would come asking for money for burials, weddings, to build churches" he explained (TUL06, 2014). A subcounty local government official noted that their request for money to support orphans had been denied: "CNOOC are very clear, they tell you exactly what they will do and what they will not do" (SLG02, 2015).

The themes of education and health for CSR suggest a commitment to social development and community improvement, given that projects within these areas are likely to be compatible with the development goals of a developing country such as Uganda. Yet they are broad enough to ensure that a number of different interventions can fall under these themes. As Frynas (2009) has shown, great diversity in investment levels and project types under these broad themes is typical of the oil sector and has led to inconsistency and poor impacts in terms of development. Indeed, in Uganda there is considerable difference between the companies' CSR. The only similarity is in national level CSR, which involved awarding educational scholarships to Ugandan students to study at Universities in the home countries of the respective companies. The study scholarship CSR aims to fulfil the national content

requirement (MEMD, 2008), for industry to skill up and support Ugandans to be employed in the industry.

Subnational CSR projects on the other hand, while sharing common themes, differed widely between companies in terms of project type and level of investment. Under health and sanitation initiatives the support ranged from CNOOC providing 'cleaning kits' in its host village and funding HIV testing in the villages surrounding the workers camp during road construction, to Tullow constructing health clinics and a hospital, and to Total planning to locate boreholes needed for industry close to villages to hand over at a later date. Under the stated aim of 'supporting education', in addition to the national level scholarships, CSR projects included giving cash awards to high achievers at primary level by CNOOC amounting to a few thousand US dollars, and in contrast, Tullow's investment in the construction of primary schools in the oil region and financial support for teacher's salaries. Indeed, there was a considerable difference in the level of investment in CSR between companies. In their 2012 CSR report, Tullow Oil reported expenditure of $4.8 million on social investment in Uganda since 2006 (Tullow Oil plc, 2012). Total does not disclose their CSR spend, but it can be surmised that financial investment in Uganda was considerably lower than Tullow's given the smaller scale of CSR and smaller number of projects (and shorter amount of time in the country). From reports of individual project spend in CNOOC's CSR reports, it is estimated that CNOOC's spending on CSR in Uganda between 2012 and 2016 was less than $250,000 (CNOOC Ltd, 2012, CNOOC Ltd, 2013, CNOOC Ltd, 2014). Seen in relation to the annual revenues of CNOOC and Total, which in 2014 were $44.7 billion (macrotrends.net) and $212 billion (macrotrends.net) respectively in comparison to Tullow Oil's $2.2 billion (Tullow Oil plc, 2015), it is clear that CSR investment from the 'oil majors' up to that point was very minimal.

The lower levels of investment in CSR during the exploration period by CNOOC and Total can be explained in two ways. The first is their approach to CSR; Total was explicit about a "cautious" approach to CSR in Uganda, and CNOOC was explicit that their CSR was

Figure 16. CSR activities by company over time

"minimum". The second is that evidence suggests that Total and CNOOC view CSR investment to be for the production phase of the industry. In comparison to Tullow Oil, this suggests considerably different approaches to crafting legitimacy in the pre-oil stage.

6.3.2 Comparing the approaches

Approaches to CSR differed between companies. In interviews in 2013, Total's Social Engagement team explained their cautious approach which aimed to ensure "we do not raise expectations" (TOT03, 2013). Total is a global oil and gas major operating in over 130 countries and has considerable experience of CSR. The company also has past experiences of negative publicity, including accusations of human rights violations in Myanmar, meaning that a key focus of Total's companywide CSR strategy is upholding human rights. The cautious approach most clearly reflects what Rajak (2016) terms 'carefully crafted' CSR, which seeks to avoid the critique that oil companies are patrons. Interview respondents stressed the importance of CSR to "avoid giving things...we want to be a partner with communities, not build dependency" (TOT03, 2013). As the Total team further explained:

> "We push people to understand we are an accelerating factor. Total will not give you something, if you make it you own it" (TOT03, 2013)

Total's main CSR activity in Uganda, the Awanga solar lamp project is one implemented in a number of other countries in which Total operates in the global south (Total S.A, 2013), and embodies this contemporary 'self-help' approach to CSR (Banks et al., 2016). The project requires local businesses to purchase the lamps from Total at a subsidised rate and sell in communities. The ultimate aim of this approach is to reduce risk by minimising Total's involvement and placing more responsibility onto communities for the success of the CSR (Shever, 2010).

CNOOC's CSR was deliberately minimal, as the CSR manager explained: "CSR is not so much, it is just for starters, to gain access to the community" (CNC02, 2015). He noted explicitly that CNOOC's CSR aims to be "support but not involved" (CNC02, 2015). However, while Total's approach was about reducing risk to Total, and reflected reputational concerns, CNOOCs approach was more pragmatic and linked to supporting operations. In other words, CSR was used instrumentally by CNOOC to build relationships and gain access to carry out activities on the ground, an approach which resonates with that of the exploration companies in phase one (section 6.2.1), and the 'old' style of CSR (Rajak, 2017). CSR was to ensure community

safety during road construction, and to monitor the increase of HIV in and around the construction workers camp (where the organisation carrying out the study on behalf of CNOOC found there to be a 12% infection rate, higher than the usual local rate of 5%). Donations, such as school materials, medical and cleaning supplies were given in villages "as a tool for mobilisation to implement other messages such as operations information or HIV awareness" (CNC01, 2014). This was still about risk, but CNOOC's focus was more on operational risk, where Total was more concerned with reputational risk to Total Global, reflecting the different pressures facing a Western oil major in comparison to a Chinese state oil company.

Tullow, on the other hand, continued social investment throughout the exploration period and evidence shows that investment began to focus on local content; "building capacity in oil and gas" (TUL04, 2014) so that local people can be involved in the oil and gas supply chain. In 2011 Tullow CEO Heavey met with the King of Bunyoro during the King's visit to London and talked about the potential for local people in Bunyoro to produce food for the oil camps: "He said they would need 4 million eggs" (KDG03, 2014) the King's secretary recalled:

> "He talked about doing lots of interesting things to empower, local content… they were going to get local enterprises producing goods for the industry" (KGD03, 2014).

In 2012 the majority of Tullow's CSR spend was invested in setting up the agricultural supply chain project with Irish NGO TraidLinks. The project involved training local farmers to build their capacity to supply produce to the oil worker camps. Interview data show that Tullow was providing 100% of the project funding for the first three years. Tullow invested in an Enterprise Centre on the edge of Hoima town, in buildings purchased from the Catholic Diocese, which served as a training centre for farmers and a collection and distribution point for locally grown produce. In our interview in 2014 the TraidLinks project officer claimed that after six months of training local farmers "about supply chain and how to plan, how to use chemicals and compliance to standards" some local farmers were successfully supplying farm produce the oil camps:

> "It was a big headache to convince the catering companies to stop sourcing from Kampala… I asked them to give us a three-month trial…the fruit and veg they're sourcing is 90% local, cereals 50% local" (TULPTN01, 2014)

While the TraidLinks project did not survive Tullow's financial struggles in Uganda, what the example serves to demonstrate here is the considerable effort Tullow put into social investment prior to oil production – and profit generation - in Uganda.

6.3.3 Anticipating the impacts

The lower levels of investment and commitment to CSR by Total and CNOOC reflect the idea that CSR is for the production phase of the industry. CNOOC's 'minimal' and Total's 'cautious' approaches to CSR suggest that longer-term CSR commitments do not take place during the exploration phase. While all three companies talked about 'managing the impact', Tullow was the only company aiming to do this through social investment during the exploration period. For Total and CNOOC it was clear that 'impacts' referred to anticipated future impacts and mitigation of these was closely related to managing risk (with managing risk a concern for all three companies). For example, in an interview in 2012, a Total CLO said that community expectations could not be addressed because "operations are still at the exploration stage" (TOT02, 2012). CNOOC's CSR manager explained that the company was looking at longer term projects for the production stage (CNC03, 2015). Although CNOOC's CLO said, in relation to mitigation, "we permanently take land, what about livelihoods?" (CNC01,2014) CNOOC had no 'livelihoods' related programmes in place. Rather, CNOOC and Total respondents talked about scaling up 'local content' for the production phase. This plan to scale up investment during the production stage reflects the 'business case' of CSR; CSR is tied to profitability and profitability is when the oil is being extracted. So, while CNOOC and Total discussed 'managing the impacts', it was clear that this was not to be achieved through social investment in the pre-oil stage.

While Tullow continued to commit to CSR during the pre-oil stage there is evidence that as Tullow's approach became more strategic, CSR became more closely linked to supporting operations and to the business case (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Tullow continued with the construction of the infrastructure projects in the oil region (villages A and B and other locations) throughout phase two, and the hospital in the next district was finally commissioned by the government in 2015. However, what changed was the way Tullow framed these projects; they were now to "serve our operations" (TUL04, 2014). As one CLO said:

> "We don't want our workers to contract HIV, we want them to have a fully equipped medical facility" (TUL05, 2014).

This demonstrates that in line with the shift in Tullow's CSR narrative in phase two to 'sustainability' and 'value for money', the wellbeing of the community had also to benefit Tullow. This reflects both the need for Tullow to effectively manage the impacts of the project, and the pressure to demonstrate the business case for CSR to its shareholders (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The oil price drop in 2014 to below $50 per barrel significantly impacted Tullow's CSR investments. The TraidLinks project, which relied 100% on funding from Tullow, suffered from the drop in the oil price and Tullow's financial difficulties. In 2014, the project officer, hopeful for more funding, explained that Tullow had promised 5 years "but it has stopped at 3 because of the ups and downs for Tullow" (PTNTUL01, 2014). In a follow up interview in 2016 the project officer explained with regret that the project had finished:

> "It's the trend of oil and gas, it's too challenging to keep injecting money, we can't give you more they said, the coffers are drying up" (PTNTUL05, 2016).

The business case for CSR meant that the CSR implemented in the pre-oil stage was short term and as a consequence, its impact was limited. In interviews, CNOOC respondents specifically referred to the 'win-win' approach, and it was clear that this approach had shaped CSR. In interviews with CNOOC's Hoima-based CSR partners (the road safety and vocational skills projects in 2014 and the HIV organisation in 2015), respondents all noted that the projects were 'on hold' waiting for review. The road safety project officer said: "It was a 2-month pilot to run in February 2014... we submitted a final report to CNOOC and they have promised phase two so we are waiting" (PTNCNC04, 2014). The organisation that implemented the HIV testing project in 2013 also explained that the project is delivered in stages:

> "We made recommendations after the first stage, we recommended supporting treatment, because what happens to those who test positive?" (PTNCNC05, 2014).

The weak commitment to CSR in the pre-oil stage by Total and CNOOC demonstrates the limits of the business case for CSR, which is tied to profitability. However, in spite of Tullow's commitment to invest during the pre-oil stage, the uncertainty of the frontier and vulnerability to the oil price revealed that ultimately Tullow's CSR was also tied to profitability.

6.3.4 Legitimacy seeking and assemblage relations

Different approaches to CSR can be seen in terms of the varied approaches to legitimacy seeking in the pre-oil stage by the three companies. While all three companies drew on global CSR discourse and used post frontier devices that are crafted by experts in the global north (Rajak, 2011), how these were used in the legitimacy seeking process at the subnational level varied. Further, the analysis shows that different approaches to legitimacy seeking shaped assemblage relations in different ways.

Total's approach to legitimacy seeking in the pre-oil stage was through 'social management plans' with which they aimed to minimise industry impacts at the local level. Total's area of operation in Uganda also extends into the Acholi region, which is a post conflict context having been the location of the conflict between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army that ended in 2006. Total employed 'experts' including an international organisation called The Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) with experience of working in conflict zones and supporting companies and NGOs to "Do no harm" (Anderson, 1999). CEP developed Total's approach to sourcing local employment – a ballot box system – which Total implemented in local communities with the aim of transparent hiring practices. Total also used International Alert, an international peace and conflict NGO with many years of experience working in Uganda. Total's choice of partners reflects Total's past experiences of working in sensitive environments, and the emphasis on human rights across the company. As such, Total's local engagement was shaped by Total Global's company-wide CSR approach as well as local conditions as interpreted by conflict management experts. Through their approach, they connected Uganda's oil assemblage with global assemblages of human rights and conflict management.

CNOOC's emphasis was on local level "community engagement" to achieve the "social licence the operate" (CNC01, 2014). CNOOC received the production licence for the Kingfisher site in 2013 and moved on in the project cycle before Tullow and Total, who remained in negotiations with the Government of Uganda until 2016. CNOOC's CLOs described a comprehensive community engagement strategy that involved regular engagement with 11 villages at the lake, 7 at the top of the escarpment, 3 in the sub-county, as well as the District Local Government leadership. CNOOC created an oil and gas advisory committee made up of 10 community representatives "so we move with the community" (CNC01, 2014):

"We involve the community in activity, we move with the committee to seek consent in getting the social license to operate…there must be a structure in place when working with people on the ground. Political and opinion leaders are a good machinery to reach the grassroots" (CNC01, 2014).

This committee of 'political and opinion leaders' meant that CNOOC developed close links with influential people in the community. This is in contrast to Tullow and Total's approach to organising village level meetings through the LC1s at the village level.

CNOOC's approach to implementing CSR also differed in that they engaged only with district level actors. They worked with the District Local Government in Hoima to organise CSR and / or implement some CSR projects, and also contracted local partners based in Hoima town. The 'Best Performers' school project was in coordination with the District Education Office. A 'pop up' health clinic in Hoima town which brought Chinese doctors to give consultations to local people, was coordinated with the district leadership. As such, while CNOOC draws on international discourses of sustainable development and CSR like Tullow and Total, its approach to implementation points to the preference of a state-owned Chinese oil company to link with government bodies rather than international non-state actors. CNOOCs engagement with district actors to implement CSR meant a new role for the district in the oil assemblage.

Tullow's approach changed from dealing exclusively with global development partners for CSR in phase one, towards the inclusion of national and subnational actors through its local content focused CSR in phases two and three. This reflected its aim to be the "partnership broker" (TUL04, 2014). Tullow's shift to include local content demonstrates their ongoing goal to use CSR to build and sustain legitimacy, both in Uganda and beyond. Local content was being pushed by the Government, was the latest 'buzzword' among development professionals, and also met local demands for opportunities. The TraidLinks agriculture supply chain project, "the initiative of the owner of Tullow" (TUL06, 2014), brought together international and national NGOs, the Uganda Revenue Authority, the Hoima District Local Government's Commercial Office, a UK based catering contractor, Hoima-based farmers associations, and local farmers. Through this project Tullow aimed to meet local content targets, and potentially provide benefits to a wide range of stakeholders.

In summary, while the three companies – joint venture partners in Uganda – shared similar aims, drew on similar global narratives and employed similar post frontier measures to manage the space, approaches to implementation differed, with implications for social relations in the assemblage. The next section demonstrates how dynamics at the subnational level articulated with these efforts and processes of legitimacy seeking to further shape outcomes in the frontier.

6.4 Subnational dynamics and corporate engagement

The findings in this chapter have demonstrated the changing approaches to CSR over three phases of the pre-oil stage, the differences between the companies in terms of approach and implementation of CSR in the legitimacy seeking process and the ways this shaped relations in the assemblage. While a key driver of CSR and community and stakeholder engagement was legitimacy seeking and territorialisation of the project, how this played out at the local level was influenced by subnational dynamics.

6.4.1 Industry impacts and 'affected communities'

The findings show that the notion of what is an 'affected community' or 'project affected person' was determined by the industry and influenced which local actors gained rights and recognition in relation to industry impacts. The findings in section 5.3.5 showed that some crops and resources were excluded from valuations by the state which led to grievances in relation to compensation. The findings also show that a range of direct, indirect and perceived impacts of the industry were not acknowledged due to the delineation of 'affected community' by industry, meaning that some claims were legitimate, and some were not. Figure 17 illustrates findings distilled from the data of the high / direct and low / indirect impacts and those impacts which are included for industry designated 'affected communities' and excluded for non-affected communities.

Figure 17. Impacts of oil from indirect to direct and demarcation of 'affected communities' by industry

One issue raised in interviews was the real and perceived impacts of oil on the lake. Local leaders, District Local Government and subnational CSOs talked about the impacts of climate change and over-fishing, leading to declining fish stocks in the lake. However, at the village level, these changes were becoming tied to oil exploration: "The oil companies did surveys on the lake and the fish catch reduced" (COMA07, 2014), was a typical comment by local people who made a link between seismic surveys - 'bombs' – on the lake and reduced fish.

There was evidence that in the context of many changes taking place at the local level, some existing issues became reframed in terms of oil impacts. A local consultant, who had worked for a Norwegian company contracted by Tullow Oil to investigate the claims, said:

> "[Communities] were complaining about machines at the oil sites drilling, claimed there was noise, pollution, fumes from trucks, that there was a loss of rain since oil had started... that their houses had got cracks in them from vibrations in the land and there were increased diseases – coughs, flu, that temperatures were high" (CNS02, 2015).

The consultant, speaking from his subject position both as an expert and someone indigenous to Bunyoro, highlighted the issue: "the problems communities were facing weren't carrying much weight". However, he further explained that this did not matter. These *perceived* impacts of oil were important because of the potential to shape responses to the industry: "[the communities] have a right (to complain). They actually believe these things".

These findings demonstrate the ways that changes taking place at the local level can become caught up with the experiences of oil and lead to pockets of discontent at the local level. In addition to the 'real' ways that industry shapes lives in material terms, it is also the belief that the industry is making impacts that can influence acceptance. These lived experiences are exacerbated by the development imaginaries at the local level which are shaped by the ideas of a resource curse (section 7.3).

The anticipated impacts of the industry were also consequential. During my fieldwork respondents linked what had happened with the refinery compensation process to the upcoming stages of the industry: "People are scared that once drilling starts, they may be evicted and may not be compensated, and have nowhere to go" (COMA08, 2014). This suggests that even for those with only indirect experiences of oil, the anticipated impacts of

the industry can create uncertainty (Limbert, 2008). And in a context in which claims are legitimatised through a stakeholder engagement approach by industry, there is the potential for these pockets of discontent and uncertainties about the future to impact the legitimacy of industry in the longer term (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl, 2013).

6.4.2 Social expectations of reciprocity

As section 5.2 showed, imaginaries of development became a key feature of Uganda's oil assemblage in phase one, fostered and sustained by the presence of the industry as well as CSR interventions by oil companies. Analysis of the data shows that an underlying notion of reciprocity was also important in shaping the expectations of local communities and influenced how they engaged with, and perceived, oil companies. While the immediate concern for relationship-building to ensure access to land and resources was a key driver of oil company approaches to CSR, communities engaged with the expectation of longer-term relationships (West, 2006).

The material conditions of the resource periphery played some role in local expectations of the industry: "the needs are great and the demands [for support] are many" as one subcounty government leader explained (SLG01, 2015). Section 6.2.1 notes the early wildcatters and Tullow's response to the frontier challenges in an area of high poverty and limited social services. CNOOC also responded to frontier conditions when it arrived in village C: "The landing site was prone to cholera, CNOOC provided cleaning kits, it is in much better shape now" (SCSO03, 2014). Even Total, with its 'cautious' approach to CSR and mandate to "not give things" (TOT03, 2013), responded to community needs by donating materials and rebuilding a school and health centre roof after a severe storm (TU08L, 2016). These responses to challenges in the frontier demonstrate that oil companies, as social actors in the region, had engaged in local development. However, overall, the evidence has shown that CSR interventions to gain access to land and resources were considered by oil MNCs to be short term, or 'for starters'.

Communities on the other hand, engaged with oil companies from a different perspective, demonstrating that CSR is a social relationship. Rather than conceive demands to oil companies for CSR as simple demands for companies to fulfil state services in a resource periphery (Cash, 2012), the findings show that this is more complex. Communities have given oil companies communal land on which to build oil company camps and facilities, leading to a

certain social expectation of reciprocity: "the community gave them the land in expectation of other things to come" (COMA01, 2014). Further, companies were using other communal resources such as 'murram' (material for road construction) and water, in the context of local people experiencing challenges to water access:

> "We are telling [CNOOC] about our drinking water. The taps were put in by Heritage, but the Hippos broke it. [CNOOC] are taking samples from the lake but not providing any water for us" (COMC03, 2014).

Indeed, these suggestions of a notion of reciprocity have also to be understood in the context of the challenging material context of the Albertine Graben. Local people link CSR to the negative impacts that communities are experiencing. A subcounty government leader commented:

> "They are interrupting communities. They improve on the road, but they are benefitting from the road and the communities are prohibited from using it" (SLG01, 2015).

In this way, CSR is considered as a form of compensation for the perceived sacrifices local people are making as they adjust their daily lives for the industry, and for the negative impacts local people were experiencing. In this regard, village level actors claimed that CSR had not gone far enough in what was perceived as a reciprocal relationship. "What they are giving, when I weigh it up, the companies should add more compared to what they're receiving" (SLG01, 2015) was a typical comment.

The community expectations regarding reciprocity for the use of land and resources do not suggest a transaction as in 'what can I get from you when I give to you', but rather reflect the expectation of an ongoing social relationship with a company represented by oil men who told them "we are neighbours" (COMA06, 2014). Local people often allow the use of land because it is part of an exchange relationship in which 'outsiders' can use land in exchange for the "social relations of development" (West, 2006: 134). Whereas companies see land as a commodity to be traded, the responses of local people suggest the value of land to communities goes beyond the economic (section 5.2.5). For the companies, the notion of responsibility is not rooted in community, but rather reflects the reworking of CSR as sustainable development and win-win outcomes (Rajak, 2011). The Tullow CLO claimed: "We are not obliged to look after people, but we must be a responsible operator" (TUL04, 2014). While 'responsibility' for Tullow

encompassed community wellbeing, one issue is that 'social improvement' tends to be defined by the oil company and not in accordance with contextual needs (Frynas, 2010, Rajak, 2017). I have already demonstrated in section 6.3.1 that it is the companies that provide the parameters for community development initiatives based on general themes, and these vary widely. There is a tension then between community expectations of longer-term relationships (West, 2006), and the strategic nature of CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006). This is important because it led to claims by respondents in host villages that companies were not addressing community concerns, which has implications for trust and legitimacy so important for the social licence to operate (Wilson, 2016). As one female respondent explained:

> "People are crying 'at least service the roads in the village', but they do nothing, and vehicles pass and destroy the roads. Time and time, we are asking but they don't do it, they do just what they want" (COMC04, 2014)

Such responses of local actors to industry do not take place in a vacuum, but rather should be seen in light of the transformational changes taking place in this context, demonstrating the ways in which CSR becomes part of local development imaginaries (Banks et al., 2016). Rather than community requests for CSR being a shopping list of demands (Imbun, 2007), instead they are better explained by an underlying notion of reciprocity which shapes the expectations of communities and influences how they engage with extractives companies (West, 2006, Dolan and Rajak, 2016, Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). What this demonstrates is that these expectations and imaginaries become part of subnational dynamics which shape perceptions – and ultimately the acceptance – of the industry during the exploration period.

The analysis suggests that contrary to the idea that CSR has the tendency to foster a relationship of dependency that is in some way damaging for local people (Rajak, 2011), seen from the perspective of local people, a relationship with industry might be something that local people pursue. Respondents in villages A and B linked the deterioration of their relationship with Tullow to the welfare of those communities. While this does suggest dependency (and an entanglement which Tullow then sought to break), from the perspective of the community their 'dependence' on Tullow for their welfare was seen to be in exchange for the community hosting the industry, and as a way to navigate the changing context: "big men will come because of oil and if we are living like this in grass houses it will be bad for us" (COMA06, 2014). A relationship with Tullow was seen as vital to improve the community and ensure they were not "left behind" because of the industry. A relationship that was described

by one of 'neighbours' by the previous oil men in phase one, was now replaced by a more formalised structure in which local people are 'stakeholders' and "told to contact Hoima, but we are not with the Hoima people, we are with the Tullow people here" (COMA06, 2014). This indicates that rather than provide greater clarity for relationships, the professionalisation of engagement created increased uncertainty.

6.4.3 A local push for inclusion in oil

Throughout the research, the issue of local benefits from oil was raised by a range of different actors, and the idea of how local people can benefit had shifted over time. A quote from a Tullow CSR partner sums up the shift:

> "The natives thought they would get money, but that didn't come. Then they thought they would benefit from a bit of business, but that didn't happen. The oil companies were getting produce from Kampala, and they were asking oil companies how they can benefit" (PTNTUL01, 2014).

There was evidence that sensitivity to the expectation of local inclusion had informed oil company approaches to managing the space to a degree. Tullow's agriculture supply chain project to provide opportunities to local farmers was one of the clearest examples, along with CNOOC's vocational skills support and Total's employment 'ballot box' system. The shared underlying concern about 'impact mitigation' meant an awareness that local people should benefit from the industry in some way, even though as section 6.3 noted, for Total and CNOOC this plan to include local content was for the later stage of oil production.

In the rural context of Hoima District where the majority of people farm, one of the main demands raised among local level actors during interviews in 2014 was related to supplying to the industry

> "There is such enormous need to reduce poverty, for markets for produce. People want to know how they can benefit" (SLG01, 2015).

There was a common perception that this was the way that local people could benefit: "supplying our goods and services to the industry is all we have" (SCSO07, 2014) was a comment from one subnational CSO. Expectations among district level actors such as DLG and CSOs had shifted from phase one, as one leader put it "we know now that jobs are not coming", and the narrative had changed to one of 'indirect benefits': "We are wanting the oil

companies to empower farmers on the more serious note, they should be supplying to the region" (DLG05, 2014).

The quote is one indication of the aspirations for the development of the district among district leaders that had been fostered by the industry in the region and the existing work Tullow was doing on the TraidLinks agriculture supply chain project. However, among local level actors in village C there were still expectations of jobs: "We are hopeful for jobs and other benefits" (COMC09, 2016) a youth respondent noted. Respondents in the same village noted that young men in the community had left fishing to seek casual work with CNOOC. However, respondents in village A and B expressed frustration that they were no longer benefitting. This was an indication of the different stage in the project cycle, meaning there was little activity taking place in villages A and B at the time of interviews in phase three, in comparison to phase one, and also demonstrates that the boom and bust during the pre-oil stage of the industry had impacted the local level. Another village leader noted: "There are two employees out of our six thousand doing a maintenance job at Tullow now" (COMB03, 2014). Many respondents talked about the unskilled jobs that a number of people from the villages had during phases one and two that had dried up by phase three. So, while the demand for jobs remained at the local level, the push for indirect benefits appeared to be coming largely from district level actors and was driven further by the government's national content policy. As the Tullow CLO noted, the TraidLinks project "was as a result of a stakeholder push to participate in oil and gas…[TraidLinks] are helping us to realise what we advocate for, local content" (TUL04, 2014).

However, the issue of 'what is local?' was something which emerged over the three phases and became entangled with and exacerbated by oil company efforts to address 'local content'. The tension between the government's notion of 'national content' and the perceptions of 'local content', was exacerbated by the interchangeable use of the terms. Some local people began to use the term "local local content" to refer to the local level, and in interviews many subnational actors stressed that 'affirmative action' was needed for the oil region. "Lacking a definition of local content, people are coming from outside" (SCSO10, 2015) as one CSO explained. This is a concern which feeds into existing narratives in Bunyoro of "bafuriga" or 'outsider', referring to the historical encroachment on land and resources by migrants from other parts of Uganda (Sjögren, 2013b).

The concern about outsiders was seen most clearly in the grievances around employment. Respondents in all villages expressed their perceptions that oil companies were employing people from 'up on the escarpment'. In the Leeds project, we found that Total's employment ballot box initiative, which was crafted by 'experts' to ensure a transparent process and avoid such contestations (section 6.3), was critiqued by respondents who claimed it was hand-picked employment and was unfair because it included people from other villages (Manyindo et al., 2014). The grievances demonstrate the challenges of getting local acceptance of externally developed initiatives. Respondents claimed the usual practice of the village LC1 recommending workers to the company was the preferred and 'fair' method of recruitment. Similar issues were raised about Tullow's grievance mechanism, which did not reflect the local cultural approach to resolving grievances. Some respondents claimed that 'grievance cards' given out by CLOs remained at the LC1s office and were not given back to the company. These examples suggest local incompatibility with post frontier devices. Indeed, Total's ballot box project and Tullow's grievance mechanism reflect a problem of 'translation' of practices from global assemblages to the local level (Lewis and Mosse, 2006).

The TraidLinks project faced an additional challenge of implementing global industry standards locally. The project officers talked about the challenges of training farmers to required industry standards, getting certification "in accordance with a standard called 'Global Gap', which is an international standard" (PTNTUL02), convincing local farmers to invest in their own development by paying a small fee, ensuring consistency and timely supply, ensuring quality fruit and vegetables, keeping records:

> "Even the technical people didn't understand, they said 'we eat it so why can't they?' They were using chemicals that were 5 years out of date" (PTNTUL02, 2014).

The project officer explained further challenges:

> "[Catering company] said they (farmers) would not be effective; standards were not enough, they were worried that locally produced food may cause sickness in the camps" (PTNTUL01, 2014).

What the industry saw as 'lack of capacity' however, the local people viewed as industry standards excluding people. As one CSO explained:

> "The communities' education is low, how can you tell a rural woman to wash and package the cassava, and then pay a price less than local markets?" (CSO20).

And one farmer that had participated in TraidLinks said: "There is such a cost to what they want, and they don't pay you for 2 weeks. This is a different system. Locals don't understand" (BENTUL02). Conversely, local content had emphasised these differences and was "a disadvantage for some... it is the middle (class) man who has the capacity to grow. These men have never seen a watermelon, only fish and cassava" (DLG09, 2014).

Unfortunately, the challenges of 'capacity' for many local people meant that efforts to produce for the TraidLinks project were in vain. "They say they want a quality pig, but what is a quality pig?" Some of the famers I interviewed locally claimed "we are finished with them". Another said: "[TraidLinks] said one of them (vegetables) was damaged, and to take it back, but take it back to where?" (BENTUL02).

So, while local content was, in theory, a way for local people to benefit, and approaches were shaped by local demands to participate, it fostered grievances and risked creating further divisions. There was evidence that those with existing 'capacity' were the ones to benefit:

> "There are 3 categories of people, those who don't know quality, those who know but can't afford, and those who know and can afford" (DLG05, 2014).

The politics of local development planning also shaped and constrained CSR and had the potential to impact oil MNC legitimacy. In general, MNCs operating in the oil sector in the global south have tried to ensure that CSR relates to local needs in light of sustained critiques that CSR in global south contexts often fails to adequately address issues of local development (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Indeed, in interviews with Tullow, Total and CNOOC, respondents stressed the importance of CSR being needs driven. However, in practice, navigating the politics of how this played out in the subnational context was a challenge. In interviews in 2012 and 2013 a range of non-industry respondents raised concerns that CSR carried out in phase one (2005-2008) and phase two (2009-2012) was concentrated too heavily in the oil communities. Further, respondents critiqued Tullow's CSR in particular as not being implemented in a participatory way: "Community consultation was not that good. The beneficiary must be consulted but they are not" (SCSO04, 2014).

There was the perception among a number of respondents that oil company CLOs were "conniving" with certain local leaders to ensure that CSR was invested in some geographical areas and not others, and focused on certain needs and not others (SCSO04, 2014).

Respondents claimed that Tullow had not coordinated with District Development Plans (DDPs), which they said would help to ensure that CSR was tailored to the development needs of the district. The DDPs are five-yearly development plans for the districts, which in theory are developed through a series of consultations with community representatives at village and sub-country levels (interview with DLG). Instead, some projects were said to reflect the priorities of leaders or a small elite and as a result had led to inappropriate or poorly planned projects:

> "[Tullow] did CSR without consulting the key decision makers. The school is heavily invested, next to a government school, without strategies for kids to go to school (DLG05, 2014).

The hospital built by Tullow was widely seen to be as a result of negotiations with district leaders in the neighbouring District of Buliisa (on the edge of Murchinson's Falls National Park), and as a result, was situated far away from villages. Another contentious CSR project was a 'resource centre' of computers and books:

> "The resource centre is for elites, people are illiterate or speak local languages, there was no consultation, only the District Local Government" (SCSO02, 2014).

What this demonstrates is the power relations and diversity of interests at the subnational level that oil company CSR became entangled with. As I noted in chapter five, the arrival of the industry in the wider district shaped the aspirations of a range of actors and played an important role in enrolling actors to support the industry, however it was also the case that these aspirations meant that oil became caught up in the politics of local development. There was evidence of tension between district actors, including the Kingdom and CSOs, who believed that CSR should benefit the wider district, and people in the oil communities who expected CSR to address issues at the village level. In our interviews, district leaders explained that they also had ambitions for CSR to benefit the whole district, but it was also clear that some leaders had tried to capture CSR benefits to benefit a narrow few. This also demonstrates that CSR by oil companies is one of the few tangible benefits of the industry in the pre-oil stage, and this raised the stakes in local development politics. Whereas oil companies aimed to address 'local needs', district level planning for local development and the politics around this shaped and constrained the extent to which it could do so.

Total, explicitly aiming to avoid Tullow's early mistake of not consulting the community on CSR, aimed to closely follow the DDP to implement the water borehole project. As one DLG leader commented: "Total will not go outside what is in the (DDP) plan" (DLG03, 2014). The issue, however, was the contested relevance of the DDPs in terms of representing community needs:

> "The oil companies come to the District to get copies to identify that investment projects are in the DDP. But some of the plans are out of date, they were done pre-oil, the DDP is a five-year plan. It's not enough just to look at the DDPs, it's just a framework and may not include issues of oil and gas" (DLG10, 2014).

Further, politics around the DDPs meant that Total was unsure how to proceed, as it was unclear which department was responsible, and as such, this constrained Total's water project. Total's approach to CSR meant that at the time of our interview the company was still waiting for this to be resolved. So, while the DDPs provided oil companies with the possibility for participatory CSR, in practice, this was constrained by the politics of the district planning system. This meant that although Tullow aimed to follow this from 2012, the 'participatory' nature of Tullow's CSR remained in question. In line with the 'cautious' approach, Total's CSR was delayed as the company continued to consult with local government. CNOOC's method of working closely with the District Education Office and the district leadership to implement CSR appeared to have avoided the need for CNOOC to decipher DDPs. And interestingly, despite considerably less investment than Tullow, respondents from DLG and CSOs claimed that CNOOC's CSR addressed local needs better than Tullow and Total.

The important observation for this chapter is that while the local push for opportunities influenced CSR, contestations about 'what is local' impacted trust, with implications for long term legitimacy (Wilson, 2016). What the findings demonstrate is the tendency of CSR and 'social management' plans to feed into and exacerbate local divisions. The lack of understanding of the complexities of local politics is also evident, and the diverse approaches from three different oil companies adds further complexities. It also raises the issue that global norms and post frontier measures to manage the space become shaped by the local politics in that space (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). The geographical shift in company engagement as well as the shift towards strategic CSR influenced which groups benefited from CSR, something which I expand on in the discussion chapter. The contestations about the local also points to a bigger question of how global assemblages, which are standardised and generic,

become implanted and 'translated' in local contexts, what Tsing terms the 'friction' in these global to local encounters (Tsing, 2011).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the CSR and community and stakeholder engagement practices by three international oil companies in Uganda's emerging oil frontier through the lens of the assemblage. First it explored how and why companies engage, identifying changing drivers and approaches to CSR and engagement over time and between companies. It then considered the factors which shape and constrain corporate engagement, drawing attention to the role of the subnational.

The chapter showed that post frontier narratives and practices become increasingly important as the project cycle progressed, however it was not until phase three, when the oil majors were established and the move towards first oil appeared imminent that companies turned towards pro-actively anticipating the impacts of the project. This focus on impact at this time is closely linked to risk, and in turn this is linked to the question of ensuring and maintaining legitimacy. The shift towards formal and pro-active stakeholder engagement at the district level is another indication of the importance of this wider legitimacy and shifted the focus away from a one solely on local communities in the oil region, with implications for relations in the assemblage.

The comparative analysis showed that while all three companies draw on global standards and norms, how they are implemented varied between companies and influenced outcomes in different ways. Although Tullow aimed to address social development needs during the exploration period, Total's cautious approach and CNOOCs pragmatic approach to CSR and engagement, combined with Tullow's scaling back from 2014, meant there was weak commitment to CSR investment in the pre-oil stage.

The need for social licence to operate to ensure ongoing legitimacy in the context of grievances relating to industry impacts, compensation and inclusion in benefits demonstrates the importance of subnational dynamics in shaping the legitimacy seeking process. The companies reached out to include local actors in addressing the impacts of industry. While this demonstrates the productive power of CSR and stakeholder engagement to enrol support,

it also demonstrates the potential for agency to shape the legitimacy seeking process in the pre-oil stage. The chapter generates insights into the complexities of the legitimacy seeking process and the various processes taking place which suggest the need to consider CSR as a social relationship.

7.0 Chapter seven

CSOs in oil governance

7.1 Introduction

Civil society, including NGOs, social movements and indigenous groups across the globe have been at the forefront of challenging predatory forms of resource extraction over the last decades, in the both the global north and global south (Schmink and Wood, 1992, Sawyer, 2004, Gedicks, 2001). These actors and organisations have contributed significantly to our understanding about the environmental and social implications of extractive industries for local populations and ecologies (Szablowski and Campbell, 2019). During the 1990s transnational NGOs played an important role in developing international norms around human rights, transparency and corporate practice in extractives contexts. As such, civil society came to be seen a crucial actor in the extractive industries governance in terms of driving accountability politics and representing the interests of communities negatively impacted by extractives projects.

In much of the literature on resource frontiers an often-conflictual relationship is assumed to exist between corporate power on the one hand and communities supported by civil society actors on the other. There has been less focus on everyday interactions between these actors (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Larsen, 2017), especially in contexts where industry is at the early stages (Behrends et al., 2013). This is especially important in a Sub-Saharan African context, such as Uganda, with no prior experience of large scale extractive industries in the region and no existing social movement vis-à-vis extractive industries (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). In such a context, it is important to consider how these processes of oil governance take shape and what the constraining or enabling factors are.

Chapter five demonstrated that oil discovery in Uganda mobilised the interests of civil society actors both internal and external to the country. Existing knowledge about oil's link to poor development outcomes in the context of post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with concerns about Uganda's deteriorating governance environment among donors and INGOs, raised the importance of oil governance in Uganda (section 5.3.3). The chapter showed that over time, through the three phases of the exploration period, links between donors and

INGOs and Ugandan civil society organisations increased and shaped the oil assemblage, not only in terms of the actors involved but also knowledge, ideas, resources, and practices.

This chapter adds greater depth to the discussion in chapter five by unpacking the role of CSOs in Uganda's oil assemblage to consider the activities they carry out at the subnational level and their role in oil governance during the pre-oil stage of the industry. In doing so, the chapter addresses research objective 3: Explore the role played by civil society actors in the governance of Uganda's oil; and contributes to addressing objective 1-part b: Explore how the emerging oil assemblage articulates with the subnational level to shape outcomes.

This chapter draws from data collected during field visits to Uganda between 2012 and 2016. As described in section 3.5, the primary data includes 137 semi-structured interviews, observations from civil society workshops, oil company stakeholder engagement meetings and multi-stakeholder forums. The chapter also draws on data from CSO, INGO and donor reports.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 highlights that the type of civil society organisations engaging on oil issues were predominantly professionalised organisations from the CSO sector; activities were influenced by the connections of these CSOs to international donors and had a national level focus. Section 7.3 shows that CSO activity shifted to the subnational level and began to include organisations in the oil region, however challenges at this level constrained efforts to engage oil communities. Section 7.4 shows that subnational dynamics impacted the work of CSOs over time, due to changing corporate engagement strategies, increasing industry impacts and key events, providing opportunities for CSOs to support local people. Section 7.5 draws on these findings to discuss the character of CSOs and oil governance in Uganda.

7.2 CSO activity and the oil governance assemblage

As the commercial threshold for oil production in Uganda was surpassed in 2009, signalling the reality that Uganda was next in line to become one of Sub-Saharan Africa's oil producers, the interests of civil society internal and external to the country mobilised. Donors and INGOs concerned about the potential impacts of oil on governance moved to support Ugandan civil society to address these challenges and help prepare the country to become an oil state. This external support considerably shaped the character of oil governance during the pre-oil stage

of the industry by bringing funding, knowledge and practices to the oil assemblage, and influencing the political context in which CSO activity was to be carried out.

7.2.1 National CSOs move into oil

As Uganda was poised to become an oil state there was a section of Ugandan civil society, already connected to external donors and INGO partners, that began to work on oil and gas issues. As is typical of 'actually existing civil society' (Mamdani, 1996) in Uganda, these are formalised organisations in the 'CSO sector'. These organisations are mainly urban, Kampala-based professional civil society organisations (CSOs), some of which became increasingly active in policy and advocacy work on energy, environment and human rights issues in the early to mid-2000s. A key characteristic of this section of civil society is their dependence on external donors for funds, and competition between organisations for this funding (Deniva, 2006). Table 9 shows some of the prominent national CSOs in Uganda which began to include oil as a core issue in their work during phase two of the exploration period identified in section 5.3 (2009 – 2012).

Table 9. Prominent national CSOs in Uganda working on oil and gas

National Civil Society Organisation	Area of work	Date established
Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)	An independent public policy research and advocacy think tank	1999
Greenwatch	Improved environmental protection and management in Uganda	1995
HURINET	A network of human rights organizations in Uganda working to promote and protect the rights of citizens	1994
The National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE)	Sustainable solutions to issues of environmental and economic growth in Uganda. Conducts research and advocacy for best practices in natural resource management	1997
Water Governance Institute (WGI)	A membership organisation which engages government and other stakeholders on policy, governance and development issues related to water.	2008
AFIEGO	Public policy research and advocacy to influence energy policies to benefit the poor and vulnerable	2004
Global Rights Alert (GRA)	Established specifically to promote good governance of Uganda's natural resources	2007

Source: websites and policy documents, selection based on participants observed workshops

In addition to these Ugandan organisations, Kampala-based offices of international NGOs working in Uganda such as International Alert, WWF and Action Aid, also began to work on oil and gas issues, and some began to channel funding for oil related work to national CSOs. International NGOs established local chapters of global advocacy networks which many of the national CSOs joined, for example a Uganda chapter of Publish What You Pay (PWYP) (which campaigns on revenue transparency and of which Global Witness is a co-founder) was established in 2008. Another network called Oil Watch Network (OWN) was established by Oil Watch International, a global network supported by Friends of the Earth and part of the global movement 'Keep the Oil in the Soil'. National CSOs also established their own umbrella organisation called Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (CSCO), which is referred to as its members as a 'platform', aiming to bring together Ugandan CSOs working on oil and gas. Data show that CSCO began to include subnational CSOs and by 2014 had more than 30 members (national CSO interviews, 2012; CSO website analysis, CSO document analysis).

Crucial to civil society engagement on oil in Uganda was the support of a 'resource governance assemblage'; a global assemblage of organisations, actors, knowledge and practices related to extractive industries governance, which shaped the trajectory of oil governance in Uganda in the pre-oil stage. As section 5.2 notes, data show that there was some initial activity in the oil region by two CSOs in the villages during phase one (2005-2008), supported by international activists on oil, which brought narratives of oil and environmental despoliation to the local level through a video on the Niger Delta. However, during phase two (2009-2012), civil society engagement on oil and gas was influenced by Uganda's state donors, international grant-making organisations and INGOs, and the focus was predominantly at the national level.

It was in phase two that the interests of donors and INGOs mobilised in relation to Uganda's oil discovery and concerns about governance of the sector. International organisations such as Global Witness, Publish What You Pay, Revenue Watch Institute and Platform, as well as the World Bank, began to organise meetings and workshops in Kampala to discuss the governance-related challenges it was believed oil posed to Uganda. Global Witness raised concerns about oil in the context of a deteriorating governance environment in Uganda and in 2010 urged Uganda's state donors to coordinate efforts to establish the necessary checks and balances as "a critical test of their commitment to transparency, accountability and long-term wealth creation in Uganda" (Global Witness, 2010: 3). A key development towards this aim was the establishment in 2011 of the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) by eight of Uganda'

donors - Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Funding for oil governance-related work began to be channelled to national CSOs through the DGF's 'Voice and Accountability' programme[3].

There was clear evidence that Ugandan CSOs' work on oil and gas was shaped by expert knowledge about oil and gas from the global resource governance assemblage that these actors were part of. Many of the national CSOs I interviewed in 2012 had been working closely with donors and INGOs on oil governance related training and capacity building, as one CSO respondent explained:

> "Us CSOs in Kampala we don't have capacity, that's why...we've been working with our donors, especially Revenue Watch that has serious expertise on extractives. So, they would fund experts to come here and facilitate meetings" (NCSO05, 2012).

National CSO representatives talked about the expertise that was passed from INGOs, donors and foreign advisers to build their understanding of the 'technical' oil industry, as well as the 'right' conditions of governance needed for a successful oil sector. Revenue Watch Institute provided training on contract monitoring; USAID provided funding to do "capacity building on EIA aspects" (NCSO04, 2012) and brought experts from USA Universities and industry to talk about "different aspects of resource governance" (NCSO04, 2012); Revenue Watch also provided educational fellowships to members of CSOs. Professor Paul Collier, an influential figure in policy development around natural resource governance and a proponent of the 'resource curse theory' (section 2.2), delivered lectures in Uganda in 2011 and in 2013 on managing Uganda's oil wealth, in his capacity of advisor to the Africa Region of the World Bank (CSO documents).

Knowledge practices about oil became a key part of Uganda's oil assemblage through links to this assemblage of knowledge, expertise, practices and narratives about oil governance (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This assemblage was itself shaped by experiences of extractive industries from other contexts, in other words, what is known about oil. For example, Global Witness's work in Angola in the 1990s had helped to establish the links between corruption and poor development outcomes in the extractives sectors and push the agenda of 'good extractives governance' around the issue of transparency. Within this focus on

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[3] The University of Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons was one project funded by DGF under this programme, and part of this PhD research was carried out with financial support from this project.

transparency and good governance is the assumed role of civil society as a key actor to drive forward this agenda (Weszkalnys, 2011). In interviews with national CSOs in 2012 and 2013, respondents presented their role as self-evident:

> "I've seen in other countries, where the NGOs do a lot of highlighting that, then making it blown out if there is a case of violation... the fact that there is someone to investigate and find the truth is important" (NCSO01, 2012).

The data show that capacity building for Ugandan CSOs focused on distilling lessons learned from other contexts. INGOs brought representatives from other oil producing countries, such as Nigeria and Chad, to speak at meetings and training workshops in Kampala. 'Exposure' visits were organised for some CSO and government representatives to visit the exemplar oil country, Norway. The aim was to show Ugandans the 'good' and 'bad' examples of resource management and also to promote the importance of Uganda joining the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative. What these interventions and training sessions reinforced therefore, was the idea of good oil management as a choice to make, rather than something political which might emerge through struggle (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). These trends in Uganda had parallels with efforts to shape oil governance outcomes in Sao Tome and Principe, prior to it becoming an oil state (Weszkalnys, 2008) and show that this is the same resource governance assemblage. In addition to the technical preparations, these include the same INGOs (International Alert, PWYP) laying the groundwork for Uganda's EITI membership, the 'exposure' visits to Norway for civil society and government elites, visits by international professors, foreign advisers, consultants and other experts (national CSOs interviews, 2012); civil society workshops sharing knowledge from other oil producing contexts.

The global resource governance assemblage and its associated knowledges and practices had material impacts in Uganda. In addition to perpetuating the idea that resource governance is a technical process, another outcome of this intervention was that CSOs in Uganda adopted narratives and roles that reflected these dominant narratives and practices. This meant that CSO activities became shaped by dominant knowledge about oil and how to address its challenges, thus delimiting oil activities with implications for the ability of local concerns to be addressed, as section 7.3 of this chapter shows. Another implication was that 'resource curse' narratives were reinforced in Uganda's oil assemblage and became a way for people in the oil region to frame experiences and express concerns about oil.

7.2.2 National level focus of activities

During phase two of the exploration period (2009 – 2012) funding, expert knowledge and governance practices relating to oil and gas began to be channelled through Uganda's existing development architecture featuring national CSOs, meaning that national CSOs in the professional CSO sector became 'experts' on oil and gas. Capacity building training and workshops were held in Kampala, where the majority of INGOs and CSOs are based and where it was possible to engage other key national stakeholders such as MPs and Ministers. The national focus of oil governance work was considered a priority by donors and INGOs throughout most of phase two, because at this time important oil legislation was being developed. The emphasis on promoting transparency in Uganda's oil industry meant a key role for Ugandan CSOs to influence outcomes.

A major concern among donors was the development of oil legislation in the context of Uganda's "deteriorating governance environment" (Global Witness, 2010: 3). The 2012 Petroleum Bill (oil bill) raised concerns among experts and was one of the 'early warning signs' that Global Witness identified as signalling problems for the sector. The oil bill is the primary law for governing Uganda's oil industry and was being updated from its 1985 version. In early June 2010, a draft copy of the bill was shared with Ugandan civil society and international NGOs (national CSO interviews). Global Witness's analysis found that the oil bill "does not provide sufficient checks and balances to safeguard against the obvious risks of high-level corruption" (Global Witness, 2010: 5). The main controversy was clause 9 in the bill, which gave powers to the Oil Minister to negotiate, grant and revoke exploration and production licences, and to issue policy and regulations. This was seen as allowing for the politicisation of the sector and an obstacle to transparency (national CSO interviews). Discussions with national CSOs about their work on the bill during our interviews reflected this analysis:

> "We think it will be very difficult for this country to avoid the much touted resource curse, because you are literally giving the oil and gas sector to two individuals to govern, that is the Minister and the President, so we are particularly not very comfortable in that" (NCSO01, 2012)

Consequently, the efforts of donors and INGOs began to focus on building the capacity of national CSOs and the Ugandan parliament to understand the Bill and challenge clause 9. Professors from Harvard University in the USA provided CSOs with detailed input into the bill, which was then discussed at CSCO meetings:

"We would meet in the day and we sit and then we handled different aspects [of the bill], different chapters, chapter by chapter, clause by clause of the bill" (NCSO05, 2012)

Donors then spent millions of shillings on training workshops and seminars, including a retreat at a five-star resort in Kampala for CSOs and 40 MPs to scrutinise the oil bill (national CSO interviews 2012).

MPs amended controversial clause 9 to improve accountability by awarding licencing powers to the Petroleum Authority rather than the Minister. President Museveni reacted strongly against what he saw as the betrayal of NRM MPs and held an unprecedented number of eight caucus meetings to push through the clause unchanged. The President directed his wrath at national CSOs and MPs whom he claimed were working for foreign interests and were bribed to fail the bill (Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). He interpreted the challenge to clause 9 as a challenge to the success of the industry and donor and INGO intervention was framed as a threat to the progress oil promised: "they don't want our oil sector to succeed because this will mean financial independence for Uganda" (Daily Monitor, 2012) . As I noted in section 5.3.3 whereas regime survival has depended on donor funding since the 1990s, oil promised a new revenue stream by which the regime can reproduce its power, and move away from its heavy reliance on, and interference from, western donors (Mwenda and Tangri, 2005, Hickey et al., 2015).

The oil bill intervention pushed CSOs' work into the political arena in a context where the role of CSOs in Uganda has since the 1990s been to play a supportive and complementary role to the state rather than engage in issues deemed 'political' (Sjögren, 2013a). And while there have been exceptions to this norm in recent years, as chapter four showed, the role of the donor funded CSO sector has been to provide stability to the state and act as a vehicle for service delivery in the context of structural adjustment. The President therefore made attempts to re-emphasise what the government believes is the role of CSOs in Uganda's oil assemblage, as one respondent explained:

"Oil is a very sensitive subject. The President made it clear and even MEMD did – that oil is not for CSOs. They should work in education not oil" (NCSO07, 2012).

There was clear concern among CSO respondents I interviewed in 2012 that government scrutiny of their activities was going to increase:

> "If it were not for us pushing MPs to stand their ground there would be no discussion, so now the President thinks that actually we CSOs are making it very hard for him to get his way, so he's going to harden on us, there's no doubt about that, he's going to harden on us" (NCSO04, 2012).

The result was a more restrictive space for CSOs. A handful of prominent CSOs were subject to government investigations, and legislation was passed to restrict meetings on issues deemed 'political' (Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). As I show in section 7.5, this had more serious repercussions for subnational CSOs in the oil region with less visibility than the high profile national CSOs.

What is clear from the intervention on the oil bills is that Ugandan CSOs gave donors the opportunity to influence Uganda's oil industry from the 'outside'. The support from external actors during this phase was notably different from the technical support provided to the Ugandan government from Norad and consultants during phase one of exploration (section 5.2.3). In this second phase, external support was channelled *around* the state by donors, INGOs and 'experts' to strengthen institutions and foster democratic oversight. This highlights the clear donor concerns about oil governance in light of trends I noted in chapter four, especially the embezzlement of aid funds by the Office of the Prime Minister. Whereas the Ugandan state's democratic transgressions had been overlooked before, oil was a different matter. Here, the ideas about oil and oil's potentialities (Weszkalnys, 2008) including the position of oil as a globally valuable and strategic resource (Watts, 2005), had a clear influence in the assemblage. The advent of oil and the incentives oil is believed to provide for elite corruption required strengthening countervailing power to the state due to concerns about the concentration of state power, to try to redress this balance.

What is also clear is that through their interventions around the state, in the efforts to improve accountability in the sector and avoid the 'resource curse', Uganda's donors inadvertently caused the political space within which civil society operates in Uganda to narrow.

7.3 CSO activity shifts to a subnational focus

After the oil bill contestation, which reached its climax in 2011, the focus of donor and CSO attention shifted to the subnational level and began to involve subnational CSO partners. This shift began towards the end of phase two, and intensified during phase three of the exploration period (2013-2016). Donor and INGO funding to involve and support the 'grassroots' required national CSOs to partner with CSOs located closer to the oil region, and so cross-scale CSO partnerships became a key characteristic of the oil assemblage. However, previous CSO activism in some communities during phase one and prevailing power relations at the local level presented challenges to CSOs' ambitions to represent the grassroots. The 'expertise' of civil society, seen from the global and national viewpoint as an essential part of ensuring good governance of Uganda's oil, was contested by oil companies, the state and the oil-affected communities in the subnational space.

7.3.1 Partnerships between national and subnational CSOs

The activities of national CSOs shifted to the subnational level[4], to focus on "strengthening capacity of the local communities and the [subnational] CSOs to be able to advocate for these oil and gas issues" (NCSO02, 2012). In doing so, this shift brought important new actors into the assemblage – subnational CSOs. Partnering with subnational CSOs became a logistic and strategic necessity for national CSOs to implement oil activities at the subnational level. The reason for partnering was twofold; the national CSOs were geographically distant from oil communities and had little legacy of interaction with local people in the oil region (Odora, 2007):

> "We work with locally rooted CSOs because they have a much more closer bond with the local communities since we are nationally based" (NCSO05, 2012).

Data show that partnering with subnational organisations was not only to 'build capacity' of local organisations but also a way for national CSOs to reach the oil communities. Restrictions put in place by the government presented additional barriers to national CSOs:

> "When we went [to the oil region] on our own it wasn't very easy for us to get into the villages because I think you've heard of the directive that the Ministry of Energy gave

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[4] An exception to this is MYJ who worked in the oil region with the University of Leeds during phase two

that no one should reach out into the villages in the oil producing areas without any permission from the Permanent Secretary" (NCSO03, 2012).

According to national CSOs, partnership working enabled national CSOs to work in the oil region despite the lack of organic connection to the oil communities. Two national CSOs established local offices in Hoima town and hired staff to be permanently based there. As a result of this geographical shift of focus to the subnational level, several subnational CSOs began to include oil and gas issues in their work and began to receive subgrants from international donors and INGOs through national CSO partners, thus changing the assemblage configuration.

Table 10. Subnational CSOs working on oil and gas issues

Subnational Civil Society Organisation	Area of work (prior to oil and gas)	Year CSO established
Kitara Heritage Development Agency (KHEDA)	The development of the Bunyoro region	2006
(MIRAC)	Member organisation to address issues of corruption and promote democratic empowerment	2008
Navigators of Development Association (NAVODA)	Socio-economic transformation of communities through environmental conservation	2005
Lake Albert Children Women Advocacy (LACWADO) (Buliisa)	Women and Children's rights	2004
Kakindo Orphans Care (Buliisa)	Children's rights	2008
Kwataniza Farmers Group (Hoima)	Women's community savings and credit group, poultry keeping and fruit growing	2008

The subnational civil society organisations working with national CSOs are relatively new, having formed in the mid to late-2000s, and are based in Hoima town. As table 10 shows, they include one organisation working on women's issues formed in 2004; one working on environment issues formed in 2005, one working on livelihoods-related issues formed in 2006; and another working on corruption, formed in 2007. While smaller than the national organisations, these CSOs are also classed as formal, professional CSOs in contrast to other subnational civil society groups at the local level that include associational groups and societies (CNS01, 2015). These subnational organisations were brought into the oil assemblage

and through links to national CSOs and their donor and INGO sponsors, were connected to global governance assemblages. Figure 18 shows some of the key civil society organisations and the types of activities they carried out in the oil region over time. Prior to 2014 (at which time there is evidence of direct links between donors and subnational CSOs), the role of subnational CSOs was mainly to mobilise local people to meetings that were facilitated by national CSOs.

Phase one 2005-2008	Phase two 2009-2012	Phase three 2013-2016
'Sensitisations' - oil and gas impacts (2008) **AFIEGO, GRA**	'Sensitisations' – demanding transparency in oil and gas (2010) AFIEGO, **NAPE, NAVODA** 'Sensitisations' – oil and gas impacts, land issues, financial education, women's rights (2012) AFIEGO, NAPE, NAVODA, KHEDA **BAPENECO, LACWADO, KAKINDO, KAWTANIZA**	'Advocacy' – Refinery rights, land and compensation, women's rights (2013, 2014, 2015) AFIEGO, GRA, NAPE, NAVODA, **MIRAC** 'Sensitisations' – business preparedness (2014, 2015) NAVODA, KHEDA, KWATANIZO, MIRAC

Type of oil and gas activity for each phase and year activity began, with CSOs involved in each stage (bold indicates when CSO first began to engage)

Figure 18. CSOs activities on oil at the subnational level through three phases of the pre-oil stage

7.3.2 CSO activities, donor agendas and resource curse narratives

Partnership working established specific roles for national and subnational CSOs, which reflected that national CSOs had become 'experts' on oil and gas through the capacity building training of the resource governance assemblage and work on the oil bills:

"[The subnational CSOs] would do all the mobilising 'cause they know the people in the areas, they would do all the mobilising, and then we would go as experts, as facilitators to facilitate these dialogues" (NCSO04, 2012)

The role of subnational CSOs was to 'mobilise' local people to attend workshops and meetings, often held at the subcounty or district level but also sometimes in selected villages, and national CSOs would deliver 'sensitisation' on oil, which means to make someone highly aware, or 'sensitive' about an issue (national CSO interviews 2012 and 2013; subnational CSO interviews, 2014). National CSOs presented themselves not only as experts on oil and gas issues, but the crucial vehicle through which oil communities could reach the attention of the government in Kampala: "the views that will be picked out of those community meetings can find a way through the civil society organisations and into parliament" (NCSO01, 2012), the director of one CSO explained.

Data show that CSO activities involved 'sensitisations' on oil and gas and capturing community voices through workshops (figure 18). This format adopted the typical model of CSO work in Uganda in relation to delivering development interventions; CSOs play the role of information provider and of capturing voices of the rural poor to feed into policy (Odora, 2007). Oil governance work by CSOs was following a similar model. Analysis of CSO workshop reports shows that sensitisations on oil were largely one-directional meetings, at which national CSOs played the role of educator about the impacts of oil and the importance of local people to have knowledge about the industry. The 'voices' captured were used to justify the need for CSOs and secure further funding, for example, a workshop presentation by a national CSO to the World Bank in 2011 discussed 'poverty' and 'high expectations' among local people in the oil region. These findings show that oil governance work was channelled through the existing development architecture in Uganda and consequently empowered a section of Ugandan civil society – the professional 'CSO sector' at the national and subnational levels. As Kothari (2005) and others have argued, it is the perceived closeness of these 'local' actors to subaltern groups (in this case the rural poor in the oil regions) which legitimises and

authorises their interventions. However, as I demonstrate in this chapter, the resource governance assemblage enabled national CSOs to claim expertise on oil through a certain framing of oil. At the local level, this expertise was contested; subnational dynamics presented a barrier to the perceived legitimacy of CSOs as the representatives of local people.

The data show that oil narratives in the assemblage were influential in shaping CSO work in this initial period of subnational CSO activities during phase two, as I discussed in chapter five. CSO activity on oil at the subnational level was shaped by the dominant ideas and narratives of oil governance, which focused on 'information access' and 'transparency', echoing the narratives of the resource governance assemblage and the 'formulaic' prescriptions seen in other contexts (Weszkalnys, 2011). This close correlation of donor funding, agendas and narratives are typical of donor funded work, and local agendas can be side lined (Banks and Hulme, 2012). This meant that CSO activity at the subnational level - especially during phase two of the exploration period – addressed issues that did not always resonate with local people. Indeed, although there was evidence of interactions between CSOs and local people, it did not appear that issues of local concern were shaping CSO agendas: "The CSOs come here but they talk about other things, how to improve community" one community respondent noted (COMA11, 2014).

The underlying assumption of the CSO approach was that people in the oil region lacked the capacity to understand and respond appropriately to the changes taking place "because you are dealing with someone who has only gone to school up to senior four (16 years old)" (CSO04,2012). As another national CSO respondent commented:

> "The districts for example cannot tell, members of the community can't tell that this is pollution, they wouldn't even have seen it" (NCSO01, 2012).

As the quotes suggest, the focus on national CSOs as experts also perpetuates the idea that the communities or subnational CSOs are not able to engage on their own merit, "because, you know oil and gas are a little too technical" (NCSO05, 2012). National CSOs have taken on the role as the interlocutor and experts on oil, when in fact the industry is new to all Ugandan actors. CSO activity at this time consisted of national CSOs bringing information to the oil region about the potential impacts of oil and gas and educating local people on the need for transparency and accountability. However, at this time there were oil related impacts taking place in communities, many of which were captured in the extensive community interviews in

the oil region in 2012 and 2013 for the Leeds project (Manyindo et al., 2014). These include concerns about the lake and pollution, missing or incorrect compensation payments for land, exclusion from communal resources, livelihoods challenges, increased dust, noise and traffic, most of which were not being addressed by the government or industry.

While national CSO work in phase two was focused on sensitisations, there is evidence that other work was being done by international and national CSOs to document oil related changes at the subnational level, for example the impacts of oil on land, conflict and women (national CSO interviews, CSO documents). However, there was little coordination between organisations prior to 2014, despite the CSO networks that had formed. The competitive nature of CSOs in Uganda was one reason for this, and another reason was lack of coordination among donors, leading for example, to the same donor funding two different national CSOs to carry out 'baseline' studies in the oil region (national CSO interviews). CSOs tended to engage on their own issues, so land CSOs documented land issues, peace and conflict CSOs carried out conflict assessments, gender-focused CSOs engaged on women's issues. It was not until 2015 that one national CSO began a study to document the various CSO interventions at the subnational level and address the problem of duplication (CNS03, 2015). While these issues about land, conflict and gender gradually found their way onto CSO agendas by phase three (figure 18), during phase two when CSO intervention was directed at the subnational level, local experiences were not informing CSO 'sensitisation' activities. This shows the way in which the dominant narratives of oil delimited the types of activities that were being done to address the issues.

One outcome of the partnerships between national CSOs, subcontracting to subnational CSOs, was that the dominant narratives in the assemblage around the resource curse and technical approach to manage oil also became reflected in subnational CSOs work. This reflects the ways in which ideas about oil have material effects (Weszkalnys, 2011). One implication of this was that while subnational CSOs talked about the salient issues facing local people, the funding from donors meant a different focus for projects that did not always address these issues. For example, in our interview in 2014 one subnational CSO respondent discussed concerns about the environment and about the impacts of the refinery resettlement process:

> "Only 52% of people have been compensated in 2 years. Developments have halted, no permanent crops have been grown, this breeds resentments" (SCSO07, 2014).

However, the funding the organisation received from the Revenue Watch Institute reflected the transparency agenda:

> "We got money to empower people, to demand transparency. To ensure that the oil money is going to be used prudently" (SCSO07, 2014).

There appeared then to be a disconnect between the salient local issues and the types of projects and narratives that were shaping subnational approaches. There was a similar finding from a focus group interview with a subnational CSO in 2014, where respondents discussed concerns about the increasing prevalence of HIV in the oil region and food shortages due to the refinery. However, the project they had funding for was to support local businesses:

> "We are working with communities around Hoima preparing them for business opportunities, through workshops, to improve their business, branding, and business health" (SCSO04, 2014).

While the issues being addressed through donor funded projects may be relevant, they were not being shaped by the current and salient needs and concerns of local people. Further, what is reflected in these agendas provides further evidence that the focus is on oil as revenue, or at a later stage of the project cycle, typical of the mainstream ideas about oil and development (section 2.2).

The character of the CSO projects being implemented at the subnational level demonstrates the effects of dominant oil narratives in shaping assemblage practices. However, there was also a further effect. Not only did dominant discourses of oil and development lead to a focus on some issues over others, but the 'sensitisation' on the potential impacts of oil reproduced the narrative of a 'resource curse' at the local level (Weszkalnys, 2013). Interviews with respondents in the oil region tended to frame their concerns in terms of the resource curse, which was presented as something intrinsic to Africa: "In Africa, we have what is known as the resource curse" one elder commented (COMA09, 2012).

While initial activism had established these concerns with images of the Niger Delta, subsequent 'sensitisations' on the impacts of oil continued and perpetuated this narrative. Witte (2018) comments on the antagonistic language and the powerful imagery of degraded landscapes used in some of the CSO workshops and meetings she observed during

ethnographic research in the oil region in Uganda in 2012. CSO leaders referred to oil as a 'time bomb', and the oil companies and government as 'thieves' (Witte, 2018: 114). Images I observed on leaflets and posters left in communities (for example in the village LC1s offices) depict a degraded oil environment. One CSO poster uses an image of gas flaring in Nigeria to ask, 'Can this happen in Uganda?'. Through this type of activity, CSOs in Uganda have contributed to an imaginary of oil in which oil's potentiality is to breed conflict, induce poverty and degrade the environment. A version of the Niger Delta is envisaged to potentially take place in Uganda's Albertine Graben. This captured the imaginations of local people. Almost all community members I interviewed throughout the period of study raised the example of Nigeria:

> "I am afraid. I saw what happened to Nigeria and afraid it will happen there, the pollution. I saw pictures of an old woman carrying babies that were so dirty, and men very dirty!" (COMA04, 2014).

These narratives played a consequential role in the assemblage, especially at the subnational level. They differed from the dominant state and industry narrative which presented oil solely in a positive light, and as such provided an important counter-narrative in the assemblage. On the other hand, the CSOs introduced the idea that the resource curse could become a reality in the Albertine Graben, and this idea mixed with existing ideas and experiences at the local level, serving to stoke and exacerbate people's fears. The idea of a 'resource curse' resonated with the concerns and lived experiences of local people in the context of transformation in the oil region and their awareness of politics in Uganda – "big men will come because of oil" (COMA06, 2014), was a common comment in interviews. In this way, CSO narratives fed the prevailing sense of uncertainty at the local level. This demonstrates the way that dominant narratives are not imposed, but rather mix with existing ideas (Tsing, 2011). However, while the 'resource curse' presented an alternative future scenario, through the resource curse narrative and the solution proposed - 'good governance' through transparency - CSOs actually supported the idea perpetuated by industry that oil was something that could be effectively managed into a 'blessing'.

7.3.3 Subnational CSOs face challenges to access and legitimacy

National CSOs framed the partnerships with subnational CSOs as a way to reach the 'grassroots', however interviews with subnational CSOs revealed numerous challenges which posed obstacles to them effectively reaching and representing people in the oil region. First,

because of the re-regulatory state and centralised control of oil, government remained hostile to CSOs that it claimed were "inciting communities" (SCSO05, 2014). The early activism by CSOs noted in section 5.2 led to the perception among government – both national and subnational – that CSOs were 'disorganising' communities and attempting to turn them against the oil project. Subnational CSOs, through their partnerships with national CSOs, were tarnished with the same reputation. As one consultant explained, due to the lack of resources and reliance on national partners "the subnational [CSOs] are being overpowered by the national and providing one sided information about the oil curse" (CNS02, 2014). The subnational CSOs interpreted this differently however; as the government wanting to ensure its monopoly over the narrative of oil as promising a positive future:

> "The Government doesn't want us talking to communities, they accused us of inciting, they see us as a threat. They want us to say only positive things, the excitement about oil" (SCSO07, 2014).

This demonstrates the tensions in the assemblage between the competing ideas about oil and the possibility of these ideas to influence expectations about oil in different ways. District officials and Kingdom respondents were also critical that they had to address the negative information being given to communities without the material resources to do so: "CSOs have the money to disorganise and we don't have the money to organise" as one DLG respondent put it (DLG09, 2015). This also indicates that it is not only a case of the re-regulatory central state clamping down on CSO activity, other local actors also claimed that CSO activity was not in the interests of local people.

The restriction put in place by the re-regulatory state to control who entered the oil region was not the only challenge to CSO access to the communities. Like national CSOs, subnational CSOs also lacked organic connections to the oil communities. Many of the subnational organisations were relatively new in the region, and most were part of the professionalised CSO sector rather than originating from the oil region; "organisations that put smart reports on the table" as one respondent described them (SCSO16, 2016). Further, the location of the subnational CSO offices was in Hoima town, some 90km distance from the oil region and the 'grassroots' level. Another respondent raised the additional point that there are difficulties for truly 'grassroots' based organisations to legally form CSOs, due to a complex registration process requiring funds and a written constitution; a level of bureaucracy that is beyond the capabilities of some of the truly 'community based' groups (CNS01, 2015). So,

although the nationally directed CSO programmes around community monitoring, information provision and 'raising voices' required local CSOs to be engaged in the communities, 'local' CSO partners based in Hoima without organic connection to the grassroots struggled both to access communities, and to be seen as legitimate representatives of the communities.

An additional challenge was the lack of recognition of subnational CSOs by other actors at the subnational level. Indeed, the 'expertise' of CSOs on oil and gas issues was contested by the state, oil companies and communities in the oil region. Processes and dynamics already taking place in the oil region that had shaped power relations, as noted in section 5.2, had excluded subnational CSOs as well as DLG and Kingdom. The data show that industry actors were in closer contact with local people than were CSOs. As chapter five showed, Tullow Oil had been working in the oil regions since 2006 (in phase one), and CNOOC began carrying out extensive engagements in villages towards the end of phase two (around 2012). This meant that the oil companies did not recognise subnational CSOs – relative newcomers to the scene - as the representatives of communities in the oil region:

> "The oil companies were saying that CSOs are concocting ideas that aren't there on the ground …they would tell us that we are not representative of the grievances, they don't exist – the companies were not hearing the grievances themselves they said" (SCSO05, 2014).

The lack of recognition by industry meant that subnational CSOs were frustrated in their attempts to hold meetings with oil companies (subnational CSO interviews). Prior to 2013, oil companies only engaged national CSOs at the national level, as one CSO noted: "Oil companies used to overlook the regional level and only talk to national CSOs" (SCSO03, 2014). National CSOs were invited to national level stakeholder meetings during phase two, but subnational CSOs were unable to attend due to resource constraints and lack of visibility. As was the case with other subnational actors in the earlier stages of the industry as I discussed in chapter five (phase one and phase two) subnational CSOs were side-lined by the centralised control and management of oil:

> "We didn't know how to access the oil companies, Total and Tullow. To access staff they need two weeks advance communication, a letter to their office in Kampala and then they decide" (SCSO12, 2015).

The inability for CSOs to engage with oil companies to find information and address local problems impacted the perspectives of local people that CSOs could not represent their issues, as another CSO noted:

> "We called [the oil company] for dialogue but they didn't turn up. The community was taking us for jokers" (SCSO05, 2014)

The data show that subnational CSOs had a similar challenge with their efforts to get District Local Government to attend meetings, which impacted their ability to show they can support local people:

> "We went to the community to get their power...It was hard, when they came to educate the communities for compensation, the government wanted facilitation from us" (SCSO07, 2014).

This suggests that the lack of legitimacy of CSOs in the eyes of oil companies and local government during phase two further compounded the struggle to be seen as relevant to communities. Local government officials expected to be paid travel allowances to attend meetings, which initially subnational CSOs did not have the resources to provide, and oil companies simply would not turn up to meetings.

In sum, the data suggest that while the resource governance assemblage discussed in section 7.2 constructed CSOs as 'experts' on oil and gas, this idea was contested at the subnational level where existing power dynamics meant that the oil industry was in closer contact with local people. Indeed, while subnational CSOs claimed to be the 'eyes and ears' of communities, this was not reflected in the relationship between subnational CSOs and communities in the oil region. CSOs struggled to access the oil regions due to frontier making dynamics and the re-regulatory role of the state. This was also due to the fracture between state and CSOs which was further exacerbated by donor interference on the oil bills; and because CSOs had no previous track record of working in communities and as a result had not developed the connections to be seen as their representatives.

7.4 Role of the subnational in shaping CSO activity

The previous section showed that subnational dynamics in the frontier constrained CSO oil related activities in various ways. However, while initially subnational dynamics constrained CSOs work, over time the ongoing material impacts in the region, changing corporate

engagement strategy and the influence of donor support during phase three began to shape CSOs work and improve legitimacy and impact.

7.4.1 Changing subnational power dynamics

In phase three (2013-2016), coinciding with the arrival of CNOOC and Total in 2012 and the progression of the project cycle, oil companies' stakeholder engagement strategy changed to one of increasing openness and inclusion of district actors, which had an impact on subnational CSOs. With the opening of the Hoima liaison offices by Tullow and CNOOC in this phase (chapter six), CSOs were able to get information directly from oil company CLOs, which improved perceptions among local communities and local leaders that CSOs could play a useful role.

As the previous section noted, during phase two, attempts by subnational CSOs to engage with international oil companies at the subnational level were frustrated; requests for meetings went unanswered and this impacted the ability of CSOs to address issues of community concern. Due to state-CSO tensions and the centralised control of oil information which excluded local government, the oil companies were a key source of information for subnational CSOs:

> "The information on oil is classified, the local government tell us they know little, they tell us we should ask the oil companies and the Ministry" (SCSO04, 2014).

While it had not been possible for CSOs to access this information during phase two, in our interviews in 2014 CSO respondents reported that oil companies had recently started to engage with subnational CSOs:

> "The companies have begun to see that there is some use in communicating with [CSO] and getting the message to communities" (SCSO02, 2014).

Most CSO respondents interpreted this change as a result of the companies' realisation that CSOs were an important connection to communities. A member of the subnational CSO network BAPENECO claimed that CSOs were responsible for the improving relationship with oil companies, due to their effective lobbying at an oil company engagement meeting they attended with CSCO in Kampala in late 2013:

"They [oil companies] used to overlook the regional level and only talk to national CSOs. So, we named and shamed them, we went to the national meetings and we blasted them" (CSO08, 2014).

While the increasing visibility of subnational CSOs thanks to BAPENECO's membership in CSCO could have played a part in this change, the most obvious explanation for the reason oil companies began to see CSOs as "serious stakeholders" is that this shift coincided with the oil companies changing engagement strategy in phase three:

"Originally the companies were confined in the Graben, but now they come to Hoima and involve CSOs...it's to get their social licence to operate" (SCSO04, 2014).

Indeed, given the changing approach to stakeholder engagement in phase three within the wider context of industry delay and reduction of CLOs in the communities, as noted in chapter six, building a relationship with subnational CSOs was a strategic move. As one CSO noted:

"Oil companies have realised that things could no longer be done the old-fashioned way. They have to work with civil society and local experts" (CSO08, 2014).

At the same time, subnational CSOs noted that they had adapted their own approach to the industry. Facing criticisms of 'inciting communities' by local and national government, they had to ensure the government and oil companies that "we are complementing your work" (SCSO06, 2014). As such, they had to change from a stance of antagonism to engagement:

"We came to realise we cannot get the expected outcome in isolation of the oil companies and government" (SCSO06, 2014).

All subnational CSO interview respondents noted that a more cooperative relationship was developing between CSOs and oil companies, which some even claimed was mutually beneficial:

"The oil companies have learnt to trust us. They understand that we need information and to work together. We have good intentions, we share reports with them" (CSO08, 2014).

The geographical shift to Hoima had helped; Tullow and CNOOC's liaison offices were now in close proximity to the offices of CSOs. Informal as well as formal engagements had become more frequent:

> "We get updates from oil companies and information about their activities. It's good to have the liaison offices in Hoima, you can go and you can call and they give information and are open." (CSO04, 2014).

Yet, although CSOs framed the relationship with oil companies in a positive light, some CSO respondents reflected on the power relationship, and when dealing with a more powerful entity there was the need to "dance to their tune" (CSO05, 2014). However, there seemed to be an acceptance that this power relationship was inevitable, and that the industry was by its nature 'secretive', indicating another dominant idea about the nature of oil. CSOs were aware that information was limited and controlled by the Ministry of Energy. While CSOs had changed their 'adversarial stance' – by which they referred to the activism in phase one in villages by certain national CSOs – out of necessity in order to gain credibility and shake off the image of 'saboteurs' of the oil project, the somewhat neutral position on the industry indicates a lack of a critical stance taken by CSOs. The livelihoods concerns of people in the villages discussed in chapter five, which certainly had not reduced by phase three of the exploration period, were not being tackled by CSOs at this point. "The companies are here for business only" was a phrase repeated by several subnational CSO respondents. Rather, the subnational CSOs were passing information from the oil companies to communities in relation to the oil project and indirect opportunities on oil and gas, promoting the 'local content' narrative. Nonetheless, at this stage, due to improving relations with oil companies, CSOs were in a better position to engage.

While donor agendas were influential in terms of shaping activities and narratives of subnational activities, it was also the case that donor funding proved crucial in enabling subnational CSOs to increase their visibility and credibility at the local level. During an observation of a CSO capacity building workshop, one CSO representative commented "Stakeholders didn't used to respect us, now they recognise us because of donor funds" (SCSO07, 2014). While the comment was tongue-in-cheek, there was some truth to this; donor funding had in fact enabled subnational CSOs to 'facilitate' meetings, by which they mean provide travel reimbursements to participants to encourage their attendance. This is important because some participants, especially local government representatives as noted

above, do not attend meetings without such 'facilitation'. As was the case with the oil companies, the ability for local CSOs to now get local government to attend community dialogues to discuss land and compensation issues had improved the credibility of CSOs among local people and raised their importance in the assemblage.

7.4.2 Industry impacts and community agency

Weak connections to the oil regions and the character of the CSO sector working on oil and gas meant that local experiences were not shaping CSO work during the initial period of CSO activity in phase two. The picture emerging from the analysis of national and subnational CSOs' work on oil is of a fragmented and poorly organised approach, with donor agendas dominant, and 'sensitisations' on oil and gas reproducing oil curse narratives. CSOs were spread thinly, and some were having to deal with numerous donors in terms of reporting requirements, as one national CSO explained with exasperation:

> "Some groups have like ten donors, getting small money form then and every donor is asking you this or that...the amount of time we spend on reporting it's not an easy thing.. you have to be in Kampala because that's where the power is very constant" (NCSO02, 2012).

This required CSOs to be in an urban setting with reliable communications infrastructure; even in Hoima the power was not always reliable. The material reality of the Albertine Graben meant that some locations were physically difficult to access, and the remote nature of villages and lack of basic services there meant that CSO officers from Kampala preferred to remain in the relative comfort of Hoima town or even Kampala. The completion of the road to village A had eased access to this village by phase three and the data show that most of the CSOs I interviewed included this village in their programmes, whereas in contrast my data show only one national CSO had visited village C.

In the meantime, the impacts of oil exploration such as the loss of crops, restrictions to communal resources, displacement from land for infrastructure, increases in dust, noise and in-migration as noted in chapters five and six, were ongoing at the local level. Chapter five noted the increasing grievances of local people in relation to some of these impacts. Indeed, there is evidence that some local people in the oil regions were beginning to respond to, or attempt to address, these impacts and challenges associated with oil in various ways. Data reveal several examples of communities or individuals (for example community leaders)

taking action to address issues of concern, some of which are captured in table 11 below. These are individualised examples, but what they demonstrate is community agency in response to oil that is taking place outside of, but parallel to, formal CSO activities.

Table 11. Examples of community responses to oil industry

Example of response	Actors identified	Exemplar quote
Creation of community groups (e.g. Land Association, Saving and Credit groups)	Community members and village level leaders in oil affected villages	"The Land Association formed because of oil, we hold meetings with CNOOC. CNOOC has already given out papers on accountability, how much money has been paid for Murram" (LC1)
Letter writing and / or petitioning the government and / or industry	Sub-country level leadership, district level leadership, communities in oil affected villages, Bunyoro Kingdom	"We wrote to [oil companies] as a District Council 18 months ago to ask them to show us what is happening, and for the first time they accepted and took leaders to the oil areas." (DLG)
Threats of roadblocks / disturbances	Some community members in Hoima District (as reported by district government and Kingdom)	"There are groups which want to start protesting, blocking roads with logs due to lack of jobs and benefits" (Kingdom)

The Land Association created in village C, close to CNOOC's workers' camp was in response to the increasing pressures of land speculation and land grabbing in the area. Respondents explained that CNOOC frequently meets the Land Association to negotiate use and access to the communally owned land. However, there had recently been a lengthy dispute over a CNOOC contractor's use of 'murram' for covering road surfaces (section 6.2.3). The murram is a communal resource which the community claimed CNOOC should be paying 80,000 ug shillings (approx. £20) per truck load to the community. CNOOC on the other hand, claimed the government prevented CNOOC from paying for it because it is considered a communal resource. The community began a court case against CNOOC to recover the monies for murram. During follow up interviews in village C in 2016 I was told that:

> "The money has been released, but the process was too long. We didn't go to court it was solved out of court. CNOOC met last week, and the contractor delivered the money via CNOOC" (COMC12, 2016).

This is one example, albeit an isolated one, of successful community action to redress perceived injustice in industry developments. This also highlights the competing resource

ontologies noted in chapter five, by which different values are placed on resources by communities, industry and state. It also shows the interests of the state in minimising the amount of compensation paid for resources. While CNOOC was prepared to pay the community for the murram, this would be a cost that CNOOC recovers from the government at a later stage. It furthermore points to the difficult question of ownership of the land vs the subsoil, which is a common source of contestation in extractives contexts (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011).

While the examples above may contradict the narratives of national CSOs that local people are unable to effectively organise without support, there were also examples of oil-affected communities needing support. It became clear from interviews that the community sensitisation workshops and 'dialogues', while mainly one-sided as noted above, also provided a space in which over time CSOs became aware of salient local issues and began to take action to address some of them. As land and compensation issues became increasingly prevalent in phase three, subnational and national CSOs became a vehicle to link some local people to land advocacy organisations or lawyers. Figure 18 in section 7.3 shows the CSOs that are working in the Bunyoro region and the issues they address. What the figure illustrates is that the issues focused on by subnational CSOs changes over time. It shows the gradual influence over time of some of the salient local level issues that become incorporated into 'sensitisations', such as land and women's issues, and then from 2013 there is 'refinery advocacy', which became a key focus. There are the externally derived narratives on oil, for example business preparedness and transparency.

7.4.3 The role of key events

Two key events at the subnational level, both involving the displacement of local people for oil infrastructure, revealed the lack of support preparing local people to cope with such serious impacts of the industry. The first event was the government-managed displacement for the oil refinery in Hoima District through the Refinery Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), noted in chapter five, which affected over 7000 people and left many destitute. The second event following this in 2014, was the forced eviction of 200 people for an oil waste plant, during which people lost their homes, land and livelihoods.

The poor handling of the RAP process by the government contractor Strategic Friends International (SFI) left hundreds of people in precarious situations, unsure about the

compensation and resettlement process, and in need of support. Chapter five noted the complex social issues caused by the displacement of more than 7000 people from the site, which began during phase two in 2012. In 2014, my interviews with respondents in Hoima District (CSOs, DLG and Kingdom and others) were dominated by discussions of refinery-related problems in terms of food shortages, domestic violence, destitution of some families and inadequate compensation. The refinery RAP was a clear failing of the state to adhere to post frontier measures (such as IFC guidelines for involuntary resettlement) to ensure timely compensation and resettlement. The fall-out from the refinery displacement process also revealed the lack of support local people had from CSOs in terms of upholding their rights prior to the RAP taking place.

The initial focus of CSOs on the transparency agenda (and only later on documenting individual cases of land grabbing), and on 'sensitisations' on oil's impacts, meant that there was not any pro-active CSO engagement to address the anticipated impacts of displacement, such as support for livelihoods, education, financial management and alternative housing during the transition period. Respondents from the refinery village noted in 2012 that CSOs had been to the village "to tell us to negotiate on compensation" and "demand transparency in the RAP" (COMF01, 2012). The focus of CSO support began to be around encouraging refinery residents to contest compensation rates and refuse payments. While this was also an area of concern for refinery residents, many of whom considered their land to have been undervalued, there lacked a focus on wider support for other issues. As such, CSO support for refinery residents was reactive and uncoordinated. As figure 18 shows, 'refinery advocacy' comes onto the agenda after the RAP process is already underway in 2013. Interview data show that the role of subnational CSOs in refinery advocacy was to mobilise the refinery affected people to attend meetings with national CSOs to discuss issues about compensation and displacement. Sensitisations on the impacts of oil that had been taking place at the subnational level prior to the refinery eviction clearly had not involved preparing people for displacement and supporting them to ensure human rights violations did not take place and to provide accountability. The lack of organic connection between CSOs and people in the refinery villages was one of the reasons, another was that as I argued above, the agenda for sensitisations during phase two had not been driven by community-led concerns.

However, the refinery event brought diverse actors together to deal with the issues posed by the refinery and as such, considerably shaped the assemblage in phase three. Data show that

gender concerns, violence concerns, financial management concerns, livelihoods concerns, food shortages, increasing animal-human conflict, pastoralists invading the partially vacant lands – these issues were now on the agendas of district and subcounty leaders, and Kingdom actors as well as CSOs. The materiality of the oil resource, in terms of the infrastructure needed for processing the resource, shaped social relations in the assemblage and mobilised responses from a range of actors across scales (Mitchell, 2009). The Bunyoro Kingdom directed its resources towards helping those affected; connections were made between the Kingdom and DLG and joint meetings were held and reports written. New narratives emerged in the assemblage due to the refinery displacement being framed in terms of 'human rights', thus linking to global assemblages. The refinery plight was reported in international press and the webpages of 'business and human rights' and activist organisations, thus forging new links across scales. While the RAP was a clear example of a failed post frontier measure, CSOs were able to link to post frontier discourse about rights to fair and timely compensation to challenge the government. What is notable however, is that the oil companies stayed quiet during the process. While they were also dealing with land and compensation issues for oil installations and the roads, the refinery was seen as a government project.

Another outcome of the refinery event was increasing cooperation between CSOs and communities in the oil region, once again demonstrating the ability of oil's materiality to shape social relations. The fallout from the RAP was something tangible that CSOs could focus on and provide support to local people for. Some national CSOs began to work almost exclusively on the refinery issue during phase three, and donor funding became directed to address some of the refinery-related issues. One national CSO helped a group of refinery-affected people to form a resident's community group and stage protests at the refinery site, which were videoed and uploaded to the internet to reach a wider audience. Data show that another national CSO convened a 'high level' meeting in Kampala bringing together government Ministers, MPs, donors, INGOs, CSOs, Bunyoro Kingdom representatives and some of the people from the refinery-affected villages to critique the RAP and discuss the challenges. Subnational and national CSOs worked together to arrange meetings with refinery-affected people to link them to lawyers in Kampala, to prepare court proceedings to challenge low compensation rates. With the support of CSOs some refinery residents refused to accept compensation, contesting the low rates. MPs and Parliamentarians visited some of the refinery-affected people in Hoima District to hear their stories. National CSOs worked with actors in the oil region including the Bunyoro Kingdom to compile research reports

documenting the impacts on women, livelihoods and youth. The outcomes of the refinery in terms of shaping the assemblage and the interests of actors suggests its role as assemblage converter (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

Then, in 2014 a second key event occurred when two hundred people were forcibly and violently evicted from their land in Hoima District by an individual claiming to own the land and have sold it to an American company for an oil waste plant. The residents were displaced and forced to live in temporary camps. CSOs immediately provided support, linking those affected families to lawyers to begin court proceedings and highlighting the issue at the national and international levels. These key events at the subnational level demonstrate the significance of the materiality of the resource and the role of infrastructure in shaping social and political relations (Mitchell, 2009). This also demonstrated how these events, which resonated with existing concerns of oil's relation to human rights for example, mobilised actors connected to other assemblages (human rights), linking local issues to global issues of concern. It is these relations of exteriority (Delanda, 2006) – the connections to other assemblages – that facilitated alliance-making and led to change in the assemblage, not only in the configuration of assemblage actors but in terms of new narratives to challenge and potentially destabilise the assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

The materiality of the resource had increased the relevance of CSOs to local people at the subnational level (Bridge, 2009). In contrast to phase two where CSOs had to work to convince communities they could represent their interests, CSOs could now show the ability to provide tangible support through legal help and connections to powerful actors. The national CSOs, with connections to lawyers, MPs, Ministers and know-how of the advocacy process had become relevant to local people affected by the impacts of the oil, demonstrated by two key events which were directly related to oil's material qualities.

7.5 CSOs and oil governance in Uganda

Events at the subnational level in phase three related to the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil linked to human rights, were instrumental in shaping the relations between communities and CSOs in Uganda's oil assemblage. As a result of these events, the work of CSOs became more closely aligned to and informed by what was taking place in the oil region. In contrast to the earlier phases when "[CSOs] were not very well versed, saying that Uganda may begin the story of Nigeria" (SCSO07, 2014), respondents in follow up interviews in 2016

reflected that CSOs were increasingly attuned to local issues and relationships with oil communities was changing:

> "The relationship has changed, the refinery residents reached out... organisations like [national CSOs] have given them legal help" (MED03, 2016).

However, it was made clear that this was due to the agency of local communities, and that communities remained sceptical about the CSO sector. As one district respondent explained:

> "CSOs have supported communities but they don't see them as their voice. They have helped, but the community knows there are those in CSOs who want to make a case where there is no case" (DLG14, 2014).

CSO work on Uganda is complex, focusing on some issues and not others, driven and shaped by a range of factors. At times it may appear contradictory; CSOs oppose the state and seek justice for some issues, for example compensation for displacement, and at the same time facilitate the industry by providing a vehicle for industry information to local communities and uncritically promoting the local content agenda (rather than critiquing and demanding accountability for local content CSR projects).

CSOs are constrained on various fronts. National and subnational CSOs are constrained by their reliance on donors, many of whom are dependent on external funds for up to 90% of their budget, and so are bound up with the donor tendency to focus on apolitical issues and those aligned with promoting a stable business environment. Witte (2016) notes that DGF had to 'tone down' its support for CSOs in areas deemed too political after the oil bills contestation, including those in relation to land. My respondents reported in interviews in 2015 that a high-profile meeting on oil related land conflict that was due to take place in Hoima days earlier was closed down by the government just four hours before it was due to start, demonstrating oil and land is a hot political topic for the government.

Subnational CSOs are restricted in their activities in the oil region by the re-regulatory state, the power of which is levied against the subnational CSOs rather than national ones. Repression by state security forces increased after CSOs became involved with exposing the refinery issues, and according to one respondent a subnational CSO representative was detained (SCSO13, 2015). However, these were not the national CSO representatives, some of whom are lawyers, and many of whom are well connected in political circles in Kampala.

Rather, those targeted are the subnational CSOs with less visibility, as one national CSO explained "If they arrest me there would be public outcry, so instead they arrest our local partners" (NCSO03, 2012).

The repression is a serious concern for CSOs, but in keeping with Uganda's hybrid political order it is not consistent. At the time of my visit in 2015 the situation was calmer after the Interior Minister had stepped in to caution subnational security forces to "let CSOs do their work" (SCSO08, 2015). Nonetheless it has implications for social organising and interview respondents noted that the subnational branches of national CSOs have more freedom to work on 'advocacy' than do subnational CSOs. The subnational project officers of national CSOs have more confidence in dealing with the repressive state: "We distract the RDC in a meeting at the district and then we run to the oil region" one explained (SCSO10, 2015). On the other hand, subnational CSOs without these links speak about "disguising meetings" (SCSO08, 2014) and being obliged to present their work plans to district security for approval.

The political context explains why subnational CSOs have tended to remain as 'mobilisers' for refinery meetings while national CSOs are the ones lobbying government and mounting legal challenges. The move to 'local content' for subnational CSOs; "promoting opportunities in oil and gas" (SCSO04, 2014) in addition to being a donor priority, is also a more comfortable space for subnational CSOs to engage in as it carries less risk. However, this means that subnational CSOs remain in their apolitical role of not challenging the state or oil companies, and promoting the 'positives' of the industry, as the government stated should be the role for CSOs.

Narratives about the 'resource curse' continue to be used to frame Uganda's impending oil experience. However, I found negative perceptions of oil to be stronger among national civil society actors in Kampala. One respondent noted:

> "It's not like there's a discussion about will it be a curse or will it be a blessing going on, many people have already decided that it's damnation" (CSO06, 2013).

This quote suggests that for national CSOs, closer to the knowledge production of the resource governance assemblage, this narrative feeds into their ongoing concerns about Uganda's bad governance and corrupt polity that many national CSOs want to challenge. The analysis of the interviews at the subnational level, in contrast, reveals more optimism. In

chapters five and six I showed that there were mixed responses and often there was an ambivalence about the industry; subnational actors had not 'decided', and the situation was dynamic. There were expectations for benefits and opportunities as well as uncertainty in the resource frontier.

There was further evidence of this tension between national and subnational CSO agendas, notably between a national CSO that adopted the agenda of its global partners to 'Keep the Oil in the Soil', and its subnational office who did not agree due to the position of local people. The local CSO officer commented:

> "I really don't think that local people will support that, they say extract the oil but with careful management" (CSO04, 2015).

This example shows the assertion of subnational agency. The global to national agenda of 'Keep the Oil in the Soil', is not being imposed on local people, demonstrating that the community work being carried out by subnational CSOs is allowing local perspectives to influence the CSOs' stance (Westoby and Lyons, 2016). However, by the same token, the national CSO and the more pessimistic (and activist) approach, provided space and opportunity for the Bunyoro Kingdom to link to their own agenda of 'cultural custodians'. In this case, the idea of 'Keep the Oil in the Soil' resonated with the Kingdom's concerns about oil in the region. The partnership between the Kingdom and a national CSO, supported by a global social movement, involved a joint report on protecting cultural sites from the oil industry in the Bunyoro region and a platform to present the report to a national and international audience in July 2014. In assemblage terms this illustrates not only the global shaping the local by providing narratives to frame local issues and gain support (or jump scale), but also local events which are needed to reinforce global narratives of oil's impacts upon indigenous people (Sassen, 2008).

While there is evidence that some subnational CSOs began to be funded by donors directly from 2015, and so are more 'visible', they are still linked to donor agendas that ultimately aim to promote stability for the industry (Weszkalnys, 2011). This chapter has demonstrated the importance of subnational CSOs in terms of a supportive and facilitating role for oil communities, however, in the restrictive political context, if communities decide not to support the oil project, it is unclear if the positions of subnational CSOs will change accordingly.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the role of civil society in oil governance in Uganda's oil assemblage, which has been undertaken largely by urban-based professional CSOs. The role of the CSO sector in oil governance was strengthened by the support, both financial and discursive, of a governance assemblage of actors, expert knowledge and practices that aimed to encourage good governance of Uganda's oil. The intervention of the governance assemblage in phase two of the exploration period demonstrates that Uganda's donors and INGOs were primarily concerned with management of the industry to prepare for oil as revenue (Mitchell, 2009). It was once Uganda's industry began moving towards production in phase two that these concerns were mobilised, along with a new role for CSOs in the oil assemblage. This meant that initial work by CSOs in the oil regions was driven by the practices and narratives of international oil governance, rather than by concerns raised within Uganda's oil regions.

The challenge of CSOs to represent the interests of those communities in the oil regions was further compounded by dynamics taking place in the oil region which reconfigured power relations. However, over time the changing engagement strategy of oil MNCs, CSOs responding to and incorporating local issues into activities, key events in the oil region and the agency of local communities, further shaped the role played by CSOs leading to closer engagement with local struggles. Overall, CSO work on oil and gas has been ad hoc, fragmented, and reactive to human rights and justice issues taking place in the oil region. The chapter raises the question of the challenge of governance in a new oil context in Sub-Saharan Africa where there is no existing social movement or community organising to provide the *a priori* counter movement to the extractives industry that is often assumed to exist. In light of calls for CSOs to facilitate social movements involving subnational CSOs at the local level in the oil region (Westoby and Lyons, 2016) it is important to recognise that subnational CSOs are enabled and constrained in various context-specific ways. The assumptions inherent in global narratives on oil may not only be out of sync with local perspectives but may also narrow the space available for subnational CSO-led advocacy by reproducing the expectation of social conflict in the sector before it has even arisen.

8.0 Chapter eight

Discussion

8.1 Introduction

In the three previous chapters I analysed the subnational within Uganda's emerging oil assemblage using an assemblage conceptual approach which brings together a focus on materiality, ideas, practices and agency. In this chapter I draw on the findings from these chapters to conceptualise Uganda's oil frontier and discuss the implications for equitable outcomes in the frontier, for extractives relationships and for resource governance during the pre-oil stage of Uganda's industry. In doing so I address the main aim and subsidiary aim of the thesis.

First, I discuss the importance of the research in relation to the gaps identified in the literature and show how I sought to address them. In section 8.3 I draw together the findings from the empirical chapters to conceptualise Uganda's emerging oil frontier in relation to the enclave and post frontier concepts. In 8.4 I address the subsidiary aim of the thesis by discussing what the findings mean for equitable outcomes in the pre-oil stage of the industry. In 8.5 I consider some insights from the findings for extractives relationships, and in 8.6 I consider some insights from the findings for resource governance in Uganda.

8.2 Importance of the research

The focus of this study is on the subnational dynamics taking place during the emergence of a new oil frontier in Uganda. A gap identified in the literature is the tendency for studies on oil to adopt a national focus for analyses, examining the subnational only in relation to the national. Further, in the academic and policy literature oil is discussed as revenue, that is, when oil is already a resource, and the struggles that surround this resource. Studies also tend to present oil solely as a hegemonic force (Behrends et al., 2013), which obscures a focus on a broader range of dynamics taking place prior to oil existing as a resource (Mitchell, 2009, Haarstad, 2016). As Bridge (2008), Watts (2009a), Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) and other scholars have argued, the relational aspects of oil are important to interrogate, in order to

move beyond the narrow focus on oil as revenue, the behaviours of national elites, and on national levels of analyses.

The thesis addresses these gaps by focusing the analysis on the resource making process at the subnational level, that is, on the social and political processes taking place as oil becomes a resource and prior to oil as revenue (Mitchell, 2009, Haarstad, 2016). In order to do this, the study develops a framework based on an assemblage approach (Delanda, 2006) and drawing from the ideas of the post frontier (Larsen, 2015), dream zones (Cross, 2014)and carbonscapes (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017) concepts in order to expand the frontiers literature beyond a focus on the destructive processes in frontiers and a focus on oil solely as hegemonic. This approach enables a focus on the emerging properties of Uganda's oil assemblage and the role of the subnational in the pre-oil stage of the industry, as it is in the early stages that an assemblage is especially dynamic (Schritt, 2016). The thesis addresses an additional gap in the literature by bringing oil company actors and civil society actors into the same study and exploring their activities at the subnational level in the early stages of the project cycle. The importance here is the focus on a broader range of actors and interactions, without starting from the assumption of a conflictual or adversarial relationship existing between these actors. The findings highlight complex dynamics taking place at the subnational level during the pre-oil stage of the industry and show that the subnational space is not a passive recipient of a hegemonic oil project.

8.3 Conceptualising Uganda's frontier

In this section I bring together the findings from the empirical chapters to consider how Uganda's oil frontier can be conceptualised in relation to two concepts in the literature; the enclave and the post frontier. As in other contemporary African extractives contexts, enclaving processes are evident in Uganda, however, the complexities of subnational dynamics and links to global assemblages challenge the idea of an enclave that is disembedded from the local surroundings. I also show that although Uganda's oil frontier is developing in the era of the post frontier, the atypical actor positions in the oil assemblage, and fragmented and ad hoc approaches to resource governance and management challenge the idea of a coherent post frontier to mediate extraction.

8.3.1 A contemporary African enclave

Resource frontiers have been conceptualised in the literature as spaces characterised by accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004) and the dissolution of social order, as new relations and forms of authority are established (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018, Tsing, 2011). Oil frontiers in particular have been conceptualised as enclaves, in which existing rights are erased (Watts, 2004) authority is passed to oil MNCs which self-rule (Watts, 2005) and selectively link with the local surroundings to mediate access to services while remaining detached (Appel, 2012b, Gardner et al., 2012). While the findings in Uganda show enclaving tendencies, the subnational focus through the assemblage conceptual framework provides insights to the literature on contemporary African enclaves. My findings show that oil MNCs in Uganda do not completely 'self-rule' in the frontier space, nor do they seek (or manage) to completely 'disembed' from their surroundings. I argue that the re-regulatory role of the state, grievances relating to land and resources, and the need for oil MNCs to craft and maintain legitimacy created complex ties to the local level and embedded the resource space in assemblages of global governance.

Throughout this thesis in chapters five, six and seven I have demonstrated some key features of Uganda's developing oil frontier that resonate with the literature on extractives enclaves. The enclosure of communal resources that support subsistence livelihoods and the acquisition of community land for industry (Harvey, 2004, Glassman, 2006), whilst providing minimal opportunities for local people for jobs and minimal links to local economies (Ferguson, 2006), are the most obvious examples that were evident throughout the three phases of the exploration period. The findings also noted the new rules in the resource space which prevented local authorities from accessing the oil sites, exposing, exacerbating and entrenching unequal power dynamics (Watts, 2009c). Companies maintained spatial separation from the local space, creating 'zones of standardisation' (Barry, 2006). During a fieldwork visit I experienced the inside of a securitised oil company camp; the comfort of air-conditioning, hot water and familiarity of western food, contrasting with the life outside the gates in what is one of the poorest regions of Uganda. This was a technological zone (Barry, 2006), with company branded posters outlining company procedures, health and safety guidelines and industry good practice on almost every wall (Appel, 2012b). Further evidence is seen in the state designating authority to the oil companies to manage the resource space, negotiate access to land, and implement CSR projects, which overlap with the remit of the state (Appel, 2012b, Cash, 2012).

However, the state's re-regulatory role to manage displacement and compensation for people losing land to oil infrastructure complicated the authority of the oil MNCs in the resource space. The analysis in the empirical chapters of the study shows that grievances arising in relation to compensation for crops and land were related to the lack of recognition by the state of the values of land and crops to local people. Because issues of land and resource access were not settled prior to exploration, oil MNCs became embroiled in local politics (Bridge, 2008). This was not a straightforward case of oil MNCs imposing their authority on local people.

The state's centralised control of oil, which excluded subnational leaders and cultural authorities and disregarded rural oil communities, impacted the legitimacy of the oil companies. The companies were perceived by some to be the ones 'cheating' local people; in one case, CNOOC was sued by the host community. The insights from the findings show that the state is an important mediator of corporate authority in the resource space, in this case undermining oil MNC-community relations. Contrary to the idea of the weak state facilitating enclaves in resource peripheries (Maconachie and Hilson, 2011, Stevens and Dietsche, 2008), in Uganda the presence of the state in its re-regulatory role has in fact contributed to subnational dynamics which compromises the ability of companies to maintain distance and disembed from the local space. These findings resonate with the arguments of Bebbington (2000), that it is the character of the state that prevents debates over how extraction occurs, and in the case of a hybrid regime such as Uganda (Tripp, 2010), the state's pursuance of its own interests shaped the relations between oil MNCs and local communities.

The need to maintain access to land and ensure legitimacy entangled the oil companies in the local space. Oil MNCs reached out to engage with local leaders in phase three to assist them in managing community relations and ensure ongoing support for the project, as chapter six showed. These subnational leaders were excluded by the centralised control of oil by the state and oil companies in phases one and two, as I discussed in chapter five. These findings contribute insights to the literature on oil frontiers by demonstrating that actor responses in these spaces can be atypical, and relations are not solely characterised by clear positions of domination and resistance. The analysis in chapter five shows that the interests of oil MNCs to maintain legitimacy was in tension with the states interests to maximise profit and push forward the oil infrastructure projects. The social licence to operate concerns of oil MNCs

aligned their interests more with local actors in this case (Cross, 2014). That the oil MNCs reached out to local actors for support demonstrates responsiveness to subnational dynamics and the willingness to make local connections in pursuit of legitimacy (Wilson, 2016).

Oil MNC's efforts to craft legitimacy and effectively manage the resource space also created linkages to global assemblages. The findings in chapters five and six showed that global norms and standards became increasingly important to inform practices of corporate engagement as the industry consolidated and professionalised and the project cycle moved closer to the production stage. By engaging in local development (Tullow) and implementing 'social management' plans (Total), either directly or in partnership with international development-focused NGOs and conflict management specialists, corporate strategy became mixed with development and human rights aims (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010). As such, corporate engagement practices linked the resource space to global assemblages of extractives governance, transparency, human rights and development. As Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) argue, it is these assemblage linkages that provide opportunities for change and agency in Uganda's oil assemblage. As chapter five showed, due to the significance of the global human rights assemblage, the oil companies distanced themselves from the American oil service company after the land grab in Hoima district. As such, the pursuit of legitimacy in the local space opens up opportunities for change through connections to assemblages of global governance.

The assemblage conceptual framework and subnational focus in this study provides novel insights that are not captured by privileging the enclaving tendencies of oil. The findings challenge the idea of an enclave that is socially disembedded; these findings support those of Abrahamsen and Williams (2017), to show that while spatially separated, the resource space becomes embedded in global governance through its links to human rights, development and CSR assemblages. My findings contribute to the work on contemporary African extractive enclaves by showing that oil MNCs in Uganda do not completely 'self-rule' in the frontier space (Watts, 2004), nor do they seek (or manage) to completely 'disembed' from their surroundings (Appel, 2012b, Gardner et al., 2012). The need for oil MNCs to craft and maintain legitimacy in the context of grievances about land and resources creates ties to the local level and links the resource space to assemblages of global governance.

8.3.2 A post frontier in the making

The contemporary resource frontier has been characterised as a post frontier; an 'inventoried and negotiated frontier' that recognises the rights of extractives communities and aims to resolve sustainability issues (Larsen, 2015; Tsing, 2011). This concept has relevance to Uganda's oil industry, which is emerging in a context of global norms and standards to inform practices which manage and govern extractives projects (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2016). Oil MNCs and CSOs alike draw on post frontier narratives and practices to emphasise rights, inclusivity and transparency and these play a role in territorialising oil projects (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Indeed, the 'post frontier paradox' (Larsen, 2015) is that extraction takes place in the context of a regulated and protected space (Larsen, 2017, Tsing, 2011).

However, the subnational focus in this study highlights that the complexities of the 'local', which global norms and post frontier practices seek to manage and regulate, challenge the idea of a coherent post frontier in place to mediate extraction. Rather, I argue that Uganda's emerging frontier is better conceptualised as a post frontier in the making. This is due to the fragmented, ad hoc and selective way that post frontier institutions and practices are employed to manage and govern the resource space, the atypical actor positions in the assemblage and no clear distinction between territorialising and deterritorialising processes.

Post frontier measures (for example social management plans, community liaison officers, ESIAs) were not in place to recognise the rights of local communities and protect local ecologies as exploration began. This was in part due to the remote frontier nature of the Albertine Graben, and that 'wildcatter' exploration companies in phase one were not under scrutiny to uphold international standards of engagement as were oil majors in phase three. Chapter six showed the ad hoc and informal nature of relationship building that was not guided by post frontier frameworks for engagement in phase one. Rather, post frontier measures began to be implemented as the project professionalised and impact mitigation became a concern in phase three.

A further reason for these measures not in place was the lack of engagement by CSOs at the local level in the exploration period to oversee, negotiate or implement post frontier practices. In the post frontier context, the position of civil society as the representative and conduit for local community voices is taken for granted (Larsen, 2015, Sawyer, 2004, Gedicks, 2001). As chapters five and seven show, there were complex reasons for the weak presence of CSOs at

the local level, including restrictions to access and the national focus of international donor and CSO activity (in phase two). However, a key reason was the lack of organic connection between CSOs engaging in oil governance and communities in the oil region; Ugandan CSOs were not the representatives of local communities in the oil region. These findings challenge the assumptions in the literature that CSOs are the natural representatives of local communities. Rather the findings showed that this was a role assigned to them by the resource governance assemblage.

An additional challenge to CSOs representing local voices was the reliance on expert knowledge to inform oil governance activities. Indeed, a common theme throughout the thesis is the ways in which what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial Africa shapes the practices which seek to govern and manage Uganda's oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). Chapter seven showed the influence of a resource governance assemblage which shaped CSO activities, especially in phase two of the pre-oil stage. By privileging expert knowledge and lessons from other contexts, the findings show that dominant ideas about oil constrained the ways in which local knowledge was able to shape post frontier practices (Li, 2007b, Tsing, 2011).

The idea of a negotiated post frontier is also challenged by the findings which show that the positions of actors were not in conflict in the pre-oil stage, nor were actor categories homogenous. Whereas in the Latin American context (Peru), post frontier institutions were "negotiated outcomes of social contestation by indigenous and environmental organisations claiming rights and calling for environmental protection" (Larsen, 2015: 156), in the Ugandan context, there is a less clear position between industry on the one hand and communities and civil society on the other. Nor was there community 'resistance' to the industry as is common in other contexts (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004). As the empirical chapters show, responses to the industry varied among actors and within actor categories. In general, in the pre-oil stage there was the acceptance of the new industry in the region because of the promise of development that the industry represented (chapter five). Grievances against the industry and state did increase as the project cycle progressed however, and these grievances elevated the importance of post frontier measures to manage the space.

As such, Oil MNCs drew on post frontier measures, but they did so in a selective manner. For example, the comparative analysis in chapter six shows that the three oil companies used post

frontier measures in ways that forwarded their own aims, leading to different approaches and varying levels of commitment. Further, while oil MNCs distanced themselves from the forced displacement of 200 families for the waste plant, which they linked to 'human rights' violations, they were silent on the human rights issues associated with oil refinery displacement because this was a government project and did not directly implicate them.

This selective drawing on post frontier narratives and practices suggests that post frontier devices might work for industry more than for local people. Chapter seven shows that CSOs were able to draw on post frontier devices, for example, IFC guidelines for land acquisition and resettlement and human rights claims, to challenge the Government's handling of the refinery resettlement process and gain recognition for refinery-affected communities. These findings point to the important role CSOs play in raising local issues to the national and international levels (Geddicks, 2001). However, contrary to the idea of a coherent post frontier, the findings show that this was reactive engagement. CSOs did not engage to prepare local people prior to the refinery displacement to ensure rights were protected.

These findings challenge the idea of a coherent post frontier in place to guide and mediate the industry. Indeed, the assemblage conceptual framing shows that it is the 'local conditions of possibility' (Savage, 2019) that influence how post frontier practices play out in the resource space and these are context specific. For example, oil MNCs efforts to manage the resource space were shaped and constrained by subnational dynamics (chapter six). The findings in chapter seven show the complexities around CSOs being able to promote the interests of oil communities which were further compounded by ongoing subnational dynamics. These findings suggest that the clear distinction between 'territorialising' and 'deterritorialising' processes in frontiers as articulated by both the post frontier and carbonscapes concepts are blurred in reality.

These insights suggest that dynamics in the subnational space during the pre-oil stage are shaped by oil, but at the same time are continually shaping the context into which oil becomes inserted (Watts, 2009b, Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Such complexity and ambiguity in the emerging Ugandan oil frontier highlight a limitation of applying a concept developed in a Latin American context to a case in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa. The findings provide further evidence of the need to look at the African cases of extractives governance differently, and in the context of the hybrid political orders that characterise many post-colonial African

states. These are not 'behind' Latin America, in terms of a linear progression towards social movement consolidation vis a vis extractives projects, because the forms of political organisation and responses have a different historical basis (Bebbington et al., 2018, De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). The cases of Latin America do show the importance of external support for local struggle (Gedicks, 2001), however, my findings show that in Uganda, this external support played a significant role in shaping local narratives in the early stages of extraction, rather than local issues shaping governance narratives (chapter seven). This points to the importance of careful comparative analysis of the African and Latin America cases, with attention to explaining the different trajectories of struggle without seeing Latin America further along a spectrum of social organisation vis a vis extraction, (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013) or without romanticising the role of external NGO / donor support (Banks and Hulme, 2012).

Uganda is a post frontier in the making not in the sense that it is 'catching up' with other contexts, but rather that the post frontier institutions are developing in a different way, with and through resource making dynamics. The assemblage lens sheds light on the emergence of this configuration which resonates with frontier, with enclave, and with post frontier thinking at the same time. We do not only see struggle and rights claims being made, we do not only see negotiation between industry and political actors, but also dynamics that suggest complex hybrids between these; the 'grey' areas (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Larsen, 2017).

8.4 Implications for equitable outcomes

A subsidiary aim of this thesis is to consider the implications of the social and political processes taking place during the pre-oil stage for equitable outcomes. The question of 'who benefits?' from extraction is an important one and is frequently at the centre of discussions in the natural resources and development literature. Yet, as I have argued in this thesis, the focus in the literature tends to be on the later stages of the project cycle (Mitchell, 2009). The findings in this study show that the processes taking place in the pre-oil stage have a significant bearing on equitable outcomes. It is at this stage that exclusionary dynamics increase vulnerabilities for some, and opportunities arising through oil MNC and CSO engagement tend to exclude some and benefit others with existing capacity.

Dynamics of exclusion were set in motion in the pre-oil stage of the industry and increased the vulnerabilities of some local actors. Chapters five, six and seven highlight processes of exclusion, restriction, accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004) and repossession through

post frontier measures (Larsen, 2015) taking place through all three phases of the exploration period, as communal land and resources became enclosed and / or acquired for industry use (Glassman, 2006).

These processes increased the vulnerabilities of certain communities in the oil-bearing region that relied on communal land and resources for survival. The findings draw attention to the issue of different resource ontologies at the local level that were not recognised by the state and industry (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). As chapters five and seven demonstrated, in some cases the losses experienced by local people were not compensated for, such as the fishers on Lake Albert and some people whose crops were not recognised as valuable. For those who did receive compensation, the manner in which compensation was distributed and handled led to considerable social impacts as noted in chapter five, with concerns that much of this money had found its way into the hands of others (e.g. local businesses, local elites in Hoima town). The findings support those of other studies that show that it is often those who are the most impacted by exploration dynamics that do not benefit (Maconachie, 2014, O'Faircheallaigh, 2013, Acuña, 2015).

A novel finding from this study is that dominant oil narratives shaped and constrained equitable outcomes at the local level. As I argued in section 8.3.2 there was no pro-active CSO intervention at the local level to support local communities in the pre-oil stage of the industry. CSO intervention was reactive and involved dealing with the aftermath of refinery displacement in phase three, rather than preparing local communities in advance and protecting the vulnerable. Of the various and complex reasons for this, one significant reason is that dominant ways of knowing about oil shaped what was focused on by CSOs and as a result, influenced which actors benefitted from CSO intervention. Chapter seven showed the close link between donor agendas and CSO activities, meaning that oil governance work became shaped by dominant understandings of oil and a pre-occupation with preparing Uganda for transparency and good governance in the production stage. This not only reduced the possibility for local issues and concerns to inform CSO interventions, but also limited the types of activities that were focused on. As such the role of CSOs was to ensure good governance of oil, reflecting the focus on oil in the later stages of the industry rather than address vulnerabilities occurring in the pre-oil stage. These findings provide insights to the literature by showing that oil governance norms, shaped by dominant ways of knowing about oil, play a role in influencing equitable outcomes in the pre-oil stage.

CSR by oil MNCs also influenced which actors benefited, and this was dependent on the project cycle. The findings show that CSR was used instrumentally by oil MNCs to gain access to land and ensure support for the industry during the exploration period, rather than to ensure 'benefits'. In some extractives contexts CSR is used by companies to ensure that benefits are channelled to local populations impacted by projects. Chapters five and six showed that there were some benefits from CSR during phase one of the exploration period in the oil region, however, as the project progressed and professionalised, the focus of CSR shifted to 'strategic CSR' (Porter and Kramer, 2006) which reduced a focus at the local level. While Tullow's infrastructural investments in the oil communities remained, CSR became re-focused to support operations and 'manage the impacts' in line with the approach of CNOOC and Total. The findings in chapter six shows that the 'impacts' oil MNCs referred to however, were essentially the future impacts of the project.

The focus on anticipating the impacts of the project meant that impacts in the pre-oil stage were not addressed. The idea that CSR investment was for the production phase is closely linked to the business case for CSR, by which CSR and profitability go hand in hand. This meant that there was minimal CSR in phases two and three during the industry delays, and the CSR that was implemented was short term and vulnerable to the 'ups and downs' of the industry. Further, because CSR was tied to the idea of 'win-win', this justified the wait for the production stage to 'scale up' investment. CSR was on hold when oil MNCs perceived nothing to be happening, even though as this study has shown, oil was having material effects (Weszkalnys, 2011). This privileging of the business case meant that those experiencing increased vulnerabilities in the pre-oil stage were not a target for CSR.

Benefits that did accrue from the local content focus of Tullow Oil's CSR in phase two tended to benefit those with the existing 'capacity', due to the standards required to engage with the local content project, in this case the TraidLinks agriculture project. Chapter six shows the contestations that emerged around this project as local people claimed CSR was benefitting others, especially those from 'outside'. This finding supports the literature in which CSR is critiqued as differentiating access to benefits (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). However, it was also the case that during the exploration period few benefits accrued from CSR at all, due to the emphasis on CSR as being for the production phase.

A novel finding in this study is that in the pre-oil stage of the industry it is the *idea* of benefitting that plays an important role. As I have argued throughout this thesis, it is the promise of future benefits that enrols people to support the industry during the exploration period (Cross, 2014, Himley, 2010). Although CSR did not provide many lasting material benefits to local people, chapters five and six showed that the promise of CSR contributed significantly to the imaginaries of development. As I showed in chapters five, six and seven of the thesis, it is the lack of recognition by state and industry that land and resources have value beyond the economic and immediate that cause people to lose hope that they will benefit from the industry. This means that the failure of the state and industry to adequately account for the losses of local people calls this promise into question and jeopardises support for the industry. These findings provide further evidence for acknowledging the importance of the pre-oil stage of the industry and recognising that it is during this time, from the very start of the industry, that processes are set in motion that shape people's acceptance of the industry in the future. It is no surprise that people used the example of the failure of the state and industry to adequately compensate people for land and crops to express anxiety about the upcoming pipeline.

8.5 Implications for extractives relationships

Through the focus on a range of actors and interactions in this study, and the conceptual framing which focuses the analysis on materiality and ideas, the thesis generates insights into extractives relationships in the pre-oil stage of the industry. Subnational studies of extractive industries have highlighted the diverse ways in which impacts of extractives create inequitable outcomes and exacerbate poverty (Gamu et al., 2015). Studies on oil have tended to focus on subnational impacts during the production stage of the industry, through grievances over the impacts of oil (Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2012, Idemudia, 2012, Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).

This study generates insights into discontent and grievances in relation to the impacts of oil in the pre-oil stage of the industry and the implications for community-industry relationships. Throughout the study I have raised the issue of competing resource ontologies. This refers to the different ways of knowing about resources and the different values placed on resources by different actors, which findings show led to industry not recognising the cultural importance of some oil exploration sites, and some resources important to local people not being considered as valuable for livelihoods. The failure of the state to include key crops and the use

of old rates to calculate compensation also demonstrated the lack of recognition of the future value of land and the importance of land beyond the economic.

The findings contribute to the existing broad literature that shows the complex transformations of social, political, and economic life in extractives context (Hinojosa et al., 2015) and also expands studies of oil to show that there are complex processes, increasing vulnerabilities and pockets of discontent in the pre-oil stage. These are emerging due to different and competing resource ontologies and the failure of post frontier measures to adequately recognise and address them. The findings across the empirical chapters show that oil exploration does not only have adverse impacts on livelihoods in the present but also in the future, which amounts to a dispossession of futures. Post frontier measures of compensation and resettlement schemes do not account for these futures invested in land, even when they are implemented following international norms. It is this context that the ability of local people to see an oil future in which they are included and in which they might benefit becomes important. It is the small pockets of discontent in the pre-oil stage that are important for understanding how struggle emerges later.

The findings of this study reveal insights into the processes that emerge in the pre-oil stage that might work to undermine legitimacy in the long run. Chapter six showed that oil MNCs reached out to subnational leaders to gain support with improving the way that local people engaged with land acquisition and compensation. The use of CSR and stakeholder engagement to establish corporate presence demonstrates the productive power of CSR in extractives contexts (Frederiksen and Himley, 2020). This power lies with the ability of CSR to align with and feed into the aspirations of local people for improved wellbeing and increased opportunities in the frontier (Barney, 2009, Cross, 2014). However, the findings point to the limits of this productive power to effectively manage relations in ways that avoid social conflict in the long term. The delimitation of 'affected community' through stakeholder engagement meant that local people who perceived themselves to be impacted by industry were excluded from any consideration of industry impacts on their lives and livelihoods. This demonstrates a further limit of post frontier measures to recognise the rights of local people through stakeholder engagement.

Oil MNCs become social actors at the local level through CSR and this shapes the responses and expectations of local people. Through the use of CSR as a tool to gain acceptability, oil

MNCs establish a social relation at the subnational level (Rajak, 2011). And while CSR is used strategically by oil MNCs, the findings in chapter six show that local people have a different understanding of this relationship. Oil MNCs in Uganda are the face of the industry, and benefits from CSR are some of the few tangible benefits from the industry that has been in a 'not yet' stage for over ten years (Tsing, 2011). Further, local people in the oil region enter into a social relationship with industry through sharing land and resources and this shapes their expectations (West, 2006). The communities at the bottom of the escarpment see their future as being tied to the industry, not only through the promise of modernity brought by the industry and the road, but also because of their sacrifice of communal land and resources. The experience of village A and the removal of CSR projects, which the community saw as negatively impacting their 'development', demonstrates the way the short termism of CSR can undermine legitimacy in the longer term.

The focus on community perspectives in this study reveals that local people are not passive recipients of corporate domination, but rather actively seek to influence industry outcomes through their agency. The findings demonstrate that some local people seek a relationship with industry even though this relationship is inherently unequal (Ferguson, 2013). The CSR literature shows that the practice of contemporary CSR has shifted to avoid such relations of dependency, through a focus on 'empowering' CSR that emphasises community self-reliance (Shever, 2010, Billo, 2015). The comparative analysis in chapter six shows that both Tullow and Total engaged in this type of CSR as a way to ensure sustainability (Tullow) and manage expectations (Total). For the community, the CSR literature argues that dependency is negative because it perpetuates neo-colonial type relationships between communities and powerful external actors (in this case oil MNCs) (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012, Rajak, 2017). These findings add insights to understanding community-company relations in the pre-oil stage. Community expectations of industry and CSR in the pre-oil stage have to be seen in light of these wider social affects and expectations of reciprocity that shape the responses of local people.

Rather than see grievances about CSR as resistance to industry, chapter six argues that this is rather a push to be included in decisions affecting the lives of people that are already in precarious situations and have their futures invested in land and resources (Bebbington, 2010). The findings highlight the importance of analysing CSR not in terms of discrete projects but rather in terms of its wider social effects (Rajak, 2011). The findings also support studies that

aim to shift the dominant corporate-centric view of CSR in extractives contexts towards a consideration of the community perspective (Banks et al., 2016, McLennan and Banks, 2019)

The relationship between oil MNCs and CSOs is one that is often presented in the literature as being in tension (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004). The incorporation of both industry and CSO actors into this study reveals some insights into this relationship and how it evolved throughout the pre-oil stage. The findings show that over time, the relationship became increasingly cooperative with CSOs providing a vehicle through which oil MNCs could give information to communities, and oil MNCs including the (subnational) CSOs as 'serious stakeholders' and increasing their relevance to local communities at the subnational level. One implication of this collaborative relationship is that in extractives contexts, accountability politics rests on the ability of civil society actors to take a critical stance against industry actors as well as the state (Newell, 2005). One constraint is that in the context of Uganda's hybrid regime and a dominant industry narrative about win-win benefits from oil, some CSOs engage with this narrative uncritically to ensure ongoing acceptance by industry actors and avoid state repression. Chapter seven showed that this was mainly the case for subnational CSOs which faced the greater threat from the state. Their role became one of information conduit for oil companies and promoting the local content agenda, supported by a mainstream donor agenda around managing and governing the industry. Some CSO respondents raised concerns about the power of oil MNCs at the local level, and yet others claimed that oil MNCs had a right to be secretive, are "here for business only", and generally viewed them as entities that should be left alone to get on with their work. It was clear that oil companies were not viewed by CSOs as 'development agents' or having obligations through reciprocity as they were by local communities, raising questions about CSOs ability to hold industry actors to account.

8.6 Implications for resource governance

A key finding in this study is that materiality and ideas both shape and constrain possibilities for agency in the oil assemblage in relation to resource governance. The assemblage conceptual framework revealed the importance of the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil to mobilise the interests of actors in the assemblage. For example, the materiality of the resource played an important role in realigning social relations in the assemblage and facilitating political action in relation to the oil refinery displacement. In line with other studies, chapter five and seven showed that it was the site of extraction, in this case the oil

refinery, that became a focal point for CSO activity (Watts, 2009c, Brown and Spiegel, 2017). This key event led to a change in the relationship between local communities and CSOs, as CSOs were able to provide tangible support to refinery-affected communities. Further, the refinery event created what Brown and Spiegel (2017) call 'spaces of convergence' between local struggles and universal ideals such as human rights. As chapter seven showed, this enabled the inclusion of excluded groups and facilitated marginalised actors (for example the Bunyoro Kingdom) to exercise political agency (Sassen, 2000), demonstrating the importance of links to global assemblages to provide possibilities for change and agency in Uganda's oil assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).

However, it was the ideas about oil that mobilised the support of international actors and elevated the issue to one of global concern. The links between oil and human rights – what is known about oil - enabled Ugandan CSOs to mobilise global support for the local struggle around the refinery. Although material impacts related to the materiality of the resource had been ongoing throughout the pre-oil stage, it was in phase three and through the refinery displacement event that CSOs were able to mobilise action across scales. These findings provide further evidence to demonstrates that oil shapes the frontier in certain ways because of dominant ideas about oil (Weszkalnys, 2011).

The findings show that claims to human rights are crucial to gain support for local struggles but can also shape and constrain what is focused on. The refinery event was important for mobilising political action across scales by making claims to universals (Tsing, 2011). However, in contrast, the plight of fishers that were restricted from livelihoods activities and denied compensation was not one that gained the attention and support of CSOs, nor the attention of international actors. One reason was the focus of CSO activity at that time was not at the local level. However, the findings raise the importance of considering the extent to which local struggles that cannot appeal to universals or connect to global assemblages become side-lined.

In a similar way, the study reveals that dominant ideas about resource governance may limit the potential for CSOs to drive an accountability politics in Uganda's oil industry (Newell, 2005). Chapter seven showed that the role of CSOs in Uganda's oil assemblage was largely shaped by a resource governance assemblage which focused on transparency and the lessons of success from other contexts (Weszkalnys, 2011). Due to the professionalised nature of Ugandan CSOs and their reliance on donor funding, the findings show CSOs working with

several donors and partners. This dependence on donors helps to explain why CSO work on oil can appear contradictory – CSOs can pursue 'activism' on the dangers of oil, while at the same time prepare local people to benefit from opportunities. While the findings in chapter seven show that local issues began to influence CSOs work, the reliance on donor funding means that CSOs work continues to be shaped and constrained by what donors are willing to fund (Banks and Hulme, 2012). Often these align with local issues, but it is also the case that donor agendas often define which issues matter. The findings in chapter seven showed that because of the dominant ideas about oil's link to corruption, CSOs were implementing programmes to promote transparency and good governance. In this way resource governance norms can delimit what is known about oil and the practices that become possible as a solution (Li, 2007b).

The promotion of local content by CSOs tapped into an issue of local concern, but rather than hold industry and the state to account for delivering local content, CSOs uncritically promoted the narrative of 'benefiting from the industry indirectly'. The findings appear to align with those of (Weszkalnys, 2011) and (Phillips et al., 2016), that donor funded CSO programmes are part of the efforts "to reduce risk and provide relative stability and security, which will allow capital investment and extraction to occur uninterrupted" (Weszkalnys, 2011: 349).

The findings of the study also point to barriers to the mobilisation of popular struggle in Uganda capable of driving an accountability politics vis-à-vis the industry. Given the weak connection between CSOs and the grassroots as shown in chapter seven, it is important to consider the opportunities for social organisation at the local level. The study revealed instances of community action to contest the impacts of industry outside of professionalised CSO activity, however there was no evidence of organised community mobilisation in the pre-oil stage. Reasons for this are that the industry is new, there is no prior social movement in the oil region, and generally the industry is accepted by local people hopeful of opportunities in the pre-oil stage. However, a potential constraint for social organising to drive accountability politics in the future is due to the hybrid nature of the contemporary state. This means that Uganda's citizens have not succeeded in building social movements capable of maintaining a balance and check upon power thus far (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). This is a trend across Africa, whereby social movements tend to be either co-opted into political systems or mirror their violent logic. The pro-democracy movement in Uganda is a case in point (Dulani, 2011).

The example of the CSOs engagement on the Oil Bills and the response of the Government, discussed in chapter seven, shows that the Ugandan state can unleash its repressive force when the interests of the state are challenged.

Uganda's hybrid political order constrains resource governance by CSOs and is likely to prevent social mobilisation at the local level also. Nonetheless, Child (2009) shows that broad-based civil society mobilisation is possible in Uganda, through the case of the civil society struggle to save Mabira forest. In 2007, a broad coalition of civil society forced the President to reverse the decision to give away part of the forest reserve to the Sugarcane Corporation of Uganda. However, the convergence of interests of actors across scales, issues and politics that characterised the Mabira forest struggle is unlikely to be replicated with oil. This is due to the vested interests of powerful national and international players and the status of oil as a globally valuable commodity (Watts, 2009c). As this study has shown, the work of donors and INGOs has been predominantly about ensuring stability and good management of the industry. Activism on oil has been taking place, with challenges around the Production Sharing Agreements and efforts to access information. Generally, however, opposition against extraction has come from the relatively marginal 'Keep the Oil in the Soil' movement.

One of the key aims of this study is to challenge the idea that oil has a hegemonic grip on development outcomes (Haarstad, 2016), and show the possibilities for agency and change in the oil assemblage. Since data collection for this studied ended, the oil project has moved on to a new phase with Total's purchase of Tullow Oil's Uganda assets in 2019 and preparations being made for the oil pipeline. Uganda finally joined the EITI in 2020. In 2019 there were emerging contestations from international and national civil society actors due to concerns about the potential environmental impacts of the pipeline. Total was taken to court in France by Friends of the Earth, with Ugandan CSOs and local community representatives testifying (Reuters, 2019). By September 2020, online petitions protesting the project had gathered almost one million signatures (Waruru, 2020). This development chimes with many of the conversations I had with local people in Hoima in 2015 and 2016, during which they told me that the bad experiences of the refinery residents would most likely inform the responses of local people to the pipeline. It is the increasing global to local connections in Uganda that were catalysed by the refinery which appear to be leading advocacy into new territory. This points to the potential of the environment to act as an umbrella issue to mobilise action

(Child, 2009), and following the Mabira forest struggle example, highlights the importance of a wider focus of 'civil society' beyond CSOs.

9.0 Chapter nine

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the subnational within Uganda's oil assemblage during the pre-oil stage of Uganda's oil industry. A subsidiary aim is to consider the implications of the processes taking place at the subnational level during the exploration period for equitable outcomes. In this chapter I summarise the key findings of the thesis against the research objectives of the study. I then set out the broader empirical, conceptual and methodological contributions of the thesis, before reflecting on any limitations of the thesis and making suggestions for future research and recommendations for practice.

9.2 Summary of findings

In this study I developed a conceptual framework that brings together a focus on ideas, materiality, practices and agency to analyse in Uganda's emerging oil assemblage. The framework was used to inform the analysis in three empirical chapters which explored aspects of Uganda's oil assemblage and the role of the subnational within it. The thesis addressed the following research objectives:

Objective 1a: Map the key actors in Uganda's oil assemblage and show how their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry.

Objective 1b: Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil assemblage to shape outcomes.

Objective 2: Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.

Objective 3: Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.

In addressing research objective 1a, the findings showed that the discoveries of commercial quantities of oil in Uganda's remote Albertine Graben enrolled the interests of powerful global players in the oil industry, mobilised the interests of actors external and internal to Uganda concerned about oil governance, and shaped the interests of the state. These interests were mobilised, aligned or in tension at different stages of the exploration phase, and through a categorisation of the assemblage in three phases (pre-commercial threshold 2005-2008, industry consolidation and progression to oil 2009-2012, post frontier management and governance 2013-2016), I showed that the configuration of actors in the assemblage changed over time. The assemblage became more complex as Uganda's oil project progressed towards oil and the impacts of oil exploration became more evident. The analysis showed that Uganda's oil assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital and the project cycle, but also by the materiality of the resource, ideas about oil and the practices which aim to facilitate and govern extraction. The material impacts of oil were experienced in terms of livelihoods implications through enclosure, restriction and displacement, and also in terms of the development imaginaries which shaped responses to the industry and enrolled the support of actors.

In addressing research objective 1b, the findings demonstrate that the subnational is not a passive recipient of a global oil industry. The findings show not only the importance of the subnational level in the oil assemblage, but the active role the subnational plays in shaping the frontier space as a constitutive part of the oil assemblage. The exploration of the subnational within the oil assemblage demonstrated the increasing importance both of global assemblages to govern and manage the resource space as the project cycle progressed, and the importance of the subnational level in shaping Uganda's oil assemblage and influencing outcomes. A key finding from the study is that what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial Africa shapes the practices which seek to govern and manage Uganda's oil through connections to global assemblages (Weszkalnys, 2011). These knowledge practices shaped corporate engagement practices and informed the agendas and practices of CSOs in Uganda's oil assemblage. However, subnational dynamics shaped and constrained how these practices played out at the subnational level.

In addressing research objective 2, the findings revealed the complex processes of legitimacy seeking in the pre-oil stage by oil MNCs. The findings showed that post frontier measures to manage the space became increasingly important as the industry consolidated and professionalised as the project cycle moved closer to production. However, while Tullow,

Total and CNOOC draw on similar norms and post frontier devices, the findings showed that there considerable diversity in how these were implemented at the local level, emphasising the agency of the companies in the legitimacy seeking process, and noting the different ways these processes shape the subnational assemblage. The overriding concern of the business case for CSR and unpredictability of the frontier context limits CSR investment, which is seen by Total and CNOOC to be for the production phase. However, the chapter demonstrates that the subnational space played an active role in shaping CSR and stakeholder engagement. Grievances at the subnational level about land and resources, exacerbated by the state's poor handling of compensation and displacement processes, influenced the companies' approaches to manage social issues in the space. Local development politics and a push for inclusion by local people shaped CSR to an extent, as local people actively sought benefits and a relationship with industry to navigate the uncertain future.

In addressing objective 3, the findings showed that oil governance in Uganda has been ad hoc, fragmented, focusing on some issues and not others, and reactive to human rights issues in the oil region. The findings show that civil society activity on oil and gas is carried out by urban professional CSOs, supported financially and discursively by a resource governance assemblage. This governance assemblage influenced and shaped CSO activities in phases one and two of the industry and limited the space for locally driven advocacy. CSO efforts to engage with oil communities through governance-related activities were constrained by subnational power dynamics, yet at the same time were facilitated by the material impacts of oil and ideas about oil in the assemblage. The refinery displacement proved to be a catalyst that facilitated political action and provided opportunities for marginalised actors to be included and for CSOs to address some issues of local concern.

9.3 Thesis contributions

In addressing the research aims and objectives, this thesis makes conceptual, empirical and methodological contributions.

Conceptually, the novel assemblage framing developed in this study brings together a focus on ideas, materiality, practices and agency, and generates important insights into the role of the subnational within Uganda's emerging oil assemblage. The thesis addresses a gap in studies of oil by focussing on the processes taking place at the subnational level prior to oil existing as revenues and demonstrating that these processes have a bearing on equitable outcomes

(Haarstad, 2016). The analysis highlighted that the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil assemblage in ways that shape and constrain outcomes, and is not dominated by a hegemonic global oil project. These insights show that dynamics in the subnational space during the pre-oil stage are shaped by oil, but at the same time are continually shaping the context into which oil becomes inserted (Watts, 2009b, Logan and McNeish, 2012a).

The assemblage framing showed that the oil assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital, but the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil play a consequential role in the pre-oil stage by mobilising actors interests and shaping development imaginaries. This conceptual contribution extends our understanding of the processes taking place in the oil frontier during the pre-oil stage of the industry, supporting studies which show the complexities of processes and range of actors involved at multiple scales (Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2003, Li, 2001). The thesis shows that the oil frontier is not solely characterised by the destructive processes in resource frontiers that suspend rights and dissolve the existing social order (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018), but is also a space of diverse development imaginaries. This study therefore extends the focus of studies to include a focus on productive processes in resource frontiers such as the role of aspirations in the pre-oil stage. I showed that it is the different ways of imagining the future which influence responses to the industry that can range between consent and contestation (Cross, 2014). The framing provides insights into extractives relationships in frontiers by illuminating that actor positions in the assemblage are not fixed or clearly distinguishable, and can be ambivalent.

A further insight from the inclusion of materiality and ideas into the same framework is that while the materiality of the resource can facilitate political action (Mitchell, 2009, Brown and Spiegel, 2017), at the same time the ideas about the resource can delimit the focus of that action, highlighting the interplay of materiality and ideas.

Empirically, the study makes a number of contributions. The focus on the interactions of a range of actors at the subnational level during the pre-oil stage shows that the interests of actors in the assemblage are shaped over time and involve processes of collaboration, cooperation, negotiation and contestation. The positions of actors were not always clearly distinguishable; in some cases, actors positioned themselves to benefit from the industry while at the same time expressed grievances. These insights show that the pre-oil stage of the industry is not always characterised by community 'resistance' vis-à-vis the industry as is

common in other contexts (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004), and provides further empirical evidence to show the importance of considering a range of interactions in extractive contexts (Logan and McNeish, 2012a).

The subnational focus in the study shows that the processes taking place in the pre-oil stage at the subnational level have a significant bearing on equitable outcomes. It is at this stage that exclusionary dynamics increase vulnerabilities for some, and opportunities arising through oil MNC and CSO engagement tend to exclude some and benefit others with existing capacity. However, responses to the industry varied among actors and within actor categories. In general, although there were pockets of discontent, in the pre-oil stage there was the acceptance of the new industry in the region because of the promise of development that the industry represented. The study adds to those which show resistance to extractives is not always the response (Bebbington, 2000, Maconachie, 2014, Conde and Le Billon, 2017), and makes a contribution to this body of work by demonstrating the role of development imaginaries in the pre-oil stage.

The empirical focus on the emergence of resource governance in a new oil context with no previous extractive industries makes a novel contribution. The findings showed the influence of a resource governance assemblage that shaped the narratives and practices of oil governance and delimited what CSOs focussed on. This study supports other work that shows that what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial Africa shapes the practices which seek to govern and manage oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). This thesis adds further insights to these studies by demonstrating that the local conditions of possibility influence how these practices play out on the ground and become 'translated' by the dynamics of the subnational context (Reyna, 2007, Tsing, 2011).

The comparative analysis of three international oil companies generated insights into the complexities of the legitimacy seeking process during the pre-oil stage and showed that approaches to managing the resource space and seeking legitimacy differed but established oil MNCs as social actors. The findings showed that development imaginaries became shaped and sustained by industry presence and the negotiations of access and legitimacy seeking at the earliest stage of the industry, supporting studies which show that CSR has wider social effects beyond discrete projects (Rajak, 2011). The findings demonstrate the importance of the community perspective and understanding the importance of social reciprocity (Banks et al.,

2016, McLennan and Banks, 2019), which this study extends by demonstrating how the notion of competing resource ontologies contribute to expectations of reciprocity in the pre-oil stage (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This generates further insights into understand industry-community relationships from the earliest stage of the industry. Community expectations of industry and CSR in the pre-oil stage have to be seen in light of these wider social affects and expectations of reciprocity that shape the responses of local people.

An additional novel empirical contribution is the inclusion of civil society actors and oil company actors into the same study and analysing their activities and interactions in the pre-oil stages of the industry and from a longitudinal perspective. The findings show that both CSOs and oil MNCs face the challenge of ensuring legitimacy in the oil region, with CSOs having to show their relevance to oil communities and oil MNCs needing to craft acceptance for the oil project. The study revealed insights into the relationship between oil MNCs and CSOs, showing that it changed during the pre-oil phase from one of mutual mistrust towards increasing cooperation.

Methodologically, this thesis makes a contribution through the longitudinal perspective to studying an oil assemblage. Data collection, observations and immersion in the context during eleven visits to Uganda over a four-year period revealed important insights from such an approach. Specifically, this enabled me to observe, map and analyse the oil assemblage over time and identify actors, interests, events, narratives, practices and interactions and how they emerged, shaped and changed over time. A further methodological contribution is made by capturing the perspectives of industry actors and bring them into the same analysis with a range of non-industry actors. Given issues of access, especially in the oil sector, there has been little research that engages with industry perspectives and few studies that analyse oil companies as separate actors (Bury, 2008).

9.4 Limitations and ideas for future research

This study addresses important gaps in the literature by focusing on subnational dynamics of an emerging oil state in the pre-oil stage of the industry. This section reflects on the limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research.

9.4.1 Limitations

One limitation was due to the scope of the study. The aim to explore the subnational in the assemblage and a range of actors and interactions was potentially an enormous undertaking. The number of actors with interests in the assemblage and the sheer number of interactions taking place over the period of study was inevitably more than could be tackled in the space of a PhD. The task of narrowing down the data into a story was a challenge, given that there were potentially many different ways and strands of the story that could be told. However, due to my ability to engage in the context over an extended period of time throughout the part time PhD and my research role in the Leeds study, through my immersion in the data and my interpretation of the data I have been able to make sense of a complex oil story.

Another limitation is related to the generalisability of the findings. Because case studies reveal specific insights from specific circumstances, they are critiqued for the limited opportunities they provide for generalisation (Idowu, 2016). However, a key importance of engaging in a detailed case study of subnational oil dynamics in Uganda was to challenge the idea that the experiences of other oil contexts can be readily applied to understand this context. Stake (2005) has argued that one danger of generalisation is that it can lead the researcher to see something in a simplistic light. Nonetheless, it is possible to generalise from the theoretical framing of the case, and thick description can enable similarities and differences between contexts to be analysed (Idowu, 2016). As I discussed in chapter eight, there is the potential for comparative research of other new oil contexts through the framing of the oil assemblage and a subnational focus.

9.4.2 Ideas for future research

The study of an emerging oil assemblage is inevitably a study of a fast changing, dynamic context. Indeed, the findings of the thesis highlighted the importance of taking a longitudinal approach. Data collection for the thesis ended in 2016, and there have been considerable developments in Uganda's oil industry since then, including Tullow Oil leaving Uganda, community resistance in Total's area of operation, and further instability in the oil price in light of Covid-19. One of the most interesting developments recently is the changing narratives and activities around resource governance, which have become focused on the environmental impacts of the upcoming oil pipeline as I noted in chapter eight. An important way to continue my study would be to map how the actors, issues, interests and narratives

have changed since the end of my study in 'phase three' in 2016. It would be interesting to see how the local to global alliances that emerged during the period of study in the PhD have further consolidated or changed, and any new opportunities for agency of local people in Uganda.

Another important avenue of research to build on my study is to further explore and unpack the local content agenda in Uganda and critically analyse the extent to which this is a vehicle through which local people are able to participate in the industry. Such a study would generate important insights about the ways in which local content shapes and constrains equitable outcomes. Another avenue of research is the role of Community Liaison Officers which is poorly understood in the literature. The findings in my study already contributed to a research project on CLOs and a paper exploring their role (Bebbington et al., 2017). Further research is required to understand the role they play in territorialising an oil project and the wider relational effects of the CLOs role at the local level.

Finally, the findings of the study emphasise the importance of critical comparative study between the African post frontier and Latin American post frontier contexts. This could generate some important findings about the different ways in which civil society and social movements mobilise to engage in shaping post frontier institutions and what are the enabling and constraining factors.

9.6 Recommendations

This study raises complex issues, many of which cannot be resolved by the efforts of actors through the frameworks of extractives governance, post frontier measures, or CSR that are typically adopted. It has highlighted the importance of appreciating subnational dynamics in the pre-oil stage of the industry. From the findings of the study, it is possible to identify ways in which engagement by a range of actors could lead to more equitable outcomes for local communities in the oil region. To this end I offer the following recommendations:

For oil MNCs, it is clear that the goal of achieving ongoing legitimacy would be better served by engagement with a wide range of local actors from the very start of the industry. It is important to recognise that the direct and indirect impacts of extractives are taking place from the early stages of the industry and so engagement should take into account legacy issues from previous companies in the area, in addition to any current impacts that are direct or

indirect. Oil MNCs should also consider their obligations as social actors in these contexts, especially where attachments to land of local people are beyond the immediate and economic. This involves 'reversing the lens' (Banks et al., 2016) and would generate deeper understanding of the local context and ultimately impact legitimacy more positively in the long term. Community development agreements (CDAs) which are used in some extractives contexts to address social and environmental impacts of operations and set out the roles and responsibilities of actors could be something that oil MNCs could consider negotiating with subnational actors in recognition of the importance of reciprocity, while bearing in mind the power inequalities in these agreements (Conteh and Maconachie, 2019).

For CSOs, a deeper understanding of the range of issues being experienced at the local level in the early stage of the industry is crucial to ensure that they are better placed to support local people. The study has shown the need to move beyond the oil legislative framework to understand and engage with frontier dynamics in the pre-oil stage. CSOs have an important role to play in facilitating relationships and connections between the local and global. If CSOs are to retain the role of 'experts' then this must be through a deeper understanding of the complexity of dynamics in the specific setting rather than a reliance predominantly on knowledge and assumptions from other contexts.

Donors and INGOs have a role to play in ensuring that resource governance is relevant for local contexts by focusing on early engagement that is evidence based. Donors should ensure that funding does not exacerbate competition between organisations in an already competitive space by identifying opportunities to enhance coordination and cooperation between CSOs. Donors and INGOs must recognise their responsibilities in the context of a hybrid regime such as Uganda, that working to influence around the state can inadvertently narrow or closed space for advocacy by CSOs and undermine the longer-term goals of accountability. The findings of the study point to the importance of casting the net wider in terms of what constitutes 'civil society' and deeper than urban elite-led civil society coalitions. Again, sensitivity to the context and historical state-society relations and evidence-based engagement through action research in the context would reveal the types of subnational organisations and associations that might support local people to navigate change.

For the state, there are clear lessons from this study about the importance of adhering to national laws, international human rights norms and post frontier measures (e.g. international

guidelines for resettlement) to address complex issues around land and resources in ways that respect the rights of local people. The findings show that support for the project in the future is compromised by the failure to ensure that local people feel part of that future. There is the potential to ensure consistency on compensation procedures and build the capacities of subnational authorities to support the processes of land acquisition and resettlement. The state has shown willingness to address some of these issues retrospectively by including subnational government. Ideally, greater involvement of subnational authorities, CSOs and local community representatives in the Refinery Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) from the very beginning could have helped to mitigate some of the social issues that have the potential to reduce support for the upcoming pipeline.

As a final comment, this study does not intend to claim that oil does not have hegemonic effects; there is clear evidence the oil shapes frontier in certain ways, and there are complex processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004), dispossession without moving (Acuña, 2015, Nixon, 2011) and dispossession of futures that I have shown to be taking place. Rather, the study shows that these destructive processes are not the only ones taking place in the oil frontier in the pre-oil stage. It is at this stage that the oil assemblage is especially dynamic (Schritt, 2016) and there are opportunities for change (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Through this study, it is hoped that the case for more attention to be paid to subnational dynamics during the pre-oil stage of a new oil context has been made. It is during the pre-oil stage at the subnational level that dynamics and processes are taking place which influence development outcomes and have implications for extractives relations in the future.

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Appendices

Interview codes

	Interview code	Year	Date of interview	Type of interview	Organisation / village	Gender	Interview location	Category
1	COMA01	2012	8.12.12	Interview	Village A	M	Village	Community
2	COMA02	2012	8.12.12	Focus group	Village A	M	Village	Community
3	COMA03	2012	8.12.12	Focus group	Village A	M	Village	Community
4	COMA04	2012	8.12.12	Interview	Village A	M	Village	Community
5	COMB01	2012	9.12.12	Interview	Village B	M	Village	Community
6	COMB02	2012	9.12.12	Focus group	Village B	M/F	Village	Community
7	COMB03	2012	9.12.12	Focus group	Village B	M/F	Village	Community
8	COMB04	2012	9.12.12	Focus group	Village B	M/F	Village	Community
9	COMD01	2012	9.12.12	Focus group	Village D	F	Village	Community
10	COMD02	2012	9.12.12	Interview	Village D	M	Village	Community
11	COMD03	2012	9.12.12	Focus group	Village D	M	Village	Community
12	COME01	2012	10.12.12	Interview	Village E	M	Village	Community
13	COME02	2012	10.12.12	Focus group	Village E	M/F	Village	Community
14	COMF01	2012	10.12.12	Focus group	Village F	M/F	Village	Community
15	COMA05	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	M	Village	Community
16	COMA06	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	M	Village	Community
17	COMA07	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	F	Village	Community
18	COMA08	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	F	Village	Community
19	COMA09	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	F	Village	Community
20	COMA10	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	F	Village	Community
21	COMA11	2014	08.08.14	Interview	Village A	M	Village	Community
22	COMA12	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village A	F	Village	Community
23	COMB05	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village B	M	Village	Community
24	COMB06	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village B	M	Village	Community
25	COMB07	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village B	M	Village	Community
26	COMB08	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village B		Village	Community
27	COMB09	2014	10.08.14	Interview	Village B		Village	Community
28	COMC01	2014	16.08.14	Interview	Village C	M	Hoima town	Community
29	COMC02	2014	18.08.14	Interview	Village C	M	Hoima town	Community
30	COMC03	2014	18.08.14	Interview	Village C	F	Hoima town	Community
31	COMC04	2014	18.08.14	Interview	Village C	F	Hoima town	Community
32	COMC05	2014	18.08.14	Interview	Village C	M	Hoima town	Community
33	COMC06	2014	18.08.14	Interview	Village C	M	Hoima town	Community

34	COMA13	2015	14.06.15	Interview	village A	M	Hoima town	Community
35	COMA14	2015	14.06.15	Interview	village A	M	Hoima town	Community
36	COME03	2015	14.06.15	Interview	Village E		Hoima town	Community
37	COME04	2015	14.06.15	Interview	Village E		Hoima town	Community
38	COMC07	2015	14.06.15	Observation	Community members from Hoima District	M/F	Hoima town	Community
39	COMC08	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
40	COMC09	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
41	COMC10	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
42	COMC11	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
43	COMC12	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	F	Village	Community
44	COMC13	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C		Village	Community
45	COMC14	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
46	COMC15	2016	13.07.16	Interview	Village C	M	Village	Community
47	DLG01	2012	10.12.12	Focus group	District Local Government	M/F	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
48	DLG02	2012	10.12.12	Focus group	District Local Government	M/F	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
49	DLG03	2012	11.12.12	Focus group	District Local Government	F	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
50	DLG04	2012	11.12.12	Focus group	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
51	DLG05	2014	05.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
52	DLG06	2014	06.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
53	DLG07	2014	06.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
54	DLG08	2014	06.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
55	DLG09	2014	06.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	Hoima town	Government
56	DLG10	2014	07.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
57	DLG11	2014	07.08.14	Interview	District Local Government	M	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government

58	GOV01	2015	19.02.15	Interview	Central government	M	Hoima town	Government
59	SLG01	2015	19.02.15	Interview	Subcounty government	M	Hoima town	Government
60	SLG02	2015	19.02.15	Interview	Subcounty government	M	Hoima town	Government
61	DLG12	2015	20.02.15	Interview	District Local Government	F	District Gov HQ Hoima	Government
62	DLG13	2015	20.02.15	Interview	District Local Government	M	Hoima town	Government
63	DLG14	2016	15.07.16	Validation interview	District Local Government	M	Hoima town	Government
64	KGD01	2012	12.12.12	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	M	Hoima town	Kingdom
65	KGD02	2012	12.12.12	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	M	Hoima town	Kingdom
66	KGD03	2014	09.09.14	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	M	Hoima town	Kingdom
67	KGD04	2014	12.08.14	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	M	Hoima town	Kingdom
68	KGD05	2015	25.02.15	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	M	Hoima town	Kingdom
69	KGD06	2015	27.02.15	Interview	Bunyoro Kingdom	F	Kampala	Kingdom
70	TUL01	2012	8.12.12	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
71	TUL02	2012	9.12.12	Interview	Tullow Oil	F	Hoima town	Industry
72	TUL03	2012	11.12.12	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
73	TOT01	2012	12.12.12	Interview	Total E & P	M	Hoima town	Industry
74	TOT02	2012	12.12.12	Interview	Total E & P	F	Hoima town	Industry
75	TOT03	2013	21.01.13	Focus group	Total E & P	M/F	Kampala	Industry
76	TUL04	2014	01.08.14	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Kampala	Industry
77	TUL05	2014	06.08.14	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
78	TUL06	2014	12.08.14	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
79	TUL07	2014	15.08.14	Focus group	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
80	CNC01	2014	13.08.14	Interview	CNOOC	M	Hoima town	Industry
81	JVP01	2014		Observation		M/F	Hoima town	Industry
82	JVP02	2014		Observation	Tullow Oil / CNOOC	M/F	Hoima town	Industry
83	CNC02	2015	21.02.15	Interview	CNOOC	M	Hoima town	Industry

84	CNC03	2015	21.02.15	Interview	CNOOC	M	Hoima town	Industry
85	CNC04	2015	21.02.15	Interview	CNOOC	M	Hoima town	Industry
86	TUL08	2016	18.07.16	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Hoima town	Industry
87	CNC05	2016	18.07.17	Interview	CNOOC	M	Hoima town	Industry
88	NCSO01	2012	12.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
89	NCSO02	2012	12.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
90	NCSO03	2012	13.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
91	NCSO04	2012	13.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
92	NCSO05	2012	13.12.12	Interview	National CSO	F	Kampala	Civil society
93	NCSO06	2012	14.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
94	NCSO07	2012	14.12.12	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
95	NCSO08	2013	05.03.13	Focus group	National CSO	M/F	Kampala	Civil society
96	NCSO09	2013	15.16.13	Workshop observation	National & subnational CSOs	M/F	Kampala	Civil society
97	SCSO01	2014	05.08.14	Focus group	Hoima branch of national CSO	M/F	Hoima town	Civil society
98	SCSO02	2014	05.08.14	Interview	Hoima branch of national CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
99	SCSO03	2014	06.08.14	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
100	SCSO04	2014	07.08.14	Focus group	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
101	SCSO05	2014	11.08.14	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
102	SCSO06	2014	12.08.14	Workshop observation	Bunyoro CSOs	M/F	Hoima town	Civil society
103	SCSO07	2014	12.08.14	interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
104	SCSO08	2014	12.08.14	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
105	SCSO09	2014	13.08.14	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
106	NCSO10	2014	21.08.14	Interview	National CSO	F	Kampala	Civil society
107	SCSO10	2015	19.02.15	Interview	Hoima branch of national CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
108	SCSO11	2015	21.02.15	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
109	SCSO12	2015	22.02.15	Interview	Subnational CSO	F	Hoima town	Civil society
110	NCSO11	2015	25.02.15	Interview	National CSO	M	Kampala	Civil society
111	SCSO13	2015	11.07.15	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society

112	SCSO14	2016	14.07.16	Validation interview	Subnational CSO	F	Hoima town	Civil society
113	SCSO15	2016	15.07.16	Validation interview	Subnational CSO	F	Hoima town	Civil society
114	SCSO16	2016	15.07.16	Validation interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
115	SCSO17	2016	16.07.16	Interview	Subnational CSO	M	Hoima town	Civil society
115	PNTUL01	2014	07.08.14	Interview	TraidLinks (Tullow)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
116	PNTUL02	2014	11.08.14	Interview	CARITAS (Tullow)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
117	PNTUL03	2014	11.08.14	Interview	CARITAS (Tullow)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
118	PNTUL04	2014	11.08.14	Interview	HODFA (Tullow)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
119	PNCNC01	2014	14.08.14	Interview	Nile Vocational Institute (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
120	PNCNC02	2014	14.08.14	Interview	Nile Vocational Institute (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
121	PNCNC03	2014	14.08.14	Interview	Nile Vocational Institute (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
122	PNCNC04	2014	15.8.2014	Interview	Better World Uganda (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
123	PNCNC05	2015	22.02.15	Interview	Meeting Point (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
124	PNTUL05	2016	18.07.16	Interview	TraidLinks (Tullow)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
125	PNTUL06	2016	18.07.16	Interview	Meeting Point (CNOOC)	M	Hoima town	CSR partner
126	BENTUL01	2014	05.08.14	Focus group	TraidLinks / Tullow	M	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
127	BENTUL02	2014	05.08.15	Interview	TraidLinks / Tullow	M	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
128	BENCNC03	2014	05.08.16	Interview	TraidLinks / Tullow	M	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
129	BENTUL04	2014	11.08.14	Interview	TraidLinks / Tullow	M	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
130	BENTUL05	2014	11.08.14	Interview	TraidLinks / Tullow	F	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
131	BENCNC01	2014	14.08.14	Focus group	Nile Vocational Institute / CNOOC	M/F	Hoima town	CSR beneficiary
132	CNS01	2015	20.02.15	Interview	Tullow Oil	M	Kaiso village	Consultant

133	CNS02	2015	24.02.15	Interview	Tullow Oil / NGOs	M	Hoima town	Consultant
134	CNS03	2015	24.02.15	Interview	Independent	M	Hoima town	Consultant
135	MED01	2014	09.08.14	Interview	Daily Monitor	M	Hoima town	Local media
136	MED02	2015	22.02.15	Interview	Daily Monitor	M	Hoima town	Local media
137	MED03	2016	16.07.16	Validation interview	Daily Monitor	M	Hoima town	Local media