

**Captive-taking in the Late Roman Republic and Early  
Principate: Historical Realities and Elite Representations**

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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## Abstract

Captives in Roman warfare are often overlooked yet played a key role in Roman society. Scholarship has previously considered institutions which involved captive-taking, including slavery and Imperialism, but there has not yet been a comprehensive study of the stages involved in acquiring captives.

Previous scholarship has been confined by linguistic parameters, such as studies which have focussed on those labelled as 'hostages' or enslaved people exclusively. I have taken an holistic approach and use 'captive' as an umbrella term which refers to individuals captured by the Romans during warfare, including those who were, or have been in recent scholarship, described as: hostages, enslaved people, or prisoners of war. This has enabled me to compare the treatment of individuals or groups of people who were not explicitly labelled using language associated with captive or hostage-taking, but who held a similar status in Roman society.

The different stages of captive-taking have been defined by the treatment captive people experienced at the hands of the Romans. Captive-taking in the Roman world was used for or involved: military intelligence, massacre, sexual violence, enslavement, hostage-taking, and the appearance of captives in triumphs. I address each of these factors in turn, arguing that the Romans recognised a process of captive-taking which involved treatment designed to humiliate an enemy people, thereby rendering them more compliant with Roman demands.

This thesis uses Greco-Roman literature, art, and iconography to outline and explore the process of captive-taking in Roman warfare. Greco-Roman evidence relating to captive-taking is written from a Roman perspective, or a viewpoint heavily influenced by Roman culture. Therefore, it has been necessary in this thesis to utilise examples which were written by the elite and promotional in nature to consider the historical realities and expectations implicit within such sources and to develop a fuller picture of captive-taking practices. The Roman elite were acutely aware of representation, and the treatment of captives was also influenced by such consideration. I have also made use of comparative examples of captive-taking and the processes briefly outlined above from modern history and current affairs to further discussion where Roman sources on the subject are limited.

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## Introduction

### **i. Captive-taking in the Roman World**

Captive-taking is a fundamental and enduring part of warfare in all world cultures.<sup>1</sup> In *The Culture of War*, military historian Martin van Creveld argues that prisoners taken during warfare are 'valuable, whether by way of their labor (both men and women), as sexual partners and breeders (women), or as a future source of manpower (children).' Van Creveld's brief discussion of captive-taking links to archaeologist Catherine M. Cameron's research which suggests that captives, as an 'invisible class of people', are overlooked in scholarship across all fields of study as they are reduced to the practical functions useful for their captors.<sup>2</sup>

This thesis is an attempt to remedy scholarship's neglect of the process of captive-taking in the Roman world. It also aims to recognise the important role captives played in Roman culture and society during the late Republic and early Imperial periods, albeit for the benefit of their captors. This involves considering the practical functions of captives and captive-taking within Roman warfare and society, in addition to elite representations of captive-taking. I use the term 'captive-taking' to refer to the process by which the Romans took prisoners during warfare and their subsequent management of the captives, i.e. the decisions made by Roman figures as to whether captives were killed, enslaved, freed or used as hostages. The majority of evidence we have from the Roman world, with the exception of archaeological remains, is from a pro-Roman perspective. Therefore, when attempting to uncover historical realities, we must be wary of how evidence may present us with a warped perspective. The sources in question were written by elite, male writers with a pro-Roman agenda, who utilised representations of captives to suit their own promotional needs. It has therefore been necessary to consider how the elite presented their interactions with captives as it informs us of the treatment captives were subjected to, and the motivations behind such treatment.

That being said, it is important to remember that captives were human beings who suffered under Roman dominion, and the usually poor treatment they were subjected to was justified by Roman authors. Such attitudes could therefore be perpetuated by the strategic attacks on their person and status, and subsequent representations of their treatment by the Roman elite. This enabled the cycle of Roman aggression and captive-taking to continue as captives were degraded in the eyes of their captors, thus enabling such treatment to be justified. It has therefore been necessary throughout this thesis to consider how captive-taking was used in elite self-representation.

The time period in question (the late Republic and early Principate), which we shall discuss in more detail shortly,<sup>3</sup> will enable comparison between Republican and early Imperial captive-taking practices. However, given the sparsity of evidence for captives

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<sup>1</sup> Lagrou, 2005: 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cameron, 2016: 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 14-16.

in this period, references to sources concerning earlier and later periods have been used where pertinent, in order to discuss Roman expectations of captive-taking or how practices became established in Roman culture. Such expectations act as a benchmark by which we can compare the treatment of different types of captives within this period. The differences in captives' treatment were usually the result of the context in which they were taken, the language used to define them (e.g., captive, hostage, enslaved person) which reflected perceived status classifications, their socio-economic position in their own societies, their gender, and the expectations which theoretically dictated the Romans' conduct towards them. Such variations in treatment ultimately impacted upon captives' subsequent portrayal in elite art, iconography, and literature. A key aspect of such representations centres on the terminology used to identify a captive's social position and the implications such a position had on their treatment by their Roman captors, which we shall address in more detail later in this chapter.<sup>4</sup>

We will discuss the Romans' understanding of captive-taking shortly but, as a basis for comparison, it is important to address our own understanding of captive-taking in recent history. Firstly, I have on occasion drawn on scholarship relating to recent conflict to discuss some aspects of warfare as certain behaviours are universal. For instance, sexual violence and the reasons for its implementation in warfare were not discussed in detail by the Romans, yet we can turn to recent conflict to see how there are clear motivations which transcend cultural boundaries. Furthermore, acknowledging our own understanding is necessary because we view the ancient world with attitudes and perspectives borne of our own cultural heritage, religion, or socio-economic background, to name just a few factors.<sup>5</sup> Essentially, when we study the ancient world, we are inherently biased. Nevertheless, this should not prevent us from using studies of the ancient world to reflect upon our own times or cultures. As a case in point, there was varying legal and cultural terminology for captives in the ancient world, and this has parallels in modern times. Such similarities enable us to understand the Romans' attitude towards captive-taking, whilst simultaneously acknowledging factors which impact upon our comprehension of the practice, both then and now.

## **ii. Modern Captives**

Over the past century alone, there have been frequent references made to individuals or groups taken captive during conflict.<sup>6</sup> Military combatants interned by the enemy are labelled as 'Prisoners of War' (henceforth PoWs). PoWs, according to the Third Geneva Convention, can be classified as: 'members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces,' who have 'fallen into the power of the enemy.'<sup>7</sup> In addition, any members of a group raising arms against an invading enemy must also be treated as PoWs, in line with the Geneva Convention. As a result of the Convention's definition, and the nature

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. pp. 7-9.

<sup>5</sup> Schaps, 2011: 374.

<sup>6</sup> Cameron, 2016: 16-17.

<sup>7</sup> Geneva Convention 3.4.

of warfare in recent times, the majority of PoWs have been male combatants, usually involved in the military or militia groups. Furthermore, as a result of recent cultural depictions of PoWs, we tend to associate PoWs with those engaged in fighting during the First and Second World Wars.<sup>8</sup> Research has largely centred around illuminating the experiences of PoWs of all nationalities during these wars, particularly their lives in internment camps. For example, Wilkinson has considered the experiences of British PoWs in internment camps in Germany during the First World War,<sup>9</sup> and there is an ongoing project at the University of Leeds which concerns diary entries written by German PoWs at Raikeswood Camp in Skipton, Yorkshire, during the First World War.<sup>10</sup> Other research centres on the reintroduction of PoWs into their societies following the conclusion of a war. Weinand's research addresses the return of PoWs to Germany following the Second World War,<sup>11</sup> and Moore and Hatley-Broad's edited volume concerns the repatriation of PoWs of all nationalities after the Second World War, illuminating common themes and issues PoWs faced when returning home.<sup>12</sup>

The individuals discussed in the aforementioned scholarship would all fall under the Geneva Convention's definition of a PoW, and would be recognised by signatories of the convention as a protected class of people in warfare. Despite this, abuses have occurred since the Conventions were ratified in 1949,<sup>13</sup> and, given human nature, are likely to do so for as long as warfare continues. However, issues of definition and identity are significant within discussions of both modern and ancient captive-taking as they dictate the application of laws or, in Roman times, customs influencing the treatment of captives. Conventions which protect PoWs, like those created at Geneva, can only extend in practice to states which are recognised as being 'legitimate' by the international community and, in turn, acknowledge the sovereignty of other nations. In addition, the states in question must also have agreed to abide by similar conventions or laws dictating, in the case of the Third Geneva Convention, the treatment of prisoners taken in warfare. As we shall see in the following chapter and throughout this thesis, the Romans applied their 'rules of war' pragmatically and were careful to stress the alien or illegitimate status of their enemies to avoid breaching their own wartime customs.

As we shall discuss shortly, the Roman elite used specific language to refer to different types of captives, i.e. captive or hostage, and such terminology had associated expectations relating to the treatment of captives. The Romans' 'rules of war' were

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<sup>8</sup> The association prevails in both scholarship and culture. Scholarship on PoWs during the First and Second World Wars is prevalent, cf. Jones, 2011, Moore, Hatley-Broad, 2005, Reiss, 2005: 475-504. Cultural works, often based on true stories, include books and their subsequent film adaptations such as *The Great Escape*, *Slaughterhouse-Five*, *The Railway Man*, and *Unbroken*.

<sup>9</sup> Wilkinson, 2017.

<sup>10</sup> University of Leeds, 2017. Other examples of scholarship using first-hand accounts from PoWs includes Neitzel's *Soldaten* which uses recordings taken of German PoWs in British camps during the Second World War, cf. Neitzel, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Weinand, 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Moore, Hatley-Broad, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Jones, 2008: 338-339, Reed, 2004.

unwritten, but we have witnessed recently how even in relation to written legislation, language can be used to distinguish individuals as something other than PoWs (a protected class) which has enabled abuses to occur. In recent years, we have seen that it is possible to argue that certain types of prisoners do not qualify for protection under the Geneva Convention. This is evident in the actions of the United States of America's government in the continued abuse of detainees at facilities like Guantanamo Bay. In 2002, US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld argued that the prisoners interned in Guantanamo Bay were "unlawful combatants", and the Geneva Convention could not be applied as they were not PoWs from a 'legitimate' nation, as the Convention dictates.<sup>14</sup> This example shows how important definitions are in dictating how prisoners are treated by their captors, a factor which is paramount in the study of Roman captives.

In addition to the Guantanamo detainees, there are other individuals taken during conflict who cannot be classified as PoWs. These individuals were often the victims of the extremist groups the USA was fighting. This further justified the USA's detention of prisoners in Guantanamo. These include those captured by terrorist groups, such as ISIS (henceforth Daesh) and Boko Haram.<sup>15</sup> Despite being taken by force, usually in conflict zones, the captives are without the protection of the Geneva Conventions as their captors are not 'legitimate' states. In addition, the terrorist groups are not signatories of the Conventions, nor do they recognise the authority of bodies operating on behalf of the international community, including the International Courts or the United Nations. Furthermore, the conflict in which they are engaged cannot be called a 'war', as it is not between two recognised states.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the Geneva Convention, which sets out treatment of prisoners in warfare, does not apply. As a counter point, how terrorist groups identify their captives (or victims) is significant here. For instance, those killed in the Manchester Arena attack in 2017, including children as young as eight,<sup>17</sup> were labelled 'crusaders' by Daesh.<sup>18</sup> Evidently, Daesh see their victims as combatants, effectively claiming that those we would consider to be innocent are their enemies. Issues of recognition cannot be underestimated, and perspective is especially evident in discussions of Roman captives, as the majority of the evidence we have was written by those who were a part of, or heavily influenced by, Roman culture and society.

### iii. Defining Ancient Captives

Turning to the Romans' understanding of captive-taking, it must be acknowledged that their definitions of different types of captives are as murky and mercurial as our own. The Romans based the treatment of their captives on what we would term the 'rules of

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<sup>14</sup> Reed, 2004. As Reed points out, even if the United States did not break the Geneva Convention in their treatment of the detainees, they violated numerous other international laws to which they were party, including the Convention against Torture.

<sup>15</sup> For instance, the 276 girls taken from a school in Chibok, Nigeria in 2014, *cf.* Amnesty International, 2015: 7,8, 26, 28, 32, 63-68, Guardian Staff and Agencies, 2017.

<sup>16</sup> ODL, 2015: war.

<sup>17</sup> Independent Staff, 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Dearden, 2017.

war',<sup>19</sup> a series of unwritten guidelines found throughout Greco-Roman literature, which often dictated how they treated certain types of captives. For the Romans, success in warfare was defined by culturally and legally ingrained traditions and rules. This is evident in the criteria that Roman generals, or later members of the Imperial family, had to meet before they could be awarded a triumphal procession by the senate.<sup>20</sup> In theory, generals could only be awarded a triumph following the conclusion of a 'just' war and if they had defeated a specific number of the enemy in battle.<sup>21</sup> This is evident in the triumphs of such Republican-era Romans as Pompey,<sup>22</sup> but instances in which triumphs were not awarded are also useful for considering how different groups of captives were categorised in the Roman mindset. In 71 BCE, Crassus was instrumental in defeating Spartacus and his army during the Third Servile War (73-71 BCE).<sup>23</sup> Pompey was also involved in the suppression of the revolt but, whilst they both received honours at similar times, only Pompey was granted a triumph.<sup>24</sup> Pompey's triumph was decreed by the senate for his victories over the rebel Roman Sertorius and an uprising in Spain, but there is no mention of his involvement in the servile revolt in the senate's approval of his triumph.<sup>25</sup> Meanwhile, Crassus was awarded an ovation (*ovatio*), a ceremony considered to be a 'lesser triumph', for his defeat of Spartacus' army.<sup>26</sup> Crassus' victory had infamously involved the crucifixion of the 6000 rebels (the majority of whom were enslaved people) along the Via Appia from Rome to Capua,<sup>27</sup> and the number of those executed was over the minimum 'enemy' casualties necessary for a triumph to be awarded. Marshall suggests that Pompey chose not to claim victory in the Third Servile War, possibly as Pompey accepted Crassus' dominant role in its suppression.<sup>28</sup> He bases this claim on evidence from Pompey's later triumph of 61 BCE in which Pompey's victory over pirates, a group with similar social and legal standing to enslaved people, was celebrated. However, the captives' backgrounds may have been of more concern to both Pompey and Crassus, as Plutarch claimed that Crassus was content with a lesser triumph as it was thought 'ignoble' to celebrate even an ovation over enslaved people.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The 'rules of war' are discussed in greater detail in Chapter One.

<sup>20</sup> Beard, 2007: 296-297, *cf.* pp. 186-188.

<sup>21</sup> Beard, 2007: 199-214. For a detailed overview of the scholarship surrounding this debate, *cf.* Lundgreen, 2014: 17-32.

<sup>22</sup> Beard, 2007: 7-41.

<sup>23</sup> N.B. As this thesis often discusses the treatment 'slaves' were subjected to in the Roman world, I attempt where possible to use the term 'enslaved person' rather than 'slave' in line with recent scholarship on slavery. For the sake of brevity, I use 'slave trade' and 'slave supply', rather than 'the trade/supply in enslaved people' but I hope the human cost of such trade has been appropriately conveyed throughout this thesis. Where I have been unable to use 'enslaved person', I have explained my use of alternative terms in the footnotes. For further reading on the language of slavery, *cf.* Foreman, 2019, Dugan, 2019: 62-87.

<sup>24</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.30.1, Plut. *Vit. Crass.* 11.8, *Vit. Pomp.* 31.5.

<sup>25</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.30.1.

<sup>26</sup> Plut. *Vit. Crass.* 11.8.

<sup>27</sup> App. *B Civ.* 1.120.

<sup>28</sup> Marshall, 1972: 671.

<sup>29</sup> Plut. *Vit. Crass.* 11.8.

This shows how the Romans distinguished and categorised their captive enemies and links closely with our understanding and the legalities of captive-taking today. Like the USA's stance on Guantanamo detainees, the Romans acknowledged captives as enemies if they belonged to a recognisable nation, e.g. one of the Gallic or Germanic nations. Therefore, enslaved people and pirates were not considered in the same way as captives belonging to identifiable groups. This is similar to the differences between officially recognised PoWs, and captives taken by terrorist groups who have little legal protection as they are not covered by International Law. Undeniably, individuals captured by terrorist groups are taken by force. However, their captors do not belong to a group recognised by the international community, nor does the group recognise conventions which dictate treatment of prisoners in conflict. Therefore, International Law cannot be applied to either the captives or the captors. As the Romans only recognised some of their captives as 'enemies', their idealised expectations of captive-taking and of their captives' behaviour only applied if the captives were recognised as legitimate adversaries.

#### iv. Language and Methodology

The Greeks and Romans both had specific terminology for those they took captive. The Greeks used the term αἰχμάλωτος, -ον (*aikhmálotos*), which translates as 'taken by the spear, captive, prisoner'.<sup>30</sup> The term has the root αἶχμη (*aikhm-*), meaning 'point of a spear', which evidently has connotations of violence.<sup>31</sup> The Romans used the terms *captivus*, -i. and *captivus*, -a, -um,<sup>32</sup> both of which derive from the verb *capto* which has associations with violent capture by seizing or taking.<sup>33</sup> The terms are used to describe comparable incidents in history or those described in parallel works, and do not appear to be merely restricted to the historical genre.<sup>34</sup> Rather, both terms appear in historical and literary writings from across the Greco-Roman period.<sup>35</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> century CE Greek author Dio Chrysostom discusses the use and meaning of αἰχμάλωτος. In his discourses, addressed to the people of Alexandria, Chrysostom uses the traditional understanding of the word, essentially physical captivity leading to enslavement, to argue a city could also be taken 'captive' by vice and excess.<sup>36</sup> Both terms refer to men, women and children (although these groups are often not differentiated) who were taken during or following a military campaign. Furthermore, all the aforementioned terms can be applied to people, places, spoils, and the capture of animals during hunting. This implies, in line with Dio Chrysostom's use of αἰχμάλωτος in relation to a city, that captives were effectively seen as a commodity or had a status akin to that of an animal. Hostages are referred to using different terms, namely *obses* and ὄμηρος

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<sup>30</sup> LSJ, 45: αἰχμάλωτος, ον.

<sup>31</sup> LSJ, 45: αἶχμη-n.

<sup>32</sup> OLD, 273: *captivus*, -a, -um.

<sup>33</sup> OLD, 273: *capto*.

<sup>34</sup> For Greek literary examples, cf. Aesch. Ag. 1440, Eur. Tro. 35, 678, Men. Asp. Fr. 112, Plut. Mor. 183E. For Latin examples, cf. Hor. Carm. 2.4.5-10, 3.3.61-68, Sat. 1.3.83-89, Ov. Her. 1.51-56, Apul. Met. 9.42.

<sup>35</sup> LSJ: 45: αἰχμάλωτος, ον, OLD: 273: *captivus*, -a, -um.

<sup>36</sup> Dio Chrys. Or. 32.89-90.



(*homeros*).<sup>37</sup> The term *obses* can be translated as either ‘hostage’ or ‘surety pledge’. The latter definition is in line with Allen’s discussion of hostages, as he claims that the use of the English word ‘hostage’ is inappropriate in translations of ancient texts, considering its modern implications of violence which were not always present in Roman society.<sup>38</sup> Allen uses the term ‘hostage’ throughout his work and, in line with Allen, I have chosen to use ‘hostage’ as it is a term applied to people, in contrast to the more dehumanising ‘surety pledge’.

In addition to captives being described using these specific terms, there are others who are often referred to as being captured using verbs. In Latin, this includes *capio*, *capto*, *rapio*, and *raptio*. The capture of women especially is often referred to using *rapio*, which is not dissimilar to ‘plunder’ or ‘snatch’,<sup>39</sup> as in the case of the Sabine Women.<sup>40</sup> In Greek, captives are often referred to using ἀπάγω (*apágo*), meaning to ‘lead off or carry away’,<sup>41</sup> or αἰρέω (*hairéō*) meaning ‘to catch or seize’.<sup>42</sup> To return to the case of the Sabine Women and similar examples, the women are not technically called ‘captives’ but the way in which they were acquired by the Romans suggests that the women had been taken prisoner against their will, and possibly through using violent means. There does not seem to be a set way in which the aforementioned terminology was used, for instance *captivus* does not directly translate as ‘Prisoner of War’, as we would understand the term. This is because individuals who were not recognised as ‘legitimate enemies’, as we have seen in the example of Crassus’ triumph, are also referred to using terms like *captivus*.<sup>43</sup> As a result of these minor complications, I have taken a pragmatic approach in searching for captives, e.g., by searching for words in translation.

If an individual was taken captive by the Romans, or was subsequently physically controlled by the Romans, using violence or the threat of it, in my view, they are ‘captives’. I have therefore limited my research to those who were taken captive and either immediately killed, as in the cases outlined in the massacre chapter of this thesis or held by the Romans for a significant period. Some people taken captive were subsequently freed, but their experiences are outside the scope of this thesis. People who were freed following siege warfare could presumably return to their lives,<sup>44</sup> albeit under Roman rule, others were freed after a period of enslavement. In the case of the former, we have limited information about the experiences of those who were immediately freed, and those who were freed after being enslaved have been studied at length elsewhere.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> OLD, 1222: *obses*, LSJ, 1221: ὄμηρος.

<sup>38</sup> Allen, 2006: 16-17. For further discussion of the definition of hostages, cf. pp. 130-134.

<sup>39</sup> OLD, 1574. *Raptum*, *rapti* as a noun can be translated as ‘plunder’ or ‘prey’, or ‘hurriedly, suddenly’ in its adverb form.

<sup>40</sup> Livy 1.11.2-3, cf. pp. 66-73, 84-89.

<sup>41</sup> LSJ, 174: ἀπάγω.

<sup>42</sup> LSJ, 66: ἀλίσκομαι.

<sup>43</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 5.156.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. pp. 109-112.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Mouritsen, 2011.

As a result of this definition, my research has often entailed carrying out a search for the words 'prisoner', 'hostage', and 'captive' in translation, in addition to the aforementioned terms in the original language. This is because translators have often used such terms when translating verbs, as outlined above, which equate to 'captured', 'snatched', or 'taken'. Furthermore, as a result of complications arising from the language, I use 'captive' as an umbrella term for all those taken prisoner by the Romans using violent means, or the threat of violence. However, there are differences between certain types of captives, which I will outline in detail throughout this thesis, beginning with the first chapter on the 'rules of war'. Nevertheless, the existence of specific terminology to refer to captives and captive-taking demonstrates how ingrained the practice was in Greco-Roman culture.

#### v. *Plautus' Captivi*

Captive-taking was assumed to be commonplace in ancient warfare, and the practice appears to be universally understood and employed across the ancient Mediterranean world.<sup>46</sup> References to captives are prevalent throughout Greco-Roman literature and art. Monuments, including the Colosseum, Trajan's Column [Figure 1], and the Arch of Septimius Severus in Rome [Figure 2], were built with the proceeds from the sale of, or graphically depict the humiliation and enslavement of, individuals the Romans subjugated.<sup>47</sup> We shall explore the Romans' understanding in more detail in Chapter One, but one play with close links to both Greece and Rome provides a basis for understanding the expectations and uses of male captives in the Roman world. The play in question, *Plautus' Captivi*, is one of the earliest extant Roman sources focussing on captives and provides evidence of shared cultural norms between Greece and Rome. These shared practices are significant in understanding the Romans' treatment of captives as the Romans often adopted and adapted Greek traditions, and many writers referenced throughout this thesis originated from the Greek speaking world. In addition, as a piece intended for performance, it also highlights the use of captives within Roman culture outside of warfare.

*Captivi* follows two captives, Philocrates and his enslaved attendant Tyndarus, who are taken during a fictional conflict between the Greek cities of Elis and Aetolia.<sup>48</sup> *Plautus' play* is an adaptation of a Greek original but its plot would only have been relevant to Roman audiences if it reflected a Roman understanding of how captives were used.<sup>49</sup> The play, produced in the early 2nd century BCE, is especially useful in not only conveying shared cultural values between Greece and Rome,<sup>50</sup> but in exposing early Roman Republican attitudes to captives and captive-taking. Republican concerns are of

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<sup>46</sup> For Greek captive-taking, cf. Sternberg, 2006.

<sup>47</sup> The Colosseum was built using proceeds from an unspecified war, possibly the First Jewish Revolt, cf. Millar, 2005: 103, 118. Trajan's Column and the Arch of Septimius Severus graphically depict the subjugation of captive men, women and children on their reliefs.

<sup>48</sup> Franko, 1995: 155-156. Franko argues that, considering the hostility at the time between Rome and Aetolia, *Plautus' presentation* of Aetolians embodying traditional Roman values would not have been lost on the audience.

<sup>49</sup> Moore, 1998: 50-52, Gruen, 2001: 84, Richlin, 2018: 213-240.

<sup>50</sup> Moore, 1998: 50-66.

note, as not only is Plautus' play a contemporary example of the attitudes towards captives' treatment, but the values it conveys also inform later discussion of the Republican nostalgia frequently evoked during the late Republic and early Empire.

*Captivi* centres on Hegio, a noble Aetolian man who buys Elean captives taken during conflict between the two Greek states. This detail is included in an explanation during the prologue in which Hegio's motivations are justified, namely that he hopes to buy enough captives (sold into slavery following the war) to exchange for his son, Philopolemus, a captive under Elean control. It is implicit that Hegio is a person of some social standing, not only because he has sufficient funds to purchase multiple captives,<sup>51</sup> but because he assumes that his son is worth the equivalent of more than one captive.<sup>52</sup> Even as mutes, as they first appear, the captives are utilised on stage as their presence during the prologue is used to assist the audience in understanding the complicated plot.<sup>53</sup> Richlin argues that the audience were accustomed to warfare as soldiers and former PoWs, either Romans or those enslaved by them, formed part of the audience.<sup>54</sup> In addition, given the recent capture of Roman soldiers during the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE and the senate's refusal to pay the ransom, the treatment of PoWs was likely to be a concern for the public at large.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, Plautus indicates that captive-taking in war and captives' subsequent enslavement was commonplace and the two central captives are not the only ones Hegio purchased.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, the plot relies on the Roman audience's acceptance that defeated peoples could be sold into slavery.<sup>57</sup>

The captives in question, one of which transpires to be Hegio's long lost son (Tyndarus), are treated with respect, as Hegio wishes to ensure his son is treated in a similar way. After ascertaining through questioning that one of the captives belongs to a noble family,<sup>58</sup> Hegio sends the other captive, whom he believes to be the nobleman's enslaved attendant, to the enemy state with a message offering the exchange of Philopolemus for the captives he has purchased. The slave's messenger role suggests there was a level of trust within the captive-captor relationship, as the enslaved person in question was bound to Hegio by the slave-master relationship.<sup>59</sup> The enslaved person's master had also made a guarantee that the slave would return. Furthermore, Hegio is aware of the captive's pre-capture status as a free man of Greek heritage, a background similar to his own. In this respect, there does appear to be differing

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<sup>51</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 126-128.

<sup>52</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 26-35, 95-100.

<sup>53</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 1-4, 26-35, 110-117, cf. Lowe, 1991: 29.

<sup>54</sup> Richlin, 2018: 213-217.

<sup>55</sup> Richlin, 2018: 226-226, Cosgrave (forthcoming). The ransom of the soldiers at Cannae continued to be a point of contention until the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, with Cicero claiming that Greek philosophers still discussed the incident, cf. Cicero, *De Or.* 3.109.

<sup>56</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 23-24, 126-128.

<sup>57</sup> Richlin, 2018: 214.

<sup>58</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 251-450.

<sup>59</sup> Throughout this section, I resort to using 'slave' and 'master' as these simply connote the relationship between enslaved person and their captors as the Romans would have understood it in these circumstances, in line with the language Plautus uses in the play.

treatment between the enslaved person and the nobleman, despite the fact that they now have the same standing as they are both captives enslaved by Hegio, a situation they both recognise and address.

By this point, Tyndarus and Philocrates, the slave and the master respectively, have secretly exchanged places so Philocrates can return home without his family locating and returning Hegio's son to him, or risk Philocrates being detained for a long period with the enemy. Both the master and the slave are technically, as captives, on equal footing, but the ways in which Plautus depicts their relationship tells us about the differences between the statuses of the formerly freeborn and enslaved captives. As we shall see in the following chapter, it appears the Romans considered that all individuals upon their capture automatically acquired a status akin to an enslaved person.<sup>60</sup> However, captives were not all treated as enslaved people by the Romans, and it can be argued this was because of their pre-capture status. Social class and wealth, which equated to power, were crucial in the Roman world. Thereby captives from wealthy, powerful families had more value in Roman minds than those from lower class backgrounds. This is evident in Hegio's decision to send the enslaved person to negotiate the exchange as the socially superior master was of more value in terms of negotiating and was also a social equal of his son.

Further evidence can be found in Hegio's decision, upon learning of the deceit, to punish the enslaved person by sending Tyndarus to carry out hard labour in the quarries.<sup>61</sup> By this stage in the play, Hegio has seemingly assumed that any chance of negotiating his son's return has vanished, having lost his bargaining power with Philocrates' departure. Tyndarus is only ordered back from the quarries once Philocrates returns with Hegio's son, by which time Tyndarus' identity, as Hegio's lost son and a person of noble birth, is revealed.<sup>62</sup> In this way, captives of different social classes had various values to their captors and were treated accordingly. Furthermore, Hegio's initially respectful treatment of the captives and then his harsh response to the deceit is also a means by which Plautus enables the audience to reflect on Hegio's character, and also allows the temporary blocking character, i.e. one who presents a obstacle which the protagonists have to overcome, to have an anagnorisis.

Plautus' *Captivi* was written before the time period of focus for this thesis. However, the play provides us with details of some of the ways in which the Romans utilised their captives, what the expectations of treatment were, or how captive treatment could be represented. Approaching this discussion with an overview of a literary example of captive treatment provides a footing for a comment on the nature of the sources used and how they can contribute to my consideration of captives in the Roman world. As I shall relay throughout this discussion, there are issues with historical sources not only because they often lack correct citing of their original sources, but also because writers

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<sup>60</sup> As we have seen, this was a recurring theme throughout Greco-Roman literature, and is also present in Dio Chrysostom's discussion of a city captured or enslaved by vice, cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.89-90.

<sup>61</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 723-6.

<sup>62</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 955-976.

may have invented details as they simply did not have access to the information. To quote Mark Twain: 'never let the truth get in the way of a good story,'<sup>63</sup> and this is nowhere more evident than in Greco-Roman writings describing the events of early Roman history.<sup>64</sup> This is even more true when the stories, and they should be initially approached as such, in question were often created or embellished with political or ideological undertones or with a view to self-promotion. However, the sources in question portray the Romans' attitude towards their captives, and this informs the reasons behind their depicted treatment which may be indicative of actual events. This thesis attempts to outline the treatment captives received in actuality, and the uses of representations of captive-taking within Roman culture.

#### vi. Sources

Source material relating to captive-taking is disparate and can be found in various mediums. This thesis considers a wide range of sources, which enables a discussion of elite and non-elite perspectives of captive-taking. The majority of literary evidence, as is typical of the ancient world, is written from an elite male perspective. The writers in question were Romans, such as Caesar or Tacitus, who were most certainly actively involved in captive-taking during military service. Alternatively, Greek authors like Plutarch or Cassius Dio were either heavily influenced by Roman culture or had been brought up in cities under Roman rule. Whilst numerous authors place themselves in the position of captives, occasionally writing from the perspective of a captive, few are able to give a true to life depiction of the captive experience.<sup>65</sup> Even individuals who were writing after enduring Roman captivity, such as the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE Greek writer Polybius and 1st century CE Judaeian writer Josephus, were not in the position to be critical of the Roman regime as they owed their continued success and safety to Roman leaders.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, both writers were of elite status and could only offer a privileged view of captivity in relative comfort, compared to their non-elite counterparts. As a result, the history of the Roman world is largely written by the victors of wars, or those who were not in any position to challenge Roman authority. For the period this thesis considers, we do not have any independent first-hand captive testimony, and the sources which we encounter are representations of a captive's experience from the captor's point of view. Therefore, there is a divergence between the treatment that captives received in reality, and the treatment as it was presented to the Roman elite and people through the works of, or histories pertaining to, the political classes. For this thesis, it is essential to consider how various aspects of captive-taking were presented by the elite in order to establish the realities of captive-taking, or how concerns for representation affected the treatment of captives.

This thesis also relies upon material culture in understanding how captives were treated. The majority of artistic sources were commissioned by the political elite, and many of the surviving examples were displayed in a public, or pseudo-public setting,

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<sup>63</sup> No one is sure if Twain said this, but why let the truth get in the way of a good quotation?

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Saïd, 2007: 76-88.

<sup>65</sup> Beard, 2007: 112-114.

<sup>66</sup> For Polybius cf. Allen, 2006: 216-219, and for Josephus, cf. Cotton, Eck, 2005: 37-53.

such as the forum or public-facing areas of the *domus*.<sup>67</sup> Warfare was essential to the development of art and iconography, not only because art and the artists were often imported through military activities, but war related objects formed a part of artistic display.<sup>68</sup> For instance, as Blagg argues, the spoils of war were the most commonly exhibited form of art until the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE.<sup>69</sup> The success of elite art and iconography relied upon the subject matter being recognisable and the usually promotional message being understood by a variety of people from across Roman society. As a result, we often see images on art commissioned by the elite being adopted in non-elite material culture across the Roman empire. Depictions of captives in art are key to our understanding of captive-taking as a process as they would only have been effective for elite self-promotion if art imitated the realities of captive-taking.

However, there are limitations to art and iconography, particularly as they are primarily intended to be celebrations of elite achievements which do not fully reflect a captive's journey, as this thesis outlines. Material culture is utilised in conjunction with literary sources but with the understanding that it reflects more on the elite individuals who commissioned the pieces, rather than the captives themselves. The experience of captives is more evident in archaeological evidence, as we encounter the physical remains of captives themselves.<sup>70</sup> However, whilst archaeological evidence, particularly human remains, provide a more human picture of the ancient world, we are limited in understanding the full experience of individuals who lived during this time period. As a result, it is essential that all forms of evidence are used in conjunction and their limitations are acknowledged throughout the thesis where appropriate.

#### **vii. Time Period**

The 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE and the early Principate (until c.100 CE) was a politically and socially turbulent time in the Roman world, with warfare and political violence prominent within its culture. The period was dominated by a series of wars and the individuals who rose triumphantly from them. In brief, the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE began with Rome's continued expansion into western Europe, whilst the Roman senate monitored and interfered with the eastern nations. Simultaneously, political tension between Rome and her Italic allies, which ultimately resulted in the Social Wars, was building. The Social Wars (91-88 BCE) were significant as they began as a war between Rome and other Italian cities, some of whom had been in treaty alliances with Rome, but resulted in the inclusion, in terms of enfranchisement, of these former enemies. As we shall see, the Social Wars were filled with examples of aggression and massacre, depictions of which became problematic given the change to the former enemies' status. The Social Wars were followed almost immediately by the First Mithridatic War (89-85 BCE), between Mithridates V of Pontus and Rome, which began a series of wars which finally concluded in 64 BCE with Mithridates' death by suicide. During this

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<sup>67</sup> Blagg, 1987: 723-5.

<sup>68</sup> Blagg, 1987: 717-42.

<sup>69</sup> Blagg, 1987: 723.

<sup>70</sup> As evident in the remains of individuals who suffered a violent death, *cf.* pp. 55-59, or whose remains were found in chains, *cf.* Thompson, 1993: 57-168.

period, the rivalry between Sulla and Marius brought violence to the heart of Rome.<sup>71</sup> Sulla's actions, both during foreign warfare and at Rome during his dictatorship (c. 82/81 BCE), set a precedent for the later actions of Pompey and Caesar.<sup>72</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> century also saw the rise of piracy and the Third Servile War (73-71 BCE), which were ultimately quashed by figures who became prominent in politics, including Crassus and Pompey. With the rise of these individuals, further violent expansion was undertaken in Spain, Gaul, and Asia Minor between 79-44 BCE, primarily by Pompey and Caesar.<sup>73</sup> The hostile nature of expansion into these areas provided the opportunity for individuals to wield power over vast areas of land, and large parts of the Roman army.<sup>74</sup> This was significant because, during this period, the individual moved to the centre of political life and military prowess became paramount to political success. This factor was largely the result of the memory of the heavy losses suffered by Rome during the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE because of military incompetence.<sup>75</sup> In turn, the profits made from military campaigning were used in benefactions made by individuals to the city of Rome.<sup>76</sup> The meteoric rise of Pompey and Caesar led to the Civil War (49-45 BCE) between them and their supporters, ultimately resulting in their assassinations in 48 and 44 BCE respectively. Further conflict between Caesar's supporters, led by his heir Octavian and Marcus Antonius, and Caesar's assassins continued until 36 BCE, when Pompey's son was defeated in battle. Despite the marital allegiance between Octavian and Antonius, tensions between them continued to build until Antonius and his ally-partner Cleopatra were defeated at the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE. Octavian, soon to be honoured with the title of Augustus in 27 BCE, was the most prominent survivor of the Civil Wars. Augustus went on to establish himself as the sole ruler of Rome whilst keeping up the pretence of supporting an independent senate and Republican values.

The following eight decades were dominated by Augustus' heirs, now known as the Julio-Claudian dynasty, and warfare continued to be conducted on the fringes of the Empire. Augustus' stepsons, the future Emperor Tiberius and his brother Germanicus, campaigned in Germania, Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Raetia, during Augustus and Tiberius' reigns (27 BCE - 14 CE and 14 CE - 37 CE, respectively). Claudius began an invasion of Britain in 43 BCE, and Boudica's revolt in 60 CE took place during the reign of Claudius' successor Nero. Following a period of civil unrest after Nero's fall from power in 68 BCE, the Flavian dynasty held power until 96 CE. The first two Flavian emperors Vespasian and Titus led campaigns in Judaea and northern Europe, including Britain, Gaul, and Germania.

The examples of captive-taking found in this thesis range from across this period, although not all leaders and campaigns are considered in detail given the scope of the

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<sup>71</sup> Patterson, 2006: 356.

<sup>72</sup> Lintott, 2013: 10.

<sup>73</sup> Richardson, 1976: 18-22, Lintott, 2013: 10.

<sup>74</sup> Richardson, 1976: 20-21, Erdkamp, 2006: 282.

<sup>75</sup> Erdkamp, 2006: 291.

<sup>76</sup> Erdkamp, 2006: 285-6, Patterson, 2006: 345-364.

thesis and complexities related to the campaigns. For instance, The First Jewish Revolt (66–73 CE) involved captive-taking and is discussed at various points in this thesis. However, the majority of evidence we have comes from Josephus, a Jewish man who was taken captive during the course of the First Jewish Revolt. Although Josephus was writing from a pro-Roman perspective, Jewish traditions and religious teachings should be taken into consideration in more detail when studying captive-taking in this campaign. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address these issues in depth.<sup>77</sup>

### viii. Literature Review

Captives are often overlooked or simply dismissed as enslaved people in scholarship. To the best of my knowledge, archaeologist Cameron is alone in centring her research on captives, covering captive-taking from across world cultures and history.<sup>78</sup> Cameron considers Roman captives briefly in her research and primarily focusses on how captives furthered the transmission of cultural practices.<sup>79</sup> Her approach is similar to my own in that she does not limit her focus to our modern understanding of captives, namely as 'PoWs' or 'hostages'. Instead, Cameron recognises that captives could (and can) have a variety of roles which may not have specific terms attached to them,<sup>80</sup> especially when they were forced to integrate within the captors' society. Furthermore, as we have seen, studies in the field of Modern History, particularly pertaining to the First and Second World Wars, have also studied captives but mainly those recognised as PoWs.<sup>81</sup>

However, within the fields of Classics and Ancient History, there has been little consideration of the role captives in a broader sense played within Roman society, particularly the process of captive-taking. This results from a tendency within scholarship to focus on certain groups of captives, usually hostages belonging to elite society, or to assume that all captives taken during Roman conquest were enslaved. To some extent, this links with both sources and scholarship's failure to outline, both in terms of linguistic and contextual considerations, the differences and similarities between those the Romans took 'captive' and those they took 'hostage'.<sup>82</sup> In this thesis, I have applied Cameron's use of captives as an umbrella term to the Roman world which has enabled me to show how captives of all types, regardless of socio-economic status, were part of a process of captive-taking which was designed to impact upon all levels of an enemy's society.

Within research on the Roman world, captive-taking is discussed in numerous areas of research, including: warfare, slavery, hostage-taking, triumphal processions,

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<sup>77</sup> The works of Reeder and Millar address captive-taking in some detail, although I believe there is scope for a fuller examination of this topic, *cf.* Millar, 2005, Reeder, 2017.

<sup>78</sup> Cameron, 2016, 2011, 2009.

<sup>79</sup> Cameron, 2016: 39-40, 66-67, 152-153, 159, 2011: 180, 196-198, 2009: 173-188.

<sup>80</sup> Cameron, 2016: 9-11. Cameron focusses on how the terms 'slave' and 'captive' are often interchangeable.

<sup>81</sup> *Cf.* pp. 3-7.

<sup>82</sup> *Cf.* p. 7.



ethnography, and art and numismatics. Captives are referenced but, as captive-taking is not the primary concern of researchers working in these areas, discussions are brief. Generally, previous scholarship has tended to remain within its own 'research area', whereas this thesis takes a cross-disciplinary approach to consider captive-taking as a practice and within elite self-promotion. In the following section, I have outlined trends within research, and I have also commented on the limitations of such scholarship when addressing captive-taking.

### **a. Warfare and Imperialism**

The majority of Rome's captives were taken during the course of or immediately after military campaigns. As captive-taking in warfare was common practice, there are references to captives within studies on the structure and organisation of the Roman army. The works in question are general overviews of Roman warfare, usually concerning its role within society, and only briefly address PoWs.<sup>83</sup> Of note is Austin and Rankov's work on military intelligence which discusses the usefulness of captive-taking in the Roman world as a means of acquiring information about an enemy's tactics or position.<sup>84</sup> The works in question focus on the historical realities of warfare and the army's organisation. In this thesis, I use examples of elite self-promotion to consider the implicit expectations, shared by the Roman elite, of captive-taking practices, which inform later discussions in the thesis. I have therefore been able to outline a fuller picture of the treatment of captives and how the elite presented their own captive-taking behaviour in line with the expectations shared by their contemporaries. For instance, in Chapter One, I argue that captives taken during war were used for more purposes than military intelligence, including as combatants and to strike terror into enemy forces. I suggest that descriptions of captive informers and the Roman commander's interaction with them were used to convey a commander's personal qualities, particularly their intellect and military prowess. Such qualities could be stressed in elite self-promotion, as evident throughout Caesar's *Gallic Wars*.

Furthermore, the majority of research in this area focusses on the capture of male military figures and does not address the role of women or children in warfare. The exception to this is research into sexual violence as it disproportionately affected (and continues to affect) women and children. However, discussion of wartime sexual violence has been limited in the field of Classics and often focusses on examples from ancient Greece. Ziolkowski, Antela-Bernárdez, and Gaca's research has used literary and historical writings to consider the role of sexual violence in siege warfare, arguing that the ancient Greeks and Romans considered it to be a necessary act which made its victims more compliant and easier to enslave.<sup>85</sup> Unlike the aforementioned scholars, I consider sexual violence outside of siege warfare, including its use in massacres. In Chapter Three: Sexual Violence, I consider Roman sexual violence and its uses in

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<sup>83</sup> Examples can be found in: Garland, 1975: 67-73, Campbell, 2002: 72-74.

<sup>84</sup> Austin, Rankov, 1995: 67-73. Their consideration of Roman torture as a means to extract information about an enemy's plans may link to a captive's 'slave' status.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91, Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 307-322, Gaca, 2013: 73-88, Gaca, 2014: 279-288.

destroying a community and enslaving women and children, which had implications on wider society. I also discuss the Roman elite's unwillingness to reference sexual violence explicitly, despite a clear acknowledgement that sexual violence was a common occurrence in warfare. Similarly, I have considered instances of sexual violence outside of siege warfare and have therefore found examples which have not previously been discussed, including examples from Caesar's *Gallic Wars*. Therefore, by looking at the intersection between historical reality and elite self-representation, I have been able to acknowledge that the Romans exhibited some discomfort when discussing sexual violence, despite often hypocritically permitting or encouraging it in warfare.

With regards to sexual violence, I have made the decision in this thesis to omit the works of scholars who have been charged with or accused of acts of sexual violence, or who condone forms of sexual violence using precedents and attitudes from the ancient world.<sup>86</sup> I am aware that an argument can be made for the inclusion of such individuals' academic works,<sup>87</sup> as their research does not necessarily reflect their personal lives or actions.<sup>88</sup> However, Rabinowitz argues that scholarship is always personal on some level, stating that her own research is only possible because she studies women in Greek tragedy from the perspective of a woman who identifies as a feminist and who has an interest in social justice.<sup>89</sup> In my opinion, the works of the individuals referenced in footnote 87 cannot be isolated from their behaviour or advocacy in relation to sexual violence. A clear connection can be made between Parker and Hubbard's behaviour and advocacy and their research, but Harris' scholarship does not explicitly refer to sexual violence. However, Harris' esteemed position gave him the opportunity to allegedly continue harassing his victim. Harris' position was one of power and privilege which he supposedly abused, a common

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<sup>86</sup> The use of citation policy in academic work appears to be uncommon in Classics and Ancient History, but is found within other fields, including Gender Studies and Geography, *cf.* Ahmed, 2017: 15-16, Mott, Cockayne, 2017: 954-973.

<sup>87</sup> The three individuals in question are: W.V. Harris, a Greco-Roman historian who wrote extensively on Roman Imperialism. Harris was sued by one of his former students at Columbia University for alleged sexual harassment, and had subsequently used his well-respected position to penalise the student for rejecting his advances. The case was settled out of court, and Harris forced to retire, *cf.* Wang, 2017a, 2017b. H. Parker, a Classicist who worked on sexuality in the Greco-Roman world. In 2016, Parker pled guilty to charges of possession of child pornography, and was sentenced in 2017 to four years in prison, *cf.* WKRC, 2016, WCPO Staff, 2017. T.K. Hubbard continues to work within Classics, focussing on ancient sexuality. Hubbard has associations with NAMBLA (North American Man-Boy Love Association), 'a visible advocate of pedophilia' (*cf.* Vice, 2016), and also advocated in support of men who carry out so-called 'campus rape', claiming the consent laws focus on a woman's pleasure rather than the attacker's, *cf.* Futo Kennedy, 2018.

<sup>88</sup> The arguments are made by Johnson, 2016, Hortensia, 2017, Scullin, 2017, Kennedy Futo, 2018. However, with the exception of Scullin who argues that further discussion is needed, all stress that they will not be citing or recommending scholarship written by the aforementioned scholars.

<sup>89</sup> Rabinowitz, 2001: 191-210.

theme in discussions of sexual violence.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, in my opinion,<sup>91</sup> by referencing the individuals in question, we are contributing towards a culture which continues to ignore the behaviour of and reward individuals who deliberately marginalise and victimise others. I address sexual violence throughout this thesis and use scholarship which details accounts of ancient and modern sexual violence, including those written by survivors. Given these factors, I cannot in good conscience use the works of individuals charged with, accused of, or who advocate any form of sexual violence.<sup>92</sup>

Beyond research on sexual violence, little attention has been paid to the role of women and children (primarily teenagers) as military figures.<sup>93</sup> Women such as Arsinoë IV of Egypt, Cleopatra VII of Egypt and Zenobia of Palmyra are likely to have acted as military commanders,<sup>94</sup> yet are rarely discussed in military history. These women and their role in warfare are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six: Triumphs where I explore the difficulty for Roman generals displaying women, despite their military capability, in the stead of expected male figures. In the same chapter, I also discuss the relationship between the Roman elite presenting their enemy as 'worthy' and showing how their status was akin to that of an enslaved person. The presence of notable individuals in triumphs contradicts scholarship's assumption that enslavement was the only possible outcome for captives, in a similar line to key arguments within research on slavery.

## **b. Slavery**

Volkman's *Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner erobelter Städte in der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit* is the most detailed study of the process of enslavement, focussing on captive-taking following the siege of a city in Greek and Roman history. Volkman considers how captives from different regions were treated and devotes a chapter to theory and practice of mass enslavement.<sup>95</sup> However, Volkman does not address gendered dimensions to captivity and focusses solely on those who were defined as enslaved, including those who were subsequently freed which is outside the scope of this thesis. Harper's *Slavery in the Late Roman World* focusses on different aspects of the slave trade and its development, including legal and socio-economic considerations, including the influence of Christianity. Harper focusses on the institution of the slavery within Roman society, rather than the process by which captives were taken.<sup>96</sup> Both Volkman and Harper consider the process of captive taking to discuss the institution of slavery and its role within ancient Greco-Roman society.

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<sup>90</sup> For examples with academia, cf. Ahmed, 2017: 139-42.

<sup>91</sup> I would stress that citation policy should be a matter of personal choice.

<sup>92</sup> As of 2019, my bibliography is, to the best of my knowledge, free of perpetrators or advocates of sexual violence. My apologies if there are any individuals whom I have inadvertently overlooked.

<sup>93</sup> Hallett, 2015: 247-253.

<sup>94</sup> For Arsinoë, cf. pp. 204-210. For Zenobia, cf. SHA, *Aurel.* 22.1-2, 26.3-7.

<sup>95</sup> Volkman, 1990: 71-90.

<sup>96</sup> Harper, 2011: 33-65.

Similarly, Bradley's *Slavery and Society at Rome* and his research into depictions of captives under the Principate provide useful but brief introductions to the process of captive-taking in the Roman world. Bradley's consideration of captives is situated within a chapter on the Roman slave supply and how enslaved wartime captives maintained the enslaved population,<sup>97</sup> a source of constant and irresolvable debate amongst scholars with an interest in this area. Scheidel discusses the two main concerns with scholarship on the Roman slave supply, the first being an attempt to ascertain the number of enslaved people involved and, secondly, what area of the Roman slave supply system produced the majority of enslaved people.<sup>98</sup> With regards to the latter, some scholars consider natural reproduction to be of more import, whilst others argue that warfare was the greatest contributor.<sup>99</sup> Wickham in his PhD thesis entitled *The Enslavement of War Captives by the Romans to 146 BC* similarly focusses on the origins of enslaved people during the early and middle Republic. Wickham argues that warfare was not the main source of enslaved people in the Republic, and continues to discuss the reasons for this, including the economic, social and political problems with enslaving individuals and using them as forced labour in Italy.

Bradley's research raises a variety of issues, including the conditions of captive transportation from the provinces to Italy.<sup>100</sup> However, Bradley does not, with the exception of mentioning mass suicide and the likely agricultural slavery captives were forced into, address the treatments other captives received, including that of the captive elite. For example, Bradley argues agricultural labour was the fate of most captives but there are instances in which enslaved former enemy soldiers were utilised as combatants for both the Roman army and in performative roles, including the triumph. In Chapters One and Six, dealing with the rules of war and triumphs respectively, I discuss how common this practice was and if there was a preference in choosing former soldiers for these roles. This will allow us to better understand the options available to the Roman elite when they took captives, what factors influenced their decisions, and how these were subsequently presented.

In a similar way, Bradley does not mention the display of captives in triumphs, other than to argue that warfare continued throughout the Principate. He suggests warfare was the main contributor to the slave supply, with supplementary enslaved people acquired from child abandonment, reproduction of enslaved persons, and piracy. In Bradley's later journal article,<sup>101</sup> he considers artistic depictions of captives. He reiterates his argument that, contrary to orthodox views on the slave supply, warfare continued to be a major source for new enslaved people during the Empire and uses Imperial iconography as evidence.<sup>102</sup> His focus rests on monumental art or objects

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<sup>97</sup> Bradley, 1994: 32-48.

<sup>98</sup> Scheidel, 2011: 287. cf. Scheidel, 1997: 156-169.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Alföldy, 1975: 11-12, Bradley, 1994: 32-48, Madden, 1996: 109-128, Morley, 2011: 265-286, Scheidel, 2011: 287-310, Thompson, 2003: 20.

<sup>100</sup> Bradley, 1989: 20-5.

<sup>101</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298-318.

<sup>102</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298-306, cf. Bradley, 2011: 241-265.

which likely circulated around the Imperial court, both of which were funded by the political elite. Bradley automatically assumes the captives depicted were destined for slavery. Granted, the chained captive groups depicted on such monuments as the Forum Arch of Septimius Severus can, with reasonable doubt, be assumed to be destined for slave markets.<sup>103</sup> However, there are images of captives on the lower registers of such works as the *Gemma Augustea* [Figure 3] and the Grand Cameo of France (both dating from the 1st century CE), which cannot be so easily identified as enslaved people.<sup>104</sup> These include personifications of captured nations, execution scenes, or captives kneeling in submission before a victorious general. I address the symbolism of elite art and iconography, including the *Gemma Augustea*, in Chapter Four: Enslavement. I argue that images which Bradley suggests show enslavement often convey the various stages of captive-taking, and do not necessarily always indicate enslavement.

Another key work on the Roman slave trade, Hopkins' *Conquerors and Slaves*,<sup>105</sup> makes no reference to enslaved people acquired as a result of warfare, but rather focusses on slavery as an institution within Roman society. Within this area of research there is a tendency to focus purely on the origins of enslaved people and to consider all captives as enslaved, rather than discussing the captive-taking process. It is likely, considering the primary references to the numbers taken during battle,<sup>106</sup> that the majority of captives did indeed become enslaved. However, this was not the only outcome for those who were taken captive, and this has not been addressed by scholars working within this area. Nor has the possibility of differing treatment, according to the socio-political or ethnic background of the captives, been addressed. Furthermore, discussion of the capture of enemy groups following a battle is useful in considering Roman Imperialism, as not all groups were enslaved: some were immediately executed, and others possibly allowed to return home. In this thesis, I outline in detail the aforementioned captive-taking practices, but argue that captives, regardless of their background or ultimate role in Roman society, could be utilised by the Roman elite for less tangible reasons than simply as enslaved workers. Rather, I suggest that the Roman elite and their audiences, elite and non-elite alike, recognised the realities of taking and managing captives, but used various aspects of the practice for political purposes, primarily to further the agenda of an individual or to further the Romans' Imperialist and militaristic ideologies.

### **c. Hostages**

The role of hostages in Roman foreign relations has been widely considered in recent years, especially in Allen's work on the subject which looks at various hostage

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<sup>103</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298.

<sup>104</sup> Dornseiff, 1944: 285-286. Dornseiff rather optimistically suggests Thusnelda makes an appearance on the Great Cameo of France.

<sup>105</sup> Hopkins, 1978.

<sup>106</sup> Thompson provides a detailed overview of the numbers taken by the Romans during warfare, cf. Thompson, 2003: 20-26 (300 BCE - 14 CE), 35-36 (the Roman Empire). Figures are usually unspecified or in the thousands. Cf. Scheidel, 2011: 287-289.

relationships, such as 'conqueror-trophy', 'creditor-collateral' and 'host-guest'.<sup>107</sup> His focus is on elite captives who were bound by treaties,<sup>108</sup> i.e. who were legally recognised and described in the literary sources as 'hostages'.<sup>109</sup> Allen does not consider the similarities between hostages and other types of captives, particularly individuals who were displayed in the same triumph position as their hostage counterparts, which I address in Chapters Five and Six. Furthermore, my discussion is not limited to those who are explicitly labelled as 'hostages', but rather considers the nature of the relationship between 'hostages' and Roman elite figures. For instance, individuals such as Dumnorix, a Gallic leader who supposedly betrayed Caesar during the Gallic Wars, was kept and used by Caesar in a manner which can only be described as akin to a hostage without ever being labelled as such. Therefore, my research considers the use of hostage-taking in both war, its immediate aftermath, and peace, the former an area which has not been fully explored in past scholarship.

Following a similar line to Allen's research, Mattern recognises the significant position held by elite hostages in the tactics of the Imperial regime. This is a view discussed in Braund's research on the Romans' relationship with client-kings.<sup>110</sup> However, Mattern and Allen's views, which stress the significance of hostages in Roman diplomacy, contradict those of Braund's, especially with regards to the education of hostages at Rome. Braund argues the children of foreign rulers were sent to Rome by their fathers and were useless as hostages as they had been dismissed from their native court. This links to Noy who briefly addresses the relatively comfortable position of elite hostages in Roman society.<sup>111</sup> However, both Braund and Allen later admit that relationships between Rome and her hostages were not always so cordial, but this is a factor they do not fully investigate. In Chapter Five: Hostage-taking, I examine how successful hostage-taking was in both war and peace, suggesting that hostage-taking was a flawed practice but one which the Romans could use and manipulate to their advantage in elite self-promotion.

However, whilst the aforementioned authors' research considers those referred to as hostages, using the terminology *obses* or ὄμηρος, their focus does not extend to those who were ransomed back to their families. Such individuals may not have been in the position to be used as diplomatic 'pawns' as the words *obses* or *homeros* (ὄμηρος) imply.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, there are examples of individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds who were ransomed for monetary rather than political purposes.<sup>113</sup> The

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<sup>107</sup> Allen, 2006.

<sup>108</sup> The treaties in question were usually following a foreign power's defeat at Roman hands, cf. Allen, 2006: 4-5, 12-14.

<sup>109</sup> Allen, 2006: 16-17. Allen considers the terms *obses* and ὄμηρος. He limits his research to only considering individuals who were referred to using such terms. However, there were individuals who were taken in hostage-like situations who were not called the aforementioned terms, cf. 130-169.

<sup>110</sup> Braund, 1984: 9-13.

<sup>111</sup> Mattern, 2002: 107-108, Noy, 2000: 67, 81, 106.

<sup>112</sup> OLD, 1222: *obses*. LSJ, 1221: ὄμηρος. Cf. Allen, 2006: 18.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. 8-11.

focus on those ransomed has been on Roman citizens, as discussed by Levy and Connolly.<sup>114</sup> Levy's research concerns the legality of ransoming and the return of citizens to Roman society from foreign captivity. Chiefly, his research considers the point at which a captive's pre-capture status was legally returned through the process of *postliminium*.<sup>115</sup> Levy and Connolly's research is of note for this thesis as it addresses how captive-taking was practised by cultures the Romans encountered. However, as I focus on Roman captive-taking of non-Roman individuals, their research is outside the scope of this thesis.

#### **d. Triumphs**

One of the features of Roman triumphs was the display of captive enemy troops, hostages, leaders and high-profile figures. Research on triumphs has been widespread over the past few decades beginning with Versnel's book on the subject, published in 1970.<sup>116</sup> Typically, previous research has focussed on the triumphant general and,<sup>117</sup> in recent years, the concept of the triumph has been researched as a movement, especially in monumental art featuring processions.<sup>118</sup> The triumph route and procession order are addressed in Chapter Six: Triumphs as they were used to convey the status of a captive, particularly in relation to the triumphator's chariot, and therefore discuss the treatment they were subjected to.

Beard and Östenberg in their research on the triumph have consistently addressed how captives were presented and treated during the procession. However, as a result of the nature of the primary evidence, there are limitations in studying captives through the ritual of the triumph. From the late Republic onwards, it is difficult to ascertain how many captives were displayed in triumphs and, possibly as a result, the ancient authors' focus shifts to prominent individuals. As Östenberg argues, the display of royalty was most highly praised, than that of their closest relatives by blood or marriage, followed by their military advisors.<sup>119</sup> Research prior to Beard and Östenberg's has pursued this line of inquiry, in keeping with the interests of the primary sources,<sup>120</sup> on royal captives who were displayed in triumphs.<sup>121</sup> Beard's *The Roman Triumph*, building on her earlier *Pegasus* article, discusses captives in detail,

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<sup>114</sup> Levy, 1943: 159-176, Connolly, 2006: 115-131.

<sup>115</sup> *Postliminium* refers to the rule that a Roman citizen, after being released from captivity, could regain the same status as before they were captured. There is much discussion as to who could begin the process, including the senate, wealthy senators, or family members of a captive, and at what point the former captives regained their status, cf. Levy, 1943: 159-60, Watson, 1961: 243-259, Garlan, 1975: 73.

<sup>116</sup> Versnel, 1970.

<sup>117</sup> Versnel, 1970, Lange, 2016.

<sup>118</sup> Favro, 2014: 85-102, Östenberg, 2015: 13-22, Leander Touati, 2015: 203-206, Popkin, 2016.

<sup>119</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 132-135.

<sup>120</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 134-135.

<sup>121</sup> The majority of scholarship on the triumph is concerned with its significance in Roman culture and largely ignores captives. Cf. Versnel, 1970, Favro, 2014: 85-102, Havener, 2014: 165-180, Gambash, 2015: 124-126, Lange, 2016, Popkin, 2016, Goldbeck, 2017: 103-124, Itgenshorst, 2017: 59-82, Meister, 2017: 83-102.

considering non-elites, women and children.<sup>122</sup> In certain cases, for instance the Germanic noblewoman Thusnelda and her son who were displayed in Germanicus' triumph of 15 CE, Beard takes into consideration the way in which they were captured and what little we know of their fate following the triumphal procession. However, there is no comparison between the treatment of either Thusnelda and her son, and other women and children in a similar position at all stages of their capture. In this thesis, I consider Thusnelda alongside female military leaders, such as Arsinoë and Cleopatra, and address how aspects of their presentation in the triumph link closely to the treatment of other captives, e.g. women as symbols of a nation and as bearers of legitimate offspring.

Another aspect of the triumph which has not been fully addressed in scholarship on this aspect of Roman culture is the method of execution used for captives at the end of the triumph. Versnel does not address execution, and Beard and Östenberg do not explore the methods of or motivations for execution as part of the triumph. It has generally been assumed that the few captives who were executed were strangled to death, an assumption which has not been challenged in previous scholarship. However, in this thesis, I explore the possible reasons for the assumption of strangulation, arguing that beheading or starvation were also methods of execution used in the triumph. I further discuss the reasons why strangulation or beheading, which is also referenced as a method of execution, were chosen by triumphators and the impact of this decision on the treatment and presentation of captives and the nations they represented. In addition, I also consider how the location of the execution, arguably in a prison setting, was used to stress the status of the individual and the severity of their actions against Rome. The example of executions in triumphs is a clear example of how the Roman elite's concern for representation informed their treatment of captives.

Triumphs are significant in literary sources as they are one of the only times when we learn the names of individual captives. Otherwise, captives largely belong to an abstract group. Many of the captives depicted on monumental arches and columns were arguably creations of the sculptor's imagination, with the 'barbarian' existing as a generalised figure in Roman thought. Differences could be distinguished but only through elaborate costumes which assisted in the creation of stereotypes.<sup>123</sup> As such, research on triumphs is one area which directly deals with how the Romans viewed and treated captives. However, little attention has been paid to the treatment captives received before their appearance in the triumph, and how this links to the elite's presentation of captives within the procession. As I have examined different types of treatment throughout captive-taking, I have therefore shown that the triumph was often represented by the elite as the final humiliation for elite captives.

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<sup>122</sup> Beard, 2005: 24-34.

<sup>123</sup> Wells, 1999: 187-189.



### e. Classical Art and Numismatics

The ways in which captives were presented in triumphs links closely with how they were depicted artistically. Research on Classical Art is the main area where captives are discussed. The majority of scholarship concerns the Imperial elite and monumental artwork, including depictions of captives on monuments, cameos and sarcophagi. Wade's short article discusses the presence of male 'prisoners of war' on coinage, without considering the different types of captives who were also depicted on coinage.<sup>124</sup> The development of the captive as a visual trope is discussed by De Souza who considers the relationship between Greek representations of the captive, namely male warrior figures, and the later Roman depictions which include female and child captives.<sup>125</sup> Uzzi views the presence of and focus on female and child captives in official state art as a means of stressing the destruction of the non-Roman family at the hands of the Roman state which is typically represented by male military figures and their families, particularly during the Imperial period.<sup>126</sup> Male and female figures are usually separated in art with the women (or occasionally male figures) holding or sitting beside a solitary child. This is another way in which contrast between the Imperial family and the captive 'barbarians' is created, particularly with implications of the Imperial family's fertility, surrounded by their children, and the captives' 'barrenness', holding their only child.<sup>127</sup>

The focus of the aforementioned works tends to be on the symbolic and artistic merits of monumental art pieces. Depictions of captives in artwork are useful in considering how other ethnic groups were represented, especially in terms of personified nations. Symbolism, such as the personifications of nations, was the most important factor in ensuring the message could be widely understood. However, there are instances in which we can argue the depictions of captives on monumental works indicate genuine forms of treatment captives received. For instance, whilst arguments concerning the symbolism of captive mothers separated from their male counterparts are relevant,<sup>128</sup> depictions of captive treatment on such scenes, such as on Trajan's column, are often not considered to be depictions of actual treatment. Indeed, where art is taken at 'face value', it has been used to argue that Rome maintained its enslaved population through warfare.<sup>129</sup> In recent scholarship, there does not appear to be a balance between viewing captive depictions as purely symbolic motifs and viewing the captives as representative of actual enslaved people. Not all captives were enslaved as slavery was merely one outcome of captivity, and this is something which is largely ignored.<sup>130</sup> My research outlines the different options elite Romans had when deciding

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<sup>124</sup> Wade, 1973: 230.

<sup>125</sup> De Souza, 2011: 31-37.

<sup>126</sup> Uzzi, 2007: 70-76.

<sup>127</sup> Ferris, 2000: 38-39, Uzzi, 2007: 61-81.

<sup>128</sup> Uzzi, 2007: 61-81.

<sup>129</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298-318. De Souza, 2011: 31-62.

<sup>130</sup> I have found one article which considers literal depictions of monumental art in a different research area to slavery. Dornseiff suggests the Grand Cameo of France features a captive Thusnelda and her child which, whilst lacking evidence from primary sources, shows an attempt to view the object without focussing purely on symbolism, *cf.* Dornseiff, 1944: 285-286.

on how to treat their captives, and how various forms of treatment were presented to their contemporaries. Throughout this thesis, I argue that artistic depictions were based on the actual treatment of captives which included mass execution, sexual violence, enslavement, hostage-taking, and performative events like the triumph. I analyse elite self-representation found in artistic and numismatic sources with an awareness of the variety of elite behaviours towards captives.

### **ix. Structure and approach**

Captives are commonplace in Roman literature, history and art. However, the literature review shows how the process of captive-taking has not been considered in detail in a cross-disciplinary format. In modern scholarship, captives have largely been dismissed as enslaved people, yet their role was more complex, and the treatment they were subjected to was by no means uniform but depended upon their social status and gender, and the Roman elite's concern for how their treatment of captives would be subsequently represented. This thesis explores the Romans' captive-taking process which was designed to humiliate and subdue an enemy. I have used examples of elite self-promotion to identify less tangible aspects of the captive-taking process.

Underpinning the captive-taking system was an ideology of Roman superiority and the treatment of captives enabled the Romans to continue to solidify power and justify Imperialism, thus continuing the process of captive-taking throughout Roman culture.

In this thesis, I use a chronological structure which aims to follow a captive's journey from when they initially fell under Roman control to the point at which they were executed, enslaved, displayed in a triumph, or entered elite Roman society as hostages. I begin in Chapter One by outlining the so-called 'Rules of War' which, in theory, dictated the treatment of captives. Chapter One also considers how captives could be used within warfare, including as messengers, envoys, for military intelligence, and as combatants with the Roman army. I continue to address wartime treatment of captives, including massacre, sexual violence and enslavement, (Chapters Two to Four respectively) before looking at hostage-taking (Chapter Five) and the treatment of captives in the Roman triumph (Chapter Six). The thesis can be divided roughly into two halves. The first deals with wartime treatment, and includes non-elite individuals who were killed or enslaved by the Romans, and the latter half primarily concerns elite persons who had political and diplomatic value to the Roman elite in their dealings with foreign nations.

I have taken the novel approach of primarily looking at the treatment of captives in wartime and soon after a nation's defeat, arguing that there was a recognised process by which captives were taken. By following a captive's journey from the point at which they were taken captive by the Romans, I consider stages of captive-taking which have not been explored in detail in previous scholarship, including considering gendered violence and treatment. I have therefore been able to consider how the treatment of captives, including massacre, sexual violence, and initial enslavement, was decided upon by the Roman elite, and carried out by the army. I have also taken into consideration how the Roman elite's concern for representation could have impacted their treatment of captives. This is an original approach as little attention within

scholarship had been paid to captives of all types as a group, the early stages of captive-taking, or how the elite chose to present their management and treatment of captives.

## Chapter One - The Rules of War and Captives' Military Value

### 1.1. The Rules of War

In the Introduction, we have seen how important the legal classifications within warfare are for captives in recent history. The Romans' understanding and application of the 'rules of war' are significant in any study of captive-taking, as they dictate the treatment captives could have received and provide a benchmark by which we can, and the Roman audience could, compare the treatment of different captives. It should be noted that the 'rules of war' in the Roman world are related only to the field of conflict. Ergo, unless the captives were designated a '*legatus*' (envoy) or war was ongoing, the rules do not extend to the treatment of prisoners following their capture, as they immediately passed into the jurisdiction of their captors, and were legally considered to be enslaved.<sup>131</sup> In Roman thought, it was a 'right of war' to kill any enemy whom they defeated in battle,<sup>132</sup> a prerogative akin to that of an enslaver's.<sup>133</sup> However, as we shall see throughout this thesis, the 'legalities' reflect the attitude towards captives, but not necessarily the treatment they received in actuality. This chapter concerns how the 'rules of war' were applied in conflict and focusses on how captives could be used as tools within warfare, and in elite writings as a means of illuminating the characteristics of a Roman leader, or an enemy commander or nation which could be used to later justify Roman aggression. The Roman's manipulation of their treatment of captives in line with the rules of war sets the scene for the rest of the thesis, where we see how expectations played out in reality and how a concern for representation influenced the Roman elite's treatment of captives.

The Romans 'rules of war' were unwritten and largely based on custom and primarily protected suppliants, oath-takers, and delegates.<sup>134</sup> Following conflict, the plunder of cities and destruction of crops and property was permitted, with soldiers usually acting on a general's orders or by a mutual understanding, as we shall see in the following two chapters on massacre and sexual violence.<sup>135</sup> The male Roman elite, at whom the works of literature we shall encounter throughout this thesis were primarily aimed, would have been educated in military affairs, including appropriate military conduct through the use of *exempla*.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, it is likely that an 'honour code' which dictated behaviour in warfare, pervaded through mythology and tradition to non-elite soldiers and the Roman public at large.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, the 'rules of war' were understood by most of in Roman society.

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<sup>131</sup> Just. *Cod. Iust.* 1.5.4.2, 1.5.5.1. The terms applied unless a previous agreement was still in force.

<sup>132</sup> Caes. *B. Gall.* 7.41.

<sup>133</sup> Wiedemann, 1981: 9-10, 15-35.

<sup>134</sup> Larson, Hornblower, 2003: 823, 1618, Mikalson, 2003: 1057.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. on page 52, on page 66.

<sup>136</sup> For the significance of *exempla* for elite males in furthering *mos maiorum*, cf. Nifong, 2000: 1081-1082, *exempla* in education in general, cf. Bloomer, 2015: 350-352, and in society generally, cf. Roller, 2018.

<sup>137</sup> Levithan, 2013: 35.

## 1.2. *Exempla* and the Battle of Cannae

Many supposed standards of treatment were disseminated through *exempla*, rather than through codified law, and illuminate how the Romans believed members of their own community should be treated and behave should they be captured in warfare. There are two *exempla* which clearly illuminate expectations of warfare. The first concerns Marcus Atilius Regulus, a Roman consul and general who was captured by Carthaginian forces in 255 BCE,<sup>138</sup> along with 500 of his men,<sup>139</sup> Some months later, Regulus was sent to Rome to negotiate a peace treaty or the exchange of prisoners.<sup>140</sup> Appearing before the senate, Regulus advised his fellow Romans to reject the terms offered by the Carthaginians, even though suing for peace would secure his freedom. Dio emphasises the change in Regulus' standing and position, claiming Regulus admitted that he was 'not a Roman' after being captured by the Carthaginians.<sup>141</sup> The change in his appearance is also noted, with claims that he appeared in the guise of a Carthaginian,<sup>142</sup> a costume change which links to representations of captives as a certain 'ethnicity'.<sup>143</sup> This *exemplum* conveys idealistic expectations, namely that those taken prisoner had their status reduced to that of human chattel, and were no longer 'Roman', as the two statuses were incompatible. Furthermore, in being taken captive in the first place, Roman captives had forfeited their right to be Roman in that they had 'voluntarily', through their 'cowardice',<sup>144</sup> reduced their status to that of an enslaved person, rather than die for Rome.

However, in the case of Regulus, he atoned for his non-Roman actions on the battlefield, i.e. his 'cowardice' in being taken prisoner, by sacrificing himself for Rome after his capture.<sup>145</sup> Regulus returned to the Carthaginians empty-handed, keeping his promise to return to them, but his failure to secure peace with Rome resulted in him being subsequently tortured to death by the means of sleep deprivation.<sup>146</sup> Seemingly, in contrast to the understanding the Romans had of the obedience of enslaved people,<sup>147</sup> they praised Regulus despite the fact that he had broken the oath he had sworn to his new 'masters'. Mix argues the First Punic War prompted the awakening of pride in being a 'Roman', with individuals like Regulus embodying typically Roman qualities.<sup>148</sup> Furthermore, it appears the Romans used the story of Regulus pragmatically, largely in order to emphasise 'Roman' qualities,<sup>149</sup> rather than drawing

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<sup>138</sup> Polyb. 1.34.8-11. For dating, cf. Mix, 1970: 15.

<sup>139</sup> Polyb. 1.34.9-12.

<sup>140</sup> App. 5.2.1, Cic. *Off.* 3.21-30, Dio 11 = Zonaras 8,15.

<sup>141</sup> Dio 11 = Zonaras 8.15.

<sup>142</sup> App. 5.2.1.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. pp. 23, 121-124, 184-186.

<sup>144</sup> Kapust, 2008: 356, De Libero, 2012: 93. The 'cowardice' sentiment is also echoed in Plaut. *Capt.* 263.

<sup>145</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 3.5.40-5. Similar cases of death as preferential to capture appear in *BHisp.* 23, cf. Nifong, 2000: 1078-1079.

<sup>146</sup> Polyb. 1.34.7-12, 1.35.1-10, Cic., *Off.* 3.21-30, Dio 11 = Zonaras 8,15.

<sup>147</sup> As evident in the manumission of enslaved people as a reward for loyalty and obedience, cf. Mouritsen, 2013: 61.

<sup>148</sup> Mix, 1970: 11-12.

<sup>149</sup> Including in legal and philosophical debate, cf. Mix, 1970: 32-48.

upon the 'cowardice' of his capture. This suggests that Regulus' status as a captive was largely dismissed in such debate as it was more serviceable for Roman writers to depict him as an honourable Roman, as opposed to a captive who disobeyed the orders of his enslavers. This would explain why, when Regulus was punished for his actions against the Carthaginians, the Romans sought revenge for his death. Learning of Regulus' execution, the Romans presented his family with Carthaginian captives and they too were killed by sleep deprivation. If Regulus had been seen only as a disobedient captive, the retribution would have been criticised, as Regulus' punishment as an enslaved person would have been just.

The character of Regulus, which was heavily embellished by later authors, embodies *Romanitas*, namely the 'set of traditionally esteemed moral standards (*mores*)'.<sup>150</sup> Despite the Romans claiming that captivity and *Romanitas* were incompatible, as symbolised by Regulus' costume change to that of a Carthaginian,<sup>151</sup> his captive status does not diminish his ability to demonstrate his innate *Romanitas*. Therefore, despite the shame surrounding his defeat and captive status, Regulus redeemed himself from his diminished position by displaying his *Romanitas* in his oath-keeping to the Carthaginians and care for the Roman state over his own well-being. This also appears to be the case for representations of Rome's enemies, in which an innate set of values is evident in some elite individuals. The Romans had to ensure that they were presenting their enemies as inherently 'noble', despite their defeat and the degraded status this signified. This enabled the Romans to demonstrate the extent and potency of Rome's power over enemies who could potentially challenge Roman dominion, whilst ultimately being defeated.<sup>152</sup>

However, it appears that such representations were reliant upon the social position of the individual in question. A corresponding case to Regulus is that of Roman soldiers captured at the Battle of Cannae by the Carthaginians in 216 BCE,<sup>153</sup> which we have briefly addressed in the introduction.<sup>154</sup> To summarise: after the capture of thousands of Roman soldiers, the Roman senate bought enslaved people and enlisted them into the army, promising them freedom after two years of service.<sup>155</sup> The cost of these people was so prohibitive that, when Hannibal offered to ransom the Roman captives,<sup>156</sup> the senate refused pay for the return of the captured Roman soldiers, citing the captives' supposed cowardice and the expense of the enlisted enslaved people as the reasons for their refusal.<sup>157</sup> Hannibal's offer was delivered to the senate by a number of captives who, like Regulus, were bound by oath to return to their

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<sup>150</sup> Holliday, 2005: 89.

<sup>151</sup> Dio, Book 11 = Zonaras 8.15.27-30.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. pp. 183-188.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Livy 22.57.17, App. *Hann.* 4. The two *exempla* were linked in the Roman mind, as evident in Cicero's use of them, cf. Cic. *de off.* 3.32.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. p. 10.

<sup>155</sup> Livy 22.57.11, 24.14.1-8, 24.18.12.

<sup>156</sup> Livy 22.58.4.

<sup>157</sup> Livy 22.60.6-24.

Carthaginian captors.<sup>158</sup> After receiving the senate's refusal, at least one of the messengers attempted to return home, thus breaking the oaths they had sworn to their new masters.<sup>159</sup> The senate ordered the messengers' return to the Carthaginians, not wishing for the Romans to appear as oath-breakers.<sup>160</sup> In the case of the Cannae captives, the non-elite soldiers who were sent as envoys were not presented as embodying the same *Romanitas* as Regulus, as they refused to return to their captors. This is the case for non-elite captives in Roman wars who are simply dismissed as being enslaved people,<sup>161</sup> rather than a discussion of their worthy attributes being stressed as this would not have served the best interests of the Roman elite in their representation of captives.

### 1.3. Justifying Rule-breaking

*Exempla* like that of Regulus, whilst highly literary or philosophical in nature, are borne of the society in which they were written,<sup>162</sup> thus they are indirectly indicative of the pragmatic way in which captives could be viewed and therefore treated, a feature which is evident throughout this thesis. As such, the 'rules of war' were idealised and we have evidence that suggests they were frequently disregarded, or manipulated to serve the Romans' or an individuals' agenda. This had a significant impact on the treatment captives received. One example of the 'rules' in action during warfare can be found in Caesar's commentaries on the Gallic Wars (58-50 BCE), and relates to captured *legati*.<sup>163</sup>

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to briefly outline the significance of Caesar's *Gallic Wars* as it is referred to throughout this thesis and is important for considering the process of captive-taking and how the elite presented the practice to their peers. Caesar's *Gallic Wars* is thought to be a revised version of despatches sent to the senate by Caesar from the frontline, and which were later published as a commentary.<sup>164</sup> The commentaries are the only surviving text written by a Roman general during the course of a war, and are evidence of wartime practices regarding captive-taking. The *Gallic Wars* is also a piece of self-promotion as Caesar was writing to his peers in the senate through the despatches and later to a wider audience in the form of published commentaries. As a piece of self-promotion, the commentaries are useful for reconstructing the universally understood but often implicit expectations of wartime conduct, and how the Roman elite presented their behaviour in relation to such expectations.

To return to the account in question, one of the supposedly universally understood practices was the protection and freedom of movement of deputies sent between

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<sup>158</sup> Livy 22.59.1-19.

<sup>159</sup> Livy 22.61.1-8.

<sup>160</sup> Livy 22.61.7-8.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. pp. 73-75, 91-115.

<sup>162</sup> For the case of Regulus, cf. Nifong, 2000: 1080-1083. For *exempla* generally, cf. Roller, 2018.

<sup>163</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.27, Dio 39.46.1-4. Another example concerns the Veneti, who planned to exchange captured Roman deputies for their troops in Roman hands, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 3.7-8.

<sup>164</sup> Edwards, 1917: xvi, Radin, 1918: 283-300. For an overview of scholarship on the composition of the *Gallic Wars*, cf. Riggsby, 2006: 9-15.

camps to discuss terms.<sup>165</sup> It appears to be accepted that the sending of deputies meant that warfare would not continue whilst talks were underway.<sup>166</sup> Caesar suggests it was unacceptable not only to abuse the deputies, but to turn them away when they were attempting to negotiate peace. Caesar draws the reader's attention to the recovery of the two translators, and Roman citizens, Gaius Valerius Procillus and Marcus Mettius.<sup>167</sup> They were both detained by the Germanic tribes whilst acting as Caesar's deputies which, in Roman thought, was a clear violation of the 'rules of war'.<sup>168</sup> The insult was further compounded by Caesar's claim that not only had the deputies been illegally captured, but the Germans planned to execute Procillus by burning him at the stake.<sup>169</sup> The death itself was not only horrific but associated in Roman culture with those who had committed crimes against the state, therefore it was not a death suitable for a Roman ally.<sup>170</sup> In contrast to the idealistic example of Regulus, there is no reference to the capture of these Roman citizens reflecting shamefully on them. This may be because the so-called 'rules' had been broken, and this ultimately gave Caesar a reason for attacking the Germanic tribes.

However, Caesar was also guilty of breaking these 'rules'. This is evident when Caesar detained Germanic nobles who sued for peace, despite the fact that they had approached Caesar for diplomatic discussions.<sup>171</sup> Caesar manages to divert criticism of his misuse of the 'rules of war' through his use of language. It is entirely a matter of semantics, as Caesar refers to Procillus and Metius as '*legati*',<sup>172</sup> whereas the Germans who intended to sue for peace, and were subsequently taken prisoner, are not granted any such title. In this instance, Powell argues that Caesar undermines his attempts at moral superiority,<sup>173</sup> yet Caesar justifies his actions by claiming that the Germans had sent deputies as a distraction, rather than a legitimate attempt at suing for peace.<sup>174</sup> Furthermore, presumably as he knew his actions would attract criticism, Caesar goes to great lengths to justify his decision not to accept deputations from the Germanic tribes after a series of attacks, one of which resulted in the death of a Roman ally, Piso of Aquitania.<sup>175</sup> Cicero, from the contemporary perspective of Caesar's peers, suggests that there was no mutual understanding in terms of legalities or rights which were shared between the Romans and Gauls and Germans.<sup>176</sup> However, Caesar presents the Gauls, Germans and Britons as playing by a set of rules of war which were universally

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<sup>165</sup> Peretz, 2006: 454, Ando, 2008: 494.

<sup>166</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.27, Dio 39.46.1-4.

<sup>167</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.53

<sup>168</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 3.9.

<sup>169</sup> This appears to be common practice amongst the Helvetii, *cf.* Caes. *BGall.* 1.4.

<sup>170</sup> Schmitz, 2011: 325-6.

<sup>171</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.13.

<sup>172</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.20.

<sup>173</sup> Powell, 1998: 125.

<sup>174</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.13.

<sup>175</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.12-13.

<sup>176</sup> Cic. *Prov. cons.* 8, 14.



understood and agreed upon.<sup>177</sup> Whether they did or not is negligible, as Caesar depicted them as doing so in order to appeal to his intended audience's cultural values, thus enabling him to justify military aggression when tribes did not abide by these rules. Therefore, the so-called 'rules of war' were only applicable when Caesar considered them to be so. Here, it is important to recognise that Caesar was highly pragmatic in his use of these rules and in his portrayal of the supposedly 'gentle' treatment captives received.

#### **1.4. Rule-breaking as an Indicator of Character**

In the historical context, captives in warfare could be used as a warning of the punishment which the enemy would face should they be captured. However, the way Romans and their enemies were presented as treating captives is essential to how an individual or nation's character or qualities were conveyed to the audience. We have seen how Caesar's behaviour in relation to the German envoys was carefully represented to avoid any implication of Caesar's wrongdoing. On the other hand, Greco-Roman authors could also stress the inappropriate conduct of an enemy. This justified Roman conduct as it was cast as retaliation for the enemy's abuse of the 'rules of war'.

For instance, the use of terrorisation was commonplace in warfare, although supposedly primarily practised by Rome's enemies. Mithridates ordered the mass killing of Roman citizens in Asia, outside the context of battle, and later left the bodies of Roman soldiers unburied in 62 BCE.<sup>178</sup> Mithridates is cast as a cruel figure who abused expectations of warfare, thus enabling pro-Pompeian historians like Cassius Dio and Plutarch to contrast Mithridates' savagery with Pompey's comparatively mild treatment of his captives.<sup>179</sup> Such a contrast was also created by individuals directly involved in their own self-promotion, as another example can be found in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*. In the winter of 54/53 BCE messengers, sent by Quintus Tullius Cicero, Marcus Cicero's brother, to Caesar during a siege, were captured and tortured by the besieging Gauls.<sup>180</sup> According to Caesar, the torture was conducted within view of Cicero's soldiers, and was evidently intended to terrify the onlooking Roman troops. There may be an element of exaggeration in Caesar's account, especially as he was not a first-hand witness to the events in question. However, considering that members of his forces were able to report back to Rome, including Quintus Cicero, the claims had to include an element of the truth. This 'display' of a kind was carried out with consideration of the impact it would have on the audience, as the treatment of captives was presented as being unusually cruel. As such, during warfare the impact that the

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<sup>177</sup> This is most evident in Caesar's dealings with the Veneti, who captured envoys and believed Roman victory would result in their enslavement, *cf.* Caes. *BGall.* 3.7-9.

<sup>178</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 39.1-2, Dio 36.12.4.

<sup>179</sup> Dio Cass. 36.9.1. Other examples can be found in texts relating to the Second Punic War in Hannibal's treatment of Gallic and Roman prisoners of war, *cf.* Livy 21.42.1, Pliny *HN* 8.7.1, Charles, Rhodan, 2007: 381-2.

<sup>180</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.45.

display of captives had on the enemy could be exploited. However, it also acted as a means of attacking the character of the Gauls and justifying further military action.

In historical reality, prisoner 'abuse' in the Roman world during conflict was more commonplace than the ideology would suggest. This links closely to Wallace's article on the causes of prisoner abuse in modern warfare,<sup>181</sup> in which he outlines the scenarios in which the likelihood of abuse increases.<sup>182</sup> Wallace's arguments are based on examples from recent history, and what we would consider 'abuse' is not in line with Roman thinking. Nevertheless, Wallace's study can be retroactively applied as a number of factors he considers appear to be present within Roman warfare and its customs. One factor concerns the increased chance of abuse if the laws of war have not been ratified, which is certainly the case for warfare in the Mediterranean world where there was no concept of international law.<sup>183</sup> Secondly, Wallace also argues that abuse is more likely if the adversary is considered to be fundamentally 'beyond the pale of Civilization', an assessment which is often based on race or religious background. These two factors are important in considering the Romans' captive-taking, as they were operating within a world in which different societies had different rules of warfare. Burton argues that the subtleties within the understanding of surrender (*deditio*) show that there was some form of international law, universally understood by some of those the Romans encountered, including the Greeks and Israelites.<sup>184</sup> Furthermore, as Garcia Riazia discusses,<sup>185</sup> Spanish and Gallic societies certainly had diplomatic procedures which were not completely alien to their Roman counterparts. Typically, official surrender was the only time in which some leniency was shown.<sup>186</sup> Should an enemy choose to fight until the bitter end, they would be entirely at the mercy of the conqueror. As such, it was universally understood that, once a nation was defeated, they were subject to the discretion of the victor.<sup>187</sup>

Nevertheless, in situations when the Romans invoked legalities, they were applying their own legal or cultural practices to situations which are likely to have been viewed differently by outsiders.<sup>188</sup> A clear example of this is the Romans' staging of 'surrender scenes'. Part of the conclusion of victory was the ritual of surrender which was carried out by the defeated enemy. Caesar refers to surrender enacted by deputies which occurred during active military campaigns, and included the envoys lying prostrate before him,<sup>189</sup> after which the enemy surrendered their arms, hostages, and returned any deserters.<sup>190</sup> Another form of surrender was passing defeated soldiers 'under the yoke' (*passum sub iugum*) which was used to indicate complete subjugation of an

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<sup>181</sup> Wallace, 2012: 955-981.

<sup>182</sup> Wallace, 2012: 956-957.

<sup>183</sup> Bederman, 2001: 89-90, Larson, Hornblower, 2003: 823.

<sup>184</sup> Burton, 2009: 237.

<sup>185</sup> Garcia Riazia, 2015: 15-41.

<sup>186</sup> Levithan, 2013: 50.

<sup>187</sup> Sanz, 2015: 87-105.

<sup>188</sup> Wiedemann, 1986: 478-488.

<sup>189</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.27.3.

<sup>190</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.28.2. Further examples at Caes. *BGall.* 2.13.1, 6.3.

enemy.<sup>191</sup> It is debatable as to how ritualistic this form of surrender was, i.e. if there really was a yoke involved or if it was merely a symbolic reference to an enemy's defeat. As we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter Six, the yoke was typically used to harness oxen in agricultural practices. Therefore, soldiers passing under the yoke were cast as docile animals, thus indicating a change in their status from free to enslaved person under the authority of the enemy.<sup>192</sup> The surrender scene, whether it involved yokes or lying prostrate, was designed to humiliate the enemy in Roman thought.<sup>193</sup> For instance, the Samnites used the yoke against the Romans after the Battle of the Caudine Forks in 321 BCE, which was remembered as a shameful defeat in the centuries that followed.<sup>194</sup> If indeed the defeated Roman soldiers did actually pass under the yoke, as opposed to later authors referring to the ritual for symbolism, the Samnites used their knowledge of Roman customs and understandings to further damage the reputation of their enemy.<sup>195</sup> Therefore, the example of Caudine Forks may indicate a universal understanding of surrender scenes and symbolism. However, the Samnites lived on the Italian peninsula and would have had access to information about the Romans. Furthermore, the 'surrender scene' trope appears in the histories of Rome's wars across the Mediterranean, and it is unlikely that from people from such diverse backgrounds as Gaul, Numidia, and Pontus would surrender in the exact same sequence. The common denominator in all the surrender scenes was the Romans who orchestrated the scene and exploited its symbolism with their victorious narratives and commemorations. Overall, the Romans' understanding of surrender was partly based on their understanding of their own laws, as other nations would not have subscribed to the same legalities, and the representations present within their literature.

By claiming that all nations they encountered obeyed the same rules of conflict, the Romans, as victors writing their own history, were able to manipulate the presentation of the enemy's use, or misuse, of the rules in order to emphasise the enemy's negative characteristics, or justify the Romans' treatment of the enemy which included the taking of captives.

### 1.5. Military Intelligence

Within warfare, the primary use of captives was as a means of gathering military intelligence, as they were active participants in warfare.<sup>196</sup> No formal espionage organisation existed in this time period,<sup>197</sup> and the majority of evidence was gathered from captives taken during warfare, from occasional reconnaissance missions, and

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<sup>191</sup> Wickham discusses 'the yoke' in detail, stating that the first time it was used was in 457 BCE, Wickham, 2014: 34-5, *cf.* Livy 3.28.10, 67.6, Flor. *Epit.* 1.5.13, Val. Max. 2.7.7.

<sup>192</sup> Outside of warfare, the 'yoke' could also be used as a form of purification, *cf.* Wickham, 2014: 34-5.

<sup>193</sup> *Cf.* Ash, 1998: 34-6, De Libero, 2012: 36-7, Wickham, 2014: 35-7.

<sup>194</sup> *Cf.* App. 6, Aul. Gel. 17.21.36, Cic. *Off.* 30.109, Dio 8.36.10, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 16.1.4, Flor. 1.11.11, Livy 9.4.3, 6.1, 6.3, 15.4, 23.42.7, 25.6.12, Val. Max. 7.2.17.

<sup>195</sup> Ash discusses the different forms of symbolism associated with surrender scenes, including issues around blindness and fate, *cf.* Ash, 1998: 27-44.

<sup>196</sup> Austin, Rankov, 1995: 67, Sheldon, 2007: 19-20.

<sup>197</sup> Sheldon, 2007: 164-171.

from allies who acted as 'early warning systems' for the Romans.<sup>198</sup> Our major sources on military intelligence are Caesar and Hirtius, the supposed writer of the eighth book of Caesar's *Gallic Wars*,<sup>199</sup> although similar examples are found across Greco-Roman writing pertaining to this period. In contrast to Caesar, Hirtius supplies specific details on what was asked of captives. The information which Hirtius, a soldier actively involved in Caesar's campaigns, provides can be used as a paradigm for intelligence-gathering in this period.<sup>200</sup> This was the case for Bellovacian soldiers who had been sent to spy on the Roman army, and who were subsequently captured by their quarry.<sup>201</sup> Hirtius claims that they revealed, under questioning, the following details: who the enemies' allies were, where they were camped, who was in charge, what their plans were, and how many troops the enemy had.<sup>202</sup> The information was then verified by checking with multiple prisoners or deserters.<sup>203</sup> Hirtius does not state that these were the questions which were asked, but the inclusion of such details in his account suggests that this was standard practice, and is supported by examples throughout Caesar's works. Other encounters with prisoners narrated by Caesar corroborate Hirtius' series of questions, as the details are invariably the same as those the Bellovaci supplied.<sup>204</sup> The intelligence provided by captives can be placed into three categories: information pertaining to strategic or topographical information, ethnographical and cultural concerns, and politics and internal rivalries. The application of the intelligence depended upon the type of war, or the context in which it was gathered.

There is little doubt that the use of military intelligence was practised by all sides and was an important aspect of the Romans' success in warfare.<sup>205</sup> Strategic and topographical information was provided by captives, of all levels of authority,<sup>206</sup> which no doubt informed the Romans' military decisions. However, references to captive intelligence enabled Greco-Roman writers to illuminate aspects of an enemy's culture, and the Roman commander's characteristics. For instance, the use of captive testimony after the fact, as apparent in Caesar's works,<sup>207</sup> enabled Roman commanders to not only further boast of their achievements, but also demonstrates their attempt at creating a sense of objectivity within their works, or later authors' presentations of their deeds. For Caesar, in addition to his use of the third person, the inclusion of a captive voice enabled him to include a non-Roman perspective, stress communication

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<sup>198</sup> Sheldon, 2007: 36.

<sup>199</sup> Austin, Rankov, 1995: 68.

<sup>200</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.2-4, 2.16-17.

<sup>201</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 8.7.

<sup>202</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 8.7, 8.17.

<sup>203</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.18, 7.72, 8.8, 8.26.

<sup>204</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.22, 1.50, 2.2-4, 2.16, 3.23, 5.8, 5.9, 5.18, 5.48, 7.18, 7.71-72, 8.7. Caesar's lieutenants also appear to gather similar information, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 3.3, 8.17, 8.26, 8.36-38.

<sup>205</sup> For uses of foreign military intelligence in Caesar's wars, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 3.23, 5.42, 6.35, 6.37, 6.39, 7.37.

<sup>206</sup> Austin, Rankov, 1995: 67-68.

<sup>207</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.8, 5.48, 5.52.

problems within the region,<sup>208</sup> and boast of the prowess and power of his forces.<sup>209</sup> The presentation of captive intelligence is evident in the depictions of enemy captives providing false information. In actuality, there is little doubt that some of the information provided was inaccurate, and such 'treachery' displayed by the enemy was an important characteristic to emphasise for a Roman commander.

This closely links, as we shall see in the discussion on triumphs, with how generals or Greco-Roman writers chose to present the enemy to maximise support for their agenda. Put simply: the enemy needed to be both worthy of Rome's greatest generals, whilst lacking the civilised characteristics which may have prompted the Romans to question the force they used against other nations, even ones considered inferior. The more powerful the enemy, the higher the victorious commander's prestige was amongst the people of Rome. As Clark argues, it was important for Romans to include references to their own defeat within their narratives, as it enabled them to emphasise a sense of triumph in contrast to the defeat, or commemorate fallen Roman soldiers.<sup>210</sup> I would add that, by including discussion of defeat, ancient authors were able to create an opportunity to justify the actions of Roman generals past and present, as we shall see shortly. Such justification ensured that Roman defeat was never portrayed as being a direct result of a Roman mistake, and this is possibly why the Romans went to great lengths to stress the treachery of their enemies.

### 1.6. Deceitful Captives

The inclusion of treacherous behaviour in relation to the captive enemy may have been the result of a Roman general generating excuses for his campaign failures, possibly in communication to the senate. The 'treacherous captive' is a common trope found across Greco-Roman literature. A particularly pertinent example is found in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, and relates to Caesar's dealings with Ambiorix, the Eburones' chief. The Roman lieutenant-general Titurius was killed after going to parlay with Ambiorix, who had promised his protection.<sup>211</sup> Ambiorix's men further showed their deceptive and treacherous nature when they were captured and pretended that Ambiorix was just out of sight, despite their knowledge of his exact whereabouts.<sup>212</sup> This loyalty to their leader enabled Ambiorix to escape.<sup>213</sup> He was never caught, but in a final attempt to capture him many of his allies were killed and devastation caused.<sup>214</sup> However, as Hirtius appears to argue, it was not a wasted effort for the Roman troops.<sup>215</sup> Thus, in a way, it was not dishonourable for the Romans to have let one of their enemies go, despite his improper actions in warfare. In this respect, the reference to foreign treachery could be used as an excuse for Roman generals who made mistakes. It was

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<sup>208</sup> For instance, when Titurius and Cotta's demise went unreported, at Caes. *BGall* 5.52, cf. Caes. *BGall*. 5.48.

<sup>209</sup> As with the British captives describing the size of Caesar's fleet at: Caes. *BGall* 5.8.

<sup>210</sup> Clark, 2014: 208-213, cf. Cooley, 2012: 85-86.

<sup>211</sup> Caes. *BGall*. 5.36-5.37.

<sup>212</sup> Caes. *BGall*. 6.43.

<sup>213</sup> The loyalty Ambiorix inspired is also referenced at: Caes. *BGall*. 6.30.

<sup>214</sup> Caes. *BGall*. 8.24-25.

<sup>215</sup> Caes. *BGall*. 8.24-25.

not about the commander's actions, but the enemy breaking the rules of war which, in turn, could justify excessive force such as massacre.<sup>216</sup>

### 1.7. The 'Inferior' Enemy

It was necessary for Roman generals to justify their often aggressive and extensive military campaigns, which involved excessive force even by Roman standards.<sup>217</sup> Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, Britain and Germany between 58 and 51 BCE are a case in point, and his commentaries highlight how important it was to emphasise multiple reasons for military action, particularly in the initial period of Caesar's campaigns which were closely associated with his controversial consulship of 59 BCE.<sup>218</sup> Despite the focus on their warrior culture, the 'inferior' character of Caesar's enemies is emphasised throughout his commentaries. This serves to denigrate them further in the eyes of the Roman audience, with their cultural practices being presented as irrational and savage. For instance, after Ariovistus, the leader of the Germanic Suebi, avoided attacking Roman troops, the prisoners explained to Caesar how the matrons had consulted the omens and advised Ariovistus to delay an attack until after the full moon.<sup>219</sup> Caesar exploited this information, and set out to provoke an offensive.<sup>220</sup> Caesar may have included this detail for dramatic effect, heightening the tragedy, as Ariovistus later attacked the Romans, ignoring the women's divine advice, and was routed. Later authors are less interested in how Caesar came about this information, including Plutarch, who just says Caesar learned of this, rather than from whom.<sup>221</sup> Dio does not suggest that Caesar was aware of the prophecy, instead focussing on Ariovistus' role in his own downfall.<sup>222</sup> Furthermore, given that Caesar tells us of the social and religious hierarchy of Gallic culture, we are aware that the druids, who could be women, were the most respected members of society. Ariovistus is presented as going against the women's religious advice, thus committing hubris. Caesar appears to present himself as well versed in Gallic culture,<sup>223</sup> and further used this knowledge to manipulate the situation on the ground, and present explanations for his military tactics and those of his enemy.<sup>224</sup> In addition, given the Romans' disdain for other religious practices, it is likely that Caesar used the prisoners' information as a means of emphasising the Gauls' superstitions, a feature of their culture which the Romans were disdainful of, thus stressing the 'otherness' of the enemy. Ultimately, the inclusion of such details enabled Caesar to practise careful self-representation, which was clearly successful, given Dio and Plutarch's later comments.

The contrast between Caesar and later authors' references to his captive-taking outlines the different uses of captives. On face value, Caesar shows that he could use captives to

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<sup>216</sup> For instance, Caes. *BGall.* 7.11.

<sup>217</sup> A point we shall discuss in more detail in the following chapter, *cf.* pp. 45-49.

<sup>218</sup> Dyson, 1968: 345, Osgood, 2009: 330-333.

<sup>219</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.50, Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 19.4.

<sup>220</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.50.

<sup>221</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 19.4.

<sup>222</sup> Dio 38.48.1-4.

<sup>223</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.13-14.

<sup>224</sup> Webster, 1999: 1-20.

acquire intelligence, and that he understood the power of cultural issues in dictating an enemy's actions. Furthermore, this example demonstrates that Caesar was aware of the use of captives to further his political agenda. He was directly involved in his own political self-representation and was using captives specifically to promote himself and his campaign to the Roman political classes. On this note, Caesar presents throughout his commentaries as a protector of Roman interests. This was crucial, both in military and political terms. Firstly, by waging war on foreign enemies, he was overstepping his jurisdiction as he had no legal right to act without the authority of the senate. Despite his attempts, later authors writing of the Gallic Wars were not fooled, as Cassius Dio suggests when he writes of the soldiers' malcontent during the war with Ariovistus.<sup>225</sup> Therefore, in order to continue his command, Caesar needed to stress that he was acting solely for Rome's interests, despite such acts enriching himself financially, politically and militarily. It was also imperative for Caesar to ensure his command continued, as he risked legal ramifications for his consulship if he lost military and political power. It was necessary for Caesar to justify both his acts of aggression and the times when he refrained from military action, especially when facing an enemy who had made violent overtures to Rome.

However, later authors are less interested in Caesar's political promotion, thus they appear to be less inclined to consider the role of captives in political discourse. This may account for how Dio used the prophecies to show how Ariovistus was hubristic in failing to take the advice given to him by the gods. Dio's description may have been linked to the numerous warnings, including through divinations, Caesar received, yet ignored, before his death.<sup>226</sup> Later authors may have used hindsight to allude to certain aspects of Caesar's life and religious habits, by using Caesar's own writings. The information that was supposedly provided by captives relating to culture is significant as it fleshes out the enemy for the Roman audience who would have had limited exposure to the Gauls. Caesar effectively introduced different types of lands and peoples to the Roman people through his writings, with Cicero complaining that it was hard to keep track of Caesar's travels.<sup>227</sup> The Romans' ignorance of foreign peoples could be exploited for the advantage of the Roman commander. Caesar harnessed the Romans' fear of the Gauls, who were considered to be belligerent and savage.<sup>228</sup> It is evident from Caesar's description of the Gauls' cultural habits in Book Six of the *Gallic Wars* that he had studied their behaviour and traditions,<sup>229</sup> yet he emphasises characteristics which presented the Gauls as a threat to civilisation as the Romans knew it. Osgood argues that Caesar's *Gallic Wars* do not bear the hallmarks of the 'us

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<sup>225</sup> Dio 38.35.1-2.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 86-87, Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 62-66, Dio 44.18.

<sup>227</sup> Cic. *Prov. cons.* 9.22, cf. Dyson, 1968: 346. Suet. *Iul.* 25.2. further claims that the British nations were unknown before Caesar's invasion. Despite traders having connections with Rome before Caesar's invasion, the later attitude present in Suetonius shows that Caesar was considered to be a conqueror of unexplored lands.

<sup>228</sup> Dyson, 1968: 342, Woolf, 2011: 60-61.

<sup>229</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.13-28. Cf. Dyson, 1968: 344, Garland, 2003: 35, Wyke, 2008: 44.

vs. them' descriptions typical of Greco-Roman ethnography.<sup>230</sup> However, Caesar emphasises the Gauls' supposed savage qualities throughout his works, building upon a tradition found in Posidonius (via Strabo),<sup>231</sup> and also attributed similar traits to the British and Germanic tribes he encountered.<sup>232</sup> Thus, Caesar not only utilised the Romans' understanding of the northern peoples, but was partly responsible for shaping and perpetuating the tradition.<sup>233</sup> Caesar was then able to harness this tradition to further his political agenda, particularly in light of his controversial consulship and insecure command, which enabled him to further raise his own profile.

Caesar is not unique in exploiting the Romans' prejudice against foreign nations, yet his commentaries are the only first-hand account of a Roman general engaged in a foreign war which survive, and they demonstrate how personal promotion, aimed at a Roman audience, could begin on campaign. This is significant when considering how Roman commanders utilised intelligence pertaining to political rivalries within an enemy culture. Sulla, Pompey and Caesar are all presented by ancient historians, and by Caesar himself, as understanding and using their enemies' internal political divisions for Rome's benefit.<sup>234</sup> A general's understanding of the internal politics of the region in which he was embroiled were used to present him as a knowledgeable commander, capable of employing his troops, foreign peoples, and the terrain for his (thus Rome's) advantage. All these factors enabled the commander to be presented as a resourceful and militarily competent, or the opposite in critical works.

Furthermore, the information provided is also telling of the Romans' concerns outside of battle, namely what they hoped to acquire from the lands which they occupied. For instance, intelligence provided could help determine where non-combatants were located, as with the women, children and elderly of the Nervii during Caesar's Gallic Wars.<sup>235</sup> Evidently, the Nervii were aware of the risks posed to their non-combatants, including execution or enslavement, as those unable to fight were hidden in areas protected by marshes.<sup>236</sup> The very fact that Caesar records such details suggests that Caesar wanted to present himself as being a resourceful and knowledgeable leader who knew where valuable human chattel was located. Furthermore, Marcus Antonius was supposedly disappointed to have taken only 30 captives during his Parthian Wars

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<sup>230</sup> Osgood, 2009: 332-333.

<sup>231</sup> Strabo, *Geog.* 4.1.1, cf. Riggsby, 2006: 47-50.

<sup>232</sup> Garland, 2003: 35.

<sup>233</sup> Riggsby, 2006: 57-58, Osgood, 2009: 328. As evidence, despite 'Gaul' being a construction of the Roman imagination, Caesar helps shape it by claiming that Gaul was divided into three parts (Caes. *BGall.* 1.1), and Strabo continues this tradition.

<sup>234</sup> For Sulla, cf. Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 5.3-6. For Pompey's manipulation of the Eastern kingdoms, cf. Fields, 2008: 98-99. Caesar also manipulated rivalries in northern Europe throughout his Gallic Wars, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 4.15-16, Murphy, 1977: 234-235.

<sup>235</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.16-17. Plunder was also a consideration, as we shall see later in the discussion on triumphs cf. Deutsch, 1924: 503-505.

<sup>236</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.16-17, Dio 39.3.1-2. At Caes. *BGall.* 3.28, the Morini and Menapii also use the woods as a place of protection. As do the Suebi at Caes. *BGall.* 4.19, and the British at Caes. *BGall.* 5.9, 5.21.



(40-33 BCE).<sup>237</sup> It is likely that this figure derived from hostile sources, yet Plutarch's interest in recording such details shows that the Greco-Roman authors expected that successful military campaigns should result in large-scale captive-taking.<sup>238</sup> The Greco-Roman authors would not have reported such details unless they were concerned about the capture of enemies, whether or not the enemy was actively involved in warfare. This has implications on claims that the Romans were reluctant Imperialists, acting only to defend their territory.<sup>239</sup> Caesar's inclusion of such details alludes to his plan in taking captives, without directly stating that it was his intention. The Romans were seemingly uncomfortable with an assumption of victory which prioritised captive-taking, as it was a sign of hubris. This was the case during Marcus Antonius's father's attack on the Cretans in 67 BCE, in which he (supposedly) transported more chains than weapons. His fleet was pushed back by the Cretans, and his captured soldiers' bodies were hung as a display of Cretan victory.<sup>240</sup> In this instance, the soldiers' bodies acted as physical symbols of Rome's defeat, and of Antonius' hubris in assuming his victory was a foregone conclusion. However, the Cretans are depicted in other sources as breaking agreements with Rome,<sup>241</sup> and their horrific use of Roman citizens' bodies casts a greater shadow on their reputation than Antonius' arrogance did on his.

### 1.8. Captives as Combatants

There are instances in which captives were used as active participants in warfare on the captors' side, including the use of captives to supplement military forces.<sup>242</sup> By the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, the practice appears to have died out in Roman warfare, probably because expansion enabled the army to recruit greater numbers, which was pivotal to the Romans' reliance on manpower for success.<sup>243</sup> However, it appears that other nations continued to utilise captives within their armies, and there are cases in which Romans were offered their lives in exchange for joining the enemy side. For instance, the Italians supposedly enrolled captive Romans (αἰχμάλωτος) into the military during the siege of Nola in 90 BCE.<sup>244</sup> The majority agreed, although there were others who were starved to death because they refused to capitulate to their captors. This was an exceptional circumstance and was not practised by the Romans but by their enemies at the time. This incident enabled the Romans to paint their former enemies as breaking the 'rules of war', heading a partly enslaved army, and abusing captives who practised integrity. The inclusion of captured combatants within warfare was probably useful, although explicit references to such practice were used to indicate political or civil unrest, such as the Social Wars which were fought on the Italian peninsula, or in later

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<sup>237</sup> Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 39.5.

<sup>238</sup> As we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter Four, *cf.* pp. 63-171.

<sup>239</sup> For views on 'defensive' or 'reluctant' Roman Imperialism, *cf.* North, 1981: 1-9. However, the attitude has largely been dismantled by more recent scholarship, *cf.* De Souza, 1996: 131, Adler, 2006: 383, Fields, 2008: 98, Mattingly, 2011: 15-18.

<sup>240</sup> Florus, *Epit.* 1.42.1-4.

<sup>241</sup> Diod. Sic. *fr.* 40.1.

<sup>242</sup> Morrison, 1988: 251-253.

<sup>243</sup> Erdkamp, 2006: 286.

<sup>244</sup> App. *B Civ.* 1.5.42-43.

history, the enrolment of 'savage' tribesmen into the army during the turbulent 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE.<sup>245</sup> However, using captives as combatants may have posed problems in terms of revolts from within Roman organisations and society.<sup>246</sup>

Furthermore, captives could be used in warfare to strike terror into the enemy or test their loyalties. We have seen evidence of the Gallic torture of Roman prisoners, yet high-profile captives could also be displayed to discourage continued warfare. The captives in question were technically held hostage, although they were not referred to using hostage-specific terms,<sup>247</sup> as they were being used to force others to behave in a certain way. For instance, during the Social Wars, one of the Italian allies captured the Roman-held Oxynta, the son of Jugurtha, and showed the Romans' Numidian allies the captive prince.<sup>248</sup> A sense of 'exhibition' is present within this example as the Italians displayed Oxynta on the city walls and dressed him in purple, the colour closely associated with royalty and the senatorial elite in Rome. Here, we see how a sense of display could be utilised as a weapon within war. In this case, it was successful, as the Numidians refused to continue attacking Nola during the siege and were sent home.<sup>249</sup>

### 1.9. Chapter Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, individuals taken during warfare were certainly useful to the Romans as a means of gaining intelligence, or as combatants. However, their treatment was of less concern to Greco-Roman authors than their use in self-representation. Greco-Roman authors presented elite Roman individuals as using rivalries between foreign parties to both further the Roman expansionist agenda and promote generals' qualities, which could be negative and positive. These two factors are evident in the Romans' use of captives, the manipulation of diplomatic practices, and subsequent representations of captive-taking in elite self-promotion. The use of captives and the ways in which the captives, rather than the Romans, are presented as behaving on the battlefield perpetuated and cemented the concerns the Roman audience would have held regarding foreign parties. The disdainful attitude towards enemies, primarily stemming from Roman views on their ethnic background and their non-Roman status, ultimately dictated their treatment rather than the 'rules of war'. On this note, 'the rules' were used pragmatically, and usually when they were beneficial, or even damaging, to the Roman commander's image depending upon the author's agenda. Gruen argues that an enemy's poor treatment of Roman captives and their allies allowed Greco-Roman writers to create a contrast,<sup>250</sup> which cast Roman generals in a positive light or else stressed the need for military action against a cruel enemy commander. Caesar's works demonstrate how this contrast was a feature which could

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<sup>245</sup> Rostovtzeff, Fraser, 1926: 467.

<sup>246</sup> Spartacus and the other leaders of the Third Servile Revolt (73-71 BCE) were supposedly prisoners of war who had been enslaved, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Crass.* 8-11, *App. B Civ.* 1.116-21, *Flor. Epit.* 2.8.

<sup>247</sup> *Cf.* pp. 7-9.

<sup>248</sup> *App. B Civ.* 1.5.42-43.

<sup>249</sup> *App. B Civ.* 1.5.42-43.

<sup>250</sup> Roman ethnography relied upon links to and contrast between the Romans' self-perception and how they perceived others, *cf.* Gruen, 2006: 459-463.

be harnessed for the self-promotion of Roman generals, and Roman Imperialism generally.<sup>251</sup> The emphasis on the contrast enabled Greco-Roman writers to justify both violent reactions during warfare, and the expense which prolonged campaigns could entail. For instance, Pompey's involvement in the Mithridatic War, which was vastly expensive, and Caesar's extensive campaigns in Gaul, which saw a million people killed or enslaved, could be justified to the Roman people through the emphasis on the enemies' rule-breaking atrocities and their ethnic inferiority.

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<sup>251</sup> Murphy, 1977: 234.

## Chapter Two - Massacre

### **2.1. Introduction**

Following the defeat of an enemy city or camp, Roman commanders could decide to kill the inhabitants, sexually assault and enslave them, or allow them to go free. Usually, this is the only information we can glean, as the Roman authors did not usually relate the aftermath of war in detail.<sup>252</sup> This chapter is concerned with massacre whilst the following two chapters address sexual violence and enslavement. It is necessary to consider why the choice to carry out mass executions was made, the way in which such violent events were presented in elite self-promotion, and how this affects our understanding of Roman captive-taking. Firstly, it is important to outline why massacre is even considered in this project. Those who were killed by the Romans in semi-orchestrated massacres, both on the battlefield and in siege warfare, were captives of a kind. Granted, they may not have been referred to as captives and their time in Roman custody may only have been for a short duration. However, they were in Roman power in these circumstances, and had the potential to be captives if Roman commanders chose to keep them alive.

There is little doubt that massacre took place in the Roman world, despite the lack of detailed references made to it within literary sources. We have corroborating literary and archaeological evidence, primarily from Caesar's campaigns in northern Europe, which supports the fact that massacre, possibly at times bordering on genocide,<sup>253</sup> was commonplace in Roman warfare. As outlined in the previous chapter, Caesar's work is the only evidence written first-hand by a Roman general on campaign. Given the heavy self-promotional aspect of his commentaries, his writings and how he presents his actions must be considered, given the lack of other first-hand accounts, as in keeping with Roman military practices at large. Therefore, they are invaluable to this study, particularly captive-taking during military campaigns. As we shall see, the circumstances in which captives were taken partly dictated their treatment, and we should consider the difference between the two main contexts: open and siege warfare.

### **2.2. Open and Siege Warfare**

Captives could be taken following open combat or during siege warfare. As ancient warfare was typically conducted by male combatants, battles usually entailed the capture of males, whereas siege warfare enabled the Romans to take the elderly, women, and children.<sup>254</sup> Levithan stresses the Romans' attitudes towards, and difference between, open combat and siege warfare.<sup>255</sup> Ideally, open combat was preferable to siege warfare both in terms of morality and strategy, as the enemy had the advantage of defences during a siege. The key issues at stake are embodied within

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<sup>252</sup> Levithan, 2013: 47-79.

<sup>253</sup> Roymans, 2018b: 51-57.

<sup>254</sup> As in Caes. *BAfr.* 18.4, *BHisp.* 41.

<sup>255</sup> Levithan, 2013: 18-21.

Cicero's *De Officiis*, in which he discusses the morality of war and addresses the correct behaviour of the military following the siege of a city.<sup>256</sup>

*As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness.*

*And it is a great man's duty in troublesome times to single out the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honourable course.*<sup>257</sup>

De evertendis autem diripiendisq; urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter.

Idque est magni viri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere.

We should remember here that Cicero did not claim to excel in military affairs, and he is certainly not remembered today for his guile in battle. Granted, Cicero underwent basic military training and had presumably carried out raids during his time as governor in Cilicia, judging by his acquisition of captives from the region.<sup>258</sup> However, he was certainly not accustomed to long-term military campaigns. As such he speaks of military matters at a distance, and with philosophy at the forefront of his mind. On this matter, Kries argues that Cicero's *De Officiis* is a philosophical text, intended to encourage and hone young members of the elite in Republican ideology following Caesar's assassination.<sup>259</sup> Therefore, Cicero's presentation of warfare is highly idealised and, as we shall see throughout this thesis, does not reflect common military practices which were bloody, cruel, and devoid of philosophical premeditation. The contrast between ideals and reality is demonstrated in Plutarch's comparison of Sulla and Lysander, in which Plutarch praised Sulla for having taken Athens by force, resulting in multiple enemy casualties, as opposed to Lysander's lengthy siege.<sup>260</sup> In reality, as long as the enemy suffered a shameful defeat, any successful battle was celebrated.<sup>261</sup> The Romans considered siege warfare justified, as the city had effectively refused to fight by closing its gates and not meeting the Romans in open conflict.<sup>262</sup> This enabled the Romans to rationalize a violent attack on a city, which usually involved massacre, followed by the sexual assault and enslavement of a city's inhabitants, and the plundering of its treasures.<sup>263</sup>

There are numerous examples of the Romans sacking cities, which are primarily found in Livy.<sup>264</sup> However, the most detailed descriptions of the sacking of a city relate to sieges of Roman cities by Roman forces during civil war contexts, presumably because

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<sup>256</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.24.

<sup>257</sup> Translation by Miller, 1913 with minor amendments.

<sup>258</sup> Cic. *Att.* 113, cf. pp. 104-108.

<sup>259</sup> Kries, 2003: 375-393.

<sup>260</sup> Plut. *Vit. Lys. Sull.* 4.4.

<sup>261</sup> Levithan, 2013: 19-20.

<sup>262</sup> Levithan, 2013: 19-20.

<sup>263</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91.

<sup>264</sup> Livy 6.4.9, 10.44.2, 21.4.9, 21.57.13-14, 22.20.9, 23.15.6, 23.17.7, 24.35.2, 29.17.15-16, 31.45.12, 31.48.7, 32.33.11, 38.43.4, 45.34.6.

the authors were more interested in the lives of Roman citizens. One of the most detailed examples can be found in Tacitus, and concerns the sacking of Cremona in 69 CE,<sup>265</sup> an act which was carried out by the troops of Vespasian's general, M. Antonius Primus. Tacitus' contempt for the troops' excessive violence suggests that the sacking of the city did not mirror the idealised norms indicated by Cicero's work. Therefore, Tacitus may have been using the example to warn his contemporaries, particularly following the Emperor Domitian's turbulent and tyrannical reign, of the dangers of unrestrained brutality both in warfare and in the political arena. However, Tacitus' source was an eye-witness to the event, L. Vipstanus Messalla, which suggests there was some element of truth in Tacitus' account.<sup>266</sup> Tacitus' description is the most detailed account we have concerning the sack of a city, and its key features are supported by Livy's descriptions of attacks in earlier Roman history. Ziolkowski and Gaca's research shows that the sacking of cities was a literary trope which was understood to involve set events.<sup>267</sup> Given how central literature was to the education of elite, male Romans,<sup>268</sup> it is likely that this trope became central to the understanding, and teaching, of military conduct. The trope, which was based on earlier practices, was influential on generals and soldiers of the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE.

*Aged men and women near the end of life, though despised as booty, were dragged off to be the soldiers' sport. Whenever a young woman or a handsome youth fell into their hands, they were torn to pieces by the violent struggles of those who tried to secure them, and this in the end drove the despoilers to kill one another. Individuals tried to carry off for themselves money or the masses of gold dedicated in the temples, but they were assailed and slain by others stronger than themselves. Some, scorning the booty before their eyes, flogged and tortured the owners to discover hidden wealth and dug up buried treasure. They carried firebrands in their hands, and when they had secured their loot, in utter wantonness they threw these into the vacant houses and empty temples. In this army there were many passions corresponding to the variety of speech and customs, for it was made up of citizens, allies, and foreigners; no two held the same thing sacred and there was no crime which was held unlawful. For four days did Cremona supply food for destruction. When everything sacred and profane sank into the flames, there stood solitary outside the walls the temple of Mefitis, protected by either its position or its deity.*<sup>269</sup>

Grandaevos senes, exacta aetate feminas, vilis ad praedam, in ludibrium trahebant: ubi adulta virgo aut quis forma conspicuus incidisset, vi manibusque rapientium divulsus ipsos postremo direptores in mutuam perniciem agebat. Dum pecuniam vel gravia auro templorum dona sibi quisque trahunt, maiore aliorum vi truncabantur. Quidam obvia aspernati verberibus tormentisque dominorum abdita scrutari, defossa eruere: faces in manibus, quas, ubi praedam egesserant, in vacuas domos et inania templa per lasciviam iaculabantur; utque exercitu vario linguis moribus, cui cives socii externi

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<sup>265</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.33.

<sup>266</sup> Morgan, 2005: 189.

<sup>267</sup> The trope can be traced back to Homer and the Epic Cycle, cf. Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91, Gaca, 2014: 279-288.

<sup>268</sup> As discussed in relation to *exempla* in Chapter One, cf. pp. 28-30.

<sup>269</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.33. Translation by Moore, 1931.

interessent, diversae cupidines et aliud cuique fas nec quicquam inlicitum. Per quadriduum Cremona suffecit. Cum omnia sacra profanaque in ignem considerent, solum Mefitis templum stetit ante moenia, loco seu numine defensum.

Ziolkowski argues that Tacitus leaves nothing to 'common knowledge' in his description of Cremona, and that this is because military knowledge of siege warfare was not widely understood during the *pax Augusta*.<sup>270</sup> However, Bradley demonstrates that warfare continued despite Augustan self-fashioning of peace,<sup>271</sup> although Imperial promotion stressed peace in a domestic setting rather than a foreign one.<sup>272</sup> Therefore, it is unlikely that Tacitus' readers would have been unaware of the characteristics of siege warfare. Rather, Tacitus' highly detailed account of Cremona may be explained by the fact that the atrocities were carried out against the citizens of a Roman colony, rather than foreign enemies or even allies. Tacitus' description, which acts as a climatic event in his *Histories* and has associations with Roman epic,<sup>273</sup> stresses the horror of the siege, thus enabling Tacitus to critique the inappropriate conduct of the troops, whilst creating *pathos* for the defeated Roman citizens.<sup>274</sup>

Importantly for this study, Tacitus' account reveals Roman attitudes towards siege warfare and massacre during civil wars which, as we shall see later in this chapter, emphasises the horror of civil discord for the Roman citizens of Cremona.<sup>275</sup>

Ziolkowski further suggests that the attack on Cremona was unusually savage,<sup>276</sup> although this perhaps demonstrates an overreliance on Tacitus' assessment of events as previous civil conflict resulted in similar atrocities.<sup>277</sup> Tacitus appears to imply that the army was at fault as it was a mass of different peoples who had different priorities in warfare. As we have seen in the previous chapter,<sup>278</sup> there were similar expectations of warfare in cultures across the ancient world, so this may have been a convenient justification as Tacitus was writing under the heirs of Vespasian, the commander ultimately responsible for the fall of Cremona. However, Bauman argues that whilst Roman historians were more inclined to 'soften' parts of history, Roman armies were perceived, in the wider Mediterranean world,<sup>279</sup> to carry out more aggressive assaults than their Hellenic counterparts, more frequently killing enemy males and enslaving the remaining population.<sup>280</sup> As such, it is likely that Tacitus' account is an extreme

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<sup>270</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91.

<sup>271</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298-318.

<sup>272</sup> Bradley, 2004: 298-318.

<sup>273</sup> Baxter, 1971: 94-6.

<sup>274</sup> Martin, 1981: 86-88.

<sup>275</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 131-2.

<sup>276</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 72.

<sup>277</sup> The siege of Perugia is a case in point, *cf.* pp. 79-81.

<sup>278</sup> *Cf.* pp. 30-32.

<sup>279</sup> Bauman, 2000: 112. Bauman argues that Greek authors were 'patronising' when referring to Roman behaviour which was outside the violent norm, *cf.* Dion. Hal 14.6.1-6, Plut. Vit. Marc. 19-20.

<sup>280</sup> Welch, 2006: 6-7.

example of conduct during the sack of the city, but that similar practices would have taken place throughout Roman history.

### 2.3. Military Control

As we have seen in the case of Cremona, who was responsible for the massacre and maltreatment of Roman citizens is central to Tacitus' presentation of the violent event. It is important to note how Roman generals are presented as controlling their soldiers, as this informs discussions of how massacres and sexual violence were carried out. Namely, to what extent can we ascertain if massacres were ordered by generals, in an orchestrated attack of which massacre was the goal, or if mass-slaughter took place in the 'heat of battle', entirely at the soldiers' own volition. The cases which follow are not necessarily in the context of massacre but concern military obedience in general, which will inform our discussion of massacre in historical reality and how it was represented in elite literature.

Firstly, let us consider attacks which were orchestrated by the higher echelons of Roman command. There were instances in which conduct following the conclusion of a battle was presented as being monitored by the military commanders. Such examples include Lucullus ordering his troops to kill but not plunder Mithridates' army after routing the Pontic king in 72 BCE.<sup>281</sup> Lucullus appears to have wished to protect Mithridates' treasure, and there is the implication that Mithridates escaped because Lucullus' men disobeyed orders as they were greedy for the gold Mithridates was travelling with. This may have been the excuse Lucullus used when explaining Mithridates' escape, but there may be a suggestion here that Lucullus was not a competent commander as he could not keep his troops under control when faced with the temptations of material wealth. The desire for material goods was criticised heavily in Roman elite society,<sup>282</sup> and was a common accusation levied by ancient authors, and possibly by Lucullus' contemporaries, at generals and soldiers alike. That Mithridates was an Eastern king, with lavish 'Eastern' tastes, is significant as the soldiers are presented as coveting such plunder over loyalty to their commander, as we shall see in the chapter on enslavement. Another example concerns Pompey's campaigns in Sicily against the Marian faction in c. 82-1 BCE. Following the siege of Himera and Pompey's talks with the city's leader, Pompey prevented his soldiers from killing by placing a seal over their swords, and threatening them with punishment should they disobey his orders.<sup>283</sup> This incident is significant as it was apparently expected that soldiers would kill during the siege of a city, and Pompey's leniency for the citizens of Himera, apparently motivated by his respect for the city's leader, was unusual and further fed into the image of Pompey as a 'good' general. The men obeyed Pompey's commands without the promise of any reward for their restraint. We should therefore consider how the army was controlled.

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<sup>281</sup> App. *Mith.* 12.81-82.

<sup>282</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.11.

<sup>283</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 10.5-7.



Polybius describes, and later Roman authors allude to, the fact that the Roman army was motivated by fear of punishment,<sup>284</sup> the promise of rewards,<sup>285</sup> or supposedly a love of their leaders.<sup>286</sup> Both the use of punishment and rewards had their respective critics, with Cicero claiming that decimation of Roman soldiers, the most extreme of corporal punishments, was the sign of an ineffective general.<sup>287</sup> For instance, Caesar presents his troops, accused of mutiny, as asking for punishment, rather than Caesar carrying it out at his direction.<sup>288</sup> Given that Caesar was acutely aware of his image, he seemingly (and shamelessly) went to great, and apparently fantastical, lengths to ensure his harsh punishment was justified. As for rewards, there were concerns within elite Roman culture about the desire to go to war for the sake of material rewards, and this can be applied in the case of soldiers who were motivated purely by plunder. As we have seen in the case of Lucullus, it was considered poor form for a general to lose control of his troops, especially if it was for material goods. The desire to wage war for goods is criticised heavily by Cicero, with the ideal soldier being motivated by a desire to serve Rome.<sup>289</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the criticism levied at the use of plunder as motivation, material rewards were an essential part of military control.<sup>290</sup> It was traditional for soldiers to be given prizes for impressive conduct, including symbolic honours, such as the *corona muralis*, which was awarded to the first soldier to go over the wall of a besieged city.<sup>291</sup> Rewards could also be in the form of human chattel, and the use of reward plunder could be financially profitable for Roman generals and soldiers alike, in addition to acting as useful symbolic currency for the political elite. We shall discuss this aspect throughout the course of this thesis, with consideration to the display of plunder in triumphs, but for now it is important to consider the practicalities of plunder for Roman troops and generals alike. Plunder was important for non-elite soldiers as they were able to supplement their relatively modest income with additional funds.<sup>292</sup> As a result, it is unsurprising that plunder was widely used to encourage the troops in battle, and keep up morale throughout a war.<sup>293</sup> The most commonly referenced form of plunder is the taking of an enemy's armour after battle.<sup>294</sup> This was seemingly common practice, either by camp followers or by members of the Roman army. The reasons for this are multiple but are not explicitly referred to, even in the military writings of Caesar. For instance, during Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, following an attack on Galba's men by the Veragri and the Seduni, the victorious Romans removed the

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<sup>284</sup> Polyb. 6.37.12-13. For the types of punishment, including decimation, *cf.* Goldberg, 2015: 141-163.

<sup>285</sup> App. *B Civ.* 5.17.

<sup>286</sup> Polyb. 6.39.1-11, *cf.* Lee, 1996: 203-6.

<sup>287</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 5.22.

<sup>288</sup> Caes. *BCiv.* 3.74, *cf.* App. *B Civ.* 2.63, Suet. *Iul.* 68.3.

<sup>289</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.11.

<sup>290</sup> Lee, 1996: 203-206.

<sup>291</sup> Levithan, 2013: 30-32. For decorations of valour, *cf.* Gilliver, 2007: 17-21.

<sup>292</sup> Erdkamp, 2006: 285-286, 292, Haynes, 2013: 48, Levithan, 2013: 30-32.

<sup>293</sup> Levithan, 2013: 30-2.

<sup>294</sup> Much of the armour was taken to Rome, *cf.* Rawson, 1991: 582-598.

enemies' armour from the battlefield.<sup>295</sup> This may have been as trophies, as loot to sell later, to prevent other prospective attackers from using the dead's weapons, or else to ensure the Roman armoury was stocked (particularly with the missiles and air assault weapons which the tribes had initially used). Other examples of plunder include the distribution of wealth, precious metals, or captives by generals from their own share of the plunder.<sup>296</sup>

Overall, elite Roman sources suggest generals were reluctant to use punishment, or at least reference its use, as the threat of terror undermined a general's supposed ability to inspire loyalty through non-mercenary means. Similarly, the presentation of soldiers as motivated purely by material rewards was also problematic, as it undermined a general's authority and the loyalty he should inspire in his troops, both to himself as a leader and to Rome. However, the way by which an army was presented as being motivated, no doubt using punishments and rewards, ultimately reflected on their leader and his qualities. Therefore, a general's control over his troops is closely linked to how massacre is presented, including who was responsible for it, the supposed reason it was carried out, and the impact it had on Rome's enemies.

#### **2.4. Responsibility for Massacre**

In addition to a general's 'orchestration' or willingness to accept that bloodshed was part of siege warfare, massacres could be carried out during the 'heat of battle'. Such cases were presented by our sources as being motivated by the soldiers' bloodlust, greed, or desire for revenge. Ziolkowski argues that there are only eight cases, including that of Cremona, in which Roman soldiers are presented as carrying out massacres without the consent of their commanders,<sup>297</sup> suggesting such cases were in the minority. However, the nature of the army changed during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, in line with socio-political issues which included the move towards individuals dominating politics.<sup>298</sup> This led to the rise of the 'client-army' which began with Sulla.<sup>299</sup> The soldiers of such armies had a greater role to play in the political success of their leaders. In certain cases, the soldiers were allowed by generals to carry out acts of violence without the risk of punishment. This is evident when Sulla's soldiers killed an Italian legate, who should have been protected by the rules of war, but the troops were not punished for doing so.<sup>300</sup> The lack of punishment suggests that Sulla condoned their actions, thus breaking the rules of war,<sup>301</sup> which may have been used by Plutarch to further denigrate Sulla's character. Nevertheless, as Levick argues,<sup>302</sup> this instance shows that Sulla allowed the soldiers to do as they pleased, ensuring that he had secured their continued loyalty. We do not know what Sulla's soldiers' motivation was for this attack. Whilst this example concerns the killing of an individual, it shows how

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<sup>295</sup> Cf. Caes. *BGall.* 3.6. Also present at Caes. *BGall.* 5.51.

<sup>296</sup> Cf. pp. 98-111.

<sup>297</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 83-84.

<sup>298</sup> Erdkamp, 2006: 278.

<sup>299</sup> Levick, 1982: 505.

<sup>300</sup> Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 6.8-9.

<sup>301</sup> Cf. pp. 27-35.

<sup>302</sup> Levick, 1982: 505.

soldiers could commit atrocities without the express consent of their commander. Other cases show that massacres were motivated by emotional factors, including revenge, as we shall see, and this demonstrates that there was a sense of agreement between the soldiers during battle, and possibly supported by the general, that massacre was an acceptable outcome of conflict. The fact that massacres were carried out in the 'heat of battle', either in open conflict or in siege warfare, should not suggest that they were not motivated by pre-existing factors, or even agreed upon by the soldiers either before the massacre or through a collective commitment to violence against a loathed enemy.

Ziolkowski argues that we cannot be sure who was responsible for massacres.<sup>303</sup> However, in most cases, the blame for failed military campaigns is placed on the general,<sup>304</sup> given that they usually gave orders but were less directly involved in the conflict than their soldiers.<sup>305</sup> Therefore, the responsibility for massacres would also have been on the Roman general, regardless of whether the general had expressly commanded it. Following Welch's argument,<sup>306</sup> massacre (and the immediate events which followed it), were conducted through a mixture of orders from higher ranks, and the soldiers' own volition. Throughout this chapter, we shall encounter Caesar's writings, which show that generals were acutely aware that their orders effectively made siege warfare a 'stage' for a performance of leadership.<sup>307</sup> Cremona was a case in point and the troops' disobedience was attributed by Tacitus to the soldiers being of non-Roman extraction, thus not displaying the obedient nature of truly 'Roman' soldiers, given that they had supposedly different interests and understanding of warfare. Motivation for massacre was also important in reflecting on a general, and the act could be carried out as a form of retribution, revenge, or as a warning. In all cases, massacres were usually justified because of some perceived breaking of the 'rules of war' by Roman enemies.

This is the case with Pompey's dealings with the Albanians in 65 BCE. In the first of two battles, the Romans slaughtered the Albanian army, before forcing a truce which allowed the Roman army freedom of movement across Albanian lands.<sup>308</sup> However, the truce was soon broken when the Albanians raised an army of 40,000 against Pompey's troops. Pompey was then justified in carrying out a second massacre on the battlefield,<sup>309</sup> which led to a more decisive victory, as the Albanian king was killed.<sup>310</sup> Despite the frequency with which massacre occurred, the Greco-Roman writers presented themselves as being uncomfortable with the concept. This is evident in their justification of the massacres. In the case of the Albanians, not only had they broken a truce with Rome, but they were thought to be savage and alien in the Greco-Roman

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<sup>303</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 84.

<sup>304</sup> Cic. *Prov. cons.* 2.5.

<sup>305</sup> Levithan, 2013: 35-6.

<sup>306</sup> Welch, 2006: 6-7.

<sup>307</sup> Levithan, 2013: 35-6.

<sup>308</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 34.3-4.

<sup>309</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 34.1-3, Dio 54.2-3.

<sup>310</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 35.1-3.

mindset, as suggested by references to Amazonian women involved in the battles.<sup>311</sup> Regardless of whether flesh-and-blood women were actually involved in battle or not, the Albanians' association with these fearsome warrior women, who transgressed gender norms,<sup>312</sup> only served to stress their sense of untameable wildness.<sup>313</sup> Furthermore, considering this confrontation was the first time Rome had encountered the Albanians, Pompey was able to exploit the Romans' ignorance of their culture to justify his actions,<sup>314</sup> and promote his agenda, namely his image as a generalissimo.<sup>315</sup> Overall, the Roman elite audience would have understood the necessity for a massacre to take place, both as retribution for the enemy breaking the rules of war, and as a warning to others of what could happen precisely because these rules were broken.<sup>316</sup>

## 2.5. Roman Criticism of Massacre

In addition to justification, it is evident within overt criticism that the Romans were not completely comfortable with massacre, although they considered it necessary within warfare. This is apparent in Pliny's assessment of Caesar's casualty record. According to Pliny, Caesar was responsible for the deaths of more than 1,192,000 people.<sup>317</sup>

*He also fought fifty pitched battles, and alone beat the record of Marcus Marcellus who fought thirty-nine – for I would not myself count it to his glory that in addition to conquering his fellow-citizens he killed in his battles 1,192,000 human beings, a prodigious even if unavoidable wrong inflicted on the human race, as he himself confessed it to be by not publishing the casualties of the civil wars.*<sup>318</sup>

idem signis conlatis quinquagens dimicavit, solus M. Marcellum transgressus, qui undequadragens dimicavit – nam praeter civiles victorias undeciens centena et nonaginta duo milia hominum occisa proeliis ab eo non equidem in gloria posuerim, tantam etiamsi coactam humani generis iniuriam, quod ita esse confessus est ipse bellorum civilium stragem non prodendo.

This figure includes those estimated to have been killed during the Civil War, but the majority were from Gallic, Germanic, or British nations. Whether or not Pliny's figure can be trusted, it is likely that the numbers of those killed by Caesar's troops during the Gallic Wars were in the hundreds of thousands. As we have seen in Chapter One, it was considered a 'right of war' to kill any enemy who fell under Roman power,<sup>319</sup> yet even Pliny thought the deaths were an atrocious crime.<sup>320</sup> Whilst Caesar's justification

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<sup>311</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 35.3-4.

<sup>312</sup> Sidebottom, 2004: 24-5.

<sup>313</sup> The landscape also reflected the wild nature of the people, with Pompey supposedly fighting off reptiles, cf. Plut. *Vit Pomp.* 36.1-2.

<sup>314</sup> Cicero also acknowledges the limitations of his knowledge when it comes to foreign lands, cf. Dyson, 1968: 346.

<sup>315</sup> Dreher, 1996: 188-189.

<sup>316</sup> Other examples can be found at Caes. *BGall.* 3.23, 7.62, 7.68, 8.27-29.

<sup>317</sup> Pliny, *HN.* 7.25. Appian claims one million people were captured, and a greater number killed, cf. App. 4.2.

<sup>318</sup> Pliny, *HN.* 7.25. Translation by Rackham, 1942.

<sup>319</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.41.

<sup>320</sup> Pliny, *HN.* 7.25.

of the massacre was evidently successful as far as Caesar's intended audience was concerned, with Pliny's assertion that they were 'unavoidable',<sup>321</sup> presentations of massacre under Caesar's orders vary amongst authors. For instance, Plutarch regularly concludes his description of each part of the Gallic Wars by referencing a massacre of the enemy forces and their non-combatants.<sup>322</sup> Plutarch's account of massacres occurs in biography, so he ensured the narrative is curtailed and the section on the Gallic Wars relatively short-winded. Despite the brevity of Plutarch's account, he stressed the massacres involved in the Gallic Wars which suggests that he considered them important to the narrative and as an indicator of Caesar's character and achievements. Caesar also alters his description of massacre, as we shall see in the following few sections, depending upon the circumstance in which it took place. On this note, there appear to be two ways in which Caesar presents massacre: either as being carried out in the heat of battle, often prompted by a desire for vengeance, or as a strategic attack ordered by Caesar himself.

## 2.6. Massacre and Revenge

Beyond the abuse of the 'rules of war', there are instances in which the Romans carried out massacres which were motivated by more personal concerns, including national and personal revenge. One example of this takes place during Caesar's Gallic Wars, when the Carnutes attacked and killed Roman traders, including one of Caesar's men, at Cenabum (thought to be modern-day Orléans).<sup>323</sup> As a result of the Gallic massacre, a whole tribe of captured Gauls at Avaricum were slaughtered by Roman troops in revenge for the Cenabum massacre.<sup>324</sup>

*In such fashion the troops, maddened by the massacre at Cenabum and the toil of the siege-work, spared not aged men, nor women, nor children.*<sup>325</sup>

Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt.

This incident is significant not only because Caesar explicitly states the troops' motivation, suggesting avenging wrongs against Rome was acceptable in warfare. In addition, the example highlights how Caesar could use the ethnicity and the Romans' understanding of 'The Other' to create an enemy's identity.<sup>326</sup> Recognising your enemy is a factor which has continued to be important throughout warfare, as discussed by Van Creveld.<sup>327</sup> The people of Avaricum were not members of the same tribe as the Gallic figurehead Vercingetorix, the Arverni, nor did they have any power in Cenabum which was the home of the Carnutes tribe. Ergo, the slaughtered Gauls had little if anything to do with the killing of Roman citizens some 100 kilometres away.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> Pliny, *HN*. 7.25.

<sup>322</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 18.2-3, 19.5, 20.3-4

<sup>323</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.3.

<sup>324</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.3.

<sup>325</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.28. Translation by Edwards, 1917.

<sup>326</sup> Johnston, 2018: 81-94.

<sup>327</sup> Van Creveld, 2008: 131-133, *cf.* pp. 1.

<sup>328</sup> Roughly the distance between modern day Orléans (Cenabum) and Bourges (Avaricum).

Nevertheless, whilst we can see from Caesar's work that different nations and connections between them were understood, here this was not a factor as the Roman army's victims were simply 'Gauls'. This sweeping ascription enabled the Roman troops to view their captives as representatives of the enemy who had attacked members of their own 'tribe'. The Romans' understanding of different nations and their ethnicities was deliberately ignored, or ignorance on the subject exploited by Caesar in his representation of Gallic ethnicity. Caesar is not unique in this, as Bittarello, writing on Etruscan ethnicity, argues that 'varying cultural needs produce diverging representations' within Greco-Roman literature.<sup>329</sup> As such, representations of other ethnicities within literary sources varied depending upon the agenda of the writer. However, such stereotypes were usually negative in comparison to the Romans' supposed achievements, which enabled Greco-Roman authors and Roman generals to justify brutality and vengeance, and show that the Romans always overcame their 'barbarian' foes.

In a similar way to massacre as a form of revenge, Caesar claims that the massacre of the Tigurini in 58 BCE was motivated by more than blood-lust or necessity.<sup>330</sup> Rather it was a matter of national and personal significance,<sup>331</sup> a theme which is found throughout the *Gallic Wars* and other writings of Caesar.<sup>332</sup> The tribe of the Tigurini had been responsible for the death of Lucius Piso, a Roman citizen and Caesar's father-in-law's grandfather. Here, Caesar offers yet another justification for ordering a massacre, namely that he was an avenger for Rome, as well as honouring his extended family. Despite his personal desire for revenge, Caesar attributes the blame for the wholesale massacre of the Tigurini to one of his lieutenants, placing himself at a distance from the slaughter.<sup>333</sup> This justification enabled Caesar to emphasise his honour and his connections to past military and political leaders, whilst not directly involving himself in the unsavoury act of massacre. However, Appian's fragmentary *Gallic History* attributes the tribe's downfall to Caesar himself.<sup>334</sup> Appian appears to consider Caesar's lieutenants' involvement simply as a division of labour, with Caesar dealing with the Helvetii, whilst his underling moved against the Tigurini. However, responsibility was presented as being ultimately Caesar's.

We shall discuss the motivations for the Romans' massacre of the Tigurini later in the chapter, but the destruction of the Helvetii and Tigurini demonstrates the vast number of casualties involved in Caesar's campaigns. The Helvetii and their allies, which included the Tigurini, supposedly numbered 368,000.<sup>335</sup> After their defeat, Caesar supposedly spared 110,000 people, whilst the remaining 258,000 were likely killed or

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<sup>329</sup> Bittarello, 2009: 211-233.

<sup>330</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.12.

<sup>331</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.7, 1.12-13. The merging of national and personal interests is evident in Caesar's speech in Dio, cf. Dio 38.35.3-38.46.4.

<sup>332</sup> Riggsby, 2006: 14.

<sup>333</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 18.2.

<sup>334</sup> App. 4.3.

<sup>335</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.29. The figure was supposedly recorded in Greek on a document found in the Helvetii camp. For issues of reliability, cf. Henige, 1998: 215-42.

possibly enslaved. Interestingly, when referring to these figures, it appears that Caesar boasts about the number he killed, not those he took captive. Granted, Caesar's figures are highly exaggerated. However, as we have seen, exaggerations presumably had to be within a sensible margin of error. Evidently, the numbers of those killed during Caesar's campaigns were vast, although we will never be able to ascertain actual numbers with any degree of certainty.

Despite the acknowledged issues with Caesar's numbers, Caesar's campaigns in northern Europe were undoubtedly bloodthirsty, a feature which is attested to in recent archaeological finds.<sup>336</sup> In 2015, the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam discovered human remains and material objects, such as belt hooks, that have been linked to Caesar's massacre of the Tencteri and Usipetes in 55 BCE.<sup>337</sup> The massacre was one of the largest Caesar carried out during his Gallic Wars,<sup>338</sup> and yet another which Caesar relates with little embellishment.<sup>339</sup>

*In the [Tencteri and Usipetes'] camp those who were able speedily to take up arms resisted the Romans for a while, and fought among the carts and baggage-wagons; the remainder, a crowd of women and children (for the Germans had left home and crossed the Rhine with all their belongings), began to flee in all directions, and Caesar despatched the cavalry in pursuit.<sup>340</sup>*

Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimentaue proelium commiserunt: at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenumque transierant) passim fugere coepit; ad quos consecrandos Caesar equitatum misit.

The remains, found by Roymans' team after dredging a riverbed, are those of at least 70 men, women and children,<sup>341</sup> and can be dated from the Iron Age to the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Of the bones which have been dated by Roymans to roughly the time and location of Caesar's massacre of the Tencteri and Usipetes,<sup>342</sup> a large proportion show signs of blunt force trauma [Figures 4 and 5]. For instance, Figure 5 shows the skull of an adult female between 40 and 60 with a wound which may have resulted from an arrow, *gladius* or *pilum*, typical Roman military equipment.<sup>343</sup> Furthermore, Caesar relates that it was the cavalry which completed the massacre close to the river. Given that most of the injuries can be found on the skulls, it is likely that the archaeological evidence supports Caesar's narrative, given that skulls would be the most obvious and accessible targets for those on horseback.

Caesar's accounts and the remains found in connection to his campaigns in northern Europe clearly show that Roman warfare was bloody and often ruthless. The nature of

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<sup>336</sup> Roymans, 2018a: 165-181, 2018b: 51-57.

<sup>337</sup> Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2015, cf. Roymans, N., Fernández-Götz, M. 2014: 70-80.

<sup>338</sup> Roymans, 2018a: 165, 2018b: 51-57.

<sup>339</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.4-15.

<sup>340</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.4-15. Translation by Edwards, 1917.

<sup>341</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.14.

<sup>342</sup> Roymans, 2018a: 169-171, 2018b: 51-57.

<sup>343</sup> Roymans, 2018a: 173-4, 2018b: 51-57.

warfare was not disguised or avoided, but Caesar went to great lengths to stress that the Tencteri and Usipetes had defied his orders and had attacked the Roman army first. Lee suggests that there was a truce existing between Caesar and the Tencteri and Usipetes, and the massacre Caesar ordered undermined his carefully cultivated clement image by attacking the tribes without sufficient justification.<sup>344</sup> This links closely to the Romans' representation of treachery, and how Caesar presented the Tencteri and Usipetes as supposedly deserving of such a fate because they had refused to treat with Rome or withdraw from the territory.<sup>345</sup>

## 2.7. Treachery

Treachery, as we have seen in relation to military intelligence, could also be punished through the execution of prisoners. After Caesar defeated the town of Vellaunodunum in 52 BCE, peace terms supposedly included the delivery of 600 hostages.<sup>346</sup> That night, apparently before the hostages had been delivered, the townsfolk rose up against the Romans. They were brutally quashed, and the whole town destroyed. It is not specified what happened to the townsfolk, but enslavement or mass execution seem likely. This links closely with Caesar's massacre of the Aduatuci in 57 BCE following their attempted nocturnal attack after agreeing peace terms.<sup>347</sup> Not only do these instances reinforce Caesar's justification for his aggressive course of action, but he presents himself as a general who is not easily tricked, thus emphasising his military prowess. In turn, this further stresses the Gauls' supposedly inherent treachery, and the Romans' superiority over them. The enemy's treachery was a recurring theme throughout Caesar's work, climaxing with the treachery of the Aedui, Rome's long-term allies, plotting with Vercingetorix and killing or enslaving Roman citizens.<sup>348</sup> Whilst this betrayal may have been an acceptable act in warfare, Caesar claims that the Aeduan deputies who came to visit him advised that only individuals within their tribe, not the governing body, were involved with Rome's enemies.<sup>349</sup> Despite this double betrayal, Caesar claimed that he was clement with the Aedui and preserved their people after the Battle of Alesia.<sup>350</sup> It is uncertain how clement Caesar was in actuality, but that he presented himself as such enables us to consider the impact of his leniency on a non-Roman audience. Presumably, through the news of his actions spreading around the neighbouring territories and Rome itself, Caesar was able to demonstrate his clemency whilst clearly showing the consequences of revolting against Rome. Here, we see yet another example of Caesar using the expectations of wartime conduct pragmatically, whilst simultaneously indulging in self-promotion by emphasising his *clementia*.

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<sup>344</sup> Lee, 1969: 100-103.

<sup>345</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.7.

<sup>346</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.11. As we shall see in the chapter on hostages, this is a large number given the logistical complications of keeping hostages, *cf.* p. 135.

<sup>347</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.33.

<sup>348</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.42-7.43.

<sup>349</sup> The personal over the national interest in the case of Gauls is also evident at Caes. *BGall.* 5.1.

<sup>350</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.90.



## 2.8. Massacre and Theatrics

There are instances which show that massacres were not carried out without an awareness of their impact on the audience, both Roman and non-Roman, who may have witnessed or heard reports of slaughter. We shall deal with the executions which took place in Rome at the end of the triumph and in spectacles in the final chapter. However, one mass execution, presented by the ancient authors as an horrific massacre, links closely to the impact massacre could have on its intended audience. A sense of staging is evident in Sulla's captive-taking, particularly his execution of 6000 Samnite soldiers in the Campus Martius.<sup>351</sup> It is uncertain why Sulla transported the captives to Rome. The male captives may have been intended for slavery, but the presentation of Sulla's carefully staged mass slaughter would suggest that the captives were intended for some form of display. Given the hostility towards Sulla by later authors, the Samnites may have been executed by Sulla as a means of appealing to the Roman public, akin to a form of early 'fatal charade'.<sup>352</sup> The Samnites had long been a problem for the Roman people, and Sulla's decision to execute them *en masse*, in a situation akin to massacre in warfare, may have been Sulla's attempt to demonstrate Roman dominance over their once troublesome enemy. Furthermore, the fact that the captives were Samnites is noteworthy as the earliest gladiators were supposed to have been Samnite prisoners of war.<sup>353</sup> As such, the massacre which took place may have been a form of entertainment which was manipulated by later Roman authors to highlight Sulla's tyranny. This is supported by Bauman, who argues that the captives were killed simply because they were foreign, and their demise would have elicited few complaints.<sup>354</sup>

However, Sulla is presented as ordering the senators to assemble in the nearby Temple of Bellona, which ensured that they could hear the cries of the dying soldiers as they were slaughtered in the Campus Martius. Arguably, this may have been an example of rule established through terror, which is universally condemned by ancient authors and, as a result, may have been highly fictionalised. However, Sulla's careful staging of the massacre is unpleasantly impressive. Considering the acoustics of a temple during this time, the high colonnades and inner sanctum would have amplified the sound, and forced the senators to imagine the horrors taking place outside. It was unnecessary for the senators to witness the massacre; the sound of the horrors alone would have been sufficient stimulation for the imagination. For the senators, the implication would have been clear: obey Sulla or face the same fate as the Samnites.

Sulla's actions are heavily criticised by later authors and his behaviour in this instance was unacceptable as it threatened his fellow Romans, and merged war and politics with theatrics. Sulla's links to the theatrical and the stage are well-recorded,<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 30.2-3, Dio. *fr.* 109.3-9.

<sup>352</sup> Coleman, 1990: 44-73.

<sup>353</sup> Jacobelli, 2003: 7, *cf.* Livy 9.40.

<sup>354</sup> Bauman, 2000: 113-114.

<sup>355</sup> Sulla infamously had connections with a number of actors, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 36.1.

especially by Plutarch, and the massacre is relayed by Sallust, Dio, and Plutarch.<sup>356</sup> However, it was likely to have been an exaggeration as associations with *infames* had ruined many a Roman aristocrat's reputation.<sup>357</sup> Furthermore, the sites in question were outside the then-*pomerium*, the sacred boundary of the city, and the Temple of Bellona had frequently been used as a meeting place for the senate and generals who had yet to relinquish control of their armies.<sup>358</sup> The sites were therefore outside the sacred boundary of Rome, where warfare and massacre were expected given Rome's expansionist agenda. Nevertheless, the setting of this story is close to the centre of Rome, and the terror generated through this story, whether fictitious or otherwise, emphasises Sulla's lack of regard for the conventions of Roman society, as he had brought war to the gates of his own city. This incident took place during Sulla's second occupation of Rome in 82 BCE and appears to set the scene for Sulla's later treatment of his fellow Romans. Throughout descriptions of Sulla's treatment of his Roman enemies, there are numerous instances in which the proscription victims are compared to prisoners of war,<sup>359</sup> which is used to highlight his poor treatment of both respectable Roman citizens and his abuse of the expectations of warfare.

## 2.9. Chapter Conclusion

Archaeological evidence supports Greco-Roman literary accounts of the massacres which were frequently carried out throughout Roman history, and it is evident during this period with Caesar's actions during his Gallic Wars. The historical realities are certain, yet the way in which the Romans represented massacre indicates that they were not entirely at ease with their overly aggressive military actions, even against those they de-humanised as being 'the other' in elite self-promotion. This unease enabled the ancient authors to depict generals, essentially those who were ultimately responsible for massacre, in either a positive or negative light. In cases where we find elite individuals positively presented, we find attempts to justify massacre, and these narratives are carefully constructed to implicate the victims in their own demise, as evident in cases of massacre as a form of revenge for the enemy's supposed 'treachery'. We can see this clearly with Caesar's writings, as he had to create careful narratives surrounding his actions which then justified his prolonged, and presumably expensive, actions in northern Europe. The opposite applies to those the Romans deemed as distasteful characters, including the likes of Sulla who supposedly engaged in the theatrical executions of captives to threaten the senatorial elite, the mainstay of the Roman political establishment, thus the Roman population at large. Ultimately, the Romans had little interest in the welfare of those they captured and massacre was an acceptable outcome for the defeated, provided they were 'the other'.

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<sup>356</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 1.50, 1.49, Dio *fr.* 109.1-9., Plut. *Vit. Sull.*, 2.3-4.

<sup>357</sup> A concern for the elite's involvement with theatrical and gladiatorial performances led to the creation of legislation banning elite individuals from taking part, *cf.* Levick, 1983: 99, Garland, 2006: 11.

<sup>358</sup> The Temple of Bellona was also closely linked to Roman victory over the Samnites, having been built with spoils taken from Rome's war with the Samnites in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE.

<sup>359</sup> Dio *fr.* 109.11, Sall. *Hist.* 1.49.1-20, 3.15.1-6, 19-20, *cf.* pp. 93-96.

## Chapter Three - Sexual Violence

### **3.1 Introduction**

The World Health Organisation defines sexual violence as ‘any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work.’<sup>360</sup> Today, we are constantly debating issues surrounding consent, cultural attitudes, and legalities relating to sexual violence both in domestic and conflict settings. For the most part, there is a growing awareness of sexual violence against women within the international community, with the United Nations declaring in 2014 that sexual violence in conflict should be treated as a war crime.<sup>361</sup> In turn, scholarship on recent conflict has focussed on the role of sexual violence,<sup>362</sup> whilst such violence in ancient warfare and as a part of the process of captive-taking continues to be an underexamined topic.<sup>363</sup>

Before we continue to consider how sexual violence was used in Roman captive-taking and its subsequent representations, we need to acknowledge the problems we face when considering sexual violence in the ancient world. A key problem with studying sexual violence in the Roman context is that there is no word to denote rape,<sup>364</sup> nor did art explicitly show scenes of sexual violence,<sup>365</sup> although it was certainly implied, as we shall see shortly. Furthermore, as our attitudes towards sexual violence develop, when faced with sexual violence in a Greco-Roman context, we are forced to consider the most horrific and ‘intimate’ of crimes from a perspective which is alien to our own. Certainly, the World Health Organisation’s description of sexual violence would not have been recognised by the Romans, and sexual violence within the context of ancient warfare tends to relate to penetrative sexual assault, rather than the numerous types of violence the WHO’s description outlines. Furthermore, in Greco-Roman writings, there are limited references to sexual violence and scholarship has primarily focussed on literary and metaphorical examples.<sup>366</sup> Despite the ‘silence’ in Greco-Roman writings, which is also found in all world cultures,<sup>367</sup> there can be little doubt that sexual violence frequently took place in the Roman world and was used as a weapon of war,<sup>368</sup> as it continues to be used in conflict today.

The lack of explicit references to sexual assault in the Roman world may be because sexual violence was a crime of an intimate nature which, in Roman times, was rarely

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<sup>360</sup> Krug et al, 2002: 149.

<sup>361</sup> United Nations, 2017.

<sup>362</sup> Card, 1996: 5. However, there is a universal acknowledgement of the ancient origins of sexual violence.

<sup>363</sup> Except for such works as: Gaca, 2013, 2014, Van Wees, 1992: 183-5, Whittaker, 2009: 234-235.

<sup>364</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 76.

<sup>365</sup> Dillon, 2006: 259-260.

<sup>366</sup> Cf. Reeder, 2017: 363-5.

<sup>367</sup> This ‘silence’ continues in relation to recent conflict, cf. Tomaselli, 1986: 2-3, Levithan, 2013: 47-79. For the Greco-Roman context, cf. Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 308.

<sup>368</sup> Gaca, 2013: 73-75.

recognised as rape.<sup>369</sup> In Britain, we need only look at our recent history to find instances in which rape was legally permitted, namely the 1990 decision to abolish the law that 'a husband cannot be convicted of raping his wife.'<sup>370</sup> Unfortunately, as also evident in society today, there is little doubt that sexual violence was endemic in the Roman world, with enslaved people being subject to whatever treatment the enslavers deemed fit, and most women having little legal say in their marriages.<sup>371</sup> In Rome itself, sexual aggression against women was problematic enough to prompt the creation of laws against it,<sup>372</sup> although no law directly pertaining to 'rape' as we would recognise it existed.<sup>373</sup> Furthermore, it is likely that free women did not report assaults to the authorities, but that their male guardian privately prosecuted the assailant.<sup>374</sup> The sexual integrity of Roman citizens was the main concern, and those who were most vulnerable to assault, or rather their male relatives, were anxious about the possibility of a sexual assault damaging their social standing, as evident in the creation of laws which punish rape.<sup>375</sup>

Within Roman society, it is highly likely that enslaved people, many of whom were former captives,<sup>376</sup> were the most common victims of sexual violence.<sup>377</sup> Sexual violence against enslaved people was permitted in Roman law,<sup>378</sup> with the only legal violation pertaining to property law. This meant that the perpetrator of sexual violence against an enslaved person had violated an enslaver's 'property'.<sup>379</sup> This was also the case for free Roman women who were under the lawful dominion of men.<sup>380</sup> As such, sexual assault against enslaved people was a property crime, rather than an act of violence which could be prosecuted. The 'degraded standing' of enslaved people meant that otherwise unacceptable sexual relations were more tolerable in the Roman mindset when perpetrated against those without rights.<sup>381</sup> As we shall see in the following chapter, captives were without rights at the point at which they fell under Roman dominion, e.g. following the defeat of a city. As enslaved people, sexual violence could be perpetrated against them by Roman soldiers with impunity, unless generals moderated their behaviour in line with the rules of war.

This is significant as, despite the acceptance and prevalence of violence within Roman society, rape was understood to be a violent act. However, Gibson argues that violence

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<sup>369</sup> There is some evidence pertaining to domestic violence, cf. Seifert, 2011: 147-162.

<sup>370</sup> Law Commission, 1992: 1.

<sup>371</sup> For a full overview of 'rape laws' in the Roman world, cf. Nguyen, 2006: 75-112.

<sup>372</sup> Gardner, 1986: 117-8.

<sup>373</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 83-4.

<sup>374</sup> Gardner, 1986: 119-121. The *lex Iulia de vi*, introduced during Caesar's dictatorship, may have permitted a woman to bring charges for rape *sui iuris*, but it is likely that social mores prevented women from appearing in court, cf. Nguyen, 2006: 88-89.

<sup>375</sup> Perry, 2015: 55-6.

<sup>376</sup> As we shall discuss in the following chapter, cf. pp. 63-108.

<sup>377</sup> Seifert, 2011: 147.

<sup>378</sup> Dig. 25.7.1.1, cf. Gardner, 1986: 117-121.

<sup>379</sup> Seifert, 2011: 154.

<sup>380</sup> Evans, 1991: 7-11, cf. Askin, 2013: 21.

<sup>381</sup> Perry, 2015: 57.

was integral to Roman culture and would not have been disapproved of as it is today,<sup>382</sup> whilst Gale and Scourfield state that ‘violence could be claimed for good’ within the Roman world.<sup>383</sup> The contradictory attitudes towards violence, and sexual violence in particular, as we shall see, enabled Greco-Roman authors to present sexual violence in way which conveyed a political and symbolic agenda beyond the historical context. Whilst Roman attitudes towards sexual violence and how it was defined would vary greatly from our own, rape continues to be used as a weapon of war by many armies and militant groups around the world. Similarly, on a domestic level, sexual violence is used as a means of threatening and attacking women, with some members of (usually right wing) movements advocating the use of rape as a weapon to punish and humiliate women.<sup>384</sup> Considering the continuation of sexual violence in modern conflict, whilst attitudes may vary, there is still much to be gained from looking at scholarship which relates to recent conflicts to illuminate aspects of Roman practice as the behaviours and motivations are similar.

It has therefore been necessary throughout this chapter to refer to research on the subjects of sexual violence in recent conflict, sex trafficking, and trauma caused by violence in captivity and coercive relationships. With regards to sex trafficking, there are a number of differences between ways the Romans took captives and how criminal organisations today coerce victims into trafficking. Victims of modern trafficking, usually women and girls, are vulnerable because they often have experience of domestic violence/abuse and poverty. The victims are coerced into ‘escaping’ from their lives and ‘making a fresh start’ somewhere else.<sup>385</sup> The victims of Roman slavery were enslaved through violence and not through coercive methods. Nevertheless, the techniques used by the Romans and modern criminal enterprises in controlling their victims are similar. After being taken captive, ancient and modern victims of trafficking alike, were transported to foreign countries where they lack knowledge of the language, are isolated and fearful of seeking help or are unable to do so because of cultural mores (this is the case for the Romans in particular given the legality of slavery), and are under constant threat of violence, sexual assault, debt, and fear. Where pertinent, I have outlined how modern scholarship speaks to the unwritten motivations behind the Romans’ behaviour in relation to sexual violence and enslavement.

As a result of the aforementioned reasons, there has not been a comprehensive study of how the Romans used sexual violence in warfare and its subsequent representations. Furthermore, there is little research into how sexual violence was part of the process and management of captive-taking, and I hope this thesis contributes to a greater understanding of such violence in Roman culture. There is much evidence which has yet to be explored and I have discussed such examples throughout this chapter, taking

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<sup>382</sup> Gibson, 2018: 269-10.

<sup>383</sup> Gale, Scourfield, 2018: 1-3.

<sup>384</sup> Classics, as Zuckerberg details, is utilised by such groups/individuals to justify their ‘pro-rape’ arguments, *cf.* Zuckerberg, 2018: 143-184.

<sup>385</sup> O’Connor, 2017: 9.10.

an interdisciplinary approach where necessary. As this thesis concerns the process and management of captive-taking and its representations, there is not scope here to conduct a full study, but sexual violence in Roman warfare deserves more consideration, particularly as the topic's neglect presents only a male-centric view of war, essentially ignoring the role of women and children in warfare. That said, my research conveys how sexual violence was used by the Romans and that it was employed as a method of subduing and degrading their enemies, with far reaching implications.

### 3.2 Survivors and Victims of Sexual Violence

Scholarship on recent warfare has shown that where there is conflict, there is also sexual violence.<sup>386</sup> Women and children are the primary targets for sexual violence, as they are not directly involved in combat and are often unable to defend themselves when faced with trained male soldiers.<sup>387</sup> As a result, this chapter primarily concerns the female victims and survivors of sexual violence in Roman warfare.<sup>388</sup> Before continuing further, we should acknowledge that boys and men were certainly subjected to sexual violence in Roman culture, but this is not reflected in Greco-Roman representations of their actions in a wartime context.<sup>389</sup> The reasons for this may be found in research on recent conflicts where we encounter numerous instances where men and boys are also victims of sexual violence in warfare.<sup>390</sup> Cultures which practise sexual violence against males are usually intent on depriving their victim of his 'masculinity'. This is significant in the Roman context as the Romans were primarily concerned with who penetrated whom. Those who were penetrated, with or without consent, were typically associated with 'servility, femininity, and social inferiority.'<sup>391</sup> As we have seen and will discuss in more detail throughout this thesis, the Romans wanted to portray themselves as having conquered fearsome peoples. It was therefore not in the Romans' best interests to present their enemies as 'feminized', given the Romans' understanding of the dynamics of power in sexual violence. Furthermore, in recent conflicts, males who were subjected to sexual violence were often identified as being 'the other', even within their own society.<sup>392</sup> As sexual violence is usually perpetrated against women, who are often legally and politically marginalised with their societies,<sup>393</sup> it is significant that men are sexually assaulted as a means of 'othering', a concept we shall discuss shortly, in that they are forced to experience punishment 'traditionally' exacted on women. We shall see references to sexual

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<sup>386</sup> Askin, 2013: 19.

<sup>387</sup> Hermann, Palmieri, 2010: 19-30. Card has also shown that women who are trained in self-defence are less likely to be the victims of sexual violence, *cf.* Card, 1996: 12-13.

<sup>388</sup> Throughout this chapter, I have used the terms 'victim' and 'survivor' to denote those who were subjected to sexual violence. For clarity, 'victim' refers to those who were killed as a result of or shortly after being assaulted, 'survivor' refers to those who survived the assault.

<sup>389</sup> For examples of sexual violence against boys in the Roman context, *cf.* Cic. *Phil.* 3.12, Tac. *Hist.* 14.4.

<sup>390</sup> Linos, 2009: 1548-1551. For the ancient world, *cf.* Gaca, 2013: 73-88.

<sup>391</sup> Kamen, Levin-Richardson, 2015: 449-460.

<sup>392</sup> Linos, 2009: 1549.

<sup>393</sup> Linos, 2009: 1549.

violence against men and boys throughout this chapter but such examples are rare and references are usually in relation to extreme situations where the author incorporates such detail to highlight poor conduct in warfare or an enemy's barbarism.<sup>394</sup> Therefore, whilst it is acknowledged that men and boys were subjected to sexual violence, violence committed against women and girls in warfare was focussed on more by Greco-Roman authors as it was expected and more acceptable conduct in war.

Whilst women and girls were the most common victims/survivors of sexual violence, women involved or affected by warfare were not entirely without agency.<sup>395</sup> Whilst captive women are typically depicted as submissive within Roman literature and iconography, there are a few instances in which non-combatant women were actively involved in warfare.<sup>396</sup> The circumstances in which they become involved were desperate, and are indicative of the position of women within Roman society and how Greco-Roman authors viewed women. The emphasis on women in these instances also shows how it was expected that women and children would be targeted during warfare, and that sexual violence was an omnipresent threat in such circumstances. Women and children defending their besieged cities appears to be a trope found within warfare. For instance, the women and children of the Tunisian city of Vaga took up arms to help massacre Roman soldiers on the orders of Jugurtha in 109 BCE.<sup>397</sup> In this case, the women and children were assisting their (usually male) defenders in the massacre, thus showing that the whole population was actively involved in the downfall of the Romans. This indicates that, in Roman thought, 'the enemy' comprised the entire population of male combatants, women and children.

Another example concerns how the women of Rome, when faced with Sulla's approaching army in 88 BCE, used the roof tiles from their city's buildings to attack the soldiers.<sup>398</sup> As Barry outlines, tiles were useful weapons in that they simply rested on a roof, so could easily be pulled off, and were light enough to be thrown, two-handed, whilst causing sufficient damage to the troops below.<sup>399</sup> The tiles are symbolic of the *domus*, the 'female' sphere and centre of Roman family life. They were also expensive commodities which, should the city be recovered, would be costly to replace.<sup>400</sup> As such, their actions not only signify their desperation, but that, should the women be captured, the household would essentially be destroyed as it was considered to be the female sphere.<sup>401</sup> Similarly, during Rome's wars with Spain in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE, Appian claimed that some women from Hispanic tribes bore arms to defend their

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<sup>394</sup> Cf. Dio. Sic. 13.58.1-2, Cic. *Phil.* 3.12.

<sup>395</sup> Loman demonstrates how women in the Greek world could participate in warfare in support roles, including financing war, food production, entertainment and direct assistance. It is likely this was the case across the Mediterranean during antiquity, cf. Loman, 2004: 34-54.

<sup>396</sup> I use the term non-combatant women to distinguish '[gender] transgressors' like the mythical Amazons and Tacitus' female British commanders, cf. Sidebottom, 2004: 24-7, Card, 1996: 12-13.

<sup>397</sup> Sall. *Iug.* 67.

<sup>398</sup> Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 9.6-7.

<sup>399</sup> Barry, 1996: 60-64.

<sup>400</sup> Barry, 1996: 60.

<sup>401</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 76-77.

cities.<sup>402</sup> Like the women of Rome, their defence was against the Romans' attack on their domestic domain, and was also used to stress the 'warlike' nature of the Hispanic people.<sup>403</sup> In such cases, whether based on actual events or simply invented by authors, the examples show that the women would destroy their homes to ensure the protection of their family.<sup>404</sup> This is significant given that, as we shall see throughout this thesis,<sup>405</sup> it was the people and not the material objects which enabled the Romans to declare that they (or their enemies) had subjugated a nation. In Greco-Roman thought, men were supposed to be the protectors of their female relatives and sexual violence was therefore indicative of the failure of men in doing their duty.<sup>406</sup> As a result, the defeat of an enemy was not complete without the subjugation of women and children. Furthermore, as we shall see, symbolism of defeat is often signified by the female form as it is often cast as 'fertile land'.<sup>407</sup> The consequences of sexual violence transcend the act itself,<sup>408</sup> and in the Greco-Roman context link to elite self-representations.

### 3.3. Motivations for Sexual Violence in Warfare

The consequences in question link to the motivations for sexual violence, and modern scholarship is illuminating given that ancient authors do not expressly state the purpose of such violence. There are a number of different motivations for sexual violence in warfare, and I shall discuss these in turn. It is important to point out that there could be multiple motivations for the use of sexual violence in one instance and some motivations had short term, reactive implications whilst others had long-term, strategic motivations. The primary motivations for the use of sexual violence in warfare were and are: the desire to display dominance, an indirect attack on male combatants, a form of revenge, humiliation and punishment, genetic Imperialism, a symbol of power changes, and the destruction of a community. As we shall see throughout this chapter, the aforementioned motivations enabled the Romans to take captives more easily as the whole of enemy society was physically and psychologically damaged through the use of sexual violence.

Firstly, we need to overturn the notion that sexual violence is primarily about the physical act of sex. Contrary to how Livy paints the 'lusty' actions of the Carthaginians during their assault of Saguntum (Sagunto in modern-day Spain) in 218 BCE,<sup>409</sup> sexual violence is not conducted as a means of gratifying soldiers' sexual desires or as a

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<sup>402</sup> App. *Hisp.* 71-72.

<sup>403</sup> Clark, 2014: 160.

<sup>404</sup> Seifert, 2011: 149.

<sup>405</sup> Cf. pp. 104-108.

<sup>406</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.10.5-6, Livy 3.47.2, 39.15.13-14, cf. Reeder, 2017: 374.

<sup>407</sup> Dougherty, 1998: 270-1. Keith has completed a full survey on the casting of land as female in epic, cf. Keith, 2000: 40-64.

<sup>408</sup> Dougherty, 1998: 272-4.

<sup>409</sup> Livy 21.57.13: *Neque ulla quae in tali re memorabilis scribentibus videri solet praetermissa clades est: adeo omne libidinis crudelitatisque et inhumanae superbiae editum in miseros exemplum est* (Nor was any cruelty omitted which historians generally deem worth noting on such an occasion; but every species of lust and outrage and inhuman insolence was visited upon the wretched inhabitants). Translation by Foster, 1929. Cf. Mueller, 1999: 181-5.



means of 'release' after engaging in heated conflict.<sup>410</sup> Sexual gratification of the perpetrators is only a by-product of sexual violence. Rather, given the connections between the socio-political position of women in 'rape-prone' societies,<sup>411</sup> as Rome was, sexual violence is an expression of a social ideology of male dominance.<sup>412</sup> This ideology was prevalent in the Greco-Roman world, given free women's inferior position within society.<sup>413</sup> Sexual violence is intended to make an impact on the 'audience' before or to which it is conducted. Therefore, sexual violence in war is 'part of a calculated strategy to terrorize, demoralize, and destroy victims, families and communities or associated groups.'<sup>414</sup> Women are attacked in warfare in intimate ways because women are essential to the social structure of a community.<sup>415</sup>

Such a concept is significant when addressing the motivations for sexual violence in the Roman world, particularly as women may have been understood to 'belong' to enemy combatants, thus were an extension of the Romans' enemies and their property.<sup>416</sup> Contrary to Whittaker's claims,<sup>417</sup> sexual violence in the Roman world was systemic, as it was understood within ideological thought that Roman males or those under their authority were 'impenetrable penetrators', a term which refers to the Romans' sexual norms, specifically that Roman males could penetrate their sexual partner, but could never be the submissive, penetrated partner. Therefore, the ability to prevent an assault on one's person was a signifier of 'manliness' (*virtus*) as the Romans understood it.<sup>418</sup> Given the prevalence of this thought within Roman ideology, the counter argument can be applied to sexual violence in war. As Roman societal conventions and law dictated, women were under the care and authority of their male relatives.<sup>419</sup> As such, an assault on a female was, by extension, an attack on their menfolk.<sup>420</sup> Thus, the women, girls and boys who were subjected to sexual violence were socially denigrated in the eyes of their attackers, as they were violated, and their menfolk were shown to be powerless. This had both short- and long-term implications which shall be addressed throughout this chapter.

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<sup>410</sup> Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 312. In the Greek world, victory in battle was associated with a 'strong sexual charge', and this attitude appears to have continued into the Roman world given the example of Saguntum, and this has been taken as read by scholars like Ziolkowski, 1993: 76-84. However, the 'sexual urge' argument does not stand up under scientific scrutiny, cf. Seifert, 1996: 35.

<sup>411</sup> A society can be defined as 'rape-prone' if 'rape is accepted practice used to punish women, as part of a ceremony, or is *clearly* an act of moderate to high frequency carried out against women or women of other societies', cf. Reeves Sanday, 1997: 55.

<sup>412</sup> Reeves Sanday argues that 'female power and authority is lower in rape-prone societies; women do not participate in public decision-making and males express contempt for women as decision-makers', cf. Reeves Sanday, 1986: 84-5.

<sup>413</sup> Evans, 1991: 1-11, Nguyen, 2006: 76-80.

<sup>414</sup> Askin, 2013: 19.

<sup>415</sup> Card, 1996: 5-8.

<sup>416</sup> Given the position of women in free Roman society, cf. Evans, 1991: 1-11, Dixon, 2007: 45-7.

<sup>417</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 131-132.

<sup>418</sup> Walters, 1997: 29-43.

<sup>419</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 78-80.

<sup>420</sup> Walters, 1997: 30.

In the short-term, the attacks on women and children, as extensions of their male relatives, enabled the Romans to enact a form of revenge, humiliation, or punishment on the whole of an enemy's society. Revenge, humiliation, and punishment are closely intertwined and are present in the ancient and modern examples. Despite their close connections, revenge is often viewed as a primary motivation for sexual violence in modern warfare, and there are countless examples from across history, including perhaps most famously the Allied assault of German women (and some men) at the end of the Second World War.<sup>421</sup> Soviet propaganda encouraged soldiers to take revenge on not just enemy soldiers, but the German people more generally.<sup>422</sup> Although evidence is limited, it is thought that the mass rape of German women was revenge for the abuses German soldiers had carried out against women on the Eastern front, including the detention of women in military brothels.<sup>423</sup> Generals throughout the Soviet army and the Soviet leader Stalin were aware of the attacks but did little to discourage sexual violence.<sup>424</sup> Sexual violence is therefore closely connected to punishment and humiliation, particularly when carried out against an enemy people. These examples from the Second World War highlight that sexual violence could be used at different stages of conflict but for similar motivations. The Germans utilised sexual violence as a means of consolidating their control on the eastern front, whilst the Russian troops used sexual violence as a form of revenge and to further humiliate the defeated German people. Ultimately, sexual violence could be used to humiliate a people, particularly in patriarchal cultures where women were seen as the property of their male relatives. The repercussions of sexual violence, primarily the trauma and potential impregnation of the survivors, had long-term effects on the whole of society.<sup>425</sup>

In the context of warfare, sexual violence is also an act which can be considered akin to genocide, as its purpose is to destroy a group's identity by decimating cultural and social bonds.<sup>426</sup> Part of this is by ensuring that the offspring resulting from rape were illegitimate, as concern for legitimacy of offspring was at the heart of Greco-Roman family 'law' and social mores.<sup>427</sup> Furthermore, Card, in her discussion of rape in recent history, argues that this 'productive' element of rape was a form of 'genetic Imperialism' which was used to impregnate women who would then be 'persuaded' to change loyalties,<sup>428</sup> presumably for the sake of their child or because their spirit was broken by the horrors they had endured, and destruction of their identity.

On this note, research on victims of violence in captivity has shown that the relationship between the victim and their attacker (or attackers) is one of coercive

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<sup>421</sup> The Soviet's attacks on women are well known, but the actions of American, British, and French soldiers are not as commonly discussed, *cf.* Gebhardt, Somers, 2017: 9-13.

<sup>422</sup> Wood, 2006: 310

<sup>423</sup> Wood, 2006: 310

<sup>424</sup> Wood, 2006: 310

<sup>425</sup> Gebhardt, Somers, 2017: 99-173.

<sup>426</sup> Card, 1996: 7-8.

<sup>427</sup> Seifert, 2011: 149.

<sup>428</sup> Card, 1996: 8-9.

control.<sup>429</sup> The victim is psychologically dominated in that all aspects of their life, including their physical autonomy are controlled by their captor or captors. This psychological domination is designed to not only destroy a person's autonomy, but to make them grateful for being allowed to continue living. To survive, the victim has little choice but to follow the orders of their captor or captors, and they are encouraged to feel grateful, after suffering prolonged abuse, to their captors for being allowed to continue to live. This links closely to how the Romans justified slavery, as we shall discuss later, with enslaved people allegedly called *servi* because generals chose to preserve (*servare*) their captives.<sup>430</sup> Although the concept of psychology was not understood by the Romans, there can be little doubt that the use of sexual violence, and its continued perpetration once a captive was enslaved, was designed to create a sense of dependence, with the victim relying on their captor for survival. This sense of dependence was more acute given that the victims, then often enslaved, were isolated from their own societies and language,<sup>431</sup> having been sold into slavery in different regions around the Mediterranean.<sup>432</sup>

The isolation of individuals from their families and culture creates a sense of 'othering' which enables sexual assaults to be justified because the female victims are 'the enemy', therefore 'the other', a position which dehumanizes them in the eyes of their assailants.<sup>433</sup> As we shall discuss in more detail throughout this chapter, research on victims of sex trafficking (a form of modern-day slavery which primarily affects girls and women) has shown that repeated sexual assaults are used by perpetrators of trafficking to wear down the victim's ability to resist and seek help.<sup>434</sup> It has been reported that, despite the obvious distress of trafficked girls and women who are forced into prostitution, buyers rarely show concern for the women's well-being.<sup>435</sup> This has been attributed to the sense of the victims' 'otherness', as they are often trafficked to foreign countries and do not have knowledge of the primary language used. There are clearly differences between Roman and modern-day slavery, but the use of sexual violence to destroy a person's agency, create a sense of 'otherness', and prevent them from seeking help or escape are common factors which shall be explored in more depth throughout this chapter.

Another motivation for using sexual violence, which had long-term consequences for the victims, was the use of such violence as a means of enslaving people. As suggested in visual depictions, which we shall discuss shortly, sexual violence was viewed as a part of the transition from free person to captive to enslaved person. Given references to the legal protection of Roman women only in exceptional circumstances, it is highly

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<sup>429</sup> Herman, 2015: 74-78.

<sup>430</sup> Just. *Dig.* 1.5.4.2, *cf.* pp. 105-107.

<sup>431</sup> Herman, 2015: 80-81.

<sup>432</sup> As we shall see in more detail in the chapter on enslavement, *cf.* pp. 103-105. Women who had been raped by Roman soldiers may have been enslaved and became 'wives' of a fashion, *cf.* Pheng, 2004: 209.

<sup>433</sup> Fogelman, 2012: 15-28.

<sup>434</sup> O'Connor, 2017: 11-12.

<sup>435</sup> O'Connor, 2017: 11-12.

likely that wartime sexual violence took place with more regularity than the primary sources would suggest. Furthermore, it also seems that sexual violence in warfare was not only permitted but recognised as part of a captive's journey and a practice which enabled individuals to be more easily enslaved.<sup>436</sup> The role of sexual violence in the process of enslavement is rarely acknowledged by ancient authors, with the exception of a passage in Diodorus Siculus, a Greek author writing during the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE. The incident refers to Greek allies of the Carthaginians who attacked the Selinuntians in 409 BCE, and the use of sexual violence by the Carthaginians as a means of terrorizing women and children, making it easier for them to be enslaved. Here, we see a discussion of the role of sexual violence in reality, rather than as a metaphor.

*The Greeks serving as allies of the Carthaginians, as they contemplated the reversal in the lives of the hapless Selinuntians, felt pity at their lot. The women, deprived now of the pampered life they had enjoyed, spent the nights in the very midst of the enemies' lasciviousness, enduring terrible indignities, and some were obliged to see their daughters of marriageable age suffering treatment improper for their years. For the savagery of the barbarians spared neither free-born youths nor maidens, but exposed these unfortunates to dreadful disasters. Consequently, as the women reflected upon the slavery that would be their lot in Libya, as they saw themselves together with their children in a condition in which they possessed no legal rights and were subject to insolent treatment and thus compelled to obey masters, and as they noted that these masters used an unintelligible speech and had a bestial character, they mourned for their living children as dead, and receiving into their souls as a piercing wound each and every outrage committed against them, they became frantic with suffering and vehemently deplored their own fate; while as for their fathers and brothers who had died fighting for their country, them they counted blessed, since they had not witnessed any sight unworthy of their own valour.<sup>437</sup>*

Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνας συμμαχοῦντες ἠλέουν τὴν τῶν ἀκληρούντων τύχην. αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἐστερημέναι τῆς συνήθους τρυφῆς<sup>1</sup> ἐν πολεμίων ὕβρει διενυκτέρευον, ὑπομένουσαι δεινὰς ταλαιπωρίας· ὧν ἓναι θυγατέρας ἐπιγάμους ὄραν ἠναγκάζοντο πασχούσας οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς ἡλικίας. ἢ γὰρ βαρβάρων ὠμότης οὔτε παίδων ἐλευθέρων οὔτε παρθένων φειδομένη δεινὰς τοῖς ἠτυχηκόσι παρίστα συμφοράς. διόπερ αἱ γυναῖκες ἀναλογιζόμεναι μὲν τὴν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ μέλλουσαν αὐταῖς ἔσεσθαι δουλείαν, θεωροῦσαι δ' αὐτὰς ἅμα τοῖς τέκνοις ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ καὶ προπηλακισμῷ δεσποτῶν ἀναγκαζόμενας ὑπακούειν, τούτους δ' ὀρώσαι ἀσύνητον μὲν τὴν φωνήν, θηριώδη δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντας, τὰ μὲν ζῶντα τῶν τέκνων ἐπένηθον, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰς ταῦτα παρανομημάτων οἰοῦντι νογμοὺς εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν λαμβάνουσαι περιπαθεῖς ἐγίνοντο καὶ πολλὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν τύχην κατωδύροντο· τοὺς δὲ πατέρας, ἔτι δὲ ἀδελφούς, οἱ διαγωνιζόμενοι περὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐτετελευτήκεισαν, ἐμακάριζον, οὐθὲν ἀνάξιον ἐωρακότας τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς. οἱ δὲ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν διαφυγόντες Σελινούντιοι, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες ἐξακόσιοι πρὸς τοῖς δισχιλίαις, διεσώθησαν εἰς Ἀκράγαντα καὶ πάντων ἔτυχον τῶν φιλανθρώπων.

<sup>436</sup> Perry, 2015: 55-75.

<sup>437</sup> Dio. Sic. 13.58.1-2.

Within Diodorus' account, there is clearly an understanding of the role sexual violence played in warfare and enslavement and an attempt to empathise with the women in question, albeit in order to stress Carthaginian barbarity. The women, like victims of modern sex trafficking, are removed from their homes and placed entirely in the power of the Carthaginians. They and their children are subjected to sexual violence and understand through this treatment their position has drastically changed. Again, like victims of sex trafficking today, the women are unable to communicate with their captors which not only conveys their lack of agency but dehumanises them further in the eyes of their captors. The women lack control of their lives and their bodies which signifies that they are enslaved and their former status within their communities now holds no bearing. Through the treatment they experience, they are gradually degraded and become increasingly distressed as a result. Unlike modern sex trafficking victims, who become reliant upon their captors to protect their well-being, the women described by Diodorus wish for death as a release from slavery.

However, as we shall see throughout in this chapter, there are issues with representation as Diodorus emphasises the brutality of the Carthaginians through their treatment of the women. Diodorus is sympathetic to the plight of the women because he is reflecting upon the folly of the Greeks in allying themselves with the Carthaginians and enabling (perhaps unintentionally) the Carthaginians to attack and enslave Greek women. Unlike some of the examples we shall discuss, the women are humanised, and this is telling of how Greco-Roman authors could use sexual violence as a means of emphasising supposed characteristics of a people or commander. As we shall see, sexual violence was usually presented as being a violent but necessary part of warfare. Writers could therefore choose to stress excessive sexual violence to denigrate or praise an individual or people, praise an individual for refraining from participating in excessive forms of such violence, or allude to sexual violence as a fact of war.

The presentation of sexual violence therefore enabled writers to emphasise certain aspects of a commander or an army's character or reflect political upheaval. As Whittaker and Arieti argue,<sup>438</sup> sexual violence was politically charged and was used within Roman *exempla*, in such cases as the Sabine women, Lucretia and Verginia, as an indication of political unrest and change.<sup>439</sup> Sexual transgression or behaviour was a way by which the Romans could denigrate an opponent, essentially acting as a form of effective slander. Given the concern within ancient sources for the sexual conduct of their leaders, it is unsurprising that the sexual misconduct of disliked individuals in politics and history could be used as a mark against their character. Similarly, given the importance of family within Roman society, the behaviour of their female relatives was also used as an indicator of character. A typical example of alleged sexual misconduct within elite Roman society pertains to Clodius and his sister, Clodia, who together

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<sup>438</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 130, Arieti, 1997: 209-230.

<sup>439</sup> Arieti, 1997: 209-230.

faced accusations of cross-dressing, incest, and voyeurism.<sup>440</sup> We have seen how sexual violence was endemic in Roman society, yet criticism of sexual transgression and violence was largely pragmatic, being based on circumstances and politicians' desire to besmirch their opponents' characters. Similarly, criticism of sexual violence against free persons was mercurial, and often hypocritical, given that it was expected in warfare and domestic slavery. Despite this hypocrisy within Roman culture and society, descriptions of sexual violence against captives could be utilised by authors and politicians as a means of indicating an individual's character.

In addition to showing how sexual violence could be used as a method of enslavement, Diodorus' aforementioned account shows that sexual violence acted as a means by which a power change could be indicated. Sexual violence was also central to Roman mythology, with violence perpetrated against the Sabine Women acting as symbolic of political and constitutional change.<sup>441</sup> Arieti argues that rape was an 'action representative of Rome', and this is significant as the expectation that conquest involved rape, as suggested by the case of the Sabine women, acts as an indication that there was an institutionalized element to sexual violence.<sup>442</sup> In the case of captives, this was a form of transition from their free status to that of enslaved captive without a home or identity.

The example of the Sabine Women demonstrates the careful construction of a narrative surrounding the issue of rape in martial affairs. In the case of the Sabine Women, they were taken against their will, as stressed by Livy's use of the word *rapio* (snatch, grab, carry off, abduct).<sup>443</sup> Given what follows in relation to representations of rape in an historical context, it is likely that rape was implicit in the taking of the Sabine Women.<sup>444</sup> However, it is the way in which the act of sexual violence is transformed from being something unacceptable, as the early Romans had effectively violated the religious games which the Sabines and surrounding tribes had been invited to, into a necessary and 'productive' act. As Dougherty argues, the taking of the Sabine women can be viewed as a 'war crime', transformed into the 'civilised act' of marriage.<sup>445</sup> Such an understanding allowed Greco-Roman writers to reference sexual violence but primarily use it to promote a secondary discussion, as we shall see later in this chapter. This is also important for representations of sexual violence, as it entirely depends upon the perspective of the narrator and their agenda, as we can see with Aeneas' account of the fall of Troy in the *Aeneid*.<sup>446</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> Cenerini, 2012: 99-111. As Cenerini argues, Clodia like Fulvia transgressed the conventional gender norms of the late Republican period, becoming politically active, and their sexuality was the focus of criticism for their contemporaries, cf. Cic. *Cael.* 13-14, 21-22.

<sup>441</sup> Arieti, 1997: 218-9, cf. Chaplin, 2010: 60-61.

<sup>442</sup> Arieti, 1997: 218-219.

<sup>443</sup> Livy 1.1.10.

<sup>444</sup> Livy's telling of the rape, and it is widely understood to be just that, of the Sabine Women has been widely researched, cf. Bryson, 1986: 152-173, Brown, 1995: 291-319, Arieti, 1997: 209-229, Dougherty, 1998: 267-84, Beard, 1999: 1-10.

<sup>445</sup> Dougherty, 1998: 268-9.

<sup>446</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 2.486-505.

### 3.4. Virgil's Aeneid

The concerns outlined above are seemingly present in one passage of the *Aeneid*, in which Aeneas details the sack of Troy.<sup>447</sup> This example is timely, given that the *Aeneid* was written in the latter half of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, and was a form of cultural promotion which was actively encouraged and supported by Augustus and his close circle, including by Virgil's patron, Maecenas.<sup>448</sup> As such, it is evident in this literary example that sexual violence could be used to promote a character, or a mythical or historical figure's agenda. Aeneas is relaying the events to Dido, the Queen of Carthage, and it is appropriate for Aeneas to present himself as a sympathetic character given his 'refugee' status, whilst also explaining how he managed to escape suffering the same fate of his Trojan countrymen.<sup>449</sup> In turn, there is a sense of justification for Rome's Imperialist activities, particularly given reference to the colonisation of Troy's enemies (Greek states) by Anchises in Book 6.<sup>450</sup> As such, the narrator's viewpoint is essential for understanding the Romans' attitude towards and representations of sexual violence.

*But within, amid shrieks and woeful uproar, the house is in confusion, and at its heart the vaulted halls ring with women's wails; the din strikes the golden stars. Then through the vast dwelling trembling matrons roam, clinging fast to the doors and imprinting kisses on them. On presses Pyrrhus with his father's might; no bars, no warders even, can stay his course. The gate totters under the ram's many blows and the doors, wrenched from their sockets, fall forward. Force finds a way; the Greeks, pouring in, burst a passage, slaughter the foremost, and fill the wide space with soldiery. Not with such fury, when a foaming river, bursting its barriers, has overflowed and with its torrent overwhelmed the resisting banks, does it rush furiously upon the fields in a mass and over all the plains sweep herds and folds. I myself saw on the threshold Neoptolemus, mad with slaughter, and both the sons of Atreus; I saw Hecuba and her hundred daughters-in-law, and amid the altars Priam, polluting with his blood the fires he himself had hallowed. The famous fifty chambers, the rich promise of offspring, the doors proud with the spoils of barbaric gold, fall low; where the fire fails, the Greeks hold sway.<sup>451</sup>*

At domus interior gemitu miseroque tumult  
miscetur, penitusque caevae plangoribus aedes  
femineis ululant; ferit aurea sidera clamor.  
tum pavidae tectis matres ingentibus errant  
amplexaeque tenent postis atque oscula figunt.  
instat vi patria Pyrrhus: nec claustra nec ipsi  
custodes sufferre valent; labat ariete crebro  
ianua et emoti procumbunt cardine postes.  
fit via vi; rumpunt aditus primosque trucidant  
immissi Danaï et late loca milite complent.

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<sup>447</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 2.486-505.

<sup>448</sup> Therefore, the poem is reflective of the time in which it was composed, cf. discussion of Parry's 'two-voices theory' in Harrison, 1990: 5-6.

<sup>449</sup> Powell, 2011: 184-202.

<sup>450</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 6.836-2, cf. Reed, 2010: 68.

<sup>451</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 2.486-505. Translation by Fairclough, 1999 with minor amendments.

non sic, aggeribus ruptis cum spumeus amnis  
 exiit oppositasque evicit gurgite moles,  
 fertur in arva furens cumulo camposque per omnis  
 cum stabulis armenta trahit. vidi ipse furentem  
 caede Neoptolemum geminosque in limine Atrida  
 vidi Hecubam centumque nurus Priamumque per aras  
 sanguine foedantem quos ipse sacraverat ignis.  
 quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum,  
 barbarico postes auro spoliisque superbi  
 procubuere; tenent Danaï, qua deficit ignis.

The extract is useful as it provides a literary example of expectations of conduct following the destruction of captured cities, which evoked traditions present in Roman history and in Greek epic poetry. Firstly, the execution of the elderly and infirm was commonplace during the siege of a city, as evident in Pyrrhus' execution of Priam.<sup>452</sup> As Horsfall notes, Priam was a symbol of 'Troy's venerable majesty',<sup>453</sup> and should have been treated with respect, given that he was an esteemed leader who was attempting to fight Pyrrhus, thus defending his family. It is interesting that, in contrast to the fragments from the Epic cycle,<sup>454</sup> Priam is dragged *to* the altar of Zeus by Pyrrhus at lines 549-550, rather than away from it with Priam in supplication at the altar, as also suggested in Greek vase paintings [Figures 6 and 7]. Thus, Priam is cast as a protector of his family and home, whilst Pyrrhus is an abuser of it who breaks religious norms by dragging Priam's body to the altar through the blood of his son, Polites. The death of Polites is yet another example of how Pyrrhus killed the male defenders of the city before turning his attention to the women.<sup>455</sup> Here, we should remember that Pyrrhus is the Trojans' enemy, and the emphasis is placed on his misdeeds, a technique used by Virgil's Aeneas to appeal to the sympathies of his audience, Dido. As such, this would suggest that, in the norms of war, the protectors and the elderly are dealt with first before attention is turned towards the women. Gaca has shown that in an historical context the elderly and male combatants were killed before the women and children were raped and subsequently enslaved.<sup>456</sup>

Whittaker has outlined that gender is central to the description of the sack of Troy.<sup>457</sup> Whittaker's comments are supported by Keith who argues that within epic poetry, a medium written by and intended to be consumed by men, a gender contrast is present throughout and was presumably one of the key ways by which *virtus* was established within elite culture.<sup>458</sup> In the sack of Troy, Virgil makes a point of contrast between the attacking male Greeks, and the remaining Trojans within the city's walls: the women

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<sup>452</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 506-560.

<sup>453</sup> Horsfall, 2008: 371-2.

<sup>454</sup> *Little Iliad*, 25-6, *Sack of Ilion*, 2.

<sup>455</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 526-533.

<sup>456</sup> Askin, 2013: 19, cf. Hirschauer, 2014: 64-6

<sup>457</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 234-235.

<sup>458</sup> Keith, 2000: 19. For sexuality and heroism in the *Aeneid*, cf. Putnam, 1995: 27-49.



trapped within the domestic setting of the *domus*.<sup>459</sup> Horsfall suggests that Virgil's use of *domus* is 'entirely appropriate' for the palace setting.<sup>460</sup> However, that *regia* (palace, court, residence),<sup>461</sup> a word which would indicate the grandeur of the Trojan court, was not used is indicative of Virgil's allusion to *domus* as the female domain, and to the centre of domestic, family life.<sup>462</sup> As such it is evident that the Greeks' attack is not merely on the male combatants, but on the whole Trojan population, through the attacks on women and children.

Language with connotations of sex and violence is implicit throughout the description of the sack of Troy. Horsfall does not refer to the sexual connotations within this passage in the use of the battering ram.<sup>463</sup> However, given that sex and military affairs were intertwined, which was reflected in the language the Romans used,<sup>464</sup> it is likely that the use of such language implies sexual violence within Virgil's retelling of the sack of Troy. As Whittaker outlines, *militia* can be used to refer to love-making or impotence, thus acting as a synonym for 'sexual intercourse' or genitalia.<sup>465</sup> Much like the sexual associations of swords, the equipment used by the Romans to breach the walls of an enemy's *domus*, the battering ram, may also have had sexual connotations.<sup>466</sup> Further emphasis is placed on the breach of Troy's gates, which is depicted as an act of rape perpetuated against the personification of the palace, with the women's cries echoing literally and metaphorically around the halls of Troy.<sup>467</sup> This is supported by Virgil's immediate use of the river metaphor to describe the Greeks' entry into the palace. Given that women's bodies were described using terms associated with landscape and agriculture, and were used to personify lands or nations,<sup>468</sup> it is likely that there was a further implication of sexual assault. The women, as the landscape, were ultimately overcome and possibly even 'fertilised' by the Greeks, depicted as the river. As we shall discuss shortly, this concept of fertilisation links closely with Card's discussion of 'genetic imperialism', with the Greeks destroying the Trojan 'race' by impregnating Trojan women with illegitimate offspring. It also reinforces the idea that sexual assault in the Roman world primarily concerned penetrative sexual assault.

Virgil used language of a sexual nature in his description of the assault on Priam's palace to 'hint at sexual assault while writing of warfare'.<sup>469</sup> He may also have inadvertently acknowledged one goal of martial rape which was to prevent the

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<sup>459</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 234-235.

<sup>460</sup> Horsfall, 2008: 371-2.

<sup>461</sup> OLD, 1599: *regia*.

<sup>462</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 76.

<sup>463</sup> Horsfall, 2008: 380.

<sup>464</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 235-6.

<sup>465</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 235-7.

<sup>466</sup> As we shall see later in this chapter, slingshots used in siege warfare also had sexual connotations, *cf.* pp. 79-81.

<sup>467</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 2.488, *cf.* Horsfall, 2008: 375-6.

<sup>468</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 119-20.

<sup>469</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 234-235.

conquered peoples from continuing their familial line. Virgil may have alluded to this aspect of sexual violence in warfare in the following lines:

*The famous fifty chambers, the rich promise of offspring, the doors proud with the spoils of barbaric gold, fall low; where the fire fails, the Greeks hold sway.*<sup>470</sup>

quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum,  
barbarico postes auro spoliisque superbi  
procubuere; tenent Danai, qua deficit ignis.

Here, Virgil may be suggesting that 'the rich promise of offspring' is dashed by the Greeks as,<sup>471</sup> through their use of sexual violence, they ensured that the Trojans could not produce legitimate offspring.<sup>472</sup> This would certainly accord with Card's research on the reproductive aspect of rape,<sup>473</sup> but also links closely with the symbolic nature of sexual violence, in that by violating the women, the future of the Trojan people was destroyed because the women carried the future of society, both literally and metaphorically.<sup>474</sup> Virgil's readers would have been aware of the fate of Troy's legitimate heir and many of the women of Troy, including Hector's wife, Andromache. Astyanax, Hector and Andromache's son, Troy's legitimate heir, was thrown from the walls of Troy [Figures 6 and 7]. The walls, which acted as the symbolic and literal protector of the Trojan people, became the weapon by which the Greeks destroy the symbol of Troy's future. As for Andromache, much like other members of her family including Cassandra and Hecuba, she was taken captive and subjected to sexual assault, resulting in her bearing Pyrrhus' son, Molossus.<sup>475</sup> Virgil conveys this aspect of mythical warfare in the *Aeneid* Book 3, when Andromache details her life following the fall of Troy. In short: Andromache had been taken captive by Pyrrhus, Achilles' son, and was impregnated before being handed over to a male Trojan captive, Helenus, whom she lived with in Epirus when Aeneas encounters her. Andromache's situation is indicative of the position of women following their capture. Virgil's Aeneas uses the word *conubia*, meaning marriage or wedlock,<sup>476</sup> to suggest a form of marriage between Andromache and Pyrrhus, yet Andromache's reply is telling of her status. Andromache is not a wife, but a 'captive' (*captiva*) forced to share Pyrrhus' bed (*cubile*).<sup>477</sup> Furthermore, even when she is placed under the protection of Helenus, a Trojan, Andromache has little agency and has effectively been given to another captive, as indicated by Virgil's use of the verb *habeo* (to have) in relation to Helenus' possession of Andromache.

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<sup>470</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 2.503-5. Translation by Fairclough, 1999.

<sup>471</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 2.503.

<sup>472</sup> Whittaker, 2009: 242.

<sup>473</sup> Card, 1996: 8-9.

<sup>474</sup> Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 308-9.

<sup>475</sup> The child is unnamed in the *Aeneid* but is referenced briefly in the *Odyssey*, cf. Hom. *Od.* 3.188.

<sup>476</sup> OLD, 438: *conubium*.

<sup>477</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 3.318-9.

In Roman thought, 'sexual intercourse was a powerful, corruptive force that possessed the potential to damage an individual both physically and morally.'<sup>478</sup> Such an implication initially appears problematic for the Romans, given that they claimed descent from the Trojans. This is interesting in the case of Andromache who continues to be treated with respect by Aeneas and Helenus, becoming queen of new Greek cities in Albania. Despite Andromache's reduction in status whilst a captive, she continued to be held in high regard. Significantly, Virgil refers to her as the 'wife' of Pyrrhus, when she was his captive, and that she later married 'a husband of her own race'.

*Helenus, is reigning over Greek cities, having won the wife and kingdom of Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, and that Andromache has again passed to a husband of her own race.*<sup>479</sup>

Helenium Graias regnare per urbes,  
coniugio Aeacidae Pyrrhi sceptrisque potitum,  
et patrio Andromachen iterum cecisse marito.

In this respect, Andromache's status was raised by the suggestion that her marriage to Pyrrhus was semi-legitimate, although she makes it clear that she remained a captive before being given to another captive, Helenus. Her assault is not alluded to in detail, other than through a 'union' or 'marriage'. This tells us not only that Virgil wanted to avoid the suggestion of sexual assault in direct relation to Andromache, as it would sully her reputation for his readers, but that it was unnecessary for sexual violence to be outlined as, if readers chose to read more closely, it was implicit in the language outlined in Andromache's description of her captivity. The Romans could clearly hold contrasting attitudes to women who were subjected to and survived sexual violence; as degrading as sexual violence was to women and their extended family and society (particularly menfolk), women could continue to be respected, depending upon who was telling the tale of the assault and their agenda. This is not dissimilar to how the treatment of Marcus Regulus or the characters in Plautus' *Captivi* were portrayed; they could continue to exhibit noble, 'Roman' qualities whilst still captive.

However, such presentation depended largely on the woman in question, how she was presented by ancient authors and the context in which she was attacked. In the case of Andromache, it was more important for Virgil to create sympathy for her character, given Helenus' usefulness to Virgil's hero Aeneas, than to denigrate her for having been assaulted and enslaved by the Greeks Virgil had been careful to categorise as barbaric. As we have seen with the case of Diodorus Siculus and will continue to look at in more detail, sexual violence was only explicitly referenced when the author wanted to identify the barbarity of an enemy. Aeneas and Helenus, as Andromache's kinsmen, are unlikely to criticise her for being attacked when the attack was an extension of their defeat. The emphasis on sexual violence as evidence of enemy barbarity is the case in literature and, as we shall see later, descriptions of sexual violence in historical conflict.

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<sup>478</sup> Perry, 2015: 55.

<sup>479</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 3.296-7.

Furthermore, Virgil's Andromache does not mention her illegitimate child Molossus which further suggests a desire for Virgil to downplay the long-term effects of the sexual violence the Trojan women were subjected to. Andromache was not a direct ancestor of the Romans, given her position in city states in Albania, many miles away from where Aeneas finally settled. Virgil could therefore discuss Andromache's assault and impregnation without suggesting that the Romans were descended from the illegitimate children of Trojan women and Greek rapists. This may explain why Roman tradition held that the surviving Trojan women were left at Eryx in Sicily,<sup>480</sup> so Virgil's description of the fall of Troy in Book 2 is used to highlight the savagery of the Greeks in their excessive cruelty, rather than imply that the Romans' ancestors were illegitimate.<sup>481</sup> The removal of the Trojan women (and any potential illegitimate offspring) from the narrative enables the Trojans to avoid any suggestion that their offspring, and the Romans' ancestors, were the progenies of Greeks who had raped the Trojan women during the sack of Troy. Furthermore, the associations of illegitimacy are further underplayed by Virgil in Book 5, where he stresses the male ancestry in the funeral games.<sup>482</sup> The concept of excessive cruelty is significant as it was often an indicator of barbarity, and as Sallust warns in his history of the Jugurthine War, the downfall of a nation often resulted from their excessive cruelty in victory.<sup>483</sup> Here, the Trojans are cast as the victims of sexual assault, and the Greeks' cruelty foreshadows their downfall at the hands of Troy's heirs, the Romans. Virgil's description of the fall of Troy in the *Aeneid* is one of the ways sexual violence was presented within Greco-Roman writings. Indeed, it is the only possible way by which victims of sexual violence were presented, given that there is a reluctance within Greco-Roman writings to present respected Roman leaders as instigating violence of this kind. As a result, this was a way by which unpleasant characteristics of individuals or groups could be stressed for literary and political purposes.

### 3.5. Scipio and New Carthage

As we have established that the Romans carried out sexual violence in warfare, we should focus on idealised expectations of generals' and soldiers' conduct in relation to women and children in warfare. These examples were used by ancient authors to highlight certain characteristics of the generals in question. Such examples present the highly idealised expectations of the Roman elite, and need to be treated with scepticism given the promotional agenda evident within Greco-Roman literature. The following details an *exemplum* which is dated before the period in question, yet it provides useful background and evidence of the socio-political uses of representations of sexual violence. Our main source for this incident, which involves Scipio Africanus, is Polybius. Polybius was not without his own agenda, given that he was a treaty-hostage who was taken to Rome in 167 BCE, and had close connections with the Scipio family, primarily Scipio Africanus' grandson-by-adoption, Scipio Aemilianus. Polybius

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<sup>480</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 5.767-770.

<sup>481</sup> The removal of the Trojan women from the narrative also freed the Trojan men to later marry women of the Latini after their victory in Book 12.

<sup>482</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 5.70-285.

<sup>483</sup> Sall. *Iug.* 42.4-5.

does not fail to acknowledge Rome's violence,<sup>484</sup> but this *exemplum* is significant as it demonstrates a careful consideration of the general's representation. In this instance, Polybius used the treatment of captives as a means of highlighting characteristics of the Roman elite.

Scipio Africanus captured New Carthage from the Carthaginians in 209 BCE. Upon discovering the Iberian hostages (ὄμηροι, *homêroi*) who had been taken by the Carthaginians, Scipio decided to release them as soon as their families could arrange emissaries to collect them.<sup>485</sup> The hostages included women and children, and Scipio's dealings with the women provide the basis for our understanding of the treatment captured women could expect during warfare.<sup>486</sup> According to Polybius and Livy, Scipio was petitioned by an older female hostage who was acting as the younger women's guardian, and it is implicit in her exchange with Scipio that she is concerned for the women's welfare. Initially Scipio assumes that she is concerned for the women's supplies, yet, in Polybius' telling of the story, she clarifies her position by stating:

*"General, you do not take me rightly if you think that our present petition is about our stomachs."*<sup>487</sup>

“Ὄκ ὀρθῶς” ἔφη “στρατηγέ, τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἐκδέχη λόγους, εἰ νομίζεις ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῆς γαστρὸς δεῖσθαί σου νῦν”.

This clarification indicates that sexual violence was heavily implied by the speaker. Livy, writing a history of Rome centuries later, echoes Polybius' description,<sup>488</sup> but more explicitly refers to sexual violence, using the term *iniuria* (offense, abuse, sexual assault).<sup>489</sup> Given Scipio's promise to the guardian that he will ensure the women are protected, treating them as if they were relatives, it is evident that Polybius chose to represent Scipio as applying the Romans' laws to their allies, with Scipio taking on the role of κύριος (*kyrios*), the head of the metaphorical household. In turn, this presented him as being moderate and loyal, qualities which were presumably those Polybius' patrons wished to be associated with. The identity of the women is significant as they were not enemies of Rome, being members of allied Iberian tribes, but they were also not Roman and so were not protected by Roman law. As such, they were hostages taken by the Carthaginians, Rome's enemy, who were themselves captured following Rome's siege of New Carthage. Despite their status as hostages, they appear to be threatened by the prospect of sexual violence, which implies that they were effectively under the Romans' jurisdiction and therefore subject to whatever treatment they deemed fit.

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<sup>484</sup> Groves, 2017: 1-13.

<sup>485</sup> Polyb. 10.18, Livy 26.49.12-.16

<sup>486</sup> This example is further discussed in the chapter on hostages, *cf.* pp. 134-135.

<sup>487</sup> Polyb. 10.18.11-12. Adapted from the translation by Paton, 2011.

<sup>488</sup> Livy 26.49.12-.14.

<sup>489</sup> OLD, 914: *iniuria*.

As we shall see later in this thesis,<sup>490</sup> hostages did not have the same status as captives. However, within the description of Scipio at New Carthage, there is another example which outlines how captive, rather than hostage, women could be considered as a form of booty in warfare. This echoes examples found in the *Iliad*, in which women are considered as a reward for successful soldiers, with the commanders being rewarded with noble female captives, i.e. Achilles with Briseis.<sup>491</sup> Scipio, supposedly a renowned womanizer, was presented with a beautiful captive (αἰχμάλωτον, *aikhmalōton*) by some of his soldiers.<sup>492</sup> Here, it appears that the woman is brought before Scipio as a gift, presumably to use as his personal enslaved attendant which, given the emphasis on the woman's physical appearance,<sup>493</sup> and her virginity,<sup>494</sup> suggests that this 'present' would be for sexual purposes. This also contradicts claims that sexual violence in warfare is solely opportunistic.

In this instance, the involvement of multiple individuals in perpetrating an act of sexual violence links to the gang-rape phenomenon observed in recent conflict. Granted, the young woman does not appear to have been gang-raped, but the involvement of multiple individuals in perpetrating sexual violence is important and addresses similar issues, including male dominance and systemic sexual violence in war. As Alison argues, 'gang-rape performs a bonding function for groups of men and that it accounts for a high proportion of wartime sexual violence.'<sup>495</sup> Gang-rapes are used to bond, and 'cement a sense of loyalty' which rests upon an awareness of shared responsibility for the act.<sup>496</sup> In this case, the fact that the men thought it appropriate to offer the woman to Scipio suggests that sexual violence was acceptable and that the practice was widespread across all hierarchical levels of the Roman army. Furthermore, a clear sense of hierarchy and respect for their superiors is conveyed with the men preserving the 'best' prizes for their commanders, recognising that sexual violence was practised by all levels of the army.

There may also have been a performative element to the soldiers bringing the woman to Scipio. As Goldstein outlines in relation to sexual violence in recent conflict, sexual violence may act as a means by which soldiers can demonstrate their 'masculinity' to their superiors.<sup>497</sup> Masculinity in the Roman world was determined by the body, primarily how the body was presented in contrast to the feminine,<sup>498</sup> and how one's bodily autonomy was preserved.<sup>499</sup> Essentially masculinity rested on the ability to protect one's body from invasive, penetrative assaults,<sup>500</sup> thus dominating the feminine

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<sup>490</sup> Cf. pp. 130-134.

<sup>491</sup> Vikman, 2005: 25.

<sup>492</sup> Polyb. 10.19, cf. Plut. *Mor. Quaest. Rom.* 196b.

<sup>493</sup> The woman is described as εὐπρεπιής ('well-looking', according to the *LSJ*) in Plut. *Mor. Quaest. Rom.* 196b. Dio also relates the story, cf. Dio 16 = Zonaras 9.8.42-43.

<sup>494</sup> Polybius stresses that she is παρθένος, which translates as chaste or virginal.

<sup>495</sup> Alison, 2007: 77.

<sup>496</sup> Alison, 2007: 77.

<sup>497</sup> Goldstein, 2001: 253-300.

<sup>498</sup> This could include physical appearance and clothing, cf. Olson, 2014: 82-205.

<sup>499</sup> Wilson, 2015: 50-52.

<sup>500</sup> Wilson, 2015: 50-52.

when the masculine body carried out invasive attacks on others. Therefore, by demonstrating their ability and willingness to enable Scipio to perform an invasive act against a woman, essentially supporting Scipio in emphasising his own masculinity, the young soldiers were stressing their difference from the feminine, thus also asserting their masculinity to their general. This is significant as masculinity, in a modern and ancient context, is associated with dominance. Goldstein's argument therefore is applicable to the Roman world in that by facilitating acts of sexual violence, the soldiers were engaging in a form of 'militarized masculinity'. Therefore, as we shall see with Scipio's subsequent rejection of the woman, the offer of the soldiers was performative in nature, and may indicate that sexual violence in warfare was, similarly to its use in cementing loyalty, used as a means of conveying societal concerns, including stressing the masculinity of its perpetrators. This performative aspect of masculinity is found in contexts outside of war, with Judith Butler arguing that gender is something which needs to be expressed rather than being something which is innate.<sup>501</sup> Butler's argument supports the idea that the soldiers were using their involvement in sexual violence to strengthen their perceived masculinity.

To return to the story: Scipio rejected the offer of the 'present', primarily because he had to set an example as a general. Scipio announced that if he were a private citizen, he would not reject the offer, and this indicates that the sexual assault of captives, especially women, was acceptable in warfare, but that he had to set an example to his men as a moderate general. Polybius stresses that the Roman soldiers who brought the woman forward were 'young' (νεανίσκος, *neānískos*).<sup>502</sup> Polybius may have intended to create a contrast between Scipio and his fellow soldiers, and there may be the implication here that their actions were the result of youthful inexperience. Therefore, Scipio's rejection of the offer appears not to be grounded in his concern for the young woman or the perpetuation of sexual violence, but rather for his appearance as a respected statesman who does not succumb to physical pleasures. Scipio was therefore 'performing' the role of a good statesman, capable of separating his personal desires from his public persona. This was a common trope in Greco-Roman literature, and Polybius may have been alluding to this, setting Scipio up as an example of a 'self-controlled' general.<sup>503</sup> Presenting a leader as being self-controlled, particularly in contrast to others, was a common trope in Polybius' writing, with Eckstein arguing that Polybius considered 'the role of the statesman lay in manipulating and restraining the emotions of the populace.'<sup>504</sup> It is uncertain whether Scipio was so restrained, or indeed if the instance ever happened, but it is significant that Polybius outlines the example in detail and evidently wished to illuminate these characteristics. In turn, this shows that during the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE, commanders wanted to portray themselves and their ancestors, which in turn reflected on their family honour, as being moderate yet successful conquerors.

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<sup>501</sup> For more on gender as performance, *cf.* Butler, 1988: 519-531.

<sup>502</sup> *LSJ*, 1164: νεανισκάριον.

<sup>503</sup> Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 312.

<sup>504</sup> Eckstein, 1990: 197-198.

Furthermore, Scipio's rejection of the young woman may reflect how, as we shall see in more detail in the chapter on slavery, captured peoples were categorised by their usefulness to Rome and the conquering general. In this instance, the young woman is returned to her family after Scipio promises that she has not been harmed.<sup>505</sup> Unlike the female hostages, the Roman rape of whom is implied, the woman was of elite status and was useful in the community Scipio was trying to subjugate to Rome. i.e. the people of New Carthage and their neighbours. The hostages may have been elite in their own societies, but they were not immediately useful to Scipio, other than as a means of political performance. However, the woman was elite in the society of New Carthage and therefore useful as a means of conveying his honourable behaviour and in creating ties with the existing elite of New Carthage. The exchange of people as hostages or as freed captives was essential in creating new alliances between the Romans and those they had conquered, and ensuring continued Roman authority in an area, as we shall see in greater detail in the chapter on hostages.<sup>506</sup>

Polybius stresses that the reasons for Scipio's decision to protect the girl are a result of Scipio's honourable nature.<sup>507</sup> However, Livy and Dio's accounts, whilst clearly based on Polybius', are more elaborate and present Scipio as using the encounter to win favour with the elites of New Carthage. Livy's retelling closely follows Polybius' but embellishes heavily on certain points, including creating a speech for Scipio about this encounter.

*Your betrothed has been in my camp with the same regard for modesty as in the house of your parents-in-law, her own parents. She has been kept for you, so that she could be given you as a gift, unharmed and worthy of you and of me. This is the only price that I stipulate in return for that gift: be a friend to the Roman people, and if you believe me to be a good man, such as these tribes formerly came to know in my father and uncle, be assured that in the Roman state there are many like us, and that no people in the world can be named to-day which you would be less desirous of having as an enemy to you and yours, or more desirous of having as a friend." The young man, overcome by embarrassment and at the same time by joy, holding Scipio's right hand, called upon all the gods to compensate him on his own behalf, since he was far from having sufficient means to do so in accordance with his own feeling and with what the general had done for him.<sup>508</sup>*

Fuit sponsa tua apud me eadem qua apud soceros tuos parentisque suos verecundia; servata tibi est, ut inviolatum et dignum me teque dari tibi donum posset. Hanc mercedem unam pro eo munere paciscor: amicus populo Romano sis et, si me virum bonum credis esse, qualis patrem patruumque meum iam ante hae gentes norant, scias multos nostri similes in civitate Romana esse, nec ullum in terris hodie populum dici posse quem minus tibi hostem tuisque esse velis aut amicum malis." Cum adulescens simul pudore et gaudio perfusus, dextram Scipionis tenens, deos omnis invocaret ad

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<sup>505</sup> Polyb. 10.19, cf. Plut. *Mor. Quaest. Rom.* 196b, Livy 26.50.1-14.

<sup>506</sup> Cf. pp. 142-171.

<sup>507</sup> Polyb. 10.19.

<sup>508</sup> Livy 26.50.1-14. Translated by Moore, 1943.



gratiam illi pro se referendam, quoniam sibi nequaquam satis facultatis pro suo animo atque illius erga se merito esset,

Livy's writing would suggest that it was more acceptable to stress the political gain which could be made from a situation which was symbolically about the family and legitimacy. Similarly, the encounter gives more character to Scipio who is presented as being clement with his enemies in order to create alliances. As we shall see in the chapter on hostages, by the time Livy was writing, imagery associated with creating alliances, albeit with allies presented in positions of subjugation, was commonplace in iconography and was, therefore, something to be celebrated.<sup>509</sup> The threat of sexual violence over women, particularly elite women, could be used to the advantage of the Romans in creating alliances.

In the case of Scipio, who was regarded as one of Rome's greatest heroes, we see that sexual violence in warfare was not only perpetrated by the Romans but considered socially acceptable in the context of war. Today, as we have discussed previously, there is much debate about whether sexual violence in warfare is opportunistic or systemic. However, it has long been established that sexual violence is not perpetrated to satisfy the assailants' sexual desires, and is therefore not entirely opportunistic but a systemic assertion of power, whether ordered by leaders or carried out by individuals within armies.<sup>510</sup> The Romans clearly did not question that sexual violence against their enemies was acceptable, as shown in the case of Scipio's exceptional rejection of the captive, and this shows that rape was institutionalized, and perpetrated in all levels of the Roman army.<sup>511</sup>

### 3.6. Chiomara

In the example of Scipio that we discussed earlier, the female young captive released by Scipio is evidence of how sexual violence, or rather refraining from it, could be used as a means of conveying a Roman leader's self-restraint, respect, and willingness to create alliances. However, it is likely that the young captive's treatment was the exception rather than the rule. Another example highlights how, like the hostages in New Carthage, women of status could be subjected to sexual violence. The *exemplum* of Chiomara, a survivor of sexual violence, is important in conveying how sexual violence was an accepted part of warfare, and how references to it were used to stress the character of the individuals involved.

In 189 BCE, Rome was at war with the Galatian Gauls who lived in Asia Minor. Following the Galatian Gauls' defeat, the Roman general Gnaeus Manlius Vulso took a number of enemy women captive.<sup>512</sup> One of these women was Chiomara, the wife of Ortiagon, the leader of the Tectosagi. Chiomara and the other captive women were

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<sup>509</sup> Cf. pp. 158-160, 164-166.

<sup>510</sup> Fogelman, 2012: 20: 'rape is not an aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation [of aggression]'.  
<sup>511</sup> Other examples of sexual violence carried out at the orders of Roman commanders can be found at Livy 29.17.15-16, Tac. *Hist.* 4.14,

<sup>512</sup> Livy, 38.24, Plut, *De mul. vir.* 22, Polyb. 21.38, Val. Max. 6.1, ext 2.

given to the Roman soldiers, possibly as a reward for the soldiers' performance during the course of the war. Chiomara was handed over to a centurion, and his high rank within the army may have meant that Chiomara was allocated to him as she was an elite woman in her own community. As we shall see in the chapter on enslavement, communities were separated and groups were categorised by the role they had played within society, e.g. if they were elite or workers. The fact that Chiomara was allocated to a centurion, as opposed to a rank and file soldier, suggests that a similar categorisation took place and, similarly to the female captives we find in the *Iliad*, elite captives were presented to high ranking soldiers as rewards.<sup>513</sup> Virgins in particular were considered appropriate prizes for commanders, as we have seen with the example of Scipio.<sup>514</sup>

The centurion proceeded to rape Chiomara. Chiomara's family discovered that she was in captivity and arranged for Chiomara to be ransomed. At the exchange, Chiomara's relatives killed the soldiers and Chiomara returned to her husband with the centurion's severed head, which she presented to him. Her husband praised her for her fidelity and Polybius, Livy, Plutarch and Valerius Maximus all stress that she lived out the remainder of her life as an honourable woman. Like Lucretia, Chiomara used the evidence of violence, in the form of the rapist's severed head, as a means of retaining her honour after being subjected to sexual violence. Unlike Lucretia, Chiomara's relatives used violence against the rapist in order to restore Chiomara and their family's honour, as opposed to Lucretia's death by suicide which was designed to protect the reputation of her husband and wider family. Similarly to the example of Marcus Regulus and Andromache, Chiomara's actions are held up as an example of Roman moral virtues. It is not pertinent in this thesis to discuss these virtues in detail as they are secondary to the discussion on what Chiomara's example tells us in relation to captive-taking and the processes involved.

In contrast to the example of Scipio at New Carthage, this example was designed to convey the poor behaviour of the army, with the centurion described as an ignorant, greedy man who lacked self-control. Ratti has suggested that the inclusion of this anecdote within histories, particularly that of Livy, was intended to convey the mismanagement of the Roman army by Vulso, and the Eastern influences on the army as they fought in the region. Ratti claims that it is too easy for historians to see Chiomara's treatment as standard practice.<sup>515</sup> This may be true if we are considering Chiomara's case as a standalone incident. However, as I have shown, sexual violence following a nation's defeat was commonplace in the Roman world, as it is in conflict today. Chiomara's case may be exceptional in that she was of elite status and, whilst historians were clearly trying to convey the army's excesses in contrast to her noble virtues, it is clear there were other factors at play in the subsequent representations of

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<sup>513</sup> Polybius' writings indicate that there was a categorisation of different forms of captives following the sack of a city, and highly prized women may have been kept, as in the *Iliad*, for the commanders during this 'inventory' period, *cf.* 110-118.

<sup>514</sup> *Cf.* Joseph. *Vit.* 414, Polyb. 10.19.3-7.

<sup>515</sup> Ratti, 1996: 101.

Chiomara's assault. In turn, these representations can tell us about the practice and process of captive-taking in the Roman world.

Chiomara's case highlights a number of key issues. Firstly, as Chiomara had been given to the centurion, it is likely that sexual violence was understood to be a factor in slavery and that sexual violence could be used as a form of reward for soldiers' good conduct in battle.<sup>516</sup> Given Chiomara's high status, it may have been assumed that the centurion could also acquire a large reward for her if she was sold into slavery or ransomed back to her family.<sup>517</sup> This is an important point and one which is not discussed by Roman authors, presumably as it links too closely with direct involvement in slave-trading which was frowned upon in elite Roman society.<sup>518</sup> The high status of Chiomara may also have made her more valuable on the slave market where, as we shall see in the chapter on enslavement, elite and well-educated captives were highly prized by the Roman elite.

Secondly, her case shows that despite Chiomara's high status, it was not unacceptable for her to be subjected to sexual assault. Ratti argues that Livy is keen to stress that the soldier is breaking the rules by sexual assaulting Chiomara,<sup>519</sup> claiming that Chiomara should have had the right to refuse her captor's advances,<sup>520</sup> but in reality, Chiomara had no rights as a captive. This is another example of how the so-called 'rules of war', including those which dictated the management of captives, could be manipulated by ancient authors if they had an alternative agenda. Thirdly, we know that sexual violence is used to issue a final humiliation on a defeated people. As the wife of a leader, Chiomara's sexual assault in particular may therefore have been intended to convey this, in addition to acting as a reward for the soldiers involved. Like Scipio at New Carthage, Chiomara is an *exemplum* and the narrative around her assault is more developed than other examples we find in histories. However, whilst historical examples are less explicit, they are alluded to and demonstrate the Romans' use of sexual violence. The motivations for conducting sexual violence may have been presented differently, but the act itself was ultimately a means of subduing women, their wider society, and signifying complete defeat which enabled the Romans to exert their will over a people.

### 3.7. Perugia

We have seen Polybius using Scipio's restraint in sexual matters as a means of flattering the Scipio family. The following examples concern instances during Roman Civil Wars: those of Sulla (88-80 BCE), and the unrest following Caesar's assassination in 44 BCE. This Civil War context is significant as the victims of sexual violence were Roman citizens and, unlike foreign captives, should have been protected under Roman law. That they were not emphasises how generals, who were ultimately responsible for their troops' behaviour, were presented as abusing not only the 'rules of war', but

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<sup>516</sup> There are examples of this from siege warfare across history, *cf.* Mitchell, 2004: 10.

<sup>517</sup> As evident in the references to ransoming in Plautus' *Captivi*, *cf.* pp. 8-11.

<sup>518</sup> Reference to slavery chapter – Vespasian.

<sup>519</sup> Ratti, 1996: 104-105.

<sup>520</sup> Livy, 38.24.

Roman laws. Essentially, references to sexual violence in Civil Wars are frequently found in relation to individuals whose memory was besmirched after their deaths. For instance, authors hostile to Sulla claimed that he allowed his troops to assault Roman women and children during his takeover of Rome.<sup>521</sup> As we have seen in relation to his massacre of the Samnite warriors, this was yet another way by which the ancient authors could paint Sulla as a bloodthirsty tyrant. As such, the cases we encounter with relation to sexual violence mostly pertain to instances where authors wanted to present figures as being either noble, as we have seen in the case of Scipio Africanus, or deliberately neglectful or vindictive. Essentially, the latter shows that the Greco-Roman authors were concerned only when sexual violence was perpetrated against those who were Roman citizens. As such, sexual violence was not actively condoned by the Romans, but it was an unchallenged expectation which was used as an indicator of character or as a means of symbolising power and an enemy's defeat.

An account which contrasts with Scipio, and relates directly to the period in question, can be found in Cicero's *Philippics*. Alongside Cremona,<sup>522</sup> the description of the attack of Perugia is the most explicit allusion to sexual violence in war in Roman literature.<sup>523</sup> The *Philippics* were produced in 44-43 BCE and created with the sole aim of attacking Marcus Antonius. As such, the examples alluded to are likely to be highly exaggerated. In this example, Cicero turns his attentions from Antony's behaviour to that of his brother, Lucius Antonius.<sup>524</sup> Lucius, on his way to meet with his brother stationed in Gaul for his proconsulship, allowed his army to rape and pillage Perugia, an Italian city (now Perugia), before setting up a base there. Cicero does not criticise Lucius for losing control of his troops, but for giving them inappropriate victims to assault, including mothers, virgins and freeborn boys. Cicero's use of the verb *trado* (hand over, deliver, bequeath) suggests that Lucius had been actively involved in his soldiers' plunder and assault.<sup>525</sup> Here, we see that Cicero's concern is not with the fact that sexual assault is carried out, as implied by the fact that the women and children are non-combatants and are the most vulnerable to assault, but with the status of the victims themselves.<sup>526</sup> Cicero's reference to the 'freeborn' (*ingenui*) boys is particularly telling of this concern, as sexual assault was acceptable if the victims were enslaved and not Roman citizens. In contrast to the Scipio example, both Perugia and Cremona were besieged, and their populations destroyed, during civil wars. As such, both Cicero and Tacitus are critical of the soldiers' conduct, but primarily because they enacted sexual violence against Roman citizens in Italy.<sup>527</sup> As a result, there is no question that sexual assault was an expected part of Roman warfare, but who it was perpetrated against was more significant than the act itself.

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<sup>521</sup> Dio 33.109.10-17.

<sup>522</sup> Cf. 42-46, 111-113.

<sup>523</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 131-2.

<sup>524</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 3.12.

<sup>525</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 3.12.

<sup>526</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 76-112.

<sup>527</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 131-2.

From the siege of Perugia, we have material evidence which complements the literary sources and supports the fact that sexual violence was used as a form of taunting the enemy, especially within civil war contexts. Several lead slingshot bullets (*glandes*) have been found around Perugia, which are engraved with sexually explicit messages.<sup>528</sup> The *glandes* can be dated to Octavian's siege of the city in the winter of 41-40 BCE, which ultimately forced Lucius Antonius and Fulvia to surrender. The messages, evidently written by the soldiers, were aimed at Octavian, Lucius and Fulvia, Marcus Antonius' wife, and include threats of anal, vaginal and oral sexual assault [Figure 8]. Weaponry is generally viewed as sexual,<sup>529</sup> and there is a strong suggestion that the slingshots were viewed as phallic implements which were used to breach a besieged city's walls.<sup>530</sup> Both sides participated in sending obscene messages using *glandes*, presumably responding to one side's opening gambit. However, Hallett states that there are no other cases in which *glandes* were inscribed with sexually explicit language.<sup>531</sup>

This may result from the rarity of Romans besieging Roman cities, or from Fulvia's involvement in the conflict, as it was unusual for a woman to act as a commander, and she is frequently cast as a masculine figure, presumably acting as a 'sexual transgressor'.<sup>532</sup> As the conflict was between Romans, Fulvia is the outlying factor as a powerful female. Therefore, like Antonius' future partner Cleopatra, Fulvia was an easy target for the Romans to attack when faced with troubling civil conflict. Nevertheless, the *glandes* speak to the close association between sexual violence and the Roman military as soldiers included such messages during civil conflict. That is, the soldiers deliberately used sexual references because they were sending messages aimed at their fellow Romans who would understand the shameful implications of sexual assault.

### 3.8. Caesar's Gallic Wars

The aforementioned examples concern explicit references to sexual violence in conflict, usually during siege warfare, and they mostly relate to instances where the primary objective of the author was to stress the poor behaviour of an enemy. The following section will address examples of sexual violence in conflict where the references are less explicit and the motivations behind the assaults, in historical reality and in later representations, relate more closely to revenge, punishment, the use of such violence in the process of captive-taking, and imperialist expansion than it does to the character of those conducting the violence. The following sections concern sexual violence during the initial conquest or in later rebellions of areas on the edges of the Roman empire,

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<sup>528</sup> Hallett, 1977: 151-171.

<sup>529</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 117.

<sup>530</sup> Hallett, 1977: 151-171.

<sup>531</sup> The word *glandes* has been translated as 'bullets', but it can also mean fruit of certain trees, e.g. acorn from the oak tree which has sexual connotations and links to fertility, cf. *OLD*, 765-6: *glans*.

<sup>532</sup> Hallett, 2015: 247-253.

primarily using evidence from Caesar's *Gallic Wars* and Tacitus' accounts of violence in the revolts in Britain in the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Caesar's commentaries on the Gallic Wars are an important source for us in that they are the only evidence we have of a general writing about an ongoing conflict in which he was actively involved.<sup>533</sup> Caesar's commentaries are therefore significant in conveying how sexual violence was used in conflict and contemporaneously reported. As we have seen throughout this chapter, sexual violence was only ever presented as being conducted by an enemy or someone the writer wished to denigrate. As a result, there are very few references in Caesar's commentaries to sexual violence and such assaults are only ever implicit within Caesar's works. I have only been able to find four examples from Caesar's writings, all from the *Gallic Wars*, which speak to the use of sexual violence in conflict during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE.<sup>534</sup> Despite the limited references, we know that sexual violence was utilised by the Romans, as the previous examples have outlined, but writers were careful when constructing narratives around sexual assaults. The carefulness with which such violence was represented is particularly evident in Caesar's works, but the fact that it was alluded to at all speaks to its inclusion in Roman warfare, and its use as a weapon of war.

As we shall see in more detail later in this chapter and in the following chapter on enslavement,<sup>535</sup> there was clearly a concern amongst Rome's enemies about the Roman army's treatment of women and children should they be taken captive. In two instances, one concerning Germanic and the other Belgae tribes, the women and children are presented as those who will primarily suffer from enslavement. The Belgae hide the women and children in marshy areas which are harder to reach,<sup>536</sup> whilst the Germanic women plead with their menfolk marching to meet the Roman army, to protect them from slavery.<sup>537</sup> As we know that sexual violence was not only a common experience for enslaved people in the ancient world, but was also a part of captive-taking, it is likely that the Germanic and Belgae tribes recognised that the women would be subjected to sexual violence should they be captured. Given the evidence we have considered throughout this chapter, it is clear that Caesar's Roman audience would also have understood that captured female enemies could be subjected to sexual violence. Caesar was careful not to directly refer to sexual violence but if such violence was widely understood to be a part of enslavement and slavery, an explicit discussion was not necessary. This also enabled Caesar to distance himself from sexual violence which was, as we have seen, always presented as being perpetrated by those Greco-Roman authors wished to denigrate.

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<sup>533</sup> Cf. pp. 29-31.

<sup>534</sup> As we shall see, these are the attacks on the Belgae tribes (Caes. *BGall.* 2.16), the Germanic tribes (Caes. *BGall.* 1.51) Eburones (Caes. *BGall.* 6.34) and the Aduatuci (Caes. *BGall.* 2.33).

<sup>535</sup> Cf. pp. 106-113.

<sup>536</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.16.

<sup>537</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.51, cf. pp. 108-110.

An often-overlooked example of sexual violence connected primarily to revenge can be found in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, in which it is implicit that Caesar used massacre and sexual assault as a form of revenge, as evident in his decision to destroy the Eburones in 53 BCE. The previous year, the Eburones had massacred Caesar's lieutenants Sabinus and Cotta,<sup>538</sup> whilst they and their troops were stationed in the Eburones' territory. It is clear from Caesar's account that his troops wanted to move against the tribe in revenge, yet Caesar claims to have checked their anger by focussing on the practical aspects of attacking the Eburones in unknown territory. Instead, Caesar ordered his Gallic and Germanic allies to 'destroy the stock and name of the tribe in requital for its horrid crime', claiming that native tribes would be better equipped with the knowledge of the land to make an attack.<sup>539</sup> Thus, Caesar was able to present himself as a highly competent and tactical commander.

*Considering these particular difficulties, all precaution that carefulness could take was taken; and Caesar preferred to forgo some chance of doing harm, although the spirit of every man was burning for vengeance, rather than to do harm with some damage to the troops. He sent messengers round to the neighbouring states and invited them all, in the hope of booty, to join him in pillaging the Eburones, so that he might hazard the lives of the Gauls among the woods rather than the soldiers of the legions, and at the same time, by surrounding it with a large host, destroy the stock and name of the tribe in requital for its horrid crime.*<sup>540</sup>

Vt in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. Dimittit ad finitimas civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur. Magnis undique numeris celeriter convenit.

Sexual violence is implicit within Caesar's description of the events. The use of the term *praeda* (booty taken in war, loot, plunder),<sup>541</sup> of which women and children were a part,<sup>542</sup> suggests that rewards in the form of captives were a key motivation for the allies in carrying out Caesar's orders. The emphasis on the term *praeda* enabled Caesar to motivate his allies, but also depict them as being driven by a need for material possessions, a characteristic which was criticised by Caesar's contemporaries, as we have seen in the section on military control. In this instance, the Eburones were scattered throughout the land and had few possessions, which indicates that their belongings were of little financial value to the attackers. It is therefore likely that the women and children were a part of this promised *praeda*. Caesar also uses the term

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<sup>538</sup> Cf. pp. 45-49, 98-98.

<sup>539</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.34.

<sup>540</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.34. Translation by Edwards, 1917.

<sup>541</sup> OLD, 1427: *praeda*.

<sup>542</sup> Cf. Plaut. *Capt.* 33-4, 116, Caes. *BGall.* 7.89-90, Cic. *Att.* 4.16.7, Livy 22.56.3, 23.37.10-13, 24.16.3-7, 30.9.10-12, 32.26.6. For scholarship on the issues, cf. Shatzman, 1972: 177-205, Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 315-7.

*diripio* (to tear apart, plunder, seize),<sup>543</sup> which Ziolkowski has shown implies massacre and sexual violence in the context of a besieged city.<sup>544</sup>

Caesar's promise of some form of reward for the attackers corresponds closely to the way by which some modern military leaders utilise sexual violence to reward their troops, as outlined by the United Nations.<sup>545</sup> In addition, given that we know sexual violence is a means of 'ethnic Imperialism', it may be argued that Caesar ensured the destruction of the Eburone 'race' (*stirps*) by ordering his allies to kill the males, and to sexually assault the women before either capturing or killing them too.<sup>546</sup> Here, we may be encountering conduct which can only be referred to as 'genocide', as Caesar intended to completely destroy the enemy race, and the attacks were carried out on his explicit orders. In more recent conflict, we find examples where sexual violence was closely connected to massacre and mass execution. In December 1937, Japanese troops raped and executed between 8 and 32% of the civilian women living in the Chinese city of Nanjing (alternatively spelt as Nanking). The systematic nature of the mass rape of a large number of Nanjing's women was clearly intended as one final act of degradation before the women were killed which signalled the ultimate defeat of the city and its people. The atrocities that occurred at Nanjing also show how an event which initially impacted upon inhabitants in a small area, ultimately became a symbol of Japanese aggression in China during the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>547</sup>

It is noteworthy that the sexual violence in question was committed not by the Romans, but by those who were allied with Rome, albeit at Caesar's invitation. As Caesar relays that he ordered the allies to attack and may have recognised that sexual violence would be used, he was seemingly unconcerned for the possible damage to his reputation. However, more significant was that the final blow was dealt to the Eburones by Germanic tribes as they attempted to cross the Rhine.<sup>548</sup> Caesar's use of an allied tribe and one which was culturally similar to the Eburones links closely to the creation of ethnic and national divisions within a region. We have previously seen how the Gallic and Germanic tribes had close connections with each other and met to discuss their fight against the Romans. Caesar's request for the Germanic tribes to make the attack was part of a divide and conquer strategy. Such a strategy is evident in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), where sexual violence became more prevalent because of the divisions created along ethnic lines.<sup>549</sup>

Furthermore, as the example from Diodorus Siculus earlier in this chapter would suggest, it was not uncommon for generals and later writers to present the use of sexual violence as being perpetrated by allied forces, rather than their own. The 'outsourcing' of rape can be found throughout history, especially in relation to

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<sup>543</sup> OLD, 548: *diripio*.

<sup>544</sup> Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91.

<sup>545</sup> United Nations, 2017: 6.

<sup>546</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.34.

<sup>547</sup> Yoshida, 2006: 5

<sup>548</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.35.

<sup>549</sup> Cf. Peres, 2011: 119-126.



mercenaries and colonial army units.<sup>550</sup> For example, during the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalist general Queipo de Llano broadcast on the radio encouragement to Moroccan troops fighting for the Fascists to 'show the 'reds', particularly their wives, what real masculinity meant.'<sup>551</sup> Here, rape is implicit. Whilst sexual violence was carried out on a large scale by Franco's forces, de Llano did not openly encourage the whole Fascist army to attack women, but rather the Moroccan troops. Thus, by not referring directly to sexual violence and by calling upon Moroccan rather than Spanish fighters to do the deed, de Llana was able to distance himself and the Nationalist side from sexual violence, at least whilst he was speaking in the public domain. The use of Moroccan troops to conduct sexual violence also enabled, as it had in other conflicts throughout history,<sup>552</sup> to perpetuate the idea of the colonial 'savagery' which contrasted against the conduct of the main armies with whom the colonial troops were attached.<sup>553</sup> In Caesar's case, he could distance himself from sexual violence whilst stressing the barbarity of the Gallic and Germanic tribes which his Roman audience were also pre-disposed to believe.

As we have seen, sexual violence was considered to be an unpleasant but necessary part of war for a variety of reasons. Therefore, it was in the best interests of those participating in warfare to distance themselves from conducting direct attacks of sexual violence. Subsequent histories, often written from the perspective of the victor, followed suit. Therefore, as we have seen throughout this chapter, it was common for military commanders and later writers to convey sexual violence as something done by either the opposing side of a war, or by allies who were not acting under their explicit orders. Caesar's use of the allies in the case of the Eburones are an example of this conduct as it enabled Caesar to further distance himself and Roman troops from massacre and sexual violence, whilst implying that he had a strong network of loyal supporters in the region. In this case, we can see that the Romans did not want to admit their direct involvement in sexual violence, and that there were ways by which extremely violent acts could be justified. For Caesar, who wished to present himself as a competent military commander, it was essential to show that his troops were under control, and that the Gallic and Germanic tribes, despite being his allies, were barbaric. In turn, this factor may have enabled the justification of Roman expansion in the region.

Furthermore, this incident acted as a form of 'punishment' and, as we have seen with massacre, this enabled Caesar to justify his use of excessive violence in warfare to the Roman people and senate. Such 'punishment' may have also enabled Caesar to caution

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<sup>550</sup> Examples from the Middle Ages show that mercenaries were often associated with extreme conduct in warfare, including rape, as they were, as members of a different society, immune from punishment, *cf.* Janin, Carlson, 2014: 25, 31.

<sup>551</sup> Storm, Al Tuma, 2015: 3-4.

<sup>552</sup> For other examples of sexual violence carried out by colonial troops or mercenaries, *cf.* Mitchell, 2004, and Gerschovich, 2015: 82-85 whose work offers a comparable example of alleged atrocities carried out by Moroccan troops attached to the French army during the Second World War.

<sup>553</sup> Storm, Al Tuma, 2015: 3-4.

would-be enemies of Rome of the outcome should they rebel against Rome. The probable mass rape and execution of the Eburones would have acted as a warning to non-allied tribes, who may have been informed by rumour. Furthermore, the incident may have acted as a warning for the allied tribes who had carried out Caesar's orders as they would have witnessed the consequences first-hand and this would have encouraged them to remain loyal to Rome. Once again this shows a reluctance on the part of the Roman elite to admit the use of sexual violence by Roman soldiers. However, Caesar was clearly complicit in the attack and this suggests an acceptance of sexual violence as a weapon in a wartime context.

Granted, in this instance the attacks were carried out by Caesar's allies. However, Caesar was aware that sexual assault could be committed during the takeover of a city by Roman soldiers. In 57 BCE, the besieged Aduatuci surrendered and allowed Caesar and his men entry into their city in north-western Gaul. Caesar claimed to have prevented sexual violence by ordering his men from the Aduatuci's stronghold at nightfall, so that no *iniuria*, meaning offense, abuse, sexual assault,<sup>554</sup> could be carried out against the Aduatuci.<sup>555</sup> The word *iniuria* links to the Romans' understanding of rape, as this was one of the ways by which sexual violence could be prosecuted under Roman law.<sup>556</sup> Thus, Caesar's audience would have understood that sexual violence was implicit in this description. Shortly after, the Aduatuci betrayed Caesar by attempting an attack under the cover of darkness. Caesar ordered a revenge attack, and the city fell to his men. Given that Caesar had previously informed us that the troops had been kept from the town to avoid *iniuria*, we can only suppose that the surviving female inhabitants were subjected to sexual violence before being enslaved, a form of punishment which had an impact on the whole tribe.

As sexual violence was implicit throughout the description of the Eburones' massacre and in the Aduatuci's fall, it is evident that it was part of the punishment. Sexual violence could be used as a form of discipline when perpetrated against enslaved people in a domestic setting,<sup>557</sup> and had associations with beatings given that invasive punishments were thought to be appropriate for those of lower status as 'social status was characterized on the basis of perceived bodily integrity and freedom'.<sup>558</sup> Punishment seemingly had different motivations than revenge, and may have been intended to discourage those who witnessed or heard reports of the sexual violence and massacre from rising up against Rome. Granted, we cannot know the cultural attitudes of the nations which the Romans defeated, but sexual assault is a violent action which is universally understood to be abhorrent. As a result, we cannot underestimate the Romans' use of sexual violence as a symbolic act which stressed the subjugation, humiliation, and absolute defeat of an enemy nation.

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<sup>554</sup> OLD, 914: *iniuria*.

<sup>555</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 2.33.

<sup>556</sup> Nguyen, 2006: 83-84.

<sup>557</sup> Catull. 56.

<sup>558</sup> Walters, 1997: 30, 39-41.

### 3.9. Tacitus' Calgacus

As we have seen in the examples from Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, sexual violence was conducted to signify the ultimate defeat of a people. However, there are examples where we see sexual violence being conducted during the Roman occupation of a province and to further Rome's control. In such cases, particularly those found in narratives concerning uprisings in Britain, Rome had occupied the regions for mere decades by the time the uprisings began but the catalyst for revolts was partly attributed to the Romans' use of sexual violence.<sup>559</sup> As Reeder has correctly pointed out, where soldiers were present in a region, sexual violence was prevalent and could continue after an initial conquest had concluded.<sup>560</sup> The association with rebellion and sexual violence can be found in Greco-Roman accounts of uprisings, and it was a common trope for speeches by the leaders of rebellious provinces to highlight atrocities committed against women and children. As we shall see in the chapter on enslavement, women and children were often hidden in remote locations to make their capture, potential sexual assault, and subsequent enslavement more difficult for the Romans.<sup>561</sup>

Within the speeches by Roman enemies, imagined entirely by Greco-Roman authors and with an alternative agenda, there are frequent references to sexual violence. In direct contrast to Caesar's representation of sexual violence, Tacitus in particular alludes to such violence committed by Roman soldiers against British tribes in speeches found in his *Annals* and *Agricola*. The differing presentations between Caesar and Tacitus' accounts of sexual violence can be attributed to the respective involvement of the authors in conducting such violence. Tacitus' agenda, which we shall address shortly, enabled him to allude directly to sexual violence and the impact it had on the enemy population, whereas Caesar needed to distance himself from sexual violence for the reasons detailed in the above section. The examples of such violence are comparative in that they are carried out in northern Europe and during conquest or reconsolidation of a region. Therefore, whilst Caesar was unwilling to address sexual violence directly and Tacitus has other concerns, we can establish that such violence was commonplace but only referenced when it was pertinent for the author and their agenda.

By using these speeches, Tacitus is able to reflect on the nature of empire and how to rule well. The character of Roman rule is a common theme throughout Tacitus' work and, particularly in his *Agricola*, he is able to contrast the poor behaviour of some provincial administrators with the superior behaviour of others, including his father-in-law, Agricola. Furthermore, by adding in these speeches, Tacitus was able to present Rome's enemies as fighting for noble causes: their homes and families are being attacked, and they are being highly taxed by unpleasant and self-serving individuals abusing the power Rome has bestowed on them. In turn, those who defeat them, in the

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<sup>559</sup> The Roman conquest of Britain began in earnest in 43 CE and was still ongoing at the time of Boudica's revolt in 63/4 CE, as Agricola's campaign in Caledonia attests to (80-83 CE).

<sup>560</sup> Reeder, 2017: 371-2.

<sup>561</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 27, cf. pp. 108-113.

following examples Suetonius Paulinus and Agricola,<sup>562</sup> are presented as being even more impressive in contrast to these noble, proud people. They are also shown to be magnanimous in that they restore order in the provinces to what it should always have been without the abuses of Roman power by middlemen involved in provincial government. Tacitus also uses his writings to discuss contemporary politics in Rome with foreign leaders being utilised to indirectly critique the actions of senators who are under the command of the notoriously ‘bad’ Emperor Domitian.<sup>563</sup> Furthermore, it is likely that the inclusion of a non-Roman perspective in the form of a speech was intended to create a sense of drama within an historical text. This is significant when one considers the emotive language and imagery Tacitus employed, particularly that associated with slavery and *libertas*.

One of the speeches found in *Agricola* is spoken by Tacitus’ Calgacus, a British leader, shortly before the battle at Mons Graupius (an unknown location in modern-day Scotland) which took place in 83/4 CE. Agricola plans to complete the conquest of Britain, and Calgacus addresses his people and other British nations in an impassioned speech which stresses that they should remain free and fight in the face of Roman ‘slavery’:

*To plunder, butcher, steal, these things they [the Romans] misname empire: they make a desolation and they call it peace. Children and kin are by the law of nature each man’s dearest possessions; they are swept away from us by conscription to be slaves in other lands: our wives and sisters, even when they escape a soldier’s lust, are debauched by self-styled friends and guests: our goods and chattels go for tribute; our lands and harvests in requisitions of grain; life and limb themselves are worn out in making roads through marsh and forest to the accompaniment of gibes and blows. Slaves born to slavery are sold once for all and are fed by their masters free of cost; but Britain pays a daily price for her own enslavement, and feeds the slavers; and as in the slave-gang the new-comer is a mockery even to his fellow-slaves, so in this world-wide, age-old slave-gang, we, the new hands, worth least, are marked out to be made away with: we have no lands or mines or harbours for the working of which we might be set aside.<sup>564</sup>*

auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. Liberos cuique ac propinquos suos natura carissimos esse voluit: hi per dilectus alibi servituri auferuntur: coniuges sororesque etiam si hostilem libidinem effugerunt, nomine amicorum atque hospitem polluantur. bona fortunaeque in tributum, ager atque annus in frumentum, corpora ipsa ac manus silvis ac paludibus emuniendis inter verbera ac contumelias conteruntur. nata servituti mancipia semel veneunt, atque ultro a dominis aluntur: Britannia servitutem suam cotidie emit, cotidie pascit. ac sicut in familia recentissimus quisque servorum etiam conservis ludibrio est,

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<sup>562</sup> Scott suggests that Tacitus probably learned details of Boudica’s revolt from his father-in-law Agricola, and therefore paints a favourably prejudicial view of Paulinus, *cf.* Scott, 1967: 12-14.

<sup>563</sup> Lavan, 2013: 136-137, 144-6.

<sup>564</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 29-31. Translated by Hutton, Peterson, 1914.

sic in hoc orbis terrarum vetere famulatu novi nos et viles in excidium petimur; neque enim arva nobis aut metalla aut portus sunt, quibus exercendis reservemur.

A key element in speeches like Calgacus' is the metaphor of slavery. As Lavan discusses, there is a difference between actual enslavement and the use of such language to discuss of Roman occupation and its empire, although Tacitus frequently 'blurs the line' between the two.<sup>565</sup> Sexual violence was closely associated with enslavement given that, as we have seen with such violence in Rome's domestic setting, enslaved people could be subjected to whatever treatment enslavers deemed fit. In Calgacus' speech, a link is drawn between sexual violence and subsequent enslavement, with the women being treated like enslaved people by soldiers or Roman officials. It is noteworthy that in such speeches, the attacks on women and children are often listed alongside other offences, including the destruction and/or confiscation of property, and the enslavement of people in the provinces. Calgacus' speech is the most explicit in describing women and children as their male relatives' possessions and using attacks on family to discuss problems with Roman imperialism, of which sexual violence was just one issue. Calgacus' speech emphasises Rome's power and Roman control over the British tribes.

Beyond these literary techniques and Tacitus' agenda, such speeches provide further evidence that sexual violence was carried out by the Romans during warfare and occupation. Furthermore, even in times of relative peace, sexual violence was clearly a concern for those living in the provinces and could be used as a weapon of terror, primarily as a means of humiliating a people and exerting Roman dominion. The use of sexual violence during a power's occupation of a region is not exclusive to Roman imperialism. Examples of sexual violence during British occupation and colonisation of Burma and India attest to the prevalence of such violence against the country's inhabitants, and recruitment drives for colonial armies often stressed the sexual availability of native women.<sup>566</sup> Women were, as we have seen throughout this chapter, considered akin to victor's spoils and were therefore seen as available for sex (consensual or otherwise).

### 3.10. Boudica's Revolt

A key example of sexual violence as a weapon of terror and as a catalyst for rebellion is found within the histories surrounding Boudica's revolt.<sup>567</sup> The story of Boudica's revolt is well known to many, but I shall outline it briefly here.<sup>568</sup> In 60/61 CE, Prasutagus, the King of the Iceni, died. In his will, he stipulated that his property be divided between his two daughters and the emperor Nero. According to Tacitus, this

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<sup>565</sup> Lavan, 2013: 136-148.

<sup>566</sup> This was often part of the fetishization of the black body, cf. Lister, 2020: 75-76, but links closely to the element of sexual misconduct and lack of prosecution against occupying soldiers within colonial rule, cf. Pheng, 2004: 209, Sarkar, 2020: 177-200.

<sup>567</sup> Other examples include the Caledonian revolt (see the discussion of Calgacus' speech above) and the Batavian revolt of 69-70 CE, cf. Tac. *Hist.* 4.14.

<sup>568</sup> Boudica's rebellion is recorded by Tacitus and by Cassius Dio, cf. Tac. *Ann.* 14.31-7, Tac. *Agr.* 16.1-2, Dio 62.1-12.

was done with the hopes that his kingdom would remain intact after his death, and as a means of protecting his daughters. However, his plan failed as his land was pillaged by Roman centurions and his household by people whom he had enslaved.

Prasutagus' wife Boudica was publicly whipped, a punishment usually reserved for enslaved people,<sup>569</sup> and her two daughters were raped. In addition to the attacks on Boudica's household, Tacitus claims that the Roman colonists settled at Camulodunum (modern-day Colchester) treated British people as though they were captives. Led by Boudica, the Iceni and a number of other British nations rebelled against Rome and focused their attacks on Roman veterans and their families. Camulodunum was attacked and destroyed, and Roman women sexually assaulted and subsequently murdered. The rebellion ended when the Roman governor Gaius Suetonius Paulinus, who had been campaigning in Mona (Anglesey), returned and defeated the rebels at the Battle of Watling Street. Boudica died either by suicide or by illness, and the rebellion was quashed.

The revolt is recorded by Tacitus and Cassius Dio and details of sexual violence are included in both accounts, but they suppose that such violence was carried out by and against different groups. In Tacitus' *Annals*, sexual violence is utilised as a weapon of terror by both the Romans and by the British rebels.

*The Icenian king Prasutagus, celebrated for his long prosperity, had named the emperor his heir, together with his two daughters; an act of deference which he thought would place his kingdom and household beyond the risk of injury. The result was contrary – so much so that his kingdom was pillaged by centurions, his household by slaves; as though they had been prizes of war. As a beginning, his wife Boudicca was subjected to the lash and his daughters violated: all the chief men of the Icenians were stripped of their family estates, and the relatives of the king were treated as slaves.*

Rex Icenorum Prasutagus, longa opulentia clarus, Caesarem heredem duasque filias scripserat, tali obsequio ratus regnumque et domum suam procul iniuria fore. Quod contra vertit, adeo ut regnum per centuriones, domus per servos velut capta vastarentur. Iam primum uxor eius Boudicca verberibus adfecta et filiae stupro violatae sunt: praecipui quique Icenorum, avitis bonis exuuntur, et propinqui regis inter mancipia habebantur.

It is unclear in Tacitus' writings if the attacks on Boudica and her daughters were carried out by the enslaved people living in Prasutagus' household or by Romans.<sup>570</sup> However, as the subsequent revolt was against the Romans, it is likely that they were actively involved in sexual violence against the Iceni. This is also supported by Tacitus' claims that Roman veterans in Camulodunum treated the British people 'like captives'. Captivity is also referenced in Tacitus' account of the attacks on Boudica and her family, thus suggesting, in addition to the language used (*iniuria*), that they were

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<sup>569</sup> Cf. Lavan, 2013: 125, 149.

<sup>570</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 14.31.

subjected to sexual assault and were treated in a manner akin to enslaved people. Throughout this chapter, we have also established that sexual violence was prevalent in wars throughout Roman (and modern) history. A key element of sexual violence in conflict was the humiliation of a people after they were defeated, often with a view of enslaving them. In the case of Boudica, the attack on her family was immediately after her husband's death and was clearly calculated to strip Boudica and her daughters of their autonomy and stress their lack of protection following the death of their male relative.

The attack may have also been carried out as a final insult, as we have seen in examples of siege warfare, to the women's dead male relative. Tacitus records that Prasutagus had created the will in order to protect his family from harm, and by attacking the daughters, the Romans were signifying that Prasutagus could no longer protect them. The act was intended to signify the humiliation of Prasutagus, even in death, through the attacks on his children. It also acted as a warning against hubris, with Rome having supreme power and the British client kings (and their families) essentially being under their ultimate control. We have also seen that genetic imperialism is a motivation for sexual violence. In the Roman world, the continuation of a legitimate line was of paramount importance which was why women's bodies were policed so heavily. By attacking Prasutagus' daughters, the Romans were signifying how Prasutagus' line, thus his rule, was over with any offspring his daughters had, as a possible result of their rape, being illegitimate. The attack was therefore a symbol of and declaration of imperial annexation which served to indicate to the Iceni that Rome had taken control over the royal family who in turn acted as representatives and symbols of the Iceni state.

Previous scholars have primarily considered the attacks on Boudica and her children through comparison to Roman *exempla*, and the historical realities of sexual violence in the rebellion and in warfare generally have been overlooked. As an *exemplum*, Boudica's household was emblematic of wider Iceni society with her and daughters' treatment acting as a powerful symbolic reminder of 'the pointlessness of resisting Roman orders' and their subordinate status during Roman occupation.<sup>571</sup> The sexual assault of Boudica's daughters certainly had a symbolic impact which would have been understood by the Romans and the British alike, particularly as the women, without the protection of their father or husband, were left vulnerable to attack. The Romans would have understood from Tacitus' writings that the surviving male protectors had been removed from power and subjugated by the Romans as they were treated 'like captives'. Therefore, the attack on Boudica and her daughters was used to signify Rome's ultimate control over the region.

In historical reality, the attacks construed a form of punishment for the Iceni's attempt to defy Roman powers in the region. The attacks on Boudica's daughters and on

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<sup>571</sup> Steyn, 2019: 1-2.

Boudica herself were designed as attacks of terror. This would have been understood by Tacitus' Roman audience and the Iceni alike, as the attack on noble women indicated that no member of the Iceni tribe was safe from harm if they continued to defy Roman rule. The punishment of the Iceni noblewoman also acted, as we have seen with Caesar, as a possible warning of the potential treatment of women and children which was clearly feared by those under threat of Roman rule, as evident in Calgacus' speech. Furthermore, the attack also had a practical purpose in ensuring that Boudica and the Iceni, whom Boudica represented as their queen, felt utterly defeated by the Romans. Tacitus' writings convey that the Romans' actions in assaulting Boudica and her daughters were symbolic of Roman misrule in the region. The Romans' actions backfired and became, in addition to other offences, the catalyst for rebellion.

Roman offences may account for why Dio omits details of the attack on Boudica and her family. Writing in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE, Dio was a provincial governor who was heavily invested in the idea of Rome as a 'world-wide polis' run by an all-powerful emperor. He did not have Tacitus' qualms with the political structure he was working within and was therefore highly critical of those who challenged imperial rule.<sup>572</sup> Instead, Dio's focus is on the British mutilation of Roman women at Camulodunum. In Dio's account, there is a sexual element to the mutilation, with his focus resting on the murdered women's bodies. According to Dio, the British forces supposedly cut off the women's breasts, sewed them to their mouths, and impaled their bodies on spikes.<sup>573</sup> In Tacitus' account, atrocities are committed by the British rebels, including implying sexual violence was used,<sup>574</sup> but he does not explicitly discuss women's treatment and states that the whole population was executed.<sup>575</sup> Tacitus acknowledges that women and children bore the brunt of the attacks in both Camulodunum and Verulamium (modern-day St. Albans), another Roman town which was attacked by the British forces.<sup>576</sup> This was partly because Suetonius Paulinus had recruited the able bodied men to fight. Both Tacitus and Dio convey that excessive cruelty took place in the British attacks, particularly as mass executions took place, but Dio's account is far more detailed in the treatment the women and children were possibly subjected to. As we have seen, it was usual for the treatment of captives, including those who fell (however briefly) into Roman power during siege warfare, to be used as indicators of a commander, army or people's character and references to British barbarity are no exception.<sup>577</sup>

Tacitus was using the behaviour of the Romans and British tribes as a means of discussing Roman imperialism and contemporary politics. As a result, in contrast to

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<sup>572</sup> De Blois, 1998: 267-281.

<sup>573</sup> Dio 62.7.

<sup>574</sup> Tacitus uses the term *direpta* to describe the sacking of a town which has associations with sexual assault, cf. Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91.

<sup>575</sup> Tacitus records that mass executions included the gibbet, arson and the cross, cf. Tac. Ann. 14.33.

<sup>576</sup> Tac. Ann. 14.33.

<sup>577</sup> Cf. pp. 31-33, 45-56.



Dio,<sup>578</sup> Tacitus is able to present a more nuanced view of the rebellion and convey the concerns of Boudica and the rebelling tribes rather than exclusively focusing of British misconduct.<sup>579</sup> Tacitus uses his description of Boudica heading into battle and her speech to her troops to convey that the sexual violence her daughters were subjected to was just one atrocity in a litter of abuses the Romans had carried out against the Iceni. In Boudica's speech to her assembled army, she clearly conveys how vengeance was needed as a result of the Romans' attack on her and the rape of her daughters.

*It was customary, she [Boudica] knew, with Britons to fight under female captaincy; but now she was avenging, not, as a queen of glorious ancestry, her ravished realm and power, but, as a woman of the people, her liberty lost, her body tortured by the lash, the tarnished honour of her daughters.*<sup>580</sup>

solitum quidem Britannis feminarum ductu bellare testabatur, sed tunc non ut tantis maioribus ortam regnum et opes, verum ut unam e vulgo libertatem amissam, confectum verberibus corpus, contrectatam filiarum pudicitiam ulcisci.

Boudica's speech is significant as, whilst there are clearly abuses concerning Roman officials, Boudica casts her rebellion as being motivated by the need to avenge (*ulcisci*) her daughters. The daughters, who accompany their mother into battle on her chariot, become living symbols of Britain itself. Like the region and its people, the daughters have been stripped of their autonomy and were, without their father's protection, powerless against Roman rule. Boudica takes on a masculine role as the avenger of her daughters whose honour, in Roman culture, would typically be defended by their nearest male relative. On this note, Whittaker suggests that the masculine elements of Boudica's speech highlight how 'barbarity and sexual license' existed beyond the frontiers, with women leaders used to 'perpetuate the stereotyped image of barbarian disorder and danger, often tinged with overt sexual references.'<sup>581</sup> However, the sexual violence present in the speeches of rebel leaders is not exclusively referenced by female commanders, as we have seen in the case of Calgacus.

Gillespie describes the way Tacitus conveys the rebellion as ultimately driven by 'a mother's desire for revenge' which was 'a model of feminine virtues fighting against the lustful tyrant of Rome.'<sup>582</sup> The sexual assault of women in Roman *exempla*, particularly that of Lucretia, was used to signify wider political and societal concerns whilst inherently being about the violation of a woman's body. As Adler argues, the inclusion of reference to sexual assault as a catalyst for rebellion enabled Tacitus to 'present a justification for the rebellion somewhat akin to Rome's expulsion of a

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<sup>578</sup> Dio 62.7.

<sup>579</sup> It should also be noted that Tacitus' account is extant, unlike Dio's. On the problematic nature of Dio's account of Boudica's rebellion, particularly concerning the lack of geographical detail, cf. Overbeck, 1969: 129-145.

<sup>580</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 14.35.

<sup>581</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 120.

<sup>582</sup> Gillespie, 2015: 430.

‘foreign monarchy’, as evident in the case of Lucretia.<sup>583</sup> Like Calgacus’ speech, Tacitus was also using Boudica’s speech to reflect on elements of contemporary Roman rule he disapproved of, and how sexual violence could be a trigger for political change. Gillespie shows how Tacitus’ account of Boudica, particularly her speech to the army, highlights how Tacitus draws connections between Boudica and exemplary Roman women, whilst creating a contrast with the women in Nero’s Imperial household of whom Tacitus disapproved.<sup>584</sup>

Scholarship has primarily looked to Boudica’s speech for Tacitus’ socio-political commentary on contemporary Roman politics. However, like Calgacus’ speech, we need to acknowledge that the figurative language used by these ‘characters’ is only successful because it has some basis in truth and historical reality. Sexual violence against women during war and conquest was used as a weapon of terror and humiliation, as we can see in the assault of Boudica’s household immediately after Prasutagus’ death. Beyond the impact it had on the individual, the assault of high-status women was also intended to convey the power Rome had over Britain, and how Prasutagus’ desire to protect his female relatives could so easily be ignored following his death. If elite women were not safe from Roman attacks, then non-elite women were also at risk. The attack on Boudica and her daughters was clearly calculated to have a wider, symbolic impact which stressed the humiliation and ultimate defeat of a people.

### 3.11. Sexual Violence in Art and Iconography

We have seen how sexual violence was presented in literature, so we should now address the allusions to sexual violence in art and iconography. The Romans’ discomfort with sexual violence is evident in that such acts were implicit within literature. Like literature, Roman art celebrated the brutality of war, yet there appears to be a reluctance to explicitly show sexual assault. Granted, sexual violence is a subject which is not only problematic to depict, but it was behaviour which the Romans did not wish to emphasise or associate with their leaders, particularly if, as in the case of Cremona, sexual violence was perpetrated against Roman citizens. Another issue is that mortal women were not commonly displayed in Roman art or iconography prior to Augustus,<sup>585</sup> particularly that which commemorated victory.<sup>586</sup> It is possible to argue that women are not usually a part of conflict given the nature of Mediterranean warfare. However, we have seen from literary evidence that women were involved in war, although they were rarely discussed in detail. Relating to this is the fact that captives were considered to be akin to enslaved people. Enslaved people, particularly women, did not frequently appear in artistic depictions, given the Romans’ universal understanding that slavery was a fact of life, and that sexual violence against enslaved

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<sup>583</sup> Adler, 2008: 181, *cf.* Lavan, 2013: 150-1.

<sup>584</sup> Gillespie, 2015: 418-420.

<sup>585</sup> Kampen, 1991: 218-9.

<sup>586</sup> From Augustus onwards, Roman women became more prominent figures in Imperial iconography, *cf.* Ramsby, Severy-Hoven, 2007: 43-71.

people was only a crime if it constituted 'property damage'.<sup>587</sup> This may account for the rarity of depictions of female captives as spoils of war on surviving Roman art, given that their capture, sexual assault and enslavement was an accepted part of Roman warfare.<sup>588</sup>

However, representations of victory were more essential to Roman iconography than depictions of enslavement, which was understood to be one part of victory. As such, defeated male warriors are depicted more frequently than their female counterparts, who were certainly taken in the same, if not greater, numbers.<sup>589</sup> Essentially, this demonstrated that the Romans had defeated 'worthy enemies' who had fought well in battle, but were ultimately overcome by the Romans' superior strength and tactics. Furthermore, given that the defeat of male warriors ultimately resulted in the capture and 'enslavement' of women and children, it is likely that depicting males was an efficient way of signifying the defeat of an entire nation.

As a result, there are few examples to consider, yet that they exist at all speaks to the prevalence and acceptance of sexual violence in Roman society. However, like literary sources, depictions of violence of this nature are implicit within art and iconography, and there are visual motifs which were used to signify rape. In Greek and Roman art, there were standard depictions of sexual violence, as evident in images of mythological rape.<sup>590</sup> The most common examples of this can be found in Greek art, particularly vase paintings. Although these vases were created centuries before the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, Hölscher argues that the Romans adapted Greek artistic tropes,<sup>591</sup> and De Souza has shown this was the case for Roman triumphal iconography which featured captives.<sup>592</sup> Therefore, it is possible to consider the influence of Greek depictions of sexual violence on Roman art and argue that the standardised tropes transcended the Greco-Roman 'cultural boundaries'.

Sexual violence is implicit in Greek art with mythical scenes relating to warfare showing the victim in a state of undress,<sup>593</sup> her hair unbound, turning her head away from the attacker.<sup>594</sup> The attacker is usually shown either physically carrying the woman away, or else threatening her with a spear, which can be viewed as a phallic symbol.<sup>595</sup> The victim is not usually completely naked,<sup>596</sup> unless depicted in a wartime

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<sup>587</sup> Seifert, 2011: 154.

<sup>588</sup> Uzzi, 2007: 62-3.

<sup>589</sup> De Souza, 2011: 31.

<sup>590</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood, 1991: 59-98.

<sup>591</sup> Hölscher, 2004: 1-4, *cf.* Zanker, 2010: 1-39.

<sup>592</sup> De Souza, 2011: 31-62.

<sup>593</sup> Lee, 2013: 188-9.

<sup>594</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood, 1991: 59-98.

<sup>595</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood, 1987: 131-153, Whittaker, 2004: 117.

<sup>596</sup> Stewart, 1997: 169.

context,<sup>597</sup> but even in a non-martial setting, the attacker is often nude or semi-nude,<sup>598</sup> another way by which sexual violence is implied through art. In a wartime context, it is typical for the victim's body to be facing the viewer, which gives the artist opportunity to show the victim's breasts, essentially emphasising the vulnerability of the victim and how her body will be violated by her attacker. For instance, *Figure 6* depicts scenes from the fall of Troy, and it is possible to see Cassandra, her hair unbound, and breasts exposed, being dragged away from her father by the Lesser Ajax who wields a spear. Her gaze is not directed at her attacker, but at her father who lies prostrate at the altar. The position of the victim's head is significant as her gaze is averted from her attacker. This is evident in 'pursuit scenes' in which heroes, gods or non-divine males are depicted chasing after mortal women usually with often unwanted sexual intent,<sup>599</sup> the woman always faces away from her attacker. As a result, an averted gaze is indicative of a reluctance to depict sexual assault within art and iconography.

Depictions of mythological rape are often framed in such a way, and we can safely assume that sexual violence was represented as such in both wartime and, more rarely, domestic contexts. This would suggest that, much like literary representations of sexual violence, rape was a behaviour which was not only acceptable, if perpetrated against mythical or enslaved women, but one which could be used within art. There are several examples which depict women in similar styles to mythological representations of sexual violence found in Greek art. A frieze from the Basilica Aemilia in Rome, dating from circa 14 BCE,<sup>600</sup> shows the Sabine Women being carried by their Roman captors [*Figure 9*]. Like the Greek vase paintings which depict mythical rape, the women's heads are turned away from their captors, but their bodies are in their captors' hands, a visual image which reflects the women's literal and metaphorical situation. The Sabine Women are significant, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, as they became the first wives of Rome and were the supposed ancestors of Rome's most prominent families. As such, it seems incongruous that the Roman elite would have wanted to depict their ancestors in a position which was considered as shameful. However, as we have seen in literary evidence, the rape was 'neutralised' and the women were transformed from foreign rape victims into the wives of Rome.

The aforementioned examples are mythical or depict non-citizen women, and this is important not only as mortal women do not often appear in Roman art, but because it shows how the Romans were unwilling to depict, or discuss, sexual violence carried out against mortal women in warfare. That is not to suggest sexual violence in such a context was not depicted. The *Gemma Augustea* [*Figure 3*], a cameo probably dating from the latter years of Augustus' reign,<sup>601</sup> reveals how the Roman elite harnessed

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<sup>597</sup> Stewart suggests that Cassandra is the only example of a naked individual in such a pursuit scene, although Amazonian women, also present in wartime contexts, are usually presented with their breasts bared, cf. Stewart, 1997: 169-170.

<sup>598</sup> Stewart, 1997: 169.

<sup>599</sup> Stewart, 1997: 166-9.

<sup>600</sup> Ramage, Ramage, 1991: 96.

<sup>601</sup> Hölscher, 2004: 41,

images found in Greek art to allude to sexual violence in warfare. The cameo, an engraved gem, appears to be a part of the Imperial family's self-promotion, in that it may have been used and circulated within the Imperial court. It is also likely that engraved gems were created by the same artisans who carved the dies for coins.<sup>602</sup> This may explain why much of the imagery evident on carved gems is similar to that found on coinage.<sup>603</sup> There is some debate as to what extent the artisans had their own creative license. However, it is likely that the elite, who commissioned the coin dies and other forms of art, had a strong influence on the final design. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the cameo, like the coins we shall discuss shortly, were a part of political promotion.

The *Gemma Augustea* perfectly encapsulates Roman Imperialism, and the image which the Imperial family wished to convey to those within their inner circle. The gem was designed as a means of flattering the Imperial family, and this is evident in the hierarchy the cameo presents. The conquerors and the conquered are shown separately, with the Imperial family depicted in the upper register, alongside the gods.<sup>604</sup> In the lower register, the Roman soldiers are below the Imperial family, but remain above the foreign captives who are seated in positions of subjugation and defeat at the soldiers' feet. The image which is most pertinent for this debate can be found on the lower right-hand side of the *Gemma Augustea*. Here, we can see a female form in a state of undress, being dragged by the hair by a Roman soldier. The hair pulling was a common motif in artwork,<sup>605</sup> and the action enabled the artist to reflect the woman's position in the hierarchy, as below her attacker. As with the Greek vase paintings and the Sabine Women frieze, the woman's chest is exposed, and her face is turned away from the soldier. The most striking part of the image is the way in which the woman is clearly clutching at her clothes and is visibly distressed. Given the importance of clothing in the Greco-Roman world,<sup>606</sup> the removal of the woman's clothing diminishes her status as her material possessions are no longer present to indicate her social standing.

The example found on the *Gemma Augustea* is tame in comparison to later depictions of sexual violence, including reliefs from the Sebasteion from Aphrodisias in Roman Asia-Minor (modern-day Turkey). Unlike the privately displayed *Gemma Augustea*, the reliefs were commissioned by the provincial elite in a Greek city. Smith suggests that, for the Julio-Claudian period, the reliefs from the Sebasteion are the 'provincial counterparts' of the 'Imperial narrative' at Rome.<sup>607</sup> The original images from Rome have not survived, but Smith argues that literary evidence attests to the presence of

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<sup>602</sup> Strong, 1976: 75.

<sup>603</sup> Strong, 1976: 75.

<sup>604</sup> Hölscher dates the gem from 10-14 CE, *cf.* 2004: 41. However, cameos are 'extremely difficult to date, since their style tended to remain remarkably uniform over the centuries', *cf.* Pollitt, 1997: 275. Others suggest a date after Tiberius' triumph of 12 CE, *cf.* Zanker, 31-2, 1988: fig. 182., Galinsky, 1996: 120-1, 2012: 132-3.

<sup>605</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 117.

<sup>606</sup> Lee, 2013: 188-9.

<sup>607</sup> Smith, 1987: 88-89.

*ethne* images, created during the reign of Augustus.<sup>608</sup> Furthermore, Aphrodisias owed its prosperity to its connection with the Julio-Claudian family, given its association with Aphrodite, the deity the family claimed as their divine ancestor.<sup>609</sup> As such, it was in the wealthy population's best interests to continue emphasising their connection to the Imperial family. This included emulating the art and iconography found in Rome, including images which are suggestive of sexual violence.

One relief from the Sebasteion shows a naked, idealised Claudius standing over a female figure whose clothing has been displaced and one of her breasts revealed. The position of the woman's head, pulled back by Claudius, demonstrates her absolute defeat, whilst also linking the scene with conflict scenes commonly found on Greek friezes.<sup>610</sup> As Hölscher argues, the Greco-Romans displayed the defeated sympathetically, enabling the audience to feel pathos for the fallen,<sup>611</sup> whilst recognising the superiority of the victor in comparison. Interestingly, the female figure has been identified as Britannia and her bare breast has been attributed to the sculptor's modelling of the figure on the Amazons,<sup>612</sup> figures who are often shown with breasts exposed but in full armour.<sup>613</sup> However, Greek vase painters often depicted Amazons as being fully clothed with their breasts exposed, but in a state of composure, prepared for battle.<sup>614</sup> Furthermore, given the depictions of sexual violence we have seen previously, it is likely that the figure in question was supposed to be representative of Claudius metaphorically penetrating and violating Britain, of whose land and people Britannia was symbolic [*Figures 10 and 11*]. As a result, whether Amazon or not, a sense of violent defeat, with the suggestion of sexual assault, is evident in this relief. Indeed, as Whittaker argues, the metaphor of 'conquest by rape' is evident within this depiction of sexual violence and is supported by the Romans' understanding of invasion of foreign lands as a form of 'penetration'.<sup>615</sup>

Given that the Romans recognised that sexual violence and enslavement were a part of warfare, and warfare was discussed in gendered terms, it is likely that the figure of a foreign female in art was viewed as being representative of a typical female from a nation, thus acting as a symbol of the female population at large. However, whilst personifications are representative, they do not show a specific example of a captive. As such, the women we have encountered throughout this section remain as mythical or metaphorical entities, thus enabling the Roman audience to distance themselves from the realities of war. This contrasts with literary depictions of sexual violence which we have seen throughout this chapter. With the exception of Virgil, all the literary sources concern historical events and women who were in actuality affected by sexual violence. Artistic sources focus on metaphorical women which speaks to the

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<sup>608</sup> Smith 1987: 50.

<sup>609</sup> Smith, 1987: 90.

<sup>610</sup> Smith, 1987: 117.

<sup>611</sup> Hölscher, 2004: 23-26.

<sup>612</sup> Smith, 1987: 117.

<sup>613</sup> Cohen, 1997: 74-7.

<sup>614</sup> Cohen, 1997: 74-7.

<sup>615</sup> Whittaker, 2004: 115-199.

difficulties of presenting the realities of sexual violence within artistic elite self-promotion. However, the images would only have been successful in conveying Roman dominion to the viewer if the implied sexual violence were not based on a universal understanding that such violence was omnipresent in Roman warfare and could be used as a weapon of war.

### **3.12. Conclusion**

In conclusion, there can be little doubt that the Romans used sexual violence as a weapon of war, with many of the same motivations we find in rape in more recent conflict. The motivations for sexual violence could include humiliation, revenge, and a desire to 'other' the victims or survivors. Sexual violence had a long-term and widespread impact given that women could suffer physically and psychologically and have unwanted pregnancies. In addition, sexual violence was a calculated act which was used to damage women, their relatives and wider society, as, in the ancient world's heavily patriarchal societies, the preservation of a woman's body and chastity, and the legitimacy of children, were central to societal structures and culture. As men were traditionally viewed, in Greco-Roman and other ancient cultures, as being protectors and warriors, their inability to protect their female relatives from rape was used as an indication of their weakness and impotency in the face of Roman power. The destruction of society through sexual violence and genetic imperialism, and women's lack of autonomy over their own bodies, resulted in (as it does today) women to be more easily enslaved and trafficked, as we shall see in greater detail in the chapter on enslavement.

In terms of representation, whilst sexual violence was present in Roman warfare, it is never explicitly referred to by Greco-Roman authors as being conducted by Romans unless it serves an agenda. Rather, as we have seen in Caesar's writings, it is inferred through the Romans' use of language and shared understandings of conduct in warfare. The Romans utilised sexual violence as a weapon in war, and Greco-Roman authors recognised that rape and other forms of sexual assault were regularly employed. However, the authors were careful to select when sexual violence was implicated in relation to Roman culture at large, especially in connection to high-profile figures within Roman political and military culture. As a result, authors primarily used sexual violence as a means of praising, should a figure abstain from such acts, or criticising figures, should violence be perpetrated against Roman citizens or their allies. Such careful literary representation contrasts with artistic representations which utilise sexual violence, implicit within the female figures' state of undress, as a means of showing Roman dominion over all members and levels of an enemy society, in addition to the role of female figures acting as personifications of a land or nation.

## Chapter Four - Enslavement

### 4.1. Introduction

Slavery was one of Roman society's prominent social institutions, and there can be little doubt that captive-taking was a contributing factor to the Roman slave trade. Thousands of captives were enslaved during Rome's campaigns,<sup>616</sup> and Bradley has suggested that Roman expansion into the East and Gaul in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE caused the rapid acceleration of slavery across the empire and its allied territories.<sup>617</sup> However, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the outcome of captive-taking was not always enslavement, but the Romans and the nations they encountered assumed it would be, or that a captive's status was akin to that of a slave. An understanding of this concept is essential as it enables us to recognise the connections between massacre, sexual violence and enslavement. As we shall see, in warfare, slavery was only possible if a person's status had been reduced through violent means, and such forceful treatment was only justifiable after the fact if a captive was considered to have the same status as an enslaved person.

Patterson, whose research focusses on slavery in world history from antiquity to the present day, argues that slavery is a form of 'social death', and that its 'three principal constituent elements' are 'violent compulsion, natal alienation and generalized dishonouring of slaves.'<sup>618</sup> The significance of Patterson's 'social death' argument and its constituent parts is that the Romans followed the same model in their enslavement of captives. In terms of 'violent compulsion', we have seen in previous chapters how captives were often taken by force, possibly after witnessing or surviving massacres and sexual assaults against members of their community. 'Natal alienation' is a term coined by Patterson, who uses it to describe the removal of captives from their native communities, language and landscapes. As Patterson's assessment is based on world slavery, we should acknowledge the difference here between Roman slavery and the Transatlantic slavery of the 16<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Children taken by Romans were not usually separated from their mothers,<sup>619</sup> unlike the practices of the Transatlantic slave trade.<sup>620</sup> As such, in the Roman context, 'natal alienation' refers to the removal of captives from their familiar cultural surroundings. With regards to the third of Patterson's terms, the 'generalized dishonouring of slaves', the Romans utilised massacre, sexual violence and the dehumanising language associated with enslavement to ensure the initial and continued humiliation of the captives from their capture to their enslavement. Much like massacre and sexual violence, the enslavement of enemy captives was an accepted part of war and the results of such actions, and their subsequent representations, were commonplace in Roman society. However, as we have seen with massacre and sexual violence, the Roman elite had to be careful

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<sup>616</sup> Alföldy, 1975: 11-39, Bradley, 1994: 32, 2011: 249-252, 241-265.

<sup>617</sup> Bradley, 1994: 32, 2011: 241-265.

<sup>618</sup> Patterson, 1982: 1, *cf.* Bodel, Scheidel, 2016: 1-2.

<sup>619</sup> This is particularly evident in iconography, *cf.* Uzzi, 2007: 61-81.

<sup>620</sup> Patterson, 1982: 18.



about how they represented their behaviour in connection to less wholesome activities in both war and peace.

As we know, massacre and sexual violence were used within the historical reality, and subsequently represented by the Roman elite in literature and art to reinforce their various agendas. Massacre affects males and females, whilst sexual violence is mostly perpetrated against women and children of both sexes after their male 'protectors' have been executed. However, within warfare, men, women and children were enslaved by the Romans both in siege warfare and in smaller raids conducted through minor military excursions in occupied areas, and beyond the frontiers. This chapter concerns all those captured by the Romans, in any form of warfare, who were subsequently enslaved. However, we should acknowledge that the three types of treatment (massacre, sexual violence, and enslavement) are interlinked, and we cannot underestimate the emotional and physical toll capture could take on individuals.

Scholarship on slavery tends to focus on the origin of enslaved people and attempts to reconstruct the numbers of enslaved people across the Roman empire.<sup>621</sup> Despite such attempts, there are limits to the conclusions we can draw, primarily because there is little focus on the enslavement of captives within Greco-Roman writings. This is possibly because it was assumed knowledge that the most likely outcome of captivity in warfare was enslavement, and because slavery was so entrenched within Roman society that it did not need to be commented upon in any detail. As such, particulars concerning the demand and supply model, and what drove the Romans to develop the slave trade, cannot be established. Undoubtedly, there was a high demand for slaves, with Bradley *estimating* that between 65-30 BCE, 100,000 new enslaved people were needed in Italy alone, based on the numbers necessary to maintain industries, agriculture and domestic labour.<sup>622</sup> Such a demand was met by enslaving large numbers of people, a feat which the Roman elite boasted of in relation to warfare.<sup>623</sup> However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to attempt to estimate the numbers of enslaved people who were directly acquired through warfare, or the other sources of enslaved people: piracy, reproduction, and child abandonment.<sup>624</sup> There can be little doubt that warfare did contribute to the slave trade and that it was widely considered to be a 'benefit' of war from the perspective of the Roman elite. Furthermore, Bradley suggests that captive-taking in warfare was *thought* to be the principal way by which new enslaved people could be acquired, and captive-taking continued throughout the Empire's so-called *pax Romana*.<sup>625</sup> As a case in point, Bradley shows that in Augustan iconography, which we shall address later in this chapter, enslavement continued to be

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<sup>621</sup> In addition to warfare, enslaved people could be acquired through abandonment, natural reproduction of slaves, and piracy, *cf.* Alföldy, 1975: 11-12, Bradley, 1994: 32-48, Madden, 1996: 109-128, Morley, 2011: 265-286, Scheidel, 2011: 287-310, Thompson, 2003: 20.

<sup>622</sup> Bradley, 1994: 32-33.

<sup>623</sup> E.g. Liv. 27.16.7, 29.29.3, 41.11.8, 41.28.8, 45.34.5f, Polyb. 30.15. For the credibility of numbers in Livy, for instance, *cf.* Ziolkowski, 1990: 15-36.

<sup>624</sup> Bradley, 1989: 20-1, 1994: 33-40.

<sup>625</sup> Bradley, 1994: 32.

a key feature.<sup>626</sup> His research would suggest that captive-taking continued to be commonplace, that dominion over provinces and new territories was represented as enslavement, and, crucially, that enslaved people were assumed to be foreign captives taken in conflict, or ultimately descended from captives. As a result, Roman thought reflected realistic practices, specifically that many of the captives taken during foreign conflicts were enslaved following the defeat of their nation. Attitudes towards slavery are evident in the language used in relation to civil conflict.

#### 4.2. The Language of Slavery

The language associated with captivity and slavery is indicative of how the Roman elite understood and represented their relationships with their enemies, in both foreign and civil war contexts. Within the historical context, there can be little doubt that captives were taken in vast numbers, but it was apparent that Greco-Roman writers also *thought* that enslaved people were more commonly taken following warfare, despite alternative means of acquiring enslaved people, as Fitzgerald outlines in *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination*.<sup>627</sup> This assumption is evident in Roman law, and the jurist Florentinus, writing in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE, claimed that generals have a custom of selling their prisoners and thereby preserving rather than killing them: and indeed, they are said to be *manicipia*,<sup>628</sup> because they are captives in the hand (*manus*) of their enemies'.<sup>629</sup>

In the same passage, Florentinus states that enslaved people were called *servi* because generals chose to preserve (*servare*) the captives taken during warfare, rather than, as we have seen in the chapter on massacre, execute their enemies *en masse*.<sup>630</sup> Florentinus 'appealed to the etymology of the term to rationalize the institution [of slavery]'<sup>631</sup>, utilising terms which are not etymologically sound but indicate how the Romans thought of and justified enslavement resulting from foreign warfare. Such justification is important given that Florentinus also claimed that slavery was 'unnatural' in that 'someone is against nature made subject to the ownership of another.'<sup>632</sup> In relation to this passage, Baumgold argues that 'the point of emphasizing capture in war was to give slavery the coloration of a benefit.'<sup>633</sup> Hence, as slavery was one key outcome of warfare, it was therefore beneficial for such people to be enslaved as it ensured the

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<sup>626</sup> Bradley, 2015: 298-318, cf. Scheidel, 2011: 287-310.

<sup>627</sup> Fitzgerald, 2007: 89-90.

<sup>628</sup> There are etymological issues with *manicipia*, as *mancipia* is more commonly used. Cf. *OLD*, 1070-1: *mancipium*, Baumgold, 2010: 415, Watson, 1987: 8. In his *Etymological Lexicon*, Maltby does not address the issues with Florentinus' etymology, but rather suggests that it is merely a variant of *mancipium*, cf. Maltby, 1991: 363. The word *mancipium* is derived from *manus* (hand) and *ceps* (wholesaler, dealer), cf. *OLD*, 1070-1: *mancipium*. The use of the word *mancipium* in relation to enslaved people is evident at *Caes. B Civ.* 3.6.1, where Caesar consoles his soldiers, arriving at Brundisium from Rome, on the safety of their *animo mancipia*, referring to their enslaved attendants and domestic animals in Italy.

<sup>629</sup> *Just. Dig.* 1.5.4.2.

<sup>630</sup> *Just. Dig.* 1.5.4.2.

<sup>631</sup> Baumgold, 2010: 415.

<sup>632</sup> *Just. Dig.* 1.5.4.1, cf. Garnsey, 1996: 14.

<sup>633</sup> Baumgold, 2010: 415, cf. Garnsey, 1996: 48.

continuation of their lives, despite the treatment they could be subjected to. In addition to Florentinus, there are other examples which support the prevalence of warfare as being the main source of slavery in Roman thought.<sup>634</sup> For instance, Watson argues that in the early Empire, former captives reproducing was the primary source of enslaved people,<sup>635</sup> supporting the idea that warfare ceased during the *pax Romana*, which we know not to be the case. Overall, it appears that the origins of enslaved people were thought to have been captivity, regardless of whether they were the first or following generations of enslaved captives.

Lavan has conducted a close analysis of the language used for literary, figurative or political purposes in *Slaves to Rome*,<sup>636</sup> and he argues that slavery was central to the Roman understanding of power and their relationships with their enemies and allies alike.<sup>637</sup> In a civil war context, it is possible to see how the Roman elite associated defeat in warfare with enslavement, which further indicates the social position of enslaved people within Roman society. In the following instances, the authors have used metaphorical references to enslavement deliberately to emphasise how civil conflict was abhorrent, with Romans 'enslaving' their fellow Romans, an act which was not legal within Roman law.<sup>638</sup> For instance, the literary representations of Sulla's Roman captives and wartime foreign captives are comparable, particularly in literature written in the decades following Sulla's dictatorship, including in the fragmentary histories of Sallust.<sup>639</sup> This is not only helpful in discussing expectations of captive-taking in warfare, specifically that it was *thought* to result in enslavement, but it also highlights how captive-taking could be used as a means of illuminating representations of an historical figure, as we have also seen in relation to massacre and sexual violence.

In a speech attributed to the consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus in 78 BCE, Sallust suggests that the Romans who were carrying out crimes against their fellow citizens were acting as the 'slaves' (*servi*) of Sulla.<sup>640</sup> This comparison further emphasises their anti-Roman behaviour by claiming that they were forced, through their servile status, to behave as if they had been seized (*rapti*) by foreigners. In turn, the Romans persecuted by Sulla and his allies were cast as captives (*capta*) reduced to slavery (*servilis*) who were forced to protect their spoils (*spolia*) from Sulla's men.<sup>641</sup> Sumi argues that Sallust's use of language with links to *pax* and *concordia* in this speech was an allusion to Sulla's use of language in political rhetoric.<sup>642</sup> As such, the contrast

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<sup>634</sup> Lavan, 2013: 133-5.

<sup>635</sup> Just. *Dig.* 1.5.5.1, cf. Watson, 1987: 8.

<sup>636</sup> Lavan, 2013: 73-123.

<sup>637</sup> Lavan, 2013: 78.

<sup>638</sup> Levy, 1943: 159.

<sup>639</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 1.49.1-20.

<sup>640</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 1.49.1-20, echoed at *Hist.* 3.

15.1-6, 19-20. In this speech, attributed to the Tribune Macer in 73 BCE, a prison metaphor is used interchangeably with that of slavery.

<sup>641</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 1.49.1-20.

<sup>642</sup> Sumi, 2002: 428-430.

between Sulla's language with its positive connotations and the reality of his rule is striking. Here, we see that the treatment of the Roman citizens may have been the same as that of foreign captives, as they were cruelly reduced by such treatment, and their citizenship ignored by the deeds inspired by Sulla or carried out on his orders. The sense of terror throughout Sulla's proscriptions is evident from the descriptions which frequently reference captive-taking, and the allusions to captives further illuminates the lawlessness and inversion of Roman norms which Sulla was promoting.<sup>643</sup> It was an established Roman trope for unjust rule or an abuse of power to be associated with captive-taking.<sup>644</sup> For instance, Cicero, who was writing before Sallust but about events after Sulla, claiming that Antony had held the senate and the city of Rome in captivity.<sup>645</sup> In both cases, captive-taking is cast as a part of warfare, and Sulla and Antony presented as bringing war into the heart of Rome. In such instances, we see that the Roman elite inverted the expectations around captive-taking and enslavement to characterise certain Romans with negative qualities. As such, whilst the Romans were certainly not enslaved by the likes of Sulla, the hyperbolic language used in later accounts emphasises the negative qualities of specific individuals, and this demonstrates an inversion of the norms of warfare. Romans were not supposed to be enslaved, as it went against the natural order of things.

### 4.3. Inevitable Enslavement?

The previous examples have dealt with the use of enslavement as a metaphor in writings concerning Roman civil unrest. However, it appears to be widely recognised throughout ancient cultures that enslavement was the understood fate of Rome's enemies, should they be taken captive. We can turn to Caesar to find that this practice was supposedly understood by the northern European tribes, or at least that Caesar chose to represent his enemies as being aware of this fate should they be captured. This essentially placed the motivation for the enemies' actions on their fear of 'enslavement', rather than Caesar's own provocative actions. Caesar emphasised the horror of massacre or slavery for effect, as we shall see shortly, presumably to stress his role as a conqueror who contributed towards the economy of Roman slavery. The threat of enslavement to Rome's enemies is implicit throughout Caesar's writings, and he frequently emphasises his enemies' acknowledgement of their fate should they lose in battle. This includes women, belonging to the Germanic tribes of the Harudes, Marcomanni, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, and Suebi pleading with their male counterparts to save them from Roman slavery as they awaited battle.<sup>646</sup>

*Then at last, compelled by necessity, the Germans led their own forces out of camp and posted them at equal intervals according to their tribes, Harudes, Marcomani, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi; and their whole line they set about with wagons and carts, to leave no*

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<sup>643</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 3.15.1.6, 19-20, *Cat.* 5.7-8, 11.4-7, 16.4, 37.9-11,

<sup>644</sup> Cf. pp. 5-9.

<sup>645</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 8.11, *de domo sua* 108-109. Other examples include Cicero contrasting the treatment of Verres' pirate captives with that of Roman citizens, cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.156, 2.26.66, 2.63-65, 2.27.69, 2.73, 2.30.76-77, 6.69.

<sup>646</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.51.

*hope in flight. Upon these they set their women, who with tears and outstretched hands entreated the men, as they marched out to fight, not to deliver them into Roman slavery.*<sup>647</sup>

Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae in proelium proficiscentes passis manibus flentes implorabant, ne se in servitatem Romanis traderent.

Later in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, the coalition of Belgae tribes formed by the Nervii attempted to protect their women, children and elderly members from war and its possible outcomes by placing them in an area which, on account of the marshy terrain, would be difficult to access by an enemy force.<sup>648</sup> This information was supplied by one of Caesar's prisoners, presumably after questioning, and suggests that non-combatants were of interest to Roman forces. We cannot ascertain what motivated the Romans to seek out such people for captivity, but it is likely that once captured non-combatants may have witnessed or suffered massacre, sexual violence and finally enslavement. Whatever the fate of the captives, it was beneficial for Caesar to present himself as a commander who could completely conquer the entire population of an enemy nation.

On this note, Caesar's *Gallic Wars* was, as Garland argues 'a masterpiece of narratological understatement and deception'.<sup>649</sup> Caesar was able to cement the image he had carefully cultivated as Rome's greatest military leader. This is evident in Cassius Dio, Plutarch, Pliny, and Velleius Paterculus' later assessment of Caesar, comparing him to other great generals, including Pompey.<sup>650</sup> The image of the successful general was created through favourable comparisons with other Romans, including how many battles they had been engaged in, the size of the area conquered, the number of cities and nations defeated, the treatment of captives, and a general's generosity to his soldiers.<sup>651</sup> Plutarch suggests that the loyalty of soldiers, also a symbol of a successful general, was the result of Caesar's generosity, further claiming that he was not amassing wealth for himself but for his soldiers.<sup>652</sup> Plutarch and Velleius Paterculus' references to captives, including the number taken and Caesar's comparative mild treatment of them,<sup>653</sup> suggests that the taking of prisoners was of concern to the Roman elite. As a result, Caesar's frequent references to captive-taking enable us to consider the ways by which Caesar used the practice to illuminate aspects of character and his military or political competencies.<sup>654</sup>

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<sup>647</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.51. Translation by Edwards, 1917.

<sup>648</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.16, Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 20.4.

<sup>649</sup> Garland, 2003: 8.

<sup>650</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 14.1-3, 15.2-3, Pliny *NH* 7.25, Vel. Pat. 2.46.1.

<sup>651</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 15.2-3.

<sup>652</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 17.1.

<sup>653</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 14.1-3, 15.2-3, Vel. Pat. 2.46.1.

<sup>654</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.51, 2.16,

Arguably, the Romans' reputation for captive-taking preceded them, as the Gallic people were aware of the Romans' practices and probably communicated such knowledge with other Gallic, Germanic and British nations.<sup>655</sup> Therefore, we can safely assume that Rome's enemies would have been aware of their fate, should they be defeated. However, Caesar counteracts this by claiming, usually through direct speech placed in the mouths of Gallic generals, that those fighting for Gaul were doing so precisely because they thought Roman dominion was a form of slavery,<sup>656</sup> rather than a literal form of slavery being the primary danger. As a case in point, Caesar creates a direct speech for Vercingetorix,<sup>657</sup> justifying his scorched earth policy by outlining the dangers that the Gallic women and children faced should the Romans defeat them. Namely, that it was the 'inevitable fate of the conquered' for men to be slaughtered, and women and children enslaved.<sup>658</sup> Furthermore, this would also account for references to suicide found throughout the *Gallic Wars*,<sup>659</sup> an issue we shall discuss in the chapter on triumphs.<sup>660</sup> From these examples, we can see that the Romans considered slavery to be a shameful state in which a person was degraded to a 'sub-human' status,<sup>661</sup> and this enabled the Romans to justify the subsequent treatment of their captured enemies.

#### 4.4. The Slave Trade: Historical Realities?

As stated, we cannot ascertain the extent to which warfare contributed to the Roman slave trade. However, we can make assumptions based on the limited information we have from ancient authors, and briefly outline the realities of their treatment. One of the most detailed examples of the enslavement of captives can be found in Polybius. Polybius describes the organisation of the Roman army and, explains in his description of Scipio's sack of New Carthage in 209 BCE the procedure by which the Roman army took captives and spoils.<sup>662</sup> Polybius' description of the organised way by which the Romans troops searched captured settlements suggests that there was a standardised process for the collection of booty and captives.<sup>663</sup> As we have seen in the previous chapter, Polybius was a witness to Roman wartime practices, as he was a treaty hostage with close connections to the Scipio family.<sup>664</sup> Therefore, we cannot ascertain the degree of accuracy within his descriptions, but his account presents an idealised version of the collection and distribution of loot (both animate and inanimate) in

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<sup>655</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.5, 7.8, 7.16, cf. Osgood, 2009: 328-358.

<sup>656</sup> A concern which is repeated throughout, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 5.54, 7.1, 7.14.

<sup>657</sup> Grant how speeches 'could not possibly have been delivered in the forms in which they were reported', as writers were often not present at the speech, did not have access to notes taken during the speech, or were often writing in a different language, cf. Grant, 1995: 44-52.

<sup>658</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.11, 7.14.

<sup>659</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.31, 8.44.

<sup>660</sup> Cf. pp. 204-210.

<sup>661</sup> Bodel, 2016: 82-108.

<sup>662</sup> Polyb. 10.16-17. The account is 'supplementary' to Polybius' earlier account of Roman army practices at 6.19-42, cf. Walbank, 1967: 216.

<sup>663</sup> I discuss the collection of booty here because, as we shall see throughout this chapter, there was a close connection between the taking of physical objects and human chattel.

<sup>664</sup> Cf. pp. 12-14, 75-78.

relation to the capture of a city.<sup>665</sup> The process was likely to have been far more chaotic, but this example speaks to the significance of captives as a form of political and financial currency for victorious generals and soldiers alike.

Polybius' accounts of Roman looting of New Carthage suggest that the troops dealt with booty separately from the collection of slaves.<sup>666</sup> It appears that whilst the tribunes were dealing with the booty, the Roman commander ordered other underlings to gather the prisoners. Polybius suggests that this was either concurrent with or after the collection of booty, and that there was an organised way, which we shall discuss in detail shortly, by which the Roman soldiers gathered loot and human chattel.

However, leaving captives within their own households whilst loot was gathered would have posed a logistical issue as the population may have attacked the Roman forces.<sup>667</sup> Inevitably, the capture of a city could not have been as organised as Polybius suggests. As such, it is likely that the removal of people from their households, which would have enabled the Romans to search the households without threat of attack, occurred either before or concurrently with the taking of material goods. In whichever order the taking of captives occurred, Polybius presents the captive-taking as being closely related to the collection of booty. This is significant for our discussion as the Romans would have understood that captives could stand in for booty, as they were a form of loot taken during the capture of foreign cities, and that material goods could also be used to represent defeated nations and people. Therefore, captives are inevitably intertwined with booty, despite being animate, and we need to take this into consideration when viewing the art and literature of the Roman elite. Furthermore, by this stage in Roman warfare, the captives, having endured defeat and the associated horrors which accompany it (as outlined in the previous two chapters), were reduced to a status in Roman thought which was akin to that of an object, being merely a form of booty. This links to Patterson's 'three principal constituent elements' of slavery, as the reduction to objects signified a form of 'generalized dishonouring of slaves.'<sup>668</sup>

Following the collection of captives, Scipio separated them into groups. These groups were the citizens (πολιται, *polítai*), including those who were presumably engaged in military activity, with their wives, (γυναῖκες, *gunáikes*) children (τέκνα, *tékna*), and the working men (χειροτέχνη, *cheirotéchnai*), who may have included craftsmen, artisans and skilled slaves.<sup>669</sup> Accordingly, Scipio released the citizens and allowed them to return home. This was a diplomatic coup as the citizens would have been the people with the most influence, and their release would have secured them as allies of Rome. As for the working men, they were kept as enslaved public labourers of Rome until the

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<sup>665</sup> Cf. pp. 75.

<sup>666</sup> Polyb. 10.16-17.

<sup>667</sup> As we have seen, women used roof tiles to defend their homes and families during a Roman siege, cf. 64-66. These examples concern the period before enslavement. However, as Rome's enemies understood that they would be enslaved, it is likely that they were attempting to avoid this fate. Nevertheless, such instances are rare and even after enslavement, revolts were uncommon, cf. Urbainczyk, 2008.

<sup>668</sup> Patterson, 1982: 1.

<sup>669</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6-7. For χειροτέχνη, cf. LSJ: 1985-6.

war against Carthage was over. Walbank argues that those identified as *cheirotéchnai* (χειροτέχναι) may have been non-elite Carthaginians, Libyans, and Iberians.<sup>670</sup> Given the emphasis on the offer of freedom, it is likely that enslaved people were amongst this group.<sup>671</sup> The quaestor oversaw the employment of these men, with Scipio personally choosing those who were the physically fittest to work on his ships.<sup>672</sup> As Libourel argues, it was unusual practice for the Romans to use slave labour within the military.<sup>673</sup> However, the use of the enslaved *cheirotéchnai* on galley ships ensured that, given the limited confines of the ship and the position of rowers below deck, the *cheirotéchnai* were easier for the Romans to manage. This example clearly demonstrates Scipio's leniency towards his enemies, particularly those who were citizens with political power, as it was necessary for his future campaigns in the region to ensure that he won their approval.<sup>674</sup> We address the issue of clemency throughout this thesis,<sup>675</sup> but in this case it presents one way by which Roman commanders could demonstrate their power over their enemies, and further highlight certain characteristics.

As said, Polybius' description is highly problematic, and his account does not align with the writings of other authors, such as Livy. According to Polybius, only certain members of the army were involved in the collection and guarding of booty taken from enemy cities and camps. Furthermore, Polybius claims that it was supposedly accepted that all soldiers would benefit from the collected booty,<sup>676</sup> and it was a key part of maintaining morale for soldiers to be promised rewards for good conduct.<sup>677</sup> This supposedly also ensured that order was kept as soldiers were able to see the booty being divided fairly.<sup>678</sup> However, Livy's account of Roman wartime practices raise issues with Polybius' description, as Livy suggests it was more common for soldiers to have loot distributed to them immediately after the battle or siege.<sup>679</sup> Nevertheless, Polybius' emphasis on the guards placed in charge of protecting the loot would suggest that there was a possibility of theft from within the camp itself.<sup>680</sup> This raises further issues in relation to Polybius' description of the sack of New Carthage, particularly with regard to women captured or in the custody of Scipio's men.

We have seen in the chapter on sexual violence that several high-born women were sexually assaulted by Scipio's men,<sup>681</sup> something which suggests that the citizens were not separated as neatly into groups as Polybius' description would suggest, and that

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<sup>670</sup> Walbank, 1967: 216.

<sup>671</sup> Walbank, 1967: 216, Libourel, 1973: 118.

<sup>672</sup> Polyb. 10.17.

<sup>673</sup> Libourel, 1973: 116-119. For the use of captives in the Roman army, *cf.* pp. 42-43.

<sup>674</sup> Polyb. 10.17.

<sup>675</sup> *Cf.* pp. 60-61, 146-152.

<sup>676</sup> Polyb. 10.16.2-4.

<sup>677</sup> Levithan, 2013: 30-33.

<sup>678</sup> Polyb. 10.16.5-6, 10.17.4-6.

<sup>679</sup> Livy 5.22.1, 7.27.8, 13.37.13, 14.16.5, 27.19.2, 36.30.1, 37.5.3, *cf.* Walbank, 1967: 216.

<sup>680</sup> Polyb. 6.33.1-8, 10.16.2-4.

<sup>681</sup> *Cf.* pp. 75-78.



within these groups, sub-groups were exposed to abuse. For instance, whilst the whole collection of captives is referred to as αἰχμάλωτος (taken by the spear, captive, prisoner), a distinction is made between the citizens (ποῖται, *polítai*) and their wives (γυναικες, *gunaîkes*) and children (τέκνα, *tékna*), and the working men.<sup>682</sup> The remainder of those taken prisoner, such as non-elite people and slaves, were effectively subject to whatever treatment the Romans saw fit. Essentially, this again relates to the careful representation of a commander in relation to their treatment of captives. In this instance, Polybius presents Scipio as an ideal Roman commander: capable, organised and fair.<sup>683</sup> That is not to suggest that abuses did not take place, but simply that it was not pertinent for Polybius to emphasise such actions in relation to Scipio, Rome's favoured general.

In the case of Scipio and the captives taken at New Carthage, the inclusion of enslaved people within the Roman army was the result of desperation, and most captives were not explicitly promised release. In the time period we are considering, many captives were sold close to the battlefield, apparently to slave traders who followed the army on their campaigns.<sup>684</sup> Assuming spoils obtained from the sale of human chattel were classed as *spolia* or *praeda*, the profits from the sale of captives were either handed over to the state treasury, or some were retained by the general (spoils of this kind were known as *manubiae*).<sup>685</sup> It should be noted that foreign wars, like governorships in far flung lands, presented opportunities for abuse and exploitation, and a certain proportion of the plunder, including profits from human chattel, was disposed of at the general's discretion. As we shall see, generals could order that captives be given as rewards to soldiers, retained as state slaves, or sold into slavery. In turn, the profits from the sale of slavery could also be used to emphasise a general's *pietas*, *potestas* or *auctoritas* through euergetism in the form of public buildings and entertainment. The most famous example of this is the Colosseum, on which construction began in 70 CE. An inscription on the building states that the amphitheatre was funded by 'the spoils of war', and although the war is not specified,<sup>686</sup> it was likely funded using the loot, including captives, taken during the First Jewish Revolt.<sup>687</sup>

#### 4.5. Soldiers' Gains: The Siege of Cremona

Polybius' account relates that soldiers throughout the ranks were motivated by a desire for gain, usually in the form of loot.<sup>688</sup> However, we have evidence from Caesar, Cicero and later Tacitus which suggests that it was not uncommon for soldiers to be rewarded with captives in exchange for their good conduct.<sup>689</sup> As with all captives taken during

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<sup>682</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6-7.

<sup>683</sup> Cf. pp. 75-78.

<sup>684</sup> Bradley, 1992: 35, Bradley, 1994: 33, Östenberg, 2009: 128, cf. Strabo, 4.7, 7.7.3, Cic. *Att.* 5.20.5, Paus. 7.16.7-8, App. *Hisp.* 98, Livy 5.22.1-4, 39.42.1, 41.11.7-7, Polyb. 30.15, Caes. *BGall.* 7.79.

<sup>685</sup> We discuss *spolia* and *manubiae* later in this chapter.

<sup>686</sup> CIL 6.40454a in Millar, 2005: 118.

<sup>687</sup> Millar, 2005: 103.

<sup>688</sup> Polyb. 10.17.1-2.

<sup>689</sup> Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 26.3, Caes. *BGall.* 6.3, 7.89-90, 8.89, Cic. *Att.* 113, Tac. *Hist.* 3.33-34.

warfare, it depended upon the soldier's own situation as to whether he sold the captive into the slave trade, retained or even killed the captive. Ultimately, the soldier had complete control over the captive he had acquired. We need to return to Roman civil conflict to fully understand the ways in which soldiers could utilise their captives which, in terms of how it was represented by later authors, was used as a means of highlighting the horrors of civil conflict, and the behaviour of certain groups of soldiers. We have discussed Cremona in the previous chapter, and we have seen how Roman women and children were subjected to sexual violence with soldiers treating them as if they were foreign captives. In a similar way, Tacitus' references to enslavement are intended to create horror for the Roman reader, but he does not suggest that sexual violence or enslavement were not common practice for those the Romans defeated. Once again, I am using this example to illuminate an aspect of Roman wartime practice which was culturally ingrained, but only mentioned as noteworthy when it was carried out against a Roman population.

The Siege of Cremona has been discussed throughout the previous two chapters as it illuminates aspects of Roman warfare, particularly violence conducted against Roman citizens or their close allies. The example includes evidence of massacre, sexual assault, and the 'false enslavement' of Roman citizens. With regards to the latter, some of the population were enslaved by Vespasian's troops, operating under general M. Antonius Primus. However, as the inhabitants were Roman citizens, it was later ordered by Primus that the captives could not be sold into slavery in Italy.<sup>690</sup> In response, the soldiers began to kill their captives, as they were effectively financially worthless or inconvenient as they needed to be fed and transported. Upon learning this news, the families of the captives paid the ransoms of the survivors, presumably to the individual soldiers, thus enabling the captives to return home. Archaeological evidence indicates that the destruction of Cremona was on a vast scale, with a 1.5-2 metre burnt rubble layer suggesting that the centre of Cremona was razed to the ground during its sack of 69 CE.<sup>691</sup> However, Cremona was subsequently rebuilt by its formerly captive inhabitants,<sup>692</sup> which would suggest that the inhabitants were able to continue their lives with little stigma, further emphasising the suggestion that they had been falsely enslaved.

Despite relating to a Roman civil war, the fate of Cremona's inhabitants is typical of those taken during Roman warfare. However, except for metaphorical allusions,<sup>693</sup> it was unheard of for Roman citizens to be enslaved by fellow Romans. As such, the Siege of Cremona and the subsequent 'enslavement' of the population may have been a way by which Tacitus could indicate the character and actions of an individual or group in Roman history, essentially using past actions to comment on contemporary events. Tacitus emphasises the horror of the event, in that Romans were mistreating

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<sup>690</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.34.

<sup>691</sup> Pitcher, Arslan, *et al*, 2017.

<sup>692</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.34.

<sup>693</sup> Cf. pp. 7-9.

Romans, by suggesting that the Flavian forces were acting as if the population were non-Roman, as Tacitus claims that the people were automatically enslaved and subjected to sale.<sup>694</sup> It was only when objections were raised because Cremona's inhabitants were Roman citizens that any action was taken to preserve them.<sup>695</sup> Cremona is an exceptional example of Romans enslaving fellow Romans, yet it does indicate that enslavement was thought to be a commonplace result of capture in warfare. This effectively enabled the Roman soldiers to have complete authority over their captives, which is further supported by the fact that there does not appear to be any punishment for those who chose to kill their captives. In this case, the issue of whether Cremona's citizens lived or died essentially rested on their financial worth. Soldiers were seemingly keen to dispose of their captives by selling them to slave traders. Once this became impossible, the captives' value had significantly decreased, and soldiers were seemingly unwilling, or unable, to keep the enslaved people for their personal use. This may have been because the upkeep of enslaved people was more than they were worth as personal attendants, or else the soldiers were not permitted to keep enslaved captives whilst on campaign, particularly given the Civil War context in which the captives were taken. Whatever the reason, the soldiers evidently considered the captives to be financially profitable, but they had little worth as labourers within military life.

#### **4.6. The Value of Enslaved People**

Enslaved people were one part of an ever-changing market, and their worth depended upon a variety of factors. These included economic matters such as issues with supply and demand, and certain aspects of such 'commodities', e.g. where enslaved people were from, their age, and their social status before their capture. In addition to the numbers of captives taken, another aspect the Roman elite were concerned about was the price of enslaved people. For instance, Cicero complains of receiving only meagre profits (of 30,000 *denarii*) from the captives he sold in the East during his proconsulship of Cilicia in 51 BCE.<sup>696</sup> Cicero was selling captives acquired during military campaigns in his governorship, and his military excursions would have been more limited in scope than Caesar's long-term war in Gaul. Therefore, it is likely that Cicero was selling a smaller number of captives. However, Cicero may have been exaggerating his horror at receiving profits which he considered to be meagre. At this time, the annual soldier's salary was 225 *denarii*,<sup>697</sup> so 30,000 *denarii* was a considerable sum for those under Cicero's command. As such, whilst Cicero may have been stressing that he was so wealthy that he considered 30,000 *denarii* to be a paltry amount, it is likely that it simply was meagre in comparison to his wealth and the profits others had obtained in

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<sup>694</sup> Wellesley, 1972: 125.

<sup>695</sup> Wellesley, 1972: 125.

<sup>696</sup> Cic. *Att.* 113.

<sup>697</sup> Watson, 1958: 117-8, Speidel, 1992: 88.

their provinces,<sup>698</sup> and the profits he may have expected to receive from the sale of enslaved people during his governorship.

We can see other instances in which Cicero expresses his concern for the financial benefits of war. In another letter to Atticus, Cicero complained that the only plunder from Caesar's campaigns in Britain were captives who could be purchased (*mancipium*).<sup>699</sup> Cicero's main concern is with the British enslaved people being ill-educated, which indicates the qualities which were most valued by the Roman elite, and further suggests that Caesar's captives would be sold in Rome itself. For their attendants, like Cicero's freedman and right-hand man Tiro, the Romans wanted enslaved people to be highly educated, fluent in numerous languages and possessing abilities which would be useful for their political careers and estate administration. Presumably Cicero was concerned with the enslaved people whom he encountered in his daily life, rather than the thousands of forced labourers who were needed to support Rome's agriculture. In both of Cicero's complaints, it is possible that Cicero's concern was weighing up the effort and expense of carrying out military campaigns to acquire a small number of captives, as with Cicero's actions in Cilicia, or with Caesar's poorly-educated, thus useless (for the elite Romans' needs), enslaved people from Britain. Whilst the demand for educated enslaved attendants was seemingly high for the political elite, enslaved people of little or no education were necessary for Roman agriculture and other industries.<sup>700</sup> Furthermore, Cicero's account is likely to have been a deliberate attack on Caesar's actions in Britain, which he deemed unwarranted given the rewards which could be gained were 'sub-standard'.

In addition to Cicero's concern for the poorly educated British enslaved people entering the market, there is some evidence to suggest that there was an interest in the origins of enslaved people, particularly those taken during warfare. Such evidence can be found in Egyptian papyri from a slightly later period.<sup>701</sup> Papyri from Roman Egypt are particularly significant considering that the region was thought to be less reliant on enslaved labour than other parts of the Empire.<sup>702</sup> Despite the large amount of papyri available to us from Egypt, and the smaller number of enslaved people in the same area, the few references we have on papyri to captives taken in war is sufficient enough evidence to state that enslaved people who originated in warfare were a concern to purchasers. For instance, one papyrus originating from Thebais in Upper Egypt, and dated to 125 CE, details the sale of two enslaved people taken during in warfare (δουλικὰ σῶματα δύο δορατόκτητα).<sup>703</sup> The papyrus relates to a private sale, given that

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<sup>698</sup> Cicero frequently complains about his stint in the provinces, as Cilicia was not as rich in resources or individuals to exploit as other provinces, *cf.* Cic. *Att.* 6.2.5, 6.1.15, *QFr.* 1.1.25, *Flac.* 9.20.

<sup>699</sup> Cic. *Att.* 89.7.

<sup>700</sup> *Cf.* Hopkins, 1978: 1-98.

<sup>701</sup> Biezunska-Malowist, 1977: 81-85.

<sup>702</sup> Biezunska-Malowist, 1977: 81-85, *cf.* *P.Oxy.* 42.3053.

<sup>703</sup> *P.Hamb.* 1.63.9. δορατόκτητος translates to 'taken by the spear', a hapax which only occurs in this papyrus. However, it is connected to αἰχμάλωτος, which also means 'taken by the spear', *cf.* pp. 7-9.

other goods, including domestic animals, are referenced, rather than the wholesale of human chattel to a dealer in enslaved people. We cannot ascertain the origins of the enslaved captives,<sup>704</sup> nor can we know how long the two people were enslaved for before their capture. However, as many papyri mention enslaved people, but few mention their origins, it is likely that the people in question were recently enslaved and were therefore in need of more attention, as they could be considered in danger of disobeying their captor's orders or running away. From this source, we can also see that a trade in recently captured and enslaved people existed on the frontier of the Roman empire,<sup>705</sup> and that enslaved captives taken during conflicts from across the empire were omnipresent within Roman society.

Caesar's captives from his northern European campaigns, which far outnumbered those taken by any other Roman in any war, were present in markets in Italy, as indicated by Cicero's complaints concerning Caesar's British captives. However, as Caesar had taken vast numbers of captives during the Gallic Wars, there may have been a danger in flooding the market with captives, as Caesar's gold had in Italy following the Gallic Wars,<sup>706</sup> which would have decreased the value of enslaved captives. As we have seen, the slave market extended far beyond Rome and an increase in the availability of captives, despite their being in vast numbers, would not have drastically affected the price. Nevertheless, with Caesar ensuring that he had thousands of enslaved people to sell, even if they had been sold at a lower price, either in Rome or on the frontier, they would have ensured he profited substantially. This is particularly important when considering Caesar's previous appointments in the provinces, primarily his quaestorship in Spain in 69 BCE. Caesar's position in Spain was not profitable, with Suetonius recording that Caesar had to borrow from his friends to pay his debts.<sup>707</sup> In addition to the financial assistance of Crassus,<sup>708</sup> Caesar's monetary problems were partly solved by his governorship in Hispania Ulterior in 61 BCE, which involved the conquering of antagonistic nations.<sup>709</sup> We have little evidence concerning his activities in Hispania, yet it seems likely that the defeated nations were subjected to massacre, sexual violence, and enslavement. The latter in particular presented the most opportunity for profit. Therefore, Caesar's actions in Hispania may have set a precedent for his behaviour in Gaul, as he benefitted from the profits available from the sale of captives. As follows, Caesar's excessive taking of captives during the Gallic Wars was possibly intended to ensure he had the financial resources, in addition to plunder, to use upon his return to Rome.

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<sup>704</sup> Madden, 1996: 114. Madden suggests this but does not refer to any specific papyri, presumably he is discussing *P.Hamb.1.63.9* given the limited references to enslaved people taken captive during warfare within papyri.

<sup>705</sup> As suggested by Bradley, 1994: 33.

<sup>706</sup> Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 54. Suetonius suggests that the money was raised through the looting of sacred sites and the plunder of towns and cities for the sake of acquiring material goods.

<sup>707</sup> Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 51.1. Cf. Frederiksen, 1966: 128-141.

<sup>708</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 11-12.

<sup>709</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 11-12, Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 18.1.

The limited financial gains from the selling of captives may account for Caesar's decision to reward his troops with people, rather than monetary rewards. At the conclusion of the Gallic Wars, Caesar supposedly gave each soldier a captive each.<sup>710</sup> As Levithan comments, it was unusual for Caesar to mention rewards for his troops, given that he usually presented them as being motivated by loyalty.<sup>711</sup> However, it was commonplace for generals to reward their soldiers with material goods. This is suggested by Livy who, in his description of the capture and subsequent enslavement of 10,000 Veians in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE, claimed that the soldiers were perturbed when they did not receive a cut of the profits from the sale of captives.<sup>712</sup> That being said, it may have been unusual for generals, including Caesar, to reward their soldiers with captives, as we have seen when Cicero complained about the price he received for the captives.<sup>713</sup> However, Cicero's decision to sell the captives, much like Caesar's to use human chattel as rewards, was probably calculated to ensure that they achieved the maximum profit. For instance, Caesar took thousands of captives during the Gallic Wars which would have flooded the Northern European and Italian market with 'product'. Presumably, this would have driven down the price of Gallic captives. As there was an abundance of captives, it was more profitable for Caesar to retain the material plunder,<sup>714</sup> which may have been limited in comparison to more eastern nations,<sup>715</sup> and to reward his soldiers with the captives. Furthermore, we know troops should not ideally be motivated by plunder. Therefore, rewarding the troops with a captive each was a means by which Caesar could present his soldiers with an indirect form of monetary reward, as it seems likely, given the logistics of keeping a captive, that the men sold the captives close to the battlefield.<sup>716</sup> Granted, this is speculative, yet Caesar's actions are in line with the Romans' concerns with the logistics and financial benefits of captive-taking found elsewhere.

#### 4.7. The Trade in Enslaved People

Captive-taking on the battlefield or in siege warfare was just the beginning of the long journey captives were forced to endure, as part of a large-scale trading operation which extended throughout the Mediterranean and beyond. There was a supply chain which saw captives passed along a series of traders and trading routes. As Bodel, in his article on Roman slave traders, outlines: the market was fuelled by Roman demand and, as we have seen with evidence pertaining to battlefield slave-trading,<sup>717</sup> the supply was partly filled by Roman military activity, in addition to piracy.<sup>718</sup> According to Strabo, writing of the Greek port of Delos in the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE and early 1<sup>st</sup> century CE,

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<sup>710</sup> Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 26.3, Caes. *B Gall.* 7.89-90, 8.89. Caesar also gave cattle and captives belonging to the revolting Nervii to his soldiers in 53 BCE, cf. Caes. *B Gall.* 6.3.

<sup>711</sup> Levithan, 2013: 30-32.

<sup>712</sup> Livy 5.22.1-4.

<sup>713</sup> Cic. *Att.* 113.5.

<sup>714</sup> Cf. fn. 706.

<sup>715</sup> For instance, Pontus had been fabulously wealthy before Mithridates' defeat by Pompey, cf. Mayor, 2010: 52-53.

<sup>716</sup> Bradley, 1992: 35. As we have seen in the case of Cremona, cf. pp. 102-104.

<sup>717</sup> Bodel, 2005: 181-2.

<sup>718</sup> Strabo 14.5.2.

the operation was smooth and efficient. Delos was a major slave-trading hub, and even prompted the creation of a proverb associated with the city: 'Merchant, sail in, unload your ship, everything has been sold' (ἔμπορε, κατάπλευσον, ἐξελοῦ, πάντα πέπρατα).<sup>719</sup> In addition to considering epigraphic evidence, Bodel suggests that Strabo's writings indicate that there were four stages of the trade in enslaved people, and each had its own specialists: acquisition, transport to market, preparation for sale, and the final sale. Bodel sees this as an on-going, standardised process which ran smoothly and efficiently, no doubt because slavery was heavily ingrained in Mediterranean society.

However, Bodel does not address the process which began before the capture of the enslaved people, which would have inevitably had psychological ramifications on the captives and made an impact on their subsequent enslavement. There is evidence to suggest that, by the time captives were taken to slave markets, they were already wholly defeated psychologically. Silver, in his discussion of the architecture of slave markets, claims that there is no evidence of provision to lock up violent, former combatant captives.<sup>720</sup> Silver uses such evidence to suggest that people from eastern nations voluntarily sold themselves into slavery in order to reach Rome. However, his argument fails to acknowledge that captives may have been kept in wooden enclosures, a material which only survives from antiquity in exceptional circumstances.<sup>721</sup> Nevertheless, beyond the allegedly missing architectural features, we need only look at the Transatlantic slave trade,<sup>722</sup> including details from the autobiography of Olaudah Equiano, a former enslaved person describing the conditions of a Caribbean slave market, to see that captives did not attempt to violently elude their captors at this stage of their enslavement.<sup>723</sup> By the time the captives reached trading posts in the Caribbean, they had already endured great hardships, including being forcibly displaced from their homes, subjected to violence and transported for many months in cramped, unsanitary and inhumane conditions. They were physically and emotionally weakened by their ordeal, and it should come as little surprise that they were unable or unwilling to resist their captors. Despite the differences between the 'closed' model of the Transatlantic slave trade, and the 'open' nature of Roman slavery, in which former enslaved people and their descendants could be integrated into free society,<sup>724</sup> it is likely that the reaction of the enslaved in the ancient world was like that of the captives transplanted from African nations over a millennium later. As such, the treatment of captives before their sale ensured that they were compliant, particularly if there was the possibility of punishment or even the chance of freedom, no matter how slim. After all, what other choice did they have? As

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<sup>719</sup> Strabo 14.5.2.

<sup>720</sup> Silver, 2016: 184-202.

<sup>721</sup> For instance, at Herculaneum and within anaerobic layers.

<sup>722</sup> Webster, 2008: 103-123. Webster outlines the importance of using comparative methods in the study of slavery, particularly with relation to the Transatlantic slave trade. For further discussion on Webster's stance, cf. Hall, 2008: 128-130, Mattingly, 2008: 135-139.

<sup>723</sup> Equiano, 1789. Available from:

[http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/ism/slavery/americas/olaudah\\_arrival.aspx](http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/ism/slavery/americas/olaudah_arrival.aspx).

<sup>724</sup> Temin, 2004: 523.

a result, whilst massacre and sexual violence have been dealt with separately in this thesis, the impact of individuals witnessing such violence cannot be dismissed and it can ultimately be considered as one way of ensuring that those defeated by the Romans could transition with more ease, given their psychological distress, from a free to enslaved person. In turn, this may contribute to the ways in which captives are represented by the Roman elite: as disregarded given the acceptability of their treatment in warfare, or as inferior beings to their Roman conquerors.

The way in which captives were presented in the context of slavery also links to the representations of slave traders in the Roman world, and how the Roman elite carefully presented their relationship to the slave trade. Bodel uses Strabo's writings on Delos to suggest that piracy and kidnapping were the primary source of enslaved people supplied at Delos.<sup>725</sup> However, Strabo does acknowledge that Roman military activity was key to the operation, yet relates the activities of pirates and kidnappers in greater detail. Bodel stresses that slave traders were thought to be distasteful individuals within Roman society.<sup>726</sup> As a result, the reference to equally distasteful groups, namely pirates and kidnappers, in relation to slave traders would have been expected from the perspective of Strabo's readers. Therefore, it is likely that Strabo stressed the involvement of pirates over that of Roman military forces to emphasise the seedy nature of the slave trade and those associated with it. This is significant in how the Roman elite referenced their involvement with the slave trade, and that inevitably impacted upon their statements relating to captive-taking. However, whilst the process may have been heavily ingrained within Mediterranean society at the time, it is likely that Roman commanders could act in the stead of parts of the slave trade, as we will see with Caesar moving British captives back to the continent.

Following his invasion of Britain in 54 BCE, Caesar boasts of having taken so many prisoners that his fleet had to cross the Channel twice.<sup>727</sup> We should remember that Caesar's expedition was not successful in a military capacity, so Caesar may have been using the numbers taken to claim that the undertaking was profitable in a financial or social capacity. Large scale captive-taking, as with Caesar's frequent references to the numbers enslaved during the Gallic Wars,<sup>728</sup> could be used as an indicator of excellent military conduct. For instance, Plutarch claims that Marcus Antonius gained the favour of Caesar by greeting him with a large army and a great number of captives in 48 BCE during the Civil War.<sup>729</sup> Antonius was presumably acutely aware of Caesar's actions, and may have been attempting to emulate Caesar's practice of captive-taking. Although we cannot ascertain how many prisoners were taken during the invasion, Caesar's account is supported by Cicero's letters which allude to Caesar's intention to enslave the British captives.<sup>730</sup> Furthermore, given Cicero's brother's involvement in

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<sup>725</sup> Strabo 14.5.2, *cf.* Bodel, 2005: 181-2.

<sup>726</sup> Bodel, 2005: 181-95.

<sup>727</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 5.23.

<sup>728</sup> *Cf.* pp. 98-102.

<sup>729</sup> Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 7.4.

<sup>730</sup> Cic. *Att.* 89.7.



the Gallic Wars, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Caesar's claims had to be plausibly deniable. We do not know what happened to these prisoners, but that Caesar went to the effort to take them to the continent suggests that they were sold on the slave market either in Gaul, or in Italy. Presumably, considering the limited connection Britain had with Rome, there was no trading infrastructure at the time to sell the captives on the island itself. This links to Patterson's 'natal alienation' argument as the British captives, transported from familiar surroundings and culture, were less likely to escape. Here, we see Caesar taking on a role which would usually be undertaken by a slave trader. As such, it may explain why Caesar, and his contemporaries, were reluctant to describe the slave trade in detail, given that they did not want to be associated with the industry, thus linking themselves with the inferior social status of those who dealt in enslaved people. This is significant for our discussion as the elite had to use the slave trade for financial gain, but there is evidence to suggest that they attempted to distance themselves from the trade. For instance, connections with the slave trade are only stressed in epigraphic evidence found in the provinces, and commanders seemingly dealt with the logistics of slavery from a distance.<sup>731</sup>

#### 4.8. Captives in the Roman Home

Despite the reluctance in the writings of the Roman elite to associate themselves closely with the slave trade, Rome and its provinces were reliant upon and demanded enslaved labour. This is not only evident in the writings of Cicero, with his discussion of the importance of his former enslaved attendant Tiro, but it is evident in the works of later writers who stress the connection between Rome and slavery.<sup>732</sup> Cicero kept a relatively small number of enslaved people in his household, in comparison to the Imperial household, with Garland using Cicero's writings to list the various enslaved roles which numbered in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, as in the case of the empress Livia's household.<sup>733</sup> Possessing dozens of enslaved people is hardly insignificant, which indicates that households of Rome's very wealthiest could include hundreds of enslaved persons, in addition to freedmen who acted as clients for their former masters.

For instance, Tacitus claims that the prefect Lucius Pedanius Secundus was murdered by one of his enslaved workers in 61 CE, and the whole of his household was sentenced to death as a result.<sup>734</sup> The enslaved household staff supposedly numbered 400.<sup>735</sup> The people and members of the senate supposedly challenged the execution of hundreds of individuals who were innocent of the crime, and it was Nero who had the final say.<sup>736</sup> According to Tacitus, Nero decided that the mass execution should take

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<sup>731</sup> For instance, Caius Sornatius Barba, possibly a legate of Lucullus, built a *statarion* (slave-market) and altar at Acmonia (Phrygia), *MAMA* 6.260, *cf.* Bodel, 2005: 184.

<sup>732</sup> The 3rd century CE writer Athenaeus claimed that the Romans kept more enslaved people as attendants, in contrast to the Greeks who preferred to employ enslaved people in mining or agricultural labour, *cf.* Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 6.272c-273a, Parkin, Pomeroy, 2007: 154-6.

<sup>733</sup> Garland, 1992: 163-172.

<sup>734</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 14.41-45.

<sup>735</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 14.43.

<sup>736</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 14.45.

place and it was carried out despite the continued protestations of the people. It is important to remember that Tacitus' writings have an anti-Neronian slant and Tacitus may be using his decision with regards to the enslaved people to indicate Nero's tyrannical qualities in his unwillingness to listen to the people and the senate.<sup>737</sup>

As we have seen in relation to the uncertainty of the numbers the Romans claimed to have massacred, taken captive or enslaved, and Tacitus' issues with Nero's reign, we cannot speak to the accuracy of Tacitus' statement with regards to the numbers of household slaves.<sup>738</sup> However, Tacitus' account, and those found in other sources,<sup>739</sup> support the seemingly universally understood thought that the Romans enslaved their enemies *en masse*, and that that slavery was an important and accepted part of Roman culture and social structure, despite the seeming reluctance to deal directly with the slave trade itself evident in elite sources. Furthermore, Tacitus relates how enslaved people could be used within Roman society as more than tools to fulfil laborious jobs. Enslaved people could act as a form of display, demonstrating the wealth of an individual or family by acting as a living embodiment of their financial prosperity. The way in which the enslaved people were brought forward into the forum demonstrates the importance of slavery in Roman society, but also indicates that there was a theatrical element to the inclusion of enslaved people within households, particularly for those in positions in which their public image was paramount to their political success and social status.

The incident relayed by Tacitus is an extreme example, but enslaved people were utilised by wealthy Romans to demonstrate their status and financial power, effectively a form of conspicuous consumption. Within examples, we still encounter a degree of theatricality, and this is particularly evident in relation to enslaved people with physical disabilities who were kept as forms of entertainment. By the time of the 1<sup>st</sup> Century CE, 'monster markets' existed in Rome,<sup>740</sup> designed to supply enslaved people of an unusual physical appearance,<sup>741</sup> those who had sensory disabilities, or those with what we would now recognise as having learning disabilities.<sup>742</sup> As we know that warfare was one origin of enslaved people, it is likely that those with disabilities or congenital conditions were preserved by the Roman elite after conflict with a view to sell them into the slave trade, particularly in the Imperial period. Unfortunately, we lack the evidence to speak to how frequently Roman commanders chose to preserve enemy individuals with disabilities. However, such a trend within Imperial society was one which generals and slave traders could benefit from as disabled or unusual

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<sup>737</sup> Tacitus frequently cast Nero as an 'extreme example of corruption and tyranny', *cf.* Rubiés, 1994: 37-38.

<sup>738</sup> Madden, 1996: 109.

<sup>739</sup> For epigraphic evidence, *cf.* Edmondson, 2011: 337-61. In literature, *cf.* *Pet. Satyr.* 37, 47, 53.

<sup>740</sup> *Plut. Mor.* 520c.

<sup>741</sup> Plutarch describes those on offer as having 'people who have no calves, or three eyes, or arms like weasels, or heads like ostriches', *cf.* *Plut. Mor.* 520c.

<sup>742</sup> *Mar. Ep.* 8.13, 11.38.

looking enslaved people were considered desirable, despite their perceived lack of function.

According to Martial, Quintilian and Longinus, enslaved people with disabilities could fetch a higher price at market.<sup>743</sup> Clearly, each author has his own agenda and it is likely that their comments were intended to demonstrate the inversion of the norm, as what use was an enslaved person who could not work? However, there was evidently an element of truth within their writings, and the high price of enslaved people with disabilities suggests that the elite not only wished to display the exotic, but also demonstrate their vast wealth by presenting these 'useless' enslaved people to their guests. For instance, Petronius' Trimalchio and Martial's Zoilus, who are depicted as extravagant, owned exotic looking enslaved people who had little to no practical function within the household.<sup>744</sup> Zoilus' enslaved attendant helps his owner, reclining at dinner, to urinate, a basic task Zoilus is too lazy to accomplish himself.<sup>745</sup> Both Trimalchio and Zoilus are represented as 'vulgar, upstart' freedmen who are attempting to improve their social standing with the use of status symbols, including possessing enslaved people with disabilities or unusual physical characteristics.<sup>746</sup> Both Petronius and Martial are highly critical of the two characters, suggesting that they both felt repugnance for such people and those who kept them. Furthermore, the purchase of disabled enslaved people was often seen as an extravagance. For instance, Seneca complained of his wife's clown who, having become blind and confused, did not even serve her purpose to entertain and had thus become a financial burden.<sup>747</sup> Whilst disabled enslaved people were clearly a niche purpose for members of the elite, we can see from these examples how enslaved people within the households of Rome's elite could be utilised to present their owners as being wealthy, to the point of wasteful, or as being curators of exotic and unusual objects and people from across the empire.

With the ostentatious presentation of enslaved people in mind, the presence of former captives within the household was, like the display of captured weaponry in temples and houses,<sup>748</sup> a means by which a former military man could demonstrate his successes on the battlefield, having reduced a former enemy, who had the potential to challenge Roman superiority, to the lowest social position a person could be demoted to in Roman society. Granted, there is scant evidence concerning the inclusion of wartime captives within a general's household, which may result from the expectation that it was common for useful enslaved people to be retained by commanders and

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<sup>743</sup> Mar. *Ep.* 8.13, 11.38, Quint. *Inst.* 2.5.11, Longinus, *Symp.* 18-19.

<sup>744</sup> Trimalchio's enslaved attendant is described as having a 'wizened appearance' and 'watery eyes', whilst Zoilus keeps a eunuch, cf. Pet. *Saty.* 1.28, Mar. *Ep.* 3.82.

<sup>745</sup> Mar. *Ep.* 3.82.

<sup>746</sup> Sullivan, 1991: 47. Cf. Sullivan, 1991: 162, Andraeu, 2013: 114-116.

<sup>747</sup> Sen. *Ep.* 50.2-3.

<sup>748</sup> Suet. *Ner.* 38.

therefore not worth commenting on in elite writings.<sup>749</sup> Furthermore, we know that prisoners of war were retained for uses outside the home, including as gladiators.<sup>750</sup> For instance, Caesar kept a seemingly large number of gladiators in a *ludus* in Capua and it is possible that these individuals had been taken during Caesar's wars in Gaul.<sup>751</sup> Given that enslaved people, who included gladiators, were referred to as *instrumentum vocale* 'talking hardware',<sup>752</sup> the position of former captives reduced to a position akin to that of an object links closely to the display of weaponry within the home. The relationship between objects and people taken during conflict is intertwined.

Captives were seen as objects, given their enslaved status, and the objects could be used as substitutes for the defeated enemy. We can see the relationship between objects and people in religious practices from the ancient world. For instance, anatomical votives, dedicated in shrines, were representative of affected body parts which the dedicator wished divine attention to be paid to. The votives took on anthropomorphic qualities, becoming representative of the specific part of the person's anatomy. Furthermore, in memory sanctions (also known as *damnatio memoriae*) carried out against high-profile individuals after their deaths, statues of individuals were deliberately damaged, and it was reported as if the statues could feel the physical hurts inflicted to its eyes, mouth and nose.<sup>753</sup> As such, the Romans understood the connection between objects and the individuals they were intended to represent. The constant presence of captives within the household would have acted as a reminder, in the form of a submissive individual considered to be akin to an object, of the homeowner's achievements in battle and his superiority, as a divinely favoured Roman, over people of different nations and ethnicities. As we have seen that domestic objects in elite households were used as a souvenir of war, former captives forced into slavery acted as another symbol of Roman dominion over other nations. This enabled the Roman elite to justify their continued aggression against foreign nations as they were surrounded by those they had taken prisoner, reduced them to slavery, which ensured that the Romans were then able to normalise the continuing attacks, massacre and enslavement of foreign peoples. Ultimately, captives acted as props within the household, as figures on art and within the physical objects which were associated with them, including weaponry, thus enabling the Romans to cement the culturally ingrained idea of their own superiority, and justify the horrors which they conducted against their enemies.

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<sup>749</sup> The example of Scipio refusing the attractive young woman at New Carthage may have been an indication of this practice. We also know from Greek epic that it was acceptable for women to be enslaved for the purpose of sexual violence, *cf.* pp. 68-75.

<sup>750</sup> Spartacus is the most famous example of a prisoner of war turned gladiator, *cf.* Plut. *Crass.* 8, App. *BCiv.* 1.116, Flor. *Epit.* 2.8.8.

<sup>751</sup> Cic. *Att.* 7.14.2. The numbers were so large that Pompey, during his Civil War with Caesar, gave each household in Capua two gladiators. The shields were also said to number 1000, suggesting a large number of gladiators were in training.

<sup>752</sup> Varro, *Rust.* 1.17, *cf.* D'Ambra, Métraux, 2006: viii-xvii.

<sup>753</sup> *Cf.* Varner, 2004: 3 for his discussion of Pliny, *Pan.* 52.4-5.

Once enslaved, the treatment of captives depended entirely upon their owners and the work they were forced to carry out. There is not room in this thesis to outline the wide-ranging treatment of slaves, but it is sufficient to say that it was generally poor.<sup>754</sup> At its 'worst', captives could be sent to carry out hard labour, in agriculture or mining,<sup>755</sup> which would have increased the probability of an early death. At its 'best', captives could be kept within the household of the elite and employed in a less labour-intensive capacity. Within this domestic setting, there was the opportunity of emancipation which offered the possibility of an enslaved person acquiring wealth, and their children rising within the Roman socio-political ranks. The patronage system ensured that freedmen were inextricably linked to their former masters,<sup>756</sup> often taking their master's names. However, for the 'invisible' majority, enslavement would have been a life-long position in which an enslaver had almost complete jurisdiction over their enslaved people.

#### 4.9. Enslavement and Iconography

As we have seen in the previous chapter,<sup>757</sup> depictions of sexual violence are often associated with females in positions of subjugation, sometimes alongside their defeated menfolk. Such depictions link closely to enslavement, possibly because the 'enslaved status' of the captive enabled sexual violence to be carried out with impunity. De Souza, in his review of captives in Roman Imperial iconography, claims the inclusion of captives, both male and female, emphasises the Romans' interest in slavery as a benefit of Imperialism within elite Roman representation.<sup>758</sup> De Souza's argument does not acknowledge the importance of captives as symbols, nor does he address the implications of sexual violence, as we have seen in the previous chapter. However, De Souza's research raises the issue of how the Romans may have recognised that depictions of warfare, including representations of captives, could be accurate to a degree. For instance, it is possible that the Roman audience may have considered the women displayed in art and iconography as the counterparts of the enslaved women they encountered within society. Furthermore, this also relates to the raising of funds from the sale of captives, which were used to finance public buildings which often utilised a captive motif to emphasise Roman Imperialism. In turn, this motif further justified the Romans' capture of foreign combatants as they were depicted as inferior to the Romans who had commissioned the erection of such buildings and monuments.

As we have seen in this chapter, war booty was an important source of income for soldiers and generals alike, and part of the booty was captives.<sup>759</sup> Cicero's writings suggest that *manubiae*, the portion of the loot which a general with *imperium* could dispose of as he wished, could be used to build public buildings.<sup>760</sup> It is uncertain if it

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<sup>754</sup> Alföldy, 1975: 58.

<sup>755</sup> Alföldy, 1975: 58.

<sup>756</sup> Gruen, 2006: 456.

<sup>757</sup> Cf. pp. 84-89.

<sup>758</sup> De Souza, 2011: 31.

<sup>759</sup> Shatzman, 1972: 177-180.

<sup>760</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.154, *Leg. Agr.* 2.53, *Dom.* 102, 104, cf. Shatzman, 1972: 182. As we have discussed briefly earlier in this chapter, cf. pp. 98-102.

was required by law, but there are public buildings which were built using *manubiae* which were generally erected overlooking or in close proximity to the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus on the Capitoline Hill.<sup>761</sup> The tradition of using *manubiae* for such purposes supposedly dates to the reign of Tarquinius Superbus, Rome's last king, who used booty from his wars with neighbouring tribes to build the foundations of the Temple of Jupiter.<sup>762</sup> Given Superbus' reputation as a tyrant, it seems incongruous for the Roman elite of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE to emulate the behaviour of such a character. However, as the use of *manubiae* for public buildings had a long history which dated back to before the Republic, the Roman elite wanted to emulate long established traditions, which had continued for generations of staunch Republican Romans. By the time of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, the booty taken during foreign warfare would have included captives, or funds raised from their subsequent sale into slavery, as we have seen with reference to Caesar and Cicero's captives. Bispham suggests that the temples acted as a 'visual metaphor for Empire'.<sup>763</sup> Furthermore, the use of *manubiae* for the funding of public buildings, particularly those of a religious kind, emphasised the significance of warfare within Roman society and linked their victory to divine favour. As such, the buildings financed through *manubiae* acted as a symbol of justification for Rome's violence against foreign nations as victory was a sign of divine favour and the proceeds partly went to honouring the gods through the building of temples. This is particularly evident in the example of the Temple of Minerva Capta, located at the foot of the Caelian Hill, which housed a statue of Minerva taken as spoils from the Falerii in 241 BCE.<sup>764</sup> Given the temple itself referred to the goddess' captive status, the Romans clearly had no qualms emphasising the capture of enemy goods, even if they were religious objects.<sup>765</sup>

In addition, it was also a way by which the Romans' supposed greatness could be emphasised, as the buildings were dedicated to the Romans' superior gods, who had helped them secure victory, and the Romans would have recognised that the buildings had been built from the sale of captives and their possessions. Ultimately, through the erection of buildings, and inclusion of captive images and arms in a public sphere, the Roman elite were able to justify their continued violence against foreign enemies whilst promoting their own political agenda through generosity to the people and their piety. As a result, the Romans' justification of captive-taking and violence was cemented in Roman culture, with each generation surrounded by evidence of the previous generation's behaviour in warfare. Thus, captive-taking was culturally ingrained within Roman society and therefore perpetuated throughout the generations. We need

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<sup>761</sup> Bispham, 2008: 141.

<sup>762</sup> Livy 1.55.6-9.

<sup>763</sup> Bispham, 2008: 141.

<sup>764</sup> Richardson, 1992a: 255.

<sup>765</sup> The Romans had a ritual called *evocatio* which called forth the gods of a captured city and enabled them to be included in the Roman pantheon. For more on the ceremony, cf. Pliny *NH* 28.18, Rutledge, 2007: 180-181.

to consider these factors closely when discussing captive motifs apparent on public buildings, monuments, numismatic and other iconographic sources.

#### 4.10. The Roman Trophy

As we have seen in Chapter Two on Massacre and in the opening sections of this chapter, *praeda*, *manubiae* and *spolia* were important for the Romans' command over their military and their allies.<sup>766</sup> In some cases, spoils could take the form of captive people, and the association between plunder and captives is perhaps the most obvious in depictions of *tropaia* (*tropaeum* in Latin) and bound captives. In Greek culture, a *tropaion* was a wooden stump upon which a full set of the enemy's armour (a panoply) was displayed, usually on a battlefield where the battle changed in the victor's favour.<sup>767</sup> In the Roman period, a *tropaeum* came to stand as a symbol of victory and can be found on numismatic and in architectural iconography, as we shall see shortly. Before addressing such iconographic uses, we need to acknowledge that *tropaia* also had religious significance, as Virgil emphasises throughout Book 10 of the *Aeneid* in relation to the deaths of Pallas, Aeneas' ally, and Mezentius, an ally of Aeneas' enemy, Turnus. The stripping of an enemy's corpse was not viewed as sacrilegious, as it was a given that single-combat would result in the acquisition of the defeated enemy's armour. The armour could then, should the general choose, be dedicated to the gods,<sup>768</sup> and continued to be displayed in a temple. Alternatively, the spoils could be kept by the general, but this is often viewed as a sign of indifference to the gods, as in the case of Mezentius who presented his spoils to his son, Lausus.<sup>769</sup> Aeneas kills Lausus shortly after killing his father, and Harrison suggests that the wearing of spoils was thought to be 'bad luck' in the *Aeneid*.<sup>770</sup> For example, Lausus unwittingly becomes a 'living trophy', signifying his father's inversion of the religious norms associated with *spolia opima* and Aeneas' ultimate victory over the Latins and their allies.<sup>771</sup>

According to Harrison, the practice of taking *spolia opima* is likely to have lain dormant until 29 BCE when M. Licinius Crassus attempted to claim *spolia opima* for his defeat of King Deldo of the Bastarnae tribe (Macedonian) in single-combat, but he was thwarted by Octavian who denied Crassus the honours.<sup>772</sup> In the cases of Lausus and Deldo, the armour appears to represent the individuals and their military prowess which, in the Roman world during this period, equated to power. As such, whilst *spolia opima* was the most desired prize for the victorious generals, the taking of an enemy leader's armour indicates a general obsession with armour and weaponry in the Roman world, which was understood by all levels of society.<sup>773</sup> This is significant as armour, in addition to representations of captives, was another way by which the Roman elite could emphasise their dominion over whole nations, with the armour standing for the

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<sup>766</sup> Cf. pp. 49-52.

<sup>767</sup> Camp, et al. 1992: 447.

<sup>768</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 10.421-3, 10.541-2.

<sup>769</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 10.699-703.

<sup>770</sup> Harrison, 1991: 238.

<sup>771</sup> Harrison, 1991: 258.

<sup>772</sup> Dio 51.23.3, cf. Harrison, 1991: 187-8.

<sup>773</sup> Gilliver, 2007: 1-21.

male, military part of the nation. As Flower argues, *spolia opima* developed over the course of time and, particularly during the late Republican and early Imperial period, the tradition was 'reinvented' to suit the tastes and concerns of Romans at the critical period of transition from Republic to principate.<sup>774</sup> This is the case for Augustus' use of the Parthian standards, a trope we shall address later, and we can see that the *spolia opima* transformed from being the rewards from a one-on-one battle between two leaders to becoming the symbol of the Roman leader's defeat of an entire nation,<sup>775</sup> which evidently had implications on how captives were viewed, sometimes replacing the spoils most desired during the Republican period.

As previously stated, the connection between armour, the enemy and Roman victory is emphasised by the Romans' adoption of the Greek trophy (*tropaion*), and its use by the elite from the late 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE onwards.<sup>776</sup> In a Greek context, the *tropaion* was usually a temporary structure, but the Romans later adapted the practice by erecting a permanent *tropaeum*, or a monument with depictions of *tropaea*, in stone or bronze.<sup>777</sup> For instance, Sulla's monument from the Battle of Chaeronea (Boeotia, Greece) in 86 BCE supposedly featured a *tropaeum* inspired by the *tropaion* from the Battle of Marathon [Figure 12].<sup>778</sup> Further connections between armour, victory and the gods were made by Sulla as he dedicated the trophy to Mars, Venus and Victory.<sup>779</sup> Greek trophies were generally dedicated to Zeus, and Sulla's departure from such a tradition demonstrates, as Picard suggests,<sup>780</sup> the founding of the Roman trophy and the beginning of the elite's use of the trophy within iconography. Given the context, Mars and Victory are understandable, but the reference to Venus, Sulla's favourite deity, demonstrates that Sulla was not only closely associating himself with victory, but also utilising a formerly Greek symbol,<sup>781</sup> one which would have been understood by the Boeotians,<sup>782</sup> as a way of showing his *pietas*. Furthermore, Sulla's signet ring featured three *tropaia*, thus further emphasising Sulla's personal connection with the gods.<sup>783</sup> As a result, similarly to the public buildings and monuments erected by the elite, the *tropaeum* acted as a form of political promotion.

Another way by which the Roman elite ensured that the trophy became a Roman symbol, as opposed to a Greek one, was the development of *tropaia* from temporary to permanent. Camp *et al* argue that, in the Roman period, a permanent *tropaeum* was usually found within an architectural setting,<sup>784</sup> and Kinnee's research corroborates

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<sup>774</sup> Flower, 2000: 59.

<sup>775</sup> Flower, 2000: 34-64.

<sup>776</sup> Kinnee suggests that the trophy entered Roman imagery from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE onwards, with Syracuse's coinage. However, Florus, *Epit.* 1.37.5-6, writing of 121 BCE, refers to the Romans' first use of a trophy on the battlefield, *cf.* Kinnee, 2018: 61-2.

<sup>777</sup> Camp, *et al.* 1992: 447-448.

<sup>778</sup> Camp, *et al.* 1992: 443-449.

<sup>779</sup> Pausanias 9.40.7-9.

<sup>780</sup> Picard, 1957: 175-178.

<sup>781</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 68-9.

<sup>782</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 68.

<sup>783</sup> Dio 42.18.3, *cf.* Voelkel, 1948: 404, Camp, *et al.* 1992: 450.

<sup>784</sup> Camp, *et al.* 1992: 447-448.



this, showing that by the time of Augustus, the trophy was frequently depicted on monuments such as the Tropaeum Alpium at La Turbie (southern France) and Augustus' victory monument at Nikopolis (province of Epirus, Greece).<sup>785</sup> As such, the trophy images which appear on coins from 101 BCE onwards,<sup>786</sup> usually accompanied by at least one captive, are unusual in that they represent temporary *tropaea*, such as those which would have been used during a triumph or similar celebrations of Rome's victory. Alternatively, such depictions may have been representative of a permanent *tropaeum*, as Sulla and his son's (Faustus Cornelius Sulla) coinage may have depicted Sulla's trophies [Figures 13 and 14].<sup>787</sup> This is significant in our understanding of representations of captives. Firstly, the physical trophies were recognisable by the people of Rome, given that they appeared on coinage which was spread throughout Italy, and were harnessed as symbols of political power by, as in the case of Faustus Cornelius Sulla, the descendants of those who first erected them. Similarly, Caesar's captive-*tropaeum* coinage, which we shall discuss shortly, may have been connected to Caesar's decision to reinstate Marius' *tropaeum* on the Capitoline Hill in the 40s BCE,<sup>788</sup> in addition to the victories he won in Hispania. Ultimately, this impacts upon our understanding of the representations of captives because, like the trophies which existed in the form of monuments, they are based on real captives which were present within society either in the form of enslaved people or displayed in triumphal processions and games.

We should note that Caesar's use of the captive-*tropaeum* tableau may have served dual purposes, and relate more closely to his political, rather than military, promotion. Marius' Capitoline *tropaeum*, erected shortly after Marius' victories against the Gallic Cimbri and Teutones in 101 BCE, was one of the first, if not the first, to feature a bound captive.<sup>789</sup> Caesar was related to Marius, who was also a great general and prominent statesman, and it is likely he was deliberately emulating and adapting Marius' development of the *tropaeum* to stress their familial connection and similar qualities. The restoration of Marius' *tropaeum* is likely to have taken place during the years of Caesar's dictatorship (from 46 BCE onwards). Significantly, the trophy had initially been demolished by the deeply denigrated Sulla, another relative of Caesar's who once forced him to go on the run.<sup>790</sup> As such, in his own dictatorship, Caesar may have been referencing his connection to Marius' career rather than Sulla's, who was known for reinstating the position of dictator and for the civil conflict which marred his and Marius' careers.

#### **4.11. The Captive-Tropaeum Motif**

The captive-*tropaeum* motif first appears on coinage around the turn of the C1st BCE, and the inclusion of captives appears to be a 'genuine Roman invention', possibly

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<sup>785</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 82-3.

<sup>786</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 78-80.

<sup>787</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 68, 81.

<sup>788</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 6.2, cf. Kinnee, 2018: 80.

<sup>789</sup> Kinnee, 2016: 208-9.

<sup>790</sup> Suet. *Caes.* 1.

based on the appearance of captive individuals in Roman triumphs,<sup>791</sup> as depicted in iconography [Figure 15], including on the frieze from the Temple of Apollo Sosianus [Figure 16], and in literature in Propertius' writings.<sup>792</sup> The panoply is deliberately humanoid in form, but what is remarkable about earlier coinage featuring the captive-*tropaeum* motif is that the captive often forms part of the *tropaeum* by sitting at the feet of the armour. This may have been a stylistic choice of the artist or the commissioner. However, presenting the captive as near the *tropaeum* emphasises the connection between the two, and leads the viewer to the conclusion that the armour once belonged to the male captives who were present in iconography. Similarly, the careful staging of the captives in relation to the *tropaeum* indicates the Romans' conscious effort to create a scene which could be recognised by viewers across the Mediterranean world. The establishment of scenes featuring captives alongside *tropaea*, most evident in triumphal processions, shows that the Roman elite created an image based on a tableau which was utilised within art and sculpture.<sup>793</sup> This is particularly evident on the *tropaeum* from the Tomb of Caecilia Metella [Figure 17], erected c. 25 BCE on the Via Appia, Rome, which includes reliefs featuring the captive-*tropaeum* motif. Roman armour forms the main body of the *tropaeum*, whilst the shields it holds are Gallic in nature, possibly linking to Caecilia's family's involvement in wars against Gallic nations.<sup>794</sup> There is some debate about whether the tomb celebrates the achievements of Caecilia's husband's family, the Licinii Crassi, or those of her own, the Caecilii Metelli.<sup>795</sup> However, as a result of the wars against Gaul during the 1st century BCE, Gallic was shorthand for 'foreign', so the trophy may be celebrating Caecilia's familial connections to victorious generals, particularly those on her paternal side who had defeated Cretan forces.<sup>796</sup> Which family was the focus of the message cannot be ascertained, and it is sufficient to say that the tomb had little to do with Caecilia herself as, even in death, she was used as a means of reflecting the qualities of her male relatives.<sup>797</sup>

Despite the debate surrounding the familial references, the relief outlines the use of the captive-*tropaeum* motif within elite iconography. Firstly, as 'Gallic' was 'short-hand' for 'foreign', this supports the understanding of the Romans' generalisation of captives automatically becoming enslaved people, and the way by which they were broadly defined as non-Roman, despite the many different backgrounds and methods of capture they had experienced. In this instance, it is possible to read the armour, which once belonged to the now defeated Gallic captive underneath, as being of both the Gallic soldier and the Gallic nation from which he hailed. The stripping of armour was commonplace in Roman warfare, and the *tropaeum* may be representative of this act

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<sup>791</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 74.

<sup>792</sup> Prop. 3.4.12-17, cf. Kinnee, 2016: 205, pp. 204-210.

<sup>793</sup> Kinnee stresses that she uses the word tableau to indicate that the scene was 'frozen in time', cf. Kinnee, 2016: 192.

<sup>794</sup> Kinnee, 2016: 192-203, cf. Kinnee, 2018: 74-8.

<sup>795</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 74-8.

<sup>796</sup> Kinnee, 2016: 192-203.

<sup>797</sup> Kinnee, 2016: 192-3. Kinnee suggests that it was usual for the tombs of elite women to reflect the interests of their male relatives.

itself. Therefore, the *tropaea*, as a carefully arranged pile of arms, reminded the viewer of this act which, in turn was symbolic of Rome having stripped the enemy of their defences, particularly as the most important defence, the shields, are held above the captives. The human element of warfare is present in the inclusion of the captives who, now presented under a symbol of Rome's power, are even more vulnerable and wholly without protection. As a result, the *tropaeum* transforms into a symbol of Roman victory over the captive, his nation, and his power which had been taken during his defeat at the hands of Rome. Ultimately, such iconography, on both coinage and architectural monuments, reflected Rome's dominance in contrast to the subjugation of the captive and his nation.

The captive-*tropaeum* motif continues as such throughout Roman history, both in coinage and architecture.<sup>798</sup> However, as Kinnee shows, the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE saw the most development of the motif, with Sulla, Pompey and Caesar each using the trophy for their own personal agenda.<sup>799</sup> Caesar further developed the motif, changing it from a single, male captive to two captives. In the mid-40s BCE, Caesar or his moneyers in Hispania produced an elaborate coinage which placed a male and female captive at the feet of a symmetrical *tropaeum* [Figure 18]. Caesar's name is placed below the motif, leading the viewer to understand that Caesar was responsible for the complete defeat and subjugation of these individuals who represented their whole nation or nations. As with the singular captive-*tropaeum* motif, the viewer recognises that the armour once belonged to the male figure or his comrades. The female, who sits unbound with her head in her hands, is evidently in despair. The Romans would have been accustomed to female figures personifying nations, and the importance of body language.<sup>800</sup> Here, the figure acted as both a personification of the nation, in this case Hispania, in which Caesar had quelled a rebellion in 46 BCE, and a literal captive from the war.

With the dual captive motif, the realities of war and Roman conquest are more obviously displayed than with the motif featuring the solitary captive. As Gaca stresses in her discussion of rape in warfare,<sup>801</sup> female prisoners are important in warfare as they are paramount to a culture's social structure in their family centred roles.<sup>802</sup> Hence, the defeat of the male captive ultimately resulted in the subjugation of the female captive. Children do not need to be present on the coinage as the female would have been associated with the family at large and childrearing. As such, the two captives represent different aspects of an enemy culture, at least as the Romans understood it. The *tropaeum* towering over them ultimately indicates the background of their capture by violence. For instance, RRC 438/1 [Figure 19] suggests that the captives had been taken following a naval conflict, as indicated through the inclusion of anchors and ship prows on the *tropaeum*. Furthermore, the *tropaeum* also acts as a symbol of

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<sup>798</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 74-8.

<sup>799</sup> Kinnee, 2018: 61-74.

<sup>800</sup> Garcia Riazia, 2015: 23-24.

<sup>801</sup> Gaca, 2013: 73-75.

<sup>802</sup> Card, 1996: 7-8.

Roman dominion over the whole nation and its people. Caesar's name underlines the scene, leaving the viewer in no doubt as to who is responsible for the nation's defeat.

In producing this coinage with the dual captive motif, Caesar or his moneyers were ensuring that his reputation across the wider Mediterranean world was that of a conqueror of foreign nations. This built upon Caesar's successful self-representation in his *Gallic Wars*, in which we find references to his ability to defeat enemy nations, including references to different parts of society, i.e. men, women and children, which the image on the coin also stresses. Furthermore, as we shall see in relation to triumphs,<sup>803</sup> depictions of non-Roman figures may have been used to divert attention away from Caesar's campaigns against his fellow Romans during the Civil War. Therefore, this example shows that representations of captive-taking could be used to illuminate key characteristics of a prominent individual which acted as a distraction from less reputable behaviour.

#### 4.12. Captive Iconography in the Provinces

We have discussed the captive-*tropaeum* motif on monuments in Rome and on coinage, but we should now turn to address the impact of captive imagery on monuments in the provinces. During the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, we have literary evidence to suggest that there were monuments erected throughout the Roman provinces which had certainly included *tropaea* and may have featured captives. We have seen evidence of Sulla's use of *tropaea* in the Roman provinces, and there is limited archaeological evidence which has been assumed to belong to Sulla's trophy in Boeotia. Sulla's use of the trophy is interesting as it was intended to be viewed by the provincials, rather than the population of Rome, as the Tomb of Caecilia Metella was certainly intended to do. Literary evidence attests to the erection of these monuments by the Roman elite, such as Pompey's monument in the Pyrenees and Caesar's at Zela, but later monuments are likely to have been commissioned by the provincial elite. Unfortunately, as with the case of Sulla's Boeotian trophy, we have little archaeological evidence to support the literary evidence.

However, by the early Imperial period, primarily during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, there are surviving monuments erected throughout the Roman provinces which show the inclusion of captives alongside armour and *tropaia*. As we have seen in the case of the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias in the previous chapter, we cannot be certain as to who commissioned the monuments in the provinces. The intended message of these pro-Roman monuments has been widely debated. Suffice it to say, it is likely that, if erected by the provincial elite, it was intended to show that the provinces were assimilating with Roman values and ideology, of which warfare was central to society. The inclusion of such iconography and the very fact of its survival, as provincial monuments were not destroyed, suggests that the provincial elite were viewing art from a Roman perspective, and choosing to emulate Roman stylistic choices.<sup>804</sup> Similarly, as Campbell argues, the presence of these monuments within the provinces

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<sup>803</sup> Cf. pp. 174-177.

<sup>804</sup> Ando, 2000: 310-311.

also acted as a warning against those who may have attempted to rebel against Rome and its dominion in the provinces,<sup>805</sup> both inside the Roman province and across the border.<sup>806</sup> However, such warnings were not direct, but took on a more subtle form as the captives who were depicted were not those from the province in which the monument was placed, but from elsewhere.

For instance, the Arch of Carpentras [Figure 20], erected in southern France in 9 BCE, depicts Augustus' victory over the Dalmatians and the Germans during a series of wars between 13-9 BCE.<sup>807</sup> D'Ambra has identified the ethnicity of two captives, presented beneath a *tropaeum*, by considering their native costumes, as the Romans understood them, with the German prisoner wearing fur, and the Dalmatian wearing a hat with earflaps.<sup>808</sup> Whilst there is some debate about the origin of the captives, with Anderson claiming that the captive with the earflaps is Parthian or Armenian, the point is ultimately that the captives were not Gallic in appearance.<sup>809</sup> The provincial viewers, despite the widespread adoption of markers of Roman culture in the area, were of Gallic ethnicity. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the provincial elite, particularly those of Gallic descent, to erect monuments which showed Roman dominion over representations of Gaul. D'Ambra argues that the purpose of the erection of the arch was to celebrate the founding of the Colonia of Julia Meminorum Carpentorate, and it was intended to stress the adoption of Roman cultural markers in the area and demonstrate to the local population that they too could identify with the values of Roman dominion. As D'Ambra summarises: the 'identification with Roman [values] could be acquired through loyalty and the proper course of action and that the distinction between Roman and non-Roman was open to question.'<sup>810</sup> In one respect, such monuments acted as an opportunity for provincials to show and be actively involved in the display and promotion of Roman values, thus creating a sense of identity through the contrast between themselves, as Roman citizens, and the foreign captives. However, whilst creating identity and Romanization are two motivations for the erection of monuments with captive iconography, there may also be more sinister motivations. Namely, it is likely that there was an element of threat in the depictions of the captives, regardless of whether the captives represented identities the viewers could identify with. As such, the tone of such depictions was always sinister in nature, but it depended on how the viewer identified with the values Rome and its allies emphasised throughout Rome and the provinces.

The Arch of Carpentras provides an example of depictions of other ethnicities within a Gallic province which was heavily influenced by Roman culture. However, we should note that the arch is problematic as we cannot ascertain who was responsible for its

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<sup>805</sup> Campbell, 2002: 126.

<sup>806</sup> Ando, 2000: 310.

<sup>807</sup> D'Ambra, 1988: 35-7. The dating has been much debated in scholarship, cf. Anderson, 2013: 78.

<sup>808</sup> D'Ambra, 1988: 35-7.

<sup>809</sup> Anderson, 2012: 78.

<sup>810</sup> D'Ambra, 1988: 37.

construction. As such, we should address another example which features the iconography of enslavement. The monument which was also located in Gaul lies some 286 kilometres from Carpentras. The Tropaeum Alpium [Figure 21], erected on the orders of the senate to commemorate Augustus' campaigns in the region which took place throughout the 30s and 20s BCE, is in La Turbie close to the principality of Monaco. In contrast to the arch of Carpentras which commemorated victories over foreign nations, the Tropaeum Alpium refers directly to the 'Alpine' nations who would have lived within its vicinity or who shared a similar background. Erected in 7/6 BCE,<sup>811</sup> the tropaeum bears an inscription which may be key to our understanding of the intended audience and how the provincial population were intended to respond.

Writing in the century following the *tropaeum's* construction, Pliny records the full inscription present on the monument:

*To the Emperor Caesar, son of the late lamented Augustus [Julius Caesar], Supreme Pontiff, in his fourteenth year of office as Commander-in-chief and seventeenth year of Tribunitial Authority – erected by the Senate and People of Rome, to commemorate that under his leadership and auspices all the Alpine races stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Mediterranean were brought under the dominion of the Roman people. Alpine races conquered – the Triumpilini, Camunni, Venostes, Vennonetes, Isarchi, Breuni, Genaunes, Focunates, four tribes of the Vindelici, the Cosuanetes, Rucinates, Licates, Catenates, Ambisontes, Rugusci, Suanetes, Calucones, Brixentes, Leponti, Uberi, Nantuates, Seduni, Varagri, Salassi, Acitavones, Medulli, Ucenni, Caturiges, Brigiani, Sobionti, Brodionti, Nemaloni, Edenates, Vesubiani, Veamini, Gallitae, Triullati, Ecdini, Vergunni, Eguituri, Nematuri, Oratelli, Nerusi, Velauni, Suetri.<sup>812</sup>*

Crucially, the names of the offending nations are listed. This is useful for Imperial representations as it enabled Augustus to demonstrate his military and political prowess in defeating dozens of nations, whilst not alienating the population who lived in the area. As we have seen in the case of the Tomb of Caecilia Metella, the Romans were happy to use 'Gallic' as an umbrella term which referred to anything foreign, whilst dismissing the complexities of identity with the region. There were multiple nations, each with their own rulers, operating in what became the Roman province of Gaul. In Rome itself, such intricacies were not acknowledged, yet this does not appear to be the case for the provinces, as Augustus carefully lists the enemy nations he conquered, thus demonstrating the range of the geographical area he conquered.<sup>813</sup> By

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<sup>811</sup> Pliny, *NH* 3.20.

<sup>812</sup> Pliny, *NH* 3.20.

<sup>813</sup> Turner, 2013: 299.

naming the nations, Augustus was able to specifically identify his enemies and ensure that other nations in the region did not feel attacked by his raising of a monument which mentioned 'Gauls' in general. In fact, Augustus' naming of specific tribes may have been following the lead of a Gallic leader and Roman ally, Marcus Julius Cottius, son of King Donnus. Dating to the 9/8 BCE, the inscription on the Arch of Augustus at Susa (Segusio) near Turin, erected to commemorate Cottius' renewed alliance with Rome, lists the nations Cottius ruled over and declares that they are allies of Rome.<sup>814</sup> Evidently, Cottius' arch was intended to honour Augustus, further cementing their alliance, and emphasise Cottius' own power in the region. Despite operating in a region close to the Tropaeum Alpium, only six of nations that Cottius listed correspond to those defeated by Augustus in battle: the Caturges, the Vesubianii, the Medulii, the Adanates, the Ecdinii, and the Veaminii.<sup>815</sup> Here, we see that the arch gives Cottius the opportunity to boast of the extension of his power, through contact with Rome,<sup>816</sup> to include these six tribes, whilst Augustus lists them regardless as they had, throughout his campaigns, been defeated by Roman forces. As a result, whilst clearly intended to have multiple messages, the deliberate naming of specific nations was crucial to ensuring that Rome's message of dominion, which we shall discuss shortly, kept the local population on side by exploiting the differences between nations within the Gaul.

The complete submission of the nations listed on the inscription is evident in the captive-tropaeum relief which adorned one side of the monument. The composition of the tableau is like the scenes on Caesar's coinage: with a singular female figure sat despondently on one side of a tropaeum whilst a male captive is bound on the other. Unusually for depictions of captive women, the female is fully clothed and chained, rather than appearing with her head in her hands, as we have seen in examples like the Gemma Augustea.<sup>817</sup> The female is sexualised as her breast is exposed, which has connections to both Amazonian images but also, as I have argued previously, to sexual assault.<sup>818</sup> The female figure looks towards the male who looks to the ground, in a manner which conveys utter defeat. They are both of a diminutive size compared to the tree tropaeum which looms over them and which bears a host of oversized armour. Their small size suggests that they have been utterly overwhelmed by Rome's power, as symbolised by the towering *tropaea*. Given that this relief was viewed by a provincial audience, it suggests that the violent nature of captive-taking and subsequent enslavement was widely accepted as a feature of warfare. The success of the trophy rested on the listing of names and the identification of the enemies in question. Despite the Romans' attitude towards Gaul, the monument seemingly shows that not *all* Gauls were Rome's enemies, thus enabling the senate to play on the 'us vs. them' rhetoric which is evident in the inscriptions on both Augustus' *tropaeum* and Cottius' arch. Whilst this rhetoric was evidently in place, that is not to suggest that there was no underlying threat within the iconography. Those who lived near the monument would

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<sup>814</sup> *CIL* V, 7231= *AE* 2004 = *ILS* 94

<sup>815</sup> Roncaglia, 2013: 358-9.

<sup>816</sup> Cornwell, 2015: 42-43.

<sup>817</sup> *Cf.* pp. 84-89,

<sup>818</sup> Ramsby, Severy-Hoven, 2007: 57.

have been reminded on a daily basis of the consequences should they rebel against Roman power, thus it was safer to forge alliances with Rome, as Cottius had, for the benefit of the provincial community.

The success of Roman captive iconography in the provinces is evident in depictions of captives which were found within non-elite households. Around 16 bound captive figurines have been found across Britain and Germany [Figures 22 and 23], and date from the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries CE. Granted, the period they originate from it is beyond the scope of this thesis, but we need to acknowledge that Britain and large parts of Germany were not under Roman dominion until after the period in question, and even after this period large parts of both areas remained outside of Roman control. As such, the figurines indicate the impact of widescale warfare on the local population and the goods they produced. Jackson suggests the bronze figures, which were secured onto unknown objects, may have been used as decoration for some aspect of the slave trade in the regions.<sup>819</sup> Unfortunately, we cannot ascertain their exact usage, and they do not bear the hallmarks of bound figurines like the so-called 'Louvre Voodoo Doll' which were used in magical practice.<sup>820</sup> However, the fact that such figurines are clearly recognisable as bound figures would suggest that the symbolism we seen in the iconography of the Late Republic and early Principate was widespread and enduring enough to be adapted for non-elite slave traders, if they were intended for decorative use in the slave trade, and their clients.

#### **4.13. Chapter Conclusion**

Slavery was central to the Romans' understanding of the power dynamics within their culture, be it in their language, literature, historical representations or within their economy and households. Captives who were enslaved acted as symbols of Rome's dominance over the provinces and their right to utilise captives as they wished. This essentially ensured the continuation of the Roman empire, as violence could be justified if the Roman elite perpetuated the myth that those they captured were inferior to themselves. However, despite the Roman elite's representations of captives as 'inferior' beings, captives and enslaved persons were essential to the Roman economy and the rhetoric developed by the elite to maintain their power. This is attested to most pointedly within artwork and iconography commissioned by the elite, which was successfully adopted within non-elite material culture as evident from the series of figurines discovered across northern Europe.

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<sup>819</sup> Jackson, 2005: 143-156.

<sup>820</sup> Ogden, 2009: 251.



## Chapter Five - 'Hostages' in War and 'Peace'

### 5.1. Introduction

In the previous three chapters, we have encountered the Romans' treatment of captives in their power, namely: massacre, sexual violence and enslavement. However, when faced with the prospect of these outcomes, there were several ways by which the Romans and the nations they interacted with could avoid further or open warfare. The ways to avoid conflict included: a show of force, hostage-taking in both diplomatic relations before or after a war, and the taking of prisoners akin to hostages outside of formal negotiations during warfare. To address each one in turn: military action, as we have seen in the previous chapters, usually involved massacre followed by looting, and the rape and enslavement of women and young children. Hostages could then be demanded during subsequent negotiations as part of Rome's standard negotiating practices.<sup>821</sup> Hostages were then used as symbols of a nation's compliance or peace with Rome. However, violence and demands for hostages need not be directed at the enemy but could also be conducted against neighbours of Rome's enemies, thus acting as a warning to other nations of the dangers of challenging Rome. Despite not being directly threatened with war, as asking for hostages was a form of threat, such nations would then be more inclined to supply Rome with hostages, as both assurances and symbols of peace. The hostages, as symbols of submission, further enabled the Romans to exert their dominance over the nations in question without having to engage in military conflict. This relationship between military force and subsequent negotiations became an unrelenting cycle which spiralled out from Rome with the expansion of the empire. Word of Rome's aggression would spread,<sup>822</sup> and Rome's enemies would have the choice between treating with Rome, which may have involved the surrender of hostages, or risking defeat and, as we have seen, its horrific consequences.

### 5.2. Defining Hostages

Before proceeding any further, we need to redefine our understanding of 'hostage', primarily as the word has modern implications which do not reflect the use of hostages in the ancient world. As we saw in the introduction, in Greco-Roman writings, hostages are referred to using the terms *obses* and *homeros* (ὄμηρος), both words which can be translated as either 'hostage' or 'surety pledge'.<sup>823</sup> As Allen outlines, scholarship has largely focussed on those referred to using the aforementioned terms, and those linked to treaties and negotiations,<sup>824</sup> which means that other examples, where the language does not directly reflect an individual's 'hostage' status, have not been discussed.<sup>825</sup> As a result, there are individuals whose treatment was comparable to that

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<sup>821</sup> Moscovich, 1979: 122.

<sup>822</sup> As we have seen in relation to the Gallic and British tribes offering warnings to one another of Caesar's approach, *cf.* pp. 35-42, 54-59, 81-84.

<sup>823</sup> OLD, 1222: *obses*, LSJ, 1221: ὄμηρος.

<sup>824</sup> For instance, *foedus aequum*, *foedus iniquum*, *deditio*, *cf.* Allen, 2006: 16.

<sup>825</sup> Allen's monograph on hostage-taking in the Roman world is highly detailed and has proved invaluable to this thesis. However, Allen omits certain types of hostages, including those taken in warfare, e.g. Dumnorix, who we shall discuss shortly.

of an explicitly labelled 'hostage' in Greek and Latin, but may be described using alternative terms for a variety of reasons which shall be addressed where appropriate. This is evident in the language used by Augustus in his *Res Gestae* when discussing the Parthian 'hostages' sent to him by King Phraates IV in 10/9 BCE,<sup>826</sup> in comparison to that of later authors.

In his *Res Gestae*, Augustus boasts of how Phraates sent his four sons along with their wives and children to Rome as a way of demonstrating his friendship to Rome. Augustus claims that this was done 'not because [Phraates] had been conquered in war, but rather seeking our friendship by means of his own children as pledges' (*non bello superatus, sed amicitiam nostram per (liberorum) suorum pignora petens*).<sup>827</sup> Whilst Gregoratti argues that 'Imperial propaganda did not miss out on the opportunity to make the gesture of the Great King pass as an explicit admission of Roman superiority',<sup>828</sup> that is not to suggest that Augustus' assessment of the situation was not carefully constructed and perhaps more subtly presented than in the works of later authors. Augustus refers to the 'friendship' as *amicitia*, a word which translates in this instance more closely to 'alliance' than 'friendship' in the modern sense of the word.<sup>829</sup> Burton demonstrates that the term was commonly used in foreign affairs throughout the mid-Republic to indicate that an informal treaty had been established, and this practice was harnessed by Augustus in his description of his relationships with other nations.<sup>830</sup> Badian has suggested that the Romans used the term to allow foreign nations to feel as though they were on equal footing.<sup>831</sup> However, as Lee points out, in this respect, nations were only equal if both parties consented to give hostages to one another.<sup>832</sup> By this time in Roman history, Roman hostage-giving was an archaic practice, as the balance of power in the Roman-Parthian relationship was in the Romans' favour. Nevertheless, as Augustus casts the relationship as a 'friendly' one, with Phraates volunteering his sons, Augustus does not use the word *obses*, but rather refers to Phraates' four sons and their families as *pignora* (*pignus*) and translated in the Greek version as ἐνέχυρον. In Latin, *pignus* translates as 'anything given as security for (a debt, bond, good conduct)', and 'a pledge, surety or hostage.'<sup>833</sup> Therefore, it was clearly understood that they were tokens or symbols of Phraates' cooperation with Augustus, and the Parthians were hostages in all but name. Furthermore, other sources refer to Phraates' sons as hostages (*obses* and ὄμηρος), rather than using the aforementioned terms, including two of Augustus' close contemporaries, Strabo and

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<sup>826</sup> We shall discuss Augustus' Parthian hostages in greater detail in the latter part of the chapter.

<sup>827</sup> Aug. RG 32.

<sup>828</sup> Gregoratti, 2011: 732.

<sup>829</sup> Aug. RG 1.32. In the context of international relations but, as Burton suggests, it is likely that the Romans understood the word to also mean a close personal bond, cf. Burton, 2003: 333-335, Burton, 2011: 2-6, Snowden, 2015: 209-12, Tiersch, 2015: 248-260.

<sup>830</sup> Burton, 2003: 333-335.

<sup>831</sup> Badian, 1958: 6-7.

<sup>832</sup> Lee, 1991: 366-374.

<sup>833</sup> OLD, 1379: *pignus*. In Greek, the definition is more straightforward, more commonly denoting a financial 'surety' or 'pledge', cf. LSJ, 565: ἐνέχυράζω.

Velleius Paterculus.<sup>834</sup> This suggests that, despite Augustus' terminology, it was widely understood, even during Augustus' reign, that the sons were hostages with a status akin to those labelled explicitly as *obses* or *homeros*. The connections between the words *pignora* (*pignus*) and ἐνέχυρον, and those which translate as 'hostage', indicate that hostages were thought of differently from other captives. This essentially centred around the fact that hostages, even those referred to using more vague terms, were seen as being symbolic of peace towards Rome. Nevertheless, Augustus' deliberate avoidance of *obses* or *homeros* suggests that hostage-taking was understood to be an action which involved the threat of force, which was certainly not in line with Phraates' volunteering his sons and his 'friendly' alliance with Augustus.

This example demonstrates several issues with studying hostages, and enables us to create a broader definition of a hostage than previous scholarship, which has focussed on linguistic definitions, has allowed. Firstly, as Phraates' sons were accompanied by their families, hostages could be men, women and children, although males were more valuable given that the Romans operated within the staunchly patriarchal societies of the ancient Mediterranean world. Secondly, individuals had to belong to the upper ranks of a nation's society, as they were more valuable to the members of the ruling classes and were often members of a leader's family. Thirdly, individuals could be taken through non-violent means, although we shall encounter examples of violence throughout this chapter; that is not to suggest that a threat of violence was not present. Fourthly, despite the use of language within elite self-representation, individuals were still identifiable as hostages through the treatment they received at the hands of their keepers. As we have seen, Augustus was careful in his presentation of the Parthian 'hostages', although his close contemporaries recognised that,<sup>835</sup> despite Augustus' own language, the Parthians were ultimately hostages. Here, we can see that the line between captives and hostages was blurred in the Roman world, and the position and treatment of hostages within society rested on their social position, whether they were still valued by their home nation, and what they are called in later representations. As such, the language I use throughout this chapter reflects the undefined nature of hostage-taking, and the blurred lines between captives and hostages. For instance, whilst I use the terms 'hostages', I have also acknowledged the fact that they were, whether presented as 'voluntarily' in Roman hands or not, ultimately 'captives' in the 'custody' of Roman 'keepers' who had little choice in their position. That being said, as we shall explore throughout this chapter, the Romans' treatment of their 'hostages' differed greatly from those deemed to be captives.

Finally, from the example of Augustus' Parthian hostages, we can see how hostage-taking was generally presented by Greco-Roman authors as being mutually beneficial. This has led the study of hostage-taking to focus on the position of hostages in custody in Rome, and their subsequent use as client kings.<sup>836</sup> The use of hostages as client kings

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<sup>834</sup> Strabo, *Geog.* 16.1.28, Joseph. *Ant. Iud.* 18.42, Tac. *Ann.* 2.1, Vell. Pat. 2.94.

<sup>835</sup> Strabo, *Geog.* 16.1.28, Vell. Pat. 2.94.

<sup>836</sup> We shall discuss client kings in the latter half of the chapter, cf. Richardson, 1976: 13-15, Braund, 1984: 1-13, Rogan, 2011: 73-76, Mattingly, 2011: 79-85.

should be acknowledged before we proceed any further, as the treatment of individuals in Roman custody, whether labelled as hostage or otherwise, relates to the Romans' plans for the future use of hostages. In theory, kings who had 'volunteered' their children were able to place their offspring close to the centre of Roman power, thus supposedly enabling the children to represent their parents' interests through their connections to the Roman elite. In turn, the Romans also benefitted politically from this arrangement and in their later representations of hostage-taking, and the practice became a central component of their 'puppet ruler' or 'client king' model across the empire. Elite hostages, usually held by members of the Roman elite in Rome itself, were singled out to return to their nations as rulers and, as a result, were well-educated and introduced to Roman culture and language. The indoctrination of hostages into Roman culture meant that the hostages acted as a means of cultural exchange between Rome and the hostage's nation. As such, the cultural and linguistic education which hostages underwent, including their immersion in Roman values and ideals, ensured that the future rulers of Rome's provinces and allied nations were loyal to Rome without force having to be exerted. As a result of the focus on former hostages who became 'client kings' within Greco-Roman literature, we often miss the opportunity to discuss what came before the 'voluntary' surrender of high-status hostages, who may have become client kings, and also how those of a less elite status were used.

Following the overall structure of this work in attempting to follow a captive's journey chronologically, I will consider representations of hostages by focussing on the circumstances in which they were apprehended. There were hostages who were taken in large numbers during warfare who could be used as collateral over their nations who had, by this stage, submitted to Rome. As we shall see in the case of Caesar's hostage-taking, many of them were probably returned to their families once an alliance had been secured and the threat to Rome had been neutralised. Others were taken following the conclusion of war and were used during negotiations following a nation's surrender. The latter two hostage types are discussed in the first half of this chapter which deals with wartime hostage-taking. The other category of hostage was those who, after their nations had surrendered, were taken to Rome to be 'educated' in Roman values, language and culture with the view of creating 'pro-Roman rulers'. The latter half of the chapter concerns their lives and Rome's representation of their treatment at the hands of their 'keepers'.

### **5.3. Hostages in Warfare: The *Exemplum* of Scipio Africanus at New Carthage**

Before considering the realities and representations of hostage-taking during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, we should consider the expectations of hostage-taking in line with the 'rules of war'. To do this, we need to return to an *exemplum* we have encountered in the chapter of sexual violence: Scipio Africanus at New Carthage.<sup>837</sup> To briefly recap: In 209 BCE, Scipio took New Carthage (Cartagena in present-day Spain) and found that the

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<sup>837</sup> Cf. pp. 75-78.

Carthaginians had taken female hostages from a number of Iberian nations.<sup>838</sup> Scipio summoned the hostages' families and protected them until they were collected, although it appears that one of their guards had made unwanted sexual advances which Scipio addressed once the issue was raised with him. This example is significant as it shows the unwritten honour code between hostages and their keepers, highlights how the treatment of hostages could ultimately be used to promote an individual's characteristics, and also conveys the fluidity of a person's status between captive and hostage as Polybius alternates between calling the women hostages and captives.<sup>839</sup>

For this *exemplum*, the most important issue is that the hostages in question had been taken by Carthage, not by Rome. As such, neither Roman law, which could be used to prosecute sexual violence against Roman women, nor the 'rules of war' which protected hostages from harm, applied to the Iberian hostages.<sup>840</sup> Therefore, Scipio was not required by propriety to protect the hostages from the unpleasant treatment captives could be subjected to as was the Romans' right of war.<sup>841</sup> The hostages were effectively elite prisoners of war as they had not been taken hostage by the Romans but by the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, the Iberian women continued to be treated like hostages by Scipio. It should be remembered that the terms of surrender were ultimately decided by the conqueror.<sup>842</sup> Therefore, it was at Scipio's discretion that he chose to preserve the status of Carthage's hostages and treated them as he would hostages taken by Romans. This enables Polybius to present Scipio's moderation and restraint in relation to female hostages, and the general's magnanimity and political vision in deciding to return *obsides*.<sup>843</sup> Furthermore, later authors could present Scipio as upholding honour codes relating to hostages despite not having made the agreement.<sup>844</sup> Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the Romans had no legal hold over the hostages, given that the treaty was between Carthage and the Iberian tribes, so it is likely that releasing the hostages was the only way to proceed.<sup>845</sup> However, the retelling of the story centred on presenting Scipio as a fair general and it is clear that the relationship between the captives and hostages depended entirely upon the general's disposition towards those in Roman custody and the nations they represented. As such, the 'rules of war' were malleable and Roman generals were able to present their dealings with hostages in a way which was beneficial to their careers, as we shall see throughout Caesar's writings on the subject.

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<sup>838</sup> Polyb. 10.18-19.

<sup>839</sup> Polybius calls the Iberian women hostages (ὄμηροι) but refers to a female brought before him for sexual purposes as a captive (αἰχμάλωτον), despite her high status in New Carthaginian society, *cf.* Polyb. 10.18-19. For further discussion on the different categories in Polybius' description, *cf.* Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34.

<sup>840</sup> Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34.

<sup>841</sup> *Cf.* pp. 75-78.

<sup>842</sup> Sanz, 2015: 87-105, *cf.* pp. 27-35.

<sup>843</sup> Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34.

<sup>844</sup> For a discussion of the protection of hostages in religion, rather than the rules of war, *cf.* Allen, 2006: 93-4.

<sup>845</sup> Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34.

#### 5.4. Caesar's Wartime Hostage-taking

Firstly, let us address hostage-taking in warfare and consider both the symbolic and practical uses of hostages during their initial stint in Roman custody. Elbern argues that Roman leaders chose to take a small number of hostages as, after battle or siege warfare, it was more practical to keep track of a group of individuals who could influence the enemy nation and its leaders, rather than be concerned about collecting an enemy's resources, including weaponry.<sup>846</sup> This may account for why the Romans tended to take hostages before requesting arms as hostages were considered to be more of a deterrent against uprisings.<sup>847</sup> However, that is not to suggest that hostage-taking in warfare was always presented as being purely practical. As we have seen throughout this thesis, Caesar is our most important source on Roman military conduct in warfare,<sup>848</sup> and we also have evidence of other generals involved in the Gallic Wars following similar practices to Caesar himself.<sup>849</sup> With reference to other accounts of hostage-taking,<sup>850</sup> it is possible to argue that Caesar's actions are typical of Roman warfare. Caesar claims to have taken hundreds of hostages,<sup>851</sup> which he refers to as *obsides* in his *Gallic Wars*. The number of hostages is telling of the importance of hostage-taking in warfare and acts as another way by which Caesar could subtly boast of his military and diplomatic competence.<sup>852</sup> For instance, Caesar allegedly demanded 600 hostages from the Aedui in c. 57 BCE, yet it is unlikely that 600 elite individuals could have been taken without completely removing the upper echelons of Gallic society: those with whom Caesar could treat. It can be argued that Caesar recognised the importance of hostages in Roman diplomatic relations and, by using a high figure, he was able to convey his achievement in subjugating the Aedui's population, as the most important individuals were in his custody. On this note, as Allen argues: 'Caesar's commentaries with their records of the unflappable detention of hostages were meant to persuade the Roman at home that his grip on Gaul, and even Britain, was secure.'<sup>853</sup> As a result, regardless of the realities, representations of hostage-taking reveal more about the person involved in the practice than the realities.

The figures Caesar provides in relation to his hostage-taking are considerably smaller than the numbers he claimed to have taken as captives during the Gallic Wars.<sup>854</sup> The numbers of hostages taken may be explained by hostages being closely linked to those

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<sup>846</sup> Elbern, 1990: 98-100.

<sup>847</sup> Vervaeet, Naco Del Hoyo, 2007: 21-46.

<sup>848</sup> Cf. pp. 45, 49-55.

<sup>849</sup> The supposed author of the *Gallic Wars*, Hirtius, references Caesar's general Fabius securing hostages from several states (Caes. *BGall.* 8.27).

<sup>850</sup> For instance, Pompey's hostage-taking during his wars in the East, cf. App. *Mith.* 103, 117, Cass. Dio. 37.2.5-7, Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.5. For an overview of other individuals and their hostage-taking practices, cf. Allen, 2006: 10-13.

<sup>851</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.15, 5.4, 5.20, 7.11. He demands an unspecified but large number of hostages from the Morini, cf. Caes. *BGall.* 4.22, and from the Avernii at 7.89-90.

<sup>852</sup> Allen, 2006: 250.

<sup>853</sup> Allen, 2006: 250.

<sup>854</sup> Cf. pp. 98-111.

in power.<sup>855</sup> As such, hostages were considered more valuable, in a political or diplomatic sense, than other captives who could be sold into slavery,<sup>856</sup> and there can be little doubt that the threat posed to such hostages would be more effective in curbing any possible rebellion against Rome, than the threat to many less politically valuable victims. Overall, it is possible that in cases where large-scale hostage-taking is found, the hostages were taken as part of peace treaties and subsequently released once an enemy's co-operation was ensured, with only the children of the leaders being retained by Caesar, as we shall discuss in the section on hostages in Rome. As a case in point, Caesar does not refer to the release of hostages at any point during his commentaries on the Gallic Wars. However, we know that other generals retained only elite hostages and Caesar certainly did the same, as evident in his decision to keep the infant Juba II.<sup>857</sup>

As we shall see in the following chapter, the triumph was intended to highlight the achievements of a Roman general and the procession was staged for maximum impact, from the triumphator's costume to the presentation of the lands he had conquered which often included the use of living people as personifications. Similarly, with hostage-taking we can see how the character and position of a leader or a nation could also be stressed in the writings of Greco-Roman authors by their engagement with hostage-taking. This has ramifications on what we know of Caesar's claims, and it is therefore sensible to assume that Caesar was exaggerating the numbers, as a mass of hostages would have caused logistical problems in terms of supplies and manpower, and this may have been a consideration for Caesar whilst he was on the move.<sup>858</sup> Such financial and logistical considerations may explain why, during his campaign against the Belgae in 52 BCE, Caesar chose to take hostages rather than prisoners as less manpower would be needed to guard a smaller number of high-profile individuals, particularly during a crucial stage in his campaign. The importance of these hostages is clear as Caesar had defeated the towns of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum (Neung-sur-Beuvron, near Orléans), which would have offered the possibility of taking thousands of prisoners who could be sold into slavery for financial gain.<sup>859</sup> Caesar's hostage-taking at this late stage in the war may have been motivated by his recognition that the Gallic alliance was losing, and that hostages would be more pertinent for the negotiations following the Gauls' defeat. In addition, Caesar kept the hostages at Noviodunum, which was an opportunity to personally influence the hostages, which may have proved useful in the negotiations after the Gallic alliance's defeat. That Caesar chose not to send the hostages to Rome suggests that he was concerned about

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<sup>855</sup> Allen, 2006: 3-4. In contrast to the maximum figure of 600 hostages Caesar claims to have taken during the Gallic Wars, Caesar asserts that he captured 53,000 captives in another instance, *cf.* Caes. *BGall.* 2.33.

<sup>856</sup> Cic. *Att.* 5.20.5, Paus. 7.16.7-8, App. *Iber.* 98.

<sup>857</sup> As we shall discuss later in the chapter.

<sup>858</sup> This also appears to be the case for Crassus, as he quickly turned from attacking the Sotiates, to attack the Vocates and the Tarusates. Logistically, Crassus needed to travel light to be able to move swiftly to new targets, *cf.* Caes. *BGall.* 3.23.

<sup>859</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.11-7.12.

the influence which could be exerted over them by members of the Roman elite,<sup>860</sup> particularly as Caesar would have had knowledge of Clodius' manipulation of Pompey's hostage Tigranes in 66 BCE,<sup>861</sup> as we shall discuss shortly. However, the comparatively more 'humane' treatment of hostages, in contrast to their executed or enslaved counterparts, highlights how the treatment of captives could be used to illuminate a Roman leader's qualities, a factor which will become apparent throughout this chapter.

### 5.5. The Practicalities of Wartime Hostage-taking

For the Romans, there were numerous practical advantages to hostage-taking, and Caesar presented hostage-taking as symbolic of a nation's willingness to assist with his campaign.<sup>862</sup> In turn, the provision of hostages acted as evidence of a nation's goodwill towards Rome, which could be parlayed into friendly or favourable relationships in later dealings with Rome and the senate.<sup>863</sup> Should a nation delay in presenting hostages, they could be threatened with or subjected to further military action.<sup>864</sup> That is not to suggest that all nations gave hostages and pledged their allegiance to Caesar willingly, and there is an element of violence in Caesar's hostage-taking. The danger to hostages is evident in an exchange between Caesar and Indutiomarus of the Treveri, a former enemy of Rome. Indutiomarus submitted to Caesar in 54 BCE and agreed to hand over 200 Treveran hostages, including his own son. Caesar is presented as using a thinly veiled threat against the hostages to remind Indutiomarus of his submission to Rome. In a dialogue in the *Gallic Wars*, Caesar promised that Indutiomarus' relatives would be safe but immediately reminded Indutiomarus to remain loyal to Rome.<sup>865</sup> Whilst Caesar does not make an explicit threat, in comparison to the direct threats he issues to Segni and Condrusi prisoners,<sup>866</sup> an 'or else' is implicit in this exchange, and unspoken threats must have been commonplace in Caesar's hostage-taking.

Such implicit threats may have enabled the Romans to ensure hostages remained in custody, as the hostages' families would be less inclined to make a move if their loved ones were at risk. Interestingly, there are no recorded cases of individuals' families breaking them out of Roman custody but, as we shall see shortly, third parties who wanted to use the hostages for their own agenda occasionally took hostages through physical or political force. The fact that no families attempted to rescue their kin suggests that threats such as Caesar's were successful, as family members would not have wished to place their loved ones at risk even though the Romans' past practices showed that hostages were not physically harmed. However, there is a first time for everything, and this may have factored into the families' concerns for the hostages.

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<sup>860</sup> Elbern, 1990: 111.

<sup>861</sup> Asc. 47, Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

<sup>862</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.6. Caesar's lieutenant-generals also used murder of people and destruction of land as a way of forcing alliances, cf. Labienus and the Treveri at 6.8, and Lucterius and the Ruteni at 7.7.

<sup>863</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.36, 6.9.

<sup>864</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.27-30, 36, 5.1.

<sup>865</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.4.

<sup>866</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.32.



Nevertheless, the threat against hostages enabled Caesar to reduce the manpower and resources necessary to protect the vast numbers of hostages Caesar claimed to have taken. On this note, it is useful to address the logistics of hostage-taking, as evident following the capture of Noviodunum in 52 BCE. The capture of the fortified town appears to have been something of a turning point in Caesar's hostage-taking, as Caesar decided to leave the hostages gathered throughout his Gallic campaigns (*obsides Galliae*) in the city as he moved forward.<sup>867</sup>

*So they [Eporedorix and Viridomarus] put to the sword the troops on guard at Noviodunum and the traders who had gathered there, and divided the money and the horses between them; they caused the hostages of the states to be conducted to the magistrate at Bibracte. As they judged that they could not hold the town they set it on fire, that it might be of no service to the Romans; all the corn that they could handle at once they removed in boats, the rest they spoilt with fire and river-water.*<sup>868</sup>

Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt; obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum deducendos curaverunt; oppidum, quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset usui Romanis, incenderunt; frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, reliquum flumine atque incendio corruerunt.

Here, we see an example of the fluidity between the treatment of captives and hostages, as Caesar writes of the precious resources which were also kept with the hostages, including: the corn, the state chest, and Caesar and the army's baggage. As the hostages are presented in the same list, it is likely that the hostages were also guarded alongside the items, which would have resulted in a slight loss of manpower. However, that the hostages are listed alongside these items and were under guard suggests that they were viewed as valuable, but were, like their captive counterparts, seen as commodities which needed to be protected. As such, they were important only in that they could serve some use to Caesar in his campaigns and their usefulness could also be manipulated by Caesar's enemies.

As it transpired, Caesar's decision to leave the hostages behind proved to be a mistake, as in the latter part of the war they were 'freed' by two Aeduans, Eporedorix and Viridomarus. The two men led a small force to Noviodunum where they killed the Roman guards and kept the hostages.<sup>869</sup> Later, it appears that the hostages were used by the two Aeduans to gain support of the hostages' nations, including through the use of torture.<sup>870</sup> Caesar's reference to torture may have been intended as a distraction from the fact that Caesar had lost the hostages by not guarding them appropriately,

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<sup>867</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.55.

<sup>868</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.55. Translation by Edwards, 1917.

<sup>869</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.55.

<sup>870</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.63. Caesar had also criticised Vercingetorix for using torture against Roman soldiers. The practice was supposedly a solely foreign trait, as Caesar fails to mention any torture carried out by the Romans, *cf.* Caes. *BGall.* 7.20. However, we know from the chapter on the rules of war that prisoner abuse was commonplace in the Roman world, on all sides, *cf.* pp. 27-35.

something which could be considered a failing on his part. Whilst Caesar makes no mention of the conditions the hostages are in under Roman care, it is evident that he wants his readers to believe their situation was graver still whilst in the custody of Eporodorix and Viridomarus. Furthermore, unlike Scipio's idealised actions at New Carthage in which he honoured the hostages' protected status, the two Aeduans had broken the 'rules of war' by taking and physically harming hostages who had been 'given' to the Romans. By interfering with the process of hostage-taking, the two Aeduans were guilty of manipulating hostages, thus violating the conditions agreed upon by Caesar and the nations from where the hostages originated. This closely links to one of the ways by which the representation of hostages taken by foreign enemies could be used by the Roman elite to promote their own agenda and justify violence against supposed enemy nations.

Caesar presents hostage-taking as frequent amongst foreign nations, thus stressing that his actions were in keeping with the so-called 'rules of war' we have encountered throughout this thesis.<sup>871</sup> However, it could also be the cause of resentment amongst foreign nations, particularly as there is the implication that the hostages were taken by force, or under threat of it.<sup>872</sup> As we have seen, hostage-taking was only necessary because of the threat of force, and it was then maintained by such a threat. Cases of captive-taking between non-Roman nations, and Rome's interference in the process, highlight how the treatment of captives by Rome's enemies could be utilised to illuminate qualities of the enemy which could then be used to justify Roman aggression. Evidently, in actuality, Rome's recovery of hostages on behalf of allied nations was intended to inspire loyalty and cement alliances which could be used in the long-term,<sup>873</sup> both for military intelligence and assistance in battle.<sup>874</sup> As such, the Roman elite hailed the recovery of hostages on behalf of their allies as a victory, and in this respect the hostages inadvertently acted as symbols of Rome's authority over foreign nations.<sup>875</sup> However, the refusal by Rome's enemies to relinquish their hostages, including those taken from other tribes, or treat with Rome, was used as evidence to justify Rome's subsequent attacks on them. This is the case for the Germanic leader Ariovistus of the Suebi whose invasion of Gaul and Caesar's reaction to it dominates the first book of Caesar's *Gallic Wars*.

In 58 BCE, Caesar was asked by the Aedui to assist in the recovery of Aeduan hostages from Ariovistus, many of whom were children.<sup>876</sup> It is unclear when the Aeduan

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<sup>871</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.9, 1.31, 1.35, 2.1, 3.2, 3.23, 5.55, 6.2, 6.12, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7, 7.64. Caesar (Caes. *BGall.* 4.27) claims that the Gauls offered hostages within their peace terms, suggesting that it was an understood practice.

<sup>872</sup> One example is found when Caesar assisted Ambiorix in the return of his relatives (Dio 38.34.1-2), and the appeal from other tribes when Ambiorix took hostages of his own (Caes. *BGall.* 5.27). Caesar also assisted in recovering other hostages at: Caes. *BGall.* 1.31-35.

<sup>873</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.54 in which Caesar reminds the Aedui of their debt to him for recovering their hostages.

<sup>874</sup> For tribes supplying intelligence, see: Caes. *BGall.* 2.3-2.4, 4.27-30, 36, 5.1, 5.21, 6.29.

<sup>875</sup> Garcia Riazia, 2015: 23-24.

<sup>876</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.31-35.

hostages were taken by the Suebi, although one of Cicero's letters from 60 BCE relates the defeat of the Aedui by an alliance of Germanic nations, so it is possible that the hostages had been in Ariovistus' custody for at least two years by the time of Caesar's intervention.<sup>877</sup> In this case, Caesar uses Ariovistus' hostage-taking as a means of justifying war against the Suebi and their Germanic allies. As Vasaly argues,<sup>878</sup> Caesar goes to great lengths to emphasise his 'reflection' on the events at hand whilst still retaining his detached third person persona,<sup>879</sup> particularly with regards to his decision to go to war. In his commentaries, Caesar claims that one of his primary reasons for going to war was the need to recover the Aeduan hostages as they were friends of Rome.<sup>880</sup> Thus, Caesar cleverly suggests that Rome's reputation was at stake should the hostages not be recovered, as they could not ensure that Rome's allies were protected from maltreatment. Vasaly suggests that this shows Caesar was aware of how he presented himself to his elite audience, particularly in his defence of Rome and her allies from the singular tyranny of Ariovistus.<sup>881</sup> This was all the more important considering that Caesar's consulship of 59 BCE bore the hallmarks of tyranny,<sup>882</sup> and Caesar wished to distance himself from the image of a tyrant by defending others against that which he was accused of. As such, in the face of the Roman elite's discomfort with Caesar's command during the first years of his campaigns, it was important for Caesar to ensure that they remained in support of his military manoeuvres.

A further contrast is created by Ariovistus' treatment of his captives, and Caesar's reaction to his behaviour. Caesar's concerns with Ariovistus' taking of child-hostages appears to contradict his own hostage-taking practices,<sup>883</sup> as Caesar certainly took children as hostages.<sup>884</sup> However, Ariovistus supposedly tortured the hostages,<sup>885</sup> and the Aedui's leader further suggested that their children, who had been taken as hostages, would be punished if Ariovistus discovered that the Aeduians were speaking to Caesar.<sup>886</sup> This provides further evidence of Ariovistus' 'cruel tyranny' in contrast with Caesar's comparably reasonable actions in relation to his hostages. As a result, representations of hostage-taking during warfare, like other practices we have seen throughout this thesis,<sup>887</sup> were used to create a contrast between Rome's enemies' actions in warfare and Roman idealised behaviour in war, which had a further impact on representations of the character and behaviours of leading figures.

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<sup>877</sup> Cic. *Att.* 1.19

<sup>878</sup> Vasaly, 2009: 250-251.

<sup>879</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.33.

<sup>880</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.33.

<sup>881</sup> Vasaly, 2009: 248-249.

<sup>882</sup> Vasaly, 2009: 248-249.

<sup>883</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.12.

<sup>884</sup> As evident in his detention of Juba II, which we discuss later in the chapter.

<sup>885</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.31.

<sup>886</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 1.31.

<sup>887</sup> Including the use of military intelligence, sexual violence and massacre and enslavement.

## 5.6. Justification for Military Action

Aymard argues that the taking of hostages and their subsequent treatment was primarily used in Greco-Roman writings to highlight characteristics of an individual or a people, or to indicate their counterparts' attitude towards an individual's personal or political behaviour.<sup>888</sup> For example, Caesar accepted hostages (representing a willingness to make peace) from the Senones and the Carnutes, despite being aware of their plotting against his efforts in Gaul.<sup>889</sup> This incident is used to emphasise Caesar's qualities as a tactician, and shows his acknowledgement that it was unsuitable to make war on two fronts: with the Treveri on one side, and with the Senone-Carnute alliance on the other. This may have been because the Treveri, led by Ambiorix, were an older and more dangerous foe,<sup>890</sup> and Caesar focussed on concluding his business with the Treveri before embarking on a new war. The alliance between Rome and the Senones-Carnutes also enabled Caesar to make use of the Senone cavalry during the campaign against the Treveri. This was a factor which allowed Caesar to support and preserve his army when facing an enemy by utilising foreign troops, thus presenting himself as a resourceful and long-sighted general.

This links to how hostage-taking could be used as a means of justifying a general's renewed or continued military aggression against a nation. As previously stated, a decision not to send the hostages requested by Rome could indicate an unwillingness to make peace, even though this usually entailed a nation accepting Roman military action against them. This is evident when only two of the British nations sent the requested hostages following the conclusion of Caesar's first campaign in Britain in 55 BCE.<sup>891</sup> Caesar hailed the delivery of these hostages as a victory,<sup>892</sup> yet Dio's account suggests that Caesar had been forced to make peace because of the approaching winter and disturbances in Gaul.<sup>893</sup> The consequences of not sending hostages are evident in the same book of Caesar's *Gallic Wars* when the Illyrian Pirustae were threatened with violence if they should continue to ignore Caesar's demands.<sup>894</sup> This incident, related at the beginning of book 5 of the *Commentaries*, immediately follows Caesar's description of only two British nations supplying hostages in book 4. Granted, the threat is in the following book which, at the time, may at not have been read immediately following given the publication of Caesar's works as letters or instalments which were read to the senate or the public. Caesar does not explicitly state that his reason for returning to Britain was because the tribes did not send hostages. However, considering the close relationship both within the text itself and the period elapsing between when they were written, it is possible that the reader, both after the *Commentaries* were compiled and contemporaneously, would have acknowledged the link and Caesar's concern with the British reluctance to send hostages. This was particularly significant for

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<sup>888</sup> Aymard, 1961: 136.

<sup>889</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.4. Also evident at 3.2.

<sup>890</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 24.1-2.

<sup>891</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.36.

<sup>892</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 4.36, cf. Garland, 2003: 40.

<sup>893</sup> Dio 39.52.1-3.

<sup>894</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.1.

Caesar's representation of his actions and the response from his audience. As we have seen, Caesar's activities in Britain were not an overwhelming success, which was why he emphasised the capture of a large, but unspecified, number of captives.<sup>895</sup> Here, we encounter the same issue: to distract from his failure to conquer Britain, Caesar used hostages to claim his campaign had been successful where 'decisive military victory was not obvious.'<sup>896</sup>

An implicit reading of Caesar's commentaries was evidently successful as Dio, using Caesar's account as a source two centuries later, states that Caesar returned to Britain because the British tribes had not sent hostages.<sup>897</sup> The taking of hostages as a form of punishment in this instance is further supported by Plutarch and Suetonius' summaries of Caesar's activities in Britain.<sup>898</sup> This is evident as both authors neglected to describe the difficulties Caesar faced when he left Britain on this occasion. The demand for hostages is cast by the authors as a punishment for the British nations' unwillingness to treat with Caesar on his first visit. This indicates that lack of compliance with Rome in treaties would be met with force, and this further justified Caesar's second assault on Britain in 54 BCE. Caesar justified his actions by taking both prisoners, possibly as a form of punishment, and hostages to secure peace. This encounter shows that the taking of hostages could be, in addition to the first step in the peace process, a means by which a peace treaty could be concluded and which ensured obedience after Rome had withdrawn from the region.<sup>899</sup> As a result, despite not having been successful in his campaign against Britain, Caesar represented his actions as such and, as a representative of Rome, his writing suggested that, through the act of surrendering hostages, there was an 'acceptance of Roman hegemony in the area'.<sup>900</sup>

As a result, the importance of hostages as a form of symbolic compliance is evident within this example. Dio, Suetonius and Plutarch do not mention the number of prisoners Caesar claimed he took, which were allegedly so numerous that his navy had to make two sea crossings.<sup>901</sup> Instead, they merely state that Caesar successfully crossed to the island twice and managed to extract hostages and tribute.<sup>902</sup> Clearly hostages were, when dealing with diplomatic negotiations, more important to Roman readers than prisoners. Presumably, this was because hostages indicated an on-going relationship with the former enemy nation, rather than the humiliation of a nation which may have been the cause of deep resentment, thus placing Rome's future relationship in peril. The on-going relationship also enabled Caesar to present his

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<sup>895</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.23.

<sup>896</sup> A common concern for Caesar which he addressed throughout his writings, cf. Allen, 2006: 112-3.

<sup>897</sup> Dio 40.1.1-3. The subtleties are ignored by Suetonius which suggests that Caesar was successful in taking hostages from this previously little-known land, cf. Suet. *Jul.* 25.2. For further analysis of responses to and the reception of Caesar's British hostage-taking, cf. Allen, 2006: 114-117.

<sup>898</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 23.3, Suet. *Iul.* 25.

<sup>899</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 6.3, 5.22-23, 8.38.

<sup>900</sup> Allen, 2006: 114-117.

<sup>901</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.23.

<sup>902</sup> Dio 40.3.1-2.

hostage-taking as a benefit to the Roman readership as this could have enabled the Romans to exercise control over the region in the long-term. Unfortunately, we do not know what happened to the British hostages. As Britain was not conquered by Caesar, it is likely that the hostage-taking was unsuccessful in curbing the aggression of British tribes, a fact which Caesar would not want to stress given his attempt to present his campaign in Britain as a success. Nevertheless, the fact that it is omitted from Caesar's writings is telling of the importance of hostages, like the enslaved captives, as symbols of submission. We should also note that by the time the aforementioned authors were writing in the Imperial period, hostage-taking was more important than the financial rewards which could be reaped from the sale of prisoners given the scope of the empire and the need to maintain compliant client kings, a point we shall discuss shortly.

### 5.7. Hostages in Rome

As we have seen, hostage-taking was commonplace throughout the ancient world, yet Rome utilised the practice on a larger scale than any other contemporaneous culture.<sup>903</sup> Hostage-taking on both a grand and small scale was frequently practised by Rome and her generals throughout the late Republic and built on earlier traditions. The previous sections have dealt with the use of hostages in warfare, rather than their treatment following the conclusion of conflict. Throughout the Republican period, hostages were commonly housed with elite members of Roman society, although their treatment varied depending on a range of factors we shall discuss shortly. However, the inclusion of hostages in the heart of Roman society, culture and politics is most evident under Augustus,<sup>904</sup> as prominent hostages, such as Juba II of Numidia and Herod Agrippa of Judaea, were kept within the Imperial household, growing up alongside the children of the Imperial family. Furthermore, by the time of the early Empire, the status quo of Rome's relationship with other Mediterranean nations was in Rome's favour. Indeed, by Augustus' reign, Rome had not been forced to give hostages for at least a century.<sup>905</sup> Throughout the late Republic and early Imperial period, a standardised form of hostage-taking was developed, although its roots can be traced back to Greek and Roman military and diplomatic practices. With the increased presence of hostages in Roman society, we encounter the importance of hostages as symbols, particularly in representing Rome's power over the nations from which the hostages originated.<sup>906</sup> The symbolic use of hostages began during conflict and continued whilst the hostages were stationed in Rome, as we can see with the comparable cases of Tigranes the Younger of Armenia and Dumnorix of the Aedui.

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<sup>903</sup> However, as Aymard rightly states, we have no statistical evidence of this and his comments rest more on cultural than statistical evidence, *cf.* Aymard, 1961: 136.

<sup>904</sup> Braund suggests that Augustus' practice built on previous hostage-taking traditions but was innovative because it was on such a large scale, *cf.* Braund, 1986: 11.

<sup>905</sup> Aymard, 1961: 137.

<sup>906</sup> Lee, 1991: 366-7.

### 5.8. Tigranes the Younger of Armenia and Dumnorix of the Aedui

Two individuals from the foreign wars of Pompey and Caesar demonstrate how the taking of hostages could be practised outside of diplomatic negotiations, and also provide a basis for considering both the use and supposed dangers of foreign allies taken captive by Roman leaders. The individuals in question are Tigranes the Younger of Armenia whom Pompey imprisoned in 66 BCE, and Dumnorix of the Aedui whom Caesar took prisoner in 58 BCE.<sup>907</sup> Both men were related to Armenian or Gallic nobility: Tigranes was the son of the Armenian king of the same name, and Dumnorix was the brother of the Aeduan chieftain, Diviciacus. Both men were taken into custody after disobeying the orders of their Roman allies, used to cement the alliance between Rome and their respective nations, and were involved in uprisings against Rome and her generals. The key differences lie in when their betrayals took place, and how they were used during their capture to appeal to different audiences. Tigranes had been an ally of Pompey's, but expressed his displeasure at his father, with whom he was fighting alongside the Romans, being allowed by Rome to retain the Armenian throne.<sup>908</sup> Plutarch suggests that Tigranes was unhappy about not being given Armenia, whilst Dio claims that Tigranes refused the offer of an area called Sophene, which was not as important as Armenia.<sup>909</sup> This was hardly the stuff of widespread rebellion, yet Tigranes was still 'placed in chains' (πέδη, *pedē*) soon after.<sup>910</sup> Similarly, Dumnorix was accused of sabotaging a Roman attack and stirring discontent amongst the Aedui,<sup>911</sup> who were allies of Rome at the time. As such, both men were acting as allies to Rome in wars with their nation's neighbours or, in Tigranes' case, his own country, shortly before their detention.

The alliances may account for why neither Tigranes nor Dumnorix are referred to using the terminology outlined in the introduction: *obses* and ὄμηρος.<sup>912</sup> This is possibly because both men were of elite status and the Roman elite would not have wished to present themselves or important Roman figures as making alliances with those labelled as *captivi*, as they were considered to be akin to enslaved people. The language is kept deliberately ambiguous and may have been used to indicate Tigranes and Dumnorix's changing statuses throughout their dealings with Pompey and Caesar. Throughout this section, my use of language also reflects the fluidity of their statuses and indicates situations in which they were 'captives' or 'prisoners', and when they were treated as 'hostages' or 'guests'. In descriptions of their initial captures, they are neither called captives nor hostages, although language is used which has connotations of captivity. Dumnorix was 'placed under guard' (*Dumnorigi custodes ponit*), whilst Tigranes was put in fetters (πέδη, *pedē*). In addition to their alliance, the language may reflect Pompey and Caesar's supposed motivation for detaining the prisoners, and the

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<sup>907</sup> I use language associated with imprisonment here to outline their initial status. As we shall see, their position changed throughout their dealings with Pompey and Caesar.

<sup>908</sup> Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 33.5-6.

<sup>909</sup> Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 33.5-6.

<sup>910</sup> Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 33.5-6.

<sup>911</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 1.18-20.

<sup>912</sup> Cf. pp. 7-9.

subsequent use of these individuals. The use of language is particularly significant as none of Caesar's hostages appear to have suffered negative reprisals following the disobedience of their nations.<sup>913</sup> This would suggest that hostages, even those taken during wartime negotiations, were protected by the 'rules of war' which ensured that they were not ill-treated, as we have seen with regards to Ariovistus' hostage-taking. As a result, the language is kept deliberately ambiguous, so Pompey and Caesar could be presented as practising wartime conventions, despite placing Tigranes and Dumnorix first in the position of captives then of hostages, statuses which required different treatment. In addition to their alliance, the language may reflect Pompey and Caesar's supposed motivation for detaining the prisoners, and the subsequent use of these individuals. Plutarch suggests that Tigranes was imprisoned so that he could feature in Pompey's triumph.<sup>914</sup> However, there were more important issues to consider, particularly if we consider Pompey's expansionist model which involved building alliances with client kings.<sup>915</sup>

Tigranes was offered a kingdom by Pompey, presumably to act as a client king, but he refused as he wanted Armenia. Tigranes is cast as arrogant and petulant, qualities which would make a wholly unsuitable client king. As such, Pompey's decision to refuse Tigranes the Armenian throne appears as justified, and his actions would have been understood by the elite Roman audience. In the Roman world, the activities of client kings within their own dominions were acceptable, as long as they did not oppose the Romans' agenda.<sup>916</sup> Tigranes, given as he was to rebellion on both large and small scales, would not be trustworthy as a client king, which would effectively have rendered him unsuitable as a representative of Rome and its interests.<sup>917</sup> Furthermore, Pompey needed strong allies in the East who could be used during his war against Mithridates, who also happened to be Tigranes the Elder's son-in-law. It was impractical for Pompey to hand over the throne to Tigranes the Younger, as he was inexperienced in ruling, and facing the prospect of possible opposition from a faction in favour of the deposed king.<sup>918</sup>

Pompey's supposed reasons for imprisoning Tigranes link closely to Caesar's suggestion that he was merely keeping Dumnorix close by as an asset, given that he had influence (*auctoritas*) with the Gauls,<sup>919</sup> as opposed to leverage over the Aedui. Despite Caesar's avoidance of using the language to convey Dumnorix's status, it is evident that he was a captive who was being held hostage as leverage over his nation and family. This is shown in Caesar's execution of Dumnorix in 54 BCE, four years after his initial detention. Caesar goes to great lengths to justify the killing of Dumnorix. Caesar alleged that Dumnorix had continued to stir up discontent amongst

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<sup>913</sup> Cf. Lee, 1991: 366-374, Noy, 2000: 107.

<sup>914</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 33.5.

<sup>915</sup> Fields, 2008: 91-5.

<sup>916</sup> Richardson, 1979: 13, Rogan, 2011: 76.

<sup>917</sup> Richardson, 1979: 13.

<sup>918</sup> Richardson, 1979: 13-15.

<sup>919</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.6.



Rome's Gallic allies from within Caesar's camp, had been continually seeking his freedom, and had then tried to escape.<sup>920</sup> As such, despite Dumnorix being used as a symbol, much like those labelled as hostages, it is clear that he was now presented by Caesar as essentially being a well-treated captive. Caesar's list of complaints is crowned by Dumnorix's continued belligerence even when faced with an ultimatum: return to camp or die.<sup>921</sup> According to Caesar, Dumnorix chose the latter. We should acknowledge that Caesar may have fabricated evidence against Dumnorix to justify his capture and subsequent execution. However, Dumnorix's case demonstrates how the preservation of captives as hostages was not always advantageous, and that the position of those kept for diplomatic means could change over time. This is particularly true for high-profile individuals taken as a captive, with the view to use them as a hostage, during a war. Caesar claimed that he wanted to keep Dumnorix alive, and hopefully use him as an ally because of his courage and influence over the Gauls.<sup>922</sup> However, the qualities which made Dumnorix a useful ally also made him a dangerous enemy. Throughout Dumnorix's imprisonment, his brother Diviciacus continued to display his loyalty towards Caesar and Rome by assisting in Caesar's campaign against the Belgae.<sup>923</sup> It is uncertain whether this loyalty was solidified by Caesar's initial clemency towards Dumnorix, or the threat posed to Dumnorix's life during his stay in Roman custody, or even later by his execution when he disobeyed Caesar's orders. In effect, such treatments were all displays of Caesar's power.

Regardless of the realities of Caesar's dealings with Dumnorix, Caesar's treatment of the Aeduan was intended to encourage Rome's allies to remain loyal until a time when their assistance in the Gallic Wars was no longer necessary. This is certainly the case for the Aedui who remained loyal to Rome until the Gallic coalition under Vercingetorix was established. This was after Dumnorix's execution around 54 BCE. As such, it is possible to argue that Caesar's detention of Dumnorix ensured the continued support of the Aedui given the threat to Dumnorix as the brother of their chief druid, Diviciacus. Furthermore, the encounter was used in later writings, including by Caesar himself, to emphasise Caesar's qualities of clemency and military prowess to the political elite. As Dumnorix had abused the limited freedom given to him by Caesar whilst in his custody, he appears to have forfeited his rights of protection as a hostage, and outlived his usefulness. Dumnorix's execution would not have been acceptable conduct had he been an official hostage, and by avoiding the use of such terms as 'hostage', Caesar could then present his actions as an act of war, rather than one which interfered with diplomatic relationships.

### **5.9. Hostages as Symbols of Power: Tigranes the Younger**

The use of captives as a symbol of an individual's power is evident with Tigranes' treatment after his arrival in Rome, where he continues to be called anything but a

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<sup>920</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.6.

<sup>921</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.7.

<sup>922</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 5.6.

<sup>923</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 2.5.

hostage,<sup>924</sup> despite being kept in a manner which was akin to that of other elite individuals labelled as hostages. After appearing in Pompey's triumph, possibly as a living personification of Armenia,<sup>925</sup> Tigranes remained in Rome as a political hostage, presumably intended to be used as leverage over his father and father-in-law, Mithridates. Tigranes was kept in the custody of L. Flavius, a Praetor in 58 BCE and friend of Pompey.<sup>926</sup> It was in his custody that Tigranes' representation as something akin to a 'token' to be fought over becomes evident.<sup>927</sup> Clodius Pulcher, a notorious Republican agitator, acting in his capacity as Tribune of the People, seized Tigranes from Flavius' house after visiting his house as a guest.<sup>928</sup> This was an abuse of power not only politically but socially, as Clodius had been a guest in Flavius' house while Tigranes, despite being called a 'guest', was in Flavius' custody. As such, Clodius' encounter with Tigranes was used to further denigrate Clodius' already tarnished character. Cicero, writing in 57 BCE, attacked Clodius for his *iniuria* against Tigranes, casting the prince as a victim of Clodius' abuse.<sup>929</sup> The term *iniuria* which means injury or assault, also has connotations of sexual assault, a transgression which Clodius was frequently criticised for.<sup>930</sup> In addition, Cicero's reference to Tigranes' position as a 'guest' is significant and was another means by which he could attack Clodius for his behaviour in relation to Tigranes. Guests were protected in the Roman world, a tradition based in mythical Greek culture where guest-hospitality (*xenia*) was a religious ritual, and any maltreatment was considered, by this time, to be a serious breach of social convention with associations of impiety. Cicero was writing contemporaneously to the events in question, but Cicero's relationship with Clodius was not amicable. Nevertheless, his remarks indicate that Clodius' actions had been widely criticised by members of the senate and that, given the disruptions on the Appian Way, which we shall discuss imminently, such behaviour cannot have been ignored by the rest of the Roman population.

Clodius attempted to return Tigranes to Armenia, but his ship was wrecked near Antium. As both Clodius and Flavius' men set off on the Appian Way to retrieve Tigranes, a fight broke out and one of Pompey's friends, Papirius, was killed.<sup>931</sup> The quarrel was not truly about Tigranes, but the increasingly fraught relationship between Clodius and Pompey.<sup>932</sup> This is evident as we do not know what happened to Tigranes after his dealings with Clodius, with Tigranes' well-being considered to be less important to ancient authors than what he represented in the relationship between

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<sup>924</sup> Cicero called Tigranes a *captivus* whilst acknowledging that he was also the son of a friendly king (*regis amici filium*), cf. Cic. *Dom.* 66.

<sup>925</sup> Dio 37.6.2-4.

<sup>926</sup> Asc. 47, Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

<sup>927</sup> Tatum, 1999: 170.

<sup>928</sup> Asc. 47, Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

<sup>929</sup> Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

<sup>930</sup> Clodius famously attended the female-only Bona Dea ceremony and was alleged to have sexual relations with his sister, Clodia, who was also a supposed voyeur, cf. Cic. *Cael.* 32, 36, 78, *Dom.* 26, 9, *Sest.* 16, 39, 116.

<sup>931</sup> Cic. *Att.* 3.8.3, 3.10.1, 3.13.1.

<sup>932</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 1-27.

Pompey and Clodius.<sup>933</sup> As such, Tigranes was understood as a political pawn moved by members of the Roman elite. Greenhalgh suggests that there may have been financial considerations in Clodius' taking of Tigranes in that he could be ransomed.<sup>934</sup> However, Greenhalgh ultimately argues that the incident with Tigranes was a way by which Clodius could 'demonstrate Pompey's weakness',<sup>935</sup> a successful feat, as Clodius' actions also caused a rift between Pompey and the consul, Gabinius.<sup>936</sup> Clodius did so by parading the unchained Tigranes throughout the streets of Rome, whilst ignoring Pompey's requests for the 'guest prince's' return. As such, much like Pompey using Tigranes to highlight his clemency, Clodius' actions in relation to Tigranes also reveal how political hostages could be used to highlight a Roman's characteristics. Clodius was disliked by much of the Roman establishment, and the incident with Tigranes illustrates the increasing political violence present in politics which was harnessed by Clodius.<sup>937</sup>

Clodius had used his political authority in his role as tribune to take Tigranes and had then used his personal authority to aid in his escape.<sup>938</sup> Abuses of power, particularly in governorships overseas, were commonplace in the Roman world.<sup>939</sup> However, as Cicero's writings indicate, it was unacceptable to flagrantly use power to further one's own agenda,<sup>940</sup> as Clodius certainly had in his use of Tigranes. Furthermore, Clodius neglected to obey the consul Gabinius when he requested the return of Tigranes, indicating a blatant disregard for the Roman establishment and its power hierarchies.<sup>941</sup> To summarise Tigranes' position: he was initially a symbol of defiance against Rome, and a reminder to Rome's would-be enemies of the consequences of challenging them. He then became symbolic of Rome's dominion over Armenia and Tigranes the Elder during his appearance at Pompey's triumph and as his hostage, before finally becoming another asset of Pompey's and a symbol of his authority, a symbol which could be manipulated by Pompey's enemies. Here, we encounter, once again, the difficulties of defining hostages separately from captives generally, and we see how fluid the relationship between captive and hostage statuses could be.

In some respects, both Tigranes the Younger and Dumnorix acted as reminders of what happens to allies who defy Rome. They were useful until they began espousing unhelpful or anti-Roman ideas, in which case they could become dangerous. At this point, they were either executed for breaching the rules laid out by their keepers, or else displayed as a warning to other rulers who had dealings with Rome. As we have seen, the harming or execution of hostages was exceptional and this may have been the reason why Caesar avoids using the term *obses*, despite Dumnorix being used in

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<sup>933</sup> Tatum, 1999: 170.

<sup>934</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 1-27.

<sup>935</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 11.

<sup>936</sup> Cic. *De Domo Sua* 66-67, cf. Seager, 1979: 103-104.

<sup>937</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 11-12, Patterson, 2006: 356.

<sup>938</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 11, Tatum, 1990: 170-171.

<sup>939</sup> Richardson, 1976: 27-42. Cf. pp. 98-102.

<sup>940</sup> Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

<sup>941</sup> Greenhalgh, 1981: 11-12.

Caesar's subsequent representations in a manner akin to other 'hostages'. The implicit threat in the treatment of captives used as hostages taken during warfare would have been directly aimed at Rome's allies who, in Pompey and Caesar's wars, were necessary for Rome's success and expansion in the area. The use of captives and hostages also enabled Roman generals to emphasise the qualities highly prized by the political elite in Rome, particularly military savvy and clemency. As such, representations of their treatment were threefold and intended to appeal to different audiences. Firstly, their treatment was a warning to nations of the dangers of displeasing Rome, secondly, they acted as symbols of Rome and its leaders' power, and finally their treatment was used by both contemporary later authors to discuss characteristics of individuals.

### 5.10. Hostages as Symbols in Rome

The use of hostages as symbols is evident in artwork from the Augustan period, and is most evident on the Ara Pacis and one of the Boscoreale cups. By keeping hostages within the Imperial household, Augustus could use hostages within his self-promotion, both in public displays and iconography. As we shall discuss shortly, Augustus paraded his Parthian hostages through the arena and sat them behind him within the Imperial box.<sup>942</sup> These actions may have been intended to show the hostages' importance to Augustus, in effect a form of 'honour', given the prominence of their position and the proximity to the Imperial family. However, this enabled Augustus to emphasise his superiority over the hostages and, as the hostages acted as symbols of Parthia, over the Parthian nation. In turn, this enabled Augustus to present his clemency to the Roman public, a key quality which linked Augustus to his policies surrounding the *Pax Augusta* and his position as Caesar's heir.<sup>943</sup> Such concerns also translated into iconography present on numismatic, sculptures and *objets d'art*. Previously, in the discussion on enslavement, we have seen how captives could be used within Imperial iconography such as the Gemma Augustea, usually in positions of subjugation and defeat. Hostages, however, were usually presented as children, and their parents as defeated warriors, offering their children to the victorious Romans.

One example of this presentation of hostages can be found on one of two drinking cups from the hoard of 109 items found in a villa close to the village Boscoreale, near Naples. Buried during the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE, the silverware was unearthed in 1895 and is now housed in the Louvre.<sup>944</sup> Stylistically significant, the two cups in question are thought to be a pair and are known as the Boscoreale Cups. They depict the exploits of Augustus and Tiberius and are thought to date from between 20 and 40 CE.<sup>945</sup> The 'Augustus cup' depicts a scene in which two Gallic leaders are kneeling in supplication [*Figure 24*], presenting their infant sons to Augustus who sits in an

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<sup>942</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 43.

<sup>943</sup> Barden Dowling, 2006: 87, 102, 117, 125.

<sup>944</sup> Kuttner, 1995: 6-9.

<sup>945</sup> For a discussion of dating the Boscoreale trove, cf. Kuttner, 1995: 6-9.

elevated position.<sup>946</sup> Uzzi argues that the gender of the figures on the cup is significant. The two Gallic fathers present their infant sons to Augustus who sits, waiting to receive the delegation. The father closest to Augustus is in a well-recognised position of subjugation, with one knee placed on the ground. The kneeling position of a defeated individual, who represented a whole nation, was a common trope in Augustan iconography, and has close connections to the Parthian standard iconography utilised by Augustus.<sup>947</sup> For instance, on coinage issued under Augustus [Figure 25], there are examples of a Parthian handing over a standard and the figure is presented in a position similar to the Gallic figures on the 'Augustus cup'. The father behind the first appears to be about to complete the same action, with his knees bent and his shoulders rounded. By contrast, their children are standing but only with the assistance of their fathers. Here, the children are still extensions of their parents, being reliant on them for support. The age of the children is significant as they are clearly identifiable as infants, particularly as we know that children and adults of all ages could be taken as hostages.

Given that only male figures could wield political or military power in the Roman world, Uzzi suggests that the encounter portrayed on the cup symbolises the transfer of power from non-Roman men to the Roman Imperial regime, as symbolised by the male offspring,<sup>948</sup> who may have been recognised as hostages. Barden Dowling also argues that the infant sons are representative of Gallic land, territory and their most precious possessions.<sup>949</sup> Therefore, the male offspring, had the Romans not defeated the Gauls in battle, would have continued to possess their fathers' powers, including dominion over their territories. In this scene, Augustus is presented as interfering with this line of succession, effectively becoming the guardian of the children in their fathers' steads. Barden Dowling suggests that *clementia* is essential in this scene, as Augustus is presented as allowing the next generation of the defeated Gauls to live, albeit under his custody, rather than execute the leaders and their children.<sup>950</sup>

The scene is significant as it shows that it was understood by the Roman elite, whose holiday villas were situated near the Bay of Naples, that hostage-taking, despite seemingly showing Augustus' clemency in not executing the Gauls, was ultimately an act of power which signified Roman control over the region. Therefore, regardless of the 'guest status' hostages supposedly had in Roman elite society, it was widely recognised that they were under Roman authority. Given the position of the fathers in the scene, as kneeling and raising their children to Augustus, we can see that, despite the 'gilded cage' in which they were kept, hostages experienced a status which was effectively considered akin to other types of captives we have encountered throughout this thesis.

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<sup>946</sup> The scene is possibly a carefully 'stage-managed' event which took place in either 13 or 10 BCE during Drusus' military campaigns in Gaul, cf. Kuttner, 1995: 117-118.

<sup>947</sup> Zanker, 1988: 187-8.

<sup>948</sup> Uzzi, 2007: 76-77.

<sup>949</sup> Barden Dowling, 2006: 147.

<sup>950</sup> Barden Dowling, 2006: 147.

### 5.11. Hostages in Iconography: The Ara Pacis

The individuals presented on the Boscoreale 'Augustus' cup have been identified as Gallic as they bear the hallmarks of how the Romans represented Gallic ethnicity. The Gallic children are clearly in the process of being given as hostages to Augustus, but there are other examples which show hostages within their positions in the Imperial household. The *Ara Pacis*, or the Altar of Peace, was dedicated in 9 BCE to celebrate Augustus' return from Hispania and Gaul. Two individuals present on the north and south friezes of the *Ara Pacis*, in the midst of a procession of Rome's great and good,<sup>951</sup> have been identified as foreign hostages,<sup>952</sup> as they are wearing non-Roman clothing.<sup>953</sup> Zanker suggests that they are supposed to be Trojan figures, linking Augustus to the founding of Rome.<sup>954</sup> However, given that Augustan iconography relied heavily on personifications of defeated nations and representations of the land and sea are used within the same friezes, it is likely that they were linked to Augustus' political and military exploits. In addition, given the presence of hostages within Augustus' household, it is also likely that the two individuals on the frieze represented hostage figures who, in turn, were representative of the nation from which they hailed.

On the south frieze, Agrippa is presented alongside a group of non-Roman women and a male child aged between 5 and 10 years old [Figure 26]. The boy holds on to Agrippa's toga, whilst a non-Roman woman places her hand on his head. The boy and the woman have been identified as Parthian given their hairstyles and headdresses.<sup>955</sup> As we know Parthian hostages were within the sphere of the Imperial family, the figures may have been intended to represent some of the hostages, further building on the use of Parthian imagery within Augustan iconography. Here, unlike the male figures holding the standards, the figures have returned to the Classical Greek model of female and infant personifications.<sup>956</sup> The dependence of the hostages on Roman figures is evident in the Parthian boy clutching at Agrippa's toga, and in the stance of the figure on the north frieze [Figure 27], a supposedly Gallic infant. Much like the children on the Boscoreale cup, the infant is unable to stand without support, with one hand holding the hand of a Roman figure, and the other clutching a toga.

As said, there is a great deal of debate surrounding the identity of the children on the *Ara Pacis*, largely centring on their clothing.<sup>957</sup> Given that the altar features both

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<sup>951</sup> For a concise overview of the complex issues of identification and artistic messages, cf. Pollini, 2012: 206-43.

<sup>952</sup> There is much debate about the two figures, cf. Simon, 1968: 18, 21, Kuttner, 1995: 99-101, 107-11, Zanker, 1988: 217, Rose, 1990, 2005: 38-43, Gruen, 2011: 229. For a full literature review, cf. Buxton, Kleiner, 2008: 57-89. The children have also been identified as Augustus' adoptive sons, Gaius and Lucius, in costume, cf. Buxton, Kleiner, 2008: 57-59.

<sup>953</sup> Rose, 2005: 38-43.

<sup>954</sup> Zanker, 1988: 217, cf. Weeber, 1974: 171-196, Kleiner, 1978, 1992: 93, Pollini, 1987: 22, Rose, 2005: 42-3, Lamp, 2009: 1-24.

<sup>955</sup> Rose, 2005: 38-43. Allen alternatively suggests that the child and his mother are Antiochus II of Commagene (modern-day Armenia) and his mother, Iotape, or the unnamed son of Dynamis of Pontus, cf. Allen, 2006: 105-6.

<sup>956</sup> Parisi Presicce, 1999: 83-106.

<sup>957</sup> Cf. Buxton, Kleiner, 2008: 72-3.

members of Augustus' family and personifications of the land and sea, it is possible to argue that the individuals present on the altar are representative of hostages within Augustus' circle, including with his closest advisor Agrippa, and, as hostages acted as symbols of their nations, personifications of the areas submissive to Rome. As such, for the Roman viewer, it was not important for individual hostages to be identified, but rather that the stereotypes and nations they presented, e.g. 'the East' and the 'West' as symbolised by the 'Parthian' and 'Gallic' children, were clearly identifiable.<sup>958</sup> As the nations are represented as dependent children, another message is clear with the inclusion of these two figures. The other figures on the frieze are either adults or older children, who are dressed in togas which indicated that they belong to a 'civilised' society,<sup>959</sup> and it is clear that the foreign children (therefore, the nations they represent) are dependent upon them. As Kuttner suggests,<sup>960</sup> this shows Augustus' attitude towards his hostages as a kind of foster-ward relationship which suggests an amicable, peaceful arrangement between Rome and the nations whose children were in the Imperial family's care. As a result, the Ara Pacis includes a dynastic message, showing Augustus' extended family as heirs to the 'peaceful' Empire he had secured.<sup>961</sup> However, as Pollini argues, the message was one of 'conditional peace',<sup>962</sup> as Rome's well-being is presented as being dependent upon the role of Augustus, his family and the political harmony he had created between Rome and those at the edges of the Empire. As such, by incorporating foreign children alongside Roman children belonging to Augustus' family,<sup>963</sup> Augustus was able to establish a model for the future with the younger foreign children becoming reliant upon his Roman heirs. Therefore, regardless of the identity of the children as hostages, the message to the Romans walking past the monument would be obviously conveyed through the image of the child: non-Roman nations and provinces were reliant on Rome to sustain and support them.

The use of children also enabled Augustus to continue his campaign of 'visual rhetoric' which centred on 'peace' as,<sup>964</sup> unlike in his images of defeated warriors, there is not the explicit suggestion of warfare on the Ara Pacis. The message is one of peaceful harmony, with young foreign hostages presented as playing 'a positive role in Roman public life, becoming royal friends and allies of Rome and participating in Roman civic activities.'<sup>965</sup> Buxton and Kleiner further argue that the children are 'pledges of empire' who were used to symbolise 'a guarantee of Rome's global hegemony.'<sup>966</sup> However, despite the altar being dedicated to peace, the inclusion of hostage figures adds an

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<sup>958</sup> Allen, 2006: 105-6.

<sup>959</sup> By Roman standards as only Romans could wear the toga, *cf.* Edmondson, 2008: 21-46.

<sup>960</sup> Kuttner, 1995: 115-116.

<sup>961</sup> Family is central to the monument, particularly in light of Augustus' rhetorical surrounding family values, *cf.* Severy, 2003: 104-7.

<sup>962</sup> Pollini, 2012: 181-3.

<sup>963</sup> Including women and children, who could not participate formally in the Roman state, is significant in itself, *cf.* Holliday, 1990: 552.

<sup>964</sup> For Augustus' use of 'visual rhetoric', *cf.* Lamp, 2009: 1-24.

<sup>965</sup> Kleiner, Buxton, 2008: 68.

<sup>966</sup> Kleiner, Buxton, 2008: 57-89.

Imperialistic element to the supposedly 'peaceful' scene. Whether understood as hostages or not, the figures signified Rome's dominion over a nation, and enabled Augustus to showcase a different form of power than military might, an essential message after the turmoil of civil unrest during the Late Republic. As Allen argues, in relation to the child-hostages present on the frieze, Augustus' agenda was to convey that '[Augustus] did not fight others, but that he did not *have* to fight others; he furthered Rome's interests by sheer intimidation.'<sup>967</sup> As such, the child figures emphasised Roman power despite not directly showing the results of violence or military activity.

The indication of the nation's subordination rested on the unequal relationship Rome held with her allies, as Rome was always omnipotent and could set the terms of their relationships with other nations. This would certainly account for the expense and effort to which members of the Roman elite went to keep their hostages, including within their own households. In this regard, where military commanders or members of the Imperial family chose to station their hostages is indicative of the esteem felt towards the hostages' hosts. For instance, Caesar chose to leave hostages from Germanic and Gallic tribes with other allied tribes.<sup>968</sup> This is clearly an indication of Caesar's trust, whilst also ensuring that Caesar's retinue was not further hampered by additional individuals who were not pertinent to the war effort. Other examples include, as we have discussed, Pompey housing Tigranes with his friend Flavius,<sup>969</sup> and Herod of Judaea sending his children as 'guest princes' to Rome under the care of Asinius Pollio.<sup>970</sup> In the latter case, this may also be an attempt by a foreign ruler to show favour to a Roman individual, or may indicate a ruler's concern for the well-being of his family in Rome. Feldman suggests that Herod's decision to send his sons to live with Pollio concerned religious sensitivities.<sup>971</sup> Pollio, a member of the Roman elite who had friendships with Jewish figures, was probably more likely to be aware of Jewish religious practices than other Romans, which would enable Herod's sons to practise their faith.<sup>972</sup>

### 5.12. The Treatment of Hostages in Rome

The treatment of hostages once they passed into Roman hands is not recorded in detail by Greco-Roman writers,<sup>973</sup> even by those who had been hostages in Roman custody. However, we can piece together some aspects of their lives from vague references in literary sources and from epigraphic evidence. Firstly, we should acknowledge that hostages were in Roman custody for several years, and some would spend the remainder of their lives in Rome, as attested in epigraphic evidence. For instance, Mattern records how several tombs were erected for hostages during the Imperial

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<sup>967</sup> Allen, 2006: 105-6.

<sup>968</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 6.4.4, 2.13.

<sup>969</sup> Asc. 47, Cic. *Dom.* 66.

<sup>970</sup> Joseph. *AJ.* 15.10.1.343.

<sup>971</sup> Feldman, 1953: 73-80.

<sup>972</sup> Feldman, 1953: 79-80.

<sup>973</sup> Lee, 1991: 366-374. On Polybius' stay in Roman custody, cf. Allen, 2006: 205-6.



period, including at least one which was erected before the hostage's death.<sup>974</sup> The tomb of Iulia Axse, who is described on her epitaph as an *opses parthorum* (Parthian hostage), is a case in point. The epitaph states that Iulia, along with her husband, whose name is lost to us, erected the epitaph for themselves, their daughter Ulpia Vobrane, grandchildren, enslaved attendants, and freedmen.<sup>975</sup>

The date of the epitaph is uncertain, but it is possible that Iulia was an elite hostage taken by Trajan during his Parthian Wars in 115-117 CE.<sup>976</sup> However, as Iulia had a Roman name, and her daughter's Roman name likely derives from the unnamed husband, it is possible that Iulia, her husband and Ulpia were Roman citizens. This suggests that Iulia's family may have been in Rome for a considerably longer period, and she may well have been the descendant of the Parthian hostages taken by Augustus in 10/9 BCE. As we shall see, we have evidence that the descendants of Phraates remained in Rome until Claudius' reign (41-54 CE), so it is not beyond the realms of possibility that members of the family were still present in Roman society more than 60 years later. Regardless of the tombstone's date, given that Iulia and her husband chose to erect the tomb before their deaths, it would suggest that Iulia recognised that she would not be returning to her country of origin.<sup>977</sup> It may also be the case that, for hostages who were not being educated with the intention to return and rule their native lands, they were able to build a life for themselves in Rome. Furthermore, given the expense of erecting epitaphs, it is likely that Iulia belonged to the Parthian elite. The elite social status was typical of the hostages whose tombs were erected in Rome, including those of Augustus' Parthian and Thracian hostages.<sup>978</sup>

Mattern points out that most of the people in this category who were commemorated in Rome were Eastern hostages and their inscriptions were in Latin.<sup>979</sup> That is not to suggest that hostages from other regions were not found in other cities across the empire. This is certainly the case for several hostages during the emperor Caligula's reign. As the infamous anecdote from Suetonius goes, whilst Caligula was travelling near the Rhine, he ordered that hostages stationed at a *litterarius ludus*, an elementary school where they certainly learned Latin,<sup>980</sup> should be collected and brought to him.<sup>981</sup> He ordered his cavalry to hunt the hostages down as though they were wild animals or fleeing enemy soldiers and then requested that they be brought back in shackles, thus suggesting a transition from 'hostage' to 'captive', a role which was assumed to lead to slavery. Suetonius' account is unlikely to be accurate, given its anti-Caligula view, but it does support Aymard's suggestion that hostage-taking and its later representations

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<sup>974</sup> Mattern, 2002: 107-8.

<sup>975</sup> CIL VI 26608 = ILS 846, cf. Šašel, 2016: 214.

<sup>976</sup> Šašel, 2016: 214, cf. Liss-Carona, Priuli, 1979: 326-332.

<sup>977</sup> Noy, 2000: 81.

<sup>978</sup> For the Parthian hostages, cf. CIL VI 1799 = ILS 842. We shall discuss the Parthian hostages in more detail shortly.

<sup>979</sup> Mattern, 2002: 107-8.

<sup>980</sup> Johannes, Bau, 2019: School.

<sup>981</sup> Suetonius, *Gaius*. 45. Suetonius also claims that Caligula engaged in sexual relationships with the hostages, signalling another abuse of power, cf. Suet. *Gaius*. 36.

were used primarily as a means of demonstrating aspects of an individual's character.<sup>982</sup> However, beyond the issues with Caligula's supposed tyranny, the anecdote shows that several hostages were in education in a *litterarius ludus*.<sup>983</sup> We know very little other information about the hostages from the Rhine, but it is likely that they belonged to Gallic and Germanic tribes and it was more pertinent for them to be stationed outside of Rome whilst being introduced to Roman customs and values.

Regardless of where hostages were held, the example of Caligula's dealings with the hostages demonstrates that hostage-taking was more about how the Roman elite chose to represent their or others' involvement with such individuals, than Rome's treatment of the captives in reality. This largely centred around power structures, and Suetonius presented Caligula, in a similar way to how Clodius' dealings with Tigranes were described by Cicero, as abusing his power by attacking hostages who should have been protected according to Roman conventions. We should bear this in mind when continuing this discussion, particularly with regards to how hostages are presented as being held, educated or manoeuvred. This leads us to discuss the purposes of hostage-taking and their 'education' in Rome, which ultimately concerns Rome's relationship with the puppet rulers we now refer to as 'client kings'.

### 5.13. Client Kings

Hostage-taking arose as a direct result of Roman expansionism, particularly in instances where Romans encountered monarchies.<sup>984</sup> In most cases, including that of Tigranes the Younger of Armenia, Rome initially engaged in military action before diplomatic means became more pertinent, usually following a nation's surrender. As such, the relationship between Rome and the kings she encountered was not, as Braund argues, that of 'conqueror and conquered' but allegedly based on 'friendship' (*amicitia*).<sup>985</sup> As previously stated, the term *amicitia* had more in common with 'alliance' than the close personal bond of friendship as we understand it. It was a relationship based on a carefully presented hierarchical structure with nations being able to show themselves as 'willingly' co-operating with Rome, despite the threat that Rome posed to their autonomy. As Jacobson outlines, the relationship between Rome and her client kings changed during the late Republic, as military figures, such as Pompey and Antony, became 'king-makers', actively involved in removing and replacing client kings to suit their own agenda.<sup>986</sup>

Nevertheless, regardless of how the Romans chose to label their relationships with other nations,<sup>987</sup> as Rome continued to grow in geographical size and wielded influence across a vast area, it became necessary for Rome to utilise alternative methods of

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<sup>982</sup> Aymard, 1961: 136.

<sup>983</sup> Aymard, 1961: 141.

<sup>984</sup> Braund, 1984: 5.

<sup>985</sup> Braund, 1984: 5. An assessment based on Badian's assessment of the subject, *cf.* Badian, 1958: 12-13.

<sup>986</sup> *Cf.* Braund, 1988: 76, Jacobson, 2001: 22-38, Fields, 2008: 98.

<sup>987</sup> For an overview of scholarship on *amicitia/clientela* as labels for Rome's relations with foreign nations, *cf.* Burton, 2011: 2-6.

control beyond military action. These factors account for the rise of the 'client kings' or 'friendly kings',<sup>988</sup> who were effectively puppet rulers whose family had previously ruled the newly formed Roman province or had connections to the area. There is some debate as to whether the Romans differentiated, in terms of treatment, between the Hellenistic kingship model or the 'tribal chieftains' of Northern Europe.<sup>989</sup> For instance, many scholars argue that 'kings' were primarily found in the East or formerly Hellenistic nations,<sup>990</sup> and were therefore subject to different treatment than their 'chieftain' counterparts of northern European societies. However, as this thesis stresses that all leaders were presented as being 'worthy' enemies of Rome, I argue that, in relation to captive-taking, there is little difference in the structure and motivations for hostage-taking. Suffice to say, there are multiple variables with the client 'king' paradigm, which shall be illuminated as and when is pertinent in this discussion.<sup>991</sup>

There were multiple benefits for the Romans to use client kings. Firstly, the Romans could exploit the client king's connection to the area to ensure that, at face value, it appeared that the provincial population was ruled not by the Romans, but by one of their own people. Suetonius emphasises the importance of client kings in his description of Augustus' treatment of them, describing them as integral parts of the Empire.<sup>992</sup> Client kings were useful for maintaining Roman rule or influence in far-flung provinces,<sup>993</sup> as the local population were less likely to revolt if they believed they were ruled by someone who represented their interests rather than those of Rome. This was particularly important for provinces which also had a governor, as Rome could pass on issues to the client king to deal with, as they were likely to be more aware of cultural issues or traditions, rather than risking revolt if they attempted to interfere in politically sensitive affairs.<sup>994</sup> In turn, this meant that fewer troops had to be stationed within the region.<sup>995</sup> As with all military manoeuvres, this would have used expensive resources which could be better utilised in other areas of the empire.<sup>996</sup> There were also benefits for client kings, as they could ensure that their rule was supported by a more powerful nation and, in theory, this would also ensure the region remained stable and peaceful, which benefitted the provincial population.<sup>997</sup> As long as client kings did not interfere with Rome's activities or agenda, they were free to rule their countries 'day-to-day affairs'.<sup>998</sup> Therefore, it was within a client king's best

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<sup>988</sup> The latter was coined by Braund in his 1984 monograph on the subject. I prefer to use 'client king' as it indicates a sense of hierarchy which, like that client-based relationship in Rome, illuminates the power structures in place and essentially shows that Rome remained in the position of power throughout their relationship.

<sup>989</sup> Braund, 1984: 6.

<sup>990</sup> *cf.* Richardson, 1976: 13-15, 1984: 6, Rogan, 2011: 73-75, Lintott, 2013: 24.

<sup>991</sup> Braund, 1984: 6.

<sup>992</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 48.

<sup>993</sup> Braund, 1984: 5, Suspène, 2015: 185-6.

<sup>994</sup> Richardson, 1976: 13-15, Jacobson, 2001: 23-24.

<sup>995</sup> Richardson, 1976: 13-15.

<sup>996</sup> Braund, 1984: 5-6.

<sup>997</sup> Richardson, 1976: 13-15.

<sup>998</sup> Richardson, 1976: 13-15, *cf.* Mattingly, 2011: 79-85, Rogan, 2011: 76.

interests to maintain their relationship with Rome, and this could be achieved by sending their children to receive an education in Rome itself.<sup>999</sup>

As Braund's study shows, this became increasingly popular from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE onwards.<sup>1000</sup> Essentially, this ensured that a king's children were inducted into Roman culture and values, which enabled them, once they ruled, to continue their relationship with the Roman elite whilst understanding how the establishment worked. Evidently, this would have benefitted their rule by ensuring Rome's continued support, and an essential part of this was through a secure, peaceful accession.<sup>1001</sup> For instance, following the death of the Judaeen leader Herod the Great in 4/3 BCE, Augustus chose to split the province of Judaea between three of his sons and his sister.<sup>1002</sup> In Herod's final days, he revised his will a number of times, including naming his son Antipas as sole heir,<sup>1003</sup> before deciding to split the province. Herod's family were notorious for infighting, and Herod himself had executed two of his own sons. As such, dividing the province would also have been beneficial for Augustus as a united Judaea under one leader may have presented problems for Rome, as any new ruler had the potential to oppose Roman rule in the area. Augustus ratified a will which was advantageous to Roman dominion in Judaea, but the very fact Augustus had a final say in the succession shows his dominion over the area. Essentially, this demonstrates that client kings were always under the power of Rome, but that they were forced to 'play the game' in order to retain power for themselves and their offspring. We shall now consider the position of a family of hostages and whether or not their close connection with Rome made them 'unsuccessful' client kings.

#### 5.14. Augustus' Parthian 'Hostages'

We have previously encountered Augustus' Parthian hostages in the introduction, in relation to the language used to define hostages, and how such language helped to define a person's status and the treatment they received as a result. Beyond this aspect, the Parthian hostages are an interesting case which illuminates how whole families could be taken hostage, build lives for themselves in Rome, but still be utilised in the provinces by the Roman establishment generations later. To briefly recap: in his *Res Gestae*, Augustus boasts of how the Parthian King Phraates IV sent his four sons alongside their wives and children to Rome (in 10/9 BCE) as a way of demonstrating his friendship to Rome. Augustus does not refer to the Parthians as *obsides*, but claims Phraates was exhibiting his *amicitia* (friendship) to Rome.<sup>1004</sup> As we have seen in the case of Caesar's use of language in relation to Dumnorix, this allowed Augustus to demonstrate, after discussing briefly hostage-taking, another way by which he could show the Roman people how his *potestas* (power) and *auctoritas* (influence) extended across the Empire and to Rome's allied states. This enabled Augustus to present an

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<sup>999</sup> Braund, 1984: 9-11.

<sup>1000</sup> Braund, 1984: 9-11.

<sup>1001</sup> Richardson, 1976: 13-15.

<sup>1002</sup> Rogan, 2011: 73-75.

<sup>1003</sup> Joseph. *AJ.* 17.146, *cf.* Toher, 2011: 209-228.

<sup>1004</sup> Aug. *RG* 1.32.

explicitly non-violent approach to securing the allegiance of belligerent nations, whilst still presenting his actions in accepting hostages, rather than waging war, as evidence of his (and Rome's) superiority. We should note that this benefitted Phraates' own agenda, as he wanted his throne to pass to his illegitimate son, rather than his legitimate ones, who were sent away to Rome. This was allegedly because the 'illegitimate' son was the offspring of Phraates' favourite wife, Musa, who was allegedly a former enslaved person who had been presented to him by Augustus.<sup>1005</sup> As such, Phraates was using Roman hostage-taking for his own benefit, which was certainly not what the Romans would have intended, as it was a process used to signify a nation's inferiority. However, regardless of Phraates' agenda, Augustus chose to present the 'friendship' with Phraates after discussing how he had expanded the empire and his other alliance and empire-building practices.<sup>1006</sup> These included the recovery of standards, as symbols of the Rome, the development of friendships and the acceptance of suppliants from foreign nations. Thus, Augustus was able to claim Phraates' actions as being evidence of the success of his Imperial regime.

As Phraates' sons had wives and children, it is likely that the four men were adults who were not in need of an education usually undertaken by elite hostages, although their children certainly would have been viable students. Furthermore, that their families accompanied them suggests that they intended to stay in Rome for an extended period. In fact, two of Phraates' sons died whilst in Rome, as attested by their tombstone.<sup>1007</sup> However, even the descendants of these hostages could still be used by the Roman establishment years after their families had first visited Rome. For instance, sometime between 6 and 8 CE, after the fall of Phraates' 'illegitimate' son and his mother, Musa, a delegation arrived from Parthia requesting the return of one of Phraates' sons.<sup>1008</sup> The inferior position of Phraates' offspring is evident in the Parthian delegation asking Augustus, rather than one of the sons themselves, if they could be released to return to Parthia. Here, we see the limit to which hostages had power or control over their own destinies. Despite them being members of the Parthian royal family, embassies were sent directly to Augustus, who then permitted the release of the eldest son, Vonones. Here, we see that the power within the relationship truly lay with the Romans, no matter if the hostages had been 'volunteered' or if they were, as in the case of the Parthians, viewed as 'guest princes'.<sup>1009</sup>

That is not to suggest that Augustus did not exploit the position of his 'guests', and he went to great lengths to ensure that their presence was acknowledged by large swathes of Rome's population. As we know, Augustus displayed the Parthian hostages by walking them through the centre of the arena during games he had sponsored, and placing them behind him in the Imperial box.<sup>1010</sup> As the Romans had not 'defeated'

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<sup>1005</sup> Joseph. *AJ.* 18.4.

<sup>1006</sup> Augustus *RG* 29-31.

<sup>1007</sup> CIL VI 1799 = ILS 842.

<sup>1008</sup> Joseph. *AJ.* 18.47, Suet. *Tib.* 16, Aug. *RG* 33, Tac. *Ann.* 2.1-3, Dio 40.15.3-4.

<sup>1009</sup> Gregoratti, 2011: 732.

<sup>1010</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 43.

Parthia before,<sup>1011</sup> which would have provided them with an opportunity to take slaves, it is likely that the princes and their families were 'exotic' to most of the Roman population.<sup>1012</sup> Suetonius described the spectacle alongside his comments on Augustus' inclusion of unusual animals in games. This was cast as a positive attribute of Augustus, as he was generous enough to acquire exotic animals for the entertainment of the Roman people. Evidently, Suetonius viewed the hostages as novelties with a position akin to unusual animals. The fact that the hostages were, in later writings from the Imperial period, viewed as novelty 'creatures' demonstrates that there was little thought for the hostages as people. As such, Augustus and the elite recognised the symbolic value of the captives.

### 5.15. Unsuccessful Hostage-taking

The tale of the Parthian princes did not end with the restoration of Vonones to the Parthian throne. The area continued to be troublesome, and the hostage family in Rome was utilised politically for decades after Vonones' attempted return which was thwarted by a rival for the throne, Artabanus. In 35 CE, more than 40 years after the Parthian princes were first sent to Rome, another delegation arrived in Rome.<sup>1013</sup> Another of the princes, Phraates, was sent by Tiberius to claim the Parthian throne. In his autumn years, Phraates did not survive the journey, and his grandson Tiridates took over the task his grandfather had been given.<sup>1014</sup> It is likely that Tiridates had never visited Parthia and that his upbringing had been Roman in nature, with Roman cultural values deeply ingrained in his psyche. The danger of this was that, whilst Tiridates had ties to the geographical area, he was no longer truly Parthian in terms of cultural outlook. Tiridates ruled Parthia briefly between 35-36, but he was soon usurped and disappears from the historical record.

Another attempt to bring Parthia under Roman control was made the following decade when yet another member of the same family, Meherdates (the grandson of Phraates IV) was sent to rule Parthia in 47 CE, during the reign of Claudius, but his claim was defeated by Gotarzes II.<sup>1015</sup> Here, we see that hostage families were kept in Rome because their descendants made excellent figureheads when Rome wished to meddle in the affairs of the nations from which the hostages originally descended. The individuals in question were not necessarily the best suited to rule, or understood the issues affecting the region and its people. Inadvertently, the Romans had made some of their hostages unviable as rulers as they had educated them in Roman values and customs, thus neglecting their native ones. Such an understanding was useful in Rome but was often not helpful for those who returned to their native lands.

However, as Allen outlines, Roman-educated hostages could be used for the advantage of their families, who were often a nation's leaders. This is the case for Demetrius, the

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<sup>1011</sup> In open conflict, although other Roman leaders had made treaties with the country throughout the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, cf. Keaveney, 1981: 195-212.

<sup>1012</sup> Rose, 2005: 37.

<sup>1013</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.31-2.

<sup>1014</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.32.

<sup>1015</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 12.10.

son of Philip V of Macedon, who was educated in Rome from an early age from 191 BCE. Demetrius remained in Rome for less than a decade, yet this time would have marked his formative years. After his return to Macedon, Philip V chose to use his son as a messenger to negotiate with the Roman senate in 184 BCE. According to Polybius and Livy,<sup>1016</sup> Demetrius was not an adept speaker, but the senate accepted his request as members of the senate felt affection towards the young man. However, whilst this relationship seems to have worked in his favour at the time of his entreaty to the senate, his connection with Rome was also his downfall. By 181 BCE, Demetrius was back in Macedon, but his elder brother Perseus arranged his execution. Livy presents Perseus as delivering a speech to their father, Philip, in which he claimed that Demetrius was more Roman than Macedonian. This cast Demetrius as a vassal of Rome who could be used by the Romans to usurp Macedon's autonomy.<sup>1017</sup> This issue was a common complaint about former hostages who returned as rulers to their 'homelands'. For instance, Tiridates' uncle, Vonones, had also experienced this when he returned to Parthia and was labelled as a 'slave to Rome'.<sup>1018</sup> However, Livy may have been including such speech, his sources for which are unknown, to stress the barbarity of Perseus in his abuse of a Roman ally. Perseus was illegitimate and therefore, if Demetrius as a legitimate son lived, his position as Philip's heir would continue to be uncertain. Further concerns surrounded the possibility of Rome installing Demetrius as a pro-Roman ruler in the area which not only threatened Perseus' accession, but also Philip's leadership. Demetrius' life and demise highlights the ways by which hostages could be made into symbols or political pawns which could easily be removed or repositioned for the benefit of Rome, or even for the rulers of the nations from which they originated. Granted, there is some evidence of affection between Demetrius and his Roman captors. However, as Allen argues, Demetrius was always in a difficult position as he was neither Roman, despite having been raised and educated in Rome, nor Greek, despite having been born in Macedon, and whose family remained in the region.<sup>1019</sup>

### 5.16. Successful Hostages? Juba II of Numidia

In contrast to the tragic Demetrius, one individual with close connections to the Roman elite provides us with an example of a hostage who behaved appropriately from his capture and throughout his role as a client king: Juba II, the son of Juba I of Numidia. In 46 BCE, Juba I was defeated by Caesar's generals and forced to commit suicide, whereupon his son was taken into Roman custody and eventually became one of Rome's most successful client kings. Once again, we encounter difficulties with the language used to refer to Juba, as he is called a hostage by one source.<sup>1020</sup> To expand on

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<sup>1016</sup> Polyb. 10.19.5, Livy 39.35.2-3, 39.47.

<sup>1017</sup> Livy 40.11.2.

<sup>1018</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.1-3.

<sup>1019</sup> Allen, 2006: 8.

<sup>1020</sup> Ael. *NA.* 7.23. For discussion of the use of language in relation to Juba's stint in Roman custody, cf. Allen, 2006: 18-19. Allen also alludes to the fluidity of language and suggests that Juba was essentially an 'elite prisoner of war'. However, his treatment is so similar to that of

this point, Allen argues that there was no coercion in the case of Juba,<sup>1021</sup> much like those labelled as hostages, given that Juba was taken captive following his father's suicide and there was no one in power in Numidia to fear for Juba's well-being. However, Juba was taken in warfare and his family were unable to protest Juba's capture, suggesting there was the continued threat of violence. Juba was not, at this stage, called a hostage but rather a captive, which meant Caesar could exercise his right to execute Juba should he have wished.<sup>1022</sup> Roller suggests that Caesar's decision to spare Juba, then a captive, meant that he was responsible for the child's upbringing. Furthermore, if Juba had been returned to his family in Numidia, this may have caused problems for the Romans if the adult Juba wanted to avenge his father. Juba's proximity to Caesar and later to the Imperial family suggests that Juba's importance was understood, and that the Roman elite wanted to keep him close to ensure his loyalty and to use him as a symbol within political promotion. In addition, Juba could not return to Numidia, which had been transformed into a province, without the consent of Caesar and later Augustus. As such, like others labelled as hostages, Juba was educated in Roman values and remained close to the Imperial family before being sent to rule Mauretania in 26/25 BCE. Therefore, it is clear that Juba was in the power of the Roman elite and was expected to carry out their demands, a position those who were explicitly called 'hostages' or understood to be client kings were forced into.

As we have seen with Augustus' careful use of language in relation to the Parthian 'hostages', Juba being called anything but a hostage ensured that, like 'guest princes' such as Tigranes, Caesar and Augustus could stress their continued control over Numidia and, once he was in position as a client king of the region, Mauretania, without having to use force. In the case of Juba, it was Caesar who had obtained the boy and paraded him in his triumph, which we shall discuss in the following chapter. Here, we see that Juba's initial stint in Roman custody was not dissimilar to that of other elite captives, and he was described using terms similar to other types of captives we have seen throughout this thesis.<sup>1023</sup> However, after appearing in Caesar's triumph, he quickly became used as an overtly political tool, being kept as a living symbol of Rome's dominion over Numidia. Similarly, retaining Juba as a hostage provided Caesar and his heirs with links to a North African royal family, thus enabling the Roman elite to continue exerting influence over the region now under Roman rule. The ancient sources do not make reference to this, but it may be the case that it was universally understood that the Numidian ruling family would have continued to be concerned for the welfare of their former prince, whilst watching the transition of their nation into a Roman province.

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comparable 'hostages', like Demetrius, that I would stress that, regardless of the ancient authors' linguistic choices, he was a hostage.

<sup>1021</sup> Allen, 2006: 8.

<sup>1022</sup> The only reference to Juba shortly after his capture was at Caesar's triumph where Dio describes him as a captive (αἰχμάλωτος), cf. Dio 43.19.

<sup>1023</sup> In his description of Caesar's triumph, Plutarch labels Juba as μακαριωτάτην ἀλοῦς ἄλωσιν (the most fortunate of the captives), cf. Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 55.2.



As said, Numidia became a Roman province after Juba I's death, under an appointed Roman governor, and it is interesting that, as Juba could not return to rule his homeland, Caesar and Augustus chose to preserve Juba when he had no kingdom. Here, we encounter similarities with Juba's future wife's situation, Cleopatra Selene. The daughter of Cleopatra and Marcus Antonius, Cleopatra Selene was forced to appear in Octavian's triumph of 29 BCE, which we shall discuss in the following chapter, and then remained in the household of his sister, Octavia. Cleopatra Selene is never referred to as a hostage, but her position is indicative of the ways by which Augustus could retain and utilise the offspring of his and Rome's former enemies,<sup>1024</sup> a precedent possibly established by Caesar's capture of Juba.

To return to Juba's treatment, Juba is thought to have been less than two years of age at the time of Caesar's triumph.<sup>1025</sup> Juba did not return to North Africa for another two decades, meaning that he was raised within an elite Roman household. Roller suggests that, given Caesar's own childless household, Juba may have been brought up in the house of Caesar's niece, Atia. There is little doubt that Juba was kept as a hostage, not as punishment to his father who committed suicide after his defeat, but to ensure the loyalty of the region, and the reinstatement of a pro-Roman monarch in northern Africa, once Juba came of age.<sup>1026</sup> Following Atia's death in 44 BCE, it is likely that Juba passed into the household of Atia's daughter, Octavia, where he remained with her large collection of politically-useful children until his posting as client king to Mauretania.<sup>1027</sup> Juba was integrated into elite Roman society, becoming friends with notable intellectuals like Strabo.<sup>1028</sup> Seemingly, he also received a Roman military education, going on tour with Augustus and his step-sons.<sup>1029</sup> Clearly, Augustus was not concerned with Juba using Roman military knowledge and tactics, should he chose to rebel against Rome upon becoming king. As such, there was a level of trust between the hostage-taker and the hostage.

Possibly at Augustus' behest, Juba married Cleopatra Selene in c. 25 BCE.<sup>1030</sup> Their marriage was hailed as a success by the Greek epigrammatist, Crinagoras of Mytilene.<sup>1031</sup>

*Great bordering regions of the world which the full stream of Nile separates from the black Ethiopians,*

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<sup>1024</sup> Cleopatra Selene could be cast as being the daughter of Cleopatra rather than Marcus Antonius given the Romans' understanding of children following the status of their mother, not their father, when there was no evidence of marriage. This is particularly evident in relation to the status of enslaved people, cf. Patterson, 1982: 132-133.

<sup>1025</sup> Roller, 2003: 59.

<sup>1026</sup> Roller, 2003: 59.

<sup>1027</sup> Roller, 2003: 63-4.

<sup>1028</sup> Strabo, *Geog.* 17.3.7. As Roller suggests, Strabo rarely mentioned the death of rulers, so it is likely that he and Juba were well acquainted during Juba's residence in Rome, cf. Roller, 2003: 69.

<sup>1029</sup> Dio 51.15.6, Strabo, *Geog.* 17.3.7.

<sup>1030</sup> For discussion of the date of Juba and Cleopatra's marriage, cf. Roller, 2003: 85-7.

<sup>1031</sup> There is some debate as to the authorship, cf. Braund, 1984: 175-8.

*ye have by marriage made your sovereigns common to both, turning Egypt and Libya into one country.*

*May the children of these princes ever again rule with unshaken dominion over both lands.*

Ἄγχουροι μεγάλοι κόσμου χθόνες, ἃς διὰ Νεῖλος,

πιμπλάμενος μελάνων τέμνει ἀπ' Αἰθιοπῶν,  
ἀμφοτέραι βασιλῆας ἐκοινώσασθε γάμοισιν,

ἐν γένος Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης θέμεναι.

ἐκ πατέρων εἶη παισὶν πάλι τοῖσιν ἀνάκτων

ἔμπεδον ἠπείροις σκῆπτρον ἐπ' ἀμφοτέραις.

A Greek writer from Lesbos, Crinagoras lived in Rome during the reign of Augustus and would therefore have been fully aware of the political situation, and able to reflect upon Augustus' use of the marriage in his self-promotion. In his poem celebrating the occasion, Crinagoras praises the joining of their two nations, making mention of the Nile which often acted as a symbol of Egypt.<sup>1032</sup> This is significant as Crinagoras appears to suggest that Roman influence, as represented by Juba and Cleopatra as client kings, extended beyond the areas Juba and Cleopatra would rule. For instance, although both were connected to other areas of North Africa, neither Juba nor Cleopatra ruled (or could rule) over Numidia or Egypt, given that they were both Roman provinces. However, the very fact that Crinagoras mentions the two areas suggests that it was widely thought that Augustus had instigated the joining of previously disparate nations by relying upon two symbols of North Africa: Juba as Libya, a region which overlapped with Numidia, and Cleopatra Selene as Egypt. That said, the poem would suggest that the regions were free of Roman influence, but this was certainly not the case as the pair acted as client rulers under Augustus and his heirs. Crinagoras may have been taking artistic liberties,<sup>1033</sup> but this would certainly be the message Augustus wished to send to the Roman population and those living in the area. Augustus chose not to engage in military campaigns to exert influence and control over the region, but instead used other tools at his disposal, namely two individuals who had been kept and raised for the purpose of acting as his instruments through their rule, which was further strengthened by inter-dynastic marriage.<sup>1034</sup> Therefore, Augustus' power was emphasised further by his ability to control an area without having to engage in military activity.

Juba and Cleopatra Selene ruled Mauretania together until Cleopatra's death in 5 BCE. Juba continued to rule the region until 23 CE, further cementing his ties with the wider Mediterranean world and Roman influence in the area by marrying Galphya, a princess of Cappadocia (modern-day Turkey) whose father, Archelaus, had been an ally of Rome. Once more, Juba proved himself to be the ideal client king, continuing to

<sup>1032</sup> Crinagoras, *Greek Anthology* 9.235.

<sup>1033</sup> Particularly when it goes to geographical locations, cf. Braund, 1984: 175-8.

<sup>1034</sup> Jacobson, 2001: 23-24.

build Rome's sphere of influence in the area by connecting himself with Eastern allies of Rome. Augustus' politics in building networks with his client kings may have also played a role in Juba's second marriage. As Jacobson outlines, Augustus exploited the practice of inter-dynastic marriages, commonly found in eastern Mediterranean nations, to further his control over the area.<sup>1035</sup> The offspring of these children, like Cleopatra and Juba's son Ptolemy, could continue to rule the kingdom or be sent to a new region, as was the case for Galphrya's son by her first husband, Alexander, son of Herod. Their child, Tigranes, was appointed king of Armenia by Augustus, and his family continued to be used as political pawns until the reign of Nero over half a century later. The cycle continued throughout Rome's history, with hostages, as captives in golden cages, being used to further the power and influence of Rome and her emperors.

### 5.17. Chapter Conclusion

Hostages, much like their enslaved captive counterparts, were viewed as commodities. The terms the Greco-Romans employed when discussing hostages indicate that hostages were seen as 'sureties' or 'pledges', rather than as people. This links closely to the Romans' understanding of captives who were automatically considered to be enslaved, therefore seen as animate objects. As such, the Romans were able to view their hostages as useful commodities who were taken in warfare, or under the threat of violence, and who could be exploited long after the conflict's conclusion, as we have seen with Augustus' Parthian hostages. The distinguishing feature between hostage and captive-taking was the Romans' concern with convention as hostages were not supposed to be harmed, having been given in good faith. Therefore, individuals such as Dumnorix were initially treated like hostages in that they were politically useful, and their vulnerabilities could be manipulated by their keepers to place pressure or ensure loyalty from the hostages' nations. However, the language Caesar used to describe his dealings with Dumnorix was careful to avoid any reference to *obses* or *homêros* (ὄμηρος) which would have meant that Caesar was obliged to treat Dumnorix differently to those considered to be and termed captives. However, regardless of how Greco-Roman writers labelled the elite individuals in their custody, the individuals in question were ultimately captives who were kept in more salubrious surroundings than their enslaved counterparts. Hostages and elite captives were valued more than non-elite individuals because there was the opportunity to exploit hostages' families and nations for political gain. However, like those labelled as captives who were assumed to be destined for slavery, hostages and elite captives were utilised by the Roman elite for their own interests, be it as symbols of Roman dominion over a nation, as a means of illuminating an individual's characteristics (negative or positive), or as a way of securing, without overt military intervention, Rome's control of regions throughout the Empire. As a result, hostages were disposable and, whilst presented as being 'friends' of Rome, were ultimately subject to whatever treatment the Roman elite deemed fit, as we have seen with Augustus and his heirs' use of Phraates' family, or

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<sup>1035</sup> Jacobson, 2001: 23-24.

how such treatment could be manipulated to present a positive view of a leader, as evident in Caesar's writings.

## Chapter Six – Captives in the Roman Triumph

### 6.1. Introduction

The triumph was the greatest honour a Roman general could be awarded, and the display of captives within this ritual demonstrates the relationship between violence, Imperialism, religion, performance, and political competition and elite self-promotion. A triumph was a military procession which involved a victorious general parading through the streets of Rome accompanied by their army and spoils of war, including captives. As we have seen in the introduction,<sup>1036</sup> the triumph had to be granted by the senate and could only be awarded to those who had achieved a decisive and bloody victory over a foreign enemy. The specific number of triumphs is difficult to ascertain, but Beard estimates that throughout the Republican period, a triumph took place approximately every two years.<sup>1037</sup> As such, the triumph was an undoubtedly common occurrence within Roman culture and, during the period in question, triumphs were continually within the Romans' shared cultural memory.<sup>1038</sup> Therefore, the ceremony may have been used by the Roman people and the elite, as it was by ancient authors, to compare triumphators in terms of the scale of the procession and its various components, including the presentation of captives. Concerns about presentation therefore had an impact on the treatment of captives.

In this chapter, we shall begin by looking at the use of triumphal imagery in Roman literature as this informs us of how the Romans imagined captives to feel during the event, before considering aspects of the triumphal practice, including the creation of competition between triumphators. We will then turn to address key features of the triumph and representations of captives, using the best-documented example (Titus' triumph of 71 CE). These aspects include selecting high-profile captives, and the use of paintings, platforms, chains, and effigies in the display of captives. I will then address executions which occasionally marked the end of the triumph, including looking in detail at the method of execution used. Most of the examples in the first part of the chapter concern men as, given that ancient Mediterranean warfare and politics was heavily patriarchal, the majority of notable captives in the triumph were male. As we shall see, this is not to suggest that female and child captives were omitted from triumphs, but ancient authors tended to focus on Rome's male enemies unless in exceptional circumstances. Establishing how male captives were presented in triumphs then allows us to consider how female and child captives were displayed in contrast, and the various problems faced for triumphators in choosing to exhibit enemies who were considered to be 'unconventional' in contrast to male figures.

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<sup>1036</sup> Cf. pp. 5-7.

<sup>1037</sup> Beard, 2005: 25. Beard's assessment is based on Orosius' *Histories against the Pagans* 7, 9. 8 and the inscription known as the *Fasti Consulares et Fasti Triumphales*, a list of triumphs and ovations awarded to victorious generals found on Rome's Capitoline Hill, cf. Degraffi, 1954.

<sup>1038</sup> The commemoration of famous triumphs in paintings across Rome and in iconography would have ensured this was the case, cf. Florus, *Epit.* 1.13.26-7, Varro, *Lingua Lat.* 7.57, Holliday, 2002: 30-2.

By considering these factors, I will demonstrate that the triumph, like the treatment captives had previously been subjected or witness to, was another way by which the Romans could further dehumanise their enemies in both historical reality and elite self-promotion. In the context of the triumph, captives were primarily thought of as spoils of war, and were preserved by the Roman elite only if they could serve a subsequent political purpose, such as becoming hostages or being used in the promotion of an individual's clemency or other characteristics. The socio-economic and political positions of captives displayed in the triumph marked them as being more useful to the Roman elite than those without prominent connections in their home countries, who were more commonly enslaved.<sup>1039</sup> However, despite the differences in captives' backgrounds, the triumph was designed, in reality and in later representations in literature and iconography, to further humiliate individuals in the eyes of the Roman people whilst acknowledging the captives' former powers as leaders or high-profile members of their own society. This enabled the Roman elite, having degraded the captives from their free and often noble status to that of enslaved people, with all the treatment such a status permitted in Roman thought, to present Roman military activities as justified as they had conquered an inferior yet challenging people. The triumph also demonstrates that Roman Imperialism was concerned with power over people, as well as control of land, as we have seen throughout this thesis.<sup>1040</sup> As a result, the triumph illuminates the significance of captives in the promotion of Imperialism by the elite, showing that captives had influence in Roman society albeit as pawns in elite self-promotion, and that the humiliation and degradation of captives had a performative aspect.

## 6.2. Captives of Rome's Imagination

Such a performative aspect, particularly focussing on the power play between the triumphator and their captives, is evident in literary references to captive-taking. In the triumph, the contrast between enemies being presented as fearsome but sympathetic figures, and the representation of captives generally are particularly significant as we do not have access to the full historical record, and we have no evidence from the perspective of any captive who appeared in a triumph.<sup>1041</sup> However, given the frequent references in literature, especially as metaphor in love elegy, it seems that there was a universal understanding that captives formed an integral part of the triumph and this fact could be exploited for the writer's agenda. Roman authors often attempted to convey a captive's emotions,<sup>1042</sup> and these instances are the author imagining how they, from a Roman perspective, would feel in such a situation. Given what we know of the position of captives in Roman thought and society, and the Romans' concern with appearances, the captives of Rome's imagination were heavily influenced by the elite honour code, which centred on males needing to retain autonomy and display their power. A key way to achieve such a contrast, as we will see in relation to the use of

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<sup>1039</sup> As we have seen in the chapter on enslavement, *cf.* pp. 96-111.

<sup>1040</sup> People could symbolise land, and land was only considered to be fully conquered once its people had submitted to Roman dominion, *cf.* pp. 81-89, 115-128, 152-157.

<sup>1041</sup> *Cf.* Beard, 2005: 27-28, Beard, 2007: 111-4.

<sup>1042</sup> Beard, 2005: 28, Beard, 2007: 111-4.

chained kings, was to compare Roman figures with those they deemed to be 'The Other'.<sup>1043</sup> In addition, this aspect of love elegy links to the use of *militia amoris* in Roman poetry written mostly by men, in which erotic pursuits are compared to or cast as forms of military conquest.<sup>1044</sup>

The triumph was frequently evoked as 'like a Roman victor, Cupid subjugates and enslaves the conquered; Roman love demeans and enslaves the lover.'<sup>1045</sup> The inferiority of the imagined captive in the triumph is shown using a captive in chains as a figurative device. The chained captive is frequently found in Latin literature,<sup>1046</sup> especially in Ovid, and is often used within love poetry to reflect how a male lover was under the power of a 'triumphant female',<sup>1047</sup> a role reversal which challenged gender norms.<sup>1048</sup> Ovid occasionally presents the antithesis in order to show a female as being enslaved by her lover. Ovid uses his readers' understanding of the triumph and the power dynamic between triumphator and captive within his poetry, thus suggesting that the triumph was deeply ingrained within the Roman readers' shared cultural memory. Ovid uses such representations as a metaphor for both the power held by women over their lovers, and his desire to see a woman under his control. For instance, Ovid alludes to triumphal traditions, such as the calling of 'io' and the presentation of captives in chains,<sup>1049</sup> whilst hailing his hero for his victory over a sad captive girl (*tristis captiva*).<sup>1050</sup>

*Ho! our valiant hero has been victorious over a girl!  
Let her walk before, a downcast captive with hair let loose.*<sup>1051</sup>

... "io! forti victa puella viro est!"  
ante eat effuso tristis captiva capillo

In actuality, appearing in a triumph was shameful, as being displayed in the procession meant that the captive had surrendered to Rome. In Roman thought, surrender was a dishonourable act which involved acknowledging another's power over one's body.<sup>1052</sup> A sense of long-lasting shame is evident in the rare cases when freed Roman PoWs were presented in triumphs, accompanying the triumphator. For instance, the freed senator Q. Terentius Culleo appeared in Scipio's triumph. Culleo's status was indicated in the triumph by his wearing of the Phrygian cap of freedom (the sign of a freedman).<sup>1053</sup> Levy suggests that freed Roman PoWs may have remained tied

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<sup>1043</sup> A common technique in all aspects of Roman life, cf. Gruen, 2006: 459-60.

<sup>1044</sup> Cf. Cahoon, 1988: 293-307, O'Rourke, 2018: 110-139.

<sup>1045</sup> Cahoon, 1988: 295.

<sup>1046</sup> Copley, 1947: 285-300.

<sup>1047</sup> Ovid, *Am.* 1.2.19-30, 1.14.45-50, 1.7.35-39, 3.8.61-64, cf. Beard, 2007: 27-28, Cahoon, 1988: 293-307.

<sup>1048</sup> Consider the criticism levelled at Antony for being 'enslaved' by Cleopatra, cf. pp. 204-210.

<sup>1049</sup> For the chant of 'io triumphe', cf. Varro, *On the Latin Language* 6.86.

<sup>1050</sup> Ovid, *Am.* 1.7.38-39.

<sup>1051</sup> Translation by Showerman, 1914.

<sup>1052</sup> De Libero, 2012: 29-40, cf. pp. 66-68.

<sup>1053</sup> Cf. Livy 30.43.11-12, 38.55.1-4. For other examples of *postliminium*, cf. Wolff, 1941: 136-183, Lica, 2001: 496-501, Havener, 2014: 167-9.

to their rescuer for life, although it is unclear to what extent.<sup>1054</sup> As a result, freed Roman PoWs held a relationship not dissimilar to that of a freedman which, as we have seen previously, was a status the Roman elite treated with derision or disapproval.<sup>1055</sup> In the case of Culleo, after appearing in Scipio's triumph, he was also involved in the funeral procession and the subsequent inquiry into Scipio's alleged misuse of state funds. Overall, the use of triumphal imagery in literature demonstrates how the procession concerned the presentation of captive people, spoils and animals which were used to express the humiliation and degradation of enemies and their lands, as people acted as physical manifestations of their nations.<sup>1056</sup>

### 6.3. Triumphs and Political Competition

Before we continue to discuss specific representations of captives in triumphs, we should acknowledge the significance of the ritual in terms of elite self-promotion and how this impacted upon political competition between leading figures. As we shall see shortly, triumphs were elaborate affairs which could raise the profile of the triumphator and their achievements. As Beard suggests,<sup>1057</sup> triumphs were prominent events throughout the period in question, and the adaptations of the ritual highlight socio-political developments, such as the rise of powerful, charismatic individuals during the civil wars of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE.<sup>1058</sup> The development which is most pertinent to this discussion concerns how the triumph raised the profile of an individual,<sup>1059</sup> which is clearly reflective of the heightened political competition during the period in question. The promotion of an individual and their personal qualities was, as shown throughout this thesis, often conveyed through representations of an individual's treatment of their captives, and this is evident in triumphal practices, too. As such, given the increasingly raised stakes of the triumphs throughout the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, the heightened sense of competition would have impacted upon the captives' roles and treatment in the triumph.

The increasing focus on the individual is evident in Pompey's demand for a triumph in 80 BCE.<sup>1060</sup> The triumph, which was Pompey's first, was reluctantly granted by the dictator Sulla. This is significant as Sulla had to overlook the fact that Pompey was not a praetor or consul,<sup>1061</sup> those who were typically awarded the honour. Not only does Pompey's triumph show Sulla's abuse of power and Roman convention,<sup>1062</sup> but

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<sup>1054</sup> Levy, 1943: 159-176.

<sup>1055</sup> Cf. pp. 9-12, 111-115.

<sup>1056</sup> Cf. pp. 37-42, 68-73, 115-128, 152-157.

<sup>1057</sup> Beard, 2005: 25.

<sup>1058</sup> Migone, 2012: 49-60.

<sup>1059</sup> Migone, 2012: 43-68. Migone suggests the opposite, and that the triumph reinforced traditional institutions and norms which 'dampened' the charisma of military leaders. However, Migone appears to undermine her own argument as she acknowledges the role Late Republican triumphs played in the making of individual's careers but denies that they were crucial.

<sup>1060</sup> The date of Pompey's triumph is disputed as either 80 BCE or 79 BCE, cf. Badian, 1955: 107-118.

<sup>1061</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 14.1-2.

<sup>1062</sup> Keaveney, 1982: 161-163.



Pompey's use of the triumph is significant as it indicated a change from the way in which triumphs were used by the elite up until that point. Previous triumphs were awarded to generals who had climbed to the top of the military and political ladder. References to triumphs were then used by a general's heirs as a form of promotion and publicity, emphasising their connection with praiseworthy Roman ancestors.<sup>1063</sup>

However, unlike that of past triumphators, Pompey's triumph was a way by which he launched his career, enabling him to ingratiate himself with the Roman people, which soon caused Sulla to worry about Pompey's rising popularity.<sup>1064</sup> As a result, the self-promotion and boost in power became beneficial to Pompey immediately, rather than for the benefit of his descendants in the long-term. Pompey's triumph was the first to show the career building possibilities for triumphators and the emphasis on the individual, which was viewed as both potentially beneficial and dangerous. This may account for why during the reign of Augustus, triumphs were monopolised by the Imperial family,<sup>1065</sup> and became a means of demonstrating succession, as evident with Titus' triumph of 71 CE when his father the Emperor Vespasian and brother Domitian accompanied him.<sup>1066</sup> This shows the role of triumphs in emphasising and securing individual and dynastic power, a factor which could pose problems for the recently established Imperial family should the opportunity be extended to those outside of their immediate circle.

In addition to highlighting the use of the triumph in career-building and the rise of the individual, Pompey's triumph also marks another turning point. Pompey's extravagant triumph set a higher precedent for later triumphators to match or outshine their predecessors, especially when compared to earlier triumphs like that of the Roman general Gaius Marius' in 104 BCE for his role in the Jugurthine War (112-106 BCE). The sense of competition is evident as Pompey's triumph was elaborate, to the point that it supposedly had to be toned down when the elephants pulling Pompey's chariot could not fit through the gates of Rome because of their size.<sup>1067</sup> The reference to the elephants is problematic as there are no contemporary accounts of Pompey's triumph which allude to the procession being disrupted by elephant related issues. We would expect to find such a reference in Cicero, as he mentions that he was present for Pompey's games following his Third Triumph.<sup>1068</sup> These games featured the killing of elephants in the arena which evoked a sympathetic response from the crowd. It seems improbable that Cicero, even as a supporter of Pompey, would have missed the opportunity to draw a comparison between the elephants at Pompey's First Triumph and those at his later games, as both were failed attempts at self-promotion.

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<sup>1063</sup> As we have seen in iconography, *cf.* pp. 121-124.

<sup>1064</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 14.6-15.1-2. Other examples include Tiberius and Marcellus riding on horseback in Augustus' Triple Triumph of 29 BCE, *cf.* Suet. *Tib.* 6.4.

<sup>1065</sup> Beard, 2007: 68-71. For the changes to the triumph after Augustus, *cf.* Goldbeck, 2017: 103-124, Itgenshorst, 2017: 59-82.

<sup>1066</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 7.123-8. We shall discuss Titus' triumph shortly.

<sup>1067</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 14.1-2.

<sup>1068</sup> Cic. *ad. Fam.* 7.1.

On another note, the elephants may have held symbolic meaning which enabled Pompey to indirectly allude to his victory over his fellow Romans during the Civil Wars between Sulla and Marius' factions (88-87 BCE), an issue we shall discuss in more detail later in relation to Arsinoë and Cleopatra. Triumphs could not be celebrated over another Roman, but this proved problematic for prospective triumphators, as many of the wars Rome was involved in during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, such as Caesar and Octavian's conflicts, concerned opposing Roman factions. Pompey, as an ally of Sulla, had been involved in the Civil War against Marius. Havener suggests that Pompey's elephants were symbolic of Marius, the leader of the faction defeated by Sulla, and were used by Pompey to hint at his victory over the Marian forces in Sicily without explicitly acknowledging victory over a Roman.<sup>1069</sup> This may be the reason why Cicero was so critical of Pompey's elephants in the arena, as they had previously been used to symbolise Pompey's fellow Romans who had been defeated in abhorrent civil strife. This example shows how each part of the triumph was carefully thought out with allusions to specific symbols which some parts of the audience would have recognised. However, Pompey's elephants also tell us how some aspects of presentation, including the use of symbols, could be misjudged and could incur the public's disapproval, as we shall see in the later discussion of women and children in triumphs.

#### **6.4. The Triumph of Titus, 71 CE**

As we have established how the Romans thought about captives in triumphs, and how the ceremony could be used for self-promotion, we should now consider some of the ways by which the appearance of captives was staged both in actuality and in later representations in art and literature. In order to achieve this, we should turn to the best-documented example of a triumph in ancient literature. This can be found in the writings of Josephus and concerns the triumph of Titus, the son of the Emperor Vespasian, in 71 CE. Titus was awarded the triumph for his victories in Judaea during the First Jewish Revolt (66-73 CE), which were noteworthy for the looting and destruction of the Temple Mount in 70 CE.

Josephus is an important observer, as he was a captive of Rome and an eyewitness to the triumph,<sup>1070</sup> essentially watching his countrymen and sacred objects from the Temple Mount being displayed in Rome.<sup>1071</sup> In a similar way to the hostage writer Polybius and his captor and later patron Scipio Africanus,<sup>1072</sup> Josephus was closely associated with Titus and his family. As Josephus had been freed by Titus, he became a

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<sup>1069</sup> Havener, 2014: 169-70.

<sup>1070</sup> I briefly discuss the importance of Josephus' account at the end of the section. For an overview of scholarship on Josephus' reliability and account of the triumph, *cf.* Frilingos, 2017: 50-67, Mason, 2017: 125-176.

<sup>1071</sup> Mason casts some doubt over whether Josephus actually witnessed the triumph first-hand and claims it is a piece of Flavian 'propaganda'. I do not contend with Mason's characterisation but would suggest that dismissing Josephus' account as being merely promotional is unhelpful for research into the triumph as Josephus' description illuminates aspects of the triumph which are found throughout Roman history, *cf.* Mason, 2017: 125-176. As such, I use Josephus' description to highlight the attitudes towards and customs concerning captives which were present within the triumph.

<sup>1072</sup> *Cf.* pp. 75.

freedman who was reliant on his former master for his future security, and was therefore also required to support the careers of the Flavian family.<sup>1073</sup> Therefore, Josephus had an agenda which served the Flavians' best interests. That being said, as he was close to the triumphator, it is likely that Josephus was party to the preparations for the triumph and may have deliberately stressed favoured areas of Titus' self-promotion and display within his description, thus illuminating key aspects of promotion for triumphators. Josephus' account of the triumph focusses on the role of the triumphator, the soldiers and Roman people in the triumph, before his attention is turned to spoils and physical representations of warfare and the conquered land, including paintings, signs and captives. Given Josephus' close proximity to the triumphal preparations and our awareness that the triumph developed over the course of time, Titus' triumph can be seen as an amalgamation of practices which were established during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE. Therefore, we will use Josephus' description as a skeleton structure which will be fleshed out with examples from the time period pertinent to this thesis.

### 6.5. Advertising the Triumph

Josephus begins his description by detailing the reaction of the crowd, claiming that most of Rome's population were in attendance. The triumph was advertised to the people through public notices,<sup>1074</sup> which were probably not dissimilar to painted notices found in Pompeii which advertised gladiatorial combat.<sup>1075</sup> Furthermore, the population was likely aware of the triumphator's return. For instance, Caesar and Pompey's achievements were celebrated throughout Italy as they travelled back to Rome.<sup>1076</sup> This suggests that rumours about the spoils and captives on show may have spread widely. In addition, in Pompey's case, his first triumph would have been within the cultural memory during his following triumphs and, as we know, it had been a grand affair.<sup>1077</sup> The anticipation may have been as keen for Pompey's next 'show', as it was for confirmation of Rome's victory over foreign enemies. The cumulative effect would have created a sense of anticipation surrounding the most well-known captives or objects.

Furthermore, the audience may have been aware of and anticipated the triumph, including the appearance of particular spoils and captives, because of reports sent to Rome from the frontlines. For instance, such reports may have been read out to the Roman public, as suggested by scholars researching the dissemination of Caesar's *Gallic Wars*.<sup>1078</sup> Public communication of this kind, such as the *Acta Diurna* (Daily Acts),<sup>1079</sup> and such examples as the proscription lists placed in the forum, suggests that wider Roman society were aware of the key players within conflicts. Furthermore, upon becoming dictator, Caesar reinstated the tradition of publishing the daily

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<sup>1073</sup> Bellemore, 1999: 94-118, Mouritsen, 2011: 36-65.

<sup>1074</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.122.

<sup>1075</sup> For a specific example of such advertisements see Coleman's discussion of CIL IV 8056, *cf.* Coleman, 1996: 194-6.

<sup>1076</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 8.51. For Pompey, see: App. *Mith.* 12.116.

<sup>1077</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 14.1-2.

<sup>1078</sup> Riggsby, 2006: 12-13.

<sup>1079</sup> A source archived and frequently used by writers of history, *cf.* Swan, 1987: 272-91.

dealings of the senate in a public setting.<sup>1080</sup> This indicates that Caesar recognised the impact of the lists and how they could be, and certainly had been, harnessed for his own means. In addition, such accounts were yet another way in which the Roman elite could represent enemy individuals, both before and after their capture, and stress their victory over the most impressive of their enemies, a consideration we shall address shortly.

### 6.6. Preparing for the Triumph

To return to Titus' triumph, prior to the procession, the army remained outside the walls of Rome on the Campus Martius, as armies were only permitted into the city for the triumph itself. The morning of the triumph, Titus and his father Emperor Vespasian, wearing civilian garb, spoke to the senators and equestrians at the Porticus Octaviae, a portico to the east of the Capitoline Hill within the *pomerium*, before offering sacrifices to the gods, presumably at the temples of Jupiter Stator and Juno Regina which were housed within the Porticus.<sup>1081</sup> The triumph also concluded with sacrifices to Jupiter, Juno and Minerva at temples on the Capitoline Hill. Therefore, the triumph had a religious element which gave thanksgiving to the gods who had ensured Roman victory. In turn, this also emphasised how the triumphator was divinely favoured, and this has an impact on how captives were perceived, as the Roman public would have thought that the enemy were condemned by the gods' will to be suffer defeat. After offering sacrifices near the Porticus Octaviae, Titus and Vespasian returned to the troops stationed outside the city walls, and Titus re-entered the city wearing the costume of a triumphator.<sup>1082</sup> The costume typically involved the triumphator wearing full military regalia and a purple cloak.<sup>1083</sup> The costume change indicated Titus' shifting role from a Roman citizen to military general, symbolising the dual role whilst ensuring that war was kept outside of the city unless in exceptional circumstances like the triumph. Such a change is also indicative of the staging of the triumph with Roman generals presenting themselves in a way which was suitable for the 'performance' or 'ritual' of the triumph.

### 6.7. The Triumph's Route and Order

Another 'staging' issue was the triumph's route and order which were important presentation considerations for the triumphator,<sup>1084</sup> and inform us about the presentation of captives. There have been attempts to reconstruct the order of the

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<sup>1080</sup> During his consulship of 59 BCE, cf. Suet. *Jul.* 20.

<sup>1081</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 7.123-8, cf. Richardson, 1992b: 317-8.

<sup>1082</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 7.130-2. This part of Titus' triumph was a feature unique to the principate as, prior to Augustus, triumphators had to remain outside the city boundaries before the triumph. Should triumphators enter the *pomerium*, they had to relinquish *imperium proconsulare* which was required for a triumph. From Augustus onwards, emperors had permanent *imperium proconsulare*, thus allowing Titus to cross across the *pomerium* before the triumph, cf. Drogula, 2007: 419-452.

<sup>1083</sup> For discussion of the appearance of a triumphator, particularly in relation to Pompey wearing the 'cloak of Alexander', cf. Beard, 2007: 13-14, Östenberg, 2009: 284.

<sup>1084</sup> Östenberg, 2005: 13-22.

triumph,<sup>1085</sup> but we cannot be entirely certain given the ancient authors' lack of interest in this aspect.<sup>1086</sup> That said, it is generally thought that from the early Imperial period, as evident in Josephus' description, a triumph would begin outside of Rome's city boundaries, pass through the Porta Triumphalis, by the Portico of Octavia (Porticus Octaviae),<sup>1087</sup> and follow a route through the streets of Rome to the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill.<sup>1088</sup> The order and processional route may have developed over the course of time, given Rome's continually developing urban landscape,<sup>1089</sup> as evident in the inclusion of the Porticus Octaviae which was built during Augustus' reign. However, the start and end points are likely to have remained the same to retain a sense of tradition and to ensure that the triumph remained a set 'public ritual'. Nevertheless, a vague 'set route' must have been widely understood as there are examples where an excessive divergence from tradition was used as a means of denigrating an individual's character or commenting upon societal changes.<sup>1090</sup> The position of captives within the procession is significant for this study as it pertains to how captives were presented within elite promotion.

There was also supposedly a set processional order, as suggested by comments pertaining to Octavian's inclusion of senators walking ahead of his chariot during his Triple Triumph in 29 BCE.<sup>1091</sup> This links to how spoils and captives which were closest to the triumphator are of particular note in the writings of Greco-Roman authors. In his description of Titus' triumph, Josephus details the masses of spoils which accompanied the triumphator's chariot.<sup>1092</sup> The spoils included precious metals, ivory, plundered art, jewellery and crowns, images of deities, animals, and captives adorned in 'ornaments of amazing richness' [Figure 28].<sup>1093</sup> Triumphators usually followed the procession, as shown by Josephus' use of the word πέμπω (pémpō) meaning 'send' in the description of the triumph, thus indicating that Titus sent forth his army and the spoils before entering the city in his chariot.<sup>1094</sup> Josephus' structure may also convey the triumphator's delayed appearance, as Josephus proceeds to outline in detail the spoils in question before the entry of the triumphator. This is also evident in art and iconography, and in this case is apparent on the Arch of Titus in Rome. Constructed in 82 CE under the Emperor Domitian, the Arch features idealised scenes from Titus' triumphal procession. On the north frieze within the archway [Figure 29], Titus is

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<sup>1085</sup> Beard, 2007: 92-3. Much debate centres on the role of the Porta Triumphalis in the procession, cf. Versnel, 1970: 132-163.

<sup>1086</sup> For instance, Josephus skips over the order of the triumph to describe the spoils on display, cf. Joseph. *BJ*. 7.123-153.

<sup>1087</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.123-4.

<sup>1088</sup> Badian, 2003: 1554, Beard, 2007: 92-6.

<sup>1089</sup> Favro, 1999: 204-219.

<sup>1090</sup> For instance, Antony held a triumph in Alexandria and paraded Artavasdes, the King of Armenia, whose surrender he had acquired through false promises, cf. Dio 49.39-40, 41.5-6, Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 1.4, Vell. Pat. 2.82.3. Octavian used Antony's triumph in Alexandria to claim that he wanted to move the Roman capital, cf. Scott, 1933: 37.

<sup>1091</sup> Dio 51.21.9, cf. Östenberg, 2015: 13-22.

<sup>1092</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.132-139.

<sup>1093</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.132-139.

<sup>1094</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.131, LSJ, 1359: πέμπω.

shown on his chariot, accompanied by a winged victory, and positioned behind the army. This is also the case for the depiction of Tiberius' triumph on one of the Boscoreale Cups,<sup>1095</sup> in which Tiberius, who is depicted riding his chariot, is located behind the rest of the triumphal procession which features his soldiers ahead of him and the sacrifice of a bull [Figure 30].<sup>1096</sup> When the triumphator did enter the city, Titus followed the most important spoils, those from Temple Mount, and images or statues (ἀγάλματα, agálmata) of victory.<sup>1097</sup> Presumably, this delayed entry enabled Titus to create anticipation for his appearance, impressing the crowds with the mass of spoils before appearing as the conquering hero.

These examples speak to the importance of the triumph in elite promotion, and we can now turn our attention to how the captives' position in the triumph may have been, as suggested by Josephus' description, carefully staged for maximum impact. We have previously seen how anticipation could be created by the use of signs advertising the triumph or a triumphator's delayed entry into Rome. However, a sense of anticipation may have been exploited in relation to the position of principal captives. We should note that, much like the rest of the triumph's order, we cannot be entirely certain of the position of captives.<sup>1098</sup> However, I would suggest that, whilst lesser-known captives were paraded at different points throughout the triumph,<sup>1099</sup> high-status captives were led either in front of the triumphator's chariot, as suggested by iconography [Figures 29 and 30] and by Appian's account of Pompey's Third Triumph and Josephus' account of Titus' triumph,<sup>1100</sup> or immediately behind it.<sup>1101</sup> Either way, the captives were located close to the triumphator's chariot. This is significant as the surrender of enemies shortly after their defeat is often characterised as 'passing under the yoke',<sup>1102</sup> a term which links to agricultural practices involving oxen.<sup>1103</sup> There may arguably have been a semi-ritual involved in the surrender scene,<sup>1104</sup> as evident in other sequences of surrender which were orchestrated by the Roman elite,<sup>1105</sup> although I would argue that regardless of the actual practice, the use of the term is indicative of how the Romans viewed their captives. Specifically, the transition from freed to enslaved person, a status which effectively rendered individuals as commodities, was characterised as a

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<sup>1095</sup> Cf. pp. 152-163.

<sup>1096</sup> Cf. Kuttner, 1995: 143-153.

<sup>1097</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 7.151-2, cf. *LSJ*, 5: ἀγάλαμα.

<sup>1098</sup> Beard suggests that the position of captives was exploited depending on the medium in which they were represented. As a result, artists and writers had plenty of opportunity to play with the dynamic between captive and triumphator, cf. Beard, 2007: 125-7.

<sup>1099</sup> After the bulk had been sold into slavery, cf. 96-111.

<sup>1100</sup> As was the case for Pompey's triumph of 61 BCE, cf. App. *Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1101</sup> Cic. *Pis.* 60-61.

<sup>1102</sup> Cf. pp. 32-35.

<sup>1103</sup> Cf. Fronto, *Ep.* 217.7-8, Livy 9.4.1-6, 10.36.19, 40.49.4-6, Tac. *Ann.* 15.15.

<sup>1104</sup> Cassius Dio suggests that a ceremonial yoke was set up, cf. Dio 5=Zonaras 7.17. However, other references are vaguer and do not suggest there was a physical yoke set up for defeated enemies to pass under. I agree with a more figurative interpretation of the 'yoke', as an expression used to indicate a transition in status.

<sup>1105</sup> De Libero, 2012: 29-40.

form of dehumanisation, i.e. men took on the status of 'yoked' animals.<sup>1106</sup> Oxen are strong, docile animals and the use of the 'yoke' as a figurative device enabled the Romans to show their ability to tame and control their powerful enemies, thus enabling a contrast between an enemy's former and present status. This links closely to triumphs as captives who were close to the triumphator's chariot were presented as being under the triumphator's control. The proximity to the triumphator would suggest that the captives were key enemies of Rome who were previously powerful figures but, through their defeat, were presented as similar to animals in that their status had been degraded to something which could be easily led. As such, it may be the case that triumphators adapted the triumphal procession order, as they did with the route, to suit their agenda and preferences.

However, whilst we cannot be certain of the position of high-profile captives, their overall position close to the triumphator should be noted. Triumphators entered the city towards the end of the triumph which, as we have seen, was probably a deliberate arrangement to heighten the crowd's excitement. By the time a triumphator entered the city, within close proximity to principal captives, the Roman public would have witnessed the passing army, shouting support for (or even playfully ridiculing) the triumphator, and elaborate stages with masses of spoils, including precious metals, statuary, art, exotic animals and captives. The eventual appearance of the triumphator would have been highly anticipated, and the carefully selected spoils suggested that the triumphator was personally responsible for bringing wealth and further power to Rome. With the captives accompanying the triumphator, the Roman people would have been able to see that such wealth and prestige was a direct result of the triumphator defeating Rome's troublesome enemies and the nations they represented. The principal captives, sometimes chained, would then be led to the bottom of the Capitoline Hill, in the north west corner of the forum.<sup>1107</sup> Here, they would either be executed, imprisoned, or placed in the custody of a member of the Roman elite. Considering the standardised route and procession order, a sense of performance is evident.<sup>1108</sup>

### 6.8. Principal Captives

Authors writing of the triumph named key enemy figures from Rome's wars, which then enabled the Roman audience to focus on individuals as symbols of their nation. On this note, the numbers of captives displayed within a triumph were relatively low in comparison to the numbers taken during warfare,<sup>1109</sup> and there are discrepancies between Greco-Roman accounts of captives within triumphs, particularly the numbers and the names of those who attended.<sup>1110</sup> References to high-profile captives presented during triumphs are in line with literary sources pertaining to enemies captured

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<sup>1106</sup> The connection between the two is clear in Ovid, *cf.* Ovid, *Am.* 1.2.19-30.

<sup>1107</sup> *App. Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1108</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 1.

<sup>1109</sup> *Cf.* pp. 98-102, 104-111.

<sup>1110</sup> Compare the description of the different material spoils on display in Pompey's triumph of 61 BCE: Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.1-4, *App. Mith.* 12.17, Pliny, *NH* 37.13.

during warfare, namely that only the number of captives and the most famous amongst their number are recorded.<sup>1111</sup> This is the case for Pompey's Third Triumph in 61 BCE in which he displayed 324 captives, which were presumably spread out throughout the procession, yet fewer than 10 captives are named.<sup>1112</sup> High-profile captives tended to be either Rome's well-known enemies or those closely associated with them, including their wives and offspring of all ages.<sup>1113</sup> Östenberg refers to such people as the 'principal captives' within the triumph, and I shall use this term to refer to the named captives within the procession, which were those the ancient authors considered to be of note.

As we know, the ancient Mediterranean world was heavily patriarchal and, as a result, the principal captives within triumphs were mostly male, often with accompanying female and child family members who were not directly involved in warfare. For instance, in Pompey's triumph over Mithridates in 61 BCE, Mithridates' seven adult offspring, both male and female, were presented alongside Pontic generals and their wives and children.<sup>1114</sup> As we shall see, this may have been because Mithridates, Rome's main enemy, was dead, but it appears to be standard practice for women and children, who would have been non-combatants, to appear in the triumph. In Roman thought, women and children were considered to be extensions of their male relatives.<sup>1115</sup> As such, the Roman population may have been made aware of the key captives involved in warfare, or those closely associated with them, and it is possible that the Romans would have heard the names of the principal captives in public reports. Thus, they would have recognised the triumphator's longstanding struggle with the nation or the individuals in question.

### 6.9. Selecting Principal Captives

A concern for the presentation of captives is clear in instances in which people or objects were chosen and retained by generals specifically for display in their triumphs. As we have seen in relation to Titus' triumph, the selection sometimes took place even before a triumph had been awarded, suggesting that the general had taken consideration of how captives would be presented, and what adornments would most please or impress the Roman people. In such cases, the selection process may have taken place months or even years before the conclusion of a war,<sup>1116</sup> as was the case when Pompey picked parts of Mithridates' treasure for his triumph.<sup>1117</sup> Such a time delay may have posed logistical problems for future triumphators, as they had to consider the transport and upkeep of the captives or objects they had chosen.<sup>1118</sup> As a

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<sup>1111</sup> For instance, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 38.3.

<sup>1112</sup> App. *Mith.* 24.117.

<sup>1113</sup> Beard, 2005: 28-29, Östenberg, 2009: 129-131.

<sup>1114</sup> App. *Mith.* 117. Pompey also displayed Tigranes the Younger of Armenia alongside his wife, and Aristobulus of Judaea and his children, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.4.

<sup>1115</sup> As discussed throughout this thesis, *cf.* pp. 66-73, 117-128, 152-157.

<sup>1116</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 128.

<sup>1117</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 36.3-6.

<sup>1118</sup> Beard, 2005: 28-29.



result, triumphators may have weighed the political and symbolic value of captives against the trouble of keeping them for months if not years before the triumph.

Given that triumphators were aware of how well-known prominent figures would have been in Rome, they were able to consider which individuals would make the most impact. In Titus' triumph, the captives included key figures from the war, including Simon bar Giora, one of the main rebel leaders, and individuals who had been carefully selected for their physical attributes, e.g. their height.<sup>1119</sup> This select group of captives were dressed in elaborate costumes which may have been used to indicate their ethnicity.<sup>1120</sup> As we know, it was common for triumphators to handpick individuals they wished to display, with the much earlier example of Scipio Africanus selecting fifty individuals from Numantia to display in his triumph.<sup>1121</sup> In the case of Scipio, it was apparently because of their wretched appearance as it reflected the long siege they had withstood.<sup>1122</sup> Criticism by ancient authors was also levelled at the Emperors Caligula, Domitian, and Gallienus for using impressive looking individuals to display in their respective triumphs who had not actually been captured during the course of warfare.<sup>1123</sup> This example also shows how captives were dressed in their 'native costumes' to clearly convey the difference between them, the Roman triumphator, and the Roman people.<sup>1124</sup> Therefore, by emphasising the captives' 'otherness', the Romans were able to humiliate captive individuals without reproach as they were clearly identifiable as the defeated enemy who could face whatever treatment the triumphator subjected them to.

The careful display of captives shows the significance of presenting captives as 'worthy enemies', i.e. those who could challenge Roman military might but, despite these fearsome qualities, had been conquered by triumphant general.<sup>1125</sup> The concept of a 'worthy enemy' is evident in Suetonius' description of Caligula selecting Gallic enslaved people to stand in the stead of the Germans he was meant to have captured.

*Then turning his attention to his triumph, in addition to a few captives and deserters from the native tribes he chose all the tallest of the Gauls, and as he expressed it, those who were "worthy of a triumph," as well as some of the chiefs. These he reserved for his parade, compelling them not only to dye their hair red and to let it grow long, but also to learn the language of the Germans and assume barbarian names.*<sup>1126</sup>

Conversus hinc ad curam triumphi praeter captivos ac transfugas barbaros Galliarum quoque procerissimum quemque et, ut ipse dicebat, ἀξιοθριάμβευτον, ac nonnullos ex

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<sup>1119</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 7.132-139.

<sup>1120</sup> *Cf.* pp. 117-124, 154-157.

<sup>1121</sup> App. *Iber.* 98, *cf.* Ostenberg, 2009: 129.

<sup>1122</sup> App. *Iber.* 97.

<sup>1123</sup> Suet. *Vit. Cal.* 47, *Pers.* 6.43-7, *Tac. Agr.* 39, *SHA, Gall.* 9.5, *cf.* Östenberg, 2009: 153-5.

<sup>1124</sup> For the use of costume in the triumph, *cf.* Meister, 2017: 83-102.

<sup>1125</sup> As Beard concisely puts it 'a good victory always requires a good enemy', *cf.* Beard, 2005: 30, Hekster, 2007: 96.

<sup>1126</sup> Suet. *Vit. Cal.* 47. Loeb translation.

principibus legit ac seposuit ad pompam coegitque non tantum rutilare et summittere comam, sed et sermonem Germanicum addiscere et nomina barbarica ferre.

This was supposedly because the captives were tall and therefore could make a more striking impression when set amongst the triumph's multimedia display. Clearly, Suetonius' intention was to further denigrate Caligula's notoriously bad character by making him appear like an incompetent general and a deceiver of the Roman people, more concerned with spectacle than with showcasing his military achievements (or lack thereof). However, Suetonius claimed that Caligula had coined the Greek term (ἀξιοθριάμβευτον) which translates as 'deserving to be led in triumph'.<sup>1127</sup> Usually translated as 'worthy' rather than deserving, the inclusion of the term by Suetonius conveys two important points. Firstly, despite Caligula's use of the neologism, the Roman elite clearly understood that some captives were more appropriate than others to display in a triumph. In Caligula's case, he selected those who *appeared* to be more suitable than the individuals he had triumphed over who were 'deserving' of defeat, in that they were 'worthy enemies' who had the potential to challenge Rome. The second thing to note is that captives displayed in the triumph were effectively undergoing a form of punishment for rising up against Rome. Therefore, captives needed to look the part, as formerly fearsome male warriors who looked utterly defeated, and who had also committed an 'offense' against Rome. In this respect, the appearance of a 'worthy enemy' was a universally understood expectation of triumphators. With regards to Titus' triumph, presenting a 'worthy enemy', like Simon Bar Giora and the Judaeen generals, served to illuminate Titus' military prowess in comparison to the impressive enemy. The careful selection of captives and spoils, particularly those from The Temple, demonstrates Titus' acute awareness of the audience and what he perceived they would find most impressive, in addition to using symbols of the Judaeen peoples' faith which may have been understood by the Roman people given that there was a large Jewish population in Rome at the time.<sup>1128</sup>

#### 6.10. Signs and Placards

Whilst the audience may have been aware of current affairs, they may not have recognised high-profile captives or representations of significant events on sight. This may account for the inclusion of placards presumably bearing the names and places from which the captives hailed.<sup>1129</sup> Iconography shows that the placards were presented within close proximity to the captives, as Beard argues is the case with the Arch of Trajan at Beneventum, in which a number of female figures, identified as prisoners, walk ahead of placards which may have included their names and details of their origins.<sup>1130</sup> The inclusion of placards may have been because the Roman audience would probably not have been able to recognise individuals by sight.<sup>1131</sup> As a case in point, during Pompey's Third Triumph of 61 BCE, his soldiers involved in the

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<sup>1127</sup> Suet. *Vit. Cal.* 47. On the use of the term, cf. Woods, 2008: 900-904.

<sup>1128</sup> Gruen, 2002: 15, Goodman, 2004: 3-5.

<sup>1129</sup> Plin. *NH* 5.5.36, SHA, *Aurelian* 34.1-2, cf. Östenberg, 2009: 153-4.

<sup>1130</sup> Beard. 2007: 125-7.

<sup>1131</sup> Cf. Östenberg, 2009: 245-8. For Aurelian's triumph over Zenobia, cf. Ando, 2000: 255.

procession carried inscriptions which listed Pompey's achievements, including details of his victories over the captives and their nations. These included the number of pirate ships he had captured, the cities he had conquered, how much the soldiers had been rewarded, and how much the wars in the East had contributed to the public treasury which, as we have seen previously, may have included profits from the sale of captives.<sup>1132</sup> This would suggest, given that literacy is thought to have been relatively low in the Roman world,<sup>1133</sup> that the placards were aimed at the elite audience, who would have been reminded of Pompey's contribution to their coffers. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, as Brice points out, the financial issues surrounding warfare during the late Republic, including the cost of paying, equipping and moving the army, should not be underestimated.<sup>1134</sup> Secondly, the use of placards within close proximity to captives shows how a triumphator could use different parts of the display to appear to different audiences.

However, despite the assumption of the non-elite audience's illiteracy,<sup>1135</sup> there were other means by which the population at large would have understood the placards. For instance, crowd members who were literate may have shouted out the information presented on the placards, enabling those who were illiterate to understand the triumphator's intended message. Alternatively, it may be that the names were chanted by the soldiers, akin to the way in which Caesar's soldiers chanted of his achievements during his Gallic triumph.<sup>1136</sup> Furthermore, as Woolf argues, the use of numbers, signs and diagrams, effectively reflects that 'very few members of the ancient world can be considered as functionally illiterate.'<sup>1137</sup> This may account for the placards bearing Roman numerals, as in Pompey's Third Triumph of 61 BCE, which detailed the numbers of cities taken.<sup>1138</sup> As we have seen in the introduction to this thesis,<sup>1139</sup> generals were awarded triumphs if they had killed a specific number of the enemy,<sup>1140</sup> and the placards may have been used to provide evidence of how Pompey had not only matched but exceeded the numbers necessary, emphasising his worthiness at being granted a triumph. We can see here that there were other means by which the audience were able to see representations of captives beyond the appearance of their person as, like our discussion of massacre, it was the general's decision whether or not to kill or spare individuals. Alternatively, the placards may have been indicative of the captives' enslaved status, as enslaved people were typically displayed within markets

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<sup>1132</sup> Again, consider Pompey's triumph with its use of placards and inscriptions: Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.1-5, *App. Mith.* 12.17, Plin. *NH* 37.13.

<sup>1133</sup> Stewart, 2008: 1.

<sup>1134</sup> Brice, 2008: 73-74.

<sup>1135</sup> Stewart, 2008: 1, Woolf, 2015: 31-42.

<sup>1136</sup> Varro, *On the Latin Language* 6.86, *Ov. Am.* 1.7.38-39.

<sup>1137</sup> Woolf, 2015: 31-42.

<sup>1138</sup> Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.1-4, *App. Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1139</sup> *Cf.* pp. 5-7.

<sup>1140</sup> 5000 is generally thought to have been the minimum number of enemy troops killed in battle, *cf.* Val. Max. 2.8.1. For an overview of the debate on the rules for obtaining a triumph, *cf.* Lundgreen, 2014: 17-32.

underneath similar noticeboards,<sup>1141</sup> usually about their age and origins. Thus, the Roman audience would have been able to see, much like those presented in chains, how far Rome's fearsome and formerly powerful enemies had fallen.

### 6.11. Captives on Display: Paintings, Platforms, and Effigies

In Josephus' account of Titus' triumph, material and human manifestations of the war and defeated nations were just some of the representations on display. There were also artistic depictions of key scenes from the First Jewish Revolt, including those showing the enemy being led into captivity.<sup>1142</sup> The connection with theatrical performances is evident in such artistic representations, as the scenes were presented on moving scaffolds, called πῆγμα (*pegma*) by Josephus. The *pegma*, as they are also called in Latin,<sup>1143</sup> were used within the theatre, and it is noteworthy that in Titus' triumph a number of the defeated were presented on the same stage as artwork depicting the fall of the cities they had once protected. The combination of paintings and captives would have evoked the scenes in which the enemy were defeated more clearly for the audience, many of whom would have had little idea of Judaea's cities or landscape. In turn, as Frilingos argues, by including graphic depictions of the war alongside the defeated generals, Vespasian and Titus were able to present the war as being justified, as a sense of self-destruction amongst the Judaeans is present throughout the description of the triumph and within Josephus' account of the First Jewish Revolt.<sup>1144</sup> As we have seen throughout this thesis, such justification for warfare, which inevitably entailed financial and human losses, was crucial for generals to retain support after engaging in conflict.

Captives may have had a status akin to an object, but their incarnation in human form had the potential to cause problems for triumphators. During the Republican period, there was often a delay of months or years between the capture of principal enemies, and the triumph.<sup>1145</sup> One of the longest terms of captivity was that of the Gallic leader Vercingetorix, who was kept by Caesar for six years before appearing in Caesar's triumph of 46 BCE. Given the effort prospective triumphators went to in order to display captives, it was clear that living specimens were preferable to objects or alternative representations. However, there were logistical issues in terms of guarding and transporting the captives. As we have discussed in a previous chapter,<sup>1146</sup> little detail of such logistical concerns is included within the primary sources. However, there are instances where captives were unavailable, or were possibly considered too troublesome to transport to Rome. In such instances, effigies were used, as in the cases of Mithridates and Cleopatra. Both were dead months before Pompey and Octavian's respective triumphs took place. Practically, cadavers could not be easily displayed given both decomposition and the Romans' concern with pollution from unburied

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<sup>1141</sup> Gell. *NA* 4.2.1, cf. Bradley, 1992: 125-138.

<sup>1142</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.142-145.

<sup>1143</sup> *OLD*: *pegma*.

<sup>1144</sup> Frilingos, 2017: 58-60.

<sup>1145</sup> Beard, 2005: 28-29.

<sup>1146</sup> Cf. pp. 98-102.

bodies, and it was not common practice during this period for captives' bodies, even executed after the triumph, to be publicly displayed post-mortem.<sup>1147</sup> However, the use of an enemy's body following their defeat could be indicative of the Romans' feelings towards their former foe. For instance, Pompey chose to bury Mithridates' body with full funerary rights. Interestingly, Romans rarely refer to the burial of their own dead in warfare,<sup>1148</sup> so it is significant when the Romans chose to bury their enemies. Granted, Mithridates' body was supposedly in a poor condition (despite its embalment) and would have certainly been unsuitable for transport to Rome. Nevertheless, the fact that Pompey afforded Mithridates proper burial rites, rather than leave his body exposed, is telling of Pompey's acknowledgement of his grudging admiration for Mithridates.<sup>1149</sup> Pompey's admiration was used to convey his own military capabilities as, by stressing Mithridates' power, he was able to show his superior capabilities in having defeated one of Rome's most powerful enemies.

Despite Mithridates being dead and buried by the time of Pompey's triumph, he did make an appearance in some form. According to Appian,<sup>1150</sup> a gold statue of Mithridates which was likely appropriated by Pompey was included in the procession, carried either on a litter or, given its size and weight, by horse drawn carriages.<sup>1151</sup> It is likely, like the throne and chariot also on display, that the statue was part of Pompey's spoils taken during the Mithridatic War. The size of and material the statue was made from are significant as gold was a precious commodity. It is possible that the oversized gold statue was presented as a means of conveying Mithridates' lavish 'Eastern' excesses, in line with the Roman stereotypes of near Eastern cultures. In addition, Pompey may have been attempting to surpass Sulla's triumph of 81 BCE, in which lavish spoils taken from his conflict with Mithridates were on display.<sup>1152</sup> In Pompey's triumph, he had not only defeated Mithridates decisively, but exceeded the wealth Sulla had taken with symbols of Mithridates as a wealthy and powerful leader on display.

However, the appearance of the statue may also have indicated Pompey's begrudging admiration for Mithridates. Evidence indicates that only the greatest of individuals were presented using gold as a material, including Augustus at his funeral and (scandalously) Cleopatra in the temple of Venus Genetrix,<sup>1153</sup> and there was an implicit

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<sup>1147</sup> In 106 CE, the Dacian leader Decebalus was forced to commit suicide in Dacia, but Trajan retained his head and brought it to Rome (Dio 68.14.3-4), where Barry suggests that it was probably thrown down the Gemonian Stairs, the first time a high-profile captive's body had been desecrated in public, *cf.* Barry, 2008: 224-6.

<sup>1148</sup> Except in the exceptional circumstances of Civil War, *cf.* Cooley, 2012: 63-77.

<sup>1149</sup> Other enemies who were afforded full burial rites were Antony and Cleopatra by Octavian, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 86.4.

<sup>1150</sup> App. *Mith.* 12.116.

<sup>1151</sup> Appian claims that the statue was 8 cubits high (3.6576 metres), *cf.* App. *Mith.* 12.116.

Appian does not specify if the statue was carried on a litter or on a horse-drawn carriage.

<sup>1152</sup> Pliny, *HN* 33.16, Plut. *Vit. Sulla* 34.1-2.

<sup>1153</sup> For Augustus, *cf.* Dio 56.34.2. Caesar infamously placed a golden statue of Cleopatra in the Temple of Venus Genetrix, *cf.* Dio, 51.22.3, App. *B Civ.* 2.102.

understanding of the significance of gold in Plautus' works.<sup>1154</sup> As such, by presenting Mithridates in gold, Pompey was able to show that Mithridates was a worthy enemy, thus emphasising Pompey's great achievement and his superiority over the impressive Mithridates. Furthermore, if taken as spoils of war, gold statues were frequently melted down.<sup>1155</sup> As such, the people watching the triumph may have recognised that, whilst the statue was a reminder of the worthy enemy Pompey had defeated, it was also financially beneficial for the Roman treasury.

### 6.12. Captives in Chains

Triumphators often presented high-profile captives was in chains. Like the issues surrounding Pompey's elephants, we are once again faced with attempting to disentangle the Romans' actual behaviour in relation to their captives, and how this was represented in later literary works, such as in Plutarch's biographies.<sup>1156</sup> Such a dichotomy is evident in the use of chains and the display of chained captives in triumphs. As we have previously discussed,<sup>1157</sup> it was common practice for captives to be chained to prevent escape, which shows that chains had a practical purpose. This is attested to in literary, archaeological and iconographic evidence.<sup>1158</sup> Nevertheless, beyond the practicalities, chains could be used as symbols of both captivity and slavery, which is also evident in art, iconography, and later literature,<sup>1159</sup> or even for comic effect as we have seen with Plautus' *Captivi*.<sup>1160</sup> Given the evidence showing that enslaved people were regularly chained, it is likely that most captives in triumphs were restrained in some way. This is apparent in artistic depiction of triumphs, with a frieze from Campania dating from 1<sup>st</sup> century CE [Figure 31] possibly depicting chained captives being led in a triumph on a horse-drawn carriage. Their physical appearance is indicative of 'barbarian' warriors, with the men sporting beards and wearing trousers. Their body language is also indicative of their defeat, with one man using hand gestures which seem to indicate a sense of despair, and the other slumped forward with his head in his hands. Beard argues that the guards in this image are presented as 'controlling (or harassing) their captives' through the use of the chains placed around their necks,<sup>1161</sup> a common feature in the display of principal captives. Figure 32, a fragmentary sarcophagus, may show the triumph of Dionysus. The sarcophagus image conveys a mythical scene, but it is likely that the artistic used

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<sup>1154</sup> For gold in Plautus' works, cf. Richlin, 2017: 441. For gold statues in Greco-Roman literature generally, cf. Whitehorne, 1975: 109-119.

<sup>1155</sup> Cf. Whitehorne, 1975: 109-119.

<sup>1156</sup> Captives were frequently presented in chains, cf. Dio 53.19.3, App. *Mith.* 12.15, Sall. *Jug.* 113.7.

<sup>1157</sup> Cf. pp. 10-12, 108-111.

<sup>1158</sup> For literary uses of chains, cf. Butrica, 1989: 258-259. Seneca even suggests that torturers used a range of different types of chains, suggesting that it was common practice for those administering punishment, cf. Sen. *Dial.* 5.3.6, Granger Cook, 2012: 68-100. For archaeological evidence, cf. pp. 108-111.

<sup>1159</sup> Hope, 2003: 79-97, De Souza, 2011: 40.

<sup>1160</sup> Cf. pp. 10-12.

<sup>1161</sup> Beard, 2007: 134.

practices found in real life triumphs. The scene features two prisoners,<sup>1162</sup> including a female captive, being led in the procession with their hands chained behind their backs. The use of chains is also suggested by Appian's claim that Pompey displayed his captives without chains. As Appian specifically pointed out this aspect of Pompey's triumph out, it would suggest that keeping captives unchained was an unusual practice.<sup>1163</sup> In Pompey's case, it may have been that Pompey wanted to convey that he had complete dominion over his captives, and that restraints were not necessary given their complete subjugation.<sup>1164</sup>

Chains had symbolic currency and were used in warfare to indicate a transition from freedom to a captive status. This is suggested by the language used, as captives are often referred to as being 'placed or delivered in chains'.<sup>1165</sup> The symbolic currency of chains is particularly evident in cases of high-profile captives, particularly those who were presented with chains made of precious metals.<sup>1166</sup> This was a practice which occurred throughout the Republican period and until the 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE. The use of precious metals may have been, as Dio suggests, a means of denoting a captive's high status.<sup>1167</sup> However, as chains denoted captivity or slavery, statuses which were thought of as deeply shameful in Mediterranean warfare,<sup>1168</sup> it was an additional insult for the defeated kings to be shown in chains. Yet, as Braund suggests, the gold or silver chains may have been deliberately selected to create a contrast between the king's former powerful position, including having control over his own body in being able to move freely, and his physical restraint under Roman control. As a result, it is likely that this carefully constructed contrast was more important than the king's 'enslaved status'. The enslaved status suggested by the chains was simply a means by which the Romans could create this contrast whilst acknowledging the status of a worthy enemy, and this links closely to the Romans' preoccupation with the fickle nature of fortune.<sup>1169</sup> Given that captives exhibited in triumphs were part of a visual display, this also links closely to representations of enemies in classical art. As Hölscher and Snodgrass suggest, enemy forces represented in art and iconography were presented with 'sympathy'.<sup>1170</sup> As we shall discuss, representations which depict fallen enemies

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<sup>1162</sup> For the use of prisoners in Dionysian triumph sarcophagi and the connection with historical triumphs, cf. Leveritt, 2016: 123-138.

<sup>1163</sup> App. *Mith.* 12.14.

<sup>1164</sup> Cf. pp. 115-128.

<sup>1165</sup> Cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.26.66, Livy 23.38.7-8.

<sup>1166</sup> Braund, 1986: 1-5. Syphax of Numidia was displayed in chains of precious metals during the Second Punic Wars (Sil. Ital. 17.629-30), Artavasdes was displayed in either gold or silver in Antony's Alexandrian triumph of 34 BCE (Vell. Pat. 2.82, Dio 49.39.5-6), Cleopatra Selene and Helios were displayed in gold chains in Augustus' Triple Triumph of 29 BCE (Prop. 2.133), and Zenobia appeared in gold chains in Aurelian's triumph in 260 CE (*SHA. Tyr. Trig.* 30.26, *Aur.* 34.3).

<sup>1167</sup> Dio 49.39.5-6.

<sup>1168</sup> Cf. pp. 9-12, 91-64.

<sup>1169</sup> Braund, 1986: 5.

<sup>1170</sup> Hölscher, Snodgrass, 2004: 26-41. Famous examples include the Dying Gaul and the Kneeling Gaul, Roman copies of Hellenistic statues which depict the fallen enemies as noble and stoic in defeat and death, cf. Ferris, 2011: 185-201.

sympathetically did not mean that the Romans pitied the captive,<sup>1171</sup> but they recognised his former status, and this enabled the triumphator to show the audience the greatness of his victory, and his and Rome's favourable fortune, in comparison to that of the defeated enemy.<sup>1172</sup>

### 6.13. Women in Triumphs

As previously stated, triumphs tended to be predominantly male affairs. Flory's study focusses on Roman women's role within triumphal processions, and she shows that even free women involved in the triumph were in the minority.<sup>1173</sup> Nevertheless, captive women were present within triumphs, but they generally appeared amongst a collective group, rather than as named individuals.<sup>1174</sup> There were exceptions, including Cleopatra VII, who appeared as an effigy, and her sister Arsinoë IV of Egypt. The daughters of Ptolemy Auletes XII, Cleopatra and Arsinoë competed with one other, and their two brothers for the Egyptian throne following their father's death in 51 BCE. The teenage Arsinoë was Queen of Egypt between 48 and 47 BCE, before being usurped by her sister, Cleopatra, who had the support of Caesar. Following her defeat and capture, Arsinoë was transported to Rome and appeared in Caesar's triumph of 46 BCE. Less than two decades later, Cleopatra may have appeared as an effigy in Octavian's triumph of 27 BCE. The last Ptolemaic queens provide a basis for comparison between the treatment of women and girls and serve to illuminate the difficulties of displaying female captives in triumphs. I will consider Arsinoë first, before continuing to discuss the possible representations of Cleopatra at Octavian's triumph, which will also inform our discussion of executions and the suicide of foreign leaders.

### 6.14. Arsinoë IV and Cleopatra the Great of Egypt

Arsinoë appeared in Caesar's triumph of 46 BCE, months after her capture in Egypt in 47 BCE. We have little information about her detention, and it is difficult to ascertain Caesar's motivation for presenting a woman as the 'principal captive' for his Egyptian triumph, particularly as women were rarely displayed in such a manner. This would certainly account for the people's negative reaction to Arsinoë's appearance, and Caesar's subsequent decision to free Arsinoë.<sup>1175</sup> According to Cassius Dio, the Roman people felt pity for Arsinoë as she was both a woman, and a former queen.<sup>1176</sup> The presentation of women in triumphs was problematic given that the ancient Mediterranean was heavily patriarchal, and a later case highlights the criticism triumphators could face should they choose to present a female in a position usually held by male warriors or statesmen. The Palmyrene Queen Zenobia, who was supposedly a descendent of the Ptolemies,<sup>1177</sup> caused similar problems for the Emperor Aurelian who captured her in 260 CE after her revolt against Rome of the same year.

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<sup>1171</sup> Although, much like Pompey's elephants, there are examples of this, as we shall see shortly.

<sup>1172</sup> Hölscher, Snodgrass, 2004: 26-41.

<sup>1173</sup> Flory, 1998: 489-494.

<sup>1174</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 141.

<sup>1175</sup> Dio 43.19.2-4.

<sup>1176</sup> Dio 43.19.2-4.

<sup>1177</sup> SHA, *The Thirty Pretenders* 30.



Zenobia was supposedly taken to Rome and was displayed in a triumph, yet Aurelian had to go to great lengths to emphasise her masculine qualities in order to present her as worthy of being the principal captive within his triumph.<sup>1178</sup> This example is from outside the scope of this study, yet it highlights the extensive justification which was necessary for Roman generals who either could not or chose not to display male leaders. This is possibly a result of how the Romans recognised men as being at the forefront of warfare, and women who were involved in military matters were often presented as masculine.<sup>1179</sup> In Roman thought, female involvement in warfare would have been considered an inversion of gender norms, as the female sphere was within the *domus*. This idea is embodied in a distich by Propertius in which he criticises the possibility of Cleopatra being paraded in Octavian's triumph.<sup>1180</sup>

*How paltry a triumph would one woman*

*make in streets through which Jugurtha once was led!*<sup>1181</sup>

...quantus mulier foret una triumphus,

ductus erat per quas ante Iugurtha vias!

Clearly, Propertius is more concerned with Cleopatra's gender than with the fact that she was a highly competent ruler who was more than capable of challenging Rome, as other authors in support of Octavian are keen to stress.<sup>1182</sup> Propertius further claims that Augustus saved them from a woman's dominion, which also denigrated Cleopatra's partner Antony's character, which was considered to be effeminate, whilst acknowledging that Octavian was forced to act against such a threat against Rome.<sup>1183</sup> Velleius Paterculus only briefly mentions the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra, but he places the blame for the other Romans' deaths, namely Sextus Pompey and Decimus Brutus, on Antony.<sup>1184</sup> Therefore, despite only appearing in the triumph as an effigy, Propertius' comments show how Cleopatra was considered to be the 'principal captive', thus Octavian's primary enemy as opposed to Antony.<sup>1185</sup> She was therefore considered to be an acceptable option for Octavian to display when compared with previous triumphs which had featured traditional male leaders. Similar criticism is also implicit in Dio's account of Caesar's Egyptian triumph. Östenberg's analysis of his account centres on Dio's displeasure with Arsinoë being 'assigned the role of the principal prisoner on display', thus implying that she was the 'principal enemy of the

<sup>1178</sup> SHA, *Aurelian* 26.3-9, 33-34, SHA, *The Thirty Pretenders* 30.

<sup>1179</sup> As we have seen with Fulvia on p. 79, cf. Hallett, 2015: 247-253.

<sup>1180</sup> Prop. *Eleg.* 4.6.65-66.

<sup>1181</sup> Prop. *Eleg.* 4.6.65-66. Translation by Goold, 1990.

<sup>1182</sup> Vir. *Aen.* 8.675-728, Hor. *Odes* 1.37, Vell. Pat. 2.87, Suet. *Vit. Aug.* 17.11, Florus, *Epit.* 2.21.10, Dio 51.13.5, cf. Tronson, 1999: 177-8.

<sup>1183</sup> Antony is often criticised for being 'enslaved' by women, including Cleopatra and Fulvia, cf. Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 10.3.

<sup>1184</sup> Vell. Pat. *Hist.* 2.87.1-2.

<sup>1185</sup> Antony was also a problematic individual to display given his Roman citizenship; this is an issue we shall address in more detail shortly.

Egyptian campaign'.<sup>1186</sup> This is in line with Dio's description of Arsinoë's actions in Egypt, in which he maintains that she was used as a pawn by eunuchs and her followers.<sup>1187</sup> Östenberg's assessment of Arsinoë's role in the triumph is in line with the Roman audience's concerns. Namely that, as a teenage girl,<sup>1188</sup> Arsinoë was unlikely to have been capable of acting as a true menace to Rome's interests in Egypt.<sup>1189</sup> However, this undermines Arsinoë's achievements or, at the least, her role as a figurehead within Egyptian society, which had long accepted female rulers.<sup>1190</sup> Furthermore, Arsinoë is cited by Caesar and Lucan as having full control over her army,<sup>1191</sup> although Caesar clearly had an agenda in presenting Arsinoë as a military leader and Lucan as a poet may have been using artistic license. As such, much like Aurelian's comments on Zenobia, authors in support of Caesar emphasised Arsinoë's role as a military commander, thus presenting her as a worthy enemy of Rome. Arsinoë's power as a figurehead is supported by her assassination, whilst exiled in Ephesus, on the orders of Cleopatra in 41 BCE.<sup>1192</sup> Antony and Cleopatra's interference in Caesar's act of clemency in sparing Arsinoë enabled later authors to present the couple as disrespecting Caesar's decisions, barbaric in the execution of a family member whose presence in the triumph had elicited sympathy, and as Antony being under the will of a woman.<sup>1193</sup>

As stated, the Roman audience's displeasure with Arsinoë's appearance may result from the fact that the use of solitary female captives was uncommon. As Wyke argues, captive women typically served as personifications of their nation, or as a symbol for all female captives taken during a particular conflict.<sup>1194</sup> However, Caesar's intention may have been to appeal to the Roman audience's understanding of symbolism. Florus' account suggests that Arsinoë was carried alongside physical representations of the Nile and the Pharos, the famed lighthouse of Alexandria, which was apparently lit.<sup>1195</sup> Forster, the translator of the Loeb edition of Florus, adds that each of the aforementioned 'symbols' was displayed on 'moving platforms'. However, there is nothing in the Latin to suggest this was the case, and it may be that Forster was basing his assessment on visual representations. Nevertheless, given the evidence from Titus' triumph, as discussed earlier, it is certainly logical to assume that Arsinoë and the two inanimate symbols would have been carried along on 'platforms' or shields, or on the back of carriage, as is typically presented in art [Figures 15, 16, 31, 32].

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<sup>1186</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 141-2.

<sup>1187</sup> Dio 52.39.1-2, 52.40.1-2.

<sup>1188</sup> There is some debate about Arsinoë's date of birth, but it is likely that she was either a teenager (between 13 and 18 years of age) or in her early twenties at the time of Caesar's triumph.

<sup>1189</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 141

<sup>1190</sup> Green, 1985: 133-168 outlines the power of the Ptolemy women, cf. White, 1989: 238-266.

<sup>1191</sup> Caes. *BAfr.* 4-5, Luc. *B Civ.* 10.519-21.

<sup>1192</sup> Green argues that Arsinoë's death was a political calculation, as she had been Egypt's queen c. 48-47 BCE and continued to pose a threat to Cleopatra's reign, cf. Green, 1985: 160.

<sup>1193</sup> App, *B Civ.* 5.9, Joseph, *Ap.* 2.56-60, *AJ* 15.88-59.

<sup>1194</sup> Wyke, 2002: 234-5, cf. pp. 124, 121-128.

<sup>1195</sup> Flor. *Epit.* 2.13.88-9.

It was not uncommon for triumphs to include paintings and images of landscapes,<sup>1196</sup> particularly those which featured exotic scenery.<sup>1197</sup> As such Caesar's intention may have been to create a physical background to contextualise the conflict for the audience, as many Romans would not have visited or seen depictions of the farflung places over which the general had triumphed.<sup>1198</sup> The Romans associated the natural landscape with the 'enemy', and the natural world was also yet another 'enemy' which had to be overcome.<sup>1199</sup> Caesar was certainly aware of this understanding, as he makes reference to being unable to completely capture Gaul, even when he had control over the towns, as its people were still eluding him.<sup>1200</sup> Furthermore, Arsinoë was displayed in chains and Dio claims that Caesar 'produced' (παράγω, parágō) her to show the Roman people. The word Dio uses had connotations of presentation and secrecy, as it can also mean to 'introduce on the stage' or 'mislead'.<sup>1201</sup> Therefore, Dio may have been implying that Caesar's presentation of Arsinoë as the principal captive was a form of sleight of hand which obscured the fact that the Alexandrian War was not a full-blown conflict, when compared to Caesar's victories in Gaul.

Nevertheless, Arsinoë's position within the triumph suggests that Caesar was aware of, and attempting to appeal to, the Roman audience's appreciation of symbolism. Arsinoë was presented alongside symbols of Egypt, a natural phenomenon and man-made landmark, and she may have been intended to represent the people of Egypt, or Caesar's dominion over the Ptolemaic dynasty. This would indicate that Caesar's conquest over Egypt was complete. However, Arsinoë's role as a symbol was seemingly unsuccessful, as Arsinoë was viewed as the 'principal captive', which supposedly damaged Caesar's credibility.<sup>1202</sup> This highlights the dangers for elite Romans of presenting captives in triumphs, particularly if the captives were not considered 'worthy' of being triumphed over.<sup>1203</sup>

Arsinoë was certainly taken prisoner by Caesar in 47 BCE, yet Cleopatra's position as a captive in 30 BCE is less clear. Cleopatra's infamous demise in 30 BCE does not need to be outlined in any detail. At the time of her death, Cleopatra was surrounded by Octavian's forces and, despite Octavian's supposed willingness to allow her a degree of freedom within her own palace, she was evidently a captive. This appears to have been understood in ancient texts, as Cleopatra is described as such in a number of sources, including by Plutarch who uses ἄγω (ágō) meaning 'to lead into captivity' to describe her position.<sup>1204</sup> Cleopatra had supposedly long planned for her death and

<sup>1196</sup> Ando, 2000: 12, Östenberg, 2018: 257.

<sup>1197</sup> Holliday, 1997: 130, Östenberg, 2009: 189-198.

<sup>1198</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 1.

<sup>1199</sup> Östenberg, 2018: 240-261.

<sup>1200</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 3.14

<sup>1201</sup> The word could be used in a practical sense, as in the introduction of a witness in court, although in many instances, the word is used to convey a negatively perceived act, including secrecy and deceit (particularly in relation to legal proceedings), cf. *LSJ*, 1307: παράγω.

<sup>1202</sup> Dio 43.19.2-4.

<sup>1203</sup> Beard, 2005: 30, Hekster, 2007: 96.

<sup>1204</sup> Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 84.3-4, *LSJ*: ἄγω.

then made preparations for suicide during her imprisonment in her palace at Alexandria.<sup>1205</sup> She only hesitated before her suicide when Octavian threatened her children's well-being should she harm herself. The fact that Octavian mentioned the possibility of Cleopatra killing herself suggests that it was expected behaviour for those faced with the possibility of capture, display in the triumph, and execution. However, it is also likely, given Octavian's hesitation to storm the palace or hurry in person to Cleopatra after receiving her suicide note, that he was complicit in her demise,<sup>1206</sup> either in not preventing it, or giving her little choice but to die by suicide.

Octavian was probably not personally involved in Cleopatra's death, but it is likely that, considering his carefully cultivated image, he recognised that Cleopatra's preservation would have been problematic for his agenda and in the wider political world.<sup>1207</sup> Like Arsinoë before her, Cleopatra would always be a dangerous and untameable figurehead. As Caesar had discovered with Arsinoë, the Roman gaze was notoriously difficult to control,<sup>1208</sup> and triumphators evidently became aware of the difficulties they would face should the presentation not be in line with Roman expectations. Such an awareness was probably based on the public's response to captives in triumphs within cultural memory. Furthermore, as Fletcher argues, Cleopatra's suicide enabled Octavian to scapegoat a non-Roman enemy for the Civil Wars, rather than Antony, whilst avoiding the resistance Caesar faced when he exhibited Arsinoë in his triumph of 46 BCE.<sup>1209</sup> Given the rhetoric surrounding Cleopatra as being 'domineering', a common accusation levelled against powerful women in the ancient world,<sup>1210</sup> it was more convenient for Octavian to continue to present Cleopatra as the primary adversary, despite the issues with displaying a female captive in a triumph. On the issue of scapegoating, captives such as Arsinoë and Juba II may have been used as a distraction from triumphs over fellow Romans. As Havener argues, no Roman general celebrated a triumph over a Roman enemy, at least not in an official capacity.<sup>1211</sup> This would explain why the emphasis in Augustus' triumph was on Cleopatra, rather than Marcus Antonius. Triumphators who had been victorious in civil strife had to ensure that they were consolidating power, which was a primary objective of the triumph, and not celebrating victory over Romans.<sup>1212</sup>

Arsinoë's appearance in Caesar's triumph may have also had an impact on Cleopatra's decision to commit suicide, and Octavian's lack of motivation in preventing it. Firstly,

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<sup>1205</sup> Dio 51.13.1-5. On her preparations for death *cf.* Fletcher, 2008: 301-303.

<sup>1206</sup> Plut, *Vit. Ant.* 85.2-3, *cf.* Chauveau, 2002: 74-5.

<sup>1207</sup> It is interesting that Virgil does not mention Cleopatra or her children's appearance in Octavian's triumph on the Shield of Aeneas, *cf.* 8.626-731.

<sup>1208</sup> Beard, 2007: 111.

<sup>1209</sup> Fletcher, 2008: 314-7, Östenberg, 2009: 143-4, Havener, 2015: 173-5.

<sup>1210</sup> Wyke, 2002: 195-6.

<sup>1211</sup> Havener, 2015: 165-205. However, individuals could be awarded a 'lesser triumph' known as an *ovatio* over Roman enemies, as Cicero received following the Catiline conspiracy, *cf.* Cic. *Att.* 16.11.

<sup>1212</sup> Havener, 2015: 165-6.

Cleopatra was aware of Arsinoë's role in Caesar's triumph and of Roman customs,<sup>1213</sup> and she would have recognised the humiliation of appearing in the procession. Cleopatra's pride and her desire to thwart Octavian's plans to display *clementia* are often cited as Cleopatra's motivation for suicide.<sup>1214</sup> Cleopatra's suicide also places her in good company with other 'worthy' enemies of Rome, as Mithridates committed suicide to avoid appearing in the triumph.<sup>1215</sup> This was a common trope in Greco-Roman writings, as the Romans viewed the suicide of individuals in desperate circumstances as a brave act. Such an assessment of suicide was based on the fact that this final act enabled an individual to retain their autonomy and not have to subjugate themselves before the victor who could, as the rules of war dictated, treat a defeated enemy as they saw fit.<sup>1216</sup> This concept is embodied in a sculpture known as the Galatian Suicide, or the Ludovisi Gaul [Figure 33].<sup>1217</sup> The sculpture depicts a nearly naked man holding up a dying woman, about to stab himself in the chest, roughly where his heart would be located. The man's head is turned away from his sword, a gesture viewed as defiant, but his chest is pushed forward, and he is clearly accepting of the anticipated fatal blow. Despite the fact that the man is in the process of ending his life, there is a sense of nobility about his actions and, whilst the sculpture is a copy of a Hellenistic original, it shows a theme which the Romans understood well: there was nobility in suicide for those who had no other choice but to subjugate themselves before a conqueror.<sup>1218</sup>

Cleopatra could have been used as a symbol of Egypt and Octavian's dominance over the nation, especially given her military status and 'noble' suicide. However, as a result of the problematic nature of females as enemies, including Cleopatra's own sister, Octavian would have been acutely aware of the possibility of angering the crowd. Similarly, the connection between Cleopatra and her children by Caesar, Octavian's adoptive father, would have probably reminded the crowd of Caesar's indiscretions with Rome's current enemy and his 'other heir', Caesarion. Should Cleopatra have been pardoned, her presence would have drawn, whether deliberately or not, her sons into scrutiny. Octavian was aware of the use of figureheads, as Antony, at Cleopatra's behest, had arranged for Arsinoë and her supporters in Ephesus to be assassinated in 41 BCE.<sup>1219</sup> Cleopatra's sons, as the children of two of Rome's greatest military leaders, would have posed the danger of undermining Octavian's claim to power, and this may have been the reason for Caesarion's alleged assassination on Octavian's orders.<sup>1220</sup>

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<sup>1213</sup> Cleopatra may have seen Caesar's triumph first-hand, witnessing her sister's humiliation, and would have been present for Antony's triumph over Artavasdes II of Armenia, *cf.* Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 27-29.

<sup>1214</sup> Hor. *Odes* 1.37, Dio, 51.13.1, Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 68.3.

<sup>1215</sup> Appian created a direct speech for Mithridates explicitly stating his reasons, *cf.* App. *Mith.* 12.11.

<sup>1216</sup> Van Hooff, 1990: 87-90, 110-117, *cf.* Griffin, 1986: 64-77, Edwards, 2005: 200-222.

<sup>1217</sup> The sculpture was unearthed during the building of the Ludovisi Villa in Rome during the 17th century.

<sup>1218</sup> *Cf.* Brown, 2001: 33-37.

<sup>1219</sup> App. *Civ.* 5.9, Joseph, *Against Apian*, 2.56-61, *Ant.* 15.89-90.

<sup>1220</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 17.

Much like Arsinoë, Cleopatra would have continued to be an Egyptian figurehead and a continual threat to Rome's peace in Egypt, should she have been allowed to live.

### **6.15. Mother and Child Captives: Thusnelda and Thumelicus**

We have seen how the display of females as principal captives could be problematic for triumphators. Interestingly, the women discussed above are not characterised or described using terms which link to what the Greco-Romans deemed to be typically 'female qualities', i.e. as pious matrons dedicated to child-rearing. Instead, Arsinoë and Cleopatra's 'feminine' qualities are underplayed, or, in the case of Cleopatra, antithetical characteristics are presented. However, as the majority of female captives appeared alongside their children and extended families,<sup>1221</sup> it is clear that the mother-child relationship was one the Romans wished to exploit in the triumph. As we have seen in the chapters on sexual violence and enslavement, women were used to symbolise land, the people belonging to it, and the future of a nation. By presenting women as mothers alongside their children, the Romans were able to demonstrate their dominion over the whole nation: men (as principal captives), women (as symbols of a nation who carry the future), and children (representative of the future). Therefore, it is necessary to discuss how women were presented alongside their children.

The case of the Germanic noblewoman Thusnelda and her infant son Thumelicus exposes some of the issues with presenting child captives and introduces some of the difficulties for the triumphator with displaying women and children as 'principal captives'. Before continuing further, it is important to outline the sources we are reliant on for details of Thusnelda. Thusnelda's story is relayed by two writers: Tacitus and Strabo. Tacitus discusses Thusnelda's marriage and capture in some detail, but does not detail Germanicus' triumph and therefore omits all reference to Thusnelda and her son appearing in the triumph. The only evidence we have that Thusnelda appeared in the triumph comes from Strabo who casts Germanicus' triumph as a success, describing it as 'most brilliant'.<sup>1222</sup> This is in contrast to Tacitus who stressed that Germanicus' triumph had been awarded before the war was over, in contradiction to the conventions for awarding a triumph. We shall discuss Tacitus and Strabo's presentation, or lack thereof, in more detail later in the discussion.

To briefly outline Thusnelda's case: in 15 CE, Germanicus was granted a triumph by the senate for the on-going conflict in Germany,<sup>1223</sup> and in 17 CE displayed the wife and child of the Romans' greatest enemy in the region, Arminius. Arminius had been instrumental in the crushing defeat of the Roman general Varus' legion in the Teutoburg forest in 9 CE. Having been captured two years before, Thusnelda, who was also the daughter of the Roman ally Segestes, was presented in the triumph alongside her infant son with Arminius, Thumelicus.

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<sup>1221</sup> As evident in Pompey's triumph of 61 BCE, cf. *App. Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1222</sup> Strabo 7.4.

<sup>1223</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.55, Strabo 7.4.

Thusnelda had supposedly been abducted by Arminius from her father's home,<sup>1224</sup> thus casting aspersions on the appropriate conduct of the hostile Arminius and the legitimacy of his child. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Thusnelda was taken captive by the Romans whilst pregnant and in her father's home, Thusnelda is cast as being more like Arminius in temperament than her father, who was amenable to Roman leaders and influence in the region. In the absence of Arminius, who continued to wage war against Rome for many years, Thusnelda and their child acted as symbols of his power and the future of the rebellion in Germany. As we know, women were problematic for triumphators to display. However, Tacitus presented Thusnelda as being powerful and the harbinger of potential doom for the Roman people. Upon her capture by Germanicus, Thusnelda is described by Tacitus as staring down at her pregnant stomach.<sup>1225</sup> Rather than this being a demure or maternal gesture, an expression of concern for her offspring's future, Thusnelda is defiant when faced with her Roman captor and is unmoved by the horrific prospects which she and her unborn child faced. The emphasis placed on Thusnelda's pregnant stomach is an indicator of the Roman readers' concern with the threat posed by Thusnelda's offspring, a possible future Arminius.<sup>1226</sup>

*They included some women of high birth, among them the wife of Arminius, who was at the same time the daughter of Segestes, though there was more of the husband than the father in that temper which sustained her, unconquered to a tear, without a word of entreaty, her hands clasped tightly in the folds of her robe and her gaze fixed on her heavy womb.*<sup>1227</sup>

Inerant feminae nobiles, inter quas uxor Arminii eademque filia Segestis, mariti magis quam parentis animo neque victa in lacrimas neque voce supplex; compressis intra sinum manibus gravidum uterum intuens.

Thusnelda's behaviour may appear passive,<sup>1228</sup> but it is significant that Tacitus' literary portrayal of her actions suggests how she and her future offspring had a temperament similar to that of Arminius. This is particularly evident in contrast to Segestes' behaviour, where he passes the decision of Thusnelda's fate over to Germanicus, rather than making any attempt to protect his daughter.<sup>1229</sup> On this point, it has been frequently noted that Tacitus does not name Thusnelda, but simply refers to her as Arminius' wife.<sup>1230</sup> Therefore, Thusnelda is presented as an extension of Arminius and

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<sup>1224</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.58.

<sup>1225</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.57. Goodyear comments that whilst Thumelicus was not born, he was still treated like a prisoner by appearing in the triumph, cf. Goodyear, 1981: 79. This would cause issues with the presentation of the child, as we shall discuss shortly.

<sup>1226</sup> Benario, 2004: 83-94.

<sup>1227</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.57. Translation by Moore, 1931.

<sup>1228</sup> Or rather less glamorous than Arminius who famously ambushed and massacred a Roman legion in the so-called Varian Disaster of 9 CE, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121. For details of the Disaster, cf. Florus. *Epit.* 2.30, Front. *Strat.* 2.9.4.

<sup>1229</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.58, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121-123.

<sup>1230</sup> Strabo is the only writer who records Thusnelda's name, cf. Strabo 7.1.4. For modern scholarship, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121, Benario, 2004: 88-89.

she could then be used as a means of harming her husband from afar.<sup>1231</sup> This is clearly outlined in an exchange between Arminius and his brother Flavus in Tacitus' *Annals*. Arminius and Flavus may have been hostages of Rome and both had entered the army upon reaching adulthood.<sup>1232</sup> Flavus had remained loyal, whilst Arminius waged war against his former keepers. Flavus attempts to convince Arminius to surrender and in doing so makes a specific reference to the treatment of Thusnelda and Thumelicus.<sup>1233</sup> Whilst clearly intended to show Germanicus' clemency, an unspoken threat is also implicit in Tacitus' description as Flavus claimed that Thusnelda and Thumelicus were not being treated 'as enemies'.<sup>1234</sup>

Arminius refused to surrender even though his family were at risk and this may account for Thumelicus' fate after his appearance in the triumph. Tacitus suggests Thumelicus' death was a shameful one,<sup>1235</sup> although the specifics are lost to us as Tacitus promises to detail the death in another (now lost) book of the *Annals*. With regards to Thumelicus' death, it is telling of his status as a symbol that it is mentioned at all. By the time of Thumelicus' death, his father had been vanquished, his mother forgotten, and his grandfather (after murdering his father, Arminius) retired in comfort by his mother's captor, Germanicus. The details of Thusnelda's fate, as the only female involved in Arminius' rebellion, are missing from the histories. It is clear that Thusnelda had outlived her usefulness as a symbol which could be exploited by Roman promotion. However, Thumelicus' short life continued to be dominated by the fact that he was his father's son.

The nature of Thumelicus' death may have been why Tacitus goes to great lengths to suggest that Thumelicus was illegitimate as his status would have enabled the Romans to justify harsh treatment as legitimacy often equated to citizenship and legal protection. There is some suggestion that Thumelicus died in the gladiatorial arena. This is based on a short reference in Tacitus to Thumelicus' 'humiliation' at Ravenna, where he was supposedly 'educated'. Tacitus uses the word *ludibrium*, meaning mockery, which has associations with games and public spectacles (*ludus*). Therefore, in addition to Ravenna being known as a centre for gladiatorial training, Thumelicus' fate is assumed by some scholars to be that of a gladiator. Alternatively, Goodyear suggests that Thumelicus was sent to the custody of naval officers who would have been stationed close to Ravenna, a coastal city.<sup>1236</sup> However, if Thumelicus had been

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<sup>1231</sup> Prieur, 2000: 121.

<sup>1232</sup> Arminius is recorded as having joined the army and we know from Tacitus that Flavus continued to serve in the army after Arminius absconded, *cf.* Vell. Pat. 2.118.1-3. Flavus may also have been a hostage in Rome, given that his son Italicus was born there, *cf.* Tac. *Ann.* 6.16. Tylawsky suggests Flavus may have been one of 40000 captives taken by Tiberius, *cf.* Suet. *Vit. Tib.* 9.1, Tylawsky, 2002: 254-258.

<sup>1233</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.9-10.

<sup>1234</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.10.

<sup>1235</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 1.58.

<sup>1236</sup> Goodyear, 1981: 85. Goodyear bases his assessment on Bato the Pannonian (Suet. *Tib.* 20) and Maroboduus (Tac. *Ann.* 2.63.4) being sent to Ravenna. However, there is nothing in these texts to suggest that they were under the care of the navy, this is conjecture based on the 18<sup>th</sup> century scholar Orelli's assertions.



under the care of naval officers, this would not explain Tacitus' reference to the child's humiliation. As we know the majority of gladiators were enslaved and, even if Thumelicus was not a slave, the *infamis* status of a gladiator was comparable. *Infames* could not, similarly to actors and athletes, be Roman citizens.

Assuming that Thumelicus was sent to a *ludus* to be trained as a gladiator, then such an act was a deliberate ploy to hurt and humiliate Arminius and his reputation, even after his death in 21 CE. From Thumelicus' appearance in Germanicus' triumph, regardless of whether he was legitimate or not, it is evident that the two-year-old was valuable to the Romans and for Germanicus' promotion. Amongst a group of Germanic captives, Thumelicus would have stood out for his youth and, as an infant, may have been carried in his mother's arms.<sup>1237</sup> As a result, the pairing of Thusnelda with Thumelicus in the triumph was likely deliberate and intended to show Germanicus' success in conquering all strata of Germanic society. This may have been the intention and may also have been intended to act as a distraction from the fact Arminius was not present. If this was the case, it was successful as with Strabo claiming that Germanicus' triumph was 'most brilliant'.<sup>1238</sup>

Tacitus' presentation of Germanicus is largely positive throughout his works,<sup>1239</sup> and this may account for why he did not refer to Thusnelda or Thumelicus in Germanicus' triumph.<sup>1240</sup> This may suggest that, as we have seen with Arsinoë and Cleopatra, Tacitus was uncomfortable with the display of high-status women in the triumph. However, Tacitus' description of Thusnelda before the triumph, Thumelicus' fate and the lack of details for Thusnelda's, shows the symbolic value of the two captives. Thusnelda, carrying Thumelicus both in utero and postnatally, acts as an extension of Arminius and the future of Germania. Arminius in turn is symbolic of Germania, as he was again in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the rebellion against Roman dominance in the area. As such, whilst Thumelicus' appearance in the triumph may have been criticised by the Roman people, it is likely the Romans would have recognised the symbolism: Germanicus, by using Arminius' wife and offspring, had effectively defeated Arminius' revolt as it could not be continued by the next generation.

#### **6.16. Child Captives: Juba II and the Ptolemy Twins**

As we have seen with Thusnelda and Thumelicus, it was more common for child captives to appear alongside their family members. However, there are exceptions to this as when those who would have been principal captives were deceased,<sup>1241</sup> and

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<sup>1237</sup> Thumelicus was probably around two years old at the time of the triumph and would have been unable to walk long distances without assistance.

<sup>1238</sup> Strabo 7.4.

<sup>1239</sup> Cf. Shotter, 1968: 194-214, Pelling, 1993: 59-85, Williams, 2009: 117-130.

<sup>1240</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.41. Tacitus' account centres on Germanicus and his children's role in the triumph, cf. Beard, 2007: 107-111.

<sup>1241</sup> For instance, Mithridates' adult children were placed on display in Pompey's Third Triumph as Mithridates was deceased. Pompey also displayed Tigranes the Younger of Armenia alongside his wife, and Aristobulus of Judaea with his children, cf. App. *Mith.* 117, Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 45.4.

some of the most prominent in this period include three individuals we encountered in the previous chapter: Juba II of Numidia, Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios of Egypt. Their treatment can be compared as Juba and Cleopatra Selene were raised in the same household and were later married, whilst Alexander Helios' disappearance from the record raises issues surrounding displaying the offspring of male military leaders. Similarly, the connection between the triumphators who paraded them cannot be ignored. Juba II was paraded in Caesar's triumph of 46 BCE, whilst the Ptolemy twins were displayed in the triumph of Caesar's heir Octavian of 29 BCE. The trio were all presented in a similar manner, although the age difference between Juba and Alexander may have accounted for the different treatment they received after the triumph took place. Juba II was probably a toddler at the time of his appearance in Caesar's triumph,<sup>1242</sup> whilst Cleopatra and Helios were either 11 or 12 years old.<sup>1243</sup>

As we know, children were regarded as representing the future of a nation. As a result, the sons of triumphators would regularly appear alongside their fathers in the procession,<sup>1244</sup> including Tiberius and Marcellus' appearance in Augustus' triumph of 29 BCE.<sup>1245</sup> As we have seen in the previous chapter,<sup>1246</sup> the Imperial family frequently used their children as symbolic currency, and it is evident from the procession on the *Ara Pacis* that Octavian's adoptive children, as his heirs, were the future of Rome, whilst the 'hostages' were used to show the dependence of foreign nations on Rome. This is significant when discussing the Ptolemy twins' appearance in Octavian's triumph as the captive children would have created a contrast with Octavian's heirs who followed immediately afterwards. As we have seen previously, Octavian used a statue of Cleopatra in the procession and presented Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios alongside the effigy.<sup>1247</sup> The Ptolemies were presented as a family group which may have enabled Octavian to avoid presenting Marcus Antonius as the primary enemy.<sup>1248</sup> The twins were presented as being part of Cleopatra's 'possessions', as her effigy was surrounded by some of the wealth she had amassed. Like Thumelicus, Cleopatra Selene and Alexandra Helios were not seen as the principal captives, but as extensions of their parents, or rather as the children of Cleopatra, not Antony. Legitimacy may also have played a part here as Cleopatra and Antony's children were not, in Roman eyes at least, legitimate, having been born out of wedlock whilst Antony was still married to Octavia. In the primary sources, Juba was considered to be the principal captive for Caesar's African triumph, but few details of his presentation are given, and emphasis is instead placed on Arsinoë.<sup>1249</sup> Havener suggests that Juba was not presented as a 'full enemy',<sup>1250</sup> and this may have indicated Caesar's

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<sup>1242</sup> Juba was mostly probably under four years old, cf. Roller, 2003: 59, Fletcher, 2008: 170-1.

<sup>1243</sup> Roller suggests that the twins were around 3 years old when Antony acknowledged paternity of them in 37 BCE, cf. Roller, 2003: 77-8.

<sup>1244</sup> Flory, 1998: 489, Beard, 2007: 224-225.

<sup>1245</sup> Suet. *Tib.* 6.4.

<sup>1246</sup> Cf. p. 154-157.

<sup>1247</sup> Dio 51.15.5, 51.21.6, Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 87.1,

<sup>1248</sup> Havener, 2014: 172-3.

<sup>1249</sup> Flor, *Epit.* 2.8, Dio 43.19, App. *B Civ.* 2.101.

<sup>1250</sup> Havener, 2014: 170-1.

acknowledgement that his war in Africa was 'morally dubious'.<sup>1251</sup> However, Juba's very young age may have enabled him to be viewed as belonging to his father and Numidia, rather than as a participant in the war itself. As Juba was clearly associated with his father, Rome's principal enemy in the war, the Romans were able to present and use Juba as a useful hostage, brought up in Roman culture,<sup>1252</sup> without the suggestion of the threat.

On this note, in the case of the Ptolemy twins, despite the victory being over Cleopatra rather than a Roman, the children could not be disassociated from their father. Dio and Paterculus' accounts of Octavian's actions after the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra are in line with Octavian's emphasis on clemency in his political promotion.<sup>1253</sup> However, it is clear that Octavian recognised the threat posed by allowing the children of Marcus Antonius to live, as he immediately ordered the execution of Antony's son (with Fulvia), the teenage Antyllus, who was Antony's official heir.<sup>1254</sup> Similarly, Caesarion (Caesar's son with Cleopatra) was quickly despatched, meaning Octavian's claim to Caesar's legacy was secured.<sup>1255</sup> That none of Cleopatra's male children survived into adulthood is significant. Alexander Helios was of an age the Romans considered close to adulthood when he was displayed in the triumph. This made him potentially dangerous as, the son of two powerful people: Antony of Rome, and Cleopatra of Egypt, meaning he could have been used as a figurehead by Octavian's enemies. As a woman, Cleopatra Selene was a more appropriate captive to keep given that the Romans did not consider women to be capable of political or military acumen and she could also be used to strengthen Roman interests by marrying, as she did, into families from around the Mediterranean. In the case of children who were presented in triumphs, the triumphator had to create a careful balance between casting the children as principal captives, whilst acknowledging that they were extensions of their parents. The children had symbolic value which was useful whilst they were at too young an age to wield power. However, it became dangerous when children, particularly males, came of an age where they could pose a threat to Rome.

### 6.17. Execution

Members of the enemy elite who survived to appear in the triumph could face execution. Executions appear to have been relatively uncommon, particularly during the Republican period,<sup>1256</sup> and evidence pertaining to the method of execution is surprisingly scant. Östenberg suggests that execution did not take place in every triumph, as there are only eight named 'principal captives', out of the 324 named in literary sources, in addition to a group of pirate captains, who are explicitly described

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<sup>1251</sup> Roller, 2003: 61.

<sup>1252</sup> Cf. pp. 165-169.

<sup>1253</sup> Dio 51.15.5-7, Vell. Pat. 2.87.

<sup>1254</sup> Dio 51.15.5, 51.21.6, Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 87.1.

<sup>1255</sup> Dio 51.15.5.

<sup>1256</sup> Beard, 2007: 129-130.

as being executed.<sup>1257</sup> Descriptions of executions in general during this period lack detail, as the condemnation or aftermath of a victim's death was often of more note than their manner of death. For instance, of the sources which refer to the triumph over Jugurtha, only two (Plutarch and Florus) of multiple sources address his death.<sup>1258</sup> The lack of detail may suggest that, as we shall discuss shortly, authors were not party to executions. Nevertheless, execution was an accepted part of the triumph, as Cicero and Appian suggest.<sup>1259</sup> For instance, it was such an expected trope that Appian incorrectly claims that Aristobulus of Judaea was executed during Pompey's third triumph of 61 BCE, despite later acknowledging that Aristobulus died 12 years later, in 49 BCE.<sup>1260</sup>

Execution appears to be reserved for male captives, possibly because they were the 'principal captives', who were usually seen as the leaders or generals, but also for the symbolic reasons which were outlined in the sections on female and child captives, and which will be discussed in the following section on women and execution. On this note, a discussion of execution should be prefaced by an understanding of 'the body' in a Roman context. As we know, the body and its parts are frequently harnessed for symbolic purposes, and this is certainly the case for the Roman world.<sup>1261</sup> Violence was omnipresent in Roman society, and was prevalent in the judicial system.<sup>1262</sup> Clearly legal punishment only applied to Roman citizens, yet penalties inflicted on non-elites, especially those without Roman citizenship, could be severe.<sup>1263</sup> Stratton argues that this was the case during the Imperial period, when harsh penalties for the lower orders were used to create a contrast between the 'nobility' which resided in the body of the elite, and the lower class *humiliores*.<sup>1264</sup>

As Stratton continues: 'social worth was demonstrated graphically by the sanctity and integrity of the elite bodies versus the vulnerability and indignity of the lower-class bodies.'<sup>1265</sup> On this point, we need to remember that enslaved people, particularly those involved in acting, sex-work, and gladiatorial combat, were akin to *infames*, and that, as Frederick argues in relation to actors, such individuals 'sold [whether willingly or not] his or her body, and, for this reason, no matter how sensational or extravagant the role played, he or she was always subject to the body.'<sup>1266</sup> Considering such a contrast, it is not surprising that such meaning was also harnessed for the execution of captives at the end of the triumph and, as we have seen throughout this thesis,<sup>1267</sup> the use of captives to represent their nation or people. Given the symbolism of the body, it

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<sup>1257</sup> Östenberg, 2009: 161. The individuals in question were: Gaius Pontius, Aristonicus, Jugurtha, Tigranes the Younger, Aristobulus, Vercingetorix, Adiatorix, Simon Bar Giora, *cf.* Table 1.

<sup>1258</sup> Plut. *Mar.* 12.3, Flor. *Epit. Summaries* 57, *cf.* Vell. Pat. 2.11-12, Sall. *Jug.* 114., Prop. 4.6.65-70.

<sup>1259</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.77, App. *Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1260</sup> *Cf.* App. *Mith.* 12.117.

<sup>1261</sup> *Cf.* pp. 111-115.

<sup>1262</sup> Barry, 2008: 222-246.

<sup>1263</sup> Stratton, 2014: 155-7.

<sup>1264</sup> Stratton, 2014: 155-7.

<sup>1265</sup> Stratton, 2014: 156-7.

<sup>1266</sup> Frederick, 2002: 246.

<sup>1267</sup> *Cf.* pp. 68-73, 84-89, 115-124, 154-157.

follows that the Romans executed enemies in order to demonstrate their control over captives' bodies which in turn represented foreign nations or peoples.

### 6.18. The Execution of Simon bar Giora

The triumph, like public spectacles, involved the audience being able to witness the increasing terror of those forced to participate.<sup>1268</sup> The increasing violence against a high-profile captive is evident in Titus' treatment of Simon bar Giora, as told in detail by Josephus in his *Jewish Wars* [Table 1]. After being presented in front of Titus' chariot, a halter was thrown over Simon's neck and he was tortured either, as we shall discuss shortly, during the triumphal procession or in prison. Josephus used the word αἰκίζω (*aikizō*), meaning 'to treat injuriously, to plague, torment'.<sup>1269</sup> The word has been translated as being 'scourged' or 'whipped',<sup>1270</sup> but there is nothing in Josephus' description to indicate a specific form of maltreatment. Still, flogging was a common punishment in Roman society for non-Roman citizens and criminals,<sup>1271</sup> and it was closely associated with the use of the halter.<sup>1272</sup> Furthermore, flogging was not only extremely painful but also shaming, as the victim was stripped of their clothing before their ordeal.<sup>1273</sup> Flogging therefore damaged an individual's reputation (*existimatio*),<sup>1274</sup> and can be viewed in the context of Simon's execution as being one final act of degradation before his death. Whatever the exact form of maltreatment inflicted by the Romans, it is clear that Simon suffered for an extended period before his death. As we shall discuss shortly, the exact method of execution is unknown as Josephus does not specify, but focuses his discussion on the lead up to the execution.

Another point of interest is the location in which captives' executions were held as, unlike other forms of public spectacle, the execution of high-profile prisoners took place in private. Josephus tells us that Simon's execution took place in an area off the forum. The area in question may have been the Tullianum, given its location in the northern corner of the forum, and Josephus may have expected that this was understood by his readers given their awareness of previous triumphal practices and criminal proceedings. The use of a *carcer* (prison) as a holding cell for captives is referenced by a number of ancient authors,<sup>1275</sup> but as Kyle notes was merely a holding place for those awaiting execution and was not usually intended as a long-term punishment.<sup>1276</sup> Cadoux has argued that the Tullianum was a secure location where high-status prisoners were detained. By contrast, the Lautumiae, a series of caverns, was where low status individuals awaiting execution were housed from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century

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<sup>1268</sup> Frederick, 2002: 243-4.

<sup>1269</sup> *LSJ*, 38: αἰκ-ία.

<sup>1270</sup> Another use of the word can be found in Lucian and refers to 'torture' by use of whipping (μαστιγῶν), cf. Lucian, *Anacharsis* 38.

<sup>1271</sup> The Porcian laws prevented Roman citizens from being whipped, cf. Sall. *Cat.* 51.21-24. For scourging in criminal law, cf. Just. *Digest* 48.19.6. Flogging was also indicative of status as those classed as *infames* could be whipped on sight by magistrates, cf. Sandbach, 1977: 110.

<sup>1272</sup> Cf. Hyldahl, Salomonsen. 1991: 342-366.

<sup>1273</sup> Bauman, 1996: 151.

<sup>1274</sup> Bauman, 1996: 151.

<sup>1275</sup> Joseph. *Bj.* 7.153-5, *Eutr.* 4.20, 4.27, *Oros* 5.15.

<sup>1276</sup> Kyle, 1997: 19, Beard, 2007: 128-132, Östenberg, 2009: 161.

BCE.<sup>1277</sup> Security was key here as Cadoux argues that the caverns could easily be guarded by a few sentries, but even if escapes did occur, the low status of the prisoner meant that 'if a few did escape it was no great disaster.'<sup>1278</sup> Therefore, Simon's high status is denoted to the Roman public through his detention in the Tullianum before his execution.

As Simon's execution was announced to the public, it seems likely that the execution was carried out in private as the crowd, despite its size,<sup>1279</sup> would have been quickly made aware of Simon's death had some amongst their number been witness to it. However, Josephus provides us with more detail about Simon's treatment than any other author, even those who would certainly have witnessed triumphs first-hand (i.e. Cicero, Ovid, Appian). As Josephus had personal access to the triumphator, he may simply have had more information available to him about the execution than previous authors writing about triumphs had. However, Josephus' focus rests on Simon's treatment before the triumph and it may have been the case that this part of Simon's punishment took place in full view of the public.

*This was Simon, son of Giora, who had just figured in the pageant among the prisoners, and then, with a halter thrown over him and scourged meanwhile by his conductors, had been hauled to the spot abutting on the Forum [possibly the Tullianum], where Roman law requires that malefactors condemned to death should be executed.*<sup>1280</sup>

Σίμων οὗτος ἦν ὁ Γιώρα, τότε πεπομπευκὸς ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις, βρόχῳ δὲ περιβληθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσύρετο τόπον αἰκίζομένων αὐτὸν ἅμα τῶν ἀγόντων· νόμος δ' ἐστὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐκεῖ κτείνειν τοὺς ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ θάνατον κατεγνωσμένους.

### 6.19. Reasons for Execution

As executions were relatively infrequent in triumphal processions, it is significant to note why they took place at all. For one, it is possible that the execution of captives enabled the audience to share in the triumphator's, thus Rome's, victory over an enemy nation. Barry considers the relationship between public execution, the mutilation of corpses and the Roman population during the Imperial period, and suggests that public displays of this nature enabled the Roman populace to take an active part in 'justice'.<sup>1281</sup> Barry's argument can be applied to the execution of captives, despite their executions not being public spectacles, as the triumph was intended to display the defeat of a nation, and the violence which was inevitable in warfare, within the 'safe' setting of Rome. Furthermore, the executions of prisoners of war within the city itself had connections to sacrifice, as a sacrifice of thanksgiving was made by the triumphator at the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus after the execution had taken place.<sup>1282</sup> The sacrifice had connections to the communal thanksgiving element of the

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<sup>1277</sup> Cadoux, 2008: 203.

<sup>1278</sup> Cadoux, 2008: 203.

<sup>1279</sup> As the triumph attracted large crowds, it seems likely that not all would have been able to see every aspect of the triumph, including if an execution had taken place in public.

<sup>1280</sup> Joseph. *BJ*. 7.153-5. Translation by Thackeray, 1928.

<sup>1281</sup> Barry, 2008: 229.

<sup>1282</sup> Flower, 2004: 326-7.

triumph, enabling the Roman public to participate, albeit from a distance, in the execution of Rome's enemies before offering sacrifices to the gods who had ensured Roman victory. The sacral element of the triumph had implications on the method of execution, as we shall discuss shortly.

Violence was further alluded to in the triumph through the inclusion of 'battle scarred' veterans, depictions of warfare on paintings, and with the degraded captives.<sup>1283</sup> The violence prevalent in the promotional activities of the political elite, including in spectacles and iconography, enabled the Roman population at large to become accustomed to the wholesale slaughter, sexual assault, and enslavement of enemy nations. In the case of the triumph and the execution of captives, the Roman public, anxiously awaiting the announcement of their enemy's death, participated in its perpetration through witnessing the last hours of enemy leaders' lives and celebrating their end. In this respect, it was unnecessary for the Roman people to witness the execution first-hand as they would have been acutely aware of the types of executions carried out against criminals. As we saw in relation to Sulla's execution of the Samnite soldiers within hearing distance of the Roman senate,<sup>1284</sup> allowing the audience to imagine the execution then announcing it was, given the creation of anticipation, more theatrically terrifying than the reality.

Nevertheless, the execution of enemies within the city of Rome marked the defeated foes as being 'the other' and enabled the Romans to create a sense of superiority. This was reinforced by the Romans' understanding that victory equated to divine favour. As we have seen with Simon bar Giora's treatment, the gradual humiliation and increasing terror was a means of foreshadowing his death and the destruction of his community. Foreshadowing, a technique commonly used in theatre, may have been another way by which triumphators could create a sense of performance as, much like tragedy, the triumph's audience would have been acutely aware of these fallen heroes' fate but would have recognised that this was the end allotted to them. Thus, the audience would have seen that the captives' deaths were justified as such a fate was inevitable. This links closely to Roman imperialism, as whilst the view of 'defensive Imperialism' is no longer widely accepted within modern scholarship,<sup>1285</sup> the representation of captives as being violent, savage barbarians in terms of their dress and the contrast created between the triumphator and the captive's humiliation, enabled the Roman elite to present the idea of Roman imperialism as justified. In turn, the death of the enemy leader within the triumph was also justified as it was part of the wider fate. Thus, although the expression of imperialist goals was considered unacceptable in Roman culture,<sup>1286</sup> triumphators were able to convey Roman dominion through the performative elements of the triumph, using the captive's body as a symbol.

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<sup>1283</sup> Brilliant, 1999: 221.

<sup>1284</sup> Cf. pp. 60-61.

<sup>1285</sup> De Souza, 1999: 131.

<sup>1286</sup> De Souza, 1999: 131.

Furthermore, as the executions were likely carried out in private, usually in the Tullianum, the death of principal captives had to be announced to the crowd, as we have seen in relation to Simon bar Giora in the triumph and will see with the Catiline conspirators in an *ovatio* context. Given that the Roman audience recognised that execution was expected in exceptional cases, a sense of anticipation would have been created by the delay between captives being led towards the Tullianum and the announcement of their deaths. This mirrors theatrical performances in which deaths took place offstage, thus enabling a messenger to deliver a monologue with details. This may explain Cicero's proclamation of 'they have lived' in relation to the Catiline conspirators which not only stressed the unusual nature of the execution but create a sense of drama by limiting the information available, something an orator like Cicero would have been acutely aware of. Like Sulla's massacre of the Samnite PoWs,<sup>1287</sup> the audience's imagination was more powerful than the impact of watching the event itself.

### 6.20. Methods of Execution

The type of execution that captives were subjected to contrasts with the few recorded occasions on which Roman citizens were executed, specifically by decapitation outside of the city wall.<sup>1288</sup> As a case in point, the Gallic leader Vercingetorix was executed after Caesar's triumph in the Tullianum.<sup>1289</sup> It is generally assumed that he was strangled,<sup>1290</sup> although the language used translates as 'put to death' which does not indicate the nature of the execution.<sup>1291</sup>

On this point, the style of executions of other captives are not mentioned, including the deaths of Aristobulus and Tigranes who were supposedly executed at the end of Pompey's triumph.<sup>1292</sup> Plutarch references the captives involved in Pompey's triumph in detail, but does not provide any details of their fate.<sup>1293</sup> However, by conducting a survey of the language used in relation to the eight individuals whose executions are explicitly referenced in primary sources [Table 1], we can see that there was a range of different methods. This is significant as the method of execution has not been fully explored in previous scholarship. Three significant studies of the triumph: Versnel, Beard and Östenberg make little reference to the method of execution. Versnel does not discuss execution at all, and Beard and Östenberg make brief references, both focussing

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<sup>1287</sup> Cf. pp. 60-61

<sup>1288</sup> Stratton, 2014: 156-7. There were some exceptional circumstances, cf. Bauman, 2002: 20. The victims of proscription were also beheaded, and their heads displayed in the forum (evidence of their execution by bounty hunters), cf. Dio 47.3.2. Cicero is highly critical of Verres for abusing power by beheading Roman citizens, cf. 2.30.76-77.

<sup>1289</sup> Dio 43.19.4.

<sup>1290</sup> Cf. Kyle, 1993: 217-8

<sup>1291</sup> Dio uses ἀποκτείνω at 40.41.3, which translates as 'kill', and θανάτω at 53.19.4, meaning 'to put to death', cf. LSJ (online): ἀποκτείνω and θανάτω.

<sup>1292</sup> App. *Mith.* 12.117. As we know, neither captive was executed at the end of the triumph: Aristobulus probably escaped from Rome, and Tigranes became a hostage whose ultimate fate is unknown.

<sup>1293</sup> Plutarch, *Vit. Pomp.* 65.



on the rarity of execution and assuming that the main method was strangulation without interrogating the sources.<sup>1294</sup>

There are eight examples of executions which range from 291 to 71 CE. Only two include explicit references to the type of execution: one case of beheading,<sup>1295</sup> and the other which lists strangulation, starvation or immuration as the causes of death. The example of Simon Bar Giora implies strangulation, but is not explicit, and the cause of death of the remaining five is not stated. The following table outlines the named captives and the method of execution used.

*Table 1. Survey of execution methods of captives in the triumph*<sup>1296</sup>

<b>Date and Captive</b>	<b>Sources</b>	<b>Method of Execution</b>
291 BCE Gaius Pontius, Samnite leader	<i>securi percussit</i> he was struck with an [headman's] axe.  Liv. Per. 11	Decapitation
126 BCE Aristonicus, alleged son of Eumenes II of Pergamon	<i>hostium more per triumphum duxere</i> they led his son Aristonicus in triumph like an enemy.  Sall. Hist. 4.fr.60.9-10  <i>capite poenas dedit</i> He paid with his life the penalty  Vell. Pat. 2.4.1  <i>Aristonicus iussu senatus Romae in carcere strangulatus est.</i> Aristonicus, by order of the senate, was strangled to death in prison.  Eutr. 4.20	Unknown, strangulation in later sources
104 BCE Jugurtha of Numidia and possibly one of his sons	ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἕξ ἡμέραις ζυγομαχήσαντα τῷ λιμῷ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ὥρας ἐκκρεμασθέντα τῆς τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμίας εἶχεν ἀξία δίκη τῶν ἀσεβημάτων. But the wretch, after struggling with hunger for six days and up to the last moment clinging to	Immuration/ starvation/ strangulation, strangulation in later sources

<sup>1294</sup> Versnel, 1970, Beard, 2007: 128-132, Östenberg, 2009: 161.

<sup>1295</sup> Gaius Pontius (291 BCE), cf. Liv. Per. 11.

<sup>1296</sup> All translations, with the exception of Liv. Per. 11, Eutropius and Orobius which are my own, are from the Loeb editions.

	<p>the desire of life, paid the penalty which his crimes deserved.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Plut. <i>Mar.</i> 12.3</p> <p><i>Ante currum tamen Marii Iugurtha cum duobus filiis ductus est catenatus et mox iussu consulis in carcere strangulatus est.</i></p> <p>Yet with his two sons, Jugurtha was led in chains before Marius' chariot, and was soon strangled in prison by order of the consuls.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Eutr. 4.27</p> <p><i>Iugurtham dolo captum catenisque obrutum per Syllam legatum misit ad Marium. qui in triumpho ante currum cum duobus filiis suis actus et mox in carcere strangulatus est.</i></p> <p>He [Bocchus] sent Jugurtha, captured by deceit and weighed down with chains, by means of the legate Sulla to Marius. He was driven in triumph before the chariot with his two sons and soon strangled in prison.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Oros 5.15</p> <p><i>nam domi pressus strangulatusque servorum manibus obstructo anhelitu gutture obstructo, ne dicam Lentuli Iugurthae atque Seiani, certe Numantini Scipionis exitu periit.</i></p> <p>In his own home he was choked and strangled by the hands of his slaves, who stopped his breath by throttling, thus causing him to meet the end of Scipio Numantinus at least – I will not say of Lentulus, Jugurtha, and Sejanus.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Sid. <i>Apoll. Epist.</i> 8.11.</p>	
65 BCE Tigranes the Younger of Armenia	<p>καὶ τούτων μόνος Ἀριστόβουλος εὐθὺς ἀνηρέθη, καὶ Τιγράνης ὕστερον.</p> <p>Of these Aristobulus alone was at once put to death and Tigranes somewhat later.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">App. <i>Mith.</i> 12.117</p>	Unknown
65 BCE Aristobulus of Judaea	<i>Ibid.</i>	Unknown

<p>46 BCE Vercingetorix of the Averni</p>	<p>καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα αὐτὸν ἠλέησεν ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐν δεσμοῖς ἔδησε, καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπινίκια μετὰ τοῦτο πέμψας ἀπέκτεινε.</p> <p>Therefore he did not pity him even at the time, but immediately confined him in bonds, and later, after sending him to his triumph, put him to death.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Dio 40.41.3</p> <p>οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν διὰ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ἀφείθη, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ ὁ Οὐερκιγγετόρις ἐθανατώθησαν.</p> <p>She [Arsinoë IV of Egypt], to be sure, was released out of consideration for her brothers; but others, including Vercingetorix, were put to death.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Dio 43.19.4</p>	<p>Unknown</p>
<p>29 BCE Adiatorix of Galatia, and his second eldest son</p>	<p>ὁ μὲν γὰρ Καῖσαρ, θριαμβεύσας τὸν Ἀδιατόριγα μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, ἔγνω ἀναιρεῖν μετὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου τῶν παίδων (ἦν δὲ πρεσβύτατος οὗτος), τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου τῶν ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ φήσαντος εἶναι πρεσβυτάτου πρὸς τοὺς ἀπάγοντας στρατιώτας, ἔρις ἦν ἀμφοτέροις πολὺν χρόνον, ἕως οἱ γονεῖς ἔπεισαν τὸν Δύτευτον παραχωρῆσαι τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῆς νίκης· αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἐπιτηδειότερον κηδεμόνα τῇ μητρὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ τῷ λειπομένῳ ἀδελφῷ· οὕτω δὲ τὸν μὲν συναποθανεῖν τῷ πατρὶ, τοῦτον δὲ σωθῆναι καὶ τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης.</p> <p>For Caesar, after leading Adiatorix in triumph together with his wife and children, resolved to put him to death together with the eldest of his sons (for Dyteutus was the eldest), but when the second of the brothers told the soldiers who were leading them away to execution that he was the eldest, there was a contest between the two for a long time, until the parents persuaded Dyteutus to yield the victory to the younger, for he, they said, being more advanced in age, would be a more suitable guardian for his mother and for the remaining brother. And thus, they say, the younger was put to death with his</p>	<p>Unknown</p>

	<p>father, whereas the elder was saved and obtained the honour of the priesthood.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Strabo, <i>Geog.</i> 12.35</p>	
<p>71 CE Simon Bar Giora of Judaea</p>	<p>Σίμων οὗτος ἦν ὁ Γιώρα, τότε πεπομπευκῶς ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις, βρόχῳ δὲ περιβληθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσούρευτο τόπον αἰκίζομένων αὐτὸν ἅμα τῶν ἀγόντων· νόμος δ' ἐστὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐκεῖ κτείνειν τοὺς ἐπὶ κακουργία θάνατον κατεγνωσμένους.</p> <p>This was Simon, son of Giora, who had just figured in the pageant among the prisoners, and then, with a halter thrown over him and scourged meanwhile by his conductors, had been hauled to the spot abutting on the Forum [possibly the Tullianum], where Roman law requires that malefactors condemned to death should be executed.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 7.153-5</p>	<p>Unknown, strangulation is implied through reference to a halter</p>

### 6.20.1. Strangulation

The assumption in scholarship that strangulation was the cause of death may be based on later references which state that captives who appeared in the triumph were strangled (or choked) in prison. This assumption is found in the *Historia Augusta* where a reference is made to 'captives of old' being strangled in prison.<sup>1297</sup> For example, in the case of Jugurtha, the earliest reference we have to his death is found in Plutarch, writing in the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE, who states that Jugurtha starved to death in prison.<sup>1298</sup> The three later references, found in Eutropius (4<sup>th</sup> century CE), Orosius (4<sup>th</sup> century CE) and Sidonius Apollinaris (5<sup>th</sup> century CE), suggest that Jugurtha died by strangulation.<sup>1299</sup> Similarly, earlier sources do not allude to the nature of Aristonicus' death, but Eutropius states that it is strangulation.<sup>1300</sup> We are clearly seeing that there is an understanding found in the writings of later authors that strangulation was the primary method of execution. However, writers before the 4<sup>th</sup> century CE make no indication that this is the case, and only beheading is mentioned as a form of execution. These authors were writing centuries after the events in question and, although using more contemporaneous sources, there is clearly an assumption based on their

<sup>1297</sup> SHA, *Tyr. Trig.* 22.8.

<sup>1298</sup> Plut. *Mar.* 12.3

<sup>1299</sup> Eutr. 4.27, Oros 5.15, Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 8.11.

<sup>1300</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 4.fr.60.9-10, Vell. Pat. 2.4.1, Eutr. 4.20.

understanding of Roman executions more widely, including those which pertain to Roman citizens.

Therefore, the hypothesis may reside in the understanding that strangulation, as a method of capital punishment, was reserved only for those in Roman society who had broken the most sacred laws, such as treason or sacrilege.<sup>1301</sup> Non-Romans could not be found guilty of treason, but the actions of enemies against Rome were like treason and the treatment of Roman traitors and enemies is therefore comparable. References in accounts of triumphs indicate that enemies were kept in the Tullianum, the same location as where those accused of treason were held and later executed. Kyle suggests that all those who were imprisoned in the Tullianum, Roman and non-Roman, were strangled to death. For instance, Kyle assumes that Vercingetorix was imprisoned in the Tullianum and therefore strangled,<sup>1302</sup> but the evidence does not support this claim. Furthermore, Kyle states that it was Tiberius who ended the use of strangulation in triumphs, but the reference from Suetonius which Kyle uses does not allude to a form of punishment, but rather to Tiberius sparing an enemy leader's life as a form of reward for honourable conduct in war.<sup>1303</sup> This widely held belief that all captives, regardless of status, were strangled in the Tullianum has caused some unsupported assumptions within scholarship which have been perpetuated in works on the triumph and executions.

As we have little evidence, we must therefore consider where this assumption originated. Some captives were presented as having chains (*vinculum, vincla*) around their necks or heads,<sup>1304</sup> and Simon bar Giora had a halter thrown around his neck. This may have been a means of foreshadowing the captives' death by strangulation at the conclusion of the procession, but this is by no means clear and as we have established, we do not know the cause of Simon's death. As said, it is possible that an understanding of strangulation as punishment for treason has led to this assumption. This is embodied by the punishment of five of those involved in the Catiline conspiracy of 63 BCE, who were all taken to prison and strangled.<sup>1305</sup> Sallust and Florus record how Cato, supporting Cicero, advocated that the conspirators should be executed in line with their offence and without trial.<sup>1306</sup> The motion was passed by the consul Cicero and senate, but proved controversial as Roman citizens would normally be permitted to avoid execution by going into exile.<sup>1307</sup> Furthermore, in his oration against

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<sup>1301</sup> Bauman, 1996: 48.

<sup>1302</sup> Kyle, 1997: 217-8.

<sup>1303</sup> Kyle, 1997: 217, 232, cf. Suet. *Tib.* 20.

<sup>1304</sup> A specific reference is made at Ov. *Trist.* 2.20-21. However, it is likely that the symbolic use of chains meant that captives were laden with chains which would have been wrapped about their person, including around their necks. For instance, Zenobia in Aurelian's triumph had to have her chains carried as the weight was too much for her to bear alone, cf. SHA, *Aurel.* 34.

<sup>1305</sup> The method of execution is recorded by Flor. *Epit.* 2.7.11-12.

<sup>1306</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 52, 55, Flor. *Epit.* 2.7.11-12.

<sup>1307</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 51, cf. Cic. *Cat.* 4.10. The executions would later prove to be an issue which Cicero's enemies could force, including Clodius who introduced a law in 58 BCE against those who had put Roman citizens to death with trial, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.45.1, Dio 38.14. Cicero was forced into exile but was later recalled.

Verres, Cicero references Verres' misconduct in executing Roman citizens by strangulation whilst they were in prison.<sup>1308</sup> In both examples, there is the sense that strangulation is an extreme measure which was usually not carried out against Roman citizens, unless in cases of treason.

The method of execution is telling of the attitude towards the conspirators and of Verres' misconduct. Strangulation is not a quick or painless death, and the 'long drop' style of hanging, which effectively broke the neck of the condemned, was not used by an executioner until 1874.<sup>1309</sup> However, before this, it was commonly understood that breaking the neck was preferable to slow strangulation or choking.<sup>1310</sup> Strangulation, which results in fatalities by depriving oxygen to the brain, is a slow and painful death in which the individual can be conscious for minutes before they succumb to unconsciousness.<sup>1311</sup> Depending on where the rope was positioned on the neck, the condemned could recover, and there are cases throughout history in which individuals had to be hanged twice to achieve the intended result.<sup>1312</sup> Therefore, it is likely that the Romans employed this method of execution as it was a more prolonged death than decapitation.

However, strangulation is also a method of execution which preserves the body as a whole, in contrast to decapitation or *damnatio ad bestias*. The assumption that strangulation was the main method of execution in triumphs may arise from the idea that the execution as a form of sacral thanksgiving.<sup>1313</sup> The shedding of blood may also have been a consideration here, as strangulation is less bloody than beheading. Blood was seen as a polluting agent which could create a sense of communal guilt and contamination.<sup>1314</sup> Some scholars, including Beard, have suggested that triumphal execution was a form of human sacrifice.<sup>1315</sup> Keeping the body whole is evident in instances which have previously been identified as being forms of human sacrifice, including the burial of Vestal Virgins and Gallic captives, or the drowning of intersex children in the earlier Republican period.<sup>1316</sup> However, human sacrifice was rare in the Roman world, evident only in extreme circumstances during the early Republic.<sup>1317</sup> By the period in question in this thesis, descriptions of human sacrifice were used as a means of 'othering' foreign peoples and would not have been an element the Roman

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<sup>1308</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.62. Other examples of strangulation in prison can be found in Cic. *Vat.* 8

<sup>1309</sup> Aitchison Robertson, 1935: 121-2.

<sup>1310</sup> As was the case for Guy Fawkes who, having been tortured and dragged (drawn) from his prison on a wattle hurdle, escaped an even more prolonged death by breaking his neck in the hanging part of his execution. His fellow conspirators were quartered, whilst still conscious after being hanged, cf. Fraser, 2003: 283.

<sup>1311</sup> A doctor in 1882 arranged for two of his colleagues to strangle him and recorded that he was conscious for 1 minute 20 seconds before falling unconscious, cf. Hammond, 1882: 292.

<sup>1312</sup> Aitchison Robertson, 1935: 121-2, Clegg, 1935: 280.

<sup>1313</sup> Cf. Beard, *et al.*, 1998: 159-162.

<sup>1314</sup> Lennon, 2014: 131-145.

<sup>1315</sup> Beard, 2008: 129

<sup>1316</sup> Schultz argues that only the example of the buried Gauls counts as sacrifice, the other examples have been misidentified as such, cf. Schultz, 2010: 516-541.

<sup>1317</sup> Schultz, 2010: 516-541.

elite would have wanted to be associated with. Furthermore, executions within Rome's city boundaries were uncommon and there was clearly some concern about executions within the heart of the city.

There may also have been an acknowledgement of the victim being a 'worthy enemy' as strangulation, unlike decapitation, enabled the body to remain whole and therefore able to pass on to the afterlife.<sup>1318</sup> For instance, following the execution of the Catiline conspirators, Cicero confirmed their deaths to the other conspirators waiting in the crowd by stating, according to Plutarch, 'they have lived' (ἔζησαν).<sup>1319</sup> In this example, Cicero avoids explicitly stating that the conspirators had died which may have resulted from the unusual nature of the execution and its location because of the nature of the crime: treason. As a result, the method of execution triumphators chose to employ against their enemies may have been used to show the enemy as someone who had committed a grievous crime against Rome, despite the fact that Roman law only applied to Roman citizens.

### 6.20.2. Decapitation

Another possible method of execution for principal captives in triumphs was decapitation. Decapitation was a quicker death than strangulation and was the method which was employed, albeit infrequently, to execute Roman citizens who did not go into exile.<sup>1320</sup> The seemingly more common use of decapitation would make strangulation more significant as a punishment as it highlighted the nature of the crime the captives had committed in trying to oppose Rome. However, as Livy shows, beheading was employed as a method of execution during the triumph.<sup>1321</sup>

The victims of proscription were also beheaded, and their heads displayed in the forum as evidence of their suicide or execution by bounty hunters.<sup>1322</sup> Clearly, the proscriptions indicated a breakdown of Roman society, and the abuse of bodies after death was a way by which those behind the proscriptions could degrade them and therefore justify their actions. The symbolism of the abuse of corpses was widely understood by the Roman elite. For instance, Cicero's body was decapitated, and his hands nailed to the senate door.<sup>1323</sup> Fulvia, Mark Antony's wife (who had also been married to Cicero's enemy Clodius), also pierced the severed head's tongue.<sup>1324</sup> The mutilation of the hands and tongue was significant for Cicero as they were essentially the tools of his trade: the hands used for oratorical gestures and the tongue to deliver

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<sup>1318</sup> As Kyle notes in relation to decapitation, *cf.* Kyle, 1997: 221.

<sup>1319</sup> Plut. *Cic.* 22.2.

<sup>1320</sup> Dig. 48.19.8.1, *cf.* Garnsey, 1970: 105. Garnsey argues that the term could be applied to a number of different punishments, but translates directly as 'by the sword' which suggests that the earliest and perhaps most typical form of punishment for Roman citizens was beheading. Crucifixion, *damnatio ad bestias*, and immolation were typically reserved for non-Roman citizens or those of lower status.

<sup>1321</sup> Liv. *Per.* 11.

<sup>1322</sup> For Sulla's proscriptions, *cf.* Dio 47.3.2.

<sup>1323</sup> Plut. *Cic.* 48-9.

<sup>1324</sup> Dio 47.8.4.

the speeches.<sup>1325</sup> However, the triumph did not indicate a breakdown in Roman society, but rather celebrated the destruction of another nation or people's social structure.

The only example we have where the method of execution is explicitly stated is from Livy and concerns Gaius Pontius.<sup>1326</sup> Pontius was a Samnite leader who was responsible for the Romans' defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321 BCE. In Chapter One, we considered the embarrassing surrender which the Romans had to endure before they were subsequently taken captive.<sup>1327</sup> As we have seen, beheading was bloody, potentially polluting through bloodshed, and destroyed the integrity of the body. In the case of Pontius, beheading could therefore have been used to convey the severity of Pontius' actions against Rome. Like the abuse of Cicero's corpse, beheading may have been used to denigrate Pontius and show the extent to which he was in Roman control, and had fallen from his position of power.

The triumphator was acutely aware of their audience and how different types and the location of executions could be perceived. Therefore, it is likely that the execution style was a consideration for triumphators, one which centred on their desire to stress their own power in contrast to that of the principal captive. Execution methods which preserved the body whole, such as strangulation or starvation, may have been selected to suggest that the actions of principal captives were akin to treason against Rome. In turn, this served to illuminate the triumphator's power and service to Rome in defeating such a foe. Alternatively, the triumphator may have wanted to demonstrate their power by humiliating the enemy through the decapitation of their body. As such, whilst evidence of execution in triumphs is scant, strangulation was not always the primary method of execution. Rather the method of execution was the choice of the triumphator, and clearly selected with careful consideration of the optics and how it illuminated aspects of their and the enemy's characters.

The aforementioned examples have dealt with high status captives who we know were executed, either during the triumph or shortly afterwards. However, we do not know what happened to less well-known captives after the triumph. Once again, the decision is likely to have been the triumphator's. It is possible that some were executed having outlived their usefulness, possibly in games associated with the triumph,<sup>1328</sup> others certainly became hostages,<sup>1329</sup> and others may have been sold into slavery. Unfortunately, the numbers detailed in accounts of triumphs are by no means comprehensive, and we cannot speak to how many people were executed, enslaved, or

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<sup>1325</sup> Richlin further argues that the public nature of the display linked to Cicero's professional as an orator, *cf.* Richlin, 1999: 189-200.

<sup>1326</sup> Liv. *Per.* 11

<sup>1327</sup> *Cf.* pp. 31-33.

<sup>1328</sup> The only evidence we have to support this assessment relates to Caesar's triumph of 46 BCE in which captives appeared in the arena. However, it is uncertain if the captives were those who had appeared in his triumph, *cf.* Dio 43.23.4.

<sup>1329</sup> Including two individuals discussed in the previous chapter: Tigranes the Younger and Juba II.



held hostage. The fact that we have so little information suggests that, regardless of the numbers involved, captives were only as important as their role in the triumph, and how their display could be used for the benefit for the triumphator.

### 6.21. Women and Execution

As we have seen, military commanders were, on rare occasion, executed at the end of a triumph. The victims were all male and there are no references to the execution of females within the triumph. This is an important issue to discuss as it shows how Roman triumphators had to carefully consider gender roles, despite some of the captive women acting in 'masculine' roles, including as leaders and generals. Before looking at specific cases, we should acknowledge that the execution of women is rarely discussed within Greco-Roman literature. If we consider the punishment of Roman women, there is evidently a sense of discomfort with discipline being in the public domain which, as we have seen with the case of Simon Bar Giora, was the case in the lead up to the private execution. We need to consider the reasons for this reluctance to execute women publicly, initially using examples concerning the punishment of Vestal Virgins, priestesses who were chosen to tend the Temple of Vesta in the Roman Forum and who were required to remain chaste for the duration of their service (usually 25 years). It should be noted that the Vestal Virgins were exceptional women who exercised more power, albeit under strictly defined circumstances, than the majority of other women in Roman society.<sup>1330</sup> Nevertheless, as we shall see, the treatment of these remarkable women once condemned closely links to how ordinary women were punished, seemingly executed by strangulation in prison.<sup>1331</sup> Further following, female captives who appeared in the triumph were high-profile and, like Arsinoë and Cleopatra, exceptional individuals. Vestal Virgins, should they break their vow to retain their virginity during their tenure at the Temple of Vesta, were buried alive with a small amount of food and water placed in a burial chamber.<sup>1332</sup> Even Vestal Virgins who were condemned to suffer corporal punishment (in the form of whipping) were privately punished, with the act carried out by a high priest behind a curtain.<sup>1333</sup> Such private forms of punishment, imprisonment and execution allowed the Romans to avoid impiety by directly harming (or seeing harmed) a Vestal Virgin who, even if found guilty of a crime, was still a member of a sacred organisation.

Wolfgang notes that accusations against Vestal Virgins usually coincided with times of political and military unrest, particularly when Roman women became more obviously interested in political life.<sup>1334</sup> Essentially this was because the Vestal Virgins were representative of Rome and its prosperity, therefore dealing with internal 'problems' may have distracted the population from outside threats whilst simultaneously giving

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<sup>1330</sup> Fantham, 1995: 236-7, Wolfgang, 2006: 64-75.

<sup>1331</sup> As the unpleasant fate of Sejanus' daughter in 31 CE shows. According to Dio, virgin girls could not be imprisoned and then executed so the executioner was ordered to sexually assault her before her death, *cf.* Dio 58.11.5

<sup>1332</sup> *Cf.* Livy 4.44.2 (420 BCE), 8.15.7-8 (337 BCE), 22.57.2-3 (216 BCE).

<sup>1333</sup> Plut. *Numa* 10, *cf.* Bauman, 93, 186*fn.*

<sup>1334</sup> Such as in 216 BCE after the Battle of Cannae (discussed at length in Chapter One), *cf.* Wolfgang, 2006: 79-81.

the impression that the Roman state was in control of its own destiny. As such, in turbulent times, news of the executions of Vestal Virgins would have been well-known to many in Rome, and it appears that the processions leading condemned Vestal Virgins to the burial chambers were in full view of the public.<sup>1335</sup> According to Plutarch, condemned Vestals were carried in a covered litter to their burial chamber, but that did not stop the public from hearing their screams.<sup>1336</sup> Much like the example of Sulla's execution of the Samnite soldiers,<sup>1337</sup> the Roman public may not have been able to see the women, but that did not matter as the screams alone would have conveyed their terror. Similarly, how the senate or an emperor responded to accusations of a Vestal Virgins' bad behaviour was indicative of their control over the Roman state. This is evident in Domitian's execution of three Vestal Virgins, at least two of whom were probably convicted on trumped up charges.<sup>1338</sup> The procession of the condemned Vestal took place in public, but her death was in the confines of a private cell.

The nature of the execution conveys the attitude of the Romans to the public execution of women. The *Digest* suggests that an alternative form of execution for women was being condemned to hard labour mines.<sup>1339</sup> Whilst seemingly not an immediate form of execution, the women were deprived of their citizenship and would have likely succumbed to the horrific conditions in the mines. As such, the Roman legal system was not directly responsible for the death of the female criminal, but still ensured that she was removed from society and her demise was not seen as being the action of the Roman state. The immurement and starvation of women, which hard labour in the mines certainly constituted, was similar to that suffered by Jugurtha, who was incarcerated in Rome and starved to death after the triumph of Marius in 104 BCE. The conclusion of the Jugurthine War had not been a fair one, with Jugurtha's followers massacred after Marius had agreed to accept Jugurtha's surrender; a clear violation of the Romans' 'rules of war'. Jugurtha's fate may have been designed to assuage Marius of the guilt of executing an opponent who had not been taken captive in an appropriate manner, an issue we encountered earlier in this chapter with Antony's triumph over Artavasdes II of Armenia.

Granted, the Vestal Virgins were afforded special treatment given their role in religious life,<sup>1340</sup> which may appear to be considered as apart from the average woman. In Roman society generally, women were typically punished privately, with the most

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<sup>1335</sup> As Plutarch suggests in relation to an incident in early Roman history, *cf.* Plut. *Numa* 10. Pliny's letter about the reign of Domitian details how he witnessed the descent of a Vestal Virgin into her tomb, *cf.* Plin. *Ep.* 4.11. It should be noted that Plutarch wrote after Domitian's reign and may have been inspired by the emperor's actions or typical treatment of condemned Vestal Virgins, *cf.* Bauman, 93, 186*fn.*

<sup>1336</sup> Plut. *Numa* 10.

<sup>1337</sup> *Cf.* Plut. Sulla 30.2-3, Dio. fr. 109.3-9, pp. 55-56.

<sup>1338</sup> For Domitian's reign, *cf.* Plin. *Ep.* 4.11, Suet. *Dom.* 8.3, Wolfgang, 2006: 104-105, Bauman, 1996: 92-99.

<sup>1339</sup> *Digest* 48.19.8, 48.19.28, *cf.* Bauman, 1996: 141-2.

<sup>1340</sup> Fantham, 1995: 236-7.

commonly cited reason being charges of adultery, with the *pater familias* administering death to his daughter and her lover. However, the privacy we encounter in adultery cases was observed even when the crimes committed were of a public nature, as Fantham discusses in relation to the Bacchanalian scandal of 189 BCE, in which 7000 cult members were accused of conspiracy against the Roman state.<sup>1341</sup> The male ringleaders were executed, but the women involved were confined to their family estates in the country, away from the public eye. According to Livy, if women's executions were not carried out by a family member, then they would be handed over to the public executioner.<sup>1342</sup> The fact that the Roman state handed the women into the custody of their families suggests a number of things. Firstly, women were under the supervision of the *pater familias* and should be dealt with accordingly. Secondly, the Roman state would not be responsible for the deaths of these women, despite the ruling that they should be executed. Thirdly, a sense of shame would have been felt by those unable to execute the women as they were failing to do their duty to Rome, and they would have also witnessed their daughter's reputation (and by extension their own) tarnished by surrendering her to the mercy of the public executioner and the public at large.

The private practice of punishing women is evident in the period in question in this thesis with Augustus choosing to exile his daughter Julia rather than kill her when she was accused of treason and adultery.<sup>1343</sup> Augustus, who had introduced moral legislation, based on ancient traditions,<sup>1344</sup> would have been legally permitted, as the *pater familias*, to execute Julia should he have wished. Cohen suggests that Julia's lovers were punished in a manner which was akin to treason, but Augustus chose to punish Julia in a less severe manner, with exile rather than death, which kept the punishment in the private domain.<sup>1345</sup> These examples pertain to elite women, but Valerius Maximus tells us of the extraordinary story of a woman who breastfed her imprisoned mother whilst she was anticipating her execution via strangulation.<sup>1346</sup> Maximus relates how the prison warder was the person in charge of execution, thus suggesting that the execution was set to take place in the privacy of the prison.<sup>1347</sup> Evidently an *exemplum*, linked to Pero and Cimon whom Maximus discusses next, this instance reveals a common theme in relation to the Romans' execution of women: criminal or captive. The common denominator, as Bauman's study of execution in the Roman world suggests, was the importance of preserving a condemned female's modesty during the execution.<sup>1348</sup>

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<sup>1341</sup> Liv. 39.8-19, cf. Fantham, 1995: 263-4.

<sup>1342</sup> Liv. 39.18.

<sup>1343</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 65, Veil. 2.100.2-5, Dio Cassius 55.10.12-16, Sen. *Ben.* 6.32.1-2.

<sup>1344</sup> There are examples of women being killed by their families before Augustus' legislation, cf. Val. Max. 6.8.

<sup>1345</sup> Cohen, 2008: 206-217.

<sup>1346</sup> Val. Max. 5.4.7.

<sup>1347</sup> Val. Max. 5.4.7.

<sup>1348</sup> Bauman, 1996: 18.

The Vestal Virgins, those involved in the Bacchanalian scandal, and Julia all belonged to the Roman elite, whilst the imprisoned woman and her daughter's statuses are unknown. Unfortunately, for the period in question, we have little evidence pertaining to the execution of non-elite women. No doubt execution of females took place during this period, and the lack of reference to executions within ancient sources may have been because the execution of non-elite females was commonplace. However, considering the private punishment of elite women, it is likely that executions of women during this period took place away from the public's gaze. As far as we know, no women were executed in the context of the triumph. The discussion throughout this section demonstrates how uncomfortable the Romans were with even the hint of women being executed, as evident with the Vestal Virgins. Therefore, whilst we have seen that women could be considered as principal captives, the issue of execution was yet another problem for the triumphator in choosing to display a female leader, rather than a man. In the triumph, which acted as a form of punishment, the presence of females as the principal captives presented a problem. Like Cleopatra and Arsinoë, the Roman public would have been aware of their position as former queens who had been subjugated and were associated, through the use of chains, with slavery. Returning to Cleopatra, Octavian could not have executed the queen without risking criticism, thus her suicide was highly convenient for Octavian's self-promotion, despite his supposed desire to preserve her for the triumph.

## **6.22. Chapter Conclusion**

Captives were central to Roman triumphs and triumphators went to great lengths to display them in ways which signified Roman dominion over foreign enemies and their nations. Humiliation and degradation were key to the presentation of captives in triumphs, primarily because the Roman audience would have recognised their lack of autonomy. Captives could be chained, forced to walk in front of crowds, placed on platforms, wear elaborate costumes, and face execution, and they had no means of escape other than to commit suicide before their capture. The presentation of captives was created to exacerbate their defeated status. However, triumphators had to also acknowledge their enemies' former power in order to stress how they had overcome a 'worthy' adversary. This was problematic when triumphators presented women and children. In such cases, the masculinity of a female was stressed, as with Cleopatra and Zenobia, or emphasis was placed on the symbolic use of women in elite promotion, as with Arsinoë appearing alongside other symbols of Egypt. Alternatively, like Thusnelda, Thumelicus, Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios, women and children were presented as extensions of their male relations. Overall, captives in triumphs were presented in ways which created a contrast between them and the triumphator. This was done in order to emphasise the triumphator's military prowess and the Romans' superiority over inferior nations which in turn justified the treatment captives had or would soon be subjected to.

## Conclusion

This thesis has shown that the Romans recognised that there was something akin to a standardised process for captive-taking which was designed to gradually humiliate and degrade enemy captives and their wider community. In turn, the destruction of an individual's well-being and society enabled the Romans to control enemy captives more easily. Captive-taking occurred on a vast scale and the Romans' ability to take large numbers of captives relied upon a campaign of terror against the enemy. Captives taken during warfare were used for military intelligence, and hostages, like Dumnorix and Tigranes, were used to cement alliances between Rome and nations involved in or geographically close to the conflict. Once an enemy had been subdued, massacre and sexual violence were essential components in degrading and destroying communities which made individuals more compliant when they were taken ultimately captive. The Roman general could then decide the captives' fates with consideration to logistics and the financial, diplomatic, political or symbolic value of the captives, which largely depended upon captives' socio-economic background. The majority of captives were either massacred or enslaved, although elite individuals were retained as hostages or for use in the triumph.

The evidence we have pertaining to captive-taking is written from a Roman viewpoint, including histories by former captives like Polybius and Josephus, who relied upon their captors for their security and wellbeing. Therefore, I have used sources which are essentially elite self-representation to identify and explore common practices and provide a detailed overview of captive-taking from the use of captives within warfare to the process of enslavement and through to subsequent public presentations of captives in triumphs or elite households. Using representations to identify historical realities, expected norms and how concern for representations impacted upon captives' treatment has not been fully explored in previous scholarship on captive-taking. Furthermore, there is a tendency to focus on such concepts as the institution of slavery or Imperialism, rather than on how a group of individuals were affected by the Romans' actions or need to represent their behaviour in a certain way.

Aggression of all forms had to be heavily justified by the Roman elite in their representations of events, which accounts for Caesar's frequent references to his foreign enemies' wrongdoings, according to the Roman rules of war. Therefore, captive-taking was seen as justifiable conduct if an enemy had broken the rules of war and had been defeated in conflict. It is within the area between expectation and reality where we find the Roman elite manipulating representations of captive-taking and captive management for their own agenda. It has therefore been appropriate to consider the impact the Roman elite's concern for subsequent representations had on their treatment of captives.

### **Gender**

It is clear that there were gendered dimensions to Roman captive-taking. Those capturing and subsequently representing capture were all male and were heavily

influenced by Rome's heavily patriarchal society. Subsequent scholarship, particularly on Roman warfare, has largely ignored the impact of war on women and children. This thesis has shown that the process of captive-taking was designed to degrade, humiliate, and make malleable everyone in an enemy society, including elite and non-elite men, women, and children. Men are most frequently referenced, given our sources (all men) and their interests in representing male enemies, who were most often commanders and combatants, as being subjugated. Men were subjected to all forms of treatment, including being used as informants and combatants in warfare, massacre, enslavement and in subsequent public presentations of captives. However, women (and sometimes children) were subjected to sexual violence, both during warfare and, if they were enslaved, for the remainder of their lives. The motivations behind sexual violence were demonstrating how women's male relatives were no longer able to protect them, and also suggesting the next generation was illegitimate. These concerns largely centre around women's relation to men, in that they were under the authority and protection of their male relatives, and the Romans had destroyed that relationship. Therefore, the treatment women received was designed to humiliate and degrade both the women and their male relatives, and was significant within Roman representation because it was not about humiliating the women as an isolated group, but rather demonstrating that women represented and linked to the rest of an enemy's society: be it the men or children of all social statuses.

Despite the importance of women within society, and the symbolic roles associated with fertility that they hold, the role of women in enemy societies was often underestimated and therefore underrepresented. We see this within examples of elite captive-taking, where women were held as hostages and appeared in triumphs but were rarely seen as being serious contenders for foreign thrones, as we see with Clodius' meddling with the male hostage Tigranes. Similarly, there are no references to female hostages ruling kingdoms in their own names, other than Cleopatra Selene who ruled jointly with Juba II. Neither were women normally considered as military commanders, as we see with the representation of Arsinoë and later Zenobia in the triumph, and how no female leader was ever executed. The Romans certainly took female captives, and they were often subjected to horrific treatment which had long-term consequences. However, the Romans were also conscious of how their own society viewed women as being under the dominion of their male relatives, and therefore the treatment they received was always in connection to damaging the reputation of men.

### **The process and representation of Captive-taking: From the Mid-Republic to the Early Principate**

Having briefly outlined the historical realities, we should consider representations of captive-taking during the late Republic and early Imperial period, and what they tell us about changes to the captive-taking process. We need to acknowledge that representations of captive-taking and its practices remained fairly stable over the course of time, particularly the period under scrutiny in this thesis, as elite individuals used captive-taking to compare and contrast the behaviour of high-profile figures to

past Romans. This would suggest that the practice of captive-taking did not change during this period as representations would only have been successful if discussion of captive-taking was in line with reality.

In terms of representation, during the mid to late Republican period, it is clear that the Roman elite moved towards using less explicit references to captive-taking practices. For instance, Polybius' account of Scipio at New Carthage explicitly addresses the controversial use of captives in the army, the soldiers' desire for material rewards, and sexual violence.<sup>1349</sup> By the time of Augustus, such references were made only implicitly in relation to Roman military practices, or were used in hostile sources to stress the bad behaviour of Roman commanders during Civil War contexts, such as Cicero's description of Lucius Antonius' actions at Perusia.<sup>1350</sup> Arguably, the lack of detail may have been because the Roman elite recognised that such acts as massacre, sexual violence and enslavement were expected parts of warfare. However, whilst it was necessary for commanders to reference such acts, as they indicated the complete subjugation of a society, behaviour of this kind may have been considered morally dubious, as indicated by Cicero's *De Officiis*,<sup>1351</sup> Caesar's justification of his actions throughout the *Gallic Wars*, and accounts of attacks on Roman citizens at Perusia and Cremona.<sup>1352</sup> Another point we need to consider is the change in the political and military structures during the late Republic and early Principate. During the Republic, generals had to stress their military prowess as they were in competition with others for political power. However, by the time of Augustus, military prowess came to be monopolised by the emperors and there was less incentive for military commanders to highlight their achievements to the same extent as their late earlier counterparts.

During this period, despite the use of more subtle references to the types of treatment captives were subjected to, captive-taking was central to elite self-promotion and the perpetuation of ideas surrounding Roman Imperialism and slavery. Enemy captives were seen by the Roman elite as representatives of their nations, with men used to symbolise combatants and protectors of a nation, women as bearers of offspring and symbols of fertility and their land, and children as the future of a nation. Therefore, the Romans' treatment and representation of captives at each stage of the captive-taking process was designed to convey the complete subjugation of a people by portraying the treatment each group faced in elite self-promotion. Male combatants were often massacred during warfare to show that a society was unprotected, women sexually assaulted to destroy the legitimacy of any offspring, and all surviving people enslaved, including children who represented a nation's future. Meanwhile, elite members of society were taken hostage and/or held by the elite for display in their triumphs, to secure future diplomatic relations with the defeated enemy, or to symbolise Roman control over the nation's leaders and their families. The differing treatment of captives

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<sup>1349</sup> Polyb. 10.18, *cf.* Livy 26.49.12-.16.

<sup>1350</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 3.12.

<sup>1351</sup> 'As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness', *cf.* Cic. *Off.* 1.24.

<sup>1352</sup> For Perusia, *cf.* Cic. *Phil.* 3.12, and Cremona, *cf.* Tac. *Hist.* 3.33.

of different genders and backgrounds was part of the process of captive-taking, and was designed to humiliate and degrade an entire community, thus enabling the Romans to impose their will on vulnerable people more easily. Furthermore, by alluding to the treatment of different types of captives taken from across an enemy's society, the Roman elite were able to convey how a whole enemy nation was under Roman control. The Romans' expectations and understanding of the treatment and symbolism of different types of captives was harnessed by the political elite to perpetuate the acceptance of violence and expansionism in Roman society.

Throughout this thesis, I have outlined the treatment and subsequent representation of different types of captives, commenting upon linguistic differences where appropriate. However, the following sections highlight how, regardless of the terms used by the Roman elite or captives' gender, age or socio-economic background, captive-taking of all forms was used within elite self-representation to demonstrate several key themes. Therefore, we should consider all captives to be ultimately thought of by the Roman elite as having an inferior status which was often in line with their perceived 'worth', be it financial, political or diplomatic. The treatment they received often dictated their perceived 'value', with elite individuals being subjected to relatively more favourable treatment than their non-elite counterparts. Here we see how the Romans' concern for status and how they treated their high-ranking enemies informed the treatment of their captives, as later representations of their actions were of concern to Roman commanders. The following sections outline the treatment of men, women and children, and non-elite and elite groups, although gendered dynamics are referenced where appropriate. Captives, regardless of the aforementioned categories, were ultimately reduced to commodities or tokens, both in actuality and representations, which were used within elite self-promotion for the benefit of the elite and their agenda.

### **Captive-taking and Elite Characterisation**

By stressing the complete subjugation of a nation through literature, art and iconography, elite individuals were able to emphasise how they or well-known figures from history were successful military commanders. As Roman society highly prized military prowess, elite individuals were therefore appealing to their audiences', elite and non-elite alike, investment in Roman concepts of military power and expansionism. For instance, in his *Gallic Wars*, Caesar claims that captives taken for the purpose of extracting military intelligence often provided false information. This is hardly surprising given that the enemy would want to protect their own people. Yet, by claiming that he recognised captives' deceptions, Caesar was able to demonstrate his military and intellectual superiority as he supposedly saw through the enemy's deceit. Therefore, captive-taking and the careful management of captives was used to illuminate personal qualities of an elite individual which contributed to their image as a conqueror acting for Rome's interests.

Captive-taking of all forms could also be used to indicate the extent of an individual's power. In particular, the use of language and symbolism associated with slavery was key to conveying military success and complete dominion over a nation. For example,



the enslavement of enemy peoples enabled Caesar to present himself in the *Gallic Wars*, acting as a representative of Rome, as completely subjugating the whole of an enemy nation. This links closely with representations of sexual violence, as women were cast as symbols of their nation or the land they inhabited, and were understood to be crucial to the enemy's society. Therefore, Caesar presented his actions in relation to capture for enslavement as being necessary to completely conquer an enemy. As we have seen, Caesar benefitted financially from the mass enslavement of Gallic and Germanic peoples, and also harnessed the optics of conquering an enemy within his self-promotion, including in his commentaries and numismatic imagery. However, the Roman elite had to strike a balance between presenting their own actions as being admirable, essentially pushing their own agenda, and ensuring that they ultimately showed their behaviour as contributing towards Rome which could be achieved by emphasising an elite individual's contribution through captive-taking to the economy, labour force, or diplomacy.

However, military aggression and enslavement were not the only means of conveying an individual's power or prestige. For instance, Scipio showed his power at New Carthage by freeing individuals who were politically or diplomatically useful for Rome in their war against Carthage, and retaining the craftsmen for labour in the Roman army. This enabled Polybius to present Scipio as a wise general who displayed his authority through clemency, rather than wholesale enslavement. Hostage-taking is another example of where diplomatic captive-taking was used to convey dominion, rather than stress military action. Presenting 'peaceful' methods of controlling a foreign nation became especially important during Augustus' reign given the emphasis on the *Pax Romana* throughout his self-representation. Hostages, including many of those not explicitly labelled using such terms, were usually kept in comfortable conditions, even building lives for themselves in Rome. However, once an enemy nation handed over hostages to Rome, they were effectively acknowledging Roman dominion, as the hostages, who were usually the offspring of foreign leaders, represented the future of their nation. The supposed foreign acknowledgement of Roman authority enabled elite individuals to utilise references to hostage-taking within their self-promotion, including on the Ara Pacis, to show the reach of their power.

In these examples, we see how captives were considered in the Roman mindset as only worth preserving if they held some political, diplomatic or financial value. This is true whether the captives were non-elite or elite. The reduction of people to commodities is clear for both non-elite captives, such as those given by Caesar as rewards to his soldiers,<sup>1353</sup> and for elite hostages, with Augustus describing his Parthian hostages as *pignora* (surety pledges) rather than hostages (*obsides*).<sup>1354</sup> With regards to the latter example, the fact that such individuals were known as pledges further stresses that they were not seen as people, but rather as diplomatic or political tools.

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<sup>1353</sup> Suet. *Vit. Iul.* 26.3, Caes. *B Gall.* 6.3, 7.89-90, 8.89.

<sup>1354</sup> Aug. *RG* 32.

The degradation of a captive's status to something akin to an object or tool links to the issue of slavery which runs throughout this thesis, as enslaved people were viewed as *instrumentum vocale* ('talking hardware'). The reduction of captives to the status of enslaved people, despite the language Greco-Roman authors used to describe them, and the justification for enslavement in Roman society, literature and art contributed towards how the Romans were able to continue perpetuating the idea that non-Roman enemies were inferior and deserving of their fate. Therefore, the presence of enslaved people, particularly as they were thought to have been taken in conflict, was a constant reminder of Roman expansionism and superiority in warfare. This is particularly evident in art and iconography, with the captives' inferiority stressed through their positioning in relation to a Roman general, such as on *tropaea* where captives are presented in subjugation under symbols of Roman military power. Roman elite self-representation relied upon creating a sense of contrast between themselves and their captives, a point we shall discuss in more detail in the following section.

We have seen examples of the successful use of captive-taking in elite self-promotion, particularly depictions of the practice in Caesar's *Gallic Wars* and by famous military commanders like Scipio. However, the use of captives as a form of self-representation could also be used against elite individuals. For example, hostile representations of Sulla's massacre of the Samnites show how representations of the treatment of captives could be used by later writers to stress, in contrast to Scipio, unattractive qualities of controversial Roman figures.<sup>1355</sup> For Sulla, the example emphasised his theatrical and violent reputation. Descriptions of Sulla's massacre of the Samnite captives appear in literature written centuries after the events in question and speaks to captive-taking and the subsequent management of captives as a means of highlighting the behaviour or characteristics of well-known Roman figures long after the events took place.

However, captive-taking could also be used in contemporary elite self-promotion to attack a high-profile figure. As we have seen that all captives were essentially reduced to commodities, high-status captives, particularly hostages who held political and diplomatic value, were used as tokens of an individual's power which could easily be manipulated. A prime example of this is Clodius' decision to kidnap Pompey's hostage Tigranes and attempt to return him to Armenia.<sup>1356</sup> The incident made Pompey appear weak as it seemed as if he was not able to control his affairs in Rome, let alone on the battlefield. We do not know what happened to Tigranes after his attempted escape, and this stresses how the Romans had little interest in Tigranes himself, but how his manipulation by Clodius affected the reputation of members of the Roman elite. Essentially, this was how the Romans presented captives generally, as being only worthy of discussion when they illuminated a feature of Roman culture, particularly Roman military or political dominance in a region, or an individual's characteristics.

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<sup>1355</sup> Plut. *Vit. Sull.* 30.2-3, Dio. *fr.* 109.3-9.

<sup>1356</sup> Asc. 47, Cicero, *Dom.* 66.

### Characterisation of the Enemy: 'Worthy' and 'Deceitful' Captives

Descriptions of captive-taking practices could also be used to illuminate the often negative characteristics of a foreign leader or nation, usually in contrast to Roman behaviours. By stressing the 'otherness' and 'non-Roman' characteristics of foreign peoples, the Roman elite were able to justify their aggression and the subsequent treatment of captives. Non-Roman barbarity was stressed to ensure that the elite Roman audience, at whom elite self-promotion was primarily directed, could identify the enemy clearly, and recognise a contrast between Roman and foreign behaviours. By emphasising how non-Romans broke or ignored certain conventions dictating conduct in conflict, the Roman elite were able to present their subsequent attacks on non-Roman enemies as being justified. Inevitably, as the enemy were portrayed as unworthy and dishonest opponents, the Roman elite were presented as being vindicated, beyond the rules of engagement which allowed them complete authority over captives, in treating the captives in whatever manner they saw fit. This also supported the Romans' view of themselves as being superior and enabled the perpetuation of their Imperialist ideology which was largely disseminated through elite self-promotion.

For instance, the 'deceitful captive' trope was common across Greco-Roman writings, and not only excused some of the Romans' military failures, but furthered the Romans' idea that non-Romans were untrustworthy and abusers of wartime conventions. A key example of this is how Caesar managed to avoid criticism for losing the hostages at Noviodunum by stressing the brutality of the enemy.<sup>1357</sup> This enabled Greco-Roman writers to justify Roman military aggression and expansionism as foreign peoples were deemed to be inferior and therefore deserving of violent and degrading treatment. Once again, we can turn to Caesar for a prime example of captive-taking practices to stress this aspect of elite self-promotion. Caesar presents the Roman massacre of the people of Avaricum during the Gallic Wars as retribution for the killing of Roman citizens at Cenabum.<sup>1358</sup> In order for the justification to make sense, given the geographical distance between the two towns, Caesar conflagrated the two tribes: the Carnutes who had killed Roman soldiers, and the people of Avaricum who Caesar's troops massacred. In doing so, Caesar was able to cast *all* 'Gauls' as being murderous. He was therefore able to present the Romans' massacre at Avaricum as justified, as the people of Avaricum were easily identifiable as being the enemy who exhibited non-Roman behaviour, signifying 'The Other'. Therefore, Caesar's troops' actions were presented as justified not only because they were avenging Roman citizens, but because the enemy were deserving of massacre.

As we have seen, the Romans applied conventions which dictated warfare and descriptions of foreign enemies in a pragmatic way. This enabled the Roman elite to manipulate such behaviour and their subsequent presentation in literature in order to promote certain characteristics of elite Romans or the Roman people as a whole. A recurring theme found in representations of captive-taking is the Romans' concern

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<sup>1357</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.55.

<sup>1358</sup> Caes. *BGall.* 7.3.

with presenting their enemies as 'worthy', specifically as powerful enough to challenge Roman dominion, but ultimately subdued by superior Roman intellectual and military prowess. Such a concern is found throughout Greco-Roman writings, particularly in relation to triumphs. Successful displays of captives in triumphs relied upon the Roman triumphator creating a contrast between himself as the victor and the defeated enemy in subjugation.

However, the triumphator had to strike a balance between presenting the enemy captives as being utterly defeated, whilst also suggesting that they were a difficult adversary to defeat. Such an acknowledgement was made through the triumphator placing principal captives in close proximity to his chariot, by emphasising their high status through costume and the display of the most lavish of their former possessions, and by in rare cases executing key captives within the city boundaries, a clear indication that the captives were significant and had broken sacred laws. The method of execution is a feature of the triumph which has not been previously fully explored in scholarship. This thesis has shown that we cannot assume strangulation was the primary method of execution in the triumph, although it has often assumed to be the case given the connection between strangulation and treason in Roman law. The Roman triumphator may have had a degree of choice concerning the method of execution (strangulation, beheading or immuration) which had different connotations. However, the execution was never in a public space, but always within a prison setting. This suggests a level of concern for protecting the reputation of the captive at the moment of their execution, thus stressing their status as a high-ranking prisoner who had committed a crime akin to treason against Rome. The contrast created between the triumphator and the formerly powerful captive was ultimately used to emphasise the triumphator's strengths and abilities as they had been able to overcome challenging enemies. This is essentially where difficulties lay in triumphators attempting to present women as principal captives, as in the case of Caesar and Arsinoë, as women were not considered to be capable military commanders and were more often used as symbols of land and fertility.

### **Humiliation and Degradation**

The treatment outlined throughout this thesis was designed both to humiliate a people in reality, thus making them more compliant to Roman authority, and to degrade their status in Roman thought. For example, as sexual violence was seen as a force which could cause moral and bodily corruption, it was therefore used (and continues to be utilised) as a means of attacking women and children, with long-term ramifications. In previous scholarship, sexual violence has been studied in the context of the lives of enslaved people within Roman households, but little focus has been on sexual violence in warfare, including examples outside of sieges, and with reference to examples from modern warfare. Such examples include Caesar's actions in Gaul against the Eburones which can be considered akin to genocide which also often involves sexual violence against women before mass executions. Sexual violence is physically and mentally harmful, with those subjected to it often experiencing long-lasting trauma, both in terms of mental health and societal implications. We find evidence of the Romans'

recognition of this trauma in Andromache's tale in the *Aeneid*, and concerns for the protection of women in Calgacus' speeches in Tacitus. The Romans used sexual violence because it traumatised the women and their families, but also stressed that the male members of the women's community were unable to protect them, as we can see in the supposed origins of Boudica's revolt.

Sexual violence also has symbolic value which the Romans used to their advantage in stressing that the next generation were illegitimate, and the women violated by enemy troops. The violation of women and children signified a degradation in status from a free to an enslaved person. As enslaved people could be subjected to whatever treatment the enslaver chose, this further justified the Romans in presenting sexual violence, an act they were clearly uncomfortable with relaying in detail, as an acceptable and even necessary practice in wartime captive-taking. In historical reality, those who were subjected to sexual violence during warfare would have inevitably been in states of severe emotional distress given that their community had been destroyed, and they had often been witness or subjected to atrocities carried out against their families and friends. Such anguish would have enabled the Romans to enslave people more easily.

Therefore, in an endless cycle, the treatment of captives was only justified if an individual was reduced in the Roman mind by how the Roman elite presented their behaviour or the treatment they received. A sense of justification was necessary within elite self-promotion as the Romans clearly recognised the human cost of war and were uncomfortable with directly referring to behaviour which was excessively aggressive. However, the treatment captives were subjected to relied upon the Romans' understanding that the captives were inferior and could therefore be subjected to violence of all forms. A key part of presenting captives as inferior was by alluding to the treatment they were subjected to, particularly sexual violence and enslavement which were, in Roman thought, degrading to a person, as they damaged an individual's autonomy.

### **Captives of Rome**

Ultimately, captives were essentially reduced to pawns who were used in reality, as *exempla*, or as symbols in artistic and literary representations, to indicate an individual or nation's characteristics which could then be used for political means. Such means included the justification of controversial military action, or stressing the military prowess of a Roman general to strengthen their political position in Rome. The status of captives relied upon the Romans' recognition that all those captured in warfare became enslaved and were, as a result of the treatment they were subjected to and the language used to describe them, essentially stripped of their humanity. By dehumanising their captives in representations, the Roman elite could present their actions against captives, including massacre and sexual violence, as being justified in elite literary works and self-promotion. This shaped Roman thought across all levels of society, ultimately enabling the Roman people to accept the militaristic and Imperialistic agenda of the elite.

The human cost of Roman captive-taking cannot be underestimated, and the Romans clearly understood how their actions could be used to degrade individuals and destroy their community. Warfare affected all members of a community, but captives were subjected to different treatment depending upon their gender and socio-economic status. Captive-taking continues today, albeit in a different guise, and the treatment different captives were subjected to, including massacre, sexual violence, enslavement, and hostage-taking, continues to be utilised, often motivated by the same concerns the Romans held two millennia ago.

## List of Figures



*Figure 1:* Relief from Trajan's Column, Rome (c. 107-113 CE). In scene 18, a Roman soldier forces a Dacian captive, his hands bound behind his back, before Trajan.

Available from: [http://www.trajans-column.org/?page\\_id=107#PhotoSwipe1567355065723](http://www.trajans-column.org/?page_id=107#PhotoSwipe1567355065723). [Date accessed 01.09.2019].



*Figure 2:* The Arch of Septimius Severus, Rome (203 CE). A Roman soldier (far right) is shown leading a captive, identified as a Dacian, on the base of a column.

Available from:

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum\\_arch\\_of\\_septimius\\_severus.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_arch_of_septimius_severus.jpg).

[Date accessed: 01.09.2019].





*Figure 3:* The Gemma Augustea (c. 10-14 CE). In the upper register, the Imperial family sit accompanied by the gods and allegories. Augustus is shown seated next to Roma, being crowned by Oikoumene, the personification of the world. On the left-hand side of the lower register, Roman soldiers are in the process of raising a tropaeum whilst a female and male captive sit underneath. On the right-hand side of the lower register, a Roman soldier pulls a captive woman by her hair, whilst her male counterpart is in a position of subjugation at the feet of a Roman soldier. The captive woman's state of undress is indicative of sexual assault. Currently housed in the Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien.

Available from: <https://www.ancientworldmagazine.com/articles/gemma-augustea-glimpse-behind-curtain/>. [Date accessed: 01/09/2019].



**Figure 4 (above):** Remains attributed to Caesar's massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri tribes in 55 BCE. **Figure 5 (below):** The skull shows evidence of trauma from an arrow, spear and slingshot.


Available from: <https://www.karwansaraypublishers.com/awblog/the-massacre-of-the-usipetes-and-tencteri/> [Date accessed: 13.09.2018].





*Figure 6:* Mixing bowl (calyx krater) with scenes from the fall of Troy, c. 470–460 B.C. by the Altamura Painter. Priam can be seen seated at the altar, reaching out for his daughter, Cassandra, as Pyrrhus looms over him with the body of Hector’s son, Astyanax, presumably preparing to throw the body from the walls of Troy. It is likely that, as Cassandra is shown in a state of undress, with her hair unbound, sexual violence is implicit within this scene. Currently housed in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

Available from: <https://www.mfa.org/collections/object/mixing-bowl-calyx-krater-with-scenes-from-the-fall-of-troy-153660>. [Date accessed: 25.09.2018].



*Figure 7:* Attic black figure amphora (550BC-540BC) showing the death of Priam. Priam is depicted being battered to death with the body of his grandson Astyanax whilst learning on the altar. Currently housed in the British Museum, London.

Available from:

[http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection\\_online/collection\\_object\\_details.aspx?objectId=398731&partId=1&images=true](http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=398731&partId=1&images=true). [Date Accessed 28/09/2018].



**Figure 8:** Slingshot from the battle of Perusia (now Perugia, Italy). The inscription reads: *Felas Octavi*, which can be translated as 'Suck cock, Octavius'. Currently housed in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.

Available from: <http://blogs.ashmolean.org/latininscriptions/2016/12/21/felas-octavi-the-roman-bullet-that-changed-sides-podcast-9/>. [Date accessed: 28.09.2018].



**Figure 9:** Relief from the Basilica Aemilia, Rome, c. 14 BCE. The Rape of the Sabine Women is depicted, with the women clearly in a state of undress and the female figure, in the group second to the left, with her hair loose and her face turned away from her attacker.

Available from: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/architecture-and-politics-in-republican-rome/pompey-caesar-and-rivals/BE4E9DAD4704B39CE1DF947883655DFE>. [Date accessed: 26.09.2018].



**Figures 10 and 11:** Two reliefs from the Sebasteion in Aphrodisias, modern-day Turkey, the left relief [Figure 10] shows Nero standing over the naked, female personification of Armenia. In the right image [Figure 11], we see Claudius vanquishing the personification of Britannia. Both reliefs are currently housed in the Aphrodisias Museum, Turkey.

Available from: (left) <https://www.flickr.com/photos/69716881@N02/15462671116> [Date accessed: 25.09.2018], (right) [aphrodisias.classics.ox.ac.uk](http://aphrodisias.classics.ox.ac.uk). [Date accessed: 23.10.2018].



*Figure 12:* The trophy from Chaeronea, Boeotia, found in excavations carried out in 1860 which has been identified as that of Sulla.

Available from: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Marble-trophy-found-at-Skripou-Orchomenos-in-1860\\_fig4\\_274294110](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Marble-trophy-found-at-Skripou-Orchomenos-in-1860_fig4_274294110). [Date accessed: 24.01.2019].



*Figure 13:* RRC 359/1, Italy (uncertain). Gold Aureus minted in Italy between 84-83 BCE and issued by Sulla. Obverse: head of Venus (left) and cupid holding palm branch (right). Reverse: Two trophies on either side of a jug and *lituus* (curved staff or war trumpet).

Available from: <http://numismatics.org/crro/id/rrc-359.1?lang=en>. [Date accessed: 22.01.2019].



*Figure 14:* RRC 426/3, Rome. Silver Denarius minted in Rome in 56 BCE and issued by Faustus Cornelius Sulla, Sulla's son. Obverse: head of Venus. Reverse: Three trophies between a jug (left) and *lituus* (right).

Available from: <http://numismatics.org/crro/id/rrc-426.3?lang=en>. [Date accessed: 22.01.2019].





*Figure 15:* An example of a *ferculum triumphale* held aloft can be found on a late 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE frieze of unknown provenance which is held in the Palazzo Altemps, Rome.

Available from: [https://www.flickr.com/photos/roger\\_ulrich/7252898998](https://www.flickr.com/photos/roger_ulrich/7252898998). [Date accessed: 18.10.2019].



*Figure 16:* Frieze from the Temple of Apollo, Rome, now housed in the Capitoline Museum. Two captives, sat either side of a *tropaeum*, are carried on a *ferculum triumphale* (triumphal platform). The platform was usually raised on the shoulders of its carriers but is shown here placed on the ground.

Available from: [https://www.flickr.com/photos/roger\\_ulrich/](https://www.flickr.com/photos/roger_ulrich/). [Date accessed: 28.01.2019].



*Figure 17:* The *tropaeum* from the Tomb of Caecilia Metella, Rome. Roman armour forms the main body of the *tropaeum*, whilst the shields it holds are Gallic in nature. A captive can be made out underneath the *tropaeum*, their arms tied behind their back.

Available from: <https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jah.2016.4.issue-2/jah-2016-0019/jah-2016-0019.xml>. [Date accessed: 01.09.2019].




**Figure 18:** RRC 468/1, Hispania. Silver Denarius minted in Hispania between 46-45 BCE and issued by Caesar. Obverse: head of Venus. Reverse: A female captive (evident from her long robes) sits to the left of a *tropaeum*, whilst her male counterpart sits to the right, his hands tied behind him, looking up at the trophy.

Available from: <http://numismatics.org/collection/1974.26.84>. [Date accessed: 22.01.2018].



**Figure 19:** RRC 438/1, Rome. Silver Denarius struck in Rome, and issued by Servius Sulpicius during his consulship of 51 BCE. The obverse shows a male head, possibly Triumphus, and the reverse depicts a naval trophy, complete with an anchor and a ships' prows. To the right of the trophy, a naked man stands with his hands bound behind his back, and a fully clothed figure, dressed in a toga, stands to the left of the trophy. The toga-clad figure is likely to be Roman. As he appears to stand slightly behind the trophy, it may be that the figure was representative of the Roman commander.

Available from: <http://numismatics.org/collection/1937.158.234>. [Date accessed: 22.01.2018].



*Figure 20:* Relief from the Roman arch at Carpentras, 9 BCE.

Available from: <https://structurae.net/structures/roman-arch-of-carpentras>. [Date accessed: 24.01.2019].



*Figure 21:* Relief from the Tropaeum Alpium in La Turbie, France, a few kilometres from the principality of Monaco.

Available from:

<https://i.pinimg.com/originals/2b/8d/ad/2b8dad357961a7725a2c5b2de8982dcc.jpg>.

[Date accessed: 18.03.2019].



**Figure 22:** A copper alloy Roman figurine representing a bound captive, found in Hampshire, UK, and thought to date from the period 100-300 CE.

Available from: <https://finds.org.uk/database/artefacts/record/id/185032>. [Date accessed: 24.01.2019].



**Figure 23:** A copper alloy Roman figurine representing a bound captive, found in Lincolnshire, UK, and thought to date from the period 100-300 CE.

Available from: <https://finds.org.uk/database/artefacts/record/id/413449>. [Date accessed: 24.01.2019].



*Figure 24:* Scene from the Augustus Boscoreale drinking cup showing two Gallic leaders presenting their sons to Augustus (seated right).

Available from:

<https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft309nb1mw&chunk.id=d0e182&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e182&brand=ucpress>. [Date accessed: 16.04.2019].



*Figure 25:* Silver Denarius of Augustus, Rome, 19 BC-4 BC. The obverse features the head of Liber, and the reverse shows a kneeling Parthian, extending a standard with an X-marked vexillum (flag) with his right hand, whilst extending his left in a sign of supplication.

Available from: [http://numismatics.org/ocre/id/ric.1\(2\).aug.287](http://numismatics.org/ocre/id/ric.1(2).aug.287). [Date accessed: 13.05.2019].





*Figure 26:* The south frieze of the *Ara Pacis*, with the 'Parthian' child at the centre (between Agrippa and the Empress Livia).

Available from: [https://howlingpixel.com/i-en/Ara\\_Pacis](https://howlingpixel.com/i-en/Ara_Pacis). [Date Accessed: 16.04.2019].



*Figure 27:* Details from the north frieze of the *Ara Pacis*, with the 'Gallic' child in the bottom left.

Available from: [http://www.vroma.org/images/mcmanus\\_images/index15.html](http://www.vroma.org/images/mcmanus_images/index15.html). [Date Accessed: 22.05.2019].



**Figure 28:** The north frieze from the Arch of Titus, Rome showing some of the sacred spoils taken from the Temple on the Mount in Jerusalem, including a menorah.

Available from: [http://www.learningsites.com/Rome/Titus\\_home.php](http://www.learningsites.com/Rome/Titus_home.php). [Date Accessed: 29.05.2019].



**Figure 29:** Frieze from the Arch of Titus, Rome, erected c. 81 CE. Titus, being crowned by Victory, rides a four-horse chariot (quadriga) in his triumph of 71 CE.

Available from: <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ancient-art-civilizations/roman/early-empire/a/the-arch-of-titus>. [Date accessed: 23.07.2019]



*Figure 30:* Tiberius on a chariot behind the triumphal procession, depicted on the so-called Tiberius Cup from Boscoreale. Currently housed in the Louvre, Paris.

Available from: <http://gjclarthistory.blogspot.com/2015/04/tiberius-cup-from-boscoreale.html>. [Date Accessed: 27.06.2019].



*Figure 31:* Captives being paraded in chains held by two guards, sitting atop a cart pulled by two horses, possibly as part of a triumph. Relief from Campania from c. 1<sup>st</sup> century CE.

Available from: <https://www.bmimages.com/preview.asp?image=00470572001>. [Date accessed: 06.06.2019].



**Figure 32:** A fragmentary relief from a Roman-era sarcophagus depicting a triumph (probably that of Dionysus), which shows a male and female captive in chains (left) and loot being carried (right). Housed in the Liebieghaus, Frankfurt am Main.

Available from:

<https://arachne.dainst.org/entity/1254444?offset=50&fl=20&q=Gefangenen&resultIndex=97>. [Date accessed: 26.06.2019].



**Figure 33:** The Galatian Suicide, also known as the Ludovisi Gaul, depicts a male figure, nude except for a cloak, plunging a sword into his chest. He holds the arm of a female figure who has been identified as his dead or dying wife. Currently housed in the Museo Nazionale di Roma, Rome.

Available: (right) <https://www.paideiainstitute.org/ludovisi>, (left)

<https://open.conted.ox.ac.uk/sites/open.conted.ox.ac.uk/files/resources/Ludovisi%20Gaul.JPG>

[Accessed: 04/07/2019].

## Abbreviations

LSJ = *Liddell & Scott Greek-English Lexicon*. 1961. Liddell, H.G., Scott, R. (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

OLD = *The Oxford Latin Dictionary*. 1969. Glare, P.G.W. (ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

P.Oxy = *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. 1871-1934. Grenfell, P and Hunt, S. (eds). London.

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### **Filmography**

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