Who is in Charge Here? Exploring the Missing Link in the Policy-Action Continuum of Turkish Counterterrorism Policies Against the PKK

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ABSTRACT

Although Turkey has implemented various counterterrorism policies to address the terror campaign led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the problem remains unresolved. The policymakers blame the implementers for failed counterterrorism policies, yet they are responsible for the context in which the implementation occurs. This paradox raises an intriguing question: Who is in charge here, politics or administration? The query requires the thesis to explore 'the missing link' between policy and action in the implementation processes of Turkish counterterrorism policies against the PKK.

The implementation stage of policy processes was once 'the missing link', in need of scrutiny. Although the implementation literature has explored this missing link across various policies, the implementation stage of counterterrorism policies remains missing. This thesis fills this gap employing a qualitative cases study design accompanied by 30 semi-structured elite interviews.

The thesis' analytical framework was established on the partial use and combination of the top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches to implementation and defiance/desistance and deterrence approaches to counterterrorism. Implementers' roles and behaviours were linked to policies via implementation paradigms (administrative, political, experimental, and symbolic) derived from Matland's (1995) ambiguity/conflict model. The evidence-based analysis of the components of the paradigms enabled the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum and shown that politics is more likely to be in charge than administration.

The thesis argues that Turkish counterterrorism policies remain unproductive, and even counterproductive because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political contexts and carried out by low-quality implementers in conflictual circumstances at the local level. Decision-makers either intentionally leave ambiguities in policies or they lack the capacity to produce sound policies. Thus, conflicting implementers find rooms to employ divergent roles and behaviours at the street level. This prevents precise implementation and turns the implementation into a barrier, resulting in policy failures.

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

1. INTRODUCTION

While Turkey has faced terrorist attacks from several terrorist organisations for years, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers' Party), an armed radical leftist organisation founded on Marxists-Leninist ideology practicing ethnic separatism, has been the biggest threat for Turkey. The armed struggle led by the PKK has claimed more than 45,000 lives (Unal and Cafnik Uludağ, 2020), including security forces members, civilians and militants, and caused huge social, economic and political burdens in Turkey since it started in 1984. Although Turkey has formulated and implemented many counterterrorism policies to respond to the problem, the PKK has not been eradicated nor has an agreement for a peaceful solution been reached. The PKK still survives and pursues its bloody campaign.

In fact, Turkey experienced one of the bloodiest violent periods of the PKK campaign starting in July 2015. The appealing and alarming aspect of this violent period was that it came after "the Solution Process". Having been named by the III. Erdoğan Government and formulated between the Government and the PKK as a reconciliation prospect, The Solution Process began secretly and was then made public at the end of 2012, with big promises. The Government and the PKK announced that the Process was intended to finish the long-standing armed conflict, giving the public the expectation that the conflict could have finished, however it failed.

In the Solution Process, from the spring of 2013 to July 2015, the Turkish Government's policy was to not permit law enforcement and military bodies to actively operate against the PKK, mainly because of the fear that the process could be interrupted by an unpredictable bloody fight. When the process dramatically collapsed in July 2015, it turned out that the PKK had took the advantage of the not permitting any operation policy and built up its military capacity in towns and cities. As the PKK has militarily had a rural power base and had not achieved control of any urban residential area to that date (Barkey and Fuller, 1997; Kocher, 2007; Unal, 2014), the increasing presence and dominance of the PKK in towns and cities in that period was a new phenomenon.

Observing the bloody campaign carried out in towns and cities, which claimed the lives of approximately 800 security personnel and 1.200 local residents between July 2015 and December 2016 (OHCHR, 2017), many believe that turning a blind eye to the PKK's activities

during the Solution Process was a fatally wrong policy. By reason of the increased military capacity of the PKK, the casualties were unprecedented in urban centres. The bill that the country had to pay was met with public dissatisfaction and triggered a blame game among the main actors. For example, Devlet Bahçeli, who is the chairman of the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/the Nationalist Movement Party), harshly criticised President Erdoğan on 16 September 2015 saying:

> "While the PKK was aiming to create liberated regions, the Government gave it a shoulder and paved the way [for it in the Solution Process]… Erdoğan's Solution Process, which was a betrayal process, eventually brought about the conditions of civil war… Who is responsible for 127 martyrs in the 2-month period since July 20?" (Hürriyet, 2015a).

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the chairman of the main opposition party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/the Republican People's Party), took part in the blame of Erdoğan on 17 January 2016 saying:

> "I will present the grim reality [of the Solution Process] from Erdoğan's discourse. He said on a TV program that 'they [the PKK] viewed the Solution Process as a weapon stockpiling process in the Southeast, and partly in the East.' Who says? The President says. So, they knew where the guns were stocked. I appeal to the conscience of my 78 million citizens. Who was in power when the East and the Southeast were turned into an arsenal? Who instructed governors and district governors not to touch them [the PKK]?" (Habertürk, 2016).

President Erdoğan tried to explain the failure as the result of his Government's orders being misunderstood and misjudged by implementers and implied that the failure was caused by poor implementation of his policies. He initially stated in a television interview that his Government, in fact, had given orders to governors not to operate actively against the PKK during the Solution Process (Hürriyet, 2015c). However, in the course of the fierce frustration at the public level, he then claimed in a public speech that his Governments' orders relating to the policies against the PKK during the Solution Process had been misunderstood and misjudged by public officials and this resulted in policy failure (CNNTÜRK, 2015). The paradox

between the two statements raises an intriguing question: Who is in charge here, politics or administration?

Were governors and other public officials responsible for the policy failure because of poor implementation? Could a counterterrorism policy's failure be attributable to implementation failure and indispensably to implementers? If one believes the second above statement, then turning a blind eye to the PKK's activities is a classic case of the use of nonelected public officials' discretion in working with the main policy made by their superiors—superiors who are responsible to the electorate. But what if problems originate from decision makers and the nature of the counterterrorism policies?

This thesis raises intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of the intentions and capabilities of the top Turkish decision makers. The findings of the empirical material strongly support the argument that the top Turkish decision makers intentionally leave ambiguities in policy means and ends, and they frequently change their tune by means of Machiavellian behaviour in order to be able to escape from responsibility. They also lack the capacity to generate sound counterterrorism policies reducing politics typically to "a game of capturing public resources and then redistributing them through legal and illegal means." (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, p. 449). Thus, implementers muddle between what chief actors say to the public and what they ask them behind closed doors. This creates ambiguity and conflict in implementation context.

Adding new insights to the counterterrorism research, this thesis shows that Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive, and even counterproductive, because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low-quality implementers in conflictual circumstances at the local level. Combining with the lack of a comprehensive and coherent national counterterrorism strategy, implementers experience dilemma and confusion, and produce divergent implementation behaviours at the street level.

Although "poor implementation" may lead to policy failure (Monar, 2007, p. 312), policy failure does not have to be the result of implementation failure. A policy can be precisely implemented but it can be a flawed counterterrorism policy. The thesis shows that the second statement of the President blaming implementers suits the circumstances, spelled out by

Barrett and Fudge (1981c), that "…leaving a maximum of discretion for "performance" rather than "conformance" to a specific directive… can be seen as abdication of responsibility; non-performance can be then "blamed" on implementers rather than policy-makers" (p. 275). While performance requires ambiguous policies, conformance needs unambiguous policies. Top decision makers prefer to formulate ambiguous counterterrorism policies to reduce the effect of the possible negative consequences of Turkish counterterrorism policies on their side. The struggle for the implementers is that they could be easily targeted in a blame game, as the whole population easily identifies big promises given by the politicians, but they hardly notice these politicians' smaller actions. This is the dilemma that inspired this study of the implementation of Turkish counterterrorism policies (henceforth referred to as TCPs or a TCP). I personally experienced this dilemma as a district governor when I was carrying out different types of TCPs.

In the above example, it is clear that there is a gap between the policy's goal, the peaceful solution of the problem as announced by the Government and the PKK, and its result. But it is unclear if this was the result of a failure in implementation. To comprehend where is a problem and whether the responsibility rests on policy and politics or on action and administration necessitates a better understanding of how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs work as they do.

As implementation problems were not expected to be a significant issue in policy processes up to the 1970s, policy studies neglected the implementation phase of the policy process presupposing that policies are clear, and implementers carry out policies in line with policy goals and the intentions of policy makers (Hill and Hupe, 2002). However, in the 1970s, several scholars began to argue that policies do not implement themselves and described the implementation phase of policy processes as 'the missing link' that needs to be discovered (e.g. Hargrove, 1975; Berman, 1978; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Smith, 1973).

Since then, as will be discussed in-depth in the following theoretical chapter, implementation studies have tried to address this 'missing link' throughout three distinct theoretical approaches, namely top-down, bottom-up and hybrid, to better understand how policy translates into action. While the top-down approach underlines the importance of policies pursuing a flawless flow-down implementation, the bottom-up approach emphasizes the importance of the local level factors in implementation. Addressing the need for combining

these approaches, hybrid approaches try to incorporate them together to achieve a more parsimonious framework to study implementation. However, as will be revealed below, although there have been numerous studies to address this missing link for a wide variety of policies, the implementation phase of counter-terrorism policies is still under-studied.

Accordingly, the thesis aims draw attention to the examination of implementation issues in order to explore the internal dynamics from top to bottom or between them. The analysis of the implementation processes of TCPs will not only enable the thesis to address 'the missing link' between policy and action (from top to bottom and between them), but it may also help to determine "the black box", where and why problems occur and what happens between politics and administration, thus, who would be held accountable. This is the puzzle that this thesis wants to analyse.

Research Questions

As will be justified below, this thesis aims to capture the implementation of the TCPs as a process in a policy-action continuum concerning the interactions between counterterrorism policies and implementers' roles and behaviours. The challenge is to understand how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs work as they do.

Within this context, the main research question is what happens and how and why it happens in the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK. Specific questions include:

1) What is the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs and what are the crucial variables throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs?
2) Why do the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do at the street level?
    - What happens once a Turkish counterterrorism policy is put into force?
    - Who determines the rules and acts of the game?
    - What factors determine the implementation behaviours of implementers?
    - What are the roles of the implementers that carry out the TCPs?
3) How to link the policy-action continuum in the implementation processes of the TCPs?
    - What problems, that could be barriers to implementation, arise in the implementation processes of the TCPs?
    - How do implementers assist in the implementation processes of different types of counterterrorism policies?

Accordingly, the main objective of this research is to link TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers so that it may be possible to comprehend the internal dynamics of the implementation processes of the TCPs since 1984, the year in which the PKK started to attack the State. Within this context, before clarifying the significance and scope of the research, the full background of the problem will be presented.

1.1. The Background of the Problem

The nature of the problem that the PKK bases its campaign on is nearly a century old. The problem is complex and controversial. The objectivity and originality of studies on the problem are mostly constrained and distorted by ideologic preferences, explicit manipulations, empathic and defensive determinations (Cizre, 2001). However, a close examination of them reveals that the problem has political, ideological, socio-economic, and international dimensions just as much as it has an ethic dimension (Cornell, 2001).

The Kurdish dissident has been evolved and constructed through two process: dialogical and dialectical. Initially, it evolved through a dialogical interaction with the socio-political and economic context of the final periods of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman Empire witnessed two major Kurdish insurgencies in the 19th century namely those of the Emir Bedir Khan rebellion of 1847 and the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion of 1880, as many scholar (Bruinessen, 1992; Özoğlu, 2001; Olson, 1996; Laciner and Bal, 2004; Klein, 2007; Ozoglu, 2012; Jwaideh, 2014; Hitchins, 1999; Olson, 2002; Olson, 2004) indicates, these revolts were not separatist. Instead, while the Ottoman Empire were modernising its political and administrative structures during that period, these rebellions were initiated by local notables to preserve their traditional powers against the central government. As soon as the collapse of the Empire at the end of the First World War resulted in the abundance of ethnic mobilizations and nationalist ideologies among its remaining Muslim residents, the Kurdish dissent were not exempt from this (Tezcür, 2019). Thus, as Özoğlu (2001) states, the rising Kurdish sentiment “was not a cause but, on the contrary, the result of the empire's disintegration.” (p. 383). However, it is important to highlight that, instead of being separatist, “even most ‘nationalists’ among them [the Kurdish dissent] continued to envision themselves as members of the multi-national Ottoman state”.

Since the beginning of the Republic, which was founded in 1923 following the Empire, not only has the Kurdish dissent dialogically evolved in parallel with socio-political and economic context, but it has also been further constructed in "a dialectical relationship" (Bruinessen, 1998, p. 41) with Republican nation building policies. While the harsh practices of the homogenous and secular nation building ideology of the new regime aggravated Kurdish sentiments (Aydin, 2016; Vali, 1998; Bozarslan, 2008; Aslan, 2015), the rising Kurdish dissent and its antagonistic objections to the new regime stimulated further aggressive nationalistic policies in return. (Olson, 2000). This suggests that, as Özoğlu argues (2001), the challenge of the Kurdish dissent with this homogenous nation building ideology on the same territory was a cornerstone for the ongoing problem. An 'officially created artificial identity' resulted in the emergence of another 'artificially created alternative identity' and vice versa. Both were ontologically subjective positions missing the objective reality of the real social order and this remains the nature of the problem.

Determining that dissident Kurdish elements need to enter into a process of homogenisation -by means of integration and/or assimilation- to prevent long term problems, the founding republican polity put nationalist policies into force starting from the second part of the 1923 (Harris, 1977; Bozarslan, 2008). In fact, although nationalism became visible throughout the final periods of the Ottoman Empire, it was the Republic that narrowly uniformed Turkishness during the authoritarian nationalistic era of interwar period, institutionalised it in a secular nation state and enforced it on its Muslim and non-Muslim communities throughout numerous state practices. (Cagaptay, 2006). Accordingly, based on this homogenous, secular and narrow understanding of nationalism, republican policies surpassed the cultural and lingual freedoms of Kurdish citizens for years (Somer, 2017; Hassanpashaei, Khaje and Firuzi, 2016; Harris, 1977). Even, at the extreme level, the very existence of Kurds was undermined at times describing them as the mountain Turk (Dunn, 1995; McDowall, 1996).

While one scholarly paradigm prefers to describe these policies as assimilationist (Unver, 2011), the state-centric wisdom sees them as "civic" aiming "to create a modern nation-state, an integrated, unitary polity of the French type" (Cornell, 2001, p. 34) employing "non-recognition" policies to prevent "de-acculturation process on the part of the Kurds which could promote the secondary (ethnic) identity of the Kurds at the expense of their primary identity of being Turk in a generic sense." (Heper, 2007, p. 181). Whatever the reason, the

secular and homogenous nation-building mission of the Turkish Republic faced strong resistance from Kurdish and Islamic identities (Taspinar, 2005; Yeğen, 2007; Yeğen, 1996; Yavuz, 2001; Gunes, 2013; Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008).

Seeing the nationalist ideology of the Republic and/or the ending of the caliphate as an existential threat for them (Bozarslan, 2008), several autonomist and/or separatist Kurdish dissidents conducted revolts against the new regime led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the interwar period. From 1920 to 1938, the Kurdish dissent staged seventeen revolts against the new regime, three of which were major (Heper, 2007). The major ones were the Sheikh Said (1925), the Mount Ararat (1930) and the Dersim (1937-38) revolts. Being under the threat of the Treaty of Sèvres, which was imposed upon the Ottoman Empire by the Allied Powers in 1920 and sought autonomy for Kurds with the prospect of independence (Romano, 2006; Olson, 2013; Barkey and Fuller, 1997) and knowing the cooperation of the leaderships of these revolts with the British and Greeks (Ozoglu, 2012; McDowall, 1996), the new regime did not hesitate to punitively suppress them. While the crackdown process of these revolts "enabled the Turkish government to articulate a much more strident nationalist discourse within a one-party autocracy." (Olson, 2000, p. 69), this nationalist position and the harsh suppression of these rebellions reversely served to deepen the Kurdish grievances in the long term (Bruinessen, 1998). In fact, although the Republic was successful in suppressing numerous periods of unrest led by its Kurdish speaking citizens from 1923 to 1938, the problem remained "the Achilles' heel of the Kemalist project" in its attempts to build a "homogenous 'Turkish' nation-state" (Taspinar, 2005, p. 2).

After the Second World War, the CHP led authoritarian one-party regime of Turkey saw its interest in the Western Block of the Cold War when the Soviet Union yearned to repose particular parts of the north-east Anatolia, and it held Turkey's first multi-party election in 1946 (Barkey and Fuller, 1997). The next three decades witnessed the recurrences of the identities, that the single-party rule surpassed from 1923 to 1946, in parallel with the rising democratic mechanisms (Donmez, 2007; Taspinar, 2005). However, the coup d'états of 1960, 1971 and 1980 in that period counterbalanced the rising pressures of the dissidents to the system and reenergised status quo in each time.

When the DP (Demokrat Parti/the Democrat Party) won the first free election in 1950 defeating Atatürk's CHP, it replaced the coercive policies related to the Kurdish dissent with

"an integrative policy" (Bozarslan, 2008, p. 343). In fact, while the political and economic liberalisation between 1950 and 1960 increased the mobility from bottom to top for every segments of the society, it also "created a real opportunity for the articulation of Kurdish grievances and even addressed some of them" (Barkey and Fuller, 1997, p. 65). Nevertheless, although the multiparty system opened channels in which Kurdish politicians were able to defend regional interests, it was still a problem to overtly appeal to the ethnic sentiments of Kurds among mainstream politics (Harris, 1977).

Whilst the 1960 coup ended the DP rule, it also revitalised the suppression policies. But it did not last long. Within the libertarian context of the 1961 Constitution, which was made after the Coup, the Kurdish sentiment experienced a revival, mainly within the left-wing organisations (Bozarslan, 2008). Especially, the TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi/the Turkish Labour Party), the TKDP (Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi/the Kurdistan Democrat Party of Turkey) and, the DDKO (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları/the Revolutionary Cultural Associations of the East) increasingly became legal epicentres for ethnic Kurdish sentiment and they challenged the ideology and policies of the status quo (Harris, 1977; Gunes, 2016). The engagement of the Kurdish dissent with legal radical left in the 1960s brought a new cohort of Kurdish left-wing generation on political arena, who pursued a socialist and secular framework to address the ethnic Kurdish sentiment (Watts, 2007).

Meantime, when several organisations such as the TİP and the DDKO were shut down, and their prominent associates were put on trial after the military intervention of 1971, the Kurdish dissident went further to an extremist current. (Bruinessen, 2004; Harris, 1977; Bozarslan, 2008). This triggered the emergence of radicalised and illegal left-wing Kurdish organisations in the 1970s, including the TKSP (Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi/the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan), Rizgarî, the KUK (Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları/the Kurdistan National Liberationists), Kawa, Ala Rizgarî, Tekoşin and the PKK. Among them, as Bruinessen (1988) states, the PKK was "the most prone to violence" (p. 40) targeting not only the State but also the above rival groups, its own members and local targets such as tribal leaders and landlords.

When the 1980 coup brutally suppressed all dissent, the Kurdish dissent was not free from this grinding process. In fact, 1790 PKK affiliated individuals including some central committee

members were detained and put in trail after the coup (McDowall, 1996). Nevertheless, the armed struggle led by the PKK began in the mid-1980s.

Emerging as an illegal organisation in the second part of the 1970s and initially known as Apocular[1], the PKK based its ideology on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and claimed that it was aiming an independent socialist Kurdish state (Özcan, 2012; Hoffman, 1999) through a Maoist insurgency strategy (Unal, 2014). Seeing "violence as the only means" to realise its aims (Bozarslan, 2008, p. 349) and imbuing "Kurdish nationalism with the idea of class war." (McDowall, 1996, p. 421), the PKK clarified its Maoist insurgency strategy as "a protracted people's war" (Gunes, 2016, p. 87) comprised of three successive stages as defence, balance and offence.

Although, as "an imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006, p. 6), "the so-called 'Kurdish nationalist movement' was neither unified nor linear" consisting of "several movements instigated by diverse actors, who embraced different visions of the kind of social and political entity they hoped to create" (Klein, 2007, p. 137), the PKK were able to simultaneously appeal to several segments of the Kurdish dissent (Barkey and Fuller, 1997) and became hegemonic among them (Tezcür, 2015).

Even if the aggravated Kurdish sentiment pawed the way for the emergence of the PKK, there are three main reasons that made the PKK hegemonic among the other Kurdish organisations. First, harsh socio-economic and political conditions before and after the 1980 coup contributed to the rise of the PKK. Especially, the practices of the military regime such as banning the cultural and lingual practices of the Kurds, indiscriminate mass detentions and widespread torture were all served to the PKK. Second, international context helped the PKK to gain momentum. In fact, it has been able to play its game across regional states "using and being used by Turkey's neighbours." (Mango, 1994, p. 989) and by the states that have interests in a fragile Turkey (Cornell, 2001).

Third, the PKK's approach to the violence determined its rise. Considering that the PKK depicted itself as a movement that is in the pursuit of the Kurdish nationalist identity "through a revivalism that invoked an imaginary past", its "nationalism was all the more virulent" among the other Kurdish dissents (McDowall, 1996, pp. 421, 422). Additionally, Öcalan built

[1] The followers of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK

"a true personality cult around himself" using violence as a mean (Cornell, 2001, p. 40). As Bozarslan (2008, p. 352) puts:

> Öcalan considered violent struggle to be not simply a means of national liberation, but the very condition of personal emancipation. This emancipation required the destruction of the individual's own identity and the building, through following the example of the leader and displaying devotion to him, of a new identity. The constant fear of betraying the leader, and therefore the nation, went hand-in-hand with the hope of achieving personal, and therefore national, salvation. Such a reinterpretation of identity created a truly sectarian universe and an almost religious outlook…

Base on this outlook, the PKK especially exploited the socio-economic underdevelopment of the Region, played on the lowest segments of the Kurdish society and indoctrinated the most vulnerable youths with a "romantic doctrine of revenge" (Bruinessen, 1988, p. 45). In fact, "the rise of the PKK was primarily a function of its ability to gain support among the peasantry in deeply unequal rural areas through its strategic employment of violence." (Tezcür, 2015, p. 248). Even, it did not hesitate to use "its violence against the very population it claimed to represent" (Cornell, 2001, p. 40).

The PKK's "almost religious belief in violence as means of salvation" (Bruinessen, 1988, p. 41) indicates that although the PKK has exploited the problems that the Kurds experienced, the problem created by the PKK has been more about terrorism than defending the problems of Kurds. Thus, it is important to highlight that the problems of Kurds and the terrorism problem created by the PKK are not necessarily mutually exclusive issues. Having witnessing the "murky ideology, repressive leadership and, ruthless methods" of the PKK (Cizre, 2001, p. 249), some even characterised the PKK as "taking up arms in the name of but without the Kurdish people" (Bruinessen, 1988, p. 45). This is why Turkey has always needed to simultaneously employ two-way approach in its struggle with the PKK: (1) to fight with the PKK (2) to address the grievances of Kurds.

Although the PKK was officially established on November 27, 1978, its first armed attacks against the State materialised in Eruh and Şemdinli, two remote districts in the South-eastern corner of the Country, on 15 August 1984 (Gunter, 1990). The nature of the PKK's attacks has been as radical as its ideology. While it used guerrilla warfare methods and terror techniques

such as raids, sabotages, mining, ambushes, assassinations, hit and run tactics to target law enforcement, military, village guards and civil servants (Gunes, 2016), it did not hesitate to raid villages that do not support them, target urban centres and, brutally and indiscriminately massacre the civilians including women and children (McDowall, 1996).

The nature of Turkey's response to the terrorist activities of the PKK were uncompromising and mainly led by the Turkish Military during 1980s and 1990s. This resulted in "the securitization of normal life in the heavily Kurdish populated provinces" (Yavuz, 2001, p. 13). Starting from 1987, the state of emergency rule (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) declared in the provinces of the Region[2] in order to deter terrorist activities. The OHAL regime enabled the public officials to use harsh techniques and it "institutionalised" the repression "through the state bureaucracy" (Jacoby, 2005, p. 649). Realising the counterproductive effects of the official doctrine, the Turkish polity started to change the tune on the cultural and lingual issues related the problem (Van Bruinessen, 1996).

There were several attempts to solve the problem in peaceful terms at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s such as the then President Turgut Özals' reconciliation attempts, SHP's Kurdish Report[3] in 1989 and the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's acceptance of 'the Kurdish Reality' in 1991. These efforts brought several positive outcomes, such as the law banning to publish Kurdish was abolished in 1991 (Ergin, 2000).

However, the struggle dramatically intensified and reached its peak in the mid-1990s. The reasons for this escalation are two folds. On the one hand, intra-state rivalries prevented the conciliation efforts to produce ultimate actions. On the other, the PKK did not properly echo to these positive attempts, escalated its campaign and staged uprisings in towns and cities across the Region from the beginning of the 1990s. The State, in turn, intensified its response and evacuated many villages to prevent the PKK having access to its supply lines. When the then president Özal, who were the backer of the reformist wing of the State, lost his life in

[2] The Region is used to refer to the heavily Kurdish populated provinces of the Est and Southeast Regions of Turkey among the circles related to terrorism and countering terrorism. The term will be encountered in the remainder of the thesis.

[3] The SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti/the Social Democratic Populist Party) was formed when CHP, which was founded by Atatürk and firmly loyal to the founding ideology, closed after the 1980 coup. The Report recognizes the reality of Kurds and recommends economic, cultural and political reforms to solve the problem (SHP, 1990).

April 1993, the hardliner and military wing of the State had the total control of the system and opted the military solution to the problem (Barkey and Fuller, 1997).

Although the developments in Northern Iraq before and after the 1991 Gulf War added a new international dimension to the ongoing fight, the PKK had been militarily defeated from the mid-1990s (Unal and Harmanci, 2016). When Turkey captured Öcalan in 1999, the PKK declared a ceasefire and nearly all of its militants left Turkey for Northern Iraq (Arinç, 2010). This was a military defeat for the PKK (Kocher, 2007). Nevertheless, the prolonged OHAL regime and overwhelmingly military counterterrorism policies employed during 1980s and 1990s weakened the quality of democracy in Turkey and balanced the civil-military relations in favour of the military (Satana and Demirel-Pegg, 2018).

The link between democratic deficit and countering terrorism occurred by two means. First, the excessive use of coercive methods by the OHAL regime incapacitated the political system's hierarchical control on security networks at the street level across the Region (Jacoby, 2005). Second, the increasing role of the military in countering terrorism, in turn, fed the popular opinion that only the military can deal with the problem (Satana and Demirel-Pegg, 2018).

Inevitably, the hardliners instrumentalised the intense fighting against the PKK and the prolonged OHAL regime getting the country into a semi-military autocratic trap. The impact of this trap throughout the 1980s and 1990s on the rule of law and human rights were enormous. For example, according to a TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi/the Grand National Assembly of Turkey) report, 3428 settlements (villages and hamlets) were emptied either by security services or by the PKK by the end of the 1997 (TBMM, 1997b), causing nearly three million people to seek refuge in the suburbs of towns and cities (McDowall, 1996) accompanied by torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, property destructions, and degrading and violent behaviours (See for example: TBMM, 1995; TBMM, 1997b; TESEV, 2005; TİHV, 1997; TİHV, 2003).

After Öcalan's capture, Turkey witnessed a shift in in its counterterrorism approach from coercion to reconciliation. Two main developments assisted this shift. First, when Turkey gained the EU (European Union) candidacy status in 1999 as part of its full membership process, the agenda for more democratization started to prevail inside the Turkish polity with the pressure and help of the EU (Somer, 2004). Second, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma

Partisi/the Justice and Development Party) came to power with a program of democratisation in 2002.

Accordingly, the TBMM had enacted eight harmonisation packages and several individual reforms until it started the EU membership talks in 2005. In that period, the state of the emergency rule was gradually lifted; the death penalty was abolished; broadcasting and teaching in Kurdish was allowed; freedom of speech, right to associate and peaceful assembly were widened; penalties for torture and ill-treatment were increased; party system was liberalised; civil-military relations were altered in favour of the civilian authority and the influence of the Military as a veto player in the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu/the National Security Council) decreased; and several amnesty laws targeting the members of the PKK were put in force (Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010; Kaya and Whiting, 2019; Tezcür, 2010; Başbakanlık, 2013).

However, although the PKK declared that its strategy was legitimate defence with the aim of a democratic republic of Turkey at its 8th Congress in 2002 (Ozeren et al., 2014), it paradoxically restarted its armed campaign in 2004 when Turkey became intensely involved in the EU-induced democratization process (Tezcür, 2010). In 2005, by the orders of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK went through a reconstruction process and established an umbrella organisation called the KCK (Kürdistan Topluluklar Birliği/the Kurdistan Communities Union). The KCK's declared aim was to establish democratic confederacies within the States of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (Gunter, 2014; Gunes, 2016). This "re-intensification of the PKK" campaign "re-energised the military" nature of the State (Jacoby, 2010, p. 110). Consequently, security-based approaches started again to prevail in counterterrorism policy area.

However, as the PKK was able to maintain its existence as a threat despite the fact that it was militarily defeated at times, Turkey shifted its approach towards reconciliation policies beginning in 2007 (Unal and Harmanci, 2016). In 2009, the government started 'the Democratic Opening' initiative. Also called 'the Kurdish Opening' and 'the National Unity and Fraternity Project', the initiative initiated an open debate on the problem and aimed social restoration without any clear agenda (Erdoğan, 2013). In parallel to this open debate, there was also a development behind closed doors: the government and the PKK was secretly negotiating in that period in order to reach an agreement, which is called as the Oslo Process (Taşpinar and Tol, 2014).

However, due to several jeopardising developments, these concession initiatives failed resulting in the reescalation of the armed struggle from the beginning of June 2011. Initially, Öcalan declared in 2010 that the PKK's strategy had reached its final phase and instructed its organisation to establish "do-facto autonomy" in the Region (Unal, 2014, p. 420). Later, In July 2011, the DTK (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi/the Democratic Society Congress), which was established as part of the KCK with the aim of structuring an alternative council to implement autonomous policies, claimed democratic autonomy in the Region (Gunter, 2014). These incidents suggest that, as Hassanpashaei et al. (2016) argues, the PKK believed that armed struggle would be better option to achieve its goals within the opportunity window arose from the Arab Spring. Besides, the government also shifted its approach towards coercion in parallel with a decreasing public support and an increasing opposition to these conciliation initiatives (Aslan, 2015).

After one-and-a-half years of continued intense violence, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan announced in December 2012 that his Government was holding talks with Öcalan to end the armed struggle. This was the starting point of the Solution Process. On 21 March 2013, Öcalan declared that the armed militants of the PKK were going to withdrew from Turkey to the Northern Iraq (Sabah, 2013). In order to prepare the public to the Process, open the democratic channels and set out solutions, the Wise Persons Committee under the Prime Ministry and the Solution Process Evaluation Commission under the TBMM were commissioned in April 2013 and conducted their works throughout the 2013 (Çiçek, 2013; TBMM, 2013b). Nevertheless, the Process stalled in the 2014 and it reached its breaking point in the first half of the 2015. On 28 February 2015, the Government and the HDP[4] (Halkların Demokratik Partisi/Peoples' Democratic Party) held a joint press conference declaring an agreement, called as the Dolmabahçe Agreement, consisting of ten provisions for an ultimate solution for the problem (Milliyet, 2015). On 22 March, President Erdogan claimed that he had not been informed about it prior and he did not cherish it too (Bila, 2015). Even though reports suggested he knew every detail of it (hurriyetdailynews, 2015), his position signposted that the Process was about to die.

[4] A pro-Kurdish party that participated to the Process in the name of Öcalan and the PKK

Eventually, although the Solution Process began with big promises, it ended dramatically in failure in July 2015. After a suicide bombing in Suruç on 20 July 2015 (BBC, 2015b) and the assassination of two policeman in Ceylanpiar on 22 July 2015 (france24, 2015) -both are the border districts of Şanlıurfa Province with Syria-, the ongoing security dominant period started. This new era also triggered dramatic political changes in Turkey. In fact, following a flawed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, Turkey replaced its parliamentary system with a Presidential System of Government on April 16, 2017.

In sum, while Turkey has been employing various policy choices, from eliminating the militants to addressing the roots of the problem, for nearly four decades in order to counter the PKK and its strategies, the type of counterterrorism policy dominating the policy area has changed over time. The implementation process is one of the aspects of these policies waiting for attention from researchers. Accordingly, this research will be the first focusing on the implementation aspect of the TCPs, which makes the study significant for the existing literature.

The Significance of the Study

The existing literature on the Kurdish conflict has not addressed this issue. It is mainly limited to the examination of the nature of the problem and the PKK's tactics, on the one hand, and Turkey's approach to and handling of the problem and its responses to the PKK's tactics, on the other (e.g. Ozeren and Yilmaz, 2007; Özcan, 2012; Nikbay and Hancerli, 2007; Houston, 2001; Gunes, 2013; Yilmaz, 2011; Loizides, 2010; Çifçi, 2019; Ozeren et al., 2014; Somer, 2007; Arinç, 2010; Aksoy, 2006). Although the counterterrorism policies that Turkey has put in force to eliminate the PKK have been studied to some degree (Demir and Avcı, 2018), there is no particular study that has analysed the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK. Accordingly, the internal aspects and processes of Turkey's responses to the PKK have been neglected. This thesis aims to fill this gap by analysing the process of implementing the TCPs.

The general literature on counterterrorism does not offer much help either. Although the shocking events of September 11, 2001 have significantly increased worldwide attention on terrorism amongst scholars (Demir and Avcı, 2018) and counterterrorism field has become a widespread topic (Mentan, 2004; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006), an important gap in the counterterrorism research area is that it studies the counterterrorism policies as a whole (Ma,

2011). Ma (2011) indicates that it needs to be broken down into different components, including the implementation stage to entirely understand the causal chain that occurs in counterterrorism policy processes. In this respect, the implementation process of counterterrorism policies is one of the most important components of these policies that needs to be paid attention by researchers. In so doing, this research will serve to fill this gap in counterterrorism research.

Like every public policy, counterterrorism policies must pass into the implementation phase to be actioned. While there has been a large amount of literature having used the word implementation in their titles since the 1950s (Saetren, 2005), researchers have predominantly produced implementation studies on education, social, health, environment and economic subjects (Saetren, 2005; Hill and Hupe, 2014), neglecting not just counterterrorism but also security more broadly. Reviewing nearly 40 research journals and more than 300 papers, O'Toole (1986) explores that academic researchers on policy implementation have pretty much ignored security based policies. The author goes on to say that the implementation research field dramatically covers "… almost all major fields of policy…" except "…the implementation of national security and defense policies, …" (p. 183).

Nevertheless, public policies concerning security and safety are key subject matter today that has not been often seen before (Hupe, 2014). Thus, the scarcity of these policies could not be reason to explain the shortage of implementation research on these policies. The reason for this could be the difficulties of collecting data and conducting research in this policy field. As counterterrorism policies are security-related, this research will also serve to fill this gap in the implementation literature by employing an extended approach to the implementation processes of the TCPs. The extended perspective also determines the scope of the study.

1.2. The Scope of the Research

The thesis will examine the implementation of the TCPs as a continuum between policy and action over time taking an extended approach to the implementation. This means that the implementation of the TCPs will be examined as a process rather than for congruence between policy and action.

Although there is a vast amount of public policy implementation research concerning who creates the rules, how the rules are interpreted, and how they are enacted they mainly focus

on “the relationship between the original policy intentions and the resulting policy outcomes“ addressing “the *congruity* between policy and outcome; where the outcome differs from the original policy intention it has been suggested that implementation has failed” (Schofield, 2004, p. 283).

This predominantly evaluative perspective misses two aspects of implementation. Firstly, assuming policies implement themselves, it neglects the “political context” and the “interactive and negotiative process taking place over time” between decision makers (politics) and implementers (administration) through the policy-action continuum (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, p. 29).

Secondly, it confines implementation into impact studies. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) make “A clear distinction…between policy implementation, performance, and… policy impact” (p. 448) believing impact studies are concerned with the results of policy decisions, but implementation can only be one of the factors effecting the impact. This means that sometimes a policy can be carried out successfully, but without any impact on the associated problem, because of inappropriate policy design and/or other conditions that affect outcomes. Accordingly, “…impact studies typically ask ‘What happened?’ whereas implementation studies ask ‘Why did it happen this way?’” (Dolbeare, 1974 cited in Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p. 448).

The evaluative perspective has its origins in the classic administrative perception, which sees legislature bodies as establishers of decisions and administrative bodies as implementers of policies. This perspective aligned with the top-down approach in implementation and mainly assumes that policy formulation and implementation stages can clearly be separated (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989) and implementation starts when an action is put into force and finishes when the goal of policy is met successfully or unsuccessfully (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).

Separating formulation and implementation as distinct sub-stages in a policy process, as confronted in the literature, may be problematic. As policies are in constant change, implementation might be seen as an evolution (Giandomenico and Wildavsky, 1984) making the policy process interactive with many modifications between formulation and implementation (Berman and McLaughlin, 1977 cited in Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989, p. 7).

There is a perception that "implementation follows formulation and decision theorem" (Hill and Hupe, 2014, p. 4) may be useful for researchers to determine the effectiveness of goal achievement and may satisfy public policy scholars who normatively believe a separation of powers between elected representatives, who make policy decisions, and appointed bureaucrats, to say implementers (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). However, the approach adopted in this thesis follows the argument of Hupe and Hill (2016) that implementation is not only a technical issue occurring in the late part of policy process. Viewing implementation this way, i.e. as "subordinate to the preceding stages of agenda-setting and policy formation" results in a perception of implementation as "'the rest'" and this view means that little attentions is paid to "'political' dimensions, like ambiguity and conflict", which makes it harder to "explain the – sometimes disappointing – results of policy processes" (Hupe and Hill, 2016, p. 103).

Whereas implementation research is mainly concerned with evaluating policy implementation from a success or failure perspective (Schofield, 2004), this thesis is not an evaluate implementation study and is *not* focused on the effectiveness of the TCPs. Instead, this thesis aims to shed light on policy and action continuum in the implementation processes of the TCPs. This necessitates a process perspective rather than an evaluative one. Thus, the research will mainly focus on capturing the implementation as a process. This extended implementation perspective also interlinks what I understand from the terms of policy, public policy, counterterrorism policy and implementation, as presented below.

Definition of Terms

Pressman and Wildavsky state that "[a] verb like "implement" must have an object like "policy"" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xxi). According to Heclo (1972) "the term policy is usually considered to apply to something 'bigger' than particular decisions, but 'smaller' than general social movements" (p. 84). A policy is also described as "… a law, or a regulation, or the set of all the laws and regulations that govern a particular issue area or problem." (Birkland, 2005, p. 18). Although these definitions achievably address general characteristics of the term policy, they concentrate on the static side of it. Having dynamic character, it may change over time interacting withs its environment. Thus, as Hill (2013) argues, a policy is generally shaped in a network, comprised of actions and is often more than a single decision.

Accordingly, "… a pattern of actions over a period of time constitutes a policy, even if these actions have not been formally sanctioned by a decision" (Hill, 2013, p. 17).

Then again, public policy is defined as any action that a government decides "to do or not to do" (Dye, 1972, p. 2). From this definition it may be inferred that, in principle, a public policy is deliberately made by the government to take negative or positive actions to address a problem (Howlett, 2009). Also, public policy is established by governmental actors via connected decisions to achieve goals using appropriate resources that are available for decision makers (Jenkins, 1972 cited in Howlett, 2009, p. 6). From these definitions, it can be inferred that counterterrorism policies are made in a dynamic environment. The ability of the government, the level of resources and targets are significant factors that influence the extent and limit of counterterrorism policies. Besides, Barrett and Fudge (1981b) define public policy as "…the implicit or explicit intentions of government and the expression of those intentions entailing specific patterns of activity or inaction by governmental agencies" (p. v). According to them; "Public policy provides the framework within which agencies of government operate to control, regulate or promote certain facets of society in the interest of national defence, law and order, economic and financial management, social welfare and the like" (1981b, p. v).

Putting this together, I analyse counterterrorism policy within a dynamic, complex and evolutionary framework, which is implicitly or explicitly shaped with the intention of governing the terrorism problem area, comprised of (1) a single law or set of laws; (2) a government's single decision or its set of connected decisions over time; and (3) a government's patterns of actions or inaction over time. This definition is the base of what I understand from the TCPs against the PKK and what policies will be the focus of the theoretical and empirical analysis. Accordingly, instead of focusing on a single TCP at a time, the thesis will base its analysis on a broad cross-counterterrorism perspective over time. While this choice will be further justified in the methodology chapter, it has implications for what I understand from implementation.

There are several definitions of implementation. Berman (1978) defines implementation as "…the carrying out of an authoritative decision, i.e., a policy choice" (p. 4). Goggin (1986) describes it as "a problem-solving activity that involves behaviours that have both administrative and political content" (p. 330). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) sate that "policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions" including

"both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by policy decisions" (p. 447). According to Lester et al. (1987) the concept of implementation could be defined "as a process, an output and an outcome" (p. 210). According to them, as a process, implementation is the realisation of a decision in a time series. As an output, implementation can be seen as the extent to which policy goals have been met. As an outcome, it could be understood as the kind of changes occurring in the addressed problems.

Taken together, I suggest that implementation occurs as a process around a wide variety of dynamic variables rather than a static pattern. Thus, I understand implementation as encompassing one-time and/or continuing efforts comprised of political and administrative elements to realise a policy over time.

As Schofield (2004) states, conceptualising implementation as a process in a policy-action continuum "means that the researcher, by necessity, has to be interested not only in the nature of the policy, but also with those upon whom the action depends" (p. 286). Thus, this thesis needs to include both the types of the TCPs (policy) and implementer's roles and behaviours (action) in its analysis.

The way this research links different types of Turkish counterterrorism polices to the roles and behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers in the policy-action continuum is at the heart of its contribution to the existing knowledge.

1.3. The Contribution of the Research

As will be analysed in-depth in the following theoretical chapter, every counterterrorism policy is distinctively characterised by its type. Accordingly, the thesis will base its analysis on a cross-counterterrorism perspective classifying the TCPs according to their underlying framework. Typifying the Turkish counterterrorism policies as deterrence and defiance/desistance polices gives the research a cross-counterterrorism policy perspective, which is one of the distinctive characteristics of the research. In fact, one of the aims of contemporary implementation research is to understand how implementation processes differ across policy types (Goggin et al., 1990; Saetren, 2014). The struggle is how to link implementers' roles and behaviours to the different types of TCPs in the implementation processes.

While the top-down approach in the implementation research mainly focuses on policies and considers and answers policy related problems in its analyses, the bottom-up approach primarily concentrates on the roles and behaviours of the implementers. But both approaches fail to link policy to action "via an explicit theory" (Sabatier, 1986, p. 35). Thus, as Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) state, "more of an effort is needed in conceptualizing and empirically exploring the linkage between individual behavior and the political, economic, and legal context in which it occurs" (p. 540). Although several hybrid approaches (e.g. Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 1995) developed the typologies of implementation to describe implementation processes across different types of policies, the question of how to link policy to action over time has remained unanswered.

To link them this thesis will distinctively employ the concept of implementation paradigm, which is an analytical framework linking different types of the TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers over time. The concept of the implementation paradigm as the linking point between policy and action in the implementation processes of the TCPs is at the core of this thesis's contribution to the existing knowledge. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

As will be analysed in-depth in the theoretical and empirical chapters of the thesis, I conceptualise and employ the implementation types of the ambiguity/conflict model, theorised by Matland (1995), as implementation paradigms that can be used as an analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. This is an original contribution of the thesis to the existing knowledge because, while Matland (1995) uses implementation types as an analytical tool to identify "which of several differing models in the literature best describes the implementation process" (p. 159) across policy types, my research employs them as analytical framework that conceptually and empirically links different types of the TCPs (policy) to implementers' roles and behaviours (action) over time. Accordingly, the main hypothesis of the thesis is that there are constant reciprocal interactions between different types of TCPs and implementers' roles and behaviours, and these are linked via implementation paradigms.

The findings of the empirical material demonstrate that the context in which the implementation of the TCPs occur consists of the core variables of ambiguity and conflict and

the secondary variables of the quality of implementers and local context. The level of ambiguity and the level of conflict of the implementation context determines the implementation paradigm. The findings also show that the quality of implementers determines the scope of their roles and behaviours at the street level across localities within the context and constraints of the implementation paradigm. While this confirms that it is possible to link different types of the TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers via implementation paradigms, the empirical analysis also adds a new dimension to the existing knowledge demonstrating the secondary role of the quality of implementers and local context in the policy-action continuum.

Adding new insights to the counterterrorism research, this thesis shows that Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive, and even counterproductive, because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low-quality implementers in conflictual circumstances at the street level.

For example, during the deterrence policy dominant 1990s, the implementation context was ambiguous and conflictual. Thus, the high ambiguity/high conflict paradigm was prevalent in that period. Within the context of this paradigm, conflicting low quality of implementers were able to divert the policies in the local context. Because, while ambiguity left them room, high conflict enabled implementers to seek coalitional support for their divergent behaviours. In this context, there were widespread out of routine implementation behaviours delimiting precise implementation and leading policy failures. This suggests the mechanisms of the implementation context may lead divergent roles and behaviours at the street level, being barrier in implementation. Consequently, the implementation could derail, and the policy could fail.

Whilst implementation research ignores counterterrorism policies, counterterrorism studies tend to analyse policies as a whole undermining implementation phase. However, this research distinctively demonstrates that the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies may be one source of the struggles of these policies.

However, the findings show that the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers do not have many instruments to sweep possible implementation barriers away. The main obstacles for precise implementation are still politics related, which implementers have no power to

alter. Yet, top decision makers have available powers and instruments to alter the policy implementation context and eventually the implementation paradigm and, thus, the rest of the implementation. To understand all these dynamics also helps us to understand who is in charge in the implementation processes of TCPs.

1.4. The Methodology of the Research

The thesis aims to fill two significant gaps in the existing literature. The first gap is that the implementation stage of policy process has been understudied in the existing counterterrorism research. The second is that implementation research has not focused on security-based counterterrorism policies. One possible reason for these gaps is the difficulty in collecting data and conducting research in this policy field.

This thesis employs a qualitative case study design in order to examine the subject matter. Thus, it is reliant on qualitative data, rather than quantitative, to answer the research questions. The unit of analysis is Turkey as a state and the thesis examines the implementation processes of the TCPs in this unit over time, although the implementation processes of these policies become dense in the certain regions of the country.

A multi-method approach consisting of qualitative interviewing, document analysis, content analysis and archival research is employed to collect empirical material. The main source of the empirical material is interviews. The thesis utilizes in-person semi-structured elite interviews with thirty participants. Using purposive and snowball sampling methods, I employ a multi non-probability sampling approach to identify participants. The qualitative analysis of documents entails collecting and classifying documents such as governmental reports, laws and regulatory orders. The thesis mainly uses a triangulation approach and several procedures from grounded theory to analyse the empirical material.

The way this research employs the concept of an implementation paradigm as an analytical tool to link the policy-action continuum of the different types of the TCPs may be generalisable across different policy sectors. However, the single case study design may limit its representativeness beyond Turkey.

1.5. The Outline of the Thesis

The research aims to explore the interrelations between policy types and implementers' roles and behaviours in an extended implementation approach. To this end, the following chapter reviews the existing literature with the aim of integrating the different theoretical models and analytical frameworks of two different strands of literature: the implementation literature and the counterterrorism literature. Chapter two then presents the analytical framework of the thesis to examine the implementation processes of the TCPs. It argues that the implementation is a reciprocal interaction process between the top and bottom in which implementation paradigms link policy to action.

While the third chapter clarifies the methodology of the research, the following three chapters concern the empirical analysis of the research. The empirical analysis aims to scrutinise what happens and how and why it happens in the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs, as specified above.

Although it is possible to draw out some clear propositions from the existing literature, the theoretical approaches and law-like propositions tell little about the authentic mechanisms and interactions that generate the implementation processes of the TCPs. Thus, the empirical chapters aim to find the real transformative dynamics, mechanisms and interactions that shape the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The empirical analysis is divided into three chapters. The fourth chapter, the first empirical chapter, explores the implementation context of the TCPs. This chapter aims to answer the "what" questions of the research. Namely, what is the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs and what are the crucial variables throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. It argues that TCPs are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low quality of implementers in conflictual circumstances across localities. This chapter builds the two main columns of the bridge between the theoretical questions and the empirical answers: ambiguity from the top and conflict from the bottom. In addition, the themes of local context and the quality of implementer are included in this chapter. These themes emerged from the data and provide additional answers to the "what" question.

The fifth chapter, the second empirical chapter, analyses the effects of the implementation context of the TCPs at the street level with the aim of answering the "why" question of the thesis. Determining the micro causal mechanisms/interactions occurring thorough the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs, the subsections of this chapter develop and carefully justify the answers to the question of why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do at the street level. It argues that the quality of implementers determines the scope of their behaviours in a locality in relation to the ambiguity and conflict variables at the street level. This chapter also functions as a linkage in the chain of causation between the preceding chapter (the what question) and the following chapter (the how question).

The sixth chapter, the third empirical chapter, presents the missing link in the policy action-continuum of the TCPs aiming to answer the "how" question of the research. That is, how does the policy-action continuum occur in the implementation processes of the TCPs? This section explores the macro causal mechanisms taking place thorough the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs, presenting the function of implementation paradigms as the linking point between policies and implementers' roles and behaviours. It argues that, in fact, implementation paradigms may be used as analytical frameworks linking the policy-action continuum of the different types of TCPs over time. The causal processes and the intermediate mechanisms explored in the previous two sections are the basis of this chapter, to justify the role of the implementation paradigms and build a comprehensive structural map of the implementation processes of the TCPs over time.

Finally, the conclusion chapter summarises the research, underlines its contribution, provides recommendations for practice, and gives recommendations for future research addressing the limitations of the research.

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: LINKING RESEARCH ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND IMPLEMENTATION

Although the roots of terrorism go back to ancient times and the literature had produced a vast amount of studies on the problem of terrorism and countering terrorism during the second part of the 20th century (Alexander, 2002), the shocking evets of September 11, 2001 made terrorism a modern worldwide phenomenon among governments, organisations, citizens and scholars. Hence, countering terrorism, which had been a matter only for specially interested people, became an important task for everyone (Mentan, 2004; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). Similarly, terrorism and countering terrorism have been primary concerns in Turkey for several decades.

As explained, the enduring objective of this research is to explore what happens, and how and why it happens, in the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK analysing the relationships between counterterrorism policy types and implementers' roles and behaviours over time. As stated in the previous chapter, the existing literature on the TCPs against the PKK is scarce (Jaffel, 2015; Gürcan, 2012) and, none has dealt with the implementation processes of these policies. Just as the empirical literature on the counterterrorism policies has paid scant attention to the implementation phase of these policies, the empirical research on implementation has largely omitted security-based policies.

Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to critically engage with the existing literature on public policy implementation and counterterrorism and bring it together in an analytical framework that will guide this empirical study in addressing the missing link in the implementation processes of the TCPs over time.

The chapter takes the form of three parts. The first will critically engage with counterterrorism policy research in order to develop a perspective to typify different strands of the TCPs. The classification of TCPs is important for this research because, as several implementation scholars (e.g. Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 1995) suggest, implementation may vary across different types of policies.

The second section will critically engage with the top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches of implementation research to develop a perspective that will help the analysis to link policy to action in the implementation processes of the TCPs. While the critical analysis of the top-

down approach provides key variables and useful assumptions related to policies, the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach provides variables and assumptions related to the roles and behaviours of implementers. Eventually, an analytical tool, which is the implementation paradigm, will be generated to link these top and bottom perspectives through the critical analysis of the hybrid approaches. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

The last section will present the analytical framework of the research on the basis of the key variables and assumptions generated from the preceding critical analysis of the literature on counterterrorism and implementation.

2.1. Developing a Policy Perspective through Counterterrorism Policy Research

The research conceptualises implementation as a process that continues between policy and action over time. The conceptualisation of the implementation as a process requires the research to include, as Schofield (2004) states, "the nature of the policy" (p. 286) in its analysis. Thus, this section provides an outline of the general characteristics of counterterrorism polices and their classifications in counterterrorism policy research. It also presents the classification of the TCPs that would be used to develop a policy type-implementation process-oriented perspective for the rest of the research.

The concept of terrorism is a highly complex and controversial phenomena. As the concept of terrorism is inherently part of a broader political context, a common definition of the term does not seem possible. While one action may be considered terrorism by one part of the political spectrum, the other side could see it as legitimate political action. Thus, there is no consensus on a uniformed definition of terrorism in literature and international conventions.

However, notwithstanding the cliché of one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, there are several commonly addressed features of terrorism across different definitions of the phenomenon that may help to differentiate terrorism from other social and political movements.

In general, terrorism is seen as a political activity accompanied by violent criminal acts (Nyaundi, 2014). So, what is its difference from other criminal acts derived from political

activities such as war crimes? Gibbs (1989, p. 330) tries to clarify this by defining terrorism as being

> "illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects, provided that it: (1) was undertaken or ordered with a view to altering or maintaining at least one putative norm in at least one particular territorial unit or population; (2) had secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine features that were expected by the participants to conceal their personal identity and/or their future location; (3) was not undertaken or ordered to further the permanent defense of some area; (4) was not conventional warfare and because of their concealed personal identity, concealment of their future location, their threats, and/or their spatial mobility, the participants perceived themselves as less vulnerable to conventional military action; and (5) was perceived by the participants as contributing to the normative goal previously described (supra) by inculcating fear of violence in persons (perhaps an indefinite category of them) other than the immediate target of the actual or threatened violence and/or by publicizing some cause."

In a short version, Sandler (2005) defines terrorism as "…the premediated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims" (p. 75). Additionally, Hoffman (2006) defines it as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change." (p. 40). Besides, Schmid (2017, p. 28) presents one of the comprehensive definitions of terrorism stating:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of

attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

Based on these definitions, it is possible to outline several common characteristics of terrorism. First, terrorism is an illegal and criminal political activity. Second, it has an ultimate socio-political goal. Third, it instrumentalises violence or threat of violence to reach its goals. Forth, it spreads fear beyond its immediate target. Fifth, its immediate victims are generally convenient means to influence and manipulate its main audience. Accordingly, it can be inferred that terrorists aim to trigger political process by manipulating general public through violent acts or the threat of such actions.

The definitions and conceptualisations of terrorism in literature mainly focus on the objective criminal mean and end features of the phenomenon such as violence, threat of violence, disseminating fear and indictable political aim. As Neumann and Smith (2007) states, articulating "the notion of terrorism as if it were a clearly observable fact however leads to severe conceptual problems that frequently impair rather than assist the understanding of the nature of the phenomenon." (p. 1).

This objectivist outlook implies positivist, top-down and deductive reasoning that undermines the political and psychological root causes of terrorism. This perspective excludes the bottom-up, inductive, constructive and interpretive elements of terrorism phenomenon from its conceptualisation. This mainstream objectivist conceptualisation of terrorism also the main logic behind the prevalent top-down coercive counterterrorism policies across the world that mainly concerns with the prevention techniques and the end results of terrorism.

However, trying to conceptualise terrorism solely from an objectivist perspective based on positivist logic and crime prevention framework may fall short to comprehend all aspects of terrorism phenomenon. In fact, as Krueger and Malečková (2003) suggest, for example, "[i]nstead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance", the terrorism "is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics." (p. 119). This is especially true in countering ethnicity-based terrorism. Byman (1998) states that "[e]thnic terrorists frequently seek to foster communal identity, in contrast to an identity proposed by the state." (p. 149) drawing on perceived discrimination stemming from cultural,

socio-economic and political differences. Thus, not only should counterterrorism measures aim to prevent criminal terrorist activities and to eliminate the end results of terrorism, but they also should address the political and psychological root causes of terrorism.

Although there is no consensus in literature on what the root causes of terrorism are, several scholars (e.g. Bjørgo, 2004; Schmid, 2011) point out socio-political, cultural, ideologic and economic structural problems in macro level such as democratic deficit, extremist ideologies, the lack of the rule of law, foreign interferences, discrimination and social injustice. In fact, "… at the macro-level, terrorist organizations are shaped by the social-structural context in which they emerge and evolve, as well as by those groups they view as allies or enemies." (LaFree and Freilich, 2016, p. 5). Thus, as Laqueur (2001) suggests, "any analysis of terrorism is incomplete unless it considers those against whom terror is directed" (p. 80).

The problem of conceptualising terrorism from a positivist, objectivist, top-down and deductive perspective is also prevalent in the Turkish case. This perspective indispensably affects the formulation of the TCPs against the PKK. Thus, TCPs are mainly coercive in nature and this has ramifications in the implementation processes of TCPs against the PKK, which have been intensely elaborated in the empirical analysis of the thesis.

The PKK is a nationalist and separatist organisation. As Post (2005) clarifies, "[n]ationalist-separatist terrorism, also known as ethno-nationalist terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a new political order or state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity." (p. 56). In fact, the PKK "conducted a terrorist campaign since the mid-1980s, mainly in the south-eastern region of Turkey with the alleged purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan…" (Reinares, 2005, p. 121). Thus, seeing the PKK as an existential threat that uses indiscriminate violence to reach its political aims, Turkey has not necessarily been in the need of making absolutely clear which actions of the PKK constitute terrorism. Instead, as Unal and Harmanci (2016, p. 3) state:

> Turkey has always conceptualized the PKK problem in the context of 'terrorism' and framed its countermeasures in the context of 'counterterrorism' simply to delegitimize and demonize the PKK uprisings, as well as legitimizing/justifying its use of force in its struggle against it.

Accordingly, I have considered all the actions committed by the PKK as terrorism. This is because the Turkish Government formulates its counterterrorism policies based on this understanding and this research aims to explore the implementation of these policies. However, this does not mean that the way that Turkish governments understands and conceptualizes terrorism in a general sense is free from complications. While the conceptualisations and definition of terrorism in the Turkish legal system and their drawbacks have been deeply analysed in the first empirical chapter, the effects of these drawbacks on the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK have been intensely scrutinized through the empirical analysis.

The following subsection will provide an overview of the broad range of policies that can be considered counterterrorism policies, and the ways of classifying them. The second subsection will address a useful way of classifying the TCPs (as deterrence and defiance/desistance) and will engage critical discussion of the relative merits of these classifications. It also explains why governments are likely to rely on a combination of classification types and change their strategy over time. The last subsection will explain why we would assume that the different counterterrorism policy types are associated with different implementation processes.

2.1.1. Counterterrorism Policies and their Classifications

Like terrorism, counterterrorism is a controversial issue having multiply aspects. Yet, a common comprehensive and coherent analytical framework on how to handle with the problem of terrorism is still absent (Bjorgo, 2013). Thus, generally, a country's conception of terrorism and its established security regime influence the formulation of its counterterrorism framework (Crelinsten, 2013).

While Spencer (2006) states that the concept of counterterrorism "…refers to all kinds of policies, operations and programmes that governments implement to combat terrorism" (p. 180), Lindahl (2016) describes it as "any efforts taken to deal with terrorism." (p. 450). Although these descriptions represent approximately all kinds of counterterrorism policies, I think they omit an important aspect, namely government inaction. I argue that this could also be viewed as a counterterrorism policy. Dye (1972) is certainly correct in saying that the term of public policy comprises all actions that "government to do or not to do" (Dye, 1972, p. 2), which is relevant to this study. For instance, to turn a blind eye to the PKK's actions in the

Solution Process was a kind of counterterrorism policy that binds the inaction of the Government and this inaction was implemented at the street level. Although the Government never officially confirmed that this was the policy, the inaction was the reality of the policy environment and implementers obeyed this choice. Thus, I have considered all actions and/or inaction by the Turkish Government to address PKK terrorism as counterterrorism policy. On this basis, the implementation process of these policies has been explored.

In addition, while efforts to reach an agreement to the problem may be considered acts of conflict resolution, I have considered the policies aimed at a peaceful solution as counterterrorism policies since the Turkish policymakers have always presented them as such. In fact, as Aydinli and Özcan (2011) state, having many common features with conflict resolution, counterterrorism includes – as presented below – not only security approaches but also socio-political approaches to the problem. Thus, it may be possible to argue that some of the findings of the research may also be of relevance to conflict resolution policies.

In fact, the counterterrorism policies could be politically conciliatory or repressive (Alexander, 2002). When a government believes that the possible cost of terrorism is greater than the cost of accepting terrorist's demands, this government might pursue an agreement (Lapan and Sandler, 1993; Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley, 1983). Besides, while governments need to employ such policies as prevention and reduction to prevail against the terrorist threat (Sandler, 2005), they also need public support in their side in their struggle with terrorism (Crenshaw, 2014).

The literature on countering terrorism is divided in two schools on how to eliminate the terrorism problem; while one stream of studies concentrates on the root causes of terrorism, the other stream is interested in eliminating the end results of terrorism (Schmid, 2005). Nevertheless, countering terrorism in an effective way is a complex phenomenon. Thus, the effectiveness of a counterterrorism strategy needs to coherently address both the root causes and the end results of terrorism (Schmid, 2005).

One difficulty for states in countering terrorism is how to formulate a balanced and coherent counterterrorism strategy. Because while some counterterrorism policies may feed the root causes of terrorism, the others may provide comfort to terrorism. For example, even though using harsh methods in fighting terrorism "can be both justifiable and legal… successfully fulfil

a number of important (though usually short-term) objectives.", they may fail in the long term as they usually undermine the psychology of target population (Silke, 2005, p. 254).

The other difficulty is to identify the root causes of the problem. As Bjørgo (2004) states, to identify polices that "have a direct relationships with the problem… is by no means easy to achieve with such a complex and multifarious phenomenon as terrorism." (p. 256). One way of dealing with this difficulty is to employ policies raising democratic standards as much as possible in order to leave no cause, that terrorism may exploit. As Wilkinson (2011) states "operative democracies" are significantly resilient against terrorism because "the overwhelming majority of their population" are aware of the fact that terrorism "can never be legitimate" when "political systems provide numerous channels for peaceful campaigning for political change" (p. 2).

Because policies to counter terrorism may range from eliminating terrorists to addressing the root causes of the terrorism (Ozeren et al., 2014), scholars have developed several theoretical typologies and approaches to study counterterrorism policies. Having interdisciplinary characteristics, these different approaches to study counterterrorism policies have developed their own conceptualizations and frameworks (Unal, 2012a). For example, while Omelicheva (2007) broadly classifies counterterrorism policies as soft and hard policies, Crenshaw (1999) uses a more nuanced classification and divides the policies that governments employ to confront terrorism into four categories; deterrence based, criminal justice, enhanced defence and negotiation policies. Crenshaw (1999) describes deterrence policies as aiming to eliminate the terrorist threat by means of coercive force such as military operations, killing terrorist leaders; criminal justice policies as perceiving terrorist acts as crimes that should be addressed in the criminal justice system; enhanced defence policies as mainly aiming to prevent terrorist activities by fortifying possible targets and using intelligence; negotiation polices as trying to solve the problem through negotiation with the terrorist organisation.

Counterterrorism policies can also be classified as proactive and defensive. While proactive policies aim to use offensive actions to eliminate terrorism and its resources, such as intelligence operations and attacking terrorist targets, defensive policies concentrate on the protection of potential targets, such as through recruiting more security staff or physical fortifications of possible targets (Sandler, 2005; Arce and Sandler, 2005). Still, in a different paper, Sandler and Siqueira (2006) classify counterterrorism policies as deterrence policies

such as hardening targets and pre-emptive policies such as annihilating terrorists. Sandler (2003; 2005) also classifies it as domestic or transnational counterterrorism policies.

From a psychological standpoint, Kruglanski et al. (2007) analyse counterterrorism policies categorizing them through four metaphors. These metaphors are countering terrorism through "war, law enforcement, containment of a social epidemic, and a process of prejudice reduction" (p. 97). They propose that the best counterterrorism policies stem from the harmonisation of these four approaches.

As can be seen from the above examples, the literature on counterterrorism has produced plentiful classifications to study a wide variety of counterterrorism policies. Although each of these classifications may be useful to illuminate certain aspects of counterterrorism policies, I argue that the most fruitful method is to employ an approach that is not too broad, nor too complicated. This research needs a classification that enables the analysis to include all policies addressing the roots of the terrorism and the results of the terrorism together.

2.1.2. Classifying Turkish Counterterrorism Policies

In terms of the TCPs, while Kim and Yun (2008) classify them as deterrence, defiance and desistance policies in their studies, Unal (2012a) uses a much less complex approach, classifying them as deterrence and defiance/desistance policies. The latter classification is less complex and covers most of the models used in counterterrorism research that lack a common framework to classify. As will be analysed below, while the deterrence approach concentrates on eliminating the results of terrorism, the defiance/desistance approaches address the causes of terrorism. As desistance and defiance approaches naturally have reciprocal characteristics, it seems feasible to combine these categories into one.

Accordingly, I have classified Turkish counterterrorism policies as deterrence and defiance/desistance polices. This classification is broad enough to capture the different types of counterterrorism policies, yet it is parsimonious enough to be usable in an in-depth analysis of the TCPs. On the one hand, as presented in the below subsections, this has enabled the research to include all of the TCPs in a comprehensive classification framework. On the other hand, as the research's acceptance of the TCPs is fairly inclusive, this comprehensive classification has provided enough theoretical background to the research to include all kinds of counterterrorism policies in analysis.

Within this context, the below analysis will critically discuss the relative merits of the deterrence and defiance/desistance counterterrorism policies, demonstrating why governments need to rely on a combination of them and change their strategy over time to counter the terrorism problem in Turkey.

Deterrence Based Counterterrorism Policies

The deterrence approach is established on the basis of rational choice theory (Kim and Yun, 2008; Unal, 2012a). Rational choice logic believes that "…credible threats of apprehension and punishment deter crime…" (LaFree and Dugan, 2009, p. 421). Thus, imposing higher costs on terrorist's movements would persuade individuals against committing terrorist activities (Dugan, Lafree and Piquero, 2005).

The rationalist approach dominates the counterterrorism policy literature (Spencer, 2006; Lafree, Dugan and Korte, 2009). As several scholars (e.g. Spencer, 2006; Sandler et al., 1983; Dugan et al., 2005; Moran, 1996; Sandler and Enders, 2004; Enders and Sandler, 1993; Landes, 1978) have argued, this approach has a number of characteristics: (1) this approach predominantly relies on quantitative methods, such as time-series and intervention analysis and econometric studies to assess counterterrorism policies; (2) it assumes that terrorists are homos economicus like every human being and can estimate the cost and benefit of their actions; (3) thus, a counterterrorism policy's possible effect on terrorist conduct can be calculated; (4) as a result, different aspects of counterterrorism policies could be assessed measuring indicators.

Dugan et al. (2005) classify deterrence based counterterrorism policies in two sub-categories. The first is certainty-based policies aiming to diminish the possibility of successful terrorist actions, such as target fortification and increasing the number of police. The second group of polices posit that if policy makers increase the perceived cost of a terrorist incident, such as imposing harsh punishments, terrorist actions would decrease (Dugan et al., 2005). The logic behind this assumption is that the severity and certainty of punishment will persuade criminals against committing crimes (Mendes, 2004).

Nonetheless, Frey and Luechinger (2003) critique deterrence theory and argue that instead of increasing costs of potential terrorist acts, an increase in the opportunity costs and a decrease in the attractiveness of acts for terrorists are more effective methods to eliminate the

terrorism. In addition, Frey and Luechinger (2004) hypothesise decentralisation as the other effective method to reduce terrorists' expected benefit from a terrorist act. However, conducting research on 110 countries between 1998 and 2004, Dreher and Fischer (2011) assert that "expenditure decentralization reduces the number of domestic terror events. In contrast, local political autonomy exerts no impact" (p. 225).

Although some empirical studies such as Prunckun and Mohr (1997) support the deterrent effect of counterterrorism policies, as it advances on the basis of rational choice theory deterrence-based counterterrorism approach has vital deficits. Ross (1993) correctly states that rational choice is one of the three main causes of terrorism alongside structural and psychological causes. While structural theory considers social, cultural, economic and political problems, psychological theory considers individual and group perceptions to explain terrorism (Ross, 1993). In this respect, deterrence-based counterterrorism policies indispensably blunder the other rather important aspects of the problem. In fact, analysing seven cases that use deterrence based counterterrorism policies, Nevin (2003) proposes that retaliatory attacks do not reduce the intensity of terrorism, therefore a government should employ alternative approaches to counter terrorism.

Many TCPs intended to counter the PKK are deterrence based e.g., the declaration of emergency rule, emergency laws, initiating collective punishment, targeting terrorist leaders, incapacitating terrorist group, and coercing terror-sponsoring countries (Unal, 2012a). Analysing five different counterterrorism interventions, namely "(1) 'a law prohibiting the use of Kurdish language (1983-1991)'; (2) 'the state of emergency (1987-2002)'; (3) 'depopulation of southeastern Turkey (1992-1998)'; (4) 'Turkey's foreign policy change (1998)'; and (5) 'the capture of the leader Ocalan (1999)'" (Kim and Yun, 2008, p. 71), Kim and Yun argue that while deterrence policies work in the short term, they backfire in the long term, putting defiance and desistance theories in a better light. This supports the argument from Byman (1998) that as ethnic terrorism has considerably different logic from the other kinds of terrorism, deterrent counterterrorism measures are not effective to eliminate ethnic terrorism.

The fact that the PKK is an ethnic terrorist group and, as demonstrated by several studies (e.g. Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010; Derin-Güre and Elveren, 2014), deterrence TCPs are insufficient to eliminate the terrorist attacks on their own, Turkey has been also instituting defiance/desistance countermeasures to solve the problem. Thus, even though a deterrence

approach is useful to examine some of the TCPs, it is necessary to consider other approaches in exploring the implementation of all kinds of counterterrorism policies in Turkey.

Defiance/Desistance Based Counterterrorism Policies

The body of literature ranging from criminology to social-psychology contradicts a rationalist based deterrence model and suggests that coercive tactics may be counterproductive, resulting in extended political violence as they may cause an increase in the frustration level of the target population and a decrease in government legitimacy (Shultz, 1979; Lichbach, 1987; Wilkinson, 2011).

The theory of defiance in criminology describes how punishment increases crime in different circumstances (Sherman, 1993). Defining defiance as "…the net increase in the prevalence, incidence, or seriousness of future offending against a sanctioning community caused by a proud, shameless reaction to the administration of a criminal sanction" (1993, p. 459), Sherman states four conditions under which defiance occurs, namely those of the offender's perception of unfairness, the alienation of offenders from the system, perceiving sanctions as stigmatizing and the offender's refusal of shame. From the psychological perspective, some scholars argue that procedural just, fair and respectful treatment increases individuals' loyalty and commitment to a system (e.g. Tyler, Degoey and Smith, 1996). Likewise, Weber argues that compliance increases if a person perceives an authority as legitimate (Weber 1948, as cited in LaFree and Dugan, 2009, p. 427). Also, Tyler (2000) states that although coercion is conceivable for some states of affair, voluntarily compliance by all individuals and groups in a society with the policies is vital for a political system.

Based on these assumptions, the defiance theory argues that counterterrorism polices should be conceptualised on the basis of legitimacy, fairness, justice and commitment in order to be more effective with terrorists and target groups so that a plausible decrease in the levels of imminent violence could be achieved. (LaFree and Dugan, 2009; Braithwaite, 2002).

Analysing the dilemmas of three deterrence counterterrorism policies, namely those of assassination, military operations and reverse-terrorism, Turk (2002) argues that deterrence policies create unfair environments, isolate people and radicalise individuals. There is merit to Turk's suggestion that instead of using fierce strategies, counterterrorism policies should consider elimination of the roots of terrorism.

On the other hand, Ciftci and Kula (2015) analyse some of the defiance-based TCPs, namely those of the returning home bill (implemented between 2003 and 2004), the active repentance law (in practice since 2005), the democratic initiative process (post 2009) and the PKK's response using time series analysis from 1995 to 2010. They found that defiance-based countermeasures neither decreased the number of incidents nor reduced the number of causalities in Turkey. In contrast, there is a positive relationship between defiance polices and the level of violence carried out by the PKK.

In contrast to deterrence approach, defiance approach highlights the importance of addressing the root causes of terrorism and eventually the public support for it. The issue of public support brings desistance approach forward.

After indicating possible backlash from deterrence policies against terrorist movements e.g., assassination and military force versus revenge and martyrdom, emergency rule versus martial image, Crenshaw (1999) argues that the question of how the public perceives the actions made by governments or terrorists is vital for countering terrorism. Asserting that (1) public opinion shapes the level of support for terrorists in a group that sympathises with terrorists; (2) while harsh policies can cause hostility towards the government, fear and punishment can reduce support for terrorists from sympathetic groups, Crenshaw (1999) points out the need for a balanced approach. Positing some effective policies, the scholar argues that governments can (1) try to disintegrate a terrorist organisation to show that support from the sympathetic group diminishes; (2) offer incentives to the terrorist group members with the purpose of splitting them off from the core group e.g., lightening penalties, prizes for leaked information; (3) initiate reforms aiming to address the sympathetic group's grievances whereas terrorists' demands are undermined (Crenshaw, 1999).

Crenshaw's (1999) desistance model emphasises that the public support and perception of counterterrorism policies, especially in ethnic based terrorism, have a central role to diminish terrorism (Unal, 2012a; Kim and Yun, 2008). Indeed, game theoretic based research on the level of popular support for terrorism, conducted by Mesquita and Dickson (2007), posits that the perceptions of the aggrieved population on counterterrorism policies matter not less than physical facts.

Dugan et al. (2008) indicate two approaches to study desistance policy effects on terrorism. One perspective is the individuals' desistance inside a terrorist group and the other is the sympathetic group's desistance towards a terrorist organisation. From the sympathetic group's perspective, they analyse the rise and disappearance of two terrorist organisations, namely those of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), and conclude that the main cause of the disintegration of these organisations is that their brutal actions undermined their legitimacy inside Armenian communities around the World. Thus, they desist themselves from the terrorism and turn against these organisations. Conversely, Unal (2012b) identifies "no clear pattern" between "violence level" perpetrated by the PKK and "popular support" for the pro-PKK political parties "in the macro-scale" (p. 432).

The above analysis suggests that a deterrence policy may increase defiance and desistance in the target group because it may be perceived as illegitimate and unfair. This means, while a policy's deterrence effect increases, the defiance level in the target population also increases. The defiance level increases as a result of an increase in the offenders' negative perceptions about legitimacy and fairness. As a high defiance level is the result of an increase in the offender's perception of unfairness it produces negative perception. Thus, an increase in the defiance level (negative perception) in the target group causes an increase in the desistance level (negative popular support) in the same group. However, while the same policy may increase the target groups' defiance level against the terrorist organisation, it may also cause a positive desistance effect on the same group due to the fear of punishment.

This brief assessment shows the dilemma that a counterterrorism policy may face. While a counterterrorism policy could effectively address one side of the terrorism problem, it also has indispensable side effects. As it is not possible to eliminate the terrorism and its related problems when solely employing deterrence or defiance/desistance-based counterterrorism policies, governments have relied on a combination of them and changed their strategies over time in Turkey.

Figure 1: The examples of the different types of TCPs against the PKK

Thus, the classification of the TCPs based on deterrence and defiance/desistance approaches provides a satisfactory theoretical framework for this thesis when exploring their implementation, as can be seen from the examples in Figure 1. The classification of TCPs is important for the study as implementation research assumes a relationship between policy types and implementation processes.

2.1.3. Implementation Across Different Types of Counterterrorism Policies

The research has analysed the implementation processes of the TCPs as a continuum between policy and action over time, taking an extended approach to the implementation. Conceptualising implementation as a process in a policy-action continuum, as Schofield (2004) states, necessitates the researcher "be interested not only in the nature of the policy, but also with those upon whom the action depends" (p. 286). Therefore, the research needs to include both the types of TCPs and the implementer's roles and behaviours in its analysis.

As the counterterrorism policy area is contradictory, uneven and complex in nature, there have always been different types of TCPs put in force to address the problem. In terms of the implementation processes of the TCPs, as will be analysed in-depth in the following sections, I argue that there are reciprocal relations between policy types and implementer's roles and behaviours over time.

Thus, the fact that every counterterrorism policy relies on specific assumptions regarding how to handle the problems of terrorism is noteworthy to keep in mind while studying policy implementation because the theoretical approach that a policy stems from may affect the implementation process of this policy. If there are varying theoretical frameworks that counterterrorism policies are based on it might be reasonable to expect that varying implementation processes would occur for each counterterrorism policy type. In fact, the implementation process may differ across different types of policies (Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Rimmerman, 1986; Peterson, Rabe and Wong, 1986; Ingram, 1987 cited in Lester et al., 1987, p. 209). Thus, one of the aims of contemporary implementation research is to understand how the implementation process differs across policy types (Goggin et al., 1990; Saetren, 2014).

As I have shown in the following critical analysis of the implementation research and in the subsequent analytical framework of my analysis, we should expect that different types of TCPs are subject to different implementation processes, due to the differing conflictual and ambiguous context of these policies over time. On the one hand, on the basis of its rational choice framework, I have argued that deterrence counterterrorism policies may be clearer than defiance/desistance policies. Thus, they may face fewer obstacles in implementation and leave less space for manoeuvre for the implementers. On the other hand, conflictual implementers may find more room to impede and divert implementation while they carry out more ambiguous defiance/desistance policies. This suggests that there is a relationship between implementer roles and behaviours and the types of counterterrorism policies. The struggle is in how to link implementers' roles and behaviours to the different types of the TCPs in the implementation processes over time, a puzzle that this research has addressed.

Thus far, the counterterrorism section has tried to provide a theoretical basis for the rest of the research that may help comprehension of the relations between different types of counterterrorism policies and their implementation processes. Whilst the focus on the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies enables the thesis to address one of the gaps in counterterrorism policy research, it also necessitates a thorough investigation of implementation research.

2.2. Developing a Policy-Action Perspective from the Research on Policy Implementation

Stemming from political science and public administration as a distinct sub-discipline (Saetren, 2005; Pülzl and Treib, 2006), the implementation research has been one of the main research fields in public policy analysis during the last four decades, enabling scholars and practitioners to understand the complications in public policy implementation (Winter, 2003a; Hill and Hupe, 2014). Though implementation research is newer than public policy and public administration research, its effect on the public policy field is enormous as it examines the complex process of execution of policies (Winter, 2006).

Although there has been a vast amount of literature on implementation studies since the 1950s (Saetren, 2005), the attention has been given to the education, health, environmental, social and economic policy sectors (Saetren, 2005; Hill and Hupe, 2014) neglecting not just counterterrorism but also security policy sectors more broadly. Reviewing nearly 40 research journals and more than 300 papers, O'Toole (1986) explores that academic researchers on policy implementation have largely ignored security based policies. The author goes on to say that the implementation research field dramatically covers "…almost all major fields of policy…" except "…the implementation of national security and defense policies,…" (O'toole, 1986, p. 183).

Public policies relating to security and safety are widely relevant nowadays, but not often seen before (Hupe, 2014). Thus, the scarcity of these policies could not be reason to explain the shortage of implementation research on these policies. The cause is likely the difficulty in collecting data and conducting research in this policy field. Overall, this shows a significant gap in the existing literature on public policy implementation.

Owing to insufficient empirical studies on the implementation processes of the TCPs, this part of the review focuses its analysis mainly on theoretical frameworks and relevant empirical studies of public policy implementation within the three generations perspective so as to provide a theoretical insight and develop an analytical framework to analyse the implementation processes of TCPs towards the PKK.

The distinct theoretical frameworks and empirical studies on implementation research emerged in the 1970s. In that period, there were substantial governmental efforts to solve different kinds of problems that arose in society. Although governmental interventions in

societal problems resulted in increased literature concerning the evaluation of these interventions, these evaluation studies of the policy process between policy formation and outcome neglected the administrative layer in this process (Hill and Hupe, 2014). This missing link was addressed as implementation by Pressman and Wildawsky in their book, Implementation, published in 1973 (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Previously, there was an assumption that administrative bodies would obey or should practice what political mandates regulate. These assumptions neglected implementers' role in carrying out policies and this resulted in a black box at policy research (Hill and Hupe, 2014).

Phases	**Theoretical frameworks**
First generation research	A-theoretical works
Second generation research	Top-down approach
	Bottom-up approach
Third generation research	Hybrid approaches

Figure 2: Positioning public policy implementation research

As shown in Figure 2, policy implementation research has gradually advanced through three generations. First generation research on policy implementation emerged before and during the 1970s, second generation research developed through the 1980s. The need for a more comprehensive and broader theoretical approach on policy implementation research resulted in emergence of the third generation of policy implementation studies (Saetren and Hupe, 2015; Saetren, 2014).

The literature produced during the first generation implementation research is defined as "qualitative, explorative, a-theoretical" (Saetren and Hupe, 2015, p. 94). Implementation of a single authoritative decision in a single or various locations was the main theme in implementation research during the first generation (Goggin et al., 1990).

First generation scholars added many valuable dimensions to the implementation research. Foremost, they took attention from the policy formation stage to the implementation stage emphasizing the importance and difficulties of policy subsystems. Categorising a number of variables, they also exposed the complex and dynamic nature of the implementation process (Goggin et al., 1990). However, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) state all these studies suffer

to link implementation behaviour to political, economic and social context, and they underestimate the tractability of the problem which policy seeks to solve.

Many scholars at this stage were pessimistic about successful implementation since they were assuming that deficit, postponement and rising expenditures were inevitable in the implementation process. As soon as some experimental wide-ringing studies handling political and administrative aspects of implementation process emerged in the second generation stage, the view of inevitable implementation failure started to change (Goggin, 1986).

As Lester et al. (1987) state, during the first two generations, implementation research evolved through four sub-stages. Case studies were the main research approach at first. Second, researchers developed models to use as frameworks for analytical implementation studies. These analytical frameworks are generally categorized in two main groups: top-down and bottom-up approaches. Then, scholars started to experiment with these analytical frameworks. From the 1980s, top-down and bottom-up polarisation of the literature on the implementation process was associated with the questions of what is the aim of the implementation research and even what is the meaning of implementation (Barrett, 2004).

Hill (1997) states that the components of the top-down and bottom-up literature consist of two main focuses: The first is on policy outputs, whether they should normatively be determined by decision makers or not; the other is methodological, whether the implementation process should be examined from the top or bottom. In fact, top-down and bottom-up approaches of implementation are not only diverse in the way they use empirical theory and research methods, but also differ in relation to their perception of democracy. While a top-down approach is generally seen as appropriate for representative democracy so that it is more democratic, representation is a complex phenomenon according to a bottom-up approach where nongovernmental actors also have roles in the implementation process (O'Toole, 2004).

Second generation research mainly focuses on the variables of policy, organisations, people and decision-making environments (Goggin et al., 1990). Accordingly, while top-downers underline the importance of central actors and variables, bottom-uppers highlight the influence of the target population and implementers at the local level. Although the division of the theory of implementation research into top and down is relevant to implementation

studies, it was not as productive as expected as both have their own advantages and disadvantages but ignore each other's strong explanation patterns (Goggin et al., 1990)

Thus, as Goggin (1986) states, although the debate on what implementation is and how and why it varies is generally settled on the first- and second-generation stages of implementation studies, several questions remained unaddressed such as the relation between implementation's nature and its outcomes, the causative configurations among variables. In fact, while the problem of "too few cases/too many variables" was the main challenge in the first and second generations (Goggin, 1986, p. 329), the top-down and bottom-up approaches have insufficient explanatory capacity at "complex, multifactor or networked instances" (O'Toole, 2004, p. 322).

Having pointed out these objections, scholars like Goggin (1986), Goggin et al. (1990) and Lester et al. (1987) called for third generation implementation studies, claiming the need for convergence between top-down and bottom-up approaches in implementation studies. As a result, scholars have tried to develop several hybrid frameworks to facilitate scientifically more impressive research on implementation (Saetren and Hupe, 2015). As the leading scholars to call for third generation research, Goggin et al. (1990, p. 19) clarify its characteristics as

> …an explicit theoretical model; operational definitions of concepts; an exhaustive search for reliable indicators of implementation and predictor variables; and the specification of theoretically derived hypotheses, with analysis of data using appropriate qualitative and statistical procedures as well as case studies for testing them.

Likewise, Saetren (2014) lists the identifying characteristics of the third generation research perspective, such as clearly defined key variables; empirical analysis guided by hypotheses; the use of both qualitative and quantitative data; comparative research design across and within policy types; and longitudinal research concepts. However, Saetren (2014) states that these are only ideal characteristics and nobody should expect them to be entirely applied in a single research project. The same point is made by O'Toole (2000) and Winter (2006) that the expectation of full accomplishment for this agenda would be unrealistic for empirical research.

The result of the calls from several scholars (e.g. O'toole, 1986; Sabatier, 1986; McLaughlin, 1987; Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 1995) for the need of more coherent and closer theoretical frameworks have been an emergence of several synthesized theoretical frameworks during the third-generation. These include such models as contingency theory by Berman (1980); forward and backward mapping as reversible logic by Elmore (1985); advocacy coalition framework by Sabatier (1986); inductive approach by Hull and Hjern (1987); design perspective by Linder and Peters (1987); integrated implementation model by Winter (1990); communications model by Goggin et al. (1990); and democratic approach by deLeon and deLeon (2002). While some of them merge top-down and bottom-up perspectives to create a new model, some demonstrate conditions under which any of them is the most appropriate (Matland, 1995). However, none of them has yet been considered generalizable (O'Toole, 2000; Winter, 2006; Saetren, 2014), and "[n]one of the models have dealt with the messiness, ambiguity and complexity of implementation" (Schofield, 2004, p. 286).

Given there is no consensus among the theoretical frameworks of public policy implementation (O'Toole, 2004) and that pursuing development of a common framework seems to be unfeasible (Winter, 2006), I agree with Barrett and Fudge (1981c, p. 251) when they say

> …given the complexity of the policy-action relationship… a pluralistic approach in the use of conceptual models or theories and in the types of studies undertaken (comparative as well as case studies) seems an essential prerequisite to understanding what is happening

This suggests that, as Winter (2006) states, researchers should employ partial theories and related hypotheses to analyse the implementation processes, as theoretical diversity is not a weakness but strength.

As explained, the objective of this study is to discover the relationships between the type of counterterrorism and implementers' roles and behaviours. This perspective tries to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the different types of TCPs.

As will be analysed in-depth below, none of the implementation frameworks offer a complete and sufficient framework to figure out the research puzzle when they are employed solely. This necessitates the research take different assumptions of the top-down, bottom-up and

relevant hybrid approaches into consideration and combine them in an analytical framework. On the one hand, the thesis considers combining and contrasting the similarities and differences of the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs, namely deterrence and defiance/desistance policies. This policy centric outlook necessitates the research take account of the top-down perspective. On the other hand, the focus on the roles and the behaviours of implementers necessitates the research pay attention to the bottom-up perspective. Besides, to link the top policy perspective to the bottom action perspective the research needs to employ hybrid perspectives in its analysis.

Accordingly, I argue that instead of using complex approaches to study the implementation processes of the TCPs, a straightforward research perspective based on different partial theories is more practical and useful. Positing a set of theoretically driven testable hypotheses and reducing the variables throughout the critical analysis of theoretical approaches, making systematic scrutiny through empirical analysis provide a satisfactory base to explore the causal complexities of the implementation processes of the TCPs. Thus, the analytical framework of this thesis has been based on the partial use and combination of the top-down, bottom up and hybrid approaches.

Accordingly, given the lack of a standard framework in public policy implementation research and an insufficient empirical literature on the implementation processes of counterterrorism policies, the following subsections will critically analyse the theoretical underpinnings of top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches concerning the implementation processes of public policies. It has prioritised the inclusion of literature that is seen as pioneering in the public policy implementation research area or that is concerned with policy areas that share similarities with counterterrorism policies.

Initially, the critical analysis of the top-down approach has generated a theoretical perspective to comprehend the upper context of the implementation processes of the TCPs including the importance of policy type in implementation. Next, the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach has generated a theoretical perspective to comprehend the lower context of the process including the roles and behaviours of implementers. Then, the analytical framework to link policy from the top and implementers' roles and behaviours from the bottom has been generated throughout the critical analysis of relevant hybrid approaches. Eventually, the analytical framework of the research has been put forward.

2.2.1. The Top-down Perspective of the Research

While the roots of the top-down approach linked to the stage model of policy process supposes an exact separation between policy formulation and implementation processes (Hill, 2013), it is also affected by classic public administration understanding assuming politics and administration can be divided and there is a hierarchic line between them (Barrett, 2004). This acceptance leads to the normative supposition that "Policy should be made 'at the top', and executed by 'agents' in compliance with policy objectives" (Barrett, 2004, p. 254). Consequently, while leading top-down scholars tend to study implementation from the aspect of the decision makers (Winter, 2006), top-down implementation research focuses on identifying implementation problems and failures so that it can recommend how to achieve policy goals (Barrett, 2004).

Having granted policies are centrally decided, Sabatier (1986, pp. 22,23) argues that the top-down approach tries to find answers for these questions:

> (1) To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision? (2) To what extent were the objectives attained over time, i.e. to what extent were the impacts consistent with the objectives? (3) What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones? (4) How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?

As these questions suggest, the top-down approach assumes that the targets of policies are enough clear to measure and resources to accomplish these targets are clearly stated. The approach also accepts that policy makers are capable actors to formulate precise policies and they have enough resources for implementers to put these policies into place (Birkland, 2005).

Based on these assumptions, a top-down approach concentrates on centrally made decisions, aiming to discover how to control the implementation process from the top down and how to prevent possible divergences at the bottom level. Consequently, top-downers seek to give recommendations to decision makers about how to formulate policies to achieve its aims without too much prohibition caused by the implementers (Winter, 2006). As top downers argue that an authoritative decision made by central governmental bodies starts the

implementation process and implementation seeks to accomplish policy goals, they pursue to develop generalizable patterns to use in the policy process and this attitude gives the top-down approach a prescriptive character (Matland, 1995).

Having pointed out the key characteristics of the top-down approach above, the below analysis has been developed based on the critical analysis of a number of top-down models with the aim of setting out the key arguments and points of contention in the top-down approach.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, first published in 1973) found, in their case study on the implementation of policy by the Economic Development Administration (EDA), established by the U.S. Congress, intended to provide new long-lasting jobs for minorities in California, that although there were enough funds and no political conflict at the central and local levels, the result was failure. Presuming the problem stems from the complex joint action occurred in implementation process due to many veto and decision points, they resume that implementation should not be taken for granted as an easy task. Thus, having recognized that the mutual interconnections of events in the policy process cause implementation problems, they recommend that policy design should directly regulate implementation to prevent failure.

One problem with this study is that it underestimates the existence of conflicts. As Winter (2006) argued, while Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) identify many actors such as central and local government actors, interest groups, courts, and the target population in the implementation process, they think little of the reality of conflict between these actors and they only emphasise central variables, namely those of policy's causal theory, actors, and decision and veto points. In my opinion, in order to properly analyse the implementation process of counterterrorism policies, the conflict variable should be employed in a given framework.

However, Hill and Hupe (2014) state that though Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) had used a rational model approach to examine the implementation process in their book's first edition, they added a new chapter in the second edition. The chapter, written by Giandomenico and Wildavsky (1984), describes implementation as evolution occurring interactively between policy's central formation and local implementation stages. The interaction between actors in

the implementation process embodies a more realistic insight to assess counterterrorism policy implementation.

In fact, Bardach (1977) posits in The Implementation Game that the implementation process is an assembly process and could be interpreted as a scene of many political and bureaucratic games occurring in a policy's boundaries. Emphasizing the implementation process as a machine, he claims that the implementation process is making this machine run. However, although his opinions take implementers at the local level into account, he sees implementation problems as control problems on the basis of assembly activities. These activities, consisting of several different policy elements, are practised by several different actors via persuasion and bargaining techniques. He describes this process as implementation politics, an insight that may help to illuminate the divergent political character of the implementation processes of the different TCPs.

While The Implementation Game does not offer an analytical model, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) present a pioneering top-down model to be used in the examination of implementation. The model starts with policy and perceives the implementation process as influenced by policy's nature, classifying policies consistent with two features: "the amount of change…, and …goal consensus…" (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p. 458). They state that the feature of change affects the implementation process in two dimensions; how a policy differentiates from preceding policies and what kind of organisational change is needed to implement a policy. By putting "goal consensus" and "amount of change" features together in a diagram, the authors illustrate a four-dimensional typology of public policies influencing the implementation process. Integral to their typology, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) have some hypotheses on effective implementation. First, the type of policy may influence the success of implementation and factors affecting policy success can change across policy sectors. Second, while low change/high goal consensus increases the probability of the most successful implementation, high change/low goal consensus has the least chance for successful implementation and high change/high consensus policies are more likely to be successfully implemented than low change/low consensus policies. With these hypotheses they conclude that the policy implementation process is more likely influenced by goal consensus in comparison with the change feature. On the basis of these opinions, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) developed a model in which six independent variables (policy goals,

resources, inter-organizational relations, implementing agency, socio-economic and political circumstances and the actions of implementers) link policy to the dependent variable of performance.

One problem with this model is that it mainly considers organisational capacity and environmental conditions for performance assuming the policies are unambiguous. However, as its emphasis on the goal consensus/policy change implies different types of implementation across types of polices, their four-dimensional typology gives an insight to developing an understanding for different counterterrorism policy implementation processes. My analysis has shown that as the amount of change and the goal consensus between deterrence and defiance/desistance policies are inversely correlated, there may be different implementation processes across different types of TCPs.

The other problem with Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975) model is that although it makes a link between the types of policies and their implementation processes using the variables of the amount of change a policy generates and its goal consensus, it underestimates the extent to which the nature of a policy shapes the implementation process. However, the emphasis of goal consensus implies conflict in implementation, that I have found as being crucial variable in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

Besides, as Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) suggest, to date implementation studies, including Van Meter and Van Horn's model, extravagantly engage details of policy implementation, dismissing the effect of political and statutory features on the implementation process. Having these concerns, they developed a conceptual framework in which the implementation process occurs in an amount of stages, starting with a policy and finishing at a revision point for this policy. Putting emphasis on the achievement of policy targets, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) outline the six most vital conditions of effective implementation; clearly defined reliable objectives, acceptable causal theory, a legally formulated implementation process to increase the implementer's and target group's acceptance, talented and motivated implementers, support from interest groups and rulers, and satisfactory socio-economic conditions.

Although Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) model lacks parsimony, Matland (1995) and its first two conditions represent the tendency to depoliticize implementation research (Barrett

and Fudge, 1981c), its emphasis on the political process, statutory settings and the proficiency and dedication of implementing officials in implementation present relevant clues for the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The most important problem with this framework is that it assumes that polices are clear. However, as Barrett and Fudge (1981c) argue, policies are generally unavoidably ambiguous and ambiguity might even be the choice of policymakers if they struggle to understand the problem or control the action. At that point Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) assumption of the sound theory becomes useless. I argue that even though clear and consistent objectives are desirable for counterterrorism policies, conflicting political ideologies and political contexts may influence the formulation of counterterrorism policies and cause ambiguity and prevent the formulation of a sound theory.

In fact, as Barrett and Fudge (1981c) argue, the idea of sound theory does not work in a real political environment as it does not consider political beliefs and the political process. The emphasize on political beliefs in political process implies conflict in implementation, as I have explored in the implementation processes of the TCPs. This, in turn, also may cause ambiguity in policies because, as Barrett and Fudge (1981c) state, when policies are framed in a negotiation process between different powers several inconsistent goals and ambiguity might be inevitable.

The above critical analysis of the top-down approach throughout a number of different pioneering top-down frameworks highlights several limitations of the top down-approach. Initially, a top-down assumption of a hierarchic flow-down implementation is excessively utopian. While it considers how body politics could control administration in implementation on the basis of the classical public administration perspective (Hjern, 1982) and the rational choice theory (Schofield, 2001), it underestimates the complex nature of the implementation process (deLeon and deLeon, 2002) and fails to address complex relations in the implementation process (Barrett, 2004). Accordingly, although it takes macro-level legal and political features into account, it miscalculates the role of the central government and lacks an organisational perspective.

Besides, the top down approach underestimates the effect of political process in implementation. On the one hand, as several studies (e.g. Schofield, 2001; Winter, 1986) state,

it ignores the political rhetoric in the formulation phase of polices and its effect on implementation. On the other hand, it neglects the role of political process at the street level throughout the implementation process. It is this point that one of the most striking limitations of the top-down approach stems: it rules out the street level implementers' key roles in implementation. As Lipsky (1980) states, street level implementer's behaviour may be inherently discretionary.

I argue that while the political process at the street level may be the source of conflict in the implementation processes of the TCPs, political rhetoric in the formulation phase may be the source of conflict and, most importantly, ambiguity. As Matland (1995) states, clear policy goals are rarely seen in real life as policies are generally made by coalitions with unambiguous dialect. Having identified this, I argue that the most crucial limitation of the top-down approach is its supposition that policies are clear. In contrast, as Baier at al. (1986) suggest, policies are generally ambiguous. I have found that this is especially true for TCPs.

In sum, as Schofield (2001, p. 251) states: "Top-down models do not deal very well with the messiness of policy making, behavioural complexity, goal ambiguity and contradiction" missing the realities of the implementation process. Thus, I completely agree with Matland (1995) when he says that "[t]he top-down emphasis on clarity, rule promulgation, and monitoring brings to mind the Weberian bureaucrat making independent decisions based on merit and technical criteria, free from political influence. It is, however, rarely possible to separate politics from administration" (p. 148).

In fact, these statements are especially true in the counterterrorism policy area because counterterrorism policies are generally formulated and put into force in a heavily contested political context. Thus, when implementing counterterrorism policies, implementers are quite probably subject to political influence. Also, there is almost always more than one type of counterterrorism policy and many organisations to implement them, namely deterrence and defiance/desistance counterterrorism policies in a given time frame. Thus, while an implementation agency may be entitled to implement these different types of policies, a counterterrorism policy is generally implemented across different institutional bodies. This complex status quo in the counterterrorism policy area does not fit the expectations of the top-down approach.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above limitations, my analysis has benefited from the application of several assumptions from the top-down approach. Primarily, its emphasis on the importance of the policies made at the top is significant for my analysis. This study intends to explore the linkages between policy types and implementer's roles and behaviours in the implementation processes of the TCPs. This suggests that my empirical analysis initially needs to comprehend the nature of the TCPs before linking the policy-action continuum of the TCPs.

The top-down approach's emphasis on macro level statutory and political factors implies the importance of high politics in implementation, a factor that I have explored affecting the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level. This suggests that the empirical analysis also needs to find, as expected by the top-down assumption, the relations between implementation problems encountered in the implementation processes of the TCPs and macro level statutory and political factors.

2.2.2. The Bottom-up Perspective of the Research

Bottom-up scholars primarily concentrate on discovering local implementers' roles in the implementation process, the problem addressed in policy and the relations among actors in the implementation process (Schofield, 2001), believing street level implementers are crucial decision makers for policies carried out (Winter, 2003b). Additionally, bottom-up scholars are "associated with those espousing a micro-political view of intra- and inter-organizational behaviour" and they comprise "a range of models, some emphasizing consensus building, influence and exchange processes (persuasion, positive-sum negotiation and learning), and others emphasizing conflict and the exercise of power (zero-sum negotiations and power bargaining) in the policy-action relationship" (Barrett, 2004, p. 255).

Having noted these key characteristics of the bottom-up approach, the below will critically analyse of a number of bottom-up models with the aim of setting out the key arguments and points of contention in the bottom-up approach to develop arguments for the study.

As one of the leading scholars of the bottom-up approach (Hill and Hupe, 2014), Lipsky (1971; 1980) established the street level bureaucracy approach, that illustrates the actions of street level bureaucrats. While studying the implementation of special educational law in Massachusetts to explore how street level bureaucrats deal with the problems of implementing a new policy, which requires considerable departures from the status quo,

Weatherley and Lipsky (1977) suggest "[t]he work of street-level bureaucrats is inherently discretionary" (p. 172). Then, Lipsky (1980) discovered that street level bureaucrats develop coping behaviours to overcome the problems occurred at the street level when they implement policies and these behaviours ultimately influence the outcomes of public policies. Lipsky (1980) conceptualises bureaucracy as "a set of rules and structures of authority" and street level as "a distance from the centre where authority presumably resides." (p. xii), and then argues that "…the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out" (p. xiii) and conflict in policy processes not only occurs at the top level, but it also at the local level.

This approach suggests that without examining the effects of street level bureaucrats on policies implemented, it would be impossible to grasp the whole picture in implementation. Maynard-Moody, Musheno and Palumbo (1990) conducted empirical research on social policy implementation and their findings support Lipsky's argument and they even propose more delegation to the street level bureaucrats for successful implementation. However, the problem with this approach is that, as Winter (2003b) argues, while it assumes that individual discrepancy at the street level is indispensable in implementation, it ironically expects that all street level bureaucrats behave in a similar way across different policy areas and different professions. Nevertheless, showing that a linear hierarchical control is fairly unlikely in the implementation process of a policy, Lipsky's approach provides valuable insights to understanding the implementation processes of the TCPs at street level. Although the inevitability of discretion of street level bureaucrats implementing counterterrorism policies—especially deterrence based—needs more empirical testing, I have discovered that if implementers pursue their objectives when they carry out the TCPs, this creates conflict and causes discrepancies at the local level.

The problem is, as my research strives to respond to, how to link these actions at the bottom of the implementation to the polices at the top. Describing implementation as the missing link to be discovered between a policy and its outcome, Berman (1978) tries to link it dividing implementation into macro and micro implementation. While macro implementation happens at the national level, micro implementation occurs at the local level because of their different institutional settings. Although Berman (1978) argues that micro implementation is

the most important stage, since the outcomes of the policies are determined by local actors, I argue that putting more emphasis on local actors than on central actors in counterterrorism policy implementation may be flawed. Thus, while dividing the implementation process between macro and micro level offers valuable insights to understanding and studying how counterterrorism policies are implemented at national and local level, it does not provide necessary suggestions on how to link policy to action.

Instead, Elmore (1979) offers a better outlook to link the policy-action continuum of the TCPs developing forward and backward mapping perspectives to describe top-down and bottom-up approaches respectively. Emphasizing forward mapping approach's limitations, Elmore (1979) states that the presumption of "…policymakers control the organizational, political, and technological processes that affect implementation." is "…the 'noble lie' of conventional public administration and policy analysis" and suggests that it is a "myth" to assume that better implementation occurs when policy intentions and outcomes are clearly formulated and implemented consistent with the clearly defined administrative layers (p. 603). To address these shortcomings, the author proposes a backward mapping approach. Backward mapping starts at the bottom of the implementation process where a particular administrative behaviour interconnects with private choice. Elmore (1979, p. 604) believes, only after outlining this behaviour, that policy goals should be formulated in the form of organisational processes and outcomes respectively, and then,

> Having established a relatively precise target at the lowest level of the system, the analysis backs up through the structure of implementing agencies, asking at each level two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behavior that is the target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have that effect? In the final stage of analysis the analyst or policymaker describes a policy that directs resources at the organizational units likely to have the greatest effect.

One problem with the backward mapping perspective is that it relies on the ability of subordinate actors, effective incentives, operational use of resources and bargaining relations of actors in the implementation process. This means the informal patterns of delegation and discretion are the rule in backward mapping. I argue that, in terms of counterterrorism policies, informal devices of delegation and discretion to break up authority has its own limitations. On the one hand, decision makers may be reluctant to give discretionary powers

to lower level actors in countering terrorism, fearing they may get out of control. On the other, counterterrorism policy implementers may be reluctant to use informal discretionary powers in fear of possible sanctions in the future.

Nevertheless, forward mapping and backward mapping metaphors suggests that it may be possible to link the policy-action continuum of the TCPs by mapping the implementation processes of the TCPs forward from the top and backward from the bottom. However, the main problem is still unaddressed: what is the linking point and how can it be linked across different types of the TCPs, namely deterrence and defiance/desistance policies.

Hjern and Porter (1981) presented the theory of implementation structures to address the missing link in the policy-action continuum. Criticizing classic public administration and conventional market theories, they formulate an original unit of study called implementation structures and describe it as "[a]n analysis of the objectives of a *programme* suggests an administrative *imperative*. This imperative points to a potential *pool* of organisations, from which an *implementation structure* is formed" (Hjern and Porter, 1981, p. 222). An implementation structure consists of implementers from different organisations aiming to implement a policy and they naturally group around an implementation of a specific policy as "'phenomenological administrative units', partly defined by their participating members." (Hjern and Porter, 1981, p. 222). Arguing that, unlike traditional top-down hierarchy, implementation structures have interactive and no authoritative relations causing local discretion in the implementation of a policy. Hjern and Porter (1981) suggest that a national policy could have many localized implementation structures varying geographically and periodically. Eventually, Hjern and Hull (1982) propose a principle of empirical constitutionalism in implementation research, arguing that formal constitutional organisations are necessary but not enough to understand the implementation process since policy process is affected by societal actors as well.

The problem with this framework is that, as Winter (Winter, 2003b) argues, it suffers from the lack of a developed theory and testable hypothesis, although it, especially its methodology, is applied by several empirical studies such as Hjern and Hull (1985) and Hull and Hjern (1982). An empirical study conducted by Hall and O'Toole (2000) on programs legislated by the US Congress supports the framework's assumption that most policies are carried out in multi-organizational implementation settings rather than an unambiguously hierarchical one. This

suggests that an interactive process in implementation is indispensable. However, I argue that, although there is a certain amount of interaction, the assumption of no authoritative relationships between actors does not work in counterterrorism policy implementation. In fact, my research implies that there are no distinct implementation structures from implementing organisations in counterterrorism policy implementation.

In terms of linking the policy-action continuum of the TCPs -to answer the question of what happens and how and why it happens in the implementation processes of these policies- the best argument from the bottom-up perspective comes from Barrett and Fudge (1981a) suggesting the "…policy-action relationship needs to be considered in a political context and as an interactive and negotiative process taking place over time…" (p. 29) between policy makers and implementers. The distinct character of Barrett and Fudge's (1981a) argument is that, as Schofield (2004) states, implementation researchers are recommended to consider the type of policy and its implementers in their studies. However, it does not still present a clear framework on how to link different types of policies to different types of actions.

The above critical analysis of the bottom-up approach puts several limitations of the bottom-up approach forward. One problem of the approach related to the present analysis is that, as deLeon and deLeon (2002) state, the assumption of inevitable bureaucratic deviation in implementation is problematic since it undermines the fact that some policy areas naturally entail hierarchical structure e.g. national security. In the case of counterterrorism policy implementation, although there is generally more than one policy and several agencies to implement them, it is clear that some sort of hierarchy is indispensable.

Further problem is related to the bottom-up assumption: prescription comes after exploration. While, as Barrett (2004) argues, this idea fails to compromise the role of government to prescribe policies in advance, it also, as Schofield (2001) argues, fails to comprehend the fact that local perceptions are predisposed by central actors using different tools. This suggests that, in terms of periphery and centre balance, bottom-uppers underestimate the centre's power to institutionally shape the periphery (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982 cited in Sabatier, 1986, p. 34) and this is normatively problematic (Sabatier, 2014).

The main problem of the bottom-up approach is that, as Schofield (2001) argues, it is too messy and complex. In fact, a critique by Sabatier (1986) of the bottom uppers, like Hjern et

al. (1978), correctly suggests that although the bottom-up approach is beneficial to identify "many of the actors involved in a policy area" (p. 35), the concept of bargaining used by bottom- uppers such as Barrett and Hill (1984) does not offer an explicit analytical framework for the problem "…to be related via an explicit theory to social, economic, and legal factors which structure the perceptions, resources, and participation of those actor." (p. 35). This is the main point that this study has achieved: to reciprocally relate the upper part of the implementation processes of the TCPs to the lower part of it, a point that the bottom-up approach fails to address.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above limitations, I argue that my analysis benefits from several assumptions of the bottom-up approach. Primarily, on the basis of the bottom-up approach's assumptions, I argue that although counterterrorism policies are primarily implemented by governmental actors, some of them, especially defiance/desistance policies, also require the commitment of civil society and non-governmental actors in order to achieve their goals. In this respect, counterterrorism policies are implemented in multi organisational environment at the street level. Thus, there may be localized implementation structures in Turkey in relation to counterterrorism policies. Also, in parallel of the bottom-up approach's robust emphasis on micro level factors such as talented implementers, differing values, power relations, conflict and consensus at the street level, I argue that these factors affect the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level.

Overall, taking different methodological and normative positions (Saetren and Hupe, 2015), top-down and bottom-up approaches were the main theoretical bases during the second generation of implementation research. Top-downers aim to realise policy effectiveness and explore how elected decision makers could control and command the activities of implementers. However, bottom-uppers' main purpose is to explore how actors develop strategies to address the policy problem at the local level. As a result, while a top-down perspective necessitates analysis of formal policies of elected actors, performance indicators and features influencing policy performance, a bottom-up perspective requires analysis of how actors act at the local level.

Although there were several points of progress towards theoretically well-constructed qualitative, analytical and experimental studies on implementation in the second generation, there remained unchallenged fields to deal with and a consensus on a common conceptual

framework of implementation was still absent (Saetren and Hupe, 2015; Goggin et al., 1990). As being the main streams in the second-generation research, the limitations of the top down and bottom approaches paved the way for hybrid approaches in the third generation.

2.2.3. The Hybrid Perspective of the Research

The above critical analysis of the top-down and bottom approaches on the basis of the key arguments and points of contention of these approaches have demonstrated the useful assumptions of these approaches and their limitations for the analysis of the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The assumptions of the top-down approach suggest that the study needs to consider the types of the TCPs and macro level statutory and political factors in its analysis. Thus, my empirical analysis has initially focused on these factors. However, as the critical analysis of the top down approach proposes, contrary to the top-down assumptions, the TCPs are carried out in an implementation context that is ambiguous, conflictual, complex, diverse and political.

The limitations of the top-down approach put the importance of several assumptions of the bottom-up approach forward for analysis. As assumed by the bottom-up approach, my empirical analysis has emphasized the role of conflict and political process in implementation, focusing on the roles and behaviours of the street level implementers in the implementation processes of the TCPs. However, as the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach suggests, contrary to the bottom-up assumption, inevitable bureaucratic deviation is not the case in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

As explained, this research aims to explore the nature of the policy-action continuum of the TCPs by way of analysing the reciprocal relationships between different types of counterterrorism policies and the roles and behaviours of implementers. This necessitates the research partially employ the theories of the top-down, bottom-up and hybrid perspectives and combine their relevant assumptions in its analytical framework.

While the critical analysis of the top-down approach provides the necessary assumptions that help to figure out the role of the different types of the TCPs and related macro level factors in the implementation processes, the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach provides assumptions that enable the analysis to comprehend the roles and behaviours of implementers and related micro factors. What is still missing is to link these top and bottom

perspectives together “via an explicit theory” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 35) in order to deal with “the messiness, ambiguity and complexity of implementation” (Schofield, 2004, p. 286) processes of the TCPs.

The assumptions to deal with the messiness and complexity of the implementation processes of the TCPs and the analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum of the TCPs between top and bottom has been generated throughout the following critical analysis of relevant hybrid approaches.

In order to merge bottom-up and top-down approaches, Elmore (1985) revised his bottom-up view conceptualising reversible logic in implementation. Explaining reversible logic as “[t]o get from a starting point…to a result…, we don’t just set an objective and go there. We begin at either end and reason both ways, back and forth, until we discover a satisfactory connection” (1985, p. 35), Elmore divides the implementation process into two parts; forward mapping from the top and backward mapping from the bottom. He states that every actor in the implementation process uses his own perception to get involved in the process and these perceptions only propose parochial solutions resulting in several failures. But reversible logic provides a sophisticated perception to every actor so that they modify their actions and beliefs. This occurs as bargaining in the policy implementation process (Elmore, 1985).

Although there should not be expectation of a bargaining process in counterterrorism policy, or at least in some types of counterterrorism policies such as deterrence-based emergency rule declaration, since it might require strict control in implementation, I have mapped the implementation processes of the TCPs forward from the top and backward from the bottom based on reversible logic. However, Elmore’s approach suffers in making predictions due to the lack of testable hypotheses (Matland, 1995) and lacks a framework (Sabatier, 1986) to address the exact linking point in the policy-action continuum.

Reviewing existing implementation research from the aspect of strong points and flaws of top-down and bottom-up approaches, Sabatier (1986; 1987; 1988; 1991) developed a conceptual framework called advocacy coalition that synthesizes top-down and bottom-up approaches. Since then, the advocacy coalition framework has been applied to many case studies and has been evaluated by many, including Sabatier and Pelkey (1987), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), Weible et al. (2011), Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014),

and Sabatier and Weible (2016). Although the advocacy coalition approach offers a sophisticated framework, it focuses on policy-oriented learning and policy change over time, rather than implementation. Using bottom-uppers' methods, it starts the process from a policy problem and considers how public and private actors learn from experience. Then, from a top-down perspective, it considers how socio-economic and legal circumstances shape actions. The advocacy coalition supplementary variables, such as the belief system, are not seen in typical implementation studies. Nevertheless, on the basis of this approach's assumption of the relationship between policy change and implementation within the period of ten years, I argue that there may be relationships between changes across different types of the TCP and their implementation processes over time.

The relation between policy change and implementation suggests that there may be reciprocal relations between policy formulation process/policy design and implementation processes. While some implementation scholars emphasize the importance of the policy formulation process and policy design for implementation, some of them neglect their effect (Winter, 2003b). Recommending a design perspective approach on policy implementation research, Linder and Peters (1987) argue that instead of concentrating on the implementation stage too much, implementation research should give more attention to the formulation stage of a policy to design a policy to enable effective goal achievement. However, May (2003) suggests that although policy design is an important factor determining implementation process and outcomes, it is not enough to assure better implementation results. I argue that, as Winter (2006) states, because policies are designed in a political context, conflict is inevitable prior to the formulation stage of policies and this results in ambiguous goals.

Winter (2003a; 1990) proposes an integrated implementation approach to join all these perspectives. The model's distinct characteristic is that it divides and conceptualises implementation performance (output) and implementation outcome as separate variables. Based on the democratic principle, it evaluates the results in accordance to the official policy targets. The integrated model posits the policy formulation process, policy design, organisational and inter-organizational conduct, street-level bureaucrat actions, target group behaviour and socio-economic context as the main factors affecting implementation results (output and outcome).

Inter-organizational implementation occurs when a policy is implemented by more than one organisation, including various public and private units and it increases the success of implementation if cooperation among them is well-designed (O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984; O'Toole, 2003). While another variable, given by Winter (2003a), street-level bureaucratic behaviour is examined by Lipsky (1980), the policy design variable is mainly examined by May (2003). All these variables interrelate with each other in socio-economic context at the integrated model. However, Ryan (1996) analyses the Australian industry policy case using the integrated approach and claims that Winter's (2003a; 1990) model has some weaknesses, such as not paying attention to the political and ideological context in implementation.

Regarding my analysis, the problem with the integrated model is that it focuses on implementation output and outcome while this research comprehends implementation as a process. However, although the pattern of implementation or what happens in the implementation process is not the same as the result of implementation (Bardach, 1977; Ripley and Franklin, 1982 cited in Lester et al., 1987, p. 209), what happens in the implementation process must inevitably effect the output and outcome. Thus, exploring what happens in the implementation processes of the TCPs, the research has also validated the relations between the implementation processes of the TCPs and policy change, although this is not the aim of this research. Besides, although Winter (2006) is correct in saying that implementation research should provide more conceptual clarification to facilitate the explanation of causal relations in the implementation, it does not provide any analytical tool that might be useful to link the causal relations in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs.

Hitherto, the useful aspects of the top-down, bottom-up and relevant hybrid approaches for the analysis have been generated. While the critical analysis of the top-down approach has underlined the importance of the macro level factors, most importantly the type of policies, in implementation, the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach has put the importance of the roles and behaviours of street level implementers forward. Besides, the above critical analysis of the hybrid approaches has provided useful assumptions to deal with the messiness and changing nature of implementation processes across polices and time. However, the question of how to link all these aspects in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs via an analytical framework remains unanswered. The below section will present the concept of the implementation paradigm as the analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum of

the different types of the TCPs. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

Implementation Paradigm as a Linking Tool in Policy-Action Continuum

The concept of the implementation paradigm as an analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum of the different types of TCPs between top and bottom over time has been generated through the critical analysis of the typologies of implementation presented by Goggin et al. (1990) and Matland (1995). As discussed below, although they use the types of implementation to describe different implementation processes, I have distinctively employed them as an analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum of the different types of the TCPs.

Given the majority of implementation papers study single policy types (Lester et al., 1987), in their call for the third generation implementation research, Goggin et al. (1990) state that "[t]he principal aim of the third-generation research is to shed new light on implementation behavior by explaining why that behavior varies across time, policies, and units of government" (p. 17). In fact, the counterterrorism section showed that counterterrorism policies are designed based on different underlying theoretical assumptions, resulting in the production different types of counterterrorism policies. As the implementation processes could differ along with policy types (Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Rimmerman, 1986; Peterson, Rabe and Wong, 1986; Ingram, 1987 cited in Lester et al., 1987, p. 209), studying the typologies of policy implementation is feasible (Wittrock and DeLeon, 1986 cited in Lester et al., 1987, p. 209) in exploring how policy implementation differs across policy types and time. Based on these suggestions, several scholars, most importantly Goggin et al. (1990) and Matland (1995), formulated the types of implementation to analyse implementation.

Integrating the major concerns and variables of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives into a single model, Goggin et al. (1990) present the typologies of implementation in their communications model of intergovernmental policy implementation. Based on the American federal system, the model tries to explain why implementation styles vary across states. It diagnosis three sets of variables effecting state-level implementation: "inducements and constraints from the 'top' (the federal level), inducements and constraints from the 'bottom'

(the state and local levels), and state decisional outcomes and capacity" (Goggin et al., 1990, p. 33). Identifying four types of implementation, namely of those of defiance, delay, strategic delay and compliance, they argue that at a specific time period in a state, interaction between these variables shapes the types of implementation.

The first problem with this model is that, although its focus on the implementation process instead of implementation outcomes and outputs (Winter, 2006) gives useful insight for my research, its analysis based on intergovernmental policy implementation limits its explanatory capacity for the analysis of the TCPs. The second problem is that although it considers many variables, it omits, as Cline (2000) states, the crucial variable of conflict among participants in the implementation process and isolates the implementation process from its social and political context. I argue that political context is important, and conflict is inevitable in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

As the intergovernmental model is mainly concerned with the policies in federal systems and considers comparatively more variables, I argue that the typologies of implementation that Matland (1995) uses in the ambiguity/conflict model, as presented below, provide a better analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum across different types of TCPs.

Identifying the need for coherence and convergence in the implementation research and reviewing previous top-down, bottom-up and hybrid perspectives, Matland (1995) developed the ambiguity/conflict model of policy implementation. There are two distinctive characteristics of the model. First, instead of combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches to create a distinct framework, it demonstrates when the top-down and bottom-up approaches are the most appropriate to explain the implementation process. Second, the model identifies conflict and ambiguity as two crucial variables saying that "[a] literature with three hundred critical variables doesn't need more variables: It needs *structure*" (Matland, 1995, p. 146) with the emphasize from O'Toole's (1986) review, which discovered that more than three hundred main variables have been mentioned within over one hundred texts on implementation studies.

Saying while top-downers' tendency is clear policies, bottom-uppers' see policies as inherently unclear, it suggests that in order to evaluate different types of policies, implementation research needs to take into consideration a policy's characteristics. The model then develops

an analytical tool analysing a policy's ambiguity and conflict level. Using a four cell conflict-ambiguity matrix, it demonstrates "the four policy implementation paradigms" (Matland, 1995, p. 145) namely those of administrative, political, experimental, and symbolic implementation. As can be seen in Figure 3, each box "presents the type of implementation process, the central principle determining outcomes for this type of implementation, and an example of a policy that fits this category" (Matland, 1995, p. 160).

AMBİGUİTY	CONFLİCT: Low	CONFLİCT: High
Low	*Administrative* Implementation Resources Example: Smallpox erradication	*Political* Implementation Power Example: Busing
High	*Experimental* Implementation Contextual Conditions Example: Headstart	*Symbolic* Implementation Coalition Strength Example: Community action agencies

Figure 3: Ambiguity-conflict matrix; replicated from Matland (1995, p. 160)

The model from Matland (1995) assumes that low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict result in administrative implementation, and in this case the process is shaped by resources and the top-down perspective is the most appropriate framework to describe the process. Political implementation occurs at low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict, newer top-down models provide a suitable framework and power is the determinant of the implementation process in this case. The cause of experimental implementation is high policy ambiguity and low policy conflict; the process is determined by the contextual condition in this case making a bottom-up perspective the most proper framework. High policy ambiguity and high policy conflict leads to symbolic implementation; coalitional strength decides the implementation process and both top-down or bottom-up perspectives could be simultaneously employed in this case.

The main problem with the ambiguity/conflict model regarding the current analysis is that although it relates the typologies of implementation with policy types, it underestimates the reciprocal relations of them with the roles and behaviours of implementers such as discretion and bargaining occurring at the street level. Yet, my research puzzle includes the roles and behaviours of implementers in its analysis and the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach

puts the importance of them forward. Thus, although the categorisations of the Matland's (1995) model "provide a useful analytical typology", these typologies "still rely upon the processes of communication, bargaining and the use of power expressed in terms of either coercion or negotiated agreements" (Schofield, 2004, p. 290). Actually, this problem is related to the descriptive character of the model.

Thus, although the aim of the typologies of implementation of the ambiguity/conflict model is to provide "an analytical tool for identifying which of several differing models in the literature best describes the implementation process" (Matland, 1995, p. 159) of different types of policies, I have distinctively employed them as analytical frameworks to link policies prom the top and implementers' roles and behaviours from the bottom. I argue that the typologies of implementation of the ambiguity/conflict model has enabled the research to link the policy-action continuum across different types of the TCPs over time. There are two main foundations of this argument.

Firstly, the model flawlessly addresses the considerations of the top-down and bottom-up approaches using only two variables. As we have seen, one of the main problems in implementation research is too many variables. After reviewing the implementation research in-depth, I agree with Matland (1995, p. 153) when he says:

> Until now, implementation studies have tended to present long lists of variables that may affect implementation. The conditions under which these variables are important and the reasons we should expect them to be important have been ignored to a large degree or have been treated superficially. This has given us a field overflowing with diagrams and flow charts with a prodigious number of variables. Synthesis that merely combines ten variables considered by the top-downers with ten variables considered by the bottom-uppers without exploring the theoretical relationship between them, is likely to exacerbate the problem.

In fact, I argue that, as Goggin (1986) and Lester et al. (1987) state, while it is possible to equally explore the problem area with two variables instead of using too many variables, research should focus on reducing variables to a few critical numbers selecting crucial ones. The conflict/ambiguity model, incorporating several top-down and bottom-up variables, clarifies the crucial variables as conflict and ambiguity. Indeed, the preceding critical analyses

of the top-down and bottom-up approaches puts the importance of ambiguity and conflict forward in implementation. Accordingly, I argue that ambiguity and conflict are the crucial variables in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

On the one hand, as several scholars (e.g. Barrett and Fudge, 1981c; Baier et al., 1986) argue, policies are unavoidably ambiguous. Ambiguity might be the choice of policymakers if they struggle to understand the problem or to control the action. If a policy has several inconsistent goals, it may also cause ambiguity; in particularly, when policies are framed in a negotiation process between different powers, ambiguity might be inevitable (Barrett and Fudge, 1981c). Thus, as Matland (1995) states, clear policy means and ends are rarely seen in real life as policies are generally made by coalitions with ambiguous dialect. Accordingly, I argue that even though clear and consistent objectives are desirable for counterterrorism policies, incompetent decision makers and conflictual political contexts prevent the design of sound counterterrorism policies and resulting in ambiguity.

On the other hand, as the critical analysis of the implementation research has shown, policies are designed and carried out in a contested political process in which actors have differing perceptions and beliefs. Thus, as Winter (2006) states, conflict in a policy area is indispensable. In fact, terrorism is a kind of problem that stems from a society that already suffers from conflictual issues. Thus, we can assume that all counterterrorism policies have naturally conflicting characteristics. Crenshaw (2001) rightly argues that counterterrorism policies are determined and implemented without consensus in a contested political process in which governmental organisations, political powers, media and general public have their own say on the processes of selection, formulation and implementation. Turkey is not free from this. The TCPs are also determined and implemented in complex and conflictual political processes. Decision making and implementation processes of a counterterrorism policy mostly take place without consensus among the public and political actors. Even inside a government, there are many different thoughts and approaches about how to understand and eliminate terrorism. In this case, Sabatier (1988) says that the approach that has coalitional strength in a government is put in force. But this does not mean that the real conflictual issues in a government will ultimately disappear. The other approaches generally wait for an opportunity window to be put in force.

It seems that conflict is indispensable when counterterrorism policies carry out at the street level. The defiance and desistance-based approach underlines the importance of the target group's perception. I argue that, regarding my research, implementers' perceptions about different counterterrorism policies are also important. Their perceptions of different types of counterterrorism policies' legitimacy, fairness and justice affect the formation of their roles and behaviours in the implementation processes of these policies.

Secondly, as the model aims to demonstrate under which conditions the top-down and bottom-up approaches may be useful to describe implementation processes, it is compatible with the research's partial use of theories. This is important in two respects. First, the emphasis of policies and macro level factors in implementation necessitate the use of the top-down approach's assumptions. On the other hand, the inclusion of the roles and behaviours of implementers in the analysis necessitates the use of the bottom-up assumptions. Yet, the function of the ambiguity/conflict model is that its typologies of implementation are used as an analytical tool to link these perspectives in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The use of the typologies of implementation to link policy from the top and the roles and behaviours of implementers from the bottom is exclusive to this research. Thus, in order to underline their unique role as an analytical tool to link the policy-action continuum, I have referred to them as implementation paradigms instead of implementation types in this thesis.

2.3. The Analytical Framework of the Research

The research aims to address the missing link in the implementation processes of the TCPs comprehending implementation as a continuum between policy and action taking place over time. Because the conceptualisation of the implementation as a process necessitates the analysis "be interested not only in the nature of the policy, but also with those upon whom the action depends" (Schofield, 2004, p. 286), the research needs to include both the types of the TCPs from the top and implementer's roles and behaviours from the bottom in its analysis.

In the critical analysis of counterterrorism research, I classified Turkish counterterrorism policies as deterrence and defiance/desistance policies regarding their underlining framework and assumed that implementation processes may vary across different types of the TCPs over time. Given the counterterrorism policy area is contradictory, uneven and complex in nature and there is, as O'Toole (2004) states, a lack of consensus among the theoretical frameworks

of the public policy implementation, the research has taken, as advised by Barrett and Fudge (1981c), “a pluralistic approach in the use of conceptual models or theories” (p. 251) to the implementation research to analyse the policy-action continuum of the TCPs.

The critical analysis of the top down and bottom-up approaches successively brought the importance of the characteristics of policies and the roles and behaviours of the implementers forward generating assumptions that can be used for guidance in the empirical analysis. The critical analysis of the relevant hybrid approaches provided the necessary assumptions that help to deal with “the messiness, ambiguity and complexity of implementation” (Schofield, 2004, p. 286) of the TCPs “via an explicit theory” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 35).



Figure 4: The policy-action continuum in counterterrorism policies

To put it briefly, as seen in Figure 4, while the type of counterterrorism policy represents the top-down perspective, the implementer’s role and behaviour represents the bottom-up perspective. What we need is to discover the missing link between policy type and implementer’s roles and behaviours. Elmore’s (1985) sophisticated reversible logic describes it as, “[t]o get from a starting point…to a result…, we don’t just set an objective and go there. We begin at either end and reason both ways, back and forth, until we discover a satisfactory connection” (Elmore, 1985, p. 35). The type/paradigm of implementation represents this missing link. Putting a torch on it will enable the research to enlighten the satisfactory

connection of these two parts of the implementation processes of the TCPs, forward from the top and backward from the bottom. Because, while policy type characterises the functions of the top and the implementers' role and behaviour characterise the functions of the bottom, implementation types/paradigms represent the sophisticated linking point that links the policy-action continuum of the TCPs 'via an explicit theory'.

As explained above, while the aim of Matland's (1995) implementation typologies is to provide "an analytical tool for identifying which of several differing models in the literature best describes the implementation process" (p. 159) of different types of policies, I exclusively conceptualise them as the analytical frameworks linking the policy (policy types)-action (implementer's roles and behaviours) continuum of the TCPs naming them implementation paradigms. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigms enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

Overall, the main hypothesis of the research is based on Elmore's (1985) reversible logic. The implementation process is shaped by both top and bottom factors. As well, I think, while policy type affects the implementation paradigm and eventually implementers' roles and behaviours, İmplementers' roles and behaviours also affect the implementation paradigm and eventually policy type. This is a "reciprocal interaction" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xxv) process between top and bottom in which implementation paradigms link policy to action. The inquiry of how these interactions occur between policy and action via implementation paradigm, and who is in charge across the different types of the TCPs is the research's empirical consideration.

However, using the ambiguity-conflict model as a base, several testable hypotheses could be derived to predict the relationships between deterrence and defiance/desistance TCPs and implementers roles and behaviours via implementation paradigms. As a whole, I hypostasize that the implementation process of a TCP (deterrence or defiance/desistance) has continuously changing character moving across different implementation paradigms and the implementer's role and behaviour is formed regarding to the existing paradigm.

Deterrence-based counterterrorism policies are generally put in force in parallel with the rise in terrorist attacks. I hypostasize that when intense terrorist activities occur, at first, there is a

near consensus in society of the need for deterrence and this results in low ambiguity. As can be seen from Figure 5, the starting implementation paradigm of the policy is *administrative implementation* (low conflict/low ambiguity). In this case, implementers' first concern is resources and the top-down perspective is dominant in implementation process. At second stage, in parallel with the rising causalities, controversy also rises. Rising controversy makes it *political implementation* (high conflict/low ambiguity). In this case, implementers need strong political support in order to carry out the policy and the dominance of the top-down perspective continues. At the third stage, as long as causalities gradually increase, controversy also rises and popular support for the government starts to decrease. Thus, the government's political support for the policy drops. The policy become blurred and it results in high ambiguity. In this stage, *symbolic implementation* (high conflict/high ambiguity) occurs. Implementers seek coalitional support in order to carry out the policy and the bottom-up perspective starts to substitute for the top-down perspective. At the last stage, as the government wants to get rid of the policy, it slows down the policy's prominence. Thus, controversy starts to decline, and *experimental implementation* occurs (low conflict/high ambiguity). In this case implementers seek surrounding circumstances to carry out the policy and the bottom-up perspective is prominent. In sum, although the implementation process of deterrence policy starts with the top-down perspective, it ends with the bottom-up perspective.



Figure 5: Deterrence counterterrorism policy implementation

Alternatively, defiance/desistance policies are generally put in force as an alternative to deterrence policies. As shown in Figure 6, at the first stage, when the policies are put in place, there is a near consensus on the need for these policies as they are seen as alternatives to deterrence policy. However, initially it is not clear what these policies will achieve as they are framed in a negotiation process between different powers. Due to their sophisticated natures, ambiguity is high. Thus, *experimental* implementation (low conflict/high ambiguity) occurs. In this case, implementers seek contextual conditions and the bottom-up perspective is dominant. At the second stage, controversy starts to rise because opposition powers and the establishment raise concerns over the ambiguous policies. At this point, *symbolic implementation* (high conflict/high ambiguity) occurs. Implementers look for coalitions and the top-down perspective starts to subsidise the bottom-up perspective. At the third stage, rising conflict persuades the government to be more explicit about the policies. Now, *political implementation* (high conflict/low ambiguity) happens. Implementers behave in accordance with political coercion and the top-down perspective is dominant. At the last stage, as soon as the policies give positive feedback, the majority is convinced, and controversy decreases. While, *administrative implementation* (low conflict/low ambiguity) occurs and implementers' behaviour is shaped by resources, the top-down perspective retains prominence. In brief, the

implementation processes of defiance and desistance policies start from the bottom-up perspective and arrive at the top-down perspective.



Figure 6: Defiance/desistance counterterrorism policy implementation

Integrating theoretical insights and empirical evidence, the veracity of the hypotheses has been comprehended in conjunction with these policies' ambiguity and conflict levels and implementers' roles and behaviours to explore how their implementation processes take place over time.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter brings together two different research areas: the literature on counterterrorism policy and the literature on public policy implementation. The aim is to generate an analytical framework to address the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs over time.

On the one hand, the critical analysis of the counterterrorism research demonstrates that counterterrorism policies have different underlying assumptions. On the other hand, the contemporary implementation research assumes that implementation may differ across different types of policies. In fact, the critical analysis of the top-down and bottom-up approaches suggests that differing conflictual and ambiguous contexts of different types of policies may alter implementation process across policies over time. Accordingly, the

typologies of the ambiguity/conflict model are conceptualised as the implementation paradigms and employed as the analytical tools linking different types of TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers over time.

Based on these assumptions, I argue that the implementation processes of the TCPs are shaped by both top and bottom factors and there is a reciprocal relation between policy types and implementers' roles and behaviours through implementation paradigms. This function of the implementation paradigms in the implementation processes is the unique contribution of the research to the wider literature.

The research takes a pluralistic approach using partial use of the theories and their related assumptions in its theoretical framework in order to comprehend the complexity of the addressed problem. This pluralistic approach and theoretical diversity have methodological implications, which is the subject of the following chapter.

3. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

As mentioned in the previous chapters, there are three rationales for conducting this research. First, the case it addresses is a social and political problem that has been largely omitted in the literature even though it has profound effects on social and pollical life. Second, the researcher's personal experiences as an implementer of the TCPs stimulated the selection of this research. Third, from the theoretical perspective, this research tries to fill the gaps in the implementation research and counterterrorism research.

As we have seen, there are two significant gaps in the related literature. The research will serve to fill these gaps in two ways. First, it concentrates on the implementation stage of counterterrorism policies, which has been ignored by the counterterrorism research. By analysing the implementation stage, this research will serve to fill this gap in the counterterrorism research. The second is related to the implementation research. That is, this research studies security-based counterterrorism policies that have been mainly omitted in previous research. One likely reason for this gap is the difficulty in collecting data and conducting research in this policy field.

In the previous chapters, the literature on implementation and counterterrorism research has been critically examined, and concepts, theories and research questions have been clarified. The main objective of this research is presented as exploring the implementation processes of the TCPs and understanding why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do. It aims to capture the implementation as a process, the relationships between the type of counterterrorism policy and the roles and behaviours of implementers.

The main research question is what happens, and how and why it happens, in the implementation processes of TCPs against the PKK: What is the nature of the implementation processes of TCPs and what are the crucial variables throughout the implementation processes of TCPs? Why do the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do at the street level? How to link the policy-action continuum in the implementation processes of TCPs?

As can be seen from the wording of the research questions, the research does not aim to be an outcome analysis or an evaluative analysis of the implementation processes of the TCPs. Instead, the research must examine the addressed phenomenon in an extended manner.

Methodological preferences are set in order to attain the best possible answers to research questions (Lilleker, 2003). Thus, the types of research question influences the research process and methodological preferences, such as the kind of literature search, research design, data collection and data analysis methods (Bryman, 2016), as has held true in the present research.

This chapter will explain the methodological considerations and context of this research. It will explain why and how specific research strategies, design and methods are employed and how the research methodologies are related to its ideas and concepts. Initially, the philosophical position of the research will be addressed. Next, the design of the research will be justified. Then, the methods of the data collection and analysis will be explained. Finally, ethical and practical issues will be discussed.

3.1. The Overall Methodology of the Research

As this is social research, its methodological considerations are affected by the wider debates on what comprises social research and how it should be carried out. Bryman (2016) states that while methods "are linked with the ways in which social scientists perceive the connection between different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined", on the basis of "the question of how research methods and practice connect with the wider social scientific enterprise", data "are invariably collected in relation to something" that could be "a burning social problem" or "a theory" (p. 17).

As it has been made clear that this research aims to explore the implementation processes of the TCPs. For this aim, a theoretical framework has been developed in the literature review. The top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches in the implementation research and defiance/desistance and deterrence approaches in counterterrorism have been analysed. In the light of these theories, a conceptual framework indicating possible crucial variables (ambiguity and conflict) and prepositions have been established. The main preposition of the research assumes reciprocal interactions between policy types, implementation paradigms and implementer roles and behaviours. This framework served as the foundation for the field work and empirical analysis.

The research primarily uses deductive reasoning. In fact, the literature review generated concepts, variables and presuppositions on the basis of theoretical traditions of the research's interested fields namely those of implementation and counterterrorism research to connect

theory and the research. However, although the deductive stance of the research has guided the empirical enquiry, including data collection methods and data analysis, the research has also employed inductive reasoning in its analysis. Because, the empirical analysis also includes the possible implications of the research findings for the theoretical frameworks related to the research fields. Also, some theoretical ideas, such as the importance of the quality of implementers in the local context, are derived from interview data as opposed to being moulded in the theoretical framework of the research. The use of both inductive and deductive reasoning points toward the grounded theory approach to gather and analyse data, which will be mentioned below.

As Marsh and Furlong (2002) state, social scientists' position toward theory and methods are shaped by "their ontological and epistemological position", thus, "all students of political science should recognise and acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions" (p. 17). Therefore, the above general theoretical assumptions of the research will be further clarified below, analysing the epistemological and ontological considerations of the research. Then, the strategy of the research will be made clear before turning the focus on the research design and procedures.

The Ontological and Epistemological Position of the Research

I will not involve a wider and in-depth debate on the different approaches of ontology and epistemology for two main reasons. First, this debate is beyond this research's limited focus. Second, the word and space limitations of the research made it impossible to engage in such debate. Instead, I will only clarify how this research positions itself across ontological and epistemological approaches assuming the reader has basic knowledge on the subject.

As the epistemological traditions could not be demarcated in a clear-cut manner and have reciprocal considerations (Marsh and Furlong, 2002), "particular epistemological principles and research practices do not necessarily go hand in hand in a neat unambiguous manner" (Bryman, 2016, p. 28). Thus "researchers depend upon different assumptions" to answer "different questions" (Halperin and Heath, 2016, p. 42). In fact, my research depends on the different epistemological assumptions of the positivist and interpretivist theories throughout the research process in order to understand and explain the implementation processes of the TCPs.

Considering positivism, the research principally does not follow a natural science model to explore and analyse the reality of the addressed phenomenon. But it does take some positivist principles into consideration to generate acceptable knowledge on the implementation processes of the TCPs. For example, it employs both deductive and inductive reasoning in order to capture the implementation from both top and bottom perspectives. Besides, more importantly, positivism is concerned with explaining causes of behaviours of societal actors, as is this research's attempt to understand them in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

This brings the possible usefulness of the behaviouralist position in political research into question. While behaviouralism is "the application of positivism and empiricism to political research" with the aim of promoting "the systematic search for sound and reliable knowledge about politics based on a positivist approach to knowledge", behaviouralist political research "involves studying and explaining the observable behaviour of individuals or aggregates of individuals" and "focuses on the question of what political actors do and why they do it" (Halperin and Heath, 2016, p. 27). Behaviouralist political research also asserts that researchers "should focus on behavior and on the groups, processes, and systems within which behavior could be explained" (Farr, 1995, p. 202).

The above proclamations of the behaviouralist approach influenced my perspective on the understanding of implementation as a process, particularly as a political process, and thus influenced my approach to understanding the how and why implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do, and how and why implementation actors behave as they behave. However, its assumptions of political science being "a form of factual or empirical inquiry", its emphasis on "the need for quantification" (Farr, 1995, p. 203), and its preoccupation "with technique rather than substance" (Halperin and Heath, 2016, p. 27) to explain political behaviours and process fall short of my research. This is because instead of an input-output process, my research pursues an extended process analysis in which actors' subjective and normative behaviours intervene.

This suggests the need for a non-positivist approach for this research. However, before shifting from classical positivism to interpretivism, I want to emphasize that scientific realism and critical realism offer valuable perspectives to my research for the generation of acceptable knowledge. On one hand, unlike classical positivism, scientific realism asserts that, as Halperin and Heath state, "unobservable elements of social life, such as structural relations between

social phenomena, are crucial to an understanding and explanation of what goes on in the world", as consequences of "unobservable elements of social life" can "produce observable effects" (p. 36). In fact, several mechanisms such as ambiguity, conflict, local context and national contested context have observable effects in the implementation processes of the TCPs without being directly observable. Thus, my research discovers causal mechanisms in the implementation processes of the TCPs, as assumed by scientific realism, to investigate and explain the addressed phenomenon.

On the other hand, causal mechanisms that would explain how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do over time bring forward the concept of critical realism's generative mechanisms. As the leading scholar of critical realism, Bhaskar (2010) says that "there are enduring structures and generative mechanisms underlying and producing observable phenomena and events" (p. 2). Bryman (2016) comments that generative mechanisms entail "the entities and processes that are constitutive of the phenomenon of interest", thus, "the identification of the context that interacts with the generative mechanism to produce an observed regularity in the social world… is crucial" because "it serves to shed light on the conditions that promote or impede the operation of the causal mechanism" (p. 25). My empirical analysis identifies the context of the implementation of the TCPs in the first chapter where ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementers are identified as generative mechanisms. The following empirical chapters engage to identify and explain the causal mechanisms of these generative mechanisms forming the behaviours and roles of implementers at the street level.

Scientific realism and critical realism hold the same assumption that the same types of methods for collection of data and analysis could and ought to be applied to the natural and social sciences. However, critical realism positions its epistemological considerations further away from positivism to the direction of interpretivism believing, as Halperin and Heath (2016) state, perception interferes in the external reality. This emphasizes the importance of human factors in attaining knowledge. This move also suggests a shift from an objectivist position to a constructivist position in ontological terms.

In fact, the main problems of the above positivist epistemological positions are derived from positivist ontological considerations. The emphasis of the positivist epistemology on the explanation of the causes of the subject of research derives from the ontological assumption

that there is an external realty/a real world being external to social actors. This is a foundationalist ontological position that positivist and realist epistemology hold (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). This ontological position, which is called objectivism, treats social phenomena as an object and independent from social actors, thus, pursues the objective reality of social phenomenon (Bryman, 2008).

Although the positivist position may explain the causations to understand why and how the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do, it does not seem appropriate for the analysis of the subject matter of my research without considering the meaning of the behaviours and actions of implementation actors, and the constant interaction between perceptions, behaviours and actions in implementation. Thus, although the realist theories give more insights to analysis of my research than the classic positivist position, the research also needs to take the assumptions of interpretivist epistemology into consideration.

This suggests that an anti-foundationalist/constructionist ontological position is inevitable for the research. Bryman (2008) states that constructionism asserts that social entities are not external to the actors, instead social actors continuously construct social phenomena through a constant interaction. Accordingly, my research also has a constructivist ontological perspective throughout the analysis. On the one hand, ambiguity in the implementation context of the TCPs creates room for implementation actors to employ their values and perceptions in implementation process and this lets constructivism prevail in implementation. Also, the implementation context of the TCPs is in a constant change. Accordingly, the social order, identified as an implementation paradigm in the implementation processes of the TCPs, is in a constant change. The paradigms of implementation are constructed and reconstructed over time and implementers must agree their implementation behaviours and roles accordingly. This ontological position brings the need of interpretivist epistemology forward.

Interpretivist epistemology, being the opposite position of positivist assumptions, considers that social sciences study, as is my research, people and institutions instead of nature, thus, studying social world “requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order” (Bryman, 2016, p. 26). Interpretivism assumes that:

> To understand, explain and predict patterns of human behaviour, we must first understand the meanings concrete agents attribute to their environment (social and natural); the values and goals they possess; the choices they perceive; and the way they interpret other individuals' social action. (Halperin and Heath, 2016, p. 42)

While answering the research questions, this study strives to understand the behaviours of implementers and the meanings of their behaviours in the implementation processes of the TCPs. Thus, several assumptions of the interpretive theory assist in generating knowledge on the subject matter.

Originally, the research needs to understand and interpret the behaviours of the actors who have roles throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. Although positivism seeks an explanation for human behaviour, the intellectual heritage of interpretivism namely of Weber's notion of Verstehen, the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition and symbolic interactionism put emphasis on the understanding and interpretation of human behaviour and/or social action (Bryman, 2016). In fact, in my empirical analysis, I take an interpretive position to understand and interpret the meanings of the behaviours of the actors in implementation. For example, the analysis of interviews and documents involves such an epistemological position.

It is important to emphasize that the interpretation process involves two levels of interpretation, namely double hermeneutic (interpretation) (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). This is an aspect of the constructionist ontology, which assumes that the perspective of a researcher on the subject matter is also constructive (Bryman, 2008). For instance, interview data used in the research is comprised of the interpretations of interviewees and my interpretations of interviewees' interpretations. My interpretations are guided by the concepts/variables and theories that I analysed in the literature review and probably my own perception of the subject matter. As an implementer of the TCPs, I have experienced several issues, problems and dilemmas. While my experiences have helped me to materialise the abstract theories and concepts of literature, the theories and concepts of literature have helped me to contextualise issues, problems and dilemmas I have experienced. As I do not only explain, but also interpret interview data, this process brings an inductive reasoning into operation.

The above analysis on the philosophical context of the research suggests that an ontologically and epistemologically plural approach/middle-range position fits the needs of my research. With regard to epistemological considerations, while top-down and deterrence approaches have a positivist stance, the bottom-up and defiance/desistance approaches have an interpretivist stance. In terms of ontological considerations, while the top-down and deterrence approaches have an objectivist stance, the bottom-up and defiance/desistance approaches have a constructivist stance.

In fact, the multiplicity of the theories and concepts/variables included in the conceptual framework and analysis of the research requires this plural approach. In the sense of theoretical assumptions, while top-down and deterrence approaches have a deductive stance on theory-research relations, bottom-up and defiance/desistance approaches have an inductive stance. Thus, throughout the process of the generation of knowledge, the research needs to consider and employ the theoretical assumptions of both deductive and inductive reasoning.

With regard to concepts/variables, on the one hand, the conceptual framework of the research clarifies the key variables and hypothesis through the literature review using a deductive reasoning. The key variables are ambiguity and conflict, and the key hypothesis assumes reciprocal interaction between top and bottom in the implementation process. New concepts or variables and the hypothesis emerging throughout the empirical analysis are the products of an inductive reasoning process. This approach of using both deductive and inductive reasoning enables the research to bring the theory and practice together. It also fits the use of both prescriptive top-down/deterrence and descriptive bottom-up/defiance/desistance dichotomies.

This plural theoretical approach could be reflected in the research's main data collection method: semi-structured interviews. While the structured parts of the interviews (initial questions) reflect the top-down, deductive, positivists, objectivist literature-based logic, the unstructured parts of the interviews (follow-up/reflective questions) reflect the bottom-up, inductive, interpretivist, constructivist empirical data-based logic.

Although the use of plural philosophical positions implies a mixed-method research strategy, the research actually employs a qualitative research strategy. There are two main reasons for

this. The first is the nature of the research questions. The data collection methods used to answer these questions rely on words rather than numbers. Nonetheless, it could be suggested that although I do not use a mixed-method research strategy to collect and analyse data, in terms of theory, epistemology and ontology, my research employs a mixed strategy. The plurality in philosophical position emerges in the conceptual framework and empirical analysis.

The second reason is related to the single case study design. As a single case study relying on qualitative data, the research has to be qualitative in nature. The following section will scrutinise the design of the research.

3.2. The Design of the Research

The research employs a qualitative case study design for the detailed examination and understanding of the subject matter. Gerring (2004) defines case study as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" and a unit as "a spatially bounded phenomenon… observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time" (p. 342). In fact, the unit of analysis is Turkey as a state. The research involves an in-depth analysis of the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK in this unit over time.

The generalizability of case studies is highly debated in the literature (See for example: Burnham et al., 2008; Bryman, 2008; Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000). As Burnham et al (2008) argue, while multiple case studies could produce more generalisable and robust results, the uniqueness of a single case study delimits its representativeness across the population as a whole.

However, employing case studies, researchers might well deeply concentrate on a single unit of analysis over time, collecting more complete data to explain causal connections across variables (Burnham et al., 2008). Schmitter (2016) states including multiple cases "means poorer quality data, more missing observations and greater problems of conceptual equivalence" (p. 586). In fact, focusing on the implementation processes of the TCPs, I have been able to collect intensive data and this data has helped me to explain the causal connections in the implementation processes of Turkish counterterrorism policy. Despite the case has unique characteristic and specific context, several of the findings of the research may

apply to other countries and raise interesting questions for other researchers to follow. For example, my findings suggest that the way this research employs the implementation paradigms may have several implications for wider literature as it adds new insights to the existing knowledge of implementation research. The dimensions on the generalisability of results to a larger class of units will be addressed in the last empirical chapter.

As we have seen, the epistemological shift from classical positivism to realism and interpretivism aims to understand causal mechanisms in causal relations and the meanings of human behaviour. In this respect, case studies become a methodological choice for social researchers (Gerring, 2009) occupying "a tenuous ontological ground midway between ideographic and nomothetic extremes" (Gerring, 2004, p. 352). The intensive nature of the case study design will enable the research to explore the multidimensional aspects of the implementation processes of the TCPs in a reliable context. It is appropriate for understanding the complex nature of these processes because case study design allows for explanation of causal relationships among the main variables of the implementation processes of the TCPs and for comprehension of the behaviours of implementation actors in the specific context over time.

Although this research has a single case study design, it has elements of longitudinal and comparative research. Initially, the research classifies the TCPs according to their theoretical background, namely deterrence and defiance/desistance policies. Accordingly, the research examines variations across policies. This could be seen as the comparative aspect of the study. However, they are not treated as two distinct cases. The research has longitudinal characteristics in that it analyses the implementation processes of the TCPs from the beginning of the problem and uses archival data. Indeed, the implementation literature underlines the need and importance of implementation studies grounding their analyses in a period of time longer than a decade to attain a precise implementation picture (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).

It is undeniable that, as Lijphart (1971) states, a case study design allows research to intensively focus on a single case, even when resources are limited. However, the main rationale for this selection is that its longstanding presence enables the research to analyse the complex phenomena in-depth across different types of counterterrorism policies over time.

As part of the case study research design, I have methodologically preferred a broad and cross-counterterrorism policy approach, instead of analysing a single counterterrorism policy. As made clear in the theoretical framework, the thesis bases its analysis on the classification of the TCPs as deterrence and defiance/desistance policies. There are four main reasons for this approach. First, as explained in the introduction chapter, the thesis not only accepts single laws, decisions and actions as counterterrorism policy, but also patterns of laws, decisions and actions formed over time. This dynamic, complex and evolutionary framework necessitates a broad cross-counterterrorism perspective over time. Second, this approach makes it possible for the research to realise its extended implementation perspective over time. Third, the issues and/or problems encountered throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs are primarily general, rather than policy specific. Fourth, a broad cross-counterterrorism policy approach enables insight into the implementation processes of the TCPs as it bases analysis on an extensively varying empirical context. This may not be possible in a narrower context of a single policy. The PKK has been active for more than forty years and, as Kim and Yun (2008) state, its longstanding presence provides rich material across different types of counterterrorism policies with a longitudinal perspective. Hence, this broad policy perspective enables the thesis to utilize a long timeframe of approximately four decades to get a precise portrait and cycle of the implementation processes of the TCPs which otherwise would not be possible. This macro perspective may also enable the thesis to attain generalisable findings, which is less likely in a micro perspective.

Accordingly, the research makes use of examples taken throughout the implementation processes of different TCPs over time. The inclusion of an example means that it illustrates specific implementation issues and serves as a good example of any related discussion. Besides, the examples chosen for discussion in the empirical analysis are well known in the Turkish context. The aim for employing well-known examples is to enhance understanding of difficult points as the familiarisation of instances would increase the eloquence of the issues addressed.

The qualitative case study design guides the methods of data collection and analysis. Accordingly, qualitative methods, which will be addressed below, are employed for data collection.

3.3. The Methods of the Data Collection

In order to examine the implementation processes of TCPs, a multi-method approach is employed to collect data. These include qualitative interviewing, document analysis, content analysis and archival research. Yin (1980) states that employing multiple sources to collect evidence is consistent with implementation research.

Interviews are the main methodology and source of the data. Thirty in-person semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with governors, deputy governors and district governors, national and local politicians, academics, security bureaucrats, and representatives of NGOs in Turkey.

Structuring Interview Questions

The interview questions were conceptualised consistent with the research questions and the theoretical framework of the research. Having prepared a script, comprised of introductory and follow-up interview questions the research utilizes a semi-structured interview technique. This structure enabled the initial asking of specified questions, but also allowed elaboration through follow-up questions. It allowed interviewees to give in-depth answers to specified questions and was enough flexible for them to extend their point of view on the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The first set of questions was designed to understand the main factors affecting the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs and implementers' roles and behaviours. While the second set was designed to comprehend the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict in the implementation context of the TCPs. The last set was designed to find out effects of implementation at the street level, such as the main actors, coping behaviours, discrepancies, reinterpretation, evolution, failures and whether these change across different types of TCPs.

During the interviews, I did not want questions to trigger defence mechanisms of the interviewees. Thus, I did not ask direct questions about their own experiences. Instead, the formation of the interview questions aimed to make them feel that we were not talking about what they had done in the field. If I needed to clarify what they said, I asked if they had observed any example while on the duty. Interviewee X11 (2017, m. 42:21) said:

> I think it [the interview] has [been] a little too much theoretical. Not from my point of view, but from your point of view. Your questions were nice, well prepared, well thought out questions. These questions are conducive to that one... I mean, I have an identity, I have a duty, I have an experience. It [the questions] allowed me to answer questions without being influenced [overwhelmed] by them. In this sense, thank you.

This approach sometimes triggered general answers without the desired information. But, If I would ask about specific experiences of the interviewees, they would have taken a position of self-protection. This would have prevented them from giving sincere answers as they would have felt I was interrogating them. However, despite my careful and unoffensive approach, some interviewees took a self-defence position by not answering some questions or giving unrelated answers to the questions (e.g. Interviewee X14, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017).

Sampling and Recruitment of Interviewees

As it was not possible to frame and map a precise target population in which participants may be randomly selected, I employed a multi non-probability sampling approach using purposive and snowball sampling methods to identify participants. Henry (1990) states that the selection of non-probability samples is based on the researcher's judgement on how best to achieve her/his research targets. While purposive sampling was used as the main method, snowball sampling played a supplementary role in sampling participants.

Tansey (2007, p. 770) describes purposive sampling as

> … a selection method where the study's purpose and the researcher's knowledge of the population guide the process. If the study entails interviewing a pre-defined and visible set of actors, the researcher may be in a position to identify the particular respondents of interest and sample those deemed most appropriate.

Thus, purposive sampling enables the research to concentrate on individuals who have particular characteristics and are relevant for the research questions (Bryman, 2016). Accordingly, I aimed to interview people having particular characteristics related to the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The participants were among governors, deputy and district governors, academics, NGO representatives, political party representatives, elected officials, and security bureaucrats in Turkey. These are key stakeholders having say, influence and/or roles in the implementation processes of the TCPs. Interviewing participants from different segments of the establishment enhanced the diversity and objectivity of the research. This intensifies the purposiveness of the sampling method.

It was vital for the research to select the most appropriate participants to extract the most reliable data. On one hand, as made clear, I had been a district governor in Turkey and knew the counterterrorism setting from the inside. Thus, it was not impossible for me to assume and judge who should be selected as participant. On the other, I employed a set of criteria to select participants and only selected, contacted and interviewed those who met these criteria. These criteria are as follows:

(1) Participant governors, deputy governors, district governors and security bureaucrats do not have to be in active duty, but they must have a minimum of six-years of experience in their jobs, of which minimum two years must have been spent in Turkey's Southeast and/or East Anatolia Regions implementing TCPs against the PKK.

(2) Academics participants must have published papers related to the different aspects of the TCPs.

(3) Participants from NGOs must have been involved in activities that related to the TCPs for at least two years.

(4) Participant elected officials and political party representatives: local participants must inhabit the East and/or Southeast Regions of Turkey, while national participants must have duties and/or experiences related to the TCPs. All local and national representatives have to have minimum two years of experiences in their positions.

Nevertheless, the majority of interviewees were governors, deputy governors and district governors. This was an intentional choice. First, although there are many institutional settings and actors in Turkey that conduct counterterrorism policies, governors and district governors have distinct roles in the Turkish administrative system. They are the main actors to coordinate different organisations carrying out TCPs and have responsibility to implement them at the local level. Second, as the middle level implementers they are a bridge between

bottom and top. Thus, they are able to experience and penetrate both top-down and bottom-up perspectives of implementation. Third, they are simultaneously responsible for implementing different types of TCPs, namely those of defiance/desistance and deterrence policies. Consequently, because of these unique positions, they are the best possible implementers to represent the indefinite implementation structure (homogeneity of the sampling in implementation structure) across different counterterrorism policies (heterogeneity of the sampling across policies). This intensifies the representativeness of the sampling method.

Based on my criteria, I identified and contacted more than 300 individuals. Eventually, I was able to interview 30 participants. This was the target number, but the difficulty of recruiting interviewees speaks to the sensitivity of the topic. Initially, I established a list using purposive sampling method and sent information sheets and consent forms to nearly 250 individuals via email. These included governors, deputy governors, district governors, security bureaucrats, local and national politicians, academics and representatives of NGOs. I waited for a decision and return from respondents for a while. Although several participants returned either accepting or rejecting the interview request, many did respond at all. They may have felt uncomfortable participating in the research as discussing issues related to counterterrorism could be a concern for them. At this point I began to call them on their official and individual phones. I was able to persuade several to participate in the research via phone.

While in the field, I also employed the snowball method as a further element of non-probability sampling to find more interviewees. I have many contacts working in the state departments. Thus, my network helped me gain access to suitable participants and begin the snowball process with these participants. I also asked initial participants for recommendations of other officials to contact.

Locating participants was time consuming but fairly easy, as they generally had active public lives. Their offices had open, stable addresses and communication channels. After locating them, I created a standard email form and I used e-mail to contact them. I also attached an informant consent form and a project information sheet. When possible, I also invited them to take part in my study by calling either their office or private phones.

As I expected that many candidate participants would refuse to take part in the research, I used several techniques in order to prevent and reduce the possible rejections. Firstly, I carefully formulated a letter and sent them via e-mail in order to make the best first impression. Lilleker (2003, p. 209) explains that:

> Whether using e-mail or letter, the written request is usually the best way to establish first contact. Bearing in mind the adage that 'first impressions last', the written request must establish three things: 1 what your research project is about; 2 why you wish to interview them; 3 what questions you are likely to ask.

Second, when required, I asked my personal contacts for help to gain access to interviewees. To clarify this point, it is important in qualitative studies to build interpersonal relationships with participants. I made clear I was a fellow professional. In my expectation, knowing some of the participants in advance would enable me to build trustworthiness and an honest-open dialog with the participants. In reality, if participants do not have prior knowledge about a researcher, it is more likely that they refuse to participate. As a result, using professional and individual relationships in the recruitment process entailed building trust and it well worked in my research.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face between July 2017 and September 2017. The meetings principally happened in the participants' official and/or individual offices to guarantee privacy and safety. I also thought they would feel more relaxed in their own offices and that it may produce more productive interviews. Some participants preferred to have meetings outside of their offices. In those instances, I had to arrange alternative places that were mutually acceptable, such as restaurants and cafes. Because I recorded all interviews, in consent with the participants, I made sure that alternative settings and acoustics were not disruptive. Although participants did not receive any payments or any other incentives, I paid all expenses if an interview was conducted in a cafe.

3.4. The Analysis of the Data

The research utilizes triangulation employing multiply data sources and different theoretical perspectives to analyse the data. As Davies (2001) argues, the strategy of triangulation based on an elite interview method in security studies is not only an effective but also a useful methodological approach. Triangulation has enabled cross-checking of the findings from

different data sources and a clearer picture of the implementation processes of the TCPs. For example, the material taken from interviews has been combined and compared with secondary sources, such as documents. Interviews and documents may inherently be biased, thus, triangulation also aims to increase of the credibility of the material used.

Combining interview material and documents, the research has a large amount of data to be scrutinised. In parallel with the data collection methods, I have taken an approach combining different qualitative analysis techniques to handle and analyse this vast amount of data. As Riessman (2008) states, each technique "provides a different way of knowing a phenomenon, and each leads to unique insights" (p. 12).

Primarily, the data analysis process is not built upon grounded theory, "a *general methodology* for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed" (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p. 273). However, the research uses several procedures from grounded theory, such as coding interview data thematically and taking notes in order to reach theoretical saturation through the categorisation of concepts and exploration of theoretical ideas, while analysing the qualitative data.

The research also utilizes the technique of qualitative thematic analysis for the analysis of interview material and the techniques of qualitative content analysis and narrative analysis for the analysis of documents.

The Analysis of Interviews

At the end of the interview process there was a total of 1260 minutes of recording, averaging 42 minutes per interview. All interviews were transcribed word for word. Although the transcription process was laborious, it enabled deep penetration into the raw data to extract the best possible usable data. Eventually, there were 441 pages of interview data, totalling 142.491 words. Several elements of grounded theory and qualitative thematic analysis were employed for the analysis of the interview material.

Analysis began as soon as a line by line translation of the interviews began, conducting line by line analysis and noting emerging key themes in the data at the same time. The themes emerging from the interviews were mainly consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the research. However, there were also new themes arising from the interview material.

Analytic notes were also generated alongside the thematic coding. As they reflect my imagination and interpretation enhanced by the literature and field work, these notes ontologically have a constructionist position and balance the objectivist position of the thematic coding process. These notes also facilitated the crystallisation process of the empirical analysis.

When I finished the whole translation process, I had already fragmented the transcripts across themes with intensive analytic notes. Then, I started to develop the empirical analysis in detail by systematically scrutinising, conceptualising, linking and categorising the themes. This process produced concepts and categories, which indicate increasingly more abstract levels that the research's empirical analysis built upon. In that process, I created the draft of empirical chapters and then went over each interview transcript line by line in a cumulative manner while writing the chapters. Although this process was fairly time consuming, it enabled the research to reach the most saturated themes, concepts, categories and theoretical ideas.

While interconnectedness and commonality among thematic codes produced concepts, categories were mapped merging concepts. Throughout the coding process the saturation of the core and related concepts, theoretical ideas, and categories was the first step. The subsequent process of validating linkages among the themes, concepts, categories, and theoretical ideas to form an analytical framework and then linking them with the existing literature has been constant, requiring numerous forward and backward revisions among chapters and sections, and triangulation among different empirical material along the way.

The sample size of the interviews was enough for the research to reach the saturation of data and to conduct analysis. While the main aim of interviews is to obtain first-hand material, the aim of the qualitative analysis of documents is to collect and classify appropriate documents such as governmental reports, laws and regulatory orders for triangulation.

Documentary Analysis

The documents used as sources of data are as follows:

(1) legal framework, such as laws and standing orders,

(2) official documents issued by state institutions and political parties, such as reports and transcripts of testimonies by the TBMM,

(3) official documents issued by international institutions, such as reports and mission statements from the UN,

(4) official documents issued by national and international NGOs, such as reports and press releases from Amnesty International, and

(5) virtual sources, such as online newspapers and virtual media outputs.

The textual and virtual materials used are already in public domain. As Bryman (2016) states, although documents already accessible, it is a time consuming process to collect, classify and interpret them. Although not all of them cited, this study benefited 176 textual documents, excluding virtual sources, totalling roughly 13000 pages (22 legal framework 604 pages, 33 documents by state institutions and political parties 5676 pages, 41 documents by international institutions 1148 pages, 80 documents by NGOs 5578 pages).

Textual documents were collected and classified as potentially useful for the qualitative content analysis. Then, I searched each document for themes and concepts, generated from the theoretical framework and from the analysis of interview material. Virtual documents were searched and investigated online. Although the authenticity and credibility may be problematic for internet sources, I made sure that the online documents have authorship or were taken from well-known established news, sites such as bbc.com. Once concepts and themes were found in textual or virtual documents, they were examined in detail to triangulate them with the related interview material.

As part of the document-based qualitative investigation and in combination with the other qualitative analysis techniques, I have also used narrative analysis. This requires the researcher to question "*how* and *why* incidents are storied, not simply the content to which language refers" (Riessman, 2008, p. 11), to focus on and analyse specific events occurred throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. These stories were either told by interviewees or encountered in documents. The narrative analysis of particular events was intended to reduce the abstractness of the thematic analysis techniques.

As documents may subjectively present a set of circumstances, they ought to be cross-examined with additional sources of data (Bryman, 2008). Thus, although documents have provided meaningful insights for the research, they have been used as the secondary source to triangulate the primary data of this research, namely the interview material.

3.5. Ethical and Practical Issues

Though the research did not seek to reveal individual experiences of the participants, the issues related to counterterrorism may inherently be sensitive for the participants. Although the implementation aspect of the TCPs could be seen as a technical phenomenon, several factors affecting the implementation process of public policies have indispensably political character. Thus, political context has been the part of the examination of the study. Within this context, although, in principle, I did not intend to make sensitive topics my interview subject, numerous sensitive issues arose during interviews. In order to eliminate any possible risk for participants, the researcher and the University, I took many safety measures concerning ethical issues.

Ethical Issues Concerning the Participants

The research is dedicated to realising the maximum standards of honesty and openness while accomplishing its goals. I responsibly carried out interviews considering participants' reflections and esteem. Although the research does not involve activities that seriously threaten participants' physical and psychological wellbeing, it has the potential to create nervousness among them. Thus, they needed to understand the nature of the study and what participation entails in order to assess potential risks.

As this suggests, I sought informed consent, which was voluntarily acquired from the participants. They had been informed in advance through the e-mailed information sheets and consent forms that they have the right of withdrawal from the research whenever they like all over the data collection process and even after the completion of the data collection process. However, I also made clear that when the thesis is complete and ready to submit, it will not be possible to withdraw consent. Although I principally obtained a written consent from the participants, in several occasions, only oral consent was obtained because several participants generally took signing written forms as an unnecessary formality and thus were reluctant to do so.

Throughout the informed consent process, I also assured the participants that the research guarantees their anonymity and confidentiality. I guaranteed them that the identification of participants will be avoided, and recordings and transcripts will not be shared.

Although I sent the information sheet and consent form to the interviewees before the interviews and assured them of the anonymity and confidentiality, I had to repeat this on many occasions during the interviews. For instance, while giving an example, Interviewee X18 said: "I worked as the district governor of X. I do not know if it is okay to say?", and I had immediately reassured them saying: "They will remain anonymous. I am not going to reveal the IDs. I am not going to identify and decode things that could reveal the IDs" (2017, m. 12:50). As this suggests, I also made sure that the study does not allow identification of unrelated individuals. If a third person unrelated with the research was identified, I have not used this data.

Although anonymising public figures might be difficult, I have taken all necessary precautions and put all relevant academic principles in force in order to prevent any serious ethical dilemma or the participants. In order to confirm anonymity and prevent identification of participants, the following measures have been taken.

Initially, I did not use a transcriber or translator. Also, I coded interviewee identities using the letter X and numbers from 1 to 30 as a code, and have securely and separately stored the key to identity and transcripts. As this suggests, interview transcripts and digital records have been safely stored, which will be covered in more detail below in discussion of handling of the interview data.

Additionally, I used pseudonyms and aggregation techniques for anonymization. While referencing and quoting, alongside coding names, I have avoided using such words that could be linked to a participant in order to prevent deductive disclosure of participants. The masking of data may entail such practices us to provide a general context to a participant's individual presentation, remove all personal identifiers and change personal or general identifiers, for instance place names and dates, in an interview quote. This serves to assure the internal confidentiality of the research.

I am aware that using fictitious names is not enough to guarantee anonymity because in a professional environment a specific voice could be identified by others. Thus, I also ensured

that participant roles or positions are not used as descriptors. Likewise, when conducting interviews, some participants were curious about the identities of other participants. In this case, I gave vague responses and referred to 'others' with the aim of protecting participants' anonymity.

Moreover, with the aim of handling possible sensitivities, I proposed participants clarify the accuracy and context of transcripts. This process was one of the most important layers of securing anonymity and participants were reminded of the opportunity during interviews as a means of building trust. Although the participants were given the opportunity to see the transcripts and notes in order to make sure that they are satisfied with the information they provided and that their anonymity is not in danger, none of them took up the opportunity. Only one participant raised concern about the sensitiveness of specific parts of his/her interview and I choose not to use this part of the interview. Thus, if any participant wanted me to keep any information secret, I have strictly obeyed this request.

I am aware that the research process is an evaluative and reflective process. Thus, it is very difficult to fully predict or instantly inform the participants for all aspects of the research. However, all of my preferences during the research process have always been in favour of the participants. For instance, although there were numerous post-interview conversations revealing valuable information after switching off the recording device, I did not use this information in the research because of the controversial ethical status of such material.

As a result of the above assurances, nearly all interviewees cooperated fully. However, even though they agreed to be interviewed and recorded I felt that some were alarmed during interviews, showing signs of anxiety and not answering questions. Combining some aspects of the counterterrorism subject that are raised all through the interviews with the then ongoing political circumstances in Turkey could cause uncomfortable feelings to these participants. If a participant showed signs of psychological discomfort and/or refused to respond to a question, I skipped this question. If a participant w not willing to answer a certain amount of questions, I would have respected this, not insist and cut short the interview. However, there was no interviewee who verbally sought to cease the interview. Thus, I did not leave any interview unfinished.

Issues Related to the Researcher's Stance

Throughout the process of seeking ethical approval for my field work from the University's ethics committee I had to clear several anticipated risks and ethical considerations related to possible conflicts of interest, practical problems and my own safety while conducting fieldwork.

Interviews took place in Turkey. Although I was not required to receive additional ethics approval for this site, as the approval given by the University was sufficient to conduct research in Turkey, I had to get a permit from the Turkish Interior Ministry to conduct the field work. This is because I have been an employee of the Ministry and because the Ministry was the sponsor of the research. Although this raises concerns about conflict of interest and the politics of the research, the extent of sponsorship by the Ministry has only been financial in paying university fees and researcher's living expenses during the degree seeking period, with the aim of supporting an employee's academic and professional development.

Accordingly, I did not experience any conflict of interest that would impact the reliability of the research, research-related activities, the University, the academic community or the discipline. The Ministry (1) was not involved in the selection of the subject matter; (2) does not have any agenda imposed upon the research to control me with the intention of affecting the research; (3) has no interest in any aspect of the research including design, management and results; and (4) does not limit its dissemination and does not require an approval for it. Thus, the extent of the sponsorship has not put the independence and objectivity of the research into question.

Handling the Interview Data

In relation to the interviews, I collected sufficient data comprised of notes from interviews with participants, digital voice records of interviews and their transcripts, participant names and work addresses, telephone numbers (private and work), and e-mails (private and work). I needed participants' personal information to effectively communicate with them. This effective communication enabled me to organize the field work so that I could use my limited time and constrained resources more effectively.

I recorded the interviews using a digital audio recording device with the consent of participants and stored them as MP3 files. Interviews were carried out with thirty participants

in Turkish. Eventually, I had 1260 minutes of recordings, averaging 42 minutes per interview. After the field work was completed, I transcribed all interviews word by word using a voice-recognition software. I opened a blank page in Google Docs and activated its voice typing tool. I listened to the recordings using a headset and spoke back to the Doc I had created. When I finished a transcription, I copy and pasted the text into a Microsoft Word document. In this simplified transcription process the technique needed numerous spelling and punctuation corrections. At the end, I had 441 pages of interview data counting 142.491 words (averaging 15 pages and 4749 words for each transcript). Thus, instead of all interview content, I have only translated the quoted or paraphrased parts of them to English.

Storing and archiving data is important for the integrity of the research. Within this context, I have preserved all original files, including their creation dates and times, on my laptop and on a hard drive in order to track and store changes in any data. I have been safely and regularly backing-up the hardware that stores this related electronic data in order to prevent the loss of original data.

As part of the anonymity and confidentiality, I have been employing several safeguards to ensure the physical and electronic security of the sensitive data. I am the only one who can access the sensitive data. I will also make sure that all confidential and personal data will be destroyed appropriately and securely when their lifetime is over.

With regard to the physical security, firstly, electronic devices and paper files containing research related sensitive data have been kept in a locked unit in a locked room. Then, when carrying these devices and documents, I have been taking extra care to ensure their security. Also, when disposing of confidential documents, I have made sure that these documents are shredded.

Regarding the cybersecurity of the digital devices, I have ensured that these devices are password protected. Also, I have updated their software and protected them with up-to-date anti-virus protection programmes and a firewall. When deleting confidential information, I have made sure that any has been securely deleted. I have strictly avoided using communal computers to process the data.

Limitations

Initially, the single case study design may delimit the generalisability of the research findings. The research aims to explore the policy-action continuum of the TCPs against the PKK. Accordingly, the research's empirical work carried out based on the context of Turkey. Thus, although its analytical framework and research design are useful to understand the policy-actin continuum of the TCPs against the PKK, its claims might be deficient in different settings, in this case in the other states.

Also, the sample in this thesis is not free from certain limitations. Interestingly, bureaucrats were more eager to participate in the research compared to other participant types. Being within the system, bureaucrats would assess low risk, while the actors outside of the system would feel uncomfortable in the ambiguous circumstances of the then state of emergency period. Thus, my sample may be biased towards implementers. Bureaucrats were also more revealing during their interviews. However, although they may have felt competent to speak about the matter and instinctually want to advertise their professional voice, they tend to be less critical of the government. The reason would be the then ongoing political situation in Turkey.

There have been several limitations related to the sensitivity of the topic. First, it may be the case that several interviewees may have felt overwhelming due to the sensitivity of the topic, causing self-censorship. Second, although conducting interviews with the PKK militants might have added depth to the analysis, the sensitivity of the issue and my position prevented my ability to access those sources. Lastly, I did not prefer to talk about specific events that interviewees experienced. The aim was to prevent self-censoring. This potentially may have prevented to discover several facts through interviews. Nevertheless, I have tried to compensate these limitations through the triangulation.

In conclusion, as a single qualitative case study, this research employs a plural philosophical approach taking different assumptions of deductive and inductive reasoning and various considerations of epistemological and ontological positions into account. The methods of data collection and analysis, which are also multi-method approaches, are determined by the qualitative case study design. The research activities have been accomplished according to

maximum standards of trustworthiness, openness and safety standards regarding participants, the researcher and the other related associates.

4. THE IMPLEMENTATION CONTEXT OF TURKISH COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES

It was made clear in the previous chapters that the main aim of this research is to answer the question of what happens and how and why it happens in the implementation processes of the TCPs against the PKK. The specific research questions are: What is the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs and what are the crucial variables throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs; Why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do at the street level; and How to link the policy-action continuum in the implementation processes of the TCPs? This research hypothesizes that there is a reciprocal interaction in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs, in which the implementation paradigms function as the linking point between different types of policies and implementers' behaviours. Thus, the analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

As we have seen, the conceptualisation of implementation as a process in the policy-action continuum necessitates research explore "not only in the nature of the policy, but also with those upon whom the action depends" (Schofield, 2004, p. 286). This suggests that to answer the question of "Why did it happen this way?" (Dolbeare, 1974 cited in Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p. 448) we need to empirically link "individual behaviour" to "the political, economic, and legal context in which it occurs" (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540).

Thus, this first empirical chapter aims to explore the context of the implementation processes of the TCPs in which implementation behaviours and the routines of implementers occur. By doing so, this chapter determines the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs and the factors that are the most significant in the implementation processes of the TCPs. The implementation context, engaging top-down and bottom-up perspectives, encompasses the crucial top and bottom factors and characterises the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs.

As I argued in the second chapter, there are many factors affecting implementation processes. For example, O'Toole (1986) found more than three hundred variables in his assessment on the field. However, third generation implementation research underlines the importance of focusing on clearly defined small numbers of predictor/key variables (For example, see Goggin

et al., 1990; Matland, 1995; Saetren, 2014). Accordingly, in the theoretical discussion, after analysing the literature in-depth, I argued that ambiguity and conflict are factors of significant importance in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

As will be shown below, the analysis of the empirical material (interviews, official documents, legal frameworks, reports and the online archives of newswires) strongly supports the argument that ambiguity and conflict are the main variables determining the context of the implementation processes of the TCPs. In addition, the empirical material reveals that the local context and the quality of implementers are supplementary variables influencing the roles and behaviours of the implementers at the street level. I exclusively conceptualise, as will be presented in depth in the second section of this chapter, the quality of implementers (determined by beliefs, values, ideology, culture, lifestyle, background, personality, expertise, knowledge, commitment, education, talent of an implementer, and the tradition and culture of the organisation to which this implementer belongs) and the local context (consisting of local demography, geography, local socio-economic conditions, local political context, local culture and local actors) on the basis of the findings of the empirical material.

Adding new insights to the counterterrorism research, this chapter argues that Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive, and even counterproductive, because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low quality of implementers in conflictual circumstances.



Figure 7: The conceptualisation of the implementation context of the TCPs based on Elmore's reversible logic

I will employ the reversible logic of forward and backward mapping metaphors established by Elmore (1985), which I analysed in the second chapter, to group the crucial variables determining the implementation context of the TCPs. As shown in Figure 7, while "forward mapping" of the implementation context explains key top-down variables of the implementation context of the TCPs, "backward mapping" analyses show bottom-up variables. Thus, this first empirical chapter consists of two main sections. The first analyses the implementation context using forward mapping, while the second analyses it using backward mapping.

4.1. The "Forward Mapping" of the Implementation Context of the TCPs

As mentioned in the literature review, the top-down approach supposes that policies are inherently clear, and the role of central government is significant in implementation. It supposes a hierarchic flow down the implementation process and employs a staged approach to analyse policy processes (For example, see Hill, 2013; Barrett, 2004; Sabatier, 1986). Thus, as Winter (2006) claims, the top-down based studies tend to examine the implementation concentrating on centrally decided polices and central factors. Accordingly, the initial objective of the empirical analysis is to determine the crucial factors at the upper part of the implementation context of the TCPs.

When the interviewees were asked about the main factors affecting the behaviours of the implementers at the outset, many commented that the approach of the central authority decisively determines their implementation behaviours (e.g. Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017).

For example, an experienced chief civil inspector in the Interior Ministry, Interviewee X24 (2017) stated that: "Of course, one of the most important factors, first of all, is the attitude, behaviour, vision of the person who is in charge of me…". "Then", there is "a policy" which has its own means and ends (m. 01:39). A chief of a security-related agency of the Interior Ministry, Interviewee X1 (2017) alluded that: "the most important is the political will… the approach of political will... That is, the messages coming out of Ankara definitely affect the implementers" (m. 03:10). In fact, many interviewees referred to the decisive central authority effecting implementation process as "political will" and/or "governments" (e.g.

Interviewee X27, 2017, m. 01:36; Interviewee X2, 2017, m. 05:06; Interviewee X5, 2017, m. 06:10; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017, m. 11:23; Interviewee X20, 2017, m. 05:41; Interviewee X26, 2017, m. 04:09).

In general, therefore, it appears that the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers initially take the decision makers' stance and policy approach into account at the upper part of the implementation context, while they determine the scope of their implementation behaviours. This result is consistent with that of Ryan (1996) who confirms that implementation "needs to take account of the policy context" (p. 751).

Many interviewees gave the Solution Process and the following deterrence period as an example to explain how implementers behave in line with the political will and its preferred policy approach. Since these two contradictory periods have recently been experienced, they are quickly entangled by the interviewees. According to them, the implementers behaved in accordance with the defiance/desistance approach during the Solution Process, as it was the top actors' preferred policy approach. But, when the top actors changed their minds and preferred the deterrence approach to be dominant, the same implementers quickly behaved accordingly. For instance, the below argument, similar versions of which were shared by several others (e.g. Interviewee X1, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017), made by Interviewee X28 (2017, m. 2:55), a chairman of a state affiliated association in the Region, clarifies this saying:

> I think the implementers in the Region such as military authorities, civil administration chiefs, implementers responsible to carry out defiance/desistance policies act according to the policies of the government, rather than their own initiatives. Whatever the government's policy on counterterrorism is, they apply it. We saw obvious examples of this. During the Solution Process, the chiefs of the civil administration units in the Region did not carry out any operation against the terrorists by applying the Government's decisions. Rather, they turned a blind eye while the terrorists used the routes to go abroad. Then, they did not allow the operations be done to avoid any conflict in this period… In other words, the determining factor here is the government's view of the problem at that moment and what it wants to be implemented. For example, the Government has currently [2017] decided to use a

> deterrence approach against the terrorists. As it is decided that the terrorists should be neutralized and eliminated with confrontation, the governors in the Region and the security units currently apply this approach. In short, the implementers in the Region play their roles according to the policies of the government.

In fact, the structure of the Turkish state and administrative system is highly hierarchical, requiring implementers to obey the policies and orders of the decision-making actors. As Interviewee X25 (2017), a long-serving chief civil inspector in the Interior Ministry, puts it, "there is a hierarchical line" (m. 06:50) in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

However, although many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X26, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017) claimed that implementers carry out the policies within the mandate and directives of the central actors, there is one complication: the question of to what extent do implementers comprehend the context of the policies they are pursuing?

When I asked if the TCPs are enough clear for implementers to guide them inexorably and measurably toward clearly articulated means and ends, many interviewees reported that they are unclear. Talking about the issue, a long-time district governor, Interviewee X9 (2017) commented that "I mean, I have been a state officer for 20 years, 16-17 years of this period as… Accordingly, I do not know if Turkey has any counterterrorism policy" (m. 10:57). This statement could be seen as an exaggeration, but it well illustrates the typical top down ambiguity theme effecting the implementation processes of the TCPs.

Although the top down approach assumes that there must be a clear policy along with a hierarchical structure in order to attain a hierarchical flow down the implementation process, several scholars contest the top-down approach's assumption of clear policies (e.g. Baier et al., 1986; Barrett and Fudge, 1981c; Matland, 1995) and hierarchic flow down the implementation supposition (e.g. deLeon and deLeon, 2002; Hjern, 1982). In fact, the empirical material suggests that ambiguity inherited in the TCPs dominates the implementation context of these policies from the top.



Figure 8: The forward mapping of the implementation context

The subsections of the forward mapping, as visualised in Figure 8, will analyse the upper part of the implementation context of the TCPs in depth, subsequently puzzling out the level of ambiguity at the top, and across different types of the TCPs and contested political context.

4.1.1. Ambiguity from the Top

This subsection aims to discover if the TCPs inexorably and measurably guide implementers toward clearly articulated means and ends while they carry out the TCPs. The objective is to evaluate the level of ambiguity of the TCPs for implementers. This is important for the research because the literature on implementation, in which top-downers favour clear policies while bottom uppers prefer ambiguous policies, shows that ambiguity is one of the key variables affecting the implementation process of public policies. Indeed, although counterterrorism polices have some unique, sensitive and different characteristics, they are part of the public policy spectrum.

Consistent with the literature, my interviewees confirmed that ambiguity is a crucial factor to be explored to find how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do. An experienced district governor, Interviewee X27 (2017, m. 13:03) illustrated the importance of ambiguity saying:

> As someone who has been in the Region [the Eastern and South-eastern of Turkey] since 87, I can say that… Nobody can say that as much as I do… I was in Siirt in 1987. I was in Sirnak in 2016. I have been in this Region all the time. I have never broken my connection [with the Region]. The correct term is ambiguity [as the main factor in implementation].

In fact, my empirical material strongly supports that although the level of ambiguity might occasionally be low while governments are strong and determined in their policy choices, the TCPs are, as many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017) said, commonly unclear.



Figure 9: The conceptualisation of the ambiguity variable

Analysing all of the empirical data it is possible to find the scope and sources of the ambiguity (variable) in the implementation processes of the TCPs. As seen in Figure 9, ambiguity mainly entails a lack of a coherent strategic counterterrorism framework, equivocal implementation bodies and unclear specific policies. The scope and importance of these sub-variables in the implementation context will be analysed within the following subsections.

4.1.1.1. The Lack of a Coherent Strategic Framework

In their systematic review of the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) emphasise the importance of a coherent national counterterrorism strategic framework that integrates implementation by clearly defining aims, establishing means and ends, refining needed resources, calculating risks and allocating responsibilities. However, my empirical material strongly suggests that, as Interviewee X19 (2017) stated, Turkey has not yet had a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework. Commenting on this issue Interviewee X27 (2017) said: “As someone who has spent two thirds of his life as a civil [servant], a soldier and a chief of civil administration in the Region, I do not think that Republic of Turkey has such a plan” (m. 05:57). As a head of a department in the

Interior Ministry, Interviewee X5 (2017) ironically alleged that "We have been thinking about it [a coherent strategy] for 40 years" (m. 22:24). Interviewee X12 (2017, m. 18:51) said:

> Let me be clear. Look, I worked in that area for eight years: X years as district governor, Y years as governor. The state has no policy [strategic framework]. This is a painful situation… There is an ambiguity in policies… I was governor for Y years. We encountered maybe 13 different policies during these years. What the hell is this?

Another interviewee argued that: "I do not think there is a counterterrorism strategy that is holistic, inclusive, appealing to all disciplines and specifies all the tasks and responsibilities of different institutions" (Interviewee X30, 2017, m. 08:39). Similar views were mentioned by many others (e.g. Interviewee X7, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017). Thus, as Interviewee X11 (2017) puts it: "The first thing an implementer encounters is the lack of a roadmap" (m. 28:22).

The lack of a coherent strategic framework to integrate the implementation as a whole means that the Turkish counterterrorism implementers have been operating in an ambiguous environment at the national level since the beginning of the PKK terror campaign. This means it has failed to address compatibility and consistency problems between different counterterrorism policies, to determine the resources to be used in the implementation, to clarify the targets and to clearly define the authorities and responsibilities in the implementation of the counterterrorism policies. This is one important aspect of ambiguity factor.

There are several possible explanations for the lack of a coherent strategic counterterrorism framework. Firstly, although the PKK bases its terror campaign, as several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017) underlined, on the ethnic identity of Kurds, decision makers have failed to understand and/or handle the problem from the beginning. The main reason for this is that, as Interviewee X13 (2017), a long-time chief civil inspector in the Interior Ministry, suggested, decision makers used to decide policies in line with the predominant nationalist ideology shaping the public perception and the stance of the State, which bases its ideology of "the homogeneity of the Turkish nation" (Barkey, 1998, p. 135) on "the decades-old position that the Kurds did not really exist" (Barkey, 2007, p. 345). It seems that the PKK has been able to base its terror campaign on the ethnic identity

of Kurds, as Interviewee X16 (2017), a prominent minister during the 1990s, said: "After the Republican policies that deny Kurdishness" and "Kurdish reality" because of "nationalism, especially, in inverted commas, 'a skull-prone [racist] nationalism stemming from the structure that emerged after September 12' [1982 Coup]"(m. 11:11). This perspective may have prevented policy makers from focusing on the roots of the terrorism. Thus, predominantly, deterrence policies have been employed.

Also, as there have been intra-state controversies on the problem due to the sensitiveness of the ethnic issue (Barkey, 2007; Loizides, 2010) elected decision makers may not have been able to take the initiative. This suggests that policies may either have been determined by such decision makers that, as Interviewee X16 (2017) described, have limited capacity to comprehend all dimensions of the problem or, as Interviewee X15 (2017) mentioned, lack "decisiveness" (m. 21:59). This, as Beriker-Atiyas (1997, pp. 448, 449) states,

> is further reinforced by the current general incapacity of the Turkish polity to produce public policy on almost any of the serious economic, social, and international problems facing the country. It is evident that politics in general has been reduced to a game of capturing public resources and then redistributing them through legal and illegal means. There is an almost complete absence of meaningful debate among the political elite. In rare cases when policy proposals are made, political debate immediately disregards the substantive elements of such proposals, and degenerates into shallow attacks. In effect, policy debates are subverted, manipulated, and transformed into an instrument for debasing and condemning opponents.

Besides, as Interviewee X8 (2017), a chairman in a non-governmental human rights association, argued, in addition to the intra-state controversies on how to handle the problem, the approaches of the PKK to the problem have been inconsistently changing since the beginning, though its terror tactics have predominantly been based on guerrilla warfare (Bilgiç, 2014). The changing nature of the PKK's strategies is one of the reasons why Turkey has been shifting its policies across different counterterrorism approaches since the beginning. For example, a leading village guard and head of an association in the Region, Interviewee X29 (2017, m. 12:33) claimed:

> I just told you, I have been in this mission for 31 years… We have brought the PKK to the bridge position four times so far. The instant we would knockdown it, someone blows a whistle… He says stand-up and start the wrestle again. When the PKK got stuck, it was like someone threw a lifebuoy… Before the Solution Process, 2012 was declared as the final year by the PKK [for victory]. What happened? It was the year of frustration for the PKK… It was suppressed in every part of Turkey. After the organization realised it was losing, it immediately said 'let the guns shut, ideas speak' [the Solution Process] … The organization immediately recovered [in the Solution Process]. It heaped weapons into the Region. Then, it surfaced as a brand-new terrorist organization [in Syria].

This also suggests that as the addressed problem has an international character (Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017), the changing nature of the international setting may make it more complicated for decision makers to formulate a coherent strategic framework. In fact, the power gained by the PKK in Syria altered the PKK's approach to the Solution Process (Şenay, 2015). Barkey (2007) states that "propitious international context" helped the maturation of the PKK (p. 351). Thus, as Interviewee X2 (2017) stated, policies are made up as the problem goes along.

Likewise, as Interviewee X10 (2017) specified, one of the biggest problems in implementation is the fact that, having cross-border characters, most of the terror operations and terrorist incidents intensify in the border regions. An event that starts inside can be reflected out. However, while the civil administration units are fully responsible within the border, they cannot intervene across the border. Only the Army has the right to go across the border with a parliamentary motion. Thus, as Interviewee X16 (2017) said the Army is always in charge. This is a dead end for counterterrorism efforts because it results in the dominance of deterrence-based policies. This creates an atmosphere in which policies addressing the roots of the problem are undermined.

In sum, all the above factors create a dilemma as barriers to producing a comprehensive and coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework. This creates ambiguity in the implementation context and paves the way for an ambiguous implementation structure.

4.1.1.2. Ambiguous Implementation Structure

A recurrent theme emerging from the empirical material is that the structure of the implementation regime to carry out the TCPs is highly ambiguous. This is not an unexpected result as while administration is the most apparent branch of the executive and the "government in action" (Wilson, 1887, p. 198) it is comprised of many internal branches and these branches do not necessarily have the same position on a given policy; especially if this policy is about counterterrorism (Huq, 2012). Talking about the issue, a former undersecretary of a prominent security related undersecretariat, Interviewee X30 (2017) stated that it is impossible to talk on a single static implementation concept and process since the structure to carry out the TCPs is "hierarchically and administratively highly fragmented and consists of various bodies" (m. 02:07).

A possible source for ambiguous implementation structure is the features of terrorism and counterterrorism. As mentioned in the literature review, the concept of terrorism is very complicated and have multidimensional aspects. Thus, counterterrorism policies must address different problem areas. There are policies addressing the consequences of terrorism which generally aim to secure law and order. However, there are also policies dealing with the root causes of the terrorism. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are many institutions that have responsibility to carry out the TCPs, rather than a single unit.

According to the country profiles on counterterrorism capacity published by the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER, 2013), the upper part of the implementation structure of TCPs consists of the Ministries of the Interior, the Justice and the Foreign Affairs, the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Intelligence Service. In terms of the operational tasks, there are four main bodies. While Turkish National Police, Gendarmerie General Command and Coast Guard Command operate under the Ministry of the Interior, National Intelligence Agency affiliated to the Turkish Presidency.

The Departments of Counterterrorism, Intelligence, Special Forces and Witness Protection are the four main divisions of the Turkish National Police dealing with the countering terrorism. A similar structure also exists within the Gendarmerie General Command. While the Police are responsible for the urban areas, the Gendarmerie operates throughout the countryside.

Although the judiciary has a secondary role to conduct counterterrorism policies (Mersel, 2005), the above picture becomes even more complicated when judiciary authorities are involved in the process. There are no distinct judicial law enforcement bodies. While the Police, the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard operate under Civil Administration Chiefs, namely those of governors and district governors, to prevent the crime, after any crime is committed the same agencies and their implementers fulfil the related judicial duties under public prosecutors.

Normally, the Armed Forces are not involved in operations inside the Country. However, the Turkish legal system allows the units of the Armed Forces to conduct operations in specific conditions. Article 11/D of the Provincial Administration Law No 5442 grants the authority to governors to use these forces in their provinces (Mevzuat, 1949). But the decision to use these forces is taken in accordance with the necessities of the exigencies. The Article verbalises that governors may decide to ask help from the nearest units of the land, sea and air forces with the fastest means, if they think they would not prevent the event that may occur or cannot prevent the events that already occur using the law enforcement forces assigned to this work.

Although the Article explains what procedures should be followed within this process, the empirical material suggests that there are ambiguities in practice. Specifically, authority, responsibility, control and coordination problems arise between commanders of local armed forces and governors, and indispensably among the street level implementers.

The above picture shows the need for a body that supervises the conveyance of Turkish counterterrorism activities among disconnected or loosely connected units. Although the National Security Council chaired by the President takes decisions regarding national security, as Interviewee X9 (2017) clarified, there has been no “predetermined leadership” to assign tasks, responsibilities and accountabilities across security services (m. 08:36). A new agency, the Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security, was created in 2010 with the purpose of developing sound policies and strategies related to countering terrorism and establishing coordination among institutions and organizations (Mevzuat, 2010).

The general sense among the interviewees is that, contrary to expectation, the Under Secretariat could not play the roles anticipated. Talking about the Under Secretariat, while Interviewee X27 (2017) described it as a “useless organisation” (m. 18:55), Interviewee X9

(2017) labelled the papers published by it as “farcical” (m. 42:54). In fact, the Under Secretariat was abolished in July 2018. Yet, the problems of control and coordination, authorities and responsibilities throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs are as intense as they ever were.

The reasons for this, as several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017) stated, are twofold. One is related to the system problems, the other is related to human problems. As Interviewee X9 (2017) argued, Turkey’s existing “security architecture” is “obsolete” dating back to the Cold War era and even beforehand; all bodies have their own budgets, specific agendas and targets; and there is “an outdated sense of security” (m. 06:10). Therefore, this old understanding is insufficient to meet the risks and threats we face in today's security environment, especially related to terror.

The problems related to the system affect the implementer’s training, resistance, and behaviours when they need to take initiative in the field. Therefore, the lack of a system that is suitable for today's security environment and the lack of appropriate implementers for today's security environment fundamentally disable the control and coordination of implementation processes of the TCPs. Implications of this will be addressed within the empirical analysis that follows.

From the above overview of implementation bodies, we can see that the implementation structure of the TCPs is mainly composed of governmental bodies conditioned to deter the PKK. This observation supports the hypothesis that the TCPs mainly focus on the consequences of the terrorism rather than addressing the root causes of it. In fact, it is not possible to draw an exact institutional framework that shows the implementation structure carrying out defiance/desistance policies. Thus, combined with the lack of a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework, this fragmented and inharmonious implementation bodies bring an ambiguous implementation structure about the TCPs.

4.1.1.3. Ambiguity in Specific Policy Contexts

Implementation literature mostly emphasizes the importance of clarity in policies to achieve better implementation. As Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 466) suggest:

> … it is vital that we concern ourselves with the clarity of standards and objectives, the accuracy of their communication to implementors, and the consistency (or uniformity) with which they are communicated by various sources of information. Standards and objectives cannot be carried out unless they are stated with sufficient clarity so that implementors can know what is expected of them.

Contrary to the expectations of the implementation literature, the analysis of the empirical material proposes that, in addition to the other features of the ambiguity variable, it is also a widespread problem that the various specific TCPs lack of clarity.

As mentioned in the literature review, terrorism is a phenomenon that lacks of a clear definition on which governments agree (Wilkinson, 2011). Thus, the legal framework dealing with terrorism and counterterrorism covers "a wide range of phenomena" (Lum et al., 2006, p. 6). Within this context, the legal framework for countering terrorism in Turkey consists of several pieces of legislation such as the Penal Code, the Act on the Duties and Powers of the Police, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Compensation of Damages Arising from Terrorism and Combating Terrorism Act. But, the crucial piece of legislation pertaining to counterterrorism is Act No. 3713, the Counterterrorism Act. The act concerns the definitions and descriptions of terrorism, terrorist, terror crimes, crimes committed with the aim of terrorism, terrorist organisations, financing terrorism.

Several reports have shown that the counterterrorism provisions in Turkish legislation exploit overly broad and vague language and contain serious ambiguities making subjective interpretations possible (e.g. UN, 2017; UNHRC, 2017; UNHRC, 2013; UNHRC, 2006). In fact, the analysis of legal documents and interviews confirms that the Turkish legal framework on counterterrorism is insufficiently precise for its implementers. In fact, commenting on the issue, a provincial governor, Interviewee X21 (2017) said: "the normative order cannot draw sharp lines [for implementers]" (m. 01:46).

Article 1 of the Counterterrorism Act (Mevzuat, 1991) defines terrorism as,

> any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State

> and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat (UNHRC, 2017, p. 5).

The phraseology of the above definition of terrorism could make an excessively wide range of subjective applications available in practice because the concept of terrorism is outlined vaguely using very comprehensive terms (UNHRC, 2006).

Initially, instead of defining and clarifying acts that would constitute terrorism (UNHRC, 2017), the Article defines terrorism in relation to the aims of "any kind" of acts stated in the Article. Thus, the wording could enable implementers "to criminalize the aims as such since it does not require any act to have been committed in pursuing the listed aims" (UNHRC, 2006, p. 7).

Besides, the would-be criminalised aims are themselves ambiguous in terms of their meaning. For example, the precise gist for the lexicon used in the Article such as "the aim of changing the characteristics of … political, legal, social, secular and economic system", "weakening … the authority of the State", and "public order or general health", is epistemologically debatable.

Defining terrorism "based on its purpose or aims rather than referring to specific criminal acts" while countering terrorism, as above, "may result in prosecution and conviction in cases where the individual concerned is not personally linked to any terrorist acts properly defined, i.e. acts of deadly or otherwise grave violence against persons, or the taking of hostages" (ECOSOC, 2006, pp. 2,3).

The above implication is more visible when combining the ambiguous definition of terrorism with the rest of the provisions of the Counterterrorism Act. For example, the Article 2 of the Act defines a terror offender as:

> …the member of such organizations that are established to reach the aims set out in the first article and s/he commits crimes together with other members or solely to reach these aims, or even s/he does not commit the aimed crime, a person belonging to the above organizations is a terror offender.

> If individuals commit crime in the name of a terrorist organization without being the members of this organization, they are considered terror offenders too.

What stands out from the analysis of the first two articles of the Turkish Counterterrorism Act is that the lines of triangulation between the concepts of terrorism, terror offender/terrorist and terror organisation is invisible. The reasoning between them is ambiguous. Whilst the first article defines terrorism based on "the aim of…" some abstract and contentious terms, the following article defines terror offender in relation to "the aims" stated in the first article. Although the articles do not define terrorist organisation, the wording shows that it is also characterised based on the aims. Hence, it could conceivably be hypothesised that vagueness and ambiguity are the key characteristics of the terms in the Counterterrorism Act.

Really, as the United Nations Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur (UNHRC, 2006, p. 8) specified, taking the last part of the first paragraph of the Article 2 and connecting

> organizations to terrorism because of their aims (and not their tactics), results in a situation where the latter part of article 1, paragraph 1, referring in broad terms to the means employed, loses any significance. Organizations are linked to terrorism because of their aims, and mere membership in such an organization makes a person a "terrorist offender".

Besides, an exact description of a terrorist organisation is not comprised in the Turkish Legal System. Combined with the vague and overly broad definitions of the terms of terrorism and terrorist, it is not surprising that opponents of the dominant powers could easily be labelled as terrorists in Turkey. Thus, the Counterterrorism Act, as the Council of Europe's commissioner for human rights Gil-Robles (2003) stated in his report, could be used "to prosecute or imprison political opponents or people who had simply criticised government policy" (p. 7). Thus, the contexts of the implementation processes of the TCPs are mostly highly contested.

The comment below, from the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (UNHRC, 2006, p. 10), well illustrates the significance of the issue:

> Despite repeated inquiries, the procedure, the criteria, the responsible bodies, and the consequences of being categorized as a terrorist organization remained unclear. Many

> officials indicated that it is “common knowledge” which groups are terrorist and which are not… An organization may also be banned under the provisions in the Anti-Terror Act for providing assistance to terrorists, and have its assets frozen.

For implementers operating within the ambiguous legal framework could make it challenging to make distinction between individuals who utilise violence and those who do not. The vagueness of the legal framework could obscure the importance of making distinctions between violent and non-violent crimes/individuals in the context of countering terrorism. As Interviewee X15 (2017), a head of a department in the Interior Ministry, said: “There is a problem of access to real information [for implementers], in every sense” including “in the sense of identifying those who are terrorists” (m. 20:29). Thus, implementers could potentially violate the human rights of the citizens. As can be seen in the following subsections, the target population, means, and ends of the different types of the TCPs are blurred throughout implementation processes by ambiguity in the legal framework handling terrorism conundrum.

Ambiguity in Target Population

Directly linked to the ambiguous legal framework, the problem of ambiguity in the target population, a population which is susceptible to TCPs, was widely reported by several interviewees (Interviewee X18, 2017; Interviewee X14, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017). For example, a long-serving district governor, Interviewee X23 (2017) alleged that an implementer must be both hands of the government; while one uses hard power, the other should use soft power so that a balance occurs. The ambiguity problem emerges at this point. To whom they will use the strong hand and to whom they will use the compassionate hand?

Although implementers must carry out the policies in a delicate balance with the aim of not exploiting the target population, it is not easy. As Interviewee X18 (2017), an experienced district governor, stated, there are “an abstract” target population and the lack of “even a definition” of the struggle (m. 17:46).

Also striking, however, is that the ambiguity in target population is not necessarily the result of the ambiguity in policies. The recruitment techniques of the PKK also make it too hard to clarify the real targets. Speaking about his experiences as a district governor in a critical locality near the Northern Iraq border, Interviewee X14 (2017, m. 10:19) argued:

> The PKK is not such a simple organisation… [it] has a strategy… and wants one person from every house to somehow be on the mountain. If s/he is not on the mountain, s/he should pay them a price and be in prison. Or s/he must be dead for them. In other words, all the factors that will prevent the rational thinking of this people, that will force them to take such emotional steps… Now this shows us that the organization [the PKK] lives there as an organism.

In fact, Interviewee X14 (2017) said that sometimes an ordinary person who is, for instance, "a carpenter" or "a teacher" in daily life could emerge as a terrorist carrying "a rocket launcher" at night (m. 33:09). Interviewee X18 (2017) said that he was witness to a raid of a police station in which the son of his employee was part of the plot.

Thus, it appears that the PKK has somewhat embedded itself in the target population. So, who will be the target of the deterrence policies and/or defiance/desistance policies? The uncertainty in target groups could harm the whole counterterrorism strategy, if there is one. For example, while pursuing terrorists, if implementers target ordinary people, it could harm the objectives of defiance/desistance-based policies. As Interviewee X24 (2017) commented, when carrying out deterrence policies the target should be terrorists, but the question is "who is the terrorist?" (m. 08:01). The struggle of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers is well illustrated by Interviewee X23 (2017) saying: "Of course, we will use the strong hand of the State with the terrorists. But we cannot distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. The crucial uncertainty is here… As the target population is unclear, our implementation behaviour also becomes unclear" (m. 24:55).

Ambiguity in target population is deteriorated by the fact that deterrence policies and deterrence policy implementers have been dominating the implementation processes of the TCPs from the beginning. Thus, as Interviewee X14 (2017) argued, it has been widespread to label the target population using "military terminologies" of "friends" and "enemies" (m. 44:51). This terminology undermines the necessity of the defiance/desistance approach and blurs the target population. Thus, "the fight against the terrorism in Turkey is perceived merely as killing terrorists", and accordingly, implementers "think they will succeed if they do this" undermining the impact of winning the hearts and minds of the target population (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 14:39).

Nevertheless, closer inspection of the research data suggests that ambiguity in the target population is predominantly a problem of deterrence counterterrorism policies. In defiance/desistance polices, the means and ends of the policies addressing target population is more ambiguous. The research data supports the claim of Interviewee X24 (2017, m. 09:26):

> … what are the targets? It is not only killing the terrorists or by increasing the number of terrorists killed. As this is not a mathematical and statistical struggle. The struggle is that implementers must win the hearts of people. But what are the means, how will you implement them and how will you win the people? There is no written goal… There are things done individually within the overall framework of a policy.

In sum, while the above analysis suggests that ambiguity in the target population is a widespread issue in implementation processes of the TCPs, it also brings the ambiguity level in the means and ends of the TCPs into question.

Ambiguity in Means and Ends

The content of the empirical material suggests that while the overall frames of the TCPs are enacted, the procedures and goals are, as Interviewee X11 (2017) said, "absolutely not" clearly detailed (m. 21:40). This means implementers usually rummage around for means, tools and resources to accomplish general policy goals.

Interviewee X23 (2017) argued that although decision makers regularly sent orders to implementers related to the terror problem, instead of driving precise lines for implementation, the wording of these orders generally finishes saying "take the necessary measures" (m. 23:51). This means that, as many interviewees suggested (e.g. Interviewee X17, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017), the means of the TCPs are predominantly unclear or unavailable for implementers.

The Compensation of Damages Arising from Terrorism and Combating Terrorism Act No 5233 is a typical example of the above situation. The objective of the Act is to compensate the victims of terrorism determining the principles and procedures of compensation for material and personal damages occurred in relation to terrorist attacks and counterterrorism activities. (Mevzuat, 2004a). When this special law entered into force on 2004, its procedural details were not clear. Although a further guideline was issued for the clarification of the Act's details (Mevzuat, 2004b), as Interviewee X25 (2017) experienced, there remained many vague areas

for implementers. For example, there was uncertainty on how material compensation and damages for pain and suffering were to be calculated. Owing to the tens of thousands of different cases and not a predetermined common framework, as Interviewee X25 (2017) put it, each province developed the necessary measures to accomplish the policy goal according to "their own internal dynamics" while they implement the policy in their locale (m. 29:49).

Another example is the village guard system, renamed security guard with the Decree Law No. 676 (Resmigazete, 2016). Although there are more than 50,000 security guards (İçişleri, 2017), the legal framework to clarify the means, tools and resources they need while participating in the operations against the PKK is widely unclear. As a prominent security guard in his region, Interviewee X3 (2017) said: "We are in a gap… An ambiguity. We do not know what we are in" (m. 18:36). This shows that unclear procedures for implementers are a problem in the implementation of the TCPs.

An experienced district governor, Interviewee X19 (2017) claimed that decision makers may intentionally leave ambiguity in the policy procedures and means as a form of Machiavellian behaviour to be able to avoid responsibility, which might pave the way for implementers to think that "the ends could justify the means", thus they "may get out of the routine" (as presented in below) in implementation (m. 28:21).

This finding raises intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of the intentions of the top Turkish decision makers. The findings of the empirical material strongly support the argument that the top Turkish decision makers may habitually have hidden agendas and/or aims. My analysis, thus, found that implementers muddle between what chief actors say to the public and what they ask them behind closed doors. Because it creates more ambiguity in implementation context, implementers experience dilemma and confusion at the street level.

In fact, Interviewee X24 (2017) argued that the real targets of decision makers are often unclear. Likewise, a veteran law enforcement officer, Interviewee X2 (2017) claimed that the elected decision makers have never been consistent on their attitudes towards the addressed terrorism problem. Talking about the inconsistencies during the Solution Process, Interviewee X27 (2017, m. 09:44) commented:

> The problem was the fact that the people who govern the Republic of Turkey—I was there at that time [in the Solution Process]—did not let us know what the Solution

> Process was and what should be implemented… There was a policy of uncertainty. I am the highest bureaucrat there; neither the governor nor the soldier or police know [the policy]. We know nothing. The second issue is that we watch this [the policy] from TV [what decision makers propagate to the public].

There could be several possible explanations for this attitude. Initially, elected decision makers may have concerns about losing popular support if they publicly endorse a politically contested policy. However, my empirical material suggest that the main rationality behind it, as several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017) argued, is to leave the responsibility to the implementers in case of policy failure.

In fact, a long-time district governor, Interviewee X10 (2017) indicated that the "very serious uncertainties" have been widespread in different counterterrorism policy contexts, because "the government chooses to create ambiguities on critical issues" and it intentionally "leaves implementers on their own to deal with problems" so that "if something positive happens, there is no burden", but "if there is anything negative" it could "leave the responsibility to implementers" (m. 21:53).

Interviewee X19 (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 33:50) confirmed the above statement saying:

> I see this in politicians in Turkey. What does he, for example, say? He [the political will] orders [to implementers behind the closed doors]: 'go and negotiate with the organization [the PKK]' … Then, he conducts daily surveys [to observe the pattern of the public perception] … If he thinks he will lose votes in the elections as the side effect [of the policy], he says that 'I did not tell them [implementers] this [in that way]'. An uncertainty…

In fact, this happened in Turkey during the Solution Process. Many interviewees confirmed that the Government did not allow implementers to carry out any operation against the PKK and instructed them to turn a blind eye to the activities of the terrorist organisation to avoid any conflict (e.g. Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X28, 2017). But when the Process failed in July 2015, the top decision makers denied their orders and started to blame implementers. For instance, before the vital December 1, 2015 election, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan blamed implementers saying: "What is included in the

internal security law is not legislated to remain in the books. Implementers should test themselves, if there is a problem" (ntv, 2015). He then intensified his argument in a public speech that his Government's orders relating to the policies against the PKK during the Solution Process are misunderstood and misjudged by public officials, resulting in policy failure (CNNTÜRK, 2015). The then Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay (Hürriyet, 2015b) agreed with him in an interview that they had not given any instruction telling implementers "not to do the operations" in the Solution Process and claimed:

> We have always said: Public order is not an alternative to the Solution Process. Both will run together. There is no such thing [an order preventing operations] as verbal or written in anywhere. It cannot be too... Is that possible to say security units 'do not do your job'?... Too many wrong things are being written [about the order in the media]. If there is an armed movement in a place, will the security units and the civil administration not intervene in it there? Is that possible?

In sum, it is a prevailing fact that, as several interviewees confirmed (e.g. Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017), decision makers may leave ambiguities in policies and they may frequently change their tune. There could be huge differences between what they say to the public and what they instruct or not instruct the implementers to do behind closed doors. This result is consistent with the argument of Barrett and Fudge (1981c), who said: "…leaving a maximum of discretion for 'performance' rather than 'conformance' to a specific directive… can be seen as abdication of responsibility; non-performance can be then 'blamed' on implementers rather than policy-makers" (p. 275).

The above findings suggest that the level of ambiguity of a TCP would be affected by this choice. While performance requires ambiguous policies, conformance needs unambiguous policies. Top decision makers probably prefer to formulate ambiguous counterterrorism policies to reduce the effect of the possible negative consequences of the TCPs on their careers. The question is whether this attitude changes across policies.

4.1.2. Ambiguity in Different Types of TCPs

To explore the correlation between ambiguity and policy types, namely those of deterrence and defiance/desistance counterterrorism policies, was one of the aims of this empirical work. The empirical material strongly suggests that ambiguity is a widespread problem, regardless

of the policy types or approaches. However, if we compare them, it seems that defiance/desistance policies tend to be relatively more ambiguous than deterrence policies. In fact, Interviewee X18 (2017) felt that policies are "clear in terms of deterrence. But in terms of other elements [defiance/desistance] you cannot draw such [precise] lines… In the deterrent, you can say 'soldiers that you will go there', 'you will operate here'"(m. 11:58).

This fact especially surfaces while the interviewees speak about the defiance/desistance-based Solution Process and the succeeding deterrence based era (e.g. Interviewee X4, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017). It clearly appears that the deterrence-based era, starting from July 2015, has been less ambiguous than the preceding defiance/desistance era of the Solution Process for the implementers.

Speaking about ambiguity in the defiance/desistance based Solution Process and its effect on implementation, Interviewee X10 (2017) commented that the central authority started the Solution Process and did not inform local actors. S/he asserted that: "I experienced that period, which started when I was there. The policy started, but street level implementers did not know what to do" (m. 10:23), although everybody said on the tv that terrorists were leaving their weapons. Thus, soldiers even encountered terrorists with guns on their hand and did not go after them on many occasions (Interviewee X16, 2017), although they apparently must pursue them under provisions of the Counterterrorism Act.

My analysis suggests that there are two possible reasons for the differing ambiguity levels across policies. First, as presented, although deterrence policies are potentially supported by the popular vote, defiance/desistance policies are less popular among the general population. Thus, political actors probably see it as less risky to have unambiguous deterrence TCPs. Second, implementers will probably be reluctant to carry out deterrence counterterrorism policies if they are ambiguous. Thus, in order to make sure they are implemented, political actors must formulate clearer deterrence policies.

Confronting top downers' normatively constructed clear policy ambition, the analysis of the ambiguity factor suggests that, as bottom uppers assume, the TCPs are produced with ambiguous means and ends and are implemented in an ambiguous context. As Matland (1995) states, the level of ambiguity has profound effects in the implementation process such as

> … the ability of superiors to monitor activities, the likelihood that the policy is uniformly understood across the many implementation sites, the probability that local contextual factors play a significant role, and the degree to which relevant actors vary sharply across implementation sites. (p. 159)

While the issue of how the ambiguity level in the implementation context of the TCPs effects the implementation processes at the street level will be the subject of the second empirical chapter, the overall analysis of the ambiguity factor raises intriguing questions related to the conflict/ambiguity relationship in implementation. The preceding findings suggest that, while ambiguity inherited in policies could create conflict, the high level of conflicting context of the TCPs could increase the ambiguity level of the implementation context. This result is consistent with the argument presented by Winter (2006), who claims that policies cannot be carried out without conflict, causing ambiguity. Thus, conflict at the top is also one of the main parts of the ambiguity factor in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

4.1.3. Conflict from Top

Consistent with the literature, the analysis of the empirical material strongly suggests that in Turkey decision makers and implementers handle terrorism related issues in an environment lacking consensus. The extent and content of the counterterrorism policies and their implementation processes is heavily affected by political context, and conflict and decisions are taken throughout political processes without consensus and implemented according to the special interests of actors. As Crenshaw (2001, p. 329) stated:

> … counterterrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process. Perceptions of the threat of terrorism and determination and implementation of policy occur in the context of a policy debate involving government institutions, the media, interest groups, and the elite and mass publics.

My analysis found that contested contextual conditions in Turkey influence implementers' behaviours in the implementation processes of the TCPs. Interviewee X10 (2017) indicated that while implementers decide on implementation behaviours they make an equation, taking into consideration desires of "the centre [decision makers]", "the minister", "the media", "the local context", "the public", "opposition [parties]" and especially "the political party [pro-PKK

Peoples' Democratic Party, the HDP]" that "constantly talks about the same thing in different discourse and raise[s] them [implementer's behaviours] and wonder[s] how they could use it" (m. 25:27).



Figure 10: Contested contextual circumstances in the implementation context

Many interviewees stated that the struggle between individual, political and institutional actors at the local and national level has significant influence on the implementation process of the TCPs (e.g. Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017). As shown in Figure 10, contested national political and contested local contexts emerged as the main themes of contested contextual conditions. While contested national political context is a top-down factor, contested local context is a bottom-up factor. I will consider only the former in this subsection. The latter will be analysed in the following backward mapping section.

Contested Political Context

The analysis suggests that the implementation context of the TCPs has been heavily contested politically. There are potentially three main reasons for this. The first is the contradictory nature of the terror problem. It appears that contradicting opinions across different segments of the nation in terms of how to handle the terrorism problem result in a heavily contested political context. For instance, Interviewee X13 (2017) argued that although the prevalent ideology in how to handle the problem is Turkish nationalism, there are contesting ideologies such as conservatism, Islamism and Kurdish nationalism throughout the different segments of society. Indeed, using Q methodology, Uluğ and Cohrs (2017) found that the perspectives of the political elites on the ongoing problem varied across four positions: nationalist, social democratic, conservative/religious and pro-Kurdish. This is consistent with Ryan (1996), who

confirms that policy context that implementation should consider contains "the ideological context of policy development" (pp. 751,752).

Second, as we have seen, the provisions of the Counterterrorism Act could be used by governments to surpass the opposition. In fact, Interviewee X28 (2017) claimed that while the terror problem could be a tool to grind governments down by opposition, governments use it to completely neutralize the opposition. The theoretical and empirical material suggests that this is prevalent in Turkey and this potentially further fuels the dispute on counterterrorism policies. Consequently, the TCPs are commonly carried out in a political context that lacks consensus.

Third, controversy generally occurs among top political, governmental and intra-state actors. Interviewee X16 (2017) argued that "apart from political bodies, the perspectives of the military-civil bureaucracy of the State" (m. 14:53) intervene in the process. In fact, Interviewee X13 (2017) stated that although there has been a stable government in recent years, there have been "zigzags in the government" (m. 08:01) on how to root out terrorism. This suggests that there may be conflict among different institutions within the constitutional structure of the top. Claiming that the Solution Process was put in force without consensus within the State, Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 30:45) explained:

> One [the political will] says we will implement it. The soldiers are already out of the game… What is happening then? The situation is getting worse as soldiers are excluded [from decision making process] and there is no consensus [within the State] … As soon as they feel that they are losing control, as there is a big reaction from the West [of the Country] in the election, they are coming back to the military and they say go and get it [deterrence on the PKK] … The lack of harmony among the civil and military bureaucracy, and politics precludes the balance [in counterterrorism policy sector] and this creates chaos [in the field].

Several interviewees felt that a contested political context influences implementation (e.g. Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017). Even implementers who know ethically and technically what to do in implementation processes might hesitate to carry out policies when dealing with the target population, due to the heavily politicised society. Interviewee X23 (2017) argued that since implementers are also

members of the community, they are ultimately influenced by "political fluctuations" (m. 41:19). Interviewee X28 (2017) stated that when there is a consensus on a policy, it increases implementers' confidence in solving problems but, if, for example, the ruling party and the opposition heavily contest a policy, this, in turn, increases the concerns and reduces the speed and motivation of the implementers to solve problems.

In general, therefore, it seems that, in addition to the normative legal framework, implementers, as Interviewee X13 (2017) said, take the "conjuncture" (m. 04:03) into account, while implementing the TCPs. The findings of the interview material suggest that this is an inevitable problem for implementers. This is the condition in which they have to operate, as Interviewee X23 (2017, m. 42:03) revealed:

> This is the air we breathe. We cannot change it right away. But if we do not breathe that air, we cannot live... We must adapt to it. Unfortunately, this politicized community structure is also difficult to manage. It is rigid to apply the rules.

The lack of consensus, as Interviewee X9 (2017) argued, puts the legitimacy of a strategy into question and implementers could potentially face resistance at the street level. As conflicting implementers could also develop resistance from the bottom, this could be a barrier in implementation as implementers are not enough competent and professional to deal with it.

For example, as one of the leading figures in the 49th Government, Interviewee X16 (2017, m. 30:44) illustrates how conflict from the bottom damaged the Government's defiance/desistance based policies saying:

> … Süleyman Demirel says that he recognizes the reality of Kurds. Kurdish is accepted as a language and is being unfettered. Publishing in Kurdish, the use of the Kurdish in television, radio, cinema, theatre is being freed… The demands [by target population] are these. And in the main square of Diyarbakir, they [Demirel and his aides] say that Turks and Kurds could not be separated from each other. They are different ethnic groups, but they are inseparable. We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey. Now, there is a state bureaucracy that is not ready for it. Both militarist and civilian. This

> bureaucracy is resisting. They resisted. Ultimately, the events of 92 Nowruz [the Bloody Nowrouz][5]…

In fact, the combination of the empirical material supports the argument that the contested political context and the level of ambiguity become crucial in the implementation processes of the TCPs in a locality, depending on how they fit an implementer's disposition, such as her/his political belief, background, experience and competence.

For example, when asked what problems are most frequently encountered when implementing TCPs in local context, Interviewee X21 (2017) initially pointed out ambiguity saying implementers could not fully comprehend and "internalize" the policies of the centre as "it is hard to understand what it [the centre] exactly wants to do" (m. 22:49). Interviewee X21 (2017, m.23:09) then pointed at conflict from bottom saying:

> Two, the intervention of implementer's feelings to the job… For example, there are different regions in Turkey: the north, the east, the west, the south. And the cultures, socio-economic structures, lifestyles, perceptions of the world of these people from these regions are different. Thus, their approaches to the execution of the centrally decided policies and the form of their implementation [behaviours] are influenced [by their point of view]. Sometimes, their feelings get confused. I mean, they experience an ambivalence [while implementing polices].

This finding supports the statement of Matland (1995), who claims a "Weberian bureaucrat making independent decisions based on merit and technical criteria, free from political influence" is not always the case as it is "rarely possible to separate politics from administration" (p. 148).

Thus, the following section will scrutinize the implementation context from the back, analysing the implementers' dispositions and local contextual conditions. It will help us to comprehend the linkages in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs.

[5] Please look at pages 209 and 210 for the details of the incident and how this incident effected the implementation process at that time.

4.2. The “Backward Mapping" of the Implementation Context of the TCPs

We have seen that the implementation context of the TCPs is comprised of ambiguity and conflict from the top, and that ambiguity mainly dominates the upper part of the process. The question is, if a policy is sufficiently clear, will its implementation proceed smoothly? Overall, the interviewees indicated that it will not. The lower part of the process also entails a number of significant obstacles which are the topics of the following subsections. This section will analyse the implementation context from backward, as shown in Figure 11.

Analysis of the empirical material suggests that, as bottom-uppers assume (e.g. Berman, 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Lipsky, 1980), the dispositions of the implementers and the local contextual factors form the basis for the obstacles at the lower part of the implementation context of the TCPs. In fact, many interviewees indicated the importance of the implementers’ dispositions and local context throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017).



Figure 11: The conceptualisation of the backward mapping of the Implementation context

For example, speaking about the crucial factors, Interviewee X24 (2017) pointed out that although policies are clear, in addition to the ideological attitude of implementers, the most important factor is the domination of the field by implementers, namely “spatial dominance” of locality (m. 10:31). This means, as Interviewee X17 (2017), a head of a department in the Interior Ministry, stated, owing to the implementation context being mainly ambiguous, implementers determine their “behaviours” and ”produce” their own “solutions” for problems in their “local environment” based on their “understanding” and “perception” of the problem formed by “a number of values” (m. 05:10). This finding is consistent with that

of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) who argue that the policies are “filtered through the perceptions of the implementor within the jurisdiction where the policy is delivered” (p. 472).

The empirical material strongly supports the argument that implementers’ dispositions and local contextual conditions create conflict from the bottom throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. This raises the importance of the implementers’ competence for better implementation behaviours in a locality. Because “when conflict exists actions change and actors resort to bargaining mechanisms” (Matland, 1995, p. 156), as bottom uppers assume.

Although it may be expected that the role of conflict from the bottom would be insignificant in the case of counterterrorism policy implementation—where a more hierarchical structure may be expected—one of the most obvious findings to emerge from the analysis supports the argument that the conflict from the bottom plays a crucial role through the implementation processes of the TCPs as expected by bottom-uppers. This finding also reflects that of Lipsky (1980) where conflict not only occurs at the national level, but it also at the local level.

In fact, based on the theoretical discussion, I expected that the behaviours of the implementers would not be solely based on merit and technical criteria. Conversely, their implementation behaviours would be influenced by environmental or personal conflictual settings. Thus, in the theoretical chapter, I concluded that the conflict variable is likely to be one of the main variables of importance to the implementation processes of the TCPs.



Figure 12: The conceptualisation of the conflict variable in the implementation context

Figure 12 presents the components of the conflict variable in the implementation context of the TCPs obtained from the analysis of the research data namely those of interviews, legal documents, reports and official documents. There are two main sources of conflict in the

implementation processes of the TCPs: environment and individuals. Contested political context from the top and contested local context from the bottom are surrounding circumstances in which implementers must operate. Additionally, individually, there could be conflict between the policy approach and the implementer's belief, and/or conflict between policy makers and implementers. The empirical material also suggests that conflicts of interest could manipulate implementers' behaviours at the bottom.

Conflict from the top has been analysed as part of the forward mapping section. The scope and importance of sub-variables related to the conflict from the bottom in the implementation context of the TCPs will be explored within the following subsections. Firstly, conflictual local context is considered alongside the importance of the local context. Then, implementer conflict will be explored alongside the importance of the quality of implementers.

4.2.1. Local Contextual Conditions

The analysis of the empirical material supports the argument that the local context has crucial effects in the implementation processes of the TCPs. In fact, a recurring theme in the interviews was a sense amongst interviewees that implementers take local conditions into account while determining their implementation behaviours. This finding is consistent with the expectation of Matland (1995), who proposes that in parallel with the level of ambiguity in a policy "local contextual factors" (p. 159) could become significantly important for the implementation process.



Figure 13: Local contextual factors of the in the implementation process of TCPs

The interview data suggests that, as can be seen in Figure 13, the local context of the implementation processes of the TCPs mainly consists of spatial and human factors. These are specifically those of local demography, geography, local socio-economic conditions, local political context, local culture and local actors. Talking about this issue, Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 21:01) said:

> I'm telling what I've lived entirely. Certainly, implementers must consider local conditions… Socioeconomic conditions, demographic conditions, population status, tradition, history, political understanding; they all determine what an implementer does when carrying out these terror policies. It absolutely affects the manner, shape and content of an implementer's behaviours.

The above view was shared by many interviewees (e.g.Interviewee X26, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X14, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017). In fact, Interviewee X18 (2017) argued that the are "invisible boundaries" among "families" and "tribes" (m. 13:09) in a locality, and that implementers must consider them. This supports the empirical constitutionalism principle of Hjern and Hull (1982) who argue that the implementation process of a policy is affected by societal actors as well in addition to constitutional organisations.

For example, if there is a feudal order in a locality an implementer, such as a district governor, should take it into consideration while carrying out counterterrorism policies. There are some influential local actors, such as in the sense of a tribal leader or a sheikh, identified by Interviewee X25 (2017) as "opinion leaders" (m. 19:11), with whom implementers should at least be in communication for a successful process.

Many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X25, 2017; Interviewee X26, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017) stated that the characteristics of the local population such as economic conditions related to income injustice, a tendency towards religion, education level and experienced grievances have impact on the implementation. A possible explanation might be that these factors also determine the target populations' perceptions and attitudes towards the problem, namely the PKK, as suggested by several studies (e.g. Akyuz and Armstrong, 2011; Basibuyuk, 2008). Thus, implementers are obliged to consider the characteristics of the target population in their localities while carrying out the policies aiming

to address the problem. Accordingly, the implementation behaviours could differ across localities.

These findings suggest that even though Turkey is a unitary country, there are differences between the East, the West, the North and the South in terms of the implementation of counterterrorism policies. For example, Interviewee X23 (2017) argued that citizens in Western Turkey can interpret security measures as a lack of confidence in them and could feel offended. As the Interviewee experienced, they may then want to be exempted from security checks saying "Why are you searching us? Are we terrorists?" (m. 13:16). Thus, implementers adapt practices to local conditions. In this case, they do not stop and search local vehicles.

One of the most striking facts to emerge from the above analysis is to how crucial socio-physiological factors are in countering terrorism. The socio-physiological factors have two dimensions. First, they could be related to the tradition and culture of the people. Interviewee X19 (2017) said "Regarding local circumstances, for example, you cannot implement a policy in the same way in X and in Y or in Z [cities]. Why? There is culture gap [across localities] regarding truths and wrongs" (m. 37:09). For example, Interviewee X5 (2017) stated that to give condolences by visiting the family of a deceased relative is extremely important for some parts of the people in the Region, thus, sometimes, going to a village to offer condolences could be more effective to impress the target population than making a road for this village.

Second, it could be linked to the grievances that the target population might have experienced. For example, Interviewee X5 (2017) argued that despite the fact that the recent Governments of the AKP have improved the quality of services "that is never before seen in the Southeast", they "still do not get the votes they want" because the people of the Region "do not want only service", but also they want the Government to recognise and address the grievances of the people, calling it "a psychological thing" (m. 12:21). For example, talking about his dialog -during his service in a district near the border with Iraq- with a mukhtar[6] about why the problem continues, despite improvements regarding the approach of the State to the problem, Interviewee X17 (2017) reported the mukhtar said: "Sir, they evacuated my village… They burned my house… my parents' house… No commodity in the world can bring back my memories I had there with my parents…" (m. 33:15).

[6] The elected head of a village

Interviewee X14 (2017) explained the people are “angry” and “worried” in places with terrorism related problems and are sincerely delighted when they feel they are being protected, as they are the ones suffering “the biggest damage from terrorism” (m. 18:03). In general, therefore, it appears that implementers need to bear in mind that the socio-psychological dimensions of the implementation of the TCPs could sometimes be more important than the material dimensions of it.

Overall, the analysis suggests that local context could cause several constraints on the implementation processes of the TCPs. For example, it may slow the accomplishments of implementers while they need to make quick decisions. Also striking, however, when local context is severely conflictual, implementation could become even more complicated at the local level.

Conflict at the Local Context

One issue identified as an element of conflict originates from local conditions and it appears that this is widespread in Turkey. The analysis of the empirical data suggests that local conditions, such as local political understanding, local setting, ambiguous implementation context, contention among local implementation agencies and implementers could be the cause of the conflict in implementation at the local context. Interviewee X27 (2017) described: “The practice in X [province] is different from the practice in Y [province]. There is much more [local] conflict in X. The system is paralyzed. There is a little less conflict in Y. The system is 50% paralyzed” (m. 33:11).

Firstly, the local political understanding and/or setting could be sources for conflict during the implementation processes. For example, Interviewee X24 (2017) stated that if a prominent figure in a locality who supposedly supports terrorism or terrorism related activities is targeted by law enforcement units, certain sections of the local community could oppose the attempt and there may be reactions. Even, as interviewee X6 (2017), a former member of parliament and a chairman of a non-governmental organisation, reported, some local politicians could intervene in this kind of case.

A long-serving parliamentary adviser, Interviewee X20 (2017, m. 19:16) confirmed this saying:

> Local politicians are also effective in this work [implementation] and with implementers… As they are the people of that region too, not all elected politicians

> speak with one voice. Thus, they can put pressure on local authorities. In fact, some are more flexible, and others are more rigid [on counterterrorism]. Although the general administration takes decisions, in terms of implementation, the politicians do not leave them alone… In some places they soften this work, in some places they can harden it putting pressure on local authorities.

One possible explanation for this kind of conflict is that the citizens live there in a comparatively small community for a long time, but implementers only come for a limited period. Speaking about a rival family, Interviewee X3 (2017), a leading village guard, said that "all families know each other" from the past and position themselves accordingly (m. 06:30). The local equilibria as interviewee X18 (2017) said, are always matter for a native community.

Additionally, it appears that if counterterrorism policy implementers stay in a place for a very long time, they could begin to accept some mistakes as correct. As Interviewee X24 (2017) describes this as becoming "localized" (m. 16:58), which may occur mentally and practically. This could develop when they increasingly be part of the local environment and the chance for original and integral thinking decreases. Perhaps this could be one of the biggest troubles in these processes, since implementers could lose objectivity, creating conflict in the local context.

The findings of the empirical material also suggest that an ambiguous implementation context triggers conflict in a locality. Implementers could have difficulty balancing the different segments of local people. Several interviewees implied that there is a tendency to label the segments of the local people as pro-State, pro-PKK or in between (e.g. Interviewee X3, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X23, 2017). It supposes that while one segment of the local population is sympathetic to the PKK, the other segment takes the side of the State. However, as there is no clear framework to define the target population of the policies, implementers have difficulties to operate on this basis. Besides, to separate the local people as pro-State and pro-PKK is a controversial approach within itself. Several interviewees objected to this approach, saying that without a clear definition of the concepts within the legal framework, it is not always practically possible to reasonably label the target population (e.g. Interviewee X23, 2017; Interviewee X18, 2017). This just creates more conflict, destroys the target population's perception of fairness and, eventually, serves the PKK. While it causes "the

alienation of people from the state" (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 10:43), the target population also "keep a foot in both camps" regarding their interests (Interviewee X12, 2017, m. 39:01).

Ambiguity could also spark confrontation between implementers and local people. Talking about his experience during the unclear implementation context of the Solution Process, Interviewee X2 (2017, m. 14:21) said:

> A lawyer and his relatives have a very clear attitude [sympathetic to the PKK]. They display the flag of the PKK saying: 'We have our own house and village. We could do this because the current Prime Minister, the current Government is in direct dialog with them [the PKK].' I am now in this situation; if I act on this man, it will trigger local conflict. Because, I really see the support for them [from the Government] and I would stand against the political will. If I do not act, I am committing a crime under the current law.

From the analysis of the empirical material, it appears that, as Interviewee X18 (2017) argued, local context is more impactful in determining the implementation processes of defiance/desistance policies than the implementation processes of deterrence policies. This may be because, as interviewee X12 (2017), a long serving provincial governor, mentioned, the level of ambiguity is generally lower in deterrence policies than defiance/desistance policies. Still, the effect of the local context on deterrence policies highly varies depending on the level of ambiguity of these policies. If ambiguity is high in a deterrence policy, conflictual local context probably becomes more vital.

Another important finding is that conflict could arise among different organisations while implementing TCPs in the field. Organisations could have incongruous views and interests with regard to the problem. Thus, they would develop conflicting attitudes towards the means and ends of policies. Such differences especially rise regarding programmatic activities, the substance of means to be used to reach aims, and jurisdictional issues. For example, Interviewee X14 (2017) said that he had experienced many difficulties with the military commanders on the programmatic activities of their units at the street level as the relationship between civilian and military authorities is loose due to ambiguous legal framework, such as Provincial Administration Law No 5442.

The consensus between local implementation organisations possibly increases the performance of the street level implementers. Interviewee X2 (2017, m. 29:38) argued that the behaviours of the street level bureaucrats are affected by the level of consensus among the local organisations. For example, if street level implementers observe a consensus between the civil administrative chief, the chief prosecutor, the chief of police and the senior commander, they act more courageously.

The above analyses suggest that local context could positively influence the implementation processes once it is well balanced by the implementers. For example, in a well-balanced local environment, implementers could carry out the policies more determinately. Because the better-balanced local context means implementers get more support from the local environment. Several interviewees see the local public support as "absolutely essential" (m. 38:01) for better implementation (e.g. Interviewee X18, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X14, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017). A possible explanation for this might be that the local support increases the legitimacy of the implementation process. Also, if public opinion is against implementers, it will be difficult for the target population to desist themselves from the PKK (Interviewee X17, 2017). In general, therefore, it appears that implementers' dispositions become crucial throughout the implementation.

4.2.2. Implementers' Dispositions

The analysis of the empirical material strongly supports the argument that the dispositions of the implementers could have crucial impact on the implementation processes of the TCPs. From the data it appears that the disposition of an implementer in the implementation processes of the TCPs consists of two main components: the implementer's conflict and the quality of the implementer. Interviewee X16 (2017) said implementers' dispositions consist of their "abilities", "resistances" and the "economic benefit" from by countering terrorism" (m. 33:33). This result is consistent with that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 472) who say that:

> Three elements of the implementors' response may affect their ability and willingness to carry out the policy: their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response.

The following subsections will explore the extent of implementer conflict and the importance of the quality of implementers. Implementer's conflict has three dimensions, as analysed below. The first discussed will be what happens if implementers disagree with policies and/or policy makers. Next discussed is what happens if they intensely agree. The findings of the empirical material suggest that an implementer's intense positive belief may lead to conflicting behaviours increasing the conflict level in the implementation context of the TCPs. In fact, the findings presented below confirm that this situation is widespread in the implementation processes of the TCPs. The third aspect discussed is implementers' conflicts of interest. The findings show that implementers' behaviours could be manipulated by conflict of interest, which has been widely omitted in the existing implementation research.

4.2.2.1. Implementer's Conflict

From analysis of the empirical material, it appears that implementer's conflict in the implementation context of the TCPs occurs when an implementer is highly motivated by his own beliefs or ideologies for or against a policy or a policy maker's belief of the problem. In my opinion an implementer should behave neutrally while implementing counterterrorism policies. Their implementation behaviours should not be politically influenced (by their own political context). On the contrary, they should behave based on merit and technical criteria (professional).

However, it is not realistic to expect a totally neutral or "mechanical" (Interviewee X14, 2017, m. 43:33) implementation behaviour from an implementer. When implementers carry out policies, they may like or dislike them, or embrace or not embrace its means and ends too much (Interviewee X19, 2017).



Figure 14: The belief spectrum of implementers in the implementation context of TCPs

As can be seen from the spectrum in Figure 14, in an extreme case an implementer could have a total belief or disbelief in a counterterrorism policy. The totality is highly unlikely in real life. An exact neutrality/pure professionalism is also rarely seen in the field. The level of conflict by

an implementer for different counterterrorism policy approaches might be somewhere between +1 and -1.

The findings from the interviews strongly support the argument that implementers' personal and subjective evaluations and perceptions of policies and towards decision makers affect their implementation behaviours. In fact, an experienced district governor, Interviewee X11 (2017) asserted that the implementation behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers are manipulated by their "identities" and "values" (m. 08:38). Commenting on implementer's conflict, Interviewee X9 (2017) claimed: "This is a problem we constantly experience. In other words, the ideological camp to which implementers belong, their ideological worldview…" determine their implementation behaviours, and they carry out policies "as if they implement" just enough to save themselves from investigation (m. 27:36). This means instead of behaving with technical and ethical merit implementers could be politically motivated.

While Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) underline the importance of the level of conflict over policies, they ask: "To what extent do implementing officials agree on the goals of the program?" (p. 459) implying that "'value-based actions of officials and leaders... may be most determinative of ultimate policy'" (Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971 cited in Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p.459).

Implementers have different perceptions because counterterrorism policies are controversial. Matland (1995) states "some policies are inevitably controversial and it is not possible to adjust them to avoid conflict. Often a conflict is based on an incompatibility of values…" (p. 157).

Therefore, it is crucial to discover how and to what degree conflict between a policy's approach and an implementer's belief, or between policy makers' belief/policy makers and implementer's belief/implementers impacts implementer behaviours and the implementation process.

There were suggestions by several interviewees that conflict does not affect these items in a vital sense (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X23, 2017) because there is a central authority. The implementers must listen and obey the centre's voice and directives. If they behave according to their head, they may face sanctions; legal,

administrative or criminal. They could even lose their positions and careers. As all implementers know this, they ensure their implementation behaviours run in parallel with the central authority. In fact, it is their duty to implement those policies. All security and other public units must act in parallel with those policies and in line with the politics of political power. They cannot act in contradiction. According to this point of view, implementers' conflict deviates their implementation behaviours only a little, as Interviewee X21 (2017) put it, "by the skin of one's teeth" (m. 11:43).

Although the above argument might have some sound points, the analysis of the research data strongly supports the argument that conflict from implementers towards policies/policy makers significantly affects their implementation behaviours. In fact, in response to the above question, most interviewees indicated that conflict from implementers could have crucial impact on implementation processes (e.g. Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017).

For example, the Government currently pursues a decisive deterrence approach against the PKK. The discourse from the top actors, such as President Erdoğan, generally articulates the sentence of "the operations will continue until the last terrorist is disabled" (VOA, 2017). But, as Interviewee X28 (2017) exemplified, similar to several others (e.g. Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017), individual attitudes of implementers could affect the implementation of this deterrence approach. According to him, the implementation of this approach could deviate from province to province because the Governors who are in charge could have dissimilar attitudes and views on how this approach should be carried out. Thus, while some could wait to perform operations at a more convenient time to prevent casualties among security forces, some could immediately take initiative at any cost.

From the above analysis, we can expect that there must be several inferences of implementers' conflict in implementation. As Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) claimed, implementers might "fail to execute policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them" or "widespread acceptance of the policy's standards and objectives" by implementers may results in better implementation (p. 472). The next subsections will analyse the implementer's conflict based on the intense belief, disbelief and conflict of interest.

Intense Belief in Policies

The analysis of the empirical material makes clear that intense belief may severely affect implementation processes. Many interviewees suggested that if there is intense belief and high motivation alongside low professionalism in implementers, serious issues emerge throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017). In fact, numerous reports (e.g. TBMM, 2013a; TBMM, 2013b; TBMM, 1997a; TİHV, 1997; TİHV, 2016; Oran, 2006) confirm this argument. The problems especially occur in the implementation process of the deterrence policies.

Talking on this issue, Interviewee X25 (2017) confirmed that during the periods of martial law and state of emergency, especially in the 1990s, over-motivation by the implementers caused some grave complications. For example, Interviewee X16 (2017) said that s/he observed cruel practices against the target population such as extrajudicial killings and torture committed by intensely motivated implementers in the ambiguous context of the deterrence approach that dominated the 1990s.

Thus, it appears that although, based on democratic theory, implementers should carry out all kinds of policies without judging and questioning, frequently, as Interviewee X10 (2017) said, over-motivation could result in extreme implementation behaviours that even decision makers would not have wanted. Interviewee X12 (2017) described them as "being more royalist than king" (m. 32:03).

The reasons for these out of routine issues are widespread, but it seems ambiguity in means creates room for these behaviours. Talking about the reasons for the out of routine implementation behaviours in the 1990s, Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 25:28) stated:

> The centre wants results. The centre does not look at the process. I mean, the centre is not interested in if implementer X executes a man in a village… The centre says: find intelligence, distribute a cell in the fight against terrorism. Or prevent an action of the PKK. The centre looks at this. The centre does not care much about how you apply it during the implementation phase of the process.

This suggests that, as several interviewees argued (Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017), the Region's socio-political and psychological setting,

implementers' perceptions and emotions and the organizational climate may lead to the anti-professional implementation behaviours. In fact, Interviewee X1 (2017) claimed that some implementers could take the problem "personally" (m. 03:36), if they, for example, lost a friend in a combat. Talking about a gendarmerie commander's misbehaviours with members of the travelling tribes, Interviewee X21 (2017) commented that such problems occur because implementers individually could justify these behaviours on the basis of their experiences. He claimed that although the gendarmerie commander knows the behaviour he performed is out of the legal framework, his individual situation in the local context psychologically pressured him because, "the danger puts his head in the lion's mouth" and he experienced "the loss of his friends" (m. 26:55) so he is at risk. This means, as Interviewee X11 (2017) said, implementers could become "a party to the conflict" (m. 07:48). Thus, if the organizational climate he belongs to does not prevent him, those behaviours could be widespread.

From this example, it is understood that some illegal practices can continue because of environmental and emotional factors. In fact, several interviewees pointed out that the high motivation of implementers to protect the country and the public authority could result in some unlawful behaviours (e.g. Interviewee X25, 2017, m. 16:05; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017).

It is also the case that encouragement and inducements from demagogue rulers can result in out of routine and extreme implementation behaviours that even the top actors in Ankara would not want. As Interviewee X12 (2017) said, highly motivated implementers may become more confident and miss the balance. As Interviewee X21 (2017) described it, "excessive motivation" (m. 20:45) gets implementers out of professionalism in the counterterrorism policy implementation field.

What stands out from the findings is that when implementers are over-motivated by overstatements from the top and carried out policies with intense belief, this, as Interviewee X11 (2017) indicates, cause huge damages on counterterrorism efforts. In particular, it harms the target population. Once the target population's perception is shaped by these practices, it becomes less likely they will desist themselves from the PKK. As implementers' mistakes could easily be attributed to the State (Interviewee X17, 2017).

Furthermore, the empirical material suggests that if unprofessional, unlawful and unethical behaviours systematically continue, it may mean that, as Interviewee X13 (2017) said, these behaviours are intentionally backed up by top decision makers.

Disbelief in Policies

Implementers could believe that the policy they carry out will not work. They also could doubt the intentions of decision makers and lose their confidence. The analysis of the empirical material suggests that there are several reasons for disfavouring policies. As Interviewee X18 (2017) said, because of "level of education" and "point of view" (m. 10:50), an implementer may not embrace a government policy.

As Interviewee X11 (2017) mentioned, there is a relationship between change in policies/policy approaches and implementers' conflicting attitudes. When a policy change occurs, the dominant implementers of the ongoing policy could develop resistance to the new policy approach.

A possible explanation for this might be that the implementers of the current policy could fear that they will lose their dominant roles within the new policy approach. Another possible explanation for this is that the ongoing implementers might genuinely believe in the necessity of the current approach. Talking about the conflicting attitudes of the implementers towards changing policies, Interviewee X5 (2017, m. 26:59) specified that:

> When you have identified a unit of the organization [the PKK] and are in the process of destroying it, a decision comes from above saying that we are taking a step back, not going on. Now, think about it… You challenged so much, you made a great effort, but they decided to step back. Does not it affect now? It seriously affects.

The findings of the interview material imply that implementers who have low motivation and disfavour policies negatively affect the implementation processes of the TCPs. Talking about this issue, a head of a security related department in the Interior Ministry, Interviewee X26 (2017) said: "if you have to do something that you do not believe, it naturally brings failure" (m. 15:20).

For example, Interviewee X28 (2017) claimed that during the Solution Process some implementers felt the Solution Process was wrong and were against it, leading to developing

behaviours that passively filled their time in service. Really, several interviewees suggested that the opposing implementers were not actively involved in the promotion of the Solution Process and some even tried to obstruct it by moving deterrence policies forward in the local context (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017).

However, the data suggests that, as Interviewee X10 (2017) said, the opposing implementers were quickly detected by central actors and replaced without delay. Thus, the effect of low motivation and rejecting policies is weaker than that of high motivation and favouring policies on the implementation processes of the TCPs.

Conflict of Interest

Analysis of the collected interviews and reports makes clear that some of the personal interest of implementers influences the implementation of TCPs. This happens intentionally and sometimes could comprise criminal acts. The data suggest that it occurs in two dimensions.

First, implementers could facilitate unprofessional and/or unethical implementation behaviours to promote their careers. This means that several implementers do not behave with technical and ethical merit. In contrast, their implementation behaviours could be self-interested. For example, Interviewee X10 (2017) stated that some implementers could "play up to top actors" (m. 34:19) and this lack of professionalism could cause an implementation deficit. As Interviewee X14 (2017) described, they could see implementation as a "jumping board" (m. 44:33). In fact, commenting on the issue, Interviewee X6 (2017) claimed that "bureaucrats should implement policies like statesman not politician", but some implementers use "political discourse" to put themselves forward and causing "great damage" to implementation (m. 22:30).

However, it is important to make a clear distinction between the above situation and the expectation of a fair promotion in a merit-based personnel regime due to the positive contribution and active involvement of implementers. As Interviewee X7 (2017) argued, the lack of a merit system could cause low motivation and less contribution among implementers.

Second, they could engage in unlawful implementation practices to make ill-gotten gains. Talking about the mechanisms benefiting from the terror problem, Interviewee X5 (2017) detailed that there are "serious interest groups" including some implementers tasked with

countering terrorism making money within the “ambiguities” (m. 31:40) of the national and local contextual conditions.

In fact, two reports, one prepared by the Prime Ministry Inspection Board Chairman Kutlu Savaş in 1998 (Hürriyet, 1998) and the other by the Parliamentary Research Commission on the Relationship Between Illegal Organizations and the State in 1997 (TBMM, 1997c), confirm that implementers tasked with counterterrorism operations began to work for their personal interests, becoming part of illegal organisations and committing crimes, especially in drug trafficking and money laundering.

The illegal activities committed in implementation processes by means of implementers’ interests have important implications for leading policy changes because they negatively impact the public perception of the ongoing policies.

4.2.2.2. The Importance of the Quality of Implementer

A common view amongst interviewees is that the quality of the implementer is one of the crucial factors determining the implementation behaviours throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X3, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017). Implementers could damage a policy’s targets but they may also more successfully carry out this policy than projected (Interviewee X5, 2017) and they may be better in “winning hearts and minds of local people” (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 05:42). This finding corroborates the ideas of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), who suggested that the competence and commitment of implementers is one of the crucial factors influencing implementation behaviours.

My use of the term of the quality of implementer is solely derived from the findings of the empirical material, as shown in Figure 15. In fact, from the content of nearly all interviews, it becomes evident that the beliefs, the values, the ideology, the culture, the lifestyle, the background, the personality, the expertise, the knowledge, the commitment, the education, the talent of an implementer, and the tradition and culture of the organisation to which this implementer belongs affect his/her implementation roles and behaviours while s/he carries out TCPs. I conceptualise all these factors in one term: the quality of an implementer.



Figure 15: The scope of the quality of Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers

Speaking on this subject, Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 03:45) argued that:

> If we take a governor or a police chief, a gendarmerie commander, a battalion commander or a chief prosecutor: the environment in which they were born and raised; the formal education they received; where they grew up in their youth; their ranks; their intellectual resources; whether or not they have interest in intellectual world; how they perceive the world; how they perceive the life; how they perceive the state; how they perceive terror. ... things like this, that are subjective things, determine their implementation behaviours and actions.

The quality of implementers could also be shaped by the organisational culture they belong to. Interviewee X21 (2017) argued that every profession has tradition and this affects the quality of implementers. For example, district governors have a more civilian perspective than the soldiers and police officers. The reason for these differing perspectives is the tradition of their institutions. Ingram and Schneider (1990) describe tradition as "longstanding organisational practices and missions of agencies" (p. 84). Interviewee X2 (2017) said that: "… it is like an inheritance from our father" (m. 38:31). Thus, as Interviewee X7 (2017) suggested, there is a tendency among the implementers to maintain the standpoint of their organisations against certain counterterrorism policies.

Consequently, while a soldier or a police officer is more likely to think that deterrence based counterterrorism policies have more potential to solve the terror problem, implementers who have civilian perspectives generally believe in the potential of the defiance/desistance based policies (Interviewee X17, 2017). This causes a problem of nonalignment all through the implementation processes of the TCPs in the field. Thus, there is no great harmony. As Implementer X21 (2017) puts it; "They are like bad tango couples. They go the same direction but step on each other's feet" (m. 05:02).

Opinions differed as to whether implementers have the capacity to understand the means and ends of different counterterrorism policies, or to what extent they comprehend them. However, the combination of the findings provide support to the argument that, as Interviewee X19 (2017) emphasised, while most implementers -especially lower level bureaucrats- are not aware of what they do as implementers, the smaller number of implementers -especially high-level implementers- are relatively aware of their powers and responsibilities.

The analysis suggests that, as several interviewees argued (e.g.Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017), the deterrence counterterrorism policy implementers mostly come from conservative and nationalist families, which, as Interviewee X2 (2017) claimed, have middle level or even lower income. An implication of this is they could have prejudices towards the target population (Interviewee X19, 2017). The impact of this could be a low level of professionalism. Interviewee X11 (2017) stated that due to implementers' "prejudices" toward target population "originating from every implementer's education, upbringing or ideology", "the language, clothing, custom, belief and even sect of the citizens are sometimes seen as threats" and this "causes local conflicts" (m. 16:10) in implementation.

However, one positive impact of the above is the possibility that, as Interviewee 10 (2017) stated, these implementers could have high levels of commitment to implementation. Nevertheless, we have seen that if low levels of professionalism combine with high levels commitment/motivation, the result could be harmful implementation practices.

Several interviewees argued that implementers recruited from the local population are short of high qualities (e.g. Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017). This may prevent better

implementation of defiance/desistance policies and, as is in case of village guard system (Arap and Erat, 2015), it might cause unsustainable implementation behaviours in deterrence policy implementation.

We have seen that the implementation context of the TCPs is highly ambiguous. Hence, the quality of implementers becomes vital. Interviewee X24 (2017) stated that although the talent is already out there, the ambiguity in TCPs puts the quality of implementer on view. Ambiguity creates room for implementers and gives them an opportunity to show their qualities. As Schofield (2014) states, although the implementation literature mostly assumes that implementers could execute policies "regardless of the behavioural, cognitive or technical demands", these policies may require implementers "learn a range of often new and detailed techniques in order to implement what are often ambiguous policy directives" (p. 283). Consequently, as Interviewee X1 (2017) put it, implementers' individual capabilities could influence the extent of implementation across geographical sectors. This means that more qualified and talented implementers could potentially reduce the disadvantages of uncertainty in a locality.

For instance, the common assumption among interviewees is that an implementer who has never known or operated in the Region before could hold back in the implementation process. But an implementer who has been there for many years or knows the conditions of the Region such as custom, socio-economic structure, demography, culture could take his own initiative by moving the orders forward for better results. As Interviewee X2 (2017) states, the experienced implementers accommodate a "more positive approach" and act "smarter" (m. 09:08) because they are more aware of the fact that the negative behaviours towards the target population backfire in the long term.

In fact, the quality of implementers is very crucial to gaining public support and to get the target population to desist from supporting the PKK in a locality. The statement of "the visibility of the State is parallel to the visibility of the implementers" made by Interviewee X24 (2017, m. 12:28) is a common view among interviewees. Thus, if implementers are not visible, the State is also not visible. In addition, as Interviewee X25 (2017) put it, the PKK mainly recruits militants from the people of the Region. Thus, as Interviewee X16 (2017) said, it is important to locally influence and transform the perceptions of the sympathetic people to the PKK for better implementation. While an incapable implementer could "create deep cracks"

and “demolish harmonious atmosphere” in the field (Interviewee X10, 2017, m. 32:57), a talented implementer could “embrace everyone” behaving “like a conductor” (Interviewee X14, 2017, m. 31:36). Therefore, implementers must have high quality.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the principal factors of the implementation context of the TCPs, analysing top factors from forward and the bottom factors from backward. It has shown the importance of the levels of ambiguity and conflict in implementation, as expected in the theoretical chapter. The empirical material also put the importance of the local context and the quality of implementers forward in the implementation context of the TCPs, which were not particularly demarcated within in the analytical framework. The findings of his chapter suggest that:

(A) Regarding ambiguity from forward (1) the TCPs are not part of a coherent national strategic framework; (2) the TCPs (both deterrence and defiance/desistance based) do not inexorably and measurably guide implementers toward clearly articulated goals, means and resources in the implementation processes because they do not have clear purposes, assessed risks, set goals, defined resources, assigned responsibilities and integrated implementation; (3) the intentions and expectations of the top decision makers are ambiguous; and (4) deterrence policies tend to be clearer than defiance/desistance policies.

(B) Regarding conflict from the forward (1) the implementation context of the TCPs is highly conflictual and lacks consensus at the top; and (2) implementers may be negatively influenced by the contested political context.

(C) Regarding implementers’ dispositions from the backward (1) conflict could occur between policy makers and implementers, for example, their beliefs, ideologies and thoughts about necessity of a policy could differ and conflict could also occur between a policy’s framework, for example its means and ends, and implementers own beliefs; (2) the level of conflict of an implementer is mainly determined by the belief level of this implementer towards policies and policy makers; (3) implementers’ behaviours may be politically influenced (by environmental or their own political context) instead of by merit and technical criteria (professional); and (4) the quality of the implementers may become crucial to determining the formation of the implementers’ behaviours at the street level.

(D) Regarding the local context from the backward (1) local contextual conditions are considered by implementers while carrying out the TCPs; and (2) the contested local context is one of parts of the main conflict factors effecting implementation.

Altogether, this chapter shows that the implementation context of the TCPs is partial, complex, uneven and conflictual. While this creates ambiguity in implementation, ambiguity may create room for implementers to carry out their strategies at the street level. This is also what I have expected based on the theoretical framework of the thesis. Besides, the effects of the quality of implementers and local context on the roles and behaviours of the implementers while they carry out the TCPs is what emerges from the empirical material. Thus, adding new insights to the counterterrorism research, this chapter argues that Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive, and even counterproductive, because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low quality of implementers in conflictual circumstances at the street level.

This chapter has identified the main factors of the implementation context of the TCPs and the extent of them. The following chapter will analyse how and to what extent these factors interact with each other, and why these interactions influence the implementation processes of the TCPs to determine implementers' roles and behaviours at the street level.

5. THE EFFECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION CONTEXT AT THE STREET LEVEL

The previous empirical chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the implementation context of the TCPs. Engaging top-down and bottom-up perspectives, the implementation context characterises the nature of the implementation processes of the TCPs encompassing the key top and bottom variables. The previous chapter showed that the main variables of the implementation context of the TCPs are ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementers.

This chapter strive for the answer the answer to the question of why the implementation processes of the TCPs occur as they do at the street level: what happens once a Turkish counterterrorism policy is put into force? What are the roles of the implementers that carry out TCPs? Who determines the rules and acts of the game? What factors determine the implementation behaviours of implementers?

The combination of the empirical material suggests that there are many causal relationships and complex interactions among these variables through the implementation processes of the TCPs over time. This chapter shows that these causal relations and complex interactions lead to several issues, dilemmas and problems in implementation and affect the roles and behaviours of the implementers at the street level.

The findings of this chapter support the argument that the quality of implementers determines the scope of their behaviours in a locality in relation to the ambiguity and conflict variables. For instance, while an implementer is in conflict with a counterterrorism policy, the form of the behaviour of this implementer is determined by his quality, the local context, conflict from top, and the level of ambiguity. The chapter further argues that in the ambiguous and conflictual implementation context, implementers may find rooms to employ divergent implementation roles and behaviours at the street level.

As analysed in the theoretical chapter, while the top-down perspective undermines the importance of the street level in the implementation process, the bottom-up perspective overemphasizes them. Arguing “top-downers are in danger of overemphasizing the importance of the Center vis-a-vis the Periphery, bottom-uppers are likely to overemphasize the ability of the Periphery to frustrate the Center” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 34), this chapter will analyse the effects of the implementation context of the TCPs at the street level in the

following three sections: the effects regarding policy arrangements, the effects relating to main actors' and implementers' roles, and the effects on the formation of implementer's behaviours.

5.1. The Effects Relating to the Policy Arrangements

Many interviewees stated that because of the multidimensional and multidisciplinary character of the terrorism problem, there is a need for a sophisticated strategic counterterrorism framework in which deterrence and defiance/desistance policies coherently function to properly address the consequences and causes of the terror problem (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X30, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017). In fact, the findings about the implementation context of the TCPs suggest that the TCPs lack clarity and are not part of a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework. Thus, it is not surprising to see that they are amorphous, inharmonious and out of sync within this ambiguous context.

This finding suggests that policy arrangements affect the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level. In fact, the empirical material suggests that due to the lack of a coherent counterterrorism framework and ambiguity in the legal framework implementers must carry out contradictory policies with scare resources without any effective control and coordination mechanism.

Contradictory Policies in Implementation

My empirical material suggests that there are two significant effects of the lack of a coherent and comprehensive counterterrorism framework. The first is that, as Interviewee X11 (2017) said, TCPs based on different approaches have been put in force one after another. Thus, "the same law enforcement may be obliged to behave differently" and "this this is a dilemma" for public and implementers (Interviewee X20, 2017, m. 11:15). In fact, Interviewee X28 (2017) asserted that Turkey is not successful in fighting terrorism because it tries to neutralize it employing incoherent policy approaches one after another.

The second is that while specific defiance/desistance policies remain in effect in a deterrence dominated era, specific deterrence policies also remain in effect in a defiance/desistance dominated era, but they are not an integral part of a coherent framework. Thus, implementers must, at least it is legal requirement, simultaneously carry out inconsistent and contradictory

policies. For example, although the Counterterrorism Act is a deterrence-based policy, it remained in charge without any profound change or modification throughout the Solution Process, during which the defiance/desistence approach was dominant.

These findings raise intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of the implementation processes across policies. Reporting that implementers must carry out many inconsistent policies, Interviewee X6 (2017) illustrated the implementation context of the TCPs over time saying: “It is like a continental climate… Summers are dry and hot, winters are rainy and cold.” Thus, “cracking” happens in implementation, resulting in such an implementation process being “covered with dust and dirt” (m. 10:21).

The general sense among the interviewees is that while the deterrence approach is dominant, defiance/desistance-based policies addressing the roots of the terrorism and aiming to win the hearts and minds of the target population, are underestimated by implementers. Interviewee X6 (2017, m. 53:36) commented that:

> What are we doing? On the one hand, we are initiating a Solution Process like telling about love in Nişantaşı [a high-end neighbourhood in Istanbul] … No troops, no law enforcement, no deterrence, nothing... There is no deterrence of the State. But then, when you turn it off [change the policy], on the contrary, it turns into a sense of security that even if you pass through a street you get a slapping.

Thus, as Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 07:02) reported:

> Individuals [implementers] come to the forefront because the system [counterterrorism strategy] does not exist. For example, we call it [village evacuations] a settlement policy, right? Our understanding of settlement policy is based on the Settlement Law of 1931. What is that? Exile. We do exile. For example, between 1991 and 95, you can see all kinds of actions, very personally, from burning a village to throwing terrorists from helicopters… They [villagers] all migrated. In truth, they were exiled. And where do we see them [villagers] again? In 2015-2016, the children who fired at our security organizations namely, the police and gendarmerie, during the trench operations [in cities], were the children of the families who had been exiled at that time… Deterrence policies have such setbacks. It works in the short and medium

> term but never in the long term… What does that mean? Since we do not formulate a solid strategy, because there is no strategy, the result of personal actions is a disaster.

Accordingly, in general, a deterrence dominant period results in losing the target population because, the defiance/desistance aspect of deterrence policies are undermined and, as we have seen, incapacitating the terrorist organisation becomes the only target in deterrence period. Similarly, when the defiance/desistance-based period is at the helm deterrence-based policies are undermined by implementers. As widely shared by the interviewees, the Solution Process is an example for this kind of period. Many interviewees shared the view that due to completely undermining deterrence based policies in this period, the life and the property of the people were exposed to the PKK (e.g. Interviewee X1, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X14, 2017; Interviewee X29, 2017).

Another important effect of the fluctuating contradictory policies for the implementation is the likelihood that implementers could lose the motivation needed to successfully play their roles. Interviewee X2 (2017) articulated that: "Fluctuating policies lead to a lack of faith. I mean, it breaks your faith [to policies and policy makers]"(m. 36:59). As Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 34:26) said:

> … he [an implementer] is trying to find a way in a dark tunnel bearing a torch. That uncertainty is already ruining him. He sets his own strategy…. And then when he suddenly faces a reverse thing [policy/approach change] by the decision-making mechanism, he is ruined. Motivation instantly goes down to zero.

Furthermore, it is possible that implementers could get confused and remain undecided while carrying out the contradictory policies because it creates ambiguity in the implementation context, building a certain vagueness into the signals implementers received. For example, a former special forces personnel, Interviewee X7 (2017) argued that, in a defiance/desistance era, deterrence policy implementers could avoid "engag[ing] a terrorist group" as they could get confused whether "it is legal [permissible] or not to kill them" (m. 22:10). In fact, talking about the Solution Process, Interviewee X2 (2017) claimed that as the policy was not very clear for them they deduced from ambiguous instructions and the information available to the public that they should not touch the PKK.

This “jigsaw process [zigzag process]” (Interviewee X28, 2017, m. 42:01) across inconsistent and contradictory policies is the direct result of the lack of a coherent and comprehensive counterterrorism framework. These findings raise intriguing questions regarding control and coordination problems in implementation.

Lack of Control and Coordination

The analysis of the empirical material strongly suggests that the problem of control and coordination emerges during the implementation processes of the TCPs. Thus far, we have seen that ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementers are the crucial factors in the implementation context of the TCPs. The changing natures of the above factors over time could easily destroy harmony among different units that have responsibility to carry out different approach-based policies. The common view among the interviewees is that the attainment of better implementation processes requires more control and coordination mechanisms among implementers, agencies and localities (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X29, 2017). Otherwise, as the findings suggest, implementation behaviours could differ across agencies and locales because, the quality of implementers, and the capacity and culture of the implementation agencies are not invariable.

The findings of the first empirical chapter suggest that the most important reason for the lack of control and coordination is the lack of a coherent strategic counterterrorism framework. As Interviewee X7 (2017) argued, “the lack of an all-inclusive counterterrorism approach” results in control and coordination problems across agencies and the implementers of these agencies (m. 05:51), because “ it lets individuals [implementers] come to prominence” and this “causes disorder [in implementation]” (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 08:18).

In fact, many interviewees articulated the need for a coherent national strategic framework to effectively bring counterterrorism measures to order (e.g. Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017). The necessity stems from two main realities of the Turkish counterterrorism implementation context.

The first is related to supervising the TCPs throughout the implementation processes. The findings suggest that this is co-ordinated, in practice, under the supervision and management of the upper political bodies and the upper bodies of units that are directly responsible for

security. But, at one point this coordination is limited. For example, if there is something related to intelligence, the intelligence unit is on duty; if it is related to the operation, it is a duty of the operational units. There are some serious gaps in the way in which all of these are carried out in a harmonious and coherent manner. Interviewee X30 (2017) argued that "the problem of coordination" and control arises, because the implementation structure of the TCPs "is a structure that is organized in the context of different organizations that do not have hierarchical integrity in administrative aspect" (m. 02:45). Accordingly, agencies and implementers are part of an ambiguous and fragmented implementation structure deficient in control and coordination.

Perceiving intelligence, operation and public diplomacy as the three main parameters of deterrence counterterrorism policies, Interviewee X7 (2017) asserted that "a mind that is able to supervise all three parameters complementing each other" throughout the implementation processes has been "absent" in "the State system" for years (m. 06:34). For example, the Gendarmerie has its own intelligence structure and does hide its intelligence from the Police in the case of the PKK.

The second reality is related to the complex and multidimensional aspect of the terrorism problem. Emphasizing the importance of coordination amongst organisations whose contributions are essential for implementation, O'Toole and Montjoy (1984) state that: "the increased complexity decreases the chances that mandates can specify in detail the required actions and interactions of the participating organizations. Lack of specificity decreases the chances that the authority of the mandating body can be invoked" (p. 492). In fact, my analysis found that the implementation context of the TCPs is too complex to be bordered and organised by extremely distinct lines.

In terms of different types of TCPs, the content of the interviews suggests that the control and coordination problems occur more frequently in defiance/desistance policies than in deterrence policies. A possible explanation for this might be that deterrence policies' means and ends are generally clearer than those of defiance/desistance policies. For example, Interviewee X28 (2017) claimed implementation fails in defiance/desistance policies because of a weak control and coordination mechanism and deficiency of objective criteria for control and coordination. This put, as the analysis has shown, the quality of implementers forward. In

fact, as Interviewee X6 (2017) claimed, an implementer who has high quality is better in control and coordination than the one who is low quality.

Really, the earlier findings convincingly suggest that policies could be better carried out if implementers are well trained and have such traits as being value oriented, and having effective technical skills and proficient knowledge on legal framework. This raises the question of how and to what degree the TCPs could arrange the available resources for the implementers at the street level.

Policy Resources

The analysis of the collected interviews and reports suggests that the implementation processes of the TCPs suffer from a deficiency of resources. My analysis found that the problem in resources is caused by the deficiencies of two policy arrangements. One is related to material resources, the other the human resources.

Although, as Interviewee X16 (2017) reported, implementers are not provided as many resources as their responsibilities require, it seems that the deficiencies in material resources, such as financial resources and weapons, may be compensable in short and medium term. However, the deficiency in human resource needs a long-term approach. In fact, most interviewees reported that the human resources regime is not efficient and impedes better implementation (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017, m. 21:33; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017). Concerns were especially expressed about the lack of quality in implementers. For instance, one interviewee said: "… the most important problem is human resources. People who will go there… has to be talented, well-equipped..." (Interviewee X24, 2017, m. 21:59). Another echoed that implementers "are not qualified accordingly" (Interviewee X27, 2017, m. 22:40).

Owing to the scarcity of human resources and an inefficient personnel regime, as Interviewee X2 (2017) declared, experienced implementers are getting "exhausted" as they are deployed to the mission "again and again" (m. 37:14). The result is too much load on very few experienced and qualified implementers. Thus, as Implementer X27 (2017) said, these implementers "count days", since it "prevails" them (m. 23:46).

Likewise, as implementers do not receive the necessary orientation training before being deployed for their missions, they do not know what they are doing for who and why in the

ambiguous and fluctuating implementation contexts of the TCS (e.g. Interviewee X15, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017). Thus, they may lose their faith in the policies they must carry out. Talking about the effect of the ambiguous context on his attitude, Interviewee X2 (2017) said: "We are here in the field. We are fighting. But, we always wonder what is going on behind the closed doors" (m. 39:11).

The findings suggest that the resources and capacity of the organisations carrying out the TCPs are negatively affected by the implementation context of the TCPs because available resources for organisations are blurred in an ambiguous context. Likewise, the components of the ambiguity factor could decrease the capacity of the organisations carrying out the TCPs. For example, Interviewee X7 (2017) stated that the Gendarmerie had been responsible for border security in addition to homeland security until the mid-1990s, while it was also the part of the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, the organisational capacity of the Gendarmerie to counter the PKK terror has been badly affected by its multi-faceted and vague mission. This means that the lack of a coherent strategic counterterrorism framework and clear legal framework result in incomplete specialisation of the organisations connected to the countering terrorism and the terrorism problem.

In terms of the different types of counterterrorism policies, the findings suggest that implementers likely experience more ambiguity in understanding available resources in defiance/desistance counterterrorism policies than in deterrence policies. In fact, Interviewee X5 (2017) claimed that although the aim of the defiance/desistance policies is generally articulated as to desist the target population from the PKK, the available resources for this aim largely remain unclear. One implication of this is that, as Interviewee X15 (2017) said, implementers look at contextual conditions to compensate the scarcity of the resources for better implementation.

The above analysis provides support for the argument that for better implementation processes there should initially be a good quality and effective human resource regime. Then, implementers need enough material resources to successfully carry out counterterrorism policies. But, the implementation processes of the TCPs generally suffer from deficiency of sufficient resources. This supports the critiques of bottom-up scholars on the top-down assumption that resources are available to implementers. The issue emerging from this finding

relates to the nature and extent of feedback mechanisms between bottom and top throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs.

Feedback Mechanism

The analysis suggests that, in principle, there is a hierarchical feedback line from bottom to top in the implementation processes of TCPs, as shown in Figure 16. Interviewee X1 (2017) claimed that information coming from the field is taken into consideration by the decision makers, although it is not well noticed by the bottom actors.



Figure 16: Hierarchical feedback line in the implementation processes of TCPs

However, many interviewees reported that the feedback process from bottom to top does not process seamlessly and efficiently (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017). One interviewee commented: "Ankara does not hear us… There is a serious disconnection between Ankara and, as an example, a district governor in the field" (Interviewee X27, 2017, m. 19:21).

There are several possible explanations for the deficiency in feedback. Firstly, each organisation such as police, gendarmerie has its own feedback process, but it is not clear if the mechanisms between the organisations and decision makers works resourcefully. The general sense among the participants is that it does not function as ideal. Secondly, as we have seen, there is not a coordinating institution among implementation agencies. Thus, the task of the systematic feedback becomes unclaimed among institutions.

Additionally, top actors could intentionally leave black holes in the feedback mechanism so that implementers would be obliged to take charge of problems in the field. Interviewee X19 (2017) said that the "decision making mechanism" is not willing "to provide solutions" for the problems that implementers experience at the street level, via "feedback", but "it says: find the solutions at the local level" (m. 27:53).

Another reported problem related to the deficiency in the feedback process is the tendency among implementers to manipulate or hide the truth from top actors. Talking about the difficulties in carrying out unclear polices, Interviewee X2 (2017) said that the implementers

sometimes give “false information” (m. 15:44) to the top to stall implementation failures. As Interviewee X6 (2017) reported, the possible explanation for this “cover up” (m. 42:05) might be the fact that implementers want to put themselves forward as very successful or at least they might not want to be compromised.

The deficiency of feedback in the implementation process may cause many problems. On the one hand, without a tangible feedback mechanism feeding top actors with the veracities of the field, decision makers , as Interviewee X5 (2017) put it, could become stranded “between the reality and the virtuality” of the problem (m. 40:50). Also, without a guide in hand prepared according to the veracities of the field through a systematic feedback, as Interviewee X19 (2017) put it, “implementers are always obliged to rediscover the wheel wherever they go” (m. 38:39).

The deficiency in the feedback mechanism suggests that actors and their roles in the implementation processes of the TCPs are disorganised. In fact, the combination of the findings, thus far, suggests that there could be important effects of the implementation context on the main actors and on the nature and formation of their roles throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level.

5.2. Effects Relating to Actors and their Roles

As the first respondents to terrorist incidents occurring at the local level (Van de Linde et al., 2002), local actors have crucial responsibility to implement a policy that concerns internal security, though it is formulated and implemented across the different levels of government structures (Kiki and Susan, 2006). This section will examine the effects of the implementation context on the roles of implementers, the main actors in implementation and role collision in implementation at the street level.

The findings about the implementation context of the TCPs strongly support the argument that the formation of the implementer’s roles, the main actors and the dynamics of role collision at the street level are mainly determined by the level of ambiguity, the level of conflict, the local context and the quality of implementers. Implementers navigate their roles through these complexities.

Implementers' Roles

When interviewees were asked what roles implementers have in implementation processes of different types of TCPs, several interviewees played down implementers' roles (e.g. Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017). Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 24:00) illustrates this point of view saying:

> Your [the implementer] power is not enough… The only thing you do is to drop the patient's fever a little bit. You [implementers] cannot solve it [the addressed terror related problems] permanently. What is your role? To gain time for the State and reinforce its hand executing the core policies of the State and reduce the fire in the Region. It is a matter of making it [the terror problem] manageable. You know it, you cannot solve those problems as an implementer. Central authorities, political decision makers, that is, Ankara, do not expect you to solve it [the terror problem].

This point of view advocates that even if there is no ambiguity and conflict and all implementers are talented, understand the policies very well knowing their means and ends, and have high personal capacity, their role in a Turkish counterterrorism policy implementation context "is limited only to keep the problem stable" (Interviewee X26, 2017, m. 33:02). This is because, terror is a macro-level problem in which politics should intervene.

It claims that should implementers effectively carry out counterterrorism policies in the local context they would still not solve the addressed problems. This suggests that successful implementation does not necessarily result in policy effectiveness and the best result for implementation is to stabilize the problem. However, this perspective misses two points. First, if a policy effectively addresses a problem, the implementation process could potentially become a determinant for addressed problems. Second, improper implementation behaviours may worsen ineffectively addressed policy problems.

In fact, although the above findings suggest that the implementer's role is more technical than political, the analysis of the empirical material strongly suggests that the level of ambiguity and conflict, the local context and the quality of implementers could significantly influence the scope of implementers' roles. While there is not enough room for implementers to employ political roles in an unambiguous context, in case of high ambiguity in an implementation

context, implementers could employ political roles. This means, potentially, unclear policies give more authority to implementers.

The findings suggest that top actors play main roles in the implementation processes of the TCTs, if the implementation context is unambiguous because the empirical material suggests that a clear policy potentially means that decision makers know what they do, and they are determined to back up their policies. Interviewee X26 (2017) states, if there is "a determined political will" (m. 25:15) implementers are able to quickly adapt the decision makers' choices.

In fact, interviewee X1 (2017) stated that although the implementers behaviours are affected by "local and personal circumstances", "the stance of the government" and "the stance of political will" (m. 03:45) are the most important in the process . This means political coercion from the top could overcome conflict from the bottom. In fact, many interviewees underlined the importance of the support and/or coercion that the street level implementers expect from top political powers throughout the implementation process (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017).

Talking about the role alteration of implementers across polices, Interviewee X27 (2017) stated that: "The extent of this change is that the bureaucrat acts according to the orders given by political power" (m. 30:40). A possible explanation for this might be that, as Interviewee X1 (2017) stated, the implementers mainly position themselves along with top-down political coercion. The above findings suggest that when implementers play their roles, more likely, they take positions relative to the centre. As several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017) reported, if decision makers employ defiance/desistance policies, implementers take a position accordingly and the alternative is true if the centre pursues deterrence policies.

This finding may also be explained by the fact that the Turkish State traditionally has a strict hierarchical structure. Public officials are part of "a bureaucratic culture dating back to the Ottoman Empire" (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 20:11) in which they learn and internalize hierarchical discipline. Thus, they can adapt quickly to the enforced decisions of the centre.

However, a highly ambiguous policy implementation context could create room for the implementers to expand their roles thorough the implementation process. In this case, the

findings of the implementation context suggest that intervention could be easy in cases of conflict in the implementation processes. In fact, many interviewees emphasised that implementers could seize crucial roles within the process (e.g. Interviewee X4, 2017; Interviewee X28, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X18, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017).

The comment below made by Interviewee X27 (2017, m. 14:14) shows how an ambiguous implementation context creates room in which implementers across different implementation structures try to expand their roles against each other:

> While I was the district governor of A, … I tried to speak their languages [Kurdish] to win the people... In the official district governorship website, I wrote the names of the villages as Zazaish [one of the dialects of Kurdish]. This has been criticized [as it is not the official language], for example, by my colleagues and by other authorities [security-based implementers]. The unique behaviours you have made are slammed in this uncertain environment… According to what?

The answer is that the bottom up expectation of "the exercise of power" (Barrett, 2004, p. 255) occurs along with the source of the power implementers employ. My empirical material suggests that there is a relationship between the source of power and the extent of the implementers' roles in the ambiguous implementation context of the different TCPs. Throughout the implementation processes of the defiance/desistance based polices, as Interviewee X16 (2017) mentioned, the main source of the power is knowledge. In the Turkish context, civilian authorities, as Interviewee X26 (2017) stated, are generally better educated. Thus, they are more influential in the defiance/desistance policy implementation context.

Throughout the implementation processes of deterrence counterterrorism polices, as Interviewee X10 (2017) argued, weapons are generally the main source of power. Thus, it appears that security actors could generate power at the expense of civil authorities, and expand their executive powers and implementation roles in an ambiguous deterrence policy's implementation context. In fact, the Article 11/D of the Provincial Administration Law No 5442 grants the authority to governors to use the military in their provinces; in this case the command and control of law enforcement undertaken by the most senior military commander (Mevzuat, 1949). This means that the roles of security actors become more dominant in such cases. My analysis found that this would lead to a pathology because they could easily

intervene in civilian areas and increase their influence in the field, undermining the civil authority.

As Interviewee X13 (2017) said, the deterrence approach has dominated the policy area in Turkey since the beginning of the PKK terror. As such, the Turkish Military is seen as the key implementation organisation for deterrence-based policies (Interviewee X16, 2017). The military has been the leading institution that has its own internal relatively coherent, yet mainly deterrence-based outline for the problem and it has the superiority in terms of the weapons (Interviewee X27, 2017).

The above findings indicate that there are factions that compete for roles throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. Although it does not necessarily mean that all uniformed implementers back the deterrence approach and all civilian implementers defend the defiance/desistance approach, the data suggests that it is common to separate the pattern of factions in the implementation context as the civilian and military perspectives.

As a civilian implementer speaking about how the security based implementers caused serious problems in implementation while they compete their roles with him during his service in the Region, Interviewee X27 (2017, m. 32:02) stated:

> I try to do my job. But the general at the top bothers me. In other words, when the civilian authority tries to dominate the policy context as the representative of the elected authority, there occurs trouble. Sometimes we can see this partly in MİT [Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı/National Intelligence Agency] as well. I also had a conflict with the police. The police want us to not involve…. But I say that you [the police] have a hammer in your hands and you see everything as a nail. Thus, you will not go out of our instructions.

In fact, Interviewee X27 (2017) stated that the military dominated the implementation processes expanding its role at the expense of civil authorities until 2010. Interviewee X18 (2017) described is as “role stealing” (m. 21:17).

Nevertheless, talking about the heavy interventions of the military in the other policy sectors in the 1990s, throughout which deterrence based policies were dominant, Interviewee X26 (2017) claimed that “these security forces did not steal a role”, but they had to play these roles because politics “did not take risks” (m. 22:58). A similar view was shared by several other

interviewees saying that many tasks were given to the military because there were very few civilian institutions to take handle the work in some parts of the Region (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017). Although this claim is debatable, the findings suggest that if there is an ambiguous legal framework and role ambiguity and, if implementers feel uncertainty in the intentions of decision-makers, they could facilitate novel roles.

It seems possible that the level of the conflict between competing factions is influenced by the level of ambiguity in implementation context. If a policy is not clearly formulated in consideration of the authorities and responsibilities for each agency and implementers, the conflict is more among competing factions. Consequently, implementers compete to take control of more roles in implementation.

At that point the quality of implementers limits the extent of the implementers' roles. Emphasizing different levels of the quality of implementers, Interviewee X21 (2017) mentioned that the intellectual capacity, experience and knowledge of an implementer determines how they appreciates their role in implementation. On the one hand, as the findings show, some low-quality implementers could over-perform their roles while carrying out policies. Thus, the poor quality of implementers could cause trouble in the implementation process including low understanding of policy means and ends, and highly debatable behaviours manipulated by the level of conflict in an implementation context. One important implication of this is the possibility that it could be perceived as a political act rather than administrative.

On the other hand, high quality implementers could alter public perception and gain public support in their locality, which is an important factor for better implementation. Interviewee X5 (2017) stated that if an implementer (1) well understands and respects the culture, tradition, religion, language and the grievances of the target population; (2) listens to expectations of them; and (3) takes care of them while carrying out policies, they could effectively play their role and gain public support in the local context. Consequently, the implementation could be more successful.

It, therefore, could be assumed that talented implementers more successfully carry out the TCPs as they play their roles more efficiently to make best use of the socio-psychological factors of local context, even with heavy problems in the implementation context. For

example, the findings strongly suggest that public relation is frequently used to fill the gaps of the scare resources to gain public support within the implementation process. Because of scare resources, the black hole in services is filled by playing on socio-psychological factors (Interviewee X15, 2017) if an implementer has adequate abilities (Interviewee X17, 2017). Thus, a talented implementer could reduce the impact of scare resources bringing socio-psychological factors of target population into play in local context.

In terms of the different types of the TCPs, my analysis suggests that although the implementation contexts of both deterrence policies and defiance/desistance policies have been ambiguous, in comparison deterrence policies tend to be clearer. On the one hand, when policies are clear, power relations between top actors and bottom actors become determinative on implementers' roles, meaning top actors could coerce and/or support implementation from top. This happens more in deterrence than in defiance/desistance in Turkey as deterrence policies could be clearer. On the other hand, when there is ambiguity, it is more likely that contextual conditions become determinative on the roles of the implementers. Accordingly, conflict, local context and the quality of implementer intervene. When top actors' affect blurred, bottom actors compete for roles. Thus, as ambiguous deterrence policies have been dominating counterterrorism policy area, the military has the advantage to extend its role in implementation

Hitherto, the findings suggest that while there are clear policies, the roles of the top actors become dominant and they are eager to coerce and/or support implementation from the top. But, having more room to show their capabilities or oppositions, implementers could "take initiative" (Interviewee X18, 2017, m.07:03) in ambiguous contexts to expand their roles. Concisely, if there is low ambiguity, the roles of the implementers are more technical and top actors are determinant in implementation. But in an ambiguous implementation context, the roles of implementers could be more political, and bottom actors could have crucial roles in implementation. One issue that emerges from this finding is that main implementation actors for a policy could vary depending on the implementation context of this policy.

Main Actors in Implementation

The combination of the findings provides support for the argument that the main actors could vary depending on the character of the implementation context. On the one hand, less

ambiguity puts the power of decision makers forward in implementation. As clear policies are generally produced by strong governments the main actors are decision makers in both deterrence and defiance/desistance policies. However, the findings suggest that the top down hierarchical implementation happens more strictly in deterrence policies than defiance/desistance policies. On the other hand, ambiguous polices bring the contextual conditions forward. If there is a weak government, decision makers' dominance weakens. Bottom-up actors could then come forward as the main actors in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

A variety of opinions were expressed by interviewees about the main actors dominating the implementation processes of the different types of the TCPs. Several interviewees suggested that although the implementers in the field, such as military commanders, police chiefs, intelligence officers, governors and district governors, are more visible throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs, the main actors determining the fate of the implementation processes of the TCPs are the top decision makers (e.g. Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017). This view was echoed by Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 29:37) saying:

> … decision makers [the main actors in implementation]. Why decision makers? Because you must act according to the decision maker's request. ... For example, what did the decision maker say in the Solution Process? It said, 'I have such a policy, do not touch it [the PKK]'. … Then it said that 'I changed my policy'. It was reversed 180 degrees. It said that 'I am going to bury them, terrorists. ... In a very radical way. ... Thus, the actors in the province are not determinants of the implementation processes of the TCPs, even if they seem to be determinants. I think they are an instrument. I think the main actors are decision makers, central authority, here is the political power in particular.

In fact, although implementers remained the same in that period, Interviewee X13 (2017) said they obeyed the decision makers and consecutively carried out two totally opposite policies with compliance. In fact, talking about the Solution Process, Interviewee X25 (2017) stated that "the government's attitude towards the PKK" had determined "the stance" and "the decisiveness" (m. 05:10) of the local actors.

Decision makers have the power and legitimacy to choose with whom they will implement policies. When a change in government and/or intra-state coalitions results in a change in counterterrorism policy approach, this power shift and policy change could also end up an alteration among main implementation actors in the course of the implementation processes (Interviewee X25, 2017). New decision makers have the power to carry out the new policy with new suitable actors. For example, Interviewee X27 (2017, m. 03:56) claimed:

> I am known by the Ministry of Interior [as a deterrence driven implementer]. … Although I wanted to be appointed as the district governor for any of A, B, C and D, the undersecretary of that period did not accept it. Because according to their prejudices, I am not a bureaucrat to fit for the Solution Process.

Echoing the above views, interviewee X1 (2017) specifically named the determinant decision maker as the top "political will" (m. 04:18); similar statements were shared by many others (e.g. Interviewee X24, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017).

Nevertheless, this view mainly considers a top-down perspective. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the top-down approach assumes that policies are inherently clear. But, as the analysis of the implementation context of the TCPs has shown, the TCPs are not always clear. Thus, when the implementation processes are determined from top-down actors while there are unambiguous implementation context and strong governments, bottom level actors could possibly dominate implementation while there are ambiguities and weak governments. Governments might even not be able to appoint appropriate implementers for their policies in such conditions (Interviewee X16, 2017). In fact, many interviewees argued that bottom actors might be effective in implementation in such settings (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017, m. 45:42; Interviewee X7, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X18, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017).

These findings suggest that the complexities of the implementation context of the TCPs increases the importance of middle level actors between central actors and street level implementers. This is because they presumably have direct links with both top and street level actors. As Interviewee X23 (2017) argued, they are like bridges between centre and local. This

supports the third-generation implementation research's assumption that both top-down and bottom-up approaches should be employed to explore the policy-action continuum.

My empirical material suggests that, as Figure 17 illustrates, middle level actors include of governors, district governors, and high-level law enforcement officers such as police chiefs and gendarmerie commanders, generals, prosecutors, mayors and deputies. It appears that high-quality middle level actors could have opportunity to shape the implementation processes of the TCPs.



Figure 17: Middle level actors in the implementation processes of TCPs

In fact, the interview data suggests that middle level actors play a huge role to balance the local context in implementation, although the quality of these implementers determines how they might be successful in doing so. They also have crucial roles to supervise street level implementers in their jurisdiction. As they "can channel organizations into certain directions" (Interviewee X20, 2017, m. 21:46), their roles to determine the scope of the everyday duties carried out by street level implementers may become vital (Interviewee X2, 2017).

The analysis suggests that the dominant middle level actors in the local setting could change across policies. While the main actors in the implementation of deterrence TCPs are security-origin implementers, the dominant actors in defiance/desistance TCPs are civilian-origin implementers. Describing the dominance of security bureaucrats, such as police chiefs and military commanders, throughout the implementation processes of deterrence TCPs in local context Interviewee X26 (2017, m. 05:25) argued that:

> I am still not convinced that the main decision maker in fighting terrorism is the civil administration. Specifically, the civil service administrators namely those of governors, deputy governors and district governors put the security-based actors' decisions into practice as if they are their own decisions while fighting terrorism in the Southeast. At least, it is the practice I have seen in my own experience in the Southeast.

This confirms that the power of weapon fortifies the positions of the security-based implementers in the implementation processes of deterrence policies. As several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X7, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X14, 2017) clarified, the top security persons in a locality become the most effective actors in that context. We could even say that civilian authorities are simply convinced and their approval becomes "symbolic" (Interviewee X14, 2017, m. 13:04), once the implementation actions are decided by the implementers that use the power of weapons in local context. The main reason for this is the dominance of the deterrence TCPs since the beginning.

Briefly, although decision makers are the main actors in an unambiguous implementation context, an ambiguous implementation context and weak government creates room for middle level and street level implementers to become key. The bottom implementation actors vary from civilian administration to military on the implementation spectrum across different policies. This suggests that there could be incompatibilities regarding the roles of actors in the implementation processes of the different policies at the local level. Thus, it is possible to expect several issues at the street level while actors realise their roles.

Role Collision in Implementation

The above analyses of the role of the implementers and the main actors suggest that there could be role collision in the implementation processes of the TCPs. In fact, one of the recurrent themes is the role collision happening during the implementation processes of the TCPs. There are two main causes for the role collision: ambiguity in specific policies and the existence of the different approach-based TCPs.

Initially, the role collision cold be the direct result of ambiguity in specific policies. It could be called as role ambiguity. In this case, implementers could compete for such roles that are not clearly formulated in the legal counterterrorism framework. As we have seen, this occurs especially between civilian and military implementers. As Interviewee X9 (2017) reported,

soldiers who have been recruited and trained to fight against an external enemy or an army of another state may have to act as law enforcement officers in the country and even in cities in countering terrorism. In this case role collision occurs because the responsibilities and authorities are not clearly put into words in specific legal frameworks (Interviewee X17, 2017). For example, Interviewee X10 (2017) stated that there has always been turmoil between civilian and military officials during security operations inside the country as the provisions of the Provincial Administration Law No 5442 are not clear-cut about their authority and responsibilities.

With respect to role collision across different policy approaches, many interviewees underlined the importance of giving tasks from deterrence policies and defiance/desistance policies to different implementation bodies and implementers (e.g. Interviewee X1, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017, m. 17:09; Interviewee X7, 2017). However, the empirical material suggests that "the same implementers" (Interviewee X13, 2017, m. 04:47) are obliged to simultaneously perform inconsistent and contradictory roles across defiance/desistance and deterrence policies and, several counterterrorism policy implementers are even assigned to different policy areas such as education, housing, social care, health and municipal services.

For example, governors and district governors, as Interviewee X25 (2017) stated, have two façade roles at the local level. Firstly, they are crucial actors in the sense of security policies. The second is the obligation to implement the government policies, as the supreme representatives of the state and government in their locality. Thus, they must implement counterterrorism policies alongside such policies as education, agriculture, and social policies.

This suggests that implementers could potentially get confused in their differing roles, resulting in role collision in implementation. This is apparently, as Interviewee X30 (2017) put it, the explicit result of the lack of a coherent national counterterrorism framework.

So, what kind of problems does this cause in the implementation process? The workload could be too much to cope with. Interviewee X26 (2017) commented that it "saps implementers' energy" (m. 41:44). For example, the domino effect of the above multiply roles on the implementation processes of the TCPs could potentially reduce the executive capacity and supervisory authority of the governors and district governors. Given the different unrelated

and often conflicting tasks, it is almost certain that they get distracted and become unable to fulfil their main responsibilities regarding countering terrorism.

It also could create room for them to escape from the struggle with the terrorism. They have a duty to supervise the street level counterterrorism implementers. As middle level actors, when they take themselves away from this mined area, as Interviewee X24 (2017) put it, they left more room for street level implementers. This usually results in unwanted implementation behaviours of the street level implementers, as they feel they are not observed or restricted from above. Since lower-level officials are probably less educated and talented, unsurprisingly, they are not always able to show the expected professionalism. This is especially the case in deterrence policies.

Regarding the different policy approaches, the findings of the interview material suggest that role collision and role ambiguity are more frequently seen in the implementation processes of defiance/desistance policies than those of deterrence policies. There are several possible explanations for this. Firstly, deterrence-based policies tend to be clearer. Secondly, as the empirical analysis suggests, the uniformed implementers of deterrence policies could often intervene in the implementation of defiance/desistance policy. For example, Interviewee X2 (2017) stated that psychological operation battalions were given the mission to desist the target population from the PKK, but they have failed as the task was in collision with the main deterrence roles of the military personnel.

In fact, several interviewees indicated that the involvement of uniformed implementers to the other policy sectors results in failure and could backfire (e.g. Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017). For example, especially during the intense deterrence period of the 1990s, teachers were commissioned as military teachers in the Region's schools while they were under compulsory military service. An important implication of this is that when military institutions carry out such policies as education and health in conflict zones, it could manipulate the perception of the target population. As Interviewee X7 (2017) stated, people might start to perceive that "if there are terrorists, there is military. If there is military, there are public services" (m. 41:40).

Similarly, Interviewee X26 (2017) said the attempts by the law enforcement bodies to carry out some defiance/desistance based policies in the Region have been "very superficial" and

“do not much serve the purpose”(m. 41:12). Once police and soldiers are bestowed with extra missions and different duties, in addition to the exhaustion they will face, they will generate power from it to interfere in everyday life. Also, as Interviewee X5 (2017) argued, law enforcement is the steely side of the State. When they are assigned with tasks unrelated with their main mission, they could get confused and role collision will happen. And, this could prevent the better implementation of the main tasks.

In short, the above findings support the idea that the lack of a coherent strategic counterterrorism framework and ambiguity in policies may result in role collision in implementation. As Interviewee X5 (2017) clarified, passing many ambiguous and contradicting tasks, authorities and responsibilities on the same implementers to carry out the different types of polices complicate the perceived roles of the implementers and this results in the problem of the role collision throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs.

The findings on the policy arrangements, implementer’s roles and main actors raise intriguing questions regarding the nature and scope of the implementer’s behaviours throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level.

5.3. The Formation of Implementers’ Behaviours

In order to carry out the different types of TCPs, implementers need to employ sophisticated implementation behaviours. As Interviewee X10 (2017) described it, implementers “put behaviours through the mill” (m. 22:55). The analysis suggests that, as shown in Figure 18, the formation of their behaviours at the street level is determined by the levels of ambiguity and conflict, local context and the quality of the implementers.



Figure 18: The formation of implementers' behaviours in the implementation process

Ambiguity in the implementation context creates room for the implementers to shape their own implementation processes. While conflictual implementers might see this as an opportunity window to seize more authority and employ divergent implementation behaviours, competent implementers could show their ability.

Initially, they need to create a road map" (Interviewee X11, 2017, m. 28:32) due to the lack of a coherent counterterrorism framework. But, in an implementation context, not every implementer has the same quality to be able to overcome the problems of conflict and the local context. Thus, the form of the implementer behaviour could vary from coping behaviours to discrepancies, even if the time frame and policy are invariable.

Coping Behaviours

The analysis of this study shows that the implementation processes of the TCPs are quite complicated. If we are talking about problems, it is also a psychological fact that people develop different behaviours to cope with the problems in their personal lives. Do the implementers develop a variety of implementation behaviours to cope with the problems they face all through the implementation processes of the TCPs?

The literature review suggests that implementers adapt themselves to the conditions of the implementation process by developing coping behaviours. Thus, exploring how implementers adapt themselves to these processes and cope with the related problems was a key subject of the interviews.

Consistent with the literature, the current study found that implementers develop various coping behaviours for the problems they face while carrying out the TCPs. These behaviours could surface in many forms. As Interviewee X26 (2017) described, coping behaviours sometimes could surface as a "self-protection reflex" and sometimes as "over acting" (m. 24:09) to handle the problem faced. The findings suggest that coping behaviours are mainly affected by the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict in a policy context. Once the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict is given, the scope of the behaviours is shaped by the quality of implementers in local conditions.

Talking about the coping behaviours, Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 31:08) gave an interesting example saying:

> In Dağlıca[7], the PKK attacked a battalion. The battalion commander normally should call his own commanders or the governor or his hierarchical chiefs in the relevant unit in the Land Forces for help. But he called Great Unity Party's leader Muhsin Yazicioglu seeking help from him.

This story was also extensively reflected in the Turkish media. It was suggested in the media that a high-ranking army officer from the battalion made this call as their hierarchical chiefs did not provide a clear reaction to their immediate appeal for help (Sabah, 2011). According to the media, Muhsin Yazicioglu immediately called the President and told him the situation (Mynet, 2011). This example illustrates how an implementer employs coping behaviours when facing the problem of ambiguity.

Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 22:53) argued that the "level of the creativity" of implementers determines the extent of the coping behaviours in such cases, reporting:

> I went to Dağlıca Outpost 3 times. Now in case of raids in Dağlıca[8], there were colonels and lieutenant colonels who could be able to save their soldiers having been foretold [about] raids as they had established their own intelligence [local network] … However, there were others becoming targets as they had not been able to establish such a system… As they have no a guide in hand, maybe that is one of the most interesting

[7] A military outpost in the border with Iraq
[8] This military post has been ambushed several times by the PKK

> points in our fight against terrorism, ... they are trying to use their brains [creativity] to produce something.

I have come across another similar example reported in a Parliamentary Report (TBMM, 2006). The report states that a mob attacked a police checkpoint in Şemdinli, at around 4pm on November 9, 2005. The crowd stoned them and conducted an armed assault. Police officers requested relief from the District Security Directorate, but no assistance was provided until 5 pm. While there was a serious tussle, a police officer called Right Way Party Chairman Mehmet AĞAR for help. Eventually, they were rescued, and the checkpoint evacuated. Although the above behaviours were not in line with the procedures and were subject to investigation, according to the disciplinary codes of the organisations that the implementers belong to, these implementers developed behaviours to cope with these problems.

Commenting on this issue, many interviewees reported that Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers regularly employ coping behaviours throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs to protect themselves or their positions (e.g. Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X17, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017). Implementers judge from their own point of view whether an action would have negative or positive consequences for them. Then, they employ coping behaviours to protect themselves.

Interviewee X24 (2017), who has significant experiences inspecting out of routine behaviours of Turkish counterterrorism implementers, supported this supposition, saying they always determine risks as they are aware that “they always have a chance to suffer from a mistake they have made while applying these policies” (m. 2:33). In fact, as an extensively experienced implementer of deterrence policies, Interviewee X2 (2017), who spent 16 years in the Region, of which 9 years were as a member of special forces, confirms the above remarks. He said that they carry out policies knowing that they could be held accountable for what they have done.

A possible explanation for this might be that the dominant approach for countering terrorism changes over time. As soon as the political atmosphere changes, policy choices could also change. One interviewee commented that “Turkish bureaucrats are awake. Okay? I mean, they get the smell. It is like a radar. Or they are like seismographs” (Interviewee X21, 2017, m. 20:12). Another interviewee claimed that they tend to take “zero risk” throughout implementation (Interviewee X25, 2017, m. 34:18). In fact, Interviewee X2 (2017) confirms

that they are aware of the fact that, within certain periods of time, political powers/decision makers and their policy choices change. Thus, they develop behaviours to protect themselves in the long term.

This suggests that that while they comply with the procedures of the TCPs, they take necessary action to save themselves from possible harmful results of the TCPs so that they will not be in trouble in the future. These findings strongly support the idea that implementers develop coping behaviours because of ambiguity. Speaking on coping behaviours needed due to ambiguity, Interviewee X2 (2017) stated that behaviours vary by the quality of implementers saying, “in parallel with their talents, world view and ability to manage”, the implementers “go to extension”, “leave it to cool”, “throw the ball to the crown”, “hit both on the shoe and the nail”, and eventually “pray not to be held accountable” (m. 15:50).

Several interviewees stated that implementers adapt their implementation behaviours to the local context they are in as the different places of the country have different cultural, social, political and demographic patterns (e.g. Interviewee X23, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017). Thus, implementers “produce their own solutions” for the problems they encountered in the local context (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 36:21).

Further, several interviewees argued that if implementers have low motivation and high disbelief in a policy approach or policy makers’ intentions, they could develop such behaviours as passively filling their time in service or not actively being involved in the promotion of polices (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017). In short, as Interviewee X21 (2017) puts it, they pursue “the notion of saving the day” (m. 23:33) on a micro scale.

Scrutiny of the interview material also suggests that implementers could employ coping behaviours, as Interviewee X11 (2017) stated, to make implementation successful, to reduce the likelihood of failure, and to achieve policy targets. These types of coping behaviours that stand out from the content of the interviews are as follows; using various side instruments to make implementation successful; supporting social, educational, cultural activities; communicating with the public; trying to make the right contacts; trying to enrich social and economic policies; trying to become a bridge between citizens and the State, especially in terms of civilian authority; and trying to ensure a sense of balance.

These findings are consistent with that of Lipsky (1980) who argues that street level implementers develop coping behaviours to overcome the problems encountered in their work. The above findings show that implementers develop such behaviours to cope with the problems they face while carrying out the TCPs. They develop new mechanisms, take self-protection, or develop behaviours that can be more effective. The point in the above examples is that there are ambiguous and conflictual circumstances for the implementers. This suggests that, initially, they realise the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict in the implementation context of the policy they carry out. Then, they produce coping behaviours within the limits of their individual capacities across localities. The question is how far the behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers could go beyond the precise limits of policies?

Divergences and Evolutions in Implementation

As mentioned in the literature review, prior studies have noted the importance of discretionary behaviours in implementation. As one of the leading scholars of the bottom-up approach, Lipsky (1980) argues that "…the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out" (p. xiii). In addition, there have been several studies arguing that implementers' behaviours and actions are characteristically discretionary (e.g. Weatherley and Lipsky, 1977; Maynard- Moody et al., 1990).

In searching to explore the extent to which implementers' behaviours depart from the status quo of policies while carrying out them, my analysis found a strong relationship between the level of divergence, the evolution of policies at the street level and the level of ambiguity and/or the level of conflict in implementation context. As illustrated in Figure 19, although ambiguity from the top and the conflict of the implementers from the bottom are the major sources of divergences, the scale of the divergences is determined by the quality of implementers in the local context. My analysis suggests that divergences could occur to such an extent that they could be assumed as the evolution of policies, especially within the eyes of the target population.



Figure 19: From policy implementation context to roles and evolution

The analysis suggests that ambiguity in policies and policy makers' intentions results in discrepancies in the implementation processes of the TCPs. On the contrary, as soon as the means, ends and resources of the TCPs are clear, implementers' compliance levels with these policies increases. This means less discrepancy in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

One participant commented on the effects of ambiguity in implementation saying: "there may be changes" due to "the different socio-cultural and personal characteristics" (Interviewee X23, 2017, m. 30:44). Owing to unclear policies and the lack of a strategy, "implementers get their own ways" in implementation with "their perception of truth" (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 09:04). Thus an "implementer" interprets policy in "local conditions" (Interviewee X24, 2017, m. 28:24) and this "causes metamorphosis" in implementation (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 08:16).

An implication of discrepancy due to ambiguity is the possibility that implementation could differ across different geographical regions. Thus, implementation behaviours may differ from place A to place B. Speaking on the Solution Process, Interviewee X27 (2017) reported that implementation differed, for example, "between Siirt and Van provinces" (m. 06:16) due to the ambiguity of the policy.

The above statements imply that the dissimilar dispositions of the implementers across localities in a given time or over time in a given locality could be the source of discrepancies in implementation. Interviewee X28 (2017) commented that although implementers initially look at the top, actions differ "from one implementer to other" (m. 06:58) due to ambiguous

contexts for the TCPs. Similar versions of this statement were shared by several others (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X7, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X20, 2017). One interviewee said because of "hesitations in decision makers" and "lack of clarity in policies", implementers could "take initiative" (Interviewee X7, 2017, m. 33:46). The other stated that, within the ambiguous policy context, implementers seek to gain knowledge from other provinces to copy their practices. He went on to say that "competent" implementers make a difference (Interviewee X24, 2017, m. 04:51).

This suggests that ambiguity leaves room for implementers to diversify the implementation process. Thus, the quality of implementer and local context become important. On the one hand, talented and experienced implementers can comprehend a policy more clearly. More importantly, they would be better dealing with the problems caused by conflict and the local context. On the other hand, incompetent and unexperienced implementers may struggle in those conditions without clear policies.

As pointed out in the literature review, Elmore (1985) claims that every actor who carries out policies employs his own perceptions in the implementation process, which causes several problems in implementation. From the findings, it becomes evident that this is also the case in the implementation of the TCPs. The question is could conflict in the implementation context, including disbelief from implementers, be the major source of divergences and evolutions and/or intensify the discrepancies that occur due to ambiguity?

To find the answer, I asked to every interviewee if implementers reinterpret and diverge a policy's means and ends from a different viewpoint in accordance with their own beliefs, objectives or perceptions at the local level.

Although there were differing opinions among interviewees, my analysis found that there could be divergences when individual perceptions, attitudes and targets intervene in the process. Interviewee X13 (2017) stated that implementer conflict could create "cracks" in implementation while there is a "weak political will" (m. 11:26). Also, as Interviewee X10 (2017) stated, although implementers formally adhere to the policies and orders on paper, they could develop divergent implementation behaviours if they believe in the importance of taking local conditions into account in implementation. Commenting on this issue Interviewee X24 (2017) claimed: "There are individual targets. In fact, the national policies or national goals

can be applied to individual targets" (m. 10:03). This suggests that even if there is no ambiguity, conflict could cause discrepancies.

However, the analysis evidences that, as Interviewee X20 (2017) stated, the extent of reinterpretation and divergence due to conflict is low at the local level if policies are clear. One interviewee stated that there could be only "slightly" different reinterpretations "between district A and district B" due to the belief system of the implementers (Interviewee X6, 2017, m. 37:45). Another commented that "stains can occur on an individual basis", but there are control mechanisms in relation to this (Interviewee X25, 2017, m. 10:58). This suggests that although implementers perceptions intervene, this intervention is restricted by control mechanisms from the top. As interviewee X15 (2017) mentioned, clarity overcomes conflict as clearer policies leave little room for implementers to deviate from the policies in the implementation processes. Thus, the discrepancy level potentially remains low.

The findings suggest that due to ambiguity and conflict, implementers could develop divergent behaviours in the implementation processes of the TCPs. The more ambiguous policies are, the more discrepancies occur in the local context while there are conflicting low-quality implementers.

Thus, the other question comes to the fore: do divergent behaviours evolve to such an extent that they become new policies at the local level?

The analysis of the empirical material suggests that although divergent behaviours are widespread throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs, as many interviewees claimed (e.g. Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017), these behaviours do not evolve to the point of becoming new counterterrorism policies. The point is that, in principle, they have not the power to completely transform the TCPs through the implementation process. The Turkish Administrative System has a strict top-down hierarchical structure and the system expects them to be loyal to the normative legal framework and orders from the top. Thus, even if ambiguity creates room for implementers to impose their values and qualities at the local context, they know that if their interpretations and divergent behaviours go beyond the lines, they would be held accountable and face possible sanctions. They would think about their careers and could even be labelled as "traitor" by top actors (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 20:22). In fact, talking about this issue Interviewee X23 (2017) said:

“We are an unitary centralized state... We cannot change them [policies] in the local. We cannot review [them]. We just implement [them]. They [decision makers] replace us if we do not.” (m. 44:50). Backing up the above statement, Interviewee X27 (2017) said: “They [policies] are not subject to revision. I did it. Then, I was expelled” (m. 34:13).

Also strikingly, however, the analysis of the collected interviews and reports makes clear that although the interpretation and the divergences do not evolve to such an extent that they become new policies, the extent of the interpretations and divergences could reach such a degree that they could fundamentally affect polices’ main objectives and public perception of these policies. The empirical material suggests that interpretations and divergences to such an extent could potentially be one of the causes for policy changes.

In fact, as we have seen, it is not unexpected that there may be abnormalities once over-motivation intervenes in the implementation processes. The over-motivation could occur negatively or positively. In particular, if positive over-motivation is accompanied by overstatements made by strong top actors or negative over-motivation (under-motivation towards policies and directions) is accompanied by relatively weak top actors, there could be dramatic reinterpretations and discrepancies in the local context.

Firstly, if implementers have over motivation, they could underestimate the local context. Then, as many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X18, 2017) reported, discrepancy due to the high motivation of the implementers, especially in deterrence policies, could result in the deterioration of the rule of law. As interviewee X13 (2017) specified, widespread implementation behaviours undermining the rule of law are attributable to the decision makers. This means that widespread discrepancies in the implementation processes of the deterrence policies could potentially, as Interviewee X15 (2017) said, be highly publicised and perceived as evolution in policies by the target population.

The empirical material suggests that this especially happens when there is a highly contested political context and weak government. In fact, commenting on this issue, Interviewee X5 (2017) argued that the compliance level across policies could change according to “the government’s stance” (m. 43:58) of a given period.

The analysis suggests that, as Interviewee X18 (2017) stated, the compliance level is higher during the implementation processes of the deterrence based counterterrorism policies in the existence of a powerful government and strong political commitment. This finding may be explained by the fact that as the implementation agencies within the implementation context of the defiance/desistance TCPs are less definite and the implementation of these policies generally requires horizontal involvement of several unrelated organizations, it could be more difficult to force the implementation from the top. Thus, surrounding circumstances would become involved in the implementation process of these polices, causing additional possible causes for discrepancies.

To the contrary, as several interviewees argued (e.g. Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017), deterrence policies are mainly carried out by agencies that have strict hierarchical structures, such as police and gendarmerie. Thus, once there is political commitment at the top, it could be easier to force the implementation of a deterrence policy from the top using coercion techniques.

If there is a highly contested political context and relatively weak government, deterrence counterterrorism polices tend to be more diverted and evaluated from the bottom. Uniformed implementers, namely law enforcement and military personnel, as Interviewee X16 (2017) said, could easily behave in accordance with their personal or environmental context. In this case, we could argue that conflict caused by the low quality of implementer dominates the process more in the deterrence approach than defiance/desistance approach.

It is a common view among the interviewees that, as Interviewee X16 (2017) said, the TCPs were predominantly deterrence based, and conflict at the top and from the bottom was highly intense during the 1990s. There were also weak coalitions during this period. It is common knowledge that, as witnessed by Interviewee X16 (2017), the law enforcement and military personnel carrying out the TCPs during the 1990s widely behaved out of professional and ethical criteria throughout the implementation processes of the deterrence policies.

Interviewees widely shared the opinion that, in the 1990s, the PKK turned the Region into a bloody theatre of war and, as Interviewee X15 (2017) articulated, political actors neither knew what to do nor to take risks. Thus, the struggle against terrorism stayed the responsibility of the army (Interviewee X16, 2017). Having said the implementation context was heavily

ambiguous during the 1990s, Interviewee X26 (2017) argued that "… the implementers draw a path from there [ambiguity] by interpreting them [policies]. Sometimes the interpretation may have been stiff, and sometimes it may have been out of the routine" (m. 10:22). While the people of the Region were "terrorised" and "subjected to very serious torture and persecutions, perhaps causing terror to escalate further into the Region" (Interviewee X28, 2017, m. 11:10), this resulted in the target population desisting themselves from the State.

This suggests that because of the ambiguities and the poor understanding of the problem and individual dispositions, the uniformed implementers frequently went out of the routine during that period. As we have seen, they undermined the rule of law and employed cruel practices against the target population. Combined with a lack of a coherent counterterrorism approach, these divergent implementation behaviours resulted in huge discrepancies during the 1990s.

The above findings suggest that although the most important actors in determining the implementation processes of the TCPs are the top decision makers and that, theoretically, there is a hierarchical top down implementation line, a closer inspection of the Turkish counterterrorism policy area shows that implementers may also deviate in policies across localities due to ambiguity and conflict. The more ambiguity there is in the policies, the more conflict becomes dominant. In this case, if the quality of implementers is low, the discrepancy will be bigger. This finding further supports the presumption of the third-generation implementation research that in order to comprehend the implementation process, we need to take the assumptions of the top-down and bottom approaches into consideration together.

The overall findings corroborate the critique of Winter (2003b), who suggests that Lipsky's (1980) approach has one ironic aspect. While it assumes that discrepancy is indispensable at the individual level, it expects that all individuals behave in the same way. On the other hand, the findings also suggest that we should not necessarily undermine the effects of the implementers' behaviours and actions on the implementation processes of the TCPs. As Interviewee X21 (2017) described, they could have a "butterfly effect" (m. 35:26), if they all come together. Thus, although they could not create a new policy individually, they could contribute to a new policy-making process and policy change.

To conclude, it is apparent from the findings that the major factors affecting discrepancies in the TCPs are ambiguity, conflict, the local context and the quality of implementers. In general,

high ambiguity, high conflict from implementers, contested political and local contexts, and the low quality of implementers cause huge problems throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. Consequently, these problems result in discrepancies and coping behaviours.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the effect of the implementation context at the street level. It has shown that causal relations and complex interactions among the variables of ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementer determine what happens at the street level. In brief, the main effects at the street level arise as follows:

(A) Regarding the policy arrangements (1) policies that implementers face at the street level are inconsistent and contradictory; (2) implementers face control and coordination problems at the street level; and (3) resources to accomplish policy means and ends are scarce.

(B) Regarding the implementation actors and implementers' roles (1) implementers' roles may change regarding to the ambiguity level, conflict level, local context and the quality of implementers in implementation context; (2) implementers' roles in the local context may change across different types of the TCPs; (3) role collision could occur at the street level; and (4) although decision makers are the main actors to determine the implementation process for different types of TCPs, implementers could play crucial roles in the local context with regard to the ambiguity and conflict level in the implementation context.

(C) Regarding the formation of implementers' behaviours (1) the complex interactions among the same factors, namely those of ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementers, also determine the form of the implementers' behaviours and the routines they establish while they carry out the TCPs; (2) implementers' behaviours may change across different types of the TCPs in the local context; (3) implementers may not obey and practice what political mandate regulates; (4) implementers' obedience level may change across different types of TCPs; (5) the form of the implementers' behaviours may not conform to the means and ends outlined in these policies/policy decisions; (6) implementers may reinterpret a TCP's means and ends in accordance with their belief at the local level; and (7) this may be perceived as evolution of these policies by the target population at the local level.

Succinctly, the findings of this chapter strongly suggest that the quality of implementers determines the scope of their behaviours in a locality in relation to the ambiguity and conflict variables. For instance, while an implementer is in conflict with a counterterrorism policy, the form of the behaviour of this implementer is determined by their quality, the local context, conflict from top, and the level of ambiguity. The chapter further argues that in the ambiguous and conflictual implementation context, implementers may find rooms to employ divergent implementation roles and behaviours at the street level.

While this chapter has analysed the effects of the implementation context at the street level, the following chapter will initially analyse the results/impact of these effects to policy change. It will then reveal the linking point in the policy-action continuum and map the implementation process of the TCPs based upon overall empirical findings.

6. ADRESSING 'THE MISSING LINK' IN THE POLICY-ACTION CONTINUUM OT THE TCPs

This thesis examines the implementation processes of Turkish counterterrorism policies as a process. It analyses the TCPs from the top as well as the implementer's roles and behaviours from the bottom, and the interactions between the two. Through this framework this chapter aims to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum.

The first empirical chapter demonstrated the complex nature of the implementation context of the TCPs and the second empirical chapter analysed the effects of this complexity on the implementation processes and on the roles and behaviours of the implementers at the street level. In consideration of the findings of the previous empirical chapters, this chapter tries to answer the question of how to link the policy-action continuum in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

However, before addressing the 'missing link' in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs and "mapping" implementation as a process, I need to address the implementation/policy change nexus. In the theoretical chapters of the thesis, I made it clear that instead of a stages model, this research employs an extended implementation approach. This approach entails an analysis of the relationships between policy change and implementation. In fact, the findings of the empirical material strongly support the argument that the effects of the implementation context on the policy arrangements and implementer's roles and behaviours at the street level, such as control and coordination problems, discrepancies and role collision (as presented in the second empirical chapter), could potentially trigger change from one policy to another as they could be barriers in implementation. As will be analysed below, this may turn the implementation process into a barrier leading to failure of the policies. Policy change is a milestone between potentially distinctive implementation processes across policies. Once policy change occurs, it is highly likely the main parameters of the implementation context change.

Accordingly, the first section analyses the implementation/policy change nexus. It argues that implementation could be a barrier to policy success and, it might lead to policy failures and policy changes. Then, the second section presents 'the missing link' in the policy-action continuum. It suggests that the missing link in the implementation processes of the TCPs is the implementation paradigm in which the upper part (policy) and lower part (roles and

behaviours) of the implementation process are connected. In the theoretical chapter, I conceptualised the implementation paradigm as an analytical framework to be used as the linking point between policy and action in the implementation processes of the TCPs. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there. Finally, the third section shows "the mapping" of the Implementation processes of the TCPs.

6.1. From Implementation Behaviours to Policy Change

The first and second empirical chapters demonstrated that the main factors of the implementation context of the TCPs are also the main sources of problems arising at the street level, such as role collisions, coping behaviours and implementation divergences. The research is not interested in exploring the effectiveness of the TCPs. However, it appears that, consistent with the literature, the main top-down and bottom up factors causing these problems may also be barriers for implementation resulting in failures in the policies. This result is consistent with that of Monar (2007) who argues that "poor implementation" may fail a policy (p. 312). The analysis of the empirical material also suggests this might trigger a change in policy from the top, though a change in policy does not solely occur due to the effects of implementation.

The Implementation Process as a Barrier and the Failure of Policies

Although this thesis is interested in the extended implementation of the TCPs, the analyses of the preceding empirical chapters suggested that the main factors shaping the implementation context of the TCPs, namely those of ambiguity, conflict, local context and the quality of implementers may constitute significant obstacles to successful implementation, and this could contribute to policy failures. This section suggests that failed implementation processes may be a barrier for the success of the TCPs and the upper part of the implementation context, in the form of ambiguity and contested political context, is more likely to contribute to policy failures than the lower part of the implementation context composed of implementers' disposition and the local context.

Ambiguity could cause confusion among implementers. They could see ambiguous policies, as Interviewee X25 (2017) described it, as "a sign of possible illegal actions" (m. 21:32) they are

forced to carried out. As we have seen in the second empirical chapter, this may lead to the development of coping behaviours to protect themselves from possible sanctions in the future. So, how might it be a barrier for policy implementation?

Interviewee X2 (2017) confirms that implementers may feel threatened in an ambiguous context. Consequently, they might take a step back or might make unhealthy decisions, resulting in failure in implementation or non-implementation.

The reason for this lies in the target population's political attitude in the contested local context. The shared view among the interviewees is that the target population is highly politicised (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017; Interviewee X25, 2017). In fact, the empirical material suggests that implementers are aware of this reality. They must challenge a strong discourse on human rights and freedoms raised by the target population while executing the TCPs. There is an influencing class within the target population consisting of ideologically and educationally well-informed individuals and they persistently monitor the behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism implementers (Interviewee X25, 2017).

My analysis found that when implementers are confronted with a determined target population, they could potentially refrain from implementing unclear policy because of possible legal liability. For example, this occurred during the initial stages of the implementation process of the unclear provisions of the Compensation of Damages Arising from Terrorism and Combating Terrorism Act. As Interviewee X25 (2017) exemplified, it occurred by implementers throwing out their responsibilities, not taking up their duties or leaving implementation to another assistant of governor or to another team or organisation and these together formed a barrier to the policy's implementation.

Another barrier relating to the ambiguity is the lack of a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework. As Interviewee X26 (2017) put it, implementers have never had a chance to "act with the same strategy within any 10 year period" (m. 13:35). This suggests that human and material resources may have been wasted throughout the implementation processes of inconsistent policies. This could pose a serious obstacle and be a barrier to better implementation processes.

Likewise, conflict between a counterterrorism policy's approach and an implementer's belief or between a policy maker's belief and an implementer's belief on the problem could be a

barrier to implementation. For example, Interviewee X28 (2017) claimed that when a government is not aware of the conflict of implementers the implementation process could be partially blocked. However, as the findings of the second empirical chapter suggest, the hierarchical top down structure of the Turkish State reduces the likelihood of conflict as a barrier.

The low quality of implementers might also be an important barrier. However, it is less likely to be a deciding factor if there is ambiguity in the policy implementation context. In an ambiguous implementation context, the quality of the implementers becomes less significant as a barrier, as it is easier to deny the impact of it. The legitimate refutation for implementers is that if a policy's implementation context is already unclear, how could they carry it out effectively?

The findings of the first empirical chapter suggest that the implementation barriers at the upper part of the implementation processes of the TCPs may be rooted to the context of the policy making processes. The problems in policy making processes comes into view as ambiguous policies and a contested political context in the implementation context. This result reflects those of Winter (1986) who argues that several implementation barriers occur within the milieu of the policy making processes. This finding suggests that the implementers of the TCPs do not have many instruments to sweep the possible implementation barriers away.

In fact, many interviewees related the relationship between failures in counterterrorism policies and their implementation processes to national-level politics (e.g. Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X27, 2017; Interviewee X21, 2017). The common view is that even if the implementation process of a counterterrorism policy is successful, this policy could fail. The suggestion is that if the political authority decides on and formulates a policy that contradicts the facts of the Region, country, and international relations, and that does not properly address the multidimensional nature and the roots of terrorism it fails, even with excellent implementation processes. One of the above factors could have, as Interviewee X21 (2017) put it, "the Magnus effect" (m. 37:44) on the whole policy process. Meaning, when a spinning top rotates quickly, as soon as an external intervention occurs, it loses its momentum, loses centrifugal force, weaves around and

topples. This suggests that even if a policy is implemented perfectly, an external policy related intervention could shake the balance and leads to failure of a policy.

However, the analysis of the interviews and reports suggests that, as emphasized by several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017), the relationship between failed implementation processes and the failure of counterterrorism policies should not be underestimated. For example, if a highly ambiguous counterterrorism policy is carried out in a highly contested environment, as Interviewee X16 (2017) reported, low quality implementers may fail to deliver a precise implementation. This is because, as the analyses of the preceding empirical chapters suggest, it is highly likely that low quality implementers cause pauses, hesitations and problems throughout the implementation process. For example, a leading head of village guard in a district in the Southeast, interviewee X4 (2017) claimed that, throughout the unclear and highly contested context of the Solution Process, "everyone [implementers] was afraid of himself [of being held accountable]" (m. 18:58) and they remained passive to protect themselves. On the contrary, if there is a clear policy and low conflict, it becomes easier for low quality implementers to focus on goals by bringing all their capacities into existence. This suggests that high ambiguity and high conflict, including the nationally and locally contested contexts, and low quality of implementers in a policy's implementation context increase the possibility of failure for this policy. Nonetheless, as the analyses of the first two empirical chapters suggests, the main obstacles to the better implementation are still from the policy related upper part of the implementation context, which implementers have no power to alter.

These findings suggest that although policy failure is not necessarily the result of a failed implementation process, an implementation failure could cause policy failure. That is, while a better implementation cannot turn a failed policy into a success, failed implementation could be the cause of the failure of an effective policy. This finding strongly supports the argument that the terror problem may only be minimized by the straightforward delivery from decision makers based on evidence. But then, though it is less likely, implementers could generate the failures of counterterrorism policies.

Concisely, the components of the implementation context may cause divergent behaviours in implementation and this could become a barrier for policy implementation. Consequently, the implementation could derail, and the policy could fail. Ultimately, decision makers may

change the policy even though there was not necessarily anything wrong with it. This means that that the effects of the implementation context at the street level related to the policy arrangements and implementer's roles and behaviours could potentially be one of the reasons for policy change.

Implementation/Policy Change Nexus

I have made it clear in the conceptual chapters that the thesis focusses on implementation as a process from policy to action. This extended approach to implementation makes it necessary to analyse the implementation/policy change nexus. So far, the thesis has explored the problems and difficulties within the implementation process. The focus on policy change in this section is related to the interconnections of the implementation problems and policy change. Here, I do not argue that policy change could be reasoned merely on the impact of the implementation process. As Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) state, implementation is one of the factors that determines the policy impact. Thus, as the analysis has shown, I argue that the problems and difficulties of the implementation process could be only one of the factors leading policy change.

The findings of the empirical material suggest that the effect of implementation on policy change is channelled in two ways. One is the reflections of implementers through feedback, the other is the reflections of the public perception, diverted by implementation behaviours, through politics.

As we have seen, feedback normally comes from the bottom to the top in a hierarchical line. The middle level actors operate as bridges between the top and the bottom. They reflect the feedback, which they receive from street level implementers, and their own evaluations given to top-level actors. Although the feedback mechanism in the implementation processes of the TCPs does not effectively work, feedback from the bottom to the top in the implementation process of the TCPs might potentially affect decision makers and lead to changes in policy, as illustrated in Figure 20.



Figure 20: Feedback-policy change in the implementation processes of TCPs

Speaking on this issue, Interviewee X23 (2017) stated that there is “a cycle” and “mutual interaction” (m. 38:01) in the implementation processes of the TCPs. As an example, he detailed that during the last OHAL (Olağanüstü Hal, or state of the emergency) period (after the failed coup on July 15, 2016), they did extraordinarily frequent stop and searches in places open to the public and there were complaints from the people. Starting from the street level, these reflections were echoed upwards by implementers. Ultimately, the Interior Minister ordered the governors to slow down this practice.

Likewise, the analysis of the content of the interviews suggests that one of the reasons for the dominant policy shift from the defiance/desistance approach to the deterrence approach in July 2015 was the feedback and evaluations received from the bottom during the Solution Process. It is a widely shared view among the interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X4, 2017) that the PKK had mistreated the Solution Process. It had seen the Process as a gain and had showed insincerity. Consequently, as Interviewee X25 (2017) stated, reports came from implementers indicating that the PKK had been abusing the Process. Although the actual reasons for the policy change in July 2015 are highly controversial, from the implementation point of view the evaluations and the feedback had been delivered from bottom to top and could have affected policy makers to some degree.

However, the empirical material suggests that this change was mainly determined by public perception about the ongoing implementation of a policy. A strong relationship between changing public perception/popular support for ongoing policy implementation processes and changes in counterterrorism has been reported by many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017). Thus, implementers' feedback could be more effective for policy makers when it concords with the wider public perception. The implementation of the Solution Process provides an example of this.

As we have seen, Turkey's counterterrorism polices are inconsistently put in force one after another due to the lack of a coherent national strategic framework. Thus, not only is the alteration among them amorphous and inharmonious, but also, as Interviewee X19 (2017) stated, while one counterterrorism approach is dominant in a given period, the other policies that have different theoretical framework are undermined. For example, when the defiance/desistance approach is dominant in a period, deterrence policies are undermined. As a widely shared example by the interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X28, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X29, 2017; Interviewee X4, 2017), the Solution Process is an example for this kind of period.

The common view is that as deterrence policies were completely undermined in this period and the life and property of the people were exposed to the PKK. While the public, as Interviewee X13 (2017) stated, reacted negatively to this and eventually public support for the Process decreased, the implementation context created room for conflicting implementers to publicly voice their concerns and to give straightforward feedback from bottom to top. For instance, answering questions at a reception on August 30, 2014, when the Solution Process was nearly one-and-a-half-years-old, Chief of General Staff General Necdet Ozel publicly stated concern among deterrence-based implementers about the policy saying:

> The Government has a policy. That policy is going on. We do not know the roadmap for the Solution Process. We are not in the groundwork of the process. Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay said that the agenda of the policy will be sent to public institutions, yet something has not been sent. We could express our opinions once we see it. If it crosses the red lines, we will say what the necessary [intervention] is. This struggle [countering terrorism] has been fulfilled by us [the military] for 30 years. (CNNTURK, 2014).

These remarks were significant because the declining public support for the Process gave needed room for implementers to play their roles in policy change and eventually the military brought its silence about the Process to an end. In this case, the decision makers eventually changed the approach from defiance/desistance to deterrence in July 2015.

The above example suggests that, as several interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017; Interviewee X7, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017) mentioned, when policy makers decide to change the policy approach from deterrence to defiance-desistance, the implementers of deterrence policies, especially law enforcement and military, may have concerns about this change. The roots of these concerns may differ. A possible explanation for this might be that the institutional perspective could affect the attitude of implementers. In fact, O'Toole and Montjoy (1984) state that: "Factors inherent in the nature of bureaucratic organizations limit the willingness and ability of existing public agencies to respond to certain types of new mandates" (p. 492).

Another possible explanation for this is that the personal considerations of implementers could be the source of the initial opposition. In fact, Interviewee X7 (2017) argued that deterrence policy implementers very seriously criticised the Solution Process, although "it was not very loud", because they have always concerns withdrawing from the public sphere thinking that "there is a terrorist organization that can fill the gap" and, thereafter, the PKK will certainly return to them "as a physical threat" (m. 18:17). Also, as Interviewee X10 (2017) said, they may feel offended since they built a culture based on the loses of their friends in the struggle. Besides, some of them could oppose for their personal "benefits" (Interviewee X16, 2017, m. 31:56).

However, the analysis of the empirical material suggests that implementers' resistance may not surface as soon as a policy comes into effect. Despite their inherent dislike for the new policy approach, as Interviewee X13 (2017) claimed, they tend to wait while "clenching their teeth" (m. 10:29), before beginning to dispatch their opinions and encounters from the bottom. On the one hand, although they have concerns, as Interviewee X2 (2017) said, they might generally give it a chance and they might not publicly oppose the newly decided policy. On the other hand, as the consensus level would be high and the political will must be determined on the necessity of a newly introduced counterterrorism approach in the first stage, implementers may "behave pragmatically to protect their positions" (Interviewee X19,

2017, m. 33:10). They may also hesitate to openly engage in any public debate about a new defiance/desistance policy in the initial phase of the implementation process (Interviewee X13, 2017). But, as Interviewee X13 (2017) said, as soon as a policy seems to fail and the public perception turns around they may start to explain their concerns more publicly, as in the above example. This further suggests that the strength of political will for and public perception (public support/opposition) of counterterrorism policies are considered by implementers while they position themselves during the implementation processes.

In fact, the findings from the above analysis suggest that although the feedback from implementers might trigger policy changes, the shifted public perception by reason of the effects of the implementation processes is the main cause forcing decision makers to inconsistently fluctuate policies across different policy types.

Exemplifying an incident to explain how the happenings in implementation could alter public perception and trigger policy change, Interviewee X9 (2017) said that decision makers strictly order military battalions stationed on the borders to prevent illegal border crossings without any clear plan for better or worse. This creates ambiguity for implementers. Without clear policy arrangements, a battalion commander might potentially see everyone who approaches the border as an enemy. Thus, s/he might treat smugglers as terrorists and might target and even kill them. This potentially creates significant political and social problems, which could transform politics at the national-level and eventually lead to a change in policy.

This is what appears to have happened in relation to an incident on 28 December 2011. On that day, a group of smugglers who were about to cross the border from Iraq to the village of Ortasu, in the Uludere district of the Şırnak Province, were shot by F-16 fighter jets who had identified them as PKK terrorists. In this incident, 34 civilians lost their lives (Amnesty, 2012). A closer inspection of the Turkish National Assembly's Committee on Human Rights Inquiry's Report on the incident demonstrates that poor control and coordination among implementers and implementation agencies throughout the action were the main causes of the incident. The main reason for this is the ambiguity on the powers and responsibilities across the implementation bodies (TBMM, 2013c).

Although there have been other assertions for causes of this incident (e.g. Oğur, 2012; Diken, 2015; bianet, 2012), from the implementation perspective, it is clear that ambiguity played a

role . As Interviewee X9 (2017) said, the implication was decreased public support for the deterrence approach and the changing public perception was one of the forces behind the policy change. Eventually, policy makers changed the dominant deterrence policy approach starting with the Solution Process in the second half of 2012.

The analysis of the empirical material suggests that the public perception and support or opposition throughout the implementation process occur in two forms. One is the perception and support or opposition of the general public, and the other is the perception and support or opposition of the target population. Both have implications for the implementation processes of the TCPs.

In terms of the wider public perception, the empirical material suggests that it directly or indirectly determines the stance of the decision makers. In fact, Interviewee X13 (2017) said that "The gravitation of public perception determines the power [the stance of the government]" (m. 13:58). My analysis also found that the implementers of the TCPs initially look at the positions of the central actors while carrying out the policies. As agreed by most interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X21, 2017; Interviewee X1, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017; Interviewee X13, 2017), Interviewee X25 (2017) said that while the "central" power is the main determinant, due to the hierarchical structure of the Turkish counterterrorism policy area, the main actor is the "government" in the centre. Yet, eventually "the will of the people" determines "the government" (m. 23:42), principally through elections. In fact, as Interviewee X21 (in Interviewee X22, 2017), a chief public prosecutor, said, the political centre takes elections into consideration in policy change and if it is going to lose votes because of the existing policy, it changes the approach. Because the politicians are looking at the polices to understand "how…they get more votes?" (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 29:31).

In fact, after losing the June 7, 2015 general election, President Erdoğan (ntv, 2015) said:

> We saw that the Solution Process had been being abused when we went to the last election [June 7, 2015, general election] and the March 30 election [local elections in 2014]. The Solution Process has not paid off [as vote]. When we come to the last general election [7 June], we noticed that this [votes] was damaged. It is not possible to continue the Solution Process with those who mean our national unity and brotherhood.

While these words confirm Interviewee X26's (2017) point, arguing that both the Government and the PKK continued the Process only to make capital from it, it also demonstrates the power of the public perception in policy change. Speaking about the public perception of the Solution Process, Interviewee X21 (2017) argued that the general public had perceived that "the State is in danger" and "the politicians or bureaucrats" do not "rule it like a state man" (m. 32:17). Thus, the politics faced "a reaction from the West [of the Country]" (Interviewee X19, 2017, m. 31:01). This perception affected things too quickly (Interviewee X21, 2017), decision makers took the public perception too seriously and changed their immediate policy, because, otherwise they might face the risk of losing power (Interviewee X19, 2017).

The analysis suggests that the perception of the people, who might sympathise with the PKK, on the implementation processes is also considered in dominant policy approach change. Initially, although it is especially crucial to desist the target population from the PKK, the lack of a coherent strategic framework results in incoherent policy changes in Turkey and, as Interviewee X16 (2017) commented, this negatively affects the perception of the target population. They are bewildered and confused when continuously facing inconsistent policies. Interviewee X19 (2017, m. 31:52) described it saying:

> … this [inconsistent policies] brings chaos… When you go to Diyarbakir and talk to the citizens there, they say 'they just want to be sure who is their mother-in-love'. You say what do you mean? They say 'on one occasion the organization is coming [the PKK in defiance/desistance period], on another occasion the State is coming [in deterrence period]' … When you intensely apply deterrence policies and then if an excessive softening period follows it, the public becomes a referee. It just crosses over and watches. Who will prevail over each other? Will the sate prevail of the terrorist organization? … Accordingly, they determine their sides.

Thus, as Interviewee X28 (2017) stated, the target population mostly positions itself in "the middle bent" (m. 42:17) between the State and the PKK.

The importance of the target populations' perception and support in implementation was articulated by Interviewee X26 (2017), saying: "The local public support is definitely an indispensable support. Because, if this public opinion is against you [legitimate authorities],

the PKK will receive ten times more power than you" (m. 38:04). In fact, similar views shared by several others (Interviewee X6, 2017 ; Interviewee X12, 2017; Interviewee X15, 2017).

In fact, it is a widely shared fact that deterrence approach was dominant, and the target population suffered from harsh implementation practices in the 1990s. The negative impact of this was that, as commonly shared by many interviewees (e.g. Interviewee X1, 2017; Interviewee X6, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X11, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017), it seriously manipulated the perception of the target population, harmed the efforts to eliminate the terrorism and contributed to the intensification of the problem. As the target population heavily suffered from the out of the routine implementation behaviours, this pushed them towards the PKK. Consequently, the suffering turned into increasing support for the PKK. On the one hand, as Interviewee X16 (2017) reported, when there are, for example, extrajudicial killings the target population perceives no difference between the State and the PKK. On the other hand, as Interviewee X7 (2017) argued, the more the state, for example, kills, the more the problem becomes rooted in the target population as the implementation behaviours undermining the rule of law empower the ideology of the PKK.

Thus, defiance/desistance-based policies have been put in force to gain the support of the target population and to desist them from supporting the PKK. In fact, as Interviewee X25 (2017) stated, one of the main aims of the defiance/desistance based counterterrorism policies which have been put into force since the beginning of the 2000s has been to impact Kurdish public opinion and desist them from endorsing the terrorist organisation.

These findings further evidence the importance of the quality of implementers at the local level. As many interviewees mentioned (e.g. Interviewee X9, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X29, 2017; Interviewee X16, 2017), a high quality implementer may be able to positively alter the target population's perception by conducting better public relations in the local context to balance the deficiencies of the upper factors of the implementation context, namely those of ambiguity and conflict from the top. For example, Interviewee X5 (2017) commented that although an implementer is very capable to carry out policies, if s/he misdirects the public relations, the implementation s/he is involved in could be perceived as failed. On the contrary, better public relations might balance the deficiencies of implementation.

From the above analyses, it appears that the effects of the implementation context at the street level could deliver policy change by way of implementers' feedback and changing public perception. Yet, the public perception manipulated by unsustainable implementation behaviours in an ongoing implementation process plays one of the main roles to force political will to make a change in the policy approach.

In brief, although this research is not interested in the effectiveness of the TCPs, the effect of the implementation processes on the failures of the TCPs was one of the themes that comes out of the empirical material. Consistent with the literature, this research found that both top-down and bottom up factors, which have been profoundly examined in the first empirical chapter, are also the main causes of the barriers in the implementation processes of the TCPs. Thus, they could deliver policy failures, and this may lead to policy change.

Thus far, the empirical analysis has explored the implementation processes of the TCPs, starting from the lack of a coherent counterterrorism policy framework for the policy change. The first empirical chapter examined the principal factors determining the implementation context. The second empirical chapter showed how these factors function at the street level in determining the roles and behaviours of implementers. The above section of this chapter has analysed linkages between implementation and policy change. The remainder of this empirical analysis will analyse the implementation process as a whole, from policy to action, embodying all of the previous empirical analysis. For this aim, initially, the role of implementation paradigms as the linking point in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs will be analysed. Then, the whole process will be mapped.

6.2. The Role of Implementation Paradigms in the Policy-Action Continuum of the TCPs

As mentioned in the theoretical chapters of the study, this thesis mainly aims to determine the interrelationships between policy types, and the roles and behaviours of implementers within the implementation processes of the TCPs. In short, it aims to explore the missing link throughout the policy-action continuum of the TCPs, which has been omitted by the literature.

For this aim, the first empirical chapter examined the main factors in the implementation context of the TCPs, namely those of ambiguity and contested political context from the top, and the implementer's dispositions and local context from the bottom. The second empirical chapter examined the effects of these factors on the policy arrangements and the roles and

behaviours of the implementers at the street level. The previous section of this chapter analysed how the problems of the implementation at the street level may turn the implementation process into a barrier leading to failure of the policies, and potentially trigger policy change.

This section argues that these numerous multifaceted interconnections occur within certain implementation paradigms that function as the linking point between the policies from the top and roles and behaviours of the implementers from the bottom in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, implementation paradigms are the analytical frameworks that would enable the research to link the bottom implementation behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers to the upper Turkish counterterrorism policies. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

In fact, the findings of the empirical material and the empirical analyses suggest that implementers operate within the context and constraints of certain implementation paradigms while carrying out the TCPs. Thus, in order to fully comprehend the implementation roles and behaviours of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers in a locality, initially we ought to understand the implementation paradigms of a given policy's implementation process in which implementers operate. So, how do the paradigms happen throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs?

When Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) criticise the implementation framework developed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), they emphasise that it is important to link the policy context to implementation by taking the political and statutory factors of the implementation process into account. This is because they reasonably think that the behaviours of implementers are shaped by the multifaceted interactions between the political process and statutory settings, the idea that the findings of this research confirm.

The first empirical chapter extensively analysed the political and statutory factors of the implementation context of the TCPs. The findings of the second empirical chapter have shown that, first and foremost, the political and statutory components of the implementation context of a policy are considered by the implementers of the TCPs while they decide the form of their

implementation roles and behaviours at the street level. Ambiguity and contested political context from the top-down, implementers' conflict and contested local context from the bottom-up influence the implementers' roles and behaviours in the field.

In fact, the combination of the previous empirical chapters' findings persuasively demonstrates that Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers tailor their implementation roles and behaviours to fit different policy implementation contexts. The key contextual factors that implementers consider while carrying out the policies include the levels of political conflict in counterterrorism polices, the levels of public support for them, whether or not implementers and organisations are willing to act in accordance with policy means and ends, whether or not ambiguities exist about the nature and features of the problem being addressed, the levels of ambiguity in the means and ends of the counterterrorism policies, and the fragmented implementation structure.

Besides, we have seen that the TCPs conditioned in different contexts are implemented in partial, complex, conflictual and uneven regimes. This is mainly because of the multidimensional nature of the addressed terrorism problem. Policy and regime complexity create ambiguity. Ambiguity creates room for tactic and divergent actions by implementers. Then, conflict is continuously constructed and deconstructed in the policy implementation context. The combination of ambiguity and conflict characterises the policy implementation context in which implementation roles and behaviours occur. Accordingly, from the findings, it seems clear that implementation processes of the TCPs are sensitive to the locus of the ambiguity and conflict levels of policy implementation contexts.

As mentioned in the literature review and shown in the first empirical chapter, while ambiguity mainly represents the substance of policies such as means and ends, the conflict embodies the politics of policies. These results reflect the work of Ingram and Schneider (1990), who articulate ambiguity as the instrumental aspect of a policy and conflict as the political aspect of a policy.



Figure 21: The occurrence of an implementation paradigm in an implementation context

Bringing the analysis together, it is evident that the instrumental aspects/statutory factors of the implementation context of the TCPs (namely ambiguity) and the political aspects/political process of the implementation context of the TCPs (namely conflict) determine the paradigms of implementation processes of the TCPs, as illustrated in Figure 21. Accordingly, it is possible to typify the implementation paradigms of the TCPs controlling the ambiguity and conflict variables.

This finding basically corroborates the main ideas of the ambiguity/conflict model. As analysed in the theoretical chapter, Matland (1995) uses the ambiguity/conflict model to describe implementation types. As expected in the theoretical chapter, the ambiguity/conflict model is a useful analytical framework to conceptualise and comprehend the implementation paradigms linking the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. Accordingly, the terming that Matland (1995) employs to label the four implementation types, as shown in Figure 22, could be employed in the following sections of the analysis to characterise the implementation paradigms.



Figure 22: Matland's terming of implementation types/paradigms

However, although Matland (1995) claims that "[a] policy field followed over many years can change so radically that it bears little resemblance to its initial form" thus, "implementation research… should be tied to a specific policy rather than to all actions in a policy field" (p. 152), this thesis has based its analysis on a broad and cross-counterterrorism policy area over time. It distinctively argues that it may be possible to conceptualise implementation types as implementation paradigms and employ them as the linking point to analyse the policy-action continuum in a broad policy area over time.

Accordingly, while Matland (1995) uses implementation types as an analytical tool to identify "which of several differing models in the literature best describes the implementation process" (p. 159) across policy types, the preceding findings and analyses of the empirical material—combined with the research's analytical framework—strongly support the argument that they may be used as analytical frameworks linking the policy-action continuum of the different types of TCPs over time. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

This is the point (the role of implementation paradigms in implementation) that the findings of the thesis add new insights to the existing literature on implementation. Thus, although the generalisability of the findings of the thesis to a larger class of units has not been the purpose of the research, the way this research employs the implementation paradigms may have several implications for the wider literature, especially the studies that involve the analysis of the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies.

Additionally, the findings of the empirical analysis suggest another unique argument that this research adds to the existing knowledge. Once an implementation paradigm related to the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict of a certain policy implementation context occurs, the quality of implementers and the local context intervene in the process, and the quality of

implementers determines the implementation roles and behaviours at the street level across localities, as shown in Figure 23.

This is to say, one of the paradigms occurs in the implementation context in a given time and the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers operate within this paradigm across localities. This paradigm links the starting point of the implementation process to the rest of the implementation process. Thus, it is the linking point between the upper part of the implementation context/policy and the lower part of the implementation context/implementation behaviours.

The significant point here is to explore in which paradigm of implementation an implementer operates. The implementation paradigm is the initial stipulation and the main determinant in implementation processes because it switches the upper implementation context to the bottom implementation context, linking "the enactment stage of the implementation process" (Schofield, 2004, p. 293) to the decisions and polices. Then, the local context and the quality of implementers get involved.



Figure 23: From implementation paradigm to implementation behaviours

This suggests that because the implementation paradigms are the variables that an implementer of a TCP cannot alter or substitute individually, the quality of this implementer could determine her/his implementation roles and behaviours in a locality, only within the context and constraints of an implementation paradigm. That is, the extent of an implementer's roles and behaviours at the street level cannot go beyond the boundaries of the implementation paradigms of the TCPs, even if the quality of implementers and local conditions intervene. These interventions occur, but only within the limits of the paradigms.

Thus, in a given time, implementers' roles and divergent behaviours may change across implementers and localities only within the limits of implementation paradigm. This means, divergent behaviours may occur. However, this does not mean that they could occur beyond the limitation of a certain implementation paradigm. As we have seen, continuous intense divergent implementation behaviours mean that they are backed up by decision makers and/or have coalitional support, and it means that implementation paradigm support these behaviours, or the paradigm shifted.

This suggest that while implementers do not have enough instruments to alter implementation patterns, top decision makers have available powers and instruments to alter the policy implementation context and eventually the implementation paradigm and, thus, the rest of the implementation. But, before addressing it, we need to understand how implementation paradigms change over time.

Implementation Paradigms Over Time

The findings suggest that the implementation paradigms of a counterterrorism policy type may change over time because the ambiguity and conflict levels in an implementation context potentially change over time. As Matland (1995) puts it: "The factors that help implement policy under one set of conditions exacerbate already existing problems under another" (p. 159). As illustrated in Figure 24, this means that implementers may potentially experience all four paradigms throughout the implementation process of a specific type of counterterrorism policy over time, although it may not necessarily occur. In fact, it should be noted that, in practice, generally one of the paradigms is dominant in a specific policy context over time.



Figure 24: Implementation paradigms over time for a specific policy

This result is related to the changing nature of the policy implementation context over time. Commenting on the issue, one of the interviewees said that the context of "a policy" could vary "from period to period" (Interviewee X5, 2017, m. 42:19). As soon as the ambiguity and conflict levels of a dominant policy type change, the implementation paradigm also changes. This result reflects the assertion of Matland (1995, p. 159) who stated:

… ambiguity and conflict are presented as dichotomous; this is strictly to simplify the exposition. The theoretical constructs are continuous. As a policy gradually moves across a dimension, for example from low to high conflict, the implementation process is expected increasingly to show the characteristics of the paradigm being moved toward and decreasingly to show the characteristics of the paradigm being moved away from. There is no tipping point at which a slight move up or down causes a radical shift from one type of implementation to another."



Figure 25: Approach types-implementation paradigms over time

Hence, my analysis suggests that it is the case that all implementation paradigms, which have been detailed in the study's theoretical chapter, might be seen across all types of the TCPs over time, as shown in Figure 25. This suggests that an implementation paradigm does not solely depend on a policy type, but on the extent to which this policy contains ambiguity and conflict in a specific period. As soon as the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict in the implementation context of this policy changes over time, the implementation paradigm also changes accordingly. The question, now, is how the paradigms change across different types of TCPs.

Policy Types/Implementation Paradigms Nexus

As mentioned in the literature review, several scholars believe the third-generation implementation studies underline the importance of exploring the relationships between policy types and implementation processes (e.g. Saetren, 2014; Goggin et al., 1990; Lester et al., 1987). As Matland (1995) states, while top-downers prefer to study unambiguous policies, bottom-uppers' preference is ambiguous policies, and "few consider how implementation varies when a different type of policy is considered" (p. 155).

As stated in the analytical framework, I expected reciprocal relations between the policy types and the implementers' roles and behaviours in the implementation processes of the TCPs. Although this is a single case study, its reliance on the multiplicity of theories (theoretically and methodologically), its broad and cross-counterterrorism perspective, and its longitudinal character made it possible for the research to examine how implementation varies across different types of TCPs over time.

My analysis suggests that every type of TCP based on the different theoretical approaches naturally contains a certain extent of ambiguity and conflict in its context. While ambiguity is inherited in policies, policies create conflict. The change among counterterrorism policies that have different theoretical background requires a fundamental departure from the status quo. This result reflects that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), who argue that major change and low consensus (high conflict) context stem from prolonged controversies, which is the case of the Turkish counterterrorism policy field. As Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) state: "Programs that require major change frequently lead to goal conflict on the part of relevant actors" (p. 460). Thus, even if we assume that the ambiguity level is the same, which is highly unlikely, the change among different types of counterterrorism policies almost always causes conflict in the policy implementation context. Accordingly, when the policy type changes, the implementation paradigm also changes with regard to the changing ambiguity and conflict levels of the new policy context.

This result may support the argument that there is an association between the type of policy and the paradigm of its implementation, as Matland (1995) suggests. In fact, the empirical material implies that there could be a relationship between them. For example, Interviewee X1 (2017, m. 23:25) argued that the implementation processes of deterrence based counterterrorism policies have different patterns from those of defiance/desistance based policies. Thus, implementers synchronise their behaviours in accordance with the spirit of the type of policy. Interviewee X21 (2017, m. 18:30) similarly described this role as playing different instruments.

However, my analysis found that the relationship between policy types and implementation paradigms is not direct. It seems likely that this relationship can be explained by the fact that when policy type changes the policy implementation context, in particular the levels of ambiguity and conflict, changes as well. Therefore, it appears that the policy types do not

directly determine the implementation paradigms. Instead, it is determined by the levels of ambiguity and conflict for a given policy's implementation context. When policy type changes, the implementation paradigm also changes and, without fail, implementation roles and behaviours are affected since the conflict and ambiguity levels of the policies vary. This suggests that if the levels of ambiguity and conflict do not change, the same implementation paradigm would occur for two different types of counterterrorism polices.



Figure 26: Policy type- implementation behaviour outline

As can be seen in Figure 26, first, the counterterrorism policy type changes. Then, the level of ambiguity and the level of conflict changes as the new policy's implementation context is different. Accordingly, the implementation paradigm changes and, eventually, the new paradigm dominates the new policy's implementation process, affecting the roles and behaviours of implementers.

Although there is no direct link between policy types and implementation paradigms, my analysis suggests that there might be relative relationships between certain policy types and certain implementation paradigms. On the one hand, administrative implementation (low ambiguity/low conflict) and political implementation (low ambiguity/high conflict) might be encountered comparatively more often in the implementation processes of deterrence TCPs than those of defiance/desistance TCPs, as they are relatively clearer than defiance/desistance TCPs. On the other hand, experimental implementation (high ambiguity/low conflict) and symbolic implementation (high ambiguity/high conflict) might be more common in the implementation processes of defiance/desistance TCPs than those of deterrence TCPs, as defiance desistance TCPs tend to be less clear than deterrence TCPs.

This suggests that surrounding contextual circumstances such as the local context and contested national political context may comparatively be more involved in the implementation processes of the defiance/desistance TCPs than deterrence TCPs. For example, Interviewee X23 (2017) revealed that when an implementer faces a terrorist there

is one option; “You will kill him, otherwise he will kill you” (m. 13:17). In this case the implementer would not take the surrounding circumstances into account. Although this example is extreme, it illustrates that when it comes to deterrence policies the surrounding circumstances may have a smaller impact on the implementation processes than when it comes to defiance/defiance TCPs. In the above example, there is less ambiguity and low conflict (as there is no other option for the implementer). This makes it administrative implementation, in which the available resources (such as guns and vehicles) become important for implementers. If there was high conflict, especially from the bottom, there would be political implementation and top actors would likely need to coerce the implementation.

Within the context and constraints of the paradigms, the quality of the implementer determines the form of their roles and behaviours at the street level. For instance, in the above “kill him or he will kill you” example, the quality of the implementer will determine their role and behaviour. If he is a high-quality implementer, he will be less likely to commit an extra-juridical killing, even if there are available resources (administrative implementation) or political coercion/support (political implementation) for deterrence from the top.

However, as ambiguity is low (in the case of deterrence), this implementer might not alter their implementation behaviour to the extent of turning a blind eye to the terrorist. If the conflict (environmental and individual) is low, they would carry the policy with the available resources (administrative). If the conflict (environmental and individual) is high, they would be coerced from the top to carry the policy (political). If their divergent behaviours occur to such an extent that goes beyond the limitations of the prevailing implementation paradigms, as the research has shown, they would be dismissed and held accountable. If divergent behaviours are intensified and implementers are not dismissed and not held accountable, it means that the implementation paradigm requires and/or permits them to do so or the paradigm changed, and this change in paradigm generally occurs in parallel with policy change.

There are some immediately dependable conclusions from the above findings for both implementation and counterterrorism perspectives. On the one hand, as the implementation context of the defiance/desistance TCPs are comparatively less clear than deterrence TCPs, symbolic and experimental implementation paradigms might occur more in the

implementation processes of these policies than those of deterrence TCPs. This suggests that the surrounding contextual conditions, such as the local context, may become comparatively more important in the implementation process of these policies. The importance of the surrounding circumstances in defiance/desistance TCPs suggests that bottom-up conditions may be more dominant influences on the implementation processes of these policies than those of deterrence TCPs. An implication of this is the possibility that the bottom-up approach and bottom-up dominant hybrid approaches of the implementation research could provide a more useful perspective for understanding the implementation processes of defiance/desistance TCPs than deterrence TCPs.

On the other hand, as deterrence TCPs tend to be comparatively clearer than defiance/desistance TCPs, political and administrative implementation paradigms might occur more in the implementation processes of deterrence TCPs than defiance/desistance polices. This suggests that instead of surrounding contextual conditions, top down factors, such as policy resources and political support/coercion, may become more important in the implementation processes of these policies. The importance of the political coercion and available resources in clear policies proposes that top-down factors may become more crucial in the implementation processes of the deterrence TCPs than deterrence TCPs. An implication of this is the possibility that the top-down approach and top-down based hybrid approaches could provide a better perspective to analyse the implementation processes of deterrence TCPs than defiance/defiance TCPs.

Meanwhile, as mentioned in the literature review and deeply analysed in the ontology and epistemology section of the methodology, while the deterrence approach in counterterrorism research and the top-down approach in the implementation research have been mainly developed based on the rational choice theory, defiance and desistance approaches in the counterterrorism research, and bottom-up approach in the implementation research contend the assumptions of the rational choice theory.

An implication of this is the possibility that the implementation context of the defiance/desistance policies may comprise more complex features than that of deterrence policies. This suggests that their implementation process needs a more sophisticated perspective in the Turkish case. This also explains why, as the previous findings have revealed, deterrence policies tend to be less ambiguous than defiance/desistance polices.

Owing to the fact that deterrence policies have been dominant since the struggle against PKK began, may it be possible to claim that administrative (low ambiguity/low conflict) and political implementation (low ambiguity/high conflict) have been more frequent paradigms throughout the Implementation processes of the TCPs?

The arguments of the above analysis have only been based on relative differences between deterrence and defiance/desistance TCPs. In fact, my analysis found that, over time, all four implementation paradigms may be encountered in the implementation processes of both deterrence and defiance/desistance TCPs.

Although from the findings it becomes evident that deterrence TCPs have been predominant since the beginning of the problem, the exact answer of which implementation paradigms have been dominant in which period and why, throughout the implementation processes of these policies and/or defiance/desistance policies, needs another comprehensive study.

However, from the findings, the leading role of the implementation paradigm of the dominant policy type for a given period's implementation context has come forward.

The Leading Role of the Dominant Policy Type's Implementation Paradigm

As we have seen, one of the obvious findings to emerge from the analysis is that deterrence and defiance/desistance TCPs all exist in parallel. This means that implementers need to simultaneously carry out different types of TCPs based on the different theoretical frameworks. The empirical analysis suggests that, at any given time, all three types of TCPs are carried out simultaneously, but with one's approach being dominant in the implementation context. Thus, there have always been successive periods in which one type of a policy is dominant while the other types of TCPs are still in charge.

For example, in the Solution Process, the defiance/desistance approach was dominant. However, this does not mean that all deterrence policies were abandoned. Deterrence-based policies still continued to have statutory power, such as the Counterterrorism Act. The distinguishing character of this period was that the political will decided to make the defiance/desistance policy prominent. Emphasizing how they experienced different conjunctures in which different policy types were dominant, Interviewee X23 (2017, m. 02:18) said:

> Of course, the conjuncture of that period is influential in the implementation of policies. We have the same laws. Our legislation does not change. I have been in this profession for 18 years… The crime of terror continues as a crime. But, when we come to practice, we see that in some periods some topics are treated more tolerantly and in some periods this tolerance disappears.

This means that in parallel with the political preference one of the policy types routinely takes the lead of the policy implementation context over time. Thus, the leading policy type's implementation paradigm dominates the counterterrorism policy implementation context in a given time.

As we have seen, a shift from one type of a policy to other may cause a shift in the implementation paradigm. Thus, as soon as decision makers change the dominant policy type from the top, the implementation paradigm could change. Accordingly, the patterns of the implementation process may change, and implementers may adjust their roles and behaviours at the bottom. But then, what happens when implementers carry out a specific policy whose approach is not the same as the dominant policy's approach?

The analysis of the collected interviews and reports supports the argument that implementers carry out specific polices under the influence of the implementation paradigm of the dominant policy type. However, the findings also suggest that there may occur two main drawbacks of this in the implementation processes of the TCPs.

First, in a defiance/desistance dominant period, implementers who do not believe in this approach could employ a deterrence policy in an attempt to derail it. For example, Interviewee X8 (2017) alleged that security based implementers intervened in an incident in Diyadin, a district in the Ağrı Province, that might be seen as an attempted provocation to terminate the Solution Process, behaving outside the political will. Although conflicting information has been put forward on what really happened in Diyadin on April 11, 2015, there was a clash between PKK members and soldiers on a hillside where a afforestation event was organized by the HDP and the DBP (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi/the Democratic Regions Party), where at least one PKK member and one civilian were killed, and at least four soldiers and one civilian were wounded (BBC, 2015a).

Although Interviewee X8 (2017) speculated that the intervention of security personnel in the incident in Diyadin was an attempt to sabotage the Solution Process, from the implementers point of view, they must intervene when they encounter any terrorist, because the Turkish Counterterrorism Act and the internal procedures of the security bodies require them to.

During that part of the Solution Process, the political will of the Government was determined in its policy. Their position and orders were clear. In fact, in an on-air tv interview, the President said: "During the Solution Process, our governors were not seriously engaged in operations against these terrorist organizations [the PKK] in accordance with the instructions we gave them" (PostMedya, 2015). Although there was high conflict, there was enough political will to force the implementation of the policy from top. In fact, the dominant implementation paradigm was political implementation, due to low ambiguity/high conflict. Coercion from the top restricted the possible divergent behaviours of conflictual implementers. Consequently, the above incident was isolated and its effect on the main policy remained limited.

Second, in a deterrence dominant period, specific defiance/defiance policies may be intensely diverged from its aims by the dominant deterrence approach's implementers. The Bloody Nowruz[9], which cost tens of lives in Sirnak in 1992 is an example of this. During the intense dominance of the deterrence approach, the results of the general elections of 20 October 1991 did not allow any party to form a government alone, thus a coalition government (the 49th Government) between the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi/the True Path Party; centre-right) and the SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti/the Social Democratic Populist Party; centre-left) was formed (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015), with an ambitious agenda to employ defiance/desistence policies, which had been previously undermined (Interviewee X16, 2017). The SHP had published a report in 1990, since called the 1989 Kurdish Report, and proposed a radical shift from the ongoing deterrence approach, pledging to address the grievances and needs of the target population by lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish, revisioning the state of the emergency rules and taking socio-economic measures (SHP, 1990). Accordingly, the programme of the 49th Government pledged more democratization as the new approach to the problem (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015). In fact, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel said the

[9] An ancient festive celebrated by people living from Balkans, to the Middle East, Iran and Central Asia.

Government recognised “the Kurdish Reality” on December 8, 1991 (Öngider, 2014), and President Turgut Özal presented a report, prepared by his aides, proposing political-social solutions including a general amnesty in the MGK meeting on March 13, 1992 (turkishnews, 2009). Nonetheless, as a member of the 49th Government, Interviewee X16 (2017, m. 27:24) said:

> When we continue our policy step by step, we came across 92, Sirnak, Cizre… Now there is a bureaucracy that is not ready for it [new approach]. Both military and civilian, this bureaucracy was resisting. They resisted. Then, 92 Nowruz events [occurred] … the security forces possessing guns resisted.

In this period, although Prime Minister Demirel said that everyone could freely celebrate the festival (Yıldırım, 2003), Turkey experienced the bloodiest Nowruz on March 21, 1992. According to official records 57 people were killed in two days, though non-governmental organizations put the number as 113, (haber7, 2009). Most of these deaths were in Şırnak and Cizre (Interviewee X16, 2017).

From the implementation point of view, the political context was intensely conflictual (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015) and the conflict of security based implementers for newly developed defiance/desistance policies was high (Özvarış, 2013; Interviewee X16, 2017). Also, while the dominant deterrence approach was unclear, the means and ends of the newly introduced defiance/desistance approach was also unclear. Within the dominant high conflict/high ambiguity paradigm (symbolic implementation), dissenting implementers looked at contextual conditions and could easily find supportive intra-state coalitions (Özvarış, 2013; Interviewee X16, 2017) for their divergent behaviours. As low-quality, dissenting, street level implementers, who can be seen in videos (dctr, 2015) of the events, could gain coalitional support from intra-state elites in the symbolic implementation paradigm of that period, these divergent behaviours continued in 1992 (haber7, 2009) and became a barrier for the newly introduced defiance/desistance approach. Thus, this approach failed, giving way for the most intense deterrence dominant era during the struggle.

The above analysis suggests that there are interconnections between policy changes, implementation paradigms and implementers’ roles and behaviours.

The Connections Between Policy Changes, Implementation Paradigms, and Implementation Roles and Behaviours Over Time

So far, we have seen that Turkey has never had a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework against the PKK, instead employing inconsistent and contradictory policies over time. As Interviewee X5 (2017, m. 04:16) said:

> Policies have changed over the years. While there have been harder struggles [deterrence policies] in certain periods, certain periods have been somewhat softer [defiance/desistance policies] ... But no clear success has been achieved so far. We clearly see that we get no [desired] result from them. The terror still continues, even though we challenge more. Thus, there must be a number of mistakes here, either in practice [implementation] or in decision [policies].

In fact, there is a rather interesting and widespread perception alleging that Turkey has always made interventions that are too late, or have lost meaning because they have been developed against the strategies of the terrorist organization (e.g. Interviewee X2, 2017; Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X26, 2017). The reasons for being one step behind are not this study's concern, but this has had important implications for the implementation processes of TCPs.

The single most striking implication of this lateness is that, although policies have been inconsistently fluctuating across different counterterrorism approaches from the beginning, as suggested many interviewees (e.g Interviewee X5, 2017; Interviewee X8, 2017; Interviewee X19, 2017; Interviewee X10, 2017), mostly deterrence based policies have dominated Turkish counterterrorism policy. For instance, Interviewee X28 (2017) commented that Turkey has always tried to eliminate the consequences of the problem instead of addressing its roots. Interviewee X26 (2017, m. 11:49) echoed:

> As soon as failures occurred and more soldiers and police were martyred, more mistakes have been made. As we gave martyrs, we more loaded on the other side. The use of power has resulted in favour of the PKK, while it has negatively affected us. ……. The PKK identified politics, we retaliated accordingly. When the movement [the retaliations] failed and the number of martyrs increased, we thought that we had to increase our strength [deterrence].

This suggests that, as Interviewee X5 (2017) stated, deterrence based polices , backfire in the long term. This finding is consistent with assertions from several counterterrorism scholars (e.g. Turk, 2002; Nevin, 2003). Due to the lack of a coherent national strategic counterterrorism framework, instead of focusing on addressing the roots of terrorism, there has been a spiralling process based on retaliation. Accordingly, the counterterrorism policy implementation context has been based on deterrence policy. Thus, However, in the post 2000s era, a more frequent change between dominant policy types have been observed.

Although the change between policy types over time is not the consideration of this research, an interrelationship between policy change and implementation processes over time has become apparent. The combination of the findings suggests that changes across policies from the top may alter the patterns of the implementation processes of the TCPs at the bottom. As Interviewee X5 (2017) put it: "…governments have had different policies" over time and "it has affected the campaign [implementation processes]" (m. 27:21). A policy change may trigger a change in the implementation paradigm, and this may alter the implementation process. That is, implementers may need to adjust their roles and behaviours at the street level because when the implementation paradigm changes, the main factors that implementers consider in the determination of their implementation roles and behaviours change too.

For instance, as can be seen in the preceding subsection's examples, while political power becomes a crucial factor in political implementation (low ambiguity/high conflict paradigm), which may occur more often in deterrence policies, contextual conditions turn out to be an important factor in symbolic implementation (high ambiguity/high conflict paradigm), which is more likely for defiance/desistance policies. As the empirical analysis suggests, the interconnections among the main factors of the implementation context may create certain effects, such as role collision, discrepancies and coping behaviours across localities at the bottom in the constraints and context of certain paradigms and the quality of implementers, as illustrated in Figure 27.



Figure 27: From the implementation context to the effects at the street level

On the other hand, this analysis found that the effects of the implementation context at the bottom related to the policy arrangements and implementers' roles and behaviours could trigger policy change at the top. As the empirical analysis has shown, the effects, such as the problem of control and coordination, role collision, coping behaviours and discrepancies may occur to such an extent that they may become barriers to implementation. These effects at the bottom could contribute to the failure of policies and may trigger policy change at the top.



Figure 28: Policy change/implementation process nexus over time

This suggests that there is a circular relationship between changing policies, implementation paradigms, and implementers' roles and behaviours over time. As illustrated in Figure 28, when top actors change polices it alters the implementation paradigm, accordingly, implementers adjust their roles and behaviours at the bottom, and while effects occur at the bottom, decision makers adjust policies at the top, and this pattern continues over time. The paradigms are the main tool in this process that connects policies/policy makers from the top and implementers/implementation behaviours from the bottom.

In sum, the analysis suggests that the functioning of the implementation paradigms may explain how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs work as they do. It appears that it is possible to link the policy to the action using implementation paradigms as analytical tools throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs. They are useful tools to connect the upper and lower part of the implementation processes of the TCPs. The analysis of the components of them enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

This section has shown that an evidence-based analysis of the components of the paradigms enable us to spread the responsibilities between politics and administration in a reasonable and realistic way. The overall analysis suggests that decision makers have more available power and instruments to alter implementation paradigms than implementers. Thus, politics is more likely to be in charge than administration in the implementation process.

The next section will map the policy-action continuum as a process based on the overall findings and analysis.

6.3. The "Mapping" of the Implementation Process of the TCPs

Hitherto, this thesis has strived to comprehend how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs principally work as they do. By focusing on the nature of the TCPs from the top and implementer's roles and behaviours from the bottom, it has tried to explore the dynamics of the implementation in the policy-action continuum. Putting the empirical analysis together, the below analysis will map the implementation as a process, which has been the main aim of the research.

The combination of findings provides support for the argument that although, in principle, there is a hierarchical structure in the implementation processes of the TCPs, the processes exhibit something of a cyclical character. Although the process is presented as sub-stages to simplify it for the reader, it gradually and continuously moves across time and, apart from the policy change, there is not a radical shifting point across stages. The stages are evolutionarily embedded.

First Stage

In the first stage of the implementation, the dominant policy type is the initial input to characterise the upper part of the implementation context of the TCPs, as shown in Figure 29. Thus, consistent with the assumption of the top-down implementation scholars (e.g. Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980), this research found that the starting point of the implementation processes of the TCPs is a policy. As soon as a policy type is decided and promulgated, the implementation process starts. As we have seen, although there may be different types of specific TCPs to be carried out in the same period, one of them dominates the implementation context.



Figure 29: The first stage of the implementation process of the TCPs

If we describe the implementation process of the TCPs as a mechanism, the central authority is at the top of that mechanism. This suggests that central actors are determinative in this stage. The policy is decided at the top and implementation is ordered from the top to be flown down in a hierarchic manner. The findings suggest that although, principally, implementers are liable to obey to decision makers' choice of a dominant policy approach/specific policy, the levels of ambiguity and conflict in the upper part of the implementation context of the TCPs may restrain the initial top down perspective.

Throughput the empirical analysis, as the dominant policy type is determined at the top and enforced from top to bottom, the assumptions of the top-down approach in implementation have been relatively more convenient for understanding this stage, regardless of the preferred counterterrorism policy type.

Second Stage

The analysis suggests that every specific counterterrorism policy type naturally contains a degree of ambiguity and conflict in its context. Thus, the context of the implementation processes of the TCPs is mainly shaped by the ambiguity and conflict factors. As the factors of ambiguity and conflict are naturally embedded in a specific policy's implementation context, these two variables determine the implementation paradigm at this stage. As shown in Figure 30, the implementation paradigm become decisive in the process, because implementers act within constraints and context of the implementation paradigm.



Figure 30: The second stage

Although, as mentioned in the literature review, the top-down perspective embraces the classical public administration models and assumes that the administration is separate from politics, the analysis of the implementation context of the TCPs shows that it contains an element of politics. While ambiguity brings predominantly administrative elements forward, conflict mainly employs political elements. In fact, while ambiguity is mainly a top-down factor, conflict is a hybrid variable comprising both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. Thus, a hybrid perspective combining the assumptions of the top-down, and bottom-up approaches have been relevant to understand this stage.

Third Stage

Once the implementation paradigm comes into being, implementers start to play their roles, as shown in Figure 31. Within the constraints and context of a given paradigm, the form of implementation roles and behaviours is determined by the quality of implementers across localities.

As Berman (1978) states, as soon as a policy starts to interact with its implementation context, the implementation problems start to arise. While the policy is carried out at the street level, the effects of the implementation context related to the policy arrangements such as the problem of control and coordination, the problem of resources and the effects related to the implementer's roles and behaviours, such as coping behaviours, discrepancies and role collision, may arise.

The findings suggest that when implementers realize their implementation roles and behaviours within a certain implementation paradigm, they need to attain appropriate conditions to achieve better implementation. For example, in a low ambiguity/low conflict paradigm, the available resources are essential for better implementation.



Figure 31: The third stage

This is the bottom point of the implementation process and the bottom-up approach is dominant at this stage. As revealed in the literature review, the problems of the implementation processes and interactions among the implementation actors is mostly the bottom-up approach's concern. In fact, one of the main aims of the bottom-up approach is to discover implementers' roles (Schofield, 2001). Thus, its assumptions have been more appropriate to appreciate this stage.

Fourth Stage

As we have seen, the effects of the implementation context at the street level regarding policy arrangements and implementer's roles and behaviours may be one of the factors contributing to policy change. My analysis suggests that effects such as discrepancies, control and coordination problems might be barriers in implementation, and this may lead to failure in policies. As illustrated in Figure 32, the impact of this may be a change in policy. That is, the impact of the implementation process of the TCPs could be one of the factors prompting policy change.

The effects of a policy's implementation context at the street level may be communicated to the decision makers through implementers' feedback and/or changing public perception. From the implementation point of view, the changing public perception and the straightforward implementation feedback may mean that the implementation process gradually changes towards the last stage. This means a revision point for a policy change may develop. When top actors change the policy, a new implementation process starts. Because once policy change occurs, it is likely that the main parameters of the implementation context change. A new paradigm occurs, and implementers adjust their roles and behaviours accordingly.



Figure 32: The fourth stage

Implementation barriers occur at the street level and the feedback comes from bottom to top in a hierarchical way. However, as the findings suggest, policy changes are primarily governmental decisions. Interviewee X5 (2017) stated that counterterrorism policies have been changed according to "the understanding and stance of governments" on the problem "from period to period", although the policies have mainly been deterrence based (m. 06:08). Sabatier (1986) clarifies that one of the main characteristics of the top-down approach is to explore "How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?" (p. 23) after a policy is put into force by central authorities. Consequently, a hybrid perspective combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches has been useful in exploration of this stage.

The Linking Point on the Implementation Chain

As revealed in the introduction chapter, beginning in the early 1970s, the implementation phase of the policy process was seen as 'the missing link' that needs to be explored. (e.g. Hargrove, 1975; Berman, 1978; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Smith, 1973). While the implementation literature has extensively addressed this missing link across various policies since then, the implementation phase of counter-terrorism policies is still missing.

So far, this thesis has explored the 'missing link' in the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies, mapping the missing link in the implementation processes of the TCPs. This study has deduced that the missing link, or the main linking point, in the implementation chain is the implementation paradigm. As shown in Figure 33, the implementation paradigm is an analytical tool to lock up the chain of the policy-action continuum throughout the implementation process of the TCPs. This finding is an original contribution to the existing knowledge. The analysis of the components of the paradigms

shows that politics is more likely in the charge than administration in the implementation processes of the counterterrorism policies.

In a point of fact, I suggest that the function of the paradigms as the linking point in the implementation chain may be generalisable to other policy sectors. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, it links the policy context to the implementation context. Secondly, it links the political aspect of the implementation to the administrative aspect of the implementation. The paradigm occurs in a context where the top-down and bottom-up perspectives interact each other. The rest of the implementation process is shaped according to the implementation paradigm.



Figure 33: The missing link/the main linking point in the implementation chain

That is, the ambiguity and conflict levels in the implementation context of the TCPs are the main determinants of the roles and behaviours of the implementers. This suggests that once it is possible to determine a policy's ambiguity and conflict levels, it may also be possible to estimate what factors are needed in a locality for precise implementation. Accordingly, decision makers may be able to decide which instruments they should use to attain precise implementation. For example, in a low ambiguity/high conflict paradigm, it would be estimated that available political coercion/support and qualified implementers are crucial for better implementation at the street level across localities.

In fact, as mentioned in the theoretical discussions, one of the main aims of the implementation research has been to explore the black holes in the implementation process that prevent better implementation behaviours. The analyses in the empirical chapters demonstrate that the components of the ambiguity and conflict variables are the core sources of the black holes in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. The shortcomings in these components determine the black holes that possibly prevent better implementation and lead

to policy failures because the crucial information and relevant consent for better implementation disappear in these black holes.

In fact, Interviewee X5 (2017) commented that “after a decision becomes clear”, it does not flawlessly go to the bottom from “the very beginning” to “the thinnest point” due to the “disconnections” and “gaps” within the implementation mechanism caused by ambiguity and conflict, because within an unclear context an implementer “could make his own decision… incorporating his own belief in implementation”, and this prevents better implementation, becoming a barrier in implementation, and leading to “failures” (m. 28:59).

It can thus be suggested that, in addition to be the linking point, the implementation paradigm is also the hole in which we should look to discover the disconnections of the policy-action continuum. This means, to shed light on this hole enables us to find the core sources of the barriers on the policy action-action continuum of the TCPs.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has initially presented implementation/policy change nexus. It has then showed that the linking point in the policy action-continuum of the TCPs is the implementation paradigm. It has eventually mapped the implementation processes of the TCPs.

(A) Regarding the implementation/policy change nexus (1) the main top-down and bottom up factors may also be barriers for implementation resulting in failures in policies; (2) this might trigger a change in policy from the top, though a change in policy does not solely occur due to the effects of implementation.

(B) Regarding the missing link in the policy-action continuum (1) the missing link in the implementation processes of the TCPs is the implementation paradigm; (2) implementation paradigm is an analytical tool to link the upper part (policy) and lower part (roles and behaviours) of the implementation process; (3) the implementation paradigms of a counterterrorism policy type may change over time because the ambiguity and conflict levels in an implementation context potentially change over time; (4) an implementation paradigm does not solely depend on a policy type, but on the extent to which this policy contains ambiguity and conflict in a specific period; (5) when the policy type changes, the implementation paradigm also changes with regard to the changing ambiguity and conflict levels of the new policy context.

(C) Regarding the mapping of the implementation processes of the TCPs (1) although there is a hierarchical structure in the implementation processes of the TCPs, the processes exhibit something of a cyclical character; (2) the implementation process gradually and continuously moves across time and, apart from the policy change, there is not a radical shifting point across sub-stages of implementation.

Altogether, the chapter initially analyses how the problems of the implementation at the street level may turn the implementation process into a barrier leading to failure of the policies, and potentially trigger policy change. It then, combining the research's analytical framework with the overall findings and analyses of the empirical material, exclusively shows that the implementation paradigms may be used as analytical tools to link the policy-action continuum of the different types of TCPs over time. The chapter also uniquely illustrates that when an implementation paradigm occurs, the quality of implementers and the local context intervene in the process, and the quality of implementers determines the implementation roles and behaviours at the street level across localities.

Empirical Analysis in a Nutshell

As mentioned in the analytical framework, based on existing literature on implementation, I expected a reciprocal interaction throughout the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. I assumed there would be a constant relationship between implementation roles and behaviours from the bottom, and policy types from the top, in the implementation processes. The analysis has shown that there may be a certain degree of reciprocal interaction, in which the paradigms function as a bridge to link the top and the bottom of the implementation.

Although the main assumption of the reciprocal interaction in the implementation processes has been confirmed, the findings of the empirical analysis do not support the other hypotheses, explained at the end of the analytical framework and assumed a precisely predictable sequential relationship between the implementation paradigms, namely administrative, political, experimental and symbolic implementation and different types of policies, namely defiance/desistance and deterrence counterterrorism policies. Those hypotheses do not work because there are no direct relationships between policy types and implementation paradigms, as assumed in the theoretical framework. As one of its

contributions to the implementation research, the empirical analysis suggests that the relation is indirect by means of ambiguity and conflict levels of each policy type in a given time.

We have seen that the implementation paradigms change within and between polices over time regarding the changing ambiguity and conflict levels of the implementation context. First, while the implementation context of a given policy changes over time, the implementation paradigms adjust accordingly. Second, a change from one type of a policy to the other type may trigger an alteration from one type of an implementation paradigm to another. If we assume that the ambiguity and conflict levels remain the same over time, we should expect that the implementation paradigm will remain the same within and between policies.

As soon as the implementation paradigm changes, the quality of implementers and local context intervene, and the rest of the implementation process adjusts accordingly. Although the policy changes have principally been the government's decision, the study demonstrates that the causal interactions among the core factors of the implementation context may be the source of several barriers related to the policy arrangements, and implementers' roles and behaviours in the implementation process at the street level. Accordingly, these barriers may deliver policy failure and eventually policy change. As Interviewee X5 (2017) stated, the decisions and implementation "affect each other" (m. 28:08).



Figure 34: The implementation steering of the TCPs

Bardach (1977) represents the implementation process of a policy as a machine. Similarly, I visualise the reciprocal interactions in the implementation processes of the TCPs using the metaphor of connected gearwheels in Figure 34. The constant transforming character of the implementation sub-stages results in continuing twists and turns with a repetitive pattern over time. The study demonstrates that although it might be too awkward to claim that the implementation processes of the TCPs work in a perfectly predictable mechanical pattern, the study has explored considerable mutual linkages and constant interactions between different stages of the implementation process. It is, therefore, likely that the above connections constantly exist between the sub-stages of the implementation processes of the TCPs. Accordingly, it may be possible to hypothesise that there is a reciprocal implementation process between top and bottom in which implementation paradigms link policy to action.

7. CONCLUSION

When a person goes into the headquarters of any governor or district governor in Turkey, they will almost immediately notice a proverb, quoted from the leader of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, written on the offices walls which says “a practitioner, an implementer is stronger than a decision-maker”. It implies that even though public policies are centrally decided, their fates are at the hands of implementers. Given that Atatürk has enormous experience, from military to politics, should we assume that his statement could be a generalizable hypothesis?

The research has shown that it is not. Instead, Turkish decision makers intentionally leave ambiguities in policy means and ends, and they frequently change their tune by means of Machiavellian behaviour in order to be able to escape from responsibility. They also lack the capacity to generate sound counterterrorism policies leaving implementers to muddle between what they say to the public and what they ask them behind closed doors. This creates ambiguity and conflict in implementation context.

Adding new insights to the counterterrorism research, this thesis has shown that Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive, and even counterproductive, because they are formulated too ambiguously in contested political context and carried out by low quality of implementers in conflictual circumstances at the local level. Combining with the lack of a comprehensive and coherent national counterterrorism strategy, implementers experience dilemma and confusion, and produce divergent implementation behaviours at the street level.

In fact, what Ataturk said was a general assumption of his time. However, starting in the 1970s, scholars of policy studies became aware of the fact that policies do not implement themselves and described the implementation stage of policy processes as ‘the missing link’. Since then, although scholars have produced a vast amount of studies related to the implementation phase of various policies, the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies has remained missing.

On that account, the objective of this research was to understand how and why the implementation processes of the TCPs work as they do. Considering counterterrorism policies from the top and implementers’ roles and behaviours from the bottom, the research sought

to explore the interrelationships between policies and implementer's roles and behaviours with the aim of exploring the missing link, which was identified as the implementation paradigm, in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs. The inquiry of how these interactions occur between policy and action via implementation paradigm, and who is in charge across the different types of the TCPs was the research's empirical consideration.

This chapter consists of four sections. Initially, it summarises the analytical insights and the key findings of the research. Then, it underlines the contribution of the research and the argument. While the third section presents recommendations for practice, the last section presents recommendations for theory and future studies underlining the limitations of the research.

7.1. Building the Bridge: From Theoretical Insight to Empirical Focus

This research conceptualised implementation as a process in a policy-action continuum. Thus, as, Schofield (2004) states, it needed both the types of TCPs as well as implementer's roles and behaviours in its analysis. Accordingly, it included the nature of the TCPs in its theoretical analysis and classified them as defiance/desistance and deterrence polices.

Although there are many theoretical frameworks used in the study of implementation processes of public policies, none offered a sufficient theoretical framework to scrutinise the complexity of the implementation processes of the different types of TCPs. Thus, the analytical framework of the research was framed by the combination of several assumptions generated through the critical analysis of the different partial theories of the implementation research.

While critical analysis of the top-down approach brought the importance of policies and decision makers' perspectives forward, the critical analysis of the bottom-up approach brought the local factors and the roles and behaviours of implementers forward. Nonetheless, although the implementation process may differ across different types of policies, they fell short in linking different types of TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers via an explicit theory.

Accordingly, throughout the critical analysis of the hybrid approaches, the typology of the implementation of the ambiguity/conflict model was distinctively employed as an analytical tool to link the policy-action continuum of the different types of the TCPs. This is to argue that ambiguity and conflict are factors of significant importance in the implementation processes

of the TCPs and they determine the implementation paradigms that link the policy-action continuum of the different types of the TCPs and connect the top-down and bottom-up perspectives.

Eventually, I developed a parsimonious framework to explore the causal complexities of the implementation processes of the TCPs and formulated the main hypotheses arguing that there are constant reciprocal interactions between policy types from the top and implementers' roles and behaviours from the bottom, and these are linked via implementation paradigms over time.

The empirical material provided valuable evidence so that it might be possible to build a bridge between the research's theoretical chapter and its empirical analysis to contribute findings to the wider knowledge. In fact, the combination of the findings provided support for the argument that it is possible to link different types of the TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers over time via the implementation paradigm.

Accordingly, analysing the implementation context of the TCPs, the first empirical chapter proved that the main variables of the implementation context of the TCPs are ambiguity, conflict, the quality of implementers and the local context. In addition, concerning a number of issues developed throughout the implementation processes of the TCPs at the street level, such as control and coordination problems, discrepancies, coping behaviours and role collision, the second empirical chapter showed that while these issues surfaced regarding the main variables of ambiguity and conflict, their scope is determined by the local context and the quality of implementer at the street level.

Thus, the third empirical chapter stated that ambiguity and conflict are the core variables shaping the implementation processes of the TCPs and that they determine the implementation paradigms. The chapter also illustrated that, as supplementary variables, local context and the quality of implementer become crucial in determining the roles and behaviours of the implementers at the street level in relation to the implementation paradigms. This is an empirical output that was not implied in the theoretical chapters.

The above general results of the empirical data made it possible to construct the main bridge between theoretical insight and empirical analysis. This is like a two-column suspension bridge. While the ambiguity variable stands as one of the columns, from mainly the top-down

perspective, the conflict variable stands as the other, representing mainly the bottom-up perspective. The deck of the bridge represents the paradigms of implementation processes linking the policy (upper context/politics) and action (lower context/administration) continuum of the TCPs. While the paradigms stand on the main columns, the local context and the quality of the implementer represents the main cables supporting the main columns, passing the compression forces of the main columns into the street level.

The way the research uses implementation paradigms to link the policy-action continuum over time is at the core of its contribution to the wider knowledge. Also, the secondary role of the quality of implementers and local context in determining the scope of the roles and behaviours of the implementers at the street level adds new insights to the existing knowledge.

7.2. The Contribution of the Research

This research filled several gaps in the existing literature. First, it focused on the implementation phase of Turkish counterterrorism polices and analysed the internal dynamics of Turkey's responses to the PKK, which was totally neglected. Second, it analysed the implementation stage of counterterrorism policies, which was ignored by the general literature on counterterrorism. Third, it studied counterterrorism polices, a policy area that was ignored by the implementation research. Yet, while filling these gaps, the research also added new dimensions to the related literature.

There are three unique primary contributions of this research to the existing knowledge. First, the relative importance of the quality of implementers and the local context at the street level. Although the it comes as no surprise to encounter an emphasis of the importance of able implementers and local factors in any implementation paper, most studies fail to evidence the conditions and constraints in which they involve in implementation. Although the analytical analysis did not emphasise this, the empirical analysis of this research exposed that implementers operate within the context and constraints of the implementation paradigms. Thus, in order to understand the roles and behaviours of implementers at the street level, we initially need to understand the paradigm in which those implementers operate. This is because, although the quality of implementers and local context intervene in determining implementers' divergent roles and behaviours, the scope of those divergent roles and

behaviours across localities cannot go beyond the margins of a given implementation paradigm.

The second, and the most important contribution, is that the research links different types of TCPs to the roles and the behaviours of the implementers via implementation paradigms. In fact, the critical analysis of the existing literature exposed that implementation research lacks a common analytical framework to link different types of policies to the roles and behaviours of implementers, although the contemporary implementation research expects that implementation processes may differ across policy types.

As expected by third generation implementation research, the aim of this research was "conceptualizing and empirically exploring the linkage between individual behaviour" of the Turkish counterterrorism policy implementers "and the political, economic, and legal context in which it occurs" (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540). It handled "the complexity of the policy-action relationship" in the implementation processes of the deterrence and defiance/desistance Turkish counterterrorism policies through "a pluralistic approach in the use of conceptual models or theories" (Barrett and Fudge, 1981c, p. 251). Eventually, this research linked different types of the TCP to the roles and behaviours of the implementers "via an explicit theory" (Sabatier, 1986, p. 35), namely the implementation paradigms.

As an original approach that adds new insights to the existing knowledge, this research distinctively employed the typologies of implementation of the ambiguity/conflict model as the implementation paradigms to link the contradictory and complex nature of the different types of TCPs to the roles and behaviours of the implementers in the policy-action continuum over time. The analysis of the components of the implementation paradigm enables the research to explore the missing link in the policy-action continuum of the TCPs so that it may be possible to identify who is in charge in there.

In fact, the use of the implementation paradigms as an analytical framework to link the policy-action continuum may be generalisable across different units and policy sectors. This is because it enables the research to link the top-down perspective and the bottom-up perspective, the upper implementation context to the lower implementation context, politics to administration, and eventually policy to action.

Also, as the third core contribution, this thesis distinctively reveals that the implementation phase of counterterrorism policies, which has been understudied by counterterrorism and implementation studies, may be one source of the struggles of these policies.

The thesis showed that the implementation phase is one of the reasons why Turkish counterterrorism policies have remained unproductive and/or counterproductive. Because, the implementation context of the Turkish counterterrorism policies is highly ambiguous and conflictual. Decision makers either intentionally leave ambiguities in policies or they lack the capacity to produce sound policies. Thus, conflicting low quality of implementers may be able to employ divergent roles and behaviours in the local context. This may prevent precise implementation and turn the implementation into a barrier, resulting in policy failures. For example, in the high ambiguity/high conflict implementation paradigm of the Solution Process, low quality implementers struggled to carry out the policy because the crucial information and relevant consent were absent for them. Within this context, the implementation of the Solution Process was flawed at the street level and the life and property of the people in the Region were exposed to the PKK. This contributed to the policy change.

When introducing this research, I stated that the unprecedented causalities starting in July 2015 that signalled the dramatic shift from the defiance desistance-based Solution Process to the deterrence period caused intense public dissatisfaction, resulting in a blame game among prominent actors. When President Erdogan made implementers the scapegoat for the failure of the Solution Process, his stance raised an intriguing question: Who is in charge here, politics or administration?

In fact, the problems that occurred throughout the implementation processes could be the subject of a blame game between politics and administration. The research has shown that an evidence-based analysis of the components of the paradigms would enable us to spread the responsibilities between politics and administration in a reasonable and realistic way. The overall analysis shows that decision makers have more available power and instruments to alter implementation paradigms than implementers. Thus, politics is more likely to be in charge than administration in the implementation process.

The key role of the implementation paradigms between the top and bottom levels of the implementation process alongside the relative importance of the local context and the quality

of implementer in the implementation processes of the TCPs suggest that it may be possible to prescribe and end even manipulate this process by fixing the variables. Thus, it is possible to develop generalisable and practical advice for both decision makers and implementers of counterterrorism policies, and even for other policy areas.

7.3. Recommendations for Policy Actors

In their design perspective on implementation, Linder and Peters (1987) state that the implementation research should pay attention to "designing effective policies and effective implementation systems" (p. 474). The research implies that if the relevant actors are made aware of the function of the main patterns of the implementation process, namely those of the paradigms, local context and the quality of implementers, they may use their propositions as effective tools to attain precise implementation.

The role of the implementation paradigms as an analytical tool between policy/politics and action/administration, and the importance of the local context and the quality of implementers for the formation of implementer's roles and behaviours at the street level are the backbone of the framework. This may help us to understand, analyse and compose the implementation processes of the TCP to be used as a guide by implementers and decision makers. Accordingly, the below analysis will identify and recommend the primary tools/instruments that may well be used by decision makers or implementers in different scenarios.

The empirical analysis has revealed that the most prevalent paradigms encountered in the implementation processes of the deterrence TCPs are the political (low ambiguity/high conflict) and administrative (low ambiguity/low conflict) paradigms. This suggests that precise implementation may be attainable if the decision makers of the deterrence TCPs benefit from the propositions of the top-down approach and top-down based hybrid approaches while formulating and supervising the implementation stages of these polices. Accordingly, while there is low conflict, precise implementation requires sufficient resources (low ambiguity/low conflict paradigm), and while there is high conflict, precise implementation requires political coercion/support (low ambiguity/high conflict paradigm). This means when the top-down perspective (means low ambiguity) is prevalent, the lack of political coercion/support in high conflict contexts and the lack of resources in low conflict may lead to implementation failures.

The empirical analysis exposed that the most prevalent implementation paradigms encountered in the implementation processes of the defiance/desistance TCPs are the experimental (high ambiguity/low conflict) and symbolic (high ambiguity/high conflict) paradigms. This suggests that taking advantage of the propositions of the bottom-up approach and bottom-up hybrid approaches while formulating and supervising the implementation phases of these policies, it may help decision makers of defiance/desistance TCPs attain precise implementation. Accordingly, while there is low conflict, precise implementation needs to take contextual conditions into account (high ambiguity /low conflict), and while there is high conflict, precise implementation needs coalitional strength/support (high ambiguity/high conflict). This means that when the bottom-up perspective (means high ambiguity) is prevalent, negative contextual conditions in low conflict and the lack of coalitional support in high conflict may lead to implementation failures.

While it is possible to trace the footprint of the above submissions in the implementation research, especially in the ambiguity/conflict model of Matland (1995), this study adds two additional instruments: local context and the quality of the implementers. In the coherent strategic counterterrorism framework deficit Turkish case, as the different levels of ambiguity and conflict are indispensable in the implementation context over time, the quality of implementers becomes crucial across localities. While high ambiguity in the implementation context creates room for implementers to freely apply their skills in the local context, high quality implementers are better at managing a highly conflictual implementation context.

The more an implementation context is ambiguous, the more the bottom-up factors become important. While this increases the importance of the quality of implementers and the local context, this also means more responsibilities for implementers. For example, in an experimental paradigm, while low-quality implementers may be the cause of implementation failures, even if there are positive contextual conditions, the high-quality implementers may attain precise implementation, even there are negative contextual conditions across localities. Also, the high-quality implementers are better at attaining coalitional support in case of a symbolic paradigm.

Accordingly, once they get the picture of the implementation context of a TCP, decision makers can utilize the tools presented in the below Figures 35, 36, 37, and 38 to achieve precise implementation.



Figure 35: The top-down/deterrence perspective (administrative)

If decision makers aim for precise implementation in the administrative paradigm of the top-down/deterrence perspective, they ought to provide sufficient resources and assign tasks to suitable implementers. If implementers aim for better implementation, they should balance the local context. Figure 35 illustrates this.



Figure 36: The top-down/deterrence perspective (political)

As Figure 36 illustrates, if decision makers aim for precise implementation in the political paradigm of the top-down/deterrence perspective, they ought to politically coerce or support implementers and assign tasks to suitable implementers. If implementers want better implementation, they should balance the local context.

Even if conflict is high, if a policy is clear and supported/coerced by top, implementers will obey this policy. This means the lack of decisiveness from the top may cause problems. While political coercion is in place to force the conflictual implementers to carry out policies, political support is in place for favouring implementers.



Figure 37: The bottom-up/defiance/desistance perspective (experimental)

If decision makers aim for precise implementation in the experimental paradigm of the bottom-up/defiance/desistance perspective, they ought to try to fix the contextual conditions and assign tasks to suitable implementers who are able to minimize the negative effects of the contextual conditions. If implementers want better implementation, they should also balance the local context. Figure 37 explains this.



Figure 38: The bottom-up/defiance/desistance perspective (symbolic)

As shown in Figure 38, if decision makers aim for precise implementation in the symbolic paradigm of the bottom-up/defiance/desistance perspective, they ought to assign tasks to suitable implementers who are able to build coalitional support. If implementers want better implementation, they should also balance the local context.

In high ambiguity, the backing implementers seek does not come as political support/coercion from decision makers, as their minds are not clear about the policy. Thus, they are not significantly decisive to politically coerce/support the implementation of this policy. However, implementers look at contextual conditions to seek coalitions to gain support and guarantees to carry out the policy.

The above analysis helps us to understand which factors are crucial to attaining precise implementation for each perspective. However, it does not claim that precise implementation necessarily leads policy success. The below analysis will address recommendations for theory and future work, while addressing the limitations of the research.

7.4. Recommendations for Further Research

To begin, the findings suggest that deterrence and defiance/desistance dominant eras and policies have switched one after the other, in the Turkish case. The findings also confirm that in a dominant policy era, such as defiance/desistance, the other policies, namely deterrence, were also in effect. Thus, implementers must, at least legally, carry out the contradictory policies at the same time.

We have seen that when a policy's implementation context is less ambiguous, the compliance of implementers with this policy increases. However, the dominant policy approach also matters for the degree of ambiguity. For example, if the defiance/desistance-based approach is dominant in a given time, the implementation context of a specific deterrence policy could become less clear for implementers. If the deterrence policy approach is dominant in a given time, the implementation context of a specific deterrence policy become less ambiguous for the implementer. In the same way, if the deterrence approach is dominant, while specific deterrence policies are less ambiguous, specific defiance/desistance policies are less clear for implementers. This means that as soon as the dominant approach's implementation context/paradigm and a specific policy's implementation context/paradigm is different, it is highly likely that implementers get confused and a dilemma occurs. This could possibly affect the behaviour of implementers.

A specific example given by Interviewee X7 (2017) well illustrates how this dilemma affects the actions/behaviours of implementers. He compared two specific incidents in which implementers acted in opposing ways. In the first incident, during a protest in which some Greek Cypriots tried to penetrate the boundaries of a Turkish signpost in Cyprus on 14 August 1996, one of the protesters climbed on a flag pole to lower the Turkish flag that was flying and was immediately shot dead by an unknown Turkish soldier (haber7, 2018). In the second incident, during a demonstration held by PKK sympathisers in Diyarbakir on 8 August 2014, a group of demonstrators penetrated the barracks of the 2nd Air Force Command and one climbed the flagpole to lower the Turkish flag. In this case, soldiers did not attempt to kill the protester (Hürriyet, 2014).

In both cases, the reaction from the decision makers shows that the policy is out in place to prevent anybody, by any means, from lowering the flag in such cases. These rather contradictory implementation behaviours could be explained by the fact that while the first incident occurred in a deterrence dominant policy era, the second incident happened in a defiance/desistance dominant era. Thus, implementers faced a dilemma and confusion in the second incident.

Nevertheless, the research has shown that, in the Turkish case, different types of specific policies are carried out within the context of a dominant counterterrorism policy type's

approach. For example, a deterrence-based counterterrorism policy could be carried out in a period in which a defiance/desistance-based policy is dominant.



Figure 39: Dominant approach/specific policy in a given time

Thus, as illustrated in Figure 39, it could be possible to segregate the macro and micro implementation contexts/paradigms in a given time frame. The macro implementation context/paradigm is that of the dominant policy type's approach. The micro implementation context/paradigm is that of a specific policy operating within the period of the dominant policy's implementation context/paradigm.

So far, the research has been principally conducted considering a macro perspective, rather than to analyse the implementation process of a specific policy/micro perspective. Still, it is possible to estimate that micro implementation context/paradigm occurs for a specific counterterrorism policy within the boundaries of the macro implementation context/paradigm. When the macro policy implementation context/paradigm changes, for example a change from a defiance desistance dominant era to the deterrence dominant era, the micro implementation process alters accordingly. Hence, although a specific policy remains in charge, for example the Counterterrorism Act, its micro implementation paradigm probably accords itself to the new macro paradigm.

However, although I expect the patterns of the macro and micro scale implementation processes to be similar, the extent of the interactions between macro and micro implementation should be the subject of another research project.

Likewise, although it becomes evident from the findings that deterrence TCPs have been dominant in the implementation context of the TCPs, further work needs to be done to

establish which implementation paradigms have been dominant, in which period and why, in the implementation processes of these policies and/or defiance/desistance policies.

In addition, the findings of the empirical analysis suggest that It would be deceptive to develop a static implementation paradigm to be used for the entire Turkish counterterrorism policy implementation context. This is because the ambiguity and conflict levels in an implementation context potentially change over time and across localities. The question is, how far discrepancies occur across localities while policy type and time frame are invariable. Should we expect different implementation paradigms across localities? This needs additional empirical evidence and another extensive study to answer.

Nevertheless, while filling gaps in the implementation and counterterrorism research, this study has identified the missing link, or the linking point, in the policy-action continuum of Turkish counterterrorism policies as the implementation paradigm, and it has demonstrated that there are constant relationships between different types of counterterrorism policies and implementers' roles and behaviours, and that these are linked via implementation paradigms.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP The Justice and Development Party

ASALA The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

CHP The Republican People's Party

DBP The Democratic Party of Regions

DDKO The Revolutionary Cultural Associations of the East

DP The Democrat Party

DTK The Democratic Society Congress

DYP The True Path Party

EU European Union

HDP Peoples' Democratic Party

JCAG The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

KCK The Kurdistan Communities Union

KUK The Kurdistan National Liberationists

MGK The National Security Council

MHP The Nationalist Movement Party

MİT National Intelligence Agency

NGOs Non-government organizations

OHAL The State of the emergency

PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party

SHP The Social Democratic Populist Party

TBMM The Grand National Assembly of Turkey

TCP Turkish counterterrorism policy

TCPs Turkish counterterrorism policies

TİP The Turkish Labour Party

TKDP The Kurdistan Democrat Party of Turkey

TKSP The Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan

UN United Nations

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